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
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

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PROJECT #: 1-71

SUBJECT: ARNOLD-GREEN COLLECTION ORAL HISTORY

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Grant, Harold & Mrs 15 Oct 70

Grierson, John

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 28, 1970

Mrs. Lavinia Van Nostrand
241 Armistead Avenue
Hampton, VA 23511

Dear Mrs. Nostrand:

I am working on a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I interviewed L/Gen and Mrs. Harold Grant last week. Dorothy Grant served as Mrs. Arnold's PIO in her work for the Army Emergency Relief. Mrs. Grant mentioned that you also worked for Mrs. Arnold as her secretary.

As this biography is an attempt to recapture Gen Arnold, the whole man, not only as military leader, but as father and as husband, I am trying to give this story some depth to explain his relationship with his family.

If you have any recollections or anecdotes that would contribute to my story, I would be delighted to have them. For your convenience, a self-addressed envelope is enclosed. However, if you plan to come into the Washington area anytime soon, perhaps we could have lunch and an interview.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

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September 18, 1970

L/Gen Harold Grant, USAF(Ret)
2420 44th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007

Dear General Grant:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name coming up in several contexts, some having to do with communications or signal planning. In any event you probably have some memories of General Arnold, good or bad, and I'd like to have the opportunity to tlk with you about them. My Pentagon phone is OX-53862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
REsearch & Analysis Div.

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Interview, L/Gen and Mrs. Harold Grant, Washington, D.C., October 15, 1970.

Q: Do you remember your first exposure or encounter with Hap Arnold?

G: I don't remember when the first time was I met Hap Arnold, but I was stationed out at old Bolling Field from about 1937 up to the start of the war. Of course, Arnold and Westover used to fly out of Bolling. We maintained, as Ted Hill used to say, the royal stables out there. And along with Bill Hall and Lewis Parker and some others we did most of the VIP flying. This sort of mission is now handled by the special group out at Andrews. So I wouldn't know when I first knew him, but during that period I got to know him as a junior officer out at Bolling.

Q: Was Westover still the Chief of the Air Corps then, or did Arnold take over?

G: Arnold took over from Westover after Westover was killed.

Q: Yes, 1938. You are talking about the period after 1938?

G: Talking about the period before and after. I went to Bolling about 1937. That's it. As a matter of fact, we had two A-17-AS's, they called them. They were the A-17, but they had the bigger engine, the retracting gear, more fuel capacity, and they were pretty hot airplanes. Arnold flew one and Westover flew the other one. It was in this aircraft that Westover was killed out on the West Coast. All of us had many, many jobs in those days. In addition to being Base Communications Officer, I was Base Adjutant. Assistant Operations Officer, Assistant Engineering Officer, and Club Officer. So I used to get to fly this A-17-AS every now and then. It wasn't a very popular

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airplane to fly. I think I first came to know Arnold a little more personally, when shortly before the war started, he decided to form the Office of the Air Inspector. He wasn't happy with the Inspector General setup in the Army where they examined the morning reports, and all the paperwork of the organization. He wanted to know how his combat effectiveness stood, and things of that kind. So he conceived this idea, and he choose Ted Hill, who was our Commander there at Bolling to be the first Air Inspector. Ted immediately picked Bill Hall, who was Executive Officer at Bolling, and me, the Adjutant, and a Mr. Charlie Mahlon, who has since died--he went from an enlisted man through Brigadier General before his career was over--to come over and head up the office. Steiner was there as Technical Inspector. He had been out at Wright-Patt. And, gradually, other people were added. So when the war broke, Bill Hall and I were down in North Carolina the day of Pearl Harbor, and we flew back up. We immediately went to the office and, of course, the first few days everybody was in a state of shock.

Q: Where was Arnold on Pearl Harbor day? He was in California, wasn't he?

G: Well, I'm not sure. I know where he was on Pearl Harbor day. I know he was in Washington damn soon after. By the time we got back, he was here. At any rate, we got a little chit from him, or Ted Hill did, saying: "Where is my Air Force?" because we'd been having maneuvers, and things like that. Some of the bombing units from the West Coast were on the East Coast, and the Norden bombsights were locked up out on the West Coast. So Ted said: "Okay, we'll find out where your Air Force is. We'll use the Mississippi River as a dividing line. I'll go out to Wright-Patt and set up my office out

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there." Vandenberg was Operations chief in Washington at the time--"and I'll call Vandenberg every night, and he'll give me a report. Bill (Hall) you take everything east of the Mississippi; Hal (Grant) you take everything west of the Mississippi." So I got into an AT-6, and headed out in lousy weather to the Western part of the United States, and I got over near Tri-Cities and the canopy blew off. I finally made a let down in to there. I phoned Bolling for another airplane. They sent one, only it never got there. They couldn't find it until much later. They finally sent a third one over, and it arrived, and I took it and continued my mission. And, afterward, any field that would have any pieces of the Air Force. Of course, as we all know now in retrospect, things were pretty pathetic.

Q: In other words, you were taking inventory?

G: Taking inventory, west of the Mississippi. Spot check. Because there was no reporting system in those days. There was no way to tell where anybody was. People operated pretty independently, you see.

Q: Arnold was a great one for wanting statistics? How many do we have on hand:

G: Yes. What is their condition? He wanted to know whether it was combat-ready or not, and if they had their bombsights.

Q: Did a guy named Jim Powell get into this with you?

G: Jim Powell?

Q: He was involved in this figuring. He was in the Materiel area.

G: I think he was at Wright-Patt, probably he was working with Ted Hill.

Q: He was working with Benny Meyers.

G: He was at Wright-Patt. I knew Jim Powell. I first knew him

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at Scott Field. He was Lighter-Than-Air. This project lasted several weeks before we got all the statistics. I came back and shortly thereafter, I was sent over to the Signal Corps. Strangely enough, I was DPed, when that really meant, "By Direction of the President." Transferred! After the war, I had a hell of a time getting out of the Signal Corps back into the Air Corps and had to be picked up as a part of the new Air Force. I was in Office, Chief Signal Officer as the Air Force member, of the Joint Equipment Coordination Board. While there I did a paper on tri-phibious operations. We had a lot of stuff from the Army and the Marines on amphibious operations, and it seemed to me that you couldn't do an across-the-beach operation without airpower. The problem of coordination of frequencies, communications nets, etc., became very important. I did this little paper. I gave it one time to a Combined Group--British, Canadian, and others. There was a Captain Michael Hodges who was the Communications officer for Admiral Mountbatten. So he went back to England and told Mountbatten that he thought Mountbatten should ask Arnold for me and that I should be on his staff. At Quebec, Mountbatten asked Arnold for my services. Well, apparently, somehow or other this didn't get translated back and later, I believe it was at Casablanca, Mountbatten saw this and asked: "Where is this guy Grant?" He was going to send for me. They got off a message right away. By that time I was back in the Air Corps as Assistant Secretary in the Air Staff. Bill Hall was Secretary of the Air Staff. This is when Stratemeyer was Chief of Staff to Arnold. This message came in at noon saying: "Get going right away." There was a train up to New York at 4 o'clock and a plane leaving at 6 P.M. Dorothy went out and bought me some nylons and lighters. I

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packed my parachute bag and took off for New York, and ended up on Mountbatten's staff. Later, when Mountbatten was posted to SE Asia as Commander-in-Chief, he again asked Arnold if I could go with him. I was one of the few Americans who went from the old staff to SE Asia with Mountbatten. All during the period I was with Mountbatten, if anything unusual in the communications area came up, Mountbatten would always get in touch with Arnold, to get his permission to order me to do something else. I was sent up to China one time to look into the problems they were having with the B-29s up there--the communications problems. This was not directly Mountbatten's responsibility, but he was interested in winning the war in that area. It was Arnold's baby, too.

Q: B-29s were in the 20th Air Force. They were Arnold's command out of Washington.

G: So I spent quite a bit of time up there, trying to sort that one out.

Q: May I ask you to go back to the early part of the war when you worked with Ted Hill. Ted Hill conducted an inspection of Pan Am. Pan Am had this ADP program--the Airport Development Program--in South America, and the chain of islands going out to Africa. Did you work on that report?

G: No, that was after I left the Air Inspector. I might say this, to hark back. After I went to England and was with Mountbatten, we got into the development of this tri-phibious business, more and more. In fact, I went down to North Africa to work on the staff of Force 141, it was called in Algiers.

Q: What was the mission of Force 141?

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G: It was the planning staff in Algiers, the outskirts of Algiers, for the invasion of Sicily. A group captain and I went down and we wrote a little booklet that we called, "The Child's Guide to Tri-phibious Operations." It later became the manual in the British forces and in the American forces. I can't even remember the name of the manual now. It was to try to point up the fact that you had to do this thing right. This is when Patton comes in. Patton ignored all this stuff. He wanted more tanks. He got the hell shot out of him when he tried to make his landing there, because he didn't have any communications. Well, anyhow, I came back from that operation, and Mountbatten announced that he had been picked to be Supreme Commander in Southeast Asia, and he said he had asked Hap Arnold if I could go with him and Hap had said "yes." So Mountbatten said: "I want you to go back and design an airplane that we can use as a command post in tri-phibious operations." So I came back and designed, without a lot of R&D work, the "first talking bird." So Hap Arnold gave me a little chit again. He wasn't much for red tape. He wrote, "Give Colonel Grant anything he needs for this thing." I said, "I want a brand new C-47. I want a brand-new DC-610 Transmitter." I could pick up the receivers as designated. And we did some rough sketching with fitters and carpenters, and without too much thought about weights and balances, designed around station within an airplane with power supplies that you could lift out of the airplane, and plug in at the tail and plug in the rear end, so that all this stuff would operate off of a 110-volt system.

Q: Who at Wright-Patt was upset?

G: Oh, I can't remember. Various engineers, bases were disturbed.

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I had nothing but a little chit to order all these things, you see, and extend this materiel. But we finally finished it, and I picked a young chap who just recently retired, Jasper Vaughn, to be my copilot. He was a Texas boy who joined me at the "royal stables" at Bolling Field. He was one of the co-pilots and he and I flew this airplane across the South Pacific, overloaded. We went by way of Pan American fields in South America--which is the thing that made me think of it--and across to Ascension Island, and then over to the Gold Coast, and across the middle of Africa, Aden, and finally ended up in Karachi, and New Delhi. I got to Delhi, incidentally, just a few hours before Mountbatten was due in. They told me there, due in from the Cairo Conferences. And it was then that I waited till he got there. He said: "Come on by my quarters after awhile and I'm going to brief the staff on the results of the Cairo Conference." It was then that I learned that his sealift had been taken away from him in the Cairo Conference. It was all going to be applied to the European effort, and we weren't going to do this tri-phibious operation that I had dreamed up, and worked on, and built the airplane for, and I must say my first impression was: "Gee, what have I come out here to this God-forsaken place for nothing." I wished I had stayed in England where I had been offered a planning job in connection with the OVERLORD operation. And I had worked somewhat on OVERLORD with Mountbatten in the Combined Operations Headquarters.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Leigh Mallory?

G: Just a few. I knew him slightly.

Q: He was supposed to come out to join Mountbatten. He was killed on the way out.

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G: He was killed in the Pyrenees. Yes, I knew him slightly; didn't know him well.

Q: You were in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor. Do you remember the flap that ensued after the Chicago Tribune published part of RAINBOW FIVE? This was three days before Pearl Harbor?

G: I remember vaguely, yes, it was a flap.

Q: There was a flap, and an investigation. You were in the Air Inspector's Office at the time. Did your office get involved?

G: I don't think so. I think that was done more by the Intelligence side of the house rather than the Air Inspector.

Q: You remember any of the inspection problems that arose while you were there? Some of the things that Arnold thought were not going right? I guess almost everything was not going right.

G: This idea of the Air Inspector was so new that it took a lot of people quite a bit of time to get used to it. But Arnold was probing everything. He was particularly interested in whether his units were combat-ready; whether they had all the equipment they were supposed to have; whether they were using it right; whether the training was being conducted properly. Most of the officers--squadron commanders, group commanders, were so oriented, being Army-raised, as we all were, to being sure that you had your Morning Report in top shape before the Inspector General got there--and he always warned you when he was coming, you know--so you had plenty of warning, and most of the old timers, clerks and Sergeants, and whatnot, could quote the Army Regulations forward and backward to you. Arnold was against all that.

Q: It was a spit-and-polish type of approach.

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G: He said, "That doesn't mean a thing to me." So he was just the antithesis of that approach. He could care less about whether you balanced the books at the last penny. He wanted to know whether...

Q: Planes could fly?

G: Whether all this equipment was being properly used; the people properly trained. A whole new concept.

Q: He had nearly an obsession. When he'd fly into a base and see planes parked on the field, he'd get all excited. He wanted to know what those planes were doing there--why weren't they in combat or in training or in some capacity to which they had been assigned. Did you get involved in his concern over that?

G: Yes, I can't say it just like he said it, but he maintained that an airplane wasn't performing its mission if it wasn't in the air; that every minute it spent on the ground vs the time it spent in the air was wasted time. He allowed a certain amount of time for maintenance, and whatnot, but that had to be charted out against flying time. Of course, we had come through a period where funds were short, where flying time was equated to dollars, and therefore when money became available again, or about to descend on us, he wanted to see those airplanes flown. He wanted that money used in making the best use of the flying machines. I can remember when, before Marshall came in as the Chief of Staff--Malin Craig was Chief of Staff-and Arnold was trying to get the B-17s, you remember, trying to get the Air Force built up. This was when Andrews was down at Langley. The President asked Malin Craig, how many airplanes he needed to fight the war, if we got in the war. And Craig said: "Mr. President, I can't possibly conceive of us ever needing over 500 airplanes." Five hundred would be the most we'd ever use. The Army just doesn't

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have that requirement for airplanes."

Q: Did you hear him say this?

G: No, but this is reported in some conversations that Arnold had. Arnold, of course, hit the ceiling in conversations with the President. Well, after this, the President, in effect, fired Craig and put Marshall in. Marshall was flying out of Bolling at that time as a Brigadier General. Louis Parker and I used to fly him most of the time.

Q: He hadn't yet taken over?

G: He hadn't taken over. But he took over from Craig and that's when Arnold proceeded to get most of his autonomy, and the President said: "Look, let's get started on a 5,000-plane Air Force.

Q: I can pin this in time. The latter part of 1938, November 1938. This is right after Munich. Craig was still Chief of Staff. Arnold had just about taken over, but Craig's time was coming to an end in 1939.

G: A little bit before that, I believe.

Q: Well, Craig was still Chief of Staff but Marshall was designated.

G: That's right.

Q: Marshall was earmarked to be the next Chief of Staff.

G: That's right.

Q: And I know he did a lot of flying around, and this was really his first contact with airplanes.

G: You know, Louis Parker and I flew him around, and at that time the Army uniform, with a Sam Browne belt and a black tie, and a bunch of other stuff. We wore a blouse with a cloth belt sewed on. We wore a tan tie. Nobody else in the Air Corps wore them. We just wore

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them at Bolling Field, and Marshall flew with us a couple of times, and he said: "You know, you all have got a smart uniform." He had a cloth belt sewed on his blouse; he put on a tan tie and that became the Army's uniform for the war.

Q: Marshall was a stickler for proper appearance.

G: Yes. But on the other hand, he was a very informal, kind of person. He used to come up and sit between the two seats when Louis and I were flying. He loved to help navigate, and he became air-conscious. He hadn't been before that.

Q: Right. I talked to Louis Parker in Shalimar, Florida, a few months ago. He mentioned that Hap Arnold was very concerned about the time of Pearl Harbor where his airplanes were, and how many he had ready to go. Arnold was a great figure filbert. He wanted to know quickly how many planes. Of course, he was being pressured above him by Marshall and President Roosevelt. "How many planes do we have? Here? There? The other Place?" One of the people he came to rely on was Benny Meyers. Benny Meyers was great with statistics. Did you have any knowledge of or association with that Project?

G: Well, I had very little to do with Benny Meyers, but I did know that he was the head man out at Wright-Patt at the time. Of course, he was very close to Ted Hill, and Ted was our coordinator on these figures we compiled in the first few days. What we would do is call in each evening. I'd call from wherever I was, and Hill would call from where he was. We'd recap what we had seen and counted that day in the way of units, airplanes and pilots. I don't know whether he cut Meyers in on it every time. I suspect he did, but at any rate, he kept a scoreboard and he would pull all that together, and he would call Vandenberg each evening, and tell Vandenberg what

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the score was, and Van would bring the report to Arnold.

Q: Were there two sets of books at this time? One set for public relations purposes; the other set showing actually "on-hand" and "ready-to-go?"

G: I don't think that there was much public relations material let out at that time.

Q: "Public relations" in the sense of figures given to Arnold and the President. I've been told that this is one of the reasons that Jim Powell got in trouble. He was keeping track of how many planes were combat-ready, on-hand, and ready to go. This figure was not satisfactory to Arnold. And he had another figure that Arnold passed on to the President. I use this in the sense of "public relations." This was not the actual figure that General Spaatz--who was then Chief of Staff, to Arnold--was using as a basis for decisions. On one occasion, I was told, that the other set, the more modest set of figures, got out, and was used by Senator Harry Byrd in a situation, with the result that Jim Powell got fired out of his job. You remember anything along that line?

G: No, I don't. In fact, it would surprise me if anybody tried to pull the wool over Arnold's eyes on something of that kind. It really would.

Q: Was he very perceptive?

G: He was quite perceptive. He'd be a hard man to fool.

Q: Did he want to be fooled? You know, this is early in the game.

G: No. I just don't think so.

Q: We needed every shred of good news we could latch onto.

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G: That's right, but I think the very fact that he set up this Air Inspector thing, and the very fact that we were sent out was because he wanted to know the absolute truth. He wanted to know really where he stood.

Q: And were these the figures he gave the President, as far as you know?

G: I don't know. He may have played that game any number of ways. I wouldn't know about it. But I know that, I feel sure that the figures we phoned in to Ted Hill, and Lord knows, we didn't try to pad them. We just told them like we saw them. I feel sure that those were the figures that got to Washington.

Q: Well, Benny Meyers achieved a very good rapport with Arnold because he was a quick man with statistics, and I understand that Benny Meyers was not averse to counting on-hand or ready-to-go planes that were somewhere on the assembly line.

G: This wouldn't surprise me.

Q: Did you have any contact with him at all?

G: Very slight.

Q: Why did Arnold have such high regard for Meyers? Do you know?

G: Well, he was a very aggressive person who always came up with the right answer--like that, you see. He came up with an answer, right or not. Arnold had no way of checking. He had an answer right away and then Arnold would use them.

Q: If he was counting numbers off the tail section of planes not quite ready, wouldn't this catch up to him sometime or other?

G: I suspect it probably did.

Q: Actually, it did not during the war. It wasn't until that

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Congressional committee exposed Meyers that Arnold was disillusioned and shocked. He came into Washington a sick man and testified against Benny Meyers. Arnold's appreciation of Benny Meyers is reflected in his bypassing Oliver Echols on many situations. Going right to the No. 2 man. Did you know about this? Did you give any thought to that?

G: I haven't given any thought to it. I know it was as you now remind me of it.

Q: Was this true?

G: I think this was very true.

Q: Oliver Echols was a courtly, soft-spoken Southerner.

Q: A courtly man.

G: Yes, when Arnold needed these figures for higher-ups, he needed them fast, and he needed some quick statistics, and he went to Meyers.

Q: I think this was a characteristic of Arnold's. When he wanted what he considered to be the straight dope, he'd go right to the source. Well, sometimes he would retrace his steps and let nobody know on the chain what he'd done, but there were times when he wouldn't or didn't.

Q: Well, then, did Meyers anticipate that Arnold wanted a generous figure that he could give the President? In other words, did he try to anticipate Arnold's need, and pad the figures in order to please his superior?

G: This may have happened, and I wouldn't know about it. I just had the feeling that during those first few weeks when Pearl Harbor had just occurred, and we were out counting them, that the figures

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were going from Ted Hill, to Vandenberg, to Arnold, and that Meyers was a part of this, but not in the chain. And later on, when Ted came back to Washington, and the office grew and so forth, Arnold then may have relied upon Meyers after production got started, to give him the figures. So it could have been different then.

Q: I have been told by several people that Arnold wanted to be fooled, and when Meyers came in with these inflated figures that showed progress from the last status report, progress which was not a fact, but part of Meyers' ability to bounce figures around, that Arnold accepted these, perhaps because he wanted to accept them.

G: It could be.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold mad?

G: Yes.

Q: Did he get angry at you ever?

G: No, not at me. I'm just trying to think of a specific case. Of course, Arnold had a great admiration for people who had some scientific background, and he very often would believe, as we used to say, somebody in a "brown derby" before he'd believe somebody in a uniform, if there was a difference of opinion.

Q: Brown derby?

G: Meaning a civilian type, or scientist. So that a Ph.D. meant more than a couple of stars to Arnold, in many cases. I can't remember who it was, but there was a difference of opinion one time when I was on the Air Staff, on the Secretariat, where he got mad at some General Officer who differed with one of his scientific advisors. His mad, as I recall stories, was short-lived. It was a flash, and it was over. As you've pointed out earlier, if he'd fired somebody, he did it. Whether he was ever sorry later or not, no

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one ever knew.

Q: He never said he was sorry?

G: No.

Q: He just went on to the next problem? Did you know anything of his relationship with von Karman? This is one of the scientists I think he had a very high regard for.

G: Yes, he had a very high regard for him. I don't know how much about his relationship with von Karman.

Q: Vannevar Bush and some of the others. Did you feel that this regard for the Ph.D., or the so-called "eggheads" was exaggerated on his part? Was it undue credence given to their opinion?

G: Yes, I do.

Q: Arnold himself was a great gadgeteer, and he had a lot of dealings with Grandison Gardner who was down at the Proving Grounds.

G: I worked for Grandison Gardner. I met him quite a while before the war. I was Executive Director of the Joint Air Defense Board out at Colorado Springs. I had a high regard for Grandison Gardner.

Q: Arnold was bugging him all the time about things like torpedoes--aerial torpedoes, glide bombs. Did you know about some of this interest in this?

G: Yes. In fact, when I went through communications school, a classmate of mine was named George Holloman. George and I lived together and became fast friends, and over the years, George went from there to Wright-Patt and stayed there until the war was over. I'd run into mutual friends and they'd say: "Have you seen George Holloman lately?" I'd say: "Two weeks ago." They'd say: "You

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know what that crazy bastard is doing now?" And they'd tell me about the glide bomb, or some other thing the was working on, blind landing system... After the war started, and some of these things were big and used, Arnold was giving him the needle to come up with more ideas. I'd run into these same friends, and they'd say: "Have you seen that smart son of a bitch, George Holloman lately? Guess what he's come up with now." George worked a lot of those projects for Arnold. I've had this RAZON-TARZON, whatnot, series.

Q: AZON, RAZON, TARZON?

G: These were projects that Holloman was working on.

Q: Also, the JB-2. This was our version of the V-1. Arnold had dreams of plastering Germany with the V-1 bomb, but they never came to fruition, partly, I think, because Arnold got sick, and the war was ending and the British were afraid of reprisals with the V-a; so the project died.

Q: I'm asking about aerial torpedoes and Arnold's attempt to get some from the Navy.

G: As we started the war, as you know, there were some pretty rigid rules about what the Air Corps could do, and what the Navy would do. We were not supposed to fly, I think, over 500 miles to sea, and things of that kind. The Navy felt very strongly about certain weapons that they had that they felt that, since they had developed them, had to be used by Navy aircraft for Naval purposes. Arnold disagreed. He was looking for any good weapon that could be used by his Air Corps, or his Army Air Forces against any sort of target.

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Q: Right. I think the experience at Pearl Harbor--experience of the British losing the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to Japanese torpedoes dropped by airplanes, I think this changed Arnold's conception of that idea.

G: Well, I don't know that it changed Arnold's conception. I think it changed a lot of other people's conception.

Q: You're right. I didn't phrase that correctly. It sort of motivated Arnold to try to latch on to aerial torpedoes as Air Force weapons.

G: He didn't believe in this very close demarcation of weapons and areas of conflict. An airplane was an airplane whether it took off of a landing field or off of a carrier.

Q: Well, this went back to the early 1930s, the concept of "paramount interest." The Navy controlled all flights over water and the Army controlled all flights over land. This is the so-called Pratt-MacArthur Agreement of 1931. This carried over and led to the restriction of Air Corps planes flight out to sea. That happened in the late 1930s.

Q: Did he get involved in any of that?

G: Yes. I was in Hawaii in 1932 through '34. We used to practice every year the repulsion of the Japanese fleet. The scenario was that they would come in behind a cold front in bad weather from the Northwest, and would launch their aircraft at sea and come in and bomb Pearl Harbor. We practiced that every year and, as far as I know, it was practiced a long time after I left there, and that's exactly how it happened on Pearl Harbor day, behind a cold front. The Navy would go out to the vanguard. The carriers against the Japs

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as part of the maneuver. The Air Corps was prohibited from going over 100 miles at sea at that time, but almost invariably we could find the enemy carriers. And this would create quite a bit of turmoil in the critiques afterwards. We weren't supposed to do that. But it's rather startling, the fact that way back then, they had it figured out how it could best happen, and that's exactly the way it was done.

Q: In fact, there was a plan prepared by Fred Martin's staff, several months before Pearl Harbor.

G: All the airmen in Hawaii felt that airpower was not being properly applied. My boss, when I was out there, was Jerry Brant. I don't know whether you heard--

Q: Yes, I've heard of him.

G: And I remember when Jerry was leaving to come back to the States. We had a formation at old Cook Field which was there on Ford Island, and he said: "Gentlemen, you all have Air Corps, U.S. Army on your social cards now," you know, calling cards. He said, "I won't live to see the day, but many of you here will live to see the day when you'll have U.S. Air Force on those cards." He was always in a harangue with the Army staff, because he was a part of it as an Army officer at Fort Shafter, and of course, invariably with the Navy over the role of airpower in the defense of Hawaii. So such a plan as you mentioned could very well have been written any time from 1932 on.

Q: Arnold, when he came to work under Marshall, did not push for a separate Air Force. He was willing to wait for a legal separation from the Army after the war ended. Some other airmen were not so

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patient as Arnold. Did you know about any of this? Was Jerry Brant one of the "firebrands" who were pushing hard?

G: As far as I know, Jerry Brant wasn't pushing for it. Of course, he was mixed up with the GHQ Air Force at that time, was with Andrews. But I can't say for sure, but I don't think he would have been one to push for it while the war was still on.

Q: I was told that Andrews when he was of GHQ Air Force (we're talking of the period '36 through '39 when he went down to San Antonio), was much more forceful in supporting a larger B-17 program than Arnold was. Arnold was then Assistant Chief to Westover, and Arnold, of course, was within the organization. He had become an organization man, so to speak. Andrews was pushing harder for a long-range bomber program than Arnold was during this period. Do you have any knowledge of this?

G: No, I don't have any specific knowledge, but I'm not surprised.

Q: Is it in accord with your general recollections?

G: Yes, I think so. I know that once the GHQ Air Force was established as a pretty autonomous outfit, you see, there was an awful lot of--this was in the early days of LeMay, too, you know--there was an awful lot of fire and enthusiasm for building that force up into what amounts to a separate Air Force.

Q: Were you in Washington in 1938 when LeMay, among others, in this small group of B-17s, went out to sea 700 miles and spotted the REX?

G: Yes, yes, I remember that.

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Interview Lt General & Mrs. Harold Grant, Washington, D.C.,
October 15, 1970 (Part II)

Q: We're talking about the Rex incident. George Goddard took those pictures, you know, that appeared in the New York Herald-Tribune the following day after the sighting. And there were a number of officials in the Army and Navy who were very exercised about this violation of unwritten law by the Air Corps, with the result that they were henceforth restricted to 100 miles offshore. Are you aware that there was such an order? Or, was there an order?

G: I don't think there was an order, but I know that there was considerable concern on the part of the Army and Navy that the Air Corps had done this. Because there had been this agreement that the Air Corps would not go to sea more than, though it was 500 miles, maybe it was 100 miles.

Q: Well, there were different figures. There was 300 miles, 500 miles.

G: I think it varied from time to time. But I don't think it has ever been a published order. I think it was sort of an understanding among the leaders of the forces.

Q: Well, Gen Eaker mentioned something along this line. He said there never was an order that you could put your finger on. Whoever issued it was careful not to put it in writing, so he couldn't get jumped on. You were talking about your problems getting George Patton to appreciate the need for better communications with the Air Force, and some of the problems he had in Sicily. And you mentioned this Communications Board that you were associated with, at Benning. Was this before the war?

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G: Before the war, before we got in the war, yes. This was during the preparation days when we knew that something was imminent, and there was considerable buildup going on. I was on the Equipment Coordination Board here in Washington. That was a Joint Board of Army, Navy, Army Air Corps. However, the Air Corps--I was the Air Corps member--sat in equality with the Armored Force, the Infantry, the Signal Corps, and all the other branches, although we were buying more communications equipment than all the rest of them put together at that time. And, of course, the board was primarily there for standardization purposes. But, being the junior member and the only Air Corps member, coordination wasn't always possible, and standardization wasn't always possible. So the Air Corps would go ahead and buy what it needed regardless of the coordination Board. At the time I went down to Benning to work on the problem that was plaguing General Patton...

Q: Was this about '40 or '41?

G: About '40, yes, roughly. It was found that the new sets for the tanks and the sets that were in the Air Corps aircraft wouldn't mesh. They couldn't talk to each other.

Q: Whose fault was this?

G: Well, it was the fault of the system at the time. The Air Corps went off on its own, developing what it needed with little regard to what the Army was doing, and there was an awful lot of that which was uncovered.

Q: Wasn't this board supposed to prevent that?

G: Supposed to, but I think it got into the act too late. It should have been in a long time before. At any rate, the solution that we arrived at was to put Air Corps sets in the tanks, and then they could mesh. He was happy with it. But he never did, I felt,

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really understand the nature of command control. I know once on a maneuver down in the desert, in the western part of the United States, when they had a big tank maneuver, Patton had a new combat commander's car with a radio in it, and he was very intrigued with it as a new toy. And the usual division of forces. There was the Red force and the Blue force, and he was commanding the Blue force. So he picked up his handset and pushed the "TALK" on the handset to talk to his commander of the Blue forces out in front. And he whispered into the set, and of course, the commander had to come back and he looked around first to see if anyone was listening, and he whispered in the set, and of course, the man he was talking to couldn't hear him, so he had to repeat it several times, each time whispering. Well, the commander of the Red forces, I don't remember who it was now, knew enough about communications to have somebody monitoring the frequency that was on. Of course, it was reading his mail. But this was typical of his lack of understanding of communications.

Q: Was there some lack of understanding in the Air Corps of the needs of the ground forces? I think of Lesley McNair who became head of the AGF. Arnold was AAF. Somervell was ASF and Lesley McNair was AGF. McNair complained from time to time that the Air Corps was not giving enough attention to ground close air support of the ground forces, that it was too much interested in strategic bombing and high-flying enterprises, and not enough concerned with supporting the boys on the ground. Did you get into any of this in the communications-signal area?

G: Yes, and I think that this has been an allegation in many areas, not just in Signals, but in many areas. This business of not being responsive to the requirements of ground forces, and like all

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these inter-service arguments, there are two sides to it. I think, sometimes, the requirements that the ground forces levy on the Air Force are unrealistic. At other times, they are very legitimate, and are ignored by the Air Force, or the Air Corps, in those days. But it wasn't just in Communications that this problem existed. It was in many, many other areas.

Q: I was just looking at your biography. You mentioned that Mrs. Grant worked for Mrs. Arnold in the Army Emergency Relief. Do you have any recollections of that aspect?

G: Yes. All during the war she worked on volunteer work. She was very close to Mrs. Arnold, Mrs. Spaatz and the others who were working on these various projects at that time. And there were so many requirements, that Mrs. Arnold recognized that weren't being answered by the customary services--the Red Cross and others--that they got into this business of Emergency relief--people who'd lost their husbands, fathers, whatnot, and had no money. They got into a locator business. I remember Mrs. Arnold starting that. A man would go overseas. His wife would take off somewhere, they couldn't find her. There was no place where she could register. So they started this locator business, and used all the various stations of the Air Corps to try and find people and get them on a register so that if a man was killed, or if there was some reason to notify the next of kin, they could find the person.

Q: Do you have any recollection of any anecdotes? Stories involving Mrs. Arnold?

G: Well, I wish you'd gotten Mrs. Grant to tell you about it, because I've heard her tell many of them. She's extremely fond of Mrs. Arnold.

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Q: Is she gone?

G: Yes, she runs a riding stables over in Rock Creek Park. That's where she's gone. She has a thing with horses. She's got a tremendous fund of stories. Mrs. Streett, Bill Streett's wife, was a close friend of hers. I saw her the other day at Bill's funeral. She worked at the same time, and through Spaatz--Ruth could probably tell you a lot of things about the Arnold's, Mrs. Arnold's background.

Q: Ruth Eaker, I mean.

Q: We're talking about Arnold's smiling face?

G: I don't classify him as a man with a keen sense of humor. He was pleasant, enjoyed being pleasant to people but I don't ever recall any examples of his sense of humor.

Q: This smile on his face--did it mean that he was pleased?

G: Not necessarily.

Q: Or was it just sort of a cover or facade to mask his real thoughts?

G: I don't think that it necessarily meant either. I think that he was just accustomed to wearing a smile.

Q: Did you see him on a frequent basis during your stay in the Air Staff?

G: Occasionally, maybe several times a day but not always intimately, not always face to face, sometimes in a group.

Q: Did you have to get through? I guess Spaatz was Chief of Staff, and then Harmon took over.

G: At the time I was there....

Q: Stratemeyer.

G: Stratemeyer--this was '42 and '43.

Q: What sort of guy was he?

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G: Wonderful guy. I later served in Southeast Asia, you see.

Q: Stratemeyer was there?

G: At the time he'd gone out there, he was Mountbatten's airman. So I had occasion to see him quite frequently Matter of fact, Mrs. Stratemeyer used to send things out to "Strat." She told my wife that she had a thing all worked out for getting things to Stratemeyer. He liked her home-made barbecue sauce. She sent out gallon jugs. So my wife used the same system to get presents out to me. She used to give them to Mrs. George, who gave them to Harold George, who ran the Ferry Command. He'd send them out on a VIP plane that was coming out that way. The pilots would have to get a receipt from either Stratemeyer or me that we'd gotten the material, and take it back to George. Otherwise, the stuff would be offloaded some place, or swiped.

Q: Do you have any recollection of Arnold's relationship with Bill Streett?

G: Well, as I recall, Bill Streett ran the Continental Air Force for Hap Arnold. It was in effect sort of the prototype, at first, for the post-war Air Force. In fact, a lot of our work was planning and designing what the structure of the post-war Air Force would look like.

Q: Arnold hadn't begun to think about a separate Air Force in this period?

G: That's right, and he used this staff and used this group out at Bolling Field whwere we were originally, to test it and more or less draft out the structure that the Air Force would have.

Q: Did he use Bill Streett as a trouble-shooter?

G: No, I don't think necessarily so. I think that he just by virtue of that position became a trouble shooter on all of these

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post-war Air Force problems.

Q: Well, Arnold gave him several jobs. You know, he never stayed in one job very long. He put him in the Second Air Force for a while, when Davenport Johnson got in trouble.

G: Yes.

Q: And then later on he sent him out to the Pacific in the 13th Air Force.

G: Yes, I remember that now.

Q: The situation got very sticky because Kenney had his own candidate. And then he came back and he got this Continental Air Command which, as you say, was to be a sort of nucleus, a prototype for a post-war Air Force. So Bill Streett did get associated with any major command for any length of time that he could be identified with.

G: Well, in that sense, yes, he was a trouble shooter, because that's why he was picked to set up this prototype Air Force.

Q: Arnold had a lot of confidence in him. There was also the fact that the two families were very close.

G: I think everybody had a lot of confidence in Bill Streett. He was a person who inspired your confidence.

Q: Did you have any involvement with the MAGIC business, you know, breaking the Jap code?

G: No.

Q: Did you know about it?

G: No, I didn't know about it until afterwards.

Q: After Pearl Harbor? Were you in Communications in '42, weren't you?

G: Yes.

Q: Did you know about Midway?

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G: No. I was not directly involved in the Communications Intelligence Area. I was cleared for communications/intelligence sometimes, but I wasn't involved in it.

G: I think Arnold had a high regard for the RAF.

Q: But not in Southeast Asia; in Britain.

G: Well, of course, the air effort in Southeast Asia as far as the British were concerned was a pretty low key effort because they sent some but the forces out there--the British themselves didn't put the forces out there.

Q: Well, Arnold didn't have a high regard for Air Marshal Peirse. Remember Peirse?

G: Yes.

Q: He recently died. They were supposed to mount an offensive in Burma and they kept delaying activity and they wanted overwhelming airpower to conduct a minor type of operation. They also wanted to catch on to the B-29s. Were you familiar with it?

G: I wasn't familiar with it. I was not surprised. Mountbatten when he got out there had all his seamen taken away from him as I mentioned earlier. At the Cairo Conference. His resources were pretty slim, and the rest of the world looked on that as a secondary theater. So he tried to latch on to anything he could get his hands on.

Q: Nonetheless, Arnold and others in Washington didn't think the British were very aggressive in Southeast Asia. You were aware of this attitude?

G: Yes. I think we all had that feeling.

Q: We're talking to Mrs. Grant now about her work with Mrs. Arnold on the Army Emergency Relief.

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Mrs. G: Well, Mrs. Arnold, of course, dreamed up the plan for the Air Force alone and the Army took it over, when she had done the preliminary work. You know all of that. But the fact that I lived in South Arlington near Ft. Myer, an example of her thoughtfulness was that she always called me. I worked in her office only two days a week and did the rest of the work at home. But she would always call me when a plane was going to Southeast Asia. And it wasn't until after the war that she asked me how the things got to Hal unbroken. She said every bit of bourbon she sent Bruce got broken en route -- or to her husband. And I said my husband came home and didn't have any golf socks left, because I packed every bar in a golf sock, and sent the party things over there. The best thing Mrs. Arnold did in the war was to get the women in Washington organized and working. She immediately disbanded the Air Force Wives Club as a social organization. It went into completely volunteer work, highly organized, in groups, and we held just one annual meeting a year. I was Secretary when the war started. Ethel Kuter was Treasurer, and Mrs. Arnold was President. Ethel stayed on untilafter her husband left Washington and it left me as permanent secretary. So Mrs. Arnold and I were together working out the work of the club. In addition to, she did that as a sideline to all of her work with the Air Force Aid Society organizing the women and the work. Her secretary at that time was Lavinia Van Nostrand. She knows a great deal about it.

Q: Is she in town?

Mrs. G: She's not in town, but I have her address. I'll give to you on the phone .

Q: Where does she live?

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Mrs. G. She lives in Norfolk and she's a fund of information. She was very closely--I was Mrs. Arnold's unofficial secretary and Lavinia was her official secretary, her paid secretary. I did the public relations, I wrote the press releases, and worked with her. A name has escaped me. The marvelous doctor that started the rehabilitation program.

Q: Dr. Rusk. I saw him in New York recently.

Mrs. G: Howard Rusk. She worked very closely with him on that, and I did the publicity under her direction for her approval with Howard Rusk on the rehabilitation training.

Q: Do you remember some of that? She brought in to see Mrs. Roosevelt?

Mrs. G: Yes.

Q: On this prosthetics program. Apparently the whole thing had bogged down under the old Army way of doing it.

Mrs. G: Completely bogged down. Mrs. Arnold was vital in the formation of this thing.

Q: Right, and I guess General Kirk was the Army Surgeon General, and I guess the Army had been doing things the things the traditional way, and Rusk was upsetting this whole apple cart, like trying to. I had a marvelous session with him. You know, he's head of the rehabilitation center in New York.

Mrs. G: Yes, I know it.

Q: His talk was inspiring...

Mrs. G: What he has done is superb. Mrs. Arnold worked very closely with Miss Harmon on the West Coast on this program, and we did numerous fund raising things here which indirectly helped the program.

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She had a great sense of the future, anticipating the needs of people. This was long before any officers' wives flew in planes and I hated to turn down a trip to the West Coast but I was afraid to go and leave the children alone. She wanted me to go out and work with the race-track people.

Q: Were you involved in that?

Mrs. G: Yes, in California, under Miss Harmon, in getting the percentage of one per day. Because I have worked in various fund raising things here.

Q: There was a lot of static on that one. After this race track, I think it was at Santa Ana.

Mrs. G: Yes.

Q: And they wanted the planes to fly over and then this got the Air Force involved, whether they should fly official planes over a race track to boost the "gate."

Mrs. G: The thing they wanted me to work on was getting a percentage of the "gate" per day for this program.

Q: That caused some repercussions.

Mrs. G: Yes, it did. On the East Coast, any of things that were done were not quite that spectacular.

Q: Do you remember the occasion when the RAF invited Mrs. Arnold to go there and inspect their auxiliary setup?

Mrs. G: I do vaguely. I'm not very clear on it.

Q: She wanted to go, and Gen Eaker who by then had acceeded to the job as Deputy Commander of the Air Force, wouldn't let her go. Do you remember that?

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Mrs. G: Yes, I do now. A pity. She formed an Air Force Officers Wives Association worldwide. The dream was to have it work into something like Navy Relief. I was the only Colonel's wife on the board. The rest were all Generals. And I fought to the end--fought bitterly, to have it become a part of the Air Force Aid Society or Air Force Association (Auxiliary), and I lost. Mrs. Arnold: Yes, an auxiliary because--this was open not only to officers' wives and airmens' wives and noncommissioned officers' wives, but to all sisters, all friends of the Air Force. Terrific money-making possibilities! The thing failed, and as it failed Mrs. Arnold called me in and said, "Dorothy, bury it. You were right." By that time Mrs. Spaatz was sitting in Mrs. Arnold's seat. But that folded; it was a pity. I still have copies of the bulletins we put out somewhere. We put out a monthly little 2,000 or 3,000-word folder, and we had a tremendous membership. She had the right idea there, but unfortunately the Board--they wished it to remain autonomous. They didn't wish to become an auxiliary. If they had, the Air Force Association would be in better shape right now. They would really have been in better shape, if this has gone through.

Q: Did you get involved -- she was very interested in Moss Hart's work. Moss Hart, the playwright, and General and Mrs. Arnold went out to his farm in Bucks County.

Mrs. G: No, I didn't get involved in that.

Q: And she was sponsoring "Winged Victory." That was his play. Did you get involved in any of the publicity?

Mrs. G: No, I didn't get involved in that publicity. I did the publicity on the rehabilitation training program.

Q: Up at Pawling, New York.

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Mrs. G: Yes. When my husband came home after the war he was so annoyed at being greeted by the rehabilitation people in New York; all he needed was to get home. I said: "Oh no you don't. I've written thousands of words on this program and I want to see it myself. If you don't need rehabilitating, I do." So we went to Florida and saw it in action. It was a wonderful program. I dragged him down there for 10 days.

Q: I guess the Air Force program became the bellwether of the whole military program?

Mrs. G: Completely.

Q: And that was partly due to Mrs. Arnold's intervention?

Mrs. G: Yes, and her direct work with Dr. Rusk.

Q: Did he ever tell you--I'll tell you what I know (story of how Dr. Rusk got started).

Mrs. G: When the first casualties started coming into the Washington area from the war, there were a lot of widows who didn't know they were widows. You were living in a Washington apartment alone, or, if you had a couple of children, you take them with you, go to visit somebody. Nobody can find you. Mrs. Arnold's file of wives in the Washington area was in my custody as Secretary of the club. And I started getting calls from the Pentagon on this file, and would look in it, and find I had more information at Mrs. Arnold's direction than they did. So she dreamed up the idea of having not just a file on the wife, but many people don't have parents living so they had no permanent address. To list always two friends who will know where that person is, and that went into effect, worldwide, throughout the Air Force, done by the Officers' Wives Club throughout the Air Force, because it's too much detail work for the Pentagon, but it's still in operation. And there were many women that we

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tracked down through her file. I kept it at my house and we were in constant discussion with it. And then, later, the Pentagon asked me to come over and bring this file, and go through all the Pentagon cards of the Air Force. So I went over with a couple of bookkeeper types, and we went through the files, and placed them all. Made it possible not only to notify them of death, but what about injury and other emergencies. This was her idea and it has worked to this day.

Q: Do you remember when General Arnold had his major heart attack in 1945:

Mrs. G: Yes.

Q: They took him down to Coral Gables shortly after he suffered this attack and he was there about three months. Mrs. Arnold had some trouble with the doctor, Marquardt. Dr. Gilbert Marquardt, the heart specialist.

Mrs. G: No, I don't remember him.

Q: One of the relationships Arnold had during the war was with Louis Marx, who wanted to be identified with greatness. Whenever Arnold or Marshall or some of the high brass came up to New York he had theater tickets for them. Just sort of courtesies that he extended to them, and the relationship between Arnold and Marx became very close. Marx around Christmas time used to send cartons of toys.

Mrs. G: Large cartons of toys.

Q: And what did Arnold do with these toys? Distribute them?

Mrs. G: They were given to the children at usually at the NCO clubs and Airmens' clubs. I know at that time I was looking for a secondhand electric train, because you couldn't buy new ones. They just weren't available. Mrs. Arnold called me one night and asked

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if I had found one and I said, "no," and she said "quit looking, Hap brought one down for Mile." He was just the right age. That train, after three children outgrew it, went on to another Airman's son.

Q: Would it be fair to say that no personal detail of her staff...

Mrs. G: No personal--

Q: --was overlooked. They had, both of them, a feeling for people.

Mrs. G: Yes. The Arnolds had a complete feeling for people. Mrs. Arnold in this Army Emergency Relief had a vast correspondence coming directly into the downtown office. Her secretary was busy on the more difficult things, but many of the letters--she would hand me files of letters that I could answer personally. Every letter that came in there was answered personally.

Q: What did you say her secretary's name was?

Mrs. G: Lavinia Van Nostrand. But letters came in--I remember one from the Virgin Islands, from a poor little girl saying: "I'm from the Virgin Islands, but I am not." She was trying to track down the father of her baby. But all of these letters, there were files of them from all over the world, and they were personally answered. Mrs. Van Nostrand could tell you a great deal about that organization. Mrs. Arnold also worked in staging war bond shows through this thing. I remember one night we had Ben(Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney) auctioning off the Stars and Bars at the end of a program. It went for $50,000 I think to an opera singer. Mrs. Arnold was misunderstood by the press in Washington in the early days of the war. And she'd never had a press conference. As a former city editor and a former newspaper woman, I told her it was vital that she have a press conference. If these women knew the hours she worked without salary,

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they would understand why she didn't always have time to see them. She finally agreed and we put out invitations for a press conference. As you know, Mrs. Arnold is shy, sometimes. After she gets talking it's all right, but she has periods of nervousness. And I told her there'd probably be about 20 people. This was for the women of the press. And a great many more showed up, and I think she was ready to kill me, for a few minutes, until it got started. I did the introductions. I talked first, and explained her actual working hours in addition to her overtime with the calls at night. That she was doing a full-time war effort and didn't have time to be interviewed by 20 or 30 different people at the time of their convenience. And I identified myself as a former newspaper-woman. And I said it was Mrs. Arnold's pleasure to meet with them at her request. In the future, that if they had special questions or special things they wanted information on, if they'd contact me direct, either by mail or by telephone, then she would answer the questions, and send them the material. And they were all perfectly happy about it. From then on, her press in Washington was very good. And she used to call me sometimes and say: "Dorothy, I really like what I said today." Because sometimes she copyread--proofread what I had written and sometimes she didn't, if it was just something like a casual statement of something on the Red Cross or a drive.

Q: Did you write the speeches for her?

Mrs. G: For the Woman's Club, yes, that kind of thing. And a lot of people got annoyed with me because Mrs. Arnold used me as a cover-up. You know, when she first stood up before a group, she was nervous. So she would cover it by turning to me. I was sitting beside her, and say: "Dorothy what was that figure? Would you read it. You have it right there." And she knew it just like that. But it gave her a moment.

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I could see it because I was sitting next to her and her knees would be knocking under the table. But I did speeches for this annual thing and under her approval at that time. We had a page in the Air Force Magazine that I did and she checked. It covered volunteer work from the woman's angle all over all Air Force bases, and it wasn't under my name because at that time they didn't take any bylines.

Q: Did you know General and Mrs. Arnold together?

Mrs. G: Yes, I remember the night that I was there. One night that I was there we were reading. There was a story written on Mrs. Arnold's life; I can't locate a copy of it. I'll try, by Mrs. Deshon who worked under me--I had five of these supposed writers and they did research and we'd put it all together in the two days, when I had the office two days. We were reading the thing and I was very self-conscious, I hate to read anything I've written aloud. So we were taking turns reading. Bruce was reading and Mrs. Arnold was reading, I was reading, and Mrs. Deshon was reading. And that night I--we started--this was a cocktail hour and I explained to Gen Arnold that I hadn't written all of this and he looked at me and he looked at me with those blue eyes that look right through you and said: "Doesn't matter whether you wrote or not, Dorothy, You're in charge of it. If it's wrong; you're wrong." And I said: "You're right, Sir." He was one to realize the responsibility is the one's that came up with the idea, and is in charge of it. Actually, they liked the story and they laughed and he approved it, but then it was killed because of this Red Cross difficulty.

Q: What was that?

Mrs. G: It was a story on Eleanor Arnold's life, written by Mrs. Deshon. She is dead. I don't know whether her husband is living or not. I can't find a copy of it. I think it got lost in that flood

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in Minnesota. Remember a lot of my papers of the war years. We had a flood in the house in Minnesota.

Q: Was it ever published?

Mrs. G: It was accepted. Red Book was a better magazine at that period than it is now. It was accepted by either Red Book or American. Red Book. I think. And then it was a decision that because of Mrs. Arnold's controversy with the Red Cross. Of course, this played up Mrs. Arnold's great contribution, and the ideas she'd had that were better than the Red Cross. So the decision was not to have it published.

Q: Did the Red Cross want to take over her activities?

Mrs. G: She went much further than the Red Cross, much further. The Red Cross's idea of every woman wrapping bandages was ridiculous. In a war effort there are women who can do a great deal more than wrap bandages.

Q: This is what they were doing in World War I, and why change it?

Mrs. G: Why change it? I don't know all the details of that. Mrs. Van Nostrand would. I didn't go into that angle. I was the unofficial secretary.

Q: I'll contact her. You have her address?

Mrs. G: It's in my book. I'll give it to you. She's very interesting. She's the widow of a retired colonel. And was then in civil service.

Q: Do you remember any other occasions of General and Mrs. Arnold in some situation?

Mrs. G: I'm trying to think. I've always felt a happy association whenever I've been around them.

Q: Did you ever see him get mad?

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Mrs. G: No, I've never seen him angry. I know the famous story of this throwing Drew Pearson out.

Q: What was that story? I've heard several versions of a story. Drew Pearson did not like Arnold.

Mrs. G: No.

Q: There was nothing that Arnold could do or say that would please Drew Pearson.

Mrs. G: No, and I understand that Arnold actually put his hand on him at one time, to get him out of his office. On the collar.

Q: Is that right?

Mrs. G: We met the Arnolds first in 1937 when we first came to Washington.

Q: When he was Assistant Chief?

Mrs. G: Yes. We were casual friends, not close friends. It was at that time that Mrs. Arnold picked me to be Secretary of the Air Force Wives Club, and I was stuck with it for I don't know how many years. Our association was mostly at clubs and parties. During the war years I was occasionally at their home.

Q: General Arnold had a smile on his face?

Mrs. G: Yes.

Q: Some people say it does not mean he was particularly happy. It was just a facial expression?

Mrs. G: I think it was somewhat of a facial expression. But his smile changed. You could feel warmth in it. He called me his Indian friend because the first time we ever met was at Bolling Field in a costume party. And I was born on a Sioux reservation, and that night was wearing an original costume that belonged to an Indian Sioux, a former princess. Long braids I had at that time.

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Q: He loved parties, didn't he?

Mrs. G: He loved parties and because he'd written the Indian books, he and I talked occasionally. You know, he'd written those boys' books, and I've written a few Indian stories. We used to discuss...

Q: Your authorship?

Mrs. G: The Indians of the West.

Q: I see, but he was very fascinated with history--Americana?

Mrs. G: Yes. I told him once how the Plains War started. If I were a good researcher, I'd have a story there. He'd never heard this story. And I told him it's absolutely gospel truth, and he said, some day he'd write a book on it, but he never had time. It all started by the theft of a cow, and a brash young Lieutenant with a new gun. Fired and killed a chief. And that started the Plains War. There is always romance somewhere.

Q: Around late 1860s?

Mrs. G: Yes.

Q: He had this great feeling for the outdoors. He regarded the outdoors as always having a therapeutic effect on things like juvenile delinquency.

Mrs. G: He's so right.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about his belief that young fellows ought to get out in the woods and do something constructive?

Mrs. G: Well, I think he talked about that to everybody he knew. Occasionally, it would come up. Certainly our present generation proves that he is right. Pitty we haven't had to follow up on it.

Q: You know that grand CCC program in the early 1930s. This is during the terrible days of the depression. He was out at March

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Field and he had something on the order of 25 camps under his jurisdiction.

Mrs. G: I didn't remember that. I was working on newspapers at that time in Nebraska, and I remember the work of the CCC well.

Q: He had the whole Western district. Malin Craig who was then the 9th Corps Area Commander in California in the Presidio. He was at March Field and he did an excellent job with the CCC.

Mrs. G: Oh, he would.

Q: Inspirational kind of leader?

Mrs. G: Yes.

Q: And this always stayed with him.

Mrs. G: I think it stayed with him through the Air Force. There were people that didn't like him, but with people generally he was idolized. And he was a man that got things done.

Q: Right. We were talking before about his sense of people. When he came to a base, I've been told that he went to the maintenance shack--talked to the sergeants. This is where the problems, if there were any, existed. Rather than go through a formal session with the CO who would naturally put the best foot forward. And Arnold came to a base and wanted to get at the problems and he went right down to the enlisted men's barracks or the hangars where he could talk to the men who were concerned with the job that had to be done. Did you have any knowledge of that?

Mrs. G: Well, I knew about it from the Officers' Club at Bolling. I knew his inspection of that was very funny, because there was no staff at that time, no permanent staff, no permanent mess.

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Mrs. G: You were talking about his close inspection of bases. You know that he used to appear in the kitchen at the old Bolling Officers' Club at a party. I think sometimes he would duck down to escape for awhile. I was always embarrassed when he caught me in the kitchen, because I was trying to pretend I wasn't the Club Officer's wife. But there wasn't enough staff unless I did some of the supervision. But he'd love to come down in the kitchen at the Officers' Club, and talk to the Sergeant who was there.

Q: Is this how he became real close to Robert Dunbar?

Mrs. G: That's part of it, I'm sure. There was a sergeant that Hal took up there. Grant Young was his name, who had never been near a kitchen in his life. One day both cooks, my maid and the other cook were sick. That was just before Robert Dunbar came and I asked Grant Young how good he was, if he could cook, and he said he was awfully quick with the hands. And I think he later told General Arnold this story. We had one big mess boy, and we put him at the door of the kitchen and told him we'd kill him if he let anybody in. Because it was another one of those big receptions and here was all the raw food, and no one to cook it. So he and I did it. And then I left out the back door, and came to the party a bit late and came in. He was dressed and acting as Maitre d' at that time. I said: "What are you having tonight? I understand there's some new cooks in the kitchen?" We carried that up all evening and I spent so much time talking to him. I know that he used to talk with General Arnold too, and then Robert Dunbar, when he came, of course, things got more organized. But there are always going to be emergencies when you run a shoestring operation. The club was a shoestring operation at that time.

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Q: Which is why he brought Dunbar in. He got him at Hall's?

Mrs. G: Yes, Hall's Restaurant. He was there for many years.

Q: I think Dunbar reflects as much as anything else that I know of Arnold's feeling for people. Dunbar had great concern that Arnold was retiring, and he thought that whoever succeeded Arnold would not do as right by Dunbar as Arnold did. I think Arnold required the Commanding Officer to sign some kind of paper which would assure Dunbar that they would take care of him.

Mrs. G: That sounds like like his thoughtfulness, his concern for people.

Q: And Dunbar told me that, so far as he knows, he is the only individual for whom such provision in perpetuity was made. I don't think they expected him to live this long.

Mrs. G: No, they didn't, absolutely. I'm so glad that he did. Speaking of concern for people, I think I'd better get some food out here.

Q: Okay. Thank you, Madam President.

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done 10-15-70

338-2616

September 18, 1970

L/Gen Harold Grant, USAF(Ret)
2420 44th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007

Dear General Grant:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name coming up in several contexts, some having to do with communications or signal planning. In any event you probably have some memories of General Arnold, good or bad, and I'd like to have the opportunity to talk with you about them. My Pentagon phone is OX-53862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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R&A ROUTING SLIP

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Mr. Zubkoff
Dr. Annunziata
Lt Col Larsen
Lt Col Napier, III
Maj Karam
Mr. Killingbeck
Staff
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FOR: Action - Info - Comment

REMARKS:

Spec Asst for Cx
Signal Planning

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Sent to Mrs A. upon Norfolk

Retired Dec 64

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HAROLD W. GRANT

Harold Winfield Grant was born in Louisville, Kentucky on 16 October 1906. He attended Evanston Township High School and later Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois where he was a member of the Beta Theta Pi Fraternity. He graduated from the University with a Bachelor of Science degree in June 1928 and shortly thereafter entered the Air Corps as a flying cadet. He took his primary and basic training at March Field, California, and was awarded his pilots wings upon graduation from the Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, on 22 June 1929. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Air Corps, Regular Army on 4 September 1929 at his first duty station, Selfridge Field, Michigan.

He attended the Air Corps Technical School at Chanute Field, Illinois and graduated from the Communications Course in 1931. In 1940 he graduated from the last class of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama. He attended the first Command Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, graduating in 1946. He successfully completed the Military Management Course at Craig Field, Alabama in 1947. He graduated from the Air War College in 1948. In June 1949 he was given a certificate of graduation from the Air Communications and Electronics Staff Officers' Course.

Prior to World War II, General Grant held numerous communications and flying assignments and 7 December 1941 found him as Special Assistant for Communications Matters in the newly formed Office of the Air Inspector in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. In March 1942, he was assigned as the Army Air Force Member of the Army Communications and Equipment Coordination Board, as well as the AAF Representative on the Signal Corps Technical Committee in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. In February 1943, he departed for London, England where he was posted as the United States Air Signals Planner in the British Combined Operations Headquarters. While in that position, he was sent on a special mission to work with the staff of Force 141 in North Africa and with Headquarters, Middle East in Cairo, in connection with the plans for the invasion of Sicily. With the formation of the Supreme Allied Command, Southeast Asia, he was selected by Admiral, the Lord Louis Mountbatten, to be Deputy Signal Officer in Chief in his new Headquarters. In September

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1943, he returned to the United States and prepared special communication equipment and units for transfer to India and later Ceylon. He also supervised the installation of communication and cryptographic gear in a C-47 type aircraft, known widely as "Mercury", to be used as a mobile command post by the Supreme Commander. He flew "Mercury" to India, arriving in December 1943; and from then on, the aircraft accompanied Admiral Mountbatten on his many trips throughout the theater.

When the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces was formed, he was recalled to the United States in April 1945 to assume the position of Assistant Chief of Staff, A-6 (Communications and Electronics). After the redesignation of that organization as the Strategic Air Command, he remained in the same position. In February of 1947 the General Staff Section, A-6, was discontinued in SAC, and General Grant became Chief of the Air Electronics Section, under the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3. He was appointed Director of the Communications and Electronics Division, USAF Special Staff School, in July 1948 for the purpose of organizing the Air Communications and Electronics Staff Officers' Course. In January 1951, he left the Air University for Minneapolis, Minnesota to organize the command the 31st Air Division (Defense). With the formation of the Joint Air Defense Board, he was assigned as Executive and joined the new group on 3 September 1951 at Colorado Springs, Colorado.

In October 1952, General Grant arrived in Nagoya, Japan to serve as Vice Commander, Japan Air Defense Force. With the absorbtion of JADF by the Fifth Air Force in September 1954, he assumed the duties of Deputy Commander in that Headquarters. On 25 January 1955 he took command of an Air Task Force based on Formosa which included the Philippines, South Korea and Japan to safeguard the evacuation of the Tachen Islands carried out by the Chinese Nationalists and the U.S. Seventh Fleet. He left Fifth Air Force Headquarters on 13 May 1955 to become Deputy Commander of the Formosa Liaison Center with headquarters in Taipei, Taiwan, China. In November 1955 FLC was reorganized and redesignated United States Taiwan Defense Command. On 5 March 1957 he left Taipei enroute to his assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations at Headquarters Air Defense Command. He reported for duty at Ent Air Force Base, on 1 April 1957.

General Grant assumed duty as Director of Communications-Electronics, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force on 15 July 1958, a position which was subsequently redesignated (1 July 1960), Director of Telecommunications.

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On 1 July 1961, General Grant assumed command of the newly formed Air Force Communications Service, Headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. This command was created in line with the single manager concept to operate Air Force communications and aids to navigation.

General Grant became Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency on 19 February 1962, having been appointed to this post by the President. As the Deputy Administrator, General Grant serves as general manager of the agency, directing and coordinating the efforts of the various Services, Bureau and Regions, and is authorized to represent and to exercise the authority of the Administrator.

His flying ratings are: Command Pilot, Senior Aircraft Observer, Combat Observer, and Technical Observer. He has been awarded the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Order of the British Empire, the Korea Ulchi Distinguished Military Service Medal with Gold Star, and the Chinese Medal of Cloud and Banner.

General Grant is the son of the late Dr. William E. Grant and Mrs. Daisy D. Grant of Louisville, Kentucky and Evanston, Illinois. The General's wife, the former Dorothy Silvis, is from South Dakota and Nebraska. She is a graduate of the University of Nebraska in Journalism and was City Editor of the Norfolk Daily News at the time of her marriage. They have three children, Michael, 22; Lina, 20; and Bruce, 10.

PROMOTIONS

To Captain (temporary) 20 April 1935; to First Lieutenant (permanent) 1 May 1935; to Captain (permanent) 4 September 1939; to Major (temporary) 21 March 1941; to Lieutenant Colonel(temporary) 5 January 1942; to Colonel (temporary) 1 March 1942; to Major (permanent) 4 September 1946; to Colonel (permanent) 2 April 1948; to Brigadier General (temporary) 5 September 1952; to Major General (temporary) 5 July 1955 with date of rank from 1 June 1951, to Brigadier General (permanent) 13 December 1955; to Major General (permanent) 20 November 1958 with date of rank from 6 September 1952; to lieutenant general (temporary) 2 April 1962

July 1962

DP and under provisions of Sec 8504 and 806, Title 10, USC, LTGEN HAROLD W GRANT, 497A, Retired (Primary AFSC - 0002; RegAF; DOB - 16 Oct 06; Date of Separation - Indefinite; Comd Pilot - on flying status; Flying Status Code - 3B; Present address - 2420 44th St, NW, WashDC) is ordered to extended active duty (voluntary) in grade indicated for an indefinite period.
ASSIGNMENT: 1137 USAF Sp Acty Sq, HQ COMD USAF, Bolling AFB, DC with duty station Federal Aviation Agency for duty as Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL GRANT, HAROLD W 497A

1137 USAF SP ACTY SQ, HQ COMD, USAF, BOLLING AFB DC 20332 WITH DUTY STN FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY, WASH DC, AS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY

SERVICING CIPO: -

MAILING ADDRESS

2420 44TH STREET, N. W., WASHINGTON, DC

REMARKS

AFAFC: 38 COMP GEN 5, 02 NOV 64 ADVANCED TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL

Effective on date indicated, you are relieved from above assignment, organization and station and from active duty. You are retired per authority cited and in grade specified. You will proceed as authorized. PCS. TDN. 5755500 525 P578.01 5505725 2112 2122 2132 2220 2250 2295 2295.

SDN			
70A			
DATE RELIEVED FROM ACTIVE DUTY	DATE RETIRED	SECTION OF TITLE 10, U.S.C.	GRADE IN WHICH RETIRED
30 NOV 64	01 DEC 64	8913 & 8962	MAJOR GENERAL

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Griggs, David 6 Aug 74

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

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

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

(13)

20 June 1974

done 6 Aug 74

Dr. David T. Griggs
Professor of Geophysics
Institute of Geophysics & Planetary Physics
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA 90024

Dear Prof. Griggs:

A follow-on to my letter of June 7th. I can fix my visit to the Los Angeles area during the week of August 5th through the 9th. I would be pleased to firm up an appointment at any time that week convenient for you. Or we can leave it loose and I can phone for an appointment when I get into town. Is there a number on which I can reach you, or your secretary?

If I knew that mornings were better than afternoons, or one day preferable to another, I would block out a date and time convenient for you.

I'll look forward to hearing from you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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20314

7 June 1974

Dr. David T. Griggs
Institute of Geophysics & Planetary Physics
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA 90024

Dear Dr. Griggs

I just happened to be writing to Mrs. Arnold about my pending visit to the West Coast and could not resist the temptation to show her your beautiful letter about General Arnold. I hope you don't mind.

When my travel plans firm up, I'll be in further touch. If your situation changes any, you may use the enclosed envelope to advise.

The other enclosure, just published, may amuse you.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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INSTITUTE OF GEOPHYSICS AND PLANETARY PHYSICS
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

June 3, 1974

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
H.Q. USAF
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Mr. Green:

I apologize for not answering your earlier letter. I carried it around in my brief-case until the statute of limitations ran out.

The fact is that I could not figure out how to express in a letter all the respect, admiration and I guess you might say hero worship which I felt for Hap Arnold. During my post-war stay in Japan, I became convinced that he was one of the greatest - in fact I thought the greatest - military figure of all time. He could imagine things the world had never seen, and bring them to fruition by his enthusiasm, drive, and knowledge of men.

Because I find it hard to express all my feelings, I welcome the opportunity to talk with you. My current schedule calls for me to be here the last week in July, but please call or drop me a note shortly before you come, so that I can be sure to get together with you.

Sincerely,

David T. Griggs

David T. Griggs
Professor of Geophysics

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20314

24 May 1974

Dr. David T. Griggs
Institute of Geophysics & Planetary Physics
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA 90024

Dear Dr. Griggs

I've been working on a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I spent about 18 months of a Brookings Institution Fellowship going through the vast collection of Arnold Papers at the Library of Congress and have interviewed most of the family, friends, and associates of the General during the past two years - about 250 people in all.

I wrote you a couple of years ago at a Granville Avenue address in L.A. Perhaps that letter mis-connected.

In any event, I'm planning a final interview trip out to the West Coast to catch some of the people I missed on earlier trips. I'm quite anxious to have the benefit of your recollections of the last year or two of World War II when you and he had some association in matters scientific and R&D.

Projecting my expected travel, I figure to be in the L.A. area about the last week in July. If you are available at that time, I would be most pleased if you could spare me a half hour (or more) of reminiscence.

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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20384

1 October 1971

Dr. David T. Griggs
190 Granville Avenue
Los Angeles, Calif 90049

Dear Dr. Griggs:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold which is to be published by Random House. I've been with the Air Force for the past quarter-of-a-century, spending most of it in the Secretary's Office. Recently I moved over to this office in order to devote more time to the Biography.

I was fortunate to obtain a Brookings Fellowship which allowed me a whole year of research into the Arnold, Spaatz and other MSS. at the Library of Congress. It was in the Spaatz papers that I came across your report to him on the JB-2 which, as you pointed out, was not a carbon copy of the German V-1.

In any event, I'm especially interested in General Arnold's desire to produce the JB-2 in quantity and let fly at the Germans. Arnold was not necessarily blood-thirsty, in my reading of his history, but he was a great gadgeteer. As you know, he was visiting the Normandy beachhead area in June 1944 when the first V-1's throbbed across the Channel. He was said to be almost gleeful as he arranged to put together the pieces and ship them back to the U.S. for reconstruction and improvement. I wonder if you share this opinion.

Incidentally, I have talked to a number of science-minded people who were associated with General Arnold during the war. Ed Bowles and Frank Collbohm come to mind. Also Arthur Raymond whom I saw out in San Diego. I should also mention Robert Millikan out at CalTech.

As I reconstruct the story of Arnold and the JB2, the project was killed late in the European war for any one of the following reasons, or a combination of them:

1) General Arnold had suffered his serious heart attack in January 1945. The leading advocate of the JB2's use was out of the picture.
2) The war was nearing an end, anyway.
3) The British counseled against use of the JB-2 in large numberss for fear of reprisals with the V-2.

I would be interested in your recollections of General Arnold in this or any other context. The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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OPD cancelled production JB-2 Jan 1945 Spaatz

Box 23 7.35

...e of the JB-2 in European War - Early Feb 1945

(consultant to Gtimson)

Report from Dr. David Griggs, to Spaatz, Feb 5, 1945. Griggs said it was not correct to assume the JB-2 was a Chinese copy of the German buzz bomb. In all important respects it was a replica of the V-1, but in some respects it was better because of better control. Griggs thought he ought to report this to Spaatz, so that if ground control experiments could materially improve the accuracy of the V-1, its importance as a military weapon would be greatly enhanced. He said there was much to learn about the mechanics of the JB-2. Up to the time he left the US there had been 22 launchings, of which 7 were successful. These were accomplished by using rocket launching gear.

Griggs noted that early in Jan 1945 Arnold had set up a program ~~which~~ to achieve launchings of the JB-2 on the following schedule: 100 per day in Sep 1945, building up to 500 per day by Feb 1946 and 500 per day thereafter. But, at the end of Jan 1945, due to a conflict in production and logistics between the JB-2 and other existing programs, OPD made a decision to cancel all production of buzz bombs, except for a pilot production of 2,000 to carry out experimentation and proof tests.

NOTE: The fact that Arnold was disabled at this time must be considered a factor in the cancellation.

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any event, Griggs held out high hopes that ground control would
the JB-2 to achieve high accuracy in the future.

Griggs said it was not unreasonable to assume that the JB-2 could be brought to an accuracy of 500 yards at 50 miles, or 1000 yards at 100 miles. With such an accuracy, he wrote, bombing of many types of battle targets could become profitable. He mentioned transportation centers, bivouac areas, troop concentrations of any sort, armor or motor vehicle parks - all appropriate targets.

Just as with artillery, he wrote, any appropriate target which could be assigned geographic coordinates, either by ground observation, aerial observation, or by photo recon, could be attacked by buzz bombs, simply by transmitting these coordinates to the controlling radar. He pointed out that JB-2s could add materially to the flexibility of the AF because they could be continually on call up to the limit of operational capabilities of launching sites, whereas fighter bombers could strike only when they were in the air and free at a proper time. Based on our experience with the V-1, the Germans could intercept the JB-2 only with jet aircraft.

In conclusion, he stated that based on the potential of the JB-2, if this weapon were desired for operational use in the winter of 1945/46, a firm theater requirement must be established now." He said production contracts could not be started in the US, until such a requirement existed.

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June 3, 1974

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Interview, Prof. David Griggs, Univ California, LA, August 6, 1974 Edited my

Q I usually start these things by asking whether you recall your first encounter with the man, Hap Arnold? Or maybe the first interesting encounter?

G I dont recall.

Q What was your job during the war?

G The way I came in contact with General Arnold, I had left the Radiation Laboratory at MIT where I had been working on radar, particularly airborne radar, to join Dr. Edward Bowles who was an expert consultant to the Secy War. And I was in his office throughout the rest of the war, although I spent about 3 and 1/2 years overseas, almost entirely with the Air Force. The things that I was doing for Bowles, trying to help get the new equipment, new radars, into combat. To find out which ones were good, how they could be used, etc. The first major job that I did was to expedite the introduction of what we called the H2X, the 3 cm radar bombing gear in the 8th AF. General Arnold was very keenly interested in this project right from the beginning. He helped us at many important junctures. One thing I remember particularly was the - these were B-17Gs - the first ones with the chin turrets. We had to put the radome, in those days we put it right behind the chin turret in front of the airplane. When they took them up for firing tests - this was done in the Rome Air Depot up in N.Y., the pilot wanted to see how his guns worked so he shot off the chin turret. The cartridge cases fell out and hit the radome, bounced off and hit the props. The inboard prop passed it on to the outboard prop, and the outboard prop passed it through the wing and it was a holy mess. There were cartridge holes all through the fuselage and the wings. In order to get around that - this was a very rush job we did, The concept of the thing was made in early June and we got it in combat in mid-September. It was fantastic because nothing like it had ever existed. At any rate we had to fix this particular problem with pieces of plywood alongside these radomes, to take the cartridge cases and guide them around the radome and send them around the bank end. We put aluminum around the fiberglass radomes. So I took these pictures of these airplanes in to General Arnold. You know, we were just about ready to go overseas at this time. He took one look at the

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abortion(?) at the nose of his airplane and asked: "Does it fly?" And I said: "Sir, we have run power and speed tests on it, and according to our records that we dont fully believe, it is 2% faster. And he said: "Aw, get out!" Then I went overseas with this outfit. My function was sort of an expediter. I was sort of free to go wherever I wanted. General Arnold gave me an airplane so I could fly around the United States. I was a civilian pilot. There was no one else to do it, so I took the job of training the first radar-bombardiers who had been navigators. They knew nothing about radar. So, two of my colleagues from the Radiation Lab trained all these bombardiers. We had three weeks to do it in Grenier Field in N.H. Then we went overseas. There, of course, Gen Eaker had the 8th AF, and Gen Fred Anderson had the 8th Bomber Comd. I worked most closely with Fred in setting up the planning and missions, etc. He let me pick the first target. I picked Wilhelmshaven because it had a nice little square. A submarine, and a turning base which showed up well on radar, and also had a Priority A-1 on it.

Q Did you remember Barton Leach, Perera and that group?

G No. We were not in the Operational Analysis business, as they were. All we were trying to do was to get this equipment into operation and make it an effective part of the AAF. The analysis of what was done, it was their job. Our job was to make it work, and if they didnt like the results we were getting, we tried to improve it.

Q Did you get into this hassle over the euphemism, "blind bombing"? Arnold did not like that term because there was a connotation of reckless or barbaric bombing. What was the expression - "overcast bombing."

G We called it, "bombing through the overcast. Called BTO. The Air Force had all kinds of things it was sensitive about. Even today, you cant talk about smart bombs. What I was going to say, after the thing got going, I had to come back. I made about a dozen trips back and forth across the Atlantic. Usually when I came back out, Fred Anderson or General Eaker would give me the latest pictures and strike photos, and I would show them to Hap Arnold.

Q Arnold was a bug also on publicizing the accomplishments of the 8th AF. He

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was always needling Eaker and Spaatz about getting some pictures back so he could show the kind of job the 8th AF was doing and the casualties they took. Did you get into the publicizing of that mission?

G No. They had all kinds of help on that, mostly from Hollywood types. They didnt need my help. Our job was to try to help make it work.

Q Do you recall any anecdotes involving General Arnold in connection with the work that you were doing?

G To me, as I told you in my letter, I came after the war to think of Arnold as perhaps the greatest military man of all time.

Q It was a great letter.

G The reason I came to that conclusion was, when I went to Japan, and went through the Japanese General HQ, particularly their air defense sector, their whole system was absolutely swamped when a B-29 raid would come in. This brought to my mind the fact that they simply had not been able to comprehend what a massive number of long range bombers of a type the world had never seen could do. But Arnold did. He had this great imagination. That is the way I interacted with Arnold. Many times we would try to sponsor a new development in the AAF. Everytime you put in a new development in the combat forces, it is a headache. You have got to hold up airplanes, for instance, as we had to do in the H2X bombing business. You have got to keep them out of the pipeline. Airplanes were always tight. You've got to interfere with training schedules, with deployment schedules, etc. So it is a nuisance to put new weapons into the inventory. But Arnold could always see more clearly than anybody I know the impact the new weapon might have. He always had the enthusiasm, the drive, the urge to do it. That's what made him great in my estimation. He had the vision to see years in advance what the 20th AF would be like and to do it; what the strategic air force in Europe would be like, and to start the wheels in motion to create them. Nobody else in that time frame had it, nor can I think of any military figure in history that had that combination of insight into what the future can bring. From my standpoint, in terms of technical advances, he had the courage to do it, and the position to bring it off, and to fight off the

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opposition, because anything like that sets off opposition.

Q I think part of that attitude that Arnold had was a great respect for academic achievement. I think this goes back to Robert Millikan at Cal Tech, back in the 1930's. Millikan was conducting some high altitude tests.

G He was working on cosmic rays

Q Arnold provided some aircraft without any question. This was at a time when the Army was counting nickels. Arnold tells of an amusing experience with a lead ball in a row boat that sank. (Ref to Arnold, Millikan, and later von Karman) Then his role in RAND)

G Do I know that! I was the first full-time employee of RAND. I was the one on the Washington scene who went through all the set-up procedures for RAND. That was a typical example of his wisdom, foresight and willingness to take the necessary steps to do something new.

Q His belief was that we should not go back to the old Army Arsenal system, or the Navy's shipyard system, but he wanted to maintain strong liaison or contact with the academic community. Dr. Ed Bowles, does he rightfully claim a large role in the establishment of RAND?

G Oh, sure, absolutely. RAND came about through four principal people: Bowles, Frank Collbohm, Arther Raymond, and Hap Arnold. These are the four.

Q How long did you work for RAND?

G I actually worked full time for RAND while it was at Douglas. I left in May of 1948, and it was incorporated in November 1948 as a non-profit corporation.

Q That was the first "think factory" and everybody has emulated it since.

G I dont think of it as one of his great contributions; it was a typical contribution in the sense that it was absolutely novel. He set it up, and only he could have done it in the Air Force to set it up in such a way that they would have the freedom to be able to do what they did.

Q It was probably slightly illegal, too, by failing to identify budget funds that were supposed to be earmarked.

G All that was necessary was a contract and a work statement, which was

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sufficient, and I'm not going to go into that. I had the feeling about creation of the work statement, but I dont want to go into that..

Q You were the author? Very interesting (laughter) I'm glad I made a discovery today. Part of Arnold's psychology in this was his interest in innovation. People would come to him with all kinds of ideas and he jumped many times. Some of his ideas for R&D didnt come through. But Arnold was not a stick-in-the-mud. If you could sell him an idea that apparently would be better than what he was using, he'd jump and buy a million of them.

G You said it. I could have said the same thing in my terms. That was, of course, my experience. I worked with Ed Bowles in B oston in the Radiation Lab. He was Secretary of the Microwave Committee, I believe. But I wanted to get more near the action. So, when he went to Washington, I sort of pleaded with him, if he ever had a slot, I'd like to come down and maybe get out in the trenches. He called me down after some months and said he had some things that could be usefully done with the AF. I had some experience with the AAF in which I'd become acquainted with some of their people, and some of the previous errors, that didnt have too much imagination, didnt have appreciation of technology, more than that, didnt have any appreciation of outside help. So it wasnt clear to me whether it would be possible to work with the AF. One of the first things that happened to me was that Ed Bowles arranged a luncheon with General McClelland who then was in charge of communications, weather, everything under which things I was doing would come, on the Air Staff. I said to him: "Will the Air Force be receptive to new ideas? Will General Arnold be receptive to new ideas?" I had not mentioned General Arnold up to this time. "Will he be receptive to new ideas?" he said. "Let me tell you some of the things that we are doing" He reeled off a few of them, but the one that stuck with me was the story of the "bat -box". Do you know about the "bat -box?"

Q No.

G They had some scientist get the idea that, since the Japanese structures are so inflammable, that the way to attack them was with incendiaries. Japan being a long way off, if you want to get something that is very effective in terms

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of payload, so, this scientist was a biologist. He suggested that you take bats and carry them as your bombload. On each bat you have two little phosphorous incendiaries attached under the wings. Now these bats have the property - in fact, any bat, you can keep them in a refrigerator and they can sort of hibernate. Then, you can take them out, warm them up and they can fly away. Often, none the worse. I've worked with bats. I had a piece of the action when we were first finding out that bats find their way around by acoustic radar. So, this fellow sold General Arnold on this scheme.

Q Do you recall who that was?

G I'd have to look it up. There was the "bat bomb" and the "pigeon bomb". Perry Stout and Skinner had the pigeon bomb. I forgot who did the bat bom b.

Q I'd like to hear about the pigeon bomb, too

G At any rate, the AAF, under McClelland, with Arnold's blessing, set up a program to pursue the bat bomb. They found the best bats, the Carlsbad Bats, as I remember...

Q From the Caverns?

G They got an Air Force Base nearby, the work was being done in a hangar, and they developed these little incendiary capsules, so that when the bat was refrigerated, of course, nothing would happen to them. When they were flying, nothing would happen to them. But these particular bats would always roost, hanging from their feet. They'd close their wings around these capsules, and their body heat would set them off.. They succeeded in developing these capsules. I said to General McClelland: "How's the project coming along? He said: "We've just had a terrible disaster. A few of the bats got loose," he said, "and we couldnt catch them. Come nightfall, they roosted in the hangar, and burned the whole hangar down."

Q Great story! In those days we didnt have what we call multiple dispensers?

G Those dispensers can carry hundreds of little explosives. We didnt have any?

We didnt have those. These people made up a set of multiple bat dispensers. The thing would fall about 9,000 feet and a barrel switch would set it off and then all the bats would come out. As they got down there, they'd warm up and then they'd

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start flying off. That's the way these little fellows got into the war. When the bombardiers would release these bombs, he wouldnt say the normal thing. He'd say, "Bats Away."

Q I've never heard that story. Has it been written up anywhere?

G It was written up in Harpers Magazine about 1946 or 1947.

Q I'm going to check that out. What about the pigeon bomb?

G Oh, you dont want to hear about the pigeon bomb. Let's talk about General Arnold.

Q Somebody tried to sell Arnold on the "explosive pencil." Do you know about that?

G Let me say, you gave your spiel about General Arnold and new gadgets. Of course, I would have said a similar thing. He was not afraid to take chances, knowingly to take chances. He always figured: "If it didnt work out, let them pick up the pieces."

Q Nobody was counting the budget at that time.

G But these things, they dont cost much until they get to be big systems. People didnt realize.

Q There were a couple of other things that somebody sold him on that didnt go well:. The XB-40 and XB-41, the armored escorts.

G They werent awful. They werent the worst we had. I'm not even sure that they were all that bad.

Q (Told of how the other bombers ended up protecting XB-40 and XB-41)

G Compared to some other fiascos we had, like at San Bernardino Straits, that was nothing. The AAF tried all kinds of things, good things and bad things. If you are going to try, you're going to try some bad things.

Q Let's talk about Arnold taking chances on weather forecasting, Prof Irving Krick. Do you remember him?

G Do I remember him! I can get along without that memory. Have you talked to Jimmy Doolittle about Irving Krick? Let me tell you something: Irving Krick was Eisen hower's weather officer. Or rather, he didnt have that job. He acted in that role. He was actually Jimmy Doolittle's weather officer as commander

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on the D-Day Operation. Irving Krick was forecasting 99 percent of CAVU weather for D-day, even when they had to postpone it a day. It had been changed. I got the job from General Spaatz of making sure - General Spaatz had guaranteed Eisenhower that the 8th AF would bomb in the beaches whether the weather was good or bad. In other words, whether you could see to bomb visually, or whether you had to do radar bombing.. So, General Spaatz asked me to make sure that the 8th AF could deliver in case the weather would be bad. Well, the first thing I did was to go to Don Yates, who was Spaatz's weather officer, and a helluva good meteorologist, and I said: "Don, what are the chances for the weather on the D-Day operation." This was maybe three or four weeks before. He said: "Hell, dont listen to Krick. The chances are like usual. They are 50/50." He said: "Furthermore, if I were telling you the day before, it would be just about the same." So I went out to Widewing, the 8th AF HQ, and there, Orvil Anderson was A-3, making the operational plan and field orders for the operations. I talked to Jimmy of course and then I talked to him and said, "We have to have a field order for radar bombing." He (Anderson) says, "Go away and dont bother me. Krick says there is a 99 percent chance of CAVU bombing. I'm working on D-day + 16." I said: "General, we have to have a field order in the one percent chance that Krick is wrong should occur." He said: "You want to have a field order? Go ahead and write it yourself." So I took one of his Key Colonels _ Matty Garland, he became a General later on, He and another guy and myself said: "We're going for a field order." Then we had to prepare the air force for all the radar bombardiers for this Special Operation, bombing the beaches. We took off visually, you were bombing point targets, and you were bombing with tail fuzes to get penetration. If you were bombing radar, you had to bomb area targets. You had a different assembly thing. You had a different initial point for the radar run, and you had to have nose fuzes for the blast instead of tail fuzes. All these things were diff= erent. Furthermore, we had to train the radar operators for the run in on the beaches, so they could come in _____ at right angles to the beaches. We had to train them to be sure they wouldnt release their bombs, because, you see, the advance part of our landing forces were only a few miles offshore at the time

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we were to bomb. You cant drop short. So we set up all this stuff, and then we came to take off. I was with Freddie Castle. Do you remember Fred Castle?

Q He was killed. Medal of Honor winner.

G Yes. I was/ with him in the lead aircraft of the 94th Group when we took off. When we took off it was clear. When we assembled, about 2 AM, there began to be low clouds coming down below. Fortunately, we had these two field orders, and we had everything fixed so we could go one way or the other. We took a long time to assemble because the sky was full of airplanes, us and the RAF, the 9th AF, and everybody else. We were going 200 miles from our base and it took us 7 and 1/2 hours. Gives you an idea of the time. At any rate, before we left our assembly areas to go to the south coast of England, there were broken clouds. As we got halfway across the Channel, it turned into solid clouds. Five minutes before we hit the beach, We couldnt see a goddamned thing. So that's what I think of Krick's forecast. But it all worked. I'm sure we were not as effective as we would have been, either if it had been radar all the way, or if it had been visual all the way.

Q Freddie Castle was the son of Ben Castle, Classmate of Hap Arnold's.

G I'd forgotten about that.

Q He was the first born to the Class of '07. So Arnold had a great deal of affection for Fred Castle.

G He was a great person.

Q He was killed later on.

G I know.

Q A colleague of mine is interested....

G Sperry Gyroscope thought very highly of him.

Q This colleague of mine, Ray Fredette, is doing a book on Medal of Honor winners. I'll tell him about you. He is writing an in-depth short biography of each of the 56 or 57 AF Medal of Honor winners. But, on another subject, I talked to Gen Don Yates down at Palm Beach, and of course, he had a few choice words for Dr. Krick. (guffaw) I guess he had to leave,

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or wanted to leave Arnold's HQ because he was unable to cope with a situation where he would give Arnold an official weather report, and Arnold, who had this great confidence in Krick - this is what caused the problem - Arnold's great confidence in Krick.

G Yes.

Q Arnold would go around the back door and get another estimate, and the official weathermen had trouble - Yates, Don Zimmerman, Oscar Senter, Hunt Bassett...

G I knew Senter. He was out with Kenney. Then, there was a Lieut Col with Krick who was quite good - Holzman, Ben Holzman - he had a miserable job. One of the unfortunate aspects of Krick was that he would falsify his data. He would make a 48-hour forecast. Then he would put up what the current weather was to compare with 2 days ago, the 48 hour forecast, and he would falsify current weather. Then he got caught.

Q Did Arnold ever catch on to him?

G I dont know whether Arnold did or not.

Q Arnold was his leading supporter. This is why he survived.

G I know.

Q Arnold read an article about him. I think it was in the Saturday Evening Post in which he claimed he could predict 30 days weather.

G I'll tell you one aspect of that. Our office, Ed Bowles' office, got Carl Rossby in. He was the leading meteorologist of the whole world, to take a look and see what could be done to improve the whole weather forecasting and training picture within the AAF. Rossby went out and made a tour of the establishment, came back and said: "One thing you've got to do, you've got to fire General Arnold."

Q Arnold had this strong belief in what Dr. Krick was doing.. I talked to Krick three days ago. He's down in Palm Springs and he's selling weather information all over the world. Apparently, some people believe in him.

G Right.

Q I suppose he is a little bitter about how UCLA treated him. I mean CalTech.

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G Why should he be bitter?

Q He feels he's lost a forum. I guess some of the people who didnt think much of his wartime service have contributed to CalTech's disillusionment with him.

G My recollection is that Lee DuBridge went out to Cal Tech to be President, and he started looking at his faculty. And he decided he'd rather have a meteorologist than a charlatan. He couldnt fire Krick. So what did he do? He abolished his department.

Q He didnt mention that to me.

(end of record)

Q I started to ask about the Eagle APQ-7 radar which created some problems because, as you point out, it was new equipment.

G Well, all the radar we ever used was new, so the Eagle radar wasnt different in that respect. It's main problem as I remember it was that it had a narrow field of view. It was only 60 degrees scan back and forth in a forward direction. That created a problem because you couldnt see where you'd been. You didnt have a map like you did with the standard H2X radar - the APQ-13 radar which was in the standard equipment in the other B-29s. It had one other problem which I experienced in flying with it from Guam. That was the 315th Bomb Wing. And that was that it didnt have any component which was designed to take out the drift. And taking out the drift is very hard in any bomb run, visual or otherwise. The operators had not been trained to take out the drift, so when we first went in, the raid I was on, going in to the Maruzen Oil Refinery, the operators - the winds over Japan got very high - and the operators didnt properly kill the drift. None of them did. As we looked at the photographs afterwards - the scope photographs - and consequently, we missed badly although we got good image of the target.

Q You also had the problem of the jet stream?

G That's what I'm saying. The main problem, in terms of the Eagle APQ-7 was the fact that it was more difficult in that equipment to take out the drift, because your field of view was limited. You see, if you'd come in with the jet stream, you would come in with a very high wind velocity component across your line

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of flight. You 'd get a big angle of drift and that means that your visibility in this narrow thing, you see, the Eagle is bore-sighted. It swept fore and aft. You couldnt move it around. You couldnt sector-scan with it. So that presented a problem. But that was only a momentary problem. They fixed that and the next time they went back to Maruzen, they clobbered it. The pictures of it, I think, are in Arnold's third annual report. That's the one he takes great pride in because, to devote a whole and untested wing of B-29's to this new and untested radar equipment took that kind of courage we are talking about. And Arnold had to do it. Incidentally, I flew one mission - I was there for only two weeks - this was in July of 1945. I flew one mission with Tommy Power's group, the 29th I guess it was called, out on Northwest Field. I flew one mission with the 315th...

Q That was the night radar...

G LeMay made them all night. Possum Hansell was doing daylight bombing and losing his shirt. Frank Armstrong had the 315th. At any rate, as we flew up with the APQ-13, went over Iwo Jima. Then, the next night, I went up with the APQ-7 Eagle over Iwo Jima, also. We always used it for dead reckoning. The contrast in the resolution of the picture was just fantastic. It was another ten years after the war, maybe 20 years, I guess, before the AF ever had the resolution with which you could see as much as that old Eagle radar. Once they learned how to use it, and how to bomb with it, I guess they had a primitive bombing computer too, which wasnt as good as what we had on the H2X. But once they learned how to use it, they did a beautiful job. And Arnold was justifiably proud.

Q There was a big decision that LeMay made. I talked to him yesterday. He went in low-level. He was taking a chance.

G Hell, yes.

Q It would have been his back-side if he failed.

G That's right. And all the rest of them, too.

Q Did you get in on that decision?

G No, no.

Q Did you see him (Arnold) in the Pacific. He was there between June 6th or 7th and June

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25th.

G I was in Manila most of that time with George Kenney. And I dont think I saw him when he came through.

Q Kenney may have come over to Guam when they had these conferences.

G Maybe he did. I took upon myself, since I was not cleared for the MAN HATTAN Project, to tell the Generals I thought ought to know, the fact that we had an A-bomb. Since I didnt have a clearance, I couldnt violate it. So I told General Spaatz, when we were in Europe, and I told General Kenney. Now, I told General Kenney just before this. Now, I think you are right. He did go somewhere to meet Arnold on this trip, and then he came back. And he got me off on the side and said: "Tell me more about the A-bomb." I said: "Havent you just seen General Arnold?" He said; "Yes, but the bastard wouldnt tell me an ything." So I said: "I'm sorry, General, I cant tell you either."

Q He saw him in Guam.

Q You knew it from your own knowledge?

G You know, I was on Guam and I ran into my friends.

Q You wanted to know what they were doing.

G When I was on Guam, I I better not say where my friend was - but I got a clear picture of our forthcoming plan, with the targets. Incidentally, I viewed the success of the atom bomb as almost essential to the decent termination of the war. From where we sat in Manila, we were planning for the operation in Kyushu.

Q The first one was OLYMPIC; the second was CORONET.

G Anyway, we were scheduled to go into Kyushu on November 1st. We were scheduled to put ashore 14 divisions the first day. In Normandy, we put ashore four. It was going to be disaster. They had - we found out afterwards - they had 4,000 suicide planes sequestered. On the center of Kyushu, they had 15 divisions waiting for us on the 1st of August. And they were going to reinforce them. Each of these suicide airplanes was pulled off in the woods where we couldnt see them. They had a can of gas, a bomb and a pilot, and they were waiting for our invasion force. General Krueger estimated that, after we got ashore, in the first month, we would have 150,000 dead. And going into CORONET

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in Tokyo Bay was going to be equally bad. So,...

Q Knowing the Jap record of fighting to the last man, we had to root them out of every island in the Pacific?

G That's right. So, the only hope I saw to bring the war to a close in any context, without terrible losses, because they were going to lose more than we did,... As I say, the only hope I saw was the success of the A-bomb attack.

Q Arnold, LeMay and others saw another success as terminating the war. On Guam, LeMay and his staff briefed Arnold on the B-29, and using butcher paper in these briefings - I've talked to three or four men who were associated with LeMay - Emrick, Cecil Combs...

G Where is Emrick?

Q Emrick has just retired from the CIA

(off the tape)

Q I've talked to J. B. Montgomery. . . the briefing they gave Arnold was that the B-29s were going to run out of targets by September or October. There was no hope for reinforcement of Japan. They thought they could do it themselves.

G Sure

Q Arnold sent LeMay and two others back to brief the JCS. . . they did this on or about June 18th. This was while Arnold was out in the Pacific. These officers came back to Washington. LeMay was then a 36 or 37 year old major General. And he was telling Admiral King and General Marshall that all their preparations, a year-long preparation, for invasion of Japan, were not as good as what we can do with the B-29s in a couple of months. In effect, LeMay was told: "Dont call us; we'll call you."

G Dont misunderstand anything I say. The B-29 bombing with conventional munitions, primarily with incendiaries, was enormously effective. In Tokyo, in two nights, about the 10th of April, they killed 500,000 people in Tokyo, which is far more than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. On the other hand, LeMay and the 20th AF had already hit all cities down to 50,000 population except those that were saved for the A-bombs. When Jimmy Doolittle got out there with his 8th AF, LeMay was delivering 50,000 tons of bombs a month. Jimmy, because he was closer, was scheduled to deliver 240,000 tons more. So they were going to make it

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just a terrible mess in Japan. On the other hand, the Japs had gone through that as a slow buildup, and they could probably survive, even as the bloody North Vietnamese could survive the CBU-2s.

Q But the North Vietnamese were being reinforced via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Japs had no hope of being reinforced.

G No, no. But they didnt need to be reinforced because they were defending their homeland. They werent able to make any Naval war, anything like that. The important thing with the A-bomb was what it turned out to be, symbolic.

Q In other words, you feel that if they had given the B-29s their lead, their way, they would have destroyed a lot more of Japan but would not necessarily have ended the war.?

G They might have ended the war, but it was a chance. And, you see, for my money, it had to be ended before the 1st of November because we were going to take enormous casualties.

Q Why didnt the JCS say: "All right, the B-29s could do it." What's so important about November 1st?

G What was important about November 1st was that it was our schedule.

Q But why risk, they had this big conference and brought President Truman into it. Harry Truman asked these same questions.

G No, no. Look, the trouble is, near as I know, you cant ever win a war by airpower alone. I'm sorry to say that but I dont see any chance of it. We'd seen in Europe that we couldnt do it. We had to go ashore. I dont think there was any expectation that we could make, any reasonable expectation that you could do it in Japan. You had to have something that was really exotic, like the A-bomb. That was my feeling. Now, dont misunderstand. I was then a greater enthusiast for airpower than almost anybody that [illegible]. When I wrote up my record of my visit to Guam -of course, I'd had all these briefings that you are talking about. I talked a lot with LeMay personally about it. And I was very optimistic about the effects that they had achieved and were going to achieve. On the other hand, I couldnt see any other way to bring the Japs to their knees, to make them surrender. You could beat them to hell, but I couldnt see any way for sure to make them

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surrender. If they elected to fight on in their bloody foxholes, it was going to be just tremendously costly. Nimitz, in the Central Pacific, had never learned how to bypass the Japs. MacArthur did, so his casualties were less, by a factor of ten or 20 less than Nimitz.

Q On Saipan, you had the two Smiths. The Marines butted their heads against the Japanese. The other Smith, the Army Smith, did it in a slower way. The Marines have been hitting him ever since.

G But going into Japan you cant let just the whole thing rot on the vine, can you? You've got to go ashore some day, and any time you go ashore, if they havent surrendered, it's going to be terribly costly. Now, I've argued with my dear friend, Edward Teller, on this matter. He feels, or until recently, he felt it was wrong to use the A-bomb in Japan. But to me, it was a necessity, a vital necessity.

Q Were you aware of a Committee that Secretary Stimson set up? He had Enrico Fermi, Oppenheimer, Lawrence and Compton.

G You mean, was I aware at the time?

Q Yes, aware of their deliberations?

G I'd better not answer that impulsively..

Q Anyway, there is an historical record. Herbert Feis has written of it. This Committee - Enrico Fermi, Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton and William Lawrence - they came to the conclusion that we should not drop the bomb on a demonstration target but should hit a live target. (Right) They recommended this to Secretary Stimson. He went along withtheir recommendation. A lot of the junior scientists, like Jerome Franck and some others, have been backbiting on this decision ever since.

G Sure have.

Q I wondered about your thoughts?

G I told you what my thoughts are. I thought it was a necessity. It was the humane thing to do, more for them than for us, even.

Q I take the position, if there are to be lives lost, better theirs than ours.

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G No, no, I'm making a different point. While I dont disagree with that, in fact I do agree with you. I make the point that by the shock effect which I anticipated, which did happen, you could save millions of Japanese lives as well as American.

Q Of course, a lot of people disagree with that, looking back at that now,...

G But they have forgotten what we did to Tokyo. I havent forgotten what we did to Tokyo. We had an A-bomb for Tokyo. When I landed at Yokusaku, you could drive all the way from Yokahama to Tokyo, less than 5% of the structures were standing. They were battered. It was a desert.

Q I went ashore too.

G Well, you remember.

Q Did you ever talk to General Arnold about this whole issue?

G About the use of the A-bomb? No., not that I remember. There was no reason. By that I mean I knew what he felt, and I was in total agreement.

Q Looking at that picture of you and General Arnold shaking hands. Did he ever wax philosophical with you and talk about a separate air force, the A-bomb, or any other subject?

G We used to talk, not very extensively, but, I came back from Japan in January 1946. I stayed in the military only a very short time. I talked with General Arnold a few times at most. I did see him when we were setting up RAND. That was a philosophical undertaking right there. In his philosophy, one of the things that impressed me most in my whole encounter with Arnold was the talk he gave to his staff. I wasnt there. He called in his principal staff officers. Do you have a copy of that?

Q If that was his valedictory, yes.

G That was a helluva speech, in just the vein you are talking about. He started out, as I remember, "when I'm out under an orange tree, and you guys are running the Air Force, think of how things are going to be different."

Q (Ref to Arnold - wings and promotions in post war) Promote on ability; not wings.

G Arnold was not a man of ingrained tradition. He believed in good tradition,

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but...

Q This is right.

G That was one of his strengths.

Q We now have men wearing wings commanding a missile squadron.

G They may be otherwise qualified, but it shouldnt be a requirement.

Q I think Arnold had a selfish reason, too, because none of his three sons wore wings. And he was trying to get all three of them to come over to the Air Force.

G I doubt that. I think he was a bigger man than that.

Q Let me put it into context.....

G I dont like that. I disagree with it totally. He was a big man.

Q Well, he was trying to convince all three sons to come over to the AF. He was able to convince two. One, Bruce, was very reluctant. He said there was no place in the AF for a non-flying officer. Bruce wanted to get into Army missiles. His father put Bozo McKee on him. Bozo McKee was the exception that proved the rule. McKee did not have wings and rose to near the top of the tree. I'm not derogating him in making this statement but I think Arnold must have thought his sons were good enough.....

G What I object to is your suggestion that a minor motive like that, be it selfish or not, would weigh heavily with him on a major decision.

Q I have misstated my point. I think he thought about it. I think he thought his sons were qualified to go and reach higher position. He had a lot of confidence in them, especially in his middle son, Bruce. Of course, I have no documentary evidence

G Bruce is a very nice guy....

Q One of the sore points - Mrs. Arnold never talks about it - but I think that one of the boys, at least, would have made a star. None of them did. David, the youngest, is still in service. He might still make one. The two older boys did not make it. I did not mean that Arnold was doing this for himself, but it may have been a factor in his thinking.

G I did talk with him about that kind of subject....

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Q In one respect I*m glad to hear you defend him. Usually, in an interview, I find myself in that role of defending him.

G Let me tell it to you my way. Many times in Ed Bowles office, we would be trying to get things done that involved the AF. Usually, we would have a verbal OK from Arnold before we'd go ahead. Then we'd write him a memo, or a piece of paper to start the project or give it a boost, or something. One of Arnold's characteristics: his paper work was poor. On the contrary, George Marshall's was very good. So, anytime we wanted to get quick action out of Hap, we'd write the memo, be sure it was alright, as far as we were concerned, take it down, and deliver it to Miss Adkins for Hap. Then we'd send one through the regular mail to General Marshall. Almost invariably, Marshall would read the damned thing the same day he got it, call up and say: "Hap, what are you doing about this project?"

Q He knew about it so he felt good?

G Well, no, he objected to the needle, but he realized. He'd say: "Find that damned thing...."

Q Did he ever get mad that you were working in two channels?

G He might be put out a bit, but he never took it out on us, if that's what you mean. Anybody hates to be reminded, you know.

Q Very good technique. Let me ask about Suzie Adkins? Was she sort of a traffic cop.

G Of course. Every good secretary is. she warn you: "Today is a bad day
Q Did to see the Old Man.?" or....

G We never got in without her blessing.

Q If something hot came up and you thought you ought to get in to see General Arnold?

G It never failed.

Q Did she ever say: "I dont think you should see him, but if you want to, go ahead."

G Never. She should know. If she said "No", I'd go through Bob Lovett. Very simple.

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Q How about Giles? He was No. 2 man in that office. Did you work through him, too?

G Barney Giles? Oh, Yes.

Q Somebody told me that Arnold was a strong No. 1 man and he couldn't work with a strong No. 2 man. So, he had two weak strong men, Stratemeyer and Giles.

G Well, Stratemeyer I always thought of as a weak man; but Barney Giles, I never did.

Q Some others had that opinion.

G Not in my opinion. He didnt have the same kind of strength that Arnold had. In fact, the only person that I knew who had a strong deputy was Marshall. Joe McNarney was a tough Scot.

Q Hard to get by?

G He read the fine print.

Q Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

G Yes, but not informally, as I remember. Just some state occasions.

Q (Ref to Arnold & Marshall. . . Dear Arnold; Dear General. Marshall kept reminding Arnold who he was working for. Wolfinbarger comment that Arnold did not open his mouth at JCS sessions. Plans people would get mad that he was not more vocal in support of AF ideas. But Arnold would not argue with Marshall in public. Ironed out behind scenes. Request comment)

G Everything I know is consistent with that. Arnold did do in the JCS the one major thing. As far as I'm concerned, he established the name, "Strategic Air Force", and he established the thing, both in the European theatre and in the Pacific, with HQ in Washington, for the 20th Bomber Command.

Q You are saying pretty much the same thing that General LeMay told me yesterday, that one of Arnold's greatest achievements was to wrest Strategic Air away from the theatres and to give it a central command in Washington.

G And he did it. He got a lot of help from the others, etc. But he did it. He did it in the JCS. I do know one thing that greatly upset Stimson. Ed Bowles may

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have told you about this. I happened to be there the night of the date it happened. At Ed Bowles' instance, his instigation, the AF had established the 1st Bomber Command with Larson in command -

Q You mean the AAF Anti-Submarine Command?

G Yes. It was based on Mitchel Field. This was effective. It was so effective that the Navy got its nose way out of joint. We had superior equipment, superior aircraft, and we were doing a superior job. We were brand new at this job.

Q The Navy had abdicated this function?

G Yes. the ASW mission from the Air. So, one day, I was out to Stimson's house on Woodley Road, you know, playing deck tennis, a command performance. And we went in after the game to have a drink. Apparently, he'd been upset. So finally he lets his hair down and said: "That goddamned Hap Arnold" - I'm not quoting him exactly, but these are essentially the words he used. He said: "Today he gave the Anti-Submarine Command to Ernie King. Can you imagine that", he said. "And do you know what he got in exchange? Some promises."

G Arnold did that at the behest of General Marshall. This was on July 1st, 1943. King would not yield on the ASW mission and Arnold felt he had bigger fish to fry. He yielded and turned over some B-24s....

G All I'm telling you was Stimson was madder than a wet hen.

Q Stimson was hung up on ASW. I thinkhe went down to Florida and a submarine sank a ship within sight of shore. The Navy didnt do a damned thing about it. I think they called it ASV radar.

G I was involved with Bowles in that. I have pictures of Stimson in a review down at Langley Field. We had the first Sea Search Attack Group there. That's where we made all the new developments.

Q Did Stimson know that Marshall had engineered this?

G Stimson blamed Arnold. What you said is consistent with that, too. As you said, he had "other fish to fry", so he thought he'd make a trade with the Navy. But he got outtraded, in Stimson's view. Stimson was a bad loser. That brings up another point where I was in contact with Arnold. He was very much interested in all the new things we were doing. One of these new things was what we called a Low Altitude Bomb

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Sight (LABS) for the B-24 using 10 cm ASV radar with a special attachment that was made in the Radiation Laboratory, which allowed you to pick up a target, a ship on the water, This only worked over water - and come in on it on instruments, just on the radar alone, and drop your bombs without ever seeing the ship, and with great accuracy.

(Turn over tape)

Ref LABS which was being installed on aircraft of the Sea-Search Attack group down at Langley, We saw the potential this might have for operations in the Pacific theatre against Japanese shipping. General Arnold, very early in the game, was very enthusiastic about it and gave us great encouragement. Then we had to make arrangements - we had to find some theatre commander who was willing to take a squadron of these airplanes, and who was willing to delay the delivery of his aircraft - the same problem we had with the H2X - 50 to allow us to do the outfitting and the testing. We tried tried several people and didnt strike paydirt until Nate Twining came back. He had the 13th AF at the time. He caught fire right away and his Deputy, I think he was Deputy Commander, Blondie Saunders, He died during the war...

Q No, he is still alive, lives in South Dakota.

G Oh, he lost his leg, that's right. I remember visiting him in Walter Reed when he was in bad shape with that leg. At any rate, Nate gave his approval to hold up his aircraft. Blondie Saunders wanted to come down to participate in the tests that we were running. So we went down to Langley and were dropping 100 lb bombs on an old wreck off shore and taking photographs of it. Blondie was there watching, and flying, and having a ball. Then as we landed, a Major came up to us and said to us - we had a Lieut Colonel flying the aircraft. He said: "Colonel, sir, this aircraft has been commandeered and ordered transferred to the squadron across the field." Blondie got madder than hell and said "By whose orders?" He brought the thing out and said: "Orders of the Secretary of War." I said: "But I'm from the Secretary of War's office. I'm down here on his orders."

"Sorry, sir," he said. They took our aircraft. What had happened, of course, they needed all of our 10 cm B-24s they could get in connection with the invasion

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of North Africa - TORCH. So we took our bomb plot - you know, we had just one afternoon, took it up and went in to see General Arnold the next day. We showed it to him. The CEP was on the order of 100 feet. It really was very good. It had been done just on this radar bombing. Blondie was very enthusiastic, and I well remember Hap Arnold saying: "You mean they took your airplane away?" I told him the circumstances. He said: "Christ, we gotta have more than one B-24." Because of his interest, we pretty soon did get another B-24. The project did go ahead and it did go out to the Pacific under Nate Twining, and Colonel Studright took it out and it was very successful. That's just an example of the personal interest that Arnold took in all these things. These projects, and anybody else's projects.

Q Did you work with Gfandison Gardner down at the Proving Ground Command?

G Sure, sure. Gardner was a great person. His freedom, his autonomy down there, the fact that he was not subservient to Wright Field was an essential ingredient which Arnold fostered. They made a lot of trouble for Hap, too. I was down at Eglin when the Eagle squadron came back from England. There was about a half dozen of them. They were integrated back into the AAF. They flew all our first-line fighters. They said: "My God. None of them is in the same class with the Spit." They'd all go back and tell Arnold this. Oh, he'd call Wright Field, and all hell would break loose.

Q He was always jumping on Wright Field; he had a "thing" for Wright Field. He himself had not a good experience there.

G How could he be happy with them? After the war, one of my friends, who shall be nameless, was on a commission to study what should be done with Wright Field. An Air Force Commission. I called him one day and asked: "What are you going to recommend?" He said: "I've already made my recommendation. The only thing that will fix it is an A-bomb." Wright Field had its good side and its bad side. Let me just say a word about its good side. This was the kind of thing that Hap Arnold was keenly interested in. One of these Eagle Squadron guys was a fellow named Red McCulpin. He came into the Eagle Squadron and was integrated into the AAF as a lst Lieutenant. He was one of the ones that flew the

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P-47, P-38, P-51, down at Eglin. He said that, of the three, the P-51 was the only one worth having at all. The other ones were absolute dogs. Well, I ran into Red after D-Day - he was then in the 9th AF, a Colonel and was in command of a P-47 group. I said: "Red, how do you like your P-47s ?" He said: "Oh, my God, they are a terrible airplane." He said: "Do you remember what I told you about them when I was flying down at Eglin?" He said "I haven't had a reason to change my mind at all." I've seen the critical tests that Grandison Gardner did flying the P-47, P-38 and P-51 against the ME-109 and FW-190. These tests showed impartial Eglin Field statistics, not Wright Field's made a difference. Although Wright Field might have had the same answer, the fact that it was done in Eglin Field made it... no axe to grind. Very important.

Anyway, these tests showed that the ME-109 and FW 190 had one characteristic weakness, that they would stall out in an accelerated turn. You get them in a high-G turn, and they would stall out and lose control. We turned it to Red McCulpin. We finished our chit-chat and I turned to Red and said: "What of excitement happened lately.? He said: " I had a pretty good day, about three days ago." He said: "We were out after some tanks and we got down, working them over. The going got rough; the visibility wasnt any good," and he said, "I got separated from my wingman and I found three Focke-Wulfs on my tail. I'm out of ammunition. I dont have more than a couple of rounds in the gun. So all I could do is to push everything down against the firewall and get down on the deck and go as fast as I can. But they're faster than I am, as you well know. They keep creeping up on me. I was just able to go fast enough to stretch them out a little bit.. When the first one got up to where his bullets were coming real close, I pulled up as fast as I could and wound up in an Immelman. He followed me right up, and he tried to roll out at the top, and by God, he spun in. So I turned and went for home. Then the other two guys came up. The second one came up; I let him get close, and he spun in. And then, the third one spun in." And then he said: "We'd been moving so fast. The Army had gone over and I got three confirmed kills."

A secret weapon. There was something good about the P-47 and the others.

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Q One of the big controversies has centered about the P-51 which turned out to be the best fighter. It was delayed. The British recognized its value first. I guess Tommy Hitchcock had a role in that. He was aide to AmbWinant.

G I used to fly with Tommy, over there.

Q What's the story of the P-51, as you know it?

G I know a lot about it, but know a lot of people who know more.

Q Did Hap Arnold have a role in that delay?

G I doub t if Hap Arnold has any responsibility. I hate to have you bring up Tommy Hitchcock. He got killed in an A-36. He was a wonderful guy. If you talked to Ed Stooge (?) you'd get the story from that standpoint. I'm not an expert on this thing. But, let me say, from the standpoint of a bomber guy - you know I spent most of my time in the air in bombers - one time I was with "Whiskey Jim" Travis going into Brunswick, the 96th Group. We were leading the whole Air Force. When we made landfall on the Dutch coast, we realized that our ground speed was 30 miles greater than had been brieied. There had been a tailwind. There was no way the fighters were going to catch us because they took off so much later on schedule. So we radioed back and told them that we had this 30 mile per hour excess speed. We tried to slow down. There was no way you could slow down. You have 1,300 airplanes behind us.. So we tried to do an S and we just got screwed up. What they did back home. This was in 8th AF in Jimmy Doolittle's time. They told the fighters to go out on individual flight plans and just get there as fast as they could, as fast as they could get off the ground, as fast as they could get there. By the time we hit Brunswick, none of the fighters had yet arrived. This was in late Spring 1945. We had almost total air superiority, but they were always waiting for us in case our fighters werent there , if something went wrong. They had about 150 fighters waiting there for us, right on our line. They really gave us a working over. We lost 11 airplanes out of 20 in our Group.

Q Any ME-262s?

G There were 262s, but not on that occasion. But, the point is, by the time - see, I had to be in the radar place where I couldnt see what was going on, but I

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could hear bullets going through the airplane - but when I got out, the three P-51s that arrived, only three, and they had broken up this whole formation of 150 airplanes. It was a clear day and they were the only three airplanes in the sky that were pulling vapor trails. That was the way you could tell. To me it was fantastic that we could make an airplane that could take off in England, fly to Berlin, and over Berlin to beat the best the Germans could put up there. I'm not an airplane man, but it was a great thing.

Q I cant recall who told me this, but he said that when the Germans saw the P-51s escorts flying over Berlin, they knew the jig was up, the handwriting on the wall. How many combat missions did you fly?

G Five in Europe.

Q How many in the Pacific?

G Just two with the B-29's and a bunch of crap around the islands.

Q Did you ever get an award?

G Got a Purple Heart. Got hit.

Q This meeting you had with General Arnold (pointing at picture)

G He was giving me the Presidential Medal for Merit. They asked me who I wanted to have pin it on, and I chose Hap Arnold. It is a Presidential award, the highest award..

Q Did he have anything to say on that occasion?

G Sure, but I cant remember what it was. There was some trouble getting the pin through the gabardine suit.

Q I think he was just coming off a heart attack he had suffered in Lima, Peru. Was this January 1946, early or late?

G I think it was January 15, 1946.

Q (Guess that it was a week after he came back from another tour in the hospital in Miami) You can see the lines of his face are haggard. He had a ruddy complexion, I'm told. Were you aware that he was not up to par?

G Oh yes. One of Arnold's characteristics in the time frame when I knew him, when he was already well along, you could walk into his office which was a corner room in the Pentagon. He would walk over and pick up a big chair and

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set it right down next to his desk, for you, for a kid like me. Just his whole approach was full of vitality and eagerness, enthusiasm.

Q Did I ask you if you ever saw him angry?

G I'm happy to say that I didnt, and I wouldnt have wanted to be there.

Q You would not have wanted him to be angry at you?

G No, sir.

Q Did some people fear to be called into his office?

G Sure, it's true of any big man.

Q Did he have a long memory? In other words, if he told somebody to do something, did he pick the guy up a week or a month later and say: "Whatdid you do with the problem I gave you?"

G He had to have a long memory because he was so disorganized. That had to be all in his head.

Q (Ref to 50 balls less one = 49)

G Are you going to see Jackie Cochran?

Q I've seen her twice.

G She must have given you a good story..

Q Oh, yes.

G Before you turn that off, I cant really communicate the real enthusiasm and admiration and respect that I had for General Arnold and his accomplishments.

Q Do you think anybody else could have done the job that he did?

G We didnt have anybody else in sight?

Q What about Andrews?

G Frank Andrews was a very fine man. I knew him. I'm terribly sorry he didnt last the war. But, he didnt have the combination of talents that Arnold had. He was the nearest to it on the horizon,that I could see. I thought Frank Andrews was a great person. The Army didnt have anybody good. It reminds me: I asked MacArthur what he thought of our commanders in Europe. He said: "Commanders? commanders? We didnt have any commanders. Tacticians, maybe, but not commanders."

Q I take it you knew MacArthur? That's another story.

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G Know him? I served on his staff. But I did have this private interview with him. I just think that Hap Arnold was one of a kind. He was the right man, in the right place at the right time. There was nobody else with the combination of talents he had: the vision, the imagination...

Q That's what I tried to tell Frank McCarthy in the little time he gave me, but I'm going to work on him again tomorrow.

G I feel it very strongly.

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Griswald, Francis H. 17 Jun 71

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8 June 1971

Lt. General Francis H. Griswold, USAF (Ret)
Twin Towers (Apt 7E)
3000 Farnam Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68131

Dear General Griswold:

I'm the fellow working on the Hap Arnold biography.

Expect to be in your area on Thursday, June 17th. Will take the liberty to phone it then.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

done
6-17-71

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

21 April 1971

Lt General Francis H. Griswold, USAF (Ret)
Twin Towers (Apartment 7-E)
3000 Farnam Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68131

Dear General Griswold:

You are one up on me. I have my nicknames mixed up. When you say you "knew him," do you mean you knew the other General Griswold or did you know General Arnold, and if the latter, do you feel it would be profitable for us to have a chat?

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosures

MG/sjp

Dear Murray
I knew General Arnold
only slightly
FHG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

16 April 1971

Lt. General Francis H. Griswold, USAF (Ret)
Twin Towers (Apt. 7-E)
3000 Farnam Street
Omaha, Nebraska, 68131

Dear General [illegible]:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold which is to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian, presently assigned to General Grussendorf's office in order to complete this assignment.

I was privileged to spend 18 months on a Brookings Institution Fellowship which enabled me to research all of the vast Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress. I also went into the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Eaker, Andrews, Knerr, LeMay and other collections.

Aside from the written word, I have tried to interview the most important Air Force people who had contacts with General Arnold some time during his colorful career. I ran across a number of references to "Pappy" Griswold in his files, especially in your assignment to the Pacific theater. It may be of interest that I have already interviewed Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, and perhaps 100 others. I have also talked with Hon. Robert Lovett, Charles Lindbergh and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I should also mention that General Glen Martin is a friend of mine and I hope to say hello when I come out that way. My schedule is just shaping up, but I wondered if you could look into your crystal ball and predict that you would be in town on Monday, June 21st. If so I would be delighted to have this opportunity to chat with you about your recollections of General Hap. Any anecdotes, insights, or even scuttlebutt which would give me a better handle on the inner man would be most helpful.

The enclosure will speed your reply to me.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Spec. Assistant to Chief
AF History
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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Dear Murray -
a common one -
law nag Poppy but I remain -

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

16 April 1971

Regards
Pappy

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Murray Green
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AF History
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Encl

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cards re
Hans Kay

Interview, Lieut General Francis Griswold, Council Bluffs, Iowa, 17 June 1971

Q: Talking about Arnold's tendency to grab people in the hall, and give them a job foreign to their experience, did you ever get grabbed?

G: Yes, I did. General Arnold knew that he had seen me before. He probably didn't know my name, but in the hall in the Pentagon, he stopped me and said: "Hey, what are all those P-39's doing up there in Buffalo?" I said: "Sir, I don't know." He said: "Hm-m, how many are there?" I said: "Sir, I don't know." He said: "Get up there and count them." I got on a train, went up and counted them, came back and tried to find him. He didn't want to hear about it. And that was the end of that.

Q: What was your job at the time?

G: I was in Operations, Commitments and Requirements.

Q: OC&R. This was Barney Giles' job?

G: Right.

Q: This must have been 1942 or 1943?

G: Yes, 1942 or 1943, I think. I was head of the Fighter Branch.

Q: And he wasn't interested in the answer?

G: No.

Q: Maybe he had gotten some kind of an answer after you got back?

G: He probably did. I tried to get in to tell him. He didn't want to hear about it.

Q: Given the world wars, if he told you to do something, to stand on your head.

G: I'd do it; I'd do it if I could.

Q: What was your rank at the time?

G: I was a Lieut Colonel. I remember another incident similar to that, again involving General Arnold. It didn't involve me directly, but I was in on it. He made the trip to Africa, and he was concerned because there were so few P-38's in Africa. When he came back to the Pentagon, I happened to be at the meeting. I still remember General Arnold saying: "I know there are P-38's because five were sent to California and I see them making them. I see them on fields around, and there aren't any in Africa. Why aren't there? I want every P-38 made from now on sent to Africa." And, so, every P-38 from then on was sent to Africa. Four or five months later, he came back again from a trip over there. He said to Barney Giles: "Where did all those P-38's.... how in the hell did they all get to Africa?" Giles said to him: "General, you told me were to send them over." He said: "You should have had more sense than that, Giles."

Q: He was a man of great impulses?

G: Yes, he was. A real nice man

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Q: Did you ever see him mad?

G: No, I never did, because if I saw him getting mad, I left. I never did see him mad, really.

Q: There are those who say he had a perennial smile on his face?

G: He did. I think it was a thing you just couldn't get rid of.

Q: It didn't mean he was happy?

G: Not necessarily. He only looked the same.

Q: Do you remember any issues that arose that you worked on which went through Ennud Giles to Arnold? Any crisis situations?

G: I don't believe so. You know, you get soft with time. Probably then I thought it was the most important thing in the world. Now, I can see that it really wasn't. What can I remember?

Q: There are a lot of little things, none of them, in my opinion, to be very important. The P-51, the P-47 and the P-38. Now, I was in the 8th Fighter Command later, and we were largely equipped with P-38's and P-47's. And then we started getting P-51's. And I seem to recall General Arnold say this, but I'm sure he did say it. He said: "I want a fighter that will go to Berlin." The trouble was we couldn't get there. The fighters we had couldn't. He said: "I don't care what it is, who makes it, how big it is, how much it weighs.

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I want a fighter that will go to Berlin." It turned out, actually, that no fighter could go to Berlin, accompanying the bombers directly. And General Kepner, 8th Fighter Command, got the idea of this escort business, where you'd go out and meet them, and go with them, say, 15 or 20 minutes, turn around and come back, and another group would fly out to meet them. Because it isn't speed; it's the time in the air that concerns the fighter. That was a very successful system, but General Arnold got a little upset about a few things. (Talked off record)

Q: We are talking about the philosophy of long range escort. When did you attend the Air Corps Tactical School?

G: 1939. I'm sure I could have been in the Air Force at the time. But the big problem, which I imagine I didn't pass was the battle of Gettysburg. What we used the Air Force for was to shoot up bridges, and tear up railroads. They had a doctrine there, as I recall, you didn't go over 37½ miles from wherever you were working on. And they would say: "I have a problem with an airline [illegible] approaches." The bombers went in; the fighters couldn't get them because they were 40 miles away.

Q: It was a very narrow conception of the fighter?

G: Very narrow.

Q: Do you think that our shortcoming in respect of the fighter long range escort can be attributed to that doctrinal idea?

G: No, I've seen it several times in the Air Force,

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where you'd get a bomber which was quite superior to the fighter which was then on hand. Everybody would say: "Oh hell, why have a fighter. Just a nuisance. They can't keep up with the bomber.

Q: That's what I mean. As between the bomber school which felt they didn't need an escort, and the Chennault school that envisaged the fighter strictly in the interceptor role, there was no planning ahead for the long range escort?

G: Not really. There wasn't. There was no planning indeed for the long range escort at all. The fighters were sitting around practicing on airframe weak. Then the B-17's came out, and I give General Olds credit for pretty much knocking the fighters in the head at the time, because you couldn't catch the B-17, so he said. You couldn't get it as high as it would go. If you did catch it, they'd knock you off. That was his philosophy. Of course, the thing that caused the long range escort to be very much in demand — the bombers went on a mission, 24 of them, and 23 of them wouldn't come back, they wanted fighter escort in the worst possible way.

Q: This gets us into the P-51 which in its early version had the Allison engine in it. It wasn't much good. The British put the Merlin, the Rolls Royce engine, into it. Then, it became a great fighter. [redacted], Tommy Hitchcock has been given credit, for part of that recognition. Do you feel that a fair evaluation.

G: I guess so. I don't know. I happened to be project officer on the P-51 at one time.

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that was in the Fighter Branch.

Q: Where was this, in the early days?

G: This was in the early war. I think we were in the war, but they did have a number of P-51's that were called P-399's, equipped with an Allison non-supercharged engine. It didn't amount to much. It was used by the British as a dive-bomber and a ground-strafer in Africa, I think. There was a Colonel Thayer Olds, not Robert Olds, he and I were more or less given the job of trying to get this P-51 in better shape than it was. Just how that Rolls Royce engine got in there, I don't know. I suspect that Tommy Hitchcock did have quite a bit to do with that, because he was the type that knew the British.

Q: Is there any merit in the argument or claim that Arnold dragged in recognizing the merit of the P-51 with the Rolls-Royce engine?

G: I don't believe so

Q: When did we come to recognize the P-51 as a good plane?

G: After we got that Rolls-Royce engine, you know we started out and had all P-38's and all P-47's. When the war ended we didn't have any P-38's and P-47's. They were all P-51's.

Q: Did they move pretty quickly when they discovered it?

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G: There wasn't so much [redacted], as discovering it. It was pretty well known that it was supercharged. It could go high; it could go fast. The pilots used to say in the 8th Fighter Command, they'd like to have a P-47 to go where they were going to fight, if they were going to fight fighters. Fighter-men in a P-51 would come home with P-47's because it was almost impossible to shoot down a P-47. With the supercharger and everything, you could not hit the pilot, you couldn't get through there. But the P-51 was really an outstanding airplane. We used to call them — I won't say what we used to call them — when they had the Allison engine. I don't want to insult General Motors.

Q: You mentioned the P-399. There was a P-400. What was that.

Q: Maybe it was the P-400?

Q: Was the P-400 a variation of one of the airplanes?

G:

Q: The P-400, was that the double fuselage?

Q: I don't know what it was, but I see references to it in a history.

G: I think the one-fourteen I was talking about was called the P-399. Maybe not. Maybe the P-400 was the P-51, that they took two fuselages and made a bigger P-38 out of it.

Q: I talked to General Frank O'D. Hunter, and he was no fan of General Arnold's even though he was

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one of his protégés, because he felt that Arnold did him wrong in taking him out of the 8th Air Force. And then he did him wrong on the segregation problem.

Q: He didn't do him wrong. Hunter was doing what he thought best. You know, that 8th Fighter Command was an interesting unit. General Hunter had made most of the people who were in the 8th Fighter Command were in World War I. Stovall, oh very wealthy people, Harkness. The people with lots of money. There was a million dollar effort out there. When General Kepner and I got out there, the million dollar aspect disappeared in a hurry.

S: All of those people and they were good people, Jake Stanton — the whole bunch of them flew and were real good people, in spite of their money. Jake Stanton — but they were in World War I.

Q: In other words, your feeling (is) they had not progressed?

S: They were fighting (in technology of) World War I

Q: They were fighting the old dog-fights of World War I?

S: Very few of them flew. Tommy Hitchcock died. None of the rest of them. Of course, General Hunter's aide, ~~with the long pedigree~~ Cookie Rather, was an 11-goal polo player. And I guess we had six or seven millionaires. It was known as the millionaires ~~leg~~ league — six or seven of them.

Q: Eaker himself didn't last very long after Hunter left ETO?

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G: Well, I don't know much about that. That's another problem. He had gone down to Africa.

Q: ~~Eaker~~ Arnold got progressively disenchanted with the situation in the 8th Air Force. He was pouring all the B-17's into the 8th AF. After the 2nd Schweinfurt raid - Black Thursday - they stopped flying deep missions. So he made the decision. It was a very traumatic experience for a lot of people.

G: I have said, I always will say that I don't want to be in command of anything first, because if you make mistakes, you get fired out. The guy who comes to relieve you will have seen all those mistakes you've made. You will either have lost the war then, or you will start to win. When General Kepner and I got there, things were just even. Then they started where we could go out, and go. They'd leave. not pay attention to the Germans. When they saw us, away they'd

Q: Eaker made this point. He used the baseball analogy (off record)

G: He struck out. Saying: "I do ~~Don't be rash~~ not want any big wing tanks because I'm not going to go much beyond the coast." So that meant....

Q: In other words, Eaker backed Hunter's decision?

G: I don't know whether he backed him. It didn't make much difference.

Q: Anyway, they tried to make Hunter feel not too badly about it because he got his promotion

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G: It wasn't anything that Hunter did, or something maybe he didn't do. I'm sure that Hunter said: "I'd love to take the wing tanks if you want to escort the bombers to Berlin."

Q: The analogy is just interesting, because Arnold took Hansell out of the 20th AF and put LeMay in. Hansell went through the trials and tribulations of the volunteer period, and LeMay took advantage...

G: LeMay was winning. LeMay, I knew real well. Real outstanding man.

Q: Did you serve with him out in the Pacific?

G: No, I never directly served with him out in the Pacific. We grew up together and I served in the same place he did. I never served under him until I came to SAC out here. But he and I were awfully close

Q: Did LeMay ever talk to you about taking Hansell out of there?

G: I never knew Possum Hansell very well. No I didn't. I didn't know anything about it.

Q: Getting back into the fighter business. You were in the fighter branch. Did Wright Field drag its feet on getting wing tanks.

G: No, I don't think so. There were so many things that had to be done at the time. Everybody had their own project that they wanted done. They wanted all sorts of things-

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conflicted. They had to have a priority. I don't know who set those priorities. We didn't. Operations, Commitments & Requirements did. They had to be told real forcefully we wanted wing tanks, instead of something else. I don't think anybody dragged their feet

Q: I talked to General Barney Giles. Beautiful man; soft spoken. It is kind of curious that he was such a gentle, soft spoken man while Arnold was such a "tiger". I'm just wondering whether Arnold chose him because he was less a firebrand than, let's say, another man who would stand up to Arnold, Spaatz

G: ~~Tooey~~ might have, but I imagine that General Arnold was so — there was no way ....

Q: Do you have any other circumstances where you ran into General Arnold or were affected by him?

G: I really don't. I wasn't paying too much attention in those days. A peculiar thing that happened to me. General Arnold didn't have anything to do with it. We came back. The war was over. For some reason, there were a few of us promoted — to Major General. Apparently, before I'd been promoted (about 40 feet blacked out — something about nobody in 20th AF knowing Griswold was promoted ahead of some others)

G: Arnold kept his hand in on all promotions.
Q: What about a "black list"?
G: I don't know if he really did.
Q: Everybody has a "blacklist"
G: I don't know that General Arnold had one.
Q: You know there are certain guys who can do a

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job, and certain people who can't do a job. Jackie Fickel?

G: Jackie Fickel was one of the old timers

Q: They took him out of there, though?

G: They figured he was....

Q: Over the hill?

G: Yes, but a real fine individual guy. I worked directly for him.

Q: There was great alarm on the West Coast, right after the war started. Everybody the

G: Yes

Q: Everybody thought the Japanese coming to California?

G: Yes. I was sent up to San Francisco to Regional Control - in 4th Army Corps Area.

Q: In DeWitt's office?

G: I wasn't in DeWitt's office. I had my own office, I had Earl Warren, Lieut Gov. of California.

continued

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Interview - LTGEN Francis Griswold, Council Bluffs, Iowa, 17 June 1971

Q: You say you were at March Field at the time

G: On Pearl Harbor Day,,yes.

Q: You know, Arnold was out on the West Coast, he was quail shooting with Donald Douglas at Bakersfield. He got into Sacramento and kissed off Truman Landon and those B-17s flying over there. Those are the B-17s that came into Pearl Harbor in the middle of the attack. Nobody there expected anyone to attack Pearl Harbor. Arnold and Marshall and all the big brass in Washington figured that if there was an attack the Philippines, ~~this would be~~

G: ~~I assume so, I don't know.~~ That's beyond me then

Q: Yes, I guess so. George Kenney came in to head up the 4th AF there for a while, didn't he?

G: That was before I got there, I think, because he had gone to Japan.

Q: The SW Pacific?

G: Yes, the SW Pacific, wherever he went, and when I got out there, Gen Fickel, I think Gen Ryan, William Ord Ryan, were there.

~~Q: I talked to him~~

~~G:~~ And after that, I don't know who came in next

Q: Did you get involved in any of the Lend Lease problem, shipping planes out? You were in Fighter Development?

G: Yes, Fighter Development.

Q: Then your view is that we got the P-51 as fast as we reasonably could?

G: Well, when the decision was made, you couldn't build all of everything

Q: We built a lot of cats and dogs, though?

G: There were a lot of cats and dogs, but out of those cats and dogs we got a cat and a dog that were good

Q: ~~Yes~~, That did the job?

G: You concentrate on one and it could be real bad,

Q: That's right,

G: And the P-38 it was known as the Allison time bomb among the pilots of the Fighter Command. It was just a question until the engines blew up, It was a time bomb.

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~~Q: Is that right~~

~~G: Yes~~

Q: The P-38?

G: ~~uh huh~~. Yes It was not a well liked airplane, because you could tell what it was 97 miles off, with a bank. With the 51 they were sort of like a German airplane.

Q: They used to look a little bit like the FW190?

G: Yes, they did. Maybe the guy that looked at the ~~FW190~~ FW-190,

Q: By the time he decided that it was a P-51 it was gone?

G: Normally fighters didn't fight fighters unless they were out protecting ~~property~~ bombers. We never sent fighters out to fight fighters.

Q: Arnold was terribly worried the Germans would develop the VT- fuse, They didn't at this time, ~~that~~ This would have been a terrible disaster, Of course, they could stay above the bombers and drop these shells.

G: Oh yes, it was all these things, None of them were really... They had the B-17 they were putting on ~~the end of~~ TNT and flew it over to the French coast.

Q: You mean the "Weary Willies"?

G: Whatever it was called

Q: At the end of the ~~if~~ war

G: All those things were somebody's brainstorm, not exactly. I don't know of anything like that was ever startling.

Q: Was Arnold in love with gimmicks?

G: I don't know. I don't think so

Q: He was great for guided missiles, and for glide bombs, torpedoes,

G: I don't think those things ever amounted to anything, either.

Q: Well, in certain specialized situations, torpedoes in the Pacific...

G: Well, torpedoes, yes, that is something else. The B-25 with the 75 mm guns in it, I fired that a couple of times, ~~and~~ We did drop some torpedoes from the B-25.

Q: Do you remember the XB-40 and the XB-41, That was the armored escort in the absence of a suitable escort? ~~this is~~ ...Whose idea was that

G: Idon't know whose it was.

Q: It didn't last very long.

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G: No, it couldn't get in the air with all that weight

Q: I guess they were too slow?

G: You couldn't get an escort that was slower than that. That's what happened to this thing, I've forgotten what they called it, a little thing that was supposed to go ahead of the bombers, made by Northrop, a little engine on it

Q: Oh, you mean postwar?

G: Oh, during the war, when they were trying to get it

Q: The drone?

G: And it turned out that it was slower than the bombers, so they never bought any of them.

Q: Did you have a lot of trouble with Wright Field, getting them to be responsive to OC&R?

G: I don't think so.

Q: Arnold seemed to have a very hard line for the people at Wright Field, they never seemed to satisfy him.

G; Not surprising. At Wright Field, you get it in there where they've had civilians in there from the Year 1. The military think they run those places. They think they run Rome, but they don't.

Q: The old line bureaucracy? Did you know anything about Benny Meyers?

G: No, I just knew Benny Meyers, ~~was all~~. I didn't know anything about him.

Q: What was your impressions?

G: Never knew him that well. He was at Wright Field and I had a brother in law who was ~~stationed~~ a surgeon in the AF, Harry Armstrong, ~~and~~ I saw Benny. I don't think I ever shook hands, never met Benny. So I don't know.

Q: He was one of Arnold's favorites?

G: Well he was because he used to get things done. A lot of things done, a couple of wrong ones.

Q: ~~Was~~. Did Arnold bypass Echols to give Benny Meyers ~~sort of~~ a lot of authority?

G: I doubt it, I don't think so. You are asking me things I don't know the answer.

G: (Ref A-bomb)

Q: Was this before it was dropped?

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G: Yes.

Q: Oh, you were there before it was dropped?

G: I was there when Gen Spaatz and General LeMay were there. I don't know who all were there. I knew somethigg was going on. I didn't know what it was. We started back, I was in Okinawa at the time, from Guam to Okinawa, and we heard on the radio compass, announcement that Spaatz made, that they dropped the bomb, and with power of 20,000 tons of TNT

Q: There is one incident that I'm trying to get a little more information about. Do you think anybody but Arnold could have done the job?

G: Sure

Q: Who?

G: Andrews. I can think of a whole bunch of them. Gen Andrews, I think Gen Kepner could have done the job,

Q: Of running the AF during the war?

G: Yes. Sure, there were a lot of people. Like when you pick the Chief of Staff of the AF, how many others could do the job, ~~if any~~.

Q: How about Emmons?

~~G: is he still alive~~

~~Q: No, he's not~~

G: I don't think he could have. I knew him over in Hawaii, and I just don't think he had it

Q: But Andrews?

G: Andrews could

Q: He had great stature. Another guy comes out very good in my research is Horace Hickam

G: I never knew Hickam.

Q: Everyone said he was one of the greats. ~~Everybody said he would have been one of the greats~~

G: I think he would have; I never knew him.

Q: But Arnold, it was lucky in a way that Arnold was there on the job when the job had to be done, ~~in the manner, I think, tremendous spirit~~

G: I think other people could have done it, but I agree with you, it is

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fortunate that Gen Arnold was there.

Q: I wanted to call this, "Hap Arnold - Man In A Hurry" - the publisher thinks that is a little facetious, what's your opinion. You know, he wanted to get everything done yesterday

Q: He was in a hurry all right, to get the right thing done, I hope. Well, but you didn't always know what the right thing was. That's the trouble when you are in that much of a hurry.

Q: If you came and said, whatever it was he was asking, "I can get it done in three weeks," he asked you to do it in one week or two weeks, wasn't this the type of thing he did?

G: Yes, I think most people do that, anyhow. Because you always cover up for yourself, by saying it is going to take longer than that, so I will say it will take longer, ~~and make sure, I think that's natural human tendency~~

Q: You know, somebody told me that Andrews ruled or directed by affection and loyalty - Arnold, by fear. What do you think?

G: I don't know, I can't comment on that, I was at Selfridge with Gen Andrews was Commander, I went in and asked him permission to marry, I knew him fairly long, I knew his daughter, his son, ~~and I doubt~~

Q: But his staff had a great deal of affection for him?

G: ~~I don't know~~ Yes I know they did, I was not on his staff, ~~but~~

Q: Those who were associated him like Knerr, Ralph Royce?

G: He was a very very nice looking man.

Q: Did you know "Sue" Clagett?

G: Just to have him pointed out to me was all

Q: He was close to Andrews. And this is pointed out as a sort of ~~black mark~~ negative mark on Andrews career, that he was loyal to guys who didn't deserve it.

G: Well, its something you've got to think about, when I got in the air Corps in '28, I went in as a flying cadet, most of the senior people in the AF didn't like airplanes, they didn't like to fly airplanes, they just didn't want to get in the airplane and fly it, ~~and~~ It wasn't a good air force at the time because the senior people didn't like the airplanes. I remember Gen Danford, the Ch. Air Corps had to get a little ladder and get up and get in a PT, I'll give him credit for that. At Selfridge, fly around and around and around

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the field for 3 hours, land, they would bring his ladder out and he would get out. That was his flying. He was a very pleasant man, in a way. But I had to call on him, of course, I didn't know what to say to him. We talked a little bit, and finally he said, LT, do you have an automobile, I was interested in the cars at the time, I thought, oh boy, here we go, something I can talk about, I said, yes, sir, I sure do, he said, you don't need one.

Q: Who did you fly air mail with, B.Q. Jones

G: No, I was at Indianapolis,

Q: Then you were under Horace Hickam,

G: I don't know who I was under to tell you the truth. But I was sent down to Langley Field, flag had P-16 to have something done to it, ~~and~~ I can remember testing out to go back to Selfridge, ~~and~~ Somebody drove out in the car and said, whoever was the commander down there, wants to see you, I've forgotten who it was now, but he was a Col, So I went in, reported, he said, I have authority to keep anyone here and put them on air mail. He said, you put that airplane in a hangar and forget about it, he said, you get a P-12, and take it to Middletown, and get a gyro put in it. So I did, and they put the gyro in, ~~and~~ I was a 2nd LT then, But I had been in years, so I was/~~the~~/senior as hell, I guess, because they made me control officer in Indianppolis. I was responsible for the flights from St. Louis, to Pittsburgh, to Indianapolis to ~~Dandelion~~ Vandalia.

Q: I'm not sure if that is the Eastern Zone or the central Zone.

G: I don't know who was ahead of it.

Q: It was either Horace Hickam or B.Q. Jones?

G: I don't remember who, but we had all the weird planes, P-12s,

Q: You could only put about 50 lbs of mail in it,

G: We had to search the P-12, under the seat, and behind the seat, and little headrest,

Q: ~~The~~ ~~AF~~ , or the Air Corps got a black eye in that thing because of the casualties,

G: Well they didn't deserve it, because no one knew anything about instrument flying. I had never seen the horizon until they put one in Middletown, and I didn't know what it was for zo

Q: Did you feel that Foulois took on a job, and said he could do it, and give

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us 10 days, he was supposed to have said this to Jim Farley, ~~give us 10 days and we will fly the mail~~, which was stretching the capability

G: Ithink it was, he should have said, we are not trained to fly in bad weather, or much at night, ~~and~~ we'll fly it in the daytime, we'll fly it in good weather, like we do now, we only fly when the weather is good, we had done that.

Q: Did you know anything about Arnold's role, he had the western zone?

G: No, I don't know

Q: Do you have any knowledge of the Alaskan flight?

G: No, nothing

Q: When the GHQ AF was set up, where did you go

G: I think I was at Langley then

Q: Then you were in Andrews Hqs.

G: Yes, I was in the 8th Fighter Group

Q: Who had that, Tony Frank?

G: No, General Kepner

Q: Then you served with Kepner for quite a while?

G: Yes.

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Interview: Lieut General Francis Griswold, Council Bluffs, Iowa, 17 June 71

Q Talking about Arnold's tendency to grab people in the hall and give them a job foreign to their expertise, did you ever get grabbed?

G Yes, I did. General Arnold knew that he had seen me before. He probably didn't know my name, but in the hall in the Pentagon, he stopped me and said: "Hey, what are all those P-39's doing up there in Buffalo?" I said: "Sir, I don't know." He said: "Hm-m, how many are there?" I said: "Sir, I don't know." He said" "Get up there and count them." I got on a train, went up and counted them, came back and tried to find him. He didn't want to hear about it. And that was the end of that.

Q What was your job at the time?

G I was in Operations, Commitments and Requirements

Q OC&R. This was Barney Giles' job?

G Right

Q This must have been 1942 or 1943?

G Yes, 1942 or 1943, I think. I was head of the Fighter Branch

Q And he wasn't interested in the answer?

G No.

Q Maybe he had gotten some kind of an answer before you got back?

G He probably did. I tried to get in to tell him. He didn't want to hear about it.

Q I guess the word was, if he told you to do something , to stand on your head

G I'd do it; I'd do it if I could

Q What was your rank at the time?

G I was a Lieut Colonel. I remember another incident similar to that, again involving General Arnold. It didn't involve me directly, but I was in on it. He made the trip to Africa, and he was concerned because

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there were so few P-38's in Africa. When he came back to the Pentagon, I happened to be at the OC&R meeting. I still remember General Arnold saying: "I know there are P-38's because I've been out to California and I see them making them. I see them on fields around, and there aren't any in Africa. Why aren't there? I want every P-38 made from now on sent to Africa." And, so, every P-38 from then on was sent to Africa. Four or five months later, he came back again from a trip over there. He said to Barney Giles: "Where did all those P-38's... how in the hell did they all get to Africa?" Giles said to him: "General, you told me we're to send them over." He said: "You should have had more sense than that , Giles."

Q He was a man of great impulses?

G Yes, he was. A real nice man.

Q Did you see him mad?

G No. I never did. because if I saw him getting mad, I left. I never did see him mad, really

Q There are those who say he had a perennial smile on his face?

G He did. I think it was a thing you just couldn't get rid of.

Q It didn't mean he was happy?

G Not necessarily. He only looked the same

Q Do you remember any issues that arose that you worked on which went through General Giles to Arnold? Any crisis situations?

G I don't believe so. You know, you get soft with time. Probably then I thought it was the most important thing in the world. Now, I can see that it really wasn't. What can I remember?

Q There are a lot of little things, none of them, in my opinion, to be very important. The P-51, the P-47 and the P-38. Now, I was in the 8th Fighter Command later, and we were largely equipped with P-38's and P-47's. And then we started getting P-51's. And I never heard General Arnold say this, but I'm sure he did say it. He said:

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"I want a fighter that will go to Berlin." The bombers could get there. The fighters we had coudn't. He said: "I don't care what it is, who makes it, how big it is, how much it weighs. I want a fighter that will go to Berlin." It turned out, actually, that no fighter could go to Berlin, accompanying the bombers directly. And General Kepner, 8th Fighter Command, got the idea of this escort business, where you'd go out and meet them, and go with them, say, 15 or 20 minutes, turn around and come back, and another group would fly out to meet them. Because it isn't speed; it's the time in the air that concerns the fighter. That was a very successful system, but General Arnold got a little upset about a few things. (Talked off record)

Q We are talking about the philosophy of long range escort. When did you attend the Air Corps Tactical School?

G 1939. I shouldn't have been in the Air Force at the time. But the big problem which I imagine I didn't pass was the battle of Gettysburg. What we used the Air Force for was to shoot up bridges, and tear up railroads. They had a doctrine there, as I recall, you didn't go over 37-1/2 miles from whatever you were working on. And they would say: "I have a problem with an airline (?) involving airplanes." The bombers went in; the fighters couldn't get them because they were 40 miles away.

Q It was a very narrow conception of the fighter?

G Very narrow

Q Do you think that our shortcoming in respect to the long range escort can be attributed to that doctrinal idea?

G No, I've seen it several times in the Air Force, where you'd get a bon bomber which was quite superior to the fighter which was then on hand. Everybody would say: "Oh, hell, why have a fighter. Just a nuisance. They can't keep up with the bomber.

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Q That's what I mean. As between the bomber school which felt they didn't need an escort, and the Chennault school that envisaged the fighter strictly in the interceptor role, there was no planning ahead for the long range escort?

G Not really. There wasn't. There was no planning indeed for the long range escort at all. The fighters were sitting around predicting an airframe sneak. Then the B-17's came out, and I give General Olds credit for pretty much knocking the fighters in the head at the time, because you couldn't catch the B-17, so he said. You couldn't get it as high as it would go. If you did catch it, they'd knock you off. That was his philosophy. Of course, the thing that caused the long range escort to be very much in demand--the bombers went on a mission, 24 of the, and 23 of them wouldn't come back. They wanted fighter escort in the worst possible way.

Q This gets us into the P-51 which in its early version had the Allison engine in it. It wasn't much good. The British put the Merlin, the Rolls Royce engine, into it. Then, it became a great fighter. Tommy Hitchcock has been given credit, for part of that recognition. Is that a fair evaluation?

G I guess so. I don't know. I happened to be project officer on the P-51 at one time. That was in the Fighter Branch.

Q When was this, in the early days?

G This was in the early war. I think we were in the war, but they did have a number of P-51's that were called P-399's, equipped with an Allison non-supercharged engine. It didn't amount to much. It was used by the British as a dive bomber and a ground strafer in Africa, I think. There was a Colonel Thayer Olds, not Robert Olds, he and I were more or less given the job of trying to get this P-51 in better shape than it was. Just how that Rolls Royce engine got in there, I don't know. I suspect that Tommy Hitchock did have quite a bit to do

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with that, because he was the type that knew the British.

Q Is there any merit in the argument or claim that Arnold dragged in recognizing the merit of the P-51 with the Rolls-Roysce engine?

G I don't believe so

Q When did we come to recognize the P-51 as a good plane?

G After we got that Rolls-Royce engine, you know we started out and had all P-38's and all P-47's. When the war ended we didn't have any P-38's and P-47's they were all P-51's.

Q Did they move pretty quickly when they discovered it?

G There wasn't so much as discovering it. It was pretty well known that it was supercharged. It could go high; it could go fast. The pilots used to say in the 8th Fighter Command, they'd like to have a P-47 to go where they were going to fight, if they were going to fight fighters. Fighter-men in a P-51 would come home with P-47's because it was almost impossible to shoot down a P-47. With the supercharger adn everything, you could not hit the pilot, you couldn't get through there. But the P-51 was really an outstanding airplane. We used to call them--I won't say what we used to call them--when they had the Allison engine. I don't want to insult General Motors.

Q You mentioned the P-399. There was a P-400. What was that?

G Maybe it was the P-400?

Q Was the P-400 a variation of one of the airplanes?

G The P-400, was that the double fuselage?

Q I don't know what it was, but I see references to it in a history.

G I think the dive-bomber I was talking about was called the P-399 Maybe not. Maybe the P-400 was the P-51 that they took two fuselages and made a bigger P-38 out of it.

Q I talked to General Frank O'D. Hunter, and he was no fan of General Arnold's even though he was one of his proteges, because he

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felt that Arnold did him wrong in taking him out of the 8th Air Force. And then he did him wrong on the segregation problem.

G He didn't do him wrong. Hunter was doing what he thought best. You know, that 8th Fighter Command was an interesting unit, General Hunter had made--most of the people who were in the 8th Fighter Command were in World War I. Stovall, Oh, very wealthy people, Harkness, the people with lots of money. There was a million dollar effort out there. When General Kepner and I got out there, the million dollar aspect disappeared in a hurry. All of those people--and they were good people, Jake Stanton --the whole bunch of them flew and were real good people, in spite of their money. Jake Stanton--but they were in World War I.

Q In other words, your feeling (is) they had not progressed?

G They were fighting in technology of World War I.

Q They were fighting the old dog-fight of World War I?

G Very few of them flew. Tommy Hitchcock did. None of the rest of them. Of course, General Hunter's aide, Cookie Rothmer, was an 11-goal polo player. And I guess we had six or seven millionaires. It was known as the millionaires' league--six or seven of them.

Q Eaker himself didn't last very long after Hunter left ETO?

G Well, I don't know much about that. That's another problem He had gone down to Africa.

Q Arnold got progressively disenchanted with the situation in the 8th Air Force. He was pouring all the B-17's into the 8th AF. After the 2d Schweinfurt raid--Black Thursday--they stopped flying deep missions. So he made the decision. It was a very traumatic experience for a lot of people.

G I have said, I always will say, that I don't want to be in command of anything first, because if you make mistakes, you get

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fired out. The guy who comes to relieve you will have seen all those mistakes you've made. You will either have lost the war then, or you will start to win. When General Kepner and I got there, things were just even. Then they started where we could go out, and not pay attention to the Germans. When they saw us, away they'd go. They'd leave.

Q Eaker made this point. He used the baseball analogy (off record)

G He struck out. Saying: "I do not need any big wing tanks because I'm not going to go much beyond the coast." So that meant...

Q In orther words, Eaker backed Hunter's decision?

G I don't know whether he backed him. It didn't make much difference.

Q Anyway, they tried to make Hunter feel not too badly about it because he got his promotion.

G It wasn't anything that Hunter did, or something maybe he didn't do. I'm sure that Hunter said: "I'd love to take the wing tanks if you want to escort the bombers to Berlin."

Q The analogy is quite interesting, because Arnold took Hansell out of the 20th AF and put LeMay in. Hansell went through the trials and tribulations of the vulnerable period, and LeMay took advantage...

G LeMay was winning. LeMay, I knew real well. Real outstanding man.

Q Did you serve with him out in the Pacific?

G No. I never directly served with him out in the Pacific. We grew up together and I served in the same place he did. I never served under him until I came to SAC out here. But he and I were awfully close.

Q Did LeMay ever talk to you about taking Hansell out of there?

G I never knew Possum Hansell very well. No I didn't. I didn't know anything about it.

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Q Getting back into the Fighter business. You were in the Fighter Branch. Did Wright Field drag its feet on getting wing tanks?

G No, I don't think so. There so many things that had to be done at the time. Everybody had their own project that they wanted done. They wanted all sorts of things--conflicted. They had to have a priority. I don't know who set those priorities. We didn't. Operations, Commitments & Requirements did. They had to be told real forcefully we wanted wing tanks, instead of something else. I don't think anybody dragged their feet.

Q I talked to General Barney Giles. Beautiful man; soft spoken. It is kind of curious that he was such a gentle, soft spoken man while Arnold was such a "tiger." I'm just wondering whether Arnold chose him because he was less a firebrand than, let's say, another man who would stand up to Arnold, ...

G Spaatz might have, but I imagine that General Arnold was so--there was no way...

Q Do you have any other circumstances where you ran into General Arnold or were affected by him?

G I really don't. I wasn't paying too much attention in those days. A peculiar thing that happened to me. General Arnold didn't have anything to do with it. We came back. The war was over. For some reason, there a few of us promoted--to Major General. App Apparently before I'd been promoted--(about 40 feet blocked out--something about nobody in 20th AF knowing Griswold was promoted ahead of some others)

G Arnold kept his hand in on all promotions

Q What about a "black list"?

G I don't know if he really did

Q Everybody has a "blacklist"

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G I don't know that General Arnold had one.

Q You know there are certain guys who can do a job, and certain people who can't do a job. Jakie Fickel?

G Jakie Fickel was one of the old timers

Q They took him out of there, though?

G They figured he was...

Q Over the hill?

G Yes, but a real fine individual. I worked directly for him.

Q There was great alarm on the West Coast, right after the war started

G Yes

Q Everybody thought the Japs were coming to California?

G Yes. I was sent up to San Francisco to Regional Control--in 4th Army Corps Area

Q In DeWitt's office?

G I wasn't in De Witt's office. I had my own office. I had Earl Warren, Lieut Gov of California

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Interview - LTGEN Francis Griswold, Council Bluffs, Iowa, 17 June 1971

Q You say you were at March Field at the time

G On Pearl Harbor Day, yes.

Q George Kenney came in to head up the 4th AF there for a while, didn't he?

G That was before I got there, I think, because he had gone to Japan.

Q The SW Pacific?

G Yes, the SW Pacific, wherever he went, and when I got out there, Gen Fickel, I think Gen Ryan, William Ord Ryan was there. And after that, I don't know who came in next

Q Did you get involved in any of the Lend Lease problem, shipping planes out? You were in Fighter Development?

G Yes, Fighter Development.

Q Then your view is that we got the P-51 as fast as we reasonably could?

G Well, when the decision was made, you couldn't build all of everything.

Q We built a lot of cats and dogs, though?

G There were a lot of cats and dogs, but out of those cats and dogs we got a cat and a dog that were good.

Q That did the job?

G You concentrate on one and it could be real bad.

Q That's right

G And the P-38 it was known as the Allison time bomb among the pilots of the Fighter Command. It was just a question until the engines blew up. It was a time bomb.

Q The P-38?

G Yes. It was not a well liked airplane, because you could tell what it was 97 miles off with a bank. With the 51 they were sort of like a German airplane.

Q They used to look a little bit like the FW-190?

G Yes, they did. Maybe the guy that looked at the FW-190.

Q By the time he decided that it a P-51 it was gone?

G Normaily fighters didn't fight fighters unless they were out protecting bombers. We never sent fighters out to fight fighters.

Q Arnold was terribly worried the Germans would develop the VT-fuse. They didn't at this time. This would have been a terrible disaster. Of course, they could stay above the bombers and drop these shells

G Oh yes, it was all these things. None of them were really. They had the B-17 they were putting on TNT and flew it over to the French coast.

Q You mean the "Weary Willies?"

G Whatever it was called.

Q At the end of the war?

G All those things were somebody's brainstorm, not exactly. I don't know of anything like that ever was startling.

Q Was Arnold in love with gimmicks?

G I don't know. I don't think so

Q He was great for guided missiles and for glide bombs, torpedoes.

G I don't think those things ever amounted to anything, either.

Q Well, in certain specialized situations, torpedoes in the Pacific?.

G Well, torpedoes, yes, that is something else. The B-25 with the 75 mm guns in it. I fired that a couple of times. We did drop some torpedoes from the B-25.

Q Do you remember the XB-40 and the XB-41? That was the armored escort in the absence of a suitable escort? Whose idea was that?

G I don't know whose it was.

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Q Did you know anything about Arnold's role, he had the Western Zone?

G No, I don't know

Q Do you have any knowledge of the Alaskan flight?

G No, nothing

Q When the GHQ AF was set up, where did you go?

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Q Then you were in Andrews/ Hqs/

G Yes, I was in the 8th Fighter Group.

Q Who had that, Tony Frank?

G No, General Kepner

Q Then you served with Kepner for quite a while?

G Yes

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Interview - LTGEN Francis Griswold, Council Bluffs, Iowa, 17 June 1971

Q You say you were at March Field at the time

G On Pearl Harbor Day, yes.

Q George Kenney came in to head up the 4th AF there for a while, didn't he?

G That was before I got there, I think, because he had gone to Japan.

Q The SW Pacific?

G Yes, the SW Pacific, wherever he went, and when I got out there, Gen Fickel, I think Gen Ryan, William Ord Ryan was there. And after that, I don't know who came in next

Q Did you get involved in any of the Lend Lease problem, shipping planes out? You were in Fighter Development?

G Yes, Fighter Development.

Q Then your view is that we got the P-51 as fast as we reasonably could?

G Well, when the decision was made, you couldn't build all of everything.

Q We built a lot of cats and dogs, though?

G There were a lot of cats and dogs, but out of those cats and dogs we got a cat and a dog that were good.

Q That did the job?

G You concentrate on one and it could be real bad.

Q That's right

G And the P-38 it was known as the Allison time bomb among the pilots of the Fighter Command. It was just a question until the engines blew up. It was a time bomb.

Q The P-38?

G Yes. It was not a well liked airplane, because you could tell what it was 97 miles off with a bank. With the 51 they were sort of like a German airplane.

Q They used to look a little bit like the FW-190?

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G Yes, they did. Maybe the guy that looked at the FW-190.

Q By the time he decided that it a P-51 it was gone?

G Normally fighters didn't fight fighters unless they were out protecting bombers. We never sent fighters out to fight fighters.

Q Arnold was terribly worried the Germans would develop the VT-fuse. They didn't at this time. This would have been a terrible disaster. Of course, they could stay above the bombers and drop these shell

G Oh yes, it was all these things. None of them were really. They had the B-17 they were putting on TNT and flew it over to the French coast.

Q You mean the "Weary Willies?"

G Whatever it was called.

Q At the end of the war?

G All those things were somebody's brainstorm, not exactly. I don't know of anything like that ever was startling.

Q Was Arnold in love with gimmicks?

G I don't know. I don't think so

Q He was great for guided missiles and for glide bombs, torpedoes.

G I don't think those things ever amounted to anything, either.

Q Well, in certain specialized situations, torpedoes in the Pacific?.

G Well, torpedoes, yes, that is something else. The B-25 with the 75 mm guns in it. I fired that a couple of times. We did drop some torpedoes from the B-25.

Q Do you remember the XB-40 and the XB-41? That was the armored escort in the absence of a suitable escort? Whose idea was that?

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Groves, Leslie R. 3 Apr 70

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

Bonnie

Hi -
Pls phone Gen Lowe's
Office for appointment any
morning March 23-28
at 0930-10AM

M

Phone # 332-7851

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Interview LTGEN Leslie R. Groves, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1970

Q: I didn't seem to find any correspondence between you and General Arnold.

G: No, I only wrote to Gen. Arnold once or twice after he retired, and I never wrote to him before that time when we were in Washington. My business was always verbal, but I may have written to him once or twice after the war--after he had retired. I know that I either wrote to him, in reply to a letter, or I talked to him. Gen Arnold apparently thought my advice was worth something in this particular affair. He told me he was being snowed under with correspondence and wanted to know what I did with it, and I told him that I divided it into the personal and non-personal. And if it was non-personal, I used franked envelopes. He said: "Well, most of mine is non-personal, and it's from people I don't know," and I said: "Well, you have to answer them, because, otherwise, you will bring discredit on the Army if you don't. I think it is perfectly proper for you to use franked envelopes in such a case." I said: "If it were somebody that I knew, then I wouldn't do it," and he expressed his gratitude and that was about the size of it.

Q: Did he estimate what it cost him to write a letter?

G: Yes, he said that it was costing him about $6 a day in postage alone on things that he, autographed requests, things of that kind.

Q: You know, money was a great problem with Arnold, because when he retired he didn't have enough money to live a comparatively simple life on his ranch. He loved that ranch of it. Warner Bros. bought the movie rights for some books that he had written for boys.

They gave him $36,000 and this money was used to pay for the ranch.

G: He never seemed to be able to handle his own finances very well. He was like many people in the AF. They just spent their money pretty freely.

Q: He had a hard go with his finances. His estate was $19,000.

G: I knew it was very little.

Q: It was very little, and Mrs. Arnold had to go to work and sell real estate. She has a problem right now, she is 83 years old, and she doesn't have enough to stay on this ranch.

G: Doesn't she get money from the government, his compensation?

Q: Yes, do you know what her pension was when he passed away as a five-star? $78 a month.

G: Yes, I knew that's what it would be, but now she has got service connected disability. That runs up to pretty close to $400.

Q: Yes, of course, she lives at this ranch, and she is talking now about moving into an apartment. But I think it would kill her, because she has all his memorabilia, his flags, and things that he acquired, and she lives, she talks about him all the time. I think if she moves into a little apartment, I think this would do her in. So I think in some way it could be arranged. Incidentally, she did mention she is a one-third partner in this enterprise, and they gave us a modest advance, $1,250 each. Mrs. Arnold will share in any royalties, this book.

G: Would you like to just start off?

Q: Do you recall your first encounter or meeting with Arnold?

G: No, I don't recall anything particular about it. I'm trying to think what was the first one, I imagine, I could find bychecking in my diary, although I'm not certain. I didn't keep my diary, it was

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kept for me. It only shows very briefly, in most instances, where I was, for example, when I went to see Gen. Arnold. But if I went to see Gen Marshall, and then went on to see Gen Arnold, it wouldn't be in there. In some cases it would just be going to the Pentagon. But the first thing--time I saw Gen Arnold, that I recall to talk to him at all, I'd met him slightly when he first became Chief of AF.

Q: In 1938, you mean after Westover was killed?

G: After Westover was killed, and I was in G-3 at the time. There was a big problem. The AF had underestimated their cost as usual, and Arnold had said he would produce so many planes out of so much money, and they were supposed to be big planes, but he found that he couldn't get all that. So they were cut back, some of them were just little baby trainers. They still counted as planes.

Q: Was this his doing, or was this the doing of Spaulding?

G: It was some of the people in his office.

Q: Of course, from my reading, they had this 2,320 plane program. Woodring and Louis Johnson were in the picture at this time. the AF was pushing for B-17s. Of course, they cost $250,000 a piece, and you couldn't get many of those for the money available. So within the G-4--this was Gen. Spaulding by name.

G: Which Spaulding? Is that the engineer Spaulding?

Q: Well, in about '37?

G: I don't know if he was there or not, I think he was.

Q: In any event, within the War Dept General Staff, they wanted the Air Corps to buy smaller planes so they could get more planes for the same amount of dollars. But was this Air Corps' underestimating its requirements?

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G: Yes. What happened was--that was the engineer's fault. Of course, he was 10 times smarter than Arnold in every way. The Air Corps had stated that they could get these planes, and, of course, the budget always cut people down, and they still stuck to their story. They had nobody who was astute in handling Congress, testifying before committees. So they just stuck to their story that they would, finally, I think Arnold was finally the one who testified that yes, they would get so many planes for so much money. They finally wound up getting a lot of little planes.

Q: But that wasn't their doing. It was the War Dept?

G: That was their doing.

Q: They wanted big planes.

G: They wanted big planes, but they agreed to producing that many planes for that much money.

Q: Well, they agreed because it was opposed.

G: They agreed because they didn't know how to handle Congress.

Q: Well, this is probably true.

G: I know that, because there were very few people who did know how to testify before Congress and get the right questions asked. That's the first requirement--to get the right question asked. But in any case, Andrews became G-3. That was just after I was assigned to G-3. I went there in '39. Then I was away for all summer on a special mission, got back around about late in November. And then Andrews came in there, and took the place as G-3.

Q: Who was his predecessor?

G: Robert M. Beck. He is still alive, in Washington. I don't know how sharp he is, but he would be a good man to talk to, I think. In any case, Andrews set up this special section to handle Air Corps

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matters. There was a great deal of friction between G-3 and Arnold, and it was made much worse because I think Andrews felt that if Westover had only been killed a few weeks earlier, he would have been Chief of Air Corps, instead of being in the line.

Q: You mean when he was available after his GHQ duty?

G: If Westover had been killed while Andrews still had GHQ he would have been made Chief of Air Corps, logically.

Q: Well, he was killed when he was GHQ AF.

G: No, he was killed...

Q: He was killed Sep 21, 1938.

G: Anyway, it was tied in with his assignment, and he always thought that he would have gotten it if he hadn't been tied into that particular assignment.

Q: My recollection of this is very good, I think, Arnold became Chief of Air Corps, Sep 29, eight days after Westover was killed. This was '38, Andrews was still GHQ AF, until March 1, 1939. Then he went for some months down to San Antonio. He reverted to Colonel. So he was still GHQ AF, although he might have been slated for another job.

G: He thought, anyway, I'm sure.

Q: Did he express his thought to you?

G: Not directly, but indirectly. There was this very brilliant AF officer--there weren't many of them that were intellectual at all--I think his name was Hamilton, although I'm not certain of that name. He was a bitter enemy of Arnold's, I think the trouble was the divorce that this man had been involved.

Q: Not Hamilton, but Howard.

G: Jan Howard. He had been involved in some divorce that cogitated some way with Arnold.

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Q: Yes, he married Mrs. Arnold's sister.

G: Well, that was it.

Q: And he worked for Andrews in G-3.

G: He was in G-3 when Andrews took over and Howard had a great deal to do with it. Howard was a very smart, very brilliant. They set up this special Air Corps section to handle all Air Corps matters, in G-3, and...

Q: Was Howard in charge of that?

G: Howard was put in charge of that, Kuter was in it. Everybody who was in it, excepting Howard, became something during the war. There was this bitter animosity between Arnold and Howard. I got it all from Howard, who talked to me quite freely.

Q: What was your position at this time?

G: I'd been in the same section with Howard when they set this up. He asked me if I would be willing to go along. I said I didn't know Air. And he said: "We want you in there." People used to come in from outside and ask what I was doing there, and I'd say: "Well, we had to have somebody who could add and subtract, and write the English language," which had always aroused a great deal of animosity.

Q: I guess the Air Corps was considered to be slightly unwashed at that time, intellectually and educationally.

G: They really are still, if you look at it frankly, you will see that, if you don't get too excited over somebody who is just an aerial chauffeur. But another one who was in there was Edwards, Idwal Edwards.

Q: I talked to him about a month ago.

G: That section was set up and the thing that I did in it was primarily, I used to do most of the--. Somehow Howard, without letting

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the the others know, would pass almost all their papers to me before they went up to see that there were no wild assumptions, and they were clear cut and all that. But one of the things that we were working on particularly, and I remember, that I worked on with Howard--he asked me to do it--was to determine the plane requirements to enable us to send land-based planes out to intercept a carrier fleet, or any enemy fleet. They had to have a certain range depending on--you could see them in the daylight, and then, from the last daylight on and all that, and that led to the insistence on the part of G-3 on long distance bombers. The Air Force was always quite enthusiastic over the fighters. Much more than they were over the big bombers, and the big bomber group was really.... (tape ran out)

Q: You were saying that the Air Corps at that time was more interested in fighters than in bombers?

G: They were interested, really, in being fly boys. Right from the start. After their initial group, which was top notch officers, they tended to get in there men who didn't like discipline--people like Spaatz for example. And they just weren't--and they always thought that flying was more important than soldiering. Now, Arnold, during the war--one of the criticisms I always had--was that it was a remarkable thing, but if you look at the General Officers that first started to come up during the war in the Air Corps, you find most of them were people who had been on some of these peculiar flights, the Question Mark, around South America, around the world, or something like that.

Q: Arnold was on the Alaskan flight...

G: Yes, Eaker went on that round South America flight.

Q: You feel, in other words, guys who made sensational flying records were not necessarily good administrators or executives?

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G: Yes, or good soldiers. And would take no interest. It was very noticeable at Ft. Leavenworth, when I was there, the AF officers just weren't interested in military matters. That was about the size of it. Oh, they went along with it.

Q: When were you at Leavenworth?

G: I was there in '35-36 when Spaatz was there.

Q: You know, Eisenhower swore by Spaatz. He always wanted Spaatz to be his Air Commander in any operation he was in. He brought Spaatz along. Spaatz was not a very articulate man, but he had a great loyalty.

G: Very likeable.

Q: Loyalty, capable, at lease Eisenhower thought he was capable.

G: Anyway, the first time I really saw Arnold to talk to him, was shortly after the Manhattan Project was started. The date isn't particularly important, but I went to him to arrange for liaison with the AF who I could talk to there without bothering Arnold. And he picked out Oliver Echols, who later fell into disfavor.

Q: Why?

G: I don't know. Something happened, and Arnold got rid of him in a hurry.

Q: My reading of it is that he was sort of a gentle, very southern man.

G: Very gentle, and he stuttered a little.

Q: Whereas his No. 2 man, Benny Meyers, was a driving type of guy...

G: Yes, crooked.

Q: He probably appealed to Arnold because....

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G: Meyers was the kind of a man--I didn't know him--but he was the kind of a man that would undercut his superior in a very unique way, and the superior would never know it was being done. In any case, Arnold at that time assigned Echols, and after talking to Echols, another officer who was, Bim Wilson. I dealt mostly with Wilson. Once in a while I would talk to Echols, but only to keep the channels open. Everything normally was handled by Wilson. After Echols went out, I think Powers came in, didn't he? He, of course, didn't have the intellect that Echols had, I think. But after Wilson, when Wilson went overseas, this guy named Fisher came in. He is the one who had McGuire recently, Anyway, there were certain things. I decided that I wanted to organize this 509th Group, it was time to do it.

Q: You had this idea of the 509th?

G: Oh yes. And I talked to Arnold about it, and said--because that wasn't in the Echols chain--and told him that I wanted to organize this. It was time to start thinking about it. We always went on the assumption that everything would turn out well. Otherwise, it would have taken us 10 years, and so, in talking to Arnold about that--I'm not sure which came first, but it doesn't make too much difference. In talking to Arnold about that, I told him what I wanted, what I thought the commander of that group should be. I said I would be very happy to see Wilson in command. He said, no, he didn't want Wilson because Wilson hadn't had any combat experience. Of course, Arnold had kept all the smart people who had engineering backgrounds, in this country. So I said, well, it's your problem to select a commander, I've just said I would be willing to have him, so he talked to Gross.

Q: Mervin Gross OCF (Operations, Commitments & Requirements)?

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G: He had been in Africa. He knew Tibbets, and he recommended Tibbets. I didn't know Tibbets, and I wasn't going to object anyway. So that's the way that that came about. Then, it was a case of forming the air outfit. But the other thing that happened was that I told Wilson at this time to get B-29s and that I wanted about 9 or something like that. Well, he told me it was absolutely impossible. He said: "You can't even get any." The only way to get them was to talk to Gen. Arnold. I said: "Well, I'll go up and see Arnold." So I talked to Arnold and Arnold immediately ordered Wilson to provide 9 B-29s. I met that Wilson as I was coming out, and he said he had just gotten a call from Arnold. He said: "I never believed he would do it, but he said that you are to have 9 of them."

Q: Was Arnold, at this time, briefed on the atomic project?

G: He knew what it was, yes. Of course, he was fairly familiar with the idea that I was go get anything I wanted.

Q: Did he, in your opinion, understand the implications of the atomic bomb?

G: Oh no.

Q: Or was it just a big bang?

G: It was a big bang, but of such enormous size, that he appreciated it could end the war. There was no doubt about that in his mind, that if we were really successful, that it would. Later, sometime--I had a Commander Ashworth, as a No. 2 boy to Parsons. Tibbets was afraid to talk to his people above him--his AF superiors--about anything. He wanted to more or less stay away from them. So Ashworth told me that these planes were not in good enough condition, and that we should have all new ones. He said: "Tibbets feels that way but he won't say anything." So I went around, again, to Wilson, asked for

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9 new planes, and he said: "Why, that's absolutely absurd! How you got these others, I don't know. But you can't possibly have those. We couldn't authorize them." And I said: "Well, I guess, I'll have to see Arnold." And he said: "Yes. But I don't think he will give them to you." So I went to see Arnold and told him of my viewpoint that these planes were old, and had been used too much. He said: "Well, how many do you want," and I said, "I want one plane that will fly to and from Japan from Tinian, and will get there and get back." And I said: "If anything happens to that one, I want another one." He said: "Well, I think you should have 14 new planes, and 14 in reserve." That was the way that was handled.

Q: Now, this was probably in 1944?

G: That would have been early in 1945.

Q: We had already captured the Marianas. Were we conducting raids from them?

G: Well, they hand't conducted any raids from them yet.

Q: Well, the first raid by Rosie O'Donnell--he conducted the first raid on Thanksgiving Day 1944.

G: Of course, we had started. I don't know when we picked Tinian, but the AF had picked Guam for our place. Ashworth had been sent over. I wanted to have Nimitz informed. Ashworth was sent over by Adm King at my request. I wanted him to do certain things.

Q: Why was the Navy brought into this? Did Ashworth have a technical engineering competence that no AF or Army had? Why was Ashworth brought into this?

G: He was brought in as an assistant to Parsons who was the Navy ordnance officer. He was the best qualified officer. There wasn't any Army Ordnance officer who was available who I felt could handle that job.

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Q: You picked Parsons, then.

G: I picked him on the recommendation of Adm. Pernell and Dr. Vannevar Bush. Parsons had been involved in the proximity fuse development.

Q: So you picked him regardless of service. He was the best man for the job.

G: He was the best man, and we had no compunction about service. He brought in mostly Navy people under him because they were the ones he knew. Ashworth was brought in because he had been a torpedo plane bomber, and was back in this country and was down at Indian Head Proving Grounds, I believe. He was available and was very highly thought of by Adm Pernell, who was my liaison with the Navy.

Q: Did you have any compunctions about selection of Tibbets? He was only around 28 years old?

G: My compunction--I would have never picked him. The reason was that he was picked was because he was a superb flyer, Ashworth told me afterwards, he said that he had never seen a flyer who was as competent as a flyer as Tibbets was. He was superb in that, but he had no officer capabilities, at all. Tibbets would bring in people that he had know, entirely, and I very unfortunately, did not urge Arnold to make this a group of people. Everyone in the group should have been somebody who expected to stay in the service, for the experience they would get. And that was not done, and I always thought that it was my fault, for not telling Arnold that he should have done it. I think he would have done it right away. At any rate, Tibbets was not--I don't think you could call him a field commander--that's the real reason he didn't get promoted. He just was not an officer; he was a wonderful pilot.

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Q: He also had a great responsibility in keeping this group trained and maintaining the security of it?

G: Of course, we put security officers in there. Tibbets' problem was really training, and we sent him down into the Caribbean for that overseas training, because of the story that got around about Nimitz almost being landed on an Japanese Island. This was the story that was told to me. Parsons got it somewhere in the Navy, and I never could get confirmation of it from anybody, and that was, Nimitz was flying in an Army plane--which I couldn't believe--and they started to land at an island where he thought he was going, and they had the wrong island. It was Japanese-held. His flag LT suddenly woke up to the fact and said: "hey, we are landing on the wrong island. This is a Japanese island." Wonderful story if it could ever be proven.

Q: An Air Corps plane?

G: As a result of that, Parsons said and I said: "Well, I don't know if it is true or not. They must have a lot of ocean flying." That's why they were sent down to Jamaica in the Caribbean for about three months. Another thing was, as you know, the AF did not have too many good navigators, they depended on the lead navigator in a bombing raid. Here, everybody had to be a good top notch navigator. Everybody had to be an individual pilot, and everybody had to be an individual bombardier. So that made a difference. But the group was very well trained, excepting that, as I say, the real trouble was the lack of command capacity. That was the trouble. If you read that article by Ashworth, that came out in the Naval Institute some years ago which described the flight over Nagasaki. It was pretty accurate, and the whole trouble there was that Tibbets had put Sweeney in as

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the flight commander. But he'd also allowed one of his staff officers who ranked Sweeney--I think his name was Hopkins--to fly one of the other planes. And it was Hopkins who didn't pay any attention to what Sweeney wanted. He said: "I'm a staff officer. I'm senior to you." The result was they had that long delay.

Q: You mean, in the second mission?

G: The second mission, it almost resulted in disaster. It was all due to lack of command foresight on the part of Tibbets, of putting in somebody there, and not really dominating the affair. They went down there, for example, and one of the key people that we wanted on it, couldn't fly, because he had picked up the wrong equipment instead of a chute. He didn't have it. Tibbets wasn't there to check out. In other words, there was none of this constant check, check, check, and Tibbets was used to the old idea, and I think the present one. A pilot went out to his plane and it was all full of gas and ready to go, and he ran an instrument board check and he took off. But the idea of going out and seeing that the tanks were full of gas, and watching the gas go in, never would have entered his mind. Things of that kind...

Q: What was the problem of that second mission? They failed to rendezvous?

G: They failed to rendezvous plus a lot of other things. The failure to rendezvous was the big one. It wasn't clear. You see, the orders were very definite. The weaponeer was in command as far as the operation went. They couldn't drop the bomb without him, and they couldn't do other things. The pilot was in command from the standpoint of taking off and flying the machine, coming home. The AF was very touchy about that and didn't want to have anything too definite, but

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that was put in a letter by Norstad who was acting for Arnold in that capacity.

Q: In other words, actually, the command shifted once the plane was in the air, or approaching the target. It went to the weaponeer. Was it a question of "when?"

G: No, it wasn't so much "when," but it was a case of not having it definite. All of them, afterwards, the AF pilots--Sweeney, whom I talked to considerably, had forgotten some of the detailed arrangements. There wasn't the communication between the weaponeer and the pilot. The pilot, Sweeney, knew that the plane that had to rendezvous. He knew which one it was, but he didn't tell Ashworth. Ashworth knew which of the two observing planes was the important one. And they both disobeyed their orders, which were to only rendezvous 15 minutes, and then go on. But they kept hoping that the other one would appear, they had all flown up individually.

Q: This was over Iwo Jima?

G: No, they didn't go over Iwo Jima.

Q: Where was the rendezvous supposed to take place?

G: A little island off the coast of Japan. I've forgotten the name of it. They were supposed to rendezvous over the southern end, and this other pilot it was over the whole island. So he kept circling around, and there was some question as to whether they were at the right altitude.

Q: And they almost ran out of gas?

G: Oh yes, they ran out of gas, just barely got to Okinawa.

Q: The first plane went all the way back?

G: Yes, a routine flight.

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Q: Did you, or somebody instruct Tibbets that if they had to drop a third one, that he was to fly it?

G: Yes, I sent the word over. Tibbets' idea was to rotate it through his squadron. As soon as I heard that, my deputy on the ground, Gen Farrell, I sent orders that Tibbets was to fly the next one. They could rotate between Tibbets and Sweeney, and also, they would rotate between Parson and Ashworth.

Q: When you said, orders, did it go through Arnold, or did you have authority to go directly to Tibbets?

G: Oh no, not to Tibbets, I sent them to...

Q: I guess, Spaatz was the overall commader.

G: Spaatz was the overall commander, and the order was very definite on what he was to do. It was understood by Spaatz that Farrell was my representative. Spaatz also looked upon me as his boss back here in a lot of ways, although officially that all came through Marshall.

Q: I think they were all a little puzzled by the technical complexity of this, and simply relied on your judgment.

G: They had to rely on me. They couldn't do anything else. They couldn't overrule me. They did some things that wouldn't have happened if I had been there.

Q: Like what?

G: They didn't, this business of arming the bomb in the plane, on the first flight. I got word of what was happening too late to change it. I had told them time after time. They all got scared of a premature on Tinian.

Q: What did you want them to do?

G: Arm it first and take off with it, because I didn't want

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them to assemble it up in the air. In any case, as far as personal relations with Arnold went, they were always splendid in every way. There was never any thought that I was subordinate to him, or to anyone else. In other words, I was on a par as far as operations went with Arnold. Any time I wanted to see Arnold I saw him at once. Bill Hall can tell you about it. He came in as Executive. He told me he never saw anything like it. If I said I wanted to see Arnold, everything had to be shooed aside, and then Arnold would take me in. He had two offices--his own office, and then back of it, there was an extra room where he could close another door. Sometimes we would go in there, but Hall commented on that. I said: "How do you remember me?" when I first met him. He said, "I was out in Arnold's outer office." And we all knew you. "Anytime you wanted to see the Old Man, you went ahead." And they would clear out. If he was having a meeting for example, they would clear them out.

Q: Were they useing this code word, SILVERPLATE?

G: I don't know who started that, whether we did or they did. But of course, we used code words all the way through much more than....

Q: I have been told this story about SILVERPLATE. Tibbets had that word and he told me he was instructed to use it if he had to, but not to use it unless it reached a point of somebody refusing him something.

G: Yes, there were quite a few things of that kind, where they were supposed to operate without disclosing as much as they could. Now, Kimble who was in command at Tinian was always miffed over the fact that he wasn't told anything about it.

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Q: Frederick Von Kimble. He's in town now, but he is in a nursing home. Have you seen him, or know about him?

G: No.

Q: I wonder if it would be worth talking to him, although, as you say, he didn't know much about it.

G: He would give you some ideas, yes, he would be worth talking to. He never was very bright, but I think the other thing that was of interest with respect to Arnold was the meeting with Marshall the morning that I had reported that we had been successful.

Q: Successful where, you mean at Trinity?

G: Successful over at Hiroshima, and we'd had a long delay in messages. Instead of coming direct. Some way they got in the wrong channel, and it was Top Secret. Of course, it was double coded--coded first with our code, and then it went down, and they recoded it again Top Secret. So nobody in between could read it. They sent this message--it came on Washington by way of the Philippines. That happened twice. First, the initial flight. I didn't know when the plane took off, for hours. I didn't know they had taken off. There was about 6 hours late to find out that they had taken off. There was about almost that much to find out the first news that they had bombed the target.

Q: Did they send back a flash message?

G: Yes, a flash message was all carefully worded. It was put out so that they would just say: "paragraph 1, second sentence; paragraph 2, third sentence." I estimated just what I wanted to know; the strength of the bomb, and everything went smoothly. There were about six or seven things, and I think Parsons who sent the message

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back, had to insert only, I think he said, "visually," to the strength of the bomb, compared to the Alamogordo.

Q: How long after the bomb drop did you find out about it?

G: I should have found out at 6:00 in the afternoon, and I actually got it about 11:30.

Q: Five hours later?

G: And, of course, I had called up the Chief Signal Officer, Gen. Ingles, whom I knew very well. I told him--I said I had some trouble, and he said: "You don't have to say a word to me about it, I don't want to know anything about it. I don't know what happened, but Gen. Marshall has already talked to me, I don't need to be scolded the second time."

Q: You went in to see Marshall and Arnold?

G: No, I saw them the next morning, after they got back to Tinian. They sent a new message with more details. I srote my report to Marshall, which was a little over a page--about a page and a half, I guess. I had that all written, then went to bed and waited for this final report to come in. Then, as soon as that came in, I revised my draft a little and I was over there at that time. I lived in style because I had the suite that had been designed for the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. In the New War Building, we had showers and everything, so I could get pretty well cleaned up in there. Then I went over and was waiting for Marshall. He came in at 7 always, and Arnold usually came in about one minute past 7. So we were already in there, I was talking to Marshall when Arnold came in.

Q: The next morning?

G: Yes, telling him what happened. George Harrison, who was Secy Stimson's man on this thing--sort of a convenience to me more

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than anything else--he was there, and we called. Marshall called Stimson on the phone. Stimson was in Long Island. He told him about the success, and so forth. Of course, we didn't have any idea what damage had been done. Marshall said something about the fact that it was sort of terrible to think that we were sitting here almost gloating over all the dead Japanese that there must be there. I said: "Well General, all I'm thinking about is the Bataan march." And he said: "I'm not particularly concerned about that." When we got out in the hallway, Arnold reached back and slapped me on the back about as hard as he could hit me. He said: "I wish I had said that," and said: "I couldn't think that fast." That was typical of Arnold.

Q: Typical you mean to give somebody credit?

G: Oh yes, not be a bit disturbed. Of course, Marshall told me once about Arnold, he talked very highly of him always--and he said that Arnold--he was talking one day about people who needed to have the pressure taken off. He said: "That's one of the reasons that I go off on these hunting trips with Arnold, is because that's the only way that I can get him to ease up." So if you run across any questions as to why he took the hunting trip it was because Marshall--trouble is, it doesn't do him any good to just go out and play golf. He's got to have three or four days at a time. He said everybody needs that, and that everyone with a big responsibility had to have that time off. When I went out of the office, I thought to myself--you notice I never take any time off and I work much longer hours than any of the rest of the, so I guess I don't amount to much.

Q: You sort of operated outside the regular Army establishment.

G: Oh completely.

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Q: Maybe he felt that you were not directly responsible to him?

G: Oh no, I was directly responsible to Marshall and Stimson, but with no interference of any kind. I never was called on for a report from Marshall or Stimson. I had a few reports only when I thought they were necessary, such as ones that affected the probable time of use, and in that case I would show it to Marshall, Stimson, Arnold, King and Adm. Leahy, on one occasion.

Q: Are you familiar with the debate over whether the bomb should be dropped on a demonstration target or a live one?

G: Oh yes, right in on it.

Q: This was probably generated by Jerome Frank and that group of younger physicists. How did that come about?

G: I guess that anything that was generated in that way was--it was a natural thought of anyone who didn't know anything. Anybody thought that, the Interim Committee started talking about that right away--that is, the people who didn't know anything about it.

Q: You mean Ralph Bard?

G: Yes, Bard, particularly, and Will Clayton too, and James Byrnes to some extent. Karl Compton, the other two, Bush and Conant never had any hesitancy at all. But the others just wanted to know why it wouldn't work and all that. There was never any thought of not dropping it on the real target by the people who were responsible. Really, the responsibility was the President's first, and to not drop it on a real target meant that he was throwing mad on Roosevelt, who had started this thing. Why start a thing like this, if you are not going to use it? And second, there was Stimson who advised Truman; and Marshall who advised Stimson; and myself who advised both Marshall and Stimson. Anybody else was just engaging in conversation, and just

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refreshing. But those were the only people with responsibility, you might say.

Q: Stimson had some qualms about this.

G: Oh, no.

Q: Did he not convene a Scientific Panel to the Interim Committee?

G: Yes, that was done, I think, mostly because I thought it was desirable. But it was a desirable thing to do, and he recognized that. The Scientific Panel was picked by me. The Interim Committee was picked by Stimson with my sitting there all the time we were doing it.

Q: You had Oppenheimer.

G: We had Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrendo, Arthur Compton, Fermi.

Q: And they recommended that it be dropped on a live target?

G: They couldn't see any other solution.

Q: Was part of the reasoning behind that (dropping on live target) was you only had two weapons?

G: Oh no.

Q: Or did you only have two?

G: We only had one, when we dropped it on Hiroshima, we had one. When we dropped it on Nagasaki, we had one. The thing that always amazed me was that no one in the military who knew, and that would have been Marshall, Arnold and King raised any question about my using the single bomb, and without testing it in advance. You see, the Hiroshima bomb was not tested in advance.

Q: When you say you only had one, you mean one at that time?

G: Just one bomb of any kind.

Q: You dropped one three days later?

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G: But we didn't have that when we dropped the first one.

Q: Was that on the way?

G: It was on the way, that is, the materials for it. Actually, you see, if the weather had not been bad, the first one would have been dropped on the 31st of July, or the 1st of August.

Q: There were four targets?

G: Yes, four targets, Kokura, Niigata, Hiroshima, Nagasaki.

Q: And they struck Kyoto?

G: Kyoto was struck out, and Nagasaki was put in, and I can't for the life of me, find any trace of just when Nagasaki was inserted, or anything about it at all, except that it suddenly appeared in a draft of mine. I don't think it was done by the Target Committee, appointed by me. That target committee had AF people in it, and Gen. Farrell was on it. The AF people were strongly supported by Norstad. The first meeting, Norstad and I both talked to them.

Q: Norstad was then Deputy to Arnold for the 20th AF?

G: Yes, I think he was Chief of Staff for the 20th AF.

Q: And Arnold delegated him to represent Arnold in these matters?

G: No, Arnold had said that he should be the one I talk to about any details.

Q: Arnold had a lot of confidence in him?

G: Norstad was a very capable fellow in every way. He was a soldier; he wasn't a fly boy and there was a terrific difference between them. I guess you found that out in your study of this.

Q: Soldier in the sense of having administrative and executive abilities beyond flying?

G: And some military capacity.

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Q: Was there a third one en route when you dropped the second one?

G: No, we held up the third one. The best place to find that is in my book, NOW IT CAN BE TOLD, the description of that particular thing--why I held up the materials on that. I think that is something you can go through and I don't know how much Arnold is mentioned in there. Now there is one thing that is awfully funny. This was this Col Stone.

Q: We are talking about the Stone incident, and I am reading this out of Arnold's GLOBAL MISSION, pps. 588-9. It is not indexed in the book. This has to do with the Potsdam Conference and the selection of targets for the atomic bomb. Arnold writes that repeating his earlier recommendation that Spaatz made the actual selection of targets and that Spaatz coordinate the decision with Gen. Groves. Arnold said he told Marshall he would send Col Jack Stone back to Washington with a memo covering the matter. They Secretary, presumably Stimson, agreed to this, and Arnold says he dispatched Stone back to the U.S. at once. Now, in the book, THE NEW WORLD, 1939/46, Vol I of the History of the US Atomic Energy Commission, by Richard Hewlitt and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., on pps. 390-1 there is a discussion of Stimson summoning Arnold and showing him a report from Groves and two calbes from Harrison.

Q: Why don't you tell me what happened?

G: Stone came back to Washington and reported to the Acting Chief of Staff, Tom Handy, with a message from Gen. Arnold, Handy could not make heads nor tails out of Stone's report and he asked

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Gen Farrell, who was my Deputy on such matters, to come over and help him. I was out of town. He got over there and between the two of them they could get nothing out of Stone. And finally, as Farrell reported to me, he said: "Why Colonel, do you mean to say that you came all the way back from Potsdam with a message for us that was of extreme importance and you don't know what it is?" Stone more or less admitted that. So, when I got back I sent for Stone and tried to, after hearing about it, I sent for Stone and tried to soft soap him and take any fears he had away. But it was absolutely hopeless, Stone didn't have the least idea of why Arnold had sent him back.

Q: Did you ever talk to Arnold about this?

G: No, then I decided that Arnold had been alarmed over the possible safety of the crews, against the explosion that could destroy the airplane. I had already told Arnold that the crew would be just as safe as they would normally be, and that as far as we could tell, they were all right. In talking it over with Wilson's successor, who by then was Fisher, I believe, and I had themplot out in a three dimensional graph, using little balls and wires, the flight of the plane and the flight of the bomb after it was released, to show the distance between the two at the time of explosion. Arnold never asked for it,or ever said a word about his message which he sent back.

Q: What do you think his message was?

G: I don't know, and I don't know whether Arnold's book is right or not, but it doesn't ring true. What's in the New World is completely out. The cables didn't mean anything of what was said at that time. Certainly, Stone, after his meeting with me, did his level best to hide

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from anybody and even myself for the rest of the war. He wasn't going to get involved with us. Handy did put in his cable something about Stone--I've forgotten the exact wording of it now--but merely, which gives some credence to the story as to what Stone was sent over for, but Stone did not participate with me, nor did Harrison, in the framing of this directive.

Q: Do you think his mission was probably in connection with safety of the crew?

G: I don't know what it was, it might have been, why would Stimson have suddenly talked to Arnold about this thing, when Stimson himself had approved the targets. Another thing is: why would Arnold who already knew the targets had been approved and knew that all he had to do--if he wanted to talk to Marshall--Marshall would have told him, yes, the targets were approved. We approved the Grove directive. Spaatz insisted in talking to Handy in front of me, that he thought this was too important a thing not to have the final approval of Marshall. I said: "Gen. Marshall has already approved the directive, and why bother by sending it over there." But Spaatz insisted on it. Spaatz was more afraid, I think, of having to face MacArthur and tell him that this had been going on and where it effected MacArthur so vitally, and I think that was what he really was afraid of.

Q: I am puzzled by this whole business of the Arnold message.

G: So am I.

Q: But you never did ask him about it?

G: No, I didn't believe in raking up things. The war was over. Why should I go out of my way to destroy Stone, who maybe had been an idiot and all that. It was the same thing with the way things went

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wrong on the last bombing. I made no effort to criticize those people. Just like a football coach at the end of the season telling his seniors the mistakes they made in the last game, what's the use of it?

Q: The war was already won. Going back to the business of the message being delayed into Washington, I saw something in some of the Spaatz' files over at the Library of Congress, which may have some bearing on it. They used the term, "Centerboard." From then on any message that had to do with the atomic bomb, should have the word "Centerboard" on there. In other words, this gets priority attention. And that message probably got lost in the shuffle.

G: I'll tell you what happened to it. There were two channels out of Guam, one apparently was an AF channel, and one was another channel. This one got in the wrong channel. It had always been coming through in a hurry and then suddenly, in this critical time. They both went the wrong way.

Q: I think Norstad probably directed this. I know this "Centerboard" thing came through. It seemed the normal thing to give it priority attention, but in light of what you say, this underscored the need to get this information back to Washington.

G: Somebody slipped, and I don't know where it was. Farrell wrote the message out and sent it as normally from Tinian to Guam, and then from Guam they made the mistake in routing.

Q: Routing it via the Philippines. You know, I saw a message from Spaatz' headquarters into Washington, recommending they drop a third one on Tokyo. Do you know about that?

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G: Yes, it was disapproved. Did you see the answer to it? The answer I wrote was, I think, just "disapproved." And the reason was, I didn't want to bomb Tokyo. For one thing, the only thing left there was the Emperor's Palace, and the other thing was with all the city in ruins anyway, what was the use in getting a few remaining blocks?

Q: It was for political reasons. The Japs between August 10 and August 13, were teetering on the brink of peace or war and their emissaries were on Ie Shima negotiating. The Japanese themselves were not clear as to what they wanted to do because the military faction wanted to keep fighting and the civilian faction wanted to end the war. This was to be a psychological or political weapon, to tip the Japanese over into surrender. I guess this was the reason for it.

G: No, there was no reason for it at that time given. I haven't seen those messages recently. If you get some copies I would like to see them.

Q: At the Library of Congress you can see them there. I was wondering whether it was overtaken by the Armistice which was on the 14th.

G: No, it was disapproved?

Q: Let me ask this: did you have the ingredients of the third bomb?

G: Oh, yes.

Q: En route?

G: No, not en route, I stopped the ingredients. There again, you can get the whole story in my book. I stopped them because of Stimson's frequent conversations with me in which he emphasized the future historical position of the U.S. I thought that we would be in a bad way if we would kick the Japs while they were down and tried to surrender. Now, they weren't teetering, they were definitely going to surrender, because they could not face the atomic weapons. That's all there was to it.

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Q: In other words, you were confident that they would surrender. It would just be a matter of hours or days?

G: Yes. I went to Gen Marshall and asked him for authority. I took the message over myself saying when we would be ready to ship it. Then verbally, I said to him: "I recommend that I be authorized not to ship these until before noon of the 13th, on the grounds," the reasons that I gave him, and he said: "I agree with that." And then he wrote on the bottom of the paper, the statement: "No bomb will be dropped without the express prior approval of the President." So on the 13th, when noon came, I knew that surrender plans were in operation, and so I went over. I called to see if I could see Gen. Marshall, and they said, no, he was tied up with the Secretary. So I went over and saw Handy, and I told him that I just had to see Gen. Marshall, and it would only take a minute or two, or if I couldn't see him, the Secretary. He said: "Well, they are both tied up together, and you know what it's about. They are not to be interrupted under any circumstances." And I said: "Well, I'm not going to stay over here all day. I can't do that. I've got too many things to do. So you just tell either one you see, the first one you see, and tell him, and if you see Stimson first, then see Marshall and tell him that I am going beyond my authority, and I am holding this bomb material until they tell me, for another day, or until I can get a definite word."

Q: They had authorized release after noon the 13th if there was no surrender?

G: To ship them over, yes.

Q: If there was no surrender by noon, the 13th?

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G: No, I was just authorized by Marshall not to ship them until noon the 13th. Of course, If there was a surrender, I wouldn't ship them anyway.

Q: There was no surrender?

G: Then I was supposed to ship. But I could sense that it was so close that I didn't want to...

Q: In other words you wanted authority to change your directive.

G: I didn't want to ship it, and I wanted Marshall's approval of that.

Q: Did they ever get shipped over?

G: No. Because I left this message with Handy, and then the surrender came before I got a reply from Handy. He'd seen Marshall, or else I may have gotten a telephone call from Handy just telling me that, "about that matter you are interested in, it's okay." That would be the way the message would have come.

Q: It was okay to withhold?

G: No, just, "It's O.K." In other words, we never discussed that thing over the phone--that could possibly give away anything.

Q: Handy is in Washington, is he in good shape?

G: He looks kind of old, but as far as his mind goes, he seems to be all right.

Q: We are talking about Kyoto on the target list now.

G: I went to see Stimson about some matter--I've forgotten what it was--and told him. He asked me if I was ready yet with my target recommendations, and I told him that I was just about ready, that I was expected to show them to Gen. Marshall the next day. He said: "I want to see it now." I said: "I haven't shown it to Gen. Marshall yet." I said: "It's over in my office. It will take quite

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a while to get it," and he said: "I haven't anything to do. Your office moves pretty fast. You just pick up that phone, and call them, and tell them to bring that report over." So there was nothing else for me to do. As we were waiting there, he said to me: "What are your targets?" And I told him. He said: "I'll disapprove Kyoto." The reason was that when he was Governor General of the Philippines, he came through Japan and visited Kyoto, which was a temple city. But it had a big population. Of course, this was all war work at the time. He said he just would not approve it, that it didn't have any military significance. I said: "It has so many square feet of shop space that is busily engaged that we know of, it wouldn't make any difference." As soon as the report came in, he walked over to the door between his office and Marshall's, and said: "Marshall, are you busy, come in if you are not." Marshall came in, and he said: "Groves has just been showing me his report on the selection of targets." And about a half hour during that conversation, I was trying to get some opening to tell Marshall that I had been doublecrossed by the Secretary, because that should have gone to Marshall first, because it was a military matter. Military matters wentto Marshall. Everything else wne to Stimson. If I had just been discussing with Stimson, without any final thing about the desirability of bombing Kyoto, that would have been perfectly all right. This way I never did tell Marshall. Marshall never said a word then or later. I never mentioned it again. I think he knew what had happened. Or if he didn't know, he didn't care, because I reported to both. Then, I kept insisting on Kyoto. I must have gone back to Stimson at least six or eight times, not believing in the military doctrine that once a superior has made a decision, that's it.

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Because this was something that went beyond that point.

Q: Apparently, the AF supported you on this?

G: The AF, of course,--Norstad had been sort of keeping an eye on this Target Committee, as did I. They didn't support me. They just were in favor of it. What happened--what may have confused you was this--when Stimson turned me down on this, I asked to have these targets reserved so that they wouldn't be damaged in advance. I then went to Arnold, and told Arnold--I think I talked to Arnold, I may have talked to somebody else there, and got the word to Arnold--that it would be a great misfortune if the AF in their normal operations, bombed Kyoto. You see Stimson and Arnold were always at swordspoint on this thing, Stimson didn't, and Arnold kept assuring him, "Oh no, we only hit military targets." If this had been done, and it wasn't reserved, it was very apt to have been destroyed, then the order that you saw not to bomb Kyoto went out, and that went to both AF, so that's the story on that.

Q: What did Hewlitt and Anderson say about you that you say their statement is purely fanciful? Page 390.

G: I said I think we ought to go back at him and see if he won't change his mind. Harrison, who was not a strong man at all, although a very brilliant lawyer and banker, sent this cable over, and he was my means of communicating with Stimson, because Stimson didn't want me to have to go through Handy, so he said Harrison will be contact,

Q: Why didn't he want you to go through Handy?

G: Because he didn't want Handy getting mixed up in it. In other words, he wanted me to be completely independent. If I wanted to tell him something, he wanted it to go without any explanation of any kind.

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Q: Anyway, they said, you wanted to bomb Kyoto.

G: Well, I still said I wanted to bomb Kyoto and Stimson sent back the message saying that it was still disapproved. Then, the next day, and what the authors say, for the President the second message required no answer. But Stimson would have to show it to the President, and to Gen. Marshall and Arnold. There is absolutely no truth in that. He didn't have to show anything to anybody he didn't want to. And that was all there was to it.

Q: The actual reason that you say in your commentary was that Kyoto was a large city and was vital to Japan's production of raw materials. So this is why the AF...

G: Too....

Q: wanted to bomb it. Now you talk about one of the most outstanding incidents you were ever connected with. You didn't know why Stimson would talk to Arnold about it, except to show him your reports and cables, and you doubted if he would ask for Arnold's views more than casually. That was not Stimson's way.

G: This is absolutely right.

Q: "If Arnold's had a view he would have presented them without being asked." And then you say you didn't know what orders Arnold gave Stone. You were out of Washington when Stone arrived, and when you came back, Gen. Farrell told you in quite flowery language, just what he thought of what had happened in your absence. Farrell said that some young AF colonel had been sent back from Potsdam with a verbal message from Arnold to Handy, and that Handy had sent for him in your absence to talk the thing over, as he could not understand what Stone was talking about. Farrell went on to say that Stone was

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so completely confused as to his message that he really didn't know what it was, in fact, has not the slightest inkling of the message. And then you say you are sure it was not long before Handy and Farrell exploded on poor Col Stone. (NOTE: Probably read from "Now It Can Be Told").

G: They could explode, too.

Q: I wonder whether Arnold ever jumped on Stone?

G: I never asked the question when he got back, because Arnold did not have a good memory, and his officers used to be told things to do, certain things. If they didn't approve of it and thought the Old Man was wrong, they just let it sit for a few days and then the Old Man would forget that he had told them.

Q: I was told that he had a pretty good memory.

G: Well, he would in some ways. But he was brought up as a soldier before he became a flyer you see, and he was accustomed to people obeying orders.

Q: You have another commentary on something they said on page 390 (Hewlitt & Anderson). Did they say anything about Spaatz requesting to drop a third bomb on Tokyo?

G: No, not that I know of.

Q: This talks about page 390, line 20.

G: That's what I said.

Q: You refer to a proposal you received from Spaatz to add Tokyo to the list, but you did not approve this as Tokyo was an unsuitable target and might destroy the Emperor's Palace. Moreover, it would seriously interfere with our gaining the peace we desired. Tokyo had been severely bombed already and much of the city was in ruins. But this was a minor reason.

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G: Marshall just says Groves directive approved.

Q: Here is a reference,you have quite a few to CENTERBOARD. I just wondered, that CENTERBOARD was being used before the atomic bomb.

G: I've forgotten when CENTERBOARD came in. It may have been the first code name for it, and SILVERPLATE may have been an AF designation.

Q: I see you have copies of all the rough drafts of cables, you kept it all?

G: No, I got those from the Archives, my papers are in the Archives and they are not subject to inspection by anybody except what I term "serious historians," and then they talk to me about what they want to see anyway. But this, I think, tells the story on the situation in general. Eaker is the man, have you talked to him much, I think if you talked to him about Arnold, you would get a very good picture on Arnold's inclination and so on.

Q: He was very, he wanted me to submit questions in advance.

G: He is a very careful.

Q: I didn't get too much out of Eaker.

G: Eaker's one that could give you a lot, so could Norstad.

Q: I talked to Norstad and I got a lot from Norstad, but Norstad talked mostly about Norstad.

G: Yes, he would, but I think you could get from that a picture of Arnold and how he was, and there was no question but in my opinion, Arnold was a much better man to have at the head of the AF during the war than Andrews would have been.

Q: Andrews was a better commander?

G: Andrews was a better commander. He was much smarter intellectually, and all of that. But he also loved to fly an airplane,

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and he held no regard to safety. That is why he was killed--just his own fault. He always did things like that. That's the same thing that happened with Dargue when Dargue was killed, he was killed because of his own stupidity.

Q: He was sent out, he was going to be commander of Hawaii?

G: Yes, and he was on his way, and he ran into the Sierra Nevadas.

Q: You know Robert Lovett told me that Andrews probably would have been the Eisenhower of WW II if he had lived.

G: Well, that was counted on.

Q: Marshall had an awfully high regard for Andrews. Why?

G: Yes, because he was an awfully capable fellow. As I say, he knew very well that the trouble between Howard and Arnold, but he didn't hesitate to keep Howard in working on this thing, because he knew that Howard could outsmart all the opposite numbers in the AF.

Q: Although in Marshall's book, Andrews is criticized for this and some other things--criticized in a sense that he gave his subordinates too much leeway, that he didn't know how to pick his subordinates. This is Marshall's comment.

G: I think this came about by Arnold and Powers, but the subordinates are not picked. When you sit on the General Staff, he didn't pick his own subordinates, they are always picked for him. They came in from a list--oh, he had something to do with it, but he didn't know why they were.

Q: Are you familiar with the controversy between Arnold and Morgenthau in 1939? Morgenthau was trying to ship out a lot of our planes to the British and French....

G: I'm not familiar with that particular one, but I know that was constant and everybody who fought it, could. They fought it

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every way they could. One man doled out vehicles such as tractors and tanks and the like who was on the Committee that--he said when we go to that committee meeting, we decided what should be done. The next day we get an order from the White House, stating that the British will have all that they want; the Russians will have all that they want, and what's left, we can have. Of course, we are left with nothing.

Q: This was one of Arnold's concerns.

G: That was one of his, too, because he had to build up the Air Corps and all the planes were going to the British. I think the strength of Arnold was the feeling that he was a man of great integrity in every way. He was also very friendly. He didn't have any enemies that I know of that there wasn't really a definite reason for having them. Howard is the only one that I really knew.

Q: Well, he had a couple, Sue Clagett, he was AF. He was one of Andrews' contemporaries, and he was broken and he blamed Arnold for it.

G: That always happens, you just can't be popular when you are at the top.

Q: Arnold, of course, had this great sense of drive. Did he have a sense of humor?

G: Oh yes, his face showed that.

Q: Well, he had a smile on his face, but I've been told that just because of that built-in smile, didn't mean he was happy or pleased with what you were doing, or with the situation.

G: No, but I think he had a hard time with the kind of officers he had under him.

Q: He had several heart attacks, as you know, and he had one in 1945. Are you familiar with his problems with Elliott Roosevelt?

G: Yes, I'm familiar with when Elliott Roosevelt was made a BG.

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Q: How did that happen?

G: White House.

Q: I believe that Pa Watson said that: "Papa wants it done." Is that the way it happened?

G: Marshall said that he had turned it down twice or three times, and said he wasn't going to fight the White House any more.

Q: Spaatz and Eisenhower had recommended it to Arnold. Arnold said he wasn't going to do it, because he didn't. Elliott didn't have the eyesight, for one reason, to get wings. If he couldn't get wings, it meant he couldn't command a unit, and he couldn't get a start. Arnold had his heart attack--this is right around the 1945 Inauguration. It was right in the middle of the "Blaze" incident, too, and that's when the star came. I've been to Hyde Park trying to run this thing down, but they won't give you anything.

G: You won't get anything on it because General Marshall told me at the time that Elliott Roosevelt was on the list, and he said I didn't want to do it, and Arnold didn't wantit. But after all, the White House has asked and asked and asked, and he said: "You can't turn the White House down too many time without impairing your relationships." He told me right at the time, that this was going in, something to the effect that: "Well, I did something that I hated to do today." And he talked, these people talked to me a great deal about...

Q: People have had a lot of confidence in you?

G: They knew that I didn't talk, and they knew that I was disinterested. In other words, I was completely adrift from them.

Q: You knew too much about too many important subjects.

G: And they also knew that I was smart and discrett, never talked about anything and that was about it. That's why I got so much

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from all these people right straight through. Secretaries--they would talk to me about all sorts of things. What did I think of this person, or that person, and what did I think of this happening, including...

Q: Do you have it all in the book?

G: No, I wouldn't put that in. I'm writing now, trying to do things that will go into the National Archives, some of them under restriction and some not under restriction and I don't know whether I've written up Arnold yet or not, but I know I wrote about 25 pages on Gen. Marshall, my dealings with him.

Q: You know, Forrest Pogue, have you been in touch with him?

G: Yes, but he never comes around to see me. He keeps telling me that he's just got to see me and he never has.

Q: When you get around to writing up Arnold, would it be under restriction?

G: Oh, it will be under restriction, because it will deal with people that I don't know whether they are still alive. My theory is that none of this that I write, writing as frankly as what you saw, could possibly be let out now, because if it is done now. If it's done after I'm dead, and the others are dead and before they are dead, then it looks like I am writing a scandal book to get royalties, and I don't need the royalties.

Q: I think you are doing an important job because a lot of memoirs, a lot of important things have gone with the men who have passed on. We will never recover them, there are a number of people that I tried to talk to, who passed on, like Stratemeyer. I never got to talk to him.

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G: There are a great many of them. Have you talked to Charles Boltė. You should talk to him.

Q: Does he know something about Arnold?

G: As I recall, I'm pretty positive of this--I think Boltė was one of those sent up from the War College to join the Arnold staff, and, of course, Boltė was an infantryman and he was finally Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. But I think you can find out from him the officers that came up from the War College to go on to the Air Staff, who were not AF officers. I think you would get a pretty good idea then of Arnold and certain other things.

Q: Were you aware that in 1941, and early 1942, Andrews and his supporter, Knerr were pushing for a separate AF? Arnold was not. Arnold had agreed with Marshall that it would wait until the war ended.

G: I know almost everybody in the AF was pushing for it one way or another.

Q: Arnold was not. Arnold wanted it, but he agreed that he would wait until the war ended. But there were some who were impatient.

G: Oh yes, there always were.

Q: Of course, Andrews was among those impatient ones, and I wonder if Marshall knew about this? Because Marshall was very devoted to Andrews.

G: Oh, I think he knew that he was in favor of it.

Q: Well, I mean everybody was in favor of it, but some were pushing it actively in a political sense.

G: You don't know how much they were pushing it either.

Q: I've seen some correspondence; they were pushing it very hard. Do you remember the half-way house that happened in March 1942--this was under McNarney. Kuter and Harrison worked for him. They came up with this plan, whereby the AAF gained equality with the AGF and the SSF--this is three months after Pearl Harbor, This was

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considered to have taken the wind out of the sails of the all-out unification--now advocates. And it was done, there were several bills in Congress pushing for a separate Air Force. Andrews was among those in that group.

G: Well, I'll tell you, Marshall had learned his lesson I think. In the mess that we got into in establishing the Services of Supply and all that. In other words, you don't change an organization in time of war.

Q: Well, he was opposed to it, and I think Arnold was opposed to it, too.

G: Yes, for same reason.

Q: You know, Arnold never disagreed with Marshall. Marshall brought him into the JCS and the CCS as an equal, Arnold was never quite equal in a sense that their correspondence between them, it's "Dear General"--Arnold to Marshall and "Dear Arnold." There was always this slight differentiation between them. I don't guess Marshall accepted anybody as an equal?

G: No, I don't think he did, but he never addressed me excepting as General. Of course, he never wrote me anything, but in going into his office, he never called me by my last name, just "General." He always did that, and as far as I know, I'm the only one he ever treated that way.

Q: Most people he would say: "Groves, I want you to do so and so." He had a lot of respect for you, but he never called you "Leslie."

G: Oh no.

Q: He never called anybody by their first name.

G: Excepting Philip Peyton. He was, wound up as either MG or LT GEN. He was retired during the war for physical disability, he had

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been a roommate at VMI with him and they were very close friends, always. He's the only one that I know of that he ever called by his first name.

Q: I want to task you about one other thing. I don't know if it was a speech or an article that you wrote, but it is displayed prominently, Facts on File. In 1947, you made a statement, or a statement was attributed to you that the Russians wouldn't have an atomic bomb for 20 years and that only if they acquired the technology via a third party. Do you remember that?

G: Yes, only that isn't what was said. It all came about, and I was quoted constantly on it, as having underestimated the Russian capabilities, which I did. But it was based primarily on the lack of ore, which I never discussed with anybody--available ore. At that time, we didn't know how to use ores that were less than about 5 or 10%.

Q: Well, they had the Czechoslovakian ores, didn't they?

G: No, these came out of Bohemia.

Q: Yes, but Czechoslovakia.

G: They didn't have anything there that would amount to anything. They were old mines, and silver mining starting in 1400. There wasn't too much there, but the Bohemian was a surprise, and also we know how to beneficiate low grade ores by that time, which changed the thing. But I would say my change of opinion came. Originally it was: "How soon could they have it?" We didn't know at that time how much had leaked to the Russians through the British, which afterwards we found out. Apparently Fuchs told them everything, and while that was also one thing to produce one bomb; it was another thing to produce them in

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quantity. We were sure that the Russians and the Germans too could produce one bomb through reactor-pile type of operation. If you took out all safety precautions, which they would have done. They could have sent some Jews down and turn the values. That's all, simple as that, but there was always this question of how soon it would be. There is no question that I told them it would be a great many years, and I don't think 20 is much out of what I probably said. But when I found out about the ore--which I found out through a Belgian connection--with samples of the ore taken from boxcards going back--of course, our people never found that out--I was then started in, when I was still on active duty so it would have been in '47, I guess, or latter part of '46--to train medical officers on how to handle atomic bomb casualties. We had an elaborate course out here at Walter Reed, a two or three weeks course. I spoke at the end of each course. If I had been asked in '48, or in '47, what my estimate was, it would have been considerably different. There is no use in going out and yelling all the time, about oh, I've changed my mind. If they had ever asked me, I would have told them.

Q: What would you have told them? It would be shorter?

G: Considerably shorter, because they are getting all this ore.

Q: But were you still surprised that the Russians had one in 1949?

G: I suppose it was a little sooner than I thought. I thought it would be about 1951-52, somewhere around there.

Q: Do you think that espionage played a major role in it?

G: Major role, and only the one man, Fuchs--that is as far as we know. We don't know of anyone else.

Q: I was told that Fuchs had an obsession about piddling security--

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that he would rummage through wastepaper baskets, and if he saw a scrap of paper that might have some name or writing on it, he would be furious with the secretaries and clerks.

G: I wouldn't be surprised.

Q: And yet he was handing out the major secrets.

G: Oh, he would do that as a cover. But, of course, the British were completely responsible. They just deliberately lied about his association.

Q: Did you ever have contact with Fuchs?

G: Just a meeting, and I met him as one of a group. I never knew what he looked like. But the British just deliberately lied about him and they did it three times, not just once.

Q: What about Oppenheimer's conversion, or turn-about in 1945 he was strong for the use of the atomic bomb on a live target and then four years later he had...

G: He fought against, he didn't like the idea of a hydrogen bomb.

Q: Yes, in 1949, but in 1945 he was one of four who served on Stimson's panel.

G: Just before he died, he wrote to me and said some speech he had made, or else he wrote in the letter that he didn't see how we could have done anything else.

Q: This is my opinion based on my reading of it, there was going to be a land-based invasion and it would have cost us, I think McGeorge Bundy and Stimson estimated a half million casualties.

G: We never knew how many it would be.

Q: It would have been a tremendous casualties, based on the Japs known ability to fight to the last man, so there really was no...

G; And also there would have been about 10 million Japanese casualties, which people just forget.

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Q: Well, we didn't care about that....

G: Well, yes, generally, people talk about it, the number of Japs killed should just balance that against it.

Q: It's like what you said before, you got thinking about Bataan...

G: Yes, well, I didn't feel sorry for them on account of that. But it was still advantageous to the world to keep their casualties down at that point.

Q: I want to ask you about, something that told me about SILVERPLATE. Tibbets went around getting things for SILVERPLAT. He was training his 509th at the C-54s, this Green Hornet transport line at Wendover? He had the SILVERPLATE directive and was told not to use it unless there was no other way to do it. Ostensibly, according to this story I was told, he came into the Pentagon and wanted, I think, 5 or 6 C-54s. At the time C-54s were scarcer than hen's teeth, and the man in charge of requirements or in charge of this particular subject, turned it down. This is when Tibbets invoked the SILVERPLATE, the overriding directive, and got his C-54s. It resulted, or I was told it resulted in the general officer involved, being demoted by Arnold,

G: I don't think so, I think, my own guess would be that, if there had been any trouble, I would have talked to Arnold about it, and gotten C-54s since I knew that he needed them, I heartily approved the idea of getting them.

Q: Do you remember when this need arose?

G: No.

Q: The issue never came to you?

G: No, not as any troublesome thing of any kind, but then those things came up all the time, where we had to tell people we wanted things. He could have easily said: "Gen. Groves says he wants these."

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Q: Di he invoke your name, or did he operate on his own?

G: I suppose both, both my name and SILVERPLATE. He got what he could on his own knowing that these liaison people were supposed to support him.

Q: Tibbets also told me another thing about his readiness, readiness of his group, he says he made a unilateral decision when he felt his group was ready he sent them, took them overseas when they were ready to go to Tinian. This apparently caused some disturbance at higher levels who had not been consulted prior to his departure from Wendover for overseas. Do you remember anything on that?

G: No, that could have been, the departure schedules and all that would have been approved by me beforehand. Tibbets was the No.1 pilot.

Q: You would have approved a more mature officer to head the 509th.

G: Yes, at the time, I wanted one, but I wasn't going to interfere with what Arnold wanted.

Q: Arnold chose him?

G: Arnold chose him on Gross' recommendation and Arnold chose him.

Q: Arnold didn't consult you?

G: Yes, I talked to Arnold about it.

Q: After he had made his choice?

G: No, in time that if I had objected strongly, why he would have probably changed it, but I wasn't going to do it, because that was not in my bailiwick.

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Q: Tibbets had compiled a great record in the ETO.

G: Oh yes, as I say, he was a magnificent pilot, but it was a mistake to have somebody who was quite that young to be the head of something that was going to develop and he showed that he didn't have the senior officer capabilities by the fact that with that back of him, he never got beyond BG.

Q: He got that via McConnell who learned about his not having a star and simply forced the issue about the star, and then he retired shortly thereafter. You know, Tibbets is very unhappy because he is on a shelf now. This is for political, moral, psychological reasons that we don't want to...

G: I don't think that that had anything to do with it, because this reason. Here was Ashworth, who was never put on the shelf. Sweeney wasn't put on the shelf, of course, the names weren't as well known. Parsons was not put on the shelf.

Q: Tibbets feels if you go up too far, too fast, you become a target of cuvy...

G: Oh sure, you are a target, after all, when I was made a temporary colonel in '40, I jumped six or eight academy classes, plus the entire WW I hump of emergency officers. Of course, everybody hated it. I even had people reporting to me on ground construction before I went over to the atomic bomb. One man was a division engineer. He was on my promotion board in 1918 or 19 from 2nd LT to 1st LT. He was a Colonel then. Naturally, he didn't enjoy doing what I told him to do,

Q: Let me take you back to 1939. The famous Einstein letter to FDR was written and Roosevelt apparently approved the Manhattan Project at that time.

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G: Well, no, he approved $6,000 and just told Pa Watson to keep an eye on it.

Q: When did the project get "ginned" up?

G: It was about January 1942, Bush and Conant decided--they finally got their hands on this--like all Roosevelt things--constantly overriding committees and changes of personnel--instead of replacing people. That was the way they did it. Bush and Conant, who by that time had control, recommended that it was feasible to develop the bomb in time to be effective during the war and that also if this was to be done that the construction activity should be under an Army Engineer officer.

Q: And that's when they chose you?

G: No, they chose somebody else first, who didn't get approved first till June. Then they had Col James Marshall in there, and after about two or three months with him, Bush and Conant asked to have somebody else in there. They wanted General Styer whom they knew, and he had been working with them to some extent and Styer didn't want the job, quite logically, and Somervell, whose Chief of Staff he was, didn't want to lose him. So they figured out that they would propose me, and they knew that Marshall would approve it because he knew what I had done on construction, and...

Q: Did Styer ever regret his decision?

G: I don't think so because I think he knows that he couldn't have done it. He wasn't the type. He wouldn't take the chances, and he wouldn't overrule the scientists on scientific matters. He would have gone into a very elaborate organization and spent a lot of time organizing, which is just what Marshall...

Q: Did you have to overrule the scientists on a lot of issues?

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G: Oh yes, quite often.

Q: On which way you were to go?

G: Yes, on scientific matters, too. You see, nobody knew anything at that time so it became a matter of judgment as to what was most likely to happen.

Q: Did you know about atomic energy at that time?

G: No, nothing.

Q: Who was the man closest to you? Was Fermi close to you?

G: Oh no, you mean among the scientists?

Q: Yes, to brief you, to bring you up on theoretical physics?

G: Oh no, nobody. I talked to various people at various times. That was all.

Q: Well, actually, you did'nt need to know the nuclear physics, did you?

G: No, I didn't have to know them, I had to be familiar with them, but it wasn't necessary to know them because none of it was certain, anyway. It was all theory. Just like the Darwin theory of evolution, which in my opinion is mostly bunk. But it is a good theory, ifyou were dealing with biological matters you would have to understand what the theory was. You wouldn't have to believe in it.

Q: Was there great concern that the Germans would have an atomic bomb?

G: Oh yes, that was one of the things that led our going into it was the fact that they could have had it very easily

Q: They got off the track somewhere.

G: They got off the track because they had a bunch of scientists running it. They never did get one.

Q: You mean as opposed to getting some engineers in there?

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G: Getting one man in there to run it all. They had one man supposedly running it, but the rest of them didn't respond.

Q: Who was that?

G: I don't know who that was. There were various people at various times, but they all thought they knew more than the others.

Q: Was there some great concern in early 1945--we knew the Germans had done some things before we had done some things with heavy water back before the war. When our project was coming toward consummation, we logically figured that the Germans might have been doing the same thing. Did we know that they were miles from it?

G: No.

Q: Wasn't there the Gondsmit project?

G: That came later, after the war, really.

Q: Yes, but wasn't there great concern when we had the atomic bomb or knew we would have one?

G: We didn't have it and didn't know we would have it.

Q: It was uncertain. But after the milestone under the "Chicago Stands," we knew we had it.

G: Oh no, not at all. That had nothing to do with it. There merely showed you could build a, "Toney" (?) reactor. It didn't show that you could have a bomb, because that showed you could have a chain reaction, if it was moderated, not full speed. That's where the Germans missed the boat.

Q: Let me ask you this. Right before Trinity, did you know then the bomb would be successful? Or you weren't sure?

G: No, we weren't sure, we weren't sure. After all, the one at Trinity was not a full-scale bomb. It was the explosive part of the bomb, had nothing to do with the firing mechanism.

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Q: You mean the problem of dropping it and getting away from it?

G: Dropping it and having the proximity fuse work correctly and all that, and, of course, the Hiroshima bomb was an entirely different bomb all the way through. That was never tested.

Q: The Nagasaki bomb was armed and they couldn't land with it, right, because once they got pass the altitude it would go?

G: On no. You had to pull out the safety plugs.

Q: Oh really. I had the understanding that it was armed and they couldn't bring it back.

G: Yes, they could have brought it back, but I don't think they would have. They would have dropped it in the ocean.

Q: Why?

G: Because it would be much safer to do it that way.

Q: You mean it was partly armed:

G: No, it was, you don't know how well your safety mechanism is going to work.

Q: And they were worried about it?

G: Naturally, they would be worried about it, and I expected them to drop it somewhere, not try to land it. But that was up to them, after all you have to leave it to people.

Q: Well, Nagasaki was not the first target, it was not the No. 1 target that day, was it Niigata or Kokura? Kokura was....

G: I think so.

Q: Then they dropped it on Nagasaki. Actually, some AF people were disappointed in that they felt the AF could have won the war without the atomic bomb.

G: Oh sure, they all felt that. All they would have done was pounded Japan to pieces, but it wouldn't have had the psychological effect.

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Q: You are right, it would not have had the psychological effect. If there was no atomic bomb, wouldn't airpower have been able to win it without invading?

G: No, seapower would have won it easily. If I had been President of the U.S., and had felt that the people would stand for it, once MacArthur got the Philippines, before Okinawa, before Iwo Jima, I would have declared a naval blockade and said: "We are not going to waste American lives going into there. We will just blockade them." That would have done it, but it would have dragged on for 5 or 10 years.

Q: Well, that would have done it, but after the LeMay low level raids of March 1945?

G: We could have driven them out without the naval blockade.

Q: Don't we have evidence the Japs were planning, or were trying to surrender for weeks, and they didn't even know about the atomic bomb?

G: They were initiating surrender moves, but that was more on the naval blockade.

Q: Well, LeMay had burned out all their cities?

G: I know but it doesn't make any difference.

Q: Well, he had burned out all their industrial capabilities?

G: That's all right, the naval blockade was really what was bothering them.

Q: More than LeMay's bombers?

G: Yes. Of course, the AF will never admit that. If you read. There is evidence that the way to end it was a combination of the two. You could have done it with a naval blockade alone; you couldn't have done it with bombing alone.

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Q: Well, LeMay felt that if they had a couple more weeks they would have done it without the atomic bomb.

G: Yes, but he's wrong. It wouldn't have happened, they wouldn't surrender on that. As it was, it was touch and go, you know on the surrender.

Q: That was sort of a discussion within the government, but everybody knew which way the Japs would go. It would be a matter of when.

G: Yes, but that came after the battle of Midway, it was just a question of when.

Q: Do you think Midway was a turning point?

G: Yes, it was a turning point.

Q: What about all the invasions that followed Miday? Were they unnecessary?

G: They weren't unnecessary. That had to be done. You had to stop that, but the turning point from which you knew the Japs were defeated was Midway and Coral Sea.

Q: It was a turning point in the sense you knew the Japs no longer could threaten the U.S. after Midway, but this was not the same as their defeat.

G: Oh yes, all you had to do was figure we could build ships a lot faster and a lot more of them then they could and that the ships would have dominated the oceans, and that would be the end of it.

Q: Carriers were, not battleships.

G: Any kind of ships.

Q: Battleships had no use in the war?

G: Oh yes.

Q: What use does a battleship have?

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G: The ~~very~~ battleships were very important for the whole thing. Otherwise, we wouldn't have kept on building them.

Q: We kept on building them. In 1939 we were building cavalry, the Army was asking for millions of dollars for the cavalry post down in Front Royal, Virginia. Do you know the arguement they were using in 1939? The Russians had a large cavalry.

Q: You say that Mitchell did not have the military grounding to be a good officer. How about Arnold? Did he have the grounding?

G: Yes, Arnold, was he in Infantry or Cavalry?

Q: He was in the Infantry, he tried to get into the Cavalry and couldn't get in.

G: He was in there for several years.

Q: He was in there for a tour in the Philippines. He came back, went into flying, and then he left flying after he got married because of the dangers, and then he went back to the Philippines for a tour.

G: That gave him a thorough understanding of it, which Mitchell didn't have.

Q: Arnold had a lot of friends in the Army, people who didn't understand airpower. But they liked Arnold. I think of Malin Craig. You know what made Arnold? Luck, and the fact that he knew Malin Craig. You see he did a great job out at March Field in 1931-35 and Malin Craig was the 9th Corps Area Commander. When Craig came in to take MacArthur's place, he brought Arnold in. That's why Arnold was the No. 2 man under Westover. When Westover was killed, Arnold was ready to step into that job.

G: Of course, there is no question. Arnold was well trained. He was a soldier first, flyer second. I don't think when Arnold flew, that he always had to be the pilot.

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Q: Andrews was this way.

G: Always wanted to fly himself.

Q: He loved it. Were you aware of a competition between Arnold and Andrews for the top slot?

G: Oh yes.

Q: Did either of them ever discuss it with you?

G: No.

Q: Was there a feeling that they chose the right man to head the Air Corps?

G: It all depended on who you talked to. Each had his supporters. I think the Army as a whole would have preferred Andrews, and the Air Force would have preferred Arnold.

Q: Why?

G: I don't know.

Q: I would say just the reverse would be true. Andrews was pushing harder for four-engine bombers at that time.

G: Didn't make any difference. They thought that Andrews was more. They just thought he was more competent, I think.

Q: Well, Andrews might have been more competent, but he was the more ideological of the two, and the Army didn't like ideological AF people.

G: Oh no, you haven't gotten that straight at all.

Q: Well, Mitchell was the ideological zealot.

G: I know, but he antagonized everybody, even when he was in France, you know. He didn't get along with people. The reason that he was tried was entirely because of his violent language. He would have gone in right with the Black Panthers today.

Q: I talked to Mrs. Arnold recently about Billy Mitchell. She sat in at the strategy sessions when Frank Reed. Arnold and some of

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the others were at the hotel and they were planning the strategy session. Billy Mitchell said that he was deliberately provoking the situation. He was going beyond what the situation called for and being more extreme in his position because he wanted to secure the position of the air force. In other words, he sacrificed himself.

G: He may have said that, but he thought he could get away with it. He had been a spoiled boy all his life.

Q: But he had a lot of public opinion behind him.

G: Oh sure he did, because it was dramatic. All he had to do--the same way as the Navy used to take Congressmen to sea and get them seasick, now they take them up in the air and flip around there a little.

Q: I agree with you there, but I am surprised what you say about Marshall and Andrews, for the reasons that you say. There are other reasons. Andrews had a reputation as more of a commander than Arnold. Arnold had the reputation as being supply, production, a driver.

G: I would say he had the reputation of being very well liked.

Q: Arnold? How about Andrews, he was well liked?

G: He was well liked, but not the same way.

Q: In what way was he liked?

G: I would say that if somebody was going on a fishing trip they would rather have Arnold than Andrews with them. That kind of personal...

Q: You know, Andrews was very close to Knerr. Put it in reverse, and Knerr was close to Andrews. Knerr was a zealot, were you aware of that, he was writing articles, Reader's Digest, American Mercury and he was trying to egg Andrews into a position of coming out for an all-out separate air force.

G: I know a lot of that went on, and a lot of AF officers weren't intelligent enough to see through it.

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Q: Arnold played the game of saying "yes," we should have a separate air force, but not now.

G: Yes, and of course, the separate Air Force has had a lot of. It turned out differently from what people thought it was going to be. In other words, there are more planes in the Army now than there are in the AF. It had to be that way because the AF said it would not assist the Army in any of its operations.

Q: Leslie McNair had strong feelings about the devotion of the Air Corps to bombing and not enough to air support of the Army.

G: Oh, yes, well they always had that.

Q: And it is kind of ironic that he was killed by some very close air support, at St. Lo.

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March 3, 1970

done 4-3-70

Lt General Leslie R. Groves, US Army (Ret)
2101 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear General Groves:

John Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who either knew General Arnold or had some connection with his policies. Among them are Hon. Robert Lovett and Jacqueline Cochran and Generals Eaker, Spaatz, Cabell, Twining, Knerr, Smart and perhaps 30 others.

Recently, in Florida, I interviewed General Paul Tibbets and your name came up very frequently in our reminiscences of a quarter of a century ago in relation to General Arnold's role in the atomic program.

I am hopeful that we can get together at your convenience sometime during the last week in March for about 90 minutes.

Incidentally, your granddaughter Patty worked in my office last summer, and did a fine job.

My secretary will phone your office next week for an appointment. In the event you wish to contact me, the number is OX 5-3862.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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Interview LTGEN Leslie R. Groves, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1970

Q: I didn't seem to find any correspondence between you and General Arnold.

G: No, I only wrote to Gen. Arnold once or twice after he retired, and I never wrote to him before that time when we were in Washington. My business was always verbal, but I may have written to him once or twice after the war--after he had retired. I know that I either wrote to him, in reply to a letter, or I talked to him. Gen Arnold apparently thought my advice was worth something in this particular affair. He told me he was being snowed under with correspondence and wanted to know what I did with it, and I told him that I divided it into the personal and non-personal. And if it was non-personal, I used franked envelopes. He said: "Well, most of mine is non-personal, and it's from people I don't know," and I said: "Well, you have to answer them, because, otherwise, you will bring discredit on the Army if you don't. I think it is perfectly proper for you to use franked envelopes in such a case." I said: "If it were somebody that I knew, then I wouldn't do it," and he expressed his gratitude and that was about the size of it.

Q: Did he estimate what it cost him to write a letter?

G: Yes, he said that it was costing him about $6 a day in postage alone on things that he, autographed requests, things of that kind.

Q: You know, money was a great problem with Arnold, because when he retired he didn't have enough money to live a comparatively simple life on his ranch. He loved that ranch of it. Warner Bros. bought the movie rights for some books that he had written for boys.

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They gave him $36,000 and this money was used to pay for the ranch.

G: He never seemed to be able to handle his own finances very well. He was like many people in the AF. They just spent their money pretty freely.

Q: He had a hard go with his finances. His estate was $19,000.

G: I knew it was very little.

Q: It was very little, and Mrs. Arnold had to go to work and sell real estate. She has a problem right now, she is 83 years old, and she doesn't have enough to stay on this ranch.

G: Doesn't she get money from the government, his compensation?

Q: Yes, do you know what her pension was when he passed away as a five-star? $78 a month.

G: Yes, I knew that's what it would be, but now she has got service connected disability. That runs up to pretty close to $400.

Q: Yes, of course, she lives at this ranch, and she is talking now about moving into an apartment. But I think it would kill her, because she has all his memorabilia, his flags, and things that he acquired, and she lives, she talks about him all the time. I think if she moves into a little apartment, I think this would do her in. So I think in some way it could be arranged. Incidentally, she did mention she is a one-third partner in this enterprise, and they gave us a modest advance, $1,250 each. Mrs. Arnold will share in any royalties, this book.

G: Would you like to just start off?

Q: Do you recall your first encounter or meeting with Arnold?

G: No, I don't recall anything particular about it. I'm trying to think what was the first one, I imagine, I could find bychecking in my diary, although I'm not certain. I didn't keep my diary, it was

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kept for me. It only shows very briefly, in most instances, where I was, for example, when I went to see Gen. Arnold. But if I went to see Gen Marshall, and then went on to see Gen Arnold, it wouldn't be in there. In some cases it would just be going to the Pentagon. But the first thing--time I saw Gen Arnold, that I recall to talk to him at all, I'd met him slightly when he first became Chief of AF.

Q: In 1938, you mean after Westover was killed?

G: After Westover was killed, and I was in G-3 at the time. There was a big problem. The AF had underestimated their cost as usual, and Arnold had said he would produce so many planes out of so much money, and they were supposed to be big planes, but he found that he couldn't get all that. So they were cut back, some of them were just little baby trainers. They still counted as planes.

Q: Was this his doing, or was this the doing of Spaulding?

G: It was some of the people in his office.

Q: Of course, from my reading, they had this 2,320 plane program. Woodring and Louis Johnson were in the picture at this time. the AF was pushing for B-17s. Of course, they cost $250,000 a piece, and you couldn't get many of those for the money available. So within the G-4--this was Gen. Spaulding by name.

G: Which Spaulding? Is that the engineer Spaulding?

Q: Well, in about '37?

G: I don't know if he was there or not, I think he was.

Q: In any event, within the War Dept General Staff, they wanted the Air Corps to buy smaller planes so they could get more planes for the same amount of dollars. But was this Air Corps' underestimating its requirements?

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G: Yes. What happened was--that was the engineer's fault. Of course, he was 10 times smarter than Arnold in every way. The Air Corps had stated that they could get these planes, and, of course, the budget always cut people down, and they still stuck to their story. They had nobody who was astute in handling Congress, testifying before committees. So they just stuck to their story that they would, finally, I think Arnold was finally the one who testified that yes, they would get so many planes for so much money. They finally wound up getting a lot of little planes.

Q: But that wasn't their doing. It was the War Dept?

G: That was their doing.

Q: They wanted big planes.

G: They wanted big planes, but they agreed to producing that many planes for that much money.

Q: Well, they agreed because it was opposed.

G: They agreed because they didn't know how to handle Congress.

Q: Well, this is probably true.

G: I know that, because there were very few people who did know how to testify before Congress and get the right questions asked. That's the first requirement--to get the right question asked. But in any case, Andrews became G-3. That was just after I was assigned to G-3. I went there in '39. Then I was away for all summer on a special mission, got back around about late in November. And then Andrews came in there, and took the place as G-3.

Q: Who was his predecessor?

G: Robert M. Beck. He is still alive, in Washington. I don't know how sharp he is, but he would be a good man to talk to, I think. In any case, Andrews set up this special section to handle Air Corps

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matters. There was a great deal of friction between G-3 and Arnold, and it was made much worse because I think Andrews felt that if Westover had only been killed a few weeks earlier, he would have been Chief of Air Corps, instead of being in the line.

Q: You mean when he was available after his GHQ duty?

G: If Westover had been killed while Andrews still had GHQ he would have been made Chief of Air Corps, logically.

Q: Well, he was killed when he was GHQ AF.

G: No, he was killed...

Q: He was killed Sep 21, 1938.

G: Anyway, it was tied in with his assignment, and he always thought that he would have gotten it if he hadn't been tied into that particular assignment.

Q: My recollection of this is very good, I think, Arnold became Chief of Air Corps, Sep 29, eight days after Westover was killed. This was '38, Andrews was still GHQ AF, until March 1, 1939. Then he went for some months down to San Antonio. He reverted to Colonel. So he was still GHQ AF, although he might have been slated for another job.

G: He thought, anyway, I'm sure.

Q: Did he express his thought to you?

G: Not directly, but indirectly. There was this very brilliant AF officer--there weren't many of them that were intellectual at all--I think his name was Hamilton, although I'm not certain of that name. He was a bitter enemy of Arnold's, I think the trouble was the divorce that this man had been involved.

Q: Not Hamilton, but Howard.

G: Jan Howard. He had been involved in some divorce that cogitated some way with Arnold.

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Q: Yes, he married Mrs. Arnold's sister.

G: Well, that was it.

Q: And he worked for Andrews in G-3.

G: He was in G-3 when Andrews took over and Howard had a great deal to do with it. Howard was a very smart, very brilliant. They set up this special Air Corps section to handle all Air Corps matters, in G-3, and...

Q: Was Howard in charge of that?

G: Howard was put in charge of that, Kuter was in it. Everybody who was in it, excepting Howard, became something during the war. There was this bitter animosity between Arnold and Howard. I got it all from Howard, who talked to me quite freely.

Q: What was your position at this time?

G: I'd been in the same section with Howard when they set this up. He asked me if I would be willing to go along. I said I didn't know Air. And he said: "We want you in there." People used to come in from outside and ask what I was doing there, and I'd say: "Well, we had to have somebody who could add and subtract, and write the English language," which had always aroused a great deal of animosity.

Q: I guess the Air Corps was considered to be slightly unwashed at that time, intellectually and educationally.

G: They really are still, if you look at it frankly, you will see that, if you don't get too excited over somebody who is just an aerial chauffeur. But another one who was in there was Edwards, Idwal Edwards.

Q: I talked to him about a month ago.

G: That section was set up and the thing that I did in it was primarily, I used to do most of the--. Somehow Howard, without letting

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the the others know, would pass almost all their papers to me before they went up to see that there were no wild assumptions, and they were clear cut and all that. But one of the things that we were working on particularly, and I remember, that I worked on with Howard--he asked me to do it--was to determine the plane requirements to enable us to send land-based planes out to intercept a carrier fleet, or any enemy fleet. They had to have a certain range depending on--you could see them in the daylight, and then, from the last daylight on and all that, and that led to the insistence on the part of G-3 on long distance bombers. The Air Force was always quite enthusiastic over the fighters. Much more than they were over the big bombers, and the big bomber group was really.... (tape ran out)

Q: You were saying that the Air Corps at that time was more interested in fighters than in bombers?

G: They were interested, really, in being fly boys. Right from the start. After their initial group, which was top notch officers, they tended to get in there men who didn't like discipline--people like Spaatz for example. And they just weren't--and they always thought that flying was more important than soldiering. Now, Arnold, during the war--one of the criticisms I always had--was that it was a remarkable thing, but if you look at the General Officers that first started to come up during the war in the Air Corps, you find most of them were people who had been on some of these peculiar flights, the Question Mark, around South America, around the world, or something like that.

Q: Arnold was on the Alaskan flight...

G: Yes, Eaker went on that round South America flight.

Q: You feel, in other words, guys who made sensational flying records were not necessarily good administrators or executives?

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G: Yes, or good soldiers. And would take no interest. It was very noticeable at Ft. Leavenworth, when I was there, the AF officers just weren't interested in military matters. That was about the size of it. Oh, they went along with it.

Q: When were you at Leavenworth?

G: I was there in '35-36 when Spaatz was there.

Q: You know, Eisenhower swore by Spaatz. He always wanted Spaatz to be his Air Commander in any operation he was in. He brought Spaatz along. Spaatz was not a very articulate man, but he had a great loyalty.

G: Very likeable.

Q: Loyalty, capable, at lease Eisenhower thought he was capable.

G: Anyway, the first time I really saw Arnold to talk to him, was shortly after the Manhattan Project was started. The date isn't particularly important, but I went to him to arrange for liaison with the AF who I could talk to there without bothering Arnold. And he picked out Oliver Echols, who later fell into disfavor.

Q: Why?

G: I don't know. Something happened, and Arnold got rid of him in a hurry.

Q: My reading of it is that he was sort of a gentle, very southern man.

G: Very gentle, and he stuttered a little.

Q: Whereas his No. 2 man, Benny Meyers, was a driving type of guy...

G: Yes, crooked.

Q: He probably appealed to Arnold because....

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G: Meyers was the kind of a man--I didn't know him--but he was the kind of a man that would undercut his superior in a very unique way, and the superior would never know it was being done. In any case, Arnold at that time assigned Echols, and after talking to Echols, another officer who was, Bim Wilson. I dealt mostly with Wilson. Once in a while I would talk to Echols, but only to keep the channels open. Everything normally was handled by Wilson. After Echols went out, I think Powers came in, didn't he? He, of course, didn't have the intellect that Echols had, I think. But after Wilson, when Wilson went overseas, this guy named Fisher came in. He is the one who had McGuire recently, Anyway, there were certain things. I decided that I wanted to organize this 509th Group, it was time to do it.

Q: You had this idea of the 509th?

G: Oh yes. And I talked to Arnold about it, and said--because that wasn't in the Echols chain--and told him that I wanted to organize this. It was time to start thinking about it. We always went on the assumption that everything would turn out well. Otherwise, it would have taken us 10 years, and so, in talking to Arnold about that--I'm not sure which came first, but it doesn't make too much difference. In talking to Arnold about that, I told him what I wanted, what I thought the commander of that group should be. I said I would be very happy to see Wilson in command. He said, no, he didn't want Wilson because Wilson hadn't had any combat experience. Of course, Arnold had kept all the smart people who had engineering backgrounds, in this country. So I said, well, it's your problem to select a commander, I've just said I would be willing to have him, so he talked to Gross.

Q: Mervin Gross OCR (Operations, Commitments & Requirements)?

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G: He had been in Africa. He knew Tibbets, and he recommended Tibbets. I didn't know Tibbets, and I wasn't going to object anyway. So that's the way that that came about. Then, it was a case of forming the air outfit. But the other thing that happened was that I told Wilson at this time to get B-29s and that I wanted about 9 or something like that. Well, he told me it was absolutely impossible. He said: "You can't even get any." The only way to get them was to talk to Gen. Arnold. I said: "Well, I'll go up and see Arnold." So I talked to Arnold and Arnold immediately ordered Wilson to provide 9 B-29s. I met that Wilson as I was coming out, and he said he had just gotten a call from Arnold. He said: "I never believed he would do it, but he said that you are to have 9 of them."

Q: Was Arnold, at this time, briefed on the atomic project?

G: He knew what it was, yes. Of course, he was fairly familiar with the idea that I was go get anything I wanted.

Q: Did he, in your opinion, understand the implications of the atomic bomb?

G: Oh no.

Q: Or was it just a big bang?

G: It was a big bang, but of such enormous size, that he appreciated it could end the war. There was no doubt about that in his mind, that if we were really successful, that it would. Later, sometime-- I had a Commander Ashworth, as a No. 2 boy to Parsons. Tibbets was afraid to talk to his people above him--his AF superiors--about anything. He wanted to more or less stay away from them. So Ashworth told me that these planes were not in good enough condition, and that we should have all new ones. He said: "Tibbets feels that way but he won't say anything." So I went around, again, to Wilson, asked for

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9 new planes, and he said: "Why, that's absolutely absurd! How you got these others, I don't know. But you can't possibly have those. We couldn't authorize them." And I said: "Well, I guess, I'll have to see Arnold." And he said: "Yes. But I don't think he will give them to you." So I went to see Arnold and told him of my viewpoint that these planes were old, and had been used too much. He said: "Well, how many do you want," and I said, "I want one plane that will fly to and from Japan from Tinian, and will get there and get back." And I said: "If anything happens to that one, I want another one." He said: "Well, I think you should have 14 new planes, and 14 in reserve." That was the way that was handled.

Q: Now, this was probably in 1944?

G: That would have been early in 1945.

Q: We had already captured the Marianas. Were we conducting raids from them?

G: Well, they hand't conducted any raids from them yet.

Q: Well, the first raid by Rosie O'Donnell--he conducted the first raid on Thanksgiving Day 1944.

G: Of course, we had started. I don't know when we picked Tinian, but the AF had picked Guam for our place. Ashworth had been sent over. I wanted to have Nimitz informed. Ashworth was sent over by Adm King at my request. I wanted him to do certain things.

Q: Why was the Navy brought into this? Did Ashworth have a technical engineering competence that no AF or Army had? Why was Ashworth brought into this?

G: He was brought in as an assistant to Parsons who was the Navy ordnance officer. He was the best qualified officer. There wasn't any Army Ordnance officer who was available who I felt could handle that job.

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Q: You picked Parsons, then.

G: I picked him on the recommendation of Adm. Pernell and Dr. Vannevar Bush. Parsons had been involved in the proximity fuse development.

Q: So you picked him regardless of service. He was the best man for the job.

G: He was the best man, and we had no compunction about service. He brought in mostly Navy people under him because they were the ones he knew. Ashworth was brought in because he had been a torpedo plane bomber, and was back in this country and was down at Indian Head Proving Grounds, I believe. He was available and was very highly thought of by Adm Pernell, who was my liaison with the Navy.

Q: Did you have any compunctions about selection of Tibbets? He was only around 28 years old?

G: My compunction--I would have never picked him. The reason was that he was picked was because he was a superb flyer, Ashworth told me afterwards, he said that he had never seen a flyer who was as competent as a flyer as Tibbets was. He was superb in that, but he had no officer capabilities, at all. Tibbets would bring in people that he had know, entirely, and I very unfortunately, did not urge Arnold to make this a group of people. Everyone in the group should have been somebody who expected to stay in the service, for the experience they would get. And that was not done, and I always thought that it was my fault, for not telling Arnold that he should have done it. I think he would have done it right away. At any rate, Tibbets was not--I don't think you could call him a field commander--that's the real reason he didn't get promoted. He just was not an officer; he was a wonderful pilot.

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Q: He also had a great responsibility in keeping this group trained and maintaining the security of it?

G: Of course, we put security officers in there. Tibbets' problem was really training, and we sent him down into the Caribbean for that overseas training, because of the story that got around about Nimitz almost being landed on an Japanese Island. This was the story that was told to me. Parsons got it somewhere in the Navy, and I never could get confirmation of it from anybody, and that was, Nimitz was flying in an Army plane--which I couldn't believe--and they started to land at an island where he thought he was going, and they had the wrong island. It was Japanese-held. His flag LT suddenly woke up to the fact and said: "hey, we are landing on the wrong island. This is a Japanese island." Wonderful story if it could ever be proven.

Q: An Air Corps plane?

G: As a result of that, Parsons said and I said: "Well, I don't know if it is true or not. They must have a lot of ocean flying." That's why they were sent down to Jamaica in the Caribbean for about three months. Another thing was, as you know, the AF did not have too many good navigators, they depended on the lead navigator in a bombing raid. Here, everybody had to be a good top notch navigator. Everybody had to be an individual pilot, and everybody had to be an individual bombardier. So that made a difference. But the group was very well trained, excepting that, as I say, the real trouble was the lack of command capacity. That was the trouble. If you read that article by Ashworth, that came out in the Naval Institute some years ago which described the flight over Nagasaki. It was pretty accurate, and the whole trouble there was that Tibbets had put Sweeney in as

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the flight commander. But he'd also allowed one of his staff officers who ranked Sweeney--I think his name was Hopkins--to fly one of the other planes. And it was Hopkins who didn't pay any attention to what Sweeney wanted. He said: "I'm a staff officer. I'm senior to you." The result was they had that long delay.

Q: You mean, in the second mission?

G: The second mission, it almost resulted in disaster. It was all due to lack of command foresight on the part of Tibbets, of putting in somebody there, and not really dominating the affair. They went down there, for example, and one of the key people that we wanted on it, couldn't fly, because he had picked up the wrong equipment instead of a chute. He didn't have it. Tibbets wasn't there to check out. In other words, there was none of this constant check, check, check, and Tibbets was used to the old idea, and I think the present one. A pilot went out to his plane and it was all full of gas and ready to go, and he ran an instrument board check and he took off. But the idea of going out and seeing that the tanks were full of gas, and watching the gas go in, never would have entered his mind. Things of that kind...

Q: What was the problem of that second mission? They failed to rendezvous?

G: They failed to rendezvous plus a lot of other things. The failure to rendezvous was the big one. It wasn't clear. You see, the orders were very definite. The weaponeer was in command as far as the operation went. They couldn't drop the bomb without him, and they couldn't do other things. The pilot was in command from the standpoint of taking off and flying the machine, coming home. The AF was very touchy about that and didn't want to have anything too definite, but

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that was put in a letter by Norstad who was acting for Arnold in that capacity.

Q: In other words, actually, the command shifted once the plane was in the air, or approaching the target. It went to the weaponeer. Was it a question of "when?"

G: No, it wasn't so much "when," but it was a case of not having it definite. All of them, afterwards, the AF pilots--Sweeney, whom I talked to considerably, had forgotten some of the detailed arrangements. There wasn't the communication between the weaponeer and the pilot. The pilot, Sweeney, knew that the plane that had to rendezvous. He knew which one it was, but he didn't tell Ashworth. Ashworth knew which of the two observing planes was the important one. And they both disobeyed their orders, which were to only rendezvous 15 minutes, and then go on. But they kept hoping that the other one would appear, they had all flown up individually.

Q: This was over Iwo Jima?

G: No, they didn't go over Iwo Jima.

Q: Where was the rendezvous supposed to take place?

G: A little island off the coast of Japan. I've forgotten the name of it. They were supposed to rendezvous over the southern end, and this other pilot it was over the whole island. So he kept circling around, and there was some question as to whether they were at the right altitude.

Q: And they almost ran out of gas?

G: Oh yes, they ran out of gas, just barely got to Okinawa.

Q: The first plane went all the way back?

G: Yes, a routine flight.

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Q: Did you, or somebody instruct Tibbets that if they had to drop a third one, that he was to fly it?

G: Yes, I sent the word over. Tibbets' idea was to rotate it through his squadron. As soon as I heard that, my deputy on the ground, Gen Farrell, I sent orders that Tibbets was to fly the next one. They could rotate between Tibbets and Sweeney, and also, they would rotate between Parson and Ashworth.

Q: When you said, orders, did it go through Arnold, or did you have authority to go directly to Tibbets?

G: Oh no, not to Tibbets, I sent them to...

Q: I guess, Spaatz was the overall commader.

G: Spaatz was the overall commander, and the order was very definite on what he was to do. It was understood by Spaatz that Farrell was my representative. Spaatz also looked upon me as his boss back here in a lot of ways, although officially that all came through Marshall.

Q: I think they were all a little puzzled by the technical complexity of this, and simply relied on your judgment.

G: They had to rely on me. They couldn't do anything else. They couldn't overrule me. They did some things that wouldn't have happened if I had been there.

Q: Like what?

G: They didn't, this business of arming the bomb in the plane, on the first flight. I got word of what was happening too late to change it. I had told them time after time. They all got scared of a premature on Tinian.

Q: What did you want them to do?

G: Arm it first and take off with it, because I didn't want

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them to assemble it up in the air. In any case, as far as personal relations with Arnold went, they were always splendid in every way. There was never any thought that I was subordinate to him, or to anyone else. In other words, I was on a par as far as operations went with Arnold. Any time I wanted to see Arnold I saw him at once. Bill Hall can tell you about it. He came in as Executive. He told me he never saw anything like it. If I said I wanted to see Arnold, everything had to be shooed aside, and then Arnold would take me in. He had two offices--his own office, and then back of it, there was an extra room where he could close another door. Sometimes we would go in there, but Hall commented on that. I said: "How do you remember me?" when I first met him. He said, "I was out in Arnold's outer office." And we all knew you. "Anytime you wanted to see the Old Man, you went ahead." And they would clear out. If he was having a meeting for example, they would clear them out.

Q: Were they useing this code word, SILVERPLATE?

G: I don't know who started that, whether we did or they did. But of course, we used code words all the way through much more than....

Q: I have been told this story about SILVERPLATE. Tibbets had that word and he told me he was instructed to use it if he had to, but not to use it unless it reached a point of somebody refusing him something.

G: Yes, there were quite a few things of that kind, where they were supposed to operate without disclosing as much as they could. Now, Kimble who was in command at Tinian was always miffed over the fact that he wasn't told anything about it.

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Q: Frederick Von Kimble. He's in town now, but he is in a nursing home. Have you seen him, or know about him?

G: No.

Q: I wonder if it would be worth talking to him, although, as you say, he didn't know much about it.

G: He would give you some ideas, yes, he would be worth talking to. He never was very bright, but I think the other thing that was of interest with respect to Arnold was the meeting with Marshall the morning that I had reported that we had been successful.

Q: Successful where, you mean at Trinity?

G: Successful over at Hiroshima, and we'd had a long delay in messages. Instead of coming direct. Some way they got in the wrong channel, and it was Top Secret. Of course, it was double coded--coded first with our code, and then it went down, and they recoded it again Top Secret. So nobody in between could read it. They sent this message--it came on Washington by way of the Philippines. That happened twice. First, the initial flight. I didn't know when the plane took off, for hours. I didn't know they had taken off. There was about 6 hours late to find out that they had taken off. There was about almost that much to find out the first news that they had bombed the target.

Q: Did they send back a flash message?

G: Yes, a flash message was all carefully worded. It was put out so that they would just say: "paragraph 1, second sentence; paragraph 2, third sentence." I estimated just what I wanted to know; the strength of the bomb, and everything went smoothly. There were about six or seven things, and I think Parsons who sent the message

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back, had to insert only, I think he said, "visually," to the strength of the bomb, compared to the Alamogordo.

Q: How long after the bomb drop did you find out about it?

G: I should have found out at 6:00 in the afternoon, and I actually got it about 11:30.

Q: Five hours later?

G: And, of course, I had called up the Chief Signal Officer, Gen. Ingles, whom I knew very well. I told him--I said I had some trouble, and he said: "You don't have to say a word to me about it, I don't want to know anything about it. I don't know what happened, but Gen. Marshall has already talked to me, I don't need to be scolded the second time."

Q: You went in to see Marshall and Arnold?

G: No, I saw them the next morning, after they got back to Tinian. They sent a new message with more details. I srote my report to Marshall, which was a little over a page--about a page and a half, I guess. I had that all written, then went to bed and waited for this final report to come in. Then, as soon as that came in, I revised my draft a little and I was over there at that time. I lived in style because I had the suite that had been designed for the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. In the New War Building, we had showers and everything, so I could get pretty well cleaned up in there. Then I went over and was waiting for Marshall. He came in at 7 always, and Arnold usually came in about one minute past 7. So we were already in there, I was talking to Marshall when Arnold came in.

Q: The next morning?

G: Yes, telling him what happened. George Harrison, who was Secy Stimson's man on this thing--sort of a convenience to me more

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than anything else--he was there, and we called. Marshall called Stimson on the phone. Stimson was in Long Island. He told him about the success, and so forth. Of course, we didn't have any idea what damage had been done. Marshall said something about the fact that it was sort of terrible to think that we were sitting here almost gloating over all the dead Japanese that there must be there. I said: "Well General, all I'm thinking about is the Bataan march." And he said: "I'm not particularly concerned about that." When we got out in the hallway, Arnold reached back and slapped me on the back about as hard as he could hit me. He said: "I wish I had said that," and said: "I couldn't think that fast." That was typical of Arnold.

Q: Typical you mean to give somebody credit?

G: Oh yes, not be a bit disturbed. Of course, Marshall told me once about Arnold, he talked very highly of him always--and he said that Arnold--he was talking one day about people who needed to have the pressure taken off. He said: "That's one of the reasons that I go off on these hunting trips with Arnold, is because that's the only way that I can get him to ease up." So if you run across any questions as to why he took the hunting trip it was because Marshall--trouble is, it doesn't do him any good to just go out and play golf. He's got to have three or four days at a time. He said everybody needs that, and that everyone with a big responsibility had to have that time off. When I went out of the office, I thought to myself--you notice I never take any time off and I work much longer hours than any of the rest of the, so I guess I don't amount to much.

Q: You sort of operated outside the regular Army establishment.

G: Oh completely.

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Q: Maybe he felt that you were not directly responsible to him?

G: Oh no, I was directly responsible to Marshall and Stimson, but with no interference of any kind. I never was called on for a report from Marshall or Stimson. I had a few reports only when I thought they were necessary, such as ones that affected the probable time of use, and in that case I would show it to Marshall, Stimson, Arnold, King and Adm. Leahy, on one occasion.

Q: Are you familiar with the debate over whether the bomb should be dropped on a demonstration target or a live one?

G: Oh yes, right in on it.

Q: This was probably generated by Jerome Frank and that group of younger physicists. How did that come about?

G: I guess that anything that was generated in that way was--it was a natural thought of anyone who didn't know anything. Anybody thought that, the Interim Committee started talking about that right away--that is, the people who didn't know anything about it.

Q: You mean Ralph Bard?

G: Yes, Bard, particularly, and Will Clayton too, and James Byrnes to some extent. Karl Compton, the other two, Bush and Conant never had any hesitancy at all. But the others just wanted to know why it wouldn't work and all that. There was never any thought of not dropping it on the real target by the people who were responsible. Really, the responsibility was the President's first, and to not drop it on a real target meant that he was throwing mad on Roosevelt, who had started this thing. Why start a thing like this, if you are not going to use it? And second, there was Stimson who advised Truman; and Marshall who advised Stimson; and myself who advised both Marshall and Stimson. Anybody else was just engaging in conversation, and just

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refreshing. But those were the only people with responsibility, you might say.

Q: Stimson had some qualms about this.

G: Oh, no.

Q: Did he not convene a Scientific Panel to the Interim Committee?

G: Yes, that was done, I think, mostly because I thought it was desirable. But it was a desirable thing to do, and he recognized that. The Scientific Panel was picked by me. The Interim Committee was picked by Stimson with my sitting there all the time we were doing it.

Q: You had Oppenheimer.

G: We had Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrendo, Arthur Compton, Fermi.

Q: And they recommended that it be dropped on a live target?

G: They couldn't see any other solution.

Q: Was part of the reasoning behind that (dropping on live target) was you only had two weapons?

G: Oh no.

Q: Or did you only have two?

G: We only had one, when we dropped it on Hiroshima, we had one. When we dropped it on Nagasaki, we had one. The thing that always amazed me was that no one in the military who knew, and that would have been Marshall, Arnold and King raised any question about my using the single bomb, and without testing it in advance. You see, the Hiroshima bomb was not tested in advance.

Q: When you say you only had one, you mean one at that time?

G: Just one bomb of any kind.

Q: You dropped one three days later?

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G: But we didn't have that when we dropped the first one.

Q: Was that on the way?

G: It was on the way, that is, the materials for it. Actually, you see, if the weather had not been bad, the first one would have been dropped on the 31st of July, or the 1st of August.

Q: There were four targets?

G: Yes, four targets, Kokura, Niigata, Hiroshima, Nagasaki.

Q: And they struck Kyoto?

G: Kyoto was struck out, and Nagasaki was put in, and I can't for the life of me, find any trace of just when Nagasaki was inserted, or anything about it at all, except that it suddenly appeared in a draft of mine. I don't think it was done by the Target Committee, appointed by me. That target committee had AF people in it, and Gen. Farrell was on it. The AF people were strongly supported by Norstad. The first meeting, Norstad and I both talked to them.

Q: Norstad was then Deputy to Arnold for the 20th AF?

G: Yes, I think he was Chief of Staff for the 20th AF.

Q: And Arnold delegated him to represent Arnold in these matters?

G: No, Arnold had said that he should be the one I talk to about any details.

Q: Arnold had a lot of confidence in him?

G: Norstad was a very capable fellow in every way. He was a soldier; he wasn't a fly boy and there was a terrific difference between them. I guess you found that out in your study of this.

Q: Soldier in the sense of having administrative and executive abilities beyond flying?

G: And some military capacity.

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Q: Was there a third one en route when you dropped the second one?

G: No, we held up the third one. The best place to find that is in my book, NOW IT CAN BE TOLD, the description of that particular thing--why I held up the materials on that. I think that is something you can go through and I don't know how much Arnold is mentioned in there. Now there is one thing that is awfully funny. This was this Col Stone.

Q: We are talking about the Stone incident, and I am reading this out of Arnold's GLOBAL MISSION, pps. 588-9. It is not indexed in the book. This has to do with the Potsdam Conference and the selection of targets for the atomic bomb. Arnold writes that repeating his earlier recommendation that Spaatz made the actual selection of targets and that Spaatz coordinate the decision with Gen. Groves. Arnold said he told Marshall he would send Col Jack Stone, back to Washington with a memo covering the matter. They Secretary, presumably Stimson, agreed to this, and Arnold says he dispatched Stone back to the U.S. at once. Now, in the book, THE NEW WORLD, 1939/46, Vol I of the History of the US Atomic Energy Commission, by Richard Hewlitt and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., on pps. 390-1 there is a discussion of Stimson summoning Arnold and showing him a report from Groves and two calbes from Harrison.

Q: Why don't you tell me what happened?

G: Stone came back to Washington and reported to the Acting Chief of Staff, Tom Handy, with a message from Gen. Arnold, Handy could not make heads nor tails out of Stone's report and he asked

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Gen Farrell, who was my Deputy on such matters, to come over and help him. I was out of town. He got over there and between the two of them they could get nothing out of Stone. And finally, as Farrell reported to me, he said: "Why Colonel, do you mean to say that you came all the way back from Potsdam with a message for us that was of extreme importance and you don't know what it is?" Stone more or less admitted that. So, when I got back I sent for Stone, and tried to, after hearing about it, I sent for Stone and tried to soft soap him and take any fears he had away. But it was absolutely hopeless, Stone didn't have the least idea of why Arnold had sent him back.

Q: Did you ever talk to Arnold about this?

G: No, then I decided that Arnold had been alarmed over the possible safety of the crews, against the explosion that could destroy the airplane. I had already told Arnold that the crew would be just as safe as they would normally be, and that as far as we could tell, they were all right. In talking it over with Wilson's successor, who by then was Fisher, I believe, and I had themplot out in a three dimensional graph, using little balls and wires, the flight of the plane and the flight of the bomb after it was released, to show the distance between the two at the time of explosion. Arnold never asked for it,or ever said a word about his message which he sent back.

Q: What do you think his message was?

G: I don't know, and I don't know whether Arnold's book is right or not, but it doesn't ring true. What's in the New World is completely out. The cables didn't mean anything of what was said at that time. Certainly, Stone, after his meeting with me, did his level best to hide

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from anybody and even myself for the rest of the war. He wasn't going to get involved with us. Handy did put in his cable something about Stone--I've forgotten the exact wording of it now--but merely, which gives some credence to the story as to what Stone was sent over for, but Stone did not participate with me, nor did Harrison, in the framing of this directive.

Q: Do you think his mission was probably in connection with safety of the crew?

G: I don't know what it was, it might have been, why would Stimson have suddenly talked to Arnold about this thing, when Stimson himself had approved the targets. Another thing is: why would Arnold who already knew the targets had been approved and knew that all he had to do--if he wanted to talk to Marshall--Marshall would have told him, yes, the targets were approved. We approved the Grove directive. Spaatz insisted in talking to Handy in front of me, that he thought this was too important a thing not to have the final approval of Marshall. I said: "Gen. Marshall has already approved the directive, and why bother by sending it over there." But Spaatz insisted on it. Spaatz was more afraid, I think, of having to face MacArthur and tell him that this had been going on and where it effected MacArthur so vitally, and I think that was what he really was afraid of.

Q: I am puzzled by this whole business of the Arnold message.

G: So am I.

Q: But you never did ask him about it?

G: No, I didn't believe in raking up things. The war was over. Why should I go out of my way to destroy Stone, who maybe had been an idiot and all that. It was the same thing with the way things went

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wrong on the last bombing. I made no effort to criticize those people. Just like a football coach at the end of the season telling his seniors the mistakes they made in the last game, what's the use of it?

Q: The war was already won. Going back to the business of the message being delayed into Washington, I saw something in some of the Spaatz' files over at the Library of Congress, which may have some bearing on it. They used the term, "Centerboard." From then on any message that had to do with the atomic bomb, should have the word "Centerboard" on there. In other words, this gets priority attention. And that message probably got lost in the shuffle.

G: I'll tell you what happened to it. There were two channels out of Guam, one apparently was an AF channel, and one was another channel. This one got in the wrong channel. It had always been coming through in a hurry and then suddenly, in this critical time. They both went the wrong way.

Q: I think Norstad probably directed this. I know this "Centerboard" thing came through. It seemed the normal thing to give it priority — attention, but in light of what you say, this underscored the need to get this information back to Washington.

G: Somebody slipped, and I don't know where it was. Farrell wrote the message out and sent it as normally from Tinian to Guam, and then from Guam they made the mistake in routing.

Q: Routing it via the Philippines. You know, I saw a message from Spaatz' headquarters into Washington, recommending they drop a third one on Tokyo. Do you know about that?

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G: Yes, it was disapproved. Did you see the answer to it? The answer I wrote was, I think, just "disapproved." And the reason was, I didn't want to bomb Tokyo. For one thing, the only thing left there was the Emperor's Palace, and the other thing was with all the city in ruins anyway, what was the use in getting a few remaining blocks?

Q: It was for political reasons. The Japs between August 10 and August 13, were teetering on the brink of peace or war and their emissaries were on Ie Shima negotiating. The Japanese themselves were not clear as to what they wanted to do because the military faction wanted to keep fighting and the civilian faction wanted to end the war. This was to be a psychological or political weapon, to tip the Japanese over into surrender. I guess this was the reason for it.

G: No, there was no reason for it at that time given. I haven't seen those messages recently. If you get some copies I would like to see them.

Q: At the Library of Congress you can see them there. I was wondering whether it was overtaken by the Armistice which was on the 14th.

G: No, it was disapproved?

Q: Let me ask this: did you have the ingredients of the third bomb?

G: Oh, yes.

Q: En route?

G: No, not en route, I stopped the ingredients. There again, you can get the whole story in my book. I stopped them because of Stimson's frequent conversations with me in which he emphasized the future historical position of the U.S. I thought that we would be in a bad way if we would kick the Japs while they were down and tried to surrender. Now, they weren't teetering, they were definitely going to surrender, because they could not face the atomic weapons. That's all there was to it.

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Q: In other words, you were confident that they would surrender. It would just be a matter of hours or days?

G: Yes. I went to Gen Marshall and asked him for authority. I took the message over myself saying when we would be ready to ship it. Then verbally, I said to him: "I recommend that I be authorized not to ship these until before noon of the 13th, on the grounds," the reasons that I gave him, and he said: "I agree with that." And then he wrote on the bottom of the paper, the statement: "No bomb will be dropped without the express prior approval of the President." So on the 13th, when noon came, I knew that surrender plans were in operation, and so I went over. I called to see if I could see Gen. Marshall, and they said, no, he was tied up with the Secretary. So I went over and saw Handy, and I told him that I just had to see Gen. Marshall, and it would only take a minute or two, or if I couldn't see him, the Secretary. He said: "Well, they are both tied up together, and you know what it's about. They are not to be interrupted under any circumstances." And I said: "Well, I'm not going to stay over here all day. I can't do that. I've got too many things to do. So you just tell either one you see, the first one you see, and tell him, and if you see Stimson first, then see Marshall and tell him that I am going beyond my authority, and I am holding this bomb material until they tell me, for another day, or until I can get a definite word."

Q: They had authorized release after noon the 13th if there was no surrender?

G: To ship them over, yes.

Q: If there was no surrender by noon, the 13th?

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G: No, I was just authorized by Marshall not to ship them until noon the 13th. Of course, If there was a surrender, I wouldn't ship them anyway.

Q: There was no surrender?

G: Then I was supposed to ship. But I could sense that it was so close that I didn't want to...

Q: In other words you wanted authority to change your directive.

G: I didn't want to ship it, and I wanted Marshall's approval of that.

Q: Did they ever get shipped over?

G: No. Because I left this message with Handy, and then the surrender came before I got a reply from Handy. He'd seen Marshall, or else I may have gotten a telephone call from Handy just telling me that, "about that matter you are interested in, it's okay." That would be the way the message would have come.

Q: It was okay to withhold?

G: No, just, "It's O.K." In other words, we never discussed that thing over the phone--that could possibly give away anything.

Q: Handy is in Washington, is he in good shape?

G: He looks kind of old, but as far as his mind goes, he seems to be all right.

Q: We are talking about Kyoto on the target list now.

G: I went to see Stimson about some matter--I've forgotten what it was--and told him. He asked me if I was ready yet with my target recommendations, and I told him that I was just about ready, that I was expected to show them to Gen. Marshall the next day. He said: "I want to see it now." I said: "I haven't shown it to Gen. Marshall yet." I said: "It's over in my office. It will take quite

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a while to get it," and he said: "I haven't anything to do. Your office moves pretty fast. You just pick up that phone, and call them, and tell them to bring that report over." So there was nothing else for me to do. As we were waiting there, he said to me: "What are your targets?" And I told him. He said: "I'll disapprove Kyoto." The reason was that when he was Governor General of the Philippines, he came through Japan and visited Kyoto, which was a temple city. But it had a big population. Of course, this was all war work at the time. He said he just would not approve it, that it didn't have any military significance. I said: "It has so many square feet of shop space that is busily engaged that we know of, it wouldn't make any difference." As soon as the report came in, he walked over to the door between his office and Marshall's, and said: "Marshall, are you busy, come in if you are not." Marshall came in, and he said: "Groves has just been showing me his report on the selection of targets." And about a half hour during that conversation, I was trying to get some opening to tell Marshall that I had been doublecrossed by the Secretary, because that should have gone to Marshall first, because it was a military matter. Military matters wentto Marshall. Everything else wne to Stimson. If I had just been discussing with Stimson, without any final thing about the desirability of bombing Kyoto, that would have been perfectly all right. This way I never did tell Marshall. Marshall never said a word then or later. I never mentioned it again. I think he knew what had happened. Or if he didn't know, he didn't care, because I reported to both. Then, I kept insisting on Kyoto. I must have gone back to Stimson at least six or eight times, not believing in the military doctrine that once a superior has made a decision, that's it.

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Because this was something that went beyond that point.

Q: Apparently, the AF supported you on this?

G: The AF, of course,--Norstad had been sort of keeping an eye on this Target Committee, as did I. They didn't support me. They just were in favor of it. What happened--what may have confused you was this--when Stimson turned me down on this, I asked to have these targets reserved so that they wouldn't be damaged in advance. I then went to Arnold, and told Arnold--I think I talked to Arnold, I may have talked to somebody else there, and got the word to Arnold--that it would be a great misfortune if the AF in their normal operations, bombed Kyoto. You see Stimson and Arnold were always at swordspoint on this thing, Stimson didn't, and Arnold kept assuring him, "Oh no, we only hit military targets." If this had been done, and it wasn't reserved, it was very apt to have been destroyed, then the order that you saw not to bomb Kyoto went out, and that went to both AF, so that's the story on that.

Q: What did Hewlitt and Anderson say about you that you say their statement is purely fanciful? Page 390.

G: I said I think we ought to go back at him and see if he won't change his mind. Harrison, who was not a strong man at all, although a very brilliant lawyer and banker, sent this cable over, and he was my means of communicating with Stimson, because Stimson didn't want me to have to go through Handy, so he said Harrison will be contact,

Q: Why didn't he want you to go through Handy?

G: Because he didn't want Handy getting mixed up in it. In other words, he wanted me to be completely independent. If I wanted to tell him something, he wanted it to go without any explanation of any kind.

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Q: Anyway, they said, you wanted to bomb Kyoto.

G: Well, I still said I wanted to bomb Kyoto and Stimson sent back the message saying that it was still disapproved. Then, the next day, and what the authors say, for the President the second message required no answer. But Stimson would have to show it to the President, and to Gen. Marshall and Arnold. There is absolutely no truth in that. He didn't have to show anything to anybody he didn't want to. And that was all there was to it.

Q: The actual reason that you say in your commentary was that Kyoto was a large city and was vital to Japan's production of raw materials. So this is why the AF...

G: Too....

Q: wanted to bomb it. Now you talk about one of the most outstanding incidents you were ever connected with. You didn't know why Stimson would talk to Arnold about it, except to show him your reports and cables, and you doubted if he would ask for Arnold's views more than casually. That was not Stimson's way.

G: This is absolutely right.

Q: "If Arnold's had a view he would have presented them without being asked." And then you say you didn't know what orders Arnold gave Stone. You were out of Washington when Stone arrived, and when you came back, Gen. Farrell told you in quite flowery language, just what he thought of what had happened in your absence. Farrell said that some young AF colonel had been sent back from Potsdam with a verbal message from Arnold to Handy, and that Handy had sent for him in your absence to talk the thing over, as he could not understand what Stone was talking about. Farrell went on to say that Stone was

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so completely confused as to his message that he really didn't know what it was, in fact, has not the slightest inkling of the message. And then you say you are sure it was not long before Handy and Farrell exploded on poor Col Stone. (NOTE: Probably read from "Now It Can Be Told").

G: They could explode, too.

Q: I wonder whether Arnold ever jumped on Stone?

G: I never asked the question when he got back, because Arnold did not have a good memory, and his officers used to be told things to do, certain things. If they didn't approve of it and thought the Old Man was wrong, they just let it sit for a few days and then the Old Man would forget that he had told them.

Q: I was told that he had a pretty good memory.

G: Well, he would in some ways. But he was brought up as a soldier before he became a flyer you see, and he was accustomed to people obeying orders.

Q: You have another commentary on something they said on page 390 (Hewlitt & Anderson). Did they say anything about Spaatz requesting to drop a third bomb on Tokyo?

G: No, not that I know of.

Q: This talks about page 390, line 20.

G: That's what I said.

Q: You refer to a proposal you received from Spaatz to add Tokyo to the list, but you did not approve this as Tokyo was an unsuitable target and might destroy the Emperor's Palace. Moreover, it would seriously interfere with our gaining the peace we desired. Tokyo had been severely bombed already and much of the city was in ruins. But this was a minor reason.

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G: Marshall just says Groves directive approved.

Q: Here is a reference,you have quite a few to CENTERBOARD. I just wondered, that CENTERBOARD was being used before the atomic bomb.

G: I've forgotten when CENTERBOARD came in. It may have been the first code name for it, and SILVERPLATE may have been an AF designation.

Q: I see you have copies of all the rough drafts of cables, you kept it all?

G: No, I got those from the Archives, my papers are in the Archives and they are not subject to inspection by anybody except what I term "serious historians," and then they talk to me about what they want to see anyway. But this, I think, tells the story on the situation in general. Eaker is the man, have you talked to him much, I think if you talked to him about Arnold, you would get a very good picture on Arnold's inclination and so on.

Q: He was very, he wanted me to submit questions in advance.

G: He is a very careful.

Q: I didn't get too much out of Eaker.

G: Eaker's one that could give you a lot, so could Norstad.

Q: I talked to Norstad and I got a lot from Norstad, but Norstad talked mostly about Norstad.

G: Yes, he would, but I think you could get from that a picture of Arnold and how he was, and there was no question but in my opinion, Arnold was a much better man to have at the head of the AF during the war than Andrews would have been.

Q: Andrews was a better commander?

G: Andrews was a better commander. He was much smarter intellectually, and all of that. But he also loved to fly an airplane,

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and he held no regard to safety. That is why he was killed--just his own fault. He always did things like that. That's the same thing that happened with Dargue when Dargue was killed, he was killed because of his own stupidity.

Q: He was sent out, he was going to be commander of Hawaii?

G: Yes, and he was on his way, and he ran into the Sierra Nevadas.

Q: You know Robert Lovett told me that Andrews probably would have been the Eisenhower of WW II if he had lived.

G: Well, that was counted on.

Q: Marshall had an awfully high regard for Andrews. Why?

G: Yes, because he was an awfully capable fellow. As I say, he knew very well that the trouble between Howard and Arnold, but he didn't hesitate to keep Howard in working on this thing, because he knew that Howard could outsmart all the opposite numbers in the AF.

Q: Although in Marshall's book, Andrews is criticized for this and some other things--criticized in a sense that he gave his subordinates too much leeway, that he didn't know how to pick his subordinates. This is Marshall's comment.

G: I think this came about by Arnold and Powers, but the subordinates are not picked. When you sit on the General Staff, he didn't pick his own subordinates, they are always picked for him. They came in from a list--oh, he had something to do with it, but he didn't know why they were.

Q: Are you familiar with the controversy between Arnold and Morgenthau in 1939? Morgenthau was trying to ship out a lot of our planes to the British and French....

G: I'm not familiar with that particular one, but I know that was constant and everybody who fought it, could. They fought it

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every way they could. One man doled out vehicles such as tractors and tanks and the like who was on the Committee that--he said when we go to that committee meeting, we decided what should be done. The next day we get an order from the White House, stating that the British will have all that they want; the Russians will have all that they want, and what's left, we can have. Of course, we are left with nothing.

Q: This was one of Arnold's concerns.

G: That was one of his, too, because he had to build up the Air Corps and all the planes were going to the British. I think the strength of Arnold was the feeling that he was a man of great integrity in every way. He was also very friendly. He didn't have any enemies that I know of that there wasn't really a definite reason for having them. Howard is the only one that I really knew.

Q: Well, he had a couple, Sue Clagett, he was AF. He was one of Andrews' contemporaries, and he was broken and he blamed Arnold for it.

G: That always happens, you just can't be popular when you are at the top.

Q: Arnold, of course, had this great sense of drive. Did he have a sense of humor?

G: Oh yes, his face showed that.

Q: Well, he had a smile on his face, but I've been told that just because of that built-in smile, didn't mean he was happy or pleased with what you were doing, or with the situation.

G: No, but I think he had a hard time with the kind of officers he had under him.

Q: He had several heart attacks, as you know, and he had one in 1945. Are you familiar with his problems with Elliott Roosevelt?

G: Yes, I'm familiar with when Elliott Roosevelt was made a BG.

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Q: How did that happen?

G: White House.

Q: I believe that Pa Watson said that: "Papa wants it done." Is that the way it happened?

G: Marshall said that he had turned it down twice or three times, and said he wasn't going to fight the White House any more.

Q: Spaatz and Eisenhower had recommended it to Arnold. Arnold said he wasn't going to do it, because he didn't. Elliott didn't have the eyesight, for one reason, to get wings. If he couldn't get wings, it meant he couldn't command a unit, and he couldn't get a start. Arnold had his heart attack--this is right around the 1945 Inauguration. It was right in the middle of the "Blaze" incident, too, and that's when the star came. I've been to Hyde Park trying to run this thing down, but they won't give you anything.

G: You won't get anything on it because General Marshall told me at the time that Elliott Roosevelt was on the list, and he said I didn't want to do it, and Arnold didn't wantit. But after all, the White House has asked and asked and asked, and he said: "You can't turn the White House down too many time without impairing your relationships." He told me right at the time, that this was going in, something to the effect that: "Well, I did something that I hated to do today." And he talked, these people talked to me a great deal about...

Q: People have had a lot of confidence in you?

G: They knew that I didn't talk, and they knew that I was disinterested. In other words, I was completely adrift from them.

Q: You knew too much about too many important subjects.

G: And they also knew that I was smart and discrett, never talked about anything and that was about it. That's why I got so much

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from all these people right straight through. Secretaries--they would talk to me about all sorts of things. What did I think of this person, or that person, and what did I think of this happening, including...

Q: Do you have it all in the book?

G: No, I wouldn't put that in. I'm writing now, trying to do things that will go into the National Archives, some of them under restriction and some not under restriction and I don't know whether I've written up Arnold yet or not, but I know I wrote about 25 pages on Gen. Marshall, my dealings with him.

Q: You know, Forrest Pogue, have you been in touch with him?

G: Yes, but he never comes around to see me. He keeps telling me that he's just got to see me and he never has.

Q: When you get around to writing up Arnold, would it be under restriction?

G: Oh, it will be under restriction, because it will deal with people that I don't know whether they are still alive. My theory is that none of this that I write, writing as frankly as what you saw, could possibly be let out now, because if it is done now. If it's done after I'm dead, and the others are dead and before they are dead, then it looks like I am writing a scandal book to get royalties, and I don't need the royalties.

Q: I think you are doing an important job because a lot of memoirs, a lot of important things have gone with the men who have passed on. We will never recover them, there are a number of people that I tried to talk to, who passed on, like Stratemeyer. I never got to talk to him.

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G: There are a great many of them. Have you talked to Charles Bolté. You should talk to him.

Q: Does he know something about Arnold?

G: As I recall, I'm pretty positive of this--I think Bolté was one of those sent up from the War College to join the Arnold staff, and, of course, Bolté was an infantryman and he was finally Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. But I think you can find out from him the officers that came up from the War College to go on to the Air Staff, who were not AF officers. I think you would get a pretty good idea then of Arnold and certain other things.

Q: Were you aware that in 1941, and early 1942, Andrews and his supporter, Knerr were pushing for a separate AF? Arnold was not. Arnold had agreed with Marshall that it would wait until the war ended.

G: I know almost everybody in the AF was pushing for it one way or another.

Q: Arnold was not. Arnold wanted it, but he agreed that he would wait until the war ended. But there were some who were impatient.

G: Oh yes, there always were.

Q: Of course, Andrews was among those impatient ones, and I wonder if Marshall knew about this? Because Marshall was very devoted to Andrews.

G: Oh, I think he knew that he was in favor of it.

Q: Well, I mean everybody was in favor of it, but some were pushing it actively in a political sense.

G: You don't know how much they were pushing it either.

Q: I've seen some correspondence; they were pushing it very hard. Do you remember the half-way house that happened in March 1942--this was under McNarney. Kuter and Harrison worked for him. They came up with this plan, whereby the AAF gained equality with the AGF and the SSF--this is three months after Pearl Harbor, This was

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considered to have taken the wind out of the sails of the all-out unification--now advocates. And it was done, there were several bills in Congress pushing for a separate Air Force. Andrews was among those in that group.

G: Well, I'll tell you, Marshall had learned his lesson I think. In the mess that we got into in establishing the Services of Supply and all that. In other words, you don't change an organization in time of war.

Q: Well, he was opposed to it, and I think Arnold was opposed to it, too.

G: Yes, for same reason.

Q: You know, Arnold never disagreed with Marshall. Marshall brought him into the JCS and the CCS as an equal, Arnold was never quite equal in a sense that their correspondence between them, it's "Dear General"--Arnold to Marshall and "Dear Arnold." There was always this slight differentiation between them. I don't guess Marshall accepted anybody as an equal?

G: No, I don't think he did, but he never addressed me excepting as General. Of course, he never wrote me anything, but in going into his office, he never called me by my last name, just "General." He always did that, and as far as I know, I'm the only one he ever treated that way.

Q: Most people he would say: "Groves, I want you to do so and so." He had a lot of respect for you, but he never called you "Leslie."

G: Oh no.

Q: He never called anybody by their first name.

G: Excepting Philip Peyton. He was, wound up as either MG or LT GEN. He was retired during the war for physical disability, he had

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been a roommate at VMI with him and they were very close friends, always. He's the only one that I know of that he ever called by his first name.

Q: I want to task you about one other thing. I don't know if it was a speech or an article that you wrote, but it is displayed prominently, Facts on File. In 1947, you made a statement, or a statement was attributed to you that the Russians wouldn't have an atomic bomb for 20 years and that only if they acquired the technology via a third party. Do you remember that?

G: Yes, only that isn't what was said. It all came about, and I was quoted constantly on it, as having underestimated the Russian capabilities, which I did. But it was based primarily on the lack of ore, which I never discussed with anybody--available ore. At that time, we didn't know how to use ores that were less than about 5 or 10%.

Q: Well, they had the Czechoslovakian ores, didn't they?

G: No, these came out of Bohemia.

Q: Yes, but Czechoslovakia.

G: They didn't have anything there that would amount to anything. They were old mines, and silver mining starting in 1400. There wasn't too much there, but the Bohemian was a surprise, and also we know how to beneficiate low grade ores by that time, which changed the thing. But I would say my change of opinion came. Originally it was: "How soon could they have it?" We didn't know at that time how much had leaked to the Russians through the British, which afterwards we found out. Apparently Fuchs told them everything, and while that was also one thing to produce one bomb; it was another thing to produce them in

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quantity. We were sure that the Russians and the Germans too could produce one bomb through reactor-pile type of operation. If you took out all safety precautions, which they would have done. They could have sent some Jews down and turn the values. That's all, simple as that, but there was always this question of how soon it would be. There is no question that I told them it would be a great many years, and I don't think 20 is much out of what I probably said. But when I found out about the ore--which I found out through a Belgian connection--with samples of the ore taken from boxcards going back--of course, our people never found that out--I was then started in, when I was still on active duty so it would have been in '47, I guess, or latter part of '46--to train medical officers on how to handle atomic bomb casualties. We had an elaborate course out here at Walter Reed, a two or three weeks course. I spoke at the end of each course. If I had been asked in '48, or in '47, what my estimate was it would have been considerably different. There is no use in going out and yelling all the time, about oh, I've changed my mind. If they had ever asked me, I would have told them.

Q: What would you have told them? It would be shorter?

G: Considerably shorter, because they are getting all this ore.

Q: But were you still surprised that the Russians had one in 1949?

G: I suppose it was a little sooner than I thought. I thought it would be about 1951-52, somewhere around there.

Q: Do you think that espionage played a major role in it?

G: Major role, and only the one man, Fuchs--that is as far as we know. We don't know of anyone else.

Q: I was told that Fuchs had an obsession about piddling security--

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that he would rummage through wastepaper baskets, and if he saw a scrap of paper that might have some name or writing on it, he would be furious with the secretaries and clerks.

G: I wouldn't be surprised.

Q: And yet he was handing out the major secrets.

G: Oh, he would do that as a cover. But, of course, the British were completely responsible. They just deliberately lied about his association.

Q: Did you ever have contact with Fuchs?

G: Just a meeting, and I met him as one of a group. I never knew what he looked like. But the British just deliberately lied about him and they did it three times, not just once.

Q: What about Oppenheimer's conversion, or turn-about in 1945 he was strong for the use of the atomic bomb on a live target and then four years later he had...

G: He fought against, he didn't like the idea of a hydrogen bomb.

Q: Yes, in 1949, but in 1945 he was one of four who served on Stimson's panel.

G: Just before he died, he wrote to me and said some speech he had made, or else he wrote in the letter that he didn't see how we could have done anything else.

Q: This is my opinion based on my reading of it, there was going to be a land-based invasion and it would have cost us, I think McGeorge Bundy and Stimson estimated a half million casualties.

G: We never knew how many it would be.

Q: It would have been a tremendous casualties, based on the Japs known ability to fight to the last man, so there really was no...

G; And also there would have been about 10 million Japanese casualties, which people just forget.

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Q: Well, we didn't care about that....

G: Well, yes, generally, people talk about it, the number of Japs killed should just balance that against it.

Q: It's like what you said before, you got thinking about Bataan...

G: Yes, well, I didn't feel sorry for them on account of that. But it was still advantageous to the world to keep their casualties down at that point.

Q: I want to ask you about, something that told me about SILVERPLATE. Tibbets went around getting things for SILVERPLAT. He was training his 509th at the C-54s, this Green Hornet transport line at Wendover? He had the SILVERPLATE directive and was told not to use it unless there was no other way to do it. Ostensibly, according to this story I was told, he came into the Pentagon and wanted, I think, 5 or 6 C-54s. At the time C-54s were scarcer than hen's teeth, and the man in charge of requirements or in charge of this particular subject, turned it down. This is when Tibbets invoked the SILVERPLATE, the overriding directive, and got his C-54s. It resulted, or I was told it resulted in the general officer involved, being demoted by Arnold,

G: I don't think so, I think, my own guess would be that, if there had been any trouble, I would have talked to Arnold about it, and gotten C-54s since I knew that he needed them, I heartily approved the idea of getting them.

Q: Do you remember when this need arose?

G: No.

Q: The issue never came to you?

G: No, not as any troublesome thing of any kind, but then those things came up all the time, where we had to tell people we wanted things. He could have easily said: "Gen. Groves says he wants these."

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Q: Di he invoke your name, or did he operate on his own?

G: I suppose both, both my name and SILVERPLATE. He got what he could on his own knowing that these liaison people were supposed to support him.

Q: Tibbets also told me another thing about his readiness, readiness of his group, he says he made a unilateral decision when he felt his group was ready he sent them, took them overseas when they were ready to go to Tinian. This apparently caused some disturbance at higher levels who had not been consulted prior to his departure from Wendover for overseas. Do you remember anything on that?

G: No, that could have been, the departure schedules and all that would have been approved by me beforehand. Tibbets was the No.1 pilot.

Q: You would have approved a more mature officer to head the 509th.

G: Yes, at the time, I wanted one, but I wasn't going to interfere with what Arnold wanted.

Q: Arnold chose him?

G: Arnold chose him on Gross' recommendation and Arnold chose him.

Q: Arnold didn't consult you?

G: Yes, I talked to Arnold about it.

Q: After he had made his choice?

G: No, in time that if I had objected strongly, why he would have probably changed it, but I wasn't going to do it, because that was not in my bailiwick.

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Q: Tibbets had compiled a great record in the ETO.

G: Oh yes, as I say, he was a magnificent pilot, but it was a mistake to have somebody who was quite that young to be the head of something that was going to develop and he showed that he didn't have the senior officer capabilities by the fact that with that back of him, he never got beyond BG.

Q: He got that via McConnell who learned about his not having a star and simply forced the issue about the star, and then he retired shortly thereafter. You know, Tibbets is very unhappy because he is on a shelf now. This is for political, moral, psychological reasons that we don't want to...

G: I don't think that that had anything to do with it, because this reason. Here was Ashworth, who was never put on the shelf. Sweeney wasn't put on the shelf, of course, the names weren't as well known. Parsons was not put on the shelf.

Q: Tibbets feels if you go up too far, too fast, you become a target of cuvy...

G: Oh sure, you are a target, after all, when I was made a temporary colonel in '40, I jumped six or eight academy classes, plus the entire WW I hump of emergency officers. Of course, everybody hated it. I even had people reporting to me on ground construction before I went over to the atomic bomb. One man was a division engineer. He was on my promotion board in 1918 or 19 from 2nd LT to 1st LT. He was a Colonel then. Naturally, he didn't enjoy doing what I told him to do,

Q: Let me take you back to 1939. The famous Einstein letter to FDR was written and Roosevelt apparently approved the Manhattan Project at that time.

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G: Well, no, he approved $6,000 and just told Pa Watson to keep an eye on it.

Q: When did the project get "ginned" up?

G: It was about January 1942, Bush and Conant decided--they finally got their hands on this--like all Roosevelt things--constantly overriding committees and changes of personnel--instead of replacing people. That was the way they did it. Bush and Conant, who by that time had control, recommended that it was feasible to develop the bomb in time to be effective during the war and that also if this was to be done that the construction activity should be under an Army Engineer officer.

Q: And that's when they chose you?

G: No, they chose somebody else first, who didn't get approved first till June. Then they had Col James Marshall in there, and after about two or three months with him, Bush and Conant asked to have somebody else in there. They wanted General Styer whom they knew, and he had been working with them to some extent and Styer didn't want the job, quite logically, and Somervell, whose Chief of Staff he was, didn't want to lose him. So they figured out that they would propose me, and they knew that Marshall would approve it because he knew what I had done on construction, and...

Q: Did Styer ever regret his decision?

G: I don't think so because I think he knows that he couldn't have done it. He wasn't the type. He wouldn't take the chances, and he wouldn't overrule the scientists on scientific matters. He would have gone into a very elaborate organization and spent a lot of time organizing, which is just what Marshall...

Q: Did you have to overrule the scientists on a lot of issues?

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G: Oh yes, quite often.

Q: On which way you were to go?

G: Yes, on scientific matters, too. You see, nobody knew anything at that time so it became a matter of judgment as to what was most likely to happen.

Q: Did you know about atomic energy at that time?

G: No, nothing.

Q: Who was the man closest to you? Was Fermi close to you?

G: Oh no, you mean among the scientists?

Q: Yes, to brief you, to bring you up on theoretical physics?

G: Oh no, nobody. I talked to various people at various times. That was all.

Q: Well, actually, you did'nt need to know the nuclear physics, did you?

G: No, I didn't have to know them, I had to be familiar with them, but it wasn't necessary to know them because none of it was certain, anyway. It was all theory. Just like the Darwin theory of evolution, which in my opinion is mostly bunk. But it is a good theory, ifyou were dealing with biological matters you would have to understand what the theory was. You wouldn't have to believe in it.

Q: Was there great concern that the Germans would have an atomic bomb?

G: Oh yes, that was one of the things that led our going into it was the fact that they could have had it very easily

Q: They got off the track somewhere.

G: They got off the track because they had a bunch of scientists running it. They never did get one.

Q: You mean as opposed to getting some engineers in there?

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G: Getting one man in there to run it all. They had one man supposedly running it, but the rest of them didn't respond.

Q: Who was that?

G: I don't know who that was. There were various people at various times, but they all thought they knew more than the others.

Q: Was there some great concern in early 1945--we knew the Germans had done some things before we had done some things with heavy water back before the war. When our project was coming toward consummation, we logically figured that the Germans might have been doing the same thing. Did we know that they were miles from it?

G: No.

Q: Wasn't there the Goudsmit project?

G: That came later, after the war, really.

Q: Yes, but wasn't there great concern when we had the atomic bomb or knew we would have one?

G: We didn't have it and didn't know we would have it.

Q: It was uncertain. But after the milestone under the "Chicago Stands," we knew we had it.

G: Oh no, not at all. That had nothing to do with it. There merely showed you could build a, "Toney" (?) reactor. It didn't show that you could have a bomb, because that showed you could have a chain reaction, if it was moderated, not full speed. That's where the Germans missed the boat.

Q: Let me ask you this. Right before Trinity, did you know then the bomb would be successful? Or you weren't sure?

G: No, we weren't sure, we weren't sure. After all, the one at Trinity was not a full-scale bomb. It was the explosive part of the bomb, had nothing to do with the firing mechanism.

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Q: You mean the problem of dropping it and getting away from it?

G: Dropping it and having the proximity fuse work correctly and all that, and, of course, the Hiroshima bomb was an entirely different bomb all the way through. That was never tested.

Q: The Nagasaki bomb was armed and they couldn't land with it, right, because once they got pass the altitude it would go?

G: On no. You had to pull out the safety plugs.

Q: Oh really. I had the understanding that it was armed and they couldn't bring it back.

G: Yes, they could have brought it back, but I don't think they would have. They would have dropped it in the ocean.

Q: Why?

G: Because it would be much safer to do it that way.

Q: You mean it was partly armed:

G: No, it was, you don't know how well your safety mechanism is going to work.

Q: And they were worried about it?

G: Naturally, they would be worried about it, and I expected them to drop it somewhere, not try to land it. But that was up to them, after all you have to leave it to people.

Q: Well, Nagasaki was not the first target, it was not the No. 1 target that day, was it Niigata or Kokura? Kokura was....

G: I think so.

Q: Then they dropped it on Nagasaki. Actually, some AF people were disappointed in that they felt the AF could have won the war without the atomic bomb.

G: Oh sure, they all felt that. All they would have done was pounded Japan to pieces, but it wouldn't have had the psychological effect

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Q: You are right, it would not have had the psychological effect. If there was no atomic bomb, wouldn't airpower have been able to win it without invading?

G: No, seapower would have won it easily. If I had been President of the U.S., and had felt that the people would stand for it, once MacArthur got the Philippines, before Okinawa, before Iwo Jima, I would have declared a naval blockade and said: "We are not going to waste American lives going into there. We will just blockade them." That would have done it, but it would have dragged on for 5 or 10 years.

Q: Well, that would have done it, but after the LeMay low level raids of March 1945?

G: We could have driven them out without the naval blockade.

Q: Don't we have evidence the Japs were planning, or were trying to surrender for weeks, and they didn't even know about the atomic bomb?

G: They were initiating surrender moves, but that was more on the naval blockade.

Q: Well, LeMay had burned out all their cities?

G: I know but it doesn't make any difference.

Q: Well, he had burned out all their industrial capabilities?

G: That's all right, the naval blockade was really what was bothering them.

Q: More than LeMay's bombers?

G: Yes. Of course, the AF will never admit that. If you read. There is evidence that the way to end it was a combination of the two. You could have done it with a naval blockade alone; you couldn't have done it with bombing alone.

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Q: Well, LeMay felt that if they had a couple more weeks they would have done it without the atomic bomb.

G: Yes, but he's wrong. It wouldn't have happened, they wouldn't surrender on that. As it was, it was touch and go, you know on the surrender.

Q: That was sort of a discussion within the government, but everybody knew which way the Japs would go. It would be a matter of when.

G: Yes, but that came after the battle of Midway, it was just a question of when.

Q: Do you think Midway was a turning point?

G: Yes, it was a turning point.

Q: What about all the invasions that followed Miday? Were they unnecessary?

G: They weren't unnecessary. That had to be done. You had to stop that, but the turning point from which you knew the Japs were defeated was Midway and Coral Sea.

Q: It was a turning point in the sense you knew the Japs no longer could threaten the U.S. after Midway, but this was not the same as their defeat.

G: Oh yes, all you had to do was figure we could build ships a lot faster and a lot more of them then they could and that the ships would have dominated the oceans, and that would be the end of it.

Q: Carriers were, not battleships.

G: Any kind of ships.

Q: Battleships had no use in the war?

G: Oh yes.

Q: What use does a battleship have?

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G: The ~~very~~ battleships were very important for the whole thing. Otherwise, we wouldn't have kept on building them.

Q: We kept on building them. In 1939 we were building cavalry, the Army was asking for millions of dollars for the cavalry post down in Front Royal, Virginia. Do you know the arguement they were using in 1939? The Russians had a large cavalry.

Q: You say that Mitchell did not have the military grounding to be a good officer. How about Arnold? Did he have the grounding?

G: Yes, Arnold, was he in Infantry or Cavalry?

Q: He was in the Infantry, he tried to get into the Cavalry and couldn't get in.

G: He was in there for several years.

Q: He was in there for a tour in the Philippines. He came back, went into flying, and then he left flying after he got married because of the dangers, and then he went back to the Philippines for a tour.

G: That gave him a thorough understanding of it, which Mitchell didn't have.

Q: Arnold had a lot of friends in the Army, people who didn't understand airpower. But they liked Arnold. I think of Malin Craig. You know what made Arnold? Luck, and the fact that he knew Malin Craig. You see he did a great job out at March Field in 1931-35 and Malin Craig was the 9th Corps Area Commander. When Craig came in to take MacArthur's place, he brought Arnold in. That's why Arnold was the No. 2 man under Westover. When Westover was killed, Arnold was ready to step into that job.

G: Of course, there is no question. Arnold was well trained. He was a soldier first, flyer second. I don't think when Arnold flew, that he always had to be the pilot.

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Q: Andrews was this way.

G: Always wanted to fly himself.

Q: He loved it. Were you aware of a competition between Arnold and Andrews for the top slot?

G: Oh yes.

Q: Did either of them ever discuss it with you?

G: No.

Q: Was there a feeling that they chose the right man to head the Air Corps?

G: It all depended on who you talked to. Each had his supporters. I think the Army as a whole would have preferred Andrews, and the Air Force would have preferred Arnold.

Q: Why?

G: I don't know.

Q: I would say just the reverse would be true. Andrews was pushing harder for four-engine bombers at that time.

G: Didn't make any difference. They thought that Andrews was more. They just thought he was more competent, I think.

Q: Well, Andrews might have been more competent, but he was the more ideological of the two, and the Army didn't like ideological AF people.

G: Oh no, you haven't gotten that straight at all.

Q: Well, Mitchell was the ideological zealot.

G: I know, but he antagonized everybody, even when he was in France, you know. He didn't get along with people. The reason that he was tried was entirely because of his violent language. He would have gone in right with the Black Panthers today.

Q: I talked to Mrs. Arnold recently about Billy Mitchell. She sat in at the strategy sessions when Frank Reed. Arnold and some of

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the others were at the hotel and they were planning the strategy session. Billy Mitchell said that he was deliberately provoking the situation. He was going beyond what the situation called for and being more extreme in his position because he wanted to secure the position of the air force. In other words, he sacrificed himself.

G: He may have said that, but he thought he could get away with it. He had been a spoiled boy all his life.

Q: But he had a lot of public opinion behind him.

G: Oh sure he did, because it was dramatic. All he had to do--the same way as the Navy used to take Congressmen to sea and get them seasick, now they take them up in the air and flip around there a little.

Q: I agree with you there, but I am surprised what you say about Marshall and Andrews, for the reasons that you say. There are other reasons. Andrews had a reputation as more of a commander than Arnold. Arnold had the reputation as being supply, production, a driver.

G: I would say he had the reputation of being very well liked.

Q: Arnold? How about Andrews, he was well liked?

G: He was well liked, but not the same way.

Q: In what way was he liked?

G: I would say that if somebody was going on a fishing trip they would rather have Arnold than Andrews with them. That kind of personal...

Q: You know, Andrews was very close to Knerr. Put it in reverse, and Knerr was close to Andrews. Knerr was a zealot, were you aware of that, he was writing articles, Reader's Digest, American Mercury and he was trying to egg Andrews into a position of coming out for an all-out separate air force.

G: I know a lot of that went on, and a lot of AF officers weren't intelligent enough to see through it.

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Q: Arnold played the game of saying "yes," we should have a separate air force, but not now.

G: Yes, and of course, the separate Air Force has had a lot of. It turned out differently from what people thought it was going to be. In other words, there are more planes in the Army now than there are in the AF. It had to be that way because the AF said it would not assist the Army in any of its operations.

Q: Leslie McNair had strong feelings about the devotion of the Air Corps to bombing and not enough to air support of the Army.

G: Oh, yes, well they always had that.

Q: And it is kind of ironic that he was killed by some very close air support, at St. Lo.

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19 August 1971

Maj General Robert W. Crow, US Army (Ret)
3250 Valley Lane
Falls Church, Va. 22044

Dear General Crow:

The man is back again! You may recall that in our reminiscences about you and Hap Arnold at Fort Leavenworth, I mentioned that on Graduation Day, Major Arnold couldnt wait to leave there, and he had Mrs. Arnold and the children outside the auditorium in the car with the engine on.

This story was told to me by General Orval Cook and confirmed by Mrs. Arnold. Part of Arnold's discomfort at the school was based on the knowledge that General Edward King, the Commandant, was a member of the Billy Mitchell Court Martial. General King is also credited with the statement: "I'll crucify Arnold if he ever comes to this School."

Mrs. Arnold recalls that the rules at the Leavenworth school were very strict. Bottles in ash cans were counted and parking tickets "flew around to every one, and the slightest misdemeanor on the part of the children was punished." Hence, Hap Arnold couldnt wait until he was out of the place. He wouldnt let Bee Arnold attend the graduation. While he was changing clothes, she gathered the family in the car with engine running and waited for him. As soon as he came out, they rushed off.

Does this stir any memory in you or in Mrs. Crow?

I'll phone next week to inquire.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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Arnold Impatient to Leave Leavenworth - June 1929

In Orval Cook's interview he recalled that Arnold had just graduated from Ft. Leavenworth and couldnt wait to get out of there, so he had Mrs. A and the children in the car with the engine running on graduation day.

Mrs. Arnold, in ltr to me July 28, 1970 confirms this story as "almost correct. As you know Hap did not want to go to School as he felt the War Dept did not have the ability to teach problems of the Air Corps, then too General King had made the statement: 'I'll crucify Arnold if he ever comes to this School.' King had been on Billy Mitchell's Court Martial and, of course, had heard Hap testify in favor of the Air Corps and Mitchell. Hap and I had a bet when we went to Leavenworth who would be called on the carpet first. I won. The rules there were very strict - bottles in ash cans were counted & parking tickets flew around to every one and the slightest misdemeanor on the

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the part of the children was punished. Hap couldnt wait to get out of the place and wouldnt let me go to graduation because he wanted me to absolutely ready when he returned from the Exercises. It was true when he was changing clothes I gathered the clan in the car, engine running and waited for him. We were the first to leave! (The Guard told us)."

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Interview (telecon) Maj Gen Robert Grow, Falls Church, Va. 11 Aug 71

Q: When you attended the Command & Staff School do you recall some of the courses, mandatory courses, that you and Arnold took?

G: Only one course was given. It was the same course for everyone. It was made up of lectures, conferences, and map problems. At this moment I don't recall any specific ones. They started in mid-Fall and lasted all year. At the end of the year for about one week they gave us tactical problems, terrain exercises. Map problems occurred once a week probably about 30 or 40 problems altogether. Those were the ones we were graded on. I went to Leavenworth a few years later as an instructor. Everyone took the same course. Later on they started a 2 year course. It was the same as the 1 year course, except that perhaps they got more lectures on national policy. Other than that, it was the same. When I was there as an instructor, I was teaching "Mechanical Cavalry." I had to make up 3 or 4 map problems myself.

Q: It made no difference whether you were Air Corps or Cavalry?

G: No difference whatsoever. We had all branches and services represented.

Q: Navy?

G: There may have been 2 or 3 from the Navy and Marine Corps. Also might have had some foreign students. I think there were a couple of Cubans. I'm not sure what they were, but I think there were some foreign students.

Q: How many students were there in your class?

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G: Over 200, but I'm not really sure, and I wouldn't want to give you an incorrect answer . I think the best thing would be for you to go out to Kansas City or Leavenworth. It is all a matter of record, and they can tell you.

Q: Any major problems dealing with inter-service problems while you were there?

G: No, all the problems dealt with the Army. Now the joint exercises were covered in ahe War College. After WWII they were covered in the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk. Don't recall any joint exercises.

Q: Do you remember any interesting situations or instructors at Leavenworth? Any eccentricities?

G: I have to think back in the record. I get mixed up because I was an instructor there afterwards and I forget who was there at what time. We had some damn bright people there. We used to have a lot of bull sessions, discussions, with a great deal of it involving the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces, particularly about the use of air power, the idea of the Air Corps for distance bombing operations particularly Air Corps versus Navy. Independent operation of the Air Corps was a possible suggestion and was argued by Andrews and Arnold.

Q: Was Andrews there at that time?

G: Yes, Andrews was in that class. You should do some investigating at Leavenworth. It is a magnificent school.

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Q: That was after Billy Mitchell got kicked out, do you remember any bull sessions at the Officers' Club or around the school about Billy Mitchell?

G: I remember that they did take place. But I can't remember who took part in them, who said what, I'm not sure. I remember a fellow, Bill Farthing was an instructor, Air Corps, whether he was an instructor when we were students or not, I don't recall. Brett was also an instructor out there. Don't remember what year. Could have been during my second tour. I have my orders for my second tour that might be able to help but I don't have very good records of 1928 and 1929. It was one of those formative times. We were in early stages of the Air Corps operations but there was not an Air doctrine at the time. Air Doctrine considered Air Corps an auxiliary arm of the Army, same as the Artillery. It was considered as long range artillery and long range cavalry. Bombing extended the Artillery and Cavalry. They wanted, Arnold particularly, greater independence for the Air Corps.

Q: I think Andrews felt stronger about bombing than Arnold. Remember Andrews?

G: I don't remember any specific talks. We didn't spend that much time in discussion because we had a great deal of studying to do. We worked a great deal. Plus, I spent my spare time writing.

Q: You said you remember that Billy Mitchell was a subject of some discussions?

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G: I don't remember any specific conversations but I do remember that there was talk about him. When you go to Leavenworth there are two things that you can get that will help you. Get the roster of instructors and students and get the catalogue of courses and requirements for graduation.

Q: Any personal recollections?

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Telecon between Gen Grow and Dr Green, 31 August 1971

Q: I sent you a little note last week.

G: Yes, thank you, let me see if I got it. Yes, I remember.

Q: There are somethings I want to clear up. About Fort Levenworth a story told me by General Cook.

G: I don't know anything about that.

Q: You never heard King say anything like that?

G: I never heard any one say anything about King's feelings toward Hap. I don't recall that question ever coming up, during my few discussions with Hap. That story I never heard before.

Q: Were you aware that General King was a member of the Billy Mitchell court martial board?

G: I did hear that when I was at Fort Riley. There was very little talk about that situation at that time. There were some caustic remarks about the Navy because we always liked to give them a dig. But other then that nothing.

Q: Mrs Arnold said that Riley was very GI about observing military regulations?

G: Yes, Eddie always kept a very clean post. I remember one time when I saw him later one he asked me if there was any more drinking at Riley since he left. I said not a bit General. But I said it in such a way that he new I was kidding. At that time we had Prohibition.

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(2.4s) Gen. Everybody took same course at Leavenworth - 1928

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Brief: Dress at Leavenworth - 1928-29

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grade I had given myself. Ed pulled out a folder, confidential, and checked the grade I had given myself against the arithmatic score given by the faculty. They graded me one point higher. Ed said that that showed that his faculty was doing a good job. During the course I got 2 Us, the rest were Ss, but some of my S were very low ones, barely acceptable solutions, not the preferred ones.

M: Do you think that the grades had any bearing on assignments?

G: Yes, I'm sure of that. When you know someone who was at the top of his class he usually got a good assignment.

Q: Did Arnold ever mention to you, or do you have any recollection if he thought he got something out of the school, or was it just a waste of time?

G: I don't remember Arnold's saying anything in particular about it to me. But most of the students thought it was a good school.

M: Did any fellows get tapped as "comers" "gungho" [redacted], etc.?

Q: Did you have any impression of Arnold being a "comer"?

G: Yes, but not as much as when we were at Ft Riley. "Briney" Booth .. No impression at Levenworth of Arnold. Levenworth is a place where your career is very heavily molded and influenced. More then a school it was professional molding. That sticks with you and stays with you during your career.

Q: Someting like the Academy? Except it is a mid-career?

G: Yes, but even more so.

Q: Dress. Gen King picked you up that time for not being properly dressed for riding. He was a real stickler about dress wasn't he?

G: Yes, a stickler about dress. Although the dress was not as good as at Ft Riley, because we had people from every branch of the service. We used to wear Peel boots made in England.

M: What type of coats?

G: We had a tailor in Levenworth, Peterson, who used to make them. Most officers had the Peterson coat. Breeches were ~~Faver~~. Levenworth set the style for the Army. They were tops.

Q: Were they expensive to purchase?

G: Prices; Peel field boots - $40 (~~[redacted]~~), a man who came around once a year to Army posts to take measurements and your orders.

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(The Faber) pair breeches pretty high, about $35 each. And the Petersen coats cost $60

Q: That was a lot of money you had to put out as a Lieutenant?

G: They trusted us. You paid your bill in a year. Often all Peels was making boots for 200 years, or more

Q: Was there any problem of non payment of bills?

G: Very seldom. [redacted]. Everybody knew everybody else. While you had a few occasional defaults, about everybody paid their bill. [redacted]

Q: Did you have a sword?

G: No sword.

Q: How about the Sam Browne belt?

G: Can't remember when we stopped wearing them. They might have been $18.

Q: It was unthinkable for an officer to be delinquent in his payments?

G: Yes. There were a few but it was relatively infrequent in those days. There were only a few hundred officers and one couldn't get by with anything. Everybody knew everybody. It is a lot different today.

Q: Seems to me that the Army which was a society within a larger society was quite different than today where what you say and do comes to national attention.

G: We weren't divorced from civilian society. The whole pace was geared differently. There is a lot that has been lost due to size. At that time Junction City (Ft Riley) Kansas was an Army town. I went back to 1934 on Mechanized Cavalry maneuvers and went to a Chamber of Commerce dinner. I was amazed that I could walk and greet about 50 business men and call them by their first names. [redacted] Eisenhower, the youngest brother, to "Eisenhower's at 4 P.M. owned a drug store there. Everybody went there. We had a poker game every monday evening with businessmen and officers from the post. It was a very close knit community. I have a silver pitcher which was donated yearly by 2 doctors in Junction City for the top Horse event in the Leavenworth graduation [redacted].

Q: The drug store was the center of activity? Did you see Ike there, he was Class of '15?

G: Didn't see Ike. Ike was a Major then somewhere in the Philippines.

Q: Told story of Philadelphia newspaper coverage of Arnold's Alaskan flight. Headlines: "Dr Arnold's Brother Flies To Alaska". Hap was then less famous brother. Same with Ike

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Interview, Maj Gen Robert Grow, US Army (Ret) Fairfax County, Va
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Q Were you the senior officer in the class?

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Q General Edward King who had been at Riley was now commander at Leavenworth?

G Yes. Eddie King was Commandant at Leavenworth during the time that we were there. We had a good many meetings with him. In fact he was a very close personal friend.

Q Let's go back to Riley for a minute. A lot of the Cavalry officers kept their riding crops with them in the air?

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G He was. General Booth was much impressed by it. He like to fly himself, and he flew quite frequently with Major Arnold. There was very little cross-country. We flew all around beyond the reservation, probably within radius of not more than 50 miles from the post. I took a couple of cross country flights with them and a number of our class flew up to Omaha to Ak-sar-ben Races. We wanted to have a good look at some of the thoroughbreds racing at the track at Omaha. And I also flew to Leavenworth with him, to make contact there for one reason or

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Q He wrote six of them.

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Q Actually, his 3rd boy was born either at Riley or just before he got to Riley. I think he was born in 1927.

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Q Was that Kromer?

G Kromer was Chief of Cavalry for two years, then Johnny Herr came in for the last two years. I was in charge of the development of equipment there, in the Chief's office, and had the most to do, as far as the office was concerned, in the development of the equipment that Armor used in World War II. And I was in very close touch with it. I had been with Mechanized Force in 1930, after I left Leavenworth and I was on short assignment on the Border with a Cavalry Regiment. And then with Mechanization until 1940, and then with Armor, its offspring, for the rest of my service. At Riley, everybody knew Arnold had been shanghaied, on account of the Mitchell case. He was being put, we were led to believe, it was common gossip there, that he was being sent out to Riley to get him out of sight. Arnold is not the kind of fellow who gets out of sight.

Q Who stays out of sight?

G One of the incidents that I have emphasized so much in the course of training that he gave to us in Special Advanced Equitation class in aero-observation is one instance of how progressively he was thinking. And this particular operation was recognized by the War Department.

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Q Let me ask some things about your Fort Riley experience. There was one occasion that Jim Bevans was at Fort Riley.

G I remember Bevans.

Q Bevans was a horseman. They had riding contests. Bevans recalled that he won one of the races. Of course, he was pitted against Cavalry officers who were either born in the saddle or raised in the saddle. And this caused some concern among the old hands at the post than Air Corps guy would lick these fellows at their own game. Do you remember anything like this? He won some kind of medal?

G I'm not sure about that.

Q Do you think that was likely?

G I don't know about that* * *

Q You were M.F.H. (Master of the Fox Hunts) How often did you have these fox hunts?

G Once or twice a week.

Q We're looking at these pictures. Did Arnold go on these fox-hunts?

G That's what Mrs. Grow and I were talking about the other day, and we cannot remember.

Q How about Mrs. Arnold? She was a horsewoman. She rode.

G You know, I can't remember.

Q Those fox hunts would take place all year round?

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Q Did Arnold regard his own stay there as punishment?

G I'm sure that he did, but he never spoke about it and he was never bitter. As far as I know, he was not bitter.

Q Juan Trippe, of Pan Am, was setting up shop in 1926. Some of the airlines were setting up in those days. He offered Arnold a job to come with the Pan Am airline which was setting up routes in South America. Arnold turned it down. Mrs. Arnold wanted him to turn it down, because she didn't want him to be a quitter. She didn't want him to leave as if he were leaving under fire. And he stayed in the Army, although he had some thoughts of departing. Did you know about this?

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Q Did he have any close friends among the Cavalry people?

G I don't know. He was friendly. Everybody was friendly with Arnold. He was popular.

Q Did he have a smile on his face?

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Fairfax County, Va 10 Aug 71

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another. I forgot. In fact, the matter is, I was detailed as a student at Leavenworth in Spring of 1928, and I believe that my last flight, not with Hap, it was with one of the members of his squadron, was over there to check on Quarters before I moved to Leavenworth.

Q Arnold was in the same class at Leavenworth?

G No. Then at Leavenworth he was in the same class, and Frank Andrews was there, also, in that class. A one year class. That was the class of 1928-29. They started a two-year class that year, but Hap and I both took the one year course. And I saw a good deal of him at Leavenworth, but I can't remember whether I flew with him at all, although they did take all of the Air Corps officers at Leavenworth as students. They did do some flying to keep up their qualification. And I probably did. I think, as I recall it -- I can't be positive, that I flew back to Riley with him at one time.

Q General Edward King who had been at Riley was now commander at Leavenworth?

G Yes. Eddie King was Commandant at Leavenworth during the time that we were there. We had a good many meetings with him. In fact he was a very close personal friend.

Q Let's go back to Riley for a minute. A lot of the Cavalry officers kept their riding crops with them in the air?

G I don't recall whether I did or not, but I know that General Booth did. On one occasion, Hap told about how he--the observer rode in tandem, at the rear, behind the pilot. Hap told me one time how Briny would use his riding crop to tap him on the head to point out where he wanted to go, with his crop.

Q Driving a horse?

G Driving a horse. Mrs. Grow and I knew the Arnold family, not intimately. At Leavenworth, I'm quite sure we played bridge with them two or three times, and we'd see them at different functions. And at that time, Hap was writing, I'm not sure whether he finished any or not.

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He had two boys, and he was absorbed in those boys of his, and he was writing books for boys. Now, I never saw the MS or any of the books. He talked about them, occasionally, when we'd meet.

Q He wrote six of them.

G I didn't know what he did with them. They were fine boys.

Q Actually, his 3rd boy was born either at Riley or just before he got to Riley. I think he was born in 1927.

G I'm not sure. I've forgotten. I don't have any record of it, and it's all memory, and it was quite a few years ago. I don't recall any occasion meeting Hap following those days at Riley and Leavenworth, except, I was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Cavalry in 1936-40.

Q Was that Kromer?

G Kromer was Chief of Cavalry for two years, then Johnny Herr came in for the last two years. I was in charge of the development of equipment there, in the Chief's office, and had the most to do, as far as the office was concerned, in the development of the equipment that Armor used in World War II. And I was in very close touch with it. I had been with Mechanized Force in 1930, after I left Leavenworth and I was on short assignment on the Border with a Cavalry Regiment. And then with Mechanization until 1940, and then with Armor, its offspring, for the rest of my service. At Riley, everybody knew Arnold had been shanghaied, on account of the Mitchell case. He was being put, we were led to believe, it was common gossip there, that he was being sent out to Riley to get him out of sight. Arnold is not the kind of fellow who gets out of sight.

Q Who stays out of sight?

G One of the incidents that I have emphasized so much in the course of training that he gave to us in Special Advanced Equitation class in aero-observation is one instance of how progressively he was thinking. And this particular operation was recognized by the War Department.

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They just couldn't overlook it. It was too good. Briney Booth, who was a very close friend of Arnold's, was quite sure that the War Department didn't overlook that. I'd like to think that that possibly had something to do with his getting back in favor. And then, of course, after he'd been to Leavenworth, why he, I believe, came into, began to progress in the manner that a man of that calibre can progress.

Q Let me ask some things about your Fort Riley experience. There was one occasion that Jim Bevans was at Fort Riley.

G I remember Bevans.

Q Bevans was a horseman. They had riding contests. Bevans recalled that he won one of the races. Of course, he was pitted against Cavalry officers who were either born in the saddle or raised in the saddle. And this caused some concern among the old hands at the post than Air Corps guy would lick these fellows at their own game. Do you remember anything like this? He won some kind of medal?

G I'm not sure about that.

Q Do you think that was likely?

G I don't know about that* * *

Q You were M.F.H. (Master of the Fox Hunts) How often did you have these fox hunts?

G Once or twice a week.

Q We're looking at these pictures. Did Arnold go on these fox-hunts?

G That's what Mrs. Grow and I were talking about the other day, and we cannot remember.

Q How about Mrs. Arnold? She was a horsewoman. She rode.

G You know, I can't remember.

Q These fox hunts would take place all year round?

G Not in the heat of the summer. We'd start usually the first of October. We'd hunt all Winter and Spring, except some days in the

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Winter, the snow got a little too deep, but we hunted in the snow. Now, these were drag hunts, not live. Now, we had a pack of greyhounds, also, and we'd hunt coyotes with them. They'd follow by sight. Of course, the fox hounds followed by scent. We dragged a fox. Those were drag hunts, In other words, we'd send a man with an (addis?) scent soap bag on a rope, dragging it on his horse. He'd select a route, drag it around, and would try to fool the fox hounds. We had a couple of soldiers to look after the dogs.

Q Did Arnold regard his own stay there as punishment?

G I'm sure that he did, but he never spoke about it and he was never bitter. As far as I know, he was not bitter.

Q Juan Trippe, of Pan Am, was setting up shop in 1926. Some of the airlines were setting up in those days. He offered Arnold a job to come with the Pan Am airline which was setting up routes in South America. Arnold turned it down. Mrs. Arnold wanted him to turn it down, because she didn't want him to be a quitter. She didn't want him to leave as if he were leaving under fire. And he stayed in the Army, although he had some thoughts of departing. Did you know about this?

G No. Arnold and I were never close enough so that we talked about personal feelings.

Q Did he have any close friends among the Cavalry people?

G I don't know. He was friendly. Everybody was friendly with Arnold. He was popular.

Q Did he have a smile on his face?

G Always. Very popular. But whether there was any partiality there, any close friendships, I don't know.

Add Telephone Interview with General Grow, 11 August 1971

(No substance here)

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Hale, Dudley D. 5 Jan 72

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110 East Morse Blvd — Park Ave Over Wolfson's Paint Near R.R. 644-2747

20314

24 November 1971

Maj General Dudley D. Hale, USAF (Ret)
Southern Seniors Golf Assn
P.O. Box 1629
Winter Park, Florida 32789

837 Brock Winter Pk

Dear General Hale:

I'm the fellow working on General Hap Arnold's life and times. As I project my schedule, I figure to come through Winter Park about Wednesday, January 5th. I hope there are no golf tournaments to conflict. If you would be available, would morning or afternoon suit you better?

Also, do you have a phone number where you could be reached - - just in case?

Incidentally, a colleage of mine, Colonel Ray Predette, is working on a book covering the Air Force Medal of Honor winners. One of his subjects is Ken Walker who was a squadron commander in the 2nd Bomb Group just a bit before you joined it. Walker moved on to the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley. If you had contacts with Walker, I should like to ask some questions on behalf of Predette.

Incidentally, my trip South will be, in part, to arrange for the disposition of the historical papers of General Hugh Knerr who passed away last month.

Hope to see you in about six weeks. 5-72

Sincerely,

Note (-

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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20314

21 May 1971

Maj General Dudley D.Hale, USAF (Ret)
Southern Seniors Golf Association
P.O. Box 1629
Winter Park, Florida 32789

Dear General Hale:

Our letters crossed in the mail. I hope you have a great tournament in North Carolina.

I'm thinking of November as an alternative and will alert you in good time.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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SOUTHERN SENIORS GOLF ASSOCIATION

P. O. Box 1629, Winter Park, Florida 32789

May 17, 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Your letter dated May 14 has been received which stated that you plan to be in our area the last week in May.

Our May Tournament is scheduled for that week and I plan to attend this tournament in Whispering Pines, North Carolina.

May I suggest, however, that you phone me in any event since my departure may be delayed or canceled due to unforeseen circumstances?

Sincerely,

Dudley D. Hale

Dudley D. Hale
Major General USAF (Ret.)

ddh;bd

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20314

20 May 1971

Maj. General Dudley D. Hale, USAF (Ret)
Southern Seniors Golf Association
P.O. Box 1629
Winter Park, Fla. 32789

Dear General Hale:

A just received publisher's commitment forces a short postponement of my travel plans to Florida. That plus the opportunity to conduct some necessary interviews up North in July and August (how convenient!) may cause me to delay my visit to your area until October or November.

I hope this prospective change will not foul up your plans in any way. I shall alert you when my travel plans firm up again. I'm looking forward to getting together with you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

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20314

14 May 1971

Major General Dudley D. Hale, USAF Ret
Southern Seniors Golf Association
P. O. Box 1629
Winter Park, Florida 32789

Dear General Hale:

Thank you for your letter of May 11th. My plans have firmed up enough for me to indicate that I will be in this area the last week in May. I will phone for an appointment and look forward to the pleasure of meeting you.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

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SOUTHERN SENIORS GOLF ASSOCIATION

P. O. Box 1629, Winter Park, Florida 32789

May 11, 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I shall be happy to talk to you during your Southland visit in reference to General "Hap" Arnold.

I am not sure, though, that the Hale referred to in your research was not Willis instead of Dudley since he, Willis, was a contemporary of General Arnold's whereas I was in a much younger age group.

Sincerely,

Dudley D. Hale

Dudley D. Hale
Major General USAF (Ret.)

DDH:bd

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20314

14 April 1971

Major General Dudley D. Hale, USAF (Ret)
837 Brook Street
Winter Park, Florida 32789

Dear General Hale:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold which is to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian presently assigned to General Grussendorf's office in order to complete this assignment.

In spending about 18 months on a Brookings Institution Fellowship, I was able to research all of the vast Arnold collection at the Library of Congress. I also went through the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Baker, Andrews, Knerr, LeMay, and other collections.

Aside from the written word, I have tried to interview the most important Air Force people who had contacts with General Arnold some time during his colorful career. Among those interviewed: Generals Spaatz, Baker, O'Donnell, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, and perhaps 100 others. I have also been privileged to talk to Charles A. Lindbergh, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, Robert Lovett, Jackie Cochran, and a number of others.

I have run across your name in a couple of contexts which may have brought you in some contact with General Arnold. If you feel you can contribute any anecdotes, insights, or even scuttlebutt which you think has validity, I would be pleased to stop by for a chat during a pending trip to the Southland in early June.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL DUDLEY D. HALE, USAF

Dudley Durward Hale was born in Perry, Missouri, August 16, 1904. He was graduated from high school in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1922, and from the University of Chattanooga in 1926.

Appointed a Flying Cadet in February 1928, General Hale completed his flying training a year later and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Reserve. Receiving his Regular commission as a second lieutenant of Air Corps May 2, 1929, he was assigned with the Second Bomb Group at Langley Field, Virginia, becoming a flying instructor at the Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, Texas, in June 1931. Entering the communications course at the Signal School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in September 1934, he was graduated the following June and returned to Langley Field as communications officer of the Eighth Pursuit Group, later serving as flying commander and squadron adjutant with that group, and assuming command of the Second Communications Squadron there in November 1938.

The following September General Hale was named communications officer and adjutant of the 23rd Composite Group at Maxwell Field, Alabama, was graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School there in July, and rejoined the 23rd Group at Orlando Air Base, Florida. Going to the Panama Canal Zone in April 1941, he was communications officer for the Sixth Air Force, becoming assistant chief of staff for operations of the Sixth that December. Entering the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, in June 1942, he was graduated that December and rejoined the Sixth in the Panama Canal Zone as deputy chief of staff. The following April he became communications officer of the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, and in July 1944 he joined the 12th Air Force in that capacity, serving in North Africa and Italy.

Transferred to the Army and Navy Staff College in May 1945, General Hale was operations instructor, and later served as chief of the Communications Section there. Appointed operations instructor at the National War College in June 1946, a year later he was named chief of the Communications Division of the Air University at Maxwell Field, Alabama, with additional duty as assistant chief of staff for operations. In September 1948 he became chief of the Academic Staff at the Air University, retaining his duties as chief of the Communications Division, and the following August he was named Director of Education for the Air University.

Assigned as chief of the War Plans Division in the Directorate of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, at Air Force Headquarters on August 7, 1950, in January 1952 he went to Korea as vice commander of the Fifth Air Force, Far East Air Forces. That November he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Allied Air Forces in Central Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), and on August 1, 1955, he assumed command of the Airways and Air Communications System, Military Air Transport Service, at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

MORE

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Interview, Maj Gen Dudley Hale, Winter Park, Fla. 5 Jan 1972

Q I know you said you had some just passing contacts with General Arnold, and I just wonder if you could tell me about them.

H Actually, when he made the B-10 flight to Alaska, when they returned, I had the communications region, the Eastern half of the United States, east of the Mississippi River. We picked up their flight and monitored it on the way in. It was a great stunt for us. Now, it's a matter of course.

Q Where were you stationed?

H I was stationed at Langley. I had about nine or ten stations: Selfridge Field, Mitchel, some place in New England that no longer exists, Langley, Pope Field at Bragg, one down here, now Hialeah. But when they came in we picked them up on the West Coast and brought them right in right across the country, and let everybody know they were coming. Landed at Bolling.

Q Big to-do?

H Cabinet was out there; Secretary of War. Seems rather silly now, but that was a great flight then. Very few navigational aids. We had practically nothing.

Q Part of the feat was flying across open water--from Juneau to Seattle--I think it was 980 miles. This caused some concern in the Navy. Do you know this?

H Oh, yes. We heard that the Navy objected to the Air Force getting more than 20 miles offshore. Maybe it was a different figure, but I remember the figure 20. Conversely, we said: "You have stations on land. What are we talking about?" That's when the argument really started.

Q The Navy, in order to take some of the edge off the Air Corps publicity, flew some seaplanes out of San Diego, and headed them up to Alaska. They left the same day.

H I didn't know that; paid no attention to it.

Q The Navy didn't make it up there. They lost out several editions of the newspapers later. The first edition was: "BOMBERS AND SEA FLIERS WINGING THEIR WAY TO FAIRBANKS." But then the Navy didn't get there. Anyway, you monitored the Air Corps flight?

H On the way back. I think they were on their own going. I'm not too sure.

Q Do you remember, after they got back they flew across country to March Field, and then came back for maneuvers?

H Right. I remember that one. I had nothing to do with maneuvers at that time.

Q You were in GHQ Air Force?

H No, Air Communications Service, in the Munitions Building at that time. Harold McClelland was running it, and Smith was there. Just died the other day.

Q Did you have any personal contact with Arnold?

H No. I just asked him about that thing. Said something about the fact that they had been talked to along the route: "Did you have any trouble?" "Did you get what you wanted?" He said: "Very fine. You're doing a good job," something like that.

Q But, during the war you had no contact with him?

H No, because I was in Panama when it started. Was brought back to the Naval War College and was sent right to the North African theatre and put right in a British unit, the only American, in the radar, #2 in the Signal business. And Hap came through with Joe Cannon who later became the commander of the unit I was in.

Q When did they come through?

H In the early part of the war. Joe said: "Here is an oldtimer in the Air Force. Do you want to take him, etc." Hap said: "We'll let the personnel people take care of that." And that was the end of that.

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Q Was that at Casablanca?

H No, no, this was in Hamamet, at Cape Bon.

Q Was this the time of the North African operation?

H This was after that. We were now fighting across North Africa. We were getting ready to go into Italy. I was in the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Forces. It was all British, but for two American units and me on the Hq.

Q Was "Mary" Coningham there?

H Mary Coningham was my first commander. George Beamish was his SASO and he was a great, big Irishman, Wonderful rugger football player.

Q Do you remember the trouble they had at Kasserine Pass?

H Yes. I was right there the next day.

Q Then they reorganized the air force? What was the problem at Kasserine Pass?

H Lack of coordination between ground and air. As far as I know, I was in the business of putting up radar screens. We kept our radar screens out there, so we knew where they were all the time. I doubt if they knew as much about us as we knew about them--their airplanes I'm talking about. One of the things that you may not be able to use, but this is an actual fact. George Patton and Mary Coningham were at daggers points, to the point where Eisenhower tried to resign as Supreme Commander, and Bedell Smith and the rest of the people around wouldn't. They said: "You can't do this. You just can't let personalities into it." For the simple reason that Patton said he saw no airplanes; he didn't have any support; he didn't do this. The RAF was trained separate from the Americans, you know. They fancied themselves pretty much. And Coningham said to Patton: "Nonsense, Georgie," And you know what this did to Patton. It just put him off like that, of course. Coningham said this to Patton. They were two commanders who were fighting. This was the high staff meeting there

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Coningham said: "Of course you don't see us. My lads are 200 miles behind the enemy's rear, keeping them completely buttoned down while you're up butting your head in front." This didn't sit very well. Patton said: "I want to see an airplane every hour on the hour over every man in every fox-hole." And that's when Coningham said: "Nonsense, Georgie." Coningham said: "You don't see any?" Patton: "No." Coningham: "You don't see Jerry either. Why don't we quit and let them hit you awhile?" This didn't sit well, but there was a flurry of messages that went back and forth, and it finally boiled down to nothing, as you know.

Q There was a fellow named Paul Robinett in the II Corps. He had been Secretary of the General Staff. He wrote a report back to George Marshall which caused a great deal of concern. He said: "The guys on the ground, all they see are Jerries. They don't see any American planes. The German air is supporting their forces"--this is at Kasserine Pass-- "And we're not getting enough air support." Anyway they reorganized the Air. Did you ever hear of that report?

H Our forward airfield at Kasserine Pass was overrun. They rushed behind a couple of little mountains--Kole or Koles, or whatever they called them--and pinched off the airfield, captured a whole unit there, Spitfires. So we didn't really have anything. Had to bring them up in a real hurry but they didn't last very long, once they got them up there. Now, this for one day or two, this is correct. There is no doubt about that. But within a day or two, it was supported to a point where you didn't see anything but ours.

Q Well right after Kasserine Pass, they reorganized the air force?

H That's right.

Q Put the tactical under one command, didn't they?

H That's right. They had it all separated before in sectors, more or less.

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Q Did you get involved in any of that?

H Well, I was in top Hq that got all the airplanes. I was in the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Forces. We had French and Americans, and of course, British. Backbone was British, South Africans. We even had some Australian units, all in there.

Q Did you see Larry Kuter? He came over?

H He came through two or three times.

Q Well, he was assigned there for a while. Arnold called to get him back. He couldn't do without him.

H Yes, that's right. He was back much further than I was. I lived within sound of the guns on the front lines for four years over there. That's right up close. We lost 70 some odd casualties in our Hq in Sicily, just from enemy air attacks. They came over and dropped things every night. We were right up there where the troops were.

Q How about Larry Norstad? He was assigned there for a while.

H I went back to see him two or three times. We had a little trouble which I don't think you ought to use now. We had trouble with the RAF. We had too much money, too many medals and better airplanes, better food. We had a lot of things that they didn't have. Of course, we didn't have the thing which they did have, a heavy attack on their homeland. And they were living from day to day. You know, they never knew whether they had a family at home or not. This is something that our people had never been subjected to. There was a little feeling between our troops and their troops. I was the senior American until Joe Cannon came. I was a full Colonel. I got called back two or three times to talk to Larry Norstad, and sit down in the back room and see if...

Q What was Larry Norstad's job?

H He was Operations, I believe. I'm not too sure.

Q He was where?

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H He was in big air headquarters back there. Whoever was the boss back there. Was it Tedder? He was Deputy to Ike and I believe he had the HQ. You can check that point. There was an American in there. Maybe it was Spaatz. They shifted back around in there. They were back in North Africa and I was in Sicily and Italy. I never knew much where they moved.

Q Were you involved, or did you know much about a situation in Sicily when our planes with a load of paratroops got shot up?

H I was in the formation.

Q What happened?

H Well, they just got shot at from the ground. The recognition wasn't right.

Q Who shot them up, the U.S. Navy or Army?

H Everybody. Anybody who had guns on the ground shot at them.

Q From ships? Did they fly over the formation?

H Ships. There were two errors made there. I'm saying this from the viewpoint of being an expert on this, having been on the planning staff for eight weeks.

Q The airborne?

H The whole operation. HUSKY. I was on the planning staff and went back to and from HQ. Every two or three days I had to fly back and forth, in a B-25.

Q From where?

H From Cape Bon, getting ready to go. Hamamet was our HQ. We had certain definite lanes in which these airplanes would fly. Remember, we only had four buttons on the talk machine, the radio. And when you've got 1,500 airplanes and 250-300 ships, and you've only got four things you can talk about, you've got problems. That was my job, to try to sort this out with the Royal Navy, the American Navy, the RAF, the American air force, and the rest of them, on what

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we were going to use these for. So we had to do things which are not normally to be done. We ought to give a guy freedom of action where he can get around, but they had to fly in channels. The navigator made a gross error. I'm sure he did. He never got on the right channel, not in his lane. He came over the ships, instead of off to one side where they were. The ships had been bombed, so the minute this happened, they said: "Here we go again." Started shooting.

Q One guy opens up and everybody figures: "He knows what he is doing."

H They do that to this day, and nobody knows. This was a gross...

Q Whose responsibility would you say that was?

H I would say offhand, that most of it belonged to the leaders of the airplanes.

Q Who was that? Swing?

H I haven't the faintest idea who that man was. Because I was riding at one side. I happened to be on the side where the shooting was going on. We could see them going down. Thank goodness. The guys were saying: "Do you think we'd better get out of here?" I said: "We're in the lanes." I had the map. "I don't think you'll be shot at." He wasn't.

Q Was Mike Dunn involved in that?

H I can't say; I don't know. Do you know offhand who the commander of the whole airborne thing was?

Q Joe Swing?

H Swing was an Army General. He didn't have anything to do with the airplanes. That was the AAF's responsibility. I don't know who was doing that.

Q Let's talk about the 2nd Group back at Langley in the 1930's. What was your job there?

H I was what you'd call Personnel Adjutant. They don't have them any more. Hugh Knerr was the commander. He was a Lieut Colonel, or a Major.

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Q Was Ralph Royce there?

H No, Ralph had the 1st Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field. What was that little boy's name...A. J. Kerwin Malone was the Adjutant. His daddy was a General in the Army, a Brigadier.

Q Paul Malone?

H Not Paul Malone, but he was a Brig Gen in the Army. Kerwin Malone had to be given permission by his Class to take a commission in the Air Corps. And he was the Adjutant, tnd I was the Personnel Adjutant. My Sgt Major was Alexander who taught me everything I knew about Personnel.

Q Ken Walker was in there?

H Ken Walker was Squadron Commander or a Deputy Squadron Commander. He may have been on the staff a little bit, too. They only had so few Senior Officers, really, and they'd trade these boys around. They all wanted to command something. This was important for them to have a command.

Q Do you have any recollections of Ken Walker?

H Yes, my wife would have more than I do, to tell the truth. He was a great fellow. Everybody liked him more for his wife. They were a very, very compatible couple to everybody on base. In those days they only had 70 officers. It was just like a family.

Q You'd get to know everybody?

H Yes, sir.

Q Was Walker smart?

H I think he was an extremely smart man. I think in lots of ways he was way ahead of the people that he dealt with.

Q Ken Walker was probably slated for some high post if he survived?

H Yes, I think so. We heard this at that time, that he was one of the people who definitely was on the way up. Of course, you remember that he was a man of considerable service when I was in...two years

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of service. I was a 2nd Lieut for seven years. This is something people now don't even know about. I was later promoted to Captain. They passed that funny law. You got rank based on your job. Here I was a Captain and my uncle out in California was a 1st Lieut in the Field Artillery with 18 years of service. And here I was a Captain with 8 years of service. He never got over that.

Q When you first came in, was Ken Walker a Major?

H He was a Captain. He may have been a 1st Lieut until, in truth, he got to be a Captain, because in those days, we didn't have any rank. See, Hugh Knerr had that whole group and he was a Major. Ralph Royce was a Major. Our base commander was Jakey Wuest. He lives down here in Orlando. He is 90 years old. He was a balloonatic. He was the base commander, and he was only a Lieut Colonel. He is as spry as he can be--straight like that.

Q Do you have recollections of Andrews?

H Oh, sure. My wife and Mrs. Andrews were the greatest friends as young girls. My wife is an Army child. We were married at Langley Field. My wife's mother and Mrs. Andrews were bosom buddies, and we were until Mrs. Andrews died. We used to come and see her every time we came into Washington. If she came anywhere near us, we'd go and see them. So we were socially with them a good deal. Frank, in fact, when he had GHQ Air Force Hq, every time they had a New Year's reception, I always introduced the whole command to the old man. He didn't have an Aide. He had Sonny Williams, who was a Sergeant to fly with him. So he did not have an official Aide. So I acted as Aide. Of course, you know what happens when you do that. You see people with whom you played golf; when they come up you don't know their names. You can't tell him who they are. The Old Man laughed. He thought that was wonderful. We used to play golf with Andrews, with Jerry Brant, Tooey Spaatz, he'd be out

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every once in awhile to play golf with Andrews--not much of a golfer. But mainly it was talking business. And you'd learn an awful lot if you're young and keep your ears open and your mouth shut.

Q Did you ever hear of any fricetion between Andrews and Arnold?

H There was, yes. What was the nature of this friction?

Q

H I think it was a basic difference in philosophies in what they were trying to do. I didn't know Hap well enough to know what his philosophy was, but I knew what Frank's were.

Q Which were?

H He wanted the Air Force to be like Billy Mitchell's.

Q He wanted a separate Air Force?

H He didn't want to kow-tow to the Army General Staff. He was at a point where he could do things these boys never dreamed of, impersonally to do that. I'm talking about the Army now. He was known as a "maverick" or a "bolshevik" or whatever you want to call it--called by the Army. The Air Corps people didn't feel this way altogether.

Q You mean, in Arnold's office?

I have a feeling that Hap was sort of a politician with the Army boys up there, and they were too close. They didn't see the big picture for looking right here in the Munitions Building. Frank Andrews did not want to fool with the people in the Munitions Building, he wanted to fool with the people in the field. There is the difference in philosophy. One's a Hq guy and one's out in the field.

Q Arnold had been tarred with the Billy Mitchell brush ten years before that. He had been exiled to Fort Riley. It might have cooled him off. So when he came into Washington, he might have become an organization man. Does this tie in?

H This could be possible.

Q Whereas Andrews was pushing hard, first for a separate Air Force, and then, for B-17s.

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H That's right.

Q Were you familiar with some of the fights that went on to get more B-17s?

H No, except for casual talk around. Of course, at my age group we didn't sit in on these things.

Q But at the Club or in the hangar?

H Oh, yes, you heard all of this, that they were going to cut it down. And then--I don't know where it came from--but we got papers out of Washington about who was doing what to whom, and who was paying for it.

Q Did Andrews ever talk to you about Arnold? You were his Aide. Did you ever have a casual moment when he talked about business?

H One thing about Frank Andrews, I don't think he talked about anybody in a derogatory way, except in answer to a direct question: "How do you feel about thus and so." And then he'd say: "He's an honest man." He'd speak his mind. He'd do that. He wouldn't gratuitously say something about somebody, just come out and say something about anyone. That's my opinion

Q Most people who worked for Andrews had tremendous respect for his sense of loyalty to the men who worked for him.

H That's what I mean. The whole outfit. He worried more about the Private out at Scott Field than he did about what went on in the Munitions Building.

Q Did Arnold have a reputation of not looking after the troops?

H I don't know. I don't remember any instance being brought up in which people talked about it at all. All the stuff they talked about was the fighting at the high level. Some people say: "You don't give the General enough credit for watching over us, taking our side." And others say: "Yes, but he ought to come down down here and see what we're doing. We're the ones that he has to...

Q You're talking about...?

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H General Arnold

Q Was General Arnold in Washington at this time?

H He was in Washington.

Q Assistant Chief under Westover?

H I think so. As I remember they would talk: "Well, he doesn't give enough attention to the people in the field. He worries more about the problems going on up there." When you get back into his shoes, because of what he thought, or whether he was on our side or not, he still was an airman. He knew that we were like this, under the collar. While he was up there, the Ordnance people who had charge of buying stuff, in those days, bought one airplane for a whole year, an O-38. And I know the man that did that. He was very proud of this.

Q Who did this?

H I won't mention his name. (off cuff)

H And he said this, and I said: "You only cost about 20,000 casualties," because we were 15 years behind when the war started. He said: "Well, how'd I know there was going to be a war?" I said: "There is always going to be a war."

Q On the Arnold-Andrews business, was there scuttlebutt among the troops that Arnold had become an organization man, in that he did not see the problems of the operator?

H Well, people said this. Now whether they discussed it widely or not, I don't know. But I heard people pro and con on that subject. More people saw Andrews than saw Arnold. That was understandable, because he was up there fighting that, and I was in the Pentagon a number of years myself, and I know. When you get in there, you don't have much time for what's going on out here.

Q What job did you have in the Pentagon?

H I was Chief of War Plans under Vandenberg.

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Q When was this?

H I came from Maxwell AFB where I was Director of Education. I took Dale Spivey's place. He went to Korea.

Q Oh, this is after the war?

H Oh, yes. I went from Chief of War Plans out to Korea and was Vice Commander under Hank Everest.

(talk of Twining's 75th Birthday at Hilton Head)

Q I want to pursue the Arnold-Andrews bit. In September 1938, Westover spun in. There was some discussion as to who would succeed him. Andrews was a year senior to Arnold. Are you familiar with this selection process?

H None whatsoever. I was in the school at Mitchel getting ready to go to Panama to put in the first radar down there. Went to Panama and from there right to the War.

Q Were you in Panama when the war started?

H Yes

Q Then you're familiar with all the problems Andrews had when he was down there? Tell me about some of that...problems with the Navy down there.

H Oh, sure. Actually, when this war started, we got together and found out that the Air Corps and the Army and the Navy could not send a message to one another. They did not have same message book, the same codes, and anything else. So Andrews, being a forthright attacking man...

Q This is while he was down the Panama Defense Command?

H That's right, he had the Command. He and the Admiral got together. I think they overrode the General. I don't know who the Admiral was.

Q Van Voorhees?

H Shafroth?

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Q Could have been Shafroth.

H Shafroth, that's who it was. He got together with Andrews, and they just plain formed a committee. Commander Cox, he's the only guy I could remember. He was Navy and I was Air Corps, and one fellow from the Army. We took those books and practically made ourselves a code we could communicate in. And as a result of this thing, damned if they didn't send me to the Naval War College to learn how to operate with the Navy...I came back down there, and by that time, they'd changed the whole thing, and Andrews had gone. He'd gone already. And Jam Johnson (Davenport) had the Air Force. I don't know who had the Theatre Command. It might have been...

Q George Brett?

H Yes, George Brett. He came from the Far East.

Q He was canned by MacArthur.

H George was a tough guy, too. Now, there's a 3rd guy in this triumvirate that missed. He was a little junior to the other two. He was pretty positive about things. And George Kenney was another. He was pretty positive. Put these people in one room and you had yourself a collection. All of them different. (Ref to Douglas Netherwood... no knowledge) Says: Netherwood was sort of a negative person. (Discussion of Andrews and Knerr--no substantive comment)

Q Did people talk about Arnold's role commanding the AAF during the war? What was the estimate of Arnold's performance?

H As far as I know--and I'm talking of the European theatre only--I don't know anything about the Far East--but as far as we were concerned, he did a real fine job, supplying the stuff we needed and everything else. Of course the crux of the whole matter was: you've got a global thing, and you've only got so many. Here is the United States. Here's the West and here is East. What do you put over here and what do you put over there? Which do you do first? Do you fight on this side, and get

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rid of that, or do you fight over there and get rid of the other? Now, that is a high level sort of thing. I got into this in War Plans later in the National Security Council. But he had to sit in there and fight practically alone, really. The Army didn't like him very much because he got to be a five-star. They had two or three. They thought they ought to have all of them.

Q They only had one at that time.

H The Navy didn't have any; they had one--Marshall. Navy had Ernie King. Hap had to sit there and decide what should be put where, and he had Larry Kuter, these people, these brains, helping him out. They had to evaluate which were stronger, theGermans or Japanese...

(Vague discussion of world strategy in WWII - p,otted_

Q Did Arnold have the reputation of getting the job done?

H As far as I know - yes.

Q During the war, did men out in the field feel he was supporting them?

H In North Africa, we felt he was. Well, I was in a low echelon. I was in a foreign unit, a stranger, and not hearing much on the American side...I never served in American Hq throughout the war. Never did.

(Unrelated to Willis Hale)

Q Ken Walker...did he have a reputation as a good flier? Or commander?

H Just can't remember. I wasn't associated with him in the flying business. But he had a reputation for being a very fine staff officer, and brain.

Q That was his reputation? Rather than a guy who flew an airplane?

H Well, this was before the days of the hotshot people who flew airplanes. These were the people that grew up and who were more or less self-trained. By our standards today, they weren't even close to being professionals, any of them, including me. I was a little more than some of the others because I was a flying instructor at Kelly Field

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for four years...but most of these people took their course, and then, there were so few that could do things that they didn't have much chance to fly - two or three hours a month - that's all you were allowed to.

Q This was because of the budget restrictions?

H When I was at Langley, they cut out all the gasoline--now I'm talking about Hugh Knerr. They cut out the gasoline, and said: "We have this many gallons until June." This was about February. So Knerr said: "Crank up the 2nd Bomb Group. We are going on field maneuvers." We put all the stuff in the airplanes; loaded them up with gasoline, flew out on maneuvers, came back, and sent a message. I sent it for him.

Q This is Hugh Knerr?

H Knerr. He said: "The second bomb group is hereby grounded. We are out of gasoline." They called on the phones: "We gave so much gas." "We used it; we can't help it. We had a maneuver all scheduled." So they gave him more, and he did the same thing. At least all the units that flew. That's Knerr. They've got to fly. The War Dept did that.

Q Did Knerr have the reputation of getting the job done? Even to cut corners?

H Yes, sir.

Q How about Andrews?

H Same kind of guy. Ramey, too.

Q That if the regs did not expressly forbid, they went ahead?

H I'll give you an example: I was up flying an airplane, and I came in late. Had to go to a command performance at Ft Monroe. The General--some Army General--Coast Artillery was giving a reception. I had to go. I threw my parachute in the back of my car--everything was locked up, and drove my wife over there with the rest of the people. Remember, I was on a staff. Went over there and came back. Somebody had broken into the back of my car and stole the parachute. And they

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sent an Inspector down--this is how bad it was--Inspector down to check up on one parachute and me, a 2nd Lieut, with no money at all. They wanted me to pay for that thing. Lieut Colonel Knerr took one look at this thing and in a red pencil on this indorsement from the War Department, he wrote: "Nonsense, Knerr," and sent it back to them I was doing a late mission. I was flying a Field Artilleryman observing gunfire on tow-targets, to see how they could shoot. We got shot down.

Q Knerr was quite a guy?

H He was. He and Andrews, you are talking about two some kind of guys.

Q This is why they were so close, because, it seems to me, they looked at the mission. "We have a mission to get the Air Force ready. If the regulations don't allow...we'll cut the corner."

H Two or three times. Jerry Brant is another one of these guys. He is more easygoing then they were. They called Jerry in. Knerr was a Brig and so was Jerry. Frank Andrews was a Maj General. We only had a few. I sat in as a junior operations officer and listened to them talk: "Well, we've got to do this. How can we do it? What money can we take from where to have this maneuver. We've got to do it." Now, if we can General So-and-so down at Pope Field interested in having troops in the field having us support them, that might be the hope...Fort Bragg.

Q In other words, they starting examining the problem: here's the job we need to get done, and now let's figure how we can bend the regulations to get it done. Is this a fair estimate?

H Well, not bend them. Legally, let's find out how we can do this. If we can't, we'll put up a lot of argument.

Q As opposed to breaking the regs?

H By shifting one set of money from one place to another--which is not a break at all, it just neglects something that the War Department

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thought you ought to do.

Q That's why I say "bending" rather than "breaking it."

H Could be.

Q Did Arnold have a different view of that?

H That I don't know.

Q Seems to me that Arnold was a "Let's get the job done" man, "and we'll figure out the reasons."

H Now, he was, in a lot of ways.

Q He was very impulsive?

H He would do this, too, but you'll remember he was captive up there in the Muntions building a great deal of the time.

Q "Captured" in the sense he was captive?

H Well, he talked to the guys who had all of our money in the War Department, and they didn't like us anyway.

Q Who was that?

H The whole General Staff.

Q Do you remember Spalding; he was G-4.

H I don't know him.

Q Early in the war Hugh Knerr was pushing for a separate Air Force. Did you know about this? He wrote some articles.

H I don't remember.

Q There were several books that appeared, William Bradford Huie.

H Oh, Huie, sure.

Q "The Case Against the Admirals"?

H Oh, yes.

Q Do you know who wrote that book? Hugh Knerr (off record)

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Hall, William E. 13 Feb 70

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OBITUARIES

William E. Hall Dies; Retired AF Lt. General

Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. William Evens Hall, 76, a former commander of the Continental Air Command and a deputy commander of the 15th Air Force in Italy during World War II, died of internal hemorrhaging May 28 at Cape Canaveral Hospital in Cape Canaveral, Fla.

Gen. Hall, a resident of the Washington area from 1939 until 1968, when he moved to Palm Bay, Fla., was born in McAlester, Okla. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point with the class of 1929 and was commissioned in the artillery. In 1932, he received his wings as a pilot in the old Army Air Corps.

During World War II, Gen. Hall served on the staff of General of the Army H.H. (Hap) Arnold, chief of staff of the Army Air Forces, and then with the 15th Air Force in Italy. Subsequently, he served on the staff of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower when Eisenhower was Army chief of staff.

Gen. Hall was the Air Force representative on the staff of Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. commander in Germany at the time of the Berlin Airlift. This operation flew in supplies to Berlin from June 1948, until May 1949, when the Soviets threw up a blockade around the city. Gen. Hall commanded the Berlin end of the airlift.

When he retired from the service in 1961, he was commander of the Continental Air Command at Robbins Air Force Base in Georgia.

Gen. Hall's decorations included the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star and the Air Medal.

His marriage to Helena Callaway Hall ended in divorce. His second wife, the noted journalist Marguerite Higgins, died in 1966.

Survivors include four children by his first marriage, Dr. William Spencer Hall of Pittsburgh, Frank Aldin Hall of Baltimore, Air Force Maj. William Evess Hall Jr. of the Philippines, and Helena Callaway Corfield of Palm Bay; two children by his second marriage, Lawrence O'Higgins Hall and Linda Marguerite Hall, both of Palm Bay; a brother, retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Linscott A. Hall of Chevy Chase, and 11 grandchildren.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

Ltr to Hall

8 March 1976

Lieut General William E. Hall, USAF (Ret)
803 SW Meadowbrook Road
Palm Bay, FL 32905

Dear General Hall:

It's been six years since our good interview on General Arnold. I'm still working on the book after being side-tracked for nearly four years.

Anyway, I'm 21 chapters into the book which is about 2/3 written and I came across the attached card extracted from our interview. I could use the story if you could recall the name of the contemporary of Arnold's referred to in the attached.

Incidentally, I've been out to the ranch in Sonoma a number of times and have been in close consultation with the Arnold boys, especially Bruce, the middle son. Mrs. Arnold just came out of the hospital and is in pretty good shape. She is approaching her 89th birthday in May.

I hope this finds you well and enjoying your retirement down in sunny Florida.

If you can help me on the attached item or any other relating to Arnold's impetuosity, I'd be grateful. For example, I have been told that when he went on inspections and saw planes "sitting around", he got aggravated. It got so that when base commanders learned of his imminent arrival, they would hide planes out of sight. Does this trigger any recollections.

Please use the attachment, if you desire.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Murray Green

Encl

Mar. 31, 1976

Dear Mr. Green,

Forgive the informal nature of this reply but since my secretarial help has been reduced to slightly less than zero, I am forced to improvise. I'm glad to hear of the progress (wes)

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on the book.

To save my soul, I stated
cant recall the name of the
proposed "victim" reported to. Wish I
could help.

Good luck.

Sincerely

William E Hall

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Interview: L/Gen William E. Hall - 13Feb70 - Pentagon, Wash.,DC

Hall: Arnold Wants Somebody Tried (IG Inquiry)

Q: Do you remember any other IG situations that were brought to Arnold?

H: Yes, I remember one specifically that I thought was kind of typical of Gen Arnold. I remember being told one afternoon to go to a certain base and find enough to fire the base commander, and I said: "Well, I'll go out the first thing in the morning." And he said: "I said right away." This is about 4 in the afternoon, so in typical Arnold fashion, he meant "now." And I went out to this base, and I went through it was a fine tooth comb, and the base commander, who was a contemporary of Arnold's, couldn't have cared less about the fact that I was there. He didn't even bother to go with me. I just had a free hand, and I spent about 24 hours on that base, going over it with a fine tooth comb, and it was one of the best run operations I've ever seen in my life. I came back and reported to Gen Arnold. He just hit the roof. I had flunked my mission, I had been sent out there to fire the guy, and I couldn't find anything to fire him for. So I was really in the doghouse, as far as Gen Arnold was concerned. About a week later,

---

at a staff meeting, he told somebody: "I wish every base we had in the air force was run like so and so's base. You can't find anything wrong with it."

Q: Can you now say who it was?

H: It was in Albuquerque, I don't believe it was Jan Howard. Jan Howard was down in North Carolina about that time, I think.

Q: I don't know where he went after he left Washington. He was taken out of several jobs. He was a man of great ability, but sort of an abrasive guy. Talking about Jan Howard, he and Arnold, of course, there was always some family friction between the two. But you don't think it was he then?

H: I don't believe it was, but it was a contemporary of Gen Arnold's. I can almost see him, he was heavier than Howard.

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Interview LTGEN William E. Hall, Pentagon, February 13, 1970

H: Well, one of the things that I've often said about Gen Arnold is that I believe there were very few men in the world for whom he had much respect with the exception of General Marshall, and he obviously had a great deal of respect for Gen Marshall. And I don't think it was just so much as I said a minute ago, that he needed Gen Marshall help to accomplish his own aim of a separate air force, but I think the respect was very real, very sincere.

Q: Was it a mutual respect?

H: Oh yes, definitely, of course, I saw much more of Gen Arnold than I did of Gen Marshall, but I did have the good fortune of being around Gen Marshall quite a bit, because in the early days when he was Chief of Staff, I was the pilot that used to fly him up to his Fire Island place, I took Mitchell along every weekend until the pressure got too great.

Q: Did Marshall understand airpower?

H: I think Gen Arnold whittled away at him until he developed an appreciation for it. He liked aircraft, I know that.

Q: Liked to fly?

H: And he liked people around aircraft, I know that. He was a very austere man, as everyone knows. None of us ever felt close to him. Generally when you pilot a man around the country a great deal, you develop a very close rapport, but it never got anything closer than Captain or Major Hall, as far as Gen Marshall was concerned.

Q: He would never call you by your first name?

H: No, I don't think I ever heard him call anybody by his first name.

Q: Nobody ever called him by his first name.

H: I'm sure they didn't.

Q: I don't think even the President called him "George," did he?

H: Well, I've never heard anybody call him "George" except his wife. I was best man at his daughter's wedding to a classmate of mine, Jimmy Wynn. So we, during that period, were thrown together personally a lot. He never called anybody by anything but by title and last name.

Q: I've seen extensive correspondence between him and Gen. Arnold. It is always "Dear Arnold," and it's "Dear General," or "Memorandum for Gen Marshall." There was always a difference in their levels.

H: That doesn't surprise me.

Q: That never broke down? How about their hunting trips? They went on a couple of fishing and hunting trips. Did he let down then?

H: I wish I'd been there, so I'd know, but from what little I do know, I doubt it very much. Gen Marshall just didn't, he just didn't relax, ever. He wasavery pleasantman to be around, but terribly formal all the time.

Q: When Arnold and Marshall were in the room, did the attention gravitate to Marshall or to Arnold, or to both?

H: Definitely to Gen Marshall, and at Gen Arnold's pleasure. There was no question about it.

Q: He deferred to Marshall?

H: Absolutely.

Q: This is the impression I got. Were you in Washington in 1945? You came back in 1945....

H: I went overseas in the fall of 1944, and came back in May of 1945.

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Q: Well, Arnold had just gone on a recuperation trip.

H: That's right.

Q: Eaker was the Deputy Commander. Did you see Arnold at that time? He had just come back from Florida. Well, he'd come back the end of March, and in April he went to Europe. He came back from Europe in May. You didn't see him?

H: I think the last time I saw Gen. Arnold while he was still very active as far as the Army Air Forces was concerned, was when he visited Gen Twining's 15th AF headquarters in Bari in the very early spring of 1945.

Q: It must have been the end of April 1945.

H: That would make sense. Something very interesting happened there, that may not have been brought out before. Gen Arnold and my relationship--was certainly a boss and employee relationship--but it was a reasonably close one, personally. Mrs. Arnold and I were very close friends, and I was Deputy Chief of Air Staff for a long time under Gen Arnold. And I think there was a little personal relationship there. Anyway, when he visited us in Bari, Italy, we had the usual dinner, of course. He told me afterwards. He said: "After this breaks up, I want you to come down to my room." So I did as he bid, always, and he said: "What do you think about things?" And I said: "Well, look, Chief, we've got this one buttoned up over here. We ought to be pulling these heavy bomb groups out and getting them retrained and redeployed." So he said: "Hell, I'm not talking about this one; I'm talking about the next one." I had just come back from working with the Russians in Bulgaria, so he knew that I had a feel for our relationship. He wasn't interested in the war that was going on, now.

Q: Did he feel that the Russians would be our adversary?

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H: Definitely.

Q: Why did he think so? Were there some incidents, or some suspicion?

H: He had been at enough of these Conferences, as you know, to develop a doubt that I think everybody developed, with the exception of the President--and that's always been my feeling that the President developed them, too. He just didn't show them.

Q: Roosevelt?

H: Yes, we don't know what the President would have done after the war. Nobody will ever know that.

Q: History never reveals its alternative--what could have happened?

H: And of course, he never talked to anybody, which is said. Another man that Hap Arnold liked a lot, speaking of the President, was Harry Hopkins. I'm sure you know that.

Q: They were very close, they got along very well, although there were some differences in their attitudes for a while, because Hopkins would have shipped everything we had out to the Russians and Arnold had some doubts about that.

H: That's true.

Q: Well, why did they get along so well?

H: Well, I think this was Hap's approach to the President. I'm sure you know in all your research, that relationships were colder than cold between Mr. Roosevelt and Gen Arnold, and no one knew the basis of it.

Q: I think I know the basis of it at the beginning. There was great difficulty in getting Arnold and Morgenthau in 1939 and 1940. Morgenthau had appropriated himself the role of, let's say, Secy of

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Defense. And Morgenthau was leader of the interventionists and he wanted to ship out all our modern planes to help the British and French. Arnold was not necessarily averse to that, but he had the job as Chief of the Air Corps. The Air Corps was trying to expand, and if he gave all our best planes away, you can't train a force. There was an incident in 1939.

Q: Harry Hopkins was the catalyst?

H: Sort of, relationship was very cold. The only way he could get to the White House was through Harry Hopkins. Gen Arnold, in spite of his great admiration for the Chief of Staff, was not loath to make a sharp turn, if it was accomplishing what he thought he should set out to accomplish.

Q: Would he prepare Marshall in advance, in the sense that so they should reconcile their own positions in public?

H: I would have to guess, but if I were to guess, I would say, "yes," because of two things: (1) His constant physical association with Gen Marshall, and (2) his great respect for him. Hap didn't believe, as I know you know, he didn't believe much in channels and I don't think it was channels that generated this close collaboration between Gen Arnold and the Chief of Staff, Gen Marshall. I think he figured it was just the way to do things with this particular type of man. One of the things that I'm sure you've researched, but if you haven't, I think you should. I think one of the greatest keys to Hap Arnold's character is what happened to all his rivals in the short period following Dec 7, 1941. Did it ever occur to you that they all scattered like a covey of quail?

Q: Yes, it has, but tell me about it.

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H: Well, that's really about all I want to say about it, because not that I'm keeping anything back, I just don't know any more, but it always fascinated me that here he was, I think he was a BG at the time.

Q: At Pearl Harbor? He was two-star, just going onto three-star.

H: Yes, I've forgotten.

Q: He had become Chief of the AAF on June 20, 1941.

H: Right, you know, he had several people in the AF senior to him, and yet for some reason or other, when the dust settled, Gen Arnold was in Washington in complete control, and everybody else was in an output someplace.

Q: Well, let me tell you something about Andrews. I wonder if you have any comment on that recitation--Knerr-Andrews. Did you have any awareness that this was going on?

H: It was my impression that Knerr was recalled to silence him. Now, I don't know whether this was true or not, but it was my impression that he was recalled to active service to keep him quiet.

Q: Well, many tried to keep him out. In fact, he blamed Arnold for a year's delay in his return to duty. He didn't come back until Nov 1942, and they called him down to Stimson's office. McNarney was down there working for Marshall. They were talking about court-martial and the Navy absolutely opposed his return, because he was writing all these articles about the failure of unification.

H: Hugh Knerr is a very interesting man. You know, history takes some very peculiar turns. In 1945, I was appointed by Gen Eisenhower to head up a committee to draw up the ground rules between the Army and the Air Force, when the separate service concept came into being, and the Air Force representative was Hugh Knerr.

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Q: That's right, well, he was a leader. He was head of the Air Board at that time, wasn't he? Or had he just come back from Wright Patt? Was this the end of 1945?

H: I don't know what his duty was when he was a member of the Air Board. We were on full-time duty.

Q: He was the head of the Air Board at that time. He was an advocate of unification from way back.

H: Well, he was a very helpful member of this Board.

Q: He is a man of great talent. But, you see, Arnold was worried about him.

H: Of course, Arnold was not ineffective, but gone by this gime.

Q: After VJ Day, from what I have learned, Arnold had one foot on his Ranch. He didn't want any part of Washington at the end of the war. Well, I think we have sort of jumped over the beginning of the war. Let's take the story back to your first contact with Arnold. Do you remember the first time you met him?

H: Yes, I came to Bolling Field as a 1st LT in 1936, from Panama, and was Operations Officer there, for almost four years. In that capacity, of course, I got to know everybody in the Chief's office pretty well, particularly the Asst Chief of Air Corps, BG Arnold. So I saw him, I'd say, twice weekly, during all that time. Then when my boss out there, Col E.W. Hill was named Air Inspector.

Q: Ted Hill?

H: Yes. He brought me from Bolling with him as his No. 1 assistant. The Air Inspector's office was brand new at the time. There were very few people in it, so those that were in it, got to know the head man pretty well.

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Q: Is Hill in good shape now? He is up in Maine.

H: I had dinner here in town with him just a week ago.

Q: Does he come to town often?

H: No, he was down for a physical checkup this time, and came out of it very well. He's in good shape.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the Inspector General's job, Hill was involved, and perhaps you were involved, perhaps you wrote this report on Pan Am and the building of bases. Can you tell me about that report, the problems you had with it?

H: Yes, do you mean the creation of the report?

Q: Pan Am got into trouble, or they had some trouble with Pan Am....

H: Well, I'm sure you are familiar with the total concept of in preparation for dire times. We needed plenty of alternate room, and maybe different routes across the Atlantic, so rather than the US government to do it openly, there was a contract let with Pan Am. Everybody knew it, but it never was announced, these were military bases.

Q: It was more convenient for Pan Am.

H: Pan Am was there, for one thing.

Q: And you didn't want to show military presence in South America, when we were not at war?

H: That's right, believe me, it wasn't just we didn't want to. It was perfectly obvious when Ted and I were down there, that we might not have gotten away with it, even if we had wanted to. But, anyway, Ted's and my mission was to land in every field that we could get into, that was under contract at that time, and anything else that looked promising. I don't remember how many places we landed, but we sure

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landed in a lot of them. We went into every country except one. I think we missed Paraguay. I think that's the only country that we missed. Our method of operation was: at the end of each day, Ted and I would sit down and write a report, and then we would get it piecemeal back here, as soon as we could. Then when we came back, we consolidated the thing, and Ted will tell you this himself, but Ted has probably never been madder in his life than he was after this long, hard trip and a hell of a lot of work, he goes boiling down to Gen Arnold with what he considered a very important study because there were a lot of things going right, but more going wrong down there. And you had to be there to see it. You had to be there to talk to people to be aware of it. He goes into Hap Arnold's office all full of beans and sits there about an hour or two. I think this went on for a couple of days. Finally, one day, Hap came busting out of the office, said: "I haven't got the time to talk to you." And Ted said: "Well, next time I'm in this office, it will be because I've gotten a direct order to do so," and stomped out with his report. It was finally reviewed and staffed, and I think served a good purpose.

Q: Didn't Pan Am get into some trouble down there? Weren't they involved in the ownership of some of the Axis airlines? Let me ask you about things that you found.

H: Some of the unpleasant things that we found, of course, were obvious padded payrolls and kickbacks, and disgraceful lack of progress in a lot of cases. But it wouldn't be exactly right to lay the total blame on the contractor, because he was working in a tough area.

Q: They had to hire indigenous labor?

H: That's right, and also a lot of things were being done under-

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cover, and the less smoke stirred up, the less anyone was apt to find the fire. So they had their problems too, and we recognized that.

Q: Talking about these three Axis owned airplanes--weren't we very much concerned that they harbored Fifth Column agents who could sabotage the canal? Wasn't this a big concern.

H: Oh yes, it was.

Q: And wasn't Arnold?

H: The French had a carrier sitting down there, too, with a lot of airplanes on it.

Q: Where?

H: At Martinique.

Q: But wasn't there a great concern that these Axis airplines in flying through there were taking pictures of the Canal and their agents were attempting to sabotage the United States?

H: Yes, there was apprehension, but I can't recall anything specific.

Q: I have seen reports on that IG report, and it was rather amazing to me that it turns out that Pan Am has financial interest in the airlines.

H: As I say, I don't remember whether it is specifically in that report or not.

Q: Was there any concern or any amazement that they were doing that? Why were they doing that?

H: I don't think I accepted it with any feeling of shock because I felt it was sort of a reverse penetration, actually. They were recognized Axis operations.

Q: Did we use this as an espionage means, you know, to penetrate?

H: I don't know, I'd like to think we did, but I don't know.

Q: I'm just wondering about this, the propriety on the part of Pan Am. Here we are trying to unload these airplanes, and Pan Am is

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our agent to unload the airlines, and here it turns out that they have financial interest in keeping them going.

H: As I say, it may have been a pretty good thing.

Q: It depends, somebody ought to talk to Juan Trippe. Was he running it then?

H: I believe he was. Of course, Pan Am, there must have been a lot of secret information available to Pan Am at that time. They must have been pretty well read in.

Q: Do you remember any other IG situations that were brought to Arnold?

H: Yes, I remember one specifically that I thought was kind of typical of Gen Arnold. I remember being told one afternoon to go to a certain base and find enough to fire the base commander, and I said: "Well, I'll go out the first thing in the morning." And he said: "I said right away." This is about 4 in the afternoon, so in typical Arnold fashion. he meant "now." And I went out to this base, and I went through it with a fine tooth comb, and the base commander, who was a contemporary of Arnold's, couldn't have cared less about the fact that I was there. He didn't even bother to go with me. I just had a free hand, and I spent about 24 hours on that base, going over it with a fine tooth comb, and it was one of the best run operations I've ever seen in my life. I came back and reported to Gen Arnold. He just hit the roof. I had flunked my mission, I had been sent out there to fire the guy, and I couldn't find anything to fire him for. So I was really in the doghouse, as far as Gen Arnold was concerned. About a week later, at a staff meeting, he told somebody: "I wish every base we had in the air force was run like so and so's base. You can't find anything wrong with it."

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Q: Can you now say who it was?

H: It was in Albuquerque, I don't believe it was Jan Howard. Jan Howard was down in North Carolina about that time, I think.

Q: I don't know where he went after he left Washington. He was taken out of several jobs. He was a man of great ability, but sort of an abrasive guy. Talking about Jan Howard, he and Arnold, of course, there was always some family friction between the two. But you don't think it was he then?

H: I don't believe it was, but it was a contemporary of Gen Arnold's. I can almost see him, he was heavier than Howard.

Q: Do you remember any other contact with Arnold at Bolling at the time--we are talking 1940-41?

H: No, I remember he was kind enough when he lost one of his crew members to ask that I be made a crew member on his aircraft. And Ted Hill, my boss, said I was needed more there, and got away with it, which is, you know, I was kind of on pins and needles, because everybody always did exactly what Gen Arnold suggested. But Ted got away with it, I think he had a great deal of respect for Ted.

Q: I think he did, too, because he got a good job in Europe.

H: Yes, well, I was supposed to go with Ted on that one, too. The night before I was all packed and in my quarters--I lived over SE--had all my gear. I was all set to go the next day, and I got a call from the Chief's office, that I was to report to the Chief the next morning. My overseas orders were cancelled, and that's how I was brought into Arnold's office. I was made Asst Secy of the Air Staff. Just a few months later I was Secy of the Air Staff, and then a year later, was made Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Q: Then you had frequent contact with Arnold?

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H: Daily, I'd say "too frequent."

Q: Through Stratemeyer?

H: Strat was the Chief of Staff, but as I say, Gen Arnold looked to certain people for certain things and he didn't look at his organization chart very closely I was probably the last man in the normal course of the daily due to see Gen Arnold in this building, because the last thing he ever did, and I thought his timing was lousy, was to sign all these letters with problems which he signed himself, one at a time. No.multipen job for him. One at a time. He read every one of them, and signed every one of them.

Q: I've run across several instances where he wanted to take care of this matter himself. He had this "Lincoln" complex. Lincoln's Bixby letter. You know, the famous condolence letters, I guess there were thousands of them. When did he sign them?

H: About the last thing each day. I'd generally go into him about the close of the day with an armload of papers that I knew Strat didn't have to clear, or which Strat had cleared, and go over them with him, and that was always at the bottom of the stack.

Q: Stratemeyer was your immediate superior?

H: Yes,he was, and later Barney Giles. I was here under the two of them.

Q: Right, Giles came in about July 1943.

H: That seems right.

Q: What sort of relationship did Stratemeyer and Arnold have?

H: Stratemeyer just adored him. He thought he was the greatest man in the world. Once again, that is a peculiarity of Strat's. I would say that he thought that of everybody he ever worked for. I know he felt towards MacArthur that way. But then everybody that worked for

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MacArthur felt that way.

Q: I missed talking to Stratemeyer. He died 7 or 8 months ago. I'd written him a letter and his wife said he was ill, and I never did get to see him.

H: I wish you had. You wouldn't have gotten any differences of opinion from Strat. He just thought Arnold was the greatest man that ever lived.

Q: You talked about Arnold disregarding organization charts. Do you recall any instances where he grabbed you or somebody in the hall, perhaps, or assigned people missions alien to their skills?

H: Funniest thing, I wish I could remember the names, but I don't know the names. He was walking down the halls of the Munitions Building one day, and there was a young officer in a flight jacket, and Arnold had just come back from a meeting relating to Materiel, and he saw this guy in the hall and said: "I want you to get up to Middletown Air Depot, and straighten that thing out." And he walked on down the hall. Well, the guy didn't know where Middletown was. He wasn't even stationed in Washington, but he was the first man in an air force outfit that Arnold say, so he told him. "You go straighten it out." Arnold knew that something would happen. He knew this guy would dig around, and eventually, the proper person would go up there and straighten it out. But he didn't have the time, and didn't want to take the time to go into detail with anybody. This was the first guy he saw. That was totally typical of his operations.

Q: He did this often?

H: All the time. He did everything that way. Whoever was around.

Q: Didn't he have some regard as to whether the guy, he liked the guy, or was competent, or whether the guy would follow through on it?

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H: Yes, yes, I think an example, he told me directly without going through Ted Hill or anybody else, to go out there and relieve this guy. I think that is a perfect example.

Q: He relieved Henry Harms in Newfoundland, of course a lot of people were coming through there, that was a critical base in the northern route, and apparently Marshall and some others had criticized the operations there and he took Henry Harms, who was one of his contemporaries, out of there. Do you know anything about that?

H: Not a thing.

Q: You know it is sort of a contradiction of terms to say that he selected his people at random in the hall, but didn't he pick people that he felt could do the job?

H: Oh yes, he was great at that, but to emphasize his character, he didn't go to anybody else to pick them. He didn't go through any command channels, to designate somebody. He just picked them, he sent them to do the job.

Q: Was he an impulsive man?

H: Very, but in his defense let me say, Tom Hanley and I were Deputy Chiefs at the same time and we came out of one of these rip roaring staff meetings where Gen Arnold--they always ended up with him livid--because everything was going wrong, and making decisions right and left. We went into my office because it was closer than Tom's, and I was sort of shaking my head. And I said: "Tom, this man defeats me. He makes these decisions in anger, off the top of head, pays no attention to staff or anybody else, and they turn out to be right, eventually. He said: "That shouldn't surprise you. Those decisions weren't made today they were made 30 years ago," which I think, is an interesting observation.

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Q: Do you think he did this by instinct?

H: I thim Tom put his finger on it. He'd been thinking nothing e lse all these years.

Q: Of course, some particular problem didn't happen till yesterday, and then he made a decision.

H: Well, he could relate it to something else, or draw on his experience. But I have this feeling, too, if it didn't relate to anything, he'd make the decision anyway.

Q: If he was wrong, did he back up, or did he butt his head and persist in the action? I'm sure that he made some wrong decisions?

H: Well, I would say if he were questioned a wrong decision, he had a pretty good defense for it as a rule.

Q: Did he ever say, I was wrong on that, and let's do something else?

H: He would say it this way: "I knew at the time that I shouldn't have done it." It didn't surprise him. He knew it was going to go wrong all the time. He'd picked a commander, who had a history of drunkeness but marvelous capability for leadership, and I remember I was instrumental, I think, in getting this man sent overseas with his unit, because it had such a...I remember because I had inspected the unit. I made a personal plea to Hap, to let him go overseas. He wasn't going to let him go, it was all right to train it, but he wasn't going to let him take it into combat. I told him I thought that would disrupt all the machinery that Les (NOTE: Probably Maitland) was a great personal leader, and that he hadn't had a drink in, I don't know how long. He was proud of his unit. Then he goes over there and does a damn good combat job and falls flat on his face, and Hap's position was

Q: He started drinking again?

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H: Yes, he fell in Lou Brereton's lap, at a decoration ceremony for Les. I mean, he did it real good, and Arnold's position was somebody had said something to him about "you shouldn't have sent that drunk over there, anyway."--and he said: "Oh, I knew it all the time. I've never seen a reformed drunkard in my life. I knew it all the time." So I think that he did make mistakes, but he could rationalize.

Q: I'll tell you something you may not know, that when Arnold was up for Westover's job--Westover died Sep 1938. This was before you came on the scene. There was some delay by Roosevelt in choosing a successor to Westover because there was a story around Washington that Arnold drank. Was this true? Did Arnold drink? Did you ever see him drink?

H: No.

Q: This is what most people tell me.

H: He didn't. Because I'd been around him too much, and at this very time that you are talking about, when things were in limbo, around this very time, before and after, he's been in my quarters many, many times when all of us were just drinking up a storm, and he'd take one of us that he sort of took a shine to, like to Lou Parker, me or somebody like that, Mint Kay, off to one side, and say let's go up to your house. Have you got any sherry up there? So not only was he not drinking in public, but when he was drinking in private, he was drinking sherry. I know that.

Q: Well this is, I've been told that possibly he drank when he was younger. He had ulcers and was in Letterman's Hospital for a while.

H: That's right, we all suspected that he did, but not at this time.

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Q: All throughout his period in Washington, he did not drink. Most people tell me that he carried a glass of sherry around all evening, and he had a gay time and he carried the one same glass.

H: That's exactly the way he drank. And if he was the least bit dubious about his company, he wouldn't even do that. He would go to somebody's quarters and sit down and have a glass of sheery.

Q: Did he feel sensitive about drinking in public?

H: No, not at all, didn't bother any of us.

Q: But he seemed to have a good time in a crowd though?

H: He had a real good time and socially, he was a great deal of fun. In this building he was no pleasure to be around. That I can assure you.

Q: But he let his hair down when he was away?

H: He was very pleasant.

Q: You mentioned Mint Kaye. Mint Kaye was close to him?

H: Very close.

Q: Why?

H: It went back to a previous association. I think it was March Field, Helen Kaye was very fond of Lois.

Q: Arnold's daughter?

H: Yes, and she was very close to Mrs. Arnold, and Mint was an apple polisher and a smart guy. He stubbed his toe though, and Arnold fired him just the way he would fire anybody else.

Q: How did he stub his toe?

H: He was supposed to come up with a photographic airplane, and failed to do it, so Arnold just sent him out to the woods, and nobody ever heard of him again.

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Q: Tinker, was he a challenger for the top slot--a potential candidate?

H: Sure, he had the seniority, and was a very beloved commander.

Q: It was a tragedy, his loss?

H: Yes,indeed.

Q: Who else was a potential challenger?

H: Well, you've got Emmons, and you mentioned Andrews.

Q: Emmons had aspirations, especially when he succeeded to the GHQ AF. Do you know, he got his third star before Arnold did? Was this a problem?

H: I don't know if it was a problem or not, but I know that Gen Arnold considered it one, and whether it really was or not, but he had a damned good solution to it.

Q: He sent Emmons out to Hawaii?

H: That's right. He solved that one. And the other competitor was the guy that was dead in the first month--Dargue--he was on his way out of the country when he got killed.

Q: You know, Dargue and Arnold were exiled from Washington after the Billy Mitchell thing. They were very close, and Dargue was killed after the war started.

H: And I don't mean to imply that he disliked these fellows. Arnold knew that he had a job to do, and he knew that he could do it. He wasn't sure anybody else could do it.

Q: In service politics he was probably a master, within the service. He knew service relationships he studied them?

H: He was a very wily character, yes.

Q: Knerr had great admiration for Arnold, but as I said, he gave me this illustration of any flower rising up above the others was leveled.

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H: Well, I'm sure that, you know, this public picture that was painted of Hap during the war, that he was called "Hap" because he was so jolly and all that. I used to read that and just lie on the floor and cry. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

Q: This smile on his face?

H: It was set there; it never moved.

Q: The fact that he smiled, didn't mean he was happy.

H: He wasn't smiling. I remember one day at a staff meeting he had a man that I don't think had ever been around him before, and I talked to this guy later. All of a sudden in the middle of the dissertation--he was castigating somebody--Arnold pointed his finger at this guy, and said: "What the hell are you laughing at?" Well, I talked to the fellow later, and he said: "Well, he kept smiling at me; so I kept smiling back." I said: "You'd better learn right now, buddy, if you want to stay around here, that's no smile."

Q: Some people told me that it was his facial expression.

H: That was it.

Q: It was a natural. Was this somebody who was close to him, or just passing through. Do you remember who it was? Whom you indoctrinated?

H: I don't remember. It was somebody newly assigned to the Air Staff. They came and went so fast.

Q: How about his Advisory Council, he started out with Norstad and Cabell, and these were his idea men. Now, did they interfere in the Air Staff?

H: No, because their job--it was the joint kind of operation. Even when Hap wasn't on the JCS, he got called on for a lot of questions, and that was the principal function of the Advisory Council--the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff actions.

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Q: They were his sort of idea men?

H: No, I don't think so.

Q: Were they troubleshooters?

H: No, they worked almost exclusively on JCS and CCS work.

Q: Well, didn't he call them in on other things?

H: Well, he undoubtedly did, as he called anybody in on anything. And he was to both of them, and liked them both, and was with them a lot.

Q: If he had a problem on his mind, and he saw someone he liked on another matter, did he dragoon this guy into doing this job?

H: He was apt to.

Q: Was it possibly because he had so many balls he was bouncing in the air? If he could unload one problem, he's got one less to worry about?

H: He knew exactly what he was doing.

Q: Did he remember who he gave it to?

H: Well I would suspect that he probably did. But, I'll tell you, I don't think it's terribly important, and the reason is whenever Gen Arnold said something, it was done. I mean you never saw such complete control as he had, and I'm sure you've got this from lots of sources, and I know that the Old Man wasn't being as haphazard as it appears, because he knew that he had started the necessary staff action when he gave this guy a job, whether it was in his province or what, he knew that this guy was going to do his level best to get that job done.

Q: Or turn it over to somebody who would. Did he mind if the guy turned it over to somebody else?

H: No, all he wanted was the job done.

Q: He wanted the job done, and if the guy turned it over, he didn't consider he was shirking his assignment.

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H: No, no. He just wanted the job done. He was a very direct and basic man. That was all he wanted done, was the job.

Q: He was very fond of Norstad, Norstad wanted to get overseas; so did Cabell. Everybody wanted to get overseas, wanted to make a mark for themselves. Did Arnold ever express his sensitivity about his own lack of a combat record?

H: Yes, he did. All of us had it in our minds, you know, to get some combat experience. And so all of us, at every opportunity, would ask if we couldn't be sent overseas. He would either explode and call you a deserter--you are deserting in the face of the enemy--"I know you think I'm the enemy"--or he would explain his problem, that certain things had to be done here, and that he thought he had an organization that could do it. He didn't want to upset it too much. He would say: "I know exactly how you feel, because I got beat out of two wars as far as combat experience is concerned." He'd throw that in every once in while. I think a real insight to his character is a personal experience that I had with him on this subject--seeing him every day as I did--I asked him too frequently if I couldn't leave. I'd pick out a nice job for myself, like Nate Twining's deputy, or something like that. I'd ask him if I couldn't go--I'd been in Washington for an abnormal length of time--and he would generally just say: "Oh get out," almost bodily throw me out of the office. But, finally, one day, he said: "When 51% of the bomber force is committed overseas, come and see me again. We will talk about this again." Well, when the day came, I asked him, and I think my timing was very bad, and he just literally exploded.

Q: You thought it was a good time?

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H: You know, there never was a good time. You always had to guess. I went back to my office pretty shaken because he was obviously so damned mad, and just then, the little flag on the Arnold box which was red, jumped up and I grabbed it, and I said: "Yes sir." He said: "When are you going to war?" And I said: "Today, General." He said: "Good bye!" Well, then I sat back, and really shook my head. I really have upset the Old Man. Pretty soon he called me back and said: "That's a hell of a way to tell an old friend goodbye. Get yourself in here." So I went in, and he said: "I'm not about to let you go overseas until you are proficient on both the B-17 and the B-24, now get yourself out to those schools, and then take off."

Q: He had these second thoughts?

H: You never knew.

Q: But he had this underneath, a basic kindness and understanding of people?

H: I think one of his problems was, he really didn't have time for it, you know.

Q: He would have been a great human being.

H: If he'd had the time to.

Q: Sometimes--in a way; he was apologizing to you?

H: Absolutely.

Q: Sometimes he didn't apologize, and people went away mad.

H: Well, I don't ever remember him doing anything like this, but this one time.

Q: Did he get mad every day?

H; Every day. First thing we did in the morning was, we'd come to work pretty early, I think most of us were at our deak around 7:00, 7 days a week.

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Q: Was he there at 7:00?

H: He was there very shortly thereafter. We tried to beat him, so we could catch up on our cables. And then we'd go in his office about 8:15 and by the time we'd left there, he was livid. He was just storming all over the place. Every day.

Q: Air Staff, A-1, 2, 3, 4, 5?

H: Yes, every day.

Q: Who did he jump on mostly?

H: He didn't have any favorites. He didn't seem tohave any favorites. Our biggest problem was accidents and getting equipment. So he spent an awful lot of time working over the training people, and the operations people, and the materiel people.

Q: Was the 2nd AF one of his favorite targets?

H: I think the 2nd AF, actually, was one of his favorites. But he was distressed about the number of accidents that were going on out there. He liked Bob Olds.

Q: Didn't he take Davenport Johnson out of there?

H: All I knew is he left, I don't remember whether he was relieved or not.

Q: He took him out of there, and then he put one of his favorites, Bill Streett, into it.

H: That's right.

Q: Was Bill Streett sort of a troubleshooter for him?

H: Yes, I think probably, I would guess that of the people around today, Bill Streett probably knows him as well as anybody.

Q: I had a long talk with him. He's got emphysema.

H: I doubt anybody didn't respect him, including his worst

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enemies. I doubt that there's anybody that doesn't respect and admire him. I know there are many people that really hate him . I know many people scared to death of him. But as far as, that's not the kind of leadership that I endorse, it's foreign to my personality. But it got the job done.

Q: Well, he was a very unique guy, and he did it in his own style. One of the guys he had trouble with was Jim Chaney. Didn't he get Chaney out of that job?

H: He fired him, one weekend, and that's interesting, because he fired him. I don't know whether Pat (Partridge) knows this or not. But he came roaring into the office. He made a weekend inspection of the fighter units over in the 1st Air Force area, and came roaring back into the office.

Q: This is when Chaney was commander?

H: Yes, and Partridge (?) was I think, Director of Ops for Chaney. Arnold came roaring into the office, and said: "Fire Chaney and Partridge." And I got him to keep pat in position. If there is something wrong with a unit fire the commander, but don't get into the staff business. I may not have done Pat a great favor. I never told Pat this.

Q: You know, I talked to Partridge two months ago, and he told me that he didn't know Arnold very well because he avoided Arnold.

H: I don't think that's a peculiarity of Pat's at all.

Q: Why did he fire Chaney? What happened? Do you remember?

H: Oh I forget, it was not enough aircraft in commission or something like that.

Q: Was this when he brought Monk Hunter in to take that job, 1943?

H: Must have been about that time.

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Q: Monk Hunter came back. Monk Hunter was taken out of his job in the 8th Fighter Command. And this was a problem.

H: I think it must be about that time.

Q: Wasn't this the second time Chaney was taken out of a job?

H: I don't know.

Q: Chaney was the commander, he was a contemporary of Arnold's and he was the commander of the US Army Forces in the British Isles.

H: That's right.

Q: And we are talking now, right after Pearl Harbor. There was BOLERO, the buildup of forces in the British Isles.

H: You are not thinking of Bill Butler, are you?

Q: No, no.

H: Because Butler was fired.

Q: Butler was fired right in 1944. This is right before OVERLORD. Butler was made second in command to Leigh Mallory, for the Tactical Air Forces in the OVERLORD operation. Now, Arnold brought Bruce Butler down from the 11th AF. No. I'm talking about 1942 when they were getting the first 8th AF units. Arnold took Chaney out of there, and in effect, put Spaatz in. Spaatz was the 8th AF Commander. He was in Bolling, just starting out. Then he came over there, and he became senior Air Force man and Chaney was taken out of there, because he was felt to be not sympathetic. Is that correct?

H: It rings a bell, I don't remember exactly.

Q: Do you remember, Chaney was our senior man? (In UK early in WW II).

H: Ira Eaker got involved in this.

Q: You see, what happened--Spaatz was the senior man. Eaker was under him. When Spaatz was brought down to North Africa, Eaker became the top commander in UK.

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H: And then Arnold switched them.

Q: Yes, I want to task you about what I call "the Big Switch." Do you know anything about it?

H: I wrote the cable. Under instructions, of course.

Q: Tell me about it. When did Arnold first think to make the change?

H: I can make it very simple, and I don't think criticizing anybody, because there is no criticism due here anywhere. This, once again, was a typical Hap Arnold decision. He said: "I have the greatest respect and admiration in the world for Ira Eaker. I think he is doing a fine job. I don't know whether he is a combat leader. I know Tooey Spaatz is. He's proven it. Make the change,and no staffs go with them. Just the people. Just these two guys.

Q: Well they changed their whole staffs; they made a big move.

H: They moved as individuals.

Q: But wasn't the staff moved with them, too?

H: No, if they did, they violated his orders.

Q: Well, there were a large number of people moved.

H: Well, you know, commander of a field force can move a large number of people, and still not move the staff.

Q: Somebody told me. You know, Spaatz didn't want to leave his job. unless they elevated the Mediterranean job to the Commander of the MAAF. In other words, it appeared that Eaker was getting a promotion.

H: Yes. I think Ira--I'm sure he does--understands exactly what the Old Man was thinking, because I spent a lot of time with Ira all these years, and I sense no bitterness, never did sense any. Of course, I was with him during the war, too. I never did sense any bitterness.

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Q: You know, he was bitter, though?

H: Well, I never did sense it.

Q: You know, he wrote many letters. He used to write.

H: This I never knew, and I've been very close to him.

Q: I talked to Eaker.

H: I've always been his junior, but always on a first name basis. Eaker never--we spent many evenings together, talking about the war--and he never even so much as indicated any bitterness.

Q: I just wonder if their relationship changed after that, because you know Eaker never made his fourth star, and he was one of the few top combat commanders who didn't. Why?

H: And a damn good one, too.

Q: Why didn't he make his fourth star?

H: I've often wondered.

Q: I'm sure that if Arnold had pushed it hard enough?

H: The job, of course, that he had after the war, was a three-star job and that's the job from which he retired.

Q: You mean Deputy Commander?

H: Yes.

Q: In that respect, he should have stood behind Spaatz, but they put Vandenberg behind Spaatz.

H: That's one subject I wouldn't go on tape about.

Q: I'll tell you when it happened, in May 1943. They had what they called a TRIDENT conference, when Churchill came to Washington. Arnold had a mild, probably had a mild heart attack. He went out to Oregon, to the MacKenzie River with Mrs. Arnold. Marshall sent him out of town, just to get away from it all. He was out there looking for a ranch. You know, he was very interested in getting back to the

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soil. Do you remember this, when he went out?

H: I only remember the facts you've stated, I do remember he had a heart attack and I remember he went out West, and we assumed he was looking for a place out there. That's all I remember.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about his love for a ranch? He wanted to get into growing something.

H: No.

Q: While he was fighting this war, and doing all these things, he was engaged in a heavy correspondence with a guy building his ranch. He wanted the water supply here, and he wanted the cattle over here, and he wanted the chickens over here, and he wanted certain compositions of the roof....

H: I didn't know that.

Q: Extensive correspondence, I mean detailed, and the guy would write him a letter about the price he was getting for a pound of beef. Should he hold the beef till the fall, or butcher it now?

H: That comes as a great surprise to me, because I knew he loved the soil, but he was such a single minded person. I didn't think he thought about anything but the war.

Q: He must have done it between midnight and 6 AM.

H: He would have had to.

Q: You say he got mad every day at the staff meeting. Were there any special targets? How about Sorensen? Was he a special target?

H: No, I remember Ed Sorensen. He came in for his share. I can see him getting him raked over the coals right now,but I don't think he was any more favored. He used to jump on Benny Meyers all the time.

Q: Meyers was MM&D.

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H: Benny was the No. 2 man in the procurement shop. But he, once again--Arnold's peculiarity--he sort of looked to Benny for the supply and equipment of aircraft. He looked to Benny more or less directly for that.

Q: How did Benny take this criticism?

H: Took it like a little man. In the first place Benny was so darn smart that he always had an answer, anything that Gen Arnold could think up. He should have been a lawyer. Clever as could be, and damned capable, too.

Q: Didn't he name his children for Arnold, or wasn't Arnold godfather or something?

H: I don't know, Benny and I had twins at the same time.

Q: Well, didn't he name one for Arnold and one for Marshall?

H: I don't know. I'll tell you, Benny Meyers wouldn't be a bad guy to talk to.

Q: Well, would he talk now?

H: I don't know.

Q: He's in San Franciso, isn't he?

H: I really don't know. I've only been in touch with him once.

Q: I was told a couple of days ago that he was in San Francisco. I wonder if he is reachable. You know, Arnold and he were very close at one time.

H: That was obvious, and that's one of the reasons that I think Gen Arnold was on his neck all the time, and one of the reasons Benny took it so well.

Q: He knew that under it all he liked him.

H: And he had the job. He had a terribly important job.

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Q: But this is why the betrayal in Arnold's eyes was the greater. You know that Arnold had written an endorsement of Benny Meyers when Meyers got into trouble, but Arnold didn't know that he was in trouble--this is when he was in retirement? Meyers called him up from the Carlton Hotel and Arnold had written this letter. But didn't mail it, because somebody probably tipped Arnold off that Meyers was in real trouble. Were you involved in the letter that Stratemeyer sent out--you must have been--in '43, asking each of the procurement officers to list all his holdings?

H: Yes.

Q: And Meyers, Orval Cook, and Echols, and all the rest of them. Didn't they all submit their letters listing their assets?

H: I assume they did.

Q: Meyers must have skipped a few of his holdings.

H: Yes, they belonged to an aunt or something, which is so easy to do. Really a kind of a fruitless exercise, actually.

Q: They just accepted these affidavits or letters on face value? Nobody was investigated?

H: No, not that I know of.

Q: Mrs. Arnold said that Benny always drove around in Cadillacs. They just assumed that his second wife had money?

H: We all assumed that.

Q: There was a lot of money in the family, he wasn't doing this on his military pay?

H: We'd assumed that. It was just at the back of your mind. We didn't talk about it. I don't remember talking about it. I remember I hated anonymous letters so, and the Air Inspector saw so many of them, and saw how much harm they could do. I was really frightened at that potential for harm, that you know an enemy could develop

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through anonymous letters.

Q: Were you around when that anonymous letter of June 22, 1945 came in, accusing Benny Meyers?

H: No, I was overseas.

Q: Jake Smart signed off on that one.

H: Well, you know I almost got Gen Arnold to agree to adopt as an Air Staff principle, all anonymous letters, whoever sees an anonymous letter, into the waste basket. Because you know it's a fact that not all of us can stand investigation in the first place, and it doesn't take much to start one. And also, this great potential for total disruption with a smart agency sending an anonymous letter to the right people on the right subject. I think he was pretty much adopted to it as a matter of principle, and then, this Meyers thing came in.

Q: He was out of Washington when he came in.

H: Didn't Junius Jones have that letter a long time before Arnold knew it?

Q: Well, that letter (re Meyers) came in, and it was kicked around. The FBI sent it over, because during the war there was an agreement that anything involving the military would be handled by the military. So the FBI turned it over. Somebody then made the decision that because the FBI turned it over, they were not interested, or concerned about it, and so Junius apparently sent it to file. Then it was picked up a couple of years later by Congressional investigators.

H: Tooey, you know, who has a wealth of good practical knowledge, Spaatz, Rosie in a conversation one day, said to him: "General, this Washington scene is all a new thing to me. I have some apprehensions

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about appearing before Congress which I may have to do from time to tim e." Old Tooey said: "Well, let me tell you Rosie, he said, don't ever lie up there. But don't go around blabbling the truth either."

Q: That's right, don't volunteer. Well, this must have been after the war when Tooey, because I don't think Tooey and O'Donnell ever served together.

H: No, I think Tooey was Chief of Staff and Rosie came in.

Q: He must have been Director of Information.

H: Yes, you are exactly right.

Q: Rosie O'Donnell came in. You knew him when he came into work for Arnold in '43?

H: Rosie and I have always been very close because we were very close at West Point.

Q: Did you graduate together?

H: One class apart, he was '28 and I was '29.

Q: And then he came to the Advisory Council.

H: I believe that's the first time Rosie, I believe he came in here from March Field.

Q: Who did he succeed?

H: The first Advisory Council had Cabell and Norstad.

Q: And Norstad left, and I think Jake Smart took his place, and maybe Cabell left, and maybe Rosie O'Donnell took his place.

H: I think that's right.

Q: And Rosie was very close to the Old Man?

H: Very, he just amused the Old Man all the time.

Q: Was he a comedy relief in a way, practical joker?

H: I think he thought a great deal of Rosie.

Q: How about socially? He saw a lot of him?

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H: No, at those times, there wasn't much social life, very little. I think I was in the Old Man's house, oh, maybe, once in all those years. Before the war, he used to be in our place over at Bolling a lot. One day at a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting Rosie had been trying to get to the Old Man. You know, like trying to paint a power lawn mower. Arnold would stomp around and pick up the squawk box and grab the phone and Rosie was trying to brief him on the meeting that was coming off in 10 minutes, you know. On the way over in the car he tried to brief him some more, and they'd sit down at this table, and the meeting was in progress and Rosie writes a little note, passes it to a Navy Captain, who in turn passes it to an AF Brigadier, and eventually works it way up to Gen Arnold. Right in the middle of the meeting, Gen Arnold just broke up, and he passed the note to Marshall. The note said: "Meeting not going well: Reason-Gen A not properly briefed. I cannot work here under these conditions." And that sort of thing just broke old Hap up. Every day at noon, everybody was so damned nervous all the time, anyway, at noon the clock would buzz, checking the bomb alert, and Rosie was working with the Old Man at the last minute, as always, trying to get his understanding of these papers. And this thing exploded, and they both jumped, and Hap said: "I hate that damn thing!" and Rosie picked up a great big paperweight and let go, and missed the big clock by about that much and made a great big hole in the wall. And the Old Man would never let anybody fix it.

Q: You know, I heard a story about a paper weight. Did Arnold ever throw a paperweight at anybody?

H: Not that I know of.

Q: Well, maybe that's the paperweight story.

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H: That's the paperweight thrown in his office. O'Donnell threw it through the wall. Arnold wouldn't let anybody patch it up.

Q: Rosie must have had a lot of confidence in his ability to get away with things like this?

H: Oh, totally, Rosie says and does exactly as he pleases. Always has.

Q: Maybe this is what ingratiated him with Arnold?

H: Well, one thing you know, a man like that can serve you well, because you know you are going to the truth.

Q: Let's talk about 1941, right before Pearl Harbor. There was publication in the Chicago Tribune of parts of RAINBOW FIVE. It caused a big to-do. You know, a man has published an article which sort of pointed a finger at Hap Arnold's having had something to do with with that leak.

H: I wish I had something to say, all I know is that I was specifically detailed to check every agency in this town that had a copy of it to see whether they had it, and knew where it was, and where it had been. Not in this town, everything that was under Air Corps jurisdiction.

Q: Was there an investigation of that RAINBOW FIVE leak?

H: There was that much of an investigation, that I know of.

Q: Did the FBI get into it.

H: I don't know. I conducted it within the Air Corps.

Q: What did you find?

H: That everybody had his plan and was, in my opinion, above suspicion, I stole one guy's plan from him. But I just did that for fun, I wanted to prove a point that it was pretty easy to get your hands on it.

Q: You were than A IG, I guess?

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H: Yes.

Q: This is the second big myster about Arnold.

Q: W are talking about RAINBOW FIVE and the lea. Do you remember the Sawyer-McCormick letter?

H: I do remember that there was such a letter, and I also remember that we thought it was strange at the time that it should come from the White House to General Arnold, and I had my own personal suspicions and I wasn't alone, by any manner of means, that the leak had come from the White House. And when this happened, it didn't decrease those suspicions a darned bit.

Q: Well, why did they give it to Arnold to write an answer? Why did Roosevelt give it to Arnold? I have one guess that Arnold claims credit for having originated the concept of aerial spotting for artillery, back in 1912, so he could claim some expertise in this area and he might have gotten it for that reason. But why do you think Roosevelt gave it to him to answer?

H: Frankly, I don't know. And all of us were amazed at the time that it had been handled that way.

Q: I know there were several drafts of this thing.

H: Well, the kind of gut feeling that we had about it was that give it to somebody that doesn't know anything at all about the leak, actually. Rather than leave it to some agency that may know something.

Q: Do you feel that if it was known that Arnold was the source of the leak, he would have been fired by Marshall?

H: Definitely. He would have been summarily fired.

Q: Do you have any idea who might have been involved in it. You think it's the White House. Why should the White House leak it,

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unless it was somebody in the White House who disagreed with Roosevelt's policy and wanted a stronger Asia first policy?

H: In the atmosphere that existed at that time, it was obvious the Administration had concluded that we were going to have a war. It appeared to us that if our very limited capabilities, and either rather limited plans were publicly exposed, that it might arouse such a public furor that the Administration would get some support for his obvious desire to increase the strength of the armed forces.

Q: Well, it could have caused a strong reaction.

H: The feeling within the military was that war was inevitable, fairly soon. So maybe we were a little inclined to think that maybe everybody felt that way.

Q: But did they think that publication of this plan would help?

H: It was one of the, it was the only reason that I could think of for, at the time, for anybody leaking it.

Q: I think this would cause a revulsion against the war?

H: It would depend on what your assessment of the public attitude was at the time.

Q: I would say that the public attitude at the time was sort of half and half, I mean, I know my attitude, I wanted to stop Hilter and Tojo, and all the rest, but I didn't particularly feel like I was going to pick up a gun and go fight.

H: Yes, now you see, probably a professional military man at that time, would not be a good one to assess public attitude, because we weren't even in that day as public as we are now.

Q: Lindbergh and some of the other people were opposed. They were saying that Roosevelt was getting up into the war. Okay, here'a a war plan that shows he's getting us involved in the war. My God,

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Roosevelt is doing all these terrible things, and we don't want any part of Roosevelt and his plan.

H: Well, on the other hand, if you felt that whether we liked it or not, we were going to have to go to war. Maybe we'd better get on doing something about it.

Q: I felt that we were going to be in the war, but I could have felt that Roosevelt was pushing us a little too far.

H: Yes, that's true.

Q: Anyway, I think the motive of the man who leaked it, or the individual who leaked it, was to cause a revulsion against the war. This is why the Chicago Tribune published it, because they were opposed to the war. They were opposed to our involvement, and they said if we have to fight a war, they said: "Let's fight the Japs, they are the real problem!"

H: I know that I at that time, sort of looked on Col McCormick as sort of a crackpot, anyway, and just the fact that he released it for, with one purpose in mind, didn't have, wouldn't have much effect on my thinking.

Q: Let me ask you about Charles Lindbergh and Arnold. Did you know they had some close contact? Lindbergh came up to visit him at West Point. They had a secret meeting, but Arnold had great respect for Lindbergh as a flyer. He may or may not have smypathized with his political beliefs, but it was through Arnold, I guess, that Lindbergh had a role to play in WW II. Did you know anything about their relationship?

H: No, other than that there was the highest mutual respect, that's really all I know.

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Q: You know Tony Frank left his papers to the Air Museum in Wright Patt?

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with McNarney?

H: No.

Q: McNarney worked for Marshall.

H: Yes, but I know that. Now that you mention it, we looked with some apprehension at McNarney's going up there, because we felt he was such an honest and straight shooting man--we all had the greatest respect for him--that we'd come off second best if he had to make a decision. So I don't know. I don't think Gen Marshall would have done it without Gen Arnold's agreement, so I think Gen Arnold must definitely have concurred in his going there.

Q: McNarney was a very competent man.

H: Very competent and very tough.

Q: He was entrusted with the reorganization plan. Did you have any involvement in that?

H: Only in settling the differences between the Army and the Air Force.

Q: Kuter was assigned to that job, wasn't he, didn't he work with McNarney?

H: No, I wasn't associated with that in any way. Kuter was.

Q: I talked to Kuter, but I didn't get too much. He was very cautious. He knows an awful lot more than he told me.

H: Larry would know damned near everything there was to know.

Q: He had Arnold's confidence?

H: I'm sure he did.

Q: Arnold admired him, intellectually?

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H: He's a bright guy.

Q: He was close to Arnold. Did Arnold ever talk about him?

H: No, Larry was made a General when he was 37, and I was made a General when I was 35. And the only thing that I ever heard Gen Arnold say on that general subject, was that the reason that he was leaning on the younger generation so heavily was that, through no fault of the older generation, their minds had been paralyzed between war starvation. That was his analysis. He said, he wasn't really being critical. He said I undersand perfectly what's happened to them.

Q: Talking about this Hall Board, this is post war now, Arnold was out of the picture, wasn't he?

H: Yes, Tooey was Chief.

Q: I know there was the Patch Board, and Hall Board.

H: This was strictly, I was Gen. Eisenhower's Air Advisor, he had what he called an Advisory Council.

Q: When he had become Chief of Staff?

H: He was Chief of Staff, and Wade Hazlett was the Director of this group, and it consisted of Hazlett, a real ground slogger, a guy named Doc Cook, a division commander during the war, a tanker and Alec Surles, armor man, and

Q: He was also public relations there for a while?

H: Yes, and Howard Schneider, who was Pres. Eisenhower's physician when he was President, and me, I was the Air man, and I was unfortunate enough not to attend a meeting one day in the Chief of Staff's office when they decided to form a board made up of an airman, a supply man, a dough foot, I guess that's it, and I say I wasn't at the meeting, so they made me chairman.

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Q: Well, Lindbergh went out to the Pacific, and as a civilian, he flew P-38s.

H: Yes, Yes.

Q: And he couldn't have done this without Arnold's permission, or acquiescence.

H: That's right. Gen Arnold knew everything that he was doing. I know that.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about Lindbergh?

H: No.

Q: Did you ever hear him talk about Lindbergh?

H: No, nothing of any significance.

Q: You got the impression that there was mutual respect.

H: Definitely.

Q: How about Robert E. Wood?

H: I never have known him.

Q: Robert E. Wood was also a guy Arnold respected highly. He was an isolationist but he was a great supply man, and Arnold utilized him.

H: You could find out everything that he's thinking, if Tony Frank hadn't died.

Q: When did he die, it must have been the last year?

H: It's been about a year, maybe two years.

Q: I saw him in one book, and he was not in the other. Is Wood alive or is he dead?

H: I think he's alive.

Q: I'd like to talk to him, try to track him down.

H: I think I know how you can get to him. At least get put on the right path. Do you know Brooke Allen? Ask Brooke, he's Tony Frank's son-in-law, and I'm sure he must know Gen Wood.

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Q: Wasn't this board

H: It was right after the Executive Order, the first Executive Order which created a Department of Defense.

Q: Oh, this is in 1947. Was this a bill of divorcement to separate?

H: Between the Army and the Air Force.

Q: Was that the 200 point agreement?

H: I never heard of it as any kind of agreement.

Q: An agreement that came up, after the act was passed.

H: This is right after the President signed the Executive Order which created the Dept of Defense.

Q: 1947.

H: Must have been 1947, I left herein May of 1947 to be gone three years, so it must have been very early in 1947.

Q: How did Arnold feel about unification, of course, he wanted it, obviously, but was he content to wait till the end of the war?

H: We all knew that he wanted a separate and equal air force. He wanted a ground force, and a sea force, and an air force. We all knew, and Gen Spaatz inherited this same viewpoint, that ultimately to get to this goal we had to have the support of the Army. So the divorce had better not be too drastic. Gen Eisenhower, when he was Chief of Staff, made the point many times that if the divorce were too drastic, he wouldn't permit it. This is an example of what I'm talking about, we wrote in our report (Hall Board), that for a medical service for instance, there must be complete career development within an individual service, right from your lowest ranking medical up to your own general officers in your own service, and your own hospital commanders. That was completely foreign to Tooey's thinking and to General Eisenhower's thinking because they wanted this efficiency on

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paper. A guy has to have his appendix out. He doesn't need his own doctor to take it out. Well, that's fine, but you don't get doctors, if they're not going anywhere. You don't get them, and eventually, of course, they adopted our recommendations. That's what's in effect right now. But I used that only as an example to indicate Air Corps thinking: "go softly, or we won't get it at all."

Q: That's right, and Arnold accepted that.

H: That was General Arnold's position.

Q: Yet, Arnold apparently changed his position after the war, after he had retired. I saw Norstad in NY and he told me, that of course he and Everest and Bart Leach... Do you remember Leach?

H: Yes.

Q: I worked for him, by the way, for several years. Norstad told me that Arnold got mad at him because he had made too many concessions to the Navy in the unification bill.

H: Well, yes, everybody in the Air Force got mad at him, because we figured that the time had come. You see, this soft pedalling had been great up to where it almost was an accomplished fact.

Q: We wanted to go all the way?

H: Well, we thought the timing was right, you know, the public was ready, and the President seemed to be ready. We thought the time for too many concessions had ceased. Now I don't know what Larry's problems were, but I was never in a meeting with him, and they may have been very serious.

Q: But he said that Arnold got mad at him and then he forgave him later on.

H: Well, I'm not surprised that Arnold got mad, because I'm sure that by that time, that the die was far enough cast, that we

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didn't have to soft pedal quite so much.

Q: Do you remember on Dec 19, 1945, Truman came out with a Presidential message. He was the first President to come out for unification. Did Arnold have anything to do with that?

H: I don't know.

Q: He was still Chief of the AAF, but he was mostly in Sonoma.

H: I don't know what Mr. Truman's and Gen Arnold's relationship was, I don't have any way of knowing.

Q: Are you aware that, well on April 19, 1945, when Arnold was on his recuperation trip to Europe, he and Eaker and Spaatz and several others--now this is one week after Roosevelt died. The new President was in office, and they were aware of the fact that Roosevelt was no great friend of airpower. He was a Navy man. He had ships on his desk, and here was a new President. Well, they met: "Let's put our best foot forward with the new President." And they talked about plans for getting closer to the present President, then they were to the previous President. One of the things they had suggested was to get Pete Quesada into the White House as Air Aide to the President.

H: All I remember was that that was the desire. That's all I remember about it.

Q: But they had this big meeting, I think in Cannes?

H: That's where it would have been.

Q: Did you hear any echoes or repercussions or discussions that came out of that?

H: No.

Q: Apparently they weren't successful, because the first qualification was that you had to be from Missouri, to get into the White House.

H: Yes, sure Bob Landry turned out to be a perfect aide.

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Q: I want to get to see him, I did a job for him back in 1949.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

H: Unless he was the butt of the joke, and then he had absolutely none. Everything was funny about everybody else.

Q: Didn't he use this guy Vince Barnett to pull some practical jokes on Marshall and some other people? You know, this guy was a professional ribber.

H: Vince pulled some things on him, now whether Gen Arnold was behind it or not, I don't know. I know he enjoyed it.

Q: Arnold used to have these game dinners down at Bolling Field. Did you have any role in setting those up?

H: Only, they started when I was Post Adjutant and Post Executive Officer. So, of course, I was involved. Yes.

Q: They started in 1941?

H: That's about it. I remember the first time, I think at the first one, he called in all the general officers, and when all these general officers walked in--there must have been about 8 or 9 of them--everybody just roared. They'd never seen so damned many generals in their life. It just broke up the place, all these generals. What are we going to do with all these generals? Must have been about nine of them.

Q: What did he think of the Russians?

H: He had, well I don't want to use the word "fear," but he had great apprehension, and saw clearly that they were our next potential enemy. It was very clear in his own mind.

Q: Were you present when he had these dealings with the Russians, the purchasing commission?

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H: No.

Q: Or did you hear him talk about them? They kept wanting more and more.

H: He was always, yes, in his general staff meetings, he'd always referred to the fact that they were leaning on him all the time to get more and more.

Q: They wanted heavy bombers. How did he feel about that?

H: He wasn't happy about giving heavy bombers to anybody he didn't have to, including the US Navy.

Q: He had some sessions with Admiral King on this, didn't he, about the bombers and did they have some pretty good sessions?

H: The three so-called Chiefs of Staff at that time, had so many things in common, that it was just amazing. They were both terribly strong, rough. He was just as tough as the other two. I never went to a meeting but that Gen Arnold always reflected the fact that there had been a big cat and dog fight. He always came back from them as mad as he was at his own Air Staff--which is pretty mad.

Q: How about the British, Portal and some of the others, did he have any dealings?

H: I don't remember any observations.

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Interview LTGEN William E. Hall, Pentagon, February 13, 1970

H: Well, one of the things that I've often said about Gen Arnold is that I believe there were very few men in the world for whom he had much respect with the exception of General Marshall, and he obviously had a great deal of respect for Gen Marshall. And I don't think it was just so much as I said a minute ago, that he needed Gen Marshall help to accomplish his own aim of a separate air force, but I think the respect was very real, very sincere.

Q: Was it a mutual respect?

H: Oh yes, definitely, of course, I saw much more of Gen Arnold than I did of Gen Marshall, but I did have the good fortune of being around Gen Marshall quite a bit, because in the early days when he was Chief of Staff, I was the pilot that used to fly him up to his Fire Island place, I took Mitchell along every weekend until the pressure got too great.

Q: Did Marshall understand airpower?

H: I think Gen Arnold whittled away at him until he developed an appreciation for it. He liked aircraft, I know that.

Q: Liked to fly?

H: And he liked people around aircraft, I know that. He was a very austere man, as everyone knows. None of us ever felt close to him. Generally when you pilot a man around the country a great deal, you develop a very close rapport, but it never got anything closer than Captain or Major Hall, as far as Gen Marshall was concerned.

Q: He would never call you by your first name?

H: No, I don't think I ever heard him call anybody by his first name.

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Q: Nobody ever called him by his first name.

H: I'm sure they didn't.

Q: I don't think even the President called him "George," did he?

H: Well, I've never heard anybody call him "George" except his wife. I was best man at his daughter's wedding to a classmate of mine, Jimmy Wynn. So we, during that period, were thrown together personally a lot. He never called anybody by anything but by title and last name.

Q: I've seen extensive correspondence between him and Gen. Arnold. It is always "Dear Arnold," and it's "Dear General," or "Memorandum for Gen Marshall." There was always a difference in their levels.

H: That doesn't surprise me.

Q: That never broke down? How about their hunting trips? They went on a couple of fishing and hunting trips. Did he let down then?

H: I wish I'd been there, so I'd know, but from what little I do know, I doubt it very much. Gen Marshall just didn't, he just didn't relax, ever. He wasavery pleasantman to be around, but terribly formal all the time.

Q: When Arnold and Marshall were in the room, did the attention gravitate to Marshall or to Arnold, or to both?

H: Definitely to Gen Marshall, and at Gen Arnold's pleasure. There was no question about it.

Q: He deferred to Marshall?

H: Absolutely.

Q: This is the impression I got. Were you in Washington in 1945? You came back in 1945....

H: I went overseas in the fall of 1944, and came back in May of 1945.

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Q: Well, Arnold had just gone on a recuperation trip.

H: That's right.

Q: Eaker was the Deputy Commander. Did you see Arnold at that time? He had just come back from Florida. Well, he'd come back the end of March, and in April he went to Europe. He came back from Europe in May. You didn't see him?

H: I think the last time I saw Gen. Arnold while he was still very active as far as the Army Air Forces was concerned, was when he visited Gen Twining's 15th AF headquarters in Bari in the very early spring of 1945.

Q: It must have been the end of April 1945.

H: That would make sense. Something very interesting happened there, that may not have been brought out before. Gen Arnold and my relationship--was certainly a boss and employee relationship--but it was a reasonably close one, personally. Mrs. Arnold and I were very close friends, and I was Deputy Chief of Air Staff for a long time under Gen Arnold. And I think there was a little personal relationship there. Anyway, when he visited us in Bari, Italy, we had the usual dinner, of course. He told me afterwards. He said: "After this breaks up, I want you to come down to my room." So I did as he bid, always, and he said: "What do you think about things?" And I said: "Well, look, Chief, we've got this one buttoned up over here. We ought to be pulling these heavy bomb groups out and getting them retrained and redeployed." So he said: "Hell, I'm not talking about this one; I'm talking about the next one." I had just come back from working with the Russians in Bulgaria, so he knew that I had a feel for our relationship. He wasn't interested in the war that was going on, now.

Q: Did he feel that the Russians would be our adversary?

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H: Definitely.

Q: Why did he think so? Were there some incidents, or some suspicion?

H: He had been at enough of these Conferences, as you know, to develop a doubt that I think everybody developed, with the exception of the President--and that's always been my feeling that the President developed them, too. He just didn't show them.

Q: Roosevelt?

H: Yes, we don't know what the President would have done after the war. Nobody will ever know that.

Q: History never reveals its alternative--what could have happened?

H: And of course, he never talked to anybody, which is said. Another man that Hap Arnold liked a lot, speaking of the President, was Harry Hopkins. I'm sure you know that.

Q: They were very close, they got along very well, although there were some differences in their attitudes for a while, because Hopkins would have shipped everything we had out to the Russians and Arnold had some doubts about that.

H: That's true.

Q: Well, why did they get along so well?

H: Well, I think this was Hap's approach to the President. I'm sure you know in all your research, that relationships were colder than cold between Mr. Roosevelt and Gen Arnold, and no one knew the basis of it.

Q: I think I know the basis of it at the beginning. There was great difficulty in getting Arnold and Morgenthau in 1939 and 1940. Morgenthau had appropriated himself the role of, let's say, Secy of

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Defense. And Morgenthau was leader of the interventionists and he wanted to ship out all our modern planes to help the British and French. Arnold was not necessarily averse to that, but he had the job as Chief of the Air Corps. The Air Corps was trying to expand, and if he gave all our best planes away, you can't train a force. There was an incident in 1939.

Q: Harry Hopkins was the catalyst?

H: Sort of, relationship was very cold. The only way he could get to the White House was through Harry Hopkins. Gen Arnold, in spite of his great admiration for the Chief of Staff, was not loath to make a sharp turn, if it was accomplishing what he thought he should set out to accomplish.

Q: Would he prepare Marshall in advance, in the sense that so they should reconcile their own positions in public?

H: I would have to guess, but if I were to guess, I would say, "yes," because of two things: (1) His constant physical association with Gen Marshall, and (2) his great respect for him. Hap didn't believe, as I know you know, he didn't believe much in channels and I don't think it was channels that generated this close collaboration between Gen Arnold and the Chief of Staff, Gen Marshall. I think he figured it was just the way to do things with this particular type of man. One of the things that I'm sure you've researched, but if you haven't, I think you should. I think one of the greatest keys to Hap Arnold's character is what happened to all his rivals in the short period following Dec 7, 1941. Did it ever occur to you that they all scattered like a covey of quail?

Q: Yes, it has, but tell me about it.

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H: Well, that's really about all I want to say about it, because not that I'm keeping anything back, I just don't know any more, but it always fascinated me that here he was, I think he was a BG at the time.

Q: At Pearl Harbor? He was two-star, just going onto three-star.

H: Yes, I've forgotten.

Q: He had become Chief of the AAF on June 20, 1941.

H: Right, you know, he had several people in the AF senior to him, and yet for some reason or other, when the dust settled, Gen Arnold was in Washington in complete control, and everybody else was in an output someplace.

Q: Well, let me tell you something about Andrews. I wonder if you have any comment on that recitation--Knerr-Andrews. Did you have any awareness that this was going on?

H: It was my impression that Knerr was recalled to silence him. Now, I don't know whether this was true or not, but it was my impression that he was recalled to active service to keep him quiet.

Q: Well, many tried to keep him out. In fact, he blamed Arnold for a year's delay in his return to duty. He didn't come back until Nov 1942, and they called him down to Stimson's office. McNarney was down there working for Marshall. They were talking about court-martial and the Navy absolutely opposed his return, because he was writing all these articles about the failure of unification.

H: Hugh Knerr is a very interesting man. You know, history takes some very peculiar turns. In 1945, I was appointed by Gen Eisenhower to head up a committee to draw up the ground rules between the Army and the Air Force, when the separate service concept came into being, and the Air Force representative was Hugh Knerr.

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Q: That's right, well, he was a leader. He was head of the Air Board at that time, wasn't he? Or had he just come back from Wright Patt? Was this the end of 1945?

H: I don't know what his duty was when he was a member of the Air Board. We were on full-time duty.

Q: He was the head of the Air Board at that time. He was an advocate of unification from way back.

H: Well, he was a very helpful member of this Board.

Q: He is a man of great talent. But, you see, Arnold was worried about him.

H: Of course, Arnold was not ineffective, but gone by this gime.

Q: After VJ Day, from what I have learned, Arnold had one foot on his Ranch. He didn't want any part of Washington at the end of the war. Well, I think we have sort of jumped over the beginning of the war. Let's take the story back to your first contact with Arnold. Do you remember the first time you met him?

H: Yes, I came to Bolling Field as a 1st LT in 1936, from Panama, and was Operations Officer there, for almost four years. In that capacity, of course, I got to know everybody in the Chief's office pretty well, particularly the Asst Chief of Air Corps, BG Arnold. So I saw him, I'd say, twice weekly, during all that time. Then when my boss out there, Col E.W. Hill was named Air Inspector.

Q: Ted Hill?

H: Yes. He brought me from Bolling with him as his No. 1 assistant. The Air Inspector's office was brand new at the time. There were very few people in it, so those that were in it, got to know the head man pretty well.

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Q: Is Hill in good shape now? He is up in Maine.

H: I had dinner here in town with him just a week ago.

Q: Does he come to town often?

H: No, he was down for a physical checkup this time, and came out of it very well. He's in good shape.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the Inspector General's job, Hill was involved, and perhaps you were involved, perhaps you wrote this report on Pan Am and the building of bases. Can you tell me about that report, the problems you had with it?

H: Yes, do you mean the creation of the report?

Q: Pan Am got into trouble, or they had some trouble with Pan Am....

H: Well, I'm sure you are familiar with the total concept of in preparation for dire times. We needed plenty of alternate room, and maybe different routes across the Atlantic, so rather than the US government to do it openly, there was a contract let with Pan Am. Everybody knew it, but it never was announced, these were military bases.

Q: It was more convenient for Pan Am.

H: Pan Am was there, for one thing.

Q: And you didn't want to show military presence in South America, when we were not at war?

H: That's right, believe me, it wasn't just we didn't want to. It was perfectly obvious when Ted and I were down there, that we might not have gotten away with it, even if we had wanted to. But, anyway, Ted's and my mission was to land in every field that we could get into, that was under contract at that time, and anything else that looked promising. I don't remember how many places we landed, but we sure

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landed in a lot of them. We went into every country except one. I think we missed Paraguay. I think that's the only country that we missed. Our method of operation was: at the end of each day, Ted and I would sit down and write a report, and then we would get it piecemeal back here, as soon as we could. Then when we came back, we consolidated the thing, and Ted will tell you this himself, but Ted has probably never been madder in his life than he was after this long, hard trip and a hell of a lot of work, he goes boiling down to Gen Arnold with what he considered a very important study because there were a lot of things going right, but more going wrong down there. And you had to be there to see it. You had to be there to talk to people to be aware of it. He goes into Hap Arnold's office all full of beans and sits there about an hour or two. I think this went on for a couple of days. Finally, one day, Hap came busting out of the office, said: "I haven't got the time to talk to you." And Ted said: "Well, next time I'm in this office, it will be because I've gotten a direct order to do so," and stomped out with his report. It was finally reviewed and staffed, and I think served a good purpose.

Q: Didn't Pan Am get into some trouble down there? Weren't they involved in the ownership of some of the Axis airlines? Let me ask you about things that you found.

H: Some of the unpleasant things that we found, of course, were obvious padded payrolls and kickbacks, and disgraceful lack of progress in a lot of cases. But it wouldn't be exactly right to lay the total blame on the contractor, because he was working in a tough area.

Q: They had to hire indigenous labor?

H: That's right, and also a lot of things were being done under-

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cover, and the less smoke stirred up, the less anyone was apt to find the fire. So they had their problems too, and we recognized that.

Q: Talking about these three Axis owned airplanes--weren't we very much concerned that they harbored Fifth Column agents who could sabotage the canal? Wasn't this a big concern.

H: Oh yes, it was.

Q: And wasn't Arnold?

H: The French had a carrier sitting down there, too, with a lot of airplanes on it.

Q: Where?

H: At Martinique.

Q: But wasn't there a great concern that these Axis airplines in flying through there were taking pictures of the Canal and their agents were attempting to sabotage the United States?

H: Yes, there was apprehension, but I can't recall anything specific.

Q: I have seen reports on that IG report, and it was rather amazing to me that it turns out that Pan Am has financial interest in the airlines.

H: As I say, I don't remember whether it is specifically in that report or not.

Q: Was there any concern or any amazement that they were doing that? Why were they doing that?

H: I don't think I accepted it with any feeling of shock because I felt it was sort of a reverse penetration, actually. They were recognized Axis operations.

Q: Did we use this as an espionage means, you know, to penetrate?

H: I don't know, I'd like to think we did, but I don't know.

Q: I'm just wondering about this, the propriety on the part of Pan Am. Here we are trying to unload these airplanes, and Pan Am is

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our agent to unload the airlines, and here it turns out that they have financial interest in keeping them going.

H: As I say, it may have been a pretty good thing.

Q: It depends, somebody ought to talk to Juan Trippe. Was he running it then?

H: I believe he was. Of course, Pan Am, there must have been a lot of secret information available to Pan Am at that time. They must have been pretty well read in.

Q: Do you remember any other IG situations that were brought to Arnold?

H: Yes, I remember one specifically that I thought was kind of typical of Gen Arnold. I remember being told one afternoon to go to a certain base and find enough to fire the base commander, and I said: "Well, I'll go out the first thing in the morning." And he said: "I said right away." This is about 4 in the afternoon, so in typical Arnold fashion. he meant "now." And I went out to this base, and I went through it with a fine tooth comb, and the base commander, who was a contemporary of Arnold's, couldn't have cared less about the fact that I was there. He didn't even bother to go with me. I just had a free hand, and I spent about 24 hours on that base, going over it with a fine tooth comb, and it was one of the best run operations I've ever seen in my life. I came back and reported to Gen Arnold. He just hit the roof. I had flunked my mission, I had been sent out there to fire the guy, and I couldn't find anything to fire him for. So I was really in the doghouse, as far as Gen Arnold was concerned. About a week later, at a staff meeting, he told somebody: "I wish every base we had in the air force was run like so and so's base. You can't find anything wrong with it."

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Q: Can you now say who it was?

H: It was in Albuquerque, I don't believe it was Jan Howard. Jan Howard was down in North Carolina about that time, I think.

Q: I don't know where he went after he left Washington. He was taken out of several jobs. He was a man of great ability, but sort of an abrasive guy. Talking about Jan Howard, he and Arnold, of course, there was always some family friction between the two. But you don't think it was he then?

H: I don't believe it was, but it was a contemporary of Gen Arnold's. I can almost see him, he was heavier than Howard.

Q: Do you remember any other contact with Arnold at Bolling at the time--we are talking 1940-41?

H: No, I remember he was kind enough when he lost one of his crew members to ask that I be made a crew member on his aircraft. And Ted Hill, my boss, said I was needed more there, and got away with it, which is, you know, I was kind of on pins and needles, because everybody always did exactly what Gen Arnold suggested. But Ted got away with it, I think he had a great deal of respect for Ted.

Q: I think he did, too, because he got a good job in Europe.

H: Yes, well, I was supposed to go with Ted on that one, too. The night before I was all packed and in my quarters--I lived over SE--had all my gear. I was all set to go the next day, and I got a call from the Chief's office, that I was to report to the Chief the next morning. My overseas orders were cancelled, and that's how I was brought into Arnold's office. I was made Asst Secy of the Air Staff. Just a few months later I was Secy of the Air Staff, and then a year later, was made Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Q: Then you had frequent contact with Arnold?

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H: Daily, I'd say "too frequent."

Q: Through Stratemeyer?

H: Strat was the Chief of Staff, but as I say, Gen Arnold looked to certain people for certain things and he didn't look at his organization chart very closely I was probably the last man in the normal course of the daily due to see Gen Arnold in this building, because the last thing he ever did, and I thought his timing was lousy, was to sign all these letters with problems which he signed himself, one at a time. No multipen job for him. One at a time. He read every one of them, and signed every one of them.

Q: I've run across several instances where he wanted to take care of this matter himself. He had this "Lincoln" complex. Lincoln's Bixby letter. You know, the famous condolence letters, I guess there were thousands of them. When did he sign them?

H: About the last thing each day. I'd generally go into him about the close of the day with an armload of papers that I knew Strat didn't have to clear, or which Strat had cleared, and go over them with him, and that was always at the bottom of the stack.

Q: Stratemeyer was your immediate superior?

H: Yes, he was, and later Barney Giles. I was here under the two of them.

Q: Right, Giles came in about July 1943.

H: That seems right.

Q: What sort of relationship did Stratemeyer and Arnold have?

H: Stratemeyer just adored him. He thought he was the greatest man in the world. Once again, that is a peculiarity of Strat's. I would say that he thought that of everybody he ever worked for. I know he felt towards MacArthur that way. But then everybody that worked for

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MacArthur felt that way.

Q: I missed talking to Stratemeyer. He died 7 or 8 months ago. I'd written him a letter and his wife said he was ill, and I never did get to see him.

H: I wish you had. You wouldn't have gotten any differences of opinion from Strat. He just thought Arnold was the greatest man that ever lived.

Q: You talked about Arnold disregarding organization charts. Do you recall any instances where he grabbed you or somebody in the hall, perhaps, or assigned people missions alien to their skills?

H: Funniest thing, I wish I could remember the names, but I don't know the names. He was walking down the halls of the Munitions Building one day, and there was a young officer in a flight jacket, and Arnold had just come back from a meeting relating to Materiel, and he saw this guy in the hall and said: "I want you to get up to Middletown Air Depot, and straighten that thing out." And he walked on down the hall. Well, the guy didn't know where Middletown was. He wasn't even stationed in Washington, but he was the first man in an air force outfit that Arnold say, so he told him. "You go straighten it out." Arnold knew that something would happen. He knew this guy would dig around, and eventually, the proper person would go up there and straighten it out. But he didn't have the time, and didn't want to take the time to go into detail with anybody. This was the first guy he saw. That was totally typical of his operations.

Q: He did this often?

H: All the time. He did everything that way. Whoever was around.

Q: Didn't he have some regard as to whether the guy, he liked the guy, or was competent, or whether the guy would follow through on it?

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H: Yes, yes, I think an example, he told me directly without going through Ted Hill or anybody else, to go out there and relieve this guy. I think that is a perfect example.

Q: He relieved Henry Harms in Newfoundland, of course a lot of people were coming through there, that was a critical base in the northern route, and apparently Marshall and some others had criticized the operations there and he took Henry Harms, who was one of his contemporaries, out of there. Do you know anything about that?

H: Not a thing.

Q: You know it is sort of a contradiction of terms to say that he selected his people at random in the hall, but didn't he pick people that he felt could do the job?

H: Oh yes, he was great at that, but to emphasize his character, he didn't go to anybody else to pick them. He didn't go through any command channels, to designate somebody. He just picked them, he sent them to do the job.

Q: Was he an impulsive man?

H: Very, but in his defense let me say, Tom Hanley and I were Deputy Chiefs at the same time and we came out of one of these rip roaring staff meetings where Gen Arnold--they always ended up with him livid--because everything was going wrong, and making decisions right and left. We went into my office because it was closer than Tom's, and I was sort of shaking my head. And I said: "Tom, this man defeats me. He makes these decisions in anger, off the top of head, pays no attention to staff or anybody else, and they turn out to be right, eventually. He said: "That shouldn't surprise you. Those decisions weren't made today they were made 30 years ago," which I think, is an interesting observation.

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Q: Do you think he did this by instinct?

H: I thim Tom put his finger on it. He'd been thinking nothing e lse all these years.

Q: Of course, some particular problem didn't happen till yesterday, and then he made a decision.

H: Well, he could relate it to something else, or draw on his experience. But I have this feeling, too, if it didn't relate to anything, he'd make the decision anyway.

Q: If he was wrong, did he back up, or did he butt his head and persist in the action? I'm sure that he made some wrong decisions?

H: Well, I would say if he were questioned a wrong decision, he had a pretty good defense for it as a rule.

Q: Did he ever say, I was wrong on that, and let's do something else?

H: He would say it this way: "I knew at the time that I shouldn't have done it." It didn't surprise him. He knew it was going to go wrong all the time. He'd picked a commander, who had a history of drunkeness but marvelous capability for leadership, and I remember I was instrumental, I think, in getting this man sent overseas with his unit, because it had such a...I remember because I had inspected the unit. I made a personal plea to Hap, to let him go overseas. He wasn't going to let him go, it was all right to train it, but he wasn't going to let him take it into combat. I told him I thought that would disrupt all the machinery that Les (NOTE: Probably Maitland) was a great personal leader, and that he hadn't had a drink in, I don't know how long. He was proud of his unit. Then he goes over there and does a damn good combat job and falls flat on his face, and Hap's position was

Q: He started drinking again?

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H: Yes, he fell in Lou Brereton's lap, at a decoration ceremony for Les. I mean, he did it real good, and Arnold's position was somebody had said something to him about "you shouldn't have sent that drunk over there, anyway."--and he said: "Oh, I knew it all the time. I've never seen a reformed drunkard in my life. I knew it all the time." So I think that he did make mistakes, but he could rationalize.

Q: I'll tell you something you may not know, that when Arnold was up for Westover's job--Westover died Sep 1938. This was before you came on the scene. There was some delay by Roosevelt in choosing a successor to Westover because there was a story around Washington that Arnold drank. Was this true? Did Arnold drink? Did you ever see him drink?

H: No.

Q: This is what most people tell me.

H: He didn't. Because I'd been around him too much, and at this very time that you are talking about, when things were in limbo, around this very time, before and after, he's been in my quarters many, many times when all of us were just drinking up a storm, and he'd take one of us that he sort of took a shine to, like to Lou Parker, me or somebody like that, Mint Kay, off to one side, and say let's go up to your house. Have you got any sherry up there? So not only was he not drinking in public, but when he was drinking in private, he was drinking sherry. I know that.

Q: Well this is, I've been told that possibly he drank when he was younger. He had ulcers and was in Letterman's Hospital for a while.

H: That's right, we all suspected that he did, but not at this time.

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Q: All throughout his period in Washington, he did not drink. Most people tell me that he carried a glass of sherry around all evening, and he had a gay time and he carried the one same glass.

H: That's exactly the way he drank. And if he was the least bit dubious about his company, he wouldn't even do that. He would go to somebody's quarters and sit down and have a glass of sheery.

Q: Did he feel sensitive about drinking in public?

H: No, not at all, didn't bother any of us.

Q: But he seemed to have a good time in a crowd though?

H: He had a real good time and socially, he was a great deal of fun. In this building he was no pleasure to be around. That I can assure you.

Q: But he let his hair down when he was away?

H: He was very pleasant.

Q: You mentioned Mint Kaye. Mint Kaye was close to him?

H: Very close.

Q: Why?

H: It went back to a previous association. I think it was March Field, Helen Kaye was very fond of Lois.

Q: Arnold's daughter?

H: Yes, and he was very close to Mrs. Arnold, and Mint was an apple polisher and a smart guy. He stubbed his toe though, and Arnold fired him just the way he would fire anybody else.

Q: How did he stub his toe?

H: He was supposed to come up with a photographic airplane, and failed to do it, so Arnold just sent him out to the woods, and nobody ever heard of him again.

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Q: Tinker, was he a challenger for the top slot--a potential candidate?

H: Sure, he had the seniority, and was a very beloved commander.

Q: It was a tragedy, his loss?

H: Yes,indeed.

Q: Who else was a potential challenger?

H: Well, you've got Emmons, and you mentioned Andrews. .

Q: Emmons had aspirations, especially when he succeeded to the GHQ AF. Do you know, he got his third star before Arnold did? Was this a problem?

H: I don't know if it was a problem or not, but I know that Gen Arnold considered it one, and whether it really was or not, but he had a damned good solution to it.

Q: He sent Emmons out to Hawaii?

H: That's right. He solved that one. And the other competitor was the guy that was dead in the first month--Dargue--he was on his way out of the country when he got killed.

Q: You know, Dargue and Arnold were exiled from Washington after the Billy Mitchell thing. They were very close, and Dargue was killed after the war started.

H: And I don't mean to imply that he disliked these fellows. Arnold knew that he had a job to do, and he knew that he could do it. He wasn't sure anybody else could do it.

Q: In service politics he was probably a master, within the service. He knew service relationships he studied them?

H: He was a very wily character, yes.

Q: Knerr had great admiration for Arnold, but as I said, he gave me this illustration of any flower rising up above the others was leveled.

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H: Well, I'm sure that, you know, this public picture that was painted of Hap during the war, that he was called "Hap" because he was so jolly and all that. I used to read that and just lie on the floor and cry. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

Q: This smile on his face?

H: It was set there; it never moved.

Q: The fact that he smiled, didn't mean he was happy.

H: He wasn't smiling. I remember one day at a staff meeting he had a man that I don't think had ever been around him before, and I talked to this guy later. All of a sudden in the middle of the dissertation--he was castigating somebody--Arnold pointed his finger at this guy, and said: "What the hell are you laughing at?" Well, I talked to the fellow later, and he said: "Well, he kept smiling at me; so I kept smiling back." I said: "You'd better learn right now, buddy, if you want to stay around here, that's no smile."

Q: Some people told me that it was his facial expression.

H: That was it.

Q: It was a natural. Was this somebody who was close to him, or just passing through. Do you remember who it was? Whom you indoctrinated?

H: I don't remember. It was somebody newly assigned to the Air Staff. They came and went so fast.

Q: How about his Advisory Council, he started out with Norstad and Cabell, and these were his idea men. Now, did they interfere in the Air Staff?

H: No, because their job--it was the joint kind of operation. Even when Hap wasn't on the JCS, he got called on for a lot of questions, and that was the principal function of the Advisory Council--the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff actions.

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Q: They were his sort of idea men?

H: No, I don't think so.

Q: Were they troubleshooters?

H: No, they worked almost exclusively on JCS and CCS work.

Q: Well, didn't he call them in on other things?

H: Well, he undoubtedly did, as he called anybody in on anything. And he was to both of them, and liked them both, and was with them a lot.

Q: If he had a problem on his mind, and he saw someone he liked on another matter, did he dragoon this guy into doing this job?

H: He was apt to.

Q: Was it possibly because he had so many balls he was bouncing in the air? If he could unload one problem, he's got one less to worry about?

H: He knew exactly what he was doing.

Q: Did he remember who he gave it to?

H: Well I would suspect that he probably did. But, I'll tell you, I don't think it's terribly important, and the reason is whenever Gen Arnold said something, it was done. I mean you never saw such complete control as he had, and I'm sure you've got this from lots of sources, and I know that the Old Man wasn't being as haphazard as it appears, because he knew that he had started the necessary staff action when he gave this guy a job, whether it was in his province or what, he knew that this guy was going to do his level best to get that job done.

Q: Or turn it over to somebody who would. Did he mind if the guy turned it over to somebody else?

H: No, all he wanted was the job done.

Q: He wanted the job done, and if the guy turned it over, he didn't consider he was shirking his assignment.

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H: No, no. He just wanted the job done. He was a very direct and basic man. That was all he wanted done, was the job.

Q: He was very fond of Norstad, Norstad wanted to get overseas; so did Cabell. Everybody wanted to get overseas, wanted to make a mark for themselves. Did Arnold ever express his sensitivity about his own lack of a combat record?

H: Yes, he did. All of us had it in our minds, you know, to get some combat experience. And so all of us, at every opportunity, would ask if we couldn't be sent overseas. He would either explode and call you a deserter--you are deserting in the face of the enemy--"I know you think I'm the enemy"--or he would explain his problem, that certain things had to be done here, and that he thought he had an organization that could do it. He didn't want to upset it too much. He would say: "I know exactly how you feel, because I got beat out of two wars as far as combat experience is concerned." He'd throw that in every once in while. I think a real insight to his character is a personal experience that I had with him on this subject--seeing him every day as I did--I asked him too frequently if I couldn't leave. I'd pick out a nice job for myself, like Nate Twining's deputy, or something like that. I'd ask him if I couldn't go--I'd been in Washington for an abnormal length of time--and he would generally just say: "Oh get out," almost bodily throw me out of the office. But, finally, one day, he said: "When 51% of the bomber force is committed overseas, come and see me again. We will talk about this again." Well, when the day came, I asked him, and I think my timing was very bad, and he just literally exploded.

Q: You thought it was a good time?

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H: You know, there never was a good time. You always had to guess. I went back to my office pretty shaken because he was obviously so damned mad, and just then, the little flag on the Arnold box which was red, jumped up and I grabbed it, and I said: "Yes sir." He said: "When are you going to war?" And I said: "Today, General." He said: "Good bye!" Well, then I sat back, and really shook my head. I really have upset the Old Man. Pretty soon he called me back and said: "That's a hell of a way to tell an old friend goodbye. Get yourself in here." So I went in, and he said: "I'm not about to let you go overseas until you are proficient on both the B-17 and the B-24, now get yourself out to those schools, and then take off."

Q: He had these second thoughts?

H: You never knew.

Q: But he had this underneath, a basic kindness and understanding of people?

H: I think one of his problems was, he really didn't have time for it, you know.

Q: He would have been a great human being.

H: If he'd had the time to.

Q: Sometimes--in a way; he was apologizing to you?

H: Absolutely.

Q: Sometimes he didn't apologize, and people went away mad.

H: Well, I don't ever remember him doing anything like this, but this one time.

Q: Did he get mad every day?

H; Every day. First thing we did in the morning was, we'd come to work pretty early, I think most of us were at our deak around 7:00, 7 days a week.

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Q: Was he there at 7:00?

H: He was there very shortly thereafter. We tried to beat him, so we could catch up on our cables. And then we'd go in his office about 8:15 and by the time we'd left there, he was livid. He was just storming all over the place. Every day.

Q: Air Staff, A-1, 2, 3, 4, 5?

H: Yes, every day.

Q: Who did he jump on mostly?

H: He didn't have any favorites. He didn't seem tohave any favorites. Our biggest problem was accidents and getting equipment. So he spent an awful lot of time working over the training people, and the operations people, and the materiel people.

Q: Was the 2nd AF one of his favorite targets?

H: I think the 2nd AF, actually, was one of his favorites. But he was distressed about the number of accidents that were going on out there. He liked Bob Olds.

Q: Didn't he take Davenport Johnson out of there?

H: All I knew is he left, I don't remember whether he was relieved or not.

Q: He took him out of there, and then he put one of his favorites, Bill Streett, into it.

H: That's right.

Q: Was Bill Streett sort of a troubleshooter for him?

H: Yes, I think probably, I would guess that of the people around today, Bill Streett probably knows him as well as anybody.

Q: I had a long talk with him. He's got emphysema.

H: I doubt anybody didn't respect him, including his worst

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enemies. I doubt that there's anybody that doesn't respect and admire him. I know there are many people that really hate him . I know many people scared to death of him. But as far as, that's not the kind of leadership that I endorse, it's foreign to my personality. But it got the job done.

Q: Well, he was a very unique guy, and he did it in his own style. One of the guys he had trouble with was Jim Chaney. Didn't he get Chaney out of that job?

H: He fired him, one weekend, and that's interesting, because he fired him. I don't know whether Pat (Partridge) knows this or not. But he came roaring into the office. He made a weekend inspection of the fighter units over in the 1st Air Force area, and came roaring back into the office.

Q: This is when Chaney was commander?

H: Yes, and Partridge (?) was I think, Director of Ops for Chaney. Arnold came roaring into the office, and said: "Fire Chaney and Partridge." And I got him to keep pat in position. If there is something wrong with a unit fire the commander, but don't get into the staff business. I may not have done Pat a great favor. I never told Pat this.

Q: You know, I talked to Partridge two months ago, and he told me that he didn't know Arnold very well because he avoided Arnold.

H: I don't think that's a peculiarity of Pat's at all.

Q: Why did he fire Chaney? What happened? Do you remember?

H: Oh I forget, it was not enough aircraft in commission or something like that.

Q: Was this when he brought Monk Hunter in to take that job, 1943?

H: Must have been about that time.

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Q: Monk Hunter came back. Monk Hunter was taken out of his job in the 8th Fighter Command. And this was a problem.

H: I think it must be about that time.

Q: Wasn't this the second time Chaney was taken out of a job?

H: I don't know.

Q: Chaney was the commander, he was a contemporary of Arnold's and he was the commander of the US Army Forces in the British Isles.

H: That's right.

Q: And we are talking now, right after Pearl Harbor. There was BOLERO, the buildup of forces in the British Isles.

H: You are not thinking of Bill Butler, are you?

Q: No, no.

H: Because Butler was fired.

Q: Butler was fired right in 1944. This is right before OVERLORD. Butler was made second in command to Leigh Mallory, for the Tactical Air Forces in the OVERLORD operation. Now, Arnold brought Bruce Butler down from the 11th AF. No. I'm talking about 1942 when they were getting the first 8th AF units. Arnold took Chaney out of there, and in effect, put Spaatz in. Spaatz was the 8th AF Commander. He was in Bolling, just starting out. Then he came over there, and he became senior Air Force man and Chaney was taken out of there, because he was felt to be not sympathetic. Is that correct?

H: It rings a bell, I don't remember exactly.

Q: Do you remember, Chaney was our senior man? (In UK early in WW II).

H: Ira Eaker got involved in this.

Q: You see, what happened--Spaatz was the senior man. Eaker was under him. When Spaatz was brought down to North Africa, Eaker became the top commander in UK.

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H: And then Arnold switched them.

Q: Yes, I want to task you about what I call "the Big Switch." Do you know anything about it?

H: I wrote the cable. Under instructions, of course.

Q: Tell me about it. When did Arnold first think to make the change?

H: I can make it very simple, and I don't think criticizing anybody, because there is no criticism due here anywhere. This, once again, was a typical Hap Arnold decision. He said: "I have the greatest respect and admiration in the world for Ira Eaker. I think he is doing a fine job. I don't know whether he is a combat leader. I know Tooey Spaatz is. He's proven it. Make the change, and no staffs go with them. Just the people. Just these two guys.

Q: Well they changed their whole staffs; they made a big move.

H: They moved as individuals.

Q: But wasn't the staff moved with them, too?

H: No, if they did, they violated his orders.

Q: Well, there were a large number of people moved.

H: Well, you know, commander of a field force can move a large number of people, and still not move the staff.

Q: Somebody told me. You know, Spaatz didn't want to leave his job. unless they elevated the Mediterranean job to the Commander of the MAAF. In other words, it appeared that Eaker was getting a promotion.

H: Yes. I think Ira--I'm sure he does--understands exactly what the Old Man was thinking, because I spent a lot of time with Ira all these years, and I sense no bitterness, never did sense any. Of course, I was with him during the war, too. I never did sense any bitterness.

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Q: You know, he was bitter, though?

H: Well, I never did sense it.

Q: You know, he wrote many letters. He used to write.

H: This I never knew, and I've been very close to him.

Q: I talked to Eaker.

H: I've always been his junior, but always on a first name basis. Eaker never--we spent many evenings together, talking about the war--and he never even so much as indicated any bitterness.

Q: I just wonder if their relationship changed after that, because you know Eaker never made his fourth star, and he was one of the few top combat commanders who didn't. Why?

H: And a damn good one, too.

Q: Why didn't he make his fourth star?

H: I've often wondered.

Q: I'm sure that if Arnold had pushed it hard enough?

H: The job, of course, that he had after the war, was a three-star job and that's the job from which he retired.

Q: You mean Deputy Commander?

H: Yes.

Q: In that respect, he should have stood behind Spaatz, but they put Vandenberg behind Spaatz.

H: That's one subject I wouldn't go on tape about.

Q: I'll tell you when it happened, in May 1943. They had what they called a TRIDENT conference, when Churchill came to Washington. Arnold had a mild, probably had a mild heart attack. He went out to Oregon, to the MacKenzie River with Mrs. Arnold. Marshall sent him out of town, just to get away from it all. He was out there looking for a ranch. You know, he was very interested in getting back to the

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soil. Do you remember this, when he went out?

H: I only remember the facts you've stated, I do remember he had a heart attack and I remember he went out West, and we assumed he was looking for a place out there. That's all I remember.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about his love for a ranch? He wanted to get into growing something.

H: No.

Q: While he was fighting this war, and doing all these things, he was engaged in a heavy correspondence with a guy building his ranch. He wanted the water supply here, and he wanted the cattle over here, and he wanted the chickens over here, and he wanted certain compositions of the roof....

H: I didn't know that.

Q: Extensive correspondence, I mean detailed, and the guy would write him a letter about the price he was getting for a pound of beef. Should he hold the beef till the fall, or butcher it now?

H: That comes as a great surprise to me, because I knew he loved the soil, but he was such a single minded person. I didn't think he thought about anything but the war.

Q: He must have done it between midnight and 6 AM.

H: He would have had to.

Q: You say he got mad every day at the staff meeting. Were there any special targets? How about Sorensen? Was he a special target?

H: No, I remember Ed Sorensen. He came in for his share. I can see him getting him raked over the coals right now,but I don't think he was any more favored. He used to jump on Benny Meyers all the time.

Q: Meyers was MM&D.

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H: Benny was the No. 2 man in the procurement shop. But he, once again--Arnold's peculiarity--he sort of looked to Benny for the supply and equipment of aircraft. He looked to Benny more or less directly for that.

Q: How did Benny take this criticism?

H: Took it like a little man. In the first place Benny was so darn smart that he always had an answer, anything that Gen Arnold could think up. He should have been a lawyer. Clever as could be, and damned capable, too.

Q: Didn't he name his children for Arnold, or wasn't Arnold godfather or something?

H: I don't know, Benny and I had twins at the same time.

Q: Well, didn't he name one for Arnold and one for Marshall?

H: I don't know. I'll tell you, Benny Meyers wouldn't be a bad guy to talk to.

Q: Well, would he talk now?

H: I don't know.

Q: He's in San Franciso, isn't he?

H: I really don't know. I've only been in touch with him once.

Q: I was told a couple of days ago that he was in San Francisco. I wonder if he is reachable. You know, Arnold and he were very close at one time.

H: That was obvious, and that's one of the reasons that I think Gen Arnold was on his neck all the time, and one of the reasons Benny took it so well.

Q: He knew that under it all he liked him.

H: And he had the job. He had a terribly important job.

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Q: But this is why the betrayal in Arnold's eyes was the greater. You know that Arnold had written an endorsement of Benny Meyers when Meyers got into trouble, but Arnold didn't know that he was in trouble--this is when he was in retirement? Meyers called him up from the Carlton Hotel and Arnold had written this letter. But didn't mail it, because somebody probably tipped Arnold off that Meyers was in real trouble. Were you involved in the letter that Stratemeyer sent out--you must have been--in '43, asking each of the procurement officers to list all his holdings?

H: Yes.

Q: And Meyers, Orval Cook, and Echols, and all the rest of them. Didn't they all submit their letters listing their assets?

H: I assume they did.

Q: Meyers must have skipped a few of his holdings.

H: Yes, they belonged to an aunt or something, which is so easy to do. Really a kind of a fruitless exercise, actually.

Q: They just accepted these affidavits or letters on face value? Nobody was investigated?

H: No, not that I know of.

Q: Mrs. Arnold said that Benny always drove around in Cadillacs. They just assumed that his second wife had money?

H: We all assumed that.

Q: There was a lot of money in the family, he wasn't doing this on his military pay?

H: We'd assumed that. It was just at the back of your mind. We didn't talk about it. I don't remember talking about it. I remember I hated anonymous letters so, and the Air Inspector saw so many of them, and saw how much harm they could do. I was really frightened at that potential for harm, that you know an enemy could develop

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through anonymous letters.

Q: Were you around when that anonymous letter of June 22, 1945 came in, accusing Benny Meyers?

H: No, I was overseas.

Q: Jake Smart signed off on that one.

H: Well, you know I almost got Gen Arnold to agree to adopt as an Air Staff principle, all anonymous letters, whoever sees an anonymous letter, into the waste basket. Because you know it's a fact that not all of us can stand investigation in the first place, and it doesn't take much to start one. And also, this great potential for total disruption with a smart agency sending an anonymous letter to the right people on the right subject. I think he was pretty much adopted to it as a matter of principle, and then, this Meyers thing came in.

Q: He was out of Washington when he came in.

H: Didn't Junius Jones have that letter a long time before Arnold knew it?

Q: Well, that letter (re Meyers) came in, and it was kicked around. The FBI sent it over, because during the war there was an agreement that anything involving the military would be handled by the military. So the FBI turned it over. Somebody then made the decision that because the FBI turned it over, they were not interested, or concerned about it, and so Junius apparently sent it to file. Then it was picked up a couple of years later by Congressional investigators.

H: Tooey, you know, who has a wealth of good practical knowledge, Spaatz, Rosie in a conversation one day, said to him: "General, this Washington scene is all a new thing to me. I have some apprehensions

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about appearing before Congress which I may have to do from time to tim e." Old Tooey said: "Well, let me tell you Rosie, he said, don't ever lie up there. But don't go around blabbling the truth either."

Q: That's right, don't volunteer. Well, this must have been after the war when Tooey, because I don't think Tooey and O'Donnell ever served together.

H: No, I think Tooey was Chief of Staff and Rosie came in.

Q: He must have been Director of Information.

H: Yes, you are exactly right.

Q: Rosie O'Donnell came in. You knew him when he came into work for Arnold in '43?

H: Rosie and I have always been very close because we were very close at West Point.

Q: Did you graduate together?

H: One class apart, he was '28 and I was '29.

Q: And then he came to the Advisory Council.

H: I believe that's the first time Rosie, I believe he came in here from March Field.

Q: Who did he succeed?

H: The first Advisory Council had Cabell and Norstad.

Q: And Norstad left, and I think Jake Smart took his place, and maybe Cabell left, and maybe Rosie O'Donnell took his place.

H: I think that's right.

Q: And Rosie was very close to the Old Man?

H: Very, he just amused the Old Man all the time.

Q: Was he a comedy relief in a way, practical joker?

H: I think he thought a great deal of Rosie.

Q: How about socially? He saw a lot of him?

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H: No, at those times, there wasn't much social life, very little. I think I was in the Old Man's house, oh, maybe, once in all those years. Before the war, he used to be in our place over at Bolling a lot. One day at a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting Rosie had been trying to get to the Old Man. You know, like trying to paint a power lawn mower. Arnold would stomp around and pick up the squawk box and grab the phone and Rosie was trying to brief him on the meeting that was coming off in 10 minutes, you know. On the way over in the car he tried to brief him some more, and they'd sit down at this table, and the meeting was in progress and Rosie writes a little note, passes it to a Navy Captain, who in turn passes it to an AF Brigadier, and eventually works it way up to Gen Arnold. Right in the middle of the meeting, Gen Arnold just broke up, and he passed the note to Marshall. The note said: "Meeting not going well: Reason-Gen A not properly briefed. I cannot work here under these conditions." And that sort of thing just broke old Hap up. Every day at noon, everybody was so damned nervous all the time, anyway, at noon the clock would buzz, checking the bomb alert, and Rosie was working with the Old Man at the last minute, as always, trying to get his understanding of these papers. And this thing exploded, and they both jumped, and Hap said: "I hate that damn thing!" and Rosie picked up a great big paperweight and let go, and missed the big clock by about that much and made a great big hole in the wall. And the Old Man would never let anybody fix it.

Q: You know, I heard a story about a paper weight. Did Arnold ever throw a paperweight at anybody?

H: Not that I know of.

Q: Well, maybe that's the paperweight story.

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H: That's the paperweight thrown in his office. O'Donnell threw it through the wall. Arnold wouldn't let anybody patch it up.

Q: Rosie must have had a lot of confidence in his ability to get away with things like this?

H: Oh, totally, Rosie says and does exactly as he pleases. Always has.

Q: Maybe this is what ingratiated him with Arnold?

H: Well, one thing you know, a man like that can serve you well, because you know you are going to the truth.

Q: Let's talk about 1941, right before Pearl Harbor. There was publication in the Chicago Tribune of parts of RAINBOW FIVE. It caused a big to-do. You know, a man has published an article which sort of pointed a finger at Hap Arnold's having had something to do with with that leak.

H: I wish I had something to say, all I know is that I was specifically detailed to check every agency in this town that had a copy of it to see whether they had it, and knew where it was, and where it had been. Not in this town, everything that was under Air Corps jurisdiction.

Q: Was there an investigation of that RAINBOW FIVE leak?

H: There was that much of an investigation, that I know of.

Q: Did the FBI get into it.

H: I don't know. I conducted it within the Air Corps.

Q: What did you find?

H: That everybody had his plan and was, in my opinion, above suspicion, I stole one guy's plan from him. But I just did that for fun, I wanted to prove a point that it was pretty easy to get your hands on it.

Q: You were than A IG, I guess?

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H: Yes.

Q: This is the second big myster about Arnold.

Q: W are talking about RAINBOW FIVE and the lea. Do you remember the Sawyer-McCormick letter?

H: I do remember that there was such a letter, and I also remember that we thought it was strange at the time that it should come from the White House to General Arnold, and I had my own personal suspicions and I wasn't alone, by any manner of means, that the leak had come from the White House. And when this happened, it didn't decrease those suspicions a darned bit.

Q: Well, why did they give it to Arnold to write an answer? Why did Roosevelt give it to Arnold? I have one guess that Arnold claims credit for having originated the concept of aerial spotting for artillery, back in 1912, so he could claim some expertise in this area and he might have gotten it for that reason. But why do you think Roosevelt gave it to him to answer?

H: Frankly, I don't know. And all of us were amazed at the time that it had been handled that way.

Q: I know there were several drafts of this thing.

H: Well, the kind of gut feeling that we had about it was that give it to somebody that doesn't know anything at all about the leak, actually. Rather than leave it to some agency that may know something.

Q: Do you feel that if it was known that Arnold was the source of the leak, he would have been fired by Marshall?

H: Definitely. He would have been summarily fired.

Q: Do you have any idea who might have been involved in it. You think it's the White House. Why should the White House leak it,

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unless it was somebody in the White House who disagreed with Roosevelt's policy and wanted a stronger Asia first policy?

H: In the atmosphere that existed at that time, it was obvious the Administration had concluded that we were going to have a war. It appeared to us that if our very limited capabilities, and either rather limited plans were publicly exposed, that it might arouse such a public furor that the Administration would get some support for his obvious desire to increase the strength of the armed forces.

Q: Well, it could have caused a strong reaction.

H: The feeling within the military was that war was inevitable, fairly soon. So maybe we were a little inclined to think that maybe everybody felt that way.

Q: But did they think that publication of this plan would help?

H: It was one of the, it was the only reason that I could think of for, at the time, for anybody leaking it.

Q: I think this would cause a revulsion against the war?

H: It would depend on what your assessment of the public attitude was at the time.

Q: I would say that the public attitude at the time was sort of half and half, I mean, I know my attitude, I wanted to stop Hilter and Tojo, and all the rest, but I didn't particularly feel like I was going to pick up a gun and go fight.

H: Yes, now you see, probably a professional military man at that time, would not be a good one to assess public attitude, because we weren't even in that day as public as we are now.

Q: Lindbergh and some of the other people were opposed. They were saying that Roosevelt was getting up into the war. Okay, here'a a war plan that shows he's getting us involved in the war. My God,

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Roosevelt is doing all these terrible things, and we don't want any part of Roosevelt and his plan.

H: Well, on the other hand, if you felt that whether we liked it or not, we were going to have to go to war. Maybe we'd better get on doing something about it.

Q: I felt that we were going to be in the war, but I could have felt that Roosevelt was pushing us a little too far.

H: Yes, that's true.

Q: Anyway, I think the motive of the man who leaked it, or the individual who leaked it, was to cause a revulsion against the war. This is why the Chicago Tribune published it, because they were opposed to the war. They were opposed to our involvement, and they said if we have to fight a war, they said: "Let's fight the Japs, they are the real problem!"

H: I know that I at that time, sort of looked on Col McCormick as sort of a crackpot, anyway, and just the fact that he released it for, with one purpose in mind, didn't have, wouldn't have much effect on my thinking.

Q: Let me ask you about Charles Lindbergh and Arnold. Did you know they had some close contact? Lindbergh came up to visit him at West Point. They had a secret meeting, but Arnold had great respect for Lindbergh as a flyer. He may or may not have smypathized with his political beliefs, but it was through Arnold, I guess, that Lindbergh had a role to play in WW II. Did you know anything about their relationship?

H: No, other than that there was the highest mutual respect, that's really all I know.

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Q: Well, Lindbergh went out to the Pacific, and as a civilian, he flew P-38s.

H: Yes, Yes.

Q: And he couldn't have done this without Arnold's permission, or acquiescence.

H: That's right. Gen Arnold knew everything that he was doing. I know that.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about Lindbergh?

H: No.

Q: Did you ever hear him talk about Lindbergh?

H: No, nothing of any significance.

Q: You got the impression that there was mutual respect.

H: Definitely.

Q: How about Robert E. Wood?

H: I never have known him.

Q: Robert E. Wood was also a guy Arnold respected highly. He was an isolationist but he was a great supply man, and Arnold utilized him.

H: You could find out everything that he's thinking, if Tony Frank hadn't died.

Q: When did he die, it must have been the last year?

H: It's been about a year, maybe two years.

Q: I saw him in one book, and he was not in the other. Is Wood alive or is he dead?

H: I think he's alive.

Q: I'd like to talk to him, try to track him down.

H: I think I know how you can get to him. At least get put on the right path. Do you know Brooke Allen? Ask Brooke, he's Tony Frank's son-in-law, and I'm sure he must know Gen Wood.

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Q: You know Tony Frank left his papers to the Air Museum in Wright Patt?

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with McNarney?

H: No.

Q: McNarney worked for Marshall.

H: Yes, but I know that. Now that you mention it, we looked with some apprehension at McNarney's going up there, because we felt he was such an honest and straight shooting man--we all had the greatest respect for him--that we'd come off second best if he had to make a decision. So I don't know. I don't think Gen Marshall would have done it without Gen Arnold's agreement, so I think Gen Arnold must definitely have concurred in his going there.

Q: McNarney was a very competent man.

H: Very competent and very tough.

Q: He was entrusted with the reorganization plan. Did you have any involvement in that?

H: Only in settling the differences between the Army and the Air Force.

Q: Kuter was assigned to that job, wasn't he, didn't he work with McNarney?

H: No, I wasn't associated with that in any way. Kuter was.

Q: I talked to Kuter, but I didn't get too much. He was very cautious. He knows an awful lot more than he told me.

H: Larry would know damned near everything there was to know.

Q: He had Arnold's confidence?

H: I'm sure he did.

Q: Arnold admired him, intellectually?

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H: He's a bright guy.

Q: He was close to Arnold. Did Arnold ever talk about him?

H: No, Larry was made a General when he was 37, and I was made a General when I was 35. And the only thing that I ever heard Gen Arnold say on that general subject, was that the reason that he was leaning on the younger generation so heavily was that, through no fault of the older generation, their minds had been paralyzed between war starvation. That was his analysis. He said, he wasn't really being critical. He said I undersand perfectly what's happened to them.

Q: Talking about this Hall Board, this is post war now, Arnold was out of the picture, wasn't he?

H: Yes, Tooey was Chief.

Q: I know there was the Patch Board, and Hall Board.

H: This was strictly, I was Gen. Eisenhower's Air Advisor, he had what he called an Advisory Council.

Q: When he had become Chief of Staff?

H: He was Chief of Staff, and Wade Hazlett was the Director of this group, and it consisted of Hazlett, a real ground slogger, a guy named Doc Cook, a division commander during the war, a tanker and Alec Surles, armor man, and

Q: He was also public relations there for a while?

H: Yes, and Howard Schneider, who was Pres. Eisenhower's physician when he was President, and me, I was the Air man, and I was unfortunate enough not to attend a meeting one day in the Chief of Staff's office when they decided to form a board made up of an airman, a supply man, a dough foot, I guess that's it, and I say I wasn't at the meeting, so they made me chairman.

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Q: Wasn't this board

H: It was right after the Executive Order, the first Executive Order which created a Department of Defense.

Q: Oh, this is in 1947. Was this a bill of divorcement to separate?

H: Between the Army and the Air Force.

Q: Was that the 200 point agreement?

H: I never heard of it as any kind of agreement.

Q: An agreement that came up, after the act was passed.

H: This is right after the President signed the Executive Order which created the Dept of Defense.

Q: 1947.

H: Must have been 1947, I left herein May of 1947 to be gone three years, so it must have been very early in 1947.

Q: How did Arnold feel about unification, of course, he wanted it, obviously, but was he content to wait till the end of the war?

H: We all knew that he wanted a separate and equal air force. He wanted a ground force, and a sea force, and an air force. We all knew, and Gen Spaatz inherited this same viewpoint, that ultimately to get to this goal we had to have the support of the Army. So the divorce had better not be too drastic. Gen Eisenhower, when he was Chief of Staff, made the point many times that if the divorce were too drastic, he wouldn't permit it. This is an example of what I'm talking about, we wrote in our report (Hall Board), that for a medical service for instance, there must be complete career development within an individual service, right from your lowest ranking medical up to your own general officers in your own service, and your own hospital commanders. That was completely foreign to Tooey's thinking and to General Eisenhower's thinking because they wanted this efficiency on

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paper. A guy has to have his appendix out. He doesn't need his own doctor to take it out. Well, that's fine, but you don't get doctors, if they're not going anywhere. You don't get them, and eventually, of course, they adopted our recommendations. That's what's in effect right now. But I used that only as an example to indicate Air Corps thinking: "go softly, or we won't get it at all."

Q: That's right, and Arnold accepted that.

H: That was General Arnold's position.

Q: Yet, Arnold apparently changed his position after the war, after he had retired. I saw Norstad in NY and he told me, that of course he and Everest and Bart Leach... Do you remember Leach?

H: Yes.

Q: I worked for him, by the way, for several years. Norstad told me that Arnold got mad at him because he had made too many concessions to the Navy in the unification bill.

H: Well, yes, everybody in the Air Force got mad at him, because we figured that the time had come. You see, this soft pedalling had been great up to where it almost was an accomplished fact.

Q: We wanted to go all the way?

H: Well, we thought the timing was right, you know, the public was ready, and the President seemed to be ready. We thought the time for too many concessions had ceased. Now I don't know what Larry's problems were, but I was never in a meeting with him, and they may have been very serious.

Q: But he said that Arnold got mad at him and then he forgave him later on.

H: Well, I'm not surprised that Arnold got mad, because I'm sure that by that time, that the die was far enough cast, that we

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didn't have to soft pedal quite so much.

Q: Do you remember on Dec 19, 1945, Truman came out with a Presidential message. He was the first President to come out for unification. Did Arnold have anything to do with that?

H: I don't know.

Q: He was still Chief of the AAF, but he was mostly in Sonoma.

H: I don't know what Mr. Truman's and Gen Arnold's relationship was, I don't have any way of knowing.

Q: Are you aware that, well on April 19, 1945, when Arnold was on his recuperation trip to Europe, he and Eaker and Spaatz and several others--now this is one week after Roosevelt died. The new President was in office, and they were aware of the fact that Roosevelt was no great friend of airpower. He was a Navy man. He had ships on his desk, and here was a new President. Well, they met: "Let's put our best foot forward with the new President." And they talked about plans for getting closer to the present President, then they were to the previous President. One of the things they had suggested was to get Pete Quesada into the White House as Air Aide to the President.

H: All I remember was that that was the desire. That's all I remember about it.

Q: But they had this big meeting, I think in Cannes?

H: That's where it would have been.

Q: Did you hear any echoes or repercussions or discussions that came out of that?

H: No.

Q: Apparently they weren't successful, because the first qualification was that you had to be from Missouri, to get into the White House.

H: Yes, sure Bob Landry turned out to be a perfect aide.

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Q: I want to get to see him, I did a job for him back in 1949.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

H: Unless he was the butt of the joke, and then he had absolutely none. Everything was funny about everybody else.

Q: Didn't he use this guy Vince Barnett to pull some practical jokes on Marshall and some other people? You know, this guy was a professional ribber.

H: Vince pulled some things on him, now whether Gen Arnold was behind it or not, I don't know. I know he enjoyed it.

Q: Arnold used to have these game dinners down at Bolling Field. Did you have any role in setting those up?

H: Only, they started when I was Post Adjutant and Post Executive Officer. So, of course, I was involved. Yes.

Q: They started in 1941?

H: That's about it. I remember the first time, I think at the first one, he called in all the general officers, and when all these general officers walked in--there must have been about 8 or 9 of them--everybody just roared. They'd never seen so damned many generals in their life. It just broke up the place, all these generals. What are we going to do with all these generals? Must have been about nine of them.

Q: What did he think of the Russians?

H: He had, well I don't want to use the word "fear," but he had great apprehension, and saw clearly that they were our next potential enemy. It was very clear in his own mind.

Q: Were you present when he had these dealings with the Russians, the purchasing commission?

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H: No.

Q: Or did you hear him talk about them? They kept wanting more and more.

H: He was always, yes, in his general staff meetings, he'd always referred to the fact that they were leaning on him all the time to get more and more.

Q: They wanted heavy bombers. How did he feel about that?

H: He wasn't happy about giving heavy bombers to anybody he didn't have to, including the US Navy.

Q: He had some sessions with Admiral King on this, didn't he, about the bombers and did they have some pretty good sessions?

H: The three so-called Chiefs of Staff at that time, had so many things in common, that it was just amazing. They were both terribly strong, rough. He was just as tough as the other two. I never went to a meeting but that Gen Arnold always reflected the fact that there had been a big cat and dog fight. He always came back from them as mad as he was at his own Air Staff--which is pretty mad.

Q: How about the British, Portal and some of the others, did he have any dealings?

H: I don't remember any observations.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Dove 2/13/70

February 13, 1970

Lt. General William E. Hall, USAF (Ret)
2139 Wyoming Avenue, N.W.
Apt. 12
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear General Hall:

I want to thank you for taking the time today to talk with me about our mutual interest -- General Hap Arnold. I'm sure that whatever Loosbrock and I produce will benefit greatly from your observations.

I hope that you can help me on that Chicago Tribune matter. It is very important that the record be made straight once and for all time.

Very sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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'65 White Bench Wason VA 940727

Friday - 930 13th date Feb 13 1970 667-7109

SAFAAR

January 29, 1970

Lt General William E. Hall, USAF (Ret)
2139 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.
Apt. 12
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear General Hall:

John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past two years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past month I've been interviewing some friends of yours and some former associates of General Arnold's now retired in Colorado Springs and in the Southland. Among them are Generals Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Hansell, Pattridge, Everest, Kepner, P.D. Weikert, Bob Lee, Thatcher, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others whose names do not readily come to mind.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City, and we have also talked with Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell and Smart here in Washington within the past six months.

You were associated with General Arnold in several enterprises during your respective careers and I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you at a time and place convenient for you.

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I would like to take the liberty of phoning for an appointment, or if it would be more convenient for you or your secretary to phone me, my Pentagon numbers are OX 5-3862 and OX 7-5587.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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Retired 9/30/61

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM E. HALL, USAF

PART I. NARRATIVE

Lieutenant General William E. Hall is Commander of the nationwide Continental Air Command.

(Continental Air Command - ConAC - trains the 15-wing Air Force Reserve, supervises the training and inspects the 24-wing Air National Guard, and is responsible for training more than 100,000 individual ready reservists.)

General Hall has commanded ConAC since July 1, 1957. Previously he had served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces in Washington.

A Command Pilot, he has more than 25 years flying experience and has logged more than 6,000 hours in the air.

In addition to commanding ConAC, an organization of over 15,000 military personnel and more than 8,000 civilian employees, General Hall serves as Senior Member and Air Force Representative of the U. S. Delegation to the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.

Born at McAlester, Oklahoma on Oct. 22, 1907, General Hall is a West Point graduate - Class of 1929.

An enthusiastic sportsman, he was active in athletics while at the Point. He captained the track team in his first class year and received All America honorable mention as a football center.

Following four years service with the Field Artillery, the General entered Primary Flying School at Randolph Field, Tex., in 1933 and graduated from the Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field in that state a year later.

During his early Air Force career, General Hall filled a number of routine assignments - serving successively with the 78th Pursuit Squadron at Albrook Field in the Panama Canal Zone and, in 1937, as Operations Officer with the 16th Air Base Squadron at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C.

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General Hall attended the Air Force Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Ala., in the Fall of 1939. Upon graduation he returned to Bolling Field as Post Adjutant. He became Assistant Executive Officer there in July 1941.

In September 1941 the General was transferred to Air Force Headquarters as general assistant to the Air Inspector. He became Secretary of the Air Staff there a year later and Deputy Chief of Air Staff in March 1943.

During the crucial period of World War II, General Hall was assigned to the 15th Air Force in the Mediterranean Theater as Chief of the American Mission to Bulgaria. Later he was appointed Deputy Commander of the 15th Air Force in Italy.

Following V-E Day, the General returned to the States as Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Personnel. He was appointed Air Member of General Eisenhower's Advisory Group in 1946.

The following year General Hall was assigned to Turkey as Chief of the U. S. Air Survey Mission - which conducted a modernization study of the Turkish Air Force. His next assignment was to Berlin - as Director of Intelligence for the Commander-in-Chief of the European Command during the Berlin Airlift.

Reassigned to Air Force Headquarters in November 1949, General Hall was named Deputy Director of Legislation and Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. He became Director the following May.

The General assumed command of the Fourth Air Force at Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif., in January 1951. During early Fall of 1952, he was assigned as Vice Commander of the Continental Air Command at Mitchel Air Force Base, Long Island, New York.

General Hall was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces at Air Force Headquarters in September 1953 - serving in that capacity until his assignment as ConAC's new Commander at Mitchel on July 1, 1957.

PART II. PERSONALIZED MATERIAL

A. Interests

1. Is a boating and motorcycle enthusiast; loves animals, having a kitten, two dogs (one a deaf Dalmatian), a canary and two parakeets.

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2. Unusual talents and skills - none.

3. Member of the Outboard Boating Club of America.

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations: none.

PART III. FACT SHEET

A. Personal Data

1. Born 22 Oct 1907 at McAlester, Oklahoma. Father - William L. Hall; Mother - May S. Hall.

2. Married to Marguerite Higgins Hall.

Children: William Spencer Hall, 22
Frank Aldin Hall, 18
William Evans Hall) Twins, 14
Helena Callaway Hall)
Lawrence O'Higgins Hall, 3 months

3. Hometown Address: 1693 34th St., NW, Washington, D. C.

B. Education

1. Graduate Public Grammar School, McAlester, Oklahoma, 1920

2. Graduate Public Junior High School, McAlester, Oklahoma, 1921

3. Graduate Public High School, McAlester, Oklahoma, 1925

4. Graduate U. S. Military Academy, 1929

5. Graduate Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, Texas, 1934

6. Graduate Air Corps Tactical School, 1939

C. Service Dates:

Date	Assignment	Station
Jun 29-Sep 30	16th Field Artillery	Ft. Bragg, N. C.
Sep 30-Mar 31	Instructor, West Point Preparatory School	Ft. McPherson, Ga.
Mar 31-Jul 32	Aide to Brig Gen G. H. Estes, CG	Ft. McPherson, Ga.
Jul 32-Jul 33	83d Field Artillery	Ft. Benning, Ga.
Jul 33-Feb 34	Air Corps Primary Flying School	Randolph Field, Tex.
Feb 34-Jun 34	Observation Section, AC Advanced Flying School	Kelly Field, Tex.

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Date	Assignment	Station
Jun 34-Sep 37	78th Pursuit Sq, Air Corps	Albrook Field, C. Z.
Sep 36-Apr 37	Asst Operations Officer(14 ABSq)	Bolling Field, D. C.
Apr 37-Sep 39	Operations Officer	Bolling Field, D. C.
Sep 39-Dec 39	Air Corps Tactical School	Maxwell Field, Ala.
Dec 39-Jul 41	Post Adjutant	Bolling Field, D. C.
Jul 41-Sep 41	Asst Executive Officer	Bolling Field, D. C.
Sep 41-Sep 42	Special Assistant to Air Inspector, Hq AAF	Washington, D. C.
Sep 42-Mar 43	Secretary of the Air Staff, Hq AAF	Washington, D. C.
Mar 43-Sep 44	Deputy Chief, Air Staff, Hq AAF	Washington, D. C.
Sep 44-Feb 45	Chief, American Mission (15AF)	Bulgaria
Feb 45-May 45	Deputy Commanding General, 15th Air Force	Italy
May 45-May 46	Deputy AC/AS-1, Hq AAF	Washington, D. C.
May 46-Aug 47	Member, Chief of Staff's Advisory Group, W. D. General Staff	Washington, D. C.
Aug 47-Oct 48	Chief, U. S. Air Survey Mission	Turkey
Oct 48-Nov 49	Director of Intelligence, European Command	Berlin, Germany
Nov 49-May 50	Deputy Director, Legislation & Liaison, Secretary of the Air Force	Washington, D. C.
May 50-Jan 51	Director, Legislation & Liaison, Secretary of the Air Force	Washington, D. C.
Jan 51-Sep 52	Commander, Fourth Air Force	Hamilton AFB, Calif.
Sep 52-Sep 53	Vice Commander, ConAC	Mitchel AFB, N.Y.
Sep 53-Jul 57	Asst Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Hq USAF	Washington, D. C.
Jul 57 -	Commander, ConAC	Mitchel AFB, N. Y.

D. Decorations and Medals

Legion of Merit w/1 OLC	1944
Bronze Star Medal	1945
Air Medal	1945
AFLS Award w/1 silver & 1 bronze OLC	1933
EAMCM w/3 battle stars	1945
Occupation Medal - Germany w/clasp	1945
American Defense Service Medal	1941
American Campaign Medal	1942
WW II VM	1945
National Defense Service Medal	1950
Order of the Southern Cross of Brazil	1945
Order of MM - Mexico	1945
Yugoslav-Bulgarian Airmen's Medal	

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B. Promotions

Rank	Temporary	Permanent
2d Lt		13 June 1929
1st Lt		1 October 1934
Captain	15 March 1936	13 June 1939
Major	15 March 1941	19 June 1946 (d/r 13 Jun 46)
Lt Colonel	5 January 1942	
Colonel	1 March 1942	2 April 1948
Brig General	2 April 1943 (d/r 25 Mar 43)	27 January 1950 (d/r 22 Sep 49)
Maj General	18 July 1946 (d/r 20 Jan 43)	27 October 1954 (d/r 29 Mar 51)
Lt General	1 July 1957	

LTGEN WILLIAM E HALL, 460A, Comdr, CONAC, Mitchel AFB, NY and Sr AF Mbr, Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, is relieved from duty station, Mitchel AFB, NY; assigned duty station Robins AFB, Ga with no change in duty assignment.
REPORTING DATA: DDALVP. Report not later than 24 Apr 61.

Retired as Lt. Gen. 30 Sept. 1961.

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

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Interview General Thomas T. Handy, Washington, DC, 22 Sep 1970.

Q: We are talking about General Arnold and your association with him.

H: Well, as a matter of fact, the first time I knew General Arnold was before the war, they used to have a thing here they called the Joint Aeronautical Board, and he was on it. The Chief of Naval Aviation, John Towers was on it, and there was another fellow, too. But anyhow, Arnold was Asst Chief of Air Corps then, I was on it as a representative of the General Staff. That's when I first knew him. He told me one day, something came up and I voted for it. He said: "What the hell's wrong with you? It's the first time I heard you vote anything but no." But I did know him, you see, before the war and on a different basis. Then, during the war, why, I don't know, I think he felt, I was on a different status or basis with him than his own people, don't you see. Sometimes he could talk to me like he wouldn't, or maybe couldn't to them. But I was always very fond of him. He, as you know, was a very strong character, and sometimes maybe not the easiest man to handle. But, on the other hand, he was, when they named him "Hap," they named him right. He was always in a good humor, most of the time.

Q: You know, some people have told me that this smile he always had on his face could be deceptive. It might be the prelude to a storm.

H: Well, it could be. He used to give his people hard times. No question about that. But he still did have very good disposition. Now, when I received Gen McNarney as Deputy Chief of Staff, I asked

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Joe to give me a little briefing. He said: "You know as much about this as I do." He said: "I think you are going to find one of your main jobs here to keep this Arnold-Somervell business under some kind of control, so it won't be piled in the Old Man's lap all the time." They had differing ideas, and both of them were very strong characters, and very outreaching. Joe McNarney told me: "There is one thing I'd always try to do; I'd get the Old Man (Marshall) before either one of them does." Now, Somervell was an outstanding man, there is no question about that. You have to have a guy like Somervell do the job he did. But he was grabbing everything loose, and Hap was inclined the same way. So, they, at times, didn't see eye to eye. But Somervell was--he used to come down about once a week and give me immortal hell--but I got along all right with both of them. But Somervell was an entirely different type man. What I'm saying is that Arnold, although he disagreed with you, he did have a good disposition.

Q: Somervell was not always that way?

H: Not always that way. But both of them were very strong characters and they were the kind of men you've got to have if you're going to get big jobs done.

Q: You are probably talking about the time following the reorganization of the War Dept where the AGF, and the ASF, and the AAF were placed on an equal level. This is the March 1942 reorganization that McNarney shepherded through. Arnold and Somervell were on an equal level, under Marshall at this time. Do you remember anything about that reorganization? Were you there?

H: Yes, I was there, with the Operations Division, War Plans, getting things set up. Gil Harrison did; we had worked on it before.

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Q: Gil Harrison, Kuter was in on it?

H: Yes, Larry Kuter; in fact, he was in it with the Secretariat of the General Staff, but yes, I was here in the War Department.

Q: Do you remember this reorganization as being an attempt to take the wind out of the sails of the separate AF guys?

H: Well, I wouldn't say so, no. Actually, of course, that had been a very controversial question for a long time. Eventually it came about. But I don't think that the real thinking people maybe figured that was the time for it. It was a War Department reorganization, no question about that.

Q: The reason I ask this question is I've seen some correspondence between Hugh Knerr and Andrews. Knerr was pushing for a separate air force. Some others were, too. I believe Gen Marshall was opposed to a separate air force during the war, was he not?

H: Well, I don't know whether it ever came to that. I would say if I had to answer that "Yes" or "No" -- "Yes." In other words, he didn't think that then was the time to bust up everything. I think that was a pretty sound view. In other words, you had a war to fight. We'd gotten involved in it. This was quite a major reorganization.

Q: It was. I got the feeling that there was an attempt to give the AF de facto autonomy without de jure, so to speak. In other words, to satisfy the AF and give it sort of an opening for its aspirations without upsetting the whole organization in a wartime period.

H: Well, yes, I think, that is a reasonable statement. You see, you've got to remember this, about that air business, there was more involved than the AF. The Navy was involved in it. Actually, I think Gen Marshall--and this is not for your book--but was really

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responsible. He was a great fellow to do things like that, for putting Arnold in position as a member of the JCS. You see, there wasn't any question, you needed somebody up there from the Air side, but if you are going to have an Army man, you're going to have a Navy man, too, and the Navy was thumbs down on anything like that. Now what happened--and this is just between us--I don't know whether you remember this speech or not, but some of these speeches particularly on the war business--Mr. Roosevelt, Rosenman, those fellows, whoever was writing speeches....

Q: Judge Rosenman I think was writing FDR's stuff, ~~I think~~.

H: Yes, and this fellow that wrote the book, the playwright?

Q: Robert Sherwood?

H: Well, anyhow, they would send them over, to get our slant on it. Gen Marshall always paid a lot of attention to these things, and he wrote this into the speech. The President was describing war procedure, and said that his military advisors were the JCS and named Marshall and King and Arnold. Well, that made Arnold. There wasn't any question about it. But when it was set up, the old Joint Board was Army-Navy Board.

Q: When did the President give recognition to Arnold?

H: I don't remember.

Q: Was it right after Pearl Harbor?

H: No, it was, maybe, it was in the early period of the war, that's all I can say, because I remember this very distinctly, because Gen Marshall ... you see, the President of the U.S. said that in a public speech. Well, couldn't anybody question it after that. And Arnold was recognized, and I don't think Admiral King

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liked it too well but he had to accept it because he didn't want, I don't think, to put his air man up there.

Q: Well, King always dealt through Marshall. He didn't talk to Arnold, because he considered Arnold a notch below him. He considered Marshall his equal and Arnold one step down.

H: Well, maybe so, although there was another very, very strong character, and one of the biggest aspects we had in the war, I think, Admiral King. Boy he could be a very difficult one. We had many battles with him.

Q: Did he and Arnold have some difficult sessions?

H: Well, maybe so. They certainly didn't see eye to eye on many things. But I wouldn't say it was exactly acrimonious. Arnold had this--as I said this "Hap" business. He didn't disagree with people, but he didn't get the bowels in an uproar. I think the JCS--I attended most of their sessions--and they weren't considering everything, had many differences, and very natural ones in viewpoint, very well. I think they realized this, that all of them--and I think the British realized the same thing in Combined CS. It was one of those things that you couldn't continually disagree. They had to come to some decisions on a lot of these extremely difficult questions, because the thing had to go on. It wasn't getting anywhere if they came to an absolute impasse. And I think the British realized that to a certain extent, too.

Q: When you mention the British, it occurs to me that perhaps the British had a hand in elevating Arnold to equality. Because when the British came over here during those conferences, the Arcadia Conferences--you remember, right around Christmas 1941?

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H: I remember them very well.

Q: They had continuous sessions, and Portal, of course, was head of the RAF. He was regarded as an equal by the British. He didn't want to deal with his Air counterpart as an inferior. So would you say that the British also had a hand in raising Arnold to equality?

H: Well, I don't know about that. Maybe it may have had some influence, I couldn't say it didn't. But I would say "no direct." But the British always wanted to do this thing on a tripartite, three-power basis. Incidentally, I personally think that was one of their biggest handicaps because they never could get one guy in charge of the thing. I think that, particularly in the early days of the war--there wasn't any question about it--they were way ahead of us on this planning business. But I--all due respects to them--and I think a lot of them--that we were ahead of them on the execution, you see, right straight through. I think one of the reasons was they just couldn't put one guy in charge, when the three services became involved. It was so bitter and so strong. Look out there in the Middle East. That was the thing. That was an awful mess for a long time, as you know, and very critical. They never had a commander out there. The nearest they came to it was that fellow, Casey, that Australian. But each one of them went straight back there to the Chiefs of Staff in London. And, of course, they also had this, which made them markedly different from us, basically in the matter of operation. They never turned over to the man in the field, the subordinate, the amount of authority and responsibility that we did. In other words, we were used to the idea,and accepted

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it, of giving a man a job and let him do it. Well, they never were that way, their commanders in the field never had anything like the power and authority that ours did. And it carried all the way through. When I was in Germany after the war, McCloy was the high commissioner, and this fellow Robson was over there. I said: "You've got to remember this. You tell me what Robson said, etc." I said: "Look, you've got to remember, Robson is in an entirely different position than you. You can make decisions and do things that he can't possibly do without going back to London." So it was always that way. Now, to answer your question, I would say it may have had some influence. In other words, the British had their system, and it was a cardinal thing with them, and everything was done on that basis. We naturally had to bring in their people because they always had an Air man. I think they just assumed: "Well, Arnold is it." I think they--the British are very smart. They had some realization that you couldn't push this thing too far, because we had problems they didn't have at all with the Navy, with the Royal Navy, because that had all been fought out. Incidentally, the RAF people were far more bitter against the Royal Navy, you know, than they were in the Army.

Q: Yes, there was a regular competition.

H: A lot of it came from the Navy originally.

Q: Well, we had our problems with the Navy, too, like in the ASW problem. Did you get into the ASW problem?

H: Well, to some extent. Arnold organized those ASW squadrons.

Q: He organized under Westside Larson. Remember "Swede" Larson? He had the AAF Antisubmarine Command. Well, King would never relinquish the jurisdiction. It seems to me that the U.S.Navy was

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unable to do the ASW job. They believed in escorts, and we--the AAF--believed in aerial reconnaissance. There was a big friction in that area. Did you get into that problem?

H: Oh yes, that was....

Q: 1943?

H: Yes, that was characteristic of Gen Arnold. If you're writing about him. He would do something. Sometimes it wasn't always the right thing--too well considered. But there wasn't any question that he was a man of action. I don't know if people realized how serious that submarine thing was.

Q: It was, very, yes.

H: We used to see these charts. They had this fellow Reuben, a statistician, present them to the Chiefs of Staff down here, and I tell you, it was god-awful. They were sinking ships....

Q: By the dozens?

H: Well, faster, not only than we, weren't building them then, but faster than we could ever build them, anybody could envisage. You get to the point where you actually stopped tankers coming up the East Coast because it didn't do any good--the losses, not only we weren't getting the oil up. Mind you, we didn't have any "Big Inch" or anything at that time.

Q: "Big Inch" being the big pipeline.

H: Big pipeline eventually built, so getting to the Gulf ports didn't do what it did later. Arnold went in there--and that's what I say about him. This was an awful situation, and if we hadn't gotten it under control, well, I don't say we would have lost the war, but I don't see how we would have ever won it. Now he did something

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about it. That's the point that I'm trying to make, that's typical of Arnold. King didn't like it a bit.

Q: And he tried to take the whole thing away from the AAF, did he not, and he did succeed in doing so.

H: Well, I think it was his, after all, the Navy's responsibility.

Q: Navy responsibility, but the Navy wasn't doing its job at that time?

H: Well, certainly the German subs weren't under control, nobody could see exactly how we were going to get them under control. See that happened twice. Back in WW I, too, there were comparatively few submarines. We came damn near losing both those wars.

Q: I talked to Mr. Lovett in NY and he said, while he was down in Florida one time the German subs sank a ship right in sight of land.

H: Came inside the Gulf. I tell you, it was really bad, very bad.

Q: You say Arnold did something about it. He organized this ASW Command, but then the Navy forced him to relinquish it. The Navy took it over.

H: Yes, but they still operated.

Q: I think it was General Marshall who persuaded Arnold to let the Navy have this mission. [A.S.W]

H: I don't know. Maybe so.

Q: Was Arnold reluctant to give it up?

H: Well, I don't know. He probably was, yes. But Arnold had sense enough to adjust to a good many things. As I say, they all realized that this thing had to go on.

Q: What kind of a relationship did Arnold and Marshall have?

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H: Well, I think a very close, and a very good one. Arnold was always very loyal to General Marshall, I think Marshall had great confidence in him, I think. You see, the Old Man, Gen Marshall, wasn't much for personal relationships. He told me one time. This was later on. We were talking about this--these people getting a clique around the, you know, that kind of thing. We had people that did this. But he said that of all the key people there in the War Dept, about the only one that he had a very close personal relationship with was Arnold. They had been LTs together in the Philippines in the early days. I think it went back to that. I think that he liked Arnold and I think Arnold was a very loyal supporter. Now Arnold had his own views and he believed in all this separate air thing, and putting the Air Force ahead and all that, but...

Q: But he deferred to Marshall, at least for the wartime period?

H: Yes, you say deferred, I think he didn't hesitate to disagree with him, but when it came to a showdown, I think he figured the Old Man was the boss. That's the way it had to be.

Q: I noticed in their many exchanges, you would have Marshall write: "Dear Arnold," and Arnold would write back: "Dear General." He would never say: "Dear George," or anything like that.

H: Well, a lot of that is, depends on the personality. A lot of people have asked me about Gen Marshall, about how cold he was. Now I don't think he was cold at all, but he certainly was very reserved. Very seldom did he ever call anybody by their first name. This fellow Butcher talked about that. It was always "Eisenhower." He did what is hard for me to get over. When you called somebody something to change it. He wasn't a hail-fellow-well-met. He was always very much reserved. That may have had something to do with that.

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Q: Very few people called him "George?"

H: Well, that's right.

Q: I guess he called you, "Dear Handy," if he sent you a memo?

H: Oh yes.

Q: I guess it was "Dear Arnold," "Dear Handy." Did the President call Marshall "George?"

H: Well, I think, they were great first name guys. Gen Marshall never got on first name basis with him. I think at times the President did. I don't know whether he did always....

Q: I was told the President liked to call people by their first names, but....

H: Oh yes, they had a first name outfit.

Q: Right, but he didn't call Marshall, "George?"

H: I think at times, possibly, he did. But most of the time I don't think he did.

Q: Did Arnold and Marshall--you said they got along very well--did you ever hear them disagree on any subject?

H: Well, it all depends on what you mean "disagree."

Q: They might have different viewpoints.

H: Oh yes, I've known them to have different viewpoints on many subjects.

Q: Did Arnold yield to Marshall's viewpoint, if Marshall stuck to it?

H: Well, I would think if it came down to an actual decision, yes. But, I don't think that Marshall's original viewpoint always prevailed. I think he was the one who always wanted to hear the other side.

Q: Was Marshall a man you could change his mind if you had

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pretty good arguments? I mean did he come to a meeting with a pretty fixed decision, or was he sort of fluid?

H: I would say he was very flexible. But I would say this: you see, he hadn't made up his mind then. After he did make up his mind, then. But he wasn't snap judgment fellow at all. We used to go in and brief him before the JCS meeting and also the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We'd give him our views, and outline the thing. Many times you wouldn't know what the Old Man had decided. He maybe hadn't made up his mind himself.

Q: Did he mask his views until the last?

H: Well, I don't think that, consciously. I think it was more this: that he figured, "maybe I haven't heard all sides of this." Also, he had in mind the fact that with the British, you know they had to do business with them, there was no question about it.

Q: Was Arnold a very persuasive man in JCS meetings, or was he pretty quiet? Were the decisions made before the meetings, really? Or did they get hammered out at the meetings?

H: Well, you mean, the JCS. Well, I think they were made pretty well in the meeting, although positions were sometimes fairly well determined. We used to talk to the Planning people over in the AF. Many questions I think, were decided in the JCS. Sometimes when it got down to real nitty gritty, if that's the right word, they put all us out of there and just the three of them would go at it. They would come out with some solutions.

Q: I saw something in the files about the 20th AF concept, where they put the 20th AF under Arnold directly, instead of out in the theater. According to this piece of paper, you did not agree with that concept. But you couldn't think of a better idea, so you accepted the 20th AF control under Arnold. Do you remember your

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thoughts on that?

H: Well, I don't remember too much about it. I remember it was a little difficult, and it went contrary to what we had done before. It was along the lines of the British Bomber Command. That was always sacrosanct with them, the British. There were a good many reasons for doing what was done. There were reasons the other way, too. I think they probably would have worked. Also, the atomic bomb coming up put a different slant on things.

Q: I want to ask you about the atomic bomb. Do you remember a message coming in from the theater, that they should use a third one on Tokyo?

H: No, and I won't say it didn't come. My memory isn't that good.

Q: You don't remember that coming in? I want to go into the period after Arnold had his heart attack. He [redacted] sort of faded out of the picture for a little while. Eaker came in to become Deputy Commander, and Eaker sat in for Arnold during this period. This is right after VE Day, and the strategy was being planned for Japan. General LeMay came in from the Pacific, and he gave the JCS a briefing on airpower. The thrust of his argument was that the B-29s could do it without an invasion. But the JCS did not accept this argument; they went ahead with the invasion plans. Do you remember that?

H: Yes, I remember something like that.

Q: And, of course, the Army and the Navy had been doing things a certain way and they felt that they should go ahead with the invasion. Eaker agreed with that, by the way. He said that the Air could not do it soon enough and it would drag out too long. Do you remember the thinking that went into the decision, "let's go ahead with the invasion?"

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H: Well, I think this, that it is always easy to look back.

Q: Yes, 20/20 hindsight?

H: But I think our feeling was that even if you didn't have to invade, you had to get ready for it. That was the whole thing. Now, you see, it's awful hard to reconstruct people's thinking, because you've got to put yourself in the position where you know what that fellow did, and only what he did at the time. If you are going to criticize his thinking. You can criticize his decision, in view afterwards, history showed it was wrong. But when you are juding him. A lot of that, on that whole business of invasion and the atomic bomb and everything else. You see, here is what we were up against. Actually, if you look at it from the viewpoint of the people back here on the American side, looking at it. There wasn't any question in our minds that the toughest individual fighter in this war was the Jap. They showed it in many ways. Now, even among those islands. After we got them, we got people killed for months, and those guys were living on roots. But they never turn in the purple handerkerchief. They never quit. If they would do that for some island way out there, what wouldn't they do for their homeland. Personally, I've always been convinced that the invasion of Japan would have been a terrifically expensive operation. No question about it. There is another thing that people forget about, too. There isn't any question that the Japanese air was out of it, and the Navy was out of it. But the Japanese Army--if you stopped to think about it--had hardly been touched. Now they fought a few of those island campaigns. They had these rice campaigns up in China. I don't think they were as good as we thought they were, but that Army really hadn't

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been touched. It was intact. Now just think about what those guys do to defend their home base, when they'd done what they did overseas.

Q: Well, accepting your agumentation, would it [redacted] be an argument for not invading? The fact that if you come to grips with them on the beach?

H: No, if you were going to lick the[redacted], and we thought we could, and we had to.

Q: If you are going to lick them, you have them surrounded; you have them blockaded; and you are bombing them freely. Wouldn't it be better to keep bombing them, and blockading them? It might take six more months, but you will save half a million, of a million casualties?

H: Well, maybe so in looking at it at this time. I don't know, but we certainly didn't think so at the time.

Q: You know, Stimson, at this time. I'm thinking of a particular meeting. It happened on June 18, 1945. They had the President meet with the JCS, and President Truman, who was very new on his job, had some doubts about the invasion. Well, for two reasons: (1) if you invade a man's homeland, he's going to fight twice as hard; and (2) the Japs were good fighters, the toughest. On every island that they fought, we had to root them out. There were not too many prisoners. They had to be rooted out in each case. Wouldn't that be a good argument for not invading?

H: Not if you were going to lick them. If you are going to stand off, if you are going to accept some kind of a draw, yes.

Q: If the Japs are surrounded, and their munitions were down. They had no more air force, and the B-29s were going over there, and

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knocking the rest of their industrial establishment, you know shattering it....

H: You can put up all kinds of arguments like that. But I think that you forget the fundamentals. The same argument you are advancing, was advanced time and time again about us going to Europe, exactly the same in principle. Now it's a question whether you start out to lick the other fellow or not. And we did. We started out to lick them. We felt that we had to get ahold of the Germans and actually fight them if we were going to lick them. Same argument you've got is basically the British argument against the invasion of Europe.

Q: You know, the Strategic Bombing Survey came out after the war and said the B-29s could have done it without the Russians, without the atomic bomb, without an invasion. Of course, this is again 20/20 hindsight.

H: Maybe they could, and maybe they couldn't.

Q: Anyway, LeMay was advancing this argument, but they wouldn't accept it. They were going to go ahead with the invasion, I guess if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, we would have invaded November 1, 1945. That was Operation OLYMPIC, I believe it was called.

H: Yes, and you've got to remember this. The position we were in then. We had the greatest concentration of military power available. There had never been nothing like it before in the history of the world.

Q: You know, Mr. Stimson's book, with McGeorge Bundy, predicted that we would have lost a million men in that invasion.

H: Well, I don't know about that....

Q: Not lost, but we would have suffered a million casualties.

H: It would have been extremely costly. Of course, that's what all these people forget, I think, completely, when they say we should have never dropped the bomb.

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Q: Yes, some of the junior scientists who worked at Los Alamos wanted us to drop one on a demonstration target. Remember, did you get into that?

H: There were all kinds of ideas.

Q: Do you remember when Stimson convoked this scientific panel? I think he had Enrico Fermi, Oppenheimer and Compton and Lawrence. He put it in their hands: "Should we drop it on a demonstration target, or on a live target?" And they came back and said: "Live target." Do you remember that?

H: Well, I don't remember that except in, I know it happened. You see, here's what, where I think it was necessary to drop it, and drop it to pay. We said this before about the Japs. Well, even after the bomb was dropped, the Japs were ready to turn in the suit. They needed some psychological thing like that to trigger it. We wondered whether the people--there were an awful lot of Japs down in Burma and everywhere else--whether those people would turn in their suits. Well, they did when the guy came down with a purple handkerchief. That's one thing. Sutherland and MacArthur said they'd do it, if the Emperor gave the word. Now, it took something like that for the Emperor to give the word. Here's the Japanese islands, with the Japanese army practically intact. Remember they had that at the time of the surrender. But it took something like that, I think. That's the reason I've always thought that it was a sound decision. But everybody can have their own opinion on it.

Q: Of course, you say, looking back at it now, we could have done it without the atomic bomb. But knowing what we did at the time, the atomic bomb was a very important element, psychological blow, that caused the Japanese government to push over into surrender.

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H: Yes.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the Russians entering the war. There was some discussion in the Spring of 1945 about whether we needed the Russians any more. Do you remember any discussions on that?

H: Yes, and all this business of us not needing the Russians, to my knowledge is all postmortem. I never heard anybody disagree with the fact that we needed the Russians then. This Japanese Army we were up against. You have already brought out what tough fighters they were. And they were practically intact. We needed something to contain the bulk of the Japanese army.

Q: Yes, they had a big army in Manchuria?

H: Oh, absolutely. And of course, they didn't. The Russians went through them like a dose of salts. What the Japs failed to do, and the Russians didn't do it in the early part of the war. They had learned a big lesson in ground warfare from WW II, which was the use of armor, mobile firepower. Now, the Russians did learn it. Got good at it. They went through the Japs. The Japs had a so-called armored division down in the Philippines, and not much idea of how to use it. They treated these tanks kind of like individual pillboxes. They never learned that big lesson. But we didn't know all that. We were confronted with this thing. All this business of saying we didn't need the Russians, and so on, I didn't hear anybody myself saying it at the time. There wasn't any disagreement then.

Q: Afterwards a lot of people said we could have done it without the Russians?

H: Absolutely, and maybe we could have, but nobody knew that at the time; here was this Japanese army. Those guys were tough; there wasn't any question about it.

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Q: A related subject, the subject of selecting jurisdictions right at the end of the war. You had MacArthur and Nimitz come together. Both men wanted to run the last show. And then, Arnold was sent out there--remember this in June 1945? Spaatz was coming out there. They set up what they called the USASTAF, US Strategic Air Force, and this was under Spaatz. So you had these three military powers out there. Do you remember Arnold being sent out there to try to reconcile their jurisdictions? Or what was his mission?

H: Well, that whole Pacific thing, not only then, but before. To be perfectly frank about it, it didn't make much sense, but it was all we could do about it. It was one of those things. Gen Marshall was a great advocate of unified command. We never had it in the Pacific, and there was no question about it, and there were good logical reasons for having it. But we never did get it. It was one of those things, I would say, that you adapt your action to circumstances that may be beyond the control of any one individual.

Q: You are talking about MacArthur, I guess. MacArthur was a pretty hard man to rein in?

H: Absolutely, and you've got to remember this, too. The Navy--I knew a lot of them--worked with them an awful lot. Very well. One of them said to me one time, "You've got to remember that we haven't run anything in this war. The only place we've got is the Pacific." That was the truth. They'd had all this naval and amphibious stuff. We had the biggest one that had ever been in history in Europe. The Marines never had a thing to do with it. So in every theater, we were the top dogs. That part of it entered into it, too. But it was always extremely difficult thing, that whole Pacific question.

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The situation you were talking about was right toward the end, and the combination of it, probably worse than at other times, because people smelt blood and possibly thought they could possibly see the end.

Q: Here is where the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific sort of came together. There was a question about who was going to run the final show. In a way, the atomic bomb was a fortunate thing, because if we had to invade Japan, you might have had some fighting on the beaches between MacArthur and Nimitz about who was going to run it?

H: Well, I don't know.

Q: You think they could have reconciled that one?

H: Well, I think that the whole Pacific showed this, and it's still true to a considerable extent. When it comes to actual operations, doing an actual job, you generally don't have too much trouble. People find a way to do it. It's this jurisdictional, more or less, theoretical business in Washington that causes the trouble. That's always been true. I used to belong, before the war, to the Joint Planning Committee. We worked for the Joint Board. Any immediate operation when you run an exercise, you could find a solution to that. But it was when people were taking stands, and the guy himself would say: "This is all right from my viewpoint." But he'd think about what might happen to his people in the future. A little thing like changing the wording of a joint action--it's not a little thing. But, boy, you'd think you had the thing set. We were the working members down there. Somebody had agreed, and then somebody would kick over the bucket because he pictured, or somebody

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told him something about what we had written in the there. There wasn't any doubt in anybody's mind what the thing meant. But they didn't always want it to be no doubt in anybody's mind, because the fellow would figure: "My people can use this as a basis for argument in the future." So a lot of it was that. Now, I think in actual operation they probably wouldn't.

Q: The interservice battle took place more in Washington than out in the field?

H: Well, it took place in the field, too. But when you come to actual fighting and operations, people have a way of coming together.

Q: I want to go back into the prewar period, you know, when Arnold was Asst. Chief of Air Corps, under Westover. During this period, the Air Corps was having all kinds of trouble getting B-17s. You had Louis Johnson operating as Asst Secretary of War, and you had Harry Woodring as Secretary of War. The general position of the War Department, I guess, at that time was: "If they had to have airplanes, let them get a lot of small airplanes instead of a few large ones." There seemed to be a great deal of trouble getting some B-17s. Do you know anything about this trouble?

H: Yes, and many people in the War Department thought that the War Department attempted to restrict ranges, and all that, didn't make any sense. When they got out that famous thing about 300 miles to sea.

Q: Was there a 300-mile limit? I know there was a 100-mile limit. Was there an actual regulation?

H: I think it was Joint Board action, something of that kind.

Q: But they didn't put it down in writing?

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H: Not that I know of. But even the Navy wouldn't go along with that. They said: "You guys can do anything you want to with your Air, but we aren't going to accept limitations on weapons." Basically, it didn't make any sense. Some of us way down the line there in the War Department felt that at the time. But it didn't make any sense. If you are going to develop a weapon, you get the most efficient one you can get. You don't automatically stymie it before you develop it. At least, that's the way we looked at it, even the Navy, as I say, wouldn't go along with that. So it never was a Joint Board action.

Q: It might have been action by the War Dept General Staff. And if it was put in writing, it might have been withdrawn from the file, because no one has ever come up with a piece of paper, saying that the Air Corps was restricted to 100-miles out to sea. But everybody I've talked to, said there was such a restriction, but it was not in writing. Now, the time of this probably took place in May 1938. In May 1938, three B-17s went out to sea, LeMay was on one of them. He was a navigator on that flight. Caleb V. Haynes was in it. They went out and they took pictures. George Goddard was on that flight. They took pictures of the Rex, the Italian liner, about 725 miles out to sea. The next day those pictures showed up in the NY Herald Tribune. This caused a lot of concern at high levels, because they felt that the Air Corps was cutting in on the Navy's mission. I was told that the restriction was put into effect shortly after that. Do you remember anything about that?

H: No, it may have been. You may be right, I couldn't say. I know it was discussed around there. It was generally understood, as far as anything....

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Q: I think they were careful not to put it in writing, because it would be embarrassing. I think the whole thing [i.e. 100 mile limit] stemmed from some agreement MacArthur had with Admiral Pratt. In 1931 when MacArthur was Chief of Staff and Pratt was CNO, they had this "paramount interest." Remember the "paramount interest," the Navy controlled every airplane over sea, over water, and the Army controlled all airplanes over land? Do you remember this? This thing affected the Air Corps development, because if they weren't permitted to fly over water, then they didn't need the B-17s; they didn't need large planes. Were you in the Planning Staff at that time?

H: Well, a little bit later, I wasn't in there when General MacArthur was Chief of Staff. As a matter of fact, Gen Craig was in there. One reason MacArthur, he was very bitter about it, the Navy used to refer to that in our discussions, as the so-called Pratt-MacArthur agreement, with the inference there never had been such a thing. That got MacArthur's goat. He said: "What are you going to do if you can't believe anything they say." They were, of course, bitterly opposed to him--things that happened during the war, and things he said about them, running off and leaving him in the early days out there. The Navy would call it the "so-called" Pratt-MacArthur Agreement.

Q: When Gen Craig came into Washington to take MacArthur's place, he brought Arnold in from the West Coast?

H: Yes, that's right, Craig had that outfit down in San Fran.

Q: He had the 9th Corps Area in the Presidio, and Arnold had done a great job out at March Field. Arnold was sort of under a cloud for a couple of years after the Billy Mitchell thing. Billy Mitchell

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was cashiered, and Arnold was sent out to Ft. Riley. From there, he went to the War College at Leavenworth, Staff & Command School, and then he went to March Field. He worked out at March Field for Malin Craig and that's how Malin Craig got to know him. When Craig came in to take MacArthur's place, he brought Arnold in to be second in command under Westover. That's how Arnold got back into Washington. Did you have any knowledge of Craig's and Arnold's relationship?

H: No, I think they were both the kind of men that were--I'll put it this way--much easier to get along with, talk to, than a lot of other people.

Q: Craig didn't know very much about airplanes, but he had a lot of confidence in Arnold. This helped Arnold get where he was. Were you in Washington when Westover was killed?

H: Yes.

Q: Was there some debate about who was going to take his place--whether it was going to be Andrews or Arnold?

H: Well, there may have been. I don't know. I was way down the totem pole. I don't know. You see, Andrews was a very strong man, and of course, Gen Marshall thought an awful lot of him. Incidentally, my own opinion is, if Andrews hadn't of been killed, he would have been one of the real big figures in this war. He was quite a guy.

Q: You know, he had been appointed CG/ETO at the Casablanca Conference. I've been told that Andrews might have had the job Eisenhower had.

H: Well, he was up there in England. You see, Gen Marshall figured these things out for quite a while ahead. He sent Andrews out to the Middle East. Well, one reason was to see how he could

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work with the British, and get along with them. Then he went up to the ETO. You can never tell what would have happened. I've always thought that what you said might very well have happened.

Q: If he wasn't the OVERLORD commander, he might have been overall commander of the Air in Europe.

H: Well, you see, Gen Marshall's idea, you remember he sent, who was the fellow he sent over there when we first sent that group to England?

Q: Chaney.

H: Gen Marshall's idea was to make this thing work. I think that, I won't say, I never heard him say so, but it could have very well developed that Andrews would have been it, and I think he would have been extremely capable, that guy was a real leader.

Q: Great combat commander.

H: Well, he was a real leader in many ways. Stratemeyer and I went over there, in the early Spring 1943, and I spent several days with Gen Andrews.

Q: This was right before he got killed?

H: Yes, shortly after that. Now this is not for the record. Well, I guess the fellow is dead. But we weren't at all satisfied with the way things were going in Iceland. There was a very definite question of relief of the fellow in charge.

Q: Army or Air?

H: Well, Army was cognizant there.

Q: Was that Bonesteel?

H: No, it was, Courtland Parker was the man I think had it. He was a classmate of Andrews, but Andrews, you see, Dan Ingles went up there. The Chief Signal Officer. He was Andrews' Deputy, and he

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went up there. As I say, this isn't for the record, but he came back and said Parker ought to be relieved. Well, Andrews said this--I talked with Gen Andrews about it when I went over there. Marshall wanted me to talk to him about it. He wasn't going to relieve anybody until he had seen for himself. Now, that's the kind of guy he was. He said: "Maybe he should be, but I'm not going to take anybody's recommendation on the relief of a senior officer."

Q: And he flew in there in bad weather.

H: Well, he had always been pushing these things, and he just pushed it a little too far, and had bad luck.

Q: Somebody told me that Andrews was kind of reckless about his own personal safety.

H: He was. You talked to--I don't know whether he is still alive--Barney Giles and some of those people, and you would find out. Things he did, and I tell you, he took some terrific chances.

Q: Several people who flew with Andrews said they wouldn't step out of doors, and Andrews had a mission, and he flew...

H: Andrews was a hell of a man, in my opinion, just a broad gauge man, the way he was handling that thing in England. He was cracking down on the Air people, to get them under control. But he took a very broad gauge view. When he was G-3 of the War Dept, I thought he was fine. Gen Marshall brought him in.

Q: Marshall brought him in from San Antonio to be G-3?

H: That's right.

Q: Do you remember anything about....there was a guy named Jan Howard, who worked for Andrews, in G-3. Jan Howard was Arnold's former brother-in-law. He was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister. There

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was some friction between Arnold and Jan Howard. Do you have any knowledge of that?

H: Well, in a very indistinct way.

Q: Andrews brought in this guy Howard--he was an engineer--and this caused Arnold to get mad.

H: I wouldn't be surprised. I think Arnold and Andrews were kind of potentially rivals.

Q: They were rivals.

H: Being the big guys in the Air business. But I think, Andrews, I think he was, I think he would have been an excellent theater commander.

Q: You know, Hugh Knerr thinks Andrews was the greatest man he ever served under. He didn't think much of Arnold. I've seen letters from Knerr to Andrews, saying: "You ought to be Chief of the Air Force, separate Air Force." In fact, Knerr was one of the people pushing for a separate air force.

H: Oh yes.

Q: When the McNarney plan came into effect in March 1942, Knerr was very upset about that, because he thought that Arnold had put over that plan.

H: I don't think so. Arnold didn't have anything to do with it--not very much as a deciding influence. But I think there was this, feeling, which is perfectly natural. Both of them were strong characters.

Q: Another rival, Delos Emmons.

H: Yes.

Q: He was, you know, in 1941, when Arnold was made Deputy Chief of Air, they had Bryden and Moore come in there. Delos Emmons was Commander of what once was GHQ AF--the Air Force Combat Command--and

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he got his third star before Arnold got his third star, a couple months before. Do you remember this? And this led him to believe that he might be head of the whole AF, but I guess Marshall didn't have the same confidence in him that he had in Arnold.

H: Well, I don't know, you can't tell what influences all those things, what influences people's thinking. I always liked Gen Emmons very much because he had been the theater commander out in Hawaii.

Q: Right. Well, this was afterwards. After they took Freddie Martin back. I want to ask you about something. There was a plan, one among many plans.

H: Well, there are several people. Now you hear a lot about several of these things after the event, and you wonder sometimes whether they actually occurred before the event. Everybody knows afterwards, and had, and everything else.

Q: Well, this letter from Fred Martin to Arnold was dated August 25, 1941. Arnold and Marshall at that time were pushing to send planes out to the Philippines. This is the place they thought, if the Japs attack, this is where the attack would occur.

H: Yes, we all did.

Q: Yes, right.

H: Including the people in Hawaii.

Q: Right. I think that somebody probably wrote Fred Martin. If so, such a comment looked very bad in the files. They might have pulled it out of the files.

H: Well, that's possible, I don't know.

Q: You never saw a plan like that? You say you saw many plans, but you don't remember that specific one?

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H: No. I know there was a suggestion, marked increase in air. That may have something to do with this. But it wasn't practical then.

Q: Were you on the Plans Staff then?

H: Yes.

Q: Did you work under Gerow at this time?

H: Yes.

Q: He was head of Plans?

H: I came back here in the summer of 1941, I was only away for a year. I left here in '40, and went down to Benning. I thought I was rid of Washington for good and all. I had served by law, and everything else, my four years on the staff. I was completely ineligible for everything, but they yanked me back here in the summer of 1941.

Q: Then you were in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor?

H: That's right.

Q: I want to ask you something very critical in Arnold's history. Three days before Pearl Harbor, the Chicago Tribune published a good hunk of our war plan, you remember that?

H: You mean, the Victory Plan?

Q: The Victory Plan, the RAINBOW FIVE. AWPD-1. They published it; a guy named Chesly Manly.

H: It wasn't the RAINBOW FIVE.

Q: Well, they published the Victory Plan in the paper. Now there was a big investigation. Do you remember anything about that?

H: Very much.

Q: Would you tell me something? We are talking about the leak of the RAINBOW FIVE plan.

H: Victory Program.

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Q: They called it different, RAINBOW FIVE, Victory Program.

H: They weren't the same thing.

Q: Kuter told me it was the leak of the AWPD-1.

H: Well, that was part of the Victory Program.

Q: Well, this war plan leak in the Chicago Tribune. If there was an FBI investigation, and it showed Arnold to be the man who leaked the plan, would Marshall have done anything to Arnold? Would he have fired him?

H: Well, I don't think you can answer a question like that, in a simple "yes" and "no." You'd have to know all the circumstances, how it happened, and everything else.

Q: I mean Marshall was a man of great circumspection and honor, etc.

H: He wouldn't have had any patience with a thing....

Q: I mean if one of his key people was going around the corner, or under the table, do you think he would have kept Arnold on the job?

H: I doubt it very much.

Q: This is one of the points that I want to try to put across.

H: Yes, I don't think General Marshall would have had any patience with the lack of real integrity.

Q: But you say there was talk that the Air people might have done it?

H: I heard some talk of it, because there was a lot of talk, and talk is the cheapest thing in the world. Everybody was speculating on how this thing got out. The only thing we were convinced of, the guy who wrote the article, actually saw the paper.

Q: Oh yes, I'm sure he did. Wedemeyer, in his book, have you seen his book? He devotes a couple of chapters to the FBI investigating him?

H: Al had an awful time, they really made him....

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Q: He had spent two years at the German War College.

H: I know, and he had a German name....

Q: And he had access to the plan?

H: He was...in the War Dept, he was the principal in the action. He worked with it more than anybody else.

Q: Do you think it might have been Wedemeyer?

H: Oh no.

Q: If it was Wedmeyer, wouldn't Marshall have fired him?

H: Well, I'm sure he would have, but I don't think anybody, see, the FBI naturally were investigating all leads. Poor Al had an awful time. We used to tease poor Al, but nobody ever had any idea among us, his associates....

Q: He was like the butler, in a murder mystery. He was a natural suspect.

H: Absolutely, that's what I say. Just imagine the FBI coming in there.

Q: I'm still trying, and I hope to succed (off the record).

H: General Marshall used to call on Hopkins at times when things got tight. You'd get results from Hopkins.

Q: Hopkins was a man of action, he was always very close to the President.

H: But you had to make your case to Hopkins. He was smart; he was nobody's fool.

Q: If what Harold George says has any basis, then my conclusion is that Harry Hopkins allowed this piece of paper to get out of his control?

H: Well, I don't think he was the neatest man. I don't know, but I wouldn't think he...

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Q: He used to call in newspapermen, and sort of give them Roosevelt's party line he wanted to get across in the newspaper. It could have been by accident that this guy had access to that plan?

H: Well, it could have been, but I doubt it. I don't know. It's pure speculation, but I'm convinced in my own mine, that these charges against Arnold are just....

Q: Unfounded?

H: Absolutely. From what I know of him, as much as anybody else.

Q: You know, many times in history, a falsehood, a canard, gets to be truth because it gets repeated.

H: Oh, absolutely.

Q: This is one I am so anxious to get at it.

H: The power of the printed word is a terrible thing. A lot of people believe things that they see in print.

Q: And this is why I'm so anxious to get at that report.

H: And particularly a thing like this, because a lot of people, although they don't accept everything, they say where there's so much smoke, there's bound to be some fire.

Q: You see, this guy Waldrop had a guilty conscience, because he was one of the perpetrators of this leak. He's a man who printed it in the paper down here. He feels a sense of guilt, or remorse about it. He may be trying to pin it on somebody. I interviewed him, and I asked him: "You mentioned in the article an AF general but you didn't say who it was?" And he said: "It was Arnold." I said: "I don't believe you," and I told him why. They wanted to embarrass Roosevelt.

H: You've got to remember, this feeling about Roosevelt was very bitter and very strong. Any mention, anything that had to do

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with Roosevelt with a lot of those people, it was just completely out of the question. They just hated his guts.

Q: One man told me that Lindbergh had something to do with leaking that plan. Did you ever hear that?

H: No, I don't know how far away you can get.

Q: All kinds of things. Anyway, my secondary interest is in who did it. My No. 1 interest is "Arnold."

H: Well, I don't know who did it, but....

Q: We are talking about Arnold as a man of action. You know, I helped write a little script for one of these documentary movies. I called it: "Arnold: Man In A Hurry." Does this sort of characterize him in your thinking?

H: Yes, in a way. He would do something. Sometimes it wasn't exactly a fully considered action, but he was a man of action. As a matter of fact, I've always felt this: that of all people that Arnold was primarily responsible for us having the AF we did during the war, because he did do things, and nothing stopped him. He would go right ahead. You needed a guy like that. As I say, you've got to have a man like that, if you are going to get a big job done. Undoubtedly, there would be a lot of mistakes made, and a lot of things that could have been done better. But he did things, there is no question about that.

Q: Did he shoot from the hip when he made decisions?

H: Well, I don't know, sometimes he....it all depends on what you mean, by "shooting from the hip."

Q: Sort of make it without fully considering all the alternatives. A quick judgment?

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H: Yes, as various people used to say. He'd hit that squawk box and talk into it. But he would act, and act right now. You remember that horrible airborne thing in Sicily?

Q: Yes, the C-47s got shot down?

H: Joe Swing was over there with them. Joe came back here. We sent him over there at the time as an observer on this thing. He came in and told me this story. I said: "Joe, go right down here and tell everything that you've told me to General Arnold, just the way you told it to me." And he did. And believe me, it didn't wait till the next day to get any action. He had a new commander and a lot of other things. He really acted.

Q: Did he act against Ray Dunn?

H: Well, I'm not sure who the people were involved but, I know he relieved two or three people. He really tore things to pieces. It was bad; there wasn't any question that something needed to be done about it. Now, you have all the facts, and later history, you might look it over and say: "This could have been done in a wiser way, etc." But the fact remains that, boy,he tore that airborne thing, he really worked on them, and he did it right now. That's what he would do.

Q: Would General Swing know about that, he's around.

H: I don't know whether he would or not. He lives out in California. But, old Hap really started right in.

Q: He was a great one for airborne operations, paratroops. He was a great innovator. He liked new techniques and new procedures. He was sort of a gadgeteer with R&D. I know he was very much concerned about that foulup when all those planes got shot down.

H: Well, that was bad, really bad.

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Q: One of the people that lost his job was Ray Dunn who lives in Alexandria. He was one of Arnold's favorites, and after that, Arnold cut him off. Several other people who were close to Arnold. If he felt that they weren't doing a job, he took them out.

H: General Arnold told me one time, there was a lot of truth in it, too. He said that when he was picking guys for real key jobs, he looked more, not in the way the fellow was doing the job he had right then, but his potential for growth. If he had grown with every job he had, that is the guy he was looking for. Of course, he bore down on his people pretty hard, as you know. I guess you have to do it in this business; it is the hardest thing about the whole thing, this relief of men.

Q: Do you remember when he took Hansell out of the B-29 program and put LeMay in? He sent Norstad out there.

H: Well, I remember about the time. I've always given LeMay an awful lot of credit. The B-29 thing wasn't going good at all, and I don't think we'd ever had the B-29s up over Japan on anything like they were, if it hadn't been for LeMay. Now he was ruthless, too, you see, but he really went to town on that business out there with the B-29s.

Q: I've got a feeling that LeMay was sort of cut in the Arnold mold--that there was a job to do, and if you had to hurt some people doing the job, you just did it.

H: As far as the end results, but as far as the attitude, and the way they talked and everything else, I would say "no." But, certainly, Arnold didn't hesitate to take action, even though it hurt somebody's feelings.

Q: Was he more diplomatic than LeMay?

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H: I would say so, yes.

Q: But they both were, perhaps ruthless in getting the job done, is this fair?

H: Well, it all depends on what you mean "ruthless." This business, particularly, if you are cutting off people you've been associated with for years and practically putting them at an end, or ruining their careers, it is a very serious thing. It's the worst thing you've got in this military business--this thing of relieving people.

Q: Well, Arnold relieved people very close to him when he felt they weren't doing. Do you remember he took Eaker out of the 8th AF and put Spaatz in there?

H: No, I don't know anything about that.

Q: Do you recall, Arnold took several people out of jobs, like Henry Harms. He took him out of Newfoundland. He was an old friend from way back, a flier, remember that?

H: No, I don't, but I know he did do things like that. And that's what a guy had to do. Gen Marshall knew that. Believe me, I always thought not easy for him, particularly people he had known well, been real good friends with him.

Q: Marshall had to make some tough decisions, take people out of jobs?

H: Oh yes.

Q: And he didn't hesitate?

H: That's right.

Q: Did he let them down easily or state the facts to them?

H: I don't know, if there is any such thing as letting a man down easy, when he knows he's been relieved.

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Q: Do you remember a guy named Stone? There was a Stone report to Arnold. I talked to Leslie Groves before he died. Stone was sent out to the Pacific theater on some mission. This had to do with the atomic bomb. Do you have any recollection of this mission?

H: No.

Q: Or he came back to Washington with the report on the bomb. You have no recollection?

H: No.

H: We used to meet down in the Chief's office practically every morning. Arnold came down there, this is typical of him. One day I saw him out there in the hall, and I said: "You are all smiles." And he said: "Well, I'm having a good time this morning. I just switched two guys on their jobs." Apparently some fellow was out in Wright Field, some fellow in here saying the other one wasn't doing his job. Hap just transferred each one of them.

Q: Was one of them Benny Meyers, perchance?

H: I don't think so, of course, he got down on Benny after Benny got in all that mess. But on the other hand, Benny Meyers, I think, myself, not knowing too much about it, had an awful lot to do with putting the B-29 program across.

Q: Right, do you remember the time Benny Meyers and Arnold went out to Salina, Kansas, to try to get those planes ready?

H: No, I don't, but I know the people who knew, said that Benny Meyers had a lot to do with the B-29 program.

Q: You know, Arnold had been pressured by Roosevelt to get those B-29s out to the Pacific. They were having trouble, the engines were catching fire....

H: Everything.

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Q: Yes, so that was really a hard job. You know, Arnold had a reputation for pulling people, grabbing people in the hall in the E-ring, and giving them some job. Do you remember any talk about this?

H: No, I know that his staff had that trouble. One fellow described that something would happen and get Hap riled up. He's hit all those buttons on his squawk box, and begin to talk into it.

Q: You mean he would have them all rushing to his office?

H: No, he would begin to talk into it. He wasn't the easiest man in the world to work for, I know that, from what I've heard.

Q: Was Lovett sort of a balance wheel to keep Arnold on course? Did Arnold take impulsive actions and Lovett sort of stand back and get him back on course?

H: I don't know about that. I think Lovett was one of the biggest assets we had in the War Dept. I have a very, very high opinion of Lovett--everything I've ever seen him do. He certainly was a balance wheel on the whole Air business. Had a lot to do with things going along as well as they did. I think Arnold was probably very close to him. But, Lovett, deserves an awful lot of credit. I think he is one of the best, and I still think so.

Q: Do you remember the time Arnold and Marshall went out on a hunting trip. They went on a fishing trip one time, and then a hunting trip, usually on the way to one of these conferences, like Quebec. They'd stop off and go fishing for a day or two. They were always talking about getting away, to go hunting....

H: They went up to the High Sierras.

Q: They went up to the High Sierras for a week. Then they went pheasant hunting in Bismarck, N.D., one time. Did you go on any of these trips with them?

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H: No, no.

Q: Marshall envied Arnold at the end of the war, when Arnold became Commissioner of Fish and Game in California. Marshall had to go to China for President Harry Truman. He was very unhappy about having to stay on, he would have liked to retire. But Truman wouldn't let him. Truman gave him one assignment after another.

H: Well, he didn't ever ask for retirement. I was Deputy then. He asked to be relieved as Chief of Staff. But he did not ask for retirement, and according to the law, those five-star people were not supposed to be retired. They were supposed to be available. Of course, he didn't hardly get his suitcase unpacked down in Leesburg before the President called him, and he came back up. Gen Marshall did so, and talked about it to me.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack in 1945?

H: Yes.

Q: And he was down there in Florida there for a couple of months?

H: Yes, I saw him down there.

Q: He was worried that Marshall would retire him, wasn't he?

H: Not that I know of. He never said it to me. I saw him down there, he was out there on the putting green.

Q: Did you feel he would come back to duty?

H: Well, I didn't know. I understood he had a very severe heart attack, and he started then, this South American thing.

Q: He had another heart attack down there.

H: I know.

Q: This was at the end of the war. They had to drag him back.

H: But he was a man of imagination and schemes, and nothing stopped him. But I saw him, I remember down in Florida. I was down

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there. He wasn't too full of zip.

Q: Yes, he lost some of that zip after the heart attack. Do you remember the Elliott Roosevelt business, the promotion? That was a heck of a thing, wasn't it? How did Elliott Roosevelt get promoted, you know Arnold opposed it, but suddenly he [Elliott] got promoted when Arnold was down in Florida. Did Marshall just sort of say: "Well, we've got to please the old man, the President?"

H: Well, I don't like to talk about that.

Q: Arnold's staff...Norstad and Cabell, and then after they left, Rosie O'Donnell and Jake Smart came in. These were men who did not have a specific job. He used them as trouble shooters. Do you remember? Did you have any contact with these men?

H: No, I know those people, Norstad, Smart, Cabell, but...

Q: Then Rosie O'Donnell came in and took that job. At the end of the war, Fred Dean came in to work for Arnold on that job. Do you remember any other personal anecdotes about you and Arnold?

H: We used to see him every day, practically, the briefings.

Q: Intelligence briefingss. Did he ask a lot of questions at these briefings?

H: No, he didn't. And as a matter of fact, it was quite remarkable. You've got to train briefers like you train everything else. We had some of the boys that were pretty good. When I had Operations, I'd get over there about 7:15. They'd brief me and we would go over to the Old Man's place about 9:00, and Arnold was almost always there. We would give him dope as we had it, and most of the questions--if there were really any questions that came up then--would be decided right away--hell of a lot of them. You'd go on back and get to work.

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Q: Did Arnold and Patterson have any problems?

H: I don't know. Maybe they did.

Q: Note: General Handy told a story that at the Teheran conference, when Marshall decided to go around the world, and the thought was that he should have an Air aide, the suggestion was made for Rosié O'Donnell to serve in that capacity. Arnold objected to it, and said that Rosie wasn't even housebroken. So they sent Possum Hansell to accompany Marshall around the world. This was at the end of 1943.

Q: We are talking about long-range escort. You said the AF did some good anticipating.

H: Yes, the thing that struck me about the AF was, they weren't satisfied with anything they had. I told the Ordnance one time, I wish they'd get the attitude toward tanks that the AF had, and they said: "What do you mean?" And I said: "Well, the guns and tanks were always trying to catch up with the other fellow. The AF had the best heavy bomber in the world in the B-17. The B-24 was very good. But they weren't satisfied at all. Although they had the best, and the other fellow wasn't catching us they had a better one, and built the B-29. So they were forward looking.

Q: You felt that Ordnance was always behind the power curve?

H: Well, Ordnance was always, it seemed to me, trying to catch up.

Q: Do you attribute this forward looking attitude to Arnold's strong view?

H: Well, I don't know. I wouldn't say, altogether. He probably had something to do with it. He was that kind of a guy. They never were satisfied with what they had, going ahead all the time.

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Q: He was never satisfied with what he had. He was always inquiring. He had a great interest in R&D.

H: Oh yes.

Q: Do you have any knowledge or any recollection of any special in the R&D field?

H: No, I know, though, that he set up that group.

Q: Under von Karman?

H: Yes, and he actually ... we had a whole year of this after the war. But Arnold, I think, was the guy who pushed it originally, this scientific....

Q: Right, he set up RAND, he was the one who started this think factory idea. They put it under Douglas. Did you have any knowledge of his relations with Donald Douglas?

H: No, no, I didn't.

Q: On code names, you say Churchill didn't like SOAPSUBS. He wanted something that had historical meaning?

H: Yes, or more expressive, you see, it was just a nickname somebody pulled out.

Q: OVERLORD or something.

H: Yes, yes.

Q: You know, they had GYMNAST.

H: Well, that was more meaningful than SOAPSUDS. SOAPSUDS was one he picked as a horrible example.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Churchill? Did they get along pretty well?

H: Well, no, not directly, so far as I know.

Q: How about Arnold and Roosevelt. Did they get along pretty well?

H: I guess so, I don't know. I was never present when the JCS met with the President.

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Q: Were you on the IOWA when it got, when somebody fired a torpedo at it? Do you remember anything about that incident?

H: Oh yes.

Q: What happened there?

H: In the first place, it is kind of foolish to load up all this brass, the President included. Well, the President used to come out every day. They'd roll him out. He had that place up there, particularly when they had the anti-aircraft practice. They had it every day. Well, we had some destroyers along with us. One guy was just having one hell of a time, keeping up. He was making smoke, and Ernie King was sending him messages, you know, flag signals. Everybody knew this poor skipper was just catching immortal hell. We kind of felt sorry for him. Well, when they had this practice drill, apparently the destroyers went through their stuff, and got ready for antisubmarine attack. Anyhow, what happened was, this guy, as I say, had been making smoke. I'll tell you the other side of what happened was--it was like when somebody said, "Clear the chamber!" Some guy didn't do it. You know, like you would with a rifle, secure it. Now they had the warheads on. This was actual stuff, there wasn't any play about it. They had them trained out. Some guy didn't do his job on the "secure."

Q: On this one ship that was making smoke?

H: Yes, and it can happen to any of us. Some guy mess it up. This damn torpedo launched right toward the IOWA. I was standing up there on the bridge, we were watching this thing with Savvy Cook, who was my opposite number in the Navy. Macrea was skipper of the IOWA.

Q: He was naval aide to the President?

H: That's right, and he had the IOWA then. Somebody yelled about a torpedo. You could see the damn thing coming toward you in the

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water, and what happened, it passed to the rear of us.

Q: Did you make a violent turn at first?

H: Oh, absolutely, right into it.

Q: We are talking about the torpedo that nearly hit the IOWA.

H: We headed right toward the torpedo.

Q: Well, it was heading toward you, the ship.

H: Yes, broadside target, the IOWA is terribly long ship.

Q: Yes, it was a big target.

H: Anyhow, the thing went to the rear of us, 500-600 yards maybe. You did feel the shock?

Q: It exploded in your wake, didn't it?

H: You heard a kind of a dull sound, and felt the shock, and Savvy Cook said that that had happened before. It wasn't unusual for torpedoes would be detonated in a heavy wake. It was really pouring on the coal, and churning up a lot of water, the IOWA was, well.

Q: But it didn't happen before that somebody launched a torpedo at our own ship?

H: No.

Q: That didn't happen too often did it?

H: Well, everybody felt sorry for this poor skipper. I asked some of the Navy people what happened to him. They said: "He wasn't promoted." But we never said anything about that. That thing was never published until after the war. It was just as well.

Q: What did the President do?

H: Well, so far as I know, he didn't do anything.

Q: I heard quite a story that appeared in the Navy Journal, that Prettyman, his valet. FDR wanted to see the torpedo. He pushed his wheelchair up to the side.

H: I wouldn't be surprised. The President was generally out

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there during this practice, and he liked it. They'd rush him out on this little deck out there. We all said: "Oh, my God. They got half the Navy out there." We had a bunch of these escort carriers, put them ahead. They couldn't keep up with the IOWA. They provided the air cover over there. They had all the Chiefs of Staff and the President and everything else....

Q: On this one ship?

H: Yes, on one ship.

Q: What did Arnold say?

H: I don't know.

Q: You know, according to the story, Arnold said to King: "Does this happen often in your Navy?" Did Arnold and King like to rag each other?

H: Well, I don't know. I don't think they were on a ragging basis. I didn't get that impression.

Q: Or did they give each other the needle once in a while?

H: Well, they might have.

Q: Let me ask you about the wisdom of putting the President on a ship. Of course, the President wanted to travel by ship. But it really was dangerous to travel by ship, was it not, when he could have flown?

H: Well, that was dangerous, too.

Q: Well, it wasn't as dangerous as going by ship. You know, you could get torpedoed.

H: Did you ever see the antiaircraft protection and everything they had around one of those capital ships? Nothing in the world is as well protected.

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Q: Yes, but you could have a torpedo come in there?

H: Yes, but we had destroyers all around us. That's what this guy was doing. We had a whole screen around us.

Q: Well screened. Do you think it was safer to go by ship than to fly?

H: I don't know. I don't think it was very wise to load everything up on one ship.

Q: Were you on the trip right before the war, at Newfoundland? This is the Argentia Conference.

H: No, I wasn't.

Q: You were out of Washington at the time?

H: Well, I was down here on duty in Washington, but I didn't go; Charlie Bundy went from War Plans. He was killed afterwards. He was going out to Pearl Harbor with Dargue.

Q: Oh, he was in that plane with Dargue?

H: Didn't get the bodies for quite a while.

Q: You know, Dargue was one of the men who probably would have gone very far if he hadn't been killed, because he was one of the old time fliers.

H: Well, I never knew him, but that was his reputation.

Q: Several other fliers of the old school didn't make it in WW II, like Foulois. Benny Foulois never got a job. Why didn't he ever get a job, do you know?

H: Well, I don't know Gen Foulois, of course, he was getting on, older, too.

Q: Yes, but he just died two years ago. So he lived a long time. Another fellow that didn't get a big job was Frank Lahm.

H: I never knew him; I know the name.

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Q: I just wondered why. You know, somebody told me about Arnold, that he got rid of all his rivals, sent them out of Washington?

H: Well, I don't know. You see, what happened, and maybe to a certain extent, it was true of the Air people as well as the Army. If you look back, you find out that very few people who were rated as completely outstanding just before the war, really had the key jobs during the war. They cut down to the Eisenhower-Bradley level. So I think the AF probably did, maybe more so, because they didn't have so many older ones. But if you take Gen Marshall, Old Man Krueger, and DeWitt. Now they were outstanding. But, that's about all. You saw, in real key positions, people that had big reputations, before the war....

Q: Didn't make it?

H: Well, they were older. But the people that were rated as outstanding--people forget a lot of things--weren't the people who did the big jobs during the war. Marshall, Krueger and DeWitt were in a higher bracket, older, but you don't find many others, well, MacArthur, of course.

Q: Did you ever regret not having a combat command? Did you try to get one?

H: Well, yes, but there were enough people worrying the Old Man. When I told him I wanted to get out of there, but I figured that was enough. Because I had enough people on my neck, my own people worrying me all the time, I knew what it was. I think you figure you've got to do the job you've got. You can't pick up. But I think everybody had that. They knew the real reputations were going to be made out of Washington.

Q: One of the criticisms of the War Dept General Staff right before the war, was that they didn't give the Air enough autonomy

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or responsibility, or budget. Do you feel that this is a justified criticism?

H: Well, if you look at it from the long-range viewpoint, it probably is. If you look at it from the immediate practical viewpoint, remember those were the days when money was awfully, awfully scarce. We didn't have anything else. If you spent all on Air, you wouldn't have had very much.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold first came in in 1938, they had a big conference at the White House? This is right after Hitler and Munich. Everybody knew there was going to be a war, or they thought there was going to be a war. They had this big conference, and Roosevelt wanted to expand the AF, yet the War Dept General Staff wouldn't let the Air Corps, at that time, expand. They wouldn't give them the money that the President had voted to airpower. They tried to hold back on it. This is just about the time Craig was going out, and Marshall was coming in. Do you remember anything like that?

H: No.

Q: Do you feel that the Air Corps was sat on by the General Staff, to some extent?

H: Well, yes,and everybody else was, too. There were other people that had very vital claims that never got them. You never hear about those.

Q: The Air Corps you heard about? But one of the things they wanted was the big bombers, and they weren't getting any. They were getting small planes. Were you conscious they were trying to make a showing, to make it look good, that we had a lot of planes, but actually these were small planes?

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H: Well, I don't know. I don't know enough about it to say I know it was a controversial question.

Q: What was your job right before the war?

H: I was in War Plans. I was a junior member.

Q: Gerow was the head of War Plans.

H: Well, old Man Kreuger was, I was just supposed to be there. You mean, just before the war? Well, Gerow was there. That was 1941. I was down in what they called the Plans Section, Al Wedemeyer, Frank Kibbler, Lev Allen, a few others.

Q: Arnold never had a combat command. In WW I he spent the war in Washington, and he got out of Washington just before the Armistice. He never got into combat. This was sort of a sensitive spot with Arnold. When his staff officers came to him and wanted an opportunity to get into combat, it was hard for him to turn them down. Were you aware of Arnold's hangup in this respect?

H: Well, I don't know. Maybe all of us had it a little bit. But I don't know that, I never thought that it was critical with him, but it may have been.

Q: Did he ever mention it to you, that he never was in combat?

H: No.

Q: This might have contributed to the fact that Andrews was considered to be the combat leader, and Arnold the sort of Washington branch?

H: Well, that's right, and see, Andrews had GHQ AF, and that was to be the tactical force that was set up under MacArthur. They picked Andrews to command it.

Q: Right, Arnold had the reputation of sort of being the Washington representative of the Air Corps?

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H: Well, I'm not sure about that. But Andrews, well, Andrews I guess was senior to Arnold.

Q: Did Marshall ever think of letting Arnold go out and have a combat command?

H: I don't know.

Q: Of course, Marshall wanted a combat command himself?

H: Oh, absolutely, everybody did.

Q: And the decision was made to keep him in Washington. I think Churchill probably contributed to that.

H: Oh, I don't think so.

Q: Oh, was it the President?

H: Yes, and pressures from back here, and I think people on the Hill, and everything else. It would have been quite difficult for somebody to have taken Gen Marshall's place. They had a scheme at one time where he was going to have a dual status. I told him, I said: "It won't work." He knew it all the time. I said: "You are always talking," which he was, "about localitis and theateritis." I said: "That is a very healthy condition. Unless a guy is absolutely devoted, and is straining every effort for his command, he's got no business having the command, particularly a big and important one." I said: "You can't possibly have this dual status. You are going to be like everybody else." There would be something wrong, if you weren't. If you were a theater commander over there, that's going to be No. 1, bound to be with you. But anyhow, it wasn't done.

Q: I want to ask you about McNarney, the man you succeeded as Deputy. McNarney was an Air man, but he was not necessarily air-oriented. He was much devoted to Gen Marshall, and I don't think the Air Corps, the AAF, considered him to be one of their people.

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In other words, he was not a partisan. He was not an Air zealot, like some of the others who were. Was this what attracted Marshall to him?

H: Well, I don't know whether that was true at all, or not, or whether General Marshall knew this. But he had a lot of respect for McNarney's ability. McNarney would do the job he had to do, you see, regardless of whether he stepped on the Air people toes. They weren't sanctified to him like they were to some others, but I don't think that affected Gen Marshall. I think he wanted an Air Corps man in there as Deputy.

Q: But he didn't want a man who didn't think Air Corps, who thought broader?

H: Well, I don't know that. He didn't control, or didn't even know McNarney at all. I don't think that McNarney, if they were right in saying he wasn't devoted to the Air. I remeber he told the JCS one time it would be nothing more or less, I don't think he used the word "criminal" but inexecusable, if they didn't push the B-29 program. When there was a question...

Q: He may have looked at these things as a weapon system necessary to have, but not from the partisan standpoint that others might have?

H: That's right.

Q: I think this is one of the reasons Marshall is attracted to him. He could get a fair appraisal of something from McNarney, without Marshall thinking; well, he is pushing something for the AF.

H: Joe was a hell of a good fellow to get a job done. It was surprising. It was decided, what it was going to be. The reorganization

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of the War Dept. Well, General Marshall turned to McNarney, and he did it, and he did it in a comparatively short time. I always thought a lot of Joe, and had a lot of respect. He was back there in War Plans one time before the war. I don't know if this was when Gen Marshall was head of it, or not. But he was a junior member like we all were. I remember my first impression. I was sitting in the same room with him, down in that old Winder Building, before we moved into Munitions, across from State, War and Navy. Anyhow, they decided--you see Puerto Rico had been a part of the Second Corps Area--they decided to set up a separate department for Puerto Rico. McNarney was the action officer. Well that was a hell of a big thing for a peacetime operation. But McNarney did that thing just as smoothly and in a comparatively short time. Now, he stepped on somebody's toes, because like reorganizing the War Department, Joes said they could ask questions and make suggestions as to how this thing--they thought it would work best--but there wasn't any use spending any time, saying they shouldn't have it, because that had been decided--I mean the reorganization of the War Dept. He just shut them all off like that. And he did it very effectively.

Q: Actually, there were two successive reorganizations of the War Department. First, in 1941, right before Pearl Harbor, when they set up the AAF.

H: Yes, I know.

Q: They didn't give it autonomy?

H: They set up, really, three deputies....

Q: Bryden, Moore and Arnold?

H: That's right.

Q: And that wasn't too satisfactory, why?

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H: Well, I don't know. A lot of things weren't too satisfactory then.

Q: And then they had the further reorganization, and McNarney handled the whole thing. This was three months after Pearl Harbor?

H: Yes, he was--you mentioned his name a while ago in England--McNarney was in that group.

Q: The observers?

H: Chaney. He was with him, on his staff. He had been on Andrews' staff, too, GHQ AF.

Q: Why didn't Chaney work out? Do you know?

H: Well, I don't know. He didn't work out, and he didn't accomplish why they thought could have been accomplished over there. It may have been, although I never heard, any open conflict with the British. But he was picked as the fair-haired boy, and could have been a respected theater commander.

Q: But Arnold didn't like him either, he didn't have enough regard for airpower. They were trying to build up this so-called BOLERO airpower in England to soften up Germany for the invasion. Suddenly there was a change--I'm talking about early summer 1942. They decided to abandon the invasion, SLEDGEHAMMER. They went to North Africa. Do you remember any background of that decision?

H: Well, there was a lot of background, a lot of discussion, backwards and forwards. The President and Prime Minister, I think, really made the decision. We were in a bad way, anyhow, because we were developing quite an Army and we didn't have any place to use them, to tell you the truth. I was personally always opposed to the North African thing, although it was successful later on.

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Q: You thought we ought to go into NW Europe?

H: Yes. I felt that it was a diversion of effort. You had to, you know, fight the Germans, and it was peripheral. The overall result f it was very good, but it was terrifically expensive in the most precious thing of all, the shipping. See, we moved the people to England, and had to move them to Africa, and then have to move them back.

Q: Looking back at it now, do you still think North Africa was a mistake?

H: Well, I don't know, when a thing is successful, it is hard to say it was a mistake. I'll tell you what Al Wedemeyer told me one time. Of course, the Old Man, the Prime Minister, almost had a fit; Mr. Churchill, he was the GYMNAST (African invasion). After the war, Al saw the Prime Minister. He said he said to him: "We often wondered if we had gone ahead with our original plan, and really built up, with the idea of going into Europe, if it wouldn't have meant the war would have been over a year earlier?"

Q: Instead of dissipating our force, if we had built up for an invasion in 1943?

H: We started to. We had troops in Ireland. Well, the biggest bottleneck was shipping. We used the damn ships to haul them to Africa, and then to haul them back. In the meantime, we could have built up in England much faster than we di. Now, maybe it would have been premature.

Q: There was a diversion to TORCH, the North African thing?

H: Oh yes.

Q: How did Arnold feel about TORCH?

H: I don't know. I think after the decision was made, everybody felt they had to put their hands to the wheel and do everything

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they could to make it a success. But it was done on a shoestring, actually. We never took the chances later that we took earlier. You asked whether it was worthwhile. It was from this viewpoint. I think, myself, that most important, single thing--if you have to pick out one thing--in the war-making business the greatest advantage you can have is possession of initiative. In other words, having the other guy scared of what you are going to do, instead of shivering all over about what he's going to do to you next. Well, we got it in North Africa. After that, the Germans wondered where we were coming next. We got it at Guadalcanal in the Pacific, too. My own opinion is, that was really the turning point of the war, in both theaters, because we did get--it was very evident what was happening to us; you know the Japs. If you don't push them, they push you. And we were being pushed. We had already been pushed out of the Western Pacific. We were going to be pushed out of all of it, eventually. We got the initiative. The Japs began to worry about what we were going to do, and the same thing with North Africa.

Q: There was another factor involved, too. In 1942, they wanted these men to taste combat under conditions not too adverse?

H: Well, I don't know about that. But the President practically told us we had to get some place to use the Army, don't you see. North Africa seemed to be the thing, and I think the British were always very gun shy of this invasion.

Q: Well, after the raid at Dieppe, it was such a disaster.

H: I was over there in England right after Dieppe. Mountbatten came in there and told Ike about it. It was a terrible mess. The Canadians, I don't think they have ever forgiven the British. It showed us this which we had been convinced of before. We thought

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maybe a combined operation, they had one guy running the show. Well, they didn't. The British never did. They weren't able to get him. Now, what happened in Dieppe. Our people, we had people along with them. They were all convinced the Germans knew all about it, beforehand. The Canadians believed that too. But what had happened was the same old story. They set a time for it, and then, the Navy would say, the weather wasn't right, and the Air would say it was, and they all had a say. None could say: "Well, boys, we've looked at all that. Now we are going ahead and do it." They monkeyed around; they changed it two or three times. We felt, our people did, that the Germans had pretty good knowledge of what was coming, and they just laid back there, and shot them sitting. The Canadians were very bitter about it. Of course, they took the biggest losses of all. They got a hell of a bloody nose there. Remember this: the British had always let somebody else carry the bulk of the fighting in all their wars, and very wisely, and had done very well with it. The British, I think, began to wonder if they were really capable of going up against a Germany army.

Q: This contributed to the decision to go into North Africa? They were a little bit gun shy about tackling the Germans at that time. They were too strong.

H: It probably did. Yes, the thing worked out all right, but it could have been a real disaster.

Q: Well, Arnold was opposed to TORCH because it meant diverting a lot of our airpower to North Africa, what he had tried to build up.

H: I know. We all had the same basic feeling about it. But it was decided, and I think after that, there was a hell of an effort made to build up down there.

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Q: The close air support which the AF, or the AAF gave the Army--many people, like Lesley McNair didn't think we were doing enough close air support. We in the AF weren't doing enough close air support because they were too concerned with strategic bombing and not enough for tactical support. This came up in several maneuvers right at the beginning of the war. Were you familiar with some of this static within the Army?

H: Well, certainly that was the Army's viewpoint, and I think, fully justified one, maybe the Air people. I'll tell you a little story in that connection. I went up to ... In that connection, I went up to Constantine. Maybe the Air people had their side. Tooey Spaatz had his headquarters there toward the end of the Runisian campaign. I was there for a couple of weeks. I was going up with Bradley, with the divisions. They were still fighting. They had a lot of complaints about close air support. Tooey and Ike had asked me to look into it a little bit. Tooey said something about it, too. He had this guy, a New Zealander, named Coningham, who was a rabid RAF guy.

Q: Was that "Mary" Coningham?

H: Yes, and I never thought but very little of him, the way he talked. The British Army, they had actually shot at the RAF. The RAF had bombed them in the desert, according to the stories. It was that bad. I went up there,and when I came back, Tooey asked me about the thing. I don't remember whether he asked me to look into it before, but he said: "How about this thing. We are getting a lot of complaints. Ike has asked me to look into it." "Well, Tooey," I said, "I'll tell you what the boys up there are saying and I'll

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tell you furthermore, it's the truth." You are talking about all this air effort. Maybe there is good reason for it, but the only airplanes they see out there--a doughboy--and for a long time they've seen are the L-4s and the German Messerschmidt. That is the God's truth, if you want to know it." I said: "As far as those people up there fighting their own people, the AF could be in Timbucktu." He told me they were supporting the 8th Army effort. But, anyhow, that was what the doughs not only were thinking, but what was the God's truth. You never saw one of our airplanes.

Q: Was this brought to Arnold's attention?

H: I imagine, so, yes.

Q: Did you ever hear him express himself on tactical air support?

H: No.

Q: Of course, this was rectified at OVERLORD. You know, Eisenhower is supposed to have said to a group, as they were going across. Just before they went, he said: "If you see any planes, they will be ours." By that time, by OVERLORD, we had wiped the skies clean of the Germans, so it took a little time for them to do this. But did you ever heard Arnold express himself on that?

H: No.

Q: Arnold, Marshall and King visited the Normandy beachhead, two or three days after the invasion started. Did you go with them?

H: No, because I went over there on D-Day, Savvy Cook and I, at Omaha Beach. We went ashore on D-Day and we were back. You see, they sent Savvy and Larry Kuter and myself over ahead of time. I think the Chiefs of Staff had some curiosity, and wanted to be in on the big show. But I think another thing affected them. You see, a lot of these things you look at them in view of what happened.

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Now, we look at the invasion and it was oh, beautiful. Everything worked fine, but let me tell you, it wasn't certain beforehand at all. Believe me on D-Day, on Omaha Beach, we hung on there for hours, practically by our eyelashes. Savvy Cook said when we got ashore there: "God, this is carnage!" He had never seen anything like it in his life, and it was really bad. Well, anyhow, the figures, I think, as a matter of fact, Gen Marshall told me, that it was possible--I don't think they thought that it was probable--that the decision might have to be made to pull off. They didn't feel that whole thing should be left on Eisenhower. Maybe they'd better be there.

Q: This is why the Chiefs came in? In the event they had to pull out...

H: Well, that was one thing, I think they had to be in on the big show.

Q: Did they make a decision to go at the last minute?

H: Well, it was made sometime ahead. They sent us over ahead of time.

Q: But they had planned to come themselves?

H: Oh yes. I don't know whether they told anybody else or not. But they had agreed--Arnold, King and Marshall. They were going, without a doubt. But Larry Kuter went off with the B-17s somewhere, and Savvy and I went with the OMAHA landing. We were on Admiral Hall's flagship, the HANCOCK. Gerow was on there, incidentally, with the 5th Corps. Huebner had first division. Believe me, that was a tough one, that Omaha Beach.

Q: That Omaha Beach was touch-and-go there for a day or two, wasn't it?

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H: Well, it was for hours, we came back to the ship. It was an awfully long day, 17 or 18 hours long. Huebner had gone ashore, and Gerow was getting ready to go ashore with the Corps Hq.

Q: They called that "The Longest Day."

H: He said: "How about it?" And I said: "Well, it isn't too good, and the only thing in God's world that you can possibly do, is push in there, far enough, regardless of the losses, with the infantry, to get those beaches out of small arms and mortar range." Hell, they were still...and Savvy said it was slaughter, and it was, it was a mess.

Q: Do you think the Air Corps, or the AAF, did a good job on the beachhead?

H: Well, I think so, yes; so far as I know, yes. But that was right on the beachhead. Of course, those Germans came in there with the maneuvers, you know, and believe me, that was tough.

Q: A week after D-Day, the Germans started lobbing V-1s over England?

H: I know, we were right there in England.

Q: Do you know anything about that when it happened?

H: Yes, we were all staying down there at that place the fellow built on the dams some place.

Q: Were you near Marshall and Arnold when this happened?

H: Yes, yes.

Q: What kind of reaction did they have?

H: Well, they didn't think it was so good. We all did--one of them hit fairly close in the village over there. So we went over and looked at it. Cooke, Kuter and myself looked at the effects of that thing, and it was the V-1s, of course.

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Q: I understand that Arnold ran over and started to get pieces of it. He was anxious to see what the Germans had.

H: Well, maybe so; I don't know whether he was over there at this village. I don't know.

Q: You didn't see him?

H: Well, I don't recall it. Now, he might have been there, you know, these things....

Q: He was in England at the time?

H: Oh yes, we were all down in the country there, staying down there.

Q: He was a great gadgeteer. You know, Arnold got pieces of the V-1 and he put it together, and we ended up with a better version of the V-1 than the Germans had. It was called the JB-2, and Arnold was going to launch these against the Germans, but this project was killed late in the war. You don't remember that?

H: No, I know there were a lot of schemes.

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September 18, 1970

General Thomas T. Handy, US Army(Ret)
3325 Runnymede Place, NW
Washington, DC 20015

Dear General Handy:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. In setting up some interviews of those who knew him best, I thought of you and your many wartime contacts.

You may wish to know that I'm a professional historian and have been associated with the Secretary's office for the past 24 years. I have been working on my project for about three years now, including a stint as a Brookings Fellow to research the Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress. My research has also taken me to the G.C. Marshall Library at VMI in Lexington, Virginia and to Hyde Park to review the FDR Collection.

I've also been fortunate to interview many of the greats associated with General Arnold including: Honorable Robert Lovett, Eddie Rickenbacker, Alexander de Seversky, Generals Norstad, Kuter, Kenney, Spaatz, Eaker and perhaps 50 others.

And so, I'm hopeful you can spare me an hour or two at a time convenient for you. Enclosed is an envelope if you wish to drop me a note. My Pentagon phone is OX5-3862.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Interview General Thomas T. Handy, Washington, DC, 22 Sep 1970.

Q: We are talking about General Arnold and your association with him.

H: Well, as a matter of fact, the first time I knew General Arnold was before the war, they used to have a thing here they called the Joint Aeronautical Board, and he was on it. The Chief of Naval Aviation, John Towers was on it, and there was another fellow, too. But anyhow, Arnold was Asst Chief of Air Corps then, I was on it as a representative of the General Staff. That's when I first knew him. He told me one day, something came up and I voted for it. He said: "What the hell's wrong with you? It's the first time I heard you vote anything but no." But I did know him, you see, before the war and on a different basis. Then, during the war, why, I don't know, I think he felt, I was on a different status or basis with him than his own people, don't you see. Sometimes he could talk to me like he wouldn't, or maybe couldn't to them. But I was always very fond of him. He, as you know, was a very strong character, and sometimes maybe not the easiest man to handle. But, on the other hand, he was, when they named him "Hap," they named him right. He was always in a good humor, most of the time.

Q: You know, some people have told me that this smile he always had on his face could be deceptive. It might be the prelude to a storm.

H: Well, it could be. He used to give his people hard times. No question about that. But he still did have very good disposition. Now, when I received Gen McNarney as Deputy Chief of Staff, I asked

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Joe to give me a little briefing. He said: "You know as much about this as I do." He said: "I think you are going to find one of your main jobs here to keep this Arnold-Somervell business under some kind of control, so it won't be piled in the Old Man's lap all the time." They had differing ideas, and both of them were very strong characters, and very outreaching. Joe McNarney told me: "There is one thing I'd always try to do; I'd get the Old Man (Marshall) before either one of them does." Now, Somervell was an outstanding man, there is no question about that. You have to have a guy like Somervell do the job he did. But he was grabbing everything loose, and Hap was inclined the same way. So, they, at times, didn't see eye to eye. But Somervell was--he used to come down about once a week and give me immortal hell--but I got along all right with both of them. But Somervell was an entirely different type man. What I'm saying is that Arnold, although he disagreed with you, he did have a good disposition.

Q: Somervell was not always that way?

H: Not always that way. But both of them were very strong characters and they were the kind of men you've got to have if you're going to get big jobs done.

Q: You are probably talking about the time following the reorganization of the War Dept where the AGF, and the ASF, and the AAF were placed on an equal level. This is the March 1942 reorganization that McNarney shepherded through. Arnold and Somervell were on an equal level, under Marshall at this time. Do you remember anything about that reorganization? Were you there?

H: Yes, I was there, with the _____ Division, War Plans, getting things set up. Gil Harrison did; we had worked on it before.

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Q: Gil Harrison, Kuter was in on it?

H: Yes, Larry Kuter; in fact, he was in it with the Secretariat of the General Staff, but yes, I was here in the War Department.

Q: Do you remember this reorganization as being an attempt to take the wind out of the sails of the separate AF guys?

H: Well, I wouldn't say so, no. Actually, of course, that had been a very controversial question for a long time. Eventually it came about. But I don't think that the real thinking people maybe figured that was the time for it. It was a War Department reorganization, no question about that.

Q: The reason I ask this question is I've seen some correspondence between Hugh Knerr and Andrews. Knerr was pushing for a separate air force. Some others were, too. I believe Gen Marshall was opposed to a separate air force during the war, was he not?

H: Well, I don't know whether it ever came to that. I would say if I had to answer that "Yes" or "No" -- "Yes." In other words, he didn't think that then was the time to bust up everything. I think that was a pretty sound view. In other words, you had a war to fight. We'd gotten involved in it. This was quite a major reorganization.

Q: It was. I got the feeling that there was an attempt to give the AF de facto autonomy without de jure, so to speak. In other words, to satisfy the AF and give it sort of an opening for its aspirations without upsetting the whole organization in a wartime period.

H: Well, yes, I think, that is a reasonable statement. You see, you've got to remember this, about that air business, there was more involved than the AF. The Navy was involved in it. Actually, I think Gen Marshall--and this is not for your book--but was really

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responsible. He was a great fellow to do things like that, for putting Arnold in position as a member of the JCS. You see, there wasn't any question, you needed somebody up there from the Air side, but if you are going to have an Army man, you're going to have a Navy man, too, and the Navy was thumbs down on anything like that. Now what happened--and this is just between us--I don't know whether you remember this speech or not, but some of these speeches particularly on the war business--Mr. Roosevelt, Rosenman, those fellows, whoever was writing speeches....

Q: Judge Rosenman I think was writing FDR's stuff, I think.

H: Yes, and this fellow that wrote the book, the playwright?

Q: Robert Sherwood.

H: Well, anyhow, they would send them over, to get our slant on it. Gen Marshall always paid a lot of attention to these things, and he wrote this into the speech. The President was describing war procedure, and said that his military advisors were the JCS and named Marshall and King and Arnold. Well, that made Arnold. There wasn't any question about it. But when it was set up, the old Joint Board was Army-Navy Board.

Q: When did the President give recognition to Arnold?

H: I don't remember.

Q: Was it right after Pearl Harbor?

H: No, it was, maybe, it was in the early period of the war, that's all I can say, because I remember this very distinctly, because Gen Marshall ... you see, the President of the U.S. said that in a public speech. Well, couldn't anybody question it after that. And Arnold was recognized, and I don't think Admiral King

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liked it too well but he had to accept it because he didn't want, I don't think, to put his air man up there.

Q: Well, King always dealt through Marshall. He didn't talk to Arnold, because he considered Arnold a notch below him. He considered Marshall his equal and Arnold one step down.

H: Well, maybe so, although there was another very, very strong character, and one of the biggest aspects we had in the war, I think, Admiral King. Boy he could be a very difficult one. We had many battles with him.

Q: Did he and Arnold have some difficult sessions?

H: Well, maybe so. They certainly didn't see eye to eye on many things. But I wouldn't say it was exactly acrimonious. Arnold had this--as I said this "Hap" business. He didn't disagree with people, but he didn't get the bowels in an uproar. I think the JCS--I attended most of their sessions--and they weren't considering everything, had many differences, and very natural ones in viewpoint, very well. I think they realized this, that all of them--and I think the British realized the same thing in Combined CS. It was one of those things that you couldn't continually disagree. They had to come to some decisions on a lot of these extremely difficult questions, because the thing had to go on. It wasn't getting anywhere if they came to an absolute impasse. And I think the British realized that to a certain extent, too.

Q: When you mention the British, it occurs to me that perhaps the British had a hand in elevating Arnold to equality. Because when the British came over here during those conferences, the Arcadia Conferences--you remember, right around Christmas 1941?

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H: I remember them very well.

Q: They had continuous sessions, and Portal, of course, was head of the RAF. He was regarded as an equal by the British. He didn't want to deal with his Air counterpart as an inferior. So would you say that the British also had a hand in raising Arnold to equality?

H: Well, I don't know about that. Maybe it may have had some influence, I couldn't say it didn't. But I would say "no direct." But the British always wanted to do this thing on a tripartite, three-power basis. Incidentally, I personally think that was one of their biggest handicaps because they never could get one guy in charge of the thing. I think that, particularly in the early days of the war--there wasn't any question about it--they were way ahead of us on this planning business. But I--all due respects to them--and I think a lot of them--that we were ahead of them on the execution, you see, right straight through. I think one of the reasons was they just couldn't put one guy in charge, when the three services became involved. It was so bitter and so strong. Look out there in the Middle East. That was the thing. That was an awful mess for a long time, as you know, and very critical. They never had a commander out there. The nearest they came to it was that fellow, Casey, that Australian. But each one of them went straight back there to the Chiefs of Staff in London. And, of course, they also had this, which made them markedly different from us, basically in the matter of operation. They never turned over to the man in the field, the subordinate, the amount of authority and responsibility that we did. In other words, we were used to the idea,and accepted

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it, of giving a man a job and let him do it. Well, they never were that way, their commanders in the field never had anything like the power and authority that ours did. And it carried all the way through. When I was in Germany after the war, McCloy was the high commissioner, and this fellow Robson was over there. I said: "You've got to remember this. You tell me what Robson said, etc." I said: "Look, you've got to remember, Robson is in an entirely different position than you. You can make decisions and do things that he can't possibly do without going back to London." So it was always that way. Now, to answer your question, I would say it may have had some influence. In other words, the British had their system, and it was a cardinal thing with them, and everything was done on that basis. We naturally had to bring in their people because they always had an Air man. I think they just assumed: "Well, Arnold is it." I think they--the British are very smart. They had some realization that you couldn't push this thing too far, because we had problems they didn't have at all with the Navy, with the Royal Navy, because that had all been fought out. Incidentally, the RAF people were far more bitter against the Royal Navy, you know, than they were in the Army.

Q: Yes, there was a regular competition.

H: A lot of it came from the Navy originally.

Q: Well, we had our problems with the Navy, too, like in the ASW problem. Did you get into the ASW problem?

H: Well, to some extent. Arnold organized those ASW squadrons.

Q: He organized under Westside Larson. Remember "Swede" Larson? He had the AAF Antisubmarine Command. Well, King would never relinquish the jurisdiction. It seems to me that the U.S.Navy was

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unable to do the ASW job. They believed in escorts, and we--the AAF--believed in aerial reconnaissance. There was a big friction in that area. Did you get into that problem?

H: Oh yes, that was....

Q: 1943?

H: Yes, that was characteristic of Gen Arnold. If you're writing about him. He would do something. Sometimes it wasn't always the right thing--too well considered. But there wasn't any question that he was a man of action. I don't know if people realized how serious that submarine thing was.

Q: It was, very, yes.

H: We used to see these charts. They had this fellow Reuben, a statistician, present them to the Chiefs of Staff down here, and I tell you, it was god-awful. They were sinking ships....

Q: By the dozens?

H: Well, faster, not only than we, weren't building them then, but faster than we could ever build them, anybody could envisage. You get to the point where you actually stopped tankers coming up the East Coast because it didn't do any good--the losses, not only we weren't getting the oil up. Mind you, we didn't have any "Big Inch" or anything at that time.

Q: Big inch being the big pipeline.

H: Big pipeline eventually built, so getting to the Gulf ports didn't do what it did later. Arnold went in there--and that's what I say about him. This was an awful situation, and if we hadn't gotten it under control, well, I don't say we would have lost the war, but I don't see how we would have ever won it. Now he did something

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about it. That's the point that I'm trying to make, that's typical of Arnold. King didn't like it a bit.

Q: And he tried to take the whole thing away from the AAF, did he not, and he did succeed in doing so.

H: Well, I think it was his, after all, the Navy's responsibility.

Q: Navy responsibility, but the Navy wasn't doing its job at that time?

H: Well, certainly the German subs weren't under control, nobody could see exactly how we were going to get them under control. See that happened twice. Back in WW I, too, there were comparatively few submarines. We came damn near losing both those wars.

Q: I talked to Mr. Lovett in NY and he said, while he was down in Florida one time the German subs sank a ship right in sight of land.

H: Came inside the Gulf. I tell you, it was really bad, very bad.

Q: You say Arnold did something about it. He organized this ASW Command, but then the Navy forced him to relinquish it. The Navy took it over.

H: Yes, but they still operated.

Q: I think it was General Marshall who persuaded Arnold to let the Navy have this mission. [A.S.W.]

H: I don't know. Maybe so.

Q: Was Arnold reluctant to give it up?

H: Well, I don't know. He probably was, yes. But Arnold had sense enough to adjust to a good many things. As I say, they all realized that this thing had to go on.

Q: What kind of a relationship did Arnold and Marshall have?

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H: Well, I think a very close, and a very good one. Arnold was always very loyal to General Marshall, I think Marshall had great confidence in him, I think. You see, the Old Man, Gen Marshall, wasn't much for personal relationships. He told me one time. This was later on. We were talking about this--these people getting a clique around the, you know, that kind of thing. We had people that did this. But he said that of all the key people there in the War Dept, about the only one that he had a very close personal relationship with was Arnold. They had been LTs together in the Philippines in the early days. I think it went back to that. I think that he liked Arnold and I think Arnold was a very loyal supporter. Now Arnold had his own views and he believed in all this separate air thing, and putting the Air Force ahead and all that, but...

Q: But he deferred to Marshall, at least for the wartime period?

H: Yes, you say deferred, I think he didn't hesitate to disagree with him, but when it came to a showdown, I think he figured the Old Man was the boss. That's the way it had to be.

Q: I noticed in their many exchanges, you would have Marshall write: "Dear Arnold," and Arnold would write back: "Dear General." He would never say: "Dear George," or anything like that.

H: Well, a lot of that is, depends on the personality. A lot of people have asked me about Gen Marshall, about how cold he was. Now I don't think he was cold at all, but he certainly was very reserved. Very seldom did he ever call anybody by their first name. This fellow Butcher talked about that. It was always "Eisenhower." He did what is hard for me to get over. When you called somebody something to change it. He wasn't a hail-fellow-well-met. He was always very much reserved. That may have had something to do with that.

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Q: Very few people called him "George?"

H: Well, that's right.

Q: I guess he called you, "Dear Handy," if he sent you a memo?

H: Oh yes.

Q: I guess it was "Dear Arnold," "Dear Handy." Did the President call Marshall "George?"

H: Well, I think, they were great first name guys. Gen Marshall never got on first name basis with him. I think at times the President did. I don't know whether he did always....

Q: I was told the President liked to call people by their first names, but....

H: Oh yes, they had a first name outfit.

Q: Right, but he didn't call Marshall, "George?"

H: I thin at times, possibly, he did. But most of the time I don't think he did.

Q: Did Arnold and Marshall--you said they got along very well--did you ever hear them disagree on any subject?

H: Well, it all depends on what you mean "disagree."

Q: They might have different viewpoints.

H: Oh yes, I've known them to have different viewpoints on many subjects.

Q: Did Arnold yield to Marshall's viewpoint, if Marshall stuck to it?

H: Well, I would think if it came down to an actual decision, yes. But, I don't think that Marshall's original viewpoint always prevailed. I think he was the one who always wanted to hear the other side.

Q: Was Marshall a man you could change his mind if you had

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pretty good arguments? I mean did he come to a meeting with a pretty fixed decision, or was he sort of fluid?

H: I would say he was very flexible. But I would say this: you see, he hadn't made up his mind then. After he did make up his mind, then. But he wasn't snap judgment fellow at all. We used to go in and brief him before the JCS meeting and also the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We'd give him our views, and outline the thing. Many times you wouldn't know what the Old Man had decided. He maybe hadn't made up his mind himself.

Q: Did he mask his views until the last?

H: Well, I don't think that, consciously. I think it was more this: that he figured, "maybe I haven't heard all sides of this." Also, he had in mind the fact that with the British, you know they had to do business with them, there was no question about it.

Q: Was Arnold a very persuasive man in JCS meetings, or was he pretty quiet? Were the decisions made before the meetings, really? Or did they get hammered out at the meetings?

H: Well, you mean, the JCS. Well, I think they were made pretty well in the meeting, although positions were sometimes fairly well determined. We used to talk to the Planning people over in the AF. Many questions I think, were decided in the JCS. Sometimes when it got down to real nitty gritty, if that's the right word, they put all uf out of there and just the three of them would go at it. They would come out with some solutions.

Q: I saw something in the files about the 20th AF concept, where they put the 20th AF under Arnold directly, instead of out in the theater. According to this piece of paper, you did not agree with that concept. But you couldn't think of a better idea, so you accepted the 20th AF control under Arnold. Do you remember your

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thoughts on that?

H: Well, I don't remember too much about it. I remember it was a little difficult, and it went contrary to what we had done before. It was along the lines of the British Bomber Command. That was always sacrosanct with them, the British. There were a good many reasons for doing what was done. There were reasons the other way, too. I think they probably would have worked. Also, the atomic bomb coming up put a different slant on things.

Q: I want to ask you about the atomic bomb. Do you remember a message coming in from the theater, that they should use a third one on Tokyo?

H: No, and I won't say it didn't come. My memory isn't that good.

Q: You don't remember that coming in. I want to go into the period after Arnold had his heart attack. He was sort of faded out of the picture for a little while. Eaker came in to become Deputy Commander, and Eaker sat in for Arnold during this period. This is right after VE Day, and the strategy was being planned for Japan. General LeMay came in from the Pacific, and he gave the JCS a briefing on airpower. The thrust of his argument was that the B-29s could do it without an invasion. But the JCS did not accept this argument; they went ahead with the invasion plans. Do you remember that?

H: Yes, I remember something like that.

Q: And, of course, the Army and the Navy had been doing things a certain way and they felt that they should go ahead with the invasion. Eaker agreed with that, by the way. He said that the Air could not do it soon enough and it would drag out too long. Do you remember the thinking that went into the decision, "let's go ahead with the invasion?"

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H: Well, I think this, that it is always easy to look back.

Q: Yes, 20/20 hindsight?

H: But I think our feeling was that even if you didn't have to invade, you had to get ready for it. That was the whole thing. Now, you see, it's awful hard to reconstruct people's thinking, because you've got to put yourself in the position where you know what that fellow did, and only what he did at the time. If you are going to criticize his thinking. You can criticize his decision, in view afterwards, history showed it was wrong. But when you are juding him. A lot of that, on that whole business of invasion and the atomic bomb and everything else. You see, here is what we were up against. Actually, if you look at it from the viewpoint of the people back here on the American side, looking at it. There wasn't any question in our minds that the toughest individual fighter in this war was the Jap. They showed it in many ways. Now, even among those islands. After we got them, we got people killed for months, and those guys were living on roots. But they never turn in the purple handerkerchief. They never quit. If they would do that for some island way out there, what wouldn't they do for their homeland. Personally, I've always been convinced that the invasion of Japan would have been a terrifically expensive operation. No question about it. There is another thing that people forget about, too. There isn't any question that the Japanese air was out of it, and the Navy was out of it. But the Japanese Army--if you stopped to think about it--had hardly been touched. Now they fought a few of those island campaigns. They had these rice campaigns up in China. I don't think they were as good as we thought they were, but that Army really hadn't

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been touched. It was intact. Now just think about what those guys do to defend their home base, when they'd done what they did overseas.

Q: Well, accepting your argumentation, would it not be an argument for not invading? The fact that if you come to grips with them on the beach?

H: No, if you were going to lick them and we thought we could, and we had to.

Q: If you are going to lick them, you have them surrounded; you have them blockaded; and you are bombing them freely. Wouldn't it be better to keep bombing them, and blockading them? It might take six more months, but you will save half a million of a million casualties?

H: Well, maybe so in looking at it at this time. I don't know, but we certainly didn't think so at the time.

Q: You know, Stimson, at this time. I'm thinking of a particular meeting. It happened on June 18, 1945. They had the President meet with the JCS, and President Truman, who was very new on his job, had some doubts about the invasion. Well, for two reasons: (1) if you invade a man's homeland, he's going to fight twice as hard; and (2) the Japs were good fighters, the toughest. On every island that they fought we had to root them out. There were not too many prisoners. They had to be rooted out in each case. Wouldn't that be a good argument for not invading?

H: Not if you were going to lick them. If you are going to stand off, if you are going to accept some kind of a draw, yes.

Q: If the Japs are surrounded, and their munitions were down. They had no more air force, and the B-29s were going over there, and

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knocking the rest of their industrial establishment, you know shattering it....

H: You can put up all kinds of arguments like that. But I think that you forget the fundamentals. The same argument you are advancing, was advanced time and time again about us going to Europe, exactly the same in principle. Now it's a question whether you start out to lick the other fellow or not. And we did. We started out to lick them. We felt that we had to get ahold of the Germans and actually fight them if we were going to lick them. Same argument you've got is basically the British argument against the invasion of Europe.

Q: You know, the Strategic Bombing Survey came out after the war and said the B-29s could have done it without the Russians, without the atomic bomb, without an invasion. Of course, this is again 20/20 hindsight.

H: Maybe they could, and maybe they couldn't.

Q: Anyway, LeMay was advancing this argument, but they wouldn't accept it. They were going to go ahead with the invasion, I guess if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, we would have invaded November 1, 1945. That was Operation OLYMPIC, I believe it was called.

H: Yes, and you've got to remember this. The position we were in then. We had the greatest concentration of military power available. There had never been nothing like it before in the history of the world.

Q: You know, Mr. Stimson's book, with McGeorge Bundy, predicted that we would have lost a million men in that invasion.

H: Well, I don't know about that....

Q: Not lost, but we would have suffered a million casualties.

H: It would have been extremely costly. Of course, that's what all these people forget, I think, completely, when they say we should have never dropped the bomb.

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Q: Yes, some of the junior scientists who worked at Los Alamos wanted us to drop in on a demonstration target. Remember, did you get into that?

H: There were all kinds of ideas.

Q: Do you remember when Stimson convoked this scientific panel? I think he had Enrico Fermi, Oppenheimer and Compton and Lawrence. He put it in their hands: "Should we drop it on a demonstration target, or on a live target?" And they came back and said: "Live target." Do you remember that?

H: Well, I don't remember that except in, I know it happened. You see, here's what, where I think it was necessary to drop it, and drop it to pay. We said this before about the Japs. Well, even after the bomb was dropped, the Japs were ready to turn in the suit. They needed some psychological thing like that to trigger it. We wondered whether the people--there were an awful lot of Japs down in Burma and everywhere else--whether those people would turn in their suits. Well, they did when the guy came down with a purple handkerchief. That's one thing. Sutherland and MacArthur said they'd do it, if the Emperor gave the word. Now, it took something like that for the Emperor to give the word. Here's the Japanese islands, with the Japanese army practically intact. Remember they had that at the time of the surrender. But it took something like that, I think. That's the reason I've always thought that it was a sound decision. But everybody can have their own opinion on it.

Q: Of course, you say, looking back at it now, we could have done it without the atomic bomb. But knowing what we did at the time, the atomic bomb was a very important element, psychological blow, that caused the Japanese government to push over into surrender.

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H: Yes.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the Russians entering the war. There was some discussion in the Spring of 1945 about whether we needed the Russians any more. Do you remember any discussions on that?

H: Yes, and all this business of us not needing the Russians, to my knowledge is all postmortem. I never heard anybody disagree with the fact that we needed the Russians then. This Japanese Army we were up against. You have already brought out what tough fighters they were. And they were practically intact. We needed something to contain the bulk of the Japanese army.

Q: Yes, they had a big army in Manchuria?

H: Oh, absolutely. And of course, they didn't. The Russians went through them like a dose of salts. What the Japs failed to do, and the Russians didn't do it in the early part of the war. They had learned a big lessin ground warfare from WW II, which was the use of armor, mobile firepower. Now, the Russians did learn it. Got good at it. They went through the Japs. The Japs had a so-called armored division down in the Philippines, and not much idea of how to use it. They treated these tanks kind of like individual pillboxes. They never learned that big lesson. But we didn't know all that. We were confronted with this thing. All this business of saying we didn't need the Russians, and so on, I didn't hear anybody myself saying it at the time. There wasn't any disagreement then.

Q: Afterwards a lot of people said we could have done it without the Russians?

H: Absolutely, and maybe we could have, but nobody knew that at the time; here was this Japanese army. Those guys were tough; there wasn't any question about it.

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Q: A related subject, the subject of selecting jurisdictions right at the end of the war. You had MacArthur and Nimitz come together. Both men wanted to run the last show. And then, Arnold was sent out there--remember this in June 1945. Spaatz was coming out there. They set up what they called the USASTAF, US Strategic Air Force, and this was under Spaatz. So you had these three military powers out there. Do you remember Arnold being sent out there to try to reconcile their jurisdictions? Or what was his mission?

H: Well, that whole Pacific thing, not only then, but before. To be perfectly frank about it, it didn't make much sense, but it was all we could do about it. It was one of those things. Gen Marshall was a great advocate of unified command. We never had it in the Pacific, and there was no question about it, and there were good logical reasons for having it. But we never did get it. It was one of those things, I would say, that you adapt your action to circumstances that may be beyond the control of any one individual.

Q: You are talking about MacArthur I guess. MacArthur was a pretty hard man to rein in?

H: Absolutely, and you've got to remember this, too. The Navy--I knew a lot of them--worked with them an awful lot. Very well. One of them said to me one time, "You've got to remember that we haven't run anything in this war. The only place we've got is the Pacific." That was the truth. They'd had all this naval and amphibious stuff. We had the biggest one that had ever been in history in Europe. The Marines never had a thing to do with it. So in every theater, we were the top dogs. That part of it entered into it, too. But it was always extremely difficult thing, that whole Pacific question.

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The situation you were talking about was right toward the end, and the combination of it, probably worse than at other times, because people smelt blood and possibly thought they could possibly see the end.

Q: Here is where the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific sort of came together. There was a question about who was going to run the final show. In a way the atomic bomb was a fortunate thing, because if we had to invade Japan, you might have had some fighting on the beaches between MacArthur and Nimitz about who was going to run it?

H: Well, I don't know.

Q: You think they could have reconciled that one?

H: Well, I think that the whole Pacific showed this, and it's still true to a considerable extent. When it comes to actual operations, doing an actual job, you generally don't have too much trouble. People find a way to do it. It's this jurisdictional, more or less, theoretical business in Washington that causes the trouble. That's always been true. I used to belong, before the war, to the Joint Planning Committee. We worked for the Joint Board. Any immediate operation when you run an exercise, you could find a solution to that. But it was when people were taking stands, and the guy himself would say: "This is all right from my viewpoint." But he'd think about what might happen to his people in the future. A little thing like changing the wording of a joint action--it's not a little thing. But, boy, you'd think you had the thing set. We were the working members down there. Somebody had agreed, and then somebody would kick over the bucket because he pictured, or somebody

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told him something about what we had written in the there. There wasn't any doubt in anybody's mind what the thing meant. But they didn't always want it to be no doubt in anybody's mind, because the fellow would figure: "My people can use this as a basis for argument in the future." So a lot of it was that. Now, I think in actual operation they probably wouldn't.

Q: The interservice battle took place more in Washington than out in the field?

H: Well, it took place in the field, too. But when you come to actual fighting and operations, people have a way of coming together.

Q: I want to go back into the prewar period, you know, when Arnold was Asst. Chief of Air Corps, under Westover. During this period, the Air Corps was having all kinds of trouble getting B-17s. You had Louis Johnson operating as Asst Secretary of War, and you had Harry Woodring as Secretary of War. The general position of the War Department, I guess, at that time was: "If they had to have airplanes, let them get a lot of small airplanes instead of a few large ones." There seemed to be a great deal of trouble getting some B-17s. Do you know anything about this trouble?

H: Yes, and many people in the War Department thought that the War Department attempted to restrict ranges, and all that, didn't make any sense. When they got out that famous thing about 300 miles to sea.

Q: Was there a 300-mile limit? I know there was a 100-mile limit. Was there an actual regulation?

H: I think it was Joint Board action, something of that kind.

Q: But they didn't put it down in writing?

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H: Not that I know of. But even the Navy wouldn't go along with that. They said: "You guys can do anything you want to with your Air, but we aren't going to accept limitations on weapons." Basically, it didn't make any sense. Some of us way down the line there in the War Department felt that at the time. But it didn't make any sense. If you are going to develop a weapon, you get the most efficient one you can get. You don't automatically stymie it before you develop it. At least, that's the way we looked at it, even the Navy, as I say, wouldn't go along with that. So it never was a Joint Board action.

Q: It might have been action by the War Dept General Staff. And if it was put in writing, it might have been withdrawn from the file, because no one has ever come up with a piece of paper, saying that the Air Corps was restricted to 100-miles out to sea. But everybody I've talked to, said there was such a restriction, but it was not in writing. Now, the time of this probably took place in May 1938. In May 1938, three B-17s went out to sea, LeMay was on one of them. He was a navigator on that flight. Caleb V. Haynes was in it. They went out and they took pictures. George Goddard was on that flight. They took pictures of the Rex, the Italian liner, about 725 miles out to sea. The next day those pictures showed up in the NY Herald Tribune. This caused a lot of concern at high levels, because they felt that the Air Corps was cutting in on the Navy's mission. I was told that the restriction was put into effect shortly after that. Do you remember anything about that?

H: No, it may have been. You may be right, I couldn't say. I know it was discussed around there. It was generally understood, as far as anything....

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Q: I think they were careful not to put it in writing, because it would be embarrassing. I think the whole thing [i.e. 100 mile limit] stemmed from some agreement MacArthur had with Admiral Pratt. In 1931 when MacArthur was Chief of Staff and Pratt was CNO, they had this "paramount interest." Remember the "paramount interest," the Navy controlled every airplane over sea, over water, and the Army controlled all airplanes over land? Do you remember this? This thing affected the Air Corps development, because if they weren't permitted to fly over water, then they didn't need the B-17s; they didn't need large planes. Were you in the Planning Staff at that time?

H: Well, a little bit later I wasn't in there when General MacArthur was Chief of Staff. As a matter of fact, Gen Craig was in there. One reason MacArthur, he was very bitter about it, the Navy used to refer to that in our discussions, as the so-called Pratt-MacArthur agreement, with the inference there never had been such a thing. That got MacArthur's goat. He said: "What are you going to do if you can't believe anything they say." They were, of course, bitterly opposed to him--things that happened during the war, and things he said about them, running off and leaving him in the early days out there. The Navy would call it the "so-called" Pratt-MacArthur Agreement.

Q: When Gen Craig came into Washington to take MacArthur's place, he brought Arnold in from the West Coast?

H: Yes, that's right, he had that outfit down in San Fran.

Q: He had the 9th Corps Area in the Presidio, and Arnold had done a great job out at March Field. Arnold was sort of under a cloud for a couple of years after the Billy Mitchell thing. Billy Mitchell

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was cashiered, and Arnold was sent out to Ft. Riley. From there, he went to the War College at Leavenworth, Staff & Command School, and then he went to March Field. He worked out at March Field for Malin Craig and that's how Malin Craig got to know him. When Craig came in to take MacArthur's place, he brought Arnold in to be second in command under Westover. That's how Arnold got back into Washington. Did you have any knowledge of Craig's and Arnold's relationship?

H: No, I think they were both the kind of men that were--I'll put it this way--much easier to get along with, talk to, than a lot of other people.

Q: Craig didn't know very much about airplanes, but he had a lot of confidence in Arnold. This helped Arnold get where he was. Were you in Washington when Westover was killed?

H: Yes.

Q: Was there some debate about who was going to take his place--whether it was going to be Andrews or Arnold?

H: Well, there may have been. I don't know. I was way down the totem pole. I don't know. You see, Andrews was a very strong man, and of course, Gen Marshall thought an awful lot of him. Incidentally, my own opinion is, if Andrews hadn't of been killed, he would have been one of the real big figures in this war. He was quite a guy.

Q: You know, he had been appointed CG/ETO at the Casablanca Conference. I've been told that Andrews might have had the job Eisenhower had.

H: Well, he was up there in England. You see, Gen Marshall figured these things out for quite a while ahead. He sent Andrews out to the Middle East. Well, one reason was to see how he could

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work with the British, and get along with them. Then he went up to the ETO. You can never tell what would have happened. I've always thought that what you said might very well have happened.

Q: If he wasn't the OVERLORD commander, he might have been overall commander of the Air in Europe.

H: Well, you see, Gen Marshall's idea, you remember he sent, who was the fellow he sent over there when we first sent that group to England?

Q: Chaney.

H: Gen Marshall's idea was to make this thing work. I think that, I won't say, I never heard him say so, but it could have very well developed that Andrews would have been it, and I think he would have been extremely capable, that guy was a real leader.

Q: Great combat commander.

H: Well, he was a real leader in many ways. Stratemeyer and I went over there, in the early Spring 1943, and I spent several days with Gen Andrews.

Q: This was right before he got killed?

H: Yes, shortly after that. Now this is not for the record. Well, I guess the fellow is dead. But we weren't at all satisfied with the way things were going in Iceland. There was a very definite question of relief of the fellow in charge.

Q: Army or Air?

H: Well, Army was cognizant there.

Q: Was that Bonesteel?

H: No, it was, Courtland Parker was the man I think had it. He was a classmate of Andrews, but Andrews, you see, Dan Ingles went up there. The Chief Signal Officer. He was Andrews' Deputy, and he

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went up there. As I say this isn't for the record, but he came back and said Parker ought to be relieved. Well, Andrews said this--I talked with Gen Andrews about it when I went over there. Marshall wanted me to talk to him about it. He wasn't going to relieve anybody until he had seen for himself. Now, that's the kind of guy he was. He said: "Maybe he should be, but I'm not going to take anybody's recommendation on the relief of a senior officer."

Q: And he flew in there in bad weather?

H: Well, he had always been pushing these things, and he just pushed it a little too far, and had bad luck.

Q: Somebody told me that Andrews was kind of reckless about his own personal safety.

H: He was. You talked to--I don't know whether he is still alive--Barney Giles and some of those people, and you would find out. Things he did, and I tell you, he took some terrific chances.

Q: Several people who flew with Andrews said they wouldn't step out of doors, and Andrews had a mission, and he flew...

H: Andrews was a hell of a man, in my opinion, just a broad gauge man, the way he was handling that thing in England. He was cracking down on the Air people, to get them under control. But he took a very broad gauge view. When he was G-3 of the War Dept, I thought he was fine. Gen Marshall brought him in.

Q: Marshall brought him in from San Antonio to be G-3?

H: That's right.

Q: Do you remember anything about....there was a guy named Jan Howard, who worked for Andrews, in G-3. Jan Howard was Arnold's former brother-in-law. He was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister. There

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was some friction between Arnold and Jan Howard. Do you have any knowledge of that?

H: Well, in a very indistinct way.

Q: Andrews brought in this guy Howard--he was an engineer--and this caused Arnold to get mad.

H: I wouldn't be surprised. I think Arnold and Andrews were kind of potentially rivals.

Q: They were rivals.

H: Being the big guys in the Air business. But I think, Andrews, I think he was, I think he would have been an excellent theater commander.

Q: You know, Hugh Knerr thinks Andrews was the greatest man he ever served under. He didn't think much of Arnold. I've seen letters from Knerr to Andrews, saying: "You ought to be Chief of the Air Force, separate Air Force." In fact, Knerr was one of the people pushing for a separate air force.

H: Oh yes.

Q: When the McNarney plan came into effect in March 1942, Knerr was very upset about that, because he thought that Arnold had put over that plan.

H: I don't think so. Arnold didn't have anything to do with it--not very much as a deciding influence. But I think there was this, feeling, which is perfectly natural. Both of them were strong characters.

Q: Another rival, Delos Emmons.

H: Yes.

Q: He was, you know, in 1941, when Arnold was made Deputy Chief of Air, they had Bryden and Moore come in there. Dels Emmons was Commander of what once was GHQ AF--the Air Force Combat Command--and

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he got his third star before Arnold got his third star, a couple months before. Do you remember this? And this led him to believe that he might be head of the whole AF, but I guess Marshall didn't have the same confidence in him that he had in Arnold.

H: Well, I don't know, you can't tell what influences all those things, what influences people's thinking. I always like Gen Emmons very much because he had been the theater commander out in Hawaii.

Q: Right. Well, this was afterwards. After they took Freddie Martin back. I want to ask you about something. There was a plan, one among many plans.

H: Well, there are several people. Now you hear a lot about several of these things after the event, and you wonder sometimes whether they actually occurred before the event. Everybody knows afterwards, and had, and everything else.

Q: Well, this letter from Fred Martin to Arnold was dated August 25, 1941. Arnold and Marshall at that time were pushing to send planes out to the Philippines. This is the place they thought, if the Japs attack, this is where the attack would occur.

H: Yes, we all did.

Q: Yes, right.

H: Including the people in Hawaii.

Q: Right. I think that somebody probably wrote Fred Martin. If so, such a comment looked very bad in the files. They might have pulled it out of the files.

H: Well, that's possible, I don't know.

Q: You never saw a plan like that? You say you saw many plans, but you don't remember that specific one?

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H: No. I know there was a suggestion, marked increase in air. That may have something to do with this. But it wasn't practical then.

Q: Were you on the Plans Staff then?

H: Yes.

Q: Did you work under Gerow at this time?

H: Yes.

Q: He was head of Plans?

H: I came back here in the summer of 1941, I was only away for a year. I left here in '40, and went down to Benning. I thought I was rid of Washington for good and all. I had served by law, and everything else, my four years on the staff. I was completely ineligible for everything, but they yanked me back here in the summer of 1941.

Q: Then you were in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor?

H: That's right.

Q: I want to ask you something very critical in Arnold's history. Three days before Pearl Harbor, the Chicago Tribune published a good hunk of our war plan, you remember that?

H: Y u mean the Victory Plan?

Q: The Victory Plan, the RAINBOW FIVE. AWPD-1. They published it, a guy named Chesly Manly.

H: It wasn't the RAINBOW FIVE.

Q: Well, the published the Victory Plan in the paper. Now there was a big investigation. Do you remember anything about that?

H: Very much.

Q: Would you tell me something? We are talking about the leak of the RAINBOW FIVE plan.

H: Victory Program.

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Q: They called it different, RAINBOW FIVE, Victory Program.

H: They weren't the same thing.

Q: Kuter told me it was the leak of the AWPD-1.

H: Well, that was part of the Victory Program.

Q: Well, this war plan leak in the Chicago Tribune. If there was an FBI investigation, and it showed Arnold to be the man who leaked the plan, would Marshall have done anything to Arnold? Would he have fired him?

H: Well, I don't think you can answer a question like that, in a simple "yes" and "no." You'd have to know all the circumstances, how it happened, and everything else.

Q: I mean Marshall was a man of great circumspection and honor, etc.

H: He wouldn't have had any patience with a thing....

Q: I mean if one of his key people was going around the corner, or under the table, do you think he would have kept Arnold on the job?

H: I doubt it very much.

Q: This is one of the points that I want to try to put across.

H: Yes, I don't think General Marshall would have had any patience with the lack of real integrity.

Q: But you say there was talk that the Air people might have done it?

H: I heard some talk of it, because there was a lot of talk, and talk is the cheapest thing in the world. Everybody was speculating on how this thing got out. The only thing we were convinced of, the guy who wrote the article, actually saw the paper.

Q: Oh yes, I'm sure he did. Wedemeyer, in his book, have you seen his book, he devotes a couple of chapters to the FBI investigating him?

H: Al had an awful time, they really made him....

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Q: He had spent two years at the German War College.

H: I know, and he had a German name....

Q: And he had access to the plan?

H: He was...in the War Dept, he was the principal in the action. He worked with it more than anybody else.

Q: Do you think it might have been Wedemeyer?

H: Oh no.

Q: If it was Wedmeyer, wouldn't Marshall have fired him?

H: Well, I'm sure he would have, but I don't think anybody, see, the FBI naturally were investigating all leads. Poor Al had an awful time. We used to tease poor Al, but nobody ever had any idea among us, his associates....

Q: He was like the butler, in a murder myster. He was a natural suspect.

H: Absolutely, that's what I say. Just imagine the FBI coming in there.

Q: I'm still trying, and I hope to succed (off the record).

H: General Marshall used to call on Hopkins at times when things got tight. You'd get results from Hopkins.

Q: Hopkins was a man of action, he was always very close to the President.

H: But you had to make your case to Hopkins. He was smart; he was nobody's fool.

Q: If what Harold George says has any basis, then my conclusion is that Harry Hopkins allowed this piece of paper to get out of his control?

H: Well, I don't think he was the neatest man. I don't know, but I wouldn't think he...

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Q: He used to call in newspapermen, and sort of give them Roosevelt's party line he wanted to get across in the newspaper. It could have been by accident that this guy had access to that plan?

H: Well, it could have been, but I doubt it. I don't know. It's pure speculation, but I'm convinced in my own mine, that these charges against Arnold are just....

Q: Unfounded?

H: Absolutely. From what I know of him, as much as anybody else.

Q: You know, many times in history, a falsehood, a canard, gets to be truth because it gets repeated.

H: Oh, absolutely.

Q: This is one I am so anxious to get at it.

H: The power of the printed word is a terrible thing. A lot of people believe things that they see in print.

Q: And this is why I'm so anxious to get at that report.

H: And particularly a thing like this, because a lot of people, although they don't accept everything, they say where there's so much smoke, there's bound to be some fire.

Q: You see, this guy Waldrop had a guilty conscience, because he was one of the perpetrators of this leak. He's aman who printed it in the paper down here. He feels a sense of guilt, or remorse about it. He may be trying to pin it on somebody. I interviewed him, and I asked him: "You mentioned in the article an AF general but you didn't say who it was?" And he said: "It was Arnold." I said: "I don't believe you," and I told him why. They wanted to embarrass Roosevelt.

H: You've got to remember, this feeling about Roosevelt was very bitter and very strong. Any mention, anything that had to do

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with Roosevelt with a lot of those people, it was just completely out of the question. They just hated his guts.

Q: One man told me that Lindbergh had something to do with leaking that plan. Did you ever hear that?

H: No, I don't know how far away you can get.

Q: All kinds of things. Anyway, my secondary interest is in who did it. My No. 1 interest is "Arnold."

H: Well, I don't know who did it, but....

Q: We are talking about Arnold as a man of action. You know, I helped write a little script for one of these documentary movies. I called it: "Arnold: Man In A Hurry." Does this sort of characterize him in your thinking?

H: Yes, in a way. He would do something. Sometimes it wasn't exactly a fully considered action, but he was a man of action. As a matter of fact, I've always felt this: that of all people that Arnold was primarily responsible for us having the AF we did during the war, because he did do things, and nothing stopped him. He would go right ahead. You needed a guy like that. As I say, you've got to have a man like that, if you are going to get a big job done. Undoubtedly, there would be a lot of mistakes made, and a lot of things that could have been done better. But he did things, there is no question about that.

Q: Did he shoot from the hip when he made decisions?

H: Well, I don't know, sometimes he....it all depends on what you mean, by "shooting from the hip."

Q: Sort of make it without fully considering all the alternatives. A quick judgment?

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H: Yes, as various people used to say. He'd hit that squak box and talk into it. But he would act, and act right now. You remember that horrible airborne thing in Sicily?

Q: Yes, the C-47s got shot down?

H: Joe Swing was over there with them. Joe came back here. We sent him over there at the time as an observer on this thing. He came in and told me this story. I said: "Joe, go right down here and tell everything that you've told me to General Arnold, just the way you told it to me." And he did. And believe me, it didn't wait till the next day to get any action. He had a new commander and a lot of other things. He really acted.

Q: Did he act against Ray Dunn?

H: Well, I'm not sure who the people were involved but, I know he relieved two or three people. He really tore things to pieces. It was bad; there wasn't any question that something needed to be done about it. Now, you have all the facts, and later history, you might look it over and say: "This could have been done in a wiser way, etc." But the fact remains that, boy,he tore that airborne thing, he really worked on them, and he did it right now. That's what he would do.

Q: Would General Swing know about that, he's around.

H: I don't know whether he would or not. He lives out in California. But, old Hap really started right in.

Q: He was a great one for airborne operations, paratroops. He was a great innovator. He liked new techniques and new procedures. He was sort of a gadgeteer with R&D. I know he was very much concerned about that foulup when all those planes got shot down.

H: Well, that was bad, really bad.

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Q: One of the people that lost his job was Ray Dunn who lives in Alexandria. He was one of Arnold's favorites, and after that, Arnold cut him off. Several other people who were close to Arnold. If he felt that they weren't doing a job, he took them out.

H: General Arnold told me one time, there was a lot of truth in it, too. He said that when he was picking guys for real key jobs, he looked more, not in the way the fellow was doing the job he had right then, but his potential for growth. If he had grown with every job he had, that is the guy he was looking for. Of course, he bore down on his people pretty hard, as you know. I guess you have to do it in this business; it is the hardest thing about the whole thing, this relief of men.

Q: Do you remember when he took Hansell out of the B-29 program and put LeMay in? He sent Norstad out there.

H: Well, I remember about the time. I've always given LeMay an awful lot of credit. The B-29 thing wasn't going good at all, and I don't think we'd ever had the B-29s up over Japan on anything like they were, if it hadn't been for LeMay. Now he was ruthless, too, you see, but he really went to town on that business out there with the B-29s.

Q: I've got a feeling that LeMay was sort of cut in the Arnold mold--that there was a job to do, and if you had to hurt some people doing the job, you just did it.

H: As far as the end results, but as far as the attitude, and the way they talked and everything else, I would say "no." But, certainly, Arnold didn't hesitate to take action, even though it hurt somebody's feelings.

Q: Was he more diplomatic than LeMay?

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H: I would say so, yes.

Q: But they both were, perhaps ruthless in getting the job done, is this fair?

H: Well, it all depends on what you mean "ruthless." This business, particularly, if you are cutting off people you've been associated with for years and practically putting them at an end, or ruining their careers, it is a very serious thing. It's the worst thing you've got in this military business--this thing of relieving people.

Q: Well, Arnold relieved people very close to him when he felt they weren't doing. Do you remember he took Eaker out of the 8th AF and put Spaatz in there?

H: No, I don't know anything about that.

Q: Do you recall, Arnold took several people out of jobs, like Henry Harms. He took him out of Newfoundland. He was an old friend from way back, a flier, remember that?

H: No, I don't, but I know he did do things like that. And that's what a guy had to do. Gen Marshall knew that. Believe me, I always thought not easy for him, particularly people he had known well, been real good friends with him.

Q: Marshall had to make some tough decisions, take people out of jobs?

H: Oh yes.

Q: And he didn't hesitate?

H: That's right.

Q: Did he let them down easily or state the facts to them?

H: I don't know, if there is any such thing as letting a man down easy, when he knows he's been relieved.

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Q: Do you remember a guy named Stone? There was a Stone report to Arnold. I talked to Leslie Groves before he died. Stone was sent out to the Pacific theater on some mission. This had to do with the atomic bomb. Do you have any recollection of this mission?

H: No.

Q: Or he came back to Washington with the report on the bomb. You have no recollection?

H: No.

H: We used to meet down in the Chief's office practically every morning. Arnold came down there, this is typical of him. One day I saw him out there in the hall, and I said: "You are all smiles." And he said: "Well, I'm having a good time this morning. I just switched two guys on their jobs." Apparently some fellow was out in Wright Field, some fellow in here saying the other one wasn't doing his job. Hap just transferred each one of them.

Q: Was one of them Benny Meyers, perchance?

H: I don't think so, of course, he got down on Benny after Benny got in all that mess. But on the other hand, Benny Meyers, I think, myself, not knowing too much about it, had an awful lot to do with putting the B-29 program across.

Q: Right, do you remember the time Benny Meyers and Arnold went out to Salina, Kansas, to try to get those planes ready?

H: No, I don't, but I know the people who knew, said that Benny Meyers had a lot to do with the B-29 program.

Q: You know, Arnold had been pressured by Roosevelt to get those B-29s out to the Pacific. They were having trouble, the engines were catching fire....

H: Everything.

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Q: Yes, so that was really a hard job. You know, Arnold had a reputation for pulling people, grabbing people in the hall in the E-ring, and giving them some job. Do you remember any talk about this?

H: No, I know that his staff had that trouble. One fellow described that something would happen and get Hap riled up. He's hit all those buttons on his squawk box, and begin to talk into it.

Q: You mean he would have them all rushing to his office?

H: No, he would begin to talk into it. He wasn't the easiest man in the world to work for, I know that, from what I've heard.

Q: Was Lovett sort of a balance wheel to keep Arnold on course? Did Arnold take impulsive actions and Lovett sort of stand back and get him back on course?

H: I don't know about that. I think Lovett was one of the biggest assets we had in the War Dept. I have a very, very high opinion of Lovett--everything I've ever seen him do. He certainly was a balance wheel on the whole Air business. Had a lot to do with things going along as well as they did. I think Arnold was probably very close to him. But, Lovett, deserves an awful lot of credit. I think he is one of the best, and I still think so.

Q: Do you remember the time Arnold and Marshall went out on a hunting trip. They went on a fishing trip one time, and then a hunting trip, usually on the way to one of these conferences, like Quebec. They'd stop off and go fishing for a day or two. They were always talking about getting away, to go hunting....

H: They went up to the High Sierras.

Q: They went up to the High Sierras for a week. Then they went pheasant hunting in Bismarck, N.D., one time. Did you go on any of these trips with them?

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H: No, no.

Q: Marshall envied Arnold at the end of the war, when Arnold became Commissioner of Fish and Game in California. Marshall had to go to China for President Harry Truman. He was very unhappy about having to stay on, he would have liked to retire. But Truman wouldn't let him. Truman gave him one assignment after another.

H: Well, he didn't ever ask for retirement. I was Deputy then. He asked to be relieved as Chief of Staff. But he did not ask for retirement, and according to the law, those five-star people were not supposed to be retired. They were supposed to be available. Of course, he didn't hardly get his suitcase unpacked down in Leesburg before the President called him, and he came back up. Gen Marshall did so, and talked about it to me.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack in 1945?

H: Yes.

Q: And he was down there in Florida there for a couple of months?

H: Yes, I saw him down there.

Q: He was worried that Marshall would retire him, wasn't he?

H: Not that I know of. He never said it to me. I saw him down there, he was out there on the putting green.

Q: Did you feel he would come back to duty?

H: Well, I didn't know. I understood he had a very severe heart attack, and he started then, this South American thing.

Q: He had another heart attack down there.

H: I know.

Q: This was at the end of the war. They had to drag him back.

H: But he was a man of imagination and schemes, and nothing stopped him. But I saw him, I remember down in Florida. I was down

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there. He wasn't too full of zip.

Q: Yes, he lost some of that zip after the heart attack. Do you remember the Elliott Roosevelt business, the promotion? That was a heck of a thing, wasn't it? How did Elliott Roosevelt get promoted, you know Arnold opposed it, but suddenly he got promoted when Arnold was down in Florida. Did Marshall just sort of say: "Well, we've got to please the old man, the President?"

H: Well, I don't like to talk about that.

Q: Arnold's staff...Norstad and Cabell, and then after they left, Rosie O'Donnell and Jake Smart came in. These were men who did not have a specific job. He used them as trouble shooters. Do you remember? Did you have any contact with these men?

H: No, I know those people, Norstad, Smart, Cabell, but...

Q: Then Rosie O'Donnell came in and took that job. At the end of the war, Fred Dean came in to work for Arnold on that job. Do you remember any other personal anecdotes about you and Arnold?

H: We used to see him every day, practically, the briefings.

Q: Intelligence briefingss. Did he ask a lot of questions at these briefings?

H: No, he didn't. And as a matter of fact, it was quite remarkable. You've got to train briefers like you train everything else. We had some of the boys that were pretty good. When I had operations, I'd get over there about 7:15. They'd brief me and we would go over to the Old Man's place about 9:00, and Arnold was almost always there. We would give him dope as we had it, and most of the questions--if there were really any questions that came up then--would be decided right away--hell of a lot of the. You'd go on back and get to work.

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Q: Did Arnold and Patterson have any problems?

H: I don't know. Maybe they did.

Q: Note: General Handy told a story that at the Teheran conference, when Marshall decided to go around the world, and the thought was that he should have an Air aide, the suggestion was made for Rosie O'Donnell to serve in that capacity. Arnold objected to it, and said that Rosie wasn't even housebroken. So they sent Possum Hansell to accompany Marshall around the world. This was at the end of 1943.

Q: We are talking about long-range escort. You said the AF did some good anticipating.

H: Yes, the thing that struck me about the AF was, they weren't satisfied with anything they had. I told the Ordnance one time, I wish they'd get the attitude toward tanks that the AF had, and they said: "What do you mean?" And I said: "Well, the guns and tanks were always trying to catch up with the other fellow. The AF had the best heavy bomber in the world in the B-17. The B-24 was very good. But they weren't satisfied at all. Although they had the best, and the other fellow wasn't catching us they had a better one, and built the B-29. So they were forward looking.

Q: You felt that Ordnance was always behind the power curve?

H: W ll, Ordnance was always, it seemed to me, trying to catch up.

Q: Do you attribute this forward looking attitude to Arnold's strong view?

H: Well, I don't know. I wouldn't say, altogether. He probably had something to do with it. He was that kind of a guy. They never were satisfied with what they had, going ahead all the time.

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Q: He was never satisfied with what he had. He was always inquiring. He had a great interest in R&D.

H: Oh yes.

Q: Do you have any knowledge or any recollection of any special in the R&D field?

H: No, I know, though, that he set up that group.

Q: Under von Karman?

H: Yes, and he actually ... we had a whole year of this after the war. But Arnold, I think, was the guy who pushed it originally, this scientific....

Q: Right, he set up RAND, he was the one who started this think factory idea. They put it under Douglas. Did you have any knowledge of his relations with Donald Douglas?

H: No, no, I didn't.

Q: On code names, you say Churchill didn't like SOAPSUBS. He wanted something that had historical meaning?

H: Yes, or more expressive, you see, it was just a nickname somebody pulled out.

Q: OVERLORD or something.

H: Yes, yes.

Q: You know, they had GYMNAST.

H: Well, that was more meaningful than SOAPSUDS. SOAPSUDS was one he picked as a horrible example.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Churchill? Did they get along pretty well?

H: Well, no, not directly, so far as I know.

Q: How about Arnold and Roosevelt. Did they get along pretty well?

H: I guess so, I don't know. I was never present when the JCS met with the President.

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Q: Were you on the IOWA when it got, when somebody fired a torpedo at it? Do you remember anything about that incident?

H: Oh yes.

Q: What happened there?

H: In the first place, it is kind of foolish to load up all this brass, the President included. Well, the President used to come out every day. They'd roll him out. He had that place up there, particularly when they had the anti-aircraft practice. They had it every day. Well, we had some destroyers along with us. One guy was just having one hell of a time, keeping up. He was making smoke, and Ernie King was sending him messages, you know, flag signals. Everybody knew this poor skipper was just catching immortal hell. We kind of felt sorry for him. Well, when they had this practice drill, apparently the destroyers went through their stuff, and got ready for antisubmarine attack. Anyhow, what happened was, this guy, as I say, had been making smoke. I'll tell you the other side of what happened was--it was like when somebody said, "Clear the chamber!" Some guy didn't do it. You know, like you would with a rifle, secure it. Now they had the warheads on. This was actual stuff, there wasn't any play about it. They had them trained out. Some guy didn't do his job on the "secure."

Q: On this one ship that was making smoke?

H: Yes, and it can happen to any of us. Some guy mess it up. This damn torpedo launched right toward the IOWA. I was standing up there on the bridge, we were watching this thing with Savvy Cook, who was my opposite number in the Navy. Macrea was skipper of the IOWA.

Q: He was naval aide to the President?

H: That's right, and he had the IOWA then. Somebody yelled about a torpedo. You could see the damn thing coming toward you in the

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water, and what happened, it passed to the rear of us.

Q: Did you make a violent turn at first?

H: Oh, absolutely, right into it.

Q: We are talking about the torpedo that nearly hit the IOWA.

H: We headed right toward the torpedo.

Q: Well, it was heading toward you, the ship.

H: Yes, broadside target, the IOWA is terribly long ship.

Q: Yes, it was a big target.

H: Anyhow, the thing went to the rear of us, 500-600 yards maybe. You did feel the shock?

Q: It exploded in your wake, didn't it?

H: You heard a kind of a dull sound, and felt the shock, and Savvy Cook said that that had happened before. It wasn't unusual for torpedoes would be detonated in a heavy wake. It was really pouring on the coal, and churning up a lot of water, the IOWA was, well.

Q: But it didn't happen before that somebody launched a torpedo at our own ship?

H: No.

Q: That didn't happen too often did it?

H: Well, everybody felt sorry for this poor skipper. I asked some of the Navy people what happened to him. They said: "He wasn't promoted." But we never said anything about that. That thing was never published until after the war. It was just as well.

Q: What did the President do?

H: Well, so far as I know, he didn't do anything.

Q: I heard quite a story that appeared in the Navy Journal, that Prettyman, his valet. FDR wanted to see the torpedo. He pushed his wheelchair up to the side.

H: I wouldn't be surprised. The President was generally out

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there during this practice, and he liked it. They'd rush him out on this little deck out there. We all said: "Oh, my God. They got half the Navy out there." We had a bunch of these escort carriers, put them ahead. They couldn't keep up with the IOWA. They provided the air cover over there. They had all the Chiefs of Staff and the President and everything else....

Q: On this one ship?

H: Yes, on one ship.

Q: What did Arnold say?

H: I don't know.

Q: You know, according to the story, Arnold said to King: "Does this happen often in your Navy?" Did Arnold and King like to rag each other?

H: Well, I don't know. I don't think they were on a ragging basis. I didn't get that impression.

Q: Or did they give each other the needle once in a while?

H: Well, they might have.

Q: Let me ask you about the wisdom of putting the President on a ship. Of course, the President wanted to travel by ship. But it really was dangerous to travel by ship, was it not, when he could have flown?

H: Well, that was dangerous, too.

Q: Well, it wasn't as dangerous as going by ship. You know, you could get torpedoed.

H: Did you ever see the antiaircraft protection and everything they had around one of those capital ships? Nothing in the world is as well protected.

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Q: Yes, but you could have a torpedo come in there?

H: Yes, but we had destroyers all around us. That's what this guy was doing. We had a whole screen around us.

Q: Well screened. Do you think it was safer to go by ship than to fly?

H: I don't know. I don't think it was very wise to load everything up on one ship.

Q: Were you on the trip right before the war, at Newfoundland? This is the Argentia Conference.

H: No, I wasn't.

Q: You were out of Washington at the time?

H: Well, I was down here on duty in Washington, but I didn't go; Charlie Bundy went from War Plans. He was killed afterwards. He was going out to Pearl Harbor with Dargue.

Q: Oh, he was in that plane with Dargue?

H: Didn't get the bodies for quite a while.

Q: You know, Dargue was one of the men who probably would have gone very far if he hadn't been killed, because he was one of the old time fliers.

H: Well, I never knew him, but that was his reputation.

Q: Several other fliers of the old school didn't make it in WW II, like Foulois. Benny Foulois never got a job. Why didn't he ever get a job, do you know?

H: Well, I don't know Gen Foulois, of course, he was getting on, older, too.

Q: Yes, but he just died two years ago. So he lived a long time. Another fellow that didn't get a big job was Frank Lahm.

H: I never knew him; I know the name.

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Q: I just wondered why. You know, somebody told me about Arnold, that he got rid of all his rivals, sent them out of Washington?

H: Well, I don't know. You see, what happened, and maybe to a certain extent, it was true of the Air people as well as the Army. If you look back, you find out that very few people who were rated as completely outstanding just before the war, really had the key jobs during the war. They cut down to the Eisenhower-Bradley level. So I think the AF probably did, maybe more so, because they didn't have so many older ones. But if you take Gen Marshall, Old Man Krueger, and DeWitt. Now they were outstanding. But, that's about all. You saw, in real key positions, people that had big reputations, before the war....

Q: Didn't make it?

H: Well, they were older. But the people that were rated as outstanding--people forget a lot of things--weren't the people who did the big jobs during the war. Marshall, Krueger and DeWitt were in a higher bracket, older, but you don't find many others, well, MacArthur, of course.

Q: Did you ever regret not having a combat command? Did you try to get one?

H: Well, yes, but there were enough people worrying the Old Man. When I told him I wanted to get out of there, but I figured that was enough. Because I had enough people on my neck, my own people worrying me all the time, I knew what it was. I think you figure you've got to do the job you've got. You can't pick up. But I think everybody had that. They knew the real reputations were going to be made out of Washington.

Q: One of the criticisms of the War Dept General Staff right before the war, was that they didn't give the Air enough autonomy

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or responsibility, or budget. Do you feel that this is a justified criticism?

H: Well, if you look at it from the long-range viewpoint, it probably is. If you look at it from the immediate practical viewpoint, remember those were the days when money was awfully, awfully scarce. We didn't have anything else. If you spent all on Air, you wouldn't have had very much.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold first came in in 1938, they had a big conference at the White House? This is right after Hitler and Munich. Everybody knew there was going to be a war, or they thought there was going to be a war. They had this big conference, and Roosevelt wanted to expand the AF, yet the War Dept General Staff wouldn't let the Air Corps, at that time, expand. They wouldn't give them the money that the President had voted to airpower. They tried to hold back on it. This is just about the time Craig was going out, and Marshall was coming in. Do you remember anything like that?

H: No.

Q: Do you feel that the Air Corps was sat on by the General Staff, to some extent?

H: Well, yes,and everybody else was, too. There were other people that had very vital claims that never got them. You never hear about those.

Q: The Air Corps you heard about? But one of the things they wanted was the big bombers, and they weren't getting any. They were getting small planes. Were you conscious they were trying to make a showing, to make it look good, that we had a lot of planes, but actually these were small planes?

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H: Well, I don't know. I don't know enough about it to say I know it was a controversial question.

Q: What was your job right before the war?

H: I was in War Plans. I was a junior member.

Q: Gerow was the head of War Plans.

H: Well, old Man Kreuger was, I was just supposed to be there. You mean, just before the war? Well, Gerow was there. That was 1941. I was down in what they called the Plans Section, Al Wedemeyer, Frank Kibbler, Lev Allen, a few others.

Q: Arnold never had a combat command. In WW I he spent the war in Washington, and he got out of Washington just before the Armistice. He never got into combat. This was sort of a sensitive spot with Arnold. When his staff officers came to him and wanted an opportunity to get into combat, it was hard for him to turn them down. Were you aware of Arnold's hangup in this respect?

H: Well, I don't know. Maybe all of us had it a little bit. But I don't know that, I never thought that it was critical with him, but it may have been.

Q: Did he ever mention it to you, that he never was in combat?

H: No.

Q: This might have contributed to the fact that Andrews was considered to be the combat leader, and Arnold the sort of Washington branch?

H: Well, that's right, and see, Andrews had GHQ AF, and that was to be the tactical force that was set up under MacArthur. They picked Andrews to command it.

Q: Right, Arnold had the reputation of sort of being the Washington representative of the Air Corps?

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H: Well, I'm not sure about that. But Andrews, well, Andrews I guess was senior to Arnold.

Q: Did Marshall ever think of letting Arnold go out and have a combat command?

H: I don't know.

Q: Of course, Marshall wanted a combat command himself?

H: Oh, absolutely, everybody did.

Q: And the decision was made to keep him in Washington. I think Churchill probably contributed to that.

H: Oh, I don't think so.

Q: Oh, was it the President?

H: Yes, and pressures from back here, and I think people on the Hill, and everything else. It would have been quite difficult for somebody to have taken Gen Marshall's place. They had a scheme at one time where he was going to have a dual status. I told him, I said: "It won't work." He knew it all the time. I said: "You are always talking," which he was, "about localitis and theateritis." I said: "That is a very healthy condition. Unless a guy is absolutely devoted, and is straining every effort for his command, he's got no business having the command, particularly a big and important one." I said: "You can't possibly have this dual status. You are going to be like everybody else." There would be something wrong, if you weren't. If you were a theater commander over there, that's going to be No. 1, bound to be with you. But anyhow, it wasn't done.

Q: I want to ask you about McNarney, the man you succeeded as Deputy. McNarney was an Air man, but he was not necessarily air-oriented. He was much devoted to Gen Marshall, and I don't think the Air Corps, the AAF, considered him to be one of their people.

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In other words, he was not a partisan. He was not an Air zealot, like some of the others who were. Was this what attracted Marshall to him?

H: Well, I don't know whether that was true at all, or not, or whether General Marshall knew this. But he had a lot of respect for McNarney's ability. McNarney would do the job he had to do, you see, regardless of whether he stepped on the Air people toes. They weren't sanctified to him like they were to some others, but I don't think that affected Gen Marshall. I think he wanted an Air Corps man in there as Deputy.

Q: But he didn't want a man who didn't think Air Corps, who thought broader?

H: Well, I don't know that. He didn't control, or didn't even know McNarney at all. I don't think that McNarney, if they were right in saying he wasn't devoted to the Air. I remeber he told the JCS one time it would be nothing more or less, I don't think he used the word "criminal" but inexecusable, if they didn't push the B-29 program. When there was a question...

Q: He may have looked at these things as a weapon system necessary to have, but not from the partisan standpoint that others might have?

H: That's right.

Q: I think this is one of the reasons Marshall is attracted to him. He could get a fair appraisal of something from McNarney, without Marshall thinking; well, he is pushing something for the AF.

H: Joe was a hell of a good fellow to get a job done. It was surprising. It was decided, what it was going to be. The reorganization

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of the War Dept. Well, General Marshall turned to McNarney, and he did it, and he did it in a comparatively short time. I always thought a lot of Joe, and had a lot of respect. He was back there in War Plans one time before the war. I don't know if this was when Gen Marshall was head of it, or not. But he was a junior member like we all were. I remember my first impression. I was sitting in the same room with him, down in that old Winder Building, before we moved into Munitions, across from State, War and Navy. Anyhow, they decided--you see Puerto Rico had been a part of the Second Corps Area--they decided to set up a separate department for Puerto Rico. McNarney was the action officer. Well that was a hell of a big thing for a peacetime operation. But McNarney did that thing just as smoothly and in a comparatively short time. Now, he stepped on somebody's toes, because like reorganizing the War Department, Joes said they could ask questions and make suggestions as to how this thing--they thought it would work best--but there wasn't any use spending any time, saying they shouldn't have it, because that had been decided--I mean the reorganization of the War Dept. He just shut them all off like that. And he did it very effectively.

Q: Actually, there were two successive reorganizations of the War Department. First, in 1941, right before Pearl Harbor, when they set up the AAF.

H: Yes, I know.

Q: They didn't give it autonomy?

H: They set up, really, three deputies....

Q: Bryden, Moore and Arnold?

H: That's right.

Q: And that wasn't too satisfactory, why?

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H: Well, I don't know. A lot of things weren't too satisfactory then.

Q: And then they had the further reorganization, and McNarney handled the whole thing. This was three months after Pearl Harbor?

H: Yes, he was--you mentioned his name a while ago in England--McNarney was in that group.

Q: The observers?

H: Chaney. He was with him, on his staff. He had been on Andrews' staff, too, GHQ AF.

Q: Why didn't Chaney work out? Do you know?

H: Well, I don't know. He didn't work out, and he didn't accomplish why they thought could have been accomplished over there. It may have been, although I never heard, any open conflict with the British. But he was picked as the fair-haired boy, and could have been a respected theater commander.

Q: But Arnold didn't like him either, he didn't have enough regard for airpower. They were trying to build up this so-called BOLERO airpower in England to soften up Germany for the invasion. Suddenly there was a change--I'm talking about early summer 1942. They decided to abandon the invasion, SLEDGEHAMMER. They went to North Africa. Do you remember any background of that decision?

H: Well, there was a lot of background, a lot of discussion, backwards and forwards. The President and Prime Minister, I think, really made the decision. We were in a bad way, anyhow, because we were developing quite an Army and we didn't have any place to use them, to tell you the truth. I was personally always opposed to the North African thing, although it was successful later on.

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Q: You thought we ought to go into NW Europe?

H: Yes. I felt that it was a diversion of effort. You had to, you know, fight the Germans, and it was peripheral. The overall result f it was very good, but it was terrifically expensive in the most precious thing of all, the shipping. See, we moved the people to England, and had to move them to Africa, and then have to move them back.

Q: Looking back at it now, do you still think North Africa was a mistake?

H: Well, I don't know, when a thing is successful, it is hard to say it was a mistake. I'll tell you what Al Wedemeyer told me one time. Of course, the Old Man, the Prime Minister, almost had a fit; Mr. Churchill, he was the GYMNAST (African invasion). After the war, Al saw the Prime Minister. He said he said to him: "We often wondered if we had gone ahead with our original plan, and really built up, with the idea of going into Europe, if it wouldn't have meant the war would have been over a year earlier?"

Q: Instead of dissipating our force, if we had built up for an invasion in 1943?

H: We started to. We had troops in Ireland. Well, the biggest bottleneck was shipping. We used the damn ships to haul them to Africa, and then to haul them back. In the meantime, we could have built up in England much faster than we di. Now, maybe it would have been premature.

Q: There was a diversion to TORCH, the North African thing?

H: Oh yes.

Q: How did Arnold feel about TORCH?

H: I don't know. I think after the decision was made, everybody felt they had to put their hands to the wheel and do everything

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they could to make it a success. But it was done on a shoestring, actually. We never took the chances later that we took earlier. You asked whether it was worthwhile. It was from this viewpoint. I think, myself, that most important, single thing--if you have to pick out one thing--in the war-making business the greatest advantage you can have is possession of initiative. In other words, having the other guy scared of what you are going to do, instead of shivering all over about what he's going to do to you next. Well, we got it in North Africa. After that, the Germans wondered where we were coming next. We got it at Guadalcanal in the Pacific, too. My own opinion is, that was really the turning point of the war, in both theaters, because we did get--it was very evident what was happening to us; you know the Japs. If you don't push them, they push you. And we were being pushed. We had already been pushed out of the Western Pacific. We were going to be pushed out of all of it, eventually. We got the initiative. The Japs began to worry about what we were going to do, and the same thing with North Africa.

Q: There was another factor involved, too. In 1942, they wanted these men to taste combat under conditions not too adverse?

H: Well, I don't know about that. But the President practically told us we had to get some place to use the Army, don't you see. North Africa seemed to be the thing, and I think the British were always very gun shy of this invasion.

Q: Well, after the raid at Dieppe, it was such a disaster.

H: I was over there in England right after Dieppe. Mountbatten came in there and told Ike about it. It was a terrible mess. The Canadians, I don't think they have ever forgiven the British. It showed us this which we had been convinced of before. We thought

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maybe a combined operation, they had one guy running the show. Well, they didn't. The British never did. They weren't able to get him. Now, what happened in Dieppe. Our people, we had people along with them. They were all convinced the Germans knew all about it, beforehand. The Canadians believed that too. But what had happened was the same old story. They set a time for it, and then, the Navy would say, the weather wasn't right, and the Air would say it was, and they all had a say. None could say: "Well, boys, we've looked at all that. Now we are going ahead and do it." They monkeyed around; they changed it two or three times. We felt, our people did, that the Germans had pretty good knowledge of what was coming, and they just laid back there, and shot them sitting. The Canadians were very bitter about it. Of course, they took the biggest losses of all. They got a hell of a bloody nose there. Remember this: the British had always let somebody else carry the bulk of the fighting in all their wars, and very wisely, and had done very well with it. The British, I think, began to wonder if they were really capable of going up against a Germany army.

Q: This contributed to the decision to go into North Africa? They were a little bit gun shy about tackling the Germans at that time. They were too strong.

H: It probably did. Yes, the thing worked out all right, but it could have been a real disaster.

Q: Well, Arnold was opposed to TORCH because it meant diverting a lot of our airpower to North Africa, what he had tried to build up.

H: I know. We all had the same basic feeling about it. But it was decided, and I think after that, there was a hell of an effort made to build up down there.

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Q: The close air support which the AF, or the AAF gave the Army--many people, like Lesley McNair didn't think we were doing enough close air support. We in the AF weren't doing enough close air support because they were too concerned with strategic bombing and not enough for tactical support. This came up in several maneuvers right at the beginning of the war. Were you familiar with some of this static within the Army?

H: Well, certainly that was the Army's viewpoint, and I think, fully justified one, maybe the Air people. I'll tell you a little story in that connection. I went up to ... In that connection, I went up to Constantine. Maybe the Air people had their side. Tooey Spaatz had his headquarters there toward the end of the Runisian campaign. I was there for a couple of weeks. I was going up with Bradley, with the divisions. They were still fighting. They had a lot of complaints about close air support. Tooey and Ike had asked me to look into it a little bit. Tooey said something about it, too. He had this guy, a New Zealander, named Coningham, who was a rabid RAF guy.

Q: Was that "Mary" Coningham?

H: Yes, and I never thought but very little of him, the way he talked. The British Army, they had actually shot at the RAF. The RAF had bombed them in the desert, according to the stories. It was that bad. I went up there,and when I came back, Tooey asked me about the thing. I don't remember whether he asked me to look into it before, but he said: "How about this thing. We are getting a lot of complaints. Ike has asked me to look into it." "Well, Tooey," I said, "I'll tell you what the boys up there are saying and I'll

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tell you furthermore, it's the truth." You are talking about all this air effort. Maybe there is good reason for it, but the only airplanes they see out there--a doughboy--and for a long time they've seen are the L-4s and the German Messerschmidt. That is the God's truth, if you want to know it." I said: "As far as those people up there fighting their own people, the AF could be in Timbucktu." He told me they were supporting the 8th Army effort. But, anyhow, that was what the doughs not only were thinking, but what was the God's truth. You never saw one of our airplanes.

Q: Was this brought to Arnold's attention?

H: I imagine, so, yes.

Q: Did you ever hear him express himself on tactical air support?

H: No.

Q: Of course, this was rectified at OVERLORD. You know, Eisenhower is supposed to have said to a group, as they were going across. Just before they went, he said: "If you see any planes, they will be ours." By that time, by OVERLORD, we had wiped the skies clean of the Germans, so it took a little time for them to do this. But did you ever heard Arnold express himself on that?

H: No.

Q: Arnold, Marshall and King visited the Normandy beachhead, two or three days after the invasion started. Did you go with them?

H: No, because I went over there on D-Day, Savvy Cook and I, at Omaha Beach. We went ashore on D-Day and we were back. You see, they sent Savvy and Larry Kuter and myself over ahead of time. I think the Chiefs of Staff had some curiosity, and wanted to be in on the big show. But I think another thing affected them. You see, a lot of these things you look at them in view of what happened.

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Now, we look at the invasion and it was oh, beautiful. Everything worked fine, but let me tell you, it wasn't certain beforehand at all. Believe me on D-Day, on Omaha Beach, we hung on there for hours, practically by our eyelashes. Savvy Cook said when we got ashore there: "God, this is carnage!" He had never seen anything like it in his life, and it was really bad. Well, anyhow, the figures, I think, as a matter of fact, Gen Marshall told me, that it was possible--I don't think they thought that it was probable--that the decision might have to be made to pull off. They didn't feel that whole thing should be left on Eisenhower. Maybe they'd better be there.

Q: This is why the Chiefs came in? In the event they had to pull out...

H: Well, that was one thing, I think they had to be in on the big show.

Q: Did they make a decision to go at the last minute?

H: Well, it was made sometime ahead. They sent us over ahead of time.

Q: But they had planned to come themselves?

H: Oh yes. I don't know whether they told anybody else or not. But they had agreed--Arnold, King and Marshall. They were going, without a doubt. But Larry Kuter went off with the B-17s somewhere, and Savvy and I went with the OMAHA landing. We were on Admiral Hall's flagship, the HANCOCK. Gerow was on there, incidentally, with the 5th Corps. Huebner had first division. Believe me, that was a tough one, that Omaha Beach.

Q: That Omaha Beach was touch-and-go there for a day or two, wasn't it?

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H: Well, it was for hours, we came back to the ship. It was an awfully long day, 17 or 18 hours long. Huebner had gone ashore, and Gerow was getting ready to go ashore with the Corps Hq.

Q: They called that "The Longest Day."

H: He said: "How about it?" And I said: "Well, it isn't too good, and the only thing in God's world that you can possibly do, is push in there, far enough, regardless of the losses, with the infantry, to get those beaches out of small arms and mortar range." Hell, they were still...and Savvy said it was slaughter, and it was, it was a mess.

Q: Do you think the Air Corps, or the AAF, did a good job on the beachhead?

H: Well, I think so, yes; so far as I know, yes. But that was right on the beachhead. Of course, those Germans came in there with the maneuvers, you know, and believe me, that was tough.

Q: A week after D-Day, the Germans started lobbing V-1s over England?

H: I know, we were right there in England.

Q: Do you know anything about that when it happened?

H: Yes, we were all staying down there at that place the fellow built on the dams some place.

Q: Were you near Marshall and Arnold when this happened?

H: Yes, yes.

Q: What kind of reaction did they have?

H: Well, they didn't think it was so good. We all did--one of them hit fairly close in the village over there. So we went over and looked at it. Cooke, Kuter and myself looked at the effects of that thing, and it was the V-1s, of course.

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Q: I understand that Arnold ran over and started to get pieces of it. He was anxious to see what the Germans had.

H: Well, maybe so; I don't know whether he was over there at this village. I don't know.

Q: You didn't see him?

H: Well, I don't recall it. Now, he might have been there, you know, these things....

Q: He was in England at the time?

H: Oh yes, we were all down in the country there, staying down there.

Q: He was a great gadgeteer. You know, Arnold got pieces of the V-1 and he put it together, and we ended up with a better version of the V-1 than the Germans had. It was called the JB-2, and Arnold was going to launch these against the Germans, but this project was killed late in the war. You don't remember that?

H: No, I know there were a lot of schemes.

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9-22-70

September 18, 1970

General Thomas T. Handy, US Army(Ret)
3325 Runnymede Place, NW
Washington, DC 20015

Dear General Handy:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. In setting up some interviews of those who knew him best, I thought of you and your many wartime contacts.

You may wish to know that I'm a professional historian and have been associated with the Secretary's office for the past 24 years. I have been working on my project for about three years now, including a stint as a Brookings Fellow to research the Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress. My research has also taken me to the G.C. Marshall Library at VMI in Lexington, Virginia and to Hyde Park to review the FDR Collection.

I've also been fortunate to interview many of the greats associated with General Arnold including: Honorable Robert Lovett, Eddie Rickenbacker, Alexander de Seversky, Generals Norstad, Kuter, Kenney, Spaatz, Eaker and perhaps 50 others.

And so, I'm hopeful you can spare me an hour or two at a time convenient for you. Enclosed is an envelope if you wish to drop me a note. My Pentagon phone is OX5-3862.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Handy - Bill Darby's trip in ETO
age 45

Handy - Arrange with Arnold
for release 7 players from Turkey
Placetti (Gen Goodfrey one (Eagle)
- Arnold may have to pay for airplanes

Handy - 20th Concept - thought poor idea
but didn't have a better one so said OK

(Grove) Stone Report to Arnold -

3rd bomb -
surrender

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Hansell, Haywood S. - 9 Apr 67
2 Jun 70

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INTERVIEW OF GEN HAYWARD S. HANSELL
AIR FORCE ACADEMY
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
APRIL 19, 1967

(Re-transcription)

(Q: The first question referred to the CBO in Europe. Did we come close to changing our bombing tactics and bomb at night?)

H: I think it was touch and go for a while. The losses in the 1st Bomb Wing (which he commanded) were very heavy. We got down to about 50% strength, as I told these gentlemen a while ago we lost 120% of the combat crews in 7 months. At that time, we were operating without a fighter escort, and there was a very, urgent surge and trend toward going to night bombing. One reason for not doing it the B-17 was not well equipped for it; the Norden bombsight was not a very good sight at night, the airframe would have had to be modified to cut out the exhaust flow. A lot of things would have had to be done with the airplane. But I suppose, most important, we would have had to give up our whole concept of strategic air warfare, and we kept feeling that if we could just learn to shoot reasonable well - we were lousy shots to start with - and fly in formation, and could get a big enough force, we could take it. The losses did vary with size of force. As the force got bigger, the percentage losses went down, this was a great help. But there was a period in which actually we had a few B-17s fight in night operations, and we were very reluctant to have to do it, because it would have involved a recasting of the entire concept of the war, both on the air and on the ground.

(Q: Hansell was asked about the few B-17s that did go out at night)

H: We didn't want the word to get out that we were serious about the possibility of having to abandon the old concept.

(Q: He was asked : Was this <u>after</u> Schweinfurt? And he answered it was before Schweinfurt)

H: Before Schweinfurt. There was as you know, a lull in the depth of penetration when the escort fighters were beginning to come into play. If we hadn't gotten escort fighters, then I think it's a moot question as to whether we would have to abandon it. I wouldn't say definitely we would have to abandon it, because the outfit did show an amazing capacity for taking punishment and going on.

(Q: General, I think the Cadets would be interested in the story of Ralph Steakley over Japan and what happened ultimate to the pictures he took?)

H: I am glad to talk about this a little bit, because it was one of the most important single events in the conduct of the war in my opinion. We were on Saipan with about 40 or 50 B-29s, with a deadline on the 30th of October. We had a deadline for an operation against Japanese aircraft industry on 15th of November, 15 days ahead, and we had no target folders. We didn't know where the Japanese aircraft industry was. Steakly came out with those the first F-15, which was a reconn version of the B-29. They made a 33 hour, two-stop flight getting out there, and I tried to persuade them to get some rest before going on. They insisted on going on, and thank the Lord they did, because about 5 hours later, after refueling, they took off for Japan. They hit Japan on one of the rare, clear days.

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I don't know if they had them any more or not, but that one was clear. They flew over Tokyo and the Nagoya area for about an hour and a half. They came back with something wonderful. Priceless pictures that made all the difference in the world to us. We were able, not only to prepare the detailed target photos, but prepare select I.P.'s, to prepare mosaics going in from the I.P.'s to the target. As a matter of training, we required every crew to trace the mosiac, to trace the details of the targets, to trace the details of the cutouts of his I.P. to the target, and then do it over from memory, and do it over and over again. So that, by the time the first mission did come off, they were thoroughly familiar with the nature of the terrain and the nature of the target. There is a side issue to this thing. I was so pleased with these - you know the initial operation against Japan was supposed to be a combined one. The Navy was supposed to conduct Operation HOTFOOT at the same time. That would divert some further fighter opposition away from us, by attacking the vicinity of Yokohoma with carriers. And then, they were in the same fix we were, they didn't have any pictures of targets, either. And when I got these pictures, I was so pleased with them, I got a staff C-47 and gave a set of these pictures to the pilot and told him: "Go find Adm Halsey, I don't know where he is. But take these pictures to him." And we sent out a set to the Joint Chiefs. I didn't get any acknowledgement of this. I'd thought he would be very pleased. But the next I heard of it, I got a report from JCS to the effect that Adm Halsey had requested that I discontinue flying over Japan.

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Which was a strange reaction we got for these fine pictures.

(Q: General Hansell was asked about the first B-29 raid over Tokyo from the Marianas)

H: Well, the first operation against Japan was called San Antonio 1. It was coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategy, which made the timing extremely important. As a matter of fact, we were in some danger of standing or falling on this operation. The 20th AF was under very severe criticism for this very concept - the idea of having a force of this magnitude in somebody else's theater that was not beholden to the local commander. There was sniping from every side. All the theater commands wanted the force broken up and turned over to them, and we were in very serious worry about the possibility of not making this thing, for it was timed with MacArthur's operation and Nimitz'. It would have been a black eye for us if we hadn't been able to make it. When the date came around - Nov 15th - the orders were out, the airplanes were warmed up, and they had taxiied out to the end of the one strip we had. At that time, the wind which had been flowing constantly down the runway for the last six weeks, died down to nothing, so the airplanes would just barely make the takeoff. They had designed for 120,000 pounds gross weight. We got authorization to raise it to 132,000 pounds in an effort to get enough gasoline aboard to get there and back. We were actually then taking off at 140,000. They had all the gasoline that could be pumped into them. And even the, it was very marginal.

NOTE: We have statements by Arnold pushing to load 140,000 pounds in the B-29s and Hansell was slow to respond.

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But it also meant that if you had a faltering engine, you were all through. The engines were running so hot in that climate, that you couldn't run them up before the takeoff run. So we went through the tricky process of checking the ignition in the first 500 feet of the takeoff. If something went wrong you tried to stop it. A very marginal sort of an operation, and when the wind stopped, it was a very serious thing. While we were discussing what to do about it, it reversed, and began going in the opposite direction. And at that time, we had a taxi way at only one end of this single strip. One strip, taxi at one end only, and it would have been impossible to taxi the airplanes the length of the strip and take off in the opposite direction. It would have taken in so much time in the assembly thereafter, we wouldn't have made it. So I had to scrub the mission. Very regretful decision, but it didn't seem to be anything else for it. And 3 or 4 hours later, we were in the midst of an intense tropical storm, hurricane, a typhoon. It lasted about 6 days, left the camp just a quagmire. Meantime, B-29s were all loaded with bombs, standing by. The orders went out. We were in very serious way for fear of a security leak it was pretty much too late to change. We kept thinking every day that maybe we would make it. We sent weather airplanes out through this hurricane to trace it up the coast. It went right on up our route to Japan. As a result, it was Nov 24th, 9 days later, before we were able to get that mission off. And when it could get off, there were 119 airplanes on the island, and 111 of them got off - that was quite a remarkable thing for an airplane that's new and untried as that

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one was - without any difficulties whatever. We were having to support the airplanes individually from Sacramento. So getting off that size a force is quite an achievement. The operation wasn't as good as we would have liked it to be, but as in initial effort, it did show us it could be done. And this was a very doubtful issue at the time.

(Q: Gen Hansell was asked a supplementary question whether, if he had gotten the airplanes off before the storm broke, would he have lost his whole mission?)

H: Couple of hours earlier, couple of hours difference in this weather situation, we would have lost the entire Bomber Command. Because there was no other place to go. The nearest landing field was Kwajalein, and that was 1,200 miles away. This was obvioulsy a great worry, anyway, because if an airplen came back damaged, and landed on the airfield, or on the one strip, and cracked up, we were out of luck. The airplane was too big to be moved - 100,000 pounds is a lot of airplane - and there wouldn't have been time to destroy it, I don't think, to get other airplanes in. We would have had to try to destroy it, to make room for other aircraft, and we did have something like this happen two nights later. On Sunday, Nov 27th, second day after the operation, we made another attack on Tokyo. It was a bright, clear sunny Sunday noon. The first thing that disturbed us, we got attacked by 6 Japanese airplanes, without any warning whatever. I was having lunch in Rosie O'Donnell's very bad mess. We came out, standing there enjoying the sunshine, and there was an airplane flying around. O'Donnell said: "I wish you would do something about these damned Marine fighters. They are no good.

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They are supposed to be defending the island, and I don't think they are paying any attention to it, and they go flying around, and blow dust on my maintenance lines." I said they don't belong to me. I'll see if I can do something about it. I'd tried a couple of times. Anyway, we were just having this kind of a conversation when the airplanes started shooting. They were Japanese airplanes. I got in my jeep and went hotfooting up to the hill..... And as I came over the crest of the hill, I ran right smack into a Japanese Zero, I stopped the jeep, with the intention of getting under it, but I was forestalled. By the time I'd tried, my Chief of Staff was already there. But that attack did destroy three or 4 B-29s, and damaged a number of others. Thank God the command was out. Because if they had all been there - they were parked two a hardstand - terribly conjested. A few of them did go off. They were loaded and it's a very messy thing to try and put out a fire like that, and not much equipment to do it with. If we had the whole Command on the ground, I think it would have been quite disastrous. As it was, we had 80 B-29s out. When they came back about 9:00 that night, a small storm moved in - a very intense tropical storm. We had no landing lights, no runway lights, except smudge pots, obviously no GCA or ILS, or anything of this kind. I was standing in the tower, and from the tower looking down, I couldn't see the runway, the rain was so intense. The air was presently full of conversation saying: "I am over Saipan, I think" or "I am out of gasoline. Request instructions." There must have been 40 or 50 milling around.

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(Q: General Hansell was asked how he resolved the problem of personal command of his forces. The question was directed at the reason he decided to the force on its bombing mission.)

H: I got a message from Gen Arnold, grounding me on the ground that I had too much information. I ignored it, and the next thing I knew, a burly looking Petty Officer from the Navy came and called on me and demanded signature for this damned message, so I was grounded. I still think it would have been better to have gone on this mission. I doubt if I would have exercised any command.

(Q: You had the same restrains in Europe during the B-17 operation?)

H: No. There we established a limit in the 1st Bomb Wing. We were losing group commander so fast that I put a limit on group commanders of one mission a month. I put the same limit on myself and on my staff.

(Q: General, tell about your trip with Gen Marshall and the meeting with General MacArthur?)

H: Well, that's just a little sidelight scene, but yes, I think it did give a picture of the people involved. At the Cairo conference, Gen Marshall came on over around the world. And I came with him. This was a new experience to me, too. I thought like I was pretty well chosen as a BG to follow along with Gen Marshall on an occasion like this. And I finally spent most of my time carrying his luggage.

NOTE: Arnold also went around the world accompained by Jake Smart.

But it was an interesting experience to have listened in on this. And he had a meeting with Gen MacArthur - a very tense meeting,

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so far as personalities are concerned. Gen MacArthur had been Chief of Staff when Gen Marshall was a Major. And now the situation was reversed. Gen Marshall was Chief of Staff and Gen MacArthur a theater commander. There were 4 people present at this discussion. Gen Kenney and I and Gen Marshall and Gen MacArthur. Gen MacArthur went to a map in his hqs., and talked for an hour and a half - the most lucid explanation I've ever heard. All the information at his fingertips and he spoke persuasively. And when he got all thourhg, he described in detail the nature of the operations, that had to be performed, the timing involved in it, the forces he'd need, what he expected to accomplish at the various phases - beautifully worked out. And then Gen Marshall got up and spent about an hour explaining to MacArthur that he couldn't have the forces. And this was a very tense situation. It was an extremely dignified one. They addressed each other as "General". They very carefully waited until each had said what he was saying. A very formal dissertation, discussion. Very interesting one.

(Q: Tell us about you impressions of Franklin Roosevelt)

H: So far as President Roosevelt is concerned, I think he was a very fine wartime President, wartime commander. He listened to Gen Marshall, I think more than anybody else, and secondarily, perhaps, to Mr. Stimson, who was also very fine citizen. But Gen Marshall had the President's complete confidence, and he was very careful about exercising it. I did get a chance to brief the President on the progress of the war in Europe, and left him with the greatest assurance that

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I didn't feel that we were doing fine. At any rate, he listened very attentively, and was an easy person to talk to. He would listen to you.

H: The B-40 was a B-17 carrying no bombload, but carrying a full capacity of armament, with an effort to feef up our defensive firepower in the most sensitive places. We put them in as the bottom squadron of the combat box because that was the one that has the least defense support from the other squadrons. The trouble with it was that the other airplane, after the bomb run, after they delivered their bombs, were much lighter, they were able to come home at a much faster rate. The B-40s didn't get rid of any weight, and they couldn't pick up any speed, and the result was that everybody had to stay back and protect the B-40s, which was a somewhat reverse expression from the intentions. At any rate, they were not successful.

H: One other item that I think ought to be mentioned with regard to application of the tactics of the European theater to the Pacific. In introducing the B-29 into this complex, it was a difficult and delicate operation because unless they were concerted against Japan, their combined effort would be dissipated. But how to do this while basing the forces in territorial command in theaters is very difficult indeed. It was finally solved when the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the establishment of the 20th AF. The 20th AF was to report directly to the JCS for its direction. It was to be commanded by Gen Arnold, as the Executive Agent of the JCS. It was to be supported in all the theaters for administration and basing facilities.

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But it was to be under the operational command of Washington. Adm King went along with this concept, very largely because it paralleled in many ways the Navy command. Adm King as Chief of Naval Operations was also commander of the US Fleet, and this was in effort to establish the same kind of thing as Arnold did with regard to the 20th AF. And it did work out. On March 24, 1944, the Army Air Forces made a presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the concept of Pacific strategy. The SECTANT conference at Cairo had already established a requirement for bases in China, Formosa and Philippines area, preliminary to an invasion of Japan. The Air Corps presented the argument that the Marianas should be captured as bases for B-29s, after/a preliminary air offensive should be under taken against Japan, and handled in the same way that the strategic air forces operated against Europe. The question as to whether or not this would make an invasion unnecessary was by-passed. It was discussed at some length, but there was a general feeling that whether or not an invasion was necessary, a major strategic air offensive ahead of time was certainly, make it possible and make it that much easier. So the 20th AF was given an overriding priority for operations against Japan and was tied into the scheme of operations for the other forces. The scheme of operations worked out by the JCS and the Area Commanders had involved such things as the capture of Leyte, the capture of the Marianas, movement on toward Formosa, or the China Coast. The 20th AF was tied into this scheme of maneuvers, and it called for a first attack against Japan. About the 15th of Nov. The timing at that time was

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coordinated with Leyte attack by Gen MacArthur. I took command of the 21st Bomber Command on the 28th of August (1944) and at that time, there was one wing, the 73rd, assigned to the 21st, and three other wings in training, the 313th, 314th, and 315th.

H: The 20th Bombcom (out of CBI) was attacking cake ovens primarily which were a vital feeder to the Japanese steel industry, and were area targets that could be attacked at night, using radar bombing. The 73rd was trained to participate in this. But it was shifted tothe 21st Bomber Command. It was a night operating, individual bombing, radar bombing outfit, but the targets that were given to the 21st were not at all suitable to this kind of operation. Actually, the plan of operation for the 21st involved the attack of the Japanese Air Force, engine and airframe factories primarily, a later attack on the heavy industrial areas, using incendiary bombs, when the force had reached enough strength for saturation. And this was not expected to happen until 6 months or so after the first operation got out to the Marianas. There were other precision targets as well, including the oil industry, the steel industry, and shipping. The targets that the first mission fell heir to were precision targets. They were not susceptible to fire attack, because they were heavily structured targets as we anticipated. Their location was in general known, but their precise location was not known. So the first thing we had to do was find the targets. The 73rd Wing had to be completely retrained. It was the 1st Bomb Wing all over again. They had to be trained, and first of all, a defensive formation had to be selected,the method of bombing had to be selected.

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They had to learn how to use daylight precision bombing techniques. They had to learn to fly in formation. They had to learn cruise control. It was just a major re-direction, and only about 2 months to do it in. Furthermore, the range of the airplane was giving us a great deal of trouble, and when the Air Force went before the JCS urging the capture of the Marianas, it was based upon theoretical ranges of the B-29 which were not realized in the airplane itself. It would be stretching the airplane to its utmost to make the round-trip from the Marianas to the target and back. These were the circumstances as we then understood them. Flying formation would make it a good deal more difficult, because gasoline comsumption is higher in formation. It is more difficult to maintain cruise control. Consequently, the whole operation was hanging pretty much on a shoestring. We did, however, establish formations - 12 airplanes instead of 18 in a combat box in this case. We did concentrate on difensive gunnery. The defensive gunnery of the B-29 was if anything, more complex and more difficult than on the B-17s. The equipment was much more sophisticated. Great effort had been made to provide sights and improve the possibility of defensive gunnergy, but it was an expremely difficult problem for the gunner. The B-29 had four-gun turret in the top, three other turrets, two guns each, 50 caliber, and a tail turret. All except the tail turret was operated from remote positions which you twisted, and the guns responded to it. We had to supply the aircraft by air. Nevertheless we did get off operation on the 15th, and we did plan and direct an operation on the 15th, and on the 15th we ran into a typhoon. First of all it was a dead calm

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and then the wind reversed itself. The aircraft were in line ready to take off, and couldn't make it.

(Q: Sir, how do you account for the confusion over the priority of industrial targets at the beginning of the war. We switched from ball bearning to oil then to communications....)

H: Well, the selection of the targets themselves, was a pretty complicated affair, an effort to gauge the effect of the destruction of a particular industry upon the warmaking capacity of Germany. The ball bearing industry came to light in a very interesting manner. Actually, a German attack on Coventry where all the Rolls Royce engines were being built early in the war, had been partially successful, but it blew out the skyhights in a lot of factory buildings, and there was a rain. Thousands of trays of ball bearing were rusted. They couldn't be used, and engine production stopped at a time when it was desperately needed. It became quite apparent that production of machinery was extremely sensitive to the ball bearing industry. We made an analysis of the German situation and found that over half the ball bearings for Germany were being made at Schweinfurt. Schweinfurt was a pretty deep penetration. We put it in the target list later in the day, when we thought we would have enough force to get that far. But we also checked with the State Dept, to see whether or not, the Germans could get ball bearings in Switzerland and Sweden. And the State Dept came back with the answer that they felt enough pressure could be put on Sweden and Switzerland by the US Government to inhibit that flow. Well, this turned out to be wrong. We paid a heavy price for Schweinfurt.

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We didn't take out as much of this plant as we had expected, although it did take it out of production for a while. But the Germans were able to make good their ball bearing requirements elsewhere. As for oil, oil was one of the first, one of the primary objectives. I think oil was Number 1 in the earliest days of planning. The Germans had better oil of their own. They were getting most of it from Ploesti, well over 50%. The rest of it they were making from synthetic plans in Germany, and almost all the aviation gasoline was from synthetic production. There were 26 plants. 13 of them were producing about 70% of aviation gas. So it was a fairly well concentrated series of objectives. They were fairly deep in Germany. They were precise, small targets. They were hard to destroy, but we were very interested. This was accepted early in the game as a primary objective with the proviso that they take out Ploesti. If you couldn't take Ploesti then we couldn't keep down the loss of German plans. That wouldn't by themselves cripple them.

And this is why the Ploesti operation was run as it was. As you know, the final effects of the offensive against Europe probably showed up the best advantage in oil. In the month of June, 1944, 90% of the oil production was destroyed, however, the Germans were most ingenious at repairing these things. We estimated initially that a plant of this magnitude taken out, well destroyed, would be out for at least 6 months. It wasn't true. They rebuilt them and got them back in operation far faster. The plant at Leuna was attacked 17 times to keep it out. But it finally was perhaps the most effective operation. The next most

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effective operation. The next most effective was probably against transportation.

The whole operation was about 6 months out of phase. If we had been able to conduct the strategic air offensive for the full six months for which it was planned, prior to the invasion then I think you would have the situation that faced our ground troops in March instead of June. By March the Germans economy was ripped, so we were out of phase. It was not entirely, well I would say, not primarily the fault of the air forces, but the strategic forces were so available, so easy to use in other ways, they kept getting diverted. And, of course, the Mediterranean operation saw a lot of strategic bombing that would normally have gone in the economy of Germany.

(Q: Sir, would you care to comment on your association with one of your collegues, Gen Fairchild, for whom this building is named?)

H: Yes sir. Among the people whom I knew in my military career, I would say the three outstanding ones was Gen Marshall, General Andrews and Gen Fairchild, and they were outstanding for pretty much the same reason. They were men of great character. They were obviously intelligent men, but they were men of marvelous personal integrity and character.

(Q: General LeMay was one of your Group Commander. I notice you didn't put him in this last group [of three greatest commanders]. How much did he have to do with the tactics in the European war?)

H: Quite a lot. The evolution of the tactics that I described earlier ran something like this. I insisted on having a standard formation. You just couldn't handle large forces with everybody going his separate way. And the putting together

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of a standard formation among the five group commanders was a monumental task. Curt LeMay got ideas of his own, and so did Stan Wray, and so did Frank Armstrong. And I got them together and said: "You people have got more experience than I have in this field. I want a standard formation, and I don't care where it comes from. But don't leave this room until you have come up with one." Well they came closer to adopting Curt's formation than the others. They wound up with a compromise. It was a better formation than any of the others had been, but it was a compromise between the 306th, the 305th, and the 303rd. And it was a good form ation.

(Q: Did anyone else figure in LeMay's decision to use the B-29 at low level over Japan?)

H: I think that was entirely his decision. The idea of the fighter attacks on the urban areas was not. That was in the basic plan, fully a year ahead of time. We actually built Japanese villages, and tried out incendiaries on them in Nevada, as you may know. So the idea was well established long before that, and the fact that the incendiary bombs were on hand was evident that it was not a last minute decision. We did agree that it should not be undertaken. It was very dangerous to undertake it in a day-raid, piecemeal. If it was to be done, we ought to hit something really hard, hard enough to make it stick. So we delayed the incendiary attacks. I was directed to carry out a couple of them, which I did, with small forces and not very good success. I did learn something. The ballistic characteristics of the bomb were not what we thought, and it wouldn't go where we thought they were going. So we did learn something on it.

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But by the time of the March attacks, three things had happened. (1) We had enough B-29s to do a massive attack; (2) we found that the Japanese air force was not anything like as strong as they had been anticipated; (3) and it was not going to be the obstacle that we had feared it would be. We found that you couldn't do precision bombing in Japanese weather with any degree of success. They were running 3 to 4 days a month, in which it was even possible to try it.

All of those things led to a natural decision to go in for the fire-bomb attack, which was far easier, far simpler, far safer than the other. The decision to go in at low altitude was something else again. I've been asked whether I would have done that. I think in all honesty, the answer would be "No." I think I would have gone in about 15,000 feet. But to go in first as low as 5,000 - 10,000 feet, without any real knowledge of the anti-aircraft defenses, was I think, a very dangerous and a very courageous thing to do, and it turned out to be right. I think that was Gen LeMay's personal decision.

(Q: In Jan 1942, Gen Eaker sent a letter to the Air Staff requesting development of long range fighters. It was two years later before we got the P-47, the P-51 with belly tanks. Can you explain this two year delay in procurement of this aircraft?)

H: The development of the escort fighter as a matter of fact was in AWPD-1 (Summer 1941) when we asked for this development. But, at the time, it looked technologically completely infeasible. This is one of the errors we made. People like me, who didn't know enough about the technical factors were weighing the technical features when we shouldn't have been. It was explained

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to us, and it sounded perfectly sensible, that if you've got two fighters, and one of them weighs twice as much as the other one, the light one is always going to whip the heavy one. Now, to have an escort fighter that would go 500 miles and be able to fight a light interceptor, was just going to wind up getting whipped. Well, this is one of those truisms that didn't turn out to be true. There were several reasons for this. The fighters against which the P-51, and P-47 were balanced were older. They were ME-109s and FW-190s, which were a design generation older than the P-51 at any rate. By that time, they had learned how to carry added weight, and still have performance. And of course, the droppable tanks made a tremendous difference. But it was no lack of desire that help up an escort fighter. It looked like it just wasn't feasible to do.

(Q: We have been accused of having a lack of foresight. I've often maintained that we did think about it)

H: It was in AWPD-41, which was the first real layout of what the strategic war should look like. At that time, we urged that every effort be made to develop one (fighter), but it was not in the cards then to have one.

(Q: Do you feel the RAF experience also had some bearing upon this. Gen Eaker seemed to think Air Marshal Portal was taking the same line, and had a great deal of influence.)

H: I don't know whether you are aware of the B-40 situation or not. We did try it the other way. We tried to provide escort fighters that were armed escort fighters, they were B-17s with armor and added gunfire. And we did put them in the most exposed position which was the lowest or bottom flight on the

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combat box, but that didn't work out either. Because they were a help going into a target, but by the time you had gotten rid of your bombs, all the other airplanes were light, and ready to go home. And the B-40 was lumbering along, and you had to stay back to protect the protector.

(Q: Do you feel Goering made a mistake by dropping the German fighter defense back to Germany instead of pushing it as far forward to meet your bombers, and thereby to force the P-51s to drop their belly tanks?)

H: I don't know. The Germans did vary their strategy several times. Initially, they were deployed well forward. The Germans had a plan advanced by Galland which Hitler wouldn't take. That might have made things very unpleaseant. Later in the war when it was apparent that they couldn't stop the bomber, he proposed gathering all the German fighters in a one massive forward position and decimating one wing or one group at a time. Let the others alone. Just bore in and take out a whole group at a time. This would have had a very unpleasant morale factor.

(Q: With reference to the doctrine of the Air Corps Tactical School, we hear a lot about the criticism of the plans for strategic bombardment only to the exclusion of anything else in the Army Air Corps. Was there a movement afoot to really equalize these forces as it later worked out in WWII, or were our early planners really off on the wrong foot as much as some history books would have us believe? We have been criticized - the Air Force - for not having looked at long range fighters, for not having looked at attack aircraft, for not having looked at other factors of airpower, and to the exclusion of bombers. Were our planners really that narrow minded? Or was there a movement afoot to really go into this a little deeper, but we just don't know anything about it?)

H: I think the first one comes closer than the second. The Air Corps Tactical School was caught up in the concept of air warfare. They did spend most of their time really trying to

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evolve a concept of strategy for strategic air warfare - bombing. They overdid it, I'm sure as we've overdone it since then, probably because we were on the defensive, all the leverage was the other way. The War Dept wanted to do it completely the other way. They wanted two things. They wanted aircraft, they had units that would literally support the troops in the battlefield, and they wanted a pool of GHQ aircraft to be used literally as GHQ artillery is used. You take the pool of this stuff and you use it, parcel it out, to suit your needs. For a long time, this was the intent of the general Staff with regard to the GHQ AF. GHQ AF and the Air Tactical School were doing their utmost to forment the idea of the achievement of a strategic purpose, a major one. Whether or not it was an effective one - achievement toward a strategic purpose by the application of airpower, and I think we did get carried away somewhat.

(Q: General, why do you say we've overdone it since then?)

H: Well, I think that we have neglected tactical air in the last 10 years.

(Q: In view of Vietnam situation?)

H: Well, even if there hadn't been a Vietnam, I think, my personal feeling is that we've got carried away too far on this strategic thing, and the more important omission in my opinion is the lack of defense. We've gotten ourself in the position now where we so frightened ourselves of strategic warfare - our people are, that we have decimated, we've emasculated our own force. So I think we should have applied far more attention to providing a support for/a defense of our own source of will. Now, I think

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we have gotten ourselves in the position where the Strategic Air Command is practically handcuffed.

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they had units that would ~~literally~~ literally support the troops in the battlefield, and they wanted a pool of GHQ aircraft to be used literally as GHQ artillery is used. You take the pool of this stuff and you use it, parcel it out, to suit your needs, ~~and~~ For a long time, this was the intent of the General Staff with regard to the GHQ AF. GHQ AF and the Air Tactical School were doing their utmost to foment the idea of the achievement of a strategic purpose, a major one. Whether or not it was an effective one achievement toward a at least a major ~~one~~ strategic purpose by the application of airpower, and I think we did get carried away somewhat.

Q: General, ~~how do you expect~~ why do you say we've overdone it since then?

H: Well, I think that we have neglected tactical air in the last 10 years.

Q: In ~~the~~ view of Vietnam ~~situation~~ ?

H: Well, even if there hadn't been a Vietnam, I think, my personal feeling is that we've got carried away with the very thesis that I did my utmost to espouse. I think we got carried away too far on this strategic thing, and the more important omission in my opinion is the lack of defense. We've gotten ourself in the position now where we so fascinated ~~fighting~~ ourselves of strategic warfare — our people are, We have decimated, we've emasculated ~~the wrong~~ our own force. their

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September 21, 1970

M/Gen Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, SC 29928

Dear General Hansell:

A follow up question on our interview of last January and my research of your papers at the AF Academy.

You gave a talk at the Air War College on January 18, 1954. You were introduced by General Pinky Craig who brought up the subject of AWPD/1 and the "terrific uproar" that took place when the plan appeared on the front page of the Chicago Tribune.

When you got up to speak, you said that General Craig "didn't mention that we spent the next four months after the publication of that plan explaining to the FBI that we had not sold it to the Chicago Tribune. Incidentally, I think the upshot or the moral of the presentation of my experience, if there is one, is that people who talk too much ultimately get caught up with."

As you may know Frank Waldrop, editor of the Washington Times Herald which also printed the leak, has been trying to pin the responsibility for the disclosure on General Arnold.

I was curious as to what you meant by the words you used to open that lecture; also, if you have anything else on the subject "who dunnit."

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October 5, 1970

M/Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Hilton Head, SC 29928

Dear General Hansell:

I am looking forward to seeing you out in Colorado during the Air Force History Symposium. We can chat then about my reserve group and a presentation which we would very much like you to give.

I am still on the trail of definitive effidence that General Arnold was not involved in the AWPD/1 leak, but so far it has been like punching pillows.

Hope to see you soon.

Very sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

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August 26, 1970

M/Gen Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Hansell:

This letter will serve two purposes:

(1) To send you a transcript of our informative interview of last January.

(2) Invite you to address my Air Force Intelligence Reserve Officers Training Group on some Wednesday evening of your choosing.

Jack Loosbrock mentioned that you come up to Washington from time to time. If you can predict such a visit in the future, we would be honored to have you make a presentation on a topic of your own choice; possibly the strategic balance between the US and USSR, or perhaps the Fitzhugh Report, if you have followed the recent attempts to reorganize the Department of Defense.

For your interest, we have been fortunate to obtain speakers of the caliber of Secretary Zuckert, Under Secretaries Norman Paul and Townsend Hoopes, Ambassadors Averell Harriman, Marshall Green and many foreign Ambassadors to the United States. Jackie Cochran will address our group next month.

Our meetings run from 1900 to 2100 on Wednesdays to include a 50 minute presentation and about a half hour of

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October 15, 1969

Major General Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Hansell:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I should mention that I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since 1947. Within the past three months, Loosbrock and I have interviewed Robert Lovett and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Norstad, Knerr, Streett, Beebe, among others who knew General Arnold.

I am hopeful of interviewing General Twining on my next trip South, probably early in January, and hope that it may be possible to interview you during that visit.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and you are enjoying your retirement. Moreover, I'm looking forward to the good excuse for visiting Hilton Head Island about which I've heard so much, and to the possibility that you could give me a couple of hours for some reminisence about "the good old days." As a matter of fact, Mr. Lovett told me that our chat made him feel 25 years younger. I hope that you will agree.

Would you please advise me if sometime during the first two weeks of January would be convenient for you. There is a self-addressed envelope enclosed for your convenience.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

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December 19, 1969

Maj.Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Hansell:

I have your fine note of the 7th. I'm sorry to have missed your visit.

My trip to Colorado Springs was very successful. I viewed the tape you made with the History faculty out at the Academy and it is excellent.

Hope to see you around the 15th or 16th of January, although there is a possibility I may stop there on January 3rd, on the way South. In any event, I'll phone or write to confirm an appointment.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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HAYWOOD S. HANSELL, JR.
MAJ. GEN. U. S. AIR FORCE RTD.
30 LIVE OAK ROAD
HILTON HEAD, S. C. 29928

803-785-2575

7 Dec 1969

Dr. Murray Gell-Mann

Dear Murray

I dropped by your office last week when I was in Washington, but you were out at Aspen Springs, so I came I missed you.

I will be delighted to get together with you here around the 15th of January.

In the mean time, best wishes and Merry Christmas

Cheers

Polly Hansell

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December 19, 1969

Maj.Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

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Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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HAYWOOD S. HANSELL, JR.
MAJ. GEN. U. S. AIR FORCE RTD.
30 LIVE OAK ROAD
HILTON HEAD, S. C. 29928

803-785-2575

7 Dec 1964

Dear Tommy Green

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Cheers

Sincerely Hansell

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December 1, 1969

Maj.Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Hansell:

Jack Loosbrock showed me his letter to you. I am hopeful we can get together for an hour or so on or about 15 January.

Please advise me if this timing would be convenient for you.

An envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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October 15, 1969

Major General Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Hansell:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I should mention that I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since 1947. Within the past three months, Loosbrock and I have interviewed Robert Lovett and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Norstad, Knerr, Streett, Beebe, among others who knew General Arnold.

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I hope this letter finds you in good health and you are enjoying your retirement. Moreover, I'm looking forward to the good excuse for visiting Hilton Head Island about which I've heard so much, and to the possibility that you could give me a couple of hours for some reminisence about "the good old days." As a matter of fact, Mr. Lovett told me that our chat made him feel 25 years younger. I hope that you will agree.

Would you please advise me if sometime during the first two weeks of January would be convenient for you. There is a self-addressed envelope enclosed for your convenience.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 15, 1969

Major General Haywood S. Hansell, USAF(Ret)
30 Live Oak Road
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Hansell:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I should mention that I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since 1947. Within the past three months, Loosbrock and I have interviewed Robert Lovett and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Norstad, Knerr, Streett, Beebe, among others who knew General Arnold.

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S. Car

Hancock

1. Eaker depended on you & Norstad to protect him with Arnold in the face of 1943 when 8th AF suffered great losses
2. Stealey B-29 photo Mon Museum - why so important
3. Friction with Halsey - did he want B-29's to quit flying over Japan?
4. In tape at AF Academy you named Fairchild, Marshall & Andrews as the 3 greatest men with whom associated. Arnold omitted?
5. St Clair McKelway - New Yorker Mag - July 1945 - Re relief of Hancock
6. Worked for Col Richards in Air Corps Def Office in 1939
   a) In European Section WPD-Air Staff - late 1941 - early 1942 - (P.H. leak?) (Farthing - Cold. Rose Plans?)
7. Close to Kuter & AFC after war. Did Kuter oppose relieving you in Jan 1945. Kuter vs Norstad. after Arnold sick.
8. Jan 1954 - AWC Lecture - Ref leak of war plans by Chic Trib. you said that people who talk too much get caught up with. what did you mean??

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November 17, 1969

Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, USAF (Ret.)
30 Live Oak Rd.
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Isle, S.C. 22928

Dear General Hansell:

I hope you don't think I've forgotten you. I do feel, however, that the article can be improved by some editing and reorganization -- even some judicious cutting as a by-product of the reorganizing. When all this is done I will send you a clean, retyped version to see if the changes meet your approval. We may have to negotiate a bit thereafter but that is par for the course.

It may be as late as December 1 before all this can be accomplished and I hope you don't mind the wait.

Since I saw you I have talked with Murray Green. He says to tell you he still wants to see you sometime soon after January 1 and will be in direct touch once his travel dates are firm. He also said he had written to Nate Twining with the same end in view but so far has not received an answer. Should we try General Twining again? I surmised he might have been away for a time.

I enjoyed our talk and hope we can get together on the article. It will be a good and useful one for us to publish.

Sincerely,

John F. Loosbrock
Editor

JFL:L

cc: Murray Green

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INTERVIEW WITH MAJ GENERAL HAYWARD S. HANSELL
HILTON HEAD ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA
JANUARY 2, 1970

Q: One of the first questions I usually ask is: do you recall the first time you met General Arnold?

H: The first time I met Gen Arnold when he was, I believe, Asst Chief of the Air Corps.

Q: When Westover was Chief?

H: Yes. And I arrived in Washington in about July 1939. I don't remember precisely what Gen Arnold was doing then.

Q: He was Chief at that time. He had taken over in September 1938. Westover had been killed.

H: Well, I worked as an Asst Executive to Ira Eaker, and Ira, of course, was living literally hand in glove with Arnold. I didn't see very much of General Arnold personally but I had a fairly close contact with that he was doing through Eaker.

Q: Eaker - was he in public relations at that time?

H: He had been. But at that time, he was Executive to Chief of the Air Corps. Which is a sort of Chief of Staff job, really.

Q: And you were in his office?

H: Yes, I was an assistant in his office. Practically all correspondence at that time came through that office, and work that had to be sent out to the staff was diverted from there with a time limit put on it. Then it was followed up and sent into Gen Arnold. Those things that required his initial direction on them were sent to him directly. Sort of a filter

center. All the correspondence came through there, and the decision was made then as to who should act on it; how long was the time we had to do it; and perhaps some suggestions as to what Gen Arnold probably would want. Then it came back and went into Gen Arnold, unless it went in to him directly.

Q: Gen Arnold was very high on your work and he noticed you along the line. When was the first time he noticed your performance? Do you remember when you think he noticed you?

H: I would guess that he may have had a little previous knowledge of what I was doing through Harold George when I was an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School. Then after working for Gen Eaker, Gen Arnold decided to set up, not an information section, but an intelligence section in the Hqs., Chief of Air Corps. Tommy White was then a Captain, and I, were called in and told to set it up - practically without instruction. He simply said that the Chief of the Air Corps should have what amounted to a G-2. Tommy and I divided the work, he took the contacts with the attaches. I took the targeting problem, and set up the machinery to start economic analysis of countries with whom we might go to war, in an effort to provide advance information on targeting.

Q: The man I was thinking of was Col Richards. Eaker worked for Richards and you were in that office.

H: I worked for Richards. I worked for Richards when I first came there. This was in the Information business.

Q: And then you branched out into the Intelligence area?

H: As I recall - I'm not sure of it - but my recollection is I reported in first to Richards in Information, and my contacts

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there, my functions were primarily in public relations. I think I went from there to work for Ira, and from that job, to the setting up of the intelligence business.

Q: I think there was one period where Eaker, too, worked for Richards. Richards was Chief of Information.

H: Yes, could well be.

Q: He sort of disappeared. What happened to him?

H: I haven't any idea.

Q: When the war started, he just disappeared...

H: I don't know. He was an older chap, I just don't know what became of him.

Q: Well, you were fairly close to Kuter at the time. You had a role in AWPD-1 did you not?

H: Right.

Q: This thing was put together in July and August 1941. You worked on it with Harold George, Ken Walker and Kuter.

H: We were the four primary people working on it. There were other people who made contributions. Are you familiar with the evolution of that?

Q: A little bit, but tell me anything you wish.

H: In my experience, at any rate, this was the most important single event in the evolution of the Air Force because the President had sent a letter to the Secy of War and Secy of Navy requesting their views on our requirements against our enemies, without saying who the enemies were, or what we were to do about it. The Joint Board (Army and Navy) was at that time the only formal contact between the two services. There was

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immediately a dichatomy as to who the enemies were, what we were supposed to do. The Navy had been concentrating on Japan for 30 or 40 years. The Army felt that its interests were primarily in the European theater, and they were unable to agree on a joint plan of approach. In the meantime, time was passing and they literally each went its separate way. The Navy came up with an answer - in terms of war against Japan. The Army came up with an answer - in terms of war against Hitler's Europe.

Q: A ground war?

H: A ground war, yes.

H: In the War Dept, the responsibility filtered down quite promptly to the War Plans Division headed by Gen Gerow. The Army Air Forces Hqs., had just been organized, it was no more than 2 or 3 weeks old. The War Plans Division proposed to do the entire War Dept plan themselves, and Clayton Bissell was the Air Force officer there.

Q: This was about July 1941, because the AAF was established legally on June 20, 1941.

H: That's right, it was just barely born. Clayton Bissell approached Gen Arnold with the idea that the new Hq Army Air Forces should collaborate by working for the War Plans Division. Hal George was the first head of the Air War Plans Division, in this new headquarters. He had no organization; no people, no office, nothing. It had just been set up. But he took the initiative in saying: "Why not let this headquarters do that job, not as a group of people individually, but as an organization."

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Q: There was no Air Plans. You were sort of part of the War Dept General Staff?

H: We were just being assembled, we hadn't been at all, you see. Gen George went to Gen Arnold and said that he felt this was the better approach. Arnold agreed with him, but as Arnold so often did, he authorized - he gave a blessing to his subordinates to do something, but did not himself go and take the initiative, and get it done. He did this frequently. It was, I'm sure, a deliberate methodology on his part, because if he met with a rebuff, he could back off this way without losing prestige.

Q: He didn't get out on a limb?

H: Yes, But George then went to Gerow, who was a very fine officer indeed, and said: "We would like to prepare the Air Annex, the Air part of this War Plan, up in my shop, which had just been opened."

Q: Gerow, at that time, was no friend of airpower?

H: Gerow was not anti-airpower, he was a very fine, broad-minded gentleman.

Q: Wedemeyer was in there too, wasn't he?

H: Al was probably, he was somewhere in the War Dept at that time. He probably was in War Plans. But Gerow's organization - McNarney was there - was up to its neck in trying to analyze the number of divisions that had to be organized; and the number of transports that would be required to move large forces of the Army; and how to mobilize the country. The deadline was set so that they had very little time to complete this study. They just didn't have time to be arguing about the

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Air Corps, and they permitted the Air Corps War Plans Division to do this almost without a directive of any kind.

Q: You were on your own?

H: It was called the Air Annex. Well, in a War Plan, an Air Annex ranks about with an Artillery Annex, or a Cavalry Annex, or a Medical Annex, or something. It's just subordinate arm - the organization of a subordinate element toward the overall concept. George took this opportunity to expand this thing, since he was not under directive, into a complete war plan - how our airpower ought to be employed in the event of war. We also had to contemplate which side we were going, whether or not we were going to place our thoughts in terms of Germany, or in terms of the Far East. We took the German route.

Q: Is this the evolution of RAINBOW FIVE?

H: The RAINBOW FIVE was ahead of this. I don't think we really contributed to RAINBOW FIVE. This was done completely in the War Plans Division. I believe, now that you've prodded my memory, I believe that the agreement on which we were to prepare the Air Annex did say that it should be in general conformity with the ABC agreements and RAINBOW FIVE. We placed a very broad interpretation on that. I had been in the intelligence business. We set up a little intelligence shop and we set it up primarily on economic basis. This was a complete departure from military approach. We stated trying to analyze the economic requirements, for instance, of Germany and of Japan and of Italy, to determine what were the things that those countries relied upon and needed to support a war-making

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capability. Then, which of those things were vulnerable to air attack, and how we might, what the effect of their destruction might be. This was, I would guess, the first concrete, succinct approach to the American concept of air-power. We talked in generalities before, but this time we tried to get down to cases. I had some oil people because we knew that oil was important. I had some transportation people. I took a trip to England to see what the RAF could tell us, and they were extremely cooperative. I was in England with McNarney, as a matter of fact - who was over there with the observer group - when the British gave me an immense amount of secret material, and I was sort of embarrassed on how to get it back - about a ton of it. It was flown back. But when I got back to the United States, right in the midst of this flurry on the part of the Air War Plans Division to try to get something done. Meantime, Harold George had gotten me transferred from this intelligence job to the War Plans Division. Fortunately I arrived just in the nick of time with the vast amount of information nobody else had. My part of the principal part in the AWPD-1 was to put together the strategic target system and to estimate the forces required to destroy it and the effect of that destruction. We worked literally day and night on this thing.

Q: It was completed sometime in August was it not? August 1941?

H: Sounds about right.

Q: Just about this time, Arnold was out at Argentia.

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H: Argentia and Newfoundland?

Q: Yes this is August 1941. This was the meeting with Churchill. I'm just trying to place that in context. He came back. I'm just trying to relate him to the completion of AWPD-1. Did he react to it, or how did he react to it?

H: Let me finish this. We completed our plan, under heavy draft, just barely able to get it done, and were able to submit it to the War Plans Division just literally hours before the deadline. They never had the opportunity, if they had the interest, to read it. So the War Plans Division accepted and incorporated that thing as an Annex without any idea of what its implications were.

Q: You pointed out, they probably regarded it as an Artillery Annex. It was way down on the chain of command.

H: They were so busy trying to complete the rest of it themselves. I think if we had gotten it in earlier, it probably would have been thrown out. We then presented it to Gen Arnold in a formal presentation. Hal George is very good at this sort of thing. We had many rehearsals of it, and charts and maps, and what not. We presented it to Arnold. Gen Arnold, then, arranged for Gen Marshall to hear it. And this time, he did carry the ball. He did make the arrangement himself, as I recall it, with Gen Marshall to come and listen to it.

Q: Arnold liked the plan?

H: Yes. We repeated it for Gen Marshall and had studied our part so very carefully we put on about a 4 hour presentation without notes. It was entirely verbal. Gen Marshall listened to it.

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Q: Marshall sat through 4 hours?

H: St through it all. He listened patiently, took notes, and asked questions. He couldn't have been a more attentive audience. At the conclusion of it, he said he wanted a repetition of it for himself and Gen Knudsen, because much of this had to do with resources of the US in supplying this force.

Q: Knudsen had just come into the War Production Board, a three star general?

H: LTGEN. We repeated for Gen Knudsen. He was very interested; asked a lot of questions, questioned some of our data, but was in substance approving. Gen Marshall then said he'd like for the General Staff to listen to it, and we put on a presentation for General Marshall and the entire General Staff of the War Dept. There we met a lot of criticism, and Gen Marshall quieted the opposition, listened to it, went against the wishes of his staff and saying: "I think, this plan has merit. I would like for Mr. Stimson to hear it, and if he approves it, I think the President should hear it." For my money, in that one attitude, Gen Marshall probably did more for American airpower than anybody has done before or since. Because all he had to do was say: "No." And all of his people were vigorously opposed to it.

Q: By this time, they had suddenly realized what they had in the bag there?

H: Yes, Gen Marshall then arranged for Mr. Stimson to hear it. We repeated this thing for him. Stimson was quite agreeably impressed, and a date was set up for the President.

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This took a little time, and it was overtaken by Pearl Harbor. We were preparing for this presentation to the President, when Pearl Harbor came along. And this had a most interesting reaction because all the rest of the plan, the Army plan and the Navy plan was thrown out. Both of them were dependent upon the US Navy, and all of a sudden the Navy had no strength. The only thing that remained was the Air Plan, and the Air Plan as a consequence received a tentative approval as a basis for mobilization. It was all they had.

Q: This reminds me of a related incident. I think you — mentioned this in your briefing at the Academy - the leak of either RAINBOW FIVE or AWPD-1 to the Chicago Tribune.

H: That was AWPD-42.

Q: No, AWPD-42 was the next year?

H: Maybe it was AWPD-1.

Q: Yes, this was three days before Pearl Harbor.

H: You are right, AWPD-1.

Q: The Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald published it.

H: The Chicago Tribune published it first...

Q: General, what about the speculation that Arnold had a role in the leak of that plan to the Chicago Tribune.

H: I think there is absolutely no truth in it. Gen Arnold stood to lose everything by losing credibility, and so did the staff. I got investigated, Harold George got investigated by the FBI. This is a very searing experience. I'm sure that Gen Arnold had no part of that. And was violently opposed to the idea of any leak in it. For instance, we had in there a lot

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of secret British information - stuff that I had brought back. And we were leaking not just American information, terribly embarassing to be releasing secret information from Britain, when they were at war.

Q: You mentioned that Harold George might have some information on the leak of this plan.

H: I believe it was Harold George who told me that it was his understanding that the leak had occurred through the carelessness of Harry Hopkins - not a deliberate leak.

Q: Was he notorious for leaving classified papers around?

H: Yes, he was. He was very casual about the things he did. He had so much authority, he could get anything he wanted.

Q: And get away with a lot of things?

H: That's something you might check with Gen George, I think.

Q: That's his opinion. He mentioned something along this line to you. This is something that I have been gnawing at, and I have been trying to get to the bottom of mostly to try to clear Arnold. An historical canard gets stated; there is no refutation, and it becomes fact. It is accepted as fact.

H: I'd stake my firmest convictions that Gen Arnold certainly did not do that, and it was against his interests, and he was, as I recall it, quite ruthless in his efforts to run down the leak. Gen George and I, and others, were subjected to intense investigation.

Q: I want to talk about Gen Eaker who was sort of in trouble in the fall of 1943 because of Schweinfurt and Regensburg, and because Arnold was badgering him to get more

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planes out on missions. Arnold went over there. Do you remember Arnold visited Eaker the first week in September 1943?

H: I had left by then.

Q: Anyway, I have a note here that Eaker was depending upon you and Norstad to protect him with Arnold on the 8th AF problem. Do you have any comment on that?

H: Yes.

Q: I think he wrote a letter on this subject.

H: I don't remember. When I came back from England, I went back into Plans, and became the Air Planner on the Joint Plans Committee. Gen Arnold used to have a meeting every morning at 7:30, in his office, of about 5 people. Barney Giles, Chief of Staff, Kuter, myself - I wouldn't vouch for Kuter, maybe Kuter was not there. Tommy White, I think maybe Pinky Craig, in which he would demand to know what had happened over the last 8 or 10 hours, and in which he just tore us literally apart every morning for things that were not being done. I hit a sour note, I'm afraid. Tommy White tried to steer me into wiser channels, but General Arnold was immensely critical of the 8th and 15th AFs without, I felt, having any real understanding of the extreme difficulty under which those people were working. I remember it because in the 1st Bomb Wing which later became the 1st Bomb Division...

Q: You commanded that?

H: I commanded that, and I lost 140% of my combat crews in 7 months. It was an extremely bitter operation. To hear people, see it and cope with it 4,000 miles away, being highly critical, I found almost intolerable. Gen Arnold threw me out of his

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office once for making a comment...

Q: For defending Eaker's position on this?

H: Yes.

Q: I have a note here that you came to work for Arnold to work on JCS and CCS plans in October 1943. You probably had been back sometime, but he put you on JCS and CCS plans about that time. Is that correct?

H: That sounds right, because when I got back, almost at once I had to depart for the Cairo meeting.

Q: The Tehran?

H: Yes. I didn't get to Tehran.

Q: That was the next month, November 1943.

H: I had a terrible time trying to catch up with all JCS work, in that time period and carrying a load as JCS Air Planner. It was a very tough assignment. I remember that very clearly.

Q: Then you probably got right into the middle of this struggle, I guess, perhaps in Arnold's mind, about what he should do about Eaker and the 8th AF? I know he came back and he was very unhappy with a lot of things that he found in England. He was in England in the first week of September. He came back, one of the things - Eaker had wanted more B-17s, and Arnold said Eaker had no place to put them. Eaker wanted 60 planes on an airdrome - this is one of the issues that came up.

Q: How about the long range escort problem? Did you get into that, wing tanks and all that?

H: Yes, I got in to it in a sense, neither AWPD-1 or AWPD-42 called for escort fighters, and patently this was the

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greatest deficiency in both plans. It was a deficiency not chosen. We did not think it possible to build an airplane that had couple thousand miles of range, that would also have the maneuverability to enter into combat with an airplane that has simply come up from the ground in the target area. We were told that by most of the aeronautical people with whom we had dealt - this had been a sore subject at Maxwell - and the air strategy people accepted the concept that we are going to have to fight our way through to defend ourselves, simply because it was either that, or give up. There was no way of providing escort. We did mention the escort fighters in AWPD-1 as a desirable thing. Later on, in business, we tried to provide escort fighters, in a very limited sense, because we didn't think we could have a maneuverable fighter that would maneuver with an enemy FW-109 and still carry all the weight of a long mission, we tried to provide extra fire power on bomber type aircraft.

Q: This was the B-40 and B-41?

H: Yes.

Q: Whose idea was that?

H: Well, it was partly mine, I'm afraid?

Q: How about Al Lyons, was he in on that too?

H: He was in the Material Division at that time, wasn't he?

Q: I don't know, I seem to recall his name in that context. This was sort of a desperation move?

H: Yes. The first thing we did in meeting the German fighter attacks was to improve our formations in an effort to pull our fire power closer together. Then we found that this was not enough. The attacks were coming in from the front, and

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we didn't have adequate fire power from the front. It had been presumed that the closing speed of the bombers and the fighters were so great that there wouldn't be time to fire effectively from the front. This turned out to be wrong, and we made a basic tactical decision that fighter defense, and we originally had planned to separate the aircraft in the flight zone, but the losses from fighters were too great for that. So we pulled them back together and maintained a tight formation, and tired to concentrate on our fire power. This meant that individual bombing had to be given up. That was too bad. It hurt the bombing action a lot, and put all our efforts on the lead bombadier and drop on him in salvo. Since the other airplanes were not using their bomb sights, we took them out and replaced them front guns. And the first of these, we put in England directly in our own shops. We simply cut holes in the plexiglass in the front and built a Jerry-rig type of a gun mount, and mounted 50 caliber machine guns in the nose. That helped some, but then, of course, the fighters used to come in on the bottom squadron, because the front guns couldn't deflect downwards very well. The top turret couldn't deflect downward at all. That was the poorest area of defense. German fighters used to come in head-on against the bottom squadron, and take it out. The bottom squadron got to be a very bad place to be, so we tried replacing these heavily armed fighters in the bottom squadron.

Q: With the B-40 and B-41. But they were too slow?

H: Trouble was that when you left the target, all the other airplanes picked up speed because they had gotten rid of their

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H: Hitchcock had something to do with it, he was an observer at the American Embassy. Who sold the British on this I just don't really know. It did have a British engine in it. It turned out to be a very fine airplane indeed. Originally it was low altitude.

Q: It wasn't any good at that time. When they put the new engine in it became a high altitude fighter. We were late in recognizing this fact.

H: That's right.

Q: Are you familiar with the so-called "Big Switch" of Eaker out of the ETO into the Mediterranean, and Spaatz up there? Was this decision made at Cairo or Tehran?

H: Yes.

Q: I've seen some papers where Portal was in the role of defending Eaker and Arnold was in the role of criticizing Eaker. That is, he wanted Eaker out of there, and Portal was defending Eaker who got on very well with the British.

H: Yes, I think you have to get pretty deeply into the conflicting motivations at that time. I had to carry the ball in the JCS machinery and the Combined Planners machinery for this switch. The switch was really not a personnel switch at all. The switch was the idea of combining the commands of the American air force. The primary motivation really was to create a great Air Command.

Q: You mean combining the 8th and 15th AF?

H: Yes, the real purpose was to create a great air command. The British had an air force that commanded all their air units.

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bomb load, whereas the fighters, escort fighters had to continue to carry their load.

Q: You mean the B-40s?

H: The B-40s. Couldn't get rid of their load, so they were at that point, appreciably slower. Nobody wanted to be hanging around there. They were trying to get the hell out, get home.

Q: Who dropped the ball, if anybody did, on the droppable wing tanks. Did Wright Field fail to anticipate this problem?

H: I don't know.

Q: It took a heck of a long time, they ended up getting some tanks from the British, these cardboard tanks - the 110 - gallon tanks. They got a lot of them from the British.

N: I guess, to tell the truth, the droppable tank is a British idea. I'm not speaking authoritatively, I don't know, but since you asked me, and I can't trace it, the British were using them to extend the range of their Spitfires.

Q: We failed to recognize the superior capability of the P-51. Early in the game. The British recognized it, the Merlin 61 on it, and then we came to recognize it later on. Do you have any comments on that? Did Arnold have any role in that failure?

H: I don't know. I don't really know that. It is true that the British recognized it earlier than we, and they bought the airplane...

Q: Right, I believe it was Tommy Hitchcock was the man responsible?

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We were split between the 8th and the 15th and if air power was to get the recognition that it deserved, we were going to have to find some way of pulling together the American air forces in Europe - simply to gain stature through size, if nothing else. The British opposed it. They opposed it on a very sensible, logical grounds. They said the theaters are so separate that there isn't any virtue really in having a unified command. We took the position that whereas the base areas were separate, the target areas were not. That unity of command at the target was more important than unity of command at the bases.

Q: Arnold was trying to unify the British and the American strategic air as well?

H: He was trying to unify the British and the American strategic air as well?

H: He was trying to unify the American strategic forces in England and the American strategic forces in the Mediterranean. This, by its very action, would reduce the British command somewhat, because the British had the theater commander in the Mediterranean when Eisenhower left, and they commanded the American strategic air forces away from the British.

Q: This decision was made at Casablanca I believe? It gave them a sort of overall supervision under Portal?

H: Yes, that's right, that was the first command, and Portal was taking the position that the unity of effort in the strategic area was adequately taken care of by this position. Actually, it was not a unity of command, it was a unity of policy and direction. And actually, it didn't work. The British

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went their way; we went ours. But it was supposed to work, but it didn't, and I think it had to, to tell the truth. But we found the British bomber command under British control with a unified force, the American strategic bomber command, were divided between the 15th and the 8th under separate theater commanders. And this was an effort really, to bring those two strategic air force commands together to give an American the stature of a major strategic commander. Now, Eaker - Spaatz' argument, I think arose as a subsidiary element to this. Spaatz was senior to Eaker. If we were going to put the 15th and the 8th together, one of them had totake command. I think Arnold was unwilling to replace Spaatz with Eaker. This would have involved literally having to recall Spaatz, and I don't know that he wanted to. He had great confidence in Spaatz. I think the confidence in Spaatz was not necessarily an evidence of lack of confidence in Eaker. And it was probably through Spaatz' insistence that Eaker was transferred to the major command in the Mediterranean.

Q: Spaatz wouldn't take the job until they elevated the Mediterranean command to a higher level, so it would appear to be a promotion for Eaker.

H: Yes. That's right.

Q: But Eaker never got four stars, why not?

H: I don't know. Let's see, there weren't very many four star generals.

Q: No, but there were a number of people who did not have the commands that Eaker had. Eaker had highest commands all throughout the war.

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H: Well, as LtGen in command of the 8th AF was an appropriate rank.

Q: Right, and then he went to MAAF and he should have gotten 4 stars.

H: Yes, he should have.

Q: But he didn't....

H: Well, Gen Arnold was never very good about taking care of his own people in promotions. No, he was not. Many of the top people in the Air Force rose really through Gen Marshall's interest. Gen Arnold - I think this was one of his basic weaknesses - and it maybe it was a reflection of Gen Arnold's general personality. The people who worked for Arnold - worked below him - did not feel a responsiveness to him. He was a driver. There were very few people who felt any warmth toward him - personal knowledge with Gen Arnold. It's not necessarily criticism of him; that's the way he was. But unlike, let's say MacArthur, or Gen Andrews, or Eisenhower - all of whom looked after their people - this was not one of the qualities Arnold had. He frequently sought to improve the command status or stature of the individual for a purpose to improve his relationship vis a vis other people. But he was not very good about taking care of the people who worked for him.

Q: He took pretty good care of people like Kuter, didn't he?

H: No, I wouldn't say so. Larry got promoted by General Marshall. Larry was working in the General Staff, in the G-3 section, when he got his promotion. Harold George got promoted

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by General Marshall. This is not a blanket condemnation of Arnold....

Q: Well, this is very interesting, and its very useful in this context. Did you work with Gen Andrews when he was G-3 in 1940.

H: I never did, I always admired Gen Andrews enormously. Wonderful personality. But I never had the privilege of working with him....

Q: You know what you said reminded me of Gen Andrews, because Gen Andrews had a reputation for looking after his own men.

H: He was a charismatic leader who was a modern day Robert E. Lee. He had all the qualities and Lee's weakness also of being too kind to his people.

Q: Right. Have you read Pogue's book? Pogue quoted Marshall as saything that Andrews stuck to some people too long. Some of his associates - for example - a guy named Clagett, Sue Clagett who got into trouble. Yet he was a classmate of Andrews, and Andrews stuck with him beyond the point he should have. This got Andrews into a little hot water. Clagett was promoted twice and demoted twice.

H: I don't know whether you want to waste time on it or not, but there is a little anecdote on Andrews that is pointed...

Q: Yes, I would, very interesting...

H: Well, when Gen Andrews commanded GHQ AF, there was a very bitter fight going on with the War Dept Gen Staff. They looked upon the GHQ AF as precisely what its name indicated. It was a pool of aviation - like the GHQ artillery - to be

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parceled out to commands that might need them for particular assignments, and then pulled back to go somewhere else. But not as a unified striking force. Gen Andrews had the opposite feeling that the GHQ AF should be an entity, a fighting organization. These arguments got pretty bitter, and on one occasion Gen Andrews was on the West Coast. The War Dept sent for a representative from GHQ AF to attend a meeting in Washington, and George Kenney went. And it was a full dress War Dept General Staff meeting, with most of the senior general staff officers there - the Asst Chiefs of Staff. I'm told - I was not there - that about half way through this meeting, Kenney got up and said: "You people don't seem to understand about aviation." He proceeded to tell them what his views and Gen Andrews' were. He got forcibly ejected. He was told to get out of there and not come back again. And apparently this had some influence even on General Kenney who was a very ebullient sort of person. He sent Gen Andrews a message, saying I think you'd better come home. I've got you - I made a mistake - I've gotten you in real bad trouble.

Q: When did this happen? Where was Andrews?

H: This would have been back in 1938 or so.

Q: Andrews was still commander of the GHQ AF?

H: Yes. Andrews did come back, and he was met at the Operations line by his staff. Hugh Knerr was Chief of Staff, and McNarney was G-4, Kenney was G-3. I've forgotten who the others were. Anyway, legend has it that Kenney went up to Gen Andrews saying: "I've made a serious mistake, I've got you in real bad trouble." Andrews said: "George, there are times when

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I despair of you. I don't think you'll ever learn anything, I thought I had made it clear that I command this outfit. Now what did I do wrong?"

Q: That's a very good story.

H: Fine picture of a command attitude. The man that has that attitude is going to draw the loyalty with his associates....

Q: You bring up this subject [of Andrews great loyalty to subordinates vs. Arnold]. Let me ask you how about Arnold's layalty downwards to his staff?

H: I find it very difficult to discuss this for two reasons. First place, I didn't understand Gen Arnold's real problems when I was working for him. Second, I have since then been in some positions myself where I'm beginning to understand the difficulty of doing what I thought Gen Arnold should have done. But Gen Arnold, it must be remembered, was subordinate to Gen Marshall in the chain of command.

Q: He was equal, but not quite equal?

N: No, not equal by any means. He was, he was still an Army officer and still subject to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Gen Marshall was a very strong - I think very fine - but a very strong man. And when Gen Arnold attempted to promulgate ideas that were useful to the Air Force, but not necessarily too useful to the Army, he had to be very careful, because if he ever really overstepped out of bounds once, he was through. I didn't understand that at the time, I thought....

Q: Gen Arnold did not pursue air caused strongly enough?

H: Often felt that, particularly in JCS meetings, Gen Arnold, when the time came to clinch something, would actually back off from it.

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Q: Slide off the point?

H: On one occasion I nearly had apoplexy because I had been working for months to get the 20th AF concept through. And finally got final approval on the things, at all the staff levels in the JCS machinery. It came up for action of the JCS level and there were a couple of questions asked, but they weren't too bad. So, Marshall answered them. A minor question about a supply problem came up, raised by a naval officer. Then, Gen Arnold should have put his foot down and said: "This question is not of sufficient stature to warrant discussion at this level." Well, he didn't, he said: "Well, maybe that is a pretty good question. Let's send it back to the planners." And it came back to me to fight all the way through again. I very nearly had apoplexy. This sort of thing happened fairly frequently. But as I say, in later years I came to realize that the one thing Gen Arnold could not do - and was wise enough to understand - was ever to have a confrontation with Gen Marshall. He just could not do it. If any issue got to the point where Gen Marshall took a position, Gen Arnold had to shut up, and he did.

Q: I think of this [Arnold and Marshall] in terms of unification. There were a lot of people who were pushing in 1940 and 1941 for unification. In fact, it became a political issue. Do you remember, Willkie, came out for a separate air force?

H: I'd forgotten that.

Q: And not only that, I bring this up because of something

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you said. Gen Andrews was strongly for a separate air force in 1941, and he was working with Hugh Knerr, you probably know about that?

H: I knew Knerr quite well, yes.

Q: Knerr was writing these articles under the table and above the table. He wrote William Bradford Huie's book, and was writing articles for the American Mercury and for Reader's Digest and he was also writing

H: Did he write the CASE AGAINST THE ADMIRALS?

Q: Yes.

H: He did, I wondered how Huie got all this information?

Q: As a matter of fact, if you look at the book, it has a dedication to Knerr. If he didn't write the whole book, he supplied the ideas. In fact, I have a lot of documentary evidence on this subject. Knerr had retired from service in 1939. When Andrews was taken down from GHQ AF and was sent down to San Antonio as a Colonel, Knerr decided to quit. He got a medical discharge and he quit. After Pearl Harbor he tried to come back. Andrews at this time, was down in the Caribbean. Knerr tried to come back and he wasn't able to come back, and I talked to Knerr. I'm going to see him again. Knerr has indicated that he thought Arnold had a role in his not being able to come back on active duty. He didn't come back until the end of 1942. Anyway, one of the reasons I bring this up is, that Knerr and Andrews were pushing for a separate air force, Arnold was holding back on this, and Knerr. I have correspondence where Knerr has indicated that Arnold took the wind out of their sails for the unification.

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The plans that Kuter and McNarney and Harrison and Otto Nelson came up with in March 1942, placed the AAF on equality with the AGF and the ASF. Knerr felt that this plan had beaten Andrews to the punch. Were you aware of this.

H: No. My first commander after I got out of flying school was Hugh Knerr, in the 2nd Bomb Group. I admire him immensely, still do.

Q: He's a tremendous intellect...

H: Very, high regard for him.

Q: You know, Knerr feels somewhat like you do, that Arnold didn't take care of his staff.

H: No, he didn't.

(Knerr tells the story of Arnold keeping his competition at a certain level?

Q: Do you think this Knerr concept of keeping the flowers at a level was basically true?

H: That's pretty sweeping statement. I think that Gen Arnold probably did what almost every ambitious leader has done. I think he probably pushed down those whom he though might supplant him. I don't know anybody who has achieved any great stature, who hasn't done something like that.

Q: Was Andrews a competitior for the job?

H: Oh yes. Andrews was a competitor for Eisenhower's job.

Q: Right, he was selected as CG,ETO at Casablanca. Mr. Lovett and others have commented on this. Andrews would have been the Eisenhower of WW II if he had survived. Because Marshall had a great deal of admiration for Andrews. Andrews was a tremendous leader...

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H: Wonderful person...

Q: And Knerr swears by him, he has this tremendous feeling about Andrews, and the tragedy of his unfortunate departure. On the Air Force Academy tape, you named three military men as the greatest leaders - Fairchild, Marshall and Andrews. I was truck by your omission of Arnold. But now based on what you tell me I think I can understand your attitude.

H: Well, I think most people would have been greatly surprised at my inclusion of Gen Marshall as an Air leader, but I'm thinking of this time...

Q: Oh, did you mean Air leader?

H: Yes. At this time, Gen Marshall could have turned the valve off and all of these projects. He went against the advice of his people, I think he showed a great breadth of understanding and tolerance. I think he made an enormous contribution as a result to the advancement of airpower.

Q: Do you feel that Arnold had to watch his position with Marshall all the time, that he could never push him too far on the unification issue?

H: Very definitely. He was quite right about this. If there had ever been a confrontation - Gen Marshall's position and his prestige with the President was enormous. There was never a question about which one was going to survive.

Q: You bring up a point - I spent a lot of time studying the records. I cannot - a major confrontation between Arnold and Marshall.

H: Arnold was very careful not to have one. Very careful, and I suspect very wise.

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Q: In 1939, Arnold had some trouble with Morgenthau. Were you involved in any of this?

H: No, not in the least. I don't know what that one was.

Q: This had to do with Morganthau shipping all the planes out to the British and French. Arnold had the job of building up the Air Force. He couldn't do that if they were taking his best planes and sending them overseas, so you had this basic conflict between the two men. But did you see any evidence - when you were in the Pentagon or in Washingto, of conflict between Arnold and Morganthau?

H: No, I was not privy to that?

Q: How about Arnold and Lovett? What was their relationship?

H: I don't know. I had some relationship with Mr. Lovett, and I regarded him, and still do, with very high esteem. I think Lovett is a wonderful man. Lovett was a far more thoughtful man than Gen Arnold. Arnold was not a thoughful man. He was a pragmatic man. He was not a strategist. He was not a philosopher; he was a doer, and an enormously successful driving does. Lovett was very much more thoughful, philosophical type; also a good doer.

Q: Right. Maybe this is why Arnold got men like yourself, Kuter, Cabell, Rosie O'Donnell - men to think up ideas for him, and then let him carry them to fruition.

H: Very possibly. I don't think Gen Arnold had any creative strategic talent or interest. I think he knew he wanted to have a great Air Force. And I think he had maybe an

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appreciative or critical interest. But as for evolving any concept himself, this was just not his cup of tea.

Q: How did you get the job in the 20th AF, the 21st Bomb Com?

H: At the Cairo conference, I had the job of carrying the ball for the installation of B-29s in the China-Burma theater, which was a certainly a harebrained scheme, and there were a lot of faults with it. But it was the only scheme we had for bringing any pressure to bear on Japan Proper. There wasn't any other way to do it. We carried this one through by just sheer awkwardness - the British were poking holes in it all the time, but we still wanted to do it. Partially, as a result of that, after the Cairo conference, we had to carry on the problem of the B-29s through the JCS. It fell to my lot more or less to carry the ball on this. As a matter of fact, it fell in my lap, literally to, be the midwife at the creation of the 20th AF, as such. We wanted very much to have a unified command of the B-29 operations. Of course, to get this, we had to have the approval of the Army and the Navy - neither of whom wanted any such thing. We finally got a most unexpected angle of support - from Adm King of all people. I went to talk to Adm King and said: "The concept of the 20th AF is very much like your own naval concept of Naval operations. We can either parcel these things out in which case the air force will be dissipated by subordinate commanders with different ideas of what should be done. Or we can retain control of it; give it a unified direction; and we feel that it ought to be under a unified strategic direction - just like the US Fleet is. You, as Chief of Naval

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operations, also wear the second hat of Commander, US Naval Forces. We'd like to see Gen Arnold in a similar position with exactly the same relationship. The US Fleet reports to the JCS, and you are its Executive Agent. We'd like to see this particular strategic air force, that literally is global in its application, creature of the JCS, with Gen Arnold as its Executive Agent." Adm King said: "I think that makes very good sense. I was able to take that then over to Tom Handy, who was head of OPD, and tell him that we had gotten a kind of tentative approval of this concept from King. I think Tom Handy is one of the finest people, too. He is top notch. Brought him a piece of paper out on this thing, and he said: "well, I'll tell you - I don't like this; I don't like any part; I think it's wrong, ppor idea. But I don't have any better idea so I'll approve it." We then had the Army and the Navy kind of up behind this thing, and actually Gen Arnold was delighted. But here was another case where maybe, wisely, he did not carry the ball himself. Maybe his associates would have jumped on him at once. But he let it come up through the process of subordinates.

Q: In other words, this idea of controlling the 20th AF in Washington was yours?

H: No, I don't want to grab too much credit on this thing. I'm sure there were a lot of people who felt this way.

Q: I don't mean to pin you down on that, but it wasn't Arnold's idea.

H: No, it was not. Something certainly it was he was very much in agreement with, but this was brought up through the

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work of subordinates for him, and maybe this was the best way to do it, maybe if he had gotten out and said: "We ought to have this thing," they'd have shot him down. As a result of this, I became Chief of Staff of the 20th AF.

Q: I don't want to change your trend of thought, just answer "yes" or "no". Is this about the first major issue on which Adm King agreed with the AF, or the only one? Did King ever come around on another important issue?

H: I can't think of another?

Q: Because usually he was a nay-sayer.

H: There were two things that motivated Adm King on everything he did. One of them was a dedication to the defeat of the Japanese Navy. He was brought up on this all his life. The Navy had had its face slapped in public at Pearl Harbor. The other, I think Adm King was devoted to the promotion of the US Navy.

Q: He was the originator of the phrase which was attributed to Charlie Wilson. He said in testimony on the unification hearings in 1945: "What is good for the Navy, is good for the US."

H: This was right, and this was accepted briefly as a motto by the Navy, and then they saw what a tremendous error they were making because they were putting the Navy ahead of the nation and they stopped it.

Q: Charlie Wilson came out with that a dozen years later, and of course - that was about General Motors, and he never lived that down to his dying day.

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Q: Arnold had a tremendous feeling of respect for you, in putting you in this job, because this was his baby, the B-29s?

H: Yes, I thik, in all fairness, Gen Arnold gave me all the support I could ask for as Chief of Staff of the 20th AF and he did give me one of the things which I wanted most, which was command of the B-29s in the Pacific. We tried to economize on personnel in the staff, by making the Hqs., USAAF also Hqs., US 20th AF, since Arnold commanded them both. We were only partially successful, so we set up a 20th AF staff in the Hqs, USAAF, by taking the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and making them Chiefs of Staff of the 20th AF. And they, in turn, had a few people whose full time was with the 20th AF. Now, I was Deputy Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces, and Chief of Staff, 20th AF. So that I dealt with Gen Arnold and with the staff, Hqs US, Army Air Forces staff. In that capacity, I spoke for him in regard to all 20th AF matters. And this worked reasonably well.

Q: You had a streak of very bad luck right at the beginning of the Marianas campaign. Your first missions were due to go I believe in October 1944, were they not?

H: Yes, actually, this is not where the bad luck came, though, I think that this is a point of my great pride, the fact that we were able to launch that operation practically on time. When I left to take command of the 21st Bomber Command, I called on Gen Marshall, and we had a very brief conversation of 15 minutes or so, as cordial as he ever was. He's very aloof. And he asked me how long it was going to take to get this operation going, and I said: "I hope to launch the first operation by

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6 weeks after we get there." He said: "What's going to take so long?" And I said: "Green outfit, and we got brand new airplanes, have to learn how to do this." Well, I got out there on the 3rd of October and 6 weeks later was mid-November. On the 15th of November, we issued the first operation order for combat operations. And it would have gone on that day. The airplanes were warmed up; it was about 4 o'clock in the morning, and crews in, starting down, taxiing to take off. And only one runway. The wind died down to zero, and we could just barely get off the runway which was not fully paved at that time.

Q: Arnold was pushing you to load 140,000# on these planes..

H: No, he wasn't really. In all fairness to him, this isn't true. We were the ones who did that on our own. At the time that we took the first B-29s to Saipan, we had never succeeded in flying a squadron of them as far as a mission from Saipan to Tokyo and back, without any opposition and with out a bombload. So when we launched that operation, it was on a shoestring. The B-29 was built for a maximum gross load of 120,000#. We got permission to boost it to 131,0000#, and we loaded them to 140,000, but this was locally. As a matter of fact, all kinds of fur were flying when they found out what had been done. But there was just no way of making it run...

Q: I've been looking at some of the correspondence, some of the papers. Of course one of the things that was sticking in Arnold's throat was the number of aborts. You were having a

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large number of aborts. And in a sense, he was partly responsible for this because he was pushing for higher loading of these planes. And as a result, you had more accidents than you probably would have.

H: I don't think that's quite fair, really. We had to load them, to have enough gas aboard to make the thing and back. We were only carrying 8,000# of bombs, at that time. Relatively small bomb load. But brand new airplanes, brand new engines. The engines were catching fire. This was a hell of a problem. The rear cylinder on the top bank wasn't getting enough cooling air, and the exhaust valves were burning and dropping into the cylinder. And presently, we would have a fire in the damned thing, in that magnesum crankcase. Once it got started there was nothing you could do. They were gone. They switched the gun ports, and it was a pressurized job, there was no way to avoid using the gun ports. They were frosting up. You couldn't see a damn thing. You were sitting in the middle of an igloo, in the front cockpit, as well. All kinds of difficulties, primarily the result of throwing a new weapon into operation before it had been tested. Fortunately, all those things were finally overcome, and great many difficulties overcome. And the launching of that, the issuance of that order precisely on schedule was a major achievement. None of the other made it close. The whole schedule was 3 months behind as far as the Navy and the Army were concerned.

Q: The delay in the, in getting the first ones to the CGI - there was a delay. Didn't Arnold and Benny Meyers go out to

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Salina, Kansas and push the project?

H: Yes, yes.

Q: I know the President was on his tail.

H: Unfortunately, agreements had been made with the President. They couldn't be met. The airplane had major difficulties. Primarily plant difficulties.

Q: Wasn't the President breathing down Arnold's neck on this one - that he was anxious to get these attacks on Japan started. And the plane was really pushed out before it was checked out?

H: Long before it ready. In all fairness to Arnold, as far as I am concerned, the most courageous decison he made in all was the acceptance of the B-29 before the damned thing had ever flown. He built factories to build these airplanes, and gave them top priority at a time when the airplane was still in test stage. That was a tremendous gamble.

Q: It could have been like the B-32?

H: Might easily have been the B-32, you know, or both of them had this problem.

Q: A double bust. Fortunately one of them worked.

H: It was a tremendous gamble, this I think he should have a great deal of credit for this.

Q: Now, the subject which may be difficult for you is, at least from my study of the records, Arnold was very quick on the trigger in deciding that he was going to bring LeMay into the job. And the reason I say this, he wrote you a New Year's greeting, Jan 1, 1945. It was a positive thing telling you how great he though the job you were doing, and then 8 days later,

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on Jan 8, 1945, Norstad shows up. Was this the first indication you had that he wanted the change made?

H: Yes. Absolutely. When Norstad and Gen Fechet arrived out there, I had no inkling of what they were concerned with. None at all. Well, I've thought about this obviously, many times. I have no quarrel with Gen Arnold's right to do what he did. This is what a top commander must do. I have a good deal of quarrel with his manner of doing it. Because there is another letter. I talked to Loosbrock about it. I have no copy of it. I wish I had thought to keep it. Just before the first mission, he wrote me one of these letters, saying: "I think it only fair to tell you, that all of my top, and most experienced air commanders have assured me that the mission you have launched is doomed to failure." He told me the airplane wouldn't make it, in the first place. And in the second place, he wrote: "If it ever gets there, it will shot out of the sky. Now, if you still feel that you have a probability of success that warrants it, good luck to you." Well, this left me sitting in thin air, because I had all these doubts, too. But whereas I might have expected from the coach a statement like: "Boy, get in there. They look like Notre Dame, but you can whip them all." I got just exactly the opposite....

Q: Did it make you feel like he was getting off the limb and putting you out on it?

H: Yes. This was the only rationalization I could reach. This, I thought, was a pretty sensible thing to do at the time.

Q: Did you have this letter, or is it at the Air Force Academy?

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H: The only person I ever showed it to was Roger Ramey, and Roger's dead. What became of it, I don't know. But it came as a schocker to me, when...

Q: Now this came before you went out to the Marianas?

H: No, this came on the eve of the first mission.

Q: That was Thanksgiving Day?

H: The first mission was ordered on the 15th of November and this was about the 12th or so.

Q: Before they were scheduled to go. I see.

H: I suspect that, well I know George Kenney was violently opposed to this whole concept.

Q: Well, George Kenney was trying to get the B-29s down in his theater.

H: It is true that we had no assurance that we could do this at all?

Q: Why did Arnold write a letter like this, when he had put so much of his own prestige and his own effort into the B-29?

H: I think he did it deliberately, for this reason. I think he realized it was an extremely hazardous venture, that it might not work. The chances are really that it wouldn't. If it were out with his blessing, the whole Army Air Forces concept was in disgrace.

Q: But I can't believe that he was sort of bailing out, I mean it's hard to understand. Do you think he was bailing out?

H: I think he was bailing out. I think he was doing so deliberately. And I thought justifiably if it was my error, if I had made an error in judgment, unit , and the whole damned

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works was lost - it could easily happen - then, Arnold was not in a position of saying - he was in a position of saying: "I told that local field commander I thought he was making a mistake, and he went ahead and did it anyway." This would have at least - I don't think he was necessarily protecting his own vanity - I think he was probably wisely leaving a loophole so that if there was disaster, the whole Army Air Forces wasn't going to go down in smoke.

Q: But, actually, so much of his prestige was on the line - as you say, he put all, he built all these factories. He ordered the plane built, and he gave contracts out, if the plane failed, it was his failure, more than anybody's, much more than your failure.

H: I think this is probably true, although he was left a loophole and might have said: "Well, we'll have these errors corrected within 2 months. They were precipitate, and went ahead too soon," or something like that. Maybe he would have found a way out of it. If he was the guy who was in writing who said: "I have approved your plan; carry it out." and it was a failure, then it was his direct personal responsibility.

Q: But this was a very late date for him to express doubts about the plane...

H: I think the answer to that one is that as time went on and the date for this first mission got closer, there was more and more criticism piling in from people everywhere saying this was going to fail. People like George Kenney and others who in the first place didn't have full knowledge of the situation

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and the second place, very anxious to get the plane themselves. There were a great many people who didn't want to see this succeed.

Q: This was a contradictory attitude on Kenney's part, because he was pushing MacArthur. MacArthur had put a bid in to get the B-29s down in the SW Pacific. And yet you say he was expressing misgivings about the plane.

H: Well, he said it would be that much better to use them in the SW Pacific. It would help this very long operation. When the time comes, when we moved up into China, Formosa, then we will use them.

Q: You started to talkabout Norstad showing up with Fechet. How did they tell you about this?

H: Well, General Fechet told me. Gen Arnold was dissatisfied with the rate of operations,and felt that, in the first place, it would be better to consolidate the two commands in the Marianas. There was room for both of them there, which was quite right. LeMay was senior to me. In choosing between one of the two, he had to take the senior officer. So he chose LeMay. He invited me to stay on as Vice Commander. Having been a commander, its a relatively poor idea to stay on in the same outfit, as a Vice Commander. I had no animosity against LeMay in the least, but I didn't want to do that.

Q: In a sense, LeMay is a chip off Arnold's block. You know, LeMay is also a man of insensibility, in the sense that the objective is the only thing to think about and devil take the hindermost. Arnold saw in LeMay - I saw the correspondence between Arnold and LeMay; we have LeMay's files - and Arnold took to LeMay like a fish takes to water.

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H: LeMay was one of my group commanders in England. I recommended him for promotion. Eaker endorsed it very strongly. I was in Washington when it reached Gen Arnold's desk and he sent for me and he said: "Who the hell is this guy LeMay?" Very top flight combat commander.

Q: Well, he saw him perform out in the CBI, and I think he became enomored of him?

H: Well, LeMay developed quite a reputation. LeMay was an excellent combat commander, top flight...

Q: In any event, it was Fechet, rather than Norstad, who told you about it. I wonder why did Fechet come out there?

H: At his own request. It was Fechet who realized...

Q: Was he a friend of yours?

H: Yes. Fechet realized the impact of such a decision on me. He came out at his own request. It was very decent of him.

Q: Norstad, at this time, felt that he had an important role in running the Air Force, I talked to Norstad. Of course, when Arnold got sick, Arnold got sich two weeks later. He had his heart attack. Norstad believed that he was virtually running the Air Force, in Arnold's absence. I just wondered if he really was...

H: He may have been. I got Norstad his job, of course. I had him brought back to be Chief of Staff of the 20th AF, because I wanted to get back out in the field. Norstad was in daily contact with Gen Arnold. I have no reason to believe Norstad thought one way or another; may very well have been so.

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Q: How did you feel when they told you about this? Were you shocked?

H: I thought the earth had fallen in.

Q: You didn't want to have any part of any combat command. You went back and just said you wanted a quiet spot...

H: Yes, I was completely crushed. Complete surprise. Although the rate of operations had been very badly, they weren't much worse than they were in England. About the same. And the obstacles that had been overcome were colossal.

Q: Do you feel that Arnold did not give you a fair chance to do the job?

H: Oh yes, I feel that very strongly. As I say again, I do not question his right to make the decision. Now, Arnold was under very heavy pressure. But this I think the difference between Gen Arnold and Gen Andrews. I think Andrews, in a similar position would have taken the weight of responsibility on himself, as I took the weight of responsibility on myself rather than pass it on to my subordinates. Gen Arnold didn't do that.

Q: It certainly was an impulsive decision because, a man sort of gradually assumes a position in respect to a certain situation and then he acts on it. Arnold, 8 days before, had written you a fairly enthusiastic letter of support. Now if he was feeling this way, that maybe Hansell couldn't do the job, why should he have written you this letter?

H: I've never understood.

Q: I don't understand it myself either. And this is why I believe that some people who have said he was a man of great

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impulse, that he acted, not as a matter of rational development of an idea, but impulsively...

H: Other circumstances may have prevailed at that time, whether he had a run-in with Gen Marshall, or whether the President had expressed displeasure at the rate of operations which was bad...

Q: Well, you were having a lot of aborts. You were losing a lot of planes. I remember one piece of paper that came in. Somebody said that a B-29 is like a naval vessel. If we lost 8 naval vessels in one engagement - I believe you made this argument, somewhere in a piece of paper. I don't recall where I saw it. But somebody brought up this idea, that if we lost 8 naval vessels in one engagement, there would be a public clamor in the US. Thin I think it was pointed out in rebuttal of that idea, that naval vessels don't go out on five or six or eight major engagements a month.

H: I think the point I was trying to make at that time was this...

Q: I believe you made that argument, did you not?

H: Yes. That's right. See, we put maximum effort everytime in one of those things. If everytime the US Navy went out and threw its whole strength into combat 8 times a month, then the argument would be comparable.

Q: But in any event, Arnold seemed suddenly to make this decision.

H: The chances are either this was suggested to him, or some other pressure arose about that time - some especial displeasure by Gen Marshall, or by the President, the Secy of War, something

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like this. This is the kind of thing he did in that kind of situation.

Q: As a related aspect of that, I believe Kuter was in your corner. Did Kuter try to argue him out of that? Or did Kuter not know about his decision until after it happened?

H: I don't know.

Q: I noticed there is a lot of correspondence between you and Kuter after the event, and I believe Kuter was very disappointed that Arnold had made this decision.

H: I think he was.

Q: I just wondered if he tried to dissuade Arnold, or didn't Arnold tell him?

H: My guess is that if Kuter had had a voice in it, he would have tried to prevent it. I'm not sure about Larry Norstad. I don't know, no particular reason why Larry Norstad should have tried to protect me, but...

Q: As a matter of fact, I think, based in my conversation with him, he sort of relished this role of responsibility that was given to him.

H: I think this is probably right. Actually, the basic responsibility for conducting the missions was mine. And I did, I don't think I assumed too much responsibility. It would have been very easy for me to have sloughed it off, if I had a couple of group commanders to blame it on. There is a widespread opinion on that that nothing had really happened in the Pacific until LeMay got there. This I kind of reacted to strongly, because a great many difficult obstacles were overcome before LeMay got there. LeMay did a fine job, but if a lot of other

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people hadn't done a pretty good job too, it wouldn't have been done at all.

Q: Let me ask you about the low level fire-bomb raids. Was this LeMay's idea?

H: That is LeMay's great tactical contribution.

Q: Did you ever think of doing that when you had the command?

H: No, I thought of the fire raids, all right. But I would have done them at higher altitude.

Q: I think you had mentioned 15,000 feet. You wouldn't bring them down to 7,000?

H: I wouldn't have brought them down.

Q: How about stripping the defensive armor?

H: Yes. It's awfully hard to be objective and fair about this. I did approve of the 315th Wing being brought out there stripped.

Q: Oh, the 315th.

H: This was a decision made long before, you see, and this was my decision.

Q: But you didn't contemplate using them at low level?

H: No. Whether I would have, I don't know. LeMay had one great advantage in having commanded the 20th Bomber Command because it was altogether a night operation. So he had experience in night operation, and he had found that the Japanese defenses were neglibible at night.

Q: Did you feel that your own ideological support of day-light precision bombing precluded your thinking about area bombing at night?

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H: No. I did not. I thought of it as a sequential approach. I thought my first job was to destroy the targets that had been laid out to me. And these could only be destroyed by daylight attack. The first target list I got from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Q: I believe he had about 15 targets.

H: They were all precision targets. They were not in a position where we could destroy them by radar bombing. Now, while I was there, I started the development of radar maps, so that we could go in for the radar bombing on a precision basis as we built these maps. But to start with, we had nothing. There wasn't any way to do it except by visual bombing, and so much was hanging on this operation. If we failed to accomplish our purpose, then the whole 20th AF concept was down the drain. So the purpose that was given to me by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to destroy those targets. And to be sure, I never wanted to depart from that. I wanted to get that job done. I didn't want the many opponents of the 20th AF to say: "We told you you couldn't do it." So I did give full complete support to the concept of doing the job we had been told to do. All the incendiary bombs, all the testing for it, everything else, had been done long before. They were done before LeMay came down.

Q: You were unhappy about the photo reconnaissance situation. You mentioned something about Ralph Steakley. You regarded his photo reconnaissance capability before you went out?

H: I hope you will understand about Ralph Steakley. I think Ralph Steadley is one of the top notic combat people

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in the whole war. He was wonderful. But when I got to Japan - no, when we got to Saipan, I had a job to do in six weeks involving the destruction of a number of aircraft factories whose location was unknown. We didn't know where these damned targets were. We didn't know what they looked like. We had Rand-MacNally road maps of Japan, some of them 10 years old. We had nothing. So this was a wild-hare, shoestring operation. So when Ralph Steakley came out there, he said: "I want to get going right now." And I said: "You'd better rest your crews; they are tired." He said:"We could take it." It was his decision, and the crew was all for it. It was a dangerous mission to be flying 1500 miles off into the blue with no escort, nothing none of us had been over Japan. It was the first mission. I have him my blessing. He went and got back in a damn windstorm, about 10 o'clock at night. We sat around waiting for him to land. They got there rolls out and took them to the photo lab, and sat there waiting for them to be developed. Just wonderful. He had had the very good fortune to get there on a perfectly clear day, and had flown all over that part of Japan about 35,000 feet, taking pictures. All of a sudden, we had more information than we had ever dreamed of, wonderful.

Q: A great windfall.

H: Oh, terrific. I was so pleased with him. You know, the Navy was supposed to collaborate on that operation. We approached this whole operation with a good deal of trepidation. It was a very dangerous thing to be doing. I had no objection to the Navy coming along and providing fighter support. I

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thought that was going to be fine. But they got mixed up coming off of heyte. They said they could not participate in the operation against Japan, and proposed that it be put off. I recommended to Gen Arnold that we do not put it off. That we go ahead and do it on our own, unescorted. And this was a pretty gutty sort of a decision.

Q: The Navy started out in October in heyte on Oct 20. They wanted you - they pulled out. Didn't they want the B-29s to pull out too?

H: Yes. They recommended the whole operation to be put off.

Q: Is this the problem you had with Halsey?

H: No, I got these photography from Ralph Steakley and I tell you I was just overjoyed with them. I had a duplicate set made, I sent one set back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And I put another set on an airplane and told the pilot to find Adm Halsey and give him thos pictures. They were priceless. They didn't know any more about it than we did. Thought I would get a letter of warm appreciation. Instead, I got a rather sharp letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying: "Adm Halsey has recommended that your operations be suspended at once; that you are simply stirring up trouble with the Japanese."

Q: What kind of trouble with the Japanese? We were at war with them. You might make them mad at you. That's very amusing.

H: I think during the normal course of events, two things would have happened, we would have had to adjust our targets

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at Joint Chiefs of Staff theaters. We found it more and more difficult to do this daylight operation against the precision targets. And we would have started a series of area type incendiary attacks. I made a couple of them, but I made them for experimental basis, trying to find out. We didn't even know how to drop the clusters to start with. When we dropped the clusters initially, dropped a cluster of incendiaries, they came apart and dropped for miles, spread all over the place. We finally learned how to adjust them so they dropped as they clustered.

Q: Was that the M-69 incendiary?

H: Yes. So we had conducted some operations, in preparation for the fire bombing. We had also conducted operations in the air for the missing harbors. But, I think, in all fairness, probably all of these things would have been involved, somewhat like LeMay finally did it, except that I don't know whether I would have gone in at a low altitude, I think that was a very big decision.

Q: You had asked Arnold to use B-29s for photo reconnaissance. Was this before Steakley came into the picture. You wanted them used on a regular basis for photo reconnaissance.

H: I tell you what this was. This was another operation. We had no weather information. We finally out that the weather information that we were getting from the Russians was deliberately falsified. The weather was coming from the mainland. So I started using B-29s every night, primarily as weather reconnaissance. And since they were going there way, we loaded them up with incendiaries, primarily to keep the people awake and

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make them respond to air alarms. We didn't expect to do much with them except reconnaissance for weather.

Q: At a War College lecture in 1953, you talked about his leak by the Chicago Tribune, and you said the people who talk too much get caught up with. Do you remember that statement? This was that leak. You and I were talking about the leak earlier, and you said people who talk to much get caught up with. But you didn't explain it.

H: I don't know why I said it, or what I had in mind.

Q: I want to go back to something we talked about. I'd mentioned that Eaker depended on you and Norstad to protect him. Now, we got to talking about Eaker's problem and the switch and so forth. Did Eaker write you and ask you to try to explain to Arnold his difficult position?

H: No, but I think Eaker knew that I knew the nature of the operations that had been going on, and that I had sense enough to try to explain these things. And I didn't - I tried to - but I didn't get to first base.

Q: Now they used Vandenberg as an emissary to get some of these messages to Eaker to tell him he was in trouble. In effect, Vandenberg acted as an emissary to Eaker, as Norstad acted as emissary to tell you the bad news in the Pacific.

H: I'm not quite as positive. I think Van simply carried a kind of a general notice to Eaker.

Q: Kuter had drafted out for Arnold several sharp cables to Eaker, trying to jog him on the 8th AF operation. They decided not to put them in the mill, not to mail them, but they

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were carried over by Vandenberg.

Q: One of the things that may have caused Arnold to turn around in his attitude toward you on Guam was that you were writing very long letters of explanation of what you were doing. You were trying to be very honest and very forthright. And I think - I'm just reacting myself - that he was a very impatient man. And when he saw these four page, single spaced letters that you were sending to him in Nov and Dec of 1944, I think he became very impatient.

H: Very possibly.

Q: I think of this in terms of comparison. LeMay used to write him these short, terse reports...

H: I don't doubt this in the least. I tried to report in some detail the experiences we were having and what we were trying to learn from it, what the problems were. And I thought really, that those letters properly addressed to Gen Arnold, since he was my immediate boss then, probably would be endorsed out to the Air Staff, for what they could learn from them. I was trying to tell them everything I knew as we lived it.

Q: I don't know this, but I am trying to analyze why he suddenly turned around and reacted 180 degrees.

H: If you find out, I'd like to know. It may well have been some other circumstance, maybe a caustic remark by the President.

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INTERVIEW OF GEN HAYWARD S. HANSELL
AIR FORCE ACADEMY
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
APRIL 19, 1967

(Re-transcription)

(Q: The first question referred to the CBO in Europe. Did we come close to changing our bombing tactics and bomb at night?)

H: I think it was touch and go for a while. The losses in the 1st Bomb Wing (which he commanded) were very heavy. We got down to about 50% strength, as I told these gentlemen a while ago we lost 120% of the combat crews in 7 months. At that time, we were operating without a fighter escort, and there was a very, urgent surge and trend toward going to night bombing. One reason for not doing it the B-17 was not well equipped for it; the Norden bombsight was not a very good sight at night, the airframe would have had to be modified to cut out the exhaust flow. A lot of things would have had to be done with the airplane. But I suppose, most important, we would have had to give up our whole concept of strategic air warfare, and we kept feeling that if we could just learn to shoot reasonable well - we were lousy shots to start with - and fly in formation, and could get a big enough force, we could take it. The losses did vary with size of force. As the force got bigger, the percentage losses went down, this was a great help. But there was a period in which actually we had a few B-17s fight in night operations, and we were very reluctant to have to do it, because it would have involved a recasting of the entire concept of the war, both on the air and on the ground.

(Q: Hansell was asked about the few B-17s that did go out at night)

H: We didn't want the word to get out that we were serious about the possibility of having to abandon the old concept.

(Q: He was asked : Was this after Schweinfurt? And he answered it was before Schweinfurt)

H: Before Schweinfurt. There was as you know, a lull in the depth of penetration when the escort fighters were beginning to come into play. If we hadn't gotten escort fighters, then I think it's a moot question as to whether we would have to abandon it. I wouldn't say definitely we would have to abandon it, because the outfit did show an amazing capacity for taking punishment and going on.

(Q: General, I think the Cadets would be interested in the story of Ralph Steakley over Japan and what happened ultimate to the pictures he took?)

H: I am glad to talk about this a little bit, because it was one of the most important single events in the conduct of the war in my opinion. We were on Saipan with about 40 or 50 B-29s, with a deadline on the 30th of October. We had a deadline for an operation against Japanese aircraft industry on 15th of November, 15 days ahead, and we had no target folders. We didn't know where the Japanese aircraft industry was. Steakly came out with those the first F-15, which was a reconn version of the B-29. They made a 33 hour, two-stop flight getting out there, and I tried to persuade them to get some rest before going on. They insisted on going on, and thank the Lord they did, because about 5 hours later, after refueling, they took off for Japan. They hit Japan on one of the rare, clear days.

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I don't know if they had them any more or not, but that one was clear. They flew over Tokyo and the Nagoya area for about an hour and a half. They came back with something wonderful. Priceless pictures that made all the difference in the world to us. We were able, not only to prepare the detailed target photos, but prepare select I.P.'s, to prepare mosaics going in from the I.P.'s to the target. As a matter of training, we required every crew to trace the mosiac, to trace the details of the targets, to trace the details of the cutouts of his I.P. to the target, and then do it over from memory, and do it over and over again. So that, by the time the first mission did come off, they were thoroughly familiar with the nature of the terrain and the nature of the target. There is a side issue to this thing. I was so pleased with these - you know the initial operation against Japan was supposed to be a combined one. The Navy was supposed to conduct Operation HOTFOOT at the same time. That would divert some further fighter opposition away from us, by attacking the vicinity of Yokohoma with carriers. And then, they were in the same fix we were, they didn't have any pictures of targets, either. And when I got these pictures, I was so pleased with them, I got a staff C-47 and gave a set of these pictures to the pilot and told him: "Go find Adm Halsey, I don't know where he is. But take these pictures to him." And we sent out a set to the Joint Chiefs. I didn't get any acknowledgement of this. I'd thought he would be very pleased. But the next I heard of it, I got a report from JCS to the effect that Adm Halsey had requested that I discontinue flying over Japan.

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Which was a strange reaction we got for these fine pictures.

(Q: General Hansell was asked about the first B-29 raid over Tokyo from the Marianas)

H: Well, the first operation against Japan was called San Antonio 1. It was coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategy, which made the timing extremely important. As a matter of fact, we were in some danger of standing or falling on this operation. The 20th AF was under very severe criticism for this very concept - the idea of having a force of this magnitude in somebody else's theater that was not beholden to the local commander. There was sniping from every side. All the theater commands wanted the force broken up and turned over to them, and we were in very serious worry about the possibility of not making this thing, for it was timed with MacArthur's operation and Nimitz'. It would have been a black eye for us if we hadn't been able to make it. When the date came around - Nov 15th - the orders were out, the airplanes were warmed up, and they had taxiied out to the end of the one strip we had. At that time, the wind which had been flowing constantly down the runway for the last six weeks, died down to nothing, so the airplanes would just barely make the takeoff. They had designed for 120,000 pounds gross weight. We got authorization to raise it to 132,000 pounds in an effort to get enough gasoline aboard to get there and back. We were actually then taking off at 140,000. They had all the gasoline that could be pumped into them. And even the, it was very marginal.

NOTE: We have statements by Arnold pushing to load 140,000 pounds in the B-29s and Hansell was slow to respond.

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But it also meant that if you had a faltering engine, you were all through. The engines were running so hot in that climate, that you couldn't run them up before the takeoff run. So we went through the tricky process of checking the ignition in the first 500 feet of the takeoff. If something went wrong you tried to stop it. A very marginal sort of an operation, and when the wind stopped, it was a very serious thing. While we were discussing what to do about it, it reversed, and began going in the opposite direction. And at that time, we had a taxi way at only one end of this single strip. One strip, taxi at one end only, and it would have been impossible to taxi the airplanes the length of the strip and take off in the opposite direction. It would have taken in so much time in the assembly thereafter, we wouldn't have made it. So I had to scrub the mission. Very regretful decision, but it didn't seem to be anything else for it. And 3 or 4 hours later, we were in the midst of an intense tropical storm, hurricane, a typhoon. It lasted about 6 days, left the camp just a quagmire. Meantime, B-29s were all loaded with bombs, standing by. The orders went out. We were in very serious way for fear of a security leak it was pretty much too late to change. We kept thinking every day that maybe we would make it. We sent weather airplanes out through this hurricane to trace it up the coast. It went right on up our route to Japan. As a result, it was Nov 24th, 9 days later, before we were able to get that mission off. And when it could get off, there were 119 airplanes on the island, and 111 of them got off - that was quite a remarkable thing for an airplane that's new and untried as that

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one was - without any difficulties whatever. We were having to support the airplanes individually from Sacramento. So getting off that size a force is quite an achievement. The operation wasn't as good as we would have liked it to be, but as in initial effort, it did show us it could be done. And this was a very doubtful issue at the time.

(Q: Gen Hansell was asked a supplementary question whether, if he had gotten the airplanes off before the storm broke, would he have lost his whole mission?)

H: Couple of hours earlier, couple of hours difference in this weather situation, we would have lost the entire Bomber Command. Because there was no other place to go. The nearest landing field was Kwajalein, and that was 1,200 miles away. This was obvioulsy a great worry, anyway, because if an airplen came back damaged, and landed on the airfield, or on the one strip, and cracked up, we were out of luck. The airplane was too big to be moved - 100,000 pounds is a lot of airplane - and there wouldn't have been time to destroy it, I don't think, to get other airplanes in. We would have had to try to destroy it, to make room for other aircraft, and we did have something like this happen two nights later. On Sunday, Nov 27th, second day after the operation, we made another attack on Tokyo. It was a bright, clear sunny Sunday noon. The first thing that disturbed us, we got attacked by 6 Japanese airplanes, without any warning whatever. I was having lunch in Rosie O'Donnell's very bad mess. We came out, standing there enjoying the sunshine, and there was an airplane flying around. O'Donnell said: "I wish you would do something about these damned Marine fighters. They are no good.

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They are supposed to be defending the island, and I don't think they are paying any attention to it, and they go flying around, and blow dust on my maintenance lines." I said they don't belong to me. I'll see if I can do something about it. I'd tried a couple of times. Anyway, we were just having this kind of a conversation when the airplanes started shooting. They were Japanese airplanes. I got in my jeep and went hotfooting up to the hill..... And as I came over the crest of the hill, I ran right smack into a Japanese Zero, I stopped the jeep, with the intention of getting under it, but I was forestalled. By the time I'd tried, my Chief of Staff was already there. But that attack did destroy three or 4 B-29s, and damaged a number of others. Thank God the command was out. Because if they had all been there - they were parked two a hardstand - terribly conjested. A few of them did go off. They were loaded and it's a very messy thing to try and put out a fire like that, and not much equipment to do it with. If we had the whole Command on the ground, I think it would have been quite disastrous. As it was, we had 80 B-29s out. When they came back about 9:00 that night, a small storm moved in - a very intense tropical storm. We had no landing lights, no runway lights, except smudge pots, obviously no GCA or ILS, or anything of this kind. I was standing in the tower, and from the tower looking down, I couldn't see the runway, the rain was so intense. The air was presently full of conversation saying: "I am over Saipan, I think" or "I am out of gasoline. Request instructions." There must have been 40 or 50 milling around.

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(Q: General Hansell was asked how he resolved the problem of personal command of his forces. The question was directed at the reason he decided to the force on its bombing mission.)

H: I got a message from Gen Arnold, grounding me on the ground that I had too much information. I ignored it, and the next thing I knew, a burly looking Petty Officer from the Navy came and called on me and demanded signature for this damned message, so I was grounded. I still think it would have been better to have gone on this mission. I doubt if I would have exercised any command.

(Q: You had the same restrains in Europe during the B-17 operation?)

H: No. There we established a limit in the 1st Bomb Wing. We were losing group commander so fast that I put a limit on group commanders of one mission a month. I put the same limit on myself and on my staff.

(Q: General, tell about your trip with Gen Marshall and the meeting with General MacArthur?)

H: Well, that's just a little sidelight scene, but yes, I think it did give a picture of the people involved. At the Cairo conference, Gen Marshall came on over around the world. And I came with him. This was a new experience to me, too. I thought like I was pretty well chosen as a BG to follow along with Gen Marshall on an occasion like this. And I finally spent most of my time carrying his luggage.

NOTE: Arnold also went around the world accompained by Jake Smart.

But it was an interesting experience to have listened in on this. And he had a meeting with Gen MacArthur - a very tense meeting,

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so far as personalities are concerned. Gen MacArthur had been Chief of Staff when Gen Marshall was a Major. And now the situation was reversed. Gen Marshall was Chief of Staff and Gen MacArthur a theater commander. There were 4 people present at this discussion. Gen Kenney and I and Gen Marshall and Gen MacArthur. Gen MacArthur went to a map in his hqs., and talked for an hour and a half - the most lucid explanation I've ever heard. All the information at his fingertips and he spoke persuasively. And when he got all thourhg, he described in detail the nature of the operations, that had to be performed, the timing involved in it, the forces he'd need, what he expected to accomplish at the various phases - beautifully worked out. And then Gen Marshall got up and spent about an hour explaining to MacArthur that he couldn't have the forces. And this was a very tense situation. It was an extremely dignified one. They addressed each other as "General". They very carefully waited until each had said what he was saying. A very formal dissertation, discussion. Very interesting one.

(Q: Tell us about you impressions of Franklin Roosevelt)

H: So far as President Roosevelt is concerned, I think he was a very fine wartime President, wartime commander. He listened to Gen Marshall, I think more than anybody else, and secondarily, perhaps, to Mr. Stimson, who was also very fine citizen. But Gen Marshall had the President's complete confidence, and he was very careful about exercising it. I did get a chance to brief the President on the progress of the war in Europe, and left him with the greatest assurance that

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I didn't feel that we were doing fine. At any rate, he listened very attentively, and was an easy person to talk to. He would listen to you.

H: The B-40 was a B-17 carrying no bombload, but carrying a full capacity of armament, with an effort to feef up our defensive firepower in the most sensitive places. We put them in as the bottom squadron of the combat box because that was the one that has the least defense support from the other squadrons. The trouble with it was that the other airplane, after the bomb run, after they delivered their bombs, were much lighter, they were able to come home at a much faster rate. The B-40s didn't get rid of any weight, and they couldn't pick up any speed, and the result was that everybody had to stay back and protect the B-40s, which was a somewhat reverse expression from the intentions. At any rate, they were not successful.

H: One other item that I think ought to be mentioned with regard to application of the tactics of the European theater to the Pacific. In introducing the B-29 into this complex, it was a difficult and delicate operation because unless they were concerted against Japan, their combined effort would be dissipated. But how to do this while basing the forces in territorial command in theaters is very difficult indeed. It was finally solved when the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the establishment of the 20th AF. The 20th AF was to report directly to the JCS for its direction. It was to be commanded by Gen Arnold, as the Executive Agent of the JCS. It was to be supported in all the theaters for administration and basing facilities.

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But it was to be under the operational command of Washington. Adm King went along with this concept, very largely because it paralleled in many ways the Navy command. Adm King as Chief of Naval Operations was also commander of the US Fleet, and this was in effort to establish the same kind of thing as Arnold did with regard to the 20th AF. And it did work out. On March 24, 1944, the Army Air Forces made a presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the concept of Pacific strategy. The SEXTANT conference at Cairo had already established a requirement for bases in China, Formosa and Philippines area, preliminary to an invasion of Japan. The Air Corps presented the argument that the Marianas should be captured as bases for B-29s, after/preliminary air offensive should be under taken against Japan, and handled in the same way that the strategic air forces operated against Europe. The question as to whether or not this would make an invasion unnecessary was by-passed. It was discussed at some length, but there was a general feeling that whether or not an invasion was necessary, a major strategic air offensive ahead of time was certainly, make it possible and make it that much easier. So the 20th AF was given an overriding priority for operations against Japan and was tied into the scheme of operations for the other forces. The scheme of operations worked out by the JCS and the Area Commanders had involved such things as the capture of Leyte, the capture of the Marianas, movement on toward Formosa, or the China Coast. The 20th AF was tied into this scheme of maneuvers, and it called for a first attack against Japan. About the 15th of Nov. The timing at that time was

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coordinated with Leyte attack by Gen MacArthur. I took command of the 21st Bomber Command on the 28th of August (1944) and at that time, there was one wing, the 73rd, assigned to the 21st, and three other wings in training, the 313th, 314th, and 315th.

H: The 20th Bombcom (out of CBI) was attacking cake ovens primarily which were a vital feeder to the Japanese steel industry, and were area targets that could be attacked at night, using radar bombing. The 73rd was trained to participate in this. But it was shifted tothe 21st Bomber Command. It was a night operating, individual bombing, radar bombing outfit, but the targets that were given to the 21st were not at all suitable to this kind of operation. Actually, the plan of operation for the 21st involved the attack of the Japanese Air Force, engine and airframe factories primarily, a later attack on the heavy industrial areas, using incendiary bombs, when the force had reached enough strength for saturation. And this was not expected to happen until 6 months or so after the first operation got out to the Marianas. There were other precision targets as well, including the oil industry, the steel industry, and shipping. The targets that the first mission fell heir to were precision targets. They were not susceptible to fire attack, because they were heavily structured targets as we anticipated. Their location was in general known, but their precise location was not known. So the first thing we had to do was find the targets. The 73rd Wing had to be completely retrained. It was the 1st Bomb Wing all over again. They had to be trained, and first of all, a defensive formation had to be selected, the method of bombing had to be selected.

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They had to learn how to use daylight precision bombing techniques. They had to learn to fly in formation. They had to learn cruise control. It was just a major re-direction, and only about 2 months to do it in. Furthermore, the range of the airplane was giving us a great deal of trouble, and when the Air Force went before the JCS urging the capture of the Marianas, it was based upon theoretical ranges of the B-29 which were not realized in the airplane itself. It would be stretching the airplane to its utmost to make the round-trip from the Marianas to the target and back. These were the circumstances as we then understood them. Flying formation would make it a good deal more difficult, because gasoline comsumption is higher in formation. It is more difficult to maintain cruise control. Consequently, the whole operation was hanging pretty much on a shoestring. We did, however, establish formations - 12 airplanes instead of 18 in a combat box in this case. We did concentrate on difensive gunnery. The defensive gunnery of the B-29 was if anything, more complex and more difficult than on the B-17s. The equipment was much more sophisticated. Great effort had been made to provide sights and improve the possibility of defensive gunnergy, but it was an expremely difficult problem for the gunner. The B-29 had four-gun turret in the top, three other turrets, two guns each, 50 caliber, and a tail turret. All except the tail turret was operated from remote positions which you twisted, and the guns responded to it. We had to supply the aircraft by air. Nevertheless we did get off operation on the 15th, and we did plan and direct an operation on the 15th, and on the 15th we ran into a typhoon. First of all it was a dead calm

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and then the wind reversed itself. The aircraft were in line ready to take off, and couldn't make it.

(Q: Sir, how do you account for the confusion over the priority of industrial targets at the beginning of the war. We switched from ball bearning to oil then to communications....)

H: Well, the selection of the targets themselves, was a pretty complicated affair, an effort to gauge the effect of the destruction of a particular industry upon the warmaking capacity of Germany. The ball bearing industry came to light in a very interesting manner. Actually, a German attack on Coventry where all the Rolls Royce engines were being built early in the war, had been partially successful, but it blew out the skyhights in a lot of factory buildings, and there was a rain. Thousands of trays of ball bearing were rusted. They couldn't be used, and engine production stopped at a time when it was desperately needed. It became quite apparent that production of machinery was extremely sensitive to the ball bearing industry. We made an analysis of the German situation and found that over half the ball bearings for Germany were being made at Schweinfurt. Schweinfurt was a pretty deep penetration. We put it in the target list later in the day, when we thought we would have enough force to get that far. But we also checked with the State Dept, to see whether or not, the Germans could get ball bearings in Switzerland and Sweden. And the State Dept came back with the answer that they felt enough pressure could be put on Sweden and Switzerland by the US Government to inhibit that flow. Well, this turned out to be wrong. We paid a heavy price for Schweinfurt.

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We didn't take out as much of this plant as we had expected, although it did take it out of production for a while. But the Germans were able to make good their ball bearing requirements elsewhere. As for oil, oil was one of the first, one of the primary objectives. I think oil was Number 1 in the earliest days of planning. The Germans had better oil of their own. They were getting most of it from Ploesti, well over 50%. The rest of it they were making from synthetic plans in Germany, and almost all the aviation gasoline was from synthetic production. There were 26 plants. 13 of them were producing about 70% of aviation gas. So it was a fairly well concentrated series of objectives. They were fairly deep in Germany. They were precise, small targets. They were hard to destroy, but we were very interested. This was accepted early in the game as a primary objective with the proviso that they take out Ploesti. If you couldn't take Ploesti then we couldn't keep down the loss of German plans. That wouldn't by themselves cripple them.

And this is why the Ploesti operation was run as it was. As you know, the final effects of the offensive against Europe probably showed up the best advantage in oil. In the month of June, 1944, 90% of the oil production was destroyed, however, the Germans were most ingenious at repairing these things. We estimated initially that a plant of this magnitude taken out, well destroyed, would be out for at least 6 months. It wasn't true. They rebuilt them and got them back in operation far faster. The plant at Leuna was attacked 17 times to keep it out. But it finally was perhaps the most effective operation. The next most

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effective operation. The next most effective was probably against transportation.

The whole operation was about 6 months out of phase. If we had been able to conduct the strategic air offensive for the full six months for which it was planned, prior to the invasion then I think you would have the situation that faced our ground troops in March instead of June. By March the Germans economy was ripped, so we were out of phase. It was not entirely, well I would say, not primarily the fault of the air forces, but the strategic forces were so available, so easy to use in other ways, they kept getting diverted. And, of course, the Mediterranean operation saw a lot of strategic bombing that would normally have gone in the economy of Germany.

(Q: Sir, would you care to comment on your association with one of your collegues, Gen Fairchild, for whom this building is named?)

H: Yes sir. Among the people whom I knew in my military career, I would say the three outstanding ones was Gen Marshall, General Andrews and Gen Fairchild, and they were outstanding for pretty much the same reason. They were men of great character. They were obviously intelligent men, but they were men of marvelous personal integrity and character.

(Q: General LeMay was one of your Group Commander. I notice you didn't put him in this last group of three greatest commanders. How much did he have to do with the tactics in the European war?)

H: Quite a lot. The evolution of the tactics that I described earlier ran something like this. I insisted on having a standard formation. You just couldn't handle large forces with everybody going his separate way. And the putting together

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of a standard formation among the five group commanders was a monumental task. Curt LeMay got ideas of his own, and so did Stan Wray, and so did Frank Armstrong. And I got them together and said: "You people have got more experience than I have in this field. I want a standard formation, and I don't care where it comes from. But don't leave this room until you have come up with one." Well they came closer to adopting Curt's formation than the others. They wound up with a compromise. It was a better formation than any of the others had been, but it was a compromise between the 306th, the 305th, and the 303rd. And it was a good form ation.

(Q: Did anyone else figure in LeMay's decision to use the B-29 at low level over Japan?)

H: I think that was entirely his decision. The idea of the fighter attacks on the urban areas was not. That was in the basic plan, fully a year ahead of time. We actually built Japanese villages, and tried out incendiaries on them in Nevada, as you may know. So the idea was well established long before that, and the fact that the incendiary bombs were on hand was evident that it was not a last minute decision. We did agree that it should not be undertaken. It was very dangerous to undertake it in a day-raid, piecemeal. If it was to be done, we ought to hit something really hard, hard enough to make it stick. So we delayed the incendiary attacks. I was directed to carry out a couple of them, which I did, with small forces and not very good success. I did learn something. The ballistic characteristics of the bomb were not what we thought, and it wouldn't go where we thought they were going. So we did learn something on it.

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But by the time of the March attacks, three things had happened. (1) We had enough B-29s to do a massive attack; (2) we found that the Japanese air force was not anything like as strong as they had been anticipated; (3) and it was not going to be the obstacle that we had feared it would be. We found that you couldn't do precision bombing in Japanese weather with any degree of success. They were running 3 to 4 days a month, in which it was even possible to try it.

All of those things led to a natural decision to go in for the fire-bomb attack, which was far easier, far simpler, far safer than the other. The decision to go in at low altitude was something else again. I've been asked whether I would have done that. I think in all honesty, the answer would be "No." I think I would have gone in about 15,000 feet. But to go in first as low as 5,000 - 10,000 feet, without any real knowledge of the anti-aircraft defenses, was I think, a very dangerous and a very courageous thing to do, and it turned out to be right. I think that was Gen LeMay's personal decision.

(Q: In Jan 1942, Gen Eaker sent a letter to the Air Staff requesting development of long range fighters. It was two years later before we got the P-47, the P-51 with belly tanks. Can you explain this two year delay in procurement of this aircraft?)

H: The development of the escort fighter as a matter of fact was in AWPD-1 (Summer 1941) when we asked for this development. But, at the time, it looked technologically completely infeasible. This is one of the errors we made. People like me, who didn't know enough about the technical factors were weighing the technical features when we shouldn't have been. It was explained

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to us, and it sounded perfectly sensible, that if you've got two fighters, and one of them weighs twice as much as the other one, the light one is always going to whip the heavy one. Now, to have an escort fighter that would go 500 miles and be able to fight a light interceptor, was just going to wind up getting whipped. Well, this is one of those truisms that didn't turn out to be true. There were several reasons for this. The fighters against which the P-51, and P-47 were balanced were older. They were ME-109s and FW-190s, which were a design generation older than the P-51 at any rate. By that time, they had learned how to carry added weight, and still have performance. And of course, the droppable tanks made a tremendous difference. But it was no lack of desire that help up an escort fighter. It looked like it just wasn't feasible to do.

(Q: We have been accused of having a lack of foresight. I've often maintained that we did think about it)

H: It was in AWPD-41, which was the first real layout of what the strategic war should look like. At that time, we urged that every effort be made to develop one (fighter), but it was not in the cards then to have one.

(Q: Do you feel the RAF experience also had some bearing upon this. Gen Eaker seemed to think Air Marshal Portal was taking the same line, and had a great deal of influence.)

H: I don't know whether you are aware of the B-40 situation or not. We did try it the other way. We tried to provide escort fighters that were armed escort fighters, they were B-17s with armor and added gunfire. And we did put them in the most exposed position which was the lowest or bottom flight on the

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combat box, but that didn't work out either. Because they were a help going into a target, but by the time you had gotten rid of your bombs, all the other airplanes were light, and ready to go home. And the B-40 was lumbering along, and you had to stay back to protect the protector.

(Q: Do you feel Goering made a mistake by dropping the German fighter defense back to Germany instead of pushing it as far forward to meet your bombers, and thereby to force the P-51s to drop their belly tanks?)

H: I don't know. The Germans did vary their strategy several times. Initially, they were deployed well forward. The Germans had a plan advanced by Galland which Hitler wouldn't take. That might have made things very unpleasant. Later in the war when it was apparent that they couldn't stop the bomber, he proposed gathering all the German fighters in a one massive forward position and decimating one wing or one group at a time. Let the others alone. Just bore in and take out a whole group at a time. This would have had a very unpleasant morale factor.

(Q: With reference to the doctrine of the Air Corps Tactical School, we hear a lot about the criticism of the plans for strategic bombardment only to the exclusion of anything else in the Army Air Corps. Was there a movement afoot to really equalize these forces as it later worked out in WWII, or were our early planners really off on the wrong foot as much as some history books would have us believe? We have been criticized - the Air Force - for not having looked at long range fighters, for not having looked at attack aircraft, for not having looked at other factors of airpower, and to the exclusion of bombers. Were our planners really that narrow minded? Or was there a movement afoot to really go into this a little deeper, but we just don't know anything about it?)

H: I think the first one comes closer than the second. The Air Corps Tactical School was caught up in the concept of air warfare. They did spend most of their time really trying to

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evolve a concept of strategy for strategic air warfare - bombing. They overdid it, I'm sure as we've overdone it since then, probably because we were on the defensive, all the leverage was the other way. The War Dept wanted to do it completely the other way. They wanted two things. They wanted aircraft, they had units that would literally support the troops in the battlefield, and they wanted a pool of GHQ aircraft to be used literally as GHQ artillery is used. You take the pool of this stuff and you use it, parcel it out, to suit your needs. For a long time, this was the intent of the general Staff with regard to the GHQ AF. GHQ AF and the Air Tactical School were doing their utmost to forment the idea of the achievement of a strategic purpose, a major one. Whether or not it was an effective one - achievement toward a strategic purpose by the application of airpower, and I think we did get carried away somewhat.

(Q: General, why do you say we've overdone it since then?)

H: Well, I think that we have neglected tactical air in the last 10 years.

(Q: In view of Vietnam situation?)

H: Well, even if there hadn't been a Vietnam, I think, my personal feeling is that we've got carried away too far on this strategic thing, and the more important omission in my opinion is the lack of defense. We've gotten ourself in the position now where we so frightened ourselves of strategic warfare - our people are, that we have decimated, we've emasculated our own force. So I think we should have applied far more attention to providing a support for/a defense of our own source of will. Now, I think

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we have gotten ourselves in the position where the Strategic Air Command is practically handcuffed.

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Interview of MG John F. Curry
Air Force Academy
December 26, 1958

(Retranscribed from previous interview)

(Note: M. Green went up to see Gen Curry in Denver on Dec 13, 1969. He had recently suffered a stroke and was not feeling well. I talked to him on the telephone. His speech was halting and slow, and I figured it would waste my time and would tax his energy to try to conduct an interview.)

Fortunately, I came upon a long lecture which Gen Curry gave in Sept 1958, discussing his experiences in aviation and I'm going to play segments of that tape.

General Curry got into aviation in 1915 and was sent to the Signal Corps Aviation School at North Island, near San Diego, California, and he talks about that experience.

C: The Air Service, in the beginning, any time there was a plane and a pilot, he was teaching somebody but the teaching wasn't very severe, very particularly good, so in 1913, the Signal Corps decided to establish a school, and I arrived there in the summer, middle of September; 23 days after I left Panama, at this Signal Corps Aviation School which was at North Island, California. This is the present location of the beautiful Naval Air Station at San Diego.

We stubbed our toes during the first war, because we didn't start from scratch, gentlemen; we started from behind scratch. We started with 55 officers, and 1,100 men. We ended with about 20,000 officers, 10,000 of whom were pilots, and about 150,000 men. We didn't get as many as we wanted to France, for the simple reason of the Germans push at Amiens the spring of 1915 to scare the life

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out of the British and the French because the Hun almost got through. In May, June, July and August, there were no people sent over, this was 1918, except infantry and machinegun. Well, that affected me a little bit too.

Another thing that you will hear a lot of hogwash about, is the DeHavilland. Now, we decided to build the Spad. We got the French Spad, we picked out that. By the time they decided on it, the French had changed it, and there was one much better. The British had 27 different types of pursuit planes during the war, and the French developed 31. So, as we sought advice abroad, we decided to build the DeHavilland. The DeHavilland was a damn good plane. Now, we started that Oct. 1917. It came into big production in the spring of 1918, but you couldn't ship it abroad. There was an embargo; nothing but infantry and machine gunners. The French and the British, they wanted bodies to stop the Hun. Gen. Pershing tried to get 7,500 air service people over during those months, but the British were furnishing the transportation, so he had to give in to them.

What were the requirements for a candidate for flying in the olden days? First, you had to be an unmarried Lieutenant of the line, under 30. Well, I was unmarried, I had been out of West Point seven years, and in my time we didn't marry in our youth. I was just under 30 and I heeded very much, the old Army saying. And by God, gentlemen, it is just as true now, as it was then. A second Lieutenant married is a second Lieutenant spoiled. Now, I'll tell you, and I know a lot won't pay any attention; that's just an old man's idea .....

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Fortunately, I came upon a long lecture which Gen Curry gave in Sept 1958, discussing his experiences in aviation and I'm going to play segments of that tape.

General Curry got into aviation in 1915 and was sent to the Signal Corps Aviation School at North Island, near San Diego, California, and he talks about that experience.

C: The Air Service, in the beginning, any time there was a plane and a pilot, he was teaching somebody but the teaching wasn't very severe, very particularly good, So in 1913, the Signal Corps decided to establish a school, and I arrived there in the summer, middle of September., 23 days after I left Panama, at this Signal Corps Aviation School which was at North Island, California. ~~I will put on~~ the first slide. This is the present location of the beautiful Naval Air Station at San Diego. The equipment consisted of about 1 Curtiss Flying Boat which gave us a lot of extra landings without too much trouble and about a dozen land planes from about 3 to 6 of which were in commission. Not more than that were in commission because we had constant engine trouble, and I will tell you a little later. Now, military aviation leader, which we obtained when we passed this test, and then a military aviation which was three years as a M/ JMA. Well, I think you can read those very well, and you can see they weren't very

I climbed up to 3,000 feet shortly after I returned I was told that sometimes when you got to those altitudes, you got no and didn't know how to come down. Well, I got up there and had a wonderful time and then decided I wanted to come down, well I had never landed except on a particular angle, so I took that angle of descent, and glided around the field four or five

times until I came over the which we used as our aiming point and cut the engines and came in to land. Now, we were delayed a great deal in our JMA tests because of these investigations and we didn't take ours in until February or March. Well, the net result was that when I joined the First Aero Squadron in Mexico, I had 87 hours of solo flying and that was more than 15 pilots had had before my time.

You migth get tight tonight and somebody might put you in the paper, but if you lead a model life for 15 years it is never mentioned. We stubbed our toes during the first war, because we didn't start from scratch, gentlemen, we started from behind scratch. We started with 55 officers, and 1,100 men. We ended with about 20,000 officers, 10,000 of whom were pilots, and about 150,000 men. We didn't get as many as we wanted to France, for the simple reason that the Germans push at Amiens in the spring of 1915 to scare the life out of the British and the French because the Hun almost got through. In May, June, July and August, there were no people pent over, this was 1918, except infantry and machinegun. Well, that affected me a little bit too. Another thing that you will hear a lot of bagwash about, is the DeHavilland. Now, we decided to build the Spad. and we got it the French Spad. we picked out that, By the time they decided on it, the French had changed it, and there was one much better. The British had 27 different types of pursuit planes during the war, and the French developed 31. So, as we sought advice abroad, we decided to build the DH. The DH was a damn good plane. Now, we started that Oct 1917, it came into big production in the spring of 1918, but you couldn't ship it abroad, there was an embargo; nothing but infantry and machine guns. The French and the British, they wanted bodies to stop the Hun. GenPershing tried to get 7,500 air service people over during those months, but the British were furnishing the transportation, so he had to give in to them.

and that is, what were the requirements for a candidate for flying in the olden days? First, you had to be an unmarried Lieutenant of the line, under 30. Well, I was unmarried, I had been out of West Point seven years, and in my time we didn't marry

Carry: Argument for flying - Olden Days

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in our youth, and I was just under 30 and I needed very much, the old Army saying, And by God, gentlemen, it is just as true now, as it was then, a second Lieutenant married is a second Lieutenant spoiled. Now, I'll tell you, and I know a lot won't pay any attention; that's just an old man's idea....

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Harbold, Norris B. 31 Aug 70

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NORRIS B. HARBOLD
148 TERRELL ROAD
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78209
4 November 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D.C. 20134

Dear Dr. Green:

I have your letter of 1 November with the extract of a telephone conversation with Aug Kissner.

Thank you for them kind words about my historical effort. It was an obsessive one and a final one. The absence of any consolidated record of events and the fast fading of people and papers were the instigation.

My recollections of Gen. Arnold are few but vivid. When the 19th Group was ordered to March from Rockwell, I was Supply Officer of the 76th Service Sqdn. - making me a temporary captain. I was subsequently made Base Supply Officer then serving two groups. As a result of the GHQ reorganization, and the imposition of a Wing organization on two groups and a base staffs, I ended up in supply with only three NCO's and one civilian employee in my entire set-up. The civilian employees authorized supply were listed as stock record clerks; one went to Wing, one went to Base Hq as stenographers. There were two experienced supply officers available, but one of these was in Wing Hq and one in Base Hq, so I was all alone at the working level. This was the way the 1st Wing, under Gen. Arnold, got started.

Of a more happy note, I believe that it was Hap Arnold who instituted the Dining In. I recall distincly a Wing Ding, as we called them, at Hamilton, and there was also one at March. Dress Army blues was the uniform, and the format of toasts with no smoking until authorized, was observed. The various groups put on skits at Hamilton wherein some of the group and squadron commanders were presented in unflattering manner.

As for Aug Kissner's story of a letter in the A-2 safe, I recall nothing. It may have been in our keeping, but I knew nothing of the contents. We had one of the few safes available.

In Guam, the only active intelligence operation by my A-2 section of USASTAF, under Gen. Spaatz, was in enemy defense, air and AA. All targeting was done by 20th BombCom. We were building up to take over this function but it never happened. The A bombs were dropped. My first knowledge of the existence thereof, incidentally, was the pictures that my photo people processed.

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The typhoon that caused all the devastation in Okinawa barely touched us in Guam.

I did keep in my safe Rosie O'Donnell's poker winnings - having staked him on a visit, with good fortune - for later application; again with good fortune.

Rosie told me then, and since, that it was he who first suggested the low level bombing attacks. I believe him, not Power, with whom I served in the 28th Bomb Sq. as a 1st Lt in the P.I., 1937-38. LeMay did what all good commanders do - (See "the Functions of The Executive" by Chester Barnard), he "filched"ideas. The decision, however, was his, LeMay, and that is what goes on the record.

I hope that this information from another observer can be of some help.

Sincerely,

Nomis B. Harbold

Maj.Gen. USAF (Ret)

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20314

1 November 1971

Maj General Norris B. Harbold, USAF (Ret)
148 Terrell Road
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Harbold:

I'm working on a Biography of General Hap Arnold and I've been very dilatory about some things, like trying to get to see you for any recollections of the man based on your experiences at March Field and subsequently.

I've also wanted to have an excuse to congratulate you on your fine book. It's gotten some good writeups and deservedly so.

Funny thing, I have been probing about in some of the same areas and have talked to many of the people with whom you were associated in those early days, including General Al Hegenberger, Glen Jamison and Swede Larson. I also talked to General Gene Eubank when I was down last May (1970) for the Daedalian thing. I just cant explain why I didnt get around to looking you up. It was my loss.

Perhaps I should tell you I have been working about three years on the Arnold Biography. I was on a Brookings Fellowship for a year and spent it at the Library of Congress MSS Division probing through the Arnold Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Billy Mitchell and other papers.

In any event, I talked to Maj General Augie Kissner and he mentioned an item that could be important to my work. I'd appreciate any comment you may have on it. I note in your biography that you were the Intelligence Officer for USASTAF in the late stages of the war, and so, would have been the logical man to take possession of this document.

When your book goes into 2nd printing, I would like to suggest places to correst a couple of small errors which, I should add, in no way detract from the overall thrust of your story and its interest for me.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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had already visited MacArthur and Nimitz. The sum and substance of this briefing was that there was no need for an invasion. LeMay came back to Washington at the head of a group of briefers and they cooled their heels for many days waiting for the Joint Chiefs. LeMay gave this briefing and Marshall fell asleep during it. The upshot of this briefing was totally negative. The plans for the invasion of Japan were not interrupted.

Kissner, at this time, was Deputy to LeMay, 21st BombCom.

This makes an interesting sort of paper because the Army-Navy were proceeding with their invasion plans and were not interested in any other approach.

Kissner talked about a paper that Gen Tom Handy had signed to drop four nuclear weapons. This directive was prepared on the orders of President Truman. It was put in an evelope and kept in a safe. He says that Skippy Harbold had access to this letter.

Kissner said that Spaatz was tired of carrying this thing around and this letter was put in the safe. Kissner mentioned that there was a severe storm and the safe was tossed about some distance from the building it was in. He must be talking about the typhoon that hit Okinawa, or that hit the Far East area on October 2, 1945.

One of the problems the AF had on the Island of Guam was that the Navy was using some logistic facilities for Navy construction. There was one case of 130 trucks that were diverted to haul for the Navy, as opposed to unloading bombs for the 20th AF. The man Kissner had trouble with was the island commander Larson. I believe this was Marine Corps Swede Larson.

On the subject of low level raids, which began March 9, 1945, LeMay popped this idea on all his commanders, including Rosie O'Donnell, Tom Power who was "speechless" and Kissner, who also had misgivings about it. This comment may be set in opposition to a Reader's Digest article which indicated that Power was the man who conceived the low level raids. But Kissner says that it was LeMay's idea all the way.

He said that Norstad came out right before the low level raids and looked

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Harmon, Leonard "Jake" 2 Aug 74

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Leonard F. Harman, Col. USAF, Ret.
62 A Calle Cadiz
Laguna Hills, Ca. 92653

7 December 74

Murray Green
Office of the Air Force History
Dept. of the Air Force
Hdqtrs. U.S. Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Mr. Green

I have often thought of our too short visit, when you were here last Summer. I have continued writing about events of the past. I wonder if you can do me a favor. After seeing the television show the other night featuring Gen. George Marshall, I am more than ever a great fan of his, as I think I told you.

I have a clipping from the Sunday Star, Washington, dated 26 Nov. 44, showing a picture of lowly me standing between General Arnold and General Marshall. I had flown a B-29 to Washington for exhibit by Congress. The exhibit was photographed by newspapers and the Air Force.

I have an Air Force photograph showing the exhibit identified as WNAAB Photo No. 335. The Photo I want should be close to this number, which shows me standing between Gen. Arnold and Gen Marshall. Gen Arnold welcomed me and then introduced me to Gen. Marshall saying "This is the young fellow I have been telling you about".

I wonder if you could find the photograph I so high-prize and send me a copy.

Thanking you in advance

Jake

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Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the
Chief of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

2 July 74

Dear Dr. Green.

The past two weeks have been devoted to a visit from our Daughter and nine year old Grandaughter from Independence, Mo. There was scarcely time available to eat and sleep.

Laguna Hills is seven miles inland on El Toro Road from Laguna Beach and about two miles South of the junction of the Santa Anna Freeway with the San Diego Freeway.

If you fly come to the Orange County Airport, which is served by a shuttle plane from the Los Angeles International Airport. We could meet and pick you up there.

The enclosed information, on Hyatt Lodge, will enable you to make reservations or I could do it for you.

We will expect to see you the early part of August.

Sincerely,

Leonard Harman

Enclosures

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Privacy, safety and security...

Everywhere there is a growing concern about safety and security from crime in the cities and unwanted intrusions of privacy. The Rossmoor concept has put great emphasis on personal safety and privacy, a concept that other communities have tried to copy.

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The entire community is surrounded by a protective, decorative masonry wall. Entrances are permanently staffed by congenial security personnel who admit only residents, guests and outside commercial companies who are invited by residents. There is no transient or through traffic.



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

Beach with its shops, renowned restaurants, art colony and unequaled year-round beaches. The Summer White House at San Clemente is a next door neighbor. Conveniently located next to the California freeway system, you are within a comfortable, safe 45 minutes from Los Angeles. And for the traveler, the jet-age Orange County Airport is a mere 15 minutes away with lines serving all the western states.

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And for those who choose to continue in their profession or business, Rossmoor Leisure World Laguna Hills is the perfect location, in Orange County, California, the fastest growing economic area in America.

The combination of peac[illegible] environment and close-[illegible] truly makes Rossmoor [illegible] Hills one of the most [illegible] world.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

5 July 1974

Colonel Leonard F. Harman, USAF (Ret)
62A Calle Cadiz
Laguna Hills, CAL 92653

Dear Colonel Harman:

Getting to the pick-and-shovel aspect of my trip. As I project my time a month ahead, Friday, August 2nd, either AM or PM, or perhaps Saturday, August 3rd, AM, would be good times for me to come by for our "bull session" on Hap Arnold.

I'll phone you a day before to firm up a time. If you wish to reach me between now and then, the enclosure will get to me in good time.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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Some time Friday Aug 2
20314

(10)

20 June 1974

Colonel Leonard F. Harman, USAF (Ret)
62A Calle Cadiz
Laguna Hills, Calif 92653

Dear Colonel Harman:

Thanks for your good letter of June 6th. Yes, "Jake" Harman was very well known in the Air Corps back when.

Maybe I'll sit in on your "Creative Writing" class. I need all the help I can get.

I'm looking forward to a good session with you. As I can project my schedule, it will be sometime during the week of August 5th through August 9th, and I will phone you at AC 714-830-5443 to firm up an appointment.

I've been having trouble finding Laguna Hills on my maps. Is it near Laguna Beach? If you have a local map (small), I probably could use.

The enclosure will speed your reply. I'm hoping to get lucky to catch you at home that week.

I just received a letter from Mrs. Arnold who is doing very well. I will see her a few days after you and I get together.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

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Leonard F. Harman, Col. USAF, Ret.
62 A Calle Cadiz
Laguna Hills, Ca. 92653

6 June 74

Murray Green
Office of the Air Force History
Dept. of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Mr Green.

With reference to your letter of 3 June 74, I have no plans at the present that would interfere with your projected visit the first week in August.

The past three years I have been doing some "Creative Writing" in a class here at Leisure World, conducted by the Saddle Back community College.

My subject has to do with the creation of all Bombardment type airplanes since the day of the Keystone Bombers.

After the war they kept me in Walter Reed for eleven months and retired me.

Give me a call when you arrive. Phone 714-830-5443

Sincerely.

Jake

Leonard F. Harman

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20314

5 June 1974

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colo. 80904

Dear General Roth

One of my informants has come through with an address for Colonel Leonard F. Harman: 62A Calle Cadiz, Laguna Hills, Calif. 92653. I shall try that one.

Appreciate you and Mrs. Roth going to so much trouble for me.

Hope you have a good day for graduation exercises today.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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MISH ROTH

1 June 1974

Dear Dr Green,

Glad to hear that the Arnold Biography is coming along. I hope to see it soon.

I do not know Jake Harmon's address and do not know anyone around here that does and we have called a few. It has been some time since we have heard anything of Jake but the last we did hear was that he sold his property on the West Coast and moved somewheres in the Midwest.

Martha has written to a few of her friends who were good friends of the Harmons and if we get the address through that effort I shall send it to you at once.

I don't know whether Jake resigned or retired. If he retired his address would be available through the AF finance office in Denver. If he resigned they would probably not have it.

I should have some replies before you go to the Coast.

Sincerely

Marshall S Roth

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3 June 1974

Colonel Leonard F. Harman
62A Calle Cadiz
Laguna Hills, Calif. 92653

Dear Colonel Harman "Jake"

I've been trying to track you down for some time. First I should mention that I'm working on a Biography of General Hap Arnold and have spent most of the past five years on this project, including about 18 months on a Brookings Institution Fellowship. I've gone around the country interviewing most of the key people associated with General Arnold during his career. I guess I have talked to over 150 senior military people, including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Cabell, Smart, Kuter, Fred Dean, Norstad, Everest, K. B. Wolfe, and many, many others. I've also talked to Mr. Lovett, Jackie Cochran, Eddie Rickenbacker, and Charles Lindbergh.

Recently I have been zeroing in on those who were involved in the B-29 program. I've talked to General LeMay and Paul Emrick. I have been corresponding with Generals J. B. Montgomery and "Cec" Combs and hope to see them on the trip I have pending this summer.

Many times, interviewees have mentioned your name as one having had some good contacts with Hap Arnold. If my plans mature, I will be coming out your way around the first week in August and hope you can give me an hour or so to reminisce about Arnold and the old Air Force.

I also hope to get to Sonoma and visit once more with Mrs. Arnold. As you may know, she celebrated her 87th birthday last week.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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24 May 1974

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Dr. Apt J-1
Colorado Springs, Colo. 80904

Dear General Roth

Still grinding away at the Arnold Biography. Right now, I'm trying to track down Colonel Leonard F. "Jake" Harman out on the West Coast. Somebody said you had his address. It is very difficult here to track down people below the star rank because the records in St. Louis are a mess.

If you have Colonel Harman's address, I'd appreciate having it, as I'm about to take off on a trip to the West Coast in a month or two.

Hope you're enjoying the Colorado weather this time of year.

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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

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(9)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

8 July 1974

Colonel Leonard F. Harman, USAF (Ret)
62A Calle Cadiz
Laguna Hills, CAL 92653

Dear Colonel Harman:

Thanks for your note of July 2nd along with map and other useful information. I believe we may stay at Camp Pendleton.

As I look at my situation, Friday, August 2nd may be my best day, but I'll phone to confirm.

Your letter crossed mine of July 5th.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

done
8-2

P.S. I'm driving - 8000 mi
21 interviews

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Edited mb

Interview with Col Leonard "Jake" Harman , Laguna Hills, Calif, 2 Aug 74

H Arnold was Chief of Wright Field for a while I was at Engineer School

Q You were at Engineering School. This was around

H '31, '32

Q He was there in '31

H My first association with Arnold was when he was Commandant at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio when I was a student in the Air Corps Engineering School there. We made the normal formal calls on commanding officers at certain designated times, and he and Mrs. Arnold were always very courteous and nice to junior officers.

Q You remember anything about her at this time? I was told she has a fabulous memory. for people she's met. Do you remember anyahing along that line?

H No The next association I had with Col Arnold was after the air mail.

Q Before you get into the air mail let me ask you some questions. Your super boss was Jan Howard in Engineering.

H He was Chief of Engineering

Q Do you know if the relationship between Jan Howard and Arnold. (No) They were brothers-in-law

H I guess I'd forgotten that

Q There was some hostility between them. Do you remember?

H No.

Q Ben Chidlaw told me about a lot of this

H He was at the desk next to mine. He was Project Officer on Trainers when I was Project Officer on Bombardment. Do you know about the B-10 that went to Alaska. While I was still a student in the Air Corps Engineering School, I was made Bombardment Project Officer, in addition to my other duties. Mr. Martin had not been building

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airplanes for a period of time But he submitted a two-engine experimental airplane later called the B-10 . It was competition to the Boeing airplane which was somewhat bigger and didn't perform quite as well. Neither one of them in fact were too good. But this Board had evaluated the B-9 as better. Being a 2d Lieut I couldn't override the Board, so I went in to see my old friend, Hugh Knerr, who at that time was Chief of the Field Service Section. I'm sure he must have used some persuasive powers on Major Jan Howard, who was my immediate boss, Chief of the Engineering Section. Next thing I knew I was invited to come into a conference. There were three people: my boss, Col Howard, Glenn L. Martin, and myself, about developing the B-10. Anyway, Mr. Martin was told in no uncertain terms to take that goddam airplane back home and have 60 days to fix it. And do exactly what Harman tells you. It was kind of a big order but, finally, in sixty days it was returned, and he was awarded a contract. It went at a high speed of 213 miles an hour and we'd enclosed the turret for the front gunner and put an enclosure for the pilot and enclosure for the rear gunner. So the crew could at least operate over a long flight, and at higher speeds, than they'd ever done before. Mr. Glenn L. Martin was awarded the Collier Trophy for having built the world's fastest bomber. After the air mail...

Q Were you in the air mail?

H Oh yes, in the Central Zone.

Q You flew under Hickam?

H Arnold had the Western and Hickam had the Center and they both did good. And a fellow by the name of B.Q. Jones had the Eastern and he bitched everything up, used pursuit airplanes. Get a 100-lb sack of mail in the tail of them, and they'd spin in. He was so dumb that he didn't realize that there was 2,000 pounds of mail a night going from Newark to Chicago. He and his pursuiters. I was called up frantically to fly the air mail, And I hadn't flown a Keystone bomber for so long, that it was going back to the Dark Ages. One night I was going from Cleveland

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to Chicago . One night in a storm, I don't know what happened, but the newfangled gyro, and directional gyro, and horizon were hurriedly installed on these airplanes, and they were put out ahead of the windshield apparently to facilitate the installation. During this storm the poor, Keystone--I hadn't flown a Keystone for years and they weren't good then. Here it was, upside down apparently, I was hanging from from my belt My instruments showed all right. I told the crew to get ready to bail out, and then I discovered my old friend the bank and turn indicator showed I was wrong. So I went to work on the old-fashioned bank and turn indicator, and all of a sudden things looked all right again. Later, I found out that the new fine and fancy horizon and directional gyro had froze up, it was so cold. I finally landed at Chicago, and I had to sit up in my seat a long time before I dared step on my legs. They were like icicles.

Q You were a 1st Lieut?

H 1st Lieut,

Q Do you know anything about why the Air Corps took that job? Gen Foulois agreed to take it when Roosevelt canceled the contract.

H I know nothing of that, but I do know that when it was only started, we had orders at Wright Field to equip B-10's which were just coming out of the Martin factory with artificial horizons, and directional gyros, and a mail compartment. Skip the artificial horizon, we had those, but it didn't have a radio compass in it. So Wright Field installed a radio compass and put in a mail compartment in the bomb bay. We were training--they ordered three groups of five pilots each to come in to Wright Field for instrument landing training I was one of the instructors. In fact I was the fifth pilot in the Air Corps to make instrument landings and takeoffs. One of the instructors, Hegenberger, cooked up this scheme with Cruzie who had invented the radio compass. Ever hear about instrument landing? All instrument landing amounted to was with a radio compass, you'd home on a radio beam or a steady beam station, and on a motorcycle they had an antenna and an inner and outer

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station beacon. They'd put the inner station about five hundred feet away from the airfield and the outer station lined up with the inner station on the runway you wanted to land on. The pilot would home on the station. When you arrieved there you'd know it by the action of the needle, and then immediately turn to the inner station, and when you'd fly over the inner station you knew it, and would immediately switch to the outer station, and set your directional gyro at 180 degrees, do a 180 degree turn when you got the outer station and come back over with a 180 degree precision turn over the outer station at a pre-given altitude depending on the terrain and speed, and then switch immediately to the inner station. When you'd pass over the inner station you knew it, and then continue that same course, and go in and land. The first landing you make is as good as your last, all completely under the hood, On getting prepared to use these B-10's on the air mail, had the air mail lasted just about a week longer, the Air Corps could have gone from the West Coast, Oakland to Newark on instruments 100% of the way, making instruments landings and takeoffs. And then the thing was turned back to the commercial operators.

Q What kind of a job did Arnold do in the Western Zone?

H He didn't have any losses. He had...

Q He had a few losses, Did you hear any static about why Foulois took this job without adequate instruments in the airplanes? And experience among the pilots who were flying the mail? Was there any criticism of Foulois? I knew he got in trouble with the President.

H It was a matter of timing. When he said what the Air Corps could do, he was hoping that these B-10's could be stepped up quicker. I think that was the whole basis of it. Had it lasted just another week or two, it would have been perfect.

Q The Alaskan flight was laid on to erase the bad smell of the air mail, I suppose?

H I don't know of course what was in somebody else's mind,

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I was not only the Project Officer on the B-10 but when this Alaska flight was organized at Wright-Patterson Field, I was designated as Liaison Officer between the flight and Wright Field to get everything that they needed.

Q Knerr was put in charge of the preparations?

H Knerr was Deputy to Arnold and Knerr was the one I principally dealt with on supplies. Knerr had been in charge of the Field Service Section and knew all the supply matters. In fact he was a genius on supply matters. As far as getting the supplies laid out up in Alaska that we'd need, spare engines and spare everything, He was just perfect. In fact, later on, when we needed a lot of these spares it just happened to be there where they were supposed to be.

Q There was a great job done getting the supplies up there. Why was Arnold brought in as commander?

H I don't know. Except he had a good record of airmail in the Western Division. He outranked Knerr.

Q Westover was supposed to have the job. They felt that Westover being a balloon man originally was not fully experienced. He was Assistant Chief to Foulois. This was a highly desirable assignment. But Arnold got the assignment. He was pulled off vacation down in Jackson Hole, Wyoming on a fishing trip after the air mail, and they pulled him out to prepare for the Alaskan flight. Were you aware of that?

H No A Arnold refused to leave Wright Field with the airplanes till he was sure everything was in good order. I think he was knowing that the Air Corps had been burned by the Air Mail. He wanted to be sure all his planes were in readiness before he took off half cocked. He was being pressured by Wright Field by messages from Washington, "When are you going to start?" Did you know that?

H No

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Q Did you have a sense that a great deal of care was being taken in the preparations for the Alaskan Flight?

H I knew the supply situation was, in as far as the pilots.

Q They changed the ratio. A lot of officers wanted to go, Arnold brought in some extra enlisted men. The ratio was 14 officers and 16 enlisted men Most of these were supposed to be master mechanics Because he wanted to be sure that those planes were kept in good order.

H They had some damned good mechanics.

Q Well anyway he started out on that flight. Now perhaps we can talk about some of the adventures on it

H Do you want to know about what happened before we started?

Q Right

H As Liaison Officer between Wright Field and this Alaska Flight I was just designated to be sure they had everything they needed and help them in any manner I could. I'd stand around and watch them flying and some of these so-called hot shot, old time hard hitting pilots that had been flying Jennies...

They didn't seem to realize that the B-10 was the cleanest airplane, meaning free from drag, of any airplane that had been built up to that time in this country, or any other country, for that matter. So they knew how to fly airplanes, but they didn't know how to fly an airplane the like of which they'd never flown before. For instance, coming in to land, they would poke the nose down like you would on a dirty airplane to keep from spinning in, The airplane would throttle off. It would pick up speed. It would scoot along the landing field about three or four feet up in the air, and it would take them about a mile before it would lose enough speed to stop. So, nothing I could do. Just stand watching these super-duper pilots. I knew they didn't know what the hell they were doing, but who was I to tell them. So I was aware that

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They were definitely opposed to this airplane going to Alaska. They thought they ought to have amphibians so they could find a place to land, and there wouldn't be any place they could possibly land one of these up in Alaska

Q Who were these people who advocated amphibians? Do you remember any specifics? The pilots assigned to the mission who wanted amphibians

H All the talk I could hear. Maybe the loudest talkers were the only ones I did hear. But they thought they could never make it in a small landing field. They'd look up Dept of Commerce bulletins, and find some fields were considerably less than 2,000 feet and here they were landing in a potential two-mile area at Patterson Field and some of them were taking a mile to land. So I'd known Arnold before, of course, when he was at Wright Field He sent for me one day. He was over in the Visiting Officers' Quarters , I think it was Sunday. Here he was shaving in his undershirt, all covered with lather. First thing he said after passing the time: He said, "Harman, what's this I hear about this airplane not being suitable to go to Alaska?" I knew the answer but, momentarily, I was afraid to tell him. Finally, I thought of this old saying that truth has that quality of meaning that you can lie about it, you can distort it, and do everything nasty you can, and finally it will stand there unblemished. So I got up my nerve and said: "Colonel, they don't know how to fly it." That was something I already knew they must have gotten together what somebody thought were the best pilots available. He looked to me as if he got red under the layer of shaving lather. Anyway, he kind of paused a moment, and, I by that time, used a little psychology on him . I said: "I can tell you, but I can't tell them. They won't listen." So by that time he calmed down a bit, and said: "Well, how do you fly it?" He omitted what he probably thought to himself "You're so goddamned smart".

I told him how to fly an airplane the like of which he'd never flown before

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You had it on the ground first, and second, taxi it around and see that the controls were all right Then, somehow get it in the air, make a takeoff. Once you did that, you were all set. Get up to several thousand feet and calibrate it. Calibrate it by throttling back gradually, and maybe no one else had flown this airplane before so they had to find out all these tricks. At plenty high altitude four or five thousand feet, you could gradually throttle the engines, and pull the nose up until you were approaching a stall . And test it all the time for directional and lateral control, and then, that way, with the engine off, you could determine the indicated air speed at which you would land. The first landing you'd make was a the best landing that you'd ever make. Incidentally, everybody knows that at Cheyenne, Wyoming, it's a high altitude field , about 7,000 feet, I remember. A typical catch question is to ask somebody, experienced pilots, or young ones or anybody: "If an airplane lands at 60 miles an hour indicated at sea level , how fast will it land at indicated air speed at Cheyenne?" All the wiseacres would say: "I don't have a slide rule" Probably wouldn't know how to run one anyway-- or "I don't have this--I don't have that". Apparently all their flying schools and all these old hard bitten people that flew before they had an airspeed indicator, I guess, didn't realize that airspeed indicator would indicate dynamic pressure which was the thing you flew on. So at Cheyenne, your dynamic pressure, you'd actually be going faster in thin air but the airspeed meter would read the same landing speed that it would at sea level.

Q This meeting with Arnold concluded by his accepting your idea?

H Finally, the second time I told him he calmed down was a little friendly. So I left him.

Q You were selected by him were you not? Who selected you to be a pilot or engineering officer?

H He must have selected me because I wasn't on the list to go. The day after I told him all this, how to fly the airplanes, everybody was

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standing around in a group, the hard bitten pilots and all were standing around and they looked up in the sky and there was a B-10 up quite high. Then everybody kept talking and finally somebody looked up again and said: "My God, he's going to spin in. He's going too slow." And this airplane kind of kept coming in, and moved slower, and it was nose kind of high. Made a beautiful landing and taxied up to where all these who were having their morning convention with nothing else better to do and somebody said: "My God, it's the Old Man!" He was the type of leader that would demonstrate and wouldn't expect anybody to do anything that he wouldn't do himself.

Q I take it that Arnold was a man who was willing to take a suggestion. He was willing to take your word about landing it with nose high, and test it out himself. Was that the idea?

H He was just merely following instructions so that he could do it himself, using the meter rather than feel. And feel in a nice high-speed airplane has an entirely different feel than a clumsy, dirty airplane

Q What I'm saying is he took your suggestion and checked it out?

H He did. But of course the way I told him was you teach yourself up in the sky, before you make your first landing.

H Then the next day orders came out assigning me as a member of this flight. Before that time I had just been liaison officer. So then to have something to do to keep me busy instead of just sitting there doing nothing, I was going to ride in the plane with Hez McClellan who was a damn fine very smooth

Q You remember when you left --I think the official start of the flight was from Washington

H We started to go to Washington to get kissed by the Secretary and the Chief of Air Corps. Finally, turned around the next day and airplanes were all over the sky. All these individualists were flying this, and that, and the other. I guess they were out of practice flying

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formation But anyway they managed to get back to Wright Field, spent overnight. Next day we went to Minneapolis. The things were all over the sky. The following day, we headed for Canada. By that time Hez McClellan was staying right on course I'd give him a course and I was going by a big B-7 compass on the drift sight and keeping book on the drift and the change, all the things to make it go. Little towns and railroads were coming up just right under the nose. So, going from Minneapolis to Edmonton, I said: "Hez, there should be a lake right ahead of us." He says "There's no lake". I said "There's got to be a lake We're on course, and you got to find a lake there."

All the rest of the flight were seven or eight miles west of us. So Hez says "well, you're right. I don't see any water but we're going to pass right over a diving board." Then he picked up the microphone and said: "Harman to Arnold. If you make a 90° right turn, you'll come back on course. You'll be ready to land. You could see this whole flight turn toward us and Hez pulled up and landed and everybody went adown and landed in good form They were getting a bit better flight discipline by that time. That night we were entertained by Canadians in a royal manner at a banquet, and they had a band all dressed up in red uniforms. I often wondered why we didn't have a little bit of color in our military forces, like some other forces had, Next morning, we had the usual critique. Arnold and I and everybody else discussed the thing. He said: "Hereafter, I'll take off first like I always do, everybody will follow And when we get in the air the navigation ship will pull out in front and everybody will follow." And then he said "Hereafter, I don't want anybody telling me how to fly". I looked at Hez and he looked at me and we were both scared totell him that. "Just let the sleeping dog lie"

Q I want to ask about something R The wing-ding which became popular in the Air Force came out of that Canadian experience. Arnold saw this ceremony and pomp.

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esprit de corps and toasting the Queen and dashing the glasses in the fireplace.

H It was colorful. It was a fine thing to build esprit

Q Were you aware that the "dining-in" of the Air Force really comes from that experience, Arnold started the dining-in right after he came back?

H I'd never heard of it

Q You remember the "wing dings" at different bases? Arnold started that when he came back. You remember anything else about Arnold in the rest of the flight?

H Anchorage and then Fairbanks

Q You remember anything about Arnold while you were in Alaska?

H You know about his fishing the airplane out of the water?

Q. How did that plane get into the water? I think it was No. 45?

H It was being flown by Bobzien, a photographer, who had come up with George Goddard by different means. He was a pilot, but didnt have sufficient experience on a B-10, and got confused on a fuel valve. He took off on an empty tank with three full tanks. That's all I know. The first time I heard about it was when I was up on Mt McKinley taking high altitude photographs.

Q Let me ask about that. Was Goddard in charge of taking those pictures? Did he set up the cameras, or set up the photography?

H I think he must have; I'm not too sure.

Q Let's go to that plane that went into the drink.

H I got a radio message that it had gone in the water and directed me to come back to Anchorage and help salvage it. After I landed, I got a ride part of the way to Cook's Inlet, and had to walk part of the way. Here was this poor B-10 sitting on the beach. It looked like a fish out of water. There was no movement. The water was way out to sea. There was about a 30 foot tide, and the tide had gone at least a mile out to sea. Major Knerr had taken over at that time and had 8 oil drums, some timber, lots of rope hauled down to where this airplane was. It was his idea to salvage it by putting oil drums

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under the wings and floating it around to where it could be dismembered and any useful parts reclaimed. We hurriedly - the three of us, Major Knerr, the crew chief and myself - put four oil drums together with a beam in-between them, lashed them all securely, and lashed this conglomerate mass under each wing. The first B-10s had metal covers, but the trailing edge was fabric. So it was easy to cut a hold through the trailing edge of the wing, just behind the wing spar, and pass a rope to get a good tight tie on it.

Q Anyway, you got this plane ashore and it was full of sand?

H We had, using the eye as a gauge to get the center of buoyancy based on what the center of gravity was. The water kept gradually coming in and we kept frantically draining the three full tanks of gasoline. We had them practically drained when the water came in and we could see the whole airplane come to life, start kind of bouncing with little ripples. It was a wonderful feeling. If we hadn't guessed right on the center of buoyancy, we would have had to wait for another tide. So Major Knerr was real happy, and so was I. So, finally, the thing actually got to floating. This little fishing dory had been alongside salvaging all the gasoline he wanted free that he wanted because we would have had to throw it away. Major Knerr had this idea that we would just take a tow, to see how it would float in deeper water. So we put a bridle around the propellers and on the little boat. Major Knerr got aboard the boat to tell the fisherman how to steer it. Finally, it started getting dark, and by that time we were out to sea. Major Knerr had arranged for a fishing boat to meet us to do this tow job. It hadnt arrived. That's why we cast off. Finally, we could see it way out, a couple of miles from us. They had lights and were looking to see where we sank. Anyway, we managed to attract their attention. Here it came. An open boat. It was made for fishing. A powerful engine. We put the bridle on them between the propellers and the boat. I told them to be sure to take it slow and easy. But what is slow and easy? The ship's skipper's idea might be different about an airplane that was crippled and floating on the water. Next thing I knew - that slow

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and easy was so fast, the drag of the oil drums caused the tail to come way out of the water. The crew chief was already standing on the stabilizer. And in the dark of night I ran out over the top of the fuselage. I still dont know why I didnt fall in. Got on the tail and yelling: "For God's sake, slow down!" Finally, they got the message and slowed down. We were at sea with this floating, crippled bomber for four hours. Shortly after daybreak we came to the pier where Colonel Arnold was standing. He had smiles all over his face. He was happy to see us. By that time, I had talked Major Knerr into seeing if we could fly that plane home. We had wasted enough gray hairs and effort on this thing. He said: "See the Old Man. It's up to him." I knew we had spare engines and spare propellers and a lot of other things that we might need if we could salvage it. So I propositioned Arnold to leave me five good crew chiefs, for me to pick them out. They were all good, but these, I knew them. Just to see what we could do. He said: "All right" And so we went to work, and everything started to fall into place. We were lucky.

Q How long did it take you to make the repairs?

H Five days, after which we flew it up to Fairbanks. But the whole town came out to help us. They would ask if we could use a speed wrench, a speed screw-driver. We rented an Alaskan Railroad wrecker that was a huge monster. It could pick up a couple of locomotives. It let out a drag line and drug the thing out on its belly close enough to where we could dig the sand out of it, then pull the wings off, and then hoist it up, carried it across an open trestle and deposited it in the freight yards which just happened to have a nice platform that was pretty near as high as we needed to be stationed. We had stands to work on the propeller and engines, it just happened to fall in place. We rented a pickup truck from a transfer company and arranged to charge all the things we needed to that one thing that one thing, give him just one roundtrip for everything

Q Mayor Collins was the mayor of Fairbanks

H I'd forgotten his name. He'd come around with wrenches. Everybody, I don't think there was a person in town that didn't help us.

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Of course there was about an hour of darkness at that time. And we put in long hours. So five days for the recovery of this thing was the equivalent of maybe two weeks for star workers.

Q Arnold was very pleased to be able to bring all his airplanes home?

H Oh yes. We had to pull the wings off. It was too big to go up through town, so we pulled the wings off and hauled them separately up through town out to the airport. Hauled the fuselage with new engines and propellers which the crane had hoisted in out to the airport. It was bad luck getting in, but it was just fantastic luck getting out again.

Q Knerr told me a story about Arnold who also had a little of the trouble that Bobzien had, switching gasoline from one tank to another. And Arnold almost spun in, coming in to White Horse, or coming in from White Horse to Alaska. His plane almost crashed. Did you ever hear that story?

H No

Q Did you go fishing while you were in Alaska?

H Went Fishing? When I got back up to Fairbanks with this airplane I went home and slept, and Arnold sent me fishing with a flying boat--an airplane on pontoons that took us down to some river that guaranteed fishing

Q for Grayling?

H Yes We caught fish; we slept in a trapper's cabin that I guess he'd been using the same blankets for ten years. Anyway, we caught fish. And then, experienced the takeoff in Alaska when with a little airplane on floats when they get up speed, around cruising in the river. They come to a straightaway, and then pull it off.

Q Did Arnold fly those pontoon airplanes too?

H I don't know He may have, He sent me fishing he was so happy

Q In all Arnold's career, he always talked about going fishing. He didn't have much time to go fishing. But when he was up there, he went fishing with a couple of newspapermen--writers who came up there

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I think he met them there. One was Corey Ford and the other was Alastair McBain. Do you remember?

H I remember the names.

Q And he went fishing with the Mayor. Arnold was great for fishing. Did he ever talk to you about the relaxation that fishing affords? (No) While you were up there did you ever talk to him about anything--just letting his hair down to talk about the Air Corps, or the state of the world? Were you too junior?

H No I was the junior of the whole mess.

Q Most of the people regarded him as way up in the stratosphere I suppose. He was a Lieut Colonel. Do you remember anything else about Arnold in that experience?

H Oh yes. Came time finally to go home So at Fairbanks we were getting ready to leave. Of course we were going to land down at Juneau. But from Juneau to Seattle was going to be nonstop. 900 miles. So there was a big meeting before we took off and all the pilots apparently had been muttering and grumbling that we'd never make it. So here I was the junior by far of the whole mess, and after this disgruntled conversation was unanimous and Arnold was apparently getting the consensus of what everybody thought, he turned to me, and said "Harman, look like we'll make it?" I said "Yes sir". So he said; "We go". Here I was giving him support and I guess it was the two of us against all the rest

Q. He took your advice against some of the others?

H. All of the others. I think it was unanimous that we'd never make it. But the catch was--at Wright Field--and I was instrumental in doing this, discovered that by slowing an airplane down to less speed than normally what was considered as cruising speed, you could enhance the range materially. So in this instance about 140 miles an hour was the speed for maximum range . It was interesting after we finally arrived at Seattle and the people that were measurers of the gasoline that we consumed were all smiles, and said that we had enough gas for at least another hundred or hundred & fifty miles. And that was a new experience for these novice, old hard bitten pilots.

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Q This was a short cut was it ~~x~~ not, Crossing from Juneau to Seattle rather than going down along the coast, by a circuitous path Why did Arnold decide to fly across open water?

H I dont know. One reason was there weren't too many places to land

Q As we talked before, there was a political consideration That Pratt-MacArthur Agreement about Army planes not flying over water. Were you aware that there was a political factor there?

H No Later I became aware that MacArthur didn't know anything about flying, and didn't care much.

Q You fellows did not get any awards for that flight. Was there any talk about that?

H I don't know of any.

Q Was there any resentment that you got no recognition for that flight?

H I wouldn't know, I thought it was fun. I had a fun time.

Q Were you not aware that Arnold had put in for DFC's for all the crew?

H No

Q There was only one DFC given and that was to Arnold by Westover almost three years after the flight. Do you remember that?

H I dont know anything about that.

Q The flight won the Mackay Trophy for 1934. Arnold received it in 1935 representing the crew. Do you recall that (No) After the Alaska Flight came back what was your next contact with Arnold?

H I guess it had to do with the B-29's.

Q To get into the B-29's we're going to talk about impending national disaster in 1938, and '39.

H Easter Sunday 1938 I got a phone call to for God's sakes cook up everything I could think of on why four-engine bombers were good, and be in Washington on the following Tuesday because the General Staff was going to cancel all of our airplanes. Four engine airplanes. This message came from Al Lyons.

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Q Easter Sunday '38 Westover was still Chief.?

H Yes. In accord with this unhappy Easter phone call I prepared large wall charts with the aid of some good aerodynamics people we had at Wright Field. And took off for Langley Field where we were going to have a dry run with Gen Andrews and Gen Knerr and his staff before going to Washington for the big meeting on Tuesday. Gen Knerr was Chief of Staff of the GHQ Air Force. He was my old good commander of the Second Bombardment Group to which I was assigned at my first duty station. After Advanced Flying School from him I had learned my lessons well as to the need for superior large bombardment type airplanes that could support the nation's needs. My boss, Colonel Echols, met me at Langley Field. He had been on leave in Virginia. He went over to Langley Field for this dry run and chart presentation to Gen Andrews, Gen Knerr, and Col George Kenney who was G-3 and other GHQ staff officers. We all went to Washington the following day as scheduled and assembled in the old Army-Navy State Department Building. The Conference room was stately. Large black leather chairs surrounded a black leather table, mahogany, which made an august setting. The wall was covered with glass doored book cases. Made you feel that it was really something important. Gen Spaulding was G-4 of the General Staff. He was presiding In his official capacity he was the staff officer responsible for supplies for the Army, be it uniforms, clothing, guns, ammunition, horses, wagons, mules, hay, oats, and so forth, ad infinitum. And airplanes for the Air Corps. Gen Spaulding, after clearing his throat with a formal growl, said: "Airplanes are getting too big for the metals and we're going to cancel all the large ones, and develop small, snappy ones." I thought to myself, just how in the world could anyone be so ignorant as to make a statement like that. Were we back in the days of the chariots and had this fellow been asleep so long not to know that we had something infinitely better? How did he get in the position he held?

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Gen MacArthur had just retired as Chief of Staff of the Army to go to the Philippines to train their army. Eisenhower accompanied him. To the best of my knowledge this same staff had recently been MacArthur's staff. Was this same attitude that of MacArthur? It seemed to me that they were too dumb, ignorant, to have minds of their own. Or did they have minds of their own and wait for MacArthur to leave before taking this action. Gen Westover, Chief of Air Corps, asked my boss Col Echols to discuss this statement made by Gen Spaulding that airplanes are getting too big for their metals. Colonel Echols gave a revealing dissertation on the question on airplane size as being too big for the metals His simile, which he hoped a ground-bound mind could assimilate, was a bridge crossing a stream. Increased knowledge of materials and their strength and bending tension and compression was necessary to build longer and longer bridges to cross wider and wider streams.

Q Spaulding was an Engineering officer and Echols though he might hit a chord. Weren't Secretary Woodring and Gen Spaulding in the belief that, if you made them smaller you could get more airplanes for one dollar. You would have a better public relations showing?

H I don't know what was in their minds

new tape

H Col Echols said that man's needs and desires fostered continual development and there was no foreseeable limit to man's continuing ability to progressively create as long as he was allowed to do so. Those are my words but that was his thought. Gen Spaulding said "I still think that airplanes are getting too big for their metals" This time, Gen Westover tapped me on the knee and said "Harman, get out your charts. I went around the room with adhesive tape --it was before the day of Scotch tape--which I bummed from the flight surgeon. sticking the large wall charts on the fancy book cases. We had at that time about 48 Martin B-10's , two engine airplane bombers, thirteen Boeing Y-1B-17's. These had a two-speed engine blower in them to push the

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B-17's We had one XB-15 experimental bomber, and an XB-15 built by Boeing. It had a gross weight of 80,000 pounds, range of 5,000 miles, an experimental XB-19 Douglas bomber with a gross weight of over 120,000 pounds and hopefully a range of 8,000 miles. Our charts showed that the larger bombers were superior because while they cost more they could do more work than a greater number of smaller bombers

Q The B-15 and the B-19 didn't have the engines to really do a job?

H That's right. We lagged in engine development Here's a cute story about the B-15. It was supposed to use an Allison engine, liquid-cooled, at a 1,000 horsepower. We'd had trouble, and trouble, and trouble with Allison engines. One day Oliver Echols, my boss, called me in He said he had Tillinghast, Pratt& Whitney's star salesman sitting out in the other room. He said "Sit down and watch something funny. I'm going to tell Tillinghast we're going to take an 1830 engine and soup it up to 1,000 horsepower." So, Tillinghast came in and Oliver Echols started; "Tillie, he said, "it's a secret project but you may have heard something about a B-15 that we're making" You could kind of see a smile come on Tillie's face because he could see that he was being let in on something that he didn't know much about, and wasn't supposed to know about. So Oliver Echols went on to say "that 1830 engine" and Tillie beamed. Echols continued to say "a thousand horsepower" Tillinghast turned down his face and said: "You can't do that. We won't let you. We build good engines. We don't want you to break up our engines." This is how the Air Corps had to force development

Q Back to this conference. You put up your charts. Did you give a briefing? Or did he?

H I gave the briefing on the long range bombers. Our charts showed that the larger bombers were superior. While they cost more they could do more work than a greater number of smaller bombers and, more importantly,

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could do work beyond the capacity of smaller bombers, which comparison GHQ Air Force wanted me to emphasize

Q The B-15 and the B-19 were lemons!

H They weren't lemons. They fostered the airplane structure of large airplanes which hadn't been done before and there was no way to get it done. And we knew that somehow, sometime, and somewhere, we would get engines.

Q Could it be that, based on the performance of those two planes, the high brass Spaulding and Secretary Woodring felt that it was a waste of a lot of money to build bigger planes, when we did not have engines that could make them perform.

H They didn't know that. And besides, they weren't that bad They could have been supercharged and they would have been practically as good as a B17

Q We had a big lemon from World War I, the Barling bomber. It couldn't get over the Appalachian mountains

H That was of course before I got in the business.

Q There was some experience and maybe some of the high brass recalled it.

H That thing, that Barling bomber, was a typical example of where people take an old DH, clumsy, high drag, biplane wing struts sticking out. There was no attempt to think in terms of speed All they were thinking about was the premise that bombers should be slow and carry bombs. Pursuit airplanes would somehow protect the bombers from the enemy. Until we came along starting to build bombers that were the best in the world, nobody ever thought of trying to make a bomber that was fast in its own right.

Q What happened at this briefing? They turned you down?

H Along with this thing, General Hughes, he was G-3, of the Army, struggled to his feet and with a florid color in his face spoke: "I've never heard such rubbish. We have no use for any bombers that you're talking about. They won't be any good." Then General

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Spaulding of the Supply Corps, who was supposed to buy all the oats for the horses as well as and hay and airplanes got to his feet and said "It is very confidential. Colonel Lindbergh has just returned from Germany where he conferred with General Goering who showed him the dive bombers they were secretly building in quantity in underground factories. We don't see any need for large bombers, and don't want any bombers that can go over three miles to sea because we don't want to run the risk of antagonizing them." (We were all aghast. It seemed to me that this
Q The Navy?
H I have a thing there, 'antagonizing who?")
statement bordered on traitorous in addition to being irresponsible and not compatible with a military officer in his official position, "sworn to defend the nation against all enemies, whether foreign or domestic, so help me God"

Q Was Secretary Woodring present at that meeting?

H No General Andrews made a brilliant plea to war game the controversy, and prove the great need for quantities of larger yet bombers. for national defense. Shortly afterward, General Andrews was retired...

Q Gen Andrews didn't retire, he was demoted to Colonel, and sent to San Antonio, 8th Air Corps

H Sent out to the bosque.

Q Do you anything about his completion of his tour as GHQ Air Force Chief? Do you know anything about Knerr retiring?

H I just knew that he was retired.

Q It was a physical disability at the time. But it probably was connected with Andrews being taken out of that command.?

H Undoubtedly

Q Who took Andrews' place? Emmons?

H I don't know. Col George Kenney was one of them, too. He was sent to the Infantry School as an Instructor at Fort Benning. The nation was being put in jeopardy by the G-3 and G-4 action of the Army General Staff. They were really traitors to the military. Just in passing, while at his new station as instructor

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at the infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, Col Kenney wrote a course in airborne infantry which the infantry school would not allow him to teach. Colonel Kenney told me after the German invasion of the Low Countries that paratroopers sent a message to the Infantry School telling them the file and drawer number to find his course that he had already prepared, but the Infantry School wouldn't let him give it. That was from Kenney just before he came back to Wright Field

Back at Wright Field one morning, my boss Col Echols buzzed me, and said: "Jake, it looks to me as if the General Staff is firm in not letting us procure any more bombers. What do you think about taking a static test B-17 and, instead of static testing it to destruction, for which it was intended to prove various design assumptions to test the wings, and everything else. Make a flying airplane out of it so that we will have at least 14 decent bombers instead of thirteen in the whole Army Air Corps." I, naturally, readily agreed. Col Echols went on to say: "What do you think about putting on turbo superchargers and doing anything else you can think of to make it a superior weapon?" I said that would be wonderful. He went on to say "Oh, by the way, how fast will it go at 25,000 feet?" I made some quick slide rule calculations, and said, "About 300 miles an hour at 25,000" He gave me a knowing smile and said: "Go ahead and do anything else you can think of. Make a superior bomber. The situation simply has to change for the better, and we want to be ready." This ended General Easter week 1938. Epilogue: After the fall of Germany, William Kietel, one of the leading Nazi prisoners, is quoted as having said after his capture: "Japanese nerves are no better than German nerves, and I know what your bombing did to us."

Q While you were at Wright Field did you run into a guy named Benny Meyers? (yes) What do you remember about him?

H Benny was a good administrator, a terrific--as far as I know--officer.

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and he was--Gen Knudsen was the Chief, but Gen Knudsen was at that time --this is during the war--Benny ran everything but he...

Q He was under Echols

H No, At this time Echols was in Washington. Benny was a successful businessman as far as making money for himself.

Q Did you know anything about his relations with Arnold?

H No

Q Marshall succeeded Malin Craig as Chief of Staff. You say he made an important contribution to the development of airpower.

H I'll say he did. In 1939 while I was still a student at the Air Corps Tactical School, he was appointed as the new Army Chief of Staff. One of his first official acts was to appoint General McNair as the new Commandant of the Command & General Staff School with orders to put that school on a paying basis, and give unlimited time to teaching that there was such a thing as airpower.

Q Let me ask Arnold was then Chief of Air Corps, and he and Marshall developed a very close relationship. Did Arnold influence him to appreciate airpower more?

H Definitely.

Q By '39?

H Definitely. In fact I think that maybe somebody such as Roosevelt had to appoint him, and maybe, he was looking around to find somebody that was going to appreciate airpower, and do something about it with it.

Q You bring up another point. Arnold and Andrews were competitors for the top air job. Were you aware of that competition?

H I wasn't

Q They selected Arnold because Andrews was brought up to the General Staff in 1940 He became G-3 under Marshall. Marshall liked him very much. Did you know that?

H No Andrews was lost at the same time that McNair was in the early part of the war

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Q He was lost three years later in '43. A plane crash in Iceland. McNair was lost in 1944 He was killed by our planes. This was four years later. I'd like to talk about your relationship with Arnold in connection with the B-29 program. I'd like to start this by summarizing something out of the Washington Sunday Star. Nov 26, 1944 A feature and an article about the Superfortress which went on display down at National Airport. And there was a picture of you standing between Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold. What was your job at that time, when they took this picture? Your job in relation to the B-29 program?

H At that time I had returned from overseas,

Q I see it says here you and Col A.D Olsen were the first Army pilots to put the B-29 through its test flights. And you were also the first B-29 pilot to return to the US from combat duty. It says here that you participated in the first B-29 raid against Japan. I guess that was the June 15 raid at Yawata (Yes) Let's talk about the B-29's and your association with Gen Arnold.

H B-29 was one of my projects as Bombardment Project Officer at Wright Field. I'd been out on various trips to Boeing, in fact, I had a lot of association with Boeing, with the B-17's, and had picked up the B-29. Started it while I was at the Tactical School but I was aware of all that thing. So I'd been at Seattle and I'd ridden with Eddie Allen there, the test pilot with a load full of engineers. Poor little fellow would take up, he had a habit of going clear back over Seattle and coming in flat amd wallowing around and finally trying to land and he'd use up all the landing field, and I could just see he didn't know how to fly. Anyway, my assumptions were correct. He had a little fire in an engine, or something, when he was coming in in his long flat approach with power on, and hit the power plant smokestack, and the whole airplane was lost with all the people aboard it. Made me so damn mad. Here was a perfectly good airplane lost, and it was just due to human error.

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And I, at that time, had been called out many times to --for instance, there was a General two star at Spokane. I was at San Diego and I got called "for god's sakes go up to Spokane and old two-star was in trouble. His B-24's wouldn't fly. So going into the conference room with him I noticed, even ten feet away, that the wheels were all dished and cupped, tired to show they'd been shimmying on a scissors mechanism that held the old landing strut together You could see pretty near a half inch clearance when it was just supposed to be a few thousandths. So in this meeting with all of his staff, they were formally sitting around, General Two-Star was at the head of the table and everybody was bewailing the fact how bad things were. Finally it came time for me apparently to say something so all I said was: "General, it looks as though things aren't so bad but what we can't fix them. We'll get some mechanics and people sent up from an air depot to kind of help you out with these maintenance problems, and we'll get everything to going back real quick." Oh, he got mad. He got mad at me. He said: "I'm in trouble and nobody's going to tell me I'm not." And this and this and I've already called up General Arnold" and goodness knows what not. So it kind of shocked me. I thought I was being helpful, and here he was. So finally it kind of dawned on me.

Q Was this, he had the 2d Air Force at Fort George Wright

H Expletive deleted. Wants to be in trouble The next time it seemed appropriate for me to say something, I said "You know, General , you're in bad trouble" He kind of looked over at me. I could see that I was on the right track. So I said "I've never seen such bad trouble as you're in. Maintenance is terrible " He started to get a wider smile on his face. And I said "In fact it just the worst thing I've ever seen, or could be" He said "Do you think so?" I said "Oh yes" He said "Come on home and meet my new wife and have lunch"

Q How did you get into the B-29's from there?

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H I was getting production I knew how to produce I was getting every bomber airplanes produced , B-24's , B-25's, B-26's, B-29's every bomber came under my wing

Q The B-29 had many production problems, The engines used to catch fire.

H Yes But that was fixed. But anyway, coming back to this first flight of this thing. This episode of losing that first one gave me the idea that nobody knew what happened, what caused it. They knew it was fire, and there was animosity everywhere, who did it or who didn't do this, and that. Made me so damn made because I'd already known, I'd suspected the qualifications of "little Eddy" as I called him as a test pilot, anyway. So I told K. B. Wolfe, my boss, we ought to package a whole deal. I was sick and tired of being called out to do somebody else's work. So this whole deal should be a special project on the B-29, to put the thing in one package and cut out all this stuff. One package to consist of flight test, training the crews, Hell, they weren't even being trained right--and production and--well, training to get the thing in combat with the least possible delay, and try to make up for lost time. So K. B. said "Well, write it down and we'll go in to show the Old Man."
I made about a half a page letter saying "a special project is hereby formed to have complete control over the B-29 consisting of control over production, flight tests, training ..."

Q Was this in 1943?

H Yes Complete control over production, complete control over flight tests, complete control of changes and training to get this airplane in combat with the least possible delay. And I put down at the bottom a place for typed in "H. H. Arnold." K. B. tagged along. I say tagged because we went into Washington to see our immediate boss, General Echols, and I had to do all the talking. Of course I'd written this thing myself anyway. So I tossed this paper on Echols' desk and he read it and said: "I suppose you know what you're getting into". I said "Yes sir".

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Is it all right to go down and see Arnold?" "YES" So we went down the hall to see General Arnold, and I'd had favorable--it just seemed like everything tied in together. My Alaska experience had been very favorable, so I went down to see Arnold and here he came out and I told him, "good morning," and I tossed this letter on his desk, and he slapped the desk, and said "That's fine. Why doesn't somebody else do something for me once in a while?" So I passed him a pen, and he signed it. So then he said "Where are you staying?"

Q He read it

H He read it, of course. My God, his eyes stuck out ; he exhibited great delight So then he said "where are you staying?" I told him "Mayflower," I guess with K.B. I had to do all the talking. So he said "Not a word of this to anybody. This is awful secret. You'll be hearing from me. Go back to your hotel" So I knew later that he went down the hall to see General Marshall. General Marshall could say yes to some other things and the two of them went over to see FDR. So FDR approved it, but then he said "I want something colorful". So, later that afternoon the phone rang, and Peterson was Arnold's aide, I could recognize his voice. He said: "Somebody wants to talk to you". No name was mentioned at all. And this somebody came on, and I recognized a voice, too. He said: "Be careful what you say. Approved. Go back there at the bosque, or wherever you are and come in just as quick as you can with something colorful. " That was Arnold. He hung up.

Q Why was there such secrecy about this?

H Hang on. You'll find out. Went back to Wright Field At that time my boss got so sick he could n't return. He was in bed We were getting in too deep water I guess. This was K.B. Wolfe.

So I got a National Geographic map of the two hemispheres, and did a map problem, That was one of the things I had learned down at the tactical school. Made little paper clips , little slips of a couple of paragraphs of the bases in Kansas which had been built especially to fly this B-29

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There were 10,000 foot runways at Great Bend, Salina, Smoky Hills and Walker. . All in Kansas The, of course there was Boeing at Wichita that was keyed up to build a B-29's And Boing at Renton, keyed up to build B-29's, Martin at Omaha, and Bell at Marietta, Georgia. So here all this money was spent and here the poor little airplane was lying dead, just all burnt up. That was the source of this big idea I had you had to go do it yourself, because this whole thing was huge and we didn't know whether we had an airplane or not.

Q This was right after Eddy Allen cracked up?

H That started this whole idea I had. By that time, the second airplane was ready to fly, so I went out to Seattle and had a very careful checklist of everything to do, and not to forget anything . It had some brake trouble so we were going to fly it tomorrow, but this day we'd just test the brakes. So I taxied around and tested the brakes and they seemed to be working fine and I had a whole list of things I was going to do tomorrow to be sure everything was right So I came in and we were way ahead of schedule, so my good friend Emby Showalter at Boeing --fact is, I told Phil Johnson who was head man at Boeing that I'd deal all through Showalter, and anything I told Showalter I wanted done right quick, and Showalter did it. Just one man contact for production or testing or anything So Emby said "Gee, if we just kind of changed the ratio or something on the ailerons." They were doing some overcontrolling or something--"if we can just get it up to, don't fly, just approaching flying speed, and try the aileron to see if it was overbalanced!" So I said "Yes, we'll do that." So we wound up the engine again and got in and poured the coal to it. Of course it was light weight. Next thing I knew, we were in flight. And then it was just like going down the highway at 60 miles an hour and turning the wheel to the left and the airplane went right instead. Next thing I knew the wing tip was dragging on the runway. I was in a vertical bank. So I gave it full power on the starboard engines and throttled the left hand engines.

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The wing gradually came up and kind of by that time went over and we landed on a taxi strip/runway parallel to the. K. B. had been up in Phil Johnson's office, and they saw me in this vertical bank behind the power plant. They figured, that was it again. They said "There goes Jake!" and K. B. told me afterwards they waited and there was no smoke. They wondered why the hell there wasn't smoke They came down and here I was standing out by the airplane. I had the hell scared out of me. He said; "Did you check the ailerons?" I said "No. I'm going to check them tomorrow. That's on the list for tomoorow not today. We weren't flying today; we were just taxiing ." So he said "get in" and by God the ailerons were reversed So they fixed the skinned up wing tip overnight and corrected the ailerons of course, and the next day we flew. And, boy, I put it through the paces and found out we had a hell of a good airplane, just a tremendous airplane.

Q This was in 1943 sometime

H For them, I went on to Wichita and flew the first production airplane out of there. I noticed in taking off, I made one bank and I got this radio call from General ____ "Jake, don't look now but your left wing is on fire" I flipped it around so fast in a vertical bank and by that time I was just about ready to land. I could see it wasn't a fire, it was just oil. It taught me; it leaked it was just nothing but black all over the whole wing. So then of course that was fixed and I flew the first production airplane the next day and found out it was a fine airplane too. Then I got this call faom Washington to pack a bag andcome in right quick, as quick as I could. So I packed a bag and went in and they gave me shots, and processed me through, and had a little talk with General Arnold. Just about this secret mission In the meantime, I skipped something when I first went in there to see him, he told me to write this thing up. So then I wrote a thing of how we were to have complete charge on just this one program, see. So then I went back and

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he told me to write up a thing which was that business - that map problem. So that was when they sent me over there apparently to look over the situation. To China. They didn't have to tell me anything. There was nothigg to tell me, I was just going over on a fact finding thing. It turned out that I was over at Chengtu, and looked around and saw a aerodromes being built The biggest thing the Chinese had ever done since the Great Wall It was done by hand and I figured that on these four bases they built 7,000 feet long and so wide, it was equivalent to building a piece of the Great Wall from Laisure World (Calif) to El Toro Air Base.

Q Did Arnold ever talk about his hopes for the B-29 as the ultimate weapon to end the war? Did he feel that this was the great hope to end the war? What did he say?

H I don't know. I knew him and he knew me. This was taken after I'd come back. Anyway, getting over there.

I came back and reported to him what I'd seen over there. Hell, I had lunch with him, and he had K. B. come up, and I was with him for a couple of hours at lunnh after I came back from overseas

Q Was this during this period

H No, after that. Coming back after this trip I reported to him-- I had to tell him; I'd already told K. B., and K. B. made me tell him. I was sitting over there in Chunking and I was invited to come to a meeting. I walked into this meeting and here was Gen Stratemeyer. There were Generals all around the thing. General Stratemeyer was conducting the meeting. Gen Stilwell was sitting on a chair close to and in front of Stratemeyer, and I was on Stilwell's right. The whole periphery had these stars all shining, and Stratemeyer had a big long message in his hand and he announced that he had received a superduper communication from the War Department, and wanted everybody there to know about it, and see if they could contribute anything to make an answer back to the War Department

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It was kind of a question of how many this and how many that. So finally the question was posed in this teletype message that Stratemeyer read off: "How many troops will it take to defend the forward bases on the premise that the ground troops will provide their own logistics and the Air Force will provide their own logistics." So Gen Stratemeyer said to Gen Stilwell: "I guess you're probably the best qualified to answer this question." So here Stilwell was, sitting just arm's length, ninety degrees to me, and he kind of shook his head, I guess to shake out the cobwebs or something and said: "One corps of U.S. troops. None of these goddamn Chinamen, They're no good" There was a hush before, which means that nobody was talking except Stilwell and Stratemeyer, and after Stilwell had said that, hell, you could have heard a mouse a mile away. All of a sudden this voice spoke up and said: "A corps of U.S. troops? That's quite a few folks And the voice continued, it just so happens if you put the Ledo road which we no longer control and the Fillen(?) road which isn't even built yet, put them both together and it won't support a corps of US troops " So the voice hushed...

Q Whose voice was it?

H The voice hushed and finally Stilwell shook himself and glanced daggers over at me "Well," he says "I guess we don't need a corps then When I got back that was the biggest thing I had to tell. Gen Arnold Oh he got mad! He sent out and got lunch, and K.B. and I were sitting there,

Q Why did he get mad?

H I don't know why, Finally he says "Well, I agree with you but there's nothing I can do about it. Stilwell is a friend of Marshall's"

Q I want to ask about your relationship to the troubles of the B-29. Arnold was always trying to push the B-29's out. We're talking of the Spring of '44, They had a thing called the "Battle of Kansas." Arnold and Benny Meyers and perhaps you--were you out there?

H I was the Wing Commander at Salina at the first 150 B-29's

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Q Arnold was out there and they were trying to modify the B-29's and ship them out as fast as possible. Could you tell me something about that?

H I don't know There were various things that had to be done and Boeing worked about 50 hours a day with a crew of people doing these various things But it was done

Q Weren't they using the telephone to call suppliers here and there? Arnold and Meyers were sort of running that battle How long was Arnold there?

H Not too long, I thought he just came in every now and then. Meyers was there all the time I was trying to get the people trained so I depended on Air Materiel Command to do all this other stuff. Anyway under this directive that Arnold had signed, flight testing and training to get the crew ready for combat-- I'd seen so many instances where crews didn't even know where things were, They knew how to fly the airplane. So: how to train 150 pilots, 150 copilots, 150 flight engineers This airplane, for the first airplane had a flight engineer who could adjust valves and mixture controls, and watch gauges and things like that.

The pilot could still have control but for continuous surveyal of the condition and how the engines were running, this man had nothing to do but just that. So I got a moving picture theatre and had all the 150 pilots 150 copilots and 150 flight engineers and navigators. We had navigators and bombardiers, and we made every bombardier become a navigator and every navigator become a bombardier. So we had two people who could run sextants, two people who could drop bombs, if they had to on occasion. I had Boeing make big charts and up on the stage with a pointer, just like an old school professor, told these people how to fly these planes, and how to use the airspeed meter. We had a table made gross weight of the airplane vs the stalling speed of the airplane to avoid crackups where people didn't know that. It was just out of the book, one, two, three type of way to fly it.

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Q Do you remember Arnold in Salina, anything specific about what he said or did?

H I do know, toward the end, just after we had them trained, ready to go, I got a message from Washington to send in an experienced crew, all dressed up fine. They wanted to exhibit the airplane to somebody. I knew who it was, but I assumed that Lewis Parker, he was the group commander, He had been stationed around Washington for a long time. So I sent Lewis, Apparently they had that plane on exhibit. They put a ramp on, and F.D.R. came on, and all examined it.. According to the people there, he was impressed. And then, casually, in passing, he said: "I suppose you have the most experienced combat people that we have to fly these airplanes.?" They said: "Oh yes". That's when Giles got in.

Q Were you present when FDR came on board?

H No, I sent Lewis Parker. I had other things to do. Next thing I know I got this from Giles, that I no longer could be wing commander. I had no overseas service. But, there was a way out of it. I'd go over to England right quick and fly over the lines, and come back. And then I'd qualify. And I said: "The hell with that!" So Lewis Parker and Al Hafvey, a commander, he was the one that flew Harry Hopkins around. Anyway, Lewis didn't return. I was told that, despite not qualifying, I could be group commander and take over Lewis' job, and they would have to put someone in as wing commander to qualify under Roosevelt's thing, after having trained the wing myself.

Q You wanted a combat command?

H Sure, hell. Engineers are always being discriminated against. But anyway, this was just to qualify. To fly one of these airplanes, you had to be that. Here it was I tested it, and saved it from being cracked up. Got the whole thing going and trained all these people. But I did not have enough ribbons on me to just merely fly one. So, anyway, when Lewis Parker didn't come in I was told, oh, they made a mistake. I would have to take over his group. So that's what I did. It was the 40th Bomb Group, and I was the first one to take off, to lead

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the procession at Salina one night. The first one to land in China. But it turned out, looking back on it, I had written the problem, the initial employment directive for the B-29s, the fuel, etc. Incidentally, how in the world were we going to build a tank at Chengtu big enough to hold the gasoline that we hauled. We had to use these same combat airplanes, haul our own fuel, and what we were going to do with it when we got up there. Well, long before the need, I had evolved a scheme - everybody knows a football has to have a bladder in it - so all we did was to make huge synthetic rubber bladders, dig a big hole in the ground, just a little bit smaller, so the bladder wouldn't be under tension. That was our gas tank. We used it up in the mountains where you couldn't get a gas tank. Up in Chengtu, they had to cut up with torches some trucks, to get them to fit into an airplane. ~~WK~~ Then they would weld them.

Q You had the 40th Group ?

H Yes.

Q Arnold should have made you a star. Somebody should have promoted you for all you had done for the program.

H I think so too. But anyway, I finally got hit over there, dysentery. I came home, and then they sent me to Wright Field. When the war was near over they sent us over to have a physical exam. I was pretty well shot, dysentery, etc. They sent me to Walter Reed. I was there for 11 months, and the damned bastards practically killed me. It was the early days of sulfa. They gave me sulfa guanadine, then sulfa diazene, then sulfathiazol, and I swelled up. One morning I couldnt see. I could hear. Everything was just double. I couldn't move. So I heard these voices, nurses gather round. I assumed they were nurses because they were females I assumed they were a bunch of doctors because they were oh-ing and ah-ing Somebody laugherd I don't know who it was and said "Gee, he has a beaut" laughed and I cussed mr. and Mr. Reed and all the doctors Finally I got well enough they let me go to that place up there, where they let me come home on sick leave once in a while to Forest Glen. After 11

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months being hospitalized I got two orders. One was promotion and the other was retirement So I met a big board. They were all generals. There was ribbons and everything on them They asked me if I wanted a counsel and I said I didn't need any counsel. They asked me if I'd received good medical attention I guessed so after they about killed me. I thought the quicker I'd get away from them the better I'd feel I said I just prefer to retire. And that was it.

Q You never got your promotion?

H I've still got the orders

Q Do you have any correspondence from Arnold (None) Your overall impression of Hap Arnold Do you think he was the best man for the job?

H He had guts and he had - the best one I knew. Of course I didn't know some of these others. I knew that he'd been discriminated against. Knerr could have done it. But I somehow think that Arnold had a bit more rank than Knerr,

Q Knerr had the personality to have done it?

H Oh yes. He was cold blooded He was Chief of the GHQ Air Force

Q He defied a court martial in 1942 Knerr was going around making speeches for airpower

H Arnold was subjected to punishment sent out to the Cavalry at Fort Riley

Q Could Andrews have done the job?

H I didn't have enough contact with Andrews I have to withhold any commnet

Q Did he ever get mad at you?

H Oh yes He got real mad with me when I flew this B-10 back to Fairbanks that I'd fished out of the water. After he got through congratulating me, everybody else shaking hands all the way round Arnold said "Harman, what the hell is this picture doing on here You can't do that! Government property! And what's that BPOE thing on the front."

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That's government property. You can't just go around maliciously messing them up" I said "I'm tired. I want to go over and get some sleep. Goodbye."

Q Then you explained to him that most of these people who helped out were Elks

H Yes Told him that was a cheap price. That we returned this airplane in good flyable condition for the expenditure of the vast sum of a thousand and thirty dollars, I think it was – $1,030.00

Q That's the expenditure to fix Airplane 45.

H Fish the airplane out I charged everything up to the Alaska Transfer No, it was $730. And charged everything to them including the rent of their truck, and everything we needed. Some new wire and some new things that had corroded away and made one voucher out for that amount of money. So finally after I told Arnold that, he calmed down,

Q Was that the beginning of putting pictures on the noses of airplanes

H To my knowledge it was Because this one looked so pretty that had been fished out of the water. that Arnold sent out and got a sign painter and painted all the other nine planes up to look just as nice as that one

Q Everybody brought pets home and totem poles, and things like that. Anything amusing? Husky dogs?

H Yes. Going from Fairbanks Brought them to Juneau. Skipped it at Anchorage, but got down to Juneau and Arnold found out that they had a pet black bear, and he wouldn't allow that. But we did bring home a big totem pole that somebody had given Arnold. He gave it to Westover.

Q You remember anything about the landing at Bolling Field when you came back in August 1934? Knerr's plane was the last one down. He couldn't get his landing gear down until the last minute Do you remember about that or the reception at Bolling Field? Secretary Dern was there and a lot of other people

H Recpption out on the grounds. They took pictures of everybody

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standing in front of the totem pole with pets, little dogs

Q MacArthur was missing? He should have been missing a long time ago

H.

Q Arnold got to see the President?

H I didn't know anything about that.

Q I call my book "Hap Arnold: Man in a Hurry," What do you think of that title?

H I don't know

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

13 Dec 1974

Mr. Ed Weinberger
1361st Photo Squadron, AAVS (MAC)
1221 South Fern Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Ed:

Col "Jake" Harman was a close associate of General Arnold's during World War II. I had occasion recently to interview him for my book project.

He wants to get a copy of a picture of himself with General Arnold and General Marshall. I would guess that "WNAAAB" stands for "Washington National Airport Army Air Base", this being before Andrews came into being.

I phoned the Star-News but their picture files get cleaned out every few years. Perhaps your people could help Col Harman out. Would appreciate it.

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl: Ltr from Col Harman, Dec 7, 1974

Dec 16 - Sent him Evening Star pkg

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Interview, Jack Hamman
Laguna Hills, Calif 2 Apr 74

cur for Bradley

H Arnold was Chief of Wright Field for a . while I was at Engineer School

Q You were at Engineering School. This was around

H '31, '32

Q He was there in '31

H My first association with Arnold was when he was Commandant at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio when I was a student in the Air Corps Engineering School there. We made the normal formal calls on commanding officers at certain designated times, and he and Mrs. Arnold were always very courteous and nice to junior officers.

Q You remember anything about her at this time? I was told she has a fabulous memory. for people she's met. Do you remember anyahing along that line?

H No The next association I had with Col Arnold was after the air mail

Q Before you get into the air mail let me ask you some questions. Your super boss was Jan Howard in Engineering.

H He was Chief of Engineering

Q Do you know if the relationship between Jan Howard and Arnold. (No) They were brothers-in-law

H I guess I'd forgotten that

Q There was some hostility between them. Do you remember?

H No.

Q Ben Chidlaw told me about a lot of this

H He was at the desk next to mine. He was Project Officer on Trainers when I was Project Officer on Bombardment. Do you know about the B-10 that went to Alaska. While I was still a student in the Air Corps Engineering School, I was made Bombardment Project Officer, in addition to my other duties. Mr. Martin had not been building

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airplanes for a period of time But he submitted a two-engine experimental airplane later called the B-10 . It was competition to the Boeing airplane which was somewhat bigger and didn't perform quite as well. Neither one of them in fact were too good. But this Board had evaluated the B-9 as better. Being a 2d Lieut I couldn't override the Board, so I went in to see my old friend, Hugh Knerr, who at that time was Chief of the Field Service Section. I'm sure he must have used some persuasive powers on Major Jan Howard, who was my immediate boss, Chief of the Engineering Section. Next thing I knew I was invited to come into a conference. There were three people: my boss, Col Howard, Glenn L. Martin, and myself, about developing the B-10. Anyway, Mr. Martin was told in no uncertain terms to take that goddam airplane back home and have 60 days to fix it. And do exactly what Harman tells you. It was kind of a big order but, finally, in sixty days it was returned, and he was awarded a contract. It went at a high speed of 213 miles an hour and we'd enclosed the turret for the front gunner and put an enclosure for the pilot and enclosure for the rear gunner. So the crew could at least operate over a long flight, and at higher speeds, than they'd ever done before. Mr. Glenn L. Martin was awarded the Collier Trophy for having built the world's fastest bomber. After the air mail...

Q Were you in the air mail?

H Oh yes, in the Central Zone.

Q You flew under Hickam?

H Arnold had the Western and Hickam had the Center and they both did good. And a fellow by the name of B.Q. Jones had the Eastern and he bitched everything up, used pursuit airplanes. Get a 100-lb sack of mail in the tail of them, and they'd spin in. He was so dumb that he didn't realize that there was 2,000 pounds of mail a night going from Newark to Chicago. He and his pursuiters. I was called up frantically to fly the air mail. And I hadn't flown a Keystone bomber for so long, that it was going back to the Dark Ages. One night I was going from Cleveland

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to Chicago . One night in a storm, I don't know what happened, but the newfangled gyro, and directional gyro, and horizon were hurriedly installed on these airplanes, and they were put out ahead of the windshield apparently to facilitate the installation. During this storm the poor, Keystone--I hadn't flown a Keystone for years and they weren't good then. Here it was, upside down apparently, I was hanging from from my belt My instruments showed all right. I told the crew to get ready to bail out, and then I discovered my old friend the bank and turn indicator showed I was wrong. So I went to work on the old-fashioned bank and turn indicator, and all of a sudden things looked all right again. Later, I found out that the new fine and fancy horizon and directional gyro had froze up, it was so cold. I finally landed at Chicago, and I had to sit up in my seat a long time before I dared step on my legs. They were like icicles.

Q You were a 1st Lieut?

H 1st Lieut,

Q Do you know anything about why the Air Corps took that job Gen Foulois agreed to take it when Roosevelt canceled the contract.

H I know nothing of that, but I do know that when it was only started, we had orders at Wright Field to equip B-10's which were just coming out of the Martin factory with artificial horizons, and directional gyros, and a mail compartment. Skip the artificial horizon, we had those, but it didn't have a radio compass in it. So Wright Field installed a radio compass and put in a mail compartment in the bomb bay. We were training--they ordered three groups of five pilots each to come in to Wright Field for instrument landing training I was one of the instructors. In fact I was the fifth pilot in the Air Corps to make instrument landings and takeoffs. One of the instructors, Hegenberger, cooked up this scheme with Cruzie who had invented the radio compass. Ever hear about instrument landing? All instrument landing amounted to was with a radio compass, you'd home on a radio beam or a steady beam station, and on a motorcycle they had an antenna and an inner and outer

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station beacon. They'd put the inner station about five hundred feet away from the airfield and the outer station lined up with the inner station on the runway you wanted to land on. The pilot would home on the station. When you arrieved there you'd know it by the action of the needle, and then immediately turn to the inner station, and when you'd fly over the inner station you knew it, and would immediately switch to the outer station, and set your directional gyro at 180 degrees, do a 180 degree turn when you got the outer station and come back over with a 180 degree precision turn over the outer station at a pre-given altitude depending on the terrain and speed, and then switch immediately to the inner station. When you'd pass over the inner station you knew it, and then continue that same course, and go in and land. The first landing you make is as good as your last, all completely under the hood. On getting prepared to use these B-10's on the air mail, had the air mail lasted just about a week longer, the Air Corps could have gone from the West Coast, Oakland to Newark on instruments 100% of the way, making instruments landings and takeoffs. And then the thing was turned back to the commercial operators.

Q What kind of a job did Arnold do in the Western Zone?

H He didn't have any losses. He had...

Q He had a few losses. Did you hear any static about why Foulois took this job without adequate instruments in the airplanes? And experience among the pilots who were flying the mail? Was there any criticism of Foulois? I knew he got in trouble with the President.

H It was a matter of timing. When he said what the Air Corps could do, he was hoping that these B-10's could be stepped up quicker. I think that was the whole basis of it. Had it lasted just another week or two, it would have been perfect.

Q The Alaskan flight was laid on to erase the bad smell of the air mail, I suppose?

H I don't know of course what was in somebody else's mind,

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I was not only the Project Officer on the B-10 but when this Alaska flight was organized at Wright-Patterson Field, I was designated as Liaison Officer between the flight and Wright Field to get everything that they needed.

Q Knerr was put in charge of the preparations?

H Knerr was Deputy to Arnold and Knerr was the one I principally dealt with on supplies. Knerr had been in charge of the Field Service Section and knew all the supply matters. In fact he was a genius on supply matters. As far as getting the supplies laid out up in Alaska that we'd need, spare engines and spare everything, he was just perfect. In fact, later on, when we needed a lot of these spares they just happened to be there where they were supposed to be.

Q There was a great job done getting the supplies up there. Why was Arnold brought in as commander?

H I don't know. Except he had a good record of airmail in the Western Division. He outranked Knerr.

Q Westover was supposed to have the job. They felt that Westover being a balloon man originally was not fully experienced. He was Assistant Chief to Foulois. This was a highly desirable assignment. But Arnold got the assignment. He was pulled off vacation down in Jackson Hole, Wyoming on a fishing trip after the air mail, and they pulled him out to prepare for the Alaskan flight. Were you aware of that?

H No A Arnold refused to leave Wright Field with the airplanes till he was sure everything was in good order. I think he was knowing that the Air Corps had been burned by the Air Mail. He wanted to be sure all his planes were in readiness before he took off half cocked. He was being pressured by Wright Field by messages from Washington, "When are you going to start?" Did you know that?

H No

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Q Did you have a sense that a great deal of care was being taken in the preparations for the Alaskan Flight?

H I knew the supply situation was, in as far as the pilots.

Q They changed the ratio. A lot of officers wanted to go, Arnold brought in some extra enlisted men. The ratio was 14 officers and 16 enlisted men Most of these were supposed to be master mechanics Because he wanted to be sure that those planes were kept in good order.

H They had some damned good mechanics.

Q Well anyway he started out on that flight. Now perhaps we can talk about some of the adventures on it

H Do you want to know about what happened before we started?

Q Right

H As Liaison Officer between Wright Field and this Alaska Flight I was just designated to be sure they had everything they needed and help them in any manner I could. I'd stand around and watch them flying and some of these so-called hot shot, old time hard hitting pilots that had been flying Jennies...

They didn't seem to realize that the B-10 was the cleanest airplane, meaning free from drag, of any airplane that had been built up to that time in this country, or any other country, for that matter. So they knew how to fly airplanes, but they didn't know how to fly an airplane the like of which they'd never flown before. For instance, coming in to land, they would poke the nose down like you would on a dirty airplane to keep from spinning in. The airplane would throttle off. It would pick up speed. It would scoot along the landing field about three or four feet up in the air, and it would take them about a mile before it would lose enough speed to stop. So, nothing I could do. Just stand watching these super-duper pilots. I knew they didn't know what the hell they were doing, but who was I to tell them. So I was aware that

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They were definitely opposed to this airplane going to Alaska. They thought they ought to have amphibians so they could find a place to land, and there wouldn't be any place they could possibly land one of these up in Alaska

Q Who were these people who advocated amphibians? Do you remember any specifics? The pilots assigned to the mission who wanted amphibians

H All the talk I could hear. Maybe the loudest talkers were the only ones I did hear. But they thought they could never make it in a small landing field. They'd look up Dept of Commerce bulletins, and find some fields were considerably less than 2,000 feet and here they were landing in a potential two-mile area at Patterson Field and some of them were taking a mile to land. So I'd known Arnold before, of course, when he was at Wright Field He sent for me one day. He was over in the Visiting Officers' Quarters , I think it was Sunday. Here he was shaving in his undershirt, all covered with lather. First thing he said after passing the time: He said: "Harman, what's this I hear about this airplane not being suitable to go to Alaska?"

I knew the answer but, momentarily, I was afraid to tell him. Finally, I thought of this old saying that truth has that quality of meaning that you can lie about it, you can distort it, and do everything nasty you can, and finally it will stand there unblemished. So I got up my nerve and said: "Colonel, they don't know how to fly it." That was something I already knew they must have gotten together what somebody thought were the best pilots available. He looked to me as if he got red under the layer of shaving lather. Anyway, he kind of paused a moment, and, I by that time, used a little psychology on him . I said: "I can tell you, but I can't tell them. They won't listen." So by that time he calmed down a bit, and said: "Well, how do you fly it?" He omitted what he probably thought to himself "You're so goddamned smart".

I told him how to fly an airplane the like of which he'd never flown before

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You had it on the ground first, and second, taxi it around and see that the controls were all right Then, somehow get it in the air, make a takeoff. Once you did that, you were all set. Get up to several thousand feet and calibrate it. Calibrate it by throttling back gradually, and maybe no one else had flown this airplane before so they had to find out all these tricks. At plenty high altitude four or five thousand feet, you could gradually throttle the engines, and pull the nose up until you were approaching a stall . And test it all the time for directional and lateral control, and then, that way, with the engine off, you could determine the indicated air speed at which you would land. The first landing you'd make was a the best landing that you'd ever make. Incidentally, everybody knows that at Cheyenne, Wyoming, it's a high altitude field , about 7,000 feet, I remember. A typical catch question is to ask somebody, experienced pilots, or young ones or anybody: "If an airplane lands at 60 miles an hour indicated at sea level , how fast will it land at indicated air speed at Cheyenne?" All the wiseacres would say: "I don't have a slide rule" Probably wouldn't know how to run one anyway-- or "I don't have this--I don't have that". Apparently all their flying schools and all these old hard bitten people that flew before they had an airspeed indicator, I guess, didn't realize that airspeed indicator would indicate dynamic pressure which was the thing you flew on. So at Cheyenne, your dynamic pressure, you'd actually be going faster in thin air but the airspeed meter would read the same landing speed that it would at sea level.

Q This meeting with Arnold concluded by his accepting your idea?

H Finally, the second time I told him he calmed down was a little friendly. So I left him.

Q You were selected by him were you not? Who selected you to be a pilot or engineering officer?

H He must have selected me because I wasn't on the list to go. The day after I told him all this, how to fly the airplanes, everybody was

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standing around in a group, the hard bitten pilots and all were standing around and they looked up in the sky and there was a B-10 up quite high. Then everybody kept talking and finally somebody looked up again and said: "My God, he's going to spin in. He's going too slow." And this airplane kind of kept coming in, and moved slower, and it was kind of high. Made a beautiful landing and taxied up to where all these who were having their morning convention with nothing else better to do and somebody said: "My God, it's the Old Man!" He was the type of leader that would demonstrate and wouldn't expect anybody to do anything that he wouldn't do himself.

Q I take it that Arnold was a man who was willing to take a suggestion. He was willing to take your word about landing it with nose high, and test it out himself. Was that the idea?

H He was just merely following instructions so that he could do it himself, using the meter rather than feel. And feel in a nice high-speed airplane has an entirely different feel than a clumsy, dirty airplane

Q What I'm saying is he took your suggestion and checked it out?

H He did. But of course the way I told him was you teach yourself up in the sky, before you make your first landing.

H Then the next day orders came out assigning me as a member of this flight. Before that time I had just been liaison officer. So then to have something to do to keep me busy instead of just sitting there doing nothing, I was going to ride in the plane with Hez McClellan who was a damn fine very smooth

Q You remember when you left --I think the official start of the flight was from Washington

H We started to go to Washington to get kissed by the Secretary and the Chief of Air Corps. Finally, turned around the next day and airplanes were all over the sky. All these individualists were flying this, and that, and the other. I guess they were out of practice flying

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formation But anyway they managed to get back to Wright Field, spent overnight. Next day we went to Minneapolis. The things were all over the sky. The following day, we headed for Canada. By that time . Hez McClellan was staying right on course I'd give him a course and I was going by a big B-7 compass on the drift sight and keeping book on the drift and the change, all the things to make it go. Little towns and railroads were coming up just right under the nose. So, going from Minneapolis to Edmonton, I said: "Hez, there should be a lake right ahead of us." He says "There's no lake." I said "There's got to be a lake We're on course, and you got to find a lake there." All the rest of the flight were seven or eight miles west of us. So Hez says "well, you're right. I don't see any water but we're going to pass right over a diving board." Then he picked up the microphone and said: "Harman to Arnold. If you make a 90° right turn, you'll come back on course. You'll be ready to land. You could see this whole flight turn toward us and Hez pulled up and landed and everybody went adown and landed in good form They were getting a bit better flight discipline by that time. That night we were entertained by Canadians in a royal manner at a banquet, and they had a band all dressed up in red uniforms. I often wondered why we didn't have a little bit of color in our military forces, like some other forces had, Next morning, we had the usual critique. Arnold and I and everybody else discussed the thing. He said: "Hereafter, I'll take off first like I always do, everybody will follow And when we get in the air the navigation ship will pull out in front and everybody will follow." And then he said "Hereafter, I don't want anybody telling me how to fly." I looked at Hez and he looked at me and we were both scared totell him that. "Just let the sleeping dog lie"

Q I want to ask about something R The wing-ding which became popular in the Air Force came out of that Canadian experience. Arnold saw this ceremony and pomp.

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esprit de corps and toasting the Queen and dashing the glasses in the fireplace.

H It was colorful. It was a fine thing to build esprit

Q Were you aware that the "dining-in" of the Air Force really comes from that experience, Arnold started the dining-in right after he came back?

H I'd never heard of it

Q You remember the "wing dings" at different bases? Arnold started that when he came back. You remember anything else about Arnold in the rest of the flight?

H Anchorage and then Fairbanks

Q You remember anything about Arnold while you were in Alaska?

H You know about his fishing the airplane out of the water?

Q. How did that plane get into the water? I think it was No. 45?

H It was being flown by Bobzien, a photographer, who had come up with George Goddard by different means. He was a pilot, but didnt have sufficient experience on a B-10, and got confused on a fuel valve. He took off on an empty tank with three full tanks. That's all I know. The first time I heard about it was when I was up on Mt McKinley taking high altitude photographs.

Q Let me ask about that. Was Goddard in charge of taking those pictures? Did he set up the cameras, or set up the photography?

H I think he must have; I'm not too sure.

Q Let's go to that plane that went into the drink.

H I got a radio message that it had gone in the water and directed me to come back to Anchorage and help salvage it. After I landed, I got a ride part of the way to Cook's Inlet, and had to walk part of the way. Here was this poor B-10 sitting on the beach. It looked like a fish out of water. There was no movement. The water was way out to sea. There was about a 30 foot tide, and the tide had gone at least a mile out to sea. Major Knerr had taken over at that time and had 8 oil drums, some timber, lots of rope hauled down to where this airplane was. It was his idea to salvage it by putting oil drums

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under the wings and floating it around to where it could be dismembered and any useful parts reclaimed. We hurriedly - the three of us, Major Knerr, the crew chief and myself - put four oil drums together with a beam in-between them, lashed them all securely, and lashed this conglomerate mass under each wing. The first B-10s had metal covers, but the trailing edge was fabric. So it was easy to cut a hold through the trailing edge of the wing, just behind the wing spar, and pass a rope to get a good tight tie on it.

Q Anyway, you got this plane ashore and it was full of sand?

H We had, using the eye as a gauge to get the center of buoyancy based on what the center of gravity was. The water kept gradually coming in and frantically we kept draining the three full tanks of gasoline. We had them practically drained when the water came in and we could see the whole airplane come to life, start kind of bouncing with little ripples. It was a wonderful feeling. If we hadn't guessed right on the center of buoyancy, we would have had to wait for another tide. So Major Knerr was real happy, and so was I. So, finally, the thing actually got to floating. This little fishing dory had been alongside salvaging all the gasoline he wanted free that he wanted because we would have had to throw it away. Major Knerr had this idea that we would just take a tow, to see how it would float in deeper water. So we put a bridle around the propellers and on the little boat. Major Knerr got aboard the boat to tell the fisherman how to steer it. Finally, it started getting dark, and by that time we were out to sea. Major Knerr had arranged for a fishing boat to meet us to do this tow job. It hadnt arrived. That's why we cast off. Finally, we could see it way out, a couple of miles from us. They had lights and were looking to see where we sank. Anyway, we managed to attract their attention. Here it came. An open boat. It was made for fishing. A powerful engine. We put the bridle on them between the propellers and the boat. I told them to be sure to take it slow and easy. But what is slow and easy? The ship's skipper's idea might be different about an airplane that was crippled and floating on the water. Next thing I knew - that slow

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and ~~xxx~~ easy, was so fast, the drag of the oil drums caused the tail to come way out of ~~s~~the water . The crew chief was already standing on the stabilizer. And in the dark of night I ran out over the top of the fuselage. I still dont know ~~how~~ why I didnt fall in. Got on the tail and yelling: "For God's sake, slow down!" Finally, they got the message and slowed down. We were at sea with this floating, crippled bomber for four hours. Shortly after daybreak we came to the pier where Colonel Arnold was standing. He had smiles all over his face. He was happy to see us. By that time, I had talked Major Knerr into seeing if we could fly that plane home. We had wasted enough gray hairs and effort on this thing. He said: "See the Old Man. It's up to him." I knew we had spare engines and spare propellers and a lot of other things that we might need if we could salvage it. So I propositioned Arnold to leave me five good crew chiefs, for me to pick them out. They were all good, but these, I knew them. Just to see what we could do. He said: "All right" And so we went to work, and everything started to fall into place. We were lucky.

Q How long did it take you to make the repairs?

H Five days, after which we flew it up to Fairbanks. But the whole town came out to help us. They would ask if we could use a speed wrench, a speed screw-driver. We rented an Alaskan Railroad wrecker that was a huge monster. It could pick up a couple of locomotives. It let out a drag line and drug the thing out on its belly close enough to where we could dig the sand out of it., then pull the wings off, and then hoist it up, carried it across an open trestle and deposited it in the ~~freight~~ yards which just happened tp have a nice platform that was pretty near as high as we needed to be stationed. We had stands to work on the propeller and engines, It just happened to fall in place. We rented a pickup truck from a transfer company and arranged to charge all the things we needed to that one thing that one thing, give him just one roundtrip for everything

Q Mayor Collins was the mayor of Fairbanks

H I'd forgotten his name. He'd come around with wrenches. Everybody, I don't think there was a person in town that didn't help us.

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Of course there was about an hour of darkness at that time. And we put in long hours. So five days for the recovery of this thing was the equivalent of maybe two weeks for fair workers.

Q Arnold was very pleased to be able to bring all his airplanes home?

H Oh yes. We had to pull the wings off. It was too big to go up through town, so we pulled the wings off and hauled them separately up through town out to the airport. Hauled the fuselage with new engines and propellers which the crane had hoisted in out to the airport. It was bad luck getting in, but it was just fantastic luck getting out again.

Q Knerr told me a story about Arnold who also had a little of the trouble that Bobzien had, switching gasoline from one tank to another. And Arnold almost spun in, coming in to White Horse, or coming in from White Horse to Alaska. His plane almost crashed. Did you ever hear that story?

H No

Q Did you go fishing while you were in Alaska?

H Went Fishing? When I got back up to Fairbanks with this airplane I went home and slept, and Arnold sent me fishing with a flying boat--an airplane on pontoons that took us down to some river that guaranteed fishing

Q for Grayling?

H Yes We caught fish; we slept in a trapper's cabin that I guess he'd been using the same blankets for ten years. Anyway, we caught fish. And then, experienced the takeoff in Alaska when with a little airplane on floats when they get up speed, around cruising in the river. They come to a straightaway, and then pull it off.

Q Did Arnold fly those pontoon airplanes too?

H I don't know He may have, He sent me fishing he was so happy

Q In all Arnold's career, he always talked about going fishing. He didn't have much time to go fishing. But when he was up there, he went fishing with a couple of newspapermen--writers who came up there

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I think he met them there. One was Corey Ford and the other was Alastair McBain. Do you remember?

H I remember the names.

Q And he went fishing with the Mayor. Arnold was great for fishing. Did he ever talk to you about the relaxation that fishing affords? (No) While you were up there did you ever talk to him about anything--just letting his hair down to talk about the Air Corps, or the state of the world? Were you too junior?

H No I was the junior of the whole mess.

Q Most of the people regarded him as way up in the stratosphere I suppose. He was a Lieut Colonel. Do you remember anything else about Arnold in that experience?

H Oh yes. Came time finally to go home So at Fairbanks we were getting ready to leave. Of course we were going to land down at Juneau. But from Juneau to Seattle was going to be nonstop. 900 miles. So there was a big meeting before we took off and all the pilots apparently had been muttering and grumbling that we'd never make it. So here I was the junior by far of the whole mess, and after this disgruntled conversation was unanimous and Arnold was apparently getting the consensus of what everybody thought, he turned to me, and said "Harman, look like we'll make it?" I said "Yes sir". So he said; "We go". Here I was giving him support and I guess it was the two of us against all the rest

Q. He took your advice against some of the others?

H. All of the others. I think it was unanimous that we'd never make it. But the catch was--at Wright Field--and I was instrumental in doing this, discovered that by slowing an airplane down to less speed than normally what was considered as cruising speed, you could enhance the range materially. So in this instance about 140 miles an hour was the speed for maximum range . It was interesting after we finally arrived at Seattle and the people that were measurers of the gasoline that we consumed were all smiles, and said that we had enough gas for at least another hundred or hundred & fifty miles. And that was a new experience for these Navy, old hard bitten pilots.

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Q This was a short cut was it ~~x~~ not, Crossing from Juneau to Seattle rather than going down along the coast, by a circuitous path Why did Arnold decide to fly across open water?

H I dont know. One reason was there weren't too many places to land

Q As we talked before, there was a political consideration That Pratt-MacArthur Agreement about Army planes not flying over water. Were you aware that there was a political factor there?

H No Later I became aware that MacArthur didn't know anything about flying, and didn't care much.

Q You fellows did not get any awards for that flight. Was there any talk about that?

H I don't know of any.

Q Was there any resentment that you got no recognition for that flight?

H I wouldn't know, I thought it was fun. I had a fun time.

Q Were you not aware that Arnold had put in for DFC's for all the crew?

H No

Q There was only one DFC given and that was to Arnold by Westover almost three years after the flight. Do you remember that?

H I dont know anything about that.

Q The flight won the Mackay Trophy for 1934. Arnold received it in 1935 representing the crew. Do you recall that (No) After the Alaska Flight came back what was your next contact with Arnold?

H I guess it had to do with the B-29's.

Q To get into the B-29's we're going to talk about impending national disaster in 1938, and '39.

H Easter Sunday 1938 I got a phone call to for God's sakes cook up everything I could think of on why four-engine bombers were good, and be in Washington on the following Tuesday because the General Staff was going to cancel all of our airplanes. Four engine airplanes. This message came from Al Lyons.

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Q Easter Sunday '38 Westover was still Chief.?

H Yes. In accord with this unhappy Easter phone call I prepared large wall charts with the aid of some good aerodynamics people we had at Wright Fiel And took off for Langley Field where we were going to have a dry run with Gen Andrews and Gen Knerr and his staff before going to Washington for the big meeting on Tuesday. Gen Knerr was Chief of Staff of the GHQ Air Force. He was my old good commander of the Second Bombardment Group to which I was assigned at my first duty station, After Advanced Flying School from him I had learned my lessons well as to the need for superior large bombardment type airplanes that could support the nation's needs. My boss, Colonel Echols, met me at Langley Field. He had been on leave in Virginia. He went over to Langley Field for this dry run and chart presentation to Gen Andrews, Gen Knerr, and Col George Kenney who was G-3 and other GHQ staff officers. We all went to Washington the following day as scheduled and assembled in the old Army-Navy State Department Building. The Conference room was stately. Large black leather chairs surrounded a black leather table, massive, which made an august setting. The wall was covered with glass doored book cases. Made you feel that it was really something important. Gen Spaulding was G-4 of the General Staff, HC was presiding In his official capacity he was the staff officer responsible for supplies for the Army, be it uniforms, clothing, guns, ammunition, horses, wagons, mules, hay, oats, and so forth, ad infinitum. And airplanes for the Air Corps. Gen Spaulding, after clearing his throat with a formal gesture, said, "Airplanes are getting too big for the metals and we're going to cancel all the large ones, and develop small, snappy ones." I thought to myself, just how in the world could anyone be so ignorant as to make a statement like that. Were we back in the days of the chariots and had this fellow been asleep so long not to know that we had something infinitely better? How did he get in the position he held?

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Gen MacArthur had just retired as Chief of Staff of the Army to go to the Philippines to train their army. Eisenhower accompanied him. To the best of my knowledge this same staff had recently been MacArthur's staff. Was this same attitude that of MacArthur? It seemed to me that they were too dumb, ignorant, to have minds of their own. Or did they have minds of their own and wait for MacArthur to leave before taking this action. Gen Westover, Chief of Air Corps, asked my boss Col Echols to discuss this statement made by Gen Spaulding that airplanes are getting too big for their metals. Colonel Echols gave a revealing dissertation on the question on airplane size as being too big for the metals His simile, which he hoped a ground-bound mind could assimilate, was a bridge crossing a stream. Increased knowledge of materials and their strength and bending tension and compression was necessary to build longer and longer bridges to cross wider and wider streams.

Q Spaulding was an Engineering officer and Echols though he might hit a chord. Weren't Secretary Woodring and Gen Spaulding in the belief that, if you made them smaller you could get more airplanes for one dollar, you would have a better public relations showing?

H I don't know what was in their minds

new tape

H Col Echols said that man's needs and desires fostered continual development and there was no foreseeable limit to man's continuing ability to progressively create as long as he was allowed to do so. Those are my words but that was his thought. Gen Spaulding said "I still think that airplanes are getting too big for their metals" This time, Gen Westover tapped me on the knee and said "Harman, get out your charts. I went around the room with adhesive tape --it was before the day of Scotch tape--which I bummed from the flight surgeon. sticking the large wall charts on the fancy book cases. We had at that time about 48 Martin B-10's , two engine airplane bombers, thirteen Boeing Y-1B-17's. These had a two-speed engine blower in them to push the

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B-17's We had one XB-15 experimental bomber, and an XB-15 built by Boeing. It had a gross weight of 80,000 pounds, range of 5,000 miles, an experimental XB-19 Douglas bomber with a gross weight of over 120,000 pounds and hopefully a range of 8,000 miles. Our charts showed that the larger bombers were superior because while they cost more they could do more work than a greater number of smaller bombers

Q The B-15 and the B-19 didn't have the engines to really do a job?

H That's right. We lagged in engine development Here's a cute story about the B-15. It was supposed to use an Allison engine, liquid-cooled, at a 1,000 horsepower. We'd had trouble, and trouble, and trouble with Allison engines. One day Oliver Echols, my boss, called me in He said he had Tillinghast, Pratt& Whitney's star salesman sitting out in the other room. He said "Sit down and watch something funny. I'm going to tell Tillinghast we're going to take an 1830 engine and soup it up to 1,000 horsepower." So, Tillinghast came in and Oliver Echols started; "Tillie, he said, "it's a secret project but you may have heard something about a B-15 that we're making" You could kind of see a smile come on Tillie's face because he could see that he was being let in on something that he didn't know much about and wasn't supposed to know about. So Oliver Echols went on to say "that 1830 engine" and Tillie beamed. Echols continued to say "a thousand horsepower" Tillinghast turned down his face and said: "You can't do that. We won't let you. We build good engines. We don't want you to break up our engines." This is how the Air Corps had to force development

Q Back to this conference. You put up your charts. Did you give a briefing? Or did he?

H I gave the briefing on the long range bombers. Our charts showed that the larger bombers were superior. While they cost more they could do more work than a greater number of smaller bombers and, more importantly,

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could do work beyond the capacity of smaller bombers, which comparison GHQ Air Force wanted me to emphasize

Q The B-15 and the B-19 were lemons!

H They weren't lemons. They fostered the airplane structure of large airplanes which hadn't been done before and there was no way to get it done. And we knew that somehow, sometime, and somewhere, we would get engines.

Q Could it be that, based on the performance of those two planes, the high brass Spaulding and Secretary Woodring felt that it was a waste of a lot of money to build bigger planes, when we did not have engines that could make them perform.

H They didn't know that. And besides, they weren't that bad They could have been supercharged and they would have been practically as good as a B17

Q We had a big lemon from World War I, the Barling bomber, It couldn't get over the Appalachian mountains

H That was of course before I got in the business.

Q There was some experience and maybe some of the high brass recalled it.

H That thing, that Barling bomber, was a typical example of where people take an old DH, clumsy, high drag, biplane wing struts sticking out. There was no attempt to think in terms of speed All they were thinking about was the premise that bombers should be slow and carry bombs. Pursuit airplanes would somehow protect the bombers from the enemy. Until we came along starting to build bombers that were the best in the world, nobody ever thought of trying to make a bomber that was fast in its own right.

Q What happened at this briefing? They turned you down?

H Along with this thing, General Hughes, he was G-3, of the Army, struggled to his feet and with a florid color in his face spoke: "I've never heard such rubbish. We have no use for any bombers that you're talking about. They won't be any good." Then General

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Spaulding of the Supply Corps, who was supposed to buy all the oats for the horses as well as and hay and airplanes got to his feet and said "It is very confidential. Colonel Lindbergh has just returned from Germany where he conferred with General Goering who showed him the dive bombers they were secretly building in quantity in underground factories. We don't see any need for large bombers and don't want any bombers that can go over three miles to sea because we don't want to run the risk of antagonizing them." (We were all aghast. It seemed to me that this statement bordered on traitorous in addition to being irresponsible and not compatible with a military officer in his official position, "sworn to defend the nation against all enemies, whether foreign or domestic, so help me God"

Q The Navy? I have a thing there, "antagonizing who?")

Q Was Secretary Woodring present at that meeting?

H No General Andrews made a brilliant plea to war game the controversy, and prove the great need for quantities of larger yet bombers. for national defense. Shortly afterward, General Andrews was retired...

Q Gen Andrews didn't retire, he was demoted to Colonel, and sent to San Antonio, 8th Air Corps

H Sent out to the bosque.

Q Do you anything about his completion of his tour as GHQ Air Force Chie Do you know anything about Knerr retiring?

H I just knew that he was retired.

Q It was a physical disability at the time. But it probably was connected with Andrews being taken out of that command.?

H Undoubtedly

Q Who took Andrews' place? Emmons?

H I don't know. Col George Kenney was one of them, too. He was sent to the Infantry School as an Instructor at Fort Benning. The nation was being put in jeopardy by the G-3 and G-4 action of the Army General Staff. They were really Traitors to the military. Just in passing, while at his new station as instructor

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at the infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, Col Kenney wrote a course in airborne infantry which the infantry school would not allow him to teach. Colonel Kenney told me after the German invasion of the Low Countries that paratroopers sent a message to the Infantry School telling them the file and drawer number to find his course that he had already prepared, but the Infantry School wouldn't let him give it. That was from Kenney just before he came back to Wright Field

Back at Wright Field one morning, my boss Col Echols buzzed me, and said: "Jake, it looks to me as if the General Staff is firm in not letting us procure any more bombers. What do you think about taking a static test B-17 and, instead of static testing it to destruction, for which it was intended to prove various design assumptions to test the wings, and everything else. Make a flying airplane out of it so that we will have at least 14 decent bombers instead of thirteen in the whole Army Air Corps." I, naturally, readily agreed. Col Echols went on to say: "What do you think about putting on turbo superchargers and doing anything else you can think of to make it a superior weapon?" I said that would be wonderful. He went on to say "Oh, by the way, how fast will it go at 25,000 feet?" I made some quick slide rule calculations, and said "About 300 miles an hour at 25,000" He gave me a knowing smile and said: "Go ahead and do anything else you can think of. Make a superior bomber. The situation simply has to change for the better, and we want to be ready." This ended General Easter week 1938. Epilogue: After the fall of Germany, William Kietel, one of the leading Nazi prisoners, is quoted as having said after his capture: "Japanese nerves are no better than German nerves, and I know what your bombing did to us."

Q While you were at Wright Field did you run into a guy named Benny Meyers (yes)? What do you remember about him?

H Benny was a good administrator, a terrific--as far as I know--officer.

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and he was--Gen Knudsen was the Chief, but Gen Knudsen was at that time --this is during the war--Benny ran everything but he...

Q He was under Echols

H No, At this time Echols was in Washington. Benny was a successful businessman as far as making money for himself.

Q Did you know anything about his relations with Arnold?

H No

Q Marshall succeeded Malin Craig as Chief of Staff. You say he made an important contribution to the development of airpower.

H I'll say he did. In 1939 while I was still a student at the Air Corps Tactical School, he was appointed as the new Army Chief of Staff. One of his first official acts was to appoint General McNair as the new Commandant of the Command & General Staff School with orders to put that school on a paying basis, and give unlimited time to teaching that there was such a thing as airpower.

Q Let me ask Arnold was then Chief of Air Corps, and he and Marshall developed a very close relationship. Did Arnold influence him to appreciate airpower more?

H Definitely.

Q By '39?

H Definitely. In fact I think that maybe somebody such as Roosevelt had to appoint him, and maybe, he was looking around to find somebody that was going to appreciate airpower, and do something about it with it.

Q You bring up another point. Arnold and Andrews were competitors for the top air job. Were you aware of that competition?

H I wasn't

Q They selected Arnold because Andrews was brought up to the General Staff in 1940 He became G-3 under Marshall. Marshall liked him very much. Did you know that?

H No Andrews was lost at the same time that McNair was in the early part of the war

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Q He was lost three years later in '43. A plane crash in Iceland. McNair was lost in 1944 He was killed by our planes. This was four years later. I'd like to talk about your relationship with Arnold in connection with the B-29 program. I'd like to start this by summarizing something out of the Washington Sunday Star. Nov 26, 1944 A feature and an article about the Superfortress which went on display down at National Airport. And there was a picture of you standing between Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold. What was your job at that time, when they took this picture? Your job in relation to the B-29 program?

H At that time I had returned from overseas,

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Next thing I know I got this from Giles, that I no longer could be wing commander. I had no overseas service. But, there was a way out of it. I'd go over to England right quick and fly over the lines, and come back. And then I'd qualify. And I said: "The hell with that!" So Lewis Parker and Al Harvey, a commander, he was the one that flew Harry Hopkins around. Anyway, Lewis didn't return. I was told that, despite not qualifying, I could be group commander and take over Lewis' job, and they would have to put someone in as wing commander to qualify under Roosevelt's thing, after having trained the wing myself.

Q You wanted a combat command?

H Sure, hell. Engineers are always being discriminated against. But anyway, this was just to qualify. To fly one of these airplanes, you had to be that. Here it was I tested it, and saved it from being cracked up. Got the whole thing going and trained all these people. But I did not have enough ribbons on me to just merely fly one. So, anyway,

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months being hospitalized I got two orders. One was promotion and the other was retirement So I met a big board. They were all generals. There was ribbons and everything on them They asked me if I wanted a counsel and I said I didn't need any counsel. They asked me if I'd received good medical attention I guessed so after they about killed me. I thought the quicker I'd get away from them the better I'd feel I said I just prefer to retire. And that was it.

Q You never got your promotion?

H I've still got the orders

Q Do you have any correspondence from Arnold (None) Your overall impression of Hap Arnold Do you think he was the best man for the job?

H He had guts and he had - the best one I knew. Of course I didn't know some of these others. I knew that he'd been discriminated against, Knerr could have done it. But I somehow think that Arnold had a bit more rank than Knerr,

Q Knerr had the personality to have done it?

H Oh yes. He was cold blooded He was Chief of the GHQ Air Force

Q He defied a court martial in 1942 Knerr was going around making speeches for airpower

H Arnold was subjected to punishment sent out to the Cavalry at Fort Riley

Q Could Andrews have done the job?

H I didn't have enough contact with Andrews I have to withhold any commn

Q Did he ever get mad at you?

H Oh yes He got real mad with me when I flew this B-10 back to Fairbanks that I'd fished out of the water. After he got through congratulating me, everybody else shaking hands all the way round Arnold said "Harman, what the hell is this picture doing on here You can't do that! Government property! And what's that BPOE thing on the front."

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That's government property. You can't just go around maliciously messing them up" I said "I'm tired. I want to go over and get some sleep. Goodbye."

Q Then you explained to him that most of these people who helped out were Elks

H Yes Told him that was a cheap price. That we returned this airplane in good flyable condition for the expenditure of the vast sum of a thousand and thirty dollars, I think it was ~~-~~ $1,030.00

Q That's the expenditure to fix Airplane 45.

H Fish the airplane out I charged everything up to the Alaska Transfer No, it was $730. And charged everything to them including the rent of their truck, and everything we needed. Some new wire and some new things that had corroded away and made one voucher out for that amount of money. So finally after I told Arnold that, he calmed down,

Q Was that the beginning of putting pictures on the noses of airplanes

H To my knowledge it was Because this one looked so pretty that had been fished out of the water. that Arnold sent out and got a sign painter and painted all the other nine planes up to look just as nice as that one

Q Everybody brought pets home and totem poles, and things like that. Anything amusing? Husky dogs?

H Yes. Going from Fairbanks Brought them to Juneau. Skipped it at Anchorage, but got down to Juneau and Arnold found out that they had a pet black bear, and he wouldn't allow that. But we did bring home a big totem pole that somebody had given Arnold. He gave it to Westover.

Q You remember anything about the landing at Bolling Field when you came back in August 1934? Knerr's plane was the last one down. He couldn't get his landing gear down until the last minute Do you remember about that or the reception at Bolling Field? Secretary Dern was there and a lot of other people

H Recpption out on the grounds. They took pictures of everybody

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standing in front of the totem pole with pets, little dogs

Q MacArthur was missing? He should have been missing a long time ago

H.

Q Arnold got to see the President?

H I didn't know anything about that.

Q I call my book "Hap Arnold: Man in a Hurry". What do you think of that title?

H I don't know

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Harper, Robert K. 23 Jul 74

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20 June 19

Lieut General Robert W. Harper, USAF (Ret)
8407 Lindenwood, Apt D
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Harper:

Thanks for the note and the maps. Will see you on Tuesday, July 23rd, if all goes well, at 2 P.M.

Appreciate the tip on General Howard Craig. By coincidence, I've received an affirmative response from him and hope to catch him in El Paso a couple of days later. He was, as you indicate, close to General Arnold.

Funny thing, I received a call from a man down in Warner Robins, Ga, and they want a talk about General Hap. Also, a Hollywood producer has expressed at least a mild interest in the possibilities of visual representation. As one who knew General Arnold in the flesh, you probably would agree that he would make a wonderful subject for a film biography. Maybe I'll have more on this when I see you.

Looking forward to our get together. If you have any letters or documents that amplify your relationship with General Arnold, I'd welcome a peek at them.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20314

12 June 1974

Lieut General Robert W. Harper, USAF (Ret)
8407 Lindenwood, Apt D
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Harper

Thanks for your good note of June 6th.

I'm trying to fill in blocks in my interview schedule and I would like to suggest Tuesday, July 23rd at 2 PM. This will give us two or three hours, and I can come back, if we can't cover all the ground.

Please let me know if this is a good time.

I'll be driving, so if there are special instructions, I'd welcome those, too.

I'm looking forward to a good session.

Sincerely

Murray Green

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

Hope the enclosed maps will help. Here is a historical lt. Gen Howard A. Craig, 3120 Piedmont Drive, Ft Worth, Tex 76107 who was Asst Chief of MMAD during the time Dewey in Wash DC, '42 to '44 who also had many contacts with Gen A and might have some pertinent info for your project. On your trip you might want to contact him, if you have not already done so.

Looking forward to seeing you on July 23rd at 2PM.

Cordially

Bob

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

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
Hill Country Village
Castle Hills
Windcrest
Leon Valley
Balcones Heights
Olmos Park
ALAMO HEIGHTS
Terrell Hills
Kirby
Martinez
SAN ANTONIO
Kelly Air Force Base
Lackland Air Force Base
Berg's Mill
Broadway
St Mary's University
Our Lady of the Lake College
St Phillips College
Trinity University
Protestant Orphan Home
Incarnate Word College
Joe Freeman Coliseum
Alamo
Mission Concepcion
Mission San Jose
Mission Espada
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20314

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MURRAY GREEN
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20314

4 June 1974

Lieut General Robert W. Harper, USAF (Ret)
8407 Lindenwood, Apt D
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Harper

I'm the fellow grinding away on Hap Arnold's biography.

As things look now, I'll be coming your way in about six weeks.

Hope you had a wonderful reunion at West Point. It's great to get together and reminisce. I hope to be doing that during this trip which will take me out to the West Coast.

Will you be around home the last week in July?

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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Dear Dr Green —
Unless something unforseen comes up I should be around home the last week in July.

Sincerely

Robert W. Harper

Best - 6/6/74

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20314

4 June 1974

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8407 Lindenwood, Apt D
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Office of Air Force History

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8407 Lindenwood, Apt D
San Antonio, Tex 78209
Friday June 4, 1974

Dear Mr. Green -

I hope you will pardon the delay in answering your letter of 5 December 73 but between illness in the family and the holiday period, I procrastinated. Further, I racked my brain on the General Arnold affair, but was unable to come up with anything constructive to assist you.

I am planning to be close to San Antonio this coming Spring - Summer, except for short trips will be to West Point the last of May to attend my 50th Reunion. At that time I hope to come by Wash DC and if you have not visited in the San Antonio area by then, I will call you.

Wishing you a happy and healthy New Year and complete success on your project on General Arnold, who by the way was a great American and one whom I had utmost admiration for, and looking forward to talking with you,

Sincerely

Robert S. Harper

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

of '43, We moved into the Pentagon. There was not a name on a door or snything that you could tell which way to go.

DuBose

Q The story of Gen Harper getting caught in the ladies' room at the Pentagon when it was just opened up in January 1943 before all the signs were painted on the doors is almost identifical to the one I heard about Gen "Pre" Cabell. In any event Gen DuBose was the middle man in this transaction, and Gen Arnold was beating on him to find Harper, because he wanted to see Harper.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20314

5 December 1973

Lieut General Robert W. Harper, USAF (Ret)
151 Treasure Way (APT F)
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Harper:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. In fact, I have been working on it for over four years and have completed most of my search for facts, including over 200 interviews with most of the key figures associated with General Arnold during his long and distinguished career.

As a matter of fact, I was in San Antonio a couple of years ago and tried to contact you among the others. I believe you were away at the time. I did get to talk to Generals Barney Giles, John McCormick, Carl McDaniel (on the phone), Pat Timberlake and Gene Eubanks (who was a house guest at the Giles'). Of course, I've talked to Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Norstad, Cabell, K.B. Wolfe, Smart, Fred Dean, Kuter, and many of the Air Force greats.

In the training field, I've talked to Harold McGinnis, Ken McNaughton and Mrs. Barton K. Yount (who lives at Distaff House, in Washington, D.C.). In any event, I also talked to Tom DuBose who mentioned you in a context of special interest. I enclose an excerpt of his interview and wonder if it rings a bell with you.

I had been planning an interview trip down your way to try to catch a number of Air Force greats living in Texas. Now, with the energy crisis upon us, I'm going to have to recalculate and regroup.

Are you planning to be close to San Antonio next Spring and Summer? If so, I would be delighted to have an opportunity to talk with you at a time and place convenient for you.

In any event, I would be pleased to hear from you in the attachment.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

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Q It was January '43

D January '43, in which Hap apparently crossed the President and Marshall. I don't know whether you--somebody must have said something about it--because he came and called the staff in and the deputies, about ten or fifteen, and methodically unpinned his two stars, he was a two-star general then. He laid them on the desk and he said: "I just want to tell you gentlemen that I will probably not be your boss tomorrow."

Q Are you sure this is in the Pentagon? Had you moved over already?

D ...trying to wrack my mind for what..

Q I've never heard this story before. It's very interesting. Who was present then? Do you remember?

D Harper.

Q Harper. Was Kuter there? Is Harper around?

D Bob Harper, yes, he's in San Antonio. Luke Smith, Craig, I'm sure Echols was there. Bevans, I think was there, Paul Wetzel

Q I've talked to both of them

D I remember. He did something, and he took these stars off.

Q He might have had, did he have three stars by then?

D No, he had only two...

Q Could it have been right about the time you came in?

D It could have been. I remember the incident, and I'm trying to think in my mind what caused it, because it was something to do with the deployment of aircraft in which he went contrary to them.

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Q The higher ups?

D The President or Marshall

Q I can think of two things, one was AWPD-42, the other was his opposition to TORCH

D The date of his promotion to LTGEN was within two or three weeks

Q Before that?

D After that incident, he was promoted to LTGEN. He thought he was going to be wiped out.

Q I think, I would guess it's AWPD-42, I'll tell you about that... Kuter was in this meeting? I'm going to write to Kuter.

D Ask him if he can remember because he will remember it, I'm sure, when Gen Arnold took his stars off and put them on the staff table and said: "I probably won't be your boss tomorrow." If you can tie that with his promotion, you'll get the answer. I bring it up because it is haunting me and if you find out, let me know. I can't remember what it was for, But I remember the incident.

Q I'm going to be passing Naples, Florida, I just might call Kuter up. He's given me a lot of his time, and I don't want to interfere too much.

D Larry is a delightful guy

Q One thing that I wanted to ask you. Arnold always had regrets, you mentioned about his son, his one son, and Hank stayed in the Army. His

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

4 December 1973

Brig General Thomas J. DuBose
920 Virginia Drive
Timberlane Shores
Winter Park, Florida 32789

Dear General DuBose:

Here is a copy of our fine interview. It's been nearly two years, but as you can expect, I've had trouble getting the kind of help needed to transcribe these interviews.

Anyway, you were so full of good memories, I thought you might read this over and come up with some other stories about General Arnold.

If so, there is enclosed an envelope for your attention and convenience.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT WELLS HARPER, USAF, RETIRED

Robert W. Harper was born at Seattle, Washington, November 7, 1900. He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, and commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry June 12, 1924.

His first assignment was with the Seventh Infantry at Vancouver Barracks, Washington. In September, 1925, he entered the Air Corps Primary Flying School at Brooks Field, Texas, and the following March transferred to the Air Corps Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, from which he was graduated in September 1926.

He was then assigned to Fort Crockett, Texas, for duty with the Third Attack Group. He returned to Brooks Field in June, 1927, as assistant operations officer of the Air Corps Primary Flying School, and two years later was appointed Secretary of the School. In May, 1928, he transferred from the Infantry to the Air Corps.

General Harper went to Nichols Field, Philippine Islands, in December 1930, for duty with the Fourth Composite Group, and in July 1931 was transferred to the Third Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field there.

Returning to the United States in December, 1932, he was assigned as personnel adjutant at Chanute Field, Illinois, where he became post adjutant in July, 1934. In August 1936 he entered the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, and upon graduation in June 1937, went to Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, where he attended the Chemical Warfare School until August, 1937. He then entered the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from which he was graduated in June 1938. His next assignment was at the U. S. Military Academy, where he served as tactical officer.

In July, 1942, he was assigned to Air Force headquarters at Washington, for duty in the office of the assistant chief of air staff for operations. A month later he became assistant chief of air staff for operations, and in March, 1943, was designated assistant chief of air staff for training at Air Force headquarters.

He went overseas in September 1944, to represent the Air Force in the organization established for the administration of Germany. He was appointed director of the Air Control Council Group on November 1, 1944, and a month later became chief of the Air Division of the Group Control Council in Germany. In October, 1946, he was appointed director of the Armed Forces Division in the Office of Military Government in Germany.

MORE

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Returning to the United States in May 1947, he was assigned to the War Department in Washington, and the following month transferred to Air Force headquarters. On July 1, 1947, he became commanding general of Air Transport Command with headquarters at Gravelly Poir Virginia. He was appointed commanding general of the Air Universi at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, the following May.

On October 15, 1948, he assumed command of Air Training Command, with headquarters at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. He retained that position when Air Training Command headquarters was moved to Scott AFB, Illinois, in November, 1949.

General Harper retired from active duty on June 30, 1954.

General Harper has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster. He is rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer, Aircraft Observer, and Technical Observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) on August 31, 1929; to captain (temporary) on March 16, 1935; to captain (permanent) on August 1, 1935; to major (temporary) on March 11, 1940; to major (permanent) on June 12, 1941; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) on November 15, 1941; to colonel (temporary) on March 1, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) on February 8, 1943; to major general (temporary) on February 27, 1944; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on June 12, 1947; to brigadier general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, to major general (permanent) on January 27, 1950, to lieutenant general (temporary) on April 11, 1951.

E N D

Up to date as of June 30, 1954.

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Edited MS

Interview with Lieutenant General Robert W. Harper, San Antonio, Tex.
23 July 1974

Q Do you remember the first time you met Hap Arnold, your first important encounter with him?

H I think the first time I really met him was when he came up to West Point to see his son. His son was a cadet up there when I was a Tactical Officer at West Point, I got to see him several times. Although I didn't know him at all, I knew who he was and had met him. And that was just about it.

Q What year was this?

H It was about between 1939 and 1940

Q This was his first son, Hank, who graduated in 1940

H He graduated in 1940 and I was up at the Academy 1938 to 1942

Q You remember "P.D." Wickert up there?

H I knew P.D. intimately. We were there together for four years. He represented the Air Force at the Academy, actually, and I represented the Air Corps as the Tactical Officer, representing the Air Corps

Q Arnold had a great interest in the Academy?

H Yes he certainly did. He had a great interest in anything

Q Do you remember that he had a dinner? I think Bruce had just come in in 1939 or '40, the middle son. He had a party there for all the Army brats. These were the sons of military officers attending the Academy. Gen Arnold came up there, I think it was in the winter of '40 or '41. Bruce spent a lot of time planning the menu, what they were to have for dessert, very important. Do you recall the party?

H Remember it. However, I wasn't one of the cadet brats at that time. I wasn't invited.

Q Arnold felt that the Academy should give some air training, did he not?

H Yes indeed He sparked the air training, that is, assisted in it in

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every possible way And that was one of my jobs, to give air training to the Corps of cadets. And I did it both through lectures, and then in the summertime I took them on flights to Langley Field, to Mitchel Field, down to Fort Benning, over to Wright Field, and everywhere. And we gave them just as broad a scope as we possibly could. On air, not only the training but the tactical and strategical use of it in our lectures as well as our summer training

Q Did Arnold ever talk about an Air Force Academy?

H Oh yes. But, at that time it was quite visionary, and there was too much preparation for war rather than for projects like the Air Force Academy. So, that didn't come up very much, but he had it in the back of his mind, and any time he had a chance, he brought out that along with many other advanced developments in air.

Q In April 1939 Arnold met with Charles Lindbergh at the Thayer Hotel up there. This is when Lindbergh came back from one of his trips to Germany. Arnold was thirsty for some current information about the German Air Force. And they met secretly because Lindbergh was a dirty word over at the White House, as you remember. So Arnold could not meet openly with him. Do you remember that?

H No I kind of hazily remember something about it, but I wasn't in on it at all.

Q Did you meet with Arnold up there to talk about any problems?

H No I didn't I just met with him socially, is all.

Q Do you remember anything that would be significant at this time?

H No. Except that whenever he'd get an idea of some project he wanted to pursue with the Corps of Cadets, of course, it came in through me Basically it generally used to come to P. D. Wickert and then I'd pick it up and carry the thing on through as I had the instruction with the Corps of Cadets there

Q Do you remember any projects that Arnold suggested for the cadets to do?

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H I'm sure he's the one that selected the project that in the summer training we included the training into Wright-Patterson Air Force Base which was then the Materiel Command. We gave them a thorough indoctrination in that which they hadn't had previously, which was very beneficial, and I think had a great effect upon them, including many of the cadets who were technically-minded, including them into the Air Corps on their graduation. Because I had better than four years of instruction to the Corps, and each time, we worked to give them a better program of not only classroom instruction in air but the instruction that we gave them in the summer training. And one of the things that Arnold wanted emphasized was the technical aspect of it, the materiel and development side.

Q How about navigation? Did he want them to have some of that?

H Yes we gave them courses in navigation, although not too much, Although we weren't able to give them in the summer training. We weren't able to give them a good thorough course in navigation. Actually, we took the groups around, as I remember, in about three individual groups. We took one group and went around the trip on it for about three and a half weeks, and then picked up another group and took them. These were all the Second Classmen. The first class had just graduated and we took the second class to try to give them as much knowledge of the Air Force with the idea that with the tactical instruction that I gave them scholastically, we would be able to induce them, interest them in, and show them what a great opportunity, and what a great organization the Air Corps was and get them so interested that they'd select the Air Corps as their career.

Q How did the military Army, Infantry, Tanks, Cavalry, how did they feel about that?

H They felt just the same way Gen Arnold felt about the Air Force.

Q A lot of competition?

H As a matter of fact in my training as a Tactical Officer with the Corps of Cadets in the summer, not only did I take them to Langley, and also took them over to Fort Monroe. I then took them to

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Fort Benning. At Monroe for Artillery, Benning for the Infantry, and then wound up generally at Wright-Patterson, where we gave them a tremendous amount of Air Corps.

Q Was there any resentment in the faculty that the Air Force was trying to skim off the cream of the crop?

H Boy! And you know how! They sure did, and I'll tell you they let us have it when they could. I can well remember that. I had it drummed into me that I could just go so far and no farther.

Q Who was the Superintendent at that time? Eichelberger?

H I think Benedict was the first one, and then Eichelberger. Eichelberger was real fine about the thing to us.

Q Where did you go after you left the Academy?

H I went up to Washington, the Pentagon, and relieved Gen Vandenberg there as A-3 which was Operations.

Q You were in Operations for awhile and then you got into training?

H Operations for about six or seven months. Then they reorganized the Hq AAF It was at that time that they changed the Army Air Forces altogether. The hq and I became Asst Chief of Air Staff/Training, whereas I'd been Asst Chief of Air Staff for Operations previously.

Q Do you remember any contacts you had with Arnold when you were Assistant Chief of Operations. You must have seen him almost every day?

H I didn't see him so much. They had quite a different organization at that time. It was stepped up much higher in the higher echelon and rank echelon than it was after I became Training. I used to see him, I was frequently called on to attend conferences, to get specific instructions when a problem of operations came up. And that was actually before we were heavily involved in the war. We hadn't had the African invasion, and we were getting trained and prepared for the African invasion

Arnold had so many problems and so many people to deal with that you just didn't sit around with him. He was a very dynamic individual, and once he

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gave you instructions, you'd better get going, and get going fast. You'd better do your job well, too. He sent me a number of times over to the Hill to sit in on conferences with the Committees of Congress with relation to the operations that the Air Corps was doing and also the training that the Air Corps was doing. He didn't have too much time to do that himself, and generally, on investigations, he would send one of his key staff officers over to represent him. Because if he spent all his time, like I did a lot of mine, over on the Hill, we'd have never gotten anywhere or gotten to Europe as a matter of fact.

Q One of the great innovations of World War II was getting K. C. Jones and C. C Moseley into the training. They set up these pilot training, basic training, and facilities. They entered contracts with a lot of people to provide basic air instruction, in 1941.

H That was a civilian training program.

Q Did you supervise any of that?

H I had a great deal to do with the setting up of it, and also not only that but supervising it during the entire period of training that I was in it.

Q I suppose it was impossible for Randolph Field and a couple of official training facilities to train the vast number of men that you were going to need. So you needed these satellite training programs?

H That's correct. We had to have them. Impossible. We didn't have the instructors ourselves ; we didn't have the locations ourselves; we couldn't become involved that much, because we had to get more involved into the war production, that was The technicians, both aviation and technical, who were able to carry on this production. We just didn't have the facilities nor the ability to carry on that entire program by ourselves unless we completely harnessed all of civilian industry, as well as everything else.

Q Arnold took a lot of initiative in giving letters of Intent to these civilian contractors before he had the money in hand. Wasn't he taking a chance?

H I think he was smart enough to know he wasn't taking a chance, but

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if there was any chance he was going to take it. He just had the drive to put that program over, and he was going to do it, or else. He was going to put it over or else go busted himself, one or the other. He stopped at nothing in order to do it that was legitimate and reasonable. And certainly, there's never anyone could have questioned--even Congress questioned his right in doing what he did, even though he had to pursue it prior to the time that he got the official OK on it. It didn't make any difference to him; he stuck his neck out when he knew he was right,

Q Did he ever stick his neck out when he knew he was wrong?

H Not to my knowledge at all. I've often thought at times that he might have stuck it out too far but, to my knowledge, he never did. He was dynamic, terrific, a driver --I almost wrote you in one of my letters --and I was thinking particularly of the Woman's Army Air Force, the setting up of the WASP at Sweetwater, Texas - the Women's Auxiliary Service Pilots.

Q Did you have any involvement with that?

H Basically the setting up of it and I had many conferences with him on it. And he handled that program under his complete jurisdiction. He didn't send down a memorandum. He called me up, if necessary, whenever things came up on that with respect to it, and called me in individually and told me basically what I was going to do. As a matter of fact, I was thinking at the time of his dynamic leadership and personality there in comparison with Patton, and I think he "out-Pattoned Patton," for my money. Because he did things there that just had terrific drive, terrific impact upon our country. He did it on his own, feeling that it was right, his concept of things was so advanced, like in the woman's training, I think that if he'd have been over there leading the forces in Europe, it would have even been different.

Q Would we have finished it faster?

H I think so

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Q Did he ever talk to you about regretting that he never served in combat?

H He never did.

Q Talked to you confidentially, man to man?

H No I don't think he ever did. I don't ever remember it. I was never a confidant of his, sitting down in a chair and just chatting. I came in and got my instructions, and when I returned, I went in and told him what the hell I'd done, and he'd either say "That's fine", or "Get the hell out of here."

Q When he said "Get the hell out of here", this was because you hadn't done what he thought, or as much as he thought should be done?

H Basically, that's right

Q You think he was unfair, sometimes?

H I never saw it. He was hard, but he was never unfair, and I'm sure he was never dishonest.

Q In the training of the women there was a movement, and perhaps you were involved in it, to get the WASP into the Army so they could wear uniforms. Women were civilians and they did not have the rights and privileges of officers. And there was an attempt to get legislation to put them into the WAAC which was run by Oveta Culp Hobby. But the attempt didnt succeed. It was in 1944, about the time you left. The legislation failed to be enacted. Did you get involved in that?

H No, I knew it was going on. I knew the fight was there and, as I remember, I did have a little to do with it in maybe some appearances before Congress, but I never did. It was towards the end of my tenure there in Training.

Q When you had the Training, did Ken McNaughton work for you?

H Yes. Ken was with me. I knew him well. I had known him well from the Academy.

Q When Arnold had these staff conferences, I suppose you attended most of them, as you were Assistant Chief of Training?

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H I attended a lot, although in the beginning Stratemeyer was the Chief of Air Staff, and he handled as much as he could himself with the Staff. And we used to go in there, certainly once a day, at least , and then stand by, and then, it was when Strat got himself a "blitz" or something happened he had to get us together to take us on in to Arnold, Those were the only times, Hap had the overall air problem as well as the overall military problem, With Gen Marshall, and with the President and with everybody else. He was out with them all the time. It's the same with Barney Giles. When Barney was ~~Chief~~ Assistant Chief of Staff there, He was a great intermediary, and he handled just as much as he possibly could himself. I remember we used to have a morning meeting every morning and go over everything in general, Review the day, and the future, and then if a real problem came up, then we'd all have to go in to Arnold.

Q In other words the routine staff conferences were handled first by Stratemeyer, and then by Giles?

H Yes.

Q In the conferences Arnold attended, do you remember him getting mad at anybody?

H I can remember him getting mad, or getting excited, or getting exhausted, or whatever you call it, and giving out very specific instructions. He never saw him throw anybody literally out of the office. But I know damn well that some of them got out just before he would have thrown them out.

Q You remember him throwing anything at anybody, like an inkwell?

H No, though I've heard that's been so, but I never saw. If he did, it was at me, and I was going so fast, I couldn't see it.

Q Did he ever get mad at you? Do you remember any specific thing you did or didn't do that made him mad?

H I think if he got mad at me over anything, and I believe it was over this Women of the Air Force training. Something I did there, some action I took, it was against what his ideas were, and he was very miffed

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with me, and as a matter of fact, I left the room prepared to pack up and get out

Q You thought you were being transferred?

H I sure thought I was going to get it. It wasn't what he wanted, and not what he had directed

Q Do you remember the specific issue?

H No, I dont. But it was in the training there of them and the methods of training. Some problem with Jacqueline Cochran I think was involved. Jackie, by the way, was sure a great gal. She did a superb job, wonderful. Maybe I failed to give her the backing she thought. She had access to Gen Arnold when nobody else did. She could go and talk to him and she could almost demand things. And she was able, and did a remarkable job. At first , it was not dealing with the boys out in the field there, the Air Force boys in the field. You had a lot of ticklish problems and you had a lot of political implications in the whole thing, and I think I got tied up in that some way, and came near to getting thrown out.

Q Was Tom DuBose in that?

H He was with me.

Q Did he work for you?

H Yes, He was a great guy too. He was a wonderful officer and did a great job, as a matter of fact. He had the brunt of a tremendous amount of those things. I know. I had to travel a great deal. There were so many hot spots, We enlarged the training program and every one of them had a potential political implication and problem, because of its location, or because of the boys or girls, or whoever we were training were concerned. And the gripes would get to Congress, and then, Congress would hit Arnold with it, and Arnold would hit me with it. An I had to spend a great deal of time. I remember they had this problem of the B-26. I think it was the Marauder, the B-26.

Q The crashes?

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H Yes. The old slogan "One a day in Tampa Bay". And they called me in. Arnold sent me up for the investigation and boy! did they give me hell over that.

Q You mean, not enough flying training so they couldn't manage the planes?

H They always said it was the first plane that ever flew without wings

Q "The Flying Prostitute." No visible means of support.

H That's right It was just too hard--the high pressure we put on in the training was just too hard to get them through in the time allotted. We just had to change our training program. We had to slow it down, but Congress gave us unmitigated hell over that. Then, speaking of the problems in training there, Arnold would fly over. I remember once he flew over in the late afternoon, I think it was--over Blythe, California coming back from the East Coast.

Q I see you got your chance to go overseas in 1944 and you represented the Air Force in the reconstitution, or the reorganization of Germany in defeat.

H The Group Control Council of Germany.

Q Who headed that?

H General Wickersham handled it originally, and then General Clay took it on over. He handled it most of the time

Q What was your job?

H I was in charge of the Armed Forces Division of the Group Control Council of Germany. Our problem was the inactivation of the units, the destruction of the German equipment and the control of all possible resurrection of the German spirit through the military organizations that they had there.

Q Did you have a part in recruiting German scientists to come over here? Like von Braun. Operation Paperclip, trying to get German scientists over the war to come over here, especially in guided missiles,

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H No. I didn't have anything to do with the recruitment there. I had a lot to do with the imprisonment of lots of Germans and the blowing up of their equipment, the equipment that we found throughout the area

Q Was this German Air Force or all kinds of equipment?

H Everything. Ordnance or Navy or anything else.

Q Was this the kind of job you wanted?

H No. But on the other hand the war was generally conceded to be coming our way. The invasion had been made, and really, shortly after that we'd got to a stalemate on the Eastern Front there with the Russians and ourselves. There wasn't much in the way of fighting going on after that time. So I didn't get in. I didn't get off early enough to get into the real fighting. I talked with Arnold about it and he just felt the same about me as he felt about most of his people, I think, --that is, he hated to let them go and bust up the working team. I felt differently. But he felt differently, and he was the commander actually.

Q You had asked him several times to let you go out?

H I had on several occasions.

Q And how did he react to that

H He wasn't mad about the thing. He felt that if I was in his position, I wouldn't have let him go, either. He always said: "Well, you can't tell. Maybe something will pop up here and you'll have lots of time to get into the fighting. So you just stay here and do the job that you're doing with me." It was of course a great pat on the back to have him feel that way, because if he didn't feel you were doing a good job he didn't mind running you out in a hell of a hurry, too.

Q There was a lot of talk about so-called "deadwood". Arnold was always writing to Spaatz and Eaker, and they were writing to him about getting rid of deadwood in their headquarters. Officers they felt were not doing the job, Did you have to deal with this problem?

H I had to either produce or get out myself, or get rid of somebody who wasn't producing.

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Q I'm thinking that he used the Training Command as sort of a dumping ground for a lot of officers who were not doing the job. Did you get involved in the ransfer of people out of headquarters?

H Yes, I did without question. It was felt, I think, and I think Arnold felt that there were a lot of good people who just couldn't cut the mustard up there in the headquarters who he felt he would have to get rid of, and they still were excellent potential people in a way, and maybe in the Training Command, they would fit on in and do a superb job. And I had many of them given me that way when I had the Air Training Command. But lots of them turned out wonderfully well and did a superior job. Others didn't, in which case I had no qualms about getting rid of them and booting them on out and then it was up to headquarters as to what the hell happened to them I wasn't going to fool with them any longer. Because you can't take in this deadwood all the time.

Q We're talking about Davenport Johnson who had the 2d Air Force. Arnold had some trouble with him. And somebody told me that he was talking to Davenport Johnson one time, and Johnson said, "If you're not satisfied, relieve me." So Arnold relieved him. Have you heard that story or did you get involved in that?

H Well, I didn't get involved in it, but I've heard it, and I think is true I was trying to think of his nickname. He did have a peculiar nickname. "Jam" Johnson. For example, I can remember one time when I was down at Bolling Field The planes were taking off and all of a sudden one started taking off the wrong way. And somebody said "Hell, get out of his way. There goes Davenport Johnson!" He was unpredictable. I think he was a very able officer in his way, but I have heard that. I never really was associated with him.

Q He had the 2d Air Force and there was a lot of complaint about the quality of the training given to the men coming out of the 2d Air Force, for the B-29's for example. Do you remember that situation?

H A little. You see, that was not, at that time, our training. They had, that is, not the Air Training Command training. They had it

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divided up into individual training and unit training. And the 2d Air Force, the 3d Air Force, at McDill, I think it was, the 4th Air Force...

Q Down on the West Coast.

H Yes. And the 1st Air Force were all unit training. They trained units. We furnished the personnel, and we furnished the basic crews. Like, we'd furnish a crew -- --individually trained--for the bombers for the machine guns, for example. And then we'd produce the navigator, and the pilot, and we'd produce the bombardier, and so on. But when it came to the actual training to put them right into combat, that was done through the Air Forces which were really combat air force training

Q Right. That was sort of group training or unit training?

H Yes.

Q Another fellow who was involved in the training was Walter Weaver, who had the technical training. Did you get involved in anything with Walter Weaver?

H I did. He was quite a guy. He was an individualist, and nobody could ever quite keep up with him.

Q He was a politician.

H I think he was basically a politician. But I had a lot of contacts with him when I was in Washington as A-3. He was a hard man to deal with, I'll tell you.

Q Why was he a hard man to deal with?

H You couldn't tell him what was right because he knew what was right himself, and he never admitted that he was wrong, and we were trying to get our programs through to meet the requirements of the units that were going to go overseas. If they weren't up to the standards demanded by them we had to change our training program, because we were supplying the people with the trained skills to fight the war. And he was hard to argue with, or reason with, or anything else.

Q He retired before the war ended. Do you remember?

H Yes. And I expect that Arnold had quite a bit to do with that,

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Q Did you get involved in the setting up of Miami Beach and the Atlantic City rest and rehabilitation centers. They also had training centers there.

H No. That took place just before I came into Washington. Vandenberg was the one that was mixed up with that. Of course, I had a lot to do with it because it came under my jurisdiction, immediately on my taking over of A-3 from Vandenberg. And I used to go down there, and check it, and I made different trips down there to address classes and things like that.

Q Did the program go smoothly, or did they have problems at Miami Beach?

H I think they went pretty smoothly, considering everything. That was a hell of a load to throw into any community. To take those young men from all walks of life and throw them in together there without any previous training or knowledge of the military was just one hell of a job, I'll tell you. I remember Jim Stowell, a classmate of mine, was the head of it, and he was a hard taskmaster too. A good one. Just right for that sort of business. He had to knock the heads together. Of course there was a lot of political implications in the whole thing because squawks came from all over the country of their babies being harassed and being taught all sorts of warfare, and all sorts of things. It was a hell of a hard problem. I never did get involved in investigations of it, though.

Q Somebody told me that Arnold was trying to get Weaver to set up the Miami Beach and the Atlantic City facilities and Weaver said he would do it, but it would take a few months. Arnold said "I want it done by next Monday" And he went through the motions of talking to somebody on the telephone. It was probably Susie Adkins his secretary. He conned Weaver into saying he would do it by next Monday. Weaver was, in Arnold's opinion, a procrastinator. Do you remember that incident?

H I don't remember the incident, but I can just imagine it was true And I probably have heard it before. That certainly could well be. And that was like Arnold in saying a thing like that. And he meant it too.

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I started to tell you about this flight over Blythe, California. I had a B-24 training base out there, four-engine bomber. One afternoon, I guess the temperature must have been 120 degrees on the ground, and certainly in the cockpits it was 170 degrees. And the planes were all settled on the ground there. And, boy, when Arnold got into Washington first thing he did is call me up, and just gave me unmitigated hell. He says: "Boy, next time I fly over a base of yours and your planes aren't being used, I'm going to take every damn one of them away from you, and give them to the combat command," he said "They can use them." I had to fly them in anything

Q This brings up another subject. Arnold's great impatience whenever he flew into a base and saw planes sitting on the ground. He became very irritated. He wanted to know why these planes were not doing something, flying some place. Did you ever go on an inspection trip with him?

H I never did. I never made an inspection trip but I got the results of almost all of them.

Q In many of them this phenomenon happened; where he saw planes on the ground, and raised questions about it.

H Of course, there was a reason for it. You can't fly the damn things for 24 hours a day. You've got to repair them; you have to get parts for them; you can't wear your students out as well. But I thought numerous times that I would get thrown out because of airplanes not being properly utilized.

Q Somebody told me that when he came into a base he avoided the red carpet briefing that the commander had prepared for him and he might end up down at the maintenance shack, talking to some sergeant to find out where the real problems were. Did you ever hear this?

H I've heard that, yes, and I think he did it, although not very often. I think he went through channels most of the time.

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Q Did he ever cut a briefer off when he thought the man was straying from the subject? Did he dismiss him, or walk out?

H I've heard that. I've never seen him do it. I think certainly if it got to a point where he wasn't interested in it, or thought the guy was giving him a lot of soft soap, he'd cut him off or get up and walk out, either one

Q Let me ask you about the recruiting. The Air Force was accused of skimming off the best people for the aviation cadet programs and for the various training programs, and the Army got the bottom of the heap where the Air Force got the best people. I guess there was a lot of criticism in Congress. Maybe this is what you had to respond to when he sent you up there?

H We were often accused of that, but with the mass of potential--with the potential we had in the military services, and from the recruiting point of view, we didn't have to just skim off the top at all. We couldn't begin to skim off the top of the best qualified, the greatest potential people. You couldn't begin to. In the first place if we tried to, half the cream of the crop wouldn't come with aviation because they weren't interested in it. There was nothing at all to it. But, of course, there was a lot of competition and there was a lot of jealousies in between the services which still exist today in one way or another. And you can't get rid of it. It's the same in civil life or any other occupation you go into. And I think it's wonderful the way the military services are getting along with this no draft deal considering everything. They're offering the kids a fortune there in the way of an education and training and I think it's great. Much better to have them do that. Go back with an education into civilian life. And they really have great potential.

Q Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together at a meeting or Conference?

H I have, but it's been with a group of people where we've come in for some special indoctrination or instructions. I suppose I've seen it

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over four or five times is all, matter of fact, and that was something where Marshall and Arnold had agreed, I think, to come to come together with us, and bring us in to give us a picture that we wouldn't have been able to get otherwise.

Q Did you ever hear them disagree on any subject publicly?

H Never.

Q I was told that Arnold was deferential to Marshall, because Marshall always let him know that he was working for Marshall. Did you ever find that so?

H I never heard it and I don't believe it for a second. I don't believe actually. Arnold would be deferential to anyone, I think he had his own ideas and his own plans, and his own ways, and I think he'd do them and would go through with them, if it was humanly possible . I think he would take reduction or demotion or whatever was necessary in order to put through his plans.

Q What do you think was his most important contribution? Or even more than one contribution, if you need to name more than one?

H Of course, he generated and developed and planned the execution of the Air Forces in their creation and employment in Europe. I think that he had a great deal through his great leadership in contributing to the defeat of Germany, although his authority, I would say, probably ended when the troops were taken over and put into other commanders' hands, who were in the field in Europe. He still exercised a tremendous influence over the whole thing. Not only through them but I believe he influenced a great deal the ground force commanders who had command of the air units

Q Did Arnold make any serious mistake in long range planning or in some action that he did that you feel he could have done better?

H I never heard of it or knew of it. I expect in training, for example, as a result of experiences I had had in training, the different types of

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technicians, specialists, pilots and navigators that I had changed our concept of the training. He, as a general rule, always accepted those changes and I've been able to go through with the program. In some cases, he has Reid to his own fixed ideas. In which case, I adhered there too. But he was a very wonderful, able man, and general. And certainly deserved a tremendous amount of credit towards winning the war

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Interview with Lieutenant General Robert W. Harper, San Antonio, Tex.

23 July 1974

Q Do you remember the first time you met Hap Arnold, your first important encounter with him?

H I think the first time I really met him was when he came up to West Point to see his son. His son was a cadet up there when I was a Tactical Officer at West Point, I got to see him several times. Although I didn't know him at all, I knew who he was and had met him. And that was just about it.

Q What year was this?

H It was about between 1939 and 1940

Q This was his first son, Hank, who graduated in 1940

H He graduated in 1940 and I was up at the Academy 1938 to 1942

Q You remember "P.D." Wickert up there?

H I knew P.D. intimately. We were there together for four years. He represented the Air Force at the Academy, actually, and I represented the Air Corps as the Tactical Officer, representing the Air Corps

Q Arnold had a great interest in the Academy?

H Yes he certainly did. He had a great interest in anything

Q Do you remember that he had a dinner? I think Bruce had just come in in 1939 or '40, the middle son. He had a party there for all the Army brats. These were the sons of military officers attending the Academy. Gen Arnold came up there, I think it was in the winter of '40 or '41. Bruce spent a lot of time planning the menu, what they were to have for dessert, very important. Do you recall the party?

H Remember it. However, I wasn't one of the cadet brats at that time. I wasn't invited.

Q Arnold felt that the Academy should give some air training, did he not?

H Yes indeed He sparked the air training, that is, assisted in it in

every possible way And that was one of my jobs, to give air training to the Corps of cadets. And I did it both through lectures, and then in the summertime I took them on flights to Langley Field, to Mitchel Field, down to Fort Benning, over to Wright Field, and everywhere. And we gave them just as broad a scope as we possibly could. On air; not only the training but the tactical and strategical use of it in our lectures as well as our summer training

Q Did Arnold ever talk about an Air Force Academy?

H Oh yes. But, at that time it was quite visionary, and there was too much preparation for war rather than for projects like the Air Force Academy. So, that didn't come up very much, but he had it in the back of his mind, and any time he had a chance, he brought out that along with many other advanced developments in air.

Q In April 1939 Arnold met with Charles Lindbergh at the Thayer Hotel up there. This is when Lindbergh came back from one of his trips to Germany. Arnold was thirsty for some current information about the German Air Force. And they met secretly because Lindbergh was a dirty word over at the White House, as you remember. So Arnold could not meet openly with him. Do you remember that?

H No I kind of hazily remember something about it, but I wasn't in on it at all.

Q Did you meet with Arnold up there to talk about any problems?

H No I didn't I just met with him socially, is all.

Q Do you remember anything that would be significant at this time?

H No. Except that whenever he'd get an idea of some project he wanted to pursue with the Corps of Cadets, of course, it came in through me Basically it generally used to come to P. D. Wickert and then I'd pick it up and carry the thing on through as I had the instruction with the Corps of Cadets there

Q Do you remember any projects that Arnold suggested for the cadets to do?

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H I'm sure he's the one that selected the project that in the summer training we included the training into Wright-Patterson Air Force Base which was then the Materiel Command. We gave them a thorough indoctrination in that which they hadn't had previously, which was very beneficial, and I think had a great effect upon them, including many of the cadets who were technically-minded, including them into the Air Corps on their graduation. Because I had better than four years of instruction to the Corps, and each time, we worked to give them a better program of not only classroom instruction in air but the instruction that we gave them in the summer training. And one of the things that Arnold wanted emphasized was the technical aspect of it, the materiel and development side.

Q How about navigation? Did he want them to have some of that?

H Yes we gave them courses in navigation, although not too much, Although we weren't able to give them in the summer training. We weren't able to give them a good thorough course in navigation. Actually, we took the groups around, as I remember, in about three individual groups. We took one group and went around the trip on it for about three and a half weeks, and then picked up another group and took them. These were all the Second Classmen. The first class had just graduated and we took the second class to try to give them as much knowledge of the Air Force with the idea that with the tactical instruction that I gave them scholastically, we would be able to induce them, interest them in, and show them what a great opportunity, and what a great organization the Air Corps was and get them so interested that they'd select the Air Corps as their career.

Q How did the military Army, Infantry, Tanks, Cavalry, how did they feel about that?

H They felt just the same way Gen Arnold felt about the Air Force.

Q A lot of competition?

H As a matter of fact in my training as a Tactical Officer with the Corps of Cadets in the summer, not only did I take them to Langley, and also took them over to Fort Monroe. I then took them to

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Fort Benning. At Monroe for Artillery, Benning for the Infantry, and then wound up generally at Wright-Patterson, where we gave them a tremendous amount of Air Corps.

Q Was there any resentment in the faculty that the Air Force was trying to skim off the cream of the crop?

H Boy! And you know how! They sure did, and I'll tell you they let us have it when they could. I can well remember that. I had it drummed into me that I could just go so far and no farther.

Q Who was the Superintendent at that time? Eichelberger?

H I think Benedict was the first one, and then Eichelberger. Eichelberger was real fine about the thing to us.

Q Where did you go after you left the Academy?

H I went up to Washington, the Pentagon, and relieved Gen Vandenberg there as A-3 which was Operations.

Q You were in Operations for awhile and then you got into training?

H Operations for about six or seven months. Then they reorganized the Hq AAF. It was at that time that they changed the Army Air Forces altogether. The hq and I became Asst Chief of Air Staff/Training, whereas I'd been Asst Chief of Air Staff for Operations previously.

Q Do you remember any contacts you had with Arnold when you were Assistant Chief of Operations. You must have seen him almost every day?

H I didn't see him so much. They had quite a different organization at that time. It was stepped up much higher in the higher echelon and rank echelon than it was after I became Training. I used to see him. I was frequently called on to attend conferences, to get specific instructions when a problem of operations came up. And that was actually before we were heavily involved in the war. We hadn't had the African invasion, and we were getting trained and prepared for the African invasion

Arnold had so many problems and so many people to deal with that you just didn't sit around with him. He was a very dynamic individual, and once he

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gave you instructions, you'd better get going, and get going fast. You'd better do your job well, too. He sent me a number of times over to the Hill to sit in on conferences with the Committees of Congress with relation to the operations that the Air Corps was doing and also the training that the Air Corps was doing. He didn't have too much time to do that himself, and generally, on investigations, he would send one of his key staff officers over to represent him. Because if he spent all his time, like I did a lot of mine, over on the Hill, we'd have never gotten anywhere or gotten to Europe as a matter of fact.

Q One of the great innovations of World War II was getting K. C. Jones and C. C Moseley into the training. They set up these pilot training, basic training, and facilities. They entered contracts with a lot of people to provide basic air instruction, in 1941.

H That was a civilian training program.

Q Did you supervise any of that?

H I had a great deal to do with the setting up of it, and also not only that but supervising it during the entire period of training that I was in it.

Q I suppose it was impossible for Randolph Field and a couple of official training facilities to train the vast number of men that you were going to need. So you needed these satellite training programs?

H That's correct. We had to have them. Impossible. We didn't have the instructors ourselves ; we didn't have the locations ourselves; we couldn't become involved that much, because we had to get more involved into the war production, that is the technicians, both aviation and technical, who were able to carry on this production. We just didn't have the facilities nor the ability to carry on that entire program by ourselves unless we completely harnessed all of civilian industry, as well as everything else.

Q Arnold took a lot of initiative in giving letters of Intent to these civilian contractors before he had the money in hand. Wasn't he taking a chance?

H I think he was smart enough to know he wasn't taking a chance, but

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if there was any chance he was going to take it. He just had the drive to put that program over, and he was going to do it, or else. He was going to put it over or else go busted himself, one or the other. He stopped at nothing in order to do it that was legitimate and reasonable. And certainly, there's never anyone could have questioned--even Congress questioned his right in doing what he did, even though he had to pursue it prior to the time that he got the official OK on it. It didn't make any difference to him; he stuck his neck out when he knew he was right.

Q Did he ever stick his neck out when he knew he was wrong?

H Not to my knowledge at all. I've often thought at times that he might have stuck it out too far but, to my knowledge, he never did. He was dynamic, terrific, a driver --I almost wrote you in one of my letters --and I was thinking particularly of the Woman's Army Air Force, the setting up of the WASP at Sweetwater, Texas - the Women's Auxiliary Service Pilots.

Q Did you have any involvement with that?

H Basically the setting up of it and I had many conferences with him on it. And he handled that program under his complete jurisdiction. He didn't send down a memorandum. He called me up, if necessary, whenever things came up on that with respect to it, and called me in individually and told me basically what I was going to do. As a matter of fact, I was thinking at the time of his dynamic leadership and personality there in comparison with Patton, and I think he "out-Pattoned Patton," for my money. Because he did things there that just had terrific drive, terrific imprint upon our country. He did it on his own, feeling that it was right, His concept of things was so advanced, like in the woman's training, I think that if he'd have been over there leading the forces in Europe, it would have even been different.

Q Would we have finished it faster?

H I think so

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Q Did he ever talk to you about regretting that he never served in combat?

H He never did.

Q Talked to you confidentially, man to man?

H No I don't think he ever did. I don't ever remember it. I was never a confidant of his, sitting down in a chair and just chatting. I came in and got my instructions, and when I returned, I went in and told him what the hell I'd done, and he'd either say "That's fine", or "Get the hell out of here."

Q When he said "Get the hell out of here", this was because you hadn't done what he thought, or as much as he thought should be done?

H Basically, that's right

Q You think he was unfair, sometimes?

H I never saw it. He was hard, but he was never unfair, and I'm sure he was never dishonest.

Q In the training of the women there was a movement, and perhaps you were involved in it, to get the WASP into the Army so they could wear uniforms. Women were civilians and they did not have the rights and privileges of officers. And there was an attempt to get legislation to put them into the WAAC which was run by Oveta Culp Hobby. But the attempt didnt succeed. It was in 1944, about the time you left. The legislation failed to be enacted. Did you get involved in that?

H No, I knew it was going on. I knew the fight was there and, as I remember, I did have a little to do with it in maybe some appearances before Congress, but I never did. It was towards the end of m;y tenure there in Training.

Q When you had the Training, did Ken McNaughton work for you?

H Yes. Ken was with me. I knew him well. I had known him well from the Academy.

Q When Arnold had these staff conferences, I suppose you attended most of them, as you were Assistant Chief of Training?

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H I attended a lot, although in the beginning, Stratemeyer was the Chief of Air Staff, and he handled as much as he could himself with the Staff. And we used to go in there, certainly once a day, at least , and then stand by, and then, it was when Strat got himself a "blitz" or something happened he had to get us together to take us on in to Arnold, Those were the only times, Hap had the overall air problem as well as the overall military problem, With Gen Marshall, and with the President and with everybody else. He was out with them all the time. It's the same with Barney Giles. When Barney was ~~Chief~~ Assistant Chief of Staff there, He was a great intermediary, and he handled just as much as he possibly could himself. I remember we used to have a morning meeting every morning and go over everything in general, Review the day, and the future, and then if a real problem came up, then we'd all have to go in to Arnold.

Q In other words the routine staff conferences were handled first by Stratemeyer, and then by Giles?

H Yes.

Q In the conferences Arnold attended, do you remember him getting mad at anybody?

H I can remember him getting mad, or getting excited, or getting exhausted, or whatever you call it, and giving out very specific instructions. He never saw him throw anybody literally out of the office. But I know damn well that some of them got out just before he would have thrown them out.

Q You remember him throwing anything at anybody, like an inkwell?

H No, though I've heard that's been so, but I never saw. If he did, it was at me, and I was going so fast, I couldn't see it.

Q Did he ever get mad at you? Do you remember any specific thing you did or didn't do that made him mad?

H I think if he got mad at me over anything, and I believe it was over this Women of the Air Force training. Something I did there, some action I took, it was against what his ideas were, and he was very miffed

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with me, and as a matter of fact, I left the room prepared to pack up and get out

Q You thought you were being transferred?

H I sure thought I was going to get it. It wasn't what he wanted, and not what he had directed

Q Do you remember the specific issue?

H No, I dont. But it was in the training there of them and the methods of training. Some problem with Jacqueline Cochran I think was involved. Jackie, by the way, was sure a great gal. She did a superb job, wonderful. Maybe I failed to give her the backing she thought, She had access to Gen Arnold when nobody else did. She could go and talk to him and she could almost demand things. And she was able, and did a remarkable job. At first , it was not dealing with the boys out in the field there, the Air Force boys in the field. You had a lot of ticklish problems and you had a lot of political implications in the whole thing, and I think I got tied up in that some way, and came near to getting thrown out.

Q Was Tom DuBose in that?

H He was with me.

Q Did he work for you?

H Yes, He was a great guy too. He was a wonderful officer and did a great job, as a matter of fact. He had the brunt of a tremendous amount of those things. I know. I had to travel a great deal. There were so many hot spots, We enlarged the training program and every one of them had a potential political implication and problem, because of its location, or because of the boys or girls, or whoever we were training were concerned. And the gripes would get to Congress, and then, Congress would hit Arnold with it, and Arnold would hit me with it. An I had to spend a great deal of time. I remember they had this problem of the B-26. I think it was the Marauder, the B-26.

Q The crashes?

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H Yes. The old slogan "One a day in Tampa Bay". And they called me in. Arnold sent me up for the investigation and boy! did they give me hell over that.

Q You mean, not enough flying training so they couldn't manage the planes?

H They always said it was the first plane that ever flew without wings

Q "The Flying Prostitute." No visible means of support.

H That's right It was just too hard--the high pressure we put on in the training was just too hard to get them through in the time allotted. We just had to change our training program. We had to slow it down, but Congress gave us unmitigated hell over that. Then, speaking of the problems in training there, Arnold would fly over. I remember once he flew over in the late afternoon, I think it was--over Blythe, California. He was coming back from the East Coast.

2nd Tape

Q I see you got your chance to go overseas in 1944 and you represented the Air Force in the reconstitution, or the reorganization of Germany in defeat

H The Group Control Council of Germany.

Q Who headed that?

H General Wickersham handled it originally, and then, General Clay took it on over. He handled it most of the time

Q What was your job?

H I was in charge of the Armed Forces Division of the Group Control Council of Germany. Our problem was the inactivation of the units, the destruction of the German equipment and the control of all possible resurrection of the German spirit through the military organizations that they had there.

Q Did you have a part in recruiting German scientists to come over here? Like von Braun. Operation Paperclip, trying to get German scientists over the war to come over here, especially in guided missiles.

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H No. I didn't have anything to do with the recruitment there. I had a lot to do with the imprisonment of lots of Germans and the blowing up of their equipment, the equipment that we found throughout the area

Q Was this German Air Force or all kinds of equipment?

H Everything. Ordnance or Navy or anything else.

Q Was this the kind of job you wanted?

H No. But on the other hand the war was generally conceded to be coming our way. The invasion had been made, and really, shortly after that we'd got to a stalemate on the Eastern Front there with the Russians and ourselves. There wasn't much in the way of fighting going on after that time. So I didn't get in. I didn't get off early enough to get into the real fighting. I talked with Arnold about it and he just felt the same about me as he felt about most of his people, I think, --that is, he hated to let them go and bust up the working team. I felt differently. But he felt differently, and he was the commander, actually.

Q You had asked him several times to let you go out?

H I had on several occasions.

Q And how did he react to that.

H He wasn't mad about the thing. He felt that if I was in his position, I wouldn't have let him go, either. He always said: "Well, you can't tell. Maybe something will pop up here and you'll have lots of time to get into the fighting. So you just stay here and do the job that you're doing with me." It was of course a great pat on the back to have him feel that way, because if he didn't feel you were doing a good job he didn't mind running you out in a hell of a hurry, too.

Q There was a lot of talk about so-called "deadwood". Arnold was always writing to Spaatz and Eaker, and they were writing to him about getting rid of deadwood in their headquarters. Officers they felt were not doing the job, Did you have to deal with this problem?

H I had to either produce or get out myself, or get rid of somebody who wasn't producing.

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Q I'm thinking that he used the Training Command as sort of a dumping ground for a lot of officers who were not doing the job. Did you get involved in the ransfer of people out of headquarters?

H Yes, I did without question. It was felt, I think, and I think Arnold felt that there were a lot of good people who just couldn't cut the mustard up there in the headquarters who he felt he would have to get rid of, and they still were excellent potential people in a way, and maybe in the Training Command, they would fit on in and do a superb job. And I had many of them given me that way when I had the Air Training Command. But lots of them turned out wonderfully well and did a superior job. Others didn't, in which case I had no qualms about getting rid of them and booting them on out and then it was up to headquarters as to what the hell happened to them. I wasn't going to fool with them any longer. Because you can't take in this deadwood all the time.

Q We're talking about Davenport Johnson who had the 2d Air Force. Arnold had some trouble with him. And somebody told me that he was talking to Davenport Johnson one time, and Johnson said: "If you're not satisfied, relieve me." So Arnold relieved him. Have you heard that story or did you get involved in that?

H Well, I didn't get involved in it, but I've heard it, and I think is true I was trying to think of his nickname. He did have a peculiar nickname, "Jam" Johnson. For example, I can remember one time when I was down at Bolling Field The planes were taking off and all of a sudden one started taking off the wrong way. And somebody said "Hell, get out of his way. There goes Davenport Johnson!" He was unpredictable. I think he was a very able officer in his way, but I have heard that. I never really was associated with him.

Q He had the 2d Air Force and there was a lot of complaint about the quality of the training given to the men coming out of the 2d Air Force, for the B-29's for example. Do you remember that situation?

H A little. You see, that was not, at that time, our training. They had, that is, not the Air Training Command training. They had it

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divided up into individual training and unit training. And the 2d Air Force, the 3d Air Force, at McDill, I think it was, the 4th Air Force. . .

Q Down on the West Coast.

H Yes. And the 1st Air Force were all unit training. They trained units. We furnished the personnel, and we furnished the basic crews. Like, we'd furnish a crew -- --individually trained--for the bombers for the machine guns, for example. And then we'd produce the navigator, and the pilot, and we'd produce the bombardier, and so on . But when it came to the actual training to put them right into combat, that was done through the Air Forces which were really combat air force training

Q Right. That was sort of group training or unit training?

H Yes.

Q Another fellow who was involved in the training was Walter Weaver, who had the technical training. Did you get involved in anything with Walter Weaver?

H I did. He was quite a guy. He was an individualist, and nobody could ever quite keep up with him.

Q He was a politician.

H I think he was basically a politician. But I had a lot of contacts with him when I was in Washington as A-3. He was a hard man to deal with, I'll tell you.

Q Why was he a hard man to deal with?

H You couldn't tell him what was right because he knew what was right himself, and he never admitted that he was wrong, and we were trying to get our programs through to meet the requirements of the units that were going to go overseas. If they weren't up to the standards demanded by them we had to change our training program, because we were supplying the people with the trained skills to fight the war. And he was hard to argue with, or reason with, or anything else.

Q He retired before the war ended. Do you remember?

H Yes. And I expect that Arnold had quite a bit to do with that,

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Q Did you get involved in the setting up of Miami Beach and the Atlantic City rest and rehabilitation centers. They also had training centers there,

H No. That took place just before I came into Washington. Vandenberg was the one that was mixed up with that. Of course, I had a lot to do with it because it came under my jurisdiction, immediately on my taking over of A-3 from Vandenberg. And I used to go down there, and check it, and I made different trips down there to address classes and things like that.

Q Did the program go smoothly, or did they have problems at Miami Beach?

H I think they went pretty smoothly, considering everything. That was a hell of a load to throw into any community. To take those young men from all walks of life and throw them in together there without any previous training or knowledge of the military was just one hell of a job, I'll tell you. I remember Jim Stowell, a classmate of mine, was the head of it, and he was a hard taskmaster too. A good one. Just right for that sort of business. He had to knock the heads together. Of course there was a lot of political implications in the whole thing because squawks came from all over the country of their babies being harassed and being taught all sorts of warfare, and all sorts of things. living down there. It was a hell of a hard problem. I never did get involved in investigations of it, though.

Q Somebody told me that Arnold was trying to get Weaver to set up the Miami Beach and the Atlantic City facilities and Weaver said he would do it, but it would take a few months. Arnold said "I want it done by next Monday" And he went through the motions of talking to somebody on the telephone. It was probably Susie Adkins his secretary. He conned Weaver into saying he would do it by next Monday. Weaver was, in Arnold's opinion, a procrastinator. Do you remember that incident?

H I don't remember the incident, but I can just imagine it was true And I probably have heard it before. That certainly could well be. And that was like Arnold in saying a thing like that. And he meant it, too.

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I started to tell you about this flight over Blythe, California. I had a B-24 training base out there, four-engine bomber. One afternoon, I guess the temperature must have been 120 degrees on the ground, and certainly in the cockpits it was 170 degrees. And the planes were all settled on the ground there. And, boy, when Arnold got into Washington first thing he did is call me up, and just gave me unmitigated hell. He says: "Boy, next time I fly over a base of yours and your planes aren't being used, I'm going to take every damn one of them away from you, and give them to the combat command," he said "They can use them." I had to fly them in anything

Q This brings up another subject. Arnold's great impatience whenever he flew into a base and saw planes sitting on the ground. He became very irritated. He wanted to know why these planes were not doing something, flying some place. Did you ever go on an inspection trip with him?

H I never did. I never made an inspection trip but I got the results of almost all of them.

Q In many of them this phenomenon happened; where he saw planes on the ground, and raised questions about it.

H Of course, there was a reason for it. You can't fly the damn things for 24 hours a day. You've got to repair them; you have to get parts for them; you can't wear your students out as well. But I thought numerous times that I would get thrown out because of airplanes not being properly utilized.

Q Somebody told me that when he came into a base he avoided the red carpet briefing that the commander had prepared for him and he might end up down at the maintenance shack, talking to some sergeant to find out where the real problems were. Did you ever hear this?

H I've heard that, yes, and I think he did it, although not very often. I think he went through channels most of the time.

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Q Did he ever cut a briefer off when he thought the man was straying from the subject? Did he dismiss him, or walk out?

H I've heard that. I've never seen him do it. I think certainly if it got to a point where he wasn't interested in it, or thought the guy was giving him a lot of soft soap, he'd cut him off or get up and walk out, either one

Q Let me ask you about the recruiting. The Air Force was accused of skimming off the best people for the aviation cadet programs and for the various training programs, and the Army got the bottom of the heap where the Air Force got the best people. I guess there was a lot of criticism in Congress. Maybe this is what you had to respond to when he sent you up there?

H We were often accused of that, but with the mass of potential--with the potential we had in the military services, and from the recruiting point of view, we didn't have to just skim off the top at all. We couldn't begin to skim off the top of the best qualified, the greatest potential people. You couldn't begin to. In the first place if we tried to, half the cream of the crop wouldn't come with aviation because they weren't interested in it. There was nothing at all to it. But, of course, there was a lot of competition and there was a lot of jealousies in between the services which still exist today in one way or another. And you can't get rid of it. It's the same in civil life or any other occupation you go into. And I think it's wonderful the way the military services are getting along with this "no draft" deal considering everything. They're offering the kids a fortune there in the way of an education and training and I think it's great. Much better to have them do that. Go back with an education into civilian life. And they really have great potential.

Q Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together at a meeting or Conference?

H I have, but it's been with a group of people where we've come in for some special indoctrination or instructions, I suppose I've seen it

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over four or five times is all, matter of fact, and that was something where Marshall and Arnold had agreed, I think, to come to come together with us, and bring us in to give us a picture that we wouldn't have been able to get otherwise.

Q Did you ever hear them disagree on any subject publicly?

H Never.

Q I was told that Arnold was deferential to Marshall, because Marshall always let him know that he was working for Marshall. Did you ever find that so?

H I never heard it and I don't believe it for a second. I don't believe actually. Arnold would be deferential to anyone, I think he had his own ideas and his own plans, and his own ways, and I think he'd do them and would go through with them, if it was humanly possible . I think he would take reduction or demotion or whatever was necessary in order to put through his plans.

Q What do you think was his most important contribution? Or even more than one contribution, if you need to name more than one?

H Of course, he generated and developed and planned the execution of the Air Forces in their creation and employment in Europe. I think that he had a great deal through his great leadership in contributing to the defeat of Germany, although his authority, I would say, probably ended when the troops were taken over and put into other commanders' hands, who were in the field in Europe. He still exercised a tremendous influence over the whole thing. Not only through them but I believe he influenced a great deal the ground force commanders who had command of the air units

Q Did Arnold make any serious mistake in long range planning or in some action that he did that you feel he could have done better?

H I never heard of it or knew of it. I expect in training, for example, as a result of experiences I had had in training, the different types of

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technicians, specialists, pilots and navigators that I had changed our concept of the training. He, as a general rule, always accepted those changes and I've been able to go through with the program. In some cases, he has held to his own fixed ideas. In which case, I adhered there too. But he was a very wonderful, able man, and general. And certainly deserved a tremendous amount of credit towards winning the war

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Harris, Hunter

22 Apr 71
28 Apr 71
4 Nov 71

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August 10, 1970

General Hunter Harris, Jr., (USAF, Ret)
Northrop Corporation
9744 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA 90213

Dear General Harris:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm coming out to the West Coast in a week to interview people who were associated with him.

I'll be traveling around the next few days, so will be out of contact with my office. If you can see me, would you have your secretary leave word with Col Marshall Ryder, 805 Leonard Road, Los Angeles, Code 213-476-5062. I hope to have an hour or so with you.

Incidentally, Bruce Arnold says he saw you in Washington. Perhaps we can arrange to meet here, if a rendezvous fails out West. I should mention that I've been working very closely with the Arnold family in this undertaking.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 6, 1970

Gen Hunter Harris, Jr., USAF(Ret)
Hilton Lagoon, Apt. 3G
2003 Kalla Road
Honolulu, HI 96815

Dear General Harris:

Thank you for your letter of September 30th. I'd just as soon wait for a "live" interview. Time is important, but not all that critical.

Let's plan to get together in late November or early December. I'll be on leave for the last two weeks of the year, so perhaps we can work in something between 1-15 December.

I attended Gen Billy Streett's funeral the other day. The "old guard" turned out for the occasion, but the ranks are thinning.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

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HUNTER HARRIS, JR.
HILTON LAGOON, APT. 3G
2003 KALIA ROAD
HONOLULU, HAWAII 96815

September 30, 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of August 26. It was good to hear that Bruce Arnold is doing well in his position, and that Mrs. Arnold is able to get around in her walking cast.

Unfortunately the short trip my secretary wrote to you about, turned out to be a month long visit, and I just returned home yesterday. Mrs. Harris and I have had a trip to the South Pacific, leaving October 13, planned with friends for some time. I have therefore had to postpone my trip to the East Coast until later in the year.

Looking at the pile of work on my desk, and being realistic, I know I will not have time to tape any of my thoughts concerning my association with General Arnold for you before my next trip. I hope you are not pressed for time, and that a get together in Washington in late November or early December would be convenient. I would appreciate the latest possible date to forward a tape in the event that we are too late for the personal interview.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Hunter Harris Jr.

Hunter Harris, Jr.
General, USAF (Ret.)

HH:en

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August 26, 1970

Gen Hunter Harris, Jr., USAF(Ret)
Hilton Lagoon Apts., 3-G
Honolulu, Hawaii 96815

Dear General Harris:

Sorry to have missed you while in California last week. I saw Mrs. Arnold at the Ranch. She had told me to be sure to talk with you.

I would like to have the taped account of your association with General Arnold, although if you plan to visit Washington fairly soon, I would just as soon wait until you get here and we can have our interview. I'd like to suggest a couple of hours be set aside for that purpose, and then, perhaps, we can have lunch.

I see Bruce Arnold frequently. He mentioned that you come to town occasionally. Bruce is doing very well at the Senate Liaison Office. And so is Mrs. Arnold with her walking cast.

You mention Fort Thomas, Kentucky. That would have been the fall of 1913, shortly after the Arnolds were wed.

I'm looking forward to meeting you.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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General Hunter Harris, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Hilton Lagoon Apts., 3-G
Honolulu, Hawaii 96815
August 18, 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of August 10. I will be delighted to assist in any way in your biography of General Arnold. I am not sure of my present plans, however I do not expect to be on the West Coast next week. My residence is in Honolulu, and I normally only spend a few days a month in Beverly Hills. When there you might call Mrs. Betty Bowen at (213) 675-4611 Ext. 251, who will be familiar with my latest plans.

My family was stationed with the Arnolds when I was only three years old at Fort Thomas, Kentucky. Later I had the pleasure of serving with General Arnold many times, starting at March Field in November 1933, and being a close friend of all of the Arnolds.

In the event that we do not get together for a personal interview soon, I will drop in on you in Washington, which should be within two months. In the meantime I have a suggestion that may be of some assistance to you. I will start an outline of personal and official material of which I have knowledge of General Arnold's very interesting and productive career. If it would be of some value to you, I could tape this on a cartridge of a standard compact cassette, which you could have transcribed and edited.

I am sure that Mrs. Arnold and Bruce have given you many personal references, however if I can be of any assistance, please let me know.

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I am sending a copy of this letter to you care of Colonel Ryder in Los Angeles in the event that you will be there this week. In the mean time I can be reached through the above address in Honolulu, or telephone (808) 941-9500.

Sincerely,

Hunter Harris, Jr.
General, USAF (Ret)

HH:en
cc: c/o Col. Ryder

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Interview - General Hunter Harris, Washington, D.C., 22 April 1971

Q: I usually ask as a starter: do you remember your first encounter with General or Colonel or Major Arnold, whenever it was you first met him?

H: I don't remember the first time because I was about three years old. He was stationed at Ft. Thomas, Kentucky with my father.

Q: 1913.

H: Yes, and my first actually, you might say, encounter, after that was when I reported to duty at March Air Force base, March Field, Riverside, Calif.

Q: At Ft. Thomas what was your father?

H: My father was a LT in the Infantry. At that time, Gen Arnold was a LT, he was on duty with the Infantry there.

Q: A freshly minted groom?

H: Right, I think they had just been married a short time.

Q: Yes, they had. This was in the fall of 1913.

H: Yes, he stayed there a few months.

Q: Did the issue of why he left the Air Service come up at that time? I think there was a matter of her being worried about his flying, so he left flying for two years.

H: I'm not familiar, actually, with that aspect of it. I do know that later on - it was common knowledge among all of his friends - that when he did get into the service, he was greatly at odds with some of the people of the War Dept General Staff, and was shipped out to out-of-the-way stations on occasion.

Q: Right, this was his second tour in the Philippines. He left Ft. Thomas to go to the Philippines around Christmas of 1913. Then he came back early in

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1916 and was up in Sackett Harbor, Alexandria, NY, with the 3rd Infantry. Then he got the call to the Aviation School, I think, from Billy Mitchell. Mrs. Arnold recalls it that way. Do you recall, perhaps your father mentioned anything involving Arnold at Ft. Thomas?

H: No, actually, I don't. My father died quite a few years ago, in 1947. I don't recall.

Q: Nothing special. Then your first real encounter was at March Field?

H: At March when I reported for duty, right after I had finished flying school, the first of November 1933. Gen Arnold was then a LTCOL, and was Base Commander. That was before the formalized organization, later on, of course, the wing structure was formed.

Q: We are talking about late 1933 when you first got to March Field. Do you have any recollections of Arnold at that time?

H: Oh yes, one of the first things I had to do was report in to him. In those days the stations were rather small. We only had 50 officers, I think, in the whole of March Field. All of us had to report to the Commander. And then I had a very pleasant social call with him which was also routine in those days. It was quite a pleasure to become associated with him. Of course, he was a stern boss. The fact that my father had been a good friend of his didn't mean a darn thing. His main job was to train LTS.

Q: Talking about Col Arnold at March Field....

H: Col Arnold was, I thought, one of the finest commanders, if not the best commander the AF ever had. He really believed, in those days, he worked very much on the training program, trying to improve the AF. One rather real humorous incident was before the air mail started. You may not have heard this. I was flying P-12s at that time. We started landing in those days with tail skid

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on prepared hard surface, and the tail skid didn't dig in and I ground-looped a P-12, and chewed up the wing a bit. Gen Arnold just got hold of the Squadron Commander, who was Capt Ira Eaker. Eaker was my first squadron commander. He really gave him the devil about this young fellow Harris, and a minor ground loop damaging the wing tip. Just a little time after that, Gen Arnold himself went into Burbank and landed a P-12 and he ground-looped himself. He stood this P-12 right up on it's nose. He got out of the airplane, got his Form #1 out, and wrote down across the Form: "100% pilot error." Of course, no one ever mentioned that incident again.

Q: He was very frank with himself?

H: Extremely.

Q: Very demanding?

H: Demanding man, but wonderful person.

Q: Was this that Snow White P-12.

H: No, this was not, this particular one as I recall was just a standard, one of the early series of the P-12.

Q: I was told that he flew this snow white P-12 around quite a bit during the air mail days.

H: Right, yes, later on, a couple of months later, that was in March 1934, and then I was stationed at Burbank Airport.

Q: Then you were under Eaker's command?

H: Eaker's run, yes, in his squadron. Gen Eaker had the route from Salt Lake to San Diego, which included these intermediate stops. Then I was ordered shortly after that, to report in as a reserve pilot in Salt Lake, so I used to see Gen Arnold there frequently.

Q: You were a LT in the reserves?

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H: Oh no, I was a 2nd LT, graduate from West Point, and commissioned in the Infantry, but immediately went to the flying school.

Q: Do you have any recollections of the air mail?

H: Oh yes, I remember it vividly because it was a pretty ticklish operation. We were really, we didn't have the instruments. We didn't have the weather equipment to fly all-weather operations. Particulary the young fellows, like me, who were quite inexperienced. So they kept a real close eye on us, and tried to keep us out of trouble.

Q: There was a LT Dennison who had some experience in flying the bomber?

H: Yes, he was a classmate of mine. Denny and I were in Flying School together, he was a Flying Cadet when I was a student officer.

Q: He was supposed to have had the most experience in flying a heavier plane. Didn't they have a lot of mail come into your post office?

H: We all flew. We were checked out on all the airplanes, so we flew fighters and observation airplanes, bombers, the whole works.

Q: Did you fly a P-12 in the air mail?

H: Occasionally a P-12. But we actually flew all types of airplanes we had. I checked out on about everything the Air Corps had at that time.

Q: Did you ever hear any comment about Foulois'decision to take on that job?

H: We had absolutely no critical comment at all. We realized it was a responsibility that we had to assume, and I never heard a gripe about it, among us youngsters. We were tickled to death because it was quite good experience.

Q: Well, of course, one of the reasons Foulois took the job was to get some money for flight pay and give his people experience.

H: Also, we profited immensely from it. Immediately we got into a very intensive weather flying program and we also were able to get a lot of flying

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instruments that we had not been able to get before, such as the gyro-stabilized instruments, both horizon and directional.

Q: Did the airlines cooperate in helping the Air Corps fly the mail?

H: They did, as a matter of fact, two of our instructor pilots voluntarily left the airlines to come on duty. I recall one, a Major Berry - I've forgotten his first name - who voluntarily left the airlines and took a reduction in pay in order to come on duty with us. And they were invaluable to us.

Q: The Western Zone under Arnold had a couple of casualties right before the mail started. One fellow was up in Idaho and another one, I can't recall where.

H: A classmate of mine was killed in that early stage, Frank Howard, classmate of mine from West Point Flying School.

Q: Arnold in his letters home to Mrs. Arnold was quite critical of Foulois' decision.

H: He was? He sure did not impart that to us. It didn't get to us, and I knew him by that time, fairly well.

Q: Do you remember a fellow named Eugene Lohman?

H: Surely. Eugene Lohman later became base commander under Arnold, and he assumed command of the wing there.

Q: Arnold had some trouble with him, did he not?

H: I don't recall any, and I think you have to bear in mind I was a 2nd LT and normally it wouldn't have come to my attention.

Q: Yes, he was a stuffed shirt, to some degree. At least, Arnold felt that he was. Do you have any other recollections of the air mail? Any incidents occur to you, near misses, or hair raising?

H: I think almost every flight was not exactly an incident...I know we had

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a very fine Operations Officer at Salt Lake, Barney Oldfield. He was an old friend of Gen Arnold's too. And I reported in for duty with him, and we went out, and overlooked the flying field in his office, where you could see everything going on. And he said: "Harris, have you flown those airplanes out there?" And I said: "No sir, quite a few of them I haven't." And he said: "Well, go get checked out,"and that's when I started in, so I could sort of handle, as a reserve pilot, I could handle any situation.

Q: Did you see Arnold operating in Salt Lake City? He was at the Newhouse Hotel.

H: Yes, that's where all of us stayed, at the Newhouse.

Q: Everybody was hard up for dough?

H: Right, as I recall, the per diem in those days was either $5 or $7.50, I've forgotten which.

Q: I think it was $5 a day. The money was late in coming in.

H: It was a little expensive, particularly for a 2nd LT.

Q: What did you pay for a room there?

H: I've forgotten, but they were awfully good to us, because they had a pretty good idea of how much money we made.

Q: This Chief, Danemiller, he was Chief of Police. They allowed the men to use the Police Gym, I think the Police and the Major were all very cooperative with the air mail. Did you occupy, or did the Air Corps, occupy several floors in the Hotel?

H: Yes, we had, I'd say, I don't recall that we had an exclusive occupancy, but they took real good care of us there at the Newhouse.

Q: Was it the first few floors of the Newhouse Hotel?

H: I don't even recall. I was in and out of there, being on this reserve

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pilot status, I was just delivering airplanes.

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold coming up to visit him. She and Lois, and drove up from March Field to visit him at Easter, 1934.

H: I don't remember seeing them there, of course, I used to see them frequently at March. I used to have dates with Lois. She was a very close friend.

Q: I'm thinking of a guy named Buckman. Do you remember LT Buckman?

H: Yes, I do.

Q: He had an experience where he was forced down in Pueblo, Colorado, and put the sack of mail on his shoulder. He landed on the golf course, and delivered the mail 5 miles to the Post Office. One of these experiences, neither rain nor snow, that kind of experience. Did anything like that ever happen to you?

H: No, not exactly, in the course of bad weather, I made several forced landings, but fortunately, they were all at intermediate or emergency fields. The worst part of the run in those days was, as far as weather was concerned, was the area called the chute, which was Cedar City, St. George, that area, and I remember once going into Cedar City under less than ideal conditions. I actually had to follow railroad tracks, by looking back of the wing, to get located, and go up to the field.

Q: Arnold had been taken away from a planned vacation to Jackson Hole to take the job and then when he came back to March Field, he and Mrs. Arnold packed up their car and they took off for a planned vacation to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. When he got to Salt Lake City telegrams caught up with him that said he was dragooned to take on the Alaskan flight. Do you remember anything on that?

H: Yes, I do. I was in the flight group at that time, and of course, the Alaskan flight was made with B-10s. I remember the flight quite well.

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Q: Did you have any role in the Alaskan flight?

H: No, I didn't, that was the 19th Bomb Group, I believe.

Q: Was that the McNarney group?

H: Yes, that was the McNarney group and I remember a real close old friend of mine and also Gen Arnold, his adjutant, Ray Dunn.

Q: He was very close to Arnold?

H: Yes, he was for a number of years.

Q: I'm told that he just followed Arnold wherever he went, and then, they had a falling out.

H: I didn't know about the falling out.

Q: I want to ask you about the wing-ding. Did Arnold originate this?

H: As far as the AF is concerned, I believe that Gen Arnold did, because, as I recall - now that you mention it - it was right after the Alaskan flight. The Royal Canadian AF had their traditional dining-in parties, when he was up there.

Q: Was this at Regina, Saskatchewan?

H: I'm not sure which of the places, but while he was there, they had one. I know when he came back, at the Officer's Club meeting, as I recall, it was Mike Dunn who told us about the wing-ding, and then started these.

Q: Do you think he might have gotten the idea from the Canadians?

H: Oh yes. I think for sure, he got the idea. That has since become a very popular tradition in the old Army Air Forces and now in the Air Force.

Q: Well, the idea of the officers getting together as an <u>espirit de corps</u> type of thing is very impressive.

H: And they had to dress up, black tie. I think it was a good occasion.

Q: He had some bad experiences in Canada. There was one fellow that got

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up and insulted the US, and Arnold got up and responded in kind. This was in one of the banquets they had, the Royal Fuseliers. Did you know about this?

H: No, I don't recall it.

Q: You see, some of his letters home, he would write home. He was a great letter writer, did you know this?

H: Yes, I did.

Q: To Mrs. Arnold, and she saved them all. Do you recall the Arnolds in a social situation at March Field?

H: Oh yes, we saw them frequently, and they were awfully good to youngsters, too. They were very hospitable. In spite of the fact that we were young 2nd LTS, it didn't make any difference. They treated us socially very well.

Q: Benny Schriever was in that group, wasn't he?

H: Yes, Benny was just ahead of me, a couple or two classes ahead, I think. But I knew Benny well because in those days, we were in high school together in San Antonio. I was a year ahead of him. He went on and finished a year ahead of me at West Point.

Q: Do you remember one occasion when Arnold was at Salt Lake City during the air mail situation, when somebody there refused to allow the Reserve Officers into the Officer's Club, and Mrs. Arnold called him, or wrote him, and he ordered everybody to be given equal treatment at the club? Do you remember anything?

H: I don't recall that one. But just as a general comment, I know that both Gen Arnold and Gen Eaker were extremely fair. As far as Reserve and Regulars were concerned, no difference at all. Certainly, among my closest friends were reserve officers, like Benny Schriever, and others, who were later commissioned. But we were treated exactly the same.

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Q: Arnold was the kind of guy, at least in my very intensive research, if you did the job, he didn't care who you were, or what your forebears were. You got attention from him. Is this a fair analysis?

H: That's certainly correct; it certainly is. Also, if you didn't do the job you got attention. He called shots exactly as he saw them.

Q: How about the CCC, did you have any involvement in that?

H: No. I did not become involved, because all of us who had just graduated from flying school were required to continue our flight training. Even when others were grounded and limited to 4 hours a month, which was the minimum required for flight pay, we continued on with our training. It was considered essential that the youngsters just out of flying school, so we were not assigned to CCC.

Q: There was a financial hardship during this period, when everybody was put on a furlough, you had to work 12 months a year, but got paid for 11. Is that correct?

H: That's correct, I was in flying school most of that time. As a matter of fact, we were on graduation leave. About the middle of July we were informed by the Comptroller General that we had been on leave without pay since the 1st, and told to report in to the nearest station. So we did. Eventually we reported in early to the flying school.

Q: Was this '33?

H: 1932.

Q: Wasn't there something involving people like Schriever, where they were kept in Aviation Cadet status, so they would be paid less than they would be as 2nd LTs?

H: Yes, it was actually, not Benny's group because they were given active

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duty as 2nd LTs. But in the group that followed mine - I think a year later - they were reported in as Flying Cadets, and their pay was $75 a month.

Q: What did a LT get?

H: Lts then had a basic pay of $125 and $62.50 flight pay, which was $187.50.

Q: So it was a question of over $100?

H: 2nd LTs were getting $187.59 and cadets were getting $75.

Q: Did they get flying pay, too?

H: No, they just got $75.

Q: So, it's like $110.

H: The only thing the Aviation Cadets did get was a larger ration, special dollar ration. Where we were getting $18 a month, they got $30.

Q: I spent some time out at March Field. I was moseying around the Quarters 176. This was Arnold's quarters.

H: I was there just two weeks ago. P.K. Carlton, LTGEN Carlton was the Commander of the 15th AF and is in those quarters.

Q: I was visiting the historian, Dr. Hurley, and got some information from him about March Field. The Arnolds built up the field, put trees in, poplars. All those big poplars were put in by Mrs. Arnold, or ordered by her.

H: I recall their quarters. She did a lot of work personally in the yard. She really made a beautiful place of it.

Q: She has not changed. She just loves growing things.

H: I visited her last year in Sonoma. She has a beautiful place.

Q: Yes, she does. I hear from her, she and I correspond.

Q: Were you there when Arnold was promoted to his one star?

H: No, I was not. I was in the Philippines.

Q: This was in early 1935, when GHQ AF was established?

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H: I was there then. I was there until '37. But I recall when he was promoted to a Colonel. I was under the impression that he was promoted to a BG later than that.

Q: Did he go to full Colonel, I thought he got a jump?

H: No, he went to full Colonel at March, and then I thought he was promoted later on, possibly in 1937.

Q: He was promoted in February 1935.

H: Well, I was there then.

Q: Didn't they have a big party for him?

H: I'm sure. I don't recally recall.

Q: When they established the GHQ AF. I think we've covered March Field. Do you have any other recollections of March Field?

H: No, not particularly. It was a wonderful station. Almost four years that I had there, I think the good fortune to be working under Col Arnold and Eaker who were two of my really close friends.

Q: You know, March Field was his turning point in a sense that he was on his way back from exile. He did very well under Gen Malin Craig. He and Craig became fairly close and when Craig came to Washington, I believe he brought Arnold with him.

H: Craig was our Corps Area Commander.

Q: Do you remember anything, any relations between them?

H: Oh yes, Arnold was very close. As a matter of fact, when General Craig came down, I was called on one occasion on a routine inspection - he was an extremely pleasant fellow - and he also thought very highly of the Air Corps. I was appointed his aide. Gen Arnold made me his aide. He also made me aide to Foulois when he came out for the Olympics, and I have some wonderful pictures.

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Q: Is that those short pants?

H: Yes, the knickers and leather jacket. I'll send you one, it shows Spaatz and Arnold and Foulois, and I was the young 2nd LT at the airplane.

Q: Do you remember Hollywood coming out to the base?

H: Oh yes, I remember several occasions.

Q: Bebe Daniels and Lyons.

H: I think the one that made the biggest splash was Jean Harlow.

Q: Do you remember anything about that visit?

H: I sure do, I think they got in an awful lot of trouble on that one occasion - not serious trouble, but Jean was being escorted by a very dashing bachelor.

Q: Howard Hughes?

H: No, by Monk Hunter. He spent a lot of time with Gen Arnold. Monk was Operations Officer there for Arnold.

Q: Was he wearing a moustache?

H: Yes, he had a moustache, very attractive, nice guy. Well, he was escorting Jean Harlow to this ball, and three of us young LTs who had met Jean over at the ball decided that we would have a little fun with Monk. So we enticed her away from the ball, and went up to one of the bachelor quarters, and had a couple of drinks. In the meantime Monk was frantically trying to find Jean Harlow, and when he found out that she was out with three 2nd LTs, he raised hell. We weren't very popular with him, but Monk later became a good personal friend. He's a distant relative of my father.

Q: I saw him down in Savannah.

H: I've seen him there several times, too.

Q: Do you remember any of the other dignitaries coming out to the field like Governor James Rolph?

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H: I don't recall Governor Rolph at all.

Q: How about Foulois coming out there?

H: I remember that quite well because I was his aide while he was there.

Q: How did Foulois and Arnold get along?

H: As far as we could determine, fine.

Q: Was it proper, or was it real friendly?

H: I thought quite friendly. I thought friendly. As far as I know it - may not be true. Foulois was an extremely popular man. Everybody in the Air Corps liked him. He was a very warm person and he treated enlisted men and junior officers very well.

Q: Having been an enlisted man himself?

H: Certainly, he had been through the mill. He knew.

Q: He stubbed his toe with the Administration on that Air Mail. I think that kind of finished him?

H: Actually, he served his term, as I recall.

Q: He finished his term.

H: I later reported to duty after three years in the Philippines in 1940, flying VIPs there. This was the predecessor of the SAM flight. We had some special staff squadrons, flew VIPs, and I remember when I was ordered in there, I called on Foulois. We were then directed to call on the Chief and again, Bolling was a relatively small station.

Q: But he never got another job. During WWII, he was obviously available.

H: He was retired.

Q: He was retired, but others were retired, Fechet got a job. Foulois never got a job. I wonder if the fact that he had soured himself with Roosevelt?

H: Could be, but I don't know.

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Q: You weren't high enough?

H: No, I was still a LT.

Q: Let me take you to the next phase. You came to Washington and worked at Bolling Field. You must have seen Gen Arnold at Bolling Field?

H: I did, and I flew with him on several occasions, too. At that time, I suppose Gen Arnold must have something to do with my promotion. He sort of steered me around, and I took on the job of flying the Under Secy, Bob Patterson. He was a wonderful man, too, a great man. So I flew him, and even later on, when the reorganization of the War Dept, I think it was March 1, 1942, right after the war started, Gen Arnold had made an agreement with Gen Marshall that half of the War Dept General Staff would be AF officers. I was one of those 50 AF officers placed on the War Dept General Staff, much against my desires, because I wanted to get a bomb unit.

Q: Kuter was in the planning side of it?

H: Yes, he was a LTCOL then. Incidentally, Kuter is one of the few officers along with Pershing - there may have been one or two others - who never served in the grade of Colonel. They were promoted from LTCOL to BG.

Q: Do you remember an incident that occurred 3 days before Pearl Harbor? The Chicago Tribune published a part of the RAINBOW FIVE war plan?

H: No, I don't.

Q: You were stationed at Bolling Field?

H: I was stationed at Bolling.

Q: Spaatz, was he the Chief there for a while? Gen Emmons was there for a while?

H: Delos Emmons at that time, when I reported. As soon as the war started, Dec 7th, I received orders, I think it was the following day, on Dec 8th, along

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with several others, to report for duty in the Operations Section of the then GHQ AF.

Q: They called it the AF Combat Command?

H: Later, I believe, the name was originally GHQ and then it was changed to AF Combat Command.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold in that period?

H: Yes, I recall, we used to see him when he came out to fly. Then on occasion, I would go and fly as copilot with his regular pilot, Gene Beebe. Gene and I had served together years ago at March Field. But I remember seeing him frequently, and of course, it was right after that, I think, a week or so, that Gen Emmons was ordered to Alaska - I think on temporary duty and he didn't come back - then went on to Hawaii. But he was on a trip to Alaska, as I recall, and then went on to Hawaii.

Q: Somebody who doesn't like Arnold said that Arnold got rid of all his opposition in Washington, including Emmons and Andrews. He got them out of Washington. Do you have any thought on that?

H: I think it was, if not common knowledge, but generally known that Emmons and Arnold were not close friends. When he left Washington, immediately after the war started, we were a little bit surprised. I don't recall anything along that line with Andrews. Gen Andrews was sent over as European Commander.

Q: In 1943, and he had a very big job.

H: He actually, the commander that replaced him was Gen Eisenhower.

Q: Actually, Devers at first, Devers couldn't cut it. Then they took him out and then Eisenhower got it several months later.

H: Devers when Gen Andrews was killed up in Iceland.

Q: Arnold and Andrews had a very good relationship, but a guy named Hugh

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Knerr sort of got between them. Did you know that there was some difficulty between Arnold and Andrews right about the start of the war?

H: I didn't realize it, no.

Q: Andrews was pushing for a separate air force. Knerr was actually pushing for a separate AF, and he was close to Andrews, and he was getting Andrews into the picture. Knerr was writing - he wrote this William Bradford Huie book and did several other things, and when Andrews (off record - no response).

Q: About Patterson and Arnold, what was their relationship?

H: As far as I knew, it was quite good, I know that Judge Patterson admired Gen Arnold. I was very close to Judge Patterson at this time, even after I was ordered into the G-3 War Dept General Staff. My boss, the G-3 then, Gen Idwal Edwards, told me to continue on whenever Judge Patterson needs me. Even though I was on the General Staff, we visited, we went down and visited Gen Andrews.

Q: This is down in the Caribbean. There was some problem though between Judge Patterson and Arnold. Several things that came up during the war. I got the impression that their relationship was just proper, not very good.

H: Judge Patterson, I knew him very well. He was a wonderful person, but the Judge was quite a reserved person.

Q: And Arnold was sort of out going?

H: Well, Arnold was, of course, not only outgoing, but very outspoken. I can see how there could be a small clash, but I was not aware of any....

Q: My feeling is that their chemistry was not quite as good as it was between Arnold and Lovett, for example. Do you have any information on that relationship?

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H: I knew Mr. Lovett. I'd flown him too. Tremendous gentleman. Of course, Lovett was very close to the Air Corps, and being Asst Secy for Air too, he did a great deal for the AF.

Q: Would you say that Lovett acted as a balance wheel to keep Arnold from making impulsive decisions?

H: I can't answer that.

Q: Was Arnold impulsive?

H: Yes, he was. He was so very direct, and said exactly what he thought. He also had no fear of criticism. One of the things I admired about him and other people didn't like about him, but he always knew exactly where he stood. I think Arnold, not singlehandedly, but I think more than any other person, had to do with the, he was the moving influence in the development of new aircraft. One perfect example was the B-17. There was a lot of opposition in the War Dept General Staff against the B-17 because they felt that the Air Corps had no requirement for a long range type flying airplane. They thought the observation role was adequate, for observation of Army forces, close type of support. General McNarney did a great deal too because he had quite a strong influence with Gen Marshall and to Secy Stimson.

Q: What kind of relationship between McNarney and Arnold?

H: As far as I know okay. I have to say okay. They had a complete rapport.

Q: I was told that McNarney leaned toward the War Dept influence in his attitude toward the Air Corps. In other words, he was more War Dept than he was Air Corps.

H: I will say one thing about it, I knew Gen McNarney slightly. He was quite a reserved individual, but extremely loyal man, I think he realized that

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his boss was Gen Marshall, and Gen Marshall had complete confidence in him.

Q: How about Marshall and Arnold, did you have any knowledge?

H: No personal knowledge. As far as I could determine, Marshall backed Arnold to the hilt.

Q: And Arnold backed Marshall?

H: He did too, on all the major issues. Such as the, Gen Arnold was very critical that the War Dept General Staff was not responsive to the AF's needs, so he actually talked Marshall into making a 50% division, 50% of the General Staff was AF and 50% was Army.

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2 Interviews
22 April 71
28 Apr 71

20330

8 March 1971

General Hunter Harris, Jr. USAF (Ret)
Hilton Lagoon, Apt. 3G
2003 Kalia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815

Dear General Harris:

Jeannie Trojan, of General Meyer's office, relayed your message that you expect to be in the Washington area on April 19-20. I shall arrange my schedule to be at your disposal.

The only cloud on the horizon is a minute one. I have a pending interview with Charles Lindbergh who, as you know, was very close to General Arnold for one period. It will depend when he comes in from Hawaii. He's a hard man to intercept for an interview. Right now, I expect it to happen several weeks before you come in, but his plans have changed before, and I just might have to dash up to Darien, Connecticut for this one. But I won't worry about this for now.

I'm looking forward to meeting you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Spec. Asst to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

P.S. I saw Mrs. Arnold in Sonoma not too long ago. She is very pleased to learn that we will be talking about General Arnold.

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20330

AF/CHO/Dr Green/37428/ecp/7 Dec 70 7 December 1970

Gen Hunter Harris, Jr., USAF (Ret)
Hilton Lagoon, Apt. 3G
2003 Kalla Road
Honolulu, HI 96815

Dear General Harris

They tell me we missed connections last Friday, I'm sorry I didn't get word as to my whereabouts to the lady who handled the call. My problem is compounded by the secretarial help situation since I moved from the Pentagon to the Forrestal Building in order to be free to devote full time to this project.

Anyway, it looks as if we'll have to wait for your next trip to Washington. I'm enclosing an envelope for your convenience so you can contact me quickly, if the occasion arises.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Asst to Chief Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

1 Atch
Envelope

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20330

AF/CHO/Dr Green/37428/ecp/7 Dec 70 7 December 1970

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Hilton Lagoon, Apt. 3G
2003 Kalia Road
Honolulu, HI 96815

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Special Asst to Chief Air Force History
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 6, 1970

Gen Hunter Harris, Jr., USAF(Ret)
Hilton Lagoon, Apt. 3G
2003 Kalla Road
Honolulu, HI 96815

Dear General Harris:

Thank you for your letter of September 30th. I'd just as soon wait for a "live" interview. Time is important, but not all that critical.

Let's plan to get together in late November or early December. I'll be on leave for the last two weeks of the year, so perhaps we can work in something between 1-15 December.

I attended Gen Billy Streett's funeral the other day. The "old guard" turned out for the occasion, but the ranks are thinning.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

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General Hunter Harris, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Hilton Lagoon Apts., 3-G
Honolulu, Hawaii 96815

September 1, 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

General Harris left for the Far East on short notice last Saturday. He expects to be away approxiamately two weeks. I have forwarded a copy of your letter to him.

He has tentative plans for a trip to the East Coast in September. I know he is anxious to meet with you, and I am certain he will let you know his plans when he returns to Honolulu.

Sincerely,

Eleanor Nelson

(Mrs.) Eleanor Nelson

wrote on meeting in Nov or Dec

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Interview - General Hunter Harris, Washington, D.C., 22 April 1971

Q: I usually ask as a starter, do you remember your first encounter with General or Colonel or Major Arnold, whenever it was you first met him?

H: I don't remember the first time because I was about threeyears old, he was stationed at Ft. Thomas, Ky, with my father.

Q: 1913.

H: Yes, and my first actually, you might say, encounter, after that was when I reported to duty at March Air Force Base, March Field, Riverside, Calif.

Q: At Ft. Thomas what was your father

H: My father was a LT in the Infantry, ~~and~~ at that time, Gen Arnold was a LT he was on duty with the Infantry there.

Q: A freshly minted groom?

H: Right, I think they had just been married a short time

Q: Yes, they had. This was in the fall of 1913.

H: Yes, stayed there a few months.

Q: Did the issue of why he left the Air Service come up at that time, ~~you know~~, I think there was a matter of her being worried about his flying, he left flying for 2 years.

H: I'm not familiar, actually, with that aspect of it. I do know that later on it was common knowledge among all of his friends that [redacted], when he did get into the service, he was greatly at odds with some of the people of the War Dept General Staff, and was shipped out to ~~out-of-the-way~~ stations on occasion

Q: Right, this was his second tour in the Philippines. He left Ft. Thomas to go to the Philippines around Christmas of 1913, ~~and~~ then he came back early in 1916 and was up in Sakett Harbor, Alexandria, NY, with the 3rd Infantry, ~~and~~ then he got the call to the Aviation School, I think, from Billy Mitchell, Mrs. Arnold recalls it that way. Do you recall, perhaps your father mentioned anything involving Arnold at Ft. Thomas?

H: No, actually, I don't, my father died quite a few years ago, in 1947. I don't recall.

Q: Nothing special. Then your first real encounter was at March Field?

H: At March when I reported for duty, right after I had finished flying schbol,

the first of November 1933 and Gen Arnold was then a LTCOL, and I was Base Commander, that was before the formalized organization, later on, of course, the wing structure was formed.

Q: We are talking about late 1933 when you first got to March Field, do you have any recollections of Arnold at that time?

H: Oh yes, one of the first things I had to do was report in to him. In those days the stations were rather small, we only had 50 officers, I think, in the whole of March Field, and all of us had to report to the Commander, and then I had a very pleasant social call with him which was also routine in thosedays, and it was quite a pleasure to become associated with him, and of course, he was a stern boss, the fact that my father had been a good friend of his didn't mean a darn thing, his main job was to train LTs.

Q: Talking about Col Arnold at March Field

H: Col Arnold was, ~~of course,~~ I thought, one of the finest commanders, if not the best commander the AF ever had, and he really believed, in those days, he worked very much on the training program, trying to improve the AF, ~~the first real,~~ one rather real humorous incident was before the Air Mail started, you may not have heard this, I was flying P-12s at that time, and we started landing in those days with tail skid on prepared hard surface, and the tail skid didn't dig in and I ground-looped a P-12, and chewed up the wing a bit, and Gen Arnold just got hold of the Squadron Commander, who was Ira Eaker, Capt Eaker, ~~who was~~ my first squadron commander, and he really gave him the devil about this young fellow Harris, and a minor ground loop damaging the wing tip. Just a little time after that, Gen Arnold himself went into Burbank and landed a P-12, and he groudd-looped himself, he stood this P-12 right up on it's nose, and he got out of the airplane, got his form #1 out, and wrote down across the Form 1 "100% pilot error" ~~and~~ of course, no one ever mentioned that incident again.

Q: He was very frank with himself?

H: Extremely.

Q: Very demanding?

H: Demanding man, but wonderful person.

Q: Was this that Snow White P-12

H: No, this was not, this particular one as I recall was just a standard, one of the early series of the P-12.

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Q: I was told that he flew this snow white P-12 around quite a bit during the air mail deep.

H: Right, yes, later on, a couple of months later, that was in March (February) 1934, and then I was stationed at Burbank Airport.

Q: Then you were under Eaker's command?

H: Eaker's run yes, in his squadron, Gen Eaker had the route from Salt Lake to San Diego, which included these intermediate stops, and then I was ordered shortly after that, to report in as a reserve pilot in Salt Lake, so I used to see Gen Arnold there frequently.

Q: You were a LT in the reserves

H: Oh no, I was a 2nd LT, graduate from West Point, and commissioned in the Infantry, but immediately went to the flying school.

Q: Do you have any recollections of the air mail?

H: Oh yes, I remember it vividly because it was a pretty ticklish opeation, we were really, we didn't have the instruments, we didn't have the weather equipment to fly all-weather operations, particularly the young fellows, like me, who were quite inexperienced, so they kept a real close eye on us, and tried to keep us out of trouble

Q: There was a LT Dennison who had some experience in flying the bomber?

H: Yes, he was a classmate of mine, Denny and I were in Flying School together, he was a Flying Cadet when I was a student offieer.

Q: He was supposed to have had the most experience in flying a heavier plane, ~~I think~~ didn't they have a lot of mail come into your post office?

H: We all flew, we were checked out on all the airplanes, so we flew fighters and observation airplanes, bombers, the whole works.

Q: Did you fly a P-12 in the air mail?

H: Occasionally a P-12, but we ~~flew~~ actually flew all types of airplanes we had. I checked out on about everything the Air Corps had at that time.

Q: Did you ever hear any comment about Foulois' decision to take on that job?

H: We had absolutely no critical comment at all, we realized it was a responsibility that we had assumed, and I never heard a gripe about it, among us youngsters, we were tickled to death because it was quite good experience.

Q: Well of course, one of the reasons Foulois took the job was to get some money

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for flight pay and give his people experience

Q: Also, we profited immensely from it, immediately we got into a very intensive weather ~~letter~~ flying program and ~~held~~, we also were able to get a lot of flying instruments that we had not been able to get before, such as the gyro-stabilized instruments, both horizon and directional.

Q: Did the airlines cooperate in helping the Air Corps fly the mail?

H: They did, as a matter of fact, two of our instructors on 11 pilots voluntarily left the airlines to come on duty. I recall one, a Major Berry, I've forgotten his first name, who voluntarily left the airlines and took a reduction in pay in order to come on duty with us, and they were invaluable to us.

Q: The Western Zone under Arnold had a couple of casualties right before the mail started, one fellow was up in Idaho and another one, I can't recall where.

H: A classmate of mine was killed in that early stage, Frank Howard, classmate of mine from West Point Flying School.

Q: Arnold in his letters home to Mrs. Arnold was quite critical of Foulois' decision?

H: He was, he sure did not impart that to us, didn't get to us, and I knew him by that time, fairly well

Q: Do you remember a fellow named ~~Ernest~~ Eugene Lohman

H: Surely, ~~Gene Lohman~~, Eugene Lohman later became base commander under Arnold, and he assumed command of the wing there.

Q: Arnold had some trouble with him, did he not?

H: I don't recall any, and I think you have to bear in mind I was a 2nd LT and normally it wouldn't have come to my attention.

Q: Yes, he was a stuffed shirt, to some degree, at least Arnold felt that he was. Do you have any other recollections of the air mail, any incidents occurred to you, near misses, or hair raising?

H: I think almost every flight was not exactly an incident....I know we had a very fine operations officer at Salt Lake, Barney Oldfield, he was an old friend of Gen Arnold's too, and I reported in for duty with him, and we went out, and overlooked the flying field, office, where you could see everything going on, and he said, "Harris, have you flown those airplanes out there?" and I said, "no sir, quite a few of them I haven't," and he said, "well, go get checked out, and that's when I started in, so I could

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sort of handle, as ~~the~~ a reserve pilot, I could handle any situation.

Q: Did you see Arnold operating in Salt Lake City. He was at the Newhouse Hotel

H: Yes, that's where all of us stayed, and at the Newhouse.

Q: Everybody was hard up for dough?

H: Right, as I recall, ~~things were dim~~ the per diem in those days was either $5 or $7.50, I've forgotten which.

Q: I think it was $5 a day and the money was late in coming in.

H: It was a little expensive, particularly for a 2nd LT

Q: What did you pay for a room there?

H: I've forgotten, but they were awfully good to us, because they ~~figured~~ had a pretty good idea of how much money we made.

Q: This Chief, ~~Daw~~ Dewemiller, he was Chief of Police. They allowed the men to use the Police Gym, I think the Police and the Mayor were all very cooperative with the air mail. Did you occupy, or did the Air Corps occupy several floors in the Hotel?

H: Yes, we had, I'd say, I don't recall that we had an exclusive occupancy, but they took real good care of us there at the Newhouse.

Q: Was it the first few floors of the Newhouse Hotel?

H: I don't even recall. I was in and out of there, being on this reserve pilot status, I was just delivering airplanes.

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold coming up to visit him. She had and Lois, and drove up from Marsh Field to visit him at Easter 1934.

H: I don't remember seeing them there, of course, I used to see them frequently at March. I used to have dates with Lois. She was a very close ~~friend~~ friend.

Q: I'm thinking of a guy named Buckman. do you remember LT Buckman?

H: Yes, I do.

Q: He had an experience where he was forced down in Pueblo, Colorado and put the sack of mail on his shoulder, he landed on the golf course, and delivered the mail 5 miles to the PO, one of these experiences, neither rain nor snow, that kind of experience. Did anything like that ever happen to you?

H: No, not exactly, in the course of bad weather, made several forced landings, but fortunately, they were all at intermediate or emergency fields. The worst part of the run in those days was, as far as weather was concerned, was the area called the chute, which was Cedar City, St. George, that area, and I remember once going into

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Cedar City under less than ideal conditions, actually had to follow railroad tracks, looking back of the wing, to get located, and go up to the field.

Q: Arnold had been taken away from a planned vacation to Jackson Hole to take the job and then when he came back to March Field, he and Mrs. Arnold packed up their car and they took off for a planned vacation to Jackson Hole, Wyo. and when he got to Salt Lake City a telegram caught up with him and said he was dragooned to take on the Alaskan flight. do you remember anything on that?

H: Yes, I do. I was in the flight group at that time, and of course, the Alaskan flight was made with B-10s. I remember the flight quite well.

Q: Did you have any role in the Alskan flight?

H: No, I did't, that was the Bomb Group, I believe, the 19th I think it was

Q: Was that the McNarney group?

H: Yes, that was the McNarney group and I remember a real close old friend of mine and also Gen Arnold, his adjutant, Ray Dunn.

Q: He was very close to Arnold?

H: Yes, he was for a number of years.

Q: I'm told that he just followed Arnold wherever he went, and then, they had a falling out.

H: I didn't know about the falling out.

Q: I saw Dunn. I want to ask you about the wing-ding. Did Arnold originate this?

H: As far as the AF is concerned, I believe that Gen Arnold did, because, as I recall, it was right after the Alaskan flight and the Royal Canadian AF had their traditional dining-in parties, when he was up there. I'm not sure which of the places, but while he was there, they had one and I know when he came back, at the Officer's Club meeting, as I recall, it was Mike Dunn who told us about the wing-ding, and then started these.

Q: Was this at Regina, Saskatchewan?

H: Do you think he might have gotten the idea from the Canadians?

H: Oh yes. I think for sure, he got the idea, and that has since become a very popular tradition in the old Army Air Force, and now in the AF.

Q: Well the idea of the officers getting together as an espirit de corps type of thing is very impressive.

H: And they had to dress up, black tie. I think it was a good occasion.

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Q: He had some bad experiences in Canada. There was one fellow that got up and insulted the US, and Arnold got up and responded in kind. This was in one of the baqquets they had, the Royal Fusiliers, did you know about this?

H: No, I don't recall it.

Q: You see, some of his letters home, he would write home, he was a great letter writer, did you know this?

H: Yes, I did.

Q: And she saved them all. Do you recall the Arnolds in a social situation at March Field?

H: Oh yes, we saw them frequently, and they were awfully good to youngsters, too. They were very hospitable in spite of the fact that we were young 2nd LTs, it didn't make any difference, they ~~were~~ socially very well.

Q: Benny Schriever was in that group, wasn't he?

H: Yes, Benny was just ahead of me, a couple, two classes, I think, but I knew Benny well because in those days, we were in high school together in San Antonio. I was a year ahead of him, ~~and~~ he went on and finished a year ahead of me at West Point.

Q: Do you remember one occasion when Arnold was at Salt Lake City during the air mail situation, when somebody there refused to allow the Reserve Officers into the Officer's Club, and Mrs. Arnold called him, or wrote him, and he ordered everybody to be given equal treatment at the club, do you remember anything?

H: I don't recall that one, but just as a general comment, I know that both Gen Arnold and Gen Eaker were extremely fair. As far as Reserve and Regulars were concerned, no difference at all, ~~and~~ certainly, among my closest friends were reserve officers, like Benny Schriever, and others, w ho were later commissioned, but we were treated exactly ~~right~~ the same.

Q: Arnold was the kind of guy, at least in my very intensive research, if you did the job, he didn't care who you were, or what your forebears were, you got attention from him. Do this a fair analogies?

H: That's certainly correct; it certainly is, ~~and~~ also if you didn't do the job you got attention, he called shots exactly as he saw them.

Q: How about the CCC, did you have any involvement in that?

H: No, I did not become involved, because all of us who had just graduated from

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flying school were required to continue our flight training. Even when others were grounded and limited to 4 hours a month, which was the minimum required for flight pay, we continued on with our training, it was considered essential that the youngsters just out of flying school, so we were not assigned to CCC.

Q: There was a financial hardship during this period, when everybody was put on a furlough, you had to work 12 months a year, but got paid for 11, Is that correct?

H: That's correct, I was in flying school most of that time, and as a matter of fact, we were on graduation leave, about the middle of July we were informed by the Comptroller General that we had

Q: Was this '33?

H: 1932, we were informed that we had been on leave without pay since the 1st, and told to report into the nearest station. So we did. Eventually we reported in early to the flying school.

Q: Wasn't there something involving people like Schriever, where they were kept in Aviation Cadet status, so they would be paid less than they would as 2nd LTs?

H: Yes, it was actually, not many because Benny's group were given active duty as 2nd LTS, but in the group that followed mine, I think a year later, they were reported in as Flying Cadets, and their pay was $75 a month.

Q: What did a LT get

H: LTs then had a basic pay of $125 and $62.50 flight pay, which was $187.50

Q: So it was a question of over $100?

H: 2nd LTS were getting $187.50 and cadets were getting $75.

Q: Did they get flying pay, too?

H: No, they just got $75

Q: So, it's like $110.

H: The only thing the Aviation Cadets did get was a larger ration, special dollar ration, where we were getting $18 a month, they got $30.

Q: I just spent some time out at March Field, I was moseying around the Quarters 176. This was Arnold's quarters

H: I was there just two weeks ago, P.K. Carlton, LTGEN Carlton was the Commander of the 15th Air Force and is in those quarters.

Q: I was visiting the historian, Dr. Hurley, and got some information from him about March Field. She Arnold's built up the field, put trees in, poplars, all those

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big popular were put in by Mrs. Arnold, or ordered by her.

H: I recall the quarters. She did a lot of work personally in the yard. She really made a beautiful place of it

Q: She has not changed, she just loves growing things.

H: I visited her last year in Sonoma. She has a beautiful place

Q: Yes, she does, I hear from her, she and I correspond.

Q: Were you there when Arnold was promoted to his one star?

H: No, I was not, I was in the Philippines?

Q: This was in early 1935, when GHQ AF was established

H: I was there then. I was there until '37. But I recall when he was promoted to a Colonel. I was under the impression that he was promoted to a BG later than that.

Q: Did he go to full Colonel, I thought he got a jump?

H: No, he went to full Colonel at March, and then I thought he was promoted later on, possibly in 1937.

Q: He was promoted on February, 1935.

H: Well, I was there, then.

Q: Didn't they have a big party for him?

H: I'm sure. I don't really recall.

Q: When they estabished the GHQ AF. I think we've covered March Field. do you have any other recollections of March Field?

H: No, not particularly. It was a wonderful station. almost four years that I had there, I think the good fortune to be working under Col Arnold and Gen Eaker, who were two of my really close friends.

Q: You know, March Field was his turning point in a sense that he was on his way back from exile, ~~and the cloude from the Billy Mitchell thing~~. He did very well under Gen Malin Craig. he and Craig became fairly close and when Craig came to Washington, I believe he brought Arnold with him.

H: ~~I remember when, see~~, Craig was our Corps Area Commander.

Q: Do you remember any thing, any relations between them?

H: Oh yes, Arnold was very close. as a matter of fact, when General Craig came down, I was called on one occasion on a routine inspection, he was an extremely pleasant fellow and he also thought very highly of the Air Corps. and I was appointed his aide. Gen Arnold made me his aide. He also made me aide to Foulois when he came out for the Olympics, and I have some wonderful pictures.

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Q: Is that those short pants?

H: Yes, the knickers and leather jacket. I'll send you one, it shows Spaatz and Arnold and Foulois, and I was the young 2nd LT at the airplane.

Q: Do you remember Hollywood coming out to the base?

H: Oh yes, I remember several occasions.

Q: Bebe Daniels and Lyons

H: I think the one that made the biggest splash was Jean Harlow.

Q: Do you remember anything about that visit.

H: I sure do, I think they got in an awful lot of trouble on that one occasion — not serious trouble, but Jean was being escorted by a very dashing bachelor.

Q: Howard Hughes?

H: No, by Monk Hunter. He spent a lot of time with Gen Arnold. Monk was Operation Officer there for Arnold.

Q: Was he wearing a moustache?

H: Yes, he had a moustache, very attractive, nice guy. well, he was escorting Jean Harlow to this ball, and three of us young LTs who had met Jean over at the ball decided that we would have a little fun with Monk. So we enticed her away from the ball, and went up to one of the bachelor quarters, and had a couple of drinks. In the meantime Monk was frantically trying to find Jean Harlow, and when he found out that she was out with three 2nd LTs, he raised hell. We weren't very popular with him, but Monk later became a good personal friend. he's a distant relative of my father.

Q: I saw him down in Savannah.

H: I've seen him there several times, too.

Q: Do you remember any of the other dignitaries coming out to the field like the Governor, James Rolph?

H: I don't recall Governor Rolph at all.

Q: How about Foulois coming out there?

H: I remembe that quite well because I was his aide while he was there.

Q: How did Foulois and Arnold get along?

H: As far as we dould determine, fine.

Q: Was it proper, or was it feal friendly?

H: I thought quite friendly, I thought friendly. as far as I know, may not be true, Foulois was extremely popular man. Everybody in the Air Corps liked him. he was a very

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warm person and he treated enlisted men and junior officers very well.

Q: Having been an enlisted man himself?

H: Certainly, he had been through the mill, he knew.

Q: He stubbed his toe with the Administration on that Air Mail. I think that kind of finished him.

H: Actually, he served his term, as I recall.

Q: He finished his term.

H: I later reported to duty after three years in the Philippines in 1940, flying VIPS there, predecessor of the SAM flight, we had some special staff squadrons, flew VIPs, and I remember when I was ordered in there, I called on Foulois, and we were then directed to call on the Chief and again, Bolling was a relatively small station.

Q: But he never got another job during WWII, he was obviously, he was retired, but others were retired. Fechet got a job, he never got a job. I wonder if the fact that he had soured himself with Roosevelt?

H: Could be, but I don't know.

Q: You weren't high enough?

H: No, I was still a LT.

Q: Let me take you to the next phase. You came to Washington and worked at Bolling Field. You must have seen Gen Arnold at Bolling Field?

H: I did, and I flew with him on several occasions, too. At that time, I suppose Gen Arnold must have something to do with my promotion. he sort of scared me around, and I was I took on the job of flying the Under Secy, Bob Patterson, wondefful man, too, great man. So I flew him, and even later on, when the reorganization of the War Dept, I think it was March 1, 1942, right after the war started, Gen Arnold had made an agreement with Gen Marshall that half of the War Dept General Staff would be AF officers, and I was one of those 50 AF officers, placed on the General Staff, much against my desires, because I wanted to get a bomb unit.

Q: Kuter was in the planning side of it?

H: Yes, he was a LTCOL then, and incidentally, Kuter is one of the few officers along with Pershing, there may have been one or two others, who never served in the grade of Colonel. They were promoted from LTCOL to BG.

Q: Do you remember an incident that occurred 3 days before Pearl Harbor? The

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Chicago Tribune published a part of the RAINBOW FIVE war plan.

H: No, I don't.

Q: You were stationed at Bolling Field.

H: I was stationed at Bolling.

Q: Spaatz, was he the Chief there for a while, or Emmons was there for a while?

H: Delos Emmons at that time, when I reported, as soon as the war started, Dec 7th, I received orders, I think it was the following day, Dec 8th, along with several others, to report for duty in the Operations Section of the then GHQ AF.

Q: They called it the AF Combat Command?

H: Later I believe, the name was originally GHQ and then it was changed to AF Combat Command.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold in that period?

H: Yes, I recall, we used to see him when he came out to fly, then on occasion I would go and fly as copilot with his regular pilot, Gene Beebe. Gene and I served together years ago at March Field, but I remember seeing him frequently, and of course it was right after that, I think, a week or so, that Gen Emmons was ordered to Alaska, I think on temporary duty and he didn't come back, then went on to Hawaii, but he was on a trip to Alaska, as I recall, and then went on to Hawaii.

Q: Somebody who doesn't like Arnold said that Arnold got rid of all his opposition in Washington, including Emmons and Andrews, got them out of Washington, do you have any thought about that?

H: I think it was, if not common knowledge, but generally known that Emmons and Arnold were not close friends, and when he left Washington, immediately after the war started, we were a little bit surprised. I don't recall anything along that line with Andrews. Gen Andrews was sent over as European Commander.

Q: In 1943, and he had a very big job.

H: He actually, the commander that replaced him was Gen Eisenhower.

Q: Actually, Devers at first, Devers couldn't cut it, and then they took him out and then Eisenhower got it several months later.

H: When Gen Andrews was killed up in Iceland

Q: Arnold and Andrews had a very good relationship, but a guy named Hugh Knerr sort of got between them, did you know that there was some difficulty between Arnold and Andrews right about the start of the war?

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H: I didn't realize it, no.

Q: Andrews was pushing for a separate air force. Knerr was actually pushing for a separate AF, and he was close to Andrews, and he was getting Andrews into the picture, and Knerr was writing, he wrote this William Bradford Huie book and did several other things, and when Andrews_____. (OB record - no response)

Q: About Patterson and Arnold, what was their relationship?

H: As far as I knew, it was quite good, I know that Judge Patterson admired Gen Arnold. I was very close to Judge Patterson at this time, even after I was ordered into the G-3 War Dept General Staff, my boss, the G-3 then, Gen Idwal Edwards, told me to continue on whenever Judge Patterson needs me, even though I was on the General Staff, we visited, we went down and visited Gen Andrews.

Q: This is down in the Caribbean. There was some problems though between Judge Patterson and Arnold, several things that came up during the war.

Q: I got the impression that their relationship was just proper, not very good.

H: Judge Patterson, I knew him very well, he was a wonderful person, but the Judge was quite a reserved person

Q: And Arnold was sort of outgoing?

H: Well, Arnold was, of course, not only outgoing, but very outspoken. I can see how there could be a small clash, but I was not aware of any....

Q: My feeling is that their chemistry was not quite as good as it was between Arnold and Lovett, for example, do you have any information on that relationship?

H: I knew Mr. Lovett. I'd flown him too. Tremendous gentleman. Of course, Lovett was very close to the Air Corps, and being Asst Secy for Air too, he did a great deal for the AF.

Q: Would you say that Lovett acted as a balance wheel to keep Arnold from making impulsive decisions?

H: I can't answer that.

Q: Was Arnold impulsive?

H: Yes, he was. He was so very direct, and said exactly what he thought. He also had no fear of criticism, ~~I mean,~~ one of the things I admired about him and other people didn't like about him, but he always knew exactly where he stood, ~~and~~ I think Arnold, not singlehandedly, but I think more than any other person, had to do with the, he was the ~~of~~ moving influence in the development of new aircraft, one perfect example

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the B-17. There was a lot of opposition in the W r Dept General Staff against the B-17 because they felt that the Air Corps had no requirement for a long range type flying airplane. They thought the observation role was adequate, for observation of Army forces, close type of support. General McNarney did a great deal too because he had quite a strong influence with General Marshall and to Secy Stimson

Q: What kind of relationship between McNarney and Arnold?

H: As far as I know okay, I have to say okay, they had a complete rapport.

Q: I was told that McNarney leaned toward the War Dept influence, his attitude toward the Air Corps, in other words, he was more War Dept than he was Air Corps?

H: I will say one thing about it, I knew Gen McNarney slightly, he was quite a reserved individual, but extremely loyal man, I think he realized that his boss was Gen Marshall, and Gen Marshall had complete confidence in him.

Q: How about Marshall and Arnold, did you have any knowledge?

H: No personal knowledge, as far as I could determine, Marshall backed Arnold to the hilt.

Q: And Arnold back Marshall?

H: He did too, on all the major issues. Such as the, General Arnold was very critical that the War Dept General Staff was not responsive to the AF's needs, so he actually talked Marshall into making a 50% division, 50% of the General Staff was AF and 50% was Army.

~~Q: I want to go back to Pearl Harbor, about the long range escorts.....~~

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Interview - General Hunter Harris, Washington, D.C., 22 April 1971

Q: I usually ask as a starter: do you remember your first encounter with General or Colonel or Major Arnold, whenever it was you first met him?

H: I don't remember the first time because I was about three years old. He was stationed at Ft. Thomas, Kentucky with my father.

Q: 1913.

H: Yes, and my first actually, you might say, encounter, after that was when I reported to duty at March Air Force base, March Field, Riverside, Calif.

Q: At Ft. Thomas what was your father?

H: My father was a LT in the Infantry. At that time, Gen Arnold was a LT, he was on duty with the Infantry there.

Q: A freshly minted groom?

H: Right, I think they had just been married a short time.

Q: Yes, they had. This was in the fall of 1913.

H: Yes, he stayed there a few months.

Q: Did the issue of why he left the Air Service come up at that time? I think there was a matter of her being worried about his flying, so he left flying for two years.

H: I'm not familiar, actually, with that aspect of it. I do know that later on - it was common knowledge among all of his friends - that when he did get into the service, he was greatly at odds with some of the people of the War Dept General Staff, and was shipped out to out-of-the-way stations on occasion.

Q: Right, this was his second tour in the Philippines. He left Ft. Thomas to go to the Philippines around Christmas of 1913. Then he came back early in

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1916 and was up in Sackett Harbor, Alexandria, NY, with the 3rd Infantry. Then he got the call to the Aviation School, I think, from Billy Mitchell. Mrs. Arnold recalls it that way. Do you recall, perhaps your father mentioned anything involving Arnold at Ft. Thomas?

H: No, actually, I don't. My father died quite a few years ago, in 1947. I don't recall.

Q: Nothing special. Then your first real encounter was at March Field?

H: At March when I reported for duty, right after I had finished flying school, the first of November 1933. Gen Arnold was then a LTCOL, and was Base Commander. That was before the formalized organization, later on, of course, the wing structure was formed.

Q: We are talking about late 1933 when you first got to March Field. Do you have any recollections of Arnold at that time?

H: Oh yes, one of the first things I had to do was report in to him. In those days the stations were rather small. We only had 50 officers, I think, in the whole of March Field. All of us had to report to the Commander. And then I had a very pleasant social call with him which was also routine in those days. It was quite a pleasure to become associated with him. Of course, he was a stern boss. The fact that my father had been a good friend of his didn't mean a darn thing. His main job was to train LTS.

Q: Talking about Col Arnold at March Field....

H: Col Arnold was, I thought, one of the finest commanders, if not the best commander the AF ever had. He really believed, in those days, he worked very much on the training program, trying to improve the AF. One rather real humorous incident was before the air mail started. You may not have heard this. I was flying P-12s at that time. We started landing in those days with tail skid

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on prepared hard surface, and the tail skid didn't dig in and I ground-looped a P-12, and chewed up the wing a bit. Gen Arnold just got hold of the Squadron Commander, who was Capt Ira Eaker. Eaker was my first squadron commander. He really gave him the devil about this young fellow Harris, and a minor ground loop damaging the wing tip. Just a little time after that, Gen Arnold himself went into Burbank and landed a P-12 and he ground-looped himself. He stood this P-12 right up on it's nose. He got out of the airplane, got his Form #1 out, and wrote down across the Form: "100% pilot error." Of course, no one ever mentioned that incident again.

Q: He was very frank with himself?

H: Extremely.

Q: Very demanding?

H: Demanding man, but wonderful person.

Q: Was this that Snow White P-12.

H: No, this was not, this particular one as I recall was just a standard, one of the early series of the P-12.

Q: I was told that he flew this snow white P-12 around quite a bit during the air mail days.

H: Right, yes, later on, a couple of months later, that was in March 1934, and then I was stationed at Burbank Airport.

Q: Then you were under Eaker's command?

H: Eaker's run, yes, in his squadron. Gen Eaker had the route from Salt Lake to San Diego, which included these intermediate stops. Then I was ordered shortly after that, to report in as a reserve pilot in Salt Lake, so I used to see Gen Arnold there frequently.

Q: You were a LT in the reserves?

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H: Oh no, I was a 2d LT, graduate from West Point, and commissioned in the Infantry, but immediately went to the flying school.

Q: Do you have any recollections of the air mail?

H: Oh yes, I remember it vividly because it was a pretty ticklish operation. We were really, we didn't have the instruments. We didn't have the weather equipment to fly all-weather operations. Particulary the young fellows, like me, who were quite inexperienced. So they kept a real close eye on us, and tried to keep us out of trouble.

Q: There was a LT Dennison who had some experience in flying the bomber?

H: Yes, he was a classmate of mine. Denny and I were in Flying School together, he was a Flying Cadet when I was a student officer.

Q: He was supposed to have had the most experience in flying a heavier plane. Didn't they have a lot of mail come into your post office?

H: We all flew. We were checked out on all the airplanes, so we flew fighters and observation airplanes, bombers, the whole works.

Q: Did you fly a P-12 in the air mail?

H: Occasionally a P-12. But we actually flew all types of airplanes we had. I checked out on about everything the Air Corps had at that time.

Q: Did you ever hear any comment about Foulois'decision to take on that job?

H: We had absolutely no critical comment at all. We realized it was a responsibility that we had to assume, and I never heard a gripe about it, among us youngsters. We were tickled to death because it was quite good experience.

Q: Well, of course, one of the reasons Foulois took the job was to get some money for flight pay and give his people experience.

H: Also, we profited immensely from it. Immediately we got into a very intensive weather flying program and we also were able to get a lot of flying

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instruments that we had not been able to get before, such as the gyro-stabilized instruments, both horizon and directional.

Q: Did the airlines cooperate in helping the Air Corps fly the mail?

H: They did, as a matter of fact, two of our instructor pilots voluntarily left the airlines to come on duty. I recall one, a Major Berry - I've forgotten his first name - who voluntarily left the airlines and took a reduction in pay in order to come on duty with us. And they were invaluable to us.

Q: The Western Zone under Arnold had a couple of casualties right before the mail started. One fellow was up in Idaho and another one, I can't recall where.

H: A classmate of mine was killed in that early stage, Frank Howard, classmate of mine from West Point Flying School.

Q: Arnold in his letters home to Mrs. Arnold was quite critical of Foulois' decision.

H: He was? He sure did not impart that to us. It didn't get to us, and I knew him by that time, fairly well.

Q: Do you remember a fellow named Eugene Lohman?

H: Surely. Eugene Lohman later became base commander under Arnold, and he assumed command of the wing there.

Q: Arnold had some trouble with him, did he not?

H: I don't recall any, and I think you have to bear in mind I was a 2nd LT and normally it wouldn't have come to my attention.

Q: Yes, he was a stuffed shirt, to some degree. At least, Arnold felt that he was. Do you have any other recollections of the air mail? Any incidents occur to you, near misses, or hair raising?

H: I think almost every flight was not exactly an incident...I know we had

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a very fine Operations Officer at Salt Lake, Barney Oldfield. He was an old friend of Gen Arnold's too. And I reported in for duty with him, and we went out, and overlooked the flying field in his office, where you could see everything going on. And he said: "Harris, have you flown those airplanes out there?" And I said: "No sir, quite a few of them I haven't." And he said: "Well, go get checked out,"and that's when I started in, so I could sort of handle, as a reserve pilot, I could handle any situation.

Q: Did you see Arnold operating in Salt Lake City? He was at the Newhouse Hotel.

H: Yes, that's where all of us stayed, at the Newhouse.

Q: Everybody was hard up for dough?

H: Right, as I recall, the per diem in those days was either $5 or $7.50, I've forgotten which.

Q: I think it was $5 a day. The money was late in coming in.

H: It was a little expensive, particularly for a 2nd LT.

Q: What did you pay for a room there?

H: I've forgotten, but they were awfully good to us, because they had a pretty good idea of how much money we made.

Q: This Chief, Danemiller, he was Chief of Police. They allowed the men to use the Police Gym, I think the Police and the Major were all very cooperative with the air mail. Did you occupy, or did the Air Corps, occupy several floors in the Hotel?

H: Yes, we had, I'd say, I don't recall that we had an exclusive occupancy, but they took real good care of us there at the Newhouse.

Q: Was it the first few floors of the Newhouse Hotel?

H: I don't even recall. I was in and out of there, being on this reserve

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pilot status, I was just delivering airplanes.

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold coming up to visit him. She and Lois, and drove up from March Field to visit him at Easter, 1934.

H: I don't remember seeing them there, of course, I used to see them frequently at March. I used to have dates with Lois. She was a very close friend.

Q: I'm thinking of a guy named Buckman. Do you remember LT Buckman?

H: Yes, I do.

Q: He had an experience where he was forced down in Pueblo, Colorado, and put the sack of mail on his shoulder. He landed on the golf course, and delivered the mail 5 miles to the Post Office. One of these experiences, neither rain nor snow, that kind of experience. Did anything like that ever happen to you?

H: No, not exactly, in the course of bad weather, I made several forced landings, but fortunately, they were all at intermediate or emergency fields. The worst part of the run in those days was, as far as weather was concerned, was the area called the chute, which was Cedar City, St. George, that area, and I remember once going into Cedar City under less than ideal conditions. I actually had to follow railroad tracks, by looking back of the wing, to get located, and go up to the field.

Q: Arnold had been taken away from a planned vacation to Jackson Hole to take the job and then when he came back to March Field, he and Mrs. Arnold packed up their car and they took off for a planned vacation to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. When he got to Salt Lake City telegrams caught up with him that said he was dragooned to take on the Alaskan flight. Do you remember anything on that?

H: Yes, I do. I was in the flight group at that time, and of course, the Alaskan flight was made with B-10s. I remember the flight quite well.

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Q: Did you have any role in the Alaskan flight?

H: No, I didn't, that was the 19th Bomb Group, I believe.

Q: Was that the McNarney group?

H: Yes, that was the McNarney group and I remember a real close old friend of mine and also Gen Arnold, his adjutant, Ray Dunn.

Q: He was very close to Arnold?

H: Yes, he was for a number of years.

Q: I'm told that he just followed Arnold wherever he went, and then, they had a falling out.

H: I didn't know about the falling out.

Q: I want to ask you about the wing-ding. Did Arnold originate this?

H: As far as the AF is concerned, I believe that Gen Arnold did, because, as I recall - now that you mention it - it was right after the Alaskan flight. The Royal Canadian AF had their traditional dining-in parties, when he was up there.

Q: Was this at Regina, Saskatchewan?

H: I'm not sure which of the places, but while he was there, they had one. I know when he came back, at the Officer's Club meeting, as I recall, it was Mike Dunn who told us about the wing-ding, and then started these.

Q: Do you think he might have gotten the idea from the Canadians?

H: Oh yes. I think for sure, he got the idea. That has since become a very popular tradition in the old Army Air Forces and now in the Air Force.

Q: Well, the idea of the officers getting together as an espirit de corps type of thing is very impressive.

H: And they had to dress up, black tie. I think it was a good occasion.

Q: He had some bad experiences in Canada. There was one fellow that got

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up and insulted the US, and Arnold got up and responded in kind. This was in one of the banquets they had, the Royal Fuseliers. Did you know about this?

H: No, I don't recall it.

Q: You see, some of his letters home, he would write home. He was a great letter writer, did you know this?

H: Yes, I did.

Q: To Mrs. Arnold, and she saved them all. Do you recall the Arnolds in a social situation at March Field?

H: Oh yes, we saw them frequently, and they were awfully good to youngsters, too. They were very hospitable. In spite of the fact that we were young 2nd LTS, it didn't make any difference. They treated us socially very well.

Q: Benny Schriever was in that group, wasn't he?

H: Yes, Benny was just ahead of me, a couple or two classes ahead, I think. But I knew Benny well because in those days, we were in high school together in San Antonio. I was a year ahead of him. He went on and finished a year ahead of me at West Point.

Q: Do you remember one occasion when Arnold was at Salt Lake City during the air mail situation, when somebody there refused to allow the Reserve Officers into the Officer's Club, and Mrs. Arnold called him, or wrote him, and he ordered everybody to be given equal treatment at the club? Do you remember anything?

H: I don't recall that one. But just as a general comment, I know that both Gen Arnold and Gen Eaker were extremely fair. As far as Reserve and Regulars were concerned, no difference at all. Certainly, among my closest friends were reserve officers, like Benny Schriever, and others, who were later commissioned. But we were treated exactly the same.

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Q: Arnold was the kind of guy, at least in my very intensive research, if you did the job, he didn't care who you were, or what your forebears were. You got attention from him. Is this a fair analysis?

H: That's certainly correct; it certainly is. Also, if you didn't do the job you got attention. He called shots exactly as he saw them.

Q: How about the CCC, did you have any involvement in that?

H: No. I did not become involved, because all of us who had just graduated from flying school were required to continue our flight training. Even when others were grounded and limited to 4 hours a month, which was the minimum required for flight pay, we continued on with our training. It was considered essential that the youngsters just out of flying school, so we were not assigned to CCC.

Q: There was a financial hardship during this period, when everybody was put on a furlough, you had to work 12 months a year, but got paid for 11. Is that correct?

H: That's correct, I was in flying school most of that time. As a matter of fact, we were on graduation leave. About the middle of July we were informed by the Comptroller General that we had been on leave without pay since the 1st, and told to report in to the nearest station. So we did. Eventually we reported in early to the flying school.

Q: Was this '33?

H: 1932.

Q: Wasn't there something involving people like Schriever, where they were kept in Aviation Cadet status, so they would be paid less than they would be as 2nd LTs?

H: Yes, it was actually, not Benny's group because they were given active

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duty as 2nd LTs. But in the group that followed mine - I think a year later - they were reported in as Flying Cadets, and their pay was $75 a month.

Q: What did a LT get?

H: Lts then had a basic pay of $125 and $62.50 flight pay, which was $187.50.

Q: So it was a question of over $100?

H: 2nd LTs were getting $187.59 and cadets were getting $75.

Q: Did they get flying pay, too?

H: No, they just got $75.

Q: So, it's like $110.

H: The only thing the Aviation Cadets did get was a larger ration, special dollar ration. Where we were getting $18 a month, they got $30.

Q: I spent some time out at March Field. I was moseying around the Quarters 176. This was Arnold's quarters.

H: I was there just two weeks ago. P.K. Carlton, LTGEN Carlton was the Commander of the 15th AF and is in those quarters.

Q: I was visiting the historian, Dr. Hurley, and got some information from him about March Field. The Arnolds built up the field, put trees in, poplars. All those big poplars were put in by Mrs. Arnold, or ordered by her.

H: I recall their quarters. She did a lot of work personally in the yard. She really made a beautiful place of it.

Q: She has not changed. She just loves growing things.

H: I visited her last year in Sonoma. She has a beautiful place.

Q: Yes, she does. I hear from her, she and I correspond.

Q: Were you there when Arnold was promoted to his one star?

H: No, I was not. I was in the Philippines.

Q: This was in early 1935, when GHQ AF was established?

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H: I was there then. I was there until '37. But I recall when he was promoted to a Colonel. I was under the impression that he was promoted to a BG later than that.

Q: Did he go to full Colonel, I thought he got a jump?

H: No, he went to full Colonel at March, and then I thought he was promoted later on, possibly in 1937.

Q: He was promoted in February 1935.

H: Well, I was there then.

Q: Didn't they have a big party for him?

H: I'm sure. I don't recally recall.

Q: When they established the GHQ AF. I think we've covered March Field. Do you have any other recollections of March Field?

H: No, not particularly. It was a wonderful station. Almost four years that I had there, I think the good fortune to be working under Col Arnold and Eaker who were two of my really close friends.

Q: You know, March Field was his turning point in a sense that he was on his way back from exile. He did very well under Gen Malin Craig. He and Craig became fairly close and when Craig came to Washington, I believe he brought Arnold with him.

H: Craig was our Corps Area Commander.

Q: Do you remember anything, any relations between them?

H: Oh yes, Arnold was very close. As a matter of fact, when General Craig came down, I was called on one occasion on a routine inspection - he was an extremely pleasant fellow - and he also thought very highly of the Air Corps. I was appointed his aide. Gen Arnold made me his aide. He also made me aide to Foulois when he came out for the Olympics, and I have some wonderful pictures.

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Q: Is that those short pants?

H: Yes, the knickers and leather jacket. I'll send you one, it shows Spaatz and Arnold and Foulois, and I was the young 2nd LT at the airplane.

Q: Do you remember Hollywood coming out to the base?

H: Oh yes, I remember several occasions.

Q: Bebe Daniels and Lyons.

H: I think the one that made the biggest splash was Jean Harlow.

Q: Do you remember anything about that visit?

H: I sure do, I think they got in an awful lot of trouble on that one occasion - not serious trouble, but Jean was being escorted by a very dashing bachelor.

Q: Howard Hughes?

H: No, by Monk Hunter. He spent a lot of time with Gen Arnold. Monk was Operations Officer there for Arnold.

Q: Was he wearing a moustache?

H: Yes, he had a moustache, very attractive, nice guy. Well, he was escorting Jean Harlow to this ball, and three of us young LTs who had met Jean over at the ball decided that we would have a little fun with Monk. So we enticed her away from the ball, and went up to one of the bachelor quarters, and had a couple of drinks. In the meantime Monk was frantically trying to find Jean Harlow, and when he found out that she was out with three 2nd LTs, he raised hell. We weren't very popular with him, but Monk later became a good personal friend. He's a distant relative of my father.

Q: I saw him down in Savannah.

H: I've seen him there several times, too.

Q: Do you remember any of the other dignitaries coming out to the field like Governor James Rolph?

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H: I don't recall Governor Rolph at all.

Q: How about Foulois coming out there?

H: I remember that quite well because I was his aide while he was there.

Q: How did Foulois and Arnold get along?

H: As far as we could determine, fine.

Q: Was it proper, or was it real friendly?

H: I thought quite friendly. I thought friendly. As far as I know it - may not be true. Foulois was an extremely popular man. Everybody in the Air Corps liked him. He was a very warm person and he treated enlisted men and junior officers very well.

Q: Having been an enlisted man himself?

H: Certainly, he had been through the mill. He knew.

Q: He stubbed his toe with the Administration on that Air Mail. I think that kind of finished him?

H: Actually, he served his term, as I recall.

Q: He finished his term.

H: I later reported to duty after three years in the Philippines in 1940, flying VIPs there. This was the predecessor of the SAM flight. We had some special staff squadrons, flew VIPs, and I remember when I was ordered in there, I called on Foulois. We were then directed to call on the Chief and again, Bolling was a relatively small station.

Q: But he never got another job. During WWII, he was obviously available.

H: He was retired.

Q: He was retired, but others were retired, Fechet got a job. Foulois never got a job. I wonder if the fact that he had soured himself with Roosevelt?

H: Could be, but I don't know.

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Q: You weren't high enough?

H: No, I was still a LT.

Q: Let me take you to the next phase. You came to Washington and worked at Bolling Field. You must have seen Gen Arnold at Bolling Field?

H: I did, and I flew with him on several occasions, too. At that time, I suppose Gen Arnold must have something to do with my promotion. He sort of steered me around, and I took on the job of flying the Under Secy, Bob Patterson. He was a wonderful man, too, a great man. So I flew him, and even later on, when the reorganization of the War Dept, I think it was March 1, 1942, right after the war started, Gen Arnold had made an agreement with Gen Marshall that half of the War Dept General Staff would be AF officers. I was one of those 50 AF officers placed on the War Dept General Staff, much against my desires, because I wanted to get a bomb unit.

Q: Kuter was in the planning side of it?

H: Yes, he was a LTCOL then. Incidentally, Kuter is one of the few officers along with Pershing - there may have been one or two others - who never served in the grade of Colonel. They were promoted from LTCOL to BG.

Q: Do you remember an incident that occurred 3 days before Pearl Harbor? The Chicago Tribune published a part of the RAINBOW FIVE war plan?

H: No, I don't.

Q: You were stationed at Bolling Field?

H: I was stationed at Bolling.

Q: Spaatz, was he the Chief there for a while? Gen Emmons was there for a while?

H: Delos Emmons at that time, when I reported. As soon as the war started, Dec 7th, I received orders, I think it was the following day, on Dec 8th, along

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with several others, to report for duty in the Operations Section of the then GHQ AF.

Q: They called it the AF Combat Command?

H: Later, I believe, the name was originally GHQ and then it was changed to AF Combat Command.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold in that period?

H: Yes, I recall, we used to see him when he came out to fly. Then on occasion, I would go and fly as copilot with his regular pilot, Gene Beebe. Gene and I had served together years ago at March Field. But I remember seeing him frequently, and of course, it was right after that, I think, a week or so, that Gen Emmons was ordered to Alaska - I think on temporary duty and he didn't come back - then went on to Hawaii. But he was on a trip to Alaska, as I recall, and then went on to Hawaii.

Q: Somebody who doesn't like Arnold said that Arnold got rid of all his opposition in Washington, including Emmons and Andrews. He got them out of Washington. Do you have any thought on that?

H: I think it was, if not common knowledge, but generally known that Emmons and Arnold were not close friends. When he left Washington, immediately after the war started, we were a little bit surprised. I don't recall anything along that line with Andrews. Gen Andrews was sent over as European Commander.

Q: In 1943, and he had a very big job.

H: He actually, the commander that replaced him was Gen Eisenhower.

Q: Actually, Devers at first, Devers couldn't cut it. Then they took him out and then Eisenhower got it several months later.

H: Devers when Gen Andrews was killed up in Iceland.

Q: Arnold and Andrews had a very good relationship, but a guy named Hugh

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Knerr sort of got between them. Did you know that there was some difficulty between Arnold and Andrews right about the start of the war?

H: I didn't realize it, no.

Q: Andrews was pushing for a separate air force. Knerr was actually pushing for a separate AF, and he was close to Andrews, and he was getting Andrews into the picture. Knerr was writing - he wrote this William Bradford Huie book and did several other things, and when Andrews (off record - no response).

Q: About Patterson and Arnold, what was their relationship?

H: As far as I knew, it was quite good, I know that Judge Patterson admired Gen Arnold. I was very close to Judge Patterson at this time, even after I was ordered into the G-3 War Dept General Staff. My boss, the G-3 then, Gen Idwal Edwards, told me to continue on whenever Judge Patterson needs me. Even though I was on the General Staff, we visited, we went down and visited Gen Andrews.

Q: This is down in the Caribbean. There was some problem though between Judge Patterson and Arnold. Several things that came up during the war. I got the impression that their relationship was just proper, not very good.

H: Judge Patterson, I knew him very well. He was a wonderful person, but the Judge was quite a reserved person.

Q: And Arnold was sort of outgoing?

H: Well, Arnold was, of course, not only outgoing, but very outspoken. I can see how there could be a small clash, but I was not aware of any....

Q: My feeling is that their chemistry was not quite as good as it was between Arnold and Lovett, for example. Do you have any information on that relationship?

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H: I knew Mr. Lovett. I'd flown him too. Tremendous gentleman. Of course, Lovett was very close to the Air Corps, and being Asst Secy for Air too, he did a great deal for the AF.

Q: Would you say that Lovett acted as a balance wheel to keep Arnold from making impulsive decisions?

H: I can't answer that.

Q: Was Arnold impulsive?

H: Yes, he was. He was so very direct, and said exactly what he thought. He also had no fear of criticism. One of the things I admired about him and other people didn't like about him, but he always knew exactly where he stood. I think Arnold, not singlehandedly, but I think more than any other person, had to do with the, he was the moving influence in the development of new aircraft. One perfect example was the B-17. There was a lot of opposition in the War Dept General Staff against the B-17 because they felt that the Air Corps had no requirement for a long range type flying airplane. They thought the observation role was adequate, for observation of Army forces, close type of support. General McNarney did a great deal too because he had quite a strong influence with Gen Marshall and to Secy Stimson.

Q: What kind of relationship between McNarney and Arnold?

H: As far as I know okay. I have to say okay. They had a complete rapport.

Q: I was told that McNarney leaned toward the War Dept influence in his attitude toward the Air Corps. In other words, he was more War Dept than he was Air Corps.

H: I will say one thing about it, I knew Gen McNarney slightly. He was quite a reserved individual, but extremely loyal man, I think he realized that

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his boss was Gen Marshall, and Gen Marshall had complete confidence in him.

Q: How about Marshall and Arnold, did you have any knowledge?

H: No personal knowledge. As far as I could determine, Marshall backed Arnold to the hilt.

Q: And Arnold backed Marshall?

H: He did too, on all the major issues. Such as the, Gen Arnold was very critical that the War Dept General Staff was not responsive to the AF's needs, so he actually talked Marshall into making a 50% division, 50% of the General Staff was AF and 50% was Army.

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Interview - GEN Hunter Harris, Washington, D.C., 28 April 1971 [redacted]

Q: Let's talk about WWII, your experiences with Gen Arnold in WWII. You were in the European theater. Did you see Arnold when he came to visit on several occasions. He was there in '42 and '43.

H: I was not in Europe at that time, I didn't go until the summer of '43, and actually the spring of '43, my experience before then, I know that it was one of the major projects that Gen Arnold undertook was a reorganization of the Dept of the Army, which was the War Dept at that time, and I was stationed as Judge Patterson's pilot and stationed at Bolling Field. The reorganization plan which Larry Kuter undertook as a major effort, and under Spaatz and McNarney's and Marshall's direction, actually formed March 7, 1942. At that time, 50% of the General Staff officers were selected from the Army Air Force, and I was on that first selection group

Q: Right, Gil Harrison and Kuter, and I guess Otto Nelson?

H: Otto Nelson had a lot to do with it.

Q: And McNarney, was the chief AF man. I want to ask you about that particular things. That was sort of a halfway house type of reorganization. There were some in the AF who wanted to go all the way, and like, Hugh Knerr, wanted it, were you aware of his idea?

H: I was not really aware of Gen Knerr's direction, because I was in the AF Combat Command at that time, and initially under Gen Emmons, when as soon as the war started, I was transferred from Bolling operations to the Combat Command.

Q: This plan that came into effect in March, was an attempt to short circuit another effort by Knerr. Knerr was pushing Andrews to go all out for a separate AF. and Andrews was sort of acquiescent. He was sort of non-committal, but there were a number of people. There was an attorney down in Florida, named Paul Scott, who was very active in this, did you know his role?

H: No, I didn't know him.

Q: Several others were involved in this. There is a letter that I have seen

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from Knerr to Andrews, in which he said "Arnold beat up to the punch," so to speak, and he blamed this McNarney plan on Arnold. ~~That~~ Arnold had this compromise plan put through in order to beat the all-out AF guys who were pushing at Congress, trying to get Congress to vote for a separate AF.

H: Well, ~~I had my~~, in the few contacts that I had with Gen Arnold, you might consider in this vein, ~~like~~, I always thought that Gen Arnold was 100% for a separate AF, too, however, I'm sure at that time, having ~~had~~ been on the fringes on it, been selected for that first group, I think Gen Arnold felt, as did Gen McNarney too, that that wasn't the time to push it, and we had a real big war on our hands,

Q: Do you think he had a commitment to Marshall to hold the line until the end of the war?

H: That I don't know

Q: Did he ever talk to you about that?

H: No, he didn't.

Q: Of course, Marshall gave the AAF ~~all~~ autonomy without legal separation?

H: I talked to one of the gentlemen who were very close to General Arnold on this. This was General Millard F. Harmon, Gen Miff Harmon at that time was still on the staff, I believe, of the Combat Command, and he personally was organizing this selection

Q: I think at that time, he was the No. 2 man on the Air Staff.

H: Right

Q: When Spaatz moved out to the 8th AF, in the spring of '42, ~~he came in as~~

H: But he told me, I know, how essential it was that Air officers be introduced into the staff, because I tried to get out of it, I wanted to get on out with the Bomber Command and go to the 8th AF, and as a matter of fact, had an offer of a job to go with Leon Johnson on the first cadre, he said, if you can get yourself sprung, well, I couldn't, and Gen Harmon, whom I had known for years and years, he said, "I'm sorry Hunter, but, he said Gen Arnold personally selected this staff, and he said, "It's extremely important, and you won't have to spend too much time there, but it was

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extremely important that the General Staff be adequately covered by Air officers.

Q: How did the War Dept General Staff react to the infiltration of Air people?

H: I think there were mixed emotions. I think the objective people who were appreciative of the Air effort, except, well, there were lots of old timers who thought we were really a bunch of whippersnappers coming in. I was a lot junior. Jim McCormick who I was just talking to and I, we were two of the junior officers on that general staff. There was some resistance, and also, they were a little jealous of our coming in, and ~~we were not~~, I certainly was not an experienced staff officer, so I had a lot to learn, getting in with some of these old pros.

Q: Was Kuter in there?

H: Yes, Kuter was there at that time, and then he left the General Staff and went on special planning board for a short time with General Arnold.

Q: What were some of the issues that came up in volving the AF?

H: Well, the ones I was most familiar were in G-3, which was responsible for Training & Organization, and the particular one that I had to carry the ball on as an action officer, I really remember, and that was organic aviation. There was very strong feeling on the part of the AF that the Army should not have organic aviation, that it should be provided by the AF and I must admit I had a devil of a time trying to write this paper, because I wrote an original position, and it was reversed, and reversed, and reversed, until it finally got to Gen Marshall, and Gen Marshall actually made the decision to authorize some units of organic aviation. These were mainly in the area of battlefield command reconnaissance and small airplanes liaison type, but it did not include, as I recall, possibly did include some artillery spotting, but the units were relatively small, and I personally didn't see anything wrong with the organic decision as it came out. However, there was a very strong resentment on the part of a lot of AF people.

Q: Why?

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H: They felt that the AAF should run all the air, and should furnish the equipment and units for the Army.

Q: Looking at it from the other side, ~~#####~~

H: We were all still quite interested in the ~~####~~ eventual solution that you mentioned, which was a separate AF

Q: There were some in the Army who felt the AF wasn't ~~getting~~ giving enough tactical air support?

H: Yes, they felt that we were ~~#####~~ inclined to put top priority and this is not my viewpoint, but it's the viewpoint that was given by somebody in the opposition

Q: Who were some of the top people who felt that the ~~AF, or the~~ AAF, ought to get more ~~impetus~~ tactical support?

Q: We are talking about some war dept types, who, at the top level, were unhappy about the tactical air situation.

H: I think ~~most of~~, mostly Air Staff, were against this organic aviation, because it looked like that eventually it would create some sort of cleavage within the AF and when the final AF did come along, that some of the work for which they were specifically trained and suited best to do would be passed on to the Army. I can't pin down any people other than ....

Q: I'm thinking of Army people,

H: Army people ...

Q: Who felt we were not giving them adequte support. They wanted their own tactical air, and they claimed we were obsessed with strategic and were not giving them the kind of support they needed. I'm thinking of Leslie McNair. Are you familiar with his position?

H: Yes, now, I know that, I ~~knew~~ saw the GHQ AF staff on occasion, one visit to Cape Cod, when they were inspectiing a National Guard Division, and in that staff, I heard, I got to talk with Gen McNair and also Mark Clark, who was the Artillery officer at that time, I think he was LTCOL Artillery Officer on the Staff. And the general feeling, this is the old GHQ before the war,

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Q: 1939?

H: That would have been '40 or '41. ~~They were~~, the Army, in general, and I think it is fair to say that Mark Clark, Gen McNair, I think all felt that they should have their own tactical air

Q: How did Arnold feel about this?

H: Well, in my own personnal opinion, Arnold was a strong complete AF separate AF man, that I've ever talked to. And this goes way back, I mean back to 1933. But at this time, you see, I really didn't, as a pilot and a very junior officer,

Q: You really weren't privy to ....

H: Really wasn't privy to this. There were a few things that went on in the General Staff during that 8 months that I was on the staff, before I managed to get loose and go over and join the 8th. I don't recall any specific people on the War Dept General Staff, I know that the G-3, Gen Edwal Edwards, ~~and~~ ...

Q: How about on the Army side, Stanley Gerow?

H: I had no contact with him.

Q: Was Stanley Embick out of there?

H: I think he was, I don't remember him on the staff at all because at that time the OPD was ...

Q: Tom Handy, was it?

H: Tom Handy may have been,

Q: Or Hull?

H: Hull was, yes, ~~and~~ Hull I got to know later on, considerably after that, in Japan, A very fine man.

Q: What was McNarney's ~~job~~ official job at that time?

H: He was, as I recall, he was Deputy to Marshall, and he actually acted as more than an Air deputy, he was really a straight deputy, and McNarney, really, I think pretty much ran the staff. He was a very superior staff man, and of course he was very loyal to his boss, and he had to be.

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Q: Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

H: I don't ever reaall seeing them together

Q: How about at a briefing, where somebody was briefing, and some issues that arose, did you ever notice any discussions between them?

H: No, and I don't recall any briefings that I attended of the high level types that you are mentioning between Arnold and Marshall. I worked in the General Staff in those days, it was handled in the old style where the action officer carried a piece of paper right through, and he came in, was given, presented the paper and position, and then it will be changed from one office to another, you see, as it went up the line. But I do know this is one of the most difficult staff papers I had to handle. It was reversed in almost every office, my own boss, a Colonel Madgett, an old timer, who later became, an Army general. I've forgotten what his job was.

Q: Did ASW come up, did you get involved in that?

H: ASW, I did not get involved in, I know that we in the ASW mission, we were unhappy about the solution because, as you know, the AF carried the ball initially on the ASW. They had the only equipments that had the extended range, the B-18 at that point

Q: How about control of anti-aircraft, did you get involved in that?

H: I did not get involved in it there, I got involved in it in the theater, when I was in the 8th AF, we had many, many arguments, when I was in operations, our there in the 3rd Air Division under Pat Patridge, and the Army was always trying to extend pretty far zones, and insisting that we stay out, as a matter of fact, there were certain entry points in the UK where we, if we intruded, our people would be shot at.

Q: Let's talk about the 8th AF, the B-17s. Arnold came out there Labor Day, I think we started talking about this the other day, and he stayed about a week or 10 days, and this was after the first Schweinfurt-Regeasburg raid, there was some unhappiness as a result of that, and the fact that the 8th AF, deep penetration type

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raids, tapered off shortly thereafter, were you in on any of that?

H: I was in on the, at the time, I had just taken the first replacements over for the 8th AF, a small group of replacements, and I was there, I flew a mission just before the Regensburg mission. I had permission to fly one mission, and then go back and train another group. I do know in my conversations, though, with Fred Anderson and others, while I was visiting the 8th AF Hqs. and, and of course, General Eaker, that there was a real good reason for dropping off some of the deep penetrations because we were fresh out of replacements, and they were quite low when I took those first 30 crews over, and they could only fly, they would alternate, more or less, on the deep missions, and then, the shallow penetrations and submarine pens and so forth, in France. Because the officers losses were about doubled. They were running around 8% inside, and about 4% over France, as I recall. It was just a question of not having having enough crews and airplanes, and it was a very costly mission.

Q: Right. On the so-called Black Thursday, Oct 14th, they lost 60 planes.

H: ~~Lost/43//~~/ That was '43?

Q: '43.

H: I reported November, reported back, the second time.

Q: About the time you reported, there were no more deep penetrations. There were no deep penetrations between Black Thursday and perhaps for 2 or 3 months.

H: I know that when we started again, when I started combat operations, which was around the 1st of December, most of our penetrations were shallow, and it was because of the losses

Q: Arnold was rather unhappy, were you aware of his unhappiness?

H: I think I was, yes.

Q: Did it get down to your level?

H: Yes

Q: I talked about The Big Switch. This is the decision to move Eaker to the Mediterranean, and Spaatz up there. They brought in Jimmy Doolittle, and made a lot of

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changes, Idwal Edwards went down. A lot of changes around the turn of the year.

H: Yes, it was a little after that.

Q: What is your comment about that change?

H: Well, here again, I didn't have any inside knowledge of the requirement for change. I know that we were a little surprised, in a way. Eaker had done a terrific job in getting that organization going, and he'd done a fine job, and we assumed that it was a time for a shift, that Gen Doolittle was extremely well known, and both those superior combat commanders. I didn't notice any great change in policy.

Q: No, there wasn't any great change in policy,

H: No change in policy, we went on the same way we started.

Q: That's correct.

H: Those penetrations, deep penetrations, from where I sat, which was England, were strictly on the basis of availability and trying to hold the force, and also trying to speed up the fighter escort.

Q: How did Eaker feel about the transfer. On paper he was being promoted, because it was a joint command, it was the Mediterranean Allied Air Force, how did he feel about it?

H: I don't know, I really don't, if I did, I would prefer not to quote anybody.

Q: In my reading of it, he was very unhappy, and my reading of it, also, this caused a schism between Arnold and Eaker which was never healed by the end of the war.

H: You know that Arnold and Eaker had been such close friends, they had written together

Q: Had written several books together...

H: Boys books, articles.

Q: Well, Arnold was a very impatient man, you know, if you couldn't get results, he wanted some change. Do you feel that he was impulsive in this decision?

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H: I don't believe so

Q: You think he was justified in what he did?

H: Well, I'm not saying that.

Q: All this is for my background, what you say is not going to be quoted in any book. I mean I'm trying to get a feel, either Arnold was impulsive or he was justified or something, it's one or the other?

H: I think Gen Arnold was an impulsive man, that's the way he did things, and I think that was one, although a lot of people were not happy with this impulse. That was one of the reasons that Gen Arnold could always get things done, because he sort of pushed, well, everything, friendship, he just had one objective in mind, and that was to get going. Actually, there was some unhappiness there, and I worked both for Gen Eaker and Jimmy Doolittle, and a lot of us felt, and I'm sure that Eaker did, too, that he had been through the real rough part, he it was extremely tough the first part of the war, and felt ashamed as things became easier, equipment came in, and fighter escort came in, that he seemed ashamed to make the change right at that moment.

Q: It seemed that he had all the tough going, and then when the P-51s came in, when it got easier....

H: The whole picture there changed, and evidenced by the tremendous drop in casualties.

Q: Do you think Arnold shot from the hip in that respect?

H: What do you mean?

Q: In moving Eaker out of there, in not giving him a chance to finish his job?

H: I just think he thought it was time for a change. Of course, Eaker was under tremendous pressure in England, one real interesting story I remember. This was told me by Gen Doolittle, I heard him say it more than once, because I asked him to use it when he was doing a testimonial for Eaker out at the AF Academy, and he did. He was looking for a story, and I said, well, here's a real good one that I've heard, they were honoring Eaker, you see, so Jimmy Doolittle's side of the story was that

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when Eaker left England, he was honored, presented and knighted by the King of England, and the King of England, of course, stuttered badly, it was well known, that he stuttered in his speech, and Gen Doolittle reported in to duty and of course one of his first calls was to make a courtesy call on the King. So after he was ushered into the Grand Buckingham Palace, the room where he was to meet with the King, he came in, and he said, "G-g-general Ggeann Doolittle, we are delighted to have you here in England, and he said, of course, we are gertainly going to miss Gen Arn, Gen Eaker." Eaker and Jimmy have since, they've become close friends. And I know from my personal experience that they both admire each other, no hard feelings.

Q: Yes, as a matter of fact, most people I have talked to strongly admire Eaker. My own reading of the material was that he felt bitter about leaving.

H: I think he did . . .

Q: Being taken out just when he was ready to profit from all the preliminary efforts that went into building that force.

H: I'll say one thing though, that there was no bitching on Eaker's part

Q: He took his medicine?

H: Yes.

Q: I heard that Spaatz refused to take that job unless they put through a facade of promoting Eaker. Eaker was moved from the 8th AF to the MAAF, he was, it was an appearance of being promoted to a joint command. So they went ahead and did that, but somebody reminded me of what they do in NY when they want to move a precinct Captain out, they move 16 guys in different directions to obscure this one key change that they want to make, is this a fair analysis of what happened?

H: I don't know.

Q: Okay. Let me ask you about the P-51, which is a favorite subject of This historians mine. Why was the P-51 so late in coming on the scene? Do you have any thoughts on that.

H: Well, yes, I think we were aware way back in the middle 30s, late 30s, when we used to go and visit North American, from March Field, 1935,1936, that North

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American had a real fine design on the fighter, and this initial airplane, the number of which escapes me was made for a

Q: P-36

H: No, that was another make, that was a Curtis. North American had another airplane that was built, hopefully, Dutch Kindelberger wanted. I knew Dutch pretty well, he wanted to build this airplane for the AF, and the first order was made to a foreign country, because I recall seing the instruments, and so forth. I believe it was Sweden, so I think the AF could have gotten those airplanes quite early.

~~General Staff~~

Q: The original P-51 had the Allison engine, it wasn't any good. It wasn't until the British put the Merlin in it that it was recognized?

H: That's right

Q: And I'm told that Tommy Hitchcock was among the first to recognized the P-51.

H: That I didn't know.

Q: How did Arnold feel about the P-51?

H: I don't recall particularly how he felt about it. I know that most of us were quite enthusiastic and some of this may be colored by hindsight rather than foresight, but it appeared that the combination of the P-47 and the P-51 was an excellent pair because the P-51 was so good for the air work, and had good range, and the P-47 was so durable, and would stand a lot of ground fire.

Q: Arnold was unhappy with Wright Field because they delayed in getting these wing tanks, you know, at the time, the P-51s weren't quite there, and they needed to put some wing tanks or belly tanks on the P-47s and the P-38s, this was right after those two disastrous losses we suffered, and Wright Field didn't seem to come up with answers.

H: I'm afraid I can't give any background on that one

Q: They were buying them from the British, these cardboard tanks, do you remember?

H: Yes, remember that.

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Q: You have no feel for why, what happened?

H: Don't have any feel for the particularly, the Wright Field aspect of it.

Q: ~~You came back to the US, before we get back to the US,~~ let me ask you about the rotation policy, for the 8th AF. This was a sore point on several counts. What was the nature of the problem?

H: I think, we heard an ~~any~~ awful lot of discussion about 25 missions and 30 missions and 35 for the bombers and corresponding exposure to combat for the fighter men. Jean Speak a little bit from both sides. The fighter losses were considerably less than the bomber losses, and they had to put in more time, of course, a lot more time in combat, just the nature of their work, and the fact that on bombing runs, we found rather early in the war, ~~and~~ we, actually, it was LeMay more than anybody else, that if you wanted to hit a target, you really had to get on a bomb run and hold it, I recall, something like the final four minutes or so, four to ~~forty~~ seven minutes, in that bracket, if you really got on a bomb run, so that you could take advantage of the best bombardier, ~~and so forth~~ etc. The first rotation policy is based on 25 missions, and actually, all it did was give a crew an even break, the losses, I know in my outfit, ran ~~###~~ about 4%

Q: You said, even break, this means after 25 missions you had a 50-50 chance of getting home?

H: Yes, either that or in the early part it was, when they were, as I recall, suffering, the figure, about 8% on the deep penetrations and about 4% on the shallow penetrations, ~~and~~ you couldn't do too many ~~deep percent~~ 8 percent missions, of course, too far. I personally favored the rotation policy, and I think we needed it for morale purposes, we needed also to get experience back, because we were on a tremendous expansion program. I thought it was a fair policy.

Q; How did Arnold feel about it?

H: That I don't know. I know one thing that Arnold did, he felt very strongly about, ~~and that was~~ getting professionals, ~~and~~ for that reason, and others, why ~~the~~ eleven West Pointers were assigned to me fresh out of school. I think one of the reasons

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I was a West Pointer myself and they felt I'd give them an even break, I think anybody would have given them an even break, we didn't differentiate, however, Arnold did insist on getting the young professional regulars into combat, he had as much to do with it as anybody.

Q: This rotation policy was a particular point of interest to him, he never had combat, he missed it in the first war, he didn't get there in time, so he was, vulnerable, you might say, to some of his key staff officers who wanted to get overseas, and this created a problem, because some theater commanders didn't want to take people from outside, they wanted to promote their own people, I'm thinking of Kenney, ~~I don't know~~, of course, this is another theater. Did you encounter that in ETO?

H: That was in the ETO. They had some reputations for being close corporations I think in general most combat commanders preferred to bring their own people up, because they had been exposed, and they were experienced, and they thought they had it coming to them, there was some resentment on bringing over full Colonels and putting them directly in command of ~~troops~~ groups.

Q: This brings me to ask you, you came back from Personnel, one of Arnold's favorite expressions was, "let's get rid of the deadwood," he said this in correspondence many times

H: He was very rough on non-producers.

Q: Was this a problem of superannuated Colonels who had been around a long time, and didn't quite cut it, and nobody wanted to take them overseas, you had to find some place for them?

Q: ~~We are talking about these superannuated~~ Colonels who one had to find a ~~place for, and~~ there were more of them than you had places overseas, what did you do?

H: I think, in general, I think this is an area ~~in~~ which, I won't say, controversial, but divided opinion, I think in general they try to select people who were best suited for it, and I do know, ~~two~~, the major commanders had an awful lot to say about whether or not they would accept certain Colonels, so that in general, that screening process

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occurred before they arrived, certainly in the case of senior Colonels. I know once I was replaced in the wing, a BG, an oldtimer had been away on a special job in Russia and he came back and my Division Commander very kindly said, "sorry, Hunter, I've been directed to take this gentleman back and he did take him back, but he didn't stay very long, and Pat Partridge put me back into a wing job.

Q: Did you get involved in FRANTIC, the shuttle bombings?

H: No, I didn't. My particular wing was not involved, ~~thos e were,~~ certain wings were selected.

Q: I was told very recently in an interview by somebody who was in Personnel, that Arnold had a "black list." These were colonels who had not done the job for him somewhere along the line, and he didn't want them either sent overseas or promoted. Is this a fact?

H: That I can't answer. When I went back into Personnel, I can say this, Fred Anderson was brought back in by Gen Spaatz to head up ~~that~~ A-1, by Gen Arnold, of course, and by Gen Spaatz, ~~and~~ the first thing that Fred did was to take out a lot of the people who had been in the Personnel business, all during the war, and he replaced most of them with you might say, so called successful group and wing commanders, so we would up with almost all the key jobs in Personnel, including Medal of Honor winners and everything else, like Leon Johnson, ~~and~~ others were brought in for most of the key jobs. There was, to my knowledge, and I can say this on the other side of the fence, I handled the Colonel's assignments, and handled quite a few Colonels who were being ...

Q: Did you work with Stan Wray (?)?

H: Yes, I took his job. Stan was the scamp supposed to go to West Point, his commander Stewart, ~~and~~ Stan wanted to get out of there, ~~so~~ he was Chief of Officer Assignments, and he got himself ordered away, and had me ordered in to replace him. Of course, I guess Fred Anderson was really the one who, I think Fred Anderson did it. However, I was not aware of any "black list" at that time, I was certainly away of older Colonels where performance ... but it was strictly based on an ER, and not an individual.

Q: I've heard two versions of this particular thing, as to whether Arnold "held grudges" Some people say no, that Arnold if he fired a guy, or put him on ice,

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is because the guy didn't do the job, and some other people have told me that anybody who didn't do a job way back, he remembered, he had a great memory for things like that, and this guy never got another job, so he did hold grudges, now

H: On the other hand, I remember, way back, in the case of officers who had damn fine records, and who had had good performances through the year, who got drunk and disorderly on occasion or two, and Arnold, I thought, was extremely fair to protect those individuals, because they had been good performers. So really there are two sides. I think he protected a lot of people, and not because they were his boys. I can think of a couple of examples. When I was a youngster, senior officers were kept on who could just have well been relieved.

Q: I was told, for example, that she showed some partiality to people who came up with him on the West Coast, the March Field route, vs those who came up on the east coast with Andrews

H: I think, unfortunately, at that time, there were some cliques in the Air Corps, and the Army/ Arnold clique was one; the Delos Emmons clique was another. I don't know about Gen Andrews. I don't think actually Gen Andrews entered in to it.

Q: No, Gen Andrews was too kind a man. But there were some people, to cite a specific example, Tony Frank was closer to Andrews. Tony Frank wanted a combat command. Arnold never gave it to him. There are some who told me that Tony Frank shouldn't have had a combat command, he wasn't a combat commander, he was a supply man. what is your opinion?

H: Well, I knew Gen Frank slightly, and by reputation, and of course, he was well known by reputation, and I think actually he was not the type I would select to move into a combat position

Q: There are others, like Ralph Royce, who came up with Andrews, he didn't get too far with Arnold, he was one of the old timers, those who came up with Arnold, Eaker and Spaatz went very high.

H: I think there again, I knew Ralph Royce quite well, during the Philippines, served with him, damned fine man, too. But at that stage of the game, I think

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that there were younger, more aggressive types to do the job

Q: I'm sortof challenging you on some things I have heard.

H: I know you are

Q: One other thing, for example, on the Alaskan flight, there were no awards except one. There was one award of the DSC to Arnold, nobody else got an award. There had been some resentment among those who went on the flight, and I have been told that Arnold's loyalty was lateral, and upward, and not down to his boys, as far as promotions and recognitions are concerned.

H: I don't think that's right, because I've seen, Arnold had an extremely good job with young officers, and with enlisted men.

Q: Did he generate a lot of confidence, rapport with young people?

H: He did, but there were a lot of people afraid of him, too.

Q: Did they act out of fear, respect, or love, or a combination?

H: I think it was a combination of fear. There was no lack of respect. Some people thought he was hardheaded and impulsive. I think that is a good expression which you have used. But Arnold did also, I mean, as I mentioned earlier, he was awfully rough on non-producers. I don't mean that they were bums. But when you start selecting people for jobs, and he had to do it, he wanted to put people, who, he thought in his own mind, were best qualified.

Q: He had seaveral special favorites, Kuter and Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell, his so--alled Advsiory Council.

H: Right, I remember that group. They were a highly qualified group, lotø of imagination and he picked them out because he knew they were good

Q: They were sort of trouble shooters for him. Did he bypass channels to get things done?

H: Oh frequently, yes. He wouldn't hesitate. I recall in the AF Combat Command one day when I was on duty, just a junior officer of the staff there, he said, 'what in the hell is that B-17 doing, that spent the night at Albuquerque, he called it by number, he said.' I

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want to know why that airplane was there, he skipped every channel, and I called right away to Albuquerque and found out the airplane was there for spark plug change

Q: He had come into Albuquerque and saw the plane.

H: No, he read the detail report, and this is when each B-17 was a real precious piece of equipment, tried to get him over to the Halpro project, remember that?

Q: Yes, did you get involved in that.

H: Well, we were moving them from Combat Command, before I went to the staff, up till March 7th.

Q: This was intended originally to bomb China, was it not?

H: Yes, it was

Q: Bomb Japan?

H: Yes, actually it was to get, start the operation as they finally did with the B-29s, later into India.

Q: Did you get involved in the B-29 operation

H: No, not until after the war.

Q: Arnold made another change in the B29s. He cancelled out Hansell and brought LeMay in. Do you have any knowledge of that?

H: No, I don't. Except that LeMay's reputation

Q: Well, LeMay didn't have a reputation in those days, of course, he had done a great job with the 20th Bomb Com, but Hansell was one of Arnold's special favorites, and after a short period Arnold got very impatient, and took him out.

H: Hansell was a damn good man, but his reputation was being for a staff officer.

Q: A theoritician?

H: Policy theoritician, but damned good staff man, whereas, I think LeMay was probably the finest combat commander

Q: Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and sending them to foreign corners of the earth, did you ever get sent by him somewhere?

H: No, the only one I was aware of was when he nailed me for the General Staff

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and then, as I say, I tried to get out of it, and then Gen Miff Harmon, said not a chance, with Gen Arnold, he said I've talked to him and he said, no, he just thought that's where I ought to go

Q: Arnold was not an ideologue, a theoritician, he was concerned with the practical side of things

H: Right, getting the job done

Q: Did he get bored quickly at a briefing, if a man rambled on?

H: I don't think I ever saw him bored, I'd seen him get impatient.

Q: Cut a man off?

H: Cut him off, right

Q: Walk out or

H: Well, he would just excuse, that's all.

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Interview - Gen Hunter Harris, Washington, D.C. 28 April 1971

Q. Let's talk about WWII and your experiences with Gen Arnold. You were in the Ruropean theater? Did you see Arnold when he came to visit on several occasions? He was there in '42 and '43.

H. I was not in Europe at that time. I didn't go until the summer of '43, actually, the spring of '43. My experience before then, I know that one of the major projects that Gen Arnold undertook was a reorganization of the Dept of the Army, which was the War Dept at that time. I was stationed as Judge Patterson's pilot and stationed at Bolling Field. The reorganization plan which Larry Kuter undertook as a major effort, and under Spaatz and McNarney's and Marshall's direction, actually formed on March 7, 1942. At that time, 50% of the General Staff officers were selected from the Army Air Forces. I was on that first selection group.

Q. Right, Gil Harrison and Kuter, and I guess Otto Nelson?

H. Otto Nelson had a lot to do with it.

Q. And McNarney, was the chief AF man. I want to ask you about that particular thing. That was sort of a halfway house type of reorganization. There were some in the AAF who wanted to go all the way. Hugh Knerr wanted it. Were you aware of his idea?

H. I was not really aware of Gen Knerr's direction, because I was in the AF Combat Command at that time, initially under Gen Emmons. As soon as the war started, I was transferred from Bolling operations to the Combat Command.

Q. This plan that came into effect in March was an attempt to short circuit another effort by Knerr. Knerr was pushing Andrews to go all out for a separate AF. And Andrews was sort of acquiescent. He was sort of non-committal, but there were a number of people. There was an attorney down in Florida named Paul Scott, who was very active in this. Did you know his role?

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H. No, I didn't know him.

Q. Several others were involved in this. There is a letter that I have seen from Knerr to Andrews, in which he said: "Arnold beat up to the punch," so to speak, and he blamed this McNarney Plan on Arnold. Arnold had this compromise plan put through in order to beat the all-out guys who were pushing at Congress, trying to get Congress to vote for a separate AF.

H. Well, in the few contacts that I had with Gen Arnold, you might consider in this vein. I always thought that Gen Arnold was 100% for a separate AF, too. However, I'm sure at that time, having been on the fringes on it, been selected for that first group, I think Gen Arnold felt, as did Gen McNarney too, that that wasn't the time to push it, and we had a real big war on our hands.

Q. Do you think he had a commitment to Marshall to hold the line until the end of the war?

H. That I don't know.

Q. Did he ever talk to you about that?

H. No, he didn't

Q. Of course, Marshall gave the AAF autonomy without legal separation?

H. I talked to one of the gentlemen who were very close to Gen Arnold on this. This was General Millard F. Harmon. Gen Miff Harmon at that time was still on the staff, I believe, of one Combat Command. He personally was organizing this selection.

Q. I think at that time, he was the No. 2 man on the Air Staff.

H. Right.

Q. When Spaatz moved out to the 8th AF in the Spring of '42.

H. But he told me, I know, how essential it was that Air officers be introduced into the staff, because I tried to get out of it. I wanted to get on out with the Bomber Command and go to the 8th AF. As a

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matter of fact, I had an offer of a job to go with Leon Johnson on the first cadre. He said: "If you can get yourself sprung." Well, I couldn't, and Gen Harmon, whom I had known for years and years, he said: "I'm sorry Hunter, but," he said "Gen Arnold personally selected this staff." He said: "It's extremely important, and you won't have to spend too much time there" but it was extremely important that the General Staff be adequately covered by Air officers.

Q. How did the War Dept General Staff react to the infiltration of Air people?

H. I think there were mixed emotions. I think the objective people who were appreciative of the Air effort, except, well, there were lots of old timers who thought we were really a bunch of whippersnappers coming in. I was a lot junior. Jim McCormick - who I was just talking to - and I, we were two of the junior officers on that General Staff. There was some resistance, and also, they were a little jealous of our coming in. I certainly was not an experienced staff officer, so I had a lot to learn, getting in with some of these old pros.

Q. Was Kuter in there?

H. Yes, Kuter was there at that time, and then he left the General Staff and went on special planning board for a short time with General Arnold.

Q. What were some of the issues that came up involving the AAF?

H. Well, the ones I was most familiar with were in G-3, which was responsible for Training & Organization. The particular one that I had to carry the ball on as an action officer, I really remember, and that was organic aviation. There was very strong feeling on the part of the AAF that the Army should not have organic aviation, that it should be provided by the AAF, I must admit I had a devil of a time trying to write this paper, because I wrote an original position, and it was

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reversed, and reversed, and reversed, until it finally got to Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall actually made the decision to authorize some units of organic aviation. These were mainly in the area of battlefield command reconnaissance and small airplanes, liaison type. But it did not include, as I recall - possibly did include some artillery spotting - but the units were relatively small, and I personally didn't see anything wrong with the organic decision as it came out. However, there was a very strong resentment on the part of a lot of AAF people.

Q. Why?

H. They felt that the AAF should run all the air, and should furnish the equipment and units for the Army.

Q. Looking at it from the other side.

H. We were all still quite interested in the eventual solution that you mentioned, which was a separate AF.

Q. There were some in the Army who felt the AF wasn't giving enough tactical air support?

H. Yes, they felt that we were inclined to put top priority - and this is not my viewpoint - but it's the viewpoint that was given by somebody in the opposition.

Q. Who were some of the tope people who felt that the AAF ought to get more tactical support? We are talking about some War Dept types, who, at the top level, were unhappy about the tactical air situation?

H. I think, mostly Air Staff were against this organic aviation, because it looked like that eventually it would create some sort of a cleavage within the AF and when the final AF did come along, that some of the work for which they were specifically trained and suited best to do would be passed on to the Army. I can't pin down any people other than...

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Q. I'm thinking of Army people?

H. Army people....

Q. Who felt we were not giving them adequate support. They wanted their own tactical air, and they claimed we were obsessed with strategic and were not giving them the kind of support they needed. I'm thinking of Lesley McNair. Are you familiar with his position?

H. Yes, now, I know that, I flew the GHQ AF staff on occasion, one visit to Cape Cod, when they were inspecting a National Guard Division. In that staff, I heard, I got to talk with Gen McNair and also Mark Clark, who was the Artillery officer at that time. I think he was LT COL Artillery Officer on the Staff. And the general feeling, this is the old GHQ before the war,

Q. 1939?

H. That would have been '40 or '41. The Army, in general, and I think it is fair to say that Mark Clark, Gen McNair, I think all felt that they should have their own tactical air.

Q. How did Arnold feel about this?

H. Well, in my own personal opinion, Arnold was a strong complete separate AF man, that I've ever talked t. And this goes way back, I mean, back to 1933. But at this time, you see. I really didn't as a pilot and a very junior officer.

Q. You really weren't privy to...

H. Really wasn't privy to this. There were a few things that went on in the General Staff during that 8 months that I was on the staff, before I managed to get loose and go over and join the 8th. I don't recall any specific people on the War Dept General Staff. I know that the G-3, Gen Idwal Edwards...

Q. How about the Army side, Stanley Gerow?

H. I had no contact with him.

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Q. Was Stanley Embick out of there?

H. I think he was, I don't remember him on the staff at all because at that time the OPD was...

Q. Tom Handy, was it?

H. Tom Handy may have been.

Q. Or Hull?

H. Hull was, yes. Hull I got to know later on, considerably after that, in Japan. A very fine man.

Q. What was McNarney's official job at that time?

H. He was, as I recall, he was Deputy to Marshall. He actually acted as more than an Air Deputy. He was really a straight Deputy. McNarney, really, I think pretty much ran the staff. He was a very superior staff man, and of course he was very loyal to his boss, and he had to be.

Q. Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

H. I don't ever recall seeing them together.

Q. How about at a briefing, where somebody was briefing, and some issues that arose. Did you ever notice any discussions between them?

H. No, and I don't recall any briefings that I attended of the high level types that you are mentioning between Arnold and Marshall. I worked in the General Staff in those days. It was handled in the old style where the action officer carried a piece of paper right through. He came in, was given, presented the paper and position. Then it will be changed from one office to another, you see, as it went up the line. But I do know this is one of the most difficult staff papers I had to handle. It was reversed in almost every office, my own boss, a Colonel Madgett, an old timer, who later became an Army general. I've forgotten what his job was.

Q. Did ASW come up? Did you get involved in that?

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H. ASW, I did not get involved in it. I know that in the ASW mission, we were unhappy about the solution because, as you know, the AAF carried the ball initially on the ASW. They had the only equipments that had the extended range, the B-18 at that point.

Q. How about control of anti-aircraft? Did you get involved in that?

H. I did not get involved in it there. I got involved in it in the theater, when I was in the 8th AF. We had many, many arguments, when I was in Operations, out there in the Air Division under Pat Patridge. The Army was always trying to extend pretty far zones, and insisting that we stay out. As a matter of fact, there were certain entry points in the UK where we, if we intruded, our people would be shot at.

Q. Let's talk about the 8th AF, the B-17s. Arnold came out there Labor Day, I think we started talking about this the other day. He stayed about a week or 10 days. This was after the first Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid. There was some unhappiness, as a result of that, and the fact that the 8th AF, deep penetration type raids, tapered off shortly thereafter. Were you in on any of that?

H. I was in on the, at the time, I had just taken the first replacements over for the 8th AF, a small group of replacements. I was there. I flew a mission just before the Regensburg mission. I had permission to fly one mission, and then go back and train another group. I do know in my conversations, though, with Fred Anderson and others, while I was visiting the 8th AF Hqs. and, of course, General Eaker, that there was a real good reason for dropping off some of the deep penetrations because we were fresh out of replacements. They were quite low when I took those first 30 crews over. They could only fly, they would alternate, more or less, on the deep missions, and then, the shallow penetrations and submarine pens and so forth, in France. Because the losses were about doubled. They were running around 8%

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inside, and about 4% over France, as I recall. It was just a question of not having enough crews and airplanes, and it was a very costly mission.

Q. Right. On so-called Black Thursday, Oct 14th, they lost 60 planes.

H. That was '43?

Q. '43.

H. I reported November, I reported back the second time.

Q. About the time you reported, there were no more deep penetrations. There were no deep penetrations between Black Thursday and perhaps for 2 or 3 months.

H. I know that when we started again, when I started combat operations, which was around the 1st of December, mostof our penetraions were shallow, and it was because of the losses..

Q. Arnold was rather unhappy. Were you aware of his unhappiness?

H. I think I was, yes.

Q. Did it get down to your level?

H. Yes.

Q. I talked about "The Big Switch." This is the decision to move Eaker to the Mediterranean and Spaatz up there. They brought in Jimmy Doolittle, and made a lot of changes. Idwal Edwards went down. A lot of changes around the turn of the year.

H. Yes, it was a little after that.

Q. What is your comment about that change?

H. Well, here again, I didn't have any inside knowledge of the requirement for change. I know that we were a little surprised , in a way. Eaker had done a terrific job in getting that organization going. He'd done a fine job, and we assumed that it was a time for a shift, that Gen Doolittle was extremely well known, and both those superior combat commanders. I didn't notice any great change in policy/

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Q. No, there wasn't any great change in policy.

H. No change in policy. We went on the same way we started.

Q. That's correct.

H. Those penetrations, deep penetrations, from where I sat, which was England, were strictly on the basis of availability and trying to hold the force, and also trying to speed up the fighter escort.

Q. How did Eaker feel about the transfer. On paper he was being promoted, because it was a joint command. It was the Mediterranean Allied Air Force. How did he feel about it?

H. I don't know. I really don't. If I did, I would prefer not to quote anybody.

Q. In my reading of it, he was very unhappy. In my reading of it, also, this caused a schism between Arnold and Eaker which was never healed by the end of the war.

H. You know that Arnold and Eaker had been such close friends. They had written together.

Q. Had written several books together...

H. Boys' books, articles.

Q. Well, Arnold was a very impatient man. If you couldn't get results, he wanted some change. Do you feel that he was impulsive in this decision?

H. I don't believe so.

Q. You think he was justified in what he did?

H. Well, I'm not saying that.

Q. All this is for my background. What you say is not going to be quoted in any book. I mean I'm trying to get a feel. Either Arnold was impulsive or he was justified or something. It's one or the other?

H. I think Gen Arnold was an impulsive man. That's the way he did things, and I think that was one. Although a lot of people were not

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happy with this impulsiveness. That was one of the reasons that Gen Arnold could always get things done, because he sort of pushed, well, everything, friendship. He just had one objective in mind, and that was to get going. Actually, there was some unhappiness there. I worked both for Gen Eaker and Jimmy Doolittle. A lot of us felt, and I'm sure that Eaker did, too, that he had been through the real rough part. It was extremely tough the first part of the war, and felt ashamed, as things became easier, equipment came in, and fighter escort came in, that he seemed ashamed to make the change right at that moment.

Q. It seemed that he had all the tough going, and then when the P-51s came in, when it got easier...

H. The whole picture changed, as evidenced by the tremendous drop in casualties.

Q. Do you think Arnold shot from the hip in that respect?

H. What do you mean?

Q. In moving Eaker out of there, in not giving him a chance to finish his job?

H. I just think he thought it was time for a change. Of course, Eaker was under tremendous pressure in England. One real interesting story I remember. This was told me by Gen Doolittle. I heard him say it more than once, because I asked him to use it when he was doing a testimonial for Eaker out at the AF Academy, and he did. He was looking for a story and I said: "Well, here's a real good one that I've heard, They were honoring Eaker, you see. So Jimmy Doolittle's side of the story was that when Eaker left England, he was honored, presented and knighted by the King of England. The King of England, of course, stuttered badly, it was well known, that he stuttered in his speech. Gen Doolittle reported in to duty and of course one of his first calls was to make a courtesy call on the King. So after he was ushered

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into the Grand Buckingham Palace, the room where he was to meet with the King, he came in, and he said: "G-g-general Doolittle, we are delighted to have you here in England,! And he said: "Of course, we are certainly going to miss Gen Arnold and Gen Eaker." Eaker and Jimmy have since, they've become close friends. And I know from my personal experience that they both admire each other, no hard feelings.

Q. Yes, as a matter of fact, most people I have talked to strongly admire Eaker. My own reading of the material was that he felt bitter about leaving.

H. I think he did...

Q. Being taken out just when he was ready to profit from all the preliminary efforts that went into building that force.

H. I'll say one thing though, that there was no bitching on Eaker's part.

Q. he took his medicine?

H. Yes.

Q. I heard that Spaatz refused to take that job unless they put through a facade of promoting Eaker. Eaker was moved from the 8th AF to the MAAF. It was an appearance of being promoted to a joint command. So they went ahead and did that. But, somebody reminded me of what they do in NY when they want to move a precinct Captain out. They move 16 guys in different directions to obscure this one key change that they want to make. Is this a fair analysis of what happened?

H. I don't know.

Q. Okay. Let me ask you about the P-51. This is a favorite subject of historians. Why was the P-51 so late in coming on the scene? Do you have any thoughts on that?

H. We.., yes, I think we were aware way back in the middle '30s, late 30s, when we used to go and visit North American, from

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March Field in 1935, 1936, that North American had a real fine design on the fighter. This initial airplane, the number of which escapes me was made for a

Q. P-36

H. No, that was another make, that was a Curtiss. North American had another airplane that was built, hopefully, Dutch Kindelberger wanted. I knew Dutch pretty well. He wanted to build this airplane for the AF. The first order was made to a foreign country, because I recall seeing the instruments, and so forth. I believe it was Sweden. I think the AF could have gotten those airplanes quite early.

Q. The original P-51 had the Allison engine. It wasn't any good. It wasn't until the British put the Merlin in it that it was recognized?

H. That's right.

Q. And I'm told that Tommy Hitchcock was among the first to recognize the P-51?

H. That I didn't know.

Q. How did Arnold feel about the P-51?

H. I don't recall particularly how he felt about it. I know that most of us were quite enthusiastic. Some of this may be colored by hindsight rather than foresight, but it appeared that the combination of the P-47 and the P-51 was an excellent pair because the P-51 was so good for the air work, and had good range, and the P-47 was so durable and would stand a lot of ground fire.

Q. Arnold was unhappy with Wright Field because they delayed in getting these wing tanks. You know, at the time, the P-51s weren't quite there, and they needed to put some wing tanks or belly tanks on the P-47s and the P-38s. This was right after those two disastrous losses we suffered. Wright Field didn't seem to come up with answers.

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H. I'm afraid I can't give any background on that one.

Q. They were buying them from the British, these cardboard tanks, do you remember?

H. Yes, remember that.

Q. You have no feel for why, what happened?

H. Don't have any feel for particularly, the Wright Field aspect of it.

Q. Let me ask you about the rotation policy for the 8th AF. This was a sore point on several counts. What was the nature of the problem?

H. I think, we heard an awful lot of discussion about 25 missions and 30 missions and 35 for the bombers and corresponding exposure to combat for the fighter men. I can speak a little bit from both sides. The fighter losses were considerably less than the bomber losses. They had to put in more time, of course, a lot more time in combat - just the nature of their work. The fact that on bombing runs, we found rather early in the war - I say "we". Actually, it was LeMay more than amybody else. That if you wanted to hit a target, you really had to get on a bomb run and hold it, I recall, something like the final four minutes or so, four to seven minutes, in that bracket. I you really got on a bomb run, so that you could take advantage of the best bombardier, etc. The first rotation policy is based on 25 missions, and actually all it did was give a crew an even break. The losses, I know in my outfit, ran about 4%.

Q. You said, even break, this means after 25 missions you had a 50-50 chance of getting home?

H. Yes, either that or in the early part it was, when they were suffering, as I recall, the figure, it was about 8% on the deep penetrations and about 4% on the shallow penetrations. You couldn't do too many 8 percent missions, of course. Too far. I personally favored the

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rotation policy, and I think we needed it for morale purposes. We needed also to get experience back, because we were on a tremendous expansion program. I thought it was a fair policy.

Q. How did Arnold feel about it?

H. That I don't know. I know one thing that Arnold did. He felt very strongly about getting professionals. For that reason, and others, why eleven West Pointers were assigned to me fresh out of school. I think one of the reasons I was a West Pointer myself and they felt I'd give them an even break. I think anybody would have given them an even break. We didn't differentiate. However, Arnold did insist on getting the young professional regulars into combat. He had as much to do with it as anybody.

Q. This rotation policy was a particular point of interest to him. He never had combat. He missed it in the first war. He didn't get there in time. So he was, vulnerable, you might say, to some of his key staff officers who wanted to get overseas. This created a problem, because some theater commanders didn't want to take people from outside. They wanted to promote their own people. I'm thinking of Kenney. Of course, this is another theater. Did you encounter that in ETO?

H. That was in the ETO. They had some reputations for being close corporations. I think in general most combat commanders preferred to bring their own people up, because they had been exposed, and they were experienced, and they thought they had it coming to them. There was some resentment on bringing over full Colonels and putting them directly in command of groups.

Q. This brings me to ask you, you came back to Personnel. One of Arnold's favorite expressions was: "Let's get rid of the deadwood." He said this in correspondence many times.

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H. He was very rough on non-producers.

Q. Was this a problem of superannuated Colonels who had been around a long time, and didn't quite cut it, and nobody wanted to take them overseas? You had to find some place for them? There were more of them than you had places overseas. What did you do?

H. I think, in general, I think this is an area which is, I won't say, controversial, but divided opinion. I think in general they tried to select people who were best suited for it. And I do know, too, the major commanders had an awful lot to say about whether or not they would accept certain Colonels. So that in general, that screening process occurred before they arrived, certainly in the case of the senior Colonels. I know once I was replaced in the wing, a BG, an oldtimer had been away on a special job in Russia. He came back, and my Division Commander very kindly said: "Sorry, Hunter, I've been directed to take this gentleman back. And he did take him back, but he didn't stay very long, and Pat Partridge put me back into a wing job.

Q. Did you get involved in FRANTIC, the shuttle bombings?

H. No, I didn't. My particular wing was not involved. Certain wings were selected.

Q. I was told very recently in an interview by somebody who was in Personnel, that Arnold had a "black list." These were Colonels who had not done the job for him somewhere along the line, and he didn't want them either sent overseas or promoted. Is this a fact?

H. That I can't answer. When I went back into Personnel, I can say this. Fred Anderson was brought back in by Gen Spaatz to head up A-1, by Gen Arnold, of course, and by Gen Spaatz. The first thing that Fred did was to take out a lot of the people who had been in the Personnel business all during the war, and he replaced most of them with, you might say, so called successful group and wing commanders,

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so we wound up with almost all the key jobs in Personnel, including Medal of Honor winners and everything else, like Leon Johnson. Others were brought in for most of the key jobs. There was, to my knowledge, and I can say this on the other side of the fence, I handled the Colonels' assignments, and handled quite a few Colonels who were being...

Q. Did you work with Stan Wray?

H. Yes, I took his job. Stan, the scoundrel, was supposed to go to West Point. His commander Stewart. Stan wanted to get out of there. He was Chief of Officer Assignments, and he got himself ordered away, and had me ordered in to replace him. Of course, I guess Fred Anderson was really the one who, I think Fred Anderson did it. However, I was not aware of any "black list" at that time, I was certainly aware of older Colonels whose performance - but it was strictly based on an ER, and not an individual.

Q. I've heard two versions of this particular thing, as to whether Arnold "held grudges". Some people say "no", that Arnold if he fired a guy, or put him on ice, is because the guy didn't do the job. Some other people have told me that anybody who didn't do a job way back, he remembered. He had a great memory for things like that. This guy never got another job. So he did hold grudges.

H. On the other hand, I remember, way back, in the case of officers who had damn fine records, and who had had good performances through the years, who got drunk and got disorderly on an occasion or two. Arnold, I thought, was extremely fair to protect those individuals, because they had been good performers. So really there are two sides. I've seen him protect a lot of people, and not because they were his boys. I can think of a couple of examples. When I was a youngster, senior officers were kept on who could just as well have been relieved.

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Q. I was told, for example, that he showed some partiality to people who came up with him on the West Coast - the March Field route - vs those who came up on the East Coast with Andrews.

H. I think, unfortunately, at that time, there were some cliques in the Air Corps. The Arnold clique was one; the Delos Emmons clique was another. I don't know about Gen Andrews. I don't think actually Gen Andrews entered into it.

Q. No. Gen Andrews was too kind a man. But there were some people, to cite a specific example. Tony Frank was closer to Andrews. Tony Frank wanted a combat command. Arnold never gave it to him. There are some who told me that Tony Frank shouldn't have had a combat command. He wasn't a combat commander. He was a supply man. What is your opinion?

H. Well, I knew Gen Frank slightly, and by reputation, and of course, he was well known by reputation. I think actually he was not the type I would select to move into a combat position.

Q. There are others, like Ralph Royce, who came up with Andrews. He didn't get too far with Arnold. He was one of the old timers. Those who came up with Arnold - Eaker and Spaatz went very high.

H. I think there again, I knew Ralph Royce quite well. During the Philippines I served with him. A damned fine man, too. But at that stage of the game, I think that there were younger, more aggressive types to do the job.

Q. I'm sort of challenging you on some things I have heard?

H. I know you are.

Q. One other thing. For example, on the Alaskan flight, there were no awards except one. There was one award of the DFC to Arnold. Nobody else got an award. There had been some resentment among those who went on the flight. I have been told that Arnold's

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loyalty was lateral, and upward, and not down to his boys, as far as promotions and recognitions are concerned.

H. I don't think that's right, because I've seen, Arnold did an extremely good job with young officers, and with enlisted men.

Q. Did he generate a lot of confidence and rapport with young people?

H. He did, but there were a lot of people afraid of him, too.

Q. Did they act out of fear, respect, or love, or a combination?

H. I think it was a combination of fear. There was no lack of respect. Some people thought he was hardheaded and impulsive. I think that is a good expression which you have used. But Arnold did also, I mean, as I mentioned earlier. He was awfully rough on non-producers. I don't mean that they were bums. But when you start selecting people for jobs, and he had to do it, he wanted to put people, who, he thought in in his own mind, were best qualified.

Q. He had several special favorites, Kuter and Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell - his so-called Advisory Council.

H. Right. I remember that group. They were a highly qualified group, lots of imagination and he picked them out because he knew they were good.

Q. They were sort of trouble shooters for him. Did he bypass channels to get things done?

H. Oh frequently, yes. He wouldn't hesitate. I recall in the AF Combat Command. One day when I was on duty, just a junior officer of the staff there. He said: "What in the hell is that B-17 doing that spent the night at Albuquerque?" He called it by number. He said: "I want to know why that airplane was there." He skipped every channel. I called right away to Albuquerque and found out the airplane was there for a spark plug change.

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Q. He had come into Albuquerque, and saw the plane?

H. No, he read the detail report, and this is when each B-17 was a real precious piece of equipment. I tried to get him over to the Halpro project, remember that?

Q. Yes, did you get involved in that?

H. Well, we were moving them from AF Combat Command. Before I went to the staff, up till March 7th.

Q. This was intended originally to bomb China, was it not?

H. Yes, it was.

Q. Bomb Japan?

H. Yes, actually it was to get, start the operation as they finally did with the B-29s, later into India.

Q. Did you get involved in the B-29 operation?

H. No, not until after the war.

Q. Arnold made another change in the B-29s. He cancelled out Hansell and brought LeMay in. Do you have any knowledge of that?

H. No, I don't. Except that LeMay's reputation.

Q. Well, LeMay didn't have a reputation in those days. Of course, he had done a great job with the 20th Bomb Com, but Hansell was one of Arnold's special favorites. After a short period Arnold got very impatient, and took him out.

H. Hansell was a damn good man, but his reputation was for being a staff officer.

Q. A theoretician?

H. Policy theoretician, but damned good staff man, whereas, I think LeMay was probably the finest combat commander.

Q. Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and sending them to far corners of the earth. Did you ever get sent by him somewhere?

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H. No, the only one I was aware of was when he nailed me for the General Staff and then, as I say, I tried to get out of it, and then Gen Miff Harmon, said: "Not a chance with Gen Arnold." He said: "I've talked to him," and he said, no, he just thought that's where I ought to go.

Q. Arnold was not an ideologue, a theoretician. He was concerned with the practical side of things.

H. Right, getting the job done.

Q. Did he get bored quickly at a briefing, if a man rambled on?

H. I don't think I ever saw him bored. I'd seen him get impatient.

Q. Cut a man off?

H. Cut him off, right.

Q. Walk out or

H. Well, he just went, that's all.

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Interview - Gen Hunter Harris, Washington, D.C. 28 April 1971

Q. Let's talk about WWII and your experiences with Gen Arnold. You were in the Ruropean theater? Did you see Arnold when he came to visit on several occasions? He was there in '42 and '43.

H. I was not in Europe at that time. I didn't go until the summer of '13, actually, the spring of '43. My experience before then, I know that one of the major projects that Gen Arnold undertook was a reorganization of the Dept of the Army, which was the War Dept at that time. I was stationed as Judge Patterson's pilot and stationed at Bolling Field. The reorganization plan which Larry Kuter undertook as a major effort, and under Spaatz and McNarney's and Marshall's direction, actually formed on March 7, 1942. At that time, 50% of the General Staff officers were selected from the Army Air Forces. I was on that first selection group.

Q. Right, Gil Harrison and Kuter, and I guess Otto Nelson?

H. Otto Nelson had a lot to do with it.

Q. And McNarney, was the chief AF man. I want to ask you about that particular thing. That was sort of a halfway house type of reorganization. There were some in the AAF who wanted to go all the way. Hugh Knerr wanted it. Were you aware of his idea?

H. I was not really aware of Gen Knerr's direction, because I was in the AF Combat Command at that time, initially under Gen Emmons. As soon as the war started, I was transferred from Bolling operations to the Combat Command.

Q. This plan that came into effect in March was an attempt to short circuit another effort by Knerr. Knerr was pushing Andrews to go all out for a separate AF. And Andrews was sort of acquiescent. He was sort of non-committal, but there were a number of people. There was an attorney down in Florida named Paul Scott, who was very active in this. Did you know his role?

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H. No, I didn't know him.

Q. Several others were involved in this. There is a letter that I have seen from Knerr to Andrews, in which he said: "Arnold beat up to the punch," so to speak, and he blamed this McNarney Plan on Arnold. Arnold had this compromise plan put through in order to beat the all-out guys who were pushing at Congress, trying to get Congress to vote for a separate AF.

H. Well, in the few contacts that I had with Gen Arnold, you might consider in this vein. I always thought that Gen Arnold was 100% for a separate AF, too. However, I'm sure at that time, having been on the fringes on it, been selected for that first group, I think Gen Arnold felt, as did Gen McNarney too, that that wasn't the time to push it, and we had a real big war on our hands.

Q. Do you think he had a commitment to Marshall to hold the line until the end of the war?

H. That I don't know.

Q. Did he ever talk to you about that?

H. No, he didn't

Q. Of course, Marshall gave the AAF autonomy without legal separation?

H. I talked to one of the gentlemen who were very close to Gen Arnold on this. This was General Millard F. Harmon. Gen Miff Harmon at that time was still on the staff, I believe, of one Combat Command. He personally was organizing this selection.

Q. I think at that time, he was the No. 2 man on the Air Staff.

H. Right.

Q. When Spaatz moved out to the 8th AF in the Spring of '42.

H. But he told me, I know, how essential it was that Air officers be introduced into the staff, because I tried to get out of it. I wanted to get on out with the Bomber Command and go to the 8th AF. As a

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matter of fact, I had an offer of a job to go with Leon Johnson on the first cadre. He said: "If you can get yourself sprung." Well, I couldn't, and Gen Harmon, whom I had known for years and years, he said: "I'm sorry Hunter, but," he said "Gen Arnold personally selected this staff." He said: "It's extremely important, and you won't have to spend too much time there" but it was extremely important that the General Staff be adequately covered by Air officers.

Q. How did the War Dept General Staff react to the infiltration of Air people?

H. I think there were mixed emotions. I think the objective people who were appreciative of the Air effort, except, well, there were lots of old timers who thought we were really a bunch of whippersnappers coming in. I was a lot junior. Jim McCormick - who I was just talking to - and I, we were two of the junior officers on that General Staff. There was some resistance, and also, they were a little jealous of our coming in. I certainly was not an experienced staff officer, so I had a lot to learn, getting in with some of these old pros.

Q. Was Kuter in there?

H. Yes, Kuter was there at that time, and then he left the General Staff and went on special planning board for a short time with General Arnold.

Q. What were some of the issues that came up involving the AAF?

H. Well, the ones I was most familiar with were in G-3, which was responsible for Training & Organization. The particular one that I had to carry the ball on as an action officer, I really remember, and that was organic aviation. There was very strong feeling on the part of the AAF that the Army should not have organic aviation, that it should be provided by the AAF, I must admit I had a devil of a time trying to write this paper, because I wrote an original position, and it was

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reversed, and reversed, and reversed, until it finally got to Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall actually made the decision to authorize some units of organic aviation. These were mainly in the area of battlefield command reconnaissance and small airplanes, liaison type. But it did not include, as I recall - possibly did include some artillery spotting - but the units were relatively small, and I personally didn't see anything wrong with the organic decision as it came out. However, there was a very strong resentment on the part of a lot of AAF people.

Q. Why?

H. They felt that the AAF should run all the air, and should furnish the equipment and units for the Army.

Q. Looking at it from the other side.

H. We were all still quite interested in the eventual solution that you mentioned, which was a separate AF.

Q. There were some in the Army who felt the AF wasn't giving enough tactical air support?

H. Yes, they felt that we were inclined to put top priority - and this is not my viewpoint - but it's the viewpoint that was given by somebody in the opposition.

Q. Who were some of the tope people who felt that the AAF ought to get more tactical support? We are talking about some War Dept types, who, at the top level, were unhappy about the tactical air situation?

H. I think, mostly Air Staff were against this organic aviation, because it looked like that eventually it would create some sort of a cleavage within the AF and when the final AF did come along, that some of the work for which they were specifically trained and suited best to do would be passed on to the Army. I can't pin down any people other than...

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Q. I'm thinking of Army people?

H. Army people....

Q. Who felt we were not giving them adequate support. They wanted their own tactical air, and they claimed we were obsessed with strategic and were not giving them the kind of support they needed. I'm thinking of Lesley McNair. Are you familiar with his position?

H. Yes, now, I know that, I flew the GHQ AF staff on occasion, one visit to Cape Cod, when they were inspecting a National Guard Division. In that staff, I heard, I got to talk with Gen McNair and also Mark Clark, who was the Artillery officer at that time. I think he was LT COL Artillery Officer on the Staff. And the general feeling, this is the old GHQ before the war,

Q. 1939?

H. That would have been '40 or '41. The Army, in general, and I think it is fair to say that Mark Clark, Gen McNair, I think all felt that they should have their own tactical air.

Q. How did Arnold feel about this?

H. Well, in my own personal opinion, Arnold was a strong complete separate AF man, that I've ever talked t. And this goes way back, I mean, back to 1933. But at this time, you see. I really didn't as a pilot and a very junior officer.

Q. You really weren't privy to...

H. Really wasn't privy to this. There were a few things that went on in the General Staff during that 8 months that I was on the staff, before I managed to get loose and go over and join the 8th. I don't recall any specific people on the War Dept General Staff. I know that the G-3, Gen Idwal Edwards...

Q. How about the Army side, Stanley Gerow?

H. I had no contact with him.

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Q. Was Stanley Embick out of there?

H. I think he was, I don't remember him on the staff at all because at that time the OPD was...

Q. Tom Handy, was it?

H. Tom Handy may have been.

Q. Or Hull?

H. Hull was, yes. Hull I got to know later on, considerably after that, in Japan. A very fine man.

Q. What was McNarney's official job at that time?

H. He was, as I recall, he was Deputy to Marshall. He actually acted as more than an Air Deputy. He was really a straight Deputy. McNarney, really, I think pretty much ran the staff. He was a very superior staff man, and of course he was very loyal to his boss, and he had to be.

Q. Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

H. I don't ever recall seeing them together.

Q. How about at a briefing, where somebody was briefing, and some issues that arose. Did you ever notice any discussions between them?

H. No, and I don't recall any briefings that I attended of the high level types that you are mentioning between Arnold and Marshall. I worked in the General Staff in those days. It was handled in the old style where the action officer carried a piece of paper right through. He came in, was given, presented the paper and position. Then it will be changed from one office to another, you see, as it went up the line. But I do know this is one of the most difficult staff papers I had to handle. It was reversed in almost every office, my own boss, a Colonel Madgett, an old timer, who later became an Army general. I've forgotten what his job was.

Q. Did ASW come up? Did you get involved in that?

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H. ASW, I did not get involved in it. I know that in the ASW mission, we were unhappy about the solution because, as you know, the AAF carried the ball initially on the ASW. They had the only equipments that had the extended range, the B-18 at that point.

Q. How about control of anti-aircraft? Did you get involved in that?

H. I did not get involved in it there. I got involved in it in the theater, when I was in the 8th AF. We had many, many arguments, when I was in Operations, out there in the Air Division under Pat Patridge. The Army was always trying to extend pretty far zones, and insisting that we stay out. As a matter of fact, there were certain entry points in the UK where we, if we intruded, our people would be shot at.

Q. Let's talk about the 8th AF, the B-17s. Arnold came out there Labor Day, I think we started talking about this the other day. He stayed about a week or 10 days. This was after the first Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid. There was some unhappiness, as a result of that, and the fact that the 8th AF, deep penetration type raids, tapered off shortly thereafter. Were you in on any of that?

H. I was in on the, at the time, I had just taken the first replacements over for the 8th AF, a small group of replacements. I was there. I flew a mission just before the Regensburg mission. I had permission to fly one mission, and then go back and train another group. I do know in my conversations, though, with Fred Anderson and others, while I was visiting the 8th AF Hqs. and, of course, General Eaker, that there was a real good reason for dropping off some of the deep penetrations because we were fresh out of replacements. They were quite low when I took those first 30 crews over. They could only fly, they would alternate, more or less, on the deep missions, .. shallow penetrations and submarine pens and so forth, in France. Because the losses were about doubled. They were running around 8%

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inside, and about 4% over France, as I recall. It was just a question of not having enough crews and airplanes, and it was a very costly mission.

Q. Right. On so-called Black Thursday, Oct 14th, they lost 60 planes.

H. That was '43?

Q. '43.

H. I reported November, I reported back the second time.

Q. About the time you reported, there were no more deep penetrations. There were no deep penetrations between Black Thursday and perhaps for 2 or 3 months.

H. I know that when we started again, when I started combat operations, which was around the 1st of December, mostof our penetraions were shallow, and it was because of the losses..

Q. Arnold was rather unhappy. Were you aware of his unhappiness?

H. I think I was, yes.

Q. Did it get down to your level?

H. Yes.

Q. I talked about "The Big Switch." This is the decision to move Eaker to the Mediterranean and Spaatz up there. They brought in Jimmy Doolittle, and made a lot of changes. Idwal Edwards went down. A lot of changes around the turn of the year.

H. Yes, it was a little after that.

Q. What is your comment about that change?

H. Well, here again, I didn't have any inside knowledge of the requirement for change. I know that we were a little surprised , in a way. Eaker had done a terrific job in getting that organization going. He'd done a fine job, and we assumed that it was a time for a shift, that Ge Doolittle was extremely well known, and both those superior combat commanders. I didn't notice any great change in policy/

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Q. No, there wasn't any great change in policy.

H. No change in policy. We went on the same way we started.

Q. That's correct.

H. Those penetrations, deep penetrations, from where I sat, which was England, were strictly on the basis of availability and trying to hold the force, and also trying to speed up the fighter escort.

Q. How did Eaker feel about the transfer. On paper he was being promoted, because it was a joint command. It was the Mediterranean Allied Air Force. How did he feel about it?

H. I don't know. I really don't. If I did, I would prefer not to quote anybody.

Q. In my reading of it, he was very unhappy. In my reading of it, also, this caused a schism between Arnold and Eaker which was never healed by the end of the war.

H. You know that Arnold and Eaker had been such close friends. They had written together.

Q. Had written several books together...

H. Boys' books, articles.

Q. Well, Arnold was a very impatient man. If you couldn't get results, he wanted some change. Do you feel that he was impulsive in this decision?

H. I don't believe so.

Q. You think he was justified in what he did?

H. Well, I'm not saying that.

Q. All this is for my background. What you say is not going to be quoted in any book. I mean I'm trying to get a feel. Either Arnold was impulsive or he was justified or something. It's one or the other?

H. I think Gen Arnold was an impulsive man. That's the way he did things, and I think that was one. Although a lot of people were not

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happy with this impulsiveness. That was one of the reasons that Gen Arnold could always get things done, because he sort of pushed, well, everything, friendship. He just had one objective in mind, and that was to get going. Actually, there was some unhappiness there. I worked both for Gen Eaker and Jimmy Doolittle. A lot of us felt, and I'm sure that Eaker did, too, that he had been through the real rough part. It was extremely tough the first part of the war, and felt ashamed, as things became easier, equipment came in, and fighter escort came in, that he seemed ashamed to make the change right at that moment.

Q. It seemed that he had all the tough going, and then when the P-51s came in, when it got easier...

H. The whole picture changed, as evidenced by the tremendous drop in casualties.

Q. Do you think Arnold shot from the hip in that respect?

H. What do you mean?

Q. In moving Eaker out of there, in not giving him a chance to finish his job?

H. I just think he thought it was time for a change. Of course, Eaker was under tremendous pressure in England. One real interesting story I remember. This was told me by Gen Doolittle. I heard him say it more than once, because I asked him to use it when he was doing a testimonial for Eaker out at the AF Academy, and he did. He was looking for a story and I said: "Well, here's a real good one that I've heard, They were honoring Eaker, you see. So Jimmy Doolittle's side of the story was that when Eaker left England, he was honored, presented and knighted by the King of England. The King of England, of course, stuttered badly, it was well known, that he stutte[illegible] speech. Gen Doolittle reported in to duty and of course one of his first calls was to make a courtesy call on the King. So after he was ushered

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into the Grand Buckingham Palace, the room where he was to meet with the King, he came in, and he said: "G-g-general Doolittle, we are delighted to have you here in England,! And he said: "Of course, we are certainly going to miss Gen Arnold and Gen Eaker." Eaker and Jimmy have since, they've become close friends. And I know from my personal experience that they both admire each other, no hard feelings.

Q. Yes, as a matter of fact, most people I have talked to strongly admire Eaker. My own reading of the material was that he felt bitter about leaving.

H. I think he did...

Q. Being taken out just when he was ready to profit from all the preliminary efforts that went into building that force.

H. I'll say one thing though, that there was no bitching on Eaker's part.

Q. he took his medicine?

H. Yes.

Q. I heard that Spaatz refused to take that job unless they put through a facade of promoting Eaker. Eaker was moved from the 8th AF to the MAAF. It was an appearance of being promoted to a joint command. So they went ahead and did that. But, somebody reminded me of what they do in NY when they want to move a precinct Captain out. They move 16 guys in different directions to obscure this one key change that they want to make. Is this a fair analysis of what happened?

H. I don't know.

Q. Okay. Let me ask you about the P-51. This is a favorite subject of historians. Why was the P-51 so late in coming on the scene? Do you have any thoughts on that?

H. We.., yes, I think we were aware way back in the middle '30s, late 30s, when we used to go and visit North American, from

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March Field in 1935, 1936, that North American had a real fine design on the fighter. This initial airplane, the number of which escapes me was made for a

Q. P-36

H. No, that was another make, that was a Curtiss. North American had another airplane that was built, hopefully, Dutch Kindelberger wanted. I knew Dutch pretty well. He wanted to build this airplane for the AF. The first order was made to a foreign country, because I recall seeing the instruments, and so forth. I believe it was Sweden. I think the AF could have gotten those airplanes quite early.

Q. The original P-51 had the Allison engine. It wasn't any good. It wasn't until the British put the Merlin in it that it was recognized?

H. That's right.

Q. And I'm told that Tommy Hitchcock was among the first to recognize the P-51?

H. That I didn't know.

Q. How did Arnold feel about the P-51?

H. I don't recall particularly how he felt about it. I know that most of us were quite enthusiastic. Some of this may be colored by hindsight rather than foresight, but it appeared that the combination of the P-47 and the P-51 was an excellent pair because the P-51 was so good for the air work, and had good range, and the P-47 was so durable and would stand a lot of ground fire.

Q. Arnold was unhappy with Wright Field because they delayed in getting these wing tanks. You know, at the time, the P-51s weren't quite there, and they needed to put some wing tanks or belly tanks on the P-47s and the P-38s. This was right after those two disastrous losses we suffered. Wright Field didn't seem to come up with answers.

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H. I'm afraid I can't give any background on that one.

Q. They were buying them from the British, these cardboard tanks, do you remember?

H. Yes, remember that.

Q. You have no feel for why, what happened?

H. Don't have any feel for particularly, the Wright Field aspect of it.

Q. Let me ask you about the rotation policy for the 8th AF. This was a sore point on several counts. What was the nature of the problem

H. I think, we heard an awful lot of discussion about 25 missions and 30 missions and 35 for the bombers and corresponding exposure to combat for the fighter men. I can speak a little bit from both sides. The fighter losses were considerably less than the bomber losses. They had to put in more time, of course, a lot more time in combat - just the nature of their work. The fact that on bombing runs, we found rather early in the war - I say "we". Actually, it was LeMay more than amybody else. That if you wanted to hit a target, you really had to get on a bomb run and hold it, I recall, something like the final four minutes or so, four to seven minutes, in that bracket. I you really got on a bomb run, so that you could take advantage of the best bombardier, etc. The first rotation policy is based on 25 missions, and actually all it did was give a crew an even break. The losses, I know in my outfit, ran about 4%.

Q. You said, even break, this means after 25 missions you had a 50-50 chance of getting home?

H. Yes, either that or in the early part it was, when they were suffering, as I recall, the figure, it was about 8% on the deep penetrations and about 4% on the shallow penetrations. You couldn't do too many 8 percent missions, of course. Too far. I personally favored the

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rotation policy, and I think we needed it for morale purposes. We needed also to get experience back, because we were on a tremendous expansion program. I thought it was a fair policy.

Q. How did Arnold feel about it?

H. That I don't know. I know one thing that Arnold did. He felt very strongly about getting professionals. For that reason, and others, why eleven West Pointers were assigned to me fresh out of school. I think one of the reasons I was a West Pointer myself and they felt I'd give them an even break. I think anybody would have given them an even break. We didn't differentiate. However, Arnold did insist on getting the young professional regulars into combat. He had as much to do with it as anybody.

Q. This rotation policy was a particular point of interest to him. He never had combat. He missed it in the first war. He didn't get there in time. So he was, vulnerable, you might say, to some of his key staff officers who wanted to get overseas. This created a problem, because some theater commanders didn't want to take people from outside. They wanted to promote their own people. I'm thinking of Kenney. Of course, this is another theater. Did you encounter that in ETO?

H. That was in the ETO. They had some reputations for being close corporations. I think in general most combat commanders preferred to bring their own people up, because they had been exposed, and they were experienced, and they thought they had it coming to them. There was some resentment on bringing over full Colonels and putting them directly in command of groups.

Q. This brings me to ask you, you came back to P[illegible]e of Arnold's favorite expressions was: "Let's get rid of the deadwood." He said this in correspondence many times.

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H. He was very rough on non-producers.

Q. Was this a problem of superannuated Colonels who had been around a long time, and didn't quite cut it, and nobody wanted to take them overseas? You had to find some place for them? There were more of them than you had places overseas. What did you do?

H. I think, in general, I think this is an area which is, I won't say, controversial, but divided opinion. I think in general they tried to select people who were best suited for it. And I do know, too, the major commanders had an awful lot to say about whether or not they would accept certain Colonels. So that in general, that screening process occurred before they arrived, certainly in the case of the senior Colonels. I know once I was replaced in the wing, a BG, an oldtimer had been away on a special job in Russia. He came back, and my Division Commander very kindly said: "Sorry, Hunter, I've been directed to take this gentleman back. And he did take him back, but he didn't stay very long, and Pat Partridge put me back into a wing job.

Q. Did you get involved in FRANTIC, the shuttle bombings?

H. No, I didn't. My particular wing was not involved. Certain wings were selected.

Q. I was told very recently in an interview by somebody who was in Personnel, that Arnold had a "black list." These were Colonels who had not done the job for him somewhere along the line, and he didn't want them either sent overseas or promoted. Is this a fact?

H. That I can't answer. When I went back into Personnel, I can say this. Fred Anderson was brought back in by Gen Spaatz to head up A-1, by Gen Arnold, of course, and by Gen Spaatz. The first thing that Fred did was to take out a lot of the people who had been in the Personnel business all during the war, and he replaced most of them with, you might say, so called successful group and wing commanders,

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so we wound up with almost all the key jobs in Personnel, including Medal of Honor winners and everything else, like Leon Johnson. Others were brought in for most of the key jobs. There was, to my knowledge, and I can say this on the other side of the fence, I handled the Colonels' assignments, and handled quite a few Colonels who were being...

Q. Did you work with Stan Wray?

H. Yes, I took his job. Stan, the scoundrel, was supposed to go to West Point. His commander Stewart. Stan wanted to get out of there. He was Chief of Officer Assignments, and he got himself ordered away, and had me ordered in to replace him. Of course, I guess Fred Anderson was really the one who, I think Fred Anderson did it. However, I was not aware of any "black list" at that time, I was certainly aware of older Colonels whose performance - but it was strictly based on an ER, and not an individual.

Q. I've heard two versions of this particular thing, as to whether Arnold "held grudges". Some people say "no", that Arnold if he fired a guy, or put him on ice, is because the guy didn't do the job. Some other people have told me that anybody who didn't do a job way back, he remembered. He had a great memory for things like that. This guy never got another job. So he did hold grudges.

H. On the other hand, I remember, way back, in the case of officers who had damn fine records, and who had had good performances through the years, who got drunk and got disorderly on an occasion or two. Arnold, I thought, was extremely fair to protect those individuals, because they had been good performers. So really there are two sides. I've seen him protect a lot of people, and not because they were his boys. I can think of a couple of examples. When I was a youngster, senior officers were kept on who could just as well have been relieved.

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Q. I was told, for example, that he showed some partiality to people who came up with him on the West Coast - the March Field route - vs those who came up on the East Coast with Andrews.

H. I think, unfortunately, at that time, there were some cliques in the Air Corps. The Arnold clique was one; the Delos Emmons clique was another. I don't know about Gen Andrews. I don't think actually Gen Andrews entered into it.

Q. No. Gen Andrews was too kind a man. But there were some people, to cite a specific example. Tony Frank was closer to Andrews. Tony Frank wanted a combat command. Arnold never gave it to him. There are some who told me that Tony Frank shouldn't have had a combat command. He wasn't a combat commander. He was a supply man. What is your opinion?

H. Well, I knew Gen Frank slightly, and by reputation, and of course, he was well known by reputation. I think actually he was not the type I would select to move into a combat position.

Q. There are others, like Ralph Royce, who came up with Andrews. He didn't get too far with Arnold. He was one of the old timers. Those who came up with Arnold - Eaker and Spaatz went very high.

H. I think there again, I knew Ralph Royce quite well. During the Philippines I served with him. A damned fine man, too. But at that stage of the game, I think that there were younger, more aggressive types to do the job.

Q. I'm sort of challenging you on some things I have heard?

H. I know you are.

Q. One other thing. For example, on the Alaskan flight, there were no awards except one. There was one award of the L. Arnold. Nobody else got an award. There had been some resentment among those who went on the flight. I have been told that Arnold's

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loyalty was lateral, and upward, and not down to his boys, as far as promotions and recognitions are concerned.

H. I don't think that's right, because I've seen, Arnold did an extremely good job with young officers, and with enlisted men.

Q. Did he generate a lot of confidence and rapport with young people?

H. He did, but there were a lot of people afraid of him, too.

Q. Did they act out of fear, respect, or love, or a combination?

H. I think it was a combination of fear. There was no lack of respect. Some people thought he was hardheaded and impulsive. I think that is a good expression which you have used. But Arnold did also, I mean, as I mentioned earlier. He was awfully rough on non-producers. I don't mean that they were bums. But when you start selecting people for jobs, and he had to do it, he wanted to put people, who, he thought in in his own mind, were best qualified.

Q. He had several special favorites, Kuter and Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell - his so-called Advisory Council.

H. Right. I remember that group. They were a highly qualified group, lots of imagination and he picked them out because he knew they were good.

Q. They were sort of trouble shooters for him. Did he bypass channels to get things done?

H. Oh frequently, yes. He wouldn't hesitate. I recall in the AF Combat Command. One day when I was on duty, just a junior officer of the staff there. He said: "What in the hell is that B-17 doing that spent the night at Albuquerque?" He called it by number. He said: "I want to know why that airplane was there." He skipped every channel. I called right away to Albuquerque and found out the airplane was there for a spark plug change.

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Q. He had come into Albuquerque, and saw the plane?

H. No, he read the detail report, and this is when each B-17 was a real precious piece of equipment. I tried to get him over to the Halpro project, remember that?

Q. Yes, did you get involved in that?

H. Well, we were moving them from AF Combat Command. Before I went to the staff, up till March 7th.

Q. This was intended originally to bomb China, was it not?

H. Yes, it was.

Q. Bomb Japan?

H. Yes, actually it was to get, start the operation as they finally did with the B-29s, later into India.

Q. Did you get involved in the B-29 operation?

H. No, not until after the war.

Q. Arnold made another change in the B-29s. He cancelled out Hansell and brought LeMay in. Do you have any knowledge of that?

H. No, I don't. Except that LeMay's reputation.

Q. Well, LeMay didn't have a reputation in those days. Of course, he had done a great job with the 20th Bomb Com, but Hansell was one of Arnold's special favorites. After a short period Arnold got very impatient, and took him out.

H. Hansell was a damn good man, but his reputation was for being a staff officer.

Q. A theoretician?

H. Policy theoretician, but damned good staff man, whereas, I think LeMay was probably the finest combat commander.

Q. Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and sending them to far corners of the earth. Did you ever get sent by him somewhere?

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H. No, the only one I was aware of was when he nailed me for the General Staff and then, as I say, I tried to get out of it, and then Gen Miff Harmon, said: "Not a chance with Gen Arnold." He said: "I've talked to him," and he said, no, he just thought that's where I ought to go.

Q. Arnold was not an ideologue, a theoretician. He was concerned with the practical side of things.

H. Right, getting the job done.

Q. Did he get bored quickly at a briefing, if a man rambled on?

H. I don't think I ever saw him bored. I'd seen him get impatient.

Q. Cut a man off?

H. Cut him off, right.

Q. Walk out or

H. Well, he just went, that's all.

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Hegenberger, Albert F. 29 May 70
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

May 26, 1970.

Dear Dr. Murray,

My residence is not in Maitland but 4 miles east of Winter Park. I suggest you call phone me at 671-8450 (Winter Park) when you arrive and we can arrange to meet. Sincerely A. Hegenberger.

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

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Erik Nelson
Hawaii

Maj Gen Wm O Ryan
Del Mesa Carmel
Carmel Calif

C/S to Martin

May 21, 1970

M/Gen Albert F. Hegenberger, USAF(Ret)
Route 1 - Box 76 -
Maitland, Florida 32751

done
5-29-70

Dear General Hegenberger:

My plans have firmed up. I expect to be in the Maitland area on Friday 29 May or Saturday 30 May.

I hope to see you at that time.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

10 AM

671-8457

Ear at McCoy Record
1/4 mi - 436 Reading N.
12 miles - to 426
Winter Park &
Golden Rod
2 miles to Greeley Road
R - Grocery - Supermarket - Post Office
on 426 - 1.5 miles
Steel off Turkey Lake Rd -
3/10 mile

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1 April 1970

Maj. General Albert F. Hegenberger, USAF (Ret.)
Route 1 - Box 76
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Hegenberger:

I have run down that "imaginary" plan to defend Pearl Harbor with 180 B-17's and 36 torpedo planes, which was sent to General Arnold by General Freddie Martin through General Short under date of 20 August 1941.

If you have time to read it through, I think you will agree it is, indeed, a remarkable report. It virtually predicts that, if ORANGE (the Japs) attacks, they would come in from the northern sector using a maximum of six carriers. The authors of the plan postulated four different times of the day and then suggested a dawn attack as the most likely possibility. Their recommendation for a 360° search, using 72 B-17D's (the rest in reserve), would enable us to detect such an attack during the daylight hours of D minus 1 and thwart it. General Martin's covering letter suggested that these 180 planes would assure "a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands...without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action."

My great interest now is to find out what happened to that report when it came to Washington. I have seen no response to that communication, hence the reference to a mysterious void in the files.

I hope to see you in a couple of months.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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March 30, 1970

Maj Gen Albert F. Hegenberger, USAF(Ret)
Route 1 - Box 76
Maitland, Fl 32751

Dear General Hegenberger:

I'm delighted to have your recent letter and the copy of the letter of February 24th from General Bill Streett. Loosbrock, Bruce Arnold and I were down to see him last October.

General Streett was not feeling especially well when we arrived but after he got thinking back a quarter of a century to his close association with General Arnold, he just poured it out. It's amazing how the mind controls the body.

As to the War Plan, it's not a figment of anybody's imagination. I saw a copy of it in General Arnold's papers. It was sent to Washington two ways, first, via Lt. General Walter Short who wrote "I concur" on it. A second copy was sent to General Arnold directly with a transmittal letter from Maj. General Fred Martin.

In some handwriting other than General Arnold's, the words "To Spaatz" are written on the copy I saw. There was no answer in the files, either to the copy that came via the War Department General Staff, or the one which came directly to General Arnold in August 1941. This is uncharacteristic of General Arnold because he answered everything.

My thesis is that there must have been an answer which, in the light of Pearl Harbor, could have been embarrassing, hence a zealous staff officer could have expunged it from the files. This is not a wild assumption because one tabbed item from the War Plan file seems to be missing, with no explanation.

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Actually Generals Arnold and Marshall had a reasonable explanation of their de-emphasis of Hawaii. 180 B-17s were extremely hard to come by. Moreover they expected any attack, if it did occur in the Pacific, to hit the Philippines. Hence, the priority reinforcements of B-17s to the Far East, 12 of which happened to stumble into Hickam in the midst of the attack with dismantled guns.

Farthing and Coddington are dead now but Elmer Rose is in San Antonio, Texas. I shall see him within the month. Perhaps when I see you, I'll know more than I know now.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

P.S. Sent copy to Bill Stutt

P.S. Copy to AAF 142-3 Hinton

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January 30, 197

Major General Albert F. Hegenberger, USAF (Ret)
Route No. 1, Box 76
Maitland, Florida

Dear General Hegenberger:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I recently returned from a trip through the South and in fact spent a day in Orlando where I saw Generals Kepner and P.D. Weikert. However, I had been consulting an out-of-date roster which did not show your address as Maitland, Florida. In any event, I must make another visit to Florida later this year and I would like very much to talk to you at a time and place convenient for you.

You were probably associated with General Arnold on several occasions, and also, you might have some information on a great big mystery we have not yet been able to solve. I have in mind:

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1. Mid-1930's when you were at Rockwell, and later at March Field.

2. You spent the pre-war and the early war years in Hawaii. I wonder if you are familiar with a war plan that was drafted by Colonel Farthing, Major Elmer Rose and Captain Laurence Coddington in the summer of 1941. They asked for 180 planes to preclude a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This plan came in to Washington and apparently disappeared from the files.

3. The 2nd Air Force caused General Arnold many headaches during the regime of Davenport Johnson and others. Perhaps you can tell me something about that.

Please let me know what your schedule will be in the months ahead. I would very much like to see you because I know you can help us answer some puzzling questions.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Air Information Division

MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT FRANCIS HEGENBERGER

Albert F. Hegenberger was born at Boston, Massachusetts, September 30, 1895. He attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology and entered the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps as a private on September 14, 1917.

He was graduated from the School of Military Aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in December, 1917, and that same month proceeded to Ellington Field, Texas, where he earned his wings and received the rating of Reserve Military Aviator. He was appointed a second lieutenant in the Aviation Section of the Signal Reserve April 6, 1918.

He then served successively at Camp Dick, Dallas, Texas; School of Aerial Observers, Post Field, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; School of Aerial Gunnery, Taliaferro Field, Texas; Park Place, Texas, and in October, 1918 entered the School of Aeronautical Engineering of Massachusetts Institute of Technology at Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Upon graduating in February, 1919, he became chief of the Instrument Branch at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio. Subsequently, he served as assistant engineer of the Equipment Section of the Air Service Engineering Division at McCook Field. In the meantime, he was commissioned a second lieutenant, Air Service, in the Regular Army July 1, 1920.

He joined the 72nd Bombardment Squadron at Luke Field, Hawaii, in October, 1923; and later served as operations officer of the Fifth Composite Group. In March, 1925, he was transferred to the 23rd Bombardment Squadron at that field.

Returning to the United States in October, 1926, he became chief of the Equipment Branch of the Air Corps Materiel Division at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio. In July, 1927, he was appointed chief of the Instrument and Navigation Unit at that same station.

He joined the 30th Bombardment Squadron at Rockwell Field, California, in August, 1935, and the following October became commanding officer of that squadron. He later moved with this unit to March Field, California, where he served until August, 1937. He then enrolled in the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama. He was graduated in June, 1939, and assigned to Hickam Field, Hawaii, as operations officer of the Fifth Bombardment Group. In February, 1940, he became operations officer of the 18th Wing at Hickam Field. He moved to Fort Shafter, Hawaii, the following November to become Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the Hawaiian Air Force, and in April, 1941, was designated commanding officer of the 11th Bombardment Group at Hickam Field.

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He subsequently commanded the 18th Bombardment Wing and the Seventh Bomber Command at Hickam Field until July, 1942. From August to October, 1942, he was assistant chief of staff for operations of the Second Air Force, and commanding officer of the Second Bomber Command at Fort George Wright, Washington.

In October, 1942, he assumed command of the 21st Bombardment Wing at Salina, Kansas, and later moved with that wing to Topeka Army Air Base, Kansas. In January, 1944, he was assigned to duty with the Second Air Force at Colorado Springs, Colorado, as chief of staff. In January, 1945, he was named chief of staff of the 14th Air Force in the China theater of operations. In August, 1945, he became commander of the 10th Air Force in the same theater.

Returning to the United States in December, 1945, he was assigned to AAF headquarters for duty with the AAF Officers Selection Committee. In July, 1946, he went to FACUSA headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, and two months later became commanding general of the First Air Division.

He returned to the States in December, 1947, and was assigned to USAF headquarters for duty with the Special Weapons Group, of which he later was appointed chief. In July, 1948, he was designated assistant to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, for Atomic Energy.

General Hoegenberger has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit and Distinguished Flying Cross with one Oak Leaf Cluster. He is rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer, and Aircraft Observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant on July 1, 1920; to captain on January 3, 1932; to major (temporary) on October 2, 1935; to major (permanent) on August 15, 1939; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) on December 30, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on December 18, 1941; to colonel (temporary) on January 5, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) on September 18, 1943; to major general (temporary) on September 7, 1945; to brigadier general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, with date of rank from September 19, 1943.

E N D

Up-to-date as of 6 August 1948.

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Dr. Murray Green

Dear Dr. Green,

Sorry I have been so tardy in replying to yours of Jan. 30th. Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to Gen. Truett and his reply.

Barring some unexpected event I do not plan to be absent the early summer but am uncertain about later. If you will let me know the date of your visit I will certainly try to arrange to meet you and give you whatever information I can regarding Gen. Arnold.

Albert F. Hegenberger
Maj. Gen. U.S.A.F. Ret.

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ST. CLAIR STREETT
MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.A.F., RET.
(CALVERT COUNTY)
LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657

February 24, 1970

Dear Hege,

It was good to hear from you and I hope that you and Judy are both well. Mary is doing this writing for me since my writing hand is in poor shape after the intravenous feedings I have been subjected to during my visits to Andrews Base Hospital. (I have suffered from acute Emphysema for the past five years)

Mr John Loosbrock and Dr Green spent an entire afternoon here with me on the Arnold material. During the conversations the same questions about the "Mystery" were asked me and I was no help. I admit that my memory is faulty, but after searching my memory, I can say that there isn't the slightest indication that I ever heard of such a plan or much less that it was ever submitted to the War Department. Either you or I would most certainly have

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ST. CLAIR STREETT
MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.A.F., RET.
(CALVERT COUNTY)
LUSBY, MARYLAND

Known about it. Bill Ryan "God Bless his soul" might have known of it, but I doubt it. If there was such a war plan or a request for 180 airplanes it did not get to Washington for consideration. Or if it did, I wonder who gave Dr Green the story about it getting lost in the files. — a time-worn excuse.

Do you remember our CPX in December of 1940 in which we were told that our CPX would precede the Army CPX and that we would wind it up with a washed out air component that could not give any support to the Army.

Incidentally, it was your sure weather knowledge, and other help that Enabled Bill Farthing, Ken Walker and I to draw a scenario that accomplished what Hqs. Hawaiian Department wanted, without being too ridiculous. Unfortunately, it was a pretty good plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec 7, 1941, if by any chance they came by a copy of it.

Mary and I sent our best regards to you both, and if you come this way, be sure to come and see us.

Most sincerely
Bill Streett

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February 16, 1970

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett
Lusby, Md.

Dear Bill,

While the inclosed copy of Dr. Green's letter furnished the purpose for this letter, it caused me to do what I have wanted to do for years, viz., say "hello" to you and Mary and learn how life is treating you.

What I particularly am seeking is information bearing on paragraph 2 of Dr. Green's letter, labelled "The Mystery: As we all remember the Navy was adamant in its opposition to the Air Force participation in over water operations, especially reconnaissance or search. I think this was why Gen Martin, during my tenure as his Operations Officer, avoided submitting search plans I had prepared to the joint planning meetings we had with the Army and Navy. This led to cancelling my attendance at these meetings and started the build-up that resulted in you and I trading jobs on April 1, 1941.

As I recollect, you told me in September, 1941 that Gen. Martin and Adm. Bellinger, at long last, had signed and sent the request to Washington for the airplanes needed for the search.

The recollection I have carried is that this request stemmed from plans I had prepared. Can you enlighten me?

Incidentally I was told after Pearl Harbor(as I recollect by Brooke Allen) that the above request was the reason that Judge Roberts' investigation refrained from recommending a court-martial for Gen Martin, after he was relieved of command along with Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel.

Incidentally a greater mystery to me was the failure of Bill Farthing and Clint Coddington to mention to me that they had submitted a search plan. Bill and I discussed about every conceivable facet of operations almost on a daily basis up until after the battle of Midway. As for Coddington we were closely associated down here and re-fought the war for ten years until his death a few months ago.

I am deferring my reply to Dr. Green until after I hear from you. Should the cold and snow drive you South to this area we would appreciate a visit by you and Mary. You would be just as welcome in the summer too. Judy joins me in sending our very best wishes.

Albert F. Hegenberger
Maj. Gen. USAF Ret.
Rt. 1, Box 169
Maitland, Florida 32751

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March 30, 1970

Maj Gen St. Clair Streett, USAF(Ret)
Calvert County
Lusby, MD 20657

Dear General Streett:

Enclosed is a copy of my letter to General Hegenberger. It may be that the Farthing - Ken Walker - Bill Streett "scenario" later evolved as the 180 plane war plan to which I referred. In any event, the plan was not imaginary. Have you seen Harold Hinton's book, Air Victory? Enclosed are photostats of interest.

I hope you are well. Please extend my very best wishes to Mrs. Streett.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Encl
Cover ltr to Hegenberger
Hinton photostat

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Interview, Maj Gen Albert F. Hegenberger, Maitland, Fla 5 Jan 1972

Q We are talking about the famous report--Farthing-Rose-Coddington report which Freddie Martin sent to Hap Arnold in August 1941. You had a role in that report, drafting it?

H I edited it when I was Operations Officer for the Hawaiian Air Force under General Martin. I prepared a number of plans none of which prior to my release from that job had been approved and forwarded to higher authority. The interesting thing about the Rose-Coddington-Farthing plan is that it originated in three officers assigned to the Base Command which had the responsibility for logistic support for the tactical units and had nothing to do with the preparation of war plans.

Q Who were those three officers?

H Farthing, Rose, and Coddington.

Q I see what you mean. They were not Plans Officers?

H They were logistical officers.

Q Well, how did they get involved in it?

H That is an interesting point. How and who got them involved.

Q Do you know?

H I don't know. I didn't know they were involved in it...

Q Until I showed you a copy of the plan?

H Yes.

Q You were the Operations Officer?

H Up until Spring 1941.

Q Who was the Plans Officer?

H Operations and Plans were joint--the same. Bill Streett and I traded jobs.

Q What was Streett's first job?

H Comdg Officer 11th Bomb Group.

Q He took your Plans & Operations job and you took his 11th Bomb Group?

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H That's right.

Q Did Freddie Martin possibly feel that the Plans job was not being done completely in Hawaiian Air Force? Could he have farmed part of this job out?

H He might have felt that it wasn't going along the lines that he had wanted because these plans were coordinated with Army and Navy, regularly.

Q Admiral Bellinger?

H Joint meetings, and Admiral Bloch.

Q Com 14?

H No. He commanded the Naval district.

Q Naval District #14?

H Yes

Q Bellinger, what job did he have?

H He commanded the Navy air.

Q Could it be that they objected to this plan?

H Yes, they definitely did because--the peculiar thing--General Wm Ord Ryan, as Chief of Staff to Martin made it his practice to leave me out of the meetings. He'd go and attend these meetings.

Q Did he have a hearing problem then?

H Not that I noticed.

Q Your relationship with William Ord Ryan was not then of the best? Or was it just on his part?

H It was sort of neutral. It was on his part as far as his attitude. I think he was inclined to play good politics.

Q Did he outrank you then?

H Oh yes

Q He was then a colonel?

H I think he was a brigadier general.

Q And you were what?

H Colonel

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Q I see. You think that the fact that you did not know of the Farthing-Rose-Coddington Plan could have been due to William Ord Ryan cutting you out of the pattern?

H I think so.

Q You know William Ord Ryan didn't seem to know much about this plan, either

H Well of course he left some time before...

Q Before Pearl Harbor

H Yes. And Streett is the one that should have been able to put some light on it.

Q Streett wasn't able to do it you know. In fact Streett was surprised; Streett denied that there was such a plan. And I sent him a copy of it like I sent you one.

H What goes on? They were inclined to accept the Navy these joint war plans

Q You mean the--Washington was?

H No. Martin and...

Q Martin and Short?

H Martin and Short.

Q Billy Streett?

H No. Streett thought just like I did. We were very close.

Q Martin was head of the Hawaiian Air Force. And the head of the Army in Hawaii was Walter Short. And they were inclined to accept the Navy viewpoint?

H Yes

Q Was there a comfortable arrangement that the Army and Navy wouldn't bother each other. Each one had its own little bailiwick and--"don't intrude on my area, and I won't step on yours?" Was there anything like that?

H I think that there was in most areas of contact. Not completely, possibly.

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Q You wrote me a year ago--This is a letter from General Hegenberger to Green, December 31, 1970 in which he said: "I will have to claim credit for the estimate of the enemy's capability to attack with six carriers. In April the day after the occupation of Cam Ranh Bay by the Japanese, I recommended the amendment of our war plans to envisage a Japanese attack on Hawaii by six of their twelve aircraft carriers. This became feasible because land-based aviation could now support operations all the way to Singapore and, as Operations and Plans Officer for the Hawaiian Air Force, I so recommended to my commander, General Martin. General Martin remarked that"he would not have an officer on his staff who thought like that" and in a couple of weeks General Streett and I traded jobs. In subsequent conversations with Bill Farthing and others I repeated my estimate of six aircraft carriers." Let me ask you, General Hegenberger, why did he keep you on his staff? Why didn't General Martin fire you or something? Was he really mad at you?

H General Martin doesn't show if he is mad. Very quiet.

Q What did he think the estimate ought to be? He thought it was exaggerated?

H He didn't go into any explanations as to why he thought that this estimate was out of line.

Q Did you suggest that the carriers might come in from the north and attack at dawn? Or was this something Farthing and Coddington and Rose put together?

H We envisioned coming in from a short route. In other words, we envisioned much the same thing that the Japs did. Assembling in the northern islands for secrecy, then the shortest great circle route would bring them in at Midway.

Q What was General Martin's position? I mean, he didn't like your estimate. What was the officially-accepted estimate?

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H As far as the plans had developed, they figured that the first indication of any intention of the Japs to attack would be the discovery of a submarine lurking in the south side of the island of Oahu, In other words, as the Navy saw it, it was out of the question to launch an attack against an installation like the Hawaiian Islands without reconnoitering extensively, in particular the south of the island of Oahu. And the plan opened up with that statement to that effect. Actually, of course, they did have submarines there.

Q There was one found right in the entrance to the harbor. Did Martin--was he upset at your position?

H He seemed to be upset.

Q Why didn't he get rid of you?

H Well I suppose he did, eventually, when I traded jobs with Streett.

Q Even trading jobs, you were still under his command?

H Oh yes.

Q When did you come back to the States?

H I came back right after the Battle of Midway.

Q You were out there all that time. You saw some of this going on at the battle of Midway? You were out there when Emmons was there. Emmons was trying to build up his command, wasn't he?

H I don't know about that. I couldn't say. I know that he okayed my release which was later prepared by General Streett who was now back heading OPD in the War Department. And he wanted to set up an anti-submarine command. And wanted me to be returned to take command and General Walker, who was later lost in the South Pacific hand-carried a letter...

Q Ken Walker?

H Yes...prepared by Streett addressed to Emmons--delivered it to Emmons asking that I be released to go back.

Q Did Ken Walker deliver this when he was on his way out to the Pacific?

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H Yes. He came through with Whitehead.

Q Let's talk about Ken Walker for a minute. What do you remember about Ken Walker?

H I knew him as a very bright, intelligent individual; quick mind. And he kept well abreast professionally. There's an interesting aspect to his career that I picked up after I settle here. There's a Colonel Rogers over here at Lockhard. He sent to the South Pacific Command a group known as the"Jolly Rogers." And he was on the flight that Walker was shot down. He said that Walker was flying with the... the flight was made up of B-17's, and B-24's and Walker was flying one of the B-17's. Mostly planes as it had come out of the Philippines withdrawal and when the Jap Zeroes attacked they busted formation leaving Walker's plane wide open. It was just a pushover to shoot him down.

Q Somebody else was responsible for that? Somebody sort of cut and ran?

H Just poor air discipline.

Q Who was the leader of the flight?

H Of the entire flight, or the B-17's?

Q Who would you say would have been responsible for the poor air discipline?

H I suppose it's all of those who were... The only B-17's that I was familiar with down there were the ones that were withdrawn from the Philippines, and that was the 19th Group. And the original 19th Group of three squadrons was flown to the Philippines the September before the outbreak of hostilities, by Colonel Eubank. And it was bolstered by the addition of the 14th Squadron from my 11th Group, under the command of Rosie O'Donnell. So that constituted the group. Where the deterioration took place in training, I don't know. These were of course people rotated home, new additions added, fillers... But at least that's the story of Colonel Rogers. That was the breakup of the formation, instead of closing in tight.

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Q Was this Ken Rogers?

H No. Art Rogers. You can see him if you want to, I guess. He lives over here at Lockhart, Florida.

Q I'll tell Fredette. Art Rogers lives in Lockhart, a suburb of Orlando? (Yes) Do you have any other recollections of Ken Walker? I guess you were kinfolk in a sense if you were both in Plans. Did you ever have any discussions with him about War Plans or your business?

H Few and not extensive. Because we had to serve together until... Our occasions were meeting when we were both away from our other duties. Up until the time I came to duty at Hickam Field, Ken was getting reddy to leave. I moved in the house he vacated. Our meetings and discussions were on an infrequent basis at meetings here and there away from our home stations. But I liked Ken and everybody was impressed with the sharpness of--quickness of his mind. And he studied.

Q He was a student? A scholar?

H Yes, a student.

Q As you say it was a bad break for him that these guys scattered. They didn't hold their formation?

H At least he did not have anything to do with the air discipline of the outfit. He had just arrived a short time before.

Q Would he have been the senior officer of that unit?

H he was, I'm pretty sure, the senior officer on that flight.

Q (Ref to Maitland & Hegenberger. Maitland now retired. Episcopal clergyman)

H Something like that. He is now retired as an Episcopal parish priest. He's reformed. Emeritus. He's going to live there, apparently.

Q Do you ever communicate with him?

H Not for many years.

Q Those were great days?

H It gave us a job, when...

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Q Going back I read this statement from General Hegenberger to me December 31, 1970 "This statement of General Martin's that he would not have an officer on his staff who thought like that." General Hegenberger, I asked you about the F-C-R plan and I sent a copy to General Streett, and he never answered me. He was ill, so this is probably the reason. But you saw him subsequently, and asked him about the plan? Is that correct? Subsequent to our interview? You saw him after I was here?

H No, I didn't see him. I was harking back to another time that he had remarked that he had had an awful time getting that plan approved and forwarded for the reconnaissance, and that it finally went forward in September 1941.

Q Not in August? It was delayed.

H That's right.

Q Why was it delayed?

H I don't know.

Q But delayed somewhere up at the Martin-Bellinger level? Or Short level?

H Probably was. Later, while the Roberts Commission was still investigating, Brooke Allen mentioned the fact that Martin was depending upon the report that was forwarded in September to justify his innocence of any guilt connected with the attack.

Q Arnold thought he was innocent. I have a letter--I just came upon it recently--a letter from Arnold to Martin. It was a nice letter. This is after Martin came back to Washington and they were going to get him another job. So Arnold knew of the plan. He sent that plan directly to Arnold in August. Martin said: "I'm sending this out of channels because I want you to have it directly." And there was no answer to that letter of August. I believe it was August 25, 1941. There is no answer from Arnold. It is uncharacteristic of Arnold to have ignored

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a letter like that. He must have written some kind of response to it and that response, in my opinion--I have no evidence but circumstantial. In my opinion that letter was destroyed.

H Who would destroy it?

Q The day after Pearl Harbor Arnold came out to the West Coast.

H Arnold ordered the Landon outfit from Albuquerque into Sacramento and ordered us to the field, and they ordered us to take the planes from the Sacramento strip and fly them over to the takeoff. They turn them over to these people. The original plan was that way but the original plan provided that when we came in from Hawaii, that we would assume priority, and we were fixing the extra tankage up in the depots when Arnold came and switched it back again to the original plan.

Q Why?

H I don't know. I think he did it to get us all mixed up

Q When he was out there, he went off quail shooting with Donald Douglas the next day. On Pearl Harbor day he was out in Bakersfield shooting quail and he didn't hear about it until three hours later.

H Had to be secret, if it was to be effective at all.

Q Right. You think that most of the people in Hawaii, other than the Japs there, thought that the attack would come in on Hawaii?

H I think 90% of our Air Force people stationed in Hawaii--

Q Thought there would be an attack there. Did you think there would be an attack?

H Definitely.

Mrs. H. There was no doubt in my mind because he had stressed that. But I don't know how long over there. This was after this thing with Martin, and he felt that the Japs were--and he talked it that way all the time--I remember hearing a bull session.

Q Do you think that Martin switched you because you were talking that way?

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H I think it was a factor.

Q The one point that doesn't fit in to my understanding of it is that, if Martin had some hostility toward the plans you were developing why did he write this letter to Arnold sending the F-C-R plan to Arnold? This plan was based in large measure on the idea that you had come up with--six carriers, when they would attack, how they would attack, and so forth. According to our conversation, you had come up with many of these ideas. So they were, in effect, building on your plans. Was that a correct statement?

H Yes

Q And Martin bought their plan, but not your plan. Is that a fair statement?

H Yes

Q Apparently. Because he wrote Arnold this letter.

H Unless he changed his mind?

Q He could have changed his mind after you had left that job. Let's accept that. Okay, then Martin says this to Arnold, with a letter. "Dear Hap... I sent you a copy of the letter... Why didn't Arnold respond to it? At the bottom it says "to Spaatz". Spaatz was then Chief of Staff. Why didn't Arnold respond? I can't believe that he would not have responded.

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Interview, Maj General Albert F. Hegenberger, Maitland, Fla 5 Jan 1972

Q: We are talking about the famous report - Farthing-Rose-Coddington report which Freddie Martin sent to Hap Arnold in August 1941. You had a role in that report, drafting it?

H: I edited it when I was Operations Officer of Hawaiian Air Force under General Martin. We had a number of plans which prior to my release from that job had been approved and forwarded to higher authority. The interesting thing about the Rose-Coddington plan is that it originated in three offices assigned to the Base Command which had the responsibility for logistic support for the tactical units and had nothing to do with the preparation of war plans.

Q: Who were those three officers?

H:Farthing, Rose and Coddington.

Q: I see what you mean. They were not Plans Officers?

H: They were logistical officers.

Q: Well, how did they get involved in it?

H: That is an interesting point. How and who got them involved.

Q: Do you know?

H: I dont know. I didnt know they were involved in it...

Q: Until I showed you a copy of the plan?

H: Yes.

Q: You were the Operations Officer?

H; Up until Spring 1941.

Q: Who was the Plans Officer?

H: Operations and Plans were joint - the same. Bill Streett and I traded jobs.

Q: What was Streett's job?

H: Comdg Officer 11th Bomb Group

Q: He took your Plans & Operations job and you took his 11th Bomb Group?

H: That's right.

Q: Did Freddie Martin possibly feel that Plans job was not being done completely in Hawaiian Air Force? Could he have farmed part of this job out?

H: He might have felt that it wasnt going along the lines that he had wanted because these plans were coordinated with Army and Navy, regularly.

Q: Admiral Bellinger?

H: Joint meetings, and Admiral Bloch.

Q: Com 14

H: No, he commanded the Naval district

Q: Naval District #14?

H: Yes

Q: Bellinger, what job did he have?

H He commanded Navy air

Q Could it be that they objected to this plan?

H Yes, they definitely did because--the peculiar thing— General Wm Ord Ryan, as Chief of Staff to Martin made it his practice to leave me out of the meetings. He'd go and attend these meetings.

~~Q: Did he have a leaning problem then?~~
~~H: Not that I noticed.~~
~~Q: Did you ever have any problems with them~~

H Not that I noticed

Q Your relationship with William Ord Ryan was not then of the best? Or was it just on his part

H It was sort of neutral. It was on his part as far as his attitude, I think he was inclined to play good politics.

Q Did he outrank you then?

H Oh yes

Q He was then a colonel?

H I think he was a brigadier general

Q And you were what?

H Colonel

Q I see. You think that the fact that you did not know of the Farthing-Rose-Coddington Plan could have been due to William Ord Ryan cutting you out of the pattern?

H I think so

Q You know William Ord Ryan didn't seem to know much about this plan, either

H Well of course he left some time before....

Q Before Pearl Harbor

H Yes. And Streett is the one that should have been able to put some

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light on it.

Q Streett wasn't able to do it you know. In fact Streett was surprised, Streett denied that there was such a plan. And I sent him a copy of it like I sent you one

H What goes on? → They were inclined to accept the Navy ——? these joint war plans

Q You mean the --Washington was?

H No, Martin and ..

Q Martin and Short?

H Martin and Short

Q Billy Streett?

H No. Streett thought just like I did. We were very close.

Q Martin was head of the Hawaiian Air Force. And the head of the Army in Hawaii was ~~William Short~~ No Walter Short, And they were inclined to accept the Navy viewpoint?

H Yes

Q Was there a comfortable arrangement that the Army and Navy wouldn't bother each other. Each one had its own little bailiwick and --"don't intrude on my area, and I won't step on yours"? Was there anything like that?

H I think that there was in most areas of contact. Not completely possibly,

Q You wrote me a year ago--This is a letter from General Hegenberger to Green, December 31 , 1970 in which he said: "I will have to claim credit for the estimate of the enemy's capability to attack with six carriers. In April the day after the occupation of Cam Ranh Bay by the Japanese , I recommended the amendment of our war plans to envisage a Japanese attack on Hawaii by six of their twelve aircraft carriers. This became feasible because land-based aviation could now support operations all the way to Singapore. and, as Operations and Plans Officers for the Hawaiian Air Force, I so recommended to my commander, General Martin. General Martin remarked

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that he would not have an officer on his staff who thought like that and in a couple of weeks General Streett and I traded jobs. In subsequent conversations with Bill Farthing and others I repeated my estimate of six aircraft carriers." Let me ask you, General Hegenberger, why did he keep you on his staff? Why didn't he fire you or something? Was he really mad at you? ~~This is~~ General Martin.

H General Martin doesn't show if he is mad. Very quiet

Q What did he think the estimate ought to be? He thought it was exaggerated?

H He didn't go into any explanations as to why he thought that this estimate was out of line

Q Did you suggest that the carriers might come in from the north and attack at dawn? Or was this something Farthing and Coddington and Rose put together?

H We envisioned coming in from a short route. In other words, we envisioned much the same thing that the Japs did. Assembling in the northern islands for secrecy, then the shortest great circle route would bring them in at Midway.

Q What was General Martin's position? I mean, he didn't like your estimate. What was the officially-accepted estimate?

H As far as the plans had developed, they figured that the first indication of any intention of the Japs to attack would be the discovery of a submarine lurking in the southside of the island of Oahu. In other words, as the Navy saw it, it was out of the question to launch an attack against an installation like Hawaiian Islands without reconnoitering extensively, in particular in the south of the island of Oahu. And the plan opened up with that statement to that effect. Actually, of course, they did have submarines there.

Q There was one found right in the entrance to the harbor. Did Martin -- was he upset at your position?

H He seemed to be upset.

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Q Why didn't he get rid of you?

He Well I suppose he did, eventually, when I traded jobs with Streett.

Q Even trading jobs, you were still under his command? When did you come back to the States?

H: Oh yes.

H I came back right after the Battle of Midway.

Q You were out there all that time. You saw some of this going on at the battle of Midway? You were out there when Emmons was there. Emmons was trying to build up his command, wasn't he?

H I don't know about that. I couldn't say. I know that he okayed my release which was later prepared by General Streett who was now back heading OPD in the War Department And he wanted to set up an anti-submarine command. And wanted me to be returned to take command and General Walker, who was later lost in the South Pacific hand-carried a letter [redacted]...

Q Ken Walker?

H: Yes...prepared by Streett addressed to Emmons--delivered it to Emmons asking that I be released to go back.

Q Did Ken Walker deliver this when he was on his way out to the Pacific?

H Yes, He came through with Whitehead.

Q Let's talk about Ken Walker for a minute. What do you remember about Ken Walker?

H I knew him as a very bright, intelligent individual, quick mind. And he kept well abreast professionally. There's an interesting aspect to his career that I picked up after I settled here. There's a Colonel Rogers over here at Lockhart. He went to the South Pacific Command, a group known as the 'Jolly Rogers". And he was on the flight that Walker was shot down. ~~and~~ He said that Walker was flying with the... the flight was made up of B-17's, and B-24's and Walker was flying one of the B-17's, mostly, ——> planes as it had come out of the Philippines withdrawal and when the Jap Zeroes attacked they busted formation leaving Walker's plane wide open. It was just a pushover to shoot him down.

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Q Somebody else was responsible for that? Somebody sort of cut and ran?

H Just poor air discipline

Q Who was the leader of the flight?

H Of the entire flight, or the B-17's?

Q Who would you say would have been responsible for the poor air discipline?

H I suppose it's all of those who were. The only B-17's that I was familiar with down there were the ones that were withdrawn from the Philippines, and that was the 19th Group And the original 19th Group of three squadrons was flown to the Philippines the September before the outbreak of hostilities, by Colonel Eubank. And it was bolstered by the addition of the ~~fourteenth~~ 14th Squadron from my 11th Group, under the command of Rosie O'Donnell. So that constituted the group. Where the deterioration took place in training, I don't know. Subsequent Of course people rotated home, new additions added, fillers,... But at least that's the story of Colonel Rogers, ~~that it~~ That was the breakup of the formation, instead of closing in tight.

Q Was this Ken Rogers?

H No. Art Rogers. You can see him if you want to, I guess. He lives over here at Lockhart, Florida.

Q ~~Ill Tell~~ I'll tell Fredette. Art Rogers lives in Lockhart, a suburb of Orlando? (yes) Do you have any other recollaections of Ken Walker? I guess you were kinfolk in a sense if you were both in Plans Did you ever have any discussions with him about War Plans or your business?

H Few and not extensive. Because we had to serve together until... Our occasions were meeting when we were both away from our other duties. Up until the time I came to duty at Hickam Field, Ken was getting ready to leave. I moved in ~~his~~ the house he vacated, ~~into the same house he vacated.~~ Our meetings and discussions were on an infrequent basis

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at meetings here and there away from our home stations But I liked Ken and everybody was impressed with the sharpness of his quickness of his mind. And he studied

Q He was a student? A scholar?

H Yes, a student

Q As you say it was a bad break for him that these guys scattered, they didn't hold their formation?

H At least he didnot have anything to do with the air disciplines of the outfitting He had just arrived a short time before.

Q Would he have been the senior officer of that unit?

H He was, I'm pretty sure, the senior officer on that flight.

Q (Ref to Maitland & Hegenberger. Maitland now retired -Episcopal clergyman.

H Something like that, He's now retired as an Episcopal parish priest, He's reformed. Emeritus He's going to live there, apparently.

Q Do you ever communicate with him?

H Not for many years.

Q Those were great days?

H It gave us a job, when

Q Going back I read this statement from General Hegenberger to me December 31, 1970 "This statement of General Martin's that he would not have an officer on his staff who thought like that." General Hegenberger, I asked you about this F-C-R plan and I sent a copy to General Streett, and he never answered me. He was ill, so this is probably the reason. But you saw him subsequently, and asked him about the plan? Is that correct? Subsequent to our interview? You saw him after I was here?

H No, I didn't see him. I was harking back to another time that he had remarked that he had had an awful time getting that plan approved and forwarded for the reconnaissance, and that it finally went forward in September 1941.

Q Not in August? It was delayed. Why was it delayed?

H: That's right.

Q:

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H I don't know

Q But delayed somewhere up at the Martin-Bellinger level? Or Short level?

H PROBABLY WAS. Later, while the Roberts Commission was still investigating, Brooke Allen mentioned the fact that Martin was depending upon the report that was forwarded in September to justify his innocence of any guilt connected with the attack.

Q Arnold thought he was innocent. I have a letter--I just came upon it recently--a letter from Arnold to Martin. It was a nice letter. This is after Martin came back to Washington and they were going to get him another job. So Arnold knew of the plan. He sent that plan directly to Arnold in August. Martin said "I'm sending this out of channels because I want you to have it directly" And there was no answer to that letter of August. I believe it was August 25 , 1941. There is no answer from Arnold, and it is uncharacteristic of Arnold to have ignored a letter like that. He must have written some kind of response to it and that response, in my opinion--I have no evidence but circumstantial. In my opinion that letter was destroyed.

H Who would destroy it?

Q The day after Pearl Harbor, → Arnold came out to the West Coast

H: Arnold and he ordered Landon outfit from Albuquerque into Sacramento and ordered us to the field,

and they ordered us to take the planes from the Sacramento strip and fly them over to the takeoff , they and turn them over to these people. The original plan was that way but the original plan divided when we came in from Hawaii, provided that that we would assume priority, and we were fixing the after tankage → up in the depots when Arnold came and switched it back again to the original plan.

Q Why

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H Yes

Q And Martin bought their plan, but not your plan. Is that a fair statement?

H Yes

Q Apparently. Because he wrote Arnold this letter.

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Q He could have changed his mind after you had left that job. Let's

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accept that. Okay, then Martin says this to Arnold, with a letter. "Dear Hap ... I sent you a copy of the letter... Why didn't Arnold respond to it.? At the bottom it says "to Spaatz" Spaatz was then Chief of Staff.

Q: Why didn't Arnold respond.

I can't believe that he would not have responded.

END OF ~~THE HEGENBERGER INTERVIEW~~

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Bitsy to Ken Weeker

Serve 1-5-72

20314

24 November 1971

Maj General Albert F. Hegenberger, USAF (Ret)
Route 1, Box 169
Maitland, Florida 32751

Bear Dolly Lake

Dear General Hegenberger:

My Florida trip finally got untracked. Part of my mission is to help screen the papers of General Hugh Knerr who passed away last month at the Bethesda Naval Hospital. General Knerr directed that his papers be sent to the AF Academy.

In any event, as I project my schedule, I hope to be in your area on Wednesday, January 5th and Thursday, January 6th. I will be coming back through your area, heading North, on Monday, January 17th. I'm hopeful that one of these times is good for you.

I shoulM like to phone you when I get close, and we can set up an appointment. I dont have your number available. Perhaps you could send it to me in the attachment.

Very sincerely,

671.8450

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Erik Nelson dead
Maitland

Exit about Maitland

Tuskawilla Road
426
W. Lake Howell Rd
4 miles on 426
L. 3/10

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20314

26 May 1971

Maj General Albert F. Hegenberger
Route 1, Box 169
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Hegenberger:

I have your note which crossed my letter of the 20th in the mail. My plans to visit Florida are delayed until the Fall. I will call or write when things straighten out up here.

Look forward to getting together with you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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MAJ. GEN. ALBERT F. HEGENBERGER

ROUTE 1, BOX 169, MAITLAND, FLORIDA 32751

Dear Dr. Grear,

I expect to be at home and available the entire last week of May.

Sincerely,
Al Hegenberger

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20314

20 May 1971

Maj General Albert F. Hegenberger, USAF (Ret)
Route 1, Box 76
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Hegenberger:

Two subjects of interest:

1) I promised some months ago to send you a transcript of our talk last year. Here it is. If the matter still holds interest for you as it does for me, I hope you will read it through. Then, perhaps, you can tell me if there is anything you can add to what we said to clarify the Farthing-Coddington-Rose mystery. To answer your specific question, I have not yet gotten to the bottom of it, although I have tried. I was out to the West Coast and saw General William Ord Ryan; I was down to Texas to see Elmer Rose; and I was down to Florida to see you. I also talked with Billy Streett before he passed away, but we didnt go too deeply into this issue, partly because he was ill, and partly because I then did not realize his role in this operational planning.

In any event, I would like very much to come back and talk with you. Perhaps we can build on the material we already have, and perhaps there are some nuggets of information which, if added to what we have, will complete the puzzle.

2) This brings me to my forthcoming trip down South which has to be postponed for some months because of a new development in my work which must be pursued for the present. Right now, I'm thinking about October or November, and I'm hopeful you will be available in Maitland if, after looking over this material enclosed, you feel we can have a profitable discussion.

Whichever way it goes, I shall be in the Orlando area and will contact you when I come down.

On the Stratemeyer material, I will have to schedule a trip down to Maxwell. As a historian and amateur archivist, I would like to recommend that you consider giving your great material to the Library of Congress. Most of the historical scholarship is performed right up here in Washington. So if you want some historical good to come out of your records, the best place is where scholars have access to them. Secondly, there may be a tax benefit in endowing them to the Library of Congress.

I'll look forward to hearing from you. Meanwhile, very best wishes to Mrs. Hegenberger.

Sincerely,

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P.S. I just received a call from the Air Archives. They have about a drawful of material received from Mrs. Stratemeyer. So I'll have to make tracks down there, perhaps this Fall.

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20314

14 May 1971

Major General Albert F. Hegenberger, USAF Ret
Route 1, Box 76
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Hegenberger:

I hope to be making some interviews down in your area the last week in May and will try to look you up. When I get close, I'll phone for an appointment.

Your comments about your recommendations to amend the war plans are most intriguing. I will look forward for the opportunity of talking about them with you.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/ajp

Send prior transcript

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

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AFCHO/Dr Green/es/5 Jan 71

20314

AF/CHO

5 January 1971

Major General Albert F Hegenberger, USAF (Ret)
Route 1, Box 76
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Hegenberger

I have your letter of the 31st, and hope to get back to you at a later time with some specific questions on the Farthing&Coddington-Rose mystery. No, sir, I haven't yet cleared it up. I've gotten closer to the truth, but do not know why there was no reaction either way to the plan in Washington when General Martin sent it to Hap Arnold in August 1941.

I'm glad Mrs. Stratemeyer has made some of the General's files available to the Air University. Hope to get down to Maxwell later on.

As you may know, General Erik Nelson passed away some months ago in Hawaii. His family wrote back in response to my letter.

Best wishes to you and to Mrs. Hegenberger for a healthy, happy New Year.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Asst, Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

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December 31, 1970

Dr, Murray Green
Special Asst, Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Dear Dr. Green:

Sorry I am so late replying to your recent letter and hope I did not inconvenience you too greatly.

Mrs. Coddington stated that Gen. Coddington kept no files and that she had so stated in a reply to an official letter to her some time ago. Mrs. Stratemeyer divided Gen. Stratemeyer's files three ways giving the greater portion to the Air University at Maxwell Field. A second part went to the Church League of America at Wheaton Illinois. The balance, which she considered least important, was burned.

I hope by this time you have cleared up the Farthing, Coddington and Rose mystery. I will have to claim credit for the estimate of the enemy's capability to attack with six carriers. In April, the day after the occupation of Camranh Bay by the Japanese, I recommended the amendment of our war plans to envisage a Japanese attack on Hawaii by six of their twelve aircraft carriers. This became feasible because land-based aviation could now support operations all the way to Singapore and, as Operations & Plans Officer for the Hawaiian Air Force, I so recommended to my Commander, Gen. Martain. Gen. Martin remarked that he would not have an officer on his staff who thought like that and in a couple of weeks Gen. Streett and I traded jobs. In subsequent conversations with Bill Farthing and others I repeated my estimate of six aircraft carriers.

Let me know if I can be of any further help.

Sincerely,

Albert F. Hegenberger

Albert F. Hegenberger
Maj. Gen. USAF Ret,
Rt. 1, Box 169
Maitland, Florida

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20330

5 November 1970

Major General Albert F Hegenberger, USAF (Ret)
Route 1, Box 76
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Hegenberger

I'm just getting around to editing the meaty transcript of our fine interview last May. If you'd like a copy, I'll send one when it's ready, probably after the first of the year. Our help situation here is tight, as you can understand.

In one context, you mentioned the possibility of checking with Mrs Patty Coddington as to whether General Clint Coddington left files. You and I are both interested in getting to the bottom of the Farthing-Rose-Coddington Plan mystery. If it was for real, it will make a contribution to our understanding of events that led up to Pearl Harbor.

You and I also talked about your taking another shot at obtaining General Stratemeyer's files. The historical people in AF/CHO have expressed a keen interest in getting to look at them. I believe you mentioned that the Stratemeyers had a whole garage full, and that you had been appointed as custodian. I'm aware that many of the Stratemeyer files are political in nature. I'm not asking to get into these, although I expect that, some day, they will provide an insight into our times for another historian. My principal interest is in General Arnold's role and the history of the AAF in World War II which General "Strat" helped so much to shape.

On the National Archives facade, it reads: "What Is Past Is Prologue". As an amateur historian, you must share my belief that we can learn from our mistakes in the past, if any.

On another subject, I hope that you and Mrs Hegenberger will give some thought to endowing some aviation historical society with those files you showed me of your role in early aviation, especially that Hegenberger-Maitland flight to Hawaii, one of the great landmark events in aviation.

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I've also written to General Erik Nelson, as you suggested, about the B-29 story.

The enclosure will speed your reply to me.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Asst, Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

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I've also written to General Erik Nelson, as you suggested, about the B-29 story.

The enclosure will speed your reply to me.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Asst, Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

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cc: Jane Belden

20330

5 November 1970

Major General Albert F Hegenberger, USAF (Ret)
Route 1, Box 76
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Hegenberger

I'm just getting around to editing the meaty transcript of our fine interview last May. If you'd like a copy, I'll send one when it's ready, probably after the first of the year. Our help situation here is tight, as you can understand.

In one context, you mentioned the possibility of checking with Mrs Patty Coddington as to whether General Clint Coddington left files. You and I are both interested in getting to the bottom of the Farthing-Rose-Coddington Plan mystery. If it was for real, it will make a contribution to our understanding of events that led up to Pearl Harbor.

You and I also talked about your taking another shot at obtaining General Stratemeyer's files. The historical people in AF/CHO have expressed a keen interest in getting to look at them. I believe you mentioned that the Stratemeyers had a whole garage full, and that you had been appointed as custodian. I'm aware that many of the Stratemeyer files are political in nature. I'm not asking to get into these, although I expect that, some day, they will provide an insight into our times for another historian. My principal interest is in General Arnold's role and the history of the AAF in World War II which General "Strat" helped so much to shape.

On the National Archives facade, it reads: "What Is Past Is Prologue". As an amateur historian, you must share my belief that we can learn from our mistakes in the past, if any.

On another subject, I hope that you and Mrs Hegenberger will give some thought to endowing some aviation historical society with those files you showed me of your role in early aviation, especially that Hegenberger-Maitland flight to Hawaii, one of the great landmark events in aviation.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Air Information Division

MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT FRANCIS HEGENBERGER

Albert F. Hegenberger was born at Boston, Massachusetts, September 30, 1895. He attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology and entered the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps as a private on September 14, 1917.

He was graduated from the School of Military Aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in December, 1917, and that same month proceeded to Ellington Field, Texas, where he earned his wings and received the rating of Reserve Military Aviator. He was appointed a second lieutenant in the Aviation Section of the Signal Reserve April 6, 1918.

He then served successively at Camp Dick, Dallas, Texas; School of Aerial Observers, Post Field, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; School of Aerial Gunnery, Taliaferro Field, Texas; Park Place, Texas, and in October, 1918 entered the School of Aeronautical Engineering of Massachusetts Institute of Technology at Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Upon graduating in February, 1919, he became chief of the Instrument Branch at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio. Subsequently, he served as assistant engineer of the Equipment Section of the Air Service Engineering Division at McCook Field. In the meantime, he was commissioned a second lieutenant, Air Service, in the Regular Army July 1, 1920.

He joined the 72nd Bombardment Squadron at Luke Field, Hawaii, in October, 1923, and later served as operations officer of the Fifth Composite Group. In March, 1925, he was transferred to the 23rd Bombardment Squadron at that field.

Returning to the United States in October, 1926, he became chief of the Equipment Branch of the Air Corps Materiel Division at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio. In July, 1927, he was appointed chief of the Instrument and Navigation Unit at that same station.

He joined the 30th Bombardment Squadron at Rockwell Field, California, in August, 1935, and the following October became commanding officer of that squadron. He later moved with this unit to March Field, California, where he served until August, 1937. He then enrolled in the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama. He was graduated in June, 1939, and assigned to Hickam Field, Hawaii, as operations officer of the Fifth Bombardment Group. In February, 1940, he became operations officer of the 18th Wing at Hickam Field. He moved to Fort Shafter, Hawaii, the following November to become Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the Hawaiian Air Force, and in April, 1941, was designated commanding officer of the 11th Bombardment Group at Hickam Field.

P.H

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He subsequently commanded the 10th Bombardment Wing and the Seventh Bomber Command at Hickam Field until July, 1942. From August to October, 1942, he was assistant chief of staff for operations of the Second Air Force, and commanding officer of the Second Bomber Command at Fort George Wright, Washington.

In October, 1942, he assumed command of the 21st Bombardment Wing at Salina, Kansas, and later moved with that wing to Topeka Army Air Base, Kansas. In January, 1944, he was assigned to duty with the Second Air Force at Colorado Springs, Colorado, as chief of staff. In January, 1945, he was named chief of staff of the 14th Air Force in the China theater of operations. In August, 1945, he became commander of the 10th Air Force in the same theater.

Returning to the United States in December, 1945, he was assigned to AAF headquarters for duty with the AAF Officers Selection Committee. In July, 1946, he went to FACUSA headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, and two months later became commanding general of the First Air Division.

He returned to the States in December, 1947, and was assigned to USAF headquarters for duty with the Special Weapons Group, of which he later was appointed chief. In July, 1948, he was designated assistant to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, for Atomic Energy.

General Hogenberger has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit and Distinguished Flying Cross with one Oak Leaf Cluster. He is rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer, and Aircraft Observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant on July 1, 1920; to captain on January 3, 1932; to major (temporary) on October 2, 1935; to major (permanent) on August 15, 1939; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) on December 30, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on December 18, 1941; to colonel (temporary) on January 5, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) on September 18, 1943; to major general (temporary) on September 7, 1945, to brigadier general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, with date of rank from September 19, 1943.

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Up-to-date as of 6 August 1948.

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

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Interview, Maj General Albert F. Hegenberger, Maitland, Florida,
29 May 1970.

Q: General, do you recall your first meeting or encounter with Hap Arnold?

H: Well, I have to do a little thinking. I have to think back to the first one.

Q: Or your first vivid impression of him?

H: Well, the first occasion when I got to see him with any regularity was when he took charge of the Field Service Section of the Chief's office, but which was located in the Materiel Division at Wright Field.

Q: This was in '29 or '30?

H: Yes, along that period. Of course, he was looking after the interests of the Operating end of the service and filling the liaison necessary with the Materiel people concerned with experimental engineering.

Q: Jan Howard out there?

H: I could dwell at quite some length on that.

Q: I was told that Arnold didn't have enough to do when he was out at that post?

H: Well, he was capable of learning the whole show, of course. He would have been a very popular commander, because the rank and file knew where his interests lay and they were the very things that the rank and file--the active pilots--were interested in.

Q: Conger Pratt was the CG at Wright-Patt? Do you remember anything about Arnold's functioning at the base? Any special recollections of anecdotes involving him or incidents, stories about Arnold?

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H: Well, all I know is that everybody had a keen appreciation of the role that the Field Service Section should fill, and Arnold did it magnificently. Everybody was happy that he filled that slot. It was quite evident that the gap between the Materiel and the Operating service at every annual engineering conference that was ever held, because they brought in their manifold problems and laid them on the line. Jan Howard's particular forte was to talk clear over their heads in technical language to tell them why what they were asking for was impractical, and they went away year after year frustrated. And so we who were part of the Engineering Division did not like that at all, but there was nothing we could do about it.

Q: This fits in with some conceptions I had of Jan Howard, a man probable technical brilliance but unable to communicate with people.

H: That's right. Jan Howard spent a couple of years at MIT on the aeronautical engineering force at the same time Jimmy Doolittle was up there. Howard came out to Dayton and took the job as Chief Engineer which amounted to Chief Engineer of the entire Air Force. It was all centered in that office.

Q: Did you work for Jan Howard?

H: I worked for Jan Howard.

Q: And did you have trouble with him?

H: Yes, I guess I had nothing but trouble. When we were engaged in the development of instrument landing, blind landing system, one of the key devices that we were working on was the visual type of radio compass. I had the only man in the United States that had ever built an operating instrument working for me. Jan wanted me to fire him, and I wouldn't fire him. It wasn't until a few years back,

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this man came through here, and we got talking. He told me the reason that Jan wanted him fired was that he was dating the same girl that Jan was who later became the second Mrs. Howard.

Q: Was Jan Howard divorced from Lois Pool, Mrs. Arnold's sister?

H: Yes.

Q: And they were already divorced?

H: Yes. I don't know how long I should string these stories.

Q: That's all right. Go ahead.

H: It was representative of William Randolph Hearst in Washington known as James T. Williams, Jr. He was a newspaperman who started his career in Washington under Teddy Roosevelt. I got to meet him, and he said he ran into Jan H ward in the Philippines. Calvin Coolidge sent a Colonel Carmine Thompson who was the Republican boss of the state of Ohio to the Philippines to straighten out the trouble they were having with the Filipinos. He hardly got on the boat before the reports began to come back that this guy was not the proper man. He was getting drunk in public and disgracing the United States. So Calvin Coolidge started James T. Williams to the Philippines, trying to head him off, and even get there before him, but he didn't succeed. Anyhow, he relieved Carmine Thompson when he arrived and he started his investigation. Hungry Gates was made available to him as his pilot to fly him around the Islands. In the course of this thing, he was invited to a tea at the commanding officer's house at Clark Field. That was Jan Howard. And he was very much impressed by the disgraceful way that this Jan Howard treated his wife publicly--insulted her. From that point on, he made it a point to check up, whenever he could, to

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find someone who knew this Jan Howard. He picked up a lot of information which led him to go to General MacArthur, who was Chief of Staff, and report some of the conduct that was going on.

Q: Lois was his wife at that time?

H: Yes, and so General MacArthur ordered his release from Dayton as Chief Engineer, and General Foulois answered the communication and described Jan Howard as his most valuable officer. Somebody stuck it in the files. It never got to General MacArthur. But a year later something came up again that focuses attention on Jan Howard, and I don't know why he was still in Dayton. They ordered him relieved within 24 hours. Again, he made a mistake. He did not say not to bring him to Washington because that is just what General Foulois did, because General Foulois was on the pan because of the Black Committee.

Q: Yes, I do, Hugo Black.

H: Well, they were investigating the disposal of surplus property from World War I. They apparently got Secretary of War Woodring involved in this thing. President F.D. Roosevelt was getting alarmed about scandal associated with his Administration and was pleading for them to soft-pedal this thing. Well, somebody told the Black Committee about that time that Woodring had cancelled the bids for a new type of plane that was going to bring us up on par with the performance of the European planes. We had been lagging seriously. The plane that won the competition performance was a Douglas airplane, the observation type, whereas Curtiss had had a monopoly for a good many years on that type. So, they called Foulois before the Black Committee very suddenly, and asked him if it were true that Woodring cancelled those bids. And he said: "Yes." So it made the press

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that day which was what the Committee was trying to do, apparently. And the next day they had Woodring on. He said in answer to the question, that he did not cancel, that General Foulois cancelled it. Well, the truth of the matter was Woodring had called Foulois to his office and told him that he was violating the Air Corps Act of 1926 which said that you had to have competitive bids for anything except the experimental plane and this was for a quantity of 13 to equip a squadron. It was not standard yet but was service test and nobody could tell for sure whether service test fell into the experimental category or limited standard.

H: What had happened was, General Foulois had been ordered by Woodring to cancel those bids because he didn't have competitive bidding, or rather not because of competitive bidding, but because they had set the performance requirements for the airplanes so high, that only one man could complete it and therefore it wasn't competitive bidding, and violated the act.

Q: I see, this was Douglas?

H: Douglas was the one who submitted the highest performance. Could meet it, yes.

Q: Which plane did this turn out to be?

H: And they started out all over again. And of course, there was an ex-Congressman from Woodring's home district in Kansas by the name of Campbell who was a lobbyist in Washington at this time and was father-in-law of Budette Wright, who left the Air Force to go with the Curtiss Company. I presume that this all had something to do with this thing.

Q: Getting back to Jan Howard and Arnold, do you remember

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anything specific in their relationship, except that it probably was not a good one?

H: I think that General Arnold leaned over backward to actions he should have taken that he deferred because he couldn't afford to have anybody claim that he was letting family matters influence him.

Q: In other words, he made more than a 50% effort to try to reconcile his differences with Howard? Howard was the problem, then, in your view?

H: Yes.

Q: Do you remember any specific issues that arose between them?

H: No, I can't offhand, but I know that they were incurring regularity, just in the day-to-day business. Of course, the fact that Arnold leaned over backward is evident in the fact that Jan Howard, in due course, at the proper time became a General Officer, BG, which Arnold, as Chief, could have blocked and had, in the opinion of lots of people, adequate grounds for blocking.

Q: But Arnold did not block it?

H: But, he didn't.

Q: You know, Jan Howard, 10 years later, in 1940, was brought in to G-3. He served in G-3 under Andrews, for a period. Do you remember that?

H: You mean in Washington?

Q: Yes.

H: Well, I know that.

Q: He got into trouble there. Well, Marshall made some adverse comment about Andrews taking people on his staff, or showing loyalty to people on his staff beyond the call of duty, so Jan Howard got into some trouble in Washington.

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H: He got into trouble when Foulois first ordered him into Washington from Dayton and he had strewn classified papers all over his desk and a lot of them disappeared from his office. He was very careless.

Q: Going back to your Dayton experience, do you have any recollections, social or official, of Arnold or the Arnold's in Dayton?

H: No, I don't believe I ever attended a club dance when I was in Dayton, I had too much work to do.

Q: Had he written his books, those boy's books? He used to take part of his lunch hour, work at night, to finish these books. Did you know he was working on these books?

H: I heard about it, and incidentally, at the time of the '29 stock market crash, I either heard him or somebody say that Arnold's father had lost everything he had in the crash.

Q: His father was a doctor, but he was an executive in the Lower Merion Savings and Loan, and the Arnolds had some money in the Savings and Loan. Every pay day, Arnold, I guess a lot of people did this, his father got hurt very badly.

H: I think that put a burden on Arnold.

Q: Yes, it did, his brothers, too. He had three brothers and they all suffered because of the depression. He was also involved with Bill Streett in trying to perfect a patent of a toy airplane. Do you remember this?

H: No, I didn't get in that.

Q: He got a lot of people to contribute $5 a piece, to put this thing on the market. Arnold was a gadgeteer, so he had to get some people, he tried to get his brother-in-law, Mrs. Arnold's brother,

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you know, Hank Pool, he married into the Woolworth family, and he tried to get the money from them to help sponsor the thing, but it fell through. What is your next recollection of association with Arnold?

H: Well, I was sent to Rockwell Field, to the 19th Group, and took command of the 30th Squadron in 1935.

Q: Arnold had just made a star.

H: Yes, he made it in March and he was commanding the 1st Wing which was on the Pacific Coast.

Q: You served under him?

H: Yes, I was at Rockwell Field and Iddidn't come up to March Field until December and just overlapped a month up there, and he got the call to Washington. Incidentally, I was then a widower. Mrs. Arnold asked me if I would escort her to a club dance the Saturday following when Arnold left for Washington, and she told me that he was very much worried about this and she was too because knowing how set Westover was, this business of a separate Air Corps and the functions of the Air vs. the Navy in coast defense, that he would be ousted. Westover had made his position so clear, that there was bound to be a clash. Actually, Westover selected him then and there on that visit.

Q: Well, my impression is that Westover didn't have much to do with selecting Arnold to be the Assistant Chief. My feeling is that Malin Craig made that selection.

H: Could well be.

Q: Arnold had done a good job at March Field in many respects, in the earthquake of 1934, in the CCC camp business, in the air mail, in the Alaskan flight, several things, Arnold had done a great job at March Field. When his boss, Malin Craig, came into Washington to take

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the job from MacArthur, it might have been Malin Craig who brought Arnold into Washington.

H: Could well be.

Q: Did you ever hear any comments about that or speculation that Arnold was Craig's man?

H: No, I never heard anything.

Q: I don't have any on this, that's why I am speculating that it wasn't Westover, but it was Craig, Foulois was out, and Westover moved to the top job, just about that time, and so they needed an Assistant Chief, and Malin Craig, who knew nothing about airpower, liked Arnold, he became very attached to Arnold.

H: That could very well explain the concern that Mrs. Arnold expressed and that General Arnold was concerned also about the fact that he was going in.

Q: Going to Washington and he didn't know how he would get along with Westover. It would explain that. Obviously, she didn't think that he was Westover's man and she felt there was some philosophical differences between the two and there probably was.

H: There was, because Arnold was a Billy Mitchell man from the beginning. Do you have anything on your record of how he was shanghied out of Washington to Ft. Riley, Kansas?

Q: A little bit, do you know anything about that?

H: All I know is that we heard of this group which was Arnold and Dargue and a few others that were accused of a separate Air Corps, so they cleaned them out and Arnold was sent to Ft. Riley where he had an observation squadron.

Q: With a cavalry post?

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H: Yes.

Q: This is an interesting period in his life because at the time he was sent down, Juan Trippe was organizing Pan Am, and Arnold had more than one offer to go with the airlines which were just literally getting off the ground. He decided to stay in the Air Corps. Did you ever hear him talk about that?

H: No, I was in the same boat, I went to work for Western Air Express laying out a transcontinental route in 1929, took leave from the service, and I'd also--Juan Trippe had me come to NY for an interview with him to go with Pan American.

Q: How long did you stay out of the service?

H: I stayed out about a month.

Q: A month--you didn't like it? It was before the depression?

H: Yes, airplane stocks were booming to beat the band. People were speculating on airplane stock and the bankers were putting up all the money in the world. You know, TAT was the first one to get their transcontinental schedules operating.

Q: What does TAT stand for?

H: Transcontinental Air Transport, and Western Air was out operating Salt Lake to Los Angeles and they were the outfit I went to work for to get, to select the routes, and later on they combined and made TWA and the interesting thing is that "Pop" Hanshue was President of Western Air, he became President of the combined company. But what I didn't like was the, it didn't seem sound the way they were going at it, they were buying landing fields, that is, TAT sounded too much like promotion.

Q: Going back to the '35 period, you actually served under Arnold, although detached?

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H: Except for the last month, when he came to March Field. Roosevelt came out to the Coast, and the Navy talked him into running us off San Diego and Rockwell Field.

Q: And that happened in 1935?

H: Yes.

Q: Yes, I know, they ran the Air Force, Arnold tried to stop that because he had trained at North Island back 20 years before that, 1916, so he had an attachment to that place. He found out about this at some dinner party when he first made his star in 1935, he was sitting next to some lady, wife of one of the officers there who told him about this. So, he sort of learned about this indirectly that the Air Corps was being pushed out. Of course, this thing had been rumored for some time.

H: The Navy had been trying to do it and they took advantage of a visit that Roosevelt made to the West Coast, to take him to the island, and say that they were cramped for space, and that this depot that we had there in the group, were taking up valuable spaces which could better be used by the Navy. But the way that it was finally put into effect, of course, left a bad taste in everybody's mouth, because on the day that the turnover was to take place, Admiral Towers lined up his entire command, with all their automotive equipment, and they decided the boundary and put all their planes in the air and at 12 noon, they blew the siren and the Navy band struck up. They marched all through the Air Force post, and the airplanes circled and swooped down, and landed on the mat by the hangars, and it was really rubbing it in pretty raw.

Q: Were you on the base at the time? It was like you were a prisoner of war?

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H: That's right.

Q: This is part of a bitter experience the Air Corps had with Roosevelt all the way through. Even though when the war made it obvious what the Germans were doing with their Air Force, it made it obvious that we needed an Air Force and Roosevelt said 50,000 planes. He really didn't understand airpower?

H: No, he didn't.

H: FDR almost returned Billy Mitchell to active duty, you know, around 1935?

Q: Do you know something about that?

H: All I know is what I heard going around, and I have some letter here about Billy Mitchell saying that he thought everyting was going to be all right.

Q: Do you have that letter?

H: Yes.

Q: An interesting phase of our history, the Billy Mitchell part of it. Billy Mitchell thought that the United States would, that President Roosevelt would change the attitude toward him. You know, Billy Mitchell campaigned for Roosevelt in 1933. He felt thathe had been wronged by the Republic Administration, it would be a new era, and he was in the Inaugural Parade in 1933, and he had aspirations to get a job. On that subject of Billy Mitchell trying to get a job, Trubee Davison, who was Assistant Secretary of War, for Air, went out with the Hoover Administration, and Billy Mitchell had aspirations to get that job but Roosevelt appointed nobody, remember that job remained vacant for eight years until Lovett got the job.

H: Yes, I think it was the Navy blocking it.

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Q: Well, this is a reasonable possibility. The Navy blocked it, and Roosevelt not especially interested. You know, Billy Mitchell wrote to Roosevelt a number of times after Roosevelt came in and he was stalled off. He'd get letters back from Roosevelt's staff, Early or McIntyre, delaying an appointment with the President. He wanted to get to see the President. He wanted to talk Roosevelt into a separate air force.

H: Yes, didn't he finally get an interview with Roosevelt?

Q: He got to see Roosevelt many months after the Inauguration and got kissed off. Possibly due to the strong Navy influence around there. The President didn't need any Navy influence. He was Navy-influenced himself, his whole desk was cluttered with Navy.

H: You see the picture where I got the Collier Trophy there, his desk was just loaded from one end to the other with Navy things.

Q: No Air Force?

H: No Air Force.

Q: So Billy Mitchell never did get down to cases with Roosevelt and I'm counting on your note before, about Mitchell, he was very disappointed with Roosevelt, he expected great things, and they didn't turn out that way. But to get back on Arnold, do you have any recollection of Arnold in the last few months of our tour at March Field? I guess they had a big party for him when he left?

H: Yes, I had to do that. The thing is, that he ran a just about as near perfect organization as you could do with the resources available to him. There were no problems, we were just all working at the job that we were supposed to be doing and trying to perfect our accuracies in bombing and navigation, emphasizing both of those, the contrast

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between our efforts and the strive for accuracy in bombing in those days under General Arnold and the letdown in bombing accuracy that took place in combat when the war broke out. In fact, I heard stories that a young Montgomery, who was quite an authority on bombing accuracy.

Q: Richard Montgomery?

H: No, the other Montgomery. A short, stoutish fellow. I heard a story that he got in dutch with Arnold because Arnold heard that he, Montgomery, had made the remark that referred to the bombing in Europe as the European Agricultural Development Program--plowing up fields.

Q: Is that right?

H: Yes.

Q: That's not J.B. Montgomery?

H: Yes, do you know him?

Q: I know of him. I wrote to him and he said he didn't know Arnold very well, he didn't want to talk, but he didn't make his star until after Arnold had left the scene.

H: No, this wasn't J.B. either, J.B. was the fellow that went to work for Wright Aeronautical, no, this was another Montgomery.

Q: We are talking about Harry G. Montgomery, Jr. Did he say this to Arnold, or said it to somebody?

H: As I got the story, Arnold overheard him.

Q: This was during the war?

H: Yes.

Q: So he had achieved his highest rank at that point?

H: That's right.

Q: What was that, Colonel?

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H: Yes.

Q: Arnold was a ruthless man, in some respects.

H: That's what Harvey Burwell told me one night in Denver.

Q: Did Burwell get in trouble with Arnold?

H: I landed one night in Denver and got out of the plane with Harvey Burwell surrounded by a bunch of civilians and he had his shiny BG stars on and said he had just arrived that day. He said: "I thought I would never get them." And I said, "Why not? And he said: "Well, I had a run in with Arnold down in North Island, at the flying school, before WW I."

Q: 1916?

H: Yes.

Q: Is that about the two men lost?

H: I don't know, but he said he had a run in with him, and he said, Arnold had the memory of an elephant, and he never forgot it, and so these civilians spoke up and said if it hadn't been for them, Burwell wouldn't have his stars then, said they had to send a delegation from Denver to Washington demanding it.

Q: Is that J. Burwell?

H: No, that's another one, Harvey was before, he was WW I.

Q: Harvey has passed on, I guess?

H: Yes, he sureccontributed his bit.

Mrs. H: That story about Gen Hale reported over in Hawaii....

H: That's interesting. You see, after Pearl Harbor attack, Martin was relieved along with Kimmel and Short. Tinker was sent over to take command of the air force and Willis Hale came over to be the bomber commander under Tinker. And Willis told us that the day

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he shoved off for Hawaii, he had a session with Arnold, and Arnold told him that he, Willis, was the last of the old timers that would get a star in this war. It was a young man's war. Willis was commissioned in the regular Army in 1916. Willis' message from Arnold was that we were passe; we were through. And boy, he couldn't have been more wrong than anything, because I tell you, I ran into officers, 10 and 12 and more years junior to me, repeatedly in the war, that never were as active as I was then, who could fly an airplane like I could fly it. Now,on this trip, for instance, going into Denver, I had Nat Forrest as co-pilot. He was class of '28, he was 11 years after my time, and we arrived over Denver above an overcast. He couldn't let down; he was flying at his turn. I had to take over the controls for a letdown, 47 years old then, for a letdown to land at Denver at night.

Q: A number of people have said that Arnold bore grudges, that he remembered like an elephant; some people said that his criticisms were impersonal, and he was thinking about the job, not the man. Well, I guess he was thinking of both.

H: I'll subscribe to the emphasis on the latter statement, because there is no man more interested in getting the job done right than Arnold was.

Q: Actually, they are not two separate propositions because getting the job done right, and getting the right man for the job, were closely allied. If he remembered that a fellow stubbed his toe on a job 20 years before, he wasn't likely to pick him to do a job now.

H: That's right.

Q: In my reading, Arnold and Lahm never saw eye to eye. Do you have any recollections of his association with Frank Lahm?

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H: Yes, I knew Lahm, I had flown with him, but I didn't know anything of his association with Arnold.

Q: No special.

H: No.

Q: Lahm never got a good job in WW II.

H: No, he'd gotten to the point where he was getting indecisive. I graduated from Leavenworth in 1939 and with orders to go to Hawaii, but meanwhile, I was to serve at the 1st Corps Area, Governor's Island, where Lahm was Air Officer, for several months before I took off, and most of it was concerned with preparing for a military exercise, and Lahm as I recall, was very indecisive at that stage.

Q: Foulois never got a job in the war either. Of course, he outlived most of the first generation of pilots. He just passed away a couple of years ago. Did anybody ever speculate as to why he didn't get any kind of a job, I mean that they could have given him, they gave Fechet a job, promotion board, or selection board?

H: Decorations Board was one of the things he was on.

Q: They never gave Foulois a job.

H: I don't know whether that was a result of that Black Committee.

Q: Black Committee and the air mail fiasco and my own reading is that there was another reason. In 1940, he ran for Congress on a Republican ticket and for FDR this was unforgivable and I've never seen anything on it, but I would guess this reason, more than anything else he ever did put him in the doghouse for WW II.

Q: Do you have any other recollections of Arnold in that final period in 1935 before he left to go to Washington?

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H: No, just as I said, he ran as near a perfect command as you could want which was exceptional, because usually, we had manifold headaches operating on short budgets and trained personnel. We were short of everything that we needed, but he had a command that made the most and really did what I think was a top-notch job.

Q: Who was the next commander after Arnold at March Field?

H: Emmons.

Q: Where did Clagett come in?

H: He came in next.

Q: Oh, was Emmons there a very short time?

H: Yes, he wasn't there very long.

Q: A couple of months?

H: I've forgotten exactly, but it was longer than that.

Q: I have the impression that Clagett succeeded Arnold at March Field, and he lasted a few months. He got in trouble.

H: Yes, what happened was that he gave a ride across country to the silver-tongued orator, Malone, who had accepted a job as public relations for the beer industry in California.

Q: And he got in trouble, I think that was just part of the reason, Clagett had some other problems, too?

H: Of course, there was a change in the law. Those people were holding temporary appointments in that grade, that went with the job. They had three wings under the GHQ, and Clagett had that 1st Wing out there. They changed the law, so they had to be reappointed, and he didn't get reappointed. I know that Skippy Harbold and I had ferried an OA-5, an experimental amphibian from Douglas to Langley Field and then had flown up to Washington. We decided to go to the Army-Navy

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Club for lunch and just as we hit the door, here was Gen Andrews and Clagett coming out. We had just heard over the radio in the taxi that he hadn't been reappointed.

Q: This brings me to another question. Clagett and Andrews were classmates one year before Arnold. I have seen letters in Andrews' file from Clagett, bitter letters denouncing Arnold. He tried to get Andrews to restore his star. Did you know about this?

H: No, I didn't know.

Q: Well, it is interesting that you saw him and Andrews coming out of the Club. They were close friends; they played poker. Clagett blamed a lot of his trouble on Arnold. Clagett got into trouble at the start of the war, in China, in the Far East, on this mission. He got in trouble there.

H: He got relieved, along with Maitland, from Australia.

Q: Drinking problems?

H: I think it was drinking in both cases. I know it was drinking in Les Maitland's case. Lewis Brereton one time, made the remark that, locally, in retrospect it appears he was Les Maitland's nemesis. He had to discipline him once down in San Antonio, and he was quite serious, and it took quite an effort later on to give him a group to train and take overseas. Then he took that group over, and the group had a good record, and Lewis and Arnold. Arnold was over on a visit.

Q: This was in September 1943?

H: Yes, they were going up to the station where Les's group was. They had a decoration for him, I believe. Lo and behold, they got there, and he was gone. He was off somewhere drunk. So Arnold sent a message back, saying he was sending him home, to discharge him

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immediately. Now Sigourney was a WW I officer that took civilian status after the war, and stayed in Personnel in the old Munitions Building, and the Pentagon. Well, after the war, Sigourney worked for me. I was the President of the first Selection Board to integrate the WW II part of the regular Air Force establishment. Sigourney told me when that message came in, that he hid it in his drawer. Finally a follow-up came in, and somebody asked him about it. He said he was sure that Arnold didn't mean discharge, he meant retire. Maybe by this time, Arnold reconsidered it. And he kept stalling them, anyhow. And finally, when they heard Arnold was returning, he put through for a retirement, a regular retirement, and he got it through, and that isn't what Arnold had said.

Q: Did a lot of people try to soften Arnold's directives, because Arnold was impulsive? These people might have figured, upon reflection, that Arnold would soften his order. Did this happen, where Arnold gave an order, and then modified it or softened it?

H: Well, that definitely was the thinking that Sigourney had.

Q: Did this kind of thing happen in other situations? (Where Arnold made an order, then later soften it)

H: No, I don't know of any other incident offhand.

Q: Did Arnold make impulsive decisions?

H: I think on a few occasions he did. I think he probably called for it at the time.

Q: Did he ever want to recall a decision he made? Did he ever tell you that he was sorry he did something and should have done something else?

H: No, I don't recall any.

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Q: Arnold did not apologize?

H: No.

Q: I have been told that on occasions where he felt that he made too strong a decision, that he tried by other means to show the individual who was affected by that decision, that he really didn't mean it so sternly, like putting his arm around the man, or asking him how he felt, or saying, "You ought to go down to the Biltmore in Coral Gables and have them look you over; you look tired," this kind of thing. Did you ever hear him do that?

H: No.

Q: I want to get to perhaps one of the most important aspects of your association with Arnold, and with the Air Force, and this is the Pearl Harbor period. You came there in '40 or '41?

H: September 1939, and I left there after the Battle of Midway in 1942, end of July or the first of August, 1942.

Q: Then you were associated with General Fred Martin?

H: When he came, they reorganized what had been the 18th Bomb Wing, into the Hawaiian Air Force. Martin became the Chief of the Hawaiian Air Force with Hq at Ft. Shafter, and I was selected as his Operations Officer, later known as A-3.

Q: And Farthing was what, A- ?

H: He was Base Commander, Logistical Commander. He had nothing to do with the tactical units, except to be prepared to supply the support called for in the plans of the tactical units.

Q: Who was the Plans Officer?

H: It was Operations and Plans.

Q: Coddington and Rose worked for ....?

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H: Farthing in the Base Command.

Q: Now we get to this plan of 1941. What was the origin of this plan? You must have been in on that? This plan to protect Pearl Harbor with B-17s?

H: Oh, I never heard of that one that you mentioned that Farthing and Rose and Coddington worked on. I worked on plans for a search. I wrote the First Navigation Course for the Air Force. It was given in connection with the Air Service Engineering Schools that opened in 1920 at old McCook Field. The Secretary was Eddy Aldrin, Sr., father of the astronaut. (NOTE: Jackie Cochran says: "Not so.") I had just come back from the Pensacola Naval School where I took a course in navigation. The course in navigation that I set up in the Engineering School was practically the Navy course in toto. Reconn and Search were an important part of that course, and I gave it just as it was given to me at Pensacola. And from then on, every course in navigation given in the Air Force embodied this business of a simple formula for computing how many airplanes you need, depending on the values you ascribed to your range of vision, and such things as that, the performance of the airplane.

Q: Do you know that Farthing and his group were working on a plan?

H: We lived right around the corner from each other. I'll first go back and tell you how I got fired from my job. On a chart in my office, I had, with Singapore as the center, a radius of action of Japanese land-based aircraft. That arc went through Camranh Bay in French Indo China, a place that I had never heard of, nor anybody else heard of at that time. The significance of this thing was that

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when the Japs advanced down the Asiatic coast, and reached that point, they could support their operations clear to Singapore with land-based aviation. So that any plans that we had concerning the Japs should envision at least half of their carriers would be free at that point. They had 12 known carriers, with the 13th building. The morning that the Honolulu Advertiser came out with headlines: "Japanese Seize Camranh Bay!" Large size, right across the top. You can check it. I picked up the paper on my way to the office down at Ft. Shafter and read this thing. About 10:00, General Martin's buzzer rang, and I went in. He had some minor matter to discuss. Then, when he was through, I said: "General, did you see this morning's paper?" He said: "No." And I said: "Well, the Japanese have seized Camranh Bay." I hesitated after that, because I thought he was familiar with this chart on my wall. Apparently, he wasn't. So I said, "Well, this means they can now support their operations clear to Singapore with land-based aviation. Our plans should now be changed to envision the possibility of an attack by six carriers." And that's the first time six carriers were ever mentioned in the Hawaiian Islands within my hearing. Nobody ever did.

Q: How did you arrive at this conclusion based on...?

H: I figured that half of the carriers would be available for other operations.

Q: In other words, they were released from Indochina, or from duty in the Singapore area?

H: Yes.

Q: General, about your advice to General Fred Martin and I believe you said that you were relieved after you gave him this advice

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about the six aircraft carriers. According to the records, you were appointed CO of the 11th Bomb Group at Hickam in April 1941 and then you mentioned that Bill Streett, who had the 11th Bomb Group came in and took your job as Operations and Plans Officer in the Hawaiian Air Force.

H: That's correct.

Q: Well, you know, he never mentioned anything about that, but he should have known about this plan.

H: Well, you see there is an apparently equal mystery--the mystery of the plan disappearing, but there is also the mystery of its creation.

Q: He never mentioned this. Of course, he is not well, as you know. We had a great session, but I didn't realize that he was the Plans officer at that time. But he can't explain how that plan came into being at that time, can he?

H: No. Now Brooke Allens says that Plans sent in were signed by Admiral Bellinger, also, but not according to what you've produced. And yet, that's what Brooke Allen told me at the time and my recollection was after it, when I said, he mentioned that. That saved Martin's neck.

Q: Could it have been that Farthing was working outside the Plans area with these fellows? Why didn't they consult with Streett?

H: That's the mystery. I can't understand it. Certainly not according to military protocol, to go in and invade another person's area of responsibility and jump over his head. I don't know how to account for it,but there was something that wasn't right in there--somewhere along the line, and I don't know who it could be. It could

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have been the Chief of Staff, General William Ryan, who was responsible for this, such an out-of-channel development.

Q: William Ord Ryan was Chief of Staff?

H: Martin's Chief of Staff--Ryan--he was a Brigadier General.

Q: He was a Colonel then? Colonel William Ord Ryan was the Chief of Staff?

H: He got a star as Chief of Staff to Fred Martin. We were having periodic meetings with the Navy and the Army to evolve a war plan for the Hawaiian Department. My thinking was in variance with his, and so he ceased to invite me to attend these meetings. I was in the peculiar position of being Operations and Plans Officer, and was left out of the meetings which discussed operations and plans.

Q: All these things contributed to what happened at Pearl Harbor. The Navy wasn't talking to the Army. Then, within the Army, certain people weren't talking to other people within the Army and all this contributed to the failure of the defense. Did General Martin know that Ryan was not inviting you?

H: I doubt it. You see, Martin had asked for an assignment to Hawaii as his last assignment before retiring, and they said, "No." So, he put in for his retirement, and they reconsidered, then, and gave him the assignment. Martin was a very fine gentleman and everybody loved him immensely, except he was getting ...

Q: Senile?

H: Well, in that direction.

Q: Well, you know when he came back, after Pearl Harbor, they gave him a small job in the Training Command. Of course, they didn't court martial Martin. If they had court martialed him, this whole

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thing would have come out. This is something I can't explain. No one has been able to come up with a good explanation of how this plan came about. But this plan is in the Pearl Harbor Board records.

H: Well, that's what I said in my letter.

Q: You said in your letter to Bill Streett of February 16, 1970, you mentioned that Bill Farthing and you discussed operations every day, and then with Coddington you said you were closely associated. You refought the war for ten years until he died a few months ago. Did this ever come up, this plan, did he ever mention this plan to you?

H: Bill Farthing and I lived right around the corner from each other in Hickam Field and almost every day we'd bump into each other on our way to work and when we came home again, and if there was anything worth discussing, we'd discuss it.

Q: You put another light on this thing; I was just wondering if this plan were prepared but never done anything with? Then, after Pearl Harbor, when the plan was shown to be right, they could have dusted it off and made it appear like it had been sent. It is very puzzling.

H: Yes, it is very puzzling. I can't understand any military man like Martin processing this thing without consulting his Chief of Operations and Plans.

Q: Which was...

H: Bill Streett.

Q: Yes, with Bill Streett. I can't understand Coddington never mentioning this plan to you. I mean, you talked about it for years afterwards.

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H: I was with Coddington in this house a hundred times, and I was in his house a hundred times. We saw a great deal of each other in the last 10 years.

Q: Do you know if he left any files?

H: I don't know. Judy, do you suppose Patty would have any information on whether Clint left any files?
(garbled answer, the gist of which Judy said she would get Patty on the phone if they wanted her to.)

H: I was in the key slot over there and I got around a good deal and six carriers were never mentioned by another soul prior to the time that I mentioned it to Martin.

Q: Well, you mentioned this to Martin in March, 1941? This plan was produced in the summer of 1941--and you mentioned six carriers in the plan? You might have talked to somebody about it?

H: I did talk to somebody about the plan...

Mrs. H: You wrote the plan?

H: I did write the plan. I wrote a half a dozen plans, but I never could get them by William Ord Ryan--I dumped armsful of stuff in the wastepaper basket when I got disgusted with the situation.

Mrs. H: I remember so well, that morning, when you were reading the newspapers, telling me what Martin said. It shocked me, too...

H: Well, I not only told you, I must have told 50 or 100 people, anybody, when the subject came up, I was very frank. I told them.

Q: Well, Streett had no recollection of such a plan?

H: No.

Q: Well this is part of it--this is a subsidiary part of it, but it is a puzzle in itself, that the Base Commander, Colonel Farthing,

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could have two people working on a plan and not consult with the Plans and Operations officer, Bill Streett. You know, I talked to Elmer Rose a couple of weeks ago. He worked on the plan. He told me he worked on it. He didn't know what happened to the plan, but when he came back to the U.S., and when he asked about it, he was told to forget about it, that the whole matter had been taken care of, andhe was told; "Don't stick your nose into it." That was essentially what he was told.

H: When was he told that?

Q: When he came back later on, after Pearl Harbor. He made inquiry about what had happened to the plan. He was told not to ask about it.

H: Apparently, Farthing used Coddington and Rose as pick and shovel boys to do all the figuring on it.

Q: But, according to this record, General Martin sent this plan to his boss, General Short, and he sent it to Hap Arnold, with a letter, August 25, 1941. I have that letter, or I have reference to it. That letter said approximately: "I want to call your attention to this plan, Hap. I am sending it to you directly because otherwise we will go through the War Department General Staff channels and never get to you" ... or some such comment. And, on the copy of the letter in our file, it's written: "To Spaatz"--Spaatz was then Chief of the Air Staff. That's the end of it--the Army Air Forces file. And the letter that went from Martin to Short--had an endorsement by Short--two words: "I concur." And he sent it out to Washington. And that's the end of it in that channel.

H: The only records left then were in Judge Roberts' file.

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Q: Well, I saw it--I don't recall precisely where I saw it, but I saw it in a file. Then I saw a copy of it in the file, and then I found it in this Roberts Commission report. So it is not an imaginary report at all.

H: No. That's what my recollection is of what Brooke Allen told me. I said here, that he said that it was sent forward by Martin and Bellinger. I checked with Brooke when I was up to the Apollo 11 presentation of the Collier trophy.

Q: Was that after I had talked to Brooke Allen?

H: Yes. And I said that my recollection was that he told me it was signed by Bellinger and Martin, and he said it was.

Q: Well, there is a reference in some files to the Martin-Bellinger report. I've seen some references to the report. I don't know whether this is the same report. I was told--Elmer Rose told me that, when the plan came out of Fred Martin's office that it was modified. They changed some things. The torpedo planes--36 torpedo planes. Now this was calculated to make the Navy mad. When you ask for torpedo planes, you were intruding in the Navy's mission.

H: Preparing for Midway, we had a B-26 group on the way to the South Pacific, that we held up. And they would only give us torpedoes for four of those airplanes, and they wouldn't let us have more than that to participate.

Q: And those four planes participated in the Battle of Midway?

H: Yes.

Q: I think we have covered the Pearl Harbor area as far as we can go. I'll go up to the National Archives. I haven't been there yet. I hope that maybe I will find something there.

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Q: Let me ask you about when you stayed on in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor.

H: Till after Midway.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold in the Pearl Harbor period, or immediate post Pearl Harbor period? Arnold had kissed off these B-17s, B-17s at Hamilton Field.

H: The Operations order covering that whole business of moving to the Philippines was quite a lengthy one, and it involved us out in Hawaii, as well as these people in Landon's 38th Reconn Squadron and Bradley's 88th Reconn.

H: I guess Bradley was relieved and somebody else took over from him. But one was Albuquerque and one was Salt Lake.

Q: I see.

H: And this plan -- I was to take half of the 5th Group combat crews and half of the 11th Group combat crews, and also, Coddington headed one of the crews, and I took them to the States. This order specifically said that on arrival that the plan that had been previously described in this long order would change, and we would take immediate possession of all new B-17-Es. That's the first job that had the power turrets in to take to the Philippines. See the whole emphasis was on the Philippines. Incidentally, if I may digress at the moment. We couldn't understand why the focus and attention on the Philippines, because outside of the top rank in Hawaii, everybody knew the Japs were going to attack at Hawaii, for the simple reason that the only thing that could interfere with them in their destiny was the U.S. Fleet which was based in Hawaii.

Q: It was not obvious in Washington?

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H: Well, boy, I tell you it was obvious to everybody I talked to except the high ranks, the top ranks. As far as they were concerned why this was the Garden of Eden, and nothing was going to happen in Hawaii.

Q: You know Arnold and Marshall were very anxious about getting all these B-17s to the Philippines and they set up this elaborate shuttle-plan in October 1941 to shuttle these planes to the Philippines, and Hawaii was the stopping off point.

H: I first got involved in that because there was a long string of telegrams from Marshall and Arnold about when the field at Midway and Wake would be ready for the transit of the 19th Bombardment Group from the West Coast to the Philippines. I was elected to be the fall guy to go out to Midway and Wake to see what could be done because the Navy was reporting to Martin, and Martin to Arnold, that the fields would not be ready before a certain date which was not suitable. And I flew out there, because you couldn't land at the time in a flying boat. And I didn't get much done at Midway with the Resident in Charge of construction, but I got to Wake and I ran into a humdoozer of a guy, Floyd Teeters, a civilian, head of the construction. There was an operator. And, boy, I told him the situation. I told him how we were getting hounded to death with these telegrams to have them ready. He said, "I'll be ready." I said: "That isn't what Captain So and So said." He was a Navy Civil Engineer Corps--you had a Navy District in addition to the Fleet and Admiral Bloch the former Commander of the Fleet.

Q: 14th Naval District?

H: Yeah, was commanding the District. So you couldn't get

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anything out of them that was satisfactory for Arnold and Marshall. So I explained to Teeters. He was made a prisoner by the Japs; captured at Wake. The whole secret of what he was doing was instead of taking the exposed blocks of coral that were dried and hard that were strewnalong the beaches and blasting them to get the stuff to build the runways, he was blasting under water, and scooping up the thing in these 20-ton trucks. They would get loaded and go 60 miles an hour down the runway with this site, and dump, and he had an operation. So I went back to Midway; I told the Lt. J.G. that was running that show what Teeters was doing, and that Teeters assured me that he was going to meet the date and beat it. He said: "Well, if he can do it, I can do it." So I come back and they called a Sunday morning meeting in Admiral Bloch's office. Short was there, and Martin. Just before they called the meeting to order, I got to this Civil Engineer Corps Navy Captain, who had been giving the bad news right along on the opening date, and I told him just exactly what took place with Teeters. He immediately went over and leaned over Admiral Bloch's shoulder and he didn't say more than half a dozen words, it seemed to me. Then Bloch called the meeting to order and Bloch opened the meeting immediately by saying to General Short and General Martin: "You can advise General Arnold that the field will be ready for the transit of the 19th Group on such and such a date. And, you can quote me." Now this was unusual. It was the first time in my career that I heard anybody.

Q: Anybody that was willing to stand on it?

H: That was willing to stand on it with about a six word statement. Well, Martin had told ... Ord Ryan had gone home, and

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Jimmy Mollison was his Chief of Staff. He told Jimmy and I to get over to the office to write the telegram. Well, Jimmy didn't have the guts to say what Bloch said to quote him, that it would be ready. Instead he said that Hegenberger was out there and had inspected, and reports that it would be ready.

Q: You know, Mollison died a few weeks ago.

H: Yeah.

Q: In Washington. I missed seeing him.

H: My step-daughter was married to his son.

Q: Oh, is that right?

H: Yes, divorced.

Q: It's a small world. In any event, these planes started coming out in November of 1941, I believe. Some might have come in earlier.

H: September.

Q: Was it September of 1941? They were coming out and Arnold was sending by hand, pencilled notations. Marshall wanted a daily record of the status of these B-17s. They would report that there were so many over-nighting at such an island. All these status reports came to Marshall by hand. You know, they were handwritten, pencilled notations, and they were anxious for the planes to go to the Philippines because...

H: Gene Eubanks commanded the 19th Group.

Q: In Washington, they thought the Philippines were the first target. You see, Hawaii was not regarded as the principal target. This is why ...

H: The Fleet was the principal target.

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Q: Right, well, this is why I am so curious about why and how these plans got lost. Because, as I see it, the Plan should have been responded to, and if it was responded to, the letter should have said it is a fine plan, but where are we going to get 180 B-17s to protect Hawaii. If we had 180 B-17s, we may put them to better use, but if they put such words on a piece of paper, they looked very bad on December 8, 1941.

H: Well, I saw General Arnold just a few days before December 7th. He came out. I had half of these two groups that I mentioned. On our arrival, we checked into Hamilton Field and the Fourth Air Support Wing was located there under Mike Davis, and we showed them our orders. Then he looked through his files and he couldn't find any record of that order in his files.

Q: Who?

H: Mike Davis, Commanding Officer of the Fourth Air Support Command. And this was important because the orders said that immediately on our arrival, deliveries of the planes from the factories would be turned over to us to be processed for the increased gas capacity at the Sacramento depot and start on our way to the Philippines.

Q: Where did they stop--Sacramento or Hamilton?

H: They took off from Hamilton. The night before they went--here's what happened--the 38th and 88th Recon Squadrons were ordered to send their families home and get rid of their cars, and be prepared as fast as the airplanes were delivered from the factory to them to get going. And they didn't do any of these things. There they were sitting fat and happy at both places when we arrived, and the delivery of the planes was going to them. We had to get some authority other

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than the piece of paper we carried, to prove to them that the factory should turn over these airplanes to us, rather than to continue to deliver to Salt Lake and Albuquerque. So, Thanksgiving Day 1941, I managed to get hold of Jake Fickel, 4th AF. He had been out of town before that and I had talked to Hubert Hopkins, on his staff, and Hubert didn't know what I was talking about, and didn't know the existence of these orders. Jake got on it immediately, and he said: "Sure, move over to Sacramento and we will have the planes diverted to Sacramento, where you can fix them up with the extra gas tanks." And that's what we did. General Arnold came out unexpectedly, and when he hit Salt Lake and found out that they hadn't done anything in preparation. He ordered them into Hamilton Field by commercial air, military air, and any means that they could move in there right away, and for us to turn back any airplanes that we had that were ready to them, and they came off and stopped at Sacramento, where we were.

Q: Was this December 6th?

H: This was December 5th. Let's see. Yes, December 6th, we turned over the airplanes and they left at midnight the 6th or 7th.

Q: Right. Then he and General Douglas went off quail shooting and Pearl Harbor Day, General Arnold was off quail shooting. They had to go looking for him. Donald Douglas' father came out with this report that he heard on the radio. Of course, Arnold immediately took off and flew day and night to get back to Washington. I think he flew on a C-47. I think it took better than a whole day to get back. And, there was kind of a hectic experience for him.

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H: I think he made a mistake by switching back to the original plan. Once he came out--we were raring to go and we meant business and we would have gotten off a day early. We could have gotten off December 6th. As a matter of fact, not all the planes, but they weren't all processed.

Q: Right, but Ted Landon and this group they arrived right in the middle of the attack.

H: They landed all over the place.

H: Some landed at Bellows Field, some at Haleiva (?) Field, some at Maui.

Q: I saw a movie on TV the other night. They described, how this B-17 was unable to land and landed at Maui.

H: Some landed on the runways at Hickam and were burned up while they were still rolling.

Mrs. H: Did they have their guns ready:

H: No, they didn't. They had guns in cases on the floor. That's another thing. We never would have had those guns mounted.

Q: Yeah. Well, this again reflects the attitude in Washington that there was no anticipation of any attack on Pearl Harbor.

H: I'll tell you another mystery. You want mysteries?

Q: I'm getting a lot of mysteries--no solutions.

H: In June of 1940, the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department arrived at Hickam...General Herron. It was shortly after 7 A.M. in our quarters. I was the only officer present.

Q: 7 A.M.?

H: Yeah. And he asked for General Frank, and I said General Tony Frank had not come up yet. He was Commanding General of the

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18th Bomb Wing. The Hawaiian Air Force hadn't been organized yet.

Q: Frank was the predecessor of Martin?

H: So I got Tony on the phone and told him, and he rushed down in time for--General Herron, the Hawaiian General Commander. So they went into a huddle in his office and the buzzer rang and I went in and Tony passed me this telegram and it said: "Alert your command for overseas raid," signed Marshall. It was June 1940. Well, we had two kinds of laerts throughout the whole department, ground forces and air forces. One was an anti-sabotage alert and the other was what you might call military combat alert.

Q: And you do the opposite thing for each?

H: Yeah. In the case of the sabotage, they were fearing Jap population uprising. They huddled over the airplanes on the map, and hopedthat we could provide security. In the military alert you scattered them all over the periphery of the field, and try to protect them against sabotage. Well, this said: "Alert your command for overseas raid," so Tony decides that he will disperse the airplanes. It is a combat alert. We are going to be attacked, and if we hadn't dispersed, the guns and the ships added to the anti-aircraft guns on the ground, we would have a good defense. Anyhow, after that exercise was over, I said to Tony: "This doesn't make sense to me. These Japs won't uprise and get shot to pieces against us unless it's combined with a military attack." I said: "How about we just washout this sabotage alert." And he agreed. So, I started the ball rolling. The thing was still in the mill at the time he left, and Martin came and I finished it off when I went down to Martin, and we washed out the anti-sabotage alert. Now the rest of the ground units had it.

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But we had just combat alert, and that's what was in effect when I left Hawaii to go to the Coast to get these B-17s to take to the Philippines. Well, lo and behold, I come back and I find out that they had had a combat alert several weeks prior to this thing, and they then decided to change to anti-sabotage alert. And I tried to find out who in the hell changed this thing back. I said it didn't make sense to me in the first place. And as near as I could find out, and this is not at all definite, Bill Farthing was the guy that talked them into changing back.

Q: Which explains the sitting ducks for the Japs.

H: Sitting ducks. They just flew down and they wiped them out right on the mat.

Q: A combination of luck, stupidity and lack of communication within the Army, and between the Army and the Navy, and between the military forces in Washington. That November 27th alert that Marshall sent out was misinterpreted. Now, you look at it, it could be read as warning of an attack, but it was interpreted as a warning against sabotage. Maybe, on the basis of that 27th letter or message. In fact Arnold sent the message to Martin, and it was interpreted as an anti-sabotage alert, and this message of Arnold's could have been the reason that Farthing recommended changing the alert to an anti-sabotage alert. As I say, Marshall and Arnold both made a mistake in anticipating that Hawaii would not be attacked but that the Philippines would be attacked. If they had any conception that Hawaii would be attacked, they could have used some of these bombers to protect Hawaii.

H: My wife will tell you that there wasn't an officer on the post, except top rank, that wasn't convinced that Hawaii would be the

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target, because the Fleet base was there. If they could get rid of that Fleet they wouldn't have any interference. Well, they were hoping to get our carriers.

Q: But they didn't get our carriers?

H: No.

Q: There have been several books written about Pearl Harbor, the so-called revisionist, theory of history. This argument suggests that Roosevelt deliberately left the carriers at Pearl Harbor vulnerable to invite an attack, in order to unify the American people. You see, we needed somebody to attack us in order to bring the American people together.

H: That's right.

Q: The American people in 1941 were pretty much like they are today. Separate; divided, argumentative. You had the American Firsters, the Lindbergh group, saying that we ought not get involved in someone else's war. Another group was saying that this is our war, against Hitler and Tojo. Well, this attack on Pearl brought everybody together.

H: There is evidence that can confirm that, like the disappearance of the East Wind message from the files.

Q: Marshall's negligence. They had this message broken hours before, and Marshall failed to take action for three or four hours. Even if they had a couple of hours notice--if you had a couple hours notice, to prepare for attack today. If everybody was called back from leave and gotten out of the sack on Sunday morning we would have put up some kind of a showing.

H: Yeah. At least you could have got the anti-aircraft back into position in that time.

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Q: And gotten everybody out of the sack.

H: And gotten the airplanes dispersed, or in the air.

Q: Do you know what they found out? They sent the message by Western Union. And a Japanese Western Union boy was dodging bomb holes to deliver a message to tell them to beware of an attack.

H: Yes, he delivered between the two attacks. Well, my wife was on Hickam Field. We lived on the last street next to the Navy Yard fence.

Mrs. H: I saw the first bomb drop. I knew what it was.

Q: You saw the first bomb drop?

Mrs. H: Yes. I had just gotten up.

H: We got the kids out of bed and went next door to General Ferguson's place, they tipped over tables and mattresses to stop the bullets from coming through. My youngest boy he went up on the roof and watched the whole show from the roof.

Q: He wasn't afraid at all?

H: There were torpedo planes across the roof so low he could identify the pilots and the ...

Mrs. H: If I only had a gun.

Q: Nobody in your family got hurt?

H: No. Did you know Walter Sweeney?

Q: Colonel Sweeney? No.

H: He is dead now.

Q: Cam Sweeney?

H: Yes. Well Cam was with me down on the Coast, and when we got back, he gave me a call, I went over to his house. There was a place where Mrs. Sweeney kept a bassinet when she bathed the baby--

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just a little kid--a 20 mm cannon bullet came in this much above the bassinet in this wall, and out that wall. That's how close it came.

Mrs. H: The baby wasn't in it.

H: She just got through bathing the baby. No, the bay wasn't in it.

Q: Everybody but Washington knew about an attack against Pearl Harbor?

Mrs. H: Colonel Farthing was out in the yard mowing the lawn, of all things.

H: If you think he cut out, you should have seen the Navy. You never saw a bunch that had lost their mental powers. Absolutely the morale was zero minus.

Mrs. H: It was such a shock.

Q: Well, actually, other than the 3,000 people who lost their lives, the Pearl Harbor attack was a blessing because it knocked off the battleships which couldn't do very much, anyway.

H: That's right.

Q: The carriers which could do something were not touched, and the most important thing it did, was unite the American people, 99½% behind the war effort.

H: Well, after Pearl Harbor the Air Force in Hawaii practically passed to the control of the Navy. I don't know that anybody ever saw or read the letter that Nimitz had in his inside pocket, signed by Roosevelt, or not. But there was such a letter according to the information going around, and it definitely put the Navy in overall control. Because from then on, our liaison officer would get up in the middle of the might go over to the Navy base and listen to the

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briefing and get a search plan that all of our B-17s that we then had, had been converted into search airplanes.

Q: You felt that there might be another attack?

H: Yes.

Q: Was there panic in Pearl Harbor? You say the Navy morale was down to the floor. Did people panic, did they expect another attack?

H: There wasn't a visible excitement; it was depression. It was panic of a type--they were very depressed, they were not thinking very good. It was quite evident when talking to them.

Q: Yeah. Did you get any message Arnold sent to the Hawaiian Air Force after Pearl Harbor? Any instructions, I mean?

H: I don't recall any. The last message I got from Arnold was wishing me well when I shoved off from the West Coast. That was the flight that was supposed to go to the Philippines, but was interrupted.

Q: Well, were you with Ted Landon's group?

H: No. Arnold appeared on the scene, and then after he got to Salt Lake and straightened that thing out, he ordered Albuquerque the same treatment, and then he arrived at Sacramento and told us to ferry all our airplanes over to Hamilton, and that people were coming in and taking off.

Q: When did you get back to Hawaii?

H: We took off Wednesday night after the attack and got in Thursday morning.

Q: I see. It was some kind of a shambles?

H: Yes.

Q: Shortly thereafter, I guess Short and Kimmel were relieved, and Fred Martin was taken out of there. He was relieved, too. Who

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was to take his place?

H: Tinker. Willis Hale was to take the Bomber Command and Tinker was lost on a raid against Wake.

Q: Shortly thereafter?

H: Yes. He was lost off Midway. You see they went up to Midway to refuel and load at Midway and take off for Wake.

Q: And then he was lost? Then Delos Emmons came in and took his place? You say you knew we were reading the Jap mail?

H: Yes.

Q: You know, there was a turnabout in the United States--at this time we were trying to build up the 8th AF. Spaatz was in charge of a movement of planes to Labrador and the East Coast the Northern route to England. This was the spring of 1942. Then, that movement was halted in May because we were reading the Jap messages, and we did not know whether they were going to hit Dutch Harbor, or attack Alaska, or attack Hawaii. We knew that they were moving in an arc but we did not know where the next threat was going to come from, so a number of the units were diverted to the Pacific. Did you know about this diversion?

H: No, I didn't know that we had a group of B-26s that were en route to the South Pacific, and we held them up. That was the time we were trying to get torpedoes and we could only get four of them.

Q: The Navy objected to your assignment to ASW?

H: They objected to the setting up of the anti-submarine thing.

Q: To give you another problem. Was Davenport Johnson commander of that?

H: At one time. Streett had it. Bob Olds was commanding 2nd AF when I joined. He died down in Tucson.

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Q: And then Davenport Johnson came in, didn't he?

H: Yes.

Q: Now, the 2nd AF gave Arnold fits because of the accident problem.

H: Yes, the plans that exported all our experience overseas was the primary cause of the accident rate. The Air Force started this war with 1970 or 1980 regular officers. That's all they had and they had some reserves on active duty to beef them up. When they started to export these units overseas in such a hurry...

Q: They took all the experience out?

H: Yes. They had a high accident rate in the 2nd AF, but there were things that were worse than that--shortcomings, deficiencies in training. I think I wrote enough reports on these crews in my wing to fill this house, on deficiencies. And criminal deficiencies, I mean deficiencies that really were criminal. For instance, I'd take a crew and put them under oath, and start questioning them, and find out that in a stage--they were going through three stages of operational training, sixty hours in each stage--and one of those operational wings, 60 hours was made up of two sessions of 16 hours each, 32 hours, more than that, 48 hours, 4/5 of the time taken with the crew in the airplane, and an instructor crew backing them up, and pounding them on the back of the neck to keep them awake, in order to be able to complete the 60 hours flying by the end of the month, and move them on to the next stage.

Q: Why did such a schedule get set up? You couldn't teach anybody anything that way?

H: That was the big mystery. Our first B-17 group was organized at Langley Field in the 1930's. Bob Olds was in command there.

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Q: Just so you could show 60 hours completed at the end of the training period.

H: Now, down at Langley Field, when Bob had the 2nd Bomb group down there, he specified that no pilot would move into the copilot's seat, to the right of the lefthand seat with less than 2,000 hours. Yet, here he was head of a program to grind these people out, take them from the flying school, and putting them through three months of training, three stages, of 60 hours each, and shipping them overseas to combat. Now, there is a tremendous discrepancy between that, but what was happening. And meanwhile, we were exporting our experience, through carrying this program out with far less experience.

Q: Did this matter get reported to Arnold?

H: I doubt it. As I say, I sent in these reports about people who went through the whole bombing course without an operable bombing sight, and we had reported it each day, after each mission, and never had an aimed bomb dropped. Things of that kind. As I could say, I could practically fill this house. There are still people alive that could testify to what was going on. I doubt if they ever got to Bob Olds. I think his Chief of Staff saw to it that these reports didn't get further.

Q: This is, my guess, one of the casualties of war, that we were trying to do so many things in such a hurry, that we were sacrificing a lot of lives and airplanes.

H: They'd get committed to a program, and the only way they could put on an appearance that the program was working, was to cheat, and the last thing in the world they wanted was for Arnold to find out.

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Q: When you say "they," this would have been either Bob Olds and his successor, Davenport Johnson?

H: Well, I'll tell you, Davenport Johnson stopped off at Kansas at my headquarters, on his way out to the 2nd AF, and didn't say a darn word that he was going to take command. He had a whole bunch with him, and he said: "Get your staff together." And so when they were all together, his staff and my staff, sat down and talked, and I talked very freely about the deficiencies, etc.

Q: And he didn't tell you that he was going to take over?

H: No, but he told me to dismiss my staff and he ordered his staff out. Just he and I there. And then he ate my fanny out; he gave me hell.

Q: For the things that you had told him?

H: Yes. But, on the other hand, he recommended me for a star. My name had been withdrawn time and again. I got in wrong with Bob Olds. He fired a group commander who lost an airplane and crew, and I investigated, and I couldn't pin it on to his neglect, because there was a false weather report flashed him by a command that was not under his control.

Q: It wasn't his fault?

H: No. I suspected that the guy wasn't fit to command, but he had served under Bob Olds at Langley Field, and Bob had made him a group commander. If I could have established any guilt to him, I'd never hesitate one minute to relieve him, but I couldn't, so his Chief of Staff would call me up, and said: "When are you going to relieve Ford Lauer?" And I said: "I'm not going to relieve him

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because I can't establish his guilt," and he said: "Well, you'd better, or the boss is going to withdraw that nomination for a star." And I said: "Well, that's too bad, I can't do it."

Q: When Davenport Johnson came in, I guess you had already moved to Colorado Springs?

H: No, I was still in Kansas. Johnson was succeeded by Bill Streett, and Streett was succeeded by Ent, and that's when I went to Colorado Springs.

Q: The 21st Bomb Wing was under the 2nd AF?

H: Yes.

Q: Did you know the difficulties Davenport Johnson was having with Arnold?

H: He was jumping on us for accidents. I didn't have the accidents, other than this group that was going through at this time, Ford Lauer's group, and I think that's the only accident we had.

H: He was finally relieved in North Africa. He had a drinking problem.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold coming out there and doing anything about the 2nd AF problems?

H: He was using the telephone all the time.

Q: To you, or Davenport Johnson?

H: They were doing it all the time before I went up to Colorado Springs, and after I got there, usually one of his staff, his Exec.

Q: When you got to Colorado Springs, Davenport Johnson had already gone. He was sent to Alaska, and Bill Streett came in. Bill Streett was sort of a troubleshooter for Arnold, wasn't he? Arnold put him in a couple of difficult jobs?

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H: I wouldn't be a bit surprised; I hadn't thought of that before.

Q: You know, he never made a mark in any one area, he had three or four different jobs. He never stuck around long enough. You know, the Continental Air Command later on. He was in the 13th AF for a short spell. Then he was in the 2nd AF. Of course, he was close to Arnold, and Arnold liked to use him for that purpose.

H: You're right. I hadn't thought about it that way.

Q: Then, I guess you wanted to get overseas, you hadn't been overseas since the beginning of the war?

H: I had been brought back from overseas under false pretenses.

Q: You mean the antisubmarine aircraft?

H: Yes. That blew up.

Q: And then you went out to the 14th AF under Chennault. So you saw the last stages of that bitter struggle. Do you have any recollections there of working for Chennault? Stilwell was already gone, wasn't he?

H: Yes, he had left. I was Chief of Staff to Chennault. Then I took the 10th AF from Howard Davidson.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold's involvement with 14th AF problems?

H: Yes, in a way, he helped me to get a second star because there was only room for supporting logistically one Air Force in China. The war in Burma folded up, and here was the 10th AF down there on their hands. So, they wondered what to do with it. Well, the people down in India, Burma, didn't want to be sent home when the AF folded, so they figured that a good plan would be to mount an

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offensive inside China with the Chinese army supported by a tactical air force to open up a part from inside China. Then, of course, supplies could come in and you could support an Army that could drive right up the Asiatic Coast to Japan. They had this plan to sell to the Joint Chiefs on, to bring the 10th AF, into China.

Q: Was it an Army General? Wedemeyer?

H: No, Wedemeyer had moved up to Chungking. By the way, the way I happened to get to China was the fact that the year previous when this submarine thing blew up, my name had been submitted along with other names available to Chennault. I was the only one that he indicated he would like to have. So he took sick--this was now a year later--and Wedemeyer didn't want his then Chief of Staff to take over.

Q: Who was that?

H: That was Buzz Glenn and Mervin Gross was an Air officer on Wedemeyer's staff, and reminded him that Chennault had indicated he would like me. So they asked me and that's how I wound up there. But, to get back to this plan, Chuck Stone was the officer they sent to Washington. He came back and reported that it was okay with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But to implement this thing, they had to get some C-54s which they never had before on the Hump airlift to build up the reserves needed, and the JCS had approved the additional C-54s. But a ground General Officer who was in that same office with Chuck Stone, while he was defending selling this idea to the Joint Chiefs, said the JCS never did approve the plan. What they said is, we'll give you this augmentation of the Hump airlift. Now, you've got your broad mission, and if this falls within the mission, why, you

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go ahead. So that's the way it actually was. So, Chennault took exception and said, even with the augmentation they couldn't build up their reserves required to make the support. They sent up some people from India from Stratemeyer's staff, and from the 10th AF staff, Davidson's staff down there. Chennault sent his people up. They worked up there in Chungking to see whether or not they could put this thing over. Well, Chennault took exception to what was going on and just filed an application to re-retire. He had been retired.

Q: He retired July 1945?

H: He retired in the '30's.

Q: Yes, the '30s, but I say he re-retired in July 1945, before the war ended.

H: Yes. He said he didn't want any part of this phoney figuring, these guys sharpening their pencils. So, anyway, he sent a message down to me at Kunming for me to come up and take over. So I sat in his place at the meetings on this thing, and I got wonderful support from this Colonel of the 10th AF staff. They couldn't support the 10th and 14th AF in China even with the augmentation of the C-54s. So Wedemeyer sent a message back to Washington to that effect. Well, the next thing we knew, was that a message, signed Arnold, came in from the Philippines. He said: "General Stratemeyer," who we thought was in India, but had apparently overflown China, and met Arnold in the Philippines.

Q: This was in June 1945?

H: Yes, Arnold said that it had been decided that the 10th AF will be brought into China, and that General Stratemeyer was flying

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in with the details. So General Wedemeyer was quite concerned about this thing. He didn't like the Chinese to be finding out this disagreement that was going on, so he designated Chengtu as the place of the meeting with Stratemeyer. As near as I can find out, all Stratemeyer said is that General Arnold didn't want to give up any of his air forces at this time, something to that effect, and therefore the 10th would be brought into China. Well, the last thing that Chennault had done was to recommend me as a successor, but Stratemeyer hadn't gone to the Philippines. He was still down in India when this happened. He knew he was, under this deal, due to come up to China to join Wedemeyer in Chungking. So he got a copy of this message. He sent a message back that he had already selected Chuck Stone to command the 14th, so that was that. Well, then, after this decision to bring the 10th in, I was designated to command the 10th. There is quite a story in back of that, too.

Q: Does it involve Arnold?

H: About me taking the 10th?

Q: Yes.

H: No, but his decision not to give up the air forces provided an air force which gave me a second star. But it was quite a story on the thing that I heard later.

Q: Was Stratemeyer unhappy with Arnold on a promotion? Did Arnold not promote him as rapidly as he thought he should have?

H: No, he didn't. He didn't get the third star until quite late.

Q: Did he think he should have had a third star?

H: I think he did because I happened to be down in Calcutta when they arrived working on personnel matters incident to the breaking

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up. That was the phase when the 10th was breaking up, and they were sending all those home that had the qualifications.

Q: Chennault -- did you know that Chennault was writing letters to Roosevelt?

H: No, I didn't know that.

Q: And some of those letters had attachments on them, a letter from Stewart Alsop to Grace Tulley. Alsop, I guess, was a LT then.

H: He was later Captain. He was aide to Chennault, but we lived together. Joe and I had adjoining rooms. All we did was argue. We couldn't see eye to eye.

Q: About what?

H: But it was all friendly.

Q: Well, Chennault didn't mind going out of channels because he knew he had Chiang-Kai Shek behind him. They couldn't fire him? He had a buffer, didn't he?

H: Yes, yes.

Q: I mean another AF officer sending letters to the President like he did.would have lost his head in a very short order, wouldn't he?

H: I would say so, because I sent a telegram to President Roosevelt. I damn near lost my job. This was before the war. There was a project that I was loaned to the Burea of Air Commerce when Gene Vidal had the Bureau of Aeronautics, and kept messing it up. I wanted to do what we were supposed to do, and get it over with. But I was being interfered with by the Navy and by the Secretary of Commerce Roper. All I did was suggest he fire Roper, and Clyde and Gene Vidal, too.

Q: I guess you had left Salina, Kansas when Arnold came out there to try to sweat out the B-29 program?

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H: No.

Q: Were you there?

H: I was over in Topeka to make room for the B-29s at Salina. Arnold came out with Benny Meyers. He pinned a second star on Benny Meyers at that time.

Q: When was that, around the end of '43, or early '44?

H: Up in 1944. We would have had to capture Saipan first. See, the first B-29 outfit was the 58th Wing which went to India, and moved up to Chengtu, and got enough stockpile of gas to make the raid on Nagasaki.

Q: They started operations on June 15, 1944. Now, Arnold was trying to rush that group out to the CBI, when he came out to Salina with Benny Meyers. Did they start some kind of modification program right on the base to get these planes out?

H: Eric Nelson was there. Eric was starting to make modifications to cool the engines on takeoff. They were burning up on takeoff. Incidentally, we found that those difficulties had been known for over a year. It had been a project that the NACA laboratories up at Cleveland, a project at Dayton, and a project somewhere at a manufacturer's plant. All three were working to get rid of that trouble. Not a word had been said about it. That project was dumped in our lap out there at Salina. Eventually, we had a whole net of fields out there with B-29s.

Q: Then you were in command when Arnold came out?

H: I was in command of the 21st Wing. They moved me out of Salina to make room for this other thing which reported directly to the 2nd AF in Colorado Springs.

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Q: This is an important phase of my interest, because Benny Meyers tried to milk Arnold's kindness later on, reminding him about how they had worked together out in Salina to solve the B-29 program. Did Arnold set up a sort of headquarters at the base?

H: Yes, to find out what was going on, and see if he couldn't push.

Q: How long was he out there?

H: I don't know, several weeks.

Q: Arnold stayed out there?

H: That's what I understand. I didn't see him.

Q: Meyer's stayed out there?

H: Meyers stayed out; Eric Nelson was really the one.

Q: Would he know this story?

H: Eric would know it, yes.

Q: Eric Nelson lives out in Hawaii. I'll try to run him down.

Q: Did you see General Arnold when you came back at the end of the war?

H: Yes, I served in the Pentagon under him for about six months before he retired. I was President of the Selection Board on regular commissions.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold in that period -- good, bad or indifferent?

H: He was a sick man, and he was taking it easy. He did make that trip to South America. It didn't do him any good.

Q: He ended up in Miami again. Arnold had a severe heart attack in January 1945. Then at the end of the war, he went on this trip to South America, and he had another heart attack. They brought him back to Coral Gables, so I don't guess he was the same man?

H: No, he was trying to take it easy and during that retirement

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party that we had there at the Statler he had to sit down while he was on the receiving line.

Q: Do you remember the speech he made? I understand it was very impressive?

H: Yes, it was, quite impressive, but I can't remember the details except that it was very stirring.

Q: He took a look at the post war, and I guess he called for a separate air force?

H: Well, now, you bring up another question. This is another mystery. The minute that we were going into the war, the strong leadership in Congress was all for establishing a separate air force, and they apparently had the power to do it. Here is General Arnold, who had been an exponent of the thing all through the years, and as far as we know, he went on record advising against it.

Q: Yes, that's right. The probable reason for that is that he made an agreement with Marshall. You see, he was working with Marshall, and Marshall never let him forget that. Marshall gave him a lot of leeway, but the understanding was that no separate air force until the war ended.

H: Yet he got shanghaied out of Washington to Ft. Riley.

Q: Well, Arnold in an earlier period was very strong for a separate air force. I have not seen anything on this, but I believe Arnold agreed not to push for a separate air force.

H: That's what we suspected, but didn't know. Did you know that we almost had a separate air force at one time in the '20s? Did you ever hear of the Furlow Bill? Furlow was a Congressman from Rochester, Minnesota, and he had a Bill for a separate air force.

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Q: Well, there were several bills.

H: Well, do you know that it passed the House, but it was referred back into Committee the following day because the Submerged Captains that we had within the air were lost in the adjustment of rank. They had a preferred position on the rank as laid down by the National Defense Act of 1920. They were going to lose this at a certain period. It would only last so long, and this would have ended it right then and there. They were a very influential group, they were the Submerged Captains. Did you ever hear of those? Late in WW I, they began to bring in people that had business experience, managerial experience. The only way they could get them would be to give them Captaincies to start. Under the reorganization following WW I, they were supposed to stay in the Captain's grade until those who had an earlier date of commission had been promoted to Major, and then they assumed their position according to date of rank.

Q: Arnold was a Colonel during WW I and then he reverted for one or two days and then was promoted to Major in 1920.

H: This pertains strictly to those that had come in from civil life during the war, the submerged captains. And they were a strong political group and strong particularly in Washington, through the years. They got busy overnight, and recommitted the bill to the Committee.

Q: Really what they wanted was a separate promotion list outside of the Army.

H: Yes.

Q: Even if that bill had passed through the House and passed the Senate, it would not have stayed passed because of the President.

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H: Well, old Calvin Coolidge, I think he would have been all right.

Q: Well, he was very bitter about Billy Mitchell. We are talking about the middle '20s, aren't we? Of course, there were several commissions. The Lanpert Committee. Well, you have the Morrow Board, which led to the Air Corps.

H: I know at one time we counted up to 18 or 19 recommended separate air force.

Q: Well, many of them recommended separate air force. But the Air Force only got half a loaf or a quarter of a loaf until the next move. And then in the 1930's after Billy Mitchell had stirred up things again, and you had the air mail disaster, people asked questions -- "If they can't fly the mail, how can they fight a war"-- and this is what went to the Baker Board, do you remember that?

H: Yes.

Q: So then they got the GHQ AF, another step. But during the war, Arnold pulled back from autonomy and my interpretation is that this is part of the price he paid for a free hand. Marshall gave him a free hand with the Air Corps.

H: I know Knerr was shipped out of the Aviation Section, Signal Corps after WW I, back into the Coast Artillery. He was at Ft. Rosecrans and Pensacola. I called on him there.

Q: He was a Naval Academy graduate. I guess he was always suspect?

H: Along with Brereton and Bradley. But they transferred into the Coast Artillery in the Navy, where there was a shortage of officers to meet the expansion of the Coast Artillery under General Weaver. So, anyhow, he finally got back in again, but he was out for awhile.

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Q: General, you mentioned Benny Meyers before. Do you have any recollections of your association with him?

H: When the house in Minoa Valley, Honolulu had burnt down, and the insurance company refused to pay the insurance, which is an indication they had the information.

Q: Somebody else told me that.

H: Another thing was he was accused of cheating at cards, and Lou Mallory, who retired as a Colonel, is purported, by people, to have confirmed that he was a partner to it. He felt he was thoroughly ashamed of his part in it that he admitted it. The third thing was that when Meyers' wife returned to the States from Hawaii before his tour was up, he started to introduce a young girl as his niece, who was there to take care of the young baby that she left with him when she left.

Q: Whose baby was it?

H: The original wife's. When she took off, she was fed up, she left the kids with Benny.

Q: Benny had twins, and named one for Marshall and one for Arnold?

H: That was the second ones. That was the wife of the sister of the guy who managed his Dayton Plant. She had been his secretary.

Q: He had some relationship with the wife of Bleriot Lamarr.

H: That was the guy. In Hawaii he had this girl, it turned out after she left, that some of the officers said that they knew she wasn't related to him at all, that they were with him when he picked her up in the lobby of Moana Motel.

Q: You know, he always lived high. Everybody thought it was his wife's money, or at least Mrs. Arnold said it was always thought

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it was his wife's money he was using.

H: Larry Bell was the one who testified against Benny that he was practically forced into placing a subcontract with ...

Q: With this Aviation Electric?

H: Yes, this company in Dayton.

Q: Is Benny Meyers still alive?

H: I presume he is, but I don't know where.

Q: I've heard he's in San Francisco; I've heard he's dead; and I've heard he's in New Jersey.

H: I don't know.

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Hobart, Vincent J. 17 Oct 74

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Interview, Vincent J. Hobart, Forrestal Building, Wash DC, Oct 17, 1974

Q You have a home at Blythe, Calif?

H From Blythe down from Palos Verde, 26 miles away. I stay there in the winter time.

Q You are visiting Washington to see someone in the VA? You said you came into service in 1923. What sort of job did you have in the Air Service then?

H Most of mine was maintenance on aircraft on the flight line.

Q You mentioned being transferred to Crissy Field. When was that?

H I came from Panama where I was in the 7th Observation Squadron, and I came to the 91st Observation Squadron at Crissy Field. I stayed there, off andon for 13 years. I was ROTC with the University of Calif when the Air Corps had that.

Q When did you first meet or see Hap Arnold?

H He was CO of the base now closed down in Pennsylvania

Q Middletown, Penna * * *

H He came out to maneuvers in 1930 to Mather Field

Q (Note: Corrected him - Fairfield, Ohio)

H He shipped the BT out there. He said he taxied into a tank with his prop. He said he was in Middletown, Penna. He became CO of March Field, and I saw him on and off through the years. In 1934 I was with him on Air Mail. I was very well acquainted with him.

Q Were you assigned to the Western Air Mail Zone?

H I was assigned there. I came from Crissy Field to Salt Lake City. We had everything trying to fly the air mail. We had to call the air mail off. We had to take a rest, we had so many planes hung up in the Wasatch Mountains.

Q What was your job in Salt Lake City?

H I was in the alert crew there. All transient airmail coming through. We did the maintenance on their aircraft.

Q Where did you stay in Salt Lake City?

H The EM stayed at Temple Square; the officers stayed down at the Newhouse Hotel. Theytreated us very well in Salt Lake City.

Q They extended credit?

H They extended credit to us because we couldnt get any per diem until Congress passed an act to pay us. The Mormon people are very fine people. They

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staked us to room and board and never even asked us when we got our checks to pay, or nothing.

Q Do you remember Arnold out there in any situation?

H Yes. He relieved a man out there and sent him back to March Field. We had an enlisted pilot, name of O.K. Harris. He was Private when he started flying, and they made him Corporal. He used to like to drink. This Master Sgt in the Operations Office, he always had a bad habit. He would wait until a bunch of rank was around, then would say: "Oh boy, was O.K. Harris drunk last night." That was a second time warning of that. Col Arnold at that time told him if he wanted to find out who drank in that outfit, he had otherways of finding out without finding out from him. So he relieved him and sent him back to March Field.

Q Do you remember Mrs. Arnold and her daughter driving out there?

H Yes. Werent supposed to have their wives up there with us. Most of them came and they sent them all back.

Q Arnold sent them all back?

H Yes.

Q She came up to visit him Easter weekend.

H She was up there at the end of airmail.

Q How many people were killed in the airmail/ Western Zone?

H I dont know. Quite a few.

Q Quite a few crashes up there -

H In the Wasatch mountains. Didnt have any instruments at that time. De-icer boots were no good to start with. We didnt have the navigation equipment; we didnt have the aircraft instruments we have today.

Q Do you remember "Fud" Lohman?

H He was down at the Newhouse Hotel. I thought Monk Hunter was up there in Salt Lake City.

Q Lohman stayed at March Field.

H Hunter and Ira C. Eaker were up there with him at Salt Lake City. He was a Captain at that time.

Q Do you recall anything involving Eaker and Hunter?

H Eddie Toro was Chief of Personnel for Air Corps during World War II. He was First Sgt for Eaker at March Field.

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Q What about John Davies?

H John M. Davies was Adjutant at March Field.

Q Did he and Arnold get along?

H Well, I dont know about that. He was told to pick out all the rumpots at March Field, and he had War Department orders to open up Hamilton Field. Then Arnold said:"That's a good list you picked out; now you're going up as Squadron Commander." I dont think Davies appreciated that.

Q Do you remember the earthquake?

H There were a couple of earthquakes.

Q There was a big one at Long Beach

H We flew down from Crissy Field. The Officers Club was built by Bebe Daniels, the old time picture actress. Shewas married to Ben Lyons. She died in England 3 or 4 years ago. She built that officers club at Long beach. Spanish tile. They were at Clover Field, the Reserve Officers, and moved to Long Beach. They had the earthquake. The tile slid off the roof.

Q Did you have dealings yourself with Arnold?

H Yes, I talked to him several times. Very fine man, very honest. Fair and square man. No ifs, ands or buts. He did did bring a group down there one weekend, and they broke the record for shooting arrows. They had a bunch of P-12s out there...

Q Do you recall the CCC

H We had several Air Force officers. They were detailed on that at first. But then they'd have to take freight up into the Mountains in California. They had a little emergency field to get their flying time in. Then, they turned that over to Reserve Officers, the CCC camps.

Q Whene did you go from the Air Mail?

H Went back to Crissy Field.

Q When did they close Crissy?

H July 1, 1936. The 9th Army Corps used it for helicopter pad.

Q Do you remember General Craig?

H Malin Craig, then followed by Paul B. Malone. His son was at West Point, was kicked out and beat his classmates by one year. Went down to flying cadet school and got his commission through that way. Skippy Malone.

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Q Do you recall "Sue" Clagett?

H He was a miserable duck, old Clagett was. He was CO of Bolling Field at one time; then he was 9th Corps Air Officer.

Q Did you have other contact with Arnold during your career?

H No. I saw him as Chief of Air Corps a couple of times and talked to him. I knew him pretty well; I knew his crew chief pretty well, fellow named Puzenski.

Q He's dead now. Died a few years ago. (Ref Sue Clagett)

H If you worked for him, he was OK. He flewjust four hours a month. He had me working on his aircraft only.

Q What about his manner of command?

H His approach would be all military, a sarcastic way. I dont think the man meant it that way. I know he was hard on junior officers,

Q The demoted him?

H Yes. Sent him to Selfridge Field. The Chamber of Commerce at Riverside, Calif got him relieved.

Q Why?

H Because there was so many purchased discharges, they had a big writeup. The Riverside Press reported that he broke down the morale at the field so badly that Arnold had built up over through the years. In the little time Clagett was there, and they shanghaied him to Selfridge Field. Everybody in Riverside was unhappy with him. They got along fine with the Servicemen until he got there and then they were all buying out discharges. They were leaving; the rentals suffered. He never was as popular as Arnold. In fact, he tried to have one of the finest old men in the Air Corps court martialed. In fact, he did. William C. Ocker who beat the court-martial. He tried to have him court martialed. They were at the same field in Texas. His Flight Surgeon grounded Ocker and Ocker told him: "Why are they letting him fly for." Apparently Clagett went to another field and had the Flight Surgeon pass him. Anyway, Ocker beat the court martial. He never went to flying school.

Q Ocker had some first in night flying?

H He wrote a book on blind flying. Ocker & David L, Myers. We have it in the Library

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H Ref the B-26s in 3rd Air Force. They'd say: "One a day in Tampa Bay."
The 17th Bomb Group took them to North Africa.

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Hodges, James P. 7 May 70

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

January 30, 1970

Major General James P. Hodges, USAF (Ret)
174 Treasure Way
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Hodges:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past two years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I've come across your name in the Arnold Papers several times and know that you had close contact when you were AC/AS Intelligence and perhaps in other capacities, at other times.

In any event, I am planning to visit San Antonio in March 1970 and I hope to have the privilege of a brief visit with you at that time. Please let me know if this would be convenient.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Be happy to see you
Phone (unlisted)
TA4-679

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES PRATT HODGES, USAF

James P. Hodges was born at Oakley, Maryland, October 7, 1894. He entered the service as a flying cadet in September, 1917, and was assigned to the Aviation Ground School at the Georgia School of Technology. Upon completing the course, he transferred to Park Air Force Base, Tennessee, for flying training, and in April, 1918, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Aviation Section of the Signal Reserve.

The following two months he spent at Park AFB and Camp Dic, Texas, and in the latter part of May went to Payne AFB, Mississippi. In June, 1929, he entered the Aerial Photography School at Langley AFB, Virginia, and upon graduation became an instructor at the Air Service Technical School at Langley AFB.

On July 1, 1920, he was appointed a second lieutenant in the Air Service of the Regular Army and that same date was promoted to first lieutenant.

In June, 1922, he moved with the Air Service Technical School to Chanute AFB, Illinois, and in October, 1923, was assigned to Mitchel AFB, New York. Two years later he went to the Philippine Islands for duty with an observation squadron and in June, 1928, returned to the United States to enter the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley AFB.

After graduating in 1930, he became an Air Corps instructor at the Coast Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia. In August, 1934, he entered the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and upon graduation in June, 1936, joined the general staff of the General Headquarters Air Force at Langley AFB.

He went to MacDill AFB, Florida, in July, 1940, where he commanded, successively, the 21st Reconnaissance Squadron and the 29th Bombardment Group. In February, 1942, he was appointed chief of staff of the Third Bomber Command at that station.

The following July he went to Europe as chief of staff of the Eighth Air Support Command, and later was given command of a bombardment division in the Eighth Air Force.

He returned to the United States in September, 1944, to become assistant chief of air staff for intelligence at Air Force headquarters at Washington. In July, 1945, he was made commanding general of the Western Flying Training Command at Santa Ana, California.

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In December, 1945, General Hodges was appointed commanding general of the Flying Division of Air Training Command, with station at Fort Worth, Texas. He remained in command of the division when it was moved to Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, in April, 1946.

General Hodges went to Berlin, Germany, in October, 1948, as Director of the Armed Forces Division of the Military Government for Germany, and later was redesignated U. S. Commissioner, Military Security Board at Coblenz, Germany.

In February, 1951, he was assigned to command the First Air Force at Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

General Hodges has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, and Air Medal. His foreign decorations include the Order of the British Empire, the French National Order of the Legion of Honor, the Belgian Croix de Guerre with Palm, and the Chinese Special Necklet Cloud Banner.

He is rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer, and Technical Observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to captain (permanent) on March 1, 1932; to major (temporary) on June 16, 1936; to major (permanent) on August 15, 1939; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) on December 30, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on December 8, 1941; to colonel (temporary) on January 5, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) on October 31, 1942; to major general (temporary) on May 29, 1944; to major general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, with date of rank from December 19, 1942.

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Up to date as of 26 February 1951

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Interview with Major General James P. Hodges, San Antonio, Texas,
May 7, 1970.

H: What I was going to say--that your business now is related to one that I had under General Arnold in A-2. At that time the Historical Section was under A-2. In that Historical Section was this horrible outfit called the "Motion Picture Division." And it was under a prima donna who had come over to England to interview me and the rest of the division commanders over there.

Q: Do you remember who that was?

H: You will know who he is because he was in charge of that motion picture outfit for some time, and he was quite a prima donna. As I say, he was first in motion picture work--direction--and so on, and he directed a small picture over there at my headquarters on our part of the thing. Well, anyhow, when I got to be A-2, I inherited this job, of looking over the list of people and talking with them. I thought, "Well, they seem to have a pretty good program--they're off on a good start. They have some pictures of the present underway, and looking forward to the future fairly well." Anyhow, "Buzzzz," you know in those days we had a buzz-box on our desks in the Pentagon. When that buzz-box rang it was usually General Arnold. And he said, "Hodges, come down here to see me!" I mean, that's the way he was. So I went down, and he just laid me out, up one side and down the other because the motion picture program in the Air Force for the Air Corps then, whatever it was....

Q: Army Air Forces?

H: Yeah...was not what he thought it ought to be, and what had I done about it? Well, I explained to him that I had just been

in the A-2 job for about a month, and that was one of the things that I hadn't really done anything about. Well, he says: "You get the lead out and get started on that motion picture business. I want pictures, pictures, pictures, everywhere pictures. I want to make a documentary when this is over, and show the Air Force role as it was." So I sneaked on out, and went about my business, but you, talking about it now just brought it out to mind. That was one of my encounters with the ruthless, smiling Hap.

Q: Well, you know one of the reasons that--you know you say something that ticks off some recollection of what I have in mind. You know why public relations and this whole thing came in under Intelligence?

H: Didn't have any place else for it, I guess.

Q: Well, that's part of it. But, possibly, before you came in as A-2, the Air Historical people tried to get some highly classified documents, and they came to the attention of General Marshall, and Marshall forbid the Air Force Historical people to look at planning documents. He made them give everything back. They weren't able to do any work. So they had to take the Historical and the Public Relations out of what it was doing, and put it into Intelligence. Then they were authorized to work with classified documents. Did that happen before you arrived?

H: I'm sure it did, because I don't recall anything about it.

Q: But Public Relations and the Historical were under Intelligence at that time?

H: It was probably during Tommy White's regime in there as A-2.

Q: Yes, this was something that happened in the Marshall era. So, you were into the Public Relations business without having had prior experience with it?

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H: That, or with Intelligence, to speak of. I had been carrying the Intelligence classification for some years, because when I went to the GHQ Air Force, when it was formed, I was A-2 there And that was a stigma, I'll tell you. You know, back in the dd days, if you ever did anything in Supply, you were labeled a "Supply Officer," and you never got out of the Materiel Command in your whole career. Thank God, I didn't get mixed up with that, but I did get stuck with the name "Intelligence-Public Relations," in the GHQ Air Force. I used to write all of General Andrew's speeches, or most of them, and that was the Public Relations job that I had--supposed to prepare stuff for him to put out. But, "Intelligence" apparently caught me in the Pentagon.

Q: Well, everything you say, you're opening all kind of doors for discussion.

H: Good, because I thought I could tell you in about three minutes all I knew about Hap Arnold.

Q: Well, you'll see, it'll take an hour and we probably won't finish everything you have.

H: Well, good. I'd enjoy talking about...

Q: I want to get back to Andrews, because that's an interesting phase of it. This business of Intelligence and Arnold's great concern about motion pictures, I've been to the Library of Congress looking through his papers, and this was one of the things that really struck him. He wanted to get publicity; he wanted to get documentary movies; he wanted to get--he was a great one with the slides and for visual displays.

H: Do you know that I suspect that that was born in him in his office the day that he called me in. Because I really got the benefit

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of his anger about this thing. Apparently, he thought that there was quite a bit that was going on, that was not going on in collecting data and assembling in historical fashion. So I think that's why he generated such intense interest in photography and intelligence, and all that went with it at that time.

Q: He was always interested in Public Relations. He was a great Public Relations man. His return to glory--return to eminence--started at March Field in 1931 to 1935. He was under a cloud after the Billy Mitchell business, you know. He was taken out of Washington and sent to Fort Riley. Well, he ended up at March Field, and then, suddenly, Arnold came into his own. He had brought these Hollywood people out there--Wallace Berry, and Mary Pickford, and Bebe Daniels, and all these Hollywood greats. He had these air shows and he had Mary Pickford flown in with an escort. This got great publicity for the Air Corps, and he found out that this public relations, or community relations, paid great dividends. So I think, it was from that point on that Arnold was greatly interested in community relations. Getting along with the civilian community--that was always one of his specialities. So I don't think it started in his office. I think he was interested in that and when the Air Force--the Eighth Air Force--came under great criticism--exaggerated scores, allegedly, kill scores. Criticism of strategic bombing--the Schweinfurt, Regensburg, all the negative comments on the Air Force strategic bombing effort. And Arnold put out several round-robin letters saying that he wanted more publicity. He wanted more attention given to what the boys were doing out there. So that's how it came under you and why he raised the dickens a few years later. But in your Intelligence capacity, I guess you had to start off the daily briefings?

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H: Yes, every morning the daily briefing to the staff and General Arnold.

Q: That started at 7:30?

H: No, I think it was at 8:00. That was a more reasonable hour. It was a go-around, I mean it. Did you know Arnold at all?

Q: No.

H: Well, he was very intolerant in any semblance of failure, and he was very critical of anybody who, no matter how good they were, and I had some fine briefers in that morning briefing--professional people who really knew what they were doing, and how to assimilate this stuff and put it out. But he was sure was rough to handle that hour of that briefing, as far as I was concerned. He was asking crazy questions all the time, you know: "What's Hitler going to do now, Hodges?" And all that sort of stuff. Well, there's nothing you can say about that except that maybe he's going to commit suicide, or some foolish answer. You didn't pull thaton Arnold without getting a scrub brush.

Q: Yesh, he'd throw a lot of questions at you during this briefing?

H: Oh yes, he threw questions at us. Actually, it was a staff meeting with an Intelligence briefing.

Q: Did you start it out personally?

H: No.

Q: I mean, each morning, were you the first one at the Intelligence briefing?

H: I rarely was on, personally. I prepared the stuff during the early morning with my briefers, as I say. They were professionals. They went on and they handled one section. One man would handle one section; another man would handle another section and if there was any

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discussion, Arnold would pop some question to me, you know, that put me on the tenter-hooks because I didn't know half as much as these briefers. Hell, I'd just been over in Europe for two years fighting a war, and I knew nothing about briefing, or anything else, except what we did in the command. So briefing was quite a trial for me and I used to get down there very early in the morning, you know, to try to get ahead of General Arnold's questions.

Q: And you had to get up very early in the morning to get ahead of him?

H: Indeed you did, yes sir. He was a ruthless man, a ruthless commander. And as I say, he wouldn't tolerate incompetence, failure in any respect. He would get you right up in the middle of the staff, and just go over you, and really good. I was fortunate in escaping that, but I've seen some poor fellows in there really put over the hoops, I tell you. He was a ruthless man. Yet, he was a very considerate man.

Q: There were contradictions in the man?

H: Yes, Yes.

Q: Considerate in what way?

H: Well, after I had been in the Pentagon for about, oh, I guess three or four, maybe six months, I got pretty wary of that job. I mean it is awfully hard trying to get up on a new job and get somewhere near competent.

Q: Seven days a week?

H: Yes. I would go down there quite early in the morning, oh, 0600 or something like that, and work on my briefers until time for the briefing at 0800. And after three, or four, or six, I don't

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remember which months, Arnold got me aside one day after a briefing and he asked: "You feel all right?" I said: "Sure, I feel fine." He said: "Well, you look awful pale." He said: "How much exercise do you get?" And that was the consideration of the man. He was concerned about my health. So he sent the Flight Surgeon around. I don't remember who it was.

Q: David Grant, maybe?

H: I believe it was Dave Grant. Dave Grant came around and he said: "Let me take your blood pressure." Well, anyhow, he sent me over to Walter Reed to have a full examination. And what he got, apparently, made him feel that I should get some mid-day rest. And he told Arnold that my heart was not doing too well at the moment, and he shouldn't work me so hard--something like that. Well, Arnold called me in, and he said: "Look, I'm going to have a cot put in the closet in your office, and I want you to take a rest every day of at least a half an hour around lunch time. So that showed that while he was very tough and ruthless with his staff members, he had their health in mind all the time.

Q: Along that same line, I'm told that Arnold's ruthlessness, if this is correct..

H: Completely...

Q: ...was impersonal. It was...

H: No, no sir--it was not. No, Arnold held a grudge against several of the people that I knew. For their entire career after they once made a mistake. I won't name any names because... NOTE: Where Arnold was called ruthless by General Hodges we went off the record--General Hodges named E---- A---- as one who got on Arnold's "list." When Arnold sa w a picture of Adler standing with one leg over a

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fallen tiger, Arnold brought him back and fired him from the Persian Gulf Command. Arnold regarded this as a neglect of his duties.

Q: You say Arnold was very perceptive?

H: He was about as perceptive a man as I had ever met up to that time. I mean, if you went into his office to brief him on something, and you had a little flaw in there, a lack of knowledge, you didn't know about that. Arnold would listen for about two minutes, and would put his finger right straight on it.

Q: On the weakness?

H: On the weakness. He was an extremely perceptive man, and I know that from personal experience, and I've seen him put the finger on other boys in the staff meeting.

Q: Did he ever put it on you?

H: Oh yes, oh yes. He put it on me in his office, on that motion picture business.

Q: Well, did he ever get his intelligence information outside of your channel? In other words--

H: Oh yes.

Q: Would he give you a job and then give a similar job to somebody else?

H: No, no, but he depended heavily on the Army Intelligence. He took a briefing down there.

Q: Clayton Bissell?

H: Clayton Bissell and his group. Gen Marshall would also brief himself because Arnold was down there quite often getting briefings. But he didn't have any other source of intelligence other than me as far as Air Force activities were concerned.

Q: Well, this man, we won't mention names, who was out in the Middle East, had he been doing a good job otherwise.

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H: He was a very superior officer; he was very highly thought of by Arnold. They were very close friends. I don't know if they are in the same class at West Point or not, but pretty close.

Q: To whom? To Arnold?

H: To Arnold.

Q: Oh, I wasn't aware of that. Well, I know this man has been around a long time, but that Perian Gulf was a very difficult assignment, because you had the British and Russians to deal with.

H: Well, I'm not familiar with the problem that existed at that particular time because it was ahead of my acquaintance with Arnold. Except I met Arnold first socially down in Miami. I had the 21st Reconnaissance Squadron, which was one of four, I think, in the United States, and it had its planes right on the International Airport of Miami.

Q: When was this?

H: 1940.

Q: Well, he was just passing through?

H: He came down to inspect my outfit, and I suspose he wanted to inspect the depot down there at the other airport.

Q: Was that your first encounter with Arnold?

H: Yes. He came down to inspect that outfit, and I invited him to dinner that night, and he accepted, surprisingly enough. He said he would be happy to come. He took down the address.

Q: You were a Colonel at that time?

H: I was a Major, I guess. He came around. He was a very jovial, affable, perfect guest. He was just one of the boys. As a matter of fact, when it got time for dinner, he said: "What are you having for dinner?" And I said: "We're having a turkey." He said: "I want to carve it." And I said: "That's delightful. I would just love for

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you to carve that." And he did. That was the other side of him. That was the first side of him that I knew, actually.

Q: Was Mrs. Arnold accompanying him on that trip?

H: No. Of course, I had run across Arnold; I didn't run into him. I had run across him through Andrews. Because Andrews and I were quite friendly.

Q: You were close to Andrews? Well, let's talk about Andrews and Arnold. In the 1930s, the mid-1930s, when you were assigned to GHQ AF.

H: Yes, there was and I was very bitter toward Arnold, because it seemed to me he was a political General, and poor Andy was not. Andy was just a good, wholesome soldier, that's all. And he was getting, I thought, pretty tricky treatment out of Arnold over the bombers in Congress.

Q: The B-17s?

H: Yes.

Q: Arnold was then Assistant Chief of the Air Corps under Westover?

H: Yes. And didn't he, during that same period take over the reins of the Air Corps?

Q: Yes, Westover was killed in a plane crash in '38. In September 1938 Westover was killed and Arnold became Chief of Air Corps.

H: Yeah, and that was when I started seeing Arnold through Andrews.

Q: Was there, what sort of relationship existed between Arnold and Andrews at this time?

H: I always felt it was stilted and cool. I don't think there was any open feud or animosity. But there was a rift. There is no question about it. I don't think Andrews got too loyal support from

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Arnold on the fight that Andrews and Arnold were having with the General Staff at that time.

Q: In other words, you feel that Arnold did not get enough backing to the B-17?

H: I don't think he carried his weight on that properly, and as a result of the way Andy was fighting the battle, he got exiled, as you know.

Q: Well, he finished his tour in March 1939 and he went down to San Antonio, where Billy Mitchell had gone.

H: Well, it was awfully sudden.

Q: Well, it really wasn't sudden, he had a four-year tour.

H: It seemed to me that he was exiled.

Q: Well, he may have gotten a bad job?

H: He and Knerr.

Q: Knerr retired.

H: Well, I mean it was an exile. I mean this was cleaned out.

Q: Knerr retired, and the whole team was dispersed. Tony Frank...

H: Tony Frank came in Knerr's place. It seems to me that the A-3 was out too, you know.

Q: Colonel Earl Naiden. Well, George Kenney was there for awhile.

H: Yeah, George was A-4, and A-3 was, oh, the ball-headed chap. Anyhow, I felt there was a very great rift there, and that Arnold had not done all he could.

Q: To fight for airpower? Well, Andrews might have gotten rougher treatment than he should have gotten, but Andrews' tour of four years was up on March 1, 1939. Remember, he took over the GHQ Air Force when it was established on March 1, 1935? And his tour lasted four years. It was a four-year tour, and then he....

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H: That doesn't mean anything.

Q: He reverted to Colonel. And then he went down to San Antonio. Mind you, I'm not defending Arnold, I'm just making this point. Perhaps he should have gotten a better job. But he was down there....

H: Didn't Arnold stay on for another tour as Chief of Air Force?

Q: Well, Arnold came in as Chief of Air Force in 1938 and it was a four-year tour and the war came along.

H: And he stayed on, didn't he?

Q: Stayed on during the war. Andrews was at San Antonio for a few months, and then Marshall brought him back to Washington and gave him his star. Brought him back as G-3.

H: Which tickled the hell out of all of us because we thought he had been exiled.

Q: Well, Marshall, of course, was not the Chief of Staff when Andrews finished this tour. Malin Craig was finishing up and Malin Craig was in support of Arnold, as you know.

H: Malin Craig was, of course, the head of the staff when Arnold had the big fight.

Q: Right. As you know, Malin Craig was the guy that brought Arnold back. Malin Craig was the 9th Corps Area Commander in California when Arnold was at March Field. Arnold did such a good job, in his opinion, that when Malin Craig succeeded MacArthur he brought Arnold in as Assistant Chief of Air Corps. I'm interested in the Arnold-Andrews relationship during the period you were there as A-2. Andrews wrote an article in about '36 or '37 which caused Malin Craig unhappiness. He either cancelled the article or caused him to rewrite it. You remember this?

H: Did it have anything to do with battleships, coast patrol, coastal defense?

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Q: I don't know what the subject was.

H: Coast defense?

Q: It probably, well, it might have been another article.

H: Well, I wrote a lecture for General Andrews to give before the Army Staff College.

Q: Where? Carlisle?

H: No. It was down there on the Potomac.

Q: Oh, you mean the War College?

G: War College, sorry. And, of course, when I say I wrote it, I generated the ideas for it, put the material out, and then Andy came in as always, and he chopped it here, and chopped it there, and elaborated here and there. But, anyhow, it was my baby and I thought it was not well received because it advocated the use of air reconnaissance off the coast to the tune of about 500 miles, or something like that.

Q: Not well received by whom?

H: By the Army, and the War College. I thought maybe that was what you were talking about.

Q: Well, this was probably another article. Did Arnold attend that lecture?

H: He could have; I don't recall.

Q: But you didn't get any static from him? Arnold?

H: Oh no, no, no.

Q: Well, this was the time LeMay and that group flew out and intercepted the Rex, 725 miles out to sea.

H: That's right. That was the thing that generated the idea in my mind. If they could find the Rex in all this weather, why the hell couldn't they patrol the coast, and find anything?

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Q: That was 1938. Well, I have been told that shortly thereafter a 100-mile limitation was imposed on the Air Corps. Is that correct?

H: That was the loss of the battle, when they said that it was not necessary to have a bomber of greater range than 100 miles off shore.

Q: Was this ever put in writing?

H: Oh yes.

Q: Nobody can find it.

H: Can't?

Q: It's either been expunged from the record, or it was a verbal order. This is a great controversy in Washington.

H: Is that so?

Q: It's never been found.

H: Well, I thought it was a matter of regulation and order.

Q: No. It was probably, and Eaker told me this....

H: A Letter Order.

Q: It was probably a verbal order which might have been written down, but then withdrawn. Or the Army and Navy, knowing that this was going to be a matter of sensitivity, established the order but did not put it in writing, so you couldn't prove it was so.

H: That's not my recollection of it, but my memory is pretty poor, I tell you.

Q: Well, I tell you there are a number of people who have been looking for a piece of paper that shows that, and can't. They have not been able to find it. I've been looking for it myself. You have any ideas where it can be found?

H: Well, I was going to say, the chap, I can't remember who A-3 was at that time, he was a little fellow, smaller than I, A-3.

Q: Then you say that was Earl Naiden?

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H: That was Earl Naiden? And he might have some record of this, but...

Q: Well, I've seen his name all over Arnold's papers, but he has passed on. And this has never been found.

H: Well, isn't that strange, that I wouldn't know that? That was, as I say, the fall of the boom.

Q: Right. Well, everybody, but everybody who was associated with this in those days says there was a 100-mile limit, and at least, you and Knerr say so, and everybody was bound or felt bound by a 100-mile limit but there is nothing in writing.

H: Well, I thought it was used as a basis for Congressional representation of appropriation requirements.

Q: Well, it still could have been used as such a basis. In fact, there was a 300-mile limit they talked about, too. And the ostensible reason for it was safety. They said you fellows don't have enough safety equipment and navigation equipment to go out beyond 100 miles. So they were doing it for your benefit. In this period, Arnold, of course, used to attend these budget hearings. Of course, Knerr has indicated to me--I have talked twice to Knerr down in Florida. Knerr is no fan of Arnold's either.

H: I'm afraid Knerr and I are of the same opinion.

Q: Well, and he said several things about Arnold which were critical. And I welcome them. Let me say that as I indicated to you in my letter, we will have an honest biography, and Arnold did many great things, and he did some other things which, looking back at them, are not so great. I hope a picture of a man will come out of this. So we, Loosbrock, my collaborator and I are trying to draw an honest picture.

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H: Well, I don't actually believe in fabricating anything.

Q: No, no, this man, if he were beloved by everybody, then he was not doing his job.

H: He was not beloved by everybody. But I say in all fairness that Arnold was a fine leader and commander. And as I say, he was just perpicacious as hell; I mean he could see right straight through any fabrication.

Q: Did Andrews have this ability?

H: No, I don't believe so. Andrews was more of an easy-going, let-the-people-work type than drive them.

Q: This was right. Andrews would not drive his men, he gave you a job, and if he gave you the job he had confidence in you and he let you work it out?

H: That's right. Absolutely. Arnold was quite the other way.

Q: Arnold rode people?

H: Checking up, riding, prodding, driving; well, that may be the greatness of the man.

Q: Well, he was an impatient man.

H: Oh, indeed. Whereas Andrews was a patient man.

Q: Incidentally, this movie, if it ever gets out, is entitled, "Man in a Hurry," and I thought this was most characteristic.

H: I thought it would be "Man with a Grin."

Q: I want to ask you about that. He always had a grin on his face.

H: Complete mask.

Q: It was a mask?

H: A personality mask. I always thought it was a personality mask. Because when he pulled somebody out for either ridicule or censure, he had this grin on his face up to the time the bomb exploded.

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Q: You say, "ridicule." Did he do that?

H: Well, I mean in ridicule, he picked the wrong time and place in my opinion. To exercise his authority, his censuring, and I don't think...

Q: Did he use sarcasm?

H: Oh no, not particularly, not sarcasm, no, direct.

Q: Because I'm thinking of "ridicule here."

H: Well, I call it ridicule because he would do it in front of the man's contemporaries. I mean, take A-2, stand him up, and everybody on the staff would be present to watch Hodges get bawled out. And I thought that was a measure of ridicule.

Q: Yeah. But he, did he use sarcasm?

H: No, I don't think so.

Q: Irony?

H: Irony, possibly, but not sarcastic.

Q: Did you feel that he was right in <u>what</u> he was saying but not <u>when</u> he was saying it.

H: Yes.

Q: In other words, did you feel that when you got bawled out that it was not correct that you did have the facts but he misunderstood them. Was that your position?

H: No, I wouldn't say that. I don't feel that I was faultless; I made mistakes like anybody else, but I thought that when he pushed the buzzer and called me up in the office and said it, I thought that was fine.

Q: But when he did it in front of an audience...

H: But when he would put me up before 50 officers, I thought it was a measure or ridicule. I felt it was ridicule. It didn't happen often.

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Arnold was awfully nice to me, he really was. When I left the Pentagon I got one of the finest efficiency reports that I had ever received. Of course, Barney Giles probably wrote it, but Hap signed it nonetheless.

Q: It was this type of attitude on his part that led somebody to say that his criticism was impersonal, that he could chew Hodges out 20 times and give him a fine fitness report.

H: I think that's true.

Q: In other words, he was dealing with issues rather than personalities?

H: Yes, indeed. Most of the time. Most of the time, and I enumerated one that I felt never got a fair deal after that.

Q: You mean this other individual?

H: Yes. And there were others, but aside from that I think he was entirely impersonal.

Q: I'll turn this off. I want to ask you about something else. Because I'm really interested in the Arnold-Andrews relationship. Now I have seen letters which Knerr and Andrews wrote to one another. Andrews was in favor of unification, autonomy, for the Air Force in 1940-41. Arnold, while he was verbally in favor of it, did not push it because he was working for Marshall, and Marshall decided there would be no separate Air Force until the war ended. Now Arnold was loyal to Marshall and he played this game, but Andrews was playing another game. Andrews was playing a game with Knerr. Knerr was writing stuff for Seversky, he was writing stuff for William Bradford Huie. Were you aware of this?

H: No.

Q: In 1940 and 41?

H: I'm familiar with the articles by those people, but I never knew that Hugh Knerr was the source.

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Q: He was the source of it. You know, the book, we, The Case Against the Admirals?

H: Yes.

Q: You have it here?

H: No.

Q: Well, if you ever see it, look in the preface. William Bradford Huie dedicated to Hugh Knerr. Hugh Knerr wrote it, well, wrote the basis of it. Huie put it into his own language. This was known. This was well known--to the Navy. Knerr wrote several articles when Andrews went down to the Caribbean. Remember in 1941? Andrews was in G-3. Marshall brought him to G-3 and then Marshall sent him down tothe Caribbean. He was the Commander of the Caribbean Defense Command.

H: Where was his headquarters?

Q: Canal Zone.

H: That's what I thought.

Q: Remember that?

H: I have a very faint recollection of that.

Q: Yes. And Knerr was trying to come back on active duty. And Arnold and Brett--Brett had then become Chief of Air Corps and Arnold had moved up to become Deputy Chief of Staff, were breaking no world's records in getting Knerr back on active duty. Andrews was writing letters asking for Knerr to come back on duty. Arnold was worried about this combination. I guess Arnold regarded Andrews as a threat.

H: I think so.

Q: Do you recall...

H: There was quite a bit of jealousy, professional jealousy involved.

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Q: Do you recall September 1938, Westover was killed in a crash. Roosevelt was considering a successor to Westover. There were two major competitors, Arnold and Andrews. There was a report on Roosevelt's desk that Arnold drank to excess.

H: They didn't blame that on Andrews, did they?

Q: No. My guess is that Pa Watson did it. Pa Watson was personal advisor to the President.

Q: Right. He was the President's military aide and he didn't like Arnold, but he liked Andrews. They were classmates.

H: No, I didn't hear about that.

Q: 1906. Anyway, I don't know who did the report; I'm just guessing, but there was a report on the President's desk that Arnold drank, and the President delayed in the appointment. Did you ever hear that?

H: Never heard a word of that. Never.

Q: Anyway, Arnold got the job and, of course, Andrews stayed in the GHQ, but there still was this uncertainty about the relative status of both men. And this thing continued, didn't it?

H: I never felt that it ceased. I thought it went on until the end of...

Q: No, I didn't say it ceased but I say it continued.

H: I say I didn't know that it ever ceased; I thought it continued.

Q: Well then when Andrews left, then Emmons came in.

H: Yes.

Q: Then there was competition between Emmons and Arnold. Were you aware of that?

H: If there was, I've forgotten that, too.

Q: Well, Emmons got his third star before Arnold did.

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H: Really?

Q: Yes.

H: Outranked him?

Q: Outranked him for a period and then Emmons got sent down.

H: I mean in the linear list, he outranked him?

Q: Do you think there was a feud? Was it, did it have the status of a feud? Or just sort of an indefinite?

H: Didn't have the status of a feud. It was a feud but it didn't come to surface too often, I mean in too obvious a way.

Q: Yes. When did it come to the surface?

H: Well, usually during appropriation time, when the GHQ AF wanted some money.

Q: And Arnold held them back or Arnold didn't...

H: Arnold didn't fight for it, I don't think. He sided with the General Staff.

Q: How about Hans Christian Adamson? Do you remember him?

H: Well, I thought he was a very colorful chap. You couldn't help but admire him, but he seemed a little bit...

Q: He wasunder you for awhile, wasn't he?

H: For a short time, I think he was. I was very impressed. I mean.

Q: He was Eddie Rickenbacker's friend.

H: Things went on as usual as far as I could tell.

Q: Well, you know there were two competing historical programs. There was one, a formal historical program; this came out as the Craven and Cate series. Remember Craven and Cate?

H: No.

Q: The two And then there was the Personnel Narrative Division under Hans Christian Adamson. Do you remember that?

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H: I remember the name Hans Christian Adamson and when you mentioned it I remembered that he was in my outfit somewhere.

Q: Yes.

H: But I just don't recall.

Q: And he was writing a popular history. He hired a bunch of Hollywood writers. He hired Harold Hinton and Lucian Hubbard and James Kirkpatrick, remember?

H: I remember all of those names.

Q: And they hired...

H: I'm surprised you can't pull this movie star out to the director that I told you....

Q: William Wyler, maybe?

H: No, no, it wasn't Willie Wyler. It was somebody almost that high.

Q: George Goddard, you say, was zealous?

H: Oh my, he'd just push anything right to the last possible good that he could get out of it, you know.

Q: You mean personally or for the photographic business?

H: Well for his profession and photography which he really embraced with open arms.

Q: Do you know in his book he talks about getting in trouble with Arnold? You remember when he was in trouble with Arnold? Arnold exiled him.

H: Really?

Q: Arnold exiled him. He became the VD officer down in North Carolina. And then the Navy dug him up again, and then, other people brought him back into favor.

H: Well, way back in his career he was in charge of the photography office in Washington in the Headquarters there.

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Q: He and Arnold wrote a joint article for the National Geographic. At one time he was one of Arnold's favorites, but he got in "dutch." This was before your time. But it was during your time that he came back into favor. Do you remember when he had this problem?

H: No.

Q: Well, he was under you in a way, wasn't he? I mean, photographic reconnaissance?

H: No, I was under him in a way.

Q: Oh really?

H: As I say he was in charge of the office in the headquarters. And I was in the photographics school at Langley. In that way he was my next step up the ladder for correspondence.

Q: I see. And he was a very aggressive individual?

H: Very aggressive. I think his outstanding characteristic was perseverance. As I recall, he was zealous about what he went after.

Q: Yes. Was he a brilliant technical man?

H: Evidently so.

Q: Do you know the strip camera that he perfected?

H: No.

Q: He tried to sell Arnold on it, according to his book, and couldn't.

H: I always thought that George was a screwball but he was very brilliant with it. That is usually the case, I guess.

Q: Right. One of the problems was that he seemed to go off in uncharted directions.

H: You never knew where he was going to jump next. I always admired George very much. Now we parted ways, I guess, when I left the Photographic School and went to Chanute Field, and then, I never saw much of George after that.

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Q: Late in the war, did you have any responsibility to Barney Giles? Did you have to report to him on a lot of things you did?

H: Yes. He was the Chief of the Air Staff when I was there.

Q: Did you have a lot of dealings with him? Or did you go direct to Arnold?

H: Just routine. I usually went direct to Arnold. On some of the business I had to transact, I got a lot of help from Barney.

Q: Some of the people who were closer to Arnold than others, like Norstad and Kuter, was this envied among the other Staff? Did they feel that these fellows were getting special treatment?

H: I don't know. I didn't envy them a darn bit. I thought they were very superior officers to be able to be in such high esteem by Arnold, and I admired both Kuter who was not too well liked by his contemporaries, as you probably know. Larry wasn't too well liked either. That may be what you speak of as jealousy.

Q: Did they interfere in your operation?

H: Not in the slightest.

Q: Did they come around and sort of look over your shoulder?

H: Never.

Q: On behalf of Arnold?

H: No.

Q: Never bothered you?

H: Never. In fact, if I wanted to intercede with Arnold for something that I hadn't been able to do, I would get help from Larry and Laury.

Q: Then if you came to them for help, they....

H: Usually would help.

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Q: Usually would help. Well, there must have been a close relationship between Intelligence and Plans. Did they consult with you?

H: No.

Q: When Kuter was working up Plans, they had a post-war division. Did they ever consult with you?

H: They may have, but I don't recall.

Q: Remember Moffat?

H: Reuben Moffat?

Q: Yes. Reuben Moffat.

H: Not anything that he ever did. No.

Q: Were you privy to the atomic bomb secret?

H: No.

Q: You had no knowledge of it?

H: None whatsoever.

Q: Then I don't guess you were doing any investigative work on the German atomic bomb, because you didn't know whether it existed?

H: No, that always surprised me that it was kept in such a small circle of people.

Q: It was a successful secret?

H: It certainly was. Was Larry Kuter in on that?

Q: I think he was; at least at the last.

H: I felt, I think I felt in the years after that he was. And probably, Larry Norstad. But the rest, I don't know. I don't think that Pinky Craig was.

Q: No, he wasn't.

H: Pinky Craig was a big boy in the regime about the time I was A-2.

Q: He is coming into town. I'm going to try to get to see him before he leaves. He's coming for the Daedalion thing. I'm going to try to find out if Giles was privy to the atomic secret.

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H: When Gen Arnold came to England in 1944, I don't recall whether it was to present the Medals of Honor, or whether he came to inspect the 8th AF, in a sort of haphazard way.

Q: 1944? This must have been the time of the invasion?

H: No, it was prior to that.

Q: Then it must have been 1943?

H: Maybe it was the winter of 1943. But any rate, I was called on the phone and told that Gen Arnold was coming up, to inspect the 44th, or to give Leon Johnson his medal, or whatever it was. So I got together with the Base Commander at Shipdam, where the 44th was stationed, and told them to get out an honor guard, and be prepared for him to land at a certain time. I went on out there posthaste, and Arnold landed, taxiied up, and...

Q: This was in the UK?

H: Yes, and he got out of his airplane, and here was this honor guard, I guess, about a squadron of troops. They were lined up, and all dressed up, little band. Arnold got out of his airplane, and his first words to me: "What the hell are these people doing out here?" I said: "Well, it's your guard of honor, General, if it's all right with you." He said: "Well, it's not, they ought to be resting or at work." I said: "Hell, they want to see you. They like to see the top man once in awhile." Well, that mollified him a little bit, and the rest of the trip around the base was all right. But that was indicative of him, you see. He liked to be honored, but he wanted to put up a little fuss about it, just the same.

Q: You don't think he was honestly perturbed about guys standing around doing nothing?

H: No, I think that was his way of trying to brush off the idea that he was entitled to honors, which he definitely was, and I wasn't

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about not to give them.

Q: Was he four star, or three starts at this time?

H: Well, he was five star, wasn't he?

Q: Five star, later, in 1945.

H: Well, this was '43 or '44. But he had all he could get at that time.

Q: Was Eaker still in command in the UK?

H: Yes, it was during Eaker's regime.

Q: Well, I'll tell you when it happened. It was Labor Day, or day before Labor Day, 1943. It was the last day in August.

H: How can you tie it down like that?

Q: I can tie it down because Eaker went out three months later. This was Arnold's inspection trip, when he was making up his mind as to whether to leave Eaker in the job. And he decided not to, he decided to bring Spaatz in, this was Christmas 1943. So he came out there, andmaybe I will refresh your memory. It was two weeks after Schweinfurt, two weeks after we lost 60 planes. Am I correct? Do you remember that?

H: Could be, I remember Schweinfurt, yes.

Q: This was the first Schweinfurt raid of August 17, 1943. And Arnold came there. There was a great deal of criticism, and he came out there really to take a look for himself. He had been bugging Eaker to increase the number of planes on missions, the idea being that if you send 300 out, you lost 5%. If you sent 600 out, you'd lose 3%, because the more planes you sent you, they were mutually supporting.

H: There were only so many fighters to hit them.

Q: Right. So, he was trying to get Eaker to increase the density of the strategic attacks, and...

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H: Now why in the hell did he divert the aircraft necessary to do just that?

Q: Divert where?

H: North Africa.

Q: He opposed it. This is a good question.

H: I thought that was another thing that Arnold had done that didn't quite make me happy. I got the brunt of that, because most of the B-24s, from that time on, whenever it was, went to North Africa, and they filled the place up with B-24s down there, where there was no war to fight at all. Up in our area, where we were getting losses, because there was so few of us to go out, and the whole German Air Force could descend on one poor little group. I mean it was that bad. And yet, our scheduled groups to come in, stopped right there, for quite a while, while North Africa filled up.

Q: I believe you are talking about 1942 now?

H: Well, it extended into 1943. I didn't get over there with the first airplane until about October 1942.

Q: Right, this was a couple of weeks before TORCH. Arnold fought that, and lost it. He fought against diversion of these planes to North Africa, but a decision was made to go into North Africa. Arnold was opposed to that. He was over...

H: I don't see how he could blame Eaker, without putting greater density over the target.

Q: You see, we are talking about a year later. A year later, 1943, the North African war was over. We were into Italy, around the time Arnold came into England when he received the welcome that you are talking about. The North African campaign was over. Sicily was over, we were just invading the boot of Italy. And there was some diversion, but most of the planes were then going into England. But Arnold had

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fought and lost the battle to divert aircraft. Now this is a year and two months before we are talking about, before this visit. In July 1942, a decision was made between Churchill and Roosevelt, for TORCH.

H: When did the flow to England resume?

Q: The flow to England resumed in the Spring of 1943.

H: It seems to me we had an awful rough winter in 1943.

Q: In 1942-43. That was a rough winter, because all the stuff was going into the Mediterranean.

H: No, I mean, I think '43-44, it seems to me we had a rough winter because of the dearth of airplanes.

Q: I'll tell you why you had a rough winter, you didn't have any escorts.

H: Well, we didn't have much density, either.

Q: Well, you lost 60 planes on two different missions. You lost 60 planes at Schweinfurt on August 17, and you lost 60 planes on October 14th.

H: Of course, now understand, I'm not talking about the B-17s, they kept pretty well up to strength there, but the B-24s, the flow stopped, bang, just as you say, and they filled up North Africa with B-24s.

Q: Another diversion, the Navy wanted B-24s in the Pacific. The Navy wanted B-24s, because the B-24 had a much longer range than the B-17. The Navy used it for reconnaissance, and the Navy was pulling for B-24s.

H: That's where some of our others went.

Q: Pacific. Right. But Arnold fought the battle to build up the 8th AF, this was his baby, because he realized that strategic

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bombing would rise and fall, or stand or fall on what happened in the UK. This is why, he put the tremendous pressure on, and then that trip.

Q: Tell me about the failure to foresee the need for long-range escorts.

H: Well, I don't know that it was a failure to foresee, but it was a failure to provide, out of funds, the diversionary amount of money from bombers, and I think that was true; I think they just skipped spending money at that time for the long-range fighter.

Q: Was it a choice of spending part of a little amount of money, splitting it up between bombers and long-range escorts? Did they decide, if we did get some money, we'd go for the bombers? Is that what happened?

H: That's my recollection of it.

Q: And they just didn't have enough to go around?

H: Didn't have enough to go around for the bombers, and they thought bombers were more valuable than fighters. Now, that is a misconception that existed, I'm sure, because we know when we got fighting a war, that fighters were very essential. But us bomber boys, we didn't think so, till about that time.

Q: Would you say that this was a legitimate criticism of Andrews as well as of Arnold? That there was not enough attention devoted to technological improvement of long-range escort?

H: Well, possibly so, but I don't think that Andrews had the responsibility that Arnold had for that sort of planning, because I don't remember anything crossing my desk at that time which envisioned tactics by fighter aircraft in support of bombardment.

Q: That's part of the problem, that people....

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H: So maybe it was Andrews' fault as much as Arnold; I didn't think so because I didn't think it was....

Q: There is a new book out criticizing the Air Force, and claiming that the Air Corps Tactical School down at Maxwell, all they taught was bombardment tactics, that long-range escort was simply obscured, or ignored.

H: I think you could put your finger on a very valid criticism.

Q: You were in England at the time of the first terrible loss, the 60 planes.

H: The first Schweinfurt, 54 planes, wasn't it?

Q: No, 60, well, it might have been 54, then they had some stragglers. I think the final count was 60. There was a great deal of criticism of that in the press. Of course, Arnold was greatly concerned, this is one of the reasons he came to Europe. He came to Europe two weeks after that, and in my opinion, he was trying to size up Eaker's ability to keep that going.

H: I think that's one of the mistakes in judgment he made that I didn't know about.

Q: What's that?

H: Relieving Eaker. I think that Eaker was one of the finest commanders that I ever knew. I thought he was a real commander in every sense of the word. Wise, he looked out for his people; I mean he had every attribute of command, and I don't know how you could blame it on him for not having sufficient forces to put in proper concentration. He only had so many airplanes.

Q: Well, during this trip that Arnold made, the one where you had the honor guard out, and Eaker had a couple of strong sessions, I mean,

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strong words were used, I was told they had a meeting at the Claridges Hotel, and some strong words were exchanged between them. And they were old friends, they wrote books together.

H: Oh yes, Arnold and Eaker were a close team there for many years.

Q: Arnold was concerned. He asked Eaker what he was going to do with all these planes coming in, and Eaker was going to put 60 planes on one airdrome. So Arnold raised the point: "How are you going to maintain and supply 60 planes on one airdrome?" Eaker said that he was going to fly them in shifts. Arnold was opposed to that, because if you fly them in shifts, then the Germans could, in the interim, take their fighters down, refuel them, get them up there again, and knock down the next contingent of bombers going through. You see, this was part of Arnold's reasoning. Do you remember any of this?

H: No, I wasn't privy to that.

Q: This, in my opinion, was part of the reasoning that went behind Arnold's decision to take Eaker out of there. Eaker was very bitter about that. Did you know?

H: No, well, I know, I served under both men, and I certainly felt that Eaker was a far more brilliant commander than Tooey. And I'd known Tooey much longer than I had known Eaker, and I loved him very much Certainly, Tooey was a very fine chap.

Q: Eisenhower had great confidence in Tooey Spaatz.

H: Yes, I suppose. Wasn't that the secret of the thing?

Q: You mean when Eisenhower was brought into Europe to command OVERLORD, then he was going to bring Spaatz in?

H: I felt that was the reason. I didn't know that Arnold had made a choice.

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Q: I think Arnold made a choice, but I'm sure that it was influenced by the others.

H: Don't you think that would have been the main reason? Don't you think, after all you've looked at Arnold's character. Don't you think he was pretty much a politician?

Q: Yes, he was a politician.

H: Therefore, Eisenhower's opinion would have a lot of weight with him.

Q: Yes. His likes and dislikes.

H: In my view, Eisenhower's coming into the theater signaled the departure of Eaker.

Q: Well, that's what Eaker told me.

H: That's my firm belief. As I say, I've served under both these people over there, one for about ayear, and the other for about a year. As far as I could tell, the next echelon of command was much more brilliant under Eaker than it was under Tooey.

Q: You know, Arnold had an argument at Cairo. This was at the time the change was made--with Lord Portal. The British wanted to keep Eaker on the job, Arnold argued in favor of taking him out of there. They camouflaged the change. They changed a lot of officers, Eaker's whole staff was moved around, and Spaatz' staff was moved around. It was Arnold's decision.

H: Because these men both worked for him?

Q: Well, I think there is some validity in what you say. But I don't think it is the whole answer, in my opinion. I'll tell you why.

H: Arnold didn't have any background of training or experience which would enable him to come into a conference with Eaker on war tactics and strategy.

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Q: You mean Arnold had no combat experience?

H: No, no, Eaker had been over there for a couple of years at that time, and he had developed a lot of leadership and ability based on experience. Arnold had absolutely none. The only thing Arnold commanded were peacetime organizations in the States, over in Panama, isn't that true?

Q: Yes.

H: All right, therefore, I would suspect that his argument or censure of Eaker was not based on experience, but on politics.

Q: Well, let me say this...

H: I mean that's an indication of the character of Arnold, and I don't depreciate his brilliance, or his leadership. But I think that in that case, he made a mistake in judgment.

Q: He knew which side of the political bread his butter was on?

H: Exactly.

Q: Well, let me make another comment (off the record).

H: Fighting in a war that was novel, let's say at least, and it had to have a lot of growing pains, and as far as Arnold was concerned, he couldn't tolerate no, not mistakes, the growing pains of a growing, group by group, build up of an air force. Now, after Spaatz came up there, I believe, as I say, the flow started back in again. The 2nd Division filled up to 15 groups, and everything was hunky dory by the time D-Day came along.

Q: You see, Eaker was bitter about this, because he had suffered all the growing pains.

H: That's right.

Q: After the thing had reached maturity, Spaatz came along and reaped all the glory.

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H: Not all the glory, I'm sure, for the public consumption he had...

Q: Except Eaker was denied the benefits of the fruition or maturing of the 8th Air Force.

H: Yes, he built up this outfit, as I say, and a new war, and a new outfit, several group by group, and you are bound to have a lot of growing pains. Guns jam, and all these things freeze up, and the airplanes get stuck in ice, all that sort of thing. We had an awful lot of growing pains in 1942.

Q: Right, let me change the subject. The German V-weapons. They came to fruition during your regime?

H: Yes, we bombed the hell out of No-Ball, the ski sites.

Q: We knew about the V-1. Did we know about the V-2?

H: Yes, sure it was going bang-bang while I was still there.

Q: Peenemunde, some of the other sites?

H: Peenemunde. Of course, the British did most of the bombing of Peenemunde.

Q: There was deep penetration, or you didn't have to hit the precise target. Why did the British do that?

H: They pretty much set up the targets over there, if you know that, or haven't figured it out. The British were sort of running that air war over there.

Q: You mean they were doing the targeting?

H: A great deal of the targeting.

Q: Were we getting out targets from the British?

H: I think so, because Eaker and "Bomber" Harris. They were so close, and what Portal, how he fitted into the machine, I don't know.

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Q: He was overall.

H: As far as I was concerned, Eaker and Harris coordinated the targets.

Q: Portal had the same job as Arnold had, approximately.

H: Yes, next echelon of command. The direction Eaker and Harris had to do.

Q: You were doing the intelligence work for the 8th AF, at this time, or you had a group.

H: No, I had the 2nd Air Division, the B-24s, of which, another bitter point with me as far as Arnold is concerned, I couldn't see the reason for buying B-24s when you could be buying B-17s.

Q: You wanted B-17s?

H: Of course, there was no comparison of the ability to resist fighters, and so on, between the two. The B-24 was a lumbering thing that you turned the wheel, and three or four seconds later, the wing would come up, you know, that sort of thing. That wasn't conducive to very good tactical ability.

Q: It had a longer range, but it was not suited for the European war?

H: It had no longer range, unless you loaded down the wing tanks. That was an illusion, too. Ordinarily, with the normal gas load, the B-17 could go farther than we could. Time after time.

Q: Was your whole division equipped with B-24s?

H: Yes.

Q: And the 1st and 3rd Divisions were B-17s?

H: Yes, now, LeMay did take on a few groups of B-24s. But mine was all B-24s.

Q: It wasn't proper to mix them?

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H: No, they didn't fly well together. The B17s got altitude better and held their flying ability better at 30,000 feet than we did. So we were usually the lower division. And we got a few more casualties that way.

Q: You had more casualties than the B-17s?

H: The B-17 boys were tickled to death, when we went along on the same mission, because we flew below them and the fighters hit us. Bob Williams will tell you, if you talk to him.

Q: Bob Williams had what job?

H: He had the 1st Air Division. Later on, after Larry Kuter had tried his hand at it, and failed. Oh, I shouldn't say that, but he had tried his hand at it, and somebody else came in, I think it was Bob.

Q: Larry Norstad and Larry Kuter were brilliant conceptualists...

H: They certainly were.

Q: But they were not commanders, at least...?

H: That's my feeling.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Norstad?

H: Only that I described to you, when we were together in the Pentagon. If I wanted something put through the front office that I couldn't get the ear of Arnold on, successfully, I would go see if Laury or Larry could help, both of whom had the ear of Arnold. And if they would put in a good word for something, I wouldn't have so much trouble the next time I talked it over with Arnold.

Q: You could see the results of missionary work that they did?

H: Yes, they were very good at that. Both of them were very brilliant officers, I'm not running them down a bit.

Q: If they told you that your proposal wouldn't fly, did you drop it?

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H: Oh yes. I didn't....

Q: You didn't buck them?

H: No, I didn't buck them; I was putting it up to them. I would say: "Now, I've recommended this line of action with General Arnold, and he doesn't like it. He doesn't go along with it. What do you think of it?" Well, if I had sold them, from then on, they would help me, and maybe I could get it across.

Q: And if you didn't sell them, you forgot it?

H: I forgot it. I figured this thing is screwy. No use of me trying to sell it.

Q: You were sensitive to the political pressures involved, too?

H: Oh yes. You can call it political. I thought they had the ear, the inner circle that I didn't have, and I shouldn't have had it as A-2. After all, A-2 had very little to do with fighting the war.

Q: When you were in A-2, Arnold had a great interest in the V-1 and the V-2. Arnold always had a great interest in science, R&D. I believe Arnold arranged for parts of the V-1 to be shipped back to the U.S., and it became the JB-2. Do you remember that?

H: I've forgotten those details. I don't remember things like that.

Q: Do you remember a plan that we had to blanket Germany with JB-2s?

H: No.

Q: This was Arnold's plan. See, we improved on the V-1. The story I get is that when Arnold visited the beachhead a couple of days after D-Day, and the Germans started firing V-1s, Arnold arranged for a team to put all the pieces of a V-1 together, and he had it shipped back. The first thing you knew, we were building them ourselves. He

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was a great gadgeteer.

H: You're damn right.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of that?

H: Only that he was brilliant, and that was one of his hobbies, that sort of brilliance.

Q: R&D. Did you know of his close relationship with von Karman?

H: No.

Q: Millikan?

H: No.

Q: Why do you say his brilliance in R&D? Do you have any other evidence?

H: No, I say that was his bent, I thought.

Q: He was hot on glide bombs. Do you remember he was hot on the pilotless bomber, the Razon and the Tarzon. Do you remember the "Weary Willie" Program?

H: Very familiar in sound, but I don't remember anything about it.

Q: "Weary Willies" were old tired B-17s that they were going to load up and fly them over Germany and hit targets with them. Do you remember that?

H: Yes, now that you mention it.

Q: This was Arnold's program, but it got killed. The British were worried that the Nazis would retaliate, reprisals. So it got killed in the last stages of the war.

H: The British are pretty smart people, you know it. I had a lot of respect for them.

Q: When the war in German ended, you were still A-2 right, V-E Day?

H: Yes, VE-Day I was just about going out. Barton Yount asked for me to come out and relieve Sammy Cousins, Western Flying Training

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Command. I was so delighted to get out of that sweat shop there.

Q: Who took your place in A-2?

H: The fellow that married the wealthy woman--Pete Quesada.

Q: Quesada became A-2?

H: Yes, that's what it said on his desk. I know he didn't work at it like I did, and I didn't know how Arnold would tolerate that. I was surprised.

Q: I can remember Pete Quesada as A-2. He didn't stay in that job long?

H: No, he was not the slightest big interested in it.

Q: You know.

H: I wasn't either. I dug in, but Pete didn't. And I don't know how he got away with it.

Q: You didn't have your heart in that A-2 job. But you did it because it was your assignment.

H: My assignment, and I did the best I could. And Pete didn't make any effort at all. He went out, and flew his P-51, or whatever he had sitting over there on the field at Bolling. And he would go off a week at a time, maybe with Arnold's permission, I don't know.

Q: By this time, Arnold was pretty nearly out of Washington. I want to ask you about his heart attack. Do you remember he had a heart attack in January 1945? Let me place it in time for you. About the time of Roosevelt's last inauguration, just before YALTA.

H: No, I don't recall it.

Q: It was kept pretty quiet.

H: January 1945, no, I was still at the Pentagon, but I don't remember it.

Q: Do you remember when Giles sort of took over?

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H: I believe I do.

Q: Arnold was sent down to Coral Gables, Florida. Giles was sort of running the show?

H: Well, I've forgotten that. You'd be surprised what I've forgotten.

Q: You probably haven't thought about some of these issues for 25 years.

H: It doesn't leave any impression on your mind at all, that's the amazing thing. You've named a lot of things here, that after you have explained them to me, I remember them quite well, "Weary Willies," things like that.

Q: Well, I've been working with it for the last year or two, so they are very fresh in my mind. Harmon was lost, and Giles went out to the Pacific. This is in the Spring of 1945. Arnold had come back from Florida from his heart attack. The word was that they would take it easy with Arnold and reduce the pressure. Marshall gave this instruction. In order to further that project along, they brought in Eaker from Europe. The war was a month from ending in Europe, and they brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. Do you have any vivid impressions of Eaker running the show?

H: No, complete blank.

Q: Do you remember Arnold and Lovett? Did you have any dealings with Lovett?

H: Yes, I've had several contacts with him, but I can't remember anything about it, except he was a very affable, pleasant chap to work with. I'd sit there in his office, and he would give me some instructions about this, that or the other. I was impressed with his clarity and directness, so on. That's all I remember.

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Q: Do you remember a guy named George Brownell in his office?

H: I remember the name, but I can't see the man.

Q: Do you remember any relationship between Arnold and Lovett?

H: I always thought they were very cordial, I didn't know anything about those two up there.

Q: Lovett has been represented as a balance wheel to sort of tone Arnold down. Let me ask you, did Arnold, I think you mentioned that Arnold made impulsive decisions. Did he?

H: No, I didn't say that.

Q: Would you say that?

H: No.

Q: Do you think he was calculating?

H: I thought he was very calculating and deliberate. I thought that he had a bad temper at times, and would fly off the handle. But I wouldn't call that impulsive.

Q: Was this a daily occurrence, Arnold flying off the handle?

H: It seemed so to me.

Q: You saw him every day?

H: He was giving somebody hell every day. His method of operation, I thought.

Q: You could almost bet on this every day at that staff meeting, somebody was going to catch it?

H: Well, I wouldn't put it that bad, but I mean....Arnold was always apparently losing his temper. He would get red, right up over the top of his scalp. He was very emotional about things of that sort, and he would get very angry. And he'd show it, and he'd let off steam when he did, at whoever he was with.

Q: Did he calm down before the end of the session?

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H: I suppose so, yes, but it took him a long time to get his color back down to where it belonged. No, I don't think he was impulsive.

Q: Did he ever apologize to anybody?

H: No. I don't think so. That wasn't his nature at all, as far as I know.

Q: There were some times when he bawled somebody out and then took a different tack. For example, with you, when he said you don't look too well, Jim. This could have been his way of apologizing to you for some previous bawling out that he later learned was not your fault.

H: Could be, could be, he used to take me over the races quite often, I'll tell you that. I'd say once a month I'd get a good scrubbing, about something or another, usually about the damn photographic business. He didn't give me much trouble about my Intelligence job.

Q: What about the photographic business, why was he so, you mean, about getting pictures?

H: Motion pictures, that was the nerve center for it there, and it was one of my offices, I was supposed to know what was going on. Apparently, I didn't know much about it. So I had to get in there and pitch for awhile, and find out something about it, because I didn't know anything about it.

Q: He was a great one for slides and visual presentation, audio visual type of demonstration, wasn't he? Didn't he have some books made of strategic bombing and distribute that to the President, and Churchill and Stalin. Did he have you do that?

H: I believe he did.

Q: He had a couple of these, he was very proud. He wanted it known, the kind of a job strategic bombing was doing?

H: Yes, I believe that was one of my little headaches for awhile, was getting those things together.

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Q: Did you have any role in the Strategic Bombing Survey? You know, Arnold set up...

H: Well, in a way. He set up a Target Division under my Division, and we had a boy in there that was a very level-headed chap that took care of that--targets, and that was the start of the strategic, as far as I know, that came out of that, Strategic Bombing Survey came out of that section.

Q: Didn't it start as the Air Force Evaluation Boards?

H: No.

NOTE: General Hodges did not recall any association between the Evaluation Boards and the Strategic Bombing Survey. He also could not remember the association of Franklin d'Olier or Mike Scanlon with the establishment of the USSBS.

Q: Did you have to brief Marshall?

H: No. Marshall used to come up and sit on our briefings, but he wasn't being briefed, he was just checking.

Q: When Marshall sat in on these meetings, did Arnold blow his stack?

H: No, he maintained his cool.

Q: Somebody told me that Arnold never contradicted Marshall in one of these groups. He was deferential to Marshall?

H: That is my memory of the time. I don't recall too much of Marshall's visits. I know that Arnold was very deferential to him.

Q: Did you ever hear them or see them together, Arnold and Marshall?

H: I suppose I have, but I can't recall.

Q: Did you go to any of the conferences, QUEBEC or CAIRO, TEHERAN?

H: No.

Q: Do you remember when Kuter was chosen to stand in for Arnold at Yalta?

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H: I remember that he was.

Q: Was it clear that Arnold had a heart attack, or did they keep this very secret?

H: Well, in view of my memory, I couldn't say one way or another, but I knew about it.

Q: Did people raise the question of why Kuter was going instead of Arnold?

H: No, not that I remember.

Q: Was this a natural, was this accepted?

H: I thought that Arnold was there.

Q: No, he wasn't.

H: Well, I know Kuter was, because I can see the photograph where Kuter was standing in the background there.

Q: Yes, this was MALTA and YALTA. Arnold had a heart attack and they kept this very quiet.

H: Wasn't he at the one up in Germany, Berlin, Potsdam?

Q: Yes, by that time he had recovered from his heart attack. Do you remember the doctor he had, Marquardt, a heart specialist?

H: No.

Q: Did you go to Potsdam with him?

H: No, no, I didn't.

Q: Andrews had a penchant for flying his own plane, he was over 50 years of age at that time. I think, probably in defiance of orders, he was flying his own plane. And he should not have been. Is that correct?

H: Not so far as I know. I didn't know he had the controls when he was killed.

Q: Well, several people have told me this.

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H: He was aboard one of my planes, at this same station I was telling you Arnold landed at, Shipdam. That was the station of the 44th Bomb Group.

Q: Did Andrews take unnecessary chances, personal, risking his life. I was told that he flew in weather that most people wouldn't fly.

H: Definitely, I was co-pilot on many of those flights that I wouldn't have flown in. I'd be waiting for a clearance, and he would say: "Come on, Jim, if we don't take off, we will never get there. Let's go,"and he being the Chief of the GHQ AF, and this being Langley Field, why, they didn't stop him, but I tell you, I've had my hair raised on many flights with him.

Q: You had misgivings about his...

H: Not his ability, but the weather that he was encountering. No, his ability to overcome them, which he did in every case.

Q: Except one.

Q: I want to ask this question (Ref to Marshall criticizing Andrews for tolerating actions by his staff).

H: I would hate to say so, I'm devoted to him.

Q: I know you are devoted. In a way, it's good that he accepted something less then perfection among his contemparies and that he was a human being.

H: Yes, I would say that he was tolerant of mistakes to a greater degree than Arnold, that's for sure.

Q: I think this is a legitimate characteristic. This was characteristic of the man.

H: He was a very easy going, quiet man, reserved. That's the complete opposite of Arnold.

Q: But people had confidence in his ability?

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H: Oh, yes.

Q: Was Andrews articulate? Could he get up and give a ringing speech?

H: No.

Q: Charge the men up?

H: No, he was not articulate.

Q: Arnold, was Arnold articulate?

H: Under pressure, he sure was.

Q: When he was mad, was he articulate?

H: Words would come right on out.

Q: He didn't lose his speech?

H: No, no.

Q: He was voluble?

H: Yes. I don't mean that Andy was not able to discuss something intelligently, but to get up and harangue about it. No, he was not able to do it.

Q: Did Arnold harangue on occasion?

H: No, I wouldn't say so, no.

Q: Was Arnold a spellbinder in his speeches?

H: No.

Q: Did you write speeches for Arnold?

H: No, only Emmons and Andrews.

Q: You wrote some for Andrews?

H: Yes.

Q: Did Knerr do any writing for him?

H: Yes, I think he did. Now Follett Bradley wrote for him. When I came into GHQ AF, I was assistant A-2 with Bradley, and that was the first task he gave me, was to write Andrews' speeches.

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Q: Did you have any involvement with Bradley when he went to Russia? Follett Bradley went to Russia on a mission. This was in '42, I guess you were in Europe at this time?

H: Oh yes, the only involvement I had was, he came through my area when he was on his way there.

Q: Ralph Royce was one of the people in Andrews' camp, wasn't he?

H: I don't know.

Q: He wasn't in GHQ AF?

H: No, Ralph Royce, not to my memory.

Q: Were you surprised that Germany put up so little air opposition over D-Day?

H: Yes, I was surprised, but I knew that they couldn't put much in the air, because they had really lost a lot of planes.

Q: You participated in this Operation STRANGLE, and the BIG WEEK in February 1944, when they plastered everything in Germany?

H: Oh yes, I was present, but I don't remember the code names.

Q: Do you remember the struggle over the targeting, oil targets? There was some problem. The British wanted us to quit pointblank and go into tactical targeting. Remember this, right before D-Day, Spaatz was holding out for continuing to hit the oil targets? Do you remember that?

H: Now that you mention it, I remember it.

Q: And they did. Well, you hit some of the oil targets?

H: I thought you were going to ask about this Jake Smart, on the mission..he had sold Arnold.

Q: Smart sold Arnold on Ploesti?

H: Yes, and Smart came over to 8th AF, for the execution of it. And, of course, the B-24s were the goat, if anything, those days, and

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we got the assignment. And I argued all I could against it, but it was Arnold's man, and Arnold's stamp of approval. So it went on through as planned. It was a horrible mistake.

Q: Why?

H: Low altitude, we hadn't been trained to do anything like that, we were high-altitude precision bombers. And the same force that went over there and got shot up tried to come to the treetop level and skip these bombs into oil tanks. They could have wiped that place out, if they had done it at high altitude.

Q: Did you advocate a high-altitude attack?

H: Yes.

Q: And they came in low altitude. Didn't somebody make a mistake when they came over the target, somebody missed a turn?

H: As I say, we weren't trained in anything like that. The heavy bombers, nowhere, were trained to do that.

Q: Who made that mistake, was it Smart, or somebody else?

H: The conception was Smart. He had nothing to do with the execution. The boy was John Kane, because it was work that we were not supposed to do, or were equipped to do. Killer Kane was his name.

Q: And you blame this on Smart for having sold Arnold?

H: Yes.

Q: Smart outsmarted himself?

H: Well, that was one of Arnold's mistakes.

Q: You mentioned the B-32 as a mistake.

H: It seemed to me it was a mistake to give that contract to Convair again after the B-24?

NOTE: General Hodges thought that it was a mistake to turn over the B-32 contract to Convair after they had done so poorly with the B-24. He said it was his job in the 2nd Air Division to keep the morale up of those flying B-24s when they much preferred to fly B-17s.

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NOTE (contd)

In respect to the death of Lesley McNair, Gen Hodges said that Tooey Spaatz told him that General Marshall had blamed Hodges for this, and had told Mrs. McNair that the man responsible for this terrible error had been relieved of his job. Hodges was relieved of his job, but Arnold certainly did not regard this as punishment, because Arnold brought him into Washington to become A-2.

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Hood, Reuben 28 May 70

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1080 Palmetto Rd
Mt. Dora, Fla 32757
16 May, 1970

Dear Dr. Green:—

I expect to be at home on 30-31 May and will be glad to see you at your convenience during that period.

My telephone number is area code 904 and local 383-5296.

Sincerely

Reuben C. Hood, Jr
Maj Gen. USAF (Ret)

old
turn left
thru town
3 stoplights
by the lake — on left
flashing sign — Morningside Dr
1 — on Palmetto
1 st house on R.

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May 7, 1970

Maj Gen Reuben C. Hood, Jr., USAF(Ret)
1080 Palmetto Road
Mt. Dora, Florida 32757

Dear General Hood:

My plans have firmed up to a degree. I'll be in the Mt. Dora area on Saturday and Sunday 30-31 May.

Please let me know if any time during this period is good for you.

A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
per dictation from
San Antonio, Texas

BONNIE JANIK, Secretary

P.S. Would you please include your phone number.

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3 March 1970

Major General Reuben C. Hood, Jr., USAF (Ret)
1080 Palmetto Road
Mt. Dora, Florida 32757

Dear General Hood:

Thanks for your nice letter. My present plans call for me to visit Mount Dora late in May. When we get closer to the event I'll alert you.

I'm sure your contribution will be valuable in the overall input. I'm looking forward to our meeting.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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1080 Palmetto Road
Mt. Dora, Fla 32757
21 February, 1970.

My dear Dr Green:-

I am sorry not to have answered your nice letter of 27 January earlier but some uncertainty about when I would be away from Mount Dora had to be resolved. It now appears that I will be here almost all the time until at least late July.

I would be delighted to see you and talk with you at any time, though I am afraid that my contribution would not be of great importance. Along with Ray Owens and Pat Timberlake, most of my contact was with Barney Giles - however I do have some vivid and personal memories of the "Old Man".

Anticipating hearing from you in the future, I remain

Sincerely yours

Reuben C. Hood, Jr.
Maj. Gen. USAF (Ret).

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January 27, 1970

Major General Reuben C. Hood
1080 Palmetto Road
Mount Dora, Florida 32757

Dear General Hood:

John Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who either knew General Arnold or had some connection with his policies.

You worked for and with General Arnold for most of the last two years of World War II, especially as D/CAS, Operations.

I'm planning a visit to Florida some months from now to interview certain key personnel who were associated with General Arnold and I would welcome the opportunity to stop by Mount Dora to see you.

Assuming your willingness to talk about General Arnold, could you let me know what your schedule is for the months ahead so that I can time my visit for your convenience?

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

MAJOR GENERAL REUBEN C. HOOD, JR., USAF

PART I - Narrative

Reuben Columbus Hood, Jr., was born at Atlanta, Georgia on April 12, 1907. He was graduated from the Georgia School of Technology in 1928 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Chemistry.

Appointed a second lieutenant in the Air Reserves on June 11, 1928, seven days later General Hood was assigned a Flying Cadet. Completing Primary and Advanced Flying School on September 4, 1929 he was commissioned a second lieutenant of Air Corps, Regular Army.

His first assignment was with the 96th Bomb Squadron at Langley Field, Virginia and in July 1930 he assumed command of the Air Corps Detachment at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. Graduating from the Line and Staff Officers' Course at the Chemical Warfare School there in April 1933, General Hood resumed his former position. Entering the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama in August 1934, he was graduated the following June and became Adjutant, and later Operations Officer, of the Third Wing at Barksdale Field, Louisiana.

Going to Nichols Field, Philippine Islands in July 1937, General Hood joined the Second Observation Squadron, becoming Public Relations Officer for the Field and the Fourth Composite Group in October 1938, and Post and Group Adjutant the following July. Moving to Hamilton Field, California shortly thereafter, he was Air Corps Supply Officer, becoming Executive Officer of the 10th Pursuit Wing of the General Headquarters Air Force in January 1941.

Shortly before Pearl Harbor, General Hood at that time serving as a major, was appointed as Supply and Logistics Advisor to the Air Section of the U. S. North African Military Mission. On the entry of the United States in the war, he moved from Cairo to India where he became Chief of Staff and finally Commander of the CBI Air Service Command. Moving up into the interior of China, he became Commander of the China Air Service Area, commanding all the US air bases in China.

In July 1944 after this lengthy combat tour, General Hood returned to the United States to become Deputy Chief of the Supply Division of the Air Service Command at Patterson Field, Ohio.

Duty in Washington commenced in September 1944 when General Hood headed a special group which was engaged in a study to determine effective control and coordination of the Air Force effort in the war with Japan. From January 1945 to February 1947, General Hood was Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations, Headquarters U. S. Army Air Forces. For this duty General Hood was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

During the period preceding and following the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, General Hood was Chief of the Organization and Manpower Division, Headquarters United States Air Force.

Between September 1948 and June 1951, General Hood was Air Attache to Brazil. He had the additional duty of Chief, Air Section, Joint Brazil-U. S. Military Commission in June 1950.

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General Hood served as Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama between July 1951 and May 1953. In early 1952 he was assigned as chief of the team which negotiated Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements with Ecuador.

In June 1953 General Hood became Commander, Caribbean Air Command in Panama, an assignment which continued until 1956. In January and February 1954, he was assigned to command and lead the jet fighter good-will tour of Central and South America, known as "Wings for the Americas."

General Hood became Commander, Headquarters Command, USAF at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D. C., in June 1956.

General and Mrs. Hood, the former Emma Thomas of Atlanta, and two of their children, Sarah Elizabeth and Thomas Harvey Hood, reside at Bolling Air Force Base. Their third child, Mrs. Eldon L. Herron, resides at Warner Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

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PART II - Personalized Material

A. Interests

1. Fishing is paramount. General Hood has done both fresh and salt water fishing all over the United States, Central and South America. He has a vast knowledge in both the art and science of fishing. Enjoys golf when time permits.

2. Member Alpha Tau Omega
Member Tau Beta Pi
Honorary (Scholarship gold T)
Scabbard and Blade

B. Opinions, Teastes, and Evaluations

1. Enjoys outdoor, charcoal cooking; is conservative in civilian dress.

2. Has an extensive collection of tape recorded South American music; in travel he likes the mountains of North Carolina and the lake districts of Chile and Peru.

3. "Nevertheless and notwithstanding", "Change should occur through evolution, not revolution" are favorite phrases.

PART III - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

1. Born 12 April 1907, Atlanta, Georgia; Father - Reuben C. Hood; Mother - Elizabeth Murphey Hood

2. Married 22 December 1931; Wife - Emma Thomas Hood; Children: Martha Adelaide, 1933; Sara Elizabeth, 1934; Thomas Harvey, 1947.

B. Education

1. Graduate Boys' High School, Atlanta, Ga.

2. Graduate Georgia School of Technology, 1928

3. Graduate AAC, Pilot Training, Kelly Field, Texas, 1929

4. Graduate Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 1933

5. Graduate Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1935.

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C. Service Dates

1. 11 June 1928 - 2d Lt., Air Reserves
2. 18 June 1928 - Flying Cadet
3. 4 Sept 1929 - July 1930 - 96th Bomb Squadron, Langley Field, Va.
4. July 1930 - Commander, Air Corp Detachment, Edgewood arsenal, Maryland
5. August 1934 - Student, Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Fld, Ala.
6. June 1945 - Adj; Operations Officer; Third Wing, Barksdale Fld, La.
7. July 1937 - 4th Composite Group, Nichols Fld, Philippine Islands
8. July 1939 - Group Adj, 4th Composite Grp, Nichols Fld
9. 1939 - Air Corps Supply Officer, Hamilton Field, Calif.
10. January 1941 - Executive Officer, 10th Pursuit Wing of the General Headquarters Air Force.
11. April 1942 - Chief of Supply * Equipment Division, 10th AF, ASC, Asiatic Theater.
12. December 1942 - ASC Chief of Staff
13. January 1944 - Commander, ASC
14. June 1944 - Deputy Chief, Supply Division, ASC Hq, Patterson Fld, Ohio
15. September 1944 - Special Study Group, Asst Chief of Air Staff for Plans at Air Corps Hq, Washington, D. C.
16. January 1945 - Continental Air Force, Hq Camp Springs, Md.
17. February 1947 - Dep Asst Chief of Air Staff, Operations
18. August 1947 - Chief of the Organization Division, Operations
19. 23 Sep 1948 - Air Attache, American Embassy, 1134th Spec Act Sq., Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
20. 1 Jul 41 - Commandant, Air Command & Staff School, Maxwell AFB
21. 30 May 53 - Commander, CAirC, Albrook AFB, Panama
22. 20 June 56 - Commander, HEDCOM, USAF, Bolling AFB 25, DC

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D. Decorations and Medals

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster

Distinguished Flying Cross

Air Medal

Army Commendation Ribbon

European-African-Middle Eastern Medal

World War II Victory Medal

National Defense Medal

Asiatic-Pacific Theater Medal

American Theater Medal

Honorary Commander in the Military Division of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (CBE)

Foreign Recognition:

Aeronautical Cross of Merit - Columbia

"Abdon Calderon" First Class - Ecuador

Military Medal, First Class - Chile

Peruvian Aviation Cross, First Class - Peru

National Order of Merit in the Grade of Grand Cross - Paraguay

Condor of the Andes - Bolivia

Cross of Aeronautical Merit - Brazil

Venezuelan Air Force Cross - Venezuela

Honduran Pilot Wings

Ecuadorean Pilot Wings

Nicaraguan Pilot Wings

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Peruvian Pilot Wings

Brazilian Pilot Wings

Chilean Pilot Wings

Cuban Pilot Wings

Mexican Pilot Wings

Uruguayan Pilot Wings

Columbian Pilot Wings

Paraguayan Pilot Wings

Chinese Pilot Wings

E. Promotions

Rank	Temp	Permanent
2nd Lt	2nd Lt	28 June 29
2nd Lt		4 Sept 29
1st Lt		1 May 35
Capt		4 Sep 39
	Major	21 Mar 41
	Lt Col	5 Jan 42
	Col	17 Aug 42
	Brig Gen	9 Nov 43
Major		4 Sep 46
Col		2 Apr 48
Brig Gen		21 Mar 51
	Maj Gen	25 Aug 53

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Interview MG Reuben Hood, Mt. Dora, Florida, May 28, 1970.

H; When I came back from overseas, China, I was sent to Dayton for a short period, and then ordered into Plans in Washington as part of a special study group. And we, at this time, were privileged to attend General Arnold's staff meetings every morning. It was a special study group. I'm sure you got some information on it, so I don't think you need to dwell on that. But that third morning after I was assigned, I was walking down the hall in the E-ring in the Pentagon, and who should be coming, but General Arnold. But, having come back from overseas, I said to myself, "This makes you feel pretty good to walk down the hall and say good morning to your boss." And I noticed people getting out of the hall quite quickly. Some went in one door and some would go up the fire escapes. So I walked down, and said: "Good morning, General." He said, "Good morning. You're new." I said: "Yes," he said: "Oh yes, you just came back from China." And he said: "You know, something is bothering me, and I wish you would find out for me." He said: "I'm told by one group of people that we are going to have a shortage of navigators; I'm told by another group that we have a shortage now; I'm told by another group that there is not going to be any shortage." He said: "I really want to know. Will you find out for me?" I, of course, dropped everything, and I hunted all over the Pentagon trying to run this thing down. Then I ran into Dr. Ed Learned, and he gave me the straight dope on it. So I went charging down to see General Arnold, reported to him what I'd found out, and he sort of smiled that little quizzical smile, and he said: "I see you found Dr. Learned." And

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I said: "Yes sir, I did." "Well, he said, "thank you very much." This appeared to me to be a little queer, so I talked to some of the other people, and they said this was the way Gen Arnold keeps the staff stirred up. He will find somebody that's in Training, and he'll send them out to do something in Plans, and somebody in Materiel, he put in the Personnel people. And as a result, he keeps people a little bit stirred up, and a little bit on the defensive as to exactly what they are passing out, to be sure there is no padding involved in it. I think this was characteristic of the General, because he really felt that, I think, that people, not intentionally, would try to pull the wool over his eyes, but they had a tendency to make things look good.

Q: In other words, he tried to get information from more than one source:

H: This is right. All the time.

Q: And he had you checking on somebody else?

H: He had me checking on a bunch of programming data. Being in Plans at the time, I had very little contact with it. But I learned from that, and the next time I saw Gen Arnold coming, I went out a fire escape. But he was great that way.

Q: He had this tendency to grab people, and give them assignments distant from their expertise.

H: He used the principle, I think, that if you pried into something, and you couldn't satisfy yourself that it was right, normally having very little on its background, that you might get people thinking along the lines that he wanted them to think. As a result--I'm sure that you picked this up from some of the other

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people--because this was quite characteristic of him, that he wanted to know, he wanted to be sure that what was reported to him was right. The second one, was a very interesting item. I could kill Larry Kuter because of it. One morning we went into the staff meeting and General Arnold said: "We will dispense with the normal stuff this morning." He said: "I'm faced with a rather serious proposition." He said: "The Japanese are moving up the railway in Central China, toward Kunming." He said: "What must I do with the 14th AF? My immediate reaction is to pull it out, and take it back to India," and he started around the room. Some people disagreed with him, and some said they would like to think about it a little. Finally, he got to Larry Kuter, and Larry Kuter said well: "Hood's just come back from over there. Why don't you ask him about it?" So Arnold said: "Come up here." He had a map up there. He explained his point of view that he had to recommend to the Joint Chiefs some disposition, and it had to be today. There was no further time. And he said to me: "Well, what do you think?" And I said: "Well, in the first place, if General Chennault is to be believed, and I really think he can be believed, and the 14th AF has been the one thing that has kept China in the war." They were in bad shape at that time, because the Japanese had the entire coast, and nothing came in there except through the West. Arnold said: "Well, what do you think I ought to do?" And I said: "General, I think you ought to leave them there." Well, he said: "Suppose Kunming is overrun?" And I said: "I don't think Kunming is going to be overrun. I think that the Japanese are on a rail steal. They knocked out their rails, and they don't have the convenient source of rails. I think when they get to the end of the railroad, they will turn around and go back and take the rails with

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with them." Well, he said, "Against my will, you convinced me." And then General Arnold said--and I'm not going to give you the exact words--"you'd better be right." Every morning from then on, after I came in, as I came in the door, the General would be sitting there. He would look at me, and he would follow me around the room with his eyes, and watch me until I sat down. Fortunately, I was right. This is a matter of record. They did do this. The 14th AF stayed there, and I think really, the war in the Pacific was shortened.

Q: This probably led to your being assigned as Deputy Chief of Air Staff?

H: Well, it might have, I don't know. But at any rate, when the special study group which, as you know, basically and fundamentally, General Arnold's dream of his own staff, when he took command of the air war against the Japs.

Q: When you talk about the special study group, are you talking about the Advisory Group?

H: No, this was a rather interesting little group of people composed of Donald Wilson, Larry Norstad, Freddie Smith, Gene Beebe, and myself.

Q: What was your basic function?

H: And our basic function was to develop a headquarters which Gen Arnold hoped to command, and he wanted to take over as a SHAEF against Japan. He wanted to do this; he wanted to go to war. He did; he really did. But unfortunately, the European war was prolonged. In April 1945, he had his heart attack,then, you see. This was before the European war was finished. That killed the project right there.

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Q: This was probably before the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944, right before Christmas.

H: That thing kept going until about Christmas time. The type of people that they had in there. You see, Norstad went up there as Chief of Staff of the 20th. Freddie Smith went back to the Pacific, Hawaii, and Gene Beebe...

Q: Didn't he go out to the CBI?

H: No.

Q: He came back from the CBI, he was out there for a period, and then came back.

H: That's right, but he was not in that at all.

Q: We are talking about the special study group.

H: Yes, as soon as Donald Wilson went in as Assistant Chief.

Q: Deputy Chief, DCAS.

H: No, this was the assistant level. They had the assistant level and then they had these three deputies which were primarily coordinating officers, assisting Barney Giles, and that was the job I had. I took that over from Freddie when he left .

Q: Freddy Smith?

H: Yes, but they couldn't hold this group of people together, you see. This bunch he had as his headquarters nucleus.

Q: What was the purpose? Was the purpose for them to run the war from Washington, and he was to go overseas?

H: No, he wanted to form his headquarters for an overseas control of airpower exercised against Japan--in the Pacific, yes.

Q: Was he trying to compete with Nimitz and MacArthur? Each one of them was vying for power, there was this struggle about who was going to run airpower.

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H: Oh, I'm sure of this. But I don't think that as far as the General himself was concerned that he visualized this whole thing occurring in exactly the same frame of reference that it did in Europe. I think he visualized that he was going to pick up the 7th and the 5th and the 20th AF's and unite them under a single air force in the Pacific against Japan, and this is what he wanted to run. This special study group was supposed to be the nucleus of the headquarters.

Q: That was formulating in his mind in the fall of 1944?

H: Yes, actually, I guess this was in September 1944 when this thing was formulated.

Q: In September, Patton was running through Germany?

H: It looked like it was going to happen before Christmas. But it didn't, and the fact that it didn't I think kept him from realizing this goal, which was his dream, almost, because I think he was a little tired of being in Washington.

Q: It was just about that time you came into Washington?

H: Yes, I had been ordered back from there, and I went to Dayton, and was in Dayton for just five weeks and was ordered back into Washington and assigned to this special study group.

Q: How did you get ordered to it?

H: Well, when I came back, in the debriefing, Larry Kuter said: "Don't get your roots in too deeply there, because I think you will be back here."

Q: In other words, Larry Kuter brought you back?

H: I think that was probably true.

Q: How did he get to know you?

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H: Well, we were in Maxwell together, the Air Tactical School.

Q: 1938 and '39?

H: No, way before, this was in '33. I was a 2nd Lieutenant when I went into that thing.

Q: He was there a number of years, then, actually.

H: Yes, he stayed on. But we were together there in the class of 1933-34.

Q: Did you see him in North Africa?

H: No. By that time I had gone on to India. I was in Cairo when the war started, because we had gone over with this North African special mission headed by General Maxwell.

Q: You mentioned a third anecdote?

H: This one is quite tragic. When General Arnold had his stroke, of course, everybody was very upset about it.

Q: This was January 1945?

H: No, this was in April, when he came back, in April 1945. He came back once. They took him down to Coral Gables when he was sick. Gene Beebe was down there with him, and they let him come back.

Q: He came back in March.

H: After he went to Washington, and he was puttering around. Well, Pat Timberlake and Ray Owens and I were the three Deputies on the staff at that time.

Q: Is Owens alive?

H: I don't think so. One morning the buzzer rang on the box; I answered it, and it was Miss Suzy Atkins, and she said: "General Arnold would like to see you." And as I came out, here came Ray and Pat Timberlake. So we went in, reported, and stood there. Arnold

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said: "You three know more about what's going on in the Headquarters as a whole than anybody I know." General Arnold said: "I think you ought to give me a briefing. Now, I know it will take you a little time to get it together. But I want you to brief me on what's going on in this headquarters tomorrow morning." We had been told that we should be very careful about what we told General Arnold, not to excite him. So we said: "Yes sir," and went back. The first thing we did was get in touch with Dave Grant. Well, I'm getting a little ahead of my story. Just as we were about to leave, and this was the thing that was so pitiful about him, General Arnold said: "Nobody will tell me anything, and I must know." First time I ever saw him get even a semblance of a note of begging in his voice. So we got ahold of Dave Grant and said: "Now look, Dave, if the General is here tomorrow, we are going to be there. We've got direct orders from the boss himself. And he said, in his office tomorrow, we are going to brief him." Well, he said, we are going to have to do something about that, and that's the last time I saw him on active duty. He was a proud man, and a man who was dynamic in his approach to things. And to see him in a position where he felt that people were holding out on him, that they were not playing square with him, and it really hurt him.

Q: Right. By this time, he had appointed Eaker to become Deputy Commander.

H: No, not quite, just before, they were bringing him in. Barney Giles was still his Chief of Staff, and was actually doing the job.

Q: But the job--without reflecting on Giles or anybody else--the job was not being done as Arnold would have done it. The reason

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I say this is, Lovett felt that. Lovett wrote some letters and said he was worried, because at the top level, Marshall and King were bypassing the AAF in certain key decisions that were being made.

H: This I think may have been right. Now, this was mostly handled between the Plans people. Between Kuter specifically, and Giles, at this time--the Operations Assistant Chief. Bozo McKee was his deputy, and we dealt mostly at the Deputy Chief of Air Staff level. We dealt mostly with the deputies and the Assistant Chiefs, it might have been Pinky Craig, I'm not sure.

Q: He's one of the few people I haven't seen.

H: Arnold was a real individual. He had, I think he went out of his way to avoid what I think he considered stereotype logic. He would always discover some littl facet of a problem, that apparently nobody else would think of.

Q: He was impatient with staff procedure?

H: He was impatient with anything that seemed to delay his achieving what he wanted done.

Q: You know, I helped write a script for a documentary movie. We entitled it "Man In a Hurry."

H: I think this was so.

Q: He was impatient with the formalized staff procedure. He went right to the man that the thought could do the job?

H: Have you been able to dig up anywhere a record of the speech that he made, I think it was either his retirement speech, or the one at his five-star celebration? If you haven't come across that, I suggest that you do.

Q: Did Ed Bowles write that speech?

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H: I don't know, because the Old Man himself, he was a little jealous of his own prerogative. He kept things very close. He played them close to his vest. But I'm quite sure that some of the stuff that was getting past Barney, because Barney just had more than he could do.

Q: Barney Giles wanted to get out. He wanted to get overseas. He had been in there for several years. He had been OC&R. He took over from Stratemeyer and he was anxious to win his spurs.

H: I'm sure that this is so.

Q: Then when Harmon was lost...

H: That was a terrible thing because I thought.... Harmon and Andrews were two of the biggest blows that we ever had.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Andrews?

H: No, I didn't you see, because I was overseas at the time all this was going on I left just before, in early November 1941 to go overseas, and I didn't get back until June-July of 1944. So that all the time, that a lot of that was going on the Andrews-Arnold confrontation, I guess, you might actually call it that, I was overseas. Of course, Miff was in the Pacific when he was lost.

Q: You were with the, at Hamilton Field in 1941. Then you moved to the GHQ AF in January 1941. I guess Emmons had it then.

H: Yes, he did. Bruce Butler was up there, and he went down. Emmons had GHQ AF, this is right. I was thinking about the 1st Wing Commander.

Q: Was Eaker out there at Hamilton Field?

H: Yes, yes, he was there.

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Q: He had a fighter group out there?

H: Yes, he had the 20th Fighter Group out there.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Eaker?

H: No, I didn't, except that, you know Ira Eaker himself always played his own cards close to his chest. I think he played a good deal of poker, but his approach to things were similar to that. I have never heard him speak of General Arnold, except in very respectful and fine terms. He may have on other occasions with other people, but with me, never. I lived next door to him out there. I was in the 10th Fighter Wing, Operations. The 2nd Bomb Group had moved out, and Gen Eaker was there for not too long. He went from there down on maneuvers, then I lost track of him there for three years because I was gone, they pulled me off of maneuvers, because I was to go to Cairo.

O: When you were in Cairo you were with Elmer Adler?

H: Yes.

Q: Elmer Adler is ill now.

H: I understood that he was.

Q: Elmer Adler later got in trouble with Arnold?

H: Elmer was...I liked him quite a bit, but he was very self-centered, egotistically, in a lot of things. Elmer's ideas, and Arnold's, I'm sure, wouldn't dovetail. They did get into a few altercations.

Q: Did you go with Elmer Adler, when he had the Persian Gulf job, you know, helping the Russians in Basra?

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H: Dan Callahan, he had that particular phase of it. It basically was a part of the same type of activity that we were doing. We were in Cairo. Bob Oliver--he is dead now--had the operational aspect. Was sort of an overall Chief of Staff. Dan had maintenance and I had logistics. Sory Smith was over there with communications.

Q: Was that Information officer? He later became PIO?

H: No, this is right, later on he did, but at this time he was running the communications, sort of a school over there. They were trying to bring the RAF up in some of our activity, our approach to things.

Q: Did Sory Smith have any contact with Arnold?

H: I think he did sporadically, but I wouldn't know.

Q: Elmer Adler got in trouble with Arnold on that particular situation; I think Arnold cut him off his list. When Arnold lost confidence in somebody, he was ruthless?

H: He minced no words. The way this whole thing boiled out--we were there at Cairo and then the war started. Then they gave us sort of a ferry command, support responsibility, this little group of people in Cairo with 13,000 miles to play with, and nothing to do it with.

Q: Tell me about the Middle East setup?

H: In Karachi, Brady was out there at the time.

Q: Did you have any contact with this Aquila group?

H: Not very much.

Q: What was their mission?

H: I don't remember very much about it at the time. That and the HALPRO outfit.

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Q: The HALPRO ended up on the Ploesti mission?

H: This is right, these were basically just names to us out there at the time. When the Germans broke through in North Africa, and started back, they pulled out everything that we had that would fly, practically, particularly any of the bombers that we had. I'd hate to tell you the criteria we used to allow those aircraft to get out of there. It was something trafic. The sand over there gave those aircraft engine fits. But Elmer Adler sensing that maybe something was going to boil up in the 9th AF, he got Gen Brereton to release him and he went back to the Middle East. And Bob Oliver and Dan Callahan and Sory Smith went back with him, too. Oliver and Callahan and a couple others of that group stayed on out there, and became the Air Service Command activity in the CBI.

Q: This is when the war started?

H: When the war started, right after the war started.

Q: Come back to your return to Washington, there were several projects that Arnold was interested in at the time you became Deputy Chief of Air Staff. One of them was the JB-2. Did you have anything to do with that? You know, the Chinese copy of the V-1.

H: Yes, I had seen this thing down at Eglin off and on a lot, and if the Germans had never been able to convert that thing to a short nail takeoff, the way that they did down in Eglin, we might have been in very serious trouble.

Q: Yes, but Arnold was a gadgeteer.

H: Oh, I know that.

Q: He had played around with a guided missile in WW I with Kettering. He was over at the Normandy beachhead, three or four days

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after the event. Of course, on the 12th of June 1944, the Germans started firing the V-1. Arnold had parts of the V-1 brought back, reassembled and improved. It became the JB-2.

H: That's right.

Q: He had a program to send thousands of these into Germany. But then he had his heart attack and that...

H: It all died right there. In the meantime, things had begun to break very rapidly over there. Patton's breakthrough, I think, being one of the great aspects, brought that thing to a close. And it became, down at Eglins a sort of test vehicle, but if the Germans had ever thought of a lowering the thrust line on that little old jet engine that they had on there, it could have been a very serious thing for us.

Q: Arnold was pushing the JB-2 and also the Weary Willy program. It was also called Weary Orphan. This was a guided bomber; this was a bomber loaded with munitions, ordnance and dumped on a German target.

H: He also was interested in a thing called the CAMEL program.

Q: What was that?

H: I never got into that particular project. It was a fishing boat loaded with very high explosives, which was radio controlled. It was supposed to take care of the Japanese carriers. I think Arnold was the one that started this. Later on there was some discussion about it when we got into the Japanese activity. I don't believe anything was every really done beyond the planning stage on this project.

Q: What sort of projects did he give you as the Deputy Chief of Staff? Things you had to monitor for him?

H: The Headquarters was split up into responsibilities of the three Chiefs, and we were primarily coordinating offices. Now, we

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did have a certain amount of approval authority. In the training aspect, for instance, I could approve any program directive that didn't involve any more than 5,000 people. More than that, it had to go into, had to be reported in at the close of the day.

Q: Was there a dollar limit, too?

H: In some instances there was, particularly with Pat Timberlake, where Pat was in the Materiel business. Ray Owens had Administration, Pat had Materiel; and I had Operations. Plans was one of the outfits I was supposed to coordinate with, and Operations, Training and Requirements was a second I was supposed to be involved with, as well as a bunch of other smaller activities, such as anti-aircraft artillery coordination--the PIO business. I was a coordinator for the Chief of Staff on that particular activity, I had to give a number of press conferences in the Pentagon during the time I was there. The historical program was also one of the activities that I had to coordinate on.

Q: Did you work for Wilfred J. Paul?

H: Yes, he lives down here. In Orlando, he lives down here on Koret Avenue in Orlando.

Q: He's a guy I'd like to talk to.

H: You can get Wilfie right down there with no problem at all.

Q: He had some contact with Arnold, didn't he?

H: Yes, he did, he had quite a bit of it. The procedure that we had to deal with was, General Giles was pretty adamant about staff procedure. He didn't want something getting out from under him before he knew what was going on around him. So any paper that came in to his office, had to come in through one of the three coordinating

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officers. If it was brought in directly, it had to go out through one of the three officers. Every afternoon at 5:00 we met in General Giles' office and we presented every paper that we had that transcended our authority. So that all three of us had a pretty good idea of what basic fundamental papers were alive there in the headquarters. Sometimes we wouldn't get away from there till 11-12:00 at night. We'd sit there and brief Gen Giles on every one of these projects that was going on.

Q: In a sense, Giles was the organization man, and Arnold was going out?

H: He was a free wheeler.

Q: And Giles was maybe trying to put it all together?

H: Right. I think what Giles was doing, in this case of course, you see. With General Arnold away, it was more than one guy could do at the time, it really was. Because Gen Arnold had taken care of many of these external activities, you see, that Gen Giles had not had the time to take care of when Gen Arnold left. Work with the Joint Chiefs and Combined Chiefs activity.

Q: The Russians, Harry Hopkins.

H: Yes. The War Dept, and I think there was just more than one man could handle.

Q: In a sense, Arnold was the outside man and Giles was the inside man, trying to keep all the ducks in line.

H: I think this was basically correct, quite a correct statement. Barney was fundamentally interested, that when the Old Man had something in mind, it was being followed through, that nobody would drop the ball on it. This was one of the ways that he elected to keep his finger on what was going on.

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Q: On the question of following through, Arnold had this Advisory Council which he started off right after Pearl Harbor.

H: That's absolutely right.

Q: Norstad and Cabell were the first two; Smart and Rosie O'Donnell, and a guy named McRae.

H: McRae, I didn't know, all the rest, I knew.

Q: I haven't been able to get a fix on what he did. Now, Fred Dean was in there when you were there?

H: That's correct.

Q: And they were trouble shooters?

H: Our paths didn't cross a great deal because, as I say, we were basically coordinating officers; that was our job. When something came through Pat Timberlake's office that had implications of Training, which was also one of my babies, instead of having to go back, or send the guy back to the Training Directorate upstairs, he'd simply open the door and say: "How about this; is this all right?" I'd drag a copy and send it out and that was a coordinated copy. Send it back out as a directive rather than as a pure coordinated basis.

Q: I want to try to zero in on January 1945. It was that month when you were assigned as DCAS. I believe it was that month that Arnold had his major heart attack.

H: I think it was a little later than that. It was either very, very late in the month or in February, because they brought him down here to Coral Gables.

Q: Well, he got sick and they kept him in Washington for a couple of days and then they sent him out. My fix on that is a couple of days after Roosevelt was inaugurated, for the final term. The reason I fix on that during the last week of January, because in the last few

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days of January, the YALTA conference started. Well, they went off to YALTA. Arnold was not fit to go on that.

H: This is right.

Q: This is how they had to choose a successor, somebody to stand in for the AF, and they chose Kuter. Why did they choose Kuter? Do you know?

H: I think primarily because he, at this time, was the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, our Plans were reasonably settled at this time, through OPD in the War Dept. We had an Operational Plans Section, Loutzenheizer had that Operational Plans Section. Kuter was thoroughly versed in this. Not only this. Though Kuter was junior to a number of other people, when Arnold was out of town and Giles was out of town, Kuter sat in the front seat.

Q: Why didn't Giles get that job--to go to YALTA?

H: I don't know; I have the feeling that Barney was not politician enough. He was a very fine fellow, and a pleasanter guy I'd never hope to see. He was always cheerful. I don't believe that he had the talent for interservice operation that Kuter had. I think in this case, the decision was a wise one.

Q: He was more the housekeeper, you know, the administration man. Kuter was the conceptualist?

H: This I believe, to be correct.

Q: Kuter was far junior, not only to Giles, but several other people?

H: Oh yes, but he was quite well-in with General Arnold.

Q: I'm interested in this Plans business, because a new book has come out, written by a fellow at the AF Academy, Perry McCoy Smith.

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He talks about AF post-war planning. He talks about Moffat. Remember that guy in postwar planning?

H: Yes.

Q: And Trubee Davison, and Dick Lindsay? Did they have to report to you on this postwar plans setup?

H: No, because you see, when General Eaker came in, he changed the entire structure. He changed the entire structure of the AF elements. He put in a single assistant who was Charlie Chauncey. And I was an assistant in charge for two months, maybe. Then I went up in the Manpower business. I was assigned to take over the Manpower activities, which had been not very well emphasized.

Q: They could change things around quite a bit while Arnold was gone:

H: They changed it around a great deal, because I think he believed a lot in the type, I think you might call it the tri-deputy type of activity. The British used it, the Administration, the Deputy System. Administration, Operations and Materiel. He tended toward that particular type of organization.

Q: Eaker also was more of a staff man than Arnold, of going through his subordinates for decision?

H: I think so, yet Gen Eaker was impatient, in my opinion, he was impatient with detail, except in certain things. I think you could characterize Gen Giles as an internal man. You might, in the same fashion, characterize Gen Eaker as an external man, because his primary interest at this time -- remember, we were driving at this time for a Department of the Air Force, and everything else was

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subsidiary as far as he was concerned. Sometimes he'd have to go in and dig stuff out of his box that had been there a month.

Q: The big immediate job was redeployment?

H: This was so.

Q: And Arnold was in Europe part of this time, on his recuperation trip? On VE-Day he was in Europe.

H: That was in May. For my sins, I was the only General Officer at the AF Headquarters that night. I stayed there all night long answering telephone calls. It was rough, but caught me before I got out of there.

Q: Did Eaker have designs on the top job?

H: I don't think so. You know, this is something that has always puzzled me. Because he was a crackerjack, in my opinion. He would have been a superior Chief of Staff because he had the suavity and the intelligence. A top man, that guy, I respected him a great deal. I think he just got tired. I'll never forget the day he told me, he said: "I am tired, and I am getting out of here."

Q: This was in '47?

H: Yes (off the record)

Q: Arnold was quick?

H: He was very quick. He knew what he wanted, and he apparently thought it all out, all before, and he had, I'm sure he had in his own mind a set of criteria which he applied to everything, but he did it instantaneously.

Q: Did he ever make any snap decisions that he should not have made?

H: You see, from the time I got there, being back in Plans, until the first of the year, when I went up and took over the other

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job there, that month was really the only time I had to do very much with him. Not to my knowledge. During that period, there was nothing there that I think you could call really a snap judgment.

Q: Did he ever apologize for something he did? Saying,"I'm sorry I did it that way"?

H: If he did, I never heard of it. This could well have been, but I had no specific opportunities.

Q: Did you ever get chewed out by him?

H: I don't think so. After my experience of running around looking for navigators I stayed clear. I wasn't around when the lightning struck.

Q: I've been told that when he had this smile on his face, it might be a danger sign.

H: Oh, it could well be. Of course, there were always legions of stories running around. The time he threw the inkwell at Rosie O'Donnell and all the rest.

Q: Did he throw it at Rosie O'Donnell or did he throw it at the clock?

H: I think he threw it at Rosie, and hit the clock. That's the way the story ran. This was while I was there. Rosie was quite a guy.

Q: I talked to him a couple of months ago. He was very close to Arnold?

H: Yes, I think he was.

Q: Did you ever get close to Arnold in a personal way?

H: No, never. I had not served with him really, long enough, well I had not served actually with him at any time prior to the time that we went to Washington. He'd been on the West Coast most

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of the time, I'd been over on the East Coast. I didn't have very much contact, and that would be a very good. I think probably the one guy that was closer to him than any other individual would be Gene Beebe. Gene was like a son to him, and of course, I think, this didn't help General Arnold either when Gene had his heart difficulties.

Q: Another guy that was close to him at one time was Minton Kaye, do you have any knowledge of that, or was Kaye out of there by the time you got back?

H: No, he was out of there by the time I got back.

Q: He was close to Arnold, and then got in trouble with Arnold and Arnold cut him off.

H: He could be vindictive, he could be.

Q: Bear a grudge?

H: Yes.

Q: Who did he bear a grudge against, in your recollection?

H: Ray Dunn, I think, was one.

Q: I talked to Ray Dunn, you mean on account of the parachute thing?

H: I don't remember what, but I remember him making several remarks at one time or another.

Q: I saw Ray Dunn a couple of months ago. Ray Dunn, at one time, was very close to him. Ray Dunn, I believe, got involved in this terrible accident with parachutists. The planes over Sicily were fired on by our own people and we lost a great number of planes; also, several hundreds of our own men because of a stupid error. I think Ray Dunn took some of the brunt of that.

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H: He may have.

Q: He didn't know why Dunn was on Arnold's list, but he was? Arnold made some crack about him.

H: I think he made a few cracks about Bob Goolrick. Why, I don't know.

Q: What was his job?

H: Bob, when he came back, I don't know whether he was overseas, but the last time I had seen him was in Shreveport. He had command at Barksdale. He went down, I've forgotten, whether it was Sheppard or someplace down in there. He had a job that should have had a star, but General Arnold was down on him. He was not going to go along on that.

Q: How about Sue Clagett?

H: I never did know very much about him. Never served with him.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald, he was on Arnold's list, too, I believe.

H: Well, I think he may have been. I didn't know very much about him. The only time I ever served with him was when I was in Flying School.

Q: Ed Perrin was on his list?

H: Yes, I know Ed was, I had heard. He was close to him, too, at one time I understand.

Q: This is May 28, 1970. We are now talking about people who might have been on General Arnold's list. When he bawled somebody out, was it personal or impersonal?

H: I think it was a great deal of personal in it, from what I've heard. I didn't actually see anybody stomped into the ground by

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General Arnold, but it always seemed to me that everything was personal with General Arnold, I think.

Q: When he cut a man--a man who he had confidence in--banished him? That man, did he have it, or did he recall him?

H: I didn't know him long enough. I wasn't with him long enough to know of any specific instance of this nature.

Q: Well, I had one instance in mind. Larry Norstad. Larry Norstad was very close to him at one time.

H: This is right.

Q: And he was Deputy for the 20th and Larry Norstad had the job working with the Navy on a unification bill. The National Security Act of 1947 did not come out the way Arnold had in mind and he cut Norstad but then forgave him and before he died, he embraced Larry Norstad.

H: Well, this type of activity, I think, was conducted primarily between the Old Man and the individuals concerned. It was not done through the staff. A few words here and there that such and such was going on, but a little task group that worked and they worked directly influence with General Eaker.

Q: You were in headquarters in a DCAS position right at the time Arnold made a decision to change the 21st BomCom Command. He took Haywood Hansell out and put LeMay in there. And it was an apparent impulsive decision on his part. Do you know anything about that decision?

H: Only that from what I remember about it. Possum practically had a nervous breakdown. The 20th Air Force again was one of those things that ran back in the Plans people and between the Plans people, and Norstad and the boss himself.

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Q: Not direct?

H: It stayed--it was almost completely outside the activities of headquarters, AAF.

Q: The reason that I am bringing it up is that Arnold had written Hansell a letter; a new Years greeting, and it seemed to be fairly effusive in praise. Then five days later, Norstad came out there with the bad news to Hansell that LeMay was going to have the job.

H: That's right, but I think, if you recall, Possum was in the hospital quite a while immediately after that.

Q: Yesh.

H: And I don't believe this was cover-up.

Q: He was broken up by this thing, and he didn't even want any job. He just wanted a backwater job and he gave him one. But I think he was broken-hearted about this thing.

H: I'm not sure, as you refer to it, which was the cart and which was the horse. I am not so sure that Possum didn't break before he was changed. Maybe the Old Man was very adept at picking up things quickly. And I am sure this has come out many, many times in the inquiries that you have made.

Q: Yes.

H: But I think actually Possum had showed some signs of distress.

Q: I think you are right there.

H: And than when the Old Man saw this--he said well, this is can't be.

Q: He was very perceptive?

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H: Very perceptive in this regard, and I think this is when he sent LeMay out there.

Q: You know I was out at the Air Force Academy looking at some papers and Arnold was getting long letters from Hansell of the 21st BombCom, telling him why he didn't quite do all the things he had in mind. LeMay would send short two-paragraph letters on what he did yesterday. Arnold was the kind of man who came to a conclusion very quickly.

H: I am sure this is right. LeMay was there at headquarters for a while and all of a sudden he was up and gone. He took over the 20th Air Force.

Q: Do you know that Arnold was sick about the time the decision was made to go in at a low level--7,000 feet with the fire bombs.

H: Yes.

Q: Norstad went out possibly to consult with LeMay, although LeMay now says--I talked to him about two months ago--Norstad did not give him much counsel. LeMay had to carry this burden himself.

H: Well, this is my impression. This is the type of thing that which it would be perfectly characteristic of LeMay, in my opinion. He felt that there was something that had to be done, and this was the best and only way. So let's do it, and that was it. That was the end of it, as far as he was concerned.

Q: Going in at 7,000 feet in Europe would have been suicide.

H: Absolutely.

Q: Going in at 7,000 in Japan was a great gamble.

H: It was a gamble. Arnold was not there to give direction.

Q: Were you aware of any shuffling to and from Coral Gables with papers for decisions?

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H: Yes.

Q: For a decision by Arnold?

H: Yes, Col Beebe used to come to Hq AAF every other day. He would come up there, go back, would be there a day, and then he would be back, and he shuttled back and forth all the time--until they suddenly discovered that he had had considerable heart difficulty himself. They took him off flying status, and then, about that time is about when they got Gen Arnold back into Washington.

Q: Yes, he came back.

H: But Gene used to carry this stuff down there--what he carried I don't know. All I know is that he used to go down there one day and be back two days later, and then go back the same day--he never spent the night in Washington.

Q: Mrs. Hood, what recollections do you have of General Arnold?

Mrs. H: They were very dear. I remember about him, he never forgot a name.

Q: Mrs. Arnold was that way, too.

Mrs. H: Yes.

Q: She had a great presence.

Mrs. H: When Reuben came back from overseas and we went to this party when he got his five stars and we went through the line, she said: "Oh, you are new. And you have just come back." She knew all about everyone, and from then on--well, she always knew my name.

Q: Well, I will be in touch with her again. What is your first name?

Mrs. H: EM

Q: I talked with Hopwood yesterday and her name is Kappy.

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Mrs. Hood: From that time on when she was very active at all those women's activities.

Q: Did you work with her?

Mrs. H: Yes, I worked with her in Army Emergency Relief.

Q: Did you go to his retirement party?

Mrs. H: I think we went there.

Q: I guess Lovett was the toastmaster. This was in February '46. Were you around then?

Gen and Mrs. H: Yes.

H: And I think this is the speech that, if you have not had a chance to read, you should do so.

Q: It was Arnold's valedictory--sort of.

H: I am sure it was the one because it was shocking to the majority.

Q: Why?

H: I am going to wait and let you read that yourself. I could not do justice to it.

Q: What shocked you?

H: His perception. I think you remember he cautioned against a number of things in that particular speech. One of them was complacency.

Q: Did he hold out a high role for people who did not wear wings? Did he ever bring that up?

H: I don't recall that he ever did. I know that he was relatively fond of Bozo McKee.

Q: He was using Bozo McKee to try and get his son to join the Air Force. None of the Arnold boys flew. And he was trying to get them into the USAF. Bruce was interested in missiles and Bruce

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was telling his father there was no opportunity for a man unless he is rated. And the Old Man put Bozo McKee to work on him, and he got Bruce to come in. Looking back at it now, it was probably a mistake, because Bruce never made his star.

H: Well, this sort of thing does happen every now and then.

Mrs. Hood: This file had the name of every Air Force wife in the whole area. We had little cards on them and where they lived, and this was supposed to be a contact that they were keeping up. Now, after the Arnolds left,

H: And the war was over...

Mrs. Hood: This was not carried on, and I was stuck with these files of paper. I remember calling up Mrs. Spaatz asking what to do with them. She said, "burn 'em up."

Q: Well, Mrs. Arnold was great on this personal identification.

Mrs. H: Personal stuff we had to know, who was in whose outfit and everything else.

Q: Well, this was great for morale.

Mrs. H: I thought so.

Q: I got this impression from Mrs. Arnold, and this is why Arnold was so successful in every command he was in, because they personalized their association with their junior officers. When you worked for Arnold you weren't just a number or a uniform. You were a name and face.

H: You weren't to Mrs. Arnold either. She was a good companion. In '46, I had then gone up to OC&R, in the manpower business.

Mrs. H: That's what I thought. Because she wanted to know who was who, in all these outfits.

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Q: Well, she is a great historian herself. You see, she has kept all these records.

Mrs. H: I was a great admirer and our girls were just teenagers at that time.

Q: Were you somewhat awed by General Arnold when you first came into headquarters?

Mrs. H: I always thought he was gorgeous. Everybody else did, too.

Q: I guess.

Mrs. H: He always had a smile.

Q: He was a good looking man. Arnold, you know, wrote thousands of love letters to Mrs. Arnold over the years, and she saved them all. Every time he went on a trip he wrote her a letter--where he was and what he did. She saved everyone of these letters. And she wrote him--they were great letter writers. But he didn't save her letters. But she saved every one that he ever sent her.

Mrs. H: Well, I would never say I saw him when he was not smiling.

Q: Well, that smile, I have been told could be a prelude to an explosion. I think his facial characteristics were built in something that looked like a smile to people. But it didn't mean that he was happy.

H: I think that when you looked at General Arnold, you had to look at his eyes to tell whether he was pleased.

Q: Or how you were doing. Did you ever see him and Lovett together?

H: I have seen them together, or I did see them together a number of times. Relatively casual. I never saw them in any argument or disagreement.

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Q: Lovett has been characterized by me as the balance wheel--Arnold making impulsive decisions, and Lovett sometimes holding him back.

H: I think this is right. And I think Muir Fairchild had a little of that same quality.

Q: Restraining role?

H: A very mature judgment approach. I think General Arnold recognized as something desirable.

Q: Did Arnold take advice? Did he ever come into a meeting when it seemed obvious he had his mind made up to go in a certain direction, and then...

H: The only occasion I think of is the one I told you about. Where he said that he --- (a bit garbled) until the situation had been clarified I think he was always a little sorry that he did not go ahead and do it anyhow.

Q: Then he was open-minded enough to accept your counseling.

H: Once it was done that was the end of it. Mr. Lovett, I agree, he was really great in that position. He did a tremendous amount for the balance, not only just the particular projects that he and Gen Arnold were particularly interested in, but just as far as anybody was concerned. In some of the instances where it looked like things might boil, high, wide and handsome quickly, Mr. Lovett was always a calming influence. He was always present with some advice, and yet he had a tremendous sense of humor. Great sense of humor.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

H: I think he did, but it was not the same type that Mr. Lovett had. For instance at General Arnold's retirement, Mr. Lovett got up

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and he was talking about nicknames. He said, "Hap" was very characteristic of General Arnold. He basically gave a Happy appearance, and he thought he was happy. But, he said that he was not always as bald as a billiard ball, and for many years his friends called him curly. You remember that? Lovett had a great sense of humor and he used it to think keep people from sometimes getting over-wrought, over-anxious. He was a great guy.

Q: Did Arnold have the sense of relieving the tension in a staff meeting by cracking a joke?

H: I do not ever remember hearing him do so.

Q: He didn't go for off-colored stories?

H: I don't think I ever heard him tell a story that was off-color. Nor do I ever know of anybody that ever told me that he told one that was off-color.

Q: Do you remember the Jeb Stuart concept? This was one that Lovett became enamoured of. This was an idea of hundreds or thousands of fighter bombers going in low-level, and keeping the Germans off balance. This was towards the end of the war.

H: Yes, but at this time I was probably back in the manpower activity and a lot of what when on then I didn't know very much about. But I don't recall that there was anything--I didn't have any contact, let's put it that way.

Q: Do you recall any problems that Mrs. Arnold had--this is right near the end of the war? Eaker was the Deputy Commander and Mrs. Arnold had been invited to observe the RAF Ladies Auxiliary. She had trouble getting a ride on an airplane?

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H: I didn't know anything about that.

Mrs. H: No, I don't.

H: If this were so, I can only believe--knowing General Eaker as I have, and maybe you ought to ask him about this--I think he might have been of the opinion when we were trying to get the Department of the Air Force, that anything which had a possible repercussion shouldn't have been attempted. This would be my guess because you remember what a terrific furor the "Blaze" incident created.

Q: Do you remember the "Blaze" incident vividly?

H: I remember reasonably well.

Q: This occurred right about the time of Arnold's heart attack?

H: This is right. Just about the time.

Q: It was about from the 19th to the 21st of January 1945 somewhere in those two days. Elliott Roosevelt was always a pain in the neck.

H: I had met him in Egypt and when he first came over, and he was not prone to let anyone get any opinion that he wasn't the President's son. Everybody knew it, and not just casually, but repeatedly.

Q: He took a number of risks--personal risks--and if he wasn't the President's son, he probably would have gone just as far or farther on his own merit, but because of this problem that he had--he flew this Boffin Bay route. He volunteered to go into Russia on a survey trip.

H: I knew that.

Q: They wouldn't let him go in because they were afraid that he might be captured and this would create problems. But Spaatz

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wanted to promote him to a star--Arnold said "No." Then Arnold got sick and he got promoted to a star. Is that correct?

H: I guess you are right, but I'm of the opinion that if General Arnold had stayed that way he would not have been promoted.

Q: Spaatz recommended this, but Arnold said "No." Well, you see he did not have wings--he couldn't command an operational unit and if you couldn't command it, you are not entitled to a star. My impression is--I've been up to Hyde Park, by the way--that the President or Pa Watson ordered it.

H: This could be.

Q: You didn't get involved? You were not in Manpower then, or were you?

H: I think I was at that time.

Q: I take it they didn't route this one through you?

H: Nope. My basic job in the Manpower activity, to start with, was the reduction of excesses. We were trying to get well from this demobilization that was a tremendous thing. One of the most remarkable activities that I have ever seen occur. But we were trying well. The Congress was getting these thousands of letters every day. The war had been over three days and little Johnny isn't home, why? This kind of thing. As a result, it began to be quite a hot political issue. That's when General Eaker told me to get up there, and get around the country, and I did. I traveled like mad. I was gone probably five days a week for about three or four months.

Q: This was in the postwar period? Did you ever see Arnold when he was retired?

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H: No, not after he retired.

Q: Did you see him when he came through Washington at any time?

H: No.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the Benny Meyers' business?

H: In handling basic supply activities, Benny did a pretty good job. When I came to Dayton he was Deputy Command out there, and he had done some things which were not looked upon with great favor at the time because they were politically explosive.

Q: Just like putting rugs in his office.

H: Sending stuff out by aircraft from Washington. When we moved the base. It scared me to death because I had been there a few days--about a month to be exact. One morning "Bonny Blue" who was the secretary there called me in, saying, "the Deputy Commander wants to see you." I went up. I was asked: "What's your previous condition of survitude (PCS)?"--what it was usually referred to in those days. Benny Meyers said: "There is a committee known as the Mead committee, that is investigating war activities and you are going to be the Materiel Command's star witness." I said: "I don't know anything about this kind of stuff. I've been overseas. I've been on the getting end of supplies, not on the procuring end." Meyers said: "All you have to do is follow the leads that I give you and you'll be all right." Well, two days later, I was ordered back into Washington, and I left there with the greatest of joy.

Q: In 1944.

H: I am sure that had I stayed I would have been right in the pot with him, because I would have been doing a lot of the talking along the lines that he expected me to do.

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Q: But you had an impression that Benny Meyers cut corners?

H: I surely did. This was my feeling. I was really quite shocked about it. Junius Jones was IG at the time. the IG was part some of the responsibility which I had. Junius used to come in. When he had something--he talked well, when he was discussing something. He would come in and just talk, and I could see that what he was trying to make up his mind as he was talking. But he was very deeply concerned about this issue.

Q: You know Arnold had great confidence in Meyers?

H: There was no doubt about it, he was a brilliant individual. He was very brilliant, but it is too bad that the ethics that he displayed were not a match for his other talent.

Q: You know, up to a month and a half before his testimony, this is in '47, when the Ferguson Committee unearthed this thing, he tried to get Arnold to back him. Arnold had drafted a letter supporting Benny Meyers. But somebody must have tipped Arnold off that they had the goods on Meyers because he did not send the letter. I saw the draft letter from Arnold. Of course, Arnold was broken hearted. He was a sick man and he came into Washington in '47 and testified about the one rotten apple in a barrel.

H: I hope you follow up on that speech. I think you ought to get it. Remember how quiet everybody went when he got through. They were almost stunned. I don't know what they expected but basically the year he was talking about was the year 2,000.

Q: You know, he put von Karman on this job. Did you have contact with von Karman on this subject?

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H: A little, not very much. Every once in a while I would get involved with something. This CAMEL project I was speaking of, for one.

H: I know there was something of this sort going on but this really was before Wilfie got too much involved in it. He was in part in the affair, I think, but later on it was down in Maxwell.

Q: Wilfie is Wilfred J. Paul.

H: Yes, and I do remember hearing something about this, but I don't remember the outcome of it. I think the historians got away with it, as I remember.

Q: Did Arnold ever talk to you about the importance of history?

H: I think he talked to everybody about that.

Q: How about the Strategic Bombing Survey? Did you get involved in the planning of that?

H: Not in the planning. That was mostly handled by Gen Joe Loutzenheiser's shop. I knew what was going on.

Q: You remember they had the Evaluation Boards?

H: This is right.

Q: Do you remember a situation arising with Scanlon? He came up with an Evaluation Report No. 3 which stated that the Navy was giving better air support to the Leyte invasion than the Air Force was giving the Army. Arnold hit the ceiling on that. Do you remember that?

H: No.

Q: This happened back about the time you came in.

H: No, it must have blown over. I remember some repercussions basically, but Orvil Anderson was the proponent mostly riding around there.

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Q: For the Strategic Bombing Survey:

H: And most of the contact I had was regard to this was with Orvil, when he was back here, because he periodically did come back. I think that whole effort was exceptionally well handled. The importance of it, General Arnold did not overlook.

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Interview MG Reuben Hood, Mt. Dora, Florida, May 28, 1970.

H; When I came back from overseas, China, I was sent to Dayton for a short period, and then ordered into Plans in Washington as part of a special study group. And we, at this time, were privileged to attend General Arnold's staff meetings every morning. It was a special study group. I'm sure you got some information on it, so I don't think you need to dwell on that. But that third morning after I was assigned, I was walking down the hall in the E-ring in the Pentagon, and who should be coming, but General Arnold. But, having come back from overseas, I said to myself, "This makes you feel pretty good to walk down the hall and say good morning to your boss." And I noticed people getting out of the hall quite quickly. Some went in one door and some would go up the fire escapes. So I walked down, and said: "Good morning, General." He said, "Good morning. You're new." I said: "Yes," he said: "Oh yes, you just came back from China." And he said: "You know, something is bothering me, and I wish you would find out for me." He said: "I'm told by one group of people that we are going to have a shortage of navigators; I'm told by another group that we have a shortage now; I'm told by another group that there is not going to be any shortage." He said: "I really want to know. Will you find out for me?" I, of course, dropped everything, and I hunted all over the Pentagon trying to run this thing down. Then I ran into Dr. Ed Learned, and he gave me the straight dope on it. So I went charging down to see General Arnold, reported to him what I'd found out, and he sort of smiled that little quizzical smile, and he said: "I see you found Dr. Learned." And

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I said: "Yes sir, I did." "Well, he said, "thank you very much." This appeared to me to be a little queer, so I talked to some of the other people, and they said this was the way Gen Arnold keeps the staff stirred up. He will find somebody that's in Training, and he'll send them out to do something in Plans, and somebody in Materiel, he put in the Personnel people. And as a result, he keeps people a little bit stirred up, and a little bit on the defensive as to exactly what they are passing out, to be sure there is no padding involved in it. I think this was characteristic of the General, because he really felt that, I think, that people, not intentionally, would try to pull the wool over his eyes, but they had a tendency to make things look good.

Q: In other words, he tried to get information from more than one source:

H: This is right. All the time.

Q: And he had you checking on somebody else?

H: He had me checking on a bunch of programming data. Being in Plans at the time, I had very little contact with it. But I learned from that, and the next time I saw Gen Arnold coming, I went out a fire escape. But he was great that way.

Q: He had this tendency to grab people, and give them assignments distant from their expertise.

H: He used the principle, I think, that if you pried into something, and you couldn't satisfy yourself that it was right, normally having very little on its background, that you might get people thinking along the lines that he wanted them to think. As a result--I'm sure that you picked this up from some of the other

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people--because this was quite characteristic of him, that he wanted to know, he wanted to be sure that what was reported to him was right. The second one, was a very interesting item. I could kill Larry Kuter because of it. One morning we went into the staff meeting and General Arnold said: "We will dispense with the normal stuff this morning." He said: "I'm faced with a rather serious proposition." He said: "The Japanese are moving up the railway in Central China, toward Kunming." He said: "What must I do with the 14th AF? My immediate reaction is to pull it out, and take it back to India," and he started around the room. Some people disagreed with him, and some said they would like to think about it a little. Finally, he got to Larry Kuter, and Larry Kuter said well: "Hood's just come back from over there. Why don't you ask him about it?" So Arnold said: "Come up here." He had a map up there. He explained his point of view that he had to recommend to the Joint Chiefs some disposition, and it had to be today. There was no further time. And he said to me: "Well, what do you think?" And I said: "Well, in the first place, if General Chennault is to be believed, and I really think he can be believed, and the 14th AF has been the one thing that has kept China in the war." They were in bad shape at that time, because the Japanese had the entire coast, and nothing came in there except through the West. Arnold said: "Well, what do you think I ought to do?" And I said: "General, I think you ought to leave them there." Well, he said: "Suppose Kunming is overrun?" And I said: "I don't think Kunming is going to be overrun. I think that the Japanese are on a rail steal. They knocked out their rails, and they don't have the convenient source of rails. I think when they get to the end of the railroad, they will turn around and go back and take the rails with

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with them." Well, he said, "Against my will, you convinced me." And then General Arnold said--and I'm not going to give you the exact words--"you'd better be right." Every morning from then on, after I came in, as I came in the door, the General would be sitting there. He would look at me, and he would follow me around the room with his eyes, and watch me until I sat down. Fortunately, I was right. This is a matter of record. They did do this. The 14th AF stayed there, and I think really, the war in the Pacific was shortened.

Q: This probably led to your being assigned as Deputy Chief of Air Staff?

H: Well, it might have, I don't know. But at any rate, when the special study group which, as you know, basically and fundamentally, General Arnold's dream of his own staff, when he took command of the air war against the Japs.

Q: When you talk about the special study group, are you talking about the Advisory Group?

H: No, this was a rather interesting little group of people composed of Donald Wilson, Larry Norstad, Freddie Smith, Gene Beebe, and myself.

Q: What was your basic function?

H: And our basic function was to develop a headquarters which Gen Arnold hoped to command, and he wanted to take over as a SHAEF against Japan. He wanted to do this; he wanted to go to war. He did; he really did. But unfortunately, the European war was prolonged. In April 1945, he had his heart attack,then, you see. This was before the European war was finished. That killed the project right there.

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Q: This was probably before the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944, right before Christmas.

H: That thing kept going until about Christmas time. The type of people that they had in there. You see, Norstad went up there as Chief of Staff of the 20th. Freddie Smith went back to the Pacific, Hawaii, and Gene Beebe...

Q: Didn't he go out to the CBI?

H: No.

Q: He came back from the CBI, he was out there for a period, and then came back.

H: That's right, but he was not in that at all.

Q: We are talking about the special study group.

H: Yes, as soon as Donald Wilson went in as Assistant Chief.

Q: Deputy Chief, DCAS.

H: No, this was the assistant level. They had the assistant level and then they had these three deputies which were primarily coordinating officers, assisting Barney Giles, and that was the job I had. I took that over from Freddie when he left .

Q: Freddy Smith?

H: Yes, but they couldn't hold this group of people together, you see. This bunch he had as his headquarters nucleus.

Q: What was the purpose? Was the purpose for them to run the war from Washington, and he was to go overseas?

H: No, he wanted to form his headquarters for an overseas control of airpower exercised against Japan--in the Pacific, yes.

Q: Was he trying to compete with Nimitz and MacArthur? Each one of them was vying for power, there was this struggle about who was going to run airpower.

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H: Oh, I'm sure of this. But I don't think that as far as the General himself was concerned that he visualized this whole thing occurring in exactly the same frame of reference that it did in Europe. I think he visualized that he was going to pick up the 7th and the 5th and the 20th AF's and unite them under a single air force in the Pacific against Japan, and this is what he wanted to run. This special study group was supposed to be the nucleus of the headquarters.

Q: That was formulating in his mind in the fall of 1944?

H: Yes, actually, I guess this was in September 1944 when this thing was formulated.

Q: In September, Patton was running through Germany?

H: It looked like it was going to happen before Christmas. But it didn't, and the fact that it didn't I think kept him from realizing this goal, which was his dream, almost, because I think he was a little tired of being in Washington.

Q: It was just about that time you came into Washington?

H: Yes, I had been ordered back from there, and I went to Dayton, and was in Dayton for just five weeks and was ordered back into Washington and assigned to this special study group.

Q: How did you get ordered to it?

H: Well, when I came back, in the debriefing, Larry Kuter said: "Don't get your roots in too deeply there, because I think you will be back here."

Q: In other words, Larry Kuter brought you back?

H: I think that was probably true.

Q: How did he get to know you?

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H: Well, we were in Maxwell together, the Air Tactical School.

Q: 1938 and '39?

H: No, way before, this was in '33. I was a 2nd Lieutenant when I went into that thing.

Q: He was there a number of years, then, actually.

H: Yes, he stayed on. But we were together there in the class of 1933-34.

Q: Did you see him in North Africa?

H: No. By that time I had gone on to India. I was in Cairo when the war started, because we had gone over with this North African special mission headed by General Maxwell.

Q: You mentioned a third anecdote?

H: This one is quite tragic. When General Arnold had his stroke, of course, everybody was very upset about it.

Q: This was January 1945?

H: No, this was in April, when he came back, in April 1945. He came back once. They took him down to Coral Gables when he was sick. Gene Beebe was down there with him, and they let him come back.

Q: He came back in March.

H: After he went to Washington, and he was puttering around. Well, Pat Timberlake and Ray Owens and I were the three Deputies on the staff at that time.

Q: Is Owens alive?

H: I don't think so. One morning the buzzer rang on the box; I answered it, and it was Miss Suzy Atkins, and she said: "General Arnold would like to see you." And as I came out, here came Ray and Pat Timberlake. So we went in, reported, and stood there. Arnold

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said: "You three know more about what's going on in the Headquarters as a whole than anybody I know." General Arnold said: "I think you ought to give me a briefing. Now, I know it will take you a little time to get it together. But I want you to brief me on what's going on in this headquarters tomorrow morning." We had been told that we should be very careful about what we told General Arnold, not to excite him. So we said: "Yes sir," and went back. The first thing we did was get in touch with Dave Grant. Well, I'm getting a little ahead of my story. Just as we were about to leave, and this was the thing that was so pitiful about him, General Arnold said: "Nobody will tell me anything, and I must know." First time I ever saw him get even a semblance of a note of begging in his voice. So we got ahold of Dave Grant and said: "Now look, Dave, if the General is here tomorrow, we are going to be there. We've got direct orders from the boss himself. And he said, in his office tomorrow, we are going to brief him." Well, he said, we are going to have to do something about that, and that's the last time I saw him on active duty. He was a proud man, and a man who was dynamic in his approach to things. And to see him in a position where he felt that people were holding out on him, that they were not playing square with him, and it really hurt him.

Q: Right. By this time, he had appointed Eaker to become Deputy Commander.

H: No, not quite, just before, they were bringing him in. Barney Giles was still his Chief of Staff, and was actually doing the job.

Q: But the job--without reflecting on Giles or anybody else--the job was not being done as Arnold would have done it. The reason

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I say this is, Lovett felt that. Lovett wrote some letters and said he was worried, because at the top level, Marshall and King were bypassing the AAF in certain key decisions that were being made.

H: This I think may have been right. Now, this was mostly handled between the Plans people. Between Kuter specifically, and Giles, at this time--the Operations Assistant Chief. Bozo McKee was his deputy, and we dealt mostly at the Deputy Chief of Air Staff level. We dealt mostly with the deputies and the Assistant Chiefs, it might have been Pinky Craig, I'm not sure.

Q: He's one of the few people I haven't seen.

H: Arnold was a real individual. He had, I think he went out of his way to avoid what I think he considered stereotype logic. He would always discover some littl facet of a problem, that apparently nobody else would think of.

Q: He was impatient with staff procedure?

H: He was impatient with anything that seemed to delay his achieving what he wanted done.

Q: You know, I helped write a script for a documentary movie. We entitled it "Man In a Hurry."

H: I think this was so.

Q: He was impatient with the formalized staff procedure. He went right to the man that the thought could do the job?

H: Have you been able to dig up anywhere a record of the speech that he made, I think it was either his retirement speech, or the one at his five-star celebration? If you haven't come across that, I suggest that you do.

Q: Did Ed Bowles write that speech?

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H: I don't know, because the Old Man himself, he was a little jealous of his own prerogative. He kept things very close. He played them close to his vest. But I'm quite sure that some of the stuff that was getting past Barney, because Barney just had more than he could do.

Q: Barney Giles wanted to get out. He wanted to get overseas. He had been in there for several years. He had been OC&R. He took over from Stratemeyer and he was anxious to win his spurs.

H: Im sure that this is so.

Q: Then when Harmon was lost...

H: That was a terrible thing because I thought.... Harmon and Andrews were two of the biggest blows that we ever had.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Andrews?

H: No, I didn't you see, because I was overseas at the time all this was going on I left just before, in early November 1941 to go overseas, and I didn't get back until June-July of 1944. So that all the time, that a lot of that was going on the Andrews-Arnold confrontation, I guess, you might actually call it that, I was overseas. Of course, Miff was in the Pacific when he was lost.

Q: You were with the, at Hamilton Field in 1941. Then you moved to the GHQ AF in January 1941. I guess Emmons had it then.

H: Yes, he did. Bruce Butler was up there, and he went down. Emmons had GHQ AF, this is right. I was thinking about the 1st Wing Commander.

Q: Was Eaker out there at Hamilton Field?

H: Yes, yes, he was there.

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Q: He had a fighter group out there?

H: Yes, he had the 20th Fighter Group out there.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Eaker?

H: No, I didn't, except that, you know Ira Eaker himself always played his own cards close to his chest. I think he played a good deal of poker, but his approach to things were similar to that. I have never heard him speak of General Arnold, except in very respectful and fine terms. He may have on other occasions with other people, but with me, never. I lived next door to him out there. I was in the 10th Fighter Wing, Operations. The 2nd Bomb Group had moved out, and Gen Eaker was there for not too long. He went from there down on maneuvers, then I lost track of him there for three years because I was gone, they pulled me off of maneuvers, because I was to go to Cairo.

O: When you were in Cairo you were with Elmer Adler?

H: Yes.

Q: Elmer Adler is ill now.

H: I understood that he was.

Q: Elmer Adler later got in trouble with Arnold?

H: Elmer was...I liked him quite a bit, but he was very self-centered, egotistically, in a lot of things. Elmer's ideas, and Arnold's, I'm sure, wouldn't dovetail. They did get into a few altercations.

Q: Did you go with Elmer Adler, when he had the Persian Gulf job, you know, helping the Russians in Basra?

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H: Dan Callahan, he had that particular phase of it. It basically was a part of the same type of activity that we were doing. We were in Cairo. Bob Oliver--he is dead now--had the operational aspect. Was sort of an overall Chief of Staff. Dan had maintenance and I had logistics. Sory Smith was over there with communications.

Q: Was that Information officer? He later became PIO?

H: No, this is right, later on he did, but at this time he was running the communications, sort of a school over there. They were trying to bring the RAF up in some of our activity, our approach to things.

Q: Did Sory Smith have any contact with Arnold?

H: I think he did sporadically, but I wouldn't know.

Q: Elmer Adler got in trouble with Arnold on that particular situation; I think Arnold cut him off his list. When Arnold lost confidence in somebody, he was ruthless?

H: He minced no words. The way this whole thing boiled out--we were there at Cairo and then the war started. Then they gave us sort of a ferry command, support responsibility, this little group of people in Cairo with 13,000 miles to play with, and nothing to do it with.

Q: Tell me about the Middle East setup?

H: In Karachi, Brady was out there at the time.

Q: Did you have any contact with this Aquila group?

H: Not very much.

Q: What was their mission?

H: I don't remember very much about it at the time. That and the HALPRO outfit.

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Q: The HALPRO ended up on the Ploesti mission?

H: This is right, these were basically just names to us out there at the time. When the Germans broke through in North Africa, and started back, they pulled out everything that we had that would fly, practically, particularly any of the bombers that we had. I'd hate to tell you the criteria we used to allow those aircraft to get out of there. It was something trafic. The sand over there gave those aircraft engine fits. But Elmer Adler sensing that maybe something was going to boil up in the 9th AF, he got Gen Brereton to release him and he went back to the Middle East. And Bob Oliver and Dan Callahan and Sory Smith went back with him, too. Oliver and Callahan and a couple others of that group stayed on out there, and became the Air Service Command activity in the CBI.

Q: This is when the war started?

H: When the war started, right after the war started.

Q: Come back to your return to Washington, there were several projects that Arnold was interested in at the time you became Deputy Chief of Air Staff. One of them was the JB-2. Did you have anything to do with that? You know, the Chinese copy of the V-1.

H: Yes, I had seen this thing down at Eglin off and on a lot, and if the Germans had ever been able to convert that thing to a short nail takeoff, the way that they did down in Eglin, we might have been in very serious trouble.

Q: Yes, but Arnold was a gadgeteer.

H: Oh, I know that.

Q: He had played around with a guided missile in WW I with Kettering. He was over at the Normandy beachhead, three or four days

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after the event. Of course, on the 12th of June 1944, the Germans started firing the V-1. Arnold had parts of the V-1 brought back, reassembled and improved. It became the JB-2.

H: That's right.

Q: He had a program to send thousands of these into Germany. But then he had his heart attack and that...

H: It all died right there. In the meantime, things had begun to break very rapidly over there. Patton's breakthrough, I think, being one of the great aspects, brought that thing to a close. And it became, down at Eglins a sort of test vehicle, but if the Germans had ever thought of lowering the thrust line on that little old jet engine that they had on there, it could have been a very serious thing for us.

Q: Arnold was pushing the JB-2 and also the Weary Willy program. It was also called Weary Orphan. This was a guided bomber; this was a bomber loaded with munitions, ordnance and dumped on a German target.

H: He also was interested in a thing called the CAMEL program.

Q: What was that?

H: I never got into that particular project. It was a fishing boat loaded with very high explosives, which was radio controlled. It was supposed to take care of the Japanese carriers. I think Arnold was the one that started this. Later on there was some discussion about it when we got into the Japanese activity. I don't believe anything was every really done beyond the planning stage on this project.

Q: What sort of projects did he give you as the Deputy Chief of Staff? Things you had to monitor for him?

H: The Headquarters was split up into responsibilities of the three Chiefs, and we were primarily coordinating offices. Now, we

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did have a certain amount of approval authority. In the training aspect, for instance, I could approve any program directive that didn't involve any more than 5,000 people. More than that, it had to go into, had to be reported in at the close of the day.

Q: Was there a dollar limit, too?

H: In some instances there was, particularly with Pat Timberlake, where Pat was in the Materiel business. Ray Owens had Administration, Pat had Materiel; and I had Operations. Plans was one of the outfits I was supposed to coordinate with, and Operations, Training and Requirements was a second I was supposed to be involved with, as well as a bunch of other smaller activities, such as anti-aircraft artillery coordination--the PIO business. I was a coordinator for the Chief of Staff on that particular activity, I had to give a number of press conferences in the Pentagon during the time I was there. The historical program was also one of the activities that I had to coordinate on.

Q: Did you work for Wilfred J. Paul?

H: Yes, he lives down here. In Orlando, he lives down here on Koret Avenue in Orlando.

Q: He's a guy I'd like to talk to.

H: You can get Wilfie right down there with no problem at all.

Q: He had some contact with Arnold, didn't he?

H: Yes, he did, he had quite a bit of it. The procedure that we had to deal with was, General Giles was pretty adamant about staff procedure. He didn't want something getting out from under him before he knew what was going on around him. So any paper that came in to his office, had to come in through one of the three coordinating

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officers. If it was brought in directly, it had to go out through one of the three officers. Every afternoon at 5:00 we met in General Giles' office and we presented every paper that we had that transcended our authority. So that all three of us had a pretty good idea of what basic fundamental papers were alive there in the headquarters. Sometimes we wouldn't get away from there till 11-12:00 at night. We'd sit there and brief Gen Giles on every one of these projects that was going on.

Q: In a sense, Giles was the organization man, and Arnold was going out?

H: He was a free wheeler.

Q: And Giles was maybe trying to put it all together?

H: Right. I think what Giles was doing, in this case of course, you see. With General Arnold away, it was more than one guy could do at the time, it really was. Because Gen Arnold had taken care of many of these external activities, you see, that Gen Giles had not had the time to take care of when Gen Arnold left. Work with the Joint Chiefs and Combined Chiefs activity.

Q: The Russians, Harry Hopkins.

H: Yes. The War Dept, and I think there was just more than one man could handle.

Q: In a sense, Arnold was the outside man and Giles was the inside man, trying to keep all the ducks in line.

H: I think this was basically correct, quite a correct statement. Barney was fundamentally interested, that when the Old Man had something in mind, it was being followed through, that nobody would drop the ball on it. This was one of the ways that he elected to keep his finger on what was going on.

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Q: On the question of following through, Arnold had this Advisory Council which he started off right after Pearl Harbor.

H: That's absolutely right.

Q: Norstad and Cabell were the first two; Smart and Rosie O'Donnell, and a guy named McRae.

H: McRae, I didn't know, all the rest, I knew.

Q: I haven't been able to get a fix on what he did. Now, Fred Dean was in there when you were there?

H: That's correct.

Q: And they were trouble shooters?

H: Our paths didn't cross a great deal because, as I say, we were basically coordinating officers; that was our job. When something came through Pat Timberlake's office that had implications of Training, which was also one of my babies, instead of having to go back, or send the guy back to the Training Directorate upstairs, he'd simply open the door and say: "How about this; is this all right?" I'd drag a copy and send it out and that was a coordinated copy. Send it back out as a directive rather than as a pure coordinated basis.

Q: I want to try to zero in on January 1945. It was that month when you were assigned as DCAS. I believe it was that month that Arnold had his major heart attack.

H: I think it was a little later than that. It was either very, very late in the month or in February, because they brought him down here to Coral Gables.

Q: Well, he got sick and they kept him in Washington for a couple of days and then they sent him out. My fix on that is a couple of days after Roosevelt was inaugurated, for the final term. The reason I fix on that during the last week of January, because in the last few

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days of January, the YALTA conference started. Well, they went off to YALTA. Arnold was not fit to go on that.

H: This is right.

Q: This is how they had to choose a successor, somebody to stand in for the AF, and they chose Kuter. Why did they choose Kuter? Do you know?

H: I think primarily because he, at this time, was the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, our Plans were reasonably settled at this time, through OPD in the War Dept. We had an Operational Plans Section, Loutzenheizer had that Operational Plans Section. Kuter was thoroughly versed in this. Not only this. Though Kuter was junior to a number of other people, when Arnold was out of town and Giles was out of town, Kuter sat in the front seat.

Q: Why didn't Giles get that job--to go to YALTA?

H: I don't know; I have the feeling that Barney was not politician enough. He was a very fine fellow, and a pleasanter guy I'd never hope to see. He was always cheerful. I don't believe that he had the talent for interservice operation that Kuter had. I think in this case, the decision was a wise one.

Q: He was more the housekeeper, you know, the administration man. Kuter was the conceptualist?

H: This I believe, to be correct.

Q: Kuter was far junior, not only to Giles, but several other people?

H: Oh yes, but he was quite well-in with General Arnold.

Q: I'm interested in this Plans business, because a new book has come out, written by a fellow at the AF Academy, Perry McCoy Smith.

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He talks about AF post-war planning. He talks about Moffat. Remember that guy in postwar planning?

H: Yes.

Q: And Trubee Davison, and Dick Lindsay? Did they have to report to you on this postwar plans setup?

H: No, because you see, when General Eaker came in, he changed the entire structure. He changed the entire structure of the AF elements. He put in a single assistant who was Charlie Chauncey. And I was an assistant in charge for two months, maybe. Then I went up in the Manpower business. I was assigned to take over the Manpower activities, which had been not very well emphasized.

Q: They could change things around quite a bit while Arnold was gone:

H: They changed it around a great deal, because I think he believed a lot in the type, I think you might call it the tri-deputy type of activity. The British used it, the Administration, the Deputy System. Administration, Operations and Materiel. He tended toward that particular type of organization.

Q: Eaker also was more of a staff man than Arnold, of going through his subordinates for decision?

H: I think so, yet Gen Eaker was impatient, in my opinion, he was impatient with detail, except in certain things. I think you could characterize Gen Giles as an internal man. You might, in the same fashion, characterize Gen Eaker as an external man, because his primary interest at this time -- remember, we were driving at this time for a Department of the Air Force, and everything else was

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subsidiary as far as he was concerned. Sometimes he'd have to go in and dig stuff out of his box that had been there a month.

Q: The big immediate job was redeployment?

H: This was so.

Q: And Arnold was in Europe part of this time, on his recuperation trip? On VE-Day he was in Europe.

H: That was in May. For my sins, I was the only General Officer at the AF Headquarters that night. I stayed there all night long answering telephone calls. It was rough, but caught me before I got out of there.

Q: Did Eaker have designs on the top job?

H: I don't think so. You know, this is something that has always puzzled me. Because he was a crackerjack, in my opinion. He would have been a superior Chief of Staff because he had the suavity and the intelligence. A top man, that guy, I respected him a great deal. I think he just got tired. I'll never forget the day he told me, he said: "I am tired, and I am getting out of here."

Q: This was in '47?

H: Yes (off the record)

Q: Arnold was quick?

H: He was very quick. He knew what he wanted, and he apparently thought it all out, all before, and he had, I'm sure he had in his own mind a set of criteria which he applied to everything, but he did it instantaneously.

Q: Did he ever make any snap decisions that he should not have made?

H: You see, from the time I got there, being back in Plans, until the first of the year, when I went up and took over the other

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job there, that month was really the only time I had to do very much with him. Not to my knowledge. During that period, there was nothing there that I think you could call really a snap judgment.

Q: Did he ever apologize for something he did? Saying,"I'm sorry I did it that way"?

H: If he did, I never heard of it. This could well have been, but I had no specific opportunities.

Q: Did you ever get chewed out by him?

H: I don't think so. After my experience of running around looking for navigators I stayed clear. I wasn't around when the lightning struck.

Q: I've been told that when he had this smile on his face, it might be a danger sign.

H: Oh, it could well be. Of course, there were always legions of stories running around. The time he threw the inkwell at Rosie O'Donnell and all the rest.

Q: Did he throw it at Rosie O'Donnell or did he throw it at the clock?

H: I think he threw it at Rosie, and hit the clock. That's the way the story ran. This was while I was there. Rosie was quite a guy.

Q: I talked to him a couple of months ago. He was very close to Arnold?

H: Yes, I think he was.

Q: Did you ever get close to Arnold in a personal way?

H: No, never. I had not served with him really, long enough, well I had not served actually with him at any time prior to the time that we went to Washington. He'd been on the West Coast most

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of the time, I'd been over on the East Coast. I didn't have very much contact, and that would be very good. I think probably the one guy that was closer to him than any other individual would be Gene Beebe. Gene was like a son to him, and of course, I think, this didn't help General Arnold either when Gene had his heart difficulties.

Q: Another guy that was close to him at one time was Minton Kaye, do you have any knowledge of that, or was Kaye out of there by the time you got back?

H: No, he was out of there by the time I got back.

Q: He was close to Arnold, and then got in trouble with Arnold and Arnold cut him off.

H: He could be vindictive, he could be.

Q: Bear a grudge?

H: Yes.

Q: Who did he bear a grudge against, in your recollection?

H: Ray Dunn, I think, was one.

Q: I talked to Ray Dunn, you mean on account of the parachute thing?

H: I don't remember what, but I remember him making several remarks at one time or another.

Q: I saw Ray Dunn a couple of months ago. Ray Dunn, at one time, was very close to him. Ray Dunn, I believe, got involved in this terrible accident with parachutists. The planes over Sicily were fired on by our own people and we lost a great number of planes; also, several hundreds of our own men because of a stupid error. I think Ray Dunn took some of the brunt of that.

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H: He may have.

Q: He didn't know why Dunn was on Arnold's list, but he was? Arnold made some crack about him.

H: I think he made a few cracks about Bob Goolrick. Why, I don't know.

Q: What was his job?

H: Bob, when he came back, I don't know whether he was overseas, but the last time I had seen him was in Shreveport. He had command at Barksdale. He went down, I've forgotten, whether it was Sheppard or someplace down in there. He had a job that should have had a star, but General Arnold was down on him. He was not going to go along on that.

Q: How about Sue Clagett?

H: I never did know very much about him. Never served with him.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald, he was on Arnold's list, too, I believe.

H: Well, I think he may have been. I didn't know very much about him. The only time I ever served with him was when I was in Flying School.

Q: Ed Perrin was on his list?

H: Yes, I know Ed was, I had heard. He was close to him, too, at one time I understand.

Q: This is May 28, 1970. We are now talking about people who might have been on General Arnold's list. When he bawled somebody out, was it personal or impersonal?

H: I think it was a great deal of personal in it, from what I've heard. I didn't actually see anybody stomped into the ground by

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General Arnold, but it always seemed to me that everything was personal with General Arnold, I think.

Q: When he cut a man--a man who he had confidence in--banished him? That man, did he have it, or did he recall him?

H: I didn't know him long enough. I wasn't with him long enough to know of any specific instance of this nature.

Q: Well, I had one instance in mind. Larry Norstad. Larry Norstad was very close to him at one time.

H: This is right.

Q: And he was Deputy for the 20th and Larry Norstad had the job working with the Navy on a unification bill. The National Security Act of 1947 did not come out the way Arnold had in mind and he cut Norstad but then forgave him and before he died, he embraced Larry Norstad.

H: Well, this type of activity, I think, was conducted primarily between the Old Man and the individuals concerned. It was not done through the staff. A few words here and there that such and such was going on, but a little task group that worked and they worked directly influence with General Eaker.

Q: You were in headquarters in a DCAS position right at the time Arnold made a decision to change the 21st BomCom Command. He took Haywood Hansell out and put LeMay in there. And it was an apparent impulsive decision on his part. Do you know anything about that decision?

H: Only that from what I remember about it. Possum practically had a nervous breakdown. The 20th Air Force again was one of those things that ran back in the Plans people and between the Plans people, and Norstad and the boss himself.

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Q: Not direct?

H: It stayed--it was almost completely outside the activities of headquarters, AAF.

Q: The reason that I am bringing it up is that Arnold had written Hansell a letter; a new Years greeting, and it seemed to be fairly effusive in praise. Then five days later, Norstad came out there with the bad news to Hansell that LeMay was going to have the job.

H: That's right, but I think, if you recall, Possum was in the hospital quite a while immediately after that.

Q: Yesh.

H: And I don't believe this was cover-up.

Q: He was broken up by this thing, and he didn't even want any job. He just wanted a backwater job and he gave him one. But I think he was broken-hearted about this thing.

H: I'm not sure, as you refer to it, which was the cart and which was the horse. I am not so sure that Possum didn't break before he was changed. Maybe the Old Man was very adept at picking up things quickly. And I am sure this has come out many, many times in the inquiries that you have made.

Q: Yes.

H: But I think actually Possum had showed some signs of distress.

Q: I think you are right there.

H: And than when the Old Man saw this--he said well, this can't be.

Q: He was very perceptive?

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H: Very perceptive in this regard, and I think this is when he sent LeMay out there.

Q: You know I was out at the Air Force Academy looking at some papers and Arnold was getting long letters from Hansell of the 21st BombCom, telling him why he didn't quite do all the things he had in mind. LeMay would send short two-paragraph letters on what he did yesterday. Arnold was the kind of man who came to a conclusion very quickly.

H: I am sure this is right. LeMay was there at headquarters for a while and all of a sudden he was up and gone. He took over the 20th Air Force.

Q: Do you know that Arnold was sick about the time the decision was made to go in at a low level--7,000 feet with the fire bombs.

H: Yes.

Q: Norstad went out possibly to consult with LeMay, although LeMay now says--I talked to him about two months ago--Norstad did not give him much counsel. LeMay had to carry this burden himself.

H: Well, this is my impression. This is the type of thing that which it would be perfectly characteristic of LeMay, in my opinion. He felt that there was something that had to be done, and this was the best and only way. So let's do it, and that was it. That was the end of it, as far as he was concerned.

Q: Going in at 7,000 feet in Europe would have been suicide.

H: Absolutely.

Q: Going in at 7,000 in Japan was a great gamble.

H: It was a gamble. Arnold was not there to give direction.

Q: Were you aware of any shuffling to and from Coral Gables with papers for decisions?

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H: Yes.

Q: For a decision by Arnold?

H: Yes, Col Beebe used to come to Hq AAF every other day. He would come up there, go back, would be there a day, and then he would be back, and he shuttled back and forth all the time--until they suddenly discovered that he had had considerable heart difficulty himself. They took him off flying status, and then, about that time is about when they got Gen Arnold back into Washington.

Q: Yes, he came back.

H: But Gene used to carry this stuff down there--what he carried I don't know. All I know is that he used to go down there one day and be back two days later, and then go back the same day--he never spent the night in Washington.

Q: Mrs. Hood, what recollections do you have of General Arnold?

Mrs. H: They were very dear. I remember about him, he never forgot a name.

Q: Mrs. Arnold was that way, too.

Mrs. H: Yes.

Q: She had a great presence.

Mrs. H: When Reuben came back from overseas and we went to this party when he got his five stars and we went through the line, she said: "Oh, you are new. And you have just come back." She knew all about everyone, and from then on--well, she always knew my name.

Q: Well, I will be in touch with her again. What is your first name?

Mrs. H: EM

Q: I talked with Hopwood yesterday and her name is Kappy.

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Mrs. Hood: From that time on when she was very active at all those women's activities.

Q: Did you work with her?

Mrs. H: Yes, I worked with her in Army Emergency Relief.

Q: Did you go to his retirement party?

Mrs. H: I think we went there.

Q: I guess Lovett was the toastmaster. This was in February '46. Were you around then?

Gen and Mrs. H: Yes.

H: And I think this is the speech that, if you have not had a chance to read, you should do so.

Q: It was Arnold's valedictory--sort of.

H: I am sure it was the one because it was shocking to the majority.

Q: Why?

H: I am going to wait and let you read that yourself. I could not do justice to it.

Q: What shocked you?

H: His perception. I think you remember he cautioned against a number of things in that particular speech. One of them was complacency.

Q: Did he hold out a high role for people who did not wear wings? Did he ever bring that up?

H: I don't recall that he ever did. I know that he was relatively fond of Bozo McKee.

Q: He was using Bozo McKee to try and get his son to join the Air Force. None of the Arnold boys flew. And he was trying to get them into the USAF. Bruce was interested in missiles and Bruce

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was telling his father there was no opportunity for a man unless he is rated. And the Old Man put Bozo McKee to work on him, and he got Bruce to come in. Looking back at it now, it was probably a mistake, because Bruce never made his star.

H: Well, this sort of thing does happen every now and then.

Mrs. Hood: This file had the name of every Air Force wife in the whole area. We had little cards on them and where they lived, and this was supposed to be a contact that they were keeping up. Now, after the Arnolds left,

H: And the war was over...

Mrs. Hood: This was not carried on, and I was stuck with these files of paper. I remember calling up Mrs. Spaatz asking what to do with them. She said, "burn 'em up."

Q: Well, Mrs. Arnold was great on this personal identification.

Mrs. H: Personal stuff we had to know, who was in whose outfit and everything else.

Q: Well, this was great for morale.

Mrs. H: I thought so.

Q: I got this impression from Mrs. Arnold, and this is why Arnold was so successful in every command he was in, because they personalized their association with their junior officers. When you worked for Arnold you weren't just a number or a uniform. You were a name and face.

H: You weren't to Mrs. Arnold either. She was a good companion. In '46, I had then gone up to OC&R, in the manpower business.

Mrs. H: That's what I thought. Because she wanted to know who was who, in all these outfits.

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Q: Well, she is a gr[illegible] historian [illegible]elf. You see, she has kept all these records.

Mrs. H: I was a grea[illegible] admirer [illegible]r girls were just teenagers at that time.

Q: Were you [illegible] awed [illegible]ral Arnold when you first came into headquarter[illegible]

Mrs. H: I alway[illegible]ought [illegible] gorgeous. Everybody else did, too.

Q: I guess.

Mrs. H: He alw[illegible]ad a [illegible].

Q: He was a gc[illegible]ooking [illegible] Arnold, you know, wrote thousands of love letters to M[illegible] Arnold [illegible]he years, and she saved them all. Every time he went c[illegible] trip he w[illegible] her a letter--where he was and what he did. She sa[illegible] everyone c[illegible]hese letters. And she wrote him--they were great letter writers. But he didn't save her letters. But she saved every one that he ever sent her.

Mrs. H: Well, I would never say I saw him when he was not smiling.

Q: Well, that smile, I have been told could be a prelude to an explosion. I think his facial characteristics were built in something that looked like a smile to people. But it didn't mean that he was happy.

H: I think that when you looked at General Arnold, you had to look at his eyes to tell whether he was pleased.

Q: Or how you were doing. Did you ever see him and Lovett together?

H: I have seen them together, or I did see them together a number of times. Relatively casual. I never saw them in any argument or disagreement.

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Q: Lovett has been characterized by me as the balance wheel--Arnold making impulsive decisions, and Lovett sometimes holding him back.

H: I think this is right. And I think Muir Fairchild had a little of that same quality.

Q: Restraining role?

H: A very mature judgment approach. I think General Arnold recognized as something desirable.

Q: Did Arnold take advice? Did he ever come into a meeting when it seemed obvious he had his mind made up to go in a certain direction, and then...

H: The only occasion I think of is the one I told you about. Where he said that he --- (a bit garbled) until the situation had been clarified I think he was always a little sorry that he did not go ahead and do it anyhow.

Q: Then he was open-minded enough to accept your counseling.

H: Once it was done that was the end of it. Mr. Lovett, I agree, he was really great in that position. He did a tremendous amount for the balance, not only just the particular projects that he and Gen Arnold were particularly interested in, but just as far as anybody was concerned. In some of the instances where it looked like things might boil, high, wide and handsome quickly, Mr. Lovett was always a calming influence. He was always present with some advice, and yet he had a tremendous sense of humor. Great sense of humor.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

H: I think he did, but it was not the same type that Mr. Lovett had. For instance at General Arnold's retirement, Mr. Lovett got up

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and he was talking about nicknames. He said, "Hap" was very characteristic of General Arnold. He basically gave a Happy appearance, and he thought he was happy. But, he said that he was not always as bald as a billiard ball, and for many years his friends called him curly. You remember that? Lovett had a great sense of humor and he used it to think keep people from sometimes getting over-wrought, over-anxious. He was a great guy.

Q: Did Arnold have the sense of relieving the tension in a staff meeting by cracking a joke?

H: I do not ever remember hearing him do so.

Q: He didn't go for off-colored stories?

H: I don't think I ever heard him tell a story that was off-color. Nor do I ever know of anybody that ever told me that he told one that was off-color.

Q: Do you remember the Jeb Stuart concept? This was one that Lovett became enamoured of. This was an idea of hundreds or thousands of fighter bombers going in low-level, and keeping the Germans off balance. This was towards the end of the war.

H: Yes, but at this time I was probably back in the manpower activity and a lot of what when on then I didn't know very much about. But I don't recall that there was anything--I didn't have any contact, let's put it that way.

Q: Do you recall any problems that Mrs. Arnold had--this is right near the end of the war? Eaker was the Deputy Commander and Mrs. Arnold had been invited to observe the RAF Ladies Auxiliary. She had trouble getting a ride on an airplane?

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H: I didn't know anything about that.

Mrs. H: No, I don't.

H: If this were so, I can only believe--knowing General Eaker as I have, and maybe you ought to ask him about this--I think he might have been of the opinion when we were trying to get the Department of the Air Force, that anything which had a possible repercussion shouldn't have been attempted. This would be my guess because you remember what a terrific furor the "Blaze" incident created.

Q: Do you remember the "Blaze" incident vividly?

H: I remember reasonably well.

Q: This occurred right about the time of Arnold's heart attack?

H: This is right. Just about the time.

Q: It was about from the 19th to the 21st of January 1945 somewhere in those two days. Elliott Roosevelt was always a pain in the neck.

H: I had met him in Egypt and when he first came over, and he was not prone to let anyone get any opinion that he wasn't the President's son. Everybody knew it, and not just casually, but repeatedly.

Q: He took a number of risks--personal risks--and if he wasn't the President's son, he probably would have gone just as far or farther on his own merit, but because of this problem that he had--he flew this Boffin Bay route. He volunteered to go into Russia on a survey trip.

H: I knew that.

Q: They wouldn't let him go in because they were afraid that he might be captured and this would create problems. But Spaatz

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wanted to promote him to a star--Arnold said "No." Then Arnold got sick and he got promoted to a star. Is that correct?

H: I guess you are right, but I'm of the opinion that if General Arnold had stayed that way he would not have been promoted.

Q: Spaatz recommended this, but Arnold said "No." Well, you see he did not have wings--he couldn't command an operational unit and if you couldn't command it, you are not entitled to a star. My impression is--I've been up to Hyde Park, by the way--that the President or Pa Watson ordered it.

H: This could be.

Q: You didn't get involved? You were not in Manpower then, or were you?

H: I think I was at that time.

Q: I take it they didn't route this one through you?

H: Nope. My basic job in the Manpower activity, to start with, was the reduction of excesses. We were trying to get well from this demobilization that was a tremendous thing. One of the most remarkable activities that I have ever seen occur. But we were trying well. The Congress was getting these thousands of letters every day. The war had been over three days and little Johnny isn't home, why? This kind of thing. As a result, it began to be quite a hot political issue. That's when General Eaker told me to get up there, and get around the country, and I did. I traveled like mad. I was gone probably five days a week for about three or four months.

Q: This was in the postwar period? Did you ever see Arnold when he was retired?

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H: No, not after he retired.

Q: Did you see him when he came through Washington at any time?

H: No.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the Benny Meyers' business?

H: In handling basic supply activities, Benny did a pretty good job. When I came to Dayton he was Deputy Command out there, and he had done some things which were not looked upon with great favor at the time because they were politically explosive.

Q: Just like putting rugs in his office.

H: Sending stuff out by aircraft from Washington. When we moved the base. It scared me to death because I had been there a few days--about a month to be exact. One morning "Bonny Blue" who was the secretary there called me in, saying, "the Deputy Commander wants to see you." I went up. I was asked: "What's your previous condition of survitude (PCS)?"--what it was usually referred to in those days. Benny Meyers said: "There is a committee known as the Mead committee, that is investigating war activities and you are going to be the Materiel Command's star witness." I said: "I don't know anything about this kind of stuff. I've been overseas. I've been on the getting end of supplies, not on the procuring end." Meyers said: "All you have to do is follow the leads that I give you and you'll be all right." Well, two days later, I was ordered back into Washington, and I left there with the greatest of joy.

Q: In 1944.

H: I am sure that had I stayed I would have been right in the pot with him, because I would have been doing a lot of the talking along the lines that he expected me to do.

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Q: But you had an impression that Benny Meyers cut corners?

H: I surely did. This was my feeling. I was really quite shocked about it. Junius Jones was IG at the time. the IG was part some of the responsibility which I had. Junius used to come in. When he had something--he talked well, when he was discussing something. He would come in and just talk, and I could see that what he was trying to make up his mind as he was talking. But he was very deeply concerned about this issue.

Q: You know Arnold had great confidence in Meyers?

H: There was no doubt about it, he was a brilliant individual. He was very brilliant, but it is too bad that the ethics that he displayed were not a match for his other talent.

Q: You know, up to a month and a half before his testimony, this is in '47, when the Ferguson Committee unearthed this thing, he tried to get Arnold to back him. Arnold had drafted a letter supporting Benny Meyers. But somebody must have tipped Arnold off that they had the goods on Meyers because he did not send the letter. I saw the draft letter from Arnold. Of course, Arnold was broken hearted. He was a sick man and he came into Washington in '47 and testified about the one rotten apple in a barrel.

H: I hope you follow up on that speech. I think you ought to get it. Remember how quiet everybody went when he got through. They were almost stunned. I don't know what they expected but basically the year he was talking about was the year 2,000.

Q: You know, he put von Karman on this job. Did you have contact with von Karman on this subject?

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H: A little, not very much. Every once in a while I would get involved with something. This CAMEL project I was speaking of, for one.

H: I know there was something of this sort going on but this really was before Wilfie got too much involved in it. He was in part in the affair, I think, but later on it was down in Maxwell.

Q: Wilfie is Wilfred J. Paul.

H: Yes, and I do remember hearing something about this, but I don't remember the outcome of it. I think the historians got away with it, as I remember.

Q: Did Arnold ever talk to you about the importance of history?

H: I think he talked to everybody about that.

Q: How about the Strategic Bombing Survey? Did you get involved in the planning of that?

H: Not in the planning. That was mostly handled by Gen Joe Loutzenheiser's shop. I knew what was going on.

Q: You remember they had the Evaluation Boards?

H: This is right.

Q: Do you remember a situation arising with Scanlon? He came up with an Evaluation Report No. 3 which stated that the Navy was giving better air support to the Leyte invasion than the Air Force was giving the Army. Arnold hit the ceiling on that. Do you remember that?

H: No.

Q: This happened back about the time you came in.

H: No, it must have blown over. I remember some repercussions basically, but Orvil Anderson was the proponent mostly riding around there.

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Q: For the Strategic Bombing Survey:

H: And most of the contact I had was regard to this was with Orvil, when he was back here, because he periodically did come back. I think that whole effort was exceptionally well handled. The importance of it, General Arnold did not overlook.

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Hopwood, Lloyd P. 27 May 70

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LLOYD P. HOPWOOD
MAJOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RETIRED
101 POINCIANA LANE
LARGO, FLORIDA 33540

done CK

10 May 1970

Dr. Murray Green, Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Div - SAFAAR
The Pentagon - 4C881
Washington D. C. 20330

Dear Doctor Green:

Your suggested schedule for Largo on 28-29 May is fine with me.

I suggest that when you arrive in the area you call me at 584-5356 and we can set up a mutually convenient discussion.

Sincerely,

Lloyd P. Hopwood

shopping
686 15 mn
cluster apts
both bdrm - Harbor Bluff
1 or Stop - 2 - 4 blocks
Stop - Palm Dr down
hill on island
R to last house

Ed Lyon - Wash
Bill Hipps -
Musgrave -
Webster -
Wetzel - NJ - adjutant or wards
Pers - 20th AF

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May 7, 1970

Maj General Lloyd P. Hopwood, USAF(Ret)
101 Poinciana Lane
Largo, Florida 33540

Dear General Hopwood:

My plans have firmed up to a degree. I'll be in the Largo area on Friday and Saturday 28-29 May. May I suggest Friday afternoon or Saturday morning.

Please let me know which time is convenient for you.

A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
per dictation from
San Antonio, Texas

BONNIE JANIK, Secretary

P.S. Would you please include your phone number.

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February 5, 1970

Maj. General Lloyd P. Hopwood, USAF (Ret.)
101 Poinciana Lane
Largo, Florida 33540

Dear General Hopwood:

I'm delighted to have your letter. It will be some months before I can come to Florida again, as I must visit California and Texas in the near future.

I'll let you know well in advance of my coming. Needless to state, I'm looking forward to a very productive visit with you.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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LLOYD P. HOPWOOD
MAJOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RETIRED
101 POINCIANA LANE
LARGO, FLORIDA 33540

Jan 29, 1970

Dear Doctor Green:

I am delighted to learn of your effort with John Loosbrock to put in print the life of Hap Arnold. To me he was and will always be one of the outstanding leaders both before and during World War II.

You must remember that when I first met General Arnold, he was a lieutenant colonel and I a lowy second lieutenant, Reserve. However, I served under his leadership at March prior to the Air Mail, during the CCC flap, during his imaginative development of the concepts that later became the GHQ Air Force. I also had several contacts with him as we moved into the mobilization for the War, first in the civilian contract flying schools and later as Director of Personnel at Western Training Command.

I was involved in several of his projects during the war while in the Pentag n, including massive aviation cadet procurement, manning our overseas combat air forces, establishing r otation policies for combat crews, mobilizing and moving the people for the Ninth Air Force in support of Normandy, the Wasp program, handling returnees, creation of the Personnel Command, and planning for post war including the Air Force Association.

Anything I may be able to contribute will be subjective and from memory as I have virtually nothing of a documentary nature. However, I would be most happy to share some of those recollections with you pretty much at your convenience. I plan to be away for perhaps two weeks sometime during the summer, but will be here otherwise.

Please let me know when you plan to come this way and we can certainly arrange a rendezvous.

Sincerely,

Lloyd P. Hopwood

Lloyd P. Hopwood
Maj. Gen., USAF Ret.

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January 27, 1970

Maj General Lloyd Hopwood
101 Poinciana Lane
Largo, Florida 33540

Dear General Hopwood:

John Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who either knew General Arnold or had some connection with his policies.

You fill both of these qualifications. I believe you served with him in the Western Zone Air Mail Operation in early 1934 and later served under him at March Field.

During World War II you served on the Air Staff in charge of military personnel, and no doubt had many contacts with General Arnold.

I have just returned from an extensive interview schedule along the East Coast of Florida and am now planning my itinerary for another trip, perhaps this Summer. I would welcome the opportunity to take an hour or two away from your well-deserved retirement at a time convenient for you.

Please advise me if you will be available at Largo, Florida later on this year.

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Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Atch

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

MAJOR GENERAL LLOYD P. HOPWOOD

PART I - Narrative

Lloyd P. Hopwood was born December 19, 1907, in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. The son of John Lloyd Hopwood and Mabel Barlow Hopwood, he was graduated in 1925 from Punahou Academy, Honolulu, Hawaii. In 1929, he was graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree from Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.

He accepted an appointment as a flying cadet in the Army Air Corps in February, 1932, and took his initial flying training at Randolph Field, Texas. Upon graduation in February, 1933, from the Advanced Flying School, Pursuit Flying Course, Kelly Field, Texas, he received pilot's wings and was commissioned a second lieutenant, United States Army Air Corps Reserve.

His first assignment was to the 95th Pursuit Squadron, March Field, California. In September, 1933, he was transferred to the 18th Pursuit Group, Wheeler Field, Hawaii, where he was assigned duties as a pursuit pilot. He returned to the Mainland in March, 1934, to fly the mail between Oakland, California, and Seattle, Washington, and was subsequently assigned to the Las Vegas, Nevada, airfield where he was Assistant Control Officer. In May, 1934, he was released from active duty.

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Recalled in July, 1934, he was assigned as pursuit pilot in the 73rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Group, March Field, California. In November, 1934, he again was released from active duty and he returned to Honolulu where he utilized his Air Corps training as pilot for Inter-Island Airways.

In March, 1936, Lieutenant Hopwood was recalled to active duty and assigned to the 18th Pursuit Group, Wheeler Field, Hawaii, where in addition to his pilot's duties he was the Squadron Engineering Officer and Operations Officer for the 18th Pursuit Group. He accepted an appointment as a Second Lieutenant in the Regular Army in October, 1936.

He was transferred to Army Air Corps Training Center, Randolph Field, Texas, in March, 1938, as a pilot instructor. In August, 1939, he was assigned as the Assistant Supervisor of the Army Air Corps Training Detachment, Ryan School of Aeronautics, San Diego, California. In August of 1940, he was assigned as the first Commander of the 5th Army Air Force Flying Training Detachment at Hemet, California.

In June, 1941, Captain Hopwood assumed duties as Personnel Officer for the West Coast Air Training Command, Moffett Field, California. He was promoted to the rank of Major in December, 1941, and was assigned as Liaison Officer to the Western Defense Command, San Francisco, California, to coordinate flying training activities with

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the Western Defense mission. In May, 1942, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and moved from Moffett Field, California, to Santa Ana, California, as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Western Flying Training Command.

In 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Hopwood was assigned to Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., where between the period January, 1943, to June, 1945, he functioned as the Chief of Aviation Cadet Branch, Chief of Foreign Assignment Branch, Deputy Chief and Chief of Military Personnel Division, and was also appointed a member of the General Staff Corps of the War Department, United States Army.

During the move of the 8th Air Force from the European Theater to the Pacific Theater, Colonel Hopwood was the Commander of the Rear Echelon of the 8th Air Force, Colorado Springs, Colorado. From September, 1945, to July, 1946, he was assigned to the 8th Air Force, Okinawa, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, and the Chief of Staff, 8th Air Force. He returned to the United States in August, 1946, and was assigned to Headquarters, Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama, as Chief of the Civilian Institutions Group, and subsequently was appointed a member of the Faculty Board at the Air University.

Upon graduation in August of 1949, from the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, he was assigned to the Pentagon as Deputy Director of

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Personnel Planning (DCS/P), Headquarters, USAF. During his tour, he assisted in the initial planning phases for the establishment of an Air Force Academy. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General during this period.

During the period July, 1953, to June, 1958, he returned to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he was Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College. For his outstanding work in the field of military and civilian education, St. Josephs College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, conferred upon him the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Letters. While at Maxwell Air Force Base, he was promoted to the rank of Major General.

In July, 1958, he was assigned to Headquarters, USAF, as Director of Personnel Procurement and Training (DCS/P). In August, 1960, he assumed command of Chanute Technical Training Center, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois.

General Hopwood assumed command of Amarillo Technical Training Center, Amarillo Air Force Base, Texas, in July, 1964.

General Hopwood is a charter member of the Air Force Association, a member of the Order of Dadaelians, the Air Force Academy Athletic Association and Rotary International.

General Hopwood is married to the former Kathleen McGowan of York, Nebraska. Their son, John Lloyd Hopwood, II, was graduated from Baylor University, Waco, Texas, in June, 1964.

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PART II - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data:

1. Born 19 December 1907 in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii; Father - John Lloyd Hopwood; Mother - Mabel Barlow

2. Wife - Kathleen McGowan of York, Nebraska; Children - John Lloyd Hopwood II.

B. Education:

1. Graduate Punahou Academy, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1925.

2. B. A. Degree, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, 1929.

3. Graduate Advanced Flying School, Randolph Field, Texas and Kelly Field, Texas, February, 1933.

C. Service Dates:

Feb 1932 - Feb 1933	Aviation Cadet, Randolph Field, Texas and Kelly Field, Texas.
Feb 1933 - Sep 1933	Pursuit Pilot, 95th Pursuit Sq., March Field, California.
Sep 1933 - Mar 1934	Pursuit Pilot, 18th Pursuit Group, Wheeler Field, Hawaii.
Mar 1934 - May 1934	Air Mail Duty.
May 1934	Released from active duty.
July 1934	Recalled to active duty.
Jul 1934 - Nov 1934	Pursuit Pilot, 73rd Pursuit Sq., 17th Pursuit Group, March Field California.
Nov 1934	Released from active duty.
Mar 1936	Recalled to active duty.

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Mar 1936 - Mar 1938	Pilot, Squadron Engineering Officer, Operations Officer, 19th Pursuit Sq., 18th Pursuit Group; subsequently Operations Officer, 18th Pursuit Gp.
Mar 1938 - Aug 1939	Pilot Instructor, Army Air Corps Training Center, Randolph Field, Texas.
Aug 1939 - Aug 1940	Assistant Supervisor, Army Air Corps Training Detachment, Ryan School of Aeronautics, San Diego, California.
Aug 1940 - Jun 1941	Commander, 5th Army Air Force Flying Training Detachment, Hemet, Calif.
Jun 1941 - Dec 1941	Personnel Officer, West Coast Air Corps Training Command, Moffett Field, California
Dec 1941 - Apr 1942	Liaison Officer, Western Defense Command, San Francisco, Calif.
Apr 1942 - Jan 1943	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Western Flying Training Command, Santa Ana, California.
Jan 1943 - Jun 1945	Chief of Aviation Cadet Branch, Chief of Foreign Assignment Branch, Deputy Chief and Chief of Military Personnel Division, and Member, General Staff Corps of the War Department, U.S. Army, Headquarters, Army Air Force, Washington, D.C.
Jun 1945 - Sep 1945	Commander, Rear Echelon, Eighth Air Force, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

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Sep 1945 - Jul 1946	Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Chief of Staff, Eighth Air Force, Headquarters, Eighth AF, Okinawa.
Aug 1946 - Jul 1949	Chief of Civilian Institutions Group, Member, Faculty Board, Headquarters, Air University, Maxwell Field, Ala.
Aug 1949 - Jun 1953	Deputy Director of Personnel Planning (DCS/P), Headquarters, USAF.
Jul 1953 - Jun 1958	Commandant, Air Command and Staff College.
Jul 1958 - Jul 1960	Director of Personnel Procurement and Training (DCS/P), Hq., USAF.
Aug 1960 - Jul 1964	Commander, Chanute Technical Training Center, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois.
Jul 1964 - Aug 1965	Commander, Amarillo Technical Training Center, Amarillo AFB, Texas
Sept 1965	Cofs, Allied AF Southern Europe, SHAPE, APO NY 09055

D. Decorations and Medals:

Legion of Merit (two oak leaf clusters)
Bronze Star
Commendation Ribbon (two oak leaf clusters)
Air Defense Service Medal
Army of Occupation Medal (Japan)
American Campaign Medal
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal
WWII Victory Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Air Force Longevity Service Award (one silver oak leaf cluster)

Current as of Nov 1964

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E. Promotions:

Rank	Temporary	Permanent
Second Lieutenant	24 Feb 1933	3 Oct 1936
First Lieutenant		7 Nov 1939
Captain	1 Oct 1940	1 Oct 1946
Major	5 Dec 1941	
Lieutenant Colonel	14 May 1942	'2 Jul 1948
Colonel	17 Aug 1943	27 Jul 1950
Brigadier General	28 Jul 1951	20 Nov 1958
Major General	29 Oct 1956	7 Mar 1961

F. Unusual Experiences: None mentioned.

PART III - Personalized Material

Nothing indicated.

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Interview with Maj/Gen Lloyd P. Hopwood, Largo, Florida, 27 May 1970:

Q: General, we are talking about Arnold and Marshall.

H: I never did know General Marshall well. I met him after the war and several times during the war, but my estimation is, of course, biased in favor of the boss. I felt that in many respects, that Arnold had more stature than any other man we saw around Washington during the war. Certainly, he had a bigger problem. It was the biggest mobilization in the history of warfare anywhere in the world. And he handled it with a blythe optimism. It would brook nothing that was impossible. His orders were very brusque--short. Just a few words--one sentence perhaps, saying we must do this. That was the end of it. He had the ability to wash his hands and back off, and whoever got the directive, bloody well went out and did it, legally or illegally.

Q: What were some of these blunt directives, or open-ended directives that you got?

H: Well, the first one that I got directly--immediately after coming to Washington. I was in charge of Aviation Cadet procurement, and he called me down, and said: "I want 100,000 cadets backlogged by next month." And that was the end of it. He assumed I would do it. I didn't dare not do it. So we got them.

Q: That was in 1940, wasn't it?

H: No, that was early '42. Right after New Year's, I got that directive.

Q: And you went out to California?

H: I was in Washington.

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Q: You came to Washington in '43?

H: I got to Washington in '42--the tailend of '42.

Q: And some time in January of '43 or thereabouts?

H: It was early '43. He was, of course, way ahead of all of us all the time. None of us had any idea the Air Force was going to get as large as it did. Nobody had any picture of the problem of replacing a fighting Air Force. Gen Arnold's first and most appealing position, and one with which we had a lot of trouble later, was that any air crew sent out to combat had a 50-50 right to survival or--which set up this gigantic training program, and the returning program. In order to get that 50-50 chance to survive--and it was the only such program that went on during the war--and we had our trouble over it. Which you could do no less than give them that chance in General Arnold's view. General Marshall finally accepted it. Now, of course, the Army wanted something like it. The Army system was growing so fast--snowballing--it was impossible to set up this rotation program.

Q: What were some of the things you had to do in order to get this Aviation Cadet program enlarged to this massive size?

H: Well, there were two major ways of doing it. One was the university system of the country was at a very low level, workload-wise. The universities were eager, and ready, and willing to get out and help us on a well-organized district basis. A key university, say like universities, and with high schools around that. Using that as a focal point, we got the people in. Another gimmick that would work beautifully was to leak to the newspapers that we had all we want. We were not going to take any more after next week. That

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worked about twice a year, and we'd get just loads of people beating down the door to get in. But we had a pretty patriotic bunch of kids in those days. They wanted to get in and get at it.

Q: You had kind of a situation that you don't have today. You had a discernible evil--Hitler.

H: It was evil identified. And they were all still mad about Pearl Harbor. And we got them in droves.

Q: The Air Force on many occasions was accused of stashing away Aviation Cadets for the future. The fellows were earmarked for Aviation Cadet and the AF did not have training facilities.

H: Oh, yes, we did it, there is no question about it. We felt we should get them while we could. General Hershey was constantly trying to stop that. It was the only voluntary program that was still operating in the course of the war.

Q: Didn't the Navy have a voluntary program?

H: They did. I'm talking about Air Force programs.

Q: Now, did you have anything to do with the training of Aviation cadets, or just the procurement?

H: No, at that time I was interested only in the procurement. I got involved in training when they finally got this huge backlog. It was becoming public relations-wise a bit of a headache, because there were youngsters all over the United States stashed away waiting to be called to be trained. At that time General Arnold said, "For God's sake get them off the street. Do something with them." So again, we went out to the universities and laid down this pre-flight program. At American Universities, just to get them in uniform. So we didn't have this so-called backlog.

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Q: Right. How many universities were brought into this program?

H: Oh, there must have been about 30, by the time we got them all off the streets. We must have had almost 110,000 of them.

Q: Well, this backlog created another kind of problem in 1944 when the Army needed infantry. A lot of young men who were in Aviation Cadets training program were suddenly told that they would have to be transferred to the Infantry. I guess this was late in the war?

H: It was late in the war. And...

Q: Were you out of the program by that time?

H: I think what happened was that there was some apprehension on General Eisenhower's mind that he was going to have more trouble than he actually had on the Continent. What did happen was that a lot of minor woundeds would flow back into the base areas and would just seem to disappear from sight. And he actually had more troops available to him in Europe than the combat front would indicate. So by the time we were getting ready to make massive transfers, they were also beating the woods over in Europe and they found an awful lot of combat-capable people way back in the pipeline.

Q: For about 30 days during the Battle of the Bulge, it looked like the German counterattack would get farther than it did, and I guess there was some worry that we would run short of manpower for the Infantry.

H: I think what happened was that--General Marshall, General Arnold and most of the people on the Air Staff felt that the battle was going so well that the war would not last much longer. Then the Battle of the Bulge hit them. There was a certain amount of panic for awhile. But as George Patton said: "If we could get some

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clear skies, there won't be any more Bulges.

Q: And they did get some clear skies?

H: They did get clear skies, and it broke just like that.

Q: It broke. Well, did Arnold put some heat on you to transfer people out of the Aviation Cadet program into the Infantry?

H: No. That was not done, on the basis that that these were volunteers and we had a certain honor-bound loyalty to those Cadets to hang on to them. I did have something to do that would transfer other air force personnel. Now we transferred quite a few. We even transferred a few sailors out of our guard house. It created a fire.

Q: One of the big problems in the Aviation Cadet program, or the replacement program--was the casualty quotient--I guess you might call it. How many men you figured to lose per mission: This was a key figure. In other words, you had to know how many men you would need to replace in the 8th Air Force in combat.

H: We never did know, and this was the heart of the problem. General Arnold was constantly troubled, with his various theater commanders. For example, in the 8th AF, they say: "You will fly 25 missions and go home."

Q: Right.

H: Well, this did not give you a basis for attrition. The system as Arnold visualized it, was that if he would give to a commander a full complement of aircraft and crews and then tell that commander: "We are prepared to replace so many crews each month." And then, hopefully, the commander would conduct his operations so that his attrition would pretty well line up with his anticipated flow of replacements. But it didn't work that way.

Q: Why didn't it work that way?

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H: Because the commander wouldn't figure that way. The only commander that did figure that way, was St. Clair Streett when he was out in the 13th Air Force. And Herbert Harmon. They took the system as it was designed and it worked beautifully. Sometimes if they were operating without too much attrition, the crews would go home with 20 missions.

Q: This problem of 25 missions was set early in the war, and then, said Arnold at one time, "We don't want a fixed number."

H: We had to say that.

Q: And this made 8th Air Force personnel very unhappy.

H: That's right.

Q: They were risking their lives and if they knew they had a certain time--25 missions--then you go home. Then you could work toward that goal. But if you had no specific goal, it was an adverse morale factor, wasn't it?

H: No doubt about it. And, of course, the 8th AF was taking the heaviest attrition, and I know General Eaker, when he was over there, General Fred Anderson, General Spaatz, all felt they had to give them a tangible goal so they could mark it off on their little chart. But two things happened: During high attrition, we just didn't have the replacements to give them. And, secondly, it added to attrition, because you would send a crew home after 25 missions, then you were always playing with green crews. You never built up the experience level that the theater commander wanted. But you never took an experienced man over there. There always had to be certain returnees, so he could do the promoting. Now we got all the senior people back as returnees, so he could do the promoting. Now we got all the senior people back as survivors. And we couldn't absorb them stateside.

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Q: And this created some problems, too?

H: It gave us an awful time for a while there. We had a bad morale. And this was one of the reasons although a secondary reason, why we set up this Redistribution Center Program.

Q: PDC?

H: This was the Personnel Distribution Command. We just lucked into that one. Because one day, the Secretary of War called General Arnold in and said: "Hey, you Air Force guys have about 75 hotels and you are just walking off and leaving them." This is when we used them for tech training, officer candidate training and everything else and then the peak of our training went over the hump and we had all these vacant hotels in Atlantic City, Santa Monica and Miami. The Secretary of War said: "You have got to find a good reason to hold these hotels. We can't turn them back." Arnold called me at 11:30 and said; "Be back in my office at 2 o'clock with a complete plan to justify the use of all these 70 hotels." So, we promptly got this redistribution thing ginned up in about two hours' time, and started filling them with returnees.

Q: Did Jim Stowell have some role in that?

H: Jim Stowell was in it. He wasn't in for very long.

Q: He was OCS down in Miami, wasn't he?

H: Yes, that's where he was. Hubert Harmon finally came back. Set up the Personnel Distribution Command with his original headquarters in Atlantic City. And then we had a command structure that all went beautifully.

Q: Well, rehabilitation of war-weary combat crews was a problem. I think the Army didn't understand what the Air Force was trying to do?

H: No, they didn't. And they envied us a whole lot, I think. And they wished they could do the same thing.

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Q: Didn't the Surgeon General of the Army express some unhappiness? I talked to Howard Rusk. Rusk was telling me about how the Army was unhappy with the Air Force Rehabilitation Centers. They considered that coddling of Air Force personnel. Did you get into any of that?

H: Well, I think, it goes a little deeper than that, really. Things that Rusk really didn't know about at that time. The Army was very bitter about our Flight Surgeon's program. They contended that in a Theater of War the Surgeon General's people could take care of all the medical problems. And we went ahead glibly, recruiting doctors. We got some damn good doctors, because they were all interested in the Air Force. And we probably did have more doctors than we actually needed. The Army took a lot of them away, when they got under the Theater Commander's control, but the Flight Surgeon's approach to life is a little different than an Army combat Surgeon's. The Flight Surgeon is interested in the psychological problems and we had a hell of a lot of them. Probably more so than the Army had. Some youngster 19 years old out in a Mustang over Berlin all by himself. He was a whole regiment. He was awfully lonesome coming back, with frostbitten fingers, bleeding with a couple of shoulder wounds, and an airplane all shot up. And they took it!

H: Absolutely different. All of our casualties had different characteristics than the Army had. By and large if you are shot on the battlefield, you have a corpsman that picked you up in a very short time on a stretcher with plasma. Gunners on a B-17, you have to have a five-hour return flight, and bleeding like stuck pigs, at 5,000 feet freezing. So we did have different characteristics.

Q: Did you ever get into the intra-service politics of it with the Army Surgeon General?

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H: I was at several of the meetings. We got into some pretty hairy, knockdown debates on the subject.

Q: Did Arnold get into these?

H: No. Arnold always backed away. I think perhaps he was also Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. Second to Marshall. And he didn't want to come in there wearing an Air Force hat. But Arnold made his staff fight the battle. Arnold did the fighting with people like Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt, Baruch. External stuff. But he would give us a directive, and tell us what he wanted done and we were expected to carry through. Some times we didn't because we were badly outranked by the War Dept General Staff. And we lost a few battles. And he didn't like it. But, even with the build-up of the 9th AF, General Eisenhower said: "I will not contemplate going across the Channel until I am guaranteed air superiority." Everyone agreed, but Eisenhower's own staff didn't give us one single space for shipping, so we had to smuggle almost 130,000 people overseas. And Arnold knew we were doing it--and in many respects illegally--but we got them there.

Q: 130,000 to build up the 9th AF? Didn't Eisenhower sympathize with the Tactical Air?

H: He was highly sympathetic but by then he was committed to combat loading number of divisions, and there were not any battalions left. So he said we would have to delay the invasion; we would have to build some more ships. Well, neither of those were possible. So, we smuggled them out on oil tankers., Panamanian ships. We did a lot of damn foolishnesssup in New York to get away with it.

Q: Was there any problem between Eaker and Arnold in respect to utilization of personnel in the 8th AF? This is before Eaker was taken out of there. Arnold came over to 8th AF around Labor Day

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of 1943. He and Eaker had some problems. There was a personnel problem. Arnold said: "If you can't use all these planes and manpower I am going to let the Navy, not the Navy, but give them to the Pacific." George Kenney and some of the others were screaming for stuff out in the Pacific. Did you get into any of these hassles?

H: I was only in on the fringes of it. I think perhaps I would have to go back a little. Eaker and Arnold were very close friends in March Field before the war. Wrote a book and all this kind of stuff. And I think Eaker was desperately disappointed when they put Spaatz in over Ira Eaker. I was over there just about that time and Eaker had a few things to say. He indicated that he was very unhappy. Another thing that I think got into the act was General Fred Anderson who was really the chief honcho of that bomber offensive. And he was watching his loss curves and was very much concerned that they drew 25% the first mission and 25% of the remainder on the second mission, and so on. Until about the end of four days of operation you would almost destroy an air force. Eaker was concerned about it. And there was a time when, I think, they purposely stretched out operations.

Q: Yes, they did.

H: To conserve the heart of their bomber command until they got the long-range Mustang. And then they went all out again. And I don't think that Arnold appreciated it. Everywhere he flew, if he saw more than two airplanes sitting on the line, he raised perfect hell. I think he did it with tongue in cheek. But he did it to keep everybody on their toes. And to keep us bugging all the time. There was another small staff where Gen Arnold was real concerned with an Eaker decision after he had gone down to the Mediterranean. Eaker wanted to keep the experience level high, so he took some people who had completed their

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combat tours, shipped them home for 30 days' leave, and then to go back into combat again. And we had a real nasty time of it. The boys rebelled. One of them shot himself; one jumped out of the hotel window at Atlantic City, and they finally marched them to the train, under armed guard, and put them on a ship and sent them back. But about mid-ocean General Arnold lowered the boom on Eaker. He said, "I'm sending them back toyou, I am sending C-54s. Put them on C-54s and send them home." They never did go back into combat. There was quite a little spat over that.

Q: Now this is after Eaker went to the Mediterranean?

H: Yes.

Q: Well, you are right about the friction that grew between Eaker and Arnold. I saw some correspondence between Eaker and Jim Fechet, the old-time head of the Air Force. Eaker said that he felt like the man who was with the team all year, had gone to the World Series, and was taken out of the box. So he was quite upset about that.

H: Well, he took some awful bloody noses earlier. Because he was trying to set up the 8th Bomber Command. Then all of a sudden, we had North Africa. All he had was one little piddling group of A-20s.

Q: They drained him for the Pacific; they drained him for North Africa and then Schweinfurt and Regensburg, and he didn't have any P-51s; he didn't have wing tanks ready for the P-47s.

H: They weren't ready for those two raids.

Q: The P-38s. They were not ready. They were trying to get these paper, cardboard tanks from the British. Personnel must have been a tremendous problem, in the combat Air Forces, especially the 8th AF where you took such heavy losses, to try to keep morale up.

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Was there any reluctance on the part of the men assigned to the 8th AF?

H: I didn't even see it. They were willing to go over. I think an awful lot of people in the training system weren't really aware of the extent of the attrition we were suffering in the 8th. And that in itself created a problem, because so many of our losses were on the 24th and 25th mission. Happened to people who were sweating it out. They were too relaxed. They got a little careless.

Q: Did they ever fix a ratio? Like two men--two pilots per plane or 2.5--I know they were negotiating.

H: We were never able to get that far.

Q: Because it changed so?

H: In the 8th AF, for example, the flow wasn't fast enough to get multiple crews. When they went out to the SOWesPac, we were not suffering high attrition. You couldn't keep them on the ground out there.

Q: Right.

H: They got two crews waiting for a chance to take one airplane. Sooner or later the crew that has been there the longer began to suffer morale-wise, and they had to get them out of the theater.

Q: The 8th AF was the only one that was suffering higher than anticipated attrition? Would you say that?

H: Well, Gen Arnold's own formula was that we must be prepared to take a 25% loss per month. We may have taken that for a couple of months, in a couple of units. But by and large, our worst year in the 8th AF was about 150% attrition per year. So that it was a little better than the Arnold assumption. And we ultimately caught up with our replacement flow so that we could give these people time off.

Q: In other Air Forces, attrition never quite reached the anticipated rate?

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H: Never anywhere near that. The 15th AF had a few bad months, but not the long, bloody years that the 8th took.

Q: In talking about World War II, and now let's flash back to the beginning. When did you first encounter Hap Arnold? Do you remember your first meeting?

H: I sure do. It was the second day I was at March Field. I arrived on a cool Saturday evening. They made me OD on Sunday. They impressed upon me that all cars were to come to a complete halt coming through the gate, and I better be ready to tell the Colonel, and warn him, if anyone came through the gate. Well, one did, a great big black Ambassador. I took the license number and wrote up the report and sent it into Colonel Arnold on Monday morning. When I went off, he called me into the office. He said: "Young man, do you know whose car that was?" I said, "No, sir, I have the license and can find out." He said: "Don't bother, but it is not the custom of the service to arrest the Old Man." I think that singled me out.

Q: Was that while you were with the 95th Pursuit Squadron?

H: That was the 134th. I had two tours there. That was the 34th. The Thunderbird. When I got in the 9th, later on, it was the Golden Bear Squadron. We needed a little mascot, I found a little bear cub in Tucson; brought him home and old Willy got awful big and broke out of his pen one night, and got into the Arnold garden, and tore up his garden. So that was the second strike on me.

Q: Mrs. Arnold probably had a few words about that, as she loves her garden.

H: She was sweet about it, just as sweet as she could be. But we had to get rid of Willy after that.

Q: What other impressions do you have of Arnold at March Field?

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H: One very strong impression. March had only been going as a Tactical organization for about a year, and there were quite a lot of Reserve officers out there. I was one. But the Club rules were that the Reserves had to pay dues but we couldn't vote. And there was a little friction out there. Colonel Arnold heard about it and he called a meeting of every officer on the base. In about three sentences, he laid the law down. He said we were an Officer Corps out here; we are all taking the same risks; we are all going after the same objectives. We will have a single officer club. Everyone is going to be a member and can vote and do anything any other officer can do. That endeared Arnold to the Reserves. He was a real interested person. He was popping up always. He was a handsome man He had a wonderful grin; a capacity for remembering names, and I don't think there was a young officer on that base that didn't love him. Kinda afraid of him, too. But he was a real wonderful guy.

Q: Well, March Field was probably his most important tour, in the sense that this was the turning back of Arnold's career.

H: I think there is no question about that.

Q: He met Malin Craig on this tour and it was that contact that brought him back to Washington. When Gen Craig became Chief of Staff, he brought Arnold to Washington. Did you know about his relationship with Craig at the base?

H: No.

Q: He did several good things which endeared him to Craig. One was during the earthquake of March 1934 (actually 1933). I believe that you were there at the time. And Arnold marshalled his soup kitchens, etc., and sent them to Long Beach. Were you involved in that operation?

H: No.

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Q: Where were you at that time? Were you flying the mail at that time?

H: Yes, I was on air mail duty at that time.

Q: You flew air mail duty. You flew one of the routes there?

H: I started out on the Oakland-Seattle route, and after they had a little moratorium because of all the deaths--that was one of the routes that they cancelled. Then they moved me up to Las Vegas on the Los Angeles-Salt Lake City route.

Q: Do you have any recollection of Arnold performing in the air mail? He was operating out of Salt Lake City?

H: He was over his neck in problems. We had some awful country to fly up there. And we had assorted airplanes, until the tail end we got some Martin B-10 planes about the last week of the mail. You didn't know what kind of an airplane would be coming in--what you'd have to fly. Sometimesyou had never seen one before. And you just did the best you could. He used to get around a lot. He painted up the P-12 snowwhite, and put the insignia on, a beautiful plane. And he would hop around in the P-12 all the time. But then he got Will Rogers interested, and Will Rogers would fly around. Sit down with all the pilots and shoot the bull in his quiet way, and persuade them it wasn't worth a life to get the mail through on time.

Q: Will Rogers made a number of broadcasts supporting the air mail. I've seen some of the articles. You know, he was doing a daily column and he made some strong points about the risks that the air mail fellows were taking to flying this through. Well, finally, the President intervened. They gave the contracts back to the commercial carriers.

H: About the time they gave the contracts back, we were really ready to go. We were getting good new equipment. We had radios in

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the aircraft. The first I flew did not have any maps or radios. But by the time the thing was ready to fold, we were beginning to get equipment and we were getting used to flying them in bad weather and at night. Just before this, we had the pay freezes. We could only fly four hours a month. That was all. We couldn't afford to light up the fields for night flying. So we were awfully rusty.

Q: Well, that was part of the reason Foulois said, "Let us fly the mail," because he felt that he could take part of this money that the Post Office had and he could use it for training purposes. But Foulois probably did not appreciate the magnitude of the problem, considering the terrible equipment that you had to fly.

H: Well, I think he knew full well what the problem was going to be, but he wasn't in a position to where he could say "no." Then they ganged him and tried to get the Air Corps to fly all the routes that the commercial lines had been flying.

Q: Have you seen Foulois' book? It just came out a couple of years ago?

H: No, I haven't seen it.

Q: Of course, he was brought into Jim Farley's office. Actually, he was dealing with a man named Harllee Branch. He later became head of the CAB. They asked him: "Can you handle the air mail?" This was about February 9, 1934. And he said, "Yes, give us 10 days." So they gave him 10 days. Now, in his book, they said that this was just a figure of speech. He didn't mean exactly 10 days. But they held him to the 10 days, and, as you pointed out, you just did not have the equipment. And just about the time they cancelled the Air Corps routes, was when we were ready to fly the air mail.

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H: As I recall, we flew the mail the last week. We brought it across country faster than it had ever been brought by the commercial lines. We were really going then. Then, of course, the worst weather was over, too.

Q: Aside from seeing Arnold hop around in his P-12 to supervise the operation, do you have any other recollections of Arnold in this air mail business?

H: Well, he was obviously doing his damnest to get the Air Corps image favorable before the public. He told me to go to Las Vegas and told me to get gardens planted, and this all prettied up. He gave me an airplane and told me to go out to Santa Rosa, where I should be of community value. Put the major in the back, and fly him over Boulder Dam, and this sort of thing.

Q: You know, he was great on community relations. You know, he had this relationship with Governor Rolph of California, and he would fly him around.

H: He was wonderful--on that.

Q: He had a very high sense of Air Force in the community. He brought Hollywood stars out to the field. Did you have any part of that?

H: Not while we were there.

Q: In 1932 he had Mary Pickford, Bebe Daniels, and Wallace Beery out there.

H: We saw a lot of Wallace Beery.

Q: Did you ever hear of a guy named Sweeley?

H: Yes, the name is familiar.

Q: They used him as sort of a liaison there, to get these people out from Hollywood. Then, of course, Arnold tied the Air Corps into

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the Olympics in 1932. Didn't he sort of bring the Air Corps into the Olympics to some degree?

H: I don't recall.

Q: He also had this Big Bear Lake Camp--this rest camp--did they not set up a rest camp up in the mountains?

H: Yes, we had one up at Big Bear. Real nice. Just above Lake Arrowhead.

Q: And he scrounged a lot of material to get this?

H: We stole, robbed, scrounged...

Q: What was your job on the base at that time?

H: I had so many of them, I can't remember. You know, of course, you didn't have a single job in those days. You were a pilot in the morning, in the afternoon you were Adjutant Communications Officer, and something of that sort. I was on the maintenance side in the afternoons.

Q: Did you get involved in the CCC?

H: Yes, I did.

Q: What was your job there?

H: I was a Personnel Officer for Arnold's CCC District.

Q: Tell me how many camps did he have?

H: We got up to about 28 camps all back in the mountain, all over the Southwest, all hard to get to. I think that was probably the aftermath of arresting him at the gate, something of that sort. Because they called me up by name, and there was no reason why they should have singled me out from the rest of the young folks. I wanted to fly airplanes. We were right in the middle of the maneuvers, so March Field pretty well stood down. Just were all shredded out to the CCC job.

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Q: Arnold did a good job of it?

H: He did a marvelous job, and again he never raised his voice for conferences on CCC. It was about three sentences long. He would say, "I don't know how to do this. We have no regulations. You folks just use your heads. I want the job done, and I don't want any bad kickbacks. I want the kids well taken care of, and that's it. Let's go to work."

Q: You know, he had a conception that young people, getting out into the open, doing some constructive work, and getting in a little fishing or hunting, would have a salutary effect. This was his post-war answer to juvenile delinquency.

H: Not bad. I am sure that he would feel that very keenly, and most of the kids we got were good. We got some of the sweepings of the Los Angeles slums, pretty bad boys. Unfortunately, we got them over at one camp in Elsinore. I flew over to see the camp commander--Jack Carsling--sitting on the steps of the mess hall with a gun in each hand. He said: "When you do your first day's work that's when you get your first meal." He held them off for a long time.

Q: Did Arnold ever get out there, to give them a talking to?

H: Arnold got out there a day or two after that--he travelled an awful lot. But so many of the places were just a long way out--you couldn't get to them in anything except in an old Condor bomber. They were the only thing that had enough gas to get there and back. It was a long time before we had flight strips close enough to the camps so that you could really get there.

Q: Was he good on the pep talk routine?

H: Very good in a short way. He never talked very long. He had a wonderful grip, and was such a dynamic guy. He would just sketch out a few words and everybody was throwing their hats up in the air.

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Q: He had this ability to spark the young?

H: I've never seen anybody unless it was Jimmy Doolittle that had the same dynamic, effervescent way of getting everybody on his ball club.

Q: He was a leader?

H: No doubt about it.

Q: Well, the CCC was one of the examples which endeared him to Malin Craig.

H: The whole 9th Corps area responsibility.

Q: Roosevelt was very strong on CCC, and Arnold did this great job there, and I think this is one f the things he did that called him to the attention of higher ups. And then, the earthquake situation. And then he did a good job on the air mail. He had the toughest job of all, I guess, flying across the Rockies in February.

H: He had far and away, the worst job. A little old depot down in San Diego was just in the process of being turned over to the Navy. So we didn't have depot support, that they had further East. We were sort of on the end of the pipeline.

Q: Arnold was unhappy that he lost on that to the Navy. Didn't the Navy give you Moffett Field there for awhile?

H: Moffett Field, I think came in later. They took Luke in Hawaii--North Island and Rockwell and San Diego, and they gave us a hunk of real estate over in Oakland, which the Navy promptly took back. And we finally ended up in Moffett.

Q: Well, Arnold was unhappy about it, because he had his training at North Island, back in 1916.

H: North Island is a wonderful station but in retrorespect, I don't think we really lost too much because there just didn't have enough land out there to handle World War II aircraft, and certainly not the jets.

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Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold, or the Arnold family, in social situations at March Field? You know, Mrs. Arnold was a very gracious lady, and I guess she did a job.

H: She was highly popular with the young wives. Everybody loved Mrs. Arnold. But we didn't see them socially. I'm sure they went to Los Angeles and Pasadena frequently to be in the Civilian Community. But we seldom saw them on the base socially. He used to have an occasional formal dinner, and we saw them for sure on that occasion, but that was a stag job.

Q: Did Arnold start the Wing-Dings at March Field?

H: Yes. There were two while I was there. One just for the hell of it, to have one and to get us all dressed up. And another one just after the close of the air mail. Gen Westover, Gen Foulois, and most of the Air Staff was there. We had quite a party.

Q: Well, he developed a sense of unity among his officer corps, I suppose. A sense of common purpose and morale by getting them together on these occasions?

H: There is no question about it. It was a wonderful experience.

Q: Were you there after he left? At MarchField?

H: No, I left before he did.

Q: Were you there when he got his star?

H: No.

Q: Then you left before Feb '35.

H: He was a Lt Colonel when I first went there. He jumped and he had just gotten his chickens about the time of the Alaskan flight.

Q: Did he get his chickens there? I didn't know he had them.

H: Either just before or just after.

Q: What about the Alaskan flight?

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H: I didn't get in on that. I was one of the fighter pilots.

Q: Was he unhappy to be called out for that so soon after the air mail? You know, he was supposed to have gone on a vacation right after the end of the air mail situation. He and Mrs. Arnold were on their way to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, when he got called back. Do you recall anything about that?

H: No, see, they ran out of money the day they stopped flying the air mail, and they kicked all the reserve officers off duty. So there was a period of several months between the end of the air mail, and the beginning of the fiscal year when they didn't have any money to pay us, so they released us, and then, on 1 July they called a bunch of us back on duty again.

Q: Didn't everybody have a furlough for a while--there was a 15% pay cut? Didn't you work 12 months and get paid for 11, or something?

H: What we actually did at March Field was request two days' leave every month, but we didn't take it. But that was the only way to make it legal. They would only pay you for 28 instead of 30 days.

Q: And this was understood by everybody at the time?

H: Yeah. No bad feeling about it.

Q: The Reserve Officers just didn't get paid for a period?

H: No, we all got the same pay as the regulars. What did happen was that we would get furloughed for monied reasons. Instead of commissioning a flying cadet when he got his wings, he went out and served on active duty as a flying cadet. There was enough money savings so they could do that. Then after about six months, they recouped the dough, and let them serve as 2nd lieutenants.

Q: Strictly economy means. Well, I guess, they cut back very sharply on flying training during this period?

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H: There was virtually nil at March. We got our first link trainer assignment, and they interpreted the link trainer as being the equivalent of flying for a good one month. We had four hours in the link trainer, the next month we would get three hours in 10 landings in an airplane. That was enough to qualify you for your flying pay.

Q: Did Arnold ever get mad at you?

H: He got mad at everybody.

Q: I guess, if he hasn't been mad at you, you haven't served in the Air Corps.

H: I think that is right. I have never known anyone who thought General Arnold was dirty about it. We know doggoned well he was disappointed and disgusted at some blooper you'd pull. I think he was mad at me in San Diego when we were having trouble with the little Ryan with the Manasco engine. We had 95 engines failures in a month.

Q: When did this happen?

H: This was in 1939. One of the first little primary contracts, and we bought the trainer off the shelf, and the engines were quitting on us. So we grounded the airplane, and I sent a message to Washington that we were out of business. The next day Gen Arnold arrived with General Knudsen, and took Claude and I up in an airplane and started back East. He said: "Talk fast and make sense," and I got my Kinner engine and I had test flown it. And my solution was to buy the Kinner and get rid of the Manasco engine.

Q: You were assigned to the Ryan school?

H: I was No. 2 at the Ryan school at San Diego. And then I

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went up and opened a big school at Hemet, California, and I was in charge of that one.

Q: In your Hqs AAF experience with Arnold, you were at one end of the squawk box. I guess you got called on the squawk box quite frequently?

H: Yes, I don't think that very many people on his staff saw a great deal of him. He traveled a lot, and tended to work with a very small inner family for the simple reason that I don't think he could have dealt on a much wider basis. And I had the strong impression that General Arnold set up certain priorities for his very careful supervision. One of the early ones, of course, was getting the people into the business, getting them trained, getting a system that he felt would work. Once that was achieved, then he backed away, and let you run your own railroad. Although, you can't got anywhere in the world in the world or anyplace in the United States, without having a "People" problem. And everytime he came back, he came back with a little notebook full of little hen scratches he made. Then he would be on the squawk box, just raising hell to get something done about it. I remember when he came back from SW Pacific, he called me up one Sunday morning, and he said: "I want you to send a fellow by the name of Ryan, out to Kenney, right away quick. Get him out right now." I said: "Sir, do you have initials? There are a lot of Ryans in the AF." And he said: "I don't give a damn, get a Ryan out to Kenney right now." And I said: "Yes sir," so I picked the first Ryan I could get, and sent him out. We got an awful blast from Kenney about a week later. Arnold had me in the office, andhe said: "Hopwood, what in the hell is the matter with Kenney now?" Well, I finally wrote a letter to General Kenney to find out what the score was, and Kenney wanted a fellow

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by the name of Ryan, who was a damn good tennis player, because Kenney had set up a sort of little Davis cup tennis match out in the SW Pacific, for Christmas Day. And this is why we had to get Ryan out there. The Ryan I sent had never seen a tennis match. Kenney set up all this business, and he was going to pull out of his hip pocket this great tennis star by the name of Ryan. The Ryan he had was a cook's helper.

Q: This is one of the times when Arnold's grabbing people and telling them to go do something backfired?

H: There was one man he sent all the way out to the West Coast to clean up the P-38.

Q: What's that story?

H: Well, they swear it's true. Arnold was all upset one morning at a couple of fatal accidents on the West Coast in the P-38. He came steaming out of his office, and grabbed the first officer he saw, and he said: "You get on a plane and get out to the West Coast, and clean up these P-38 accidents." And it was a young Infantryman just wandering around the Pentagon, sightseeing. He would do that.

Q: This is one of those apocryphal stories. But it could have been true because this is the kind of thing he did, out of channels.

H: Yes, channels were nothing but a nuisance to him. I think it was part of his greatness. He would take a stab at anything, and tell someone to do it, with supreme confidence that guy would damn well do it, one way or another. He might go back into channels to get it done.

Q: Did he ever grab you, and give you something alien to your background, and tell you to do it?

H: Oh, all the time.

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Q: Do you remember any specific things you had to do?

H: I sent the directive for me to take over all these bloody hotels and get a show on the road in two hours. That was something that I wasn't up to. I had never messed around with hotel management, or anything of that sort before.

Q: I was told that he got Walter Weaver in on that hotel business, the Miami hotels?

H: This is where it started. Walter Weaver was having trouble getting a technical training plant built to handle the number of technicians we had to produce. So he took over the Stevens Hotel in Chicago, and a bunch in Atlantic City, and some down in Miami at the time the hotel owners were delighted to get out from under. If we decided to walk out and turn them back over to the hotel owners, with travel down there virtually nothing, and all the rationing, the hotel owners would have gone bankrupt. So we just had to figure a way to keep them going.

Q: Somebody told me the story that Weaver said: "Well, it was going to take a certain length of time." But Arnold said he wanted it done over the weekend, and he pretended to talk to somebody on the telephone, and say: "Well, if Weaver won't do it, you do it." Did he ever pull this stunt on you?

H: I wouldn't doubt it. The man had an insidious way of booby-trapping you into doing something. You knew you couldn't do it, but you knew you would bust your neck trying to get it done, because you didn't want to have to come back and say: "Sir, I flubbed it." And damn few people ever went back and said: "I flubbed it."

Q: If he found out that somebody flubbed it, if the thing didn't go off as you hoped, did you tell him: "General, we just couldn't do

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it?" Or did you try to cover it up and figure, well, we'll settle this tomorrow or next week?

H: Oh, I'm sure there were times when we tried to keep it away from the Old Man for a little while, when we were pretty sure we were going to get well. We just needed a little bit more time to do it. Towards the end of the war, I think all of us sensed Arnold was suffering pressure, and we didn't want to go back with anything that would upset him.

Q: He had a heart attack in 1943. Do you remember that? Did he go around in a wheelchair for a while?

H: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Then he had a Major attack right around Inauguration Day, 1945. Do you remember that--they tried to keep this very quiet, for several reasons.

H: I know a lot of us didn't even know he had a heart attack until about a week after. I was then in Military Personnel Division, and certain documents were being hand-carried down to Coral Gables. That's the only reason I knew about it.

Q: Who covered up for him? H: Well, several people covered up certain areas, like Norstad covered up in the 20th AF, and then Lovett covered up for him. Q: Did you have any knowledge of his relationship with Lovett?

H: I've heard Lovett speak of his relationship with Arnold, subsequently. They were very close, very warm, and they were a wonderful team together. I've been to maybe two or three conferences in Washington during the war when both the Secretary and Gen Arnold were present. There is no doubt about the fact there was mutual respect and admiration between the two.

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Q: Was Lovett a sort of balance wheel for Arnold?

H: He must have been. Lovett is a very dignified, quiet man, never raises his voice. He thinks before he talks. Arnold didn't always do that; he was very impetuous. I'm sure that Lovett probably was more helpful than almost any American you could have picked for the job.

Q: Do you remember any specific situation where Arnold impulsively acted in some respect, and Lovett sort of smoothed it out, or held it back until Arnold could reconsider, and perhaps take another course?

H: No, not really, not that I would connect with it closely enough so it was an eyeball relationship.

Q: Did you have some dealings with Jim Bevans in Personnel?

H: Yes, Jim was my boss.

Q: Where did McCormick fit into it.

H: McCormick was Bevan's deputy. McCormick had an awful lot of personnel background, and Bevans was kind of the front man and the office manager. The Chief of Staff of the Personnel Division was John McCormick.

Q: Where does Trubee Davison fit into the personnel picture?

H: Well, whenwe started out, we had an operating staff and we had a policy staff. Trubee Davison was Asst Chief of Staff for Personnel, and Augie Kissner was Trubee Davison's No. 2. That was about all there was in the Asst Chief of Staff Personnel office. Now, over at Gravely Point we had the Director of Personnel who was Jim Bevans, and the operating functions of enlisted, officer, overseas replacement, cadet procurement, was under Bevans, and he had a big operating staff, at Gravely Point.

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Q: You worked for him at Gravely Point?

H: I worked for him there, and then, Bevans and Trubee Davison's office blended, as soon as the Pentagon was available, and we all moved over to the Pentagon.

Q: And, then Trubee Davison sort of moved out of that into post-war plans?

H: He went into post-war planning with NY lawyers. They were just thorns in our side from then on out.

Q: I saw Trubee Davison in Locust Valley, NY.

H: How is he?

Q: Well, he's well along in years. Pretty old, so I didn't get as much as I could have gotten 5 or 10 years ago. But he had a high regard for Arnold.

H: Trubee was kind of a funny guy from the Arnold standpoint. I have never seen Arnold nasty to anybody except Trubee Davison. And, to the best of my knowledge, Arnold was the guy that picked Trubee to come in. Maybe, because they knew each other many long years ago. But Trubee used to walk with a cane.

Q: He was in a wheelchair for a while, wasn't he?

H: Yes, he was in a wheelchair for a while. At this time, I had gone into Arnold's office with Trubee. I can't remember the subject matter. I guess it was the WASPS. He put his cane on Arnold's desk and sat down and started explaining something to Arnold, and Arnold got mad and picked up the cane and threw it at Trubee Davison, and let out a bellow. I've never seen him do that with anybody else.

Q: You know, there was a great problem with Jackie Cochran. I talked to her, by the way. She wanted them to become 2nd LTs. There

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was a problem of getting legislation through, wasn't there?

H: That's right.

Q: Could this have been the issue?

H: I was the go-between, when he was having trouble on the Hill, and was also having serious trouble with General Marshall, about continuing the WASPs. Nobody wanted him to get it started. I tried to persuade him against it. Jackie Cochran sold him. My big argument was not that we couldn't use the concept. But I tried to persuade Gen Arnold that if we use the rotation program, and brought the survivors home from the war, we are going to have to have something for the kids to do. Ferrying airplanes, or working in the training command, or doing all the things that the WASPs did, were just wonderful jobs for the kids coming back from combat. And if you put the WASPs in, you had surplus combat pilots with nothing to do.

Q: How did he react to that?

H: I think he saw the reason for it. But he said: "I'm just too far committed. Now we will go ahead, but don't let it get too big." So we just kept it as small as we could get by with. And then when they finally gave it up....

Q: In the end of 1944, near the end of the war, really?

H: That's right. Arnold was presumed to be mad about giving it up, and he wasn't. In my opinion, he was bloody well relieved to get out from under it, because it was one of his mistakes.

Q: At the time the WASPs first came in, there was a need for them. You didn't have enough pilots. Is that correct?

H: Yes, but the trouble with that, was you could see just a matter of a couple of months ahead that the situation was going to

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reverse. And once you got a program like that rolling, it's awfully hard to shred it out.

Q: Then there came political reasons for maintaining the WASPs, because, if you cancel them you have this business of discrimination against women, and the politics of it. I think John Costello was in there, wasn't he?

H: That's right.

Q: Some others, too, and they were trying to get them 2nd Lieutenants, and if you did that, then you would preserve the system. So I think they never did get legal status?

H: Not to the best of my knowledge. We had trouble with the Civil Service Commission. We had some fancy pay system that I never got into. They did a wonderful job. There is no doubt about it. But it was just the wrong thing to do at that point of time.

Q: There was a point, say, in '43 or '44, when you had returning veteran flyers, and you didn't have enough for them to do. There were some cases of some of these fellows given sedentary jobs. There was one case of a fellow flying under the Brooklyn Bridge for some excitement, and then he was court martialed.

H: Well, we had that trouble, I think, all through the war. The accident rate in the U.S. was something that Arnold was constantly concerned about. Sometimes he would come out and say: "Well, hell, if they are going to be killed in training, better if it happens in the U.S., than ship them all the way overseas, improperly trained and wreck the airplane over on the other side. On the other hand, the confidence of the American people was something that used to bother him. The headlines were heckling us a little bit. He used to sweat that out.

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Q: You introduce something now involving the 2nd AF. It reminds me of Arnold and Davenport Johnson. You know, he had problems with the accident rate in the 2nd AF, a high accident rate there. And he finally took Johnson out of that job. Do you remember that? And he put Bill Streett in there. Did you get involved in that problem?

H: No.

Q: Did you get involved in his concern with the accident rate? In other words, did he ask you to do anything in any specific area to curb that?

H: No, no specific areas. He told Personnel to get their noses out of their paperwork, and go down and find out if there is anything, personnel-wise that we might do to improve the situation. One of the things, a case in point, the kids out at Luke Field--the fighter trainer out there--there was no air conditioning, the barracks were hot as the devil. The kids couldn't sleep nights, and some of the problems were they were do damn fatigued, after three or four sleepless nights, they weren't very good in the air,which caused some of the accidents. We finally got desert coolers out there, so they could sleep nights. But that kind of thing we were involved in.

Q: You mentioned several contacts Arnold had with the civilian contract flying schools, C.C. Moseley and some of these other flying school operators. This is the early movement to build up a large block of flying personnel. Do you remember any specific contacts with him on the subject of civilian flying training schools?

H: Yes, I did. I had my problem with the engine failures from San Diego, and he was out there about a month later, and called Claude Ryan and me, into the airplane, parked on the ground. He told

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us what he saw in the future in terms of training. And he asked Claude--he didn't ask him--he said: "Claude, I want you to open a second school; a big one." And Claude said: "All right, sir, when shall I have it done?" And Arnold says: "60 days." And we got it in 59. But boy, it was hard work. Even Claude Ryan wasn't about to go back to the boss and say: "I can't do it." We got it in.

Q: He did these with Letters of Intent, really; he didn't even have the money.

H: He didn't have the money the first round. For the San Diego station there was no money, and Claude Ryan went to several bankers in town and scrapped up about a quarter of a million dollars to get the show started.

Q: Just on the basis of a letter from Arnold to him?

H: Didn't have a letter. Just verbal. Said he was called into Arnold's office in Washington, and Arnold explained the problem, and said: "I called you nine people in. Will you go with me?" And they all said: "Yes, we will," and that was it.

Q: All these to build flying training schools. Well, he did this with the aircraft manufacturers, too. Got them started on building planes without any real authority or any money. Just on the strength of his say-so.

H: We did an awful lot of that. We would have never gotten mobilized if Arnold hadn't stuck his personal neck out many a time.

Q: He took many risks. If these things had bounced back, it would have been his head?

H: Part of his greatness. And everybody recognized this. It was a fantastic thing. Everybody believed Arnold, a man of integrity, a

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man of drive, and nobody ever shaked their heads, unless it was the Navy.

Q: You sort of expected him to do this?

H: Oh yes.

Q: Marshall had complete confidence in him?

H: I'm sure of that.

Q: Marshall sort of kept hands-off the Air Corps development. I think he gave Arnold his free rein on that thing?

H: Marshall backed Arnold up all the way, wherever Arnold asked him, and I think other than that it was sort of a gentleman's agreement; "I'm an old Cavalryman," Marshall says, "and I'm not going to mess with your airplanes. You know the business, or I'd get rid of you. You run the Air Force."

Q: Did Marshall understand airpower, or don't you know?

H: I think toward the end, he understood the tactical application of airpower. He wasn't always sure in his mind about the strategic application. I felt that even more when Marshall was Secy of Defense. I had several sessions with him there when he wasn't real, real confident.

Q: You mentioned in your letter to me, of Arnold's imaginative development of concepts that led to the GHQ AF. What did you have in mind? Some of the things he did on maneuvers?

H: He was talking about it constantly. I knew him better when I was at March Field, than I ever did since.. It was a piddling little air force. I saw him every day. But we would be out in a place somewhere, and sitting down for a cigarette, and he would philosophize about the whole thing, the tactics of the business.

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H: Bombing the bombers from fighters--that was a German tactic late in the war. This was in late '33 and he promoted some little two-pound bombs from somewhere. We would load up our fighters with 25 of these little old bombs, and then go up to some predetermined altitude which coincided with the fuze setting, and bomb the shadows of some bombers. They would project shadows on the water, off San Diego, and we would go out and bomb them. You see, it would be a possible fighter tactical to shoot down bombers. We worked at that for a couple of weeks. We did a lot of experimentation on fighter interception of bombing formations. And he was always coming up with some idea. Always ahead of everybody else with an idea.

Q: There are a lot of books written about the failure of the Air Corps to anticipate the need for long-range pursuit--that the Air Force was bomber-conscious and not pursuit-conscious. Was Arnold guilty of this, too? I mean, was this throughout the Air Corps?

H: What happened, as the bomber got a little bigger, the B-18, a case in point, they decided they needed more experience with a bigger airplane, so you tended to get the more senior people on the bombardment side of the house, and the more junior people on the fighter side. Well, obviously, the senior side had the loudest voice, I don't think General Arnold, ever for a minute, was as rabid a bomber man as some of the rest of them. We had to have a tactical capability, an air defense capability, and also the escort capability. I felt that--this goes back to the days of Wheeler Field--when Gen Miff Harmon was then a Colonel, commanding a bomber command down at Luke Field. We were up at Wheeler. We'd gotten the first B-10s, and they were pretty cocky. At a cocktail party one night, some of

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the fighter boys were signing off. Said they could knock down B-10s, so Harmon took us up there, and for three months, we fired first the camera guns--bombers shooting at the fighters with camera guns--and then we started firing with live ammunition and towed targets. And we ended up proving that the bombers were defenseless. This whole study then went--with Miff Harmon and Gen Yount, who was the wing commander--into the War Dept. We got a wonderful letter of commendation back from the Secy of War, and another personal note from Arnold, saying this is going to go a long way towards getting proper bomber armament, and also proving the case for the long-range escort fighter. And he was having trouble. Just about that time, I guess it was, he was trying to persuade people to spend the money on a long-range fighter, and we never did have one really, until the P-47N and the Mustang came.

Q: The AF did not anticipate how good the P-51 was?

H: No, we got that by accident; we just lucked in to that.

Q: How did that happen?

H: I don't know.

Q: Was it the British?

H: The British had asked for Spitfires, and North American had developed a P-51 on their own, and that was close enough to the Spit in performance, so North American was going to turn out the P-51.

Q: Well, the first P-51 wasn't any good, because the engine, it had a liquid cooled engine. That's when the British put this Merlin engine in it.

H: We had a little trouble with the Allison, as I recall. It didn't have the power of the Merlin. The Merlin was a wonderful flying machine.

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Q: Yes, that made the airplane. Well, you mentioned something here which interested me very much. The planning for postwar, including the Air Force Association. What role did you have, that brought you close to Arnold?

H: Once again, I was in the personnel business, and toward the latter part of the war, one of the people working for me, Colonel Goetz, and General Arnold thought the world of Col Goetz, and pulled Goetz away from Personnel as sort of a private planner to Gen Arnold on things we should be doing after the war was over. One of them was the RAND Corp. He got Donald Douglas to reach into his hip pocket and set up RAND. I ran a little back office in Douglas Corp. for a while.

Q: Did Ed Bowles have something to do with that?

H: Yes. On the AF Association. We must have written a half-dozen papers for Arnold, various conceptual ideas of what an AF Association should be. Now, Arnold, was particularly interested in getting some of these people on the civilian side of the house who had been so involved with airpower during the war, to stay with the AF Association, so we could speak with a national voice, instead of a little parochial blue-suit voice.

Q: He had a high regard, although some distrust, for the Navy League. He thought the Navy League was doing a great job for the Navy.

H: That's right, but it wasn't doing a great job for the country. And this is what Arnold was interested in. He was a real broad gauge guy.

Q: In other words, did he want something like the Navy League, or did he want something that was broader gauged, than the Navy League?

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H: He wanted something that would really do both. Because there was a time when his thinking was very definitely down the alley of getting the aircraft industry to put up a whole lot of the money that was necessary for a vigorous AF Association. But then he kept on enlarging his horizons, and saw it as a national requirement that airpower mustn't be permitted to fall apart after the war, and there must be a public awareness of it. A broad gauged AFA would be one of the vehicles to do that.

Q: You know, there was a problem, and I think it involved Trubee Davison for a while. There were several different organizations which started up after the war. Arnold was unhappy because the whole business splintered. There was the AF Association. Jimmy Doolittle was running that. And there was the Airpower League, with Trubee Davison in that. And then there were, Arnold joined the AVC-American Veterans' Committee--because it had a program that had a national appeal to people. They said: "We're not going to be veterans first and Americans second." We're going to be Americans first and veterans second." And, of course, it ended up as a left wing organization. And that's when Arnold broke with it. But, there was a time that Arnold refused to join the AF Association. Do you remember that? This happended after the war. Because he felt we were splintering our effort in several different directions. He wanted to see one organization, and I guess the AFA became strong after Arnold passed from the scene. But I don't think he ever joined it.

H: I left just before VJ-Day, went out to Okinawa. So some of the things that happened in the year right after the war....

Q: But you were involved in some of the planning? Setting up the AFA?

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H: We were setting up conceptual programs, and then I pulled out in about April 1945. Goetz to the best of my knowledge, remained with the AFA.

Q: The AFA was one of the conceptions that you were working on. The civilian side. Let's see, Sonny Whitney was in it at that time, and a couple of other civilian, people liked Ted Curtis.

H: Oh, he was very active.

Q: These are people who had risen in the AF, but also were Reserves, who would go back to civilian life and talk up the Air Force. Arnold had this belief that the AF would have to establish itself in public opinion and Congressional opinion in order to get ahead in the post-war period.

H: I think he realized all the way along that there was a strong body of WW I military experience in the Congress, and it was going to be a long time before AF veterans of WW II achieved the political stature, get into the halls of the Senate, and the House of Representatives. So, somehow, we had to fill in the gap. He still remembered how it collapsed after WW I, there wasn't anything. He was probably worried about what we did with too much WW II equipment--"get rid of it, burn it, melt it, for God's sake, don't be living in a P-51 for the next 30 years."

Q: Right, he was very conscious of that, because after WW I, we had all these DH-4s.

H: That's right.

Q: And we got stuck with them for years. You know, he was corresponding with Kenney, and several others, on this "Weary Willy" program. Were you familiar with that program?

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H: Yes.

Q: You do two things; one, you hit some targets; the other, you get rid of all these tired airplanes. So this was part of his conception, to clean out these old planes. Did you get into any of that planning?

H: No, we knew there was a program, and we got involved with how you did it. We were going to put two pilots aboard, and get it off the ground, and then bail out, and have the fly and rescue tactics, retrieve the pilots, etc.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about a separate AF, unification, in the post-war period? This was the goal of the AAF.

H: It was one of the things we were playing with. He called all of the Air Staff senior officers together, just before VE-Day, in the theater in the Pentagon--the first time he had done it in the war, to my knowledge. And he came in, and sat on a table, dangling his legs over the edge, and just philosophized about what lay ahead. Now, he chastised us for beginning to be just paper shufflers. And he said: "Now, more than any other time, the Air Staff has got to justify itself, by planning for the future." He insisted that we get away from the office, and get out and get some fresh air, and think, and start to get some really comprehensive plans for the future.

Q: Was this after VE-Day?

H: Just before VE-Day.

Q: He was in Washington for a week or so, after he came back from Coral Gables, this is the end of March 1945. Eaker had been brought in to become Deputy Commander. Arnold was sent on a recuperation trip to Cannes and the Riviera. So he was in Washington say about the last week of March 1945.

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H: That could well have been the time, because he was in a very philosophical mood. Very quiet; spoke off the cuff, all the senior people in the Air Staff, LT COLs and above.

Q: And this was a lecture on looking ahead?

H: That's right. "Get away from the paper now, we are downstream on the war; don't worry about losing a war. It's just a matter of when we are going to win it." But now the big battle was for the future, security of the nation through airpower.

Q: Did he talk about guided missiles or R&D, the need for maintaining a high-level R&D? I'm thinking of, did he ever talk about, was there a role for non-rated officers in the Air Force? This was one of the subjects that he talked about with Bozo McKee.

H: No, but it was highly obvious that after the war he recognized there was a role for non-rated officers. He had people he used to call in to help him on it, against the case in point, non-rated, very able persons sometimes.

Q: Bozo McKee?

H: Bozo was one of the first to come in.

Q: Who were some of the other non-rated people?

H: Asensio, he came up. Further down the stream, there weren't very many Army transferees into the Air Staff. Bozo was one of the few that got in real early and I think Bozo was with an anti-aircraft outfit down in Puerto Rico, or something, and decided they didn't need him, and they all wanted to come into the Air Force, and Arnold said: "I'd love to have them." A little handful of them got in.

Q: You know, a valedictory memorandum to Spaatz--this was January 1946--the war was over, and Spaatz was about to take over.

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Arnold gave him certain points that he had in mind for a future air force. One of those points was the need for recognizing non-rated officers and giving them an opportunity to advance. But apparently this was not followed by the Air Force.

H: No, there was talk about it, but Gen Arnold was real interested in whether we were going to have an Air Force Academy or not. We ran several studies on that. Marshall was interested in this thing. One of the businesses was no military academies at all, but civilian universities to about the end of the junior year. Then take the men to a two-year, sort of a post-graduate, Armed Forces college. This was one idea.

Q: Did you do a study on that concept?

H: Yes, we did about three. For instance, just to give him some alternatives to mull around in his own mind.

Q: Looking over this letter, you mentioned moving the people to the 9th AF. This was, I think, you covered this, putting them on tankers and sneaking them over there, because the Army had not made provision for logistic movement of Air Force people.

H: We got most of the pilots over. Security officers on the Queen Elizabeth and the Queen Mary. Now we did this by scaring Gen Grominger, who was commander of the fort in NY, reminding him he was violating all security regulations by leaving those safes unguarded, and he was very much distressed about it. He didn't have the personnel to do it. He had about 100 safes on each vessel, and I put three shifts of security officers on it, one guy for each safe. We got them over in very short order then.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

H: Mild sense of humor. You didn't always see it, but out at March Field, he had a wonderful sense of humor.

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Q: This was when you really got to know him personally? During the war he was too busy?

H: Too busy. I don't really know whether he had all that many close friends. I've often wondered.

Q: You know, Ray Dunn was fairly close to him.

H: Ray Dunn went everywhere with the Old Man.

Q: But he lost out with the Old Man later on, was that because of the parachute business?

H: I think Ray wasn't well, he just couldn't keep up the pressure. He was just barely hobbling around. Out at March Field, Ray Dunn was his alter ego. They went everywhere together, and Ray Dunn was kind of like Lovett. Quiet, soft spoken. He'd take the barbs out of some of the mistakes, and Hap Arnold would listen to him.

Q: Minton Kaye was close to him, too,

H: Yes.

Q: Why was he so fond of Kaye?

H: I don't know.

Q: You couldn't see it?

H: No.

Q: A lot of people couldn't see it. You know, I talked to George Goddard. There was this thing between Kaye and Goddard. Did you know about this?

H: No.

Q: Kaye had access to the throne room. Then finally he lost out with Arnold, late in the war. I guess you know about that. Who else was close to Arnold for any period of time? Norstad was during the war.

H: Well, he had a series of people he kept putting under this little outer office of his, pretty close to him. Gene Beebe was always close to him. Jake Smart was pretty close.

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Q: How about Cabell?

H: Cabell was close; Norstad; O'Donnell; Kuter.

Q: Did this so-called Advisory Council that he had--he always had two men sort of trouble-shooting for him--did they get in your hair?

H: Once in a while. Well, we thoroughly agreed with the purpose of the thing. But there were times when we were busy as hell, working 20 hours a day,and they would come in with sold wild-eyed scheme, and wanted you to drop everything, and get some facts together for them. There were times when we had harsh words. But generally speaking, the purpose was understood, and we did whatever we could to be helpful.

Q: Well, one of the problems that they were wrestling with, early in the war, Arnold had the idea that maybe if we should have enlisted pilots. Finally, I think Arnold had always been sold on this concept, I think. Cabell told me that they wrote him up a piece of paper, recommending against it. Do you remember this, getting very high up and then getting chopped off?

H: I remember every so often, Arnold would harp back at it, and then the argument later in the war, was "why." We were doing all right with commissioned officers. Why get a double standard? I have a sergeant in one B-17 cockpit and a major in another one. Why should a sergeant be exposed? It just didn't make any sense.

Q: The rationale at the beginning of the war was, we needed pilots. We needed more pilots If you lowered your standards, and took enlisted men, why, you would get the pilots. You see, actually, you didn't need a guy with a fancy college education to fly a plane?

H: We tried to get around that. I think Gen Arnold gave up later on it. He saw that it didn't make sense. The British used to needle him, because they had enlisted pilots. And I think every

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was pick people. He had fantastic loyalty from the people he had known back at Ft. Riley and at March Field. They all went way up during the war, and sometimes they weren't qualified.

Q: Is there some basis for a charge that has been made, that those who came up the March Field route with Arnold got better jobs than those who came up the Langley Field route with Andrews? Is there any basis for that?

H: I think there could be. I think that as the war wore on, our experience deficit was so severe that anybody that had any experience got himself in a pretty good job.

Q: Arnold himself never had combat, and he was very sensitive about this. The fact that he himself never got into combat situations. So that when some of his staff people said that they wanted to be rotated out into the field, he was sort of on the defensive about that.

H: That's right. I was worried about it. I wanted to stay in the AF, and I thought I ought to get to combat. One of the things I think he said that he shouldn't have said, was that any West Pointer on his staff, he would guarantee combat, but he didn't say it for the rest of us. And we were regular officers, too.

Q: And that was resented by the others?

H: Oh yes.

Q: When did he say that, in public or private?

H: He said it at some staff meeting,and it got around the Pentagon pretty fast. But he used to pull people. He'd go off on a field trip, and he'd see some guy that looked pretty sharp. Thirty days later, he would be in as Deputy Chief of Staff, in the Air Staff. Some guys weren't qualified.

Q: Some of these people were picked on a very great impulse?

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H: That's right.

Q: He picked Rosie O'Donnell like that. Rosie O'Donnell was out in the Pacific in Burma. Some question of the British doing something came up, and, do you know this story?

H: Vaguely, I've heard it.

Q: And Rosie O'Donnell said the British are not going to attack anything. Arnold said: "How do you know?" And he said: "Well, I just know that they are not going to do what they said they are going to do." And a short time later, Rosie O'Donnell was on his staff. So I guess this must have happened a number of times.

H: Oh, I don't think there is any doubt about it.

Q: Do you have some notes about something that I missed:

H: I'm just looking around here.

Q: On Okinawa--Doolittle was supposed to fly a B-29 back?

H: He was supposed to fly that real big, long distance job that we had all the headlines on.

Q: LeMay and Giles went out.

H: That's right.

Q: And what happened?

H: I don't know all that happened. It happened on the Washington end. I think maybe Gen Arnold had very high hopes that Doolittle would stay with us. I have reason to believe, that he was thinking in terms of Jimmy being Chief of Staff, from the little scuttlebutt I got.

Q: But Jimmy didn't fly back on that mission?

H: I don't think they really scrubbed it. Jimmy kept waiting for his okay to go ahead, and at that time, the other B-29 took off, copped all the headlines. Someone might be able to put that in shape, I don't know.

Q: Put that in perspective.

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Hoyt, Ross G. 7 Apr 71

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METAMORPHOSIS

Hoyt Brig

BY BRIG. GEN. ROSS G. HOYT, USAF (RET.)

For almost two decades prior to World War II, US development of the bomber took precedence over the fighter, with near-disastrous results during the early days of the bomber offensive in Europe. A dyed-in-the-wool pursuit man traces how, though painfully slowly, fighters finally caught up.

"HERE comes the last remaining member of a vanishing race of Americans." That was the greeting I often received from the Douhet-oriented advocates of bombardment aviation when I met them in the corridors of the old Munitions Building back in 1933. There, in addition to my duties in the Operations Section, I was Pursuit Representative in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps.

Although the greeting was given in a joking manner, it reflected an attitude of the strong and voluble proponents of the bomber, including those in upper echelons of the Air Corps. They believed that the bomber could perform high-altitude, precision, daylight missions against strategic objectives deep in enemy territory without pursuit support.

Following that reasoning, it could be assumed that *our* pursuit planes also would be ineffective against enemy bombers invading *our* airspace. Therefore, to the bomber proponents, it seemed logical there was no requirement for pursuit. One airframe adapted to bombardment, reconnaissance, and cargo purposes with one powerplant would simplify development/procurement and reduce costs. That made a very attractive picture in those days of pitifully limited budgets.

Also, the air arm of the 1920s and 1930s was a newcomer on the military scene, and from necessity was controlled by men transferred from other branches, whose careers depended upon conformity with the views of the War Department. There was no role envisioned for the airplane other than as an auxiliary to the old, established branches of the service. No airman had ever served as Chief of Staff of the Army, and no true proponent of pursuit aviation served as chief of the Army air arm during the years between the wars.

The development and procurement of aircraft and the strategy and tactics of employment were dominated by those who were convinced that the bomber could operate without pursuit support. There was even a movement at one time to phase the single-place pursuit out of existence, replace it with a multiplace airplane, and abolish the course in pursuit tactics at the Air Corps Tactical School. Fortunately, the movement died aborning.

1933 Air Defense Exercises

The year 1933 produced contradictory evidence in the controversy surrounding the efficacy of the single-place pursuit airplane.

Early in the 1930s, then-Capt. Claire Chennault, instructor in pursuit tactics at the Air Corps Tactical School, proposed that pursuit, operating in cooperation with a properly disposed ground radio and telephone intelligence net surrounding an installation to be defended, could "scramble" and intercept enemy aircraft entering over the net. In May 1933, two exercises were conducted to test Chennault's proposal: one on the West Coast and the other at Fort Knox-Bowman Field, Ky., known as the Antiaircraft-Air Corps Exercise.

At the completion of the West Coast exercise, the commanding officer of that operation concluded that single-place pursuit was ineffective against high-flying bombers. He recommended to the Chief of the Air Corps the development without delay of a multiplace pursuit airplane. As a result, in 1937 the Bell XFM-1 five-place pursuit plane appeared on the horizon and, like the comet Kohoutek, disappeared with rapidity.

The Fort Knox Antiaircraft-Air Corps Exercise, in which I participated as Group Operations Officer of the First Pursuit Group (the pursuit organization involved in the exercise) and as Group Commander in the air, resulted in opposite conclusions. Much of the success of the pursuits in the Fort Knox operation can be attributed to the employment of two radio-equipped reconnaissance planes, which I, as Operations Officer, ordered to orbit the "enemy" airdromes at high altitude and report their takeoff and subsequent locations to a central intelligence agency. This agency, in turn, relayed the information to the Group Commander and vectored the pursuits to an interception. All "enemy" aircraft enter-

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developments in the Middle East. This shift in Soviet policy has been influenced by the USSR's deteriorating position in the Mideast. By identifying itself with the Palestinians, Russia is in a position, without foreclosing any of its options, to gain from a failure of the Palestinian problem as well as from a solution, the author contends. Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1730 Rhode Island Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036, 1974. 26 pages. $1.50.

Pictorial History of Japanese Military Aviation, by Eiichiro Sekigawa, edited by John W. R. Taylor and David Mondey. From its beginnings to Pearl Harbor, Japanese military aviation is highlighted. The author discusses the development of Japan's aviation industry and the political and economic reasons that led her to war in 1941. Ian Allan, Ltd., London, England, 1974. 224 pages. $9.

Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy, by William F. Scott. An annotated bibliography of Soviet newspapers, journals, and books on military doctrine and strategy between 1960 and 1974. Commentary on the articles indicates how Soviet military doctrine and strategy have evolved over the past fifteen years. Crane, Russak & Co., New York, N. Y., 1975. 72 pages. $2.75.

The US Air Force—Selected US Government Publications. A set of twelve color prints of airplanes, Air Force installations, and views from the air. Size: 17" x 22". US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1975. $4.25.

Why Did You Start Without Me?, by Mary Lee Strickland O'Neal. The daughter of Brig. Gen. Auby Strickland writes tenderly of her father, remembering him as a man who tempered tough discipline with liberal doses of love. His career spanned the growth years of the air age, beginning with the crude planes of the twenties and ending with the jets of the Cold War era. The book is based on Mrs. O'Neal's high school journal, begun during WW II. The Naylor Co., San Antonio, Tex., 1975. 196 pages. $7.95.

Wilbur and Orville Wright, A Chronology, compiled by Arthur G. Renstrom, Library of Congress. A chronology and flight log tracing the careers of the Wright brothers from Wilbur's birth on April 16, 1867, to the centennial of Orville's birth on August 19, 1971. Based on an extensive survey of the Library's Wright Collection and on other documentary sources. US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1975. 234 pages. $2.30.

Among the recently published *Adelphi Papers* are Number 112, "Defense Budgeting: The British and American Cases," by Richard Burt; Number 114, "The Middle East and the International System: I. The Impact of the 1973 War"; and Number 115, "The Middle East and the International System: II. Security and the Energy Crisis." Each of the latter two papers includes articles by several authors. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam St., London WC2N 6AL, England. Each paper approximately 40 pages. Number 112, $1.00 postpaid; Numbers 114 and 115, $1.50 postpaid.

—Reviewed by Robin Whittle

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

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

One of the classic biplane pursuit aircraft of the early 1930s was the Curtiss P-6E Hawk (above), shown here in the colors of the 17th Pursuit Squadron, Selfridge Field, Mich. The author, General Hoyt, is leading the flight in this photo. In addition, he designed the Snow Owl motif on these aircraft. The P-6Es cruised at 175 mph, had a range of 570 miles, and carried a pair of forward-firing .30-caliber machine guns. Boeing's P-12 (at right), one of the Air Corps's last biplane pursuits and the first to be produced in quantity—366 in all—came along a little before the P-6. Like the P-6 and like many of the fighters that would follow, its range was too short for bomber escort duty.

ing the intelligence net were intercepted, and simulated attacks made before they arrived over Fort Knox.

We were not aware at the time, but those reconnaissance airplanes were an excellent simulation of radar, not yet perfected, which six years later enabled the British Fighter Command to inflict devastating losses on the Luftwaffe. That was the first proof in the crucible of war that bombardment could not operate with impunity. It demonstrated that defensive fighters, given sufficient warning to take off and gain altitude, could successfully intercept incoming aircraft before they reached their objective.

Progress in Pursuit Planes

The first notable change in the pursuit airplane came in late 1933, when the P-26 appeared. It was a low-wing, all-metal monoplane with a radial engine. Like its fabric-covered biplane predecessors, it had fixed landing gear and an open cockpit. Its armament consisted of two .30-caliber guns mounted in the nose, synchronized to fire through the propeller disc. This had been standard since World War I and reduced the potential rate of fire by about half. It was a good interim airplane in all phases of peacetime pursuit training. Because of its small-caliber armament, it gained the sobriquet "Pea-shooter." The P-26 participated, briefly and ineffectively, in combat during the opening days of World War II in the Philippines.

After fifteen years of peacetime neglect, the performance of the pur-

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suit airplane (speed, climb, service ceiling, range, and armament) was seriously deficient. The deficiencies were directly attributable to the emphasis on developing the bomber at the expense of pursuit, and indirectly to those who had adopted the Air Corps Tactical School concept: high-altitude, precision bombing of hostile objectives defended by pursuit, without their own pursuit support. This concept persisted throughout the years between the wars and well into World War II.

In contrast to the armament of our P-26, the British and Germans were greatly improving the firepower of their fighters by increasing the number of guns, and mounting them in the wings to approximately double their rate of fire. This tremendous increase in volume and spread of fire partially overcame the lack of efficient sighting equipment. Belatedly, we followed their example. The Germans had also adopted 20-mm cannon mounted in the wings.

The immediate successors to the P-26, in 1935 and 1936, were the Seversky P-35 and Curtiss P-36. They were also low-wing, all-metal monoplanes and the first fighters to be equipped with retractable landing gear and closed cockpits. They were a long stride forward in performance. However, the first P-36s with their two .30-caliber synchronized guns were still "peashooters." In succeeding models, the armament was increased to six .30-caliber guns: two synchronized and two free-firing in each wing. It was still a "peashooter."

The first P-35 had one .30-caliber and one .50-caliber gun mounted in the nose and synchronized. Later, one .30-caliber, free-firing gun was mounted in each wing. These two airplanes were the first Air Corps pursuits to mount free-firing guns in the wings. The P-35 was the first to adopt the .50-caliber gun. It was the forerunner of the P-47 Thunderbolt with its eight free-firing .50-caliber guns mounted in the wings.

The P-26, while earning many firsts, was by no means a world leader in armaments, as its nickname, "Peashooter," implied.

There were aspects of the development of these fighters, which led to the P-38, -39, -40, -47, and -51, that were inexplicable and contradictory. Here was a weapon system considered ineffective; yet, slowly the fighter and its capabilities improved. The reasons for the paradox are obscure.

The improvement in peacetime development and capabilities was brought about mainly by the unofficial recommendations of Fighter Evaluation Boards to the manufacturers. Designers were urged to incorporate higher performance, heavier armament, and greater range into airplanes to be submitted for future evaluation. The manufacturers had the engineering talent and the willingness to comply.

Less Than a "Fortress"

The advent of the B-17 "Flying Fortress" in 1935, and its spectacu-

The P-35, with its retractable landing gear and closed cockpit, was a long step forward for the pursuit pilots, but it still lacked range and armament.

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lar, nonstop flight from the Boeing Co. at Seattle to Dayton, Ohio, were greeted with enthusiasm by the advocates of bomber operations without fighter escort. They believed their concept had been further substantiated.

The appellation "Flying Fortress" proved to be a misnomer insofar as defensive armament was concerned. Five .30-caliber flexible guns (again, "peashooters") were provided: one in the nose and one in each of four blisters on the fuselage aft of the wing. They were proved inadequate against attack by fighters before we entered World War II, especially attacks approaching head-on.

Early in 1940, an exercise was conducted in California involving the 20th Fighter Group and the 7th Bombardment Group to test the relative effectiveness of their respective armaments. Both of these groups were equipped with camera guns.

I was commanding officer of the 20th Fighter Group and led it in the exercise. The group, flying P-36s, was formed in a column of squadrons in loose formation to permit some maneuvering of individual elements and with enough spacing between squadrons to allow preceding squadrons to clear. The squadrons made mass, head-on attacks. The multitude of gun-camera pictures obtained by the fighters demonstrated, theoretically at least, the effectiveness of the fighter attacks. Closing, passing, and departure speed of the fighters was so great it was extremely difficult for the B-17 gunners to bring their flexible guns to bear.

The exercise raised the ire of the bombardment commander, who declared that such tactics were dangerous. (Apparently the German fighter pilots over Regensburg and Schweinfurt in 1943 had not been warned of that danger.) However, in later models of the B-17, defensive armament was increased to thirteen .50-caliber flexible guns including two in a "chin" turret to improve forward firepower. Fighter escort was still mandatory on the long-range strategic bombing missions of WW II to prevent intolerable losses to enemy fighters.

The Evidence Piles Up

As our entry into the war drew nearer and more inevitable, the Commanding General of the Air Corps directed his War Plans Division to prepare plans for an air offensive against priority objectives vital to the war effort of the German Reich, and to gain air superiority. It is significant that the members of the Air War Plans Division were mostly, if not all, strong advocates of the concept of high-altitude, deep penetration, daylight, precision bombing without fighter support. The Air War Plans Division selected bombing objectives vital to the enemy. Whether or not fighter escort was required was considered a tactical decision to be made by the commander in the field. In any event, their plans were strategic, and, at the time they were formulated in 1939, there were no fighters capable of furnishing escort on long-range strategic missions. The gravity of that oversight was soon to become apparent.

In 1940, the author led the 20th Fighter Group's P-36s, similar to this one, demonstrating with camera guns the deficiency of bomber defensive armament.

Striking evidence refuting the Air Corps Tactical School concept had been presented prior to our entry into WW II by the overwhelming losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe by Royal Air Force fighters during the Battle of Britain. That action was scrutinized by US Air Corps observers.

Another demonstration of the effectiveness of fighters against invading bombers occurred over the airport at Rangoon, Burma, less than three weeks after Pearl Harbor.

On Christmas Day, 1941, I was en route by air from Chungking (where I had been Air Force Representative on the Military Mission to Nationalist China) to Australia, where I was to become Director of Allied Air Operations under Gen. George Brett during the early days of the war, when we were "firing and falling back" from the Philippines. (We were doing a lot of falling back, but there was very little to fire with.) We had just landed at Rangoon when the sirens sounded, and we headed for the trenches! Fifty-two Mitsubishi bombers came over to pattern-bomb the airport. They were in tight defensive formation, strictly in accord with teaching of our Air Corps Tactical School.

Twenty-six P-40s of Chennault's American Volunteer Group (AVG) stationed at Toungoo, Burma, intercepted the bombers. From the bottom of a slit trench on the airport, I saw several bombers shot down. Reports stated twenty-six Mitsubishis were destroyed or forced down. No better proof of the effectiveness of the fighter could be offered. A ground intelligence net similar to the one employed at Fort Knox gave the AVG fighters sufficient warning of the Japanese bombers' approach to take off and meet them at altitude.

Vindication and Victory

The USAF entered the air war in the European Theater with the B-17E operating from a base in

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Brig. Gen. Ross G. Hoyt, USAF (Ret.), was involved in the development of fighter aircraft and the command of fighter units through most of his Air Force career, which extended from 1918 to the closing days of World War II. He participated in or led many pioneering flights of the 1920s and '30s, and was one of the refueling pilots who made possible the Question Mark *endurance record set in 1929. General Hoyt described that experience in our January 1974 issue. He and Mrs. Hoyt now live in Washington, D. C.*

England. On August 17, 1942, twelve B-17Es made a daylight raid against Rouen, France, less than forty miles inside the French coast. Whether or not fighter escort was provided had little bearing on the success of that mission or the ability of bombers to operate unescorted. The bombers were in enemy airspace for only a brief period. The mission was hailed by USAAF authorities in Britain as "the beginning of the end." It was the beginning, but a lot of air was to go down the slipstream before the end came.

The British Spitfire, German Messerschmitt, and our own fighters were designed for and cast in defensive roles. Their range, therefore, was inadequate for fighter escort on long-range bombardment missions. The error in not developing the performance of the fighter in pace with that of the bomber and the error of the concept that bombers could perform missions deep in enemy territory without fighter support soon became painfully if not tragically obvious.

The Luftwaffe's error was somewhat offset by geography. Me-109s could be moved to advanced airfields near the continental coast, and furnish, for brief periods, fighter support for the German bombers over Britain. The targets of the British bombers, however, were located deep in German territory, beyond the range of British fighters. The British learned early on that daylight bombardment of targets deep in German territory, without fighter support, resulted in intolerable losses. Therefore, they adopted the policy of area bombing at night.

The British had urged from the beginning that our Bomber Command join theirs in night area bombing. This was contrary to the concept of our strategists, who maintained our Bomber Command mission was the oft-repeated one of daylight, precision bombing for which it had been equipped and trained. This was only partly true. We were trained, but only partially equipped. It became immediately evident once the bomber offensive began that long-range fighters were urgently needed for escort. They were not available.

The unescorted raids on Regensburg and Schweinfurt in August and October 1943 alone suffered losses of more than a hundred bombers and their crews. Such losses could not be tolerated. Not all the losses were due to enemy fighters, but there were enough to prove the infeasibility of long-range, deep penetration, unescorted bombing missions. Such missions were canceled until fighter escort became available.

Crash programs were launched to increase the range and production of the P-38, P-47, and P-51 Mustang. The origin, design, and development of the P-51 is of special interest.

The P-51 Mustang

In 1940, the British contracted with North American Aviation for a fighter that would fulfill their escort requirements. A single-seat fighter, later to be known as the P-51 Mustang, was designed, and the first prototype was built in the phenomenal time of 120 days, starting from scratch.

This was extremely fortunate for us and was seized upon by the USAAF. By the end of the war, the P-51 equipped all but one of the 8th Fighter Command groups. The performance of the P-51—speed, range, firepower, and versatility—was equal to and in many ways superior to other fighters powered by reciprocating engines. Development of the jet-powered fighter is another phenomenal story.

During my tenure as Commanding General of the 8th Fighter Command's Air Defense Wing, the deficiency in range of our fighters, not only for bomber escort, but also for fighter sweeps to help gain air superiority, was forcefully demonstrated. Our P-47s were limited to mostly uneventful shallow sweeps.



The P-38 saw extensive service in both the European and Pacific theaters. Heavily armed, it could provide deep penetration escort when equipped with external tanks.

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P-51s became the workhorse of the US fighter force, equipping all but one of the 8th Fighter Command groups by the war's end. Its speed, range, firepower, and versatility were equal to and in many ways superior to other fighters before it.

When we obtained auxiliary, belly fuel tanks and could penetrate deeper into enemy territory, business picked up, as did our aerial victories.

On August 3, 1943, the wing, consisting of the 4th, 56th, and 78th Groups, made its first deep penetration sweep. Enemy fighter reaction was violent. The exact figures are not available, but the number of German fighters destroyed increased tremendously. My personal files contain congratulatory messages, which were passed on to the individual groups where the credit for success of the mission belonged. Later, the entire wing was moved temporarily to airfields in the Land's End area, and furnished fighter escort for a bomber raid on the submarine pens at St. Nazaire. These fighter missions would not have been possible without the increased range.

Late 1943 and 1944 saw enough long-range fighters available to support the deep penetration bombing of objectives vital to the German war effort. The destruction of those objectives and the destruction by our fighters of Luftwaffe fighters rising to their defense, together with devastating victories on the long-range sweeps of our Fighter Commands, rendered German industry and airpower impotent.

So the metamorphosis of the fighter airplane from an ineffective "peashooter" to an overpowering offensive weapon and the metamorphosis of the general concept of the role, capabilities, and employment of the fighter were finally complete. But the transformation resembled more that of the seventeen-year locust than the butterfly. ■

The author with a P-1C known as the Curtiss Hawk Hoyt Special. Equipped with extra tanks and christened "Newlaska" by Mrs. F. Trubee Davison, wife of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, this fighter, with then-Captain Hoyt at the controls, took off from Mitchell Field, N. Y., July 18, 1929, on a flight to Nome, Alaska, and return. Flying day and night, as much as 1,000 miles between refueling stops, Hoyt was forced down on July 21 by fuel trouble at Valemount, B. C., the midpoint of the return trip. This flight demonstrated the potential of the fighter for long-range bomber escort, a potential not yet realized at the start of World War II.

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By Don Steele
AFA AFFAIRS EDITOR

THE GENERAL THOMAS P. GERRITY CHAPTER, OKLAHOMA . . . cited for consistent and effective support of the Air Force and AFA's mission, most recently exemplified in its cosponsorship of the Bicentennial Dining-Out at Tinker Air Force Base.

AFA's **General Thomas P. Gerrity Chapter** of Oklahoma City, Okla., together with the **Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce** and the **Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center,** cosponsored a Bicentennial Dining-Out in the Tinker AFB Officers' Club. The guest of honor was **the Hon. Tom Steed,** US Representative from Oklahoma's 4th District. The guest speaker was the **Hon. David P. Taylor,** Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). **Maj. Gen. James G. Randolph,** Commander, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, introduced the speaker; and **Edward H. Cook,** President of the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce, was the President of the Mess. Distinguished guests included **Sens. Henry Bellmon** (R-Okla.) and **Dewey F. Bartlett** (R-Okla.), and **US Rep. John Jarman,** from Oklahoma's 5th District. In recognition of this outstanding program, **AFA President Joe L. Shosid** names the General Thomas P. Gerrity Chapter as AFA's "Unit of the Month" for October.

In the upper photo at the right, **Secretary Taylor,** center, visits with some of the many distinguished guests and program participants. They are, from left, **Stanley L. Campbell,** Vice President for AFA's Southwest Region; **Congressman Steed;** Chapter President **Ivan Nelson; Secretary Taylor; General Randolph; Brig. Gen. Jack Kraras,** President of the Arkansas State AFA; and Oklahoma State AFA President **David Blankenship.**

In the middle photo, **Mr. Cook,** left, presents **Congressman Steed,** center, the original "sea letter" of the ship *General Hamilton,* which was signed by President Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison in 1805. Mrs. Steed and Senator Bellmon are on the right.

AFA's eleventh annual **State President's Orientation Meeting** was held at the Marriott Twin Bridges Motor Hotel in Arlington, Va., July 25–26. Twenty-five states with chartered State Organizations were represented at the two-day meeting. AFA Executive Director **James H. Straubel** chaired the sessions at which the State Presidents were briefed by AFA department heads on the responsibilities and operation of their respective departments within AFA headquarters. Speakers included **Maj. Gen. Guy E. Hairston, Jr.,** Director, Air Force Office of Information; **Col. Harry J. Dalton, Jr.,** Deputy Director, Air Force Office of Information; and **AFA President Joe L. Shosid.** The photo at the bottom of this page shows the group as it was being briefed on the Aerospace Education Foundation by Mr. Straubel.

Lt. Gen. William F. Pitts, Commander, Fifteenth Air Force (SAC), March AFB,

General Thomas P. Gerrity Chapter's Dining-Out.

Presentation at Gerrity Chapter's Dining-Out.

State Presidents' Orientation Meeting.

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20314 file

Brig General Ross G. Hoyt, USAF (Ret)
4100 W. Street, N.W., Apt 313
Washington, D.C. 20007

23 March 1971

Dear General Hoyt:

It was good of you to phone me relative to our pending meeting to reminisce about General Hap Arnold. I will look forward to this session with great interest. Incidentally, I had a very good talk with Charles A. Lindbergh at the Army-Navy Club the other day. He was devoted to General Arnold, as you probably know.

My reference to your service as a photographer comes from the official report of the Alaskan Flight. I've taken the liberty to reproduce the offending page. If that is wrong, maybe other statements are wrong and you can help straighten me out.

I hope Mrs. Hoyt fared well at the hospital.

Sincerely,

Encl

Murray Green

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4-7-71
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AF/CHO/Dr. Green/37428/ecp/10 Feb 71

10 February 1971

Brig General Ross G. Hoyt, USAF (Ret)
4100 W Street N. W., Apt 313
Washington, D. C. 20007

Dear General Hoyt

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and came across your name in connection with the Alaskan Flight of 1934, and then suddenly realized that you reside in the Washington, D. C. area.

I have been researching this book for about three years and have interviewed most of the Air Force greats who are still around, including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Kuter, LeMay, Norstad and well over 100 others. I should also mention that I am a professional historian, previously associated with the Office of the Secretary, but now assigned to the Office of the Historian in order to complete the research.

According to my notes, you and Captain Ed Bobzien flew up to Fairbanks in O-38s and served as photographers. I have been talking to General George Goddard who was on the Alaskan mission. As you may know, he recently re-retired and moved down to Boca Raton, Florida.

In any event, I hope to phone you in about two weeks to arrange an interview at your convenience, lasting an hour perhaps. I'm especially interested in your recollections of General Arnold, in Alaska, or in any other contacts you may have had with him.

This book has official support for the research, but is not an official book. It will be published by Random House. I'm interested in any stories about General Hap, good or bad, as this will be a "warts and all" biography.

You may wish to contact me via the attached. Or if you prefer, you can reach me at OX 3-7388 or OX 3-7428.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to Chief Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

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Interview BG Ross G. Hoyt, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1971

Q: Do you recall when you first met General Arnold?

H: Yes, I first met Gen Arnold in 1925. He was, I believe, Chief of the Public Relations Section in the then Chief of Air Corps office.

Q: Air Service, it was then?

H: Yes, it was Service. They finally changed in '26, I believe. And at that time, in addition to his other activities, he was involved in something which I'm sure you are aware.

Q: The Billy Mitchell?

H: Yes, the Billy Mitchell trial. I never was directly associated with him. Of course, we knew each other.

Q: What was your job in 1925?

H: In 1925 I was assigned to the War Plans Division, and working up plans for different flights, and for a mobilization plan. That was my first tour, I served there my whole tour.

Q: Do you have any recollection as to why he got in trouble along with Mitchell?

H: Well, because of his activities, sub rosa and otherwise, for a separate air force.

Q: What sort of sub rosa activities? Do you remember any of them?

H: There were releases, press releases. Of course, his testimony at the trial wasn't sub rosa. That was publicly known.

Q: Was he putting out releases to Congressmen, or writing letters to Congressmen at this time?

H: I'm not sure. I wasn't in the Public Relations Section. But I believe

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it was. Anyway, he was ostracized to Ft. Riley, Kansas.

Q: I think he and Herbert Dargue were involved in a little activity?

H: Yes, yes. I think Dargue came out better than Arnold.

Q: Why?

H: I don't know, maybe he was not quite so impetuous in his statement.

Q: Arnold is supposed to have made some statement about, in a Congressional hearing, when the planes flew over the Capitol. He is supposed to have said, "There goes our air force." I think there were about 30-35 planes. Do you remember anything like that?

H: No, I don't recall that particular incident. That was in...?

Q: 1925.

H: Well, we didn't have very many airplanes.

Q: No, we didn't. But in any event, he got on Mason Patrick's list, and Patrick shipped him out. Did you have any direct dealings with Arnold that you recall in 1925?

H: No, I didn't have any.

Q: You just met him in the office?

H: I met him in the office and all that.

Q: When was the next time you saw him, or had contact?

H: The next time I saw him, he was out at Ft. Riley. I worked up the plans for the Pan American flight with Major Dargue.

Q: Was that 1927?

H: 1926. Then when Dargue got back from South America - there was a period there when he traveled around the country - 38 states. And I, having worked on the plans, I guess as a reward - he had me assigned as an advance officer, and I flew ahead of him, and with him, through the 38 states.

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Q: What contact did Arnold have? Or you just flew into Riely in the course of this trip?

H: In the course of that, we visited Ft. Riley.

Q: Were you aware that Arnold was toying with the idea of leaving the Air Service or the Air Corps, in 1926, and going into commercial aviation?

H: No, I wasn't aware of that.

Q: Did he talk to you about that?

H: No, he didn't talk to me about it. This is news to me.

Q: He decided then against leaving, and he stayed on, but he felt that he was exiled to Ft. Riley.

H: Yes, he was exiled. I mean, that was common knowledge. None of us thought that he should be, but that was a fact.

Q: Did you admire him for the stand that he took in the Billy Mitchell case?

H: I certainly do.

Q: This sort of made him conspicuous among the Air Corps people who were pushing for a separate Air Force?

H: Yes, and then, of course, later, it probably was responsible for a great deal of his promotion. As soon as those who were also in favor of a separate department or separate service, why he, of course, was highly regarded.

Q: Did you see him in the early '30s when he went to March Field?

H: I believe they had maneuvers in the early '30s. I was at Selfridge Field and had a fighter squadron up there. They had the maneuvers. I believe Gen Foulois was Chief then. Yes, only casually, because Arnold commanded one of the organizations.

Q: Did you serve under Andrews when you were at Selfridge?

H: No, I served under Brett. Brower was Group Commander, Brett was Post Commander.

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Q: Then the next contact you had with Arnold was the Alaskan flight?

H: No, I came back on a second tour from 1933-37, and he was, I can't recollect quite what happened.

Q: Came back to where?

H: Came back to Washington, he was in Washington. I was ordered from Selfridge Field down there as Chief of the Operations Section in the Chief's office, and he was here.

Q: How did you get selected for the Alsakan flight?

H: Well, I think it was because I had made this solo flight in a fighter plane from NY to Nome, making....

Q: In 1929?

H: Yes, that's right.

Q: So you had familiarity with it?

H: Well, yes. I didn't fly the route that they flew, but I was familiar with the territory.

Q: You were an advance man?

H: Yes. Of course, you mentioned my position as a photographer. When we were there, we arrived at Fairbanks ahead of the fighter bombers, Bobzien and I. When the flight arrived, we supposedly had finished our duties, and we were picked up as members of that flight, assigned to a flight, we were designated as photographers, but we never did any work as photographers. They just picked us up for duty on the flight.

Q: They had a lot of trouble getting the supplies up. George Goddard and Carlyle Ridenour were involved in that supply bit. There was a little old ship?

H: Yes, they finally, Ridenour and Goddard, of course, Goddard was a famous photographer, and he arrived. I suppose you know that they photographed, took

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aerial photographs of a strip from Fairbanks to Anchorage.

Q: Yes, right. They started out the day you and Bobzien went into the drink in that plane.

H: You mean to photograph this?

Q: No, you went into the Cook's Inlet.

H: I don't know exactly when they started their photographic work.

Q: Tell me about this lay. According to Knerr, I talked to Gen Knerr...

H: He's a fine man....

Q: Yes, he is. He said that Ralph Royce had talked Arnold into allowing Bobzien to fly one of the B-10s.

H: That's possible. Unfortunately, he must have talked to me being in the plane with him. I believe that Bobzien took off on an empty tank, only partially filled tank. I'm not sure about that.

Q: One of the problems....

H: He wasn't familiar enough with the plane.

Q: There was a complicated valve transfer system for the fuel?

H: That's right.

Q: And maybe you didn't turn the right valve on?

H: I think so. I think that's what happened.

Q: But he was able to land the plane in the inlet?

H: That was, to go straight was the only thing to do because we didn't have very much altitude.

Q: Did he land wheels up?

H: I think he did, yes. I don't recall now. But I don't think he had time, and that would have been the proper thing to do, rather than put the wheels down. Of course, it didn't sink immediately.

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Q: Did you land in the water?

H: In the water, and I can show you. We landed in the water, and someone saw it, and came out with a rowboat, and I got out of the end of the rowboat and took a line fastened the line to the tail skid of the bomber, took it in and tied to a stump or a tree, so that when the tide went out, the airplane wouldn't go with it. There was a 29 foot tide. I imagine you have heard most of this before. Then when the tide went out and the airplane was lying on the beach. They fastened a number of empty oildrums to the wings and towed it over to the dock, and there were some heavy hoisting equipment there that they could hoist it out.

Q: Who managed this towing? Was Knerr in charge of it?

H: I'm not sure. It may have been Ridenour, if Ridenour had arrived up there at that time.

Q: In any event, they got that plane back in commission?

H: Yes, and it was flown back.

Q: Was Arnold upset about that?

H: I don't know. I have no personal knowledge of his having been upset. I imagine he was - something which, I think, could have been avoided.

Q: Yes, they wanted to bring all the planes back.

H: Yes.

Q: Do you have any knowledge as to why the Alaskan flight was ordered?

H: No, I don't know. It may have been to demonstrate the ability to move an organization.

Q: Was there any thought to erase the black mark of the air mail which preceded the Alaskan flight?

H: Well, if there was, I had no knowledge of it.

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Q: There is some talk that questions arose that "if they can't fly the mail, how can they fight a war?" To prove that the Air Corps was capable, the Alaskan flight was supposed to have been ordered on that count. Did you hear anything about that?

H: That may have been common knowledge in the higher echelons. But at that time, I was a Captain.

Q: In Fairbanks, they had a big celebration at Moose Hall one time. Did Arnold give the boys a lecture on drinking or carousing? Do you remember him giving the boys a lecture one time?

H: No, I don't recall.

Q: Do you have any recollection of him at Fairbanks?

H: Well, he did what a great many of us did there, go on fishing trips and hunting trips, when we were off duty.

Q: He went on a fighing trip with Corey Ford and Alastair MacBain. Remember those two fellows? They were writers.

H: Yes.

Q: Did he meet them there?

H: I think so, I don't know, he may have known them before that.

Q: They became very close to him and they followed his career for years afterwards and wrote about him. They went fishing for grayling.

H: Yes, I have a picture in here which might amuse you, a fishing trip.

Q: Were you on it with him?

H: No, I didn't go on the fishing trip.

Q: Did you ever go fishing with Arnold?

H: No.

Q: He was a great fisherman, or he liked fishing. It was relaxing sport.

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H: I like fishing, but I never had the urge to get the proper equipment.

Q: He was an inveterate fisherman. During the war when he went to a conference, he would try to take some time off and go fishing, and dragooned George Marshall into a couple trips during the war. You probably read about it?

H: Well, I met Marshall down at Barksdale Field, the 20th Fighter Group down there.

Q: The Alaskan flight was a very great success. Did you fly back to Washington with the flight?

H: No, they came back by way of Seattle, and I came back the same route that I went up.

Q: Did you fly back?

H: Oh yes, we went up, Bobzien and I went up in two O-38s because we had to get in. We couldn't make the range.

Q: You flew back in the O-38s?

H: Yes.

Q: You flew back to where?

H: To Washington, D.C., Bolling Field.

Q: You came back later?

H: No, I believe we actually got here ahead of the flight. We were ordered to stay at Fairbanks until the flight reached Seattle, which we did. I imagine because of entertainment, so on, of the bomber flight, they were delayed. They didn't get back until later.

Q: They came back on Aug 20th, they had a big celebration in Washington. Were you in on any of that?

H: Not that I recall, no.

Q: There was a stag party at the Carlton Hotel for the officers. Do you remember that?

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H: No, these auxiliary, so to speak, officers, were very suddenly lost sight of, and rightfully so.

Q: There was some talk of resentment, that nobody received an award for the Alaskan flight. Arnold, several years later, got a DFC, but nobody got an award for that flight. Some people feel they should have received a DFC for that. Did you ever hear anything on that score?

H: I don't think so, no.

Q: Did you ever hear of any resentment against Arnold for not pushing harder for an award?

H: No, I didn't expect any. To me it was just another extended cross country flight.

Q: Except that the flight was very successful. Should there have been some kind of recognition of the flight?

H: Well, I think there should have. Perhaps there were letters of commendation, I don't know.

Q: There were some.

H: I didn't get any as an advance officer, I didn't expect it. They may have gotten letters, because Arnold was in a position, he could have given them letters of commendation.

Q: You didn't get a letter of commendation?

H: Not for that mission.

Q: Where was your next contact with Arnold?

H: After the Alaskan flight? I think it was when he came to the UK, England. I had a fighter wing over there.

Q: This is during the war?

H: Yes, I think that's the next time I saw him. There wasn't anything,

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except just a greeting.I mean there was no particular occasion.

Q: Was this in 1943?

H: Yes.

Q: Was this around Labor Day?

H: I wouldn't remember.

Q: Was this around the time of the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid, the first raid?

H: No, I think it was a little before that.

Q: There were two raids, one was in August and the other one was in October. He made a trip in September.

H: I think it was about the time of the first one.

Q: This was 10 days after the first one. Was he unhappy about the losses suffered?

H: He didn't express - I had a fighter. He didn't express anything to the fighter wing, but he may have to the Bomber Command.

Q: Well, Monk Hunter was taken out of there, about that time, was he not, as the 8th Fighter Commander?

H: He had the 8th Fighter Command, and I was under him. He was my direct commander.

Q: He was taken out of there, and Kepner put in.

H: Yes, Kepner arrived shortly before Hunter left.

Q: Was there any expression of unhappiness about the support the fighters were giving the bombers at that time?

H: No, of course....

Q: You didn't have the P-51s at that time?

H: The Mustang?

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Q: You had the P-47s.

H: Yes, we had P-47s and when I arrived in England, they had not yet put the belly tanks on them, or at least they hadn't increased the size of the belly tanks.

Q: They didn't have much range?

H: They could just barely escort the bombers inside the coast line, or a short distance inland on the continent. They had to turn around and come back.

Q: Arnold was pushing to get some tanks, belly tanks on the P-47s and the P-38s. Did they try to get them from the British?

H: Not to my knowledge. I think they were manufactured in this country.

Q: There were some cardboard tanks that they were putting on some of the planes. Do you remember cardboard wing tanks, I guess they were, perhaps not on P-47s.

H: Not on the P-47s, I don't think...

Q: This was sort of a makeshift arrangement, the cardboard tanks.

H: I don't think they became standard at all.

Q: They tried for a while to use the armored B-17, the XB-40, remember that, that went in there for a little bit?

H: No, the big thing on the bombers was the lack of armament.

Q: Yes, but they used these armored escorts. They called him B-40s. Do you remember that?

H: No, I don't remember that.

Q: It didn't work out, they were too slow. What do you remember of Arnold's visit to the UK? Did he make a speech before your boys?

H: Yes, he made talks before every group.

Q: What did he say?

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H: I don't remember, the usual pep talk. I don't remember anything specific. There wasn't any criticism of them.

Q: A couple of months later....

H: I came back to the States, incidentally, with Gen Arnold.

Q: Did you complete your tour then?

H: I got sick. I had been in the SW Pacific, and had gone through that mess over there, and came back, but didn't go through because I wasn't finished. I went to Luke Field where I commanded the advanced single engine flying school. Then somebody in England, I guess it was Hunter, asked for me for England, UK.

Q: How long were you there?

H: I was there from March until September.

Q: Yes, that's the visit. You came back with him.

H: Yes, I came back with him and went into the hospital.

Q: Then you weren't there when Eaker was taken out of the UK?

H: No.

Q: Did you ever hear anything about Arnold's decision to take Eaker out and bring Spaatz in to the UK?

H: Spaatz and Eaker were together in England, in the original army before we had anything much over there.

Q: Right, but then Spaatz went to North Africa, and Eaker was in England.

H: Eaker was head of the 8th AF for quite some time.

Q: Yes, but then he was shifted to the Mediterranean.

H: Yes, I guess he was down there. The thing that I remember was the bombing over Monte Cassino.

Q: You don't remember anything involving the shift of Eaker to the Mediterranean?

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H: No, I wouldn't. I wasn't in a position to know.

Q: What other contact did you have with Arnold in the war, did you have any other?

H: No, because I came back, was in the hospital for almost a year and then was retired. So, Arnold also retired....

Q: Retired shortly after the war.

Q: Let me ask you about the air mail. You say you were in Foulois' office during the air mail situation?

H: Yes, that's right.

Q: Spaatz was there?

H: Spaatz was Chief of the Operations Section and I was under him.

Q: Chaney was in there?

H: Yes.

Q: Do you remember the meeting Spaatz had with Harlee Branch? He was the Asst PMG. This is when Foulois is supposed to have said: "Give us a week or 10 days and we will fly the mail." Do you remember anything about that? What is your recollection of that situation?

H: Well, I wasn't in on the command decisions.

Q: Yes, right, but you heard a lot about it?

H: Oh yes, and I personally didn't think we should have ever been given the job.

Q: Was Foulois ordered to do the job, or did he volunteer for this job? I'v heard two accounts.

H: I personally don't know. From what you say, he is supposed to have offered to fly.

Q: I've heard two different versions of what happend, and I wondered if

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you had any light to shed on it.

H: No. Spaatz was Chief of Operations.

Q: How did Spaatz feel? Was he opposed to taking on the job?

H: I don't know, but I feel that he would rather not have taken it on. Very bad time of year, lots of fog and rain, and all that. We had not at that time concentrated on blind flying.

Q: Right, we didn't have the equipment or the airplanes, or the training to do it. There have been several books written recently in which it is indicated that Foulois was ordered to fly the mail, and he simply was a good soldier, and said: "Yes sir." Does that square with your recollection?

H: I have no knowledge of that.

Q: What was your job in the Chief's office at the time?

H: At that time, Spaatz was actually Training and Operations Division and I was Chief of Operations.

Q: You were directly under Spaatz?

H: Yes.

Q: I talked to Spaatz and he said that he counseled Foulois against taking that mission.

H: I can understand that, but I was not in on those meetings. But I can understand how Tooey would have counseled him.

Q: How about Walter Weaver? He was in the office there too, wasn't he?

H: He was Chief of the Public Relations.

Q: Do you know his feeling about the airmail job?

H: No, I don't, but he was close to Spaatz.

Q: Do you remember when Foulois got called into the President's office and the President is supposed to have read the riot act to him?

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H: That comes back vaguely to mind, but I have no personal knowledge of it.

Q: How about Foulois and MacArthur? MacArthur was Chief of Staff?

H: Of course, at that time, it was all a great deal of sub rosa friction, so to speak, between the Air Corps and the Chief of Staff, Army.

Q: Arnold wrote a letter home about: "I hope for promotion." He hoped to get his star, this is in 1934, during the air mail thing. He indicated that Foulois promised him a star, but Conger Pratt got the star, and Chaney got the star. Do you remember that?

H: I know they got them, but I didn't know that there was any promise between Foulois made to Arnold.

Q: What was Arnold's relations with Foulois? Do you remember? Were they good?

H: Well, I don't think they were particularly good. In fact, a great many people have changed their opinions of Foulois in the latter days of his life. I don't know whether you know that or not.

Q: Yes, I do. I have the feeling that Foulois' great contribution was that he outlived all his contemporaries.

H: You could say that.

Q: At the time he was not highly regarded. Is that correct?

H: That's right. I think that is a fair statement.

Q: Because when he retired as Chief of the Air Corps, he never got another job. Never got another job. During WWII he never had a job. Why?

H: Well, I don't know, perhaps it was a hangover from prejudices, right or wrong.

Q: Right or wrong, but they had that feeling. I think the President felt

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Foulois had misinformed him. Whether that's right or wrong, we don't know.

H: You mean about the air mail?

Q: About the air mail, and the President was very embarrassed about all the crashes, and he blamed it on Foulois, right or wrong.

H: Well, I think perhaps he was right.

Q: You think the President was right?

H: I think that Foulois would have been wise to have said: "We are not equipped, prepared." I don't know whose idea it was in the first place.

Q: I have been told that because flying pay and flying training pay or funds were so scarce, when the Post Office came up with nearly a million dollars in flying training pay to fly the air mail, Foulois figured here's a chance to get flying time for his boys. Is there anything to that?

H: Not to my knowledge. Those things may have gone on up in the upper echelons.

Q: But you were in Operations during that period. Did you have anything to do with organizing the Air Mail routes?

H: Yes. They had to conform to try to do the job that the Air Mail was doing.

Q: Was it considered that Arnold did a good job in the Western Zone, or not?

H: Yes, I think so. You have a lot better flying conditions, especially in February, and so on, out in the western part of the country than you do here in the East. Unfortunately, it just settled down for the first few weeks there was just nothing but fog and rain.

Q: Well, flying over the Rockies was not easy, was it?

H: Well, they had the airplanes that could make the altitude. The weather generally out there is better than it is in the East.

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Q: Well, in the SW it is better, but not in the NW?

H: Not in the NW, no.

Q: How about Hickam?

H: He's an old friend of mine.

Q: He did a good job in the Central Zone, didn't he?

H: Yes.

Q: How about B.Q. Jones? What kind of job did he do?

H: I don't remember what his job was.

Q: He had the Eastern Zone.

H: He did as good a job I think as anybody could.

Q: There were three zones. Arnold, in a letter home, said that B.Q. Jones made everybody equal, he abolished rank in his area.

H: I don't know that to be a fact, but I can understand it.

Q: This kind of disorganized his zone, at least in Arnold's opinion. Did you hear anything about that?

H: The organization didn't work out very well, I'll say that.

Q: Of course, this was Arnold's opinion. It may not be the fact.

H: Of course, I think there was not enough grounding of airplanes because of weather. That's why we had those crashes. Those boys could fly across country, navigate, so on, visual navigation.

Q: Was it that they did not give the young flyers enough warning not to fly in the case of bad weather, or were they reckless young fellows?

H: I don't think they were reckless. I think that some of them probably were. But orders should have gone down that they should not fly. They would take off in practically no ceilings.

Q: Do you think Foulois bears responsibility for this as Chief?

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H: It percolates on up.

Q: On up to him. Who else should bear responsibility for the black eye of the air mail, in your opinion?

H: I imagine we were all involved.

Q: Guilty to some degree?

H: Some degree, yes.

Q: How about the CCC, were you involved in that, planning of the CCC?

H: No, the only way I was involved in that at that time, I had been transferred to the Public Relations. I wanted to send out some bulletins, pamphlets and so on, for the instruction of these boys in their spare time, besides just picking up leaves, raking leaves and so on, to get a little military training. But they canceled that, I mean they disapproved of it.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of the job that Arnold did running the CCC out on the West Coast?

H: No.

Q: When you were in Public Relations, were you under Jakie Fickel? Was he your boss?

H: No, he's gone now, but there was another man that proceded him....

Q: They called him H. Square Richards?

H: Yes, H.H. Richards.

Q: What kind of guy was he?

H: He was very friendly with me.

Q: Was he a stuffed shirt?

H: Well, no, I don't think he could be called a stuffed shirt. He was a humanitarian. He really gave a square deal to certain people.

Q: Do you remember a guy named Jan Howard? What do you remember about him?

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H: Well, the only thing that I remember is that he was pretty bombastic and had very few friends.

Q: Do you recall his relationship with Arnold?

H: No.

Q: He was at one time related to Arnold. He was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister.

H: Yes, and they were divorced, I believe.

Q: There was some friction between Arnold and Howard.

H: Because of that, I imagine. I always got along all right with Howard. We lived in the same apartment building out there at the time.

Q: Where?

H: At the Westchester.

Q: Do you remember a man named Sue Clagett?

H: Yes.

Q: What about him?

H: Well, I hesitate to express an opinion about these people.

Q: I know he had a problem.

H: Yes, I guess he had a drinking problem.

Q: I'm interested in his relationship with Arnold, he and Arnold had some friction. Do you know anything about that?

H: Well, I imagine probably because of the drinking problem, I don't know.

Q: He was promoted three different times and broken, Clagett. Do you remember that?

H: Yes, I think I remember something of it. I followed him into China.

Q: With the Magruder Commission?

H: Yes.

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Q: Were you in there when....

H: I was the AF representative on the Magruder mission. That's where I joined Brett. Brett came over with Alexander Wavell, to Chungking. I had been his Operations Officer. It was the last job I held, so he took me out with him. Finally wound up down in Australia.

Q: Then Clagett got in trouble there, didn't he?

H: I don't know whether he got in trouble there. I didn't agree with his opinions. He had stated that, just give the Chinese airplanes and they'd have an air force. Well, I didn't agree with that.

Q: What was your opinion?

H: I was of the opinion, I told Chiang-kai-Shek that I didn't think he would ever have an AF comparable of other nations, and they never have. I don't know what they are doing now. They aren't doing anything, I guess.

Q: What was wrong with what Clagett said, give them airplanes? Do you mean the Chinese were not competent enough to fly them.

H: No, no, he said they were

Q: But I say you thought they weren't?

H: Yes, one thing, they are all individualists, and it takes a man that can follow the leader in the AF, whether it is bombers or fighters or whatnot. The Chinese - in my experience with them - they hesitated to take orders, or to follow their leader.

Q: Did you have any contact out there with a fellow named Merian Cooper?

H: No, I think he was....

Q: He was an Intelligence type.

H: No, I didn't, I know Cooper was out there, but I think he left before I got there.

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Q: Do you have any knowledge of a plan to bomb Japan from the East Coast of China early in the war?

H: No.

Q: What was the purpose of the Magruder Mission?

H: To study the needs of the Chinese. There was a representative of each branch, and they....

Q: And you were the AAF representative?

H: Yes, Air Corps at the time.

Q: What was your rank?

H: Colonel.

Q: This was right before Pearl Harbor?

H: Yes, as a matter of fact....

Q: Straddling Pearl Harbor, before and after?

H: We were in, I was in China, Hqs., in Chungking and had been up the Yangtze River the weekend that it happened. We came back and found out that Pearl Harbor had been hit.

Q: You say "we", who was with you on that?

H: There were several officers on the commission.

Q: Was Clagett in that group?

H: Oh no, he wasn't there.

Q: Was he already gone?

H: He had long since left there.

Q: You don't recall why he left?

H: Left China? I think his mission was over.

Q: He was reduced in rank when he came back. Do you know why?

H: No, I don't know why.

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Q: He blamed Arnold. Do you have any idea why he should have done that?

H: No, I don't know, unless it was still a part of his drinking. I don't know what he did over in China.

Q: He replaced Arnold at March Field, when Arnold came to Washington in 1936. I think you were in Washington at the time.

H: Yes, I was there.I came in '33 and left in '37, four-year tour.

Q: And Arnold got his star. He was BG. He was Asst to Westover, who had just become Chief of Air Corps. Clagett replaced Arnold at March Field, and he lasted a few months, and he was taken out of there. Do you know anything about that?

H: No.

Q: Let me ask you about Brett and MacArthur. You were In Australia with Brett. Friction developed between him and MacArthur. Why?

H: I can't say why. I know that it developed, or it already existed. But it may have been the idea of Brett that he would be in the supreme command.

Q: Did he have aspirations to be the top dog out there?

H: Yes. He left Melbourne and went back up to the Dutch East Indies, figuring that he - with Wavell as a matter of fact - Wavell was out there - that he would get some additional stars.

Q: And he didn't get it?

H: Yes, he did.

Q: Well, he got his third star?

H: Yes.

Q: And then MacArthur had him removed?

H: Yes.

Q: Do you know why?

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H: Because of the friction.

Q: You worked directly for Brett? You were on his staff?

H: Yes.

Q: Did you have your star by that time?

H: No.

Q: When Brett came back, did you come back, too?

H: No, I came back ahead of him. I asked to get out of there, because I wasn't getting anywhere with Brett.

Q: You were having trouble with Brett, too?

H: Well, I wouldn't say having trouble, but I can see where he and I were not doing too well, to hit it off.

Q: And you decided to ask to come back?

H: Yes.

Q: How long had you been out there?

H: We went out to China, and we got down to Australia around Christmas time, New Year's.

Q: It was Christmas '41?

H: Yes, we left Chungking on Christmas Eve 1941.

Q: You saw Arnold when you came back from the SW Pacific. Do you have any recollection of Arnold?

H: He asked me what the difficulty was out there. As a matter of fact, I had talked to Arnold over TransPacific telephone.

Q: Did he ask you about Brett and MacArthur.

H: Yes.

Q: And what did you tell him?

H: He wanted to know my recommendation, and I said: "Well, I recommend

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either one or the other of them be brought back."

Q: Because there was friction?

H: That's right.

Q: We are talking about Brett and MacArthur and your decision that there was no future for you in the Pacific and you came back to Washington and you saw General Arnold. Do you have a recollection of that meeting with General Arnold?

H: Yes, he wanted to know some of the details of the friction between General MacArthur and General Brett. I didn't know any of the details, I just knew that there was friction.

Q: Any specific issues? Was it a case of one man wanting to do it one way, and another wanting to do it the other. Do you know any specific cases of disagreements between them?

H: No, I think it was more personality than it was issues.

Q: MacArthur had several candidates in mind. Of course, Kenney eventually got the job. Do you know how Kenney got that job? Who recommended Kenney?

H: Kenney was very highly regarded throughout the AF. I imagine perhaps Arnold.

Q: Yes, Arnold eventually chose him. Kenney was then 4th AF. He was out on the Pacific coast and they chose him. Did MacArthur want an Air man who would not compete with him?

H: Well, from my experience in past years, back in 1925-26 when the Air Service and Air Corps was a part of the Army, you had a pretty tough row to hoe under MacArthur in the way of appropriations and so on, which really it required in order to get anywhere.

Q: He wasn't very favorable toward airpower when he was Chief of Staff?

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H: No, no.

Q: Did you always have to battle for dollars?

H: Yes, always. I think from an operating standpoint it had to be rammed down his throat. I never held any great brief for General MacArthur. I don't know anything about his strategy and tactics in other branches, but as far as the Air Force was concerned, it didn't agree.

Q: I'm told he fell in love with Kenney. Kenney just sort of hit it up right with MacArthur. MacArthur give him just about everything he wanted. Kenney had the right chemistry for MacArthur.

H: That's right, their personalities meshed. It was just the opposite, of course, with Brett. And it may be that if MacArthur had assumed that attitude with Brett, he would have been just as successful. Because the AF really was successful out there under Kenney in all of those advances of island hopping.

Q: Did Arnold ever say anything about MacArthur to you in your conversation with him?

H: No, nothing.

Q: He just asked you for your opinion?

H: Yes, and he sent me over to General Marshall, and I told General Marshall the same thing. I don't know that it did me any good to express an opinion like that, but that was what I felt.

Q: They were interested in knowing it. Did Arnold accompany you to that meeting?

H: No, no.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Frank Andrews?

H: No, they weren't in Washington, I don't believe, at the same time. I was

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out in the field, and I wasn't here in the Chief's office. I was out in the field. I had no way of knowing. After you reach a certain point, there is a great deal of competition as to who gets what, where the stars shine, and so on. I have some scars on my back.

Q: On the subject of competition, somebody who doesn't like Arnold, said that he sent his competition out of Washington. For example, Brett was a competitor. He got sent out to the Middle East and then to China. Andrews was sent down to the Caribbean at the time. Emmons was sent out to Hawaii. Those were his three major competitors. Is there any merit in that observation?

H: From a personal standpoint, I couldn't say, but it certainly sounds like him.

Q: Was Arnold a politician, military politician? Was he crafty, or was he straight forward?

H: Well, I never knew the workings of his mind.

Q: Well, in your dealings with him, did he seem to come straight out or was he devious?

H: On one or two occasions, he was very straight out as far as I was concerned.

Q: What were the occasions?

H: It's more or less a picayune thing. But we were stationed here in Washington, and you flew from Bolling Field. And they had some airplanes out there that normally were called "Sacred Cows". They weren't flown by anybody but the Chief of Air Corps, etc.

Q: You are talking about during the war?

H: No, before the war, and I asked, I knew, I did a lot of flying. I mean, every time I got a chance I got away from my desk and got out of Washington. So

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this was a nice airplane, and I knew that it stood out there for weeks on end and nobody flew it. So I asked for it, to make a cross country flight. Well, I liked to fly every type of airplane that I could get my hands on.

Q: What kind of plane was that?

H: A Seversky....

Q: P-35.

H: No, they didn't have those at that time. This was a two-seater, advanced trainer, I believe. It had some characteristics that those that didn't fly so much weren't very....

Q: You wanted to fly this plane?

H: I wanted to fly the plane and I put in for it. Arnold called me up and kind of laid me out for just asking for it. Well, that didn't increase his popularity with me.

Q: He was what, a BG at the time?

H: I think so.

Q: He was Asst Chief?

H: Yes.

Q: What was the other occasion?

H: I don't know that there was any other occasion. I never talked to him very much. I used to write speeches for him when I was down in Public Relations. There wasn't anything that I detested more than trying to tell somebody else what to say.

Q: Was he Chief by this time?

H: No, he was still Asst Chief. Well, I don't know, he may have been Chief by this time.

Q: This was like in the late '30s?

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H: Around '36, probably.

Q: He was Asst Chief. You left in '37 you say? Then, he was Asst Chief, and you wrote speeches for him?

H: Yes, and he didn't often like the speeches, I mean, certain parts of them. I made one or two statements about loyalty, in a speech. I forget what it was. I made the statement that loyalty worked both ways, from a junior up, and from a senior down, which he didn't particularly like. Of course, it's more important I suppose, that the junior be loyal to the senior. But still they should stand behind their juniors, too.

Q: Did he just disagree with that sentiment, or do you feel that he was not loyal to his subordinates?

H: No, I think he probably was loyal. He was, but he didn't want to say it.

Q: You know, General Knerr has said that Arnold was loyal up but not down. He has in mind a couple of instances in his relationship with Arnold. So he feels that Arnold didn't believe in loyalty down to his staff.

H: Well, then perhaps he didn't. But I don't know.

Q: You don't have any personal recollection?

H: No, I don't know that he ever undercut me, or tried to do anything detrimental to my career.

Q: Right. But he did change a lot of your speeches?

H: And I once told him: "Why in the hell don't you write your own speeches?"

Q: What did he say to that?

H: He said: "Well, you're down there to do that sort of thing."

Q: Was he pretty peremptory about that?

H: I think he was a little autocratic.

Q: Did you ever see him get mad? Did he get mad at you?

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H: Yes, he would get red in the face and his hair start raising up, you know.

Q: About some of the speeches, maybe?

H: No, this airplane assignment, and I was amazed.

Q: Did he call you up on the phone, or did he call you in?

H: Called me into his office - you sent in a form requesting certain airplanes....

Q: And he got red in the face?

H: And I've seen him some place, I can't remember well enough to say anything. When he was over in Europe he got hot under the collar about something. I don't remember what it was. He was quick tempered.

Q: Yes, he was. Was he forgiving? Or did he bear grudges?

H: I think that he recalled the things that he didn't like. If a man's name came up....

Q: If he didn't like something about the man, and he thought the man could do the job, did he hire him to do the job? In other words, was he bigger than holding grudges?

H: Yes, I think so.

Q: I'm thinking of Knerr. He and Knerr did not get along, but Knerr got big jobs during WWII.

H: Yes.

Q: Because Knerr was a great logistics man, and he could do a job no one else could do. So he got hired, even though his relationship with Arnold was not good, and I'm trying to plumb this issue of whether Arnold bore grudges to the detriment of the AF, or not?

H: No, see, I got my star over in England - and Eaker came back - when he

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was in the 8th AF -- he brought up my recommendation for promotion. I went over as a Colonel. When he came back General Eaker told me that it would probably go through, and then in conversation, Arnold said: "Well, if you recommend him, okay," in a tone of voice that indicated to me that he didn't exactly approve, but still that if Eaker recommended it, he would go along.

Q: Is this 1943 or later?

H: 1943.

Q: In other words, when you had the fighter wing, you got your star.

H: Yes.

Q: I take that to be that you were not one of Arnold's favorite people, but he accepted Eaker's recommendations?

H: Yes, I feel that was the case. From the tone of the conversation between Gen Eaker and Gen Arnold.

Q: You didn't hear them?

H: No, no.

Q: This is Eaker's recounting?

H: Eaker told me when he came back. He thought it would go through, but that there was some little hesitancy on the part of General Arnold.

Q: I'm told that most of the fellows who participated in the Alaskan flight got their stars?

H: Let's see....

Q: Let me ask you about the Alaskan flight. On selecting personnel. Arnold made some changes in personnel when he came into Patterson Field, he took out a couple of fellows, the Flight Surgeon, Smith, and he put Malcom Grow in there. He took out Eubank and he put in his own man, Mike Dunn. Remember Mike Dunn, he was the Adjutant?

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H: He's here now.

Q: I know, I talked to him. Now, Arnold selected each of the men. He also changed the composition of the flight, there was a high percentage of officers, 20 officers and 10 enlisted. He took out some of the officers and put more enlisted, mechanics, in there. Do you know anything about that?

H: No, but I can understand it. Needed proper maintenance on the way there, and an officer normally doesn't get his hands too dirty.

Q: He got mad at some of the officers because he felt they were goofing off during the Alaskan flight.

H: You mean during the preparation for it?

Q: Yes.

H: Of course, I was up in Alaska. I wouldn't know about that.

Q: Did you ever get any sense of his unhappiness with the officers. He had a lot of confidence in the enlisted men. He thought they did a great job, better job than some of the officers did. I wonder if this is a factor in his not pushing harder for the DFC for the crew members?

H: I wouldn't know.

Q: Let me go back to Eaker. Eaker recommended you for the star, and Arnold approved it. Are you aware of any cooling between Eaker and Arnold in the late years of the war, toward the end of the war?

H: I'm not aware of it. I thought that they collaborated on books....

Q: They did earlier, they did before the war, but not at the end of the war. You know, Eaker was the only top combat commander who didn't make a fourth star.

H: I knew he came in for a brief period.

Q: He was the Deputy Commander.

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H: Deputy Chief of Staff of the AF.

Q: Right, this is when Arnold had his heart attack.

H: I thought for a brief period, maybe when he substituted when Arnold had his heart attack.

Q: He was a stand in.

H: Yes, he was the Deputy.

Q: He took Barney Giles' place, but he never got his fourth star. Do you know why?

H: I don't know.

Q: Do you think that Vandenberg's uncle was a factor in his getting the job?

H: I think so.

Q: He was close to Harry Truman, who was then President of the US. Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Roosevelt? Or is that way above your level?

H: No, I have no knowledge.

Q: How about Arnold and Morgenthau. Remember, right before the war, a little problem?

H: No, I don't.

Q: You say, you didn't think the flight to Alaska would do much for Arnold's promotion?

H: Not that it wasn't successful.

Q: But you didn't think it was that big?

H: After all, formations of bombers had flown many places....

Q: It happened right after the air mail, though, and since it was a complete success, a lot of people attributed that to Arnold's preparations.

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H: Well, it could be.

Q: Maybe they felt that here's a guy, if you give him a job, he can do it.

H: Possible, you mean, in that he was not in on the air mail.

Q: As an operator, but here was a man, if you gave him a hard job, he did it. In preparing for the Alaskan flight, Foulois' office - you were in Foulois office -

H: Yes.

Q: They were nagging him: "Let's get going with the flight." And he was out at Patterson Field and he kep delaying, getting B-10s ready for the flight. Arnold come in there around June 25th, and the flight didn't get off for almost a month, and July 18th to be exact. They were pushing him to get on with the flight. Were you aware of this pressure being exerted against him to get going?

H: We were up in Alaska, we were wondering why they weren't.

Q: I see, you were in Alaska. You weren't in Foulois' office at the time?

H: Oh no, I was, already arrived in Fairbanks.

Q: But you did wonder why it was taking so long.

H: Wondered why they didn't get up there, it was getting into, beginning to get the short summer. It was daylight 24 hours in the day when we arrived and then we finally didn't get off, Bobzien and I, until August, and it was beginning to get dark.

Q: That day, when you went into Cook's Inlet, was a very good day, wasn't it?

H: Yes, beautiful.

Q: Clear day, you could see Mt. McKinley. Arnold wrote home from Anchorage, you could see Mt. McKinley. That was over 100 miles away, wasn't it?

H: Yes.

Q: You could see it though, the snow capped mountain?

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H: I don't remember seeing it. I flew down to Mt. McKinley with Joe Crosson. I don't know whether you know of him or not. But he was Pacific Alaskan Airways, which is a subsidiary of Pan American at that time. He took Bobzien and I on a sheep hunting trip down at the base of Mt. McKinley.

Q: Do you remember Arnold meeting some German in Fairbanks? This German is supposed to have told him that Hitler was building up a big AF?

H: I have no knowledge of that.

Q: He told about this in his book.

H: That was one of the things that Lindbergh brought back.

Q: Yes, a couple of years later. But this fellow came up to Arnold and told him that the Germans were building a better bomber than the B-10, and the B-10 was supposed to be great stuff at that time.

Q: You did not go back with Arnold, you went back separately in your O-38?

H: Yes, we came back by way of White Horse, Prince George, Edmonton, Winnipeg and Minneapolis.

Q: When Arnold came back to March Field after the flight had gone to Washington and back to March Field, he was ordered to fly back to Washington. There was a secret maneuver on, and all the B-10s had to fly back to the East Coast. I think they were running it out of the Raritan Arsenal, NJ. Do you remember that?

H: No.

Q: Tell me about George Goddard.

H: He's quite a character, likeable, talkative, he's got a good line.

Q: He's a great photographer, though?

H: Yes, he's famous for his photography.

Q: Did Arnold had admiration for him?

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H: I think he did.

Q: Did he think he did a good job?

H: Yes, I believe he did. I think he did a good job.

Q: Of photomapping the whole thing?

H: I don't know whether it was ever put to any use or not, as a navigation tool.

Q: Well, it was, yes. When Arnold came back he made recommendations about setting up a permanent air base at Fairbanks. But nothing came of that. You were back in Foulois' office at that time. Do you remember anything like that?

H: No, I don't remember.

Q: They ignored him?

H: I ran into Gen Mitchell in a restaurant here.

Q: You mean Billy Mitchell?

H: Yes, I think it was right after I had gotten back from this flying a fighter plane up to Nome, and....

Q: This is 1929.

H: And he came over and among other things, he said: "You know, he who holds Alaska, holds the world." That was his statement.

Q: Yes, Mitchell felt very strongly about Alaska.

H: He had been up there in the early days in the Signal Corps.

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Interview BG Ross G. Hoyt, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1971

Q: Do you recall when you first met General Arnold?

H: Yes, I first met Gen Arnold in 1925. He was, I believe, Chief of the Public Relations Section in the then Chief of Air Corps office.

Q: Air Service, it was then?

H: Yes, it was Service. They finally changed in '26, I believe. And at that time, in addition to his other activities, he was involved in something which I'm sure you are aware.

Q: The Billy Mitchell?

H: Yes, the Billy Mitchell trial. I never was directly associated with him. Of course, we knew each other.

Q: What was your job in 1925?

H: In 1925 I was assigned to the War Plans Division, and working up plans for different flights, and for a mobilization plan. That was my first tour, I served there my whole tour.

Q: Do you have any recollection as to why he got in trouble along with Mitchell?

H: Well, because of his activities, sub rosa and otherwise, for a separate air force.

Q: What sort of sub rosa activities? Do you remember any of them?

H: There were releases, press releases. Of course, his testimony at the trial wasn't sub rosa. That was publicly known.

Q: Was he putting out releases to Congressmen, or writing letters to Congressmen at this time?

H: I'm not sure. I wasn't in the Public Relations Section. But I believe

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it was. Anyway, he was ostracized to Ft. Riley, Kansas.

Q: I think he and Herbert Dargue were involved in a little activity?

H: Yes, yes. I think Dargue came out better than Arnold.

Q: Why?

H: I don't know, maybe he was not quite so impetuous in his statement.

Q: Arnold is supposed to have made some statement about, in a Congressional hearing, when the planes flew over the Capitol. He is supposed to have said, "There goes our air force." I think there were about 30-35 planes. Do you remember anything like that?

H: No, I don't recall that particular incident. That was in...?

Q: 1925.

H: Well, we didn't have very many airplanes.

Q: No, we didn't. But in any event, he got on Mason Patrick's list, and Patrick shipped him out. Did you have any direct dealings with Arnold that you recall in 1925?

H: No, I didn't have any.

Q: You just met him in the office?

H: I met him in the office and all that.

Q: When was the next time you saw him, or had contact?

H: The next time I saw him, he was out at Ft. Riley. I worked up the plans for the Pan American flight with Major Dargue.

Q: Was that 1927?

H: 1926. Then when Dargue got back from South America - there was a period there when he traveled around the country - 38 states. And I, having worked on the plans, I guess as a reward - he had me assigned as an advance officer, and I flew ahead of him, and with him, through the 38 states.

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Q: What contact did Arnold have? Or you just flew into Riely in the course of this trip?

H: In the course of that, we visited Ft. Riley.

Q: Were you aware that Arnold was toying with the idea of leaving the Air Service or the Air Corps, in 1926, and going into commercial aviation?

H: No, I wasn't aware of that.

Q: Did he talk to you about that?

H: No, he didn't talk to me about it. This is news to me.

Q: He decided then against leaving, and he stayed on, but he felt that he was exiled to Ft. Riley.

H: Yes, he was exiled. I mean, that was common knowledge. None of us thought that he should be, but that was a fact.

Q: Did you admire him for the stand that he took in the Billy Mitchell case?

H: I certainly do.

Q: This sort of made him conspicuous among the Air Corps people who were pushing for a separate Air Force?

H: Yes, and then, of course, later, it probably was responsible for a great deal of his promotion. As soon as those who were also in favor of a separate department or separate service, why he, of course, was highly regarded.

Q: Did you see him in the early '30s when he went to March Field?

H: I believe they had maneuvers in the early '30s. I was at Selfridge Field and had a fighter squadron up there. They had the maneuvers. I believe Gen Foulois was Chief then. Yes, only casually, because Arnold commanded one of the organizations.

Q: Did you serve under Andrews when you were at Selfridge?

H: No, I served under Brett. Brower was Group Commander, Brett was Post Commander.

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Q: Then the next contact you had with Arnold was the Alaskan flight?

H: No, I came back on a second tour from 1933-37, and he was, I can't recollect quite what happened.

Q: Came back to where?

H: Came back to Washington, he was in Washington. I was ordered from Selfridge Field down there as Chief of the Operations Section in the Chief's office, and he was here.

Q: How did you get selected for the Alsakan flight?

H: Well, I think it was because I had made this solo flight in a fighter plane from NY to Nome, making....

Q: In 1929?

H: Yes, that's right.

Q: So you had familiarity with it?

H: Well, yes. I didn't fly the route that they flew, but I was familiar with the territory.

Q: You were an advance man?

H: Yes. Of course, you mentioned my position as a photographer. When we were there, we arrived at Fairbanks ahead of the fighter bombers, Bobzien and I. When the flight arrived, we supposedly had finished our duties, and we were picked up as members of that flight, assigned to a flight, we were designated as photographers, but we never did any work as photographers. They just picked us up for duty on the flight.

Q: They had a lot of trouble getting the supplies up. George Goddard and Carlyle Ridenour were involved in that supply bit. There was a little old ship?

H: Yes, they finally, Ridenour and Goddard, of course, Goddard was a famous photographer, and he arrived. I suppose you know that they photographed, took

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aerial photographs of a strip from Fairbanks to Anchorage.

Q: Yes, right. They started out the day you and Bobzien went into the drink in that plane.

H: You mean to photograph this?

Q: No, you went into the Cook's Inlet.

H: I don't know exactly when they started their photographic work.

Q: Tell me about this day. According to Knerr, I talked to Gen Knerr...

H: He's a fine man....

Q: Yes, he is. He said that Ralph Royce had talked Arnold into allowing Bobzien to fly one of the B-10s.

H: That's possible. Unfortunately, he must have talked to me being in the plane with him. I believe that Bobzien took off on an empty tank, only partially filled tank. I'm not sure about that.

Q: One of the problems....

H: He wasn't familiar enough with the plane.

Q: There was a complicated valve transfer system for the fuel?

H: That's right.

Q: And maybe you didn't turn the right valve on?

H: I think so. I think that's what happened.

Q: But he was able to land the plane in the inlet?

H: That was, to go straight was the only thing to do because we didn't have very much altitude.

Q: Did he land wheels up?

H: I think he did, yes. I don't recall now. But I don't think he had time, and that would have been the proper thing to do, rather than put the wheels down. Of course, it didn't sink immediately.

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Q: Did you land in the water?

H: In the water, and I can show you. We landed in the water, and someone saw it, and came out with a rowboat, and I got out of the end of the rowboat and took a line fastened the line to the tail skid of the bomber, took it in and tied to a stump or a tree, so that when the tide went out, the airplane wouldn't go with it. There was a 29 foot tide. I imagine you have heard most of this before. Then when the tide went out and the airplane was lying on the beach. They fastened a number of empty oildrums to the wings and towed it over to the dock, and there were some heavy hoisting equipment there that they could hoist it out.

Q: Who managed this towing? Was Knerr in charge of it?

H: I'm not sure. It may have been Ridenour, if Ridenour had arrived up there at that time.

Q: In any event, they got that plane back in commission?

H: Yes, and it was flown back.

Q: Was Arnold upset about that?

H: I don't know. I have no personal knowledge of his having been upset. I imagine he was - something which, I think, could have been avoided.

Q: Yes, they wanted to bring all the planes back.

H: Yes.

Q: Do you have any knowledge as to why the Alaskan flight was ordered?

H: No, I don't know. It may have been to demonstrate the ability to move an organization.

Q: Was there any thought to erase the black mark of the air mail which preceded the Alaskan flight?

H: Well, if there was, I had no knowledge of it.

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Q: There is some talk that questions arose that "if they can't fly the mail, how can they fight a war?" To prove that the Air Corps was capable, the Alaskan flight was supposed to have been ordered on that count. Did you hear anything about that?

H: That may have been common knowledge in the higher echelons. But at that time, I was a Captain.

Q: In Fairbanks, they had a big celebration at Moose Hall one time. Did Arnold give the boys a lecture on drinking or carousing? Do you remember him giving the boys a lecture one time?

H: No, I don't recall.

Q: Do you have any recollection of him at Fairbanks?

H: Well, he did what a great many of us did there, go on fishing trips and hunting trips, when we were off duty.

Q: He went on a fighing trip with Corey Ford and Alastair MacBain. Remember those two fellows? They were writers.

H: Yes.

Q: Did he meet them there?

H: I think so, I don't know, he may have known them before that.

Q: They became very close to him and they followed his career for years afterwards and wrote about him. They went fishing for grayling.

H: Yes, I have a picture in here which might amuse you, a fishing trip.

Q: Were you on it with him?

H: No, I didn't go on the fishing trip.

Q: Did you ever go fishing with Arnold?

H: No.

Q: He was a great fisherman, or he liked fishing. It was relaxing sport.

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H: I like fishing, but I never had the urge to get the proper equipment.

Q: He was an inveterate fisherman. During the war when he went to a conference, he would try to take some time off and go fishing, and dragooned George Marshall into a couple trips during the war. You probably read about it?

H: Well, I met Marshall down at Barksdale Field, the 20th Fighter Group down there.

Q: The Alaskan flight was a very great success. Did you fly back to Washington with the flight?

H: No, they came back by way of Seattle, and I came back the same route that I went up.

Q: Did you fly back?

H: Oh yes, we went up, Bobzien and I went up in two O-38s because we had to get in. We couldn't make the range.

Q: You flew back in the O-38s?

H: Yes.

Q: You flew back to where?

H: To Washington, D.C., Bolling Field.

Q: You came back later?

H: No, I believe we actually got here ahead of the flight. We were ordered to stay at Fairbanks until the flight reached Seattle, which we did. I imagine because of entertainment, so on, of the bomber flight, they were delayed. They didn't get back until later.

Q: They came back on Aug 20th, they had a big celebration in Washington. Were you in on any of that?

H: Not that I recall, no.

Q: There was a stag party at the Carlton Hotel for the officers. Do you remember that?

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H: No, these auxiliary, so to speak, officers, were very suddenly lost sight of, and rightfully so.

Q: There was some talk of resentment, that nobody received an award for the Alaskan flight. Arnold, several years later, got a DFC, but nobody got an award for that flight. Some people feel they should have received a DFC for that. Did you ever hear anything on that score?

H: I don't think so, no.

Q: Did you ever hear of any resentment against Arnold for not pushing harder for an award?

H: No, I didn't expect any. To me it was just another extended cross country flight.

Q: Except that the flight was very successful. Should there have been some kind of recognition of the flight?

H: Well, I think there should have. Perhaps there were letters of commendation, I don't know.

Q: There were some.

H: I didn't get any as an advance officer, I didn't expect it. They may have gotten letters, because Arnold was in a position, he could have given them letters of commendation.

Q: You didn't get a letter of commendation?

H: Not for that mission.

Q: Where was your next contact with Arnold?

H: After the Alaskan flight? I think it was when he came to the UK, England. I had a fighter wing over there.

Q: This is during the war?

H: Yes, I think that's the next time I saw him. There wasn't anything,

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except just a greeting.I mean there was no particular occasion.

Q: Was this in 1943?

H: Yes.

Q: Was this around Labor Day?

H: I wouldn't remember.

Q: Was this around the time of the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid, the first raid?

H: No, I think it was a little before that.

Q: There were two raids, one was in August and the other one was in October. He made a trip in September.

H: I think it was about the time of the first one.

Q: This was 10 days after the first one. Was he unhappy about the losses suffered?

H: He didn't express - I had a fighter. He didn't express anything to the fighter wing, but he may have to the Bomber Command.

Q: Well, Monk Hunter was taken out of there, about that time, was he not, as the 8th Fighter Commander?

H: He had the 8th Fighter Command, and I was under him. He was my direct commander.

Q: He was taken out of there, and Kepner put in.

H: Yes, Kepner arrived shortly before Hunter left.

Q: Was there any expression of unhappiness about the support the fighters were giving the bombers at that time?

H: No, of course....

Q: You didn't have the P-51s at that time?

H: The Mustang?

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Q: You had the P-47s.

H: Yes, we had P-47s and when I arrived in England, they had not yet put the belly tanks on them, or at least they hadn't increased the size of the belly tanks.

Q: They didn't have much range?

H: They could just barely escort the bombers inside the coast line, or a short distance inland on the continent. They had to turn around and come back.

Q: Arnold was pushing to get some tanks, belly tanks on the P-47s and the P-38s. Did they try to get them from the British?

H: Not to my knowledge. I think they were manufactured in this country.

Q: There were some cardboard tanks that they were putting on some of the planes. Do you remember cardboard wing tanks, I guess they were, perhaps not on P-47s.

H: Not on the P-47s, I don't think...

Q: This was sort of a makeshift arrangement, the cardboard tanks.

H: I don't think they became standard at all.

Q: They tried for a while to use the armored B-17, the XB-40, remember that, that went in there for a little bit?

H: No, the big thing on the bombers was the lack of armament.

Q: Yes, but they used these armored escorts. They called him B-40s. Do you remember that?

H: No, I don't remember that.

Q: It didn't work out, they were too slow. What do you remember of Arnold's visit to the UK? Did he make a speech before your boys?

H: Yes, he made talks before every group.

Q: What did he say?

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H: I don't remember, the usual pep talk. I don't remember anything specific. There wasn't any criticism of them.

Q: A couple of months later....

H: I came back to the States, incidentally, with Gen Arnold.

Q: Did you complete your tour then?

H: I got sick. I had been in the SW Pacific, and had gone through that mess over there, and came back, but didn't go through because I wasn't finished. I went to Luke Field where I commanded the advanced single engine flying school. Then somebody in England, I guess it was Hunter, asked for me for England, UK.

Q: How long were you there?

H: I was there from March until September.

Q: Yes, that's the visit. You came back with him.

H: Yes, I came back with him and went into the hospital.

Q: Then you weren't there when Eaker was taken out of the UK?

H: No.

Q: Did you ever hear anything about Arnold's decision to take Eaker out and bring Spaatz in to the UK?

H: Spaatz and Eaker were together in England, in the original army before we had anything much over there.

Q: Right, but then Spaatz went to North Africa, and Eaker was in England.

H: Eaker was head of the 8th AF for quite some time.

Q: Yes, but then he was shifted to the Mediterranean.

H: Yes, I guess he was down there. The thing that I remember was the bombing over Monte Cassino.

Q: You don't remember anything involving the shift of Eaker to the Mediterranean?

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H: No, I wouldn't. I wasn't in a position to know.

Q: What other contact did you have with Arnold in the war, did you have any other?

H: No, because I came back, was in the hospital for almost a year and then was retired. So, Arnold also retired....

Q: Retired shortly after the war.

Q: Let me ask you about the air mail. You say you were in Foulois' office during the air mail situation?

H: Yes, that's right.

Q: Spaatz was there?

H: Spaatz was Chief of the Operations Section and I was under him.

Q: Chaney was in there?

H: Yes.

Q: Do you remember the meeting Spaatz had with Harlee Branch? He was the Asst PMG. This is when Foulois is supposed to have said: "Give us a week or 10 days and we will fly the mail." Do you remember anything about that? What is your recollection of that situation?

H: Well, I wasn't in on the command decisions.

Q: Yes, right, but you heard a lot about it?

H: Oh yes, and I personally didn't think we should have ever been given the job.

Q: Was Foulois ordered to do the job, or did he volunteer for this job? I've heard two accounts.

H: I personally don't know. From what you say, he is supposed to have offered to fly.

Q: I've heard two different versions of what happend, and I wondered if

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you had any light to shed on it.

H: No. Spaatz was Chief of Operations.

Q: How did Spaatz feel? Was he opposed to taking on the job?

H: I don't know, but I feel that he would rather not have taken it on. Very bad time of year, lots of fog and rain, and all that. We had not at that time concentrated on blind flying.

Q: Right, we didn't have the equipment or the airplanes, or the training to do it. There have been several books written recently in which it is indicated that Foulois was ordered to fly the mail, and he simply was a good soldier, and said: "Yes sir." Does that square with your recollection?

H: I have no knowledge of that.

Q: What was your job in the Chief's office at the time?

H: At that time, Spaatz was actually Training and Operations Division and I was Chief of Operations.

Q: You were directly under Spaatz?

H: Yes.

Q: I talked to Spaatz and he said that he counseled Foulois against taking that mission.

H: I can understand that, but I was not in on those meetings. But I can understand how Tooey would have counseled him.

Q: How about Walter Weaver? He was in the office there too, wasn't he?

H: He was Chief of the Public Relations.

Q: Do you know his feeling about the airmail job?

H: No, I don't, but he was close to Spaatz.

Q: Do you remember when Foulois got called into the President's office and the President is supposed to have read the riot act to him?

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H: That comes back vaguely to mind, but I have no personal knowledge of it.

Q: How about Foulois and MacArthur? MacArthur was Chief of Staff?

H: Of course, at that time, it was all a great deal of sub rosa friction, so to speak, between the Air Corps and the Chief of Staff, Army.

Q: Arnold wrote a letter home about: "I hope for promotion." He hoped to get his star, this is in 1934, during the air mail thing. He indicated that Foulois promised him a star, but Conger Pratt got the star, and Chaney got the star. Do you remember that?

H: I know they got them, but I didn't know that there was any promise between Foulois made to Arnold.

Q: What was Arnold's relations with Foulois? Do you remember? Were they good?

H: Well, I don't think they were particularly good. In fact, a great many people have changed their opinions of Foulois in the latter days of his life. I don't know whether you know that or not.

Q: Yes, I do. I have the feeling that Foulois' great contribution was that he outlived all his contemporaries.

H: You could say that.

Q: At the time he was not highly regarded. Is that correct?

H: That's right. I think that is a fair statement.

Q: Because when he retired as Chief of the Air Corps, he never got another job. Never got another job. During WWII he never had a job. Why?

H: Well, I don't know, perhaps it was a hangover from prejudices, right or wrong.

Q: Right or wrong, but they had that feeling. I think the President felt

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Foulois had misinformed him. Whether that's right or wrong, we don't know.

H: You mean about the air mail?

Q: About the air mail, and the President was very embarrassed about all the crashes, and he blamed it on Foulois, right or wrong.

H: Well, I think perhaps he was right.

Q: You think the President was right?

H: I think that Foulois would have been wise to have said: "We are not equipped, prepared." I don't know whose idea it was in the first place.

Q: I have been told that because flying pay and flying training pay or funds were so scarce, when the Post Office came up with nearly a million dollars in flying training pay to fly the air mail, Foulois figured here's a chance to get flying time for his boys. Is there anything to that?

H: Not to my knowledge. Those things may have gone on up in the upper echelons.

Q: But you were in Operations during that period. Did you have anything to do with organizing the Air Mail routes?

H: Yes. They had to conform to try to do the job that the Air Mail was doing.

Q: Was it considered that Arnold did a good job in the Western Zone, or not?

H: Yes, I think so. You have a lot better flying conditions, especially in February, and so on, out in the western part of the country than you do here in the East. Unfortunately, it just settled down for the first few weeks there was just nothing but fog and rain.

Q: Well, flying over the Rockies was not easy, was it?

H: Well, they had the airplanes that could make the altitude. The weather generally out there is better than it is in the East.

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Q: Well, in the SW it is better, but not in the NW?

H: Not in the NW, no.

Q: How about Hickam?

H: He's an old friend of mine.

Q: He did a good job in the Central Zone, didn't he?

H: Yes.

Q: How about B.Q. Jones? What kind of job did he do?

H: I don't remember what his job was.

Q: He had the Eastern Zone.

H: He did as good a job I think as anybody could.

Q: There were three zones. Arnold, in a letter home, said that B.Q. Jones made everybody equal, he abolished rank in his area.

H: I don't know that to be a fact, but I can understand it.

Q: This kind of disorganized his zone, at least in Arnold's opinion. Did you hear anything about that?

H: The organization didn't work out very well, I'll say that.

Q: Of course, this was Arnold's opinion. It may not be the fact.

H: Of course, I think there was not enough grounding of airplanes because of weather. That's why we had those crashes. Those boys could fly across country, navigate, so on, visual navigation.

Q: Was it that they did not give the young flyers enough warning not to fly in the case of bad weather, or were they reckless young fellows?

H: I don't think they were reckless. I think that some of them probably were. But orders should have gone down that they should not fly. They would take off in practically no ceilings.

Q: Do you think Foulois bears responsibility for this as Chief?

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H: It percolates on up.

Q: On up to him. Who else should bear responsibility for the black eye of the air mail, in your opinion?

H: I imagine we were all involved.

Q: Guilty to some degree?

H: Some degree, yes.

Q: How about the CCC, were you involved in that, planning of the CCC?

H: No, the only way I was involved in that at that time, I had been transferred to the Public Relations. I wanted to send out some bulletins, pamphlets and so on, for the instruction of these boys in their spare time, besides just picking up leaves, raking leaves and so on, to get a little military training. But they canceled that, I mean they disapproved of it.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of the job that Arnold did running the CCC out on the West Coast?

H: No.

Q: When you were in Public Relations, were you under Jakie Fickel? Was he your boss?

H: No, he's gone now, but there was another man that proceded him....

Q: They called him H. Square Richards?

H: Yes, H.H. Richards.

Q: What kind of guy was he?

H: He was very friendly with me.

Q: Was he a stuffed shirt?

H: Well, no, I don't think he could be called a stuffed shirt. He was a humanitarian. He really gave a square deal to certain people.

Q: Do you remember a guy named Jan Howard? What do you remember about him?

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H: Well, the only thing that I remember is that he was pretty bombastic and had very few friends.

Q: Do you recall his relationship with Arnold?

H: No.

Q: He was at one time related to Arnold. He was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister.

H: Yes, and they were divorced, I believe.

Q: There was some friction between Arnold and Howard.

H: Because of that, I imagine. I always got along all right with Howard. We lived in the same apartment building out there at the time.

Q: Where?

H: At the Westchester.

Q: Do you remember a man named Sue Clagett?

H: Yes.

Q: What about him?

H: Well, I hesitate to express an opinion about these people.

Q: I know he had a problem.

H: Yes, I guess he had a drinking problem.

Q: I'm interested in his relationship with Arnold, he and Arnold had some friction. Do you know anything about that?

H: Well, I imagine probably because of the drinking problem, I don't know.

Q: He was promoted three different times and broken, Clagett. Do you remember that?

H: Yes, I think I remember something of it. I followed him into China.

Q: With the Magruder Commission?

H: Yes.

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Q: Were you in there when....

H: I was the AF representative on the Magruder mission. That's where I joined Brett. Brett came over with Alexander Wavell, to Chungking. I had been his Operations Officer. It was the last job I held, so he took me out with him. Finally wound up down in Australia.

Q: Then Clagett got in trouble there, didn't he?

H: I don't know whether he got in trouble there. I didn't agree with his opinions. He had stated that, just give the Chinese airplanes and they'd have an air force. Well, I didn't agree with that.

Q: What was your opinion?

H: I was of the opinion, I told Chiang-kai-Shek that I didn't think he would ever have an AF comparable of other nations, and they never have. I don't know what they are doing now. They aren't doing anything, I guess.

Q: What was wrong with what Clagett said, give them airplanes? Do you mean the Chinese were not competent enough to fly them.

H: No, no, he said they were

Q: But I say you thought they weren't?

H: Yes, one thing, they are all individualists, and it takes a man that can follow the leader in the AF, whether it is bombers or fighters or whatnot. The Chinese - in my experience with them - they hesitated to take orders, or to follow their leader.

Q: Did you have any contact out there with a fellow named Merian Cooper?

H: No, I think he was....

Q: He was an Intelligence type.

H: No, I didn't, I know Cooper was out there, but I think he left before I got there.

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Q: Do you have any knowledge of a plan to bomb Japan from the East Coast of China early in the war?

H: No.

Q: What was the purpose of the Magruder Mission?

H: To study the needs of the Chinese. There was a representative of each branch, and they....

Q: And you were the AAF representative?

H: Yes, Air Corps at the time.

Q: What was your rank?

H: Colonel.

Q: This was right before Pearl Harbor?

H: Yes, as a matter of fact....

Q: Straddling Pearl Harbor, before and after?

H: We were in, I was in China, Hqs., in Chungking and had been up the Yangtze River the weekend that it happened. We came back and found out that Pearl Harbor had been hit.

Q: You say "we", who was with you on that?

H: There were several officers on the commission.

Q: Was Clagett in that group?

H: Oh no, he wasn't there.

Q: Was he already gone?

H: He had long since left there.

Q: You don't recall why he left?

H: Left China? I think his mission was over.

Q: He was reduced in rank when he came back. Do you know why?

H: No, I don't know why.

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Q: He blamed Arnold. Do you have any idea why he should have done that?

H: No, I don't know, unless it was still a part of his drinking. I don't know what he did over in China.

Q: He replaced Arnold at March Field, when Arnold came to Washington in 1936. I think you were in Washington at the time.

H: Yes, I was there.I came in '33 and left in '37, four-year tour.

Q: And Arnold got his star. He was BG. He was Asst to Westover, who had just become Chief of Air Corps. Clagett replaced Arnold at March Field, and he lasted a few months, and he was taken out of there. Do you know anything about that?

H: No.

Q: Let me ask you about Brett and MacArthur. You were In Australia with Brett. Friction developed between him and MacArthur. Why?

H: I can't say why. I know that it developed, or it already existed. But it may have been the idea of Brett that he would be in the supreme command.

Q: Did he have aspirations to be the top dog out there?

H: Yes. He left Melbourne and went back up to the Dutch East Indies, figuring that he - with Wavell as a matter of fact - Wavell was out there - that he would get some additional stars.

Q: And he didn't get it?

H: Yes, he did.

Q: Well, he got his third star?

H: Yes.

Q: And then MacArthur had him removed?

H: Yes.

Q: Do you know why?

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H: Because of the friction.

Q: You worked directly for Brett? You were on his staff?

H: Yes.

Q: Did you have your star by that time?

H: No.

Q: When Brett came back, did you come back, too?

H: No, I came back ahead of him. I asked to get out of there, because I wasn't getting anywhere with Brett.

Q: You were having trouble with Brett, too?

H: Well, I wouldn't say having trouble, but I can see where he and I were not doing too well, to hit it off.

Q: And you decided to ask to come back?

H: Yes.

Q: How long had you been out there?

H: We went out to China, and we got down to Australia around Christmas time, New Year's.

Q: It was Christmas '41?

H: Yes, we left Chungking on Christmas Eve 1941.

Q: You saw Arnold when you came back from the SW Pacific. Do you have any recollection of Arnold?

H: He asked me what the difficulty was out there. As a matter of fact, I had talked to Arnold over TransPacific telephone.

Q: Did he ask you about Brett and MacArthur.

H: Yes.

Q: And what did you tell him?

H: He wanted to know my recommendation, and I said: "Well, I recommend

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either one or the other of them be brought back."

Q: Because there was friction?

H: That's right.

Q: We are talking about Brett and MacArthur and your decision that there was no future for you in the Pacific and you came back to Washington and you saw General Arnold. Do you have a recollection of that meeting with General Arnold?

H: Yes, he wanted to know some of the details of the friction between General MacArthur and General Brett. I didn't know any of the details, I just knew that there was friction.

Q: Any specific issues? Was it a case of one man wanting to do it one way, and another wanting to do it the other. Do you know any specific cases of disagreements between them?

H: No, I think it was more personality than it was issues.

Q: MacArthur had several candidates in mind. Of course, Kenney eventually got the job. Do you know how Kenney got that job? Who recommended Kenney?

H: Kenney was very highly regarded throughout the AF. I imagine perhaps Arnold.

Q: Yes, Arnold eventually chose him. Kenney was then 4th AF. He was out on the Pacific coast and they chose him. Did MacArthur want an Air man who would not compete with him?

H: Well, from my experience in past years, back in 1925-26 when the Air Service and Air Corps was a part of the Army, you had a pretty tough row to hoe under MacArthur in the way of appropriations and so on, which really it required in order to get anywhere.

Q: He wasn't very favorable toward airpower when he was Chief of Staff?

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H: No, no.

Q: Did you always have to battle for dollars?

H: Yes, always. I think from an operating standpoint it had to be rammed down his throat. I never held any great brief for General MacArthur. I don't know anything about his strategy and tactics in other branches, but as far as the Air Force was concerned, it didn't agree.

Q: I'm told he fell in love with Kenney. Kenney just sort of hit it up right with MacArthur. MacArthur give him just about everything he wanted. Kenney had the right chemistry for MacArthur.

H: That's right, their personalities meshed. It was just the opposite, of course, with Brett. And it may be that if MacArthur had assumed that attitude with Brett, he would have been just as successful. Because the AF really was successful out there under Kenney in all of those advances of island hopping.

Q: Did Arnold ever say anything about MacArthur to you in your conversation with him?

H: No, nothing.

Q: He just asked you for your opinion?

H: Yes, and he sent me over to General Marshall, and I told General Marshall the same thing. I don't know that it did me any good to express an opinion like that, but that was what I felt.

Q: They were interested in knowing it. Did Arnold accompany you to that meeting?

H: No, no.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Frank Andrews?

H: No, they weren't in Washington, I don't believe, at the same time. I was

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out in the field, and I wasn't here in the Chief's office. I was out in the field. I had no way of knowing. After you reach a certain point, there is a great deal of competition as to who gets what, where the stars shine, and so on. I have some scars on my back.

Q: On the subject of competition, somebody who doesn't like Arnold, said that he sent his competition out of Washington. For example, Brett was a competitor. He got sent out to the Middle East and then to China. Andrews was sent down to the Caribbean at the time. Emmons was sent out to Hawaii. Those were his three major competitors. Is there any merit in that observation?

H: From a personal standpoint, I couldn't say, but it certainly sounds like him.

Q: Was Arnold a politician, military politician? Was he crafty, or was he straight forward?

H: Well, I never knew the workings of his mind.

Q: Well, in your dealings with him, did he seem to come straight out or was he devious?

H: On one or two occasions, he was very straight out as far as I was concerned.

Q: What were the occasions?

H: It's more or less a picayune thing. But we were stationed here in Washington, and you flew from Bolling Field. And they had some airplanes out there that normally were called "Sacred Cows". They weren't flown by anybody but the Chief of Air Corps, etc.

Q: You are talking about during the war?

H: No, before the war, and I asked, I knew, I did a lot of flying. I mean, every time I got a chance I got away from my desk and got out of Washington. So

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this was a nice airplane, and I knew that it stood out there for weeks on end and nobody flew it. So I asked for it, to make a cross country flight. Well, I liked to fly every type of airplane that I could get my hands on.

Q: What kind of plane was that?

H: A Seversky....

Q: P-35.

H: No, they didn't have those at that time. This was a two-seater, advanced trainer, I believe. It had some characteristics that those that didn't fly so much weren't very....

Q: You wanted to fly this plane?

H: I wanted to fly the plane and I put in for it. Arnold called me up and kind of laid me out for just asking for it. Well, that didn't increase his popularity with me.

Q: He was what, a BG at the time?

H: I think so.

Q: He was Asst Chief?

H: Yes.

Q: What was the other occasion?

H: I don't know that there was any other occasion. I never talked to him very much. I used to write speeches for him when I was down in Public Relations. There wasn't anything that I detested more than trying to tell somebody else what to say.

Q: Was he Chief by this time?

H: No, he was still Asst Chief. Well, I don't know, he may have been Chief by this time.

Q: This was like in the late '30s?

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H: Around '36, probably.

Q: He was Asst Chief. You left in '37 you say? Then, he was Asst Chief, and you wrote speeches for him?

H: Yes, and he didn't often like the speeches, I mean, certain parts of them. I made one or two statements about loyalty, in a speech. I forget what it was. I made the statement that loyalty worked both ways, from a junior up, and from a senior down, which he didn't particularly like. Of course, it's more important I suppose, that the junior be loyal to the senior. But still they should stand behind their juniors, too.

Q: Did he just disagree with that sentiment, or do you feel that he was not loyal to his subordinates?

H: No, I think he probably was loyal. He was, but he didn't want to say it.

Q: You know, General Knerr has said that Arnold was loyal up but not down. He has in mind a couple of instances in his relationship with Arnold. So he feels that Arnold didn't believe in loyalty down to his staff.

H: Well, then perhaps he didn't. But I don't know.

Q: You don't have any personal recollection?

H: No, I don't know that he ever undercut me, or tried to do anything detrimental to my career.

Q: Right. But he did change a lot of your speeches?

H: And I once told him: "Why in the hell don't you write your own speeches?"

Q: What did he say to that?

H: He said: "Well, you're down there to do that sort of thing."

Q: Was he pretty peremptory about that?

H: I think he was a little autocratic.

Q: Did you ever see him get mad? Did he get mad at you?

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H: Yes, he would get red in the face and his hair start raising up, you know.

Q: About some of the speeches, maybe?

H: No, this airplane assignment, and I was amazed.

Q: Did he call you up on the phone, or did he call you in?

H: Called me into his office - you sent in a form requesting certain airplanes....

Q: And he got red in the face?

H: And I've seen him some place, I can't remember well enough to say anything. When he was over in Europe he got hot under the collar about something. I don't remember what it was. He was quick tempered.

Q: Yes, he was. Was he forgiving? Or did he bear grudges?

H: I think that he recalled the things that he didn't like. If a man's name came up....

Q: If he didn't like something about the man, and he thought the man could do the job, did he hire him to do the job? In other words, was he bigger than holding grudges?

H: Yes, I think so.

Q: I'm thinking of Knerr. He and Knerr did not get along, but Knerr got big jobs during WWII.

H: Yes.

Q: Because Knerr was a great logistics man, and he could do a job no one else could do. So he got hired, even though his relationship with Arnold was not good, and I'm trying to plumb this issue of whether Arnold bore grudges to the detriment of the AF, or not?

H: No, see, I got my star over in England - and Eaker came back - when he

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was in the 8th AF -- he brought up my recommendation for promotion. I went over as a Colonel. When he came back General Eaker told me that it would probably go through, and then in conversation, Arnold said: "Well, if you recommend him, okay," in a tone of voice that indicated to me that he didn't exactly approve, but still that if Eaker recommended it, he would go along.

Q: Is this 1943 or later?

H: 1943.

Q: In other words, when you had the fighter wing, you got your star.

H: Yes.

Q: I take that to be that you were not one of Arnold's favorite people, but he accepted Eaker's recommendations?

H: Yes, I feel that was the case. From the tone of the conversation between Gen Eaker and Gen Arnold.

Q: You didn't hear them?

H: No, no.

Q: This is Eaker's recounting?

H: Eaker told me when he came back. He thought it would go through, but that there was some little hesitancy on the part of General Arnold.

Q: I'm told that most of the fellows who participated in the Alaskan flight got their stars?

H: Let's see....

Q: Let me ask you about the Alaskan flight. On selecting personnel. Arnold made some changes in personnel when he came into Patterson Field, he took out a couple of fellows, the Flight Surgeon, Smith, and he put Malcom Grow in there. He took out Eubank and he put in his own man, Mike Dunn. Remember Mike Dunn, he was the Adjutant?

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H: He's here now.

Q: I know, I talked to him. Now, Arnold selected each of the men. He also changed the composition of the flight, there was a high percentage of officers, 20 officers and 10 enlisted. He took out some of the officers and put more enlisted, mechanics, in there. Do you know anything about that?

H: No, but I can understand it. Needed proper maintenance on the way there, and an officer normally doesn't get his hands too dirty.

Q: He got mad at some of the officers because he felt they were goofing off during the Alaskan flight.

H: You mean during the preparation for it?

Q: Yes.

H: Of course, I was up in Alaska. I wouldn't know about that.

Q: Did you ever get any sense of his unhappiness with the officers. He had a lot of confidence in the enlisted men. He thought they did a great job, better job than some of the officers did. I wonder if this is a factor in his not pushing harder for the DFC for the crew members?

H: I wouldn't know.

Q: Let me go back to Eaker. Eaker recommended you for the star, and Arnold approved it. Are you aware of any cooling between Eaker and Arnold in the late years of the war, toward the end of the war?

H: I'm not aware of it. I thought that they collaborated on books....

Q: They did earlier, they did before the war, but not at the end of the war. You know, Eaker was the only top combat commander who didn't make a fourth star.

H: I knew he came in for a brief period.

Q: He was the Deputy Commander.

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H: Deputy Chief of Staff of the AF.

Q: Right, this is when Arnold had his heart attack.

H: I thought for a brief period, maybe when he substituted when Arnold had his heart attack.

Q: He was a stand in.

H: Yes, he was the Deputy.

Q: He took Barney Giles' place, but he never got his fourth star. Do you know why?

H: I don't know.

Q: Do you think that Vandenberg's uncle was a factor in his getting the job?

H: I think so.

Q: He was close to Harry Truman, who was then President of the US. Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Roosevelt? Or is that way above your level?

H: No, I have no knowledge.

Q: How about Arnold and Morgenthau. Remember, right before the war, a little problem?

H: No, I don't.

Q: You say, you didn't think the flight to Alaska would do much for Arnold's promotion?

H: Not that it wasn't successful.

Q: But you didn't think it was that big?

H: After all, formations of bombers had flown many places....

Q: It happened right after the air mail, though, and since it was a complete success, a lot of people attributed that to Arnold's preparations.

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H: Well, it could be.

Q: Maybe they felt that here's a guy, if you give him a job, he can do it.

H: Possible, you mean, in that he was not in on the air mail.

Q: As an operator, but here was a man, if you gave him a hard job, he did it. In preparing for the Alaskan flight, Foulois' office - you were in Foulois office -

H: Yes.

Q: They were nagging him: "Let's get going with the flight." And he was out at Patterson Field and he kep delaying, getting B-10s ready for the flight. Arnold come in there around June 25th, and the flight didn't get off for almost a month, and July 18th to be exact. They were pushing him to get on with the flight. Were you aware of this pressure being exerted against him to get going?

H: We were up in Alaska, we were wondering why they weren't.

Q: I see, you were in Alaska. You weren't in Foulois' office at the time?

H: Oh no, I was, already arrived in Fairbanks.

Q: But you did wonder why it was taking so long.

H: Wondered why they didn't get up there, it was getting into, beginning to get the short summer. It was daylight 24 hours in the day when we arrived and then we finally didn't get off, Bobzien and I, until August, and it was beginning to get dark.

Q: That day, when you went into Cook's Inlet, was a very good day, wasn't it?

H: Yes, beautiful.

Q: Clear day, you could see Mt. McKinley. Arnold wrote home from Anchorage, you could see Mt. McKinley. That was over 100 miles away, wasn't it?

H: Yes.

Q: You could see it though, the snow capped mountain?

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H: I don't remember seeing it. I flew down to Mt. McKinley with Joe Crosson. I don't know whether you know of him or not. But he was Pacific Alaskan Airways, which is a subsidiary of Pan American at that time. He took Bobzien and I on a sheep hunting trip down at the base of Mt. McKinley.

Q: Do you remember Arnold meeting some German in Fairbanks? This German is supposed to have told him that Hitler was building up a big AF?

H: I have no knowledge of that.

Q: He told about this in his book.

H: That was one of the things that Lindbergh brought back.

Q: Yes, a couple of years later. But this fellow came up to Arnold and told him that the Germans were building a better bomber than the B-10, and the B-10 was supposed to be great stuff at that time.

Q: You did not go back with Arnold, you went back separately in your O-38?

H: Yes, we came back by way of White Horse, Prince George, Edmonton, Winnipeg and Minneapolis.

Q: When Arnold came back to March Field after the flight had gone to Washington and back to March Field, he was ordered to fly back to Washington. There was a secret maneuver on, and all the B-10s had to fly back to the East Coast. I think they were running it out of the Raritan Arsenal, NJ. Do you remember that?

H: No.

Q: Tell me about George Goddard.

H: He's quite a character, likeable, talkative, he's got a good line.

Q: He's a great photographer, though?

H: Yes, he's famous for his photography.

Q: Did Arnold had admiration for him?

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H: I think he did.

Q: Did he think he did a good job?

H: Yes, I believe he did. I think he did a good job.

Q: Of photomapping the whole thing?

H: I don't know whether it was ever put to any use or not, as a navigation tool.

Q: Well, it was, yes. When Arnold came back he made recommendations about setting up a permanent air base at Fairbanks. But nothing came of that. You were back in Foulois' office at that time. Do you remember anything like that?

H: No, I don't remember.

Q: They ignored him?

H: I ran into Gen Mitchell in a restaurant here.

Q: You mean Billy Mitchell?

H: Yes, I think it was right after I had gotten back from this flying a fighter plane up to Nome, and....

Q: This is 1929.

H: And he came over and among other things, he said: "You know, he who holds Alaska, holds the world." That was his statement.

Q: Yes, Mitchell felt very strongly about Alaska.

H: He had been up there in the early days in the Signal Corps.

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Hudwell, William P. 11 May 70

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May 18, 1970

M/Gen William T. Hudnell, USAF(Ret)
101 Carolwood Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78213

Dear General Hudnell:

I enjoyed talking to you the other day, especially the anecdote about Gen Arnold passing through LaGuardia Field.

If any other recollections of your association with Gen Arnold come to mind, I hope you will jot them down and send them to me in the enclosure.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Telephone Interview - General Wm. T. Hudnell, San Antonio, Texas, 11 May 1970

Hudnell's account from his trip with Gen Chaney

General Hudnell said he had two contacts with Gen Arnold. The first contact was a second hand one, and occurred early in the war. Hudnell was the Materiel Officer of the 1st Fighter Command in the NY City area. Gen Cheney was then the Commander of the 1st AF at Mitchel Field. According to this account, Gen Arnold was passing through LaGuardia Field, and he grabbed a 2nd LT outside one of the hangars and asked him: "Young man, what do you think of this outfit?" The young man didn't think much of the outfit and had a negative report.

It was on the basis of this haphazard report that Arnold was thinking of relieving Gen Cheney of his assignment. As it turned out, upon investigation, this 2nd LT had just reported to duty with the 1st Fighter Command.

Hudnell's Meeting with Arnold in June 1945

The second contact that Hudnell had with Arnold was later in the war. He was Chief of Staff of the 5th AF. The meeting with Arnold occurred in June 1945. Arnold was visiting in the Philippines, and I'm not sure whether he said the meeting occurred in Manila or at Clark Field. In any event, there was a meeting on the porch, and Arnold was working Gen Kenney over. Hudnell does not recall what the substance of the needling was, but he says that John Alison, who was A-3 of the outfit, and who was now Executive Vice President of Northrop, was at that meeting on the porch and could fill me in on it.

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3 June 1971

Brig General Harris B. Hull, USAF (Ret)
5409 Duvall Drive
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear General Hull:

I'm taking a small chance committing these documents to the mails. For that reason, I'm sending them to your home to reduce the possibility of loss.

That was a fine interview we had. I appreciate your special insights into General Hap's character and motivations. I'm also grateful to you for giving me three hours of your time in an office "flap" situation. Incidentally, I hope von Braun sees the light and fulfills the commitment.

You mentioned Freddie Castle twice in the interview, including your association with him in Sperry. There is a fellow in our office, Lt.Colonel Ray Fredette, who is doing a real worthwhile project, a book on Air Force Medal of Honor Winners. It will go beyond the flack treatment of heroes and probe deeply into motivations and environment that led each man to his "moment of truth." Ray is a great guy and his book will do the Air Force a lot of good. He would like to phone for an appointment at a later time when he gets into the Castle story. It's another imposition upon your good nature and time, but I believe the book will do the Air Force a world of good and hope you will agree.

Incidentally, I would like to leave the door open for myself when I get into some of the areas of your special know-how. I would like to come back with some specific questions.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

cc: Col Fredette

Memo Note on Files to AF Academy
Sunderman + Johns

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AF/CHO/Dr Green/37428/ecp/7 Dec 70 7 December 1970

Brig General Harris B. Hull, USAF (Ret)
5409 Duvall Drive
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear General Hull

I'm going to make this last attempt to get together for a chat about your association with General Hap Arnold because my friend, Flint DuPre, strongly suggested that I try to see you.

Incidentally, I have been over to NASA on two recent occasions to talk to General Jake Smart who was kind enough to give me more than three hours of his time. I've also interviewed General Rosie O'Donnell, Bill Westlake and Harold Bowman who were associated with us in Air Force Public Relations during the late 1940's. I guess I've talked to 120 of the Air Force greats-and not so greats-who were associated with Hap Arnold during his career.

In any event, I would suggest some time in January for our chat when the Holiday season is out of the way. You name a time and place convenient for you and I will try to make it. The enclosure will speed your reply to me. I've recently been transferred over to the Forrestal Building so I can devote full time to this undertaking.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Asst to Chief Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

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20330

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656-7199 - Home
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March 6, 1970

Brig. General Harris B. Hull, USAF (Ret)
5409 Duvall Drive
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear General Hull:

I must be out of town the next two weeks. Would you please indicate a suitable time on any day during the two-week period between March 23 and April 3, and we can have our interview then.

Enclosed is an envelope for your reply.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

Harris Hull - Why did A. turn down Elliott R. for Russian photo shuttle mission?

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SAFAAR

January 29, 1970

Brig. General Harris B. Hull, USAF (Ret)
5409 Duvall Drive
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear General Hull:

John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. You may recall that I worked for you briefly in 1946.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past month I've been interviewing some friends of yours and some former associates of General Arnold's now retired in Colorado Springs and in the Southland. Among them are Generals Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Hansell, Partridge, Everest, Kepner, P.D. Weikert, Bob Lee, Thatcher, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others whose names do not readily come to mind.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City, and we have also talked with Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell and Smart here in Washington within the past six months.

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Incidentally, I visited the Marshall Library in Lexington, Virginia, and was helped very much by Miss Lejeune, the resident archivist there. I believe she said you were related.

I will phone for an appointment within a week. However, if it would be more convenient for your secretary to phone me, my Pentagon numbers are OX 5-3862 and OX 7-5587.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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2. COL HARRIS B HULL, 1050A
ASSIGNMENT: Relieved from Hq PACAF, APO 953, San Francisco, Calif, from duty as ACS, Intelligence, PACAF; assigned Hq ADC, Ent AFB, Colo Springs, Colo for duty as DCS/Intelligence, Hq North American Air Def Comd and DCS/Intelligence, Hq Continental Air Def Comd.
REPORTING DATA: DALVP. Report to CinC, North American Air Def Comd not later than 18 Jul 60. EDCSA: 1 Jul 60.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Provisions of AFM 75-4 will be complied with.
TRANSPORTATION: 5713500 148-132 P 531.9 S 503725 0200, 0300 (Customer Identification Code 4 5 148 5332 503725). Transportation of dependents: wife, Jeanne G Hull; step-daughters, Katherine F Harris, DOB 18 May 47 and Ellie G Harris, DOB 25 Sep 49; daughter, Louise H Hull, DOB 7 Jan 55 and son, Harris B Hull, Jr, DOB 23 Apr 57 authorized concurrently with sponsor. Household goods weight restrictions does not apply. Assignment to area accomplished by SO 21, 1007 Air Intel Svc Gp, WashDC, 9 Feb 56 (Authority: Paragraph 91302, AFM 75-1 as amended). Travel time: 5 days. Items 11a, 12c, 16, 18a, 19 and 24 on reverse side are applicable.

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OFFICIAL
HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE

THOMAS D. WHITE
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
"Delmar McGuire
Civil"
1935 - Christian Century
July 8, 1936
R Guide 1937-45 -
Paul E. Johnson "Buzzin' Johnnie Gets
His Medal, Dec 18 1943
SEP, p. 11
Paul Johnson -
"Hitler Has Had The Aces"
Air & Space Museum

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Army Air Forces in WW II. So I would say that both of them made a very great contribution toward a separate air force, and the proper appreciation of air power at that time.

Q: You were assigned temporarily for maneuvers to Andrews headquarters down at Langley, I believe, in 1937?

E: No, the only time that I was personally closely associated on the staff of Andrews was the maneuvers and arranged for taking B-17s out, photographing the REX 200 miles at sea....

Q: You were in the Information Office? You worked for Col Richards?

E: Yes, that is right, I was his assistant in 1936-37.

Q: Andrews was trying to write some articles for autonomy and for more B-17s. He was pushing against Westover, and Andrews got into trouble with Malin Craig, and got his wrists slapped. Westover was still the Chief before he was killed. Did you or Arnold get involved in that?

E: No, I did some rewriting of the thing. But I agreed completely. I was on Gen Arnold's staff, and I told Gen Andrews: "Now, let's not have any internecine fighting. It's not the way to accomplish a result." And the answer that I just gave you became apparent at that time. I said: "Gen Arnold feels as strongly about this thing as you or I do, but he knows he has got to get along." You see he had a very close relationship with Gen Craig. They played golf together, and

Interview, Hansell & Caldwell 8-1-69

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into a long study in Puerto Rico. I came back to Mitchel Field and unloaded all the rum that they had given me down there and went over to the club. I had just sat down when the phone rang. It was Hap Arnold again, and he said to put some more gas in that ship and come on back to Washington.

(The issue was Cape Borinquen or another site. Kenney and O'Donnell went back down and confirmed Borinquen.)

Q: You mentioned your affiliation with the Navy - I think you were attached to the Navy on another occasion back in 1934. Weren't you on maneuvers with the Navy? There was some report that I saw where somebody said you quoted Adm King, it might have been a Capt or RADM, as saying that on maneuvers - a Navy plane would accompany Air Corps planes out to sea.

K: We were to build up navigation in the Air Force. I was on a board - joint Army, Air Force, Navy aviation board. Benny Foulois and King were two top ranking guys, and I was a working member for the Army side.... This subject came up as one of the arguments that had to be settled. This board was to settle all arguments on aviation between the Army and the Navy. They never settled a thing because the vote was always three against three. And then the two working members could be called in to vote in case of tie, but of course, the Navy guy voted the Navy, and the Army guy voted Army.

Q: So it was four-to-four...

K: The only thing that we ever agreed on that this was Wednesday and the sun was shining, or something like that. To go on with this business about King -I had given an impassioned speech about the necessity of learning how to fly over-water outside of land. He said there was no excuse for it at all, that they didn't need to. I said, well, this thing is coming up before McSwain's Military Affairs Committee in a few days and I notice you're

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going to be up there to testify and so am I. He said: "Well, I'm going to tell them the same thing I'm going to tell you. In case we...need some Army bombers out there, we'll have a Navy airplane fly out there with them and show them how to get back to North America." He repeated that same thing before the Congressional Committee.

C: Was this the start of the 100-mile limit?

K: No, that came about in '36. The Italian liner Rex was...

Q: No, that was May 1938. That was when they went out there and flew out and spotted it. You were on that mission?

K: I was on the ship with Caleb V. Haynes...LeMay was the navigator on that same ship. When we came back, the Navy was madder than hell because this thing had broken showing the Air Force could navigate. That's when they had this gentlemen's agreement. It was not on a piece of paper - there was no argument - the Navy says: "Oh, it never happened." But it did. We were restricted 100 miles off the coast. Couldn't fly beyond that - that was Navy territory.

(After a tour in Dayton in 1939 to try to expedite production, Kenney says:) It had just started paying off, when Hap called him and said to come on into Washington. "So I get this B-18 of mine out and hop on into Washington. He says: "Got the stateroom and tickets all ready for you to sail on the MANHATTAN...he said, well, you're going over to Paris, Asst Military Attache, that's your title, got to find out what in the hell these French and British are doing. We think that they are lying about their aircraft production. Go on over there and find out what it's all about. See what's going on, maybe we've got to learn some lessons....I came over there in January and I stayed over there until the Germans started coming in the front door of Paris and I had to get out the back door.

C: This was 1940....

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Interview - BG Harris B. Hull, NASA Hq., Washington, D.C., 2 June 1971

Q: General Hull, you started to make some comment about the GHQ maneuvers at Raritan Arsenal in Sept 1934.

H: Raritan Arsenal was the first maneuver of the four-Army plan that General MacArthur had introduced. It was an overall Army maneuver, and if you will recall prior to that the Army had been broken down into many more units. He organized the Army on the basis of four armies, and he conducted an extensive paper war, and I have articles describing the blow-by-blow on that because I wrote articles every day and those articles were published. Now, the GHQ AF figured in this maneuver, but it was only a participant in the overall maneuver. In the play of the game the Air people would be called upon to supply air support, air missions in support of the Army, but emphasize that those missions were in support of. Now, during the maneuver, at the time of the maneuver, Gen Arnold had come back to Washington with the B-10 bomber.

Q: He was still a LTCOL then?

H: Yes, he was a LTCOL, he came back to Washington and then he, and was received here, and I have articles telling of that reception. I was there at the time they came back. He then took the airplanes out to Hamilton Field and out to the West Coast, out to March Field, California. When he got out there the airplanes were stripped down a great deal, and they were very tired crews because they had conducted this Alaskan flight. Gen MacArthur called for air support in the play of the maneuver game. Now, either there was confusion as to whether it was a paper order, or whether it was a real order, and I don't think anyone could honestly answer that question except Douglas MacArthur. My opinion was that when he called for air - and he had been reading of the B-10s - he simply

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meant it as a paper maneuver. But it got into the other basket, it got into the other mechanism, which was the real mechanism, and suddenly, Col Arnold got word to move his B-10 bombers back.

Q: In the dead of night?

H: It was a miserable thing, and of course, Gen MacArthur, if he did know that there had been a slip, he never let anyone know it, because I was assigned fairly close to him as one of his junior aides. I can recall Arnold coming into the building at Raritan Arsenal striding across the hall. His face showed real irritation, and he went right in to see Gen MacArthur, to find out what was going on. In my opinion there is some doubt as to whether Gen MacArthur ever really intended him to come back. You must understand that there was a large amount of paper play in the war, and to conduct the war you had to issue orders all of which were fictitious. At the end of the day, the umpires ruled on the validity and the results of these orders, and that was the way you played the war game.

Q: This is interesting interpretation of it. A lot of the fellows thought that it was a phony, or not a fair situation. These fellows having been through what they had, and they no sooner got back to March Field. I think they came back on the 25th or 26th of August. I think on the 2nd of September they were called back on this Raritan Arsenal.

H: You must remember one thing, that once they got back, there was no real mission for them to perform because the entire game was a paper war game. But when they got here, there wasn't really anything for them to do. So I'm inclined to think that either, between Gen MacArthur's thinking of calling them back, and the execution of the piece of paper that went out, there were many hands in it, including his Executives, that there may have been some confusion. But when Arnold walked in to see him, Gen MacArthur was not one to say: "Well, we made a

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mistake." Gen MacArthur said: "I'm glad to see you here."

Q: Talking about this particular era, nobody got an award for that Alaskan mission. A number of people I have talked to, Mike Dunn, Hugh Knerr, some others, have resented to this day the fact that they didn't get a DFC for that mission. Although some lesser flights, lesser in their estimation, did get a DFC. Like the Italo Balbo. You remember he came over in some seaplanes, just about this time; also the Kepner-Stevens-Anderson balloon mission received DFCs. Arnold took this matter up with Drum when he came back here two months after this particular mission, in Nov 1934. Drum simply fobbed him off. Do you know anything about this?

H: Let me start by saying that when Col Arnold came to Washington, I met him, and we decided that we would put on the air a radio progtam.

Q: Came to Washington?

H: With the airplanes, prior to flying to Alaska. I was then a newspaper man writing for the Washington Post. But I was also doing the Post first 15-minute news program on a regular schedule that I think was done in this country, certainly one of the first. So here is the script that I dug out last night and it starts out: "22 years ago an eager young LT assigned to what comprised the Air Corps, completed a flight over a triangular course around Washington. Then today Arnold came back to Washington, not as a LT but as a LTCOL. He flew here from Dayton." This is the script of the broadcast.

Q: This is, do you have the date of that?

H: I can tell from the newspaper clippings which I have, but it was the night before, a couple of days before they took off.

Q: This is for Alaska?

H: They went back, as I recall, to Wright Field to do a little bit of,

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getting a few pieces of equipment, and then they took off for Alaska. It was just before the Alaska flight. In fact, the reason for the broadcast was to salute these people as they took off. Foulois was brought into the broadcast. I brought in Foulois. I wrote some of Foulois' remarks. I wrote some of Arnold's remarks, I wrote the questions, and there is the whole script. Now, the important thing was that Arnold suggested to me that I go on the flight. I don't know whether I suggested it to him, but he and I came to an agreement that I would go on the flight. Now this is pertinent to what you are saying. I have a set of orders which I couldn't find last night with these other papers. But my name is on the list of the crews. However, to show you, I'm trying to interpret an attitude that existed. However, at the time, Gen MacArthur -- Gen Drum was Gen MacArthur's deputy -- they were not enthusiastic about any particular recognition being given to the Air Corps at that time. So Arnold came to me and said I'm sorry but they have taken you off the crew list. Now that showed what their general attitude is. This is completely consistent with the fact that they weren't interested in giving any awards to anyone. What would I have done on the flight, the same thing I did on these maneuvers for the other side of the coin. I would have been working as an officer in the daytime, and writing articles, and I've got all the articles here. And they were very happy with those articles, because it told about the ground soldier and the overall picture. But when they saw me getting in to the role where I would fly to Alaska and send back daily articles to the Washington Post about it, they said "no dice." So, they were not enthusiastic about it. They were not interested in any recognition and I think it is completely consistent that they weren't interested in any awards.

Q: In this report, I have the Alaskan flight report here, there is mention

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of a War Dept press representative, and in a letter that Arnold wrote home to his wife, he said the press representative did not go along, and he was happy that he did not go along, because he would rather have a mechanic.

H: I would say the press representative may have been someone from the press office. But he was perfectly, he told me that he wanted me to go, and he put me on the crew list. He wouldn't have put me on the crew list unless he wanted me to go.

Q: If he was going to get some publicity he wanted it from an Air Corps slant, rather than a War Dept slant.

H: Right, but on the other hand, I was an experienced, objective reporter and I have to live in my environment. I couldn't write propaganda for the Washington Post, but at the same time I was an enthusiast on airpower, and we were trying to demonstrate what the flight could do.

Q: Were you a reserve officer?

H: That's exactly correct. I was commissioned as a reservist in 1931 after I graduated. In those years I kept up my reserve commission, and I would go to active duty at the GHQ maneuver. There I am sitting next to Gen MacArthur as his aide. So my role was dual. I served as an officer because I was very anxious to keep up my reserve commission. I worked very hard to get it and you know, if you don't keep it up, you lose it, and I kept it up all through the years between 1931 and 1942, when I was called to duty.

Q: Let me ask you about the Alaskan flight. Westover was supposed to have the flight, Westover passed the command to Arnold. Why?

H: I don't know the answer to that. I never really knew that...first of all, I don't think that Gen Westover at that time was all that experienced in command of B-10 units. I think I would question whether or not Westover ever planned to

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lead the flight. I think there may have been some conversation about that, but the man to lead the flight was clearly the CO of the B-10 units in California, and that man was Henry Arnold. For anyone else to be put in charge of it, I think would have been a mistake. I think the pilots would have been very unhappy with that, because it was quite an ambitious venture for those days.

Q: Do you know how the Alaskan flight originated? Or where it originated? Or why?

H: I think in those days, Gen Arnold, just as in the case of the flight to the REX, Gen Arnold, all the people, probably Gen Andrews, certain people like myself were always interested in figuring out logical demonstrations for the utilization of airpower.

Q: I talked to Seversky, and you're commenting on why Seversky doesn't like Arnold.

H: Seversky as a designer, as an engineer, and as a pilot, everyone respected. But as a head of a company, correctly or incorrectly, Gen Arnold didn't have very much confidence in him. So he, Arnold, was dissatisfied with the production of aircraft, and they were putting a lot of faith in that facility up on Long Island to produce fighters and fighter-bombers for the AF. But there always seemed to be a whole host of design-engineering problems and delays. Arnold wasn't happy with this, he thought what was going to happen..When it did in fact happen, he wanted better management.

Q: This is somewhere around '37 or '38. Was Arnold the Chief then or Asst Chief?

H: He was Asst Chief, then it carried on to when he was Chief. He was instrumental in bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear and a group came in and bought out Seversky and got rid of Seversky, and they ran it. The

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President of the company up there, his name slips my mind at the moment, but I can look it up, but he would be a very good source on this. So the reason Seversky feels bad toward Arnold was that he felt that Arnold was instrumental in kicking him out of his company. But, actually, he came out of it pretty well, because he came out of it with a good deal of cash.

Q: If I am quoting or paraphrasing his comment to me, correctly, he said that Arnold wouldn't give them any contracts unless they squeezed him out of the company, and a change from deSeversky or Seversky Aircraft to Republic. Arnold bought an inferior plane, the P-36, over Seversky's plane, the P-35.

H: I don't know all of this, but I know that it was, that would be the Seversky version, in looking at it from Alexander Seversky's viewpoint. But naturally, Arnold had a different viewpoint, and whether it was an inferior plane or not, Arnold would certainly argue that. He would say that he wanted to insure the best management possible so he was instrumental in getting him out. So that's the reason he doesn't like him. Now, go back for one second to the Alaskan flight. Here is a clipping which you may want which was an article I wrote the day that they returned.

Q: The 20th of August 1934.

H: Now, it seems to me as I looked at Gen Arnold, Arnold was a man who basically was a man, you might say, of two strategies. He had as precise an understanding as it is almost possible to imagine, and I have kept track of this by reading a lot of these things, and actually, I wrote some of his papers. I wrote some of his speeches for him. But he had a very precise understanding of the events that did transpire in the years ahead, i.e., the air war against Europe. And he had very precise understanding an an accurate understanding of the weapons that would be needed, and he pushed, and he worked very hard to

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attain these. This was the Arnold dedication, and it was fantastically accurate, if you go back and appraise the things, the way that he pushed for certain things that they really needed.

Q: Like what?

H: The B-17 program, the better fighter, a better airplane that could survive in an air war. At that time, there was no understanding as to just exactly what the role of air was in warfare. The War Dept visualized it as a close support operation in which you would support forward moving ground forces. But Arnold's vision was higher than that. He saw the air superiority role, and he saw the strategic air mission role, very clearly.

Q: We did not have a good fighter until 1944 - the P-51. We were a little late in recognizing its merit?

H: That wasn't Gen Arnold's fault. Gen Arnold knew it, but he couldn't do everything. He was a man who had to set - and that was the second characteristic - he had to set his sights on a set of goals that he could attain. He knew that they needed a better fighter. His efforts at the Seversky plant were pointed in the development of a better fighter. But the main thing that he wanted to get was to get started a good basic strategic weapon system that would participate in the war. And he did that. But also, he was a man of another strategy. And that was: how do you survive in the atmosphere that is in front of you. Now, if you are unable to survive in an atmosphere, you are only a theorist. But he was a practical man, and he understood that he had to be very diplomatic. He had to be very careful. He couldn't make too many mistakes, or he would get labeled, and he had seen other people labeled in the past, and he had seen them lose out. So he wanted to be the sophisticated man. He wanted to be the cultured man, to use Ben Jonson's words. Ben Jonson said: "A cultured man is a man who

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gracefully lives in his environment." Survives, is what he meant. And Arnold knew he had to survive. So, he was very careful, as you assess him, and you'll see situations where he may have pulled away from a position, because he knew that in that particular situation he would run up against far too fierce an opposition, but then he would work around a different way, and he was also the master strategist insofar as his own personal generalship was concerned. This to me was the hallmark of him because look at the era that he survived in. He was in the Wright airplane, and he was the CG of the Army Air Forces in WWII. Now, there were many very zealous airmen, who tripped up in that period. I lived in that period, and I saw them trip up. They were labeled as wild men, and dreamers. They were eventually, would get tagged, or get labeled in some fashion, or they would leave themselves vulnerable and get pushed aside. Gen Arnold's second strategy that I mentioned was his own strategy of how he conducted himself. Now, this can be interpreted in many ways, one of the ways you could interpret it was the great ease and care in which he had other officers carry out tasks for him. Take Casablanca. Arnold knew that the Casablanca Conference was a crisis conference for air because it looked as though, on the basis of the results that had been obtained by the 8th AF, that there was reason to believe that they would talk in terms of cancelling the strategic mission, that they would have made some crazy decisions. Decisions such as taking the B-17s and attaching them to the British bomber force, decisions such as cutting back on the program of producing a very large number of airplanes needed to conduct the 8th AF and the 15th AF campaigns against Europe. Gen Arnold knew because he had such great personal insight into people. He knew the capabilities of all the people around him. He knew exactly what I could do as a writer, in a small way. I've got literally hundreds of articles that he helped me develop. Some of them are

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right here. He knew exactly the qualities of the various other officers around him. Being dedicated to this mission of air, deeply dedicated to it, because he felt it was a national necessity, he felt that it was very important that these officers played their rightful role in the developing drama that was coming off. He could have thrust himself forward very quickly into all kinds of situations. He probably would have had his head chopped off. He probably would not have been as effective as some of the people that he assigned tasks to. But he had this insight into people, and I saw it. He recognized Norstad's qualities quicker than anyone else. He recognized Hansell and all those young men. He knew what they had.

Q: Cabell too?

H: Cabell, he recognized his qualities and he brought those along. Now when he went to give you, again, an insight into this part of his makeup, it wasn't a selfish characteristic, it was very unselfish, because he would step back and let them do it. It wasn't that he felt, they were just as eager to do it, but they looked to their Chief to decide what they should do, and he gave them that leadership. That was one of the real hallmarks of his genius. At Casablanca, he could have stood up in front of Roosevelt, he could have stood up in front of the Prime Minister and Admiral King, but he knew that his effectiveness would not be as great as a new voice, someone that had been fighting with that airplane. So he came to England, and when he came to England, he went to see Gen Eaker, and he told Gen Eaker, exactly what the situation was. He also had this precise insight into human beings, and he knew he didn't have to tell Ira Eaker what to do. Leave it to Eaker. So what did Gen Eaker do, Gen Eaker then worked with the Prime Minister of England.

Q: He brought Eaker down from England to Casablanca?

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H: Yes, yes, exactly, and Jim Parton, who just hung that telephone up, went with him, and that's where I know the story. Jim Parton was working, he started the war working for me. Gen Eaker drafted him very quickly, made him sort of an Executive. So when they got down to Casablanca, Arnold was shrewd, smart, great insight. He knew he could have told Ira, I want you to do this, this and this. But he didn't do that, he left the job to the man that he had confidence in. And this great ability to weigh all of their characteristics came forward. Eaker went to the Prime Minister, told the Prime Minister that he felt that there was great....Eaker was a master of understatement, and the Prime Minister liked Eaker. The Prime Minister used to come to our Bomber Command dinners in England at the invitation of Gen Eaker, and shake hands with the officers. He thought Gen Eaker was a very splendid person. He admired his military ability, he admired the way he made speeches - the early speech that Eaker made when he came to England, where he said, "we are glad to be here, we'll do a little bit more talking, after we've done some fighting, and I hope when we leave, you'll say you're glad we came." That's all there was to it. Now, this was the kind of thing that rang a bell with Churchill. So Eaker then went to Churchill and said: "Now, look, I think that the case for daylight bombardment should be stated." And the Prime Minister said: "I think it should, too, and I'll call on you, Gen Eaker, tomorrow, at Casablanca, to state that case." Who was the man behind the move on that? Arnold. Arnold knew that King, and Franklin Roosevelt, and all the guys around that table had all heard him a dozen times. But he knew that Eaker had been out on missions, and he knew that Eaker was a very convincing and logical person. Again, never overstating the case, and he then prepared the paper that night, and this fellow (Parton) helped him do it. They wrote the paper called "The Case for Daylight Bombardment,"

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and the meeting opened, Parton told me, I did not go, only because Eaker picked Parton to go with him.

Q: You were in England at the time?

H: I was the Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence, from the start. I was among the original six people who went to England with Eaker. When the war was over, I was the only one of the original six still in Europe. So I was there the whole time, I was there longer than anyone, obviously. Gen Eaker had picked me as a LT to be, because Arnold had been encouraging me, and Eaker had been encouraging me in these years, to try to read and study what there was on the German AF. They would also help me get these little tours of duty so that I could get my commission alive. If you could see my record it was signed by Arnold, it was signed by Eaker, it was signed by MacArthur, signed by all these various people that I had taken six weeks of duty to keep my commission going. Now, so I was the Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and I had gotten Parton and a whole group of people over there with me, to work with me. But Gen Eaker grabbed Parton very quickly because he needed that kind of a man as personal support. He had so many problems. Now when they get down there, when the meeting opened at Casablanca, the Prime Minister said: "Mr. President, I know that one of the things on the agenda," and these are almost his words, "is this matter" - and he looked at his little card - "the case for stated daylight bombardment" - that Eaker had written out on a card for him. "I think that Gen Eaker has worked very hard on this, and I think that we should hear from the Commander of the AF involved, what is the case for daylight bombardment. Don't you agree? Thank you, Mr. President. Gen Eaker." Not a word was said, Eaker got up and gave his talk, and it is a masterpiece. And at that time, the whole air war hung on the narrowest balance that I know. Right there, it could have gone the

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wrong way. Eaker never overstated his case, because he knew King. If you overstated your case, King would have charged in. But he admitted that we had trouble bombing submarine pens, but he also stated: "You've got to remember, we didn't want to bomb submarine pens. That was a super-priority, but we must..." and then he came back to the old air fundamental, "we must attain superiority over the German air force, or you can call it anything you want, but there isn't going to be victory, because you can't be victorious in any kind of a campaign unless you get that superiority. How do you do it?" And then without going into details, "obviously, you do it by destroying them in their nests." And he then talked in terms of working with the British because the case for daylight bombardment was also the case for night bombardment, that it would be, as Eaker called it, "around-the-clock air offensive against Germany would never let them rest." The Prime Minister then chimed in and said: "Mr. President, I think that the American Commander has made a fine presentation, and I think that the American forces should have a chance to prove the theories of the AF. And I'm sure that the British Chiefs who are here with me agree." There wasn't one of them in my opinion that agreed. Not one! They were all a little bit under the influence of King, who was fighting very hard to get more of the strategic allocation assigned to the Navy. And so again, not a word had been spoken except by Churchill and Eaker. And so they went ahead then.

Q: I want to ask, how did King influence the situation so drastically as you indicated? Because the alternative that the British Chiefs wanted was for the AAF to participate in night bombing?

H: Which was a frightening thought to us because we didn't have any flame dampeners. We weren't trained in that. This was an idea that would have given the British--talking to this point the British viewpoint--the British felt that

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they could accomplish an overall strategic mission in a manner different than the American concept. To do this they would love dearly to have had the additional airplanes to increase the impact of their bombardment.

Q: Right, if they got them, then King wouldn't get them?

H: No, it wasn't, I'm saying, I'm sure King wouldn't have gotten them but, on the other hand, King was basically unconvinced on the strategic air mission. Sure, there were two people after them. King would have liked to have a cutback, I'm not saying that King would have acquiesced to it going to the British side. But he basically could see the buildup of a great air force, and he basically was never enthused, and this can be easily documented.

Q: Yes, I'm not questioning that. I just raised the question of the entire matter. A number of things that you are saying, well, everything that you say, I agree with, but I just want to bring out some points here.

H: King wasn't looking at it from that viewpoint. He was sunk whether it went one way or the other. He was fighting right down to the last ditch, and it didn't make any difference which way it went. He said that was really immaterial, as long as you had a large strategic air force buildup he did not subscribe to that concept. And the funny part, the whole background of the Navy and there's a whole series of articles in this collection here, the Navy had every opportunity to develop their own strategic mission, but they went off on this airship tangent, and I was deeply involved in that. I was the first one to reach the side of the Akron when it crashed. Elmer Stone and I flew an airplane out to the site of the Akron. And I started writing articles about airships because, after all, it was a part of it. But they frittered away their energies in this tremendous airship thing that Adm Moffett was so enthusiastic about.

Q: You are talking about the '20s and early '30s?

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H: Right straight up to the destruction of the Macon, which was the late '30s, not just the early '30s. But you must remember that they couldn't do everything. Instead of going ahead and developing a sensible mission, Admiral Moffett - they had every opportunity. They got the money; they built the dirigibles; these guys thought that these things would be instruments of warfare. They visualized them - and I've got all the background in the world on that. Now, the Navy had the opportunity and they naturally felt that they wanted a balanced fleet to carry out a major war, particularly in the Pacific. They saw that this was going to loom, and they didn't have the vision to recognize that out of the B-17 program would come the B-29 program which would play a decisive part in a defeated Japan. So I don't give the Navy very high marks for the way that they battled Arnold on these things, and Arnold was tough. I said that Arnold, in my opinion - I admired him, of course, enormously - I said that he was the man that knew where these various people had their roles. It was this insight into people that I saw him demonstrate, which was to me the most convincing characteristic. I could give you many examples. Let me give you one. I came back, Gen E ker and I had developed a target system to show how the targets of the 8th AF were kept up to date.

Q: You are talking '43 or '44.

H: '42 and '43, I came back all throughout the war, and we had the target like this, and then we had an acetate overlay that I had developed, and we had all the buildings traced out, and as a photograph would come in, we would trace in there, damaged, destroyed, rebuilt. We would float through this overlay as many as 60 or 70 pictures, and it would show the condition of the targets. Eaker didn't like the idea of sitting down and looking at a big stack of pictures. He'd look at me and say: "What does it all add up to?" So I was unhappy. So I

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got a bunch of draftsmen, and we would take all of the pictures and put all of that data on one overlay - do you follow me - if the next day found that when the smoke cleared, one picture might show one little piece of evidence, and you would pull that one. If, four days later it showed they were rebuilding this part of the factory, you would put in green crosshatch. If it was rebuilt, it would be green solid. If it was still undamaged, it would be red crosshatched. If it was completely destroyed, it was red solid, four codes, and you could look at the picture. I developed this, and it was a devil of a job to keep it up to date, because at night these guys would work until they almost dropped, getting it ready for the next morning's conference. But it did give the commander the picture. When Gen Arnold came on one of his trips to England, Gen Eaker said: "I want you to show the book to Gen Arnold." And I said, half kiddingly: "I don't think I want to." I knew Gen Eaker pretty well; he could be real friendly, he could be fairly stern sometimes, but he was a wonderful man. And he said: "Well, I don't quite understand." And I said: "Well, if I show this thing to Gen Arnold, I know General Arnold pretty well." Then I got serious. I said: "He's going to say, 'I want one of those in my office in Washington, D.C.'" And I said, "Ira, I don't know how in the world - it is killing me to keep this thing up to date here - how in the world can I keep all the targets up to date on a bomb-by-bomb basis in Washington, D.C." And he looked to me as if to say: "That's information I don't want and can't use." He was kind of a little short then, so he just said: "Just show it to Gen Arnold." So I showed it to Gen Arnold, and sure enough, Gen Arnold, that night at dinner, told Gen Eaker he wanted one of these set up in Washington, D.C. So, then, the only person to do it was me. So I went to Gen Eaker and said: "See, I told you." He said: "Well, yes, that's right, but we still had to show it to Gen Arnold." Well, I said: "Okay, I'm flattered. If they want one in

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Washington, we will find a way to do it." So we had, once a sheet was completed, we laid down a tracing over it, and showed all the changes. First, we had a duplicate set of books made. That took a week. Then we made these tracings, and then as my team would plot these things, they would make a tracing. They would fly that up to Prestwick; they would give that to the pilot of the plane that flew back, and I would grab it in Washington, take it in and lay it out, and Gen Arnold was happy. And I was back in Washington.

Q: He was great for visual aids, wasn't he?

H: This was THE visual aid, you see. You could literally show, as Trubee Davison I guess it was said, you could almost show where every bomb had dropped in Europe with this damn thing. Of course, you had to have a truck to carry it around the Pentagon. It was literally too heavy. There were 250 of these sheets and the sheets were heavy, and there were binders and stuff on it. Now, my job was to keep Gen Arnold informed on this. That's what I was told. But he also said: "Keep Vandenberg informed," and then he said: "Keep Gen Marshall informed."

Q: Vandenberg was A-3?

H: Vandenberg was A-3, Vandenberg and I got along real well. So I showed it to him and he said: "Great, fine. I've got other work to do. Let Gen Eaker run that part of the war." I said to Vandenberg: "You know, Gen Arnold still wants to run this war just like he is a squadron commander, sometimes." Half kidding, I said, "He wants to know where every bomb dropped." And Gen Vandenberg said" "You're not kidding, he really does." I got a new set of sheets. We were just getting rolling, to really show how the thing worked, and it was an impressive display. You could show within about 48 hours after the bombs had dropped where the bomb had fallen, what the condition of every target was. Nothing to it. I went up to Gen Marshall's office. I guess probably the first time I may have

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briefed him was in Arnold's office. So I went to Marshall's office, full of vinegar and I said to the Exec up there: "I'm Major Hull. I would like to brief Gen Marshall." This guy looked at me as if to say: "You know,you've got holes in your head. He's a very busy man." I said: "I'm from Gen Arnold's office, and I want to brief him on the targets."

Q: Was this Frank McCarthy?

H: No, it wasn't Frank McCarthy, it was another fellow whose name I can't remember, it was not McCarthy.

Q: Robinett, maybe?

H: I can't remember who it was. But he said no, and I guess I was a little bit bolder than I am now, and I said: "Do me a favor." He's a LTCOL. He said: yes, I said: "Just write on your pad there, that Maj Hull wanted to see General Marshall." He looked at me, and I just stood there and looked at him. So he thought: "This crazy guy wants me to write it, I'll write it on the pad. What's your name?" I said: "Major Hull wants to see Gen Marshall. Thank you," and left. He wouldn't let me in. So I got back to the office. Papers were coming in. Arnold had a million other things to do. He came out and he said: "I want you to go up and brief Henry Morgenthau," I said: "You mean at the Treasury Dept? He said: "Yes." It was then about 9:30. So he said: "Get my car and go on up and brief Henry Morgenthau. I said: "Yes, sir, with my books?" "Certainly, with your books." So I got all of the books together and I got them in the car, and I started in. The little fellow that was Morgenthau's executive, works at HEW, and he laughs about this story every time I see him. He's a cripple. He worked for Henry Morgenthau. He has paralysis, works with crutches, and he was Morgenthau's Exec, and he said: "Major Hull, Mr. Secy Morgenthau is expecting you. Go right in." So I went on in, it was about 9:45 or 10:00, and I briefed Morgenthau. Now

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this showed again the fact that Arnold had had these contacts with these people. They had said we would like to know more about the air war. Arnold knew exactly the ones to try to keep in the picture. He wasn't trying to be retentive. He wasn't a man to say, let me run that department. Not Gen Arnold! If they had an interest in it, that was good, and he would try to tell them. This is another one of these qualities, the insight he had into people. Now, after I briefed Morgenthau, a dramatic series of events happened. At 12:00 he went to the White House and at the conference at the White House, Marshall was at the conference, and so was Morgenthau and the Cabinet. At that meeting Morgenthau - of course, Franklin Roosevelt, I was only in a room with him two or three times, so I really don't know the man like I knew Gen Arnold,but I'm told he had a little bit of the imp in him, he liked to sort of play games with people. He sort of had fun. So he apparently turned to Morgenthau and said: "Have you got anything to say, Henry?" Henry said: "Yes, I would like to discuss the strategic air war." And Marshall, I'm told by a person that was in the room, just really was startled, to say the least. So Morgenthau then went through my briefing and he made notes on it. He gave a military briefing to the President of the US. Well, Gen Marshall was not that kind of a man. That violated a lot of principles with him. This was the difference between Arnold and Marshall, in my opinion. Had Arnold been there, he would have rolled with it, but Marshall was irritated at this sequence of events.

Q: That Morgenthau had cut into his province?

H: It was his area, it was his bailiwick, and he was supposed to be briefing the President of the US on these subjects. But Morgenthau did it and took about 20 minutes to do it, and gave all of my up-to-the-minute stuff that I had given him 2 hours before in his office. So Marshall then went back and called in Arnold and just raised hell with him. So Arnold came back to me. He said: "Why didn't

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you brief Gen Marshall?" I said, just like I'm saying it now; "I didn't brief Gen Marshall because the guy wouldn't let me in. I tried to brief him before you sent me up to Morgenthau's office." Can you prove it? I said: "Oh yes." "How?" "Because I made the aide write my name on the calendar with a request to see Marshall and he turned me down." Oh, he said, "Come with me," and we went roaring up there. And he burst right into Marshall's office. And he said, I think he said: "George, my office in line with the conversation we just had," now, here was a chance for him to be sharp with Marshall, he wasn't. Here is where he was deft, skillful. He let the impact of it fall very gently, indeed. He said: "My officer endeavored to come in to see you. He wanted to see you. I told him to see you." And so, then he let Marshall ask the inevitable question: "Well, why didn't he see me?" "Because your officer out here wouldn't let him in." "Did he ask to see me?" "Yes." "Are you sure of that Henry?" "Yes."

Q: Did he call him Henry or Hap?

H: I think he called him Henry Arnold, don't think he called him Hap. But in any event, he said: "Are you sure?" Obviously, the aide by this time was getting very goosey as to what was going on with me in there, and the voices. He was undoubtedly listening, so he called him in and Marshall said to this fellow: "Did this officer endeavor to see me this morning?" And I looked at this guy just as hard as I could look at a human being. He said: "Yes, he did." Well, why didn't you let him in." "Well, I told him you were very busy." And then, of course, Arnold had worked it out to the point where it was an internal matter, and by the Grace of God I had this note made on the calendar. So I was headed for that calendar if this guy had lied. Arnold put his arm around me as we left and said: That's the way to do things. Just keep doing them that way." What I am saying here is there were two examples of this fine insight that he had into

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people. He wanted to do what Henry Morgenthau wanted. It kicked off a real furor, but he managed that, and we came out of that fairly lucky.

Q: I want to ask something at this point. Arnold and Morgenthau had some difficulties in 1939-40. This is when Morgenthau had appropriated to himself the job as unofficial Secy of Defense. He was sending Lend Lease stuff out to the British and French. Arnold was trying to expand an air force, and Morgenthau was sending out his best planes. And there was an incident in 1939. A Douglas plane crashed in the Santa Monica yard with a Frenchman, a fellow named Paul Schmedlin aboard. Do you know anything about that, and Arnold had to testify.

H: I remember vaguely the thing, but you've got to keep in mind. No, I don't really remember all about it.

Q: This resulted in Arnold being called to testify before Bennett Champ Clarke, Senate Military Service Committee, and of course, they put him to the wall and he had to say that Morgenthau was the guy who authorized it. Roosevelt is supposed to have said - Arnold had a little bit in his book about it - that Roosevelt said there were places on Guam for recalcitrant officers. Because of this altercation with Morgenthau who was bound to ship everything out, Arnold got in trouble with Roosevelt, and it took him a little time to get back into the President's good graces.

H: I don't mean to say that in every situation Arnold could be so tactful as to prevail, because what you are saying gives an indication of the kinds of things he was confronted with. There was no enthusiasm, very little enthusiasm outside of a small group of people, for the development of a strategic air force. Let's face it. And Arnold again in the right place, right straight on through, knew, had such skill - I'm repeating myself - but had such skill in his relationships with people that he in fact would prevail in these situations. Now, other people

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would have stubbed their toes. I can mention others; General Arnold naturally wanted to have a senior Air advisor attached to General Marshall, and he tried several of them before he finally settled upon Gen Kuter. Kuter became the guy that really worked very closely with Marshall, went to YALTA with him, wrote the book. What I'm saying is, some of these other people couldn't take it, and some of them were pretty...

Q: He went to YALTA because Arnold wasn't there?

H: No, no, he was also scheduled to go, anyway. He sat at the table because of the fact that some of the top people. No, that's not right, he went because I saw him off, and he went. At that time, he didn't know that he would be at the table with them.

Q: Was Arnold sick at that time?

H: I think that Kuter sat in the seat of George Marshall at YALTA, I don't believe that Marshall sat at the table, but you would have to go back on that reference to the Kuter book.

Q: I think Arnold had a heart attack, didn't he?

H: I don't know. I'm mixed up in there.

Q: You were in Europe.

H: I was in Europe at this time. But all I know is I went down at the time that they went, I thought it was the YALTA meeting, and I was back and saw General Kuter off on the boat, and gave him a lot of briefing material, a lot of target material. They got on some vessel down in the Navy Yard and then they went out to the ocean and boarded a cruiser and slipped across. Now, all I was saying was: Arnold, in all of these dealings, was again a man of two strategies. He had the military strategy but he knew exactly how he had to work with people to attain his objectives. This was the feature that I observed mostly closely in my dealings

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with Arnold, that ability to work with people and get what he wanted. Sometimes he had to be brutal to work with people. Sometimes he had to encourage people who had greater ability than they thought they had. In other cases, he had to practically dismiss officers. But he knew his people, believe me.

Q: Let me take you back to this Arnold visit to the ETO when Eaker...

H: He went out and visited Castle's group. Castle was the son of his classmate, Col Ben Castle, and later killed, and was also in the original six with me when we went to England. They went down to visit the group. So I would brief, I had briefed Gen Eisenhower, when he was in England, I was constantly briefing - Parton helped me a great deal.

Q: Now the visit was after Casablanca?

H: As I recall, he got there on the way to Casablanca.

Q: This is when you showed this fancy visual aid. Did Arnold go to England before he went to Casablanca?

H: Yes, I think he did. Now if he didn't, I think he sent somebody to tell Eaker what I told you. But my impression was he came through England on the way down. But Gen Eaker could tell you this in a minute.

Q: I'm trying to get into another area. I'm trying to pin down the visit because of certain other things that happened. There was a visit he made right after the first Schweinfurt-Regensburg, this was Labor Day, he stayed there for about 7 or 8 days in the ETO. Do you remember this visit.

H: Came back so often, I was shoving back and forth so often.

Q: You were shoving back and forth, but he didn't make too many trips.

H: I realize that, but it was hard for me to identify just when Gen Arnold was there.

Q: I was just thinking, I mentioned Schweinfurt-Regensburg, because we took

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a beating on that first one. We lost 60 planes, and I am just wondering if you could associate any complaints or his own feelings of concern about them.

H: I don't believe I saw him at that time. I didn't always see Arnold. But he might come and go to Gen Spaatz' headquarters and talk to the people there, but I don't have any recollection of that.

Q: Do you remember him coming over Labor Day? He was there for a week.

H: I remember almost all of his trips in one fasion or another, but I can't identify each individual trip.

Q: There was one trip - this was the Labor Day trip, when he and Eaker had some strong words for one another at the Claridges Hotel. Eaker wanted to put 60 planes on one air base, and Arnold said that was too many. When Arnold came back, he was starting to think about Eaker leaving there. Do you know anything about that?

H: I just don't know. I mean that would be something between Arnold and Eaker. I sure wasn't privy to it.

Q: Arnold was sending a lot of messages and some of them were supposed to have been written by Kuter. This is part of the reason that Kuter and Eaker never saw things the same way. After the second Schweinfurt raid, "Black Thursday," October 14, 1943, the deep missions stopped. There were no deep missions for several weeks and months. By this time Arnold had come to the conclusion that he was going to make a change. This was a traumatic experience for Eaker. Now, you were pretty close to him.

H: I was back in the States, again, on one of my trips, and when I got back there I was taken ill. My appendix burst, of all things.

Q: About this time?

H: Yes, right in this period, and this is just the time they were thinking

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about the change. They hauled me out to Walter Reed Hospital. I was working in Arnold's office, and took sick. Didn't go that night. Got up in the middle of the night, went out. They operated on me immediately and found a ruptured appendix. Fortunately, the first of the sulfa drugs were coming in then and I was one of the first patients at Walter Reed to have them. I had a period of about a month recuperation. By that time they sent over another officer, and he picked up the business of carrying on the briefings to Gen Arnold. But he still had the same basic material I had used. Now when I got back, when I got out of there, I went down and worked a few days. Then, Fred Anderson said: "I've got an airplane here." Fred Anderson was back. He was a bomber commander and they brought him back. So he and I flew back in the same airplane. We went up to New York, and went to a show together with his wife, and then we flew back to England. On the way back, Anderson said: "You might as well know that in the period you've been hospitalized, there is a change of command, probably in the wind, of some sort. So I went in, I didn't really know what it was all about, but a big dinner party, and we just got down there about a day before this beg dinner party. Doolittle was there; "Bert" Harris was there; Anderson and Eaker. It was apparent that Gen Doolittle was going to succeed Eaker, and I've got a picture of the two of them shaking hands. Eaker looked pretty grim. Air Marshal Harris took me over to Doolittle, and said: "If you are clever" - now I had also taken my books over and shown them to the British. The British were fascinated, and they set up a similar system of target information. It was varied a little bit, it was easier to keep because you didn't have to have a mass attack. Air Marshall Harris said to Doolittle: "If you're clever, you will keep this intelligence officer." I always interpreted that as meaning that Air Marshal Harris would like to have me around to be a consultant on his target

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information system, which is a very important part of his intelligence. Doolittle said: "I'm hopeful that I can." Well, it wasn't in the cards, because Gen Eaker had permission to take with him any one he wanted, so he took the immediate members of his staff, and we were off to the Italian campaign in about 4 or 5 days.

Q: You went with Eaker?

H: Yes, actually, I went in another airplane. We had two airplanes. I went down to Tunis and we kicked around there, until we could get over to Italy, and the battle was moving north, and they wanted to use a particular GHQ Hqs in Italy, and the only place you could put the monster was at Caserta, and Castera needed a little bit of tidying up there. There were a few Germans still around. So they waited until the Germans were pushed north, and then we flew over and moved into the palace. Norstad was the Operations Officer, and he was Director of Operations, and I was Intelligence Officer.

Q: Were you aware of Eaker's bitterness? Of being moved out of the 8th AF? Or was he a bitter man?

H: Let me give you my impression. My impression was that at that particular time he was indeed a very disappointed man. But I think that when he got down to the Mediterranean, and he saw the magnitude of the task, and the fact that the Mediterranean AF down there with Slessor - Slessor was his Deputy - that this was indeed an enormous assignment, because we had the British bomber force, we had the 15th AF. Obviously, we had the tactical air forces under Gen Cannon. We had more missions than you can imagine.

Q: Did you know Spaatz wouldn't take that job unless they elevated the Mediterranean job to MAAF, which would give an appearance of a promotion to Eaker?

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H: Spaatz wouldn't take what job?

Q: The job in the ETO. They brought Spaatz in to be USSTAF.

H: I didn't know what job you meant.

Q: Moved Spaatz from the Mediterranean up to England, they moved Eaker down to the Mediterranean. Spaatz wouldn't take it unless they elevated the other job.

H: I wasn't privy to that.

Q: Because he and Eaker were very close.

H: Still are. I had lunch with the two of them not too long ago.

Q: You know, Eaker was writing some letters to people. I've seen a couple, where he was quite...he never forgave Arnold, ever.

H: I think he felt that he was the architect of the 8th AF, and he would have preferred to stay there.

Q: I can understand his position. I talked to him about this. Of course, now he's mellowed on the subject. But, at the time, he was very much exercised, one of the letters that he wrote to an individual was that he felt that he was the coach through spring training and stayed with the team, or was right in the middle of it, and then the manager took him out of the box in the World Series. He used this kind of analogy. Arnold was an impatient man, as you knew better than anybody else. Why do you think Arnold took him out of there?

H: Well, one of the reasons in my opinion was this. It seemed to me that if Gen Eaker woke up one time and found in a very short period that he was on the front cover of Time, and on the front cover of Life -- I have both the issues - and I think that - I have reason to believe that this caused some wretchedness to some of the people. They felt that Eaker was, actually, it was a natural consequence of the role of the 8th AF. Eaker had had Thruelson and Parton and Gordon

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write a book called "Target Germany." Life Magazine, because Parton had come out of the Time-Life organization, took "Target Germany." I have a copy of it at home. They reprinted about 10 or 15 pages of this book in a lot of columns. They made quite a pictorial digest with a lot of pictures that were fortuitiously made by Bourke-White. So here was Eaker, one week on the front cover of Life, and then a couple weeks later, on the front cover of Time, and...

Q: You feel somebody in Hqs. resented his publicity?

H: I don't think that any commander out in the field, be it George Patton or anyone else can get that kind of exposure and not have people develop some wretchedness.

Q: This "wretchedness" would have been...?

H: Wretchedness on the part of some people that were around Arnold, and probably a little bit of wretchedness on Arnold's part. I think he was getting to the point where to use a simple analogy, he was getting, Eaker was getting too big for his britches. Because people react peculiarly, just like in the medical business. If you see a picture of a doctor and he gets a lot of publicity, all the other doctors hate him.

Q: This is reflected in some of Eaker's letters. I've seen a lot of his letters to other people.

H: I think that he was getting, but the nature of the AF mission was so great that it was one of the predominant things happening in Europe. And so, he didn't go out and seek it, if anything, some of the eager beavers around him were the guilty ones. If we had to live it again, we might have played that down a little bit.

Q: You were the Asst Intelligence Officer?

H: Yes, but Eaker also knew I had this journalism background. I had known

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Ira Eaker for many, many years before this. I had served with him in Wright Field one time. I served under Eaker in the GHQ AF maneuvers. That contrasted with the GHQ maneuvers, the GHQ AF maneuvers at Mitchel Field when I was on his staff. I worked for him down here in the Munitions Building, or what was the Munitions Building before they tore it down. So I knew Eaker all through this period very, very well.

Q: One of the things I detect from the Arnold-Eaker confrontation at the Claridges Hotel was that Eaker could not satisfy Arnold with what he was going to do with all the B-17s. Our factories were really turning them out at this point - we are talking about like Sept 1943 - the B-24s and B-17s were really being turned out. Arnold said to Eaker: "If you can't use these planes, I can't resist demands that they be sent out to the Pacific." You know, King and the Navy and our air commanders in the Pacific were screaming for planes. Eaker proposed to put 60 planes on one airfield. He couldn't operate 60 planes at one airfield. He could only operate them piecemeal. And Arnold contended that if you do that, the German fighters can go back, refuel and knock off - if you stage your bombers - do you remember this arising?

H: I wasn't privy to it. I was working on the Intelligence side all that time. I just don't know anything about it. There wasn't any real threat of the German fighters coming in and hitting them on the air bases.

Q: Well, Arnold figured you have to fly all your planes at one time in mass formation. In other words, it is strictly a mathematical formula. If you fly 600 planes, you lose maybe fewer than 5 percent.

H: You should.

Q: Because the planes were mutually supporting?

H: Also because you tend to overtax the air defenses in Europe.

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Q: But if you flew them in stages, you couldn't get all your planes off at one time - which was Arnold's concern - then if you flew them at stages and flew others after the others were part of the way along on the mission. The Germans could refuel, come back.

H: Our main argument against that, one of the arguments was that we used up all the daylight hours, and the daylight hours in England get pretty short part of the year. We used up all the daylight hours. I was on missions where we took off at night, and it was damn near dark when we got back from the missions. So, when you talk about staging, staging to where, and we weren't going very far, the B-17 wasn't all that fast, in other words, you couldn't stretch out your period. Do you understand what I'm saying? If you are going to fly, you get up at 3:00 in the morning, you take off at 5:00 and you are going to fly a mission down to the Bay of Biscay, and back, as we did. Holy mackerel, where is the staging time coming in?

Q: You couldn't operate them all together, fly all your planes in one mission. Because you didn't have repair and maintenance facilities, then it gave the Germans opportunity to shoot at only part of the force, and then refuel.

H: I appreciate the desirability of it, but I have to repeat that the air base capacity was such that you could only take off a certain number of airplanes and recover a certain number of airplanes.

Q: This was part of Arnold's argument - that you can't use all the planes we are sending to you. He looked at the statistics you had...

H: Arnold was the greatest man in the world to throw an argument up like that. He knew that you had other air bases, he also knew what the replacement rates were. But he would throw out an argument like that to get the very best argument that he could out of Gen Eaker, and then he would make notes on it,

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and carry it back.

Q: Your air bases were saturated with planes, and Arnold felt that sending planes over in the same number that we had been sending over, would not utilize the B-17s to the degree that we had been.

H: Let me tell you, I was the Intelligence Officer, I wasn't the Operations Officer. General Armstrong was the Operations Officer, so I mean I would have to defer to that. However, Gen Eaker's idea was that up...

Q: He just passed away, Frank Armstrong, a year or so ago

H: Yes, I went to his funeral.

Q: Down in Tampa?

H: The funeral was here in Washington, he was buried in Arlington. Frank Armstrong was the A-3, and I was the A-2, so we were very close friends.

Q: The argumentation for staging planes....

H: Gen Eaker felt that one of the ways that you would work this would be if you would have an air base up north of the midlands, and as airplanes were lost you would bring in replacement crews, and that would be one way to keep up the strength. Now, I can't really get into the details of the argument of Arnold and Eaker on that, except that Gen Arnold was one to pose all of the...he had problems at home. He was posing these problems. You had to look at them in a certain amount of perspective. He would pose these various problems, and as he posed them, he would get the best argument that he could. Now, he came to High Wycombe one day on one of his trips -- I can't remember which one it was -- I'm mixed up on dates for the moment. He asked for the intelligence briefings, so I gave it to him, and I gave it to him I guess, very very thoroughly, and I said goodbye to him. He was my friend. I had known him very well. He was very friendly after all the ceremonies, go out to his car and shake hands with him. Always enjoyed

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seeing him. He couldn't have been nicer. At about 3:00 in the morning his aide called me, and said: "Gen Arnold wants you to have breakfast with him," and I said: "Well, sure, I guess I can get up there." He said, "Well, he'll be expecting you to have breakfast about 6:00." He was up at Spaatz' place, up near London. So I got a car and I went up there, and he said: "Harris, I want you to give me a repeat. Now, I have problems back home, and I've got problems, and I want you to repeat some of these points you were making." We had kept a whole set of charts, we had gone into all kinds of analysis of reaction. We had a lot of evidence right in our fingertips to answer questions - current information. He said after breakfast: "Ride out to the airport with me. I want to ask you more questions." So I rode out to the airplane, and then he said this amazing statement: "This pilot takes a long time to warm this plane up. Would you mind getting in the airplane, and having your driver pick you up at the end of the runway." Well, I knew the pilot, strangely enough, Frank Nizeworm. He never took a lot of time, so I said: "Sure, if you want me to get in the airplane, I'll get in the airplane, General." So I climbed in the airplane with him. The guy swung down and my little driver came down, about 100 yards off to the side, and I was there. They were supposed to lower a rope or something to let me out of this beast. The guy swung around and took off for Prestwick. Gen Arnold said: "I'm sorry about this, but I wonder if you would sit down with Gen Strong, who is General Marshall's G-2 and talk to him a little bit," and I said: "Sure, I know Gen Strong." Well, Gen Strong and I got along reasonably well, as much as anybody could get along with Gen Strong. And I said: "Nice to see you. I'm taking the trip up to Prestwick. Then Strong was one to throw out the tough questions. He said: "I understand you fellows think you are going to win all these campaigns and win the war all by airpower." I said: "No, I don't really think that. I think that some of the other

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people are saying that, but I haven't heard very much reference to that by the senior Air commanders in Europe." He said: "What have you heard?" Then I started in on Strong, and I went through the whole thesis of air power in Europe - the same basic arguments. You had to prevail over the continent; you had to destroy the German air force on the ground and in the air. I went all through it. So when we got up to Prestwick, I started to get out. I said, General Arnold, "Don't worry, I've got a lot of friends here, I'll find an airplane. I'll get back." Arnold said: "Look, you are doing real well with Strong. I was sitting a couple of seats back there, and Strong's questions were very friendly. I think you are doing well. Would you mind riding over to Iceland?" "No," I said, "if you want me to." Well, to make a long story short, the conversation continued into Washington, D.C, There was Arnold trying to get at his fingertips, and he saw that when he got back he was going to have to try to work over George Strong. He knew that Strong leaned very heavily on the Army side of all of these big arguments. So he saw a chance for one of the people he knew - me - to go ahead and talk about airpower with Strong, in fairly elementary terms. Now, that is mentioned in Global Mission. That comes out, my name is in there. It said: "Hull returned with me and had an interesting discussion," just a passing reference.

Note: No reference to Harris Hull in Global Mission.

Arnold, as he would with Eaker, would throw out an argument, he would throw out an idea, and Eaker, sometimes, would react rather sharply, but basically they both had mutual admiration for each other. So I summarized Arnold, and I've said almost everything I know about him. I summarized him as a man of two strategies; a real brilliant military understanding, a brilliant, much more brilliant than most people have ever really given him credit for. He showed it so many times to me. That would be the one thing that I would emphasize, that he saw the sequence

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of events, he had me interrogate Gen Spaatz when he came back - by interrogate, I mean talk to him, be sure that we drained off all of the information that Spaatz had while Spaatz was fresh from his trip to Europe. He would use me to go out and talk to all sorts of people because he saw the trend of things. But he saw them very early, but he also had that second strategy, which was (Hull interpolating) "If I am to serve the cause to which I am dedicated, which is American airpower, I've got to be a very discreet person in some circles. I've got to previal, I've got to be cultured, and I've got to be careful, or else I'll get my head chopped off, because I am sitting out here in front. There will be times, when I'll be stern with people, and there'll be other times when I'll take a step backwards and let somebody else go in and do the talking."

Q: Let's talk about Andrews and Arnold.

H: Andrews was a different kind of man. I knew Frank Andrews very well. I knew him because I flew with him. I flew with him in the GHQ AF maneuvers up at Mitchel Field. He was educated to a degree by Eaker. Arnold knew all of the needs for public appreciation of airpower. That was why he did this kind of work. This book is not Global Mission. It is Army Flyer. Now, and it was written, by that I mean there were many books. There were other Arnold-Eaker books. Now, Andrews was a man with a completely different makeup, and he was educated to a degree in these matters by Eaker, at places like the GHQ AF maneuver. He recognized the need for it; he gradually learned about it - and some of the lessons were a little harsh, such as the aftermath of the Rex mission when they flew out over the water. But Andrews - I don't think that Arnold could have ever held General Eisenhower's job, but Andrews could have. Andrews was....

Q: Was he slated to have the job of CG/ETO?

H: My understanding was that he was, General Marshall said - after he was

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killed - "well, that's the end of putting an air man in there." Somebody told me that they heard Marshall say this. There is not going to be another air man. Now, I don't think that anybody could say definitely what the chain of command was going to be, but certainly he was a prime candidate for it.

Q: There is some disagreement. I've asked a number of people. Some say that Andrews would have been the Eisenhower of WWII.

H: I would be one of them, and the way that I briefed him, and the questions he asked when he came to England. I had known him, so when he came to England, I briefed him and talked to him at length, and he was fascinated, told me certain things he wanted done. He was a man of, he was a very intellectual person. He was very studious. He was, of course, very popular with the British.

Q: Getting back to your two strategies that Arnold pursued. Andrews was of a different mind, I think, as I read his record. Andrews took a more forward position in respect to airpower in the '30s than Arnold did. Andrews was GHQ AF starting 1935 through 1939, Arnold was second-in-command of the Air Corps under Westover. Andrews took a more forward position in respect to procuring B-17s. Arnold had moderated his views, somewhat. When people like Woodring, Westover and Gen Spaulding, G-4 said, we want to get more airplanes for the money. Under the Eaker Board there were 2,320 planes on the agenda. And the War Dept General Staff figured if we get smaller airplanes, like B-18s, we can get more planes for the same dollars. Andrews pushed hard for the B-17. Arnold did not push as hard for the B-17s in this period, I am talking '36-37-38.

H: I wouldn't know that, to me, Arnold always pushed as hard as anybody could push, but I know that Andrews and Knerr were pushing awfully hard, too. Because I later spent a lot of time with Gen Knerr, and he told me about it.

Q: This brings up a follow-on question. In 1940-41, Andrews had been sent out

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to San Antonio after he completed his tour in 1939. Knerr went to work for the Sperry Company and you worked alongside of Knerr. This is '39,'40,'41.

H: Knerr had done some writing and some of his writing had caused some degree of irritation.

Q: Yes, it did. He wrote for Fortune magazine....

H: He was very outspoken. He was different than Arnold, he believed in laying the cards on the table.

Q: And he probably wrote William Bradford Huie's book....

H: I don't think he wrote the book, but he helped him, and then he came to work in the Sperry Corporation, and I was an Asst to the Vice President of the Sperry Company. Fred C stle was an Asst to the President of Sperry. And Jim Webb was the Vice President.

Q: You know, Knerr came down to visit Andrews in the Panama Canal in 1941. Andrews was pushing Sperry's equipment. Sperry had a rangefinder or some kind of an antiaircraft spotter. So Andrews was going to help out a little bit, and recommend Sperry equipment. But mostly, they were corresponding with one another, and there was a tone of bitterness toward Arnold in this correspondence.

H: Hugh Knerr could inject a little bit of fire in anything he did. I later became his Executive Officer in the Pentagon. When he became IG after the AF became a separate service. I knew him very, very well, so he could get kind of, I guess, bitter....

Q: I talked to him several times.

H: He could get kind of bitter on certain things. He's very splendid person, and he made a wonderful IG.

Q: He and I are great friends now. In fact, I'm helping him with the Board of Military Corrections on the awards for the Alaskan flight. He is one of the

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bitter people. He felt that Arnold got a DFC...Arnold ended up with a DFC and nobody else got an award. Knerr felt, to put it bluntly:"Arnold looked after Arnold; Andrews looked after his men."

H: Arnold, of course...Gen Knerr was completely devoted, as an individual, to Gen Andrews. He was the Chief of Staff, GHQ AF. He is a very blunt man, and he had that quality, I know him as well as any human being. I get Christmas cards from him regularly. Maybe I'm getting older, but I tend to look upon those things as personal characteristics, rather than anything said or done with any venom. He was just that kind of a guy. Now, he got himself into some difficulty when he wrote some of these articles. He left the Sperry Co. I think the Navy wasn't too happy with some of the things he had written. Sperry was doing a lot of business with Navy. So by mutual agreement he left, and about that time things were beginning to heat up very quickly, and as soon as the war came along, Gen Andrews got him back in. The day that he arrived in Europe was th3 day that Gen Andrews was killed.

Q: Let me back you up about a year before that. Knerr was trying to get back into service, 1941. Andrews was down in the Caribbean. Arnold was breaking no world's records getting Knerr back on active duty. Were you aware of that?

H: Wasn't privy to it, didn't know about it. Actually, anything done through the Army staff was very difficult. You must remember that Arnold wasn't a controlling factor.

Q: Right, he wasn't. But he was aware that Knerr was a disturbing influence, that Knerr was pushing very hard for a separate air force.

H: It wasn't the time....

Q: Correct. But he was writing Andrews, letters; Arnold has betrayed us, using strong language like this. Andrews was acquiescent. Andrews' letters

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were neutral. But do you know that Knerr had an idea to put Andrews on top of the AF, and put Arnold out in Africa. He wanted Andrews to run the AF. I've seen his letters. He doesn't know that I've seen them, but I have. The McNarney-Kuter-Harrison reorganization. You know the reorganization that took effect March 9, 1942, this started sometime just before Pearl Harbor. It was a halfway house type of thing. It gave the Army Air Forces autonomy within the War Dept in order to still the clamor for a separate Air Force, which was being built up in Congress. Knerr was one of those guys lighting that fire. He had two things in mind, one, he wanted a separate air force. He figured airpower was the most important ingredient in winning a war which it probably was. Secondly, he probably felt that under a separate Air Force Andrews would, having more command experience than Arnold had, would rise to the top of the tree, and he would be the commander of the unified Air Force. And all the help he gave William Bradford Huie, all the articles he wrote for American Mercury, either under Huie's by-line, if he didn't write them, Huie got all his material, or most of his material.

H: Huie wrote "The Case Against the Admirals."

Q: That's Knerr's book, and so is the book, "The Fight for Airpower," Knerr's argumentation, too. In fact, in the preface of each of these books is a big word of praise for Knerr. But did you know that this was going on?

H: I knew to this extent. I wasn't really privy to it because I didn't know Knerr all that well at that time. My association with Gen Knerr resulted later.

Q: Well, did he ever talk to you about that?

H: Not very much.

Q: Did he ever talk about Arnold to you? I give Arnold credit for this, because Arnold knew the type of guy he was. Arnold knew that he was a disturbing element. Arnold had pledged to Marshall that he was not going to push for a

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separate Air Force during WWII. This was understood between them.

H: This is characteristic of Arnold, of prevailing in his environment. If you had a Knerr in there - and I love Gen Knerr - but if you had a Gen Knerr in there he would have lasted about 24 hours. Because the heat, the pressures, which surrounded the position, he would not have been able to survive it.

Q: As I wanted to conclude my little comment - my big comment, maybe - that despite Arnold's feeling about Knerr, he had great respect for his ability. Knerr was one of the great logistics people of WWII. Logistics in the 8th AF and the ETO were messed up. Arnold permitted him to come back and rise up to become the Deputy for Logistics.

H: Deputy for Administration and Logistics.

Q: That's correct. I mean he was like No. 3 man in there.

H: Anderson and Knerr and there was Spaatz and Curtis.

Q: Right. But what I am saying is that Arnold did not allow his own feelings about Knerr to intervene. There was no love lost between Arnold and Knerr, but Arnold did not allow his feelings about Knerr to interfere with his other feelings.

H: I said earlier that one of Arnold's great qualities was this insight into what individuals could do, and his ability to roll with certain situations, to make compromises. This is another example of it. This was the great genius of the man, which he knew just exactly what different people had capacity to do. He knew the little role I could do. He knew what Norstad could do. He knew what Anderson could do.

Q: Now having made that point, on the other side of it, there are some people who say that Arnold bore grudges.

H: My feeling is that people in different situations as they get older and as they are confronted with some God-awful situations, tend to be partly

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contradictory basically. In other words, everything you said about Arnold is correct, but then in a particular instance, he could show hostility, and he could be mean, but over a period of time it was not a lasting quality with him, because he had all these various, he was being pulled in every direction. Everything you said about the way that he could handle people and that he recognized Knerr's abilities as a logistician is correct. But, then, in a given situation, as he got older and as the frustrations in some cases built up on him, he might very well spit out some ugly words about some SOB, and he would really be mean. But, over the long period, when you evaluated it six weeks later, it would have vanished like the morning fog. But the same basic quality that you described earlier was the prevailing quality. I believe I can get mad at one of my kids, in any given situation, get very angry with them, very disappointed with them, and practically not speak to them for 24 hours because of something that they had done. But, basically, that isn't the prevailing quality in family life. The prevailing quality of Arnold's life was an ability to understand what the values were, and how to use those values.

Q: To use your phrase, "prevailing quality" some have said that Arnold gave preference in assigning good jobs to men who came up on the West Coast with him - Eaker, Spaatz, some of the others - as opposed to those who came up on the East Coast with Andrews - Royce, Tony Frank, Knerr...

H: It wasn't a case of the East Coast vs. the West Coast. No, it was not, definitely. If you take a look at this GHQ list here, you realize the small number of the eligibles. There weren't all that many good people to pick from. How in God's name could you compare Krogstad, Cousins, and as much as I like Frank, with people of the stature of Eaker and Spaatz?

Q: You know, Tony Frank wanted a command, and Arnold wouldn't give him one?

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H: I know he did, but on the other hand, Tony Frank served his nation well but it wasn't a case of...there was such a small number of people, here I was a LT and I was rubbing elbows with all these Generals. There I am in the order, so you know if I am in the order, every single man of any ability at all in the Major and LTCOL rank were all there. No, it wasn't a case of where you lived or anything. It was a case of Arnold's very precise evaluation of what the hell the quality was. What could they do?

Q: When did he moderate his drive for a separate air force - in the '30s?

H: Oh yes. He shelved it for a while. Now, the reason was he saw that the time wasn't then. He had to prevail, he had to prevail through those difficult years, so he had to fashion a mechanism that he could ride on. That mechanicsm came out after many, many conferences. He wasn't about to go out on a crusade that he was going to lose on. If you want one quality of Gen Arnold, he wouldn't attach himself to a losing cause. So he saw that at that time it was timely. Now, as a younger officer, when things were going along, he had aspirations for it.

Q: He learned his lesson in the Billy Mitchell situation? He was sent into exile and he benefited from it.

H: Arnold, if he were here, would say,that's not the way to be influential.

Q: Mrs. Arnold told me that she sat in on some of these trial conferences, during the Morrow Board hearings, and during the trial. I think she sort of blended them in together. But Billy Mitchell deliberately chose an extreme position, in order to bring attention to the plight of airpower. Billy Mitchell was a martyr; he sacrificed himself, knowingly. But Arnold did not have this psychological problem.

H: Because Billy Mitchell didn't serve his country as well as Arnold did in the long run. If you are going to prevail, you've got to prevail in a time bracket.

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You can't just prevail for one moment, and Arnold recognized, again, that quality of culture.

Q: You know, Billy Mitchell is far better known than Arnold is today. Most young people don't even know Arnold, but everybody knows Billy Mitchell. Of course there's been a Gary Cooper movie about Billy Mitchell. There ought to be a movie about Arnold. Maybe we can rectify this. But you know, looking at the history, I agree with you that Arnold did far more than Mitchell did for the AF. But Arnold does not come through to a lot of young people today.

H: I think any dramatic event invites, any particular dramatic event such as the Mitchell trial would be the thing that's remembered. The more careful, diplomatic person who prevails is the person perhaps who isn't as well known. C'est la vie.

Q: Let's back up to the Rex Mission.

H: I was on it.

Q: You were on the mission? There was a big to-do the next morning when the pictures hit the Herald Tribune.

H: Well, we had a number of correspondents at Mitchel Field, Gen Eaker, as I recall, was head of the Public Information Office, I was one of the officers working for him there.

Q: Was there a fellow named Richards?

H: H.H.C. Richards, I don't think he was up there at that time. He was down here, in the Munitions Building. I don't think he was up there, I don't recall seeing him, but Eaker was Public Information Officer. So it was decided that they would send these airplanes out to the Rex. Andrews wasn't one to go and get too many clearances from anyone, so we prepared some lists and then we advised the correspondents that wanted to go. And so, we picked up a few, and we loaded them

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into the airplane. I loaded them myself. One fellow almost didn't get on board, a little mixup at time of takeoff. But I took these guys down and put them in these airplanes. One of the airplanes was flown by Cousland; one was flown by C.V. Haynes, one was flown by either Malloy or George, I've forgotten which. Our copilot was Doug Kilpatrick, and most of the people were out of the South American flight. In other words, they were all 2nd Bomb Group people. LeMay was on board as a navigator. So we took off and we started to fly, and the weather was just simply frightful. You couldn't even see the other airplanes. So we had to be very careful. We got different elevations to be sure that nobody slid into somebody. And we flew, and we flew and flew. After we had flown about something like 3 1/2 hours, we broke out into the most amazingly clear day you've ever seen. We were barging along there, and pretty soon we saw the REX.

Q: You knew where it was?

H: We knew the general course it was on. The idea was to go out and intercept it in the ocean. This is a pretty tough navigation problem, because you know you didn't have any radio aids as such. You couldn't exactly turn on a homing beacon. The airplane that I was in was not the one that spotted the REX, but they said they had spotted the REX. So we all closed in and we flew across the deck of the REX. We flew down fairly close. I've got a whole bunch of pictures.

Q: The captain invited you for dinner?

H: Oh yes, there was some...and there were a lot of Americans on board who were coming back from troubled Europe, and they got out. They sort of thought that this was a salute to them, you know, to welcome them back to the States. It wasn't that at all. They started to sing the Star Spangled Banner on the decks. This came out the next day in the Herald Tribune, two days later, and how exciting it was for them coming back from a Europe that was on the verge of

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difficulty, to see these American airplanes welcoming them as though they were right outside of the Statue of Liberty, about two miles. Hell, they were 700 miles at sea. And so we flew down and made this picture, and George Goddard was making them. Then we'd say, "one more, fellows". These airplanes would turn around like this, and come down like that, and make these pictures, because Gen Andrews said he wanted a picture of the REX with the airplanes in it. He said that kind of thing half-jokingly. I don't think he really expected us to get it. These guys were pretty eager beavers and they didn't mind flying like that. I wouldn't have flown that low. I mean that's getting down pretty low. If you got a downdraft, you would go down in the water very quickly. Out over that kind of water you could get some downdrafts and updrafts, as we learned about an hour later. So we made these pictures and we said "Hi Ho" to the REX, turned around and started home. Except for the fact that Doug Kilpatrick buckled himself in, I would be dead. We were coming along, and we came into this clear air turbulence. That airplane went down like nothing I have ever seen.

Q: You were flying B-10s?

H: No, these were B-17s, airplane went down very rapidly, and Cousland went up against the ceiling - he was the pilot. But Kilpatrick was strapped in, because somebody told him to fly it by the book. He was all strapped in, probably had his elbows under the arm gear and he was holding on tight. When it snapped out, why, he just let it gently out like that, and as a result he was able to save the airplane, but I don't know but what we went down - George Goddard could tell you - I guess we must have gone down about 2,000 feet in about 2 seconds. The airplane rivets were strained. You could see them when we came back, I think they had to disassemble the airplane. Had that airplane been pulled out sharply, the wings would have come off. But this kid was so damned good - he was a very good

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pilot - he was later killed in a B-17. He just slid it right in sort of gently and then let it catch on. We had a frightful ride back, but we did intercept the REX, the publicity was tremendous. The aftermath you know very well.

Q: Let me ask you about the aftermath. This is the 100-mile limit which was imposed..?

H: I've never been able to document that.

Q: But it must have existed because many people - I talked to Eaker about this. Eaker said it was imposed, but nobody can document it.

H: I've been tracing the document on that with Hansell and others for a long period of time, but I know, afterwards, the furor that was cooked up by the REX flight. They took Knerr and assigned him to some place. They assigned McNarney to another place, Kenney was assigned to the Infantry School. Various people went their several ways, and it was a blow to the organization that Gen Andrews had created. Arnold, here again, Arnold was deft. He didn't get himself too closely involved in this. I keep coming back to the two [redacted] strategies of Arnold. You've got to have a military strategy, but you've also got to have a strategy to survive in the atmosphere, you've got to be cultured.

Q: Let me ask you, you quoted Ben Jonson.

H: Ben Jonson said once, the definition of a cultured man is a man who, with grace, can live easily in his environment.

Q: Now, this is your thought. Did Arnold quote Ben Jonson?

H: No.

Q: Your interpretation of his role?

H: He fitted into that. No, it wasn't a quotation that I got from Arnold; it's a quotation I got from my own reading.

Q: Arnold was not a learned man, in a sense of, he did not do a lot of reading

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of the classics. He did not literally quote from Shakespeare, the Bible, or things of this sort.

H: Practical air man. Had these qualities that I described. Some of the other people that might have done a lot of philosophic readings and be very learned would have failed to have prevailed in this kind of an atmosphere. Knerr wouldn't have lasted 24 hours. Knerr was a very - he used to read all the time - I mean he was a studious man. But he didn't have the great ability to be diplomatic.

Q: I made a note here, remember Perera and Bart Leach and Elihu Root, and a couple of others - this Committee on Operations Analysis. I guess you worked closely with them on this targeting, damage effectivenss and things of this sort. Did they do a good job out there?

H: You mean in England?

Q: Yes, didn't they come out to England, and you know, the targeting was not as good as it became later on.

H: But that wasn't due to them?

Q: No, I don't mean it was due to them....

H: The targeting of the air force was perfectly classic and perfectly well defined. I went through this at the Air War College. Have you talked to Emme? Emme will fill you in on my comments at the Air War College on this. But what happened was that after, the targets were not all that elusive, there was nothing about the 8th AF target. Counterair, transportation, oil, airfields, and things like that. But then these people came forward and some of them are the people who are claiming they had the great cure - they had a great deal of influence in curing the target ailments. But what happened was: people would come forward and Gen Marshall was one of them, with his staff. He said: "As there are any submarines in the Atlantic, the first thing we have got to do is to insure" - and

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this was the Navy that got to Marshall - "we've got to insure that those submarine targets are hit." Well, what were the targets? I had the job of getting all the intelligence together, had about 4 or 5 days to do it. It was very easy. I can name them: St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, Brest, and Lorient. So we took off - I went on one of these missions just to see what bombing submarine pens was like. When you got down there, you couldn't do a damn bit of damage to them. They made them too deep. So what I'm saying is, the ailment of the target was, it was like the dish put on the table. Don't blame the cook of every one of the guests comes in and throws in some salt. They changed it. Are you talking about the Orvil Anderson group, too?

Q: Yes.

H: In the early days, the number of missions that you could fly was at such a level that there weren't really many other opportunities for you. The airplanes didn't have the nose turrets. You didn't have any fighters. But as the problems became more complex, then you had to go for a variety of tactics, Orvil Anderson's Operational Analysis Group, I guess that's what it was called. The Operational Analysis Group, it seems to me, as things became more complicated, provided a useful mechanism. It didn't influence the basic intelligence; it did not basically influence the targets very much.

Q: I want to ask you about a thing that was in your bailiwick. The alleged exaggeration of kill scores. This was a situation that exercised a lot of people in Washington, one of whom was Under Secy of War Patterson. Remember this issue arising on several occasions?

H: The morale of the forces were such that we were in no position - when those crews came back and started to make claims - we were in no real position to start to apply a truth factor to what they were telling us. We flew on a

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certain number of missions. The mission I was on, we knew exactly how many planes we hit, we knew exactly how many we lost. We had very heavy losses on the mission that I flew down to the Bay of Biscay - Lorient - Of the four airplanes in our box, only two got back, 20 men died. Now, the morale was such that Gen Eaker wasn't about to start this. He did explain that this was the result of the very best interrogation that we knew how to conduct. Now, Colonel Humphrey up in LeMay's division developed a whole set of models up there in which he took these things and he tried. Example: there would be an airplane coming down like this. Let me show you the problem. A fighter would be coming through here, it had already been hit, and it was on one wing, but as it would go through the formation two or three guys would be pouring lead into it, as it went under the formation. Who shot it down, you tell me. I'm not arguing with you, but I'm saying the matter of sorting it out. Now, how are we going to sit in solemn judgment and say, the first pilot that put the lead...you couldn't do that. You had to just go ahead and let them turn in their claims and admittedly, they had to be evaluated on the basis, but as soon as experienced people came over and we put them through this briefing, they all understood the problem. But some guy would sit in Washington and he would get all exercised about these things. It was a lot of nonsense. Much ado about nothing. You couldn't start sending back reports that the airplane hadn't been destroyed two or three times.

Q: Well,a lot of people, perhaps, who didn't like the AF, jumped on this issue.

H: And there were plenty of people who didn't like the AF. And people that rubbed - maybe Mr. Patterson liked the AF, I never saw that he was very hostile, but I'll bet a dollar some of the people he rubbed elbows with, were sticking pins in him.

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Q: Remember Peter Masefield?

H: Yes, he was the writer. He used to go out to the bases.

Q: I've been corresponding with him. He's head of the British aviation, I guess the equivalent of FAA. He was a skeptic about daylight bombing, but you or Eaker made a believer out of him.

H: The thing that made the believer out of him was the demonstrated effectiveness. When you began to take a look at these British - I remember the first time I had to brief some newspapermen. I wasn't very enthused on this, but Eaker had an ability to give some of his busy people - and I was one of them - additional jobs. So he put the Public Affairs Officer under me, because he felt that as long as a communique was going to be written, the intelligence people should be in it. So I worked, I had this fellow - Col Letts - I think his name was. Basically, he worked for the Commander, but basically he worked for me, too. I would take some of these pictures, and conduct these briefings, occasionally. Of course, some of my intelligence friends back in Washington - this was absolutely heresy for an Intelligence Officer to even speak to newspapermen. They had a bunch of theoretical ideas - most of them had never been in a combat zone - that Intelligence people should stay away because they could betray the secrets of the nation or some such junk. But I remember one time I talked to these guys and I took a set of pictures - in regard to the picture - I pulled out a picture of, I remember it, the Focke-Wulf plant at Bremen. We really hit the Focke-Wulf plant at Bremen, and we didn't bomb downtown. We hit many airplane factories, but you only had to take one look at this, and recognize that the Focke-Wulf airplane was a threat, and recognize that they weren't going to do very much production there for a while. You could make a believer, so I'm not saying that I convinced any of them, but I would just take simple pieces of evidence. I follow Eaker, I go the

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understatement route. I would say: "It would look like this factory here will have some difficulty in producing airplanes." And you could hear a twitter run across the room. Bur rather than say, "This factory i s gone for all time, or destroyed." And it was a picture of an airplane factory. So Masefield and a lot of these people had come under theinfluence of "Bert" Harris and naturally they had doubts. These were two air doctrines. And here, again, was Arnold. Two air doctrines: he had to live with Portal and Harris. He had to live with the American air doctrine, and he had to move very definitely through this atmosphere. Don't forget you had two air doctrines. Eaker was the guy that came up with the thought: the way to do was to link them into a single military strategy. It wasn't Arnold; it wasn't anybody else but Ira Eaker that thought of that. The case for daylight bombardment makes the point that round-the-clock bombing gives them no rest.

Q: On the subject of two doctrines: there were two doctrines in respect to area bombing. Of course, this is a current issue. We have had some problems that have arisen in the AF very recently about Dresden and Berlin, and some of the bombing of civilians. The British policy, the area bombing, of course, you just drop the stuff. The Pathfinders gave you a mark and you dropped everything inside. The official Army Air Forces policy, as I can detect it, was, we only hit military targets but if we have to kill some civilians in the process, we should not be squeamish about it. Is that a fair analysis?

H: That's as fair an analysis, as I know. I listened to some person the other night who was on a radio program. He was some one--day wonder expert, and he was talking about the mass-bombing strategies of the British and the American forces. And he was so mixed up. In the first place, we respected what the British were trying to do. Their towns had been burned down. Who were we to say that they

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shouldn't go back and reply in kind. And Churchill agreed to it. So they were trying to bring a great impact of the war on the Germans and make them realize that "they were in it, fellers." They didn't start it. You've got to remember the Germans started it. The Germans were the ones who bombed Coventry. It wasn't anybody else, so the British went back. The Americans, on the other hand, felt that you had to reduce the German AF and to do that, you had to bomb in the daylight. Because you couldn't find those factories. The Focke-Wulf plant was just like something like the Goddard Research Center out here on the fringes of Washington. You couldn't hit that at night. And so, it was necessary to have the two strategies, and they were mutually self-supporting.

Q: You know, the British tried to get us into their strategy, sort of "tar us with the same brush" toward the end of the war. They tried to get us into several of these mass bombing raids, but we, Spaatz wrote Arnold and warned against our getting involved in this.

H: Eaker and Spaatz worked very close.

Q: Eaker and Spaatz were very close, Eaker also warned against this. I have a note here. This has to do with the FRANTIC Operation, the shuttle bombing to Russia. Now, you were involved in that.

H: I went on the mission.

Q: Why did Arnold turn down Elliott Roosevelt for the Russian photo shuttle mission? Elliott Roosevelt wanted to get in on that. Did you get involved in that decision?

H: I think that Arnold felt, I think he recognized Elliott Roosevelt's role. It was a very dangerous mission. The airplane I was in had a horrid time. We got hit, and we had to turn back. On the return flight, we had to turn back to Russia, and damned near didn't make it - Poltava.

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Q: You were on the sort of first reconnaissance mission?

H: No, I was on the first B-17 mission. We had flown a reconnaissance flight before, but that was flown by some of the people from over there. I think that it would have been unnecessarily confusing for the President's son to be lost on this mission. So as a matter of judgment, Gen Arnold just tried to tell Roosevelt to slow down a little.

Q: Did Elliott Roosevelt come in under your jurisdiction?

H: Yes and no. He was under Eaker's, of course. He was a part of the 12th AF. Gen Eaker was the Mediterranean Commander. I was staff officer to Eaker. I took all my authority from my commander. However, Elliott Roosevelt's role was in the area of photo reconnaissance, and photo reconnaissance was the thing that I laid the requirements on. So I used to go over. They had a place called San Savero, and I used to go over there. And I'd known Elliott, we both were in St. Albans together, but by that time he was sort of flitting around. He had other interests, and a Col Shetler, can't quite say his name. He was Colonel that ended up in Intelligence and this fellow as the Acting Commander, and I did my work with him. I would lay my requirements on, and I would say: "These are the pictures I want; get them." And he understood. He would come over and visit me, and I would show him the things that I needed to develop the intelligence, because there wasn't any point in them...they had to know exactly what our thinking was in order to develop their photo requirements.

Q: Did you get involved in any of this business of Elliott Roosevelt trying to get promoted?

H: I wasn't privy to that. You mean get promoted to what?

Q: To BG.

H: No.

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Q: You know, I ask a lot of people about Arnold getting mad, and Eugene Beebe, his aide, saw, he got mad every day.

H: I saw him get mad. I saw him get awfully mad...

Q: About what?

H: He was frustrated, and like a lot of people who had their frustrations, he would take them out in a strange way. The things that he'd do didn't make any sense, and he would forget them later. When he brought me back, he asked among other things, as though I didn't have enough to do, that I start taking some of the reports that were coming in, and reduce them, as he said, to one or two sheets of paper. So I'd come in fairly early in the morning and read this stuff and then I would, this would be on the trip....

Q: Is this towards the end of the war?

H: 1943--44. I would then take the material and write a page and put it there, because he didn't have time to read all these reports. One day he came in and he found on his desk a volume that was, literally, about that thick. It was the operational reports of Gen Kenney's AF as I recall it. It certainly wasn't an 8th AF one, because I wouldn't have put an 8th AF report there in that form.

Q: It was from the 5th AF?

H: Yes. It was a great big document. It had been prepared very carefully, and was sent back, and somebody put it on Arnold's desk. It was impossible for him to read it and evaluate it. It was a ridiculous thing to do. That was one of the reasons I was in the circuit as far as Eaker was concerned, to try to reduce this stuff to something meaningful, because I had been a journalist, and I could take it and pull it down. So he had all the Air Staff around, I can remember. There was O'Donnell, Kuter, and all these guys sitting around, and I was out in

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the little office there in the corner, digging away at my pack of material, getting ready for the next day's briefings, I guess. And he called in and he said: "Hull!" And like that, so I walked in the room, and here was the Air Staff sitting there, all kinds of looking over their shoulders like this, and he picked up this volume, which was at least 3 times as thick as this, and about like that, that, and he threw it at me. He just hauled off and he threw it. And he said: "Put that on a single sheet of paper!" So I suddenly looked up and here was this book coming across the Air Staff. So I caught it like this, and O'Donnell said: "...and a fine catch."

Q: He had a great sense of humor.

H: And he took the pressure off, and Arnold laughed, and I didn't know if I was the villian. I was, of course, young, but I remember looking up and I couldn't believe my eyes. This goddamned thing was hurtling through the air, and I caught it, and took it out, and put it down, and O'Donnell said: "...and a fine catch."

Q: Rosie O'Donnell had this knack of taking the sting out of a situation. Anyway, I told you the Rosie O'Donnell inkwell story. Did Arnold ever get mad at you at any other time.

H: Never. I was too far down the line. I was just - you must remember that I had known him and I wrote speeches for him when I was a 2nd LT. He looked upon me like he'd look upon a junior officer. There was no point in getting mad at me. He was fond of me, and he was kind to me. We wrote a speech for him once. Hansell and I wrote a speech. We turned it out very carefully, we gave it to him about 3:00 in the afternoon, and he said: "Well, do some more work on it and fly it up to NY to me." So we flew it up to NY the next day, and finally, there was confusion up there. I had put the damn thing in a zipper part of the airplane. When I went to get it out, it had worked its way down into the structure. The canvas inside was

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rotten. And I had a horrid time getting it. I went and told him: "If I can get a few people to tilt this airplane up on end, and shake it, I will get the speech. And he looked as if to say: "My God, what a bunch of nuts I work with." So he took off and we had to fly the speech out to Chicago. That was all right. When we got out there we delivered the speech to him, and it was to be given the next day. After we delivered the speech to him we came in, the speech was about 1:00 and we said: "We would like to stay and hear your speech, General," Hansell and myself. He said: "Fine, that's fine," so we got down to the studio, and we were sitting there, and he came in, and he had been with some friends, and he'd had a drink, and he put his arm around Possum - and I knew something had happened. He said: "Possum, I have to tell you this, I lost the speech." We didn't have copies of it. So Hansell roared out of there for a typewriter, and he said: "You write the first part, and I'll write the last part." So we sat there writing, 40 minutes to go, and we wrote the whole speech over again. When he started he had the first three pages, and when he'd get to page 4, he would reach out, just with the confidence of God, you know, and we would hand him a sheet. Finally, the thing came through, and he said: "Thank's fellows." And we rewrote that whole speech in 40 minutes, but it so happened it was one we had done twice already, and we knew what we wanted to say.

Q: When was this, early in the game?

H: That would have been about 1936.

Q: He was still Asst Chief then. You were probably what, a Captain?

H: I was never a Captain. He promoted me from 1st LT to Major. See, they had to. In the 8th AF they were bringing in all these Colonels, and I didn't want to have any break in my record because I had seniority, involved in pay purposes. So I was a 1st LT in January 1942 and I was a full Colonel in December 1942. To

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do that they had to skip some ranks.

Q: Somebody told me Arnold had a black list.

H: No, I don't think so. I think that was just got to hypocryphal. I think every man has got a black book.

Q: These are people that he doesn't want to get promoted, and he allegedly said to this individual who had something to do with General Officer assignments: "I don't want these guys going overseas," because they would have commanders ask for them and they would go overseas and get promoted into some kind of a job. He didn't want any of these people getting promoted.

H: I don't believe that. I think that that just gets to be legend. It's awfully easy around a man like Arnold to build up legends. You take a pea and you turn it into a stew. I mean I just don't believe he was that kind. Now, there were people who lacked real capacity, and I knew some of them. He told me that. And he said: "This fellow is a nice guy, but he hasn't got it." What do you do? And he frequently would talk to people like Fred Dean and me. - Did you ever interview Fred Dean?

Q: Yes. I interviewed him, but I didn't have the machine going, I interviewed him on an airplane flying up from Florida to Langley Field. I didn't have this machine with me, and I was taking notes. I tried to remember.

H: Point being, he would take a young officer like Dean and myself, and he would sort of take us occasionally into his confidence. Not that he was trying to impress, he just wanted to talk to somebody.

Q: You know, he did this several times. He did this with Norstad. Norstad was one of his boys.

H: Norstad was cut out of a different league than I was. Norstad, he looked upon as a guy who was...he saw the value of Norstad. Norstad was much more senior.

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Q: We are talking about Kuter and Eaker, and the fact that these messages were coming in to Eaker, and that things did not run smoothly. Well, they never ran smoothly because there were so many issues at the time.

H: Gen Arnold sent over to England, a fellow named Harold Hinton, who was later a NY Times correspondent, and he came over and he told Gen Eaker that he should fly a mission on the 4th of July 1942, and Gen Eaker didn't want to fly a mission on July 4, 1942, because the only airplanes we had then were the A-20s. And so he challenged this in a message gently, and found that Gen Arnold, in fact, did want this mission flown. Now, this was a very poor decision on Arnold's part. So I went out, and we didn't have any intelligence officers out there, so I went out and did the briefing. The crews took off and bombed an airfield near Holland named De Kooy. It was just a little airfield, a little village there on the shore. They went across low level and they put about 6 British planes in the formation, and about 6 American planes. Well, we lost a couple of airplanes, and Gen Eaker felt it was a badly conceived mission. Now, what I'm saying is the nature of the game was such, that with these decisions being made in this way, it wasn't possible when the lives of men hung in the balance, for the relationships to be other than constant strained on occasion. When the airplanes got back, and there were two planes missing, Gen Eaker was upset. He thought it needless. It violated his idea of the way you ought to run a military operation. So he told me to take the report up to Gen Eisenhower, who was in London. So I took his airplane, and his pilot, and they flew me up to London. I went in to see Gen Eisenhower, and I knew him very well. So I told Butcher, the aide. I said: "I've got a report here. So I walked in and saluted, which was a little unusual, and said: "I guess you will recall that forces under your command engaged the enemy today." And he had forgotten for the moment - there were so many messages going back and forth - and

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he had forgotten for the moment that this had been scheduled. I put the reports together, and one of the planes had returned, flown by a man named Major Kegelman, had had a fantastic mission. Kegelman had touched the ground, leaped into the air, turned, attacked the flak tower and returned home. I had interrogated all the crews, to be sure my facts were right. Everybody came back, and we were all kind of... I just get ill every time I think of that mission, because of the needless loss of life, which kills you to see that sort of thing happen.

Q: Do you think Arnold was trying to make headlines?

H: I think Arnold, somewhere along the line, had been told, perhaps by the White House, it was a July 4th mission. It was so obvious they were trying to make headlines. So I put all these reports on there, and Gen Eisenhower read them and he said: "Are you sure of your facts?" And I said: "Yes, I am. I'm very sure." "How are you sure?" I said: "I'm sure because I cross-interrogated. I just didn't depend on one person. I pieced the whole thing together." So he said: "This officer is hereby awarded the Distinguished Service Cross." That was the first time that report Eisenhower ever got and the first decoration he ever gave. Two of us in the room - three of us, Butcher was in there. Then I went back and Gen Eaker felt that that was a badly conceived order that he'd gotten.

Q: Did he ever complain to Arnold about it?

H: He complained in the original message. He challenged it. He didn't want to do it.

Q: Did Arnold withdraw it?

H: Not a bit.

Q: Did Arnold ever back off when he made a mistake, or did he just do something else, without admitting he was wrong in the first place?

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H: I never saw him back off very much, you understand, there is a sequence of events. We got Hinton in there one day. The mission was to be flown. Hinton came to town about July 1st, and the mission was to be flown about the 4th. Eaker sent a message back to me to be sure that they meant what they said. And he got a message back that Hinton, did, in fact, have the complete instructions. Eaker wanted to be very sure. We didn't have combat orders or anything coming from Washington then. You didn't have the kind of order that Eaker would send out to a division which is a combat order. The authority was sort of: "Wouldn't it be a good idea to bomb such and such." Eaker wanted to be sure they knew what they were talking about, so there was an exchange of messages.

Q: I was looking beyond this particular mission, about Arnold when he made a mistake, did he back off?

H: I never saw him back off much.

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Interview - BG Harris B. Hull, NASA Hq., Washington, D.C., 2 June 1971

Q: General Hull, you started to make some comment about the GHQ maneuvers at Raritan Arsenal in Sept 1934.

H: Raritan Arsenal was the first maneuver of the four-Army plan that General MacArthur had introduced. It was an overall Army maneuver, and if you will recall prior to that the Army had been broken down into many more units. He organized the Army on the basis of four armies, and he conducted an extensive paper war, and I have articles describing the blow-by-blow on that because I wrote articles every day and those articles were published. Now, the GHQ AF figured in this maneuver, but it was only a participant in the overall maneuver. In the play of the game the Air people would be called upon to supply air support, air missions in support of the Army, but emphasize that those missions were in support of. Now, during the maneuver, at the time of the maneuver, Gen Arnold had come back to Washington with the B-10 bomber.

Q: He was still a LTCOL then?

H: Yes, he was a LTCOL, he came back to Washington and then he, and was received here, and I have articles telling of that reception. I was there at the time they came back. He then took the airplanes out to Hamilton Field and out to the West Coast, out to March Field, California. When he got out there the airplanes were stripped down a great deal, and they were very tired crews because they had conducted this Alaskan flight. Gen MacArthur called for air support in the play of the maneuver game. Now, either there was confusion as to whether it was a paper order, or whether it was a real order, and I don't think anyone could honestly answer that question except Douglas MacArthur. My opinion was that when he called for air - and he had been reading of the B-10s - he simply

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meant it as a paper maneuver. But it got into the other basket, it got into the other mechanism, which was the real mechanism, and suddenly, Col Arnold got word to move his B-10 bombers back.

Q: In the dead of night?

H: It was a miserable thing, and of course, Gen MacArthur, if he did know that there had been a slip, he never let anyone know it, because I was assigned fairly close to him as one of his junior aides. I can recall Arnold coming into the building at Raritan Arsenal striding across the hall. His face showed real irritation, and he went right in to see Gen MacArthur, to find out what was going on. In my opinion there is some doubt as to whether Gen MacArthur ever really intended him to come back. You must understand that there was a large amount of paper play in the war, and to conduct the war you had to issue orders all of which were fictitious. At the end of the day, the umpires ruled on the validity and the results of these orders, and that was the way you played the war game.

Q: This is interesting interpretation of it. A lot of the fellows thought that it was a phony, or not a fair situation. These fellows having been through what they had, and they no sooner got back to March Field. I think they came back on the 25th or 26th of August. I think on the 2nd of September they were called back on this Raritan Arsenal.

H: You must remember one thing, that once they got back, there was no real mission for them to perform because the entire game was a paper war game. But when they got here, there wasn't really anything for them to do. So I'm inclined to think that either, between Gen MacArthur's thinking of calling them back, and the execution of the piece of paper that went out, there were many hands in it, including his Executives, that there may have been some confusion. But when Arnold walked in to see him, Gen MacArthur was not one to say: "Well, we made a

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mistake." Gen MacArthur said: "I'm glad to see you here."

Q: Talking about this particular era, nobody got an award for that Alaskan mission. A number of people I have talked to, Mike Dunn, Hugh Knerr, some others, have resented to this day the fact that they didn't get a DFC for that mission. Although some lesser flights, lesser in their estimation, did get a DFC. Like the Italo Balbo. You remember he came over in some seaplanes, just about this time; also the Kepner-Stevens-Anderson balloon mission received DFCs. Arnold took this matter up with Drum when he came back here two months after this particular mission, in Nov 1934. Drum simply fobbed him off. Do you know anything about this?

H: Let me start by saying that when Col Arnold came to Washington, I met him, and we decided that we would put on the air a radio progtam.

Q: Came to Washington?

H: With the airplanes, prior to flying to Alaska. I was then a newspaper man writing for the Washington Post. But I was also doing the Post first 15-minute news program on a regular schedule that I think was done in this country, certainly one of the first. So here is the script that I dug out last night and it starts out: "22 years ago an eager young LT assigned to what comprised the Air Corps, completed a flight over a triangular course around Washington. Then today Arnold came back to Washington, not as a LT but as a LTCOL. He flew here from Dayton." This is the script of the broadcast.

Q: This is, do you have the date of that?

H: I can tell from the newspaper clippings which I have, but it was the night before, a couple of days before they took off.

Q: This is for Alaska?

H: They went back, as I recall, to Wright Field to do a little bit of,

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getting a few pieces of equipment, and then they took off for Alaska. It was just before the Alaska flight. In fact, the reason for the broadcast was to salute these people as they took off. Foulois was brought into the broadcast. I brought in Foulois. I wrote some of Foulois' remarks. I wrote some of Arnold's remarks, I wrote the questions, and there is the whole script. Now, the important thing was that Arnold suggested to me that I go on the flight. I don't know whether I suggested it to him, but he and I came to an agreement that I would go on the flight. Now this is pertinent to what you are saying. I have a set of orders which I couldn't find last night with these other papers. But my name is on the list of the crews. However, to show you, I'm trying to interpret an attitude that existed. However, at the time, Gen MacArthur -- Gen Drum was Gen MacArthur's deputy -- they were not enthusiastic about any particular recognition being given to the Air Corps at that time. So Arnold came to me and said I'm sorry but they have taken you off the crew list. Now that showed what their general attitude is. This is completely consistent with the fact that they weren't interested in giving any awards to anyone. What would I have done on the flight, the same thing I did on these maneuvers for the other side of the coin. I would have been working as an officer in the daytime, and writing articles, and I've got all the articles here. And they were very happy with those articles, because it told about the ground soldier and the overall picture. But when they saw me getting in to the role where I would fly to Alaska and send back daily articles to the Washington Post about it, they said "no dice." So, they were not enthusiastic about it. They were not interested in any recognition and I think it is completely consistent that they weren't interested in any awards.

Q: In this report, I have the Alaskan flight report here, there is mention

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of a War Dept press representative, and in a letter that Arnold wrote home to his wife, he said the press representative did not go along, and he was happy that he did not go along, because he would rather have a mechanic.

H: I would say the press representative may have been someone from the press office. But he was perfectly, he told me that he wanted me to go, and he put me on the crew list. He wouldn't have put me on the crew list unless he wanted me to go.

Q: If he was going to get some publicity he wanted it from an Air Corps slant, rather than a War Dept slant.

H: Right, but on the other hand, I was an experienced, objective reporter and I have to live in my environment. I couldn't write propaganda for the Washington Post, but at the same time I was an enthusiast on airpower, and we were trying to demonstrate what the flight could do.

Q: Were you a reserve officer?

H: That's exactly correct. I was commissioned as a reservist in 1931 after I graduated. In those years I kept up my reserve commission, and I would go to active duty at the GHQ maneuver. There I am sitting next to Gen MacArthur as his aide. So my role was dual. I served as an officer because I was very anxious to keep up my reserve commission. I worked very hard to get it and you know, if you don't keep it up, you lose it, and I kept it up all through the years between 1931 and 1942, when I was called to duty.

Q: Let me ask you about the Alaskan flight. Westover was supposed to have the flight, Westover passed the command to Arnold. Why?

H: I don't know the answer to that. I never really knew that...first of all, I don't think that Gen Westover at that time was all that experienced in command of B-10 units. I think I would question whether or not Westover ever planned to

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lead the flight. I think there may have been some conversation about that, but the man to lead the flight was clearly the CO of the B-10 units in California, and that man was Henry Arnold. For anyone else to be put in charge of it, I think would have been a mistake. I think the pilots would have been very unhappy with that, because it was quite an ambitious venture for those days.

Q: Do you know how the Alaskan flight originated? Or where it originated? Or why?

H: I think in those days, Gen Arnold, just as in the case of the flight to the REX, Gen Arnold, all the people, probably Gen Andrews, certain people like myself were always interested in figuring out logical demonstrations for the utilization of airpower.

Q: I talked to Seversky, and you're commenting on why Seversky doesn't like Arnold.

H: Seversky as a designer, as an engineer, and as a pilot, everyone respected. But as a head of a company, correctly or incorrectly, Gen Arnold didn't have very much confidence in him. So he, Arnold, was dissatisfied with the production of aircraft, and they were putting a lot of faith in that facility up on Long Island to produce fighters and fighter-bombers for the AF. But there always seemed to be a whole host of design-engineering problems and delays. Arnold wasn't happy with this, he thought what was going to happen..When it did in fact happen, he wanted better management.

Q: This is somewhere around '37 or '38. Was Arnold the Chief then or Asst Chief?

H: He was Asst Chief, then it carried on to when he was Chief. He was instrumental in bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear and a group came in and bought out Seversky and got rid of Seversky, and they ran it. The

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President of the company up there, his name slips my mind at the moment, but I can look it up, but he would be a very good source on this. So the reason Seversky feels bad toward Arnold was that he felt that Arnold was instrumental in kicking him out of his company. But, actually, he came out of it pretty well, because he came out of it with a good deal of cash.

Q: If I am quoting or paraphrasing his comment to me, correctly, he said that Arnold wouldn't give them any contracts unless they squeezed him out of the company, and a change from deSeversky or Seversky Aircraft to Republic. Arnold bought an inferior plane, the P-36, over Seversky's plane, the P-35.

H: I don't know all of this, but I know that it was, that would be the Seversky version, in looking at it from Alexander Seversky's viewpoint. But naturally, Arnold had a different viewpoint, and whether it was an inferior plane or not, Arnold would certainly argue that. He would say that he wanted to insure the best management possible so he was instrumental in getting him out. So that's the reason he doesn't like him. Now, go back for one second to the Alaskan flight. Here is a clipping which you may want which was an article I wrote the day that they returned.

Q: The 20th of August 1934.

H: Now, it seems to me as I looked at Gen Arnold, Arnold was a man who basically was a man, you might say, of two strategies. He had as precise an understanding as it is almost possible to imagine, and I have kept track of this by reading a lot of these things, and actually, I wrote some of his papers. I wrote some of his speeches for him. But he had a very precise understanding of the events that did transpire in the years ahead, i.e., the air war against Europe. And he had very precise understanding an an accurate understanding of the weapons that would be needed, and he pushed, and he worked very hard to

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attain these. This was the Arnold dedication, and it was fantastically accurate, if you go back and appraise the things, the way that he pushed for certain things that they really needed.

Q: Like what?

H: The B-17 program, the better fighter, a better airplane that could survive in an air war. At that time, there was no understanding as to just exactly what the role of air was in warfare. The War Dept visualized it as a close support operation in which you would support forward moving ground forces. But Arnold's vision was higher than that. He saw the air superiority role, and he saw the strategic air mission role, very clearly.

Q: We did not have a good fighter until 1944 - the P-51. We were a little late in recognizing its merit?

H: That wasn't Gen Arnold's fault. Gen Arnold knew it, but he couldn't do everything. He was a man who had to set - and that was the second characteristic - he had to set his sights on a set of goals that he could attain. He knew that they needed a better fighter. His efforts at the Seversky plant were pointed in the development of a better fighter. But the main thing that he wanted to get was to get started a good basic strategic weapon system that would participate in the war. And he did that. But also, he was a man of another strategy. And that was: how do you survive in the atmosphere that is in front of you. Now, if you are unable to survive in an atmosphere, you are only a theorist. But he was a practical man, and he understood that he had to be very diplomatic. He had to be very careful. He couldn't make too many mistakes, or he would get labeled, and he had seen other people labeled in the past, and he had seen them lose out. So he wanted to be the sophisticated man. He wanted to be the cultured man, to use Ben Jonson's words. Ben Jonson said: "A cultured man is a man who

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gracefully lives in his environment." Survives, is what he meant. And Arnold knew he had to survive. So, he was very careful, as you assess him, and you'll see situations where he may have pulled away from a position, because he knew that in that particular situation he would run up against far too fierce an opposition, but then he would work around a different way, and he was also the master strategist insofar as his own personal generalship was concerned. This to me was the hallmark of him because look at the era that he survived in. He was in the Wright airplane, and he was the CG of the Army Air Forces in WWII. Now, there were many very zealous airmen, who tripped up in that period. I lived in that period, and I saw them trip up. They were labeled as wild men, and dreamers. They were eventually, would get tagged, or get labeled in some fashion, or they would leave themselves vulnerable and get pushed aside. Gen Arnold's second strategy that I mentioned was his own strategy of how he conducted himself. Now, this can be interpreted in many ways, one of the ways you could interpret it was the great ease and care in which he had other officers carry out tasks for him. Take Casablanca. Arnold knew that the Casablanca Conference was a crisis conference for air because it looked as though, on the basis of the results that had been obtained by the 8th AF, that there was reason to believe that they would talk in terms of cancelling the strategic mission, that they would have made some crazy decisions. Decisions such as taking the B-17s and attaching them to the British bomber force, decisions such as cutting back on the program of producing a very large number of airplanes needed to conduct the 8th AF and the 15th AF campaigns against Europe. Gen Arnold knew because he had such great personal insight into people. He knew the capabilities of all the people around him. He knew exactly what I could do as a writer, in a small way. I've got literally hundreds of articles that he helped me develop. Some of them are

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right here. He knew exactly the qualities of the various other officers around him. Being dedicated to this mission of air, deeply dedicated to it, because he felt it was a national necessity, he felt that it was very important that these officers played their rightful role in the developing drama that was coming off. He could have thrust himself forward very quickly into all kinds of situations. He probably would have had his head chopped off. He probably would not have been as effective as some of the people that he assigned tasks to. But he had this insight into people, and I saw it. He recognized Norstad's qualities quicker than anyone else. He recognized Hansell and all those young men. He knew what they had.

Q: Cabell too?

H: Cabell, he recognized his qualities and he brought those along. Now when he went to give you, again, an insight into this part of his makeup, it wasn't a selfish characteristic, it was very unselfish, because he would step back and let them do it. It wasn't that he felt, they were just as eager to do it, but they looked to their Chief to decide what they should do, and he gave them that leadership. That was one of the real hallmarks of his genius. At Casablanca, he could have stood up in front of Roosevelt, he could have stood up in front of the Prime Minister and Admiral King, but he knew that his effectiveness would not be as great as a new voice, someone that had been fighting with that airplane. So he came to England, and when he came to England, he went to see Gen Eaker, and he told Gen Eaker, exactly what the situation was. He also had this precise insight into human beings, and he knew he didn't have to tell Ira Eaker what to do. Leave it to Eaker. So what did Gen Eaker do, Gen Eaker then worked with the Prime Minister of England.

Q: He brought Eaker down from England to Casablanca?

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H: Yes, yes, exactly, and Jim Parton, who just hung that telephone up, went with him, and that's where I know the story. Jim Parton was working, he started the war working for me. Gen Eaker drafted him very quickly, made him sort of an Executive. So when they got down to Casablanca, Arnold was shrewd, smart, great insight. He knew he could have told Ira, I want you to do this, this and this. But he didn't do that, he left the job to the man that he had confidence in. And this great ability to weigh all of their characteristics came forward. Eaker went to the Prime Minister, told the Prime Minister that he felt that there was great....Eaker was a master of understatement, and the Prime Minister liked Eaker. The Prime Minister used to come to our Bomber Command dinners in England at the invitation of Gen Eaker, and shake hands with the officers. He thought Gen Eaker was a very splendid person. He admired his military ability, he admired the way he made speeches - the early speech that Eaker made when he came to England, where he said, "we are glad to be here, we'll do a little bit more talking, after we've done some fighting, and I hope when we leave, you'll say you're glad we came." That's all there was to it. Now, this was the kind of thing that rang a bell with Churchill. So Eaker then went to Churchill and said: "Now, look, I think that the case for daylight bombardment should be stated." And the Prime Minister said: "I think it should, too, and I'll call on you, Gen Eaker, tomorrow, at Casablanca, to state that case." Who was the man behind the move on that? Arnold. Arnold knew that King, and Franklin Roosevelt, and all the guys around that table had all heard him a dozen times. But he knew that Eaker had been out on missions, and he knew that Eaker was a very convincing and logical person. Again, never overstating the case, and he then prepared the paper that night, and this fellow (Parton) helped him do it. They wrote the paper called "The Case for Daylight Bombardment,"

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and the meeting opened, Parton told me, I did not go, only because Eaker picked Parton to go with him.

Q: You were in England at the time?

H: I was the Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence, from the start. I was among the original six people who went to England with Eaker. When the war was over, I was the only one of the original six still in Europe. So I was there the whole time, I was there longer than anyone, obviously. Gen Eaker had picked me as a LT to be, because Arnold had been encouraging me, and Eaker had been encouraging me in these years, to try to read and study what there was on the German AF. They would also help me get these little tours of duty so that I could get my commission alive. If you could see my record it was signed by Arnold, it was signed by Eaker, it was signed by MacArthur, signed by all these various people that I had taken six weeks of duty to keep my commission going. Now, so I was the Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and I had gotten Parton and a whole group of people over there with me, to work with me. But Gen Eaker grabbed Parton very quickly because he needed that kind of a man as personal support. He had so many problems. Now when they get down there, when the meeting opened at Casablanca, the Prime Minister said: "Mr. President, I know that one of the things on the agenda," and these are almost his words, "is this matter" - and he looked at his little card - "the case for stated daylight bombardment" - that Eaker had written out on a card for him. "I think that Gen Eaker has worked very hard on this, and I think that we should hear from the Commander of the AF involved, what is the case for daylight bombardment. Don't you agree? Thank you, Mr. President. Gen Eaker." Not a word was said, Eaker got up and gave his talk, and it is a masterpiece. And at that time, the whole air war hung on the narrowest balance that I know. Right there, it could have gone the

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wrong way. Eaker never overstated his case, because he knew King. If you overstated your case, King would have charged in. But he admitted that we had trouble bombing submarine pens, but he also stated: "You've got to remember, we didn't want to bomb submarine pens. That was a super-priority, but we must..." and then he came back to the old air fundamental, "we must attain superiority over the German air force, or you can call it anything you want, but there isn't going to be victory, because you can't be victorious in any kind of a campaign unless you get that superiority. How do you do it?" And then without going into details, "obviously, you do it by destroying them in their nests." And he then talked in terms of working with the British because the case for daylight bombardment was also the case for night bombardment, that it would be, as Eaker called it, "around-the-clock air offensive against Germany would never let them rest." The Prime Minister then chimed in and said: "Mr. President, I think that the American Commander has made a fine presentation, and I think that the American forces should have a chance to prove the theories of the AF. And I'm sure that the British Chiefs who are here with me agree." There wasn't one of them in my opinion that agreed. Not one! They were all a little bit under the influence of King, who was fighting very hard to get more of the strategic allocation assigned to the Navy. And so again, not a word had been spoken except by Churchill and Eaker. And so they went ahead then.

Q: I want to ask, how did King influence the situation so drastically as you indicated? Because the alternative that the British Chiefs wanted was for the AAF to participate in night bombing?

H: Which was a frightening thought to us because we didn't have any flame dampeners. We weren't trained in that. This was an idea that would have given the British--talking to this point the British viewpoint--the British felt that

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they could accomplish an overall strategic mission in a manner different than the American concept. To do this they would love dearly to have had the additional airplanes to increase the impact of their bombardment.

Q: Right, if they got them, then King wouldn't get them?

H: No, it wasn't, I'm saying, I'm sure King wouldn't have gotten them but, on the other hand, King was basically unconvinced on the strategic air mission. Sure, there were two people after them. King would have liked to have a cutback, I'm not saying that King would have acquiesced to it going to the British side. But he basically could see the buildup of a great air force, and he basically was never enthused, and this can be easily documented.

Q: Yes, I'm not questioning that. I just raised the question of the entire matter. A number of things that you are saying, well, everything that you say, I agree with, but I just want to bring out some points here.

H: King wasn't looking at it from that viewpoint. He was sunk whether it went one way or the other. He was fighting right down to tha last ditch, and it didn't make any difference which way it went. He said that was really immaterial, as long as you had a large strategic air force buildup he did not subscribe to that concept. And the funny part, the whole background of the Navy and there's a whole series of articles in this collection here, the Navy had every opportunity to develop their own strategic mission, but they went off on this airship tangent, and I was deeply involved in that. I was the first one to reach the side of the Akron when it crashed. Elmer Stone and I flew an airplane out to the site of the Akron. And I started writing articles about airships because, after all, it was a part of it. But they frittered away their energies in this tremendous airship thing that Adm Moffett was so enthusiastic about.

Q: You are talking about the '20s and early '30s?

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H: Right straight up to the destruction of the Macon, which was the late '30s, not just the early '30s. But you must remember that they couldn't do everything. Instead of going ahead and developing a sensible mission, Admiral Moffett - they had every opportunity. They got the money; they built the dirigibles; these guys thought that these things would be instruments of warfare. They visualized them - and I've got all the background in the world on that. Now, the Navy had the opportunity and they naturally felt that they wanted a balanced fleet to carry out a major war, particularly in the Pacific. They saw that this was going to loom, and they didn't have the vision to recognize that out of the B-17 program would come the B-29 program which would play a decisive part in a defeated Japan. So I don't give the Navy very high marks for the way that they battled Arnold on these things, and Arnold was tough. I said that Arnold, in my opinion - I admired him, of course, enormously - I said that he was the man that knew where these various people had their roles. It was this insight into people that I saw him demonstrate, which was to me the most convincing characteristic. I could give you many examples. Let me give you one. I came back, Gen E ker and I had developed a target system to show how the targets of the 8th AF were kept up to date.

Q: You are talking '43 or '44.

H: '42 and '43, I came back all throughout the war, and we had the target like this, and then we had an acetate overlay that I had developed, and we had all the buildings traced out, and as a photograph would come in, we would trace in there, damaged, destroyed, rebuilt. We would float through this overlay as many as 60 or 70 pictures, and it would show the condition of the targets. Eaker didn't like the idea of sitting down and looking at a big stack of pictures. He'd look at me and say: "What does it all add up to?" So I was unhappy. So I

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got a bunch of draftsmen, and we would take all of the pictures and put all of that data on one overlay - do you follow me - if the next day found that when the smoke cleared, one picture might show one little piece of evidence, and you would pull that one. If, four days later it showed they were rebuilding this part of the factory, you would put in green crosshatch. If it was rebuilt, it would be green solid. If it was still undamaged, it would be red crosshatched. If it was completely destroyed, it was red solid, four codes, and you could look at the picture. I developed this, and it was a devil of a job to keep it up to date, because at night these guys would work until they almost dropped, getting it ready for the next morning's conference. But it did give the commander the picture. When Gen Arnold came on one of his trips to England, Gen Eaker said: "I want you to show the book to Gen Arnold." And I said, half kiddingly: "I don't think I want to." I knew Gen Eaker pretty well; he could be real friendly, he could be fairly stern sometimes, but he was a wonderful man. And he said: "Well, I don't quite understand." And I said: "Well, if I show this thing to Gen Arnold, I know General Arnold pretty well." Then I got serious. I said: "He's going to say, 'I want one of those in my office in Washington, D.C.'" And I said, "Ira, I don't know how in the world - it is killing me to keep this thing up to date here - how in the world can I keep all the targets up to date on a bomb-by-bomb basis in Washington, D.C." And he looked to me as if to say: "That's information I don't want and can't use." He was kind of a little short then, so he just said: "Just show it to Gen Arnold." So I showed it to Gen Arnold, and sure enough, Gen Arnold, that night at dinner, told Gen Eaker he wanted one of these set up in Washington, D.C. So, then, the only person to do it was me. So I went to Gen Eaker and said: "See, I told you." He said: "Well, yes, that's right, but we still had to show it to Gen Arnold." Well, I said: "Okay, I'm flattered. If they want one in

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Washington, we will find a way to do it." So we had, once a sheet was completed, we laid down a tracing over it, and showed all the changes. First, we had a duplicate set of books made. That took a week. Then we made these tracings, and then as my team would plot these things, they would make a tracing. They would fly that up to Prestwick; they would give that to the pilot of the plane that flew back, and I would grab it in Washington, take it in and lay it out, and Gen Arnold was happy. And I was back in Washington.

Q: He was great for visual aids, wasn't he?

H: This was THE visual aid, you see. You could literally show, as Trubee Davison I guess it was said, you could almost show where every bomb had dropped in Europe with this damn thing. Of course, you had to have a truck to carry it around the Pentagon. It was literally too heavy. There were 250 of these sheets and the sheets were heavy, and there were binders and stuff on it. Now, my job was to keep Gen Arnold informed on this. That's what I was told. But he also said: "Keep Vandenberg informed," and then he said: "Keep Gen Marshall informed."

Q: Vandenberg was A-3?

H: Vandenberg was A-3, Vandenberg and I got along real well. So I showed it to him and he said: "Great, fine. I've got other work to do. Let Gen Eaker run that part of the war." I said to Vandenberg: "You know, Gen Arnold still wants to run this war just like he is a squadron commander, sometimes." Half kidding, I said, "He wants to know where every bomb dropped." And Gen Vandenberg said" "You're not kidding, he really does." I got a new set of sheets. We were just getting rolling, to really show how the thing worked, and it was an impressive display. You could show within about 48 hours after the bombs had dropped where the bomb had fallen, what the condition of every target was. Nothing to it. I went up to Gen Marshall's office. I guess probably the first time I may have

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briefed him was in Arnold's office. So I went to Marshall's office, full of vinegar and I said to the Exec up there: "I'm Major Hull. I would like to brief Gen Marshall." This guy looked at me as if to say: "You know,you've got holes in your head. He's a very busy man." I said: "I'm from Gen Arnold's office, and I want to brief him on the targets."

Q: Was this Frank McCarthy?

H: No, it wasn't Frank McCarthy, it was another fellow whose name I can't remember, it was not McCarthy.

Q: Robinett, maybe?

H: I can't remember who it was. But he said no, and I guess I was a little bit bolder than I am now, and I said: "Do me a favor." He's a LTCOL. He said: yes, I said: "Just write on your pad there, that Maj Hull wanted to see General Marshall." He looked at me, and I just stood there and looked at him. So he thought: "This crazy guy wants me to write it, I'll write it on the pad. What's your name?" I said: "Major Hull wants to see Gen Marshall. Thank you," and left. He wouldn't let me in. So I got back to the office. Papers were coming in. Arnold had a million other things to do. He came out and he said: "I want you to go up and brief Henry Morgenthau," I said: "You mean at the Treasury Dept? He said: "Yes." It was then about 9:30. So he said: "Get my car and go on up and brief Henry Morgenthau. I said: "Yes, sir, with my books?" "Certainly, with your books." So I got all of the books together and I got them in the car, and I started in. The little fellow that was Morgenthau's executive, works at HEW, and he laughs about this story every time I see him. He's a cripple. He worked for Henry Morgenthau. He has paralysis, works with crutches, and he was Morgenthau's Exec, and he said: "Major Hull, Mr. Secy Morgenthau is expecting you. Go right in." So I went on in, it was about 9:45 or 10:00, and I briefed Morgenthau. Now

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you brief Gen Marshall?" I said, just like I'm saying it now; "I didn't brief Gen Marshall because the guy wouldn't let me in. I tried to brief him before you sent me up to Morgenthau's office." Can you prove it? I said: "Oh yes." "How?" "Because I made the aide write my name on the calendar with a request to see Marshall and he turned me down." Oh, he said, "Come with me," and we went roaring up there. And he burst right into Marshall's office. And he said, I think he said: "George, my office in line with the conversation we just had," now, here was a chance for him to be sharp with Marshall, he wasn't. Here is where he was deft, skillful. He let the impact of it fall very gently, indeed. He said: "My officer endeavored to come in to see you. He wanted to see you. I told him to see you." And so, then he let Marshall ask the inevitable question: "Well, why didn't he see me?" "Because your officer out here wouldn't let him in." "Did he ask to see me?" "Yes." "Are you sure of that Henry?" "Yes."

Q: Did he call him Henry or Hap?

H: I think he called him Henry Arnold, don't think he called him Hap. But in any event, he said: "Are you sure?" Obviously, the aide by this time was getting very goosey as to what was going on with me in there, and the voices. He was undoubtedly listening, so he called him in and Marshall said to this fellow: "Did this officer endeavor to see me this morning?" And I looked at this guy just as hard as I could look at a human being. He said: "Yes, he did." Well, why didn't you let him in." "Well, I told him you were very busy." And then, of course, Arnold had worked it out to the point where it was an internal matter, and by the Grace of God I had this note made on the calendar. So I was headed for that calendar if this guy had lied. Arnold put his arm around me as we left and said: That's the way to do things. Just keep doing them that way." What I am saying here is there were two examples of this fine insight that he had into

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people. He wanted to do what Henry Morgenthau wanted. It kicked off a real furor, but he managed that, and we came out of that fairly lucky.

Q: I want to ask something at this point. Arnold and Morgenthau had some difficulties in 1939-40. This is when Morgenthau had appropriated to himself the job as unofficial Secy of Defense. He was sending Lend Lease stuff out to the British and French. Arnold was trying to expand an air force, and Morgenthau was sending out his best planes. And there was an incident in 1939. A Douglas plane crashed in the Santa Monica yard with a Frenchman, a fellow named Paul Schmedlin aboard. Do you know anything about that, and Arnold had to testify.

H: I remember vaguely the thing, but you've got to keep in mind. No, I don't really remember all about it.

Q: This resulted in Arnold being called to testify before Bennett Champ Clarke, Senate Military Service Committee, and of course, they put him to the wall and he had to say that Morgenthau was the guy who authorized it. Roosevelt is supposed to have said - Arnold had a little bit in his book about it - that Roosevelt said there were places on Guam for recalcitrant officers. Because of this altercation with Morgenthau who was bound to ship everything out, Arnold got in trouble with Roosevelt, and it took him a little time to get back into the President's good graces.

H: I don't mean to say that in every situation Arnold could be so tactful as to prevail, because what you are saying gives an indication of the kinds of things he was confronted with. There was no enthusiasm, very little enthusiasm outside of a small group of people, for the development of a strategic air force. Let's face it. And Arnold again in the right place, right straight on through, knew, had such skill - I'm repeating myself - but had such skill in his relationships with people that he in fact would prevail in these situations. Now, other people

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would have stubbed their toes. I can mention others; General Arnold naturally wanted to have a senior Air advisor attached to General Marshall, and he tried several of them before he finally settled upon Gen Kuter. Kuter became the guy that really worked very closely with Marshall, went to YALTA with him, wrote the book. What I'm saying is, some of these other people couldn't take it, and some of them were pretty...

Q: He went to YALTA because Arnold wasn't there?

H: No, no, he was also scheduled to go, anyway. He sat at the table because of the fact that some of the top people. No, that's not right, he went because I saw him off, and he went. At that time, he didn't know that he would be at the table with them.

Q: Was Arnold sick at that time?

H: I think that Kuter sat in the seat of George Marshall at YALTA, I don't believe that Marshall sat at the table, but you would have to go back on that reference to the Kuter book.

Q: I think Arnold had a heart attack, didn't he?

H: I don't know. I'm mixed up in there.

Q: You were in Europe.

H: I was in Europe at this time. But all I know is I went down at the time that they went, I thought it was the YALTA meeting, and I was back and saw General Kuter off on the boat, and gave him a lot of briefing material, a lot of target material. They got on some vessel down in the Navy Yard and then they went out to the ocean and boarded a cruiser and slipped across. Now, all I was saying was: Arnold, in all of these dealings, was again a man of two strategies. He had the military strategy but he knew exactly how he had to work with people to attain his objectives. This was the feature that I observed mostly closely in my dealings

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with Arnold, that ability to work with people and get what he wanted. Sometimes he had to be brutal to work with people. Sometimes he had to encourage people who had greater ability than they thought they had. In other cases, he had to practically dismiss officers. But he knew his people, believe me.

Q: Let me take you back to this Arnold visit to the ETO when Eaker...

H: He went out and visited Castle's group. Castle was the son of his classmate, Col Ben Castle, and later killed, and was also in the original six with me when we went to England. They went down to visit the group. So I would brief, I had briefed Gen Eisenhower, when he was in England, I was constantly briefing - Parton helped me a great deal.

Q: Now the visit was after Casablanca?

H: As I recall, he got there on the way to Casablanca.

Q: This is when you showed this fancy visual aid. Did Arnold go to England before he went to Casablanca?

H: Yes, I think he did. Now if he didn't, I think he sent somebody to tell Eaker what I told you. But my impression was he came through England on the way down. But Gen Eaker could tell you this in a minute.

Q: I'm trying to get into another area. I'm trying to pin down the visit because of certain other things that happened. There was a visit he made right after the first Schweinfurt-Regensburg, this was Labor Day, he stayed there for about 7 or 8 days in the ETO. Do you remember this visit.

H: Came back so often, I was shoving back and forth so often.

Q: You were shoving back and forth, but he didn't make too many trips.

H: I realize that, but it was hard for me to identify just when Gen Arnold was there.

Q: I was just thinking, I mentioned Schweinfurt-Regensburg, because we took

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a beating on that first one. We lost 60 planes, and I am just wondering if you could associate any complaints or his own feelings of concern about them.

H: I don't believe I saw him at that time. I didn't always see Arnold. But he might come and go to Gen Spaatz' headquarters and talk to the people there, but I don't have any recollection of that.

Q: Do you remember him coming over Labor Day? He was there for a week.

H: I remember almost all of his trips in one fasion or another, but I can't identify each individual trip.

Q: There was one trip - this was the Labor Day trip, when he and Eaker had some strong words for one another at the Claridges Hotel. Eaker wanted to put 60 planes on one air base, and Arnold said that was too many. When Arnold came back, he was starting to think about Eaker leaving there. Do you know anything about that?

H: I just don't know. I mean that would be something between Arnold and Eaker. I sure wasn't privy to it.

Q: Arnold was sending a lot of messages and some of them were supposed to have been written by Kuter. This is part of the reason that Kuter and Eaker never saw things the same way. After the second Schweinfurt raid, "Black Thursday," October 14, 1943, the deep missions stopped. There were no deep missions for several weeks and months. By this time Arnold had come to the conclusion that he was going to make a change. This was a traumatic experience for Eaker. Now, you were pretty close to him.

H: I was back in the States, again, on one of my trips, and when I got back there I was taken ill. My appendix burst, of all things.

Q: About this time?

H: Yes, right in this period, and this is just the time they were thinking

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about the change. They hauled me out to Walter Reed Hospital. I was working in Arnold's office, and took sick. Didn't go that night. Got up in the middle of the night, went out. They operated on me immediately and found a ruptured appendix. Fortunately, the first of the sulfa drugs were coming in then and I was one of the first patients at Walter Reed to have them. I had a period of about a month recuperation. By that time they sent over another officer, and he picked up the business of carrying on the briefings to Gen Arnold. But he still had the same basic material I had used. Now when I got back, when I got out of there, I went down and worked a few days. Then, Fred Anderson said: "I've got an airplane here." Fred Anderson was back. He was a bomber commander and they brought him back. So he and I flew back in the same airplane. We went up to New York, and went to a show together with his wife, and then we flew back to England. On the way back, Anderson said: "You might as well know that in the period you've been hospitalized, there is a change of command, probably in the wind, of some sort. So I went in, I didn't really know what it was all about, but a big dinner party, and we just got down there about a day before this beg dinner party. Doolittle was there; "Bert" Harris was there; Anderson and Eaker. It was apparent that Gen Doolittle was going to succeed Eaker, and I've got a picture of the two of them shaking hands. Eaker looked pretty grim. Air Marshal Harris took me over to Doolittle, and said: "If you are clever" - now I had also taken my books over and shown them to the British. The British were fascinated, and they set up a similar system of target information. It was varied a little bit, it was easier to keep because you didn't have to have a mass attack. Air Marshall Harris said to Doolittle: "If you're clever, you will keep this intelligence officer." I always interpreted that as meaning that Air Marshal Harris would like to have me around to be a consultant on his target

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information system, which is a very important part of his intelligence. Doolittle said: "I'm hopeful that I can." Well, it wasn't in the cards, because Gen Eaker had permission to take with him any one he wanted, so he took the immediate members of his staff, and we were off to the Italian campaign in about 4 or 5 days.

Q: You went with Eaker?

H: Yes, actually, I went in another airplane. We had two airplanes. I went down to Tunis and we kicked around there, until we could get over to Italy, and the battle was moving north, and they wanted to use a particular GHQ Hqs in Italy, and the only place you could put the monster was at Caserta, and Castera needed a little bit of tidying up there. There were a few Germans still around. So they waited until the Germans were pushed north, and then we flew over and moved into the palace. Norstad was the Operations Officer, and he was Director of Operations, and I was Intelligence Officer.

Q: Were you aware of Eaker's bitterness? Of being moved out of the 8th AF? Or was he a bitter man?

H: Let me give you my impression. My impression was that at that particular time he was indeed a very disappointed man. But I think that when he got down to the Mediterranean, and he saw the magnitude of the task, and the fact that the Mediterranean AF down there with Slessor - Slessor was his Deputy - that this was indeed an enormous assignment, because we had the British bomber force, we had the 15th AF. Obviously, we had the tactical air forces under Gen Cannon. We had more missions than you can imagine.

Q: Did you know Spaatz wouldn't take that job unless they elevated the Mediterranean job to MAAF, which would give an appearance of a promotion to Eaker?

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H: Spaatz wouldn't take what job?

Q: The job in the ETO. They brought Spaatz in to be USSTAF.

H: I didn't know what job you meant.

Q: Moved Spaatz from the Mediterranean up to England, they moved Eaker down to the Mediterranean. Spaatz wouldn't take it unless they elevated the other job.

H: I wasn't privy to that.

Q: Because he and Eaker were very close.

H: Still are. I had lunch with the two of them not too long ago.

Q: You know, Eaker was writing some letters to people. I've seen a couple, where he was quite...he never forgave Arnold, ever.

H: I think he felt that he was the architect of the 8th AF, and he would have preferred to stay there.

Q: I can understand his position. I talked to him about this. Of course, now he's mellowed on the subject. But, at the time, he was very much exercised, one of the letters that he wrote to an individual was that he felt that he was the coach through spring training and stayed with the team, or was right in the middle of it, and then the manager took him out of the box in the World Series. He used this kind of analogy. Arnold was an impatient man, as you knew better than anybody else. Why do you think Arnold took him out of there?

H: Well, one of the reasons in my opinion was this. It seemed to me that if Gen Eaker woke up one time and found in a very short period that he was on the front cover of Time, and on the front cover of Life -- I have both the issues - and I think that - I have reason to believe that this caused some wretchedness to some of the people. They felt that Eaker was, actually, it was a natural consequence of the role of the 8th AF. Eaker had had Thruelson and Parton and Gordon

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write a book called "Target Germany." Life Magazine, because Parton had come out of the Time-Life organization, took "Target Germany." I have a copy of it at home. They reprinted about 10 or 15 pages of this book in a lot of columns. They made quite a pictorial digest with a lot of pictures that were fortuitiously made by Bourke-White. So here was Eaker, one week on the front cover of Life, and then a couple weeks later, on the front cover of Time, and...

Q: You feel somebody in Hqs. resented his publicity?

H: I don't think that any commander out in the field, be it George Patton or anyone else can get that kind of exposure and not have people develop some wretchedness.

Q: This "wretchedness" would have been...?

H: Wretchedness on the part of some people that were around Arnold, and probably a little bit of wretchedness on Arnold's part. I think he was getting to the point where to use a simple analogy, he was getting, Eaker was getting too big for his britches. Because people react peculiarly, just like in the medical business. If you see a picture of a doctor and he gets a lot of publicity, all the other doctors hate him.

Q: This is reflected in some of Eaker's letters. I've seen a lot of his letters to other people.

H: I think that he was getting, but the nature of the AF mission was so great that it was one of the predominant things happening in Europe. And so, he didn't go out and seek it, if anything, some of the eager beavers around him were the guilty ones. If we had to live it again, we might have played that down a little bit.

Q: You were the Asst Intelligence Officer?

H: Yes, but Eaker also knew I had this journalism background. I had known

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Ira Eaker for many, many years before this. I had served with him in Wright Field one time. I served under Eaker in the GHQ AF maneuvers. That contrasted with the GHQ maneuvers, the GHQ AF maneuvers at Mitchel Field when I was on his staff. I worked for him down here in the Munitions Building, or what was the Munitions Building before they tore it down. So I knew Eaker all through this period very, very well.

Q: One of the things I detect from the Arnold-Eaker confrontation at the Claridges Hotel was that Eaker could not satisfy Arnold with what he was going to do with all the B-17s. Our factories were really turning them out at this point - we are talking about like Sept 1943 - the B-24s and B-17s were really being turned out. Arnold said to Eaker: "If you can't use these planes, I can't resist demands that they be sent out to the Pacific." You know, King and the Navy and our air commanders in the Pacific were screaming for planes. Eaker proposed to put 60 planes on one airfield. He couldn't operate 60 planes at one airfield. He could only operate them piecemeal. And Arnold contended that if you do that, the German fighters can go back, refuel and knock off - if you stage your bombers - do you remember this arising?

H: I wasn't privy to it. I was working on the Intelligence side all that time. I just don't know anything about it. There wasn't any real threat of the German fighters coming in and hitting them on the air bases.

Q: Well, Arnold figured you have to fly all your planes at one time in mass formation. In other words, it is strictly a mathematical formula. If you fly 600 planes, you lose maybe fewer than 5 percent.

H: You should.

Q: Because the planes were mutually supporting?

H: Also because you tend to overtax the air defenses in Europe.

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Q: But if you flew them in stages, you couldn't get all your planes off at one time - which was Arnold's concern - then if you flew them at stages and flew others after the others were part of the way along on the mission. The Germans could refuel, come back.

H: Our main argument against that, one of the arguments was that we used up all the daylight hours, and the daylight hours in England get pretty short part of the year. We used up all the daylight hours. I was on missions where we took off at night, and it was damn near dark when we got back from the missions. So, when you talk about staging, staging to where, and we weren't going very far, the B-17 wasn't all that fast, in other words, you couldn't stretch out your period. Do you understand what I'm saying? If you are going to fly, you get up at 3:00 in the morning, you take off at 5:00 and you are going to fly a mission down to the Bay of Biscay, and back, as we did. Holy mackerel, where is the staging time coming in?

Q: You couldn't operate them all together, fly all your planes in one mission. Because you didn't have repair and maintenance facilities, then it gave the Germans opportunity to shoot at only part of the force, and then refuel.

H: I appreciate the desirability of it, but I have to repeat that the air base capacity was such that you could only take off a certain number of airplanes and recover a certain number of airplanes.

Q: This was part of Arnold's argument - that you can't use all the planes we are sending to you. He looked at the statistics you had...

H: Arnold was the greatest man in the world to throw an argument up like that. He knew that you had other air bases, he also knew what the replacement rates were. But he would throw out an argument like that to get the very best argument that he could out of Gen Eaker, and then he would make notes on it,

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and carry it back.

Q: Your air bases were saturated with planes, and Arnold felt that sending planes over in the same number that we had been sending over, would not utilize the B-17s to the degree that we had been.

H: Let me tell you, I was the Intelligence Officer, I wasn't the Operations Officer. General Armstrong was the Operations Officer, so I mean I would have to defer to that. However, Gen Eaker's idea was that up...

Q: He just passed away, Frank Armstrong, a year or so ago

H: Yes, I went to his funeral.

Q: Down in Tampa?

H: The funeral was here in Washington, he was buried in Arlington. Frank Armstrong was the A-3, and I was the A-2, so we were very close friends.

Q: The argumentation for staging planes....

H: Gen Eaker felt that one of the ways that you would work this would be if you would have an air base up north of the midlands, and as airplanes were lost you would bring in replacement crews, and that would be one way to keep up the strength. Now, I can't really get into the details of the argument of Arnold and Eaker on that, except that Gen Arnold was one to pose all of the...he had problems at home. He was posing these problems. You had to look at them in a certain amount of perspective. He would pose these various problems, and as he posed them, he would get the best argument that he could. Now, he came to High Wycombe one day on one of his trips -- I can't remember which one it was -- I'm mixed up on dates for the moment. He asked for the intelligence briefings, so I gave it to him, and I gave it to him I guess, very very thoroughly, and I said goodbye to him. He was my friend. I had known him very well. He was very friendly after all the ceremonies, go out to his car and shake hands with him. Always enjoyed

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seeing him. He couldn't have been nicer. At about 3:00 in the morning his aide called me, and said: "Gen Arnold wants you to have breakfast with him," and I said: "Well, sure, I guess I can get up there." He said, "Well, he'll be expecting you to have breakfast about 6:00." He was up at Spaatz' place, up near London. So I got a car and I went up there, and he said: "Harris, I want you to give me a repeat. Now, I have problems back home, and I've got problems, and I want you to repeat some of these points you were making." We had kept a whole set of charts, we had gone into all kinds of analysis of reaction. We had a lot of evidence right in our fingertips to answer questions - current information. He said after breakfast: "Ride out to the airport with me. I want to ask you more questions." So I rode out to the airplane, and then he said this amazing statement: "This pilot takes a long time to warm this plane up. Would you mind getting in the airplane, and having your driver pick you up at the end of the runway." Well, I knew the pilot, strangely enough, Frank Nizeworm. He never took a lot of time, so I said: "Sure, if you want me to get in the airplane, I'll get in the airplane, General." So I climbed in the airplane with him. The guy swung down and my little driver came down, about 100 yards off to the side, and I was there. They were supposed to lower a rope or something to let me out of this beast. The guy swung around and took off for Prestwick. Gen Arnold said: "I'm sorry about this, but I wonder if you would sit down with Gen Strong, who is General Marshall's G-2 and talk to him a little bit," and I said: "Sure, I know Gen Strong." Well, Gen Strong and I got along reasonably well, as much as anybody could get along with Gen Strong. And I said: "Nice to see you. I'm taking the trip up to Prestwick. Then Strong was one to throw out the tough questions. He said: "I understand you fellows think you are going to win all these campaigns and win the war all by air-power." I said: "No, I don't really think that. I think that some of the other

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people are saying that, but I haven't heard very much reference to that by the senior Air commanders in Europe." He said: "What have you heard?" Then I started in on Strong, and I went through the whole thesis of air power in Europe - the same basic arguments. You had to prevail over the continent; you had to destroy the German air force on the ground and in the air. I went all through it. So when we got up to Prestwick, I started to get out. I said, General Arnold, "Don't worry, I've got a lot of friends here, I'll find an airplane. I'll get back." Arnold said: "Look, you are doing real well with Strong. I was sitting a couple of seats back there, and Strong's questions were very friendly. I think you are doing well. Would you mind riding over to Iceland?" "No," I said, "if you want me to." Well, to make a long story short, the conversation continued into Washington, D.C. There was Arnold trying to get at his fingertips, and he saw that when he got back he was going to have to try to work over George Strong. He knew that Strong leaned very heavily on the Army side of all of these big arguments. So he saw a chance for one of the people he knew - me - to go ahead and talk about airpower with Strong, in fairly elementary terms. Now, that is mentioned in Global Mission. That comes out, my name is in there. It said: "Hull returned with me and had an interesting discussion," just a passing reference.

Note: No reference to Harris Hull in Global Mission.

Arnold, as he would with Eaker, would throw out an argument, he would throw out an idea, and Eaker, sometimes, would react rather sharply, but basically they both had mutual admiration for each other. So I summarized Arnold, and I've said almost everything I know about him. I summarized him as a man of two strategies; a real brilliant military understanding, a brilliant, much more brilliant than most people have ever really given him credit for. He showed it so many times to me. That would be the one thing that I would emphasize, that he saw the sequence

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of events, he had me interrogate Gen Spaatz when he came back - by interrogate, I mean talk to him, be sure that we drained off all of the information that Spaatz had while Spaatz was fresh from his trip to Europe. He would use me to go out and talk to all sorts of people because he saw the trend of things. But he saw them very early, but he also had that second strategy, which was (Hull interpolating) "If I am to serve the cause to which I am dedicated, which is American airpower, I've got to be a very discreet person in some circles. I've got to previal, I've got to be cultured, and I've got to be careful, or else I'll get my head chopped off, because I am sitting out here in front. There will be times, when I'll be stern with people, and there'll be other times when I'll take a step backwards and let somebody else go in and do the talking."

Q: Let's talk about Andrews and Arnold.

H: Andrews was a different kind of man. I knew Frank Andrews very well. I knew him because I flew with him. I flew with him in the GHQ AF maneuvers up at Mitchel Field. He was educated to a degree by Eaker. Arnold knew all of the needs for public appreciation of airpower. That was why he did this kind of work. This book is not Global Mission. It is Army Flyer. Now, and it was written, by that I mean there were many books. There were other Arnold-Eaker books. Now, Andrews was a man with a completely different makeup, and he was educated to a degree in these matters by Eaker, at places like the GHQ AF maneuver. He recognized the need for it; he gradually learned about it - and some of the lessons were a little harsh, such as the aftermath of the Rex mission when they flew out over the water. But Andrews - I don't think that Arnold could have ever held General Eisenhower's job, but Andrews could have. Andrews was....

Q: Was he slated to have the job of CG/ETO?

H: My understanding was that he was, General Marshall said - after he was

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killed - "well, that's the end of putting an air man in there." Somebody told me that they heard Marshall say this. There is not going to be another air man. Now, I don't think that anybody could say definitely what the chain of command was going to be, but certainly he was a prime candidate for it.

Q: There is some disagreement. I've asked a number of people. Some say that Andrews would have been the Eisenhower of WWII.

H: I would be one of them, and the way that I briefed him, and the questions he asked when he came to England. I had known him, so when he came to England, I briefed him and talked to him at length, and he was fascinated, told me certain things he wanted done. He was a man of, he was a very intellectual person. He was very studious. He was, of course, very popular with the British.

Q: Getting back to your two strategies that Arnold pursued. Andrews was of a different mind, I think, as I read his record. Andrews took a more forward position in respect to airpower in the '30s than Arnold did. Andrews was GHQ AF starting 1935 through 1939, Arnold was second-in-command of the Air Corps under Westover. Andrews took a more forward position in respect to procuring B-17s. Arnold had moderated his views, somewhat. When people like Woodring, Westover and Gen Spaulding, G-4 said, we want to get more airplanes for the money. Under the Eaker Board there were 2,320 planes on the agenda. And the War Dept General Staff figured if we get smaller airplanes, like B-18s, we can get more planes for the same dollars. Andrews pushed hard for the B-17. Arnold did not push as hard for the B-17s in this period, I am talking '36-37-38.

H: I wouldn't know that, to me, Arnold always pushed as hard as anybody could push, but I know that Andrews and Knerr were pushing awfully hard, too. Because I later spent a lot of time with Gen Knerr, and he told me about it.

Q: This brings up a follow-on question. In 1940-41, Andrews had been sent out

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to San Antonio after he completed his tour in 1939. Knerr went to work for the Sperry Company and you worked alongside of Knerr. This is '39,'40,'41.

H: Knerr had done some writing and some of his writing had caused some degree of irritation.

Q: Yes, it did. He wrote for Fortune magazine....

H: He was very outspoken. He was different than Arnold, he believed in laying the cards on the table.

Q: And he probably wrote William Bradford Huie's book....

H: I don't think he wrote the book, but he helped him, and then he came to work in the Sperry Corporation, and I was an Asst to the Vice President of the Sperry Company. Fred C stle was an Asst to the President of Sperry. And Jim Webb was the Vice President.

Q: You know, Knerr came down to visit Andrews in the Panama Canal in 1941. Andrews was pushing Sperry's equipment. Sperry had a rangefinder or some kind of an antiaircraft spotter. So Andrews was going to help out a little bit, and recommend Sperry equipment. But mostly, they were corresponding with one another, and there was a tone of bitterness toward Arnold in this correspondence.

H: Hugh Knerr could inject a little bit of fire in anything he did. I later became his Executive Officer in the Pentagon. When he became IG after the AF became a separate service. I knew him very, very well, so he could get kind of, I guess, bitter....

Q: I talked to him several times.

H: He could get kind of bitter on certain things. He's very splendid person, and he made a wonderful IG.

Q: He and I are great friends now. In fact, I'm helping him with the Board of Military Corrections on the awards for the Alaskan flight. He is one of the

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bitter people. He felt that Arnold got a DFC...Arnold ended up with a DFC and nobody else got an award. Knerr felt, to put it bluntly:"Arnold looked after Arnold; Andrews looked after his men."

H: Arnold, of course...Gen Knerr was completely devoted, as an individual, to Gen Andrews. He was the Chief of Staff, GHQ AF. He is a very blunt man, and he had that quality, I know him as well as any human being. I get Christmas cards from him regularly. Maybe I'm getting older, but I tend to look upon those things as personal characteristics, rather than anything said or done with any venom. He was just that kind of a guy. Now, he got himself into some difficulty when he wrote some of these articles. He left the Sperry Co. I think the Navy wasn't too happy with some of the things he had written. Sperry was doing a lot of business with Navy. So by mutual agreement he left, and about that time things were beginning to heat up very quickly, and as soon as the war came along, Gen Andrews got him back in. The day that he arrived in Europe was th3 day that Gen Andrews was killed.

Q: Let me back you up about a year before that. Knerr was trying to get back into service, 1941. Andrews was down in the Caribbean. Arnold was breaking no world's records getting Knerr back on active duty. Were you aware of that?

H: Wasn't privy to it, didn't know about it. Actually, anything done through the Army staff was very difficult. You must remember that Arnold wasn't a controlling factor.

Q: Right, he wasn't. But he was aware that Knerr was a disturbing influence, that Knerr was pushing very hard for a separate air force.

H: It wasn't the time....

Q: Correct. But he was writing Andrews, letters; Arnold has betrayed us, using strong language like this. Andrews was acquiescent. Andrews' letters

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were neutral. But do you know that Knerr had an idea to put Andrews on top of the AF, and put Arnold out in Africa. He wanted Andrews to run the AF. I've seen his letters. He doesn't know that I've seen them, but I have. The McNarney-Kuter-Harrison reorganization. You know the reorganization that took effect March 9, 1942, this started sometime just before Pearl Harbor. It was a halfway house type of thing. It gave the Army Air Forces autonomy within the War Dept in order to still the clamor for a separate Air Force, which was being built up in Congress. Knerr was one of those guys lighting that fire. He had two things in mind, one, he wanted a separate air force. He figured airpower was the most important ingredient in winning a war which it probably was. Secondly, he probably felt that under a separate Air Force Andrews would, having more command experience than Arnold had, would rise to the top of the tree, and he would be the commander of the unified Air Force. And all the help he gave William Bradford Huie, all the articles he wrote for American Mercury, either under Huie's by-line, if he didn't write them, Huie got all his material, or most of his material.

H: Huie wrote "The Case Against the Admirals."

Q: That's Knerr's book, and so is the book, "The Fight for Airpower," Knerr's argumentation, too. In fact, in the preface of each of these books is a big word of praise for Knerr. But did you know that this was going on?

H: I knew to this extent. I wasn't really privy to it because I didn't know Knerr all that well at that time. My association with Gen Knerr resulted later.

Q: Well, did he ever talk to you about that?

H: Not very much.

Q: Did he ever talk about Arnold to you? I give Arnold credit for this, because Arnold knew the type of guy he was. Arnold knew that he was a disturbing element. Arnold had pledged to Marshall that he was not going to push for a

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separate Air Force during WWII. This was understood between them.

H: This is characteristic of Arnold, of prevailing in his environment. If you had a Knerr in there - and I love Gen Knerr - but if you had a Gen Knerr in there he would have lasted about 24 hours. Because the heat, the pressures, which surrounded the position, he would not have been able to survive it.

Q: As I wanted to conclude my little comment - my big comment, maybe - that despite Arnold's feeling about Knerr, he had great respect for his ability. Knerr was one of the great logistics people of WWII. Logistics in the 8th AF and the ETO were messed up. Arnold permitted him to come back and rise up to become the Deputy for Logistics.

H: Deputy for Administration and Logistics.

Q: That's correct. I mean he was like No. 3 man in there.

H: Anderson and Knerr and there was Spaatz and Curtis.

Q: Right. But what I am saying is that Arnold did not allow his own feelings about Knerr to intervene. There was no love lost between Arnold and Knerr, but Arnold did not allow his feelings about Knerr to interfere with his other feelings.

H: I said earlier that one of Arnold's great qualities was this insight into what individuals could do, and his ability to roll with certain situations, to make compromises. This is another example of it. This was the great genius of the man, which he knew just exactly what different people had capacity to do. He knew the little role I could do. He knew what Norstad could do. He knew what Anderson could do.

Q: Now having made that point, on the other side of it, there are some people who say that Arnold bore grudges.

H: My feeling is that people in different situations as they get older and as they are confronted with some God-awful situations, tend to be partly

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contradictory basically. In other words, everything you said about Arnold is correct, but then in a particular instance, he could show hostility, and he could be mean, but over a period of time it was not a lasting quality with him, because he had all these various, he was being pulled in every direction. Everything you said about the way that he could handle people and that he recognized Knerr's abilities as a logistician is correct. But, then, in a given situation, as he got older and as the frustrations in some cases built up on him, he might very well spit out some ugly words about some SOB, and he would really be mean. But, over the long period, when you evaluated it six weeks later, it would have vanished like the morning fog. But the same basic quality that you described earlier was the prevailing quality. I believe I can get mad at one of my kids, in any given situation, get very angry with them, very disappointed with them, and practically not speak to them for 24 hours because of something that they had done. But, basically, that isn't the prevailing quality in family life. The prevailing quality of Arnold's life was an ability to understand what the values were, and how to use those values.

Q: To use your phrase, "prevailing quality" some have said that Arnold gave preference in assigning good jobs to men who came up on the West Coast with him - Eaker, Spaatz, some of the others - as opposed to those who came up on the East Coast with Andrews - Royce, Tony Frank, Knerr...

H: It wasn't a case of the East Coast vs. the West Coast. No, it was not, definitely. If you take a look at this GHQ list here, you realize the small number of the eligibles. There weren't all that many good people to pick from. How in God's name could you compare Krogstad, Cousins, and as much as I like Frank, with people of the stature of Eaker and Spaatz.

Q: You know, Tony Frank wanted a command, and Arnold wouldn't give him one?

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H: I know he did, but on the other hand, Tony Frank served his nation well but it wasn't a case of...there was such a small number of people, here I was a LT and I was rubbing elbows with all these Generals. There I am in the order, so you know if I am in the order, every single man of any ability at all in the Major and LTCOL rank were all there. No, it wasn't a case of where you lived or anything. It was a case of Arnold's very precise evaluation of what the hell the quality was. What could they do?

Q: When did he moderate his drive for a separate air force - in the '30s?

H: Oh yes. He shelved it for a while. Now, the reason was he saw that the time wasn't then. He had to prevail, he had to prevail through those difficult years, so he had to fashion a mechanism that he could ride on. That mechanicsm came out after many, many conferences. He wasn't about to go out on a crusade that he was going to lose on. If you want one quality of Gen Arnold, he wouldn't attach himself to a losing cause. So he saw that at that time it was timely. Now, as a younger officer, when things were going along, he had aspirations for it.

Q: He learned his lesson in the Billy Mitchell situation? He was sent into exile and he benefited from it.

H: Arnold, if he were here, would say,that's not way to be influential.

Q: Mrs. Arnold told me that she sat in on some of these trial conferences, during the Morrow Board hearings, and during the trial. I think she sort of blended them in together. But Billy Mitchell deliberately chose an extreme position, in order to bring attention to the plight of airpower. Billy Mitchell was a martyr; he sacrificed himself, knowingly. But Arnold did not have this psychological problem.

H: Because Billy Mitchell didn't serve his country as well as Arnold did in the long run. If you are going to prevail, you've got to prevail in a time bracket.

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You can't just prevail for one moment, and Arnold recognized, again, that quality of culture.

Q: You know, Billy Mitchell is far better known than Arnold is today. Most young people don't even know Arnold, but everybody knows Billy Mitchell. Of course there's been a Gary Cooper movie about Billy Mitchell. There ought to be a movie about Arnold. Maybe we can rectify this. But you know, looking at the history, I agree with you that Arnold did far more than Mitchell did for the AF. But Arnold does not come through to a lot of young people today.

H: I think any dramatic event invites, any particular dramatic event such as the Mitchell trial would be the thing that's remembered. The more careful, diplomatic person who prevails is the person perhaps who isn't as well known. C'est la vie.

Q: Let's back up to the Rex Mission.

H: I was on it.

Q: You were on the mission. There was a big to-do the next morning when the pictures hit the Herald Tribune.

H: Well, we had a number of correspondents at Mitchel Field, Gen Eaker, as I recall, was head of the Public Information Office, I was one of the officers working for him there.

Q: Was there a fellow named Richards?

H: H.H.C. Richards, I don't think he was up there at that time. He was down here, in the Munitions Building. I don't think he was up there, I don't recall seeing him, but Eaker was Public Information Officer. So it was decided that they would send these airplanes out to the Rex. Andrews wasn't one to go and get too many clearances from anyone, so we prepared some lists and then we advised the correspondents that wanted to go. And so, we picked up a few, and we loaded them

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into the airplane. I loaded them myself. One fellow almost didn't get on board, a little mixup at time of takeoff. But I took these guys down and put them in these airplanes. One of the airplanes was flown by Cousland; one was flown by C.V. Haynes, one was flown by either Malloy or George, I've forgotten which. Our copilot was Doug Kilpatrick, and most of the people were out of the South American flight. In other words, they were all 2nd Bomb Group people. LeMay was on board as a navigator. So we took off and we started to fly, and the weather was just simply frightful. You couldn't even see the other airplanes. So we had to be very careful. We got different elevations to be sure that nobody slid into somebody. And we flew, and we flew and flew. After we had flown about something like 3 1/2 hours, we broke out into the most amazingly clear day you've ever seen. We were barging along there, and pretty soon we saw the REX.

Q: You knew where it was?

H: We knew the general course it was on. The idea was to go out and intercept it in the ocean. This is a pretty tough navigation problem, because you know you didn't have any radio aids as such. You couldn't exactly turn on a homing beacon. The airplane that I was in was not the one that spotted the REX, but they said they had spotted the REX. So we all closed in and we flew across the deck of the REX. We flew down fairly close. I've got a whole bunch of pictures.

Q: The captain invited you for dinner?

H: Oh yes, there was some...and there were a lot of Americans on board who were coming back from troubled Europe, and they got out. They sort of thought that this was a salute to them, you know, to welcome them back to the States. It wasn't that at all. They started to sing the Star Spangled Banner on the decks. This came out the next day in the Herald Tribune, two days later, and how exciting it was for them coming back from a Europe that was on the verge of

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difficulty, to see these American airplanes welcoming them as though they were right outside of the Statue of Liberty, about two miles. Hell, they were 700 miles at sea. And so we flew down and made this picture, and George Goddard was making them. Then we'd say, "one more, fellows". These airplanes would turn around like this, and come down like that, and make these pictures, because Gen Andrews said he wanted a picture of the REX with the airplanes in it. He said that kind of thing half-jokingly. I don't think he really expected us to get it. These guys were pretty eager beavers and they didn't mind flying like that. I wouldn't have flown that low. I mean that's getting down pretty low. If you got a downdraft, you would go down in the water very quickly. Out over that kind of water you could get some downdrafts and updrafts, as we learned about an hour later. So we made these pictures and we said "Hi Ho" to the REX, turned around and started home. Except for the fact that Doug Kilpatrick buckled himself in,. I would be dead. We were coming along, and we came into this clear air turbulence. That airplane went down like nothing I have ever seen.

Q: You were flying B-10s?

H: No, these were B-17s, airplane went down very rapidly, and Cousland went up against the ceiling - he was the pilot. But Kilpatrick was strapped in, because somebody told him to fly it by the book. He was all strapped in, probably had his elbows under the arm gear and he was holding on tight. When it snapped out, why, he just let it gently out like that, and as a result he was able to save the airplane, but I don't know but what we went down - George Goddard could tell you - I guess we must have gone down about 2,000 feet in about 2 seconds. The airplane rivets were strained. You could see them when we came back, I think they had to disassemble the airplane. Had that airplane been pulled out sharply, the wings would have come off. But this kid was so damned good - he was a very good

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pilot - he was later killed in a B-17. He just slid it right in sort of gently and then let it catch on. We had a frightful ride back, but we did intercept the REX, the publicity was tremendous. The aftermath you know very well.

Q: Let me ask you about the aftermath. This is the 100-mile limit which was supposed...

H: I've never been able to document that.

Q: But it must have existed because many people - I talked to Eaker about this. Eaker said it was imposed, but nobody can document it.

H: I've been tracing the document on that with Hansell and others for a long period of time, but I know, afterwards, the furor that was cooked up by the REX flight. They took Knerr and assigned him to some place. They assigned McNarney to another place, Kenney was assigned to the Infantry School. Various people went their several ways, and it was a blow to the organization that Gen Andrews had created. Arnold, here again, Arnold was deft. He didn't get himself too closely involved in this. I keep coming back to the two two strategies of Arnold. You've got to have a military strategy, but you've also got to have a strategy to survive in the atmosphere, you've got to be cultured.

Q: Let me ask you, you quoted Ben Jonson.

H: Ben Jonson said once, the definition of a cultured man is a man who, with grace, can live easily in his environment.

Q: Now, this is your thought. Did Arnold quote Ben Jonson?

H: No.

Q: Your interpretation of his role?

H: He fitted into that. No, it wasn't a quotation that I got from Arnold; it's a quotation I got from my own reading.

Q: Arnold was not a learned man, in a sense of, he did not do a lot of reading

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of the classics. He did not literally quote from Shakespeare, the Bible, or things of this sort.

H: Practical air man. Had these qualities that I described. Some of the other people that might have done a lot of philosophic readings and be very learned would have failed to have prevailed in this kind of an atmosphere. Knerr wouldn't have lasted 24 hours. Knerr was a very - he used to read all the time - I mean he was a studious man. But he didn't have the great ability to be diplomatic.

Q: I made a note here, remember Perera and Bart Leach and Elihu Root, and a couple of others - this Committee on Operations Analysis. I guess you worked closely with them on this targeting, damage effectivenss and things of this sort. Did they do a good job out there?

H: You mean in England?

Q: Yes, didn't they come out to England, and you know, the targeting was not as good as it became later on.

H: But that wasn't due to them?

Q: No, I don't mean it was due to them....

H: The targeting of the air force was perfectly classic and perfectly well defined. I went through this at the Air War College. Have you talked to Emme? Emme will fill you in on my comments at the Air War College on this. But what happened was that after, the targets were not all that elusive, there was nothing about the 8th AF target. Counterair, transportation, oil, airfields, and things like that. But then these people came forward and some of them are the people who are claiming they had the great cure - they had a great deal of influence in curing the target ailments. But what happened was: people would come forward and Gen Marshall was one of them, with his staff. He said: "As there are any submarines in the Atlantic, the first thing we have got to do is to insure" - and

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this was the Navy that got to Marshall - "we've got to insure that those submarine targets are hit." Well, what were the targets? I had the job of getting all the intelligence together, had about 4 or 5 days to do it. It was very easy. I can name them: St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, Brest, and Lorient. So we took off - I went on one of these missions just to see what bombing submarine pens was like. When you got down there, you couldn't do a damn bit of damage to them. They made them too deep. So what I'm saying is, the ailment of the target was, it was like the dish put on the table. Don't blame the cook of every one of the guests comes in and throws in some salt. They changed it. Are you talking about the Orvil Anderson group, too?

Q: Yes.

H: In the early days, the number of missions that you could fly was at such a level that there weren't really many other opportunities for you. The airplanes didn't have the nose turrets. You didn't have any fighters. But as the problems became more complex, then you had to go for a variety of tactics, Orvil Anderson's Operational Analysis Group, I guess that's what it was called. The Operational Analysis Group, it seems to me, as things became more complicated, provided a useful mechanism. It didn't influence the basic intelligence; it did not basically influence the targets very much.

Q: I want to ask you about a thing that was in your bailiwick. The alleged exaggeration of kill scores. This was a situation that exercised a lot of people in Washington, one of whom was Under Secy of War Patterson. Remember this issue arising on several occasions?

H: The morale of the forces were such that we were in no position - when those crews came back and started to make claims - we were in no real position to start to apply a truth factor to what they were telling us. We flew on a

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certain number of missions. The mission I was on, we knew exactly how many planes we hit, we knew exactly how many we lost. We had very heavy losses on the mission that I flew down to the Bay of Biscay - Lorient - Of the four airplanes in our box, only two got back, 20 men died. Now, the morale was such that Gen Eaker wasn't about to start this. He did explain that this was the result of the very best interrogation that we knew how to conduct. Now, Colonel Humphrey up in LeMay's division developed a whole set of models up there in which he took these things and he tried. Example: there would be an airplane coming down like this. Let me show you the problem. A fighter would be coming through here, it had already been hit, and it was on one wing, but as it would go through the formation two or three guys would be pouring lead into it, as it went under the formation. Who shot it down, you tell me. I'm not arguing with you, but I'm saying the matter of sorting it out. Now, how are we going to sit in solemn judgment and say, the first pilot that put the lead...you couldn't do that. You had to just go ahead and let them turn in their claims and admittedly, they had to be evaluated on the basis, but as soon as experienced people came over and we put them through this briefing, they all understood the problem. But some guy would sit in Washington, and he would get all exercised about these things. It was a lot of nonsense. Much ado about nothing. You couldn't start sending back reports that the airplane hadn't been destroyed two or three times.

Q: Well, a lot of people, perhaps, who didn't like the AF, jumped on this issue.

H: And there were plenty of people who didn't like the AF. And people that rubbed - maybe Mr. Patterson liked the AF, I never saw that he was very hostile, but I'll bet a dollar some of the people he rubbed elbows with, were sticking pins in him.

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Q: Remember Peter Masefield?

H: Yes, he was the writer. He used to go out to the bases.

Q: I've been corresponding with him. He's head of the British aviation, I guess the equivalent of FAA. He was a skeptic about daylight bombing, but you or Eaker made a believer out of him.

H: The thing that made the believer out of him was the demonstrated effectiveness. When you began to take a look at these British - I remember the first time I had to brief some newspapermen. I wasn't very enthused on this, but Eaker had an ability to give some of his busy people - and I was one of them - additional jobs. So he put the Public Affairs Officer under me, because he felt that as long as a communique was going to be written, the intelligence people should be in it. So I worked, I had this fellow - Col Letts - I think his name was. Basically, he worked for the Commander, but basically he worked for me, too. I would take some of these pictures, and conduct these briefings, occasionally. Of course, some of my intelligence friends back in Washington - this was absolutely heresy for an Intelligence Officer to even speak to newspapermen. They had a bunch of theoretical ideas - most of them had never been in a combat zone - that Intelligence people should stay away because they could betray the secrets of the nation or some such junk. But I remember one time I talked to these guys and I took a set of pictures - in regard to the picture - I pulled out a picture of, I remember it, the Focke-Wulf plant at Bremen. We really hit the Focke-Wulf plant at Bremen, and we didn't bomb downtown. We hit many airplane factories, but you only had to take one look at this, and recognize that the Focke-Wulf airplane was a threat, and recognize that they weren't going to do very much production there for a while. You could make a believer, so I'm not saying that I convinced any of them, but I would just take simple pieces of evidence. I follow Eaker, I go the

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understatement route. I would say: "It would look like this factory here will have some difficulty in producing airplanes." And you could hear a twitter run across the room. Bur rather than say, "This factory is gone for all time, or destroyed." And it was a picture of an airplane factory. So Masefield and a lot of these people had come under theinfluence of "Bert" Harris and naturally they had doubts. These were two air doctrines. And here, again, was Arnold. Two air doctrines: he had to live with Portal and Harris. He had to live with the American air doctrine, and he had to move very definitely through this atmosphere. Don't forget you had two air doctrines. Eaker was the guy that came up with the thought: the way to do was to link them into a single military strategy. It wasn't Arnold; it wasn't anybody else but Ira Eaker that thought of that. The case for daylight bombardment makes the point that round-the-clock bombing gives them no rest.

Q: On the subject of two doctrines: there were two doctrines in respect to area bombing. Of course, this is a current issue. We have had some problems that have arisen in the AF very recently about Dresden and Berlin, and some of the bombing of civilians. The British policy, the area bombing, of course, you just drop the stuff. The Pathfinders gave you a mark and you dropped everything inside. The official Army Air Forces policy, as I can detect it, was, we only hit military targets but if we have to kill some civilians in the process, we should not be squeamish about it. Is that a fair analysis?

H: That's as fair an analysis, as I know. I listened to some person the other night who was on a radio program. He was some one--day wonder expert, and he was talking about the mass-bombing strategies of the British and the American forces. And he was so mixed up. In the first place, we respected what the British were trying to do. Their towns had been burned down. Who were we to say that they

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shouldn't go back and reply in kind. And Churchill agreed to it. So they were trying to bring a great impact of the war on the Germans and make them realize that "they were in it, fellers." They didn't start it. You've got to remember the Germans started it. The Germans were the ones who bombed Coventry. It wasn't anybody else, so the British went back. The Americans, on the other hand, felt that you had to reduce the German AF and to do that, you had to bomb in the daylight. Because you couldn't find those factories. The Focke-Wulf plant was just like something like the Goddard Research Center out here on the fringes of Washington. You couldn't hit that at night. And so, it was necessary to have the two strategies, and they were mutually self-supporting.

Q: You know, the British tried to get us into their strategy, sort of "tar us with the same brush" toward the end of the war. They tried to get us into several of these mass bombing raids, but we, Spaatz wrote Arnold and warned against our getting involved in this.

H: Eaker and Spaatz worked very close.

Q: Eaker and Spaatz were very close, Eaker also warned against this. I have a note here. This has to do with the FRANTIC Operation, the shuttle bombing to Russia. Now, you were involved in that.

H: I went on the mission.

Q: Why did Arnold turn down Elliott Roosevelt for the Russian photo shuttle mission? Elliott Roosevelt wanted to get in on that. Did you get involved in that decision?

H: I think that Arnold felt, I think he recognized Elliott Roosevelt's role. It was a very dangerous mission. The airplane I was in had a horrid time. We got hit, and we had to turn back. On the return flight, we had to turn back to Russia, and damned near didn't make it - Poltava.

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Q: You were on the sort of first reconnaissance mission?

H: No, I was on the first B-17 mission. We had flown a reconnaissance flight before, but that was flown by some of the people from over there. I think that it would have been unnecessarily confusing for the President's son to be lost on this mission. So as a matter of judgment, Gen Arnold just tried to tell Roosevelt to slow down a little.

Q: Did Elliott Roosevelt come in under your jurisdiction?

H: Yes and no. He was under Eaker's, of course. He was a part of the 12th AF. Gen Eaker was the Mediterranean Commander. I was staff officer to Eaker. I took all my authority from my commander. However, Elliott Roosevelt's role was in the area of photo reconnaissance, and photo reconnaissance was the thing that I laid the requirements on. So I used to go over. They had a place called San Savero, and I used to go over there. And I'd known Elliott, we both were in St. Albans together, but by that time he was sort of flitting around. He had other interests, and a Col Shetler, can't quite say his name. He was Colonel that ended up in Intelligence and this fellow as the Acting Commander, and I did my work with him. I would lay my requirements on, and I would say: "These are the pictures I want; get them." And he understood. He would come over and visit me, and I would show him the things that I needed to develop the intelligence, because there wasn't any point in them...they had to know exactly what our thinking was in order to develop their photo requirements.

Q: Did you get involved in any of this business of Elliott Roosevelt trying to get promoted?

H: I wasn't privy to that. You mean get promoted to what?

Q: To BG.

H: No.

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Q: You know, I ask a lot of people about Arnold getting mad, and Eugene Beebe, his aide, saw, he got mad every day.

H: I saw him get mad. I saw him get awfully mad...

Q: About what?

H: He was frustrated, and like a lot of people who had their frustrations, he would take them out in a strange way. The things that he'd do didn't make any sense, and he would forget them later. When he brought me back, he asked among other things, as though I didn't have enough to do, that I start taking some of the reports that were coming in, and reduce them, as he said, to one or two sheets of paper. So I'd come in fairly early in the morning and read this stuff and then I would, this would be on the trip....

Q: Is this towards the end of the war?

H: 1943--44. I would then take the material and write a page and put it there, because he didn't have time to read all these reports. One day he came in and he found on his desk a volume that was, literally, about that thick. It was the operational reports of Gen Kenney's AF as I recall it. It certainly wasn't an 8th AF one, because I wouldn't have put an 8th AF report there in that form.

Q: It was from the 5th AF?

H: Yes. It was a great big document. It had been prepared very carefully, and was sent back, and somebody put it on Arnold's desk. It was impossible for him to read it and evaluate it. It was a ridiculous thing to do. That was one of the reasons I was in the circuit as far as Eaker was concerned, to try to reduce this stuff to something meaningful, because I had been a journalist, and I could take it and pull it down. So he had all the Air Staff around, I can remember. There was O'Donnell, Kuter, and all these guys sitting around, and I was out in

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the little office there in the corner, digging away at my pack of material, getting ready for the next day's briefings, I guess. And he called in and he said: "Hull!" And like that, so I walked in the room, and here was the Air Staff sitting there, all kinds of looking over their shoulders like this, and he picked up this volume, which was at least 3 times as thick as this, and about like that, that, and he threw it at me. He just hauled off and he threw it. And he said: "Put that on a single sheet of paper!" So I suddenly looked up and here was this book coming across the Air Staff. So I caught it like this, and O'Donnell said: "...and a fine catch."

Q: He had a great sense of humor.

H: And he took the pressure off, and Arnold laughed, and I didn't know if I was the villian. I was, of course, young, but I remember looking up and I couldn't believe my eyes. This goddamned thing was hurtling through the air, and I caught it, and took it out, and put it down, and O'Donnell said: "...and a fine catch."

Q: Rosie O'Donnell had this knack of taking the sting out of a situation. Anyway, I told you the Rosie O'Donnell inkwell story. Did Arnold ever get mad at you at any other time.

H: Never. I was too far down the line. I was just - you must remember that I had known him and I wrote speeches for him when I was a 2nd LT. He looked upon me like he'd look upon a junior officer. There was no point in getting mad at me. He was fond of me, and he was kind to me. We wrote a speech for him once. Hansell and I wrote a speech. We turned it out very carefully, we gave it to him about 3:00 in the afternoon, and he said: "Well, do some more work on it and fly it up to NY to me." So we flew it up to NY the next day, and finally, there was confusion up there. I had put the damn thing in a zipper part of the airplane. When I went to get it out, it had worked its way down into the structure. The canvas inside was

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rotten. And I had a horrid time getting it. I went and told him: "If I can get a few people to tilt this airplane up on end, and shake it, I will get the speech. And he looked as if to say: "My God, what a bunch of nuts I work with." So he took off and we had to fly the speech out to Chicago. That was all right. When we got out there we delivered the speech to him, and it was to be given the next day. After we delivered the speech to him we came in, the speech was about 1:00 and we said: "We would like to stay and hear your speech, General," Hansell and myself. He said: "Fine, that's fine," so we got down to the studio, and we were sitting there, and he came in, and he had been with some friends, and he'd had a drink, and he put his arm around Possum - and I knew something had happened. He said: "Possum, I have to tell you this, I lost the speech." We didn't have copies of it. So Hansell roared out of there for a typewriter, and he said: "You write the first part, and I'll write the last part." So we sat there writing, 40 minutes to go, and we wrote the whole speech over again. When he started he had the first three pages, and when he'd get to page 4, he would reach out, just with the confidence of God, you know, and we would hand him a sheet. Finally, the thing came through, and he said: "Thank's fellows." And we rewrote that whole speech in 40 minutes, but it so happened it was one we had done twice already, and we knew what we wanted to say.

Q: When was this, early in the game?

H: That would have been about 1936.

Q: He was still Asst Chief then. You were probably what, a Captain?

H: I was never a Captain. He promoted me from 1st LT to Major. See, they had to. In the 8th AF they were bringing in all these Colonels, and I didn't want to have any break in my record because I had seniority, involved in pay purposes. So I was a 1st LT in January 1942 and I was a full Colonel in December 1942. To

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do that they had to skip some ranks.

Q: Somebody told me Arnold had a black list.

H: No, I don't think so. I think that was just got to hypocryphal. I think every man has got a black book.

Q: These are people that he doesn't want to get promoted, and he allegedly said to this individual who had something to do with General Officer assignments: "I don't want these guys going overseas," because they would have commanders ask for them and they would go overseas and get promoted into some kind of a job. He didn't want any of these people getting promoted.

H: I don't believe that. I think that that just gets to be legend. It's awfully easy around a man like Arnold to build up legends. You take a pea and you turn it into a stew. I mean I just don't believe he was that kind. Now, there were people who lacked real capacity, and I knew some of them. He told me that. And he said: "This fellow is a nice guy, but he hasn't got it." What do you do? And he frequently would talk to people like Fred Dean and me. - Did you ever interview Fred Dean?

Q: Yes. I interviewed him, but I didn't have the machine going, I interviewed him on an airplane flying up from Florida to Langley Field. I didn't have this machine with me, and I was taking notes. I tried to remember.

H: Point being, he would take a young officer like Dean and myself, and he would sort of take us occasionally into his confidence. Not that he was trying to impress, he just wanted to talk to somebody.

Q: You know, he did this several times. He did this with Norstad. Norstad was one of his boys.

H: Norstad was cut out of a different league than I was. Norstad, he looked upon as a guy who was...he saw the value of Norstad. Norstad was much more senior.

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Q: We are talking about Kuter and Eaker, and the fact that these messages were coming in to Eaker, and that things did not run smoothly. Well, they never ran smoothly because there were so many issues at the time.

H: Gen Arnold sent over to England, a fellow named Harold Hinton, who was later a NY Times correspondent, and he came over and he told Gen Eaker that he should fly a mission on the 4th of July 1942, and Gen Eaker didn't want to fly a mission on July 4, 1942, because the only airplanes we had then were the A-20s. And so he challenged this in a message gently, and found that Gen Arnold, in fact, did want this mission flown. Now, this was a very poor decision on Arnold's part. So I went out, and we didn't have any intelligence officers out there, so I went out and did the briefing. The crews took off and bombed an airfield near Holland named De Kooy. It was just a little airfield, a little village there on the shore. They went across low level and they put about 6 British planes in the formation, and about 6 American planes. Well, we lost a couple of airplanes, and Gen Eaker felt it was a badly conceived mission. Now, what I'm saying is the nature of the game was such, that with these decisions being made in this way, it wasn't possible when the lives of men hung in the balance, for the relationships to be other than constant strained on occasion. When the airplanes got back, and there were two planes missing, Gen Eaker was upset. He thought it needless. It violated his idea of the way you ought to run a military operation. So he told me to take the report up to Gen Eisenhower, who was in London. So I took his airplane, and his pilot, and they flew me up to London. I went in to see Gen Eisenhower, and I knew him very well. So I told Butcher, the aide. I said: "I've got a report here. So I walked in and saluted, which was a little unusual, and said: "I guess you will recall that forces under your command engaged the enemy today." And he had forgotten for the moment - there were so many messages going back and forth - and

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he had forgotten for the moment that this had been scheduled. I put the reports together, and one of the planes had returned, flown by a man named Major Kegelman, had had a fantastic mission. Kegelman had touched the ground, leaped into the air, turned, attacked the flak tower and returned home. I had interrogated all the crews, to be sure my facts were right. Everybody came back, and we were all kind of... I just get ill every time I think of that mission, because of the needless loss of life, which kills you to see that sort of thing happen.

Q: Do you think Arnold was trying to make headlines?

H: I think Arnold, somewhere along the line, had been told, perhaps by the White House, it was a July 4th mission. It was so obvious they were trying to make headlines. So I put all these reports on there, and Gen Eisenhower read them and he said: "Are you sure of your facts?" And I said: "Yes, I am. I'm very sure." "How are you sure?" I said: "I'm sure because I cross-interrogated. I just didn't depend on one person. I pieced the whole thing together." So he said: "This officer is hereby awarded the Distinguished Service Cross." That was the first time that report Eisenhower ever got and the first decoration he ever gave. Two of us in the room - three of us, Butcher was in there. Then I went back and Gen Eaker felt that that was a badly conceived order that he'd gotten.

Q: Did he ever complain to Arnold about it?

H: He complained in the original message. He challenged it. He didn't want to do it.

Q: Did Arnold withdraw it?

H: Not a bit.

Q: Did Arnold ever back off when he made a mistake, or did he just do something else, without admitting he was wrong in the first place?

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H: I never saw him back off very much, you understand, there is a sequence of events. We got Hinton in there one day. The mission was to be flown. Hinton came to town about July 1st, and the mission was to be flown about the 4th. Eaker sent a message back to me to be sure that they meant what they said. And he got a message back that Hinton, did, in fact, have the complete instructions. Eaker wanted to be very sure. We didn't have combat orders or anything coming from Washington then. You didn't have the kind of order that Eaker would send out to a division which is a combat order. The authority was sort of: "Wouldn't it be a good idea to bomb such and such." Eaker wanted to be sure they knew what they were talking about, so there was an exchange of messages.

Q: I was looking beyond this particular mission, about Arnold when he made a mistake, did he back off?

H: I never saw him back off much.

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

USAF ACADEMY MICROFILM SERVICE CENTER

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END DATE: 10-1-92

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

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