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DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

FRAME NUMBER	CLASS NUMBER	DATE PERIOD	VOL	PT	TITLE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REMARKS	DNGRAD/ DECLASS.
33-53	1103191	27/3/70			Folder 1 box 73 O'Donnell, Emmett	UNCLASS/FOUO		NONE
54-58	1103192	28/5/70			Folder 2 Ogle, Dan	UNCLASS		NONE
59-69	1103193	19/3/70			Folder 3 Old, Archie	UNCLASS		NONE
70-72	1103194	18/8/70			Folder 4 Oldfield, Barney	UNCLASS		NONE
73-86	1103195	26/5/70			Folder 5 Parker, Lewis	UNCLASS		NONE
87-97	1103196	4/68-3/73			Folder 6 Partridge, Earle E.	UNCLASS		NONE
98-114	1103197	6/6/72			Folder 7 Pawley, William D.	UNCLASS		NONE
115-131	1103198	16/11/72			Folder 8 Peabody, Hume	UNCLASS		NONE
132-141	1103199	2/10/69			Folder 1 Box 74 Peterson, Pete	UNCLASS		NONE
142-146	1103200	3/1/70			Folder 2 Pool, Henry J.	UNCLASS		NONE
147-148	1103201	2/1/70			Folder 3 Powell, James F.	UNCLASS		NONE
149-155	1103202	14/4/70			Folder 4 Powers, Edward M.	UNCLASS		NONE
156-165	1103203	4/74-8/74			Folder 5 Putt, Donald L.	UNCLASS		NONE
166-171	1103204	26/3/70			Folder 6 Quesada, Elwood	UNCLASS		NONE
172-178	1103205	14/8/70			Folder 7 Raymond, Arthur	UNCLASS		NONE
179-180	1103206	16/4/70			Folder 8 Rickenbacker, Eddie	UNCLASS		NONE
181-187	1103207	7/1/72			Folder 9 Rives, Tom	UNCLASS		NONE
188-189	1103208	20/12/77			Folder 10 Roach, Hal	UNCLASS		NONE

DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

FRAME NUMBER	CLASS NUMBER	DATE PERIOD	VOL	PT	TITLE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REMARKS	DNGRAD/ DECLASS.
190-201	1103209	10/8/72			Folder 11 Roosevelt, Elliott	UNCLASS		NONE
202-207	1103210	3/5/70			Folder 12 Rose, Elmer P.	UNCLASS		NONE
208-219	1103211	29/4/72			Folder 13 Roth, Marshall S.	UNCLASS		NONE
220-224	1103212	8/1/72			Folder 14 Ruestow, Paul E.	UNCLASS		NONE
225-END	1003213	13/4/70			Folder 15 Rusk, Howard A.	UNCLASS		NONE
					INDEX			

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01103193		Folder 3	Old, Archie	28	May 70	ODO 54-58
01103194		Folder 4	Oldfield, Barney	19	Mar 70	Tape 40,41 ODO 59-69
01103195		Folder 5	Parker, Lewis	18	Aug 70	Tape 88 ODO 70-72
01103196		Folder 6	Partridge, Earle E.	26	May 70	Tape 71 ODO 73-86
				12	Apr 68	Tape 163A,163B, ODO 87-97
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				8	Mar 73	"
01103197		Folder 7	Pawley, William D.	6	Jun 72	Tape 154,155 ODO 98-114
01103198		Folder 8	Peabody, Hume	16	Nov 72	Tape 159,160 ODO 115-131
01103199	Box 74	Folder 1	Peterson, Pete	2	Oct 69	ODO 132-141
01103200		Folder 2	Pool, Henry J.	3	Jan 70	Tape 18 ODO 142-146
01103201		Folder 3	Powell, James F.	2	Jan 70	Tape 96 ODO 147-148
01103202		Folder 4	Powers, Edward M.	14	Apr 70	Tape 48,49 ODO 149-155
01103203		Folder 5	Putt, Donald L.	1-3	Apr 74	ODO 156-165
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01103204		Folder 6	Quesada, Elwood	26	Mar 70	Tape 42 ODO 166-171
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01103213		Folder 15	Rusk, Howard A.	13	Apr 70	Tape 47,48 ODO 225-END


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HQ USAF ACADEMY/REPROGRAPHICS DIVISION

continued

FROM

Roll

92-186

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

USAF ACADEMY MICROFILM SERVICE CENTER

ROLL NUMBER: 92-221

PROJECT #: 1-71

SUBJECT: "Hap" Arnold - Green Collection

START FRAME: 1

START DATE: 23 Nov. 92

PHOTOGRAPHER: K. Lentz

HQ USAF ACADEMY/REPROGRAPHICS DIVISION

O'Donnell, Emmett 21 Dec 67

March 30, 1970

Reader's Digest
Humor In Uniform Department
Pleasantville, N.Y.

Dear Sir:

Here's one that happened to me over the past weekend.

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold, wartime leader of the Army Air Forces. One of his key lieutenants was Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell who first gained fame as a star football player at West Point, and then coached the team. In 1943 he headed General Arnold's Advisory Council, and later in the war went out to command a B-29 wing. He led the first Mariana - based mission against Japan on Thanksgiving Day 1944.

General Rosie O'Donnell presently heads the U.S.O. and is a very busy man in Washington. I finally succeeded in getting him to pause for an interview on General Arnold, and to that end, tried to arrange privileged parking for him at the River Entrance to the Pentagon.

I had more than the usual quota of static from the bureaucracy and didn't receive confirmation of his space (without which his car would be ticketed) until a half hour before his scheduled arrival. I couldn't understand it, because requests of this sort for a four star general usually get unquestioned approval in this rank conscious building.

Today I found out why we had all the trouble. My secretary told me the girl in the Parking Control Office kept asking her incredulously: "Does she really have four stars?"

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

Encl

March 30, 1970

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Humor In Uniform Department
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Encl

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

March 30, 1970

Gen Emmett O'Donnell, USAF(Ret)
6221 Kellogg Drive
McLean, VA 22101

Dear General O'Donnell:

Needless to state, Jack and I are very grateful for the fine interview you gave us last Friday. Like a cow chewing her cud I played it back the 2nd time and suffered no indigestion. I enjoyed it as much as the first time.

Another reason for this note may be sub-titled: "Fame is Fleeting", and it appears you are the subject of it. In arranging privileged parking for you at the River Entrance, I had more than the usual quota of static from the bureaucracy, and I didn't receive confirmation of the space until a half hour before you arrived. I couldn't understand it, because requests of this sort for a four star general usually get unquestioned approval in this rank-conscious building.

Today I found out why we had all the trouble. My secretary told me the girl in the Parking Control Office kept asking her incredulously about Rosie O'Donnell: "Does she really have four stars?"

That ranks with the one where Shirley Povich found himself on the rolls honored by Who's Who in Women of America.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

done 3-27-70

March 6, 1970

General Emmett O'Donnell, USAF (Ret)
6221 Kellogg Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear General O'Donnell:

I must be out of town the next two weeks. Would you please indicate a suitable time on any day during the two-week period between March 23 and April 3, and we can have our interview then.

Enclosed is an envelope for your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray G.

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

Pls. indicate a suitable time and date!

Mon - March 23 ____
Tues " 24 ____
Wed " 25 ____
Thurs " 26 ____
Fri " 27 1:00 PM

March 30 - Mon ____
March 31 - Tues ____
April 1 - Wed ____
April 2 - Thurs ____
April 3 - Fri ____

Dear Murray, I shall be in Wash only on week ends from now until Mar 27 - if that is OK I'll meet you at Bolling for 1:00 PM

356-8589

4 door gray 1970 Impala
Va. A-698853

March 6, 1970

General Emmett O'Donnell, USAF (Ret)
6221 Kellogg Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

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DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

Above 3-27-70

Called Mrs OD 3/25

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

356-8587

February 13, 1970

General Emmett O'Donnell, USAF (Ret)
6221 Kellogg Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear General O'Donnell:

I'm sorry I missed your call today. I've tried to reach your number several times, but of course, you've been away.

My schedule for the week after next is clear except for Wednesday, February 25th. Loosbrock and I have a date to interview Jackie Cochran who will be in town that day.

Hope we can get together soon at a time convenient for you. I can arrange for parking at the River Entrance, if you would like to come over to the Pentagon.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

SAFAAR

356-8589

January 28, 1970

General Emmett O'Donnell, USAF (Ret)
6221 Kellogg Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear General O'Donnell:

As you know, Jack Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I worked for you back in 1947 when you were Director of Information. I was assigned to a "stable of writers" working under Casey Gantz and later Brig. Gen. Ginsburgh. I've been with the Secretary's office since then.

To facilitate my research work, I obtained a Brookings Institution Fellowship for the period July 1968 to October 1969 and that time away enabled me to go through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Also, within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who either knew General Arnold or had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past month I've been interviewing some friends of yours and former associates of General Arnold's now retired in Colorado Springs and in the Southland. Among them are Generals Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Hansell, Partridge, Everest, Kepner, P.D. Weikert, Bob Lee, Thatcher, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others whose names do not readily come to mind.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney and Kuter in New York City, and we have also talked with Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell and Smart here in Washington within the past six months.

Of course, we've been out to the Ranch to see Mrs. Arnold and she has been most helpful. She has several thousands of letters which she saved for periods going back to 1903.

Jack and I would like to interview you at a time and place convenient for you. We hope you can make it at an early date, because we've started writing the book and are quite aware that Rosey O'Donnell was as close to Hap Arnold as any man outside his own immediate family ever got.

To this end, I would like to phone you next week to arrange such an appointment of about 90 minutes duration. If it would be more convenient to phone me, my Pentagon numbers are OX 5-3862 and OX 7-5587.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Wash DC

O'Donnell

1. Big meeting on LeMay's porch the evening Arnold arrived June 12, 1945 The meeting was at instance of officers accompanying Arnold to Pac. What subject?

2. LeMay's fire bomb attacks - Jap expedient of carefully planned - Ltr from LeMay to Norstad March 3, 1945 - 10 days before

3. LeMay wrote Norstad Jan 31, 1945 that O'Donnell's outfit ~~to~~ in bad shape. Needed 2 group Comdrs. LeMay said he might have to put you in group comdr spot. What was the problem? Aborts?

4. Norstad flew in for Tokyo fire raid of March 9th since Arnold was in Sta was this Norstad's decision?

5. Nov 27, 1944 - Jap fighters surprise you on Guam? Did your people think they were Marine Corps fighters? How serious was Jap threat? Arnold worried?

6. In Reader's Digest Article - Tom Power said it was he who changed the tactics to low-level - not LeMay

7. Sent a memo to Arnold June 12, 1943 about the safe delivery of bombers into hands of the workers - Worried about escort?

8. Wrote of high abort rates - June 8, 1943 - seemed to disagree with Harrell on daylight vs night radar

9 Scared of FDR

10. Big flap over a/c production - 1943. You advised Arnold to cash off on production + accept WPB figure of 95,000 for 1944 - Production outrunning pilots + facilities. Also casualties fewer than anticipated. Arnold ignored advice C+C Vol G, p. 286

11. Arnold practical joker - you too. Could he take it as well as give it?

O'Donnell - concerned about escort of bombers into Germany

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

Released 31 Jul 63

GENERAL EMMETT O'DONNELL, JR., USAF

PART I Narrative

Emmett O'Donnell, Jr. was born in Brooklyn, New York, on September 15, 1906. On graduation from the United States Military Academy on June 9, 1928, he was appointed a second lieutenant in the Infantry. In the fall of that year he entered flying training at Brooks Field, Texas, and earned his pilots rating on completion of the course at the Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, Texas, in March 1930. He now holds the rating of command pilot and is credited with over 8,000 flying hours.

His initial flying assignment in the Air Corps was a six and a half year tour with the First Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field, Michigan. During this assignment he served as an airmail pilot with the Army Air Corps mail operation at Cleveland, Ohio from February to June 1934.

In December 1936, he was assigned to the 18th Reconnaissance Group at Mitchel Field, New York, where he remained for four years. While with this organization, he attended the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, graduating in August 1939. During the football seasons of 1934 to 1938, he was an assistant football coach at the U.S. Military Academy.

Transferred to Hawaii in February 1940, he was assigned as a squadron commander in the 11th Bombardment Group. Shortly before World War II, in September 1941, he led the 14th Squadron of B-17 Flying Fortresses across the Pacific to Manila. This was the first mass flight of land planes to cross the Western Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines.

When the United States entered the war in December, his group fought in the air and later with the infantry until they were forced to withdraw to Bataan and then to Mindanao. General O'Donnell and some of his group later moved to Java.

Before the war in the Philippines was two days old, General O'Donnell earned the Distinguished Flying Cross. Forced off the ground by an enemy air attack upon Clark Field, Manila, he flew to Vigan where he attacked a heavy cruiser and its destroyer escort. Because of trouble with the bomb releases, he had to make five runs over the target while subjected to heavy anti-aircraft fire and, during the last run, to enemy fighters.

From January 20, 1942, when he arrived in Java, until the first of March, when that country was taken by the Japanese, General O'Donnell served as operations officer of the Far East Air Force. He was then evacuated to India, where he became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the newly-organized Tenth Air Force.

MORE

In March 1943 General O'Donnell was ordered to Washington, D. C. to be chief of General Henry H. Arnold's Advisory Council, a post he retained until he was appointed Commanding General of the 73d Bomb Wing at Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Salina, Kansas, a year later. He trained the wing for six months and then led it to Saipan to begin the B-29 attacks on Japan. In November 1944 General O'Donnell led the first B-29 attack on Tokyo.

General O'Donnell was assigned to the Air Technical Service Command (later AMC) Headquarters at Wright Field in November 1945 where he served as Deputy Chief of the Engineering Division. He remained there until August 1946, when he was made Director of Information of the Army Air Force. In September 1947 after the USAF Headquarters was established, he was designated Deputy Director of Public Relations.

In January 1948 he was appointed Steering and Coordinating Member of the military representation on the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States; the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee; the Joint Mexico-United States Defense Commission; and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission.

He became Commanding General of the 15th Air Force at Colorado Springs, Colorado in October 1948, and on November 7, 1949, moved with that Headquarters to March Air Force Base, California.

Early in 1950, as a result of United Nations action against Communist forces in Korea, General O'Donnell took a nucleus of his 15th Air Force staff for the Far East to organize and command the Far East Bomber Command, with Headquarters in Japan. His first B-29 units to arrive in Japan accomplished the outstanding feat of carrying out a maximum effort bombing mission in Korea 36 hours after the first B-29 touched down in Japan after a flyover from the United States. During this period of temporary duty, he retained command of the 15th Air Force, with Headquarters at March Air Force Base. He returned to the United States on January 18, 1951.

On May 1, 1953, General O'Donnell became Deputy Chief of Staff for Person at Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D. C., remaining in this position until August 1, 1959 when he became Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam A Force Base, Hawaii.

PART II. Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

1. Born: 15 September 1906
   Father: Emmett O'Donnell, Sr. Mother: Veronica Tobin O'Donnell (deceased)
2. Married: 29 December 1930
   Wife: Lorraine Muller O'Donnell
   Children: Terry (born March 3, 1944)
   Pat (born March 17, 1937)
   Dale (born May 20, 1933)
3. Hometown address: Brooklyn, New York

B. Education

1. Graduate Manual Training High School, Brooklyn, New York, 1924
2. Graduate U. S. Military Academy, 1928
3. Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, 1930
4. Air Corps Tactical School, 1939.

C. Service Dates

1. September 1924 - June 1928 - Cadet, U. S. Military Academy.
2. September 1928 - March 1930 - Pilot Training, Brooks and Kelly Fields, Texas.
3. March 1930 - December 1936 - Squadron duties, First Pursuit Group, Selfridge Field, Michigan. (Served as assistant football coach at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, during the 1934-1938 seasons.)
4. December 1936 - February 1940 - Squadron and group duties, 18th Reconnaissance Group, Mitchel Field, New York.
5. February 1940 - January 20, 1942 - Squadron Commander and Group Commander, 11th Bombardment Group, Hickam Field, Hawaii; Clark Field, Bataan, Mindanao, and Philippine Islands.
6. 20 January 1942 - March 1942 - Operations Officer, Far East Air Force, Java.
7. March 1942 - March 1943 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters, 10th Air Force, India.
8. March 1943 - February 1944 - Chief, Advisory Council, Hq, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
9. March 1944 - November 1945 - Commanding General, 73d Bomb Wing (H), Saipan.

MORE

10. November 1945 - August 1946 - Deputy Chief, Engineering Division, Air Technical Service Command, Wright Field, Ohio.
11. August 1946 - September 1947 - Director of Information, Hq Army Air Force, Washington, D. C.
12. September 1947 - January 1948 - Deputy Director of Public Relations, Hq, USAF, Washington, D. C.
13. January 1948 - September 1948 - Steering and Coordinating Member, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada - United States; The Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee; The Joint Mexico-United States Defense Commission; and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission.
14. October 1948 - April 1953 - Commander, 15th Air Force, March Air Force Base, California. (5 July 1950 - 10 January 1951 on temporary duty as Commanding General, Far East Bomber Command, Japan.)
15. May 1953 - Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Hq USAF, Washington, D. C.
16. Aug 1959 - Commander-in-Chief, PACAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

D. Decorations and Medals

1. Distinguished Service Cross - 1950
2. Distinguished Service Medal - 1945
3. Silver Star - 1944
4. Legion of Merit - 1947
5. Distinguished Flying Cross with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters - 1942
6. Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster - 1942
7. Presidential Unit Citation with Oak Leaf Cluster - 1942
8. Korean Presidential Unit Citation
9. National Defense Service Medal
10. World War II Victory Medal
11. American Defense Ribbon with Bronze Star
12. Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Ribbon with 6 Stars
13. American Campaign Medal
14. Philippine Defense Ribbon with 1 Star
15. Philippine Independence Ribbon
16. Korean Military Service Medal with Silver Star (Taeguk)
17. Inter-American Defense Board Medal - 1948
18. United Nations Service Medal
19. Korean Military Service Medal with Silver Star - 1954
20. Honorary Companion of the Military Division of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath (C.B.) - 1954

E. Promotions

Rank	Temporary	Permanent
2nd Lieutenant	June 9, 1928	June 9, 1928
1st Lieutenant	October 1, 1934	October 1, 1934
Captain	April 20, 1935	June 9, 1938
Major	February 1, 1941	June 9, 1945
Lieutenant Colonel	January 5, 1942	
Colonel	March 1, 1942	April 2, 1948
Brigadier General	February 22, 1944	September 21, 1949
Major General	*March 16, 1943	September 28, 19[illegible]
Lieutenant General	May 1, 1953	
General	Aug 1, 1959	

* Adjusted from February 27, 1947

F. Additional Items

1. President of Scholastic Society and President of the Student Body, Manual High School, Brooklyn, New York, in 1924.
2. While in high school went to see Congressman William E. Cleary on his own to apply to the U.S. Military Academy. Prior to this, family had expected him to enter college in preparation for a career in medicine.
3. Played substitute half-back behind All-American Harry Wilson and Red Cagle at West Point.
4. During World War II, his men salvaged a B-18 that had been hidden in the Philippine jungle. General O'Donnell was assigned to fly a senior Army officer to Australia. His flight plan called for him to land at a certain island to refuel; however, the condition of the aircraft was such that he felt he might not get back in the air again if he made the stop. Taking advantage of tail winds, he stretched his flight non-stop to Australia. On arrival he learned that the Japs had captured the island where he had intended to refuel and, had he landed, he undoubtedly would have been captured.

END

b. Religious preference - Catholic.

B. Opinions, Tastes, and Evaluations

1. On receiving orders in 1953 to become the DCS/Personnel, Headquarters, USAF, he commented "We in the service too often neglect the human factor in dealing with officers and airmen. I hope to change that concept of thinking." He has stressed the importance of the individual in the attainment of military objectives throughout his career.

2. The following is an extract from the Distinguished Flying Cross Citation awarded for combat against the Japanese in the Philippines at the beginning of World War II, December 9, 1941.

"During the last run enemy pursuit planes attempted to intercept him. Major O'Donnell's calmness under fire and his determination to carry out his mission, set an example of leadership and heroism that afforded his officers and men the inspiration and confidence to carry on in spite of almost unsurmountable difficulties against heavy odds."

On May 1, 1953, General O'Donnell became Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel at Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D. C. ~~and is now completing six years in this position.~~ On August 1, 1959 he became Commander-in-Chief, PACAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

PART II. Personalized Material

A. Interests

1. Enjoys and is an avid fan of nearly all forms of amateur and professional sports. Was a member of the lacrosse, swimming, and football varsity teams at the United States Military Academy.

2. Civic and Religious Activities

a. Has always supported and maintained a keen interest in the Olympic movement and has been the US service representative on United States' Olympic Committee since 1954. In 1956 he was selected to represent the Department of Defense at the Melbourne, Australia Olympic games. In 1957 Olympic authorities honored him with an appointment as a member of the Executive Board. He is now serving indefinitely as a member of this Board.

al Emmett O'Donnell Jr., USAF (RET.)
. Kellogg Dr
cLean, Va. 22101

O'Donnell

1. Came in to Advisory Council in mid 1943 - replaced Cabell?

2. Some pretty loose & optimistic talk about what CBO could accomplish
   - Francis V. Drake article
   - ~~Optimistic~~ reports from VIII AF
- How did Arnold react to Schweinfurt-Regensburg in August 1943?
- How did he react to curtailment of bombing in Fall 1943, when bombing was supposed to achieve climax

3. What was Operation RANKIN? Did Arnold have some disagreement with British on what air support might be needed.

4. What type duties did Arnold assign you? And which to Jake Smart? Any special areas of interest?

Rosie O'D - Re Brereton vs MacArthur - PI
- Refused to move reg drawn to San Marcelino -
Msg sent us clear - worried about 5th Column -
chair move - Del Monte attacked - clobbered.

experience has piled up, the cost of specialized equipment ome down. For example, the ADSIDs cost $2,145 each in . The cost now is down to $975 for a better, longer-life sensor. ID's cost per day of usable life been trimmed from $100 to $15.

re Development

eneral Evans believes that th potential of the Igloo White m is almost unlimited. He men- d some areas in which sensor rch and development is con- ng. longer-life batteries and r sources adapted to operation old climates; sensor casing de- that will blend into environ- ts with different topography and tation; new types of detectors better target discrimination; r frequency bands for world- use; and transmitters that are vulnerable to jamming. Tests are under way to determine effectiveness of seismic sensors pped on frozen terrain.

he accuracy of sensor delivery be improved by different sensor figuration and by even more pre- navigation systems for delivery raft. By implanting sensors ser to enemy trails and highways, detection range is needed, which ans lower battery power, a small- lighter, and probably cheaper, sor.

In a combat environment that's east Asia, less vulnerable relay platforms would be needed—perhaps a platform entirely different from either manned or drone aircraft.

The entire system must be compatible with the sensors and other equipment used by the Army in its Integrated Battlefield Control System. As General Evans pointed out, Army battlefield sensors could become interdiction sensors as the tide of battle ebbs and flows. The Air Force must then be able to make use of the information if the air-ground team is to operate in concert.

Finally, the huge permanent-type facility that houses Igloo White's Infiltration Surveillance Center is not compatible with tactical air mobility. A Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART) has been developed as a backup to the ISC. It is air transportable, but has no computer capability, depending rather on real-time operator assessment of sensor signals.

A much more sophisticated Sensor Reporting Post, air transportable and computer equipped, is now at Eglin AFB, Fla., for integration with the Tactical Air Control System. Except for a smaller data-storage capability, it closely duplicates the functional capabilities of the ISC.

The Most Difficult Task

Interdiction in Southeast Asia has been the most difficult task the Air Force has ever faced. From the start of US participation in Vietnam, the principal sources of enemy supplies points for military materiel, mainly the port of Haiphong, have been off limits to attack. Since the cessation of bombing in the North during 1968, the vulnerable segment of the enemy's line of communications has been shortened to that part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail running through Laos. Road or bridge cuts could be easily bypassed as the Trail grew into a network of interconnected roads, covered for the most part by layers of jungle canopy. And in the kind of short-duration, small-unit engagement that has been most typical of the war, the enemy could sustain limited operations on a logistics shoestring.

Igloo White has brought an impossible task into the realm of the possible. The success of the Vietnamization program, and all that goes with it, rests heavily on checking the flow of men and materiel into the south. For that reason alone, Igloo White may be considered among the most important development programs of the war.

And, as General Evans observed, the potential of this new and growing system still is relatively untapped. The equipment and techniques developed for, and in support of, Igloo White already have reduced significantly a long-recognized deficiency of tactical airpower—its lack of a high-confidence, all-weather interdiction capability. That's a long stride forward in our search for a more effective deterrent to conventional war. ■

HAVEN'T YOU HEARD OF WOMEN'S LIB?

The famous—we thought—Gen. Rosie O'Donnell keeps busy these days running the USO. Not long ago, he graciously granted me an interview to discuss his relationship with General "Hap" Arnold.

The day before General O'Donnell was due to arrive at the Pentagon for our interview, I arranged—or thought I had arranged—for him to park at the River Entrance to the Pentagon. An hour before our noon appointment, I found that the space had not been cleared.

With some high-level assistance, the Pentagon Parking Control Office rapidly defrosted and cleared the space just minutes before the General drove up to the River Entrance. We had our lunch and the interview, and both went well.

The next morning, a secretary in the necessarily rank-conscious Parking Control Office called my secretary and asked: "This Gen. Rosie O'Donnell—does she really have four stars?"

—CONTRIBUTED BY DR. MURRAY GREEN, OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY

(AIR FORCE Magazine will pay $10 for each anecdote published.)

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Interview General Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell, March 27, 1970, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
(with Jack Loosbrock)

Q: Do you remember your first encounter with Hap Arnold?

O'D: Yes, I do. I was stationed in India. Having been kicked out of the Philippines and Java, I wound up in New Delhi. I was there with nothing to do for several months. Gen Brereton came along and he was placed in command of the 10th AF which we started to build up in New Delhi. That was in '42. He got there in March 1942. About Christmas 1942, as I recall, or just before Christmas of that year, Hap Arnold came out to visit us.

Q: It was October 1942. He came over with Jake Smart.

O'D: That's right. It was before Christmas. I know because I left after Christmas. We had a meeting, I had never met Gen Arnold. Naturally knew of him, but I had never served under him, and we didn't have very much out in India at that time. We were all a little teed off, those of us coming out thinking that, for want of a little bit more sustenance and little better plan for the defense of the Philippines, we could have been easily there and set those guys back. We were upset about it, at any rate. General Arnold told us, among other things, that there was going to be an invasion of Burma in roughly the spring of 1943, and the British were going to hit Rangoon. General Arnold asked if there were any questions, and I said I didn't have any questions, but I would like to make an observation. The observation was that I didn't think there would be an invasion of Rangoon in the spring, I didn't see how in the world the British troops in India could possibly be made ready to take on such a project.

General Arnold said: "Where do you get your information? What's your name?" I told him I was Col O'Donnell. "Where do you get your information?" And I said: "I've just been here since March, and it doesn't look to me that these people are geared for any kind of war at all. I can't see how they could make a major invasion. They haven't got the wherewithal. If they did, we would have to give them all the stuff, and where's it coming from?" So he bristled a little bit, and said ... well, he gave me a lecture in front of everybody, and said: "It might be of interest to you and the rest of the people here that I sit on what they call the JCS, and we meet every Tuesday. These are the American senior service representatives, and then every Thursday I sit on anotheroutfit called the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which are the American and British Joint Chiefs representatives. And for your information, we have decided that there will be an invasion." He said: "What do you think of that?" And I said: "I still don't believe there is going to be an invasion." Jake Smart told me later, on the way home, General Arnold said: "Say, who was that O'Donnell?" Smart told him he was an air force football coach and fighter pilot and all that kind of stuff. So before long, it was after Christmas that I got the word that I was ordered back into Washington to be Chief of his Advisory Council. I was one of the great unwashed. I had never been to a service school. I went to West Point, and I had 90 days at the Tactical School--a 90-day wonder. When they cut the Tactical School from two years to 90 days, I was one of the guys that went through that and suddenly I was projected back here, and Hap found out that I was right--they were making the decisions over the table, and then the old trick that we have seen many times before. Why, certainly we will be

willing to undertake this observation (operation). We will depend on you for the wherewithal and logistic supply. And all right! "What do you need for logistics", and they put in a request for more sealift that we had for taking Normandy, which was one way of negating the campaign.

Q: The thought occurs to me that what you said influenced him in another way. Because when Arnold came back, he wrote a report, and really tore the British apart. There was this Marshall Peirse, and Arnold had the lowest opinion of him and some of the other people. I can't recall them by nam...

O'D: Peirse was senior RAF officer in India.

Q: Right, and so he derogated the opinions which Peirse had given him, and it might be partly due to your expression.

O'D: I can't conceive of any other way I was ordered back to be on his Advisory Council. From then on (after the Burma invasion incident) for one solid year, I accompanied Arnold to every single JCS and Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, and I went with him to Quebec and to Cairo, went across the Atlantic on the battleship, the good ship IOWA.

Q: Was that the one that almost took a torpedo hit?

O'D: Yes.

Q: Is that account about him kidding Ernie King about that incident..."Your aim is bad...?"

O'D: No, the thing he really needled King about was the Alaskan invasion of Kiska. All that thing, getting ready, and we go in there, and not a single Japanese. Of course, he and King were not natural enemies, but they were in a way. King was very pompous. He took

his position very extremely gravely. And if it hadn't been for Gen Marshall, it wouldn't have worked out too well. But Marshall played the real catalyst in that group. He had King on one side and Arnold on the other, and he had a lot of others, Somervell. When Marshall spoke, he spoke with authority, everybody listened to him, including the President.

Q: This account that I heard about the torpedo fired at the IOWA. Arnold said to King, who was mad as hell at this accidental firing.

O'D: I was standing on the bridge next to King. There were only a few of us. We were allowed to go anywhere we wanted to and watch this demonstration, about 500 miles off of Gibraltar. And here was the President, the JCS, and all those great guys, O'Donnell. I'm the colonel with the black book. So we are standing up there, next to King and this thing came over. They started showing the President what naval might was, the 5" guns were going, and the 15" guns, and 16" guns were going, and the Bofors, and the submarines, the destroyers and cruisers were zigging and zagging. The whole thing was just a show for the Old Man [President Roosevelt] sitting down there with his white hat and green visor and that long cigarette holder. And [Louis McHenry] Howe standing behind him, the YMCA social director--what was his name?--Harry Hopkins. All these great strategic thinkers, Pop (Pa) Watson. So over the loudspeaker system came, "This is not a drill, repeat, not a drill." King was up there, and he had his hands, thumbs out of the leading edge of the pocket. He turned the color of that wall, and we could see this torpedo coming. And I thought, when you see one coming like that, I didn't see how it could miss, we were zigging

and it looked to me, of course, I was looking from the side, I thought we had it. But the SOB missed us and went across the stern and it didn't miss by much. You know what happened? They tell me the guy got excited on the tube on one of our own destroyers. He tripped the tube--got all excited with the guns going--they tell me he is still on Adak as a Post Exchange Officer, ship's store...

Q: This might have been Arnold's afterthought. But there is a great line. But he went over to King--the red was going up his neck. Arnold said: "I don't mind you firing torpedoes at us, but I want to tell you, your aim is bad." Of course, this could have been somebody's afterthought.

O'D: We were all sworn to secrecy and that stood up, and the first time I ever heard it mentioned, Hap told me never to take a note when I was working with him, traveling, and I never did.

Q: This is something that is kind of perplexing. You mentioned that at lunch, because he was a prodigious notetaker himself.

O'D: Well, he didn't want me to take them. I was a young guy. Marshall wanted me to go back with him after the Teheran-Cairo Conference.

Q: November 1943?

O'D: Yes, Marshall went home by way of the Philippines, I guess. And he wanted to have me go with him. He wanted to have an Air Force guy with him. Hap said: "You can't take Rosie. He's not even house-broken yet, you don't know what the hell he is liable to tell the Old Man." But what Arnold really wanted me to do was go on up and see his kid, young Hank, running this battery up there, at the base of CASSINO. To get in a B-17 and plug over to Italy, and the old B-17 was converted with a bunk in it. He would put on a stocking hat, and took off his clothes and go to bed there and lie down.

L: Rosie, there is some indication, it may not be completely accurate, a theory again. But it seems to me that there is a lot of evidence that Arnold was very fearsome for people who worked for him. In some cases, he liked to scare people. But he was always very circumspect when he was moving laterally or looking up. Is there basis for that comment?

O'D: He was hard...he would raise hell when he saw something that was really terrible. For instance, we went out with a B-29. They gave us a lousy engine in those things. They had hot spots. He called me in and said: "Ever since you have been in here, you've wanted to get out"--this was after I got out of the Advisory Council. He said: "I'm going to put a star on your shoulder and send you out with the B-29s." And he said: "I want some action!" He gave you that kind of a talk. But, we went out there and started getting those B-29s. We had them in a base at Kansas, Nebraska--all through the Middle West, and they were catching fire. So we were all getting ready to run a mission from Saipan up to Tokyo and back, so I thought I'd put on a grand dress rehearsal and ran a mission from our bases around Topeka down to Cuba and back. And this really brought out the thing in its real perspective. We had airplanes all over the country. Some were catching on fire and bailing out. Other people were landing all over the place--Florida and Cuba. So he called an immediate group in. He had old Man Knudsen. Barney Giles, of course, was working across the hall from him.

Q: Was this a meeting in Washington?

O'D: Yes.

Q: This was early 1944 probably?

O'D: Early 1944. I went out in October 1944 with the B-29s. This was early 1944.

O: The President was putting the heat on him to get the B-29 operational.

O'D: That's right. So he called all these guys in and said: "Just what I have suspected is going wrong. O'Donnell is supposed to be taking a wing out of here in October and he has airplanes with cellophane engines in them." He said: "Now, I want those goddamned things fixed, and I want them fixed now, and I don't want any aspirin cures. Now, get your asses out here and get at it!" That kind of talk, and he could be tough that way. And they did. They got a harness which guaranteed the flow of air, and did away with those hot spots around three or four cylinders, and we came out with a pretty good product.

Q: When you saw him with Marshall, was he obsequious, deferential?

O'D: No--Marshall as you may know, never referred to anybody by his first name or nickname. Arnold respected Marshall.

Q: Did he ever call him George?

O'D: No, never, no, he returned the compliment, "General Marshall." Marshall was that way, a great man in my book. Hap hadn't been accustomed, of course they were about the same age. He was in the driver's seat, because we all belonged to the Army side. You see, he had a funny position, he was on the Joint Chiefs by sufferance. And of course, the Navy resented it. And a lot of Army people did. There never should have had a breakoff. But to get to this question, no he was not, he had a great respect for General Marshall. And when we lived together at that Cairo conference, we lived in a villa. We didn't stay at the Mina house, we had a villa, Tom Handy, Marshall, Arnold, Frank McCarthy--who produced this Patton picture--and a guy who was with Tom Handy, and I, lived in this house. So we had breakfast every day and dinner every night. Marshall [at Cairo] liked a nice good, two, or maybe three, stiff old fashioneds before dinner at the end of the day. That was one of the places where I wish I had been

able to take notes or go back to my room, because there was a lot of reminiscing about how things were in the old days, and Marshall could be a very, very charming guy, you know.

Q: Great raconteur?

O'D: Oh, yes.

Q: We have eight or nine diaries in his little shortland that Arnold took at various conferences. Arnold took notes in a little book that he kept in the palm of his hand. This guy, Forrest Pogue, who wrote the first two volumes of the Marshall history, told me that Arnold once got chewed out for taking notes, unauthorized notes at the White House. Somebody told him, when you come here--he was then just a fresh two-star, he had just taken Westover's place. And he was told: "You don't take notes here with the President." So Arnold was a notetaker, and I just wonder why he told you not to take notes? (Referring to Arnold's injunction re taking notes of torpedo firing at USS IOWA.)

O'D: I guess he didn't want people, he probably got crossed up a lot of times. He didn't want second guessing, or having leaks generated which would be attributed to him or his immediate staff. So I was very happy about it at the time, although since I have many times regretted that. But he wasn't going to be having me blabbling my mouth around. But since he wanted it that way, he knew I wasn't. He told me that. But the only fellow he was really in awe of was Roosevelt, not of King, or not of Marshall, but Roosevelt. He had a little concern about what the Old Man was going to do, and what he might do.

Q: You answered one of my questions. He was scared of FDR?

O'D: That's understandable, too. He was President of the U.S. Arnold was just a M/General, suddenly elevated.

Q: This was well before your time, but Arnold got into this altercation with Morgenthau over the planes for the British and French in 1939. They finally settled this thing. According to Arnold's book, you may remember that the President called him in for an old fashioned, called him Hap. Then he knew he was out of the Presidential doghouse. This was probably around the time of Pearl Harbor. But I guess he always was worried about his relationship with Roosevelt. Never felt too much at ease there.

O'D: Yes, I would say that's correct.

Q: You led the first raid from the Marianas on Thanksgiving Day, 1944. There was some delay in getting that raid off. Wasn't it delayed some weeks?

O'D: We had some very bad weather, let me see now.

Q: Weren't they supposed to get them off in October? Or at least wasn't that the plan?

O'D: I really have forgotten. It seems to me there was some kind of holdup--bad weather, unpredictability of the wing. In fact, we were the first people to hit that real jet stream, and we hit it hard on that first mission.

Q: Did we fail to anticipate this? Or was it our meterology that shortchanged us. You know, there was a 200-mile-an-hour jet stream.

O'D: Over 200-mile-an-hour jet stream, and nobody ever briefed us on the possibility of running in to that. We hit a very heavy one. It was the time of the year when you get them, and we wound up crabbing it. Mt. Fuji was our initial point and we hit Fuji in a direct line without wind this way, and we wound up flying it this way, and when we turned downwind, we were over Chelsea Point before you could say "Jack Robinson." And we had the fighters on us. They

were coming up to meet us. They never even got to us on the first raid; they were well below us. But you didn't have a chance to line up, and you had scattered clouds. We fought right from the start--at least I did, and I wrote a letter to Gen Arnold about the subject, about operating with a new weapon and a new APQ-13 radar set. We had a capability that they didn't have in England--the 8th AF, the B-17, and we should use it. And I hope that we didn't get people running us who came back from the 8th AF and say the way to do this is high altitude accurate mass bombing. We had the capability and a good altitude, about 16,000 feet, which was the optimum altitude for that radar equipment. We could do a hell of a job burning them out. But, boy, we went right on in there at 30,000 feet, and we flew at 30,000 feet with desultory results which I forecasted--if I do say so. And finally LeMay brought them down and I didn't agree with him, going down all that way. I thought 7,000 feet was asking for trouble. The optimum altitude for radar resolution for that set was 12,000 to 15,000 feet.

Q: Did LeMay make that decision to go to low level? This here is an article in Reader's Digest a couple of years ago in which Tom Power or somebody who wrote the article attributed to Tom Powers this decision. Is there any basis for that?

O'D: No, I think LeMay decided to go, we were getting nowhere at that high altitude stuff.

Q: This was a great decision to make, because in Germany at 7,000 feet, you would have gotten clobbered.

O'D: That's the point I'm getting to. They finally got to using the airplane the way it was built, although 7,000 was not the right

altitude. We went back. The whole last half of the campaign, we flew from 12,000 to 15,000, where we should have been. That's where you had your best resolution all the way.

L: Then, too, there was a difference in the target complex from Germany to Japan. On the subject of firebombing, the accuracy was not a critical element.

Q: General O'Donnell, on this decision LeMay made. They went in March 9, 1945. Arnold was in Coral Gables flat on his back. He was having his heart attack, Norstad was his Deputy for the 20th AF. Now, did LeMay consult with Arnold or Norstad or anybody?

O'D: I'm sure he did, I don't know. His headquarters were at Guam, and I was at Saipan. I was covering the North side of the beach. But I'm sure they did. He didn't do anything without checking. I forget how it was. Let's see, Nate Twining came in later; Norstad was back here.

Q: Norstad came out there just before.

O'D: He came out on a quick mission.

Q: Well, he came out on two missions, one to tell Hansell. He came out just before the mission, and apparently, LeMay wanted to, if not to consult with, at least to tell somebody what he was going to do. My guess is that if it was to run contrary to policy or doctrine, somebody could stop him. Of course, Arnold was in no position to do that. He was pretty sick.

O: He wasn't in bad shape at that time.

Q: Well, he was in Coral Gables. Of course, he was down there.

O'D: When did he come out to visit us?

Q: Oh, he came out in June, that was three months later.

O'D: He couldn't have been so sick.

Q: They kept him two months. He got sick right around Inauguration Day. He was pretty sick for nearly two months; he was down in Coral Gables.

L: Again, theorizing, if it were anybody else but Arnold, he probably would have been retired.

Q: In fact, we have gotten some indication--this is one of his great concerns--this is one of the reasons why they kept it so secret. He was worried that Marshall would retire him. This wasn't his first heart attack. He had one in 1943 that they kept pretty quiet. Of course, he was walking around there, but he wasn't in good shape. In any event, this decision--LeMay had this decision to make.

O'D: It was LeMay's decision, he was in command.

Q: Let me ask you, going back. On New Year's Day 1945, Arnold sent a lovely message to Hansell, telling him what a great job he was doing--this is the 21st Bomb Comdr. And 8 days later, Norstad shows up out there to give Hansell the bad news that he is being relieved, and that LeMay is taking over. Do you know anything about the workings of that decision? Was this an impulsive decision by Arnold? Or did he think this through?

O'D: I really don't know. I think that Blondie Saunders was being groomed to come out to take that job when he was banged up.

Q: Blondie Saunders was in the CBI; he got banged up.

O'D: Yes, he got hurt out there, and that did away with Blondie. So Arnold reached down and he wanted to get a fellow with active combat experience. And so he picked Blondie first, and then he got LeMay.

L: To follow up this matter of Arnold being impulsive, you had a year's close association with him. You know, he had the reputation

somwhat accumulated posthumously, of being a very impulsive guy. Yet there is a lot of his impulses had been pretty carefully thought through, or as George Kenney says, the ad libs were all written out ahead of time. What was your opinion?

O'D: I wouldn't say that he was impulsive to the point where that was characteristic in everything that came up, where he acted instinctively or impulsively. I think there was a mixture there, a balance. He certainly was impulsive and acted impulsively at certain times. At other times, he'd sweat out a lot of decisions, and other possibilities, options.

L: I've known people who were impulsive about small things, but they think about big things. And I've known people the other way around, worried about little things and they would go out and buy a house on an impulse.

O'D: Some of the little things, I think he was looking for an escape, or something to blow off. He would do crazy things in little things. One day I brought some papers in to him and he didn't want to sign them. He told me. The papers had to do with giving Mark Clark some small aircraft with bigger engines, more horsepower so they could climb around those mountains in Italy: "So why should he have them?" So I said: "I don't know why they shouldn't have any. So he said: "Well, get them some." Well, we found out they were committed to other areas, and by the time we got back--and my job was to see who was the roadblock--and get the whys and wherefores and explain them to him. He never liked the solution I brought him in, so he wouldn't sign the papers. And I said: "General, you promised Clark and Spaatz that you are going to get these airplanes, and they need them and want them...

Q: You mean personal airplanes?

O'D: No, these were spotters and I've forgot--liaison types--so he really didn't want to sign the thing. And that's when he pushed the paper back: "Take it out." I came back again and put it down, and he looked at it again. By this time the big air raid alarm went off. They were all on the clocks on the buildings, so this thing, a harsh racket coming from that thing. The thing went on and stopped. He put the pen down. Then he picked it up again and as he started, it went on again. He had a leak duck, a paperweight, on his "IN" basket. He said: "Can't you stop that goddamned thing?" And he grabbed the duck and he gave it to me. And I said: "Do you mean it? And he said: "What do you think I mean!" So I hauled off and let go of the duck at the clock. I missed it. It took a hunk of the wall out. Suzy Atkins came running in. It made a hell of a racket, you know, and the duck bounced off the wall, and the Old Man went under the deck to duck it because it came bouncing like a carom shot off the wall. So he gets up and said: "The great O'Donnell, the great passer. He couldn't even hit the goddamn clock." But he picked up the pen and signed the paper.

Q: That's an impulse.

O'D: On the other side, things like determining who was going to be his successor. I know he pondered about that a hell of a lot--for the good of the AF. He felt that we should have certain things. And he was really a truly big man in that position, in a subservient position, because he was working for the Army, and to get going on a drive for your own service, and to have your own academy--these were things that were in his craw a long, long time.

Q: You bring up another subject now. When he was sick, Marshall brought Eaker in to be his Deputy. This was in April 1945. Did Eaker have an idea that he might succeed Arnold?

O'D: No, I don't think so, because I think Eaker was--I never got that impression. Of course, Tooey was a good deal more senior and had the rank, and, of course, Arnold. It probably would have been Andrews. Andrews was the ... you see, we had a couple of pretty big fellows there. We had Andrews....

Q: Andrews, of course, was already dead.

O'D: Yes, Andrews was dead, but he was being groomed, he was going to be "Eisenhower."

Q: Yes, Lovett told us that.

O'D: Sure he was groomed to go over there and take Eisenhower's job. Because he understood the air picture as well as the other. Everybody who knew Frank Andrews adored him, admired him and he undoubtedly would have been head of the AF--if he wasn't head of the Army. He probably would have been Chief of Staff of the Army. Could well have been. Another guy who didn't get very much credit in those days was Marshall's deputy, McNarney, who kept the logistics picture straighten out as an Air Corps officer. He made a lot of sense, he put in those overseas inspections and all that type of thing, so they didn't send half-baked outfits over there. He was a tough guy, he was a hard guy to share.

O'D: Andrews, who else do we have, they were both very senior to Hap, as I recall.

Q: Didn't Delos Emmons have ideas?

O'D: Oh yes, I think Emmons was a contender. But there weren't very many of them, and not very many of them had real command experience

in warfare. A couple of guys got into the fight in WW I. Then we had that long bleak period, and the reason for the quick promotion of our group--the gang that I went to school with--LeMay, Powers, Hank Everest, Fred Anderson. We are all in the same period of time at West Point and Flying School. By the time the war broke, we were 35 years of age. We were all squadron commanders and we knew the business.

Q: You mentioned Tony Frank at lunch. He was very anxious to leave the Air Service Command to get a Combat command, but Arnold wouldn't give him one. Did you know about that?

O'D: I figured there was something like that going on. Of course, I knew those guys were a lot senior than I was, and I didn't know what the score was. We had a lot of guys, Eddy House; Tony Frank; Dargue.

Q: Dargue was killed right after Pearl Harbor.

O'D: That's right.

Q: Some of the other old timers never made it big, like Jakey Fickel, and Conger Pratt...

O'D: Well they didn't really...no, they were truly Army officers, who hadn't been through the mill on the flying game. They were just like Navy guys--the Navy aviators, all those old-timers. They didn't fly. That's why I think Andrews was so anxious to get out and do it. He wanted to prove to himself he was an aviator, and that's what brought about his end, too.

Q: You know, Benny Foulois, they gave him nothing to do. Benny Foulois outlived them all, but Benny Foulois, in 1940 or 1941, was still able to do a job, but was given no assignment. Do you know why?

O'D: I think they all liked Benny, but I thought they figured in his later days, he was a bit of a lightweight.

Q: He had had it with Roosevelt because of the air mail. What I

am getting at, could it have been a political decision that he not be given any assignment?

O'D: Could be. I think they figured that he didn't have the stature compared to Tooey or some of the other people.

Q: But he was given no job.

O'D: He was getting pretty old, too. At the end of the war, Benny Foulois must have been over 60.

Q: But they gave other people jobs. Fechet preceded Foulois, and they gave him a job.

O'D: I don't know, those old timers used to fight each other all the time. One would be the Inspector and the other guy would be r unning. What was the guy at Langley, the IG, he's a real toughy?

Q: Was that Hugh Knerr?

O'D: No, it wasn't Knerr. He and Frank were always opposed. Anyway, they called him Lenin and Trotsky. So he came up, the guy down there came up to inspect Mitchel Field when Tony was in command, and he cut it up. He found all kinds of things, dust in finger bowls. Bricks not whitewashed properly. And so, Tony took him down to his airplane, and put him back. And he said: "Now Trotsky, I just want you to remember one thing, one day you are going to be in command of one of these stations and I am going to be the Inspector. Brother look out!"

Q: On Arnold's visit in June 1945. He came out there to Okinawa, he was, one of his main missions was trying to reconcile the three major figures, MacArthur, Nimitz, and Spaatz--to try and reconcile the missions. There was a big meeting on LeMay's porch on Guam one night. Did you attend that meeting?

O'D: No, I didn't.

Q: This is a high-level pow-wow, knockdown, drag out type of thing. You weren't there?

O'D: No, I wasn't present. But he did when he took off from Honolulu and they sent back the word, Ceil Combs was with him,I believe. They gave him the word that they would land in Guam at such and such a time. And Hap said: "Who the hell said we are going to Guam? We are going to Saipan. We are going to see O'Donnell. Get the hot word." Cecil told me this. So surer than hell, they were all waiting for him, Nimitz and LeMay all of them down at Guam, and he landed at Saipan, and stayed with us for about three hours and went down,and talked to them. He loved to do things like that.

L: He was a great practical joker.

O'D: Oh yes. This showed that he was in command. Nobody was going to tell him where he was going to go.

Q: Could he take it as well as give it?

O'D: Well, that laugh wasn't a laugh. That Hap is a misnomer. You see, he was a real intense guy. And I don't know. I don't know of any instance--I would guess that he would not be able to take it. He took things very seriously. Really, this smile, it took me a little while to find out, he wasn't laughing.

L: Somebody told me, and I'm trying to think of who it was, not in this kind of situation, that it was almost a nervous tic.

O'D: Yes, it was a nervous laugh. You've seen a lot of people like that. I'll tell you who had one, "Carn" Sweeney. He would stand up there, and he'd pull his shirtsleeves down like this, and laugh like hell about nothing--your mother died. He'd laugh like hell.

L: Another one was Tom Lanphier, he had a kind of nervous giggle.

Q: Right after your first mission, and the Japs came over and hit your base. Was there some booboo on the air defense, where they thought this was Marine fighters or something?

O'D: This was what I laughingly call a calculated risk, that the Japs wouldn't be able to hit us down there. Because, if any kind of a good tactical organization ever got loose on one of those bases, they would cut it up to ribbons. They didn't have any strength down there. And those few abortive raids--and that's what they were--they didn't do any real damage, based out of the islands up there, a couple hundred miles north of Saipan. I forget their name. And they ran a few low-level missions. There was no radar around there to conduct that. The Marines, and we had some of the 7th AF, which I think was part of the defense of Saipan. But you might as well jump on the people in the Philippines for not fighting the Japs. They weren't ready; they weren't prepared, that's all.

Q: Was Arnold worried about the possibility of a major Jap attack

O'D: No, because at that time, the intelligence was the Jap fleet had been pretty well broken up, and they didn't have very much. And if they did work a little bit, we could find out where they were working from, and they didn't have very many places to work from. There were several islands around there. They didn't have the capacity to come down from Iwo. Of course, we took Iwo in February 1945.

Q: Just a couple of weeks before that--LeMay was your boss at that time--Arnold wrote Norstad, again, this was the end of January, and he wrote Norstad that your wing was in bad shape. And he might have to get you out there as a wing commander or something.

O'D: Yes, that could be, we had a little confrontation on that.

L: You and who?

O'D: LeMay. We came up to look it over. We were in the mud, and we were flying these high altitude missions which I objected to from the start, and said we should go the other route. LeMay didn't like the crack I made. Curt's all right, it didn't make any difference to me. We had been fighting as good friends for years. He looked over the place. It was a mess. The mud more than anything else, and the difficulty in getting this operation going at 30,000 feet. It would cut down on our fuel supply in order to lug the bombs up there. And he said: "Well, I'll tell you, I don't like what I see." And I said: "I don't think you see good. I don't know if you know what you are looking for." And we had a few other words along that line. Of course, LeMay is a quick guy to get to the draw. The solution for improving a situation is firing the commander. But we had some very real problems in starting that campaign. These other outfits came in very nicely. They came in after the fall of Iwo Jima. I lost 100 crews out there. We had that long run with no place to ditch, and we didn't get many of them back either. So all these things added up, once we got Iwo Jima gone. My wing dropped one-third of the whole effort. That's in the books. We took one third of the casualties; one-third of the bombing; and at least one-third of the accuracy needed to get in there.

Q: One of the main problems that was eating Arnold, I think, in his decision to relieve Hansell, was the aborts. There were an awful lot of aborts at this early stage. Of course, the B-29 was not then a proven plane.

O'D: As soon as they got to flying it at an optimum altitude, 12,000-15,000 feet, they didn't have any aborts. Driving that engine to maximum performance up there at 30,000 feet, and they wouldn't make it.

Q: There was also this business, Arnold wanted to get 140,000 pounds off, and I think Hansell was sort of building up to it. Arnold kept sending him a lot of driving messages. Did you ever get in on that business?

O'D: Hansell was kind of in an impossible position. He didn't have any headquarters. He had no experience in this. He superimposed himself on my wing. So I became piggyback in the 20th Bomber Command Hqs. We'd write all the field orders, and the flimsies and everything else, and send them up to get the imprimatur. That goes all over. That is a difficult situation, and Possum was trying--he was responsible, but he wasn't doing the work, and he didn't have the staff to do the work. It was one of those things that goes on during the war. Things get screwed up in command relationships.

Q: (Gen O'Donnell was asked about his experiences in the Philippines in 1941.)

O'D: We got past point of no return and I got instructions from Clagett's headquarters, that we were flying to Clark Field. And he was in command of the air forces out there. So I got--it was raining like hell, a real torrential downpour. I was told to go back to Del Monte, Del Monte to me was the name on a can of peaches. So I said: "We are coming in, I don't know where Del Monte is." The maps they sent us out with, they were just naval charts. And Del Monte, it turned out, was just a turf field, a plantation, no runway or anything.

Q: This is down in Mindanon?

O'D: Mindanou, so we passed Mindanou, and we kept on going. It couldn't have been too tough, because we all made it in--except Bill Fisher. He had the landing lights. Claget got mad as hell.

Q: Was he your commander?

O'D: He was in command out there. I was reporting out there. I belonged to the 11th Bomb Wing.

Q: And then he was taken out of there?

O'D: In 1941, September, right before the war.

Q: He was taken out of there right after Pearl Harbor?

O'D: I was threatened, and what's his name was there too--Les Maitland. Maitland told me that the Old Man wanted to court martial me. He said this would be a stupid action, something or other. We made it in there, made a hell of a flight, as a matter of fact. We had nothing to go on, no radar, clear across the Western Pacific, so nothing ever happened of it. I used to see him down at the Army-Navy Club, I knew him before--tough old guy.

Q: He was a classmate of Andrews, and he was maybe the only man to have been made a BG three times, and broken twice, or broken three times. He was broken down to a Colonel. The reason we are interested in him is that we have seen his extensive correspondence with Andrews. And he blames Arnold for his demotions.

O'D: He was a character.

Q: Did Arnold ever talk to you about Clagett?

O'D: No, not about him. He was thinking of some other fellows. Les Maitland was a "case." I've seen him since, he is an Episcopal minister in very good standing.

Q: Is he still alive?

O'D: Sure he is, he works out of, near Phoenix. He is a man of the cloth--married to a girl that we all knew, happily married. He did a hell of a job, and he's great, and he's one of those fellows that

couldn't handle a drink. It just was poison.

Q: He's one that Arnold forgave. They sent him over to Europe, and then when Arnold came over there in September 1943, he said: "Get him out of here!" So he is one they knew about him and they gave him another chance and he made good.

O'D: There were several pretty well-known guys that were in sort of a frustration and not knowing how to cope with the reality of the war. They started hitting that bottle pretty hard. Old Clagett--I never will forget him--he was in command of Selfridge Field when I reported up there. And he used to wear one of those puttees and an old Army issue overcoat. The thing buttoned right up to the collar and came right down to his ankles, like a maxi skirt, and a campaign hat. And he had this little whip under his arm. He was coming down the street one day. We had a fresh little kid named MacDonald who later went out with Chennault. This kid used to wear this mackinaw open, with his belt around, open. Sue would come down and kicking the ice off the sidewalk, and he passed MacDonald, and MacDonald said: "Good morning, sir." "Good morning, my ass, report to my office immediately!" He was going to tell him about his open coat.

Q: I was told about Clagett that he was a stickler for looking for dust underneath the ledge.

O'D: Yes, he was old time, old school tie.

Q: Yes, he was an usher at Arnold's wedding. His wife was very political.

O'D: His wife was a lovely woman and so was his daughter, married...

Q: One of the reasons we bring this up is that, of course, Clagett was very close to Andrews, Andrews was a grand man who had a

higher degree of tolerance than Arnold and Andrews, for example, tolerated letters to him by Clagett about Arnold which really, if they were not insubordinate, they were disloyal. And he would say all these nasty things about Arnold, and Andrews would take this. This brings me to ask you, was there any tendency of Arnold to promote men like Spaatz and Eaker, who had come up with him through the West Coast, as against those like Clagett and Royce and Tony Frank who had come up through the Langley route under Andrews?

O'D: I really don't know. We had a beautiful little air force until the war came along and spoiled it. We had the 1st Bombardment--the 1st Pursuit, the 2nd Bombardment, and the 3rd Attack--that was the AF. We were just one big family, plus a little group in the Philippines, a group in Hawaii, and a group in Panama, and a couple of schools, Chanute. That was it. So it was very close, and when things started going, and promotions given out, I suppose some of their families and everybody else, I knew him when...

Q: There were a number of guys who came up with Andrews like Tony Frank and like Hugh Knerr. For example, Hugh Knerr does not like Arnold. Andrews was his god. He was pushing for a separate air force, and Hugh was writing letters under the table, writing books. The Wm. Bradford Huie books, was probably written by him. Any number of articles for Reader's Digest, American Mercury, at that time-- we are talking '40-'41. Now, Knerr had retired, after Andrews was not demoted, after he left the GHQ AF and he became a Colonel and went down to San Antonio, Knerr then retired, and Andrews from there, went back to G-3 for a year, under Marshall, and then he went out to the Caribbean in 1941. And this is when Knerr tried to get back on duty. Arnold--at least Knerr says that Arnold--was blocking his return to

active service, he didn't get in till the end of 1942. So I bring this up in thinking whether the men who came up close to Andrews might have suffered by way of promotions to the highest jobs as compared to those who came up with Arnold.

O'D: You couldn't prove it by me. I know nothing about them. I knew all of those people. I knew Royce very well, I knew Andrews and Brett. Andrews was the kind of a guy, when I was coaching at West Point, I was stationed at Selfridge when I first went back. I was a 1st LT. Andrews writes me a letter and says Johnny (his wife) gave my tickets to the Army game away, and I am in dire straits. Could I possibly enlist your aid to get a ticket, somewhere--any place in the stadium. So I had acess to 16 which we could buy as coaches, and I didn't have much use for them. So I sent him mine. And I got an immediate note back which said: "It sure pays to know influential people." Andrews was a kindly guy, you know. Everybody respected him. A real gentleman.

Q: That brings up something else...

O'D: He stood out from that whole group; no question about it, Andrews stood out.

L: The way things were going, there was room for both of them. I mean Andrews was on his way to a very big job.

Q: Most of the people who worked for Andrews, in fact, all that I have talked to, swore by him. He was sort of like a father and a friend, where Arnold, not so. Arnold was a tough taskmaster.

O'D: Yes, he was. He wouldn't put up with certain things. He detested mediocrity. He detested heavy drinking. He was kind of a "Christer" in his own way.

L: This time you spent in close contact with him. Would you call

it kind of nerve-wracking?

O'D: Not to me. No, gee, I had a ball. He was something to be around for me. I don't know, I just got along well with him. He didn't frighten me at all. I had my bit of fright out there in the Philippines and Java, and he was very good to me, as a young guy, and everything. He told me what he wanted me to do. He didn't want my decisions or anything like that. And a lot of those guys down in Plans thought I was in a close position to him. I was carrying the book,and we were making last minute changes before he went in to testify or be heard. And I had to be very careful in that position not to get the boys downstairs mad at me, so what I would do was get up--I had good points of contact in Navy--Admiral Savvy Cook was a good guy and a friend of mine, and I had Tom Handy who was a wonderful guy. And anytime I would get in trouble with the Army I would just go right to Tom. He knew the Old Man was waiting for me to get the dope and he would ease the way for me.

Q: Handy is in Washington now, isn't he?

O'D: Yes.

Q: Is he in good shape?

O'D: I don't know. He's getting a little old. But he was a fine looking man and a great guy. And our own trouble was in the AF, because we were merging, telling them how we could win the war by ourselves out there, which we could, once we were given the bases,and just as we could have won the war out here in Vietnam. We don't seem to learn anything in this country. But that's another story, indeed. But my relationship was one, well, I know he liked me because when he retired, I got a DSM for my work with him. And he asked Vandenberg to permit him to give it to me. He wanted to give a private party. So he

invited me out to his home in Sonoma, and he threw a party for all the local newspaper editors and the bankers, and champagne and Bee was just lovely. We had a hell of a time. A couple of other fellows up there helped him. He gave me a damn nice citation for my loyalty and my work with him. And I did, I would just try to get him the information, I didn't take any notes or anything personal at all. And I tried to get him the best information that I could on any given subject, and I got away with a lot, because I was kind of a snot nosed type.

L: I think, let me try this out. You know, you begin to draw conclusions. I would expect that the fact that you had been through the wringer in the Philippines and Java, had a positive effect on your relationship in the beginning because, and I think this is probably a result of his not getting into combat at any time, he was always very interested in people who had firsthand, who had been shot at.

O'D: He liked the boys that were in the combat business. He liked Freddie Dean because of his reputation down in Africa. He liked all the younger fellows that were in combat, and he showed a great preference for them.

L: He also tried to be sure that people were not stuck in Washington for the whole war as he was in WW I.

Q: Did he ever show sensitivity or self-consciousness about the fact that he himself was never under fire?

O'D: No, nobody expected it at that time.

Q: In WW I, he had tried to get over, and he finally did get over, and the war seemed to end the day before he got there. And he always had--to use the current expression--a kind of hangup, about that thing, and this is probably why he was very lenient, comparatively

lenient, with guys who said that they wanted to get out of Washington, and get over--in your case, and in Jake Smart's case, in Norstad's case...

O'D: He shipped us right out: "Ever since I brought you in, you've been wanting to get out, so now you are out. We'll give you a star. Let's see you get going.

Q: Just like that? You took Jake Smart's place when you came into Arnold'd office?

O'D: Yes, Jake went with him on the trip over there, when I first saw him. He was there. Pearre Cabell had it.

Q: Jake came in for Pearre?

O'D: Jake came after Cabell for a short time, and I came in for Jake, and then Fred Dean came in for me.

Q: I want to ask you about Europe. You sent a memo to Arnold, dated June 12, 1943 about the safe delivery of bomgs into the hands of the wolves. I think you were talking about the lack of escorts in Europe. Do you remember this? What were the circumstances of that letter?

O'D: Yes, it was. I said that they were. That started at the Cairo Conference. Portal came in to see Hap--a very enchanging guy, well spoken, Chief of the Royal Air Force. He said: "Hap, old boy," he said, "I think that if you would change your training methods and not be burning all that gasoline up in California and Texas, making these pilots sustain the battle more with that petrol, we would be a lot better off. We are in short supply. We got three million barrels," or whatever the figure m ght be. And boy, old Hap blew. The hair went up on the back of his neck, and he says: "Portal,

I'll run my U.S. Army Air Corps the way I goddamn please. And I'm not taking any issue or any instructions from you. My men need the kind of training that I am furnishing them. And furthermore, you haven't got three million barrels of petrol, you've got 10 million, or some comparable figure in the United Kingdom." And Arnold was saying how much we were using up the petrol in unnecessary flights and sweeps. I told Atkingon (?) these guys were burning up all our gasoline and then getting thousands of millions doing nothing, making sweeps over the Channel where they never see anything. We were sending our boys in there like lambs to the slaughter, and we ought to have an escort at the point of bomb drop, or bombs away, and whatever we should do to get there, it seemed to me we should do, and not be burning up this gasoline in passing over in good formation. I think that was the point. Then, Hap took it up with the 8th AF. Who was the guy that ran that? Eddie House had it for a long time, and Monk Hunter.

Q: Newton Longfellow was the Bomb Commander....

O'D: I don't remember the whole bit, but I think they put Butch Griswold in there, and Butch tried to stretch out the missions, and get out and give the bombers a hand. But for a long time there, it was a bad concept and a wasteful one, and they were burning up gasoline. We couldn't get enough, and everything was fine. No losses no contacts.

L: Well, Monk Hunter eventually got fired.

Q: Yes, and they brought in Kepner. Got a long letter from Kepner the other day, a hand-written letter.

Q: I want to ask you about a key subject in our thinking. We call it "the Big Switch," and this occurred right after Cairo. Now,

I have seen some documents at the Cairo Conference where Portal seemed to be defending Eaker, and Arnold seemed to be advocating moving Eaker down in to the Mediterranean. Arnold, probably after Schweinfurt or Regensburg, had come to the conclusion, or was coming to the conclusion, that Eaker was no longer for the 8th AF, and he had made his decision to move Eaker out of there, and this took place right around Christmas of 1943. I believe you were on the job. Do you have any recollections of Arnold's thinking processes in that period?

O'D: Not with Eaker. I remember that he wanted--we had a couple of conferences out there.

Q: Did you accompany him, Labor Day, 1943, when he went out to the UK? He was there for a week.

O'D: No.

Q: Right after Schweinfurt-Regensburg.

O'D: No, the only time I was with him in Europe was at Cairo, we went to Iran and Cairo and up to Tehran.

Q: That was later. Wasn't the decision made there to bring Eisenhower in as OVERLORD chief?

O'D: Yes.

Q: This was the final decision that Marshall would not take the job, and Eisenhower would. Then Arnold made the decision that he was going to take Eaker out of there, and bring in Spaatz.

O'D: I think Spaatz was already there, wasn't he?

Q: Spaatz was in Africa. He was operating out of Africa.

O'D: But what was his job?

Q: He was commander of the AF under Eisenhower.

O'D: It wasn't a numbered air force?

Q: No, it was the North African Air Forces.

O'D: I mean he had a much bigger command.

Q: Right, but Arnold had made this decision to take Eaker out of there. Somebody has told me, compared it to moving cops in NY City. When they want to get the Captain out of a certain station house for any reason, they move 10 different police all over the place, so they disguised it.

O'D: I don't know about that, I know he was worried about who would replace Eisenhower. He wanted Spaatz.

Q: He also wanted Spaatz with Eisenhower to head a unified British and American Air Command.

O'D: He was very high on Tooey and that's why I think the Eaker business didn't make sense, because....

Q: Eaker wrote some letters to people. One letter he wrote, that I recall, was to Fechet. He was very close to Fechet, I guess he had ghosted some things for Fechet. And he said he felt like the man who started the season with the team and then he got to the World Series, and they took him out of the box, so he was quite unhappy.

L: Another question: Where would Spaatz have gone?

O'D: To Eisenhower's job. Let's see where was Ike before he went up to OVERLORD?

Q: He was commander in Africa. Of course, they had taken Sicily by this time; they had taken Italy. He was in the middle of Italy at this time.

O'D: We were there then; we were in Sicily and Italy.

Q: Of course, we talked to Eaker, and Eaker said that he knew that there was a change in the wind, because when Eisenhower was given the OVERLORD job, his air man was Spaatz. And Eaker expected that Spaatz would be given the top air job for OVERLORD. But my thought is:

why didn't Eaker stay on? He could have commanded the strategic bombers under the overall command, instead of Doolittle.

O'D: I don't know. I couldn't help you on that one. I know he wanted, I heard him say several times, I'd like to see Eaker take Eisenhower's job. He wanted an air man over there.

L: Eaker or Spaatz?

O'D: Spaatz. They felt that it was an air war and it was going to wind up an air war no matter what they talked about--invasions and everything else. They couldn't get any where without airpower, and I don't know what happened on that.

Q: Did you get involved in this racial problem that they had at Selfridge Field in 1944?

O'D: No.

Q: Monk Hunter had come back. He was the wrong man to give that job to.

O'D: No, I was long gone from Selfridge. I was there from '30 to '37, I remember.

Q: Do you remember the thing they had in '44 at Selfridge?

O'D: Somebody shot some guy.

Q: They built two officers' clubs, and the Negroes wouldn't go to the one that was designated for them. The whites wouldn't let them in their officer's club. Monk Hunter, who was the 1st AF Commander--Selfridge was under him--of couse he is from Savannah, and the thing got quite bitter, and Arnold got into it. You didn't get into that?

O'D: No, I'm not familiar with that, in '44 I was long gone.

Q: I wanted to ask you about, I have a note here about a big flap over aircraft production in 1943. You advised Arnold to ease off

on production and accept the War Production Board figure of 95,000 planes for 1944. Arnold was pushing for a larger figure and Lovett was telling him to accept a lesser figure, that he ought to be more practical about it, he was asking for 131,000 planes. This was that AWPD-42. Do you remember that production plan, there was a big hassle over it.

O'D: Well, roughly, I'm not too familiar with that. I remember that Lovett, I thought, at my tender age at that time, was a wonderful influence on Hap. I guess Lovett was the best Secretary. That was the best relationship between a military commander and civilian control--civilian secretaryship I've seen since I've been in the business. And he'd let him alone. He gave him free wheeling rights. And on Sunday mornings--they'd see each other during the week once in a while, but not very often. Hap would be working with the military commanders, and the various training commands. Lovett would come down at 9:00 Sunday morning, come in that little banker's tie of his, looking like he was just turned out of a bandbox. He'd sit down and they would chat. Anything that Lovett would suggest that he do, he'd do. He had that much confidence in him. And Lovett, on the other hand, was a real loyal friend and a strong supporter. He would caution him on things, and when he would caution him, boy that was it. There was no argument.

Q: This kind of fits into a similar description of Lovett as the balance wheel, to sort of keep Arnold from some impulsive actions.

O'D: I figure it was more than a balance wheel, he exercised correctly, his job of supervision of civilian supremacy and civilian control. He did it in a way that was not only accepted, but sought

after. You see, Hap would never do anything without going to Lovett and talking about it--any big thing. He'd seek his counsel and we have had other extremes, the other way, where the Secretary and the Chief wouldn't talk to each other.

L: In the post-war period?

O'D: That's right. Wouldn't talk to each other.

L: Were there any specific things, an incident or two, that really stuck out in your mind in the field and in your working closely with Arnold that might serve as a key to his character, or that showed he was the right guy, in the right place, at the right time?

O'D: I would say, of those that I met, and I knew them all at his level. I don't think there was any one who could hold a candle to Hap at that time. He grew up fast, too. You know, he got rubbing against that problem, and a lot of it rubbed off on him. Some people call that experience. And he got experience as association as he grew in a job, and he grabbed it fast. And I don't know what his relationships with people in the field, I didn't see too much of. I dealt mainly with the JCS and the CSC, and was trying to get the proper information out of here for the White House. But having been in the field most of my life, myself, I really liked this guy. I mean I admired him greatly, and the way he went about his work. Of course, he was tough on you. He expected you to work your backside off, and you did--everybody did. But there was a war on, too, and why shouldn't you be working your tail off?

Q: We've been told about this propensity he had to grab people in the hall, and to give them jobs sometimes alien to their expertise. Is this true?

O'D: Well the classic story is where the fellow--Arnold is supposed to have told him to go down and go to England, go back to England get this straightened up, and the fellow is said to have told him he was working at Chanute Field. Whereupon Arnold's reply: "Don't give me that stuff." It's just not true. He probably did something like that one time. He got a couple of fellows confused in the hall. He would buttonhole a guy in the hall. He was preoccupied going up there, and he would grab the first guy that he saw that he thought knew something about it.

L: Did he ever give two or three people the same assignment, to see how they'd do?

O'D: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Didn't he go to more than one source for typical information? He had somebody getting data on how many bombs we dropped, and then he'd go some place else...?

O: He was very dissatisfied with his statistical data. "Goddam it, how many airplanes do I have in this outfit?" The answer: "Well, we think so and so." Arnold would say: "Don't give me your 'think.' Where are they? Stop everything! Let's have a count! Can't you do that? Hungry Gates would go up there and tell him how many airplanes he had, and sometimes he wasn't within 50,000. That's an exaggeration, but I mean, he was way the hell off. The same thing with people, and the statistical picture. Things were moving too fast, casualties and transfers. They'd lose airplanes and they didn't know where the hell they were.

Q: Did he ever go around the back door, ask you for something, and then go to somebody else to see how the info you got compared to the info somebody else got?

O'D: He probably did, because he was really perplexed and upset by the inaccuracy of the data that he received. He would probably go to different sources and somebody would ask him--this was a reaction to something they'd want to know in the White House--"What the hell are you doing; what have you got here, and what have you got there"--pilot training and all the rest of this stuff. And he had a tough time getting that kind of dope because it wasn't forthcoming. I mean, people couldn't get it that fast.

Q: Did he love visual aid presentations, charts, fancy colors?

O'D: No, he wasn't much of a guy to be patient, I remember one guy came in to give the weather presentation, what they should do about the weather service, Hopkins, I guess it was. And he had the lecture all ready. And Hopkins was one of those guys that runs scared, and if you ever run scared of Hap, he would walk all over you. He was like LeMay that way, too. Hopkins had this big line of books all along there. And Arnold said: "What the hell is that?" Hopkins said: "This is the backup for my presentation." Arnold swept them off the table and stomped out of the room.

Q: You know, talking about the weather--there was one guy he really loved. Well, there were many he loved. But one fellow he had high respect for was this Irving Krick.

O'D: Yes, the weather guy.

Q: And his like for this guy caused several guys to quit or be fired. Specifically, Don Yates, Don Zimmerman and Oscar Senter. Some guys at different times, who were giving Arnold weather reports, and then Arnoldwas going around the back door to get weather reports from Irving Krick. Is this a fair analysis?

O'D: I don't know, I don't know where he could be looking for weather reports. He had great difficulty in getting an accurate report from overseas on battle results, and that was understandable because people would report they shot down so many, and the damage. And they saw the bombs go off right on the button, and then, when the smoke clears, and they get reconnaissance in there and they find out it was nothing. And with these 500# bombs, you are not going to do the damage you think you are doing in a lot of those places. So he would get one report that the AF in the field report, complete obliteration of a key target. And they would find out a week later, that not only was it not oblitereated, but in some cases, it wasn't even hit. And again, that's that altitude bombing, under attack, and trying to do it in mass formation and compact attack, and the rest of the thing. Unfortunately, I think it hurt the AF a lot. A lot of claims were made which made us look like a lot of idiots, claiming things that we shouldn't have claimed. But that was in reaction again to the demand that you have information. So the guys says, if he demands information, we will give him the best of what we think, and of course, you are always thinking on the optimistic side that you creamed them.

L: What was this time when he was complaining about the exaggerations of the 8th AF?

O'D: That's what I'm talking about, the damage from the 8th AF.

Q: Damage, and also the fighter score, how many German planes they shot down. Wasn't this a source of contention between him and Under Secretary Patterson? You mention the empathy between him and Lovett. This did not exist, I think, between him and Patterson.

O'D: Patterson wasn't in a comparable position.

Q: He was more of a lawyer type.

O'D: Let's see, when Patterson was there.

Q: Stimson had the top job and Patterson was Under Secretary, and then you had McCloy.

O'D: Lovett was for Air.

Q: But Patterson was on top of Lovett as Under Secretary, but there was friction between Arnold and Patterson on several occasions. Did you know about that?

O'D: No, I wasn't cognizant of that. Of course, Patterson, I had a great regard for, too. He was very cryptic and very straightforward. He said exactly what he had on his mind. He used to fight Symington, and he didn't get along at all.

Q: Patterson didn't like the way Arnold made speeches for example. He thought that Arnold was accepting a lot of data that was coming in from the 8th AF. This was an issue, this business of exaggeration.

O'D: That had Hap mad, had him angry, and with good reason. But the only reason the reports were wrong was, No. 1, they didn't have the means of evaluation quickly, and there was a demand in the White House and all the way down, from DOD and everybody else to get those right now. They wanted an accurate report, so they got the stuff in, and it was not accurate. And in those days, we didn't have the means of collecting the sort of thing. It was a long drawn out job, and meanwhile you were supposed to be fighting a war every day. Questions like: "How many crews have I got." They get shot down, they are tired; they get sent home, crack up. It was a rough time, and I think Hap had as good a grip as anybody did on understanding his field

commanders on this thing, and letting them go to the maximum that he was permitted to let them go. It was only on things where he got in a jam, because he didn't have the information. It made him look like a dope where he didn't know what his AF was doing, where the Army and Navy could tell exactly how many cruisers and submarines they had. They were cruising around out there--three dimensional, right, left, and down.

L: He knew this was the only way he could play with the stuff and still be around. He's kind of an anomaly in that respect, having graduated in 1970, a long time before.

O'D: You see, that was it. He was so much older than all of us, he was 20 years older than I was. And consequently, it is no use trying to analyze him or trying to figure out his character. I might have missed a lot of things that went on there, and I don't know much about what went on in the personal politics and with the group that he grew up with--his old classmates and all that kind of stuff. That goes on in any business, little jealousies and rivalries, and cliques. It would be a great thing if we could eliminate them throughout the military. As a matter of fact, the military does a hell of a sight better than most businesses, and I got to know a little about business since I've been out, too.

Q: Toward the end of the war, when Arnold got very close to von Karman, he talked about R&D and guided missiles, and he gave one talk, I know. In the Pentagon, he gave a pep talk to the Air Staff and said there would be a place for non-rated officers in the postwar air force, and that one's ability to rise to the hierarchy would not depend on whether you had wings or not. Of course, this is the argument he used on his own sons. He tried to get Bozo McKee--a living example of a man who rose to the top without wings--to argue

Bruce and his other son, Hank, into coming in the AF. Did you ever hear him talk about the future of the AF?

O'D: Oh yes, a lot of times. He thought a lot about it, he brooded a lot about it. He was convinced that we had the solution to keeping America strong, and he believed in a strong America. He thought that there was no other way to come out of this mess in years to come, because we were going to have trouble with the Russians and trouble with others. We didn't know where we stood in Europe. Airpower was truly the way to do it, and of course, it is. We deliberately threw away what we had, which is what he feared. We put our dependence on a third rate way of fighting and that's for the infantry--the Marines, with all due respect--to them--not worth a good goddamn. Did you ever see a successful vertical development with a helicopter, winning a decisive battle? Hell no, you haven't, because there has never been one. And so we make noises and expend ammunition and go through all this stuff. Hap had a feeling for that. He thought the Army would rise again with Eisenhower riding high, and all the rest. He thought that airpower might get lost--which indeed, it damned near has.

Q: He was a great advocate of airborne operations?

O'D: Oh yes, he went along, he played ball, if the Army wanted it, he went along. He said: "Sure I can give you the transports, I'll do this and that."

Q: No, I mean, based on my reading, he did more, than go along with it. He was a strong advocate of it. In fact, he tried to push it on Eisenhower. Eisenhower was dubious about paratroop operations, and Arnold tried to sell this at Normandy, to a greater extent, and also the DRAGOON.

O'D: How much effort did he put on trying to sell it?

Q: He put some effort into it.

O'D: I think he was always for anything that used airplanes.

Q: He was great on gliders; for example, he pushed gliders. This idea of airborne operations, enveloping the enemy, he pushed that. He got this guy Dupont--Laux--he was a hotshot on the glider business. So he really pushed this R&D thing.

O'D: I think he got a kick out of it. He liked to think of himself as imaginative. He was always looking for ideas. That's why he had the Advisory Council, why he had people to do his thinking for him. But you know darn well, if you did his thinking for him, that didn't mean he was going to buy it. But he liked to play with that stuff. He liked to go far out, he liked the idea of using those gliders over in Burma--Johnny Alison and those guys. But I think this was a kind of smoke screen to keep the pressure on airpower and to get a strong unified air force--a separate air force--get our own Academy; get our own uniform, get all these things, he wanted to break away from the Army and Navy,and he had a hell of a fight. Big people in the Army didn't like any part of us. Thought we were fresh upstarts, snotnoses, didn't know anything.

L: Were there any particular opponents? You know Marshall was understanding about it. But what Army people did he have head-on confrontations with?

O'D: I don't know of anybody with whome he had head-on confrontations. But I can tell you that an awful lot of people--I don't want to mention names, but some of my friends are still around. They had nothing but contempt for the Air Force, and they tried to downgrade it at every turn. And I'm talking big guys who never understood it.

Maxwell Taylor is one. He was a paratrooper, so he thought he knew all about airpower. He didn't know from nothing.

L: Gavin?

O'D: Gavin, too. Paul Harkins, the whole gang. They got to be the new separate brilliant flying corps.

L: Gavin, one of my theories about him--he washed out of flying school, and he never got over it. But I was thinking more of someone like Lesley McNair.

O'D: McNair, I don't know whether or not he fits.

Q: He was always complaining that he was not getting enough air support when he was head of the AGF. You know, when they set up the AAF and the AGF and the ASF. McNair was head of the AGF and he was complaining about the close air support, and it is some kind of irony that he got such close support it killed him.

Q: You know, on this business, you mention about Arnold being a gadgeteer and he liked to fool with these concepts. I think you are absolutely right on that. On guided missiles for example, he had a little role in the Kettering "Bug" of WW I. When he was at the Normandy Beach head, three days after the invasion--they stayed there for about a week. A couple of days after he arrived, the Germans started firing the V-1 and everybody was terribly frightened. Arnold was almost joyful--in the sense that he had them put together one of these V-1s, and he had it shipped over, and of course, it became the JB=2. Arnold was going to produce 5,000 a month of those things, and obliterate Germany. He was going to do this, and he had his heart attack. And when he had his heart attack Giles wasn't strong enough to carry this program, and the Army killed it, but he was going to obliterate the Germans and the Japs with JB-2s.

O'D: Well, he did, he wanted to get a reputation for a sound operator, and I think he selected sound men, like LeMay. LeMay is a sound SOB--let me tell you. He had his ups and downs. He scowls and chews in his cigar, but he is a fine man and a good leader. And Hap recognized that, he is responsible for it, and he did a good job. He selected a lot of his commanders, and he had a feel for it, which kind of amazed me, because I didn't think he had the personnel touch, but he did. Always in the back of his craw, I know that he had this --"what's going to happen in the future?" "How do we get an Academy?" I've been interested in that Academy since it was a glint in his eye, and it was just that. He got it rolling andhe got it rolling right, and, of course, we had a lot of help along the line.

Q: Norstad told us that Arnold was very disappointed in Norstad's role in the unification. Arnold felt when the bill came out--of course you were in a position here, right in the middle of it--that the bill was much less than the AF had hoped for. Arnold, at least in Norstad's conception, blamed Norstad for our getting less than the whole leaf. Do you remember any of that?

O'D: Oh, there was a lot of crap that went on, I don't. I think Larry was a good negotiator and he got up there by being a good negotiator. Eisenhower got up there by being a good negotiator. It's all right to negotiate, but sometimes, we have to draw the line on it, too. And Hap was more of a line drawer, than he was a negotiator.

L: Did he ever--I mean in your presence, or to your knowledge--ever let down and say, "the hell with it."?

O'D: No--give up the ghost?--No! Hell no, he was for more and more--an insatiable desire to build up this damn air force. I think

he truly believed that it was the saving grace of this country--the military. It had changed just as it did from bows and arrows and all the way. And this was the new arm; it was flexible. He liked the flexibility aspect of it, even as they developed other things to get away from it.

Q: Was it almost a religion with him?

O'D: I don't know, you know he didn't do anything else. He had no hobbies to my knowledge. I don't think he was a hunter.

Q: He talked about fishing. Once a year he'd go out.

O'D: A worm here and there. The boys all tried to get him interested up around Pennsylvania, but he was no ardent fisherman or hunter. He liked the athletics. He liked to go to football games.

L: Those great logistics before the war. His planning with friends to get to the Army-Navy games was sort of like war plans.

Q: Complex arrangements to rendezvous. Somebody would come up from Philly--somebody from elsewhere.

O'D: Yes, that's right. The Columbia game one time. Davis and Blanchard were playing. During the war years, they really went to town. And I took him later into Toots Shor's place. Old Toots never got over there. I came in with a five-star general. We popped right in the corner, and had a couple of drinks and a nice dinner, and went on home.

Q: He always stayed at the Astor Hotel.

O'D: "Astor Barracks," we all did in those days. The Astor was the headquarters for West Point. The Commodore was the one for the Navy.

Q: Did you know about his relationship with Lindbergh?

O'D: No, I really didn't. I knew they knew each other, but I don't know much about that at all. I know Lindbergh, but not well, and I didn't know him with Hap.

Q: How about de Seversky?

O'D: I think, as my memory goes, Seversky and he were kind of eye to eye, and Sasha, he's been pitching for a long time.

Q: Didn't he sort of serve the gadfly at one time?

O'D: Yes, he sent him out, he had a pass to go anywhere he wanted--kind of be a general inspector, that type of thing.

Q: He came out with these articles, he was writing. He had a column and then he had this movie, a Disney movie. And he was pushing for airpower, and he might have gotten a little ahead of Arnold, and it might have irritated Arnold. Was there any period of friction between the two?

L: I think he got ahead of him for the political climate of the time, and Arnold felt that he was going too far, too fast and he talked too much about what he wanted, and he couldn't get it.

Q: How about Drew Pearson?

O'D: You want my opinion?

Q: I've done a lot of research on Drew Pearson over the Arnold years--six years of Drew Pearson, and I could write an article about that alone. Drew Pearson seemed to have certain pet hates and certain likes, and there were some people who could do no wrong and some people who could do no right, Arnold was one of those who could do no right. Do you remember this, and if so, why?

O'D: I don't remember that, I remember, of course, he would raise hell about Meyers. He blamed Arnold; gave Arnold a lot of bad press on that I recall.

Q: He gave Arnold bad press on the marriage between Bruce and Barbara Douglas. He gave bad press on the leakproof tanks; and he blamed Arnold for this Sicily, we had like 100 planes shot down, by our own people. He blamed Arnold for parachutes--we didn't have safety parachutes--several other things. But he never said a good word about Arnold, if he had to say anything good about the AF--he would just say AF, or the AAF, The Air Corps, he would call it, but never praised Arnold.

O'D: The things that I know about, where I was involved with Pearson, he turned out to be 90% inaccurate. Just about 90% inaccurate, he would pick one little thing and he would build it up and assume all the rest would be very careful not to say anything that he could be sued on for libel.

Q: And he would keep hitting at it for weeks.

O'D: Every time I hear of his name, you like to think well of the dead. But to hell with him, because I didn't like the guy, I think he was a crook.

Interview General Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell, March 27, 1970, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
(with Jack Loosbrock)

Q: Do you remember your first encounter with Hap Arnold?

O'D: Yes, I do. I was stationed in India. Having been kicked out of the Philippines and Java, I wound up in New Delhi. I was there with nothing to do for several months. Gen Brereton came along and he was placed in command of the 10th AF which we started to build up in New Delhi. That was in '42. He got there in March 1942. About Christmas 1942, as I recall, or just before Christmas of that year, Hap Arnold came out to visit us.

Q: It was October 1942. He came over with Jake Smart.

O'D: That's right. It was before Christmas. I know because I left after Christmas. We had a meeting, I had never met Gen Arnold. Naturally knew of him, but I had never served under him, and we didn't have very much out in India at that time. We were all a little teed off, those of us coming out thinking that, for want of a little bit more sustenance and little better plan for the defense of the Philippines, we could have been easily there and set those guys back. We were upset about it, at any rate. General Arnold told us, among other things, that there was going to be an invasion of Burma in roughly the spring of 1943, and the British were going to hit Rangoon. General Arnold asked if there were any questions, and I said I didn't have any questions, but I would like to make an observation. The observation was that I didn't think there would be an invasion of Rangoon in the spring, I didn't see how in the world the British troops in India could possibly be made ready to take on such a project.

General Arnold said: "Where do you get your information? What's your name?" I told him I was Col O'Donnell. "Where do you get your information?" And I said: "I've just been here since March, and it doesn't look to me that these people are geared for any kind of war at all. I can't see how they could make a major invasion. They haven't got the wherewithal. If they did, we would have to give them all the stuff, and where's it coming from?" So he bristled a little bit, and said ... well, he gave me a lecture in front of everybody, and said: "It might be of interest to you and the rest of the people here that I sit on what they call the JCS, and we meet every Tuesday. These are the American senior service representatives, and then every Thursday I sit on anotheroutfit called the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which are the American and British Joint Chiefs representatives. And for your information, we have decided that there will be an invasion." He said: "What do you think of that?" And I said: "I still don't believe there is going to be an invasion." Jake Smart told me later, on the way home, General Arnold said: "Say, who was that O'Donnell?" Smart told him he was an air force football coach and fighter pilot and all that kind of stuff. So before long, it was after Christmas that I got the word that I was ordered back into Washington to be Chief of his Advisory Council. I was one of the great unwashed. I had never been to a service school. I went to West Point, and I had 90 days at the Tactical School--a 90-day wonder. When they cut the Tactical School from two years to 90 days, I was one of the guys that went through that and suddenly I was projected back here, and Hap found out that I was right--they were making the decisions over the table, and then the old trick that we have seen many times before. Why, certainly we will be

willing to undertake this observation (operation). We will depend on you for the wherewithal and logistic supply. And all right: "What do you need for logistics", and they put in a request for more sealift that we had for taking Normandy, which was one way of negating the campaign.

Q: The thought occurs to me that what you said influenced him in another way. Because when Arnold came back, he wrote a report, and really tore the British apart. There was this Marshall Peirse, and Arnold had the lowest opinion of him and some of the other people. I can't recall them by nam...

O'D: Peirse was senior RAF officer in India.

Q: Right, and so he derogated the opinions which Peirse had given him, and it might be partly due to your expression.

O'D: I can't conceive of any other way I was ordered back to be on his Advisory Council. From then on (after the Burma invasion incident) for one solid year, I accompanied Arnold to every single JCS and Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, and I went with him to Quebec and to Cairo, went across the Atlantic on the battleship, the good ship IOWA.

Q: Was that the one that almost took a torpedo hit?

O'D: Yes.

Q: Is that account about him kidding Ernie King about that incident..."Your aim is bad...?"

O'D: No, the thing he really needled King about was the Alaskan invasion of Kiska. All that thing, getting ready, and we go in there, and not a single Japanese. Of course, he and King were not natural enemies, but they were in a way. King was very pompous. He took

his position very extremely gravely. And if it hadn't been for Gen Marshall, it wouldn't have worked out too well. But Marshall played the real catalyst in that group. He had King on one side and Arnold on the other, and he had a lot of others, Somervell. When Marshall spoke, he spoke with authority, everybody listened to him, including the President.

Q: This account that I heard about the torpedo fired at the IOWA. Arnold said to King, who was mad as hell at this accidental firing.

O'D: I was standing on the bridge next to King. There were only a few of us. We were allowed to go anywhere we wanted to and watch this demonstration, about 500 miles off of Gibraltar. And here was the President, the JCS, and all those great guys, O'Donnell. I'm the colonel with the black book. So we are standing up there, next to King and this thing came over. They started showing the President what naval might was, the 5" guns were going, and the 15" guns, and 16" guns were going, and the Bofors, and the submarines, the destroyers and cruisers were zigging and zagging. The whole thing was just a show for the Old Man [President Roosevelt] sitting down there with his white hat and green visor and that long cigarette holder. And [Louis McHenry] Howe standing behind him, the YMCA social director--what was his name?--Harry Hopkins. All these great strategic thinkers, Pop (Pa) Watson. So over the loudspeaker system came, "This is not a drill, repeat, not a drill." King was up there, and he had his hands, thumbs out of the leading edge of the pocket. He turned the color of that wall, and we could see this torpedo coming. And I thought, when you see one coming like that, I didn't see how it could miss, we were zigging

and it looked to me, of course, I was looking from the side, I thought we had it. But the SOB missed us and went across the stern and it didn't miss by much. You know what happened? They tell me the guy got excited on the tube on one of our own destroyers. He tripped the tube--got all excited with the guns going--they tell me he is still on Adak as a Post Exchange Officer, ship's store...

Q: This might have been Arnold's afterthought. But there is a great line. But he went over to King--the red was going up his neck. Arnold said: "I don't mind you firing torpedoes at us, but I want to tell you, your aim is bad." Of course, this could have been somebody's afterthought.

O'D: We were all sworn to secrecy and that stood up, and the first time I ever heard it mentioned, Hap told me never to take a note when I was working with him, traveling, and I never did.

Q: This is something that is kind of perplexing. You mentioned that at lunch, because he was a prodigious notetaker himself.

O'D: Well, he didn't want me to take them. I was a young guy. Marshall wanted me to go back with him after the Teheran-Cairo Conference.

Q: November 1943?

O'D: Yes, Marshall went home by way of the Philippines, I guess. And he wanted to have me go with him. He wanted to have an Air Force guy with him. Hap said: "You can't take Rosie. He's not even housebroken yet, you don't know what the hell he is liable to tell the Old Man." But what Arnold really wanted me to do was go on up and see his kid, young Hank, running this battery up there, at the base of CASSINO. To get in a B-17 and plug over to Italy, and the old B-17 was converted with a bunk in it. He would put on a stocking hat, and took off his clothes and go to bed there and lie down.

L: Rosie, there is some indication, it may not be completely accurate, a theory again. But it seems to me that there is a lot of evidence that Arnold was very fearsome for people who worked for him. In some cases, he liked to scare people. But he was always very circumspect when he was moving laterally or looking up. Is there basis for that comment?

O'D: He was hard...he would raise hell when he saw something that was really terrible. For instance, we went out with a B-29. They gave us a lousy engine in those things. They had hot spots. He called me in and said: "Ever since you have been in here, you've wanted to get out"--this was after I got out of the Advisory Council. He said: "I'm going to put a star on your shoulder and send you out with the B-29s." And he said: "I want some action!" He gave you that kind of a talk. But, we went out there and started getting those B-29s. We had them in a base at Kansas, Nebraska--all through the Middle West, and they were catching fire. So we were all getting ready to run a mission from Saipan up to Tokyo and back, so I thought I'd put on a grand dress rehearsal and ran a mission from our bases around Topeka down to Cuba and back. And this really brought out the thing in its real perspective. We had airplanes all over the country. Some were catching on fire and bailing out. Other people were landing all over the place--Florida and Cuba. So he called an immediate group in. He had old Man Knudsen. Barney Giles, of course, was working across the hall from him.

Q: Was this a meeting in Washington?

O'D: Yes.

Q: This was early 1944 probably?

O'D: Early 1944. I went out in October 1944 with the B-29s. This was early 1944.

O: The President was putting the heat on him to get the B-29 operational..

O'D: That's right. So he called all these guys in and said: "Just what I have suspected is going wrong. O'Donnell is supposed to be taking a wing out of here in October and he has airplanes with cellophane engines in them." He said: "Now, I want those goddamned things fixed, and I want them fixed now, and I don't want any aspirin cures. Now, get your asses out here and get at it!" That kind of talk, and he could be tough that way. And they did. They got a harness which guaranteed the flow of air, and did away with those hot spots around three or four cylinders, and we came out with a pretty good product.

Q: When you saw him with Marshall, was he obsequious, deferential?

O'D: No--Marshall as you may know, never referred to anybody by his first name or nickname. Arnold respected Marshall.

Q: Did he ever call him George?

O'D: No, never, no, he returned the compliment, "General Marshall." Marshall was that way, a great man in my book. Hap hadn't been accustomed, of course they were about the same age. He was in the driver's seat, because we all belonged to the Army side. You see, he had a funny position, he was on the Joint Chiefs by sufferance. And of course, the Navy resented it. And a lot of Army people did. There never should have had a breakoff. But to get to this question, no he was not, he had a great respect for General Marshall. And when we lived together at that Cairo conference, we lived in a villa. We didn't stay at the Mina house, we had a villa, Tom Handy, Marshall, Arnold, Frank McCarthy--who produced this Patton picture--and a guy who was with Tom Handy, and I, lived in this house. So we had breakfast every day and dinner every night. Marshall [at Cairo] liked a nice good, two, or maybe three, stiff old fashioneds before dinner at the end of the day. That was one of the places where I wish I had been

able to take notes or go back to my room, because there was a lot of reminiscing about how things were in the old days, and Marshall could be a very, very charming guy, you know.

Q: Great raconteur?

O'D: Oh, yes.

Q: We have eight or nine diaries in his little shortland that Arnold took at various conferences. Arnold took notes in a little book that he kept in the palm of his hand. This guy, Forrest Pogue, who wrote the first two volumes of the Marshall history, told me that Arnold once got chewed out for taking notes, unauthorized notes at the White House. Somebody told him, when you come here--he was then just a fresh two-star, he had just taken Westover's place. And he was told: "You don't take notes here with the President." So Arnold was a notetaker, and I just wonder why he told you not to take notes? (Referring to Arnold's injunction re taking notes of torpedo firing at USS IOWA.)

O'D: I guess he didn't want people, he probably got crossed up a lot of times. He didn't want second guessing, or having leaks generated which would be attributed to him or his immediate staff. So I was very happy about it at the time, although since I have many times regretted that. But he wasn't going to be having me blabbling my mouth around. But since he wanted it that way, he knew I wasn't. He told me that. But the only fellow he was really in awe of was Roosevelt, not of King, or not of Marshall, but Roosevelt. He had a little concern about what the Old Man was going to do, and what he might do.

Q: You answered one of my questions. He was scared of FDR?

O'D: That's understandable, too. He was President of the U.S. Arnold was just a M/General, suddenly elevated.

Q: This was well before your time, but Arnold got into this altercation with Morgenthau over the planes for the British and French in 1939. They finally settled this thing. According to Arnold's book, you may remember that the President called him in for an old fashioned, called him Hap. Then he knew he was out of the Presidential doghouse. This was probably around the time of Pearl Harbor. But I guess he always was worried about his relationship with Roosevelt. Never felt too much at ease there.

O'D: Yes, I would say that's correct.

Q: You led the first raid from the Marianas on Thanksgiving Day, 1944. There was some delay in getting that raid off. Wasn't it delayed some weeks?

O'D: We had some very bad weather, let me see now.

Q: Weren't they supposed to get them off in October? Or at least wasn't that the plan?

O'D: I really have forgotten. It seems to me there was some kind of holdup--bad weather, unpredictability of the wing. In fact, we were the first people to hit that real jet stream, and we hit it hard on that first mission.

Q: Did we fail to anticipate this? Or was it our meterology that shortchanged us. You know, there was a 200-mile-an-hour jet stream.

O'D: Over 200-mile-an-hour jet stream, and nobody ever briefed us on the possibility of running in to that. We hit a very heavy one. It was the time of the year when you get them, and we wound up crabbing it. Mt. Fuji was our initial point and we hit Fuji in a direct line without wind this way, and we wound up flying it this way, and when we turned downwind, we were over Chelsea Point before you could say "Jack Robinson." And we had the fighters on us. They

were coming up to meet us. They never even got to us on the first raid; they were well below us. But you didn't have a chance to line up, and you had scattered clouds. We fought right from the start--at least I did, and I wrote a letter to Gen Arnold about the subject, about operating with a new weapon and a new APQ-13 radar set. We had a capability that they didn't have in England--the 8th AF, the B-17, and we should use it. And I hope that we didn't get people running us who came back from the 8th AF and say the way to do this is high altitude accurate mass bombing. We had the capability and a good altitude, about 16,000 feet, which was the optimum altitude for that radar equipment. We could do a hell of a job burning them out. But, boy, we went right on in there at 30,000 feet, and we flew at 30,000 feet with desultory results which I forecasted--if I do say so. And finally LeMay brought them down and I didn't agree with him, going down all that way. I thought 7,000 feet was asking for trouble. The optimum altitude for radar resolution for that set was 12,000 to 15,000 feet.

Q: Did LeMay make that decision to go to low level? This here is an article in Reader's Digest a couple of years ago in which Tom Power or somebody who wrote the article attributed to Tom Powers this decision. Is there any basis for that?

O'D: No, I think LeMay decided to go, we were getting nowhere at that high altitude stuff.

Q: This was a great decision to make, because in Germany at 7,000 feet, you would have gotten clobbered.

O'D: That's the point I'm getting to. They finally got to using the airplane the way it was built, although 7,000 was not the right

altitude. We went back. The whole last half of the campaign, we flew from 12,000 to 15,000, where we should have been. That's where you had your best resolution all the way.

L: Then, too, there was a difference in the target complex from Germany to Japan. On the subject of firebombing, the accuracy was not a critical element.

Q: General O'Donnell, on this decision LeMay made. They went in March 9, 1945. Arnold was in Coral Gables flat on his back. He was having his heart attack, Norstad was his Deputy for the 20th AF. Now, did LeMay consult with Arnold or Norstad or anybody?

O'D: I'm sure he did, I don't know. His headquarters were at Guam, and I was at Saipan. I was covering the North side of the beach. But I'm sure they did. He didn't do anything without checking. I forget how it was. Let's see, Nate Twining came in later; Norstad was back here.

Q: Norstad came out there just before.

O'D: He came out on a quick mission.

Q: Well, he came out on two missions, one to tell Hansell. He came out just before the mission, and apparently, LeMay wanted to, if not to consult with, at least to tell somebody what he was going to do. My guess is that if it was to run contrary to policy or doctrine, somebody could stop him. Of course, Arnold was in no position to do that. He was pretty sick.

O: He wasn't in bad shape at that time.

Q: Well, he was in Coral Gables. Of course, he was down there.

O'D: When did he come out to visit us?

Q: Oh, he came out in June, that was three months later.

O'D: He couldn't have been so sick.

Q: They kept him two months. He got sick right around Inauguration Day. He was pretty sick for nearly two months; he was down in Coral Gables.

L: Again, theorizing, if it were anybody else but Arnold, he probably would have been retired.

Q: In fact, we have gotten some indication--this is one of his great concerns--this is one of the reasons why they kept it so secret. He was worried that Marshall would retire him. This wasn't his first heart attack. He had one in 1943 that they kept pretty quiet. Of course, he was walking around there, but he wasn't in good shape. In any event, this decision--LeMay had this decision to make.

O'D: It was LeMay's decision, he was in command.

Q: Let me ask you, going back. On New Year's Day 1945, Arnold sent a lovely message to Hansell, telling him what a great job he was doing--this is the 21st Bomb Comdr. And 8 days later, Norstad shows up out there to give Hansell the bad news that he is being relieved, and that LeMay is taking over. Do you know anything about the workings of that decision? Was this an impulsive decision by Arnold? Or did he think this through?

O'D: I really don't know. I think that Blondie Saunders was being groomed to come out to take that job when he was banged up.

Q: Blondie Saunders was in the CBI; he got banged up.

O'D: Yes, he got hurt out there, and that did away with Blondie. So Arnold reached down and he wanted to get a fellow with active combat experience. And so he picked Blondie first, and then he got LeMay.

L: To follow up this matter of Arnold being impulsive, you had a year's close association with him. You know, he had the reputation

somwhat accumulated posthumously, of being a very impulsive guy. Yet there is a lot of his impulses had been pretty carefully thought through, or as George Kenney says, the ad libs were all written out ahead of time. What was your opinion?

O'D: I wouldn't say that he was impulsive to the point where that was characteristic in everything that came up, where he acted instinctively or impulsively. I think there was a mixture there, a balance. He certainly was impulsive and acted impulsively at certain times. At other times, he'd sweat out a lot of decisions, and other possibilities, options.

L: I've known people who were impulsive about small things, but they think about big things. And I've known people the other way around, worried about little things and they would go out and buy a house on an impulse.

O'D: Some of the little things, I think he was looking for an escape, or something to blow off. He would do crazy things in little things. One day I brought some papers in to him and he didn't want to sign them. He told me. The papers had to do with giving Mark Clark some small aircraft with bigger engines, more horsepower so they could climb around those mountains in Italy: "So why should he have them?" So I said: "I don't know why they shouldn't have any. So he said: "Well, get them some." Well, we found out they were committed to other areas, and by the time we got back--and my job was to see who was the roadblock--and get the whys and wherefores and explain them to him. He never liked the solution I brought him in, so he wouldn't sign the papers. And I said: "General, you promised Clark and Spaatz that you are going to get these airplanes, and they need them and want them...

Q: You mean personal airplanes?

O'D: No, these were spotters and I've forgot--liaison types--so he really didn't want to sign the thing. And that's when he pushed the paper back: "Take it out." I came back again and put it down, and he looked at it again. By this time the big air raid alarm went off. They were all on the clocks on the buildings, so this thing, a harsh racket coming from that thing. The thing went on and stopped. He put the pen down. Then he picked it up again and as he started, it went on again. He had a leak duck, a paperweight, on his "IN" basket. He said: "Can't you stop that goddamned thing?" And he grabbed the duck and he gave it to me. And I said: "Do you mean it? And he said: "What do you think I mean!" So I hauled off and let go of the duck at the clock. I missed it. It took a hunk of the wall out. Suzy Atkins came running in. It made a hell of a racket, you know, and the duck bounced off the wall, and the Old Man went under the deck to duck it because it came bouncing like a carom shot off the wall. So he gets up and said: "The great O'Donnell, the great passer. He couldn't even hit the goddamn clock." But he picked up the pen and signed the paper.

Q: That's an impulse.

O'D: On the other side, things like determining who was going to be his successor. I know he pondered about that a hell of a lot--for the good of the AF. He felt that we should have certain things. And he was really a truly big man in that position, in a subservient position, because he was working for the Army, and to get going on a drive for your own service, and to have your own academy--these were things that were in his craw a long, long time.

Q: You bring up another subject now. When he was sick, Marshall brought Eaker in to be his Deputy. This was in April 1945. Did Eaker have an idea that he might succeed Arnold?

O'D: No, I don't think so, because I think Eaker was--I never got that impression. Of course, Tooey was a good deal more senior and had the rank, and, of course, Arnold. It probably would have been Andrews. Andrews was the ... you see, we had a couple of pretty big fellows there. We had Andrews....

Q: Andrews, of course, was already dead.

O'D: Yes, Andrews was dead, but he was being groomed, he was going to be "Eisenhower."

Q: Yes, Lovett told us that.

O'D: Sure he was groomed to go over there and take Eisenhower's job. Because he understood the air picture as well as the other. Everybody who knew Frank Andrews adored him, admired him and he undoubtedly would have been head of the AF--if he wasn't head of the Army. He probably would have been Chief of Staff of the Army. Could well have been. Another guy who didn't get very much credit in those days was Marshall's deputy, McNarney, who kept the logistics picture straighten out as an Air Corps officer. He made a lot of sense, he put in those overseas inspections and all that type of thing, so they didn't send half-baked outfits over there. He was a tough guy, he was a hard guy to share.

O'D: Andrews, who else do we have, they were both very senior to Hap, as I recall.

Q: Didn't Delos Emmons have ideas?

O'D: Oh yes, I think Emmons was a contender. But there weren't very many of them, and not very many of them had real command experience

in warfare. A couple of guys got into the fight in WW I. Then we had that long bleak period, and the reason for the quick promotion of our group--the gang that I went to school with--LeMay, Powers, Hank Everest, Fred Anderson. We are all in the same period of time at West Point and Flying School. By the time the war broke, we were 35 years of age. We were all squadron commanders and we knew the business.

Q: You mentioned Tony Frank at lunch. He was very anxious to leave the Air Service Command to get a Combat command, but Arnold wouldn't give him one. Did you know about that?

O'D: I figured there was something like that going on. Of course, I knew those guys were a lot senior than I was, and I didn't know what the score was. We had a lot of guys, Eddy House; Tony Frank; Dargue.

Q: Dargue was killed right after Pearl Harbor.

O'D: That's right.

Q: Some of the other old timers never made it big, like Jakey Fickel, and Conger Pratt...

O'D: Well they didn't really...no, they were truly Army officers, who hadn't been through the mill on the flying game. They were just like Navy guys--the Navy aviators, all those old-timers. They didn't fly. That's why I think Andrews was so anxious to get out and do it. He wanted to prove to himself he was an aviator, and that's what brought about his end, too.

Q: You know, Benny Foulois, they gave him nothing to do. Benny Foulois outlived them all, but Benny Foulois, in 1940 or 1941, was still able to do a job, but was given no assignment. Do you know why?

O'D: I think they all liked Benny, but I thought they figured in his later days, he was a bit of a lightweight.

Q: He had had it with Roosevelt because of the air mail. What I

am getting at, could it have been a political decision that he not be given any assignment?

O'D: Could be. I think they figured that he didn't have the stature compared to Tooey or some of the other people.

Q: But he was given no job.

O'D: He was getting pretty old, too. At the end of the war, Benny Foulois must have been over 60.

Q: But they gave other people jobs. Fechet preceded Foulois, and they gave him a job.

O'D: I don't know, those old timers used to fight each other all the time. One would be the Inspector and the other guy would be running. What was the guy at Langley, the IG, he's a real toughy?

Q: Was that Hugh Knerr?

O'D: No, it wasn't Knerr. He and Frank were always opposed. Anyway, they called him Lenin and Trotsky. So he came up, the guy down there came up to inspect Mitchel Field when Tony was in command, and he cut it up. He found all kinds of things, dust in finger bowls. Bricks not whitewashed properly. And so, Tony took him down to his airplane, and put him back. And he said: "Now Trotsky, I just want you to remember one thing, one day you are going to be in command of one of these stations and I am going to be the Inspector. Brother look out!"

Q: On Arnold's visit in June 1945. He came out there to Okinawa, he was, one of his main missions was trying to reconcile the three major figures, MacArthur, Nimitz, and Spaatz--to try and reconcile the missions. There was a big meeting on LeMay's porch on Guam one night. Did you attend that meeting?

O'D: No, I didn't.

Q: This is a high-level pow-wow, knockdown, drag out type of thing. You weren't there?

O'D: No, I wasn't present. But he did when he took off from Honolulu and they sent back the word, Ceil Combs was with him,I believe. They gave him the word that they would land in Guam at such and such a time. And Hap said: "Who the hell said we are going to Guam? We are going to Saipan. We are going to see O'Donnell. Get the hot word." Cecil told me this. So surer than hell, they were all waiting for him, Nimitz and LeMay all of them down at Guam, and he landed at Saipan, and stayed with us for about three hours and went down,and talked to them. He loved to do things like that.

L: He was a great practical joker.

O'D: Oh yes. This showed that he was in command. Nobody was going to tell him where he was going to go.

Q: Could he take it as well as give it?

O'D: Well, that laugh wasn't a laugh. That Hap is a misnomer. You see, he was a real intense guy. And I don't know. I don't know of any instance--I would guess that he would not be able to take it. He took things very seriously. Really, this smile, it took me a little while to find out, he wasn't laughing.

L: Somebody told me, and I'm trying to think of who it was, not in this kind of situation, that it was almost a nervous tic.

O'D: Yes, it was a nervous laugh. You've seen a lot of people like that. I'll tell you who had one, "Carn" Sweeney. He would stand up there, and he'd pull his shirtsleeves down like this, and laugh like hell about nothing--your mother died. He'd laugh like hell.

L: Another one was Tom Lanphier, he had a kind of nervous giggle.

Q: Right after your first mission, and the Japs came over and hit your base. Was there some booboo on the air defense, where they thought this was Marine fighters or something?

O'D: This was what I laughingly call a calculated risk, that the Japs wouldn't be able to hit us down there. Because, if any kind of a good tactical organization ever got loose on one of those bases, they would cut it up to ribbons. They didn't have any strength down there. And those few abortive raids--and that's what they were--they didn't do any real damage, based out of the islands up there, a couple hundred miles north of Saipan. I forget their name. And they ran a few low-level missions. There was no radar around there to conduct that. The Marines, and we had some of the 7th AF, which I think was part of the defense of Saipan. But you might as well jump on the people in the Philippines for not fighting the Japs. They weren't ready; they weren't prepared, that's all.

Q: Was Arnold worried about the possibility of a major Jap attack

O'D: No, because at that time, the intelligence was the Jap fleet had been pretty well broken up, and they didn't have very much. And if they did work a little bit, we could find out where they were working from, and they didn't have very many places to work from. There were several islands around there. They didn't have the capacity to come down from Iwo. Of course, we took Iwo in February 1945.

Q: Just a couple of weeks before that--LeMay was your boss at that time--Arnold wrote Norstad, again, this was the end of January, and he wrote Norstad that your wing was in bad shape. And he might have to get you out there as a wing commander or something.

O'D: Yes, that could be, we had a little confrontation on that.

L: You and who?

O'D: LeMay. We came up to look it over. We were in the mud, and we were flying these high altitude missions which I objected to from the start, and said we should go the other route. LeMay didn't like the crack I made. Curt's all right, it didn't make any difference to me. We had been fighting as good friends for years. He looked over the place. It was a mess. The mud more than anything else, and the difficulty in getting this operation going at 30,000 feet. It would cut down on our fuel supply in order to lug the bombs up there. And he said: "Well, I'll tell you, I don't like what I see." And I said: "I don't think you see good. I don't know if you know what you are looking for." And we had a few other words along that line. Of course, LeMay is a quick guy to get to the draw. The solution for improving a situation is firing the commander. But we had some very real problems in starting that campaign. These other outfits came in very nicely. They came in after the fall of Iwo Jima. I lost 100 crews out there. We had that long run with no place to ditch, and we didn't get many of them back either. So all these things added up, once we got Iwo Jima gone. My wing dropped one-third of the whole effort. That's in the books. We took one third of the casualties; one-third of the bombing; and at least one-third of the accuracy needed to get in there.

Q: One of the main problems that was eating Arnold, I think, in his decision to relieve Hansell, was the aborts. There were an awful lot of aborts at this early stage. Of course, the B-29 was not then a proven plane.

O'D: As soon as they got to flying it at an optimum altitude, 12,000-15,000 feet, they didn't have any aborts. Driving that engine to maximum performance up there at 30,000 feet, and they wouldn't make it.

Q: There was also this business, Arnold wanted to get 140,000 pounds off, and I think Hansell was sort of building up to it. Arnold kept sending him a lot of driving messages. Did you ever get in on that business?

O'D: Hansell was kind of in an impossible position. He didn't have any headquarters. He had no experience in this. He superimposed himself on my wing. So I became piggyback in the 20th Bomber Command Hqs. We'd write all the field orders, and the flimsies and everything else, and send them up to get the imprimatur. That goes all over. That is a difficult situation, and Possum was trying--he was responsible, but he wasn't doing the work, and he didn't have the staff to do the work. It was one of those things that goes on during the war. Things get screwed up in command relationships.

Q: (Gen O'Donnell was asked about his experiences in the Philippines in 1941.)

O'D: We got past point of no return and I got instructions from Clagett's headquarters, that we were flying to Clark Field. And he was in command of the air forces out there. So I got--it was raining like hell, a real torrential downpour. I was told to go back to Del Monte, Del Monte to me was the name on a can of peaches. So I said: "We are coming in, I don't know where Del Monte is." The maps they sent us out with, they were just naval charts. And Del Monte, it turned out, was just a turf field, a plantation, no runway or anything.

Q: This is down in Mindanon?

O'D: Mindanou, so we passed Mindanou, and we kept on going. It couldn't have been too tough, because we all made it in--except Bill Fisher. He had the landing lights. Claget got mad as hell.

Q: Was he your commander?

O'D: He was in command out there. I was reporting out there. I belonged to the 11th Bomb Wing.

Q: And then he was taken out of there?

O'D: In 1941, September, right before the war.

Q: He was taken out of there right after Pearl Harbor?

O'D: I was threatened, and what's his name was there too--Les Maitland. Maitland told me that the Old Man wanted to court martial me. He said this would be a stupid action, something or other. We made it in there, made a hell of a flight, as a matter of fact. We had nothing to go on, no radar, clear across the Western Pacific, so nothing ever happened of it. I used to see him down at the Army-Navy Club, I knew him before--tough old guy.

Q: He was a classmate of Andrews, and he was maybe the only man to have been made a BG three times, and broken twice, or broken three times. He was broken down to a Colonel. The reason we are interested in him is that we have seen his extensive correspondence with Andrews. And he blames Arnold for his demotions.

O'D: He was a character.

Q: Did Arnold ever talk to you about Clagett?

O'D: No, not about him. He was thinking of some other fellows. Les Maitland was a "case." I've seen him since, he is an Episcopal minister in very good standing.

Q: Is he still alive?

O'D: Sure he is, he works out of, near Phoenix. He is a man of the cloth--married to a girl that we all knew, happily married. He did a hell of a job, and he's great, and he's one of those fellows that

couldn't handle a drink. It just was poison.

Q: He's one that Arnold forgave. They sent him over to Europe, and then when Arnold came over there in September 1943, he said: "Get him out of here!" So he is one they knew about him and they gave him another chance and he made good.

O'D: There were several pretty well-known guys that were in sort of a frustration and not knowing how to cope with the reality of the war. They started hitting that bottle pretty hard. Old Clagett--I never will forget him--he was in command of Selfridge Field when I reported up there. And he used to wear one of those puttees and an old Army issue overcoat. The thing buttoned right up to the collar and came right down to his ankles, like a maxi skirt, and a campaign hat. And he had this little whip under his arm. He was coming down the street one day. We had a fresh little kid named MacDonald who later went out with Chennault. This kid used to wear this mackinaw open, with his belt around, open. Sue would come down and kicking the ice off the sidewalk, and he passed MacDonald, and MacDonald said: "Good morning, sir." "Good morning, my ass, report to my office immediately!" He was going to tell him about his open coat.

Q: I was told about Clagett that he was a stickler for looking for dust underneath the ledge.

O'D: Yes, he was old time, old school tie.

Q: Yes, he was an usher at Arnold's wedding. His wife was very political.

O'D: His wife was a lovely woman and so was his daughter, married...

Q: One of the reasons we bring this up is that, of course, Clagett was very close to Andrews, Andrews was a grand man who had a

higher degree of tolerance than Arnold and Andrews, for example, tolerated letters to him by Clagett about Arnold which really, if they were not insubordinate, they were disloyal. And he would say all these nasty things about Arnold, and Andrews would take this. This brings me to ask you, was there any tendency of Arnold to promote men like Spaatz and Eaker, who had come up with him through the West Coast, as against those like Clagett and Royce and Tony Frank who had come up through the Langley route under Andrews?

O'D: I really don't know. We had a beautiful little air force until the war came along and spoiled it. We had the 1st Bombardment--the 1st Pursuit, the 2nd Bombardment, and the 3rd Attack--that was the AF. We were just one big family, plus a little group in the Philippines, a group in Hawaii, and a group in Panama, and a couple of schools, Chanute. That was it. So it was very close, and when things started going, and promotions given out, I suppose some of their families and everybody else, I knew him when...

Q: There were a number of guys who came up with Andrews like Tony Frank and like Hugh Knerr. For example, Hugh Knerr does not like Arnold. Andrews was his god. He was pushing for a separate air force, and Hugh was writing letters under the table, writing books. The Wm. Bradford Huie books, was probably written by him. Any number of articles for Reader's Digest, American Mercury, at that time-- we are talking '40-'41. Now, Knerr had retired, after Andrews was not demoted, after he left the GHQ AF and he became a Colonel and went down to San Antonio, Knerr then retired, and Andrews from there, went back to G-3 for a year, under Marshall, and then he went out to the Caribbean in 1941. And this is when Knerr tried to get back on duty. Arnold--at least Knerr says that Arnold--was blocking his return to

active service, he didn't get in till the end of 1942. So I bring this up in thinking whether the men who came up close to Andrews might have suffered by way of promotions to the highest jobs as compared to those who came up with Arnold.

O'D: You couldn't prove it by me. I know nothing about them. I knew all of those people. I knew Royce very well, I knew Andrews and Brett. Andrews was the kind of a guy, when I was coaching at West Point, I was stationed at Selfridge when I first went back. I was a 1st LT. Andrews writes me a letter and says Johnny (his wife) gave my tickets to the Army game away, and I am in dire straits. Could I possibly enlist your aid to get a ticket, somewhere--any place in the stadium. So I had acess to 16 which we could buy as coaches, and I didn't have much use for them. So I sent him mine. And I got an immediate note back which said: "It sure pays to know influential people." Andrews was a kindly guy, you know. Everybody respected him. A real gentleman.

Q: That brings up something else...

O'D: He stood out from that whole group; no question about it, Andrews stood out.

L: The way things were going, there was room for both of them. I mean Andrews was on his way to a very big job.

Q: Most of the people who worked for Andrews, in fact, all that I have talked to, swore by him. He was sort of like a father and a friend, where Arnold, not so. Arnold was a tough taskmaster.

O'D: Yes, he was. He wouldn't put up with certain things. He detested mediocrity. He detested heavy drinking. He was kind of a "Christer" in his own way.

L: This time you spent in close contact with him. Would you call

it kind of nerve-wracking?

O'D: Not to me. No, gee, I had a ball. He was something to be around for me. I don't know, I just got along well with him. He didn't frighten me at all. I had my bit of fright out there in the Philippines and Java, and he was very good to me, as a young guy, and everything. He told me what he wanted me to do. He didn't want my decisions or anything like that. And a lot of those guys down in Plans thought I was in a close position to him. I was carrying the book,and we were making last minute changes before he went in to testify or be heard. And I had to be very careful in that position not to get the boys downstairs mad at me, so what I would do was get up--I had good points of contact in Navy--Admiral Savvy Cook was a good guy and a friend of mine, and I had Tom Handy who was a wonderful guy. And anytime I would get in trouble with the Army I would just go right to Tom. He knew the Old Man was waiting for me to get the dope and he would ease the way for me.

Q: Handy is in Washington now, isn't he?

O'D: Yes.

Q: Is he in good shape?

O'D: I don't know. He's getting a little old. But he was a fine looking man and a great guy. And our own trouble was in the AF, because we were merging, telling them how we could win the war by ourselves out there, which we could, once we were given the bases,and just as we could have won the war out here in Vietnam. We don't seem to learn anything in this country. But that's another story, indeed. But my relationship was one, well, I know he liked me because when he retired, I got a DSM for my work with him. And he asked Vandenberg to permit him to give it to me. He wanted to give a private party. So he

invited me out to his home in Sonoma, and he threw a party for all the local newspaper editors and the bankers, and champagne and Bee was just lovely. We had a hell of a time. A couple of other fellows up there helped him. He gave me a damn nice citation for my loyalty and my work with him. And I did, I would just try to get him the information, I didn't take any notes or anything personal at all. And I tried to get him the best information that I could on any given subject, and I got away with a lot, because I was kind of a snot nosed type.

L: I think, let me try this out. You know, you begin to draw conclusions. I would expect that the fact that you had been through the wringer in the Philippines and Java, had a positive effect on your relationship in the beginning because, and I think this is probably a result of his not getting into combat at any time, he was always very interested in people who had firsthand, who had been shot at.

O'D: He liked the boys that were in the combat business. He liked Freddie Dean because of his reputation down in Africa. He liked all the younger fellows that were in combat, and he showed a great preference for them.

L: He also tried to be sure that people were not stuck in Washington for the whole war as he was in WW I.

Q: Did he ever show sensitivity or self-consciousness about the fact that he himself was never under fire?

O'D: No, nobody expected it at that time.

Q: In WW I, he had tried to get over, and he finally did get over, and the war seemed to end the day before he got there. And he always had--to use the current expression--a kind of hangup, about that thing, and this is probably why he was very lenient, comparatively

lenient, with guys who said that they wanted to get out of Washington, and get over--in your case, and in Jake Smart's case, in Norstad's case...

O'D: He shipped us right out: "Ever since I brought you in, you've been wanting to get out, so now you are out. We'll give you a star. Let's see you get going.

Q: Just like that? You took Jake Smart's place when you came into Arnold'd office?

O'D: Yes, Jake went with him on the trip over there, when I first saw him. He was there. Pearre Cabell had it.

Q: Jake came in for Pearre?

O'D: Jake came after Cabell for a short time, and I came in for Jake, and then Fred Dean came in for me.

Q: I want to ask you about Europe. You sent a memo to Arnold, dated June 12, 1943 about the safe delivery of bomgs into the hands of the wolves. I think you were talking about the lack of escorts in Europe. Do you remember this? What were the circumstances of that letter?

O'D: Yes, it was. I said that they were. That started at the Cairo Conference. Portal came in to see Hap--a very enchanging guy, well spoken, Chief of the Royal Air Force. He said: "Hap, old boy," he said, "I think that if you would change your training methods and not be burning all that gasoline up in California and Texas, making these pilots sustain the battle more with that petrol, we would be a lot better off. We are in short supply. We got three million barrels," or whatever the figure m ght be. And boy, old Hap blew. The hair went up on the back of his neck, and he says: "Portal,

I'll run my U.S. Army Air Corps the way I goddamn please. And I'm not taking any issue or any instructions from you. My men need the kind of training that I am furnishing them. And furthermore, you haven't got three million barrels of petrol, you've got 10 million, or some comparable figure in the United Kingdom." And Arnold was saying how much we were using up the petrol in unnecessary flights and sweeps. I told Atkingon (?) these guys were burning up all our gasoline and then getting thousands of millions doing nothing, making sweeps over the Channel where they never see anything. We were sending our boys in there like lambs to the slaughter, and we ought to have an escort at the point of bomb drop, or bombs away, and whatever we should do to get there, it seemed to me we should do, and not be burning up this gasoline in passing over in good formation. I think that was the point. Then, Hap took it up with the 8th AF. Who was the guy that ran that? Eddie House had it for a long time, and Monk Hunter.

Q: Newton Longfellow was the Bomb Commander....

O'D: I don't remember the whole bit, but I think they put Butch Griswold in there, and Butch tried to stretch out the missions, and get out and give the bombers a hand. But for a long time there, it was a bad concept and a wasteful one, and they were burning up gasoline. We couldn't get enough, and everything was fine. No losses no contacts.

L: Well, Monk Hunter eventually got fired.

Q: Yes, and they brought in Kepner. Got a long letter from Kepner the other day, a hand-written letter.

Q: I want to ask you about a key subject in our thinking. We call it "the Big Switch," and this occurred right after Cairo. Now,

I have seen some documents at the Cairo Conference where Portal seemed to be defending Eaker, and Arnold seemed to be advocating moving Eaker down in to the Mediterranean. Arnold, probably after Schweinfurt or Regensburg, had come to the conclusion, or was coming to the conclusion, that Eaker was no longer for the 8th AF, and he had made his decision to move Eaker out of there, and this took place right around Christmas of 1943. I believe you were on the job. Do you have any recollections of Arnold's thinking processes in that period?

O'D: Not with Eaker. I remember that he wanted--we had a couple of conferences out there.

Q: Did you accompany him, Labor Day, 1943, when he went out to the UK? He was there for a week.

O'D: No.

Q: Right after Schweinfurt-Regensburg.

O'D: No, the only time I was with him in Europe was at Cairo, we went to Iran and Cairo and up to Tehran.

Q: That was later. Wasn't the decision made there to bring Eisenhower in as OVERLORD chief?

O'D: Yes.

Q: This was the final decision that Marshall would not take the job, and Eisenhower would. Then Arnold made the decision that he was going to take Eaker out of there, and bring in Spaatz.

O'D: I think Spaatz was already there, wasn't he?

Q: Spaatz was in Africa. He was operating out of Africa.

O'D: But what was his job?

Q: He was commander of the AF under Eisenhower.

O'D: It wasn't a numbered air force?

Q: No, it was the North African Air Forces.

O'D: I mean he had a much bigger command.

Q: Right, but Arnold had made this decision to take Eaker out of there. Somebody has told me, compared it to moving cops in NY City. When they want to get the Captain out of a certain station house for any reason, they move 10 different police all over the place, so they disguised it.

O'D: I don't know about that, I know he was worried about who would replace Eisenhower. He wanted Spaatz.

Q: He also wanted Spaatz with Eisenhower to head a unified British and American Air Command.

O'D: He was very high on Tooey and that's why I think the Eaker business didn't make sense, because....

Q: Eaker wrote some letters to people. One letter he wrote, that I recall, was to Fechet. He was very close to Fechet, I guess he had ghosted some things for Fechet. And he said he felt like the man who started the season with the team and then he got to the World Series, and they took him out of the box, so he was quite unhappy.

L: Another question: Where would Spaatz have gone?

O'D: To Eisenhower's job. Let's see where was Ike before he went up to OVERLORD?

Q: He was commander in Africa. Of course, they had taken Sicily by this time; they had taken Italy. He was in the middle of Italy at this time.

O'D: We were there then; we were in Sicily and Italy.

Q: Of course, we talked to Eaker, and Eaker said that he knew that there was a change in the wind, because when Eisenhower was given the OVERLORD job, his air man was Spaatz. And Eaker expected that Spaatz would be given the top air job for OVERLORD. But my thought is:

why didn't Eaker stay on? He could have commanded the strategic bombers under the overall command, instead of Doolittle.

O'D: I don't know. I couldn't help you on that one. I know he wanted, I heard him say several times, I'd like to see Eaker take Eisenhower's job. He wanted an air man over there.

L: Eaker or Spaatz?

O'D: Spaatz. They felt that it was an air war and it was going to wind up an air war no matter what they talked about--invasions and everything else. They couldn't get any where without airpower, and I don't know what happened on that.

Q: Did you get involved in this racial problem that they had at Selfridge Field in 1944?

O'D: No.

Q: Monk Hunter had come back. He was the wrong man to give that job to.

O'D: No, I was long gone from Selfridge. I was there from '30 to '37, I remember.

Q: Do you remember the thing they had in '44 at Selfridge?

O'D: Somebody shot some guy.

Q: They built two officers' clubs, and the Negroes wouldn't go to the one that was designated for them. The whites wouldn't let them in their officer's club. Monk Hunter, who was the 1st AF Commander--Selfridge was under him--of couse he is from Savannah, and the thing got quite bitter, and Arnold got into it. You didn't get into that?

O'D: No, I'm not familiar with that, in '44 I was long gone.

Q: I wanted to ask you about, I have a note here about a big flap over aircraft production in 1943. You advised Arnold to ease off

on production and accept the War Production Board figure of 95,000 planes for 1944. Arnold was pushing for a larger figure and Lovett was telling him to accept a lesser figure, that he ought to be more practical about it, he was asking for 131,000 planes. This was that AWPD-42. Do you remember that production plan, there was a big hassle over it.

O'D: Well, roughly, I'm not too familiar with that. I remember that Lovett, I thought, at my tender age at that time, was a wonderful influence on Hap. I guess Lovett was the best Secretary. That was the best relationship between a military commander and civilian control--civilian secretaryship I've seen since I've been in the business. And he'd let him alone. He gave him free wheeling rights. And on Sunday mornings--they'd see each other during the week once in a while, but not very often. Hap would be working with the military commanders, and the various training commands. Lovett would come down at 9:00 Sunday morning, come in that little banker's tie of his, looking like he was just turned out of a bandbox. He'd sit down and they would chat. Anything that Lovett would suggest that he do, he'd do. He had that much confidence in him. And Lovett, on the other hand, was a real loyal friend and a strong supporter. He would caution him on things, and when he would caution him, boy that was it. There was no argument.

Q: This kind of fits into a similar description of Lovett as the balance wheel, to sort of keep Arnold from some impulsive actions.

O'D: I figure it was more than a balance wheel, he exercised correctly, his job of supervision of civilian supremacy and civilian control. He did it in a way that was not only accepted, but sought

after. You see, Hap would never do anything without going to Lovett and talking about it--any big thing. He'd seek his counsel and we have had other extremes, the other way, where the Secretary and the Chief wouldn't talk to each other.

L: In the post-war period?

O'D: That's right. Wouldn't talk to each other.

L: Were there any specific things, an incident or two, that really stuck out in your mind in the field and in your working closely with Arnold that might serve as a key to his character, or that showed he was the right guy, in the right place, at the right time?

O'D: I would say, of those that I met, and I knew them all at his level. I don't think there was any one who could hold a candle to Hap at that time. He grew up fast, too. You know, he got rubbing against that problem, and a lot of it rubbed off on him. Some people call that experience. And he got experience as association as he grew in a job, and he grabbed it fast. And I don't know what his relationships with people in the field, I didn't see too much of. I dealt mainly with the JCS and the CSC, and was trying to get the proper information out of here for the White House. But having been in the field most of my life, myself, I really liked this guy. I mean I admired him greatly, and the way he went about his work. Of course, he was tough on you. He expected you to work your backside off, and you did--everybody did. But there was a war on, too, and why shouldn't you be working your tail off?

Q: We've been told about this propensity he had to grab people in the hall, and to give them jobs sometimes alien to their expertise. Is this true?

O'D: Well the classic story is where the fellow--Arnold is supposed to have told him to go down and go to England, go back to England get this straightened up, and the fellow is said to have told him he was working at Chanute Field. Whereupon Arnold's reply: "Don't give me that stuff." It's just not true. He probably did something like that one time. He got a couple of fellows confused in the hall. He would buttonhole a guy in the hall. He was preoccupied going up there, and he would grab the first guy that he saw that he thought knew something about it.

L: Did he ever give two or three people the same assignment, to see how they'd do?

O'D: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Didn't he go to more than one source for typical information? He had somebody getting data on how many bombs we dropped, and then he'd go some place else...?

O: He was very dissatisfied with his statistical data. "Goddam it, how many airplanes do I have in this outfit?" The answer: "Well, we think so and so." Arnold would say: "Don't give me your 'think.' Where are they? Stop everything! Let's have a count! Can't you do that? Hungry Gates would go up there and tell him how many airplanes he had, and sometimes he wasn't within 50,000. That's an exaggeration, but I mean, he was way the hell off. The same thing with people, and the statistical picture. Things were moving too fast, casualties and transfers. They'd lose airplanes and they didn't know where the hell they were.

Q: Did he ever go around the back door, ask you for something, and then go to somebody else to see how the info you got compared to the info somebody else got?

O'D: He probably did, because he was really perplexed and upset by the inaccuracy of the data that he received. He would probably go to different sources and somebody would ask him--this was a reaction to something they'd want to know in the White House--"What the hell are you doing; what have you got here, and what have you got there"--pilot training and all the rest of this stuff. And he had a tough time getting that kind of dope because it wasn't forthcoming. I mean, people couldn't get it that fast.

Q: Did he love visual aid presentations, charts, fancy colors?

O'D: No, he wasn't much of a guy to be patient, I remember one guy came in to give the weather presentation, what they should do about the weather service, Hopkins, I guess it was. And he had the lecture all ready. And Hopkins was one of those guys that runs scared, and if you ever run scared of Hap, he would walk all over you. He was like LeMay that way, too. Hopkins had this big line of books all along there. And Arnold said: "What the hell is that?" Hopkins said: "This is the backup for my presentation." Arnold swept them off the table and stomped out of the room.

Q: You know, talking about the weather--there was one guy he really loved. Well, there were many he loved. But one fellow he had high respect for was this Irving Krick.

O'D: Yes, the weather guy.

Q: And his like for this guy caused several guys to quit or be fired. Specifically, Don Yates, Don Zimmerman and Oscar Senter. Some guys at different times, who were giving Arnold weather reports, and then Arnoldwas going around the back door to get weather reports from Irving Krick. Is this a fair analysis?

O'D: I don't know, I don't know where he could be looking for weather reports. He had great difficulty in getting an accurate report from overseas on battle results, and that was understandable because people would report they shot down so many, and the damage. And they saw the bombs go off right on the button, and then, when the smoke clears, and they get reconnaissance in there and they find out it was nothing. And with these 500# bombs, you are not going to do the damage you think you are doing in a lot of those places. So he would get one report that the AF in the field report, complete obliteration of a key target. And they would find out a week later, that not only was it not oblitereated, but in some cases, it wasn't even hit. And again, that's that altitude bombing, under attack, and trying to do it in mass formation and compact attack, and the rest of the thing. Unfortunately, I think it hurt the AF a lot. A lot of claims were made which made us look like a lot of idiots, claiming things that we shouldn't have claimed. But that was in reaction again to the demand that you have information. So the guy says, if he demands information, we will give him the best of what we think, and of course, you are always thinking on the optimistic side that you creamed them.

L: What was this time when he was complaining about the exaggerations of the 8th AF?

O'D: That's what I'm talking about, the damage from the 8th AF.

Q: Damage, and also the fighter score, how many German planes they shot down. Wasn't this a source of contention between him and Under Secretary Patterson? You mention the empathy between him and Lovett. This did not exist, I think, between him and Patterson.

O'D: Patterson wasn't in a comparable position.

Q: He was more of a lawyer type.

O'D: Let's see, when Patterson was there.

Q: Stimson had the top job and Patterson was Under Secretary, and then you had McCloy.

O'D: Lovett was for Air.

Q: But Patterson was on top of Lovett as Under Secretary, but there was friction between Arnold and Patterson on several occasions. Did you know about that?

O'D: No, I wasn't cognizant of that. Of course, Patterson, I had a great regard for, too. He was very cryptic and very straightforward. He said exactly what he had on his mind. He used to fight Symington, and he didn't get along at all.

Q: Patterson didn't like the way Arnold made speeches for example. He thought that Arnold was accepting a lot of data that was coming in from the 8th AF. This was an issue, this business of exaggeration.

O'D: That had Hap mad, had him angry, and with good reason. But the only reason the reports were wrong was, No. 1, they didn't have the means of evaluation quickly, and there was a demand in the White House and all the way down, from DOD and everybody else to get those right now. They wanted an accurate report, so they got the stuff in, and it was not accurate. And in those days, we didn't have the means of collecting the sort of thing. It was a long drawn out job, and meanwhile you were supposed to be fighting a war every day. Questions like: "How many crews have I got." They get shot down, they are tired; they get sent home, crack up. It was a rough time, and I think Hap had as good a grip as anybody did on understanding his field

commanders on this thing, and letting them go to the maximum that he was permitted to let them go. It was only on things where he got in a jam, because he didn't have the information. It made him look like a dope where he didn't know what his AF was doing, where the Army and Navy could tell exactly how many cruisers and submarines they had. They were cruising around out there--three dimensional, right, left, and down.

L: He knew this was the only way he could play with the stuff and still be around. He's kind of an anomaly in that respect, having graduated in 1970, a long time before.

O'D: You see, that was it. He was so much older than all of us, he was 20 years older than I was. And consequently, it is no use trying to analyze him or trying to figure out his character. I might have missed a lot of things that went on there, and I don't know much about what went on in the personal politics and with the group that he grew up with--his old classmates and all that kind of stuff. That goes on in any business, little jealousies and rivalries, and cliques. It would be a great thing if we could eliminate them throughout the military. As a matter of fact, the military does a hell of a sight better than most businesses, and I got to know a little about business since I've been out, too.

Q: Toward the end of the war, when Arnold got very close to von Karman, he talked about R&D and guided missiles, and he gave one talk, I know. In the Pentagon, he gave a pep talk to the Air Staff and said there would be a place for non-rated officers in the postwar air force, and that one's ability to rise to the hierarchy would not depend on whether you had wings or not. Of course, this is the argument he used on his own sons. He tried to get Bozo McKee--a living example of a man who rose to the top without wings--to argue

Bruce and his other son, Hank, into coming in the AF. Did you ever hear him talk about the future of the AF?

O'D: Oh yes, a lot of times. He thought a lot about it, he brooded a lot about it. He was convinced that we had the solution to keeping America strong, and he believed in a strong America. He thought that there was no other way to come out of this mess in years to come, because we were going to have trouble with the Russians and trouble with others. We didn't know where we stood in Europe. Airpower was truly the way to do it, and of course, it is. We deliberately threw away what we had, which is what he feared. We put our dependence on a third rate way of fighting and that's for the infantry--the Marines, with all due respect--to them--not worth a good goddamn. Did you ever see a successful vertical development with a helicopter, winning a decisive battle? Hell no, you haven't, because there has never been one. And so we make noises and expend ammunition and go through all this stuff. Hap had a feeling for that. He thought the Army would rise again with Eisenhower riding high, and all the rest. He thought that airpower might get lost--which indeed, it damned near has.

Q: He was a great advocate of airborne operations?

O'D: Oh yes, he went along, he played ball, if the Army wanted it, he went along. He said: "Sure I can give you the transports, I'll do this and that."

Q: No, I mean, based on my reading, he did more, than go along with it. He was a strong advocate of it. In fact, he tried to push it on Eisenhower. Eisenhower was dubious about paratroop operations, and Arnold tried to sell this at Normandy, to a greater extent, and also the DRAGOON.

O'D: How much effort did he put on trying to sell it?

Q: He put some effort into it.

O'D: I think he was always for anything that used airplanes.

Q: He was great on gliders; for example, he pushed gliders. This idea of airborne operations, enveloping the enemy, he pushed that. He got this guy Dupont--Laux--he was a hotshot on the glider business. So he really pushed this R&D thing.

O'D: I think he got a kick out of it. He liked to think of himself as imaginative. He was always looking for ideas. That's why he had the Advisory Council, why he had people to do his thinking for him. But you know darn well, if you did his thinking for him, that didn't mean he was going to buy it. But he liked to play with that stuff. He liked to go far out, he liked the idea of using those gliders over in Burma--Johnny Alison and those guys. But I think this was a kind of smoke screen to keep the pressure on airpower and to get a strong unified air force--a separate air force--get our own Academy; get our own uniform, get all these things, he wanted to break away from the Army and Navy,and he had a hell of a fight. Big people in the Army didn't like any part of us. Thought we were fresh upstarts, snotnoses, didn't know anything.

L: Were there any particular opponents? You know Marshall was understanding about it. But what Army people did he have head-on confrontations with?

O'D: I don't know of anybody with whome he had head-on confrontations. But I can tell you that an awful lot of people--I don't want to mention names, but some of my friends are still around. They had nothing but contempt for the Air Force, and they tried to downgrade it at every turn. And I'm talking big guys who never understood it.

Maxwell Taylor is one. He was a paratrooper, so he thought he knew all about airpower. He didn't know from nothing.

L: Gavin?

O'D: Gavin, too. Paul Harkins, the whole gang. They got to be the new separate brilliant flying corps.

L: Gavin, one of my theories about him--he washed out of flying school, and he never got over it. But I was thinking more of someone like Lesley McNair.

O'D: McNair, I don't know whether or not he fits.

Q: He was always complaining that he was not getting enough air support when he was head of the AGF. You know, when they set up the AAF and the AGF and the ASF. McNair was head of the AGF and he was complaining about the close air support, and it is some kind of irony that he got such close support it killed him.

Q: You know, on this business, you mention about Arnold being a gadgeteer and he liked to fool with these concepts. I think you are absolutely right on that. On guided missiles for example, he had a little role in the Kettering "Bug" of WW I. When he was at the Normandy Beach head, three days after the invasion--they stayed there for about a week. A couple of days after he arrived, the Germans started firing the V-1 and everybody was terribly frightened. Arnold was almost joyful--in the sense that he had them put together one of these V-1s, and he had it shipped over, and of course, it became the JB-2. Arnold was going to produce 5,000 a month of those things, and obliterate Germany. He was going to do this, and he had his heart attack. And when he had his heart attack Giles wasn't strong enough to carry this program, and the Army killed it, but he was going to obliterate the Germans and the Japs with JB-2s.

O'D: Well, he did, he wanted to get a reputation for a sound operator, and I think he selected sound men, like LeMay. LeMay is a sound SOB--let me tell you. He had his ups and downs. He scowls and chews in his cigar, but he is a fine man and a good leader. And Hap recognized that, he is responsible for it, and he did a good job. He selected a lot of his commanders, and he had a feel for it, which kind of amazed me, because I didn't think he had the personnel touch, but he did. Always in the back of his craw, I know that he had this --"what's going to happen in the future?" "How do we get an Academy?" I've been interested in that Academy since it was a glint in his eye, and it was just that. He got it rolling andhe got it rolling right, and, of course, we had a lot of help along the line.

Q: Norstad told us that Arnold was very disappointed in Norstad's role in the unification. Arnold felt when the bill came out--of course you were in a position here, right in the middle of it--that the bill was much less than the AF had hoped for. Arnold, at least in Norstad's conception, blamed Norstad for our getting less than the whole leaf. Do you remember any of that?

O'D: Oh, there was a lot of crap that went on, I don't. I think Larry was a good negotiator and he got up there by being a good negotiator. Eisenhower got up there by being a good negotiator. It's all right to negotiate, but sometimes, we have to draw the line on it, too. And Hap was more of a line drawer, than he was a negotiator.

L: Did he ever--I mean in your presence, or to your knowledge-- ever let down and say, "the hell with it."?

O'D: No--give up the ghost?--No! Hell no, he was for more and more--an insatiable desire to build up this damn air force. I think

he truly believed that it was the saving grace of this country--the military. It had changed just as it did from bows and arrows and all the way. And this was the new arm; it was flexible. He liked the flexibility aspect of it, even as they developed other things to get away from it.

Q: Was it almost a religion with him?

O'D: I don't know, you know he didn't do anything else. He had no hobbies to my knowledge. I don't think he was a hunter.

Q: He talked about fishing. Once a year he'd go out.

O'D: A worm here and there. The boys all tried to get him interested up around Pennsylvania, but he was no ardent fisherman or hunter. He liked the athletics. He liked to go to football games.

L: Those great logistics before the war. His planning with friends to get to the Army-Navy games was sort of like war plans.

Q: Complex arrangements to rendezvous. Somebody would come up from Philly--somebody from elsewhere.

O'D: Yes, that's right. The Columbia game one time. Davis and Blanchard were playing. During the war years, they really went to town. And I took him later into Toots Shor's place. Old Toots never got over there. I came in with a five-star general. We popped right in the corner, and had a couple of drinks and a nice dinner, and went on home.

Q: He always stayed at the Astor Hotel.

O'D: "Astor Barracks," we all did in those days. The Astor was the headquarters for West Point. The Commodore was the one for the Navy.

Q: Did you know about his relationship with Lindbergh?

O'D: No, I really didn't. I knew they knew each other, but I don't know much about that at all. I know Lindbergh, but not well, and I didn't know him with Hap.

Q: How about de Seversky?

O'D: I think, as my memory goes, Seversky and he were kind of eye to eye, and Sasha, he's been pitching for a long time.

Q: Didn't he sort of serve the gadfly at one time?

O'D: Yes, he sent him out, he had a pass to go anywhere he wanted--kind of be a general inspector, that type of thing.

Q: He came out with these articles, he was writing. He had a column and then he had this movie, a Disney movie. And he was pushing for airpower, and he might have gotten a little ahead of Arnold, and it might have irritated Arnold. Was there any period of friction between the two?

L: I think he got ahead of him for the political climate of the time, and Arnold felt that he was going too far, too fast and he talked too much about what he wanted, and he couldn't get it.

Q: How about Drew Pearson?

O'D: You want my opinion?

Q: I've done a lot of research on Drew Pearson over the Arnold years--six years of Drew Pearson, and I could write an article about that alone. Drew Pearson seemed to have certain pet hates and certain likes, and there were some people who could do no wrong and some people who could do no right, Arnold was one of those who could do no right. Do you remember this, and if so, why?

O'D: I don't remember that, I remember, of course, he would raise hell about Meyers. He blamed Arnold; gave Arnold a lot of bad press on that I recall.

Q: He gave Arnold bad press on the marriage between Bruce and Barbara Douglas. He gave bad press on the leakproof tanks; and he blamed Arnold for this Sicily, we had like 100 planes shot down, by our own people. He blamed Arnold for parachutes--we didn't have safety parachutes--several other things. But he never said a good word about Arnold, if he had to say anything good about the AF--he would just say AF, or the AAF, The Air Corps, he would call it, but never praised Arnold.

O'D: The things that I know about, where I was involved with Pearson, he turned out to be 90% inaccurate. Just about 90% inaccurate, he would pick one little thing and he would build it up and assume all the rest would be very careful not to say anything that he could be sued on for libel.

Q: And he would keep hitting at it for weeks.

O'D: Every time I hear of his name, you like to think well of the dead. But to hell with him, because I didn't like the guy, I think he was a crook.

O'Donnell

INTERVIEW OF GEN EMMETT O'DONNELL
AIR FORCE ACADEMY
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
DECEMBER 2, 1967

(Interviewed by members of the History Dept, AFA)
(Re-transcription)

I must confess as I told Col Hurley, that I didn't have a chance to do any homework, and perhaps it is better that I didn't. No. 1, I have a lot of papers somewhere up in my attic, and I've never been through them. Maybe it is just as well that I burn them. Certain things stick out in your mind, and I suppose that is the purpose, to try to get recollections, and I might be inaccurate on times, names and places, but that just comes with age. Gen Twining said the other day. He said: "How are you feeling now that you are fully retired?" He quit his business too, and he said: "I'll tell you the truth, he said, 'I've spent half of my time peeing and the other half trying to remember names."

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O'D: And this is the thing we are into, we get these machines, and you get out of a computer what you put into it. They pile in a lot of improper assumptions and they go very logically indeed, a, b, c, the most logical argument to an improper conclusion. Or they take the conclusion that they want and break it up to justify the assumption. Like Gen MacArthur used to do every once in a while, he'd do the thing, then call in his staff and say: "Justify that decision in a logical way and estimate back to the situation."

(Q: During WWII you were on Gen Arnold's Advisory Committee. you had kind of a close inside view for a while. Just what was Gen Arnold's attitude toward the Soviet Union, and that which you observed in the War Dept or on the Air Staff?

O'D: Well, at that time, you know, it was the policy to, the Russians were our great ally. We'd do everything we could to help them. For instance, we fly our aircraft from Great Falls, up to Alaska, and we were not allowed to go into the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet pilots came down to Great Falls to to into the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet pilots came down to Great Falls to take their equipment. The same thing was true with our trucks. General Motors had a big plant in Southern Abrabia. We'd assemble the trucks, and they'd send these Russian drivers down. Our drivers weren't allowed to go anywhere near the Soviet border. And the airplanes, just to answer your question, riled Hap - he didn't like that at all. And this is one of our really great men, Hap Arnold. His vision, and his toughness and his practical astuteness was rarely matched. And he was the junior bird man. He said to me one time, he said how the hell long do I have to live (and still remain) the kid around here. The Joint Chiefs, they were just a bunch of upstarts, and he was permitted to sit on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he was not (accepted). Truly, it was Army and Navy. But he didn't like that at all, and he had serious concern about what this would mean in the future. And Mr. Roosevelt, on the other hand, thought that he could manipulate Stalin, FDR really figured that he was a lot smarter. Maybe he was but it didn't show up very well in the results. Because he let those Chinese Commies come in and

take over the equipment that the Chinese surrendered you know, that we supplied them. And then they gave up Sakhalin Islands, and they did all sorts of things, which turned out to be very, very bad, with long reaching bad effect. But Arnold had a sense about this thing, I don't know where he got it. He was just a natural born visionary. He was tough minded. He was called Hap, not because he was smiling, I found that out very quickly, I thought he was laughing.

(Q: When you were on his staff, did you get a chance to go to any of these conferences)?

O'D: When the war started, I had command of a squadron, 14th Squadron, we made the first trip across the Western Pacific, land based planes, but that's another story. But we got out there, and at Clark Field, Clark Field was just about to fall apart. We were just about to give Clark Field back to the Philippines, and we were about to give the Philippines back to the Filipinos, when all of a sudden it looked like it might be starting out there. By a stroke of a pen, we pushed the front lines from Hawaii out to the Philippines. So we would got out there and land at this place, we got, not even a runway, a grass field, Clark Field, couple of broken down hangars, and I guess that hadn't spent a dime on them for 2 years, because they wanted to save money, and they said: "Well, they will fall down about the time we give them to the Philippines, then they will have to build them theirselves, the only trouble is that hadn't reckoned with the bahouka bug. The bahouka bug is a sort of termite, a big termite, and he had those hangars falling apart then.

We had no radar, except a last-minute installed thing at Iba. We didn't have enough aircraft. The whole thing was very badly conceived, and a very badly executed campaign, and I firmly believe that if we had 8 groups stationed there, and built up the field, we could have stopped the Japanese fleet from coming down. We could control the Hong Kong-Japanese line, that is after-the-fact, too. At any rate, we got run out of there, through Bataan, and I had command of the outfit at Clark, and we finally withdrew in Bataan, and got a boat out of Bataan later on down to Mindanao and Java. We wound up in India. I became the Operations Officer of an AF that didn't exist, the 10th AF. We had nothing to do, no equipment. We were living in an Imperial hotel. Finally things started building up, and we had a bit of liaison with the British and the Chinese and the Burmese.

Gen Arnold came out to visit us [in the Pacific]. I never met him. He was Major Arnold. He was with the Bombardment gang, and out on the West Coast when I was up at Selfridge. I'd never known him. So when he came out to talk to us, and visit us, it was a little after Christmas, as I recall, 1943. He said he'd like to cut us in on the plans for Asia. There was going to be a British invasion of Rangoon, of Burma, in May, so this was before Christmas. In May, the following year, just before the monsoon, there was going to be an invasion. And he went on talking about it, and he said: "Can I answer any question?" And I said: "I haven't got a question, sir, but I'd like to make a statement." And I said: "I don't think the British are going to invade Burma in May." And he said: "What's your name?" And I gulped a time or two, and I said, "I'm Colonel O'Donnell, sir." And he said: "Well it might interest you, O'Donnell, to know that

I belong to an outfit called the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we meet every Tuesday. And I also belong to an outfit called the Combined Chiefs of Staff and we meet every Thursday. That's the American Joint Chiefs and the British Joint Chiefs, Combined." Boy, I could see that hair going up his neck. And he said: "We have determined that there will be an invasion of Burma in May. Where do you get your information?" And I said: "Well, I've been out here with the British and I've seen around Bombay, Calcutta, and up around Assam, and I don't think these people are prepared to fight, and I don't think they will." And he just looked at me, and he didn't say anything else. Jake Smart was his aide, and Jake was on this trip with him, Jake had the Advisory Council at that time, so going back, Smart told me later on, he said, the ols man said: "Who is that O'Donnell?" And he said: "Well, he is kind of a screwball, I think he's got the Asian "rudd", something like that. He's been out there too long, and he's a former football player." You know, this was, I guess, in February, I got orders to report to Washington, to be Chief of the Advisory Council, to Hap Arnold. And I am one of the great unwashed. I'd never been to a service school, except 90 days in the Tactical School. I'd never been near a staff. In that capacity, I went to every Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, every Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, and I went with him to Montreal to the conference, to Cairo. I was the only AF officer with him at Tehran. And don't get me wrong. The name of the Advisory Council was ill-chosen, I believe. My function was to get the agenda of each meeting, and to be sure that Gen Arnold had the

latest dope that we had in the Air Staff, or elsewhere, for him to base his replies or his discussions. And we had a godd little staff in there. I guess we hurt some people's feelings a couple of times. They thought we were trying to run the war. But I was assiduous in making sure that I didn't put my own feelings into this kind of thing and we served him. I was one pace to the right and rear with his book. It was a mighty interesting experience and I wouldn't trade it for anything, and I got to see an awful lot of big people. I saw Hap go in action, and he was toughie. We got down to the Cairo conference, for instance, and Air Marshal Portal, of the RAF, was a very convincing talker and quite a guy. Portal was a fighter pilot, highly educated, and every warm. He said: "Hap, old boy, I think it would be a great idea if you would reduce your training time in the US in order to save petrol, because we are running short here, we only have - I forget the term - 5 million barrels, or 3 million barrels." And Hap started bristling. Right away Portal said the wrong thing. He said: "Portal, I run my air force the way I want it run, and I know they need the kind of training that I give them, and as a matter of fact, you haven't got 3 million barrels of petrol in England, the United Kingdom, you've got 10 million." And that ended that.

(Q: About the shuttle bombing to Russia and also the question of making available to the US bases in Siberia)

O'D: No, I think what they wanted was a shuttle base and they established it. They had a couple of shuttle runs up there. And I think that Hap's interest was in trying to find out something about them. Just get in, get a foot hold in there a

little bit, and maybe also to use it as good tactical means of dropping a load, and then continuing on to a safe haven without having to go back through all that flak. But I don't know too much about that. I didn't serve very much in the European theater, very little. Never served at all, but with Gen Arnold, going with him on trips.

(Q: What was your impression of the B-29 back in '44)?

O'D: Well, it was a new weapon, and a great weapon. All of our weapons, it wasn't built in a day. After I had been on that Advisory Council, Gen Arnold called me in one day and said: "Ever since I've had you here, you've been trying to get out. So now you are out. I'm putting a star on your shoulder, and you go out and run those B-29s out of Kansas. I'm going to send you out to the Marianas." And he said: "I want some performance. And I want you to keep me personally posted on what your opinion is of these airplanes, as you train." We went out in 6 months, we had guys jumping all over Nebraska, Kansas. I said: "Boy, what a job this has been." We had trouble. Our engines were catching on fire - hot spots and they couldn't get the cadant flow. We had to have several spots in the engine that would heat up and the whole wiring system would burn out and catch fire. A lot of people were hitting the silk. I ran a mission from Salina, Kansas, with all of our 4 wings involved, down to Havana and back, and that did it. Boy, we had them all over the map.

(Q: I was on that trip....)

O'D: Fortuitous thing, because the old man called me in and said: "What the hell is the matter with that airplane", and I said

"we've got bad engines on them." And he said: "What do you mean, bad engines?" And I said: "they catch on fire." He grabbed the phone, called out to Wright Field, got old man Knudsen, and he said: "I want you in here tonight, and he got Barney Giles and Meyers, the fellow that got in trouble. He was in the materiel business, and he got them on the line, and he said: "You stay here till tomorrow." Next morning he said, "Col O'Donnelll is scheduled to go to the Marianas in November," and this was September, I believe. Ane he said: "You people have given me a good airplane with a cellophane engine." He said: "Now, goddamn it, I want that engine fixed before they go out there and the modifications made, and that's a top priority job, and I don't want any aspririn answers either. I want it fixed." So they went to work and they found out the trouble was the baffle. They didn't have baffling to put the cool air over these hot spots. They were blanked out from cool air. So they fixed it up, and from then on, we were in business. But it took something like that to develop it, and once it got going, as you know, it was a tremendous weapon, at that time. Ten ton payload we had. Twenty thousand pounds.

(Q: You were at Clark Field when the Japanese attacked. Was there warning given to the people on the line. A difference between MacArthur and Brereton?)

O'D: We knew we were going to war. I had written my wife a letter which se still has. It said: "We will be at war before Christmas." You could feel it; it was in the air, you knew damn well, just reading the radios, and reading what little information we got down at Manila, and I think everybody knew that it was coming, they didn't know it was going to hit. But it didn't

make any difference when it hit, because if we weren't knocked out the first day, on the line, we would have been knocked out the second day, because there was no place to go except in the air. And you had to land for fuel. And the Japanese overran us, they had complete air superiority. Caught everything on the ground, the fighters. The fighters scrambled off, and they didn't have many fighters there in the first place. We only had 35 B-17s. I had half of them at Mindanao the day of the strike. We were so sure that it was coming that we dispersed the force. I had 16 of them down in Del Monte, and they hit up at Clark. And then we went up to Del Monte the next day, then back into Clark at night, in order to load up and try to get out, and make some attacks on the Navy which were absurd. We had no information; nointelligence; no radar. Damn poor communications, none between Mindanao and Clark. The whole thing was wiped out. There's another thing which has always stayed in the back of my craw. I saw the Americans get creamed. Here we were the first nation in the world on paper, and here, little Japanese, a fourth rate ration, was surging down through Malaya with their tails over their shoulders, and hitting us, and knocking us out and making us fight a war for 4 years which should have been over within a year, had we been at all prepared. We let our defenses completely down, thinking that the great oceans would protect us, etc., etc. And I saw American troops who had been out there too long, in the sunshine, who ran with the first bomb explosion into the hills. Just ran in there, living on bananas for a while, and came back only when they couldn't subsist. We didn't have

time to court martial. I went back there and I took command of Clark, until we were run out. And I and Mo Daley, abandoned Clark, we got the orders from Manila, on Christmas Eve. We stayed over till the next morning, and we took every way we could to send people down to Bataan, and I was out in a banana patch where we had our headquarters, and we got this field phone. We only had about 1,000 taps between me and Manila. You could barely hear anything on it, and the caller said that his headquarters is closing - Manila, and preceding to Australia. "You go to Bataan." I said: "Okay." And I took a pencil and paper, and I thought well, no sense in arguing these things over the phone, I'm going to prepare my questions: 1. "Where in Bataan?" This is no fooling, we had only been there 3 months, and we had nothing to do. We weren't even in the so-called Orange plan. You know, the great plan for the defense of, withdrawal into Bataan. The Air Force wasn't even considered. 2. "Where are the Japs?" 3. "Should I go immediately or wait for darkness?" I thought that was enough questions so I took about 15 minutes to work ot these questions, so I - no answer. They'd hit the track, and had just called us as a last minute thought. We got a bunch of guys up there; we ought to tell them what to do. So we piled them out that night on every thing, on trucks, we had a railroad spur up there, we loaded all the ammunition, I told the boys to go to the PX and the commissary and take all the food they could get, and get all the ammunition we could get, and pile them on those cars and take them with us. We had a National Guard outfit from New Mexico that arrived around that time. They had no night training, and it was blackout driving. They went down at

night, with a lot of our boys piled on them, and Daley and I and a guy named Neery, classmate of mine at West Point who was our Ordnance Officer. We stayed the night and drove down in a jeep the next morning after blowing up our ammunition dump and our fuel dump. Neery, that was his kick in the war. The poor guy got killed later on in Bataan, but he rigged up a pretty good system there, and he got out there with that bicycle tire, and that was his war, blowing up everything in sight. We drove down to Bataan and here were all these trucks. I don't believe that 10% of them made it. They overturned off the road. Very narrow road and pitch dark, and they weren't allowed to use lights. They were supposed to have a red light and go bumper to bumper, one guy would go over the other guy. So it was a pretty, pretty sorrowful sight and pretty sad one, and one I'll always remember. We should never get ourselves in that position again.

(Q: About airpower vs invasion of Japan. Did he feel that Japan would have to be invaded in order to end the war in the Far East?)

O'D: No, we felt that the war could be won by airpower alone, not by airpower alone. I mean by the application of weapons by air, would terminate the war. This was a big argument at Cairo. Gen Marshall and my old friend with the campaign hat, Burt Stilwell, claimed that it was going to cost us a million casualties to take Japan - that they sell themselves dearly. You would have to go over the beach and run them out with a bayonet, and Hap didn't think so. Hap said: "That's not right. We can pummel them to death." And we did. Actually, there was no need for MacArthur to go in on the USS Missouri, he could have gotten in on the Staten Island Ferry. It was a pretty expensive desk, and he go no opposition

whatever. And of course, the dropping of bombs, the straw that broke the camel's back. And it's conjecture as to how long it would have gone, but they were licked, no question about it.

(Q: Did we have to drop the bomb?)

O'D: Well, that's backsight. I don't know. I would think not, because I think we could have run - but that was a political decision again. And these political decisions in military affairs can become very, very rough. And of course, the fact of the matter was that they are made, and you just live by them. They had $2 billion spent on the bomb, and they had to justify it, apparently.

(Q: Wasn't there some merit to the argument that the Germans had failed to succumb to bombing? Why should the Japanese?

O'D: Yes, but they were on an island. Their food supplies and their medicines everything was cut off. Germany had a pretty fair economy still.

(Q: The whole nation was attuned to Bushedo. They would give their life up for their country?

O'D: That's my opinion, I don't know. Could be that they wouldn't have to go over the beach, but there was no reason to. What if we went into Japan and kept hammering them, it wouldn't have cost us anything. We had the airplanes, we had the bombs, this was, had the crews. We could just keep hammering them to death. How much can you stand? I mean, we weren't even trying to get rid of them on land, didn't have to go in on land. Eventually, you give them a way to get out and save some face. I think, it could have been done.

(Q: Did you have contact with Gen Chennault?)

O'D: Oh yes, he was the Flying School Instructor when I went through Flying School, and I saw him in India and China a good many times. He is an old friend.

(Q: How did you evaluate him as an individual?)

O'D: Oh, he was a rare bird. He was a free thinker and a Chennault thinker. When he was talking, he said what he wanted to say. And when he was listening, he was deaf, and he wouldn't necessarily hear anything. If you were talking about something you wanted from him, he wouldn't hear a blessed thing, and he looked around and get that faraway look in those deep brown eyes. But if somebody whispered over in a corner, don't you think we ought to get a few P-51s up to Chennault?" "You're damned right; I want them right away." He had tremendous ability and he knew his men and he got the most out of his men. He was stern, the talk you hear about the lack of discipline up there, after reading these magazines, like Saga, and Man, all that kind of stuff. He kept control of all the people up there. He was very much concerned when his boys got in trouble. He wired me one time he had a young guy that had gotten in trouble, you know, contacted a terrible veneral disease up there and kept him away. He was fine young kid. Didn't know anything about anything. He came back a basket case and commited suicide when he got to the states. Came through from New Delhi. Old Claire was real upset about this. He tried to talk to these guys: "I'm not going to moralize with you. Just try to behave yourselves out here, because this is murder. But your time and your efforts on the war, and don't worry about this other business." You know, it affected him when some of his boys went sour.

(Q: How do you contrast General Stilwell with Chennault?)

O'D: Oh, he was a great soldier, and a real knothead. Boy, he had his mind made up and tough. He was one of the great advocates of going over the beaches. You know, sell themselves dearly, and we've got to go, dig them out with a bayonet. And he said: "I've had the experience of getting pushed through Burma," which he did. Referring to Japan, he said it was going to take a million casualties, and another year of war. I saw him in Guam, after the hostilities ceased, and he was just going through in a hurry, and I saw him down there at the airport. And I said: "Gen Joe, how about that million casualties, and the year delay in going over the beach." And he just looked at me and said: "Incredible."

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latest dope that we had in the Air Staff, or elsewhere, for him to base his replies or his discussions. And we had a good little staff in there. I guess we hurt some people's feelings a couple of times. They thought we were trying to run the war. But I was assiduous in making sure that I didn't put my own feelings into this kind of thing and we served him. I was one pace to the right and rear with his book. It was a mighty interesting experience and I wouldn't trade it for anything, and I got to see an awful lot of big people. I saw Hap go in action, and he was toughie. We got down to the Cairo conference, for instance, and Air Marshal Portal, of the RAF, was a very convincing talker and quite a guy. Portal was a fighter pilot, highly educated, and every warm. He said: "Hap, old boy, I think it would be a great idea if you would reduce your training time in the US in order to save petrol, because we are running short here, we only have - I forget the term - 5 million barrels, or 3 million barrels. And Hap started bristling. Right away Portal said the wrong thing. He said: "Portal, I run my air force the way I want it run, and I know they need the kind of training that I give them, and as a matter of fact, you haven't got 3 million barrels of petrol in England, the United Kingdom, you've got 10 million." And that ended that.

(Q: About the shuttle bombing to Russia and also the question of making available to the US bases in Siberia)

O'D: No, I think what they wanted was a shuttle base and they established it. They had a couple of shuttle runs up there. And I think that Hap's interest was in trying to find out something about them. Just get in, get a foot hold in there a

little bit, and maybe also to use it as good tactical means of dropping a load, and then continuing on to a safe haven without having to go back through all that flak. But I don't know too much about that. I didn't serve very much in the European theater, very little. Never served at all, but with Gen Arnold, going with him on trips.

(Q: What was your impression of the B-29 back in '44)?

O'D: Well, it was a new weapon, and a great weapon. All of our weapons, it wasn't built in a day. After I had been on that Advisory Council, Gen Arnold called me in one day and said: "Ever since I've had you here, you've been trying to get out. So now you are out. I'm putting a star on your shoulder, and you go out and run those B-29s out of Kansas. I'm going to send you out to the Marianas." And he said: "I want some performance. And I want you to keep me personally posted on what your opinion is of these airplanes, as you train." We went out in 6 months, we had guys jumping all over Nebraska, Kansas. I said: "Boy, what a job this has been." We had trouble. Our engines were catching on fire - hot spots and they couldn't get the cadant flow. We had to have several spots in the engine that would heat up and the whole wiring system would burn out and catch fire. A lot of people were hitting the silk. I ran a mission from Salina, Kansas, with all of our 4 wings involved, down to Havana and back, and that did it. Boy, we had them all over the map.

(Q: I was on that trip....)

O'D: Fortuitous thing, because the old man called me in and said: "What the hell is the matter with that airplane" and I said

"we've got bad engines on them." And he said: "What do you mean, bad engines?" And I said: "they catch on fire." He grabbed the phone, called out to Wright Field, got old man Knudsen, and he said: "I want you in here tonight, and he got Barney Giles and Meyers, the fellow that got in trouble. He was in the materiel business, and he got them on the line, and he said: "You stay here till tomorrow." Next morning he said, 'Col O'Donnelll is scheduled to go to the Marianas in November," and this was September, I believe. Ane he said: "You people have given me a good airplane with a cellophane engine." He said: "Now, goddamn it, I want that engine fixed before they go out there and the modifications made, and that's a top priority job, and I don't want any aspririn answers either. I want it fixed." So they went to work and they found out the trouble was the baffle. They didn't have baffling to put the cool air over these hot spots. They were blanked out from cool air. So they fixed it up, and from then on, we were in business. But it took something like that to develop it, and once it got going, as you know, it was a tremendous weapon, at that time. Ten ton payload we had. Twenty thousand pounds.

(Q: You were at Clark Field when the Japanese attacked. Was there warning given to the people on the line. A difference between MacArthur and Brereton?)

O'D: We knew we were going to war. I had written my wife a letter which se still has. It said: "We will be at war before Christmas." You could feel it; it was in the air, you knew damn well, just reading the radios, and reading what little information we got down at Manila, and I think everybody knew that it was coming, they didn't know it was going to hit. But it didn't

make any difference when it hit, because if we weren't knocked out the first day, on the line, we would have been knocked out the second day, because there was no place to go except in the air. And you had to land for fuel. And the Japanese overran us, they had complete air superiority. Caught everything on the ground, the fighters. The fighters scrambled off, and they didn't have many fighters there in the first place. We only had 35 B-17s. I had half of them at Mindanao the day of the strike. We were so sure that it was coming that we dispersed the force. I had 16 of them down in Del Monte, and they hit up at Clark. And then we went up to Del Monte the next day, then back into Clark at night, in order to load up and try to get out, and make some attacks on the Navy which were absurd. We had no information; nointelligence; no radar. Damn poor communications, none between Mindanao and Clark. The whole thing was wiped out. There's another thing which has always stayed in the back of my craw. I saw the Americans get creamed. Here we were the first nation in the world on paper, and here, little Japanese, a fourth rate ration, was surging down through Malaya with their tails over their shoulders, and hitting us, and knocking us out and making us fight a war for 4 years which should have been over within a year, had we been at all prepared. We let our defenses completely down, thinking that the great oceans would protect us, etc., etc. And I saw American troops who had been out there too long, in the sunshine, who ran with the first bomb explosion into the hills. Just ran in there, living on bananas for a while, and came back only when they couldn't subsist. We didn't have

time to court martial. I went back there and I took command of Clark, until we were run out. And I and Mo Daley, abandoned Clark, we got the orders from Manila, on Christmas Eve. We stayed over till the next morning, and we took every way we could to send people down to Bataan, and I was out in a banana patch where we had our headquarters, and we got this field phone. We only had about 1,000 taps between me and Manila. You could barely hear anything on it, and the caller said that his headquarters is closing - Manila, and preceding to Australia. "You go to Bataan." I said: "Okay." And I took a pencil and paper, and I thought well, no sense in arguing these things over the phone, I'm going to prepare my questions: 1. "Where in Bataan?" This is no fooling, we had only been there 3 months, and we had nothing to do. We weren't even in the so-called Orange plan. You know, the great plan for the defense of, withdrawal into Bataan. The Air Force wasn't even considered. 2. "Where are the Japs?" 3. "Should I go immediately or wait for darkness?" I thought that was enough questions so I took about 15 minutes to work ot these questions, so I - no answer. They'd hit the track, and had just called us as a last minute thought. We got a bunch of guys up there; we ought to tell them what to do. So we piled them out that night on every thing, on trucks, we had a railroad spur up there, we loaded all the ammunition, I told the boys to go to the PX and the commissary and take all the food they could get, and get all the ammunition we could get, and pile them on those cars and take them with us. We had a National Guard outfit from New Mexico that arrived around that time. They had no night training, and it was blackout driving. They went down at

night, with a lot of our boys piled on them, and Daley and I and a guy named Neery, classmate of mine at West Point who was our Ordnance Officer. We stayed the night and drove down in a jeep the next morning after blowing up our ammunition dump and our fuel dump. Neery, that was his kick in the war. The poor guy got killed later on in Bataan, but he rigged up a pretty good system there, and he got out there with that bicycle tire, and that was his war, blowing up everything in sight. We drove down to Bataan and here were all these trucks. I don't believe that 10% of them made it. They overturned off the road. Very narrow road and pitch dark, and they weren't allowed to use lights. They were supposed to have a red light and go bumper to bumper, one guy would go over the other guy. So it was a pretty, pretty sorrowful sight and pretty sad one, and one I'll always remember. We should never get ourselves in that position again.

(Q: About airpower vs invasion of Japan. Did he feel that Japan would have to be invaded in order to end the war in the Far East?)

O'D: No, we felt that the war could be won by airpower alone, not by airpower alone. I mean by the application of weapons by air, would terminate the war. This was a big argument at Cairo. Gen Marshall and my old friend with the campaign hat, Burt Stilwell, claimed that it was going to cost us a million casualties to take Japan - that they sell themselves dearly. You would have to go over the beach and run them out with a bayonet, and Hap didn't think so. Hap said: "That's not right. We can pummel them to death." And we did. Actually, there was no need for MacArthur to go in on the USS Missouri, he could have gotten in on the Staten Island Ferry. It was a pretty expensive desk, and he go no opposition

whatever. And of course, the dropping of bombs, the straw that broke the camel's back. And it's conjecture as to how long it would have gone, but they were licked, no question about it.

(Q: Did we have to drop the bomb?)

O'D: Well, that's backsight. I don't know. I would think not, because I think we could have run - but that was a political decision again. And these political decisions in military affairs can become very, very rough. And of course, the fact of the matter was that they are made, and you just live by them. They had $2 billion spent on the bomb, and they had to justify it, apparently.

(Q: Wasn't there some merit to the argument that the Germans had failed to succumb to bombing? Why should the Japanese?

O'D: Yes, but they were on an island. Their food supplies and their medicines everything was cut off. Germany had a pretty fair economy still.

(Q: The whole nation was attuned to Bushedo. They would give their life up for their country?

O'D: That's my opinion, I don't know. Could be that they wouldn't have to go over the beach, but there was no reason to. What if we went into Japan and kept hammering them, it wouldn't have cost us anything. We had the airplanes, we had the bombs, this was, had the crews. We could just keep hammering them to death. How much can you stand? I mean, we weren't even trying to get rid of them on land, didn't have to go in on land. Eventually, you give them a way to get out and save some face. I think, it could have been done.

(Q: Did you have contact with Gen Chennault?)

O'D: Oh yes, he was the Flying School Instructor when I went through Flying School, and I saw him in India and China a good many times. He is an old friend.

(Q: How did you evaluate him as an individual?)

O'D: Oh, he was a rare bird. He was a free thinker and a Chennault thinker. When he was talking, he said what he wanted to say. And when he was listening, he was deaf, and he wouldn't necessarily hear anything. If you were talking about something you wanted from him, he wouldn't hear a blessed thing, and he looked around and get that faraway look in those deep brown eyes. But if somebody whispered over in a corner, don't you think we ought to get a few P-51s up to Chennault?" "You're damned right; I want them right away." He had tremendous ability and he knew his men and he got the most out of his men. He was stern, the talk you hear about the lack of discipline up there, after reading these magazines, like Saga, and Man, all that kind of stuff. He kept control of all the people up there. He was very much concerned when his boys got in trouble. He wired me one time he had a young guy that had gotten in trouble, you know, contacted a terrible veneral disease up there and kept him away. He was fine young kid. Didn't know anything about anything. He came back a basket case and commited suicide when he got to the states. Came through from New Delhi. Old Claire was real upset about this. He tried to talk to these guys: "I'm not going to moralize with you. Just try to behave yourselves out here, because this is murder. But your time and your efforts on the war, and don't worry about this other business." You know, it affected him when some of his boys went sour.

(Q: How do you contrast General Stilwell with Chennault?)

O'D: Oh, he was a great soldier, and a real knothead. Boy, he had his mind made up and tough. He was one of the great advocates of going over the beaches. You know, sell themselves dearly, and we've got to go, dig them out with a bayonet. And he said: "I've had the experience of getting pushed through Burma," which he did. Referring to Japan, he said it was going to take a million casualties, and another year of war. I saw him in Guam, after the hostilities ceased, and he was just going through in a hurry, and I saw him down there at the airport. And I said: "Gen Joe, how about that million casualties, and the year delay in going over the beach." And he just looked at me and said: "Incredible."

INTERVIEW OF GEN EMMETT O'DONNELL
AIR FORCE ACADEMY
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
DECEMBER 2, 1967

(Interviewed by members of the History Dept, AFA)
(Re-transcription)

I must confess as I told Col Hurley, that I didn't have a chance to do any homework, and perhaps it is better that I didn't. No. 1, I have a lot of papers somewhere up in my attic, and I've never been through them. Maybe it is just as well that I burn them. Certain things stick out in your mind, and I suppose that is the purpose, to try to get recollections, and I might be inaccurate on times, names and places, but that just comes with age. Gen Twining said the other day. He said: "How are you feeling now that you are fully retired?" He quit his business too, and he said: "I'll tell you the truth, he said, 'I've spent half of my time peeing and the other half trying to remember names."

(Gen O'Donnel referring to Mr. McNamara and his whiz kids)

O'D: And this is the thing we are into, we get these machines, and you get out of a computer what you put into it. They pile in a lot of improper assumptions and they go very logically indeed, a, b, c, the most logical argument to an improper conclusion. Or they take the conclusion that they want and break it up to justify the assumption. Like Gen MacArthur used to do every once in a while, he'd do the thing, then call in his staff and say: "Justify that decision in a logical way and estimate back to the situation."

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Gen Arnold came out to visit us in the Pacific. I never met him. He was Major Arnold. He was with the Bombardment gang, and out on the West Coast when I was up at Selfridge. I'd never known him. So when he came out to talk to us, and visit us, it was a little after Christmas, as I recall, 1943. He said he'd like to cut us in on the plans for Asia. There was going to be a British invasion of Rangoon, of Burma, in May, so this was before Christmas. In May, the following year, just before the [illegible], there was going to be an invasion. And he went on talking about it, and he said: "Can I answer any question?" And I said: "I haven't got a question, sir, but I'd like to make a statement." And I said: "I don't think the British are going to invade Burma in May." And he said: "What's your name?" And I gulped a time or two, and I said, "I'm Colonel O'Donnell, sir." And he said: "Well it might interest you, O'Donnell, to know that

I belong to an outfit called the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we meet every Tuesday. And I also belong to an outfit called the Combined Chiefs of Staff and we meet every Thursday. That's the American Joint Chiefs and the British Joint Chiefs, Combined." Boy, I could see that hair going up his neck. And he said: "We have determined that there will be an invasion of Burma in May. Where do you get your information?" And I said: "Well, I've been out here with the British and I've seen around Bombay, Calcutta, and up around Assam, and I don't think these people are prepared to fight, and I don't think they will." And he just looked at me, and he didn't say anything else. Jake Smart was his aide, and Jake was on this trip with him, Jake had the Advisory Council at that time, so going back, Smart told me later on, he said, the ols man said: "Who is that O'Donnell?" And he said: "Well, he is kind of a screwball, I think he's got the Asian "rudd", something like that. He's been out there too long, and he's a former football player." You know, this was, I guess, in February, I got orders to report to Washington, to be Chief of the Advisory Council, to Hap Arnold. And I am one of the great unwashed. I'd never been to a service school, except 90 days in the Tactical School. I'd never been near a staff. In that capacity, I went to every Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, every Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, and I went with him to Montreal to the conference, to Cairo. I was the only AF officer with him at Tehran. And don't get me wrong. The name of the Advisory Council was ill-chosen, I believe. My function was to get the agenda of each meeting, and to be sure that Gen Arnold had the

latest dope that we had in the Air Staff, or elsewhere, for him to base his replies or his discussions. And we had a good little staff in there. I guess we hurt some people's feelings a couple of times. They thought we were trying to run the war. But I was assiduous in making sure that I didn't put my own feelings into this kind of thing and we served him. I was one pace to the right and rear with his book. It was a mighty interesting experience and I wouldn't trade it for anything, and I got to see an awful lot of big people. I saw Hap go in action, and he was toughie. We got down to the Cairo conference, for instance, and Air Marshal Portal, of the RAF, was a very convincing talker and quite a guy. Portal was a fighter pilot, highly educated, and every warm. He said: "Hap, old boy, I think it would be a great idea if you would reduce your training time in the US in order to save petrol, because we are running short here, we only have - I forget the term - 5 million barrels, or 3 million barrels. And Hap started bristling. Right away Portal said the wrong thing. He said: "Portal, I run my air force the way I want it run, and I know they need the kind of training that I give them, and as a matter of fact, you haven't got 3 million barrels of petrol in England, the United Kingdom, you've got 10 million." And that ended that.

(Q: About the shuttle bombing to Russia and also the question of making available to the US bases in Siberia)

O'D: No, I think what they wanted was a shuttle base and they established it. They had a couple of shuttle runs up there. And I think that Hap's interest was in trying to find out something about them. Just get in, get a foot hold in there a

little bit, and maybe also to use it as good tactical means of dropping a load, and then continuing on to a safe haven without having to go back through all that flak. But I don't know too much about that. I didn't serve very much in the European theater, very little. Never served at all, but with Gen Arnold, going with him on trips.

(Q: What was your impression of the B-29 back in '44)?

O'D: Well, it was a new weapon, and a great weapon. All of our weapons, it wasn't built in a day. After I had been on that Advisory Council, Gen Arnold called me in one day and said: "Ever since I've had you here, you've been trying to get out. So now you are out. I'm putting a star on your shoulder, and you go out and run those B-29s out of Kansas. I'm going to send you out to the Marianas." And he said: "I want some performance. And I want you to keep me personally posted on what your opinion is of these airplanes, as you train." We went out in 6 months, we had guys jumping all over Nebraska, Kansas. I said: "Boy, what a job this has been." We had trouble. Our engines were catching on fire - hot spots and they couldn't get the cadant flow. We had to have several spots in the engine that would heat up and the whole wiring system would burn out and catch fire. A lot of people were hitting the silk. I ran a mission from Salina, Kansas, with all of our 4 wings involved, down to Havana and back, and that did it. Boy, we had them all over the map.

(Q: I was on that trip....)

O'D: Fortuitous thing, because the old man called me in and said: "What the hell is the matter with that airplane," and I said

"we've got bad engines on them." And he said: "What do you mean, bad engines?" And I said: "they catch on fire." He grabbed the phone, called out to Wright Field, got old man Knudsen, and he said: "I want you in here tonight, and he got Barney Giles and Meyers, the fellow that got in trouble. He was in the materiel business, and he got them on the line, and he said: "You stay here till tomorrow." Next morning he said, "Col O'Donnelll is scheduled to go to the Marianas in November," and this was September, I believe. Ane he said: "You people have given me a good airplane with a cellophane engine." He said: "Now, goddamn it, I want that engine fixed before they go out there and the modifications made, and that's a top priority job, and I don't want any aspririn answers either. I want it fixed." So they went to work and they found out the trouble was the baffle. They didn't have baffling to put the cool air over these hot spots. They were blanked out from cool air. So they fixed it up, and from then on, we were in business. But it took something like that to develop it, and once it got going, as you know, it was a tremendous weapon, at that time. Ten ton payload we had. Twenty thousand pounds.

(Q: You were at Clark Field when the Japanese attacked. Was there warning given to the people on the line. A difference between MacArthur and Brereton?)

O'D: We knew we were going to war. I had written my wife a letter which se still has. It said: "We will be at war before Christmas." You could feel it; it was in the air, you knew damn well, just reading the radios, and reading what little information we got down at Manila, and I think everybody knew that it was coming, they didn't know it was going to hit. But it didn't

make any difference when it hit, because if we weren't knocked out the first day, on the line, we would have been knocked out the second day, because there was no place to go except in the air. And you had to land for fuel. And the Japanese overran us, they had complete air superiority. Caught everything on the ground, the fighters. The fighters scrambled off, and they didn't have many fighters there in the first place. We only had 35 B-17s. I had half of them at Mindanao the day of the strike. We were so sure that it was coming that we dispersed the force. I had 16 of them down in Del Monte, and they hit up at Clark. And then we went up to Del Monte the next day, then back into Clark at night, in order to load up and try to get out, and make some attacks on the Navy which were absurd. We had no information; nointelligence; no radar. Damn poor communications, none between Mindanao and Clark. The whole thing was wiped out. There's another thing which has always stayed in the back of my craw. I saw the Americans get creamed. Here we were the first nation in the world on paper, and here, little Japanese, a fourth rate ration, was surging down through Malaya with their tails over their shoulders, and hitting us, and knocking us out and making us fight a war for 4 years which should have been over within a year, had we been at all prepared. We let our defenses completely down, thinking that the great oceans would protect us, etc., etc. And I saw American troops who had been out there too long, in the sunshine, who ran with the first bomb explosion into the hills. Just ran in there, living on bananas for a while, and came back only when they couldn't subsist. We didn't have

time to court martial. I went back there and I took command of Clark, until we were run out. And I and Mo Daley, abandoned Clark, we got the orders from Manila, on Christmas Eve. We stayed over till the next morning, and we took every way we could to send people down to Bataan, and I was out in a banana patch where we had our headquarters, and we got this field phone. We only had about 1,000 taps between me and Manila. You could barely hear anything on it, and the caller said that his headquarters is closing - Manila, and preceding to Australia. "You go to Bataan." I said: "Okay." And I took a pencil and paper, and I thought well, no sense in arguing these things over the phone, I'm going to prepare my questions: 1. "Where in Bataan?" This is no fooling, we had only been there 3 months, and we had nothing to do. We weren't even in the so-called Orange plan. You know, the great plan for the defense of, withdrawal into Bataan. The Air Force wasn't even considered. 2. "Where are the Japs?" 3. "Should I go immediately or wait for darkness?" I thought that was enough questions so I took about 15 minutes to work ot these questions, so I - no answer. They'd hit the track, and had just called us as a last minute thought. We got a bunch of guys up there; we ought to tell them what to do. So we piled them out that night on every thing, on trucks, we had a railroad spur up there, we loaded all the ammunition, I told the boys to go to the PX and the commissary and take all the food they could get, and get all the ammunition we could get, and pile them on those cars and take them with us. We had a National Guard outfit from New Mexico that arrived around that time. They had no night training, and it was blackout driving. They went down at

night, with a lot of our boys piled on them, and Daley and I and a guy named Neery, classmate of mine at West Point who was our Ordnance Officer. We stayed the night and drove down in a jeep the next morning after blowing up our ammunition dump and our fuel dump. Neery, that was his kick in the war. The poor guy got killed later on in Bataan, but he rigged up a pretty good system there, and he got out there with that bicycle tire, and that was his war, blowing up everything in sight. We drove down to Bataan and here were all these trucks. I don't believe that 10% of them made it. They overturned off the road. Very narrow road and pitch dark, and they weren't allowed to use lights. They were supposed to have a red light and go bumper to bumper, one guy would go over the other guy. So it was a pretty, pretty sorrowful sight and pretty sad one, and one I'll always remember. We should never get ourselves in that position again.

(Q: About airpower vs invasion of Japan. Did he feel that Japan would have to be invaded in order to end the war in the Far East?)

O'D: No, we felt that the war could be won by airpower alone, not by airpower alone. I mean by the application of weapons by air, would terminate the war. This was a big argument at Cairo. Gen Marshall and my old friend with the campaign hat, Burt Stilwell, claimed that it was going to cost us a million casualties to take Japan - that they sell themselves dearly. You would have to go over the beach and run them out with a bayonet, and Hap didn't think so. Hap said: "That's not right. We can pummel them to death." And we did. Actually, there was no need for MacArthur to go in on the USS Missouri, he could have gotten in on the Staten Island Ferry. It was a pretty expensive desk, and he go no opposition

whatever. And of course, the dropping of bombs, the straw that broke the camel's back. And it's conjecture as to how long it would have gone, but they were licked, no question about it.

(Q: Did we have to drop the bomb?)

O'D: Well, that's backsight. I don't know. I would think not, because I think we could have run - but that was a political decision again. And these political decisions in military affairs can become very, very rough. And of course, the fact of the matter was that they are made, and you just live by them. They had $2 billion spent on the bomb, and they had to justify it, apparently.

(Q: Wasn't there some merit to the argument that the Germans had failed to succumb to bombing? Why should the Japanese?

O'D: Yes, but they were on an island. Their food supplies and their medicines everything was cut off. Germany had a pretty fair economy still.

(Q: The whole nation was attuned to Bushedo. They would give their life up for their country?

O'D: That's my opinion, I don't know. Could be that they wouldn't have to go over the beach, but there was no reason to. What if we went into Japan and kept hammering them, it wouldn't have cost us anything. We had the airplanes, we had the bombs, this was, had the crews. We could just keep hammering them to death. How much can you stand? I mean, we weren't even trying to get rid of them on land, didn't have to go in on land. Eventually, you give them a way to get out and save some face. I think, it could have been done.

(Q: Did you have contact with Gen Chennault?)

O'D: Oh yes, he was the Flying School Instructor when I went through Flying School, and I saw him in India and China a good many times. He is an old friend.

(Q: How did you evaluate him as an individual?)

O'D: Oh, he was a rare bird. He was a free thinker and a Chennault thinker. When he was talking, he said what he wanted to say. And when he was listening, he was deaf, and he wouldn't necessarily hear anything. If you were talking about something you wanted from him, he wouldn't hear a blessed thing, and he looked around and get that faraway look in those deep brown eyes. But if somebody whispered over in a corner, don't you think we ought to get a few P-51s up to Chennault?" "You're damned right; I want them right away." He had tremendous ability and he knew his men and he got the most out of his men. He was stern, the talk you hear about the lack of discipline up there, after reading these magazines, like Saga, and Man, all that kind of stuff. He kept control of all the people up there. He was very much concerned when his boys got in trouble. He wired me one time he had a young guy that had gotten in trouble, you know, contacted a terrible veneral disease up there and kept him away. He was fine young kid. Didn't know anything about anything. He came back a basket case and commited suicide when he got to the states. Came through from New Delhi. Old Claire was real upset about this. He tried to talk to these guys: "I'm not going to moralize with you. Just try to behave yourselves out here, because this is murder. But your time and your efforts on the war, and don't worry about this other business." You know, it affected him when some of his boys went sour.

(Q: How do you contrast General Stilwell with Chennault?)

O'D: Oh, he was a great soldier, and a real knothead. Boy, he had his mind made up and tough. He was one of the great advocates of going over the beaches. You know, sell themselves dearly, and we've got to go, dig them out with a bayonet. And he said: "I've had the experience of getting pushed through Burma," which he did. Referring to Japan, he said it was going to take a million casualties, and another year of war. I saw him in Guam, after the hostilities ceased, and he was just going through in a hurry, and I saw him down there at the airport. And I said: "Gen Joe, how about that million casualties, and the year delay in going over the beach." And he just looked at me and said: "Incredible."

OK for cards — Clear copy

(Partial (Re-transcription)

Interview Gen Earle Partridge, AFA, Apr 12, 1968

Partridge: Primary Mission of 8th Air Force Fighter Command

Gen Partridge was asked a question about fighter support for the bombers in the 8th AF.

Partridge said he was standing there when it happened. He was Deputy to Doolittle and Doolittle didn't tell him anything about what he was going to do on this particular morning. Doolittle said: "Let's go over to the 8th Fighter Command Headquarters." He said they went over to see Gen Bill Kepner. Doolittle walked into the office and saw a sign on the wall which said to the effect: "The primary job in the 8th Fighter Command is to bring the fighters back alive."

Doolittle looked at the sign and said to Kepner, I want you to take that sign down and throw it away. Partridge said he thought Kepner ~~would~~ might have a heart attack, but he didn't. But Kepner was really disturbed, and tried to argue Doolittle out of it. He told Kepner: "I want you to cut loose from the bombers; I want you to chase down the German Air Force wherever it goes and shoot them down.

Partridge guesses that this incident occurred in early January or mid January 1944. This was shortly after Doolittle took over command of the 8th AF.

Partridge & LeMay & Mission of Strategic

Partridge tells this next story about LeMay. He said LeMay told it to him. Before LeMay got into combat, with the 305th, Bomb Group, he was told that the bomb run was 10 seconds. LeMay changed that to something like a 2 minute bomb run, or even 5 minutes. He figured that you can't hit a target effectively with a 10 second bomb run. While it was far more dangerous to hold to a line of flight for such an extended period, LeMay took the position that he would only have to hit the target once.

Somebody asked Gen Partridge about Andrews, and he said that Andrews would

have been the European Commander if he hadn't been killed in the crash in Iceland. Gen Partridge was then asked about Gen Hoyt Vandenberg, and

P: ~~Shall I tell you what I said downstairs~~. I had to work with that man for many years. First in a TAC group at Kelly Field and then Montgomery and the Air Corps Tactical School. and he was the kind of commander, he was fitted to be a commander. He was the laziest man around. he always could get somebody else to do his work for him. Personable, fine looking young man, played a good game of golf. A delightful man. My earliest recollection of him was at West Point. I was a plebe and he was a yearling. I recall him poking his head and the door in the evening and yelling: "Hey Al, how do you solve problem No. 36?" He could have figured it out himself, but he didn't want to bother.

~~Hey, Al, how to you solve problem number 36? He couldn't have figured it out himself,~~ but he didn't want to bother.

(Gen Partridge was akked a question about whether the need for a long range escort plane was foreseen in the days of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell in the years before the war)

P: These were the days when we had the B-10s, do you remember? ~~Remember that~~ It was a very good airplane, but it couldn't carry much, and it would go fast, and it was so fast or faster than the fighters. So everybody said: "Fighters are finished." That proved not quite to be right.

I talked to the bomber people about this many times, because I was teaching "fighters" and they were teaching "bombers" and I didn't want to get up and shoot them down on the platform. That's a bad place to be shooting people down. You ought to agree beforehand what you should say. Almost without exception, these fellows would say: "we want all the escort fighters we can get. We want to be escorted right to the target. Gen George, Gen Walker, and a few other guys didn't believe this. And they were so effective in

their argument, that Gen Chennault just finally threw in the sponge, pretending he was deaf.

(Gen Partridge was asked about the German fighter situation at the end of the war)

P: In April the war stopped in May, about 30 days before that, we were deep into Germany, and we had a severe losses. Some days you would only have a little, but I don't remember any time we didn't have some, somewhere along the line. The weather was terrible, and ~~I don't think they were~~ over their experienced pilots, the few they had left, caused to get up, and they came up, ~~that~~. There were more airplanes, more fighter airplanes available at the end of the war, then the Germans could use. They had them stashed away all over the place. They manufactured them in many, many places and put them together, somehow.

Years later, I went to the city of Garmisch, (just north of Garmisch, you'll find a ridge, road down each side, no railroad, and tunnels going through. They told me there were 21 miles of tunnels on both sides. So they had a great many planes in those tunnels

Partridge: GAF - Lots in war

Note: This points up the fuel shortage ~~out the fuel situation~~ at the end of the war. The Germans apparently had airplanes, but not enough fuel to fly them.

Ogle, Dan

28 May 70

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

May 7, 1970

Maj General Dan C. Ogle, USAF(Ret)
5130 Brittany Drive
St. Petersburg, Florida 33715

Dear General Ogle:

My plans have firmed up to a degree. I'll be in the St. Petersburg area on Friday, 28 May.

Is this a good time for you? If not can you suggest another time?

A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
per dictation from
San Antonio, Texas

Bonnie Janik
BONNIE JANIK, Secretary

P.S. Would you please include your phone number.

This date is O.K. - Phone 867, 5881

Dan Ogle

done 5-29-70

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BONNIE JANIK, Secretary

P.S. Would you please include your phone number.

867-5881

St Petersburg, Florida
April 12, 1970

Dear Dr. Green:

Your letter about Arnold's biography is most interesting. - I was not at the Coral Gables Hospital during Hap's heart episode. However, during the years I was Chief General Arnold made many trips that - usually incognito - or an attempt at incognito - wearing my civies. - I have interesting stories - but know little of his illness except what I got from his doctor - Gilbert Marquardt of Chicago.

Sincerely

Wm. B. Ogle, Apt 102
5130 Brittany Dr.
St. Petersburg, 33715

March 31, 1970

Maj General Dan C. Ogle
5801 Bahama Shores Drive S.
Saint Petersburg, FL 33700

new address

Dear General Ogle:

Recently I saw Generals O.K. Niess and Jim Bevans in connection with a research project of interest to you. John Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

I believe you were the CO of the Miami-Biltmore Hospital early in 1945 when General Arnold was recuperating from his heart attack.

I am planning to visit Florida in the fairly near future. If you believe it would be useful for me to stop by St. Petersburg for an interview of about one hour's duration, I'd be delighted to arrange it.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL DAN C. OGLE, USAF (MEDICAL)

Dan Clark Ogle was born at Keithsburg, Illinois, October 9, 1901 He was graduated from Eureka College, Illinois, in 1924, and received his Doctor of Medicine degree from the University of Illinois College of Medicine in 1929.

Appointed a first lieutenant in the Medical Corps Reserve that June, General Ogle was assigned to medical duty at William Beaumont General Hospital at El Paso, Texas, and received his Regular commission as a first lieutenant in the Medical Corps July 1, 1930. Entering the School of Aviation Medicine at Brooks Field, Texas, in April 1931, he was graduated that July; entered the Army Medical School at Washington, D.C., three months later and was graduated in January 1932; and four months later was graduated from the Medical Field Service School at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Assigned to Chanute Field, Illinois, as flight surgeon and war officer at the station hospital, he was named post surgeon in May 1936. The following November he went to Luke Field, Hawaii, where he served as post surgeon. In March 1939 he was appointed war officer at the Army and Navy General Hospital, Hot Springs, Arkansas, and in June 1941 resumed his position as post surgeon at Chanute.

Moving to Miami Beach, Florida, in April 1942, General Ogle was named post surgeon of the Technical Training Center, and the following March assumed command of the Army Air Force Regional Station Hospital at Coral Gables, Florida. Going overseas in December 1944, he was appointed staff surgeon of the 15th Air Force in Italy. Returning to the United States the following September, he was named chief of the Plans and Services Division in the Office of the Air Surgeon, Washington, D.C.

Transferred to Maxwell Field, Alabama, in November 1945 General Ogle was named post surgeon, and a month later was appointed command surgeon of the Air University there, in addition. In December 1946 he relinquished his duties as post surgeon, retaining his position as command surgeon. Entering the Air War College there in August 1948, he was graduated in June 1949.

The following December General Ogle was named Deputy Surgeon General of the Air Force, and in July 1949 was transferred from the Army to the Air Force. Going to Weisbaden, Germany, in March 1953, General Ogle was named Surgeon for the United States Air Forces in Europe.

On July 15, 1954, General Ogle was designated Surgeon General of the United States Air Force, with headquarters at Washington, D.C.

MORE

He has been awarded the Bronze Star Medal, and is rated a Flight Surgeon and Aircraft Observer (Medical). General Ogle is a member of the American Medical Association, Association of Military Surgeons, and the Aero-Medical Association.

General Ogle and his wife, Mrs. Helen Garber Ogle, have two children, James and Carol.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to captain (permanent) on July 1, 1932; to major (permanent) June 27, 1938; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) February 1, 1942; to colonel (temporary) July 9, 1942; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) June 27, 1946; to colonel (permanent) March 25, 1948; to brigadier general (temporary) July 30, 1949; to major general (temporary) April 11, 1951; to brigadier general (permanent) July 21, 1952.

E N D

Up to date as of July 1954.

Interview with Maj General Dan Ogle, St. Petersburg, Florida, 28 May 1970.

Q: You recall your first encounter with Arnold?

O: Yes, I do recall the first encounter. It stems from my being Commanding Officer of the Air Force Hospital in Miami Beach and Coral Cables, and dealt with a direction I received from Arnold's office. Primarily it was sent by General Miles, and it was to bring a Brigadier General to the office up there for them to talk to. And I took this thing in. The Brigadier was a brilliant young officer up there. I carried his bags and looked after him and we walked into the office up there, he a Brigadier and I, a Colonel. When we walked out I was still a Colonel and he was a Captain. That was indicative of the rapid and decisive action that Arnold was noted for. This brilliant young officer had made quite a name for himself. In the meantime he had been hitting the bottle a little to much and embarrassed the Air Force under certain circumstances primarily due to his drinking. As a consequence, he went from Brigadier back to his normal rank of Captain. That occurred on several occasions, as you are probably aware of.

Q: Was that Ed Perrin?

O: That was Ed Perrin. I believe that's right. He was a nice guy.

Q: Well, Arnold had brought him as one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Arnold was, in my conception, a 19th Century man--high sense of honor, integrity, and frowned upon anybody who drank or played around. And a couple of people got caught, you know, caught in the sense of when Arnold found out about them he sort of cut them off his list.

O: My impression was that Arnold was intensely loyal to the officers of the Air Force and his personal friends, but only so long as those officers and friends were intensely loyal to the Air Corps, and the Government, and the intent and mission of the war. Regardless of the degree of friendship and how long it had lasted, he would not hesitate to get rid of somebody, or transfer them, or order them practically to retire. And I found myself in some most embarrassing circumstances when relatively senior general officers would be patients in the hospital down there, and I would get a personal call from General Arnold. He would say: "Well now you've got General so and so in there as a patient. I want him retired for physical disability." I finally went to Washington and got an interview with him to state that our business in the Medical Service was one of cooperation as far as command was concerned, but we didn't feel it was proper to be ordered to retire someone for physical disability unless we could find some physical disability. But he was very patient, very understanding about it, but he still continued to call down to the hospital every now and then with the idea that so and so was there, and one way or another, he wanted him out of the Service.

Q: Well, he was a man who saw his duty to do a certain thing and he did it, or tried to do it. He had this terrible impatience with staff work, or with regulations. When I said he had a great sense of integrity, what you say might reflect on that sense of integrity.

O: No, it doesn't reflect on integrity. It reflects on, it insures or enhances his integrity because he had a purpose. He would not compromise that purpose by virtue of friendship or old time religion.

Q: Right. He had a complete disregard for organization charts -- you know the plumbing charts. You had to go through with certain

procedure. I've talked to many people and almost everyone has told me some story of Arnold in the hall, or somewhere, grabbing a man and saying: "Get to Europe,or get to Asia, or get to some place and straighten this matter out." The man may or may not have had any competence in this particular area, but Arnold gave him the job. He had confidence in the man, and he was bouncing fifty balls in the air simultaneously, and if he gave one to somebody then he only had forty-nine to worry about. And the fact that this man had the job and someone else was supposed to do the job, organizationally, Arnold disregarded this kind of thing, he was impatient to let the thing seep down through the echelons of command and organization. This is why I think that he would, he felt that so-and-so, General so-and-so, who was in your care, could not cut the mustard anymore. And he wanted him out of there, and this was the most painless way to do it, I think.

O: Well, no difficulty was ever encountered that wasn't accomplished without any too great sadness or discomfort on anybody's part.

Q: Did you comply with his requests?

O: Whenever it was physically and ethically possible to do so.

Q: And when it was not, what did you do?

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physical condition involved, some of them did do that, and thereby solving the problem as far as I was concerned.

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O: Or early '44.

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Q: Did you know about his major heart attack in January 1945?

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O: He never got out of the dash situation in ...

O: In his whole life.

Q: Who brought Marquardt in? He was a heart specialist, was he not?

O: Yes, he was an internal medicine man with emphasis on heart. I brought him into the Service you mean?

Q: Yes. In to take care of Arnold?

O: Well, he was Chief of Medicine at the hospital at Coral Gables, and that's where he met Arnold and vice versa. And when Dave Grant and some of them wanted to know who would be the man to look after General Arnold, well, we sent Marquardt, he's qualified, interested to do it. And with Mac's personality in the place where he would be acceptable to Arnold.

Q: They got along very well, Marquardt and Arnold?

O: Yeah, I'm sure they did.

Q: You know, he took two trips, two major trips with Arnold, perhaps others. He went to Europe with him. When Arnold came back at the end of March 1945 they had brought Eaker in to become Deputy Commander--the idea being to take some of the load off Arnold, and some of the administration and lesser policy problems off his shoulders. They brought Eaker in to become Deputy and Arnold went to Europe. Ostensibly it was an inspection trip but he spent time at the Riviera and then he came to Paris when you probably met him. And Marquardt was with him on that trip. Marquardt was also with him about six or eight weeks later, early in June 1945, when he went to the Pacific. But Marquardt was not with him on the last major trip before the war ended, and that was Potsdam. Did Marquardt ever talk to you about the reasons for that?

O: I don't recall.

Q: Well, we had a new President, Harry Truman. One of the things they wanted to do in the Air Force was to get closer to the new President than they were to the old President who had all these Navy ships on his desk and the Air Force came behind. Well, this was when Arnold switched doctors to Howard Rusk, and he took Howard Rusk with him. Howard Rusk was from Missouri and he took him with him on the Potsdam trip. Marquardt was deeply disappointed at sort of being shunted aside. Did he ever talk to you about that?

O? Not that I recall in any detail. We have discussed it, but I don't recall enough about it to make any comment.

Q: Well he, I think he liked that job.

O: Oh yes.

Q: But Arnold had to write him a letter, and you could read between the lines that Howard Rusk was from Missouri and Harry Truman had this loyalty to people from Missouri, you know, Harry Vaughan and Bob Landry, Bob Landry who was his air aide, and Howard Rusk, a medical man. So, you know, there was a new team in the White House and Arnold wanted to get with it. They saw the handwriting on the wall and changed, he changed doctors. You never heard anything about that?

O: Not to comment, I don't know that much about it.

Q: Going back to the establishment of the hospital at Miami Beach and the OCS, you know the whole Miami complex, Jim Stowell had a role in that, did he not?

O: He was one of the first ones down there. He went in as Commanding General of the reception and training center. He was

quite a character, too. He lives over here in Florida.

Q: I know. I hope to see him. He is at Boca Ratan.

O: Yes.

Q: I saw Howard Rusk about two months ago in New York, head of this rehabilitation center. Very interesting guy.

O: Very.

Q: And, of course, he's deeply involved in this rehabilitation program and Arnold gave him a great start on the rehabilitation. He was internist, he told me, and he started out, I think, at Chanute Field.

O: No, at St. Louis.

Q: Was it St. Louis?

O: Jefferson Barracks.

Q: Oh, Jefferson Barracks, that's where Rusk started the rehabilitation. He had a lot of static from the Army medical people, you know. He tried to set up this program and the Army apparently was doing things a different way, the old way, and Rusk sort of rubbed the establishment the wrong way in the rehabilitation program. Do you have any knowledge of this problem?

O: Well, yes, I have some. Rusk and I had been in some degree of correspondence. We started rehabilitation programs about the same time, and I devoted one whole hotel to it, practically, down at Miami Beach. Later, when we rebuilt the Biltmore into a hospital we made provisions for rehabilitation. Well, the difficulty with the old established Army developed because this was something new. It hadn't been foisted on the people by the Surgeon General of the Army. As a consequence, it was a program that hadn't been approved by headquarters or instigated by headquarters, and gained so much popularity that I

think there was a little jealously. When General Kirk did come down to review our activities in Florida, he was impressed by it and accepted it totally without any mental reservation or criticism whatever. But Rusk had started it first within a strictly Army hospital. The Jefferson Barracks as distinct from the advantage which I had by being in an Air Corps hospital without too much contact with Army headquarters.

Q: He mentioned General Kirk as being one of the people who was slow to react favorably to the Air Force rehabilitation program, the prosthetic program. There's one case in point. He went to Arnold on one situation. The Army was doing the prosthetics programs the old way and Rusk went to Arnold, and Arnold became incensed about it in a characteristic way. There was a meeting with Mrs. Roosevelt on the subject and apparently General Kirk, his opposition, or within the Army Surgeon General's office was beaten down, and the Air Force prosthetics program gained acceptance. Does this tie in?

O: That is generally true. I never knew all the details of it. I knew that there was controversy right along and that the Air Corps program on rehabilitation and prosthetic development was accepted. We had a man from Hollywood, who had been a physical trainer and rehabilitation expert out there, work into our program down in Florida and he alone carried enough prestige to sell a lot of it.

Q: Do you remember his name?

O: No, I can't remember his name.

Q: He was a Hollywood, was he movie type?

O: One of the difficulties I encountered down there, I would frequently act as an aide to General Arnold and whether he was there

officially or incognito--everyone knew he was there, and particularly friends or former friends would attempt to get a private audience with him for some purpose. He would avoid those at all costs, if possible, because invariably what they would want would be a particular assignment or change of assignment, or promotion, and I finally got an audience for one old-timer,with him. I arranged it. And the old-timer had told me he just wanted to greet him and shake hands with him. That's all he wanted to do. But it was an old-timer who had previously been a General and who at that time was not. I assured General Arnold that all he wanted to do was greet him, and for old time friendship's sake, I think it would be well if he did. He finally agreed to do it, but immediately, the first thing that was asked was he wanted Arnold to promote him to Major General and he would be retired, and get out of his hair forevermore, if he would just promote him. Arnold called me. He said, "So he didn't want anything, did he?" He really gave me the "Harry".

Q: Was this individual a one-star at that time?

O: Well at this time he was only a Colonel, I mean he didn't have any star.

Q: Oh, I see. And he wanted to retire as a Major General?

O: Yes, he had been promoted twice. He wanted to retire as a Major General and assured Arnold that if he could get his starts he would get out and retire.

Q: Did Arnold dismiss him, or did he grant his wish?

O: Well, you probably could guess that pretty good. He dismissed him very hurriedly, and very thoroughly.

Q: That's kind of ironic because this individual (Clagett) in

correspondence had blamed Arnold for all his troubles.

O: Well, several people did.

Q: Were there some other incidents like that came to your attention, people trying to importune Arnold for some personal favor?

O: Oh yes. That was a favorite indoor sport when you got a chance to talk to the Commanding General.

Q: Was he in a relaxed mood when he came down there?

O: Generally, I would say so.

Q: Sort of dropped his guard a little bit when he got out of the Washington scene?

O: Yes, he would try to be as friendly and liked to go to parties; and he had a few little sleight of hand tricks he liked to demonstrate.

Q: Really. Cards, card tricks?

O: Well, he just liked to...

Q: Gin Rummy?

O: Yes, he liked to play gin rummy. He didn't play much cards, though. It was too slow a procedure as far as he was concerned.

Q: Did he go fishing when he was down there?

O: Very little.

Q: You mentioned this one trip?

O: Ordinarily, he did not go much for fishing. I remember one time, he called up and said he wanted to have a turkey shoot down. There were wild turkeys, of course, over in the Everglades area. I got some of my friends down there and we worked for some time herding up a flock of turkeys, so we would know where they were. In fact, I think we even fed them a little bit to try to get them located. We had them fixed with everything but tied behind a log with their heads

sticking out. But he never got to shoot. Something came up in the meantime and someone else finally got into the turkeys. But we really had them ready.

Q: Was he a good patient?

O: I never had him as a patient, but from the best of my knowledge from talking with hospital people and certainly with Dr. Marquardt he was a good patient.

Q: I know that in some of his correspondence he mentions that he went to bed very early, you know, like 9 o'clock. I guess they had him on a very strick regimenof a lot of rest. Mrs. Arnold tells me he loved sweets, and he would sneak off when he was in Sonoma--this was after he retired--he would go down to this bake shop and go in the back, and get two handsful of some French pastry, you know, and sort of gorge himself. This got him off his routine. Sort of like a child in a way. Did you ever notice this boyish impulsiveness?

O: Well, yes, I think he was an impulsive individual and intolerant of inactivity, and sluggishness, or lethargy. I mean this was just so foreign to him that he couldn't stand it in anybody else.

Q: He had this smile on his face, but it didn't mean he was happy at any particular time. It was sort of a built-in smile.

O: I've heard some people say, "Be awful careful when the General starts smiling at you."

Q: It was a prelude to a possible explosion? You left in '44. Left the Miami hospital, who succeeded you down there?

O: Henry Clay Chennault.

Q: The fellow that just died?

O: Yeah. On April 25. Saw it in the paper just now.

Q: That right? Where did he live?

O: Hot Springs.

Q: Arkansas? I see. That's too bad in several respects. Sort of interested in that particular phase of Arnold's career. You know, when he was in Washington, one of the doctors they called in to take care of him was a fellow named Lee Martin, a local doctor. He's one of the people on my list to talk to. He lives in Arlington. He treated Arnold. They kept this thing very secret in Washington for at least two reasons. One, connected with the war; the other, Arnold was afraid Marshall might retire him, figured he couldn't do it any longer. So they didn't want any publicity attached to it, so he was sort of sneaked out of town when he had his major heart attack. Well, I guess you were in Europe at this time.

O: I wasn't there.

Q: Yeah. Well do you have any other recollections of Arnold which we haven't touched?

O: I don't think of any at the moment.

Q: Do you have this $5 check?

O: Oh yes, I have it around somewhere.

Q: When my wife comes back with the camera, maybe I'll take a picture of it.

NOTE: General Arnold autographed a picture to Colonel Ogle at Bari, Italy, 4/27/45. Arnold met Colonel Ogle when Arnold was on his convalescent trip just before V-E Day.

Interview with Maj General Dan Ogle, St. Petersburg, Florida, 28 May 1970.

Q: You recall your first encounter with Arnold?

O: Yes, I do recall the first encounter. It stems from my being Commanding Officer of the Air Force Hospital in Miami Beach and Coral Cables, and dealt with a direction I received from Arnold's office. Primarily it was sent by General Miles, and it was to bring a Brigadier General to the office up there for them to talk to. And I took this thing in. The Brigadier was a brilliant young officer up there. I carried his bags and looked after him and we walked into the office up there, he a Brigadier and I, a Colonel. When we walked out I was still a Colonel and he was a Captain. That was indicative of the rapid and decisive action that Arnold was noted for. This brilliant young officer had made quite a name for himself. In the meantime he had been hitting the bottle a little to much and embarrassed the Air Force under certain circumstances primarily due to his drinking. As a consequence, he went from Brigadier back to his normal rank of Captain. That occurred on several occasions, as you are probably aware of.

Q: Was that Ed Perrin?

O: That was Ed Perrin. I believe that's right. He was a nice guy.

Q: Well, Arnold had brought him as one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Arnold was, in my conception, a 19th Century man--high sense of honor, integrity, and frowned upon anybody who drank or played around. And a couple of people got caught, you know, caught in the sense of when Arnold found out about them he sort of cut them off his list.

O: My impression was that Arnold was intensely loyal to the officers of the Air Force and his personal friends, but only so long as those officers and friends were intensely loyal to the Air Corps, and the Government, and the intent and mission of the war. Regardless of the degree of friendship and how long it had lasted, he would not hesitate to get rid of somebody, or transfer them, or order them practically to retire. And I found myself in some most embarrassing circumstances when relatively senior general officers would be patients in the hospital down there, and I would get a personal call from General Arnold. He would say: "Well now you've got General so and so in there as a patient. I want him retired for physical disability." I finally went to Washington and got an interview with him to state that our business in the Medical Service was one of cooperation as far as command was concerned, but we didn't feel it was proper to be ordered to retire someone for physical disability unless we could find some physical disability. But he was very patient, very understanding about it, but he still continued to call down to the hospital every now and then with the idea that so and so was there, and one way or another, he wanted him out of the Service.

Q: Well, he was a man who saw his duty to do a certain thing and he did it, or tried to do it. He had this terrible impatience with staff work, or with regulations. When I said he had a great sense of integrity, what you say might reflect on that sense of integrity.

O: No, it doesn't reflect on integrity. It reflects on, it insures or enhances his integrity because he had a purpose. He would not compromise that purpose by virtue of friendship or old time religion.

Q: Right. He had a complete disregard for organization charts -- you know the plumbing charts. You had to go through with certain

procedure. I've talked to many people and almost everyone has told me some story of Arnold in the hall, or somewhere, grabbing a man and saying: "Get to Europe,or get to Asia, or get to some place and straighten this matter out." The man may or may not have had any competence in this particular area, but Arnold gave him the job. He had confidence in the man, and he was bouncing fifty balls in the air simultaneously, and if he gave one to somebody then he only had forty-nine to worry about. And the fact that this man had the job and someone else was supposed to do the job, organizationally, Arnold disregarded this kind of thing, he was impatient to let the thing seep down through the echelons of command and organization. This is why I think that he would, he felt that so-and-so, General so-and-so, who was in your care, could not cut the mustard anymore. And he wanted him out of there, and this was the most painless way to do it, I think.

O: Well, no difficulty was ever encountered that wasn't accomplished without any too great sadness or discomfort on anybody's part.

Q: Did you comply with his requests?

O: Whenever it was physically and ethically possible to do so.

Q: And when it was not, what did you do?

O: When it was not, we had to compromise, and generally, under those circumstances where we couldn't find a physical reason to retire someone, why I would very frankly discuss the matter with him, which was an embarrassing situation sometimes on my part, being a Colonel maybe talking to a Major General. Just tell him that probably he had no choice except to request retirement. And when there was no

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O: Yes, he was an internal medicine man with emphasis on heart. I brought him into the Service you mean?

Q: Yes. In to take care of Arnold?

O: Well, he was Chief of Medicine at the hospital at Coral Gables, and that's where he met Arnold and vice versa. And when Dave Grant and some of them wanted to know who would be the man to look after General Arnold, well, we sent Marquardt, he's qualified, interested to do it. And with Mac's personality in the place where he would be acceptable to Arnold.

Q: They got along very well, Marquardt and Arnold?

O: Yeah, I'm sure they did.

Q: You know, he took two trips, two major trips with Arnold, perhaps others. He went to Europe with him. When Arnold came back at the end of March 1945 they had brought Eaker in to become Deputy Commander--the idea being to take some of the load off Arnold, and some of the administration and lesser policy problems off his shoulders. They brought Eaker in to become Deputy and Arnold went to Europe. Ostensibly it was an inspection trip but he spent time at the Riviera and then he came to Paris when you probably met him. And Marquardt was with him on that trip. Marquardt was also with him about six or eight weeks later, early in June 1945, when he went to the Pacific. But Marquardt was not with him on the last major trip before the war ended, and that was Potsdam. Did Marquardt ever talk to you about the reasons for that?

O: I don't recall.

Q: Well, we had a new President, Harry Truman. One of the things they wanted to do in the Air Force was to get closer to the new President than they were to the old President who had all these Navy ships on his desk and the Air Force came behind. Well, this was when Arnold switched doctors to Howard Rusk, and he took Howard Rusk with him. Howard Rusk was from Missouri and he took him with him on the Potsdam trip. Marquardt was deeply disappointed at sort of being shunted aside. Did he ever talk to you about that?

O: Not that I recall in any detail. We have discussed it, but I don't recall enough about it to make any comment.

Q: Well he, I think he liked that job.

O: Oh yes.

Q: But Arnold had to write him a letter, and you could read between the lines that Howard Rusk was from Missouri and Harry Truman had this loyalty to people from Missouri, you know, Harry Vaughan and Bob Landry, Bob Landry who was his air aide, and Howard Rusk, a medical man. So, you know, there was a new team in the White House and Arnold wanted to get with it. They saw the handwriting on the wall and changed, he changed doctors. You never heard anything about that?

O: Not to comment, I don't know that much about it.

Q: Going back to the establishment of the hospital at Miami Beach and the OCS, you know the whole Miami complex, Jim Stowell had a role in that, did he not?

O: He was one of the first ones down there. He went in as Commanding General of the reception and training center. He was

quite a character, too. He lives over here in Florida.

Q: I know. I hope to see him. He is at Boca Ratan.

O: Yes.

Q: I saw Howard Rusk about two months ago in New York, head of this rehabilitation center. Very interesting guy.

O: Very.

Q: And, of course, he's deeply involved in this rehabilitation program and Arnold gave him a great start on the rehabilitation. He was internist, he told me, and he started out, I think, at Chanute Field.

O: No, at St. Louis.

Q: Was it St. Louis?

O: Jefferson Barracks.

Q: Oh, Jefferson Barracks, that's where Rusk started the rehabilitation. He had a lot of static from the Army medical people, you know. He tried to set up this program and the Army apparently was doing things a different way, the old way, and Rusk sort of rubbed the establishment the wrong way in the rehabilitation program. Do you have any knowledge of this problem?

O: Well, yes, I have some. Rusk and I had been in some degree of correspondence. We started rehabilitation programs about the same time, and I devoted one whole hotel to it, practically, down at Miami Beach. Later, when we rebuilt the Biltmore into a hospital we made provisions for rehabilitation. Well, the difficulty with the old established Army developed because this was something new. It hadn't been foisted on the people by the Surgeon General of the Army. As a consequence, it was a program that hadn't been approved by headquarters or instigated by headquarters, and gained so much popularity that I

think there was a little jealously. When General Kirk did come down to review our activities in Florida, he was impressed by it and accepted it totally without any mental reservation or criticism whatever. But Rusk had started it first within a strictly Army hospital. The Jefferson Barracks as distinct from the advantage which I had by being in an Air Corps hospital without too much contact with Army headquarters.

Q: He mentioned General Kirk as being one of the people who was slow to react favorably to the Air Force rehabilitation program, the prosthetic program. There's one case in point. He went to Arnold on one situation. The Army was doing the prosthetics programs the old way and Rusk went to Arnold, and Arnold became incensed about it in a characteristic way. There was a meeting with Mrs. Roosevelt on the subject and apparently General Kirk, his opposition, or within the Army Surgeon General's office was beaten down, and the Air Force prosthetics program gained acceptance. Does this tie in?

O: That is generally true. I never knew all the details of it. I knew that there was controversy right along and that the Air Corps program on rehabilitation and prosthetic development was accepted. We had a man from Hollywood, who had been a physical trainer and rehabilitation expert out there, work into our program down in Florida and he alone carried enough prestige to sell a lot of it.

Q: Do you remember his name?

O: No, I can't remember his name.

Q: He was a Hollywood, was he movie type?

O: One of the difficulties I encountered down there, I would frequently act as an aide to General Arnold and whether he was there

officially or incognito--everyone knew he was there, and particularly friends or former friends would attempt to get a private audience with him for some purpose. He would avoid those at all costs, if possible, because invariably what they would want would be a particular assignment or change of assignment, or promotion, and I finally got an audience for one old-timer,with him. I arranged it. And the old-timer had told me he just wanted to greet him and shake hands with him. That's all he wanted to do. But it was an old-timer who had previously been a General and who at that time was not. I assured General Arnold that all he wanted to do was greet him, and for old time friendship's sake, I think it would be well if he did. He finally agreed to do it, but immediately, the first thing that was asked was he wanted Arnold to promote him to Major General and he would be retired, and get out of his hair forevermore, if he would just promote him. Arnold called me. He said, "So he didn't want anything, did he?" He really gave me the "Harry".

Q: Was this individual a one-star at that time?

O: Well at this time he was only a Colonel, I mean he didn't have any star.

Q: Oh, I see. And he wanted to retire as a Major General?

O: Yes, he had been promoted twice. He wanted to retire as a Major General and assured Arnold that if he could get his starts he would get out and retire.

Q: Did Arnold dismiss him, or did he grant his wish?

O: Well, you probably could guess that pretty good. He dismissed him very hurriedly, and very thoroughly.

Q: That's kind of ironic because this individual (Clagett) in

correspondence had blamed Arnold for all his troubles.

O: Well, several people did.

Q: Were there some other incidents like that came to your attention, people trying to importune Arnold for some personal favor?

O: Oh yes. That was a favorite indoor sport when you got a chance to talk to the Commanding General.

Q: Was he in a relaxed mood when he came down there?

O: Generally, I would say so.

Q: Sort of dropped his guard a little bit when he got out of the Washington scene?

O: Yes, he would try to be as friendly and liked to go to parties; and he had a few little sleight of hand tricks he liked to demonstrate.

Q: Really. Cards, card tricks?

O: Well, he just liked to...

Q: Gin Rummy?

O: Yes, he liked to play gin rummy. He didn't play much cards, though. It was too slow a procedure as far as he was concerned.

Q: Did he go fishing when he was down there?

O: Very little.

Q: You mentioned this one trip?

O: Ordinarily, he did not go much for fishing. I remember one time, he called up and said he wanted to have a turkey shoot down. There were wild turkeys, of course, over in the Everglades area. I got some of my friends down there and we worked for some time herding up a flock of turkeys, so we would know where they were. In fact, I think we even fed them a little bit to try to get them located. We had them fixed with everything but tied behind a log with their heads

sticking out. But he never got to shoot. Something came up in the meantime and someone else finally got into the turkeys. But we really had them ready.

Q: Was he a good patient?

O: I never had him as a patient, but from the best of my knowledge from talking with hospital people and certainly with Dr. Marquardt he was a good patient.

Q: I know that in some of his correspondence he mentions that he went to bed very early, you know, like 9 o'clock. I guess they had him on a very strick regimenof a lot of rest. Mrs. Arnold tells me he loved sweets, and he would sneak off when he was in Sonoma--this was after he retired--he would go down to this bake shop and go in the back, and get two handsful of some French pastry, you know, and sort of gorge himself. This got him off his routine. Sort of like a child in a way. Did you ever notice this boyish impulsiveness?

O: Well, yes, I think he was an impulsive individual and intolerant of inactivity, and sluggishness, or lethargy. I mean this was just so foreign to him that he couldn't stand it in anybody else.

Q: He had this smile on his face, but it didn't mean he was happy at any particular time. It was sort of a built-in smile.

O: I've heard some people say, "Be awful careful when the General starts smiling at you."

Q: It was a prelude to a possible explosion? You left in '44. Left the Miami hospital, who succeeded you down there?

O: Henry Clay Chennault.

Q: The fellow that just died?

O: Yeah. On April 25. Saw it in the paper just now.

Q: That right? Where did he live?

O: Hot Springs.

Q: Arkansas? I see. That's too bad in several respects. Sort of interested in that particular phase of Arnold's career. You know, when he was in Washington, one of the doctors they called in to take care of him was a fellow named Lee Martin, a local doctor. He's one of the people on my list to talk to. He lives in Arlington. He treated Arnold. They kept this thing very secret in Washington for at least two reasons. One, connected with the war; the other, Arnold was afraid Marshall might retire him, figured he couldn't do it any longer. So they didn't want any publicity attached to it, so he was sort of sneaked out of town when he had his major heart attack. Well, I guess you were in Europe at this time.

O: I wasn't there.

Q: Yeah. Well do you have any other recollections of Arnold which we haven't touched?

O: I don't think of any at the moment.

Q: Do you have this $5 check?

O: Oh yes, I have it around somewhere.

Q: When my wife comes back with the camera, maybe I'll take a picture of it.

NOTE: General Arnold autographed a picture to Colonel Ogle at Bari, Italy, 4/27/45. Arnold met Colonel Ogle when Arnold was on his convalescent trip just before V-E Day.

Old, Archie

19 Mar 70

WP 3/30/84

DEATHS ELSEWHERE

MARCH AIR FORCE BASE, Calif.—**Archie J. Old Jr.**, 77, a retired Air Force lieutenant general and pioneer in strategic aviation who led the 1943 bombing raid against the German ball-bearing works at Schweinfurt, died March 24 at the base hospital here. The cause of death was not reported.

In 1957, Gen. Old led a crew on the first around-the-world, non-stop flight of Boeing B-52 stratofortresses in a test to prove the plane's range. He commanded the 15th Air Force at March Air Force Base for 10 years before retiring in 1965.

10 March 1970

Dr. Murray Green
El Rancho Feláz
Sonoma, California 95476

Dr. Green

Reference your letter of 3 March 1970 I will be very glad to talk to you anytime at your convenience during the week of 16 20 March or anyother time convenient to you. My Telephone number is 714 682 6639

Archie J. Old, Jr.
Lieutenant General U.S.A.F. (Ret)
1427 Ransom Road
Riverside, California 92506

File
Saw him
3/14/70

Interview LTGEN Archie Old, Riverside, California, 19 March 1970

Q: Do you remember the first time you met Arnold, or you were exposed to him maybe?

O: Yes, it was back in 1940 at MacDill Field. I had just been assigned there to the 49th Bomb Group. There is different nomenclature now. What was called a group is now called a wing, and what we called wings are now divisions. But I had just been assigned down to MacDill in 1940, and Gen Arnold came down there.

Q: He came down there on a pep talk, training, inspection?

O: Just down on inspection to meet some of the boys.

Q: Was Bill Streett commanding then? He came in later?

O: He came in later. Bob Walsh was down there at the time.

Q: What did Arnold do down there?

O: He was just down on an inspection trip and was doing a lot of talking to the crews. I was in Operations, and I was also Director of Operations. Mixed them up quite a bit in those days.

Q: You went from there to the 8th AF?

O: We left, they formed the 97th Group was the first B-17 group to go to England during the war, and they transferred the 29th to the 97th. Col Cousland was Commander of that. About the time they were going overseas, why, they pulled me out of the 97th, much to my disappointment. I went down to talk to them and they said they were going to give me a group later. This was all wrong, I was just a Major at that time. We moved there in the spring of '42, and went to Boise, Idaho. The first group that was formed was the 96th and they did give it to me, I was a LTCOL at the time, probably the only one to take a group to England. (The 97th Group in training for 8th AF duty). We went up and opened up the Walla Walla base for a month,

in the month of September 1942. Then we went up and opened up Rapid City in South Dakota. Then a month later we went up to Pocatello, Idaho and then we went down and opened up four bases as part of this training.

Q: Was that part of the 2nd AF?

O: Yes, Bob Olds, who was no relation of mine. His son Robin is at the AF Academy. Bob commanded the 2nd AF with his headquarters at Ft. George Wright, Spokane.

Q: Then they moved it shortly thereafter to Colorado Springs?

O: Yes, but I think they were still there when Bob died. Bob died in '43, of course, I had already gone overseas.

Q: Davenport Johnson came in?

O: Yes, that's right, in fact, Davenport Johnson was one of my first commanders. I got through flying school in 1931, and was with the 3rd Tac Group at Ft. Crockett, Texas, and Davenport Johnson was the commander.

Q: He had a lot of trouble with Arnold, or Arnold had a lot of trouble with him?

O: I think a lot of people had a lot of trouble with Davenport.

Q: They were having a high accident rare, and I guess Arnold was needling him on it, and fina lly he took him out of there. In fact, K.B. Wolfe told me he was in the office when Davenport Johnson said: "All right, if you don't like it, relieve me." And Arnold said: "All right, you are relieved," and he brought in Bruce Butler."

O: I remember I had a go around with Davenport Johnson. We were just fixing to go overseas, and the Geramsn at this time were making these head on attacks. We had that single .50 caliber gun. So everybody

was saying that we should have twin .50s. At that time, Davenport Johnson was in Oklahoma City, and I went up there and told him I wanted to get some twin 50s in the nose of my B-17s. And he said: "Oh, what's the matter, are you going soft?" We had quite a knockdown and dragout, but I did get the twin 50s.

Q: He apparently had a lot of personality clashes with people, he was apparently a hard man to deal with.

O: Yes. From there, apparently, he went up to Alaska and retired.

Q: He was one of Arnold's early cronies, but Arnold took a lot of guys out of there if he felt they didn't cut the mustard.

O: The guy that replaced Davenport Johnson at Ft. Crockett--now this is going back to 1932--was Horace Hickam. And Horace was a LTCOL, of course, we didn't have too much rank in the Air Corps at that time.

Q: Everybody speaks very highly of him, saying he would have been one of the top commanders had he lived.

O: Yes, a lot of people think he might even have had Gen Arnold's job because he was quite senior, and real fine fellow.

Q: We are talking about Davenport Johnson, and personality problems he may have had with some commanders.

O: He was first commander of the 3rd Tac group when I got out of flying school in '32 and my first assignment, and then a few months after that, Horace Hickam took over. Horace got killed in an A-8. That was the first low wing airplane we had.

Q: What year was he killed?

O: That would have been late'32 or early '33.

Q: Anyway, after Gallant Field, I guess you went to the 8th AF.

O: Well, I took this group that they gave us, the 96th, and took it through this training deal. They had a peculiar deal, we were on

four different bases a month each and as I said we opened up Walla Walla, Washington, Rapid City, S.D., Pocatello, Idaho; and Pyote, Texas. The way I tell it, by that time we were so mad, we were ready to go hit the Germans, you know. And then we went over to England--one of the first early groups to go over there.

Q: Were you in on some of the first missions?

O: Yes, I got there real early and stayed there till it was over with. I personally flew 70 some odd missions, and our crews, we had to end at 25 missions before they went home.

Q: Did you do 70 in one stretch before...?

O: Yes, I went over there and stayed till the war was over. I started out as group commander, and ended up as division commander. I finally had five different bases and groups under my command during the war. I led the famous Oct 14, 1943 Schweinfurt raid.

Q: Black Thursday?

O: Yes. We lost 60 airplanes that day out of the 8th AF. The first division lost 45. I was in the third division, and we lost 15. I got shot out of formation and barely made it back. Every man in the airplane was either dead or wounded except one man. We had one man that wasn't wounded. We landed in England at a British base. The name of that place was Graves End. Col LeMay was commanding the 3rd Division at that time. I remember I called him and told him who it was, and he said: "They told me they saw you spinning in over the target." We actually got shot out of formation, and lost a couple of engines right after bombs away. It was a very good bombing job. My bombardier had been wounded twice but he got them right in there. Then, as we made a turn out, a bunch of fighters came in and took a couple of our engines out. So we stayed on in formation as long as we could, till

the fighters--they were pretty adept at jumping on cripples--and then we went in a big dive and went down to about 2,000-3,000 feet above the deck. There was 50% cloud cover and we had to fight our way all the way back. We had no idea where we were because one of my navigators was killed, and the other was seriously wounded. But they had given me a flight plan before we had taken off and I had tried to follow this flight plan but, taking all this evasive action, we had absolutely no idea where we were. When we hit the Channel, it was overcast. We threw everything in the airplane out. We were out of ammunition by that time, anyway. So we threw guns and radios and everything else out, and fortunately we happened to hit the English coast about 50-75 miles from where we were supposed to and we started up to East Anglia where our home base was. I said: "Let's don't push our luck any more," so we turned back and landed at Graves End and when we dropped our gear, we had a fire start up in the wing, and when we tried to put the flaps down, we got a good fire going. The main thing I knew we were probably still going 50 miles an hour when those British fire trucks were running along side of us, with foam and stuff. I had to ground loop the airplane to keep from going through a fence as we had no brakes.

Q: Did you hit the target?

O: Oh yes, it was a sack job. Right smack on that ball bearing works. I also led the first mission over to Russia.

Q: Oh, on June 2nd.

O: I've forgotten what the date was, but the first one out of England. They had flown one out of Italy prior to that time--by the 15th AF. But I led the first one of the 8th. If you remember, we got really clobbered on the ground.

Q: About three weeks later?

O: No, the day we landed there. We took off from England and bombed an oil refinery just south of Berlin, and then, instead of turning and going back like we normally did, we flew on over Poland to Russia, and we landed on three bases over there. I landed at Poltava.

Q: That's the one that got clobbered on June 23, 1944.

O: That's right.

Q: What was that, the next day?

O: It was that night. You mentioned Bob Walsh. Bob was in Moscow at the time. He came down there; he was there that night.

Q: He was in charge of the air group. Right, I had a long talk with him in the Pentagon.

O: I had 75 bombers at Poltava and 75 at Mirogorad and then I had 75 fighters. Finally, 75 went with us, and they were at Piryatin. When we landed there, we could see this aircraft up there, obviously a German ME 210, a reconnaissance plane. I thought we had better get these planes off the ground there. Oh no, and that night we were having dinner with this general, I remember his name was Perminov.

Q: Yes, he was the head of it?

O: That's right and that's when the Germans came there and really clobbered us. We lost possibly 75 airplanes there, and finally flew about 10 of them out. Completely destroyed about 52 of them on the ground-sitting there--no fuel in them.

Q: The Russians didn't want us to put in air defense, did they?

O: No, I tried to get Gen Perminov to let me dispatch my fighters out of Piryatin. But he said he had to get in touch with Moscow before

he could permit that, and in the meantime, of course, the thing was all over with. I had been told to get along with the Russians over there.

Q: They were always suspicious of Americans flying over Russia, weren't they?

O: Oh yes, if I could put my fighters out that night, I think we could have shot down every airplane they had up there. They had some of the oldest stuff they had, but the really did a good bombing mission. You were pretty safe as long as you stayed off that airfield.

Q: You had what, 51's, escort?

O: P-51s, yes.

Q: They would have really clobbered those Germans.

O: Oh yes, and they were refueled at Piryatin. It was just not more than 20 or 30 miles, at the most, over there. But the Russians would not give me permission to dispatch my fighters without getting permission from Moscow, and by that time it was all over with.

Q: I think you were pretty disgusted, and I guess the Russians were just as happy for the Americans to leave.

Q: Well that was pretty well near the end. Were there any more missions after that?

O: Yes, they flew I think maybe one, or two more of that type, so called shuttle missions. I know one more, and maybe two more. I'm not too sure about that.

Q: Eaker had led the first one from Italy. Didn't he fly the first one from Italy?

O: I don't think so, now Eaker was in command of all air force there.

Q: I seem to remember him being on a mission, but maybe I am wrong.

O: Gen Leon Johnson, I believe at that time was in command of the 15th. Now, when we left Russia, I got my remaining 75 or 80 bombers, and we bombed some targets on the way out and landed in Italy, and then I went over to the 15th AF Hqs. Then we stayed over and flew several missions with them because the weather was real lousy in England and then we finally left Italy and bombed some targets in France, on our way back to England.

Q: I guess by that time, the invasion of southern France was underway, DRAGOON. Was that to support that operation?

O: No, no.

Q: That started off August 14th.

O: I believe that started right after we were over there.

Q: Then you must have come in before DRAGOON.

O: We were just from Italy to England.

Q: For the same price you hit a couple of targets.

Q: Let's go back to the October 14th mission. After that, of course, Arnold was very upset. I guess everybody was upset--a lot of guys killed. Eaker didn't run any long range missions for sometime after that. Is that correct?

O: Well, yes, there was certainly a lot of adverse publicity, because we lost 60 airplanes with 10 men in each airplane.

Q: That was the second time we lost 60, we lost them in that Aug 17th, Schweinfurt-Regensburg, we lost 60.

O: Yes, now my outfit led that raid, and I was going to be the leader of that. But Curt LeMay said he might or might not, so he showed up at the last minute. I got into the Deputy Commander's airplane real quick, and he immediately took off, I was right behind him. But we had trouble right across the Channel, and that was the

only abort I had during the war. We had an engine run away, a prop run away. We would never had made it to altitude.

Q: You didn't miss much. After this Oct 14th mission, it became very difficult for Eaker. Arnold was unhappy. He was sending messages. Of course, he wanted Eaker to sustain the rate of missions and Eaker was unable to do this. Is this a correct evaluation?

O: They were, I'll give you a good example. All of those targets up around Dresden, those oil targets, and so forth--extremely deep penetrations. Those targets cost us overall, 300-400 airplanes in 20-25 missions, something like that. I know that I tried to get Curt, and Jimmy Doolittle, who at that time, was commanding the 8th to let us go in at a lower altitude, and clobber them once and for all. And he said: "Well, we just can't afford to lose that many airplanes." And I said: "Certainly we are going to lose more airplanes, but we get the job done. We might well lose 50-75 airplanes, and get the job done, rather than losing 15 to 20 every time we went over there." But they were not going to do it, they said public opinion back in the US just wouldn't stand any losses of that type which we would have to take. I wanted to go in about 12,000-14,000 feet. I said I would lead the thing, but I could not get the go-ahead on it.

Q: Did you have morale problems at that time, after that October 14th mission?

O: No, I did not. I might say this with a lot of pride. The 96th Group that I took over--as you know, early in the game, we were losing about 7% of our airplanes every mission. We were making the crews fly 25 missions, so 7 x 25, if you want to figure it that way, your chances of getting through was 175% against you. But I took 35 crews over there and we graduated 26 of them that flew 25 missions.

At the time these losses ran 7%, but I had a real hot outfit. We flew real tight formation which was a secret, frankly, keeping those airplanes really tucked in there. Two reasons: (1) you could combine your firepower against the fighters, and that was the big enemy in those days you know! (2) When they took a good look at you, and you were really tucked in there, and they saw another group or two down the line, that were a little loose, why they would leave you alone and go get on them. But I never had one instance of lack of moral fiber, this is what we called it over there at the time. There was a couple of other groups--the 94th and the 95th--that had as many as 60 or 70 cases of this lack of moral fiber, where the guy says: "I'm not going to fly anymore. I can't stand it." But we never had a single one in the 96th. I might say that I used pretty rough approach to that, if I thought that I had a little problem sometime. Now, of course, the famous 100 group, that lost the whole group twice--that caused a lot of comment. I was flying with them on the first leg and we were bombing a seaport, but on a Sunday afternoon was the next time I remember, when it seemed like all the rough ones came on Sunday. We were going against that walled city there deep in the heart of Germany. That was the second time they lost the entire group.

Q: I had an appointment with Jimmy Doolittle, but missed him.

O: Well, Jimmy was commander of the 8th AF, and that second time when they lost the whole group, he thought he had better go down there and see about the morale. Jimmy tells wonderful stories anyway about this young lieutenant was at the bar, feeling no pain, and finally looked at him and told him, he said: "General Eaker, I know what you are doing down here, you are down here checking on our MO-RALE, and I'll tell you what's the whole thing wrong with the

MO-RALE, there are too damn many generals coming around checking on our MO-RALE.

Q: After that Oct 14th mission, based on my looking at the dispatches, it seems to me that Arnold had just about made up his mind to take Eaker out of there. Was there any scuttlebutt or any discussion about whether Eaker was not long for that command?

O: No, I didn't understand it that way. Actually, that change between Eaker and Doolittle was made prior to Oct 14th mission.

Q: No, it was made in Dec 1943.

O: Yes, but this mission was in October, the 14th.

Q: Yes, so I say the change was made two months later.

O: I guess where I am crossed up here, Jimmy Doolittle was flying under Eaker and then Doolittle came down, I guess that's where I'm off. I know I remember Jimmy Doolittle called me up to Widewing headquarters.

O: If you remember, they had a real crisis real early over there when Eaker put some of the groups over Brest at about 12,000 feet.

Q: This was the submarine pen raids?

O: That's right, and they lost their tails on that one, and they relieved two of the commanders--Frank Robinson was one of them, and I forgot what theother fellow's name was. But they made such a protest of going in there at those alti[illegible]s, because, you know, all kind of flak.

Q: Not only that, but they had five ffet of concrete, pretty hard, I know. There were targets in Brest, La Pallice and St. Nazaire and Lorient.

O: We used to bomb those pens in there regularly. But this crisis came up there at Brest, and I think this is really when,

probably Gen Arnold, got a little sour on Gen Eaker at that time, I'm doing a certain amount of conjecturing here on that.

Q: Why, you mean for ordering those missions?

O: Well, they went in there, and they really got clobbered--that altitude and these commanders made such a fight of it, that they were both relieved. Frank Robinson and I forget the other guy's name was. Robinson had the 44th Group.

Q: And Arnold blamed Eaker for this, you think?

O: This is as I understood it.

Q: When, that was in '42, wasn't it?

O: Yes, that was in the fall of '42.

Q: I think, well, he might have been irritated for some time, but, of course, he was sending this stuff out to Eaker, and he had high confidence that once the 8th AF was built up to a large number, they'd be able to destroy all the strategic targets. But the German air opposition didn't evaporate. In fact, it got tougher. It seemed to get tougher, didn't it?

O: Oh yes, in those early days. Put it this way: soon after the Schweinfurt mission we started winning the air battles.

Q: You mean the October 14th mission?

O: Yes, that's when we really started winning the air battles. We had clobbered aircraft factories and we created some pretty heavy losses for them, through bomber defenses. Then by early '44, the fighters ceased to be the air menace that they had been up to that time.

Q: There was this famous "Big Week" in February, when they got everything up in the air, and they just clobbered the Germans.

O: That was February 1944. That was about the time we had won the air battle up there.

Q: How about the jet menace? Were you worried about the ME 262?

O: No. The first jet I saw in my life, in addition to the missions that I flew that I told you about previously--I flew quite a few missions, later on it was the P-51, but then I had that British Mosquito, in fact, Jeffrey de Havilland, himself, checked me out on a Mosquito, so I'd fly missions in a Mosquito and up and down the bomber column about 100 knots faster. So I would go up and down and here these guys in the planes were going up and down there. One day, z-z-zing, and I saw an airplane going by there. He almost cut my left wing off, it was an ME 262--first jet I ever saw in my life.

Q: Were you scared? It gave you pause.

O: But after that, Curt LeMay stopped me from flying any missions in the Mosquito because it had no guns in it. I talked him into letting me do the same thing in the P-51, and he agreed on that provided that I use wing men.

Q: By that time, the P-51s were coming in, and of course, the ME 262 didn't have much of a range. It ran out of gas pretty quick, I guess it could make 1 or 2 passes and then have to refuel.

O: Then what was the other, the ME-163, the rocket plane.

Q: Did that bother you?

Q: No, I don't think anybody ever bothered about that. Well, the fact that they never got those jets where they were a factor.

Q: It was really a nuisance. If they had gotten them in some larger numbers? Earlier?

O: Then it would have been a tremendous difference.

Q: Especially at that Normandy beachhead. You know, Eisenhower said something of great praise when the invasion was taking off on June 6. He said: "If you see any planes, they will be ours," which was a high compliment to the AF. Namely, the Air Force had knocked

the enemy out of the sky.

O: That was mostly true, too.

Q: And the invasion took place without more than a couple of German planes making a brief appearance and they got chased away.

O: On June 6th, I flew three missions myself that day, the first one, and then I flew two more.

Q: Tactical bombing of bridges, railroads?

O: No, we were bombing ahead of the landing troops.

Q: Hedgerows?

O: Just dropping the bombs in there on the enemy ground defenses. We just dropped many many tons of bombs, and put the airplanes down and back up again as fast as we could.

Q: You know, you remind me of something, Lesley McNair observing and getting killed. A case of short bombing. What happened there, do you know?

O: No, as I recall, tho, that was some tactical aircraft, wasn't it?

Q: I don't remember, it was one of these carpet bombing jobs where they were bombing ahead of the advancing troops.

O: It was short bombing, where he got killed, but I do not believe it was either the B-17s or the B-24s, I think it was some tactical bombing--probably the B-26s. I could be wrong.

Q: I don't remember who did it, but you know, it is kind of ironic because McNair, who was head of the Army Ground Forces for a while, was badgering Arnold for ground support aircraft. He was saying: "You guys are always flying high, wide and handsome. We need support on the ground." He was always hitting Arnold on this thing,and then he gets killed by this means. You know, it is kind of ironic.

O: Peter Masefield, the British writer, Peter was a very good friend of mine. Eaker called me up one day and told me, I'm sending Peter Masefield, who has been very critical of daylight bombing, and he said: "It's your job to sell him the daylight bombing, and I won't have any other answers." So Peter came down there and lived with me for about two weeks, and he was greatly impressed. We got to fly some real good missions at that time, and practically, very small losses. So then Peter wanted to fly one of these missions, and I said: "I'm sure I can probably get our people to approve it, but I don't know if we can get the Air Ministry to approve it or not." As it turned out, he got approval. We bombed one of the airfields in Paris, and it was a perfect mission. We did an exact job on the bombing, there was enough fighters up there to get us some action. In fact, Peter Masefield himself practically wore out a couple machine guns by himself, and he was sold after that.

Q: I'm glad you mention that, because I always wondered about that. I have been reading all the documents and Peter Masefield was a source of great concern because he was writing, was it the London Times or London Telegraph--he was writing these nasty articles about daylight bombing. This was right after Casablanca and then he quit, and he came around.

O: Well, he came around, Eaker called me up and told me, and said: "You will sell this guy on daylight bombing."

Q: I'm glad to know this. Now I know why he turned around.

O: Peter was right down there, had to live with the crews, every briefing and everything else, and it just happened we flew a bunch of real fine missions about that time.

Q: Did you see Arnold, right around Labor Day 1943,he came to visit for a week?

O: Yes, I remember that.

Q: Did you meet him? I think it was the first part of September.

O: Oh yes.

Q: He went around and gave a lot of pep talks. I was told that he and Eaker had a knock-down and drag-out argument in the Claridges Hotel.

O: I would know nothing about that.

Q: This badgering of Eaker to get more up.

O: That's right and it was well proven. We went over there-- I think I took 37 or 38 airplanes over, and 35 crews. We graduated 26 of them which I was always proud of, because the loss rate was so high at that time. But then we thought building those groups up, and we put about 60 airplanes in each group, and about 90 groups, and we would fly every damn airplane we could get up every day, you know. Of course, at that time, also, they went in for the blind bombing. In fact, my outfit there was the training center for that.

Q: H2X?

O: The 413th Squadron was the one that developed that system.

Q: That H2X?

O: Yes, and that's when we started doing the blind bombing and doing pretty well.

Q: Do you feel that Arnold was unreasonable? Whatever you did, he wanted more. He never was satisfied.

O: I think I'm prejudiced, but I think that his philosophy, his thinking and so forth was right down the line, exactly. And when he was able to put it over to the groups in the field over there, and our

leaders--of course, I, being one, at the lower echelon at fighting end of it--that's when we started winning the war.

Q: Then you feel that he was not going beyond the bounds of propriety or command? In other words, he was asking too much?

O: Absolutely not, I think that he was one of the greatest leaders in warfare at any time. His thinking was right down the middle, and by sheer determination, and so forth he put that force over there. That enabled us to win the war. And he was absolutely right. The more effort you put in there, the less losses you were going to have, and the more targets you were going to knock out.

Q: Some of the problems they were trying to solve were wing tanks on the P38 and the P-47. They were getting some cardboard wing tanks from the British. Do you remember that?

O: No, of course, we got the Jugs first--the P-47s. They were like the Spits. They couldn't go anywhere. They'd take us across the Channel, then turn around and come back.

Q: Yes, but weren't they trying to put some wing tanks on them to get range?

O: Oh yes, we were screaming for that, to get some wing tanks, so they could escort us.

Q: Did you ever discuss with your colleagues--who dropped the ball on that? Or did anybody drop the ball?

O: It was my thinking all along, that any balls that were dropped were back in industry, back here. That we just didn't get the things fast enough--the long range drop tanks, on both the Jugs and P-38s. That P-51 really solved the problem because we would go as far as Dresden. I use the term Dresden. What's that big oilfield in there? Well...

Q: Let me ask you about the P-51. We had a P-51. It was low level. It had the Allison engine, and it wasn't much good. The way I read it, the British came up with the Merlin,you know, the 61 engine. They put that in there, and suddenly it became a great plane. So it was the British who probably discovered that. Is that a fair estimate of what happened?

O: If it is, I don't know that.

Q: Did Tommy Hitchcock have anything to do with recommending the P-51?

O: I wouldn't know. Again, you have to keep in mind that I'm only in the fighting force.

Q: The guys were talking a lot. Was there any discussion about why we didn't get the P-51 before?

O: No, actually everybody seemed to have been pretty well satisfied with the P-47 if they could get some long range tanks on the thing. They were like the Spits. But they would have to turn around after we crossed the Channel. I remember one time in Sep 1943, I led a mission on the Renault works, right in Paris, on the Seine River, you know. When we bomb in areas like that, the bombing had better be good or you are in trouble. We went in there, and we got hit pretty hard as we went in on the target, and we turned around and started back late in the afternoon. The sun was right in our faces and as we headed back toward England and our P-47s were supposed to meet us at a certain place much further down the line. This is when they got a few wing tanks. And the gunners called off some fighters at 6 o'clock high. I cocked my head around, took a look at them, and they were making an "S" maneuver above us, but gaining. So I called out over

the radio, I said: "Watch those fighters, they don't look like P-47s to me." They had the 190s, and the 109s. I said I think they are 190s, and they were. Then they did half rolls and came back through, and we were sitting there waiting for them, and we were still using tracers in those days, and this is the darnest thing I've ever seen in my life. There were hundreds and hundreds of thousands of tracers going out. We must have knocked down half of those fighters at that time, and then a little further on, here came our 47s, but the Germans were trying to make out like they were our fighter cover.

Q: That's a dirty trick. You know, talking about knocking down a lot of planes. Do you remember an occasion in Russia when the Russians started shooting at our 51s and we knocked down a whole bunch of Yaks. Twining told me about this.

O: Yes, I heard that story.

Q: You weren't in on that when you were over there?

O: No, actually that night over in Russia, Poltava, when the Germans were bombing us, the Russians had a lot of anti-aircraft there, but they didn't have any way of firing it. They were just shooting it up in the air. I guess 30 minutes after the last German bomber had gone by, they were still firing that stuff up there, and I'm sure they didn't hit an airplane all night long. But they were throwing a lot of metal up there. In fact, a lot of that was falling around us.

Q: Let me ask you about the XB-40 and XB-41, this was the armored escort idea.

O: It didn't work out. It was a bust. The whole idea was to feed a few of them very heavily armored planes--a lot of guns on them. It never worked out.

Q: Why?

O: Well, in the first place, the aircraft were too heavy. They couldn't maintain speed with the other formations.

Q: Especially when you wanted to get out of there?

O: That's right, and you had to adjust yourself to them. That just subjected you to more danger.

Q: So they weren't defending you; they were dragging you down?

O: I will say that it was a complete bust.

Q: Whoseidea was that?

O: I don't know. Somebody in Washington, I'm sure. Putting these very heavy armored and armed B-17s up there.

Q: What was your next contact with Arnold? You were in Europe, all the way through?

O: I stayed till July 1945 till it was all over with, and then I was going to Okinawa. They were going to move the 8th AF toOkinawa. I was one of the few generals that General Arnold was going to let go out to the Pacific. You know, most of the generals that fought the war over in Europe came back and took over administrative jobs of various types in the US and the ones that were over here, that had been in the Pentagon, and the training command, all that stuff, were going out to the Pacific. But I was one of the people that Gen Arnold sent--General Doolittle asked if I could go along--and Gen Arnold agreed on it.

Q: This was the idea of getting the best team out there and finishing the war as quickly as possible?

O: I'd like to think of it that way, Gen Doolittle asked for me to go and Gen Arnold approved it.

Q: You had had 70 missions, and you had done more than your share.

O: I was looking forward going over with Doolittle, I wanted to get into the B-29 end of it.

Q: Did you ever get into the B-29s?

O: No, when I was on my way over there, why that was in Aug 1945 when the war was over, when they dropped the atomic weapons. The war was over, so I had already been overseas 3 years, so I ended up another year with Air Transport Command over in the Pacific, with headquarters out in Manila.

Q: I see here, you were assigned to Hqs AAF, in Washington for a couple of months. This is right around VE Day.

O: That was just a holding assignment, at the end of the war, to find an assignment for me. That's when Gen George got me assigned over to ATC.

O: Funny story about Gen Arnold--this is after he had retired out to Sonoma. He had a son, who went to West Point. So he used to come out, and I moved my headquarters over to Travis at that time. Of course, he would come out there pretty often, because Sonoma was pretty close by. One night, his son was coming in on a vacation from West Point...

Q: This is David, the youngest.

O: I believe so, yes, and generally, General Arnold is there to pick him up. So he gets to the gate, and I go in, and he says: "I'm Gen Arnold" and the guard said: "Do you have a pass?" And he said: "I have an ID." "Well, you will have to go to that little house over there, and get permission to get on the plane." So he goes on over there, you know, and frankly, I think most of these guys had never heard of Hap Arnold. A bunch of kids....

Q: Was he wearing a uniform?

O: No, see he was retired. He had just come out to pick his son up, who was coming in on an aircraft on the Stateman flight. Anyway, took him 20-30 minutes to get on the base, so he drove on down to the operation end of the field, at terminal, he just drove out on the flight line. He drove all up and down the flight line, and he drove all up and down the flight line, and he drove up and down the runway, the taxiways. Then he came back up there, and he said: "Who is the base commander?" Of course, I had the chief command; I had the big command. Col Danny Ainsworth, he was the base commander and Danny said he never had such a hard time in his life. Here it takes Gen Arnold 20-30 minutes to get on base, and he gets up there and drives up and down the runways and all over the ramp and everything else.

Q: That was typical of him. If they pulled that on him, he was going to do the same to them. I guess they put a little security on that runway.

O: He gets Ainsworth down there and Ainsworth said that was the worst time he ever had in his life.

Q: Really ripped him. Do you remember him getting mad at anybody else. Did he ever get mad at you?

O: No, never did.

Q: You were one of his special people.

O: Well, I'd like to think so.

Q: Partly because he himself was denied the privilege of getting into a shooting war and those who had stellar records, I think he admired or envied.

O: I knew a time he came over there, about Sep 1943--he particularly asked and I went into the Widewing headquarters. He wanted to see me and talk to me. We had quite a little talk. He wanted my ideas about what I thought of what we were doing over there, and how it could be improved. He was a very attentive listener, and knew what he was talking about. He was pretty knowledgeable.

Q: He would really press you about details?

O: Oh yes, he would talk about certain missions there.

Q: Just the two of you?

O: Yes.

Q: Did he give you any indication of his unhappiness with the way things were going or did he shield it?

O: As I recall, he did not, I mean he shielded it, as I recall he did not. But as one of the combat commanders over there, he wrung me dry.

Q: This was really a debriefing then.

O: I know some of the missions that I had flown there, that he had me go into great detail. Some of the things that went wrong, and how they could be improved. As I said, he was extremely knowledgeable, I was very surprised with the knowledge he had.

Q: He was reading those dispatches when they came in--the operation reports, the debriefing reports.

O: If you happened to say something humorous to him, he seemed to get a big kick out of it. That was one of the things. When you reminisce now, you talk about more of the humorous things. At the time it wasn't funny.

Q: I was told that he had a smile on his face, but it didn't mean he was happy. Is this a fair comment?

O: I think so. He was extremely serious. He was always serious. Now he might put on a little bit of a front, with this smile, but it was no nonsense. It was all business.

Q: Did you ever see him dress anybody down?

O: No, I don't think I never did. Again, he was the type of guy that I always thought that I was. If I wanted to dress somebody down, I would be dressing down their boss and not them. I used go give Colonels and Generals hell, but not LTs and Captains. boss and not them.

Q: Looking at his role in WW II, you would evaluate it how?

O: Absolutely superior, I think that he was the difference between us winning the war as fast as we did--which wasn't fast enough of course--we would like to win it fast than that. But I think of him being in that job up there. That was a big difference. I don't think there was another man in the Air Corps that could have done the job he did up there, unless it would have been Horace Hickam, someone like this.

O: One comment I'd like to make about General Arnold here--and this was the opinion I think of a big majority of us out in the combat end of this thing. Seniority meant nothing to him. He wanted men that could get the job done, and I think that was proven pretty early back there when some of the people like Norstad and Kuter--some of the people close to him, that went up pretty fast. This is the reputation he had. The old Army system, where seniority ruled, didn't rule with him. He wanted people who would get the job done. This is the reputation he had with myself, and practically everybody I've ever talked to. I've talked to many people, hashing this over many times. This is the reputation that he had, that he would put his finger on people that he had reason to think were top notch and they were the ones he put in.

Q: Would you classify him more as a doer than a thinker?

O: I don't, I could differentiate that. I think he was both. I think he was a great doer and a great thinker, and I think that the record speaks for itself.

Q: My comment is along the lines of differentiating between him and, let's say, Billy Mitchell, who had long range ideas about airpower. Of course, Arnold had long range ideas about R&D, he had von Karman into this. So he was a thinker, too, in many respects. But would you say that his greatest achievement was getting a job done?

O: Exactly. I think that exactly what he did under very adverse circumstances, as Chief of the Air Corps, working with the Army and Navy, and really getting the Air Corps going.

Q: Well, he came in when it had so little. There were some hard times in those 1930s. Did you ever see him when he was at March Field?

O: No.

Q: You mentioned a little anecdote when we were outside in the garden. You know, about Mrs. Arnold. Would you tell that again?

O: The quarters at March Field. It is now occupied by the 15th AF and, of course, I commanded the 15th AF a little more than 10 years, and lived there. The Arnolds were the first ones to occupy those quarters--a real fine set of quarters. But when they first built March back in the late '20s, there wasn't a shrub or anything growing on the place. So Gen Arnold got all the officers out there, and made them kind of responsible for their own areas. They planted a lot of palm trees and all kinds of shrubbery, to the extent that right now it is a very beautiful place. But Mrs. Arnold had gone out there.

Q: Recently?

O: No, this was about 14 years ago, something like that. And she walked out to see the old quarters, and she walked out on the

patio, and she said: "Oh, I wonder what they did with my little palm trees out there." The things were about 3 feet through and tower way up. She was looking for the little palm trees on the ground.

Q: She was a great gardener and loves to see things grow. She loves animals and so did he. You know, when the war was over, even before the war was over, toward the end, Arnold lost all interest in Washington. He was busy arranging for his Ranch. He was busy corresponding with a guy named Hansen out at Sonoma. He was telling him where to put the tile; where to put in the water supply. He couldn't wait until he left Washington. Actually, he left in Feb 1946, but Tooey Spaatz was the Acting Commander long before that. Arnold was out of there more than he was in. Then he officially turned over the command to Spaatz in March 1946. Did he ever talk to you about the farm, his Ranch?

O: Oh yes, I've been out to his place several times. I went to Travis commanding the East Pacific of the ATC in July of 1946, and he had just arrived out there a few months before that, and I talked to him quite a few times.

Q: You sat under his famous oak tree?

O: Oh yes.

Q: And he loved that ranch, didn't he?

O: Oh yes. He was completely wrapped up in it.

Q: He didn't miss Washington at all, did he?

O: No, I mean the war was over, he got rid of that responsibility, and he was going to enjoy life, and try to make out the best he knew how.

Q: You know he was appointed the Commissioner of Fish and Game in California when he first came there, and he received a wistful letter

from Marshall. Marshall had been dragged off by Truman to go to China, and tried to perform "Mission Impossible." This was truly a mission impossible--bringing the communists and Chiang Kai shek together, Marshall wrote him this letter saying, I wish I was out there fishing with you. Of course, Hap Arnold had taken Marshall on a couple of fishing trips. Marshall also was a tremendously dynamic man and never had a chance to relax. He thought Arnold was relaxing out on his far while he was out there trying to do this job. Did he ever talk to you about Marshall?

O: No, I don't recall anything other than the big responsibility, where Marshall would have liked to been out of Washington, just like Arnold. He would have liked to been mixed up in the combat end of it.

Q: Did you ever see them together?

O: No, I don't believe I ever did.

Q: What did you and Arnold talk about at the Ranch, just general things, and future of airpower?

O: Yes, we were reminiscing about the war, and the future of airpower, that sort of stuff.

Q: Did he ever talk about the Russians?

O: Yes, we had quite a bit about that. I told him about my experiences when I was over there on that first shuttle mission, you know, he got a big kick out of the story of Perminov. When we went over, on that mission, we took certain supplies and such things as certain basic exchange things, cigarettes and that stuff. We had a little "medicinal" whiskey. It was for that purpose. After we lost all those airplanes that time, we had about 600 men that the Air Transport Command had to bring back down through Tehran, via Egypt

and back to England, because they had no airplanes. We had a surplus of these supplies, things like cigarettes. So about the day before I was leaving, I was to fly back to Italy the next day, to bomb targets in Romania on the way back. I got up half dozen cartons of American cigarettes and 3 or 4 bottles of liquor, and went over to Gen. Perminov's office and presented it to him as a present from me. Of course, he didn't speak a word of English, and I didn't speak a word of Russian, but he had a gal officer, interpretor, about the equivalent of a Major or something like that. She spoke real fluent English, and so we conversed this way. He thanked me very profusely for these things, and I went on back down to where I was staying, and within less than an hour, Gen. Perminov showed up with this interpreter, and he presented to me exactly the same number of Russian cigarettes and vodka that I had given him.

Q: This was a diplomatic exchange rather than a gesture of friendliness.

O: Also, to me, it meant they weren't accepting a whole lot.

Q: He might have checked with headquarters, and they made a diplomatic exchange while this on your part was pure friendship.

O: Oh yes, I had extra supplies. I couldn't get them all in the airplane, anyway. Not that we had that much, but we had to put in ammunition and gasoline.

Q: Did you tell Arnold this story?

O: Oh yes, that's what I said, he got a big kick out of Gen. Perminov.

Q: He wrote several articles in the postwar period, namely, about the Russians who were hard to get along with. Basically his argument was, they were not to be trusted.

O: Of course, you have to admire the Russians at that time. They **really** fought that war. That night that we got bombed out at Poltava, I saw two or three things that night that were almost unbelievable. The first airplane came over and dropped a bunch of flares, and they saw these B-17s, and it was almost like bombing fish in a barrel. Our planes were burning all over the place down there. These Germans had also, without knowing it at the time, dropped tens of thousands of anti-personnel bombs,--the old butterlfy bombs--that type. As I said, if you stayed on the airfield that night, it was pretty safe. I left toward the end of the bombing, but sat at the edge of the field, and here these airplanes burning all over the place out there, and I heard this noise, and I looked around. Here came, must have been a couple hundred Russian women soldiers, marching. They had shovels over their shoulders and they were singing. This was their firefighting group, these gals walked out there and stepped on anti-personnel bombs and I don't know how many of them got killed. Then, the next day...

Q: Trying to put out the fires?

O: Oh yes. They sent them down there to put out fires with shovels and dirt, which is impossible in burning airplanes. The next day, about noon--they had these anti-personnel bombs all over the place, so it was off limits to everybody. The next day, the Russians had a very unqiue way of clearing that, they put a line of a couple hundred men, something like that. They would walk very slowly down there. They would see a butterfly bomb, or one of the other types, and they would call halt. The guy closest to it--it was his job to disarm this bomb. If you just touch those butterflies, they would go. They called them butterfly bombs because when they hit the ground, the little

arms went out. But shortly before this, we had a rain shower, and it sounded like young war going on out there, because raindrops were setting those things off. That probably saved a lot of people's lives. Then there was a butterfly bomb and he was closest to it. It was up to him to get this bomb, and he would go back and throw it and hit the ground, and might or might not get by with this, but this is the way that they cleared that airfield at Poltava of those anti-personnel bombs.

Q: Great risk of life.

O: Human lives meant nothing to them. They had a job to do and they went ahead and did it.

Q: Eaker told me a story about how these women got out there to protect the planes, when he came up there. And they had guards out there. They had these women out there, helping with the runway.

O: I was worried about my own troops. I made sure that I had at least one man left on each airplane, as we landed that day out of gas. It was a long flight from England. It was a sod field, no runways, Airplanes were landing in every direction, just to get on the ground with their tanks showing empty. I was one of the last to land--the leader there. We didn't have to juggle the throttle much, so we had more fuel left than those wing men, just sitting there, keeping up the formation there. But I made a point to be sure that we had someone at each airplane at night, because I was greatly worried about these guys, but we actually never lost a man until that bombing. Because when the airplanes started blowing up, we had some men wounded, but we got everybody out of there. We had a tent city at the edge of the field. We didn't have a single man killed, quite a few wounded.

Q: Did you have anything to do with Perre Cabell?

O: Oh yes, he was my Deputy over there for quite a while. In fact, it is quite a story. Ira Eaker called me up. And as you know, Cabell was Gen Arnold's fair haired boys, and Ira Eaker called me up one day from Widening and told me that we've got a Colone over there--Cabell, who Gen Arnold has sent over here, and he wants him promoted to BG, but to do it right. He wants to give him a command and he said: "I've got a proposition I want to make to you." He said: "You are the most junior division commander we have," which I was before. Because I took a group at LTCOL and I made General pretty soon after that. But Eaker said: "What I want to do is send Cabell down there and let him take over as Commander of your division, but with the full understanding that he's taking over this job in name only--that you are still commander of the group and responsible for it, and he will not interfere with you, but you will be his Deputy. Now, is that all right with you?" I said: "Sure, if he understands it. The thing is all right with me." Pearre said he will understand it. So Cabell came down there, and under the rules at that time, he was supposed to have this command for a month. So they made him commander of the 45th Air Division and made me his deputy, with this understanding--that he had nothing to do with running the wing. I would run the wing. It was towards getting him promoted. So almost exactly to the month, Cabell was promoted and they immediately moved him out to the job that they wanted him for.

Q: Where did he go from there?

O: He went down to Spaatz headquarters.

Q: He was sort of Plans and Operations. He worked on this Combined Bomber Operation plan--the strategic bombing plan. I guess they wanted him in a Plans capacity.

O: I thought Pearre was a great guy, but there is a little funny story connected with that. Some time after that, after Cabell had left, I was talking to LeMay and LeMay said: "If you were to make a thousand or two dollars would you give me half of it?" And I said well: " I don't think so, if I had a thousand dollars I would get it anyway." So he told me I drew retroactive pay--although I was still a Colone--I drew pay as a BG from then on until I was promoted to BG. There were four things that were necessary. (1) The job has to authorize a general--all right, it did, (2) It had to have been occupied by a general. Well, I think Cabell kept it for one day, and then was promoted, but the job had been occupied. (3) You had to have held the job not by reasons of seniority but by DP--direction of the President, in other words, other people were senior to me. At one time I think I was the 12th ranking guy in my command. I had about 11 Colonels senior to me in my command working for me. I've forgotten what the fourth one was. But anyway, as a result, that one day that Cabell was commanding there as a BG before they moved him out, I drew I don't know how much it was.

Q: Was he a good commander?

O: He was one of my favorite people. In fact, I just had a letter from him within the last week or two.

Q: Did he ever mention my talking to him? I saw him several months ago.

O: No, I don't believe he did.

Q: The reason I mention Cabell is that he and Norstad were the first of Arnold's Advisory Counceil. You know, Jake Smart came in later and then Rosie O'Donnell and a couple of others.

O: That's what I said earlier, he picked out people regardless of what rank they were. They became advisors.

Q: I saw Norstad in NY and he said one of the things Arnold told these fellows: "I want you guys to do my thinking for me." That's why I said to you I thought he was more of a doer than a thinker, and he said: "If I ever catch you in operations, I'll chop you down." These fellows had a lot of power, because everybody knew they were close to the throne. Did they, like Norstad, ever come out there and bother you or bother other people out there?

O: No, they would come over there infrequently and sometimes I would see them, or we would have meetings...

Q: But they were not regarded as hatchet men?

O: No, no.

Q: Just observing for Arnold?

O: I worked for Kuter, when MATS was first formed. He picked me out to be the first commander of the Atlantic Division. I had headquarters at Westover in 1948 when the MATS was formed. They supposedly combined the Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service.

Q: The story of how Cabell got lost? Yes, I'd like to hear it.

O: When you walk down those long corridors in the Pentagon, you come to the rest rooms, they used to have them spelled out laterally, WOMEN or MEN. As a result of what happened, they spelled them vertically. What happened was Cabell had a lot of things to do, but he had to go to the bathroom. He walks down the hall and he sees "MEN" and he quit looking and right on in a booth. About that time he heard someone come in, and they went into the booth next door and looked over there and saw a pair of heels. He thought this woman was in the wrong place.

Then when somebody else came in, and gets in the other booth next to him. About that time, he hears a bunch of women's voices--some more had come in. It suddenly dawned on Cabell that they weren't in the wrong place, he is. So, he couldn't have his feet on the ground. He puthis feet up and was in there about an hour. About the time he went in there, Arnold wanted him, and he had everybody in the Pentagon looking for him. Pearre is in the woman's rest room trying to find an opportunity to get out.

Q: Did he ever tell Arnold why?

O: Oh yes, in fact, we were laughing about that with Gen Arnold about that one time up at Sonoma.

Q: Was it Arnold that told you about that?

O: No, Cabell and Arnold knew all about it. It was all over the Pentagon. He told the story himself.

Q: Did you ever hear the story about Arnold pushing the button, or grabbing people in the halls? Did you ever hear this story, about Arnold, if he had a job to do and he saw somebody in the hall he liked, he'd grab them to do a job?

O: Yes, I've heard.

Q: Do you know of any specific instances where that happened?

O: No, I can't, but I do remember there was a slight criticism of Arnold that he would do that sometimes, and nobody would know anything about it except he and the guy he had said it to. Things would get a little bit twisted and mixed up a bit.

Q: This tendency to go out of channels, again this man in a hurry, a man trying to get the job done, and he wasn't patient enough to wait for the thing to work itself through the Air Staff.

O: He would give somebody a job, meet them in the hallway, something like that. Then he would not make a memorandum or tell anybody else, forget about it. This is one of the very few criticisms that I have heard of Arnold.

Q: Well, it's criticism and yet it's praise in a sense that this was his way of operating. He had all these things he had to do and he was impatient to complete them.

dlw
5-19 682-6039

3 March 1970

Lieut. General Archie J. Old, Jr; USAF (Ret)
1427 Ransom Road
Riverside, Calif. 92506

Dear General Old:

As you may know, John Loosbrock editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past couple of months I've been interviewing some friends and associates of yours and of General Arnold's. Among them are Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Hansell, McKee, Quesada, Bob Walsh, Howard Davidson, Idwal Edwards, Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others. I also had a long interview with Jackie Cochran the other day.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City within the past six months.

You were associated with General Arnold in some critical undertakings, and I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you at a time and place convenient for you.

I'll be going out to Norton AFB next week to help on a documentary movie of General Arnold to be used by the Arnold Air Society and other Air Force groups. I'll be in your area

for several days in mid-March and will take the liberty to phone for an appointment. I had in mind some time during the week of 16-20 March an interview of about 90 minutes.

If you wish to drop me a note, the enclosed envelope will get to me.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Encl

Retired 31 Aug 65

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
Directorate of Information
March Air Force Base, California

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARCHIE J. OLD, JR., USAF

Part I - Narrative

Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr., Fifteenth Air Force Commander, was born at Farmersville, Texas, August 1, 1906. He attended Trinity University and Texas University, studying civil engineering, then began his military career in 1930 by enlisting in the Texas National Guard.

Appointed a flying cadet in 1931, he completed his flying training and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Reserve. Assigned to active duty with the 13th Attack Squadron at Fort Crockett, Texas, he served until February 1933.

In 1940 he was ordered to extended active duty and assigned to the 52d Bombardment Squadron at MacDill Field, Florida. The following February he became an operations officer in the 29th Bombardment Group at that base, then a squadron commander and finally deputy commander of the group, moving with it to Gowen Field, Idaho. In September 1942, now a lieutenant colonel, he assumed command of the 96th Bombardment Group at Walla Walla, Washington.

The 96th transferred to the European Theater the following January and began flying combat missions against German targets. Colonel Old led the October 14, 1943 raid against the ballbearing works at Schweinfurt, and later the first shuttle bomb run from England to Russia. In all, he flew 43 combat missions.

Following the Schweinfurt raid, he became Commander of the 45th Bombardment Wing, and in November 1944 was promoted to brigadier general.

. Eight months later General Old was assigned to AAF Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Reassigned to Air Transport Command Headquarters, he became Commanding General of the Southwest Pacific Wing of ATC in September 1945 and in early 1946 assumed the additional duty as Commanding General of the China Wing.

He became Commanding General of the 530th Air Transport Wing of the Military Air Transport Service in June 1948 and a month later was named Commander of the Atlantic Division of MATS at Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

Promoted to major general in January 1950, he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Eighth Air Force at Carswell Air Force Base, Texas, two months later. During his assignment at Carswell General Old twice served as Acting Commanding General of Eighth Air Force.

In August 1951 General Old became Commanding General of the 5th Air Division in French Morocco.

Assigned to SAC Headquarters, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, in 1953, he served as Deputy Director of Operations for three months and as Director of Operations for fifteen months.

He assumed command of the Fifteenth Air Force August 22, 1955.

General Old led a round-the-world non-stop flight of B-52 stratofortresses in 1957 to prove the range of SAC's heavy bombers.

He was promoted to his present rank of lieutenant general on June 30, 1959.

He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with four Oak Leaf Clusters, Air Medal with eight Oak Leaf Clusters and the Purple Heart. His foreign decorations include the French Legion of Honor, French Croix de Guerre with Palm, French

Moroccan Order of Ouissam Alouite Cherifien, Belgian Croix de Guerre with Palm, British Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Russian Order of Suvorov.

Part II - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

1. Born 1 August 1906, Farmersville, Texas; Father - Archie J. Old, Sr. Mother - Mrs. Archie J. Old, Sr. (Both deceased).

2. Married 3 January 1933; Wife - Annis Allday Old; One child: Frances Adeline.

3. Hometown Address: Atlanta, Texas.

B. Education

1. Graduate Josephine High School, Josephine, Texas, 1922.

2. Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas, 1924-1925.

3. Texas University, Austin, Texas, 1926-1927.

C. Service Dates

1. Feb 1931 - Feb 1932	Aviation Cadet at Brooks and Kelly Fields, Texas. Commissioned second lieutenant upon completion of flying training.
2. Feb 1932 - Feb 1933	Pilot and squdron officer duty, 13th Attack Squadron, Fort Crockett, Texas.
3. Feb 1933 - Sep 1940	Inactive duty, Air Reserve.
4. Sep 1940 - Feb 1941	Assistant armament and chemical officer, 52d Bombardment Squadron, MacDill Field, Fla.
5. Feb 1941 - Sep 1942	Operations officer, squadron commander and deputy commander, 29th Bombardment Group, MacDill Field, Florida, and Gowen Field, Idaho.
6. Sep 1942 - Jan 1943	Commander, 96th Bombardment Group, Walla Walla, Washington.
7. Jan 1943 - Dec 1943	Commander, 96th Bombardment Group in England.
8. Dec 1943 - Jul 1945	Commander, 45th Bombardment Wing in England.
9. Jul 1945 - Aug 1945	Assigned to duty at AAF Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
10. Aug 1945 - Sep 1945	Assigned to Air Transport Command Headquarters, Gravelly Point, Virginia.
11. Sep 1945 - Feb 1946	Commander, Southwest Pacific Wing, Air Transport Command.

12.	Feb 1946 - Jun 1948	Commander, Southwest Pacific Wing, Air Transport Command. Additional duty as Commander, China Wing, ATC.
13.	Jun 1948 - Jul 1948	Commander, 530th Air Transport Wing, Military Air Transport Service.
14.	Jul 1948 - Mar 1950	Commander, Atlantic Division, MATS, Westover AFB, Mass.
15.	Mar 1950 - Jun 1950	Deputy Commander, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas (SAC).
16.	Jun 1950 - Aug 1950	Acting Commanding General, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Forth Worth, Texas (SAC).
17.	Aug 1950 - Jan 1951	Deputy Commander, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas (SAC).
18.	Jan 1951 - Aug 1951	Acting Commanding General, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Forth Worth, Texas (SAC).
19.	Aug 1951 - Feb 1953	Commanding General, 5th Air Division, APO 30 and APO 118 (SAC).
20.	Feb 1953 - Feb 1953	Deputy Commander, Headquarters Second Air Force, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (SAC).
21.	Feb 1953 - May 1953	Deputy Director of Operations, Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska (SAC).
22.	May 1953 - Aug 1955	Director of Operations, Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska (SAC).
23.	Aug 1955 -	Commander, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, March AFB, California.

D. Decorations and Medals

Distinguished Service Cross

Silver Star with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Legion of Merit with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Distinguished Flying Cross with Four Oak Leaf Clusters

Air Medal with Eight Oak Leaf Clusters

Distinguished Unit Citation with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Purple Heart

French Croix de Guerre with Palm

French Legion of Honor

Belgian Croix de Guerre with Palm

French Moroccan Order of Ouissam Alouite Cherifien

British Distinguished Flying Cross

Russian Order of Suvorov

American Defense Service Medal

American Campaign Medal

European - Africa - Middle Eastern Campaign Medal

Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal

National Defense Service Medal

Air Force Longevity Service Award

Armed Forces Reserve Medal

E. Promotions

Grade	Temp	Permanent
2d Lieutenant	26 Feb 32	26 Feb 32
1st Lieutenant	30 Mar 35	30 Mar 35
Captain	16 Apr 41	16 Apr 41
Major	1 Feb 42	
Lieutenant Colonel	9 Jul 42	
Colonel	5 Jun 43	2 Apr 48
Brigadier General	19 Nov 44	21 Jul 52
Major General	27 Jan 50	10 Mar 58
Lieutenant General	30 Jun 59	

F. Unusual Experiences

1. Led the October 14, 1943 raid against the ballbearing works at Schweinfurt, Germany.

2. Led the first shuttle bomb run from England to Russia in June 1944, inaugurating the shuttle bombing of Germany during the late stages of World War II.

3. Is a member of the Caterpillar Club. He bailed out of a training plane early in his Air Force career at Barksdale Field, Louisiana, when the tail section of his plane broke off while he was doing aerobatics.

4. Led the first round-the-world non-stop flight of Boeing B-52 heavy bombers in January 1957. He took off in the lead plane of a three-plane flight from Castle Air Force Base, California, and 45 hours, 19 minutes later landed at March Air Force Base, California, after covering a distance of 24,325 miles while circling the globe.

Part III - Personalized Material

A. Interests

1. Is very keen on physical conditioning. Works out in the base gymnasium every chance he gets. Shoots a respectable game of golf. Carries a good average as a bowler. Likes hunting and fishing when he can find the time. Gin rummy expert.

2. Since his early military days in the Texas National Guard, General Old has always had the ability to get the most out of any project he undertook. Through insistence on efficiency, he always gets the best possible results.

3. Accepts a number of civic speaking engagements. Member of Methodist Church.

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations

1. Likes every kind of Mexican food. Prefers sports clothing. Likes modern homes.

2. Prefers professional Air Force-type reading material; also detective stories and historical books. No interest in art. Likes warm climate. Not talented but enjoys music (plays the organ a little) and his favorite scenery is oceans or mountains.

3. Always tells his staff, "It is easier and better to affect decisions before they are made, rather than try to do it afterwards." Expresses himselves a lot with similes.

4. The General has a dynamic nervousness which he keeps under control. Listening to a report from a staff officer, he shoots fast, brief questions. Awaiting the answer, he may run his left hand through his hair. First, he'll look the speaker directly in the eye and then turn his gaze to the ground or floor. He'll paw the earth or run with his right foot and then carefully pat back the misplaced ground or rumpled rug. Meanwhile, he's formulating another question almost before the previous one has been answered.

5. General Old doesn't make a fetish of being loved, or allow a desire to be a "good guy" to interfere with the job at hand. Nor does he feel he's anyone's Great White Father. When he's displeased, no honeyed words of censure fall from his lips. On the other hand, he will fight for his men with higher headquarters even more enthusiastically than headquarters may like. "We keep our troubles within the family," he says grinning. "To the outside world we present a solid front."

6. During World War II, General Old had many officers and enlisted men in his office for "conferences" on efficiency and the way he wanted missions flown. "By God, he can give you hell," one officer said, "but if he has saved my life by being thorough and demanding--and I sort of think he has--then he gets my vote no matter how often he has me on the carpet."

7. A staff officer at Fifteenth Air Force Headquarters recently said, "General Old is a pilot's pilot. Drawing on his vast experience as a combat pilot and flying know-how, he is acquainted with all operational and technical requirements facing this command. He is demanding, but asks nothing of his staff officers which he cannot do himself."

Interview LTGEN Archie Old, Riverside, California, 19 March 1970

Q: Do you remember the first time you met Arnold, or you were exposed to him maybe?

O: Yes, it was back in 1940 at MacDill Field. I had just been assigned there to the 49th Bomb Group. There is different nomenclature now. What was called a group is now called a wing, and what we called wings are now divisions. But I had just been assigned down to MacDill in 1940, and Gen Arnold came down there.

Q: He came down there on a pep talk, training, inspection?

O: Just down on inspection to meet some of the boys.

Q: Was Bill Streett commanding then? He came in later?

O: He came in later. Bob Walsh was down there at the time.

Q: What did Arnold do down there?

O: He was just down on an inspection trip and was doing a lot of talking to the crews. I was in Operations, and I was also Director of Operations. Mixed them up quite a bit in those days.

Q: You went from there to the 8th AF?

O: We left, they formed the 97th Group was the first B-17 group to go to England during the war, and they transferred the 29th to the 97th. Col Cousland was Commander of that. About the time they were going overseas, why, they pulled me out of the 97th, much to my disappointment. I went down to talk to them and they said they were going to give me a group later. This was all wrong, I was just a Major at that time. We moved there in the spring of '42, and went to Boise, Idaho. The first group that was formed was the 96th and they did give it to me, I was a LTCOL at the time, probably the only one to take a group to England. (The 97th Group in training for 8th AF duty). We went up and opened up the Walla Walla base for a month,

in the month of September 1942. Then we went up and opened up Rapid City in South Dakota. Then a month later we went up to Pocatello, Idaho and then we went down and opened up four bases as part of this training.

Q: Was that part of the 2nd AF?

O: Yes, Bob Olds, who was no relation of mine. His son Robin is at the AF Academy. Bob commanded the 2nd AF with his headquarters at Ft. George Wright, Spokane.

Q: Then they moved it shortly thereafter to Colorado Springs?

O: Yes, but I think they were still there when Bob died. Bob died in '43, of course, I had already gone overseas.

Q: Davenport Johnson came in?

O: Yes, that's right, in fact, Davenport Johnson was one of my first commanders. I got through flying school in 1931, and was with the 3rd Tac Group at Ft. Crockett, Texas, and Davenport Johnson was the commander.

Q: He had a lot of trouble with Arnold, or Arnold had a lot of trouble with him?

O: I think a lot of people had a lot of trouble with Davenport.

Q: They were having a high accident rare, and I guess Arnold was needling him on it, and finally he took him out of there. In fact, K.B. Wolfe told me he was in the office when Davenport Johnson said: "All right, if you don't like it, relieve me." And Arnold said: "All right, you are relieved," and he brought in Bruce Butler."

O: I remember I had a go around with Davenport Johnson. We were just fixing to go overseas, and the Geramsn at this time were making these head on attacks. We had that single .50 caliber gun. So everybody

was saying that we should have twin .50s. At that time, Davenport Johnson was in Oklahoma City, and I went up there and told him I wanted to get some twin 50s in the nose of my B-17s. And he said: "Oh, what's the matter, are you going soft?" We had quite a knockdown and dragout, but I did get the twin 50s.

Q: He apparently had a lot of personality clashes with people, he was apparently a hard man to deal with.

O: Yes. From there, apparently, he went up to Alaska and retired.

Q: He was one of Arnold's early cronies, but Arnold took a lot of guys out of there if he felt they didn't cut the mustard.

O: The guy that replaced Davenport Johnson at Ft. Crockett--now this is going back to 1932--was Horace Hickam. And Horace was a LTCOL, of course, we didn't have too much rank in the Air Corps at that time.

Q: Everybody speaks very highly of him, saying he would have been one of the top commanders had he lived.

O: Yes, a lot of people think he might even have had Gen Arnold's job because he was quite senior, and real fine fellow.

Q: We are talking about Davenport Johnson, and personality problems he may have had with some commanders.

O: He was first commander of the 3rd Tac group when I got out of flying school in '32 and my first assignment, and then a few months after that, Horace Hickam took over. Horace got killed in an A-8. That was the first low wing airplane we had.

Q: What year was he killed?

O: That would have been late'32 or early '33.

Q: Anyway, after Gallant Field, I guess you went to the 8th AF.

O: Well, I took this group that they gave us, the 96th, and took it through this training deal. They had a peculiar deal, we were on

four different bases a month each and as I said we opened up Walla Walla, Washington, Rapid City, S.D., Pocatello, Idaho; and Pyote, Texas. The way I tell it, by that time we were so mad, we were ready to go hit the Germans, you know. And then we went over to England--one of the first early groups to go over there.

Q: Were you in on some of the first missions?

O: Yes, I got there real early and stayed there till it was over with. I personally flew 70 some odd missions, and our crews, we had to end at 25 missions before they went home.

Q: Did you do 70 in one stretch before...?

O: Yes, I went over there and stayed till the war was over. I started out as group commander, and ended up as division commander. I finally had five different bases and groups under my command during the war. I led the famous Oct 14, 1943 Schweinfurt raid.

Q: Black Thursday?

O: Yes. We lost 60 airplanes that day out of the 8th AF. The first division lost 45. I was in the third division, and we lost 15. I got shot out of formation and barely made it back. Every man in the airplane was either dead or wounded except one man. We had one man that wasn't wounded. We landed in England at a British base. The name of that place was Graves End. Col LeMay was commanding the 3rd Division at that time. I remember I called him and told him who it was, and he said: "They told me they saw you spinning in over the target." We actually got shot out of formation, and lost a couple of engines right after bombs away. It was a very good bombing job. My bombardier had been wounded twice but he got them right in there. Then, as we made a turn out, a bunch of fighters came in and took a couple of our engines out. So we stayed on in formation as long as we could, till

the fighters--they were pretty adept at jumping on cripples--and then we went in a big dive and went down to about 2,000-3,000 feet above the deck. There was 50% cloud cover and we had to fight our way all the way back. We had no idea where we were because one of my navigators was killed, and the other was seriously wounded. But they had given me a flight plan before we had taken off and I had tried to follow this flight plan but, taking all this evasive action, we had absolutely no idea where we were. When we hit the Channel, it was overcast. We threw everything in the airplane out. We were out of ammunition by that time, anyway. So we threw guns and radios and everything else out, and fortunately we happened to hit the English coast about 50-75 miles from where we were supposed to and we started up to East Anglia where our home base was. I said: "Let's don't push our luck any more," so we turned back and landed at Graves End and when we dropped our gear, we had a fire start up in the wing, and when we tried to put the flaps down, we got a good fire going. The main thing I knew we were probably still going 50 miles an hour when those British fire trucks were running along side of us, with foam and stuff. I had to ground loop the airplane to keep from going through a fence as we had no brakes.

Q: Did you hit the target?

O: Oh yes, it was a sack job. Right smack on that ball bearing works. I also led the first mission over to Russia.

Q: Oh, on June 2nd.

O: I've forgotten what the date was, but the first one out of England. They had flown one out of Italy prior to that time--by the 15th AF. But I led the first one of the 8th. If you remember, we got really clobbered on the ground.

Q: About three weeks later?

O: No, the day we landed there. We took off from England and bombed an oil refinery just south of Berlin, and then, instead of turning and going back like we normally did, we flew on over Poland to Russia, and we landed on three bases over there. I landed at Poltava.

Q: That's the one that got clobbered on June 23, 1944.

O: That's right.

Q: What was that, the next day?

O: It was that night. You mentioned Bob Walsh. Bob was in Moscow at the time. He came down there; he was there that night.

Q: He was in charge of the air group. Right, I had a long talk with him in the Pentagon.

O: I had 75 bombers at Poltava and 75 at Mirogorad and then I had 75 fighters. Finally, 75 went with us, and they were at Piryatin. When we landed there, we could see this aircraft up there, obviously a German ME 210, a reconnaissance plane. I thought we had better get these planes off the ground there. Oh no, and that night we were having dinner with this general, I remember his name was Perminov.

Q: Yes, he was the head of it?

O: That's right and that's when the Germans came there and really clobbered us. We lost possibly 75 airplanes there, and finally flew about 10 of them out. Completely destroyed about 52 of them on the ground-sitting there--no fuel in them.

Q: The Russians didn't want us to put in air defense, did they?

O: No, I tried to get Gen Perminov to let me dispatch my fighters out of Piryatin. But he said he had to get in touch with Moscow before

he could permit that, and in the meantime, of course, the thing was all over with. I had been told to get along with the Russians over there.

Q: They were always suspicious of Americans flying over Russia, weren't they?

O: Oh yes, if I could put my fighters out that night, I think we could have shot down every airplane they had up there. They had some of the oldest stuff they had, but the really did a good bombing mission. You were pretty safe as long as you stayed off that airfield.

Q: You had what, 51's, escort?

O: P-51s, yes.

Q: They would have really clobbered those Germans.

O: Oh yes, and they were refueled at Piryatin. It was just not more than 20 or 30 miles, at the most, over there. But the Russians would not give me permission to dispatch my fighters without getting permission from Moscow, and by that time it was all over with.

Q: I think you were pretty disgusted, and I guess the Russians were just as happy for the Americans to leave.

Q: Well that was pretty well near the end. Were there any more missions after that?

O: Yes, they flew I think maybe one, or two more of that type, so called shuttle missions. I know one more, and maybe two more. I'm not too sure about that.

Q: Eaker had led the first one from Italy. Didn't he fly the first one from Italy?

O: I don't think so, now Eaker was in command of all air force there.

Q: I seem to remember him being on a mission, but maybe I am wrong.

O: Gen Leon Johnson, I believe at that time was in command of the 15th. Now, when we left Russia, I got my remaining 75 or 80 bombers, and we bombed some targets on the way out and landed in Italy, and then I went over to the 15th AF Hqs. Then we stayed over and flew several missions with them because the weather was real lousy in England and then we finally left Italy and bombed some targets in France, on our way back to England.

Q: I guess by that time, the invasion of southern France was underway, DRAGOON. Was that to support that operation?

O: No, no.

Q: That atarted off August 14th.

O: I believe that started right after we were over there.

Q: Then you must have come in before DRAGOON.

O: We were just from Italy to England.

Q: For the same price you hit a couple of targets.

Q: Let's go back to the October 14th mission. After that, of course, Arnold was very upset. I guess everybody was upset--a lot of guys killed. Eaker didn't run any long range missions for sometime after that. Is that correct?

O: Well, yes, there was certainly a lot of adverse publicity, because we lost 60 airplanes with 10 men in each airplane.

Q: That was the second time we lost 60, we lost them in that Aug 17th, Schweinfurt-Regensburg, we lost 60.

O: Yes, now my outfit led that raid, and I was going to be the leader of that. But Curt LeMay said he might or might not, so he showed up at the last minute. I got into the Deputy Commander's airplane real quick, and he immediately took off, I was right behind him. But we had trouble right across the Channel, and that was the

only abort I had during the war. We had an engine run away, a prop run away. We would never had made it to altitude.

Q: You didn't miss much. After this Oct 14th mission, it became very difficult for Eaker. Arnold was unhappy. He was sending messages. Of course, he wanted Eaker to sustain the rate of missions and Eaker was unable to do this. Is this a correct evaluation?

O: They were, I'll give you a good example. All of those targets up around Dresden, those oil targets, and so forth,--extremely deep penetrations. Those targets cost us overall, 300-400 airplanes in 20-25 missions, something like that. I know that I tried to get Curt, and Jimmy Doolittle, who at that time, was commanding the 8th to let us go in at a lower altitude, and clobber them once and for all. And he said: "Well, we just can't afford to lose that many airplanes." And I said: "Certainly we are going to lose more airplanes, but we get the job done. We might well lose 50-75 airplanes, and get the job done, rather than losing 15 to 20 every time we went over there." But they were not going to do it, they said public opinion back in the US just wouldn't stand any losses of that type which we would have to take. I wanted to go in about 12,000-14,000 feet. I said I would lead the thing, but I could not get the go-ahead on it.

Q: Did you have morale problems at that time, after that October 14th mission?

O: No, I did not. I might say this with a lot of pride. The 96th Group that I took over--as you know, early in the game, we were losing about 7% of our airplanes every mission. We were making the crews fly 25 missions, so 7 x 25, if you want to figure it that way, your chances of getting through was 175% against you. But I took 35 crews over there and we graduated 26 of them that flew 25 missions.

At the time these losses ran 7%, but I had a real hot outfit. We flew real tight formation which was a secret, frankly, keeping those airplanes really tucked in there. Two reasons: (1) you could combine your firepower against the fighters, and that was the big enemy in those days you know! (2) When they took a good look at you, and you were really tucked in there, and they saw another group or two down the line, that were a little loose, why they would leave you alone and go get on them. But I never had one instance of lack of moral fiber, this is what we called it over there at the time. There was a couple of other groups--the 94th and the 95th--that had as many as 60 or 70 cases of this lack of moral fiber, where the guy says: "I'm not going to fly anymore. I can't stand it." But we never had a single one in the 96th. I might say that I used pretty rough approach to that, if I thought that I had a little problem sometime. Now, of course, the famous 100 group, that lost the whole group twice--that caused a lot of comment. I was flying with them on the first leg and we were bombing a seaport, but on a Sunday afternoon was the next time I remember, when it seemed like all the rough ones came on Sunday. We were going against that walled city there deep in the heart of Germany. That was the second time they lost the entire group.

Q: I had an appointment with Jimmy Doolittle, but missed him.

O: Well, Jimmy was commander of the 8th AF, and that second time when they lost the whole group, he thought he had better go down there and see about the morale. Jimmy tells wonderful stories anyway about this young lieutenant was at the bar, feeling no pain, and finally looked at him and told him, he said: "General Eaker, I know what you are doing down here, you are down here checking on our MO-RALE, and I'll tell you what's the whole thing wrong with the

MO-RALE, there are too damn many generals coming around checking on our MO-RALE.

Q: After that Oct 14th mission, based on my looking at the dispatches, it seems to me that Arnold had just about made up his mind to take Eaker out of there. Was there any scuttlebutt or any discussion about whether Eaker was not long for that command?

O: No, I didn't understand it that way. Actually, that change between Eaker and Doolittle was made prior to Oct 14th mission.

Q: No, it was made in Dec 1943.

O: Yes, but this mission was in October, the 14th.

Q: Yes, so I say the change was made two months later.

O: I guess where I am crossed up here, Jimmy Doolittle was flying under Eaker and then Doolittle came down, I guess that's where I'm off. I know I remember Jimmy Doolittle called me up to Widewing headquarters.

O: If you remember, they had a real crisis real early over there when Eaker put some of the groups over Brest at about 12,000 feet.

Q: This was the submarine pen raids?

O: That's right, and they lost their tails on that one, and they relieved two of the commanders--Frank Robinson was one of them, and I forgot what theother fellow's name was. But they made such a protest of going in there at those altitudes, because, you know, all kind of flak.

Q: Not only that, but they had five ffet of concrete, pretty hard, I know. There were targets in Brest, La Pallice and St. Nazaire and Lorient.

O: We used to bomb those pens in there regularly. But this crisis came up there at Brest, and I think this is really when,

probably Gen Arnold, got a little sour on Gen Eaker at that time, I'm doing a certain amount of conjecturing here on that.

Q: Why, you mean for ordering those missions?

O: Well, they went in there, and they really got clobbered-- that altitude and these commanders made such a fight of it, that they were both relieved. Frank Robinson and I forget the other guy's name was. Robinson had the 44th Group.

Q: And Arnold blamed Eaker for this, you think?

O: This is as I understood it.

Q: When, that was in '42, wasn't it?

O: Yes, that was in the fall of '42.

Q: I think, well, he might have been irritated for some time, but, of course, he was sending this stuff out to Eaker, and he had high confidence that once the 8th AF was built up to a large number, they'd be able to destroy all the strategic targets. But the German air opposition didn't evaporate. In fact, it got tougher. It seemed to get tougher, didn't it?

O: Oh yes, in those early days. Put it this way: soon after the Schweinfurt mission we started winning the air battles.

Q: You mean the October 14th mission?

O: Yes, that's when we really started winning the air battles. We had clobbered aircraft factories and we created some pretty heavy losses for them, through bomber defenses. Then by early '44, the fighters ceased to be the air menace that they had been up to that time.

Q: There was this famous "Big Week" in February, when they got everything up in the air, and they just clobbered the Germans.

O: That was February 1944. That was about the time we had won the air battle up there.

Q: How about the jet menace? Were you worried about the ME 262?

O: No. The first jet I saw in my life, in addition to the missions that I flew that I told you about previously--I flew quite a few missions, later on it was the P-51, but then I had that British Mosquito, in fact, Jeffrey de Havilland, himself, checked me out on a Mosquito, so I'd fly missions in a Mosquito and up and down the bomber column about 100 knots faster. So I would go up and down and here these guys in the planes were going up and down there. One day, z-z-zing, and I saw an airplane going by there. He almost cut my left wing off, it was an ME 262--first jet I ever saw in my life.

Q: Were you scared? It gave you pause.

O: But after that, Curt LeMay stopped me from flying any missions in the Mosquito because it had no guns in it. I talked him into letting me do the same thing in the P=51, and he agreed on that provided that I use wing men.

Q: By that time, the P-51s were coming in, and of course, the ME 262 didn't have much of a range. It ran out of gas pretty quick, I guess it could make 1 or 2 passes and then have to refuel.

O: Then what was the other, the ME-163, the rocket plane.

Q: Did that bother you?

Q: No, I don't think anybody ever bothered about that. Well, the fact that they never got those jets where they were a factor.

Q: It was really a nuisance. If they had gotten them in some larger numbers? Earlier?

O: Then it would have been a tremendous difference.

Q: Especially at that Normandy beachhead. You know, Eisenhower said something of great praise when the invasion was taking off on June 6. He said: "If you see any planes, they will be ours," which was a high compliment to the AF. Namely, the Air Force had knocked

the enemy out of the sky.

O: That was mostly true, too.

Q: And the invasion took place without more than a couple of German planes making a brief appearance and they got chased away.

O: On June 6th, I flew three missions myself that day, the first one, and then I flew two more.

Q: Tactical bombing of bridges, railroads?

O: No, we were bombing ahead of the landing troops.

Q: Hedgerows?

O: Just dropping the bombs in there on the enemy ground defenses. We just dropped many many tons of bombs, and put the airplanes down and back up again as fast as we could.

Q: You know, you remind me of something, Lesley McNair observing and getting killed. A case of short bombing. What happened there, do you know?

O: No, as I recall, tho, that was some tactical aircraft, wasn't it?

Q: I don't remember, it was one of these carpet bombing jobs where they were bombing ahead of the advancing troops.

O: It was short bombing, where he got killed, but I do not believe it was either the B-17s or the B-24s, I think it was some tactical bombing--probably the B-26s. I could be wrong.

Q: I don't remember who did it, but you know, it is kind of ironic because McNair, who was head of the Army Ground Forces for a while, was badgering Arnold for ground support aircraft. He was saying: "You guys are always flying high, wide and handsome. We need support on the ground." He was always hitting Arnold on this thing,and then he gets killed by this means. You know, it is kind of ironic.

O: Peter Masefield, the British writer, Peter was a very good friend of mine. Eaker called me up one day and told me, I'm sending Peter Masefield, who has been very critical of daylight bombing, and he said: "It's your job to sell him the daylight bombing, and I won't have any other answers." So Peter came down there and lived with me for about two weeks, and he was greatly impressed. We got to fly some real good missions at that time, and practically, very small losses. So then Peter wanted to fly one of these missions, and I said: "I'm sure I can probably get our people to approve it, but I don't know if we can get the Air Ministry to approve it or not." As it turned out, he got approval. We bombed one of the airfields in Paris, and it was a perfect mission. We did an exact job on the bombing, there was enough fighters up there to get us some action. In fact, Peter Masefield himself practically wore out a couple machine guns by himself, and he was sold after that.

Q: I'm glad you mention that, because I always wondered about that. I have been reading all the documents and Peter Masefield was a source of great concern because he was writing, was it the London Times or London Telegraph--he was writing these nasty articles about daylight bombing. This was right after Casablanca and then he quit, and he came around.

O: Well, he came around, Eaker called me up and told me, and said: "You will sell this guy on daylight bombing."

Q: I'm glad to know this. Now I know why he turned around.

O: Peter was right down there, had to live with the crews, every briefing and everything else, and it just happened we flew a bunch of real fine missions about that time.

Q: Did you see Arnold, right around Labor Day 1943,he came to visit for a week?

O: Yes, I remember that.

Q: Did you meet him? I think it was the first part of September.

O: Oh yes.

Q: He went around and gave a lot of pep talks. I was told that he and Eaker had a knock-down and drag-out argument in the Claridges Hotel.

O: I would know nothing about that.

Q: This badgering of Eaker to get more up.

O: That's right and it was well proven. We went over there--I think I took 37 or 38 airplanes over, and 35 crews. We graduated 26 of them which I was always proud of, because the loss rate was so high at that time. But then we thought building those groups up, and we put about 60 airplanes in each group, and about 90 groups, and we would fly every damn airplane we could get up every day, you know. Of course, at that time, also, they went in for the blind bombing. In fact, my outfit there was the training center for that.

Q: H2X?

O: The 413th Squadron was the one that developed that system.

Q: That H2X?

O: Yes, and that's when we started doing the blind bombing and doing pretty well.

Q: Do you feel that Arnold was unreasonable? Whatever you did, he wanted more. He never was satisfied.

O: I think I'm prejudiced, but I think that his philosophy, his thinking and so forth was right down the line, exactly. And when he was able to put it over to the groups in the field over there, and our

leaders--of course, I, being one, at the lower echelon at fighting end of it--that's when we started winning the war.

Q: Then you feel that he was not going beyond the bounds of propriety or command? In other words, he was asking too much?

O: Absolutely not, I think that he was one of the greatest leaders in warfare at any time. His thinking was right down the middle, and by sheer determination, and so forth he put that force over there. That enabled us to win the war. And he was absolutely right. The more effort you put in there, the less losses you were going to have, and the more targets you were going to knock out.

Q: Some of the problems they were trying to solve were wing tanks on the P38 and the P-47. They were getting some cardboard wing tanks from the British. Do you remember that?

O: No, of course, we got the Jugs first--the P-47s. They were like the Spits. They couldn't go anywhere. They'd take us across the Channel, then turn around and come back.

Q: Yes, but weren't they trying to put some wing tanks on them to get range?

O: Oh yes, we were screaming for that, to get some wing tanks, so they could escort us.

Q: Did you ever discuss with your colleagues--who dropped the ball on that? Or did anybody drop the ball?

O: It was my thinking all along, that any balls that were dropped were back in industry, back here. That we just didn't get the things fast enough--the long range drop tanks, on both the Jugs and P-38s. That P-51 really solved the problem because we would go as far as Dresden. I use the term Dresden. What's that big oilfield in there? Well...

Q: Let me ask you about the P-51. We had a P-51. It was low level. It had the Allison engine, and it wasn't much good. The way I read it, the British came up with the Merlin,you know, the 61 engine. They put that in there, and suddenly it became a great plane. So it was the British who probably discovered that. Is that a fair estimate of what happened?

O: If it is, I don't know that.

Q: Did Tommy Hitchcock have anything to do with recommending the P-51?

O: I wouldn't know. Again, you have to keep in mind that I'm only in the fighting force.

Q: The guys were talking a lot. Was there any discussion about why we didn't get the P-51 before?

O: No, actually everybody seemed to have been pretty well satisfied with the P-47 if they could get some long range tanks on the thing. They were like the Spits. But they would have to turn around after we crossed the Channel. I remember one time in Sep 1943, I led a mission on the Renault works, right in Paris, on the Seine River, you know. When we bomb in areas like that, the bombing had better be good or you are in trouble. We went in there, and we got hit pretty hard as we went in on the target, and we turned around and started back late in the afternoon. The sun was right in our faces and as we headed back toward England and our P-47s were supposed to meet us at a certain place much further down the line. This is when they got a few wing tanks. And the gunners called off some fighters at 6 o'clock high. I cocked my head around, took a look at them, and they were making an "S" maneuver above us, but gaining. So I called out over

the radio, I said: "Watch those fighters, they don't look like P-47s to me." They had the 190s, and the 109s. I said I think they are 190s, and they were. Then they did half rolls and came back through, and we were sitting there waiting for them, and we were still using tracers in those days, and this is the darnest thing I've ever seen in my life. There were hundreds and hundreds of thousands of tracers going out. We must have knocked down half of those fighters at that time, and then a little further on, here came our 47s, but the Germans were trying to make out like they were our fighter cover.

Q: That's a dirty trick. You know, talking about knocking down a lot of planes. Do you remember an occasion in Russia when the Russians started shooting at our 51s and we knocked down a whole bunch of Yaks. Twining told me about this.

O: Yes, I heard that story.

Q: You weren't in on that when you were over there?

O: No, actually that night over in Russia, Poltava, when the Germans were bombing us, the Russians had a lot of anti-aircraft there, but they didn't have any way of firing it. They were just shooting it up in the air. I guess 30 minutes after the last German bomber had gone by, they were still firing that stuff up there, and I'm sure they didn't hit an airplane all night long. But they were throwing a lot of metal up there. In fact, a lot of that was falling around us.

Q: Let me ask you about the XB-40 and XB-41, this was the armored escort idea.

O: It didn't work out. It was a bust. The whole idea was to feed a few of them very heavily armored planes--a lot of guns on them. It never worked out.

Q: Why?

O: Well, in the first place, the aircraft were too heavy. They couldn't maintain speed with the other formations.

Q: Especially when you wanted to get out of there?

O: That's right, and you had to adjust yourself to them. That just subjected you to more danger.

Q: So they weren't defending you; they were dragging you down?

O: I will say that it was a complete bust.

Q: Whoseidea was that?

O: I don't know. Somebody in Washington, I'm sure. Putting these very heavy armored and armed B-17s up there.

Q: What was your next contact with Arnold? You were in Europe, all the way through?

O: I stayed till July 1945 till it was all over with, and then I was going to Okinawa. They were going to move the 8th AF toOkinawa. I was one of the few generals that General Arnold was going to let go out to the Pacific. You know, most of the generals that fought the war over in Europe came back and took over administrative jobs of various types in the US and the ones that were over here, that had been in the Pentagon, and the training command, all that stuff, were going out to the Pacific. But I was one of the people that Gen Arnold sent--General Doolittle asked if I could go along--and Gen Arnold agreed on it.

Q: This was the idea of getting the best team out there and finishing the war as quickly as possible?

O: I'd like to think of it that way, Gen Doolittle asked for me to go and Gen Arnold approved it.

Q: You had had 70 missions, and you had done more than your share.

O: I was looking forward going over with Doolittle, I wanted to get into the B-29 end of it.

Q: Did you ever get into the B-29s?

O: No, when I was on my way over there, why that was in Aug 1945 when the war was over, when they dropped the atomic weapons. The war was over, so I had already been overseas 3 years, so I ended up another year with Air Transport Command over in the Pacific, with headquarters out in Manila.

Q: I see here, you were assigned to Hqs AAF, in Washington for a couple of months. This is right around VE Day.

O: That was just a holding assignment, at the end of the war, to find an assignment for me. That's when Gen George got me assigned over to ATC.

O: Funny story about Gen Arnold--this is after he had retired out to Sonoma. He had a son, who went to West Point. So he used to come out, and I moved my headquarters over to Travis at that time. Of course, he would come out there pretty often, because Sonoma was pretty close by. One night, his son was coming in on a vacation from West Point...

Q: This is David, the youngest.

O: I believe so, yes, and generally, General Arnold is there to pick him up. So he gets to the gate, and I go in, and he says: "I'm Gen Arnold" and the guard said: "Do you have a pass?" And he said: "I have an ID." "Well, you will have to go to that little house over there, and get permission to get on the plane." So he goes on over there, you know, and frankly, I think most of these guys had never heard of Hap Arnold. A bunch of kids....

Q: Was he wearing a uniform?

O: No, see he was retired. He had just come out to pick his son up, who was coming in on an aircraft on the Stateman flight. Anyway, took him 20-30 minutes to get on the base, so he drove on down to the operation end of the field, at terminal, he just drove out on the flight line. He drove all up and down the flight line, and he drove all up and down the flight line, and he drove up and down the runway, the taxiways. Then he came back up there, and he said: "Who is the base commander?" Of course, I had the chief command; I had the big command. Col Danny Ainsworth, he was the base commander and Danny said he never had such a hard time in his life. Here it takes Gen Arnold 20-30 minutes to get on base, and he gets up there and drives up and down the runways and all over the ramp and everything else.

Q: That was typical of him. If they pulled that on him, he was going to do the same to them. I guess they put a little security on that runway.

O: He gets Ainsworth down there and Ainsworth said that was the worst time he ever had in his life.

Q: Really ripped him. Do you remember him getting mad at anybody else. Did he ever get mad at you?

O: No, never did.

Q: You were one of his special people.

O: Well, I'd like to think so.

Q: Partly because he himself was denied the privilege of getting into a shooting war and those who had stellar records, I think he admired or envied.

O: I knew a time he came over there, about Sep 1943--he particularly asked and I went into the Widewing headquarters. He wanted to see me and talk to me. We had quite a little talk. He wanted my ideas about what I thought of what we were doing over there, and how it could be improved. He was a very attentive listener, and knew what he was talking about. He was pretty knowledgeable.

Q: He would really press you about details?

O: Oh yes, he would talk about certain missions there.

Q: Just the two of you?

O: Yes.

Q: Did he give you any indication of his unhappiness with the way things were going or did he shield it?

O: As I recall, he did not, I mean he shielded it, as I recall he did not. But as one of the combat commanders over there, he wrung me dry.

Q: This was really a debriefing then.

O: I know some of the missions that I had flown there, that he had me go into great detail. Some of the things that went wrong, and how they could be improved. As I said, he was extremely knowledgeable, I was very surprised with the knowledge he had.

Q: He was reading those dispatches when they came in--the operation reports, the debriefing reports.

O: If you happened to say something humorous to him, he seemed to get a big kick out of it. That was one of the things. When you reminisce now, you talk about more of the humorous things. At the time it wasn't funny.

Q: I was told that he had a smile on his face, but it didn't mean he was happy. Is this a fair comment?

O: I think so. He was extremely serious. He was always serious. Now he might put on a little bit of a front, with this smile, but it was no nonsense. It was all business.

Q: Did you ever see him dress anybody down?

O: No, I don't think I never did. Again, he was the type of guy that I always thought that I was. If I wanted to dress somebody down, I would be dressing down their boss and not them. I used go give Colonels and Generals hell, but not LTs and Captains.

Q: Looking at his role in WW II, you would evaluate it how?

O: Absolutely superior, I think that he was the difference between us winning the war as fast as we did--which wasn't fast enough of course--we would like to win it fast than that. But I think of him being in that job up there. That was a big difference. I don't think there was another man in the Air Corps that could have done the job he did up there, unless it would have been Horace Hickam, someone like this.

O: One comment I'd like to make about General Arnold here--and this was the opinion I think of a big majority of us out in the combat end of this thing. Seniority meant nothing to him. He wanted men that could get the job done, and I think that was proven pretty early back there when some of the people like Norstad and Kuter--some of the people close to him, that went up pretty fast. This is the reputation he had. The old Army system, where seniority ruled, didn't rule with him. He wanted people who would get the job done. This is the reputation he had with myself, and practically everybody I've ever talked to. I've talked to many people, hashing this over many times. This is the reputation that he had, that he would put his finger on people that he had reason to think were top notch and they were the ones he put in.

Q: Would you classify him more as a doer than a thinker?

O: I don't, I could differentiate that. I think he was both. I think he was a great doer and a great thinker, and I think that the record speaks for itself.

Q: My comment is along the lines of differentiating between him and, let's say, Billy Mitchell, who had long range ideas about airpower. Of course, Arnold had long range ideas about R&D, he had von Karman into this. So he was a thinker, too, in many respects. But would you say that his greatest achievement was getting a job done?

O: Exactly. I think that exactly what he did under very adverse circumstances, as Chief of the Air Corps, working with the Army and Navy, and really getting the Air Corps going.

Q: Well, he came in when it had so little. There were some hard times in those 1930s. Did you ever see him when he was at March Field?

O: No.

Q: You mentioned a little anecdote when we were outside in the garden. You know, about Mrs. Arnold. Would you tell that again?

O: The quarters at March Field. It is now occupied by the 15th AF and, of course, I commanded the 15th AF a little more than 10 years, and lived there. The Arnolds were the first ones to occupy those quarters--a real fine set of quarters. But when they first built March back in the late '20s, there wasn't a shrub or anything growing on the place. So Gen Arnold got all the officers out there, and made them kind of responsible for their own areas. They planted a lot of palm trees and all kinds of shrubbery, to the extent that right now it is a very beautiful place. But Mrs. Arnold had gone out there.

Q: Recently?

O: No, this was about 14 years ago, something like that. And she walked out to see the old quarters, and she walked out on the

patio, and she said: "Oh, I wonder what they did with my little palm trees out there." The things were about 3 feet through and tower way up. She was looking for the little palm trees on the ground.

Q: She was a great gardener and loves to see things grow. She loves animals and so did he. You know, when the war was over, even before the war was over, toward the end, Arnold lost all interest in Washington. He was busy arranging for his Ranch. He was busy corresponding with a guy named Hansen out at Sonoma. He was telling him where to put the tile; where to put in the water supply. He couldn't wait until he left Washington. Actually, he left in Feb 1946, but Tooey Spaatz was the Acting Commander long before that. Arnold was out of there more than he was in. Then he officially turned over the command to Spaatz in March 1946. Did he ever talk to you about the farm, his Ranch?

O: Oh yes, I've been out to his place several times. I went to Travis commanding the East Pacific of the ATC in July of 1946, and he had just arrived out there a few months before that, and I talked to him quite a few times.

Q: You sat under his famous oak tree?

O: Oh yes.

Q: And he loved that ranch, didn't he?

O: Oh yes. He was completely wrapped up in it.

Q: He didn't miss Washington at all, did he?

O: No, I mean the war was over, he got rid of that responsibility, and he was going to enjoy life, and try to make out the best he knew how.

Q: You know he was appointed the Commissioner of Fish and Game in California when he first came there, and he received a wistful letter

from Marshall. Marshall had been dragged off by Truman to go to China, and tried to perform "Mission Impossible." This was truly a mission impossible--bringing the communists and Chiang Kai shek together, Marshall wrote him this letter saying, I wish I was out there fishing with you. Of course, Hap Arnold had taken Marshall on a couple of fishing trips. Marshall also was a tremendously dynamic man and never had a chance to relax. He thought Arnold was relaxing out on his far while he was out there trying to do this job. Did he ever talk to you about Marshall?

O: No, I don't recall anything other than the big responsibility, where Marshall would have liked to been out of Washington, just like Arnold. He would have liked to been mixed up in the combat end of it.

Q: Did you ever see them together?

O: No, I don't believe I ever did.

Q: What did you and Arnold talk about at the Ranch, just general things, and future of airpower?

O: Yes, we were reminiscing about the war, and the future of airpower, that sort of stuff.

Q: Did he ever talk about the Russians?

O: Yes, we had quite a bit about that. I told him about my experiences when I was over there on that first shuttle mission, you know, he got a big kick out of the story of Perminov. When we went over, on that mission, we took certain supplies and such things as certain basic exchange things, cigarettes and that stuff. We had a little "medicinal" whiskey. It was for that purpose. After we lost all those airplanes that time, we had about 600 men that the Air Transport Command had to bring back down through Tehran, via Egypt

and back to England, because they had no airplanes. We had a surplus of these supplies, things like cigarettes. So about the day before I was leaving, I was to fly back to Italy the next day, to bomb targets in Romania on the way back. I got up half dozen cartons of American cigarettes and 3 or 4 bottles of liquor, and went over to Gen. Perminov's office and presented it to him as a present from me. Of course, he didn't speak a word of English, and I didn't speak a word of Russian, but he had a gal officer, interpretor, about the equivalent of a Major or something like that. She spoke real fluent English, and so we conversed this way. He thanked me very profusely for these things, and I went on back down to where I was staying, and within less than an hour, Gen. Perminov showed up with this interpreter, and he presented to me exactly the same number of Russian cigarettes and vodka that I had given him.

Q: This was a diplomatic exchange rather than a gesture of friendliness.

O: Also, to me, it meant they weren't accepting a whole lot.

Q: He might have checked with headquarters, and they made a diplomatic exchange while this on your part was pure friendship.

O: Oh yes, I had extra supplies. I couldn't get them all in the airplane, anyway. Not that we had that much, but we had to put in ammunition and gasoline.

Q: Did you tell Arnold this story?

O: Oh yes, that's what I said, he got a big kick out of Gen. Perminov.

Q: He wrote several articles in the postwar period, namely, about the Russians who were hard to get along with. Basically his argument was, they were not to be trusted.

O: Of course, you have to admire the Russians at that time. They really fought that war. That night that we got bombed out at Poltava, I saw two or three things that night that were almost unbelievable. The first airplane came over and dropped a bunch of flares, and they saw these B-17s, and it was almost like bombing fish in a barrel. Our planes were burning all over the place down there. These Germans had also, without knowing it at the time, dropped tens of thousands of anti-personnel bombs,--the old butterlfy bombs--that type. As I said, if you stayed on the airfield that night, it was pretty safe. I left toward the end of the bombing, but sat at the edge of the field, and here these airplanes burning all over the place out there, and I heard this noise, and I looked around. Here came, must have been a couple hundred Russian women soldiers, marching. They had shovels over their shoulders and they were singing. This was their firefighting group, these gals walked out there and stepped on anti-personnel bombs and I don't know how many of them got killed. Then, the next day...

Q: Trying to put out the fires?

O: Oh yes. They sent them down there to put out fires with shovels and dirt, which is impossible in burning airplanes. The next day, about noon--they had these anti-personnel bombs all over the place, so it was off limits to everybody. The next day, the Russians had a very unqiue way of clearing that, they put a line of a couple hundred men, something like that. They would walk very slowly down there. They would see a butterfly bomb, or one of the other types, and they would call halt. The guy closest to it--it was his job to disarm this bomb. If you just touch those butterflies, they would go. They called them butterfly bombs because when they hit the ground, the little

arms went out. But shortly before this, we had a rain shower, and it sounded like young war going on out there, because raindrops were setting those things off. That probably saved a lot of people's lives. Then there was a butterfly bomb and he was closest to it. It was up to him to get this bomb, and he would go back and throw it and hit the ground, and might or might not get by with this, but this is the way that they cleared that airfield at Poltava of those anti-personnel bombs.

Q: Great risk of life.

O: Human lives meant nothing to them. They had a job to do and they went ahead and did it.

Q: Eaker told me a story about how these women got out there to protect the planes, when he came up there. And they had guards out there. They had these women out there, helping with the runway.

O: I was worried about my own troops. I made sure that I had at least one man left on each airplane, as we landed that day out of gas. It was a long flight from England. It was a sod field, no runways. Airplanes were landing in every direction, just to get on the ground with their tanks showing empty. I was one of the last to land--the leader there. We didn't have to juggle the throttle much, so we had more fuel left than those wing men, just sitting there, keeping up the formation there. But I made a point to be sure that we had someone at each airplane at night, because I was greatly worried about these guys, but we actually never lost a man until that bombing. Because when the airplanes started blowing up, we had some men wounded, but we got everybody out of there. We had a tent city at the edge of the field. We didn't have a single man killed, quite a few wounded.

Q: Did you have anything to do with Perre Cabell?

O: Oh yes, he was my Deputy over there for quite a while. In fact, it is quite a story. Ira Eaker called me up. And as you know, Cabell was Gen Arnold's fair haired boys, and Ira Eaker called me up one day from Widening and told me that we've got a Colone over there--Cabell, who Gen Arnold has sent over here, and he wants him promoted to BG, but to do it right. He wants to give him a command and he said: "I've got a proposition I want to make to you." He said: "You are the most junior division commander we have," which I was before. Because I took a group at LTCOL and I made General pretty soon after that. But Eaker said: "What I want to do is send Cabell down there and let him take over as Commander of your division, but with the full understanding that he's taking over this job in name only--that you are still commander of the group and responsible for it, and he will not interfere with you, but you will be his Deputy. Now, is that all right with you?" I said: "Sure, if he understands it. The thing is all right with me." Pearre said he will understand it. So Cabell came down there, and under the rules at that time, he was supposed to have this command for a month. So they made him commander of the 45th Air Division and made me his deputy, with this understanding--that he had nothing to do with running the wing. I would run the wing. It was towards getting him promoted. So almost exactly to the month, Cabell was promoted and they immediately moved him out to the job that they wanted him for.

Q: Where did he go from there?

O: He went down to Spaatz headquarters.

Q: He was sort of Plans and Operations. He worked on this Combined Bomber Operation plan--the strategic bombing plan. I guess they wanted him in a Plans capacity.

O: I thought Pearre was a great guy, but there is a little funny story connected with that. Some time after that, after Cabell had left, I was talking to LeMay and LeMay said: "If you were to make a thousand or two dollars would you give me half of it?" And I said well: " I don't think so, if I had a thousand dollars I would get it anyway." So he told me I drew retroactive pay--although I was still a Colone--I drew pay as a BG from then on until I was promoted to BG. There were four things that were necessary. (1) The job has to authorize a general--all right, it did, (2) It had to have been occupied by a general. Well, I think Cabell kept it for one day, and then was promoted, but the job had been occupied. (3) You had to have held the job not by reasons of seniority but by DP--direction of the President, in other words, other people were senior to me. At one time I think I was the 12th ranking guy in my command. I had about 11 Colonels senior to me in my command working for me. I've forgotten what the fourth one was. But anyway, as a result, that one day that Cabell was commanding there as a BG before they moved him out, I drew I don't know how much it was.

Q: Was he a good commander?

O: He was one of my favorite people. In fact, I just had a letter from him within the last week or two.

Q: Did he ever mention my talking to him? I saw him several months ago.

O: No, I don't believe he did.

Q: The reason I mention Cabell is that he and Norstad were the first of Arnold's Advisory Counceil. You know, Jake Smart came in later and then Rosie O'Donnell and a couple of others.

O: That's what I said earlier, he picked out people regardless of what rank they were. They became advisors.

Q: I saw Norstad in NY and he said one of the things Arnold told these fellows: "I want you guys to do my thinking for me." That's why I said to you I thought he was more of a doer than a thinker, and he said: "If I ever catch you in operations, I'll chop you down." These fellows had a lot of power, because everybody knew they were close to the throne, Did they, like Norstad, ever come out there and bother you or bother other people out there?

O: No, they would come over there infrequently and sometimes I would see them, or we would have meetings...

Q: But they were not regarded as hatchet men?

O: No, no.

Q: Just observing for Arnold?

O: I worked for Kuter, when MATS was first formed. He picked me out to be the first commander of the Atlantic Division. I had headquarters at Westover in 1948 when the MATS was formed. They supposedly combined the Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service.

Q: The story of how Cabell got lost? Yes, I'd like to hear it.

O: When you walk down those long corridors in the Pentagon, you come to the rest rooms, they used to have them spelled out laterally, WOMEN or MEN. As a result of what happened, they spelled them vertically. What happened was Cabell had a lot of things to do, but he had to go to the bathroom. He walks down the hall and he sees "MEN" and he quit looking and right on in a booth. About that time he heard someone come in, and they went into the booth next door and looked over there and saw a pair of heels. He thought this woman was in the wrong place.

Then when somebody else came in, and gets in the other booth next to him. About that time, he hears a bunch of women's voices--some more had come in. It suddenly dawned on Cabell that they weren't in the wrong place, he is. So, he couldn't have his feet on the ground. He puthis feet up and was in there about an hour. About the time he went in there, Arnold wanted him, and he had everybody in the Pentagon looking for him. Pearre is in the woman's rest room trying to find an opportunity to get out.

Q: Did he ever tell Arnold why?

O: Oh yes, in fact, we were laughing about that with Gen Arnold about that one time up at Sonoma.

Q: Was it Arnold that told you about that?

O: No, Cabell and Arnold knew all about it. It was all over the Pentagon. He told the story himself.

Q: Did you ever hear the story about Arnold pushing the button, or grabbing people in the halls? Did you ever hear this story, about Arnold, if he had a job to do and he saw somebody in the hall he liked, he'd grab them to do a job?

O: Yes, I've heard.

Q: Do you know of any specific instances where that happened?

O: No, I can't, but I do remember there was a slight criticism of Arnold that he would do that sometimes, and nobody would know anything about it except he and the guy he had said it to. Things would get a little bit twisted and mixed up a bit.

Q: This tendency to go out of channels, again this man in a hurry, a man trying to get the job done, and he wasn't patient enough to wait for the thing to work itself through the Air Staff.

O: He would give somebody a job, meet them in the hallway, something like that. Then he would not make a memorandum or tell anybody else, forget about it. This is one of the very few criticisms that I have heard of Arnold.

Q: Well, it's criticism and yet it's praise in a sense that this was his way of operating. He had all these things he had to do and he was impatient to complete them.

Oldfield, Barney

18 Aug 70

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

done 18 Aug 70

August 7, 1970

Col Barney Oldfield, USAF(Ret)
Litton Industries, Inc.
9370 Santa Monica Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California 90213

Dear Colonel Oldfield:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm coming out to the West Coast in a week to interview key people who were associated with him.

I'll be traveling around in the next few days, so will be out of contact with my office. If you can see me, would you [have your secretary] leave word with Col. Marshall Ryder, 805 Leonard Road - Code 213-476-5062. I hope to see you some time during the week of August 17th at your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Tues 9-1 2p

Interview Colonel Barney Oldfield, Litton Industries, Beverly Hills, Cal, 18 Aug 70

Q: Colonel, You were talking about Pat Paul, who was an old friend of mine, a terrible tragedy for the AF.

O: Yes, all my stories will have to be anecdotal, because I didn't have a rather close relationship with Gen Arnold, most of my things were richochet. But in the case of, if you are working on a portion of the story about being severe economics of military life, pre WWII, it brought to my mind a time when Pat Paul and I were at an AF Association convention in San Francisco, which was attended by Mrs. Arnold, and he was talking to her, as I was, and

Q: The general had passed away?

O: The general had passed on by that time, and she was selling real estate out in Northern California, but she said, I always remember, Pat, how you used to chase my chickens, and when we left her presence, he said that's one lady I'll always going to remember meeting as a Chicken Colonel, no matter what happens. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~brances,~~ and when they lived at Ft. Myer when I was a young LT, General Arnold and Mrs. Arnold took care of their, a portion of their, food requirements by raising their own chickens, and everybody at Ft. Myer was curious about the fact that the Arnold's chickens would get out and be all over the place, on some of the better lawns on the neighborhood, so the only two available chicken catchers at that time were the two very junior officers, one of whom was Pat Paul, and we had to run around and catch Gen Arnold's chickens. So he said everytime she sees me no matter how old I get, she always remembers that I chased the Arnold chickens.

Q: You told me a great story down in Maxton, Laurinburg (?) North Carolina.

O: Yes, Laurinburg-Maxton, is down in North Carolina, was a base where much of the glider training had been initiated in 1943, and ~~there~~ was there, that they did a lot of the wedding of troops with the CG-4 and the glider, so on this one particular occasion there were being assaulted about the safety of the glider, there was always the difference of opinion as to whether the parachute was the safer means of transportation

7.67 Oshkosh - Visit of Kenneth Long - Maxton Glider Base

or whether the glider was, so they did many kinds of things to illustrate the safety factor of these rather odd-looking vehicles which had no power of their own, and were dependent on the guts and courgge an d training of the pilot to deliver their load safely. One of the most celebrated of these pilots had been a stunt flyer named Mike Murphy, ~~and~~ on one particular occasion ~~w~~ there were a series of things set in motion which involved the presence of General Arnold, ~~and~~ the first one he was not there for which was to establish the DC-4 as a potential tug ship, and because of its great power it could take three gliders, and hitch behind it, ~~and~~ on this one particular occasion, the three glider pilots, having been taken aloft, proceeded to scare the pants off all the passengers in their gliders by braiding the tow line, ~~which~~ This caused the glider flying on the left on the outside to have to get up to the elevation above the one in the middle which would then go down and side slip under him and the one who had been on the outside then found himself in the middle and he would side slip down under the man who was on the ~~right~~/right side, ~~and~~ they did six braids in the tow line to indicate that these were very maneuverable vehicles and that anybody should enjoy this means of conveyance, but the piece de resistance was when the premises was visited by General Arnold, ~~and~~ as I'm able to put these names together from memory, I believe General Marshall, Leslie McNair, who was then the head of the Army Gound Forces, and the host, of course, was General E. G. Chapman, who was Commander of the Aibborne Command, this was to be a night flight, ~~and~~ Mike Murphy was the pilot, and this distinguished group of many stars on the shoulder were loaded in one glider and taken aloft to be released and make a landing, ~~and~~ unknown ~~was~~/was/ to them was another aircraft tugging another glider, ~~w~~ in which there was a small military band, so the two gliders were released aloft in the night, and ~~for~~ to those of us who were waiting on the ground for the return, the high star ~~de~~ delegation were treated to a military band concert aloft as they came in, and I remember Gen Chapman standing on the ground, with his fingers crossed, and said, sort of under his breath, that if anythigg happens tonight, there are going to be a lot ~~of~~/of/ /~~lit~~/ of promotions in the military forces, and so, emblematic of General Arnold's belief in the

the safety of this craft and the assurance he had in the hands of a good pilot, it was a good conveyance, a means of getting one place to another, and delivering a unit, ~~with its ... established.~~ The amusing side of the thing was the arrival of General Arnold who was old time Air Corps officer, and I was rather used to the casualness of the flight line, but as he drove up to the Hqs at Lovelace-Lovelace-Moxton, there was a corporal standing there who was a part of the Air Corps contingent on that base, and he was rather casual about the fact that a four-star general had driven up and was leaning waiting for a bus against a fire hydrant in front of Hqs. So Gen Arnold was somewhat taken by the fact that this young man could be so casual in the presence of so much rank, and with a smile on his face, he said, "son, what do those four stars mean to you, and he pointed to the flag that was riding on the fender of his car, and the young man looked at it rather puzzled for a moment, and finally broke into a great smile and said, "it means you've got four boys in the Army."

Q: Were you present at this?

O: Yes, it was such an unexpected answer that even though Arnold had tried to establish something about military courtesy on that occasion, he broke out into a big laugh, and used to tell this story over and over again about how many things mean different things to different people.

Q: You know, out in North Dakota when he and Marshall went hunting in 1944, they ran into, they had a flat tire, and a farmer came along to help Marshall and Arnold, to get their car going again, and he was introduced, and he was totally unimpressed with like 8 stars, or maybe it was 10 stars, I'm not sure, I can't recall if it was in 144 or '45, because at the end of '44 they got their fifth star, and It was a lot of rank, and he was totally unimpressed. The thing that I am thinking about, is that, 1943, Andrews was killed in a plane crash, and the President reinforced orders which went out for senior officers, not to risk themselves in aerial flights, especially flying themselves, or things of this sort, you know. Andrews was supposed to have flown himself, in Iceland, yes, he was at the controls at least, they think he was, when the plane crashed. But this glider, why didn't

they put them in two gliders, if something happened to one, you'd only lose one.

O: I think the whole thing was the fact that Murphy was such a competent pilot. He was a man who did things like looping a glider, when it was cut loose.

Q: He didn't try any stunts with them?

O: No, no, he just cut loose and sail in for a landing. There was, as these things go, a minimum of risk, and what happened ...

Q: It was at night, though?

O: As I remember, yes. And the next day, Murphy did another demonstration in which he landed a glider in water to prove that it would stay afloat in sufficient time for people to escape and take care of themselves.

Q: Arnold was great for airborne operations, including gliders, and I don't recall Marshall's attitude toward it, but he had a lot of confidence in Arnold.

O: I may be wrong in the presence of General Marshall at this particular time but I do know it involved Gen McNair and General Arnold, and it seems to me one other high ranking officer, but it was certainly, it proved the point of the safety of this particular

Q: Well, Arnold would take a chance like that to prove a point.

O: Going on with this, just giving you a lead for a question you might ask elsewhere, I think in this case, General Freddy Smith might be productive for you to get into, as he was a man assigned to brief the press daily in the Pentagon during the time when the war was on before he escaped to other things, and on one particular occasion, I believe it was shortly after the expedition of the British mounted to destroy the heavy water plant in Norway, which the heavy water was related to the production of atomic weapons, a question was asked at the press briefing at the Pentagon, the following day, after the story was out, as to whether or not the US was engaged in research in atomic weapons, and as I recall, this was early in the war, and as press briefers are wont to do, Freddy Smith said something to the effect that we, the US was interested in all kinds of weapons, and their potential, and this was just an exit line to get on another subject, the next morning the papers carried the

7-85 Oxfield: Assistant to German Attaché

story that the US was interested in atomic weapons, and when Freddy came to his office that morning he found his squawk box was bouncing merrily, and he was being summoned to Gen Arnold's presence, and when he got there, he was also in the presence of General Leslie Groves, I believe, as the story goes, and it was a very coloratura type of a meeting, because Freddy, of course, had touched on something that was the best kept secret thing of the war, the fact that there was a thing called the Manhattan Project, and it was on the way to doing exactly that, develop an atomic weapon. So, Freddy, I think, was denounced for having said something that he didn't realize what he said, they went away from the room without anybody having proved to him that he had done anything wrong, because I don't believe they told him but that he was supposed to avoid, from that time on, any reference to such things about weapons testing.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and Warner Bros.?

O: Yes, in the case of my servitude at Warner Bros. studio, I have heard many recountings of the story of how General Arnold came to Hollywood, and how he was entertained at Warner Bros at the executive dining room with Jack Warner as his host, and Jack Warner, in his usual way, was very being very generous in offering to do anything he could to help the General while he was in California, as well as any other official thing that he could be useful for, and so, Gen Arnold listened to this frequently expressed sentiment being useful, and finally with a great smile, which had qualities of disarming, which everybody knew very well, Arnold said, "do you really mean that, Jack?" and Warner says, "you just ask me, and so it was on that occasion that General Arnold said he had a tremendous problem in that everyone apparently wanted to fly, but very few realized that it took ground crews and it took gunners and navigators and people like this to make up an entire crew, and each man performing his function would be the thing that would complete a mission, and therefore, there was room for other than those who sat in the pilot's seat, so Arnold said, I need someone who will make some short subjects which will outline, or dramatize the role of each of these crew members, and perhaps we can convince a lot of the young people who

Redfield; Arnold Show - 6.29

are interested in the AF, that if they get in and they don't make it as pilots, that there is still enough distinction and honor and work to do of contributory nature, that they'll settle more easily for these roles, and not feel that as a pilot, they are a failure in everything. So Warner granted this to be a reasonable request, and immediately set about making a series of short subjects which I think later testimony has proven had a great deal to do with not only recruiting, but maintaining an interest in the other roles aloft, and taking all the way back to the supporting ground crew and what it took in order to keep the airplanes in top shape, and maintain them flying. This led to the suggestion that since this talent and this aptitude of Hollywood in this particular bent should lead to the formation of a unit which would incorporate these talents out here, and this became the forerunner of what later became the 1st Army Air Corps Motion Picture Unit, and the man that was the titular commander of this was Jack Warner, and he relied a great deal on the one who wrote many of those short subjects that Gen Arnold had asked for, one Olin Crump, and the administrative officer, in that unit was Ronald Reagan who was also a Warner Bros star, and a member of the branch known as the Cavalry, and so they made a rather quick adjustment to incorporate him in this motion picture unit, because they thought motion pictures might perform /the/ a bigger role in the war than the horse. There was a time they made Jack Warner a LTCOL, and they often tell this story of the time an inspector came out from Washington to find out how things were going, and he went to the Motion Picture unit and they told him that Jack was at the studio, so he went to the studio, and he was not being given ready access to see Col Warner, so finally he asked the girl /who/ how much longer he had to wait, and she said, "well, is this personal business, or studio business, or military business?" and he said "I'm here on a military mission," and she said, well, his Army hours are from one to two." Shortly after that, Jack went back to civilian status and performed well in the manufacture of films both for entertainment and morale, and for helping the war effort, and such significance was attached to his contribution that, by the time I got to the studio in 1946, I believe through the efforts of Gen Arnold, Warner was given the Medal

for Merit, which is the highest civilian award.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Bill Guthrie and Arnold, they worked together.

O: oh yes.

Q: Bill Guthrie was very close to Arnold, and Arnold used to come to him for a lot. Arnold had a great sense of public relations which was shown when he was at March Field in his early 30's, he used to have all the Hollywood stars come down to March Field for air shows, and I have pictures of Wally Beery and Mary Pickford and all these other people coming down there, you know, letters from Richard Dix,

O: In fact, that's the place they made the award for the Medal of Merit to Jack Warner, and they really sort of shook Jack on that particular day, because he had never seen a jet before, and they had the F80s down there as a part of the climax of the affair, and in those days they used to slip the jets up behind you in the reviewing stands, and go straight out, which was a great shock to audiences that were unused to this little tactic.

LITTON INDUSTRIES INC. PUBLIC RELATIONS & ADVERTISING, INTERNATIONAL · 360 NORTH CRESCENT DRIVE · BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90213

(213) 273-7860
Ext. 2315

COL. BARNEY OLDFIELD, USAF (RET.)
CORPORATE DIRECTOR

August 10, 1970

Dear Murray ...

Glad to know that you will shortly be among us.

I'm afraid I wouldn;t have too much to offer on Hap Arnold, but if a few anecdotes will help, I'll do my best.

Let me know when you get in.

Most cordially,

Barney

Dr. Murray Green,
805 Leonard Road,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90049

Tues - 9:00 - 9:30
Down to Crescent
R on Crescent

Interview Colonel Barney Oldfield, Litton Industries, Beverly Hills, 18 Aug 70

Q: Colonel, You were talking about Pat Paul, who was an old friend of mine, a terrible tragedy for the AF.

O: Yes, all my stories will have to be anecdotal, because I didn't have a rather close relationship with Gen Arnold. Most of my things were ricochet. But in the case of, if you are working on a portion of the story about being severe economics of military life, pre-WW II, it brought to my mind a time when Pat Paul and I were at an AF Association convention in San Francisco, which was attended by Mrs Arnold. He was talking to her, as I was, and

Q: The general had passed away?

O: The General had passed on by that time. She was selling real estate out in Northern California. But, she said: "I always remember, Pat, how you used to chase my chickens." And when we left her presence, he said: "That's one lady I'll always going to remember meeting as a Chicken Colonel, no matter what happens." When they lived at Ft Myer when I was a young Lt, General Arnold and Mrs Arnold took care of their, a portion of their food requirements by raising their own chickens. Everybody at Ft Myer was curious about the fact that the Arnold's chickens would get out and be all over the place, on some of the better lawns on the neighborhood. So the only two available chicken catchers at that time were the two very junior officers, one of who was Pat Paul, We had to run around and catch Gen Arnold's chickens. So she said everytime she sees me no matter how old I get, she always remembers that I chased the Arnold chickens."

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Arnold who was old time Air Corps officer, and was rather used to the casualness of the flightline, but as he drove up the Hqs at Laurinburg-Maxton, there was a Corporal standing there who was a part of the Air Corps contingent on that base. He was rather casual about the fact that a four-star general had drive up and was leaning waiting for a bus against a fire hydrant in front of Hqs. So Gen Arnold was somewhat taken by the fact that this young man could be so casual in the presence of so much rank. With a smile on his face, he said: "Son, what do those four stars means to you." And he pointed to the flag that was riding on the fender of his car. The young man looked at it rather puzzled for a moment, and finally broke into a great smile and said: "It means you've got four boys in the Army."

Q: Were you present at this?

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Q: You know, out in North Dakota when he and Marshall went hunting in 1944, they ran into a similar situation. They had a flat tire, and a farmer came along to help Marshall and Arnold to get their car going again. He was introduced and he was totally unimpressed with like 8 stars, or maybe it was 10 stars, I'm not sure. I can't recall if it was in 1944 or '45 because at the end of '44 they got their fifth star. It was a lot of rank and he was totally unimpressed.

Q: The thing that I am thinking about is that 1943 Andrews was killed in a plane crash, and the President reinforced orders which went out for senior officers, not to risk themselves in aerial flights, especially flying themselves, or things of this sort, you know. Andrews was supposed to have flown himself in Iceland, yes. He was at the controls at least they think he was when the plane crashed. But this glider, why didn't they put them in two gliders, if something happened to one you'd only lose one General.

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O: No, no, just cut loose and sail in for a landing. There was, as these things go, a minimum of risk, and what happened...

Q: It was at night though?

O: As I remember, yes. And thenext day, Murphy did another demonstration in which he landed a glider in water to prove that it would stay afloat in sufficient time for people to escape and take care of themselves.

Q: Arnold was great for airborne operations, including gliders, and I don't recall Marshall's attitude toward it, but he had a lot of confidence in Arnold.

O: I may be wrong in the presence of General Marshall at this particular time but I do know it involved Gen McNair and General Arnold. It seems to me one other high ranking officer, but it was certainly, it proved the point of the safety of this particular.

Q: Well, Arnold would take a chance like that to prove a point.

O: Going on with this, just giving you a lead for a question you might ask elsewhere. In this case, it was General Freddy Smith. It might be productive for you to get into this. He was a man assigned to brief the press daily in the Pentagon during the time when the war was on before he escaped to other things. One one particular occasion, I believe it was shortly after the expedition of the British mounted to destroy the heavy water plant in Norway. The heavy water was related to the production of atomic weapons. A question was asked at the press briefing at the Pentagon, the following day, after the story was out, as to whether or not the US was engaged in any research in atomic weapons. As I recall, this was early in the war. As press briefers are wont to do, Freddy Smith said something to the effect that we, the US, was interested inall kinds of weapons and their potential. This was just an exit line to get on another subject. The next morning the papers carried the story that the US was interested in atomic weapons, and when Freddy came to his office that morning he found his squawk box was bouncing merrily, and he was being summoned to Gen Arnold's presence. When he got there,he was also in the presence of General Leslie Groves, I believe, as the story goes.It was a very coloratura

type of meeting, because Freddy, of course, had touched on something that was the best kept secret thing of the war, the fact that there was a thing called the Manhattan Project. It was on the way to doing exactly that, to develop an atomic weapon. So, Freddy, I think, was denounced for having said something that he didn't realize that he said, they went away from the room without anybody having proved to him that he had done anything wrong. Because I don't believe they told him but that he was supposed to avoid, from that time on, any reference to such things about weapons testing.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and Warner Brothers.

O: Yes, in the case of my servitude at Warner Bros. studio, I have heard many recountings of the story of how General Arnold came to Hollywood, and how he was entertained at Warner Bros at the executive dining room with Jack Warner as his host. Jack Warner, in his usual way, was being very generous in offering to do anything he could to help the General while he was in California, as well as any other official thing that he could be useful or, and so, Gen Arnold listened to this frequently expressed sentiment being useful. Finally with a great smile, which had qualities of disarming, which everybody knew, very well, Arnold sai:" Do you really mean that, Jack?" And Warner says:"You just ask me." And so it was on that occasion that General Arnold said he had a tremendous problem in that everyone apparently wanted to fly, but very few realized that it took ground crews and it took gunners and navigators and people like this to make up an entire crew. Each man performing his function would be the thing that would complete a mission, and therefore, there was room for other than those who sat in the pilot's seat.So Arnold said: "I need someone who will make some short subjects which will outline, or dramatize the role of each of these crew members, and perhaps we can convince a lot of the young people who are interested in the AF, that if they get in and they don't make it as pilots, that there is still enough distinction and honor and work to do of contributory nature, that they'll settle more easily for these roles, and not feel that as a pilot, they are a failre in everything. So Warner granted

this to be a reasonable request, and immediately set about making a series of short subjects which I think later testimony has proven had a great deal to do with not only recruiting, but maintaining an interest in the other roles aloft, and taking all the way back to the supporting ground crew and what it took in order to keep the airplanes in top shape, and maintain them flying. This led to the suggestion that since this talent and this aptitude of Hollywood in this particular bent should lead to the formation of a unit which would incorporate these talents out here. This became the forerunner of what later became the 1st Army Air Corps Motion Picture Unit. The man that was the titular commander of this was Jack Warner . He relied a great deal on the one who wrote many of those short subjects that Gen Arnold had asked for, one Olin Crump. The administrative officer in that unit was Ronald Reagan who was also a Warner Bros star, and a member of the branch known as the Cavalry. So they made a rather quick adjustment to incorporate him in this Motion Picture Unit, because they thought motion picture might perform a bigger role in the war than the horse. There was a time they made Jack Warner a Lt Col . They often tell this story of the time an inspector came out from Washington to find out how things were going, and he went to the Motion Picture Unit. They told him that Jack was at the studio, so he went to the studio, and he was not being given ready acess to see Col Warner. Finally he asked the girl how much longer he had to wait, and she said: "Well, is this personal business, or studio business, or military business?" And he said: "I'm here on a military mission." And she said: "Well, his Army hours are from one to two." Shortly after that, Jack wnet back to civilian status and performed well in the manufacture of films both for entertainment and morale, and for helping the war effort. Such significance was attached to his contribution that, by the time I got to the studio in 1946, I believe through the efforts of Gen Arnold, Warner was given the Medal for Merit, which is the highest civilian award.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Bill Guthrie and Arnold. They worked together.

Q: Oh yes.

Q: Bill Guthrie was very close to Arnold, and Arnold used to come to him for a lot. Arnold had a great sense of public relations which was shown when he was at March Field in his early '30s. He used to have all the Hollywood stars come down to March Field for air shows. I have pictures of Wally Beery and Mary Pickford and all these other people coming down there. You know, letters from Richard Dix.

Q: In fact, that's the place they made the award for the Medal of Merit to Jack Warner, and they really sort of shook Jack on that particular day, because he had never seen a jet before. They had the F-80s down there as a part of the climax of the affair. In those days they used to slip the jets up behind you in the reviewing stands, and go straight out, which was a great shock to audiences that were unused to this little tactic.

Parker, Lewis

26 May 70

December 1, 1969

Maj. Gen. Lewis R. Parker, USAF (Ret)
Post Office Box 263
Shalimar, Florida 32579

Dear General Parker:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is a "warts add all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire. We have talked to Colonel Peterson and he strongly suggested we talk to you.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

---- 20314

9 December 1971

Maj General Lewis R. Parker, USAF (Ret)
P.O. Box 263
Shalimar, Florida 32579

Dear General Parker:

I had been looking for an excuse to send you a copy of our fine interview. The excuse: I cam across a memo you prepared during that trip to India. One reason I ask about it is that General Arnold had written to Stilwell, Bissell and Chennault hoping to patch things up. His visit followed a month later. I wonder if Chennault stayed away, or possibly, you were going on to see C.K.S. and Chennault at a later meeting.

Anyway, if you have any footnote recollections of this meeting, it would be helpful to me.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

May 7, 1970

Maj General Lewis R. Parker, USAF(Ret)
Post Office Box 263
Shalimar, Florida 32579

Dear General Parker:

My plans have firmed up to a degree. I'll be in the Shalimar area Wednesday afternoon 26 May and possibly Thursday morning 27 May.

Are either of these times convenient for you?

Please let me know. A self-addressed enveloped is enclosed for your convenience.

Encl

Sincerely,

done
5-26-70

DR. MURRAY GREEN
per dictation from
San Antonio, Texas

BONNIE JANIK, Secretary

P.S. Would you please enclose your phone number.

Shalimar, Florida
December 27, 1969

Dear Dr. Green –

I apologize for the delay in answering your letter.

I am delighted to hear that a biography of General Arnold is forthcoming and will be glad to talk with you about my association with him.

If you will call me when you reach this area we can get together. My telephone number is 651-1640.

Sincerely,

Leon R. Pauken
Maj Gen USAF (ret)

Wrote Jan 20
deferred
appt

December 1, 1969

Maj. Gen. Lewis R. Parker, USAF (Ret)
Post Office Box 263
Shalimar, Florida 32579

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As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

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Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

12 April 1945

Maj General Lewis R. Parker, USAF (Ret)
P.O. 263
Shalimar, Florida 32579

Dear General Parker:

It's nearly a year since we had our most interesting talk. I've just gotten around to editing the transcript and & see where I more or less promised to get you a copy of George Goddard's book. Well, here it is.

I'm making progress on the Arnold Biography. I'm nearly finished with the interview schedule. I talked to Charles Lindbergh recently, and soon will see Mr. Lovett and Juan Trippe, both of whom had important contacts with General Arnold. In the writing department, I've completed about two chapters, with many more to go.

Hope this finds you in good health and spirits.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

Encl

Parker: March & Rockwell Fields - 1930's

~~Dictated~~ ~~Here begin [illegible] it, as I~~ ~~remember part of it~~ ~~We are~~ Interviewing Major General Lewis Parker ~~in his beautiful home in Shalimar, it has a romantic name,~~ Shalimar, Florida, ~~Today is the~~ 26th of May 1970.

Q ~~Interviewer:~~ ~~I usually start these things off by asking people if they recall their first exposure to the~~ Arnold ~~personality.~~ Do you remember when you first met ~~him~~?

P: ~~General~~: I know when I first met him I was stationed at March Field. General Arnold was then Lt Colonel.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: He was Commander of ~~the 90th~~.

P: ~~General:~~ Yes. I don't recall the ~~incident. The~~ first time that I saw him. I just had been at Rockwell and just had been married and got quarters at March Field. The Rockwell outfit was moving up there, and Arnold was in command.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: What was your job?

P: ~~General~~: I was just an Engineering Officer in the bombardment squadron. We got to know the Arnolds quite well - my wife and myself, my wife had been a kindergarten teacher and General Arnold got her to start a little kindergarten on the base for the children. ~~He had a little~~ His younger boy was then of kindergarten age, so we got to know them quite well as a family.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: I could see then how you got to know ~~them~~. Minton Kaye ~~Generalx~~ As a young married officer, I guess Mrs. Arnold was so much taken with Helen Kaye?

P: ~~General~~: Well, Mrs. Arnold had known Helen Kaye's father, who was old Army.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: I see, I did not know that. No. I thought they had met on ~~the~~ board the ship, the Republic, coming around Panama.

P. ~~General~~: Well, they did but I am quite sure.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: There was prior knowledge?

P. ~~General~~: It was my understanding that she had known Helen.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: ~~(Were you on March Field?)~~ You were at Rockwell and Arnold was at March, ~~and then you were~~ he?

P. ~~General~~: And then Rockwell was turned over to the Navy.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: This was around '34 or '35, wasn't it?

P. ~~General~~: No, that was in 1931.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: I didn't realize it was that early. I know that Arnold was very unhappy about it because North Island was one of our bases. He was trained there, too, in 1916.

P. ~~General~~: Yes, I think they lost a child while he was stationed at Rockwell

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: Yes, they lost a child, but that was during his ~~the~~ second tour, in '21 or '22. John Linton Arnold. This was after the first war. Well, March Field, in my understanding and research, is the key period ~~there~~ in his life, because ~~it~~ this brought him back into prominence.

P. ~~General~~: Right, He was suffering from the aftermath of the Mitchell business.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: And at March Field he was really put out in many directions.

P. ~~General~~: That's right.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: Do you remember this building ~~==~~ the rest camp at Bear Lake?

P. ~~General~~: Yes, oh, yes, he did a great deal ~~there~~ along that

Parker: Rockwell Field

line, ~~and over the~~ Oh, with officers, he organized - we had horses, ~~and~~ these breakfast rides, and trips down to the beach south of La Jolla across into the mountains. ~~It was very~~

~~Interviewer~~: Ensenada Beach?

~~General~~: No, it was, actually, it was almost opposite San Juan Capistrano. Right along the beach from there.

~~Interviewer~~: His tour at March Field brought him into contact with General ~~Maylon Creight~~ Malin Craig.

~~General: Yes.~~

~~Interviewer~~: This helped his career.

~~General~~: ~~Yeah, Yeah~~. yes

Interviewer: Do you have any knowledge of his association with ~~Maylon Creight~~ Malin Craig?

~~General~~: No, I don't.

~~Interviewer~~: Do you remember the earthquake of 1933?

~~General~~: Yes, oh, yes.

~~Interviewer~~: Arnold sort of took the bull by the horns

General: Yes, he organized an aid relief mission ~~that~~ the parts of Long Beach and Compton, I think was the center ~~xxxxxxxx~~ suffered the worst damaage. ~~Practically~~ ~~I can't say~~ promptly ~~apply~~ in flying ~~materially~~ materially.

~~Interviewer~~: That occurred in March '34.

~~General: I can't remember the date~~

~~Interviewer~~: Did you do any flying for Arnold as pilot?

~~General~~: No, not at that time

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: You were Engineering Officer?

P: ~~General~~: I was engineering officer of the bombardment squadrons. There were two bombardment squadrons and two pursuit squadrons.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Do you remember Lawrence [illegible] Woods.

P: ~~General:~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ Yes.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ I saw him recently. He was an Army Engineer-type. ~~xxxxxx~~

P: ~~General~~: Yes, I think he was.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ He remembered where everybody lived. It was a closely knit officers group at the base.

P: ~~General:~~ Yes, quite ~~x~~ close. Very pleasant. And, of course, a lot of things happened there. The air mail.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Did you fly air mail?

P: ~~General~~: Well, ~~I~~ No, that came along right with the CCC camps, and, of course, March Field was the headquarters of the CCC California area, and I was in the headquarters and was stuck there when air mail first started and then got out and went up to ~~Ogden~~ Salt Lake but was sent right back to a Blind [illegible] Landing course they were giving at Wright-Patterson, and finished the blind landing course and the air mail was ~~opened~~ over. So I never ~~quite~~ actually flew

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Arnold had his headquarters in Salt Lake City,

- The Newcomb Hotel house I think. the Parkers saw a lot of the Arnolds because ...

General: Yes, yes, we did, quite a bit

Interviewer: Do you have any recollections, special recollections, of Arnold; any anecdotes?

General: Well, one, I think shows his character. As I say I was working in the headquarters, personnel officer for this CCC, something happened up at the camp ~~that~~, up in the Owens ~~Grounding~~, Valley, ~~and~~

Interviewer: One of the CCC Camps?

General: One of the CCC camps and General Colonel Arnold called me in and said, "I want you to go up there first thing tomorrow morning, and tell those damn commanders, so and so and so. And I said, "yes, sir," and went out and called Operations, and set up an airplane for 8:00 o'clock in the morning, and thought I was just doing fine, and I got another call from Colonel Arnold's office, and he said, "what time you leaving in the morning?" I said, "I set up an airplane for 8:00 o'clock in the morning, sir," he said, "what time is sunup?" I said, "well, I imagine it is about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock." He said, "you be off the ground ~~whenever~~ whenever sunup is." So I was. I thought I was doing very well at 8 AM.

Interviewer: Do you remember what the problem at the CCC Camp was?

General: No, I don't. Some personnel problem that he felt the camp commander was not handling properly.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ They had a couple of racial incidents at one or two of the camps.

P: ~~General~~: It wasn't racial. And I don't recall that we had any serious racial incident. As a matter of fact, ~~so~~ this far removed, I don't remember any like that.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Well, every account that I've had about the CCC situation gave him high marks for ~~administration~~ running a large number of camps.

P: ~~General~~: Yes, ~~he~~. He did do a real good job.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: This experience ~~Probably an effect of~~ had his psychology long afterwards, because he had this sort of extroverted thought that if you take young men and put them out in the woods, doing some healthful activity, going fishing or hunting, or being out in the fresh air, somehow how a salutary effect on their character.

P: ~~General~~: Yes.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: This was something very positive ~~a very part of him~~ to be ~~doing~~ doing. He always talked about fishing or hunting,

P: ~~General~~: Well, that was one connection between Arnold and Kaye, and Kaye knew that country, and I think ~~Kaxexxiewaxx~~ Kaye was born around Bakersfield and had done a hunting and fishing himself. He ~~lot of that~~ and would organize, on these trips, and Arnold loved to get out - get out the camping equipment and go out in the desert.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Kaye told me something like that but I didn't pick it up.

P: ~~General~~: That is quite a strong feeling that ~~he~~ was one of the reasons for the close ties.

Parker: Spicer Kaye

~~Interviewer~~: I thought it was Mrs. Arnold becoming attached to this young gal, Helen Kaye?

~~General~~: It was that too, no question about it. I think Mint was somewhat of an opportunist. I think he made the most of the situation.

~~Interviewer~~: One of the reasons that I am interested in that particular situation is that I have become very friendly with George Goddard

~~General~~: Oh, yes.

~~Interviewer~~: And George Goddard has produced a book. Have you seen his new book?

~~General~~: I read about it, I haven't seen it.

~~Interviewer~~: It is called "Overview". Did you know George Goddard?

~~General~~: Yes, uhuh

~~Interviewer~~: I wonder why he didn't send you a book? He sent the book to a lot of people..

~~General~~: I don't know.

~~Interviewer~~: Were you ever real close to him?

~~General~~: Oh, no, we were never real close. We were never even stationed with him. but I knew him

~~and~~

~~Interviewer~~: Well, you know he ended up in General Arnold's dog house, and he blames Kaye for this.

~~General~~: Well, I think a lot of that is true. You see, I was in Washington during this whole thing, and of course, Kaye was

disliked
~~just~~ ~~itked~~ generally, because they felt he had Arnold's ear and he did cut people. And I have heard him in a sly way. So he worked himself to the top in the photography thing, you see, ~~and~~ ~~x~~ ~~t~~ ~~h~~ ~~a~~ ~~t~~ at Goddard's expense .

~~Interviewer~~: Well Goddard ~~was exiled~~ was exiled from Washington, and he ended up as VD officer at Charlotte Air Force Base, Charlotte, North Carolina.

~~General~~: I remember that. See, I was over at Bolling Field during that.

~~Interviewer~~: --- Arnold shipped him out.

~~General~~: And Kay got to the top of this thing.

~~Interviewer~~: Right. It was a regrettable thing in a way because Goddard had a great deal of ~~t~~ ~~a~~ ~~l~~ talent.

~~General~~: ~~A great deal of~~ talented Oh, complicating

~~Interviewer~~: He is a very vigorous 83.

~~General~~: The last time I saw him I was still on duty in the Pentagon and he was bustling around there, still just as ~~(garbled)~~ busy as a bee.

~~Inteviewer~~: Anyway, he is trying to sell his book right now, and he refers to Kay as "Nemesis," ~~and~~ Colonel ~~Nemises~~. Apparently the publishers made him ~~keep~~ take that out.

~~General~~: Well, I personally, never had any words with Kaye whatsoever, or any problem. he had no reason to cut me down because I wasn't up.

~~Interviewer~~: But He had a reputation for cutting?

~~General~~: He had a reputation and a deserved reputation for,

I don't know what it was about Kaye. As you said, he is bitter now, and I am not a bit surprised.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ He apparently got his come-uppance toward the end of the war.

P: ~~General~~: The way I found that out, I was in command at Bolling Field for a year early in the war, and finally managed to get away, ~~with~~ Got a B-29 group that was out in ~~the~~ Kansas and I had occasion to come into Bolling. /I brought I think a B-29 into Bolling, the first one that the people in the Pentagon could come and see and look at. /~~and~~ Arnold invited the President and Marshall to come down ~~and so.~~

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ I recall that

P: ~~General~~: That's right. I knew the thing in. ~~I~~ I went up to the BOQ to get a room, and ran into Kaye, and the most lonesome, lonely, dejected looking person in the world. When I 'd left, and I learned what had happened since I left Bolling, He was on top of the photography business, ~~xpshn~~, here he was being shipped as just as an individual over to India AP Actually the a house of cards, collapsed. And I didn't ask him of course, but he intimated he had gotten a dirty deal.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Well, he intimated to me that - of course, I have been given two reasons. One on Goddard's part.

~~General: Do you want a cigarette?~~

~~Interviewer: No, thank you, sir.~~ Goddard said that Elliott Roosevelt, who worked closely with Goddard, got "Papa" to put some pressure on to get rid of him. Another ~~one~~ version that I heard

was that Kay was fooling around - extra-marital type of stuff.

P: ~~General:~~ Well, knowing the relationship that Arnold had with the Kays and all, I felt that Arnold got wise to Kay using that relationship. You know how Arnold could be when he was convinced he just cut ~~them~~ him off. To me, that makes sense.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ Either of these ~~may have these two~~ theses may have some ~~political~~ validity, One of which ~~General: Yes, yes.~~

~~Interviewer:~~ You may not know this, but Arnold was a prolific letter writer.

P: ~~General~~: Oh, yes.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: He wrote to his wife - love letters to his wife, all through out his career. Mrs. Arnold saved them, and I have seen most of them.

P: ~~General~~: He was quite a writer. He wrote some boys books.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Six boys books, ~~but at~~ before March Field, and Arnold was in my opinion, a 19th Century man, in that he had a high sense of honor and loyalty, ~~and~~ This business of people ~~straining~~ straying, either ~~of them~~, drinking or playing around ....

P: ~~General:~~ Would not go well with him.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: And if the theory about Kay is correct, The other theory which I had been told.

P: ~~General~~: I had heard that, but it could be true.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ But, anyway, ~~it~~ that is an interesting aspect of it because I am trying to situate or place Goddard. You see Arnold probably wronged Goddard.

Parker: Head of Goddard

Goddard came back, but it wasn't through Arnold's influence. Goddard's - this ~~open~~ strip camera, ~~what did he call it, it didn't~~ didnt have a shutter. ~~There is a term that I cannot think of it.~~ This played a great role in the Normandy invasion and played a great role in the ~~display~~ exposure of Russian missiles, in ~~19~~ 1962.

P: ~~General~~: You see, I don't know, As I say, I have known Goddard, but not well. I was never ~~xxx~~ stationed with him or anything. But I have always felt that he was technically wonderfully qualified, and ~~all~~, but I do not know as an organizer, To organize the photographic business world-wide, what his capabilities ~~are~~ were.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: He was more of a technical man than he was an organizer.

P: ~~General~~: An inventor

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Right. The merits of this thing ~~xxxx~~ aren't all on one side. Goddard was the kind of a guy -- You put him on a project and then you did something else, ~~and~~ If he didn't like that project and liked something else, he went off on his own.

P: ~~General~~: Oh, yes, ~~an~~ individualistic

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: An individual, right.

P: ~~General~~: And whether he would have worked out as a world - wide head of the photographic empire, I don't know. I am not saying one way or the other. But, knowing Kaye and the works, I am sure ~~he~~ Goddard was undercut with Arnold.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: I want to take you back to March Field. Arnold ~~was~~ was a great man for public relations, or community relations. And he used to have the Hollywood stars come out to the base.

Do you remember a round of these events?

P. ~~General~~: Yes.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: Mary Pickford, Wallace Beery

P ~~General~~: Yes.

Q ~~Interviewer~~: Were you given anything part of ~~this~~ that assignment to sort of ~~shepard~~ shepherd some of these Hollywood stars around?

P ~~General~~: No, no, never was. I was appointed as a technical director on a picture that was going to be made by Warner Bros.

Q ~~Interviewer~~: Warner Bros. Was this later on? In the war?

P ~~General~~: No, this was while I was ~~[illegible]~~ at March Field. And, I went in several times ~~and~~ for preliminary discussions and so on.

Q ~~Interviewer~~: Did you work with Guthrie?

P ~~General~~: ~~Gothrie~~, Bill Guthrie, then the thing fell through and they made it with the Marines. It fell through because the Air Corps then, or the Army, didn't like the way the ~~way~~ they were handling it, it was a stereotyped flying picture.

Q ~~Interviewer~~: So it fell through ~~on the part of~~ as far as the Air Corps was concerned.

Q: So Warner switched the local and made it a Marine picture?

P ~~General~~: Yeah. Made it with the Marines.

Q. ~~Interviewer~~: Well, Arnold and Warner had a lot of good relations during the war.

P ~~General~~: Well, I've been into the studio several times,

v

Parsons: Arnold & Hollywood

having flown with Arnold but mainly with ~~Beebe~~ Beebe, but never Arnold's pilot, as Beebe was. But he needed two pilots, and I was it many times

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: But then Peterson came in?

P: ~~General~~: But then Peterson. But when Beebe got away, we all wanted to go to war, and he got away and then was chosen for the job, Peterson and I flew with Peterson, the trip to Casablanca.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Oh, you went on that?

P: ~~General~~: Yes Peterson and I were the Pilots.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Then you went on to China?

P: ~~General~~: On into China, and there is an incident in Arnold's book ...

Q: Interviewer: getting lost?

General: Getting lost, and also about me when we went up to see Chiang Kai-shek (spelling), for some reason or another, he took me along, and we flew up on China National Airways, because of the little field at Chungking, because you could get a B-17 in. Arnold be _____, and he took me up there, and went on to this place in the country with Chiang, and spent a couple of nights, and Chiang became convinced that I was sitting there silently because Arnold insisted that I go into these meetings, and Chiang definitely got the impression that I understood Chinese, and he said I don't want Colonel Parker at any more of these meetings. / ~~Interviewer: Did he tell it straight~~

It is in Arnolds book

Q: Did he tell it straight?

Parker: Went to China - Flying Low

Pc General: Yes, he told it straight. Just getting lost this was to throw some light on the Arnold, as far as this flying business is concerned. We took off from Hasan Assam at night and --- in crossing the hump, and they had one little radio beacon at Kunming was all, and we had a navigator and Hap Pete and I were up above the clouds stars, and it was very pleasant, but we had as it turned out, found a terrific tailwind that we didn't know about, so we were listening to this beacon, and we didn't hear it, but we weren't a bit concerned, and a couple of hundred miles short of Kunming and never did hear it, and finally the navigator, the navigator was a young kid who was pretty good, but he had flown this business back and forth across the Atlantic ferrying jobs, and he never went much higher than 7,000 or 8,000 feet, and he was down in the nose of the B-17 where the navigator stayed, and finally we called him. I called, and said, "where are on a fix." Well, his voice came and it sounded like he was drunk and I [redacted] couldn't get anything out of him), "Pete, I better go down and take a look." I went down there and the kid hadn't worn an oxygen mask, and we were up about 20-21,000 feet and he was almost out. So I got in and said: "sit down here," and got him an oxygen mask on, "sit there for at least 10 minutes before you even move, and breath this oxygen, and then, when you feel all right keep it on, and take a reading." So he did, and when he got up there, and

shot the stars and all, we were several hundred miles beyond Kunming. In the meantime, we decided that we had better keep right on course. We couldn't see anything down, so we did 180° and started back. Throughout this thing and through all the flights that I made with General Arnold, he never interfered with the pilots or anything. We reported the situation, no flap. He was back in the radio operators compartment, and Clayton Bissell who was along, a Brig Gen then, was all excited, jumping up and down, said a word. We got back and

Q: Interviewer: Arnold knew about this?

P: General: Oh, yes, we told him that we had overflown Kunming and that we were going back. Luckily, as we came back across, it turned out that this radio beacon had been out of commission when we passed it the first time. We picked it up, and went on in and landed. Arnold, the next day, got Pete ----- and he is, and in a very fatherly manner assured us that we had not been quite as careful as we could have been, and we should have checked on this navigator before. But we had assumed from the weather report that we had such a strong wind and that we were still an hour from Kunming, when actually we were probably passing it. The combination of that and the radio beacon being out...

Q: Interviewer: Guess you were very low on gasoline when you turned?

P: General: We were not in any - there was no crisis as far as gasoline since we found Kunming. We never could have made it back across the Hump at all with the terrific wind.

Q: ~~Interviewer: Head winds~~ If you had to back into a headwind.

P: ~~General~~: So we would have had to land ~~in~~ do something.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Was that the only landing field ~~that~~ you knew about?

P: ~~General~~: That was the only landing field. that you could get into with a B-17.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: The Japs weren't too far away, were they?

P: ~~General~~: No, we were over the Japanese. We plotted it all out the next day. See, we knew what the wind was when ~~he~~ we returned, ~~that~~. Terrific wind - almost a 100 miles an hour. And we plotted how long it took us to get back, you see, ~~and~~ ~~we were~~

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Were you lucky that Arnold didn't fire you and Pete?

P: ~~General~~: No, no, as I say, he just pointed out in a very quiet way

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Not excited?

P: ~~General~~: No, not excited way that we probably weren't as careful as we might have been. Trusting this weather report

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: about checking on this navigator. I think that

P: was very typical of him.

~~General~~: Every flight I made with him, he was the same way. Having been a pilot himself, he'd sit in the back seat, never bother. Once in a while he would come up front and sit there in one seat or the other, and talk, but he liked to work out little

problems and they come up and hurl them at you. Give you 10 minutes to figure, what's the answer to this one?"

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ Do you mean problems?

P: ~~General:~~ mathematical Problems or any sort of thing. Throw them at you and see how quickly you could get them.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ He had ~~xxx~~ a quick mind?

P: ~~General~~: Very quick.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Was he an articulate man? ~~when he got~~

P: ~~General:~~ Yes.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Did you ever hear him get mad?

P: ~~General~~: Oh, yes, I've heard him get mad.

Q ~~Interviewer~~: Did he ever get made at you?

P: ~~General~~: No, no. This time that he called me in the office he had checked something with operations to see what time I had planned to leave, he was made about the situation up there and there was just that steely look and what time is sunup, - ~~no yelling~~ No raving or raving

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ Did you know what he wanted?

P: ~~General~~: I knew exactly what the problem was. When he said "early" he meant early.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: On this Chinese trip, did he talk to you about the Chinese problem, about the Chinese wanting airplanes and materiel which we at that time were not able to give?

P: ~~General:~~ He didn't discuss that with me a great deal. You see I was along as another pilot, and I wanted to be sure that you understood that. I never worked in Arnold's office, or directly under

under him, ~~or~~ but another characteristic of him ~~that~~ - every time I ~~met~~ went - many, many times - either with Beebe Pete, or I would fly him myself, if at that time Beebe ~~was~~ would ill or something, coming along. he he would ~~always~~ always insist the pilots ~~if~~ If ~~you~~ were invited to dinner that they be ~~dinner~~ invited, a party or anything. He was Most considerate that way, because with my tenure there at Bolling I flew a lot of people. P: I was actually designated by Arnold to be Marshall's pilot. So I flew Marshall.

~~Interviewer: You flew Marshall~~ all the time.

~~General:~~ That's why /I had a hard time getting away from there, but finally did.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Did XM Marshall understand aviation? Did he understand the role of airpower?

P: ~~General~~: I'm not qualified to say. I am a great admirer of Marshall's.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Well, I am, too, and most people are. But I've gotten some impressions that he was somewhat naive about the capability of an airplane.

P: ~~General~~: Well, I think most of the Army types were, actually. Well, we ~~felt~~ thought they were. At least, we ~~Being~~ in the Air Corps.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

P: ~~General~~: Oh, ~~yeah~~. Yes.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: What sort of relationship?

P: ~~General~~: Very pleasant, ~~when~~ what I saw them.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Arnold was differential to Marshall?

P: ~~General~~: Oh, yeah. He was strictly....

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: He was working for Marshall? And Marshall let everybody

P: That's right.

Parker: George Marshall

know, he was very correct.

P: ~~General~~: Marshall was a rather different individual. All the trips that I took, and he never took a big staff, ~~all the others might~~ take a big staff - eight or ten. Marshall never even took an aide. So I sorted acted for him, and ~~he~~ - one time I was flying him out to ~~- well, you are not interested.~~

~~Q: Interviewer: Well, yes, I am.~~

~~P: General: Well, this is on Marshall. We were flying out to~~ Seattle, with ~~the~~ Secretary Stimson, ~~and General Marshall,~~ ~~and~~ we had some bad weather after crossing the mountains in northern Washington to get into Seattle, ~~and~~ Stimson had an aide...

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Brownell?

P: ~~General: Brownell~~, No, it wasn't Brownell, at that time. Anyway he came up to the cockpit and we were on instruments, and flying ~~low, and~~ he wanted to know what the score was and what the weather was in Seattle. It wasn't very good but was supposed to clear up by the time he got there. Well, he went back and told the Secretary, and the old Secretary got kind of concerned, and General Marshall came out to see. I think the Secretary said, "General, would you go see." So he came up and made a suggestion that maybe we ought to go into Portland or something, and ~~---~~ everything ~~would~~ be all right. ~~(Garbled)~~ ~~---~~ He and I were together, and he was actually Stimson's

pilot all the time, ~~and~~ so they went back, and ~~sent~~ they sent the aide ~~back~~ up to get ~~the chart~~ Turner to come back and consult about this thing. ~~and~~ Turner ~~is~~ was quite a correct individual, ~~and~~ he repeated, he told me when he came back, he was red in the face, ~~finally he said~~, ~~I~~ I told them our main concern was, not you, Mr. Secretary or you, General Marshall, it's Colonel Parker and I are concerned about ourselves, ~~and~~ we are not going to get into any trouble." We arrived in Seattle perfectly all right. And, the fear and ~~trepid~~ trepidation, all the rest of the trip, ~~and~~ we got back to Bolling and the Secretary and General Marshall both, said, "we want to apologize for our conduct there in Washington and it will never happen again." That's all they said.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: I want to take you back to March Field. There are a couple of questions. You did not make the air mail mission. You were at Wright Field?

P: ~~General~~: No.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Were you disappointed in not flying the air mail?

P: ~~General~~: ~~Yes~~, Oh, yes, of course. They had started this blind landing ~~and~~ school, ~~is that this~~ they thought this thing might carry on.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Do you have any recollections, probably, second hand, in your case, of the kind of a job that Arnold did? He had the Western ~~had~~ Air Mail Zone. ~~the Eastern, Hickum had the Central and Arnold the Western.~~ Do you have any recollections of the men who flew. Did they talk about Arnold, he may be handled it? He had the toughest job of all.

Flying the Rockies.

P: ~~General~~: The main criticism wasn't of Arnold . It was ~~of~~ the policy of splitting ~~up~~ everything up, instead of going by units. We had ~~Fairley~~ ~~Fairley~~ ~~policy~~ pursuit pilots flying bombers, and bomber pilots flying pursuit airplanes. You had military units, but they were just scattered to the winds. Just Airplanes and people, ~~and~~ that was my general criticism, although I never took part, and criticism I heard. But

~~Interviewer:~~ That wasn't Arnold.

~~General:~~ That was done every place.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: That was the whole setup, really.

P: ~~General~~: I heard no criticism of Arnold.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Was there criticism of ~~Fairley?~~ Fowlair for taking on this job with open-cockpit planes, ~~and~~ inadequate Radios?

P: ~~General~~: Not in the military. I never heard of any.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: It was just a job to be done.

P: ~~General:~~ A job and nobody thought anything about it. There was a great furor about killing all these people. It didn't disturb anybody in our unit.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Well, shortly thereafter Arnold was pulled back from ~~on hand~~ vacation. He and Mrs. Arnold were going to Jackson Hole for a vacation after the air mail, ~~and~~ he was pulled back and ordered to fly the Alaskan ~~gamut~~ flight. Did you get in on ~~it?~~ that?

P: ~~General~~: No, no, I didn't get in on it. ~~The~~ There ~~is~~ was a matter of Rank, probably as much as anything else. ~~another blank because~~ we had the lowest ranking officer, that went on ~~was~~ that. Jack Mills, ~~he~~ was about a year and a half, two years ahead of me.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: In other words, you lost out on that mission because of seniority?

P: ~~General~~: Well, I don't know. I don't think I was even considered or people in my group.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ I see. Twining was standby. He never did make the flight, and he was very unhappy.

P: ~~General~~: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes. Well, of course, everybody would have liked to have gone but, I had no...

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: Well, one of the people who did go, and had a lot to do with ~~Piney and~~ planning the trip was Hugh Knerr. ~~He was~~ and ~~I saw him there.~~ And of course his great ~~hexexis~~ hero is Andrews.

P: ~~General~~: Yes, oh yes.

Q: ~~Interviewer:~~ And his criticism of Arnold was that Arnold looked after Arnold, and not his troops. And ~~he~~ Knerr said in effect that Arnold's loyalty was up and not down, ~~In case of the Alaskan flight~~ the point being that in the Alaskan flight but Arnold, ~~but Arnold~~ none of the people participating ~~in the Alaskan flight~~ received a medal for it.

P: ~~General~~: I didn't even know that.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: You didn't hear any static on it?

P: ~~General:~~ No, I knew a number of them quite well, and some intimately. Knerr had any criticism.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: The Alaskan flight was very successful?

P: ~~General~~: Oh, yes.

Q: ~~Interviewer~~: When they came back, they were given a special

to see ~~if~~ whether secret mission they could react after the long mission across country. Do you remember ~~that?~~ the secret orders that Arnold got to fly his B-10s across country? He flew back to Washington.

~~General~~: Yes.

~~Interviewer~~: You didn't get in on that side of it?

~~General~~: No.

~~Interviewer~~: Well, Arnold shortly thereafter made his star. Were you at March Field when he got his star? This would be February 1935.

~~General~~: No, I had gone to Hawaii. I left in November of 1934.

~~Interviewer~~: That was about a year before he left?

~~General:~~ Yes.

~~Interviewer~~: Arnold and Mrs. Arnold were very much for building up the base, the beautification program.

~~General~~: Yes, oh, yes.

~~Interviewer~~: Do you have any recollection of that program? They put ~~Put some palm trees.~~ in some poplar trees?

~~General~~: ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ I remember when that went on. Planted a lot of palms, and did a lot toward fixing the base

~~Interviewer~~: Mrs. Arnold was sort of a Lady Bird Johnson, a generation a head. Very active. In fact, I saw Archie Old ~~Holbrook~~, of course, he lives ~~at March Field and~~ near March Field and he says those poplars are 101 feet tall now.

Parker: Beautifying March Field

and have you been out to March Field?

P: General: Yes, of course, many times and the trees meet across the street, and when I moved there the quarters had just been built not too long before, and there wasn't anything.

Q: Interviewer: You mentioned the Riding Club that Arnold organized?

P: General: Breakfast club?

Q: Interviewer: Was she very much for keeping the officers together, making (too low cannot make out the words)

P: General: Yes, I think so. They weren't, the Arnolds, I have seen a lot of Commanding Officer's wives much more so inclined toward social affairs and so on than the Arnolds. They were more to have a group of different people, in a small way, rather than big affairs.

Q: Interviewer: Mrs. Arnold did she throw her weight around as wife of the Commanding Officer?

P: General: Well, I didn't see it, and my wife didn't.

Q: Interviewer: She probably had recollections - the fair side always has different recollections of things.

P: General: My thoughts on Arnold as a commander. I say I never served in his office, although I saw a great deal of him when I was at Bolling Field. I think that Arnold was inclined, to tie in with a small group, rather than using a staff.

Interviewer: You think Arnold was inclined rather than using a staff.

General: Rather than using a staff, tie in with what, decisions

Patton: Arnolds Society at March Field

Maybe, a little too much like some Commanders and [illegible] to surround themselves

and then maybe make decisions based on what Joe Blow told them,

To tie in with what Knerr said.

~~Trying to tie in with what Kaye has said on what Joe Blow told him, rather than using a staff.~~

~~Interviewer: You think Arnold was inclined~~

~~General: Well~~, for example, when Kaye was close. ~~Arnold checked~~

Q: Talking about Arnold as a commanding officer.

~~End of tape.~~

P: That's the only criticism that I heard in my observation. I thought that was the weakest, because I've seen other people that do that. In other words, Hap had around him some quite junior officers, bright young boys. But that's the criticism the president has gotten recently, the kitchen cabinet, usurping the regular cabinet. Well, that method of operation is what I am talking about. Marshall was the exact opposite. Marshall went through the staff, didn't have himself surrounded by a group like that.

Q: Who was always close to Arnold, you mentioned Kaye, we are talking about March Field, McNarney, was he close to Arnold at that time.

P: Not awfully close, they were ...

Q: He worked for Arnold at March Field. Tooey Spaatz was very close to Arnold.

P: Yes, yes.

Q: Was Eaker out there at any time.

P: Eaker was there, lived right across the street from me, Monk Hunter was there.

Q: I have heard a comment that those officers who grew up with Arnold on the West Coast graduated to better ~~high~~ positions during the war than those who

grew up with Andrews on the East Coast, is there any basis for that.

P: I think there is a basis, I think there is always where someone gets up pretty high, he's going to choose the people with whom he has worked, those he knows intimately and trusts, I think it is just the human thing to do.

Q: Would it be a matter of people getting positions beyond their ability, just on the basis of nepotism.

P: Oh, I don't think so much in getting...

Q: Minton Kaye, I guess, has some ability, but he also had the inside track.

P: I think Mint had a lot of ability. He had this odd quirk of personality, he seemed to enjoy cutting people down, and he did it, and he had Arnold's ear as a friend, and I think he used it.

Q: Was it Lord Acton who said, "Absolute power corrupts absolutely", and I guess when you have access to the Chief's office, and if...

P: If you are that way, I mean if you have a lot of potential power, and used cunningly, as he would, to drop a word, " so and so tells me he gets pretty drunk, " you know, little things that if the person in power pays any attention to that sort of thing, and does not treat it skeptically, it can be pretty harmful.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold, I'm sure you did, at social occasions at March Field. He didnt do much drinking, did he?

P: He didn't drink at all, he didn't touch a drop in those days. The only time I ever seen him take a drink was after he had retired, he'd had this heart attack, and the doctor had prescribed that he take...

Q: I think he took sherry.

P: Sherry or an old fashioned, or a highball before dinner, and before that, I think he had been on the wagon for years

Q: I'd heard that he might have done some hard drinking when he was very young. He had ulcers.

P: Well, I don't know about that, of course, that is the story, if often is, and it could be true, about someone who has ulcers.

Q: But in mid-career, at the peak of his career.

P: He never drank, but he was very broad minded about it, Mrs. Arnold always

Parker's Friend No Drinker

had cocktails, and they'd have people in, but Arnold never had any. Of course, he didn't smoke.

Parker: Arnold Angry

Q: When he got mad, was it a sort of explosive type of anger?

P: Yes, I think so. I think he was, as you say in a hurry, and he just seemed to...

Q: Was he forgiving? If he got mad at somebody, was it a personal kind of anger, was it a grudge?

P: I never saw any of that at all.

Q: Or was it just a job involved.

P: The only time that I ever observed it, it was just a job. And as I say, the two times where I mentioned he had occasion to chew me out, he didn't, except in a way that meant great deal to me. There was no blowing up or anything like that. But I could tell he was unhappy.

Parker: Fishing

Q: Did you ever go on, you mentioned that Mint Kaye organized some of these outdoor, fishing parties?

P: No, I never went on them.

Q: A fellow named Joe Elliott with the Forest Service, with whom he had some contacts, and he went on a number of pack trips. I think late in the war he took Marshall on one of these trips to the High Sierras. You didn't go along on that?

P: No

Q: It was a pack trip for a number of days, and then they went pheasant hunting in '45, near Bismarck, N.D.

P: No, I never went. I wasn't much of a hunter, fisherman.

Q: You mentioned you left in Nov 1934 and went to Hawaii...

P: Went to Hawaii for 2 years and then to Bolling.

Q: What was your job at Bolling?

P: I was there 7 years, I started out as Engineering Officer, I had taken the engineering maintenance course at Chanute Field, that's why I was always in engineering or maintenance engineering.

Q: You were there from say '37 to...

P: I was there from 1937 to 1942, I got out in the spring of 1942.

Q: You were there then when the war started.

P: Oh yes.

Q: Do you remember a publication in the Chigago Tribune, of part of our war plan, a couple days before Pearl Harbor

P: I don't recall.

Q: At Bolling Field, I guess Tooey Spaatz made his headquarters there, when they formed the 8th AF,

P: Yes, and they formed the 9th AF there. It grew pretty big, and the last year I was there, I was base commander, but still flying General Marshall. Being a non pilot himself, we assigned some body to fly these higher ranking Army generals, and they wouldn't let them go. They were the only one they would go with, and it was just too hot to get loose.

Parker: Rotating Staff Overseas

Q: You mentioned sort of being stuck in the Washington area, and probably anxious to go. Arnold, himself, never had combat. He never got into operations in WWI and he never quite made it, and so he was perhaps sympathetic to the wishes of some of his staff?

P: Oh yes, I think he was, he let Gene Beebe go

Q: Stratemeyer?

P: Yes, oh, yes, I think he was, quite sympathetic, but General Marshall, being the Chief of Staff. You see, I had a time. I had to finally just go to him personally, and he hand picked this officer, and he flew with us for several months, and finally, Marshall decided he wanted somebody else to get him here and there.

Parker: Casablanca

Q: I want to ask you about Casablanca, on that trip. You flew Arnold over?

P: No, Pete and I flew several other officers that were going along, a non-pilot who was in Plans, and another officer who was in Plans. We flew the B-17 over. Marshall and Arnold went over in a C-54, at that time, I don't think it was even a military plane; I think it was sort of a chartered job. Well, then,

we flew up to Algiers, into Cairo, and I've forgotten where Marshall dropped out, whether he even went up to Cairo with us, no, I don't think he did, he came on back from Algiers, and then went on over into India and China. Then we got back to Calcutta and we had Wedemeyer

Q: This is the one who went out to Chiang Kai-shek?

P: Yes, Wedemeyer. So, Arnold told me there, that Wedemeyer was going on to brief Mac Arthur on the thing, and I was to go with him,

Q: Brief MacArthur on what?

P: On the Casablanca Conference. So, then Pete picked up another pilot and flew Arnold back, and I went on around with Wedemeyer.

Q: On his way to China, Arnold stopped in India, and he saw Air Marshal Pearse, a couple of other people, Wavell. Arnold had a very negative reaction toward the British, in that period. They weren't doing a darn thing, they were getting a lot of material, and they weren't doing anything with it. Did you get into that?

P: I didn't get into that, no.

Q: Policy aspect? Arnold never sat down in the airplane, and shot the breeze with anybody, talk about his problems?

P: No, [redacted]

Q: You sat in one some of the Chiang Kai-shek briefings until Chiang decided you were a spy?

P: Until he specifically told Arnold he didn't want Col Parker in there.

Q: Did Arnold ever say anything to you about this?

P: Oh yes, he told me about it. He thought it was a great joke, and it was, of course.

Q: I remember reading that in Global Mission. But he never made any further comment on that, that Chiang was a suspicious man?

P: No, only that he said, "Chiang is convinced that you speak and understand Chinese, and he doesn't want you in there, anymore."

Parker: C. K. S.

Q: Was there some byplay between Chiang and his interpreter?

P: Well Chiang went through his interpreter all the time. I don't know how much he understood. His wife speaks fluently.

Q: Was she present at the meeting?

P: No, she wasn't up there. So, apparently, he didn't want Arnold to have an interpreter.

Q: He wanted the only version to come from him. Was Chiang pretty tough in this byplay, demanding?

P: No, it didn't seem to me, at all, that there was really much...

Q: Did Arnold have any instructions from higher up to play along with Chiang? Chiang was asking for a lot more than Arnold was able to give him.

P: Well, I heard that, in Arnold talking to Stilwell, his conversation with Stilwell, and of course, Stilwell was no admirer of Chiang at all and vice versa. So I heard that side of it.

Q: How about Stilwell and Chennault? Of course they were at odds all the time?

P: They were at odds.

Q: Did you get into any of that?

P: I heard it discussed.

Q: Did Arnold take any position on the Chennault-Stilwell controversy?

P: Not that I know of, I'm sure that he would have been for Chennault. I think, again, as a matter of, a lot of it could have been the lack of understanding of airpower, so-called, by the Army Generals. Of course, another thing that might have hurt Stilwell was the fact that Chennault and Chiang were so close.

Q: Well, one aspect of that closeness was that Chennault used to write letters to President Roosevelt, directly,

P: Yes, I'm sure he did, you see, that cut in...

Q: And Joseph Alsop, who was on his staff, would write a transmittal letter to Grace Tully, who was President Roosevelt's secretary, and he simply bypassed

Parker: Stilwell vs Chennault

Stilwell's staff, and he got away with it because he knew that Chiang was with him, and I guess the policy was, "we'll give Chiang as much as we can, but don't give him to the point alienate him to the point of breaking off relations"

P: That was my impression, as I recall it, at the time.

Q: That seems to have been the policy, and I guess Arnold may have instructions; "say yes to almost everything and then we will do the best we can"

P: Yes, placate him and make him as happy as you can, but don't promise.

Q: Are there any other impressions you have of Arnold that perhaps I didn't touch upon? Any recollections or stories about him?

P: Well, I have a story, I always admired Arnold and I was the CO up at Mitchel Field after Arnold had retired, I left Hamilton, and Arnold came back quite frequently to NY for various things, and Mrs. Arnold would come back, her mother lived within just a few miles, And Gen Stratemeyer was the CG of the AC, with Q: In Locust Valley, Long Island. P: yes. and Gen Chuck Stone was his Deputy, and Stratemeyer, who was an easy-going type, very nice to me, he'd always managed to be away. I would be the only one to meet General Arnold, and I thought well here's Chief of the AC, and all he's done, and I took a pretty dim view of it, Arnold noticed it,

Q: Was this deliberate on Stratemeyer's part?

P: Oh yes. And then Stone would duck, You see, I had known Chuck Stone a long time, I talked to him about it, "I said I think it is a disgrace, regardless of what you think of Arnold, Here he is retired, the only 5-star General the AF ever had, He has done a great deal, and I know, from the remarks he made to me, I'm the only one out there at Operations when he comes in, Stratemeyer is gone, and you are gone, and I think it is disgraceful." Well, from that time on, Chuck would be there, but Stratemeyer never did. Stratemeyer, I've heard him talk, he felt he should have had a fourth star, and that Arnold didn't give it to him, It's just that simple, and Stratemeyer was a very easy-going, pleasant personality, but he had that bug in his bonnet, and I think a lot of that happened after Arnold's retirement, I think a lot of them just dropped him because he no longer had

Parker: Stratemeyer Unsatisfactory

any power. Now what their quarrels were with Arnold, I know he wasn't universally popular, because there were people after he was no longer in power - a lot of them came out of the woodwork then and spoke up. Whether they had a legitimate beef or not, I don't know.

Q: Stratemeyer got his third star when he went down to CBI?

P: My impression was that Stratemeyer was right at his peak at the 3rd star. You know the story, he should have been, or he could never have been a woman of ill repute, because he could never say no. So easygoing. But that was an incident that irked me, and that was an example of what I saw quite frequently. As soon as Arnold was out, then they were....

Q: The King is dead, long live the new King. Eaker had a bug in his bonnet too, I think, he didn't make his fourth star.

P: I lot of them, was this promotion business. Of course, everybody thinks he is better than he is. All wanted to get promoted, and of course, they blamed the top man.

Q: I ~~think this~~, I have gotten some of this static, that Arnold had loyalty up and not down. Some people felt that they did not get all the stars that they were entitled to.

P: My observation on that is that, the ones I know, I think they got all the stars that they had coming, and that they owed what they got to Arnold, but it wasn't enough.

Q: Actually, you were not within Arnold's direct orbit.

P: No, I want to make that quite clear. I'm reminiscing here....

Q: You are speaking in a detached way about this.

P: Yes, I never was in his ~~inner circle~~ immediate orbit, although I was a friend, not close as Beebe was, or Kaye

Q: There was a fellow named Jimmy Maher, who was his aide for a while, did you have any contact with him?

P: No.

Parker: Arnold's loyalty

Parker: Hard personnel decisions

Parker: The Big Strikes

Q: You know Eaker was somewhat embittered toward Arnold towards the end of the war, well for several reawons. One of which was he was taken out of the ETO, and Spaatz brought in right before the invasion. Do you remember, did you ever hear anything about that?

P: I heard about it, yes. But I had heard too, that he didn't think Eaker was doing the job

Q: He didn't think Eaker was doing the job, this is why he acted...

P: And some others didn't think Eaker was quite doing the job.

Q: Arnold had to make some tough decisions. Some decisions he made were probably wrong, and some were right. He made a decision about Eaker, right or wrong; he made a decision about Possum Hansell, the 20th AF, he took him out and put in LeMay

P: Obviously, he made the right decision there, and Possum is a classmate of mine, I know him very well, but for a combat commander, Possum and LeMay are in different leagues. And I'm not a great admirer of LeMay, certainly not his quite from his book and his recent activity, but he was a combat commander.

Q: ~~I think Arnold made this decision~~, I was out to the AF Academy not too long ago, and I saw the papers Possum Hansell there, and Hansell would write Arnold three page letters telling him why he was unable to do all the things he had in mind, ~~and~~ LeMay ~~with~~ was the 20th BombCom, would write a half page letter, telling about what he did yesterday, ~~and that~~ I think Arnold added this thing up and said, I'm extrapolating my own thoughts, that Hansell could do a pretty good job, LeMay can do the job.

P: That's right, I'm sure of it. As I say, these people we talked about, them that are bitter, and were bitter as soon as he were out, got as high as they deserved and they got ~~to~~ that high through Arnold. Then because they didn't get higher, they turned.

Q: Some might have gotten higher then they deserved.

P: I'm sure he made enemies, Everybody does that gets any place, ~~and I don't~~

Q: Your overall evaluation of Arnold, do you think he was sort of indispensable

in the job he did.

P: I think he was the right man, at the right time, I don't think Arnold was any mental giant or genius, but the sheer drive and all that, was what we needed.

Q: I have almost always asked the same question. This is why I call the man in a hurry."

P: I think that is a perfect title. I don't think he was any mental genius, Do you?

Q: No, I don't any.

P: I mentioned this weakness I thought probably, too impulsive, what they used to call making decisions in the field, you go out and some guy would tell him a hard luck story, and he would send a wire to Washington and get this thing fixed, you know, without any staff look into it.

Q: He did a lot of this on that trip, By the way. When he went on this trip, there was a whole battery of wires sent back

P: That's where I saw a great deal of it, on these trips, Beebe do this or that, whoever, Pete. Another little anecdote in a way to illustrate this. I saw this actually happen. We had probably 8 or 10 officers along, including a chaplain, and one day amused he turned to this chaplain and he said, "look, you go tell so and so, something. so and so and the chaplain didn't know what he was talking about, but it was that kind of thing, some impulsive deal he had. He gave it to the chaplain and the chaplain's mouth dropped open, and he said, "what, do do now? how come he gave this to me?"

Q: He never thought that this man is not the man I'm supposed to give an assignment to do, but he was the closest one?

P: Yes, Closest one

Q: At the time he thought of it. I have this same impression, At any given time, he had 50 balls bouncing in the air. If he could unload one of them, then he had 49 to worry about, and this is how he ignored established staff procedures, and was supposed to have grabbed people in the hall

P: That puts it exactly. I mean, his whole personality and the way he operated. He'd go out on these trips with just a toothbrush, almost, no money.

Q: Did he expect Pete to finance him?

P: Only one change of underwear. Not that he was sponging, just never thought of it.

Q: I guess he wore himself out.

P: I think so. I'm not a bit surprised.

Q: Were you overseas when he had his major heart attack in 1945?

P: No, did he have one in 1945?

Q: He had one in '43

P: See, I was a POW, I got shot down over Germany.

Q: I wasn't aware of that. When were you shot down?

P: March 6, 1944. Berlin raid.

Q: I did not bring your biography, I have a little biography on everyone, and I'm trying to recall your record, and I have a blank in there, and I was wondering, I remember that you had a March Field association, you had an early association, I wasn't aware of that. Then you were in one of the Stalags. Which one?

P: Stalag 3, Sagan, it is part of Poland now. We marched out of there in the dead of winter in January when the Russians were coming close, walked for about 4 days, and got in boxcars and ended up down near Munich, and were liberated.

Q: You don't think "Hogan's Heroes" gets close to the subject at all.

P: No.

P: You were talking about the revetments at Bolling Field, you mean right after Pearl Harbor?

P: Yes, the panic after Pearl Harbor. I always thought the Japanese — probably the biggest victory they made out of — Pearl Harbor was the panic they threw us into, and the money that we spent

Q: Well, we did a lot of foolish things, like the relocation centers.

P: Oh yes, we hit the panic button, relocation centers was one.

Q: Bolling Field became sort of an armed camp, although there really wasn't anything the enemy could do to get to Bolling?

Parker: POW

P: How could they get to any of these places.

Q: No, not really. I think we attributed to the enemy capability, which they did not then have.

P: Yes, and I think also the fact of Hawaii getting caught, so cold, everything, ships in the harbor, airplanes on the ground, not dispersed, and all that, and think, "Boy, this couldn't happen to me, So every commander all the way up, was prepared; say I wasn't ready"

Q: They were "Fifth Column" happy?

P: Right.

Q: Did you ever hear about Arnold's reaction to any of this?

P: No, this is an aside here, personal. More or less interested sideline on how we panicked.

Q: Right, especially on the West Coast, they were really in a stew. The 4th AF, they thought they were going to get hit soon.

PARKER

Interview with MajorGeneral Lewis Parker Shalimar, Florida, 26 May 1970.

Q: Do you remember when you first met Arnold?

P: I know when I first met him I was stationed at March Field. General Arnold was then Lt Colonel.

Q: He was Commander.

P: Yes. I don't recall the first time I saw him. I just had been at Rockwell and just had been married and got quarters at March Field. The Rockwell outfit was moving up there, and Arnold was in command.

Q: What was your job?

P: I was just an Engineering Officer in the bombardment squadron. We got to know the Arnolds quite well--my wife and myself. My wife had been a kindergarten teacher and General Arnold got her to start a little kindergarten on the base for thechildren. His younger boy was then of kindergarten age, so we got to know them quite well as a family.

Q: I could see then how you got to know Minton Kaye. As a young married officer, I guess Mrs. Arnold was so much taken with Helen Kaye?

P: Well, Mrs. Arnold had known Helen Kaye's father, who was old Army.

Q: I see. I did not know that. No. I thought they had met on board the ship, the Republic, coming around Panama.

P: Well, they did but I am quite sure.

Q: There was prior knowledge?

P: It was my understanding that she had known Helen.

Q: You were at Rockwell and Arnold was at March?

P: And then Rockwell was turned over to the Navy.

Q: This was around '34 or '35, wasn't it?

P: No, that was in 1931.

Q: I didn't realize it was that early. I know that Arnold was very unhappy about it, because North Island was one of our bases. He was trained there, too, in 1916.

P: Yes, I think they lost a child while he was stationed at Rockwell.

Q: Yes, they lost a child, but that was during his second tour, in '21 or '22. John Linton Arnold. This was after the first war. Well, March Field, in my understanding and research, is the key period in his life, because this brought him back into prominence.

P: Right. He was suffering from the aftermath of the Mitchell business.

Q: And at March Field he was really put out in many directions.

P: That's right.

Q: Do you remember his building the rest camp at Bear Lake?

P: Yes, oh, yes, he did a great deal along that line. Oh, with officers, he organized--we had horses. These breakfast rides, and trips down to the beach south of La Jolla across into the mountains.

Q: Ensenada Beach?

P: No, it was, actually, it was almost opposite San Juan Capistrano. Right along the beach from there.

Q: His tour at March Field brought him into contact with General Malin Craig. This helped his career.

P: Yes.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of his association with Malin Craig?

P: No, I don't.

Q: Do you remember the earthquake of 1933?

P: Yes, oh, yes.

Q: Arnold sort of took the bull by the horns.

P: Yes, he organized an aid relief mission in parts of Long Beach and Compton, I think was the center suffered the worst damage. He acted very promptly in flying materials in.

Q: That occurred in March '34.

Q: Did you do any flying for Arnold as pilot?

P: No, not at that time.

Q: You were Engineering Officer?

P: I was Engineering Officer of the bombardment squadron. There were two bombardment squadrons and two pursuit squadrons.

Q: Do you remember Lawrence Woods?

P: Yes.

Q: I saw him recently. He was an Army Engineer-type.

P: Yes, I think he was.

Q: He remembered where everybody lived. It was a closely knit officers' group at the base?

P: Yes, quite close. Very pleasant. And, of course, a lot of things happened there. The air mail.

Q: Did you fly air mail?

P: Well, no, that came along right with the CCC camps, and of course, March Field was the headquarters of the CCC California area, and I was in the headquarters and was stuck there when air mail first started and then got out and went up to Salt Lake but

was sent right back to a blind landing course they were giving at Wright-Patterson, and finished the blind landing course and the air mail was over. So I never actually flew.

Q: Arnold had his headquarters in Salt Lake City. The Newhouse Hotel, I think. I guess the Parkers saw a lot of the Arnolds because...

P: Yes, yes, we did, quite a bit.

Q: Do you have any recollections, special recollections of Arnold; any anecdotes?

P: Well, one, I think shows his character. As I say I was working in the headquarters, personnel officer for this CCC. Something happened up at the camp, up in the Owens Valley.

Q: One of the CCC Camps?

P: One of the CCC camps and Colonel Arnold called me in and said, "I want you to go up there first thing tomorrow morning, and tell those damn commanders, so and so and so." And I said, "Yes, sir," and went out and called Operations, and set up an airplane for 8:00 o'clock in the morning, and thought I was just doing fine. I got another call from Colonel Arnold's office. I went up there and he said: "What time you leaving in the morning?" I said, "I set up an airplane for 8:00 o'clock in the morning, sir." He said, "What time is sun-up?" I said, "Well, I imagine it is about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock." He said, "You be off the ground whenever sun-up is." So I was. I thought I was doing very well at 8 AM.

Q: Do you remember what the problem at the CCC Camp was?

P: No, I don't. Some personnel problem that he felt the camp commander was not handling properly.

Q: They had a couple of racial incidents at one or two of the camps.

P: It wasn't racial. And I don't recall that we had any serious racial incident. As a matter of fact, this far removed, I don't remember any like that.

Q: Well, every account that I've hadeabout the CCC situation gave him high marks for administering a large number of camps.

P: Yes. He did do a real good job.

Q: This experience probably effected his psychology long afterwards, because he had this sort of extroverted thought that, if you take young men and put them out in the woods, doing some healthful activity, going fishing or hunting, or being out in the fresh air, somehow had a salutary effect on their character.

P: Yes.

Q: This was something very positive to be doing. He always talked about fishing or hunting.

P: Well, that was one connection between Arnold and Kaye. Kaye knew that country, and I think Kaye was born around Bakersfield and had done hunting and fishing himself. He would organize these trips. Arnold loved to get out--get out the camping equipment and go out in the desert.

Q: Kaye told me something like that, but I didn't pick it up.

P: That is quite a strong feeling. That was one of the reasons for the close ties.

Q: I thought it was Mrs. Arnold becoming attached to this young gal--Helen Kaye?

P: It was that too, no question about it. I think Mint was somewhat of an opportunist. I think he made the most of the situation.

Q: One of the reasons that I am interested in that particular situation is that I have become very friendly with George Goddard.

P: Oh yes.

Q: And George Goddard has produced a book. Have you seen his new book?

P: I read about it, I haven't seen it.

Q: It is called "Overview." Did you know George Goddard?

P: Yes.

Q: I wonder why he didn't send you a book? He sent the book to a lot of people.

P: I don't know.

Q: Were you ever real close to him?

P: Oh, no, we were never real close. We were never even stationed with him. But I knew him.

Q: Well, you know he ended up in General Arnold's dog house, and he blames Kaye for this.

P: Well, I think a lot of that is true. You see, I was in Washington during this whole thing, and of course, Kaye was disliked generally, because they felt he had Arnold's ear and he did cut people. And I have heard him in a sly way. So he worked himself to the top in the photography thing, you see, at Goddard's expense.

Q: Well, Goddard was exiled from Washington, and he ended up as VD officer at Charlotte Air Force Base, Charlotte, North Carolina.

P: I remember that. See, I was over at Bolling Field during that.

Q: Arnold shipped him out?

P: And Kaye got to the top of this thing.

Q: Right. It was a regrettable thing in a way, because Goddard had a great deal of talent.

P: Oh, terrifically talented.

Q: He is a very vigorous 83.

P: The last time I saw him I was still on duty in the Pentagon and he was bustling around there, still just as busy as a bee.

Q: Anyway, he is trying to sell his book right now, and he refers to Kaye as "Colonel Nemesis." Apparently, the publishers made him take that out.

P: Well, I personally, never had any words with Kaye whatsoever, or any problem. He had no reason to cut me down because I wasn't up.

Q: But he had a reputation for cutting?

P: He had a reputation and a deserved reputation for, I don't known what it was about Kaye. As you said, he is bitter now, and I am not a bit surprised.

Q: He apparently got his come-uppance toward the end of the war.

P: The way I found that out, I was in command at Bolling Field for a year early in the war, and finally managed to get away. Got a B-29 group that was out in Kansas and I had occasion to come into Bolling. I think I brought the first B-29 into Bolling. One that the people in the Pentagon could come and see and look at.

Q: I recall that Arnold invited the President and Marshall to come down.

P: That's right. I flew the thing in. I went up to the BOQ to get a room, and ran into Kaye, and the most lonesome, lonely, dejected looking person in the world. When I'd left, and I learned what had happened since I left Bolling. He was on top of the photography business. Here he was, being shipped as just as an individual over to India. Apparently, the house of cards collapsed. And I didn't

ask him of course, but he intimated he had gotten a dirty deal.

Q: Well, he intimated to me that--of course, I have been given two reasons. One on Goddard's part. Goddard said that Elliott Roosevelt, who worked closely with Goddard, got "Papa" to put some pressure on to get rid of him. Another version that I heard was that Kaye was fooling around--extra-marital type of stuff.

P: Well, knowing the relationship that Arnold had with the Kayes and all, I felt I had no direct knowledge of this, that Arnold got wise to Kaye using that relationship. You know how Arnold could be, when he did. When he was convinced, he just cut him off. To me, that makes sense.

Q: Either of these may have some validity, one of which you may not know that, but Arnold was a prolific letter writer.

P: Oh, yes.

Q: He wrote to his wife--love letters to his wife, all throughout his career. Mrs. Arnold saved almost everyone of them, and I have seen m most of them.

P: He was quite a writer. He wrote some boys' books.

Q: Six boys' books, before March Field, and Arnold was in my opinion, a 19th Century man, in that he had a high sense of honor and loyalty. This business of people straying, either drinking or playing around....

P: Would not go well with him.

Q: And if the theory about Kaye is correct; the other theory which I had been told.

P: I had heard that, but it could be true.

Q: But, anyway, that is an interesting aspect of it because I am trying to situate or place Goddard. You see, Arnold probably

wronged Goddard. Goddard came back, but it wasn't through Arnold's influence. Goddard's--this strip camera, didn't have a shutter. This played a great role in the Normandy invasion and played a great role in the exposure of Russian missiles in 1962.

P: You see, I don't know. As I say, I have known Goddard, but not well. I was never stationed with him or anything. But I have always felt that, technically, he was wonderfully qualified. But I do not know as an organizer, to organize the photographic business world-wide, what his capabilities were.

Q: He was more of a technical man than he was an organizer.

P: An inventor.

Q: Right. The merits of this thing aren't all on one side. Goddard was the kind of a guy, you put him on a project and then you did something else. If he didn't like that project and liked something else, he went off on his own.

P: Oh, yes, individualistic.

Q: An individual, right.

P: And whether he would have worked out as a worldwide head of the photographic empire, I don't know. I am not saying one way or the other. But, knowing Kaye and the works, I am sure Goddard was undercut with Arnold.

Q: I want to take you back to March Field. Arnold was a great man for public relations, or community relations. And he used to have the Hollywood stars come out to the base. Do you remember some of these events?

P: Yes.

Q: Mary Pickford, Wallace Beery.

P: Yes.

Q: Were you given anything part of that assignment, to sort of shepherd some of these Hollywood stars around?

P: No, no, never was. I was appointed as a technical director on a picture that was going to be made by Warner Brost

Q: Warner Bros. Was this later on? In the war?

P: No, this was while I was at March Field. And, I went in several times for preliminary discussions and so on.

Q: Did you work with Guthrie?

P: Bill Guthrie, then the thing fell through and they made it with the Marines. It fell through because the Air Corps then, or the Army, didn't like the way they were handling it. It was a stereotyped flying picture. So it fell through as far as the Air Corps was concerned.

Q: So Warnereswitched the locale and made it a Marine picture?

P: Yeah. Made it with the Marines.

Q: Well, Arnold and Warner had a lot of good relations during the war.

P: Well, I've been into the studio several times, having flown Arnold, but mainly with Beebe. But I was never Arnold's pilot, as Beebe was. But he needed two pilots, and I was it many times.

Q: Then Peterson came in?

P: And then Peterson. But when Beebe got away--we all wanted to go to war. He got away and then Peterson was chosen for the job. And I flew with Peterson on the trip to Casablanca.

Q: Oh, you went on that?

P: Yes, Peterson and I were the pilots.

Q: Then you went on to China?

P: On into China, and there is an incident in Arnold's book...

Q: Getting lost?

P: Getting lost, and also about me when we went up to see Chiang Kai-shek. For some reason or another, he took me along. We flew up on China National Airways, because of the little field at Chungking, because you could get a B-17 in. Arnold took me up there, and went on to this place in the country with Chiang, and spent a couple of nights. Chiang became convinced--you see, I was sitting there silently because Arnold insisted that I go into these meetings--and Chiang definitely got the impression that I understood Chinese. And he said I don't want Colonel Parker at any more of these meetings. It is in Arnold's book.

Q: Did he tell it straight?

P: Yes, he told it straight. This getting lost was--to throw some light on Arnold, as far as this flying business is concerned. We took off from Assam at night and--in crossing the hump. They had one little radio beacon at Kunming. That was all--quite weak. We had a navigator and Pete and I were up above the clouds, stars, and it was very pleasant. But we had as it turned out, found out later, there was a terrific tailwind that we didn't know about. It wasn't predicted. So we were listening to this beacon, and we didn't hear it. But we weren't a bit concerned, and a couple of hundred miles short of Kunming and never did hear it. Finally, the navigator--the navigator was a young kid who was pretty good, but he had flown this business back and forth across the Atlantic on ferrying jobs, and he never went much higher than 7,000 or 8,000 feet, and he was down in the nose of the B-17 where the navigator stayed, and finally we called him. I called him and said: "Where are you on a fix." Well, his

voice came back, and it sounded like he was drunk and I couldn't get anything out of him. I said, "Pete, I better go down and take a look." I went down there and the kid hadn't worn an oxygen mask, and we were up then about 20-21,000 feet, and he was almost out. So I got in and said, "Sit down here," and got him an oxygen mask on, "Sit there for at least 10 minutes before you even move, and breathe this oxygen, and then, when you feel all right keep it on, and take a reading." So he did, and when he got up then, and shot the stars and all, we were several hundred miles beyond Kunming. In the meantime, we decided that we had better keep right on course. We couldn't see anything down, so we did 180° and started back. Throughout this thing and through all the flights that I made with General Arnold, he had never interfered with the pilots or anything. We reported the situation. No flak. He was back in the radio operation's compartment, and Clayton Bissell who was along--a Brig General then--was all excited, jumping up and down. Arnold never said a word. We got back and...

Q: Arnold knew about this?

P: Oh, yes, we told him that we had overflown Kunming and that we were going back. Luckily, as we came back across, it turned out that this radio beacon had been out of commission when we passed it the first time. We picked it up, and went on in and landed. Arnold, the next day, got Pete and me,in, and in a very fatherly manner assured us that we had not been quite as careful as we could have been, and we should have checked on this navigator before. But we had assumed from the weather report that we had such and such a word and we were still an hour from Kunming, when actually we were probably passing it. The combination of that and the radio beacon being out...

Q: Guess you were very low on gasoline when you turned?

P: We were not in any--there was no crisis as far as gasoline since we found Kunming. We never could have made it back across the Hump at all with the terrific wind.

Q: If you had to back into a head wing.

P: So we would have had to land, do something.

Q: Was that the only landing field that you knew about?

P: That was the only landing field that you could get into with a B-17.

Q: The Japs weren't too far away, were they?

P: No, we were over the Japanese. We plotted it all out the next day. See, we knew what the wind was when we returned. Terrific wind--almost a 100-miles an hour. And we plotted how long it took us to get back, you see.

Q: Were you lucky that Arnold didn't fire you and Pete?

P: No, no, as I say, he just pointed out in a very quiet way.

Q: Not excited?

P: No, not excited way that we probably weren't as careful as we might have been. Trusting this weather report.

Q: Also, about checking on this navigator?

P: I think that was very typical of him. Every flight I made with him, he was the same way. Having been a pilot himself, he'd sit in the back seat, never bother. Once in a while he would come up front and sit there in one seat or the other, and talk. But he liked to work out little problems and they come up and hurl them at you. Give you 10 minutes to figure, what's the answer to this one?

Q: Do you mean problems?

P: Mathematical problems or any sort of thing. Throw them at you and see how quickly you could get them.

Q: He had a quick mind.

P: Very quick.

Q: Was he an articulate man?

P: Yes.

Q: Did you ever hear him get mad?

P: Oh, yes, I've heard him get mad.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

P: No, no. This time that he called me in the office he had checked something with Operations to see what time I had planned to leave. He was mad about the situation up there and there was just that steely look and what time is sunup. No ranting or raving.

Q: Did you know what he wanted?

P: I knew exactly what the problem was. When he said "early" he meant early.

Q: On this Chinese trip, did he talk to you about the Chinese problem, about the Chinese wanting airplanes and materiel which we at that time were not able to give?

P: He didn't discuss that with me a great deal. You see, I was along as another pilot, and I wanted to be sure that you understood that. I never worked in Arnold's office, or directly under him. But another characteristic of him--every time I went--many, many times--either with Beebe or Pete, or I would fly him myself, if at that time Beebe was will or something, he would always insist the pilots come along. If he were invited to a dinner that they be invited, a party or anything. He was most considerate that way, because with my tenure there at Bolling I flew a lot of people. I was actually designated

by Arnold to be Marshall's pilot. So I flew Marshall all the time. That's why I had a hard time getting away from there, but finally did.

Q: Did Marshall understand aviation? Did he understand the role of airpower?

P: I'm not qualified to say. I am a great admirer of Marshall's.

Q: Well, I am, too, and most people are. But I've gotten some impressions that he was somewhat naive about the capability of an airplane.

P: Well, I think most of the Army types were, actually. Well, we thought they were. At least, we in the Air Corps.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: What sort of relationship?

P: Very pleasant, what I saw of them.

Q: Arnold was differential to Marshall?

P: Oh,yyeah. He was strictly....

Q: He was working for Marshall?

P: That's right.

Q: And Marshall let everybody know.h

P: He was very correct. Marshall was a rather different individual from most of them. All the trips that I took--and he never took a big staff--you take another general at that time who would take a big staff--eight or ten henchmen,aaides, etc. Marshall never even took an aide. So I sort of acted for him. And--one time I was flying him out to Seattle, with Secretary Stimson. We had some bad weather after crossing the mountains in northern Washington to get into Seattle. Stimson had an aide...

Q: George Brownell?

P: No, it wasn't Brownell, at that time. Slim Turner. Anyway, he came up to the cockpit and we were on instruments, and flying along. He wanted to know what the score was and what the weather was in Seattle. It wasn't very good, but was supposed to clear up by the time he got there. Well, he went back and told the Secretary, and the old Secretary got kind of concerned, and General Marshall came out to see. I think the Secretary said: "General, would you go up and see?" So he came up and made a suggestion that maybe we ought to go into Portland or something. We said: "Well, everything is going to be all right." Did you know General Slim Turner? He and I were together, and he was actually Stimson's pilot all the time. So they went back, and they sent the aide up to get Turner to come back and consult about this thing. Turner was quite a correct individual. He repeated, he told me when he came back, he was red in the face, he sat there and didn't say a word. Okay, I told them our main concern was, "not you, Mr. Secretary or you, General Marshall; it's Colonel Parker and I are concerned about ourselves. We are not going to get into any trouble." And went on back down. We arrived in Seattle perfectly all right. And, the fear and trepidation, all the rest of the trip. We got back to Bolling and the Secretary and General Marshall both, said: "We want to apologize for our conduct there in Washington and it will never happen again." That's all they said.

Q: I want to take you back to March Field. There are a couple of questions. You did not make the air mail mission, you were at Wright Field?

P: No.

Q: Were you disappointed in not flying the air mail?

P: Oh, yes, of course. They had started this blind landing school. They thought this thing might carry on.

Q: Do you have any recollections, probably, second hand in your case, of the kind of job that Arnold did? He had the Western Air Mail Zone. Do you have any recollections of the men who flew? Did they talk about Arnold, the way he handled it? He had the toughest job of all. Flying the Rockies.

P: The main criticism wasn't of Arnold. It was the policy of splitting everything up, instead of going by units. We had pursuit pilots flying bombers, and bomber pilots flying pursuit airplanes. You had military units, but they were just scattered to the winds. Just airplanes and people. That was my general criticism, although I never took part, and criticism I heard. But that wasn't Arnold. That was done every place.

Q: That was the whole setup, really.

P: I heard no criticism of Arnold.

Q: Was there criticism of Foulois for taking on this job with open-cockpit planes, inadequate radios?

P: Not in the military. I never heard of any.

Q: It was just a job to be done?

P: A job and nobody thought anything about it. There was a great furor about killing all these people. It didn't disturb anybody in our unit.

Q: Well, shortly thereafter Arnold was pulled back from vacation. He and Mrs. Arnold were going to Jackson Hole for a vacation after the air mail. He was pulled back and ordered to fly the Alaskan

flight. Did you get in on that?

P: No, no, I didn't get in on it. There was a matter of rank, probably as much as anything else. We had the lowest ranking officer that went on that. Jack Mills, he was about a year and a half, two years ahead of me.

Q: In other words, you lost out on that mission because of seniority?

P: Well, I don't know. I don't think I was even considered or people in my group.

Q: I see. Twining was standby. He never did make the flight, and he was very unhappy.

P: Yes. Well, of course, everybody would have liked to have gone but, I had no...

Q: Well, one of the people who did go, and had a lot to do with planning the trip was Hugh Knerr. Of course, his great hero is Andrews.

P: Yes, oh yes.

Q: And his criticism of Arnold was that Arnold looked after Arnold, and not his troops. And Knerr said in effect that Arnold's loyalty was up and not down. The case in point being that none of the people participating in the Alaskan flight, but Arnold received a medal for it.

P: I didn't even know that.

Q: You didn't hear any static on it?

P: No, I knew a number of them quite well, and some intimately. I never heard any criticism.

Q: The Alaskan flight was very successful?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: When they came back I think they were given a special secret mission to see whether they could react after the long mission across country. Do you remember the secret orders that Arnold got to fly his B-10s across country? He flew back to Washington.

P: Yes.

Q: You didn't get in on that side of it?

P: No.

Q: Well, Arnold shortly thereafter made his star. Were you at March Field when he got his star? This would be February 1935?

P: No, I had gone to Hawaii. I left in November of 1934.

Q: That was about a year before he left?

P: Yes.

Q: Arnold and Mrs. Arnold were very much for building up the base, the beautification program.

P: Yes, oh, yes.

Q: Do you have any recollection of that program? They put in some poplar trees?

P: I remember when that went on. Planted a lot of palms, and did a lot toward fixing the base.

Q: Mrs. Arnold was sort of a Lady Bird Johnson, a generation ahead. Very active. In fact, I saw Archie Old. He lives near March Field and he says those poplars are 100 feet tall now. Have you been out to March Field?

P: Yes, of course, many times and the trees meet across the street, and when I moved there the quarters had just been built not too long before. There wasn't anything.

Q: You mentioned the Riding Club thatArnold or Mrs. Arnold organized?

P: The riding, breakfast club?

Q: Was she very much for keeping the officers working or playing together, making a sort of cohesive unit?

P: Yes, I think so. They weren't, the Arnolds, I have seen a lot of Commanding Officer's wives much more inclined toward social affairs and so on than the Arnolds. They were more to have a group of different people, in a small way, rather than big affairs.

Q: Mrs. Arnold--did she throw her weight around as wife of the Commanding Officer?

P: Well, I didn't see it, and my wife didn't.

Q: She probably had recollections--the distaff side always has different recollections of things.

P: My thoughts of Arnold as a commander. I say I never served in his office, although I saw a great deal of him when I was at Bolling Field. Maybe, a little too much inclined like some commanders and bases to surround themselves with a small group, and then maybe make decisions based on what Joe Blow told them, rather than using a staff. To tie in with what Knerr said.

Q: Talking about Arnold as a commanding officer.

P: That's the only criticism that I heard in my observation. I thought that was the weakest, because I've seen other people that do that. In other words, Hap had around him some bright junior officers, bright young boys. But that's the criticism the President has gotten recently, about the White House "kitchen cabinet," usurping the regular Cabinet. Well, that method of operation is what I am talking about. Marshall was the exact opposite. Marshall went through the staff. He didn't have himself surrounded by a group like that.

Q: Who was always close to Arnold? You mentioned Kaye, we are talking about March Field, McNarney, was he close to Arnold at that time?

P: Not awfully close, they were...

Q: He worked for Arnold at March Field. Tooey Spaatz was very close to Arnold.

P: Yes, yes.

Q: Was Eaker out thereaat any time?

P: Eaker was there, lived right across the street from me. Monk Hunter was there.

Q: I have heard a comment that those officers who grew up with Arnold on the West Coast graduated to better type positions during the war than those who grew up with Andrews on the East Coast. Is there any basis for that?

P: I think there is a basis. I think there is always where someone gets up pretty high, he's going to choose the people with whom he has worked. Those he knows intimately and trusts, I think it is just the human thing to do.

Q: Would it be a matter of people getting positions beyond their ability, just on the basis of nepotism?

P: Oh, I don't think so much in getting...

Q: Minton Kaye, I guess, has some ability, but he also had the inside track.

P: I think Mint had a lot of ability. He had this odd quirk of personality. He seemed to enjoy cutting people down, and he did it. He had Arnold's ear as a friend, and I think he used it.

Q: Was it Lord Acton who said, "Absolute power corrupts absolutely," and I guess when you have access to the Chief's office, and if...

P: If you are that way, I mean if you have a lot of potential power, used cunningly, as he would, to drop a word,"so and so tells me he gets pretty drunk." You know, little things like that. If the person in power pays any attention to that sort of thing, and does not treat it skeptically, it can be pretty harmful.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold--I'm sure you did--at social occasions at March Field. He didn't do much drinking, did he?

P: He didn't drink at all. He didn't touch a drop in those days. The only time I'had ever seen him take a drink was after he had retired. He'd had this heart attack, and the doctor prescribed that he take...

Q: I think he took sherry?

P: Sherry or an old fashioned, or a highball before dinner. Before that, I think, he had been on the wagon for years.

Q: I'd heard that he might have done some hard drinking when he was very young. He had ulcers.

P: Well, I don't know about that, of course, that is the story, it often is, and it could be true, about someone who has ulcers.

Q: But in mid-career, at the peak of his career.

P: He never drank, but he was very broad-minded about it. He never minded. Mrs. Arnold always had cocktails. They'd have people in, but Arnold never had any. Of course, he didn't smoke.

Q: When he got mad, was it a sort of explosive type of anger?

P: Yes, I think so. I think he was, as you say "in a hurry," and he just seemed to...

Q: Was he forgiving? If he got mad at somebody, was it a personal kind of anger, was it a grudge?

P: I never saw any of that at all.

Q: Or was it just a job involved?

P: The only time that I ever observed it, it was just a job. And as I say, the two times where I mentioned he had occasion to chew me out, he didn't, except in a way that meant a great deal to me. There was no blowing up or anything like that. But I could tell he was unhappy.

Q: Did you ever go on, you mentioned that Mint Kaye organized some of these outdoor, fishing parties?

P: No, I never went on them.

Q: A fellow named Joe Elliott with the Forest Service, with whom he had some contacts, and he went on a number of pack trips. I think late in the war he took Marshall on one of these trips to the High Sierras. You didn't go along on that?

P: No.

Q: It was a pack trip for a number of days. Then they went pheasant huntingiin '45, near Bismarck, N.D.

P: No, I never went. I wasn't much of a hunter, fisherman.

Q: You mentioned you left in Nov 1934 and went to Hawaii...

P: Went to Hawaii for two years and then to Bolling.

Q: What was your job at Bolling?

P: I was there seven years. I started out as Engineering Officer; I had taken the engineering maintenance course at Chanute Field, that's why I was always in engineering or maintenance engineering.

Q: You were there from say '37 to...

P: I was there from 1937 to 1942. I got out in the Spring of 1942.

Q: You were there then when the war started?

P: Oh yes.

Q: Do you remember publication in the Chicago Tribune, of part of our war plan, a couple days before Pearl Harbor?

P: I don't recall.

Q: At Bolling Field, I guess Tooey Spaatz made his headquarters there, when they formed the 8th AF.

P: Yes, and they formed the 9th AF there. It grew pretty big, and the last year I was there, I was base commander, but still flying General Marshall. Being a non-pilot himself, we assigned somebody to fly these higher ranking Army generals, and they wouldn't let them go. They were the only one they would go with.

Q: You mentioned sort of being stuck in the Washington area, and probably anxious to go. Arnold, himself, never had combat. He never got into operations in WWI. He never quite made it, and so he was perhaps sympathetic to the wishes of some of his staff?

P: Oh yes, I think he was, he let Gene Beebe go.

Q: Stratemeyer?

P: Yes, oh, yes, I think he was, quite sympathetic, but General Marshall, being the Chief of Staff. You see, I had a time. I had to finally just go to him personally, and he hand-picked this officer, and he flew with us for several months, and finally, Marshall decided he wanted somebody else to get him here and there.

Q: I want to ask you about Casablanca, on that trip. You flew Arnold over?

P: No, Pete and I flew several other officers that were going along, a non-pilot who was in Plans, and another officer who was in Plans. We flew the B-17 over. Marshall and Arnold went over in a C-54. At that time, I don't think it was even a military plane; I

think it was sort of a chartered job. Well, then, we flew up to Algiers, into Cairo, and I've forgotten where Marshall dropped out, whether he even went up to Cairo with us. No, I don't think he did, he came on back from Algiers, and then went on over into India and China. Then, we got back to Calcutta and we had Wedemeyer.

Q: This is the one who went out to Chiang Kai-shek?

P: Yes, Wedemeyer. So, Arnold told me there, that Wedemeyer was going on to brief MacArthur on the thing, and I was to go with him.

Q: Brief MacArthur on what?

P: On the Casablanca Conference. So, then Pete picked up another pilot and flew Arnold back, and I went on around with Wedemeyer.

Q: On his way to China, Arnold stopped in India, and he saw Air Marshal Peirse, a couple of other people, Wavell. Arnold had a very negative reaction toward the British in that period. They weren't doing a darn thing. They were getting a lot of materiel, and they weren't doing anything with it. Did you get into that policy aspect?

P: I didn't get into that, no.

Q: Arnold never sat down in the airplane, and shot the breeze with anybody; talk about his problems?

P: No.

Q: You sat in on some of the Chiang Kai-shek briefings until Chiang decided you were a spy?

P: Until he specifically told Arnold he didn't want Col Parker in there.

Q: Did Arnold ever say anything to you about this?

P: Oh yes, he told me about it. He thought it was a great joke, and it was, of course.

Q: I remember reading that in Global Mission. But he never made any further comment on that, that Chiang was a suspicious man?

P: No, only that he said: "Chiang is convinced that you speak and understand Chinese, and he doesn't want you in there, anymore."

Q: Was there some byplay between Chiang and his interpreter?

P: Well, Chiang went through his interpreter all the time. I don't know how much he understood. His wife speaks fluently.

Q: Was she present at the meeting?

P: No, she wasn't up there. So, apparently, he didn't want Arnold to have an interpreter.

Q: He wanted the only version to come from him. Was Chiang pretty tough in this byplay, demanding?

P: No, it didn't seem to me, at all, that there was really much...

Q: Did Arnold have any instructions from higher up to play with along with Chiang? Chiang was asking for a lot more than Arnold was able to give him.

P: Well, I heard that, in Arnold talking to Stilwell--his conversation with Stilwell. Of course, Stilwell was no admirer of Chiang at all and vice versa. So I heard that side of it.

Q: How about Stilwell and Chennault? Of course, they were at odds all the time?

P: They were at odds?

Q: Did you get into any of that?

P: I heard it discussed.

Q: Did Arnold take any position on the Chennault-Stilwell controversy?

P: Not that I know of. I'm sure that he would have been for Chennault. I think, again, as a matter of, a lot of it could have been the lack of understanding of airpower, so-called, by the Army Generals. Of course, another thing that might have hurt Stilwell was the fact that Chennault and Chiang were so close.

Q: Well, one aspect of that closeness was that Chennault used to write letters to President Roosevelt directly.

P: Oh, I'm sure he did, you see, that cut in...

Q: And Joseph Alsop, who was on his staff, would write a transmittal letter to Grace Tully, who was President Roosevelt's secretary, and he simply bypassed Stilwell's staff, and he got away with it because he knew that Chiang was with him, and I guess the policy was: "We'll give Chiang as much as we can, but don't alienate him to the point of breaking off relations."

P: That was my impression, as I recall it, at the time.

Q: That seems to have been the policy. I guess Arnold may have instructions: "Say 'yes' to almost everything and then we will do the best we can."

P: Yes, placate him and make him as happy as you can, but don't promise.

Q: Are there any other impressions you have of Arnold that perhaps I didn't touch upon? Any recollections or stories about him:

P: Well, I have a story, I always admired Arnold and I was the CO up at Mitchel Field after Arnold had retired. I left Hamilton, and Arnold came back quite frequently to NY for various things. Mrs. Arnold would come back, her mother lived within just a few miles.

Q: In Locust Valley, Long Island.

P: Yes. And Gen Stratemeyer was the CG of the CONAC, with headquarters there, and Gen Chuck Stone was his Deputy. Stratemeyer, who was an easy going type, very nice to me, he'd always managed to be away. I would be the only one to meet General Arnold, and I thought well here's Chief of the AC, and all he's done. I took a pretty dim view of it. Arnold noticed it.

Q: Was this deliberate on Stratemeyer's part?

P: Oh yes. And then Stone would duck. You see, I had known Chuck Stone a long time. I talked to him about it: "I said I think it is a disgrace, regardless of what you think of Arnold. Here he is retired, the only five-star General the AF ever had. He has done a great deal. I know, from the remarks he made to me, I'm the only one out there at Operations when he comes in. Stratemeyer is gone, and you are gone, and I think it is disgraceful." Well, from that time on, Chuck would be there, but Stratemeyer never did. Stratemeyer, I've heard him talk, he felt he should have had a fourth star, and that Arnold didn't give it to him. It's just that simply, and Stratemeyer was a very easy going, pleasant personality, but he had that bug in his bonnet, and I think a lot of that happened after Arnold's retirement. I think a lot of them just dropped him because he no longer had any power. Now what their quarrels were with Arnold, I know he wasn't universally popular, because there were people--after he was no longer in power--a lot of them came out of the woodworkd then and spoke up. Whether they had a legitimate beef or not, I don't know.

Q: Stratemeyer got his third star when he went down to CBI?

P: My impression was that Stratemeyer was right at his peak at the third star. You know the story, he should have been, or he could never have been a woman of ill repute, because he could never say no. So easy going. But that was an incident that irked me. That was an example of what I saw quite frequently. As soon as Arnold was out, then they were....

Q: The King is dead, long live the new King. Eaker had a bug in his bonnet, too, I think, he didn't make his fourth star.

P: A lot of them, was this promotion business. Of course, everybody thinks he is better than he is. All wanted to get promoted, and of course, they blamed the top man.

Q: I have gotten some of this static, that Arnold had loyalty up and not down. Some people felt that they did not get all the stars that they were entitled to.

P: My observation on that is that, the ones I know, I think they got all the stars that they had coming, and that they owed what they got to Arnold, but it wasn't enough.

Q: Actually, you were not within Arnold's direct orbit.

P: No, I want to make that quite clear. I'm reminiscing here....

Q: You are speaking in a detached way about this.

P: Yes, I never was in his immediate orbit, although I was a friend, not close as Beebe was, or Kaye.

Q: There was a fellow named Jimmy Maher, who was his aide for awhile. Did you have any contact with him?

P: No.

Q: You know Eaker was somewhat embittered toward Arnold towards the end of the war, well for several reasons. One of which was he was taken out of the ETO, and Spaatz brought right in before the

invasion. Do you remember, did you ever hear anything about that?

P: I heard about it, yes. But I had heard, too, that he didn't think Eaker was doing the job.

Q: He didn't think Eaker was doing the job, this is why he acted...

P: And some others didn't think Eaker was quite doing the job.

Q: Arnold had to make some tough decisions. Some decisions he made were probably wrong, and some were right. He made a decision about Eaker, right or wrong; he made a decision about Possum Hansell, the 20th AF. He took him out and put in LeMay.

P: Obviously, he made the right decision there, and Possum is a classmate of mine; I know him very well. But for a combat commander, Possum and LeMay are in different leagues. And I'm not a great admirer of LeMay, certainly not his quote from his book and his recent activity, but he was a combat commander.

Q: I was out to the AF Academy not too long ago, and I saw the Possum Hansell papers there, and Hansell would write Arnold three-page letters telling him why he was unable to do all the things he had in mind. LeMay was the 20th BombCom, would write a half-page letter, telling about what heddid yesterday. I think Arnold added this thing up and said--I'm extrapolating my own thoughts--that Hansell could do a pretty good job, LeMay can do <u>the</u> job.

P: That's right, I'm sure of it. As I say, these people we talked about. Them that are bitter, and were bitter as soon as he was out, got as high as they deserved and they got that high through Arnold. Then, because they didn't get higher, they turned.

Q: Some might have gotten higher than they deserved.

P: I'm sure he made enemies. Everybody does that gets any place.

Q: Your overall evaluation of Arnold? Do you think he was sort of indispensable in the job he did?

P: I think he was the right man, at the right time; I don't think Arnold was any mental giant or genius, but the sheer drive and all that, was what we needed.

Q: I have almost the same view. This is why I call him "The man in a hurry."

P: I think that is a perfect title. I don't think he was any mental genius. Do you?

Q: No, I don't any.

P: I mentioned this weakness I thought probably, too impulsive, what they used to call making decisions in the field. You go out and some guy would tell him a hard luck story, and he would send a wire to Washington and get this thing fixed, you know without any staff look into it.

Q: He did a lot of this on that trip, By the way, when he went on this trip, there was a whole battery of wires sent back.

P: That's where I saw a great deal of it, on these trips, Beebe do this or that, whoever, Pete. Another little anecdote in a way to illustrate this. I saw this actually happen. We had probably 8 or 10 officers along, including a chaplain. One day Arnold turned to this chaplain and said: "Look, you go tell so and so something." The chaplain didn't know what he was talking about. But it was that kind of thing, some impulsive deal he had. He gave it to the chaplain and the chaplain's mouth dropped open and he said: "What do I do now? How come he gave this to me?"

Q: He never thought that this man is not the man I'm supposed to give an assignment to do, but he was the closest one?

P: Yes, closest one.

Q: At the time he thought of it. I have this same impression. At any given time, he had 50 balls bouncing in the air. If he could unload one of them, then he had 49 to worry about. This is how he ignored established staff procedures, and was supposed to have grabbed people in the hall.

P: That puts it exactly. I mean, his whole personality and the way he operated. He'd go out on these trips with just a toothbrush, almost, no money.

Q: Did he expect Pete to finance him?

P: Only one change of underwear. Not that he was sponging, just never thought of it.

Q: I guess he wore himself out?

P: I think so. I'm not a bit surprised.

Q: Were you overseas when he had his major heart attack in 1945?

P: No, did he have one in 1945?

Q: He had one in '43.

P: See, I was a POW; I got shot down over Germany.

Q: I wasn't aware of that. When were you shot down?

P: March 6, 1944. Berlin raid.

Q: I did not bring your biography. I have a little biography on everybne. I'm trying to recall your record, and I have a blank in there, and I was wondering, I remembered that you had a March Field association, you had an early association, I wasn't aware of that. Then you were in one of the Stalags? Which one?

P: Stalag 3. Sagan, it is part of Poland now. We marched out of there in the dead of winter in January when the Russians were coming close, walked for about 4 days, and got in boxcards and ended

up down near Munich, and were liberated.

Q: You don't think "Hogan's Heroes" gets close to the subject at all?

P: No.

Q: You were talking about the revetments at Bolling Field, you mean right after Pearl Harbor?

Q: Yes, the panic after Pearl Harbor. I always thought the Japanese--probably the biggest victory they made out of Pearl Harbor was the panic they threw us into, and the money that we spent.

Q: Well, we did a lot of foolish things, like the relocation centers.

P: Oh yes, we hit the panic button, relocationscenters were one.

Q: Bolling Field became sort of an armed camp, although there really wasn't anything the enemy could do to get to Bolling?

P: How could they get to any of these places?

Q: No, not really. I think we attributed to the enemy a capability which they did not then have.

P: Yes, and I think also the fact of Hawaii getting caught, so cold, with everything, ships in the harbor, the airplanes on the ground, not dispersed, and all that. They thought: "Boy, this couldn't happen to me." So every commander all the way up, was prepared: "So they couldn't say I wasn't ready."

Q: They were "Fifth Column" happy?

P; Right.

Q: Did you ever hear about Arnold's reaction to any of this?

P: No, this is an aside here, personal. More or less interesting sideline on how people panicked.

Q: Right, especially on the West Coast, they were really in a stew. The 4th AF, they thought they were going to get hit soon.

PARKER

Interview with MajorGeneral Lewis Parker Shalimar, Florida, 26 May 1970.

Q: Do you remember when you first met Arnold?

P: I know when I first met him I was stationed at March Field. General Arnold was then Lt Colonel.

Q: He was Commander.

P: Yes. I don't recall the first time I saw him. I just had been at Rockwell and just had been married and got quarters at March Field. The Rockwell outfit was moving up there, and Arnold was in command.

Q: What was your job?

P: I was just an Engineering Officer in the bombardment squadron. We got to know the Arnolds quite well--my wife and myself. My wife had been a kindergarten teacher and General Arnold got her to start a little kindergarten on the base for the children. His younger boy was then of kindergarten age, so we got to know them quite well as a family.

Q: I could see then how you got to know Minton Kaye. As a young married officer, I guess Mrs. Arnold was so much taken with Helen Kaye?

P: Well, Mrs. Arnold had known Helen Kaye's father, who was old Army.

Q: I see. I did not know that. No. I thought they had met on board the ship, the Republic, coming around Panama.

P: Well, they did but I am quite sure.

Q: There was prior knowledge?

P: It was my understanding that she had known Helen.

Q: You were at Rockwell and Arnold was at March?

P: And then Rockwell was turned over to the Navy.

Q: This was around '34 or '35, wasn't it?

P: No, that was in 1931.

Q: I didn't realize it was that early. I know that Arnold was very unhappy about it, because North Island was one of our bases. He was trained there, too, in 1916.

P: Yes, I think they lost a child while he was stationed at Rockwell.

Q: Yes, they lost a child, but that was during his second tour, in '21 or '22. John Linton Arnold. This was after the first war. Well, March Field, in my understanding and research, is the key period in his life, because this brought him back into prominence.

P: Right. He was suffering from the aftermath of the Mitchell business.

Q: And at March Field he was really put out in many directions.

P: That's right.

Q: Do you remember his building the rest camp at Bear Lake?

P: Yes, oh, yes, he did a great deal along that line. Oh, with officers, he organized--we had horses. These breakfast rides, and trips down to the beach south of La Jolla across into the mountains.

Q: Ensenada Beach?

P: No, it was, actually, it was almost opposite San Juan Capistrano. Right along the beach from there.

Q: His tour at March Field brought him into contact with General Malin Craig. This helped his career.

P: Yes.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of his association with Malin Craig?

P: No, I don't.

Q: Do you remember the earthquake of 1933?

P: Yes, oh, yes.

Q: Arnold sort of took the bull by the horns.

P: Yes, he organized an aid relief mission in parts of Long Beach and Compton, I think was the center suffered the worst damage. He acted very promptly in flying materials in.

Q: That occurred in March '34.

Q: Did you do any flying for Arnold as pilot?

P: No, not at that time.

Q: You were Engineering Officer?

P: I was Engineering Officer of the bombardment squadron. There were two bombardment squadrons and two pursuit squadrons.

Q: Do you remember Lawrence Woods?

P: Yes.

Q: I saw him recently. He was an Army Engineer-type.

P: Yes, I think he was.

Q: He remembered where everybody lived. It was a closely knit officers' group at the base?

P: Yes, quite close. Very pleasant. And, of course, a lot of things happened there. The air mail.

Q: Did you fly air mail?

P: Well, no, that came along right with the CCC camps, and of course, March Field was the headquarters of the CCC California area, and I was in the headquarters and was stuck there when air mail first started and then got out and went up to Salt Lake but

was sent right back to a blind landing course they were giving at Wright-Patterson, and finished the blind landing course and the air mail was over. So I never actually flew.

Q: Arnold had his headquarters in Salt Lake City. The Newhouse Hotel, I think. I guess the Parkers saw a lot of the Arnolds because...

P: Yes, yes, we did, quite a bit.

Q: Do you have any recollections, special recollections of Arnold; any anecdotes?

P: Well, one, I think shows his character. As I say I was working in the headquarters, personnel officer for this CCC. Something happened up at the camp, up in the Owens Valley.

Q: One of the CCC Camps?

P: One of the CCC camps and Colonel Arnold called me in and said, "I want you to go up there first thing tomorrow morning, and tell those damn commanders, so and so and so." And I said, "Yes, sir," and went out and called Operations, and set up an airplane for 8:00 o'clock in the morning, and thought I was just doing fine. I got another call from Colonel Arnold's office. I went up there and he said: "What time you leaving in the morning?" I said, "I set up an airplane for 8:00 o'clock in the morning, sir." He said, "What time is sun-up?" I said, "Well, I imagine it is about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock." He said, "You be off the ground whenever sun-up is." So I was. I thought I was doing very well at 8 AM.

Q: Do you remember what the problem at the CCC Camp was?

P: No, I don't. Some personnel problem that he felt the camp commander was not handling properly.

Q: They had a couple of racial incidents at one or two of the camps.

P: It wasn't racial. And I don't recall that we had any serious racial incident. As a matter of fact, this far removed, I don't remember any like that.

Q: Well, every account that I've had about the CCC situation gave him high marks for administering a large number of camps.

P: Yes. He did do a real good job.

Q: This experience probably effected his psychology long afterwards, because he had this sort of extroverted thought that, if you take young men and put them out in the woods, doing some healthful activity, going fishing or hunting, or being out in the fresh air, somehow had a salutary effect on their character.

P: Yes.

Q: This was something very positive to be doing. He always talked about fishing or hunting.

P: Well, that was one connection between Arnold and Kaye. Kaye knew that country, and I think Kaye was born around Bakersfield and had done hunting and fishing himself. He would organize these trips. Arnold loved to get out--get out the camping equipment and go out in the desert.

Q: Kaye told me something like that, but I didn't pick it up.

P: That is quite a strong feeling. That was one of the reasons for the close ties.

Q: I thought it was Mrs. Arnold becoming attached to this young gal--Helen Kaye?

P: It was that too, no question about it. I think Mint was somewhat of an opportunist. I think he made the most of the situation.

Q: One of the reasons that I am interested in that particular situation is that I have become very friendly with George Goddard.

P: Oh yes.

Q: And George Goddard has produced a book. Have you seen his new book?

P: I read about it, I haven't seen it.

Q: It is called "Overview." Did you know George Goddard?

P: Yes.

Q: I wonder why he didn't send you a book? He sent the book to a lot of people.

P: I don't know.

Q: Were you ever real close to him?

P: Oh, no, we were never real close. We were never even stationed with him. But I knew him.

Q: Well, you know he ended up in General Arnold's dog house, and he blames Kaye for this.

P: Well, I think a lot of that is true. You see, I was in Washington during this whole thing, and of course, Kaye was disliked generally, because they felt he had Arnold's ear and he did cut people. And I have heard him in a sly way. So he worked himself to the top in the photography thing, you see, at Goddard's expense.

Q: Well, Goddard was exiled from Washington, and he ended up as VD officer at Charlotte Air Force Base, Charlotte, North Carolina.

P: I remember that. See, I was over at Bolling Field during that.

Q: Arnold shipped him out?

P: And Kaye got to the top of this thing.

Q: Right. It was a regrettable thing in a way, because Goddard had a great deal of talent.

P: Oh, terrifically talented.

Q: He is a very vigorous 83.

P: The last time I saw him I was still on duty in the Pentagon and he was bustling around there, still just as busy as a bee.

Q: Anyway, he is trying to sell his book right now, and he refers to Kaye as "Colonel Nemesis." Apparently, the publishers made him take that out.

P: Well, I personally, never had any words with Kaye whatsoever, or any problem. He had no reason to cut me down because I wasn't up.

Q: But he had a reputation for cutting?

P: He had a reputation and a deserved reputation for, I don't know what it was about Kaye. As you said, he is bitter now, and I am not a bit surprised.

Q: He apparently got his come-uppance toward the end of the war.

P: The way I found that out, I was in command at Bolling Field for a year early in the war, and finally managed to get away. Got a B-29 group that was out in Kansas and I had occasion to come into Bolling. I think I brought the first B-29 into Bolling. One that the people in the Pentagon could come and see and look at.

Q: I recall that Arnold invited the President and Marshall to come down.

P: That's right. I flew the thing in. I went up to the BOQ to get a room, and ran into Kaye, and the most lonesome, lonely, dejected looking person in the world. When I'd left, and I learned what had happened since I left Bolling. He was on top of the photography business. Here he was, being shipped as just as an individual over to India. Apparently, the house of cards collapsed. And I didn't

ask him of course, but he intimated he had gotten a dirty deal.

Q: Well, he intimated to me that--of course, I have been given two reasons. One on Goddard's part. Goddard said that Elliott Roosevelt, who worked closely with Goddard, got "Papa" to put some pressure on to get rid of him. Another version that I heard was that Kaye was fooling around--extra-marital type of stuff.

P: Well, knowing the relationship that Arnold had with the Kayes and all. I felt I had no direct knowledge of this, that Arnold got wise to Kaye using that relationship. You know how Arnold could be, when he did. When he was convinced, he just cut him off. To me, that makes sense.

Q: Either of these may have some validity, one of which you may not know that, but Arnold was a prolific letter writer.

P: Oh, yes.

Q: He wrote to his wife--love letters to his wife, all throughout his career. Mrs. Arnold saved almost everyone of them, and I have seen most of them.

P: He was quite a writer. He wrote some boys' books.

Q: Six boys' books, before March Field, and Arnold was in my opinion, a 19th Century man, in that he had a high sense of honor and loyalty. This business of people straying, either drinking or playing around....

P: Would not go well with him.

Q: And if the theory about Kaye is correct; the other theory which I had been told.

P: I had heard that, but it could be true.

Q: But, anyway, that is an interesting aspect of it because I am trying to situate or place Goddard. You see, Arnold probably

wronged Goddard. Goddard came back, but it wasn't through Arnold's influence. Goddard's--this strip camera, didn't have a shutter. This played a great role in the Normandy invasion and played a great role in the exposure of Russian missiles in 1962.

P: You see, I don't know. As I say, I have known Goddard, but not well. I was never stationed with him or anything. But I have always felt that, technically, he was wonderfully qualified. But I do not know as an organizer, to organize the photographic business world-wide, what his capabilities were.

Q: He was more of a technical man than he was an organizer.

P: An inventor.

Q: Right. The merits of this thing aren't all on one side. Goddard was the kind of a guy, you put him on a project and then you did something else. If he didn't like that project and liked something else, he went off on his own.

P: Oh, yes, individualistic.

Q: An individual, right.

P: And whether he would have worked out as a worldwide head of the photographic empire, I don't know. I am not saying one way or the other. But, knowing Kaye and the works, I am sure Goddard was undercut with Arnold.

Q: I want to take you back to March Field. Arnold was a great man for public relations, or community relations. And he used to have the Hollywood stars come out to the base. Do you remember some of these events?

P: Yes.

Q: Mary Pickford, Wallace Beery.

P: Yes.

Q: Were you given anything part of that assignment, to sort of shepherd some of these Hollywood stars around?

P: No, no, never was. I was appointed as a technical director on a picture that was going to be made by Warner Bros.

Q: Warner Bros. Was this later on? In the war?

P: No, this was while I was at March Field. And, I went in several times for preliminary discussions and so on.

Q: Did you work with Guthrie?

P: Bill Guthrie, then the thing fell through and they made it with the Marines. It fell through because the Air Corps then, or the Army, didn't like the way they were handling it. It was a stereotyped flying picture. So it fell through as far as the Air Corps was concerned.

Q: So Warner switched the locale and made it a Marine picture?

P: Yeah. Made it with the Marines.

Q: Well, Arnold and Warner had a lot of good relations during the war.

P: Well, I've been into the studio several times, having flown Arnold, but mainly with Beebe. But I was never Arnold's pilot, as Beebe was. But he needed two pilots, and I was it many times.

Q: Then Peterson came in?

P: And then Peterson. But when Beebe got away--we all wanted to go to war. He got away and then Peterson was chosen for the job. And I flew with Peterson on the trip to Casablanca.

Q: Oh, you went on that?

P: Yes, Peterson and I were the pilots.

Q: Then you went on to China?

P: On into China, and there is an incident in Arnold's book...

Q: Getting lost?

P: Getting lost, and also about me when we went up to see Chiang Kai-shek. For some reason or another, he took me along. We flew up on China National Airways, because of the little field at Chungking, because you could get a B-17 in. Arnold took me up there, and went on to this place in the country with Chiang, and spent a couple of nights. Chiang became convinced--you see, I was sitting there silently because Arnold insisted that I go into these meetings--and Chiang definitely got the impression that I understood Chinese. And he said I don't want Colonel Parker at any more of these meetings. It is in Arnold's book.

Q: Did he tell it straight?

P: Yes, he told it straight. This getting lost was--to throw some light on Arnold, as far as this flying business is concerned. We took off from Assam at night and--in crossing the hump. They had one little radio beacon at Kunming. That was all--quite weak. We had a navigator and Pete and I were up above the clouds, stars, and it was very pleasant. But we had as it turned out, found out later, there was a terrific tailwind that we didn't know about. It wasn't predicted. So we were listening to this beacon, and we didn't hear it. But we weren't a bit concerned, and a couple of hundred miles short of Kunming and never did hear it. Finally, the navigator--the navigator was a young kid who was pretty good, but he had flown this business back and forth across the Atlantic on ferrying jobs, and he never went much higher than 7,000 or 8,000 feet, and he was down in the nose of the B-17 where the navigator stayed, and finally we called him. I called him and said: "Where are you on a fix." Well, his

voice came back, and it sounded like he was drunk and I couldn't get anything out of him. I said, "Pete, I better go down and take a look." I went down there and the kid hadn't worn an oxygen mask, and we were up then about 20-21,000 feet, and he was almost out. So I got in and said, "Sit down here," and got him an oxygen mask on, "Sit there for at least 10 minutes before you even move, and breathe this oxygen, and then, when you feel all right keep it on, and take a reading." So he did, and when he got up then, and shot the stars and all, we were several hundred miles beyond Kunming. In the meantime, we decided that we had better keep right on course. We couldn't see anything down, so we did 180° and started back. Throughout this thing and through all the flights that I made with General Arnold, he had never interfered with the pilots or anything. We reported the situation. No flak. He was back in the radio operation's compartment, and Clayton Bissell who was along--a Brig General then--was all excited, jumping up and down. Arnold never said a word. We got back and...

Q: Arnold knew about this?

P: Oh, yes, we told him that we had overflown Kunming and that we were going back. Luckily, as we came back across, it turned out that this radio beacon had been out of commission when we passed it the first time. We picked it up, and went on in and landed. Arnold, the next day, got Pete and me in, and in a very fatherly manner assured us that we had not been quite as careful as we could have been, and we should have checked on this navigator before. But we had assumed from the weather report that we had such and such a word and we were still an hour from Kunming, when actually we were probably passing it. The combination of that and the radio beacon being out...

Q: Guess you were very low on gasoline when you turned?

P: We were not in any--there was no crisis as far as gasoline since we found Kunming. We never could have made it back across the Hump at all with the terrific wind.

Q: If you had to back into a head wing.

P: So we would have had to land, do something.

Q: Was that the only landing field that you knew about?

P: That was the only landing field that you could get into with a B-17.

Q: The Japs weren't too far away, were they?

P: No, we were over the Japanese. We plotted it all out the next day. See, we knew what the wind was when we returned. Terrific wind--almost a 100-miles an hour. And we plotted how long it took us to get back, you see.

Q: Were you lucky that Arnold didn't fire you and Pete?

P: No, no, as I say, he just pointed out in a very quiet way.

Q: Not excited?

P: No, not excited way that we probably weren't as careful as we might have been. Trusting this weather report.

Q: Also, about checking on this navigator?

P: I think that was very typical of him. Every flight I made with him, he was the same way. Having been a pilot himself, he'd sit in the back seat, never bother. Once in a while he would come up front and sit there in one seat or the other, and talk. But he liked to work out little problems and they come up and hurl them at you. Give you 10 minutes to figure, what's the answer to this one?

Q: Do you mean problems?

P: Mathematical problems or any sort of thing. Throw them at you and see how quickly you could get them.

Q: He had a quick mind.

P: Very quick.

Q: Was he an articulate man?

P: Yes.

Q: Did you ever hear him get mad?

P: Oh, yes, I've heard him get mad.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

P: No, no. This time that he called me in the office he had checked something with Operations to see what time I had planned to leave. He was mad about the situation up there and there was just that steely look and what time is sunup. No ranting or raving.

Q: Did you know what he wanted?

P: I knew exactly what the problem was. When he said "early" he meant early.

Q: On this Chinese trip, did he talk to you about the Chinese problem, about the Chinese wanting airplanes and materiel which we at that time were not able to give?

P: He didn't discuss that with me a great deal. You see, I was along as another pilot, and I wanted to be sure that you understood that. I never worked in Arnold's office, or directly under him. But another characteristic of him--every time I went--many, many times--either with Beebe or Pete, or I would fly him myself, if at that time Beebe was will or something, he would always insist the pilots come along. If he were invited to a dinner that they be invited, a party or anything. He was most considerate that way, because with my tenure there at Bolling I flew a lot of people. I was actually designated

by Arnold to be Marshall's pilot. So I flew Marshall all the time. That's why I had a hard time getting away from there, but finally did.

Q: Did Marshall understand aviation? Did he understand the role of airpower?

P: I'm not qualified to say. I am a great admirer of Marshall's.

Q: Well, I am, too, and most people are. But I've gotten some impressions that he was somewhat naive about the capability of an airplane.

P: Well, I think most of the Army types were, actually. Well, we thought they were. At least, we in the Air Corps.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: What sort of relationship?

P: Very pleasant, what I saw of them.

Q: Arnold was differential to Marshall?

P: Oh, yeah. He was strictly....

Q: He was working for Marshall?

P: That's right.

Q: And Marshall let everybody know.

P: He was very correct. Marshall was a rather different individual from most of them. All the trips that I took--and he never took a big staff--you take another general at that time who would take a big staff--eight or ten henchmen, aides, etc. Marshall never even took an aide. So I sort of acted for him. And--one time I was flying him out to Seattle, with Secretary Stimson. We had some bad weather after crossing the mountains in northern Washington to get into Seattle. Stimson had an aide...

Q: George Brownell?

P: No, it wasn't Brownell, at that time. Slim Turner. Anyway, he came up to the cockpit and we were on instruments, and flying along. He wanted to know what the score was and what the weather was in Seattle. It wasn't very good, but was supposed to clear up by the time he got there. Well, he went back and told the Secretary, and the old Secretary got kind of concerned, and General Marshall came out to see. I think the Secretary said: "General, would you go up and see?" So he came up and made a suggestion that maybe we ought to go into Portland or something. We said: "Well, everything is going to be all right." Did you know General Slim Turner? He and I were together, and he was actually Stimson's pilot all the time. So they went back, and they sent the aide up to get Turner to come back and consult about this thing. Turner was quite a correct individual. He repeated, he told me when he came back, he was red in the face, he sat there and didn't say a word. Okay, I told them our main concern was, "not you, Mr. Secretary or you, General Marshall; it's Colonel Parker and I are concerned about ourselves. We are not going to get into any trouble." And went on back down. We arrived in Seattle perfectly all right. And, the fear and trepidation, all the rest of the trip. We got back to Bolling and the Secretary and General Marshall both, said: "We want to apologize for our conduct there in Washington and it will never happen again." That's all they said.

Q: I want to take you back to March Field. There are a couple of questions. You did not make the air mail mission, you were at Wright Field?

P: No.

Q: Were you disappointed in not flying the air mail?

P: Oh, yes, of course. They had started this blind landing school. They thought this thing might carry on.

Q: Do you have any recollections, probably, second hand in your case, of the kind of job that Arnold did? He had the Western Air Mail Zone. Do you have any recollections of the men who flew? Did they talk about Arnold, the way he handled it? He had the toughest job of all. Flying the Rockies.

P: The main criticism wasn't of Arnold. It was the policy of splitting everything up, instead of going by units. We had pursuit pilots flying bombers, and bomber pilots flying pursuit airplanes. You had military units, but they were just scattered to the winds. Just airplanes and people. That was my general criticism, although I never took part, and criticism I heard. But that wasn't Arnold. That was done every place.

Q: That was the whole setup, really.

P: I heard no criticism of Arnold.

Q: Was there criticism of Foulois for taking on this job with open-cockpit planes, inadequate radios?

P: Not in the military. I never heard of any.

Q: It was just a job to be done?

P: A job and nobody thought anything about it. There was a great furor about killing all these people. It didn't disturb anybody in our unit.

Q: Well, shortly thereafter Arnold was pulled back from vacation. He and Mrs. Arnold were going to Jackson Hole for a vacation after the air mail. He was pulled back and ordered to fly the Alaskan

flight. Did you get in on that?

P: No, no, I didn't get in on it. There was a matter of rank, probably as much as anything else. We had the lowest ranking officer that went on that. Jack Mills, he was about a year and a half, two years ahead of me.

Q: In other words, you lost out on that mission because of seniority?

P: Well, I don't know. I don't think I was even considered or people in my group.

Q: I see. Twining was standby. He never did make the flight, and he was very unhappy.

P: Yes. Well, of course, everybody would have liked to have gone but, I had no...

Q: Well, one of the people who did go, and had a lot to do with planning the trip was Hugh Knerr. Of course, his great hero is Andrews.

P: Yes, oh yes.

Q: And his criticism of Arnold was that Arnold looked after Arnold, and not his troops. And Knerr said in effect that Arnold's loyalty was up and not down. The case in point being that none of the people participating in the Alaskan flight, but Arnold received a medal for it.

P: I didn't even know that.

Q: You didn't hear any static on it?

P: No, I knew a number of them quite well, and some intimately. I never heard any criticism.

Q: The Alaskan flight was very successful?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: When they came back I think they were given a special secret mission to see whether they could react after the long mission across country. Do you remember the secret orders that Arnold got to fly his B-10s across country? He flew back to Washington.

P: Yes.

Q: You didn't get in on that side of it?

P: No.

Q: Well, Arnold shortly thereafter made his star. Were you at March Field when he got his star? This would be February 1935?

P: No, I had gone to Hawaii. I left in November of 1934.

Q: That was about a year before he left?

P: Yes.

Q: Arnold and Mrs. Arnold were very much for building up the base, the beautification program.

P: Yes, oh, yes.

Q: Do you have any recollection of that program? They put in some poplar trees?

P: I remember when that went on. Planted a lot of palms, and did a lot toward fixing the base.

Q: Mrs. Arnold was sort of a Lady Bird Johnson, a generation ahead. Very active. In fact, I saw Archie Old. He lives near March Field and he says those poplars are 100 feet tall now. Have you been out to March Field?

P: Yes, of course, many times and the trees meet across the street, and when I moved there the quarters had just been built not too long before. There wasn't anything.

Q: You mentioned the Riding Club thatArnold or Mrs. Arnold organized?

P: The riding, breakfast club?

Q: Was she very much for keeping the officers working or playing together, making a sort of cohesive unit?

P: Yes, I think so. They weren't, the Arnolds, I have seen a lot of Commanding Officer's wives much more inclined toward social affairs and so on than the Arnolds. They were more to have a group of different people, in a small way, rather than big affairs.

Q: Mrs. Arnold--did she throw her weight around as wife of the Commanding Officer?

P: Well, I didn't see it, and my wife didn't.

Q: She probably had recollections--the distaff side always has different recollections of things.

P: My thoughts of Arnold as a commander. I say I never served in his office, although I saw a great deal of him when I was at Bolling Field. Maybe, a little too much inclined like some commanders and bases to surround themselves with a small group, and then maybe make decisions based on what Joe Blow told them, rather than using a staff. To tie in with what Knerr said.

Q: Talking about Arnold as a commanding officer.

P: That's the only criticism that I heard in my observation. I thought that was the weakest, because I've seen other people that do that. In other words, Hap had around him some bright junior officers, bright young boys. But that's the criticism the President has gotten recently, about the White House "kitchen cabinet," usurping the regular Cabinet. Well, that method of operation is what I am talking about. Marshall was the exact opposite. Marshall went through the staff. He didn't have himself surrounded by a group like that.

Q: Who was always close to Arnold? You mentioned Kaye, we are talking about March Field. McNarney, was he close to Arnold at that time?

P: Not awfully close, they were...

Q: He worked for Arnold at March Field. Tooey Spaatz was very close to Arnold.

P: Yes, yes.

Q: Was Eaker out there at any time?

P: Eaker was there, lived right across the street from me. Monk Hunter was there.

Q: I have heard a comment that those officers who grew up with Arnold on the West Coast graduated to better type positions during the war than those who grew up with Andrews on the East Coast. Is there any basis for that?

P: I think there is a basis. I think there is always where someone gets up pretty high, he's going to choose the people with whom he has worked. Those he knows intimately and trusts, I think it is just the human thing to do.

Q: Would it be a matter of people getting positions beyond their ability, just on the basis of nepotism?

P: Oh, I don't think so much in getting...

Q: Minton Kaye, I guess, has some ability, but he also had the inside track.

P: I think Mint had a lot of ability. He had this odd quirk of personality. He seemed to enjoy cutting people down, and he did it. He had Arnold's ear as a friend, and I think he used it.

Q: Was it Lord Acton who said, "Absolute power corrupts absolutely," and I guess when you have access to the Chief's office, and if...

P: If you are that way, I mean if you have a lot of potential power, used cunningly, as he would, to drop a word,"so and so tells me he gets pretty drunk." You know, little things like that. If the person in power pays any attention to that sort of thing, and does not treat it skeptically, it can be pretty harmful.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold--I'm sure you did--at social occasions at March Field. He didn't do much drinking, did he?

P: He didn't drink at all. He didn't touch a drop in those days. The only time I had ever seen him take a drink was after he had retired. He'd had this heart attack, and the doctor prescribed that he take...

Q: I think he took sherry?

P: Sherry or an old fashioned, or a highball before dinner. Before that, I think, he had been on the wagon for years.

Q: I'd heard that he might have done some hard drinking when he was very young. He had ulcers.

P: Well, I don't know about that, of course, that is the story, it often is, and it could be true, about someone who has ulcers.

Q: But in mid-career, at the peak of his career.

P: He never drank, but he was very broad minded about it. He never minded. Mrs. Arnold always had cocktails. They'd have people in, but Arnold never had any. Of course, he didn't smoke.

Q: When he got mad, was it a sort of explosive type of anger?

P: Yes, I think so. I think he was, as you say "in a hurry," and he just seemed to...

Q: Was he forgiving? If he got mad at somebody, was it a personal kind of anger, was it a grudge?

P: I never saw any of that at all.

Q: Or was it just a job involved?

P: The only time that I ever observed it, it was just a job. And as I say, the two times where I mentioned he had occasion to chew me out, he didn't, except in a way that meant a great deal to me. There was no blowing up or anything like that. But I could tell he was unhappy.

Q: Did you ever go on, you mentioned that Mint Kaye organized some of these outdoor, fishing parties?

P: No, I never went on them.

Q: A fellow named Joe Elliott with the Forest Service, with whom he had some contacts, and he went on a number of pack trips. I think late in the war he took Marshall on one of these trips to the High Sierras. You didn't go along on that?

P: No.

Q: It was a pack trip for a number of days. Then they went pheasant hunting in '45, near Bismarck, N.D.

P: No, I never went. I wasn't much of a hunter, fisherman.

Q: You mentioned you left in Nov 1934 and went to Hawaii...

P: Went to Hawaii for two years and then to Bolling.

Q: What was your job at Bolling?

P: I was there seven years. I started out as Engineering Officer; I had taken the engineering maintenance course at Chanute Field, that's why I was always in engineering or maintenance engineering.

Q: You were there from say '37 to...

P: I was there from 1937 to 1942. I got out in the Spring of 1942.

Q: You were there then when the war started?

P: Oh yes.

Q: Do you remember publication in the Chicago Tribune, of part of our war plan, a couple days before Pearl Harbor?

P: I don't recall.

Q: At Bolling Field, I guess Tooey Spaatz made his headquarters there, when they formed the 8th AF.

P: Yes, and they formed the 9th AF there. It grew pretty big, and the last year I was there, I was base commander, but still flying General Marshall. Being a non-pilot himself, we assigned somebody to fly these higher ranking Army generals, and they wouldn't let them go. They were the only one they would go with.

Q: You mentioned sort of being stuck in the Washington area, and probably anxious to go. Arnold, himself, never had combat. He never got into operations in WWI. He never quite made it, and so he was perhaps sympathetic to the wishes of some of his staff?

P: Oh yes, I think he was, he let Gene Beebe go.

Q: Stratemeyer?

P: Yes, oh, yes, I think he was, quite sympathetic, but General Marshall, being the Chief of Staff. You see, I had a time. I had to finally just go to him personally, and he hand-picked this officer, and he flew with us for several months, and finally, Marshall decided he wanted somebody else to get him here and there.

Q: I want to ask you about Casablanca, on that trip. You flew Arnold over?

P: No, Pete and I flew several other officers that were going along, a non-pilot who was in Plans, and another officer who was in Plans. We flew the B-17 over. Marshall and Arnold went over in a C-54. At that time, I don't think it was even a military plane; I

think it was sort of a chartered job. Well, then, we flew up to Algiers, into Cairo, and I've forgotten where Marshall dropped out, whether he even went up to Cairo with us. No, I don't think he did, he came on back from Algiers, and then went on over into India and China. Then, we got back to Calcutta and we had Wedemeyer.

Q: This is the one who went out to Chiang Kai-shek?

P: Yes, Wedemeyer. So, Arnold told me there, that Wedemeyer was going on to brief MacArthur on the thing, and I was to go with him.

Q: Brief MacArthur on what?

P: On the Casablanca Conference. So, then Pete picked up another pilot and flew Arnold back, and I went on around with Wedemeyer.

Q: On his way to China, Arnold stopped in India, and he saw Air Marshal Peirse, a couple of other people, Wavell. Arnold had a very negative reaction toward the British in that period. They weren't doing a darn thing. They were getting a lot of materiel, and they weren't doing anything with it. Did you get into that policy aspect?

P: I didn't get into that, no.

Q: Arnold never sat down in the airplane, and shot the breeze with anybody; talk about his problems?

P: No.

Q: You sat in on some of the Chiang Kai-shek briefings until Chiang decided you were a spy?

P: Until he specifically told Arnold he didn't want Col Parker in there.

Q: Did Arnold ever say anything to you about this?

P: Oh yes, he told me about it. He thought it was a great joke, and it was, of course.

Q: I remember reading that in Global Mission. But he never made any further comment on that, that Chiang was a suspicious man?

P: No, only that he said: "Chiang is convinced that you speak and understand Chinese, and he doesn't want you in there, anymore."

Q: Was there some byplay between Chiang and his interpreter?

P: Well, Chiang went through his interpreter all the time. I don't know how much he understood. His wife speaks fluently.

Q: Was she present at the meeting?

P: No, she wasn't up there. So, apparently, he didn't want Arnold to have an interpreter.

Q: He wanted the only version to come from him. Was Chiang pretty tough in this byplay, demanding?

P: No, it didn't seem to me, at all, that there was really much...

Q: Did Arnold have any instructions from higher up to play along with Chiang? Chiang was asking for a lot more than Arnold was able to give him.

P: Well, I heard that, in Arnold talking to Stilwell--his conversation with Stilwell. Of course, Stilwell was no admirer of Chiang at all and vice versa. So I heard that side of it.

Q: How about Stilwell and Chennault? Of course, they were at odds all the time?

P: They were at odds?

Q: Did you get into any of that?

P: I heard it discussed.

Q: Did Arnold take any position on the Chennault-Stilwell controversy?

P: Not that I know of. I'm sure that he would have been for Chennault. I think, again, as a matter of, a lot of it could have been the lack of understanding of airpower, so-called, by the Army Generals. Of course, another thing that might have hurt Stilwell was the fact that Chennault and Chiang were so close.

Q: Well, one aspect of that closeness was that Chennault used to write letters to President Roosevelt directly.

P: Oh, I'm sure he did, you see, that cut in...

Q: And Joseph Alsop, who was on his staff, would write a transmittal letter to Grace Tully, who was President Roosevelt's secretary, and he simply bypassed Stilwell's staff, and he got away with it because he knew that Chiang was with him, and I guess the policy was: "We'll give Chiang as much as we can, but don't alienate him to the point of breaking off relations."

P: That was my impression, as I recall it, at the time.

Q: That seems to have been the policy. I guess Arnold may have instructions: "Say 'yes' to almost everything and then we will do the best we can."

P: Yes, placate him and make him as happy as you can, but don't promise.

Q: Are there any other impressions you have of Arnold that perhaps I didn't touch upon? Any recollections or stories about him:

P: Well, I have a story, I always admired Arnold and I was the CO up at Mitchel Field after Arnold had retired. I left Hamilton, and Arnold came back quite frequently to NY for various things. Mrs. Arnold would come back, her mother lived within just a few miles.

Q: In Locust Valley, Long Island.

P: Yes. And Gen Stratemeyer was the CG of the CONAC, with headquarters there, and Gen Chuck Stone was his Deputy. Stratemeyer, who was an easy going type, very nice to me, he'd always managed to be away. I would be the only one to meet General Arnold, and I thought well here's Chief of the AC, and all he's done. I took a pretty dim view of it. Arnold noticed it.

Q: Was this deliberate on Stratemeyer's part?

P: Oh yes. And then Stone would duck. You see, I had known Chuck Stone a long time. I talked to him about it: "I said I think it is a disgrace, regardless of what you think of Arnold. Here he is retired, the only five-star General the AF ever had. He has done a great deal. I know, from the remarks he made to me, I'm the only one out there at Operations when he comes in. Stratemeyer is gone, and you are gone, and I think it is disgraceful." Well, from that time on, Chuck would be there, but Stratemeyer never did. Stratemeyer, I've heard him talk, he felt he should have had a fourth star, and that Arnold didn't give it to him. It's just that simply, and Stratemeyer was a very easy going, pleasant personality, but he had that bug in his bonnet, and I think a lot of that happened after Arnold's retirement. I think a lot of them just dropped him because he no longer had any power. Now what their quarrels were with Arnold, I know he wasn't universally popular, because there were people--after he was no longer in power--a lot of them came out of the woodworkd then and spoke up. Whether they had a legitimate beef or not, I don't know.

Q: Stratemeyer got his third star when he went down to CBI?

P: My impression was that Stratemeyer was right at his peak at the third star. You know the story, he should have been, or he could never have been a woman of ill repute, because he could never say no. So easy going. But that was an incident that irked me. That was an example of what I saw quite frequently. As soon as Arnold was out, then they were....

Q: The King is dead, long live the new King. Eaker had a bug in his bonnet, too, I think, he didn't make his fourth star.

P: A lot of them, was this promotion business. Of course, everybody thinks he is better than he is. All wanted to get promoted, and of course, they blamed the top man.

Q: I have gotten some of this static, that Arnold had loyalty up and not down. Some people felt that they did not get all the stars that they were entitled to.

P: My observation on that is that, the ones I know, I think they got all the stars that they had coming, and that they owed what they got to Arnold, but it wasn't enough.

Q: Actually, you were not within Arnold's direct orbit.

P: No, I want to make that quite clear. I'm reminiscing here....

Q: You are speaking in a detached way about this.

P: Yes, I never was in his immediate orbit, although I was a friend, not close as Beebe was, or Kaye.

Q: There was a fellow named Jimmy Maher, who was his aide for awhile. Did you have any contact with him?

P: No.

Q: You know Eaker was somewhat embittered toward Arnold towards the end of the war, well for several reasons. One of which was he was taken out of the ETO, and Spaatz brought right in before the

invasion. Do you remember, did you ever hear anything about that?

P: I heard about it, yes. But I had heard, too, that he didn't think Eaker was doing the job.

Q: He didn't think Eaker was doing the job, this is why he acted...

P: And some others didn't think Eaker was quite doing the job.

Q: Arnold had to make some tough decisions. Some decisions he made were probably wrong, and some were right. He made a decision about Eaker, right or wrong; he made a decision about Possum Hansell, the 20th AF. He took him out and put in LeMay.

P: Obviously, he made the right decision there, and Possum is a classmate of mine; I know him very well. But for a combat commander, Possum and LeMay are in different leagues. And I'm not a great admirer of LeMay, certainly not his quote from his book and his recent activity, but he was a combat commander.

Q: I was out to the AF Academy not too long ago, and I saw the Possum Hansell papers there, and Hansell would write Arnold three-page letters telling him why he was unable to do all the things he had in mind. LeMay was the 20th BombCom, would write a half-page letter, telling about what he did yesterday. I think Arnold added this thing up and said--I'm extrapolating my own thoughts--that Hansell could do a pretty good job, LeMay can do <u>the</u> job.

P: That's right, I'm sure of it. As I say, these people we talked about. Them that are bitter, and were bitter as soon as he was out, got as high as they deserved and they got that high through Arnold. Then, because they didn't get higher, they turned.

Q: Some might have gotten higher than they deserved.

P: I'm sure he made enemies. Everybody does that gets any place.

Q: Your overall evaluation of Arnold? Do you think he was sort of indispensable in the job he did?

P: I think he was the right man, at the right time; I don't think Arnold was any mental giant or genius, but the sheer drive and all that, was what we needed.

Q: I have almost the same view. This is why I call him "The man in a hurry."

P: I think that is a perfect title. I don't think he was any mental genius. Do you?

Q: No, I don't any.

P: I mentioned this weakness I thought probably, too impulsive, what they used to call making decisions in the field. You go out and some guy would tell him a hard luck story, and he would send a wire to Washington and get this thing fixed, you know without any staff look into it.

Q: He did a lot of this on that trip. By the way, when he went on this trip, there was a whole battery of wires sent back.

P: That's where I saw a great deal of it, on these trips, Beebe do this or that, whoever, Pete. Another little anecdote in a way to illustrate this. I saw this actually happen. We had probably 8 or 10 officers along, including a chaplain. One day Arnold turned to this chaplain and said: "Look, you go tell so and so something." The chaplain didn't know what he was talking about. But it was that kind of thing, some impulsive deal he had. He gave it to the chaplain and the chaplain's mouth dropped open and he said: "What do I do now? How come he gave this to me?"

Q: He never thought that this man is not the man I'm supposed to give an assignment to do, but he was the closest one?

P: Yes, closest one.

Q: At the time he thought of it. I have this same impression. At any given time, he had 50 balls bouncing in the air. If he could unload one of them, then he had 49 to worry about. This is how he ignored established staff procedures, and was supposed to have grabbed people in the hall.

P: That puts it exactly. I mean, his whole personality and the way he operated. He'd go out on these trips with just a toothbrush, almost, no money.

Q: Did he expect Pete to finance him?

P: Only one change of underwear. Not that he was sponging, just never thought of it.

Q: I guess he wore himself out?

P: I think so. I'm not a bit surprised.

Q: Were you overseas when he had his major heart attack in 1945?

P: No, did he have one in 1945?

Q: He had one in '43.

P: See, I was a POW; I got shot down over Germany.

Q: I wasn't aware of that. When were you shot down?

P: March 6, 1944. Berlin raid.

Q: I did not bring your biography. I have a little biography on everyone. I'm trying to recall your record, and I have a blank in there, and I was wondering, I remembered that you had a March Field association, you had an early association, I wasn't aware of that. Then you were in one of the Stalags? Which one?

P: Stalag 3. Sagan, it is part of Poland now. We marched out of there in the dead of winter in January when the Russians were coming close, walked for about 4 days, and got in boxcards and ended

up down near Munich, and were liberated.

Q: You don't think "Hogan's Heroes" gets close to the subject at all?

P: No.

P: You were talking about the revetments at Bolling Field, you mean right after Pearl Harbor?

Q: Yes, the panic after Pearl Harbor. I always thought the Japanese--probably the biggest victory they made out of Pearl Harbor was the panic they threw us into, and the money that we spent.

Q: Well, we did a lot of foolish things, like the relocation centers.

P: Oh yes, we hit the panic button, relocation centers were one.

Q: Bolling Field became sort of an armed camp, although there really wasn't anything the enemy could do to get to Bolling?

P: How could they get to any of these places?

Q: No, not really. I think we attributed to the enemy a capability which they did not then have.

P: Yes, and I think also the fact of Hawaii getting caught, so cold, with everything, ships in the harbor, the airplanes on the ground, not dispersed, and all that. They thought: "Boy, this couldn't happen to me." So every commander all the way up, was prepared: "So they couldn't say I wasn't ready."

Q: They were "Fifth Column" happy?

P: Right.

Q: Did you ever hear about Arnold's reaction to any of this?

P: No, this is an aside here, personal. More or less interesting sideline on how people panicked.

Q: Right, especially on the West Coast, they were really in a stew. The 4th AF, they thought they were going to get hit soon.

Partridge, Earle E.

12 Apr 68
6 Dec 69
6 Dec 69
8 Mar 73

October 2, 1970

Gen Earle E. Partridge, USAF(Ret)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, CO 80906

Dear General Partridge:

In the process of cleaning up the transcript of a recent interview I had with Gen Barney Giles, I recalled what you told me last December, that you usually tried to avoid General Arnold. The enclosure may put the finger on why you felt that way.

In any event, I don't have a real good handle on the triggering events - on what General Chaney and his staff did or didn't do to make General Arnold so mad.

I wonder if you still have any recollections of these events while you served under General Chaney and could perhaps describe them to me briefly. The enclosure will speed your reply.

I hope you have had a good summer. The weather in Washington reminds me of Colorado. It is beautiful, but it won't last too long.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

November 28, 1969

Gen Earle E. Partridge, USAF(Ret)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80900

Dear General Partridge:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I will be in the Colorado Springs area for about two weeks, beginning about the time this letter reaches you. I will be working on the Kuter Papers, which, as you may know, were endowed to the Air Force Academy Library. During my stay in Colorado Springs, I would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about General Hap Arnold. Your name shows up in his official and personal files in several contexts. Loosbrock and I are especially interested in any anecdotes, amusing or otherwise, which may give some insight into his accomplishments or character. This is going to be a "warts and all" biography. We would like to have any impressions, good or bad; non-attributable, if you desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

I shall try to phone you in the next two weeks, although if you wish to contact me at your convenience I can be reached at the Academy, through Col Jim Sunderman, Public Affairs Officer or Major Claude Johns, Director of the AFA Library.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Edit ms frame

Interview, General Earle Partridge, L'Enfant Plaza, Wash DC March 8,,1973

Q: These ~~items~~ Comments are Gen Partridge's responses to a letter to him from T.D. Stamps, Professor at U.S. Military Academy, dated 19 March 1946. These are some of the questions which were asked of Partridge on 8 March 1973.

Q: Any thaughts? I could ask some specific Questions. You said in this Commentary that Arnold had judgment and common sense "of an exceedingly high order, but sometimes disregarded these factors in directing action along lines he was particularly interested in." Can you think of specific ~~events~~ instance in which he disregarded his early judgment?

P: No, I cant really.

Q: Do you have any comment on that?

P: No, that was written a very long time ago - 27 years ago.

Q: You said: "I had the feeling that he sometimes directed that a specific job be done, when in the back of his mind, he didnt see how the work was to be accomplished, he had only the grim determination that it would be done."

P: I cant amplify that either, but I ~~think~~ take the matter of the Scientific Advisory Board, ~~he was used by~~ He got Dr. von Karman to start this organization when other people were not thinking along those lines at all. If I remember rightly, he instructed that there by no more propellor driven airplanes bought for the Air Force. It was a very far-sighted decision.

Q: Premature?

P: Not necessarily, no. We did have to buy some more propellor-driven bombers and transports, ~~But~~ because the turbo-jet engine had not yet developed to the point where it would carry a big aircraft. But for the fighters it was a great decision. The Scientific Advisory Board has turned out to be one of the most ~~accepted~~ effective organisations that the Air Force has had in the past 2 wds. I've worked with it. It was very helpful to me when I was in the Air Research & Development Command. Bear in mind that this is in 1950, '51, '52, and '53. I've been associated with it tangentially ever since.

Q: You said something here on the subject of "tact and diplomacy" that Arnold was not the greatest in the world, and did have the, ~~and~~ was willing to give ~~him~~ people the needle to encourage them to greater effort.

P: He just didnt have time. His duties were so pressing, particularly in wartime. He just didnt have time to consider all the factors relating to getting done what he thought should be addressed. He went, as he did to the Air Surgeon: "Go fix the

engine program of such-and-such." The Air Surgeon would turn white, I'm told, I wasnt there....

Q: Was this David Grant?

P: Yes, it was Dave Grant. Have you talked to him? (No) Is he still alive? (No)

Q: He got an assignment, grabbed in the hall, perhaps? And asked to work on figures?

P: Yes.

Q: Did he turn it over to somebody else to do?

P: Yes, finally. He talked to somebody to Materiel. I've forgotten now, but just went from there to the office....

Q: Could it have been Echols? or "Pop" Powers?

P: It could have been Echols. But I dont know; I was overseas.

Q: Did Arnold ever grab you in the hall to give you an assignment?

P: No.

Q: If I recall rightly, you said something to me that Arnold almost got you canned from your job. I think you were in the 1st Air Force at the time.

P. Yes, an actual, the way the matter worked was that Arnold wanted to use the air people, units of the 1st Air Force primarily for training, and Hugh Drum wanted to use them primarily for defense of the northeastern area. There was such a to-do about it that the Inspector General of the Army came up there...

Q: Was that Peterson?

P: Yes, I talked to him several times, went around with him on an educational trip to visit units with the Inspector General, a very fine man. As a result of this, the three top Generals, and I happened to be on the bottom rung, were relieved. One was retired; one was sent to Panama; I was sent to Africa. But it was only with General Stratemeyer's interference in my behalf that kept me from getting busted, too.

Q: I have had access to General Arnold's 201 File. On three occasions in his career he received very bad OERs. It is surprising that he wasnt busted himself, considering. . .

P: I'm not surprised.

Q(Ref to Squier and Arnold in WW I;) In our day, a man who gets an OER like that doesnt survive long in the Air Force. I asked Bruce Arnold and he said that in those days, they said more of what they thought. Nowadays, if you cant say anything good, you dont say anything? Is that true?

P: Not necessarily.

Q: Can a man get a bad OER like that in this day and age and survive in the Air Force?

in the case of Arnold and Squier

P: Oh, yes, that was a particularly bad one, I would say. But nowadays, if a man gets a bad efficiency report, he is allowed to, he is supposed to review the report. If he wishes, he can appeal it. Quite frequently, comments are removed from the ER, to take off the stigma of one or more bad statements. Some times, they charge the reporting officer of biased views, etc.

Q: Later Arnold got another one from Patrick. He was involved in the Billy Mitchell business. Arnold was exiled by Patrick to Fort Riley. He got a bad ER for that.

P: I had very little almost no direct contact with Arnold.

Q: Did you admire him for his work?

P: Oh, absolutely. He was a tower of strength.

Q: Did people fear to be called into his office, when he hit the squawk-box?

P: I dont know; I never was called in there.

Q: There are some who believe Andrews was just as good as Arnold and, moreover, he had more empathy with the troops. Arnold didnt have time to be polite. Is this a fair evaluation?

P: I would say so. I knew Andrews very well. I served under him at Kelly Field, Texas, under him again at Selfridge Field. In my opinion, ~~in my opinion~~ - in most people's opinion, he would have been head of the Armed Forces in Europe, had he not been killed in a very regrettable aircraft accident.

Q: You mean the job Eisenhower eventually got, you think he would have had that job?

P: I think so.

Q: But he wasnt a ground man. Do you think the British would have stood for him getting the top job?

P: I think they liked him. I think so.

Q: Well, they liked Eisenhower . . . I've heard this from a number of people. Maybe he would have gotten an overall Air job. We never unified Air in Europe - the British kept theirs and we kept ours. Maybe he wuld have gotten that job ?

(Q: Ref Black list) Arnold did not forget if some man did not do his job? Arnold had a list or a long memory?

P: Could be. I dont think he was any worse or better in the business of getting rid of the incompetents than anybody else was. Except he was in a position to do something about it.

Q: In some cases there was a strained feeling between Arnold and somebody who was competent, like General Knerr. Hugh Knerr was a fan of General Andrews; they were

very close.

P: Knerr was a good man; he was extremely good. He had done a great deal of work in preparing for the GHQ Air Force. He was Spaatz's logistic man in Europe, and when he came back to the U.S. after the war, he was sort of a one-man Air Force Board. The people in charge had problems they needed to study. He would study them.

Q: What I'm trying to say that even though there was no love lost between Arnold and Knerr, Knerr got a good job even though he wasnt one of Arnold's favorites?

P: I didnt know this.

Q: Do you think anybody else could have done a better job that Arnold in WW II in the job he had?

P: I cant think of anyone.

Q: How about Emmons?

P: I did not know him. I dont think I ever even said hello to him. I knew who he was; where he was, etc. Arnold had the combination of character and drive, capacity, ability to select people; he could fire them, too. I dont think there was anybody else in the Air Force with those characteristics necessary for a wartime command. It was the Air Corps, later Army Air Forces.

Q: Do you think Andrews could have done that job as well?

P: Different kind of man, quiet, very gentlemanly type who got things done; a terrific pilot; loved to fly. Inspired his people by doing things like flying on instruments when very few other people would do it.

Q: That did him in, probably?

P: He may have been flying when they went in at Iceland. He got things done, but in a different way. I'm not at all sure that he would have been tough enough to stand up to the Army, the British, the Navy, to get the necessary support - Materiel, Personnel needed to build a great Air Force. It is hard to believe that we started - we never had more than 4,000 Regular officers in the Army Air Corps in WW II. Then we had 420,000 officers, and a couple of million men. It has always seemed strange to me that we were able to maintain the traditions, the background of Air Force experience while making such an expansion.

Q: Do you think the credit goes to Arnold for having maintained the integrity of the Air Force during this expansion?

P: He gets a good share of it. He really fought for his troops.

Q: How about George Brett? He was a comer; all of a sudden, his star faded?

P: I knew him very well. I'm not at all surprised that he faded away. I liked him very much. I liked to serve with him, but he didnt have the strength of character that was required for high ranking wartime officers. He got in trouble with MacArthur. He got sent back.

P: Q: Arnold and Eaker? I wouldnt be surprised.

P: They were great pals.

Q: They wrote three books together; they were very close. And then there were some problems. Then, Eaker was taken out of the Eighth Air Force. Did you know anything about that?

P: A little. I was in Africa, working for Jimmy Doolittle. We were engaging considerable success in beating down the Italians, and that part of the German Air Force in the Mediterranean Theatre. Eaker was in U.K., he had the 8th Air Force. He was trying his best to build it up and doing very well at it. But for some reason Arnold didnt think Eaker was doing as well as he should be, and he thought Doolittle would do it a little better. I dont know I didnt hear Arnold expound on this. This is what I gathered from the African end of the deal.

Q: After the war, Eaker, who was really the number 3 man, after Spaatz and Arnold, did not get the top job after Spaatz retired. Did you ever hear any speculation on that? Vandenberg got the top job.

P: No. I used to work for Eaker, and I was working for Eaker about that time in that period. He announced one time, and I was astonished to hear it, that he was going to retire at such-and-such a date. He was going to some small town, buy a radio station, or paper, or both and just live in some small place. He had studied journalism; he'd written books. This was his plan. But he only got as far as Hughes. He was going to LA on his way up to Oregon, when the Hughes organization got hold of him and gave him a job for ten years.

Q: Eaker is perhaps the only top combat commander who never got four stars. Why?

P: (Indecipherable), but it must be if you say so). I however thought of that,

Q: I cant think of anybody else in that situation; in fact, I can think of people who had lesser jobs who got four stars, but he never did?

P: Well, you might think about Whitehead. He was a terrific combat commander; he was a great commander after the war. He was like Arnold. He was always out there trying

to get something for his troops; driving them, working on weekends; building them up; and making them proud of the job they were doing. Yet he never got beyond three stars. There weren't many four-star jobs available.

Q: Eaker had the 8th Air Force and then the Med. Allied Air Force. Whitehead had the ~~1st~~ 13th Air Force which in magnitude was much smaller.

P: He had the 5th Air Force...

Q: Yes, that's right; when Kenney moved up. I just wondered if there was anything beyond that. You see, Arnold and Eaker did not have a good relationship after Eaker was taken out. Eaker felt he should have been kept on. He had come through with the 8th, and just when it was ready to blossom, they took him out.

P: Before that, ~~some were sent back in the forces~~ he suffered a setback in that some of those to Africa for the invasion were taken out of the 8th Air Force. And then they were planning to make a 9th Air Force, also, with units getting earmarked for the 9th.

end

Interview, Gen Earle Partridge, L'Enfant Plaza, Wash, DC Mar 8, 1973

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has had in the past _____. I've worked with it. It was very helpful to me when I was in the Air Research and Development Command. Bear in mind that this is in 1950, '51, '52, and '53. I've been associated with it tangentially ever since.

Q You said something here on the subject of "tact and diplomacy" that Arnold was not the greatest in the world, and did have the, was willing to give people the needle to encourage them to greater effort.

P He just didn't have time. His duties were so pressing, particularly in wartime. He just didn't have time to consider all the factors related to getting done what he thought should get done. He went, as he did to the Air Surgeon: "Go fix the engine program of such-and-such." The Air Surgeon would turn white, I'm told. I wasn't there...

Q Was this David Grant?

P Yes, it was Dave Grant. Have you talked to him? (No) Is he still alive? (No)

Q He got an assignment, grabbed in the hall, perhaps? And asked to work on engines?

P Yes

Q Did he turn it over to somebody else to do?

P Yes, finally. He talked to somebody in Materiel. I've forgotten now, but just went from there to the office...

Q Could it have been Echols? or "Pop" Powers?

P It could have been Echols. But I don't know, I was overseas.

Q Did Arnold ever grab you in the hall to give you an assignment?

P No.

Q If I recall rightly, you said something to me that Arnold almost got you canned from your job. I think you were in the 1st Air Force at the time.

P Yes, an actual, the way the matter worked was that Arnold wanted to use the air people, units of the 1st Air Force primarily for training,

and Hugh Drum wanted to use them primarily for defense of the north-eastern area. There was such a to-do about it that the Inspector General of the Army came up there...

Q Was that Peterson?

P Yes, I talked to him several times, went around with him--an educational trip--to visit units with the Inspector General, a very fine man. As a result of this, the three top Generals, and I happened to be on the bottom rung, were relieved. One was retired; one was sent to Panama; I was sent to Africa. But it was only with General Stratemeyer's interference in my behalf that kept me from getting busted, too.

Q I have had access to General Arnold's 201 File. On three occasions in his career he received very bad OERs. It is surprising that he wasn't busted himself, considering...

P I'm not surprised.

Q (Ref to Squier and Arnold in WW I) In our day, a man who gets an OER like that doesn't survive long in the Air Force. I asked Bruce Arnold and he said that in those days, they said more of what they thought. Nowadays, if you can't say anything good, you don't say anything. Is that true?

P Not necessarily.

Q Can a man get a bad OER like that in this day and age and survive in the Air Force?

P Oh, yes, that was a particularly bad one, I would say in the case of Arnold and Squier. But nowadays, if a man gets a bad efficiency report, he is allowed to, he is supposed to, review the report. If he wishes, he can appeal it. Quite frequently, comments are removed from the ER, to take off the stigma of one or more bad statements. Sometimes, they charge the reporting officer of being biased, etc.

Q Later Arnold got another one from Patrick. He was involved in the Billy Mitchell business. Arnold was exiled by Patrick to Fort Riley. He got a bad ER for that.

P I had very little, almost no direct contact with Arnold.

Q Did you admire him for his work?

P Oh, absolutely. He was a tower of strength.

Q Did people fear to be called into his office, when he hit the squawk-box?

P I don't know; I was never called there.

Q There are some who believe Andrews was just as good as Arnold and, moreover, he had more empathy with the troops. Arnold didn't have time to be polite. Is this a fair evaluation?

P I would say so. I knew Andrews very well. I served under him at Kelly Field, Texas, under him again at Selfridge Field. In my opinion, in most people's opinion, he would have been head of the Armed Forces in Europe, had he not been killed in a very regrettable aircraft accident.

Q You mean the job Eisenhower eventually got, you think he would have had that job?

P I think so.

Q But he wasn't a ground man. Do you think the British would have stood for him getting the top job?

P I think they liked him. I think so.

Q Well, they liked Eisenhower... I've heard this from a number of people. Maybe he would have gotten an overall Air job. We never unified Air in Europe--the British kept theirs and we kept ours. Maybe he would have gotten that job?

Q (Ref Black list) Arnold did not forget if some man did not do his job? Arnold had a list or a long memory?

P Could be. I don't think he was any worse or better in the business of getting rid of the incompetents than anybody else was. Except he was in a position to do something about it.

Q In some cases there was a strained feeling between Arnold and somebody who was competent, like General Knerr. Hugh Knerr was a fan of General Andrews; they were very close.

P Knerr was a good man; he was extremely good. He had done a great deal of work in preparing for the GHQ Air Force. He was Spaatz's logistic man in Europe, and when he came back to the U.S. after the war, he was sort of a one-man Air Force Board. The people in charge had problems they needed to study. He would study them.

Q What I'm trying to say that even though there was no love lost between Arnold and Knerr, Knerr got a good job even though he wasn't one of Arnold's favorites?

P I didn't know this.

Q Do you think anybody else could have done a better job than Arnold in WW II in the job he had?

P I can't think of anyone.

Q How about Emmons?

P I did not know him. I don't think I ever even said "hello" to him. I knew who he was; where he was, etc. Arnold had the combination of character and drive, capacity, ability to select people; he could fire them, too. I don't think there was anybody else in the Air Force with those characteristics necessary for a wartime commander. It was the Air Corps, later Army Air Forces.

Q Do you think Andrews could have done that job as well?

P Don't know. Different kind of man, quiet, very gentlemanly type who got things done; a terrific pilot; loved to fly. Inspired his people by doing things like flying on instruments when very few other people would do it.

Q That did him in, probably?

P He may have been flying when they went in at Iceland. He got things done, but in a different way. I'm not at all sure that he would have been tough enough to stand up to the Army, the British, the Navy, to get the necessary support--Materiel, Personnel, needed to build a great Air Force. It is hard to believe that we started--we never had

more than 4,000 Regular officers in the Army Air Corps in WW II. Then we had 420,000 officers, and a couple of million men. It was simply incredible. It has always seemed strange to me that we were able to maintain the traditions, the background of Air Force experience while making such an expansion.

Q Do you think the credit goes to Arnold for having maintained the integrity of the Air Force during this expansion?

P He gets a good share of it. He really fought for his troops.

Q How about George Brett? He was a comer; all of a sudden, his star faded?

P I knew him very well. I'm not at all surprised that he faded away. I liked him very much. I liked to serve with him. But he didn't have the strength of character that was required for high ranking wartime officers. He got in trouble with MacArthur. He got sent back. I wouldn't be surprised.

Q Arnold and Eaker?

P They were great pals.

Q They wrote three books together; they were very close. And, then, there were some problems. Then, Eaker was taken out of the Eighth Air Force. Did you know anything about that?

P A little. I was in Africa, working for Jimmy Doolittle. We were enjoying considerable success in beating down the Italians, and that part of the German Air Force in the Mediterranean Theatre. Eaker was in U.K., he had the 8th Air Force. He was trying his best to build it up and doing very well at it. But for some reason Arnold didn't think Eaker was doing as well as he should be, and he thought Doolittle would do it a little better. I don't know. I didn't hear Arnold expound on this. This is what I gathered from the African end of the deal.

Q After the war, Eaker, who was really the number 3 man, after Spaatz and Arnold, did not get the top job after Spaatz retired. Did you ever hear any speculation on that? Vandenberg got the top job.

P No. I used to work for Eaker, and I was working for Eaker about that time in that period. He announced one time, and I was astonished to hear it, that he was going to retire at such-and-such a date. He was going to some small town, buy a radio station, or paper, or both and just live in some small place. He hadsstudied journalism; he'd written books. This was his plan. But he only got as far as Hughes. He was going to L. A. on his way up to Oregon, when the Hughes organization got hold of him and gave him a job for ten years.

Q Eaker is perhaps the only top combat commander who never got four stars. Why?

P I haven't thought of that, but it must be if you say so.

Q I can't think of anybody else in that situation; in fact, I can think of people who had lesser jobs who got four stars, but he never did?

P Well, you might think about Whitehead. He was a terrific combat commander; he was a great commander after the war. He was like Arnold. He was always out there trying to get something for his troops; driving them, ; working on weekends; building them up; and making them proud of the job they were doing. Yet he never got beyond three stars. There weren't many four-star jobs available.

Q Eaker had the 8th Air Force and then the Med. Allied Air Force. Whitehead had the 13th Air Force which in magnitudewwas much smaller.

P He had the 5th Air Force...

Q Yes, that's right; when Kenney moved up. I just wondered if there was anything beyond that. You see, Arnold and Eaker did not have a good relationship after Eaker was taken out. Eaker felt he should have been kept on. He had come through with the 8th, and just when it was ready to blossom, they took him out.

P Before that, he suffered a setback in that some of the forces that went to Africa for the invasion were taken out of the 8th Air Force. And then they were planning to make a 9th Air Force, also, with units getting earmarked for the 9th.

- 203M1

19 December 1972

General Earle E. Partridge, USAF (Ret)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, Colo 80906

Dear General Partridge:

Thanks for your good letter of December 12th. I appreciate your willingness to give me some more of your time.

Right now, it looks as if I'll be coming out your way in the early Spring. When my plans firm up I'll be in touch.

If for any reason I dont make it out there, perhaps we can arrange something for about an hour here in Washington during the next "Senior Statesmen's Conference in the late Spring.

Here is wishing for you and yours a happy and healthy holiday season and New Year.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

3-8-73

E. E. PARTRIDGE
1317 HERMOSA WAY
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO.
80906

12 Dec. '72.

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Hq U. S. Air Force
Washington, DC. 20314

Dear Dr. Green.

I have your letter of 1 December requesting further amplification of my impressions of General Arnold.

In my opinion it would be better for us to talk than for me to try to write something that would be useful to you as background for your book. We could get together here in Colorado Springs or, if preferable, at the time of the next "Senior Statesmens Conference" in Washington late next spring, if that's not too late.

Sincerely,

E.E. Partridge

CYPRESS VIEW MAUSOLEUM
Columbarium and Crematory

Telephone Main 4-1911
3960 Imperial Avenue

San Diego 13, California

9 July 1953

Lt.Gen'l. Earle E. Partridge
Washington D. C.

Dear General Partridge:

Congratulations on your appointment, I was certainly glad to read about it, and now when Gen'l. Twinning retires I hope you succeed him.

Some of we old timers who served with General Arnold when he was a mjor and on up to Lt. Col. Col. etc. just knew that he would some day be the chief of the Abr Forces. Some of us never even changed our opinions when General Patrick sent him to Ft. Riley Kansas, we knew that was just a small stymie, and that is exactly the way it turned out. I might add what a god send it was to our country when he became the chief. We should never forget the training program he initiated in 1939, that had our country ready when the Japs struck Hawaii. You know the story on that one better than I perhaps. In 1940 when General Arnold had me commssioned out of civil life and put me in Judge Patterson's office, was when I really saw how the General operated and how he got things done. When I washis adjutant at Rockwell Field in the late years of 1919 and 1920, I was rather young, but we all loved General Arnold.

I plan on being in Washington for the A.F.A. convention and hope I may have the pleasure of seeing you then.

Here is a thought that you might give attentio to, my wife and I plan on going to Spain for about two years, just to live, while there perhaps I could be of some service to the Abr Forces. While I am in Washington I am going to make arrangements for our passports, so I will be there for several days.

So congratualtions once more and my very best wishes for your success, in your tremendous responsibilities.

Very Sincerely

Frank W. Seifert

20314

1 December 1972

General Earle E. Partridge, USAF (Ret)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, Colo 80900

Dear General Partridge:

I'm the fellow working on a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. You may recall that we had a good interview session at your home a couple of years ago. I'm still work-ing ing on the book which has a 1974 publication date.

Recently I came across some "impressions" that you "dictated" for use by Colonel T.D. Stamps (your Leavenworth classmate) for use in an Academy lecture. One of them is a key item that has to do with General Arnold's propensity for grabbing people in the halls and sending them off on assignments which could have no connection with their MOS.

Responding to the question of "decisiveness and executive ability", you offered this comment:

> "General Arnold turns out decisions right and left and enjoys tremendous executive ability. Sometimes, however, he used to get out of channels in a big way. For example, one day he intercepted an officer in the halls of the Munitions Building and ordered this officer, whomm he knew very well, to a new station in Newfoundland on a most important assignment. The officer had just completed a change of station and was merely a visitor in Washington, but he happened to be handy when General Arnold needed some one on whom he was sure he could depend."

In another context, you offered this comment about General Arnold's "judgment and common sense."

> "It was my impression that although General Arnold had judgment and common sense of an exceedingly high order, he sometimes disregarded these factors in directing action along lines in which he was particularly interested. This is in no sense meant as criticism, but I had the feeling that he sometimes directed that a certain job be done when in the back of his mind, he didnt see how the job was going to be accomplished. He had only the grim determination that it would be done."

These are two most interesting comments and I would welcome the opportunity to talk to you about them, or perhaps you could drop

me a line in the enclosure at your convenience. I expect to be coming out to Colorado Springs for another purpose before Spring, and so we could do it either way, if you are willing.

One word about my book: as you may recall, when I saw you it was a collaborative venture with Jack Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force Magazine. I was to do most of the research and Jack was to handle most of the writing. The pressures of his job caused him to back away from this task, and so I have been flying solo the past year and a half.

I've talked to 225 people associated with General Arnold, including Charles Lindbergh, Alex de Seversky, Jackie Cochran, Robert Lovett (twice), and of course, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell and O'Donnell (before they passed on), and a whole host of General Officers who served under General Arnold.

In the Colorado Springs area, I've just about caught them all, including Chidlaw, Atkinson, Gerhart, O.K. Niess, Thatcher, Low, Marshall Roth, Strother and yourself. I recently talked to Franklin Carroll and Rush Lincoln (although I was kind of late with him) in Boulder.

I am planning to endow my tapes and transcripts to a scholarly organization so that we may preserve for future generations some of the flavor of the Army Air Corps and Army Air Forces as they grew up and fought World War II.

Sorry to take up your time in this way. I look forward to hearing from you.

Incidentally, my boy is a Cadet in the Class of '75 at the Academy and I'm very proud of him.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK

19 March 1946

Major General Earle E. Partridge,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-3,
Headquarters Army Air Forces,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Partridge:

I wonder if you would be willing to do something for your one-time Leavenworth classmate who is now one of those old broken-down professors that one sometimes reads about.

The attached sheet outlines a lecture project which I am working on for this department. We naturally want to have the Army Air Forces represented and have selected Generals Arnold and Spaatz as subjects of lectures this year. I know that you, of course, are well acquainted with General Spaatz, and no doubt the same holds true for General Arnold. It would help me immeasurable if you could squeeze out the time to dictate your comments on both, preferably, or at least on General Spaatz. We shall incorporate the material in lectures and shall be careful not to quote you by name.

Perhaps I should say that similar letters are being written by our superintendent to two or three other general officers in your Headquarters, but I hope you don't collaborate with them, since I am anxious to have the benefit of different viewpoints.

I can assure you that anything you are able to do for me will be put to good use this year and in the years to come. Think what a warm glow you will have after having done this good turn for your Alma Mater, and the future generations of cadets.

Hopefully yours,

Stamps

T. D. STAMPS,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Professor of Military Art and Engineering.

Incl.-1

LECTURES ON OUTSTANDING LEADERS OF WORLD WAR II

As a part of their course in leadership, a series of lectures is being given to the members of the First Class, U.S. Military Academy, on the great leaders of history. While much material is available on those of past wars, very little has been published on the leaders of World War II. We are, therefore, forced to ask the assistance of distinguished officers who served under the great leaders of the recent war.

In our study of a leader we wish to bring out the attributes or qualities of leadership that made him successful. We seek an answer to the question, why was so-and-so a great leader? Incidents and examples that will illustrate the various attributes will be especially valuable for our purpose.

We are not requesting a formal article on a leader, for that would require too much time. Informal comments, regardless of how fragmentary, are all that we ask.

For convenience, a list is given below of most of the leadership qualities that we consider in our studies. While comments on all of them--insofar as they apply to the leader under consideration--would be welcome, we do not expect so much. Comments on the principal characteristics of the leador are all that we hope for.

1. Character
2. Color and showmanship
3. Coolness and self-control
4. Determination and force
5. Decisiveness and executive ability
6. Devotion to duty
7. Energy and enthusiasm
8. Initiative and aggressiveness
9. Intelligence and vision
10. Judgement and common sense
11. Knowledge of his men and interest in their welfare
12. Loyalty
13. Mission or purpose; sense of responsibility
14. Physical courage
15. Physical fitness
16. Professional knowledge
17. Personality and appearance
18. Self-expression
19. Tact and diplomacy
20. Tactical and strategic ability

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Thanks
no further use

5 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PARTRIDGE:

1. Attached is biographical background on Generals Spaatz and Arnold for reference in reply to Colonel Stamps.

2. While these items are rather standard, certain incidents related indicate specific leadership traits as indicated below:

A. "Boss of the Heavyweights"

(1) Ability to delegate authority.

(2) Lack of prejudice.

(3) Vision.

(4) Professional knowledge.

B. "General Carl Spaatz"

(1) Physical courage.

(2) Determination and force.

(3) Tactical and strategic ability.

(4) Personality and appearance.

C. "General of the Army Henry Harley Arnold"

(1) Loyalty

(2) Initiative and aggressiveness

(3) Vision

3. The attached items are not briefed in anticipation of your selecting other items considered more pertinent to your desired reply.

Ted Thompson

3 Incls.

Notes on General Arnold

1. Character - General Arnold is a man of the highest type, whole-heartedly devoted to his country and determined that it will be protected at all times.

2. Color and showmanship - General Arnold is a most colorful person who makes headlines wherever he goes and whose showmanship is excellent.

3. Coolness and self-control - While he is generally cool, he works at such high pressure that he occasionally "flies off the handle."

4. Determination and force - These qualities are developed in General Arnold to a high degree. He decides what he wants to do and orders it done in such forceful terms that his subordinates don't dare say "it can't be done."

5. Decisiveness and executive ability - General Arnold turns out decisions right and left and enjoys tremendous executive ability. Sometimes, however, he used to get out of channels in a big way. For example, one day he intercepted an office in the halls of the Munitions Building and ordered this officer, whom he knew very well, to a new station in Newfoundland.on a most important assignment. The officer had just completed a change of station and was merely a visitor in Washington, but he happened to be handy when General Arnold needed some one on whom he was sure he could depend.

6. Devotion to duty.- Before he retired General Arnold's devotion to duty drove him to far overtax his strength. Operating as he did at a very high tempo, he frequently endangered his health by overwork.

7. Energy and enthusiasm - The remarks under 6. above apply equally to this heading. General Arnold radiates energy and enthusiasm and inspires almost everyone with whom he comes in contact by this means alone.

8. Initiative and aggressiveness - These qualities characterize General Arnold to a marked degree.

9. Intelligence and vision - I find great difficulty in evaluating General Arnold from the point of view of intelligence, but to me, as one of his subordinates, his vision seemed oftentimes like clairvoyance.

10. Judgment and common sense - It was my impression that although General Arnold had judgment and common sense of an exceedingly high order, he sometimes disregarded these factors in directing action along lines in which he was particularly interested. This is in no sense meant as criticism, but I had the feeling that he sometimes directed that a certain job be done when in the back of his mind he didn't see how the work was to be accomplished. He had only the grim determination that it would be done.

11. Knowledge of his men and interest in their welfare - General Arnold always pushed toward a better knowledge of his men although naturally his time was very much limited. He never flagged in his interest in the welfare of the officers and men and somehow found time to relay information to the families in times of distress.

12. Loyalty - He was exceedingly loyal both to those above him and to those below him. He almost always had time to lend a hand to some old friend, but I might add that he rarely forgot those who let him down.

13. Mission or purpose; sense of responsibility - These characteristics are covered indirectly in the comments already made above.

14. Physical courage - My observations do not include any special ones pertaining to physical courage as such.

15. Physical fitness - General Arnold's ability to work at high pressure year after year was amazing. He always seemed to have a smile and a hearty greeting even when things were going badly. As I have noted above, he drove himself unmercifully.

16. Professional knowledge - This quality necessarily was of a high order. General Arnold's ability to remember details pertinent to a wide variety of activities constantly amazed his subordinates.

17. Personality and appearance - He is a man of splendid appearance and fine bearing. Coupled with this outward appearance his hearty greeting and charm in meeting people were of tremendous assistance in getting the work done.

18. Self-expression - My observations were that he was a good though not outstanding public speaker. In his office he sometimes gave instructions which his subordinates had difficulty in carrying out because they did not understand exactly what was required.

19. Tact and diplomacy - General Arnold did not object to giving people the "needle." He had a habit of sticking to his objectives and driving toward them with enthusiasm and a bold front. Nevertheless he was able to get along diplomatically and otherwise under conference conditions which must have tried his patience severely.

20. Tactical and strategic ability - My observations do not permit comments on these characteristics.

30 July 1946

Colonel T. D. Stamps
Professor of Military Art and Engineering
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York

Dear Colonel Stamps:

There is nothing to do but confess that more than four months ago you wrote me requesting information and opinions on General Spaatz and General Arnold for use in connection with a course at the Academy. Your letter was sent out to one of my assistants to collect certain information and was returned to my office only to be swept with other pressing correspondence into a safe drawer which is rarely used except for filing of bulky reference material. There your letter rested until yesterday, when I searched every possible cranny to find a misplaced document. The fault is wholly mine and I can only apologize for my failure to answer immediately.

There are attached some brief dictated notes which give my impressions of these two great leaders. Unfortunately, my contacts with them were not of an intimate nature, and you should bear that fact in mind in evaluating my comments. I did, however, work near both of them for an extended period and am happy to give you this small contribution toward what should turn out to be a most interesting and helpful course.

Best regards,

E. E. PARTRIDGE,
Major General, U. S. A.

...MILITARY
...AND ENGINEERING

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK

Personnel File P

2 August 1946

Maj. Gen. E. E. Partridge,
Hqrs. Army Air Forces,
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear General:

Your comments on the leadership qualities of Generals Arnold and Spaatz were so valuable that they were well worth waiting for. We shall indeed make excellent use of them next year.

Thank you very much for going to so much trouble.

Sincerely,

Stamps

T. D. STAMPS,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Professor of Military Art and Engineering.

INTERVIEW WITH GEN EARLE E. PARTRIDGE
COLORADO SPRINGS
DECEMBER 6, 1969

Q: Gen Partridge, the first question I usually ask people: Do you recall the first time you met General Arnold?

P: No, I don't think I do. Strange, but I don't think I do.

Q: Do you recall when you first had frequent contact with him?

P: Going back to your first question. I guess the first time I ever saw him, and I don't think I met him then, was when he came to the Air Corps Tactics School at Maxwell Field, and gave us a talk at Graduation, I believe, explaining that the Air arm was going to have to expand to take care of the war, which he could see coming. This was before the war broke out. I never had frequent contact with him.

Q: He was one-star at that time? Was he assistant to Westover?

P: He must have been. I think he was....

Q: Well, during the war, you had no frequent contacts with him?

P: No.

Q: You were in the Air War Plans?

P: Rarely, did I ever see him.

Q: You were in the Air War Plans Division. Did you work on the AWPD-1 with Kuter?

P: No, that was completed just before I arrived in Washington. I came to Washington, I think, the 1st of October

in 1941. That plan was either finished, or almost finished.

Q: I think they finished it in either August or September of that year. Were you in Washington when the Chicago Tribune published a big hunk of our war plan three days before Pearl Harbor?

P: Yes, I was there.

Q: Do you remember anything about that disclosure or about the investigation that transpired?

P: No. I remember that I was astonished - concerned that this had been published. I didn't see how it could be published.

Q: Well, somebody had leaked a portion of that plan, or the RAINBOW FIVE - I think they called the whole plan, to the Chicago Tribune and there was an investigation but it was sort of quieted down after Pearl Harbor. I guess it was overtaken by Pearl Harbor.

P: I didn't know about the investigation. I thought it would be investigated, but I was busy doing other things.

Q: The reason I bring this up is that a man named Frank Waldrop, who was the editor of the Washington Times-Herald, at that time. He is now retired, has written an article blaming Arnold for the disclosure. How does that strike you?

P: Improbable, I would say.

Q: The reason he ascribes to that was that Arnold was supposedly bitter about the failure of the War Dept to give equality to the Air Corps before the AAF. This was an act of reprisal. Of course, he is trying to vindicate himself because he published it, and this was close to an act of treason.

P: Did I get it straight that he was the editor of the Washington Times Herald?

Q: This was the Washington Times-Herald. There was a family relationship between the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald and the NY Daily News. They were related. Cissy Patterson owned the Times Herald, so Waldrop had a guilt complex about this. Anyway, he had written an article about it, and several people have picked this up, and a man who has written a book called Passion of the Hawks has picked this up, and pinned it on Arnold. Everybody I have talked to said this is ridiculous. I wrote a letter to the FBI and I got a bed-bug letter back from J. Edgar, so I didn't get any response there. To most of the people who were then in Washington, I usually ask them if they have any knowledge. I talked to Kuter. He was, of course, he said it was absolutely ridiculous that anybody should blame him.

Q: In Plans, were you in Plans when they hired Wallace Clark, to do a management study?

P: No.

Q: Was that before your time?

P: I think it must have been before my time. I was there very briefly. I arrived the 1st of October and just after the first of 1942, I was transferred over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, over in the Public Health Building. I worked over there until about 11 or 12 months, maybe not that long.

Q: In other words, you were in JCS through 1942?

P: Practically all of 1942. I think perhaps I went over in March, and I got another assignment in January 1943.

Q: Where did you go in 1943?

P: I went up to NY. Command the Air Defense System.

Q: And how long were you there?

P: Three months.

Q: Three months and then you went overseas?

P: Overseas. I was transferred to NY in January. Headquarters in the New Yorker Hotel, of all places.

Q: This is in 1943?

P: January 1943. And I stayed there only about 3 months. The reason I stayed such a short time was that I found myself in the middle of an argument between Gen Drum - a difference of opinion - as to priorities on the use of the air fighters that were in the Northeast United States. Gen Arnold thought they should be used primarily for training, and training of the aircraft, and training of the crews with their aircraft in organization units, and so on. Preparation for overseas should take priority. Gen Drum, of course, had the responsibility for the air defense and he argued, apparently equally well for the use of these units for primarily, for defense,

Q: Did you get into the ASW problem?

P: No, no I didn't. Not there.

Q: This was a problem at that time in that area.

P: It really was.

Q: Gen Drum was I suppose unhappy because he had hoped to be Chief of Staff and Marshall got the job in 1939.

P: I don't know anything about that.

Q: I mean he was sort of bypassed in the Army chain of command.

P: He was sort of sidetracked there in NY, as the Corps Area Commander.

Q: He never got a big job in WWII. Incidentally, there is an officer at the Air Force Academy who has just come upon the Drum papers, and they are in about 8 cartons and he is doing a doctoral dissertation on Drum. So, he promised to let me take a look at it when he finishes working on it.

Q: Where did you got after you left NY?

P: I was ordered direct to North Africa, and given the job of Operations Officer of the 12th NW African Strategic AF.

Q: Spaatz was running it, I guess.

P: Spaatz was in charge. He was in charge of all the air. Doolittle had the command. Vandenberg was the Chief of Staff and I was Operations Officer.

Q: Well you got into Kasserine Pass then?

P: No. That had all taken place before I got over there. I got over there in late April.

Q: The African war was almost over?

P: It was over the next month - in May.

Q: Then, of course, they started planning Sicily after that. Did you get into that operation in Sicily?

P: Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Pantelleria which was the first island they took.

Q: By air along.

P: Had a lot of ground and naval forces, too, but the ground forces just went ashore after long siege of bombing.

Q: There is a big thing, public relations wise, over Pantelleria. Do you think it was overstated? In the sense

that people made a conclusion that Pantelleria succumbed without a ground invasion. If you give us enough air power, we can do this across the Channel. Do you feel that this was overdone, public relations wise?

P: Yes, I think people were claiming more for the air than was possible. This was a very special operation, from many points of view. The Italians were defending the island,and they didn't have their heart in the job.

Q: You went to England?

P: Then I went to Africa when they - 15th AF...

Q: This is the end of '43?

P: End of '43, about two months, made a trip home, in the meanwhile, get supplies, check on people, so on. Then I came back immediately and took off with Doolittle for England. So we arrived there just after the first of the year in 1944.

Q: You were there, there was a little party for Fred Castle when he made this star, and I think he was killed right after that. Wasn't he?

P: I don't think I was there.

Q: Didn't they have some kind of party, housewarming or something, Dec 1943 or Jan 1944?

P: Well, let me go back. When I went up there with Doolittle, I stayed at High Wycombe, the 8th AF Hqs., until June. Then, just after the invasion, I moved up there. I moved from High Wycombe to a place near Thetford, the 3rd Air Division Hqs.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the so-called Big Switch? Spaatz was moved up to command USSTAF and Eaker was moved out

to the Mediterranean.

P: Yes.

Q: This was a traumatic experience for Eaker. Eaker was very unhappy about this. Did you get into it?

P: I could understand why he would be unhappy. First of all, he had to give up a good number of his units. They came down to Africa where they did quite well against the Germans. We were losing about a half a percent a sortie in the long run. That's a very low loss rate. On the other hand, he was left in England without the units that he expected to have, and he had to fight the Germans, the Germans were opposite his force.

Q: That was the toughest league?

P: Yes. The Germans weren't putting too much down at the Mediterranean at the time. I don't want to discount what the people did in the Mediterranean, but I could see his point of view. I never did talk to him about it.

Q: There was a failure, somewhere along the line, to anticipate the need for long range escorts. This is putting it mildly. Do you have any thoughts about who dropped the ball? Was it Wright Field or Arnold? Do you feel that somebody failed to anticipate this need, that is, these bombers were going out without escort, and the P-38 couldn't do it; the P-47 couldn't do it; and P-51, of course, they didn't have enough of them.

P: They didn't have any at first.

Q: Somebody dropped the ball. Do you have any feelings about that?

P: Well, the technology was not up to it at that time. The Germans didn't have any either, you understand.

Q: Well, we had a P-51, but we didn't want it?

P: Well, we had a great deal of trouble getting the headquarters to adopt the P-51. I don't think it would have been adopted at all except when one of the Generals went in and got ahead of Miff Harmon, said he'd been out looking at the airplanes, and he'd flown it, it was a wonderful airplane. We ought to buy them. Harmon then took up the cudgels for the Mustang.

Q: Well, we didn't start getting Mustangs until the end of 1943.

P: We had them before that, in terms of the A-36. Remember we had a dive bomber. The reason I know this is because Joe Cannon, who was the commander of the 12th AF, had a forced landing one day, combing across from Sicily back to Juris, to go to a staff operations meeting. He was in an A-36 and he skilfully landed it in the Mediterranean, in the open sea. That airplane, everybody said, couldn't be ditched.

Q: Do you feel that Wright Field was not giving the support, like modifications. For example, wing tanks back in June 1943, and you may recall that they were buying these cardboard wing tanks from the British, 1500 of them, I think. Somehow, Wright Field couldn't get untracked to get the wing tanks. Do you feel there was somebody in that modification, supply complex, who dropped the ball on that?

P: No, I wouldn't say that at all. I would say there was a great deal of lost motion, wasted effort, misapplied effort in trying to convey in firm terms, the requirements of the operational theaters. Each theater had a different requirement.

If you turned out a B-24, for example, and it was going to the Pacific, they sent it to modification center, and put on Pacific modifications - longest range they could get. If they went to England, they didn't need all that range, so they put on greater gun turrets. In the case of the fighters, it is extremely difficult, even in peacetime, to get the people back in the United States to understand your problem. It was awfully difficult in an operation theater to convince the people in the US to initiate action in the US, to procure the kind of equipment that was needed. Personal flying gear was one of the worst problems. We had B-17s with open windows, and even in the Mediterranean, where it was relatively warm, people were freezing, fingers, toes. They had to stand in the back of the airplanes in the open bays manning machine guns, and they just couldn't handle it.

Q: Well, Spaatz brought Knerr in there to handle logistics.

P: That's right.

Q: Did he do a good job?

P: Yes, extremely well.

Q: He was a very competent man. Are you familiar with Knerr's background in relation with Andrews?

P: Not too much. They were in the GHQ AF.

Q: They were very close. When Knerr left, retired in 1939, when Andrews left the GHQ.

P: He got ordered to San Antonio.

Q: San Antonio as a Colonel. He wet back to Colonel. And Knerr retired, and then tried to come back on duty and he couldn't.

P: I don't know when he came back...

Q: He came back in 1942, he was involved in writing articles under the table for unification. He wrote William Bradford Huie's book, or wrote most of it. Did you know that?

P: No.

Q: He was also writing much of Seversky's stuff. Of course, Arnold used to get mad about this because Seversky was needling him. Disney made a movie about how we needed more bombers, and of course, all this heat was on Arnold. Arnold thought that Seversky was zealous, you know. In any event, Knerr was in this association, and I have been told that Arnold was not exactly enthusiastic about Knerr coming back on duty. But he had a great confidence in Knerr, and he came back and of course he went overseas. He was in ASC first, at Wright Patt, and then he went overseas and did a great job. But you have no personal knowledge of this association?

P: No.

Q: What sort of relationship did Arnold have with Spaatz, do you know?

P: I really don't.

Q: Not firsthand.

P: Not firsthand, or secondhand.

Q: Where were you in 1944?

P: I was in England, all of 1944, practically from the first day.

Q: In the 8th AF?

P: Yes, 8th AF Hqs., for about 5 months, the rest of the time in the 3rd Air Division.

Q: Do you recall Arnold visiting England in 1943, August 1943, this was after Schweinfurt, were you in the Schweinfurt-Regensburg thing?

P: No, I was in Africa.

Q: Well they had some of the 15th come in on one of those raids...

P: The airplanes went from England, down to Southern Germany and then came to Africa. I was in Africa.

Q: Do you recall when Arnold came to England the first week of September 1943?

P: I knew that he was up there. I didn't see him. He came through Italy I don't know whether it was the same trip, or a later trip.

Q: Well, he came through Italy after D-Day.

P: No, he came through before that. At least, I'm sure he did, because he talked to Doolittle going through and then he talked to him coming back.

NOTE: Partridge correct - Arnold came back through Italy and Africa in September 1943.

Q: Well, he came through there, he came through North Africa after Casablanca. In January 1943.

P: No, this was much later than that. It was in the fall of 1943, when he was on his way to Cairo.

Q: Well, that was November 1943, this was the Cairo-Tehran conferences. Yes, he did come through there.

P: I didn't know anything about him being in England.

Q: Well he was in England in the first week of September,

and he was worried about our losing 60 planes in the raids. And then we lost 60 more on "Black Thursday", October 14th. And I have been told that Arnold had pretty nearly decided at that time that he was going to take Eaker out of there. One of the things that he was unhappy about was Eaker wanted to put 60 planes on one airdrome, do you remember this?

P: I don't know anything about it.

Q: And Arnold asked, how are you going to maintain 60 planes on one airdrome and Eaker said he was going to put them up in shifts. And Arnold thought about this when he got home and he was unhappy about it. Because if you can't get all your planes out, then the Germans can go back and refuel and they can hit each new wave of bombers as they come through. Anyway, I don't really know this, but people have implied, or at least, their impression that Arnold was progressively unhappy starting in September 1943 and finally made his decision in December to make the Big Switch.

P: After Cairo.

Q: Right after Cairo. In fact, I was just looking at something today at the Air Force Academy. He and Portal had an exchange. Portal was in a strange position of supporting Eaker. The British liked Eaker very much. He got along wonderfully with them. And Arnold wanted to get him out of there, and Portal was defending him. Were you aware of this?

P: I wasn't there. I was in Italy.

Q: You were under Eaker at that time.

P: No, I was under Doolittle. 15th AF.

Q: Well, that was really under Spaatz. Spaatz was really controlling the whole thing wasn't he? USSTAF.

P: No. Spaatz was in Caserta someplace down there. We are talking about two different time periods. I was in Africa and Italy on April through the 1st of January 1943, and I was Operations Officer until Vandenberg left, under Doolittle. When Vandenberg left, I became Chief of Staff, in the 15th AF. It had become the 15th AF.

Q: At Foggia?

P: At Bari.

Q: Were you there when the Germans came in and clobbered all those ships in Bari?

P: Yes, first we moved our headquarters over one day and they blew it up the next day. That's the most spectacular explosion I have ever seen. One ammunition ship set them all off.

Q: That dit it all? Did you go on any of the shuttle flights to Russia?

P: No. My units went. I didn't go. That was from England.

Q: Didn't a flight go in from Italy?

P: Yes, but that was 6 months later, after I left.

Q: Then you were in England. You were in England for D-Day, OVERLORD.

P: Yes, I'd been there since, that was the 6th of June, and I got there the 1st of January.

Q: Were you involved in this discussion over targeting, POINTBLANK. Spaatz wanted to hit the POINTBLANK targets, and Leigh-Mallory wanted them to hit the rail systems. Were you involved in that?

P: Not too much, no. By that time, I had moved away from the 8th AF hqs., so I didn't hear all this discussion. All I did was read the Operations order, and hand it over to my folks. They read it and then split it up. They had a Division mission the next day.

Q: Did you see Arnold when he came over with Marshall and King on D-Day?

P: No.

Q: You didn't see him? He visited the beachhead, he and Kuter.

P: Not on D-Day.

Q: No, I think they came 3 days later, 3 or 4 days later.

P: Sometime later.

Q: They had a CCS meeting in London and they came down, King got on a ship and Arnold got into an airplane. He didn't want to go on a ship. Arnold was very unhappy with the British Intelligence about D-Day because he felt that we had followed their lead, in the sense that there were no German opposition - no air opposition - no air opposition on D-Day. Am I right or wrong?

P: There wasn't any opposition. The reason there wasn't any opposition was we'd shot down their fighters as fast as they came up off the ground.

Q: Well Arnold felt that the British had overstated the air menace on the beachhead. You are not aware of that problem?

P: There wasn't hardly a German airplane around. Well, we had been piling into the German airplanes, on the ground,

shooting them down in the air, hundreds a day. We captured some of their pilots later and they were ferry pilots who were taking the airplanes from back in Germany up to the fields in the front. Some of them that were getting shot down - a lot of them were getting shot down. One man got shot down three times one day, and he made it. That's what he said, we believed him.

Q: When you encountered the German jets, the ME-262, was this kind of alarming?

P: Not particularly. They had weaknesses, major weaknesses. They were a very short duration airplane. Didn't have much time in the air on a mission and they didn't have runways as we do nowadays to fly them from. They had to land in turf fields, and they backed off 4 or 5 miles or so and came straight in, slowing down as they came, and landed. This time in their flight, they were extremely vulnerable. We shot a lot of them down. They also shot a lot of them down when they zoomed up to high altitude after attacking bomber formation. They'd go way bak up in the sky, P-51s climb up there and sit, shoot them down when they were leveling off at low speed. They had very little acceleration.

Q: Arnold was terribly concerned lest the Germans come up with the proximity fuze, because they would drop the bombs in the bomber formation. He was very much worried about it. He wrote to Vannevar Bush and some of the scientific types trying to plumb their knowledge and asking them to speculate about if the Germans come up with a proximity fuze, how ere we going to counter that, because they could drop it right in the

bomber formation and raise hell with them. Were you involved in this?

P: No.

Q: Of course you were worried that the Germans had a VT fuze?

P: They would have given our formations a drubbing from the ground without having any bombs. If they had been fitted, if their anti-aircraft artillery had been fitted for the proximity fuze, we would have had a rough time indeed. So I wasn't worrying about them bombing the formations, I would have been if I thought about it at all. I would have worried about them getting the VT fuze on the ground anti-aircraft.

Q: How about the V-1, was that a source of great concern.

P: No, not a great concern.

Q: The British asked us to bomb the ski sites, but the British didn't do it themselves.

P: No, they were doing night bombing, and they needed percision. They needed bigger targets.

Q: Was this a source of friction?

P: I don't remember observing friction between the RAF and the 8th AF. There probably was, but we held each other in high regard. I used to go to visit the British units, and they'd come over and visit ours.

Q: Well, it was a remarkably well preserved friendship, collaboration, considering that they were doing one thing and we were doing another.

P: It happened to work out that way. They did extraordinary work when they were put on day bombing. I don't know whether you

know this or not. By the time we got control of the air, we needed some moe air support for the British Army. Everybody said they couldn't do it, but they learned how to fly formation in columns, in fives, and they went in the day time and did wonderful bombing.

Q: When was this in '44, '45?

P: Yes.

Q: W hen the Battle of the Bulge occurred, did the Air Force fail, in any way, to do the job like it was expected on the ground. Of course, I know we had some very bad weather there for a period. Were you involved in the Battle of the Bulge - air support?

P: To some degree. It was mostly a question of weather. The weather was terrible and we had, I know at one time, the 8th AF had about 800 bombers down in France and Belgium. They couldn't get home. There weren't any bases to get back to. We took off when the weather was zero-zero. You couldn't see your hand before your face. There was a freezing mist all through that Christmas period in 1944. Around my quarters, the frst was about this deep, like snow. It wasn't snow - just the frozen precipitation out of the fog. Our people took off from our fields - you could get off all right - but we couldn't get back home again. You'd send off about 500-600 bombers, and only about 100 would come back. All of them were over in France. We'd send some more the next day, a majority of them went to France. Pretty soon you don't have much .force.

Q: Were you aware of Arnold's heart attack in Jan 1945? This was kept pretty quiet.

P: I didn't know about it.

Q: It really was kept pretty quiet. I know a few people at the top knew it for a while, he was trying to run the war from his sick bed in Florida. You know Pete Peterson, was his pilot, was coming down, McCabe was coming down, and they were bringing him memoranda, and he was writing through them instructions. Marshall got very unhappy - you just can't do it that way. Arnold was afraid he was going to be retired. This is one of the reasons that Eaker was brought back to be Deputy Commander. They wanted somebody experienced. The European war was ending, anyway. There was a month to go, and they felt there was nobody in Headquarters who could carry the ball. So they wanted somebody experienced and there were two people, one was Spaatz, and they wanted him to go out to the Pacific, and the other was Eaker.

P: The timing is a little different. Arnold had his heart attack in January, the war didn't stop until May, so about 4 months.

Q: Right. They struggled along through this whole period without a real head of the AF. Marshall was progressively unhappy.

P: I don't blame him.

Q: Lovett was unhappy, too, because he felt that without Arnold in the top seat, they were bypassing the AF. The AF just werent' getting the attention.

Q: Did you meet Arnold when he was over on his trip in April 1945?

P: No.

Q: You didn't meet him all through the war? When did you have your first good contact with Arnold. Talking, planning or working?

P: I don't believe I ever did. I shied away from him.

Q: Why?

P: As I was explaining to some kids yesterday morning, he was a man of impulse, and he did things like this, a Colonel named Henry Harms.

Q: In Newfoundland.

P: Well, he wasn't in Newfoundland. This was just before the start of the war. Things were pressing, however, and we had forces in Newfoundland. Henry Harms came to Washington from the Southwest somewhere, he had just been moved to a new station. He was to build it, and he came to Washington to get the plans and the money, and so on - for building the station. He just walked into the Munitions Building, and Gen Arnold happened to see him and he said: "Henry, you get up to Newfoundland, that place is a mess. Henry Harms tried to explain, he just moved,he had a station, he liked his job and he wanted to stay where he was. He didn't even get to go home, right up to Newfoundland and had to stay there 2 years.

Q: What job was he assigned to when he came back.

P: He was Post Commander, building a station someplace.

Q: And Arnold sent him up there?

P: This is all second hand. The story had wide coverage. Probably an altered version of it but that's about the way I heard it. I mentioned this to Mrs. Harmon last night, and she just laughed, and then she told me another story about another man - much the same thing.

Q: Of course, Harms was in a key spot, in the sense that all the VIPs coming through Goose Bay, Labrador, had to stop off there, and things were not....

P: He was in Newfoundland, Newfoundland Base Command.

Q: Anyway, he was relieved of that job. Did you know that?

P: No. Did badly?

Q: Did badly. He was one of the guys Arnold knew from way back.

P: Oh, yes, he was an old, old friend.

Q: Right, and he was one who was relieved. There are several others, men who had known Arnold from way back, who, in his opinion, didn't cut the mustard and were relieved. One man was Sue Clagett. Did you know anything about him?

P: Didn't know anything about the relationship between Clagett and Arnold.

Q: Clagett was a friend of Andrews. Clagett was a classmate of Andrews - Class of '06. Clagget succeeded Arnold at March Field. Did you ever come through March Field when Arnold was there?

P: No, came through when Tinker was there. I never did, seomehow I just never did get in contact with Arnold.

Q: You didn't make any special effort.

P: No, minded my own business.

Q: Did you ever meet Gen Andrews?

P: I knew him very well.

Q: I was told that if he had not died, he would have been the Eisenhower of WWII.

P: He was sent to England for this purpose. And he was coming back to the US on a trip on a B-17. Everybody tried to convince him that the weather was too bad. He was the kind of fellow who flew himself, and he was just going to go that day, that's all.

Q: As far as we know, he was flying the plane when it crashed.

P: I don't know.

Q: This was a terrible blow, but do you think that Adm King would have permitted an Air man to be commander of the OVERLORD operation?

P: I think he would have allowed Andrews. Andrews had great stature.

Q: Well, Marshall liked him very much. Marshall brought him back. He was a great commander. You know there was a little movement on in certain elements of the Air Staff to get Arnold overseas, and to put Andrews in the top seat. Were you aware of that?

P: No.

Q: Let's go back to your duty in France. You were in France for some months. Were you involved - right after Pearl Harbor - Roosevelt was very anxious to bomb Tokyo - some kind of

reprisal. Arnold told his training people, perhaps your or Kuter, I don't know who it was he told: "Let your imaginations roam, and come up with some idea that we can bomb Tokyo." This of course ended up three months later, as the Doolittle mission.

P: I had nothing to do with that.

Q: Did you have any contact with a guy named Merian Cooper?

P: He was in Intelligence.

Q: One of the things they were trying to do, is get the Russians to give up some bases in Siberia. Were you in on any of that planning?

P: No.

Q: Were you on any of the planning with the Russians, the Al-Sib plans?

P: No.

Q: How about with the Chinese. Getting planes to the Chinese?

P: After the war was over, then I had something to do with it. This was 1946.

Q: What were some of the projects you had when you were in Plans? Do you recall?

P: No, I don't. One thing that tickled me was that I was supposed to be keeping my eye on what was going on out in the Hawaiian Islands. And I knew that our inspector had been out there and was very much disturbed when he found that the air troops were being used for military policemen. The airplanes were concentrated. I knew that he had explained all this to Gen Arnold. And yet, nobody ever said a word to me about it. Even after the attack, nobody came around to me and said to me: "Hey, you are in charge of that, aren't you?"

Q: Let me ask you another thing. You just reminded me of something. Do you remember a report by William Farthing, Rose and Coddington, in Hawaii. This was just about the time you came into Plans. It was a proposal that said in effect: "Give us 180 reconnaissance planes, and we'll guarantee that Pearl Harbor will be safe from attack."

P: Never heard of that.

Q: General, we are talking about Elliott Roosevelt....

P: I knew him in England when he was the Photographic Officer for the 8th AF Hqs at High Wycombe. He did a tremendous job for the 8th AF - excellent job. He was able to project the requirements for photographic coverage better than almost anybody I ve ever dealt with, and he had the foresight to build the reporduction and processing facilities that turned out prints in great quantities needed at the time of the invasion.

Q: Were you familiar with the problem of getting him promoted to BG?

P: Only tangentially. I was in the Hqs., and I know that Jimmy Doolittle had recommended him, and I don't know what the machinery was after that, on what machinatious took place after that.

Q: One of the problems was that he had bad eyesight. He had 20/200 eyesight, so he couldn't wear wings. If he couldn't wear wings, he couldn't command the 325th Photographic Wing. This was presented by Spaatz to Arnold, and Arnold siad:"No, we will get in trouble on it if we promote him, because we have to stretch the facts." Arnold had his heart attack, and two weeks later, Roosevelt

had his wings and star.

Q: I know in August 1941 when they had this Argentia, Elliott was there as Hap's aide, when they went up there and met Churchill. Then Elliott participated in the planning the Baffin Bay-Greenland ferry route. So he did a lot of good things. On the other hand, he got involved in a lot of other situations which caused trouble.

Q: He did a lot of good, and then he would do things like a spoiled boy, and get into trouble.

Q: Did you have any contact with Goddard - the great photographic genius?

P: Yes, I know him well.

Q: I just talked to him the other day.

P: Did you talk, or did he talk?

Q: He talked. As a matter of fact, I'm in the AF Reserve, and we had him at our Christmas banquet last week. We gave him an award, and he's planning to address our group in February. He's going to put on a show. He can talk a mile a minute. Let me ask you, have you seen his book, Overview?

P: I've heard of it, but I haven't seen it.

Q: Well, he doesn't like Arnold, and he blames Arnold for shunting him out of the photographic business. Arnold was partial to Minton Kaye. Is this true, in your knowledge?

P: I don't know anything about this.

Q: I know that Goddard came over to the UK. Did he do a good job there with his strip camera?

P: I didn't know he had a strip camera over there. So I can't say. He came to Korea with a strip camera. He did well

with it over there.

Q: But you didn't know him during WWII?

P: I had met him before WWII at Wright Field, starting about 1925. I'd see him periodically on maneuvers. But, the first place I saw him in the European theater that I can remember was at Brunswick where he was going through that experimental site.

Q: Oh this was after the war.

P: Yes. Picking up cameras right and left. This was just after the displaced persons had gone through, and what they did to that beautiful laboratory is something.

Q: Did you have any contact with Von Karman? Von Karman had a group ....

P: Not over there, but I had contact with him in Europe, starting about 1951.

Q: Von Karman had the confidence of Arnold. Arnold dearly loved this little man.

P: This little man was one of the most brilliant scientists that had ever been around.

Q: Arnold picked some good ones, and of course, Von Karman was one of them. He gave him a carte blanche, and that report. "Toward New Horizons" have you ever read that?

P: Yes, I have. I've read a summary volume. Not qualified to read the rest.

Q: Very few of us are, but that summary is quite remarkable in predicting the future 20 years hence. One of the interesting things for me about Arnold, was that he had many levels of communication; with guys in the Forest Service, with whom he loved

to go out and hunt and fish; he had contact with Millikan, Vannevar Bush, Von Karman, some of the brains. He was a great man for R&D. He was always looking for innovations. Of course, he and Kettering had developed this "bug" in WWI.

P: I didn't know Arnold had a finger in that one.

Q: Yes he did [have a finger in the "Flying Bug"]. Arnold had a job in Production. He was a Colonel, and he was trying to get overseas in WWI. And he just managed a trip overseas when the war ended. This is one of the reasons that he always tried to get his officers rotated, because he felt that he was denied a chance to go. A lot of men worked for him, Cabell and Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell. They all got their chance overseas. Arnold never got his chance overseas in combat. This is one of the sort of hang-ups in Arnold's career.

P: The penalty he pays for being such a powerful man on the Washington scene.

Q: Did you ever hear any stories about his getting mad? I know you probably never encountered his ire.

P: No. I know he used to get furious once in a while, but I had no personal knowledge.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the ASW problem with the Navy?

P: The problem wasn't so much with the Navy. The problem was to get on with the job of doing some ASW work. Somebody had to do it.

Q: The Navy wasn't doing it.

P: They weren't doing enough. We brought over from England....

Q: Watson Watt.

P: Scientists too, but I worked with the operational people, like Freddy Evans and a few other people. We spent about a week with them. We are talking about the Atlantic Coastline.

Q: Atlantic coastline. Stimson went down, Stimston got very much agitated about this, right after Pearl Harbor, and he was really pounding the table. In fact, German submarines were surfacing 3 miles off Palm Beach - this kind of thing. And we weren't doing enough about it. The Navy just didn't have enough to go around. They didn't have the werewithal to do the ASW, and they wouldn't let the Air Force do it. Well, they made the Air Force come under the ComSea Frontier. Is that so?

P: Yes, this is the way it operated.

Q: The Air Force figured if we are doing, we ought to have our own command. Didn't Westside Larson come in there?

P: He had been instrumental in teaching navigation, and when this operation came along, he moved headquarters to NY.

Q: He's on the West Coast now.

P: Looks just the same now as he did 30 years ago.

Q: Is that right? He's one of the guys I want to talk to. One of the people I want to get to is McNarney,but he's been ill.

Q: Let's talk about George Goddard.

P: Goddard was a genius - low order I guess - but a genius nonetheless. Such an enthusiastic fellow, and such a visionary. He got himself in trouble all the time. I will just give you one example. When I was in the research - this is 1952, about. I was in charge of the Research and Development Command, and of course, in my rounds, I visited Wright Field. George, wasn't

content to let you visit just wherever you wanted to visit. He got you by the arm, and said: "I want you to see this device that I have right now. It's going to revolutionize night photography." He had a very crude worm-screw tube device which fitted on the end of an airplane wing. The theory was that you could screw this powder out at just the right rate, and burn it without burning up the airplane, it would give you continuous light, one on each wing. He took it out; took me over to the side of a building, where they had the airplanes parked, and tried to demonstrate, and it wouldn't work. I said: "George, you've got some more work to do on this." He said: "Oh, it worked yesterday and it will work tomorrow, but it just won't work here." Well, unknown to me, George arranged to get his airplane flown down to Partrick AFB at the time that we were having a Scientific Advisory Board meeting down there, and he insisted on demonstrating this machine at night. He got all these scientists - a couple hundred of them - out there, and of course the thing didn't work very well then either. And so, instead of having a roaring success, which he could have had if he had taken a little more time, a little more care....

Q: Went off hafcocked?

P: Yes, he went off half cocked. That's only one of them. But I could have killed him, We were trying to demonstrate successes. We had one or two of them - we had a few failures too. We had enough bailures; we didn't want anymore. Let's look at the fighter gunnery business. He maintained for years and years before anyone else was doing anything about it, that we should put

a camera on every airplane. We should be particularly be sure there was one on a fighter. So when the fighter shot its guns, take a picture. And we finally got it. He stuck with it, worked on development of cameras, and so on, but he still didn't develop one as good as the Russians had. We captured one of them in Korea, and they had a 70 mm.

Q: George wouldn't like to hear that.

Q: General, we are talking about Arnold grabbing people in the hall and giving them jobs unrelated to their specialty.

P: Well, I didn't see this happen, but I am reasonably sure it did. I heard it from several sources. We had a flight surgeon - Flight Surgeon of the AF. He of course had nothing to do with the materiel business. One day, I believe this was Glenn....

Q: Was it David Grant?

P: Oh, I guess maybe it was Grant. Anyway, yes, I guess it was Grant. Toward the close of the war, and the B-29s were doing badly because the 3350 engines were failing at a great rate, and nobody seemed able to fix them. Arnold walked out of his office one day, saw the Surgeon, and caught him by the arm, and said: "You get on that 3350 program and get it fixed. And I don't want to hear another word out of you." And of course, the Surgeon went into a complete flap, but he had the good sense to go over to the materiel people, and got them to take it over, and then I guess he disappeared. I don't know what happened to him. But if he had any sense, he got out of the building, and stayed away, so Arnold would forget about it.

20330

AF/CHO

1 December 1970

Gen Earle E. Partridge, USAF(Ret)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, CO 80906

Dear General Partridge

I'm very grateful for your very complete and frank discussion of the air defense vs. air training situation on the East Coast in 1943. It fills in one of the gaps--one among many--in my analysis of General Arnold. I'm most grateful.

Your walking trip in Nepal was a most unusual way to spend a vacation. It's not so bad either just living in Colorado Springs. As another dreary winter sneaks up on Washington, D.C., I'll be wishing I was back in Broadmoor country.

All good wishes to you and yours.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

1317 Hermosa Way,
Colorado Springs,
Colorado, 80906.
22 November, 1970.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of the Secretary,
Research & Analysis Division,
SAFAAR - 4C881,
Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20330.

Dear Doctor Green:

Your letter dated 2 October was waiting for me when I returned to Colorado a few days ago. My wife and I had been on a walking trip in Nepal since late September.

It is interesting to me that you should be digging up information regarding the incident which took place in the spring of 1943 and in which I nearly came a-cropper. You have only part of the story and I will try to fill some of the voids from personal background.

General Giles, in his interview, described his relationship with General DeWitt as one in which Barney had complete freedom of action so that air training could be carried on day and night whenever airplanes were available. Such was not the situation on the East Coast. Although I never read or heard any of the orders passed by the area commander, General Drum, to General Chaney, I had then and still have the firm impression that Drum and his staff required the committment of airplanes at all times for the active air defense of the northeastern part of the country. I inherited an air defense ground environment with headquarters in the offices of the Telephone Company on 18th Street in downtown New York City. This center was operational 24 hours a day and a good part of my time and energy was devoted to the supervision of that center , to the other parts of the defense system in outlying places and to the maintenance of aircraft on alert ready to intercept unknowns.

Perhaps a good indication of the importance attached to the air defense mission is given by the fact that in the brief three months that I was assigned to command of the New York sector, a substantial portion of January, the first month, was spent at Orlando, Florida, where I was brought up to date on the airplanes and equipment used at that time for air defense. I do not remember the dates of my assignment in New York nor do I recall how much of that time was devoted to indoctrination at Orlando but I do remember that my orders to Orlando originated at Mitchel Field where Generals Chaney (air force) and Taylor had their headquarters.
2 Fighter Command.

I can not recall at any time receiving instructions to emphasize flying hours for the fighter units in the sector. These were scattered through Long Island and southern New England, usually with only one squadron to an air field, and I might add that unlike other Air Forces throughout the country there were only fighters, not bombers, transports or other types. Even though we flew from municipal airports almost exclusively (imagine if you can, the troubles involved in operating a fighter squadron from La Guardia Field with

The airplanes we use were P-47's, which at that time period, were having severe engine reliability problems.

its short runways and mixture of military and civilian air traffic), were dispersed on many air fields, saddled with an incompatible mission of air defense and hampered a good deal of the time by unfavorable weather, the groups in training were made ready for overseas shipment on time and in retrospect, did well in combat. (The present Vice Chief of Staff General Meyer, was the squadron commander at La Guardia, and Neil Kearby who later won the Medal of Honor in the South Pacific was the group commander at Providence)

These units were being sent overseas for tactical use, not for air defense.

Anyhow, in view of what I thought were very successful operations in the New York area, it came as a complete surprise when I was summoned to a meeting called by the inspector general of the Army, General Peterson I believe, and informed that he was there to find out why things were going so badly. Specifically he wanted to know whether the carrying out of the air defense mission interfered with air training. Both Generals Chaney and Taylor were present and when Chaney said No, that there was no conflict, Taylor said nothing. Chaney's answer was not right and I knew it, as did Taylor, but since I had been there only briefly whereas the two of them, Chaney and Taylor, my immediate superiors, had been in charge for a long time, I kept quiet, too.

After that meeting, General Peterson took me with him to visit some of my units (I can not recall that he asked any of the upper echelons to go too) and during the interviews he held with my people he let me sit in. In the process of these talks I suddenly realized that the fly in General Arnold's eye was that he and General Drum were carrying on a full scale feud as to priority of missions for the air units in General Drums area. Drum insisted that defense of the northeast was primary while Arnold wanted training to dominate. Chaney and Taylor were caught in the middle of this grinder and effectively destroyed. Chaney was ordered reduced to colonel, according to my information at that time, but it was found that he was already a brigadier and could not be busted further. Taylor remained a brigadier who was a most competent officer, somewhat on the glamorous side but an expert in the photographic field (he was the father of the gun sight camera which became standard equipment on all fighters in World War II and since) and he could have made a major contribution if he had been permitted. Instead he was ordered to Panama as a colonel and he died there in an air accident. A Pity!

I was relieved and sent to North Africa to join Doolittle and Vandenberg among others. This was perhaps the most fortunate turn of events of my life for it put me into a combat situation as a brigadier, something I had been striving to achieve since the outbreak of the war.

Giles indicates that he was the one who saved my skin. I was told personally -- much later than the time of my relief -- by General Stratemeyer, that he was the one who came to my rescue.

You suggest that this fracas in 1943 resulted in my avoiding Arnold. Long before then I had decided to stay away from him but thereafter, you may be sure that my feeling on the subject was intensified.

Sincerely

E. E. Partridge

October 2, 1970

Gen Earle E. Partridge, USAF(Ret)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, CO 80906

Dear General Partridge:

In the process of cleaning up the transcript of a recent interview I had with Gen Barney Giles, I recalled what you told me last December, that you usually tried to avoid General Arnold. The enclosure may put the finger on why you felt that way.

In any event, I don't have a real good handle on the triggering events - on what General Chaney and his staff did or didn't do to make General Arnold so mad.

I wonder if you still have any recollections of these events while you served under General Chaney and could perhaps describe them to me briefly. The enclosure will speed your reply.

I hope you have had a good summer. The weather in Washington reminds me of Colorado. It is beautiful, but it won't last too long.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

EXTRACT

Interview with Lt General Barney M. Giles
San Antonio, Texas
May 12, 1970

G: Something happened. When Gen Arnold got something in his craw it was hard to get out, and he would get it in for you real fast. Now, like flying aircraft, now, during the war, he put out orders that you get as many hours on this training as possible. I had the 4th AF out there, and I was flying these fighters and the bombers. I had an order, if the airplane was not being worked on for maintenance, have them in the air. We had those pilots, all those groups under training, more pilots than we had airplanes. I gave an order that if the airplane was not being worked on, it had to be in the air training, day and night. Consequently, we were getting a lot of time in the aircraft. Chaney, CO of the East Coast, which was working under the Eastern Defense Commander - my command was under the Western Defense Commander - but we were operating the AF as we saw it. Gen DeWitt, the W. D. Commander, didn't bother me one bit. Hardly knew I was in command, and he hardly knew I was out there. So they wouldn't fly the airplanes on the East Coast. General Arnold called me in there one morning and he said "I want Chaney relieved and busted. I want every general officer in that command relieved of his command today".

Q: Arnold said this?

G: General Arnold was telling me. I was the Chief of Staff. And I said, "Gen Arnold, aren't you awfully hasty on this deal." He said: "I sent Chaney the same wires I sent you and all the other commanders." He said: " By the way, you are the only one who took the order seriously and did something about it. No one else has done it." The boys down in the 2nd AF did a pretty fair job. But Arnold said the East Coast hadn't done anything about it. They had done a worse job. I was scared for Gen Arnold. I went up to see Gen Marshall and

told him what orders I had. He told me to do it, because I was under the Personnel Division then. All we had to do was just request this officer be relieved of his command and reassigned, busted back to his permanent grade. Marshall went along with that, except in this one case, Chaney was already a permanent BG. He was a temporary MG. Well, I said: "will you please talk to Gen Arnold about it." General Arnold gave me an order. I didn't want to argue with him too much, because his blood pressure used to get a little bit high. But I went around him, to Gen Marshall, to talk to him, Marshall said he didn't want to do it. He said: "We will relieve him because he is your man, and an airman, but we don't want to bust him." And he said; "We will find a place for him. Pat Partridge had just been made a BG. A fellow named Taylor had been a BG in the Fighter Command up there for about 4 or 5 months, I couldn't talk him out of busting Taylor. He had him busted to Colonel, and sent to Panama, and I said: "You can't bust Pat Partridge, he's only been up there. "I said :

Any officer that has been up there less than 3 months, we'll reassign him, and he said: "Get him out of there; get him out of there this week. I don't want him up there." Well, anyway, I talked him into leaving Pat Partridge as is. So we sent Pat over to England as a BG. We sent Taylor down. He would never forgive Chaney from then on out. As far as he was concerned, Arnold would have him be a BG or busted back to Colonel. He would never get over it, if he was still Chief of the Air Force, he would never give Chaney a command.

Q: He helped get Chaney out of England. Chaney dragged his heels when they were setting up the 8th AF. Chaney was the senior man in England, and he brought him back and put Spaatz in there, in the 8th AF. So I think he was kind of sour on Chaney all along.

Colo

done
12-6-69

November 28, 1969

Gen Earle E. Partridge, USAF(Ret)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80900

Dear General Partridge:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I will be in the Colorado Springs area for about two weeks, beginning about the time this letter reaches you. I will be working on the Kuter Papers, which, as you may know, were endowed to the Air Force Academy Library. During my stay in Colorado Springs, I would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about General Hap Arnold. Your name shows up in his official and personal files in several contexts. Loosbrock and I are especially interested in any anecdotes, amusing or otherwise, which may give some insight into his accomplishments or character. This is going to be a "warts and all" biography. We would like to have any impressions, good or bad; non-attributable, if you desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

I shall try to phone you in the next two weeks, although if you wish to contact me at your convenience I can be reached at the Academy, through Col Jim Sunderman, Public Affairs Officer or Major Claude Johns, Director of the AFA Library.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

for 632-9113
call, Sat 6 PM - Dec 6

SW Corner of Penn
Howard Broadmoor
SW on Cheyenne Blvd
6 Cresta - 1 block
R on Cresta
L on Hermosa
3rd on Left

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

GENERAL EARLE E. PARTRIDGE, USAF

Earle Everard Partridge was born at Winchendon, Massachusetts on July 7, 1900. He enlisted in the Army on July 10, 1918 at Fort Slocum, New York and was assigned to the Fifth Engineer Training Regiment at Camp Humphries, Virginia. General Partridge went to France in August 1918 where he joined the 79th Division, participating in the St. Mihiel and Argonne operations prior to the Armistice. When the Division returned to Camp Dix, New Jersey in June 1919, he was honorably discharged.

Following a year at Norwich University, General Partridge re-enlisted in June 1920 and was appointed to the U. S. Military Academy. Graduating from the Academy on June 12, 1924 he was commissioned a second lieutenant of Air Service in the Regular Army.

Entering Primary Flying School at Brooks Field, Texas, the General was graduated from Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, Texas. After serving ten months in the Third Attack Group there he was appointed an Instructor at the Advanced Flying School in July 1926, remaining until September 1929 when he became an instructor in mathematics at the Military Academy.

Going to the Panama Canal Zone in October 1930, he was assigned to the Seventh Observation Squadron at France Field, and was later transferred to the Sixth Composite Group there.

In December 1932 General Partridge was assigned to Selfridge Field, Michigan, and in July 1936 went to Wright Field, Ohio as a test pilot. Entering the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama in September of that year, he was graduated the following June and assigned to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He then returned to Maxwell Field as an instructor in the Pursuit Section of the Tactical School. Transferring to the Southeast Air Corps training command in June 1940, he took a major part in establishing flying schools in the southeast. On October 1, 1940 he was sent to Barksdale Field at Shreveport, Louisiana to start an advanced single-engine flying school, going to Dothan, Alabama in May 1941 to supervise construction of the single-engine advanced flying school there.

Five months later the General was assigned to Air Force Headquarters as a member of the Air War Plans Division, and in March 1942 was made a member of the War Department General Staff to serve on the Joint Strategic Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He assumed command of the New York Air Defense Wing in January 1943.

Interview Gen Earle E. Partridge, Colorado Springs, Dec 6, 1969

Q: Gen Partridge, the first question I usually ask people, ~~when~~, do you recall the first time you met General Arnold?

P: No, I don't think I do. Strange, but I don't think I do.

Q: Do you recall when you first had frequent contact with him?

P: Going back to your first question. I guess the first time I ever saw him, and I don't think I met him then, was when he came to the Air Corps Tactics School at Maxwell Field, and gave us a talk at Graduation, I believe, explaining that the Air arm was going to have to expand to take care of the war, which he could see coming. This was before the war broke out. I never had frequent contact with him.

Q: He was one-star at that time? Was he assistant to Westover?

P: He must have been. I think he was...

Q: Well, during the war, you had no frequent contacts with him?

P: No.

Q: You were in the Air War Plans

P: Rarely, did I ever see him.

Q: You were in the Air War Plans Division. Did you work on the AWPD-1 with Kuter.

P: No, that was completed just before I arrived in Washington. I came to Washington in ~~October~~, I think, the 1st of October in 1941. That plan was either finished, or almost finished,

Q: I think they finished it in either August or September of /41/ that year. Were you in Washington when the Chicago Tribune published a big hunk of our war plan three days before Pearl Harbor?

P: Yes, I was there. /Do you remember anything about that disclosure or about the investigation that transpired?

P: No. I remember that I was astonished, concerned that this had been

published. I didn't see how it could be published.

Q: Well, somebody had leaked a portion of that plan, or the RAINBOW FIVE — I think they called the whole plan, to the Chicago Tribune and there was an investigation but it was sort of quieted down after Pearl Harbor. I guess it was overtaken by Pearl Harbor.

P: I didn't know about the investigation. I thought there would be an investigation but I was busy doing other things.

Q: The reason I bring this up is that a man named Frank Waldrop, who was the editor of the Washington Times-Herald, at that time, he is now retired, has written an article blaming Arnold for the disclosure. How does that strike you?

P: Improbable, I would say.

Q: The reason he ascribes to that was that Arnold was supposedly bitter about the failure of the War Dept to give equality to the Air Corps before the AAF and this was an act of reprisal. Of course, he is trying to vindicate himself because he published it, and this was close to an act of treason.

P: Did I get it straight that he was the editor of the ...

Q: Washington

P: Washington Times Herald.

Q: This was the Washington Times-Herald. There was a family relationship between the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald and the NY Daily News. They were related. Cissy Patterson owned the Times Herald, so Waldrop had a guilt complex about this. Anyway, he had written an article about it, and several people have picked this up, and a man who has written a book called Passion of the Hawks has picked this up, and pinned it on Arnold. Everybody I have talked to said this is ridiculous, and I wrote a letter to the FBI and I got a bad-boy letter back from J. Edgar, so I didn't get any response there. To most of the people who were then in Washington, I usually ask them if they have any knowledge. I talked to Kuter, he was, of course, he said it was absolutely ridiculous that anybody should blame him

Q: In Plans, were you in Plans when they hired Wallace Clark, to do a

management study?

P: No.

Q: Was that before your time?

P: I think it must have been before my time. I was there very briefly. I arrived the 1st of October and just after the first of ~~the year~~ 1942, I was transferred over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, over in the Public Health building, and worked over there until about 11 or 12 months, maybe not that long.

Q: ~~Where~~ In other words, you were in JCS through 1942?

P: Practically all of 1942. I think perhaps I went over in March, and I got another assignment in January 1943.

Q: Where did you go in 1943?

P: I went up to NY. Command the Air Defense System.

Q: And how long were you there?

P: Three months.

Q: Three months and then you went overseas?

P: Overseas. I was transferred to NY in January. Headquarters in the New Yorker Hotel, of all places.

Q: This in 1943?

P: January 1943. And I stayed there only about 3 months. The reason I stayed such a short time was that I found myself in the middle of an argument between Gen Drum, a difference of opinion, as to priorities on the use of the air fighters that were in the Northeast United States. Gen Arnold thought they should be used primarily for training, and training of the aircraft, ~~train~~ and training of the crews with their aircraft in organization units, and so on, preparation for overseas, should take priority. Gen Drum, of course, had the responsibility for the air defense and he argued, apparently, equally well, for the use of these units for primarily, for defense,

Q: Did you get into the ASW problem?

P: No, no I didn't. Not there.

Q: This was a problem at that time in that area.

Pershing: Air Defense & Eastern U.S.

skip for cont.

P: It was really was.

Q: Gen Drum was I suppose unhappy because he had hoped to be Chief of Marshall Staff and ~~Arnold~~ got the job in 1939.

P: I don't know anything about that.

Q: I mean he was sort of bypassed in the Army chain of command.

P: He was sort of sidetracked there in NY, as the Corps Area Commander

Q: He never got a big job in WWII. Incidentally, there is an officer at the Air Force Academy who has just come upon the Drum papers, and they are in about 8 cartons and he is doing a doctoral dissertation on Drum. So, he promised to let me take a look at it when he finishes working on it. [redacted] Q: Where did you go after you left NY?

P: I was ordered direct to ~~Africa~~, North Africa, and given the job of Operations Officer of the 12th NW African Strategic AF.

Q: Spaatz was running it, I guess.

P: Spaatz was in charge. He was in charge of all the air. Doolittle had the command. Vandenberg was the Chief of Staff and I was Operations Officer.

Q: Well you got into Kasserine Pass then?

P: No. That had all taken place before I got over there. I got over there in late April.

Q: The African war was almost over?

P: It was over the next month in May.

Q: Then, of course, they started planning Sicily after that. Did you get into that operation in Sicily?

P: Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Pantelleria (tell which Pantelleria) was the first island they took.

Q: By air alone.

P: Had a lot of ground and naval forces, too, but ~~they just went~~ - the ground forces just went ashore after a long siege of bombing.

Q: There is a big thing, public relations wise, over Pantelleria, (tell) do you think

it was overstated? In the sense that people made a conclusion that Pantelleria succumbed without a ground invasion. If you give us enough air power, we can do this across the channel. Do you feel that this was overdone, public relations wise?

P: Yes, I think people were claiming more for the air than was possible. This was a for the air to carry out, this was a very special operation, from many points of view. The Italians were defending the island, and they didn't have their heart in the job.

Q: You went to England?

P: Then I went to Africa when they - 15th AF . . . and of course, there

Q: This is the end of '43.

P: End of '43, about two months, made a trip home, in the meanwhile, get supplies, check on people, so on. Then I came back immediately and took off with Doolittle for England. So we arrived there just after the first of the year in 1944.

Q: You were there, there was a little party for Fred Castle when he made this star, and I think he was killed right after that. Wasn't he?

P: I don't think I was there.

Q: Didn't they have some kind of a party, housewarming or something, Dec 1943 or Jan 1944?

P: Well, let me go back. When I went up there with Doolittle, I stayed at High Wycombe, Wickam, the 8th AF Hqs., until June. Then, just before the invasion, no, just after the invasion, I moved up there, I moved from there to High Wycombe a place near Shelford, the 3rd Air Division Hqs.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the so-called Big Switch. Spaatz was moved up to command USSTAF and Eaker was moved out to the Mediterranean.

P: Yes,

Q: This was a traumatic experience for Eaker. Eaker was very unhappy about this. Did you get into it?

P: I could understand why he would be unhappy. First of all, he had to

give up a good number of his units, They came down to Africa, where they did quite well against the Germans, ~~really.~~ We were losing about a half a percent of sortie in the long run. That's a very low loss rate. On the other hand, he ~~was~~ was left in England, without the units that he expected to ~~have~~ have, and he had to fight the Germans, the Germans were opposite his force

Q: That was the toughest league?

P: Yes. The Germans ~~were~~ weren't putting too much down at the Mediterranean at the time. I don't want to discount what the people did in the Mediterranean, but I could see his point of view. I never did talk to him about it.

Q: There was a failure, somewhere along the line, to anticipate the need for long range escorts. This is putting it mildly. Do you have any thoughts about who dropped the ball, ~~with this~~ was it Wright Field or Arnold? ~~Did Arnold~~, do you feel that somebody failed to anticipate this need, that is, these bombers were going out without escort, and the P-38 couldn't do it, the P-47 couldn't do it, and P-51, of course, they didn't have enough of them.

P: They didn't have any at first.

Q: Somebody dropped the ball. Do you have any feelings about that?

P: Well, the technology was not up to it at that time. The Germans didn't have any either, you understand.

Q: Well, we had a P-51, but we didn't want it?

P: Well, we had a great deal of trouble getting the headquarters to adopt the P-51. I don't think it would have been adopted at all except when one of the Generals went in and got ahold of ~~Harmon~~, Miff Harmon, said he'd been out looking at the airplanes, and he'd flown it, it was a wonderful airplane. We ought to buy them. Harmon then took up the cudgels for the Mustang,

Q: Well, we didn't start getting Mustangs until the end of 1943

P: We had them before that, in terms of the A-36. Remember we had a dive bomber. The reason I know this is because Joe Cannon, who was the commander of the 12th AF, had a force landing one day, coming across from Sicily back to ~~Ghulis~~ Tunis,

Parish: No Long Range Escorts - 1943

he was in an A-36 and he skilfully landed it in the Mediterranean, in the open sea, airplane, everybody said, couldn't be ditched.

Q: Do you feel that Wright Field was not giving the support, like modifications. For example, wing tanks. They called for wing tanks back in June 1943, and you may recall that they were buying these cardboard wing tanks from the British, 1500 of them, I think, and somehow, Wright Field couldn't get on the track, get the wing tanks. Do you feel there was something in that modification, supply complex, dropped the ball on that?

P: No, I wouldn't say that at all. I would say there was a great deal of lost motion, wasted effort, misapply effort, and trying to convey in the firm terms, the requirements of the operational theaters. Each theater had a different requirement. If you turned out a B-24, for example, and it was going to the Pacific, they sent it to modification center, and put on Pacific modifications, long range, longest range they could get. If they went to England, they didn't need all that range, so they put on greater gun turrets. In the case of the fighters, it is extremely difficult, even in peacetime, to get the people back in the United States, to understand your problem. I'll just give you one little example of a peacetime operation of a thing that big around, called a computer. In Japan, over Japan they have

It was awfully difficult in an operation theater, to convince the people in the US to initiate action in the US, to procure the kind of equipment that was needed. Flying personal flying gear was one of the worst problems. We had B-17's with open windows, and even in the Mediterranean, where it was relatively warm, people were freezing, fingers, frozen, they had to stand in the back of the airplanes in the open bays manning machine guns, and they just couldn't handle it.

Q: Well, Spaatz brought Knerr in there to handle logistics.

P: That's right.

Q: Did he do a good job?

P: Yes, extremely well.

Q: He was a very competent man . Are you familiar with Knerr's background in relation with Andrews?

P: Not too much, very they were in the GHQ AF.

Q: They were very close, and Knerr, left, retired in 1939, when Andrews left the GHQ.

P: He got ordered to San Antonio.

Q: San Antonio as a Colonel. He went back to Colonel. And Knerr retired, and then tried to come back on duty, and he couldn't.

P: I don't know when he came back ...

Q: He came back in 1942, and he was involved in writing articles under the table for unification. He wrote William Bradford Huie's book, or wrote most of it. Did you know that?

P: No.

Q: He was also writing much of Seversky's stuff. And of course, Arnold used to get mad about this because Seversky was needling him. Seversky, and Disney made a movie about how we need more bombers, and of course, all this heat was on Arnold, and Arnold thought that Seversky was zealous, you know. In any event, Knerr was in this association, and I have been told that Arnold was not exactly enthusiastic about Knerr coming back on duty. But he had a great confidence in Knerr, and he came back and of course he went overseas, He was in ASC first, and Wright Patt, and then he went overseas and did a great job. But you have no personal knowledge of this association?

P: No.

Q: What sort of relationship did Arnold have with Spaatz, do you know?

P: I really don't.

Q: Not firsthand?

P: Not firsthand, or secondhand.

Q: Where were you in 1944?

P: I was in England, all of 1944, practically from the first day.

Q: In the 8th AF?

P: Yes. 8th AF Hqs., for about 5 months, the rest of the time in the 3rd Air Division.

Q: Do you recall Arnold visiting England in 1943, August 1943, this was after Schweinfurt, were you in the Schweinfurt-Regensburg thing?

P: No, I was in Africa.

Q: Well they had some of the 15th come in on one of those raids...

~~Nuestadt~~

P: The airplanes went from England, down to Southern Germany and then came to Africa. I was in Africa.

Q: Do you recall when Arnold came to England, the first week of September 1943?

P: I knew that he was up there. I didn't see him. He came through Italy I don't know whether it was the same trip, or a later trip.

Q: Well, he came through Italy after D-Day.

P: No, he came through before that. At least, I'm sure he did, because he talked to Doolittle going through and then he talked to him coming back

Note: Partridge correct - Arnold came back through Italy and Africa in Sept 1943

Q: Well, he came through there, he came through North Africa after Casablanca. In January 1943.

P: No, this was much later than that. It was in the fall of 1943, when he was on his way to Cairo.

Q: Well, that was November 1943, this was the Cairo-Tehran conferences. Yes, he did come through there.

P: I didn't know anything about him being in England.

Q: Well in he was in England in the first week of September, and he was worried about ~~we lost~~ our losing 60 planes in the raids. And then we lost 60 more on "Black ~~and~~ by Thursday," October 14th. And I have been told that Arnold had pretty nearly decided at that time that he was going to take Eaker out of there. ~~Because he was, for example,~~ he was ~~unhappy~~. One of the things that he was ~~that~~ unhappy about was Eaker wanted

Partridge: Arnold visits UK Sept 1943

to put 60 planes on one airdrome, do you remember this?

P: I don't know anything about it.

Q: And Arnold asked, how are you going to maintain 60 planes on one airdrome and Eaker said he was going to put them up in shifts. And Arnold thought about this when he got home and he was unhappy about it, because if you can't get all your planes out, then the Germans can go back and refuel and they can hit each new wave of bombers as they come through. Anyway, I don't really know this, but people have implied, or at least, their impression that Arnold was progressively unhappy starting in September 1943 and finally made his decision in December to make the Big Switch

P: After Cairo

Q: Right, after Cairo. In fact, I was just looking at something today at the Air Force Academy. He and Portal had an exchange. Portal was in a strange position of supporting Eaker. The British liked Eaker very much. He got along wonderfully with them. And Arnold wanted to get him out of there, and Portal was defending him. Were you aware of this?

P: I wasn't there, I was in Italy.

SKIP

Q: You were under Eaker at that time

P: No, I was under Doolittle. 15th AF.

Q: Well, that was really under Spaatz. Spaatz was really controlling the whole thing, wasn't he? USSTAF

P: No. Spaatz was in Caserta someplace down there. We are talking about two different periods. I was in Africa and Italy on April through the 1st of January 1943, and I was Operations Officer until Vandenberg left, under Doolittle, when Vandenberg left, I became Chief of Staff, in the 15th AF. It had become the 15th AF.

Q: At Foggia?

P: At Bari Bari

Q: Were you there when the Germans came in and clobbered all those ships in Bari?

P: Yes, first we moved our headquarters over one day and they blew it up

the next day. That's the most spectacular explosion I have ever seen. One ammunitions ship set them all off.

Q: That did it all? Did you go on any of the shuttle flights to Russia.

P: No. My units went. I didn't go. That was from England.

Q: Didn't a flight go in from Italy.

P: Yes, but that was 6 months later, after I left.

Q: Then you were in England. You were in England for D-Day, OVERLORD.

P: Yes, I'd been there since, that was the 6th of June, and I got there the 1st of January.

Q: Were you involved in this discussion over targetting, POINTBLANK, Spaatz wanted to hit the ~~PINT~~ POINTBLANK targets, and Leigh-Mallory wanted them to hit the rail systems. Were you involved in that?

P: Not too much, no. By that time, I had moved away from the 8th AF hqs., so I didn't hear all this discussion, all I did was read the Operations order, and hand it over to my folks, they read it and then split it up. They had a Division mission the next day.

Q: Did you see Arnold, when he came over with Marshall and King on D-Day?
P: No.
Q: You didn't see him? He visited the beachhead, he and Kuter.

P: Not on D-Day

Q: No, I think they came 3 days later, 3 or 4 days later. They had a CCS
P: Sometime later
meeting in London and they came down, King got on a ship and Arnold got into an airplane, he didn't want to go on a ship. ~~This was three or four days after D-Day.~~ Arnold was very unhappy with the British Intelligence about D-Day because he felt that we had followed their lead, in the sense that there were no German opposition - no air opposition on D-Day. Am I right or wrong?

P: There wasn't any opposition, and the reason there wasn't any opposition was ~~well~~ we'd shot down their fighters as fast as they came up off the ground.

Q: Well Arnold felt that the British had overstated the air menace on the beachhead. You are not aware of that problem?

P: There wasn't hardly a German airplane around. Well, we had been piling

Partridge: Arnold visits beachhead

into the German airplanes, on the ground, shooting them down in the air, hundreds a day, and we captured some of their pilots later and they were ~~ferrying pilots~~ ferry pilots who were taking the airplanes from back in Germany up to the fields in the front, and some of them that were getting shot down, a lot of them were getting shot down. One man got shot down three times one day, and he made it. That's what he said, we believed him.

Q: When you encountered the German jets, the ME262, was this kind of alarming?

P: Not particularly. They had weaknesses, major weaknesses. They were a very short duration airplane. Didn't have much time in the air on a mission and they didn't have runways as we do nowadays to fly them from. They had to land in turf fields, and they backed off 4 or 5 miles or so and came straight in, slowing down as they came, and landed. This time in their flight, they were extremely vulnerable. We shot a lot of them down. They also shot a lot of them down when they zoomed up to high altitude after attacking bomber formation, they'd go way back up in the sky, P-51s climb up there and sit, shoot them down when they were leveling off at low speed. They had very little acceleration.

Q: Arnold was terribly concerned lest the Germans come up with the proximity fuze, because they would drop the bombs in the bomber formation. He was very much worried about it. He wrote to Vannevar Bush and some of the scientific types trying to plumb their knowledge and asking them to speculate about if the Germans come up with a proximity fuze, how ~~we are going~~ were we going to counter that, because they could drop it right in the bomber formation and raise hell with them. Were you involved in this?

P: No.

Q: Of course you were worried that the Germans had a VT fuze?

P: They ~~were~~ would have given our formations a drubbing from the ground without having any bombs. If they had been fitted, if their ~~artillery had been~~, anti-aircraft artillery had been fitted for the proximity fuze, we would have had a rough time

Pantridge: Arnold worried about Jets & VT fuse

indeed. So I wasn't worrying about the bomb formations, I would have been if I thought about it at all, I would have worried about them getting the VT fuze on the ground anti-aircraft.

Q: How about the V-1, was that a source of great concern.

P: No, not great concern

Q: The British asked us to bomb the ski sites, but the British didn't do it themselves.

P: No, they were doing night bombing, and they needed precision. They needed bigger targets.

Q: Was this a source of friction?

P: I don't remember observing friction between the RAF and the 8th AF. There probably was, but we held each other in high regard. I used to go to visit the British units, and they'd come over and visit ours.

Q: Well, it was a remarkably well preserved friendship, collaboration, considering that they were doing one thing and we were doing another.

P: It happened to work out that way. They did extraordinary work when they were put on day bombing. I don't know whether you know this or not. By the time we got control of the air, we needed more air support for the British Army, and everybody said they couldn't do it, but they learned how to fly formation, in columns, in fives, and they went in the day time and did wonderful bombing.

Q: When was this in '44, '45?

P: Yes.

Q: When the Battle of the Bulge occurred, did the Air Force fail, in any way, to do the the job like it was expected on the ground. Of course, I know we had some very bad weather there for a period. Were you involved in the Battle of the Bulge - air support?

P: To some degree. It was mostly a question of weather. The weather was terrible and we had, I know at one time, the 8th AF had about 800 bombers down in France and Belgium, they couldn't get home, there were no bases to get back to, so we took off when the weather was zero-zero, over couldn't see your hand before you face, there was a freezing mist all through that Christmas period in 1944. It wasn't snow around my quarters was, the frost was about this deep, like snow. Just frozen precipitation out of the fog. Our people took off from our fields, you

Cartwright: Relations with RAF

Cartwright: Air Power in Battle of the Bulge

could get off all right, but we couldn't get back home again, you'd send off about 500-600 bombers, and only about 100 would come back. All of them were over in France. We'd send some more the next day, a majority of them went to France. pretty soon you don't have much force.

Q: Were you aware of Arnold's heart attack in Jan 1945? This was kept pretty quiet.

P: I didn't know about it.

Q: It really was kept pretty quiet. I know a few people at the top knew it for a while, he was trying to run the war from his sick bed in Florida. You know Pete Peterson, who was his pilot, was coming down, McCabe was coming down, and they were bringing him a memorandum, and he was writing through them instructions, and Marshall got very unhappy, you just can't do it that way. Arnold was afraid he was going to be retired. This is one of the reasons that Eaker was brought back to be the Deputy Commander. They wanted somebody experienced. The European war was ending, anyway. There was a month to go, and they felt there was nobody in Headquarters who could carry the ball. So they wanted somebody experienced and there were two people, one was Spaatz, and they wanted him to go out to the Pacific, and the other was Eaker.

P: The timing is a little different. Arnold had his heart attack in January, the war didn't stop until May, so about 4 months.

Q: Right. They struggled along through this whole period without a real head of the AF. Marshall was progressively unhappy.

P: I don't blame him.

Q: Lovett was unhappy, too, because he felt that without Arnold in the top seat, they were bypassing the AF, and the AF just weren't getting the attention.

Arnold came, he was on a rest and recuperation trip, around April 1st he left for Europe, and he went to Cannes and the Riveria, and he met with a lot of people there. There was a big meeting on Apr 19, 1945. This is one week after Roosevelt died. There was a big planning meeting, Eaker was taking a trip around the world, sort of to get familiarization, Spaatz and Arnold and several other people there. They

were talking about how can we get closer to the new president? Roosevelt had died on Apr 12, 1945, and of course, Roosevelt, they felt, was Navy all the way, and they had this planning session, in Cannes, and one of the things they talked about was getting Quesada into the White House as Harry Truman's aide. Are you familiar with this?

P: No.

Q: Did you meet Arnold when he was over on his trip in April 1945?

P: No.

Q: You didn't meet him all through the war? When did you have your first good contact with Arnold. Talking, planning or working?

P: I don't believe I ever did. I shied away from him.

Q: Why?

P: As I was explaining to some kids yesterday morning, he was a man of impulse, and he did things like this, a Colonel named Henry Harms

Q: In Newfoundland

P: Well, he wasn't in Newfoundland, - this was just before the start of the war. Things were pressing, however, and we had fouces in Newfoundland. Henry Harms came to Washington from the Southwest somewhere, he had just been moved to a new station, he was to build it, and he came to Washington to get the plans and the money, and so on, for building the station. He just walked into the Munitions Building, and Gen Arnold happened to see him, and he said, "Henry, you get up to Newfoundland, that place is in a mess. Henry Harms tried to explain, he just moved, he had a station, and he liked his job and he wanted to stay where he was, he didn't even get to go home, right up to Newfoundland and had to stay there 2 years.

Q: What job was he assigned to when he came back.

P: He was Post Commander, building a station someplace.

Q: And Arnold sent him up there?

P: This is all second hand. He story had wide coverage. Probably an altered version of it but that's about the way I heard it. and I mentioned this to Mrs. Harmon last

Partially Shied Away from Arnold

night, and she just laughed, and then she told me another story about another man— much the same thing.

Q: Of course, Harms was in a key spot, in the sense that all the VIPs coming through Goose Bay, Labrador, had to stop off there, and things were not

P: He was in Newfoundland, Newfoundland Base Command

Q: Anyway, he was relieved of that job. Did you know that?

P: No. Did badly?

Q: Did badly. He was one of the guys Arnold knew from way back.

P: Oh, yes, he was an old, old friend.

Q: Right, and he was one who was relieved. There are several others, men who had known Arnold from way back, who, in his opinion, didn't cut the mustard and were relieved. One man was Sue Clagett. Did you know anything about him?

P: Didn't know anything about the relationship between Clagett and Arnold.

Q: Clagett was a friend of Andrews. Clagett was a classmate of Andrews — class of '06. Clagget succeeded Arnold at March Field. Did you ever come through March Field when Arnold was there?

P: No, came through when Tinker was there. I never did, somehow I just never did get in contact with ~~him~~ Arnold.

Q: You didn't make any special effort.

P: No. Minded my own business.

Q: Did you ever meet Gen Andrews?

P: I knew him very well.

Q: I was told that if he had not died, he would have been the Eisenhower of WWII.

P: He was sent to England for this purpose. And he was coming back to the US on a trip ~~when the~~ on a B-17, and everybody tried to convince him that the weather was too bad. He was the kind of fellow who flew himself, and he was just going to go that day, that's all.

Q: As far as we know, he was flying the plane when it crashed.

Tinker, Andrews' Crash

P: I don't know

Q: This was a terrible blow, but do you think that Adm King would have permitted an Air man to be commander of the OVERLORD operation?

P: I think he would have allowed Andrews. Andrews had great stature.

Q: Well, Marshall liked him very much. Marshall brought him back. He was a great commander. You know there was a little movement on in certain elements of the Air Staff to get Arnold overseas, and put Andrews in the top seat. Were you aware of that?

P: No.

Q: Let's go back to your duty in France. You were in France for some months. Were you involved right after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was very anxious to bomb Tokyo. Some kind of reprisal, and Arnold told his training people, perhaps you or Kuter, I don't know who it was he told: "let your imaginations roam, and come up with some idea that we can bomb Tokyo." This of course ended up three months later, as the Doolittle mission.

P: I had nothing to do with that.

Q: Did you have any contact with a guy named Marian Cooper?

P: He was in Intelligence.

Q: One of the things they were trying to do, is get the Russians to give up some bases in Siberia. Were you in on any of that planning?

P: No.

Q: Were you on any of the planning with the Russians, the Al-Si.6 planes.

P: No.

Q: How about the with the Chinese. Getting planes to the Chinese?

P: After the war was over, then I had something to do with it. This was 1946.

Q: What were some of the projects you had when you were in France. Planes. Do you recall?

P: No, I don't. One thing that tickled me was that I was supposed to be keeping my eye on what was going on out in the Hawaiian Islands. And I knew that our inspector had been out there and was very much disturbed when he found that the air troops

were being used for military policemen. The airplanes were concentrated, and I knew that he had explained all this to Gen Arnold. And yet, nobody ever said a word to me about it, and even after the attack, nobody came around to me and said to me, "hey, you are in charge of that, aren't you?"

Q: Let me ask you another thing, You just reminded me of something. Do you remember a report by William Farthing, Rhodes and Coffington, down in Hawaii. This was just about the time you came into Pearl Harbor. It was a proposal that Roosevelt said in effect, "give us 180 reconnaissance planes, and we'll guarantee that Pearl Harbor will be safe from attack."

P: Never heard of that.

Q: General, we are talking about Elliott Roosevelt and ...

P: I knew him in England when he was the Photographic Officer for the 8th AF Hqs at High Wycombe. He did a tremendous job for the 8th AF - excellent job. he was able to project the requirements for photographic coverage better than almost anybody I've ever dealt with, and he had the foresight to build the reproduction and processing facilities that turned out prints in great quantities needed at the time of the invasion.

Q: Were you familiar with the problem of getting him promoted to BG?

P: Only tangentially. I was in the Hqs., and I know that Jimmy Doolittle had recommended him, and I don't know what the machinery was after that, or what machinations took place after that.

Q: One of the problems was that he had bad eyesight, he had 20/200 eyesight, so he couldn't wear wings, and if he couldn't wear wings, he couldn't command the 3rd 325th Photographic Wing. This was presented by Spaatz to Arnold, and Arnold said, "No, we will get in trouble on it if we promote him, because we have to stretch the facts." Arnold had his heart attack, and two weeks later, Roosevelt had his wings and Star.

~~In my opinion,~~

Q: I know in August 1941 when they had this Argentia, Elliott was there and as Hqs aide, ——→ when they went up there and met Churchill, and then Elliott participated in the planning the Baffin Bay - Greenland ferry route. so he did a lot of good things. On the other hand, Then he got involved in a lot of other situations which caused trouble.

Partial: Elliott Roosevelt

For example, he London, move into the C Hotel, and then, of course I don't know what the per diem was, like $5 and Elliott would go back to North Africa, somebody had to pay it. A Colonel or BG

P: I didn't know about this.

Q: He did a lot of good, and then he would do things like a spoiled boy, and get into trouble. Did you have any contact with Goddard? The great photographic genius?

P: Yes, I know him well.

Q: I just talked to him the other day.

P: Did you talk, or did he talk?

Q: He talked. As a matter of fact, I'm in the AF REserve, and we had him at our Christmas banquet, last week. We and gave him an award, and he's planning to address our group in February, he's going to put on a show. a he can talk a mile a minute. Let me ask you, have you seen his book, Overview?

P: I've heard of it, but I haven't seen it.

Q: Well, he doesn't like Arnold, and he blames Arnold for shunting him out of the photographic business. Arnold was partial to Minton Kaye, is this true, in your knowledge?

P: I don't know anything about this.

Q: I know that Goddard came over to the UK, did he do a good job there with his strip camera?

P: I didn't know he had a strip camera over there. So I can't say. He came to Korea with a strip camera. He did well with it over there.

Q: But you didn't know him during WWII?

P: I had met him before WWII, at Wright Field, starting about 1925, and I'd see him periodically on maneuvers. But the first place I saw him in the European theater that I can remember was at Brunswick where he was going through that experimental site.

Q: Oh this was after the war.

P: Yes. Picking up cameras right and left. This was just after the displaced persons had gone through, and what they did to that beautiful laboratory is something.

Q: Did you have any contact with von Karman? Von Karman had a group . . .

P: Not over there, but I contact with him afterward, in Europe, starting about 1951

Q: Von Karman had the confidence of Arnold. Arnold dearly loved this little man.

P: This little man was one of the most brilliant scientists that had ever been around.

Q: Arnold picked some good ones, and of course, Von Karman was one of them. He gave him a carte blanche, and that report, "Toward New Horizons" have you ever read that?

P: Yes, I have. I've read a summary volume. Not qualified to read the rest.

Q: Very few of us are, but that summary is quite remarkable in predicting the future 20 years hence.

Arnold, one of the interesting things for me about him, was that he had many levels of communication, with guys in the Forest Service, with whom he loved to go out and hunt and fish, he had contact with a Millikan, Vannevar Bush, von Karman, some of brains. of course he was a great man for R&D, and he was always looking for innovations. Of course, he and Kettering had developed this "bug" in WWI.

P: I didn't know Arnold had a finger in that one.

Q: yes he did I have a finger in the "Flying Bug" Arnold had a job in Production. He was a Colonel, and he was trying to get overseas in WWI. And he just managed a trip overseas when the war ended. This is one of the reasons that he always tried to get his officers rotated, because he felt that he was denied a chance to go. A lot of men worked for him, Cabell and Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell. They all got their chance overseas. Arnold never got his chance in combat This is one of the sort of hangups in Arnold's career.

P: The penalty he pays for being such a powerful man on the Washington scene.

Q: Did you ever hear any stories about his getting mad? I know you probably

never encountered his ire.

P: No. I know he used to get furious once in a while, but I had no personal knowledge.

Q: You were in Headquarters at the time, I think you were, at the time this thing happened. Col Ellis Esson — and I was told that he came into Arnold's office, Arnold chewed him out, and the man dropped dead of a heart attack in Arnold's office. Did you

P: No, never did.

Q: This happened around Febeary, March of 1942.

~~This made him an ogre.~~ Q: Did you have any knowledge of the ASW problem with the Navy?

P: ~~Probabl~~ The Problem wasn't so much with the Navy. The problem was to get on with the job of doing some ASW work. Somebody had to do it.

Q: The Navy wasn't doing it.

P: They weren't doing enough. We brought over from England

Q: Watson Watt

P: Scientists too, but I worked with the operational people, like Freddy Evans and a few other people. We spent about a week with them. We are talking about the Atlantic Coastline.

Q: Atlantic coastline. Stimson went down, Stimson got very much agitated about this, right after Pearl Harbor, and he was really pounding the table. In fact, German submarines were sufacing 3 miles off Palm Beach, this kind of thing. And we weren't doing enough about it, and the Navy just didn't have enough to go around. They didn't have the wherewithal to do the ASW, and they wouldn't let the Air Force do it. Well, they made the Air Force come under the ComSea Frontier. So that was?

P: Yes, this isthe way it operated. ~~The Air~~

Q: The Air Force figured if we are doing, we ought to have our own command. Didn't Westside Larson come in there?

P: He had been instrumental in teaching navigation, and when this operation

came along, he moved headquarters to NY. ~~I remember~~.

Q: He's on the West Coast now.

P: Looks just the same as he did 30 years ago.

Q: Is that right? He's one of the guys I want to talk to. One of the people I want to get to is McNarney, but he's been ill.

Q: Let's talk about George Goddard.

P: Goddard was a genius, low order I guess, but a genius nonetheless. Such an enthusiastic fellow, and such a visionary, ~~that~~ he got himself in trouble ~~on that~~. I will just give you one example. When I was in the research, this is 1952, about. I was in charge of the Research & Development Command, and of course, in my rounds, I visited Wright Field. George ~~would not~~, wasn't content to let you visit just where you wanted to visit. He got you by the arm, and said, "I want you to see this device that I have right now, it's going to revolutionize night photography." He had a very crude worm-screw ~~chew~~ device which fitted on the end of an airplane wing. The theory was that you could screw this powder out at just the right rate, and burn it without burning up the airplane, give you continuous light, one on each wing, and he took it out, took me over to the side of a building, where they had the airplanes parked, and tried to demonstrate, and it wouldn't work. I said, "George, you've got some more work to do on this." He said, "Oh, it worked yesterday and it will work tomorrow, but it just won't work here." Well, unknown to me, George arranged to get his airplane flown down to Patrick AFB at the time that we were having a Scientific Advisory Board meeting down there, and he insisted on demonstrating this machine at night. He got all these scientists, a couple hundred of them, out there, and of course the thing didn't work very well then either. And so, instead of having a roaring success, which he could have had if he had taken a little more time, a little more care, ...

Q: Went off halfcocked.

P: Yes, he went off halfcocked. That's only one of them. But I could have killed

him, ~~look~~ we were trying to demonstrate successes, we had one or two of them' we had a few failures too, we had enough failures; we didn't want any more. Let's ~~Just~~ look at the fighter gunnery business. He maintained for years and years before anyone else was doing anything about it, that we should put a camera on every airplane. We should be particularly sure there was one on a fighter. So when the fighter shot its guns, take a picture. And we ~~he~~ finally got it. He stuck with it, worked on development of cameras, and so on, but he still didn't develop one as good as the Russians had, we captured one of them in Korea, and they had a 70 mm.

Q: George wouldn't like to hear that.

Q: General, we are talkigg about Arnold grabbing people in the hall and giving them jobs ~~unrelated to the~~ unrelated to their specialty.

P: Well, I didn't see this happen, but I am reasonably sure it did. I heard it from several sources. We had a flight surgeon, Flight Surgeon of the AF, ~~and~~ he of course had nothing to do with the materiel business. One day, I believe this was Glenn, ...

Q: Was it David Grant, ~~was he~~?

P: Oh, I guess maybe it was Grant. Anyway, ~~who was the surgeon,~~ yes, I guess it was Grant. Toward the close of the ~~world~~ war, and the B-29s were doing badly because the 3350 engines were failing at a great rate, and nobody seemed able to fix them. Arnold walked out of his office one day, saw the Surgeon, and caught him by the arm, and said, "you get on that 3350 program and get it fixed, and I don't want to hear another word out of you." And of course, the Surgeon went into a complete flap, but he had the good sense to go over it to the materiel people, and got them to take it over, and then I guess he disappeared, ~~I guess~~, I don't know what happened to him. But if he had any sense, he got out of the building, and stayed away, so Arnold would forget about it.

Particularly: Arnold grabs Surgeon of AF

Partridge

Carded
perhaps twice
mls 6/19/93

INTERVIEW OF GEN EARLE PARTRIDGE
AIR FORCE ACADEMY
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
APRIL 12, 1968

(Re-transcription)

(Gen Partride was asked a question about fighter support for the bombers in the 8th AF.)

Partridge said he was standing there when it happened. He was Deputy to Doolittle and Doolittle didn't tell him anything about what he was going to do on this particular morning. Doolittle said: "Let's go over to the 8th Fighter Command Headquarters." He said they went over to see Gen Bill Kepner. Doolittle walked into the office and saw a sign on the wall which said to the effect: "The primary job in the 8th Fighter Command is to bring the fighters back alive."

Doolittle looked at the sign and said to Kepner, I want you to take that sign down and throw it away. Partridge said he though Kepner might have a heart attack, but he didn't. But Kepner was really disturbed, and tried to argue Doolittle out of it. He told Kepner: "I want you to cut loose from the bombers; I want you to chase down the German Air Force wherever it goes and shoot them down.

Partridge guesses that this incident occurred in early January or mid January 1944. This is shortly after Doolittle took over command of the 8th AF.

(Partridge tells this next story about LeMay. He said LeMay told it to him.)

He said LeMay told it to him. Before

Before LeMay got into combat, with the 305th, Bomb Group, he was told that the bomb run was 10 seconds. LeMay changed that to something like a 2 minute bomb run, or even 5 minutes. He figured that you can't hit a target effectively with a 10 second bomb run. While it was far more dangerous to hold to a line of flight for such an extended period, LeMay took the position that he would only have to hit the target once.

(Somebody asked Gen Partridge about General Andrews, and he said that Andrews would have been the European Commander if he hadn't been killed in the crash in Iceland. Gen Partridge was then asked about Gen Hoyt Vandenberg).

P: I had to work with that man for many years. First in a TAC group at Kelly Field and then Montgomery and the Air Corps Tactical School. He was the kind of commander, he was fitted to be a commander. He was the laziest man around. He always could get somebody else to do his work for him. Personable, fine looking young man, played a good game of golf. A delightful man. My earliest recollection of him was at West Point. I was a plebe and he was a yearling. I recall him poking his head out of the door in the evening and yelling: "Hey, how do you solve problem No. 36.?" He could have figured it out himself, but he didn't want to bother.

(Gen Partridge was asked a question about whether the need for a long range escort plane was foreseen in the days of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell in the years before the war)

P: These were the days when we had the B-10s, do you remember? It was a very good airplane. It couldn't carry much, but it could go fast, and it was as fast or faster than the fighters. So everybody said: "Fighters are finished." That

proved not quite to be right. I talked to the bomber people about this many times, because I was teaching "fighters" and they were teaching "bombers" and I didn't want to get up and shoot them down on the platform. That's a bad place to be shooting people down. You ought to agree beforehand what you should say. Almost without exception, these fellows would say: "We want all the escort fighters we can get. We want to be escorted right to the target. Gen George,Gen Walker, and a few other guys didn't believe this. And they were so effective in their argument, that Gen Chennault finally just threw in the sponge, pretending he was deaf.

(Gen Partridge was asked about the German fighter situation at the end of the war)

P: In April - the war stopped in May - about 30 days before that, we went deep into Germany, and we had a severe loss. Somedays you would only have a little, but I don't remember any time we didn't have some, somewhere along the line. The weather was terrible, and only their experienced pilots, the few they had left, could get up, and they came up. There were more airplanes, more fighter airplanes available at the end of the war, then the Germans could see. They had them stashed away all over the place. They manufactured them in many, many places and put them together, somehow. Years later, I went to the city of Garmisch. Just north of Garmisch. You'll find a ridge, road down each side, no railroad, and tunnels going through. They told me there were 21 miles of tunnels on both sides. So they had a great many planes in those tunnels.

NOTE: This points up the fuel shortage at the end of the war The Germans apparently had airplanes, but not enough fuel to fly them.

INTERVIEW OF GEN EARLE PARTRIDGE
AIR FORCE ACADEMY
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
APRIL 12, 1968

(Re-transcription)

(Gen Partride was asked a question about fighter support for the bombers in the 8th AF.)

Partridge said he was standing there when it happened. He was Deputy to Doolittle and Doolittle didn't tell him anything about what he was going to do on this particular morning. Doolittle said: "Let's go over to the 8th Fighter Command Headquarters." He said they went over to see Gen Bill Kepner. Doolittle walked into the office and saw a sign on the wall which said to the effect: "The primary job in the 8th Fighter Command is to bring the fighters back alive."

Doolittle looked at the sign and said to Kepner, I want you to take that sign down and throw it away. Partridge said he though Kepner might have a heart attack, but he didn't. But Kepner was really disturbed, and tried to argue Doolittle out of it. He told Kepner: "I want you to cut loose from the bombers; I want you to chase down the German Air Force wherever it goes and shoot them down.

Partridge guesses that this incident occurred in early January or mid January 1944. This is shortly after Doolittle took over command of the 8th AF.

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Pawley, William D. 6 Jun 72

Dr. Green -

Attached is copy of memo you requested.

Anita Pawley

Secretary to Mr. Pawley

6/7/72

IN REPLYING
REFER TO No.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

U.S. Naval Aviation Mission to Peru, S.A.

THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS PROJECT

Colonel Backes, USAAF, with Captain Daily and 1st Lieut. Black, apparently constitute the entire air staff of the Caribbean Defense Command, including aid and administration to all of the Army Missions in South America. After briefly acquainting Colonel Backes with the Peruvian background of this project, Lt. Col. Elwood was questioned, in tenor as follows:

B. Why were the planes to be sent to the Ambassador, inasmuch as he is not a military man?

E. Don't know—possibly a maneuver to expedite the desires of the War Dept.

B. Then why not to the Military Mission?

E. They are obviously not equipped for the job. The present Aviation Mission has available aviation personnel to assist the Ambassador in this work.

B. Then what has the CDC to do with it?

E. Because the Ambassador expects to use "el Pato" field at Talara, as the main operational training base and this is under the direct control of the CDC.

B. Is that in writing?

E. Don't know. Doubt it. We were assured verbally by General Arnold.

B. Are you prepared to emmerate specifically what items of assistance you will require of the CDC?

E. No. "El Pato" is strictly an Army Base. The assistance required there will be that necessary to feed, clothe, transport and administer the Army personnel involved, and to provide the operational facilities which will enable the training program to be executed in accordance with the Ambassador's wishes. The specific requirements naturally will have to be decided upon by the USAAF, in accordance with its own system.

B. Then suppose this program were carried on at another Peruvian airfield. The CDC would have nothing to do with it.

E. Talara and Limatambo are the only two fields capable of accomodating such training and Limatambo, although possible, is too crowded for desirable, safe training operations. However, assuming "El Pato" were not used, the Naval Aviation Mission would assume all of

the operational details within its limitations, providing what facilities were available. However, these being very limited, would work a hardship on the U.S. Army personnel. The administration and internal logistical support would have to be handled by the Army--the Administrative Officer as per General Arnold's directive, and/or the Military Mission. It is anticipated that these officers would turn immediately to Panama, hence any advance planning by C.D.C. would be to advantage. Moreover, in approximately July of this year the U.S. Naval Aviation Mission is to be withdrawn and if it is to be presumed that an Army Air Mission will replace it, then the execution of the entire training program will become the responsibility of the C.D.C., which again bids for forehandedness. Also, while the present Mission is prepared to provide what training and maintenance details are necessary they would undoubtedly differ from the same details as executed by the Army. The Peruvians are alert to note discrpancies in the U.S. systems and it is believed that sufficient advance cooperation between this Mission and C.D.C. would go far toward smotthing the transition from Navy to Army, with more credit to the United States.

In the ensuing conversations with Col. B. and with 6th Air Force Jefes, the following items were revealed:

(a). Col. Backes is the responsible man for C.D.C.

(b). His contacts with this project have been confined chiefly to the similar program for Columbia, where practically all the aircraft have already been delivered.

(c). All planes delivered to Columbia were transferred to the Military Air Mission there and as Mission planes, are provided with complete U.S. facilities, <u>including gas and oil</u>, shipped from Panama.

(d). C.D.C. Air strongly disapproves the procedure used in Peru, where the planes are sent to the Ambassador, stating that only if the planes were under the custody of an Army Air Mission would C.D.C. be obligated to support them in any way. (General Arnold spent only a few minutes in Panama enroute to U.S. and apparantly did not brief anyone there on aiding the U.S. Ambassador in the Peruvian project. Moreover, all U.S. aircraft attached to Embassies, attaches, etc. in South America are administered by some U.S.A.A.F. Dept. other than C.D.C.).

(e). Three C-47 loads (Approx. 10,000 lbs) of training material etc. have already arrived in Panama for the Peruvian program. In accordance with the above theory Col. Backes had ordered this material to be forwarded to the Peruvian Military Mission (Gen. Strong) at Lima, but cancelled this order upon learning the situation.

(f). Upon learning that Talara was to be made available to the Ambassador for this program, the 6th Air Force command pilots and engineers agreed that this runway would not last more than two weeks for operations; that while there is now available in Panama $170,000 for airport repair, the U.S. Army will surely not spend this money at Talara until the final disposition of this field is settled; that if repaired, it would take six months, more or less; that the USAAF, <u>if necessary</u>, would do better to build the necessary storage buildings at

Limatambo, but that operations of B-25s and P-47s cannot be conducted at "El Pato" Talara.

(g) CDC Air believed that the only solution from their point of view is to get a USAAF Air Mission in here as soon as possible and that he will recommend this to the War Dept.

(h) Meanwhile the CDC Air Officer has been directed by the CG CDC to give this project first priority, to have all the facts available by the middle of next week, when instructions will be requested from the War Dept. No arrival dates of the Peruvian planes are known and it is CDC's hope to finish first with Colombia before starting on Peru. CDC will try to hold the delivery of all planes destined for Peru until some decision has been made regarding the field to be used in Peru, and incidentally, to permit some plans to be made.

(i) It was agreed by the undersigned and by CDC Air that it would be a good idea, if possible to send a responsible USAAF officer to Peru promptly to review the situation and to act as liaison between the Ambassador (i.e. this Mission) and Panama, to determine what field will be used, what the Army can send, whether the gas will come from Panama or Talara, (assuming the U.S. Army chooses to provide it), what the Mission can expect in the way of instructional standards, etc. etc.

INCIDENTAL CHARGES

WILLIAM DOUGLAS PAWLEY
260 NORTHEAST 175th TERRACE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132

April 25, 1972

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of April 19, 1972 to Mr. Pawley.

Mr. and Mrs. Pawley are away in Europe for six weeks or two months and I do not believe they will have returned to Miami by June 5th.

I know he will be sorry to have missed you on this visit.

Very sincerely yours,

Anita Pawley
(Miss) Anita Pawley
Secretary to Mr. Pawley

AP:gh

P. S. You refer to our office in the First National Bank Bldg.; however, we moved from there several years ago and the office address is the one shown on this letterhead.

A. P.

done
6-6-72

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

19 Apr. 1972

Mr. Pawley

Copy to your office

Murray Snow

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

19 April 1972

Hon. William D. Pawley
2555 Lake Avenue
Sunset Island #2
Miami Beach, Florida

Dear Mr. Pawley:

My plans to visit Florida are firming up and I look forward to the honor and pleasure of visiting with you to talk about General Hap Arnold and any other subjects of mutual interest.

Monday, June 5th (all day); Tuesday PM, June 6th; or Wednesday, June 7th (all day) are available on my schedule.

Please choose a date and hour convenient for you and I shall be there.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

P.S. A belated thought....you may prefer for us to meet in your office at the First National Bank Building in Miami. Considering the problem with my last letter, I am sending a copy of this letter to that address to be sure it reaches you.

20314

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William D. Pawley
260 NORTHEAST 17th TERRACE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132

Per our conversation. With kind regards,

WILLIAM D. PAWLEY
PRESIDENT

TALISMAN SUGAR CORPORATION
260 NORTHEAST 17th TERRACE
MIAMI, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
374-3321

Wrote to Sarasota Herald

---- 20314

4 February 1972

Hon. William D. Pawley
President, Talisman Sugar Corporation
260 Northeast 17th Terrace
Miami, Florida

Dear Mr. Pawley:

Those chapter headings of your "Memoirs" had me drooling. I can't imagine a publisher turning down a first hand account of your experiences in the Caribbean, China and later in South America. However, as I mentioned on the phone, General George Goddard had a very bad experience with that publisher. They spent nil in advertising the book. Their distribution policy leaves something to be desired.

As a case in point, I assisted General Goddard in getting some press attention in the Washington area. There was a half page in the Post with pictures, etc. That alone should have sold a couple of thousand books. But inquiry in Brentano's revealed that they did not have it in stock. We'll never know how many sales were missed.

I suggest you compare notes with General Goddard. He lives on South Ocean Boulevard, Boca Raton. He's a great guy and is a fisherman.

I would dearly like to take a gander at your "Memoirs"

for HHA. Would send franked envelope

WB

MEMOIRS

Title	Yellow Draft	White Draft	Extra Copy
Introduction	X	X	X
Airline in the Caribbean	X	X	X
Wings for the Chinese Dragon	X	X	X
Building Aircraft for China	X	X	X
The Noose Around China Tightens	X	X	X
Factory on the Burma Border	X	X	X
In the Forgotten Theatre of War	X	X	X
Unheeded Pearl Harbor Warning	X	X	X
Organizing the Flying Tigers	X	X	X
Flying Tiger Logistics	X	X	X
Air Battles Over Burma	X	X	X
Building Aircraft at Bangalore	X	X	X
Transition toward Diplomacy	X	X	X
Social and Economic Conflict in Peru	X	X	X
Confrontation over Argentine Policy	X	X	X
Brazilian Ambassadorship	X	X	X
Red Challenge to Pan Americanism	X	X	X
Storm Clouds on the Economic Horizon	X	X	X
The Bogota Uprising	X	X	X
Revolution in Colombia	X	X	X
Negotiations for Military Bases in Spain	X	X	X
The Fall of China	X	X	X

American Wheat and Indian Famine	X	X	X
Eisenhower Becomes President	X	X	X
Strangling a Red Dictatorship	X	X	X
Message to Batista	X	X	X
Negotiations with Trujillo	X	X	X
Assassination of Trujillo	X	X	X
Losing the Battle for Cuban Freedom	X	X	X
Kennedy and the Cuban Catastrophe	X	X	X
The Perilous Future	X	X	X

file to Rosenbaum Beam

27 January 1972

Hon William D. Pawley
2555 Lake Avenue
Sunset Island #2
Miami Beach, Florida

Dear Mr. Pawley:

General Jack Beam wrote me after we talked on the phone. We have been unable to get together for a talk about General Hap Arnold because of a misdirected letter and my bad timing in visiting Tampa. But I'm still hopeful. He mentioned having to go into the hospital for exploratory surgery. Once again, let's hope it proves to be negative.

Anyway, I'm a professional historian and have been working on this project for three years or more. I've been assigned to the Air Force since 1946 and have worked for about eight Secretaries starting with Stuart Symington. After receiving a Brookings Fellowship, I spent a year in 1969 at the Library of Congress going through the Arnold, Spaatz, Andrews, Billy Mitchell et all, collections.

I've interviewed over 200 people associated with General Arnold during some phase of his colorful career. Among those I've seen is Mr. Lovett up at 59 Wall Street, New York City. I got to see de Seversky (who didnt like Arnold, as you know), Howard Rusk, Charles Lindbergh, Eddie Rickenbacker, among others.

One man I havent been able to reach is Averell Harriman who has been very busy romantically and politically of late.

In any event, Hap Arnold had a thing about helping Brazil and Mexico and pushed very hard to send military aircraft to a number of Latin American countries against the wishes of people like Spruille Braden. Arnold was on a good-will tour early in 1946 and suffered another heart attack in Lima, Peru.

I note also that you were associated with the China National Aviation Corporation, so perhaps you can throw some light on Arnold's relationship with Chennault and the Generalissimo.

My immediate plans are unsettled, as I just returned from a trip down your way. My main job there was to screen the papers of General Hugh Knerr for endowment to the Air Force Academy Library. As you know, I'm sure, he lived in Coral Gables. I spent a week going over his papers with Mrs. Knerr.

I may be able to work my way down to Miami in May or June and wonder if you may be in town at that time. The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Wm. Douglas Powley
2555 Lake Ave.
Sunset Island
2,
Miami
Beach, Fla

Office:
1st Natl Bank Bldg
Miami, Fla. 33131

Office Phone FR-90193
FR-374-3321

House
JE 42406
unlisted

Pawley — Miami →

1. Great pers friends
2. P found flying types
3. Signed contract for
Stilwell mission, p. 17

SCM —

Dec 1940 — should
be 1937

Pawley signed contract

Contract with

sent his crew — secured 2
based in Burma

Brett

Hap — heart attack at Linz at
party

Pawley predicted attacks on P.H.

Sunday, January 9, 1977 THE WASHINGTON POST

William Pawley, Ex-Envoy To Brazil, Aviation Expert

MIAMI BEACH, Fla. (AP)—William Douglas Pawley, former U.S. ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an aviation entrepreneur, is dead at 80. Police said he killed himself on Friday.

Mr. Pawley, who organized several aviation companies and helped form the World War II Flying Tigers, shot himself in the chest after leaving a note asking forgiveness of his wife, Edna, police said.

Authorities said he was still alive when an ambulance reached his home on Sunset Island Two just off Miami Beach. He died in the emergency room of Mt. Sinai Hospital.

Anita Pawley, his niece and secretary, said he had been suffering from shingles, a painful disease of the nerve endings, for more than a year. "He was in considerable pain," she said. "The pain was excruciating."

Mr. Pawley was an aviation expert who organized the Cuban national airline in Havana in 1929. That line later merged with Pan Am Airways.

The native of Florence, S.C., started his business career at the age of 11 in Cuba, selling food to sailors in Havana harbor.

He went into government service with the U.S. entry into World War II, assisting Gen. Claire Chennault in forming the Flying Tigers, a volunteer group of American pilots that fought for Gen. Chiang Kai-shek before becoming part of the regular U.S. Army. Another famous general, James Doolittle, once served as a test pilot for Mr. Pawley.

Mr. Pawley was named U.S. ambassador to Peru in 1945 and was ambassador to Brazil during 1946-48.

He returned to Havana in 1949, founded a bus company, and returned to Washington in 1951. He served variously as a special assistant to the secretaries of State and Defense.

Mr. Pawley also founded the Miami Transit Company and the Miami Beach Railway Co., local transportation systems that he later sold to Dade County.

Interview with Hon William D. Pawley Miami, Fla 6 June 72

Q Today is the anniversary of D-Day. We're talking about Pearl Harbor. (about 60 seconds lost)

P I was quite familiar with the fleet's activities in that on holidays and weekends it came into Pearl Harbor. And they also knew that all of our airplanes were hangared--were wing to wing on the Hickam Field.

Q In revetments there?

P Yes. In the speech that I made, I predicted that Pearl Harbor would be struck, that the Japanese would endeavor to bring in and sacrifice submarines at Pearl Harbor to block it up, and then proceed to try to destroy as much as (about 5 words missing) and also disperse the fleet. I found that most of the high officers--I had General Tony Frank and Jack (Rosenham) Beam and their wives for dinner that night and we discussed it at some length, and they agreed that we were not taking the necessary precautions, and that the fleet should be dispersed, and that they would have an intelligence meeting in a few days, and make the decisions. And the decision was made correctly. They came up with the same idea as to the dangers of a Japanese attack. So they actually ordered the fleet dispersed outside of Pearl Harbor, and all of the airplanes were put in revetments until General Hap Arnold and General Marshall came out for an inspection some time during 1940.

Q Would it have been late 1940 or perhaps 1939?

P I really don't know.

Q This letter from General Beam says they were briefed by General Frank's staff to include your report. There was a danger of attack.

P That's right.

Q Well, how did General Marshall and Arnold react to this report?

P I've never learned from the various letters I've received from officers who were present, who have written me that they recall my

speech and my warning. None of them have stated what General Marshall's and General Arnold's feeling was. Possibly they didn't have any. They came for information, and when they were thoroughly briefed, they went ba back to Washington and reported to Pres Roosevelt. I think the decision to change all of the officers, and to put the fleet back in Pearl Harbor and put all the airplanes back wing to wing was made by the President, and not by George Marshall or Hap Arnold.

Q What you are saying or implying here: these officers--Tony Frank and some of the other officers, Herron and Richardson--were taken out of their jobs because they were not willing to put the fleet and the aircraft in a position of greater vulnerability?

P That is correct.

Q The thing that is hard for an outsider, somebody who hears this, to believe, is that... Marshall and Arnold were patriotic, dedicated and knowledgeable and would permit this to happen. Could it be that they did not believe that Pearl Harbor was subject to attack?

P I don't really believe, having known General Arnold and General Marshall intimately as great personal friends, and men whom I believed to as patriotic and as capable as any officers in our service. I don't believe that they, on their own, would have moved the fleet back into Pearl Harbor and moved the airplanes into a wing to wing position, had they not received instructions to do so.

Q If Gen Marshall or Gen Arnold received instructions which in their view was inimical to our national defense, do you think that they would have done it or resigned?

P No. I got to know Marshall so well over the years, and we became great personal friends. We discussed many of our national problems, and I recall distinctly Marshall making a speech at VMI when they dedicated the arch to him. He invited Mrs. Pawley and me to accompany him and Mrs. Marshall.

Q Was this after the war?

P And I remember in that speech he was telling the young graduates that many of them would go into the services, and that one thing that they must remember as the paramount thing that they might have learned at VMI, was that no matter what doubts they personally might have from any orders given them by superiors, that they were to carry it out, even if it called for the complete sacrifice of a squad or a company. Because those that were planning the greater strategy knew what sacrifices had to be made in the interest of the overall picture. And I turned to Mrs. Pawley and stated: "He's talking about Chiang." I didn't say Pearl Harbor. He was told to have 800 Communists in the Kuomintang. And he carried out that order although I'm convinced in my heart that he did not believe that to be in the best interests of the United States.

Q This gets off into China, and I'd like to talk about China. I wonder whether Marshall and Arnold thought that Jearl Harbor would be the subject for an attack*** This letter of July 1, 1967 from Gen Rosenham Beam to Mr. Pawley concludes that Gen Frank was relieved by Fred Martin and Gen Herron was relieved by Gen Short, and Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson, and all aircraft were removed from revetment and placed back on the hangar lines, and all the naval aircraft were returned inside Pearl Harbor. That was the status of our defenses of Hawaii on Dec 7, 1941. We have a letter from Ambassador Pawley sent from Lima, Aug 27, 1945 to Gen Arnold thanking him for a photograph which Arnold had sent him in mid-July 1945. Ambassador Pawley invited Gen Arnold to visit them in Lima. I want to ask you about Arnold visiting in Latin America. You know he was wanting to retire to his ranch in Sonoma, Calif. and he was persuaded, or perhaps volunteered to make this good will mission, because he strongly believed that Brazil especially was a sort of balance wheel against Peron in Argentina. And of course he was on opposite sides with Spruille Braden. Arnold had this belief that we should

send some of these surplus planes to the Latin American countries and he was a leader in doing that. Do you recall any conversations or exchanges with Arnold on the subject?

P Yes. No question. One of the first things that I wrote after arriving in Peru and becoming acquainted with my responsibilities was on the subject of military aid to Latin American countries. I wrote a memorandum and I don't know whether Gen Arnold got a copy of it or not, but I would assume that he would have known about it, because it dealt with airplanes as well as other military supplies. And I wrote this: that I'd been in Latin America long enough, having gone to Cuba when I was four years old, and having lived in and out of Latin America a good part of my life, that I felt that the strongest ties that existed between the Latin American countries and the U S, were members of the military missions: the air missions, the marines, the navy, and that part of the army that participated, and that I felt that we should continue to supply at very reasonable prices, the naval equipment, the air equipment and the ground equipment that they needed for a respectable but small military establishment in each country. That no matter what size the country was, how small, they would have a military establishment, and cover all of the services. And therefore, if we didn't supply it, other countries not friendly to us would supply the material. Because they were going to get it. And that I felt that in supplying the material, we also supplied the missions, headed sometimes by Major Generals and Admirals, two-star Admirals, and the fact that the Latin Americans were brought to the United States to go to our military schools, had created a feeling of comradeship and mutual defense of such strength that in my opinion it was far more valuable than all of the twenty Ambassadors' influences put together. For that reason I advocated that we continue to supply particularly aircraft but also all of the other material they needed.

Q When did you take the job as Ambassador to Lima?

P Mr. Truman sent me down there in 1945. But I was sent for a specific purpose. Twenty-two years earlier they had borrowed $100 million and $50 million had accumulated in interest. Not a dime had ever been paid. And Truman wanted to help Peru, having come in first. And he sent me down to see if I could service the debt and I was fortunate in being able to do it.

Q He sent you down shortly after he took office?

P Very shortly after. Roosevelt wanted me to go as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and I turned him down on that, because I told him I knew nothing about Czechoslovakia. But it brings out an interesting point, because it was in the latter part of his life and Roosevelt was very sick, the day that we talked. And I said: "I know nothing about Czechoslovakia; I know very little about Europe or the history; I know nothing about the language. But in Asia or Latin America I do a pretty good job." He said: "Bill, that isn't the reason I want you. I now feel I've got to send somebody that'll stand up to the Russians." This is the report that was sent to Hap Arnold by the Chief of Mission in Peru.

Q This report of 23 Jan 1946, Memorandum for General Arnold, subject: "U.S. Ground Military Mission in Peru." It mentions Arnold's request of the 21st of January 1946, for a memorandum. The authority for this mission was a contract between the U.S. and Peru, signed July 10, 1944, for four years. It refers to military staff conversations held at Lima, Peru, between March 19, and April 6, 1945. This memo was sent a few days after he had his heart attack?

P Right

Q Arnold strongly believed, I think, for two reasons that we should cement relationships with certain non-communist countries in Latin America, especially Brazil. Of course, Brazil had done us a great favor, providing facilities for bases, Recife, Belem, etc, along the eastern coast for our aircraft. Another reason for sending these planes to Latin America was

to get rid of surplus planes. After World War I there was a traumatic experience in the military. All these DH-4s which had been produced after the Armistice were kept in the inventory. They were required to fly these planes for 10 years after the war ended. So Arnold had conversations with his staff. They were worried they would be stuck with these planes for long after. To fulfill this concept of improving our relationship with Latin America, and to get rid of these surplus planes, Arnold did this. Spruille Braden was opposed to this, and other people opposed it, fearing the Latin American countries would make war on one another with armaments they got from U.S. Do you remember him making this argument? How did you knock it down?

P Oh, of course. I opposed Spruille Braden very strongly in this. Spruille Braden was aiming against Peron at the time, and not permitting Eisenhower or Arnold or Halsey, or any of these men who visited Peru and Brazil--we had them in our Embassy--he would not permit them to go to the Argentines, which in my judgment was a big mistake. A man would come to Brazil and would have to go all the way back to Panama, and go down the other coast because Spruille Braden would not let them even fly across Argentine.

Q Why?

P Because he felt that would be giving Peron prestige to have high American military officials to be passing through Argentine. General Marshall never expressed an opinion on this subject to me, but I know, certainly, Eisenhower, who spent four or five days with us at the Embass6, felt very strongly about it, and pulled no punches in his opposition to Braden's point of view. Neither did Halsey who spent almost ten days with us. And, certainly, neither did Hap Arnold. He felt that Spruille Braden was completely wrong, not only in his opposition to going to Argentine, but not supplying the military equipment that was needed by these countries which were going to have and would continue to have, as

long as there is a Latin America, they were going to have a military establishment. If they don't get the military equipment from us, they are going to get it from Russia, as Cuba is getting it now, as Peru will probably get it, and, now, Chile will probably get it.

Q In January 1946 when the war was over, was there this feeling that, if we didn't supply the Latin American countries, Russia would? Was that already defined?

P That was sufficiently defined by those of us who were familiar with the Communist problem. There were plenty of people in the U.S. in high government jobs who had no concept of this problem.

Q Was there any feeling that these small countreis would war against one another? There was the Chaco War that went on for years between Bolivia and Paraguay. And there were several other local wars going on. War there any fear?

P Not important ones.

Q Was there any fear on the part of Braden and other State Dept types that they would use these planes to bomb one another?

P That's what Braden stated. But unfortunately the documents that will appear in my book that deal with the Braden problem--he was completely, at that point, cooperating with the--unknowingly--with the Communist conspiracy.

Q Arnold came to Lima sometime around January 15th of 1946. How long was he there before he had his heart attack?

P Several days.

Q Did you have any conversations with him before?

P Oh, sure.

Q And you talked about the need to supply?

P Yes. This was the paramount thing that I wanted to discuss with him.

Q And did he mention the trouble he was having with Braden?

P Yes

Q So you shared this common problem?

P Yes, and I express it in the book that I'm endeavoring to write.

Q Of course he was using his great prestige as one of the 5-star generals to carry this policy forward of military aid?

P That's right. In that respect, I would call Braden on the telephone and beg him to cease campaigning against Peron on the theory that he was electing Peron because Peron put out a pamphlet with Braden's picture on it and his picture on it and said: Either vote for the Yankee or vote for me." And nothing could, in my opinion, help Peron more than what Braden was doing. And, as I learned later, that was what was intended by those who were directing Braden's activities.

Q You felt that Braden's policy of trying to isolate Peron from the rest of Latin America and the world would only strengthen his position?

P And it did. And it caused us great trouble. And it took a lot of doing for us to straighten things out with Peron, in order for him to participate in the Rio Conference.

Q Then Arnold was one of three or possibly more officers with great stature who were sent on these political missions. You mentioned Eisenhower.

P They were not permitted to go to Argentina.

Q But during the same period Halsey and Eisenhower...

P Same period exactly. During '45, '46, and '47.

Q The fact that Arnold had to go back right in the middle of his tour. He had a whole itinerary planned. He had several other countries on his itinerary. He was unable to make any of them.

P That is right. That was very tragic because, with his great prestige and being so knowledgeable on this whole subject, he would have helped us tremendously.

Q He was strong for having the Brazilians participate in World War II. They did. One squadron of Brazilian Air Force went over to Italy and fought in the Mediterranean Theater.

P 40,000 Brazilians were the ones that fought under Mark Clark and the immediate general over them was Crittenberger, and Gen Crittenberger is the only man that's ever been presented with the Brazilian Sword, which is the greatest honor that can be given to an American military man. And Crittenberger was down there as our guest at the Embassy, and he also felt very strongly on this subject that we are talking about, and there were several others that felt equally strongly about this subject.

Q This is a continuation of the memorandum of January 23, 1946 from Brig Gen Robert W. Strong, Chief of Mission in Lima, Peru, addressed to Gen Arnold. In his estimate of the present situation, he said that we can easily lose the trust of the Peruvian people, "unless we do something promptly to keep faith with them. Peru wants some tangible proof that we mean business in talking about inter-American security. She had shown respectful patience but that patience may easily wear then. Foreign (European) governments are busy right now in Peru to the prejudice of our country. A representative of the British Vickers arms company is now in Peru. French influence is trying hard to come back. Various Russian delegations have recently been in Peru. All know about the Security Plan, and that Peru expects and needs badly to re-equip her army. A few days ago, the Peruvian War Minister, in a periodic conference on current matters suddenly asked me: "My friend, do you think the United States is really going to let us ever get any equipment or not? If so when? I've got to know."

Gen Strong continues his memo to Gen Arnold, saying that it is the right and duty of every sovereign state to protect its sovereignty and maintain internal order. To this end he said that Peru would maintain an armed force and the attitude of that force and what objectives it would work towards were matters which General Strong's mission could do much to influence in a positive way towards the USA. He concluded: "If Peru

is to get no equipment from the US, Peru needs no mission here, and they know it." He recommended that the US start moving promptly to Peru the first increment of equipment, including materiel for a light infantry division."

This is a letter from Spruille Braden to the Acting Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, dated Jan 9, 1946. He refers to Royall's letter of Jan 6, 1946 to Dean Acheson, concerning the furnishing of military aircraft to other American republics. He said he had the pleasure of discussing the so-called adjusted interim Latin American aircraft requirements program with Gen Arnold and Maj Gen Walsh the day before. At this meeting, Spruille Braden said it was agreed that the State Department approved the interim program subject to understandings that: (1) no airplanes would be made available at the present time to Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Paraguay; (2) The furnishing of airplanes to the other 13 American republics would be subject to the concurrence with respect to each country of the American Ambassador concerned and to the desires of each country should it not wish to receive the full number approved by the American ambassador for that country.

Spruille Braden said tha Arnold had agreed that "any implied commitment" with regard to military airplanes resulting from the staff conversations will have to be discharged by furnishing the aircraft comprising the adjusted interim program, and that the United States is under no further obligation with respect to supplying additional military airplanes.

Mr. Braden also stated that General Arnold agreed that a decision concerning supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and the other American republics. In other words, the

military aircraft supply would be made subject to these Latin American countries coming around on policy matters.

P That's the point. I was involved in those conversations and objected very strenuously to Braden's restrictions, and pointed out that not only was Russia, but also France and England, involved in trying to get equipment into Latin America. But I was fearful that the one that would be successful in it would be the Russians. And for that reason, I felt that Spruille Braden's objections and restrictions were going to work to our detriment. And I believe history has proven that to be so.

Q Was he trying to use the aircraft supply as a club to get them to make concessions to us in other policy matters?

P I don't know that. I didn't work close enough with Braden.

Q I'm interested in this last paragraph where he says that Arnold agreed that a decision concerning the supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and other American republics. I just wonder if this was a sort of club?

P It could be and I don't know what he means by "collaboration" because as far as I was concerned, up to that point, we had complete collaboration from every country in Latin America and Central America with the exception of Argentina, and we didn't have that because Spruille Braden had destroyed the relationships that did exist, and could have been rebuilt. And when I had finished the job that the President gave me in Peru, he offered me my choice between going to Argentina or Brazil as Ambassador. I immediately selected Argentina and told the President in the presence of George Marshall who was at the White House that I was taking it because I wanted to undo some of the damage that I felt Spruille Braden had done. But, unfortunately Spruille then returned to the United States as Assistant Secretary of State, and he persuaded the President to let him send George Messersmith from Mexico to the Argentine and to

send me to Brazil. And that was the reason the change of the appointment that had been offered me both by the President and the Secretary of State.

Q This is a letter from Ambassador William Pawley to General Arnold from Lima, Peru, dated February 1, 1946. Gen Arnold had suffered a heart attack a couple of weeks before and was taken back to Miami to recover. The letter from Ambassador Pawley says: "I am writing to you in Miami in the hope that you have stopped off there for some well-deserved rest. Your visit to Peru accompanied by Mrs. Arnold and your daughter was appreciated here in Peru, and I am sure that it would be difficult to measure the good that was produced by the trip. It has been greatly regretted that your health did not permit you to participate in all the program that had been planned. However, all the principal part was accomplished which was an opportunity for the President, the Ministers of Air, War, and Navy plus a large group of Air Force officers to meet and talk with you on subjects of mutual interest.

"I hope that your plans will enable you to remain in Miami long enough to give you the rest that will put you back in excellent condition.

"Please give my very best wishes to Mrs. Arnold and Mrs. Snowden."

P His heart attack shortly before a reception in his, and his wife's, and daughter's honor at the Embassy. And Mrs. Arnold and the daughter came in spite of the attack and stayed just a very brief time and then joined the General. They were all three flown back to Miami the next day.

Q Had he exerted himself or was it just the high altitude?

P Lima is at sea level. I think that probably he was tremendously interested in what was going there and the subject matter of the discussion, the supplying of military equipment to Latin American countries, was uppermost in his mind, as it was in mine. And I think that he was probably stricken by, I don't know, overexertion, physically, may not be necessary. You can overexert yourself mentally.

Q He had a severe heart attack and was hors de combat for two and a half months in January 1945. Then he was on a half schedule for some months, so he had this tendency. Whatever it was, this just about finished him. He retired shortly after that.

Q This is a penciled note concerning Gen Arnold's heart attack in Lima, Peru. The note reads: "Gen Arnold's condition has improved greatly at this time. He has been suffering with an irregularity of the pulse. His condition is much improved. Further physical and mental strain are not advisable. For this reason he is returning to the United States for rest and further treatment."

This is a memorandum for Ambassador Pawley, 14 January 1946, from Maj J.R. Reist, Acting Military Attache: It discusses the arrival of General Arnold and his party, including Mrs. Arnold, Mrs. Ernest Snowden, Col Lawrence Peterson (pilot), Maj Murray Sargent, Maj Thomas Sheffield, and Master Sgt Marion Pettie. They were expected to arrive at Limatambo Airport at 1640 hours on 16 January 1946. A report from Caribbean Defense Command Hq that Col J. B. Brown had joined the party at Panama. Was he a Doctor? J. B. Brown?

P (didn't know)

Q George Brett came back from the Pacific around July 1942. He and Douglas MacArthur had a falling out. He was the senior air officer there. Prior to that time he was #2 man under Arnold, and he had been sent on this mission to the Philippines, and ended up in the Far East. He had apparently hoped to be the top man in the Pacific, but Douglas MacArthur wasn't moving over for anybody. In any event, he came back and George Kenney took his job in the Pacific. After that, Brett had a pall over his career and was sent to the Caribbean, and spent most of the remainder of the war in the Caribbean. Did you have any dealings with Brett?

P I had three interesting encounters with Brett. When Pres Roosevelt

gave me permission to organize the Flying Tigers and to employ 350 men. The first call I made and my Miami Lawyer (Paul Scott) who has since passed away - decided to go down to see General Brett, because we had permission to visit airfields, carriers, and any place where airmen could be employed by my company if they cared to volunteer, and permission to leave the service within 24 hours after hthey signed the contract with my company. Paul Scott, my lawyer, and I decided to call on Brett. This was before hthe Pentagon, and we went down to the Munitions Building where they had their offices. When I went in I told General Brett that I had permission from the White House to employ a certain number of pilots, to go to China to form an American Volunteer Group. He was indignant. He said he wasn't about to let the men that cost the U.S. Government a tremendous amount of money to train to join the crazy schemes the various people weree coming up with. He was sorry but he would not give me any letters of recommendation or introduction to any field in the U.S., and that he would not let me have the pilots. I said: "All right, I'll report back to the President and let him decide whether the President's decision has more weight than yours." And as I walked halfway down the hall, his Chief of Staff came and called me back. When I went back, evidently, he had checked with someone because he said that I was entitled to talk to some officers. He asked where did I want to go. I told him I wanted to go to a field south of Los Angeles, a pursuit field. I've forgotten the name of the field.

Q March Field?

P I've forgotten. It's right outside of Los Angeles. Riverside. I understood that Brig General was in charge of that field. I said: I'd like to go and see him." I had my own Lockheed, and I was going to take some of the men that I had employed, as employment personnel, and one of them was a former Air Force colonel who was dying with leukemia and decided to take this job and work as long as he could. He died about a

year later, but he was in charge of my recruitment program, and we flew out and saw Gen Ficken. And when I walked into Gen Fickel's office with my personnel and told him what I was about to do, he said he had no word of any kind, and that I must have lost my mind to think that he was going to let me have any fliers out of his command. We had quite an argument and he said: "You bring me something in writing." I went back to have lunch and called Gen Brett and Secretary Knox, both of whom were knowledgeable on the subject, and they told me to go back about an hour and a half later. When I went back, Fickel received me and said I could have anything I wanted. That was the first recruitment program we had but Brett had been very, very difficult. My next encounter with him he became Deputy Chief of the Pacific under Wavell. Wavell was the top man and Brett was #2. When they came through Burma I had moved my offices, first from Shanghai to Hong Kong, and from Hong Kong to Rangoon, and they were occupying rooms in the Governor's mansion. Wavell was in one group of rooms, and Brett and his staff was in another group. And I had an aircraft factory at Loy Wing, otherwise known as Pawleyville, one thousand miles north of Rangoon, where I worked 3,500 men and had a very fine factory and very fine airfield. And we were building airplanes, repairing airplanes, and doing a marvelous job. And I went in and spoke to Wavell who was a great friend of mine, and he said: "Brett wants to see you very urgently." So I went in to see Brett. This was my second encounter. Brett said: "Pawley, I understand you have an aircraft factory a thousand miles north of here." I said: "Yes, sir." He said: "I want you to move it to Rangoon immediately." I said: "General Brett, I can't move this aircraft factory to Rangoon. The war would be over before I could get it moved and I'm working every day there building and repairing aircraft, and it's beautifully located. It's not subject to bombardment as it would be down here."

Q Why did he want it moved?

P He said it would be more accessible to their needs. You understand that it would take two years to move a big aircraft factory and build all the plants. We had quite an argument about it. He said: "All right. If that's the way you want it, I'll have nothing to do with your aircraft factory." I said: "General, that's up to you." So they went on about their business and I didn't move my aircraft factory, and I continued to operate up there a year and a half after he had left there. Finally the Japs took it. They walked in and took it. When they took Burma, went up the Burma Road and then into Mandalay and into Lascio, and took our factory.

Q That's Loy Wing?

P Yes. My brother was there; I was not there. He took his .45 and blew out all the windows and we set aeverything afire that we could. We had 100 trucks and we salvaged everything that we could salvage and left there. So my next encounter with Brett, I'm on my way to Peru and he is then in charge of the Caribbean.

Q This is late in the war now?

P Yes. And he invited Mrs. Pawley and my party to stay at his quarters. And during the evening he said: "I made a tremendous mistake in both of the encounters I've had with you before. And I would like for you to leave your DC-3 here, and go down to Peru in my plane and I'm going to send my aide with you." And his name was Robbie Roberts. I went down in Brett's airplane to Peru and I got there an hour too soon, and they weren't expecting me, because my schedule was based on going in the DC-3. We had cracked up fifty of our people in Burma. And at that time we had no ammunition, no tires and tubes, no solenoids. We were in very bad shape, and this had reached George Marshall. So he sent Gen (George?) I'll think of his name in a minute--out to see whether we could continue to operate. In the mean time, I'd gone down in my Lockheed to Singapore to talk to Sir Robert Brook-Popham, the commanding general of the British in the Far East and he gave me a letter to MacArthur which I didn't need because MacArthur and I were great friends, and I left

the next day on the Clipper to the Philippines. I had employed Joe Alsop to work for Chennault and he was Chennault's secretary. aAnd he was down there, and he wanted to go. And he came to where I was having dinner with Sir Robert that night to ask me not to go and let him go over to get the supplies that we needed for the P-40's. And I said: "Joe, I'd be delighted for you to go but I can't fail to go myself, because this is my responsibility. This is a thing I organized and I've got to go over there and talk to MacArthur about it." He said: "Well, I'm kin to Mrs. Roosevelt and I've got a lot of influence, and I'd like to go" I said: "Get permission from Chennault. You work for him, and I'd be delighted for you to go. Just be at the plane in the morning." He didn't show up at the plane. I went over, and as I walked in I found Admiral Hart and Admiral Purnell (?) walking through the lobby of the hotel.

Q This was in Singapore?

P No, this was in the Philippines. So when I got there I asked them, did they have any P-40 parts, and they said: "No, but MacArthur has a lot. Have dinner with us tonight." I said: "I'll try to make a date with MacArthur." So when I called his apartment he was over having dinner with the President Quezon, and Mrs. MacArthur said: "You be at his office at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, and I'll make the date for you." So when I dined with them that night, the Admirals, they said: "What we'll do, if you get the supplies, we'll give you some PBY flying boats to take the stuff to Singapore. Because you're going to need to get it...

Q Was the war on yet?

P Not yet. This was before--just a few days--I would say two weeks. And when I walked into MacArthur's office the next morning, Brereton and Sutherland were there. Wainwright and two other officers were in the office. And Magruder, Gen Magruder had been sent out by Marshall to find out whether we ought to disband the AVG, a And Magruder had already reported that it ought to be disbanded. We had too many desertions;

we had no supplies. We were just no good. The thing was a washout. And a copy of that had gone to MacArthur. And I told him what I needed, I gave him a list this big of stuff I needed. He was walking up and down this beautiful office with all these officers sitting around. And he said: "Bill, I'm terribly sorry, I just cannot let you have any parts because I've got 250 P-40's. I've got parts but I'm going to need them. And I can't let you have them for more reasons than one." I said: "Give me just one reason." He went over the reasons this way. He said: "Here's a telegram from Brett, through the War Department, saying that your outfit's no good, and won't accomplish anything. So I can't give you anything." So after a lot of argument we walked out, and Brereton said: "Bill, come over and have dinner at my house tonight and the whole gang will be there." So I went over and had dinner, I never will forget that dinner. There was a tremendous big, round mahogany table and all the group that were in that office. We talked until 11:00 o'clock and when he heard my story he said: "We've just got a ship over. Colonel George was the supply officer, not Harold, another George.

Q There were two Harolds, one was lost in the Philippines

P That was Harold Lee George, then. He was the supply officer. He said: "Let's give him what he wants. We've got everything that he needs, three times more than we could possibly use for ours." So I went to the telephone, and called Admiral Hart, and said" "Admiral." He said: "Why in God's name did you wake me up this time of night? I go to bed at 10:00. See Purnell in the morning." I got three PBY flying boats. We loaded them that night and started out the next morning at daybreak loaded to the gills with everything that we needed. We got to Singapore and the telegram that had been sent to our Naval Attache--he was playing golf and never got it and they damn near shot us out of the air when we got in. But the commander, who was in the first ship, and I was in there, and my secretary, Bill Bailey, was in the second

ship. The third ship didn't have anybody except the crew. We landed successfully because he used his flash, and gave the signal. And when I landed and they put a rubber boat over and I went ashore, I called Sir Robert Brook-Popham, and he said: "Dammit Bill, why didn't you let us know you were coming. We almost shot you out of the air." And I said: "We did send a telegram." And he said: "Bring your officers up to dinner tonight." And he had the Naval Attache up there and he really gave him hell for playing golf, and not having the telegram processed, that could have possibly cost our lives. I took what I could in my Lockheed, and the balance he put in the tug and sent around to Rangoon. It arrived on the 6th day of December, and war broke out on the 8th. We had the material and the supplies and everything else. He lost every one of his ships on the ground, his 250 ships. And we shot down 276 airplanes, and we lost ten boys in combat, with the equipment that was given to us from the Philippine Islands.

Q You've opened several areas of interest. You talked about the Magruder Commission. That was there to take a look at the AVG, and Chennault mission. There was a man there with the Magruder commission. His name was Clagett. General Sue Clagett.

P I remember the name. Nothing else

Q He was sent back from there; he was demoted. He had a problem. Another matter that you brought up: Alsop and Chennault. Alsop used to write letters to President Roosevelt's secretary, Margaret LeHand. Chennault used to write letters directly to the President, bypassing the military chain of command. Lieutenant Alsop would put a covering letter on, address it to President Roosevelt's secretary, introducing Chennault because Roosevelt would take these letters and turn them back to the staff. They couldn't do anything to Chennault because he had Chiang Kai-shek behind him and there was great fear that Chiang Kai-shek might get out of the war. Do you have any knowledge of this correspondence that was going on?

P No, I didn't but I knew that Chennault was not in very good favor with George Marshall because Marshall had sent his close friend out there to be Deputy to Chiang Kai-shek--Stilwell. Stilwell and Chennault didn't hit it off at all. They were in terrible disagreement. Of course, I was in disagreement with Chennault about many things myself. In fact, he didn't want to leave our squadron in Rangoon, and it took a lot of doing. Actually I had to use Wavell and this fellow, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck. He fought Rommel in the desert and I spent a week with him going all through the desert with him just as a friend. But to get Churchill, to get Roosevelt, to insist that one squadron be left at Rangoon. And that squadron was left there by Chennault, 18 ships, 18 men, one doctor. He didn't give me a mechanic; he didn't give me spare parts; he didn't give me a damn thing because he was so mad with me about this. And yet the fighting took place in Rangoon. The first fight was on the 23rd, and we lost six ships badly shot up, and two men killed. And on the 25th, by the new tactics that had been instigated by the men themselves, we shot down either 26 or 28 airplanes and we didn't lose any. And after that it was murder. I mean we just knocked them out of the sky. And Chennault was up in China. We were reporting to him every day by wire what was going on but the fighting all took place in Rangoon. Had we not had those men there, the 18 ships that were in the harbor at Rangoon, with lend-lease supplies for China would not have had any protection. So, unfortunately, Chennault got all of the glory, being the military head of the AVG. He had no more to do with it than you did, really. Except that he commanded it after the men were out there. But the organizing it, and putting it together, and paying the men.

Q Was yours?

P Yes. And yet that has never been even covered.

Q Did Barbara Tuchman mention you or cover your role?

P I don't think so.

Q Have you seen her book on Stilwell?

P No. I haven't seen it.

Q Chennault took a very strong position in his dealings with his fellow American officers like Marshall and Arnold because he had Chiang Kai-shek behind him, and he was a very difficult man to deal with.

P Extremely difficult. That was the reason I didn't want him in the first place.

Q Who did you want?

P I wanted Gen Tony Frank, or I wanted Ralph Royce.

Q I talked to Mrs. Royce at Mrs. Knerr's house. Tony Frank wanted a combat command and Arnold wouldn't give him one. You mentioned Tony Frank in several communications. Do you know him well?

P Yes

Q He was a great supply man but Arnold apparently didn't think he was a combat leader. Did you hear about this? Do you have any other recollections of Arnold?

P No. I talked to him on the telephone a couple of times regarding the formation of the AVG, and of course he knew the President was behind this, and had the support. This was about 1940.

Q He was already Chief of the Air Corps, a two-star general. Another subject that intrigues me is Paul Scott.

(discussion of Paul Scott)

Q You say you built three aircraft factories in China?

P Yes. I built the first aircraft factory. I knew nothing about building aircraft factories, but I knew I could hire technical people. So I built a beautiful aircraft factory at Hang Chow where the President visited lately. And it was right near the air school that had been built by Colonel Jack Jouett. I was the one that was responsible for getting Chennault the job to replace Jack Jouett. I got Chiang Kai-shek to hire him. But three days after the war started, in '37, the Japs bombed my

plant very badly. So Chiang then ordered me to build another factory at Hankow. So, taking what we could, I came back to the States and got more machinery. We shipped it out right away. I built the second aircraft factory at Hankow, in the middle of the Japanese concession. And I got the river boat, the American river boat, to tie up at my pontoon, because we were right on the river. And I worked there for a year, building and repairing airplanes.

Q Who underwrote the building of the factory?

P The Chinese Government. I financed them and they paid me back in five years in monthly instalments, 6% interest, and permitted me to make 20% profit. That was the deal I had with them. So he called me in one day and said: "We can't keep Hankow more than three months. So I'm going to give you the sampans and material to box all the machinery, take it across the river, and then take it to the railroad. I want you to take it down to Hong Kong, put it on a ship, take it to Haiphone, then to Hanoi, and up the narrow gauge railway, and take it up to Kunming." I did all this. He gave me 50 sampans and about 10,000 coolies, and we moved this whole aircraft factory onto about 100 railroad cars, and moved it to Canton at night. We had it beautifully camouflaged with trees and limbs and things. Got it to Hong Kong. I chartered a ship. Took it to Haiphong over the railroad to Hanoi, unloaded it on trucks, and took it to the narrow gauge railway. My wife and I stayed there three months in Hanoi, trying to get the stuff shipped. They told me it wouldn't be shipped for five years. So I went back to see the Generalissimo, and he said: "All right, find a place to build it." So a chap that's living up in Alabama now, who was with Chennault as a Flying Tiger, one of the original ones. Chennault-Williamson, and McDonald. The only one living is McDonald. He is one of my greatest friends. He lives in Alabama. Comes down here quite often. And he and I started out to look for a back door to China and we found Loy Wing.

We were flying an airplane we had built actually but it had a Chinese insignia on it. We saw a British flag flying and it looked like a fort, and we gave it plenty of room because we didn't want to be shot at. We found a road and followed the road, and it went over the mountain 5,000 feet. Immediately on the other side of the mountain, almost just a drop was the little town of Bhamo, and we landed on the other side of the river. There was no place on the Bhamo side, and the whole town, 5,000 people, came out, including the three British officers that were there. They loaned us a Land Rover, and one of them went with us, and we went back over that 70 miles of dirt road to the Fort and then we crossed the river on a raft that the boys had built and had there for their own use. A very narrow river; a strong river, but narrow. And went on to the China side. We were at 2,500 feet above sea level, but the Himalayas went up 17,000 feet right behind us. It was a beautiful scene overlooking the Burma mountains, the two rivers down in front of us. You couldn't find a more gorgeous sight and the climate at 2,500 feet was just out of this world. So I said: "This is the place. We'll go back and tell Chiang that this is where we want to build our aircraft factory." So I went back and reported to him and he said: "OK, take the stuff back by truck to Hanoi, and then back to Haiphong, and charter another boat and take it around to Rangoon." So we did this, took a whole ship to take it. We got it to Rangoon and we had to unload it and put it on a river boats, sidewheelers. And the sidewheelers always had a couple of barges with them so you could carry quite a lot of stuff. And it's a ten day trip up to Bhamo. We had to build a facility--it wasn't much of a facility--to unload this machinery on to the bank from these river boats. And we moved a 100 carloads of machinery and then took it across this mountain road--dirt road--got a couple of bulldozers, fortunately, to be able to cut the sides off. And we built a bridge across the river. Every load we took in, we built a gadget to pick up gravel, and every truck that

went across, came back and picked up the gravel out of the river bed and repaired the road. So we kept repairing the road. By the time a year was past, we had a very good fairly hard surface road. We built a factory there capable of housing 3,500 men, a 100-bed hospital, Dr. Seagrave, the Burma surgeon, was our doctor. I had five other doctors and nine nurses. We built the houses for all the married people, electric lights, flush toilets, and up on stilts. Everything was screened because it was a very heavy malaria country. I didn't know it at the time we picked it. And it was so bad that the government gave us the money to buy out all of the little settlements within 25 or 30 miles, and move them away because of the blackwater fever. We built an airstrip there and put in water supply and we had an ice plant. We had a very fine factory at Loy Wing, otherwise known as Pawleyville.

Q And when the planes were completed they flew them out?

P We'd fly them out of our airstrip when we'd finished them.

Q Where did you fly them to?

P All over. I mean we'd fly to various parts of China. And a lot of cracked up airplanes were brought in there for repair. And we were about 35 miles north of the Burma Road, and about 70 miles from Lascio. That's where the Japs--they got up to Lascio when they came up to Mandalay and Lascio. Then, they dressed up in Chinese uniforms, believe it or not, and put them in Chinese trucks and they came up the road, and our boys didn't recognize them as anything but Chinese.

Q When was this?

P This was between 1939 and 1940. Because that factory I built at one end a club house building and the clubhouse building was perfectly beautiful. It was just like an airplane. It had the middle 60 foot fuselage--sixty foot wide with no posts in the middle and a 100 feet long. That was our living room, dining room, play room. That's where we had our weekly dances, and all that. And the two wings were rooms on each side. All built out of teak. Our boys built all these things, and I had a beautiful

suite of two bedrooms and a parlor for myself down at one end which later I turned over to Chennault. The British would come up there all the time for our weekend parties. And they used to tell the Viceroy, Linlithgow, in India how we were building aircraft on the China-Burma border. And I got a wire from him to come to India to discuss aircraft manufacturing. And I went over there. I arrived in Simla on July 1, 1940 and July 4, at the Viceroy's house, I signed a contract to build an aircraft factory at Bangalore, India, to work 15,000 men. And I did that and operated it for four years. They paid me the highest salary they've ever paid anybody in English history. They paid me $40,000 a month salary, free of taxes in the United States and the UK for four years. That aircraft factory was taken away from me at the end of three and a half years by a general who later went to England as Air Attaché, and was busted for smuggling stuff out of Germany, Clayton Bissell. He took the factory away from me.

Q He was 10th Air Force at the time.

P That's right. He said it had to be under his command. It was too important a unit not to be under his command. So the President of the University there, and I, had picked Bangalore because of the University because I had to train the Indians who spoke English to train the men who didn't speak English. That's how we were able to do it. That factory today, incidentally, is working 44,000 men. It's one of the finest factories in the Orient. There's nothing in Japan any better. I was then invited to build China's first fertilizer plant. And I went down to Travancore and spent a week as a guest of the Maharajah and his mother, and at the end of the week I agreed to build a $10,000,000 ammonium sulphate plant. And I built it, and that today is six times bigger than it was when I finished it--and going strong. I've had a lot of fun.

Q Arnold came through there right after the Casablanca Conference. He met with the British Air Marshal Peirse and some others, and then he went in to see Chiang Kai-shek. This was around February 1, 1943.

P I don't like Peirse because he commandeered my Lockheed. It was the prettiest airplane in the Far East. Anothert thing I don't like about him, he ran away with Offenbach's (?) wife.

Q Arnold didn't like Peirse because he didn't seem to be doing anything in a military way.

P Well, he wasn't any good, anyway.

Q In fact, Arnold had a low opinion of the British officers in India. He didn't think the British were doing much.

P Wavell was all right, and certainly, Alexander was all right. No question. But the didn't have the personnel or material to fight with.

Q Gen Rosie O'Donnell. . ?

P He was a great friend of mine. He came out when I was decorate by Chiang Kai-shek.

Q He just passed away a few months ago. He was in the C-B-I when Arnold came through and hthey had a briefing session and somebody said the British are going to try to move in Burma on May 1, 1943. Rosie O'Donnell, a colonel then, said "They're not going to move." and Gen Arnold said: "Who'e this brash young man?" And they introduced Rosie O'Donnell to him. Later, Arnold remembered and O'Donnell joined his staff. And Rosie O'Donnell was right; the British weren't going to move by May 1, 1943. So Arnold had a very bad impression of the British war effort in India. The British wanted a lot of equipment to be sent over there but they didn't seem to be doing much with it. Did you have this?

P No. I didn't get that impression because, having been in Rangoon at the time that Rangoon fell and subsequent to its fall, I realized that they didn't have anything to fight with. And they were asking for troops. Instead of shipping them to Rangoon, where they should have sent them, they sent them to Singapore which was the biggest mistake they ever made in the world. And Sir Robert Brook-Popham told me at dinner one night--

he's all through this book.

Q An Account of Mr. Pawley Signing a Contract with Soong on April 15, 1941 to Secure Volunteers for 100 P-40's" is on pp 18-19 of Sunderland & Romanus, "Stilwell's Mission to China" (Army Historical Series). We have a copy of Gen Arnold's itinerary in January 1946 in his visit to Lima, Peru. He probably had his heart attack on the 18th of January 1946 shortly before a reception at the American Embassy which was planned for that evening. The last item here is a letter from Arnold to Ambassador Pawley, January 28, 1946 thanking him and Mrs. Pawley for many kindnesses to the Arnold family during their visit. He wrote: "It will always be a source of deep regret that I was unable to do all the things planned for me in Lima, but in spite of the medicos, I did come away with a better picture of your problems and those of our missions down there, all of which I have summed up in a memorandum to Gen Eisenhower. I hope that out of all our efforts something will at long last be done which may not only further our interests in Peru, but also win back some of the prestige we seem to be so rapidly losing."

Arnold said that since his return to Miami, he had been resting and he felt very well. In fact, he said he had a 3-hour luncheon with Winston Churchill the previous day, which was January 27, 1946, and he hoped that his path would cross that of Ambassador Pawley.

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Interview with Hon William D. Pawley Miami, Fla 6 June 72

Q Today is the anniversay of D-Day We're talking about Pearl Harbor
(about 60 seconds lost)

6.01

P: I was quite familiar with the fleet's activities in that on holidays and weekends it came into Pearl Harbor. And they also knew that all of our airplanes were hangared--were wing to wing on the Hickam Field. [redacted]
Q: In revetments there?
P: Yes. In the speech that I made, I predicted that Pearl Harbor would be struck, that the Japanese would endeavor to bring in and sacrifice submarines at Pearl Harbor to block it up, and then proceed to try to destroy as much as (about 5 words missing) and I was sure that most of the airplanes would be lost on the field unless (3 words omitted) and also disperse the fleet. I found that most of the high officers, I had General Tony Frank and Jack (Rosenham) Beam and their wives for dinner that night and we discussed it at some length, and they agreed that we were not taking the necessary precautions, and that the fleet should be dispersed, and that they would have an intelligence meeting in a few days, and make the decisions. And the decision was made correctly. They came up with the same idea as to the dangers of a Japanese attack. So they actually ordered the fleet dispersed outside of Pearl Harbor, and all of the airplanes were put in revetments until General Hap Arnold and General Marshall came out for an inspection sometime during 1940.

Q: Would it have been late 1940 or perhaps 1939?

P: I really dont know.

Q: This letter from General Beam says they were briefed by General Frank's staff to include your report. There was a danger of attack.

P: That's right.

Q: Well, how did General Marshall and Arnold react to this report?

P: I've never learned from the various letters I've received from officers who were present, who have written me, that they recall my speech and my warning. None of them have stated what General Marshall's and General Arnold's feeling was.

Possibly they didnt have any. They came for information, and when they were thoroughly briefed, they went back to Washington and reported to Pres Roosevelt. I think the decision to change all of the officers, and to put the fleet back in Pearl Harbor and put all the airplanes back wing to wing was made by the President, and not by George Marshall or Hap Arnold.

Q: What you are saying or implying here: these officers - Tony Frank and some of the other officers, Herron and Richardson - were taken out of the job because they were not willing to put the fleet and the aircraft in a position of greater vulnerability?

P: That is correct.

Q: The thing that is hard for an outsider; somebody who hears this ~~who refuses~~ to believe, is that Marshall and Arnold were patriotic, dedicated and knowledgeable and would permit this to happen. Could it be that they did not believe that Pearl Harbor was subject to attack?

P: ;I dont really believe, having known General Arnold and General Marshall intimately, as great personal friends, and whom I believed to be as patriotic and as capable as any officers in our service. I don't believe that they, on their own would have moved the fleet back into Pearl Harbor and moved the airplanes into a wing to wing position, had they not received instructions to do so.

Q! If Gen Marshall or Gen Arnold reeeived instructions which in their view was inimical to our national defense, do you think that they would have done it or resigned?

P: No, I got to know Marshall so well over the years, and we became great personal friends. and We discussed many of our national problems, and I recall distinctly Marshall making a speech at ~~the VMI~~ VMI when they dedicated the arch to him. He invited Mrs. Pawley and me to accompany him and Mrs. Marshall. And I remember in that speech he was telling the young graduates that many of them would go into the services, and that one thing that they must remember as the paramount thing that they might have learned at VMI, was that no matter what doubts they personally might have from any orders given them by superiors, that they were to carry it out,

even if it called for the complete sacrifice of a squad or a company. Because those that were planning the greater strategy knew what sacrifices had to be made in the interest of the overall picture. And I turned to to Mrs. Pawley and stated: "He's talking about Chiang" I didn't say Pearl Harbor. He was told to have 800 Communists in the Kuo Min tang And he carried out that order although I'm convinced in my heart that he did not believe that to be in the best interests of the United States.

Q: This gets off into China, and I'd like to talk about China. I wonder whether Marshall and Arnold thought that Pearl Harbor would be the subject for an attack. *** This letter of July 1, 1967 from Gen Rosenham Beam to Mr. Pawley concludes that Gen Frank was relieved by Fred Martin and Gen Heron was relieved by Gen Shortt, and Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson, and all aircraft were removed from revetment and placed back on the hangar lines, and all athe naval aircraft were returned inside Pearl Harbor. and That was the status of our defenses of Hawaii on Dec 7, 1941. We have a letter from Ambassador Pawley sent from Lima , Aug 27, 1945 to Gen Arnold thanking him for a photograph which Arnold had sent him in mid-July 1945. fAmbassador Pawley invited Gen Arnold to visit them in Lima. I want to ask you about Arnold visiting in Latin America. You know he was wanting to retire to his ranch in Sonoma, Calif. and he was persuaded, or perhaps volunteered to make this good will mission, Because he strongly believed that Brazil especially was a sort of balance wheel against Peron in Argentina. And of course he was on opposite sides with Spruille Braden. Arnold had this belief that we should send some of these surplus planes to the Latin American countries and he was a leader in doing that. Do you recall any conversations or exchanges with Arnold on the subject?

P Yes. No question. One of the first things that I wrote after arriving in Peru and becoming acquainted with my responsibilities was on the subject of

military aid to Latin American countries. I wrote a memorandum and I don't know whether Gen Arnold got a copy of it or not, but I would assume that he would have known about it, because it dealt with airplanes as well as other military supplies. And I wrote this: that I'd been in Latin America long enough, having gone to Cuba when I was four years old, and having lived in and out of Latin America a good part of my life, that I felt that thesstrongest ties that existed between the Latin American countries and the U S, were members of the military missions: The air missions, the marines, the navy, and that part of the army that participated, and that I felt that we should continue to supply at very reasonable prices, the naval equipment, the air equipment and the ground equipment that they needed for a respectable but small military establishment in each country. That no matter what size the country was, how small, they would have a military establishment, and cover all of the services. And therefore, if we didn't supply it, other countries not friendly to us would supply the material. Because they were going to get it. And that I felt that in supplying the material, we also supplied the missions, and the missions, headed sometimes by major generals and admirals, two-star admirals, and the fact that the Latin Americans were brought to the United States to go to our military schools, had created a feeling of comradeship and mutual defense of such strength that in my opinion it was far more valuable than all of the twenty Ambassadors' influences put together. ~~And that~~ For that reason I advocated that we continue to supply particularly aircraft but also all of the other material they needed.

Q ~~What~~ When did you take the job as Ambassador to Lima?

P Mr. Truman sent me down there in 1945. But I was sent for a specific purpose. ~~22~~ Twenty two years earlier they had borrowed a ~~hundred million~~ $100 million ~~dollars and fifty~~ and $50 million ~~dollars~~ had accumulated in interest. Not a dime had ever been paid. And Truman wanted to help Peru, having come in first. And he sent me down to see if I could service the debt and I was fortunate

in being able to do it.

Q He sent you down shortly after he took office?

P Very shortly after. ~~Truman wanted me --I mean~~ Roosevelt wanted me to go as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and I turned him down on that, because I told him I knew nothing about Czechoslovakia. But it brings out an interesting point, because it was in the latter part of his life and ~~he~~ Roosevelt was very sick, the day that we talked. And I said "I know nothing about Czechoslovakia; I know very little about Europe or the history; I known nothing about the language. But in Asia or Latin America I do a pretty good job." He said: "Bill, that isn't the reason I want you, I now feel I've got to send somebody that'll stand up to the Russians." This is the report that was sent to Hap Arnold by the Chief of Mission in Peru.

Q: This report of 23 Jan 1946, Memorandum for General Arnold, subject: "U.S. Ground Military Mission in Peru." It mentions Arnold's request of the 21st of January 1946, ~~memo~~ for a memorandum. The authority for this mission was a contract between the U.S. and Peru, signed July 10, 1944, for four years. It refers to military staff conversations held at Lima, Peru, between March 19, and April 6, 1945. This memo was sent a few days after he had his heart attack?

P: Right.

Q: Arnold strongly believed, I think, for two reasons that we should cement relationships with certain non-communist countries in Latin America, especially Brazil. Of course, Brazil had done us a great favor, providing facilities for bases, Recife, Belem, etc, along the eastern coast for our aircraft. Another reason for sending these planes to Latin America was to get rid of surplus planes. After World War I there was a traumatic experience in the military. All these DH-4s which had been produced after the Armistice were kept in the inventory military. They were required to fly these planes for 10 years after the war ended. So Arnold had conversations with his staff. They were worried they would be stuck these planes for long after. To fulfill this concept of improving our relationship with Latin America, and to get rid of these surplus planes, Arnold did this. Spruille Braden was opposed to this, and other people opposed it, fearing the Latin American

countries would make war on one another with armaments they got from U.S. Do you remember him making this argument? How did you knock it down?

P: Oh, of course. I opposed Spruille Braden very strongly in this. Spruille Braden was aiming against Peron at the time, and not permitting Eisenhower or Arnold or Halsey, or any of these men who visited Peru and Brazil - we had them in our Embassy - he would not permit them to go to the Argentines, which in my judgment was a big mistake. A man would come to Brazil and would have to go all the way back to Panama, and go down the other coast because Spruille Braden would not let them even fly across Argentine.

Q: Why?

P: Because he felt that would be giving Peron prestige to have high American military officials to be passing through Argentine. General Marshall never expressed an opinion on this subject to me, but I know, certainly, Eisenhower, who spent four or five days with us at the Embassy, felt very strongly about it, and pulled no punches in his opposition to Braden's point of view. Neither did Halsey who spent almost ten days with us. And, certainly, neither did Hap Arnold. He felt that Spruille Braden was completely wrong, not only in his opposition to going to Argentine, but not supplying the military equipment that was needed by these countries which ~~had and~~ were going to have, and would continue to have, as long as there is a Latin America, they were going to have a militaryestablishment. If they dont get the military equipment from us, they are going to get it from Russia, as Cuba is getting it now, as Peru will probably get it, and, now, Chile will probably get it.

Q: In January 1946 when the war was over, was there this feeling that, if we didnt supply the Latin American countries, Russia would? Was that already defined?

P: That was sufficiently defined by those of those who were familiar with the Communist problem. There were plenty of people in the U.S. in high government jobs who had no concept of this problem.

Q Was there any feeling that these small countries would war against one another? There was the Chaco War that went on for years between

Bolivia and Paraguay. And there were several other local wars going on. Was there any fear?-

P Not important ones.

Q Was there any fear on a the part a of Braden and other State Dept types that they would use these planes to bomb one another?

P That's what Braden stated. But unfortunately the documents that will appear in my book that deal with the Braden problem ; he was completely, at that point, cooperating with the —unknowingly—with the Communist conspiracy.

Q Arnold came to Lima sometime around January 15th of 1946 . How long was he there before he had his heart attack?

P Several days

Q Did you have any conversations with him before? And you talked about the need to supply

P Yes. This was the paramount thing that I wanted to discuss with him

Q And did he mention the trouble he was having with Braden?

P Yes

Q So you shared this common problem ?

P Yes and I express it in the book that I'm going to write.

Q Of course he was using his great prestige as one of the 5-star generals to carry this policy forward of military aid?

P That's right. In that respect, I would call Braden on the telephone and beg him to cease campaigning against Peron on the theory that he was electing Peron because Peron put out a pamphlet with Braden's picture on it and his picture on it and said: "Either vote for the Yankee or vote for me". And nothing could, in my opinion, help Peron more than what Braden was doing. And, as I learned later , that was what was intended by those who were directing Braden's activities.

Q You felt that Braden's policy of trying to isolate Peron from the rest of Latin Americanand the world would only strengthen his position?

P: And it did. And caused us great trouble And it took a lot of doing for us to strengthen things out with Peron, in order for him to participate in the Rio Conference.

Q: Then Arnold was one of three or possibly more officers with great stature who were sent on these political missions. You mentioned Eisenhower.

P: They were not permitted to go to Argentina.

Q: But during the same period Halsey and Eisenhower....

P: Same period exactly, During '45, '46, and '47.

Q: The fact that Arnold had to go back right in the middle of his tour He had a whole itinerary planned. He had several other countries on his itinerary. He was unable to make any of them

P: That is right. That was very tragic because, with his great prestige and being so knowledgeable on this whole subject, he would have helped us tremendously.

Q: He was strong for having the Brazilians participate in World War II They did. One squadron of Brazilian Air Force went over to Italy and fought in the Mediterranean Theater.

P: 40,000 Brazilians were the ones that fought under Mark Clark and the immediate general overt them was Crittenberger, and Gen Crittenberger is the only man that's ever been presented with the Brazilian Sword, which is the greatest honor than can be given an American military man. And Crittenberger was down there as our guest at the Embassy, and he also felt very strongly on this subject that we are talking about, and there were several others that felt equally strongly about this subject. But

Q: This is a continuation of the memorandum of January 23, 1946 from Brig Gen Robert W. Strong, Chief of Mission in Lima, Peru, addressed to Gen Arnold. In his estimate of the present situation, he said that "we can easily lose the trust of the Peruvian people," unless we do something promptly to keep faith with them. Peru wants some tangible proof that we mean business in talking about inter-American security. She has shown

respectful patience but that patience may easily wear thin. Foreign (European) governments are busy right now in Peru to the prejudice of our country. A representative of the British ~~Vegas~~ Vickers arms company is now in Peru. French influence is trying hard to come back. Various Russian delegations have recently been in Peru. All know about the Security Plan, and that Peru expects and needs badly to reequip her army. A few days ago, the Peruvian War Minister, in a periodic conference on current matters suddenly asked me: "My friend, do you think the United States is really going to let us ever get any equipment or not? If so when? I've got to know."

Gen Strong continues his memo to Gen Arnold, saying that it is the right and duty of every sovereign state to protect its sovereignty and maintain internal order. To this end he said that Peru would maintain an armed force and the attitude of that force and what objectives it would work towards were matters which General Strong's mission could do much to influence in a positive way towards the USA. He concluded: "If Peru is to get no equipment from the US, Peru needs no mission here, and they know it." He recommended that the US start moving promptly to Peru the first increment of equipment, including materiel for a light infantry division."

~~That is the end of this item.~~

This is a letter from Spruille Braden to the Acting Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, dated Jan 9, 1946. He refers to Royall's letter of Jan 6, 1946 to Dear ~~Mr.~~ Acheson, concerning the furnishing of military aircraft to other American republics. He said he had the pleasure of discussing the so-called adjusted interim Latin American aircraft requirements program with Gen Arnold and Maj Gen Walsh the day before. At this meeting, Spruille Braden said it was agreed that the State Department approved the interim program subject to understandings that: 1) no airplanes would be made available at the present time to Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Paraguay; 2) The furnishing of airplanes to the other 13 American republics would be subject the concurrence with respect to each

9.22

country of the American Ambassador concerned and to the desires of each country should it not wish to receive the full number approved by the American ambassador for that country.

Spruille Braden said that Arnold had agreed that "any implied commitment" with regard to military airplanes resulting from the staff conversations will have to be discharged by furnishing the aircraft comprising the adjusted interim program, And that the United States is under no further obligation with respect to supplying additional military airplanes.

Mr. Braden also stated that General Arnold agreed that a decision concerning supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and the other American republics. In other words,

the military aircraft supply would be made subject to these Latin American countries coming around on policy matters.

P: That's the point. I was involved in those conversations and objected very strenuously to Braden's restrictions, and pointed out that not only was Russia but also France and England involved in trying to get equipment into Latin America. But I was fearful that the one that would be successful in it would be the Russians. And for that reason, I felt that Spruille Braden's objections and restrictions were going to work to our detriment. And I believe history has proven that to be so.

Q: Was he trying to use the aircrafts supply as a club to get them to make concessions to us in other policy matters?

P: I don't know that. I didn't work close enough with Braden.

Q: I'm interested in this last paragraph where he says that Arnold agreed that a decision concerning the supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and other American republics. I just

wonder if this was sort of a club?

P It could be and I don't know what he means by "collaboration" because as far as I was concerned, up to that point, we had complete collaboration from every country in Latin America and Central America with the exception of Argentina, and we didn't have that because Spruille Braden had destroyed it, the relationship that did exist, and could have been rebuilt. And when I had finished the job that the President gave me in Peru, he offered me my choice between going to Argentina or Brazil as Ambassador. I immediately selected Argentina and told the President in the presence of George Marshall who was at the White House that I was taking it because I wanted to undo some of the damage that I felt Spruille Braden had done. But, unfortunately Spruille then returned to the United States as Assistant Secretary of State, and he persuaded the President to let him send George Messersmith from Mexico to the Argentine and to send me to Brazil. And that was the reason the change of the appointment that had been offered me both by the President and the Secretary of State.

Q: This is a letter from Ambassador William Pawley to General Arnold from Lima, Peru, dated February 1, 1946. Gen Arnold had suffered a heart attack a couple of weeks before and was taken back to Miami to recover. The letter from Ambassador Pawley says: "I am writing to you in Miami in the hope that you have stopped off there for some well-deserved rest. Your visit to Peru accompanied by Mrs. Arnold and your daughter was appreciated here in Peru, and I am sure that it would be difficult to measure the good that was produced by the trip. It has been greatly regretted that your health did not permit you to participate in all the program that had been planned. However, all the principal part was accomplished which was an opportunity for the President, the Ministers of Air, War, and Navy plus a large group of Air Force officers to meet and talk with you on subjects of mutual interest.

"I hope that your plans will enable you to remain in Miami long enough to give you the rest that will put you back in excellent condition.

" Please give my very best wishes to Mrs. Arnold and Mrs. Snowden."

P: His heart attack shortly before a reception in his, and his wife's, and daughter's honor at the Embassy. And Mrs. Arnold and the daughter came in spite of the attack and stayed just abvery brief time, and then joined the General. They were all three flown back to Miami the next day.

Q: Had he exerted himself or was it just the high altitude?

P: Lima is at sea level I think that probably he was tremendously interested in what was going there and the subject matter of the discussion, the supplying of military equipment to Latin American countries, was uppermost in his mind, as it was in mine. And I think that he was probably stricken by, I don't know, overexertion, physically, may not be necessary, you can overexert yourself mentally.

Q He had a severe heart attack and was hors de combat for two and a half months in January 1945. Then he was on a half schedule for some months, so he had this tendency. Whatever it was, this just about finished him. He retired shortly after that.

Q: This is a penciled note concerning Gen Arnold's heart attack in Lima, Peru, The note reads: "Gen Arnold's condition has improved greatly at this time. He has been suffering with an irregularity of the pulse, but his condition is much improved for this reason he is returning to the United States for rest and further treatment."

Further physical and mental strain are not advisable. For

This is a memorandum for Ambassador Pawley, 14 January 1946, from Maj J. R. Reist, Acting Military Attache: It discusses the arrival of General Arnold and his party, including Mr. Arnold, Mrs. Ernest Snowden, Col. Lawrence Peterson (pilot), Maj Murray Sargent, Maj Thomas Sheffield, and Master Sgt Marion Pettie. They were expected to arrive at Limatambo Airport at 1640 hours on 16 January 1946. A report from Caribbean Defense Command Hq that Col J. B. Brown had joined the Party at Panama. Was he a Doctor? J. B. Brown?

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P: (Didnt know)

Q: George Brett came back from the Pacific around July 1942. He and Douglas MacArthur had a falling out. He was the senior air officer there. Prior to that time he was #2 man under Arnold, and he had been sent on this mission to the Philippines, and ended up in the Far East. He had apparently hoped to be the top man in the Pacific, but Douglas MacArthur was nt moving over for anybody. In any event, he came back and George Kenney took his job in the Pacific. After that, Brett had a pall over his career and was sent to the Caribbean, and spent most of the remainder of the war in the Caribbean. Did you have any dealings with Brett?

P: I had three interesting encounters with Brett. When Pres Roosevelt gave me permission to organize the Flying Tigers and to employ 350 men. The first call I made and my Miami Lawyer (Paul Scott) who has since passed away - decided to go down to see General Brett, because we had permission to visit airfields, carriers, and anyplace where airmen coujld be employed by my company, if they cared to volunteer, and permission to leave the service within 24 hours after they signed the contract with my company. Paul Scott, my lawyer, and I decided to call on Brett. This was before the Pentagon, and we went down to the Munitions Building where they had their offices. When I went in I told General Brett that I had permission from the White House to employ a certain number of pilots, to go to China to form an American Volunteer Group. He was indignant. He said he wasnt about to let the men that cost the U.S. Government a tremendous amount of money to train to join the crazy schemes the various people were coming up with. He was ~~would decide that~~ sorry but he would not give me any letters of recommendation or introduction to any field in the U.S., and that he would not let me have the pilots. I said: "All right, I'll report back to the President and let him decide whether the Presidzent's decision has more weight than yours." And as I walked halfway down the hall, his Chief of Staff came and called me back. When I went back, evidently, he had checked with someone, because he said that I was entitled to talk to some officers. He asked where did I want to go. I told him I wanted to go to a field south of Los Angeles, a pursuit field. I've forgotten the name of the field.

Q: March Field?

P: I've forgotten. It's right outside of Los Angeles. Riverside. I understood that a Brig General was in charge of that field, I said, "I'd like to go and see him." I had my own Lockheed, and I was going to take some of the men that I had employed, as employment personnel, and one of them was a former Air Force colonel who was dying with leukemia and decided to take this job and work as long as he could. He died about a year later, but he was in charge of my recruitment program, and we flew out and saw Gen Fickel. And when I walked into Gen Fickel's office with my personnel and told him what I was about to do, he ~~He~~ said he had no word of any kind, and that I must have lost my mind to think that he was goingt to let me have any fliers out of his command. We had quite an argument and he said, "you bring me something in writing." I went back to have lunch and called Gen Brett and Secretary Knox, both of whom were knowledgeable on the subject, and they told me to go back about an hour and a half later. When I went back, ~~and~~ Fickel received me and said I could have anything I wanted. That was the first recruitment program we had but Brett had been very very difficult. My next encounter with him he became Deputy Chief of the Pacific under Wavell. Wavell was the top man and Brett was #2. When they came through Burma I had moved my offices, first from Shanghai to Hong Kong, and from Hong Kong to Rangoon, and they were occupying rooms in the Governor's mansion. Wavell was in one group of rooms, and Brett and his staff was in another group. And I had an aircraft factory at Loiwing otherwise known as Pawleyville, one thousand miles north of Rangoon, where I worked 3,500 men and had a very fine factory and very fine airfield. And we were building airplanes, repairing airplanes, and doing a marvelous job. And I went in and spoke to Wavell who was a great friend of mine, and he said, "Brett wants to see you very urgently." So I went in to see Brett. This was my second encounter. Brett said: "Pawley, I understand you have an aircraft factory a thousand miles north of here." I said "Yes sir." He said "I want you to move it to Rangoon immediately." I said "General Brett, I can't move this aircraft factory to Rangoon. The war would be over before I could get it moved and I'm

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working every

working every day there building and repairing aircraft, and it's beautifully located. It's not subject to bombardment as it would be down here."

Q Why did he want it moved?

P He said it would be more accessible to their needs. You understand that it would take two years to move a big aircraft factory and bring all the plants, and we had quite an argument about it. He said "All right. If that's the way you want it, I'll have nothing to do with your aircraft factory." I said, "General, that's up to you." So they went on about their business and I didn't move my aircraft factory, and I continued to operate up there a year and a half after he had left there. Finally the Japs took it. They walked in and took it. When they took Burma went up the Burma Road and then into Mandalay and into Lashio, and took our factory.

Q That's Loy Wing?

P Yes. My brother was there; I was not there. He took his .45 and blew out out all the windows and we set everything afire that we could. We had 100 trucks and we salvaged everything that we could salvage and left there.

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So my next encounter with Brett, I'm onmmy way to Peru and he is then in charge of the Caribbean

Q: This is late in the war now?

P: Yes And he invited Mrs. Pawley and my party to stay at his quarters. And during the evening he said "I made a tremendous mistake in both of the encounters I've had with you before. And I would like for you to leave your DC-3 here, and go down to Peru in my plane and I'm going to send my aide with you." And his name was Robbie Roberts, and I went down in Brett's airplane to Peru and I got there an hour too soon, and theywweren't expecting me, because my schedule was based on going in the DC-3. We had cracked up fifty of our people in Burma. And at that time we had no ammunition, no tires and tubes, no solenoids, We were in very bad shape, and this had reached George Marshall, and he sent Gen (George)? I'll think of his name in a minute--out to see whether we could continue to operate,

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In the mean time, I'd gone down in my Lockheed to Singapore to talk to Sir Robert Brook-Popham, the commanding general of the British in the Far East and he gave me a letter to MacArthur which I didn't need because MacArthur and I were great friends, and I left the next day on the Clipper to the Philippines. I had employed Joe Alsop to work for Chennault and he was Chennault's secretary. And he was down there, and he wanted to go. And he came to where I was having dinner with Sir Robert that night to ask me not to go and let him go over to get the supplies that we needed for the P-40's. And I said "Joe, I'd be delighted for you to go but I can't fail to go myself, because this is my responsibility, a thing I organized and I've got to go over there and talk to MacArthur about it." He said: "Well, I'm ~~attending~~ to Mrs. Roosevelt and I've got a lot of influence, and I'd like to go" I said "Get permission from Chennault. You work for him, and I'd be delighted for you to go. Just be at the plane in the morning." He didn't show up at the plane. I went over, and as I walked in I found Admiral Hart and Admiral Purnell (?) walking through the lobby of the hotel. ~~And~~

Q This was in Singapore?

P No this was in the Philippines. So when I got there I asked them, did they have any P-40 ~~supplies~~ parts, and they said "No, but MacArthur has a lot" Have dinner with us tonight" I said "I'll try to make a date with MacArthur." So when I called his apartment he was over having dinner with the President Quezon, and Mrs. ——> MacArthur said: "You be at his office at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, and I'll make the date for you." So when I dined with them that night, the Admirals, they said, "What we'll do if you get the supplies, we'll give you some PBY flying boats to take the stuff to Singapore. Because youre going to need to get it--

Q Was the war on yet?

P Not yet. This was before--just a few days--I would say two weeks. Andwwhen I walked into MacArthur's office the next morning, ~~what did~~

get

~~you say his name is, the General? Brett~~ Brereton were there. ~~who~~ and Sutherland, ~~knows Col Wright, he was his Chief of Staff~~

Q ~~You're thinking of Brereton Louis Brereton~~

~~Brereton was~~ there ~~and Sutherland~~, ~~he would like~~ a copy of ~~this, and~~ Wainwright and two other officers were in the office. And Magruder, Gen Magruder had been sent out by Marshall to find out whether we ought to disband the AVG. And Magruder had already reported that it ought to be disbanded. We had too many desertions; we had no supplies. We were just no good. The thing was a washout. And a copy of that had gone to MacArthur. And I told him what I needed, I gave him a list this big of stuff I needed, he was walking up and down this beautiful office with all these officers sitting around. And he said "Bill, I'm terribly sorry, I just cannot let you have any parts because I've got 250 P-40's, I've got parts but I'm going to need them. And I can't let you have them for more reasons than one." I said "Give me just one reason" However over the reasons this way. ~~and~~ He said "Here's a telegram from Brett, through the War Department, saying that your outfit's no good, and won't accomplish anything. So I can't give you anything." So after a lot of argument we walked out, and Brereton said "Bill come overaand have dinner at my house tonight and the whole gang will be there." So I went over and had dinner, I never will forget that dinner. There was a tremendous big, round mahogany table and all the group that were in that office. We talked until 11;00 oclock and when he heard my story he said "We've just got a ship over. Colonel George was the supply officer, not Harold, another George.

Q There were two Harolds, one was lost in the Philippines

P That was Harold Lee George, then. He was the supply officer He said "Let's give him what he wants. We've got everything that he needs, three times more than we could possibly use for ours." So I went to the telephone, and called Admiral Hart, and said "Admiral." He said "Why in God's name did you wake me up this time of night?

[redacted] go to bed at 10:00 See Purnell in the morning. I got three PBY flying boats. We loaded them that night and started out the next morning at daybreak loaded to the gills with everything that we needed. We got to Singapore and the telegram that had been sent to our Naval Attache --he was playing golf and never got it and they damn near shot us out of the air when we got in. But the commander, who was in the first ship, and I was in there, and my secretary, Bill Bailey, was in the second ship. The third ship didn't have anybody except the crew. We landed successfully because he used his flash, and gave the signal. And when I landed and they put a rubber boat over and I went ashore, I called Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, and he said, "Dammit Bill, why didn't you let us know you were coming. We Almost shot you out of the air" And I said, "We did send a telegram." And he said, "Bring your officers up to dinner tonight" And he had the Naval Attache up there and he really gave him hell for playing golf, and not having the telegram processed, that would have possibly cost our lives. I took whatII could in my Lockheed, and the balance he put in the tug and sent around to Rangoon. It arrived on the 6th day of December, and War broke out on the 8th. ~~And~~ We had the material and the supplies ~~ships~~ and everything else. He lost everyone of his ships on the ground, His 250 ships. And we shot down 276 airplanes, and we lost ten boys in combat, With the equipment that was given to us from the Philippine Islands. ~~Isn't that a interesting~~

Q You've opened several areas of interest. You talked about the Magruder Commission. That was there to take a look at the AVG, and Chennault mission There was a man there with the Magruder commision. His name was Claggett. General Sue Claggett.

P I remember the name. Nothing else.

Q He was sent back from there; he was demoted. He had a problem. Another matter that you brought up: Alsop and Chennault. Alsop used to write letters to President Roosevelt's Secretary Margaret LeHand. Chennault

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used to write letters directly to the President, bypassing the military chain of command. Lieutenant Alsop would put a covering letter on, address it to President Roosevelt's secretary, introducing Chennault. because Roosevelt would take these letters and turn them back to the staff. They couldn't do anything oto Chennault because he had Chiang Kai-Shek behind him and there was great fear that Chiang Kai-Shek might get out of the war. Do you have any knowledge of this correspondence that was going on?

P: No, I didn't but I knew that Chennault was not in very good favor with George Marshall because Marshall had sent his close friend out there oto be Deputy to Chiang Kai-Shek--Stilwell. Stilwell and Chennault didn't hit it off at all. They were in terrible disagreement. Of course, I was in disagreement with Chennault about many things myself. In fact he didn't want to leave our squadron in Rangoon, and it took a lot of doing. Actually I had to use Wavell and this fellow Claude Auchinleck, Field Marshal. He fought Rommell in the desert and I spent a week with him going all atthrough the desert with him just as a friend. But to get Churchill, to get Roosevelt, to insist that one squadron be left at Rangoon. And that squadron was left there by Chennault, 18 ships, 18 men, one doctor. He didn't give me a mechanic; he didn't give me spare parts for a damn thing because he was so mad with me about this. And yet the fighting took place in Rangoon. The first fight was on the 23d, and we lost six ships badly shot up, and two men killed. And on the 25th, by the new tactics that hadbbeen instigated by the men themselves, we shot down either 26 or 28 airplanes and we didn't lose any. And after that it was murder. I mean we just lknocked them out of the sky. And Chennault was up in China. We were reporting to him every day by wire whatwwas going on but the fighting all took place in Rangoon. Had we not had those men there, the 18 ships that were in the harbor at Rangoon, with lend-lease supplies for China, would not have had any protection. So, unfortunately, Chennault got all of the glory,

being the military head of the AVG. He had no more to do with it than you did, really. Except that he commanded it after the men out there. But the organizing it , and putting it together, and paying the men,

Q Was yours?

P Yes. And yet that has never beeneeven covered.

Q Did Barbara Tuchman mention your role cover your role

P I don't think so

Q Have you seen her book on Stilwell?

P No. I haven't seen it.

Q Chennault took a very strong position in his dealings with his fellow American officers like Marshall and Arnold because he had Chiang Kai-Shek behind him, and he was a very difficult man to deal with.

P Extremely difficult. That was the reason I didn't want him in the first place.

Q Who did you want?

P I wanted Gen Tony Frank, or I wanted Ralph Royce.

I talked to Mrs Royce at Mrs Knerr's house.

Q Tony Frank wanted a combat command and Arnold wouldn't give him one. You mentioned Tony Frank in several communications. Do you know him well?

P: Yes

Q: He was a great supply man but Arnold apparently didn't think he was a combat leader. Did you hear about this? Do you have any other recollections of Arnold?

P No I talked to him on the telephone a couple of times regarding the formation of the AVG, and ofcourse he knew the President was behind this, and had the support. This was about 1940.

Q He was already Chief of the Air Corps, a two-star general. Another subject that intrigues me is Paul Scott. You say you built three aircraft factories ~~carriers in China~~ factories in China?

(discussion of Paul Scott)

Q:

P Yes. I built the first aircraft factory. I knew nothing about building

aircraft factories, but I knew I could hire technical people. So I built a beautiful aircraft factory at Hang Chow where the President visited lately. And it was right near the air school that had been built by Jack Jouett, Colonel I was the one that was responsible for getting Chennault the job to replace Jack Jouett. I got Chiang Kai-Shek to hire him. But, ~~two~~ three days after the war started, ~~2~~ in '37, the Japs bombed my plant very badly. So Chang then ordered me to build another factory at Han Kow So, taking what we could, ~~and~~ I came back to the States and got more machinery, ~~and~~ we shipped it out right away, ~~and~~ I built the second aircraft factory at Han Kow, In the middle of the Japanese concession. And I got the river boat, the American river boat, to tie up at my pontoon, because we were right on the river. And I worked there for a year, building and repairing airplanes.

Q Who underwrote the building of the factory?

P The Chinese Government. I financed them and they paid me back in five ~~years~~ in monthly instalments, 6% interest, and permitted me to make 20% profit. That was the deal I had with them. So he called me in one day and said, "We can't keep Han Kow more than three months. So I'm going to give you the sampans and material ~~to~~ to box all the machinery, take it across the river, and then take it to the railroad ~~and~~ I want you to take it down to Hong Kong, put it on a ship, take it to Haiphong, then to Hanoi, and up the narrow gauge railway, and take it up to Kunming." I did all this. He gave me 50 sampans and about 10,000 coolies, and we moved this whole aircraft factory onto about 100 railroad cars, and moved it to Canton at night. We had it beautifully camouflage with trees and limbs and things. Got it to Hong Kong. I chartered a ship. Took it to Haiphong over the railroad to Hanoi, unloaded it on trucks, and took it to the narrow gauge railway. My wife and I stayed there three months in Hanoi, trying to get the stuff shipped. They told me it wouldn't be shipped for five years. So I went back to see the Generalissimo, and he said, "All right, find a place

to build it." So a chap that's living up in Alabama now, who was with Chennault as a Flying Trapeze, one of the original ones. Chennault-Williamson, and McDonald. The only one living is McDonald. He is one of my greatest friends. He lives in Alabama. Comes down here quite often And he and I started out to look for a back door to China and we found Loy Wiig.
(2nd Tape)

We were flying an airplane we had built actually but it had a Chinese insignia on it, ~~and~~ we saw a British flag flying and it looked like a fort, ~~and~~ we gave it plenty of room because we didn't want to be shot at. ~~and~~ we found a road and followed the road, and it went over ~~x~~ the mountain 5,000 feet, ~~and~~ Immediately on the other side of the mountain, almost ~~as~~ just a drop was the little town of Bhamo, and we landed on the other side of the river. There was no place on the Bhamo side, and the whole town, 5,000 people, came out, including the three British officers that were there, ~~and~~ They loaned us a Land Rover, and one of them went with us, and we went back over that 70 miles of dirt road to the fort and then we crossed the river on a raft that the boys had built and had there for their own use. A very narrow river, a strong river, but narrow. And went on to the China side. We were at 2,500 feet above sea level, but the Himalayas went up 17,000 feet right behind us. It was abbeautiful scene overlooking the Burma mountains the two rivers down in front of us. You couldn't find a more gorgeous sight and the climate ~~of~~ at 2,500 feet was just out of this world. So I said, "this is the place. We'll go back and tell Chang that this is where we want to build our aircraft factory." So I went back and reported to him and he said, "OK take the stuff back by truck to Hanoi, and then back to Haiphong, and charter another boat and take it around to Rangoon." So we did this, took a whole ship to take it. We got it to Rangoon and we had to unload it and put it on a river boats, sidewheelers. And the sidewheelers always had a couple of barges with them so you could carry quite a lot of stuff. And it's a ten

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day trip up to ~~Burma~~ Burmas. We had to build a facility--it wasn't much of a facility--to unload this machinery on to the bank from these river boats. And we moved a 100 carloads of machinery and then took it across this mountain road--dirt road--got a couple of bulldozers, fortunately, to be able to cut the sides off. And we built a bridge across the river, ~~and~~ & every load we took in, we built a gadget to pick up gravel, and every truck that went across, came back and picked up the gravel out of the river bed and repaired the road. So we kept repairing hthe road. By the time a year was past, we had a very good road, fairly hard surface. We built a factory there capable of housing 3500 men , a 100-bed hospital, Dr. Seagrave, the Burma surgeon, was our doctor, ~~and~~ I had five other doctors and nine nurses. We built the houses for all the married people, electric lights, flush toilets, and up on stilts. ~~and~~ & everything was screened because it was a very heavy malaria country. I didn't know it at the time we picked it. And it was so bad that the government gave us the money to buy out all of the little settlements within 25 or 30 miles, and move them away because of the blackwater fever. We built an airstrip there and put in water supply and we had an ice plant. We had a very fine factory, at Loy ~~Wen~~ Wings otherwise known as Pawleyville.

Q And when the planes were completed they flew them out?

P We'd fly them out of our airstrip when we'd finished them.

Q Where did you fly them to?

P All over I mean we'd fly to various parts of China. And a lot of cracked up airplanes were brought in there for repair. And we were about 35 miles north of the Burma Road, and about 70 miles from Lascio. That's where the Japs--they ~~came~~ got up to Lascio when they came up to Mandalay and Lascio. Then, they dressed up in Chinese uniforms , believe it or not, and put them in Chinese trucks and they came up the road, and our boys didn't recognize them as anything but Chinese.

Q: When was this?

P This was between 1939 and 1940. Because that factory I built at one end a clubhouse building and the bclubhouse building was perfectly beautiful. It was just like an airplane. It had the middle 60 foot fuselage — Sixty foot wide with no posts in the middle and a 100 feet long, and that was our living room, dining room, play room. That's where we had our weekly dances, and all that. And the two wings were rooms on each side. All built out of teak. Our boys built all these things, and I had a beautiful suite of two bedrooms and a parlor for myself down at one end which later I turned over to Chennault. The British would come up there all the time for our weekend parties. And they used to tell the Viceroy, Linlithgow, in India how we were building aircraft on the China-Burma border. And I got a wire from him to come to India to discuss aircraft manufacturing. And I went over there, on I arrived on July 1, 1940, in Simla and July 4, at the Viceroy's house, I signed a contract to build an aircraft factory at Bangalore, India, to work 15,000 men. And I did that and operated it for four years. They paid me the highest salary they've ever paid anybody in English history. They paid me $40,000 a month salary, free of taxes in the United States and the UK for four years. That aircraft factory was taken away from me at the end of three and a half years by a general who later went to England as Air Attache, and was busted for smuggling stuff out of Germany, ~~into~~ Clayton Bissell. ~~John Bissell~~ He took the factory away from me.

Q: He was 10th Air Force at the time. He said it had to be under his command.

P: That's right. It was too important a unit not to be under his command. So the President of the University there, and I, had picked Bangalore because of the University because I had to train the Indians who spoke English to train the men who didn't speak English. That's how we were able to do it. That factory today, incidentally, is working 44,000 men. It's one of the finest factories in the Orient. There's nothing in Japan any better. I was then invited to build China's first fertilizer plant. And I went down to Travancore and spent a

week as a guest of the Maharajah and his mother, and at the end of the week I agreed to build a $10,000,000 ammonium sulphate plant. And I built it, and that today is six times bigger than it was when I finished it--and going strong. I've had a lot of fun.

Q ~~Let me ask you.~~ Arnold came through there right after the Casablanca Conference. He met with the British, Air Marshal ~~Pierce~~ Peirse and some others, and then he went in to see Chiang Kai-Shek This was around February 1, 1943.

P I don't like ~~Pierse~~ Peirse because he commandeered my Lockheed. It was the prettiest airplane in the Far East. ~~And a~~ Another thing I don't like about him, he ran away with Offenbach's (?) wife.

Q Arnold didn't like ~~him~~ Peirse because he didn't seem to be doing anything in a military way.

P Well he wasn't any good, anyway.

Q In fact Arnold had a low opinion of the British officers in India. He didn't think the British were doing much.

P ~~Raeburn~~ Wavell was all right, and certainly, Alexander was all right. No question, But they didn't have the personnel or material to fight with.

Q Gen Rosie O'Donnell,...?

P He was a great friend of mine. He came out when I was decorated by Chiang Kai-Shek.

Q He just passed away, a few months ago. He was in the C-B-I ~~and~~ when Arnold came through, and they had a briefing session and somebody said the British are going to try to move in Burma on May 1, 1943, ~~and~~ Rosie O'Donnell, ~~who was~~ a colonel then, said "They're not going to move" and Gen Arnold said "Who's this brash young man?" And they introduced Rosie O'Donnell to him. Later, Arnold remembered and ~~and~~ O'Donnell joined his staff. And Rosie O'Donnell was right; the British weren't going to move by May 1, 1943. So Arnold had a very bad impression of the British war effort in India. The British wanted a lot of equipment to be sent over there but they didn't seem to be doing much with it. Did you have this?

P No. I didn't get that impression because, having been in Rangoon at the time that Rangoon fell and subsequent to its fall, I realized that they didn't have anything to fight with. And they were asking for troops. Instead of shipping them to Rangoon, where they should have sent them, they sent them to Singapore which was the biggest mistake they ever made in the world. And Sir Robert Brooke-Popham told me at dinner one night — he's all through this book, "An Account of Mr. Pawley Signing a Contract with Soong on April 15, 1941 to Secure Volunteers for 100 P-40's " is on pp 18-19 of Sunderland and Romanus, "Stilwell's Mission to China" (Army Historical Series)

Q: We have a copy of Gen Arnold's itinerary in January 1946 in his visit to Lima, Peru. He probably had his heart attack on the 18th of January 1946 shortly before a reception at the American Embassy which was planned for thateevening. The last item here is a letter from Arnold to Ambassador Pawley, January 28, 1946 thanking him and Mrs. Pawley for many kindnesses to the Arnold family during their visit. He wrote: "It will always be a source of deep regret that I was unable to do all the things planned for me in Lima, but in spite of the medicos, I did come away with a better picture of your problems and those of our missions down there, all of which I have summed up in a memorandum to Gen Eisenhower. I hope that out of all our efforts something will at long last be done which may not only further our interests in Peru, but also win back some of the prestige we seemed to be so rapidly losing."

Arnold said that since his return to Miami, he had been resting and he felt very well. In fact, he said he had a 3-hour luncheon with Winston Churchill the previous day, which was January 27, 1946, and he hoped that his path would cross that of Ambassador Pawley's.

~~END OF PAWLEY INTERVIEW~~

Interview with Hon William D. Pawley Miami, Fla 6 June 72

Q Today is the anniversary of D-Day. We're talking about Pearl Harbor. (about 60 seconds lost)

P I was quite familiar with the fleet's activities in that on holidays and weekends it came into Pearl Harbor. And they also knew that all of our airplanes were hangared--were wing to wing on the Hickam Field.

Q In revetments there?

P Yes. In the speech that I made, I predicted that Pearl Harbor would be struck, that the Japanese would endeavor to bring in and sacrifice submarines at Pearl Harbor to block it up, and then proceed to try to destroy as much as (about 5 words missing) and also disperse the fleet. I found that most of the high officers--I had General Tony Frank and Jack (Rosenham) Beam and their wives for dinner that night and we discussed it at some length, and they agreed that we were not taking the necessary precautions, and that the fleet should be dispersed, and that they would have an intelligence meeting in a few days, and make the decisions. And the decision was made correctly. They came up with the same idea as to the dangers of a Japanese attack. So they actually ordered the fleet dispersed outside of Pearl Harbor, and all of the airplanes were put in revetments until General Hap Arnold and General Marshall came out for an inspection some time during 1940.

Q Would it have been late 1940 or perhaps 1939?

P I really don't know.

Q This letter from General Beam says they were briefed by General Frank's staff to include your report. There was a danger of attack.

P That's right.

Q Well, how did General Marshall and Arnold react to this report?

P I've never learned from the various letters I've received from officers who were present, who have written me that they recall my

speech and my warning. None of them have stated what General Marshall's and General Arnold's feeling was. Possibly they didn't have any. They came for information, and when they were thoroughly briefed, they went back to Washington and reported to Pres Roosevelt. I think the decision to change all of the officers, and to put the fleet back in Pearl Harbor and put all the airplanes back wing to wing was made by the President, and not by George Marshall or Hap Arnold.

Q What you are saying or implying here: these officers--Tony Frank and some of the other officers, Herron and Richardson--were taken out of their jobs because they were not willing to put the fleet and the aircraft in a position of greater vulnerability?

P That is correct.

Q The thing that is hard for an outsider, somebody who hears this, to believe, is that...Marshall and Arnold were patriotic, dedicated and knowledgeable and would permit this to happen. Could it be that they did not believe that Pearl Harbor was subject to attack?

P I don't really believe, having known General Arnold and General Marshall intimately as great personal friends, and men whom I believed to as patriotic and as capable as any officers in our service. I don't believe that they, on their own, would have moved the fleet back into Pearl Harbor and moved the airplanes into a wing to wing position, had they not received instructions to do so.

Q If Gen Marshall or Gen Arnold received instructions which in their view was inimical to our national defense, do you think that they would have done it or resigned?

P No. I got to know Marshall so well over the years, and we became great personal friends. We discussed many of our national problems, and I recall distinctly Marshall making a speech at VMI when they dedicated the arch to him. He invited Mrs. Pawley and me to accompany him and Mrs. Marshall.

Q Was this after the war?

P And I remember in that speech he was telling the young graduates that many of them would go into the services, and that one thing that they must remember as the paramount thing that they might have learned at VMI, was that no matter what doubts they personally might have from any orders given them by superiors, that they were to carry it out, even if it called for the complete sacrifice of a squad or a company. Because those that were planning the greater strategy knew what sacrifices had to be made in the interest of the overall picture. And I turned to Mrs. Pawley and stated: "He's talking about Chiang." I didn't say Pearl Harbor. He was told to have 800 Communists in the Kuomintang. And he carried out that order although I'm convinced in my heart that he did not believe that to be in the best interests of the United States.

Q This gets off into China, and I'd like to talk about China. I wonder whether Marshall and Arnold thought that Jearl Harbor would be the subject for an attack*** This letter of July 1, 1967 from Gen Rosenham Beam to Mr. Pawley concludes that Gen Frank was relieved by Fred Martin and Gen Herron was relieved by Gen Short, and Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson, and all aircraft were removed from revetment and placed back on the hangar lines, and all the naval aircraft were returned inside Pearl Harbor. That was the status of our defenses of Hawaii on Dec 7, 1941. We have a letter from Ambassador Pawley sent from Lima, Aug 27, 1945 to Gen Arnold thanking him for a photograph which Arnold had sent him in mid-July 1945. Ambassador Pawley invited Gen Arnold to visit them in Lima. I want to ask you about Arnold visiting in Latin America. You know he was wanting to retire to his ranch in Sonoma, Calif. and he was persuaded, or perhaps volunteered to make this good will mission, because he strongly believed that Brazil especially was a sort of balance wheel against Peron in Argentina. And of course he was on opposite sides with Spruille Braden. Arnold had this belief that we should

send some of these surplus planes to the Latin American countries and he was a leader in doing that. Do you recall any conversations or exchanges with Arnold on the subject?

P Yes. No question. One of the first things that I wrote after arriving in Peru and becoming acquainted with my responsibilities was on the subject of military aid to Latin American countries. I wrote a memorandum and I don't know whether Gen Arnold got a copy of it or not, but I would assume that he would have known about it, because it dealt with airplanes as well as other military supplies. And I wrote this: that I'd been in Latin America long enough, having gone to Cuba when I was four years old, and having lived in and out of Latin America a good part of my life, that I felt that the strongest ties that existed between the Latin American countries and the U S, were members of the military missions: the air missions, the marines, the navy, and that part of the army that participated, and that I felt that we should continue to supply at very reasonable prices, the naval equipment, the air equipment and the ground equipment that they needed for a respectable but small military establishment in each country. That no matter what size the country was, how small, they would have a military establishment, and cover all of the services. And therefore, if we didn't supply it, other countries not friendly to us would supply the material. Because they were going to get it. And that I felt that in supplying the material, we also supplied the missions, headed sometimes by Major Generals and Admirals, two-star Admirals, and the fact that the Latin Americans were brought to the United States to go to our military schools, had created a feeling of comradeship and mutual defense of such strength that in my opinion it was far more valuable than all of the twenty Ambassadors' influences put together. For that reason I advocated that we continue to supply particularly aircraft but also all of the other material they needed.

Q When did you take the job as Ambassador to Lima?

P Mr. Truman sent me down there in 1945. But I was sent for a specific purpose. Twenty-two years earlier they had borrowed $100 million and $50 million had accumulated in interest. Not a dime had ever been paid. And Truman wanted to help Peru, having come in first. And he sent me down to see if I could service the debt and I was fortunate in being able to do it.

Q He sent you down shortly after he took office?

P Very shortly after. Roosevelt wanted me to go as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and I turned him down on that, because I told him I knew nothing about Czechoslovakia. But it brings out an interesting point, because it was in the latter part of his life and Roosevelt was very sick, the day that we talked. And I said: "I know nothing about Czechoslovakia; I know very little about Europe or the history; I know nothing about the language. But in Asia or Latin America I do a pretty good job." He said: "Bill, that isn't the reason I want you. I now feel I've got to send somebody that'll stand up to the Russians." This is the report that was sent to Hap Arnold by the Chief of Mission in Peru.

Q This report of 23 Jan 1946, Memorandum for General Arnold, subject: "U.S. Ground Military Mission in Peru." It mentions Arnold's request of the 21st of January 1946, for a memorandum. The authority for this mission was a contract between the U.S. and Peru, signed July 10, 1944, for four years. It refers to military staff conversations held at Lima, Peru, between March 19, and April 6, 1945. This memo was sent a few days after he had his heart attack?

P Right

Q Arnold strongly believed, I think, for two reasons that we should cement relationships with certain non-communist countries in Latin America, especially Brazil. Of course, Brazil had done us a great favor, providing facilities for bases, Recife, Belem, etc, along the eastern coast for our aircraft. Another reason for sending these planes to Latin America was

to get rid of surplus planes. After World War I there was a traumatic experience in the military. All these DH-4s which had been produced after the Armistice were kept in the inventory. They were required to fly these planes for 10 years after the war ended. So Arnold had conversations with his staff. They were worried they would be stuck with these planes for long after. To fulfill this concept of improving our relationship with Latin America, and to get rid of these surplus planes, Arnold did this. Spruille Braden was opposed to this, and other people opposed it, fearing the Latin American countries would make war on one another with armaments they got from U.S. Do you remember him making this argument? How did you knock it down?

P Oh, of course. I opposed Spruille Braden very strongly in this. Spruille Braden was aiming against Peron at the time, and not permitting Eisenhower or Arnold or Halsey, or any of these men who visited Peru and Brazil--we had them in our Embassy--he would not permit them to go to the Argentines, which in my judgment was a big mistake. A man would come to Brazil and would have to go all the way back to Panama, and go down the other coast because Spruille Braden would not let them even fly across Argentine.

Q Why?

P Because he felt that would be giving Peron prestige to have high American military officials to be passing through Argentine. General Marshall never expressed an opinion on this subject to me, but I know, certainly, Eisenhower, who spent four or five days with us at the Embass6, felt very strongly about it, and pulled no punches in his opposition to Braden's point of view. Neither did Halsey who spent almost ten days with us. And, certainly, neither did Hap Arnold. He felt that Spruille Braden was completely wrong, not only in his opposition to going to Argentine, but not supplying the military equipment that was needed by these countries which were going to have and would continue to have, as

long as there is a Latin America, they were going to have a military establishment. If they don't get the military equipment from us, they are going to get it from Russia, as Cuba is getting it now, as Peru will probably get it, and, now, Chile will probably get it.

Q In January 1946 when the war was over, was there this feeling that, if we didn't supply the Latin American countries, Russia would? Was that already defined?

P That was sufficiently defined by those of us who were familiar with the Communist problem. There were plenty of people in the U.S. in high government jobs who had no concept of this problem.

Q Was there any feeling that these small countreis would war against one another? There was the Chaco War that went on for years between Bolivia and Paraguay. And there were several other local wars going on. War there any fear?

P Not important ones.

Q Was there any fear on the part of Braden and other State Dept types that they would use these planes to bomb one another?

P That's what Braden stated. But unfortunately the documents that will appear in my book that deal with the Braden problem--he was completely, at that point, cooperating with the--unknowingly--with the Communist conspiracy.

Q Arnold came to Lima sometime around January 15th of 1946. How long was he there before he had his heart attack?

P Several days.

Q Did you have any conversations with him before?

P Oh, sure.

Q And you talked about the need to supply?

P Yes. This was the paramount thing that I wanted to discuss with him.

Q And did he mention the trouble he was having with Braden?

P Yes

Q So you shared this common problem?

P Yes, and I express it in the book that I'm endeavoring to write.

Q Of course he was using his great prestige as one of the 5-star generals to carry this policy forward of military aid?

P That's right. In that respect, I would call Braden on the telephone and beg him to cease campaigning against Peron on the theory that he was electing Peron because Peron put out a pamphlet with Braden's picture on it and his picture on it and said: Either vote for the Yankee or vote for me." And nothing could, in my opinion, help Peron more than what Braden was doing. And, as I learned later, that was what was intended by those who were directing Braden's activities.

Q You felt that Braden's policy of trying to isolate Peron from the rest of Latin America and the world would only strengthen his position?

P And it did. And it caused us great trouble. And it took a lot of doing for us to straighten things out with Peron, in order for him to participate in the Rio Conference.

Q Then Arnold was one of three or possibly more officers with great stature who were sent on these political missions. You mentioned Eisenhower.

P They were not permitted to go to Argentina.

Q But during the same period Halsey and Eisenhower...

P Same period exactly. During '45, '46, and '47.

Q The fact that Arnold had to go back right in the middle of his tour. He had a whole itinerary planned. He had several other countries on his itinerary. He was unable to make any of them.

P That is right. That was very tragic because, with his great prestige and being so knowledgeable on this whole subject, he would have helped us tremendously.

Q He was strong for having the Brazilians participate in World War II. They did. One squadron of Brazilian Air Force went over to Italy and fought in the Mediterranean Theater.

P. 40,000 Brazilians were the ones that fought under Mark Clark and the immediate general over them was Crittenberger, and Gen Crittenberger is the only man that's ever been presented with the Brazilian Sword, which is the greatest honor that can be given to an American military man. And Crittenberger was down there as our guest at the Embassy, and he also felt very strongly on this subject that we are talking about, and there were several others that felt equally strongly about this subject.

Q This is a continuation of the memorandum of January 23, 1946 from Brig Gen Robert W. Strong, Chief of Mission in Lima, Peru, addressed to Gen Arnold. In his estimate of the present situation, he said that we can easily lose the trust of the Peruvian people, "unless we do something promptly to keep faith with them. Peru wants some tangible proof that we mean business in talking about inter-American security. She had shown respectful patience but that patience may easily wear then. Foreign (European) governments are busy right now in Peru to the prejudice of our country. A representative of the British Vickers arms company is now in Peru. French influence is trying hard to come back. Various Russian delegations have recently been in Peru. All know about the Security Plan, and that Peru expects and needs badly to re-equip her army. A few days ago, the Peruvian War Minister, in a periodic conference on current matters suddenly asked me: "My friend, do you think the United States is really going to let us ever get any equipment or not? If so when? I've got to know."

Gen Strong continues his memo to Gen Arnold, saying that it is the right and duty of every sovereign state to protect its sovereignty and maintain internal order. To this end he said that Peru would maintain an armed force and the attitude of that force and what objectives it would work towards were matters which General Strong's mission could do much to influence in a positive way towards the USA. He concluded: "If Peru

is to get no equipment from the US, Peru needs no mission here, and they know it." He recommended that the US start moving promptly to Peru the first increment of equipment, including materiel for a light infantry division."

This is a letter from Spruille Braden to the Acting Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, dated Jan 9, 1946. He refers to Royall's letter of Jan 6, 1946 to Dean Acheson, concerning the furnishing of military aircraft to other American republics. He said he had the pleasure of discussing the so-called adjusted interim Latin American aircraft requirements program with Gen Arnold and Maj Gen Walsh the day before. At this meeting, Spruille Braden said it was agreed that the State Department approved the interim program subject to understandings that: (1) no airplanes would be made available at the present time to Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Paraguay; (2) The furnishing of airplanes to the other 13 American republics would be subject to the concurrence with respect to each country of the American Ambassador concerned and to the desires of each country should it not wish to receive the full number approved by the American ambassador for that country.

Spruille Braden said tha Arnold had agreed that "any implied commitment" with regard to military airplanes resulting from the staff conversations will have to be discharged by furnishing the aircraft comprising the adjusted interim program, and that the United States is under no further obligation with respect to supplying additional military airplanes.

Mr. Braden also stated that General Arnold agreed that a decision concerning supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and the other American republics. In other words, the

military aircraft supply would be made subject to these Latin American countries coming around on policy matters.

P That's the point. I was involved in those conversations and objected very strenuously to Braden's restrictions, and pointed out that not only was Russia, but also France and England, involved in trying to get equipment into Latin America. But I was fearful that the one that would be successful in it would be the Russians. And for that reason, I felt that Spruille Braden's objections and restrictions were going to work to our detriment. And I believe history has proven that to be so.

Q Was he trying to use the aircraft supply as a club to get them to make concessions to us in other policy matters?

P I don't know that. I didn't work close enough with Braden.

Q I'm interested in this last paragraph where he says that Arnold agreed that a decision concerning the supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and other American republics. I just wonder if this was a sort of club?

P It could be and I don't know what he means by "collaboration" because as far as I was concerned, up to that point, we had complete collaboration from every country in Latin America and Central America with the exception of Argentina, and we didn't have that because Spruille Braden had destroyed the relationships that did exist, and could have been rebuilt. And when I had finished the job that the President gave me in Peru, he offered me my choice between going to Argentina or Brazil as Ambassador. I immediately selected Argentina and told the President in the presence of George Marshall who was at the White House that I was taking it because I wanted to undo some of the damage that I felt Spruille Braden had done. But, unfortunately Spruille then returned to the United States as Assistant Secretary of State, and he persuaded the President to let him send George Messersmith from Mexico to the Argentine and to

send me to Brazil. And that was the reason the change of the appointment that had been offered me both by the President and the Secretary of State.

Q This is a letter from Ambassador William Pawley to General Arnold from Lima, Peru, dated February 1, 1946. Gen Arnold had suffered a heart attack a couple of weeks before and was taken back to Miami to recover. The letter from Ambassador Pawley says: "I am writing to you in Miami in the hope that you have stopped off there for some well-deserved rest. Your visit to Peru accompanied by Mrs. Arnold and your daughter was appreciated here in Peru, and I am sure that it would be difficult to measure the good that was produced by the trip. It has been greatly regretted that your health did not permit you to participate in all the program that had been planned. However, all the principal part was accomplished which was an opportunity for the President, the Ministers of Air, War, and Navy plus a large group of Air Force officers to meet and talk with you on subjects of mutual interest.

"I hope that your plans will enable you to remain in Miami long enough to give you the rest that will put you back in excellent condition.

"Please give my very best wishes to Mrs. Arnold and Mrs. Snowden."

P His heart attack shortly before a reception in his, and his wife's, and daughter's honor at the Embassy. And Mrs. Arnold and the daughter came in spite of the attack and stayed just a very brief time and then joined the General. They were all three flown back to Miami the next day.

Q Had he exerted himself or was it just the high altitude?

P Lima is at sea level. I think that probably he was tremendously interested in what was going there and the subject matter of the discussion, the supplying of military equipment to Latin American countries, was uppermost in his mind, as it was in mine. And I think that he was probably stricken by, I don't know, overexertion, physically, may not be necessary. You can overexert yourself mentally.

Q He had a severe heart attack and was hors de combat for two and a half months in January 1945. Then he was on a half schedule for some months, so he had this tendency. Whatever it was, this just about finished him. He retired shortly after that.

Q This is a penciled note concerning Gen Arnold's heart attack in Lima, Peru. The note reads: "Gen Arnold's condition has improved greatly at this time. He has been suffering with an irregularity of the pulse. His condition is much improved. Further physical and mental strain are not advisable. For this reason he is returning to the United States for rest and further treatment."

This is a memorandum for Ambassador Pawley, 14 January 1946, from Maj J. R. Reist, Acting Military Attache: It discusses the arrival of General Arnold and his party, including Mrs. Arnold, Mrs. Ernest Snowden, Col Lawrence Peterson (pilot), Maj Murray Sargent, Maj Thomas Sheffield. and Master Sgt Marion Pettie. They were expected to arrive at Limatambo Airport at 1640 hours on 16 January 1946. A report from Caribbean Defense Command Hq that Col J. B. Brown had joined the party at Panama. Was he a Doctor? J. B. Brown?

P (didn't know)

Q George Brett came back from the Pacific around July 1942. He and Douglas MacArthur had a falling out. He was the senior air officer there. Prior to that time he was #2 man under Arnold, and he had been sent on this mission to the Philippines, and ended up in the Far East. He had apparently hoped to be the top man in the Pacific, but Douglas MacArthur wasn't moving over for anybody. In any event, he came back and George Kenney took his job in the Pacific. After that, Brett had a pall over his career and was sent to the Caribbean, and spent most of the remainder of the war in the Caribbean. Did you have any dealings with Brett?

P I had three interesting encounters with Brett. When Pres Roosevelt

gave me permission to organize the Flying Tigers and to employ 350 men. The first call I made and my Miami Lawyer (Paul Scott) who has since passed away - decided to go down to see General Brett, because we had permission to visit airfields, carriers, and any place where airmen could be employed by my company if they cared to volunteer, and permission to leave the service within 24 hours after they signed the contract with my company. Paul Scott, my lawyer, and I decided to call on Brett. This was before the Pentagon, and we went down to the Munitions Building where they had their offices. When I went in I told General Brett that I had permission from the White House to employ a certain number of pilots, to go to China to form an American Volunteer Group. He was indignant. He said he wasn't about to let the men that cost the U.S. Government a tremendous amount of money to train to join the crazy schemes the various people were coming up with. He was sorry but he would not give me any letters of recommendation or introduction to any field in the U.S., and that he would not let me have the pilots. I said: "All right, I'll report back to the President and let him decide whether the President's decision has more weight than yours." And as I walked halfway down the hall, his Chief of Staff came and called me back. When I went back, evidently, he had checked with someone because he said that I was entitled to talk to some officers. He asked where did I want to go. I told him I wanted to go to a field south of Los Angeles, a pursuit field. I've forgotten the name of the field.

Q March Field?

P I've forgotten. It's right outside of Los Angeles. Riverside. I understood that Brig General was in charge of that field. I said: I'd like to go and see him." I had my own Lockheed, and I was going to take some of the men that I had employed, as employment personnel, and one of them was a former Air Force colonel who was dying with leukemia and decided to take this job and work as long as he could. He died about a

year later, but he was in charge of my recruitment program, and we flew out and saw Gen Ficken. And when I walked into Gen Fickel's office with my personnel and told him what I was about to do, he said he had no word of any kind, and that I must have lost my mind to think that he was going to let me have any fliers out of his command. We had quite an argument and he said: "You bring me something in writing." I went back to have lunch and called Gen Brett and Secretary Knox, both of whom were knowledgeable on the subject, and they told me to go back about an hour and a half later. When I went back, Fickel received me and said I could have anything I wanted. That was the first recruitment program we had but Brett had been very, very difficult. My next encounter with him he became Deputy Chief of the Pacific under Wavell. Wavell was the top man and Brett was #2. When they came through Burma I had moved my offices, first from Shanghai to Hong Kong, and from Hong Kong to Rangoon, and they were occupying rooms in the Governor's mansion. Wavell was in one group of rooms, and Brett and his staff was in another group. And I had an aircraft factory at Loi Wing, otherwise known as Pawleyville, one thousand miles north of Rangoon, where I worked 3,500 men and had a very fine factory and very fine airfield. And we were building airplanes, repairing airplanes, and doing a marvelous job. And I went in and spoke to Wavell who was a great friend of mine, and he said: "Brett wants to see you very urgently." So I went in to see Brett. This was my second encounter. Brett said: "Pawley, I understand you have an aircraft factory a thousand miles north of here." I said: "Yes, sir." He said: "I want you to move it to Rangoon immediately." I said: "General Brett, I can't move this aircraft factory to Rangoon. The war would be over before I could get it moved and I'm working every day there building and repairing aircraft, and it's beautifully located. It's not subject to bombardment as it would be down here."

Q Why did he want it moved?

P . . He said it would be more accessible to their needs. You understand that it would take two years to move a big aircraft factory and build all the plants. We had quite an argument about it. He said: "All right. If that's the way you want it, I'll have nothing to do with your aircraft factory." I said: "General, that's up to you." So they went on about their business and I didn't move my aircraft factory, and I continued to operate up there a year and a half after he had left there. Finally the Japs took it. They walked in and took it. When they took Burma, went up the Burma Road and then into Mandalay and into Lascio, and took our factory.

Q That's Loy Wing?

P Yes. My brother was there; I was not there. He took his .45 and blew out all the windows and we set everything afire that we could. We had 100 trucks and we salvaged everything that we could salvage and left there. So my next encounter with Brett, I'm on my way to Peru and he is then in charge of the Caribbean.

Q This is late in the war now?

P Yes. And he invited Mrs. Pawley and my party to stay at his quarters. And during the evening he said: "I made a tremendous mistake in both of the encounters I've had with you before. And I would like for you to leave your DC-3 here, and go down to Peru in my plane and I'm going to send my aide with you." And his name was Robbie Roberts. I went down in Brett's airplane to Peru and I got there an hour too soon, and they weren't expecting me, because my schedule was based on going in the DC-3. We had cracked up fifty of our people in Burma. And at that time we had no ammunition, no tires and tubes, no solenoids. We were in very bad shape, and this had reached George Marshall. So he sent Gen (George?) I'll think of his name in a minute--out to see whether we could continue to operate. In the mean time, I'd gone down in my Lockheed to Singapore to talk to Sir Robert Brook-Popham, the commanding general of the British in the Far East and he gave me a letter to MacArthur which I didn't need because MacArthur and I were great friends, and I left

the next day on the Clipper to the Philippines. I had employed Joe Alsop to work for Chennault and he was Chennault's secretary. And he was down there, and he wanted to go. And he came to where I was having dinner with Sir Robert that night to ask me not to go and let him go over to get the supplies that we needed for the P-40's. And I said: "Joe, I'd be delighted for you to go but I can't fail to go myself, because this is my responsibility. This is a thing I organized and I've got to go over there and talk to MacArthur about it." He said: "Well, I'm kin to Mrs. Roosevelt and I've got a lot of influence, and I'd like to go" I said: "Get permission from Chennault. You work for him, and I'd be delighted for you to go. Just be at the plane in the morning." He didn't show up at the plane. I went over, and as I walked in I found Admiral Hart and Admiral Purnell (?) walking through the lobby of the hotel.

Q This was in Singapore?

P No, this was in the Philippines. So when I got there I asked them, did they have any P-40 parts, and they said: "No, but MacArthur has a lot. Have dinner with us tonight." I said: "I'll try to make a date with MacArthur." So when I called his apartment he was over having dinner with the President Quezon, and Mrs. MacArthur said: "You be at his office at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, and I'll make the date for you." So when I dined with them that night, the Admirals, they said: "What we'll do, if you get the supplies, we'll give you some PBY flying boats to take the stuff to Singapore. Because you're going to need to get it...

Q Was the war on yet?

P Not yet. This was before--just a few days--I would say two weeks. And when I walked into MacArthur's office the next morning, Brereton and Sutherland were there. Wainwright and two other officers were in the office. And Magruder, Gen Magruder had been sent out by Marshall to find out whether we ought to disband the AVG, a And Magruder had already reported that it ought to be disbanded. We had too many desertions;

we had no supplies. We were just no good. The thing was a washout. And a copy of that had gone to MacArthur. And I told him what I needed, I gave him a list this big of stuff I needed. He was walking up and down this beautiful office with all these officers sitting around. And he said: "Bill, I'm terribly sorry, I just cannot let you have any parts because I've got 250 P-40's. I've got parts but I'm going to need them. And I can't let you have them for more reasons than one." I said: "Give me just one reason." He went over the reasons this way. He said: "Here's a telegram from Brett, through the War Department, saying that your outfit's no good, and won't accomplish anything. So I can't give you anything." So after a lot of argument we walked out, and Brereton said: "Bill, come over and have dinner at my house tonight and the whole gang will be there." So I went over and had dinner, I never will forget that dinner. There was a tremendous big, round mahogany table and all the group that were in that office. We talked until 11:00 o'clock and when he heard my story he said: "We've just got a ship over. Colonel George was the supply officer, not Harold, another George.

Q There were two Harolds, one was lost in the Philippines

P That was Harold Lee George, then. He was the supply officer. He said: "Let's give him what he wants. We've got everything that he needs, three times more than we could possibly use for ours." So I went to the telephone, and called Admiral Hart, and said" "Admiral." He said: "Why in God's name did you wake me up this time of night? I go to bed at 10:00. See Purnell in the morning." I got three PBY flying boats. We loaded them that night and started out the next morning at daybreak loaded to the gills with everything that we needed. We got to Singapore and the telegram that had been sent to our Naval Attache--he was playing golf and never got it and they damn near shot us out of the air when we got in. But the commander, who was in the first ship, and I was in there, and my secretary, Bill Bailey, was in the second

ship. The third ship didn't have anybody except the crew. We landed successfully because he used his flash, and gave the signal. And when I landed and they put a rubber boat over and I went ashore, I called Sir Robert Brook-Popham, and he said: "Dammit Bill, why didn't you let us know you were coming. We almost shot you out of the air." And I said: "We did send a telegram." And he said: "Bring your officers up to dinner tonight." And he had the Naval Attache up there and he really gave him hell for playing golf, and not having the telegram processed, that could have possibly cost our lives. I took what I could in my Lockheed, and the balance he put in the tug and sent around to Rangoon, It arrived on the 6th day of December, and war broke out on the 8th. We had the material and the supplies and everything else. He lost every one of his ships on the ground, his 250 ships. And we shot down 276 airplanes, and we lost ten boys in combat, with the equipment that was given to us from the Philippine Islands.

Q You've opened several areas of interest. You talked about the Magruder Commission. That was there to take a look at the AVG, and Chennault mission. There was a man there with the Magruder commission. His name was Clagett. General Sue Clagett.

P I remember the name. Nothing else

Q He was sent back from there; he was demoted. He had a problem. Another matter that you brought up: Alsop and Chennault. Alsop used to write letters to President Roosevelt's secretary, Margaret LeHand. Chennault used to write letters directly to the President, bypassing the military chain of command. Lieutenant Alsop would put a covering letter on, address it to President Roosevelt's secretary, introducing Chennault because Roosevelt would take these letters and turn them back to the staff. They couldn't do anything to Chennault because he had Chiang Kai-shek behind him and there was great fear that Chiang Kai-shek might get out of the war. Do you have any knowledge of this correspondence that was going on?

P No, I didn't but I knew that Chennault was not in very good favor with George Marshall because Marshall had sent his close friend out there to be Deputy to Chiang Kai-shek--Stilwell. Stilwell and Chennault didn't hit it off at all. They were in terrible disagreement. Of course, I was in disagreement with Chennault about many things myself. In fact, he didn't want to leave our squadron in Rangoon, and it took a lot of doing. Actually I had to use Wavell and this fellow, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck. He fought Rommel in the desert and I spent a week with him going all through the desert with him just as a friend. But to get Churchill, to get Roosevelt, to insist that one squadron be left at Rangoon. And that squadron was left there by Chennault, 18 ships, 18 men, one doctor. He didn't give me a mechanic; he didn't give me spare parts; he didn't give me a damn thing because he was so mad with me about this. And yet the fighting took place in Rangoon. The first fight was on the 23rd, and we lost six ships badly shot up, and two men killed. And on the 25th, by the new tactics that had been instigated by the men themselves, we shot down either 26 or 28 airplanes and we didn't lose any. And after that it was murder. I mean we just knocked them out of the sky. And Chennault was up in China. We were reporting to him every day by wire what was going on but the fighting all took place in Rangoon. Had we not had those men there, the 18 ships that were in the harbor at Rangoon, with lend-lease supplies for China would not have had any protection. So, unfortunately, Chennault got all of the glory, being the military head of the AVG. He had no more to do with it than you did, really. Except that he commanded it after the men were out there. But the organizing it, and putting it together, and paying the men.

Q Was yours?

P Yes. And yet that has never been even covered.

Q Did Barbara Tuchman mention you or cover your role?

P I don't think so.

Q Have you seen her book on Stilwell?

P No. I haven't seen it.

Q Chennault took a very strong position in his dealings with his fellow American officers like Marshall and Arnold because he had Chiang Kai-shek behind him, and he was a very difficult man to deal with.

P Extremely difficult. That was the reason I didn't want him in the first place.

Q Who did you want?

P I wanted Gen Tony Frank, or I wanted Ralph Royce.

Q I talked to Mrs. Royce at Mrs. Knerr's house. Tony Frank wanted a combat command and Arnold wouldn't give him one. You mentioned Tony Frank in several communications. Do you know him well?

P Yes

Q He was a great supply man but Arnold apparently didn't think he was a combat leader. Did you hear about this? Do you have any other recollections of Arnold?

P No. I talked to him on the telephone a couple of times regarding the formation of the AVG, and of course he knew the President was behind this, and had the support. This was about 1940.

Q He was already Chief of the Air Corps, a two-star general. Another subject that intrigues me is Paul Scott.

(discussion of Paul Scott)

Q You say you built three aircraft factories in China?

P Yes. I built the first aircraft factory. I knew nothing about building aircraft factories, but I knew I could hire technical people. So I built a beautiful aircraft factory at Hang Chow where the President visited lately. And it was right near the air school that had been built by Colonel Jack Jouett. I was the one that was responsible for getting Chennault the job to replace Jack Jouett. I got Chiang Kai-shek to hire him. But three days after the war started, in '37, the Japs bombed my

plant very badly. So Chiang then ordered me to build another factory at Hankow. So, taking what we could, I came back to the States and got more machinery. We shipped it out right away. I built the second aircraft factory at Hankow, in the middle of the Japanese concession. And I got the river boat, the American river boat, to tie up at my pontoon, because we were right on the river. And I worked there for a year, building and repairing airplanes.

Q Who underwrote the building of the factory?

P The Chinese Government. I financed them and they paid me back in five years in monthly instalments, 6% interest, and permitted me to make 20% profit. That was the deal I had with them. So he called me in one day and said: "We can't keep Hankow more than three months. So I'm going to give you the sampans and material to box all the machinery, take it across the river, and then take it to the railroad. I want you to take it down to Hong Kong, put it on a ship, take it to Haiphone, then to Hanoi, and up the narrow gauge railway, and take it up to Kunming." I did all this. He gave me 50 sampans and about 10,000 coolies, and we moved this whole aircraft factory onto about 100 railroad cars, and moved it to Canton at night. We had it beautifully camouflaged with trees and limbs and things. Got it to Hong Kong. I chartered a ship. Took it to Haiphong over the railroad to Hanoi, unloaded it on trucks, and took it to the narrow gauge railway. My wife and I stayed there three months in Hanoi, trying to get the stuff shipped. They told me it wouldn't be shipped for five years. So I went back to see the Generalissimo, and he said: "All right, find a place to build it." So a chap that's living up in Alabama now, who was with Chennault as a Flying Tiger, one of the original ones. Chennault-Williamson, and McDonald. The only one living is McDonald. He is one of my greatest friends. He lives in Alabama. Comes down here quite often. And he and I started out to look for a back door to China and we found Loy Wing.

We were flying an airplane we had built actually but it had a Chinese insignia on it. We saw a British flag flying and it looked like a fort, and we gave it plenty of room because we didn't want to be shot at. We found a road and followed the road, and it went over the mountain 5,000 feet. Immediately on the other side of the mountain, almost just a drop was the little town of Bhamo, and we landed on the other side of the river. There was no place on the Bhamo side, and the whole town, 5,000 people, came out, including the three British officers that were there. They loaned us a Land Rover, and one of them went with us, and we went back over that 70 miles of dirt road to the Fort and then we crossed the river on a raft that the boys had built and had there for their own use. A very narrow river; a strong river, but narrow. And went on to the China side. We were at 2,500 feet above sea level, but the Himalayas went up 17,000 feet right behind us. It was a beautiful scene overlooking the Burma mountains, the two rivers down in front of us. You couldn't find a more gorgeous sight and the climate at 2,500 feet was just out of this world. So I said: "This is the place. We'll go back and tell Chiang that this is where we want to build our aircraft factory." So I went back and reported to him and he said: "OK, take the stuff back by truck to Hanoi, and then back to Haiphong, and charter another boat and take it around to Rangoon." So we did this, took a whole ship to take it. We got it to Rangoon and we had to unload it and put it on river boats, sidewheelers. And the sidewheelers always had a couple of barges with them so you could carry quite a lot of stuff. And it's a ten day trip up to Bhamo. We had to build a facility--it wasn't much of a facility--to unload this machinery on to the bank from these river boats. And we moved a 100 carloads of machinery and then took it across this mountain road--dirt road--got a couple of bulldozers, fortunately, to be able to cut the sides off. And we built a bridge across the river. Every load we took in, we built a gadget to pick up gravel, and every truck that

went across, came back and picked up the gravel out of the river bed and repaired the road. So we kept repairing the road. By the time a year was past, we had a very good fairly hard surface road. We built a factory there capable of housing 3,500 men, a 100-bed hospital, Dr. Seagrave, the Burma surgeon, was our doctor. I had five other doctors and nine nurses. We built the houses for all the married people, electric lights, flush toilets, and up on stilts. Everything was screened because it was a very heavy malaria country. I didn't know it at the time we picked it. And it was so bad that the government gave us the money to buy out all of the little settlements within 25 or 30 miles, and move them away because of the blackwater fever. We built an airstrip there and put in water supply and we had an ice plant. We had a very fine factory at Loy Wing, otherwise known as Pawleyville.

Q And when the planes were completed they flew them out?

P We'd fly them out of our airstrip when we'd finished them.

Q Where did you fly them to?

P All over. I mean we'd fly to various parts of China. And a lot of cracked up airplanes were brought in there for repair. And we were about 35 miles north of the Burma Road, and about 70 miles from Lascio. That's where the Japs--they got up to Lascio when they came up to Mandalay and Lascio. Then, they dressed up in Chinese uniforms, believe it or not, and put them in Chinese trucks and they came up the road, and our boys didn't recognize them as anything but Chinese.

Q When was this?

P This was between 1939 and 1940. Because that factory I built at one end a club house building and the clubhouse building was perfectly beautiful. It was just like an airplane. It had the middle 60 foot fuselage--sixty foot wide with no posts in the middle and a 100 feet long. That was our living room, dining room, play room. That's where we had our weekly dances, and all that. And the two wings were rooms on each side. All built out of teak. Our boys built all these things, and I had a beautiful

suite of two bedrooms and a parlor for myself down at one end which later I turned over to Chennault. The British would come up there all the time for our weekend parties. And they used to tell the Viceroy, Linlithgow, in India how we were building aircraft on the China-Burma border. And I got a wire from him to come to India to discuss aircraft manufacturing. And I went over there. I arrived in Simla on July 1, 1940 and July 4, at the Viceroy's house, I signed a contract to build an aircraft factory at Bangalore, India, to work 15,000 men. And I did that and operated it for four years. They paid me the highest salary they've ever paid anybody in English history. They paid me $40,000 a month salary, free of taxes in the United States and the UK for four years. That aircraft factory was taken away from me at the end of three and a half years by a general who later went to England as Air Attaché, and was busted for smuggling stuff out of Germany, Clayton Bissell. He took the factory away from me.

Q He was 10th Air Force at the time.

P That's right. He said it had to be under his command. It was too important a unit not to be under his command. So the President of the University there, and I, had picked Bangalore because of the University because I had to train the Indians who spoke English to train the men who didn't speak English. That's how we were able to do it. That factory today, incidentally, is working 44,000 men. It's one of the finest factories in the Orient. There's nothing in Japan any better. I was then invited to build China's first fertilizer plant. And I went down to Travancore and spent a week as a guest of the Maharajah and his mother, and at the end of the week I agreed to build a $10,000,000 ammonium sulphate plant. And I built it, and that today is six times bigger than it was when I finished it--and going strong. I've had a lot of fun.

Q Arnold came through there right after the Casablanca Conference. He met with the British Air Marshal Peirse and some others, and then he went in to see Chiang Kai-shek. This was around February 1, 1943.

P I don't like Peirse because he commandeered my Lockheed. It was the prettiest airplane in the Far East. Another thing I don't like about him, he ran away with Offenbach's (?) wife.

Q Arnold didn't like Peirse because he didn't seem to be doing anything in a military way.

P Well, he wasn't any good, anyway.

Q In fact, Arnold had a low opinion of the British officers in India. He didn't think the British were doing much.

P Wavell was all right, and certainly, Alexander was all right. No question. But the didn't have the personnel or material to fight with.

Q Gen Rosie O'Donnell. . ?

P He was a great friend of mine. He came out when I was decorate by Chiang Kai-shek.

Q He just passed away a few months ago. He was in the C-B-I when Arnold came through and they had a briefing session and somebody said the British are going to try to move in Burma on May 1, 1943. Rosie O'Donnell, a colonel then, said "They're not going to move." and Gen Arnold said: "Who'e this brash young man?" And they introduced Rosie O'Donnell to him. Later, Arnold remembered and O'Donnell joined his staff. And Rosie O'Donnell was right; the British weren't going to move by May 1, 1943. So Arnold had a very bad impression of the British war effort in India. The British wanted a lot of equipment to be sent over there but they didn't seem to be doing much with it. Did you have this?

P No. I didn't get that impression because, having been in Rangoon at the time that Rangoon fell and subsequent to its fall, I realized that they didn't have anything to fight with. And they were asking for troops. Instead of shipping them to Rangoon, where they should have sent them, they sent them to Singapore which was the biggest mistake they ever made in the world. And Sir Robert Brook-Popham told me at dinner one night--

he's all through this book.

Q An Account of Mr. Pawley Signing a Contract with Soong on April 15, 1941 to Secure Volunteers for 100 P-40's" is on pp 18-19 of Sunderland & Romanus, "Stilwell's Mission to China" (Army Historical Series). We have a copy of Gen Arnold's itinerary in January 1946 in his visit to Lima, Peru. He probably had his heart attack on the 18th of January 1946 shortly before a reception at the American Embassy which was planned for that evening. The last item here is a letter from Arnold to Ambassador Pawley, January 28, 1946 thanking him and Mrs. Pawley for many kindnesses to the Arnold family during their visit. He wrote: "It will always be a source of deep regret that I was unable to do all the things planned for me in Lima, b ut in spite of the medicos, I did come away with a better picture of your problems and those of our missions down there, all of which I have summed up in a memorandum to Gen Eisenhower. I hope that out of all our efforts something will at long last be done which may not only further our interests in Peru, but also win back some of the prestige we seem to be so rapidly losing."

Arnold said that since his return to Miami, he had been resting and he felt very well. In fact, he said he had a 3-hour luncheon with Winston Churchill the previous day, which was January 27, 1946, and he hoped that his path would cross that of Ambassador Pawley.

Interview with Hon William D. Pawley Miami, Fla 6 June 72

Q Today is the anniversary of D-Day. We're talking about Pearl Harbor. (about 60 seconds lost)

P I was quite familiar with the fleet's activities in that on holidays and weekends it came into Pearl Harbor. And they also knew that all of our airplanes were hangared--were wing to wing on the Hickam Field.

Q In revetments there?

P Yes. In the speech that I made, I predicted that Pearl Harbor would be struck, that the Japanese would endeavor to bring in and sacrifice submarines at Pearl Harbor to block it up, and then proceed to try to destroy as much as (about 5 words missing) and also disperse the fleet. I found that most of the high officers--I had General Tony Frank and Jack (Rosenham) Beam and their wives for dinner that night and we discussed it at some length, and they agreed that we were not taking the necessary precautions, and that the fleet should be dispersed, and that they would have an intelligence meeting in a few days, and make the decisions. And the decision was made correctly. They came up with the same idea as to the dangers of a Japanese attack. So they actually ordered the fleet dispersed outside of Pearl Harbor, and all of the airplanes were put in revetments until General Hap Arnold and General Marshall came out for an inspection some time during 1940.

Q Would it have been late 1940 or perhaps 1939?

P I really don't know.

Q This letter from General Beam says they were briefed by General Frank's staff to include your report. There was a danger of attack.

P That's right.

Q Well, how did General Marshall and Arnold react to this report?

P I've never learned from the various letters I've received from officers who were present, who have written me that they recall my

speech and my warning. None of them have stated what General Marshall's and General Arnold's feeling was. Possibly they didn't have any. They came for information, and when they were thoroughly briefed, they went back to Washington and reported to Pres Roosevelt. I think the decision to change all of the officers, and to put the fleet back in Pearl Harbor and put all the airplanes back wing to wing was made by the President, and not by George Marshall or Hap Arnold.

Q What you are saying or implying here: these officers--Tony Frank and some of the other officers, Herron and Richardson--were taken out of their jobs because they were not willing to put the fleet and the aircraft in a position of greater vulnerability?

P That is correct.

Q The thing that is hard for an outsider, somebody who hears this, to believe, is that... Marshall and Arnold were patriotic, dedicated and knowledgeable and would permit this to happen. Could it be that they did not believe that Pearl Harbor was subject to attack?

P I don't really believe, having known General Arnold and General Marshall intimately as great personal friends, and men whom I believed to as patriotic and as capable as any officers in our service. I don't believe that they, on their own, would have moved the fleet back into Pearl Harbor and moved the airplanes into a wing to wing position, had they not received instructions to do so.

Q If Gen Marshall or Gen Arnold received instructions which in their view was inimical to our national defense, do you think that they would have done it or resigned?

P No. I got to know Marshall so well over the years, and we became great personal friends. We discussed many of our national problems, and I recall distinctly Marshall making a speech at VMI when they dedicated the arch to him. He invited Mrs. Pawley and me to accompany him and Mrs. Marshall.

Q Was this after the war?

P And I remember in that speech he was telling the young graduates that many of them would go into the services, and that one thing that they must remember as the paramount thing that they might have learned at VMI, was that no matter what doubts they personally might have from any orders given them by superiors, that they were to carry it out, even if it called for the complete sacrifice of a squad or a company. Because those that were planning the greater strategy knew what sacrifices had to be made in the interest of the overall picture. And I turned to Mrs. Pawley and stated: "He's talking about Chiang." I didn't say Pearl Harbor. He was told to have 800 Communists in the Kuomintang. And he carried out that order although I'm convinced in my heart that he did not believe that to be in the best interests of the United States.

Q This gets off into China, and I'd like to talk about China. I wonder whether Marshall and Arnold thought that Jearl Harbor would be the subject for an attack*** This letter of July 1, 1967 from Gen Rosenham Beam to Mr. Pawley concludes that Gen Frank was relieved by Fred Martin and Gen Herron was relieved by Gen Short, and Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson, and all aircraft were removed from revetment and placed back on the hangar lines, and all the naval aircraft were returned inside Pearl Harbor. That was the status of our defenses of Hawaii on Dec 7, 1941. We have a letter from Ambassador Pawley sent from Lima, Aug 27, 1945 to Gen Arnold thanking him for a photograph which Arnold had sent him in mid-July 1945. Ambassador Pawley invited Gen Arnold to visit them in Lima. I want to ask you about Arnold visiting in Latin America. You know he was wanting to retire to his ranch in Sonoma, Calif. and he was persuaded, or perhaps volunteered to make this good will mission, because he strongly believed that Brazil especially was a sort of balance wheel against Peron in Argentina. And of course he was on opposite sides with Spruille Braden. Arnold had this belief that we should

send some of these surplus planes to the Latin American countries and he was a leader in doing that. Do you recall any conversations or exchanges with Arnold on the subject?

P Yes. No question. One of the first things that I wrote after arriving in Peru and becoming acquainted with my responsibilities was on the subject of military aid to Latin American countries. I wrote a memorandum and I don't know whether Gen Arnold got a copy of it or not. but I would assume that he would have known about it, because it dealt with airplanes as well as other military supplies. And I wrote this: that I'd been in Latin America long enough, having gone to Cuba when I was four years old, and having lived in and out of Latin America a good part of my life, that I felt that the strongest ties that existed between the Latin American countries and the U S, were members of the military missions: the air missions, the marines, the navy, and that part of the army that participated, and that I felt that we should continue to supply at very reasonable prices, the naval equipment, the air equipment and the ground equipment that they needed for a respectable but small military establishment in each country. That no matter what size the country was, how small, they would have a military establishment, and cover all of the services. And therefore, if we didn't supply it, other countries not friendly to us would supply the material. Because they were going to get it. And that I felt that in supplying the material, we also supplied the missions, headed sometimes by Major Generals and Admirals, two-star Admirals, and the fact that the Latin Americans were brought to the United States to go to our military schools, had created a feeling of comradeship and mutual defense of such strength that in my opinion it was far more valuable than all of the twenty Ambassadors' influences put together. For that reason I advocated that we continue to supply particularly aircraft but also all of the other material they needed.

Q When did you take the job as Ambassador to Lima?

P Mr. Truman sent me down there in 1945. But I was sent for a specific purpose. Twenty-two years earlier they had borrowed $100 million and $50 million had accumulated in interest. Not a dime had ever been paid. And Truman wanted to help Peru, having come in first. And he sent me down to see if I could service the debt and I was fortunate in being able to do it.

Q He sent you down shortly after he took office?

P Very shortly after. Roosevelt wanted me to go as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and I turned him down on that, because I told him I knew nothing about Czechoslovakia. But it brings out an interesting point, because it was in the latter part of his life and Roosevelt was very sick, the day that we talked. And I said: "I know nothing about Czechoslovakia; I know very little about Europe or the history; I know nothing about the language. But in Asia or Latin America I do a pretty good job." He said: "Bill, that isn't the reason I want you. I now feel I've got to send somebody that'll stand up to the Russians." This is the report that was sent to Hap Arnold by the Chief of Mission in Peru.

Q This report of 23 Jan 1946, Memorandum for General Arnold, subject: "U.S. Ground Military Mission in Peru." It mentions Arnold's request of the 21st of January 1946, for a memorandum. The authority for this mission was a contract between the U.S. and Peru, signed July 10, 1944, for four years. It refers to military staff conversations held at Lima, Peru, between March 19, and April 6, 1945. This memo was sent a few days after he had his heart attack?

P Right

Q Arnold strongly believed, I think, for two reasons that we should cement relationships with certain non-communist countries in Latin America, especially Brazil. Of course, Brazil had done us a great favor, providing facilities for bases, Recife, Belem, etc, along the eastern coast for our aircraft. Another reason for sending these planes to Latin America was

to get rid of surplus planes. After World War I there was a traumatic experience in the military. All these DH-4s which had been produced after the Armistice were kept in the inventory. They were required to fly these planes for 10 years after the war ended. So Arnold had conversations with his staff. They were worried they would be stuck with these planes for long after. To fulfill this concept of improving our relationship with Latin America, and to get rid of these surplus planes, Arnold did this. Spruille Braden was opposed to this, and other people opposed it, fearing the Latin American countries would make war on one another with armaments they got from U.S. Do you remember him making this argument? How did you know it down?

P Oh, of course. I opposed Spruille Braden very strongly in this. Spruille Braden was aiming against Peron at the time, and not permitting Eisenhower or Arnold or Halsey, or any of these men who visited Peru and Brazil--we had them in our Embassy--he would not permit them to go to the Argentines, which in my judgment was a big mistake. A man would come to Brazil and would have to go all the way back to Panama, and go down the other coast because Spruille Braden would not let them even fly across Argentine.

Q Why?

P Because he felt that would be giving Peron prestige to have high American military officials to be passing through Argentine. General Marshall never expressed an opinion on this subject to me, but I know, certainly, Eisenhower, who spent four or five days with us at the Embass6, felt very strongly about it, and pulled no punches in his opposition to Braden's point of view. Neither did Halsey who spent almost ten days with us. And, certainly, neither did Hap Arnold. He felt that Spruille Braden was completely wrong, not only in his opposition to going to Argentine, but not supplying the military equipment that was needed by these countries which were going to have and would continue to have, as

long as there is a Latin America, they were going to have a military establishment. If they don't get the military equipment from us, they are going to get it from Russia, as Cuba is getting it now, as Peru will probably get it, and, now, Chile will probably get it.

Q In January 1946 when the war was over, was there this feeling that, if we didn't supply the Latin American countries, Russia would? Was that already defined?

P That was sufficiently defined by those of us who were familiar with the Communist problem. There were plenty of people in the U.S. in high government jobs who had no concept of this problem.

Q Was there any feeling that these small countreis would war against one another? There was the Chaco War that went on for years between Bolivia and Paraguay. And there were several other local wars going on. War there any fear?

P Not important ones.

Q Was there any fear on the part of Braden and other State Dept types that they would use these planes to bomb one another?

P That's what Braden stated. But unfortunately the documents that will appear in my book that deal with the Braden problem--he was completely, at that point, cooperating with the--unknowingly--with the Communist conspiracy.

Q Arnold came to Lima sometime around January 15th of 1946. How long was he there before he had his heart attack?

P Several days.

Q Did you have any conversations with him before?

P Oh, sure.

Q And you talked about the need to supply?

P Yes. This was the paramount thing that I wanted to discuss with him.

Q And did he mention the trouble he was having with Braden?

P Yes

Q So you shared this common problem?

P Yes, and I express it in the book that I'm endeavoring to write.

Q Of course he was using his great prestige as one of the 5-star generals to carry this policy forward of military aid?

P That's right. In that respect, I would call Braden on the telephone and beg him to cease campaigning against Peron on the theory that he was electing Peron because Peron put out a pamphlet with Braden's picture on it and his picture on it and said: Either vote for the Yankee or vote for me." And nothing could, in my opinion, help Peron more than what Braden was doing. And, as I learned later, that was what was intended by those who were directing Braden's activities.

Q You felt that Braden's policy of trying to isolate Peron from the rest of Latin America and the world would only strengthen his position?

P And it did. And it caused us great trouble. And it took a lot of doing for us to straighten things out with Peron, in order for him to participate in the Rio Conference.

Q Then Arnold was one of three or possibly more officers with great stature who were sent on these political missions. You mentioned Eisenhower.

P They were not permitted to go to Argentina.

Q But during the same period Halsey and Eisenhower...

P Same period exactly. During '45, '46, and '47.

Q The fact that Arnold had to go back right in the middle of his tour. He had a whole itinerary planned. He had several other countries on his itinerary. He was unable to make any of them.

P That is right. That was very tragic because, with his great prestige and being so knowledgeable on this whole subject, he would have helped us tremendously.

Q He was strong for having the Brazilians participate in World War II. They did. One squadron of Brazilian Air Force went over to Italy and fought in the Mediterranean Theater.

P. 40,000 Brazilians were the ones that fought under Mark Clark and the immediate general over them was Crittenberger, and Gen Crittenberger is the only man that's ever been presented with the Brazilian Sword, which is the greatest honor that can be given to an American military man. And Crittenberger was down there as our guest at the Embassy, and he also felt very strongly on this subject that we are talking about, and there were several others that felt equally strongly about this subject.

Q This is a continuation of the memorandum of January 23, 1946 from Brig Gen Robert W. Strong, Chief of Mission in Lima, Peru, addressed to Gen Arnold. In his estimate of the present situation, he said that we can easily lose the trust of the Peruvian people, "unless we do something promptly to keep faith with them. Peru wants some tangible proof that we mean business in talking about inter-American security. She had shown respectful patience but that patience may easily wear then. Foreign (European) governments are busy right now in Peru to the prejudice of our country. A representative of the British Vickers arms company is now in Peru. French influence is trying hard to come back. Various Russian delegations have recently been in Peru. All know about the Security Plan, and that Peru expects and needs badly to re-equip her army. A few days ago, the Peruvian War Minister, in a periodic conference on current matters suddenly asked me: "My friend, do you think the United States is really going to let us ever get any equipment or not? If so when? I've got to know."

Gen Strong continues his memo to Gen Arnold, saying that it is the right and duty of every sovereign state to protect its sovereignty and maintain internal order. To this end he said that Peru would maintain an armed force and the attitude of that force and what objectives it would work towards were matters which General Strong's mission could do much to influence in a positive way towards the USA. He concluded: "If Peru

is to get no equipment from the US, Peru needs no mission here, and they know it." He recommended that the US start moving promptly to Peru the first increment of equipment, including materiel for a light infantry division."

This is a letter from Spruille Braden to the Acting Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, dated Jan 9, 1946. He refers to Royall's letter of Jan 6, 1946 to Dean Acheson, concerning the furnishing of military aircraft to other American republics. He said he had the pleasure of discussing the so-called adjusted interim Latin American aircraft requirements program with Gen Arnold and Maj Gen Walsh the day before. At this meeting, Spruille Braden said it was agreed that the State Department approved the interim program subject to understandings that: (1) no airplanes would be made available at the present time to Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Paraguay; (2) The furnishing of airplanes to the other 13 American republics would be subject to the concurrence with respect to each country of the American Ambassador concerned and to the desires of each country should it not wish to receive the full number approved by the American ambassador for that country.

Spruille Braden said tha Arnold had agreed that "any implied commitment" with regard to military airplanes resulting from the staff conversations will have to be discharged by furnishing the aircraft comprising the adjusted interim program, and that the United States is under no further obligation with respect to supplying additional military airplanes.

Mr. Braden also stated that General Arnold agreed that a decision concerning supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and the other American republics. In other words, the

military aircraft supply would be made subject to these Latin American countries coming around on policy matters.

P That's the point. I was involved in those conversations and objected very strenuously to Braden's restrictions, and pointed out that not only was Russia, but also France and England, involved in trying to get equipment into Latin America. But I was fearful that the one that would be successful in it would be the Russians. And for that reason, I felt that Spruille Braden's objections and restrictions were going to work to our detriment. And I believe history has proven that to be so.

Q Was he trying to use the aircraft supply as a club to get them to make concessions to us in other policy matters?

P I don't know that. I didn't work close enough with Braden.

Q I'm interested in this last paragraph where he says that Arnold agreed that a decision concerning the supply of future aircraft should be made subsequent to policy decisions involving the extent and nature of military collaboration between this country and other American republics. I just wonder if this was a sort of club?

P It could be and I don't know what he means by "collaboration" because as far as I was concerned, up to that point, we had complete collaboration from every country in Latin America and Central America with the exception of Argentina, and we didn't have that because Spruille Braden had destroyed the relationships that did exist, and could have been rebuilt. And when I had finished the job that the President gave me in Peru, he offered me my choice between going to Argentina or Brazil as Ambassador. I immediately selected Argentina and told the President in the presence of George Marshall who was at the White House that I was taking it because I wanted to undo some of the damage that I felt Spruille Braden had done. But, unfortunately Spruille then returned to the United States as Assistant Secretary of State, and he persuaded the President to let him send George Messersmith from Mexico to the Argentine and to

send me to Brazil. And that was the reason the change of the appointment that had been offered me both by the President and the Secretary of State.

Q This is a letter from Ambassador William Pawley to General Arnold from Lima, Peru, dated February 1, 1946. Gen Arnold had suffered a heart attack a couple of weeks before and was taken back to Miami to recover. The letter from Ambassador Pawley says: "I am writing to you in Miami in the hope that you have stopped off there for some well-deserved rest. Your visit to Peru accompanied by Mrs. Arnold and your daughter was appreciated here in Peru, and I am sure that it would be difficult to measure the good that was produced by the trip. It has been greatly regretted that your health did not permit you to participate in all the program that had been planned. However, all the principal part was accomplished which was an opportunity for the President, the Ministers of Air, War, and Navy plus a large group of Air Force officers to meet and talk with you on subjects of mutual interest.

"I hope that your plans will enable you to remain in Miami long enough to give you the rest that will put you back in excellent condition.

"Please give my very best wishes to Mrs. Arnold and Mrs. Snowden."

P His heart attack shortly before a reception in his, and his wife's, and daughter's honor at the Embassy. And Mrs. Arnold and the daughter came in spite of the attack and stayed just a very brief time and then joined the General. They were all three flown back to Miami the next day.

Q Had he exerted himself or was it just the high altitude?

P Lima is at sea level. I think that probably he was tremendously interested in what was going there and the subject matter of the discussion, the supplying of military equipment to Latin American countries, was uppermost in his mind, as it was in mine. And I think that he was probably stricken by, I don't know, overexertion, physically, may not be necessary. You can overexert yourself mentally.

Q He had a severe heart attack and was hors de combat for two and a half months in January 1945. Then he was on a half schedule for some months, so he had this tendency. Whatever it was, this just about finished him. He retired shortly after that.

Q This is a penciled note concerning Gen Arnold's heart attack in Lima, Peru. The note reads: "Gen Arnold's condition has improved greatly at this time. He has been suffering with an irregularity of the pulse. His condition is much improved. Further physical and mental strain are not advisable. For this reason he is returning to the United States for rest and further treatment."

This is a memorandum for Ambassador Pawley, 14 January 1946, from Maj J.R. Reist, Acting Military Attache: It discusses the arrival of General Arnold and his party, including Mrs. Arnold, Mrs. Ernest Snowden, Col Lawrence Peterson (pilot), Maj Murray Sargent, Maj Thomas Sheffield, and Master Sgt Marion Pettie. They were expected to arrive at Limatambo Airport at 1640 hours on 16 January 1946. A report from Caribbean Defense Command Hq that Col J. B. Brown had joined the party at Panama. Was he a Doctor? J. B. Brown?

P (didn't know)

Q George Brett came back from the Pacific around July 1942. He and Douglas MacArthur had a falling out. He was the senior air officer there. Prior to that time he was #2 man under Arnold, and he had been sent on this mission to the Philippines, and ended up in the Far East. He had apparently hoped to be the top man in the Pacific, but Douglas MacArthur wasn't moving over for anybody. In any event, he came back and George Kenney took his job in the Pacific. After that, Brett had a pall over his career and was sent to the Caribbean, and spent most of the remainder of the war in the Caribbean. Did you have any dealings with Brett?

P I had three interesting encounters with Brett. When Pres Roosevelt

gave me permission to organize the Flying Tigers and to employ 350 men. The first call I made and my Miami Lawyer (Paul Scott) who has since passed away - decided to go down to see General Brett, because we had permission to visit airfields, carriers, and any place where airmen could be employed by my company if they cared to volunteer, and permission to leave the service within 24 hours after they signed the contract with my company. Paul Scott, my lawyer, and I decided to call on Brett. This was before the Pentagon, and we went down to the Munitions Building where they had their offices. When I went in I told General Brett that I had permission from the White House to employ a certain number of pilots, to go to China to form an American Volunteer Group. He was indignant. He said he wasn't about to let the men that cost the U.S. Government a tremendous amount of money to train to join the crazy schemes the various people were coming up with. He was sorry but he would not give me any letters of recommendation or introduction to any field in the U.S., and that he would not let me have the pilots. I said: "All right, I'll report back to the President and let him decide whether the President's decision has more weight than yours." And as I walked halfway down the hall, his Chief of Staff came and called me back. When I went back, evidently, he had checked with someone because he said that I was entitled to talk to some officers. He asked where did I want to go. I told him I wanted to go to a field south of Los Angeles, a pursuit field. I've forgotten the name of the field.

Q March Field?

P I've forgotten. It's right outside of Los Angeles. Riverside. I understood that Brig General was in charge of that field. I said: I'd like to go and see him." I had my own Lockheed, and I was going to take some of the men that I had employed, as employment personnel, and one of them was a former Air Force colonel who was dying with leukemia and decided to take this job and work as long as he could. He died about a

year later, but he was in charge of my recruitment program, and we flew out and saw Gen Ficken. And when I walked into Gen Fickel's office with my personnel and told him what I was about to do, he said he had no word of any kind, and that I must have lost my mind to think that he was going to let me have any fliers out of his command. We had quite an argument and he said: "You bring me something in writing." I went back to have lunch and called Gen Brett and Secretary Knox, both of whom were knowledgeable on the subject, and they told me to go back about an hour and a half later. When I went back, Fickel received me and said I could have anything I wanted. That was the first recruitment program we had but Brett had been very, very difficult. My next encounter with him he became Deputy Chief of the Pacific under Wavell. Wavell was the top man and Brett was #2. When they came through Burma I had moved my offices, first from Shanghai to Hong Kong, and from Hong Kong to Rangoon, and they were occupying rooms in the Governor's mansion. Wavell was in one group of rooms, and Brett and his staff was in another group. And I had an aircraft factory at Loj Wing, otherwise known as Pawleyville, one thousand miles north of Rangoon, where I worked 3,500 men and had a very fine factory and very fine airfield. And we were building airplanes, repairing airplanes, and doing a marvelous job. And I went in and spoke to Wavell who was a great friend of mine, and he said: "Brett wants to see you very urgently." So I went in to see Brett. This was my second encounter. Brett said: "Pawley, I understand you have an aircraft factory a thousand miles north of here." I said: "Yes, sir." He said: "I want you to move it to Rangoon immediately." I said: "General Brett, I can't move this aircraft factory to Rangoon. The war would be over before I could get it moved and I'm working every day there building and repairing aircraft, and it's beautifully located. It's not subject to bombardment as it would be down here."

Q Why did he want it moved?

P . . He said it would be more accessible to their needs. You understand that it would take two years to move a big aircraft factory and build all the plants. We had quite an argument about it. He said: "All right. If that's the way you want it, I'll have nothing to do with your aircraft factory." I said: "General, that's up to you." So they went on about their business and I didn't move my aircraft factory, and I continued to operate up there a year and a half after he had left there. Finally the Japs took it. They walked in and took it. When they took Burma, went up the Burma Road and then into Mandalay and into Lascio, and took our factory.

Q That's Loy Wing?

P Yes. My brother was there; I was not there. He took his .45 and blew out all the windows and we set everything afire that we could. We had 100 trucks and we salvaged everything that we could salvage and left there. So my next encounter with Brett, I'm on my way to Peru and he is then in charge of the Caribbean.

Q This is late in the war now?

P Yes. And he invited Mrs. Pawley and my party to stay at his quarters. And during the evening he said: "I made a tremendous mistake in both of the encounters I've had with you before. And I would like for you to leave your DC-3 here, and go down to Peru in my plane and I'm going to send my aide with you." And his name was Robbie Roberts. I went down in Brett's airplane to Peru and I got there an hour too soon, and they weren't expecting me, because my schedule was based on going in the DC-3. We had cracked up fifty of our people in Burma. And at that time we had no ammunition, no tires and tubes, no solenoids. We were in very bad shape, and this had reached George Marshall. So he sent Gen (George?) I'll think of his name in a minute--out to see whether we could continue to operate. In the mean time, I'd gone down in my Lockheed to Singapore to talk to Sir Robert Brook-Popham, the commanding general of the British in the Far East and he gave me a letter to MacArthur which I didn't need because MacArthur and I were great friends, and I left

the next day on the Clipper to the Philippines. I had employed Joe Alsop to work for Chennault and he was Chennault's secretary. And he was down there, and he wanted to go. And he came to where I was having dinner with Sir Robert that night to ask me not to go and let him go over to get the supplies that we needed for the P-40's. And I said: "Joe, I'd be delighted for you to go but I can't fail to go myself, because this is my responsibility. This is a thing I organized and I've got to go over there and talk to MacArthur about it." He said: "Well, I'm kin to Mrs. Roosevelt and I've got a lot of influence, and I'd like to go" I said: "Get permission from Chennault. You work for him, and I'd be delighted for you to go. Just be at the plane in the morning." He didn't show up at the plane. I went over, and as I walked in I found Admiral Hart and Admiral Purnell (?) walking through the lobby of the hotel.

Q This was in Singapore?

P No, this was in the Philippines. So when I got there I asked them, did they have any P-40 parts, and they said: "No, but MacArthur has a lot. Have dinner with us tonight." I said: "I'll try to make a date with MacArthur." So when I called his apartment he was over having dinner with the President Quezon, and Mrs. MacArthur said: "You be at his office at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, and I'll make the date for you." So when I dined with them that night, the Admirals, they said: "What we'll do, if you get the supplies, we'll give you some PBY flying boats to take the stuff to Singapore. Because you're going to need to get it...

Q Was the war on yet?

P Not yet. This was before--just a few days--I would say two weeks. And when I walked into MacArthur's office the next morning, Brereton and Sutherland were there. Wainwright and two other officers were in the office. And Magruder, Gen Magruder had been sent out by Marshall to find out whether we ought to disband the AVG, a And Magruder had already reported that it ought to be disbanded. We had too many desertions;

we had no supplies. We were just no good. The thing was a washout. And a copy of that had gone to MacArthur. And I told him what I needed, I gave him a list this big of stuff I needed. He was walking up and down this beautiful office with all these officers sitting around. And he said: "Bill, I'm terribly sorry, I just cannot let you have any parts because I've got 250 P-40's. I've got parts but I'm going to need them. And I can't let you have them for more reasons than one.". I said: "Give me just one reason." He went over the reasons this way. He said: "Here's a telegram from Brett, through the War Department, saying that your outfit's no good, and won't accomplish anything. So I can't give you anything." So after a lot of argument we walked out, and Brereton said: "Bill, come over and have dinner at my house tonight and the whole gang will be there." So I went over and had dinner, I never will forget that dinner. There was a tremendous big, round mahogany table and all the group that were in that office. We talked until 11:00 o'clock and when he heard my story he said: "We've just got a ship over. Colonel George was the supply officer, not Harold, another George.

Q There were two Harolds, one was lost in the Philippines

P That was Harold Lee George, then. He was the supply officer. He said: "Let's give him what he wants. We've got everything that he needs, three times more than we could possibly use for ours." So I went to the telephone, and called Admiral Hart, and said" "Admiral." He said: "Why in God's name did you wake me up this time of night? I go to bed at 10:00. See Purnell in the morning." I got three PBY flying boats. We loaded them that night and started out the next morning at daybreak loaded to the gills with everything that we needed. We got to Singapore and the telegram that had been sent to our Naval Attache--he was playing golf and never got it and they damn near shot us out of the air when we got in. But the commander, who was in the first ship, and I was in there, and my secretary, Bill Bailey, was in the second

ship. The third ship didn't have anybody except the crew. We landed successfully because he used his flash, and gave the signal. And when I landed and they put a rubber boat over and I went ashore, I called Sir Robert Brook-Popham, and he said: "Dammit Bill, why didn't you let us know you were coming. We almost shot you out of the air." And I said: "We did send a telegram." And he said: "Bring your officers up to dinner tonight." And he had the Naval Attache up there and he really gave him hell for playing golf, and not having the telegram processed, that could have possibly cost our lives. I took what I could in my Lockheed, and the balance he put in the tug and sent around to Rangoon, It arrived on the 6th day of December, and war broke out on the 8th. We had the material and the supplies and everything else. He lost every one of his ships on the ground, his 250 ships. And we shot down 276 airplanes, and we lost ten boys in combat, with the equipment that was given to us from the Philippine Islands.

Q You've opened several areas of interest. You talked about the Magruder Commission. That was there to take a look at the AVG, and Chennault mission. There was a man there with the Magruder commission. His name was Clagett. General Sue Clagett.

P I remember the name. Nothing else

Q He was sent back from there; he was demoted. He had a problem. Another matter that you brought up: Alsop and Chennault. Alsop used to write letters to President Roosevelt's secretary, Margaret LeHand. Chennault used to write letters directly to the President, bypassing the military chain of command. Lieutenant Alsop would put a covering letter on, address it to President Roosevelt's secretary, introducing Chennault because Roosevelt would take these letters and turn them back to the staff. They couldn't do anything to Chennault because he had Chiang Kai-shek behind him and there was great fear that Chiang Kai-shek might get out of the war. Do you have any knowledge of this correspondence that was going on?

P. No, I didn't but I knew that Chennault was not in very good favor with George Marshall because Marshall had sent his close friend out there to be Deputy to Chiang Kai-shek--Stilwell. Stilwell and Chennault didn't hit it off at all. They were in terrible disagreement. Of course, I was in disagreement with Chennault about many things myself. In fact, he didn't want to leave our squadron in Rangoon, and it took a lot of doing. Actually I had to use Wavell and this fellow, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck. He fought Rommel in the desert and I spent a week with him going all through the desert with him just as a friend. But to get Churchill, to get Roosevelt, to insist that one squadron be left at Rangoon. And that squadron was left there by Chennault, 18 ships, 18 men, one doctor. He didn't give me a mechanic; he didn't give me spare parts; he didn't give me a damn thing because he was so mad with me about this. And yet the fighting took place in Rangoon. The first fight was on the 23rd, and we lost six ships badly shot up, and two men killed. And on the 25th, by the new tactics that had been instigated by the men themselves, we shot down either 26 or 28 airplanes and we didn't lose any. And after that it was murder. I mean we just knocked them out of the sky. And Chennault was up in China. We were reporting to him every day by wire what was going on but the fighting all took place in Rangoon. Had we not had those men there, the 18 ships that were in the harbor at Rangoon, with lend-lease supplies for China would not have had any protection. So, unfortunately, Chennault got all of the glory, being the military head of the AVG. He had no more to do with it than you did, really. Except that he commanded it after the men were out there. But the organizing it, and putting it together, and paying the men.

Q Was yours?

P Yes. And yet that has never been even covered.

Q Did Barbara Tuchman mention you or cover your role?

P I don't think so.

Q Have you seen her book on Stilwell?

P No. I haven't seen it.

Q Chennault took a very strong position in his dealings with his fellow American officers like Marshall and Arnold because he had Chiang Kai-shek behind him, and he was a very difficult man to deal with.

P Extremely difficult. That was the reason I didn't want him in the first place.

Q Who did you want?

P I wanted Gen Tony Frank, or I wanted Ralph Royce.

Q I talked to Mrs. Royce at Mrs. Knerr's house. Tony Frank wanted a combat command and Arnold wouldn't give him one. You mentioned Tony Frank in several communications. Do you know him well?

P Yes

Q He was a great supply man but Arnold apparently didn't think he was a combat leader. Did you hear about this? Do you have any other recollections of Arnold?

P No. I talked to him on the telephone a couple of times regarding the formation of the AVG, and of course he knew the President was behind this, and had the support. This was about 1940.

Q He was already Chief of the Air Corps, a two-star general. Another subject that intrigues me is Paul Scott.

(discussion of Paul Scott)

Q You say you built three aircraft factories in China?

P Yes. I built the first aircraft factory. I knew nothing about building aircraft factories, but I knew I could hire technical people. So I built a beautiful aircraft factory at Hang Chow where the President visited lately. And it was right near the air school that had been built by Colonel Jack Jouett. I was the one that was responsible for getting Chennault the job to replace Jack Jouett. I got Chiang Kai-shek to hire him. But three days after the war started, in '37, the Japs bombed my

plant very badly. So Chiang then ordered me to build another factory at Hankow. So, taking what we could, I came back to the States and got more machinery. We shipped it out right away. I built the second aircraft factory at Hankow, in the middle of the Japanese concession. And I got the river boat, the American river boat, to tie up at my pontoon, because we were right on the river. And I worked there for a year, building and repairing airplanes.

Q Who underwrote the building of the factory?

P The Chinese Government. I financed them and they paid me back in five years in monthly instalments, 6% interest, and permitted me to make 20% profit. That was the deal I had with them. So he called me in one day and said: "We can't keep Hankow more than three months. So I'm going to give you the sampans and material to box all the machinery, take it across the river, and then take it to the railroad. I want you to take it down to Hong Kong, put it on a ship, take it to Haiphone, then to Hanoi, and up the narrow gauge railway, and take it up to Kunming." I did all this. He gave me 50 sampans and about 10,000 coolies, and we moved this whole aircraft factory onto about 100 railroad cars, and moved it to Canton at night. We had it beautifully camouflaged with trees and limbs and things. Got it to Hong Kong. I chartered a ship. Took it to Haiphong over the railroad to Hanoi, unloaded it on trucks, and took it to the narrow gauge railway. My wife and I stayed there three months in Hanoi, trying to get the stuff shipped. They told me it wouldn't be shipped for five years. So I went back to see the Generalissimo, and he said: "All right, find a place to build it." So a chap that's living up in Alabama now, who was with Chennault as a Flying Tiger, one of the original ones. Chennault-Williamson, and McDonald. The only one living is McDonald. He is one of my greatest friends. He lives in Alabama. Comes down here quite often. And he and I started out to look for a back door to China and we found Loy Wing.

We were flying an airplane we had built actually but it had a Chinese insignia on it. We saw a British flag flying and it looked like a fort, and we gave it plenty of room because we didn't want to be shot at. We found a road and followed the road, and it went over the mountain 5,000 feet. Immediately on the other side of the mountain, almost just a drop was the little town of Bhamo, and we landed on the other side of the river. There was no place on the Bhamo side, and the whole town, 5,000 people, came out, including the three British officers that were there. They loaned us a Land Rover, and one of them went with us, and we went back over that 70 miles of dirt road to the Fort and then we crossed the river on a raft that the boys had built and had there for their own use. A very narrow river; a strong river, but narrow. And went on to the China side. We were at 2,500 feet above sea level, but the Himalayas went up 17,000 feet right behind us. It was a beautiful scene overlooking the Burma mountains, the two rivers down in front of us. You couldn't find a more gorgeous sight and the climate at 2,500 feet was just out of this world. So I said: "This is the place. We'll go back and tell Chiang that this is where we want to build our aircraft factory." So I went back and reported to him and he said: "OK, take the stuff back by truck to Hanoi, and then back to Haiphong, and charter another boat and take it around to Rangoon." So we did this, took a whole ship to take it. We got it to Rangoon and we had to unload it and put it on river boats, sidewheelers. And the sidewheelers always had a couple of barges with them so you could carry quite a lot of stuff. And it's a ten day trip up to Bhamo. We had to build a facility--it wasn't much of a facility--to unload this machinery on to the bank from these river boats. And we moved a 100 carloads of machinery and then took it across this mountain road--dirt road--got a couple of bulldozers, fortunately, to be able to cut the sides off. And we built a bridge across the river. Every load we took in, we built a gadget to pick up gravel, and every truck that

went across, came back and picked up the gravel out of the river bed and repaired the road. So we kept repairing the road. By the time a year was past, we had a very good fairly hard surface road. We built a factory there capable of housing 3,500 men, a 100-bed hospital, Dr. Seagrave, the Burma surgeon, was our doctor. I had five other doctors and nine nurses. We built the houses for all the married people, electric lights, flush toilets, and up on stilts. Everything was screened because it was a very heavy malaria country. I didn't know it at the time we picked it. And it was so bad that the government gave us the money to buy out all of the little settlements within 25 or 30 miles, and move them away because of the blackwater fever. We built an airstrip there and put in water supply and we had an ice plant. We had a very fine factory at Loy Wing, otherwise known as Pawleyville.

Q And when the planes were completed they flew them out?

P We'd fly them out of our airstrip when we'd finished them.

Q Where did you fly them to?

P All over. I mean we'd fly to various parts of China. And a lot of cracked up airplanes were brought in there for repair. And we were about 35 miles north of the Burma Road, and about 70 miles from Lascio. That's where the Japs--they got up to Lascio when they came up to Mandalay and Lascio. Then, they dressed up in Chinese uniforms, believe it or not, and put them in Chinese trucks and they came up the road, and our boys didn't recognize them as anything but Chinese.

Q When was this?

P This was between 1939 and 1940. Because that factory I built at one end a club house building and the clubhouse building was perfectly beautiful. It was just like an airplane. It had the middle 60 foot fuselage--sixty foot wide with no posts in the middle and a 100 feet long. That was our living room, dining room, play room. That's where we had our weekly dances, and all that. And the two wings were rooms on each side. All built out of teak. Our boys built all these things, and I had a beautiful

suite of two bedrooms and a parlor for myself down at one end which later I turned over to Chennault. The British would come up there all the time for our weekend parties. And they used to tell the Viceroy, Linlithgow, in India how we were building aircraft on the China-Burma border. And I got a wire from him to come to India to discuss aircraft manufacturing. And I went over there. I arrived in Simla on July 1, 1940 and July 4, at the Viceroy's house, I signed a contract to build an aircraft factory at Bangalore, India, to work 15,000 men. And I did that and operated it for four years. They paid me the highest salary they've ever paid anybody in English history. They paid me $40,000 a month salary, free of taxes in the United States and the UK for four years. That aircraft factory was taken away from me at the end of three and a half years by a general who later went to England as Air Attaché, and was busted for smuggling stuff out of Germany, Clayton Bissell. He took the factory away from me.

Q He was 10th Air Force at the time.

P That's right. He said it had to be under his command. It was too important a unit not to be under his command. So the President of the University there, and I, had picked Bangalore because of the University because I had to train the Indians who spoke English to train the men who didn't speak English. That's how we were able to do it. That factory today, incidentally, is working 44,000 men. It's one of the finest factories in the Orient. There's nothing in Japan any better. I was then invited to build China's first fertilizer plant. And I went down to Travancore and spent a week as a guest of the Maharajah and his mother, and at the end of the week I agreed to build a $10,000,000 ammonium sulphate plant. And I built it, and that today is six times bigger than it was when I finished it--and going strong. I've had a lot of fun.

Q Arnold came through there right after the Casablanca Conference. He met with the British Air Marshal Peirse and some others, and then he went in to see Chiang Kai-shek. This was around February 1, 1943.

P I don't like Peirse because he commandeered my Lockheed. It was the prettiest airplane in the Far East. Another thing I don't like about him, he ran away with Offenbach's (?) wife.

Q Arnold didn't like Peirse because he didn't seem to be doing anything in a military way.

P Well, he wasn't any good, anyway.

Q In fact, Arnold had a low opinion of the British officers in India. He didn't think the British were doing much.

P Wavell was all right, and certainly, Alexander was all right. No question. But the didn't have the personnel or material to fight with.

Q Gen Rosie O'Donnell. . ?

P He was a great friend of mine. He came out when I was decorate by Chiang Kai-shek.

Q He just passed away a few months ago. He was in the C-B-I when Arnold came through and they had a briefing session and somebody said the British are going to try to move in Burma on May 1, 1943. Rosie O'Donnell, a colonel then, said "They're not going to move." and Gen Arnold said: "Who'e this brash young man?" And they introduced Rosie O'Donnell to him. Later, Arnold remembered and O'Donnell joined his staff. And Rosie O'Donnell was right; the British weren't going to move by May 1, 1943. So Arnold had a very bad impression of the British war effort in India. The British wanted a lot of equipment to be sent over there but they didn't seem to be doing much with it. Did you have this?

P No. I didn't get that impression because, having been in Rangoon at the time that Rangoon fell and subsequent to its fall, I realized that they didn't have anything to fight with. And they were asking for troops. Instead of shipping them to Rangoon, where they should have sent them, they sent them to Singapore which was the biggest mistake they ever made in the world. And Sir Robert Brook-Popham told me at dinner one night--

he's all through this book.

Q An Account of Mr. Pawley Signing a Contract with Soong on April 15, 1941 to Secure Volunteers for 100 P-40's" is on pp 18-19 of Sunderland & Romanus, "Stilwell's Mission to China" (Army Historical Series). We have a copy of Gen Arnold's itinerary in January 1946 in his visit to Lima, Peru. He probably had his heart attack on the 18th of January 1946 shortly before a reception at the American Embassy which was planned for that evening. The last item here is a letter from Arnold to Ambassador Pawley, January 28, 1946 thanking him and Mrs. Pawley for many kindnesses to the Arnold family during their visit. He wrote: "It will always be a source of deep regret that I was unable to do all the things planned for me in Lima, b ut in spite of the medicos, I did come away with a better picture of your problems and those of our missions down there, all of which I have summed up in a memorandum to Gen Eisenhower. I hope that out of all our efforts something will at long last be done which may not only further our interests in Peru, but also win back some of the prestige we seem to be so rapidly losing."

Arnold said that since his return to Miami, he had been resting and he felt very well. In fact, he said he had a 3-hour luncheon with Winston Churchill the previous day, which was January 27, 1946, and he hoped that his path would cross that of Ambassador Pawley.

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Q Arnold didn't like Peirse because he didn't seem to be doing anything in a military way.

P Well, he wasn't any good, anyway.

Q In fact, Arnold had a low opinion of the British officers in India. He didn't think the British were doing much.

P Wavell was all right, and certainly, Alexander was all right. No question. But the didn't have the personnel or material to fight with.

Q Gen Rosie O'Donnell. . ?

P He was a great friend of mine. He came out when I was decorate by Chiang Kai-shek.

Q He just passed away a few months ago. He was in the C-B-I when Arnold came through and they had a briefing session and somebody said the British are going to try to move in Burma on May 1, 1943. Rosie O'Donnell, a colonel then, said "They're not going to move." and Gen Arnold said: "Who'e this brash young man?" And they introduced Rosie O'Donnell to him. Later, Arnold remembered and O'Donnell joined his staff. And Rosie O'Donnell was right; the British weren't going to move by May 1, 1943. So Arnold had a very bad impression of the British war effort in India. The British wanted a lot of equipment to be sent over there but they didn't seem to be doing much with it. Did you have this?

P No. I didn't get that impression because, having been in Rangoon at the time that Rangoon fell and subsequent to its fall, I realized that they didn't have anything to fight with. And they were asking for troops. Instead of shipping them to Rangoon, where they should have sent them, they sent them to Singapore which was the biggest mistake they ever made in the world. And Sir Robert Brook-Popham told me at dinner one night--

he's all through this book.

Q An Account of Mr. Pawley Signing a Contract with Soong on April 15, 1941 to Secure Volunteers for 100 P-40's" is on pp 18-19 of Sunderland & Romanus, "Stilwell's Mission to China" (Army Historical Series). We have a copy of Gen Arnold's itinerary in January 1946 in his visit to Lima, Peru. He probably had his heart attack on the 18th of January 1946 shortly before a reception at the American Embassy which was planned for that evening. The last item here is a letter from Arnold to Ambassador Pawley, January 28, 1946 thanking him and Mrs. Pawley for many kindnesses to the Arnold family during their visit. He wrote: "It will always be a source of deep regret that I was unable to do all the things planned for me in Lima, b ut in spite of the medicos, I did come away with a better picture of your problems and those of our missions down there, all of which I have summed up in a memorandum to Gen Eisenhower. I hope that out of all our efforts something will at long last be done which may not only further our interests in Peru, but also win back some of the prestige we seem to be so rapidly losing."

Arnold said that since his return to Miami, he had been resting and he felt very well. In fact, he said he had a 3-hour luncheon with Winston Churchill the previous day, which was January 27, 1946, and he hoped that his path would cross that of Ambassador Pawley.

Hub Pawley

MEMOIRS

Title	Yellow Draft	White Draft	Extra Copy
Introduction	X	X	X
Airline in the Caribbean	X	X	X
Wings for the Chinese Dragon	X	X	X
Building Aircraft for China	X	X	X
The Noose Around China Tightens	X	X	X
Factory on the Burma Border	X	X	X
In the Forgotten Theatre of War	X	X	X
Unheeded Pearl Harbor Warning	X	X	X
Organizing the Flying Tigers	X	X	X
Flying Tiger Logistics	X	X	X
Air Battles Over Burma	X	X	X
Building Aircraft at Bangalore	X	X	X
Transition toward Diplomacy	X	X	X
Social and Economic Conflict in Peru	X	X	X
Confrontation over Argentine Policy	X	X	X
Brazilian Ambassadorship	X	X	X
Red Challenge to Pan Americanism	X	X	X
Storm Clouds on the Economic Horizon	X	X	X
The Bogota Uprising	X	X	X
Revolution in Colombia	X	X	X
Negotiations for Military Bases in Spain	X	X	X
The Fall of China	X	X	X

American Wheat and Indian Famine	X	X	X
Eisenhower Becomes President	X	X	X
Strangling a Red Dictatorship	X	X	X
Message to Batista	X	X	X
Negotiations with Trujillo	X	X	X
Assassination of Trujillo	X	X	X
Losing the Battle for Cuban Freedom	X	X	X
Kennedy and the Cuban Catastrophe	X	X	X
The Perilous Future	X	X	X

Peabody, Hume

16 Nov 72

20314

25 October 1972

done 11-16-72

Brig. General Hume Peabody, USAF (Ret)
"Deep Falls"
Chaptico, Maryland 20621

Dear General Peabody:

Hope you havent given up on my coming out. I've just not been able to find the right time to come out. And, now, I've used up all my leave time and some of my reserve. Moreover, some pressing deadlines force postponement until after the first of the year.

Most of that leave time was used in spending two weeks out in Colorado and Wyoming where I interviewed a number of retired officers living out there, not the least being Colonel H.H. Arnold, Jr. who retired out to Sheridan, Wyoming.

I'm glad to learn that you are a subscriber to Aerospace Historian. I had a piece about Robert Dunbar in the Summer issue. The editors were kind enough to make about 100 available for distribution at his annual party, held last Sunday night at Bolling. He is 91 years young, and has slowed a step or two. General Spaatz headed the list of guests, and I guess he has slowed a step or two himself.

Anyway, I have every intention of coming out and will let you know well in advance.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

P.S. One factor in my planning. I'm trying to get together with General William Arnold, former Chief of Chaplains, AAF, who lives in Milford, Delaware. I'm thinking of making a one-day package trip. We shall see.

Called 11/13/72 - OK Thurs AM

Hume Peabody

1. Class of 1915 - Eisenhower - "Class of Stars"

2. Served as Air Officer Western Department Aerial Forest Fire Patrol

3. Air Corps Tactical School - Carney - 1931-4

4. Left HQ Air Corps for Langley - Did this hurt your career?

4. War Org & Movement - Stevenson

5. Gen Fairchild - great brain - F & Arnold?

6. School of Applied Tactics -

7. Chennault vs Bomber advocates? ACTS - Who were bomber men.

8. G-2 ~~trusted~~ British Intel more than A-2 - Why?

9. CG AF at Normandy

Hume Peabody
Chaptico, Maryland 20621

Memorial Day

Dear Dr.Green,

Being somewhat familiar with the Pentagon rat race,I imagined that you had been busier than a bull pup with a feather duster. No harm done as what little I can contribute will keep.

However,a slight monkey wrench has been tossed into the works. All of a sudden we sold our house and we are in the throes of separating the sheep from the goats in preparation for our move about the middle of June. The move will take us less than three miles away from where we are now,as shown below.

Many thanks for the Aerospace Historian as an extra copy always comes in handy. I had read and greatly enjoyed your article on Hugh Knerr. "Sailor" Knerr and I were in the same J.M.A.Class at Rockwell in 1917. The others were Henry Abbey,Carlisle Wash,Junius Houghton,Henry J.F.Miller,Dexter Rumsey and a cuple of National Guard officers-Noggle from the Hawaian Guard and Thorpe from Washington. We first took the R,M,A,course with a class of cadets and then took the J.M.A.course.

Any time you are free after June 20th will be fine with me.

Sincerely,

Hume Peabody.

over



After June 15—

Phone 301/884-4334

4439

20314

26 May 1972

Brig General Hume Peabody, USAF (Ret)
Chaptico, Maryland 20621

Dear General Peabody:

I just havent been able to break away for that interview about Hap Arnold. Please dont give up on me.

Just happen to have an extra of current magazine, for your interest. A.H. March issue

I'll phone beforehand, when I find that I can break away.

All good wishes,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

AC 301

20314 475-8515

7 March 1972

Brig General Hume Peabody, USAF (Ret)
Chaptico, Maryland 20621

Dear General Peabody:

Your letter has a great suggestion and I will take it up sometime in April. I'd come earlier but I'm a Reservist in Air Force Intelligence and have two weeks of duty coming up next Monday.

Incidentally, Col.Tom Mustain, a colleague in Air Force Intelligence who plays "den mother" for the Reserve, tells me that you were invited to attend the Christmas banquet some years ago. General Tommy White was the guest speaker that year. You were indisposed and could not make it.

Perhaps you will keep our Banquet in mind for this year. Normally, we hold it at Bolling on the second Wednesday evening in December. We would invite you as an honored guest and you wouldnt have to do more than rise to acknowledge an introduction.

Your driving instructions down to Chaptico are first rate. I'm looking forward to a pleasant drive and a most interesting session with you. I'll phone in a couple of weeks, just a few days before I plan to come down, just to check your schedule.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Hume Peabody
Chaptico, Maryland 20621

March 2nd.

Dear Mr.Green,

Any time you can make it will be OK with me if you will give me a call (301/475-8515) a few days in advance. I keep pretty busy but my schedule is usually so flexible that changes present no difficulties. Why not come down in time for a confab before lunch and then after lunch we could pick up the loose ends. Spring is usually a busy time for me and my getting in to the Big City might meet with delays.

Enclosed is a map which may be of help. If you should go astray anywhere in St.Mary's County, just ask anyone. I am fairly widely known and highly suspected.

I never did hear anything about Steve Ferson's death other than it had happened, this in spite of my being A2 at the time. Nate Twining took over for a few days until they had time to look around and find a permanent goat.

I can tell you about an amusing dido of Steve's while we were at the Tactical School at Langley 28-29.

I'll be looking for you some time in April with much pleasure.

Sincerely yours,

Hume Peabody

Hume Peabody

P.S.
Sorry to hear about Jack Curry. -HP

Come out S.Penn.Ave,over Sousa Bridge,and at top of hill in Anacostia(church on left) turn right on Branch Ave which becones Rte 5. At TB (short for Thomas Brooke,early settler) you join Rte 301. Best way is stay on #301 (Rte 5 turns south at Waldorf) on thru Waldorf and La Plata. Turn left on Rte 234,between old Thunderbird Motel,now an office bldg,and the White House Motel. Eleven miles from turnoff you enter the thriving metropolis of Chaptico...first the P.O. and a Village Liquor Store (which I do not patronize the Navy Pax River being cheaper) and then left on Rte 238 1.1 miles to Wayside,the Peabody domicile.



20314

29 February 1972

Brig General Hume Peabody, USAF (Ret)
Chaptico, Maryland 20621

Dear General Peabody:

Your prompt response to my inquiry opened up a host of possibilities. I would say you had some excellent and close contacts with General Arnold and I eagerly look forward to getting together with you.

I'm very much interested in talking to somebody who recalls Colonel Arnold as Air Officer at the Presidio, as I have very little on that phase of his career. I also want to get more on the AAFSAT at Orlando. I talked with General Eubank last year and got something on it, but, as you say, you started the school, and that is very important.

Your comment about having succeeded to the post of Director of War Organization & Movement brings to mind the sad departure of Colonel Oliver "Steve" Ferson who was said to have died in General Arnold's office. However, General "Billy" Streett practically swore that Ferson died in the adjacent office of Mr. Lovett. The thought occurs that poor Ferson was taken out through the Office of Mr. Lovett in order to take the starch out of a quickly-spreading rumor that the man died while General Arnold was chewing him out.

Your letter brought to mind other key reminiscences. Incidentally, I never did get to talk to General John Curry. I was out in Denver last year interviewing General Arnold's sister-in-law and tried to see General Curry, but he sounded feeble and his wife would not let me come up.

I would like to drive down some day, perhaps in April, although if you have occasion to come up here, I would be pleased to have lunch with you. Please send me a map and I'll try to work a visit to Chaptico into my plans. I have to be out of town for two weeks in March, and so I would like to shoot for April.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Chaptico,Md. 20621
24 February 1972.

Mr.Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History,
Hq.U.S.Air Force,
Washington,D.C. 20314

Dear Mr.Green,

Your letter of February 22nd was received today which is about par for covering the approximate 60 miles separating us.

Perhaps I should straighten out a misunderstanding so that we will both be talking about the same guy. The Hume Peabody who attended the Arnolds' dinner was my son who was then a second classman and who graduated in 1941. I was a few years earlier, being of 1915 vintage. Our thanks for the copy of his letter which tells us that at least some of his early training registered.

I would be most happy to be of any assistance I can in furthering your project. I will let you be the judge as to whether or not my contacts with General Arnold might develop anything of interest. My first contact was in 1920 when I was stationed at March Field,Calif.,as OIC Training. General Arnold was Air Officer,Western Department, at the Presidio of San Francisco. There was quite an investigation of the then C.O.for some alleged irregularities and he was relieved and until the Field closed in 1922,I was C.O.directly under General Arnold's supervision.(There were two brief periods when senior officers took command during a shuffle of personnel.)

During my tour with the R.O.T.C. at the University of California at Berkeley I had the extra duty of running summer camps for the R.O.T.C.and Organized Reserve Officers. Two of these were held at Rockwell Field where General Arnold was in Command of the Rockwell Field Air Depot.

My next contact was when I was ordered to Hq.AAF just after General Arnold took over after the death of General Westover. I was brought in as Chief of Plans. Shortly thereafter General Spatz came in and as there was no slot for him,he was made Chief of Plans although he functioned almost entirely as General Arnold's special assistant. My tenure here was rather short as things were cracking and Joe McNarney,A-4 of the GHQ A.F. was ordered to the WDGS and I was hooked to take his job at Langley.

In 1942 I was ordered to Hq AAF and made A-2,which pleased me mightily. To my dismay,three weeks later I was shifted to Director of War Organization and Movement due to the sudden death of the incumbent. This was a blessing in disguise since I was under General Fairchild who headed Operations. When the question of a school to teach a get-rich-quick course in tactics for the newly organized groups destined for overseas,it was right down my alley. While Ass't Con under General John F.Curry,Comdt.,of the ACTS from 1931-4, we had developed the idea of a tactical school where we would teach the theory and at once illustrate with tactical operations by our highly selected school troops. During that time we were never able to get our idea off the ground but it had been a dream of mine so when the subject was brought up at a special conference in Operations I had more ideas than a dog has fleas. Two days later I was told that I was it...that I would proceed to Orlando and organize such a school,absorbing as part what was then the Fighter Command School at Orlando. I told General Arnold that if he wanted maximum results the fledgling AAFSAT would have to have priority on domestic personnel assignments and he agreed.

Perhaps the best way to describe AAFSAT is to say(and this is not original with me) that it stood in the same relation to other service schools as Disneyland compared with the average County Fair. At any rate,General Arnold was very proud of it as evidenced by his frequent visits and the Top Brass he sent down beginning with Undersecretary Patterson

and Secretary Lovett.

Of course my contacts were relatively few compared to those of many of the people you mentioned in your letter. However, if you think they might be productive, I would be glad to have a talk with you at your convenience.

When you were at General Streett's you were about fifteen air miles from where I live but several times farther by road as the Patuxent River is between. I am about 55 miles from the center of D.C. in St. Mary's County. I usually drive to the Army-Navy Club in an hour and twenty minutes. Should you be interested in coming down let me know and I will send you a map. Chaptico is just a wide place in the road and I live a mile farther out in the wilds.

Sincerely,

Hume Peabody

Hume Peabody,
BG/USAF/Ret.

20314

22 February 1972

Brig General Hume Peabody, USAF (Ret)
Chaptico, Maryland 20621

Dear General Peabody:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold, and have been at it for three years or more. I'm a professional historian and was assigned in the Secretary's Office for over twenty years before coming over to the Historian's Office.

After a Brookings Institution Fellowship that allowed me to go through the Arnold Manuscript Collection at the Library of Congress, I began an interview program about 18 months ago, and have been privileged to have talked to most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, and over 100 others. Outside the uniformed service, I talked with Hon. Robert Lovett, Charles Lindbergh, Jackie Cochran, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker and some others.

On a couple of occasions I have seen your name in the files and knew that you had at least a few contacts with General Arnold. Recently, I came across some correspondence at the Arnold Ranch in Sonoma, California, having to do with the Cadet Dinner at the Thayer Hotel on February 10, 1940. You were one of the invited guests because you qualified as an Army or Air Corps "brat". Anyway, your bread-and-butter letter after the event ended up in the Arnold file. You may retain the enclosure.

And now, I'd like to have the benefit of any recollections you may have of General Arnold. It seems to me that I have passed near Chaptico enroute to Ocean City. If this is indeed the case, I would be very pleased to have the opportunity of spending an hour or so with you, if you feel that it would be profitable.

I might mention that Col Bruce Arnold and I visited Gen St Clair Streett and Mrs. Streett in Lusby, Maryland late in 1969, just before the General passed away. I dont guess we were too far away at that time.

I would be pleased to hear from you at your convenience. The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

February 20, 1940

Dear General Arnold,

Ever since the dinner last week I have intended to write and thank you, but somehow academics or Corps-land practices or some other duty have always seemed to interfere. I enjoyed the dinner a great deal, and the opportunity to renew some acquaintances that had lapsed somewhat was a real pleasure.

Please give my best regards to Mrs. Arnold.

Sincerely yours,
Hume Peabody, Jr.

WAYSIDE
CHAPTICO, MARYLAND

1 December 1964.

Major General Jack E.Thomas,USAF,
Assistant Chief of Staff,Intelligence,
Headquarters U.S.Air Force,
Washington 25,D.C.

Dear General Thomas,

I regret that unforeseen developments in the home bailiwick will prevent my attendance at the AFNIN dinner after all. Please accept my thanks for your kind invitation.

I doubt if any remarks of mine on Air Intelligence would be of much constructive value as I was A-2 for such a brief period. I had barely learned where to hang my cap when the sudden death of the Director of War Organization and Movement resulted in my transfer to chaperone that rat race. During my brief tenure,however,I learned to love the work,while at the same time acquiring a feeling of frustration. The latter was the result of the tendency of G-2....we were still part of the Army in those days...to write off any of our intelligence estimates not emanating from British information. I have often regretted that we never had the opportunity in later months to gloat over our estimate of the German air potential as compared to that set forth by our British cousins.

With best wishes for a most successful gathering,

Sincerely yours,

Hume Peabody.

Hume Peabody,
Brig.Gen.,USAF,(Ret),
Former A-2 for all of three weeks.

Interview - BG Hume Peabody, Chaptico, Md. 16 Nov 1972, w/ Tom Sturn

Q We are talking about Gen Delos Emmons and Gen Hap Arnold, your recollection of Arnold and Emmons together.

H When they were together, their conversation wasn't the same that you would exactly as the same as you would expect of two officers of high rank, like that, who have a kind of ease of communication. I can't put my finger on any one incident or anything that was said, but I just got that impression that Emmons was deferring all the time to Hap. He stood in either just a little bit of awe, or a little bit of fear, which after all, are more or less the same thing.

Q What rank was Emmons? Did you have the Air Force Combat Command then at Bolling?

P. I went to the Air Force Combat Command after the GHQ AF moved up to Bolling and became the Air Force Combat Command.

Q Are you talking about that period?

P I'm talking about that entire period.

Q And he was two, possibly three stars by then. Was he higher ranking than Arnold at this time?

P To my recollection, I couldn't say so for sure.

Q A man who was very close to Emmons, who has turned over his papers to me--and I have been reading them with great interest--Harold McGinnis. Harold McGinnis was very close to Emmons.

P. Yes, he was very close to him, and he used to accompany Emmons on a lot of his inspection trips.

S The WWII story has been published, but not well. I don't think it has credited Gen Saville sufficiently for his contribution. Very interesting contribution, but it would seem that among all the officers of the AF, none ever had such a single mission as he had all those years.

He was "Mr. Air Defense." I was very much interested in his relations with Gen Chennault was a pursuit pilot. But then, I think, Gordon Saville had different ideas on how to use his airplanes for interception than Chennault envisaged. Then, of course, Chennault went to China and installed a remarkably effective interceptor air defense system.

P. Didn't he go to the two plane element rather than the three plane element in his tactics?

Q This is Chennault?

P. Chennault

S I think so

P I think he finally accepted that.

S That's an awfully good point, I'm going to check that out, I believe so.

P I'll tell you who can probably some information, and he's living in Arlington. Johnny Alison, who was a fighter in the 13th AF there

S I met him Thursday and he was a friend of an old friend of mine, Casey Vincent

P Oh yes, I knew Casey well. Casey served under me.

Q General, I want to take you now to the period right after the death of General Westover. This was Sept 1938. Arnold took over. You were brought into Arnold's Hqs, to head up Plans. Then there was some problem between assigning you and Gen Spaatz. Was he supposed to be Chief of Staff.

P There wasn't any problem there. I was brought in there with the idea of heading Plans. But I hadn't been there more than two minutes when Tooey was brought in. There wasn't any place in the organization for Tooey, except in Plans. So Tooey was the Head of Plans. But, actually he was a first-hand assistant for General Arnold. At the time I was in Plans, I found that Plans Section as such did not function. It was a trouble shooting section. If any outfit, if any of the other departments

there had any problems, and they didn't know how to solve them, they said" "send it to Plans and make a study." So we were concerned with solving problems for other people, rather than sitting back and making our long distance plans. Our time devoted to that was very minimal. In the meantime, of course, just exactly what Tooey was doing for Gen Arnold, I don't know. But he spent more time in Gen Arnold's office, than he did in ours. I took care of the pick and shovel work in Plans and Tooey was the top man. Every now and then, he would come in with something that Gen Arnold wanted done, but as a general thing, as a Plans Section, we were not planning, we were solving things for other people. I called it "the chief trouble-shooting section."

Q Well, Spaatz had Arnold's confidence? They were very close?

P Very close indeed, right

Q They brought in Eaker about that time. Didn't he come into the Information Office?

P He may have, but I didn't have the contact with Eaker that I had with Spaatz. Of course, right about that time, the expansion started, the 5,500 plane expansion came. They brought McNarney in. From then on, Tooey spent more of his time in it. The Plans Section as such didn't do any work with that expansion. They had a separate group there that drew up the plans for the expansion.

Q When did you leave to go to Langley, was that around '39, maybe?

P Yes, I was there about 6 months. Then I went down to Langley

S What was your job there, general, at the AF Combat Command

P At Langley, I was a G-4, I took Joe McNarney's job

Q Joe McNarney was brought up because Marshall liked him, I think Didn't Marshall know him?

P I don't know whether he knew him or not, but he couldn't have picked a better man.

Q And he moved up and became Marshall's deputy before long. Did Marshall single him out? Just about that time Marshall took Malin Craig's job.

P I couldn't say, I don't know anything about the relation, but I know that he did work for him for a long time, and I can easily see why he was a success on that top job, Joe had the ability, when any problem was brought up, to put his finger right on the weak point. I'll give you an illustration. The bombardment people came around with a problem. They said: "With our attrition rate that we are having around there and our production so far, if we are going to keep up our training, we are not going to be able to send any planes to the combat area." I looked over the thing, all the figures, and said: "Let's go over and talk to J Joe" We went over and gave it to Joe. Joe glanced over it and he said: "Your attrition rate is wrong." He said" "That attrition rate is six months old. The actual attrition rate isn't that now." He got the new attrition rate, which we should have had, but it just never came down to us. Joe was absolutely right, that just illustrates one thing. And that took him maybe 5 minutes. He solved our problem we had been worrying about for half a day.

Q He was a dour Scot, wasn't he? Not much on the talk?

P Joe, really, when you got to know him, and I got to know him quite well as a cadet, and later on, because we had acquaintances around Emporia, Pa., where he came from. When Joe unbent, he really had a warm personality. I think a lot of that dourness was a defense mechanism.

Q What kind of relationship did he have with Arnold?

P Oh Arnold thought very highly of Joe McNarney.

Q He was a squadron commander for Arnold at March Field. Did Arnold bring him into Hqs?

P Yes, he brought him in during the expansion. Joe was still out there and when this expansion started, he set up a group to handle that, and he brought Joe in at that time.

Q I get the impression that Joe McNarney was highly thought of and brought in to do tough jobs, but you couldn't get too close to him?

P No, you couldn't get close to him. But he had a peculiar personality. You couldn't get close to him, but nobody disliked him. Everybody liked Joe, but as you say, you could never get close to him. He was never a buddy with anybody.

Q I think that's why Marshall liked him, because he was no-nonsense. Marshall was no-nonsense, too. Marshall, you couldn't get next to, either. He was very formal in his relationships. He wanted things done. Marshall wasn't the kind of guy you would put your arm around his shoulder and go out drinking with him?

P I only met Marshall one time, when he was Asst Command at the Infantry School and I was in a much lower job with the same title at the Tactical School. We had some maneuvers over there, and I met him in his office just a short time.

Q What kind of relationship between Marshall and Arnold?

P I couldn't say, I never even heard one way or another, but apparently it was cordial. No reason to believe it wasn't

Q Yes, otherwise Arnold wouldn't have had the job, because Marshall was his boss. When you said Emmons held Arnold in awe, perhaps in a little fear, this might describe Arnold's relationship with Marshall?

P Is that so? I never knew Arnold was in awe of anybody.

Q Yes, he was, if you look at their relationship (story of "Dear General" vs "Dear Arnold")

Q Getting into your Plans business again, we are talking about 1938, early '39, Arnold had just taken over the job as Chief of the Air Corps,

they had a big series of conferences. This was the first expansion program. They were to get 10,000 planes, and they ended up with around 5,000 planes. What role did you have in that expansion?

P None, as I say, when the program came up, it was settled at 5,500 planes, that's when Gen Arnold put up a special section under Tooey and Joe McNarney, and I forget some of the others. But they were the two main ones working in there. So I had absolutely no direct connection with it. At that time I was busy trouble shooting for the rest of the office.

Q Did Arnold, in effect, give Tooey the main Plans job because he knew him? He knew him from way back--they were close friends--would that accurately describe the situation?

P Well, I imagine so, Arnold had his own way on how he wanted anything done. When something came up, he would just assign it to somebody, and give them the help they needed, and say: "Go to it."

Q Arnold had a number of people who came up from March Field with him. There were two "schools," the west coast school under Arnold and the east coast under Andrews. Many of the fellows who came up with Arnold at March Field, like McNarney, Spaatz, Eaker, some others, got top jobs. Others, perhaps with equal ability, did not get top jobs. Is this a fair statement?

P You know, that gives rise to some interesting thought. That never occurred to me before.

Q It had occurred to some others.

P With respect to the ability of those people, but I know if I had a job, I was going to have to have 3 top notch men. If I had three men here with whom I had served, and whose ability I knew very well; I knew how they worked; I knew they could do the job for me, wouldn't it be only natural that I would pick them rather than three other people that

might be just as good, who had good reputations, and against whom I had nothing? I would go for the known-ability every time. It is unfortunate on the others. You can look back not only in the AF but in the other branches of service, of people who just weren't in the right place at the right time. They had a lot more ability than a lot of people.

Q When you were in Plans in 1939, Arnold was just really starting out to expand the AF

P That's right

Q He was having a lot of trouble with Louis Johnson and Mr.. Woodring who was Secretary of War. They were not yet prepared to open the purse-strings. Arnold and others were having a lot of trouble getting money for the bomber program. You were in Plans, of course. Do you have any recollection of specific problems?

P No, we had no direct contact that would lead me to any information with the trouble he was having with those people you mentioned.

Q Did you work for Westover at all, or was he already gone?

P No, no.

Q Let me take you now to WWII, when you came in you were A-2 for a little bit, and then you were in the War Organization and Movement. You worked for "Sandy" Fairchild. Everybody has a very high regard for Sandy Fairchild as one of the brains of the AAF. Do you know anything about Fairchild's relationship with Arnold?

P I have no idea of what his relationship was. I didn't know Sandy very well until I went to War Organization & Movement, but I was very much impressed by the way he organized his staff meetings. There was no time wasted. He got right down to the crux of every problem and discussed it with people. When you left, you knew how he felt about it, and what you were supposed to do.

Q Arnold was supposed to have a great respect for him, but I don't know anybody, or I haven't really gotten a feel for their inter-personal relationship, except that Arnold must have had great regard for him. He was DM[N] there for a long time. He was a sick man too, wasn't he?

P I never knew that he was, but apparently he was.

Q He had some heart trouble. Arnold had some trouble too, Did you know about it?

P No, I never knew. To me, he was always the picture of health.

Q Arnold was supposed to have a perennial smile on his face. Is this so?

P He did.

Q Could it be deceptive?

P Oh yes, lots of time you had to know whether to smile with him or not to smile with hin. But he had that perpetual smile. Sometimes when he was displeased with something, he would still have this smile. He'd ask you a question, just as much to say: "Well, now, I'm just kind of waiting, and if you don't give me the right answer--boom!"

Q When you say "boom" how did he react negatively?

P I was one of the fortunate ones. He never reprimanded me for anything, never climbed on me, never chewed me out. But I can imagine when he did, he really did a job of it.

Q Did he explode in words?

P I have no first-hand information. I do know one thing. The only weakness that I think the man had, I won't say, the only weakness, because we all have many weaknesses, But one weakness that he had was a stubbornness. He was very loath to change on something that he had made up his mind on. Small matters, I am speaking of now. I'll give you an illustration on that. Shep Fitzgeral was passed over, any number of years for temporary BG, or any number of times. Finally,

Shep went in to see Gen Arnold, to ask him why, and Gen Arnold said: "Yes, I'll tell you why," he said: "When I had the Western Section of the Air Mail, I came down to Rockwell Field on a Sunday to get some very needed supplies. You were out playing golf and I couldn't get them." Shep told him he never had a golf club in his hand, that he must be mistaken. Gen Arnold said: "I'm not mistaken. Of course, we all knew who it was, it was Al Sneed he was thinking of, and not Shep. It was several months later before he finally broke down and promoted Shep, and he was a very outstanding officer, I thought, in the few times I had any dealings with him. But Arnold was stubborn that way.

Q This reminds me of something else. Arnold, in shooting from the hip, or making snap decisions--sometimes about little things--had a propensity for grabbing people in the hall of the Pentagon or the Munitions Bldg and putting them on jobs sometimes foreign to their expertise. Have you ever heard that story of him grabbing people to do jobs for him?

P No, I've never heard that.

Q Was there some terror among the Air Staff in going in to face him with a problem? If you had some bad problem, some bad situation arose, was there some reluctance to report to the leader on this problem?

P I never heard anybody say that, personally I never had any difficulty. Just go see Miss Atkins and say I'd like to see the General about such and such a thing. She'd talk to him on the squawk box and he'd say: "Just a minute," or "Send him in." I'd go in and state what my business was, some question that I had. He had one bad feature though, that would just drive me nuts. He'd call me up on the squawk box. As soon as he would make contact with me, he would get up and walk to the window. I'd have the worst time trying to hear what he was saying on the squawk box. as a result. I talked to other officers and they said they had the same trouble with him.

Q You mean while he had you on the squawk box, he'd go to the window?

P He'd be thinking about something. He'd walk to the window and he would have his back to the squawk box, and I almost made a booboo on the transference of an airplane from West Point. He called me on the squawk box and said he wanted this airplane transferred. It was so out of reason, that I said: "You mean you want it taken away?" And he said "Yes." So I started orders for the transfer of this airplane, according to what he said although I thought: "That didn't make sense." So I went down to see him, and I said: "General, I want to check on something again. I asked you over the squawk box if you wanted this airplane transferred." He said: "My God, no, don't transfer it." Well, I got entirely a different impression. Fortunately I checked back on that. But a lot of us had that squawk box trouble with him.

Q He had this tendency to hit the squawk box and get, he'd go to the lower man sometimes in the echelon. He wouldn't go to the top man. He would go right to the man with the question or the problem, would he not? Did this make people unhappy?

P I did work directly under him. In those cases where I had any dealings with him when I was in Plans, that was the only time I was ever called on the squawk box.

Q What you just said brings up two questions. Suzy Atkins. She was his traffic manager in a way. Some people have told me that she would tell them: "Today is a bad day for your problem." Or she would call up and say: "Now is a good time to go see him." In other words, she was their counselor. Some people told her what their problem was and then she would counsel them: "Go in and see him, or you'd better stay away." Did this ever happen to you?

P Only one time. I went into her office, and I heard a lot of laughter coming from Gen Arnold's office, and I said I wanted to see him. She said: "What's it about?" And I told her. She said: "Can it wait?" and I said: "Oh yes, it's not important. I can let it go." She said: "Well,

he's having a lot of fun in there with mechanical Christmas presents." He said: "Come on in." And she took me in and there were several officers from around there, and some friend of Gen Arnold's who was in the business.

Q Louis Marx

P Yes. He sent him all these mechanical Christmas toys. They were all wound up and running around the office, and Arnold was in stitches. I was glad to see him relax that much. He was more relaxed than I ever saw him at any other time.

Q He gave these toys to children of staff officers. Louis Marx was a guy who liked to be associated with greatness, and he latched on to Arnold and Marshall. He gave them some stock, small amount of stock, and he sent down this big bundle of toys, and Arnold would distribute it to his staff. The second question I have to ask was about this Advisory Council that he set up. The original members of it were Gen "Pre" Cabell and Lauris Norstad. They were supplanted in time by Rosie O'Donnell, Jake Smart, Larry Kuter, Fred Dean. Now, these people were Ministers without portfolio. He would give them a problem in Plans, or in Operations, or in Management, or something and they would supersede the Air Staff authority. Sometimes they would jump across the chain of command, because he wanted results; he wanted action; he didn't want to wait until it filtered down through the Air Staff. Did these fellows ever give you any problems?

P No, because I was out of the office by that time.

Q They were just starting out really, in February 1942, so maybe they hadn't really gotten going yet. But, did you hear of anybody having any problems?

P I never heard anybody mention that. And the only time that I had any contact about that time with Jake Smart was when he came down to

AFSAT, just a general look around tour. The First Air Support Command was out in Oklahoma City when Pearl Harbor happened. Shortly afterwards that Support Command was ordered to New Orleans. But, in the meantime, I came down with pneumonia and when I got out of the hospital I was ordered down to Washington for reassignment. It was recommended that I not have overseas service for some time as a result of this pneumonia.

S You were greatly disappointed then?

P I was, yes. I finally got overseas by going when the Staff Surgeon was on leave. He came back the day I was leaving the post. I was at Barksdale at that time. He said: "Well, I'll give you three months." He hit it right on the nose. At the end of three months I was back in this country. I had a flareup of pneumonia while I was at Post Hostilities planning on USSTAF.

S When did they form the Air Support Commands? Can you recall that date?

P Yes, that was shortly after, it would be in the summer of '41. I reported out to Oklahoma in October '41 as I recall. They had a meeting at Bolling AFB, or at the War College, I think it was. They had the Air Support Commanders--North Duncan, J. W. Jones

S Carlyle Wash?

P No, he wasn't one of them, Bill Kepner, and I forget who the other one was. We set up the program at that time, and I went to the 2nd Air Support at Oklahoma City. Asa North Duncan went to the 1st Air Support Command, I think. Jones went down to the 5th.

S Asa North Duncan joined Spaatz in the 8th AF very soon after that, did he not? At Bolling Field? He was in the 8th AF Advanced Echelon when he went overseas. They gave him his star and he became Spaatz' deputy, did he not?

P I don't know, just what it was. He was lost shortly after in a flight.

Q This was during the North African TORCH Operation?

P Oh yes.

S The Air Support Commands were apparently formed to fill a vacuum, or to correct a lack of something. We formed the Fighter Command, that and the Bomber Command. That emulated the Royal Air Force organization. That took care of that. But after that came the Air Support Command, and the history of that, the genesis of the Support Command has never been adequately done. Whose idea? Have you any idea whose idea the Air Support Command was?

P No, I don't, see, when I was at the Tactical School, our organizations were as I say, more or less in a state of flux. The Air Support was carried out--the bombardment end of it--by the Attack Aviation. We had Pursuit Aviation which we would use for Pursuit purposes. We had observation aviation which would take care of the Observation. But it was never brought into one single command to work directly with the ground commanders. I think it was because there was a kind of a hesitancy of assigning aviation to the direct support of ground commanders because of the fear it might be misused. I know bombardment people were very much afraid of that. They pointed to map problems at Leavenworth, where they had Bombardment attacking Field Artillery, for example, which was not a target for bombardment in the stage of development it was at that time. So I think there was a lag in the formation of a tactical air force.

S Would you hazard a guess as to why you were selected to head one of them? Seniority?

P No, I don't know why I was selected.

S You were a pretty select group from what I've seen. Somebody must have deliberately chosen these men destined to command these Air Support Commands with something in mind--an ability acquired to do a certain thing.

P Of course, while I was Asst Commandant, I always advanced the idea that the ground forces were not utilizing aviation to the extent that they should use it to carry out their mission. It may be it went back to that.

Q What was Arnold's attitude toward the bomber-fighter-air support command idea?

P I never heard him express anyt;ing along any particular lines.

Q I get the feeling that he was not a doctrinaire man. He was not an idealogue, but a doer?

P That's right

Q He left that to others to formulate the fancy theories about how you perform. Is this an accurate assessment?

P I think you are correct in that?

Q There were others who were more interested in theories. Kenney was one who went into that. Kuter got involved in that. Do you have any knowledge of Kuter's relationship with Arnold? He put him in charge of Plans toward the end of the war?

P No, not at all. He was in the student at the Air Corps Tactical School during the one year that I went back there on the Air Corps Board.

Q He was supposed to be brilliant?

P Yes, and he wasn't afraid. The thing I admired about Larry, he wasn't afraid to stand up on his hind legs and say what he thought. They had a number of Naval Officers in the class at that time. They made some remark about bombardment, and Larry got up in class and spoke his mind, to a result that the Navy came to the Asst Commandant, who was Conger Pratt at that time. The Navy entered a very vehement protest. They felt there was an apology due. Larry as much as told them to "go to." He was right and he wasn't about to apologize for expressing his opinion.

Q You mentioned Conger Pratt. There were several men like Conger Pratt and Shep Fitzgerald who were "old timers" and didn't get too far along the promotion trail. Another man was Sue Clagett. I just wonder. Do you happen to know Arnold's relationship with some of these men?

P No, I don't. My relations with Conger Pratt were very widely spaced. I first met him in WWI when I was sent overseas on a special mission for what was then the Technical Section out in Dayton. Pratt was the head of the mission. There were several Reserve Officers who were on specific assignments, like schools, and so forth. I didn't get over with the mission, but I met them over there in Paris just as we were ready to come back. And I came back with them, which was very fortunate, because when we got to London, the Transportation Officer over there was a former Union Pacific man with whom Conger had a previous acquaintance, and we came back on the bridal suite of the Mauretania.

Q How did the SAT get started--the School for Applied Tactics--how did it get started?

P That goes back to when I was in the Tactical School, and Jack Curry and I visualized the type school where we would teach the theory in the morning and then in the afternoon go out and apply these tactics with trained troops. You'd have an organization set up, and the students would take the place of commanders, flight commanders, group commanders, squadron commanders, etc. and carry out their problems in the afternoon while the theory was fresh in their mind. We didn't get to first base when Benny Foulois was Chief, because Benny had never been to school, and he didn't go strong for schools anyway. But, I was very much surprised when I was in War Organization & Movement when Sandy Fairchild called me in and said: "We are starting a school up here, and we'd like to have your ideas about this school." When we had this meeting in Sandy's office, I had all the ideas that Jack Curry and I had developed. It was a 50-50 proposition. Neither one of us did any

more than the other. It was a joint project as far as Jack and I were concerned. I gave them the plan and told them that Jack and I had developed this. They listed to what everybody had to say. The next morning Sandy called me in and he said: "We are organizing a School of Applied Tactics and you are to be the Commander."

Q Sandy Fairchild had sold it to Arnold?

P Hw didn't have to sell it too much. We had previously talked, when I was in Plans, or before I was in Plans, when I was still at the Tactical School. I had sent stuff into the front office to have a composite group to demonstrate these things. We thought we would start that way. That never got to first base. Then when I was in Plans, Hap called me in and said that he wanted a study on a composite group along the lines that had been advanced earlier. And I said: "Well, that has been turned down as not being feasible." And he said: "It isn't a question of that," He said: "I want it." And I said: "Oh, you want a study supporting the demand for it," I said. "I could write it up either way," which you could on any study, of course. So I wrote up a study recommending that such a group be formed. Now, this was before the School of Flying Tactics arose. So that was sent on to General Staff, and they did organize a composite group down at Maxwell Field. They started to get super-duper personnel in there. But when the School of Applied Tactics came up, that was the only time I went to see Gen Arnold. I said: "This isn't going to amount to a hill of beans unless I have absolute priority on personnel," He said, speaking in general: "You have it. If you have any trouble getting them, come to me." I never had any trouble in getting the personnel I asked for.

Q The great pressure to build up that school occurred in 1943 when the B-17s were getting shot down in large numbers. Was a lot of pressure applied to you to try to devise some box formation or some tactic?

P Nope. I don't know whether was or not, but we did devise a stack formation for a group. We had a group of two squadrons of B-17s and two squadrons of B-24s, and we devised a stack formation which we felt was better suited to the problem than the one they were using. Curt LeMay came down there, and we flew this stack formation for him. He didn't say anything that day, and he came in the office the next day. He said: "Can you fly that formation for me again?" And I said: "It will take a little time. They are on different missions right at the present time. But I said: "Inside of an hour, hour and a half, we can have them back here, and fly it." They flew it again, and he said: "I want to change this airplane, and this one, and then I'm going to use it." Now whether or not he did, I don't know, but he said, "That is an answer to some of our problems."

S Do you recall the officer who developed that stack formation?

P. Montgomery was in charge of the Bombardment Section, and just who devised it, it was a case of cooperation with the Fighter Section, the Bombardment Section.

Q Which Montgomery - Richard or J.B.?

P Little short fellow. It will be in the records. He was head of the Bombardment Section at the Tactical School. The Fighter Section was under command of Grover... Our personnel We were shooting to end up with personnel who had overseas service, not only in the European theater but in the Pacific theater, so we would get a levening of ideas. We wouldn't get any one particular theater shoved down our throats. At the time I left there, we had built up so we had about 60% of the personnel in our demonstration groups there had overseas experience. Maybe some of them, as they came back, brought the demand for it. All we needed was somebody to give us an idea, and we had the facilities to work on it. We could work on it where a mistake was only a mistake, and not a fatality or a calamity. We developed a number of things from ideas that were brought back. For example, you would probably, I don't know

whether you are interested in it or not, but the orbiting idea for the fighters on bomber penetrations, we developed that. We tried to sell it to George Kenny and George said if I had any pilots that could fly that much at night, I would be using them in the daytime.

Q There was a difference of opinion between Frank O'D. Hunter, who commanded the 8th Fighter Command, and Arnold. He took him out of there and put in Kepner, the idea of whether the fighters stuck to the bombers, or they were free ranging and flew ahead to anticipate problems. Some people were comforted by the physical presence of the fighters. Did you get involved in that?

P I never got involved in that. We more or less left that up to the air force commander, as far as the Tactical School was concerned, unless they requested it, of course.

Q I just wondered whether they tried this going ahead of the bombers, or just hovering over the bombers, whether these experiments were conducted at your school?

P No, no. We had no experiments along that line whatsoever, at my time at least

Q Let me ask you about another experiment. This one went real sour, this was the XB-40 and the XB-41. This was the armored escort. They took some bombers and they put a lot of armor on them, and filled them full of guns. They were disguised and they went along with the bomber formation. I guess they were called "destroyer escorts." I guess it didn't work out.

P What year was that?

Q 1943, it lasted a couple of months.

P We weren't involved in that at all. At that time we were fighting for a way to get longer range for our fighters with droppable tanks, or even, of course, the main thing at that time was production, getting

. . .

enough bullet proof tanks that we could use on the wings. We tried a number of experiments using a metal tank which could be set on fire with incendiary bullets and we showed that you could go ahead, and in combat with those tanks, and the minute they were set on fire there was no danger immediately, because the fire was streaming out behind. You could then drop your tanks. Arnold wouldn't go along with that development at all.

Q Arnold wouldn't go along with that?

P No, he said he didn't want to jeopardize the lives of his pilots.

Q How about the cardboard tanks? They were buying them from the British. Did you try to test those?

P We didn't run into that

Q This was a very spontaneous experiment. Wright Field was dragging on developing the wing tanks and the droppable tanks. They purchased some of these cardboard tanks from the British. Did you get involved in testing that out?

P No, the last time Gen Arnold came down with a problem was when they were picking up photographs of the V-1. We ran experiments, or Eglin was running experiments for attacking the little hangars, little L-shaped hangars they had. At that time they even had a 3" field gun mounted in a B-25.

Q This was Grandison Gardner, Proving Ground Command?

P Yes

Q Did you work closely with him?

P Oh yes, very closely

Q How often did Arnold come down to see what you were doing?

P He was very proud of AFTAC. He used to bring the top brass down quite often. One was particular anxious, our Under Secy at that time.

Q Patterson?

P Oh yes, he just had a field day down there. It was more or less like Disneyland compared to the ordinary schools. But everything had a purpose. I never saw anybody as interested in the exact operation of the thing. For example, somebody came in, a ground officer for example, who didn't know anything about air support at all. We could start him off with an illustrated lecture on a board, with electric lights.

S Which one was that, General?

P This change of nomenclature.

S At one point in the Continental Air Defense structure, they called them "defense fighter wing". In mid-1943, they dropped the "defense." They called it "fighter wing," and the reason being that they wanted to get offensive minded in all of the OTU and PTU Training programs. But you say you can't recall who...?

P That was more or less strategic implications rather than strictly tactical implications, which we were mainly concerned with at the Tactical School.

S Did you have much trouble in getting trained radar operators for your tactical training there at Orlando?

P No, no, we were continually training personnel of course, all the time, rotating our personnel.

S These are on the search radars?

P Yes

S I see. They would come in to you pretty well trained, wouldn't they?

P Yes, We had quite a radar setup. We had 24-hour radar setup there at Orlando in that Air Defense Command

S Did 2nd Fighter Command work with you on that? They were at Drew, weren't they?

P No, we were more or less just working on our own.

S I see. I can't figure out what 2nd Fighter Command did all those years

P Where was their headquarters?

S At Drew Air Base. They remained in existence until the was was over. But I find no evidence that they did much. Now Gen Gilkeson was there for a good part of that time.

Q General, about how often did Arnold come down to SAT to look at you operation?

P Well, it was irregular. I would say, in the year and a half that I was there, he was probably down half a dozen times.

Q Did he come down because you called him and said: "General, we'd like you to look at something," or was it just a routine?

P No, he always set the time for coming. He always tied it in more or less with a general trip, except, I think, one or two times when he was bringing somebody down like the Under Secy.

Q Usually tie it into a visit to the Proving Ground Command at Eglin?

P Yes, they would generally go over there.

Q In a sense you were dealing with tactics and they were dealing with hardware?

P Yes, that's right.

Q He was a gadgeteer in my reading of him. He liked gadgets. He liked new ideas or new gadgets for solving operational problems. Is this a fair estimate of him?

P Well, he always supported anything we wanted. Lord knows we ran to gadgets, if ever any school did. Practically all of them were used successfully. We only had one failure in my time there, and that wasn't our fault. That was the fault of Bel Geddes. We were setting up a building in which we would have a complete ground-air battle, cutting the time down where one hour would be condensed into five minutes, for example. It was all done in display, electrically. It required so many little motors and rheostats, we couldn't cool it. It was a wonderful idea. It would be wonderful for training ground

commanders who had had no cooperation with the Air at all. It was all right in theory, but mechanically they just couln't cool the job.

Q I want to take you to one more area, the area of Intelligence. You said something about G-2 trusted the British Intelligence more than they did A-2. You said something about that in your letter to me?

P Yes, they seemed to. We had our own ideas as to the strength of the German Air Force. The British, of course, based everything on what they called their battle formations, the report they got of the outfits in contact. We based ours more or less on their manufacturing capabilities. We didn't feel that what they were using at the present time gave any adequate idea of what their ultimate strength, or their actual strength was, or what their ultimate strength would be. So I think our estimates in A-2 were somewhat disregarded. As a matter of fact, G-2 didn't think too highly, I think, of the kind of brash youngster that was growing up right on their doorstep. An illustration was our meteorologist.

Q Irving Krick?

P Yes, I was very much interested, during that period, in his long term forecasts. I followed up on the thing and found that they were going to G-2 and then were stopping. So Tooey was overseas at that time--no, not Tooey, whoever was over there at that time--asked him if he would like these reports. And he said, he'd love to have them, so he not only got the reports, he got Krick over there, too. But there was a tendency to downrate any information we had. I think they found out, later on, that our estimate of the strength of the German Air Force was a lot closer than the British estimate.

Q Was it an estimate of lower strength? Did the British overestimate?

P Oh, they underestimated, ye. We were, I think, pretty close to 50% higher in our estimates than they were.

Q At Normandy, the German Air Force didn't show up. Arnold got very much incensed at the British intelligence because they overestimate what the Germans could bring to bear at Normandy. Of course, only a few planes showed up. The German AF almost disappeared from the skies.

P Of course, now, we are talking about two different times. Our estimates of what I was speaking was when we first went into the war, and you are talking of the period after we had been operating some time. You see, their AF had been whittled down and their manufacturing facilities.

Q I see, you are talking about the period before the war?

P I'm talking just right after we went in. As a matter of fact, we weren't in yet. Pearl Harbor hadn't come along yet.

Q And the British estimates were lower than ours? We estimated higher and more accurately?

P I'll tell you one thing that we based ours on a lot was Lindbergh's reports. He had a pretty good access to their manufacturing facilties over there.

Q Did you get to see the Lindbergh report?

P I didn't see his report, no. But we had access to a certain number of figures from them, and we based ours a lot on that.

Q There is a guy in our office working on Lindbergh. Do you know anything about Arnold and Lindbergh?

P No, I don't

Q They were good friends?

P I never had the pleasure of meeting Lindbergh.

Q I interviewed him a year and a half ago. This fellow is working on a book of Lindbergh in our office, and he's very close to Lindbergh now. You said something about Irving Krick. What about Irving Krick and Arnold?

P I don't know, he was giving, in the short time I was in A-2, a little air resume at the briefings that were held at 11:00 every day. And the first thing I thought: "What was this naval officer doing here?" And I found out he had been called to active duty and kind of kicked around from here to ther.

Q That was in 1942? Arnold had him switched over to the AF

P And that's when I got interested

Q In meteorology

P Interested in his long range forecasting

Q Was he accurate?

P The ones that I was able to check in a limited time ran about 80% accurate. That was the thing that amazed me. These local forecasters weren't doing that well.

Q Were you impressed by Krick's briefings? Did you attend some of his briefings?

P His briefings were very brief. I was--his reports were very brief. They just interested me enough that I started digging into the things, to see how they were arrived at. Now, maybe he gave me some of his best estimates.

Q Was Arnold present when he gave some of these briefings?

P No, no. I did this on my own, that's when I went to George Strong, who was in G-2, George was a classmate of mine at Leavenworth, so I could talk to him. I asked him what was being done with Krick's reports. He said they weren't getting any farther than his office there.

Q One last area, Arnold was greatly interested in the JB-2. This was a Chinese version of the V-1. Arnold had this idea of launching a lot of JB-2's against the Germans. We had taken the V-1 and improved upon it. And, of course, he got sick and this plan was never adopted, but he was trying it out down at the Proving Grounds. I wonder if this ever got to you at SAT?

P No, the only thing that I ever saw, I saw the first V-1 they had over there. I saw a launching on that. Shortly afterwards, I was moved from the Tactical Center, and sent out to organize the 2nd Air Support Command.

Q Where was that?

P That was at Barksdale, and we were charged with furnishing replacements for all the tactical air force units in the theater. We had quite a little setup down there and were cooperating quite closely with the Coast Artillery, in addition to the area of supply

Q Did you stay there the rest of the war?

P No, I was there about six months, and I got this chance to go overseas. Barney Giles called me, and wanted to know if I wanted to go overseas and I said: "Can a duck swim?" And he said: "Well, there's a chance to go over.". He explained what the job was. It was post-hostilities planning.

Q This was in Guam

P Barney was the Chief of Air Staff at that time. This was over with USSTAF

Q This is out in the Pacific?

P No, no, the US Strategic Air Forces with the Headquarters in London. Tooey was head of them at the time.

Q You are talking about '45?

P Talking about '45, yes, or '44 it was.

Q Giles left to go to the Pacific himself?

P Who was Chief of Staff then?

Q When Giles left - Eaker. Eaker was brought in right at the end of the war.

P Then it was Eaker who called me.

Q Eaker came in April 1945. He became Deputy Commander, AAF.

Q You spent only a little time overseas. Arnold himself was never in combat. Did he ever talk to you about his regret that he never served in combat?

P No

Q You were not that close to him?

P No

Q Did he ever let his hair down with you, and talk to you about what his hopes were for a separate AF?

P No, generally when we weren't talking shop, or it wasn't a business proposition, it was in a large group where he wasn't talking directly to me.

Q You don't recall ever just having a conversation with him, two-man conversation, casual? You weren't that close to him?

P No, generally when I was with him alone was when I was showing him or taking him from our headquarters, Orlando, out to his airplane.

Q You know, I sent you a copy of that letter, when he had all the brats of the Army officers. He had a party at West Point. Your son was there. .. He did this for all his sons. He tried to establish an esprit de corps among Air Corps guys in the Army. Were you aware that he was trying to build up this kind of spirit?

P A lot of people do things like that they don't get credit for

Q He had a great interest in West Point, in converting part of the training there into flying, because he wanted to get some of the cream of the crop into the Air Corps. This is one way of piping in on that talent.

Q One last sort of overall question. Was Arnold the best man in job as heading the AF at the time? Related to that possibility, could Andrews as good a job or better, or not quite as good, or what do you think?

P I'm in no position to judge, because I just met Andrews two or three times. I never had any close association with him. I never served under him, or with him, for any length of time.

Q Do you feel Arnold did a good job or an outstanding job?

P I feel he did, yes, In fact I would say he did a marvelous job. That's my opinion of it.

Q Is there anybody in your career acquaintance that could have done a better job?

P Discounting Andrews, some people name him. As I say, I couldn't compare the two.

S We talked about Gen Arnold and we talked about air defense. I'd like to ask a couple of questions on BG Peabody. What made you choose West Point, General?

P Well, I'd always had an inclination for the military. At the time I got an appointment to West Point, I was living in Cheyenne, Wyoming. I had no idea, I knew very little about West Point. I had no idea how you got in, went about getting an appointment. At that time I was interested in taking up engineering at the University of Michigan. I was in my last year of high school. I made plans, in fact, I had a job lined up. I was going to work my way through. I had a job lined up in one of the fraternity houses there. And I was talking to my brother-in-law with whom I was living at the time. He was talking to the State Engineer, he mentioned the fact, he said: "Why does he want to become a surveyor?" I was interested in surveying at the time. He said: "Why does he want to become a surveyor? Surveyors are a dime a dozen now." He said: "By the way, I was talking to Elmer Lane, Secy for Sen Warren, and he says there's a vacancy for West Point. Would he be interested in that?" My brother-in-law came home and told me and I said: "Oh golly, yes." So I put in an application, letter to Sen Warren, and took a competitive examination, and got the appointment, and went to West Point. Just one of those things that happen. Somebody came along and told me the opportunity was available. I grabbed it!

Q And then, what made you choose the Air Service?

P When I was a cavalryman I thought that anybody that didn't ride a horse was a little bit touched in the head. I actually believed that. There was something radically wrong with their thinking. And then when the flying came along, it appealed to me, but I couldn't do anything about it at that time, because I was married. They changed the regulations about that time.

Q In 1914.

P Before, yes. They changed the regs about marriage and I immediately applied. I think it was about 6 or 7 months before I heard anything about it. Then I was ordered to take my physical examination. While I was at Fort Sam Houston and then sent out to Rockwell Field for my training, I started my training in Sept 1, 1917.

S Did you find that flying held the promise that you hoped it would?

P Oh, yes, I never regretted that.

S You enjoyed flying?

P Very much indeed. I tried to talk my son out of it. I presented all the occupational hazards, etc, when he was to make up, before he graduated from the Academy. I told him about the certain disadvantages and so forth, so he listened to me. When I got done, he said: "Dad, if you had to do it over again, what would you do?" I said: "Pick up my marbles, you win!"

Q Did he go into flying?

P Yes, he took flying training and he transferred. At that time, they had to take a commission in one of the branches of services and then, were transferred as soon as they got their rating.

S Was there any time during the 1930s, considering the pay..

P I didn't want to leave the flying game until I was ready to retire. The civilian life just didn't appeal to me, at all.

S One final question: I keep coming across the name of a man named Herbert Dargue. Did you ever have any contacts with him?

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S One final question: I keep coming across the name of a man named Herbert Dargue. Did you ever have any contacts with him?

P Oh yes. He was Asst Commandant at the Tactical School. But I never had any direct contact with him, I just knew him casually. He had reported at the time I left. I left at the end of the school year and he reported some time during the summer.

Q Did you ever have any contact with Horace Hickam?

P Oh yes, yes. More or less on a social level, he used to come through Maxwell quite often when he was down at Galveston. And stay there over there, more or less an overnight stop for those people.

Q Many people who knew him said that if he had lived he would have gone to a high position?

P Oh, I think no doubt about it. He was one of the few at the time who had that seniority who looked ahead.

Q You didn't get involved in the air mail?

P No, I did not.

Q Hickam got involved in it. Hickam had the Gentral Zone. You didn't get into that.

P No, I was at Tactical School at the time. They kept up more or less intact.

Q Did you know Byron Q. Jones.

P Yes, I did. He was a first classman when I was a plebe.

S He left the Air Corps and went back to the Cavalry. Do you know why?

P He was very outspoken. I think he made quite a few enemies as a result. When he had a fighter group, that string formathon when he had his fighter group, one of the first ones to use it. I think the two-plane element was more or less a result with the maneuverability he had with his string formation. I think string formation dispersed your tactical force too much. But with your two-plane element, you had flexibility. You could vary the size of your force, and its maneuverability was unquestioned. With Clair Chennault's insistence on the 3-plane element,

you were fixed. You were more or less down to one pair of eyes working. In a two-plane element with your wing man, he was looking around. He wasn't right up close.

Q B.Q. had the Eastern Zone during the air mail. Arnold had the Western Zone and Hickam had the Central Zone. Arnold did not think much of Byron Q. Jones.

P No, they djust didn't get along, I understand.

Q You don't know this first-hand?

P I have no information as to what it was all about.

Q That could have been a reason that Byron Q. Jones went back into the Cavalry.

Q How about Foulois? Did you have knowledge of him?

P Oh yes. When he was Chief, I was still down at the Tactical School. As I said before, Benny had no use for schools because he wasn't a graduate of any school. I was concerned mainly later on when I retired, when I was Exec Director for the AF Historical Foundation. We were to get a new President. Nobody had any ideas who it should be. I said: "If any man has a place of history in the AF it's Benny. Let's just make him President." And, of course, he just fell right into it. He had the time to devote to it, very enthusiastic about it, and did a grand job, while he was President of the Foundation.

Q Benny Foulois got in bad with Pres Roosevelt. Although he was in good health and ability, he never had any job during WWII. Did you know that? Did you ever think about that?

P No

Q He outlived all his contemporaries; guys who started with him.

P Benny's thinking was a bit outdated. He had two strikes against him.

Q Was he impatient with schooling and books because he learned to fly by the seat of his pants?

P I don't know. I think he was just impatient with schooling, period. Because he learned in the school of hard knocks. He gave the graduation address at the Tactical School the first year I was there. I remember him saying that the number of his class that came into the Army at the same time that he did, he was the only one that was a General Officer and he was the only one who had never attended any service school.

Q This is Westover?

P I was very fond of Oscar Westover in the few contacts I had with him, mainly while he was an instructor at Leavenworth while I was a student. But I have a feeling that--of course, there's always a tendency to compare a man like that with Hap. Oscar was the plodding type to me. His view: "Well, I won't make this move until I have thought out every angle on the thing." and "let's not hurry about this." He wasn't the "let's-get-this-done" type that Hap was. So from that standpoint, I don't think he was too well-fitted for the job.

S In attempting to re-evoke this fascinating period of 1930's when the Air Corps was so small and yet doing so much, how did the rest of you feel when one of you went in? What was the impact on those of you who were senior men? For example, when Horace Hickam was killed, how did you feel?

P Personally, as far as Horace Hickam was concerned, I felt a great personal loss because I was very fond of him. We were kind of kindred spirits in that he had been frustrated a great deal when he was on the General Staff, by presenting ideas, as he said were sent around for concurrence, and they came back with some nonconcurrences on them. He said: "I simply took it and wrote: 'nibbled to death by ducks,' and put it in a big drawer in my desk." Jack Curry and I had had many instances of frustration with sending our ideas up to the front office.

So we were kind of kindred spirits in that respect. And then Hickam had a very charming personality. He was a good story teller, and a very affable type. So I felt a personal loss. I didn't think: "Well, I've gained one more file," or anything like that. I never ran across anybody that didn't have--other than, at my level--the highest regard for Horace Hickam. Earl Narden thought he was just tops. Horace took Earl and said: "Now, you've been moving armies around. I'm going to teach you how to handle a flight." He started him out as a Flight Commander, and then, as a Squadron Commander, and afterwards, he had the group down there.

Q There were men--Sue Clagett, Davenport Johnson, Douglas Netherwood--with whom Arnold did not see eye to eye--Jakie Fickel.

P With Sue Clagett I didn't see eye to eye either. Sue Clagett was Air Officer of the 9th Air Corps Area when I had the ROTC at California. He insisted on holding the ROTC camp at Crissy Field. And I told him: "Colonel, you can't do it. You are only going to get about 15% of the time when the weather is going to be fog-free enough to fly." Well, he would have none of it. I tried to tell the outfit at the 9th Corps Area the same thing, and I didn't get to first base. They held the camp there, and I think we flew about 20% of our program. Down at Rockwell we would fly 100%.

Q You mentioned Hugh Knerr...

P In the same JMA class. He was a Naval Academy graduate. I didn't run across him very much after that until I was with USSTAF, and Hugh at that time was the A-4 for USSTAF. And Douglas Netherwood came down to Orlando, and we had breakfast together and I took him over to the field the day he was killed. That was an odd thing. There was a front between Orlando and Jacksonville, and Douglas took off. There were a few local showers around there. He just never checked in with the first check-in point which was Daytona Beach. We searched that

area, criss-crossed it for two weeks. We had out ground searchers, got these hunters, went all through the ground area, and we never found any trace at all of his airplane.

Interview - BG Hume Peabody, Chaptico, Md. 16 Nov 1972, w/ Tom Sturm

Q We are talking about Gen Delos Emmons and Gen Hap Arnold, your recollection of Arnold and Emmons together.

H When they were together, their conversation wasn't the same that you would exactly as the same as you would expect of two officers of high rank, like that, who have a kind of ease of communication. I can't put my finger on any one incident or anything that was said, but I just got that impression that Emmons was deferring all the time to Hap. He stood in either just a little bit of awe, or a little bit of fear, which after all, are omore or less the same thing.

Q What rank was Emmons? Did you have the Air Force Combat Command then at Bolling?

P. I went to the Air Force Combat Command after the GHQ AF moved up to Bolling and became the Air Force Combat Command.

Q Are you talking about that period?

P I'm talking about that entire period.

Q And he was two, possibly three stars by then. Was he higher ranking than Arnold at this time?

P To my recollection, I couldn't say so for sure.

Q A man who was very close to Emmons, who has turned over his papers to me--and I have been reading them with great interest--Harold McGinnis. Harold McGinnis was very close to Emmons.

P. Yes, he was very close to him, and he used to accompany Emmons on a lot of his inspection trips.

S The WWII story has been published, but hnot well. I don't think it has credited Gen Saville sufficiently for his contribution. Very interesting contribution, but it would seem that among all the officers of the AF, none ever had such a single mission as he had all those years.

He was "Mr. Air Defense." I was very much interested in his relations with Gen Chennault was a pursuit pilot. But then, I think, Gordon Saville had different ideas on how to use his airplanes for interception than Chennault envisaged. Then, of course, Chennault went to China and installed a remarkably effective interceptor air defense system.

P. Didn't he go to the two plane element rather than the three plane element in his tactics?

Q This is Chennault?

P. Chennault

S I think so

P I think he finally accepted that.

S That's an awfully good point, I'm going to check that out, I believe so.

P I'll tell you who can probably some information, and he's living in Arlington. Johnny Alison, who was a fighter in the 13th AF there

S I met him Thursday and he was a friend of an old friend of mine, Casey Vincent

P Oh yes, I knew Casey well. Casey served under me.

Q General, I want to take you now to the period right afterthe death of General Westover. This was Sept 1938. Arnold took over. You were brought into Arnold's Hqs, to head up Plans. Then there was some problem between assigning you and Gen Spaatz. Was he supposed to be Chief of Staff.

P There wasn't any problem there. I was brought in there with the idea of heading Plans. But I hadn't been there more than two minutes when Tooey was brought in. There wasn't any place in the organization for Tooey, except in Plans. So Tooey was the Head of Plans. But, actually, he was a first-hand assistant for General Arnold. At the time I was in Plans, I found that Plans Section as such did not function. It was a trouble shooting section. If any outfit, if any of the other departments

there had any problems, and they didn't know how to solve them, they said" "send it to Plans and make a study." So we were concerned with solving problems for other people, rather than sitting back and m making our long distance plans. Our time devoted to that was very minimal. In the meantime, of course, just exactly what Tooey was doing for Gen Arnold, I don't know. But he spent more time in Gen Arnold's office, than he did in ours. I took care of the pick and shovel work in Plans and Tooey was the top man. Every now and then, he would come in with something that Gen Arnold wanted done, but as a general thing, as a pPlans Section, we were not planning, we were solving things for other people. I called it "the chief trouble-shooting section."

Q Well, Spaatz had Arnold's confidence? They were very close?

P Very close indeed, right

Q They brought in Eaker about that time. Didn't he come into the Information Office?

P He may have, but I didn't have the contact with Eaker that I had with Spaatz. Of course, right about that time, the expansion started, the 5,500 plane expansion came. They brought McNarney in. From then on, Tooey spent more of his time in it. The Plans Section as such didn't do any work with that expansion. They had a separate group there that drew up the plans for the expansion.

Q When did you leave to go to Langley, was that around '39, maybe?

P Yes, I was there about 6 months. Then I went down to Langley

S What was your job there, general, at the AF Combat Command

P At Langley, I was a G-4, I took Joe McNarney's job

Q Joe McNarney was brought up because Marshall liked him, I think Didn't Marshall know him?

P I don't know whether he knew him or not, but he couldn't have picked a better man.

Q And he moved up and became Marshall's deputy before long. Did Marshall single him out? Just about that time Marshall took Malin Craig's job.

P I couldn't say, I don't know anything about the relation, but I know that he did work for him for a long time, and I can easily see why he was a success on that top job, Joe had the ability, when any problem was brought up, to put his finger right on the weak point. I'll give you an illustration. The bombardment people came around with a problem. They said: "With our attrition rate that we are having around there and our production so far, if we are going to keep up our training, we are not going to be able to send any planes to the combat area." I looked over the thing, all the figures, and said: "Let's go over and talk to J Joe" We went over and gave it to Joe. Joe glanced over it and he said: "Your attrition rate is wrong." He said" "That attrition rate is six months old. The actual attrition rate isn't that now." He got the new attrition rate, which we should have had, but it just never came down to us. Joe was absolutely right, that just illustrates one thing. And that took him maybe 5 minutes. He solved our problem we had been worrying about for half a day.

Q He was a dour Scot, wasn't he? Not much on the talk?

P Joe, really, when you got to know him, and I got to know him quite well as a cadet, and later on, because we had acquaintances around Emporia, Pa., where he came from. When Joe unbent, he really had a warm personality. I think a lot of that dourness was a defense mechanism.

Q What kind of relationship did he have with Arnold?

P Oh Arnold thought very highly of Joe McNarney.

Q He was a squadron commander for Arnold at March Field. Did Arnold bring him into Hqs?

P Yes, he brought him in during the expansion. Joe was still out there and when this expansion started, he set up a group to handle that, and he brought Joe in at that time.

Q I get the impression that Joe McNarney was highly thought of and brought in to do tough jobs, but you couldn't get too close to him?

P No, you couldn't get close to him. But he had a peculiar personality. You couldn't get close oto him, but nobody disliked him. Everybody liked Joe, but as you say, you could never get close to him. He was never a buddy with anybody.

Q I think that's why Marshall liked him, because he was no-nonsense. Marshall was no-nonsense, too. Marshall, you couldn't get next to, either. He was very formal in his relationships. He wanted things done. Marshall swasn't the kind of guy you would put your arm around his shoulder and go out drinking with him?

P I only met Marshall one time, when he was Asst Command at the Infantry School and I was in a much lower job with the same title at the Tactical School. We had some maneuvers over there, and I met him in his office just a short time.

Q What kind of relationship between Marshall and Arnold?

P I couldn't say, I never even heard one way or another, but apparently it was cordial. No reason to believe it wasn't

Q Yes, otherwise Arnold wouldn't have had the job, because Marshall was his boss. When you said Emmons held Arnold in awe, perhaps in a little fear, this might describe Arnold's relationship with marshall?

P Is that so? I never knew Arnold was in awe fof anybody.

Q Yes, he was, if you look at their relationship (story of "Dear General" vs "Dear Arnold")

Q Getting into your Plans business again, we are talking about 1938, early '39, Arnold had just taken over the job as Chief of the Air Corps,

they had a big series of conferences. This was the first expansion program. They were to get 10,000 planes, and they ended up with around 5,000 planes. What role did you have in that expansion?

P None, as I say, when the program came up, it was settled at 5,500 planes, that's when Gen Arnold put up a special section under Tooey and Joe McNarney, and I forget some of the others. But they were the two main ones working in there. So I had absolutely no direct connection with it. At that time I was busy trouble shooting for the rest of the office.

Q Did Arnold, in effect, give tTooey the main Plans job because he knew him? He knew him from way back--they were close friends--would that accurately describe the situation?

P Well, I imagine so, Arnold had his own way on how he wanted anything done. When something came up, he would just assign it to somebody, and give them the help they needed, and say: "Go to it."

Q Arnold had a number of people who came up from March Field with thim. There were two "schools," the west coast school under Arnold and the east coast under Andrews. Many of the fellows who came up with Arnold at March Field, like McNarney, Spaatz, Eaker, some others, got top jobs. Others, perhaps with equal ability, did not get top jobs. Is this a fair statement?

P You know, that gives rise to some interesting thought. That never occurred to me before.

Q It had occurred to some others.

P With respect to the ability of those people, but I know Iif I had a job, I was going to have to have 3 top notch men. If I had three men here with whom I had served, and whose ability I knew very well; I knew how they worked; I knew they could do the job for me, wouldn't it be only natural that I would pick them rather than three other people that

might be just as good, who had good reputations, and against whom I had nothing? I would go for the known-ability every time. It is unfortunate on the others. You can look back not only in the AF but in the other branches of service, of people who just weren't in the right place at the right time. They had a lot more ability than a lot of people.

Q When you were in Plans in 1939, Arnold was just really starting out to expand the AF

P That's right

Q He was having a lot of trouble with Louis Johnson and Mrs. Woodring who was Secretary of War. They were not yet prepared to open the purse-strings. Arnold and others were having a lot of trouble getting money for the bomber program. You were in Plans, of course. Do you have any recollection of specific problems?

P No, we had no direct contact that would lead me to any information with the trouble he was having with those people you mentioned.

Q Did you work for Westover at all, or was he already gone?

P No, no.

Q Let me take you now to WWII, when you came in you rwere A-2 for a little bit, and then you were in the AWar Organization and Movement. You worked for "Sandy" Fairchild. Everybody has a very high regard for Sandy Fairchild as one of the brains of the AAF. Do you know anything about Fairchild's relationship with Arnold?

P I have no idea of what his relationship was. I didn't know Sandy very well until I went to War Organization & Movement, but I was very much impressed by the way he organized his staff meetings. There was no time wasted. He got right down to the crux of every problem and discussed it with people. When you left, you knew how he felt about it, and what you were supposed to do.

Q Arnold was supposed to have a great respect for him, but I don't know anybody, or I haven't really gotten a feel for their inter-personal relationship, except that Arnold must have had great regard for him. He was DM[IV] there for a long time. He was a sick man too, wasn't he?

P I never knew that he was, but apparently he was.

Q He had some heart trouble. Arnold had some trouble too, Did you know about it?

P No, I never knew. To me, he was always the picture of health.

Q Arnold was supposed to have a perennial smile on his face. Is this so?

P He did.

Q Could it be deceptive?

P Oh yes, lots of time you had to know whether to smile with him or not to smile with hin . But he had that perpetual smile. Sometimes when he was displeased with tsomething, he would still have this smile. He'd ask you a question, just as much to say: "Well, now, I'm just kind of waiting, and if you don't give me the right answer--boom!"

Q When you say "boom" how did he react negatively?

P I was one of the fortunate ones. He never reprimanded me for anything, never climbed on me, never chewed me out. But I can imagine when he did, he really did a job of it.

Q Did he explode in words?

P I have no firsthand information. I do know one thing. The only weakness that I think the man had, I won't say, the only weakness, because we all have many weaknesses, But one weakness that he had was a stubbornness. He was very loath to change on something that he had made up his mind on. Small matters, I am speaking of now. I'll give you an illustration on that. Shep Fitzgeral Fitz Gerald was passed over, any number of years for temporary BG, or any number of times. Finally,

Shep went in to see Gen Arnold, to ask him why, and Gen Arnold said: "Yes, I'll tell you why," he said: "When I had the Western Section of the Air Mail, I came down to Rockwell Field on a Sunday to get some very needed supplies. You were out playing golf and I couldn't get them." Shep told him he never had a golf club in his hand, that he must be mistaken. Gen Arnold said: "I'm not mistaken. Of course, we all knew who it was, it was Al Sneed he was thinking of, and not Shep. It was several months later before he finally broke down and promoted Shep, and he was a very outstanding officer, I thought, in the few times I had any dealings with him. But Arnold was stubborn that way.

Q This reminds me of something else. Arnold, in shooting from the hip, or making snap decisions--sometimes about little things--had a propensity for grabbing people in the hall of the Pentagon or the Munitions Bldg and putting them on jobs sometimes foreign to their expertise. Have you ever heard that story of him grabbing people to do jobs for him?

P No, I've never heard that.

Q Was there some terror among the Air Staff in going in to face him with a problem? If you had some bad problem, some bad situation arose, was there some reluctance to report to the leader on this problem?

P I never heard anybody say that, personally I never had any difficulty. Just go see Miss Atkins and say I'd like to see the General about such and such a thing. She'd talk to him on the squawk box and he'd say: "Just a minute," or "Send him in." I'd go in and state what my business was, some question that I had. He had one bad feature though, that would just drive me nuts. He'd call me up on the squawk box. As soon as he would make contact with me, he would get up and walk to the window. I'd have the worst time trying to hear what he was saying on the squawk box. as a result. I talked to other officers and they said they had the same trouble with him.

Q You mean while he had you on the squawk box, he'd go to the window?

P He'd be thinking about something. He'd walk to the window and he would have his back to the squawk box, and I almost made a booboo on the transference of an airplane from West Point. He called me on the squawk box and said he wanted this airplane transferred. It was so out of reason, that I said: "You mean you want it taken away?" And he said "Yes." So I started orders for the transfer of this airplane, according to what he said although I thought: "That didn't make sense." So I went down to see him, and I said: "General, I want to check on something again. I asked you over the squawk box if you wanted this airplane transferred." He said: "My God, no, don't transfer it." Well, I got aentirely a different impression. Fortunately I checked back on that. But a lot of us had that squawk box trouble with him.

Q He had this tendency to hit the squawk box and get, he'd go to the lower man sometimes in the echelon. He wouldn't go to the top man. He would go right to the man with the question or the problem, would he not? Did this make people unhappy?

P I did work directly under him. In those cases where I had any dealings with him when I was in Plans, that was the only time I was ever called on the squawk box.

Q What you just said brings up two questions. Suzy Atkins. She was his traffic manager in a way. Some people have told me that she would tell them: "Today is a bad day for your problem." Or she would call up and say: "Now is a good time to go see him." In other words, she was their counselor. Some people told her what their problem was and then she would counsel them: "Go in and see him, or you'd better stay away." Did this ever happen to you?

P Only one time. I went into her office, and I heard a lot of laughter coming from Gen Arnold's office, and I said I wanted to see him. She said: "What's it about?" And I told her. She said: "Can it wait?" and I said: "Oh yes, it's not important. I can let it go." She said: "Well,

he's having a lot of fun in there with mechanical Christmas presents." He said: "Come on in." And she took me in and there were several officers from around there, and some friend of Gen Arnold's who was in the business.

Q Louis Marx

P Yes. He sent him all these mechanical Christmas toys. They were all wound up and running around the office, and Arnold was in stitches. I was glad to see him relax that much. He was more relaxed than I ever saw him at any other time.

Q He gave these toys to children of staff officers. Louis Marx was a guy who liked to be associated with greatness, and he latched on to Arnold and Marshall. He gave them some stock, small amount of stock, and he sent down this big bundle of toys, and Arnold would distribute it to his staff. The second question I have to ask was about this Advisory Council that he set up. The original members of it were Gen "Pre" Cabell and Lauris Norstad. They were supplanted in time by Rosie O'Donnell, Jake Smart, Larry Kuter, Fred Dean. Now, these people were Ministers without portfolio. He would give them a problem in Plans, or in Operations, or in Management, or something and they would supersede the Air Staff authority. Sometimes they would jump across the chain of command, because he wanted results; he wanted action; he didn't want to wait until it filtered down through the Air Staff. Did these fellows ever give you any problems?

P No, because I was out of the office by that time.

Q They were just starting out really, in February 1942, so maybe they hadn't really gotten going yet. But, did you hear of anybody having any problems?

P I never heard anybody mention that. And the only time that I had any contact about that time with Jake Smart was when he came down to

AFSAT, just a general look around tour. The First Air Support Command was out in Oklahoma City when Pearl Harbor happened. S Shortly afterwards that Support Command was ordered to New Orleans. But, in the meantime, I came down with pneumonia and when I got out of the hospital. I was ordered down to Washington for reassignment. It was recommended that I not have overseas service for some time as a result of this pneumonia.

S You were greatly disappointed then?

P I was, yes. I finally got overseas by going when the Staff Surgeon was on leave. IHe came back the day I was leaving the post. I was at Barksdale at that time. He said: "Well, I'll give you three months." He hit it right on the nose. At the end of three months I was back in this country. I had a flareup of pneumonia while I was at Post Hostilities planning on USSTAF.

S When did they form the Air Support Commands? Can you recall that date?

P Yes, that was shortly after, it would be in the summer of '41. I reported out to oOklahoma in October '41 as I recall. They had a meeting at Bolling AFB, or at the War College, I think it was. They had the Air Support Commanders--North Duncan, J. W. Jones

S Carlyle Wash?

P No, he wasn't one of them, Bill Kepner, and I forget who the other one was. We set up the program at tthat time, and I went to the 2nd Air Support at Oklahoma City. Asa North Duncan went to the 1st Air Support Command, I think. Jones went down to the 5th.

S Asa North Duncan joined Spaatz in the 8th AF very soon after that, did he not? At Bolling Field? He was in the 8th AF Advanced Echelon when he went overseas. They gave him his star and he became Spaatz' deputy, did he not?

P I don't know, just what it was. He was lost shortly after in a flight.

Q This was during the North African TORCH Operation?

P Oh yes.

S The Air Support Commands were apparently formed to fill a vacuum, or to correct a lack of something. We formed the Fighter Command, that and the Bomber Command. That emulated the Royal Air Force organization. That took care of that. But after that came the Air Support Command, and the history of that, the genesis of the Support Command has never been adequately done. Whose idea? Have you any idea whose idea the Air Support Command was?

P No, I don't, see, when I was at the Tactical School, our organizations were as I say, more or less in a state of flux. The Air Support was carried out--the bombardment end of it--by the Attack Aviation. We had Pur Pursuit Aviation which we would use for Pursuit purposes. We had observation aviation which would take care of the Observation. But it was never brought into one single command to work directly with the ground commanders. I think it was because there was a kind of a hesitancy of assigning aviation to the direct support of ground commanders because of the fear it might be misused. I know bombardment people were very much afraid of that. They pointed to map problems at Leavenworth, where they had Bombardment attacking Field Artillery, for example, which was not a target for bombardment in the stage of development it was at that time. So I think there was a lag in the formation of a tactical air force.

S Would you hazard a guess as to why you were selected to head one of them? Seniority?

P No, I don't know why I was selected.

S You were a pretty select group from what I've seen. Somebody must have deliberately chosen these men destined to command these Air Support Commands with something in mind--an ability acquired to do a certain thing.

P Of course, while I was Asst Commandant, I always advanced the idea that the ground forces were not utilizing aviation to the extent that they should use it to carry out their mission. It may be it went back to that.

Q What was Arnold's attitude toward the bomber-fighter-air support command idea?

P I never heard him express anything along any particular lines.

Q I get the feeling that he was not a doctrinaire man. He was not an idealogue, but a doer?

P That's right

Q He left that to others to formulate the fancy theories about how you perform. Is this an accurate assessment?

P I think you are correct in that?

Q There were others who were more interested in theories. Kenney was one who went into that. Kuter got involved in that. Do you have any knowledge of Kuter's relationship with Arnold? He put him in charge of Plans toward the end of the war?

P No, not at all. He was in the student at the Air Corps Tactical School during the one year that I went back there on the Air Corps Board.

Q He was supposed to be brilliant?

P Yes, and he wasn't afraid. The thing I admired about Larry, he wasn't afraid to stand up on his hind legs and say what he thought. They had a number of Naval Officers in the class at that time. They made some remark about bombardment, and Larry got up in class and spoke his mind, to a result that the Navy came to the Asst Commandant, who was Conger Pratt at that time. The Navy entered a very vehement protest. They felt there was an apology due. Larry as much as told them to "go to." He was right and he wasn't about to apologize for expressing his opinion.

Q You mentioned Conger Pratt. There were several men like Conger Pratt and Shep Fitzgerald who were "old timers" and didn't get too far along the promotion trail. Another man was Sue Clagett. I just wonder. Do you happen to know Arnold's relationship with some of these men?

P No, I don't. My relations with Conger Pratt were very widely spaced. I first met him in WWI when I was sent overseas on a special mission for what was then the Technical Section out in Dayton. Pratt was the head of the mission. There were several Reserve Officers who were on specific assignments, like schools, and so forth. I didn't get over with the mission, but I met them over there in Paris just as we were ready to come back. And I came back with them, which was very fortunate, because when we got to London, the Transportation Officer over there was a former Union Pacific man with whom Conger had a previous acquaintance, and we came back on the bridal suite of the Mauretania.

Q How did the SAT get started--the School for Applied Tactics--how did it get started?

P That goes back to when I was in the Tactical School, and Jack Curry and I visualized the type school where we would teach the theory in the morning and then in the afternoon go out and apply these tactics with trained troops. You'd have an organization set up, and the students would take the place of commanders, flight commanders, group commanders, squadron commanders, etc. and carry out their problems in the afternoon while the theory was fresh in their mind. We didn't get to first base when Benny Foulois was Chief, because Benny had never been to school, and he didn't go strong for schools anyway. But, I was very much surprised when I was in War Organization & Movement when Sandy Fairchild called me in and said: "We are starting a school up here, and we'd like to have your ideas about this school." When we had this meeting in Sandy's office, I had all the ideas that Jack Curry and I had developed. It was a 50-50 proposition. Neither one of us did any

more than the other. It was a joint project as far as Jack and I were concerned. I gave them the plan and told them that Jack and I had developed this. They listed to what everybody had to say. The next morning Sandy called me in and he said: "We are organizing a School of Applied Tactics and you are to be the Commander."

Q Sandy Fairchild had sold it to Arnold?

P Hw didn't have to sell it too much. We had previously talked, when I was in Plans, or before I was in Plans, when I was still at the Tactical School. I had sent stuff into the front office to ahave a composite group to demonstrate these things. We thought we would start that way. That never got to first base. Then when I was in Plans, Hap called me in and said that he wanted a study on a composite group along the lines that had been advanced earlier. And I said: "Well, that has been turned down as not being feasible." And he said: "It isn't a question of that," He said: "I want it." And I said: "Oh, you want a study supporting the demand for it," I said. "I could write it up either way," which you could on any study, of course. So I wrote up a study recommending that such a group be formed. Now, this was before the School of Flying Tactics arose. So that was sent on to General Staff, and they did organize a composite group down at Maxwell Field. They started to get super-duper personnel in there. But when the School of Applied Tactics came up, that was the only time I went to see Gen Arnold. I said: "This isn't going to amount to a hill of beans unless I have absolute priority on personnel," He said, speaking in general: "You have it. If you have any trouble getting them, come to me." I never had any trouble in getting the personnel I asked for.

Q The great pressure to build up that school occurred in 1943 when the B-17s were getting shot down in large numbers. Was a lot of pressure applied to you to try to devise some box formation or some tactic?

P Nope. I don't know whether was or not, but we did devise a stack formation for a group. We had a group of two squadrons of B-17s and two squadrons of B-24s, and we devised a stack formation which we vfelt was better suited to the problem than hthe one they were using. Curt LeMay came down there, and we flew this stack formation for him. He didn't say anything that day, and he came in the office the next day. He said: "Can you fly that formation for me again?" And I said: "It will take a little time. They are on different missions right at the present time. But I said: "Inside of an hour, hour and a half, we can have them back here, and fly it." They flew it again, and he said: "I want to change this airplane, and this one, and then I'm going to use it." Now whether or not he did, I don't know, but he said, "That is an answer to some of our problems."

S Do you recall the officer who developed that stack formation?

P. Montgomery was in charge of the Bombardment Section, and just who devised it, it was a case of cooperation with the Fighter Section, the Bombardment Section.

Q Which Montgomery - Richard or J.B.?

P Little short fellow. It will be in the records. He was head of the Bombardment Section at the Tactical School. The Fighter Section was under command of Grover... Our personnel We were shooting to end up with personnel who had overseas service, not only in the European theater but in the Pacific theater, so we would get a levening of ideas. We wouldn't get any one particular theater shoved down our throats. At the time I left there, we had built up so we had about 60% of the personnel in our demonstrationsgroups there had overseas experience. Maybe some of them, as they came back, brought the demand for it. All we needed was somebody to give us an idea, and we had the facilities to work on it. We could work on it where a mistake was only a mistake, and not a fatality or a calamity. We developed a number of things from ideas that were brought back. For example, you would probably, I don't know

whether you are interested in it or not, but the orbiting idea for the fighters on bomber penetrations, we developed that. We tried to sell it to George Kenney and George said if I had any pilots that could fly that much at night, I would be using them in the daytime.

Q There was a difference of opinion between Frank O'D. Hunter, who commanded the 8th Fighter Command, and Arnold. He took him out of there and put in Kepner, the idea of whether the fighters stuck orto the bombers, or they were free ranging and flew ahead to anticipate problems. Some people were comforted by the physical apresence of the fighters. Did you get involved in that?

P I never got involved in that. We more or less left that up to the air force commander, as far as the Tactical School was concerned, unless they requested it, of course.

Q I just wondered whether they tried this going ahead of the bombers, or just hovering over the bombers, whether these experiments were conducted at your school?

P No, no. We had no experiments along that line whatsoever, at my time at least

Q Let me ask you about another experiment. This one went real sour, this was the XB-40 and the XB-41. This was the armored escort. They took some bombers and they put a lot of armor on them, and filled them full of guns. They were disguised and they went along with the bomber formation. I guess they were called "destroyer escorts." I guess it didn't work out.

P What year was that?

Q 1943, it lasted a couple of months.

P We weren't involved in that at all. At that time we were fighting for a way to get longer range for our fighters with droppable tanks, or even, of course, the main thing at that time was production, getting

...

enough bullet proof tanks that we could use on the wings. We tried a number of experiments using a metal tank which could be set on fire with incendiary bullets and we showed that you could go ahead, and in combat with those tanks, and the minute they were set on fire there was no danger immediately, because the fire was streaming out behind. You could then drop your tanks. Arnold wouldn't go along with that development at all.

Q Arnold wouldn't go along with that?

P No, he said he didn't want to jeopardize the lives of his pilots.

Q How about the cardboard tanks? They were buying them from the British. Did you try to test those?

P We didn't run into that

Q This was a very spontaneous experiment. Wright Field was dragging on developing the wing tanks and the droppable tanks. They purchased some of these cardboard tanks from the British. Did you get involved in testing that out?

P No, the last time Gen Arnold came down with a problem was when they were picking up photographs of the V-1. We ran experiments, or Eglin was running experiments for attacking the little hangars, little L-shaped hangars they had. At that time they even had a 3" field gun mounted in a B-25.

Q This was Grandison Gardner, Proving Ground Command?

P Yes

Q Did you work closely with him?

P Oh yes, very closely

Q How often did Arnold come down to see what you were doing?

P He was very proud of AFTAC. He used to bring the top brass down quite often. One was particular anxious, our Under Secy at that time.

Q Patterson?

P Oh yes, he just had a field day down there. It was more or less like Disneyland compared to the ordinary schools. But everything had a purpose. I never saw anybody as interested in the exact operation of the thing. For example, somebody came in, a ground officer for example, who didn't know anything about air support at all. We could start him off with an illustrated lecture on a board, with electric lights.

S Which one was that, General?

P This change of nomenclature.

S At one point in the Continental Air Defense structure, they called them "defense fighter wing". In mid-1943, they dropped the "defense." They called it "fighter wing," and the reason being that they wanted to get offensive minded in all of the OTU and PTU Training programs. But you say you can't recall who...?

P That was more or less strategic implications rather than strictly tactical implications, which we were mainly concerned with at the Tactical School.

S Did you have much trouble in getting trained radar operators for your tactical training there at Orlando?

P No, no, we were continually training personnel of course, all the time, rotating our personnel.

S These are on the search radars?

P Yes

S I see. They would come in to you pretty well trained, wouldn't they?

P Yes, We had quite a radar setup. We had 24-hour radar setup there at Orlando in that Air Defense Command

S Did 2nd Fighter Command work with you on that? They were at Drew, weren't they?

P No, we were more or less just working on our own.

S I see. I can't figure out what 2nd Fighter Command did all those years?

P Where was their headquarters?

S At Drew Air Base. They remained in existence until the was was over. But I find no evidence that they did much. Now Gen Gilkeson was there for a good part of that time.

Q General, about how often did Arnold come down to SAT to look at you operation?

P Well, it was irregular. I would say, in the year and a half that I was there, he was probably down half a dozen times.

Q Did he come down because you called him and said: "General, we'd like you to look at something," or was it just a routine?

P No, he always set the time for coming. He always tied it in more or less with a general trip, except, I think, one or two times when he was bringing somebody down like the Under Secy.

Q Usually tie it into a visit to the Proving Ground Command at Eglin?

P Yes, they would generally go over there.

Q In a sense you were dealing with tactics and they wereddealing with hardware?

P Yes, that's right.

Q He was a gadgeteer in my reading of him. He liked gadgets. He liked new ideas or new gadgets for solving operational problems. Is this a fair estimate of him?

P Well, he always supported anything we wanted. Lord knows we ran to gadgets, if aever any school did. Practically all of them were used successfully. We only had one failure in my time there, and that wasn't our fault. That was the fault of Bel Geddes. We were setting up a building in which we would have a complete ground-air battle, cutting the time down where one hour would be condensed into five minutes, for example. It was all done in display, electrically. It required so many little motors and rheostats, we couldn't cool it. It was a wonderful idea. It would be wonderful for training ground

commanders who had had no cooperation with the Air at all. It was all right in theory, but mechanically they just couln't cool the job.

Q I want to take you to one more area, the area of Intelligence. You said something about G-2 trusted the British Intelligence more than they did A-2. You said something about that nin your letter to me?

P Yes, they seemed to. We had our own ideas as to the strength of the German Air Force. The British, of course, based everything on what they called their battle formations, the report they got of the outfits in contact. We based ours more or less on their manufacturing capabilities. We didn't feel that what they were using at the present time gave any adequate idea of what their ultimate strength, or their actual strength was, or what their ultimate strength would be. So I think our estimates in A-2 were somewhat disregarded. As a matter of fact, G-2 didn't think too highly, I think, of the kind of brash youngster that was growing up right on their doorstep. Ann illustrationswas our meteorologist.

Q Irving Krick?

P Yes, I was very much interested, during that period, in his long term forecasts. I followed up on the thing and found that they were going to G-2 and then were stopping. So Tooey was overseas at that time--no, not Tooey, whoever was over there at that time--asked him if he would like these reports. And he said, he'd love to have them, so he not only got the reports, he got Krick over there, too. But there was a tendency to downrate any information we had. I think they found out, later on, that our estimate of the strength of the German Air Force was a lot closer than the British estimate.

Q Was it an estimate of lower strength? Did the British overestimate?

P Oh, they underestimated, ye. We were, I think, pretty close to 50% higher in our estimates than they were.

Q At Normandy, the German Air Force didn't show up. Arnold got very much incensed at the British intelligence because they overestimate what the Germans could bring to bear at Normandy. Of course, only a few planes showed up. The German AF almost disappeared from the skies.

P Of course, now, we are talking about two different times. Our estimates of what I was speaking was when we first went into the war, and you are talking of the period after we had been operating some time. You see, their AF had been whittled down and their manufacturing facilities.

Q I see, you are talking about the period before the war?

P I'm talking just right after we went in. As a matter of fact, we weren't in yet. Pearl Harbor hadn't come along yet.

Q And the British estimates were lower than ours? We estimated higher and more accurately?

P I'll tell you one thing that we based ours on a lot was Lindbergh's reports. He had a pretty good access to their manufacturing facilties over there.

Q Did you get to see the Lindbergh report?

P I didn't see his report, no. But we had access to a certain number of figures from them, and we based ours a lot on that.

Q There is a guy in our office working on Lindbergh. Do you know anything about Arnold and Lindbergh?

P No, I don't

Q They were good friends?

P I never had the pleasure of meeting Lindbergh.

Q I interviewed him a year and a half ago. This fellow is working on a book of Lindbergh in our office, and he's very close to Lindbergh now. You said something about Irving Krick. What about Irving Krick and Arnold?

P I don't know, he was giving, in the short time I was in A-2, a little air resume at the briefings that were held at 11:00 every day. And the first thing I thought: "What was this naval officer doing here?" And I found out he had been called to active duty and kind of kicked around from here to ther.

Q That was in 1942? Arnold had him switched over to the AF

P And that's when I got interested

Q In meteorology

P Interested in his long range forecasting

Q Was he accurate?

P The ones that I was able to check in a limited time ran about 80% accurate. That was the thing that amazed me. These local forecasters weren't doing that well.

Q Were you impressed by Krick's briefings? Did you attend some of his briefings?

P His briefings were very brief. I was--his reports were very brief. They just interested me enough that I started digging into the things, to see how they were arrived at. Now, maybe he gave me some of his best estimates.

Q Was Arnold present when he gave some of these briefings?

P No, no. I did this on my own, that's when I went to George Strong, who was in G-2, George was a classmate of mine at Leavenworth, so I could talk to him. I asked him what was being done with Krick's reports. He said they weren't getting any farther than his office there.

Q One last area, Arnold was greatly interested in the JB-2. This was a Chinese version of the V-1. Arnold had this idea of launching a lot of JB-2's against the Germans. We had taken the V-1 and improved upon it. And, of course, he got sick and this plan was never adopted, but he was trying it out down at the Proving Grounds. I wonder if this ever got to you at SAT?

P No, the only thing that I ever saw, I saw the first V-1 they had over there. I saw a launching on that. Shortly afterwards, I was moved from the Tactical Center, and sent out to organize the 2nd Air Support Command.

Q Where was that?

P That was at Barksdale, and we were charged with furnishing replacements for all the tactical air force units in the theater. We had quite a little setup down there and were cooperating quite closely with the Coast Artillery, in addition to the area of supply

Q Did you stay there the rest of the war?

P No, I was there about six months, and I got this chance to go overseas. Barney Giles called me, and wanted to know if I wanted to go overseas and I said: "Can a duck swim?" And he said: "Well, there's a chance to govover." He explained what the job was. It was post-hostilities planning.

Q This was in Guam

P Barney was the Chief of Air Staff at that time. This was over with USSTAF

Q This is out in the Pacific?

P No, no, the US Strategic Air Forces with the Headquarters in London. Tooey was head of them at the time.

Q You are talking about '45?

P Talking about '45, yes, or '44 it was.

Q Giles left to go to the Pacific himself?

P Who was Chief of Staff then?

Q When Giles left - Eaker. Eaker was brought in right at the end of the war.

P Then it was Eaker who called me.

Q Eaker came in April 1943. He became Deputy Commander, AAF.

Q You spent only a little time overseas. Arnold himself was never in combat. Did he ever talk to you about his regret that he never served in combat?

P No

QY You were not that close to him?

P No

Q Did he ever let his hair down with you, and talk to you about what his hopes were for a separate AF?

P No, generally when we weren't talking shop, or it wasn't a business proposition, it was in a large group where he wasn't talking directly to me.

Q You don't recall ever just having a conversation with him, two-man conversation, casual? You weren't that close to him?

P No, generally when I was with him alone was when I was showing h him or taking him from our headquarters, Orlando, out to his airplane.

Q You know, I sent you a copy of that letter, when he had all the brats of the Army officers. He had a party at West Point. Your son was there. .. He did this for all his sons. He tried to establish an esprit de corps among Air Corps guys in the Army. Were you aware that he was trying to build up this kind of spirit?

P A lot of people do things like that they don't get credit for

Q He had a great interest in West Point, in converting part of the training there into flying, because he wanted to get some of the cream of the crop into the Air Corps. This is one way of piping in on that talent.

Q One last sort of overall question. Was Arnold the best man in job as heading the AF at the time? Related to that possibility, could Andrews as good a job or better, or not quite as good, or what do you think?

P I'm in no position to judge, because I just met Andrews two or three times. I never had any close association with him. I never served under him, or with him, for any length of time.

Q Do you feel Arnold did a good job or an outstanding job?

P I feel he did, yes, In fact I would say he did a marvelous job. That's my opinion of it.

Q Is there anybody in your career acquaintance that could have done a better job?

P Discounting Andrews, some people name him. As I say, I couldn't compare the two.

S We talked about Gen Arnold and we talked about air defense. I'd like to ask a couple of questions on BG Peabody. What made you choose West Point, General?

P Well, I'd always had an inclination for the military. At the time I got an appointment to West Point, I was living in Cheyenne, Wyoming. I had no idea, I knew very little about West Point. I had no idea how you got in, went about getting an appointment. At that time I was interested in taking up engineering tat the University of Michigan. I was in my last year of high school. I made plans, in fact, I had a job lined up. I was going to work my way through. I had a job lined up in one of the fraternity houses there. And I was talking to my brother-in-law with whom I was living at the time. He was talking to the State Engineer, he mentioned the fact, he said: "Why does he want to become a surveyor?" I was interested in surveying at the time. He said: "Why does he want to become a surveyor? Surveyors are a dime a dozen now." He said: "By the way, I was talking to Elmer Lane, Secy for Sen Warren, and he says there's a vacancy for West Point. Would he be interested in that?" My brother-in-law came home and told me and I said: "Oh golly, yes." So I put in an application, letter to Sen Warren, and took a competitive examination, and got the appointment, and owent to West Point. Just one of those things that happen. Somebody came along and told me the opportunity was available. I grabbed it!

Q And then, what made you choose the Air Service?

P When I was a cavalryman I thought that anybody that didn't ride a horse was a little bit touched in the head. I actually believed that. There was something radically wrong with their thinking. And then when the flying came along, it appealed to me, but I couldn't do anything about it at that time, because I was married. They changed the regulations about that time.

Q In 1914.

P Before, yes. They changed the regs about marriage and I immediately applied. I think it was about 6 or 7 months before I heard anything about it. Then I was ordered to take my physical examination. While I was at Fort Sam Houston and then sent out to Rockwell Field for my training, I started my training in Sept 1, 1917.

S Did you find that flying held the promise that you hoped it would?

P Oh, yes, I never regretted that.

S You enjoyed flying?

P Very much indeed. I tried to talk my son out of it. I presented all the occupational hazards, etc, when he was to make up, before he graduated from the Academy. I told him about the certain disadvantages and so forth, so he listened to me. When I got done, he said: "Dad, if y you had to do it over again, what would you do?" I said: "Pick up my marbles, you win!"

Q Did he go into flying?

P Yes, he took flying training and he transferred. At that time, they had to take a commission in one of the branches of services and then, were transferred as soon as they got their rating.

S Was there any time during the 1930s, considering the pay..

P I didn't want to leave the flying game until I was ready to retire. The civilian life just didn't appeal to me, at all.

S One final question: I keep coming across the name of ma man named Herbert Dargue. Did you ever have any contacts with him?

P Oh yes. He was Asst Commandant at the Tactical School. But I never had any direct contact with him, I just knew him casually. He had reported at the time I left. I left at the end of the school year and he reported some time during the summer.

Q Did you ever have any contact with Horace Hickam?

P Oh yes, yes. More or less on a social level, he used to come through Maxwell quite often when he was down at Galveston. And stay there over there, more or less an overnight stop for those people.

Q Many people who knew him said that if he had lived he would have gone to a high position?

P Oh, I think no doubt about it. He was one of the few at the time who had that seniority who looked ahead.

Q You didn't get involved in the air mail?

P No, I did not.

Q Hickam got involved in it. Hickam had the Central Zone. You didn't get into that.

P No, I was at Tactical School at the time. They kept up more or less intact.

Q Did you know Byron Q. Jones.

P Yes, I did. He was a first classman when I was a plebe.

S He left the Air Corps and went back to the Cavalry. Do you know why?

P He was very outspoken. I think he made quite a few enemies as a result. When he had a fighter group, that string formathon when he had his fighter group, one of the first ones to use it. I think the two-plane element was more or less a result with the maneuverability he had with his string formation. I think string formation dispersed your tactical force too much. But with your two-plane element, you had flexibility. You could vary the size of your force, and its maneuverability was unquestioned. With Clair Chennault's insistence on the 3-plane element,

you were fixed. You were more or less down to one pair of eyes working. In a two-plane element with your wing man, he was looking around. He wasn't right up close.

Q B.Q. had the Eastern Zone during the air mail. Arnold had the Western Zone and Hickam had the Central Zone. Arnold did not think much of Byron Q. Jones.

P No, they djust didn't get along, I understand.

Q You don't know this first-hand?

P I have no information as to what it was all about.

Q That could have been a reason that Byron Q. Jones went back into the Cavalry.

Q How about Foulois? Did you have knowledge of him?

P Oh yes. When he was Chief, I was still down at the Tactical School. As I said before, Benny had no use for schools because he wasn't a graduate of any school. I was concerned mainly later on when I retired, when I was Exec Director for hthe AF Historical Foundation. We were to get a new President. Nobody had any ideas who it should be. I said: "If any man has a place of history in the AF it's Benny. Let's just make him President." And, of course, he just fell right into it. He had the time to devote to it, very enthusiastic about it, and did a grand job, while he was President of the Foundation.

Q Benny Foulois got in bad with Pres Roosevelt. Although he was in good health and ability, he hnever had any job during WWII. Did you know that? Did you ever think about that?

P No

Q He outlived all his contemporaries; guys who started with him.

P Benny's thinking was a bit outdated. He had two strikes against him.

Q Was he impatient with schooling and books because he learned to fly by the seat of his pants?

P I don't know. I think he was just impatient with schooling, period. Because he learned in the school of hard knocks. He gave the graduation address at the Tactical School the first year I was there. I remember him saying that the number of his class that came into the Army at the same time that he did, he was the only one that was a General Officer and he was the only one who had never attended any service school.

Q This is Westover?

P I was very fond of Oscar Westover in the few contacts I had with him, mainly while he was an instructor at Leavenworth while I was a student. But I have a feeling that--of course, there's always a tendency to compare a man like that with Hap. Oscar was the plodding type to me. His view: "Well, I won't make this move until I have thought out every angle on the thing." and "let's not hurry about this." He wasn't the "let's-get-this-done" type that Hap was. So from that standpoint, I don't think he was too well-fitted for the job.

S In attempting to re-evoke this fascinating period of 1930's when the Air Corps was so small and yet doing so much, how did the rest of you feel when one of you went in? What was the impact on those of you who were senior men? For example, when Horace Hickam was killed, how did you feel?

P Personally, as far as Horace Hickam was concerned, I felt a great personal loss because I was very fond of him. We were kind of kindred spirits in that he had been frustrated a great deal when he was on the General Staff, by presenting ideas, as he said were sent around for concurrence, and they came back with some nonconcurrences on them. He said: "I simply took it and wrote: 'nibbled to death by ducks,' and I put it in a big drawer in my desk." Jack Curry and I had had many instances of frustration with sending our ideas up to the front office.

So we were kind of kindred spirits in hthat respect. And then Hickam had a very charming personality. He was a good story teller, and a very affable type. So I felt a personal loss. I didn't think: "Well, I've gained one more file," or anything like that. I never ran across anybody that didn't have--other than, at my level--the highest regard for Horace Hickam. Earl Narden thought he was just tops. Horace took Earl and said: "Now, you've been moving armies around. I'm going to teach you how to handle a flight." He started him out as a Flight Commander, and then, as a Squadron Commander, and afterwards, he had the group down there.

Q There were men--Sue Clagett, Davenport Johnson, Douglas Netherwood--with whom Arnold did not see eye to eye--Jakie Fickel.

P With Sue Clagett I didn't see eye to eye either. Sue Clagett was Air Officer of the 9th Air Corps Area when I had the ROTC at California. He insisted on holding the ROTC camp at Crissy Field. And I told him: "Colonel, you can't do it. You are only going to get about 15% of the time when the weather is going to be fog-free enough to fly." Well, he would have none of it. I tried to tell the outfit at the 9th Corps Area the same thing, and I didn't get to first base. They held the camp there, and I think we flew about 20% of our program. Down at Rockwell we would fly 100%.

Q You mentioned Hugh Knerr...

P In the same JMA class. He was a Naval Academy graduate. I didn't run across him very muchaafter that until I was with USSTAF, and Hugh at that time was the A-4 for USSTAF. And Douglas Netherwood came down to Orlando, and we had breakfast together and I took him over to the field the day he was killed. That was an odd thing. There was a front between Orlando and Jacksonville, and Douglas took off. There were a few local showers around there. He just never checked in with the first check-in point which was Daytona Beach. We searched that

area, criss-crossed it for two weeks. We had out ground searchers, got these hunters, went all through the ground area, and we never found any trace at all of his airplane.

Interview: Brig Gen Hume Peabody, Chaptico, Md. Nov 16, 1972
(Tom Sturm participating) PART II

Q You were in the Class of Stars - 1915?

P One of the spear-carriers

Q You were one of the "seven mules" - the "four horsemen" were in the backfield?

P They were from Notre Dame

Q I mean you had all these distinguished Generals in your class -- Eisenhower, Bradley, McNarney, Van Fleet.

Sturm: Quite a class

Q You met Arnold?

P First contact with him was when he came down on an investigation at March Field of a little shenanigan that was being worked there, turning over some JN-4D's back to the Curtiss company. It was quite a scandal on the field. And oddly enough, I was the one officer in any position with some authority down there. Didn't know the first thing about it. He came down there and settled that matter and relieved the then commanding officer, and put me in temporary command.

Q What was the nature of the scandal?

P Briefly, it worked like this: we had a number of brand new JN-4D's. The CO thought well he'd just change the engines on these new JN4D's and put them in some of our old planes and change the numbers on the engines. He gave his Asst Engineering Officer instructions to do that. Meantime, he issued a memorandum to the effect that no one of our personnel would go inside the wire fence which surrounded the 3 or 4 hangars which the Curtiss Company had taken over for these airplanes, covering himself that way. All this went on. I didn't know anything about it. I happened at that time to be in charge of ground instruction, so I didn't come in contact with the engineering of the line very much. The Curtiss Company employee

was a former officer at March Field. Of course, he picked that up in a hurry. The CO was a little bit dumb in a way. He didn't know that the serial number was stamped on the engine block as well as on the plate. So he told the Engineering Officer to change the plate. That was done, and of course when the checkup was made as to what had transpired, it was brought to light. That was just one of several irregularities they had against him.

Q Were you impressed with the way Arnold handled the matter?

P We didn't even come in direct contact. I wasn't even called as a witness because I didn't know anything about it. But there had been an Inspector down there for a week or ten days. He had uncovered--he did the spade work for Colonel Arnold, as it was. But when Colonel Arnold came down there: "Boom!" Things happened right now. In less than a day, he settled the matter, relieved the CO, and shot me into the job.

Q Did he act in a fair way in respect to the rights of the accused?

P As I say, I didn't get in on any of the hearing at all. But from what I learned afterwards, I don't think the accused had anything much working for him. It was an open and shut case against him. I thought--we all thought--that for the offense, his punishment was very mild. All they did was transfer the officer to another station.

Q Did Arnold call you in to tell you he was putting you in the job?

P He came over to my office and didn't call me. He said: "I'm relieving so-and-so and I'm putting you in command." I said" "Sir, when is that effective?" And he said: "Immediately." He said: "I'm having a letter typewritten to that effect. That will be in the office by the time you get there."

Q Was he an impatient man to get things done?

P I never saw that man when he wasn't impatient. He was always in a hurry to get things done. One of the worst tortures he could possibly go through was to be held down at the station by the weather when he

wanted to go some place else. I saw indications of that down at Orlando one time. He wanted to go on to Eglin Field. The weather was socked in there. At that time, we didn't have any night facilities. So he couldn't go there. It was all socked in. The only place he could go was Tampa. He didn't want to go to Tampa. He didn't have any business in Tampa, but he had to go some place. So he went to Tampa.

Q Was this around 1940-41?

P It was, I would say, 1942, when AAFSAT was started--School of Applied Tactics--down in Orlando. I was sent down to organize that afterwards; it was changed to "Tactical Center".

Q I want first to take you through the early days. When Arnold was Air Officer, he started the Aerial Forest Patrol.

P Don't I know it. I had the job of training the Foresters at March Field. As I said, I was in charge of ground instruction. Then we had a bunch of State Foresters as well as National Foresters down there, and gave them a kind of a get-rich-quick course in observation. At the time we had no means of communication from the airplane to the ground, so we had to use dropped messages. And I experimented with a little parachute, dropping it from the top of the water tower. And when we actually started our patrol, it was rather amusing. The first report was phoned into the L.A. office in 20 minutes from the time the report was written. The second was phoned in 2 weeks later. But the following year, or the year after that--I wasn't connected with it then--they had radio communication, and of course, they did a beautiful job afterwards.

Q Did Arnold get the creditafor having started bothat?

P I don't know; I couldn't say.

(Mrs. Peabody said something about when Arnold used to land at Langley Field and perhaps some golf was played)

Q Arnold was usually too busy to play golf. He never really worked at it.

P I played with him quite a few times at Rockwell when he was in

command of the Depot down there. At that time, I was on ROTC duty at the University of California and during the summer I had a five-weeks ROTC camp down there, followed by two weeks of Reserve Officer camp. I guess we used to play--come to think of it, he only played twice a week, and maybe once in mid-week.

Q This was in the early 1920s?

P In the mid-1920s, along about 1924-25

Q In 1924 he left to come to Washington

P Then it was earlier than that--1923-24.

Q Do you have any other recollections of him as Air Officer at the Presidio?

P No, other than a few times that I had to correspond with him about certain matters that came up that I took up with him by letter rather than through channels, and got things settled, just like that. But I didn't have any face-to-face dealings with him other than that first one I mentioned.

Q I never met General Arnold

P He moved at a half-run all the time, and he had the most marvelous memory of anyone I've ever seen. I'm jumping the gun, but later on, when I had to, or helped, prepare talks for him--that's when I was in the Plans Section. I'd prepare a talk and hear him give it, and I wouldn't recognize it. Speaking without notes, I wouldn't have recognized it as my prepared talk, until I stopped to analyze it. He had covered every point we had down in this talk, but he expressed it in his own words much better than I'd had it expressed. And I talked to several other people who performed similar tasks. He'd read it through once and he could remember it.

Q That's the ideal speaker, to take your material and do better with it than the speech-writer did

P He was tops in my book.

Q Inspections--you talked about his going around making inspections. He had a talent, I'm told, to go right down to the Maintenance shack, or down to where the Sergeants were, where the real problems were. He

tried to avoid the plush red-carpet treatment in the CO's office where they tended to cover up the problems rather than expose them. Do you have any thoughts about that?

P Yes. Of course when he inspected our organization at Orlando, we were scattered all over the state of Florida. We didn't spend too much time in any one place. He was interested in the teaching facilities we had set up, but there was one incident that bears out that attitude of his. We're on the way over to the airport. He was getting ready to leave. That was one of those days, that time I mentioned, when he couldn't go any place but Tampa. I said: "General, if you have a few minutes, I'd like to show you a new installation we just started," We had an organization called the Airdrome Defense Squadron, and it was about 350 black soldiers, and they'd been gathered from every place, and we were giving them their basic training. We'd just opened a new mess. We had brand new equipment in there, a very smooth-talking Mess Sgt, a graduate of New York University, and very proud of this mess. General Arnold went all through this mess and asked him any number of questions about his manner of operation, and was very much impressed. He didn't say anything to me about it. He landed at Drew Field, right at the time, the worst time he could possibly have gone in a mess. He went in a back door, where all the garbage cans were, then through the kitchen into the mess. The poor Commanding Officer who had just arrived at the field the day before, and hardly had time to hang up his hat, bore the brunt of this. He called him and he said: "Send your Mess Sgt up to Peabody at Orlando and have them learn how to run a mess." We didn't have a course for Mess Sgts. The next day, we did have a course for them.

Q I've been told this many, many times, that he went right down to where the problems were, the back door of the mess, or the back door of the maintenance shack.

P One thing you had to learn early in dealing with him. If he asked you a question and you didn't know the answer, not to stall, but to tell him: "I don't know, but I'll find out." He wouldn't forget that. The next time he saw you, he'd ask you for the answer to this particular question.

Q Somebody told me that one thing that infuriated him was "Don't worry. Leave it to me, General. I'll take care of it." He wanted some specific recommendations on getting it done. If somebody tried to put him off without any specific recommendations for improvement, this would irritate him. Do you have any thoughts on that?

P I don't recall any specific occasion that would illustrate that. I think you can sum it up by saying, he just wanted to get things done. He didn't want to leave any loose ends. If it wasn't done, he wanted to know when it was going to be done, and if he thought it couldn't be done in that length of time, he'd want to know just how you were going to do it. You had to prove to him you were going to get it done in that length of time.

Q When he had briefings, or you had him in and set him down and put up a "plumbing chart," and a briefing officer, did he become impatient if the man strayed from his subject? Did he ever cut off a briefing officer?

P The only time I had any contact along that line was when I was for a short time A-2 for about 3 weeks. And he used to come to the briefings there and apparently, they had had experience with him, because their briefings were excellent. They just gave the bare facts. He never had any criticism or expressed any criticism. He always asked very pointed questions. I don't remember any time that the various briefing officers didn't have an answer for him. If they hadn't had, I imagine there would have been an explosion.

Q Who replaced you as A-2? Edgar Sorenson?

P He took my place, yes. I moved down to War Organization & Movement, and from there down to AAFSAT.

Q Jumping now, you went into War Organization & Movement when the incumbent died.

P Steve Ferson

Q Do you remember the circumstances of his death?

P I wasn't in Washington at the time. I was just getting over an attack of pneumonia at that time in Oklahoma City. I came to Washington and moved into the A-2 slot. And at that time, Nate Twining had taken over in the interim, after Steve Ferson died, but just temporarily, because they had other jobs lined up for him. I was very happy in A-2. If I'd been able to pick a job, I couldn't have found a more interesting one. Just beginning to learn what it was all about at the end of three weeks, and "boom", I was called on the telephone and moved up to a different office.

Q Ferson was supposed to have died in General Arnold's office.

P I never did hear any of the details. (off-tape)

Q Back to the 20's when Arnold was at Rockwell Field. Do you remember him at Rockwell Field? He was there from 1921-24

P Very well. We were down there for at least one double tour. I remember that particularly well. He was great on physical fitness. The 91st Observation Squadron went down from Crissy Field to furnish the personnel for both camps. They arrived. They had several overweight officers. So, immediately, Major Arnold established, you wouldn't call it an athletic program, but he established a kind of a contest between the personnel at Rockwell Field and the personnel of the 91st Squadron in a number of different things: pistol shooting, rifle shooting, tennis, handball, waterskiing, skeet shooting--everything that required an activity. I must admit that the Rockwell Field officers kind of had an edge in all those activities. But he was great for physical fitness. All of his officers there at the field exercised regularly, and were in trim shape.

Q Was this competition good for morale at the base, too?

P Everybody enjoyed it, and I don't think there was, even the most overweight officer, had no complaint to make.

Q Was he strong on esprit de corps of the organization?

P Oh yes. People around there felt that the Rockwell Air Depot could do things better than anyone else.

Q Do you remember Mrs. Arnold at the Club?

P Oh yes. One of the things I remember was the time that the daughter's (Lois) pony ran away. We all tried to catch the pony, and we finally shooed it over in the corner of the hospital. And she wasn't a bit scared, and we were all scared to death she was going to get hurt, because the pony was taking off on a straight line. He was taking her across roads and hitting curbstones. That cart would fly up in the air. She was the calmest one in the vicinity.

Q She must have been 7, 8 or 9 at the time?

P Just a child

Q The Arnolds lost a child when he was there. The child got sick, He went to Letterman Hospital and passed away. This was around 1923.

P No, I didn't...we were only down there during the summer. I don't remember that aloss at all.

Q Arnold was very strong in supporting various flights. The round-the-world fliers started out at Rockwell. There were all kinds of flights. This was immediately preceding the Lindbergh Flight. There was a lot of activity, barnstorming and aviation were coming to attention. And Arnold did some things to advance aviation in the public eye. Do you remember anything along that line?

P No, at that time I was at the University of California. We didn't have the communication we have at the present time. When you are 200 or 300 miles away from a certain place, you didn't know much of what was going on there. I was at the start of the flight at Los Angeles, and I was at the University when they came back and were on their barnstorming trip. I was called upon to give the talk at the Greek Theatre, which was my first public speaking engagement before an audience of any size.

Q Arnold had a great fondness for Rockwell Field. He wrote a history of Rockwell Field. One of the prominent things in that history: they were

looking for this hidden spring. Do you remember there was a big search for a spring used by the Indians?

P I never heard that

Q He was very disappointed when the Navy took over Rockwell. The Navy first encroached upon it.

P I know. I was down there one year when the Navy was there. I had a little set-to with them, because they were flying across our hangar-line, about the time we were starting our flight operations. So I went down to see the boss-man down at the Navy, and had that stopped. Rusty Rowell, later quite famous in Marine aviation, in charge of the Marine flying at that time. Made quite a name for himself in Central America.

Q Do you recall anything about Arnold trying to hold the Navy off?

P No. You see, our association down there was relatively so brief--five weeks of a summer camp one year, followed by two weeks more when I was busy with the camp at that time, and I knew nothing much about the administration of Rockwell itself, except whenever I needed anything, I always got it, just like that. He was very proud of their installation there. As an excuse for showing me around the place, Arnold gave me a very thorough tour. Everyplace he'd go, he didn't have to ask anybody what or how it was being done. He was telling me how it was being done.

Q Were you a First Lieut or Captain?

P Heavens no, I was a Major at that time

Q He was a Major, too. You were both of the same rank? He left there in late 1924 to come to Washington. That's where he got involved with Billy Mitchell. Where were you during the Mitchell thing?

P I was out on the West Coast.

Q You were not involved?

P I was not involved, but I was an ardent supporter, but I wasn't in a position. If anybody asked my humble opinion.

Q When was the next time you saw Arnold?

P When he was punished by being sent out to Marshall Field, Ft Riley. It was supposed to be kind of a Siberia." He made it into a garden spot, where everybody wanted to be stationed.

Q What did he do?

P In the first place, he built up the surroundings. He saw that the equipment was the best obtainable. He increased the morale right off the bat. He kept them busy and came up with a number of differentwways they could cooperate with the Cavalry in their training. So that everyone was happily busy wbut not overworked. They had a feeling of accomplishment. As a result, when before, well, you can imagine what an Observation Squadron stuck out in the mid-West had to look forward to.

Q That was the 16th Observation Squadron. Were you attached to it?

P No, I was at Levenworth at the time, a student for two years.

Q You remember General Briney Booth? He was the CG there?

P I wouldn't know. I used to fly in. I had a close friend in the Squadron--Lloyd Barnett. When I was getting in a little flying time from Leavenworth, I'd fly over there. I'd stop in and see him. It made a nice little two-hour flight.

Q But the men who worked for Arnold in that 16th Squadron liked their jobs?

P Oh, they were all crazy about it.

Q He called it his "Elba," like Napoleon--in exile. And then he went to Leavenworth from there. Did you see him at Leavenwoath?

P No

Q In 1928 he went to Leavenworth

Pq That was before my time. You see, I was there in 1929. I entered when he left.

Q You were in the next class?

P I was in the Class of 1929-31. I wonder if I'm getting my dates mixed.

Q He was there from 1928-29.

P I was trying to figure whether I actually saw him at Marshall Field,

or whether I got over there to talk to the personnel afterwards. I think he had left. He had just left Marshall Field. The results were so apparent. That's right. Goolrick was in command, when I was a student. But all of the personnel who were there under Arnold were still there.

Q What happened to Goolrick? He sort of disappeared?

P I don't know what did happen to Goolrick.

Q Do you remember Lowell Thomas coming out to Fort Riley?

P Heavens, yes. Oh, no, not Lowell Thomas. I was thinking of Lowell Smith. Arnold was at Riley only two years? (yes) I was out in California at the time. And then I went to the Tactical School, and after graduating from that school, I went to Leavenworth, and from there was when I used to fly over to Marshall. He had left by then. Goolrick was in charge. It was matter of common knowledge that Arnold had made that place really something.

Q He conducted some Observation experiments there with the cavalry. I heard a lot of stories about Fort Riley. It was a spit-and-polish existence under the Cavalry. Arnold and some of the Air Corps officers chafed at that regimentation.

P He would.**

Q After Leavenworth, Arnold went to Wright Field. He was there from 1929-31. Did you ever see him there?

P I had no occasion to go to Wright Field.

Q And then he got his big break--he went to March Field in 1931. That's where he made his come-back.

P At that time I was Asst Commandant at Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell. In 1933 we had maneuvers on the West Coast. The entire student body at the Tactical School participated in those maneuvers. And I was one of the air umpires, and helped to arrange some of the air problems. My contacts with Arnold were very casual at that time, as he was in command of the station. He had no direct control over the maneuvers. They were being run by General Westover.

Q Did you work with Colonel Curry? He's in Denver in bad shape.

P He's sick

Q The Air Corps Tactical School in this period is very important. It is very important to Tom Sturm, as well as it is to me, because this is where the ideology, the doctrine of the Air Corps which evolved during World War II was shaped. Do you remember anything about bomber doctrine over fighter doctrine? This is the rise of the bomber in the ACTS?

P When I took over in 1931, Ken Walker was head of the Bombardment Dept, and Claire Chennault had the Fighter Dept. And of course, they were just like this--(sign of squabbling). I went over the lectures that they'd used in the preceding two years and then I had the Dept heads in--the Bombardment, Attack, Observartion, and Pursuit, and particularly, I had a talk with Chennault before this. I impressed upon them particularly, that we were making a new start. We were starting out, and there was no limit. They could let their imaginations roam. The doctrine they were going to preach in their particular departments--and we would hit two extremes: we would hit the "ultra" and we would hit the low level. And I hoped, during my next two or three years there, that we would hit a median by compromise, that we could all agree on. I was only there 3 years. I didn't finish the 4th years there. I went on to the War College.

Q What was your specific job at the Air Corps Tactical School?

P Well, I practically ran the school. In matters of policy, Jack Curry had the final word. But the day-to-day running of the school was up to me. They had an Academic Board, of course, but Jack left everything to me. He would just dictate the general policy on the thing. And I would make no big change without consulting him, of course. But it was very interesting. And he helped Chennault, I think. He had been under the thumb of Bombardment where he was practically afraid to stick his head up. Claire, you know, was a vehement arguer when he was pleading his cause. I think that his Fighter tactics began to develop. He was very loath to give

up anything that he had. For example, he was a great believer in nothing but the 3-plane element, because of the concentrated fire-power you had. When some of the other fighter outfits came up with the string formation, or the 2-plane element where they had more flexibility, he was very slow to consider that. But by putting a little heat on, he would try out these various formations in our Pursuit training.

Q Actually, within the Fighter School there were two sub-schools, you might say: one was the escort fighter going out with bombers; the other was the interceptors.

P I had quite an argument with both the Fighters and the Bombardment on that. I visualized an entirely different type of escort airplane. And in our organization we set up for our map problems, the Air Division, I had a Pursuit Squadron, and then I had what I called the Fighter Squadrons, which would escort the bombardment. Of course, the Bombardment was very loath to accept that, because they insisted that they didn't need any escort. They could take care of themselves. They totally disregarded any pursuit threat and any AA threat. I remember George Kenney told Walker: "Ken," he said: "You are very, very nearsighted, if you can't see the development that's going to take place, when they're going to have instrument-control tracking of you"--there was no radar--" they're going to make these bombardment missions very, very hard to accomplish. You're going to get big losses; you're going to get as many on some missions as 10% losses." You can imagine the morale in your Bombardment formation if a young fellow comes in and they say: "You pay the first 10 days of your mess bill, because you may not need it after that." But, one thing I had to ram down their throats. And I was on the wrong track as regards the type of airplane. I visualized a two-place airplane, very maneuverable, which could protect its rear, but at the same time, had enough maneuverability to attack fighters that were trying to break up the bombardment mission. In a way, I was

kind of relieved to see that my thought bore some fruit when the heads of the escort bombardment on their missions in ;WW II (??)

Sturm: Do you recall, General, who besides Walker felt that way?

P Harold George, and Otis Moon. They were the three. Otis wasn't one of the vehement ones, but it was a continual war, with Hal and Ken Walker..

Q How about Larry Kuter? He was a lecturer there?

P Yes, but that was later, about 1938. Larry was in one of the later classes. We also had in ahe AA a Coast Artillery officer, named Welshman. He was just as rabid on anti-aircraft as the others were. So sometimes, when I had all the arguments I could take, I'd either get Claire Chennault, or Welshman in the bombardment office and start an argument, hot and heavy. I'd walk out and get myself a little relief.

Sturm: We've seen it stated many times that the Air Force felt the bomber could go unescorted. And yet, when one begins to search for who said it, he always comes down to Ken Walker. Were there any Lieut Colonels, or Brigadiers, who shared Ken Walker's vehemence on this subject?

P I don't remember anybody that pleaded the cause quite as vehemently as Ken did. Of course, at that time, a person who went through the ACTS was inclined to take what was given and accept that. It was something that wasn't changed immediately by experience. Later on, things were changed by w world war experience. But I tried, when I went there--one of the first things I told the students in my opening lecture--and I illustrated this with one of Bruce Bairnsfather's cartoons. Alf and his sidekick were in this shell-hole, with shells bursting all around them. One was saying he ought to leave--"Well if you know of a better hole, go to it." That's going to be our instruction here," I told them, "you don't have to accept what the school teaches. If you object to it, fine. But you've got to come up with something better, or at least something. You just don't object." Don't just say: "I don't believe this." "If you come up with something you believe in, and you have some reason to believe it is a better solution than the solution the

school has," I said, "stand up on your hind legs, and let us know. We are in a state of flux--we're in a state of building strategy. Without your help, we're handicapped a great deal."

Q Could it be that Ken Walker overcompensated somewhat, because they were trying to get some B-17s, and they were having a lot of trouble getting them budgeted. We're talking about 1936-37. The War Dept was very chinchy about giving you some money. Mr. Woodring, and General Spalding (G-4), their rationale was, "for the money it costs to build a B-17, we can build 3 or 4 smaller planes." They wanted to make a showing in numbers of planes, rather than in capability. So, it just occurs to me that Ken Walker, and people who felt like he did, arguing the capability of the heavy bomber in order to push through the budget some of the ideas they had. How does this strike you?

P Could be. Of course, we didn't have so much of an argument against the heavy bomber as such, as regards its necessity. We didn't go too strong for the light bomber, because we felt our Attack planes would take care of the Light Bombardment missions adequately.

Q At that time there was a big movement--as you said, you were among the supporters of the two-place plane. Why did you feel that plane had a place in war?

P I felt that any escort plane should be able to, as such, have some rear defense. I didn't want it to be too much. I wanted it to be enough to discourage an attack from six o'clock. And I was anxious to get enough maneuverability so they could attack other fighters, or Pursuit, as we called them in those days. I was looking for a compromise airplane, that had a gasoline capacity, so they could accompany the bombardment, or at least accompany them a major part of their mission, and then be relieved by some other supporting planes, have rear support so they weren't sitting ducks for pursuit themselves, staying in a formation besides the bombardment, and yet be able to have enough maneuverability to drive off attacking fighters, and allow bombardment to continue on their mission.

Sturm: Do you think you were forced into that logical conclusion by the shortage of funds for pursuit development? If you'd had ample funds, would you have had a different idea?

P No, I came to that decision originally, because I wanted to give them something to shoot at. In considering the problem we had to meet, it seemed to me an airplane of that type--and I had no hard and fast ideas about it except I was just generalizing on it, and using it in our map problems so they'd get used to the idea of escort fighters. My idea was to throw something in thewworks to be kicked around and come up with an idea that people would develop, and eventually, we'd come up with something. I think the end result was the P-51 which gave them escort.

Q Was Chennault opposed to a long range fighter?

P Yes. He didn't want anything but single seaters. Of course, the bombardment people said: "That damned Peabody, with the crazy idea of fighter fighters." But I made it stick. At least I got the idea across, that bombardment wasn't all that sacred, that they were going to be shot down. And all this time, on the other angle, Kenney, who was an ardent air strategist, kept telling the bombardment people that they were going to have to look forward to an anti-aircraft threat in the future. He foresaw that long before anybody in bombardment realized the seriousness of AA development, I think.

Sturm: Was Kenney at the ACTS?

P He was an instructor of mine when I was a student, in 1929, I think he was in the Chief's office at this time, and the AAA held a series of exercises down around Richmond, in which they used some advanced

equipment. He was down there for all of those exercises as the representative of the Chief of Air Corps. He was very much impressed. And if you know George, he was a very practical man. He had an excellent mind, but he didn't let anything run away with him. He had a practical approach to anything. I'll admit that his idea of anti-aircraft changed my thinking a lot, because with the experience I had with AA over in Hawaii, I didn't have much more fear of them than, I'll admit, some of these bombardment people did.

Q Wasn't Kenney punished in the middle 1930's for taking liberties, and sent down to Fort Benning? He was sent to the Infantry, from the Air Corps Tactical School? This was after the Rex incident? When they went out to sea in violation of the 100-mile limit? Wasn't Kenny punished?

P If he was, I don't recall

Sturm: Did you have any contacts with Gordon Saville while you were out there?

P Yes. Quite a lot. Gordon is one of the brightest people I ever ran across, to begin with. He was a student, while I was Asst Commandant, I think, in my last year. I believe he was held over as an instructor. Later, when I came back from Hawaii in 1937, Gordon was on the Air Corps Board, and I had contact with him there. I was only on the Board a year, and then I was shifted to Washington, to the Plans Section. Then I ran into him again when I was at AAFSAT. Gordon came down there in charge of our Development Section. He was a man who never let his mind rest. He was always thinking of something. He'd see something now, and right away, he'd sit there with a faraway look, and he was off on another tack. He was solving another problem that hadn't been presented to us yet. He's living out in Colorado, and I believe his wife was ill. He found the climate better.

Q I interviewed him at great length down in San Antonio, at the Daedalian meeting a couple of years ago.

P Often, it was the case, he'd only have to explain something and he'd expect you to understand the whole thing. (Saville)

Q You left the Tactical School and went up to Langley Field?

P From the ACTS I went to the War College. After one year at the War College they tried to keep me on as an instructor at the War College. Golly, that would have made 12 straight years as an instructor for me, or going to school. I begged off on that.

Q When did you go to Langley?

P I went to Langley two different times. When I came back from Hawaii in 1937, and after I was relieved from _____.

Q I want to ask about Emmons. He had some ideas that he might be the top man in the Air Corps. Were you aware of that?

P I never was aware of that ambition. He never mentioned anything like that to me.

Q Your impression of Emmons?

P He had a remarkably bright mind, and when a problem arose, as I saw it arise over in Hawaii--when he was Air Officer over ther--he took hold of it and solved it in very rapid fashion. I think one reason, one handicap he had when he was head of GHQ Air Force, was that he was buffaloed by General Arnold. I think, for some reason, he was very afraid of General Arnold. He was senior to General Arnold in the original promotion rank. He was ahead of Arnold

Q Right. He was 3 stars when Arnold was 2 stars

Sturm: No. Actually Emmons graduated after Arnold

P Arnold was '07, and Emmons was '08 or ' 09.

Q Emmons was 1909

P I always had the impression, when the two of them were together, from the way he deferred to Hap, that he was in considerable awe of him.

Interview: Brig Gen Hume Peabody, Chaptico, Md. Nov 16, 1972
(Tom Sturm participating)

PART II

Q You were in the Class of Stars - 1915?

P One of the spear-carriers

Q You were one of the "seven mules" - the "four horsemen" were in the backfield?

P They were from Notre Dame

Q I mean you had all these distinguished Generals in your class -- Eisenhower, Bradley, McNarney, Van Fleet.

Sturm: Quite a class

Q You met Arnold?

P First contact with him was when he came down on an investigation at March Field of a little shenanigan that was being worked there, turning over some JN-4D's back to the Curtiss company. It was quite a scandal on the field. And oddly enough, I was the one officer in any position with some authority down there. Didn't know the first thing about it. He came down there and settled that matter and relieved the then commanding officer, and put me in temporary command.

Q What was the nature of the scandal?

P Briefly, it worked like this: we had a number of brand new JN-4D's. The CO thought well he'd just change the engines on these new JN4D's and put them in some of our old planes and change the numbers on the engines. He gave his Asst Engineering Officer instructions to do that. Meantime, he issued a memorandum to the effect that no one of our personnel would go inside the wire fence which surrounded the 3 or 4 hangars which the Curtiss Company had taken over for these airplanes, covering himself that way. All this went on. I didn't know anything about it. I happened at that time to be in charge of ground instruction, so I didn't come in contact with the engineering of the line very much. The Curtiss Company employee

was a former officer at March Field. Of course, he picked that up in a hurry. The CO was a little bit dumb in a way. He didn't know that the serial number was stamped on the engine block as well as on the plate. So he told the Engineering Officer to change the plate. That was done, and of course when the checkup was made as to what had transpired, it was brought to light. That was just one of several irregularities they had against him.

Q Were you impressed with the way Arnold handled the matter?

P We didn't even come in direct contact. I wasn't even called as a witness because I didn't know anything about it. But there had been an Inspector down there for a week or ten days. He had uncovered--he did the spade work for Colonel Arnold, as it was. But when Colonel Arnold came down there: "Boom!" Things happened right now. In less than a day, he settled the matter, relieved the CO, and shot me into the job.

Q Did he act in a fair way in respect to the rights of the accused?

P As I say, I didn't get in on any of the hearing at all. But from what I learned afterwards, I don't think the accused had anything much working for him. It was an open and shut case against him. I thought--we all thought--that for the offense, his punishment was very mild. All they did was transfer the officer to another station.

Q Did Arnold call you in to tell you he was putting you in the job?

P He came over to my office and didn't call me. He said: "I'm relieving so-and-so and I'm putting you in command." I said" "Sir, when is that effective?" And he said: "Immediately." He said: "I'm having a letter typewritten to that effect. That will be in the office by the time you get there."

Q Was he an impatient man to get things done?

P I never saw that man when he wasn't impatient. He was always in a hurry to get things done. One of the worst tortures he could possibly go through was to be held down at the station by the weather when he

wanted to go some place else. I saw indications of that down at Orlando one time. He wanted to go on to Eglin Field. The weather was socked in there. At that time, we didn't have any night facilities. So he couldn't go there. It was all socked in. The only place he could go was Tampa. He didn't want to go to Tampa. He didn't have any business in Tampa, but he had to go some place. So he went to Tampa.

Q Was this around 1940-41?

P It was, I would say, 1942, when AAFSAT was started--School of Applied Tactics--down in Orlando. I was sent down to organize that afterwards; it was changed to "Tactical Center".

Q I want first to take you through the early days. When Arnold was Air Officer, he started the Aerial Forest Patrol.

P Don't I know it. I had the job of training the Foresters at March Field. As I said, I was in charge of ground instruction. Then we had a bunch of State Foresters as well as National Foresters down there, and gave them a kind of a get-rich-quick course in observation. At the time we had no means of communication from the airplane to the ground, so we had to use dropped messages. And I experimented with a little parachute, dropping it from the top of the water tower. And when we actually started our patrol, it was rather amusing. The first report was phoned into the L.A. office in 20 minutes from the time the report was written. The second was phoned in 2 weeks later. But the following year, or the year after that--I wasn't connected with it then--they had radio communication, and of course, they did a beautiful job afterwards.

Q Did Arnold get the creditafor having started that?

P I don't know; I couldn't say.

(Mrs. Peabody said something about when Arnold used to land at Langley Field and perhaps some golf was played)

Q Arnold was usually too busy to play golf. He never really worked at it.

P I played with him quite a few times at Rockwell when he was in

command of the Depot down there. At that time, I was on ROTC duty at the University of California and during the summer I had a five-weeks ROTC camp down there, followed by two weeks of Reserve Officer camp. I guess we used to play--come to think of it, he only played twice a week, and maybe once in mid-week.

Q This was in the early 1920s?

P In the mid-1920s, along about 1924-25

Q In 1924 he left to come to Washington

P Then it was earlier than that--1923-24.

Q Do you have any other recollections of him as Air Officer at the Presidio?

P No, other than a few times that I had to correspond with him about certain matters that came up that I took up with him by letter rather than through channels, and got things settled, just like that. But I didn't have any face-to-face dealings with him other than that first one I mentioned.

Q I never met General Arnold

P He moved at a half-run all the time, and he had the most marvelous memory of anyone I've ever seen. I'm jumping the gun, but later on, when I had to, or helped, prepare talks for him--that's when I was in the Plans Section. I'd prepare a talk and hear him give it, and I wouldn't recognize it. Speaking without notes, I wouldn't have recognized it as my prepared talk, until I stopped to analyze it. He had covered every point we had down in this talk, but he expressed it in his own words much better than I'd had it expressed. And I talked to several other people who performed similar tasks. He'd read it through once and he could remember it.

Q That's the ideal speaker, to take your material and do better with it than the speech-writer did

P He was tops in my book.

Q Inspections--you talked about his going around making inspections. He had a talent, I'm told, to go right down to the Maintenance shack, or down to where the Sergeants were, where the real problems were. He

tried to avoid the plush red-carpet treatment in the CO's office where they tended to cover up the problems rather than expose them. Do you have any thoughts about that?

P Yes. Of course when he inspected our organization at Orlando, we were scattered all over the state of Florida. We didn't spend too much time in any one place. He was interested in the teaching facilities we had set up, but there was one incident that bears out that attitude of his. We're on the way over to the airport. He was getting ready to leave. That was one of those days, that time I mentioned, when he couldn't go any place but Tampa. I said: "General, if you have a few minutes, I'd like to show you a new installation we just started," We had an organization called the Airdrome Defense Squadron, and it was about 350 black soldiers, and they'd been gathered from every place, and we were giving them their basic training. We'd just opened a new mess. We had brand new equipment in there, a very smooth-talking Mess Sgt, a graduate of New York University, and very proud of this mess. General Arnold went all through this mess and asked him any number of questions about his manner of operation, and was very much impressed. He didn't say anything to me about it. He landed at Drew Field, right at the time, the worst time he could possibly have gone in a mess. He went in a back door, where all the garbage cans were, then through the kitchen into the mess. The poor Commanding Officer who had just arrived at the field the day before, and hardly had time to hang up his hat, bore the brunt of this. He called him and he said: "Send your Mess Sgt up to Peabody at Orlando and have them learn how to run a mess." We didn't have a course for Mess Sgts. The next day, we did have a course for them.

Q I've been told this many, many times, that he went right down to where the problems were, the back door of the mess, or the back door of the maintenance shack.

P One thing you had to learn early in dealing with him. If he asked you a question and you didn't know the answer, not to stall, but to tell him: "I don't know, but I'll find out." He wouldn't forget that. The next time he saw you, he'd ask you for the answer to this particular question.

Q Somebody told me that one thing that infuriated him was "Don't worry. Leave it to me, General. I'll take care of it." He wanted some specific recommendations on getting it done. If somebody tried to put him off without any specific recommendations for improvement, this would irritate him. Do you have any thoughts on that?

P I don't recall any specific occasion that would illustrate that. I think you can sum it up by saying, he just wanted to get things done. He didn't want to leave any loose ends. If it wasn't done, he wanted to know when it was going to be done, and if he thought it couldn't be done in that length of time, he'd want to know just how you were going to do it. You had to prove to him you were going to get it done in that length of time.

Q When he had briefings, or you had him in and set him down and put up a "plumbing chart," and a briefing officer, did he become impatient if the man strayed from his subject? Did he ever cut off a briefing officer?

P The only time I had any contact along that line was when I was for a short time A-2 for about 3 weeks. And he used to come to the briefings there and apparently, they had had experience with him, because their briefings were excellent. They just gave the bare facts. He never had any criticism or expressed any criticism. He always asked very pointed questions. I don't remember any time that the various briefing officers didn't have an answer for him. If they hadn't had, I imagine there would have been an explosion.

Q Who replaced you as A-2? Edgar Sorenson?

P He took my place, yes. I moved down to War Organization & Movement, and from there down to AAFSAT.

Q Jumping now, you went into War Organization & Movement when the incumbent died.

P Steve Ferson

Q Do you remember the circumstances of his death?

P I wasn't in Washington at the time. I was just getting over an attack of pneumonia at that time in Oklahoma City. I came to Washington and moved into the A-2 slot. And at that time, Nate Twining had taken over in the interim, after Steve Ferson died, but just temporarily, because they had other jobs lined up for him. I was very happy in A-2. If I'd been able to pick a job, I couldn't have found a more interesting one. Just beginning to learn what it was all about at the end of three weeks, and "boom", I was called on the telephone and moved up to a different office.

Q Ferson was supposed to have died in General Arnold's office.

P I never did hear any of the details. (off-tape)

Q Back to the 20's when Arnold was at Rockwell Field. Do you remember him at Rockwell Field? He was there from 1921-24

P Very well. We were down there for at least one double tour I remember that particularly well. He was great on physical fitness. The 91st Observation Squadron went down from Crissy Field to furnish the personnel for both camps. They arrived. They had several overweight officers. So, immediately, Major Arnold established, you wouldn't call it an athletic program, but he established a kind of a contest between the personnel at Rockwell Field and the personnel of the 91st Squadron in a number of different things: pistol shooting, rifle shooting, tennis, handball, waterskiing, skeet shooting--everything that required an activity. I must admit that the Rockwell Field officers kind of had an edge in all those activities. But he was great for physical fitness. All of his officers there at the field exercised regularly, and were in trim shape.

Q Was this competition good for morale at the base, too?

P Everybody enjoyed it, and I don't think there was, even the most overweight officer, had no complaint to make.

Q Was he strong on esprit de corps of the organization?

P Oh yes. People around there felt that the Rockwell Air Depot could do things better than anyone else.

Q Do you remember Mrs. Arnold at the Club?

P Oh yes. One of the things I remember was the time that the daughter's (Lois) pony ran away. We all tried to catch the pony, and we finally shooed it over in the corner of the hospital. And she wasn't a bit scared, and we were all scared to death she was going to get hurt, because the pony was taking off on a straight line. He was taking her across roads and hitting curbstones. That cart would fly up in the air. She was the calmest one in the vicinity.

Q She must have been 7, 8 or 9 at the time?

P Just a child

Q The Arnolds lost a child when he was there. The child got sick, He went to Letterman Hospital and passed away. This was around 1923.

P No, I didn't...we were only down there during the summer. I don't remember that loss at all.

Q Arnold was very strong in supporting various flights. The round-the-world fliers started out at Rockwell. There were all kinds of flights. This was immediately preceding the Lindbergh Flight. There was a lot of activity, barnstorming and aviation were coming to attention. And Arnold did some things to advance aviation in the public eye. Do you remember anything along that line?

P No, at that time I was at the University of California. We didn't have the communication we have at the present time. When you are 200 or 300 miles away from a certain place, you didn't know much of what was going on there. I was at the start of the flight at Los Angeles, and I was at the University when they came back and were on their barnstorming trip. I was called upon to give the talk at the Greek Theatre, which was my first public speaking engagement before an audience of any size.

Q Arnold had a great fondness for Rockwell Field. He wrote a history of Rockwell Field. One of the prominent things in that history: they were

looking for this hidden spring. Do you remember there was a big search for a spring used by the Indians?

P I never heard that

Q He was very disappointed when the Navy took over Rockwell. The Navy first encroached upon it.

P I know. I was down there one year when the Navy was there. I had a little set-to with them, because they were flying across our hangar-line, about the time we were starting our flight operations. So I went down to see the boss-man down at the Navy, and had that stopped. Rusty Rowell, later quite famous in Marine aviation, in charge of the Marine flying at that time. Made quite a name for himself in Central America.

Q Do you recall anything about Arnold trying to hold the Navy off?

P No. You see, our association down there was relatively so brief--five weeks of a summer camp one year, followed by two weeks more when I was busy with the camp at that time, and I knew nothing much about the administration of Rockwell itself, except whenever I needed anything, I always got it, just like that. He was very proud of their installation there. As an excuse for showing me around the place, Arnold gave me a very thorough tour. Everyplace he'd go, he didn't have to ask anybody what or how it was being done. He was telling me how it was being done.

Q Were you a First Lieut or Captain?

P Heavens no, I was a Major at that time

Q He was a Major, too. You were both of the same rank? He left there in late 1924 to come to Washington. That's where he got involved with Billy Mitchell. Where were you during the Mitchell thing?

P I was out on the West Coast.

Q You were not involved?

P I was not involved, but I was an ardent supporter, but I wasn't in a position. If anybody asked my humble opinion.

Q When was the next time you saw Arnold?

P When he was punished by being sent out to Marshall Field, Ft Riley. It was supposed to be kind of a Siberia." He made it into a garden spot, where everybody wanted to be stationed.

Q What did he do?

P In the first place, he built up the surroundings. He saw that the equipment was the best obtainable. He increased the morale right off the bat. He kept them busy and came up with a number of different ways they could cooperate with the Cavalry in their training. So that everyone was happily busy but not overworked. They had a feeling of accomplishment. As a result, when before, well, you can imagine what an Observation Squadron stuck out in the mid-West had to look forward to.

Q That was the 16th Observation Squadron. Were you attached to it?

P No, I was at Levenworth at the time, a student for two years.

Q You remember General Briney Booth? He was the CG there?

P I wouldn't know. I used to fly in. I had a close friend in the Squadron--Lloyd Barnett. When I was getting in a little flying time from Leavenworth, I'd fly over there. I'd stop in and see him. It made a nice little two-hour flight.

Q But the men who worked for Arnold in that 16th Squadron liked their jobs?

P Oh, they were all crazy about it.

Q He called it his "Elba," like Napoleon--in exile. And then he went to Leavenworth from there. Did you see him at Leavenwoath?

P No

Q In 1928 he went to Leavenworth

P That was before my time. You see, I was there in 1929. I entered when he left.

Q You were in the next class?

P I was in the Class of 1929-31. I wonder if I'm getting my dates mixed.

Q He was there from 1928-29.

P I was trying to figure whether I actually saw him at Marshall Field,

or whether I got over there to talk to the personnel afterwards. I think he had left. He had just left Marshall Field. The results were so apparent. That's right. Goolrick was in command, when I was a student. But all of the personnel who were there under Arnold were still there.

Q What happened to Goolrick? He sort of disappeared?

P I don't know what did happen to Goolrick.

Q Do you remember Lowell Thomas coming out to Fort Riley?

P Heavens, yes. Oh, no, not Lowell Thomas. I was thinking of Lowell Smith. Arnold was at Riley only two years? (yes) I was out in California at the time. And then I went to the Tactical School, and after graduating from that school, I went to Leavenworth, and from there was when I used to fly over to Marshall. He had left by then. Goolrick was in charge. It was matter of common knowledge that Arnold had made that place really something.

Q He conducted some Observation experiments there with the cavalry. I heard a lot of stories about Fort Riley. It was a spit-and-polish existence under the Cavalry. Arnold and some of the Air Corps officers chafed at that regimentation.

P He would.**

Q After Leavenworth, Arnold went to Wright Field. He was there from 1929-31. Did you ever see him there?

P I had no occasion to go to Wright Field.

Q And then he got his big break--he went to March Field in 1931. That's where he made his come-back.

P At that time I was Asst Commandant at Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell. In 1933 we had maneuvers on the West Coast. The entire student body at the Tactical School participated in those maneuvers. And I was one of the air umpires, and helped to arrange some of the air problems. My contacts with Arnold were very casual at that time, as he was in command of the station. He had no direct control over the maneuvers. They were being run by General Westover.

Q Did you work with Colonel Curry? He's in Denver in bad shape.

P He's sick

Q The Air Corps Tactical School in this period is very important. It is very important to Tom Sturm, as well as it is to me, because this is where the ideology, the doctrine of the Air Corps which evolved during World War II was shaped. Do you remember anything about bomber doctrine over fighter doctrine? This is the rise of the bomber in the ACTS?

P When I took over in 1931, Ken Walker was head of the Bombardment Dept, and Claire Chennault had the Fighter Dept. And of course, they were just like this--(sign of squabbling). I went over the lectures that they'd used in the preceding two years and then I had the Dept heads in--the Bombardment, Attack, Observartion, and Pursuit, and particularly, I had a talk with Chennault before this. I impressed upon them particularly, that we were making a new start. We were starting out, and there was no limit. They could let their imaginations roam. The doctrine they were going to preach in their particular departments--and we would hit two extremes: we would hit the "ultra" and we would hit the low level. And I hoped, during my next two or three years there, that we would hit a median by compromise, that we could all agree on. I was only there 3 years. I didn't finish the 4th years there. I went on to the War College.

Q What was your specific job at the Air Corps Tactical School?

P Well, I practically ran the school. In matters of policy, Jack Curry had the final word. But the day-to-day running of the school was up to me. They had an Academic Board, of course, but Jack left everything to me. He would just dictate the general policy on the thing. And I would make no big change without consulting him, of course. But it was very interesting. And he helped Chennault, I think. He had been under the thumb of Bombardment where he was practically afraid to stick his head up. Claire, you know, was a vehement arguer when he was pleading his cause. I think that his Fighter tactics began to develop. He was very loath to give

up anything that he had. For example, he was a great believer in nothing but the 3-plane element, because of the concentrated fire-power you had. When some of the other fighter outfits came up with the string formation, or the 2-plane element where they had more flexibility, he was very slow to consider that. But by putting a little heat on, he would try out these various formations in our Pursuit training.

Q Actually, within the Fighter School there were two sub-schools, you might say: one was the escort fighter going out with bombers; the other was the interceptors.

P I had quite an argument with both the Fighters and the Bombardment on that. I visualized an entirely different type of escort airplane. And in our organization we set up for our map problems, the Air Division, I had a Pursuit Squadron, and then I had what I called the Fighter Squadrons, which would escort the bombardment. Of course, the Bombardment was very loath to accept that, because they insisted that they didn't need any escort. They could take care of themselves. They totally disregarded any pursuit threat and any AA threat. I remember George Kenney told Walker: "Ken," he said: "You are very, very nearsighted, if you can't see the development that's going to take place, when they're going to have instrument-control tracking of you"--there was no radar--" they're going to make these bombardment missions very, very hard to accomplish. You're going to get big losses; you're going to get as many on some missions as 10% losses." You can imagine the morale in your Bombardment formation if a young fellow comes in and they say: "You pay the first 10 days of your mess bill, because you may not need it after that." But, one thing I had to ram down their throats. And I was on the wrong track as regards the type of airplane. I visualized a two-place airplane, very maneuverable, which could protect its rear, but at the same time, had enough maneuverability to attack fighters that were trying to break up the bombardment mission. In a way, I was

kind of relieved to see that my thought bore some fruit when the heads of the escort bombardment on their missions in WW II (??)

Sturm: Do you recall, General, who besides Walker felt that way?

P Harold George, and Otis Moon. They were the three. Otis wasn't one of the vehement ones, but it was a continual war, with Hal and Ken Walker.

Q How about Larry Kuter? He was a lecturer there?

P Yes, but that was later, about 1938. Larry was in one of the later classes. We also had in ahe AA a Coast Artillery officer, named Welshman. He was just as rabid on anti-aircraft as the others were. So sometimes, when I had all the arguments I could take, I'd either get Claire Chennault, or Welshman in the bombardment office and start an argument, hot and heavy. I'd walk out and get myself a little relief.

Sturm: We've seen it stated many times that the Air Force felt the bomber could go unescorted. And yet, when one begins to search for who said it, he always comes down to Ken Walker. Were there any Lieut Colonels, or Brigadiers, who shared Ken Walker's vehemence on this subject?

P I don't remember anybody that pleaded the cause quite as vehemently as Ken did. Of course, at that time, a person who went through the ACTS was inclined to take what was given and accept that. It was something that wasn't changed immediately by experience. Later on, things were changed by w world war experience. But I tried, when I went there--one of the first things I told the students in my opening lecture--and I illustrated this with one of Bruce Bairnsfather's cartoons. Alf and his sidekick were in this shell-hole, with shells bursting all around them. One was saying he ought to leave--"Well if you know of a better hole, go to it." That's going to be our instruction here," I told them, "you don't have to accept what the school teaches. If you object to it, fine. But you've got to come up with something better, or at least something. You just don't object." Don't just say: "I don't believe this." "If you come up with something you believe in, and you have some reason to believe it is a better solution than the solution the

school has," I said, "stand up on your hind legs, and let us know. We are in a state of flux--we're in a state of building strategy. Without your help, we're handicapped a great deal."

Q Could it be that Ken Walker overcompensated somewhat, because they were trying to get some B-17s, and they were having a lot of trouble getting them budgeted. We're talking about 1936-37. The War Dept was very chinchy about giving you some money. Mr. Woodring, and General Spalding (G-4), their rationale was, "for the money it costs to build a B-17, we can build 3 or 4 smaller planes." They wanted to make a showing in numbers of planes, rather than in capability. So, it just occurs to me that Ken Walker, and people who felt like he did, arguing the capability of the heavy bomber in order to push through the budget some of the ideas they had. How does this strike you?

P Could be. Of course, we didn't have so much of an argument against the heavy bomber as such, as regards its necessity. We didn't go too strong for the light bomber, because we felt our Attack planes would take care of the Light Bombardment missions adequately.

Q At that time there was a big movement--as you said, you were among the supporters of the two-place plane. Why did you feel that plane had a place in war?

P I felt that any escort plane should be able to, as such, have some rear defense. I didn't want it to be too much. I wanted it to be enough to discourage an attack from six o'clock. And I was anxious to get enough maneuverability so they could attack other fighters, or Pursuit, as we called them in those days. I was looking for a compromise airplane, that had a gasoline capacity, so they could accompany the bombardment, or at least accompany them a major part of their mission, and then be relieved by some other supporting planes, have rear support so they weren't sitting ducks for pursuit themselves, staying in a formation besides the bombardment, and yet be able to have enough maneuverability to drive off attacking fighters, and allow bombardment to continue on their mission.

Sturm: Do you think you were forced into that logical conclusion by the shortage of funds for pursuit development? If you'd had ample funds, would you have had a different idea?

P No, I came to that decision originally, because I wanted to give them something to shoot at. In considering the problem we had to meet, it seemed to me an airplane of that type--and I had no hard and fast ideas about it except I was just generalizing on it, and using it in our map problems so they'd get used to the idea of escort fighters. My idea was to throw something in the works to be kicked around and come up with an idea that people would develop, and eventually, we'd come up with something. I think the end result was the P-51 which gave them escort.

Q Was Chennault opposed to a long range fighter?

P Yes. He didn't want anything but single seaters. Of course, the bombardment people said: "That damned Peabody, with the crazy idea of ... fighters." But I made it stick. At least I got the idea across, that bombardment wasn't all that sacred, that they were going to be shot down. And all this time, on the other angle, Kenney, who was an ardent air strategist, kept telling the bombardment people that they were going to have to look forward to an anti-aircraft threat in the future. He foresaw that long before anybody in bombardment realized the seriousness of AA development, I think.

Sturm: Was Kenney at the ACTS?

P He was an instructor of mine when I was a student, in 1929, I think he was in the Chief's office at this time, and the AAA held a series of exercises down around Richmond, in which they used some advanced

equipment. He was down there for all of those exercises as the representative of the Chief of Air Corps. He was very much impressed. And if you know George, he was a very practical man. He had an excellent mind, but he didn't let anything run away with him. He had a practical approach to anything. I'll admit that his idea of anti-aircraft changed my thinking a lot, because with the experience I had with AA over in Hawaii, I didn't have much more fear of them than, I'll admit, some of these bombardment people did.

Q Wasn't Kenney punished in the middle 1930's for taking liberties, and sent down to Fort Benning? He was sent to the Infantry, from the Air Corps Tactical School? This was after the Rex incident? When they went out to sea in violation of the 100-mile limit? Wasn't Kenny punished?

P If he was, I dpn't recall

Sturm: Did you have any contacts with Gordon Saville while you were out there?

P Yes. Quite a lot. Gordon is one of the brightest people I ever ran across, to begin with. He was a student, while I was Asst Commandant, I think, in my last year. I believe he was held over as an instructor. Later, when I came back from Hawaii in 1937, Gordon was on the Air Corps Board, and I had contact with him there. I was only on the Board a year, and then I was shifted to Washington, to the Plans Section. Then I ran into him again when I was at AAFSAT. Gordon came down there in charge of our Development Section. He was a man who never let his mind rest. He was always thinking of something. He'd saw something now, and right away, he'd sit there with a faraway look, and he was off on another tack. He was solving another problem that hadn't been presented to us yet. He's living out in Colorado, and I believe his wife was ill. He found the climate better.

Q I interviewed him at great length down in San Antonio, at the Daedalian meeting a couple of years ago.

P. Often, it was the case, he'd only have to explain something and he'd expect you to understand the whole thing. (Saville)

Q You left the Tactical School and went up to Langley Field?

P From the ACTS I went to the War College. After one year at the War College they tried to keep me on as an instructor at the War College. Golly, that would have made 12 straight years as an instructor for me, or going to school. I begged off on that.

Q When did you go to Langley?

P I went to Langley two different times. When I came back from Hawaii in 1937, and after I was relieved from _____.

Q I want to ask about Emmons. He had some ideas that he might be the top man in the Air Corps. Were you aware of that?

P I never was aware of that ambition. He never mentioned anything like that to me.

Q Your impression of Emmons?

P He had a remarkably bright mind, and when a problem arose, as I saw it arise over in Hawaii--when he was Air Officer over ther--he took hold of it and solved it in very rapid fashion. I think one reason, one handicap he had when he was head of GHQ Air Force, was that he was buffaloed by General Arnold. I think, for some reason, he was very afraid of General Arnold. He was senior to General Arnold in the original promotion rank. He was ahead of Arnold

Q Right. He was 3 stars when Arnold was 2 stars

Sturm: No. Actually Emmons graduated after Arnold

P Arnold was '07, and Emmons was '08 or ' 09.

Q Emmons was 1909

P I always had the impression, when the two of them were together, from the way he deferred to Hap, that he was in considerable awe of him.

Interview: Brig Gen Hume Peabody, Chaptico, Md. Nov 16, 1972
(Tom Sturm participating) PART II

Q You were in the Class of Stars - 1915?

P One of the spear-carriers

Q You were one of the "seven mules" - the "four horsemen" were in the backfield?

P They were from Notre Dame

Q I mean you had all these distinguished Generals in your class -- Eisenhower, Bradley, McNarney, Van Fleet.

Sturm: Quite a class

Q You met Arnold?

P First contact with him was when he came down on an investigation at March Field of a little shenanigan that was being worked there, turning over some JN-4D's back to the Curtiss company. It was quite a scandal on the field. And oddly enough, I was the one officer in any position with some authority down there. Didn't know the first thing about it. He came down there and settled that matter and relieved the then commanding officer, and put me in temporary command.

Q What was the nature of the scandal?

P Briefly, it worked like this: we had a number of brand new JN-4D's. The CO thought well he'd just change the engines on these new JN4D's and put them in some of our old planes and change the numbers on the engines. He gave his Asst Engineering Officer instructions to do that. Meantime, he issued a memorandum to the effect that no one of our personnel would go inside the wire fence which surrounded the 3 or 4 hangars which the Curtiss Company had taken over for these airplanes, covering himself that way. All this went on. I didn't know anything about it. I happened at that time to be in charge of ground instruction, so I didn't come in contact with the engineering of the line very much. The Curtiss Company employee

was a former officer at March Field. Of course, he picked that up in a hurry. The CO was a little bit dumb in a way. He didn't know that the serial number was stamped on the engine block as well as on the plate. So he told the Engineering Officer to change the plate. That was done, and of course when the checkup was made as to what had transpired, it was brought to light. That was just one of several irregularities they had against him.

Q Were you impressed with the way Arnold handled the matter?

P We didn't even come in direct contact. I wasn't even called as a witness because I didn't know anything about it. But there had been an Inspector down there for a week or ten days. He had uncovered--he did the spade work for Colonel Arnold, as it was. But when Colonel Arnold came down there: "Boom!" Things happened right now. In less than a day, he settled the matter, relieved the CO, and shot me into the job.

Q Did he act in a fair way in respect to the rights of the accused?

P As I say, I didn't get in on any of the hearing at all. But from what I learned afterwards, I don't think the accused had anything much working for him. It was an open and shut case against him. I thought--we all thought--that for the offense, his punishment was very mild. All they did was transfer the officer to another station.

Q Did Arnold call you in to tell you he was putting you in the job?

P He came over to my office and didn't call me. He said: "I'm relieving so-and-so and I'm putting you in command." I said" "Sir, when is that effective?" And he said: "Immediately." He said: "I'm having a letter typewritten to that effect. That will be in the office by the time you get there."

Q Was he an impatient man to get things done?

P I never saw that man when he wasn't impatient. He was always in a hurry to get things done. One of the worst tortures he could possibly go through was to be held down at the station by the weather when he

wanted to go some place else. I saw indications of that down at Orlando one time. He wanted to go on to Eglin Field. The weather was socked in there. At that time, we didn't have any night facilities. So he couldn't go there. It was all socked in. The only place he could go was Tampa. He didn't want to go to Tampa. He didn't have any business in Tampa, but he had to go some place. So he went to Tampa.

Q Was this around 1940-41?

P It was, I would say, 1942, when AAFSAT was started--School of Applied Tactics--down in Orlando. I was sent down to organize that afterwards; it was changed to "Tactical Center".

Q I want first to take you through the early days. When Arnold was Air Officer, he started the Aerial Forest Patrol.

P Don't I know it. I had the job of training the Foresters at March Field. As I said, I was in charge of ground instruction. Then we had a bunch of State Foresters as well as National Foresters down there, and gave them a kind of a get-rich-quick course in observation. At the time we had no means of communication from the airplane to the ground, so we had to use dropped messages. And I experimented with a little parachute, dropping it from the top of the water tower. And when we actually started our patrol, it was rather amusing. The first report was phoned into the L. A. office in 20 minutes from the time the report was written. The second was phoned in 2 weeks later. But the following year, or the year after that--I wasn't connected with it then--they had radio communication, and of course, they did a beautiful job afterwards.

Q Did Arnold get the creditafor having started that?

P I don't know; I couldn't say.

(Mrs. Peabody said something about when Arnold used to land at Langley Field and perhaps some golf was played)

Q Arnold was usually too busy to play golf. He never really worked at it.

P I played with him quite a few times at Rockwell when he was in

command of the Depot down there. At that time, I was on ROTC duty at the University of California and during the summer I had a five-weeks ROTC camp down there, followed by two weeks of Reserve Officer camp. I guess we used to play--come to think of it, he only played twice a week, and maybe once in mid-week.

Q This was in the early 1920s?

P In the mid-1920s, along about 1924-25

Q In 1924 he left to come to Washington

P Then it was earlier than that--1923-24.

Q Do you have any other recollections of him as Air Officer at the Presidio?

P No, other than a few times that I had to correspond with him about certain matters that came up that I took up with him by letter rather than through channels, and got things settled, just like that. But I didn't have any face-to-face dealings with him other than that first one I mentioned.

Q I never met General Arnold

P He moved at a half-run all the time, and he had the most marvelous memory of anyone I've ever seen. I'm jumping the gun, but later on, when I had to, or helped, prepare talks for him--that's when I was in the Plans Section. I'd prepare a talk and hear him give it, and I wouldn't recognize it. Speaking without notes, I wouldn't have recognized it as my prepared talk, until I stopped to analyze it. He had covered every point we had down in this talk, but he expressed it in his own words much better than I'd had it expressed. And I talked to several other people who performed similar tasks. He'd read it through once and he could remember it.

Q That's the ideal speaker, to take your material and do better with it than the speech-writer did

P He was tops in my book.

Q Inspections--you talked about his going around making inspections. He had a talent, I'm told, to go right down to the Maintenance shack, or down to where the Sergeants were, where the real problems were. He

tried to avoid the plush red-carpet treatment in the CO's office where they tended to cover up the problems rather than expose them. Do you have any thoughts about that?

P Yes. Of course when he inspected our organization at Orlando, we were scattered all over the state of Florida. We didn't spend too much time in any one place. He was interested in the teaching facilities we had set up, but there was one incident that bears out that attitude of his. We're on the way over to the airport. He was getting ready to leave. That was one of those days, that time I mentioned, when he couldn't go any place but Tampa. I said: "General, if you have a few minutes, I'd like to show you a new installation we just started," We had an organization called the Airdrome Defense Squadron, and it was about 350 black soldiers, and they'd been gathered from every place, and we were giving them their basic training. We'd just opened a new mess. We had brand new equipment in there, a very smooth-talking Mess Sgt, a graduate of New York University, and very proud of this mess. General Arnold went all through this mess and asked him any number of questions about his manner of operation, and was very much impressed. He didn't say anything to me about it. He landed at Drew Field, right at the time, the worst time he could possibly have gone in a mess. He went in a back door, where all the garbage cans were, then through the kitchen into the mess. The poor Commanding Officer who had just arrived at the field the day before, and hardly had time to hang up his hat, bore the brunt of this. He called him and he said: "Send your Mess Sgt up to Peabody at Orlando and have them learn how to run a mess." We didn't have a course for Mess Sgts. The next day, we did have a course for them.

Q I've been told this many, many times, that he went right down to where the problems were, the back door of the mess, or the back door of the maintenance shack.

P One thing you had to learn early in dealing with him. If he asked you a question and you didn't know the answer, not to stall, but to tell him: "I don't know, but I'll find out." He wouldn't forget that. The next time he saw you, he'd ask you for the answer to this particular question.

Q Somebody told me that one thing that infuriated him was "Don't worry. Leave it to me, General. I'll take care of it." He wanted some specific recommendations on getting it done. If somebody tried to put him off without any specific recommendations for improvement, this would irritate him. Do you have any thoughts on that?

P I don't recall any specific occasion that would illustrate that. I think you can sum it up by saying, he just wanted to get things done. He didn't want to leave any loose ends. If it wasn't done, he wanted to know when it was going to be done, and if he thought it couldn't be done in that length of time, he'd want to know just how you were going to do it. You had to prove to him you were going to get it done in that length of time.

Q When he had briefings, or you had him in and set him down and put up a "plumbing chart," and a briefing officer, did he become impatient if the man strayed from his subject? Did he ever cut off a briefing officer?

P The only time I had any contact along that line was when I was for a short time A-2 for about 3 weeks. And he used to come to the briefings there and apparently, they had had experience with him, because their briefings were excellent. They just gave the bare facts. He never had any criticism or expressed any criticism. He always asked very pointed questions. I don't remember any time that the various briefing officers didn't have an answer for him. If they hadn't had, I imagine there would have been an explosion.

Q Who replaced you as A-2? Edgar Sorenson?

P He took my place, yes. I moved down to War Organization & Movement, and from there down to AAFSAT.

Q Jumping now, you went into War Organization & Movement when the incumbent died.

P Steve Ferson

Q Do you remember the circumstances of his death?

P I wasn't in Washington at the time. I was just getting over an attack of pneumonia at that time in Oklahoma City. I came to Washington and moved into the A-2 slot. And at that time, Nate Twining had taken over in the interim, after Steve Ferson died, but just temporarily, because they had other jobs lined up for him. I was very happy in A-2. If I'd been able to pick a job, I couldn't have found a more interesting one. Just beginning to learn what it was all about at the end of three weeks, and "boom", I was called on the telephone and moved up to a different office.

Q Ferson was supposed to have died in General Arnold's office.

P I never did hear any of the details. (off-tape)

Q Back to the 20's when Arnold was at Rockwell Field. Do you remember him at Rockwell Field? He was there from 1921-24

P Very well. We were down there for at least one double tour. I remember that particularly well. He was great on physical fitness. The 91st Observation Squadron went down from Crissy Field to furnish the personnel for both camps. They arrived. They had several overweight officers. So, immediately, Major Arnold established, you wouldn't call it an athletic program, but he established a kind of a contest between the personnel at Rockwell Field and the personnel of the 91st Squadron in a number of different things: pistol shooting, rifle shooting, tennis, handball, waterskiing, skeet shooting--everything that required an activity. I must admit that the Rockwell Field officers kind of had an edge in all those activities. But he was great for physical fitness. All of his officers there at the field exercised regularly, and were in trim shape.

Q Was this competition good for morale at the base, too?

P Everybody enjoyed it, and I don't think there was, even the most overweight officer, had no complaint to make.

Q Was he strong on esprit de corps of the organization?

P Oh yes. People around there felt that the Rockwell Air Depot could do things better than anyone else.

Q Do you remember Mrs. Arnold at the Club?

P Oh yes. One of the things I remember was the time that the daughter's (Lois) pony ran away. We all tried to catch the pony, and we finally shooed it over in the corner of the hospital. And she wasn't a bit scared, and we were all scared to death she was going to get hurt, because the pony was taking off on a straight line. He was taking her across roads and hitting curbstones. That cart would fly up in the air. She was the calmest one in the vicinity.

Q She must have been 7, 8 or 9 at the time?

P Just a child

Q The Arnolds lost a child when he was there. The child got sick, He went to Letterman Hospital and passed away. This was around 1923.

P No, I didn't...we were only down there during the summer. I don't remember that loss at all.

Q Arnold was very strong in supporting various flights. The round-the-world fliers started out at Rockwell. There were all kinds of flights. This was immediately preceding the Lindbergh Flight. There was a lot of activity, barnstorming and aviation were coming to attention. And Arnold did some things to advance aviation in the public eye. Do you remember anything along that line?

P No, at that time I was at the University of California. We didn't have the communication we have at the present time. When you are 200 or 300 miles away from a certain place, you didn't know much of what was going on there. I was at the start of the flight at Los Angeles, and I was at the University when they came back and were on their barnstorming trip. I was called upon to give the talk at the Greek Theatre, which was my first public speaking engagement before an audience of any size.

Q Arnold had a great fondness for Rockwell Field. He wrote a history of Rockwell Field. One of the prominent things in that history: they were

looking for this hidden spring. Do you remember there was a big search for a spring used by the Indians?

P I never heard that

Q He was very disappointed when the Navy took over Rockwell. The Navy first encroached upon it.

P I know. I was down there one year when the Navy was there. I had a little set-to with them, because they were flying across our hangar-line, about the time we were starting our flight operations. So I went down to see the boss-man down at the Navy, and had that stopped. Rusty Rowell, later quite famous in Marine aviation, in charge of the Marine flying at that time. Made quite a name for himself in Central America.

Q Do you recall anything about Arnold trying to hold the Navy off?

P No. You see, our association down there was relatively so brief--five weeks of a summer camp one year, followed by two weeks more when I was busy with the camp at that time, and I knew nothing much about the administration of Rockwell itself, except whenever I needed anything, I always got it, just like that. He was very proud of their installation there. As an excuse for showing me around the place, Arnold gave me a very thorough tour. Everyplace he'd go, he didn't have to ask anybody what or how it was being done. He was telling me how it was being done.

Q Were you a First Lieut or Captain?

P Heavens no, I was a Major at that time

Q He was a Major, too. You were both of the same rank? He left there in late 1924 to come to Washington. That's where he got involved with Billy Mitchell. Where were you during the Mitchell thing?

P I was out on the West Coast.

Q You were not involved?

P I was not involved, but I was an ardent supporter, but I wasn't in a position. If anybody asked my humble opinion.

Q When was the next time you saw Arnold?

P When he was punished by being sent out to Marshall Field, Ft Riley. It was supposed to be kind of a Siberia." He made it into a garden spot, where everybody wanted to be stationed.

Q What did he do?

P In the first place, he built up the surroundings. He saw that the equipment was the best obtainable. He increased the morale right off the bat. He kept them busy and came up with a number of different ways they could cooperate with the Cavalry in their training. So that everyone was happily busy but not overworked. They had a feeling of accomplishment. As a result, when before, well, you can imagine what an Observation Squadron stuck out in the mid-West had to look forward to.

Q That was the 16th Observation Squadron. Were you attached to it?

P No, I was at Levenworth at the time, a student for two years.

Q You remember General Briney Booth? He was the CG there?

P I wouldn't know. I used to fly in. I had a close friend in the Squadron--Lloyd Barnett. When I was getting in a little flying time from Leavenworth, I'd fly over there. I'd stop in and see him. It made a nice little two-hour flight.

Q But the men who worked for Arnold in that 16th Squadron liked their jobs?

P Oh, they were all crazy about it.

Q He called it his "Elba," like Napoleon--in exile. And then he went to Leavenworth from there. Did you see him at Leavenwoath?

P No

Q In 1928 he went to Leavenworth

P That was before my time. You see, I was there in 1929. I entered when he left.

Q You were in the next class?

P I was in the Class of 1929-31. I wonder if I'm getting my dates mixed.

Q He was there from 1928-29.

P I was trying to figure whether I actually saw him at Marshall Field,

or whether I got over there to talk to the personnel afterwards. I think he had left. He had just left Marshall Field. The results were so apparent. That's right. Goolrick was in command, when I was a student. But all of the personnel who were there under Arnold were still there.

Q What happened to Goolrick? He sort of disappeared?

P I don't know what did happen to Goolrick.

Q Do you remember Lowell Thomas coming out to Fort Riley?

P Heavens, yes. Oh, no, not Lowell Thomas. I was thinking of Lowell Smith. Arnold was at Riley only two years? (yes) I was out in California at the time. And then I went to the Tactical School, and after graduating from that school, I went to Leavenworth, and from there was when I used to fly over to Marshall. He had left by then. Goolrick was in charge. It was matter of common knowledge that Arnold had made that place really something.

Q He conducted some Observation experiments there with the cavalry. I heard a lot of stories about Fort Riley. It was a spit-and-polish existence under the Cavalry. Arnold and some of the Air Corps officers chafed at that regimentation.

P He would.**

Q After Leavenworth, Arnold went to Wright Field. He was there from 1929-31. Did you ever see him there?

P I had no occasion to go to Wright Field.

Q And then he got his big break--he went to March Field in 1931. That's where he made his come-back.

P At that time I was Asst Commandant at Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell. In 1933 we had maneuvers on the West Coast. The entire student body at the Tactical School participated in those maneuvers. And I was one of the air umpires, and helped to arrange some of the air problems. My contacts with Arnold were very casual at that time, as he was in command of the station. He had no direct control over the maneuvers. They were being run by General Westover.

Q Did you work with Colonel Curry? He's in Denver in bad shape.

P He's sick

Q The Air Corps Tactical School in this period is very important. It is very important to Tom Sturm, as well as it is to me, because this is where the ideology, the doctrine of the Air Corps which evolved during World War II was shaped. Do you remember anything about bomber doctrine over fighter doctrine? This is the rise of the bomber in the ACTS?

P When I took over in 1931, Ken Walker was head of the Bombardment Dept and Claire Chennault had the Fighter Dept. And of course, they were just like this--(sign of squabbling). I went over the lectures that they'd used in the preceding two years and then I had the Dept heads in--the Bombardment, Attack, Observartion, and Pursuit, and particularly, I had a talk with Chennault before this. I impressed upon them particularly, that we were making a new start. We were starting out, and there was no limit. They could let their imaginations roam. The doctrine they were going to preach in their particular departments--and we would hit two extremes: we would hit the "ultra" and we would hit the low level. And I hoped, during my next two or three years there, that we would hit a median by compromise, that we could all agree on. I was only there 3 years. I didn't finish the 4th years there. I went on to the War College.

Q What was your specific job at the Air Corps Tactical School?

P Well, I practically ran the school. In matters of policy, Jack Curry had the final word. But the day-to-day running of the school was up to me. They had an Academic Board, of course, but Jack left everything to me. He would just dictate the general policy on the thing. And I would make no big change without consulting him, of course. But it was very interesting. And he helped Chennault, I think. He had been under the thumb of Bombardment where he was practically afraid to stick his head up. Claire, you know, was a vehement arguer when he was pleading his cause. I think that his Fighter tactics began to develop. He was very loath to give

up anything that he had. For example, he was a great believer in nothing but the 3-plane element, because of the concentrated fire-power you had. When some of the other fighter outfits came up with the string formation, or the 2-plane element where they had more flexibility, he was very slow to consider that. But by putting a little heat on, he would try out these various formations in our Pursuit training.

Q Actually, within the Fighter School there were two sub-schools, you might say: one was the escort fighter going out with bombers; the other was the interceptors.

P I had quite an argument with both the Fighters and the Bombardment on that. I visualized an entirely different type of escort airplane. And in our organization we set up for our map problems, the Air Division, I had a Pursuit Squadron, and then I had what I called the Fighter Squadrons, which would escort the bombardment. Of course, the Bombardment was very loath to accept that, because they insisted that they didn't need any escort. They could take care of themselves. They totally disregarded any pursuit threat and any AA threat. I remember George Kenney told Walker: "Ken," he said: "You are very, very nearsighted, if you can't see the development that's going to take place, when they're going to have instrument-control tracking of you"--there was no radar--" they're going to make these bombardment missions very, very hard to accomplish. You're going to get big losses; you're going to get as many on some missions as 10% losses." You can imagine the morale in your Bombardment formation if a young fellow comes in and they say: "You pay the first 10 days of your mess bill, because you may not need it after that." But, one thing I had to ram down their throats. And I was on the wrong track as regards the type of airplane. I visualized a two-place airplane, very maneuverable, which could protect its rear, but at the same time, had enough maneuverability to attack fighters that were trying to break up the bombardment mission. In a way, I was

kind of relieved to see that my thought bore some fruit when the heads of the escort bombardment on their missions in WW II (??)

Sturm: Do you recall, General, who besides Walker felt that way?

P Harold George, and Otis Moon. They were the three. Otis wasn't one of the vehement ones, but it was a continual war, with Hal and Ken Walker.

Q How about Larry Kuter? He was a lecturer there?

P Yes, but that was later, about 1938. Larry was in one of the later classes. We also had in ahe AA a Coast Artillery officer, named Welshman. He was just as rabid on anti-aircraft as the others were. So sometimes, when I had all the arguments I could take, I'd either get Claire Chennault, or Welshman in the bombardment office and start an argument, hot and heavy. I'd walk out and get myself a little relief.

Sturm: We've seen it stated many times that the Air Force felt the bomber could go unescorted. And yet, when one begins to search for who said it, he always comes down to Ken Walker. Were there any Lieut Colonels, or Brigadiers, who shared Ken Walker's vehemence on this subject?

P I don't remember anybody that pleaded the cause quite as vehemently as Ken did. Of course, at that time, a person who went through the ACTS was inclined to take what was given and accept that. It was something that wasn't changed immediately by experience. Later on, things were changed by world war experience. But I tried, when I went there--one of the first things I told the students in my opening lecture--and I illustrated this with one of Bruce Bairnsfather's cartoons. Alf and his sidekick were in this shell-hole, with shells bursting all around them. One was saying he ought to leave--"Well if you know of a better hole, go to it." That's going to be our instruction here," I told them, "you don't have to accept what the school teaches. If you object to it, fine. But you've got to come up with something better, or at least something. You just don't object." Don't just say: "I don't believe this." "If you come up with something you believe in, and you have some reason to believe it is a better solution than the solution the

school has," I said, "stand up on your hind legs, and let us know. We are in a state of flux--we're in a state of building strategy. Without your help, we're handicapped a great deal."

Q Could it be that Ken Walker overcompensated somewhat, because they were trying to get some B-17s, and they were having a lot of trouble getting them budgeted. We're talking about 1936-37. The War Dept was very chinchy about giving you some money. Mr. Woodring, and General Spalding (G-4), their rationale was, "for the money it costs to build a B-17, we can build 3 or 4 smaller planes." They wanted to make a showing in numbers of planes, rather than in capability. So, it just occurs to me that Ken Walker, and people who felt like he did, arguing the capability of the heavy bomber in order to push through the budget some of the ideas they had. How does this strike you?

P Could be. Of course, we didn't have so much of an argument against the heavy bomber as such, as regards its necessity. We didn't go too strong for the light bomber, because we felt our Attack planes would take care of the Light Bombardment missions adequately.

Q At that time there was a big movement--as you said, you were among the supporters of the two-place plane. Why did you feel that plane had a place in war?

P I felt that any escort plane should be able to, as such, have some rear defense. I didn't want it to be too much. I wanted it to be enough to discourage an attack from six o'clock. And I was anxious to get enough maneuverability so they could attack other fighters, or Pursuit, as we called them in those days. I was looking for a compromise airplane, that had a gasoline capacity, so they could accompany the bombardment, or at least accompany them a major part of their mission, and then be relieved by some other supporting planes, have rear support so they weren't sitting ducks for pursuit themselves, staying in a formation besides the bombardment, and yet be able to have enough maneuverability to drive off attacking fighters, and allow bombardment to continue on their mission.

Sturm: Do you think you were forced into that logical conclusion by the shortage of funds for pursuit development? If you'd had ample funds, would you have had a different idea?

P No, I came to that decision originally, because I wanted to give them something to shoot at. In considering the problem we had to meet, it seemed to me an airplane of that type--and I had no hard and fast ideas about it except I was just generalizing on it, and using it in our map problems so they'd get used to the idea of escort fighters. My idea was to throw something in the works to be kicked around and come up with an idea that people would develop, and eventually, we'd come up with something. I think the end result was the P-51 which gave them escort.

Q Was Chennault opposed to a long range fighter?

P Yes. He didn't want anything but single seaters. Of course, the bombardment people said: "That damned Peabody, with the crazy idea of fighters." But I made it stick. At least I got the idea across, that bombardment wasn't all that sacred, that they were going to be shot down. And all this time, on the other angle, Kenney, who was an ardent air strategist, kept telling the bombardment people that they were going to have to look forward to an anti-aircraft threat in the future. He foresaw that long before anybody in bombardment realized the seriousness of AA development, I think.

Sturm: Was Kenney at the ACTS?

P He was an instructor of mine when I was a student, in 1929, I think he was in the Chief's office at this time, and the AAA held a series of exercises down around Richmond, in which they used some advanced

equipment. He was down there for all of those exercises as the representative of the Chief of Air Corps. He was very much impressed. And if you know George, he was a very practical man. He had an excellent mind, but he didn't let anything run away with him. He had a practical approach to anything. I'll admit that his idea of anti-aircraft changed my thinking a lot, because with the experience I had with AA over in Hawaii, I didn't have much more fear of them than, I'll admit, some of these bombardment people did.

Q Wasn't Kenney punished in the middle 1930's for taking liberties, and sent down to Fort Benning? He was sent to the Infantry, from the Air Corps Tactical School? This was after the Rex incident? When they went out to sea in violation of the 100-mile limit? Wasn't Kenny punished?

P If he was, I dpn't recall

Sturm: Did you have any contacts with Gordon Saville while you were out there?

P Yes. Quite a lot. Gordon is one of the brightest people I ever ran across, to begin with. He was a student, while I was Asst Commandant, I think, in my last year. I believe he was held over as an instructor. Later, when I came back from Hawaii in 1937, Gordon was on the Air Corps Board, and I had contact with him there. I was only on the Board a year, and then I was shifted to Washington, to the Plans Section. Then I ran into him again when I was at AAFSAT. Gordon came down there in charge of our Development Section. He was a man who never let his mind rest. He was always thinking of something. He'd saw something now, and right away, he'd sit there with a faraway look, and he was off on another tack. He was solving another problem that hadn't been presented to us yet. He's living out in Colorado, and I believe his wife was ill. He found the climate better.

Q I interviewed him at great length down in San Antonio, at the Daedalian meeting a couple of years ago.

P Often, it was the case, he'd only have to explain something and he'd expect you to understand the whole thing. (Saville)

Q You left the Tactical School and went up to Langley Field?

P From the ACTS I went to the War College. After one year at the War College they tried to keep me on as an instructor at the War College. Golly, that would have made 12 straight years as an instructor for me, or going to school. I begged off on that.

Q When did you go to Langley?

P I went to Langley two different times. When I came back from Hawaii in 1937, and after I was relieved from _____.

Q I want to ask about Emmons. He had some ideas that he might be the top man in the Air Corps. Were you aware of that?

P I never was aware of that ambition. He never mentioned anything like that to me.

Q Your impression of Emmons?

P He had a remarkably bright mind, and when a problem arose, as I saw it arise over in Hawaii--when he was Air Officer over ther--he took hold of it and solved it in very rapid fashion. I think one reason, one handicap he had when he was head of GHQ Air Force, was that he was buffaloed by General Arnold. I think, for some reason, he was very afraid of General Arnold. He was senior to General Arnold in the original promotion rank. He was ahead of Arnold

Q Right. He was 3 stars when Arnold was 2 stars

Sturm: No. Actually Emmons graduated after Arnold

P Arnold was '07, and Emmons was '08 or ' 09.

Q Emmons was 1909

P I always had the impression, when the two of them were together, from the way he deferred to Hap, that he was in considerable awe of him.

Peterson, Pete

2 Oct 69

Interview with Col Pete Peterson
Redondo Beach, California
October 2, 1969

Q: Col Peterson, one of the first things I usually ask people in this situation is do you remember the first time, and under what circumstances you first met Gen Arnold?

P: I got out of flying school in 1934 and was sent out. My first station was March Field, California, and Gen Arnold was then a LTCOL in charge of the West Coast and March Field. But I arrived during the air mail. He wasn't there; he was up in Salt Lake City, running the air mail. After the air mail, he came down, that was when I first met Gen Arnold.

Q: What was your first impression? What were the circumstances? Was it an official meeting? You were a 2nd LT?

P: No, we were flying cadets. We were the first group to go out because of budget constraints. We went out on active duty as flying cadets. Actually, while Col Arnold was still up there, a Lt Lewis was in charge of the base, and he didn't know what to do with us, because it was the first time they had ever had flying cadets on active duty. So he didn't know whether to treat us as enlisted men or officers, or what; whether we ought to live in the barracks or whether we ought to live in the BOQ. Anyway, he got ahold of LTCOL Arnold to find out what to do with us, and Arnold said in no uncertain terms we were to be treated as officers, live in the BOQ, eat in Officer's Mess, and belong to the Officer's Club. That was really my first contact with Arnold. Arnold had a great feeling, as you know, for people.

Q: We get the impression that his tour at March Field was kind of the turning point in his career. This is where he really made a big impression on a lot of people. There was the air mail, his contacts with Gen Craig,

his flair for public relations, his friendships with the people in Hollywood. Here he acquired a reputation for innovation and for getting things done. Does that square with your recollection?

P: Well, I think that's probably true but, of course, being a flying cadet, down the lower echelon of things at that time, I really didn't have too much contact with the General.

Q: You didn't have anything to compare it with either.

P: No, that's right. All I know is that in his home, he and Mrs. Arnold were always very gracious to the cadets. They were always welcome. Of course, he had a daughter that was about our age at that time, too. We were always very welcome at his home and he always treated us great.

Q: When was your next contact, then?

P: Shortly after that the bombardment group was moved up to Hamilton Field. Major Clarence Tinker was in command up there. So I really didn't have any further contact with Col Arnold until years later when Col Beebe was looking for somebody to replace him as pilot for General Arnold, and I was selected. I was at Wright Field at that time on flight tests. In the meantime, I had gotten out of the service, flown with the airlines, and come back in the service again in 1939 when I got a regular commission.

Q: What was your rank in June 1942 when you went to work for him?

P: I was a Major then.

Q: What kind of duties did he assign? I know that you were his personal pilot, and did you also fly Marshall as Beebe had?

P: No.

Q: Well, you must have had a lot of other things to do for him?

P: Well, yes. The main thing I was looking at, trying to keep track of, was aircraft production. My job was to look into some of the problems, where we had production falling off, that sort of thing. I tried to keep informed of where production problems occurred, and what was going on with production.

Q: This was a big interest of his?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: The minute we started rearming at all?

P: As a matter, one of the instances, you might have heard before. We were always going to some factory and milling around the factory to find what was going on. He would go through them like a whirlwind. We were out at Seattle, where the B-29s were being built. We were having a lot of problems. And one of the biggest problems was the continuous changes. Every engineer wanted to get his changes put in there.

Q: It is still going on.

P: Yes. Anyway, General Arnold said: "There will be no more changes!" Benny Meyers came along, and said: "There will be no more changes, unless it is a safety factor. From now on, no more changes unless it is a safety factor."

Q: About what time was that - 1943?

About 1943 or 1944. Yes. But he loved to go around to these factories and talk to the workers, talk to the women workers, or talk to anybody, to gain interest.

Q: Well, this also goes back to the point you made about March Field, about Arnold recognizing that there are people at the bottom of it. So he kind of got double duty out of his visits. He spurred the workers and management at the same time.

P: Yes. That was one of the big things. Generally, management had a hard time keeping up with him because he was busy going through these factories. He had a great capacity.

Q: You know with all this energy and moving about quickly, did he grasp what he was getting at the time, or would someone have to sit down later and sort of re-explain it to him?

P: No, he had a tremendous capacity for remembering things, and

getting at the basic problems, and really understanding things. In fact, he was, as you well know, thinking so far ahead of everybody, that he got impatient with people, and Beebe probably told you this.

Q: Well, there's lots of evidence of his impatience with people.

P: Yes, that was the thing. He was just thinking so far ahead of everybody that it was just fantastic.

Q: Gen Cabell told us the story about when he and Norstad went to work for Gen Arnold. One of them had drafted a letter for his signature and in it was a paragraph it began: "I'm afraid we can't do something," and he sent it right back. He said: "I won't sign any letters that say 'I can't,' and I won't sign any letters that say, 'I'm afraid.'"

P: He was very positive about things.

Q: Did he do much flying himself when he traveled with you?

P: No, he would, lots of times, quite a bit of the time, ride as co-pilot, but he never took the wheel except maybe for a couple of seconds, when I was doing something else. But he never landed or took off. He loved to sit up there and navigate. And he'd give me my estimates, my next check-point, and all this sort of thing. But he, as long as I was with him, he never flew - I mean, took off and landed. I went through some pretty bad weather with him riding as copilot.

Q: Do you recall any specific example?

P: We had a couple of airplanes; we had a B-25 and a DC-3, but we flew the B-25 most of the time. I remember one time we took off in the B-25 which was fixed up with some comfortable seats in back. But once he got up in the front, in the cockpit, he couldn't get back in the back part to sit in a comfortable seat. So once he sat up there, if he didn't do it, then Puzenski, the crew chief, would ride with me as co-pilot. We took out of Texas one time, in a very bad storm, hard snow, what not. I remember the engine was

cutting out, and so he was adjusting that carburetor heat, trying to get that carburetor from icing up. So it sputtered three or four times, and finally we got through all right.

Q: Did that bother him?

P: No, he was sitting up there, enjoying it, I think.

Q: Evidently, his personal courage was pretty high?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: Do you think he ever regretted never having some combat? Did he ever bring it up?

P: He never, I wouldn't know.

Q: I think there is evidence that he was conscious of the fact that he never saw combat in WWI and he seemed to make an effort to assure that his people had a chance in WWII.

P: Yes, that's why Beebe left. For two reaons: one, he wanted to get into combat; No. 2 he wanted to be promoted. He couldn't get promoted sitting there in Arnold's office. Of course, that wasn't my case, because I was a Major.

Q: How long did you stay with Arnold, then?

P: Well, I was with him all through the war, and then I left.... either the end of 1945 or early 1946, when I left him, I went back to Wright Field and went to Panama, in June 1946. So, it must have been right at the end of 1945 when he retired.

NOTE: It was February 1946 when he left Washington.

Q: He retired quite quickly. In fact, we found a lot of evidence in letters and so forth, that he spent a lot of time, as busy as he was, thinking about the ranch. He was trying to get things going out there. Did he talk a lot about that to you?

P: Yes, we made several trips out to the West Coast, up in Oregon,

looking for a place. And he finally decided on Sonoma.

Q: I know they were almost on the verge of buying a place in Oregon.

P: MacKenzie River, yes. He was thinking about that.

Q: Do you remember, well, you must have been along, early in the war, September 1942, when he took a trip to the SW Pacific, and looked around, and among other things, called on MacArthur.

P: Yes, I remember that real well.

Q: Were you along when he and MacArthur were talking?

P: No.

Q: We have had several versions of that, and including one that MacArthur went into a very long monologue, and that he was not very happy with Air, and so on, and this was one of the things which led Arnold to....

P: Kenney was there, probably with him when he was talking with MacArthur.

Q: Yes, I think he was, but I should go off the record. But Kenney is not an impartial witness when Mac Arthur is concerned. Where MacArthur is concerned, he is really a hero worshipper. And, of course, he is of Arnold, too, but not as much.

Q: Well, there is an incident - I think it appears in Global Mission, you might recall - when you were flying over the Hump, and into China, and got lost. What do you remember about that?

P: Well, as I remember reading his book, I don't think he was quite factual.

Q: Well, that's one of the reasons I asked.

P: We got lost, for sure. I think that he said his pilot fainted - I didn't faint. He was talking about me - I didn't faint. I didn't like that 18,000 feet were at, but I didn't faint.

Note: See Global Mission, p. 411.

P: Anyway, I did go back and, of course, I was without oxygen. I went back to check with him, Sir John Dill, but it was a bad situation. I mean, it was one of the times, perhaps the only time, that I really got lost, but it was just an accumulation of circumstances. No. 1: We weren't going to go that night, and we'd all gone to the quarters where we were going to stay. Then Stilwell had taken off and decided to go over the Hump and go back that night. So Arnold says: "By God, if Stilwell can do it, we can do it." So, anyway, we got a call about 8:00 PM to get ready to go. So we went down, got the briefings and all that stuff. We supposedly got the correct radio frequencies. Anyway, we took off. It was dark - about 9:00 PM, I guess. We climbed to 18,000 feet. It was a little rough when we first took off until we got up to our altitude and we got squared away. It was a nice, black night. We couldn't see anything, but there was nothing to see up there, anyway. So we headed out on course. My navigator was trying to get some fixes and to find out what our position was. Well, he wasn't taking oxygen, and here we were at 18,000 feet. Pretty soon he couldn't add 2 and 2. He couldn't get his positions. In the meantime, I was trying to contact Kunming. I couldn't contact them. I could still talk to Chabua, India, but I couldn't talk to Kunming. I still think to this day - of course, they wouldn't admit it, I think they had shut down for the night. They probably shut off their marker beacon, and the whole works, because I couldn't get that, either. So we kept on flying, and finally I said: "Well, we ought to be there." I think it was 2 1/2 hours and I still couldn't raise anything, couldn't see anything. So we kept on flying for a while longer, and finally went into a square trying to find ourselves. In the meantime, I forget who it was went down and got our navigator taking oxygen and got him squared away, back on his feet. So, finally, he got to a point - in the meantime, I 'd figured out my gas, and everything else. I didn't have enough gas to get back to Chabua. By this time, I figured out I would run

out of gas just about daylight, right in the middle of the Mountains. Well, I had Bissell's pilot along. He was supposed to know all the data, but he didn't know any more than I did. I'm sorry to say that he was no help, and Louis Parker. Have you talked to Parker?

Q: No.

P: Well, Parker was my co-pilot. So, anyway, about this time, I said we were going to head back, I don't care. We are wasting time, I'm sure we are over Japanese territory by now, we are going to head back, I said, if we have drifted north, we haven't even enough atitude, will be running into mountains. To the north the mountains got higher, around 19,000-20,000 feet. So, I turned around on a reciprocal course and headed back, still trying to tune in that beacon. Well, just about the time I turned around, and headed back, I got the beacon. And about that time, my navigator called me and said: "If you make a 5° turn to the left, you will be headed right towards the beacon. That coincided with my calculation, and so, finally we landed. What a night! Never got lost before.

Q: Or since?

P: Or since. So anyway, General Arnold, the next morning, all he said, I guess he had given it a lot of thought. Anyway, the next morning, he said: "Well, we'd better do a little better planning on flights." That's all he said.

Q: And you hadn't been around too long at the time either, had you?

P: It was 1943, I think. I'd been around a year.

Note: Flight took place early in February 1943.

Q: Of course, he was forgiving that time. But how forgiving was he generally?

P: Well, not too forgiving. I didn't make any other mistakes. I don't know.

Q: You didn't want to find out.

P: There was another instance. McCabe might have told you about this. McCabe hadn't been on too long. We were up at Casper, Wyoming. General Arnold said takeoff time was going to be such and such. He told everybody, it was going to be takeoff time. When he said that was takeoff time, you'd better be ready. So I was usually there at least a half hour before to get the engines going and to get everything checked out, to be sure we were ready to go on time. Well, the time came and he closed the door and took off. Now, if some of the staff or anybody wasn't there, that was too bad. He left McCabe there. I'll tell you, McCabe was never late after that. Was it McCabe or Sheffield, I've forgotten? No, it was Tom Sheffield, that's who it was. He's dead now.

Q: Well, some of these things. When I get back, I can double check these with any other instances we've got, on times and dates and so on.

P: When he said he wanted to take off at a certain time, that's the time he meant. Now, if I said the weather was bad, or we couldn't go because of weather he would listen, and we wouldn't go. But if everything else being equal, and the airplane was ready to go, and the weather was satisfactory, he would say: "I want to take off at this time." That's the time we took off.

Q: On that same trip to India, apparently he wasn't very happy with what he saw, and didn't think things were going too well with Wavell and the whole general command setup. Do you remember anything about that?

P: No, I wasn't aware of that. Beebe was over there at that time.

Q: There is another time when he was unhappy when he went to the UK in late August 1943. He wasn't too happy with Eaker. Then came what we call the "Big Switch."

P: Yes, that was kind of interesting. We flew over on MATS that time. We didn't take an airplane over, and Puzenski, his crew chief, and I

went with him. When we got over there, General Arnold said: "You and Puzenski go out and live with these bomber crews and find out what's going on, why we have all these aborts and so forth. So, we took off and we went out to some of the bomber groups. Puzenski, of course, knew all the maintenance Captains, because they were all former Master Sergeants, and he was a Master Sergeant. He would have been a Captain, too, except he wanted to stay with the General. So, in order to stay with him, he didn't take a commission. So we got to talking with all these people out there to find out what the problems were. One of the big problems was the bigger prop, a heavier prop. They hadn't changed the governor. As a result, the governors wouldn't hold, and they were shearing off the pins, and we had sent over, I knew about this because I read most of the wires overseas. I knew some of the things going on; some of the problems. We had sent over a kit to retrofit all these governors. None of them had heard about these kits, couldn't find them, or didn't know where they were. And I tried to find one. I went over to one of the depots there and tried to find one, but the Depot Commander seemed to be more interested in getting the grass cut around there. When we went back to London, we reported in to General Arnold, and we told him what we saw. Needless to say, he was really perturbed about things. So when Eaker came in that night to talk to him, I happened to be still there. I was a Major at the time. This should be sort of off-the-record, too. But, anyhow, he lit into Eaker. He said: "How come you don't get out in the field, and find out what's going on, instead of sitting around here in London, playing poker. You know, Eaker loved to play poker, and he had a lot of these Hollywood types around, I mean I shouldn't criticize, I really don't know, but I mean as far as I knew.

Q: Well, there's lots of evidence, I mean there is evidence of dissatisfaction.

P: Well, anyway, Eaker got real mad. How come you know this - all these supposed facts. You haven't even been out of your hotel room. You haven't even been out of London. How do you know this? Arnold came back. He said: "Peterson and Puzenski were out there last week living with your bomber crews, and this is what they found out. Well, Jakey Devers, who was the Army General at that time (Note: CG/ETO) here in this little group too, and Eaker said: "Well, if you are going to take a Sergeant's word - he didn't mention me - as to what's going on...." Well, about this time, the red was coming up Arnold's neck. Gen Jake Devers tried to smooth things over. He says: "You know, when I want to find out what's really going on, I go out and talk to these sergeants, because they're the ones who really know.". Well, I left about that time. That was no place for me.

Q: Things were getting hot.

P: You know, Eaker remembered that incident. When he came back as Chief of Staff (Note: Deputy Commander, AAF) and I knew Eaker from the days when he was Captain out there at March Field - he passed me in the hall. He wouldn't speak to me. I don't know whether he was so burdened with his duties or what it was.

Q: Well, I know Eaker pretty well.

P: But, since then, of course, when he went to work for Douglas Aircraft Co., I was the AFPRO(?) there at the time. I was out at a party at Junior's one night, just about the time he was coming on board. He greeted me like a long, lost brother. And of course, when I got ready to retire, he asked if there was anything he could do for me, or letters of commendation, or anything, to let him know. He was great then, but he wasn't so good there for a while in the Pentagon.

Q: This was the same time, August- September 1943, that Monk Hunter got bounced out of the fighter command.

P: Yes, but I don't know the circumstances on that.

Q: You answered one question very thoroughly. One of Arnold's concerns was that so many bombers had been sent to England, that he felt could have been used in the South Pacific, if they weren't getting full utilization out in the UK.

P: Well, they were having a lot of aborts. That was one of the reasons, because they had this heavy prop on there, and had not retro-fitted the governor.

Q: You recall the costly raids against Schweinfurt and Regensburg? Did you ever get the impression that he began to wonder whether daylight bombing was the way to do it?

P: Well, I'm sure he gave it a lot of thought, lot of consideration, but I don't know.

Q: Talking about production problems with the C-54s.

P: Well, we were very short of cargo airplanes, as you know. And the C-54s were not coming off the line too quickly, and Gen Arnold recognized the need for C-54s. Instead of him getting a C-54 for personal use, why he got a B-25 and DC-3 for his personal use in the United States, and then when we went overseas, we got a production airplane, a B-17. For our Australian trip, he took a C-82, which was a Convair and converted into cargo, transport. He recognized the shortage of airplanes like that. And, of course, he'd like to have had P-51s, which was North American, but North American was so busy building B-25s that they didn't have the production capability unless they quit building B-25s. They needed B-25s more than they needed P-51s. The P-51 was a great airplane, but it just so happened that they just didn't have the production capability to produce it, unless they were going to cut off something else.

Q: How did they finally solve that problem?

P: Well, essentially, we got more production capability, I guess.

Q: You mean new plants?

P: New plants, yes, and they got P-51s.

Q: Beebe said that when they were flying together, especially just the two of them, they did a lot of talking about things in general. Did you find this true with Gen Arnold?

P: No.

Q: I say it with a specific question in mind, whether he ever talked to you about what was going to happen after the war, and the shape the Air Force might take, or airpower might take in the future. This was something that was on his mind a lot.

P: No, he really never did this with me. Most of the time - it was very seldom that we flew alone. He had Sir John Dill with him, or he had some of his staff along with him, or some other dignatary along with him. But it wasn't too often that - in fact it was on rare occasions - that he ever flew alone.

Q: I think it is the difference in times, from the period when Beebe was flying and when the war was really going full blast.

P: And, of course, on those kinds of times he was talking these problems over with his staff, or other people.

Q: Who would you say was probably the closest person to him?

P: Boy, that's a tough one.

Q: Well, there must be several candidates. Or was anybody really that close?

P: I don't think so. I really don't think so, because, well, he had a lot of respect for Benny Meyers, despite the later problem. And he really didn't, I mean Rosie O'Donnell, Cabell and these people. None of them were really close. You know, I just don't think so. Beebe was probably closer to him than any one.

Q: I know it's real hard to find a confidante.

P: I used to go over and have breakfast with him, I'd ride to work with him; ride home with him, but I still don't consider myself in that category.

Q: What would he talk about?

P: Oh, just things in general, really. He tried, once he left the office, he tried to forget things. It is pretty hard to do.

Q: I suppose, just thinking out loud, that if you don't have any confidantes, you don't have any problems about playing favorites and it seemed to be something that he just did not want to do. Did you ever know of any cases where you think he really did play favorites.

P: I'm really not aware - well, I think he played favorites as far as his people that were with him on the West Coast. In the early days of the Air Force, we had two air forces, one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast. And he was West Coast. I think he really leaned over backwards to take care of all those people. They produced, if they didn't produce, then they were out.

Q: I wouldn't call that really playing favorites, then.

P: You're right. He knew those people; he knew their capabilities, and he knew them better than the people on the east coast.

Q: Including their shortcomings too, which is just as important.

P: Yes, you're right.

Q: Did you have any feeling or evidence that he was really slowing down physically before he had the big heart attack in 1945?

P: No, I don't think he slowed down. That was his problem; he couldn't slow down.

Q: Did he ever relax?

P: Well, we went on a fishing trip, I forget when this was, down in

Florida. We went out there and he relaxed, fishing. It wasn't Tampa; it was Miami. He was real relaxed and got his eyeballs burnt from the sun. He sunburned real easy, but he could relax out there. We would just go out riding on the Potomac River, his wife, my wife, maybe Hank and his wife, if they were around.

Q: Do you mean just cruising up and down the river?

P: Yes. They had Air Force rescue boats over there. We went up in the mountains one time during the war with Gen Marshall. Did you hear about that?

Q: Well, a little bit. Was that up in the High Sierras?

Note: Trip in 1944, probably.

P: Yes, well, I don't remember the time now, I know Marshall was, and Arnold was there, the reason we went up there was to get away from things and to relax a little bit, to get another perspective on things. No telephones, no radio, nothing. Arnold knew the Rangers out in that area, and he set it up with Rangers, and I think we went on a big climb, with horses, packed up in the mountains. Every day a light airplane would fly over and drop messages. That was the only contact we had. I forget how long, must have been gone about a week, something like that. So we finally got up in the High Sierras and caught these little golden trout, about that long. You don't even clean them. You just throw them in a frying pan, eat them like corn on cob, delicious. He really enjoyed that fishing. I did too,incidentally.

Q: How long were you gone?

P: Well, we were gone about a week.

Q: Was there ever anything important in the stuff that was dropped?

P: Not that I know of. I don't know what they would have done if there was something important, cause I don't know how, they didn't have any way of getting a message out. Except to get on a horse and get out. So I guess

it wasn't too important.

Q: We went down to visit General Streett last week (Oct 1969).

P: If anybody, I think Streett was close to Arnold. He wasn't Air Force. Yes, he was Air Force, but he was acting more as a planner for Marshall. I guess he was sort of our representative. It just seemed like - well, he did take over later, the 3rd AF, down in Tampa. It just sort of seemed to me like he wasn't really in the Air Force. I don't know why, just sort of seemed like he was more Army.

P: Of all the people, I guess I'd say Streett would be close to him. Of course, Kuter, he thought a lot of Kuter. Kuter was a real smart guy. Brilliant.

Q: Well, Norstad was a young braintruster, too. Quite different temperaments.

P: Norstad came along later.

Q: Yes, but he was one of the original - what did they call them? The "heavenly twins," with Cabell.

P: Yes, Cabell and Norstad.

Q: We had a very good session with Gen Cabell; very informative. We were lucky because he was - he had been working on his memoirs, and so a lot of the stuff was fresh in his mind. He had been thinking about it, trying to remember for his own purpose. That worked to our advantage.

Q: We were talking about Arnold and FDR; you mentioned a big meeting.

P: Prior to the start of the war, FDR felt that there was a war coming, and so he got a big meeting of all the top generals - Army and Navy admirals, etc., to discuss what should be done to get prepared for the war. And Arnold went along with Marshall, because at that time, as his Air advisor. Arnold hadn't been invited, but he went along as Marshall's

aide, so to speak. But anyway, they were sitting around this big table, and I've kind of forgotten the details of the story. The Army generals said: "We've got to build a few more barracks down there," and the Navy wanted to build some more of something or other. They came around to Arnold, and he said, well, we ought to get industry prepared to build, and I've forgotten the number now, but seems to me, 8,000 airplanes a year, something like that. Our biggest order at this time was about for 13 B-17s, which took a year to build. Here Arnold comes up, and says we have to get the factories ready to build. So FDR mulled this over a little bit, all these things, and the President said, well, building these barracks isn't going to do anything, and building these gunboats or whatever the Navy wanted, won't bother Hitler. He said that's not going to bother them one bit. The President says: "I agree with Arnold. Arnold is too modest. He says we ought to gear up industry to build 50,000 airplanes a year." And it just goes to show the foresight Arnold had.

Note: This story is a bit muddled. Peterson is probably confusing conference of Nov 24, 1939 with FDR speech of May 1940.

P: After FDR said that, Arnold called in Dr. Ginsberg for Donald Douglas, Martin and all the rest of the leaders, Larry Bell, and all the rest of the industry. He told them: "I don't have any money. It's not appropriated yet." But he said: "You people got to start building up your factories, and building aircraft industry so that we can produce just as many airplanes as possible." Of course, they all sat around with their mouths open, they never heard anything like that before, but that's when they started. And whatever the figure was, but we finally did reach that production rate.

Q: Maybe even exceeded it.

P: I don't know; I don't recall now.

Q: Apparently, Arnold's best friend in the White House was Harry

Hopkins. Did you know him much?

P: Yes, oh yes. We went, another instance there. We went fishing with Harry Hopkins. I don't know whether Harry Hopkins belonged to this exclusive club up there in Canada, I can't even remember the name of the river up there. Anyway, we ran up to this base in Massachusetts - Harry Hopkins, the General and myself, that was all. No, there was one other fellow. He was connected with the Singer family, but his name wasn't Singer, I think he worked in the Pentagon some place, LTCOL, nice guy, very wealthy family.

Note: Possibly, Sol Rosenblatt.

P: Anyway, he was a friend of Harry Hopkins. We went up there salmon fishing. This creek, this river, 7 miles of it, is owned exclusively by some NY millionaires. I don't know whether Harry belonged to it, or friends set it up. Each mile, they had what they called a cabin. It wasn't a cabin, it was a beautiful place. There was a pool right out there in front, and the river where they fished. Anyway, we went up there with a guide, got in the boats, canoes and went up the river, caught some great big salmon. But Harry Hopkins - I was mixing some drinks - I asked him what he wanted, and he said, oh, I'll have a scotch old-fashioned. So I mixed a normal, put a little sugar in it. Well, as soon as I went out, when he wanted a scotch old-fashioned, what he was talking about was on the rocks. He didn't want an old-fashioned, he drank like a fish. So anyway, I used to carry messages occasionally over to Hopkins. But they got along great. Arnold and Lovett got along great, too.

Q: Yes, we had a good visit with him.

P: He is a great guy.

C: Hopkins seemed to be of tremendous help in putting Arnold's view over, as far as the White House is concerned.

P: Yes, I think he was a great supporter of the Air Force.

Q: How did that come about. Had they know each other before?

P: No, I don't think so.

Q: What brought them close together? They don't seem the same type of person at all.

P: No, they really weren't.

Q: Of course, neither was Lovett.

P: No, no. Typical New Yorker. Harry Hopkins was a typical New Yorker, I think you could call him that. I don't know. I guess they just recognized the great talent that Arnold had, and supported him.

Q: Well, apparently, Marshall did, too.

P: Louis Parker, have you talked to him?

Q: No, I will find out where he is. You know, if you're a retired general you are easy to find, but otherwise....

P: Well, he's a retired Major General.

Q: I don't know. I've got a list at home.

P: I think that he's up in Oregon. I know they were talking about Eugene, Oregon some times.

Note: Major General Louis Parker lives in Shalimar, Florida, near Eglin AFB.

Q: You mentioned the fact that Gen Arnold never told stories on himself or about himself, at least on serious matters. And yet he must have been, did he have more or less than the average amount of conceit?

P: I don't think he was conceited at all. Just wanted to get things done. And I don't think he thought well, boy, I'm the greatest, or anything. I think he was a very humble person. Really.

Q: Did you have the feeling that he thought some of these things wouldn't get done, if he didn't get at them?

P: You'd better believe it.

Q: So, I guess it would be more self-confidence than conceit.

P: You know, every letter that was written to the family of air force persons - he personally signed those. He didn't have a stamp. He personally signed every one of those. And not only that, when it appeared to him that the letters were getting too stereotyped, why he would fire the guy that was writing them, and get a new writer.

Q: Did he ever pull any big boners? Or even small ones? You know the tendency is in talking to people like this, you build up a sort of picture of almost perfection, you know?

P: Well, maybe he should have fired me when I lost him over India, that might have been a boner.

Q: Oh, I was wondering for example, if he ever went along with anybody too long? He must have made some mistakes somewhere?

P: Well, I don't know of any. You could point out some hard and fast ones. I'm sure he made some. All the decisions he made with the little facts that he could get, I'm sure he made a lot of bad decisions. I can't think of any off hand, but I'm sure there were bad decisions. You have to; you're bound to. Particularly in those kind of days when you didn't have computers and all these other things to give you information, you made your decisions on a limited amount of knowledge.

Q: That reminds me in talking about computers, did you know von Karman? I never could figure out how close he and Arnold were personally. I know Arnold looked for talent wherever he could find it, or help wherever he could find it. But von Karman didn't take any trips with you two that you remember?

P: He might have, but I don't remember offhand now. He was responsible for getting about $10 million right after the war put into missiles,

to develop missiles.

Q: Von Karman?

P: No, Arnold. In fact, I think he gave Douglas $10 million. He kind of played a little favoritism there, maybe.

Q: This was a point that Drew Pearson brought up. About the kind of personal friendship, Barbara and Bruce.

P: Barbara doesn't even speak to the old man. She never used to, I don't know whether she does now or not.

Q: I don't know either, I know Bruce does because we were up there one time and had lunch with him.

20314

7 November 1974

Major E.A.Petersen, USAF (Ret)
5002 Hill Road
Boise, Idaho 83702

Dear Maj. Petersen:

I concur in your statement that Arnold and the men who served with him at March Field became the nucleus of the greatest Air Force ever assembled in time of war and peace. At peak strength we reached 80,000 first line planes and 2,411,000 officers and men.

Of course, a B-17 then cost $300,000, including everything on it. Nowadays, the little black box in a B-1 costs more than that. So we may never see the likes of the force General Arnold assembled, of which you were a part.

One of the difficult jobs a historian has to do is sift through the first hand reports he gets and to come up with an accurate picture. Your recollection of Arnold at March Field is that Arnold never paid attention to, or gave credit to enlisted me.

Curiously, in the same mail, and in fact written on the same date is a letter from another man who had some contact with General Arnold. He says Arnold would deliberately reach down to the enlisted level and question a lowly G.I. to get some real dope about a base.

In fact, I have on tape at least a dozen accounts from people who recall General Arnold making a base inspection and ignoring the red carpet briefing the C.O. had prepared for him. He was likely to head across the runway to the maintenance shack and talk to some Staff Sgt who served him at Fort Riley, or March Field, or Crissy Field, etc, and from this individual, he would get the real dope as to what was happening at the base.

Mind you, I'm not questioning the accuracy of your recollection. Arnold scared the hell out of a lot of people. In fact, that's how he got many to produce - out of fear. You might have seen him on one of his bad days and that memory stuck when all others have faded with time. On the other hand, maybe the others saw him on one of his fewggood days.

Anyway, many thanks for your letter.

Sincerely,

5002 Hill Road
Boise, Idaho
31 October 1974

Dr. MURRAY GREEN
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Sir:

I am sorry I have taken so long to answer your letter of 20 Sept. Frankly, I laid it aside while I did a lot of thinking and remembering and then I forgot all about it for several days. I am highly flattered you should contact me at all and if you are in Boise again I should be happy to meet you and hash over old times in the'Army Air Corpse'.

During the period you refer to, I was an enlisted man and my interest and attention was focused on many things other than the activities of Commisioned Oficers. As to Lt.Col. Arnold in particular - he scared Hell out of me. I do remember that he never gave much credit to the enlisted ranks, especially after the air shows you mention. The Navy used to contribute to those shows and the Naval C.O. always publicly thanked his Officers AND Men - but not Arnold -, he would give credit to his Officers, his pilots but never a word to the "men". We worked hard to make those shows a success, we didn't dare do otherwise, but it would have been nice if we had recieved a word of thanks. That is really about all I remember about Col. Arnold, but I always did feel a bit of pride in being able to say that I had once served on the same Air Base with Col. "Hap" Arnold. The other things you mention were either before I arrived at March Field or while I was back at Chanute Air Field attending technical school.

One interesting point of which I refer quite often was the Commissioned Officers who were stationed at March when I was first there, they were the "power" of later days. There was, of course, Col. Arnold and there is no need to mention the high offices these men later attained. Major Carl Spaatz, Base operations Officer; Capt. Frank O.D. Hunter, Base test pilot and assistant to Spaatz; Capt. Ira C. Eaker, my Sqdn. C.O.; Lt. Barney, who I later met as a fill Colonel in Cairo. All these fine Officers, with the help of many, many others made our dinkey little Army Air Corps into the greatest Air Force in the world. It is really an honor to have served with them and the entire United States owes them a great deal of gratitude.

I am sorry I could not have been of more help to you and I am sorry I took so long to answer your letter - please forgive me and accept my wishes for your success in the work you are engaged in.

Respectfully

Ellis A. Petersen

Maj. E.A. Petersen USAF (Ret)
5002 Hill Road
Boise, Idaho 83703

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

20 September 1974

Major E.A. Peterson, USAF (Ret)
5002 Hill Road
Boise, Idaho

Dear Major Peterson:

If I had known of your presence, I would have stopped in when I was passing through on I-80, enroute East from Oregon to Salt Lake City.

Anyway, George B. Watts gave me your address. My interest is in Hap Arnold on whom I'm working - a Biography for Random House is in the works. I happen to be right in the middle of the March Field experience and would be pleased to have any recollections you may have of Arnold in any or each of these situations:

1) The monthly air shows he would put on. I have pictures of Wallace Beery, Bebe Daniels and Ben Lyon, Will Rogers, Amelia Earhart, and others, coming out to the Field. There was a review in honor of Governor Rolph of California, etc.

2) The earthquake of March 1933. Arnold promptly dispatched soup kitchens, blankets, communications equipment to help out Long Beach;

3) The C.C.C. camps

4) The Air Mail episode. Arnold was in Salt Lake City working out of the Newhouse Hotel - I saw it when I came through last month - running the Western Air Mail Zone;

5) The Alaskan Flight;

6) Major Ernest "Tud" Lohman and any experiences on base;

7) Planting of the poplar trees. Mrs. Arnold was big on that. I'm told some of those trees at March Field are now 100 feet tall.

If you have any memories of these (and other) events involving Lieut Colonel Hap Arnold, I would welcome having them.

Mr. Watts mentioned that you are a friend of Gen Hunter Harris. I interviewed him a couple of years ago when I caught him in town before he shuttled back to Hawaii.

I'd be pleased to hear from you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

cc: Mr. Watts

20314

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I'd be pleased to hear from you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

9-15-74
K.C. mo.

Dr Green

Just return home from west coast vacation - will answer your letter.

Im sorry I can't help you much on Lt. Col. Hallman - I knew him well but he was kind of stiff or a loner. He didn't say much - just walk around the H.Q. building an flew P-12 Boeings. Brig. Gen. R.B. Hunter is my old friend of many years. He has all my pictures an info from the old days at march field. Also I sent him book 34th Bomb Sqd Goes to War. Its my old Sqd. at march field, has wonderful pictures of aircraft an history each day - WW II. I think you would like to see this book. Again thank you an your office personal for making me feel happy + proud to take part in your interesting

works.

I hope to see you some day in Wash. D.C. but T.W.A. keeps me working tight schedule.

Thank you again + take care.

Sincerely

J. B. Watts

P.S.

Sgt Peterson - in 1931 to 39? was at March Field During Hap's time

Address Major E. A. Peterson
5002 Hill Rd
Bowie, Md.

Pete is a very good friend of Gen. H. Harris.

20314

9 September 1974

Mr. George B. Watts
3435 North Walrond
Kansas City, MO 64117

Dear Mr. Watts:

Belated thanks for your note and its enclosure which arrived a day or two after I left on a 2-month interview trip. I got to see many key associates of General Arnold who live on the West Coast, including Generals LeMay, J.B. Montgomery, Cecil Combs, Howard Craig, Donald Putt and other worthies.

The Roster you sent will be of some use to me, although it is as of 1937, a year after Arnold left March Field for Washington. I notice "George B. Watts", Private, among the troops.

You may be able to help if you have any recollection of people like Lt Col Eugene Lohman. They called him "Fud" among other names.

Any anecdotes involving Lt Col Arnold (later Brig Gen Arnold) and his family will be most welcome. I'm right into the middle of the March Field experience.

Many thanks for your help. The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

On march Fd. staff

20314

17 July 1974

Mr. George B. Watts
3435 N. Walrond
Kansas City, MO 64117

Dear Mr. Watts

Thank you for sending the roster to Dr. Green. He is at present on an interview trip and I will call it to his attention when he returns.

Sincerely

ELIZABETH SCHWARTZMANN
Office of Air Force History

Elizabeth Schwartzmann

1

Mr. George B. Watts
3435 Walrond

17 July 1974

20314

Interview with Col Pete Peterson
Redondo Beach, California
October 2, 1969

Q: Col Peterson, one of the first things I usually ask people in this situation is do you remember the first time, and under what circumstances you first met Gen Arnold?

P: I got out of flying school in 1934 and was sent out. My first station was March Field, California, and Gen Arnold was then a LTCOL in charge of the West Coast and March Field. But I arrived during the air mail. He wasn't there; he was up in Salt Lake City, running the air mail. After the air mail, he came down, that was when I first met Gen Arnold.

Q: What was your first impression? What were the circumstances? Was it an official meeting? You were a 2nd LT?

P: No, we were flying cadets. We were the first group to go out because of budget constraints. We went out on active duty as flying cadets. Actually, while Col Arnold was still up there, a Lt Lewis was in charge of the base, and he didn't know what to do with us, because it was the first time they had ever had flying cadets on active duty. So he didn't know whether to treat us as enlisted men or officers, or what; whether we ought to live in the barracks or whether we ought to live in the BOQ. Anyway, he got ahold of LTCOL Arnold to find out what to do with us, and Arnold said in no uncertain terms we were to be treated as officers, live in the BOQ, eat in Officer's Mess, and belong to the Officer's Club. That was really my first contact with Arnold. Arnold had a great feeling, as you know, for people.

Q: We get the impression that his tour at March Field was kind of the turning point in his career. This is where he really made a big impression on a lot of people. There was the air mail, his contacts with Gen Craig,

his flair for public relations, his friendships with the people in Hollywood. Here he acquired a reputation for innovation and for getting things done. Does that square with your recollection?

P: Well, I think that's probably true but, of course, being a flying cadet, down the lower echelon of things at that time, I really didn't have too much contact with the General.

Q: You didn't have anything to compare it with either.

P: No, that's right. All I know is that in his home, he and Mrs. Arnold were always very gracious to the cadets. They were always welcome. Of course, he had a daughter that was about our age at that time, too. We were always very welcome at his home and he always treated us great.

Q: When was your next contact, then?

P: Shortly after that the bombardment group was moved up to Hamilton Field. Major Clarence Tinker was in command up there. So I really didn't have any further contact with Col Arnold until years later when Col Beebe was looking for somebody to replace him as pilot for General Arnold, and I was selected. I was at Wright Field at that time on flight tests. In the meantime, I had gotten out of the service, flown with the airlines, and come back in the service again in 1939 when I got a regular commission.

Q: What was your rank in June 1942 when you went to work for him?

P: I was a Major then.

Q: What kind of duties did he assign? I know that you were his personal pilot, and did you also fly Marshall as Beebe had?

P: No.

Q: Well, you must have had a lot of other things to do for him?

P: Well, yes. The main thing I was looking at, trying to keep track of, was aircraft production. My job was to look into some of the problems, where we had production falling off, that sort of thing. I tried to keep informed of where production problems occurred, and what was going on with production.

Q: This was a big interest of his?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: The minute we started rearming at all?

P: As a matter, one of the instances, you might have heard before. We were always going to some factory and milling around the factory to find what was going on. He would go through them like a whirlwind. We were out at Seattle, where the B-29s were being built. We were having a lot of problems. And one of the biggest problems was the continuous changes. Every engineer wanted to get his changes put in there.

Q: It is still going on.

P: Yes. Anyway, General Arnold said: "There will be no more changes!" Benny Meyers came along, and said: "There will be no more changes, unless it is a safety factor. From now on, no more changes unless it is a safety factor."

Q: About what time was that - 1943?

About 1943 or 1944. Yes. But he loved to go around to these factories and talk to the workers, talk to the women workers, or talk to anybody, to gain interest.

Q: Well, this also goes back to the point you made about March Field, about Arnold recognizing that there are people at the bottom of it. So he kind of got double duty out of his visits. He spurred the workers and management at the same time.

P: Yes. That was one of the big things. Generally, management had a hard time keeping up with him because he was busy going through these factories. He had a great capacity.

Q: You know with all this energy and moving about quickly, did he grasp what he was getting at the time, or would someone have to sit down later and sort of re-explain it to him?

P: No, he had a tremendous capacity for remembering things, and

getting at the basic problems, and really understanding things. In fact, he was, as you well know, thinking so far ahead of everybody, that he got impatient with people, and Beebe probably told you this.

Q: Well, there's lots of evidence of his impatience with people.

P: Yes, that was the thing. He was just thinking so far ahead of everybody that it was just fantastic.

Q: Gen Cabell told us the story about when he and Norstad went to work for Gen Arnold. One of them had drafted a letter for his signature and in it was a paragraph it began: "I'm afraid we can't do something," and he sent it right back. He said: "I won't sign any letters that say 'I can't,' and I won't sign any letters that say, 'I'm afraid.'"

P: He was very positive about things.

Q: Did he do much flying himself when he traveled with you?

P: No, he would, lots of times, quite a bit of the time, ride as co-pilot, but he never took the wheel except maybe for a couple of seconds, when I was doing something else. But he never landed or took off. He loved to sit up there and navigate. And he'd give me my estimates, my next check-point, and all this sort of thing. But he, as long as I was with him, he never flew - I mean, took off and landed. I went through some pretty bad weather with him riding as copilot.

Q: Do you recall any specific example?

P: We had a couple of airplanes; we had a B-25 and a DC-3, but we flew the B-25 most of the time. I remember one time we took off in the B-25 which was fixed up with some comfortable seats in back. But once he got up in the front, in the cockpit, he couldn't get back in the back part to sit in a comfortable seat. So once he sat up there, if he didn't do it, then Puzenski, the crew chief, would ride with me as co-pilot. We took out of Texas one time, in a very bad storm, hard snow, what not. I remember the engine was

cutting out, and so he was adjusting that carburetor heat, trying to get that carburetor from icing up. So it sputtered three or four times, and finally we got through all right.

Q: Did that bother him?

P: No, he was sitting up there, enjoying it, I think.

Q: Evidently, his personal courage was pretty high?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: Do you think he ever regretted never having some combat? Did he ever bring it up?

P: He never, I wouldn't know.

Q: I think there is evidence that he was conscious of the fact that he never saw combat in WWI and he seemed to make an effort to assure that his people had a chance in WWII.

P: Yes, that's why Beebe left. For two reaons: one, he wanted to get into combat; No. 2 he wanted to be promoted. He couldn't get promoted sitting there in Arnold's office. Of course, that wasn't my case, because I was a Major.

Q: How long did you stay with Arnold, then?

P: Well, I was with him all through the war, and then I left.... either the end of 1945 or early 1946, when I left him, I went back to Wright Field and went to Panama, in June 1946. So, it must have been right at the end of 1945 when he retired.

NOTE: It was February 1946 when he left Washington.

Q: He retired quite quickly. In fact, we found a lot of evidence in letters and so forth, that he spent a lot of time, as busy as he was, thinking about the ranch. He was trying to get things going out there. Did he talk a lot about that to you?

P: Yes, we made several trips out to the West Coast, up in Oregon,

looking for a place. And he finally decided on Sonoma.

Q: I know they were almost on the verge of buying a place in Oregon.

P: MacKenzie River, yes. He was thinking about that.

Q: Do you remember, well, you must have been along, early in the war, September 1942, when he took a trip to the SW Pacific, and looked around, and among other things, called on MacArthur.

P: Yes, I remember that real well.

Q: Were you along when he and MacArthur were talking?

P: No.

Q: We have had several versions of that, and including one that MacArthur went into a very long monologue, and that he was not very happy with Air, and so on, and this was one of the things which led Arnold to....

P: Kenney was there, probably with him when he was talking with MacArthur.

Q: Yes, I think he was, but I should go off the record. But Kenney is not an impartial witness when Mac Arthur is concerned. Where MacArthur is concerned, he is really a hero worshipper. And, of course, he is of Arnold, too, but not as much.

Q: Well, there is an incident - I think it appears in Global Mission, you might recall - when you were flying over the Hump, and into China, and got lost. What do you remember about that?

P: Well, as I remember reading his book, I don't think he was quite factual.

Q: Well, that's one of the reasons I asked.

P: We got lost, for sure. I think that he said his pilot fainted - I didn't faint. He was talking about me - I didn't faint. I didn't like that 18,000 feet were at, but I didn't faint.

Note: See Global Mission, p. 411.

P: Anyway, I did go back and, of course, I was without oxygen. I went back to check with him, Sir John Dill, but it was a bad situation. I mean, it was one of the times, perhaps the only time, that I really got lost, but it was just an accumulation of circumstances. No. 1: We weren't going to go that night, and we'd all gone to the quarters where we were going to stay. Then Stilwell had taken off and decided to go over the Hump and go back that night. So Arnold says: "By God, if Stilwell can do it, we can do it." So, anyway, we got a call about 8:00 PM to get ready to go. So we went down, got the briefings and all that stuff. We supposedly got the correct radio frequencies. Anyway, we took off. It was dark - about 9:00 PM, I guess. We climbed to 18,000 feet. It was a little rough when we first took off until we got up to our altitude and we got squared away. It was a nice, black night. We couldn't see anything, but there was nothing to see up there, anyway. So we headed out on course. My navigator was trying to get some fixes and to find out what our position was. Well, he wasn't taking oxygen, and here we were at 18,000 feet. Pretty soon he couldn't add 2 and 2. He couldn't get his positions. In the meantime, I was trying to contact Kunming. I couldn't contact them. I could still talk to Chabua, India, but I couldn't talk to Kunming. I still think to this day - of course, they wouldn't admit it, I think they had shut down for the night. They probably shut off their marker beacon, and the whole works, because I couldn't get that, either. So we kept on flying, and finally I said: "Well, we ought to be there." I think it was 2 1/2 hours and I still couldn't raise anything, couldn't see anything. So we kept on flying for a while longer, and finally went into a square trying to find ourselves. In the meantime, I forget who it was went down and got our navigator taking oxygen and got him squared away, back on his feet. So, finally, he got to a point - in the meantime, I 'd figured out my gas, and everything else. I didn't have enough gas to get back to Chabua. By this time, I figured out I would run

out of gas just about daylight, right in the middle of the Mountains. Well, I had Bissell's pilot along. He was supposed to know all the data, but he didn't know any more than I did. I'm sorry to say that he was no help, and Louis Parker. Have you talked to Parker?

Q: No.

P: Well, Parker was my co-pilot. So, anyway, about this time, I said we were going to head back, I don't care. We are wasting time, I'm sure we are over Japanese territory by now, we are going to head back, I said, if we have drifted north, we haven't even enough altitude, will be running into mountains. To the north the mountains got higher, around 19,000-20,000 feet. So, I turned around on a reciprocal course and headed back, still trying to tune in that beacon. Well, just about the time I turned around, and headed back, I got the beacon. And about that time, my navigator called me and said: "If you make a 5° turn to the left, you will be headed right towards the beacon. That coincided with my calculation, and so, finally we landed. What a night! Never got lost before.

Q: Or since?

P: Or since. So anyway, General Arnold, the next morning, all he said, I guess he had given it a lot of thought. Anyway, the next morning, he said: "Well, we'd better do a little better planning on flights." That's all he said.

Q: And you hadn't been around too long at the time either, had you?

P: It was 1943, I think. I'd been around a year.

Note: Flight took place early in February 1943.

Q: Of course, he was forgiving that time. But how forgiving was he generally?

P: Well, not too forgiving. I didn't make any other mistakes. I don't know.

Q: You didn't want to find out.

P: There was another instance. McCabe might have told you about this. McCabe hadn't been on too long. We were up at Casper, Wyoming. General Arnold said takeoff time was going to be such and such. He told everybody, it was going to be takeoff time. When he said that was takeoff time, you'd better be ready. So I was usually there at least a half hour before to get the engines going and to get everything checked out, to be sure we were ready to go on time. Well, the time came and he closed the door and took off. Now, if some of the staff or anybody wasn't there, that was too bad. He left McCabe there. I'll tell you, McCabe was never late after that. Was it McCabe or Sheffield, I've forgotten? No, it was Tom Sheffield, that's who it was. He's dead now.

Q: Well, some of these things. When I get back, I can double check these with any other instances we've got, on times and dates and so on.

P: When he said he wanted to take off at a certain time, that's the time he meant. Now, if I said the weather was bad, or we couldn't go because of weather he would listen, and we wouldn't go. But if everything else being equal, and the airplane was ready to go, and the weather was satisfactory, he would say: "I want to take off at this time." That's the time we took off.

Q: On that same trip to India, apparently he wasn't very happy with what he saw, and didn't think things were going too well with Wavell and the whole general command setup. Do you remember anything about that?

P: No, I wasn't aware of that. Beebe was over there at that time.

Q: There is another time when he was unhappy when he went to the UK in late August 1943. He wasn't too happy with Eaker. Then came what we call the "Big Switch."

P: Yes, that was kind of interesting. We flew over on MATS that time. We didn't take an airplane over, and Puzenski, his crew chief, and I

went with him. When we got over there, General Arnold said: "You and Puzenski go out and live with these bomber crews and find out what's going on, why we have all these aborts and so forth. So, we took off and we went out to some of the bomber groups. Puzenski, of course, knew all the maintenance Captains, because they were all former Master Sergeants, and he was a Master Sergeant. He would have been a Captain, too, except he wanted to stay with the General. So, in order to stay with him, he didn't take a commission. So we got to talking with all these people out there to find out what the problems were. One of the big problems was the bigger prop, a heavier prop. They hadn't changed the governor. As a result, the governors wouldn't hold, and they were shearing off the pins, and we had sent over, I knew about this because I read most of the wires overseas. I knew some of the things going on, some of the problems. We had sent over a kit to retrofit all these governors. None of them had heard about these kits, couldn't find them, or didn't know where they were. And I tried to find one. I went over to one of the depots there and tried to find one, but the Depot Commander seemed to be more interested in getting the grass cut around there. When we went back to London, we reported in to General Arnold, and we told him what we saw. Needless to say, he was really perturbed about things. So when Eaker came in that night to talk to him, I happened to be still there. I was a Major at the time. This should be sort of off-the-record, too. But, anyhow, he lit into Eaker. He said: "How come you don't get out in the field, and find out what's going on, instead of sitting around here in London, playing poker. You know, Eaker loved to play poker, and he had a lot of these Hollywood types around, I mean I shouldn't criticize, I really don't know, but I mean as far as I knew.

Q: Well, there's lots of evidence, I mean there is evidence of dissatisfaction.

P: Well, anyway, Eaker got real mad. How come you know this - all these supposed facts. You haven't even been out of your hotel room. You haven't even been out of London. How do you know this? Arnold came back. He said: "Peterson and Puzenski were out there last week living with your bomber crews, and this is what they found out. Well, Jakey Devers, who was the Army General at that time (Note: CG/ETO) here in this little group too, and Eaker said: "Well, if you are going to take a Sergeant's word - he didn't mention me - as to what's going on...." Well, about this time, the red was coming up Arnold's neck. Gen Jake Devers tried to smooth things over. He says: "You know, when I want to find out what's really going on, I go out and talk to these sergeants, because they're the ones who really know." Well, I left about that time. That was no place for me.

Q: Things were getting hot.

P: You know, Eaker remembered that incident. When he came back as Chief of Staff (Note: Deputy Commander, AAF) and I knew Eaker from the days when he was Captain out there at March Field - he passed me in the hall. He wouldn't speak to me. I don't know whether he was so burdened with his duties or what it was.

Q: Well, I know Eaker pretty well.

P: But, since then, of course, when he went to work for Douglas Aircraft Co., I was the AFPRO(?) there at the time. I was out at a party at Junior's one night, just about the time he was coming on board. He greeted me like a long, lost brother. And of course, when I got ready to retire, he asked if there was anything he could do for me, or letters of commendation, or anything, to let him know. He was great then, but he wasn't so good there for a while in the Pentagon.

Q: This was the same time, August- September 1943, that Monk Hunter got bounced out of the fighter command.

P: Yes, but I don't know the circumstances on that.

Q: You answered one question very thoroughly. One of Arnold's concerns was that so many bombers had been sent to England, that he felt could have been used in the South Pacific, if they weren't getting full utilization out in the UK.

P: Well, they were having a lot of aborts. That was one of the reasons, because they had this heavy prop on there, and had not retro-fitted the governor.

Q: You recall the costly raids against Schweinfurt and Regensburg? Did you ever get the impression that he began to wonder whether daylight bombing was the way to do it?

P: Well, I'm sure he gave it a lot of thought, lot of consideration, but I don't know.

Q: Talking about production problems with the C-54s.

P: Well, we were very short of cargo airplanes, as you know. And the C-54s were not coming off the line too quickly, and Gen Arnold recognized the need for C-54s. Instead of him getting a C-54 for personal use, why he got a B-25 and DC-3 for his personal use in the United States, and then when we went overseas, we got a production airplane, a B-17. For our Australian trip, he took a C-82, which was a Convair and converted into cargo, transport. He recognized the shortage of airplanes like that. And, of course, he'd like to have had P-51s, which was North American, but North American was so busy building B-25s that they didn't have the production capability unless they quit building B-25s. They needed B-25s more than they needed P-51s. The P-51 was a great airplane, but it just so happened that they just didn't have the production capability to produce it, unless they were going to cut off something else.

Q: How did they finally solve that problem?

P: Well, essentially, we got more production capability, I guess.

Q: You mean new plants?

P: New plants, yes, and they got P-51s.

Q: Beebe said that when they were flying together, especially just the two of them, they did a lot of talking about things in general. Did you find this true with Gen Arnold?

P: No.

Q: I say it with a specific question in mind, whether he ever talked to you about what was going to happen after the war, and the shape the Air Force might take, or airpower might take in the future. This was something that was on his mind a lot.

P: No, he really never did this with me. Most of the time - it was very seldom that we flew alone. He had Sir John Dill with him, or he had some of his staff along with him, or some other dignatary along with him. But it wasn't too often that - in fact it was on rare occasions - that he ever flew alone.

Q: I think it is the difference in times, from the period when Beebe was flying and when the war was really going full blast.

P: And, of course, on those kinds of times he was talking these problems over with his staff, or other people.

Q: Who would you say was probably the closest person to him?

P: Boy, that's a tough one.

Q: Well, there must be several candidates. Or was anybody really that close?

P: I don't think so. I really don't think so, because, well, he had a lot of respect for Benny Meyers, despite the later problem. And he really didn't, I mean Rosie O'Donnell, Cabell and these people. None of them were really close. You know, I just don't think so. Beebe was probably closer to him than any one.

Q: I know it's real hard to find a confidante.

P:: I used to go over and have breakfast with him, I'd ride to work with him; ride home with him, but I still don't consider myself in that category.

Q: What would he talk about?

P: Oh, just things in general, really. He tried, once he left the office, he tried to forget things. It is pretty hard to do.

Q: I suppose, just thinking out loud, that if you don't have any confidantes, you don't have any problems about playing favorites and it seemed to be something that he just did not want to do. Did you ever know of any cases where you think he really did play favorites.

P: I'm really not aware - well, I think he played favorites as far as his people that were with him on the West Coast. In the early days of the Air Force, we had two air forces, one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast. And he was West Coast. I think he really leaned over backwards to take care of all those people. They produced, if they didn't produce, then they were out.

Q: I wouldn't call that really playing favorites, then.

P: You're right. He knew those people; he knew their capabilities, and he knew them better than the people on the east coast.

Q: Including their shortcomings too, which is just as important.

P: Yes, you're right.

Q: Did you have any feeling or evidence that he was really slowing down physically before he had the big heart attack in 1945?

P: No, I don't think he slowed down. That was his problem; he couldn't slow down.

Q: Did he ever relax?

P: Well, we went on a fishing trip, I forget when this was, down in

Florida. We went out there and he relaxed, fishing. It wasn't Tampa; it was Miami. He was real relaxed and got his eyeballs burnt from the sun. He sunburned real easy, but he could relax out there. We would just go out riding on the Potomac River, his wife, my wife, maybe Hank and his wife, if they were around.

Q: Do you mean just cruising up and down the river?

P: Yes. They had Air Force rescue boats over there. We went up in the mountains one time during the war with Gen Marshall. Did you hear about that?

Q: Well, a little bit. Was that up in the High Sierras?

Note: Trip in 1944, probably.

P: Yes, well, I don't remember the time now, I know Marshall was, and Arnold was there, the reason we went up there was to get away from things and to relax a little bit, to get another perspective on things. No telephones, no radio, nothing. Arnold knew the Rangers out in that area, and he set it up with Rangers, and I think we went on a big climb, with horses, packed up in the mountains. Every day a light airplane would fly over and drop messages. That was the only contact we had. I forget how long, must have been gone about a week, something like that. So we finally got up in the High Sierras and caught these little golden trout, about that long. You don't even clean them. You just throw them in a frying pan, eat them like corn on cob, delicious. He really enjoyed that fishing. I did too,incidentally.

Q: How long were you gone?

P: Well, we were gone about a week.

Q: Was there ever anything important in the stuff that was dropped?

P: Not that I know of. I don't know what they would have done if there was something important, cause I don't know how, they didn't have any way of getting a message out. Except to get on a horse and get out. So I guess

it wasn't too important.

Q: We went down to visit General Streett last week (Oct 1969).

P: If anybody, I think Streett was close to Arnold. He wasn't Air Force. Yes, he was Air Force, but he was acting more as a planner for Marshall. I guess he was sort of our representative. It just seemed like - well, he did take over later, the 3rd AF, down in Tampa. It just sort of seemed to me like he wasn't really in the Air Force. I don't know why, just sort of seemed like he was more Army.

P: Of all the people, I guess I'd say Streett would be close to him. Of course, Kuter, he thought a lot of Kuter. Kuter was a real smart guy. Brilliant.

Q: Well, Norstad was a young braintruster, too. Quite different temperaments.

P: Norstad came along later.

Q: Yes, but he was one of the original - what did they call them? The "heavenly twins," with Cabell.

P: Yes, Cabell and Norstad.

Q: We had a very good session with Gen Cabell; very informative. We were lucky because he was - he had been working on his memoirs, and so a lot of the stuff was fresh in his mind. He had been thinking about it, trying to remember for his own purpose. That worked to our advantage.

Q: We were talking about Arnold and FDR; you mentioned a big meeting.

P: Prior to the start of the war, FDR felt that there was a war coming, and so he got a big meeting of all the top generals - Army and Navy admirals, etc., to discuss what should be done to get prepared for the war. And Arnold went along with Marshall, because at that time, as his Air advisor. Arnold hadn't been invited, but he went along as Marshall's

aide, so to speak. But anyway, they were sitting around this big table, and I've kind of forgotten the details of the story. The Army generals said: "We've got to build a few more barracks down there," and the Navy wanted to build some more of something or other. They came around to Arnold, and he said, well, we ought to get industry prepared to build, and I've forgotten the number now, but seems to me, 8,000 airplanes a year, something like that. Our biggest order at this time was about for 13 B-17s, which took a year to build. Here Arnold comes up, and says we have to get the factories ready to build. So FDR mulled this over a little bit, all these things, and the President said, well, building these barracks isn't going to do anything, and building these gunboats or whatever the Navy wanted, won't bother Hitler. He said that's not going to bother them one bit. The President says: "I agree with Arnold. Arnold is too modest. He says we ought to gear up industry to build 50,000 airplanes a year." And it just goes to show the foresight Arnold had.

Note: This story is a bit muddled. Peterson is probably confusing conference of Nov 24, 1939 with FDR speech of May 1940.

P: After FDR said that, Arnold called in Dr. Ginsberg for Donald Douglas, Martin and all the rest of the leaders, Larry Bell, and all the rest of the industry. He told them: "I don't have any money. It's not appropriated yet." But he said: "You people got to start building up your factories, and building aircraft industry so that we can produce just as many airplanes as possible." Of course, they all sat around with their mouths open, they never heard anything like that before, but that's when they started. And whatever the figure was, but we finally did reach that production rate.

Q: Maybe even exceeded it.

P: I don't know; I don't recall now.

Q: Apparently, Arnold's best friend in the White House was Harry

Hopkins. Did you know him much?

P: Yes, oh yes. We went, another instance there. We went fishing with Harry Hopkins. I don't know whether Harry Hopkins belonged to this exclusive club up there in Canada, I can't even remember the name of the river up there. Anyway, we ran up to this base in Massachusetts - Harry Hopkins, the General and myself, that was all. No, there was one other fellow. He was connected with the Singer family, but his name wasn't Singer, I think he worked in the Pentagon some place, LTCOL, nice guy, very wealthy family.

Note: Possibly, Sol Rosenblatt.

P: Anyway, he was a friend of Harry Hopkins. We went up there salmon fishing. This creek, this river, 7 miles of it, is owned exclusively by some NY millionaires. I don't know whether Harry belonged to it, or friends set it up. Each mile, they had what they called a cabin. It wasn't a cabin, it was a beautiful place. There was a pool right out there in front, and the river where they fished. Anyway, we went up there with a guide, got in the boats, canoes and went up the river, caught some great big salmon. But Harry Hopkins - I was mixing some drinks - I asked him what he wanted, and he said, oh, I'll have a scotch old-fashioned. So I mixed a normal, put a little sugar in it. Well, as soon as I went out, when he wanted a scotch old-fashioned, what he was talking about was on the rocks. He didn't want an old-fashioned, he drank like a fish. So anyway, I used to carry messages occasionally over to Hopkins. But they got along great. Arnold and Lovett got along great, too.

Q: Yes, we had a good visit with him.

P: He is a great guy.

Q: Hopkins seemed to be of tremendous help in putting Arnold's view over, as far as the White House is concerned.

P: Yes, I think he was a great supporter of the Air Force.

Q: How did that come about. Had they know each other before?

P: No, I don't think so.

Q: What brought them close together? They don't seem the same type of person at all.

P: No, they really weren't.

Q: Of course, neither was Lovett.

P: No, no. Typical New Yorker. Harry Hopkins was a typical New Yorker, I think you could call him that. I don't know. I guess they just recognized the great talent that Arnold had, and supported him.

Q: Well, apparently, Marshall did, too.

P: Louis Parker, have you talked to him?

Q: No, I will find out where he is. You know, if you're a retired general you are easy to find, but otherwise....

P: Well, he's a retired Major General.

Q: I don't know. I've got a list at home.

P: I think that he's up in Oregon. I know they were talking about Eugene, Oregon some times.

Note: Major General Louis Parker lives in Shalimar, Florida, near Eglin AFB.

Q: You mentioned the fact that Gen Arnold never told stories on himself or about himself, at least on serious matters. And yet he must have been, did he have more or less than the average amount of conceit?

P: I don't think he was conceited at all. Just wanted to get things done. And I don't think he thought well, boy, I'm the greatest, or anything. I think he was a very humble person. Really.

Q: Did you have the feeling that he thought some of these things wouldn't get done, if he didn't get at them?

P: You'd better believe it.

Q: So, I guess it would be more self-confidence than conceit.

P: You know, every letter that was written to the family of air force persons - he personally signed those. He didn't have a stamp. He personally signed every one of those. And not only that, when it appeared to him that the letters were getting too stereotyped, why he would fire the guy that was writing them, and get a new writer.

Q: Did he ever pull any big boners? Or even small ones? You know the tendency is in talking to people like this, you build up a sort of picture of almost perfection, you know?

P: Well, maybe he should have fired me when I lost him over India, that might have been a boner.

Q: Oh, I was wondering for example, if he ever went along with anybody too long? He must have made some mistakes somewhere?

P: Well, I don't know of any. You could point out some hard and fast ones. I'm sure he made some. All the decisions he made with the little facts that he could get, I'm sure he made a lot of bad decisions. I can't think of any off hand, but I'm sure there were bad decisions. You have to; you're bound to. Particularly in those kind of days when you didn't have computers and all these other things to give you information, you made your decisions on a limited amount of knowledge.

Q: That reminds me in talking about computers, did you know von Karman? I never could figure out how close he and Arnold were personally. I know Arnold looked for talent wherever he could find it, or help wherever he could find it. But von Karman didn't take any trips with you two that you remember?

P: He might have, but I don't remember offhand now. He was responsible for getting about $10 million right after the war put into missiles,

to develop missiles.

Q: Von Karman?

P: No, Arnold. In fact, I think he gave Douglas $10 million. He kind of played a little favoritism there, maybe.

Q: This was a point that Drew Pearson brought up. About the kind of personal friendship, Barbara and Bruce.

P: Barbara doesn't even speak to the old man. She never used to, I don't know whether she does now or not.

Q: I don't know either, I know Bruce does because we were up there one time and had lunch with him.

Interview with Col Pete Peterson
Redondo Beach, California
October 2, 1969

Q: Col Peterson, one of the first things I usually ask people in this situation is do you remember the first time, and under what circumstances you first met Gen Arnold?

P: I got out of flying school in 1934 and was sent out. My first station was March Field, California, and Gen Arnold was then a LTCOL in charge of the West Coast and March Field. But I arrived during the air mail. He wasn't there; he was up in Salt Lake City, running the air mail. After the air mail, he came down, that was when I first met Gen Arnold.

Q: What was your first impression? What were the circumstances? Was it an official meeting? You were a 2nd LT?

P: No, we were flying cadets. We were the first group to go out because of budget constraints. We went out on active duty as flying cadets. Actually, while Col Arnold was still up there, a Lt Lewis was in charge of the base, and he didn't know what to do with us, because it was the first time they had ever had flying cadets on active duty. So he didn't know whether to treat us as enlisted men or officers, or what; whether we ought to live in the barracks or whether we ought to live in the BOQ. Anyway, he got ahold of LTCOL Arnold to find out what to do with us, and Arnold said in no uncertain terms we were to be treated as officers, live in the BOQ, eat in Officer's Mess, and belong to the Officer's Club. That was really my first contact with Arnold. Arnold had a great feeling, as you know, for people.

Q: We get the impression that his tour at March Field was kind of the turning point in his career. This is where he really made a big impression on a lot of people. There was the air mail, his contacts with Gen Craig,

his flair for public relations, his friendships with the people in Hollywood. Here he acquired a reputation for innovation and for getting things done. Does that square with your recollection?

P: Well, I think that's probably true but, of course, being a flying cadet, down the lower echelon of things at that time, I really didn't have too much contact with the General.

Q: You didn't have anything to compare it with either.

P: No, that's right. All I know is that in his home, he and Mrs. Arnold were always very gracious to the cadets. They were always welcome. Of course, he had a daughter that was about our age at that time, too. We were always very welcome at his home and he always treated us great.

Q: When was your next contact, then?

P: Shortly after that the bombardment group was moved up to Hamilton Field. Major Clarence Tinker was in command up there. So I really didn't have any further contact with Col Arnold until years later when Col Beebe was looking for somebody to replace him as pilot for General Arnold, and I was selected. I was at Wright Field at that time on flight tests. In the meantime, I had gotten out of the service, flown with the airlines, and come back in the service again in 1939 when I got a regular commission.

Q: What was your rank in June 1942 when you went to work for him?

P: I was a Major then.

Q: What kind of duties did he assign? I know that you were his personal pilot, and did you also fly Marshall as Beebe had?

P: No.

Q: Well, you must have had a lot of other things to do for him?

P: Well, yes. The main thing I was looking at, trying to keep track of, was aircraft production. My job was to look into some of the problems, where we had production falling off, that sort of thing. I tried to keep informed of where production problems occurred, and what was going on with production.

Q: This was a big interest of his?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: The minute we started rearming at all?

P: As a matter, one of the instances, you might have heard before. We were always going to some factory and milling around the factory to find what was going on. He would go through them like a whirlwind. We were out at Seattle, where the B-29s were being built. We were having a lot of problems. And one of the biggest problems was the continuous changes. Every engineer wanted to get his changes put in there.

Q: It is still going on.

P: Yes. Anyway, General Arnold said: "There will be no more changes!" Benny Meyers came along, and said: "There will be no more changes, unless it is a safety factor. From now on, no more changes unless it is a safety factor."

Q: About what time was that - 1943?

About 1943 or 1944. Yes. But he loved to go around to these factories and talk to the workers, talk to the women workers, or talk to anybody, to gain interest.

Q: Well, this also goes back to the point you made about March Field, about Arnold recognizing that there are people at the bottom of it. So he kind of got double duty out of his visits. He spurred the workers and management at the same time.

P: Yes. That was one of the big things. Generally, management had a hard time keeping up with him because he was busy going through these factories. He had a great capacity.

Q: You know with all this energy and moving about quickly, did he grasp what he was getting at the time, or would someone have to sit down later and sort of re-explain it to him?

P: No, he had a tremendous capacity for remembering things, and

getting at the basic problems, and really understanding things. In fact, he was, as you well know, thinking so far ahead of everybody, that he got impatient with people, and Beebe probably told you this.

Q: Well, there's lots of evidence of his impatience with people.

P: Yes, that was the thing. He was just thinking so far ahead of everybody that it was just fantastic.

Q: Gen Cabell told us the story about when he and Norstad went to work for Gen Arnold. One of them had drafted a letter for his signature and in it was a paragraph it began: "I'm afraid we can't do something," and he sent it right back. He said: "I won't sign any letters that say 'I can't,' and I won't sign any letters that say, 'I'm afraid.'"

P: He was very positive about things.

Q: Did he do much flying himself when he traveled with you?

P: No, he would, lots of times, quite a bit of the time, ride as co-pilot, but he never took the wheel except maybe for a couple of seconds, when I was doing something else. But he never landed or took off. He loved to sit up there and navigate. And he'd give me my estimates, my next check-point,and all this sort of thing. But he, as long as I was with him, he never flew - I mean, took off and landed. I went through some pretty bad weather with him riding as copilot.

Q: Do you recall any specific example?

P: We had a couple of airplanes; we had a B-25 and a DC-3, but we flew the B-25 most of the time. I remember one time we took off in the B-25 which was fixed up with some comfortable seats in back. But once he got up in the front, in the cockpit, he couldn't get back in the back part to sit in a comfortable seat. So once he sat up there, if he didn't do it, then Puzenski, the crew chief, would ride with me as co-pilot. We took out of Texas one time, in a very bad storm, hard snow, what not. I remember the engine was

cutting out, and so he was adjusting that carburetor heat, trying to get that carburetor from icing up. So it sputtered three or four times, and finally we got through all right.

Q: Did that bother him?

P: No, he was sitting up there, enjoying it, I think.

Q: Evidently, his personal courage was pretty high?

P: Oh, yes.

Q: Do you think he ever regretted never having some combat? Did he ever bring it up?

P: He never, I wouldn't know.

Q: I think there is evidence that he was conscious of the fact that he never saw combat in WWI and he seemed to make an effort to assure that his people had a chance in WWII.

P: Yes, that's why Beebe left. For two reaons: one, he wanted to get into combat; No. 2 he wanted to be promoted. He couldn't get promoted sitting there in Arnold's office. Of course, that wasn't my case, because I was a Major.

Q: How long did you stay with Arnold, then?

P: Well, I was with him all through the war, and then I left.... either the end of 1945 or early 1946, when I left him, I went back to Wright Field and went to Panama, in June 1946. So, it must have been right at the end of 1945 when he retired.

NOTE: It was February 1946 when he left Washington.

Q: He retired quite quickly. In fact, we found a lot of evidence in letters and so forth, that he spent a lot of time, as busy as he was, thinking about the ranch. He was trying to get things going out there. Did he talk a lot about that to you?

P: Yes, we made several trips out to the West Coast, up in Oregon,

looking for a place. And he finally decided on Sonoma.

Q: I know they were almost on the verge of buying a place in Oregon.

P: MacKenzie River, yes. He was thinking about that.

Q: Do you remember, well, you must have been along, early in the war, September 1942, when he took a trip to the SW Pacific, and looked around, and among other things, called on MacArthur.

P: Yes, I remember that real well.

Q: Were you along when he and MacArthur were talking?

P: No.

Q: We have had several versions of that, and including one that MacArthur went into a very long monologue, and that he was not very happy with Air, and so on, and this was one of the things which led Arnold to....

P: Kenney was there, probably with him when he was talking with MacArthur.

Q: Yes, I think he was, but I should go off the record. But Kenney is not an impartial witness when Mac Arthur is concerned. Where MacArthur is concerned, he is really a hero worshipper. And, of course, he is of Arnold, too, but not as much.

Q: Well, there is an incident - I think it appears in Global Mission, you might recall - when you were flying over the Hump, and into China, and got lost. What do you remember about that?

P: Well, as I remember reading his book, I don't think he was quite factual.

Q: Well, that's one of the reasons I asked.

P: We got lost, for sure. I think that he said his pilot fainted - I didn't faint. He was talking about me - I didn't faint. I didn't like that 18,000 feet were at, but I didn't faint.

Note: See Global Mission, p. 411.

P: Anyway, I did go back and, of course, I was without oxygen. I went back to check with him, Sir John Dill, but it was a bad situation. I mean, it was one of the times, perhaps the only time, that I really got lost, but it was just an accumulation of circumstances. No. 1: We weren't going to go that night, and we'd all gone to the quarters where we were going to stay. Then Stilwell had taken off and decided to go over the Hump and go back that night. So Arnold says: "By God, if Stilwell can do it, we can do it." So, anyway, we got a call about 8:00 PM to get ready to go. So we went down, got the briefings and all that stuff. We supposedly got the correct radio frequencies. Anyway, we took off. It was dark - about 9:00 PM, I guess. We climbed to 18,000 feet. It was a little rough when we first took off until we got up to our altitude and we got squared away. It was a nice, black night. We couldn't see anything, but there was nothing to see up there, anyway. So we headed out on course. My navigator was trying to get some fixes and to find out what our position was. Well, he wasn't taking oxygen, and here we were at 18,000 feet. Pretty soon he couldn't add 2 and 2. He couldn't get his positions. In the meantime, I was trying to contact Kunming. I couldn't contact them: I could still talk to Chabua, India, but I couldn't talk to Kunming. I still think to this day - of course, they wouldn't admit it, I think they had shut down for the night. They probably shut off their marker beacon, and the whole works, because I couldn't get that, either. So we kept on flying, and finally I said: "Well, we ought to be there." I think it was 2 1/2 hours and I still couldn't raise anything, couldn't see anything. So we kept on flying for a while longer, and finally went into a square trying to find ourselves. In the meantime, I forget who it was went down and got our navigator taking oxygen and got him squared away, back on his feet. So, finally, he got to a point - in the meantime, I 'd figured out my gas, and everything else. I didn't have enough gas to get back to Chabua. By this time, I figured out I would run

out of gas just about daylight, right in the middle of the Mountains. Well, I had Bissell's pilot along. He was supposed to know all the data, but he didn't know any more than I did. I'm sorry to say that he was no help, and Louis Parker. Have you talked to Parker?

Q: No.

P: Well, Parker was my co-pilot. So, anyway, about this time, I said we were going to head back, I don't care. We are wasting time, I'm sure we are over Japanese territory by now, we are going to head back, I said, if we have drifted north, we haven't even enough altitude, will be running into mountains. To the north the mountains got higher, around 19,000-20,000 feet. So, I turned around on a reciprocal course and headed back, still trying to tune in that beacon. Well, just about the time I turned around, and headed back, I got the beacon. And about that time, my navigator called me and said: "If you make a 5° turn to the left, you will be headed right towards the beacon. That coincided with my calculation, and so, finally we landed. What a night! Never got lost before.

Q: Or since?

P: Or since. So anyway, General Arnold, the next morning, all he said, I guess he had given it a lot of thought. Anyway, the next morning, he said: "Well, we'd better do a little better planning on flights." That's all he said.

Q: And you hadn't been around too long at the time either, had you?

P: It was 1943, I think. I'd been around a year.

Note: Flight took place early in February 1943.

Q: Of course, he was forgiving that time. But how forgiving was he generally?

P: Well, not too forgiving. I didn't make any other mistakes. I don't know.

Q: You didn't want to find out.

P: There was another instance. McCabe might have told you about this. McCabe hadn't been on too long. We were up at Casper, Wyoming. General Arnold said takeoff time was going to be such and such. He told everybody, it was going to be takeoff time. When he said that was takeoff time, you'd better be ready. So I was usually there at least a half hour before to get the engines going and to get everything checked out, to be sure we were ready to go on time. Well, the time came and he closed the door and took off. Now, if some of the staff or anybody wasn't there, that was too bad. He left McCabe there. I'll tell you, McCabe was never late after that. Was it McCabe or Sheffield, I've forgotten? No, it was Tom Sheffield, that's who it was. He's dead now.

Q: Well, some of these things. When I get back, I can double check these with any other instances we've got, on times and dates and so on.

P: When he said he wanted to take off at a certain time, that's the time he meant. Now, if I said the weather was bad, or we couldn't go because of weather he would listen, and we wouldn't go. But if everything else being equal, and the airplane was ready to go, and the weather was satisfactory, he would say: "I want to take off at this time." That's the time we took off.

Q: On that same trip to India, apparently he wasn't very happy with what he saw, and didn't think things were going too well with Wavell and the whole general command setup. Do you remember anything about that?

P: No, I wasn't aware of that. Beebe was over there at that time.

Q: There is another time when he was unhappy when he went to the UK in late August 1943. He wasn't too happy with Eaker. Then came what we call the "Big Switch."

P: Yes, that was kind of interesting. We flew over on MATS that time. We didn't take an airplane over, and Puzenski, his crew chief, and I

went with him. When we got over there, General Arnold said: "You and Puzenski go out and live with these bomber crews and find out what's going on, why we have all these aborts and so forth. So, we took off and we went out to some of the bomber groups. Puzenski, of course, knew all the maintenance Captains, because they were all former Master Sergeants, and he was a Master Sergeant. He would have been a Captain, too, except he wanted to stay with the General. So, in order to stay with him, he didn't take a commission. So we got to talking with all these people out there to find out what the problems were. One of the big problems was the bigger prop, a heavier prop. They hadn't changed the governor. As a result, the governors wouldn't hold, and they were shearing off the pins, and we had sent over, I knew about this because I read most of the wires overseas. I knew some of the things going on; some of the problems. We had sent over a kit to retrofit all these governors. None of them had heard about these kits, couldn't find them, or didn't know where they were. And I tried to find one. I went over to one of the depots there and tried to find one, but the Depot Commander seemed to be more interested in getting the grass cut around there. When we went back to London, we reported in to General Arnold, and we told him what we saw. Needless to say, he was really perturbed about things. So when Eaker came in that night to talk to him, I happened to be still there. I was a Major at the time. This should be sort of off-the-record, too. But, anyhow, he lit into Eaker. He said: "How come you don't get out in the field, and find out what's going on, instead of sitting around here in London, playing poker. You know, Eaker loved to play poker, and he had a lot of these Hollywood types around, I mean I shouldn't criticize, I really don't know, but I mean as far as I knew.

Q: Well, there's lots of evidence, I mean there is evidence of dissatisfaction.

P: Well, anyway, Eaker got real mad. How come you know this - all these supposed facts. You haven't even been out of your hotel room. You haven't even been out of London. How do you know this? Arnold came back. He said: "Peterson and Puzenski were out there last week living with your bomber crews, and this is what they found out. Well, Jakey Devers, who was the Army General at that time (Note: CG/ETO) here in this little group too, and Eaker said: "Well, if you are going to take a Sergeant's word - he didn't mention me - as to what's going on...." Well, about this time, the red was coming up Arnold's neck. Gen Jake Devers tried to smooth things over. He says: "You know, when I want to find out what's really going on, I go out and talk to these sergeants, because they're the ones who really know.". Well, I left about that time. That was no place for me.

Q: Things were getting hot.

P: You know, Eaker remembered that incident. When he came back as Chief of Staff (Note: Deputy Commander, AAF) and I knew Eaker from the days when he was Captain out there at March Field - he passed me in the hall. He wouldn't speak to me. I don't know whether he was so burdened with his duties or what it was.

Q: Well, I know Eaker pretty well.

P: But, since then, of course, when he went to work for Douglas Aircraft Co., I was the AFPRO(?) there at the time. I was out at a party at Junior's one night, just about the time he was coming on board. He greeted me like a long, lost brother. And of course, when I got ready to retire, he asked if there was anything he could do for me, or letters of commendation, or anything, to let him know. He was great then, but he wasn't so good there for a while in the Pentagon.

Q: This was the same time, August- September 1943, that Monk Hunter got bounced out of the fighter command.

P: Yes, but I don't know the circumstances on that.

Q: You answered one question very thoroughly. One of Arnold's concerns was that so many bombers had been sent to England, that he felt could have been used in the South Pacific, if they weren't getting full utilization out in the UK.

P: Well, they were having a lot of aborts. That was one of the reasons, because they had this heavy prop on there, and had not retro-fitted the governor.

Q: You recall the costly raids against Schweinfurt and Regensburg? Did you ever get the impression that he began to wonder whether daylight bombing was the way to do it?

P: Well, I'm sure he gave it a lot of thought, lot of consideration, but I don't know.

Q: Talking about production problems with the C-54s.

P: Well, we were very short of cargo airplanes, as you know. And the C-54s were not coming off the line too quickly, and Gen Arnold recognized the need for C-54s. Instead of him getting a C-54 for personal use, why he got a B-25 and DC-3 for his personal use in the United States, and then when we went overseas, we got a production airplane, a B-17. For our Australian trip, he took a C-82, which was a Convair and converted into cargo, transport. He recognized the shortage of airplanes like that. And, of course, he'd like to have had P-51s, which was North American, but North American was so busy building B-25s that they didn't have the production capability unless they quit building B-25s. They needed B-25s more than they needed P-51s. The P-51 was a great airplane, but it just so happened that they just didn't have the production capability to produce it, unless they were going to cut off something else.

Q: How did they finally solve that problem?

P: Well, essentially, we got more production capability, I guess.

Q: You mean new plants?

P: New plants, yes, and they got P-51s.

Q: Beebe said that when they were flying together, especially just the two of them, they did a lot of talking about things in general. Did you find this true with Gen Arnold?

P: No.

Q: I say it with a specific question in mind, whether he ever talked to you about what was going to happen after the war, and the shape the Air Force might take, or airpower might take in the future. This was something that was on his mind a lot.

P: No, he really never did this with me. Most of the time - it was very seldom that we flew alone. He had Sir John Dill with him, or he had some of his staff along with him, or some other dignatary along with him. But it wasn't too often that - in fact it was on rare occasions - that he ever flew alone.

Q: I think it is the difference in times, from the period when Beebe was flying and when the war was really going full blast.

P: And, of course, on those kinds of times he was talking these problems over with his staff, or other people.

Q: Who would you say was probably the closest person to him?

P: Boy, that's a tough one.

Q: Well, there must be several candidates. Or was anybody really that close?

P: I don't think so. I really don't think so, because, well, he had a lot of respect for Benny Meyers, despite the later problem. And he really didn't, I mean Rosie O'Donnell, Cabell and these people. None of them were really close. You know, I just don't think so. Beebe was probably closer to him than any one.

Q: I know it's real hard to find a confidante.

P: I used to go over and have breakfast with him, I'd ride to work with him; ride home with him, but I still don't consider myself in that category.

Q: What would he talk about?

P: Oh, just things in general, really. He tried, once he left the office, he tried to forget things. It is pretty hard to do.

Q: I suppose, just thinking out loud, that if you don't have any confidantes, you don't have any problems about playing favorites and it seemed to be something that he just did not want to do. Did you ever know of any cases where you think he really did play favorites.

P: I'm really not aware - well, I think he played favorites as far as his people that were with him on the West Coast. In the early days of the Air Force, we had two air forces, one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast. And he was West Coast. I think he really leaned over backwards to take care of all those people. They produced, if they didn't produce, then they were out.

Q: I wouldn't call that really playing favorites, then.

P: You're right. He knew those people; he knew their capabilities, and he knew them better than the people on the east coast.

Q: Including their shortcomings too, which is just as important.

P: Yes, you're right.

Q: Did you have any feeling or evidence that he was really slowing down physically before he had the big heart attack in 1945?

P: No, I don't think he slowed down. That was his problem; he couldn't slow down.

Q: Did he ever relax?

P: Well, we went on a fishing trip, I forget when this was, down in

Florida. We went out there and he relaxed, fishing. It wasn't Tampa; it was Miami. He was real relaxed and got his eyeballs burnt from the sun. He sunburned real easy, but he could relax out there. We would just go out riding on the Potomac River, his wife, my wife, maybe Hank and his wife, if they were around.

Q: Do you mean just cruising up and down the river?

P: Yes. They had Air Force rescue boats over there. We went up in the mountains one time during the war with Gen Marshall. Did you hear about that?

Q: Well, a little bit. Was that up in the High Sierras?

Note: Trip in 1944, probably.

P: Yes, well, I don't remember the time now, I know Marshall was, and Arnold was there, the reason we went up there was to get away from things and to relax a little bit, to get another perspective on things. No telephones, no radio, nothing. Arnold knew the Rangers out in that area, and he set it up with Rangers, and I think we went on a big climb, with horses, packed up in the mountains. Every day a light airplane would fly over and drop messages. That was the only contact we had. I forget how long, must have been gone about a week, something like that. So we finally got up in the High Sierras and caught these little golden trout, about that long. You don't even clean them. You just throw them in a frying pan, eat them like corn on cob, delicious. He really enjoyed that fishing. I did too, incidentally.

Q: How long were you gone?

P: Well, we were gone about a week.

Q: Was there ever anything important in the stuff that was dropped?

P: Not that I know of. I don't know what they would have done if there was something important, cause I don't know how, they didn't have any way of getting a message out. Except to get on a horse and get out. So I guess

it wasn't too important.

Q: We went down to visit General Streett last week (Oct 1969).

P: If anybody, I think Streett was close to Arnold. He wasn't Air Force. Yes, he was Air Force, but he was acting more as a planner for Marshall. I guess he was sort of our representative. It just seemed like - well, he did take over later, the 3rd AF, down in Tampa. It just sort of seemed to me like he wasn't really in the Air Force. I don't know why, just sort of seemed like he was more Army.

P: Of all the people, I guess I'd say Streett would be close to him. Of course, Kuter, he thought a lot of Kuter. Kuter was a real smart guy. Brilliant.

Q: Well, Norstad was a young braintruster, too. Quite different temperaments.

P: Norstad came along later.

Q: Yes, but he was one of the original - what did they call them? The "heavenly twins," with Cabell.

P: Yes, Cabell and Norstad.

Q: We had a very good session with Gen Cabell; very informative. We were lucky because he was - he had been working on his memoirs, and so a lot of the stuff was fresh in his mind. He had been thinking about it, trying to remember for his own purpose. That worked to our advantage.

Q: We were talking about Arnold and FDR; you mentioned a big meeting.

P: Prior to the start of the war, FDR felt that there was a war coming, and so he got a big meeting of all the top generals - Army and Navy admirals, etc., to discuss what should be done to get prepared for the war. And Arnold went along with Marshall, because at that time, as his Air advisor. Arnold hadn't been invited, but he went along as Marshall's

aide, so to speak. But anyway, they were sitting around this big table, and I've kind of forgotten the details of the story. The Army generals said: "We've got to build a few more barracks down there," and the Navy wanted to build some more of something or other. They came around to Arnold, and he said, well, we ought to get industry prepared to build, and I've forgotten the number now, but seems to me, 8,000 airplanes a year, something like that. Our biggest order at this time was about for 13 B-17s, which took a year to build. Here Arnold comes up, and says we have to get the factories ready to build. So FDR mulled this over a little bit, all these things, and the President said, well, building these barracks isn't going to do anything, and building these gunboats or whatever the Navy wanted, won't bother Hitler. He said that's not going to bother them one bit. The President says: "I agree with Arnold. Arnold is too modest. He says we ought to gear up industry to build 50,000 airplanes a year." And it just goes to show the foresight Arnold had.

Note: This story is a bit muddled. Peterson is probably confusing conference of Nov 24, 1939 with FDR speech of May 1940.

P: After FDR said that, Arnold called in Dr. Ginsberg for Donald Douglas, Martin and all the rest of the leaders, Larry Bell, and all the rest of the industry. He told them: "I don't have any money. It's not appropriated yet." But he said: "You people got to start building up your factories, and building aircraft industry so that we can produce just as many airplanes as possible." Of course, they all sat around with their mouths open, they never heard anything like that before, but that's when they started. And whatever the figure was, but we finally did reach that production rate.

Q: Maybe even exceeded it.

P: I don't know; I don't recall now.

Q: Apparently, Arnold's best friend in the White House was Harry

Hopkins. Did you know him much?

P: Yes, oh yes. We went, another instance there. We went fishing with Harry Hopkins. I don't know whether Harry Hopkins belonged to this exclusive club up there in Canada, I can't even remember the name of the river up there. Anyway, we ran up to this base in Massachusetts - Harry Hopkins, the General and myself, that was all. No, there was one other fellow. He was connected with the Singer family, but his name wasn't Singer, I think he worked in the Pentagon some place, LTCOL, nice guy, very wealthy family.

Note: Possibly, Sol Rosenblatt.

P: Anyway, he was a friend of Harry Hopkins. We went up there salmon fishing. This creek, this river, 7 miles of it, is owned exclusively by some NY millionaires. I don't know whether Harry belonged to it, or friends set it up. Each mile, they had what they called a cabin. It wasn't a cabin, it was a beautiful place. There was a pool right out there in front, and the river where they fished. Anyway, we went up there with a guide, got in the boats, canoes and went up the river, caught some great big salmon. But Harry Hopkins - I was mixing some drinks - I asked him what he wanted, and he said, oh, I'll have a scotch old-fashioned. So I mixed a normal, put a little sugar in it. Well, as soon as I went out, when he wanted a scotch old-fashioned, what he was talking about was on the rocks. He didn't want an old-fashioned, he drank like a fish. So anyway, I used to carry messages occasionally over to Hopkins. But they got along great. Arnold and Lovett got along great, too.

Q: Yes, we had a good visit with him.

P: He is a great guy.

Q: Hopkins seemed to be of tremendous help in putting Arnold's view over, as far as the White House is concerned.

P: Yes, I think he was a great supporter of the Air Force.

Q: How did that come about. Had they know each other before?

P: No, I don't think so.

Q: What brought them close together? They don't seem the same type of person at all.

P: No, they really weren't.

Q: Of course, neither was Lovett.

P: No, no. Typical New Yorker. Harry Hopkins was a typical New Yorker, I think you could call him that. I don't know. I guess they just recognized the great talent that Arnold had, and supported him.

Q: Well, apparently, Marshall did, too.

P: Louis Parker, have you talked to him?

Q: No, I will find out where he is. You know, if you're a retired general you are easy to find, but otherwise....

P: Well, he's a retired Major General.

Q: I don't know. I've got a list at home.

P: I think that he's up in Oregon. I know they were talking about Eugene, Oregon some times.

Note: Major General Louis Parker lives in Shalimar, Florida, near Eglin AFB.

Q: You mentioned the fact that Gen Arnold never told stories on himself or about himself, at least on serious matters. And yet he must have been, did he have more or less than the average amount of conceit?

P: I don't think he was conceited at all. Just wanted to get things done. And I don't think he thought well, boy, I'm the greatest, or anything. I think he was a very humble person. Really.

Q: Did you have the feeling that he thought some of these things wouldn't get done, if he didn't get at them?

P: You'd better believe it.

Q: So, I guess it would be more self-confidence than conceit.

P: You know, every letter that was written to the family of air force persons - he personally signed those. He didn't have a stamp. He personally signed every one of those. And not only that, when it appeared to him that the letters were getting too stereotyped, why he would fire the guy that was writing them, and get a new writer.

Q: Did he ever pull any big boners? Or even small ones? You know the tendency is in talking to people like this, you build up a sort of picture of almost perfection, you know?

P: Well, maybe he should have fired me when I lost him over India, that might have been a boner.

Q: Oh, I was wondering for example, if he ever went along with anybody too long? He must have made some mistakes somewhere?

P: Well, I don't know of any. You could point out some hard and fast ones. I'm sure he made some. All the decisions he made with the little facts that he could get, I'm sure he made a lot of bad decisions. I can't think of any off hand, but I'm sure there were bad decisions. You have to; you're bound to. Particularly in those kind of days when you didn't have computers and all these other things to give you information, you made your decisions on a limited amount of knowledge.

Q: That reminds me in talking about computers, did you know von Karman? I never could figure out how close he and Arnold were personally. I know Arnold looked for talent wherever he could find it, or help wherever he could find it. But von Karman didn't take any trips with you two that you remember?

P: He might have, but I don't remember offhand now. He was responsible for getting about $10 million right after the war put into missiles,

to develop missiles.

Q: Von Karman?

P: No, Arnold. In fact, I think he gave Douglas $10 million. He kind of played a little favoritism there, maybe.

Q: This was a point that Drew Pearson brought up. About the kind of personal friendship, Barbara and Bruce.

P: Barbara doesn't even speak to the old man. She never used to, I don't know whether she does now or not.

Q: I don't know either, I know Bruce does because we were up there one time and had lunch with him.

Pool, Henry J.

3 Jan 70

November 20, 1969

Mr. and Mrs. Henry Pool
Poolfield Farm
Shavertown, Penna. 18708

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Pool:

As you may know, John Loosbrock editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine and I are working on a biography of General Arnold. We have been out to the Ranch three times to see Mrs. Arnold and to research the material she still has out in California.

We would like to come out some day in the near future to talk with you about General Arnold. Colonel Bruce Arnold, now stationed at the Pentagon, said he would love to join us.

There may be a question of bad weather at this time of year, and Bruce also mentioned your annual visits to Sea Island, Georgia. I am planning to visit the Southland in January and it may be more convenient for me to see you in Georgia than for us to visit Shavertown, Penna.

We are completely at your disposal in this matter and would accommodate our schedule to your wishes.

I hope this letter finds you both in good health.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

December 19, 1969

Col and Mrs. J. Henry Pool
No. 620
Sea Island, Georgia 31561

Dear Colonel and Mrs. Pool:

I just talked to Bruce Arnold and he might just join us if we meet the first week in January. He is shipherding a Congressional delegation down that way.

You mentioned January 5 to 9 as the best time at Sea Island. Then, I believe, you said you were moving South. Those dates may be a bit out of phase with my schedule as I'm driving my daughter back to the University of Miami. She is due back on January 5th. Therefore I'd be coming through about January 3rd.

Would it be possible to make a date for Saturday, the 3rd, or preferably, later on in the Miami or Palm Beach area, if that is where you are heading.

If you could give me a bit more information about your plans for the middle two weeks of January, I'll adjust mine to fit yours.

Last week,I had a good talk with Mrs. Ruth Arnold, widow of J. Price Arnold, who now lives in Denver, Colorado.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Mr. J. HENRY POOL
COTTAGE NO. 20
SEA ISLAND
GEORGIA 31561

File
dud
9-70

Dear Dr Green:

Sorry Jan 16 & 17 are not possible, we are leaving for Fla on the 16 and will not be back until Feb.

If you have any questions I will try to answer them by mail upon my return

Best of luck

Hank Pool

Poolfield 5
Shawntown Pa

western union

Telegram

KEA002 WA063 =(KE) ET

WASHINGTON D.C

(A UA066 HL) PDB FAX SEA ISLAND GA DEC 30 600P EST

DR MURRAY GREEN =

DEPT OF AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SECRETARY WASHDC =

WILL BE HERE AT SEA ISLAND JAN 3 ADVISE IF YOU WILL BE HERE =

COL POOL =

3 Jan. late after

Col J. Henry Pool
Calls 912 638-3611
X620

done

Called 9/15/70

WU 1201 (R 5-69)

December 19, 1969

Col and Mrs. J. Henry Pool
No. 620
Sea Island, Georgia 31561

Dear Colonel and Mrs. Pool:

I just talked to Bruce Arnold and he might just join us if we meet the first week in January. He is shepherding a Congressional delegation down that way.

You mentioned January 5 to 9 as the best time at Sea Island. Then, I believe, you said you were moving South. Those dates may be a bit out of phase with my schedule as I'm driving my daughter back to the University of Miami. She is due back on January 5th. Therefore I'd be coming through about January 3rd.

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Sincerely,

Phone no Sea Island
C 912 638-3611

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

Col J Henry Pool

Sea Island
Georgia = in Georgia now moving south soon.

can see him Jan 6-9th
or later on
in winter

AREA 912-638-3611
extension 620

wants Dr. Green
contacted

Nancy

INTERVIEW COLONEL J. HENRY POOL
SEA ISLAND, GEORGIA
JANUARY 3, 1970

P: Hap's father was a very unusual and plain everyday country doctor. When he was called, he would come. I remember one time, I had a broken arm, fell off a horse at my home in Ardmore. The doctor came and said: "Oh, we'll fix this." And so he fixed it, and so I had to put in in a splint. It was a little sore, but I gave it an awful bang some way or other, the next day he had to reset it. Well, they weren't using plaster casts in those days, it was just a bandage with a normal piece of board on it, and he tied so tight that that night, it started to swell up. But he was a man who was very thorough, every kid loved him, because in the old days when we had sleighs and horses, Dr. Arnold always drove a sleigh - single horse, lots of bells on it, and he would always let the kids get on the runners, and off we'd go, and he'd take us around. If it was a question if we got too far, he'd even bring us back. But I just, the Arnold family just loved him.

Q: You lived in the neighborhood?

P: We lived right in Ardmore, and we lived on Montgomery Avenue in Ardmore, move down from Haverford where I happened to be born, but Dr. Arnold had been our family doctor. In fact, he brought me into the world, so that's how close the Arnold family and the Pools were.

Q: Did he [Dr. Arnold] bring Eleanor into the world too?

P: No, Eleanor was born in Rochester, NY with, the same as my brother Sydney, who has passed away. Lois was born - I guess Lois was born in Haverford, too. My twin brother and I were born there.

Q: She was born up in Rochester, I know your family was up at Lake Ontario....

P: We had a[t] home at Lake Ontario - Forest Lawn, a summer resort, and we were brought up there as kids, Eleanor, Sydney, all five of the kids were brought up there.

Q: You'd be up there every summer.

P: Every summer, and we had wonderful time, and Mrs. Arnold was a great one to make mayonnaise. In those days you couldn't buy mayonnaise, and you had to really whip it. Occasionally she would get one of us kids to chip in and help her out making mayonnaise for one of her beaus who was going to be there over the weekend.

Q: Hap Arnold, they called him "Harley" in those days - they didn't call him Hap until later. He was corresponding with her when she was up at Forest Lawn, when they were engaged. There were letters flying to and fro...

P: That all happened, actually, as I remember it, when we were in Europe in 1909 and mother had taken my sister and my brother - twin brother and Beedle as she is known is Eleanor

Q: Who was your twin brother.

P: John, Jack, and we were in Switzerland. I think it was the firt time I'd ever really met Hap as a grown person and he visited us.

Q: He was a LT coming home?

P: He was a LT coming home, and it was in Gersau, Lake Lucerne small town which we were in the pension just having a great time, mountain climbing, and that's the first time I really remember meeting Hap as being very close to the family, and it wasn't shortly after that, I think they became engaged, after we had returned from Europe.

Q: That was in 1909. They didn't get married until four years later. He went into flying when he came back. He wasn't at Governor's Island, and then he went flying in 1911 and he was in that for about a year or two. He must have corresponded with her.

P: All the time. One time - no secret of course - Beedle had a very heavy beau. And of course Hap came along, and he became the favorite. Eleanor was a very, very charming lovely person.

Q: Whe was, she is a remarkable woman.

P: She was a god-awful time with asthma and hay fever, but she comes though it each summer.

Q: Well, I know she used to go down to Nags Head.

P: They came East, and Hap and I used to play a lot of golf together. He was a pretty good golfer, wonderful short game. I'd outdrive him, but when it came to the end, his game usually paid off.

Q: Did you play golf with him before they were married?

P: No, after they were marriend. Hap always loved all kinds of sports, particularly hunting. I recall one time, he

wanted to go pheasant hunting out in North Dakota, and we were up going over the B-29, which was in a little trouble in Oregon. So I made arrangements to stop at Bismarck, for cars and guides, guns, etc.

Q: Was this the trip on which Marshall came?

P: No, this was the first time he went out. We had a great two days and we had some wonderful shooting. But following that, Gen Marshall heard about all this, and in order to take time off. So I arranged for the same deal at the hotel in Bismarck, and got the place to hunt and everything like that. Both of them were missing their shots terribly, so I told Hap, I said: "Before we go to bed, come on in my cabin and we will see if we can straighten you out on this thing. In the meantime, I'd taken threat, bought a red ball and some chewing gum and put it on the ceiling, he got his gun, he was in his bathrobe and pajamas, and so we started the ball swinging, and he'd try to follow it, and he'd click the trigger, and I'd say: "Missed, and you're back of the bird. Swing, keep that gun swinging through." So he got it down, and pretty soon we had a knock on the door, and who was there but Gen Marshall. He said: "What are you doing?" And Hap said: "I'm taking a shooting lesson."

"Well", said Gen Marshall, "for goodness sake, let me in on it." I said: "General, get your gun, and we'll start all over again." So we had a great time, and the next day they shot a lot better, because they were following the bird, and not just stopping as they pulled the trigger. Hap was a pretty good fisherman, too. Loved to fish.

Q: He loved to go out, and wherever he had an opportunity?

P: Anytime to be in the wild, to walk or to ride, go down stream, why, he'd...

Q: Did you go salmon fishing with him at the Gaspe? I think there were several occasions, coming through Labrador, and there was one occasion during the QUEBEC conference, he came down there.

P: He did. And he visited, I forget the name of the people.

Q: Was this in Maine; Mrs. Arnold stayed in Maine?

P: No, it was on the Restigouche, actually, where he fished, and I know he wanted to spend more time there. I think he only spent about a day and a half - had to come on back to Washington.

Q: Did you go on that High Sierra trip?

P: No, that was for the golden trout.

Q: Yes, the golden trout, he went on one with Joe Elliott...

P: General Marshall was with him.

Q: Well, Gen Marshall was with him in 1944, I think it was. But he went on one with Joe Elliott in 1939, before this. They used to write one another about it.

P: He was always anxious to catch golden trout, find out where it was and what it was all about. And he and Gen Marshall finally did it, and they came back exhausted. They had to ride up this mountain on ponies, and sleep out, and camp out.

Q: This went on for a week?

P: And neither one of them were hardened up enough to for it. In fact, they were worse off then when they went up there.

Q: They needed a vacation after that?

P: Yes, you bet they did.

Q: They brought back Joe Elliott and his friend. I can't remember the man's name. They brought them back for a week in Washington. These fellows had never been to the big city. They came to Washington and they had lunch in the Pentagon, and Arnold had some WAF captain escort them around. Their eyes were popping, and they wrote a long letter to everybody concerned. They really had a great time.

P: I don't know if they ever told you about Hap and his drinking. Well, he didn't feel well during the latter part of the war. He went down to Miami, so they said: "General", - I happened to go down with him - "General, how much liquor do you drink?" He said: "I don't drink liquor, never have." He said: "I take a little wine." So they are cutting out the wine right away. They said: "We want you to have at least 5 ounces of bourbon whiskey a day." Well, he said: "I can try it, but if I don't like it, I won't take it." But, he came back to Washington, and he was making a little survey of the officer's club. A Major Hodges, who was in charge. He got around to the back where they loaded the vegetables and everything. There was a truck unloading several cases of Jack Daniels whiskey. He said: "Hodges, whose whiskey is this?" And Hodges said: "Well, sir," he hesitated. "Come", he said, "speak up, Hodges. Whose whiskey is this?" And he finally said: "It belongs to Col Pool sir." "Well," he said, "isn't that lucky," he said. "Hank, send me up a couple of cases. At Ft. Myer, I lost two cases of whiskey."

Q: Are you talking about his major heart attack?

P: No, this is a preliminary examination. He had a lot of great doctors down there.

Q: I think he went down there around 1943.

P: Yes, right before or just after Christmas.

Q: He apparently had a heart attack in 1943 - in May, during the TRIDENT Conference. Then he and Mrs. Arnold went out to Oregon. Was it a heart attack?

P: I'm not sure. It was never actually, pinpointed to me that it was a heart attack. But he hwas so dynamic, and so much on the go, that nothing would stop him. No matter how he felt, or how bad he felt, he never wanted to quit or ease up or do anything else.

Q: They went out to Medford, Oregon, I think he was looking for a ranch at that time. He wanted to settle down after the war.

P: I went out to Eugene, Oregon with him. That's where the B-29 was. We were going to look that over, and then we fished the Mackenzie River. We had a lot of fun doing that for a couple of days. Beautiful river, renowned river, we didn't catch many fish.

Q: Did Mrs. Arnold go on that trip?

P: Yes, she did.

Q: Was he also looking for a ranch at that time?

P: Yes, he was. In fact, later we went down looked the property over where his present ranch is - at Sonoma, and he selected that.

Q: When he was out in Oregon, did he visit his brother out there?

P: No, not to my knowledge.

Q: His brother Price was in Oregon. Mrs. Price Arnold tole me something about Hap coming out there and they never quite got together - he and his brother.

P: Well, he was on the go every minute, and we didn't stay right in the town of Eugene. We stayed at a camp outside, but Mrs. Arnold stayed in Eugene, and there were 5 or 6 of us - Pete Peterson, and quite a few others.

Q: Do you recall when he had his major heart attack in 1945? Did you have any close connection with him at that time, or were you overseas?

P: No, it was after the war, I mean the major one. No, in fact, I was right here at Sea Island, and we left here, and went directly to Washington, and of course, he was buried in Arlington.

Q: Was this the heart attack he had after South America in 1946?

P: Yes.

Q: He had two major heart attacks, one in Jan 1945, right about the time of Inauguration Day, of President Roosevelt - the last inauguration. He had one then, and he had one apparently in South America. He had to break off his trip. He spent some time in Miami coming back.

P: That's right.

Q: In January 1946?

P: I recall that, but I wasn't with him.

Q: I see some of the letters, of course. He was very fond of you, and I know you were on some hunting trips, shooting grouse in England.

P: Oh, he sent me all over the country on missions. I told him originally which I think he enjoyed it to the extent that if there was anything - "one officer you want picked out and want me to tell, you'll never get it out of me." And I think that's why they, some of them, knew I was his brother-in-law.

Q: Did this create any problems for you?

P: I could have told him a lot more things about certain things than I did, but I wasn't going to be the squealer, and I was not definitely going to squeal on some of the officers for situations that maybe wasn't their fault - and maybe I didn't know enought about it.

Q: Did he send you on some missions to look over a situation?

P: Yes.

Q: Can you think of several specific things that he asked you to do for him, sort of confidential missions?

P: Well, I was sent out to the Leavenworth. School out there, to find out what they were doing about air.

Q: Was this before the war?

P: No, during the war. I got out there. Gen Truesdale was in command. I told him what I was there for, and he said: "well, I wish you would go over this, and come into class and see." And I found out. They were still battling the Battle of Gettysburg. There was no coordination between Ground and Air,

to speak of. So I brought back not a very glowing report about Leavenworth, and Gen Arnold sent it on to Gen Marshall and that was when I almost became a Corporal in the reak ranks. But I didn't. Gen Marshall asked me if I worte it, and I said I did write it. And he said: "Do you believe in this?" And I said: "I certainly do; it's the truth, general." Well, I was fortunate. I got a letter of commendation from Gen Marshall on it. But Hap was very pleased. Those were the kind of things that he had to have the truth about, and had to have the future officers of the US Air Force, they had to know something about it as well as the Ground people.

Q: Can you recall any other mission that he sent you on?

P: Oh, I was sent to Brazil in South America. I was sent down to the Group which we had in South America.

Q: Was Bob Walsh down there?

P: Walsh was down there as the coordinator?

Q: Arnold was very interested in Brazil. He felt that the United States should put its money on Brazil as the pillar of South America.

P: That Brazilian squadron did a good job in Italy, you know, and we visited Italy. Hap and the rest of us. We visited the 15th AF, they were doing a fine job.

Q: He wanted to help the Brazilians. What was your job on this mission?

P: Well, it was kind of a coordinating job of how they were getting along, and what was the score.

Q: Did you check in with Walsh?

P: Another mission that he sent me on - how the aerial gunnery was doing in England, and I found out that we were wasting so many shells, that we had to revamp our whole aerial gunnery in this country, that is, what we were shooting at. Somebody would say, Boche at 3 o'clock, then they just started to blast.

Q: Was this related to the 2nd AF problem?

P: 8th.

Q: They sent you to the 8th in England, but they had a problem with the 2nd AF, the training. They were at Fort George Wright, Washington, and they moved out to Colorado Springs. They weren't giving - at least there was a charge - they weren't giving the men adequate aerial gunnery, and adequate training at high altitudes.

P: There was no question about that. How we finally overcame it - the fangible bullet was developed and you would take a P-51 and P-39, and fire at it. The different planes had different colored marks on it. Well, the first frangible bullet we had went right through the windshield and didn't make a mark. It just made a whole and almost hit the pilot. So it had to be revamped. But it was a great help in the latter part of the war. It was terrific, particularly the ground shooting, too.

Q: Was the frangible bullet part of a result of your visit?

P: Oh yes, definitely, it really all worked out from that, because we were wasting so many shells, and the bosy didn't have the training which they should have had, before they went over.

In fact, we went over there pretty fast, and of course, first it was the 32 caliber and then a .50 caliber came, and then the.50 caliber with armor piercing shells were terrific. When they once hit a German fighter plane, it was pretty much gone.

Q: He used you as sort of a good will ambassador with the British?

P: Many times.

Q: Ambassador Winant.

P: Yes, with Winant, and also with Mr. Ferry, developer of the Spitfire, yes, I went hunting out there, just as a very rural - his whole home was taken over as a hospital, but we lived in the servants quarters, and went pheasant shooting one day and, yes, I did quite a little of that in different places, had a very interesting time, sometimes it was quite uncomfortable, but other times it was very interesting. Anything you ever wrote out for Hap, I found out that he wanted one sentence paragraphs. If you had a long, long thing to tell him, you had to tell him practically on two sheets of paper, and sentences of not more than 3 sentences to a paragraph.

Q: He didn't want any long winded reports?

P: He wanted things right to the point, and that's why he was so severe. Sometimes, you might say, he lost friends, because he would take apart a BG or a full Colonel much more than he would a Corporal, or a Major or a Captain or LTCOL. But those were the responsible people. They were the ones he felt should do a job. And they shouldn't be there if they didn't.

Q: Do you remember some specific cases of his getting mad?

P: Yes, we took another trip to the coast, he made a speech out there, to try to keep the people, not to go home and paint up the old gas pump. That was more oreless, the theme, to stay on the job because the war wasn't over.

Q: This must have been late in the war?

P: It was it was late 1943, I guess. And so he said: "Let's look things over on the way back." So, instead of flying the B-26, we got a DC-3, and he said: "Where is so and so? Who's in command of this, that and the other thing." And we'd tell him. He'd say: "Let's go down there and see how he's doing." Well, on three occasions, he found the commanding officer, to his mind, was doing a very poor job. He was supposed to be fighting a war, and his base wasn't the way Arnold thought it was. Well, he was reduced back to Major from a BG-permanent rank.

Q: This was at a base?

P: Right at the base. He'd go into another base, and he was very upset.

Q: I guess you've seen him get mad many times?

P: I could tell when he got mad, immediately, he generally gritted his teeth and then the side of his face, you could see the tension building up, and when it did, why it was one of my jobs to get him away from it - cool him off - tell him he's wanted on the telephone. Basically, some of the decisions were fast, but 99% of them were right on the ball, they should have been done. If he hadn't done it, the war would have gone on for several more years.

Q: Can you think of any decisions in that 1% where you think he went off - pulled the trigger and the gun wasn't loaded? Well, we will get to that again. You mentioned that the tension built up in his cheeks as a sign to you that he was ready to blow.

P: Jaw always came out a little bit - like that.

Q: Bruce Simmons, his driver, he drove us down to see Mary and Bill Streett.

Q: Tell me about Seversky.

P: Seversky had been writing different things in the press about how poorly the Air Force - what they should be doing, what they hadn't done, never a good word. So, Gen Arnold called him on the telephone, and asked him if he'd be kind enough to come to Washington, and so Seversky did come down to Washington and I was called down to, there was Seversky, Gen Arnold, myself in his office.

Q: Just the three of you.

P: Three of us, and he said, Seversky, you have been very critical of the Air Force, and he said, I'm not going to say we've done a bum job or I think we are doing a pretty good job, and he said, I want you to do something for me if you will. Will you be kind enought to go over there and sit in my seat back of that desk, and he said, I won't say a word for 10 minutes, if you will tell me how you think the Air Force and this war should be conducted. Seversky became very, very flustered. He was, in fact, very much embarrassed, and so he sat down for a minute, and got right up.

Q: He sat down in that chair?

P: St down and got right up, and he and General Arnold had a marvelous talk. And before it was all over, I know, I was excused, and the next day I happened to be called down to the office, and he said: "I think that did the Air Force more good - did me a lot of good, and I think Seversky learned a lot." And he said: "I think from now on, we're in good hands." And Seversky after that wrote some very, very complimentary wonderful things about the Air Force, and wonderful things that they were doing.

Q: I remember somebody telling me about Seversky's problem. There was an instance where Arnold was said to have pointed to a board, with different planes having different performances. And he asked Seversky what he would do to, or which one of these planes he would scrap and which ones he would push.

P: Oh yes, he went into detail with him.

Q: In that particular conference?

P: No, not right then. That was, that you are speaking of, is afterwards up in the Map Room, which was strictly top secret.

Q: Did he call Seversky in on that?

P: Oh yes. He took him right in there and showed him exactly what it was, and explained to him the whole situation - of course, under confidential rules. Seversky never divulged any of the knowledge which he learned, but it helped him a lot in the future.

Q: Another critic, Al Williams, too?

P: Al wasn't in on that conference.

Q: And then Bill Ziff?

P: I had a funny time. I must tell about Clark Gable who wanted to get into the Armed Forces. So I was called down to the General's office to, I didn't know what, and I was asked: "Hank, do you know who this is?" And the man was sitting in the chair. When he got up, I said: "Well, it looks like Clark Gable to me from all the pictures I've seen." And he said: "Well, that's who it is." He said: "He wants to do his part in the war." What are we going to do about it?" "Well," I said, "General, I read in the paper where the Navy has offered him some high rank, and the Army had done the same." And, he said: "That isn't the question." He said: "What would you do with him?" I said: "I'd send him right down to Miami, at the Officer's Training School. Give him a good education, and Air Force training, and assign him to duty." So, of course, Clark Gable, in the Pengaton building, is like a bull in the china shop. Every kid, from hell and high water, was gaping at him, running after him, and the only way we could duck out was, they had a toilet in the middile of the Pentagon building in which you'd go in one door, and go out the other, so we go in one, and then out the other side, and duck around that way before we got cut off.

Q: All the secretaries were following him?

P: Oh, it just broke up the Pentagon. Everytime he came in.

Q: Well, he got a Captaincy in the AF, didn't he?

P: No, he didn't get a Captaincy. He got a 2nd LT, out of Miami, I was there at his graduation. Hap spoke at his graduation.

Q: What job did they give him to do?

P: He was in aerial photography. He went on about 8 missions, 8 or 9 missions. But he took some wonderful pictures, which were all recorded by the Air Force. Then he was promoted to Captain after his given time and then he resigned. After the war. He came in to see Hap. I was there, and Hap promoted him to Major, on his retirement. They did a whale with the job. Hap was very fond of him, and it was mutual.

Q: You know, Bruce Simmons told us a story that he had picked up your mother, she was apparently visiting in Washington. He picked her up at the Keiths theater, and I can't recall just how Clark Gable got into this, but she met Clark Gable.

P: That was out in California.

Q: And she ran over to Clark Gable and said this old bag is going to give you a big kiss. And she just went over and kissed him.

P: Well, Wallace Berry was another one. Yes, that's when I think they were down at Los Angeles. Pretty close to the movie colony, but, Wallace Beery, quite a number of them used to come out to see Hap.

Q: I have see letters from Ann Harding, Will Rogers, Wallace Beery, Richard Dix, Bebe Daniels and Ben Lyons, two or three others.

P: Jeanette McDonald?

Q: Right. When he was out at March Field, and he had put on these air shows, and he invited all these movie stars. Some of them were on location, making a picture, and couldn't make it. But we have all this correspondence saved from all these people. You say your mother liked Wallace Beery?

P: Oh yes, she liked Wallace Beery, and thought he was wonderful.

Q: Did he ever come out to the base?

P: Oh yes, yes, indeed. He came out to the base.

Q: Did you visit the Arnolds at March Field?

P: No, never did. We were going out to the Olympics one time...

Q: 1932?

P: Yes, and something went wrong, I forget what it was, we had our tickets and reservations, and everything. I think one of our kids got sick, and we had to cancel the whole show.

Q: Well, his father came out there about that time.

P: Yes.

Q: He came out on a bus.

P: That's right.

Q: He went home in the middle of the summer, I believe he died shortly after that, in fact, Mrs. Arnold, Eleanor, believed that this terrible trip that he took back - he insisted going back by bus - was a factor in his health.

P: He didn't like the train, and he wanted to see more of the country from the bus. He was a very, very wonderful guy to the extent, he wanted to see what was going on. He wanted to see the country.

Q: Dr. Arnold was greatly disappointed, in WWI, that he was not called to active duty?

P: He served in the Spanish-American war.

Q: Right. He served on the Mexican border in 1916, but he was not called to duty during WWI.

P: I guess Mrs. Arnold told you how Hap got to West Point. It wasn't his appointment, you know.

Q: It was his brother?

P: That's right, and the doctor. But Hap took it, he finally got a transfer.

Q: Why was his father so anxious for one of the boys to go to West Point. He was not a West Point man himself, was he?

P: No, no. But he was a soldier. A soldier and a doctor.

Q: He loved the military service?

P: He thought a great deal of it, and he thought that the Army was one of the greatest things for young men, and the discipline, that any young man could have.

Q: Was he very strict with the boys?

P: No, I never heard him raise his voice at any time, and I've been in his house many times. He was not one to holler or yell.

Q: Not a disciplinarian?

P: No, not that I would know. He was firm, but never one that would really put the heat down.

Q: What about Hap's mother and father, their relationship? Was she strong person?

P: Yes, she was a very fine looking woman.

Q: Oh, she was a beautiful woman. I saw pictures of her.

P: Yes. And very capable, and she was a wonderful person.

Q: She managed to get her way often times by going around the doctor, I understand.

P: She had helped him out a lot, too. If he thought he was going to have a bad case in the birth of a baby out in the back country. Why, whe went right along, and acted as a midwife. She was a wonderful person.

Q: She went right with him?

P: Oh yes. She was great.

Q: Did Hap Arnold always want to be in the military? He wanted to be an engineer, didn't he?

P: Originally, I think he did, but I don't think he graduated high enough in his class at West Point to be an engineer.

Q: He was disappointed at not being in the Cavalry.

P: He loved horses, and he was in command of the 10th Cavalry at one time... The colored troops.

Q: Is that right, where?

P: In the Philippines, I think. Yes. And of course, now that is a stationary place for it at Ft. Myer I believe.

Q: Was this during his first tour in the Philippines, before he was married?

P: No. This was when he was married.

Q: In 1914 and 1915.

P: That's right, because he was married Sept 10, 1913.

Q: Then he went to Ft. Thomas for a little bit.

P: And then he was at Ft. Riley for a little while.

Q: He was at Ft. Riley before he was marriend. She didn't want him to fly. Did you ever get in on this?

P: Oh, you know, he cracked up and Beedle tried to stop him, of course. She told him to get out of flying, but Hap was so fascinated with it, he cracked up at Plymouth Rock.

Q: There is a famous story about these two old guys coming by and looked at this plane, this Burgees plane, I think they had, and wondered what it was. This was 1912, the year before he got married. Did she make a condition of their marriage that he get out of flying?

P: No, never that I knew. You aren't going to make Hap do anything or sign any conditions. If there was something he wanted to do, he was going to do it.

Q: Well, then, he voluntarily got out of flying?

P: Well, he got out of it, and then, of course, went right back in again.

Q: He went back in it after they went up to Madison barracks. When he came back from the Philippines in Jan 1916, he was sent to the 3rd Infantry up at Sackett Harbor.

P: You know more about these things than I do. I've forgotten so many of these things.

Q: Do you recall that winter [of 1916]? In fact, Lois had just been born, and Eleanor had this little baby, and she was coming out. He was writing her letters. We have a whole packet of letters from Sackett Harbor, and it was a cold winter. He was up there making plans for her and the baby to come up there. I'm not sure whether she ever got there or not, but by May 1916, he had decided he was going back into aviation

and he went to San Diego. They all went to San Diego. He went to North Island Aviation School there. Do you remember what caused him to change his mind about the infantry?

P: Well, no I couldn't say exactly what changed his mind, I know he was always talking about the air, and the potential of the air, and then of course, Billy Mitchell was his god...

Q: Well, Mrs. Arnold tells this story that Billy Mitchell, who was down at the [North Island] school, offered him a Captaincy if he'd come back into aviation. This was a temporary Captaincy, and he did. He accepted it. He went from Madison Barracks down to San Diego and he only lasted there about a year. He got in trouble there on those flyers who were lost, do you remember that?

P: Yes, I remember that also, his great disappointment, was of course, that he was, during the first World War, that he was tied down in this country. He never got into combat in France.

Q: Yes, he finally got overseas in October, then he got sick. He was in a hospital at Hensley for several weeks in 1918, and then he finally got to France. The war ended just before he got there. He got there in November 1918. This was - to use the modern idiom - a hangup with him all throughout his career. In fact, he never got into combat.

P: I know he was very much disappointed because he had a great ability to fly, and he flew every opportunity he could get.

Q: Hank was the only Arnold boy to get into major combat.

P: I was with him in Europe. I think he was in Patton's Third Army, and he had leave to come up to Paris, and Hap came

over. And we - that was where the German pilot was brought in, the jet pilot, and the interview was in the Ritz Hotel in Paris.

Q: You were there? This was when he was taking his recuperation leave in April 1945?

P: Yes, just before the war was over. This boy was brought in, and he spoke excellent English, in fact, Oxford English. He and Hap had a great discussion. He told Hap, then, that Goering there was only one thing he wanted to do - if we were going to do anything about the war - they had to destroy Arnold.

Q: That's what the man told him?

P: Oh yes, that's what this young pilot told him. We never are going to do anything unless we can destroy Arnold. And I saw Goering in Berchtergarden. I was in Germany after the war.

Q: They interviewed Goering.two days after the war, May 10, 1945. They brought him in and they had this very long interview....

P: I have a couple of relics of his at home in my house. I have many of Hitler's girlfriend - Eva Braun - I have her curlers, and they are pure ivory.

Q: Getting back to Hank. He had this combat record. He didn't want to get out of the line, in the Army, the artillery, the antiaircraft artillery. Yet Hank never made his star. I wonder why? Was there prejudice against him because he was a general's son?

P: I don't think so. He just missed going right to the top by a small fraction, and I think he definitely had a slight inferiority complex. And I think it came down righteously from being the sone of the father. But he never seemed to have that

drive and that push that -- he had the brains, and he had the ability -- but he never seemed to have that one thing that would put him over the top, and definitely make a decision or to do something in a crucial time which would have pushed him to the top. But he was a fine officer.

Q: You know Bruce is a great intellect. He is very congenial and he is smart, and it seems to me, I've had more relations with Bruce than I've had with the other sons.

P: I haven't seen him in years.

Q: He also does not have this outgoing drive.

Q: Let me ask about this toy project that Streett and Arnold were on.

P: Bill Streett delivered serum to Alaska. They had an epidemic up there, and he and Hap were in Washington, and they flew up to Wilkes Barre and they were flying planes in our bedroom, and our daughter Nancy had just been born two days before.

Q: How many years ago was this?

P: Forty.

Q: This was in 1929 or 1928.

P: 1929 I guess.

Q: He was at Wright Field at that time.

P: That's right.

Q: That reminds me, I want to ask you something - Did you help him? He had some kind of a toy that he was trying to patent. He and Bill Streett were working on this toy, toy airplanes that they were going to try to market.

P: That's what they were flying around the room. Do you remember, Maffie?

Mrs. P: I came home from the hospital and they came and sat in the bedroom, and flying these planes around.

Q: He was trying to get some financial support.

Mrs. P: I think so, yes.

Q: He got all the fellows to contribute something. I know it didn't work out, and he gave them back all their money.

P: It wasn't marketable; it wasn't a practical thing to go into the toy field.

Q: He and Bill Streett - Streett mentioned something that he had asked you. Did he ask you for something?

P: Yes, he did, and it didn't look good to me, and I told him so.

Mrs. P: That's many years ago and planes were just coming in.

Q: He was writing his books at that time, wasn't he?

P: I guess you have that whole series of books. You could see how air minded he was, writing those books and the balloons. The whole thing, it was imagination.

P: And I guess they told you the story when the President called him up, President Roosevelt. And Hap told him the only way he was going to win the war was by day bombing and just continue it, and gave him his whole theory on it, and Churchill said, of course, to the President, that night bombing was the only thing to do.

Q: That's right, and they had this session at Casablanca.

P: That came up later, at which I was there. And it worked out that the President said, "Well, if you have any more of this, you may go to Shangri-la." And Hap said: "Well, maybe that's where I belong, Mr. President." Then, we were given one opportunity with the B-25 to bomb LeBourget. I guess you have gotten that story?

Q: No.

P: And I can't remember right now, the number of planes, but it wasn't too many. But it had to be under radar, which we went in low, very low, and bombed LeBourget. We practically destroyed most of the hangars, tremendous amount of German supplies, and airplanes, and returned to England without loss of one plane. Well, that proved to the President that Hap was on the right track.

Q: This was at the time when the Germans were taking over all of France?

P: They moved right in. They had LeGourget. They had all the fields. But that started the beginning of President Roosevelt's thinking that day attacks might work out, and when Hap's order was that we would have 5,000 planes over Germany, and France, 1943, July 4, 1943. Well that was done, it took about almost 4½ or 5 hours to rendezvous them over England.

Q: This was sort of an anniversary flight?

P: Yes, they came from Italy; they came from Scotland every where we had bases all over British Isles.

Q: What was your job when you were in Britain? Were you in personnel work?

P: No, no. First time it was strictly in aerial gunnery, and....

Q: You were just on temporary assignment?

P: Temporary assignment to the 8th AF at that time. The second time, of course, was with the Group Control Council in Germany. And the war was over when we moved into France and into Germany. We went right up into Berlin. The main thing was, we had lost a great deal of coordination between the 8th AF and some of the different units that could help them out in the Pentagon, in the States here. We kind of coordinated those things; got them working together and really helped the 8th AF, and also the coordination of the British.

Q: Going back a little bit, about 10 years before the war, when the depression hit, the Arnolds were in this Building and Loan game?

P: Everybody in Philadelphia was in Building and Load. Everybody sent so much per week.

Q: Sent some money out of his salary into the Building and Load, he and Cliff...

P: That's right, he was a Director also of the Merion Trust & Title Company

Q: His father was involved, wasn't he Vice President?

P: No, he was director, Dr. Arnold. And of course, my father was vice president, director of the First National Bank of Ardmore. But the Building and Loans, that was the thing in all of Philadelphia, everybody saved money. They put up $2 a week, or $5 a week, or whatever you put in. It was like a Christmas fund, but it usually paid much better interest than a savings fund.

Q: Then all those banks went...

P: In '28, '29, they just popped like popcorn.

Q: The Arnold's owned a house in Coronado. I know there was a lot of correspondence on it, he apparently had bought a house a house when he was in North Island - Hap did in the 1920s. Did his father put up the money for that house?

P: I don't know. I never knew much about the financial affairs of the Arnold family. But I know the Dr. was a very thrifty man, and I think it hurt him a great deal to have the Merion Title & Trust Company go under and all these thrist, savings...

Q: In 1931, his mother and father had their golden anniversary. There was a big party in Ardmore. Do you remember that?

P: I do remember that, and it, you can rest assure it was a dry one too. Dr. and Mrs. Arnold they were really back country people. They would never think of having anything, except for medicinal purposes. That was the only thing they permitted.

Q: Eleanor told us some stories about their marriage, that the Dr. wouldn't permit any hard liquor around. And some of the boys who came in from the Air Service..

P: You mean Hap's and Bee's marriage?

Q: Yes.

P: Well, it was different in our house, because I was sent away at that time, down to the shore, to go fishing. And my brother and I went down there so they could use our room to keep some of the bridesmaids and usher and everything else there. But my father was never dry.

Q: You were taling about Brereton. Brereton needed some help out in the Pacific.

P: Yes, and he asked us to send him some officers with good qualifications, which we dug up out of personnel.

Q: Now, this was after Pearl Harbor?

P: Oh yes, well after Pearl Harbor.

Q: And Brereton was in command in the Philippines in the Far East. So this must have been first few months of the war.

P: No, it wasn't the first few, it was more than that. They had expanded so out there into Australia and various other places.

Q: This must have been Australia, then....

P: He needed personnel. So after a great deal of trouble, taking people from here and there, they sent him out two or three or maybe four 1st LTs, and men of various ranks, but only two in the field grade. And he blew his top, and was going to send them right back. General Arnold called him back to Washington, and he told Brereton in so many terms that he better get himself straightened out and know what he was doing, or there would be a new commander out there.

Q: And Brereton would go back to his permanent rank. Major.

P: Hap was really upset over that. He was really mad over it.

Q: Did you ever hear the story - talking about a man being cut back to his permanent rank.

[NOTE: The Tibbets story. Pool didn't recall it.]

Q: We are talking about the atomic bomb. Do you remember Arnold's role. Did he ever talk to you about it, in confidence?

P: Yes, he did, in fact, at our house, anybody that knew it, was watched night and day. But were were in Germany, at the Potsdam conference, and Gen Arnold, it was known then amongst very few of us, was called in. There was Gen Oliver Echols, and he said to Echols: "Oliver, how are we going to get that airplane away from this explosion and have the pictures back to see what we have done?" Echols said: "General, that's going to be a question, because we do not know the speed of the concussion of that bomb, and what power it will have 20,000, 30,000, or 40,000 feet.

Q: Echols said this?

P: Yes. He said: "That is the dangerous part of the whole thing." Well, Hap said: "I want those men back; I want the pictures back; now how are we going to figure this out?" So Echols said: "Well, General, I'll do everything in my power to find out. I'll talk to you tomorrow morning." And I was at the meeting in the following morning, because there was only three of us in the room at that time. But Hap said to me: "I think we have it figured." And he said: "Off she goes." And that's all of the conversation.

Q: Who were the three in the room?

P: Echols, Arnold and myself. This was in the bedroom, by the way.

Q: This was at the time that Truman told Stalin that we had a wapon, Stalin brushed him off.

P: That's right.

Q: People wondered whether he was disinterested in it, or he already had information through his spies, about our atomic weapon?

P: That's right, but he didn't have it.

Q: Talking about Potsdam now.

P: There was a man by the name of Sarka. He was of Russian descent. He spoke two of their dialects. To me, he was an invaluable person. He would listen to all conversations. He was always with me. And the Russians, in several of the meetings. He would come out. He never wrote down a word, but he had a photographic mind. And he would repeat almost word for word, what some of the Russians were talking about, that we would never have gotten otherwise. I just got a Christmas card from him.

Q: Sarka - and he was just assigned to your staff?

P: No, he wasn't assigned. He was with me in England and he was...

Q: Oh, what was his job?

P: He was, what you might say, one of my aides. He was a good typist, good shorthand....

Q: Arnold took you on a lot of trips?

P: I can't even think of all of them.

Q: You know, this convalescent trip that he took when Marshall sent him out of town. This was in April 1945, when he went to Cannes and the Riviera.

P: I was there, with Jimmy Doolittle. In fact, we found out. I happened to see something down in the water, when we were going to go down these steps to the Mediterreanean. And here lay a beautiful mine in there. But, I was sent by Gen Arnold. Do you remember the bombing of Zurich?

Q: Oh you meant the accidental bombing of Switzerland, yes.

P: I might tell you. My own personal viewpoint, was that it wasn't too accidental. The Germans set up a barrage, a heavy barrage along the Swiss border. They were in Switzerland when they were doing the shooting. Never thought that they could be bombed. Well the boys got pretty upset about it, and let them have it. Well, nevertheless, to make a long story short. When we were at Cannes, Gen Arnold, Gen Marshall thought it would be a good idea if somebody went up to Geneva, and apologize to the Swiss government.

Q: They sent Spaatz, didn't they?

P: No, they sent me.

Q: They sent you? Well, Spaatz was on a trip to apologize.

P: That was afterwards. This isjust to let them know that we weren't going to do it again. So I went up, and we landed at Geneva, a terrible little airport, in a DC-3. We got out and we were well received. We had to be in civilian clothes, and it was quite a job to get civilian clothes, because Switzerland was full of Japanese. Every German, loads of them, and particularly Geneva. So I met with some of the Swiss officials, and made a short talk in front of the Parliament, or Senate, I think they called it. And they were very well pleased, and very happy about it. But, before I left, Gen Arnold told me: "don't accept any gifts or anything." And I said: "Yes sir." So when I came back, I said: "You missed something pretty nice." And he said: "What was that?" And I said: "They gave me one for you and one for Gen Marshall, a "Patty Philippe" watch, which there was only possibly 50 ever made in the world. Each was worth

about $1,000. And I said: "I'm sorry but I couldn't accept it. Gen Arnold, said, oh, why (laughing). And

Q: You didn't have to take his instructions so literally?

P: And General Marshall said: "Well, where's mine?"

Q: Was this at the time of his trip to Cannes, or before that?

P: This is while we were in Cannes that the big meeting of the ground force, the air forces, of which we were transferring from the ETO to the Pacific.

Q: Then this was April 1945?

P: Yes. The transportation of troops, material, the whole thing, and absolutely a complete redeployment of the western front.

Q: Well, your trip came after Spaatz'. Spaatz went in there in March 1945.

P: As I remember, this was in September or July of 1945.

Q: Of July? Your trip was probably a supplementary trip.

P: I didn't think Tooey was in there.

Q: Yes, in March 1945, he was sent in there by Marshall on a secret mission, to go in there and try to placate the Swiss. There were two bombings, at least two bombings, and these were apparently accidental bombings of towns. Schiffhausen(?) This was bombed, they claimed, accidentally. You don't think it was?

P: No, they were just getting tired of getting shot at.

Q: Spaatz was sent in on this mission. Incidentally, right about this time, a guy named Hank Stovall. Do you remember him?

P: Well, he and I set up the Miami Officer's Training School. Great big fellow?

Q: He's a friend of Spaatz'. Col Stovall was sent on a secret mission to Europe by Gen Marshall. Now, Arnold was having his major heart attack in Miami at this time. It was around March or April 1945, and Stovall was sent on a secret mission. Now, he lives in Mississippi, I've written to him, but he didn't anwer me. Do you have any idea of what that mission was.

P: No. Stovall's first mission and mine was too, was to set up and, take over the hotels in Miami and set it up as an officer's candidate school.

NOTE: I've since talked to Col. Stovall by phone. He didn't recall any such mission.

Q: Was there any mission to find out if the Germans had the atomic bomb?

P: I heard of one, yes.

Q: Did you know of the atomic bomb at this time, or did you find out later?

P: No.

Q: You didn't find out till Postdam?

P: No, everything was more or less up in the air. Somebody had something. Nobody knew anything, couldn't definitely pin-point it. But we had an idea that there was definitely some form of weapon being built, that was going to be effective.

Q: Paul Tibbets, told me a story, they had this operation SILVERPLATE, which is the code name for the atomic bomb, and he was told that wnenever they mentioned SILVERPLATE, he was to get anything he wanted. Well, he wanted some C-54s. Some General in the Pentagon would not give it to him, the General was called

into Arnold's office and demoted to his permanent rank of Captain - from 2 stars to a Captain - Did you ever hear of that story?

P: I knew somebody what we called, got clipped.

Q: Where in the Pentagon?

P: No, he came out of Dayton.

Powell, James F. 2 Jan 70

Dear Dr Green:

I fully appreciate your responsibility as historian for the Air Force, but I can assure you that I have no intention of re-living my experiences in Washington during the General Arnold regime.

Sincerely,

James F. Powell

James F. Powell

File
7/19/71

20314

2 July 1971

Maj General James F. Powell, USAF (Ret)
208 Glen Avenue, SW
Vienna, Virginia 22180

Dear General Powell:

You will recall our conversation of some months ago, I'm sure. I'm the fellow working on the biography of General Hap Arnold. You indicated on the telephone that you were no fan of his, and based on other accounts that I've received, your complaint about his impulsiveness seems to be borne out by others. The enclosed excerpt of an interview with General Sam Anderson supports your statement and branches into other areas, such as General Arnold's ordering the 22nd Medium Group (B-26's) out to the Pacific before they were ready. pp 16-18

Perhaps I should mention that all tapes of all interviews will not be quoted without permission. Mainly, these tapes will be preserved for future historians working out of the Air Force Academy to ponder over.

I may have indicated to you that I am a professional historian, and have been associated with the Office of the Secretary for just 25 years. I have been through the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, Mitchell and other collections and I have interviewed practically all of the living Air Force greats, starting with Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Kuter, Smart, Norstad, Kenney and 100 others. Outside of uniform, I've talked with to Hon. Robert Lovett, Eddie Rickenbacker, Charles Lindbergh, Alex de Seversky (who also was no fan of Arnold's), Jackie Cochran, and many others.

I was fortunate enough to have interviewed Generals "Pre" Cabell, St. Clair "Billy" Streett and Leslie Groves - all of whom died in the past year. Their recollections will be part of the imperishable record. Nowadays, when the newspapers are kicking around documents that purport to be the whole history, it is important to get the story as straight and complete as human effort and ingenuity can make it.

To that end, I hope you will reconsider and grant me an interview. You may impose any conditions as to the use of this information. The enclosure will speed your reply. Or, if you desire to telephone, my office numbers are OX 3-7388, OX 3-7428.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

Encl

(Don't make any cards - cards already made) transcript ✓ cards ✓

Telephone Interview, major [redacted] Lee James F. Powell, Vienna, Virginia, Sept 2, 1970

Powell was in the Materiel Division at Wright Field, and came to Washington with the Materiel Division when it moved from Dayton, probably in 1939. From June 1940 to May 1941, he was in Hqs., ~~AAF~~ Army Air Corps, as the Chief of the Materiel Planning Section in the Materiel Division. His overall boss was George Brett, who became Chief of the Air Corps when Arnold moved up as Deptuy Chief of Staff for Air.

From May 31, 1941, to January 31, 1942, Col Powell held the same job in Hqs., AAF, his overall boss was General Oliver Echols/. The No. 2 in command was Benny Meyers who is the one that caused Powell to be sent out of Washington. Powell expressed views strongly hostile to Arnold, although he said he didn't not want to talk to me directly and subject himself to any interview. He said he is an old man and would like to forget all about it. I pressed the matter and asked the nature of his feeling toward Arnold, and he told me about two situations. First, the one involving the industrial representatives. This incident probably took place in 1940.

Arnold had called in all the industrial representatives, probably in 1940. There was a growing national emergency and there was a survey of industry to determine whether it would be possible for industry to make parts for aircraft in an emergency. There was a deal in Detroit with Packard, using the Rolls Royce engine.

According to Powell's version of it, Arnold was told by Donald Douglas that the aircraft industry could make all the planes and parts that would be needed by the Air Corps and so the representations by Detroit at this time were turned down.

Powell says that three other people could document his assertion. Including Eddy Langmead, Alonzo Drake, who lives in Sarasota, and Joe Stromme. I will

Unclassified

try to write to them to get their views.

The conflidt with Benny Meyers occurred when Powell served under him in the Materiel Division. Powell was concerned with expediting foreign orders and industrial planning to build up the capability of the aircraft industry. One of Powell's main jobs was to prepare materiel statistics, first for Brett, and then for Benny Meyers and Oliver Echols. He had two sets of books, showing aircraft statistics. One set was planes suitable for combat, the other type of statistic showed planes on hand, or on order. The latter statistics were utilized by Benny Meyers because they showed higher figures than those suitable for combat. Meyers would take these to Arnold and to the president. Benny Meyers was adept at juggling figures and was responsive to Arnold's requirement for figures right off the cuff.

Powell said he kept the "hard" figures on planes suitable for combat so that Spaaatz, who was Chief of Operations, would have some idea of the number of planes he could call on. The on hand or on order planes were those that didn't have struts or props. These showed a higher figure of aircraft available and were generally publicized.

The conflict arose when somebody, perhaps Powell, gave Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, information on B-17s which he used on the radio. These figures were based on the "suitable for combat" statistics and were much lower than those the president had been using in his public statements. This conflict was brought to attention by Benny Meyers and as a result of this conflict, Powell was personna nongrata in Washington. He says he was called in by Stratemeyer (this may be early for Stratemeyer to have been Chief of Air Staff) and Powell was asked where he wanted to be transferred to. He thought it over and he ended up on the west coast under Sammy Cousins. According to his 201 file, he was transferred as of Feb 1, 1942, to the Hqs., West Coast, Air Force Training Command, in Santa Ana, Calif. His job was Chief of Buildings and Grounds Section under BG Ralph Cousins.

Powell says that on several occasions his name came up to get a star. In one instance he had two wings under him, one wing at Sherman, Texas, the other wing at Ennid, Oklahoma, but Arnold is supposed to have struck his name on each occasion.

I asked him how come he ended up with a star, and later two stars, and he said that the list with his name on it passed through when Arnold was in Potsdam - out of the city. I said don't believe that, because Arnold took painstaking care with those who made the General Officer's list, and the fact that he was out of the city did not mean that he was not paying full attention to the General Officer's list. Therefore, I concluded that it could be inferred that Arnold had, in 1945, relented concerning Powell, and permitted his name to come up and pass through for his star. I'm not sure when Powell got his second star, I would guess that it was after Arnold's time.

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Powers, Edward M. 14 Apr 70

Letter returned
no address

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20910
May 12, 1976

Maj General E.M. "Pop" Powers, USAF (Ret)
68 Eagle Rock Way
Montclair, New Jersey, 07042

Dear General Powers:

You may recall our fine interview just six years ago, in April 1970, in connection with my work on a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm still grinding away at it and am finished with 90% of the research and about 50% of the writing.

Right now, I'm into the period of Arnold and Lindbergh and I ran across the fact that you visited Germany in 1937 or 1938 and wrote a report of what you saw. As I look through our interview, this phase of your personal history did not emerge, and there are a few questions I would like to ask, if convenient for you.

I have other business that will take me into the New York area over the weekend of June 5/7, and I would be pleased to stop off in Montclair for a half an hour, certainly not more than an hour, if you can spare me the time.

My best times would be Friday afternoon, June 4th, or Monday AM, perhaps 10 AM, June 7th.

Incidentally, I still recall that we drove over to your country club after our interview and you played some cards with your friends in the locker room. Perhaps I can scrape up a copy of that interview for you, if you would like to have it.

I just received a telephone call from my friend, Brig Gen George Goddard, who has just been elected to the Aviation Hall of Fame in Dayton. I'm hopeful I can come out for the ceremony scheduled for July 24th.

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

P.S. My colleague, Ray Fredette, is writing on Lindbergh, as you know. I think he said he talked to you.

C 201 - 746-1404
10:30 Tues - 14th

done
4-14-70

April 6, 1970

Maj General Edward M. Powers, USAF(Ret)
68 Eagle Rock Way
Montclair, NJ 07042

Dear General Powers:

I enjoyed talking to you this morning and I'm looking forward to our appointment at 10:30 AM Tuesday, April 14th.

I saw Mrs. Arnold at the Ranch in Sonoma a couple of weeks ago and she wanted to be remembered to you and Mrs. Powers.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

15 miles out on S-3 - [illegible] Tunnel
Across Bloomfield. Turn R. first street L.
toward Oranges - 6 blocks
Take R fork - Harrison
Llewellyn - R - Three lefts
House - Brickwall - White house

March 4, 1970

Major General Edward M. Powers, USAF (Ret)
68 Eagle Rock Way
Montclair, New Jersey 07042

Dear General Powers:

John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House.

I am normally in the Office of Secretary Robert Seamans, Jr., and am a trained historian. I've been on a Brookings Institution Fellowship to search the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, Mitchell, et al collections at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division.

I've also been up to the FDR Library at Hyde Park for several weeks.

As we have completed our research of the written word, we are engaged in interviewing the key personalities who were associated with General Arnold some time during his career. I've talked with Robert Lovett and Generals Kuter, Norstad and Kenney in New York.

In Washington I've interviewed Jackie Cockran and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Smart and many others. I've been told in several interviews that "Pop" Powers would know the answer to several questions nobody else can answer.

I'm hopeful it will be possible for you to spare me an hour or two in mid-April during a planned visit to New York. May I suggest some time during the week of April 13-17th.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

Chisholm

Pop Powers played golf with him W F 1929-31

Powers lives in Montclair NJ

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Public Information Division

MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD MICHAEL POWERS

Edward M. Powers was born on 4 September 1892, at LeRoy, Illinois. During the World War, he served as private first class in the Aviation Section, Signal Corps Reserve, from 30 November 1917 until he was appointed a second lieutenant (temporary) in the Air Service on 28 June 1918. He was honorably discharged from the Army on 23 August 1919, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Service, Regular Army, on 1 July 1920.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant on that same day, 1 July 1920; to captain on 1 November 1933; to major (temporary) on 2 March 1935; to major (permanent) on 17 June 1940; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) on 15 March 1941; to colonel (temporary) on 5 January 1942; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on 20 October 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) on 22 February 1944; to major general (temporary) on 7 June 1945; to major general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, with date of rank from February 22, 1944.

SERVICE

Upon enlisting in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps Reserve, he was assigned to the School of Military Aeronautics at the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, for ground instruction. He then received his flying instruction at Camp Dick, Dallas, Texas and Kelly Field, Texas until June 1918, when he was commissioned a second lieutenant. He then remained at Kelly Field, Texas as an instructor, and subsequently moved to Payne Field, Mississippi, where he served as an instructor until he was honorably discharged on 23 August 1919.

His first Regular Army assignment was to the Aviation Repair Depot, Dallas, Texas, as Supply Officer and Acting Quartermaster until March 1921, when he transferred to the San Antonio Air Intermediate Depot, San Antonio, Texas, as Supply Officer and Assistant Engineering Officer. From July to September 1924, he served as Engineering Officer, San Antonio Air Intermediate Depot; then was ordered to duty at Camp Nichols, Rizal, Philippine Islands, where he served as Assistant Engineering Officer and later Engineering Officer, 66th Service Squadron, until March 1927, when

he joined the 28th Bombardment Squadron as Assistant Engineering Officer and Engineering Officer, successively, at Camp Nichols.

Returning to the U.S., he proceeded to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio for duty in the Field Service Section, Air Corps Materiel Division, from November, 1927 until July, 1929. During this tour of duty he was Chief of the Repair Section for one year. His next assignment was to New York University, New York, N.Y. as a student Officer until July, 1930, when he returned to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, where he was graduated from the Air Corps engineering School in June, 1931. He then remained at Wright Field as a Test Engineer, Power Plant Branch, Air Corps Materiel Division; and in July, 1933, became Chief, Power Plant Branch.

In August, 1935, he was ordered to Maxwell Field, Alabama, where he was graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School in June, 1936. He again returned to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio as Assistant Chief of the Engineering Section, Air Corps Materiel Division, until August, 1937, when he transferred to Washington, D. C. In June, 1938, he was graduated from the Army Industrial College. He then became Chief, Equipment Branch, Air Corps Materiel Division, Wright Field, Ohio; and in May, 1939, was designated Assistant Chief of the Production Engineering Section at that field. In October, 1939, he was ordered to Washington, D. C. for duty in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps, as Chief of the Engineering Section, Materiel Division.

From September to November, 1941, he was detailed to the Office of the Military Attache, London, England, as a Military Observer. Returning to the U. S., he proceeded to Washington, D. C., and subsequently became Chief of the Engineering Section, Materiel Division (redesignated Materiel Command). In May, 1942, he again was ordered to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, as Army Air Forces Representative and as Administrator, Aircraft Scheduling Unit, Army Air Forces Materiel Center. In October, 1943, he moved to Washington, D. C. as an Army Member, Joint Production Survey Committee, U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In June, 1944, he was assigned to Hq., Army Air Forces as Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution; and in May, 1945, became Acting Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution. In August, 1945, he became a Member of the Joint-Army-Navy Board on Postwar Army-Navy Training in Industrial Mobilization, Washington, D.C. He was appointed Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel at USAF headquarters on October 10, 1947. He is rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer, Aircraft Observer, and Technical Observer. END

UP-TO-DATE AS OF 5 MARCH 1948

Interview MG E.M. "Pop" Powers, Montclair, NJ, 14 April 1970

Q: General Powers, do you remember the first time you encountered Hap Arnold? It must be way back?

P: It was shortly after I came back from the Philippines.

Q: Where was it, in Ft. Riley?

P: As I recall, I met him at Wright Field.

Q: This must have been about 1929?

P: Yes, I think it was about 1929.

Q: And he was assigned there?

P: I met him somewhere before that, but I can't remember where it was.

Q: He was at Fairfield.

P: That's right. So was I.

Q: Do you remember anything special about him?

P: He was quite a card. When I first met him he was the executive officer of the Materiel Command, Gen. Robins was the CG.

Mrs. P: He had just come back from exile, hadn't he? When the Pratts were there, and they were going out for dinner and he didn't want to go, so Mrs. Pratt called me and asked me if we could have them for dinner. So Arnold came over and had dinner and he sat a long time telling us how the different equipment was developed. For instance, they used to wear football helmets, when they would have a crash, and somebody would get their head hurt and then they put on football helmets. He told us about every little phase of the equipment.

Q: He had just come back from Ft. Riley?

Mrs. P: No, he had been, when we first knew him, but he had left and come back again on business, I guess. /Anyway, the Pratts had us out.

Q: Conger Pratt was Commander of Wright Field at that time?

Mrs. P: Yes.

Q: Do you remember anything special about him at Wright Field? Was he disgruntled because of his experience at Riley, and the fact that he was shunted out?

P: Never heard him say a word about it, I don't think so particularly. I guess he figured he stepped out of bounds a bit, and had it coming to him.

Q: He had a lot of time on his hands out at Wright Field, and I guess he got to play some golf?

P: Yes, he played golf. He wasn't very much good there, but I saw him play one game of golf that was better than anybody in the foursome. I can't remember the exact score, but we were up in Seattle, going through the Boeing plant.

Q: Is this during the war?

P: No, before the war. No, it was after the war. I'm not sure.

Q: I played golf with him out at Wright Field, yes, and I've played with him in this match up there, we had Clare Engvedt,=who was Chairman of the Boardoof Boeing at the time, and McDonnell who is now Chairman of the Board of McDonnell--Douglas, and Hap and I played. He turned in a score that was pheonmenal. For the first time he ever broke 80, I think he went down to a 73, on a strange course, strange golf course, and strange shoes.

Q: He was just a sporadic golfer, wasn't he? He didn't take it seriously, he didn't play enough to be a good golfer?

P: Well, no, he played for exercise and fun. That's all, he never expected to be good. That was the best score in his life, he

told me he had never broken 80 before and I think he had a 73 that day. But Arnold on a strange course, strange club, strange shoes.

Q: Did you play a lot of golf in those days?

P: Yes, we played quite a lot, used to play. We lived on the post out there, and we would quit work at 4:00 in the summertime. We could go out and have 18 holes of golf after we got back.

Q: Do you remember any relationship he had with Jan Howard in those days?

P: Well, they were brothers-in-law in those days. Jan Howard married his wife's sister.

Q: Right, but I think they were divorced by that time, weren't they?

P: They were divorced by the time I met Arnold, I think, and I knew Jan Howard down at Paine Field, Mississippi in 1918. He came down there to help close the place up, and Lois was his wife's name.

Q: Wasn't there some friction between Arnold and Howard in that period?

P: Oh, I don't think they were very friendly, because of that family personal setup there.

Q: There was another aspect to that, too. Weren't they sort of rivals for the top job under Conger Pratt?

P: I suppose you could say they were, yes.

Q: Howard was the engineering officer.

P: Howard was the engineering officer, and a damn good engineer, and Hap had, of course, was a graduate of West Point, but I don't think he ever specialized in engineering, as such, he was more an administrative type, and a damn good one...

Q: Ben Chidlaw told me that Arnold really didn't have enough to do out there at Fairfield and so he got involved in a lot of other activities like writing some boy's books, you remember his books?

P: Oh yes, he wrote a lot of those boys books you know, he had a series he wrote.

Q: The "Billy Bruce" series, named it for his sons. Do you remember anything about him working on the manuscripts?

P: No, he used to work very quietly at home on those things.

Q: When did he have time to do this?

P: Weekends, done evenings, I guess, in wintertime, and I think he started those while he was out at Riley.

Q: That's right, yes he did, he continued that for a while. Was he trying to make some extra money?

P: Well, I never heard him say so, but it was always welcome in those days, because we never had enough.

Q: What was your job at that time?

P: When I first came there I had the shops, then I had the Equipment Branch under Gen Howard, and then I had the Power Plant Branch, the last assignment I had there, I had the Chief of the Power Plant Branch. I spent a lot of time working on engines after that, too.

Q: You came to Washington, did you see Arnold when he was at March Field?

P: Once or twice yes, he was commanding, I went through there a couple of times, I used to go out to and land there and pick up fuel, and go on to Los Angeles, and go through the aircraft factories.

Q: Did you have any contact with him in the early '30s, that you remember?

P: I had him on final (?) maneuvers, I can't remember. I think it was '33. We had maneuvers out at March Field.

Q: Did he have a godd reputation out there?

P: As far as I know, he always had a good reputation. He was a little easy to upset once in a while. Funny thing about Hap Arnold was, you know, he could be furious and he would be grinning. Nobody ever knew he was mad, like a Congressman said one time when Hap was at a hearing in Washington. He was being questioned by one of these Senators, and it got a little bit heated, you know. Hap started to laugh, and started to grin and Gen Marshall was there. And this Senator said: "This is no laughing matter." Gen Marshall said to the Senator: "You know, you never can tell about Gen Arnold. I can assure you that he is madder than a hatter right now."

Q: He may have a smile on his face, but he isn't alaughing.

P: Yes, a great big grin.

Q: I guess it was just the shape of his face, facial muscles that looked like he was smiling. But it didn't mean that he was happy.

P: Didn't mean he was smiling, either.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

P: Not that I remember. He put me on the spot a couple of times. One time I was Asst Chief of Staff for Materiel in Washington, and he was Chief of Staff of the AF. It was after the war ended. He was still there. I took Oliver Echols' place when he went on the front to Germany. We had a book. We put out all these contracts--what we were buying, and all that sort of stuff. They had a buzz box that was connected up to Hap's office. All he had to do was push it down and he had me on the buzz box. It was a very embarrassing thing

because you never had a chance to find out what he wanted to talk about. But he started to ask me about various airplanes: "What are you doing with this contract?" And I had to answer those questions.

Q: Right off the top?

P: Yes, and finally he asked about: this big Douglas airplane that had the double bubble for the pilot and co-pilot. We built three or four of them right after the war. We had a hundred on order, and we canceled them because after we got the first ones, they didn't look like they were going to be very good airplanes, but anyhow....

Q: Which plane was that?

P: I can't remember, it was a Douglas plane.

Q: Was it a jet?

P: No, it wasn't a jet. This was right after the war. We had jet fighters during the latter part of the war. But this was a big transport. You know we had a policy that we would sort of subsidize the aircraft industry and get them into the commercial transport business. We had to have new commercial transports and that was the halfway policy that we spread the business around, and Douglas got this contract. Arnold said: "How many did we order?" And I said: "We ordered 100." He said: "100? Why do we need 100 of those things?" And I said: "No, I wasn't in the office at that time, but Gen Echols was, but I'll get the correspondence." I happened to have it in my office. I knew somebody was going to have to answer questions because this was not a thing we wanted to do. Arnold said: "Well, who approved it?" I said: "Gen Echols did the contracting. He authorized the contract." I said: "I've got a piece of paper here where Gen Echols recommended to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that the

purchase be made, and down below, in the lower lefthand corner, it says: 'approved, HHA.'" He said: "I guess that must be my initials." And I said: "Yes sir, your initials all right, and the date is there." "Well, then add another sentence under there, 'Approved--provided we have the money.'" I read that to him, too. He dug me down completely, and he said: "Well, where did you get the money?" Well, that was ancient money. It was a couple of years old then, and I said I would find out. I knew where it came from. But he was quite a talker. He was snappy. He had a brain like a whip. He could think faster than anybody you ever saw.

Q: He was a quick thinker?

P: Yes, he was, a very quick thinker.

Q: In '39 you came into the Engineer Section in the Materiel Division into Washington in the Air Corps.

P: I came into Washington in 1939. I don't remember exactly, but I guess so, yes.

Q: In a way you were working under him? He was Chief of Air Corps at that time?

P: Yes, I think I was working for Gen George Brett. He came in and brought me in with him.

Q: Brett brought you in from Wright Field?

P: Yes, Brett was Chief out there. When he left George Kenney took over, K.B. Wolfe and I were on a par out there, and working for Brett. When Brett came to Washington, he brought me with him. I was in Washington practically all the time afterwards.

Q: What sort of guy was Brett?

P: He was a very good guy. I always liked him a lot. He was a little bit peculiar in some respects. He was a bit uppity sometimes. He talked like it at least, but I always got along with him very well. One thing I found about George Brett and I don't believe many people knew, and I don't believe the Flight Surgeon knew. He was color blind; he was just as color blind as he could be. I was riding down the road in Dayton one day and he went right through a red light, he didn't know it. The only way he could tell was by the position of the light, or to get someone to tell him if the red was on the top or the bottom. Brett: "You know I can't tell the difference between a red light and a green light."

Q: How did he get along with Arnold?

P: As far as I know, all right, they were contemporaries. I think they got along fairly well.

Q: Brett went out on this trip, right before Pearl Harbor. He ended up under MacArthur. He and MacArthur didn't get along.

P: He wasn't there very long.

Q: No, MacArthur sent him out and got Kenney in there. Then Brett sort of got shuffled aside, and he was sent to the Caribbean.

Q: You were sent to England as an observer. Did you have any contact with Arnold at this time? Arnold was over there in April and May of 1941. Maybe that was before you got there?

P: No, I wasn't there, we left here the first day of August 1941.

Q: What was your job?

P: A group of us over there were setting up facilities to repair and overhaul American-built aircraft and engines--the stuff that we furnished the British. We were going to set it up and do the work with civilian employees, but before we got the thing going, we were in the war, so we used soldiers after that.

Q: That was when they set up Langford Lodge, and some of those places. Did you have anything to do with that?

P: Yes, got in on the picking of the whole sites. Doolittle and I went around, and I stayed there and finished up a report on it. I was over there at Pearl Harbor time. I got home before Christmas, Pearl Harbor was on Dec 7. I left over there between Christmas and New Year's. I remember we had a banana boat and we had a New Year's Eve party on the boat. We had an unusual boat coming back, it was a small boat that used to fly between Jamaica and England, --a banana boat--it was loaded to the gulls with Scotch whiskey. They had a lot of British and...

Q: That's what you came home from Britain on?

P: Yes, I came home from Britain on it.

Q: We needed some scotch whiskey here.

P: We needed some whiskey because the bars used to open at 7 in the morning.

Q: You went to Wright Field when you came back from overseas, didn't you? You were head of the Engineering Section?

P: I was sent to the War Production Board. I was in the Engineering Section of the War Production Board.

Q: You worked for Knudsen?

P: Yes, for a while, and then I came back and they made me Chief, and put me on the Aircraft Scheduling Unit which was located right there. And I went down and stayed for about 4 months there.

Q: Did you have any contact with Arnold when you were at Wright Field?

P: Not at that time too much. I was in the business of getting materiels, I didn't see him much.

Q: When was your next contact with him?

P: I don't know, it must have been when I came into Washington.

Q: When you took over MM&D?

P: Yes, I think so.

Q: Did Benny Meyers have that job?

P: Yes, I relieved Benny.

Q: Now where did he go?

P: He went to Wright Field and took over the Materiel Command. I think, if I remember correctly.

Q: What sort of a guy was he at that time?

P: Always got along with him quite well. He was a hell of a hard worker, and was intelligent as could be. He was as bright as a silver dollar, I don't know why he ever got in the way he did. He got himself sent to jail for subornation of perjury, he knew better.

Q: He was living very high in those days, wasn't he?

P: He always had money, you know, first time I ever saw him was in Love Field when I accepted my regular commission in 1921, and was sent down to Love Field. He was there, in Texas, and we didn't have money enough to buy a car. Peg and I got down there. We had only been married about two months. Benny had a big car. Every year he would trade it in and get another one. Told me he owned some apartment houses out in Los Angeles--that's where he came from. He had plenty of money, he had a big income from those things.

Q: During the war, was there any indication that Benny was playing it both ways?

P: Well, I didn't know about it. Of course, I didn't bother my head about it. I was busy with what I had to do. He was CG of the

Materiel Command out there. I think he relieved Branshaw. Branshaw was there ahead of Benny, and Benny came along and took over from him.

Q: Do you remember the time when everybody had to sign a letter, Stratemeyer wrote the letter, everybody had to sign the list of stocks and bonds?

P: Very well.

Q: Were you required to sign that?

P: Oh yes.

Q: And Meyers was required to sign it, but he didn't state all his holdings.

P: He didn't. I don't know. I didn't have any. But he did. He had some, I know, he transferred some of them over to his wife.

Q: He was playing several games, he set up this company, Aviation Electric, and he was throwing some subcontracts their way.

P: That's that little town north of Dayton there.

Q: But there were some rumors during the war about Benny Meyers. Did they ever come to your attention, rumors that maybe he was not playing it straight?

P: I don't recall ever hearing any rumors until the thing broke wide open. I didn't know anything about this other stuff. I left then, and came into Washington.

Q: When you headed up MM&D (Materiel, Maintenance & Distribution)--this is when you took over from Benny Meyers?

P: I took over, Oliver Echols got me in there in Benny Meyer's place.

Q: Benny Meyers worked for Oliver Echols and then you took over.

P: I went to work for Echols and Benny went to Wright Field, and he expected to become CG out there, but theyysent Knudsen out there.

Q: When Knudsen retired he expected to get that job, and then they sent Knerr out there. When you had the MM&D?

P: At this point I was assistant to Oliver Echols.

Q: Did you have contact with Arnold?

P: Oh, when I got into Washington I did, quite often.

Q: Do you remember any specific contact?

P: They sent me over to the JCS, after I had been in there for a while in what they called the Joint Production Survey Committee, and we used to sit when the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the JCS met. This group, AF, Army, Navy and Marine Corps--four of us--would sit with the JCS and with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We always sat in on meetings, so they got firsthand information on what their plans were and all that stuff. I don't think that committee was really well known, I don't know what history said for it, but we were rechecking over the plans, the combat plans, and we'd find out if they changed. If it wasn't for our intervention, nobody would have cutt off or cut out the orders for the things that were needed for the plans--the old plans.

Q: You are talking about the Joint Production Survey Committee?

P: Yes, I was over there for a little while, and Oliver Echols wanted me to come back, and I used to see Arnold every time they met--I think twice a week over there, sometimes twice a day.

Q: Do you remember any contacts you had with Arnold on production, for example? The B-29 was a big production problem, was it not?

P: Yes, it was quite a production problem.

Q: Did you get involved with Arnold in any problems connected with that?

P: No, I couldn't say I ever got involved, we would get up and tell him what we were trying to do, he was very keenly interested in all that stuff.

Q: Did he like Oliver Echols?

P: I think so, yes, they got along well, as far as I can tell,

Q: Oliver Echols was sort of an easy going, soft spoken southern gentleman?

P: Until he got mad, he had a temper like nobody's business. Oh, yes, I've seen him do some precipitate things when he got mad. Somebody made him a little bit mad, under the pressure that he was working under sometimes, and it didn't take too much to make him mad, either.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold mad at him?

P: I never saw it, but I heard they had a big argument one day, and Oliver came out on top. Arnold had said: "Maybe you are right."

Q: What was the subject of this argument?

P: I don't remember that--too long ago for me. Something to do with production because Oliver was in charge with production. It had something to do with buying certain airplanes, spare parts, something in the supply line that fell in our bailiwick.

Q: Well, spare parts were always a great problem?

P: It was, you take a new airplane going out, we never knew what the hell was going to go bad on it, and we bought a lot of spare parts and sometimes didn't get delivery on it, you would be on the groundf for a while, andthat was very bad during the war, you know. Awfully funny thing happened. I got a wire, when I was Asst Chief of Staff for Materiel. I was still working for Echols. Wire from Nat Twining, who was commanding the 15th AF. He said: "Unless we get some airplane tires in three days from now, we are going to be on the ground, because we have run out of tires." So I called Wright Field, and said: "What goes on? We are out of tires for the bombers in Nat Twiningssaair

force." And they said; they would have to look it up. I talked to Tubby Miller, who was in charge of the Supply Division up there. And he said he didn't know, but he would find out. He said: "They haven't been ordered." Well, I said: "You'd better get them ordered, because we are vulnerable, because we haven't got any tires and we've got to get all the tires you have in stock around here and send them out to Nat Twining via air express so he will have something to get these airplanes flying, because if Hap ever found out about that, boy, the roof would fall in. The funny thing about it was, Tubby came back and he said, in about two days, and he said: "I found out what happened." I said: "Well, what happened?" "Well, he said: "the fellow that figured out how much they need and orders these things, and the fellow that buys them are not on speaking terms." He said: "They are both fired now. I fired them yesterday." But, he said: "The fellow that was supposed to order the tires, if I'm not speaking to this guy, how in the hell could I tell him to order tires?" Can you imagine that with a war going on, and here these fellows weren't speaking to each other, and nobody ordered the tires.

Q: Were they military or civilians?

P: Civilian employees at Wright Field.

Q: How about the problem of wing tanks, long-range escorts, Wright Field did not supply wing tanks, or was late in supplying them? As a result, we had to get these cardboard wing tanks from the British. Do you remember that?

P: Yes, we hadn't been told that they were going to be required in time. It took longer to get them they thought it would. We finally got the wing tanks thing solved, you know. We would stamp these

things out. The thing was made in two pieces, and the pieces we used to ship the wing tanks on top of fighters. The War Production Board made us stop that, because we were shipping air. So we used to nest these halves, and we shipped them over there and we set up a welding outfit, in the Marianas, in Guam I guess, to make those tanks, and made hundreds of them a day out there.

Q: Are you talking about the escorts in the Pacific?

P: Yes.

Q: How about the escorts in the ETO? They were trying to get some P-51s?

P: They were shipped over,and I think some of them were made in England.

Q: Yes, cardboard ones.

P: I don't know about that, I don't think they were cardboard. Some kind of synthetic, we made them out of metal.

Q: But we were late in getting those there to the theater, weren't we?

P: Yes, that's right.

Q: Did anybody drop the ball on that?

P: No, I don't think so. What they wanted to do, you see, they had these interceptors and in order to make them stretch the range, we had to put wing tanks on them. But they didn't put the plan out until it was rather late. They didn't give us very much time on that one. But you never saw so many. There were about a dozen people in this country making those things, and we finally got them rolling, and they were coming out of our ears.

Q: This is what often happened. We got the thing cranked up. We started turning them out like cookies. Then we didn't need them, too late.

P: They used a lot of them to accompany fighters over in England.

Q: Ben Chidlaw told me that Arnold always used to jump on Wright Field. Arnold had sort of a negative attitude toward Wright Field.

P: Yes, he was a little hard on them. There is no question about that. He was hard on all the supply people. As the result of it, all the promotions went to the fighting boys. The fellows that stayed at home and worked at Wright Field didn't get them. That's one thing where he was a little bit off base. You take Oliver Echols. He never got to be more than a MG, you see, until he got out of that area.

Q: You think Arnold failed to promote his supply and procurement people?

P: I think the policy was to give the advantages and the breaks to the fighting boys.

Q: How did you make out promotion-wise with Arnold? Do you feel that he did all right by you?

P: Well, he was a little slow. He finally did.

Q: You know, Ben Chidlaw seems to think that Arnold had an unhappy experience out at Wright Field with his brother-in-law, Jan Howard, back in 1929, and that soured him on Wright Field and all its works.

P: Well, I don't know. In the first place, Jan Howard was junior to Hap, and Howard couldn't do very much to him, even if he wanted to.

Q: I think he pointed out that Jan Howard seemed to have more things to do out at Wright Field than Arnold had. He said, Arnold's main job was to paint the lanes in the parking area, and paint the fireplugs.

P: I guess he did do that, but the point of the things was that, Howard was the Chief of the Engineering Division and was busy

as hell all the time. I was in the Engineering Division in the Power Plant Production and so was Chidlaw in Engineering. He was in the Aircraft Division. Hap was the Executive Officer, the No. 2 man on command, but I don't think that Robins gave him a hell of a lot to do. As a matter of fact, he didn't do very much himself. He took it sort of easy, and he had plenty of staff around there to take care of things for him and keep him informed of what was going on. Arnold's office was right up next to Warner Robins.

Q: What was Warner Robins' job?

P: He was the CG over at Patterson Field, and then he became Chief of the Materiel Command.

Q: He was senior to Arnold?

P: Yes, he must have been.

Q: Do you have any strong recollections of Arnold at that time, was he happy go lucky, or very serious?

P: You never could tell, you know, when you met him, he would always pat you on the back, and had a big smile on his face, and you think everything was rosy, and then he would shoot a question at you, and pin you down as to why the hell you hadn't done something. He always did that. He had a very keen mind, I'd say, well above average. He knew more about what was going on than a lot of people thought he did, that was my experience. Because the questions he asked, he knew all about it, when he started asking questions about it. He'd found out somewhere about it.

Q: Was he impatient with staff procedures?

P: Yes, I think he was.

Q: If he wanted you to do something, and there were two or three levels of administration between you and him, did he go out and grab somebody?

P: I'll give you a shining example of what he did. Now, he was Chief of Staff of the AF, and I was G-4, during the war, we were building some primary training planes up in Canada, andhe had been talking to somebody. They had a training meeting somewhere that he addressed. They were talking about these airplanes and they apparently said something was wrong with them, I don't remember the details. But they weren't coming in fast enough, or they weren't very good airplanes, something like that. He left this meeting, and went in, on his way back, to Frank Hackett, who was the CG. He was a BG of a training group of three airdromes out in either New Mexico or Arizona, I don't know which. Hap got ahold of Frank and he said: "Frank, you are just the guy I am looking for. I want you to get on an airplane and go up to Canada and find out what the hell is wrong with these airplanes." Frank never had anything to do with production at all, he wasn't an engineer or anything else. So Frank just said: "Yes sir," and took off down the hall to my office, and he came in and said: "I'm in a hell of a fix." And I said: "What's the matter with you?" Well, he said: "I'm commanding this thing out here, and I'm working for Bart Yount, out in the SW--I think his headquarters was in New Mexico somewhere--and I just ran into Hap, and he told me to get myself up to this aircraft factory up in Canada and find out what the hell is wrong with the production of the flying characteristics of these airplanes." Frank said: "What the hell am I going to do?" He said: "I've got a job. My boss is going to have a meeting this afternoon, and he's got me, I'm slated to be there, and Hap told me to go to Canada." So I got on my buzzer and I just buzzed Arnold and I said: "General, I understand that you ran into Frank and want him to go up

Canada, and see about the production." I knew what it was he was talking about. I said: "I don't think he'll need to go because I sent two Colonels up there yesterday. If they can't fix it then it's too bad. We will have some new Colonels." Well, he said: "That's all right. I didn't know anything had been done about it. You tell Frank to forget about it."

Q: This is what he was said to have been famous for--grabbing people in the E-ring and giving them jobs foreign to their expertise.

P: He did that all the time, he would pay no attention to organization charts. He'd grab anybody up...

Q: Did he ever grab you and ask you to do something that was strange to your experience?

P: No, not strange to my experience, really. He would grab me and tell me to go down and see General Knudsen. One time, he said: "I want you to do down and see Knudsen. Gen Knudsen wants to seeeyou." So I went down to see Gen Knudsen. I was at Wright Field then, head of the Aircraft Scheduling unit of the War Production Board. By golly, I went down to see him, and Hap sent me down there, and Knudsen said: "We are going to leave at 1:00 P.M. " This was about 10:00 AM and I had flown in that morning from Dayton. I didn't have a clean shirt or anything else. I had to go down to the Post Exchange and buy some uniforms and get going. We went up through New England, and finally, wound up in Evansville, Indiana. I was gone with Gen Knudsen for 10 days. My job out here, nobody was there--and I wasn't assigned to the AF. I was assigned to the War Production Board, and they started looking for me.

Q: Knudsen and Arnold got along very well, didn't they?

P: Yes, I guess so.

Q: They are both doers.

P: Knudsen didn't have any time for staff work, or any of this business.

Q: He may have had three stars, but he didn't know much about the military, did he?

P: The kind of work we did in the Materiel Command wasn't too different from industry. When I retired, I went in with Curtiss Wright. I had a lot to do with the industry during my experience. It was just business; that was all it was. We weren't much different from a regular business.

Q: Do you remember any dealings with Arnold late in the war? Anything special? You were connected with the postwar industrial mobilization business, weren't you? The retrenchment program of cutting back production? I see here that you became a member toward the end of the war of the joint Army-Navy Board on postwar training and industrial mobilization.

P: Yes, I attended the meetings, I never did any work on that. We had a big staff that worked on that, but they were in the backroom.

Q: Can you think of any other contacts you had with Arnold?

P: I had plenty of them, but I don't think about them.

Q: How about socially, did the Powers and the Arnolds see each other socially?

P: Oh yes, we saw them quite a lot, much more before we got to Washington. He didn't go out too much during the war.

Q: You saw him a lot socially at Wright Field in 1929 or 30, didn't you?

P: Yes we saw him then. Everybody used to have a party every

week or two. He would go. He never used to drink, you know. I don't think he ever got tight in his life, maybe he would have one drink.

Q: He drank sherry, I think.

P: Some kind of a cordial.

Q: Did he have a sense of humor?

P: I think he did, yes. Sometimes it didn't show, but he had it. I think he had a sense of humor.

Q: When you played golf with him, did he, was he at his ease?

P: Oh yes, when he was out playing golf, he didn't have much to worry about. He would get mad as hell at himself for a bad shot or something like that.

Q: This job that you had, MM&D, there were problems like getting petroleum. There were some discussions with the British about whether whether they had enough petroleum over there, or how much surplus stocks, supplies they should have. Arnold got into some contest with Portal on that?

P: I don't remember that. Our trouble with the British was, let me see, I know that the difficulty we had when we sent the P-40s out to Africa, around Cairo, they had a type of gasoline out there that ate all the (something off) airplanes We had to put in complete new type of rubber.

Q: What dodthey call that gasoline, it had spirits in them? I remember something; it ate up the rubber.

P: Something in the gasoline that ruined the rubber.

Q: Did Arnold get into this problem?

P: He got into it because he got a report from the field that the rubber was going to hell. They were losing airplanes. They had to change gasoline.

Q: Was this the self-sealing tanks?

P: Self-sealing tanks was one of the problems. Yes, they went to hell from the fuel, too. Then we began building them from this imitation rubber--some kind of a chemical compound instead of rubber. They worked all right after that.

Q: Do you remember anything specific about Arnold, who did he have problems with on that? The British? Or Wright Field?

P: Of course, it went to Wright Field from his office to be handled. We had to send it out there, and have the petroleum sent back. In Washington, we had a Petroleum Board. The AF, the Navy and the Army and everybody, was a member of it. It was put together. Later on, I don't remember when it started, but along toward the last, they bought all the gasoline products, gasoline and oil for all the services. I can't think of the ingredient, whatever came out of the oil in the Middle East was really tough on our rubber I was up to my clavidde on it.

Q: Did you have Arnold jumping on you to get the thing moving?

P: He was always jumping oneme and Oliver Echols to get things moving. Sometimes we would find out, he would get the reports from the field, combat units. Sometimes he would get them a day or two before we got them. Of course, when that happened, he would call up and we wo wouldn't know anything about it. He thought we were falling down on the job. But actually, we got it set up finally after it had happened once or twice. Oliver and I went down to the message center and said that anything that comes in that has to do with materiel, we want a copy just about five minutes before the Old Man gets his.

Q: Did they do it?

P: Pretty well, once in a while they missed.

Q: Did he like to get his information from two different sources, to check them out, one against the other?

P: I don't know, of course. I never knew where he got his information. You could get it from both places of course.

Q: Did he ever call you in the middle of the night?

P: I don't recall now, but I'm sure he did.

Q: Very early in the morning?

P: Very early in the morning and sometimes up to 10 P.M. or 11 P.M. Of course, we had been in the office, somebody was in our office too, as long as he was in the front office.

Q: You had your office covered until he went home?

P: You're damned right. Sure did. We knew when he went home.

Q: Did Suzy Adkins tell you he was gone? That you could go home?

P: She spread the word that it was safe to go home, and everybody took off.

Q: Was she sort of on everybody's side, you know, did she help?

P: She was very nice. She would tip you off if she had a chance--if there was something bad coming up.

Q: Some days, she'd tell you he's in a stew?

P: Some days worse than others.

Q: Some days when he called you on the buzz box, and you came over, did you ask Suzy what it was about?

P: Sometimes if she got the chance. If he was busy and you had to wait a little bit, you always asked: "Suzy, what's going on?"

Q: And then, she would let you know if it was going to be a bad one or not?

P: Sometimes you had to go on in without being able to prepare yourself. It was too late for her to tell you.

Q: When he got mad at you or Oliver Echols, was there a residue? Did it hang on? Or did he forget about it right afterwards?

P: He was on the next thing. He'd pat you on the back, all gone, all behind. We had it fixed up by that time, whatever he was mad at. He would forget about it. He wouldn't hold grudges, wouldn't hold it against anybody.

Q: He didn't harbor grudges?

P: No. I know he didn't against me. I don't know if he did against Oliver, but he may have against Jan Howard. I'm sure he probably did.

Q: Jan Howard, there was something personal in that. You know when you came to Washington in 1939, Jan Howard came back into Washington, and he was working for Andrews. Do you remember that? In 1940 Andrews was G-3 under Marshall, and Jan Howard was working for him. Do you remember that?

P: Yes, I guess he was.

Q: And Arnold and Howard had some friction at that time?

P: Well, they were just like a pair of tomcats most of the time. They just didn't like each other.

Q: I guess this was one instance where Arnold didn't have a long standing grudge.

P: I'm pretty sure of it. Because I don't think it was official. I think it was all personal--family affair, that would be my guess. He got along with a lot of people, but he was pretty tough, you know. He relieved a few people during the war because he thought they weren't doing the job. If you were trying to do a good job and you kept on the job, stayed in, and worked it out, and got it going as fast as you could,

he was all right. But if he felt that somebody was laying down on the job for him, he didn't put up with it for a minute. He had one or two cases where he was pretty sure of that, and I think he did relieve a couple of officers.

Q: Do you remember any of them?

P: Don't remember the details, I just recall, at the back of my mind, that he did.

Q: Was this in his office? Fellows that worked for him?

P: Not so much in his office, because he had those fellows pretty well hand-picked, and they were damned good, there was no question about that. But it was in the various commands, in our command out at Wright Field, he used to get mad. He would talk about moving some guy out somewhere.

Q: Do you remember any specific instances?

P: No, my memory is bad, I can't remember those things. It's been a long time, I've been retired 21 years, 31st March (1949).

Q: Are you completely away from the Air Force now?

P: No, I keep in touch with what is going on, but I don't go down. They never give me a job to do or anything like that. Haven't ever since I retired, and when I worked for Wright Aeronautical, and after that, I was in the consulting business, I used to get around quite a bit, then I retired completely. Now, don't do anything at all. Strangely enough, in the consulting business, nobody seems to want to give a consulting job to a man who is over 70.

Q: Talking about B-29s now, and were you aware that Pres. Roosevelt was very anxious to get those B-29s out?

P: Yes, indeed, I think everybody knew that.

Q: And Arnold felt a sense of urgency?

P: Oh yes, Wolfe was out in China, and he wanted them out there. I remember one time I had a project officer in my office who did nothing but follow B-29s, Sol Rosenblatt--a lawyer from N.Y. He died a few years ago. But he was going out to see what was the matter. We had airplanes stopped on the way out, two or three of them being en route, were being held for spare parts of something like that. One of them was down in Pakistan. The pilot got appendicitis, and they had to take him to the hospital and operate on him naturally. That airplane sat there, it didn't have a pilot, so he got after that.

Q: Do you remember the, I think it was about March 1944, Arnold had promised the President that the B-29s would start attacking Japan, and I think that had to be postponed because the engines were giving so much trouble. The plane had so many bugs in it. Arnold and Benny Meyers went out to Salina, Kansas, Do you remember that?

P: That was one of the training places, yes.

Q: But they used this as sort of a headquarters to get these planes out. All these planes were sitting around, waiting for some modification. One plane had this thing wrong with it; another plane had an engine wrong with it. Another plane had something else wrong with it. They were all sitting around. None of them seemed to be getting out, and Arnold couldn't wait.

P: No, he didn't want to wait, that's for sure.

Q: So, he went out there. You didn't go on that trip?

P: No.

Q: But you knew that he had gone out there with Benny Meyers? How long did they spend out there?

P: I don't know, I think probably a week, something like that. Of course, we had selected an awful lot of people from the engine manufacturers and the airplane manufacturers from Boeing and Curtiss Wright. We had them out there working on those damned engines, to get them going. We did have a fire. You see, they put this very light material in the intake manifold. You had a backfire, and the damn thing was on fire. But this I was telling about. Sol Rosenblatt was going out to see what was wrong with some of these airplanes, to see what he could do about getting them moving. He was going to fly out, but he had to have approval from anybody going from the Materiel Command or our office in Washington to go into a combat theater. It had to have personal approval from the Old Man because he found out that a lot of these fellows were going around and causing a lot of trouble, apparently. I don't know what the score was, but there were a few of them out there. So finally, I said to Rosenblatt: "You've got to go down and get your authority from the Old Man personally on this one. I can't give it to you." So he went in to see the Old Man. Gen Arnold had just gotten a wire about the airplane sitting on the ground at Pakistan, and he said to Sol: "You are not going out there till you get that airplane moved out of there and up to K.B. Wolfe. I don't want to hear any more about it." Sol came back and said, how am I going to get that damned thing off the airdrome? There is 19 inches of water on that airdrome and they don't think it's going to runn off. The river is flooded. It will be two days at least before that airplane or airport is usable, and he said the other airplane was sitting there, and the pilot had got appendicitis. We had to get a pilot out to it, he was on his way out. The funny thing about it

was that the water ran off a hell of a lot faster, and the pilot got there and the two airplanes went off the next day on to K.B. Wolfe. But we had one hell of a time with these engines in the B-29s. Another thing about it, I thought the B-29 was never a very good airplane, because it was definitely underpowered. Those engines were not big enough for the airplane. The airplane, when it was loaded, was too heavy to get off the ground without more power. We should have had an airplane that had, oh maybe 50% more power. Then we would have had a nice airplane. I used to worry, I watched them take off on this low altitude stuff that was going on one time. Tommy Power had that group up there. They made a low altitude attack on Yokohatma.

Q: That was LeMay's group?

P: Yes. The first time I saw these boys take off from Guam they went out about 5:00 in the evening--LeMay and this group we had from Washington--Larry Norstad and two or three of us from Washington--we went out to see this thing take off. They started taking off at 5:00 in the evening. The first one went down like that. We knew that airport was high, about 500 feet above sea level. There was a sharp cliff at the end of the runway, and the boys got up speed by heading down. The boys from Washington, if you hadn't seen it before, and nobody told me about having this good technique of the way they used to take these heavily loaded airplanes off. They disappeared right over the top off the cliff. They had about 500 feet and they would nose it down to the water to pick up what little breeze they could before they had to level off again. Then they'd come up.

Q: Was that because they were so heavily loaded?

P: Yes, lack of power. And another thing about that airdrome, it was just a little bit short.

Q: Why did Norstad come out there? Norstad was representing Arnold at that time.

P: Norstad, he was A-3.

Q: On the B-29s? Arnold had his heart attack at this time, right?

P: I don't recall that no. I don't believe he was, was he? I don't remember just exactly when he did get sick.

Q: He was ill at that time. Norstad was representing him.

P: Well, Norstad had a job as A-3 in plans and operations.

Q: You are talking about the low-level attacks, right?

P: Yes.

Q: Now, did LeMay have to get approval from Norstad to go in low level?

P: That was all talked over. We had to put in the stuff to get it moving first.

Q: Did you get in on any of that discussion?

P: Oh yes, we got in on it. We went out there to see what the hell happened. They left at 5:00 in the evening and came back the next morning. When they went out and took off, we sat around for a while. We went to bed and got up and had breakfast and cleaned up and were out at the airport just as they were coming back about 8:30 or 9:00 the next morning. Every one of our planes came back from Guam. I think maybe one of them had landed at Iwo Jima.

Q: Was that the first mission?

P: Yes.

Q: March 9, 1945. That was LeMay's outfit.

P: Yes, LeMay was out there, 20th AF.

Q: We are talking about Arnold not holding grudges against people. Did he give people another chance, a second chance, or a third chance? If a man came in with a bad report, you know. He could have said: "I couldn't do it," or he wasn't able to do it--some failure. Was Arnold tolerant or intolerant of failure? Or would it depend on the guy?

P: I think it depended on what the guy told him. I think the manner of a fellow reporting would have a lot to do with it. Sometimes he wasn't hard on people at all. I watched him, or observed him, rather. But he didn't like to have somebody try to alibi. If he just come and say: "It didn't work, or I didn't get it done," that would be all right. But no alibi, he didn't like alibis, I know that.

Q: Were you aware of the situation when he sent Norstad out there to relieve Hansell you know, LeMay came in and took Hansell's job running the B-29s. Remember that?

P: Yes, I remember that.

Q: Norstad was sent out there to tell Hansell the bad news? Did you hear about that, or get in on it?

P: No, I didn't get in on it. Now you see that was an operational soiree, that I wasn't, a party to it. Well, I knew about it after the fact, but I didn't....

Q: You didn't get in on it?

P: No, we had enough to do without getting mixed up in operations.

Q: Do you remember the controversy over the Air War Plan No. 42, AWPD-42? Remember this was the plan for production of 131,000 planes, 1943, do you remember that?

P: Yes. That was by order of the President. We used to have a hell of a time, because we never got to it. We never got the rate up,

and we did the best we could, but we were not allowed to change that program.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and Admiral Jack Towers, trying to reconcile the Army and Navy aircraft production program.

P: They used to do that through the Aeronautical Board. They would have the meetings there, each of them had a staff on the side. They got together and pressed those programs out to beat the band to see what they could do. They had also to take care of the British program, we had a guy over here with me at Wright Field in War Production Board there, on the Scheduling Unit--a retired Colonel of the British Army. He was representing the British. They did a pretty good job, but you had to take all into account.

Q: Did you have any trouble with the British?

P: No, we didn't have much trouble with the British.

Q: How about the Russians, did they give you any trouble? They wanted some heavy bombers, didn't they?

P: I guess they did. I don't remember now exactly what they did want, but they got, we were sending the P-39s up through Alaska, on up through Siberia. I never will forget, Benny Meyers was talking about Basra, about sending stuff around through the Persian Gulf area, and somebody was in the President's office, when they had this meeting of the Security Council. The JCS were there, and they called in Benny Meyers, and the President said the wanted to talk to Meyers because Meyers was really the fellow getting the airplanes lined up to deliver and the President said: "Gen Meyers, what do you think of our group through Basra?" Well, Benny, that hadn't hit him, he turned around to somebody and the story went, and said: "Basra, Basra, where in the hell is Basra?" and everybody was kidding him about not knowing where

Basra was. The President himself got a chuckle out of it.

Q: Did you run into a guy named Eugene Gillespie?

P: Yes, I think so. I knew two Gillespies and Gene Gillespie was the guy down at Langley Field the last time I saw him. I don't think he showed up much around Washington during the war, though, did he?

Q: He was around early in the war and later on he left Washington. But he had some special contacts with Arnold, you had no knowledge of that?

P: No, a lot of these things, I may have had more knowledge at the time, but I can't remember.

Q: Did you say you had some pictures?

P: Yes.

Q: You and Marshall came to Washington about the same time. Marshall became Chief of Staff about the time you came to Washington, and I guess he and Arnold had a lot of contacts. Do you remember anything about Arnold and Marshall? Did they get along pretty well?

P: I thought they did. We used to sit in the JCS meetings during the war. Later when I was over on the Joint Production Survey Committee of the JCS--they seemed to get along very well. Arnold was a member of the JCS.

Q: Right, but he was still working for Marshall, wasn't he?

P: Yes, Admiral King, General Marshall.

Q: Arnold and Leahy.

Q: Did Arnold ever disagree publicly with Marshall, do you remember? I don't mean publicly, but I mean in the JCS?

P: Oh, I don't recall any particular instance, but I'm quite

sure they disagreed sometimes. They used to sit down and talk it out. But they seemed to get along together fairly well.

Q: How did Arnold get along with King?

P: Well, they were very much alike.

Q: In what way?

P: Same kind of guy. They wanted to get something done. King used to get very impatient about a lot of things that went on in the JCS, as Arnold did, too. Sometimes the ruling was that they would have to extend it. The thing that Arnold never liked much as I recall it--I saw him raise hell about it once--when the JCS wanted to send back for further study. This was something that had been handed to them as a finished product--he thought there wasn't any use for sending them back for further study. The boys had been over the thing as thoroughly as anybody could, and he said so.

Q: He didn't want further study. He wanted to get going. Does this strike you about Arnold, that he was impatient to get moving on a problem?

P: Oh yes, he didn't like to fool around, he wanted to get going. If he was going to go, he wanted to go right now.

Q: Was he an impatient man, or impulsive?

P: Oh he was impulsive, and I think he was impatient with people that didn't get the stuff done on time--keep up their end.

Q: These acts of impulse--do you think they were spur of the moment, or had he thought them out beforehand that made it appear that he was impulsive?

P: I think a lot of it was done on plan. He knew what he was up to--probably planned it sometimes. Once in a while he was furious, and would fly off a little bit.

Q: When he flew off the handle on something, and he realized he had made a mistake, did he back off gracefully? Or did he just plunge ahead? Did he admit he made a mistake?

P: I always thought that he was very fair about that, that he would admit, I've seen him say: "Well, all right, maybe you've got something there," and he would back off.

Q: He's back off and try something else?

P: He usually came out accepting somebody's recommendation, or somebody's idea that didn't quite agree with his. He'd start to put up an argument. Somebody would argue a little bit better than he did. Then he would give up.

Q: Did you ever disagree with him to where he backed off from a position he had taken beforehand?

P: Well, I suppose so, but I don't recall any now. It would have to be a specific instance, I don't know.

Q: Do you recall any specific instance?

P: No. We used to do quite a lot of talking. He would holler into that squawk box. It would drive you nuts. He used to call me about four or five times a day on that thing. Yes.

Q: "Come right down?"

P: Yes, come down. Then Suzy Atkins would call up and send for me, too. But she always told me what to bring. When she called me she gave me a little clue, what he wanted to talk about, and if I knew what he wanted to talk about, then I could get the stuff together, so I could do a better job for him.

Q: Then the procedure may have gone something like this; he would call you and say: "Come right down here," And then, you would call her

to find out what he wanted? Or did she call you right after he called you?

P: Sometimes I think she did. She was very nice about it. When she knew it was something we had been talking about--that I had a background on--she didn't worry about it. But if it was something that just came up, many times she'd call up and give me a little tip off on what was coming up--something I hadn't heard of before, and that was a big help. She did all right. Everybody liked her. She used to get very impatient with a lot of us too, you know.

Q: Did she ever swing her weight as Secretary to the Commanding General?

P: No, not with me; we got along well.

Q: She was very nice, then?

P: Oh yes, she was very nice.

Q: She didn't try to use her influence for her own purpose?

P: No, not as far as I was concerned. I never noticed that at all.

Q: Did a lot of officers try to be nice to her? Bring her a box of candy, stuff like that? To get on the good side of Arnold, figuring if they got on the good side of her?

P: I never tried that because I got the impression it wasn't working very well.

Q: She didn't try to butter up easily?

P: She like you or she didn't like you, one or the other. You couldn't improve it much with a box of candy. She had several girls in there with her; she had quite a staff, I don't know how many now. There must have been five or six of them.

Q: Do you remember Gwen Kinkaid?

P: No, I don't remember the names of the other girls.

Q: Did you ever come down and say I want to see Gen Arnold, and Suzy tell you: "Not today; not a good day."

P: No, I don't think so, she might have.

Q: Did you ever call him to tell him you wanted to see him? Or were you responding to his call?

P: Occasionally I would call him if I had something I thought he ought to know about; something that had happpened, or something that was coming up. I would call him, and then go down and talk it over with him. I didn't want him to get caught short. If something happened in my bailiwick that was important enough for him to know about, and I hadn't told him, or Oliver Echols hadn't told him, and it came to his attention from some other channel....

Q: That's when he got mad?

P: That's when he didn't like it. So we would always call him and give him the dope. I never called him on the buzz box, though. I always called him on the telephone. His secretary Adkins would tell him what I wanted to see him about.

Q: How about Echols?

P: Echols and Arnold had a lot of sessions. They would start in the morning and go over something, maybe for an hour or two. I used to do that with him too occasionally.

Q: Did Arnold bypass Echols to see Benny Meyers?

P: I don't know whether he did or not, but I don't think so. I got the impression that Arnold liked Echols better than he did Benny Meyers.

Q: But he liked Benny Meyers, he was a doer?

P: He wasn't bad, he wasn't against him or anything like that till after this thing happened. I remember a remark he made about, well, when Benny Meyers got put in jail and Arnold said, I guess in the barrel of apples, there is always one bad one.

Q: Yes, this was a great shock to him because he had put such trust in Meyers, and Meyers betrayed that trust.

P: That's right, definitely. It was a great shock to all of us, because Meyers was regarded as one of the corners. But the funny thing about it, I've never understood why, when Knudsen left the Materiel Command, and Benny Meyers had been his assistant for some time, why Arnold didn't make him Chief of the Materiel Command. But he didn't, that was a tipoff tomme that Meyers didn't suit him quite right. There was something about Meyers that Hap didn't like too well.

Q: Right. He put Knerr in there. He didn't put Benny Meyers in there. You know, that was the same week, at the end of June 1945, that the anonymous letter came in on Benny Meyers. That's the one they sent to file. Of course, it just might be a coincidence, I'm sure that if Arnold knew about the letter, he would have acted on it. The letter was sent to file. That letter came in and

P: Was it? I didn't know that.

Q: That letter came in and was sent to file, and two years later, the Congressional Committee dug it up. This is what caused the trouble.

P: No, I didn't know there had been a letter in the file that long. Who wrote the letter, do you know?

Q: Somebody who worked out at Wright Field. It was an anonymous letter. It was written to the FBI. In those days the FBI turned over all matters of military import to the military. It got kicked around,

and it went to file. And it's part of the reason that Junios Jones got in trouble, because they didn't act on it. They didn't act on it until the Congressional committee found it, that was 1947, two years later. Did you know anything about that?

P: No, I didn't know anything about that letter. I knew that somebody had reported him, but I didn't know a letter had been in the file for two years. These investigators they have for these committees. I went over there (Capitol Hill) one day and let's see, I believe it was a Hughes boat. We had very little to do with it. I sent my boys to the file. I put three officers with the file clerk, and said: "I want you to go through here, and anything that is remotely connected with this project, I want a copy of it in my file," and I got a file about that thick. I went over and the investigation, this fellow from Florida--Pepper--He picked up a piece of paper, and it was a buck slip. I didn't have it in my files. I remembered it the minute I saw it, though. It was written to Ben Chidlaw, and it said: "If anybody inquires about the policy of the AF on this boat, just tell them that we have nothing to do with this. It's a Navy file. The only thing we are responsible for is furnishing a few things that we have been directed to furnish." He said: "Did that represent the AF's position of the Hughes' boat," and I said, nearly as I can remember, it did. Well, then, everything hit the fan because all the Democrats...the President ordered it done, you know, and the Democrats didn't like that. They didn't like anybody to say anything about them. So we got a lot of it all right, but we didn't have anything to do with it, for two reasons. One of the reasons was: the division responsibility. The Navy had cognizance over flying boats. We didn't have a thing to do with flying boats, anything with flying boats that were built for

military, the Navy had responsibility for it.

Q: You know, Hughes investigation started and they were trying to get to Elliott Roosevelt, remember that? You know, Elliott Roosevelt had this tie with Howard Hughes. It was in this investigation, that they came upon this Benny Meyers thing. You see, Hughes investigation preceded the Benny Meyers probe. The Congressional committee was fishing for something on Hughes and the Democrats. This was '47. There was a Presidential election coming up in '48, and they were trying to stir up some politics. This is how they came upon the Benny Meyers thing. Did you have some dealings with Howard Hughes?

P: Yes, I had a famous dealing with Hughes. Do you remember the airplane that he got damn near killed in--a photo reconnaissance airplane? He cracked that one up. The next one came up for test flying. We had two of them on contract, and after he got out of the hospital, I wasn't sure how well he was, or anything like that. So I issued an order to the Materiel Command that they would direct Hughes to hire a professional test pilot when this airplane was ready to fly.

Q: Did Arnold get into that one?

P: No, but Ira Eaker did. I got a call from Ira Eaker after I issued this.

Q: Ira Eaker was then Deputy Commander?

P: I'm not sure but what Hap was retired then and I think it might have been Vandenberg in the front office. I don't remember my dates exactly. They get mixed up. Eaker called me on the buzz box about 10 days after I wrote this letter, and he said Howard Hughes was down there, and he wanted to talk to me, and I said: "Well, do you want me to come down, or do you want to send him up?" And he said: "Come

down. I want to get a tete a tete on this thing, but this is something we want to get interested in and know about." I went on down, I'd known Howard Hughes for a long time. Ira said: "In the first place, I have a copy of that letter you sent to the Materiel Command, about the test flying of the second Hughes airplane and I concur in your action. I think it was the right thing to do." But he said: "Howard has got a proposition he wants to put up to you." And I said: "Well, I'm glad to listen." And he just produced a piece of paper. It was written on Hughes stationery, and I don't remember the exact wording, but the sense of the thing was, when the second airplane was ready to fly, that Howard Hughes would act as the test pilot for the first 20 or 30 hours of test flying. If, during that period, the airplane is cracked up for any reason whatsoever, the Hughes aircraft will cancell all monies due their company from the AF for both airplanes.

Q: That's how badly Hughes wanted to fly?

P: Yes, well, I said: "Howard are you sure you want to do this, because you are risking about $7 or $8 million." Well, he said: "It's my $7 or $8 million. I won't break the airplane up." I said: "I have no doubt about your ability as a test pilot. If you are recovered from that first one." In that, the pilot couldn't have done a thing about it anyway." He said: "That's what I want to do. My reputation as a test pilot has been sort of marred and I don't want to leave it at that. I want to take this airplane out and test fly it for the first 20 or 30 hours." And Ira said: "Do you have any objection to that?" And I said: "Well, I would like to have our lawyers take a look at it. If it's a perfectly legal deal, I have no objection to it. I would be silly to object to it. If he wants to fly and take a chance on cracking

it up, I don't doubt his ability as a test pilot," I said this to Ira. I think he is a damn good one, but things might happen and of course....

Q: Did the attorneys approve it?

P: Yes, they approved it, and I signed our copy of it, and we each took one copy, and I put mind in the file very carefully, and he went out and flew the airplane and it was perfectly all right.

Q: You know, Ira Eaker went to work for Hughes.

P: Yes, I knew he did, for years. Sometimes he got very fed up with it because he said, it would be months and he would try to find Hughes and he never could locate him.

Q: Did Arnold have any contact with Hughes?

P: Oh I think he did, yes.

Q: What sort of contact?

P: He had contact with all the aircraft manufacturers.

Q: What sort of contacts were they, do you know?

P: Just looking over what they were going to come up with? What kind of airplanes they were thinking about.

Q: Was Arnold worried that this would get him in the middle of a political hassle, the Howard Hughes--the flying boat?

P: I don't think so because we had nothing to do with it, we had instructions to send so many engines and so many propellors and certain other instruments, thing like that.

Q: But Arnold knew that any dealings with Hughes had political implications?

P: Oh yes, definitely.

Q: They were explosive, and he was worried about that, wasn't he, did he ever talk to you about it, about the danger?

P: No, if he did, I don't remember.

Q: How about Elliott Roosevelt? Did Elliott ever talk to you about helping Howard Hughes?

P: The only thing Elliott ever talked to me about was women. This guy used to get in my hair all the time. I went out to Wright Field, and I stayed at the hotel downtown,and Elliott came in.... (off tape)

Putt, Donald L.

1-3 Apr 74
13 Aug 74

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

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Interview #K239.0512-724

of

Lt General Donald L. Putt

By

Dr. James C. Hasdorff

Date: 1-3 April 1974

Location: Atherton, CA

1001023

P: Very well, yes.

H: How was your working relationship with General Cook?

P: It was always very good. He was certainly a capable officer and certainly knew his business; no foolishness. I didn't always agree with him, but he was so much senior to me that there was no argument about it. (Laughter) When I was in this production engineering section, I think he was my boss for a while. But I always enjoyed him. We still exchange Christmas cards and see him and his wife whenever we get to Washington. But I think he made a great contribution to the Air Force.

H: Our office is scheduled to interview him, too, before long.

P: He'll have a lot of history that kind of went over my head.

H: I read an interview just the past week in which he discussed General Hap Arnold's career, and he had some very interesting things to say about him. Anyway, in this interview I read in one part where General Arnold has been quoted as saying that, "Wright Field had a mass of deadwood" in regard to its scientific personnel. Did you agree with this assessment?

P: Yes and no. I think you have to look at the times and the

circumstances. There are some good reasons why that occurred. One, in those days nobody thought of the military as being very scientific. As a matter of fact, it was looked down upon by the scientific community, even the engineering community. So I think I would categorize it as a situation where we had the best we could get. We weren't particularly in those very early days of educating people into the higher realms of knowledge and engineering and science. It really wasn't until after World War II that the Air Force started paying some attention to its technical and scientific capabilities, and it wasn't until then that the scientific community, because of their experience with World War II and the Rad [Radiation] Lab up at MIT and places like that, finally realized, "Gee, we've got to help our military." So while I would agree that there was probably a lot of deadwood or incompetent people at Wright Field, I don't know that one could have done any better under the circumstances in those days. Now, as it would be in any organization that size, there were probably some there that should have been kicked out a long time before or just because of tenure and civil service they stayed on, and nobody ever got fired.

H: From what I gather from General Cook's interview, General Arnold had some kind of thing about Wright Field, that he had some grudge against it, I guess you would say, and never quite got over it.

P: This is probably right and perhaps somewhat understandable. The operational side of the Air Force, the Air Corps then, all hated Wright Field because, in their view, Wright Field was always telling them things that they couldn't do, or they would turn down things that they wanted to do, or they would listen to an airplane manufacturer tell them what Wright Field was doing to ruin their airplane. An aircraft would come in, and we'd find something that was unsafe, structurally weak somewhere as a result of static tests and things like that. So to repair it or make it airworthy, why, you've got to add a little weight, and that decreases its performance a little bit and so on and so forth. We were always ruining their airplanes. It was a great struggle between Wright Field and the rest of the Air Force, particularly operational Air Force. Oh, they hated our guts!

H: That's interesting.

P: Yes, and that still goes on today a little bit. I don't think you see it on the surface because, shortly after World War II, I think those of us that were in the R&D business recognized that this was something we had to get solved. And I think at least from the late 1940's, early 1950's, there was an effort on the part of Wright Field, or the R&D organization, to get closer to the operational people and try to get them to understand our problems and we to better understand theirs. There were

deficiencies on both sides. Wright Field wasn't always right. You know, I used to gripe myself.

H: While we're on the subject, what contacts did you have with General Arnold, and what was your impression of the man?

P: My contacts weren't very numerous. The ones I had were interesting. I was at Wright Field, of course, when he was in the Pentagon. I guess I participated probably in a couple or three briefings as I recall from Wright Field where we had to present things to him. I guess my most interesting contact, which really wasn't a person-to-person one, was while I was in Europe towards the end of the war. My outfit turned into more of a technical intelligence operation than it did technical services. And since I had nearly all of the technical people in the theater assigned, why, our technical people went out to examine shot-down aircraft and whatnot. But one of the interesting jobs that I was assigned to was in about March, I think it was, of 1945. The ground armies traveling east uncovered this secreat research and development base outside of Brunswick [Braunschweig], Germany, in a place called Volkenrode. And this was the Herman Goering Aeronautical Research Establishment, a great place. It had been started in 1935, and until the ground armies went through it in 1945 nobody ever knew it was there, including British intelligence. It was that well camouflaged. Well, I got instructions

to go over to Volkenrode and take over that place. So a German-speaking sergeant and I went over and gradually got the place organized. We had a great time. It was a real cloak and dagger job because we had to round up the scientists that had scattered all over the place, and they had buried documents and laboratory equipment in the forests, and we had to dig that stuff up. One chap had buried some stuff--we had learned that he had buried it somewhere on his own property in Brunswick, and, with a little bit of persuasion, we got him to take us to his home. And he takes us out through the back door, and he has got a little tool shed in his gardenhouse in his garden with a brick floor. And he starts digging up the bricks, an area about that big, and he digs down a deep hole and comes out with some sealed tin cans that had formula for rocket fuel and things like that in it. There was a lot of laboratory equipment in addition to experimental items, like propulsion units and wind tunnel models. In fact, it was as a result of what we found there that the B-47 has swept-back wings on it. I can elaborate on that a little later if it's interesting. But it appeared that it would be desirable to get some of this stuff back to Wright Field real quick. In the meantime, after the sergeant and I had gone over there, we moved in a housekeeping detail from one of the operational units, and we opened up a mess and quarters and things like that and ran it like a little base while we were doing this exploitation work. So it seemed to be desirable that we get some

of this stuff back to Wright Field as quickly as possible. So I had a little airline of my own, with one B-24 and one B-17. But by the time we got organized, we started having--well, I asked for the Scientific Advisory Group. It hadn't been organized as the Scientific Advisory Board at that time, with Dr. Von Karman and Guy[ford] Stever, who is now director of National Science Foundation. That group, which later became the Scientific Advisory Board--I asked that a group like that come over to interview these scientists that we were rounding up and see some of the work that was going on, see the facilities and whatnot. They had supersonic wind tunnels. Then the British started coming in. They wanted to see all this, too. As we developed our thinking and our plans, it developed that this area was to be turned over to the British at the end of the war. So how to take this stuff out of Volkenrode and ship it to Wright Field without the British finding out about it. While they were there--well, when there was anybody there visiting us, why, we'd be helping them during the day. But as soon as everybody was in bed and the lights were out, we'd spring into action. There was a flying field just across town, and with trucks we'd haul this stuff over there, fill it up. They'd take off. By the time people woke up the next morning, they were at Lakenheath, or in Ireland, fueling to get to Wright Field. So I had these two airplanes shuttling back and forth sending that equipment. Well, finally the British caught on to this. So at the Potsdam Conference,

which happened shortly after that, the British threw this up to General Arnold. Of course, I'm sure he must have pleaded ignorance to it. I don't know that he would have known what was going on anyhow. Then in July--Hugh Knerr was boss of what they called the Air Technical Services Command in Europe, so he was my immediate boss. And in early July he showed up at Volkenrode one day, and he said, "I've got orders to go back to Wright Field and take command sometime later." And he said, "I'd like to have you back there. In addition, I think we'd better get you out of here." (Laughter) So very shortly I got orders to return to Wright Field. Knerr knew what I was doing all the time; there was no question about it. In fact, he had approved it. So very shortly after that I departed. But not too long after that, after I had been back at Wright Field--the war was over by that time; this must have been October, something like that--I was out at the Northrop Company. I arrived there in the morning, and Jack Northrop said, "Gee, General Arnold is coming in this morning, also." I said, "Well, that will be interesting." I, at this point in time, hadn't known about the Potsdam incident. General Arnold arrived. We were already out on the factory floor looking at something Northrop was doing. Jack Northrop had gone to meet him at the front office and then brought him back to join the group. Northrop introduced me to Arnold; that is, I knew him, but he introduced me and said, "You know Colonel Putt." He said, "Oh, yes, I know him all right." (Laughter)

And then he told about the Potsdam. But I never saw much of him after that. But I think he was a great man; he really was. And he understood the--strangely enough, in spite of his antagonism towards Wright Field, he understood the interaction of technology and the military. I don't know whether he originated the idea--I always gave him credit for it. The idea of Rand I think was basically his. He asked von Karman to organize the Scientific Advisory Board. I guess we called it committee at that time, SAC. And over the years, as long as he was in the Pentagon, he had a lot of contact with von Karman. In my book he was a great man. Sure did a hell of a lot for the Air Force.

H: What was your reaction to the employment of air power by the Germans early in World War II?

P: They did a terrific job, boy.

H: Had you felt at the time that the American forces were keeping up to par with developments in Europe?

P: No, I don't think that I did. In fact, I was inclined to believe Lindbergh, that things were happening that we either didn't believe or didn't want to believe and that advances were being made and we were being pretty niggardly with our own forces.

H: Well, we had such a tremendous isolationist sentiment in Congress at the time.

P: Yes, that's right. As the war went on, of course, their employment of air power was not what it should have been. But in the early stages when they were using the Stuka in the support of the ground forces with their attack bombardment and whatnot, that was terrific.

H: In many respects, Hitler was the best friend the United States had.

P: Exactly. I'm sure you've read or heard that if Hitler had let his air force and Messerschmitts do what they wanted to do with that--was it 263?, the fighter; I think it was the 263 or 262. If he had let them use that as a fighter when it first came out, we would have been in bad shape, even with our B-17's. But Hitler was so paranoid as far as the British were concerned, he wanted to make a bomber out of that thing, and they spent, I think it was, two or three years trying to make a bomber out of that ME-262--that's what it was--and lost a lot of time when it could have been used as a fighter. We would have been in bad shape.

H: In the beginning was the jet aircraft looked upon as a real

alternative to a prop-driven aircraft, or was it strictly looked at as an experimental device?

P: Very much an experimental device and certainly as sort of a one-shot proposition, you might say. In fact, the jet aircraft was pooh-poohed a lot by a lot of people that, you know, were authorities in their day. Of course, initially when it came out, those early jet engines burned an awful lot of fuel, so you thought of them as only short-legged aircraft; in other words, I can remember when people used to say, "Well, if it's good for anything, it'll never be good for more than just a short-legged interceptor, one that takes off, shoots down an airplane, and lands almost over base." Illustrative of this, I recall an incident, and this must have been before I went overseas. The British and the Whittle engine, of course, were very much in the forefront in those days. General [Franklin] Carroll, who was then Chief of the Engineering Division, had been trying to get the engine companies to get interested in doing some development work in turbine engines. So he invited Pratt & Whitney people and the Wright Aeronautical and the Allison people to come to Wright Field to talk about this. I don't remember sitting in on the Allison or the Wright Aeronautical conference, but I did sit in the conference with the Pratt & Whitney people. They were very firm in their conviction that the turbine engine would never be much of a threat. The piston engine was going to be with us forever;

it was the way to go. There might be some place for a turboprop, but for a straight jet, forget it. At this point in time we had already, over in the aircraft lab, been doing some design studies in which they had made some allowance for future possible developments in the jet engine itself. They had looked then at those hypothetical engines in bombers, and we had shown a possible range of about 2,000 miles I guess, something like that, or maybe it was a radius of 1,200; I guess that was it, a radius of 1,200 miles, probably carrying only 2,000 pounds of bombs. But that looked pretty good in those days. So I mentioned that, and, you know, complete disbelief, impossible, can't be done. So then they went back home. And in a couple or three weeks I got a copy of a report that they did after they had been out to Wright Field proving conclusively that they were right, and I wish I had saved that, because now the story that you hear from Pratt & Whitney repeatedly whenever the question comes up, they state that the reason they were late getting into the jet engine business was because they were so busy with their other work that General Arnold wouldn't let them get in. And that's just a bunch of malarkey. But they won't mention that, and they don't like to hear me say it.

H: Did the effectiveness of such aircraft as the P-51 actually delay the development of the jet?

P: I don't believe that it did, except to the extent that you always have competition for resources, money, men, and materials. But the people that are supposed to be developing jet engines, we'll say, or jet airplanes, for instance, boy, that's their one drive in life, you see. So with all of the resources that they can get, they're going to push that just as hard as they can. I believe that the development of the technology for jet engines at that time was such that I don't believe--you said the 51, didn't you?

H: Right.

P: I don't believe that the P-51 really postponed that. I think it was really more of the limitations of the technology at the time. The Whittle engine was great for a start, but it had a lot to be desired yet. It truly was kind of short-legged.

H: Was Pratt & Whitney's skepticism based on the fact that the ME-262 had such an extremely short range?

P: That probably had something to do with it, but I think much more importantly would have been their assessment of the technology and what was possible. Knowing the Pratt & Whitney organization, I'm sure that's what--and I'm sure they were sincere in what they were saying and really believed that what they were saying was

correct. But it turned out to be wrong. (Laughter) Of course, as soon as they discovered it--this was one of the beauties of that organization, at least as long as Jack Horner was there. Once they had made up their mind that either they were wrong or that something new was coming along, boy, they didn't spare any horses. Of course, they quickly became the leaders in the jet engine business when they finally decided that there was a future in it.

H: Were there any Army Air Corps jets or Army Air Force jets that actually deployed operationally in World War II?

P: There were five Lockheed Shooting Star P-80's that came over to Europe under the command of General George Price, that was in our class, at the tail end of the war, and, as I recall, I think they went down into Italy. I don't recall that they actually flew combat missions or not, but there were five of them over there towards the end of the war. Another chap that was closely associated with that was Marcus Cooper, who had many years at Wright Field also. But it was sort of a--you might call it an operational suitability test which was their purpose in being over there.

H: Were these jets capable of any range above the earlier ones?

P: Yes. I don't recall the magnitude of that, but it was a longer-legged aircraft than any that the British had at that time. And it certainly was longer legged than the P-59, which was our first jet aircraft. It was the one built by Bell and had the British I-16 engine in it, which was the Whittle engine. But a chap by the name of [Major General Donald J.] Don Keirn, who was in the power plant lab at Wright Field, was given the mission by General Arnold to go over to England and bring that engine back. And Bell was selected to be the first one to install an engine in an aircraft. So they built that P-59. I've forgotten how many of those there were. There weren't very many of them.

H: Was there a large input of foreign technology or know-how in the first jet aircraft built by the United States?

P: With the exception of the engine, I don't believe there was much foreign technology. But actually we went over and physically picked up a British engine and brought it over and put it into the P-59. Later on we then built some of those I-16's. We called them a J-something or other. Here in the US I think GE built them, as a matter of fact. But so far as the airframe itself, that was US technology.

H: What actually was your role in development of the first jet?

P: Really nothing direct until we started looking at bombers. I was Chief of the Experimental Bombardment Branch of the Engineering Division, and I guess my one big job just before I went overseas was the running of the competition that had the B-45, the B-46, the B-47 and the B-48 in it. We had four competitors, out of which, of course, the B-47 was the winner. We did build a few B-45's, which was a North American jet, and a lot of B-47's.

H: Was there any one problem that was more difficult to overcome than any other in regard to the jet engine? Was it range?

P: Range was the thing that we kept struggling for most, I would say. Of course, we struggled with that even with piston engines but more so with jet-equipped aircraft. Configuration initially was--you know, where do you put these engines? They're different now; they don't have props on them. You don't have to worry about ground clearance for the prop tips so they don't dig into the ground. The B-47 went through at least a half dozen different configurations, where the engines were put in the fuselage, and how were they hung under the wing?, what was the best placement for them?, things of that nature, which were problems that had been pretty much solved so far as placement of propeller-piston engines on aircraft. So there were all different kinds of configurations trying to find the best place to put jet engines. It was always a problem of stuffing as much fuel as

possible into the airframe. You had to worry some about foreign object damage because jet engines suck up a lot of air, so you had to worry about stones and stuff being picked off runways or fields. But other than that--because the engine was much lighter, of course, for its power, for its thrust, than a propeller engine, that gave you some different parameters so far as weight and balance were concerned, where was the CG [center of gravity]?, and so on and so forth, but nothing particularly difficult to handle. Maintenance of the jet engines--you were always fighting a materials problem, and still are, in a jet engine because your temperatures are high, and the higher they go, the more efficient your engine, and the more efficient the engine, the farther the range and stuff like that. I don't know; I guess having said all this, I guess really, whether we recognize it or not, in broad aspect, materials were probably the toughest problem so far as jet engines were concerned. You worried about the life of the engine. As you may recall, our early jet engines, the time between overhauls was a couple of hundred hours, if that much. Of course, now we've got up to, what?, 13,000 hours before they have to be pulled out.

H: Was the technology more or less difficult than it was first imagined in regard to the jet engine?

P: I guess I would say yes to that, because there was a lot of

conversation in those days, "Boy, this looks just like a real simple device compared to the piston engine with all these things going up and down, and here we've just got one thing rotating around." The first reaction was that while there were problems, they appeared to be simple compared to some of the problems we were facing in higher powered piston engines and what they anticipated would be the problem. The same thing happened with the ramjet. The Germans first used this on their buzz bombs. When that first came out, we thought, "Gee, this is great; all it is is a piece of stovepipe." Well, they're still working on ramjets, and they're working real hard on them right now. It has sort of had a rebirth. Boy, it's really becoming a highly sophisticated stovepipe. There's just a lot that we didn't know at the time. It appeared like both the jet engine and even the ramjet was a real simple solution to many of our problems, but it didn't turn out to be that way. The deeper you got into it, the more sophisticated it got. It's interesting that in this German establishment that we spent some time at, we found the wind tunnel reports.

H: Was there any Army Air Corps R&D effort toward the jet prior to 1941?

P: I don't recall any. The very earliest jet work that we did--and I don't remember the date when that started; I just remember

the project--was called the Turbodyne, and the Northrop Company had a contract with the Air Corps with the power plant lab there at Wright Field. That went on for several years, but I can't recall the timing of that with relation to 1941 or some of the other work. But I think that was the earliest turbine engine work that the Air Force put money into. Now whether any of that was going on before we learned of the Whittle engine, I don't recall. It seems to me it was after that, which would have been later than 1941. I'm not real sure of the timing on that. Oh, I guess I didn't finish this. In some of the documents that we picked up in this German research establishment there were wind tunnel tests of compressor sections, little air foils, dated in 1934. They were running what they called cascades where they put three or four of them in the wind tunnel and measured the forces on them that early.

H: Thank heavens for Hitler, huh?

P: Right.

H: What was the primary purpose of the Aircraft Projects Branch at Wright-Patterson in 1941?

P: It was the management of aircraft projects, just like the SPO's manage. You know, there is an F-15 SPO, a B-1 SPO, and a whatnot.

Well, the project offices in those days accomplished the same thing. They were the contact with the contractor. And we had the job of making sure that all the government-furnished equipment was available and specified and available to the contractor for installation in the aircraft. It was really the management of the program from the standpoint of the Air Force.

(End Reel 1, Side 2)

H: Was the Army Air Force R&D during World War II devoted primarily to model improvement, or were they more concerned with entirely new systems?

P: I think most of the effort was really on model improvement, on upgrading the performance, and just solving some of the mumps and the measles that kept occurring. Of course, during the World War II period, the B-29 came into the picture. Before that, the B-36, which we had ready shortly after the war was over. So there was effort on new aircraft, too, but, dollarwise and personnelwise, I guess probably most of the effort was on trying to improve the aircraft that were in operations and in combat.

H: From the standpoint of the military, who do you think were some of the most farsighted thinkers in World War II R&D?

P: General Arnold himself kind of set a stage, although that was mostly at the end of the war. General [Oliver] Echols was certainly a big figure in that regard. Then there was General [Franklin] Carroll, who was chief of the Engineering Division. Although he was on the procurement and production side of the house most of the time, I would say [Lt Gen Kenneth] K. B. Wolfe was a real forward thinker. He didn't always agree with what the experimenters were trying to do, but he was always looking ahead for something better. General [Benjamin W.] Chidlaw was one of the forward thinkers. Another old-timer that people never heard too much about was [Col] Paul Kemmer, who was Chief of the Aircraft Laboratory, and he was always thinking up new things. [Gen Orval] Cook contributed, I think, on the R&D side of the house, although his duties were always in procurement and production. Other people that were involved at that time were [Maj Gen Alden R.] Al Crawford--he was both at Wright Field, and then he was in the Pentagon. Then there was General Fritz Phillips, who came in from the Corps of Engineers. Most of his efforts were in reconnaissance and things of that nature at that period of time. One we should never forget is [Brig Gen] George Goddard, the photographic proponent. He was way ahead of his time, not to the extent of it being a detriment; but I mean he was always thinking down the road. I would say that he was really the leader in aerial photography and mapping, as it applied to reconnaissance. He wielded a tremendous force, not only on the

development of equipment within the Air Force itself, but within the industry. He played quite a role at Fairchild Camera and Instruments Company. In fact, they were almost the only ones that were manufacturing equipment in those days. He would be an interesting guy to interview. He retired as a BG, and I think he's still around Washington. In fact, I'm sure he's around Washington. He and General Arnold would tangle every once in a while. One time Arnold got mad at him, and he ordered him out of Wright Field and sent him to somewhere in Florida and made him--this part may have just been a good joke. Goddard would say, "I'm the vice commander of this base," not the number two man but "I'm in command of vice." This was during World War II, and they were having problems along that line. Boy, he could tell you history that a lot of people don't know.

H: Looking at the other side of the coin, who did you consider were the real reactionaries at the time who were constantly against innovation?

P: I don't think of anybody that I would put in that class. There was always the clash and always will be the clash between the R&D people, who want to get on with things that are new, and the production people that want to get something rolling off the end of the line. You have this in industry, and I don't think you'll ever get away from it. Both sides have their point. You can

see typical examples of that. One was Alexander P. de Seversky, a great designer. The P-35 was his baby during World War II. He was president of his own company, but he was always thinking of some improvement to put into that. And he could never sit still long enough so that they could put something into production. We had a lot of trouble--I didn't, because I was over in the experimental side, but the production people had a lot of trouble getting him to get something into production and then leave it alone. But he was always wanting to engineer improvements into the other one. I run across this even today. I get associated with a lot of small companies, either on their boards or consulting and whatnot. There's one right here in Menlo Park that's trying to develop a system for disposing of garbage and generating power at the same time. The chap that's heading the company is a good engineer and developer, and he resists bringing a product along. There are some products that could be spun off before they get the complete system. So they've had a management problem. But it's the same thing. So I don't think of anybody that I could pin the label on as being the most reactionary, because it's just a different viewpoint.

H: Where did you first come into contact with General Schriever?

P: We were both at Wright Field before World War II. I don't remember exactly what year. I think he came there to the engineering school first, and I guess that's when I would have first met him. His

wife was General Brett's daughter. When I went to Selfridge Field, Colonel Danford was in command and then General Brett was the next commander while I was there. I got to know Dora when she was about that high. But it was during that pre-World War II period at Wright Field that I'm sure I first met him, but without much contact. Then the next time was after World War II when he came back from overseas. That would have been in 1946, 1947. I think he went to the War College.

H: National War College?

P: National War College. In any event, from the National War College, I got him in the Pentagon in what was then DCS/D. I made him Director of Development Planning. So there, of course, we were closely assbciated all the period of time he was there, until he went out to Los Angeles for the Western Development Division.

H: I've heard other general officers comment and I've read that he had an uncanny knack for projecting ideas into the future. Did you have that assessment of the man?

P: I guess I didn't think of it as being uncanny, but he was good at it. He had an engineering education in his time at Wright Field. So technically he was solid, and he was good, because that was his total job there in that development planning. We had to write

what we called development planning objectives, which were papers to look ahead, and, on the basis of operational requirements, strategy, tactics, and everything that was involved, come up with what we thought would be the next developments either in strategic air warfare or tactical air warfare, reconnaissance, fighters. He was good, excellent.

H: Why do you think he in particular was selected to head the Western Development Division?

P: I've always thought that I had more to do with that than anybody else, although it was not my final decision. But Trevor Gardner was the Assistant for--we didn't have an Assistant Secretary at that time; he was an Assistant for R&D in the Secretary's office. The Secretary then was Harold Talbott. This was the very beginning of the IBM era. Gardner had done a good job of selling Talbott that this was something we really ought to get into. And Gardner's initial approach to how to do this was to set up a Manhattan-type organization like we did with the bomb, which would be completely separated from the Air Force. It might still report to the secretarial level, but staff and Wright Field and everybody else would not be involved. I resisted that and used as an example the way we had handled the DEW distant early warning line, using Western Electric as the contractor but developed special procedures for handling it so it could be expedited and didn't get involved in a

lot of bureaucracy and red tape and whatnot. I finally convinced Gardner that this was a better way to go. I don't know; maybe other people had been working on him, too. But since I was then Director of Research and Development under DCS/M--I can't remember whether we had separated the Research and Development organization at that time or not--but, anyhow, I headed the Directorate of Research and Development. So I recommended that we set it up in the way that we had done this Western Electric job on the DEW line, and I recommended Schriever for the job. Probably others had recommended him, too. But Gardner accepted that, and away he went.

H: Trevor Gardner seemed to have been a great advocate of General Schriever's.

P: Oh, he was, yes. He thought Schriever was good. I think that was one reason why he accepted the rest of the idea. He visualized that Schriever could probably do the job.

H: Let's back up again in years. What was the association between the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the old NACA, and the Air Corps in the 1930's?

P: I know that for quite a number of years General Arnold was on the committee. In fact, I think it always had some Air Force representative on it, maybe not from year one, but going way back, I think

there was always somebody on it. I was on the committee for nine years, and that was 1949 to 1958. Let's see; who preceded me? Jimmy Doolittle was on it for years. Of course, he had both civilian and military associations. But there must have been somebody that occupied the spot that I did before me that was on there, but I don't recall who it was. But there always was a close association between NACA and the Air Corps and the Air Force. I guess at times there was some disagreement as to how much they were helping the Air Force and vice versa, but it was always a close relationship. I remember one time after World War II when we were cutting back and whatnot, and the Air Force didn't know what they were going to do or how they could take care of ROTC graduates coming out of college, most of them engineering graduates. So we worked out a plan with NACA whereby they took a limited number--I mean it was in the tens--of graduates as reserve officers on active duty and actually put them in their laboratories and paid their salaries. Of course, they benefited because some of them didn't stay in the service and went to work for NACA. But, on the other hand, it helped the Air Force out because we were able to put those people on active duty.

H: You've already touched on this to some extent, but maybe you could summarize it a little bit. What was the quality of the military and civilian engineers and technicians in the Air Corps R&D projects in the 1930's?

P: With some few exceptions, I guess I would have to say that it was fairly mediocre if you compared it with the scientific, technical, and engineering community as a whole. Now there were exceptions to that. There were some that had good credentials, had good work, had inventions, and things like that. But I think if you took an average, it probably was below the average, nationally speaking. Civil Service pay wasn't so good those days. We always thought of it as being sort of a refuge for the guy that couldn't make a living outside, although in the very early days there were a lot of people that--I shouldn't say a lot--there were good people as scientists and engineers--well, mostly engineers--there were hardly any scientists involved in those days--but a lot of engineers good for their day that were just interested in aviation and gravitated toward the old McCook Field and then later Wright Field. But I think, on average, you'd have to say they were below average as compared to the rest of the community.

H: During this period, what was the knowledge and understanding of foreign aviation capabilities? Did we have an appreciation for it, or were we pretty much in our own world?

P: There may have been some who had an appreciation of it. I don't know to how high a level that would have gone. See, in the early 1930's I was still a second lieutenant and really didn't get into the R&D business, outside of my flight testing, until I started

going to school and then came back to Wright Field in 1938. We should have had an appreciation of it, because in spite of the fact that the airplane was invented here, European development in aviation was really ahead of the US. Except for the DH-4 that came along right at the tail end of World War I, we were practically dependent upon European aircraft. So there may have been some who were aware and appreciated or had a feeling for where they stood. Generally, I would guess that maybe we didn't pay too much attention to it.

H: Prior to World War II, how much did we know about foreign developments in aviation?

P: I guess I can only speak in general terms there. We certainly knew more. We had air attaches scattered around the country. I wouldn't say that our intelligence was very good, but I think we were generally aware of what was going on. I remember some good British publications like one called The Aeroplane; it was one of the very early British publications that came closest to being like our Aviation Week, more like it used to be than it is now. They carried good technical information on it, particularly on British developments and some on other developments. So I would say we were more aware and more cognizant of what was going on. I happen to know quite well our air attache that was in Germany just before the war broke out, which was [Maj Gen] Arthur [W.] Vanaman, living in Sacramento now. He had the opportunity through a German friend

that was fairly high up in the hierarchy at that time--which is another interesting story all of its own--to visit a lot of German aircraft factories and military airfields and whatnot. So he certainly was well aware--maybe not completely aware--of what was going on in Germany at that pre-World War II time. Now I'm sure that there was a lot going on that we didn't know about; the example of this research establishment that I got involved with in Germany after the war.

H: You were discussing Operation Paperclip. Would you go into that?

P: Yes. Toward the end of the war and then following the cessation of hostilities, there was a project to gather up some of the German scientists and bring them to the US. I wasn't the only one, but I recommended that we bring some of those people back because they did have knowledge over and beyond what I was sure that we had, particularly in aerodynamics. And a sizeable group from this research establishment that we were exploiting came from that installation. Among those that were brought over, although he was not one of the Volkenrode scientists, was this chap Adolph Baeumker. He carried the title of Doctor. He never claimed to be a real scientist, although he was sort of classed as that. But he had been an artillery officer in World War I and later got involved in the air ministry and knew Goering and Hitler and all the rest of them. He had been instrumental in organizing aeronautical

organizations corresponding to what used to be our IAS, Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, now known as the American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics. He was much involved with the government and particularly on the air side in research and development. So he knew all these scientists, and his name appears through this document time after time. He had befriended General Vanaman when he was our air attache before the war in Germany. Then just before the war broke out Vanaman was ordered back and later returned to take over a B-17 group but on his first flight was shot down and spent the rest of the war in prison. But not too long after he had been shot down somehow Baeumker found this out, learned where he was in prison, and called on him and from that time made it possible for that particular camp to get something in the way of extra food and comforts and whatnot. However, back in--oh, it must have been very early--around 1942 or something like that, Baeumker was smart enough to see the direction in which the Germans were going, and he took steps to disassociate himself from the government at some risk. I don't know just what this was, but he used to say he had to trod very carefully in what he did. Then later, after the war was over, among the scientists, we brought Dr. Baeumker back. I knew of Vanaman's experience, so I got Vanaman and Baeumker together again here in the United States, and they saw quite a bit of each other while Baeumker was here. He brought his wife with him and their two adopted children. She was a medical doctor. He was at Wright Field for a while. Then when I was the Commander of the

old Air Research and Development Command, I transferred him to Baltimore when the command was still there temporarily. He moved to Baltimore with his family, and there Mrs. Baeumker died of cancer. All of them incidentally became American citizens. He stayed in Baltimore then. I was thinking he transferred to the Pentagon when I moved in there, but he didn't. He stayed in Baltimore, but I kept close contact with him. It must have been about 1959 or 1960; he got a hankering he'd like to return to Germany. Retained his American citizenship, and became an employee of the Air Force in Bonn in liaison for the US Air Force in Europe with the Federal Ministry, the German Federal Ministry, particularly on the R&D side. At least up until quite recently he knew all the top echelon people in the Federal Ministry there and was able to affect a lot of interchange that probably never would have taken place without that personal set up. Well, he's an old man now. I guess he's--well, he was 65 probably--no, what's the Civil Service retirement age? Is it 70 now or is it 65?

H: It's 65 if you came in at a fairly young age, but it depends on when you came on board. If you came on board later, they can't force you to retire until you have so much accrued time.

P: I see. Well, I think he must at least be in his 80's now. After he could no longer be employed as a full-time employee, they kept him on as consultant for quite a while, up until just within the

last year or two, I guess. I still hear from him occasionally. He used to get over here. In his Bonn job, he'd come over here for meetings of the Scientific Advisory Board, and he came out here a couple of times, and we spent some time together. But it's kind of an interesting human interest story between him and Vanaman and the circumstances.

H: Sure is. Is he completely bilingual?

P: Yes. Writes in English when he's writing to me. Writes in German. He's a very prolific writer. He has written all kinds of reports and things for the German Ministry and whatnot. I've got a file of them.

H: That's interesting. You say he's retired completely now?

P: He's retired completely now, yes, but still living in, what is it, Godesberg, right out side of Bonn.

H: What other prominent Germans did you bring to this country?

P: There was one by the name of Zobel that was from this research establishment who had worked out a means of making airflow visible by the use of interferometry, which is actually using the mirrors and optics to get interference patterns. He could make visible the

airflow over a body in the wind tunnel. We used to do it by what we called a Schlerin process, but this interferometry system was much clearer, and you could even make measurements on it, or with it. One of the large pieces of equipment that we dismantled in the hours of darkness and hauled away from Volkenrode was this equipment, along with him and three or four of his assistants. That was sent to Wright Field and was later put into operation there. He was one. He stayed around Wright Field for quite some time and then went to work for General Electric. I guess he had been there a couple or three years and died of cancer. Others that we brought over: there was another man by the name of Schelp, and he wound up with AiResearch, I think, got to a fairly high position in their technical efforts, development of power plants and whatnot. Another chap, a Dr. Steinhoff, was one. I don't know where he is now, but he carried the title of Chief Scientist for Holloman Air Force Base up until fairly recently. I've lost track of him. Then another one became Chief Scientist of the Systems Command. He's now down at AEDC. What's his name? Well, that escapes me right now. But he has been around the Air Force now for a long time. Interesting sidelight is one F. Ringleb, he and another German--and they were both later brought to the United States--were taken off of a submarine that our forces captured. They were on their way to Japan with the drawings of the ME-262, and we caught them on the way. There's F. Flugge-Lotz, a woman mathematician. Up until very recently she was a professor over here at Stanford in Guidance and

Control in their Aeronautics and Astronautics Department and was a real whizz bang. I used to see her quite often. The department over there still has an annual meeting, and she usually shows up for that. Very interesting person. There's Kurt Tank who designed the Focke Wulf-109, which, along with the ME--not the jet, but the piston-powered engine early in the war, fighter. It was the Focke Wulf-190 and the ME-109; that's what they were. Well, Kurt Tank was the designer of the Focke Wulf-190. We didn't bring him over. Somewhere I've got an autographed photograph of him. I wish I could think of some of the others, because we had--there was one; his name was Vander something or other--and I don't think it's in here--who became Chief Engineer for AiResearch down in Los Angeles. Some of the Germans that we brought over made real names for themselves in the Aeronautical industry.

H: This group was primarily concerned with aeronautics?

P: Aeronautics, yes. They were all aeronautics.

H: They had nothing to do with the von Braun missile group?

P: No. That was another group. All of them were picked up by the Army and went to White Sands down in El Paso. This was another group. I don't think we had anybody from von Braun's group. I'll take that back. No, I guess he still came from the von Braun

group, but one chap that was sort of number two to von Braun, although he was a German Air Force-type, had a--I don't know whether he was Chief Engineer or Science Advisor for Bell Aeronautics, Bell Aircraft. He did a lot of writing and a lot of lecturing here in the States.

(End Reel 2, Side 1)

H: We were talking about the German scientists that you brought over. Would you agee that, although there might have been a little initial reluctance on the part of the German scientists to give us their information, they ultimately wound up being very cooperative?

P: Oh, yes, very much so. As a matter of fact, once we got them to Wright Field, I never felt that there was any reluctance. It was somewhat amazing and embarrassing, too, because all they wanted was an opportunity to work. We had them in a barbed wire compound which was required and included their barracks, their housing. They asked for drafting machines and drawing boards to put into their living quarters so they could work at night. They were just glad to have something to do. We wound up with about 163 or 164 there at Wright Field. I guess, having made so much noise about it before I left Germany, when I got to Wright Field I was put in charge of German Scientists. (Laughter) You know, if you complain about the soup, you wind up in the kitchen. But I found it very

interesting and rewarding. I don't think we ever had any trouble. Once we did find one that had found within the compound there was a manhole cover or something that gave him access to a tunnel that carried heating pipes and electric cables and things like that around, and the guards found one down in there one night. We didn't know whether he was trying to escape or what; but other than that, never any problem with them. I found, among the people that were stationed at Wright Field at the time, when I was handed that job of mothering the German scientists, a chap who was German born, an American citizen, he was a captain, and had been in Army Intelligence during the war. He just loved this cloak and dagger and spy work, so to speak. And he could understand how they thought because he was one of them, so to speak. So I used him for much of the communication with them. His name was Walter Boesch, which is about as German as you could get. He was a bachelor, and his home address was the Battle Creek Country Club, and he owned a drug firm. I never did quite figure out whether it was a manufacturing drug firm or whether it was just a distributing. But he had business interests in Europe, in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, England. And when the war came along, he just thought he ought to do his duty, so his drug business sort of ran itself. So, by golly, he volunteered, and they put him in uniform and assigned him to G-2. He helped the interrogation of Goering and that whole group. Then he wanted to be transferred to the Air Force. So, because of his business background in running the drug business, they put him in procurement at

Wright Field. There, going through the IBM records, his card dropped out as somebody that was German speaking and whatnot. So he transferred over to me, and he helped me with the Germans.

H: Did you develop any German speaking ability?

P: No. My capabilities for speaking anything but English--I'm not very good at that. It was pretty poor, although I grew up in Ohio in what we called the Pennsylvania Dutch community where a lot Amish and Mennonites and Dunkards--there are three there; each one is a little higher cast than the other. I think most of the people around the community talked this Dutch as they called it, Pennsylvania Dutch. My dad used to talk it. But I never could pick it up.

H: There's a knack for a language anyway.

P: It is, yes. General White was one of those. He in his career was Air Attache in Russia, Moscow, Italy, Spain, China, and--I don't know; it must have been somewhere else. And years later when he was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, we had a group of Chinese Nationalists visiting in Washington, and General White had a dinner party for them at the Bolling Club. And he got up and made a speech in Chinese. But he was one of those that it just came natural to, and he could speak all these languages.

H: That's just like adding words to your own vocabulary when you take on a foreign language; it's amazing how people can just indefinitely extend their vocabularies like that. Well, did you feel the quality of American weapon systems had outstripped those of the Germans by the end of World War II?

P: Oh, yes, right. I think by that time we had better aircraft. Of course, basically we overwhelmed them with quantity rather than quality. But I think by the end of the war we had better aircraft; we had better weapons; we certainly had gotten farther with the radar, although the British were the people that took the lead in that. But we caught up awfully fast and I think went on ahead of them.

H: You touched on this already, too, to some extent, but what was the extent of the sharing of information with the allied countries during World War II?

P: As near as I recall, I don't think there was any restriction and no holding back so far as the British were concerned. I'm sure there must have been so far as the development of the atomic bomb was concerned, but in the normal technology--and I'm not sure of that either--I would think that that had been held pretty close. We weren't dealing too much with the French at that point in time. Of course, even after the war we had grave doubts about the French

and still do. And they used to get real mad at us because we wouldn't tell them everything. I'm sure there was a free exchange with the Canadians. So I'd say there was a pretty good two-way street.

H: Was this also true with the Russians after they joined the Allies?

P: No. I don't think we ever exchanged much in the way of technical information with them, except as it pertained to their operation of some of our equipment, because I remember during the War we had a contingent of Russian pilots at Wright Field training them in--gee, it seemed to me it was the Martin B-26, which was the counterpart to the North American B-25. They were both developed at the same time in competition with each other. The B-26 turned out not to be too good an airplane, although it was used in Europe. But these Russians were ferrying aircraft from the States to Russia and I think using them, because I know we had a group of them there. So, of course, they were given the technical information as it related to that. But, other than that, I don't think we exchanged any information with them.

H: Did the Army Air Corps or the Army Air Force have to justify to Congress or the administration why the US was not the first to have a particular weapon, such as the jet, missiles or anything of this order?

P: I don't recall that we were ever on the pan for that. I do recall, though, when I was on the NACA--no, this must have been before I was on the NACA, because it was not too long after the war that in one of the--and I presume it was one of the budget hearings--the then chairman of the NACA, Jerry Hunsaker, was before committee. He was being queried about why in some areas--and I think this had to do with supersonic aerodynamics--the Germans were ahead of us. His comment was, "Well, we didn't have the resources." Dollars. And they asked him, "Why didn't you ask for them?" I've forgotten just what his reply was, but then they got around to asking him, "what was the basis on which they determined the size of the NACA budget request?" And there he made his mistake. His reply was, "We put in for what we think we can get." Boy, they dove on him like ducks on a June bug. (Laughter) I remember reading the Congressional Report on that. Boy, they really took him apart on that. The fact that that was how you did do the job and probably the best way to get along, that didn't make any difference, but that's not the policy you ought to follow, or at least express.

H: You shouldn't be too truthful.

P: That's right, yes. That's like General [Carl] Spaatz used to say. I was transferred into the Pentagon around September of the year, and in November we started our budget hearings. I had never been over on the Hill before. So General Spaatz would--well, every year I

guess he did this as long as he was Chief--bring the crew in that was going to go up on the Hill, and he'd say, "When you get over there, I want you to answer the questions as simply and succinctly as you can. Tell nothing but the truth. But, for Christ's sakes, don't blab all the truth," (Laughter) which was pretty good advice too.

H: How well did you get to know General Spaatz?

P: Quite well, yes. Very well, I would say. I first had close association with him when we were doing the bombardment competition between the B-25 and B-26. Those were probably the first two airplanes that we bought off the drawing board without going through this experimental quantity and then a service test quantity and then into production. But this was right at the beginning--I've forgotten whether this was after 1941--but things were getting tense. We bought these two airplanes right off the drawing board. General Spaatz was chairman of the, I guess we called it, Evaluation Committee. But after the technical people had gone over and rated everything and whatnot, then we had to make presentations to this committee, and they would decide then which one to be procured. He was chairman of that, and I was the project officer on that competition. So I got to know him real well then. I can't remember now whether this was before or after, but for about three or four months he was in command of the Materiel Division, a job

that he detested, and he wormed his way out of that one way or another. So I saw quite a bit of him then. We still exchange Christmas cards.

H: How did you assess him as a leader?

P: Great, very astute.

H: He retired quite early.

P: Yes. Retired in June of 1948.

H: He just barely saw the Air Force come into being.

P: Yes, that's right. Yes, [Gen Hoyt S.] Vandenberg was sort of the one that picked up the cudgels on that.

H: How good were the lines of communication between the Army Air Force's R&D and the field during the war?

P: They were fair, I guess I would say. We were pretty close in the European theater. Well, I should say in the northern European theater; that is, England, France, Germany. I'm not sure how good they were down in the Mediterranean area, Africa, Italy. Towards the end of the war, we attempted to have actually Wright Field

liaison people, usually one, stationed with the operational units so that they could feed things back and help them to the best of their capabilities as an individual and get stuff and process it at Wright Field. Occasionally, if it was a big problem or a big program or something like that, they'd come trotting on back to Wright Field and work around there and get things sorted out and then return. So I would say it was fair to good, not everything that you would desire by any means, nor nearly as good as I'm sure that it is now.

H: Did you run into a lot of problems with the great variance of climactic conditions, say between northern Europe and north Africa, the Far East?

P: Yes. We had those problems. We didn't have quite as much cold weather problems, as I recall, during World War II as we do now operating out of Alaska and places like that. One problem that I do remember that caused us an awful lot of trouble was operation of aircraft down in Africa and southern Europe there where there was a lot of sand. To get screens on air intakes and things like that that would let the air in and keep the sand and gravel out was a real problem. But I don't remember too much from the standpoint of excessively cold weather during that period of time.

H: Did the jungle conditions create much of a problem for R&D?

P: The major problem that I remember was one of fungus growth in electronic equipment. That caused us a lot of problems. I'm sure there were, but I don't recall any other major problems as a result of jungle operations. I remember one time when General [George] Kenney was still out there with MacArthur, and we were chasing the Japs back up the island steps, Kenney wanted something that he could go out in the B-25 and shoot up a ship. We installed a 105 cannon in a B-25 and sent that out to him, and they shot up some ships with that. But that was a horrible thing to put into an airplane. (Laughter) We were afraid the first shot, recoil would just tear it apart. But it was pretty well shock-mounted. It was used, but I don't think we had more than one.

H: Did the United States genuinely believe that we were in danger of an air threat to the Continental United States during World War II?

P: I don't believe that there was any genuine fear of that. There was a lot of public fear of that. You know, people moved away from the West Coast, and we kept looking for balloons with bombs on them and things of that nature. But I don't recall any great official concern over that. There may have been, and I just didn't come in contact with it.

H: Out of World War II technology, did you see much spin-off toward civilian application of any of these items?

P: Quite a bit, I would say. It's always hard to list these because the threads of evidence get lost along the way, but much of the Air Force development in aerodynamics, in propulsion and everything, of course, went into commercial aircraft; no doubt about the US being the leaders in commercial aircraft. I would say that was probably the greatest spin-off in that period of time. Then the many uses that we now make of radar--of course, that was a spinoff of the early radar work that was done by the radiation lab at MIT during the war for military purposes. Of course, there is always some development in medicine, treatment of wounds, new methods of treatment, new drugs and things of that nature. Development of radio communication equipment and gear. The Air Force, of course, sponsored a lot of research and development--a lot for those times--in helicopters, first with autogyros and helicopters. Of course, their commercial use really didn't--well, it's just developing now really in a big way, so that there really wasn't much commercial use of helicopters till a long time after World War II. Well, there wasn't a whale of a lot of development of helicopters during or immediately after World War II because the helicopter didn't come along until fairly late where it was a practical sort of thing, in spite of the fact that General Gregory wrote a book entitled Anything a Horse Can Do.

H: Why was there such a slow application of laser technology in the US? I understand we were dabbling with it during World War II.

P: Well, I'm not an expert on lasers, but it's my understanding that the phenomena was discovered which gave one the capability of having coherent beams. But for a long time nobody could figure out what it was good for. It was one of these scientific curiosities, and it just took a long time to find the application. Now whether we proceeded as fast as could have been done if there were no budgetary restraints or anything like that, I guess I'm not familiar enough with the field to know that. But in the early days I know that was one of the problems; we said, "Here's something that's very interesting, but what can we use it for?" Andnow we're finding all kinds of uses for it, of course, in civil work, et cetera.

H: Moving up a little bit again, what were your feelings toward the concept of a separate Air Force back in 1947?

P: It made a lot of sense, because certainly up until that time, rightly or wrongly, the people in authority couldn't see the value of air weapons, and there was an awful lot of restraint on what could be done, even in the light of what you may have thought as justifiable reason for going ahead and doing certain things. It just seemed to make a lot of sense to become unfettered with that kind of thinking. For instance, at about the time that the B-17 was coming into being, the Air Corps was supposed to be limited to an area, I think it was 100 miles beyond our borders; we weren't supposed to fly any farther out than that. That was the Navy's

or for one cause or another were withheld. We saw some of that in the C-5.

H: Absolutely. That was going to be my next question. Is there a reluctance on the part of the company or even ths SPO to report unfavorable information?

P: I think there is just a natural reluctance to spread bad news.

H: Well, it reflects on your career that you weren't right on top of everything.

P: That's right.

H: While we're talking on that, do you think that there is too much of a tendency within the Air Force to cover up the fact that we can make mistakes? There seems to be a philosophy, oh starting back with General Arnold, that if a guy goofed up, he'd get canned, and that was the end of his career. We've almost developed a psychology within the Air Force to be perfect in all things that we do.

P: I wouldn't say that that is unique to the Air Force. I think that's characteristic of any organization; well, it's characteristic of the individual. His future is at stake if he goofs up, just like

George Goddard being sent to Orlando to be in charge of vice because he goofed up for some reason or other and Arnold didn't like it. But I think there is this tendency in any organization. Now whether it's exaggerated in the Air Force more than another, I guess you could reason that it's something that's exaggerated in any governmental body, at least in a democracy where you're using the taxpayer's money and whatnot and certainly are subject to all kinds of criticism, political and otherwise. So I would say maybe there is some added effort to do that sort of thing, but I think it's a human tendency.

H: General Jerry Lee had a good comment in that regard that as far as he saw it that if he didn't see a man making a mistake once in a while, he was highly suspect of him, and he would get rid of him. Those that make mistakes are working.

P: Yes, that's right. That's not a bad comment either. You're a little more vulnerable in a governmental situation like this, because you've got people like Proxmire that are going to take even the simplest mistake, or maybe your first mistake, and they're going to just blow the hell out of it. So your vulnerability is a little higher and, therefore, I would guess that your countermeasures are a little higher too.

(End Reel 6, Side 1)

qualified.

H: Do you feel these family traditions where second and third generation generals in a family, that this has a lot to do with why particular individuals are promoted?

P: I never observed anything like that. Maybe it was there, but I certainly never saw it.

H: I know you can look in the general officer register, and you can see a lot of father/son and grandfathers right on down the line.

P: Oh, yes, Vandenberg, Patton, right down the line, yes. I could imagine that even unconsciously it might have some influence on a guy that's trying to do the best job possible, particularly if he thought the old man was a pretty good guy, a little bit of hero worship there or something. But I never observed any of that influence.

H: Is there any one event during your Air Force career that stands out above all others?

P: I don't know; I guess I could name two or three that in retrospect I would say were outstanding. One, I think the opportunity to go to Cal Tech, as far as I was concerned, was a great asset, primarily

not so much the knowledge that I obtained there, but the association with people like von Karman and Clark Millican and all that top echelon of scientific people. That, of course, really led me into association with people of the stature that were selected for the Scientific Advisory Board and things of that nature. And I guess, considering that the association with von Karman was over a period of--well, from 1938 until he died three or four years ago. But it was a real significant thing, I think, in shaping my career, external forces that shaped my career. It didn't help my career any, but I sure had it impressed on me--that crash of the B-17. I guess I'll never forget that.

H: Could you maybe describe that accident a little bit or what actually happened there?

P: Yes. This was the largest airplane that had been built to that time. This was along before the time when you had a pilot and co-pilot checklist, all the things you do before you take off. Things were much simpler then, so you didn't have one of those. On this particular morning, my boss, Pete Hill, the chief of the Flying Branch at that time, wanted to go on the test that was scheduled, which was a series of what we called test climbs in which you go to a certain altitude and you run a climb through 1,000 or so feet, and then you climb up to a higher altitude and do a climb through another 5,000 feet. This way you establish a rate of climb for any

given altitude and the airspeed for the maximum rate of climb. If you keep your airspeed too high, then your climb angle is flat; if you get it too high, your speed gets slow, and then you squash. So there's an optimum speed there where your rate of increase in altitude is maximum. For some reason, we got behind schedule, and we were in a hurry. And that's always bad. So we got in; he was in the pilot's seat; I was in the copilot's seat. Les Tower, who was Boeing's chief test pilot, was still at the field, and he went along with us. He was standing up between us, just a little bit aft of the pilot and copilot's seats, probably hanging on to the back of our chairs. There was a flight test observer sitting at what normally would be the navigation table immediately behind me on the righthand side. Then back behind the bomb bay in the radio compartment was the crew chief, a mechanic. We taxied out to takeoff, and we sat there for a little bit and ran the engines up, moved the controls, and gave it the gun. We got up to flying speed in good shape and lifted off. And as the airplane picked up speed, it finally reached the point to where the nose kept coming up. Hill pushed forward on the stick, and nothing happened. It just kept coming up and up. Of course, we had full takeoff power on the engines. Not realizing what was happening, except that when it got to an alarmingly steep angle, then I got on the controls, too, attempting to help Hill shove them forward; no help. And so, with full power on, we just, right over the center of the field, we went up until we were vertical like that, and then we did a wing over--that is,

stalled--and fell off like this and then came back down in a dive. Of course, as soon as we started doing that way, then we pulled back on the stick to level it off. But I think it was fortunate that we left the engines on, because, one, it got us to a higher altitude that way, and also when we turned around and started down, we picked up speed quicker, and we had almost leveled off when we hit the ground, full speed ahead. So we came down a little bit left wing low. I don't recall whether we had the gear up or not. The way the airplane settled onto the ground, I guess we may have, although we could have just wiped it off the way we hit. Anyhow, I think having hit wing low is the thing that saved us, those that made it, because that absorbed some of the shock, and it wasn't a direct impact. But it split open the wing, and we had a full tank of gas, and it immediately caught fire. Hill was--when we finally hit the ground, both of us, our bodies were thrown forward. We were strapped in all right, but our bodies were thrown forward. And the control wheel was something less than a full circle with three spokes, and a piece of the rim about like that projected above the two spokes up here. Hill's head hit one of those and punctured his skull. He lived about three or four hours. Of course, we had a problem getting him out, too. I hit the same thing, but I guess I broke if off. My head was too hard or something, but the jagged edge then caught me right here in the corner of the eye. It was just about that far from going into my eye. Caught me right in the eye, and just scalped me right back like this. Of course, the

scalp bleeds tremendously anyhow for some reason or other, so I looked like I was in bad shape. But after just being out momentarily, I came to, and the fuselage split at the windshield line. So there was a hole there. I tried to get out of my seat without unbuckling the belt, but finally realized what was happening. I unbuckled that, crawled out where the windshield normally would be onto the nose of the ship, and dropped off onto the ground. The flight test observer, who was seated behind me, he followed me out through that hole and onto the ground. Cougr, the mechanic in the back, had a terrible time getting the door open. He couldn't get out, and he suffered some pretty severe burns. But he finally kicked it open and got out by himself. After I got out, realizing that he was still in there, I tried to get close enough to open the door from the outside. But gee it was just so damn hot, and the flames were coming. I just couldn't push myself in there. But Hill and Tower were both knocked out, and they were still in the airplane. Two chaps, officers, Jake Harman and Bob Jovenoly, were standing in front of Operations and saw us take off. When they saw us go up to this dangerous angle, they got in the car and dashed out to the center of the field. So they were almost there instantly when we hit. The fire trucks came out real quick. So they backed a truck up to the lefthand side of the cockpit where Hill was still inside and sprayed foam on Jovenoly, threw a blanket over him and sprayed foam on him, and he went back into the airplane and disentangled Hill's foot from the rudder pedal. They couldn't pull him out

because his foot was there. He got down and cut his shoe off and pulled him out and went back in and pulled Tower out. Hill, of course, died from the skull fracture. Tower was badly burned, and his head was lacerated because when he saw what was going to happen, he kind of backed up in the aisleway behind the pilot's seat. When he hit, it threw him forward--he's now flat on the floor--and then drove his head into the back of the control pedestal with all its levers and stuff. So it lacerated his scalp and whatnot. That was not serious however. But he had about 60, 70 80 percent of his body with bad burns on it. He lived for nine days, and he was doing great. I got back on my feet. I had second and third degree burns on the side of my head here and this. The thing that hurt worse was when I jumped off the nose of the airplane, I sprained my ankle. But Tower was getting along fine. They had to have him completely naked in the covered thing with lamps to dry out the oozing from this burned flesh and whatnot. Apparently, the charred tissue that you have in a severe burn generates a poison. It's protein, so to speak. And your kidneys and liver get overloaded, and they couldn't handle it. And he finally died from this poison.

H: Two casualties then?

P: Two casualties out of the five, yes.

H: What was the investigating board's findings?

P: Oh, what was the reason? Well, one of the other chaps that got there real quick was standing beside me right after I got out. I said to him, Sam Harris, "Has somebody checked to see whether or not the controls were locked?" And that's exactly what happened. We took off with locked controls. Now this was an unusual circumstance. It's no excuse. But all airplanes that we had had up to that time, the control locks were external locks. You went out and slipped the thing on that would--say here's an aileron and here's the rest of the wing, you slipped a wedged piece of wood in there that locked the aileron. Then there were red streamers on it, so you would see those as you were checking the airplane. The same way with the tail and the rudder; there were external locks. In the case of the B-17, X-299, it being so large and whatnot, they decided that they would put internal locks operated by a plunger that stood about that high off the floor of the cockpit and immediately behind the back face of the control pedestal. And it had a little button on top of it about that big around and with about maybe a two-inch movement was the difference between the controls locked and the controls unlocked. To unlock them, you just stepped on that thing, and it pulled all the pins that were inside the control surfaces themselves and unlocked them. The thing that fooled us was--and again it being a large airplane--the wind tunnel tests had indicated that the control forces would be so great that having the rudder and the ailerons and the elevators directly connected to the controls in the cockpit, the controls would just be so heavy that it wouldn't be a flyable

airplane. So to counter that, solve that problem, at the trailing edge--say here's the tail of the airplane coming like this. This is the elevator, the fixed stabilizer and the elevators here. These hinge up and down. Almost every airplane had just a little bit of a movable trim tab on it like that, so if the airplane was flying along level and the forces were such that it wanted to climb a little bit, you could move a wheel down here and bend this down or up, and that would pull a little force and it would change the position of the main force. In order to have some aerodynamic help in moving the main controls, what they did was put another little tab on here almost the same size. But that tab now was hooked to the controls in the cockpit instead of the controls being hooked to the main surface. So even though these main surfaces were locked with their internal locks so that they wouldn't move, the control surface of the controls in the cockpit moved because they were moving these little things. So we didn't catch that. Nobody had had much experience with this, although I had been flying it, and always before I had thought to unlock the controls. But that morning I hadn't and neither had Hill; we both missed it. And the main controls were fixed in such a position so that at the speed that we picked up it gave us a nose up attitude, and there was no way we could have countered it. If we had known immediately what had happened, we might have handled it by throttling back and decreasing our speed so that at least we wouldn't be increasing our angle of climb. But we might have been flying around in almost a stall, but we might

have gotten down without such tragic results. But that was what caused it.

H: Were there any reprimands handed out on that?

P: No, none at all. Obviously pilot error. I guess maybe the board was being kind and probably considered there were extenuating circumstances, a different kind of a control system, no signal or anything to tell you that the controls were locked or unlocked, except to look at the position of this little plunger down here on the cockpit floor.

H: Did this crash cause any changes in policies at that time?

P: Oh, yes, indeed. There was a great hue and cry at that point that an airplane of this size was just too much for the human being to handle, and the whole program almost got scuttled. It took a lot of effort to continue the program. See, we were under the War Department then, and there was an awful lot of pressure to cut it out.

H: What year was it exactly?

P: Halloween, 1935.

H: Was this an old A model, the one with the funny tail?

P: The tail configuration changed but not in its basics. It was pretty much a standard fuselage, pretty much a standard configured tail.

H: Right, but the later models had a tail that looked sort of like that.

P: Yes, they kept putting more--as they got more power up here under the wings, then they had to put more rudder surface on the airplane to take care in case one of these engines went out, because that would give you a yawing movement, which you have to counteract with this, and the force that you can get here is proportional to the area that you've got there.

H: What was the basic difference between the early A models and moving up toward the G models and so on?

P: Primarily, so far as the exteriors were concerned, that probably would have been the most noticeable one from just a layman's viewpoint. I don't think that we ever materially lengthened the fuselage like they do commercial airplanes now. The only other major changes were in the armament arrangements. That first X model, the 299, had streamlined bubbles on it, like that; if you looked at this on the side, it was a bubble like that. Then there was a slot along here.

(End Reel 7, Side 1)

H: Were you involved with the B-26 program any, and the extreme difficulties they had in getting that thing perfected during the war?

P: Is that the Martin B-26 or the Douglas A-26 that after the war was labeled . . .?

H: No, the one during the war.

P: The one during the war, the Martin B-26, which was the competitive model to the North American B-25. Yes, I was involved. As a matter of fact, I was the project officer on both of them and ran the competition on those. We did, indeed; we had a lot of trouble. In fact, we used to call it--it had a very high wing loading--you know, a small wing for its weight--and probably was pushing the state of the art as we knew it in those days. It acquired the name of the Flying Vagrant, no visible means of support. One of the big problems and major modifications that had to be made to make it even a reasonably flying airplane was in the initial experimental models and, I believe, in some of the early production the wing was set on the fuselage at the wrong angle. Here's the fuselage, and let's say this is the axis of the fuselage. Every aircraft that I know anything about, the wing is set on at some slight angle. That's exaggerated [an illustrated drawing]. And here's the angle of

attack of the wing, so to speak, and this is the angle of incidence in there. Martin had put that on at too small an angle, and we had to go back and modify and redo those airplanes to move it only three degrees. But that made the difference between something that was reasonable to handle. It never was really a very satisfactory airplane. It was kind of a tricky airplane. We class some airplanes as forgiving airplanes and some that you had to fly every minute or, boy, it would get you. The B-25 was an easy one; it was a forgiving airplane. You could make lots of mistakes, and you wouldn't get into trouble. But with the B-26's, that was a real dog. However, the people that flew those things--and this is characteristic of pilots; whatever piece of equipment you're flying is the best there is. You know, there were even pilots that would swear by a B-24 as against a B-17, which just doesn't make much sense. But I guess it's a case of any airplane that brings you home, particularly from combat, you feel pretty good about it. But the guys that flew it in the European theater, they swore by it. They took an awful clobbering because it was basically a low altitude airplane. The best altitude so far as speed and range and altitude was concerned put you probably right at the level where antiaircraft was the most accurate and the most intense. So most of their missions were ground hugging missions, low altitude. But it was a dog.

H: General Jerry Lee remarked that he had trained B-26 crews down in Tampa, and he said he had the crews mutiny on him, that the

casualties were so high--you remember the expression, "One a day in Tampa Bay "--that they actually refused to fly that thing.

P: Yes, those early days when they were training and getting them ready to go to combat, gee, the washout rate was awful. We should have given more of them to the Russians. (Laughter)

H: Are there any other outstanding events that you care to mention?

P: I always thought I was lucky with my assignments at Wright Field, first in the flight test section there and then being in the project office business for a good number of years and my assignments in the Pentegon and to the Air Research and Development command, I enjoyed. There were days when I would like to have ditched it all, but, on balance, all 30 years were real pleasant. I've never regretted any of them.

H: Did you have any regrets that you didn't get an operational assignment?

P: No, never, because engineering was always my greater interest, and I had, what?, three, three and a half years, in an operational unit right after flying school. So I had an appreciation of what they did in an operational unit during those days. It was a lot of fun, but it didn't look like a full career to me. So while I personally had

not taken any action to get into engineering activities at that time, I guess I was just lucky, [Victor H.] Vic Strahm asked for me to come to Wright Field. Of course, that was the beginning then of a long association with the research and development side of the house.

H: I don't mean to end on a negative note, but was there any one disappointment in your career?

P: I can't really think of one. I remember one instance when I was greatly disturbed, not so much as to what was happening to me but what was going on in research and development. That was finally having achieved this separation, or having gotten the decision to separate research and development from materiel. Then the first commander of the new Air Research and Development Command came from an operational unit. Here, we had been making all this noise that we had for people that were engineering and technically oriented, and the first guy to sit in that slot is a character from an operational unit. I had no reason to believe that I was a candidate for that, but there were people that were senior to me that had many years in the R&D business, and they were being passed over for this particular job. I don't know that it held back research and development in the Air Force by having done that, but that was a disappointment to me to see that sort of thing happen when we were trying to drive for another policy that would put R&D people in R&D command and management slots. I think most of my

career was a pretty happy one.

H: Did you get the feeling at times that the R&D personnel were sort of second class citizens in the military?

P: Well, they certainly were for a good many years of my early career in the Air Force. They were kind of second class citizens. Operational people looked down on them and whatnot. But I think as time went by and there was a greater and greater appreciation of the necessity for good research and development and what it could do for the operational forces, these attitudes changed.

H: While we're on the subject then, what is your assessment of rated versus non-rated personnel in the Air Force, and even the navigators for that matter, that as a navigator or a nonrated officer that you can't achieve many command positions in the Air Force the way it's structured? Do you feel that this is a fair situation?

P: I don't know whether it's fair or not, but I think I would have to say, being realistic, it does seem to me that in today's world it sort of has to be that way, only to this extent: it seems to me that the commander of a combat flying organization just has got to be a pilot to understand the problems. Now it's conceivable that you could have a nonrated chap who was assigned to a combat outfit and he just had so much experience going out on missions sitting

behind some pilot that he might acquire that knowledge of the problems of the pilot and the operation of the aircraft under kind of a utilization. It would seem to me to be a waste to take an excellent Ph.D. in electronics or lasers or something like that, and try to understand the operation from a pilot's standpoint. So it does seem to me that it limits opportunities for command slots to nonrated pilots in flying combat organizations. There may be some other organizations that--well, for instance, MAC, Military Airlift, or transport squadrons and stuff like that. I don't know that it necessarily requires a rated officer to be the commander of that kind of a service type organization.

H: I remember the time that General "Bozo" McKee became Vice Chief of Staff. There was a great uproar amongst the rated officers in the Air Force.

P: Yes, I was in the Pentagon when that happened. Oh, there was great turmoil about that. But I think there's a whale of a lot more to the Air Force mission than just flying an airplane. It's highly technical, and I think we should do everything to make the Air Force attractive to the nonrated officers; we need them.

H: Do you feel that the promotional and career opportunities are equitable between the rated and nonrated now?

P: I don't know; I don't know the statistics well enough to know whether they are equitable or not. I don't know that it's inequitable if you have a condition or a circumstance where everybody does or does not have an opportunity to serve in any capacity or all capacities in an organization. I've been trying to think whether there is any similarity or corollary between the situation in the military and in industry. For instance, if you're an accountant and go into a company in the accountant capacity, it would be highly unlikely that you'd ever have an opportunity to be the chief engineer of that company. Now a lot of people that go into finance become presidents of companies, and I know of even engineers that have become directors of personnel. But I'm sure there are some areas in which people from one discipline, there's just no way that they can achieve a position in some other discipline. I guess I would say it's just the nature of the beast, and you have to play the game according to what the requirements are. I sure would hate to be a pilot in a combat organization that was commanded by a nonpilot. Now maybe that's a biased view, but I would always have a feeling that that guy really doesn't appreciate what he's ordering me to do. And a good commander who is a pilot won't order his men to do something that he isn't willing and able to get out there and do himself.

H: Of course, when you talk to a nonrated person, he . . .

P: Oh, sure, he gives no lip to that kind of thinking.

H: They take an altogether different tack on it.

P: Yes, that's right, and he may have a point.

H: General Putt, is there anything that I haven't brought out that you'd like to discuss?

P: I'd like to make one observation, maybe more than one observation. First, a little bit of levity; somewhat representative of some of the criticisms that you hear of how things happen and operate in the military. They always criticize the military for doing things the wrong way and so, when I was in the Pentagon, I coined a phrase to categorize that kind of a criticism. We'd say, "If there's a better way to do it,"--no, wrong--"If there's a harder way to do it, we'll find it." Then I had another one. People used to ask me, "What do you do?" This was when I was in the Pentagon in a staff position. When somebody asks you that direct a question and they're laymen and they absolutely have not a hazy idea of the kind of an organization you're in and what its function was, it's awful hard to say, "At 7:30 I talked to President so and so of Convair, and then we had a conference," and so on and so forth. There was, I think, a little more truth than poetry in this one, but when people would ask me that facetiously, I would say, "Well, I spend 75 percent of my time defending why I am doing what I have been directed to do." There was a lot of that; maybe it wasn't 75 percent, but you were given a

job to do, and then you were continually having to defend that job, either to Congress or to your boss or to the Chief of Staff or some budget type that was coming in. You spent an awful lot of time that was non-productive, just defending why you were doing it this way or why you were doing it at all. Yet you had a directive that this was what you were supposed to do. Another observation I would like to make is that there always has been, and there is now, and there probably always will be, criticisms, for whatever purpose, whether it's headline hunting like Proxmire, of management within the military.

I guess I should limit this to management within the Air Force. My observation, having spent 30 years in it--and this applied more to the period from about 1950 on--that there was more management practiced, there was more application of modern management techniques within the Air Force at any given period of time than there was in industry, and at least the Air Force never gets credit for that in the general public. This, in spite of overruns and all that sort of thing, with people dedicated and sincere in what they're doing and trying to do the best job possible. I didn't arrive at that conclusion until after I retired and got into industry. Of course, for, what?, 25 years most of my contacts were with industry because it had to do with development, but you always had the feeling when you were dealing across the table that industry had everything all organized and they knew exactly what was going on and they had their long-range plans and everything, and you just felt

kind of at a disadvantage. When I got into industry, boy, at least those that I came in contact with--and they were still making a profit--so far as their management was concerned, their corporate planning and things of that nature couldn't compare with what was going on in the Air Force from the management standpoint. There may not be anybody that believes me, but, by golly, I'll stick to that. (Laughter) I would also say that the last three days here have been most pleasant. I've enjoyed it.

H: Well, I've certainly enjoyed it. I have a couple of other points that I'll quickly make. Who or what individuals do you thing played the biggest part in your career?

P: That's fairly easy. One, von Karman; two, I think [Gen Nathan] Nate Twining. Those are so much more outstanding than anybody else that I have difficulty remembering any others.

H: Could you just briefly tell me why you say these two individuals?

P: One, because just the association with von Karman gave me many contacts that I otherwise wouldn't have had, and I'm certain that it sort of shaped the direction in which I went. It certainly influenced my thinking, and I received lots of advice from both of them. So far as General Twining was concerned, we were together at Wright Field after the war when he was in command of the materiel division.

We became close friends, and he had much to do with my movements in and out of the Pentagon. At one time, I thought I was kind of mad at him, because I had been General Partridge's Deputy Commander at ARDC over in Baltimore and then he was transferred out, and I became the Commander. I thought this was great, thought I would probably sit there for at least a couple years. Nine months after I became the commander, Twining ordered me back into the Pentagon as DCS/D, because he was going to be the Chief. So I would have to say that had a great influence. But I really didn't regret the fact that I went back into the Pentagon.

H: As a related question to that then, in your 30 years in the military, out of all the people that you met, who do you consider as being truly outstanding?

P: In uniform probably?

H: Well, civilian, too, if you'd like to comment on it.

P: I think there were any number that you would have to class as outstanding, certainly Jimmy Doolittle, von Karman, Twining. I guess I would put General Oliver Echols in that class, a truly outstanding person. General Spaatz, of course. Another person very early in the early 1930's, one of the Air Force's first generals, General Conger Pratt. He was a transfer from the Army, but, for his time,

I thought he was an outstanding man. He commanded Wright-Patterson at the time. General Arnold, of course, you can't slip him. General [Hugh] Knerr. I'm sure if I had a list of the names of all the people that I came in contact with, I'd come up with some more. But it's kind of hard to pull out names like that.

H: Is there any other point you'd like to add before we wrap this up?

P: Well, I can't think of any. I'm sure after you've left I'll think of a whole lot.

H: I've certainly enjoyed this interview. It's probably one of the most gratifying I've sat in.

P: I would suspect that you get some quite varied answers to the same questions as you go around talking to different people, all of them exactly right but based on their particular segment of experience.

H: If that's about all, we'll close with that. Thank you very much.

(End Interview #K239.0512-724)

20314

11 Sept 1974

Lieut General Donald L. Putt, USAF (Ret)
87 Flood Circle
Atherton, CA 94025

Dear General Putt:

Seems like ages ago since our good interview. It's just four weeks ago today. We put on 10,300 miles and I got in no less than 26 interviews. Miles and miles of tape to transcribe, so the job is still less than half done.

In any event I'm grateful for the interview you gave me and I wish in my mind's eye to be transported back to your lovely garden whose tranquility is in sharp contrast to the scene I found here in Washington when I returned last weekend.

I obtained the address of the man you can write to if you wish to obtain some help in fixing your Hammond Organ:

Mr. Tom Balle
National Service Manager
Hammond Organ Company
11610 Copenhagen Court
Franklin Park, Ill 60131

You should tell Mr. Balle that you have attempted to contact Hammond's local representative about getting your instrument fixed but the man seems more interested in selling you a new one.

If he wishes to know who gave you his name, you can say; Ralph Renier, of Dodge Street, Omaha, NEB, who has the Hammond franchise for Omaha and environs.

Hope you get some action. Hello to Mrs. Putt from Bea Green and me.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

P.S. Be sure to give Mr. Halle the Model & Serial Number of your instrument and describe in some detail the problem

Model + Serial #
+ Describe problem

Tom Balle
Natl Service Manager
Hammond Organ Co
11610 COPENHAGEN CT.
FRANKLIN PARK ILL
60131

DONALD L. PUTT
LIEUT. GENERAL U.S.A.F. (RET.)
EIGHTY-SEVEN FLOOD CIRCLE
ATHERTON, CALIFORNIA 94025

July 12, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I'm glad your plans are shaping up and I am looking forward to our getting together.

Unfortunately August 14 is the only day of the week on which I have a problem. I have a bank board meeting that day of which I am chairman that ties me up from 11:00 to 3:00. Before or after those times, the 13th, 15th or any other day that week is clear. I regret this and hope it won't louse up your plans too much.

On the assumption that you will be driving north from Monterey, I would suggest that we meet here at our home since it is just off the freeway. This might not fit in with whatever your overnight plans are so any place convenient to you will be fine with me. If you should want to stop here, it would be a comfortable spot for Mrs. Green to relax.

Enclosed is a section of a map showing our location in relation to Bayshore Highway. When you call from Monterey we can make final arrangements.

Sincerely,

D. L. Putt

Write
Will receive
Tues. Aug 13 at 10:30AM

CHO/Dr Green/es/9 Jul 74

(17)

20314

9 July 1974

Lieut General Donald L. Putt, USAF (Ret)
87 Flood Circle
Atherton, CA 94025

Dear General Putt

Getting into the nitty-gritty of my trip, I can project myself into the Atherton area on Wednesday, 14 August. Mrs. Green and I are staying in Monterey the night before, and I'll phone you from there to firm up our meeting the next day, if that is convenient.

According to my map, it would be no problem to meet with you, say at 10:30 AM in Atherton, or at the Ambassador Club, as you suggested.

You may contact me via the enclosure, and I'll make plans based on your suggestion.

The Good Lord and the gasoline shortage permitting, will see you on 14 August. I have your phone: AC 415-324-2203.

Until then, all good wishes.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Read
File

DONALD L. PUTT
LIEUT. GENERAL U.S.A.F. (RET.)
EIGHTY-SEVEN FLOOD CIRCLE
ATHERTON, CALIFORNIA 94025

June 24, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Around the 15th of August looks good on my calendar.

My home is just twenty miles south of the San Francisco International airport and just of of highway 101 (Bayshore Freeway), the main norty-south highway down the Peninsula.

However, since you are proceeding north after our meeting, perhaps it would be more convenient for us to meet at the airport in the Ambassador Club. When you call we can decide where best to meet and then I can give you directions.

My telephone number is 415/324-2203

Looking forward to meeting with you.

Sincerely,

D. L. Putt

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

20 June 1974

Lieut General Donald L. Putt, USAF (Ret)
87 Flood Circle
Atherton, CA 94025

Dear General Putt:

According to present plans, it will be about August 15th when I'll be in the vicinity of Atherton which I assume is close to places like Palo Alto and Sunnyvale. Without looking too carefully, I had initially assumed it was in the L.A. area, then noticed the different zip code the other day.

near menlo park

If there is a phone number where you could be reached without disturbing too many people, I'll give you a day's notice of my arrival and we can make specific plans.

I'm looking forward to our reminiscing about Hap Arnold and the old Air Force of another era.

Incidentally, I hope to push on from there to visit Mrs. Arnold at her Ranch in Sonoma. I got a letter just yesterday. She had her 87th Birthday a couple of weeks ago and seems in great shape. In fact, she persuaded her sons, who paid her a surprise birthday visit, to remove the nurse they had looking after her. She is very independent.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

P. S. If there are special driving instructions, I'd welcome those.

DONALD L. PUTT
LIEUT. GENERAL U.S.A.F. (RET.)
EIGHTY-SEVEN FLOOD CIRCLE
ATHERTON, CALIFORNIA 94025

June 3, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

As near as I can tell now, I'll be at home during the first week of August and would be glad to do a bit of reminiscing with you.

My personal contacts with Hap Arnold were pretty rare and I may not be of much help in that area but can probably recall Wright Field events during his era.

Sincerely,

D. L. Putt

D. L. Putt

20314

24 May 1974

Lieut General Donald L. Putt, USAF (Ret)
87 Flood Circle
Atherton, CA 94025

Dear General Putt

You may recall our brief correspondence of a couple of years back. I'm working on a biography of General Arnold and it's about half written (about 90% of research done), and I'll be coming out to the West Coast about the first week in August. If you are available at that time, I would welcome the opportunity to reminisce with you for an hour or so about Hap Arnold, Wright Field, and any other related subject.

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

Encl

87 Flood Circle
Atherton, Ca. 94025
July 23, 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D. C. 20134

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your 8 July letter and the interview transcript. Perhaps I can add some comments, strictly from memory, on the questions you raise. Comments following are numbered as in your letter.

carded

1) At this period of time I was Chief of the Experimental Bombardment Branch of the Engineering Division and was involved primarily with solution of the engineering problems so far as the B-29 was concerned. Hence there was a lot going on in the production program and organizing the first operational CBI units that by-passed me. However, I always had the impression that there was great pressure from Washington to get the B-29's to the CBI as quickly as possible but I did not relate the urgency to the anniversary of the Doolittle mission. An indication of the urgency of the whole program was the action by General Echols to commit the B-29 to large production before the first flight of the XB-29. No doubt General Arnold was a party to that decision.

I do not recall the circumstances or the incident of the Arnold-Meyers trip to Salina. I do recall that at about this time-perhaps a little later- the R-3350 engines were overheating on take-off and severely limiting operations. Not much progress was being made in solving the problem, so Gen. Arnold directed Gen. Barney Giles, then in Arnold's office to go to Salina and fix the engine cooling. Jim Gillespie, Eric Nelson, and I-and I believe K.B. Wolfe- joined Giles at Salina not convinced that we were the persons or that this was the procedure for tackling the problem. However, after a conference with the operations folks at Salina we proceeded to the flight line and with a hack saw and a ladder we sawed off about two inches from the trailing edges of the engine cowl flaps to open up the cooling air passages when the cowl flaps were partially or fully closed. The clipped B-29 was then test flown and it did appear that the cooling was improved. This obviously was not a permanent solution but the Power Plant Lab shortly thereafter came up with some technical and flight procedure changes that permitted unrestricted operations. As indicated in one of the transcripts, we had a serious problem with engine fires. I believe the fires were caused by bearing failures which in time were corrected.

2) The rationale of the B-32 program was notonly as a back-up for the B-29 but, more importantly in my view, to provide competition between Boeing and Convair. We had learned much earlier in the B-17/B-24 program that both aircraft were better because of the existence of a competitor. It is regrettable that we can not afford this procedure today. In today's commercial world, I'm sure both the DC-10 and the L-1011 are better transports than if either one had been built without it's competing counterpart.

3) I was not very close to the fighter program, but as I recall there was an early recognition of the need and merit of long range escort fighters-at least at Wright Field. I would suspect that any delay was caused by adminstrative, production, and logistic problems.

Lt. Gen. Ralph P. Swofford (Ret), 3634 Goode St., Montgomery, Ala. was then Chief of Experimental Fighter Projects and Maj. Gen. George E. Price(Ret), PO Box 33 Ontario International Airport, Ontario, Calif. wasChief of Production Fighter Projects. They could probably shed some light on this and other situations.

4) I am not sure who conceived the idea for the escort destroyer (XB-40 & XB-41), but have the impression that the concept generated in several places at about the same time. Col. Paul Shanahan, who was in my office at the time, might have been a strong proponent as he was always wanting to put more guns on any type of aircraft.

Curded

As demonstrated by the XB-40 & 41, an escort destrayer developed from the type of bomber it was to escort was not technically feasible at the time. Obviously the escort needed equal or better speed, altitude, and range of the bomber. As soon as more guns were added to the bomber, the increased drag degraded all three performance characteristics. Further when the bomber released it's bombs over the target, it's performance increased, further widening the performance gap between the bomber and it's escort destroyer. Had time and funds permitted, a new design of destroyer could have been developed that would have had the performance to effectively escort the B-17 & B-24.

Arthur Boykin, who recently received the Civil Service Distinguished Service Award, was a bombardment project engineer in my office throughout the war period and may have a far better memory on all these points than I have. I believe he is still at ASD although I recently read something that indicated that he might now be in the Pentagon. I'm sure someone in DCS R&D would know where to find him.

I believe both Jack Northrop, and Donald Douglas, Sr. would be fruitful sources of information on General Arnold by virtue of considerable personal contact.

Sincerely,

D. L. Putt

D. L. Putt

8 July 1971

Lieut General Donald L. Putt, USAF (Ret)
87 Flood Circle
Atherton, Calif 94025

Dear General Putt:

I have your letter of June 11th and I also have a transcript of an interview with some of your former associates in the Air Force. They think you know a lot about some AAF policies. A couple that are of special interest:

1) Around March 1944, Arnold accompanied Benny Meyers to Salina, Kansas, and they literally nursed each B-29 to completion and on its way to the CBI. Were you involved in this program? Do you recall the circumstances of this episode? I have been told that the President was pressuring Arnold to get the first B-29 mission by April 18, 1944, the 2nd anniversary of the Doolittle flight.

2) The rationale behind the B-32 program. Was it strictly backup in case the B-29 didnt make it?

3) The delay in the long range escort program. The P-51 didnt come out to ETO in numbers until the end of 1943. Was there excessive delay in recognizing its merit?

4) The escort destroyer concept (XB-40 and XB-41). Whose idea were they?

These are just a few of the questions that arise in trying to write this biography. While you may not have dealt directly with General Arnold on many issues, you may have some accurate slant on how these policies got started.

The leads on Wattendorf and Irvine are good ones. I plan to follow up.

I dont have any immediate travel schedule, but if you would wish to give me the benefit of any recollections you may have via the mail or in person, I feel my book will be so much the better for it.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
AFCHO

Encl

see what you can do to help him. Which I did. Later on, Hap saw that he was made a BG. Now, he did a wonderful job for me. He was the liaison man on the advanced party up in Chengtu, China. He did a wonderful job for me. There was never any problem on the drinking side, at all. Hap finally made him a BG again. That's the story that went around. But he had a reputation of being a drinking man.

Q: You went out to the CBI with the 73rd or 58th Bomb Wing?

W: No, I took the first unit out there, the 20th Bomber Command. That was the first group of B-29s.

Q: Was that the 58th Wing?

W: One of the wings, yes. The reason it was called the "B-29 Special" Project, it was the 20th Bomber Command, we had bases in India and bases up in Chengtu, China, and made the first bombing runs on Japan, on the Yawata steelworks. And then, later, of course, the boys in the ETO were going to come over and win the war.

Q: Is that after you guys had gotten the thing off the ground, some of the ETO leaders were to come out?

W: This had always been the plan, even in the beginning with MacArthur. You can check me on this. He was only supposed to operate as a holding operation in the Pacific until we got the ETO war won, and then, all the hot shots would come out there. Spaatz was ordered out, Eaker, LeMay, and Twining and the rest of them.

Q: Was there any resentment among you fellows who had come out there first, that these guys could come in and got the top jobs?

W: Oh, I wouldn't say any resentment. Of course, we all thought, we gave the ETO boys the royal raspberries. When they got out there, the war had already been won. MacArthur, contrary to orders like that, and he'd won the war for them.

Q: Kenney had some ideas to get the B-29s, did he not?

W: Oh boy, that's a long story. Yes, he kept fighting till the very last about that to get them. He wanted to use them out in the Pacific against Japan.

Q: Did he understand how to use B-29?

W: He understood the use of airpower as well as anybody?

Q: But he used airplanes tactically. Did he have , was he a close air support? It was interdiction, strategic or destroy an area before somebody goes in.

W: He's the fellow that gave MacArthur the slogan which MacArthur used all through his operation: "Advance the bomber line." This was Kenney's concept, and he sold MacArthur on it.

Q: Why didn't Arnold give him some B-29s?

W: Because he had committed them at either Yalta or Tehran.

Q: At Tehran.

W: He committed them to the operation out of India against Japan.

Q: Was Roosevelt putting the heat on Arnold to get the B-29s started earlier?

W: NO. (Note: See below)

Wagner: It started about as early as it could have been.

Q: Well, the B-29s were having terrible problems with the engines?

W: Oh, that was later on, not any more so than any new airplane and engine.

Q: Weren't they catching fire?

W: Oh sure, we had a lot of problems, but significantly the first unit flew across the Atlantic and into India without any problems.

Q: They flew out of Salina, Kansas, I believe.

W: That was one of the training bases. That was my original training base.

Q: I have an account of frenzied activity at Salina, Kansas, in March and April 1944.

W: Sure, because Arnold made a commitment at Tehran. They said: "We

middle of winter down there in the god-awful Salina, Kansas, which was a pro-German outfit, anyway. Long story, you see. Going back on the B-29, I think I told you this before, the first B-29 was under test. It was wiped out in an accident there at Seattle.

Q: Eddy Egan?

W: No, Eddy Allen, and his whole crew.

F: Did Eddy get killed in that?

W: Yes, he and his whole crew. Of course, there was a lot of controversy within the aircraft industry that this airplane would never work anyway. Too damn big, and too damn heavy wingload. It had all these remote control guns on it. It was just too far out; it would never work, see. It finally got so bad, and Sparky Siebold knows this story, that the pressure got onto Arnold. We had to have hand-held guns. So I got an order to build one with hand held guns sticking out the side like the B-17 had. In the meantime, we went right ahead with this GE remote controlled firepower.

F: We made 131 B-32s didn't we? What happened to them. We gave all our stuff to Boeing and he got more aspect ratio in the B-29s from then on.

S: The B-32 that KB was talking about. They were so worried about remotely controlled turrets and pressurization which had never been used by the military in war, that the B-32 was changed from pressurization and remotely controlled turrets to just -- well, I remember a telegram we got at Ft. Worth from General Putt. It said: "Tell us what to go ahead with." It said: "Green light on local with no blowup".

F: By the way, what ever happened to Don Putt?

S: He is working for United Aircraft up in Los [illegible] California, United Technology Center up there.

F: Still with them, isn't he?

S: Far as I know. (Note: Don Putt has retired to Atherton, Calif.)

Q: Would he be a good man to talk to?

S: Oh yes.

F: He'd be a good man, because he was a technical man; pretty good man.

Q: He was a real good engineering officer.

W: Of course he had a lot to do with the B-17. He was involved; he was involved in the first crash.

F: On the B-17? Don Putt?

W: Yes, when they killed the Boeing test pilot.

F: You mean Eddy Allen?

W: No, on the B-17.

F: Eddy Allen was on the B-29. Eddy Allen used to work for us, you know, at McCook Field.

Q: After Eddy Allen crashed, wasn't there a very close shave with the second B-29.

W: Yes, I told you about that one.

F: Who was that; who was flying it?

W: Jake Harman.

Q: That was the Harman we were thinking about yesterday and couldn't think of his name, three Harmans.

F: Big boy - you mean the lawyer?

W: No, no.

F: Brother of Miff and Hubert.

W: No, no relation.

Q: It is spelled Harman, I believe

W: Leonard Harman. Everybody called him Jake.

Q: We are talking about 1939. Arnold was called up to testify before this Bennett Champ Clark Committee, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, I believe it was. They sort of put him on the spot, because they were trying to get Morgenthau, really, I mean they put Arnold on a spot, but they were trying to get Morgenthau, who had some role in authorizing the Frenchman to get into that plane. Wasn't there some law against a foreigner having access to secret equipment?

W: Well, there was very tight controls on it, they had to get permission, and then the local representative and the manufacturer had to get authorization

DONALD L. PUTT
LIEUT. GENERAL U.S.A.F. (RET.)
EIGHTY-SEVEN FLOOD CIRCLE
ATHERTON, CALIFORNIA

June 11, 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D. C. 20134

Dear Dr. Green:

Much as I would have enjoyed talking to you, after reading all the names of those you contacted, I doubt that you missed anything about General Arnold by missing Atherton on your West Coast trip.

In mentally reviewing my activities during General Arnold's regime, even I was surprised at how little personal contact I had with him. Since I was at Wright Field most of the time, I always seemed to be one person removed from him in matters of common interest. Hence I doubt that I could add anything of significance over what you have obtained from those who had close personal contact with General Arnold.

Write

I do believe it might be worth talking to Bill Irvine. As I recall Bill had close contact with General Arnold during the early days of the deployment and operation of the B-29's in the 20th Bomber Command and the CBI.

It is most unfortunate that Dr. VonKarman is not alive to be interviewed. I believe that in his association with General Arnold in the organization and chairmanship for ten years of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board gave VonKarman an insight perhaps not observed by others. If you have not already done so, I believe that an interview with Dr. Frank Wattendorf might fill the void. I believe Wattendorf, now retired, is living in Washington but if not I'm sure the SAB office will know where to reach him.

I retired from United Aircraft Corporation (United Technology Corporation) last August so my travels to Washington are few and far between. I do wish you great success with your biography of General Arnold and know that it will be fascinating reading.

Sincerely
D. L. Putt
D. L. Putt

P.S. I've completely lost track of Meyers.

20314

7 June 1971

Lt. General Donald L. Putt, USAF (Ret)
87 Flood Circle
Atherton, Calif 94025

Dear General Putt:

For reasons I cant explain to myself, I failed to contact you during a recent interview trip to California in connection with a biography of General Hap Arnold which I'm writing to be published by Random House. I think it is because "Atherton" didnt sound like it was near any place I planned to be. In any event, I had the pleasure of talking to Generals LeMay, Claude Duncan, Eugene Beebe, Jimmy Doolittle and K.B. Wolfe (who mentioned you frecuently), Laurence Craigie, Sam Anderson, Truman Landon, Charles Stone, Donald Wilson, William Ord Ryan, Mark Bradley, and maybe a couple more whose names dont readily come to mind.

In places like Washington, D. C., Colorado Springs, Florida, New York, etc, I've been fortunate enough to talk about my favorite subject, General Hap Arnold to Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, Partridge, Chidlaw, Kelsey and perhaps 100 others. In fact, I had a great session with General "Pre" Cabell not too long before he passed away recently.

It may also be worth mentioning that I've been on a Brookings Institution Fellowship for 15 months to research the vast Arnold Collection in the Library of Congress. Otherwise, I'm a professional historian and have worked for the Air Force in this capacity for the past 25 years.

I dont know when I'll be out your way in the near future, but it may be that you will be traveling East. If your travels take you to Washington, I should like to reserve about an hour of your time to talk about your recollections of General Hap. Reuben Fleet, who I saw in San Diego, mentioned that you are with United Technology Corporation in Los Gatos which led me to speculate that you may get around the country in your work.

I would be pleased to hear from you in the enclosure. Incidentally, I'm trying to run down Benny Meyers. I heard from General E.M. Pop Powers he was in New Jersey. Someone else told me he is in San Francisco. I ran both leads down with negative results. Perhaps you might have a clue.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

P.S. Bill Irvine in Palm Springs?

Edited ms

Interview, Lieut General Donald L. Putt, Atherton, Calif, Aug 13, 1974

Q Do you recall your first encounter with the man, Hap Arnold?

P I guess I cant really. I was trying to think. When was the time when he was in the Pentagon?

Q He was in Washington from 1936 to 1946. The Pentagon was built at the end of 1942. Did you meet him before World War II?

P Yes. At least I think I did. Probably my first contacts with him were in the area between 1940 and later. I was in Wright Field then. I was in Wright Field until 1948, so I was never in the Pentagon while he was in the Chief's lot there.

Q What was your job in 1940 when you first knew him?

P I was Chief of Bombardment Experimental Projects at that time. Of course we had the B-29 coming along. Of course, the B-17 was out, the B-24. I think my first contacts with him must have been on trips to Washington. I just have hazy memory of briefing him a couple of times on new bomber projects and things of that nature.

Q What was his attitude towards the B-17s in the early period?

P Best I can remember, it was favorable. I may be wrong on that.

Q I get the impression - I'm talking about the late 1930s - that people like Andrews and Knerr were pushing harder than Arnold who then was the Assistant Chief of Air Corps to Westover. Were you in Wright Field at that time, in 1937-38?

P Yes. During the school-year 1937-38 I was out at CalTech. And then, it must have been June of 1938, I went back to Wright Field.

Q Arnold became Chief shortly thereafter. Westover spun in in Sept 1938. Do you remember him coming out to put some "Spinach" into the Wright Field program?

P No, I dont have any recollection of that.

Q Several people have told me he always seemed to be angry at Wright Field.

P I think that was generally true. As a matter of fact, for a long time,

everybody was mad at Wright Field, because we were the guys that always spoiled their airplanes, by insisting on this particular item of safety, or something of that nature. Particularly, the Operational people in the combat commands. There was always a lot of anger and resistance at Wright Field

Q What about this criticism of "goldplating", putting a lot of safety things on to slow up the plane?

P Yes, I dont think it had acquired the terminology of "goldplating," but it was adding more weight for safety reasons, etc. Of course that feeling by the operational commands was always aided and abetted by the contractor. Of course, the contractor didnt want to do a lot of these things that Wright Field insisted upon.

Q Arnold had a tour at Wright Field and Fairfield between 1929 and 1931 which in some view contributed to his, not hostility, but skepticism about how fast Wright Field was working. Did you ever hear any of that?

P MM Don't recall. That was the general impression that everybody had that it took Wright Field just too damned long to get things done.

Q Did you work with Ben Kelsey?

P Not directly with him. He had Fighter projects. For awhile, experimental and production were all under one project office. When I went back there in 1938, I was in the Bombardment Project Office with Jake Harman Frank Cook (?) and then when they split, the Engineering Division was pulled away from procurement and production. I went over to the engineering side, and had the experimental bomber projects. Kelsey, as I recall, still remained on the production side. General Ralph Swofford had the Experimental Fighter projects.

Q (Ref to Swofford not answering letters re interview) How about Don Keirn?

P Don Keirn was over in the Power Plant Lab at that time and was very instrumental in bringing the Whittle engine over for Arnold and getting it into the P-80.

Q You were involved in some way when that first B-17 cracked up?

P Yes. I still have the scars.

Q How did that happen?

P To be truthful, we took off with the controls locked. That was the first airplane in which they thought the control surfaces were so large, the forces so great, that they had to have some kind of aerodynamic servo to assist in moving the control surfaces. Even though the control surfaces were locked, it was the first airplane in which you could lock the controls from the cockpit. That was before you had to go out and slip on these wooden locks. With the controls locked on the B-17, you still had control of the wheel, rudder, elevators and ailerons. Actually, what that movement was doing was working these little tabs out on the surfaces. When we taxied out, for some reason we were in a hurry. Those were the days before the checklists.

Q Who was the pilot?

P Pete Hill was the pilot that day. I'd been doing most of the test work. When we got to the end of the field, ready to take off, the controls were all right. The elevators were locked in a slightly up position, so that the takeoff was perfectly normal. Even in the few seconds werwere in the air, we gradually picked up speed, and the elevation of the elevators took effect, so we did a beautiful split-S right over the center of Wright Field. We went into a vertical position (just like that) and came right down. Fortunately, we left the power full on which helped to pull us out, almost flat, when the left wing tipped in. That kind of started things.

Q Were there two of you in the plane?

P No, there were five of us. Pete Hill, Les Tower, the Boeing test pilot, who was standing up between us; I was in the seat. And Richard Cutting, as co-pilot. Flight Test Observer. In the radio compartment was Mark Cragin, the crew chief.

Q How many survivors?

P I think, three: Hill and Less Tower and myself. Power died ten days later from burns. * * *

Q When did this crash occur?

P October 30, 1935.

Q Do you remember Arnold coming out to Wright Field? Up to the start of the war?

P No. After the war started he came out often. We went trotting back to the Pentagon an awful lot, too. The person that I had most contact with in

the Pentagon while he was there was Oliver Echols. He was kind of an Assistant Chief for Materiel.

Q He was MM&D - Materiel, Maintenance & Distribution.

P That's right. So he and Benny Meyers... When I went in there, they were the people I usually reported to, in addition to General Allen Crawford and "Admiral" Sims, Turner Sims.

Q Talking about Benny Meyers, where is he now?

P I lost complete track of him. For awhile we were pretty good friends. You will remember that for a short time, he commanded Wright Field. When he was there, Margo and I used to play bridge with he and his wife.. We saw a lot of them.

Q Arnold had a great deal of confidence in him?

P He was. He was a helluva intelligent guy. The only trouble was, he outsmarted himself * * *

Q I guess Arnold turned to him for numbers?

P I'm quite sure he did.

Q Rather than Echols?

P Yes, Benny would have been much quicker than Echols.

Q Do you have any specific recollection of Arnold coming out in connection with any problems that arose?

P No, I dont. The one contact with Arnold that I remember best. This was after the war, early 1946. Or it could have been shortly after the war ended with Japan. I was out at the Northrop Company. On the morning I arrived there, I was out with Jack Northrop. That was the morning Arnold was coming through for an inspection of the plant.

Q Which plane was involved?

P There was no particular plane involved although I guess we were working on the Flying Wing in those days - the B-35 and B-49. Jack Northrop and I were already out on the factory floor when Arnold arrived, so whoever had met him, probably the Air Force representative at the plant.

Q Wasnt Arnold retired by that time?

P No, he was still in, so it must have been early 1946. Whoever met him at the plant brought him down to the factory floor where the rest of us were. Jack, of course, shook hands with him, introduced him. When he came to me he said to Arnold: "I guess you know Col Putt."

Arnold responded: "Sure do, he caused me a lot of trouble." The trouble went back to the Potsdam Conference. I had been Chief of Technical Section, or something, for the Air Technical Service Command in Europe. Chap named Kane was in command of that, and Hugh Knerr was in command of ATSC. When we started moving into Germany, we uncovered this research establishment. It was called the Hermann Goering Aeronautical Research Establishment. The ground Armies went through there in March 1945. Shortly after that, I got orders up to this place, outside of Brunswick, I was instructed to look it over and exploit it. I went with a German-speaking Sergeant and a German-speaking officer. I went up there to see what we could see and find. It developed that we moved in a house-keeping squadron. I got von Karman and the Scientific Advisory Group to come over and interview the scientists that we had rounded up. They had buried a lot of things in the forests and metal-lined the wooden boxes which we dug up. It was kind of a cloak-and-dagger operation. Lot of fun. There was a lot of very good laboratory equipment, wind tunnel models and all kinds of things. And so, with Knerr's knowledge, I started running a little airline between that place and Wright Field, shipping stuff back. I dont know how many B-24 loads we sent back. We had a B-17 and a B-24, alternating.

After we'd been there for awhile some British Group of scientific people came in to do the same thing. It was in an area that had already been decided that, as soon as the war was over, it would become a part of the British area. When the British moved in, we allowed as how we would probably have to stop shipping stuff out. But we didnt stop right away. We'd wait until they were asleep at night, and then we had a gang of men move into the laboratories to pick up stuff, haul it across town where this little field was. By the time they'd woke up, they had landed in Ireland, on their way back to Wright Field.

Finally, the British became aware of our operation. Shortly before the Potsdam Conference, the British threw this up to General Arnold. Very shortly after that, this was in July 1945...

Q Potsdam Conference was in July.

P It must have been after the 4th of July because I spent that day in the woods, in the forest out there. General Knerr flew in one day and said: "I think we ought to get you out of here."

Q The British put the heat on Arnold ?

P Yes.

Q Was Arnold embarrassed by it?

P I dont think he was. I think he was laughing up his sleeve, and was kind of joking when he said that

Q So he wasnt embarrassed by it. Matter of fact, maybe he was secretly pleased to beat out the British ?

P Yes. I remember one night we picked up a new type of internal combustion engine. It was a single cylinder affair that was in the propulsion plant. We'd take these things down to a central place where they were boxed and packed. And the British had seen that thing during the day. The next day they wanted to look at it. It was gone. They came to me. They couldnt understand that, I said: "Give me a little time and I'll see if I can locate it. Maybe one of our guys picked it up." The next day day I found it and put it back in the Lab.. So they went back and looked at it. And So, the following night we went back and picked it up. In fact, we took out - in one of their tunnels they had an instrumentation setup using very highly polished aluminized mirrors. It was an interferometer technique for visualizing air flow over an air foil. We hadnt done much in this area. We got the five scientists or engineers who were involved in this - Germans - we got them to agree that they would dismantle this equipment, and help us to get it over across town and ship it back to Wright Field.

Q How about the German scientists? Were they shipped back as part of Operation PAPERCLIP?

P Oh yes, they came back. The leader of that group was a chap named Zobel. He was at Wright Field for some time. One night they started taking this apart, and they didnt quite get it done. Then we got word that the British wanted to see this. They heard of it. So we scrambled around and got these guys to set it up again. The British came and saw it operate, etc. The next night we completely dismantled it, shipped it back to Wright Field.

Q Were the British doing the same with stuff that they latched onto?

P Not while we were there. They tried to get away with this engine.

Q Was this the BBRL - the British, something Research Laboratories?

P Yes, pretty close. After they looked at this engine, we went around one time - we didnt ship it back the next night - when we did go to get it it was gone. Through the grapevine we found out that one of the Britishers had hauled it off in his car. In spite of the fact that we were taking all that stuff out, I just raised holy hell - and they brought it back. Then we packed it up and sent it off.

Q They probably snitched a few things you didnt know about?

P I'm sure they did. And when we left the area, too, they took over the Germans.

Q What about the Russians? Did they get in on this?

P Not there. I guess they got quite a bit elsewhere.

Q Did von Karman supervise this whole operation?

P To the extent of interrogating scientists, inspecting facilities from a technical standpoint, and capabilities, etc.

Q What kind of guy was Knerr?

P I thought he was a great guy. I think like Arnold, there were people who didnt like him. But he always treated me fine.

Q Did you ever hear him talk about Arnold?

P No. At the time he told me they had better get me out of Europe, he knew that he was going to come back to Wright Field to command it. He said: "I want you to go back to Wright Field and join the staff."

Q Benny Meyers thought he was going to get that job? That was Knudsen's

job. ATSC Command. (Ref to anonymous letter of June 22, 1945)

P (Didnt recall that business)

Q Knerr didnt like Arnold.

P I would guess not. They were two different types.

Q We're asking whether you briefed General Arnold on any big bomber programs during the war?

P I briefed him on the B-29 because that was a major project at the time, and Echols was the one, at least got the credit for having made the decision to go into production before they had good and complete tests on the experimental articles.

Q Lot of trouble with the B-29s?

P Oh yes. Engines catching fire. I remember, I think it was Arnold. We were having trouble with the B-29 engines catching fire and the problem was the cooling on takeoff, with temperature exceeding cylinder head limits. And we were struggling with it a great deal and still didn't have any real good answers. As I recall, one answer was, as I recall, procedures. The Labs out in the field were attempting to keep the engines from overheating by taking off at less than takeoff power. That just made the situation worse. The best way to do it was to give it full blower, and get off as quick as you could. Anyway, Arnold got irritated at Wright Field because they weren't getting the job done. He ordered Barney Giles to go to Salina, Kansas, I think it was - "and you fix it." Well, Giles got K. B. Wolfe, who was then in charge of production, and Gillespie, who was then Chief of the Power Plant Lab, and me. We all went out to Salina, not knowing what the hell we would do when we got there. But Arnold had ordered that Giles, "By God, you get this stopped."

Q Was that the so called "Battle of Kansas."

P I guess it was.

Q Was this late winter 1944/45? Bad weather.

P It was not winter, as I recall. It seems to me it was fairly hot. It might have been later. Another chap that was with us was Erickson. Anyhow, we went out there. We pulled one of these B-29s out of the hangar and said: "What do we do

with it now?" And somebody said: "Maybe these cowl flaps on the rear of the engine cowl closed down pretty tight when they were closed." Somebody said: "What if we shortened those up and opened up that area, even though though the flap indicator said it was closed?" We decided to try it. We got a step-ladder and a hacksaw. One or another of us sawed away at the flaps. I dont think we sawed it all. It was mostly at the top. Then we flew the airplane. That did not solve the problem at all. But we Wright Fielders considered that the mission had been performed, but not successfully, and we went back. Later, I've forgotten what the final solution was, something was done either to the cowling. I think new baffles were put on the engine cylinders. That solved the heating problem.

(2nd tape)

One thing I remember about Arnold, this is from 2nd hand observation, and what little observation I had, was that even if he was bawling you out, he had a smile, or what looked like a smile on his face.

Q I've been told that. Some people mistook that for pleasure, and they got burned.

P Yes.

Q Did he ever bawl you out?

P No

Q You briefed him on the B-29s. Was it a staff presentation, or a singleton?

P I think it was a single briefing in his office. Now, he might have had a couple of his staff there, but the briefing was primarily to him.

Q He had a reputation of grabbing off people and sending them off on a mission sometimes alien to their expertise?

P Yes.

Q Did this ever happen to you?

P No, but I remember that that was one of his, if you happened to be walking down the hall at the wrong time, and he saw you, and he had something he wanted you to do. Of course, LeMay has done that, too.

Q Did LeMay ever send you off on a mission?

P He didnt send me off on one. It wasn't exactly that. I remember William

"Nellie" Morgan. He came back from the Philippines after the war, having been assigned to go to the National War College. Before the war, he had been assigned to Wright Field. On his way back from the Philippines, he stopped at Wright Field, he and his wife. They were spending some time there, [redacted] waiting for school to start, Nellie said: "I think I'll go into Washington and see the people around the Pentagon, and say hello to LeMay." Some of us told him, "You had better stay the hell out of the Pentagon, or LeMay will put you to work on something else." He disagreed. He said he and LeMay were good friends. Nellie went into Washington, was walking down the corridor and LeMay happened to be walking out. He greeted him, hadnt seen him for a long time. LeMay said: "Nellie, where are you going?" He said: "Going to the National War College in the Fall." LeMay said: "The hell you are; I'm going to assign you back to Wright Field." He went. Never got to National War College.

Q Any other recollections of Arnold in his relationship with Benny Meyers? He seemed to call on Meyers very frequently for numbers, And presumably, Arnold was being pressured by Marshall and perhaps the President to get the B-29 out into action. I think I mentioned to you that Arnold came himself out to Kansas to try to expedite the B-29's,

P I dont remember that, no.

Q K. B. Wolfe had aspirations to be a combat commander. He didnt last too long. Why?

P I don't know that I ever knew really why. I think I always thought that they needed him back at Wright Field to manage the production.

Q He was one of Arnold's favorites. (Yes) Maybe Arnold felt he was not suited for combat?

P That could be.

Q Arnold and Hansell in the Marianas in command of the B-29's.

P Nothing specific there.

Q Did you get involved any in the low level modifications on the B-29s?

P I dont recall any specific modifications there. The one modification on the B-29 that I did get involved in, after they were operational, were the modifications of the "Enola Gay", the one that dropped the A-bomb. I was the Wright Field end on doing that.

Q Arnold was a bug on R&D. He was an innovator, as I read his record. He was willing to try a lot of new things?

P This is right. A matter of fact, he was the one who conceived the idea of calling in von Karman and telling him to form a group of scientists that could look where we'd been and look ahead to see where we'd be going. Karman and that group wrote that volume, several volumes, Toward New Horizons.

Q Arnold was also a bug on guided missiles? Did you get involved in the guided missiles program?

P Yes, towards the end of my active duty, mostly on Atlas and a little bit of Titan. Also, Arnold was the guy who conceived the idea of RAND.

Q He stashed away the money?

P At Santa Monica

Q (Ref to JB-2) Not involved in program.

P Just generally.

Q Involvement in B-32?

P Said the competition improved the B-29. Ref the crash of Eddie Allen, said he and Franklin Carroll had ridden with Eddie Allen at Boeing the day before the crash. * * * Said crash amplified some of the doubts in B-29

Q Were there any doubts the B-29 would succeed?

P Yes, there were some people who thought so. For instance, In order to assure - I dont know if it was General Arnold or General Echols that did this - but in order to get some independent analysis of whether the B-29 would do what Boeing said it would do, they sent the data to North American. They analyzed it, and it came back: "Impossible". The particular item that they focused on was the low drag of the engine and nacelles that Boeing was quoting. As I recall, North American said the weight would be four times that much. They said there was no way Boeing could get that kind of performance. In fact, Kindelberger made some rash statement about the B-29.

Q Did he have his own bomber at that time?

P No, he didnt have anything that was competing at the time.

Q Did you get involved in any way in the P-51 Fighter?

P No (Not involved in changing engines or development of P-51.

Q In 1943, during Schweinfurt and Regensburg, was there any pressure on you to do something to improve the B-17s and B-24s?

P Oh yes, there was pressure on us all during the war. More guns, more turrets. I remember, we even, in an effort to solve that escort problem we even had an escort version of the B-17 and B-24. The XB-40 and XB41.

Q Who originated that idea?

P I dont really know. The guy I would suspect would be Paul Shanahan. He came out of the Armament Laboratory and he was my Deputy in the Experimental Bomber Projects. He was always wanting to load more armament on to the airplanes. As a matter of fact, we used to have signs on our desk. One said: "More Guns Shanahan", and mine said: "More Speed Putt" But he was a great one for putting more armament on the bombers. * * *

Q The XB-40 andXB41 proved to be busts? Too slow?

P That's right, plus the fact, they had to carry their load all the way out and all the way back. The bombers only had to carry their load one way. The 40 and 41 couldnt keep up with them. * *

Q The whole thing died pretty quickly?

P Oh yes, I think we had only one of each or something.

Q Do you remember any telephone calls from Arnold, or any pressure from him to improve the bomber's ability to survive?

P I dont recall anything specific, but that was an objective all the way through.

Q (Ref B-24s in ASW in 1942 . . nothing to do with it)

Q (Arnold and Knudsen. . . . no recollection)

P I was pretty low level in those days, perhaps a Major in those days.

Q Was there a feeling that Arnold didnt fully understand the feelings at

Wright Field?

P I think there was some of that. He was not unique in that by any means, plus the fact, even if he did understand our problems, being in the position he was in, I think in that position I would have put all the heat possible on Wright Field anyhow, event to the extent of making them think I didnt understand the problems.

Q Did you know a man named Jan Howard?

P Yes. He was Chief of the Division in 1933 when I reported in to the Flight Test Division.

Q Do you know anything of his relationship with Arnold? He was Arnold's brother in law. ~~Now that you remind me, I guess I did know~~ that.

P Now that you remind me, I guess I did know that.

Q The marriage broke up.

P (No knowledge)

Q Could anybody else but Arnold have done the job? Like Andrews? Or Emmons?

P I think the only one that I can think of that might have done the same sort of job might have been Andrews. * * * I think that Arnold was the man for his time. Among his contemporaries, I think he was the man.

Quesada, Elwood 26 Mar 70

July 22, 1970

Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada
990 L'Enfant Plaza South SW
Washington, DC 20024

Dear General Quesada:

I've just gotten around to transcribing our good interview. We were interrupted by the press of business and you promised that we could conclude it at a later date.

To help refresh your memory, here is a copy of the transcript. I would like to phone in a week to arrange a follow-on interview.

Recently, I spoke to Mrs. Arnold. She's just past birthday No.83 and she is just as alert as ever. She sent best wishes to you and to a couple of others whom I've recently interviewed.

Again, I appreciate your great help and hope that you can spare me another half hour.

1 Atch
Interview, dtd 26Mar70

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Interview LT GEN Elwood Quesada, Washington, D.C. 26 March 1970

Q: Do you remember the first time you encountered General Arnold?

A: No, I don't remember the first time because when I did encounter him, no doubt, was back in 1927 or maybe earlier. Our paths would cross in a routine manner, so the first time I contacted him would not constitute a memory. I would just accept him as I would accept anybody else, and I hoped he accepted me. I don't remember when I first met Eaker, or any of my other friends.

Q: You flew Trubee Davison when he was Asst. Secy. Weren't you his first?

A: I was first Executive Officer in his office, and also flew him a great deal.

Q: Did you encounter Arnold in the 1930s at any time, when he was at March Field?

A: Oh, definitely, we, when I say we--I mean Trubee and others--when we would got to March Field, Arnold was in command at March Field. I do recall on one occasion, going out to March Field with Trubee Davison when Hap Arnold was in command of March Field.

Q: Any special recollections of him at that time?

A: My association with Hap became other than normal during the period of the GHQ AF, when I was in the Hqs of the GHQ AF and Hap Arnold was in command of what I think was called Division in those days.

Q: GHQ AF? Was Westover still around?

A: He was still around, yes.

Q: Then Arnold was the Asst. Chief.

A: No, this was before that. The GHQ AF.

Q: Started in 1935, March 2, 1935 and Arnold was made a BG out

on the West Coast.

A: And in command of what I think was the First Wing. GHQ AF was then commanded by Andrews, and Arnold was one of the subordinate commanders to Andrews, and I was in the Hqs of the GHQ AF at Langley, and Arnold used to come to the Commander's meetings and I would see a lot of him there. All of my other associations with him were quite routine.

Q: How did he get to pick you to go with him in 1941 on that trip to England?

A: Oh, I'd forgotten about that. Arnold was the Chief of the Air Corps, and I was on his staff, having returned from Argentina. I was in effect the liaison between his staff and the various missions here in the country--the French, Italian and British. The British being the only ones that were really active, because we were almost enemies of Italy. France had already capitulated. So I was in daily contact and in constant contact with the British, trying to get for the British information related to the various development programs that were underway in our country. So when it came time to go to England, he wanted to take somebody with him who was familiar with the intercourse we were having with the British Embassy and the British Purchasing Mission here, and since all that came through me, he elected to take me.

Q: On the trip (to UK in 1941), did he talk to you about the concern with the Axis infiltrating Latin America?

A: I don't recall any specific conversation in that regard. I do recall in a general sense, that he was alert to the spreading infiltration, that the Germans were engaged in every place. We did discuss the infiltration, or the increased influence that Germany was having in South America, with me mainly because I had just returned

from there, having spent 3 1/2 years. He was concerned over the gaining influence that was obvious to all on the part of the Germans throughout South America, definitely.

Q: There were three airlines, SCADTA, LATI and TACA which were Axis dominated, and he was trying to get them out and substitute American.

A: You have reminded me. Now, he was definitely concerned over one of the German airlines that had gained tremendous success in the northern part of the continent, Colombia in particular. It had achieved very noticeable success, and he was definitely anxious to get it out of there.

Q: They were working with Pan Am. Pan Am was building these airports at the time. I think they were trying to use Pan Am as a means--we were not in the war then, of course--as a means to get the German and Italian airlines out. Did he express any thoughts?

A: I am reminded of this which I wouldn't otherwise have been unless you brought it up. Hap was friendly with Juan Trippe, and he went to a great deal of trouble to try to get Pan American to take the place of this German effort in these countries of North and South America in the northern part of the continent. My memory tells me that he was successful, that one of these airlines, he actually got out of the country I don't know the name of it, but I have that recollection.

Q: By the time of Pearl Harbor, he managed to get rid of all three of them to some degree. Of course, there were Axis agents all over the place.

A: Oh definitely, he was quite sensitive to that.

Q: He was very concerned about the Panama Canal?

A: He was terribly concerned over it.

Q: At this time, Norway had fallen and the Quislings were a problem--the fifth column. Anyway, getting to your trip, I think you went through the Azores and I think...

A: On the way over, we went to the Azores, and then to Portugual, Lison.

Q: Did he have any contact with, I can't recall the name, Hoheuloh (?) some agent who apparently briefed him on the Axis situation.

A: You mean in Lisbon?

Q: In Lisbon, either coming or going, I'm not sure of that. But he had some report on that.

A: I don't remember. I do know that in Lisbon we met with some--and I can't remember if it was on our way home or the way over--we did meet with some--I think it was on our way to England, because we spent a night in Lisbon, if my memory serves me correctly. And we did meet with somebody whose name I do not now recall, who was quite sympathetic. He had a close association with the Germans and a great deal of knowledge of what they were doing in Europe. I do remember that, but my memory isn't sufficiently firm to say who it was.

Q: It was a name starting with Hoh...., but in England, did he have any reaction to the British about what they were doing, was he sympathetic to the British cause?

A: When we got to England, Hap had several programs that he was anxious to pursue with vigor. One was to establish a ferry service across the Atlantic ocean to deliver our airplanes by air, which eventually turned out to be the Ferry Command. Later it turned out to be the Air Transport Command, he had the concept which was way out, "using current terminology," of deliverying all or nearly all of our airplanes across the North Atlantic, specifically through Newfoundland.

That was one of his concerns--one of his objectives in going to England. Another was to arouse in the British an awareness of the status of our aluminum production, both here and throughout the world, on the grounds--it was his conclusion, or the conclusion of the staff or perhaps others as well, that aluminum production was a very serious bottleneck to the war objectives of the Allies. Another objective was to get some of our aircraft that were to go into production, or were in recent production, into service in England to get some battle experience from them. They were his major objectives. And the British, as I remember it, were slightly--and only slightly aloof. They thought that the idea of ferrying aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean,though imaginative, was not as practical as Hap though it to be. I recall the astonishment of the British when they heard Hap's suggestion of stocking 2 million gallons of fuel in Newfoundland. They concluded that this was such a vast quantity that it was not real. It turned out that we used 2 million gallons a day.

Q: How about this route by Belem, Natal and Dakar?

A: I don't recall that that route was discussed. I think that route came afterwards but I might be wrong. Harold George might know better.

Q: I talked to GenGeorge last week and one of the points that came up was Arnold's interest in the Azores--getting Salazar to let us use the Azores as a base. This was his great concern, and they finally got in in 1944.

A: On our way over to England, as I indicated, we stopped at the Azores and we actually went out and made a reconnaissance of where we thought an airport could be built.

Q: Santa Maria Island?

A: Right, which turned out to be a temporary island, and eventually a base was built there. A physical and visual reconnaissance was made while we were there in 1941.

Q: You know, Salazar was holding out for a role in WW II, starting in 1943, when it turned out that we were going to win the war, he wanted to enter the war and he wanted a little contingent of Portuguese to occupy Timor Island. Timor was out near Bali, which was Portuguese property. If they had a platoon go ashore, and then they could say it was in the war effort, and he was holding out for a role, and Arnold refused to accede. Did you ever get into that?

A: No, I never got into that. You are reminding me of many things which I had in fact forgotten, particularly in the Azores. We actually made a reconnaissance of a place where American aircraft could be based.

Q: He was so concerned about that, because the northern route between November and March was very, it was dangerous. The Southern route was, would add 5 or 6,000 miles to the trip, so he was trying to go through the Central Atlantic.

A: His interest was influenced by weather. That was a good weather route--admitted by further, but it was more reliable.

Q: The Azores would have been more direct and it would be an all year round route. But Salazar was holding out for a price. I want to get into another area. After this trip, when was your next contact with Arnold. I guess Pearl Harbor?

A: My next contact with Arnold was after the trip to England, one of my tasks was to initiate staff action to implement some of his commitments made in England.

Q: When he went around, I guess there was a flurry of activity after he left?

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said: "Pete, I'm not going to make this address to our senior commanders and senior staff officers," You are." I'd forgotten about this. And my reaction was: "Who me?" Because I was a young Captain at that time, and Hap Arnold was held in great admiration and was considered very senior, and I was worried about being a young Captain taking his place--it being somewhat presumptuous. But, nevertheless, the dinner was held, and I had to give my views in respect to our trip to England.

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Q: One of the reasons Arnold was sent to England was because of his pessimism. Well not pessimism, but his negativism about the British. Harry Hopkins and Morgenthau were pushing to get everything out to the British, while Arnold had the job to build up the Air Corps.

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Q: And nobody ever called him "Dear George?"

A: Oh hell no.

Q: How about the President?

A: I don't know, but I think the President referred to him as "General."

Q: I think he was just so austere and maybe forbidding or distant in his manner, that nobody could call him "George?"

A: There is something to that, but I don't think it was austere. I think of him as a very, very pleaaant personality, whose character made you call him "General," not the reflection of his character.

Q: How about Arnold and King? Did you ever see them together?

A: I've seen them together, but not very much.

Q: You were in the Air Defense business for awhile?

A: I was in the Air Defense business after we came back from England.

Q: Now, you got into the ASW business with the Navy to some degree, did you not?

A: That was over in Africa. In the air defense business I got into a problem that Marshall and Arnold, particularly Arnold, were involved, I must say, Arnold liked me. Why, I don't know, but he did. And I certainly liked him. While I was in command of the Air Defense Wing in Philadelphia, I got into a fracas with the commander of the artillery.

Q: Sanderford Jarman.

A: Yes. It was a fellow who worked for Jarman. I can't remember precisely what was said, but the occasion was when the artillery in Philadelphia put their searchlights on a young pilot in a P-40 who was landing and he was under going training, and I kind of lost my temper, I guess.

Q: There was a big hassle over who should control the AAA?

A: That's right, and I got in the middle of it, and had a big inquiry, and I hollered, over the telephone to this general: "Turn

those lights out!" on the assumption that I had command of them, which was questionable. He brought up the fact that: how do we know that airplane was friendly. And I remember saying, damn it, "the Germans can't even get across the English Channel, although it is only 27 miles wide. How do you expect them to get across the Atlantic Ocean, I'll tell now they are friendly." That started off hell of a row.

Q: The AF never did quite take over the AAA, did it?

A: Never did.

Q: Did Arnold ever get into the middle of that?

A: He sure did.

Q: With Marshall? I saw a lot of correspondence on it, but it never seemed to reach any conclusions.

A: It was never solved. They got into this concept of operational control, and that just created more troubles than it solved.

Q: Just sort of meandered along?

A: Everybody did their best under bad conditions.

Q: Did you have any contact with Arnold during the war?

A: Only when he came over to Europe. He made one of his trips over to Europe and I was one of the principal commanders, and he came around to my headquarters and things like that.

Q: Was this in '43?

A: We were on the continent when he came over.

Q: This was right after D-Day?

A: Yes, then, also not long before the surrender.

Q: Oh, yes, he was sick, this was his recuperation trip. He went to Cannes and he went to the Riviera, and he was sort of on a meandering trip. He had a heart attack, and I wanted to ask you about

this. It's a very important thing in which you are involved, although you may know. If not, I'll tell you about it. If you know it, maybe you can tell me about it. On April 19, 1945, one week after Roosevelt died, there was a big pow wow, I believe in Cannes or the Riviera. I don't know if you were present.

A: I wasn't.

Q: Eaker was making a round-the-world trip. He had just taken the job of Deputy Commander, AAF. He had just come back from Europe. They wanted to relieve Arnold of some of the burden because of the heart attack. I believe Spaatz was there, and Eaker and Arnold, and perhaps others. And they were talking about how we could get closer to the new incumbent in the White House, because we hadn't done too well with the previous incumbent. Many suggestions were kicked around, one of which was get Pete Quesada into the White House as the Exec Air Aide. Did you know about this?

A: I knew about it, but not until afterwards. When Spaatz told me that I was being sent back, he didn't tell me why. If he did tell me, it didn't come through. And I didn't want to go back--the war was over--but nevertheless I went back and after I got back I learned that that was one of the reasons why I was sent back to be Asst Chief of Staff.

Q: But it didn't come about?

A: No.

Q: Probably for the reason that Truman wanted Missourians?

A: He wanted his own.

Q: Harry Vaughan and Bob Landry?

A: That's right. Yes. I remember that, and I don't think it got any place. He had this fellow, and Vaughan wanted his own.

Interview LT GEN Elwood Quesada, Washington, D.C. 26 March 1970

Q: Do you remember the first time you encountered General Arnold?

A: No, I don't remember the first time because when I did encounter him, no doubt, was back in 1927 or maybe earlier. Our paths would cross in a routine manner, so the first time I contacted him would not constitute a memory. I would just accept him as I would accept anybody else, and I hoped he accepted me. I don't remember when I first met Eaker, or any of my other friends.

Q: You flew Trubee Davison when he was Asst. Secy. Weren't you his first?

A: I was first Executive Officer in his office, and also flew him a great deal.

Q: Did you encounter Arnold in the 1930s at any time, when he was at March Field?

A: Oh, definitely, we, when I say we--I mean Trubee and others--when we would got to March Field, Arnold was in command at March Field. I do recall on one occasion, going out to March Field with Trubee Davison when Hap Arnold was in command of March Field.

Q: Any special recollections of him at that time?

A: My association with Hap became other than normal during the period of the GHQ AF, when I was in the Hqs of the GHQ AF and Hap Arnold was in command of what I think was called Division in those days.

Q: GHQ AF? Was Westover still around?

A: He was still around, yes.

Q: Then Arnold was the Asst. Chief.

A: No, this was before that. The GHQ AF.

Q: Started in 1935, March 2, 1935 and Arnold was made a BG out

on the West Coast.

A: And in command of what I think was the First Wing. GHQ AF was then commanded by Andrews, and Arnold was one of the subordinate commanders to Andrews, and I was in the Hqs of the GHQ AF at Langley, and Arnold used to come to the Commander's meetings and I would see a lot of him there. All of my other associations with him were quite routine.

Q: How did he get to pick you to go with him in 1941 on that trip to England?

A: Oh, I'd forgotten about that. Arnold was the Chief of the Air Corps, and I was on his staff, having returned from Argentina. I was in effect the liaison between his staff and the various missions here in the country--the French, Italian and British. The British being the only ones that were really active, because we were almost enemies of Italy. France had already capitulated. So I was in daily contact and in constant contact with the British, trying to get for the British information related to the various development programs that were underway in our country. So when it came time to go to England, he wanted to take somebody with him who was familiar with the intercourse we were having with the British Embassy and the British Purchasing Mission here, and since all that came through me, he elected to take me.

Q: On the trip (to UK in 1941), did he talk to you about the concern with the Axis infiltrating Latin America?

A: I don't recall any specific conversation in that regard. I do recall in a general sense, that he was alert to the spreading infiltration, that the Germans were engaged in every place. We did discuss the infiltration, or the increased influence that Germany was having in South America, with me mainly because I had just returned

from there, having spent 3 1/2 years. He was concerned over the gaining influence that was obvious to all on the part of the Germans throughout South America, definitely.

Q: There were three airlines, SCADTA, LATI and TACA which were Axis dominated, and he was trying to get them out and substitute American.

A: You have reminded me. Now, he was definitely concerned over one of the German airlines that had gained tremendous success in the northern part of the continent, Colombia in particular. It had achieved very noticeable success, and he was definitely anxious to get it out of there.

Q: They were working with Pan Am. Pan Am was building these airports at the time. I think they were trying to use Pan Am as a means--we were not in the war then, of course--as a means to get the German and Italian airlines out. Did he express any thoughts?

A: I am reminded of this which I wouldn't otherwise have been unless you brought it up. Hap was friendly with Juan Trippe, and he went to a great deal of trouble to try to get Pan American to take the place of this German effort in these countries of North and South America in the northern part of the continent. My memory tells me that he was successful, that one of these airlines, he actually got out of the country I don't know the name of it, but I have that recollection.

Q: By the time of Pearl Harbor, he managed to get rid of all three of them to some degree. Of course, there were Axis agents all over the place.

A: Oh definitely, he was quite sensitive to that.

Q: He was very concerned about the Panama Canal?

A: He was terribly concerned over it.

Q: At this time, Norway had fallen and the Quislings were a problem--the fifth column. Anyway, getting to your trip, I think you went through the Azores and I think...

A: On the way over, we went to the Azores, and then to Portugual, Lison.

Q: Did he have any contact with, I can't recall the name, Hoheuloh (?) some agent who apparently briefed him on the Axis situation.

A: You mean in Lisbon?

Q: In Lisbon, either coming or going, I'm not sure of that. But he had some report on that.

A: I don't remember. I do know that in Lisbon we met with some--and I can't remember if it was on our way home or the way over--we did meet with some--I think it was on our way to England, because we spent a night in Lisbon, if my memory serves me correctly. And we did meet with somebody whose name I do not now recall, who was quite sympathetic. He had a close association with the Germans and a great deal of knowledge of what they were doing in Europe. I do remember that, but my memory isn't sufficiently firm to say who it was.

Q: It was a name starting with Hoh...., but in England, did he have any reaction to the British about what they were doing, was he sympathetic to the British cause?

A: When we got to England, Hap had several programs that he was anxious to pursue with vigor. One was to establish a ferry service across the Atlantic ocean to deliver our airplanes by air, which eventually turned out to be the Ferry Command. Later it turned out to be the Air Transport Command, he had the concept which was way out, "using current terminology," of deliverying all or nearly all of our airplanes across the North Atlantic, specifically through Newfoundland.

That was one of his concerns--one of his objectives in going to England. Another was to arouse in the British an awareness of the status of our aluminum production, both here and throughout the world, on the grounds--it was his conclusion, or the conclusion of the staff or perhaps others as well, that aluminum production was a very serious bottleneck to the war objectives of the Allies. Another objective was to get some of our aircraft that were to go into production, or were in recent production, into service in England to get some battle experience from them. They were his major objectives. And the British, as I remember it, were slightly--and only slightly aloof. They thought that the idea of ferrying aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean,though imaginative, was not as practical as Hap though it to be. I recall the astonishment of the British when they heard Hap's suggestion of stocking 2 million gallons of fuel in Newfoundland. They concluded that this was such a vast quantity that it was not real. It turned out that we used 2 million gallons a day.

Q: How about this route by Belem, Natal and Dakar?

A: I don't recall that that route was discussed. I think that route came afterwards but I might be wrong. Harold George might know better.

Q: I talked to GenGeorge last week and one of the points that came up was Arnold's interest in the Azores--getting Salazar to let us use the Azores as a base. This was his great concern, and they finally got in in 1944.

A: On our way over to England, as I indicated, we stopped at the Azores and we actually went out and made a reconnaissance of where we thought an airport could be built.

Q: Santa Maria Island?

A: Right, which turned out to be a temporary island, and eventually a base was built there. A physical and visual reconnaissance was made while we were there in 1941.

Q: You know, Salazar was holding out for a role in WW II, starting in 1943, when it turned out that we were going to win the war, he wanted to enter the war and he wanted a little contingent of Portuguese to occupy Timor Island. Timor was out near Bali, which was Portuguese property. If they had a platoon go ashore, and then they could say it was in the war effort, and he was holding out for a role, and Arnold refused to accede. Did you ever get into that?

A: No, I never got into that. You are reminding me of many things which I had in fact forgotten, particularly in the Azores. We actually made a reconnaissance of a place where American aircraft could be based.

Q: He was so concerned about that, because the northern route between November and March was very, it was dangerous. The Southern route was, would add 5 or 6,000 miles to the trip, so he was trying to go through the Central Atlantic.

A: His interest was influenced by weather. That was a good weather route--admitted by further, but it was more reliable.

Q: The Azores would have been more direct and it would be an all year round route. But Salazar was holding out for a price. I want to get into another area. After this trip, when was your next contact with Arnold. I guess Pearl Harbor?

A: My next contact with Arnold was after the trip to England, one of my tasks was to initiate staff action to implement some of his commitments made in England.

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A: Oh, much more so, in a different way. He was, although Leahy was sort of the Chairman of the JCS, he didn't begin to have the influence that Marshall had. Now to get back to this "Dear Arnold," there is one thing that you ought to know, Marshall never referred to anybody by their first name, he always referred to them by their last names, he would always say "Quesada," he would always say "Spaatz." He would always say "Leahy." That was a characteristic of his, and he almost never varied from it. Just habit.

Q: And nobody ever called him "Dear George?"

A: Oh hell no.

Q: How about the President?

A: I don't know, but I think the President referred to him as "General."

Q: I think he was just so austere and maybe forbidding or distant in his manner, that nobody could call him "George?"

A: There is something to that, but I don't think it was austere. I think of him as a very, very pleaaant personality, whose character made you call him "General," not the reflection of his character.

Q: How about Arnold and King? Did you ever see them together?

A: I've seen them together, but not very much.

Q: You were in the Air Defense business for awhile?

A: I was in the Air Defense business after we came back from England.

Q: Now, you got into the ASW business with the Navy to some degree, did you not?

A: That was over in Africa. In the air defense business I got into a problem that Marshall and Arnold, particularly Arnold, were involved, I must say, Arnold liked me. Why, I don't know, but he did. And I certainly liked him. While I was in command of the Air Defense Wing in Philadelphia, I got into a fracas with the commander of the artillery.

Q: Sanderford Jarman.

A: Yes. It was a fellow who worked for Jarman. I can't remember precisely what was said, but the occasion was when the artillery in Philadelphia put their searchlights on a young pilot in a P-40 who was landing and he was under going training, and I kind of lost my temper, I guess.

Q: There was a big hassle over who should control the AAA?

A: That's right, and I got in the middle of it, and had a big inquiry, and I hollered, over the telephone to this general: "Turn

those lights out!" on the assumption that I had command of them, which was questionable. He brought up the fact that: how do we know that airplane was friendly. And I remember saying, damn it, "the Germans can't even get across the English Channel, although it is only 27 miles wide. How do you expect them to get across the Atlantic Ocean, I'll tell now they are friendly." That started off hell of a row.

Q: The AF never did quite take over the AAA, did it?

A: Never did.

Q: Did Arnold ever get into the middle of that?

A: He sure did.

Q: With Marshall? I saw a lot of correspondence on it, but it never seemed to reach any conclusions.

A: It was never solved. They got into this concept of operational control, and that just created more troubles than it solved.

Q: Just sort of meandered along?

A: Everybody did their best under bad conditions.

Q: Did you have any contact with Arnold during the war?

A: Only when he came over to Europe. He made one of his trips over to Europe and I was one of the principal commanders, and he came around to my headquarters and things like that.

Q: Was this in '43?

A: We were on the continent when he came over.

Q: This was right after D-Day?

A: Yes, then, also not long before the surrender.

Q: Oh, yes, he was sick, this was his recuperation trip. He went to Cannes and he went to the Riviera, and he was sort of on a meandering trip. He had a heart attack, and I wanted to ask you about

this. It's a very important thing in which you are involved, although you may know. If not, I'll tell you about it. If you know it, maybe you can tell me about it. On April 19, 1945, one week after Roosevelt died, there was a big pow wow, I believe in Cannes or the Riviera. I don't know if you were present.

A: I wasn't.

Q: Eaker was making a round-the-world trip. He had just taken the job of Deputy Commander, AAF. He had just come back from Europe. They wanted to relieve Arnold of some of the burden because of the heart attack. I believe Spaatz was there, and Eaker and Arnold, and perhaps others. And they were talking about how we could get closer to the new incumbent in the White House, because we hadn't done too well with the previous incumbent. Many suggestions were kicked around, one of which was get Pete Quesada into the White House as the Exec Air Aide. Did you know about this?

A: I knew about it, but not until afterwards. When Spaatz told me that I was being sent back, he didn't tell me why. If he did tell me, it didn't come through. And I didn't want to go back--the war was over--but nevertheless I went back and after I got back I learned that that was one of the reasons why I was sent back to be Asst Chief of Staff.

Q: But it didn't come about?

A: No.

Q: Probably for the reason that Truman wanted Missourians?

A: He wanted his own.

Q: Harry Vaughan and Bob Landry?

A: That's right. Yes. I remember that, and I don't think it got any place. He had this fellow, and Vaughan wanted his own.

Q: One thing that gave me the clue was that Arnold switched doctors. Arnold had his heart attack, and he had this Dr. Gil Marquardt. He changed doctors, and got Howard Rusk, who was one of Truman's people from Missouri.

A: It's funny you bring this up now, I remember just before leaving Paris. Tooey got me aside and being a very nice person that he is, and very close personal friend for, up till that time, at least 20 years--we were closest of friends all of our lives, and we also liked each other. He said: "Look here, Pete, I want you to know that you are going back to Washington for a purpose, and I want you to fulfill it." He filled me in, indicated that they wanted to try, I do remember now; we want to get you in the White House and the idea is you have a war record, and all that kind of stuff.

Quarter

Problems with Van at Bulge

Msg from A. floating barge down Rhine to destroy bridges - Bob Lee said ridiculous

Q: One thing that gave me the clue was that Arnold switched doctors. Arnold had his heart attack, and he had this Dr. Gil Marquardt. He changed doctors, and got Howard Rusk, who was one of Truman's people from Missouri.

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March 31 - 10 AM

10 AM - 12 AM
March 31

554-3900
~~554-1104~~
call 1/2 - no answer

Refer to Dawson

SAFAAR

January 29, 1970

Lt. General Elwood R. Quesada, USAF (Ret)
990 L'Enfant Plaza South, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20024

Dear General Quesada:

John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past month I've been interviewing some friends of yours and some former associates of General Arnold's now retired in Colorado Springs and in the Southland. Among them are Generals Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Hansell, Partridge, Everest, Kepner, P.D. Weikert, Bob Lee, Thatcher, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others whose names do not readily come to mind.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City, and we have also talked with Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell and Smart here in Washington within the past six months.

You were associated with General Arnold in many enterprises during your respective careers, probably starting in 1941 when you accompanied him to the U.K. I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you at a time and place convenient for you.

I will phone for an appointment within the week. However, if it would be more convenient for your secretary to phone me, my Pentagon numbers are OX 5-3862 and OX 7-5587.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS SECTION

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ELWOOD R. QUESADA, USAF,(RETIRED)

Elwood R. Quesada was born in Washington, D.C., April 13, 1904, He attended Technical High School there, Wyoming Seminary in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, the University of Maryland, and Georgetown University.

In September, 1924, General Quesada entered the Air Service Primary Flying School as a flying cadet and was graduated from the pursuit course on September 14, 1925. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Reserve and reverted to inactive status.

On January 23, 1927, General Quesada was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Corps of the Regular Army. His first duty was engineering officer at Bolling Field, D. C., where he served from April, 1927, until June, 1928. He then was made flying aide to General Fechet who was Chief of Air Corps. Following his tour of duty as flying aide to General Fechet, he was appointed assistant military attache to Cuba. He served in this capacity from October, 1930, to April, 1932, when he returned to Bolling Field as engineering officer. At that time he was made flying aide to F. Trubee Davison, then Assistant Secretary of War for Air. His accumulated leave in the Army totaled four months in the summer of 1933, so he took a holiday in a Sikorsky amphibian and flew all over Africa with F. Trubee Davison and Martin Johnson on a mission to collect animals for the New York Museum of Natural History.

When the air mail contracts were cancelled in the winter of 1933-34, General Quesada was made chief pilot on the New York-Cleveland route. He then became a flying aide to General Hugh Johnson, Administrator of the NRA, and when NRA was ended, he became an aide to Secretary of War Dern.

In June, 1937, following a course at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, General Quesada was ordered to Mitchel Field, New York, as flight commander of the First Bombardment Squadron. He left Mitchel Field in June, 1938, and spent the next two and a half years as technical advisor to the Argentine Air Force.

General Quesada was assigned in October, 1940, to the office of the Chief of Air Corps, where he became chief of the Foreign Liaison Section in the Intelligence Division. From July, 1941, to April,1942, he was in command of the 33rd Pursuit Group at Mitchel Field. He then assumed command of the Philadelphia Region of the First Fighter Command, and in December, 1942, returned to Mitchel Field as commanding general of the First Air Defense Wing, which he took to Africa early in 1943.

MORE

1. Pilot to Dern
2. Visit to UK with Arnold Apr 41
3. Meeting Apr 1945 - Quesada to U.K.

Soon after arriving in Africa, General Quesada was given command of the 12th Fighter Command, and also filled the position of Deputy Commander of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force. He participated in many operational flights during the Tunisian, Sicilian, Corsican, and Italian Campaigns. He continued with the 12th Fighter Command until the landings in Italy had been well established.

In October, 1943, General Quesada arrived in England, where he assumed command of the 9th Fighter Command. He established advanced headquarters of the Normandy beachhead on D-Day plus one, and directed the planes of the Ninth Fighter Command as they furnished aerial cover and air support for the Allied invasion of the continent He then became commanding general of the Ninth Tactical Air Command, which from that time until the cessation of hostilities in Europe worked in cooperation and coordination with the First U.S. Army.

In April, 1945, General Quesada was assigned as Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence at Air Force headquarters. On March 1, 1946, he assumed command of the Third Air Force in Tampa, Florida. A few weeks later, the Third Air Force was redesignated Tactical Air Command, with General Quesada as commanding general.

General Quesada became Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for Reserve Forces in November, 1948. The following August he was named by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to head a Special Planning Project for that agency, with station at Washington, D.C., and a month later became chairman of the Joint Technical Planning Committee in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was designated commander of JTF-3 in that office in March, 1950.

General Quesada has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross, Legion of Merit, Air Medal with two Silver Oak Leaf Clusters, Purple Heart, American Defense ribbon, European-African-Mediterranean theater ribbon with seven battle participation stars.

His foreign decorations include the British Order of the Bath (Degree of Companion); the Commander of the British Empire; the French Legion of Honor; the French Croix de Guerre with Palm; Luxembourg Croix de Guerre; Order of Adolphe of Nassau; the Polish Pilot's Badge, and the Belgium Order of the Couronne in the grade of Commander, with aviation Palm, and Croix de Guerre with Aviation Palm.

He is rated a command pilot, combat observer, aircraft observer, and technical observer.

General and Mrs. Quesada, the former Miss Kate Davis Pulitzer, have two daughters and a son.
General Quesada retired October 31, 1951.

MORE

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) November 1, 1932; to captain (temporary) April 20, 1935; to captain (permanent) January 25, 1937; to major (temporary) Dembember 30, 1940; to lieutenant Colonel (temporary)January 5, 1942; to colonel (temporary) March 1. 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) December 11, 1942; to major (prcmanent) January 23, 1944; to major general (temporary) April 28, 1944; to lieutenant general (temporary) October 1. 1947; to brigadier general (permonant) February 19, 1948; with date of rank from December 12, 1942; to major general (pormanent) October 9, 1951 with date of rank from September 20, 1949.

END

Up to date as of 31 October 1951

Raymond, Arthur 14 Aug 70

Transc _____
Card _____

Interview, Arthur Raymond, San Diego, Cal., 14 August 1970
(General Doolittle and Reuben Fleet, minor participation)

Q: (To Mr. Raymond) Do you recall your first exposure to Hap Arnold?

R: I think the first time I saw him was in Dayton, at the time when you mentioned that he didn't have too much to do...

Q: 1930-1931?

R: He was writing boy's books, I think that was the first time.

Q: Is that a fair analysis. He did not have enough to keep a very active man busy?

R: I think so.

Q: So he was writing boys books. He also was involved in a patent. He was trying to patent a toy airplane. He and Bill Streett had been involved in this thing, and he was trying to raise some money for that?

R: I don't remember.

Q: Did you have any experience with him at Dayton, personal experiences?

R: Not at Dayton, no; I saw him briefly there.

Q: Cong Pratt was the CO of the whole operation?

R: I guess so, I don't remember. I remember Jan Howard being there, so on.

Q: Were you aware of their conflict? I guess this was general knowledge, was it?

R: Not too much. Again, I wasn't very political, or involved in intrigues of any kind.

Q: What was your job there.

R: I don't remember exactly what year that was, but

Q: It was sometime between '29 and early '31.

R: Then I was Asst Chief Engineer at Douglas until '34. Dutch Kindelberger was Chief, and he left in '34 to form North American.

Q: When was your next experience with Arnold?

R: Well, I had one experience with him that Jimmy might like to hear about. Jimmy is involved in it, incidentally. He probably doesn't remember it. It was at the time when General Doolittle was preparing for the Tokyo raid, I think. And I didn't know that, of course, at the time. But I think you (addressing Doolittle) were detailed in General Echols office in Washington, and I correct. At that period of time?

D: (Nodding affirmative)

R: I had been asked to see what I could do to get the AF interested in a latge transport airplane, which subsequently became the C-73. I went into Dayton, first, and saw Franklin Carroll, and he said: "Well, we can't do anything much about that here. You'd better go into Washington. So I went into Washington and I went up to Oliver Echols office, and put on my sales talk and showed pictures, and this and that. He turned me over to General Doolittle, and I didn't get anywhere with General Doolittle because he had something else on his mind, quite obviously, at that time. He turned me over to Benny Chidlaw, and I didn't get much of anywhere with Benny Chidlaw either, So the days went by, and I was kind of wandering disconsolately around, deciding I'd better go home because I hadn't gotten anywhere, and I ran into Hap Arnold in one of the halls. This was at the Old Munitions Building. I guess he was kind of making a kind of inspection at the time, going around through the halls. He said: "Well what are you doing here? And I said: "Oh, I'm trying to sell this large transport airplane. " And he said: "Come on into the office." So I went into

his office, and he said: "Tell me about it.: So I pulled out my little brochure and gave him the sales talk." He said: "You've seen Oliver Echols about this?" And I said: "Yes." And he said: "Kinds of looks to me as though this is the kind of airplane we need in the Pacific. So he went into what I believe was General Marshall's office, which must have been quite close to his, and was there for about 5 minutes. Then he came back, and he said: "I suggest you go see General Echols on this again on Friday."

Q: Maybe it was Lovett's office. His was next door.

R: No, it was General Marshall, I'm sure. So I did, and my reception was altogether different that time when I went in there. The net result was that I called for Ted Conaut to come in to reinforce me because he was the man who had the dollar signs and knew about those things. So he came in, and I remember Hap Arnold saying at that time: "Well, I don't care what you say the airplane is going to cost: There is no airplane that is worth more than a million dollars. So we aren't going to pay more than a million dollars for this. I think that's what the contract was for, and I think we probably lost money on it. But we didn't build very many of them. It got changed into the C-124, as you remember, with a big deep (one ward), bitt that to me was an example of what General Doolittle has said here of Hap's ability, in the first place, to make up his mind in a great big hurry; and secondly, not to worry too much about going through channels, etc. Now, my relationship with Hap Arnold was -- there was a great difference in age, of course, between us -- and I kind of looked up to him as a father image more than, certainly, as a contemporary. He just put his arm around my shoulder when he saw me. He was always very

friendly and fatherly, anyway, to anybody who was in a younger position. Other than that particular experience with him, my contact with him was simply of an informal nature. When he would come to luncheon or when I went to talk to him he was arriving for an inspection of the plant, or something of that sort.

Q: Well, late in the war, you got involved in the B-29 business, wasn't Douglas building B-29s, or parts of B-29s?

R: B-24s and B-17s.

Q: You didn't get into the B-29s?

R: I don; think we got into the B-29 at all, to my recollection.

Q: Did you get into the analysis of the B-29 in the Pacific? Was there a team that helped analyze the strategic bombing effort. I seem to recall your name...

R: Yes, but that's in connection with Dr. Bowles' office. The only other contact we had was in connection with Enola Gay and the atomic bomb, and that was a case where I guess that arose indirectly through the Bowles connection, too. Frank Collbohm, who later was president of RAND, was what I called my technical assistant at that time, during the war. He came to know a good many people in Washington in connection with this job, and he got picked up by Dr. Bowles to do some work, and he asked me come in and help to, and Ed Welles came in also. The three of us worked on a little job;there which was involved in trying to see whether it would be a good idea to strip the armament, or a lot of the armament off of, I guess, it was the B-29.

Q: Effectiveness of the B-29?

R: Yes, and see if the extra altitude and the extra speed, etc. dexterity that you get that way.

Q: We're talking about the low level bombing.

Doolittle: The B-29 was designed for high altitude bombardment -- bombing in the vicinity of 30,000 feet. But at that altitude, the engines and the superchargers proved unreliable, so that LeMay found over a period of time that his losses due to enemy action were very low, but his losses due to operational failures were very high. As the consequence of this, he decided to try low altitude bombing, feeling that it would be better to face the enemy flak, particularly at night, than to face the assurance of engine failure. This proved to be very, very successful. The engine failures were practically nil at low altitude, and the enemy flak was not prohibitive. So he made that decision, and it was a very wise decision. It had a profound effect on the ability of the 20th AF to do its job with minimum losses.

Q: That's right. You know, later after the war, Stimson and McGeorge Bundy wrote this book and said there were more Japanese casualties, caused by the firebomb raids than the atomic raids. They were more effective in closing down the war than the atomic raid, although it had a tremendous psychological effect. But, Arnold was sick, he was flat on his back at this time. He was at Coral Gables in the hospital. Norstad had sort of taken over the direction of the 20th AF. Well, LeMay had some misgivings, as I read the record, about going in low level. Of course, in Europe, going in low level was suicide, at 7,000 feet. So Norstad came out to the Pacific, and they had a conference. I haven't been able to, well I have a difference of opinion as to what role Norstad played in their decision.

D: I do not know.

Q: Mr. Raymond, now. There were you and Collbohm and Ed Welles. You had done some study on the B-29's effectiveness for Arnold?

R: No, this was for...

Q: LeMay?

R: Well, it was really working for Ed Bowles office, and it was for, I'd say Arnold and Norstad.

Q: Arnold was hors de combat, not in the picture?

R: He wasn't in the picture, directly. I didn't realize that he was out of combat.

Q: They kept it very secret at the time.

R: You see, Dr. Bowles was essentially working with 2 hats; he was working for General Arnold and Stimson.

Q: Both his jobs... Was he Special Assistant?

R: I guess you'd call him special assistant, yes. It's one of those unusual kind of things that happen during war time.

Q: It was special assistant with emphasis on the

R: I think nowadays you would call it Chief Scientist, or something like that. He called in a number of people, Dave Briggs was one and Bill Shockley was another.

Q: Yes, I remember both of them.

R: Well, I was mentiong the atomic bomb. It was really through Frank Collebohm we got involved in Douglas, in making a flight plan analysis of the B-29 in connection with carrying this thing. It was so secret that I didn't even tell Mr. Douglas we were doing it. He called me in the office one day and he said: "What's this I hear about a Weapon X, or something like that." And I said: "What was that, sir?" And he said: "I understand that we are connected with it somehow." And I said: "Oh, are we?" And I thought I was about to lose my job.

Q: Did you know about the weapon?

R: Oh no, I knew about the weapon through Frank Collbohm, in a

general sort of way yes. And there was an Admiral in the Navy, Parsons?

Q: He was the weaponeer.

R: He came in and spent the day with us there at Douglas in connection with this flight job. Warren Dickinson of Douglas was the one who did the work. I knew that the bomb was going to be dropped, before it was dropped. I didn't know what day it was going to be dropped. I went on vacation, up in the High Sierras, and it's pretty hard to get radio reception there, because we were on the east side of the mountains. My wife never could understand why it was that I would get this little radio here, and get my ear to it whenever the news came on, day after day, during the vacation.

Q: You knew about when it was going to be dropped?

R: I knew about when it was going to happen, I got back to my desk at Douglas and right in the my desk in the middle was a notice that it had been dropped. It was dropped during the time I got back, but that was the connection we had with the B-29.

Q: When did Arnold become interested in the RAND comcept?

R: Well, that was the other connection that I had with him. I'd forgotten it when you asked me. And this again, it was certainly connected with Ed Bowles, or Ed Bowles was connected with it. It's funny there was sort of a coming together of various people who all had about the same concept, but a little bit different. One of them was Paul Shearer who was working for Vannevar Bush in the transition office of the OSRD, at that time NDRC (National Defense Research Committee). One was Ed Bowles, and I think onw was Arnold himself. One was me, and I guess there were others. But the general thought was the scientific fraternity and the university fraternity and the business fraternity had all joined hands with the military during

the war, and had been very influential in connection with it. Now that the war was coming to an end, everything was going to be disbanded. What could be done to maintain some continuity in the the years ahead. It was on that basis, I think, that it appealed to General Arnold, and I'm sure that Ed Bowles had a great influence in that. I'm sure that others did, too, at least I'm reasonably sure that others did, too.

Q: You and Collbohm among them?

R: Well, I never talked to General Arnold about it, directly, and I'm not sure whether Frank did or not, but...

Q: Was the initial idea, to put this fledgling concept under the wing of a favorably disposed organization like Doulgas until it could grow up and fly on its own?

R: That's right. It was felt that it needed a strong father to start with, because it was in a sense, a new concept, and to struggle along without good sponsorship might just mean that it would fail. So at the time it came to a head, General Arnold came out to I think, it was Hamilton Field. That really was the time when he said that he would commit a sum of money to finance a contract, if the Douglas Company would take it. He had certain sums of money that were at his discretion at that ime. This was one of those lump sums of money. That was enough to finance it for a period of, I guess three to five years, something like that, so that it would have a sustaining element. It wouldn't have to worry about where the funds were going to come from. Well, Doug was willing to take it on as, you might say in the interests of national security, and all of that. He wasn't too enthusiastic about it from a business point of view, because he could see some dangers in it, from the standpoint of being accused of conflict of interest, and of being accused of using it to obtain

some business, and so on. So Doug never took a primary role in this. As time went on he became less and less a enomored of it. As a matter of fact, and I think through Ed Bowles and, I guess, General LeMay, because General LeMay at that time...

Q: Was Deputy for R&D.

R: Yes. This fell under his wing, which was a strange kind of thing for him to come godfather to. But, at any rate, he did a very good job of it, and there was a formation of four or five aircraft manufacturing company presidents, and so on, who that came together, Clair Egtvedt was one of them. Dutch Kindelberger was another. I can't remember who was on that. Jack Northrop was on it too. They were simply supposed to act more or less as a board of trustees for this little thing. That worked along for a while, but it obviously wasn't very satisfactory, and Doug said: "Well, we've just got to get rid of this. We can't keep it because it's not to our benefit as a business proposition, and it's about time it ought to stand on its own feet. So that was the point at which Rowan Gaither came into the picture and I went back with Frank Collbohm and saw Karl Compton at MIT, who was then one of the trustees of Ford Foundation. We tried to interest the Ford Foundation -- which had just been formed -- through him, and I guess Rowan knew Henry Ford, Jr. himself, I'm not sure. He came to know him late, anyway. I think that the sum of money that they gave to the establishment of RAND as an independent organization was just about the first grant the Ford Foundation gave to anybody. They hadn't really determined yet what their policies were going to be, and so on. But it appealed to the trustees as something which would be in the national interest.

Q: RAND was a revolutionary new concept in several ways?

R: Yes, sure, sure.

Q: The idea of perpetuating inpeacetime a military-industrial complex, you might say. Now adays, it has taken on a different connotation. But at that time....

R: It continued to be a kind of unique concept because the RAND contract was couched in much more general tersm thatn any of the other contracts with any of the other non-profits that came along later. It had a greater degree of independence in setting up its research program than any of the others. The others, in general, were told what ot do, and they did it. But under the particular AF office that it reported to; they happened to get some very broadminded offieers in there. Don Putt was one of them. I don't remember all of them. But it was just lucky that way. I think one of the reasons RAND was os successful during those years was that it wasn't under such tight rein, and the AF showed a remarkable willingness totaccept RAND recommendations and conclusions which were counter to what it thought wasitts best interest at h the time. But that's always been a problem that RAND has had and othershad.

Fleet: Where did they get the name RAND from?

Q: Research and Development, I guess?

R: I've been asked that many times, and I've been accused that it's the first two and last two letters of my name (Arthur Raymond). But that doesn't have anything to do with it. It happened one day in Frank Collbohms' office, which was adjacent to mine. We got together, and said: "What's this going to be called. We were looking for a short name which hopefully wouldn't have other connotations to it. I guess R&D may have coeminto the discussions to some extent. It since has come in more than I remember it. Shortly after we decided on it, we found out that it was being confused with Rand shoes, and various other things, but it turned out to be a pretty good name.

F: What was your biggest appropriation from Ford?

Q: A million dollars, I think it was.

F: Is that all?

R: Yes, it wasn't, it was a lot of money in those days.

Doolittle: About $30 million a year.

R: You mean, as of now?

D: Yes.

R: As of now, it's about $26 million a year. But the AF contract got up as high as $15 million and is now down around $12.5 million.

Q: Talking about Ed Bowles and RAND; would he know about the early days?

R: Yes, Bowles had a great deal to do with it at the very early stages, gut later on, he rather washed his hands of it, I think, because it took a direction which was somewhat different from what he had in mind for it at the geginning. I'm not quite sure what he was objecting to, except it was about the time when some of the soft scientists came in -

for it at the beginning. I'm not quite sure what he was objecting to, except it was about the time when some of the soft scientists came in - so called soft scientists came into the thing as a multi-disciplinary sort of a group. At any rate, he has not been active in connection with RAND since the fairly early years. But he would have good recollections of the initial period. He, incidentally, was at Hamilton Field in connection with this meeting I spole to you about.

Q: I had talked to Donald Yates and he says that Bowles has a very elaborate filing system, and has kept all his correspondence. Bowles also lays claim to doing some scientific type speeches for Arnold, for example, the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences speech when Arnold addressed them.

R: I think he did.

Q: And so he probably wrote that speech, or wrote parts of it.

R: He actually was a kind of Chief Scientist at that time in the Pentagon. I guess the Chief Scientist role hadn't been invented at that time, but that's really what he was doing.

Q: (Question about Stimson and Bowles. Reference to Bowles fallive, out of favor with the front office).

R: He had a pretty free hand.

Q; Stimson was an old man when he was in the job, and Bowles could do anything he wanted?

R: Well then he was working for Arnold, too, I think Arnold leaned on him in connection with technical matters, just as he leaned on von Karman. Bowles was a different kind of a person than von Karman.

Q: In what way?

R: Von Karman was more if the professorial type, a scientist type. Ed Bowles was, to my mind, more of the scientist-engineer, you know, and...

Q: Also, maybe politician, too?

R: Yes.

F: Von Karman was a pretty good politician, too.

Q: Was he? I wondered about that?

R: But, at any rate, there were people whom Bowles liked, and people whom he didn't like, and people who liked Bowles, and didn't like Bowles. It was that kind of a thing. So I think that from feeling that he was the authority of RAND to the position where he could not call all the shots, was probably had something to do with the alienation.

Q: That's a reasonable assumption.

R: Yes, right.

Q: I wanted to ask you about Douglas and Arnold. You were in a unique position to judge that relationship. Of course, they were friends going back to the first war. In the early '30s when Arnold was assinged to March Field, this friendship flourished. Douglas had the Endymion, his boat. The Arnolds went aboard it, and I guess Barbara and Bruce picked it up from that association. From time to time, there had been published rumors. Fro example, I have one here-Drew Pearson, who made assumptions about Douglas being in a favored position because of a relationship with Arnold.

R: Check.

Q: Do you have any comment on that?

R: Well, I'd say that there was nothing whatever to it, because I never knew anyone who was less apt to take advantage of that sort of thing than Doug. One of the things that I believe made the Douglas Company so much, you might say, the preference of airlines in the early stages, wasn't just because they had the DC-3, but it was because it was headed by a man they had complete confidence in as far as his word was concerned, as far as his ethics and his integrity were concerned. So there was just never any intimation of anything like that, except in Drew Pearson's column and I certainly never ran into it, and I don't expect to.

Q: You know, Drew Pearson, for example-and I went through about 6 years of his newspaper clippings, and he appeared almost every day-I discovered about Drew Pearson something about which some people probably don't. Pearson had certain friends, "friends" in a snese that people could not do wrong, and other people who could not do right. Arnold was one of these people who could not do right. Pearson never-in six or seven years of commenting about Arnold, when he was in the spotlight of Washington-never had a good opinion to say about Arnold. If he ahd something good to say about the Air Corps, he would say "Air Corps leaders", if he had something bad to say Arnold was identified. The same thing with Douglas. For example, back in 1959, Pearson was saying something about Douglas having sold blueprints of the DC-4 to Japan. Do you remember?

R: Yes, I do.

Q: Pearson tied Vic Bertrandis into it. What was the story of that? Do you remember?

R: Well, it was something I never liked. There was also a sale to the Russians, you remember, of DC-3s. They built their own DC-3s. I didn't have

anything directly to do with it, Vic Bertrandis was hanling that. I think that it was entirely a business propostiion, as far as Doug was concerned. Of course, we didn't feel about the Japanese or about the Russians then, the way we did subsequently. Aside from the fact that it was a foreign government that might potentially give us trouble, it wasn't a current thing.

Q: Another factor-the State Dept gave them export licenses. They gave some others these export licenses.

R: Yes this is right.

Q: Douglas was interested in selling airplanes, and Japan was a customer?

R: But it just so happened that those two customers subsequently became our enemies, you see.

Q: Drew Pearson also made soem unsavory associations when Barbara Douglas and Bruce Arnold were married.

R: I remember.

Q: Of course, this pained Arnold because he was such a scrupulous man, and because of Donald Douglas. You know, their relationship was always, there was friendship, but it didn' go beyond that. Douglas had to sell his airplanes, not only to Arnold, but to a Board. Is this a fair analysis to make?

R: Yes, I think to supplement what General Doolittle said about Arnold's view of organization, I've always felt that the way he operated was that in view of the kind of an organization that he was the head of, that there were a great many ways in which a bad decision could get stopped, but darn few ways in which a good decision could get started. He made decisions off the cuff quite frequently without taking the time or the depth of analysis,ect., to be sure that they were right. A certain number of them were wrong, but the organization saved him from trouble in general. The ones that were good, since they started from the very top, and had his signature on them, they had some chance of getting through. I've often thought maybe that is the best way to operate the Pentagon, really.

Q: He had a philosophy, if you act or do something, it is better than doing nothing,I have been told about him-if 60% of his decisions were plusses, then it was worht taking the risk of making all these dicisions...

R: Yes, but the other 40% wouldn't go through-maybe only 10%. The others, they'd get caught.

Q: Who was to decide which were the smart decisions or which were the other kind?

R: Well, I think it just became more or less evident, as they filtered down through the system.

Q: Did Lovett a filter for bad dicisions?

R: I think so. I think he was very good filter just as General Doolittle said that they were a good tean. Lovett was a very courtly gentleman, very preceptive and they worked very well in harness with Hap.

Q: How about Giles? Was he a filter? or was he....he seemed to me, toobe too deferential to Arnold?

R: I rather think so, yes.

Q: And Stratemeyer I never got to talk to, so I don't know. Did he have a strong role? Or was he also deferential?

R: I never had to much contact with him, so I don't know.

Q: But lovett did stand up to Arnold in his own way?

R: Oh yes, I think that Arnold would pretty much consider Lovett on a par. Now Lovett is a very great person. How is his health now?

Q: Well, he seemed to be in very good health when I was him a couple of months ago.

R: Good.

Q: I want to ask you about some of these cards here that I've pulled out. Donald Douglas and Arnold. Arnold wrote an article criticizing the immediate postwar commercialization. He was talking about modern airports and he called them glorified cow pastures. Douglas took issue with him on this article that he wrote. He thought that Arnold was shooting from the hip. Arnold foresaw a wide expansion of co commercial aviation in the postwar period. He felt that the commercial aviation interests were not going about it in the right way, that they were not looking after public welfare. They were looking after profits or looking after other things, and not the comfort and convenience of passengers. He wrote this article, and he and Douglas had some small difference. Were you aware of this? It might have been just a passing thing.

R: I have a very vagur memory, but not much.

Q: This was in, say 1947, but you don't have any strong recollections?

R: No, I'm afraid not.

Q: I have four or five items like this, in the same area, where they disagreed on how commercial air should take hold in the postwar period.

R: That seems to have gone by me. I've forgotten.

Q: Probably wasn't important, just one of these passing things.

R: There was a circumstance that didn't involve Arnold. It involved Lovett. Namely, he had the feeling sometime before the war was over, that something should be done to assist the commercial aircraft industry to be prepared for the situation which would exist after the 3 year war was over, so to speak, have some commercial airplanes on the line that could be delivered that could be sold. Lovett took steps, as you know, before the war was over, to put through some Air Force orders for what subsequently was the DC-6, I guess, actually. That did ease the transition somewhat, as far as Douglas was concerned. I don't know that Hap Arnold had any direct connection with that at all, but I know Lovett did. And even as it was, we went from 140,00 140,000 employees, down to, what was it, 28,000 something like that, in practically no time at all.

Q: Let me take you back before the war. The Air Corps bought a bunch of B-18s when Andrews and soem others were pushing for B-17s. The B-18s were considered worthless as bombers because, for one thing, they couldn't fly to Hawii. You know, they were junk. There has been implications that Arnold had some role in buying the B-18s because of the connection with Douglas?

R: I don't think so, I think it was one of those cases of a converted DC-3 and the DC-3 was a pretty inexpensive airplane at that time, due to the fact that there were quite a few of them built.

Q: My meaning was that hte War Dept-Louis Johnson and Woodring wanted to get more airplanes for the same amount of dollars.

R: I think that is more the answer. Now there was the Douglas B-23 of course. I do know that in that case, the decision went elsewhere. I argure with Hap Arnold, tried to sell him on the B-23, and didn't get anywhere with him.

Q: Did you ever feel that he was unfair to Douglas? He may have leaned over in the other diretion?

R: I don't think so, I think it was one of those sases of a converted DC-3 and the DC-3 was a pretty inexpenive airplane at that time, due to the fact that there were quite a few of them built.

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Q: Did you ever feel that he was unfair to Douglas? He may have leaned over in the other direction?

R: No, I don't think, he certainly wasn't prejudiced in favor of Douglas. I didn't think that the fact that I was unable to sell him, that he was leaning too far in the other direction. No, I think that what actually happened there was that we had a chief air aerodynamiant by the name of Bailey Oswald, eho was absolutely incorruptible. I mean if he'd come out with a statement that an airplane that he'd estimated would go so many miles an hour, you couldn't budge him. We'd say: "If you would only make it a couple of miles higher, why I think maybe we can sell the airplane." And he wouldn't do it. This happened in the case of the B-23. It just so happened that he was wrong. The airplane went about 10-12 miles an hour faster than he said.

Q: You might have sold it?

R: Yes. And I think that, if I remember correctly, I saw Hap Arnold at Wright Field, over some ceremony. It was out on the lawn. I told him that the airplane had gone faster than the estimate ect. He said: "Well,a decision was made on the basis of the information we had. I always thought that had something to do with it.

Q: You know, Arnold had a negative attitude toward Wright Field, for various and sundry reasons. He always seemed to be jumping on Wright Field. One reason ascribed that he had been there, and had an unfortunate experience involving Jan Howard as part of this situation. Did you have this feeling, that he seemed to be negative towards Wright Field and all its works?

R: I don't think I could confirm that, I knew there was... well, Jan Howard was, a, you know, kind of person that was always a certain amount of scuttlebutt going around about...

D: Hap didn't take an active part in soem of the things that went on, after he got out of office. I think one reason was that all of us who loved him were trying to take every bit of load off him that we could. None of us would have thought of asking him to participate in anything that would have taken effort and time on his part.

Q: I know when he was on his convalescent trip, after his heart attack, he went to Europe for a period. I don't know if you saw him in Cannes. They had a big meeting; they were trying to spare him. Spaatz told his subordinates; "Don't bring up anything controversial before the old man. Just sort of give him..."

D: We were all trying to take a load off of him because he had just worn himself to a nub.

Q: Were you at the conference, I believe it was either at CAnnes or the Rivierra. It took place on April 19, 1945. It was one week after Roosevelt died. Roosevelt was no fan of the AAF; he was a Navy man, and he was a reluctant supporter of the AF. Now that Roosevelt was dead, the AF-Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker,Eaker was taking a round the world trip, he was just about to take over as Deputy Commander. They got together and they had this little meeting. They said: "How can we get closer to the new incumbent in the White House, so that we can do better for the AF, than we did with the previous man?" And they plotted-plotted is a conspiratorial word- but they planned different things ot do. One of them was to put Pete Quesada in the White House as Air Aide to Harry Truman. But Harry Truman would have noe of that, he wanted a Missourian in there. So that didn't work out. You were in Europe at the time. Did you attend this conference, or know about it?

D: I attended the conference, but I did not attend that part of it. Hap was there. One of the things that I remember best was that we had Hap on the first floor, most of the bedrooms were on the second floor. It was on the Riviera, yes, We didn't feel that it was safe for Hap to walk up one flight of stairs. So we kept him on the bottom floor.

Q: What were some some of the things they talked about at that meeting. Do you remember?

D: Nothing that I would care to recall.

Q: Somebody mentioned that Lovett was sort of a balance wheel.

D: That's right.

Q: Arnold was very impulsive, and Lovett got him back on the tracks sometimes. Is this true?

D: I would say that Arnold was strictly a military man, and used to making very rapid decisions, without perhaps taking into consideration all of the political considerations. Lovett, as a lawyer, knew the political side of it very well, and between the two of them, I think they made an almost perfect team.

Q: Lovett would sometimes steer him back without sort of letting him know that he was being steered back?

D: I would think so. I think that's a fair statement.

Q: What resposibility did Lovett have. Did he have any specific ones, or just, sort of across the board.

D: He was Asst Secy of the Army for Air, and yes, he had very different, the Constitution says that our military establishment will be run by cililians. So he was really the head Air man. Hap, of course, was the dominating influence. And I would say that Lovett was the ameliorating and smoothing our influence.

Q: Just as Arnold and Lovett got along superbly, Arnold and Patterson had different chemistry. I've been told this. Do you have any knowledge of or experience with that combination?

D: No, I had very little to do with Judge Patterson. When the war was over, I was then a three-star general. I was asked if I would accept a BG in the Regular Army of the US, I was a reserve officer, the only reserve officer to achieve three star rank in any of the services. So I got this letter from Judge Patterson, saying: "I hereby invite you to accept commission as a regular BG in the Army." I wrote back, and there were three paragraphs to the letter. THe first paragraph;"I am very pleased to accept appointment as a BG in the regular Army." Paragraph two: "If I am eligible for retirement," which I was , "this letter constitutes my request for retirement." Paragraph three: "If I am not eligibilie for retirement, this letter constitutes my resignation." So I'm probably the shortest term BG in the regular Army of the US,there ever was. So immediately Patterson called me on the phone, and he said; "Dog gone you, Jimmy. You know you are eligible for retirement, and I'm not going to retire you." He said: "I know where you are going. You're going back to Shell Oil Company as the VP." He said: "If you think the Government is going to pay you retirement pay, you are crazy."

I waid: "Very well, Mr. Secy." So I retired with no retirement pay. Then I went back into the Reserves. Many, many years later, as a matter of fact, 11 years ago, Rosie O'Donnell was in charge of personnel in the Reserves. He called me up and said: "Listen, we've got a little problem." And I said: "What is it?" He said: "You're a LTGEN in the Reserve. There's never been a LTGEN in the Reserve, and there is no law that says when you should retire." He said: "We don't know what to do about it. What do you suggest?" And I said: "Well, suppose I were a regular LTGEN . When would I retire?" He said? "You retire when you are 62." And I said: "I'm 62." And he said: "I know it." I said: "Well, retire me!" And he said: "All right." So I was retired, But this time I was retired as a LTGEN with full retirement privileges, and so, that was 11 years ago, it amounts to about $12,000 a year.

Q: (B-17 vs B-24)

D: The B-24 just did a hell of a good job in the Pacific. Now when you talk to George Kenney, I think you will find he liked the B-24 more than the B-17. I did not, simply because my losses were too high.

Q: You mentioned something about the Truman Invertigating Committee. Somebody told me that when Truman became President, and Roosevelt died, Benny Meyers saw the handwriting on the wall. Truman had given him a hard time when he came out to Wright Field. Benny Meyers rushed down ot Coral Gables to get himself physically set, you know, before the Board.

F: Rehabilitation?

Q: So he could retire. Did you ever hear anything about that? The reason I ask you is that you say that Arnold wanted you to take over the Materiel Command?

D: This was after the war in England was over.

Q: Right. Exactly in June 1945, they had reorganized the, or a little before that, they had reorganized Wright Field, and it had become the Air Technical Service Command. Knudsen was the Commander; Benny Meyers was the No. 2 man. Knudsen was leaving, Benny Meyers had aspired to that job. But maybe Arnold offered you the job, and you didn't want it.

D: Right.

Q: You wanted to go out to the Pacific, so he gave it to Knerr. Knerr got that job, but Benny Meyers figured he'd better retire. And it was just on June 22, 1945, that the anonymous letter came in to Washington about Benny Meyers. It was filed for 2 years, and then, the Ferguson Committee unearthed it. Did you hear any-

thing-there were some things said about Meyers-some suspicions about his integrity. Did you hear anything about that?

D: Nothing that I would care to talk about.

F: What ever happened to him.

Q: Well, I heard two rumors. One that he is in NJ, and one that he is in San Francisco. Do you know?

D: No, I don't know where he is.

F: He's been out of the AF for years.

Q: Let's talk of Billy Mitchell and Roosevelt. Billy Mitchell was very active in Roosevelt's election in 1932. And he thought the millenium had arrived when Roosevelt was elected, that he would be restored to a position of glory because he had fared very badly under Hoover and Coolidge. But he got the brushoff. I was up to Hyde Park and I saw letters from McIntyne, from Steve Early. They gave Billy Mitchell the brushoff, he was trying to get to see Roosevelt, and he aspirations to take the job that Trubee Davison had filled, the Asst Secy of War for Air. Now, this is in the 1930's. But he became progressively disillusioned with Roosevelt, because he was fobbed off, especially during the time of the Baker Board and the Drum Board. Do you know anything about this?

D: I've heard a lot of rumors about these things, but I don't care to repeat rumors. Whenever I know the facts I will give them to you.

Q: Now, you were a member of the Baker Board. I'd forgotten that, but I'm glad you reminded me. There was strong opposition to giving the AF the goal you wanted, autonomy, but within the War Department there was strong opposition. Who were those opposed to giving the AF any measure of control of its own destiny?

D: The Board was unanimous, except for my minoriyt report, as far as I know, if the only part of the Baker Board report that recommended that the AF be given their autonomy. That is available. I would recommend, if you are going to putter with this, that you read that minority report, because it was rahter puisant? Many of the things that I recommended in that minority report came to pass later. I think it is worth your reading.

Q: Well, I will, I will read it now. I knew that you had been on the board, but I had forgotten until you mentioned it. They ended up in a compromise, again. Another compromise, and the GHQ AF was established in March 1935. Then Arnold came into Washington as Asst Chief. Malin Craig became Chief, and he brought

Arnold in. Now, I've talked to Knerr at great length. I've talked to him twice, Knerr is no fan of Hap Arnold's. He was a fan of Andrews. He indicates that Arnold was no supporter of heavy bomber program in the late '30's. When Andrews as head of the GHQ AF was pushing for B-17s, Arnold was playing the company game of not pursuing the heavy bomber program as conscientiously as he could have. Do you have any thought?

D: I do not have the facts. No.

Q: Of course this brigns me to talk about Andrews and Arnold in that period.

D: Andrews and Arnold were, to some degree, competitors. They were both very great men. It is only natural that two great men should each aspire to the top job. Arnold was given the job in Washington, and Andrews was given the GHQ AF with Hqs. at Langley. This was, to a some degree, a compromise also, splitting up the two top jobs between these two top people.

Q: Andrews wrote a couple of articles, pushing for greater auonomy for the AF, and was slapped down by Malin Craig.

F: Who was Malin Craig?

Q: Malin Craig was the Chief of Staff who succeeded MacArthur and he in turn was succeeded by Marshall in '39.

F: He was an old line Army officer.

Q: He didn't know anything about airpower but he liked Arnold. You see he met Arnold in California, when Arnold was Commander of March Field.

D: Malin Craig, I think at that time, was Corps Area Air Officer in California.

Q: In the Presidio. But he had acquired confidence in Arnold. That's how Arnold got back into Washington, when he came back in. You know nothing of this?

D: I was not in the inner circle at that time. I was not back in the service; I was out of the service.

Q: This brings me to another question. When Arnold became Chief of the Air Corps, and I believe you had come in. Of course, you were a LTCOL, so you might not have been privy to the higher policy. Knerr told me that Arnold tried to get rid of his competitors, get them out of Washington. His competitors were Emmons and Andrews. Emmons got his third star before Arnold got his third star, in 1941. Emmons was Chief of the AF Combat Command, which was the successor organization to the GHQ AF. He got his third star before Arnold got his third star.

D: I don't remember that.

Q: And he had aspirations-this is several months before Pearl Harbor-he had aspirations to head up the AF. Those that don't like Arnold, or somebody that doesn't like Arnold, has told me that Arnold watched the garden grow of all the AF officers, and anybody that stuck his head up above anybody else (sign of scythe). In other words, he wanted to head up the AF. This is somebody who had a very narrow view or very negative view of Arnold in this capacity. Do you have any thought about that?

D: No, I have no knowledge of this at all except to say that when anyone gets in the cutthroat environment of Washington, they are not usually in the habit of building up their competitors.

Q: It's a normal reaction, and stated very well. Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Marshall?

D: Only that on the occasions when I was with them both, together. They seemed to be in complete accord, and to my knowledge, I know of no occasion where Marshall did not support Arnold. Arnold was Marshall's good, right hand Airman.

Q: He was equal but not quite equal?

D: They were both five star generals, but there was no question as to who was the boss.

Q: In their extensive correspondence, it's "Dear General," from Arnold to Marshall and "Dear Arnold," from Marshall to Arnold. You see, he called him by his last name. So it was equal, but one step below. I talked to Curly Wolfinbarger.

D: That was Roosevelt's doing, naturally. I think it was also the doing of the two individuals, because Arnold had tremendous respect for and confidence in Marshall. He looked upon him as his superior, as he had always been.

Q: General Doolittle, you know, Jan Howard came into Washington with Andrews in 1940, when Andrews was brought back by Marshall to become G-3. Jan Howard was his Engineering Officer in the War Dept General Staff. Jan Howard got into trouble, both with Arnold and with other people. He was taken out of that job. Now you had just come back into rank and duty, do you remember, do you have any recollection?

D: I didn't get to Washington until the following year, end of the following year, my first year and a half after coming back, first of July 1940, first six months more of less in Indianapolis, and the next year in Detroit. This was before my time in Washington.

Q: I think I've exhaused my questions, but I wonder if I could just sort of ask you to wrap up some of the qualities of Arnold that you saw. Good, and maybe bad.

D: In the several decades that I knew, much of which time I worked for General Arnold, I found him to be a very fair, very fair, very intelligent man. He was a devoted, dedicated individual, whose primary objective was to get the job done. He was ordinarily an organizational man, but from time to time he would go completely outside the organization. If he had something on his mind, as he walded down the hall and ran into somebody, and that somebody clicked something in his mind that made him remember that this chap had done a certain job well at such and such a certain time, he'd grab this guy and give him a job to do, completely outside of the organization. So I would say that while he usually worked as a member, as the head man of an organization, he sometimes did rather unusual things and, I'm afraid, in an unorganized way.

Q: Didn't this sort of disrupt an operation? If he grabbed you, and asked you to do something alien to your field, there was somebody in his Air Staff who was normally assigned this chore. Then you were asked to superimpose your talents on top of the regular organization. Didn't this confuse matters?

D: In a thing of this kind, it could have been very confusing. But I think it was time of war. Everybody was interested in getting a job done, and getting a war won. I think that personalities were submerged to the extent where two people worked together very closely and tried to get the job done, despite the lack of organizational leadership and teamwork.

Q: In other words, the normal state was somewhat of confusion anyway in war, and perhaps....

D: I wouldn't say confusion, "uncertainty" is a better word than confusion.

Q: Well, a lot of things were happening simltaneously!

D: That's right. There was always a great degree of uncertainty. But you can have the most perfect organization in the world, and if people don't work together, your organization won't work. On the other hand, you can have the poorest organization in the world, and if people are really determined to make it work, they can make that poor organization work. I'm not advocating poor organization, but what I am advocating is a good organizational structure, and then, a determination on the part of everybody in it, to make it work. Then you have the ideal combination.

Q: WAs this sort of a one-man structure? I mean, there was, Arnold had a organization, but...

D: Arnold very definitely dominated the entire structure.

Q: I wanted to ask you something back on Arnold. If a man made a mistake, and came in and said: "It was an honest mistake," or it was something, that circumstances had intervened, was Arnold forgiving?

D: I would imagine and it would, that he was reasonably tolerant, reasonably tolerant of honest mistakes, unless he was personally embarrassed by the mistake. If somebody made a stupid mistake, no matter how honest, and Arnold bore the brunt of that chaps mistake, it was a little more difficult for him to be forgiving.

F: That's a pretty good asseasment, isn't it?

Q: That's excellent.

Transc _____
Card _____

Interview, Arthur Raymond, San Diego, Cal., 14 August 1970
(General Doolittle and Reuben Fleet, minor participation)

Q: (To Mr. Raymond) Do you recall your first exposure to Hap Arnold?

R: I think the first time I saw him was in Dayton, at the time when you mentioned that he didn't have too much to do...

Q: 1930-1931?

R: He was writing boy's books, I think that was the first time.

Q: Is that a fair analysis. He did not have enough to keep a very active man busy?

R: I think so.

Q: So he was writing boys books. He also was involved in a patent. He was trying to patent a toy airplane. He and Bill Streett had been involved in this thing, and he was trying to raise some money for that?

R: I don't remember.

Q: Did you have any experience with him at Dayton, personal experiences?

R: Not at Dayton, no; I saw him briefly there.

Q: Cong Pratt was the CO of the whole operation?

R: I guess so, I don't remember. I remember Jan Howard being there, so on.

Q: Were you aware of their conflict? I guess this was general knowledge, was it?

R: Not too much. Again, I wasn't very political, or involved in intrigues of any kind.

Q: What was your job there.

R: I don't remember exactly what year that was, but

Q: It was sometime between '29 and early '31.

R: Then I was Asst Chief Engineer at Douglas until '34. Dutch Kindelberger was Chief, and he left in '34 to form North American.

Q: When was your next experience with Arnold?

R: Well, I had one experience with him that Jimmy might like to hear about. Jimmy is involved in it, incidentally. He probably doesn't remember it. It was at the time when General Doolittle was preparing for the Tokyo raid, I think. And I didn't know that, of course, at the time. But I think you (addressing Doolittle) were detailed in General Echols office in Washington, and I correct. At that period of time?

D: (Nodding affirmative)

R: I had been asked to see what I could do to get the AF interested in a latge transport airplane, which subsequently became the C-73. I went into Dayton, first, and saw Franklin Carroll, and he said: "Well, we can't do anything much about that here. You'd better go into Washington. So I went into Washington and I went up to Oliver Echols office, and put on my sales talk and showed pictures, and this and that. He turned me over to General Doolittle, and I didn't get anywhere with General Doolittle because he had something else on his mind, quite obviously, at that time. He turned me over to Benny Chidlaw, and I didn't get much of anywhere with Benny Chidlaw either, So the days went by, and I was kind of wandering disconsolately around, deciding I'd better go home because I hadn't gotten anywhere, and I ran into Hap Arnold in one of the halls. This was at the Old Munitions Building. I guess he was kind of making a kind of inspection at the time, going around through the halls. He said: "Well what are you doing here? And I said: "Oh, I'm trying to sell this large transport airplane. " And he said: "Come on into the office." So I went into

his office, and he said: "Tell me about it.: So I pulled out my little brochure and gave him the sales talk." He said: "You've seen Oliver Echols about this?" And I said: "Yes." And he said: "Kind of looks to me as though this is the kind of airplane we need in the Pacific. So he went into what I believe was General Marshall's office, which must have been quite close to his, and was there for about 5 minutes. Then he came back, and he said: "I suggest you go see General Echols on this again on Friday."

Q: Maybe it was Lovett's office. His was next door.

R: No, it was General Marshall, I'm sure. So I did, and my reception was altogether different that time when I went in there. The net result was that I called for Ted Conaut to come in to reinforce me because he was the man who had the dollar signs and knew about those things. So he came in, and I remember Hap Arnold saying at that time: "Well, I don't care what you say the airplane is going to cost. There is no airplane that is worth more than a million dollars. So we aren't going to pay more than a million dollars for this. I think that's what the contract was for, and I think we probably lost money on it. But we didn't build very many of them. It got changed into the C-124, as you remember, with a big deep (one ward), bitt that to me was an example of what General Doolittle has said here of Hap's ability, in the first place, to make up his mind in a great big hurry; and secondly, not to worry too much about going through channels, etc. Now, my relationship with Hap Arnold was -- there was a great difference in age, of course, between us -- and I kind of looked up to him as a father image more than, certainly, as a contemporary. He just put his arm around my shoulder when he saw me. He was always very

friendly and fatherly, anyway, to anybody who was in a younger position. Other than that particular experience with him, my contact with him was simply of an informal nature. When he would come to luncheon or when I went to talk to him he was arriving for an inspection of the plant, or something of that sort.

Q: Well, late in the war, you got involved in the B-29 business, wasn't Douglas building B-29s, or parts of B-29s?

R: B-24s and B-17s.

Q: You didn't get into the B-29s?

R: I don; think we got into the B-29 at all, to my recollection.

Q: Did you get into the analysis of the B-29 in the Pacific? Was there a team that helped analyze the strategic bombing effort. I seem to recall your name...

R: Yes, but that's in connection with Dr. Bowles' office. The only other contact we had was in connection with Enola Gay and the atomic bomb, and that was a case where I guess that arose indirectly through the Bowles connection, too. Frank Collbohm, who later was president of RAND, was what I called my technical assistant at that time, during the war. He came to know a good many people in Washington in connection with this job, and he got picked up by Dr. Bowles to do some work, and he asked me come in and help to, and Ed Welles came in also. The three of us worked on a little job;there which was involved in trying to see whether it would be a good idea to strip the armament, or a lot of the armament off of, I guess, it was the B-29.

Q: Effectiveness of the B-29?

R: Yes, and see if the extra altitude and the extra speed, etc. dexterity that you get that way.

Q: We're talking about the low level bombing.

Doolittle: The B-29 was designed for high altitude bombardment -- bombing in the vicinity of 30,000 feet. But at that altitude, the engines and the superchargers proved unreliable, so that LeMay found over a period of time that his losses due to enemy action were very low, but his losses due to operational failures were very high. As the consequence of this, he decided to try low altitude bombing, feeling that it would be better to face the enemy flak, particularly at night, than to face the assurance of engine failure. This proved to be very, very successful. The engine failures were practically nil at low altitude, and the enemy flak was not prohibitive. So he made that decision, and it was a very wise decision. It had a profound effect on the ability of the 20th AF to do its job with minimum losses.

Q: That's right. You know, later after the war, Stimson and McGeorge Bundy wrote this book and said there were more Japanese casualties, caused by the firebomb raids than the atomic raids. They were more effective in closing down the war than the atomic raid, although it had a tremendous psychological effect. But, Arnold was sick, he was flat on his back at this time. He was at Coral Gables in the hospital. Norstad had sort of taken over the direction of the 20th AF. Well, LeMay had some misgivings, as I read the record, about going in low level. Of course, in Europe, going in low level was suicide, at 7,000 feet. So Norstad came out to the Pacific, and they had a conference. I haven't been able to, well I have a difference of opinion as to what role Norstad played in their decision.

D: I do not know.

Q: Mr. Raymond, now. There were you and Collbohm and Ed Welles. You had done some study on the B-29's effectiveness for Arnold?

R: No, this was for...

Q: LeMay?

R: Well, it was really working for Ed Bowles office, and it was for, I'd say Arnold and Norstad.

Q: Arnold was hors de combat, not in the picture?

R: He wasn't in the picture, directly. I didn't realize that he was out of combat.

Q: They kept it very secret at the time.

R: You see, Dr. Bowles was essentially working with 2 hats; he was working for General Arnold and Stimson.

Q: Both his jobs... Was he Special Assistant?

R: I guess you'd call him special assistant, yes. It's one of those unusual kind of things that happen during war time.

Q: It was special assistant with emphasis on the

R: I think nowadays you would call it Chief Scientist, or something like that. He called in a number of people, Dave Briggs was one and Bill Shockley was another.

Q: Yes, I remember both of them.

R: Well, I was mentiong the atomic bomb. It was really through Frank Collebohm we got involved in Douglas, in making a flight plan analysis of the B-29 in connection with carrying this thing. It was so secret that I didn't even tell Mr. Douglas we were doing it. He called me in the office one day and he said: "What's this I hear about a Weapon X, or something like that." And I said: "What was that, sir?" And he said: "I understand that we are connected with it somehow." And I said: "Oh, are we?" And I thoyght I was about to lose my job.

Q: Did you know about the weapon?

R: Oh no, I knew about the weapon through Frank Collbohm, in a

general sort of way yes. And there was an Admiral in the Navy, Parsons?

Q: He was the weaponeer.

R: He came in and spent the day with us there at Douglas in connection with this flight job. Warren Dickinson of Douglas was the one who did the work. I knew that the bomb was going to be dropped, before it was dropped. I didn't know what day it was going to be dropped. I went on vacation, up in the High Sierras, and it's pretty hard to get radio reception there, because we were on the east side of the mountains. My wife never could understand why it was that I would get this little radio here, and get my ear to it whenever the news came on, day after day, during the vacation.

Q: You knew about when it was going to be dropped?

R: I knew about when it was going to happen, I got back to my desk at Douglas and right in the my desk in the middle was a notice that it had been dropped. It was dropped during the time I got back, but that was the connection we had with the B-29.

Q: When did Arnold become interested in the RAND comcept?

R: Well, that was the other connection that I had with him. I'd forgotten it when you asked me. And this again, it was certainly connected with Ed Bowles, or Ed Bowles was connected with it. It's funny there was sort of a coming together of various people who all had about the same concept, but a little bit different. One of them was Paul Shearer who was working for Vannevar Bush in the transition office of the OSRD, at that time NDRC (National Defense Research Committee). One was Ed Bowles, and I think onw was Arnold himself. One was me, and I guess there were others. But the general thought was the scientific fraternity and the university fraternity and the business fraternity had all joined hands with the military during

the war, and had been very influential in connection with it. Now that the war was coming to an end, everything was going to be disbanded. What could be done to maintain some continuity in to the years ahead. It was on that basis, I think, that it appealed to General Arnold, and I'm sure that Ed Bowles had a great influence in that. I'm sure that others did, too, at least I'm reasonably sure that others did, too.

Q: You and Collbohm among them?

R: Well, I never talked to General Arnold about it, directly, and I'm not sure whether Frank did or not, but...

Q: Was the initial idea, to put this fledgling concept under the wing of a favorably disposed organization like Doulgas until it could grow up and fly on its own?

R: That's right. It was felt that it needed a strong father to start with, because it was in a sense, a new concept, and to struggle along without good sponsorship might just mean that it would fail. So at the time it came to a head, General Arnold came out to I think, it was Hamilton Field. That really was the time when he said that he would commit a sum of money to finance a contract, if the Douglas Company would take it. He had certain sums of money that were at his discretion at that ime. This was one of those lump sums of money. That was enough to finance it for a period of, I guess three to five years, something like that, so that it would have a sustaining element. It wouldn't have to worry about where the funds were going to come from. Well, Doug was willing to take it on as, you might say in the interests of national security, and all of that. He wasn't too enthusiastic about it from a business point of view, because he could see some dangers in it, from the standpoint of being accused of conflict of interest, and of being accused of using it to obtain

some business, and so on. So Doug never took a primary role in this. As time went on he became less and less a enomored of it. As a matter of fact, and I think through Ed Bowles and, I guess, General LeMay, because General LeMay at that time...

Q: Was Deputy for R&D.

R: Yes. This fell under his wing, which was a strange kind of thing for him to come godfather to. But, at any rate, he did a very good job of it, and there was a formation of four or five aircraft manufacturing company presidents, and so on, who that came together, Clair Egtvedt was one of them. Dutch Kindelberger was another. I can't remember who was on that. Jack Northrop was on it too. They were simply supposed to act more or less as a board of trustees for this little thing. That worked along for a while, but it obviously wasn't very satisfactory, and Doug said: "Well, we've just got to get rid of this. We can't keep it because it's not to our benefit as a business proposition, and it's about time it ought to stand on its own feet. So that was the point at which Rowan Gaither came into the picture and I went back with Frank Collbohm and saw Karl Compton at MIT, who was then one of the trustees of Ford Foundation. We tried to interest the Ford Foundation -- which had just been formed -- through him, and I guess Rowan knew Henry Ford, Jr. himself, I'm not sure. He came to know him late, anyway. I think that the sum of money that they gave to the establishment of RAND as an independent organization was just about the first grant the Ford Foundation gave to anybody. They hadn't really determined yet what their policies were going to be, and so on. But it appealed to the trustees as something which would be in the national interest.

Q: RAND was a revolutionary new concept in several ways?

R: Yes, sure, sure.

Q: The idea of perpetuating inpeacetime a military-industrial complex, you might say. Now adays, it has taken on a different connotation. But at that time....

R: It continued to be a kind of unique concept because the RAND contract was couched in much more general tersm thatn any of the other contracts with any of the other non-profits that came along later. It had a greater degree of independence in setting up its research program than any of the others. The others, in general, were told what ot do, and they did it. But under the particular AF office that it reported to; they happened to get some very broadminded officers in there. Don Putt was one of them. I don't remember all of them. But it was just lucky that way. I think one of the reasons RAND was os successful during those years was that it wasn't under such tight rein, and the AF showed a remarkable willingness to accept RAND recommendations and conclusions which were counter to what it thought was its best interest at the time. But that's always been a problem that RAND has had and othershad.

Fleet: Where did they get the name RAND from?

Q: Research and Development, I guess?

R: I've been asked that many times, and I've been accused that it's the first two and last two letters of my name (Arthur Raymond). But that doesn't have anything to do with it. It happened one day in Frank Collbohms' office, which was adjacent to mine. We got together, and said: "What's this going to be called. We were looking for a short name which hopefully wouldn't have other connotations to it. I guess R&D may have coeminto the discussions to some extent. It since has come in more than I remember it. Shortly after we decided on it, we found out that it was being confused with Rand shoes, and various other things, but it turned out to be a pretty good name.

F: What was your biggest appropriation from Ford?

Q: A million dollars, I think it was.

F: Is that all?

R: Yes, it wasn't, it was a lot of money in those days.

Doolittle: About $30 million a year.

R: You mean, as of now?

D: Yes.

R: As of now, it's about $26 million a year. But the AF contract got up as high as $15 million and is now down around $12.5 million.

Q: Talking about Ed Bowles and RAND; would he know about the early days?

R: Yes, Bowles had a great deal to do with it at the very early stages, gut later on, he rather washed his hands of it, I think, because it took a direction which was somewhat different from what he had in mind for it at the geginning. I'm not quite sure what he was objecting to, except it was about the time when some of the soft scientists came in - so called soft scientists came into the thing as a multi-disciplinary sort of a group. At any rate, he has not been active in connection with RAND since the fairly early years. But he would have good recollections of the genesis of it, the initial period. He, incidentally, was at Hamilton Field in connection with this meeting I spole to you about.

Q: I had talked to Donald Yates and he says that Bowles has a very elaborate filing system, and has kept all his correspondence. Bowles also lays claim to doing some scientific type speeches for Arnold, for example, the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences speech when Arnold addressed them.

R: I think he did.

Q: And so he probably wrote that speech, or wrote parts of it.

R: He actually was a kind of Chief Scientist at that time in the Pentagon. I guess the Chief Scientist role hadn't been invented at that time, but that's really what he was doing.

Q: (Question about Stimson and Bowles. Reference to Bowles fallive, out of favor with the front office).

R: He had a pretty free hand.

Q: Stimson was an old man when he was in the job, and Bowles could do anything he wanted?

R: Well then he was working for Arnold, too, I think Arnold leaned on him in connection with technical matters, just as he leaned on von Karman. Bowles was a different kind of a person than von Karman.

Q: In what way?

R: Von Karman was more if the professorial type, a scientist type. Ed Bowles was, to my mind, more of the scientist-engineer, you know, and...

Q: Also, maybe politician, too?

R: Yes.

F: Von Karman was a pretty good politician, too.

Q: Was he? I wondered about that?

R: But, at any rate, there were people whom Bowles liked, and people whom he didn't like, and people who liked Bowles, and didn't like Bowles. It was that kind of a thing. So I think that from feeling that he was the authority of RAND to the position where he could not call all the shots, was probably had something to do with the alienation.

Q: That's a reasonable assumption.

R: Yes, right.

Q: I wanted to ask you about Douglas and Arnold. You were in a unique position to judge that relationship. Of course, they were friends going back to the first war. In the early '30s when Arnold was assinged to March Field, this friendship flourished. Douglas had the Endymion, his boat. The Arnolds went aboard it, and I guess Barbara and Bruce picked it up from that association. From time to time, there had been published rumors. Fro example, I have one here-Drew Pearson, who made assumptions about Douglas being in a favored position because of a relationship with Arnold.

R: Check.

Q: Do you have any comment on that?

R: Well, I'd say that there was nothing whatever to it, because I never knew anyone who was less apt to take advantage of that sort of thing than Doug. One of the things that I believe made the Douglas Company so much, you might say, the preference of airlines in the early stages, wasn't just because they had the DC-3, but it was because it was headed by a man they had complete confidence in as far as his word was concerned, as far as his ethics and his integrity were concerned. So there was just never any intimation of anything like that, except in Drew Pearson's column and I certainly never ran into it, and I don't expect to.

Q: You know, Drew Pearson, for example-and I went through about 6 years of his newspaper clippings, and he appeared almost every day-I discovered about Drew Pearson something about which some people probably don't. Pearson had certain friends, "friends" in a snese that people could not do wrong, and other people who could not do right. Arnold was one of these people who could not do right. Pearson never-in six or seven years of commenting about Arnold, when he was in the spotlight of Washington-never had a good opinion to say about Arnold. If he ahd something good to say about the Air Corps, he would say "Air Corps leaders", if he had something bad to say Arnold was identified. The same thing with Douglas. For example, back in 1959, Pearson was saying something about Douglas having sold blueprints of the DC-4 to Japan. Do you remember?

R: Yes, I do.

Q: Pearson tied Vic Bertrandis into it. What was the story of that? Do you remember?

R: Well, it was something I never liked. There was also a sale to the Russians, you remember, of DC-3s. They built their own DC-3s. I didn't have

anything directly to do with it, Vic Bertrandis was hanling that. I think that it was entirely a business propostiion, as far as Doug was concerned. Of course, we didn't feel about the Japanese or about the Russians then, the way we did subsequently. Aside from the fact that it was a foreign government that might potentially give us trouble, it wasn't a current thing.

Q: Another factor-the State Dept gave them export licenses. They gave some others these export licenses.

R: Yes this is right.

Q: Douglas was interested in selling airplanes, and Japan was a customer?

R: But it just so happened that those two customers subsequently became our enemies, you see.

Q: Drew Pearson also made soem unsavory associations when Barbara Douglas and Bruce Arnold were married.

R: I remember.

Q: Of course, this paingd Arnold because he was such a scrupulous man, and because of Donald Douglas. You know, their relationship was always, there was friendship, but it didn' go beyond that. Douglas had to sell his airplanes, not only to Arnold, but to a Board. Is this a fair analysis to make?

R: Yes, I think to supplement what General Doolittle said about Arnold's view of organization. I've always felt that the way he operated was that in view of the kind of an organization that he was the head of, that there were a great many ways in which a bad decision could get stopped, but darn few ways in which a good decision could get started. He made decisions off the cuff quite frequently without taking the time or the depth of analysis,ect., to be sure that they were right. A certain number of them were wrong, but the organization saved him from trouble in general. The ones that were good, since they started from the very top, and had his signature on them, they had some chance of getting through. I've often thought maybe that is the best way to operate the Pentagon, really.

Q: He had a philosophy, if you act or do something, it is better than doing nothing,I have been told about him-if 60% of his decisions were plusses, then it was worht taking the risk of making all these dicisions...

R: Yes, but the other 40% wouldn't go through-maybe only 10%. The others, they'd get caught.

Q: Who was to decide which were the smart decisions or which were the other kind?

R: Well, I think it just became more or less evident, as they filtered down through the system.

Q: Did Lovett a filter for bad dicisions?

R: I think so. I think he was very good filter just as General Doolittle said that they were a good tean. Lovett was a very courtly gentleman, very preceptive and they worked very well in harness with Hap.

Q: How about Giles? Was he a filter? or was he....he seemed to me, to be too deferential to Arnold?

R: I rather think so, yes.

Q: And Stratemeyer I never got to talk to, so I don't know. Did he have a strong role? Or was he also deferential?

R: I never had to much contact with him, so I don't know.

Q: But lovett did stand up to Arnold in his own way?

R: Oh yes, I think that Arnold would pretty much consider Lovett on a par. Now Lovett is a very great person. How is his health now?

Q: Well, he seemed to be in very good health when I was him a couple of months ago.

R: Good.

Q: I want to ask you about some of these cards here that I've pulled out. Donald Douglas and Arnold. Arnold wrote an article criticizing the immediate postwar commercialization. He was talking about modern airports and he called them glorified cow pastures. Douglas took issue with him on this article that he wrote. He thought that Arnold was shooting from the hip. Arnold foresaw a wide expansion of commercial aviation in the postwar period. He felt that the commercial aviation interests were not going about it in the right way, that they were not looking after public welfare. They were looking after profits or looking after other things, and not the comfort and convenience of passengers. He wrote this article, and he and Douglas had some small difference. Were you aware of this? It might have been just a passing thing.

R: I have a very vagur memory, but not much.

Q: This was in, say 1947, but you don't have any strong recollections?

R: No, I'm afraid not.

Q: I have four or five items like this, in the same area, where they disagreed on how commercial air should take hold in the postwar period.

R: That seems to have gone by me. I've forgotten.

Q: Probably wasn't important, just one of these passing things.

R: There was a circumstance that didn't involve Arnold. It involved Lovett. Namely, he had the feeling sometime before the war was over, that something should be done to assist the commercial aircraft industry to be prepared for the situation which would exist after the 3 year war was over, so to speak, have some commercial airplanes on the line that could be delivered that could be sold. Lovett took steps, as you know, before the war was over, to put through some Air Force orders for what subsequently was the DC-6, I guess, actually. That did ease the transition somewhat, as far as Douglas was concerned. I don't know that Hap Arnold had any direct connection with that at all, but I know Lovett did. And even as it was, we went from 140,000 employees, down to, what was it, 28,000 something like that, in practically no time at all.

Q: Let me take you back before the war. The Air Corps bought a bunch of B-18s when Andrews and soem others were pushing for B-17s. The B-18s were considered worthless as bombers because, for one thing, they couldn't fly to Hawii. You know, they were junk. There has been implications that Arnold had some role in buying the B-18s because of the connection with Douglas?

R: I don't think so, I think it was one of those cases of a converted DC-3 and the DC-3 was a pretty inexpensive airplane at that time, due to the fact that there were quite a few of them built.

Q: My meaning was that hte War Dept-Louis Johnson and Woodring wanted to get more airplanes for the same amount of dollars.

R: I think that is more the answer. Now there was the Douglas B-23 of course. I do know that in that case, the decision went elsewhere. I argure with Hap Arnold, tried to sell him on the B-23, and didn't get anywhere with him.

Q: Did you ever feel that he was unfair to Douglas? He may have leaned over in the other diretion?

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Q: Did you ever feel that he was unfair to Douglas? He may have leaned over in the other direction?

R: No, I don't think, he certainly wasn't prejudiced in favor of Douglas. I didn't think that the fact that I was unable to sell him, that he was leaning too far in the other direction. No, I think that what actually happened there was that we had a chief air aerodynamiant by the name of Bailey Oswald, eho was absolutely incorruptible. I mean if he'd come out with a statement that an airplane that he'd estimated would go so many miles an hour, you couldn't budge him. We'd say: "If you would only make it a couple of miles higher, why I think maybe we can sell the airplane." And he wouldn't do it. This happened in the case of the B-23. It just so happened that he was wrong. The airplane went about 10-12 miles an hour faster than he said.

Q: You might have sold it?

R: Yes. And I think that, if I remember correctly, I saw Hap Arnold at Wright Field, over some ceremony. It was out on the lawn. I told him that the airplane had gone faster than the estimate ect. He said: "Well,a decision was made on the basis of the information we had. I always thought that had something to do with it.

Q: You know, Arnold had a negative attitude toward Wright Field, for various and sundry reasons. He always seemed to be jumping on Wright Field. One reason ascribed that he had been there, and had an unfortunate experience involving Jan Howard as part of this situation. Did you have this feeling, that he seemed to be negative towards Wright Field and all its works?

R: I don't think I could confirm that, I knew there was... well, Jan Howard was, a, you know, kind of person that was always a certain amount of scuttlebutt going around about...

D: Hap didn't take an active part in soem of the things that went on, after he got out of office. I think one reason was that all of us who loved him were trying to take every bit of load off him that we could. None of us would have thought of asking him to participate in anything that would have taken effort and time on his part.

Q: I know when he was on his convalescent trip, after his heart attack, he went to Europe for a period. I don't know if you saw him in Cannes. They had a big meeting; they were trying to spare him. Spaatz told his subordinates: "Don't bring up anything controversial before the old man. Just sort of give him..."

D: We were all trying to take a load off of him because he had just worn himself to a nub.

Q: Were you at the conference, I believe it was either at CAnnes or the Rivierra. It took place on April 19, 1945. It was one week after Roosevelt died. Roosevelt was no fan of the AAF; he was a Navy man, and he was a reluctant supporter of the AF. Now that Roosevelt was dead, the AF-Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker,Eaker was taking a round the world trip, he was just about to take over as Deputy Commander. They got together and they had this little meeting. They said: "How can we get closer to the new incumbent in the White House, so that we can do better for the AF, than we did with the previous man?" And they plotted-plotted is a conspiratorial word- but they planned different things ot do. One of them was to put Pete Quesada in the White House as Air Aide to Harry Truman. But Harry Truman would have noe of that, he wanted a Missourian in there. So that didn't work out. You were in Europe at the time. Did you attend this conference, or know about it?

D: I attended the conference, but I did not attend that part of it. Hap was there. One of the things that I remember best was that we hhd Hap on the first floor, most of the bedrooms were on the second floor. It was on the Riviera, yes. We didn't feel that it was safe for Hap to walk up one flight of stairs. So we kept him on the bottom floor.

Q: What were some some of the things they talked about at that meeting. Do you remember?

D: Nothing that I would care to recall.

Q: Somebody mentioned that Lovett was sort of a balance wheel.

D: That's right.

Q: Arnold was very impulsive, and Lovett got him back on the tracks sometimes. Is this true?

D: I would say that Arnold was strictly a military man, and used to making very rapid decisions, without perhaps taking into consideration all of the political considerations. Lovett, as a lawyer, knew the political side of it very well, and between the two of them, I think they made an almost perfect team.

Q: Lovett would sometimes steer him back without sort of letting him know that he was being steered back?

D: I would think so. I think that's a fair statement.

Q: What resposibility did Lovett have. Did he have any specific ones, or just, sort of across the board.

D: He was Asst Secy of the Army for Air, and yes, he had very different, the Constitution says that our military establishment will be run by cililians. So he was really the head Air man. Hap, of course, was the dominating influence.. And I would say that Lovett was the ameliorating and smoothing our influence.

Q: Just as Arnold and Lovett got along superbly, Arnold and Patterson had different chemistry. I've been told this. Do you have any knowledge of or experience with that combination?

D: No, I had very little to do with Judge Patterson. When the war was over, I was then a three-star general. I was asked if I would accept a BG in the Regular Army of the US, I was a reserve officer, the only reserve officer to achieve three star rank in any of the services. So I got this letter from Judge Patterson, saying: "I hereby invite you to accept commission as a regular BG in the Army." I wrote back, and there were three paragraphs to the letter. THe first paragraph:"I am very pleased to accept appointment as a BG in the regular Army." Paragraph two: "If I am eligible for retirement," which I was , "this letter constitutes my request for retirement." Paragraph three: "If I am not eligibilie for retirement, this letter constitutes my resignation." So I'm probably the shortest term BG in the regular Army of the US,there ever was. So immediately Patterson called me on the phone, and he said; "Dog gone you, Jimmy. You know you are eligible for retirement, and I'm not going to retire you." He said: "I know where you are going. You're going back to Shell Oil Company as the VP." He said: "If you think the Government is going to pay you retirement pay, you are crazy."

I waid: "Very well, Mr. Secy." So I retired with no retirement pay. Then I went back into the Reserves. Many, many years later, as a matter of fact, 11 years ago, Rosie O'Donnell was in charge of personnel in the Reserves. He called me up and said: "Listen, we've got a little problem." And I said: "What is it?" He said: "You're a LTGEN in the Reserve. There's never been a LTGEN in the Reserve, and there is no law that says when you should retire." He said: "We don't know what to do about it. What do you suggest?" And I said: "Well, suppose I were a regular LTGEN . When would I retire?" He said? "You retire when you are 62." And I said: "I'm 62." And he said: "I know it." I said: "Well, retire me!" And he said: "All right." So I was retired, But this time I was retired as a LTGEN with full retirement privileges, and so, that was 11 years ago, it amounts to about $12,000 a year.

Q: (B-17 vs B-24)

D: The B-24 just did a hell of a good job in the Pacific. Now when you talk to George Kenney, I think you will find he liked the B-24 more than the B-17. I did not, simply because my losses were too high.

Q: You mentioned something about the Truman Invertigating Committee. Somebody told me that when Truman became President, and Roosevelt died, Benny Meyers saw the handwriting on the wall. Truman had given him a hard time when he came out to Wright Field. Benny Meyers rushed down ot Coral Gables to get himself physically set, you know, before the Board.

F: Rehabilitation?

Q: So he could retire. Did you ever hear anything about that? The reason I ask you is that you say that Arnold wanted you to take over the Materiel Command?

D: This was after the war in England was over.

Q: Right. Exactly in June 1945, they had reorganized the, or a little before that, they had reorganized Wright Field, and it had become the Air Technical Service Command. Knudsen was the Commander; Benny Meyers was the No. 2 man. Knudsen was leaving, Benny Meyers had aspired to that job. But maybe Arnold offered you the job, and you didn't want it.

D: Right.

Q: You wanted to go out to the Pacific, so he gave it to Knerr. Knerr got that job, but Benny Meyers figured he'd better retire. And it was just on June 22, 1945, that the anonymous letter came in to Washington about Benny Meyers. It was filed for 2 years, and then, the Ferguson Committee unearthed it. Did you hear any-

thing-there were some things said about Meyers-some suspicions about his integrity. Did you hear anything about that?

D: Nothing that I would care to talk about.

F: What ever happened to him.

Q: Well, I heard two rumors. One that he is in NJ, and one that he is in San Francisco. Do you know?

D: No, I don't know where he is.

F: He's been out of the AF for years.

Q: Let's talk of Billy Mitchell and Roosevelt. Billy Mitchell was very active in Roosevelt's election in 1932. And he thought the millenium had arrived when Roosevelt was elected, that he would be restored to a position of glory because he had fared very badly under Hoover and Coolidge. But he got the brushoff. I was up to Hyde Park and I saw letters from McIntyne, from Steve Early. They gave Billy Mitchell the brushoff, he was trying to get to see Roosevelt, and he aspirations to take the job that Trubee Davison had filled, the Asst Secy of War for Air. Now, this is in the 1930's. But he became progressively disillusioned with Roosevelt, because he was fobbed off, especially during the time of the Baker Board and the Drum Board. Do you know anything about this?

D: I've heard a lot of rumors about these things, but I don't care to repeat rumors. Whenever I know the facts I will give them to you.

Q: Now, you were a member of the Baker Board. I'd forgotten that, but I'm glad you reminded me. There was strong opposition to giving the AF the goal you wanted, autonomy, but within the War Department there was strong opposition. Who were those opposed to giving the AF any measure of control of its own destiny?

D: The Board was unanimous, except for my minoriyt report, as far as I know, if the only part of the Baker Board report that recommended that the AF be given their autonomy. That is available. I would recommend, if you are going to putter with this, that you read that minority report, because it was rahter puisant? Many of the things that I recommended in that minority report came to pass later. I think it is worth your reading.

Q: Well, I will, I will read it now. I knew that you had been on the board, but I had forgotten until you mentioned it. They ended up in a compromise, again. Another compromise, and the GHQ AF was established in March 1935. Then Arnold came into Washington as Asst Chief. Malin Craig became Chief, and he brought

Arnold in. Now, I've talked to Knerr at great length. I've talked to him twice, Knerr is no fan of Hap Arnold's. He was a fan of Andrews. He indicates that Arnold was no supporter of heavy bomber program in the late '30's. When Andrews as head of the GHQ AF was pushing for B-17s, Arnold was playing the company game of not pursuing the heavy bomber program as conscientiously as he could have. Do you have any thought?

D: I do not have the facts. No.

Q: Of course this brigns me to talk about Andrews and Arnold in that period.

D: Andrews and Arnold were, to some degree, competitors. They were both very great men. It is only natural that two great men should each aspire to the top job. Arnold was given the job in Washington, and Andrews was given the GHQ AF with Hqs. at Langley. This was, to a some degree, a compromise also, splitting up the two top jobs between these two top people.

Q: Andrews wrote a couple of articles, pushing for greater auonomy for the AF, and was slapped down by Malin Craig.

F: Who was Malin Craig?

Q: Malin Craig was the Chief of Staff who succeeded MacArthur and he in turn was succeeded by Marshall in '39.

F: He was an old line Army officer.

Q: He didn't know anything about airpower but he liked Arnold. You see he met Arnold in California, when Arnold was Commander of March Field.

D: Malin Craig, I think at that time, was Corps Area Air Officer in California.

Q: In the Presidio. But he had acquired confidence in Arnold. That's how Arnold got back into Washington, when he came back in. You know nothing of this?

D: I was not in the inner circle at that time. I was not back in the service; I was out of the service.

Q: This brings me to another question. When Arnold became Chief of the Air Corps, and I believe you had come in. Of course, you were a LTCOL, so you might not have been privy to the higher policy. Knerr told me that Arnold tried to get rid of his competitors, get them out of Washington. His competitors were Emmons and Andrews. Emmons got his third star before Arnold got his third star, in 1941. Emmons was Chief of the AF Combat Command, which was the successor organization to the GHQ AF. He got his third star before Anold got his third star.

D: I don't remember that.

Q: And he had aspirations-this is several months before Pearl Harbor-he had aspirations to head up the AF. Those that don't like Arnold, or somebody that doesn't like Arnold, has told me that Arnold watched the garden grow of all the AF officers, and anybody that stuck his head up above anybody else (sign of scythe). In other words, he wanted to head up the AF. This is somebody who had a very narrow view or very negative view of Arnold in this capacity. Do you have any thought about that?

D: No, I have no knowledge of this at all except to say that when anyone gets in the cutthroat environment of Washington, they are not usually in the habit of building up their competitors.

Q: It's a normal reaction, and stated very well. Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Marshall?

D: Only that on the occasions when I was with them both, together. They seemed to be in complete accord, and to my knowledge, I know of no occasion where Marshall did not support Arnold. Arnold was Marshall's good, right hand Airman.

Q: He was equal but not quite equal?

D: They were both five star generals, but there was no question as to who was the boss.

Q: In their extensive correspondence, it's "Dear General," from Arnold to Marshall and "Dear Arnold," from Marshall to Arnold. You see, he called him by his last name. So it was equal, but one step below. I talked to Curly Wolfinbarger.

D: That was Roosevelt's doing, naturally. I think it was also the doing of the two individuals, because Arnold had tremendous respect for and confidence in Marshall. He looked upon him as his superior, as he had always been.

Q: General Doolittle, you know, Jan Howard came into Washington with Andrews in 1940, when Andrews was brought back by Marshall to become G-3. Jan Howard was his Engineering Officer in the War Dept General Staff. Jan Howard got into trouble, both with Arnold and with other people. He was taken out of that job. Now you had just come back into rank and duty, do you remember, do you have any recollection?

D: I didn't get to Washington until the following year, end of the following year, my first year and a half after coming back, first of July 1940, first six months more or less in Indianapolis, and the next year in Detroit. This was before my time in Washington.

Q: I think I've exhaused my questions, but I wonder if I could just sort of ask you to wrap up some of the qualities of Arnold that you saw. Good, and maybe bad.

D: In the several decades that I knew, much of which time I worked for General Arnold, I found him to be a very fair, very fair, very intelligent man. He was a devoted, dedicated individual, whose primary objective was to get the job done. He was ordinarily an organizational man, but from time to time he would go completely outside the organization. If he had something on his mind, as he walded down the hall and ran into somebody, and that somebody clicked something in his mind that made him remember that this chap had done a certain job well at such and such a certain time, he'd grab this guy and give him a job to do, completely outside of the organization. So I would say that while he usually worked as a member, as the head man of an organization, he sometimes did rather unusual things and, I'm afraid, in an unorganized way.

Q: Didn't this sort of disrupt an operation? If he grabbed you, and asked you to do something alien to your field, there was somebody in his Air Staff who was normally assigned this chore. Then you were asked to superimpose your talents on top of the regular organization. Didn't this confuse matters?

D: In a thing of this kind, it could have been very confusing. But I think it was time of war. Everybody was interested in getting a job done, and getting a war won. I think that personalities were submerged to the extent where two people worked together very closely and tried to get the job done, despite the lack of organizational leadership and teamwork.

Q: In other words, the normal state was somewhat of confusion anyway in war, and perhaps....

D: I wouldn't say confusion, "uncertainty" is a better word than confusion.

Q: Well, a lot of things were happening simltaneously!

D: That's right. There was always a great degree of uncertainty. But you can have the most perfect organization in the world, and if people don't work together, your organization won't work. On the other hand, you can have the poorest organization in the world, and if people are really determined to make it work, they can make that poor organization work. I'm not advocating poor organization, but what I am advocating is a good organizational structure, and then, a determination on the part of everybody in it, to make it work. Then you have the ideal combination.

Q: WAs this sort of a one-man structure? I mean, there was, Arnold had a organization, but...

D: Arnold very definitely dominated the entire structure.

Q: I wanted to ask you something back on Arnold. If a man made a mistake, and came in and said: "It was an honest mistake," or it was something, that circumstances had intervened, was Arnold forgiving?

D: I would imagine and it would, that he was reasonably tolerant, reasonably tolerant of honest mistakes, unless he was personally embarrassed by the mistake. If somebody made a stupid mistake, no matter how honest, and Arnold bore the brunt of that chaps mistake, it was a little more difficult for him to be forgiving.

F: That's a pretty good assessment, isn't it?

Q: That's excellent.

Rickenbacker, Eddie 16 Apr 70

March 25, 1970

Mr. Edward V. Rickenbacker
45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, 10020

Dear Mr. Rickenbacker:

I'm delighted that we can get together on Wednesday, April 15th at 3:30 PM.

I will be at your office at that time.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

OFFICE PHONE: OX5-3862

Confirmed by phone

EDWARD V. RICKENBACKER
45 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 10020
TEL. LT 1-7576

March 18, 1970.

Dr. Murray Green
Research & Analysis Division (SAFAAR)
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

On my return to the office I found your letter of March 4 requesting an appointment between April 13 and 17 in order to discuss General Hap Arnold.

As I will be in the city at that time, I would suggest 3:30 P.M., Wednesday, April 15, and would appreciate your confirming this to me.

Sincerely,

E. V. Rickenbacker

EVR:jl

done
9-15-70
very short. had
to leave for work.

4 March 1970

Honorable Eddie Rickenbacker
45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Rickenbacker:

John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House.

I am normally in the Office of Secretary Robert Seamans, Jr., and am a trained historian. I've been on a Brookings Institution Fellowship to search the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, Mitchell, et al collections at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division.

I've also been up to the FDR Library at Hyde Park for several weeks.

As we have completed our research of the written word, we are engaged in interviewing the key personalities who were associated with General Arnold some time during his career. I've talked with Robert Lovett and Generals Kuter, Norstad and Kenney in New York.

In Washington I've interviewed Jackie Cochran, and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Smart and many others. Recently in Florida, I interviewed General Bill Nuckols who accompanied you on several trips which you undertook for Secretary Stimson and General Arnold. Several issues came up on which Nuckols suggested that "Rick" might know the answers.

I'm hopeful it will be possible for you to spare me an hour or two in mid-April during a planned visit to New York. May I suggest some time during the week of April 13-17th.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

EDWARD V. RICKENBACKER
45 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 10020
TEL. LT 1-7576

March 9, 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Your letter of March 4 has been received during Captain Rickenbacker's absence for ten days to two weeks but it will be brought to his attention immediately on his return when you will hear from him.

Sincerely,

Marguerite H. Shepherd
Secretary to E.V.Rickenbacker

Rickenbacker

1. what was purpose of your WW II missions
(1A) - Well received in Britain
2. Arnold - Adamson exchange - "install in crews the will to kill"

3. your book (p. 265) you said top brass of air corps laughed at you re ordering 1,000 DC-4s. who laughed at you? You say A. was 6/6 - time is 1935-38

4. Stimson directive
4A - R. asks for secrecy
5. Spaatz records - Rick came incognito
a) Criticism of air equipment - US
6. Visit to Alaskan Theater - ~~Sept~~ Oct 43.
Purposes
(7) More Hat in Ring insigna - N. Africa
No Publicity
8. Coded weather - complaint
(9) Visit to Moscow
10. Report to Marshall - Stimson - Arnold.
any directive? - what channels?
10A - Whiskey - Beer
11. Trip to Russia
A) Arnold Worried?
B) FDR Opposed?

c) Why did Russians shoot you so much? You were no special friend of theirs?

12. Flying Jr Hump - CNAC better than ATC Report to Marshall - Arnolds response

13 P-51 - Takes Credit - Tom Hitchcock

14. - Pan Am attempts to Circumvent Miami from Puerto Rico

Gillespie

15 - Arnold Questions - So. Atl. Ferry Route -

16 - Complained - business as usual

(17) Secret Reports ?? A-bomb no mention by mr George Bundy

(18) - Hero Like Rickenbacker

(19) Pretty good production - Germany - fall of 1944

New York City

Dean Rusk	400 E. 34th St NYC	Monday Apr 13 - 10:30 AM + Lunch
Alex de Seversky	30 Rockefeller Plaza NY	
Rockefeller	45 Rockefeller Plaza	Wed. Apr 15 - 3:30 PM
Trubee Davison	Locust Valley L.I.	Ltr from his Secy 3-9. W. "I be in touch with me
Em Pop Powers	Montclair	
CR Smith		

Interview, Eddie Rickenbacker, New York City, 16 April 1970.

Q: Do you recall the first time you met Hap Arnold?

R: He was at North Island.

Q: Rockwell Field.

R: Yes. To celebrate the annual sailing of the Baltic, which carried Pershing and his staff over and Bil Mitchell called me in California and I suggested well, as long as they were going to expect me to take a trip across the continent, might as well do it the right way and get a long range DH-4 and fill it up with gasoline and come along. Well, it's a hell of a trip, unbelievable, and it's rough. However, he called Hap and told Hap that he was sending me down there, and tell me what he wanted done and that's how it got started. Then I got to know Hap, of course, after that, quite frequently.

Q: You were in the automobile business for a while.

R: Been in it all my life. It was in the pioneering days, same thing with air.

Q: Because we don't have much time to talk, I want to ask you one question that intrigued me in your book. You mentioned a mission which either Arnold or Stimson had given you which was so secret that you could not disclose it.

R: You're only the millionth individual that has tried to pump me. Forget it, it's never going to be printed, there were only three men that knew it.

Q: Did Arnold give you the mission or Stimson?

R: No, no, this was Traverse City and Commander in charge of the ... Stimson's confidential advisor. By the time that I got through

with Arnold all over the country, I then took up all the activities of the Secretary of War and I visited every fighting front in the world.

Q: In your book you mention that the top brass in the Air Corps was not very enthusiastic when you asked for 1,000 DC-4s. Do you remember you had been calling for four-engine transports and...

R: I wrote up in Look magazine a story suggesting that we build 50,000 airplanes, five-year program.

Q: Was this the way Roosevelt got it?

R: That's where he got it.

Q: Do you recall...

R: Then, I might add, that it later jumped that to 300,000 and went to 350,000.

Q: Do you recall the time you were asking for a thousand DC-4s and there seemed to be some bureaucratic static up topside. You mention this in your book.

R: I think you are misinformed. That was in the early days when they were just getting started with the DC-4, Don Douglas. He, unfortunately, was told: "Cut them out, eliminate them." And I said at that time--Bob Patterson was Secy of War at the time, I was listening in on the conversation, I said they would wish some day they had a thousand of them available, and that happened.

Q: On your visit to Russia, they handled this with a great deal of secrecy. Was it because Roosevelt would have opposed it, if he knew?

R: No comment. I told my Secretary that you would come in here with a pump a mile long, and you would get nowhere.

Q: What was your impression of Hap Arnold?

R: Well, he was a very dynamic and a very able soldier, and a very dedicated one.

Q: Do you think he was the best man in the AF to do the job? There were some people who thought that Andrews could have done the job perhaps better, or what is your comment on that.

R: Hap did just as good a job as could be done under the circumstances, as any man could have done.

Q: Were you a very good friend of his all the way though? I know he entrusted many confidential missions to you.

R: Very.

Q: Was he man of charisma? Did he have a sort of dynamic quality that attracted people to him?

R: You got to be, can't help it, that's a basic tribute of a leader.

Q: You know, I owe my job indirectly to your being on a raft out in the Pacific Ocean, I understand that when you and Hans Christian Adamson were out there on a raft, you decided that you would go to Hap and try to get an AF Historical Program started, to tell the real story of what was going on out in the combat theaters and the Personnel Narratives Division under Adamson started this.

R: No.

Q: It didn't happen that way?

R: No, it did not.

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Q: Do you recall the first time you met Hap Arnold?

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R: No.

Q: It didn't happen that way?

R: No, it did not.

Rives, Tom

7 Jan 72

R The first major contact I had with Arnold was in the 1934 flight. He came to Wright Field with that group, aboard a communications plane.

Q Right, this is before they took off?

R Before they took off, preparing the planes for the flight, and McClelland went along with them, Gen McClelland. And we did all that we could to fit them up with equipment that was available at that time.

Q This is radio equipment?

R That's right, very crude compared with anything we have today. But we did all that we could there, and Arnold was...

Q He was a LTCOL at that time?

R He was about a LTCOL at that time.

Q What was your job?

R I was in charge of the Signal Corps Radio Aircraft Laboratory, SCARL. I was a Signal Corps officer at that time, and he had little patience with any officer that didn't wear wings, that wasn't an AF officer. In other words he was still fighting that battle. He had to fight to put the AF ahead.

Q I want to ask you about that one particular experience. He was assigned to that job in June, about June 22nd or thereabouts, 1934. He refused to take off with that flight until all the equipment was in place. He had the engines redone. He had them taken down, and he had certain modifications put on the engines, and then he had the signal equipment put on, and then he had everybody working around the clock for a period, over the July 4th weekend. Everybody wanted to go home--the July 4th weekend intervened there, and I think it came on a weekend. And everybody wanted to fold up, and he wouldn't let them do it. Do you remember anything like that?

R No. I can't give you any information on that. I wasn't that close

to the project. I know we had engineers and officers in the laboratory, working long hours, trying to get the best communications equipment we could possibly get on the aircraft at that time.

Q Do you remember Arnold being adamant about not allowing the planes to take off? He delayed their departure for several weeks until he was sure in his own mind that the planes were right?

R I can't give you any information on that.

Q Do you remember any of this readiness preparation?

R Nothing about that, except he was very particular, and insistent upon us doing the utmost to get the communications equipment installed, and that it was of the latest possible type. And McClelland was in charge of that installation and came out to Wright Field and stayed there a week or 10 days, but the more intimate details of that, I can't give you.

Q You worked for McClelland?

R No, I was working for the Signal Corps, in that Signal Corps Aircraft Radio Laboratory. I was in charge of the laboratory at that time.

Q So you were in charge of the installation?

R I was in charge of the installation

Q What was your rank then?

R I was a Captain.

Q Do you remember anything about Hugh Knerr. Knerr was the Exec. He was the No. 2 man. He did most of the planning for that flight.

R Yes, I remember Knerr from all the way aback in the Coast Artillery days when he was down, in 1920, he was at Ft. Maracao (?), Florida, as the Adjutant down there. It was shortly after that that he went into the AF. I don't know when he did graduate, or when he did get his wings. I knew Knerr, and knew that he was very particular. This whole group that Arnold had around him were selected individuals.

Q Right, they were selected. I think this is a probable reason that the flight was so successful, because to fly 10 bombers in formation over

Arctic regions--they covered 18,000 miles before they finished--without any major casualty or incident--is a feat of great significance.

R That's right, in other words, it portrayed the care with which the whole thing was done, I can see part of that, but further than that, I can't give you anything else.

Q When's the next time you saw, or had contact with Arnold?

R The next direct contact with Arnold was at the conference in which the discussions were held in regard to the transfer of the radio research and development from the Signal Corps to the Air Force.

Q This was during WWII?

R This was during WWII. So there was a big gap in there, you see, When we went to England on the Compton mission with McClelland.

Q Which Compton--Karl?

R Karl, and we went over on that mission, and McClelland was really the one insisted on my going. He got me from the Signal Corps to go at that time. I was still in the Signal Corps. I was in charge of the Research & Development Division in the Office, Chief Signal Officer in the Pentagon at that time.

Q Who was the CSO at that time?

R Harry C. Ingles

Q McClelland?

R He was Air Communications Officer of the AAF at that time. When we came back from that mission, McClelland requested that I be assigned to duty with the AAF. I remember very distinctly Ingles calling me down to his office and telling me: "Rives," he says, "McClelland has asked for this. Arnold backed him up, and supported him in it. I am agreeing to it." He says: "But I want to tell you one thing. Don't you go up to the AAF and start requesting all of the best Signal Officers that you know of in the radio and communications field, because I will disapprove any requests that you make for the assignment of these officers to the AAF."

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R And you have the dope on the members of the committee that met. There was Arnold, Somervell, and McNarney, Bowles and I. We didn't talk about this--Bowles can undoubtedly give you a list of everyone who was present at that meeting."

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Q Ingles was eased out of his job?

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Q Didn't Bowles have something to do with that, behind the scenes?

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R Defector. Yes. And I was actually called that by one of the general officers in the Signal Corps.

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R That was my next direct contact with Arnold.

Q Did you have any other contacts with him?

R No. That's about all that I can give you, in direct contacts.

Q At Pearl Harbor you were in the Munitions Building. Do you remember the leak of the war plans that was published in the Chicago Tribune just a couple of days before Pearl Harbor?

R No

Q Right after Pearl Harbor there was a big flap that Stimson got into, about the radar, the so-called ASV. The German submarines were operating practically two or three miles off our coast, along the Atlantic Coast. This is when Bowles was brought into the picture. Do you have any of that period? Did you get involved in that?

R I didn't get involved in that close enough to give you any direct information. We had moved from the old Munitions Building to the Building M down at the foot of Constitution Avenue which was put up right next to that big brewery down there. The brewery was there at that time. About the only direct contact I can give you on that was that in working with the Cifice of Research and Development, they had developed a harbor search radar equipment and I saw it demonstrated, and General Colton saw it demonstrated--General Roger B. Colton--I think he's still living in Alexandria. General Greene was Chief of Coast Artillery at that time. Colton asked me: "How many of those equipments do you think the Coast Artillery can use?" I said: "Well, something in the order of 50." And I says: "For me, that's an installation on our own coast here." Because the submarines were pretty bad at that time, right off the coast. And he said: "Do you think you can get the OSRD to build them?" I said: "The only thing I can do is call up and find out." So I called the Executive Officer up there who I believe was the Provost at MIT. I says: "How many of those things can you build and how quick can you do it?" He said: "We ought to be able to turn out the first one in about 90 days. It will all be hand work." I said: "What will they cost?" He said: "On the order of ---

Q Was it Lee DuBridge?

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and development of 50 models of this harbor search equipment for the Coast Artillery." And I asked him: "How do we get the million dollars?" He says: "Go up and ask Jimmy Watson," who was the Signal Corps Finance Officer. I went up to see Watson and I asked Colton: "How do you want the money?" And he says: "We'd like to get a government check for it." I says: "We'll see what can be done." I told Roger. He says: "Well, you ask Watson and if he can give you a check for a million dollars go ask for OSRD. I went to see Jimmy Watson, and Watson says: "Yes, I can give you a check for a million dollars." He says: "I don't think they can use it, but we can certainly send it to them." And I said: "All right, I'll write the letter saying: "Herewith enclosed a check for a million dollars. We want fifty of these harbor search radar qui equipment just as quickly as possible." And I said: "We'll send it up to them." Roger Colton signed the letter. We sent it up to Lee DuBridge. About ten days later, the check bounced back. Lee DuBridge says: "We found out we couldn't handle our financial arrangements this way. It will have to be transferred through government channels." Then I had the job of going to Major General Greene and convincing him that the Coast Artillery needed fifty of these radar search equipments.

Q In those days radar was a mysterious thing?

R Nobody knew what it was.

Q Do you remember the occasion when somebody brought Arnold down to the Jersey coast to watch the demonstration of radar off the coast? Were you involved in that?

R I was not involved. Roger Colton was involved. He was very much involved.

Q They tried to sell Arnold on this new concept. The British were much advanced over us in the radar business?

R Very much ahead of us.

Q Do you remember when Stinson got very active in the so-called ASV? The submarine search radar?

R That's right. He got very active in it through Eddie Bowles.

Q He brought Eddie Bowles in. Was this before you knew Bowles or had a working relationship with him?

R I knew Bowles then.

Q Bowles indicated to me that he had some role in your coming into the Air Corps, and he said he preferred to deal with you rather than with McClelland. Do you know anything about this? Did this sort of thing ever come up? Apparently he and McClelland didn't get along too well, or McClelland didn't move fast enough.

R As I explained to you in this letter, there was quite a bit of antagonism between Eddie Bowles and Harold McClelland because McClelland felt that Arnold should turn to him for all of his information and consulting, anyways, on radar equipment.

Q Rather than to Bowles?

R Rather than to Bowles. Bowles was representing both Stimson and Arnold, and was in a very powerful position. McClelland took umbrage at this, you might say, and would never talk to Bowles if he could avoid it. He always sent me down, and Eddie and myself developed a very close comradeship in that way. It finally got to the point where Eddie would call McClelland and McClelland would call me and say: "Eddie Bowles wants you to go on down to his office," when Eddie really wanted to talk to the Air Communications Officer. When I came back I would report to McClelland what hajpened.

Q Did McClelland go along with whatever you agreed to?

R He went along with it, yes. But, sometimes, it was very difficult to make him go along when you pointed out to him that it had to be done.

Q Well, did Arnold become aware of this situation after awhile?

R I'm sure he did because he circumvented McClelland in all cases.

Q Why didn't Arnold just fire him? Was he a close friend of Arnold's or did he have political punch?

R I think that Arnold was getting what he wanted through Bowles. It would have been just one more thing for him to worry about. The main thing was that McClelland was very highly instrumental in building what was an Airways Communications thatwworked under General Farman.

Q I'm going to see Farman this afternoon.

R Well, Farman can tell you a lot about McClelland and Arnold, and the Army Air Forces communications program. In fact, I have a name to recommend to you to see two or threepeople.

Q Roger Colton was Deputy Chief Signal Officer to Olmstead, then Ingles?

R Yes. He was in charge of Research & Development in the Pentagon.

Q We talked about Arnold welding together a bunch of intransigents?

R Yes, and I tried to express it in that letter. The Air Force personnel were individualists, as you well know. I think that may be one of the reasons why Hugh Knerr didn't know any more about what Arnold had done to get recognition for him. He didn't tell the rest of the personnel what he was doing. He went ahead and operated pretty well, dictatorially, you might say. Because he didn't fraternize with the lower ranks, like most of the general officers did.

Q Arnold was sort of aloof?

R Yes, very much so.

Q Are you talking about during the war?

R Even before, on the Alaskan trip. He stood head and shoulders above his men, and didn't call committee meetings, and those kinds of things to confer with him. He might confer with the individuals, but he went ahead and acted on his own.

Q General, in this draft letter, you had an interesting comment about the rated Air Corps officer who looked down on unrated Air Corps officers. I guess the Signal Corps officers were assigned to the Air Corps. You were not rated?

R I wa. 't a pilot and therefore I couldn't command. At that time, you remember, the regulations were such that a non-rated officer couldn't command an Air Force field. And he couldn't command any kind of an Air Corps flight.

Q Did you feel that this was, that you were on the outside looking in when you were attached to the Air Corps?

R That is correct. In fact, my efficiency reports which I didn't have sense enough to look at were all rated as average when I was doing superior work. When the time came that they began to assign a numerical rating to the different grades on their efficiency report, my rating was not high enough numerically to authorize me to be made a general officer. When they dug out those Air Force efficiency reports at Wright Field, and I was there for ten years, all of them were "Average" right straight across the board. This officer's just an average officer, just a run of the mine officer. There is nothing outstanding about him. Well, the Signal Corps rated me as superior but the Signal Corps had nothing to do with those efficiency reports. Efficiency reports went straight from the Air Force commanding officer at Wright Field to the files.

Q Another complication in your case was the fact that McClelland who had to rate you probably didn't rate you high. You were in a sense cutting the legs from under him.

R I've never checked my efficiency reports from McClelland. I can't say about that. I don't think Mac rated me--I don't think he down-rated me. But that was too late. Because all the efficiency reports before that had been so damned low. And when Roger Colton investigated the thing, and tried to have me made a general officer, when I was still in the Signal Corps, he came to me and he says: "Tom, the Air Force has done you dirt. All that hard work that you put in out there for them. They went and rated you "Average." he said: "Your efficiency rating is an average 5. It's got to be a 7 before you can be considered for a general officer."

Q But you made it, anyway. How did that happen?

R Because Roger Colton said: "From now on, every efficiency report I make for you will be rated as "Superior." If we go long enough, we'll outlive that downrating." It was all due to Roger Colton that I was ever considered eligible to be promoted to general officer.

Q What about Arnold? Arnold knew of the work that you were doing?

R Reports never got high enough for him to see them. They were handled at a lower level.

Q By Giles or somebody in that area?

R That's right.

Q Did you see Arnold perform at staff meetings? Did you attend staff meetings?

R I saw Arnold perform at several staff meetings.

Q How did he do?

R One in particular stands out in my memory. It was right about the time of the Benny Meyers situation, or just before--just prior to that, as a matter of fact. Arnold called a staff meeting of all the general officers in HQ AAF, and the staff meeting consisted of blessing out of the whole damn group, and he said: "You boys are going to quit this business of covering up for those that wear the same class pin that you wear." He used that expression, "the same class pin that you wear." He says: "I'm tired of you covering up because some things are turning up here that are going to hurt the whole Air Force."

Q Was this during the war?

R This was during the war.

Q Do you think he suspected that Benny Meyers was playing hanky-panky?

R I have an idea that something--as I remember it now--this was just prior to the time that the Benny Meyers situation came up.

Q The Benny Meyers situation came up in 1947 after the war--two years after Arnold retired. However, there was an anonymous letter written to the Army Air Forces which was sent to the FBI and it got

kicked around and it was sent to file. It was ignored. And there was a Congressional committee that picked it up and then exposed Benny Meyers. But during the war Benny Meyers was a favorite of Arnold's. Did you know that?

R Yes.

Q Why?

R Meyers could ingratiate himself with anyone. He was that type of an individual. And he could cover up everything that he didn't want exposed.

Q You know, he was a fantastic figure filbert. Somebody told me he could add up a column of figures simultaneously. He was very sharp with statistics.

R I don't know about that. I do know that he got deeply involved with an electronics outfit out there.

Q Aviation Electric?

R Yes, and we in the Signal Corps--we in the electronics business--were severely criticized, in fact, investigated, to see if we had let any contracts to them due to Benny Meyers' influence.

Q Do you remember Bleriot LaMarr? He was the head of this company. LaMarre.

R No, I don't remember him.

Q He was the president of the company. He was just a figurehead. Benny Meyers was having a relationship with LaMarre's wife while he was giving contracts to this company which he had an interest in.

R I didn't know all that.

Q Do you remember that Arnold in 1943--Stratemeyer was still Chief of Air Staff--they passed around a questionnaire. All the officers in the procurement business were required to fill out a list of their stocks and their holdings. Did you have to fill out one of these?

R I never saw that

Q I guess all the senior men did. You probably were lower?

R I was only a Colonel.

Q Right. Benny Meyers was living very high out at Wright Field. Did you know this?

R Yes.

Q Everybody seemed to know it. What explanation was there for this? What understanding? Did people feel he was making money in the stock market?

R I can't give you anything on that at all. I know that Benny Meyers was flying high, wide, and handsome. But why he was doing it, or what questions were raised about it, I don't know.

Q Were there rumors around about him?

R There were rumors about Benny Meyers and big poker parties being held out there. Tooey Spaatz and the rest of them getting into them.

Q Well, did they figure he made it all on poker?

R I can't give you anything on that, because I really don't know anything on that. It would be hearsay.

Tom C. Rives, Retired General

Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Tom C. Rives, 82, who saw service in both World Wars, the Korean conflict and on the Mexican Border, died June 17 in a nursing home in St. Petersburg Beach, Fla.

Gen. Rives, who had served in both the Army and Air Force Signal Corps, was assigned to Washington for eight of his 31 years in uniform.

After retiring from the Air Force in 1949, he held various civilian posts including consultant to Syracuse University Research Corp., and special research associate professor at the University of Illinois. He also served as an executive with General Electric Co. in the electronics field.

He held several decorations, including the Order of the British Empire.

Survivors include his wife, Annie, of the home; a brother, Richard T.; three daughters, Mrs. Albert E. Ninde, of Tucson, Ariz., Mrs. Cecil W. Sanders and Mrs. John S. Lucas Jr., both of St. Petersburg Beach, Fla., and six grandchildren and two great-grandsons.

Wash. Post
July 1, 1975

Interview - BG Tom Rives, St. Petersburg Beach, Fla. 7 Jan 1972

R The first major contact I had with Arnold was in the 1934 flight. He came to Wright Field with that group, aboard a communications plane.

Q Right, this is before they took off?

R Before they took off, preparing the planes for the flight, and McClelland went along with them, Gen McClelland. And we did all that we could to fit them up with equipment that was available at that time.

Q This is radio equipment?

R That's right, very crude compared with anything we have today. But we did all that we could there, and Arnold was...

Q He was a LTCOL at that time?

R He was about a LTCOL at that time.

Q What was your job?

R I was in charge of the Signal Corps Radio Aircraft Laboratory, SCARL. I was a Signal Corps officer at that time, and he had little patience with any officer that didn't wear wings, that wasn't an AF officer. In other words he was still fighting that battle. He had to fight to put the AF ahead.

Q I want to ask you about that one particular experience. He was assigned to that job in June, about June 22nd or thereabouts, 1934. He refused to take off with that flight until all the equipment was in place. He had the engines re-done. He had them taken down, and he had certain modifications put on the engines, and then he had the signal equipment put on, and then he had everybody working around the clock for a period, over the July 4th weekend. Everybody wanted to go home--the July 4th weekend intervened there, and I think it came on a weekend. And everybody wanted to fold up, and he wouldn't let them do it. Do you remember anything like that?

R No. I can't give you any information on that. I wasn't that close

to the project. I know we had engineers and officers in the laboratory, working long hours, trying to get the best communications equipment we could possibly get on the aircraft at that time.

Q Do you remember Arnold being adamant about not allowing the planes to take off? He delayed their departure for several weeks until he was sure in his own mind that the planes were right?

R I can't give you any information on that.

Q Do you remember any of this readiness preparation?

R Nothing about that, except he was very particular, and insistent upon us doing the utmost to get the communications equipment installed, and that it was of the latest possible type. And McClelland was in charge of that installation and came out to Wright Field and stayed there a week or 10 days, but the more intimate details of that, I can't give you.

Q You worked for McClelland?

R No, I was working for the Signal Corps, in that Signal Corps Aircraft Radio Laboratory. I was in charge of the laboratory at that time.

Q So you were in charge of the installation?

R I was in charge of the installation

Q What was your rank then?

R I was a Captain.

Q Do you remember anything about Hugh Knerr. Knerr was the Exec. He was the No. 2 man. He did most of the planning for that flight.

R Yes, I remember Knerr from all the way back in the Coast Artillery days when he was down, in 1920, he was at Ft. Maracao (?), Florida, as the Adjutant down there. It was shortly after that that he went into the AF. I don't know when he did graduate, or when he did get his wings. I knew Knerr, and knew that he was very particular. This whole group that Arnold had around him were selected individuals.

Q Right, they were selected. I think this is a probable reason that the flight was so successful, because to fly 10 bombers in formation over

Arctic regions--they covered 18,000 miles before they finished--without any major casualty or incident--is a feat of great significance.

R That's right, in other words, it portrayed the care with which the whole thing was done, I can see part of that, but further than that, I can't give you anything else.

Q When's the next time you saw, or had contact with Arnold?

R The next direct contact with Arnold was at the conference in which the discussions were held in regard to the transfer of the radio research and development from the Signal Corps to the Air Force.

Q This was during WWII?

R This was during WWII. So there was a big gap in there, you see, When we went to England on the Compton mission with McClelland.

Q Which Compton--Karl?

R Karl, and we went over on that mission, and McClelland was really the one insisted on my going. He got me from the Signal Corps to go at that time. I was still in the Signal Corps. I was in charge of the Research & Development Division in the Office, Chief Signal Officer in the Pentagon at that time.

Q Who was the CSO at that time?

R Harry C. Ingles

Q McClelland?

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Q Right after Pearl Harbor there was a big flap that Stimson got into, about the radar, the so-called ASV. The German submarines were operating practically two or three miles off our coast, along the Atlantic Coast. This is when Bowles was brought into the picture. Do you have any of that period? Did you get involved in that?

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Q Was this during the war?

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Q Do you think he suspected that Benny Meyers was playing hanky-panky?

R I have an idea that something--as I remember it now--this was just prior to the time that the Benny Meyers situation came up.

Q The Benny Meyers situation came up in 1947 after the war--two years after Arnold retired. However, there was an anonymous letter written to the Army Air Forces which was sent to the FBI and it got

kicked around and it was sent to file. It was ignored. And there was a Congressional committee that picked it up and then exposed Benny Meyers. But during the war Benny Meyers was a favorite of Arnold's. Did you know that?

R Yes.

Q Why?

R Meyers could ingratiate himself with anyone. He was that type of an individual. And he could cover up everything that he didn't want exposed.

Q You know, he was a fantastic figure filbert. Somebody told me he could add up a column of figures simultaneously. He was very sharp with statistics.

R I don't know about that. I do know that he got deeply involved with an electronics outfit out there.

Q Aviation Electric?

R Yes, and we in the Signal Corps--we in the electronics business--were severely criticized, in fact, investigated, to see if we had let any contracts to them due to Benny Meyers' influence.

Q Do you remember Bleriot LaMarr? He was the head of this company. LaMarre.

R No, I don't remember him.

Q He was the president of the company. He was just a figurehead. Benny Meyers was having a relationship with LaMarre's wife while he was giving contracts to this company which he had an interest in.

R I didn't know all that.

Q Do you remember that Arnold in 1943--Stratemeyer was still Chief of Air Staff--they passed around a questionnaire. All the officers in the procurement business were required to fill out a list of their stocks and their holdings. Did you have to fill out one of these?

R I never saw that

Q I guess all the senior men did. You probably were lower?

R I was only a Colonel.

Q Right. Benny Meyers was living very high out at Wright Field. Did you know this?

R Yes.

Q Everybody seemed to know it. What explanation was there for this? What understanding? Did people feel he was making money in the stock market?

R I can't give you anything on that at all. I know that Benny Meyers was flying high, wide, and handsome. But why he was doing it, or what questions were raised about it, I don't know.

Q Were there rumors around about him?

R There were rumors about Benny Meyers and big poker parties being held out there. Tooey Spaatz and the rest of them getting into them.

Q Well, did they figure he made it all on poker?

R I can't give you anything on that, because I really don't know anything on that. It would be hearsay.

Interview - BG Tom Rives, St. Petersburg Beach, Fla. 7 Jan 1972

R The first major contact I had with Arnold was in the 1934 flight. He came to Wright Field with that group, aboard a communications plane.

Q Right, this is before they took off?

R Before they took off, preparing the planes for the flight, and McClelland went along with them, Gen McClelland. And we did all that we could to fit them up with equipment that was available at that time.

Q This is radio equipment?

R That's right, very crude compared with anything we have today. But we did all that we could there, and Arnold was...

Q He was a LTCOL at that time?

R He was about a LTCOL at that time.

Q What was your job?

R I was in charge of the Signal Corps Radio Aircraft Laboratory, SCARL. I was a Signal Corps officer at that time, and he had little patience with any officer that didn't wear wings, that wasn't an AF officer. In other words he was still fighting that battle. He had to fight to put the AF ahead.

Q I want to ask you about that one particular experience. He was assigned to that job in June, about June 22nd or thereabouts, 1934. He refused to take off with that flight until all the equipment was in place. He had the engines re-done. He had them taken down, and he had certain modifications put on the engines, and then he had the signal equipment put on, and then he had everybody working around the clock for a period, over the July 4th weekend. Everybody wanted to go home--the July 4th weekend intervened there, and I think it came on a weekend. And everybody wanted to fold up, and he wouldn't let them do it. Do you remember anything like that?

R No. I can't give you any information on that. I wasn't that close

to the project. I know we had engineers and officers in the laboratory, working long hours, trying to get the best communications equipment we could possibly get on the aircraft at that time.

Q Do you remember Arnold being adamant about not allowing the planes to take off? He delayed their departure for several weeks until he was sure in his own mind that the planes were right?

R I can't give you any information on that.

Q Do you remember any of this readiness preparation?

R Nothing about that, except he was very particular, and insistent upon us doing the utmost to get the communications equipment installed, and that it was of the latest possible type. And McClelland was in charge of that installation and came out to Wright Field and stayed there a week or 10 days, but the more intimate details of that, I can't give you.

Q You worked for McClelland?

R No, I was working for the Signal Corps, in that Signal Corps Aircraft Radio Laboratory. I was in charge of the laboratory at that time.

Q So you were in charge of the installation?

R I was in charge of the installation

Q What was your rank then?

R I was a Captain.

Q Do you remember anything about Hugh Knerr. Knerr was the Exec. He was the No. 2 man. He did most of the planning for that flight.

R Yes, I remember Knerr from all the way back in the Coast Artillery days when he was down, in 1920, he was at Ft. Maracao (?), Florida, as the Adjutant down there. It was shortly after that that he went into the AF. I don't know when he did graduate, or when he did get his wings. I knew Knerr, and knew that he was very particular. This whole group that Arnold had around him were selected individuals.

Q Right, they were selected. I think this is a probable reason that the flight was so successful, because to fly 10 bombers in formation over

Arctic regions--they covered 18,000 miles before they finished--without any major casualty or incident--is a feat of great significance.

R That's right, in other words, it portrayed the care with which the whole thing was done, I can see part of that, but further than that, I can't give you anything else.

Q When's the next time you saw, or had contact with Arnold?

R The next direct contact with Arnold was at the conference in which the discussions were held in regard to the transfer of the radio research and development from the Signal Corps to the Air Force.

Q This was during WWII?

R This was during WWII. So there was a big gap in there, you see, When we went to England on the Compton mission with McClelland.

Q Which Compton--Karl?

R Karl, and we went over on that mission, and McClelland was really the one insisted on my going. He got me from the Signal Corps to go at that time. I was still in the Signal Corps. I was in charge of the Research & Development Division in the Office, Chief Signal Officer in the Pentagon at that time.

Q Who was the CSO at that time?

R Harry C. Ingles

Q McClelland?

R He was Air Communications Officer of the AAF at that time. When we came back from that mission, McClelland requested that I be assigned to duty with the AAF. I remember very distinctly Ingles calling me down to his office and telling me: "Rives," he says, "McClelland has asked for this. Arnold backed him up, and supported him in it. I am agreeing to it." He says: "But I want to tell you one thing. Don't you go up to the AAF and start requesting all of the best Signal Officers that you know of in the radio and communications field, because I will disapprove any requests that you make for the assignment of these officers to the AAF."

So I could do nothing else but agree to that, but at the same time I requested the best officers I could get my hands on.

Q This must have been 1943-44?

R 1943. I then went to work on a staff study. I no sooner reported to McClelland up there at the Air Communications Office when he said: "I want you to prepare a staff study recommending that the R&D and procurement on all air signal equipment be transferred to the Air Force. It took pretty near two years to get the thing done. We finally got it up, and Bowles was the mastermind behind this, too.

Q I got a lot of dope from Bowles.

R And you have the dope on the members of the committee that met. There was Arnold, Somervell, and McNarney, Bowles and I. We didn't talk about this--Bowles can undoubtedly give you a list of everyone who was present at that meeting."

Q What was [illegible] meeting?

R This was the meeting to transfer the communications to the AAF with Arnold, Ingles, McNarney, Somervell, and one or two others who were representing Stimson. Bowles was representing Stimson. It was agreed at that meeting between all of them that it would be transferred. And that's where I really got the black eye with the Signal Corps. I was then called a defector from the Signal Corps. And I was the only one I thought was right, because you couldn't develop aircraft and have someone else develop the communications equipment, and make it work.

Q Ingles was eased out of his job?

R Olmsted had been kicked out.

Q Olmstead had been kicked out?

R Yes

Q Didn't Bowles have something to do with that, behind the scenes?

R I wouldn't be at all surprised.

Q Didn't Arnold have something to do with Olmsted being kicked out?

R I couldn't say, but Olmsted was so definitely crazy. He had lost his mind, practically. I had one experience with him when we were in the Pentagon, when we first went there. Somebody at Wright Field, or at Fort Monmouth, decided that they wanted to demonstrate a piece of radar equipment and demonstrate if from the top of the Pentagon. Well they came down and put it in. I had nothing to do with it at all. And after they got it in they asked for Olmsted to come up and see it. Well, Olmsted was very feeble at that time. He'd been through surgery or something. I finally went up myself. It was a devil of a job to get up the ladder there and get up on the roof of the Pentagon to see this radar equipment. Well, about two hours afterwards I received a call from Olmsted's office, asking me to come down to his office. I came down and he dressed me out from ass-hole to appetite, and says: "Don't you ever ask me to go up on the roof of the Pentagon to see a piece of radar equipment." I said: "General, I had nothing to do with that." and he says: "You're the man that I blame for all the radar stuff. You're responsible." I got the worst skinning I ever got in my life on that. And then, after that, Olmsted was relieved. Ingles came in. Ingles had been in London at the time the Compton mission went over.

Q What was the purpose of the Compton mission?

R It was to coordinate radar research and development between the British and the United States. And it had quite a few scientiests and Navy, Air Force and Army, etc. Then it was after we came back from that that Olmstead was relieved and Ingles was put in as Chief Signal Officer. There was a period in there for about three months from the time that McClelland asked for my assignment, because I went down to North Africa and inspected the Signal Corps installations down there. So that's the way that came about and the only thing that I can tell you about the conference, and about all of the reaction there, When they finally asked

me, Eddie Bowles as I remember, turned to me and says: "Colonel Rives, you know, had had experience both in Wright Field and in the Pentagon with the Signal Corps-Air Force developments, and I want him to tell you the story." Well, I had written a staff study, and I brought it out to them that there were 54 or 57 separate steps that had to be initiated between the two services before you could get even so much as the olive drab paint on the Signal Corps equipment changed to black paint to make the Air Force installation in an aircraft. I talked for about 20 minutes, and after I got through Bowles turned off to Somervell and said: "Well, that's the story. Now what do you say?" Somervell says: "Well, I say, transfer it."

Q He wasn't too happy about it, though?

R No, and Ingles was sitting there. So I was cutting Ingles' throat.

Q So this is part of the reason that Ingles regarded you as an apostate.

R Defector. Yes. And I was actually called that by one of the general officers in the Signal Corps.

Q I can imagine.

R That was my next direct contact with Arnold.

Q Did you have any other contacts with him?

R No. That's about all that I can give you, in direct contacts.

Q At Pearl Harbor you were in the Munitions Building. Do you remember the leak of the war plans that was published in the Chicago Tribune just a couple of days before Pearl Harbor?

R No

Q Right after Pearl Harbor there was a big flap that Stimson got into, about the radar, the so-called ASV. The German submarines were operating practically two or three miles off our coast, along the Atlantic Coast. This is when Bowles was brought into the picture. Do you have any of that period? Did you get involved in that?

R I didn't get involved in that close enough to give you any direct information. We had moved from the old Munitions Building to the Building M down at the foot of Constitution Avenue which was put up right next to that big brewery down there. The brewery was there at that time. About the only direct contact I can give you on that was that in working with the Office of Research and Development, they had developed a harbor search radar equipment and I saw it demonstrated, and General Colton saw it demonstrated--General Roger B. Colton--I think he's still living in Alexandria. General Greene was Chief of Coast Artillery at that time. Colton asked me: "How many of those equipments do you think the Coast Artillery can use?" I said: "Well, something in the order of 50." And I says: "For me, that's an installation on our own coast here." Because the submarines were pretty bad at that time, right off the coast. And he said: "Do you think you can get the OSRD to build them?" I said: "The only thing I can do is call up and find out." So I called the Executive Officer up there who I believe was the Provost at MIT. I says: "How many of those things can you build and how quick can you do it?" He said: "We ought to be able to turn out the first one in about 90 days. It will all be hand work." I said: "What will they cost?" He said: "On the order of ---

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R This was during the war.

Q Do you think he suspected that Benny Meyers was playing hanky-panky?

R I have an idea that something--as I remember it now--this was just prior to the time that the Benny Meyers situation came up.

Q The Benny Meyers situation came up in 1947 after the war--two years after Arnold retired. However, there was an anonymous letter written to the Army Air Forces which was sent to the FBI and it got

kicked around and it was sent to file. It was ignored. And there was a Congressional committee that picked it up and then exposed Benny Meyers. But during the war Benny Meyers was a favorite of Arnold's. Did you know that?

R Yes.

Q Why?

R Meyers could ingratiate himself with anyone. He was that type of an individual. And he could cover up everything that he didn't want exposed.

Q You know, he was a fantastic figure filbert. Somebody told me he could add up a column of figures simultaneously. He was very sharp with statistics.

R I don't know about that. I do know that he got deeply involved with an electronics outfit out there.

Q Aviation Electric?

R Yes, and we in the Signal Corps--we in the electronics business--were severely criticized, in fact, investigated, to see if we had let any contracts to them due to Benny Meyers' influence.

Q Do you remember Bleriot LaMarr? He was the head of this company. LaMarre.

R No, I don't remember him.

Q He was the president of the company. He was just a figurehead. Benny Meyers was having a relationship with LaMarre's wife while he was giving contracts to this company which he had an interest in.

R I didn't know all that.

Q Do you remember that Arnold in 1943--Stratemeyer was still Chief of Air Staff--they passed around a questionnaire. All the officers in the procurement business were required to fill out a list of their stocks and their holdings. Did you have to fill out one of these?

R I never saw that

Q I guess all the senior men did. You probably were lower?

R I was only a Colonel.

Q Right. Benny Meyers was living very high out at Wright Field. Did you know this?

R Yes.

Q Everybody seemed to know it. What explanation was there for this? What understanding? Did people feel he was making money in the stock market?

R I can't give you anything on that at all. I know that Benny Meyers was flying high, wide, and handsome. But why he was doing it, or what questions were raised about it, I don't know.

Q Were there rumors around about him?

R There were rumors about Benny Meyers and big poker parties being held out there. Tooey Spaatz and the rest of them getting into them.

Q Well, did they figure he made it all on poker?

R I can't give you anything on that, because I really don't know anything on that. It would be hearsay.

Roach, Hal

20 Dec 77

INTERVIEW

Hal Roach, Belair, Los Angeles, Calif, Dec 20, 1977

(Telecon)

Service with Eaker in 8th Air Force. Job to make motion pictures of the B-17 formadtions, to improve defensive formations against attack.

Served under Harold Hopper, War Production Board, Motion picture executive.

Reached rank of Lieut Colonel. Lectured to staff of 8th AF during 1942-43

Tells story of the requirement set up to procure motion pictures Apparently the project was Minton Kaye's. The amount to be procured shifted from a Captain to a Major who wanted to make sure, and doubled the requirement. At higher headquarters, it re-doubled and in Washington the requirement for film again doubled. It ended up that the AAF was asking for 2x all the film produced in the U.S. This bizarre incident is supposed to have contributed to Minton Kay's deposal from the Washington scene and being shipped out to the CBI, though there may have been other reasons as well about which Mr. Roach had no knowledge

Roach did not know Arnold personally, and never worked for him. He worked for Spaatz and Eaker in ETO

He knew Barney Giles, his friend, who sent him to Fla to photo= graph formations for use by 8th AF.

He was sent over to Normandy and was on an adjacent road from where Gen McNair was killed by carpet bombing.

Hon. Motion pic -
for A Serv Unit
Capt to major Kaye
2x = ever been
produced
sent to C 131
Harold Hopper
WPB Motion pic
exec.
not. pic 8th - sent back
to us - Ira sent to Italy
take pic - Lt Col.
photographs B-17's
lectured to staff - 8th AF
formations - 1942-43

Barney Giles - friend sent to Pla to photograph formations for 8th AF Hdqs

Never met Arnold

Somebody sent slide bombs to Pluto - Bahamas - to attack sub bombs - slap bombs - nobody thought of that - paid no attention to value - wrong.

Sent over to Normandy & road from Omaha Beach to Cerpel Bocage

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1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20910
December 15, 1977

Mr. Hal Roach
1183 Stradella Road
Beverly Hills, CA 90024

Dear Mr. Roach:

I'm so glad I phoned tonight. I've been talking to General George Goddard - in fact, we talked on the phone tonight - and I mentioned not having heard from you. He told me to be sure and try to get to see you while I was out on the West Coast. Of course I'm quite aware of the important role you had in producing the wartime moving pictures for General Hap Arnold and the Army Air Forces.

General Goddard also mentioned some amusing anecdotes you told about Arnold. I'm looking forward to hearing those.

I'll phone you Monday, the 19th, or Tuesday morning, the 20th, depending on what time my plane arrives in Los Angeles.

Sorry the first letter was mislaid, but it created no problem at all. I'm looking forward to meeting you.

All good wishes,

Very sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

213-472-2938

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20910
December 15, 1977

Mr. Hal Roach
1183 Stradella Road
Beverly Hills, CA 90024

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November 30, 1977

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1183 Stradella Road
Beverly Hills, CA 90024

Dear Mr. Roach:

General George Goddard phoned me the other night and mentioned the wonderful visit he had with you in California. He also mentioned having talked to you about General Hap Arnold about whom I'm writing a biography. I would dearly love to come out and talk to you about the Man. General Goddard said you regaled him with several anecdotes about Arnold.

I would be honored to have an opportunity to meet you perhaps to spend an hour or so reminiscing about your recollections of another great man who contributed so much to winning the war.

Perhaps it's worth mentioning that I have spent most of my adult life in the Air Force as a professional historian. I started in the book program under Hans Christian Adamson who worked for Eddie Rickenbacker and started the Personal Narratives History program out of which emerged a dozen or more books.

I'm a professional historian and hold a Ph.D. Recently I retired from Government service so I could work full time on Arnold's biography. I have interviewed most of the important people who were associated with Arnold during his career. Among them: Hon. Robert Lovett, Jacqueline Cochran, Charles Lindbergh, Mrs. Arnold (up at the ranch in Sonoma), the three Arnold sons, and a host of Generals including: Rosie O'Donnell, Larry Kuter, Larry Norstad, K.B. Wolfe, Jimmy Doolittle, "Pre" Cabell - well over 100 officers who served with him.

I should also mention that I interviewed General LeMay several times, in one instance when he lived at 773 Stradella Road - about five or six years ago.

If agreeable with you, would it be convenient to get together on Tuesday, December 20, or Wednesday, December 21st, for an hour or so at about 10:30 AM? If neither of these dates is suitable, you may prefer another right after New Years, perhaps on January 3rd or 4th. I'm just setting up my schedule so I'm flexible at the moment.

The enclosure is for your convenience. Many thanks.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

Encl

213-472-2938

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Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

Encl

11-27-77
1050

Gen Goddard called -
He had called Eng. &
his cousin was expecting you.
He just left from Calif &
stayed with Hal Roach -
producer - said he
has many memories &
Stan & Arnold - gave
me his address
He's going to hear Gen
Keegan at a Jewish
meeting tonite so will
be home until 7 pm
if you want to call -

1059

Dear Goddard -

Hal ~~Roach~~ Roach - old producer

Re Monta Bay

Hal Roach - old producer
1183 Stradella Rd
Beverly Hills Calif 90024
Los Angeles, Ca

Abraham Lehr
Brentwood, Calif.

near Keegan at Jewish Club
8pm candlelight 6-7

Roosevelt, Elliott 10 Aug 72

THE SUNDAY STAR
Washington, D. C.
April 9, 1972

Counterpart

Elliott Roosevelt, under contract to G. P. Putnam & Sons, is writing a book to be called "The Roosevelts of Hyde Park," the obvious counterpart for his side of the family to "The Roosevelts of Sagamore Hill."

It will cover life among the children of FDR's family from the time of Elliott's birth in 1910 until he was 22.

Eleanor and Franklin's second son is not thrilled with Joseph Lash's best-seller on them. "It's pedantic," said Elliott, who was in town this past week. "I got bored and I skipped pages."

He also finds fault with the authenticity in parts. "Mother never was anti-semitic. If she had had any of those prejudices she would have passed them on to us."

When did he first know about Lucy Mercer? "When I was 7. Mother came home from Campobello and there was a bitter scene." There were several scenes over a period of time" and the children were there and knew about them. "She became a completely different personality from that point."

Elliott said of the report that he and Patty were separated, "It's completely untrue." They are very much together on a farm in Goulds, Fla., just north of the Florida Keys, where they are raising Arabian horses. They have five now and are expecting a new foal any day.

20314

10 August 1972

Brig General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF (Ret)
15201 Hainlin Mill Drive
Goulds, Florida 33170

Dear General Roosevelt:

Enclosed herewith is a copy of our fine interview. We covered a lot of ground, and quite well, too.

I'm sorry to report to Mrs. Roosevelt that my movies of that new-born horse came out badly. I changed my film in too much light, and it is streaked.

Again, many thanks, and all the best to you and yours.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

20314

1 December 1971

Brig General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF (Ret)
15201 Hainlin Mill Drive
Goulds, Florida 33170

Dear General Roosevelt:

I'm the fellow working on the biography of General Hap Arnold. We finally untangled my situation sufficiently for me to plan my trip Southward right after the Holidays. As I project those plans, I figure to be in your area about Monday, January 10th.

If this is a convenient time, I'll phone beforehand to set up a specific time. Mrs. Roosevelt was kind enough to send me a phone number some months ago. I have AC 305 - 232-1375.

Incidentally, one of the reasons I'm coming down is to screen through the papers of General Hugh Knerr who passed away last month. He lived in Coral Gables. General Knerr endowed his papers to the Air Force Academy.

Hope to be seeing you in about a month.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

24 June 1971

Brig General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF (Ret)
15201 Hainlin Mill Drive
Goulds, Florida 33170

Dear General Roosevelt:

In some correspondence between Generals Arnold and Spaatz in July/August 1943, there is an indication of your return home in response to a cablegram from Arnold. I wonder if you recall the reason. No need to answer right now, as I plan to include this subject of your contributions to Photo Recon in our discussion.

I should also mention having received a note from Patty Roosevelt giving me your new telephone number.

I'm working up a trip for the Fall and will give you some notice so we can coordinate plans.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl



Wash. Star 3-10-71

Elliott Roosevelt Quits Miami Post

MIAMI BEACH, Fla. (AP)—Elliott Roosevelt, son of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, has quit as executive director of the Miami Beach Tourist Development Authority, saying he was tired of "political controversy."

A recent auditors' report said he had failed to account for $2,500 in expense advances from the authority. Roosevelt, whose salary was $15,000 a year, paid the amount of the advances back.

Roosevelt, a former mayor of the city, was appointed to the tourist post last year.

THE FEDERA[illegible]OTLIGHT

L/G CARL SPAATZ, CG NAAF, TO ARNOLD, 14 July 43.

Dear Hap:

* * * * * *

The operations against Sicily[1] up to this time have been successful beyond expectation. The amount

* * * * * *

Elliott Roosevelt is being returned for a brief period in response to your cablegram. He has been doing a perfectly splendid job and has, in my opinion, a better grasp of aerial photography in all of its phases than anyone here, including RAF, our own Air Forces, and both Armies. He has worked hard and visualized requirements. In spite of many difficulties, he has produced outstanding results. I hope his opinions will be given justifiable weight. Do not get too mad if he finds too much wrong with what has been done. This is an expression of the intensity of his purpose, and probably the typical Roosevelt method of getting results. I hope it will not be necessary to keep him in the United States longer than two weeks since he is badly needed here in connection with our further operations. * * *

ARNOLD TO L/G CARL SPAATZ, CG NAAF, 20 Aug. 43.

Dear Toohey: Your letter of 14 July 1943 [above] was most welcome with its great fund of combat information and your valuable up-to-the minute observations. I have carefully studied its contents paragraph by para-

* * * * * * *

Your comments regarding Elliott Roosevelt were fully borne out during his visit here. I considered his contribution to the whole field of Photographic Reconnaissance of such importance as to warrant a delay in his return to your Theater. In accordance with my cable to you of 27 July, I will advise you later as to the date of his return.

* * * * * *

From the desk of

Patricia Peabody Roosevelt

Date May 17, 1971

New Telephone number

Dc. 305

232-1375

Thank You

Patty Roosevelt

20314

19 May 1971

Brig. General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF (Ret)
15201 Hainlin Mill Drive
Goulds, Florida 33170

Dear General Roosevelt:

I'm slightly embarrassed to ask to postpone our meeting planned for June 1st after expending some time and effort to set it up. However, we have a new boss coming on board and I'm going to have to stay close to Hq. USAF for the time being.

The way it looks, my trip will be postponed until the early Fall. I hope this will not conflict in any way with plans that you may have. In fact, I expect you will be quite busy getting your family established in "greener pastures". (Somebody sent me a clipping from the Miami Herald). I'm sure you will enjoy more working with Arabian horses than wrestling with tourists.

I will alert you a couple of weeks before I came down, but in the meantime, if there is any change in your plans, I would be pleased to learn about it in the enclosure.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

20314

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15201 Hainlin Mill Drive
Goulds, Florida 33170

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Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

20314

13 May 1971

Brigadier General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF Ret
15201 Hainlin Mill Drive
Goulds, Florida 33170

Dear General Roosevelt

I was very pleased that we have made contact and look forward to seeing you sometime around June 1st. When my schedule becomes clearer, I'll write to firm up a specific date at a time convenient for you. I have several potential interviews in the Miami area, and so will spend at least three days there. I have 238-7812 as your phone number. You mentioned the likelihood of getting an unlisted number. If you will entrust it to me, I will safeguard it for my use only in the event I have to reach you quickly for any purpose.

The enclosure will serve to reach me fairly quickly if your plans change. You can reach me by phone on Area Code 202, Local Exchange OX 3-7388 or OX 3-7428, and please call me collect.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

20314

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15201 Hainlin Mill Drive
Goulds, Florida 33170

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Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

Elliott Roosevelt

15201 Hamlin Mill Dr.
Gouldo, Fla
Phone 238-8712
232-1375

April 25, 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Many thanks for your letter concerning your desire to interview me with regard to the General Arnold biography.

I would be very glad to spend as much time as you want, whenever you can get away from Washington to come to Miami for an indepth interview.

Kindest personal regards,

Elliott Roosevelt

Elliott Roosevelt

6655 S. W. 106 Street
Miami, Florida 33156

ER/mr

old
AC 767-6633

memories.

* * *

nd Monsters

E IS the generation
ich trains were living
grand, fire-snorting
s rushing through the
endless clacking miles
wing landscapes and
of strange towns
ed briefly, then gone.
ns had personality,
smells, power.
et plane will ever have
haracter.
de the sleeping car Bir-
am stood the porter
Howard, 67, and due
retirement soon. He
on trains in 1925, as a
an porter. "It was the
adventure then," he
you.

OW, Howard's face has
weathered look of aging
ogany. His mustache has
to gray. His memories
ack over a rich era.
have traveled," he said
fully, "many a mile."
one under Amtrak's na-
wide efficiency cutback
many of the storied crack
ns of his youth: the Wa-
h Cannon Ball, the Poca-
tas, the Nancy Hanks.
Today, only 191 passenger
ns are running across the
. as the new federally-
sidized Amtrak makes its
to woo travelers back to
s. When Howard first
nt to work, there were 20,-
trains.
nt in the Seaboard sta-
Monday, train people
high hopes for better
gs.

* * *

Enthusiasm'

ICKET Agent Michael
nan had posted on the
tin a letter to all passen-
train employes from
id Kendall, Amtrak
l chairman. "All across
ountry," Kendall said,
oad people like you are
ning this new service
tremendous enthusi-

pitch was for better
, greater comfort, effi-

the ticket window,
er, clerk Mary Fisher
herself explaining to
frustrated passengers
due to the nation-
cutbacks — they
reach certain dest
by train. This

Herald Staff Photo by JOE SCHUPPE

Patty Roosevelt and Her Friend
... family will keep horse, but coat will go

Miami Her. May 9, 1971

Roosevelts Place Family Furniture On Auction Block

By SUSAN BURNSIDE
Herald Staff Writer

The Eliott Roosevelts are moving to greener pastures.

They are leaving their Republican neighbors, Patty's mink coat and most of their furniture behind.

The furniture, the mink and eight rooms stuffed with Roosevelt memorabilia will go on the auction block at 11 a.m. Saturday.

"I'd rather have Arabian horses than a mink coat," explained Patty Roosevelt Monday as she sifted through a typical moving week mess in the Roosevelt's ranch-style home at 6655 SW 106th St.

"AS A GENTLEMAN farmer's wife, I'll never wear a mink coat again," she promised with a relief-filled sigh.

Since Roosevelt's abrupt retirement from public life and his $35,000-a-year job as executive director of the Miami Beach tourist Authority two months ago, the 60-year-old son of the former president and his family have been seeking a more peaceful profession.

He believes he has found it in breeding and training Arabian horses — a love carried over from his youthful days as a rodeo rider and Wyoming ranch owner.

THE FIRST of Roosevelt's Arabian stable, a mare and a filly, arrived from England Saturday.

The two Arabians will join two quarterhorses, a gelding, a 30-month-old stallion, one goat, assorted dogs, Patty, Elliott and children at their new 29-acre farm in southwest Dade near the Monkey Jungle.

"The barn is bigger than the house," Mrs. Roosevelt said of the new homestead.

The new home also is furnished, which is why the Roosevelts' memento-crammed house on SW 106th Street must be emptied on the auctioneer's block, she added.

IN ADDITION to the mink — which is not an antique — are such collector's items as a ship's model once in the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt's collection and a bedroom set that once sat in Franklin Roosevelt's Hyde Park mansion, according to Patty Roosevelt.

The history-tinged bric-a-bra belongs to Elliott Roosevelt's days in public life — a life he gave up in March "with no sadness or nostalgia," Roosevelt announced at the time.

The bidding list also includes a late 16th Century Spanish tile-topped table, assorted couches, a massive Spanish silver cabinet, Sevres vases, Limoges lamps and antique jewelry.

Inspection of the items will begin at 9 a.m. Saturday. The terms are cash only.

The Long Arm

...harged in Jetport...

cc: Lorrie

20314

25 March 1971

Brigadier General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF Ret
6655 S.W. 106th Street
Miami, Florida 33156

Dear General Roosevelt

My friend, Frank Jackman, was kind enough to assist me in contacting you on a subject of consuming interest, a biography of General "Hap" Arnold, which is to be published by Random House. I have spent three years on this project, about half of it on a Brookings Institute Followship, which enabled me last year to go through the tremendous manuscript collection now housed in the Library of Congress. Needless to state, I have come upon numerous instances of your association with General Arnold. Those contacts go back to the Argentia Conference of August 1941 when you acted as aide-de-camp for General Arnold, and they extend through the war to include your volunteering to pioneer reconnaissance of the Operation FRANTIC (shuttle-bombing to Russia). Your offer was very politely put aside, as you know, because of the danger of possible capture of the President's son by the enemy.

In any event, I have interviewed practically all of the Air Force greats still living, including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, O'Donnell, Twining, and perhaps one-hundred more. I have also talked with Howard Rusk, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, Jackie Cochran, Robert Lavett, and others who know General Arnold. Incidently, I interviewed Charles A. Lindbergh just last week. I am most interested in the precise nature of Lindbergh's relationship with General Arnold, who maintained certain contacts at the risk of his position with President Roosevelt.

Needless to state, this is to be a "warts and all" biography. The Air Force has given me certain logistic support but has agreed that the chips will fall where they may. And so, I'm hopeful that we can get together at a time and place convenient to you for an hour or two of reminiscence. I am hopeful of visiting South Florida on another interview trip sometime in late Spring or early Summer and would be pleased to learn of your plans at that time, if you can predict them. I will adjust my schedule to fit yours.

The enclosure will speed your reply. I hope you are having a restful vacation in Jamaica, and will look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to Chief, Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

20314

25 March 1971

Brigadier General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF Ret
6655 S.W. 106th Street
Miami, Florida 33156

Dear General Roosevelt

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The enclosure will speed your reply. I hope you are having a restful vacation in Jamaica, and will look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to Chief, Air Force
History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

20 January 1972

Mr. Frank Jackman
Holiday Sportswear of Miami, Inc
537 N.W. 24th Street
Miami, Florida 33127

Dear Frank:

In good measure due to your help, I got to see Elliott Roosevelt down on his horse farm last week. It was a very worthwhile interview and he and Mrs. Roosevelt were really helpful.

I was otherwise tied up on an official project. General Hugh Knerr, one of the Air Force greats, passed away recently and it was my difficult task to go through his papers to assist Mrs. Knerr. He lived in Coral Gables, on Biltmore Way. I was really pushed to complete the task and meet other commitments back here. If I'd seen my way clear to have enough time to buy you a drink I would have called. Perhaps another time.

Again many thanks, and best wishes to Mrs. Jackman.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to Chief AF
History

25 March 1971

Mr. Frank Jackman
Holiday Sportswear of Miami, Inc.
537 N.W. 24th Street
Miami, Florida 33127

Dear Frank:

Needless to state, I had almost despaired that our interesting discussion of New Year's Eve would ever bear fruit. That wine must have been weak, because I recall almost everything that happened.

The enclosure will speak for itself. I have a couple of other interviews that I can set up, but will wait to hear from General Roosevelt, as I would want to build the trip around the interview with him.

Incidentally, that interview with Lindbergh was really interesting. He has lost none of his strong feeling against President Roosevelt, and I suppose that if FDR were alive today, that feeling would be reciprocated.

I hope to have the pleasure of yours and Mrs. Jackman's company when we come down again. Bea (my wife) is also looking forward to that possibility although her perspective is limited. She's in the hospital recovering from removal of a cervical disc. Operation was completely successful, the doctor says, so when Bea is up and around she'll need a vacation. Miami is an ideal place.

In any event, I hope it wont be too long. All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

25 March 1971

Brig. General George W. Goddard, USAF (Ret)
Boca Mar Apts
310 S. Ocean Boulevard
Boca Raton, Florida 33432

Dear General Goddard:

A contact I made down in Florida has apparently come through for me. I hope to see Elliott Roosevelt on my next trip down.

I've sent you a copy of this fellow's letter with Roosevelt's address and phone number. You may wish to contact him. In any event, if I can swing the interview, I'll be down to Florida and look you up.

My best wishes to Mrs.Goddard.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

HOLIDAY A DIVISION OF ROSE JACKMAN INTERNATIONAL
SPORTSWEAR OF MIAMI INC.

(305) 379-2771 537 N.W. 24TH STREET • MIAMI, FLA. • 33127

March 22, 1971

Department of the Air Force
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Mr. Murray Green
Special Asst. Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Dear Murry:

A rather belated reply, however going through the pile of work on my desk I discovered your letter and decided its about time to give you an answer.

General Roosevelt was very thrilled to find out that his old side kick General George Goddard is now located in Boca Raton, and also General Roosevelt told me that he would be most happy to give you an interview anytime you are ready to make the trip down to his home, or if possible you could get together on one of his frequent trips to Washington, what ever you are able to arrange with him. The following is his home address and telephone number, 6655 S.W. 106 Street, Miami, Florida 33156 telephone number 667-6633. At the present time he is resting in Jamaica but will return to Miami around the 28th of March.

It was sure nice chatting with you that evening and will look forward to possibly seeing you on your next trip down. My very best to you and yours.

Sincerely,

Frank Jackman

Elliott R

AFCHO/Dr Green/es/5 Jan 71

20314

AF/CHO

5 January 1971

Mr. Frank Jackman
3158 North Bay Road
Miami Beach, Florida

531-5476

Dear Frank

I hated to leave Florida for Washington, D.C., but the clock struck twelve and here I am, back as a literary chimney sweep, trying to sift through the ashes of history. If this project succeeds, it will lend some contemporary meaning to the life of General Hap Arnold, the guy who probably did as much as any mortal to help win World War II.

Elliott Roosevelt had some frequent contacts with Arnold and, as I said the other night, part of the problem was his misfortune in being the President's son. When he did something good and was recognized for it, some people attributed that success to his position, rather than his ability.

In any event, when you next see General Roosevelt, you may mention that General George Goddard, his old sidekick, is now in Boca Raton and has been trying to reach him.

If you would be kind enough to send me General Roosevelt's address I'll write him to request an appointment later on. A return envelope will speed your reply to me.

Best wishes to Mrs. Jackman and a very happy New Year to you both.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Asst, Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

File Copy
R/F

Jackson phone
531-5476

November 4, 1970

Brig. General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF
4 Ambassador Towers
Suite 1611
801 Bayshore Drive
Miami, Florida 33515

Dear General Roosevelt:

I'm the fellow working on the biography of General Hap Arnold. Before General George Goddard left Washington for the Boca Raton area, he promised to write you in my behalf.

I don't know whether you received his letter, but in any event, I would appreciate an opportunity to talk with you for an hour or so at a time convenient for you.

I plan to be in the Miami area late in December and would hope to contact you at that time.

The enclosure will speed your reply to me.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

Atch

November 4, 1970

Brig. General Elliott Roosevelt, USAF
4 Ambassador Towers
Suite 1611
801 Bayshore Drive
Miami, Florida 33515

Dear General Roosevelt:

I'm the fellow working on the biography of General Hap Arnold. Before General George Goddard left Washington for the Boca Raton area, he promised to write you in my behalf.

I don't know whether you received his letter, but in any event, I would appreciate an opportunity to talk with you for an hour or so at a time convenient for you.

I plan to be in the Miami area late in December and would hope to contact you at that time.

The enclosure will speed your reply to me.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

Atch

3714 Leland Street
Chevy Chase, MD 20015
July 1, 1970

B/Gen Elliott Roosevelt
Four Ambassador Towers
Suite 1611
801 Bayshore Drive
Miami, FL 33515

Dear Elliott:

I haven't heard from you since I mailed you a copy of my book, OVERVIEW, several weeks ago. I hope it was received and that you have had a chance to read it. At the time I was working with you in Europe, you helped me in so many ways to get my job done, and I hope I did the same for you. I have always had the warmest feelings about the help you gave me, and I hope what this book says about you will partially pay the debt of gratitude I owe you.

I wish we had a better report to make on current sales of my book but we are in a period when the military has come under a cloud. The American people seem more interested in pollution and urban crisis than they are in the reminiscenses of old soldiers. However, I'm plugging away as best I can with the limited personal resources at my disposal.

One fellow who has helped immeasurably to get some public relations visibility for my book is Dr. Murray Green who works for Bob Seamans, Secretary

of the Air Force. Murray is writing a biography of Hap Arnold and has been interviewing people like Tooey Spaatz, Curt LeMay, Nate Twining, Jimmy Doolittle and yours truly.

Murray wants to come down to Miami to talk to you at a time convenient for you. If you would be willing to see him, I would regard it as a personal favor to me.

It's nice to write to old friends and I hope the world is treating you well. I also hope the book was not mislaid on route to Miami. When you have a chance to read the book, I hope you will feel that what I said does justice to your important contribution to my work and to the overall war effort.

Very sincerely,

GEORGE GODDARD
B/Gen, USAF(Ret)

In next letter mention Gen Goddard

March 3, 1970

Brig. General Elliott Roosevelt
Four Ambassadors Towers No. 1
Suite 1611
801 South Bayshore Drive
Miami, Florida

Dear General Roosevelt:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

To help me do the vast research required, I have been on a Brookings Institution Fellowship. During the past two years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress.

I've spent two weeks at the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, and plan to visit it again as the Morgenthau Collection is opened up.

Within the past several months I have also been interviewing some of the key personalities who either knew General Arnold or had some connection with his policies, including Hon. Robert Lovett and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney and about 30 others.

I plan to visit Florida late in May and wonder whether it would be possible to talk to you about General Arnold at a time and place convenient for you.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Encl

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

AP Aug 11, 1984
Fairbanks.
arnold & Elliott
R
in front on bowline
Bolling

Elliott Roosevelt
4 Ambassador Towers
#1
Suite 1611
801 S. Bayshore Dr.
Miami Fla
371-0638

Elliott Roosevelt

see who's Who p. 1863
for biog.

address: Rolling R Ranch, Meeker, Colo;
also: 6601 N. Palm Canyon Drive,
Phoenix

office: P.O. Box 746
Grand Junction, Colo.

BRIG. GEN. TOM C. RIVES, USAF RET.
P. O. BOX 6206 - ST. PETERSBURG BEACH
FLORIDA 33736
Tel No. 813-362-4811

8¢ U.S. AIR MAIL

Dr. Murray Green
AFCHO. Office Air Force History
Washington D.C.
20314

9 Dec 1971

Dear Dr. Green - Pardon informal reply to your letter 2 Dec 71. Have sold 2905 Shuach Way and am now living in Apt No. 2 - Belle Vista Apts, 35-44th Avenue St Pete Bch Fla. Mail still goes To Post Office Box 6206 - St Pete Bch Fl. 33736. Tel No. same - 813-362-4811. So far as I can tell now - will be glad to see you 7 or 8th Jan 72.

Sincerely
Peter Rivers.

done
1-7-72

---- 20314

2 December 1971

Brig General Tom C. Rives, USAF (Ret)
2905 Sunset Way
P.O. Box 6206
St. Petersburgh Beach, Florida 33736

Dear General Rives:

I'm the fellow working on General Hap Arnold. I finally got my schedule untracked to plan my trip south.

It looks as though I would be in your area some time between Friday, January 7th and Saturday, January 8th. I am hopeful you will be available at that time.

In any event, I shall phone to set up a sppcific time. Perhaps you can let me have your phone number in the enclosure. I'm hopefully assuming you will be available.

I'm really looking forward to a good session with you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Gen Wolfe

Mrs Rives ill

Wilder Scott
746-0185
Bradenton

Gen Wallace
Letter of Signed Copy

David Trafton
11625 6th St E
Isle of Capri
Treasure Island
Fla
363-1271

20314

15 June 1971

Brig. GeneralTom C. Rives, USAF (Ret)
2905 Sunset Way
P.O. Box 6206
St. Petersburg Beach, Fla 33736

Dear General Rives:

Enjoyed reading your "meaty" letter and will look forward to more of the same when we can get together. I may try to get together with General Colton later on when I get into the writing of this section. I've had a number of adverse comments about General Hap which I dont at all object too It adds some spice to the sauce.

On your subject of interest, enclosed is page 73 of the U.S. Army History which lists the Don-Ce-Sar Hotel as one among many Army Hospitals established in converted Civilian Buildings during the war. It may be that the cryptic sources mentioned below the table would have some useful information on the earlier history of this interesting looking building. In any event, the Army SGO (Col Israeloff) suggested that you write to:

Colonel William S. Mullins, US Army
Director, USA MEDD Historical Unit
Forest Glen Section
Walter Reed Army Medical Center
Washington, D. C. 20012

It is quite possible that they have retired those files and they would be hard to get to. These people deal with G.S.A. and might be able to direct you to the person who could latch onto this file.

Let me know how you make out. I'll be glad to help you follow up.

Sincerely

Murray Green
Office of AF History

Encl

TOM C. RIVES
BRIG. GEN., USAF, RET.
2905 SUNSET WAY, P. O. BOX 6206
ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, FLA. 33736

9 June 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History,
Department of the Air Force,
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Thanks for Dr. Bowles address. I will try to drop him a line in a few days.

Will be glad to see you in November. You of course appreciate there is nothing an old General likes better than to reminisce.

Now let me say a word or so as to the two comments I made that aroused your special interest.

My Heritage dictionary defines an intransigent as: "Refusing to moderate an extreme position, uncompromising." Fowler defines it as " an irreconcilable."

When I went to Wright- Patterson Field in 1930 as a Signal Corps officer, I soon found I had to sell myself to the finest group of "individuals" it had ever been my pleasure to meet. Each and every one of them had his own ideas as to how things should be done. Few of the pilots there were West Pointers with the discipline taught there. I think my not being a Pointer, but a graduate of a civilian engineering school, helped some. Even then, It was about a year before I began to get the confidence and trust of the officers and engineers on duty there. Every pilot there had a desk job and most of them had trouble getting in their "flying time" of four hours per month. A "non-pilot" officer soon learned NOT to tell one pilot that another pilot said that was not the way to do a certain bit of flying. Some flew by compass and some flew by the railroad tracks. Yes-the Hegenbergers, Hollomans, Streets, Stevens, Goddards, Gilkesons, Hoffmans and countless others flew airplanes like they flew their desks, according to the dictates of their own conscience. That was what made the Air Force.

Now General Mac still thought Hap Arnold should ask for his advice on electronic matters even after Van Bush had placed Eddie Bowles in the strategic position of consultant to Stimson as well Arbold. This reminds me of a comment General Roger Colton of the Signal Corps made when the Executive Order came out setting up OSRD. Roger had been lord of all he surveyed, until he saw that order, then he said very simply. "When you can't lick 'em, jine 'em." Van Bush's "Pieces of the Action" explains it.

I ran across portions of a letter from 2nd. Lieut. H.H. Arnold to the Commanding Officer, Signal Corps Aviation School, Washington, D.C., dated November 6, 1912 at Fort Riley Kansas, in Lt.Col.Marshall's story of the U.S.ARMY Signal Corps, that I am sure you must have seen. It is on Page 134.

As an "amateur historian" I am occupying some of my time, when I can find any free, researching the history of the " Don Ce Sar" building about two blocks from my home. It was constructed right at the end of the Florida Boom- 1926 to 1928. It was used as a luxury hotel from 1928 to 1942 ,when it was purchased as a rehabilitation center for Air Corps personnel. It was taken over by the Veterans Administration in 1944 and given up April 1,1969 when they moved to the new Federal Building in St.Petersburg. The General Service Administration has declared the building surplus to U.S.Government needs and the City of St.Petersburg Beach is trying to take it over to avoid its being razed. I am particularly interested in the Air Corps personnel who operated the building during the 1942-44 period and distinguished Air Corps personnel,who were patients there during the period it was being used as an Air Corps rehabilitation center for personnel returning from WW II.

Can you give me any information as to where I might write for further data on Air Corps use of the Don Ce Sar during the period 1942-44 ? Am enclosing a small picture I took of the building last week.

****

2100- 12 June 1971

This was left in the "mill" when some visitors arrived unexpectedly, after a tour in Okinawa, and I have just been able to get back to it, they leave in the morning for Ft. Hood, Texas. I am also enclosing a page of a letter I started to you on 2 June and never completed. When I read it " the morning after" having written it, I decided to make a new try, as it contained too much of my painful recollections of Wright Field in 1930- am sending it along as it may add something to your story background. I am a very strong believer in the historian " telling it as it was " in all its gory details. That is why Van Bush's book, the Dulaney Terrett series on the "US Army in WW II" are such valuable contributions. Quite a lot of Terrett's work was based on inter-office memoranda and also memos for file. These were written by the individuals concerned in the heat of action, rarely edited, sometimes in longhand and often dictated to a steno immediately after a heated conference. This is also what makes Eddie Bowles comments so tremendously important- he always tried to make a memo for file on anything of importance at the time it happened. Wish you could get Maj.Gen. Roger B.Colton, now living in ~~Alexandria~~ Alexandria to talking - have an idea his remarks might not be so complimentary to Hap but I feel sure they would be very illuminating.

Please pardon the many typographical errors and also those of grammar and spelling. One learns too late in life that a good secretary typist is a treaure.

(TCR) Encl-

Sincerely Tom C Rives

Enclosure 2/71 to Ltr 1 Apr 71

1st Draft - never mailed as a letter

TOM C. RIVES
BRIG. GEN., USAF, RET.
2905 SUNSET WAY, P. O. BOX 6206
ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, FLA. 33736

2 June 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History,
Department of the Air Force,
Washington, D.C. 20314,

Dear Dr. Green:

Thanks for Dr. Bowles address. I will try to drop him a line in the next day or so.

Perhaps I should go into a little detail reference the two comments that excited your special interest.

Let me say that my opinions of the personnel of the Air Force were gained, first as a Signal Corps Officer ordered to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio in 1930 to take command of the Signal Corps Aircraft Radio Laboratory. Even at that early date, an officer from another branch of the service, particularly the Signal Corps, was suspect. I soon found there were many good reasons for this feeling among the Air Corps officers. As a general rule, officers with the same length of service in the Air Corps held lower ranks than like officers in other branches or corps of the army. The rated air corps officer had earned his wings the hard way and he looked down on the unrated officer of another corps. The possible exception to this was respect for the doctors in the Medical Corps. The doctor was in a position to take them off "flying duty" and thus stop that flying pay. This was reflected in many ways, such as assignment to quarters and ratings on efficiency reports, to mention only two. I had trouble getting quarters and my efficiency reports were " Average", for the first six year tour at Wright Field. Prior to that my ratings had always been " Excellent" or "Superior". This last situation delayed my getting my BG by at least two years, so I have been told on good authority.

Even now, I cannot blame them too much for their attitude. I soon found that the Signal Corps attitude was very restrictive with respect to anything the Air Corps wanted. The development of the aircraft was carried out by some of the large aircraft companies, engine companies etc. The Signal Corps was trying to to develope the communications equipment, to keep pace with them. The Signal Corps insisted on its rights under the Army Regulations, and despite Air Corps objections, continued to specify "olive drab" finish on sets to be installed along side Air Corps "black crackle" finish. I went through six years of this at the Signal Corps Aircraft Laboratory at Wright Field 1930 -1936, and came back to another assignment to the Air Force in 1942 to find the situation unchanged. This in their own laboratories was one reason for the "Staff Study" that resulted in the R+D for all electronic equipment peculiar to the AF being transferred to them in 1944 -

20314

1 June 1971

Brig. General Tom C. Rives, USAF (Ret)
2905 Sunset Way
P.O. Box 6206
St. Petersburg Beach, Florida 33736

Dear General Rives:

I was delighted to have your response of the 27th. It makes me want to break off some prior commitments and rush down to talk with you. Of special interest are your comments:

1) "...welding a group of intransigent individualists.... "

2) "General Mac resented Bowles acting as Hap's consultant..."

Dr. Ed Bowles is a tremendous guy. He can document everything he told me, and some of his comments were quite startling. But he made a believer out of me.

His address: 15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181
His Phone: A/C 617 - 235-2414

Bowles spoke of you with affection and he would be delighted to hear from you, I'm sure.

I propose to save up my questions and fire them at you when we get together. I expect that will be November at the earliest. I'll alert you when my plans firm up, so we will be sure to make connections.

I too am honored to have the opportunity to ask you questions. We ought to have a good session.

Sorry to hear about Mrs. Rives. Hope she is coming along.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

TOM C. RIVES
BRIG. GEN., USAF, RET.
2905 SUNSET WAY, P. O. BOX 6206
ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, FLA. 33736

May 27, 1971

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History,
Headquarters United States Air Force,
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Delayed my reply to your letter of 18 May 1971 until I could replay a tape I made for Col. George S, Walborn on September 10,1968, covering a good part of my career in the Air Corps with particular reference to communications and electronics. Col. Walborn was doing research at that time for a history of the Air Corps communications and electronics work. I find it made no references to Hap Arnold or to that part of my work as Deputy Air Communications Officer.

I consider it quite an honor to be asked to contribute to your research for the biography of Hap Arnold. Like you, I am a great admirer of Hap. He did a tremendous job welding a group of intransigent individualists into one of the most cohesive fighting forces ever known.

I am also a great admirer of Eddie Bowles. He bridged the "communications gap" between Hap Arnold and General Harold Mc Clelleand in an admirable way. General Mac resented Bowles acting as Hap's consultant on radar and other electronic matters and this resulted in something of a personality clash between Eddie and Mac, due to no fault of Eddies. As a result, General Mac delegated most of the work with Eddie to me. This suited me fine and led to a very friendly relationship.

So far as I can tell you now, I will be available here on short notice at any time you find it convenient to make your other contacts. I must add that I find it difficult to go away from the immediate vicinity for any extended period of time due to an invalid wife. Locally, I can spend any reasonable amount of time with you. In fact, I am sure I would enjoy it.

May I suggest, you send me a list of the questions generated by your conversations with Eddie Bowles and I will try to furnish you with answers. If satisfactory to you, I will put my replies on tape as I have several recorders here. I must warn you that I had very little direct or intimate contact with Hap.

Please send me Eddie Bowles address, I would like to drop him a line.

Let me hear from you.

Sincerely,
Tom C. Rives.

(TCR)

20314

18 May 1971

Brig. General Tom C. Rives, USAF (Ret)
P.O. Box 6206
St. Petersburg Beach, Florida 33736

Dear General Rives:

I recently visited Dr. Edward Bowles in Wellesley Hills, Mass and spent the better part of three days going through his fantastic files and talking to him about my favorite subject - General Hap Arnold, about whom I'm doing a biography.

Dr. Bowles mentions you many times in connection with the problems in AAF communications and radar, and how you were brought in under General McClelland to pick up a great deal of the slack.

In any event, I should mention that I'm a professional historian and have worked for the eight Secretaries of the Air Force beginning with Stuart Symington in 1947. Recently I was detached to work on this book which is to be published by Random House.

In the course of my research I have interviewed most of the great ones in Air Force History, including: Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Norstad, Kuter, Kenney, O'Donnell, LeMay and over 100 others. I've also talked with Hon. Robert Lovett, Charles Lindbergh, Jackie Cochran, de Seversky, and some others.

I would be pleased to have the opportunity to talk to you about your recollections of General Arnold. Perhaps an hour would do it.

Just when we could do it is a bit of a puzzle right now. I'm thinking of the early Fall as a time when many retirees begin to flock back to the warm weather.

In any event, I would like to hear from you. If you feel you have something to contribute, would you indicate the best times for me to come down. I have several interviews pending on the Gulf Coast and would be delighted to include you among them.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Season's Greetings

TOM C. RIVES
BRIG. GEN., USAF, RET.
~~2905 SUNSET WAY~~, P. O. BOX 6206
ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, FLA. 33736
Tel. (813) 362-4811

December 29, 1971

HOLLIDAY GREETINGS TO ALL THE FOLKS AND THE PEOPLE.

We want to thank you for the HOLLIDAY GREETINGS of the past few years. We have been unable to acknowledge them. Now, since so many have asked for news, we have decided to bring you down to date.

We are happy to report that we are enjoying life gratefully and graciously, as Senior Citizens. When we look around us at all the want, misery and unhappiness, we fully appreciate being able to enjoy so much of the fruits of life and in some small measure help a few others over the rough spots.

Annie is in a small nursing home a short distance from my present two bedroom ground floor apartment. She has lost her memory, but is otherwise healthy, happy and well able to take care of most of her own physical needs. She is just as fussy about her own personal appearance as ever, must have her "permanent" every two weeks. Goes for a ride with me several times a week, must have the car radio on and enjoys counting out the nickels to pay the toll across the Bay Way. Nancy, Betty and Queenie, her maid for the last five years, all visit her and take her to ride. She has improved quite a bit since she entered the nursing home, as the trained nurses get her to take the medication she was putting in the waste basket when my back was turned.

We sold the BIG HOUSE on the beach at a fair profit. Jane came on from Tucson and she and Nancy and Betty divided the household and personal belongings, leaving me more than enough to keep house with. You will notice the street address is crossed out in the letterhead - so send any mail to the same old Post Office Box 6206--33736. To satisfy your curiosity, the girls all come to see Apartment # 2, Belle Vista Apartments, 35 - 44th Avenue, St.Pete Beach, Fla., where me and my stock of bourbon, scotch, gin and vodka hold forth at appropriate times.

As for me, Doc Moore says my blood pressure and chlosterol are OK and my EKG is a duplicate of the one he made five years ago--BUT he says I have got to cut out at least one " bourbon and creek water" a day to get my weight below 220.

Now for a brief resume' of the daughters and their families.

Number One Daughter- Nancy, John and Spen Lucas still at their old home here in St.Pete Beach. Jimmie still in Texas. Chris and her daughter in St.Petersburg. Nancy still sailing and doing quite a bit of genealogical work on the Rives-Spann-Lucas lines. John has set up a real estate office in down town St.Pete Beach and still manages Cameo Apartments. Spen home from college at Charlotte, N.C. and says he is not going back as he wants a job.

Number Two Daughter- Jane, Bert and Jay are back at their old home in Tucson, Ariz. Jane and Jay spent a year here at Treasure Island while Bert did a tour of duty in Thailland and retired as a Lt. Colonel. Bert is now a member of a real estate firm and Jane just quit a job as the F.W.Dodge Tucson reporter to look for an easy one with more promotion and pay. Jay says he is going to work for a construction company and they say "Yes if you will cut your hair".

Number Three Daughter- Betty and Sandy Sanderson live on Vina Del Mar Island, another one of the small communities that form a part of St.Pete Beach. They have a nice home fronting on Boca Ciega Bay. In addition to that they have a swimming pool and a flag pole with flag, two nice cocker spaniels and an old yaller alley cat. Sandy is a VP with the William Zemp Advertising company. Betty graduated last June as a Computer Programmer. Eveleigh stayed in Chi working for Time-Life and she just spent Xmas here making the Bikini stock go up several points. Tom married a pretty little brunette and has a home on Vina Del Mar- he is a DDD specialist with General Telephone drawing a five figure salary.

Miss Nora and Miss Bunnie, (Annie's sisters) still in Montgomery.

"The Moving Finger writes: and, having Writ, moves on: Nor all your piety nor Wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line, Nor all your tears wash out a word of it."

SEE YOU NEXT YEAR- Yours truly, Annie & Tom.

Annie and Tom.

(TCR)

Interview - BG Elliott Roosevelt, Goulds, Florida, Jan 15, 1972

Q: I feel very honored and anxious to talk with you. I've been through the Library of Congress and I've seen most of Arnold's files. One of the files he had there was the Argentia Conference, where you served as his aide.

R: Right.

Q: You wrote a hand-penciled report. Do you recall the circumstances of that?

R: Yes, I remember it very well. I was stationed in Newfoundland with the - I'm trying to remember my squadron's number up there, but we were on anti-submarine patrol. We were a recon squadron flying B-18s, and I had been sent up there in the Fall of 1940, because of the fact, and I don't know if you remember it, I was stationed at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, in procurement. Because I had been commissioned as a Captain during the campaign - I Want To Be A Captain Too" screwup - it became pretty hot for my father. So when he and Gen Arnold came through during the campaign, and father inspected Wright-Patterson Fields, they had me come down to the train and told me I'd better get transferred - get out of town - and so I said: "That is just fine with me." Gen Arnold said: "Well, now, you did fill out your preferences as to whether you wanted to go, when you were commissioned and assigned to your present post in the event that you were to be ordered overseas." And I said: "Yes." I had stated at the time that I was perfectly willing to serve overseas, and named my preferences. You were given, I think it was, 5 or 6 preferences. But, in any event, I named my preferences. They were the Philippines No. 1, and Hawaii No. 2, Panama No. 3. I named every warm area that I could think of overseas. Of course, I got sent to Newfoundland by Larry Norstad, who said that they had a special mission that they wanted me to perform up there. So I was detached to the 300(?) Squadron, as the Intelligence Officer. Shortly after I got up there, I received my supplementary orders which were that I was to also head up this group combined effort to explore not only Labrador, but Baffin I land and all the way up to Elsmere Island, and then all of Greenland, particularly on the east coast of Greenland, because they

had another mission that was doing the west coast of Greenland. But they asked us to go to the extreme northern end of the West Coast of Greenland, and find weather station sites. Of course, we were supposed to do this in the summertime, and we were going to use, there was combined Army-AF and Navy exploration team. We used an old PBY, and we had some pretty hairy experiences there for quite a while. But we did find the Goose Bay location in the spring of 1941. I came back from England, just after the ice had gone out. I came back from England after going over all of our stuff with the RAF, and had the pleasure of flying over Goose Bay, and seeing the bulldozers finishing up the runway. They flew the first aircraft across the Atlantic off that airfield in November 1941. Then also the Bluie East airfield that was eventually established. We located that site. We located about 15 weather station sites. We also did collaborate with the other group on Bluie West #1 and #2 sites. So we had quite a long period up there and then it was during the summer of the early part of the summer of 1941, I happened to have come back in from up there, and received instructions to report down to Argentia. I had to go down on a train. I remember that train trip very well because Lord Beaverbrook had flown in from England and had landed at Gander where I was stationed. We took the train down together on a wooden seat that we shared.

Q: Did they tell you what it was at the time?

R: Yes, they did. It was super-secret that I was to report to Gen Arnold, and that this was to be a very high level meeting at which my father - I didn't know until I ran into Beaverbrook on that train that I was also going to be meeting the Prime Minister, whom I had met earlier in England.

Q: When did you learn that you were going to be Arnold's aide?

R: Only when I got to Argentia. Reported on board and he greeted me as I came aboard.

Q: Talking about Argentia Conference. When you met Arnold there, did he explain what he hoped you would do for him as his aide?

E: Yes, I was to keep as close a record of all the meetings and what transpired and keep this record on his behalf, so he would have this when making

up his reports when he got back to the Pentagon. So my job daily was to sit down and write out just exactly what transpired, at not only the large meetings, but the smaller meetings that took place. There were a number of meetings of opposite numbers where I would sit in on one conference or another. But wherever I sat in, I was to keep records of that.

Q: Now Arnold left two days before.

R: Right.

Q: He came back with the photographs, I guess they were going to give it to the press, but they were "Hold For Release," because....

R: After the announcement of the....

Q: Right, because the President was still going to be at sea for a couple of days, and there were German submarines floating around. You know, Arnold had an experience, when he got home - it was supposed to be very secret - when he got home, there was a newsman in his house with his wife. This guy was interviewing her and taking pictures for the Army Emergency Relief. So this guy was in there. Arnold saw this fellow and he got very frightened because this guy might spill the beans that he was back. Everybody knew the President was out of town someplace. So he hustled Mrs. Arnold and the family down to Nags Head, this is August 1941, to keep them out of sight. He was very agitated about this. Did you ever hear this story?

R: I'd never heard this story at all. This is entirely new to me.

Q: He was supposed to have come back, and I think there was like a two-day lag before the announcement was to be made. Of course, and he didn't want any press to see him back, because there was speculation about the President having a JCS meeting with Churchill some place. But you didn't hear anything about that?

R: No, I didn't hear any of that.

Q: What sort of guy was Arnold to work for or with?

R: He was probably the most understanding individual I've ever known or served under with the possible exception of Tooey Spaatz, who was always a wonderful person to me. But I felt that Arnold, of course, had a much greater

grasp of how to accomplish Father's goal, which was to build practically a non-existent AF up to the goal of 50,000 aircraft a year. And I think really the complete credit for having accomplished this has to go to Arnold. This is the most incredible feat ever accomplished in the history of our country, really.

Q: Taking the AAF from a non-existent force to a tremendous force?

R: Right, because I can remember. You see, I was Aviation Editor for the Hearst Newspapers way back when Father cancelled the air mail contracts. I wrote some very scathing prose. I'd met Gen Arnold at that time. He was a LTCOL at March Field, and I got a great deal of my information from him, which was the complete lack of communications equipment, adequate communications equipment, the complete lack of proper aircraft to be able to fly the air mail route. In spite of that, they had to do it. I wrote some pretty terrible articles, I 'm afraid, about what my Father was doing.

Q: Criticizing the cancellation?

R: Criticizing the cancelling the air mail contracts, and exposing these young officers to flying what amounted to death missions with inadequate equipment.

Q: Arnold had the Western Air Mail Zone.

R: Right, I remember that very, very well.

Q: And, of course, he cautioned the young pilots under him not to fly unless they were sure of the weather situation. They still lost a number of people.

R: Right.

Q: And as a result of the air mail situation, General Benny Foulois got in trouble with your dad. Do you remember anything about that?

R: Oh yes. Yes sir. In fact, I know that Benny Foulois was one of my father's most bitter enemies for many years. He felt that he had been very unjustly treated, and in many ways, I think he was unjustly treated, because my father felt that this was scandal that had to be exchanged at any cost. I think that rightly, Benny Foulois felt that, really it was not fair to expose human lives to correct what was really an Administration fault.

Q: I've done a lot of research into this area, and the situation as it developed from Benny Foulois' standpoint, he went to see Harlee Branch, the 2nd Asst Postmaster.

R: Whom I disliked with a holy passion. Oh, I couldn't get along with him.

Q: And before they cancelled the contracts, they asked Foulois how long it would take him to get ready, and he said: "Give us a week or 10 days." So they gave him 10 days. Now, ex post facto, Benny Foulois' biography, have you seen it?

R: No.

Q: Said that he was ordered to fly the mail, and he had no choice but to say "yes sir."

R: That was the impression I was under.

Q: That he was ordered to fly the mail?

R: I was under the impression that he had been ordered to fly, and that he had protested to Harlee Branch that he wasn't ready, and Harlee Branch said: "Well, I'm sorry. But this is all the time that you have."

Q: I see.

R: In any event, I don't understand the statement that Foulois could possibly have made that he could get ready, because he didn't have the equipment, never did. So how in the world he could make a statement like that, would have been, maybe this is something that I didn't know, if he made such a statement t hat he could fly.

Q: Well, this is, one of the accounts that I have come across. His anxiety, or his statement was motivated by a desire to get $800,000 in Post Office funds for flying pay. At this time, flying pay was drastically cut. The Economy Act was inforce. Money was very hard to come by for flying purposes. Here was a chance to do two things: One, get money for flying pay; two, get experience in flying. So at least the story that I understand to be fact is that Foulois kind of stretched the possibility, you know, flying the mail to be easier than operational, and may have overestimated the capability.

R: This puts a completely different light on the whole thing.

Q: You understand that he was ordered to do that?

R: At that time, we were told at all levels that they were just ordered willy nilly to fly, because when I came in as a reporter, to investigate why, and I kept asking "why, when you haven't got any communications equipment that is worth throwing in the river, and you've got inadequate aircraft. Why would anybody order you to do it?" And always, everybody said: "We were ordered to do it, anyway."

Q: Did Arnold tell you this?

R: Arnold never did. Arnold complained about the inability to get better equipment. He felt at that time when he was in charge of that Western Zone. As I remember, he felt very strongly that there was equipment available that could be put into the aircraft, and that there were better aircraft, too, that were available to fly the mail. And that here we were flying anything that was at hand in any one of the sectors.

Q: There was a scene in Foulois' book, how he and Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of Staff, were called into the White House - this is after the first series of crashes - and the President ordered the mail stopped. It was stopped for about a week or 8 days. The President was in bed. Looking over his glasses, he let Foulois and MacArthur have it in very strong terms. Do you recall that?

R: I don't recall that, because actually, I was on the West Coast at the time, and was writing really from a field standpoint rather than being close to my father at that time. I didn't really see my father until after that period when the air mail was stopped, and it had started again. He went down to Miami, and went off on Vincent Astor's yacht on a trip. I went down. I flew a plane that belonged to William Randolph Hearst down to Miami, and then, the Coast Guard flew me out and I was out there for one day with my father. It was a little frosty that visit, because my father felt that I was being very unfair in my criticism.

Q: Your writing about the air mail?

R: Yes.

Q: That's very interesting. Well, from the President's standpoint, if they had come back to him and said: "It will take us 30 days, 60 days, to do it." He asked Jim Farley - of course - they were interested in obviously exploiting for political purposes the hanky-panky with the air mail contracts.

R: Right.

Q: It was something they wanted to expose. However, somebody had recalled to the President that in the 1920s, the Air Service had flown the mail. And I think - at least I understand the story - that he asked can they do it again, and he was told they could. But if Foulois had said it would take 30 or 60 days he needed to prepare, would they have given him that time?

R: I think so. I think without a question they would have given him that extra time. I think also that Foulois probably was not really honest in outlining fully what needed in order to be properly prepared.

Q: I have a feeling in having spent a lot of time researching this stuff. He was so anxious to....

R: Get that extra money?

Q: To get the money and the mission, that he sort of skimmed over the inadequacies of the Air Corps in its performance. As it turned out, toward the end of the mission, which lasted about 3 or 4 months, they were flying the mail....

R: Really doing very well..

Q: Doing very well.

R: Very well, of course, they were flying VOR all the time. They finally got the pilots to recognize that you just cannot fly IFR.

R: It had to be the farthest stretch of the imagination to think that he did. Mark Clark never had any love for my father. Mark Clark was quite bitter that he wasn't elevated much more rapidly in the ground forces. He felt the was far superior to many of those who were chosen.

Q: I want to ask you about Arnold and your father. Going back to 1934, Arnold had done a good job, and he was named to head the Alaskan flight. Now, this is a big thing, and the President called for Arnold. He invited him to the White House. He came to the White House and the President spent a lot of

time asking a lot of questions about Alaska. I think the President was impressed with Arnold. He thought the President was sort of Navy oriented.

R: Right.

Q: And, of course, Arnold came back to Washington with Malin Craig. Arnold had been somewhat, not cashiered, but exiled.

R: He was out in the boondocks.

Q: And Malin Craig brought him back. After Craig succeeded MacArthur. Arnold became Asst Chief under Westover, and two years later, Westover spun in. There was Arnold available for the job. Now, the President delayed in appointing Arnold because there was a story, widely accepted in Washington that Arnold drank. Did you ever hear this story?

R: Yes, sir, I knew that. What is completely wrong.

Q: Do you have any idea of who might be passing this story around?

R: Well, on the West Coast I know there were a number of people who were in the service, who were anti-Arnold. Arnold was very popular with all of the aircraft manufacturing people, with Douglas, North American and Boeing. All of the big aircraft manufacturers felt that Arnold had a grasp of what was needed, and could cut through to enable them to get a job done faster, because, if you remember, back in the old days, to get an aircraft approved, after you got a contract, it was a matter of 4, 5 or 6 years. Arnold was very anxious to cut this time down, this huge time lag, and actually get aircraft flying. They just loved him, but the one whale of a lot of AF people, particularly in the procurement branch, who just were dead set against Arnold, and felt that he was trying to cut their jobs out from under them, and so forth. They were pretty autocratic, if you remember it. If you have interviewed any of the people who headed those companies during the war years, there was an awful lot of autocratic personnel that Arnold was pretty ruthless when he became Chief. He cut out all that kind of stuff.

Q: Right, well, whatever they told him, he asked them to do it in half the time.

R: That's right.

Q: He never allowed them to relax.

R: And he told a man if he had to work 24 hours a day, you work 24 hours a day. We've got to have this.

Q: Yes, he had tremendous drive. I did a documentary movie script, a nd I called it "Hap Arnold, Man In A Hurry."

R: That's right.

Q: To me it is the most characteristic personality trait the had. Whatever somebody told him, he wanted it done in less time. Well, you mentioned some people at Wright Field who were opposed to Arnold, who felt that he was cutting them out of the pattern, or felt that he was pushing them too hard.

R: Who was head of procurement at Wright Field?

Q: Tony Frank.

R: Tony Frank, yes, he was definitely against him.

Q: He was an Andrews man.

R: Yes, definitely.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of Arnold and Andrews' relationship?

R: I don't, no sir. I'm sorry.

Q: You see, Andrews was one year ahead of Arnold, and was a natural candidate for the job. And it was speculated that he might have the job. He was down in Langley Field. Head of the GHQ AF.

R: Right.

Q: I've been told that he was brought up to Washington and interviewed. You see, he was pushing hard for the B-17s, he and Knerr, who was second in command, and it caused some embarrassment to people like Woodring, who said, we could take a dollar and get a lot of small planes, instead of these big planes. But Andrews was pushing hard for the big planes, and he was sort of disliked in the War Dept Gen Staff. One story I have is that Pa Watson, who was a classmate of Andrews - 06 - was pushing Andrews.

R: Well I don't....I have some feelings on that, I think there is probably no question but what Pa Watson was the kind of person who had a real close feeling

for all of his old classmates, and so forth. It would have been normal for him to push his classmate as against the younger man. At West Point, it's always seniority. I think there is no question but what he did. But I'm also positive that Pa Watson was the kind of person, and his relationship with father was on such a personal basis of friendship, because I really feel that when Pa Watson died on the way back from YALTA, that that was the real time of loss to father. That really made him start to go downhill, as rapidly as he did from that time on.

Q: His strong right hand?

R: He was, and he was such a strong affinity between those two men, and I'm positive, because the way it turned out, that Pa Watson said to father: "Now, I really think you have to make the final decision between these men. Of course, I feel that this man has the right to the job, by virtue of seniority. But you have passed over a great many senior officers already, and if you have strong feelings after you've gotten the chance to evaluate Arnold and Andrews, I think you took the attitude, Frank, you go ahead and do it the way you think is best."

Q: There was a delay, some thought an inordinate delay.

R: I think that was probably due to Pa Watson.

Q: But this then rumor that Arnold drank was kicked around Washington.

R: This afflicted a great many people. And it was not justified.

Q: In Arnold's case, he didn't drink. Most people tell me he walked around with a glass of sherry.

R: And he'd have the same glass when the whole evening was through.

Q: Yes.

R: At all of these conferences when, believe you me, the British counterparts drank very heavily, because from Churchill right on down. Arnold at the end of an evening, he was going strong, and it was a tough deal to stay up with him.

Q: In any event, the President did decide to give Arnold the job. And it was right after Arnold got the job, Hitler moved into Munich. The day after.

And the President became very exercised about the lack of airpower. Of course, the President really didn't understand what it took to get airpower. He made the 50,000 plane speech....

R: Off the cuff, I might add.

Q: Was that off the cuff?

R: Yes sir.

Q: Did anybody counsel him on that?

R: No sir.

Q: You know about that? How did it come about?

R: He made the decision that we just had to build. I don't think he had any idea that we'd ever reach that plateau. I think he was as surprised as anyone else when we actually started producing at the rate we did. But he felt that we had to startle the nation, and so he chose that right out of the blue.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about that? Did you ever talk to your father about how he arrived at 50,000 planes?

R: No, I didn't.

Q: It was so far out of the ball park.

R: Completely out of all belief of anybody that it could be done, and of course, when he made the speech, it wasn't contemplated that we would divert as much of our manufacturing capability to such places as Willow Run, and all of those places. It wasn't even contemplated on any drawing boards of procurement that we would be geared to this type of production. Of course, when Hitler really moved in, the German AF wasn't that powerful.

Q: Well, it was spectacular. The Stukas made a lot of racket and terrorized people. The Stukas were great without air opposition.

R: They were evidentally great enough that they impressed Mr. Lindbergh, really.

Q: Yes. Which reminds me of another area of interest. Arnold was very interested in what Lindbergh had to offer. Arnold had just gotten the job, and there were all kinds of rumors, not too many facts about the German AF. Lindbergh had been over there, and they showed him everything. I interviewed Lindbergh a

few months ago, and his feeling towards Franklin D. Roosevelt is unchanged.

R: Absolutely. No question about it.

Q: Really remarkable. In any event, Arnold in a sense had to walk a tightrope, because he was trying to get information from Lindbergh. He greatly admired Lindbergh's technical ability.

R: Right.

Q: Lindbergh had the ability to go into a plant, and come up with an estimate of what that plant could produce, and he was very good at that. Arnold was trying to pump Lindbergh for the information he had. But Lindbergh went beyond technical expertise. He wrote letters to Arnold saying that we should not involve ourselves in a war that might destroy western civilization. In other words, we should not fight Nazi Germany. He considered Germany as part of the western culture.

R: Right.

Q: And he was opposed to that. I don't think Arnold was a political man?

R: Far from it.

Q: He stayed out of politics. In any event, Arnold had to walk a tightrope between Lindbergh and your father.

R: Yes, but I know, I do know of two meetings that he had, to my knowledge, where he convinced my father that he had to use the expertise of Lindbergh. In both of those instances, my father said: "Well, it's up to you. I do not want to have you create a major figure of Lindbergh in this war effort, but you can utilize him as long as you keep him under wraps.

Q: As a civilian? I think your father would not allow him back in uniform?

R: He would not give him. Arnold went to him and tried to sell him on the BG commission. My father refused on that.

Q: Do you remember when these two meetings occurred?

R: I know that one of them occurred just prior to when Gen Arnold sent him to the Pacific.

Q: Was this after Pearl Harbor?

R: This was after Pearl Harbor. One of them was prior to Pearl Harbor. which was during that period shortly after Lindbergh had come back from Germany.

Q: Was he already making speeches for the America First?

R: He was making the speeches, America First speeches.

Q: I saw Robert Lovett in NY.

R: How is Bob?

Q: He's doing fine. He's in his 80s and has got all his marbles.

R: He's a great person.

Q: He was sort of....

R: He's like Grover Loening. Every time I see Grover Loening I'm just absolutely amazed, here's a man whose got all his marbles and he must be close to 90 now.

Q: I interviewed him at the Metropolitan Club. He is thin and wiry....

Q: We are talking about Lindbergh. There was a meeting on Jan 12, 1942, five weeks after Pearl Harbor. Arnold and Lindbergh, with Lovett sitting in - and this is an attempt by Lindbergh to come back into the active service. After Pearl Harbor he volunteered for active service. You father wouldn't have him. Arnold wanted him back, obviously, because he wanted to make use of his talent.

R: Right.

Q: Lindbergh told me that your father offered him a job as Secy of the AF. Of course, there was no AF. This was prior to this meeting, but that he was given an offer as Secy of an independent AF, if he would lay off his criticism of the foreign policy. Do you have any feeling there?

R: This may be true. I am rather doubtful of the authenticity of that, but I wouldn't want to question his integrity.

Q: It's quite possible that....

R: In 1942 I was already way up there in the Arctic.

Q: Right, this is so.

R: No, by Jan 1942, I was being sent to Africa.

Q: I confused two things, actually, Jan 1942, he was trying to get

back into service. The offer of Secy of the AF was made in 1943, before Pearl Harbor.

R: Of course, I was up in the North.

Q: This is when Lindbergh still had tremendous prestige. Whenever Lindbergh spoke he got front page attention. This offer could have been made, and they figured that if he accepted the offer, they would set up a Secy of the AF, and put him in a corner some place with a plush office, and sort of isolate him.

R: Yes, but I can't see, you mean that father at that time, contemplated a separate branch of the service?

Q: Yes, even though he was opposed to it himself.

R: There was a real reason why he was opposed to it because of his close Navy ties, and he felt that the Navy had to have their own AF. Therefore, he didn't want the precedent established through the Army splitting off the AF into a separate entity.

Q: Well, it could have been sort of a political offer. In Arnold's dealings with Lindbergh, I gather that Arnold did not regard the offer, if it was made, as a bonafide offer. In other words, they would set up an office as Secy of the AF, as a Special Assistant to the President, in other words, without making a big thing of it, and give him an office somewhere in the West Wing or some place, and isolating Lindbergh.

R: Entirely possible.

Q: Do you remember C.B. Allen?

R: Yes.

Q: He just passed away. He was very close to Lindbergh. He retired to Moorefield, W.Va. I interviewed him. He is the one who was close to Lindbergh. He won an award because he reported Lindbergh's takeoff back in '27. And he was very close to Lindbergh. He said that that offer was made. In fact, he wrote an article in a magazine about it. But you have never heard of it?

R: No sir.

Q: This brings me to another possible source of friction between Arnold

Franklin D. Roosevelt, this one involving Morgenthau. Do you remember this? This is 1939. And there was a big hassle about it. Morgenthau was pushing to get our planes, Lend Lease, well, this was before Lend Lease. But the French had sent a mission over here. Morgenthau had virtually directed Arnold, who had just become Chief of the Air Corps, to allow this Frenchman to fly this Douglas plane out in Santa Monica. It was the DB-7 prototype, a secret plane. The plane crashed "right in Macy's window," so to speak, right in the parking lot. It became a source of Congressional criticism as to why we were allowing foreigners to have access to American secret equipment. This created a confrontation between Arnold and Morgenthau which was never resolved, in my reading of it. They never were good friends.

R: I don't think that there was any friendship lost on the part of any of the military leadership and Mr. Morgenthau.

Q: Why?

R: I think Mr. Morgenthau was quite a gadfly, interfering in other departments all the way through. I think, very frankly, that father was his own Secy of Treasury, anyway. Morgenthau used to make periodic efforts to interfere and I think Bretton Woods was a very good example of his really pushing into the high level decisions as to what policy was to be. He was used by many foreign interests as the means of pushing when they couldn't make it with either the State Dept or War Dept, or wherever. They were trying to get something from us. I really don't think that Arnold was all by himself in having this dispute with Morgenthau. I think the dispute with Morgenthau covered the whole gamut of everybody who was in the same position with my father.

Q: In this particular case, the President backed Morgenthau because he was anxious to help the British and French get ready. They needed some help in the way of aircraft. Arnold had just come on as the Chief of the Air Corps. He had come on in Sept 1938.

R: Let's analyze though just exactly. Here was a prototype aircraft, a long way from production, and what was the point if there was an imminent need

for aircraft in showing them anything that was still in the prototype stage, because, obviously we wouldn't have that for them within a couple of years.

Q: Well, Arnold felt that if we sent out our best airplanes, he couldn't build up his own air force. The President backed Morgenthau at that time. Arnold, in his own book, tells that the President threatened to send him to Guam, which was "Elba." And it wasn't until later on, I think, Arnold's tremendous activity, his attitude, similar to the President's. "Whatever it is, let's get it done in a hurry." I think this is probably the characteristic of Arnold's that the President admired.

R: Right.

Q: In Arnold's book, he says the President invited him for an old-fashioned one night, and called him "Hap," and this is how he knew he was out of the doghouse.

Q: I've had a lot of contact with George Goddard, and George Goddard said that Arnold fired him out of Washington, I think it was 1942, because of the inordinate influence over Arnold by a guy named Minton Kaye. Do you remember Minton Kaye?

R: Well, Col Kaye was head of the Reconnaissance Division in the Pentagon. There is no question that Kaye was shooting for Goddard all along. I would say that Goddard is absolutely correct. But I should, I would like to say that, in my humble opinion, Goddard may have felt that he was getting kicked out. But Arnold was doing it in such fasion that he gave orders in the European theater. when they sent Goddard over there, to all of us, boy, we had carte blanche to do anything he wanted. He would build up a plant outside of Paris there, and he did a fantastic job. He had practically the greatest orders ever cut for anybody who was going to Elba.

Q: You mentioned his orders?

R: Goddard was ordered to come to the European theater and to find out from the operational unit, the things that were needed, and improvements in our equipment and our installations. Actually Goddard did almost all of his infrared film development over there. In my opinion, Gen Arnold did him a favor in getting

him away and giving him the opportunity of seeing what was actually needed in the operational units to make our job more efficient. I will say that it was a great favor to us that we got Goddard.

Q: I think this was the second time that he left Washington. The first time he left he was sent down to Charlotte Air Base.

R: Oh, I remember.

Q: To be VD officer and this was probably due to Minton Kaye's influence.

R: Oh yes, but Minton Kaye was a very, very vindictive soul. I think he retired out to Colorado Springs.

Q: He is now in Pasadena. His wife passed away, and he remarried. His influence with Arnold resulted from his wife having access to Mrs. Arnold. Did you know about this?

R: I think I do recall that it was his wife's friendship with Mrs. Arnold.

Q: Yes. Helen Kaye. When Arnold was transferred to March Field in 1931, he took a ship around the Panama Canal. This was customary in those days. A LT and a newlywed wife were aboard, Minton Kaye and Helen Kaye. And Mrs. Arnold sort of took a fancy to Helen Kaye and Minton Kaye exploited this friendship, and was in and out of Arnold's office. Apparently, let everybody know that he had this access and had special privileges.

R: Well, of course, I suppose you can attribute the demise of Kaye's influence with Arnold to the operational units in the field, and our complete disenchantment with Col Kaye. Col Kaye gave us less than support in our operational units. We had a great deal of trouble with the F-4s and F-5s, that were modifications of the P-38 for photo recon. We were throwing rods every time we went over 17,000 feet with those Allison engines in them. Well, I lost 92 out of 95 pilots the first five weeks that I was in North Africa. Nothing that I could do would get Kaye to do anything. Further than that, we had a great deal of trouble in the operation of our cameras. They were freezing on us, and we were sending back report after report after report to headquarters, urging that something be done before the aircraft and the equipment left the US. They had to be modified, and it wasn't until Bob Lovett came over, I believe it was

in May 1942, and visited and spent quite a lot of time with me. We explained to him what had to be done. It might have been a little earlier than that, because I sent back my Group Operations Officer....

Q: Was it '42 or '43?

R: 1942, right after the invasion of North Africa.

Q: North Africa was Nov 1942.

R: Then it was '43, I'm sorry. So, we had our orders and we had to fly a complete mapping job of Sicily prior to the invasion. We were getting murdered, just absolutely literally murdered. Not that we didn't get murdered all the way through, because records show that we lost 25% of our personnel every month, all the way through the war. But the big difficulty was Minton Kaye had absolutely no concept of what it was to be in a theater, in a war operation, and not to be able to get any kind of help in rectifying what was wrong. If it hadn't been for Bob Lovett and Gen Arnold, establishing the modification depot down in Dallas for the F-5, we would have gone through the war just crippled. We never would have really done a job.

Q: We never did have a satisfactory photo plane. They were sort of makeshift planes?

R: All of our aircraft were makeshift. We had some aircraft that were adequate, I would say, because you take the P-51 that we used on tactical reconnaissance, and the P-38 that we used on strategic reconnaissance, plus we were lucky enough to get a few of the Mosquitoes, and the Mosquito was a very superior reconnaissance aircraft. We did use that on types of missions such as the dropping of personnel behind the lines which we were charged with the responsibility for. So I would say that, by and large, the choice of these aircraft was not too bad, but the modifications took really two years to bring them out.

Q: Was Minton Kaye the action officer in the Pentagon to whom all these problems went?

R: Everything went to him. He fell down completely and finally was relieved by General Arnold, and Gen Arnold asked me for a replacement, and I

made the suggestion of Colonel Jim Hall, who had been a WWI flier, and I got Gen Arnold to let him come back on active duty. When I was training the 3rd Reconnaissance Group in Colorado Springs, he was activated and assigned to my group. He later became the CO of that group in England when I went down to Africa.

Q: George Goddard tells the story that Elliott Roosevelt got "Poppa" to get Minton Kaye relieved from Washington.

R: That's absolutely incorrect. It was done directly by Arnold. It was not at any time - I don't think the President ever heard of Minton Kaye.

R: I think the thing that you wanted to have clarified was the fact that George Goddard thought that I got my father to get Minton Kaye relieved as Chief of the Reconnaissance Branch of the AAF in the Pentagon. This is not true. I saw that in the book. This at no time was true. I never talked to my father. In fact, I don't think that during my father's lifetime, he ever heard Minton Kaye's name. I think the decision was made by Arnold, and the only other person who had any part in that relieving of Minton Kaye from active duty was Bob Lovett. Frankly speaking, I think they only relieved him because they found that he truly had been incompetent. I had a Deputy Commander who had come from the Pacific theater, Col "Pop" Polifka. He has been the only reconnaissance squadron commander in the early days of the war in the Pacific. He had the same story to tell to Gen Arnold and to Bob Lovett that I did. I think they came to the conclusion, through Pop and myself, that these were valid arguments.

Q: One of the possible reasons that contributed to Minton Kaye's departure, he went to the CBI, about as far from Washington as one could be sent, was that Arnold was very straitlaced in his moral approach, to his office. Anybody who had trouble with women or whiskey didn't stay around long, and I think Minton Kaye was guilty of straying....

R: Lots of things.

Q: Anyway, Goddard had this. Goddard has a lot of impressions about a lot of things. But he still is a great man; I greatly admire him. I want to talk about the lack of photo airplanes, and Howard Hughes trying to build a

photo airplane. You got into that a little bit.

R: A little, hah! Well in 1943 when Bob Lovett came over to North Africa, I made a very strong pitch that we needed an aircraftthat was built especially for our requirements. He asked me to outline the requirements that we felt that were necessary in such an aircraft. We had a meeting of all of my staff, and we came up with a list of what we considered were the essentials needed in any reconnaissance aircraft, whether it be tactical or strategic in nature. Mainly, we knew that we were going to have to have a long range aircraft, because we were going to have to fly very shortly. We knew that we were going into Europe, and we were going to be called upon to make very deep penetrations as far away as Warsaw, Poland. Whether it be from our bases in Italy or our bases in England, this was one hell of a long way to fly. It called for an aircraft with the range of 5,500 miles. It also had to be an airplane that could effectively counter the threat of the ME-109 which was far and away more maneuverable and more operational than our aircraft were. Of course, we didn't know at that time that the German AF - Luftwaffe - was going to come up with their later development of their jet aircraft in the latter days of the war, which made all of our plans look pretty silly. But we did come up with a requirement list that Lovett took back and discussed with Arnold, and Arnold said it was a plane that Hughes had on the drawing boards and was tinkering around with, that he felt might fit our needs, and that it was contemplated as an aircraft that could be put into pretty fast production. I was called back in July 1943, and from North Africa, and sent out by General Arnold with some evaluating officers, to look at this airplane, which was then known as the XF-11. We looked at the aircraft; we evaluated it; we made a report that we considered that this did meet our requirements for both the Pacific and the European theaters. It had the speed, and the range, and the altitude requirements and could fly at low altitude as well as a tactical aircraft, and we recommended it highly. This recommendation was followed by a long series of hassles that ended up with the plane never getting off the ground during the war for the very simple reason that, first of all, they never gave them priority allocations for parts, for engines, for metal

materials. He had to switch his design, so that it was to go into production as a plywood aircraft. It was originally designed with the idea of having a metal aircraft, and we felt it would have been a much better aircraft if it had been an aluminum structure. But, without that, and with all the delays that came between the War Production Board and all of the priorities that came ahead of it, we never did get the airplane. Thirteen were ordered, as you know - one squadron. The contract - I never did know, as I remember it - Hughes said that he would pay the whole contract in the event that this airplane did not perform to specifications, and so forth, and that the AF would not have to pay a dime. I had reported in the first thing, this as a statement that Hughes made. As a matter of fact, I could very easily determine whether this man that's down at Paradise Island is the true Howard Hughes, by just asking him some questions about the development of that aircraft, and our evaluation. Because nobody else sat in those meetings. None of his engineers or aides. I did this by myself with him. Not even any of my personnel were present. I said: "I'm making this report direct to Gen Arnold and to Secy Lovett. They will base their decision on this, and what you say, you have got to be prepared to back up in any contract."

Q: And he said he would underwrite the cost?

R: Underwrite the complete cost of the production of these 13 aircraft, and if they did not meet the full specifications as set forth in my report, that he was prepared to pay the entire cost at no expense to the Government.

Q: What happened?

R: It got bogged down through so much of the bureaucracy, if you want to put it that way, that he had promised to do it all within a period of 12 months. If we had gotten them, actually, this aircraft would have been a pretty effective airplane, even against the German jets during the last days of the war there. They would have been highly successful operationally in the Far Eastern theater.

Q: Why did they got bogged down?

R: They never got the priorities, and there was a tremendous amount of real opposition to Hughes.

Q: Even in that day?

R: Right in the War Dept itself. Oh, definitely, in that day.

Q: Arnold gave you carte blanche to deal with him on this?

R: He sent me out to be the sole evaluating officer with the assistance of 4 or 5 other officers that he sent with me.

Q: And you came back with an affirmative report?

R: I came back with an affirmative that stated clearly that if he can do what he promises, and if he will take the full responsibility, we can't lose. We can't lose, because if he doesn't live up to the performance characteristics required here, we don't own one nickel. And he did make that promise. I have never seen it in the newspapers.

Q: I came across this where Hughes made this proposition, where he would underwrite the cost himself. If you don't want it, you don't have to take it.

R: Correct.

Q: Did he stand by this at the end?

R: I don't think so. I don't think anybody stood by anything. Very frankly, the airplane never was produced. The first one that flew was the one that we saw, the prototype that we saw at that little hangar that he had south of Muroc Dry Lake. This airplane we couldn't fly at the time because he didn't have some of the engine parts. He was using a very revolutionary twin-engine design with four props. The four props were counter-rotating props on each engine. This is what caused his bad accident that he had when he was flying the airplane, and that one of the counter-rotating props on one side ran away with him, and that caused this terrific....

Q: Centrifugal force?

R: Yes, and it just threw him to a spin. Torque.

Q: This whole business of a photographic plane was a contractual mess. It carried on after the war, and then, with the 80th Congress came into power, the Ferguson Committee was looking into the Elliott Roosevelt-Hughes relationship. I don't think they found anything substantive, but they came up on Benny Meyers.

R: Yes, right. And of course, Benny Meyers later, really got caught up. He went to jail, didn't he?

Q: Right, he went to jail, and they took his medals away. They took his pension away, and all the rest. Arnold had a great deal of faith in Benny Meyers.

R: I had a great deal of admiration for Benny Meyers. Regardless of what they may have proven, and I suppose that the law found that he was guilty of these things, this was a brilliant, brilliant man.

Q: Somebody told me that he could add up a column of four figures simultaneously.

R: Yes, he could.

Q: I've also heard that Arnold....

R: He could look at a complete column and give you the answer just like that. Just look at it for a second, glance at it, and give you the answer.

Q: He was living very high during the war?

R: That was what his downfall was. He accepted an unusual amount of g ratuities, let's say.

Q: A little bit spun off and got stuck on his fingers. Arnold had tremendous admiration for him. One of the reasons is as I understand it, the President was always bugging Arnold: "When are we going to get the B-29s?"

R: Right.

Q: This is one of the things he was pushing - when are we going to get t his out, or that out? Arnold would go to Meyers rather than to Echols. Echols was the Chief of that Materiel. But he went around him to Meyers, the assistant, b ecause Meyers would give him an optimistic figure. Meyers, according to people I've talked to, would read numbers off the tail sections of the planes not yet completed and say: "We have 200 planes available, when only 150 were actually available. By the time it got to the President and somebody made a decision, the other 50 would be off the assembly line.

R: He anticipated.

Q: Anticipated, right. Some people said that Arnold knew that he was anticipating, because Arnold is a hard guy to fool. But he gave Arnold figures

that he wanted to hear, and maybe this is part of the reason that Arnold accepted it?

R: You've got to remember that a man in Gen Arnold's position was in a most untenable position that it was possible to occupy, where you had a President that wanted instant reaction and instant ability to counter. This depended upon a production that was super human. If you remember, November 1944, when the breakthrough came at Ardennes, I think it was, and we were in trouble. We didn't have a single airplane flying, because it was absolutely socked in. Even on the ground. Ground units couldn't see two feet in front of them. The real terrible thing about it was they thought, good God, the only place they could turn to was the AF. Well, the AF couldn't do anything. You didn't know what you were going to hit. There wasn't any way, and yet the pressure, I know, from the White House, was to Arnold: "Get that AF in there, and do something," because we were really in deep trouble. Of course, I've often wondered, because the A-2s in every single AAF unit, right from Gen Spaatz' hqs. on down to the 9th AF, the 8th AF, everybody had been briefed on the buildup of the German forces. The same reports had gone into the G-2 Army Hqs. They were familiar with this, and yet not one single one of the Army commanders gave any recognition to the fact to this big German buildup that came at that particular time. That I think is a book all of its own. We had the pictures; we had all the interpretations exactly of what the German buildup had been before it happened. We had it for over a week before it happened. We never reacted, ground wise, whatsoever.

Q: There's a letter from Spaatz to Arnold, July 14, 1943, mentioning that Arnold had sent a cablegram to Spaatz, asking that you be returned to the States.

R: Right. What happened was that I was recalled, No. 1, after, as I told you before, the Secy (Lovett) had been out there. He and Spaatz had talked about our difficulties. And, also, the fact that we felt very strongly, and I had convinced Spaatz that we needed better aircraft for reconnaissance purposes. Also, that the operation in the Pentagon itself of the Reconnaissance Branch was still not operating closely enough to, and it was at this time, that I went back,

and made the recommendation that Col Hall be brought back. It was just after Minton Kaye had been relieved. On this trip, I made my first trip out to see the Hughes plant.

Q: And, of course, Arnold responded to Spaatz. It says: "Your comments regarding Elliott Roosevelt were fully borne out during his visit here." This is his letter to Spaatz of 20 Aug 1943. That covers that question.

Q: Now I want to ask you about this problem, or it became a problem, your promotion to get your star. This caused a big, big hassle, politically, and all across the military board.

R: Correct.

Q: Apparently, based on the fact that your eyesight was not good enough for you to be rated, and if you were not rated, you could not command the unit....

R: That is correct. They maintained that I had been illegally rated. In other words, I had a rating as a service pilot. I had a rating as a navigator, and also as a bombardier. These I had acquired, and I had flown a great many missions as a pilot on a service pilot's rating. I think it was in Dec 1944, Arnold finally approved a request through Doolittle, who was my immediate CG, to Spaatz, to Eisenhower, to Arnold, in view of the fact that I was flying these things, and at one time, they asked that they be permitted to grant me my combat status. At first the answer came back: "We have reviewed this, and the medical authorities, the Surgeon General's office said: "It is impossible, and therefore, he is ordered grounded." And I was relieved of my command for a period of 3 weeks.

Q: This was in '44 - late '44?

R: Right around the end of December. Then the early part of January' 1945, I was called in by Doolittle and he said: "Gen Arnold had decided to overrule his Surgeon General's Dept," and Doolittle gave me my combat wings. I was immediately reinstated as Wing Commander. Then, thereafter, the question of my promotion came up because at that time I had 6,300 men under me on an Allied basis.

Q: 3rd Photo Reconnaissance?

R: No, this was the....I had commanded the 90th Wing Reconnaissance in the Mediterranean theater, and then I commanded the...I can give it to you later. But I had a new wing for the European theater and had overall command of all reconnaissance in the whole European theater, including Africa and Italy, and so forth. And then, they determined that I should have, because my opposite number in the RAF was Air Commodore, they decided that I should be at least equal in rank to him. I was over him, actually. They put in for my promotion, Doolittle again, through Spaatz, through Eisenhower, through Arnold to the President. The President sent it back, and Arnold sent it back in again. In February 1945, it was finally voted on, and carried over many objections.

Q: Right. It was just about this time that Arnold had a severe heart attack.

R: Right.

Q: He was down at Coral Gables, at the Biltmore Hotel for a period of time. In January 1945, just about the time of the President's Inauguration, several things happened involving you. It seems to me that Arnold was worried that the promotion would attract criticism. Spaatz was pushing it, Eisenhower was pushing the promotion. By this time, Arnold had some misgivings about it. Did you know that?

R: Yes, I'm sure he had misgivings. I'm positive. He had to have misgivings because there was a lot of pressure back in the US. Eisenhower and Spaatz, of course, were not privy to too much of that political stuff.

Q: Right. Of course, one of the factors was there was an Election in 1944, and so it might have been that whatever they were going to do, they were going to wait till after Election.

R: Well, I think they waited because I do know that it would come back to me that there were certain things pending for me and nothing ever happened, and then after the election it all seemed to gather momentum.

Q: Right in the middle of the promotion discussion, this Blaze incident happened. Of course, this started the whole mess.

R: That brought the Adjutant General's Office down on my head. I had a team over from the AG's office and they inspected every unit that I had from top to bottom. I had a list of things that were wrong that was as long as your arm.

But the main thing, that really ticked me off probably worse than anything else was that they found me guilty of permitting our aircraft, when they returned from a mission, to have the wings washed down with gasoline because we threw a lot of oil. There was no way that you could get that oil off in a hurry - we were flying with each aircraft; we were flying two missions a day - that you could possibly get that off without using aviation gas. In the record book, that is strictly against regulations. But I couldn't see not using it because it was the only way I could get the oil off.

Q: There was a period of time where you were kind of discouraged about this promotion hassle, and perhaps the command that you had. You wrote Arnold a letter and you wanted to resign from the AF. You wrote him in pencil. Do you remember this?

R: Yes sir.

Q: You felt that you were being put upon?

R: Well, no, I really felt that there was not much useful service that I could render. By this time, with all of the center of attention on me, and not on what the outfit was doing, that it made me practically useless.

Q: Well, sort of overall looking, summarizing, do you think anybody could have done the job that Arnold did? Anybody in the AF?

R: Not in my opinion.

Q: There were several people who you know, could have done it. Many people tell me that Andrews had a warmer quality about him, of communication with his men, men who served. Arnold had this forbidding manner, some felt it forbidding. Perhaps you didn't?

R: No, I didn't feel that way. I can understand because he could be quite short with you and say: "All right. This is it! Get it done!" And probably, I know that for instance, Tooey Spaatz was more informal with his men, and also, was able to get a lot of affection from them. But at the same time, I don't think that he could have accomplished nearly the job that Arnold could drive people to do. I always felt that Arnold felt: "Well, I've got you in the AF. You've been a headache to me, and you've got to prove to everybody."

That's why I always felt that I had to really get in there and pitch.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

R: Not that I know of. He may have.

Q: To your face?

R: No, never to my face.

Q: But you saw him get mad at people?

R: Oh yes. Many times.

Q: Do you remember any situations?

R: Particular one? Well, I was at one time in his office with Minton Kaye when he really blew his stack at Minton Kaye, when Minton Kaye was making excuses, and actually, was downgrading the information that I had given. Of course, I flared too. I said: "All right, why don't you come on out to the theater and see how it is."

Q: And then he...

R: He just landed both feet on top of Kaye.

Q: And I guess he was not long for this world after that?

R: No.

Q: Arnold had this smile on his face which could be deceptive. People say, if you mistook this for pleasure at what you were doing, it could be very misleading.

R: Did you ever know the elder Donald Douglas?

Q: Yes, I talked to Donald Douglas about a year ago. He lives in Rolling Hills, California, now.

R: He does? Well, Donald Douglas was, I would say, he was an extremely close friend of Hap Arnold's.

Q: Yes, his daughter married Arnold's son.

R: Right, and I would say that the personalities of these two people was a very interesting parallel, because Don Douglas was very taciturn individual during those years. I don't know what he is like today, but during those years he was a type of person that would sit, and he would talk technical things with Arnold by the hour. I was there both as a civilian, and in later years, but I would say

that there was a great deal of similarity between the personalities of Don Douglas and Arnold. They were two peas in a pod.

Q: In what respect?

R: In the fact that they were absolutely steely in their requirements for the people that worked for them. They were completely "go, man, go," type individuals. They couldn't brook any interference, or any excuses for not getting the job done. You had to find a way around a problem.

Q: Never accepted defeat?

R: Never.

Q: On another subject, did you ever hear Arnold talk about the Russians?

R: I had an occasion to talk to him about the Russians after I had been over to Poltava, when I went over there on the installation of our air base over there, and making arrangements for our recon airplanes to fly in there. He asked me what I thought of the Russians, not only the Russians in their relationship with us, but also their aircraft. I told him I thought they had a system that was fantastic, because I had never seen aircraft that were designed to fly for 2 or 3 weeks, and then throw it in the junkpile.

Q: Their regard for the human life was....

R: Absolutely nil. They had, for instance, I got one engine shot out flying down the corridor by a P-39.

Q: Which corridor?

R: The corridor coming in from Poland to Poltava. You know, that was supposed to be protected by the Russian aircraft. I was flying a P-38, and got my left engine out. It was a P-39, and I was flying at 34,000 feet. I said: "This is impossible. A P-39 is not supposed to get up there, but I later found out that they took out P-39 and stripped it, and it could go up to 38,000 feet.

Q: That reminds me that you wanted to fly one of the first reconnaissance missions in the FRANTIC operation. You got shot down. They were afraid that if the President's son was captured, it would create a severe incident.

R: Right.

Q: Was Harris Hull involved in that? I can't remember who told me. But you had volunteered for this. Kessler was in on it. Remember he was in that? They shot you down on it. Were you disappointed?

R: I was very disappointed.

Q: Did you appeal to Arnold?

R: No, he was too far away.

Interview - BG Elliott Roosevelt, Goulds, Florida, Jan 15, 1972

Q: I feel very honored and anxious to talk with you. I've been through the Library of Congress and I've seen most of Arnold's files. One of the files he had there was the Argentia Conference, where you served as his aide.

R: Right.

Q: You wrote a hand-penciled report. Do you recall the circumstances of that?

R: Yes, I remember it very well. I was stationed in Newfoundland with the - I'm trying to remember my squadron's number up there, but we were on anti-submarine patrol. We were a recon squadron flying B-18s, and I had been sent up there in the Fall of 1940, because of the fact, and I don't know if you remember it, I was stationed at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, in procurement. Because I had been commissioned as a Captain during the campaign - I Want To Be A Captain Too" screwup - it became pretty hot for my father. So when he and Gen Arnold came through during the campaign, and father inspected Wright-Patterson Fields, they had me come down to the train and told me I'd better get transferred - get out of town - and so I said: "That is just fine with me." Gen Arnold said: "Well, now, you did fill out your preferences as to whether you wanted to go, when you were commissioned and assigned to your present post in the event that you were to be ordered overseas." And I said: "Yes." I had stated at the time that I was perfectly willing to serve overseas, and named my preferences. You were given, I think it was, 5 or 6 preferences. But, in any event, I named my preferences. They were the Philippines No. 1, and Hawaii No. 2, Panama No. 3. I named every warm area that I could think of overseas. Of course, I got sent to Newfoundland by Larry Norstad, who said that they had a special mission that they wanted me to perform up there. So I was detached to the 300(?) Squadron, as the Intelligence Officer. Shortly after I got up there, I received my supplementary orders which were that I was to also head up this group combined effort to explore not only Labrador, but Baffin I land and all the way up to Elsmere Island, and then all of Greenland, particularly on the east coast of Greenland, because they

had another mission that was doing the west coast of Greenland. But they asked us to go to the extreme northern end of the West Coast of Greenland, and find weather station sites. Of course, we were supposed to do this in the summertime, and we were going to use, there was combined Army-AF and Navy exploration team. We used an old PBY, and we had some pretty hairy experiences there for quite a while. But we did find the Goose Bay location in the spring of 1941. I came back from England, just after the ice had gone out.I came back from England after going over all of our stuff with the RAF, and had the pleasure of flying over Goose Bay, and seeing the bulldozers finishing up the runway. They flew the first aircraft across the Atlantic off that airfield in November 1941. Then also the Bluie East airfield that was eventually established. We located that site. We located about 15 weather station sites. We also did collaborate with the other group on Bluie West #1 and #2 sites. So we had quite a long period up there and then it was during the summer of the early part of the summer of 1941, I happened to have come back in from up there, and received instructions to report down to Argentia. I had to go down on a train. I remember that train trip very well because Lord Beaverbrook had flown in from England and had landed at Gander where I was stationed. We took the train down together on a wooden seat that we shared.

Q: Did they tell you what it was at the time?

R: Yes, they did. It was super-secret that I was to report to Gen Arnold, and that this was to be a very high level meeting at which my father - I didn't know until I ran into Beaverbrook on that train that I was also going to be meeting the Prime Minister, whom I had met earlier in England.

Q: When did you learn that you were going to be Arnold's aide?

R: Only when I got to Argentia. Reported on board and he greeted me as I came aboard.

Q: Talking about Argentia Conference. When you met Arnold there, did he explain what he hoped you would do for him as his aide?

E: Yes, I was to keep as close a record of all the meetings and what transpired and keep this record on his behalf, so he would have this when making

up his reports when he got back to the Pentagon. So my job daily was to sit down and write out just exactly what transpired, at not only the large meetings, but the smaller meetings that took place. There were a number of meetings of opposite numbers where I would sit in on one conference or another. But wherever I sat in, I was to keep records of that.

Q: Now Arnold left two days before.

R: Right.

Q: He came back with the photographs, I guess they were going to give it to the press, but they were "Hold For Release," because....

R: After the announcement of the....

Q: Right, because the President was still going to be at sea for a couple of days, and there were German submarines floating around. You know, Arnold had an experience, when he got home - it was supposed to be very secret - when he got home, there was a newsman in his house with his wife. This guy was interviewing her and taking pictures for the Army Emergency Relief. So this guy was in there. Arnold saw this fellow and he got very frightened because this guy might spill the beans that he was back. Everybody knew the President was out of town someplace. So he hustled Mrs. Arnold and the family down to Nags Head, this is August 1941, to keep them out of sight. He was very agitated about this. Did you ever hear this story?

R: I'd never heard this story at all. This is entirely new to me.

Q: He was supposed to have come back, and I think there was like a two-day lag before the announcement was to be made. Of course, and he didn't want any press to see him back, because there was speculation about the President having a JCS meeting with Churchill some place. But you didn't hear anything about that?

R: No, I didn't hear any of that.

Q: What sort of guy was Arnold to work for or with?

R: He was probably the most understanding individual I've ever known or served under with the possible exception of Tooey Spaatz, who was always a wonderful person to me. But I felt that Arnold, of course, had a much greater

grasp of how to accomplish Father's goal, which was to build practically a non-existent AF up to the goal of 50,000 aircraft a year. And I think really the complete credit for having accomplished this has to go to Arnold. This is the most incredible feat ever accomplished in the history of our country, really.

Q: Taking the AAF from a non-existent force to a tremendous force?

R: Right, because I can remember. You see, I was Aviation Editor for the Hearst Newspapers way back when Father cancelled the air mail contracts. I wrote some very scathing prose. I'd met Gen Arnold at that time. He was a LTCOL at March Field, and I got a great deal of my information from him, which was the complete lack of communications equipment, adequate communications equipment, the complete lack of proper aircraft to be able to fly the air mail route. In spite of that, they had to do it. I wrote some pretty terrible articles, I 'm afraid, about what my Father was doing.

Q: Criticizing the cancellation?

R: Criticizing the cancelling the air mail contracts, and exposing these young officers to flying what amounted to death missions with inadequate equipment.

Q: Arnold had the Western Air Mail Zone.

R: Right, I remember that very, very well.

Q: And, of course, he cautioned the young pilots under him not to fly unless they were sure of the weather situation. They still lost a number of people.

R: Right.

Q: And as a result of the air mail situation, General Benny Foulois got in trouble with your dad. Do you remember anything about that?

R: Oh yes. Yes sir. In fact, I know that Benny Foulois was one of my father's most bitter enemies for many years. He felt that he had been very unjustly treated, and in many ways, I think he was unjustly treated, because my father felt that this was scandal that had to be exchanged at any cost. I think that rightly, Benny Foulois felt that, really it was not fair to expose human lives to correct what was really an Administration fault.

Q: I've done a lot of research into this area, and the situation as it developed from Benny Foulois' standpoint, he went to see Harlee Branch, the 2nd Asst Postmaster.

R: Whom I disliked with a holy passion. Oh, I couldn't get along with him.

Q: And before they cancelled the contracts, they asked Foulois how long it would take him to get ready, and he said: "Give us a week or 10 days." So they gave him 10 days. Now, ex post facto, Benny Foulois' biography, have you seen it?

R: No.

Q: Said that he was ordered to fly the mail, and he had no choice but to say "yes sir."

R: That was the impression I was under.

Q: That he was ordered to fly the mail?

R: I was under the impression that he had been ordered to fly, and that he had protested to Harlee Branch that he wasn't ready, and Harlee Branch said: "Well, I'm sorry. But this is all the time that you have."

Q: I see.

R: In any event, I don't understand the statement that Foulois could possibly have made that he could get ready, because he didn't have the equipment, never did. So how in the world he could make a statement like that, would have been, maybe this is something that I didn't know, if he made such a statement t hat he could fly.

Q: Well, this is, one of the accounts that I have come across. His anxiety, or his statement was motivated by a desire to get $800,000 in Post Office funds for flying pay. At this time, flying pay was drastically cut. The Economy Act was inforce. Money was very hard to come by for flying purposes. Here was a chance to do two things: One, get money for flying pay; two, get experience in flying. So at least the story that I understand to be fact is that Foulois kind of stretched the possibility, you know, flying the mail to be easier than operational, and may have overestimated the capability.

R: This puts a completely different light on the whole thing.

Q: You understand that he was ordered to do that?

R: At that time, we were told at all levels that they were just ordered willy nilly to fly, because when I came in as a reporter, to investigate why, and I kept asking "why, when you haven't got any communications equipment that is worth throwing in the river, and you've got inadequate aircraft. Why would anybody order you to do it?" And always, everybody said: "We were ordered to do it, anyway."

Q: Did Arnold tell you this?

R: Arnold never did. Arnold complained about the inability to get better equipment. He felt at that time when he was in charge of that Western Zone. As I remember, he felt very strongly that there was equipment available that could be put into the aircraft, and that there were better aircraft, too, that were available to fly the mail. And that here we were flying anything that was at hand in any one of the sectors.

Q: There was a scene in Foulois' book, how he and Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of Staff, were called into the White House - this is after the first series of crashes - and the President ordered the mail stopped. It was stopped for about a week or 8 days. The President was in bed. Looking over his glasses, he let Foulois and MacArthur have it in very strong terms. Do you recall that?

R: I don't recall that, because actually, I was on the West Coast at the time, and was writing really from a field standpoint rather than being close to my father at that time. I didn't really see my father until after that period when the air mail was stopped, and it had started again. He went down to Miami, and went off on Vincent Astor's yacht on a trip. I went down. I flew a plane that belonged to William Randolph Hearst down to Miami, and then, the Coast Guard flew me out and I was out there for one day with my father. It was a little frosty that visit, because my father felt that I was being very unfair in my criticism.

Q: Your writing about the air mail?

R: Yes.

Q: That's very interesting. Well, from the President's standpoint, if they had come back to him and said: "It will take us 30 days, 60 days, to do it." He asked Jim Farley - of course - they were interested in obviously exploiting for political purposes the hanky-panky with the air mail contracts.

R: Right.

Q: It was something they wanted to expose. However, somebody had recalled to the President that in the 1920s, the Air Service had flown the mail. And I think - at least I understand the story - that he asked can they do it again, and he was told they could. But if Foulois had said it would take 30 or 60 days he needed to prepare, would they have given him that time?

R: I think so. I think without a question they would have given him that extra time. I think also that Foulois probably was not really honest in outlining fully what needed in order to be properly prepared.

Q: I have a feeling in having spent a lot of time researching this stuff. He was so anxious to....

R: Get that extra money?

Q: To get the money and the mission, that he sort of skimmed over the inadequacies of the Air Corps in its performance. As it turned out, toward the end of the mission, which lasted about 3 or 4 months, they were flying the mail....

R: Really doing very well.

Q: Doing very well.

R: Very well, of course, they were flying VOR all the time. They finally got the pilots to recognize that you just cannot fly IFR.

R: It had to be the farthest stretch of the imagination to think that he did. Mark Clark never had any love for my father. Mark Clark was quite bitter that he wasn't elevated much more rapidly in the ground forces. He felt the was far superior to many of those who were chosen.

Q: I want to ask you about Arnold and your father. Going back to 1934, Arnold had done a good job, and he was named to head the Alaskan flight. Now, this is a big thing, and the President called for Arnold. He invited him to the White House. He came to the White House and the President spent a lot of

time asking a lot of questions about Alaska. I think the President was impressed with Arnold. He thought the President was sort of Navy oriented.

R: Right.

Q: And, of course, Arnold came back to Washington with Malin Craig. Arnold had been somewhat, not cashiered, but exiled.

R: He was out in the boondocks.

Q: And Malin Craig brought him back. After Craig succeeded MacArthur. Arnold became Asst Chief under Westover, and two years later, Westover spun in. There was Arnold available for the job. Now, the President delayed in appointing Arnold because there was a story, widely accepted in Washington that Arnold drank. Did you ever hear this story?

R: Yes, sir, I knew that. What is completely wrong.

Q: Do you have any idea of who might be passing this story around?

R: Well, on the West Coast I know there were a number of people who were in the service, who were anti-Arnold. Arnold was very popular with all of the aircraft manufacturing people, with Douglas, North American and Boeing. All of the big aircraft manufacturers felt that Arnold had a grasp of what was needed, and could cut through to enable them to get a job done faster, because, if you remember, back in the old days, to get an aircraft approved, after you got a contract, it was a matter of 4, 5 or 6 years. Arnold was very anxious to cut this time down, this huge time lag, and actually get aircraft flying. They just loved him, but the one whale of a lot of AF people, particularly in the procurement branch, who just were dead set against Arnold, and felt that he was trying to cut their jobs out from under them, and so forth. They were pretty autocratic, if you remember it. If you have interviewed any of the people who headed those companies during the war years, there was an awful lot of autocratic personnel that Arnold was pretty ruthless when he became Chief. He cut out all that kind of stuff.

Q: Right, well, whatever they told him, he asked them to do it in half the time.

R: That's right.

Q: He never allowed them to relax.

R: And he told a man if he had to work 24 hours a day, you work 24 hours a day. We've got to have this.

Q: Yes, he had tremendous drive. I did a documentary movie script, a nd I called it "Hap Arnold, Man In A Hurry."

R: That's right.

Q: To me it is the most characteristic personality trait the had. Whatever somebody told him, he wanted it done in less time. Well, you mentioned some people at Wright Field who were opposed to Arnold, who felt that he was cutting them out of the pattern, or felt that he was pushing them too hard.

R: Who was head of procurement at Wright Field?

Q: Tony Frank.

R: Tony Frank, yes, he was definitely against him.

Q: He was an Andrews man.

R: Yes, definitely.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of Arnold and Andrews' relationship?

R: I don't, no sir. I'm sorry.

Q: You see, Andrews was one year ahead of Arnold, and was a natural candidate for the job. And it was speculated that he might have the job. He was down in Langley Field. Head of the GHQ AF.

R: Right.

Q: I've been told that he was brought up to Washington and interviewed. You see, he was pushing hard for the B-17s, he and Knerr, who was second in command, and it caused some embarrassment to people like Woodring, who said, we could take a dollar and get a lot of small planes, instead of these big planes. But Andrews was pushing hard for the big planes, and he was sort of disliked in the War Dept Gen Staff. One story I have is that Pa Watson, who was a classmate of Andrews - 06 - was pushing Andrews.

R: Well I don't....I have some feelings on that, I think there is probably no question but what Pa Watson was the kind of person who had a real close feeling

for all of his old classmates, and so forth. It would have been normal for him to push his classmate as against the younger man. At West Point, it's always seniority. I think there is no question but what he did. But I'm also positive that Pa Watson was the kind of person, and his relationship with father was on such a personal basis of friendship, because I really feel that when Pa Watson died on the way back from YALTA, that that was the real time of loss to father. That really made him start to go downhill, as rapidly as he did from that time on.

Q: His strong right hand?

R: He was, and he was such a strong affinity between those two men, and I'm positive, because the way it turned out, that Pa Watson said to father: "Now, I really think you have to make the final decision between these men. Of course, I feel that this man has the right to the job, by virtue of seniority. But you have passed over a great many senior officers already, and if you have strong feelings after you've gotten the chance to evaluate Arnold and Andrews, I think you took the attitude, Frank, you go ahead and do it the way you think is best."

Q: There was a delay, some thought an inordinate delay.

R: I think that was probably due to Pa Watson.

Q: But this then rumor that Arnold drank was kicked around Washington.

R: This afflicted a great many people. And it was not justified.

Q: In Arnold's case, he didn't drink. Most people tell me he walked around with a glass of sherry.

R: And he'd have the same glass when the whole evening was through.

Q: Yes.

R: At all of these conferences when, believe you me, the British counterparts drank very heavily, because from Churchill right on down. Arnold at the end of an evening, he was going strong, and it was a tough deal to stay up with him.

Q: In any event, the President did decide to give Arnold the job. And it was right after Arnold got the job, Hitler moved into Munich. The day after.

And the President became very exercised about the lack of airpower. Of course, the President really didn't understand what it took to get airpower. He made the 50,000 plane speech....

R: Off the cuff, I might add.

Q: Was that off the cuff?

R: Yes sir.

Q: Did anybody counsel him on that?

R: No sir.

Q: You know about that? How did it come about?

R: He made the decision that we just had to build. I don't think he had any idea that we'd ever reach that plateau. I think he was as surprised as anyone else when we actually started producing at the rate we did. But he felt that we had to startle the nation, and so he chose that right out of the blue.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about that? Did you ever talk to your father about how he arrived at 50,000 planes?

R: No, I didn't.

Q: It was so far out of the ball park.

R: Completely out of all belief of anybody that it could be done, and of course, when he made the speech, it wasn't contemplated that we would divert as much of our manufacturing capability to such places as Willow Run, and all of those places. It wasn't even contemplated on any drawing boards of procurement that we would be geared to this type of production. Of course, when Hitler really moved in, the German AF wasn't that powerful.

Q: Well, it was spectacular. The Stukas made a lot of racket and terrorized people. The Stukas were great without air opposition.

R: They were evidentally great enough that they impressed Mr. Lindbergh, really.

Q: Yes. Which reminds me of another area of interest. Arnold was very interested in what Lindbergh had to offer. Arnold had just gotten the job, and there were all kinds of rumors, not too many facts about the German AF. Lindbergh had been over there, and they showed him everything. I interviewed Lindbergh a

few months ago, and his feeling towards Franklin D. Roosevelt is unchanged.

R: Absolutely. No question about it.

Q: Really remarkable. In any event, Arnold in a sense had to walk a tightrope, because he was trying to get information from Lindbergh. He greatly a dmired Lindbergh's technical ability.

R: Right.

Q: Lindbergh had the ability to go into a plant, and come up with an estimate of what that plant could produce, and he was very good at that. Arnold was trying to pump Lindbergh for the information he had. But Lindbergh went beyond technical expertise. He wrote letters to Arnold saying that we should not involve ourselves in a war that might destroy western civilization. In other words, we should not fight Nazi Germany. He considered Germany as part of the western culture.

R: Right.

Q: And he was opposed to that. I don't think Arnold was a political man?

R: Far from it.

Q: He stayed out of politics. In any event, Arnold had to walk a tightrope between Lindbergh and your father.

R: Yes, but I know, I do know of two meetings that he had, to my knowledge, where he convinced my father that he had to use the expertise of Lindbergh. In both of those instances, my father said: "Well, it's up to you. I do not want to have you create a major figure of Lindbergh in this war effort, but you can utilize him as long as you keep him under wraps.

Q: As a civilian? I think your father would not allow him back in uniform?

R: He would not give him. Arnold went to him and tried to sell him on the BG commission. My father refused on that.

Q: Do you remember when these two meetings occurred?

R: I know that one of them occurred just prior to when Gen Arnold sent him to the Pacific.

Q: Was this after Pearl Harbor?

R: This was after Pearl Harbor. One of them was prior to Pearl Harbor, which was during that period shortly after Lindbergh had come back from Germany.

Q: Was he already making speeches for the America First?

R: He was making the speeches, America First speeches.

Q: I saw Robert Lovett in NY.

R: How is Bob?

Q: He's doing fine. He's in his 80s and has got all his marbles.

R: He's a great person.

Q: He was sort of....

R: He's like Grover Loening. Every time I see Grover Loening I'm just absolutely amazed, here's a man whose got all his marbles and he must be close to 90 now.

Q: I interviewed him at the Metropolitan Club. He is thin and wiry....

Q: We are talking about Lindbergh. There was a meeting on Jan 12, 1942, five weeks after Pearl Harbor. Arnold and Lindbergh, with Lovett sitting in - and this is an attempt by Lindbergh to come back into the active service. After Pearl Harbor he volunteered for active service. You father wouldn't have him. Arnold wanted him back, obviously, because he wanted to make use of his talent.

R: Right.

Q: Lindbergh told me that your father offered him a job as Secy of the AF. Of course, there was no AF. This was prior to this meeting, but that he was given an offer as Secy of an independent AF, if he would lay off his criticism of the foreign policy. Do you have any feeling there?

R: This may be true. I am rather doubtful of the authenticity of that, but I wouldn't want to question his integrity.

Q: It's quite possible that....

R: In 1942 I was already way up there in the Arctic.

Q: Right, this is so.

R: No, by Jan 1942, I was being sent to Africa.

Q: I confused two things, actually, Jan 1942, he was trying to get

back into service. The offer of Secy of the AF was made in 1943, before Pearl Harbor.

R: Of course, I was up in the North.

Q: This is when Lindbergh still had tremendous prestige. Whenever Lindbergh spoke he got front page attention. This offer could have been made, and they figured that if he accepted the offer, they would set up a Secy of the AF, and put him in a corner some place with a plush office, and sort of isolate him.

R: Yes, but I can't see, you mean that father at that time, contemplated a separate branch of the service?

Q: Yes, even though he was opposed to it himself.

R: There was a real reason why he was opposed to it because of his close Navy ties, and he felt that the Navy had to have their own AF. Therefore, he didn't want the precedent established through the Army splitting off the AF into a separate entity.

Q: Well, it could have been sort of a political offer. In Arnold's dealings with Lindbergh, I gather that Arnold did not regard the offer, if it was made, as a bonafide offer. In other words, they would set up an office as Secy of the AF, as a Special Assistant to the President, in other words, without making a big thing of it, and give him an office somewhere in the West Wing or some place, and isolating Lindbergh.

R: Entirely possible.

Q: Do you remember C.B. Allen?

R: Yes.

Q: He just passed away. He was very close to Lindbergh. He retired to Moorefield, W.Va. I interviewed him. He is the one who was close to Lindbergh. He won an award because he reported Lindbergh's takeoff back in '27. And he was very close to Lindbergh. He said that that offer was made. In fact, he wrote an article in a magazine about it. But you have never heard of it?

R: No sir.

Q: This brings me to another possible source of friction between Arnold

Franklin D. Roosevelt, this one involving Morgenthau. Do you remember this? This is 1939. And there was a big hassle about it. Morgenthau was pushing to get our planes, Lend Lease, well, this was before Lend Lease. But the French had sent a mission over here. Morgenthau had virtually directed Arnold, who had just become Chief of the Air Corps, to allow this Frenchman to fly this Douglas plane out in Santa Monica. It was the DB-7 prototype, a secret plane. The plane crashed "right in Macy's window," so to speak, right in the parking lot. It became a source of Congressional criticism as to why we were allowing foreigners to have access to American secret equipment. This created a confrontation between Arnold and Morgenthau which was never resolved, in my reading of it. They never were good friends.

R: I don't think that there was any friendship lost on the part of any of the military leadership and Mr. Morgenthau.

Q: Why?

R: I think Mr. Morgenthau was quite a gadfly, interfering in other departments all the way through. I think, very frankly, that father was his own Secy of Treasury, anyway. Morgenthau used to make periodic efforts to interfere and I think Bretton Woods was a very good example of his really pushing into the high level decisions as to what policy was to be. He was used by many foreign interests as the means of pushing when they couldn't make it with either the State Dept or War Dept, or wherever. They were trying to get something from us. I really don't think that Arnold was all by himself in having this dispute with Morgenthau. I think the dispute with Morgenthau covered the whole gamut of everybody who was in the same position with my father.

Q: In this particular case, the President backed Morgenthau because he was anxious to help the British and French get ready. They needed some help in the way of aircraft. Arnold had just come on as the Chief of the Air Corps. He had come on in Sept 1938.

R: Let's analyze though just exactly. Here was a prototype aircraft, a long way from production, and what was the point if there was an imminent need

for aircraft in showing them anything that was still in the prototype stage, because, obviously we wouldn't have that for them within a couple of years.

Q: Well, Arnold felt that if we sent out our best airplanes, he couldn't build up his own air force. The President backed Morgenthau at that time. Arnold, in his own book, tells that the President threatened to send him to Guam, which was "Elba." And it wasn't until later on, I think, Arnold's tremendous activity, his attitude, similar to the President's. "Whatever it is, let's get it done in a hurry." I think this is probably the characteristic of Arnold's that the President admired.

R: Right.

Q: In Arnold's book, he says the President invited him for an old-fashioned one night, and called him "Hap," and this is how he knew he was out of the doghouse.

Q: I've had a lot of contact with George Goddard, and George Goddard said that Arnold fired him out of Washington, I think it was 1942, because of the inordinate influence over Arnold by a guy named Minton Kaye. Do you remember Minton Kaye?

R: Well, Col Kaye was head of the Reconnaissance Division in the Pentagon. There is no question that Kaye was shooting for Goddard all along. I would say that Goddard is absolutely correct. But I should, I would like to say that, in my humble opinion, Goddard may have felt that he was getting kicked out. But Arnold was doing it in such fasion that he gave orders in the European theater. when they sent Goddard over there, to all of us, boy, we had carte blanche to do anything he wanted. He would build up a plant outside of Paris there, and he did a fantastic job. He had practically the greatest orders ever cut for anybody who was going to Elba.

Q: You mentioned his orders?

R: Goddard was ordered to come to the European theater and to find out from the operational unit, the things that were needed, and improvements in our equipment and our installations. Actually Goddard did almost all of his infrared film development over there. In my opinion, Gen Arnold did him a favor in getting

him away and giving him the opportunity of seeing what was actually needed in the operational units to make our job more efficient. I will say that it was a great favor to us that we got Goddard.

Q: I think this was the second time that he left Washington. The first time he left he was sent down to Charlotte Air Base.

R: Oh, I remember.

Q: To be VD officer and this was probably due to Minton Kaye's influence.

R: Oh yes, but Minton Kaye was a very, very vindictive soul. I think he retired out to Colorado Springs.

Q: He is now in Pasadena. His wife passed away, and he remarried. His influence with Arnold resulted from his wife having access to Mrs. Arnold. Did you know about this?

R: I think I do recall that it was his wife's friendship with Mrs. Arnold.

Q: Yes. Helen Kaye. When Arnold was transferred to March Field in 1931, he took a ship around the Panama Canal. This was customary in those days. A LT and a newlywed wife were aboard, Minton Kaye and Helen Kaye. And Mrs. Arnold sort of took a fancy to Helen Kaye and Minton Kaye exploited this friendship, and was in and out of Arnold's office. Apparently, let everybody know that he had this access and had special privileges.

R: Well, of course, I suppose you can attribute the demise of Kaye's influence with Arnold to the operational units in the field, and our complete disenchantment with Col Kaye. Col Kaye gave us less than support in our operational units. We had a great deal of trouble with the F-4s and F-5s, that were modifications of the P-38 for photo recon. We were throwing rods every time we went over 17,000 feet with those Allison engines in them. Well, I lost 92 out of 95 pilots the first five weeks that I was in North Africa. Nothing that I could do would get Kaye to do anything. Further than that, we had a great deal of trouble in the operation of our cameras. They were freezing on us, and we were sending back report after report after report to headquarters, urging that something be done before the aircraft and the equipment left the US. They had to be modified, and it wasn't until Bob Lovett came over, I believe it was

in May 1942, and visited and spent quite a lot of time with me. We explained to him what had to be done. It might have been a little earlier than that, because I sent back my Group Operations Officer....

Q: Was it '42 or '43?

R: 1942, right after the invasion of North Africa.

Q: North Africa was Nov 1942.

R: Then it was '43, I'm sorry. So, we had our orders and we had to fly a complete mapping job of Sicily prior to the invasion. We were getting murdered, just absolutely literally murdered. Not that we didn't get murdered all the way through, because records show that we lost 25% of our personnel every month, all the way through the war. But the big difficulty was Minton Kaye had absolutely no concept of what it was to be in a theater, in a war operation, and not to be able to get any kind of help in rectifying what was wrong. If it hadn't been for Bob Lovett and Gen Arnold, establishing the modification depot down in Dallas for the F-5, we would have gone through the war just crippled. We never would have really done a job.

Q: We never did have a satisfactory photo plane. They were sort of makeshift planes?

R: All of our aircraft were makeshift. We had some aircraft that were a dequate, I would say, because you take the P-51 that we used on tactical reconnaissance, and the P-38 that we used on strategic reconnaissance, plus we were lucky enough to get a few of the Mosquitoes, and the Mosquito was a very superior reconnaissance aircraft. We did use that on types of missions such as the dropping of personnel behind the lines which we were charged with the responsibility for. So I would say t hat, by and large, the choice of these aircraft was not too bad, but the modifications took really two years to bring them out.

Q: Was Minton Kaye the action officer in the Pentagon to whom all these problems went?

R: Everything went to him. He fell down completely and finally was relieved by General Arnold, and Gen Arnold asked me for a replacement, and I

made the suggestion of Colonel Jim Hall, who had been a WWI flier, and I got Gen Arnold to let him come back on active duty. When I was training the 3rd Reconnaissance Group in Colorado Springs, he was activated and assigned to my group. He later became the CO of that group in England when I went down to Africa.

Q: George Goddard tells the story that Elliott Roosevelt got "Poppa" to get Minton Kaye relieved from Washington.

R: That's absolutely incorrect. It was done directly by Arnold. It was not at any time - I don't think the President ever heard of Minton Kaye.

R: I think the thing that you wanted to have clarified was the fact that George Goddard thought that I got my father to get Minton Kaye relieved as Chief of the Reconnaissance Branch of the AAF in the Pentagon. This is not true. I saw that in the book. This at no time was true. I never talked to my father. In fact, I don't think that during my father's lifetime, he ever heard Minton Kaye's name. I think the decision was made by Arnold, and the only other person who had any part in that relieving of Minton Kaye from active duty was Bob Lovett. Frankly speaking, I think they only relieved him because they found that he truly had been incompetent. I had a Deputy Commander who had come from the Pacific theater, Col "Pop" Polifka. He has been the only reconnaissance squadron commander in the early days of the war in the Pacific. He had the same story to tell to Gen Arnold and to Bob Lovett that I did. I think they came to the conclusion, through Pop and myself, that these were valid arguments.

Q: One of the possible reasons that contributed to Minton Kaye's departure, he went to the CBI, about as far from Washington as one could be sent, was that Arnold was very straitlaced in his moral approach, to his office. Anybody who had trouble with women or whiskey didn't stay around long, and I think Minton Kaye was guilty of straying....

R: Lots of things.

Q: Anyway, Goddard had this. Goddard has a lot of impressions about a lot of things. But he still is a great man; I greatly admire him. I want to talk about the lack of photo airplanes, and Howard Hughes trying to build a

photo airplane. You got into that a little bit.

R: A little, hah! Well in 1943 when Bob Lovett came over to North Africa, I made a very strong pitch that we needed an aircraftthat was built especially for our requirements. He asked me to outline the requirements that we felt that were necessary in such an aircraft. We had a meeting of all of my staff, and we came up with a list of what we considered were the essentials needed in any reconnaissance aircraft, whether it be tactical or strategic in nature. Mainly, we knew that we were going to have to have a long range aircraft, because we were going to have to fly very shortly. We knew that we were going into Europe, and we were going to be called upon to make very deep penetrations as far away as Warsaw, Poland. Whether it be from our bases in Italy or our bases in England, this was one hell of a long way to fly. It called for an aircraft with the range of 5,500 miles. It also had to be an airplane that could effectively counter the threat of the ME-109 which was far and away more maneuverable and more operational than our aircraft were. Of course, we didn't know at that time that the German AF - Luftwaffe - was going to come up with their later development of their jet aircraft in the latter days of the war, which made all of our plans look pretty silly. But we did come up with a requirement list that Lovett took back and discussed with Arnold, and Arnold said it was a plane that Hughes had on the drawing boards and was tinkering around with, that he felt might fit our needs, and that it was contemplated as an aircraft that could be put into pretty fast production. I was called back in July 1943, and from North Africa, and sent out by General Arnold with some evaluating officers, to look at this airplane, which was then known as the XF-11. We looked at the aircraft; we evaluated it; we made a report that we considered that this did meet our requirements for both the Pacific and the European theaters. It had the speed, and the range, and the altitude requirements and could fly at low altitude as well as a tactical aircraft, and we recommended it highly. This recommendation was followed by a long series of hassles that ended up with the plane never getting off the ground during the war for the very simple reason that, first of all, they never gave them priority allocations for parts, for engines, for metal

materials. He had to switch his design, so that it was to go into production as a plywood aircraft. It was originally designed with the idea of having a metal aircraft, and we felt it would have been a much better aircraft if it had been an aluminum structure. But, without that, and with all the delays that came between the War Production Board and all of the priorities that came ahead of it, we never did get the airplane. Thirteen were ordered, as you know - one squadron. The contract - I never did know, as I remember it - Hughes said that he would pay the whole contract in the event that this airplane did not perform to specifications, and so forth, and that the AF would not have to pay a dime. I had reported in the first thing, this as a statement that Hughes made. As a matter of fact, I could very easily determine whether this man that's down at Paradise Island is the true Howard Hughes, by just asking him some questions about the development of that aircraft, and our evaluation. Because nobody else sat in those meetings. None of his engineers or aides. I did this by myself with him. Not even any of my personnel were present. I said: "I'm making this report direct to Gen Arnold and to Secy Lovett. They will base their decision on this, and what you say, you have got to be prepared to back up in any contract."

Q: And he said he would underwrite the cost?

R: Underwrite the complete cost of the production of these 13 aircraft, and if they did not meet the full specifications as set forth in my report, that he was prepared to pay the entire cost at no expense to the Government.

Q: What happened?

R: It got bogged down through so much of the bureaucracy, if you want to put it that way, that he had promised to do it all within a period of 12 months. If we had gotten them, actually, this aircraft would have been a pretty effective airplane, even against the German jets during the last days of the war there. They would have been highly successful operationally in the Far Eastern theater.

Q: Why did they got bogged down?

R: They never got the priorities, and there was a tremendous amount of real opposition to Hughes.

Q: Even in that day?

R: Right in the War Dept itself. Oh, definitely, in that day.

Q: Arnold gave you carte blanche to deal with him on this?

R: He sent me out to be the sole evaluating officer with the assistance of 4 or 5 other officers that he sent with me.

Q: And you came back with an affirmative report?

R: I came back with an affirmative that stated clearly that if he can do what he promises, and if he will take the full responsibility, we can't lose. We can't lose, because if he doesn't live up to the performance characteristics required here, we don't own one nickel. And he did make that promise. I have never seen it in the newspapers.

Q: I came across this where Hughes made this proposition, where he would underwrite the cost himself. If you don't want it, you don't have to take it.

R: Correct.

Q: Did he stand by this at the end?

R: I don't think so. I don't think anybody stood by anything. Very frankly, the airplane never was produced. The first one that flew was the one that we saw, the prototype that we saw at that little hangar that he had south of Muroc Dry Lake. This airplane we couldn't fly at the time because he didn't have some of the engine parts. He was using a very revolutionary twin-engine design with four props. The four props were counter-rotating props on each engine. This is what caused his bad accident that he had when he was flying the airplane, and that one of the counter-rotating props on one side ran away with him, and that caused this terrific....

Q: Centrifugal force?

R: Yes, and it just threw him to a spin. Torque.

Q: This whole business of a photographic plane was a contractual mess. It carried on after the war, and then, with the 80th Congress came into power, the Ferguson Committee was looking into the Elliott Roosevelt-Hughes relationship. I don't think they found anything substantive, but they came up on Benny Meyers.

R: Yes, right. And of course, Benny Meyers later, really got caught up. He went to jail, didn't he?

Q: Right, he went to jail, and they took his medals away. They took his pension away, and all the rest. Arnold had a great deal of faith in Benny Meyers.

R: I had a great deal of admiration for Benny Meyers. Regardless of what they may have proven, and I suppose that the law found that he was guilty of these things, this was a brilliant, brilliant man.

Q: Somebody told me that he could add up a column of four figures simultaneously.

R: Yes, he could.

Q: I've also heard that Arnold....

R: He could look at a complete column and give you the answer just like that. Just look at it for a second, glance at it, and give you the answer.

Q: He was living very high during the war?

R: That was what his downfall was. He accepted an unusual amount of g ratuities, let's say.

Q: A little bit spun off and got stuck on his fingers. Arnold had tremendous admiration for him. One of the reasons is as I understand it, the President was always bugging Arnold: "When are we going to get the B-29s?"

R: Right.

Q: This is one of the things he was pushing - when are we going to get t his out, or that out? Arnold would go to Meyers rather than to Echols. Echols was the Chief of that Materiel. But he went around him to Meyers, the assistant, b ecause Meyers would give him an optimistic figure. Meyers, according to people I've talked to, would read numbers off the tail sections of the planes not yet completed and say: "We have 200 planes available, when only 150 were actually available. By the time it got to the President and somebody made a decision, the other 50 would be off the assembly line.

R: He anticipated.

Q: Anticipated, right. Some people said that Arnold knew that he was anticipating, because Arnold is a hard guy to fool. But he gave Arnold figures

that he wanted to hear, and maybe this is part of the reason that Arnold accepted it?

R: You've got to remember that a man in Gen Arnold's position was in a most untenable position that it was possible to occupy, where you had a President that wanted instant reaction and instant ability to counter. This depended upon a production that was super human. If you remember, November 1944, when the breakthrough came at Ardennes, I think it was, and we were in trouble. We didn't have a single airplane flying, because it was absolutely socked in. Even on the ground. Ground units couldn't see two feet in front of them. The real terrible thing about it was they thought, good God, the only place they could turn to was the AF. Well, the AF couldn't do anything. You didn't know what you were going to hit. There wasn't any way, and yet the pressure, I know, from the White House, was to Arnold: "Get that AF in there, and do something," because we were really in deep trouble. Of course, I've often wondered, because the A-2s in every single AAF unit, right from Gen Spaatz' hqs. on down to the 9th AF, the 8th AF, everybody had been briefed on the buildup of the German forces. The same reports had gone into the G-2 Army Hqs. They were familiar with this, and yet not one single one of the Army commanders gave any recognition to the fact to this big German buildup that came at that particular time. That I think is a book all of its own. We had the pictures; we had all the interpretations exactly of what the German buildup had been before it happened. We had it for over a week before it happened. We never reacted, ground wise, whatsoever.

Q: There's a letter from Spaatz to Arnold, July 14, 1943, mentioning that Arnold had sent a cablegram to Spaatz, asking that you be returned to the States.

R: Right. What happened was that I was recalled, No. 1, after, as I told you before, the Secy (Lovett) had been out there. He and Spaatz had talked about our difficulties. And, also, the fact that we felt very strongly, and I had convinced Spaatz that we needed better aircraft for reconnaissance purposes. Also, that the operation in the Pentagon itself of the Reconnaissance Branch was still not operating closely enough to, and it was at this time, that I went back,

and made the recommendation that Col Hall be brought back. It was just after Minton Kaye had been relieved. On this trip, I made my first trip out to see the Hughes plant.

Q: And, of course, Arnold responded to Spaatz. It says: "Your comments regarding Elliott Roosevelt were fully borne out during his visit here." This is his letter to Spaatz of 20 Aug 1943. That covers that question.

Q: Now I want to ask you about this problem, or it became a problem, your promotion to get your star. This caused a big, big hassle, politically, and all across the military board.

R: Correct.

Q: Apparently, based on the fact that your eyesight was not good enough for you to be rated, and if you were not rated, you could not command the unit....

R: That is correct. They maintained that I had been illegally rated. In other words, I had a rating as a service pilot. I had a rating as a navigator, and also as a bombardier. These I had acquired, and I had flown a great many missions as a pilot on a service pilot's rating. I think it was in Dec 1944, Arnold finally approved a request through Doolittle, who was my immediate CG, to Spaatz, to Eisenhower, to Arnold, in view of the fact that I was flying these things, and at one time, they asked that they be permitted to grant me my combat status. At first the answer came back: "We have reviewed this, and the medical authorities, the Surgeon General's office said: "It is impossible, and therefore, he is ordered grounded." And I was relieved of my command for a period of 3 weeks.

Q: This was in '44 - late '44?

R: Right around the end of December. Then the early part of January' 1945, I was called in by Doolittle and he said: "Gen Arnold had decided to overrule his Surgeon General's Dept," and Doolittle gave me my combat wings. I was immediately reinstated as Wing Commander. Then, thereafter, the question of my promotion came up because at that time I had 6,300 men under me on an Allied basis.

Q: 3rd Photo Reconnaissance?

R: No, this was the....I had commanded the 90th Wing Reconnaissance in the Mediterranean theater, and then I commanded the...I can give it to you later. But I had a new wing for the European theater and had overall command of all reconnaissance in the whole European theater, including Africa and Italy, and so forth. And then, they determined that I should have, because my opposite number in the RAF was Air Commodore, they decided that I should be at least equal in rank to him. I was over him, actually. They put in for my promotion, Doolittle again, through Spaatz, through Eisenhower, through Arnold to the President. The President sent it back, and Arnold sent it back in again. In February 1945, it was finally voted on, and carried over many objections.

Q: Right. It was just about this time that Arnold had a severe heart attack.

R: Right.

Q: He was down at Coral Gables, at the Biltmore Hotel for a period of time. In January 1945, just about the time of the President's Inauguration, several things happened involving you. It seems to me that Arnold was worried that the promotion would attract criticism. Spaatz was pushing it, Eisenhower was pushing the promotion. By this time, Arnold had some misgivings about it. Did you know that?

R: Yes, I'm sure he had misgivings. I'm positive. He had to have misgivings because there was a lot of pressure back in the US. Eisenhower and Spaatz, of course, were not privy to too much of that political stuff.

Q: Right. Of course, one of the factors was there was an Election in 1944, and so it might have been that whatever they were going to do, they were going to wait till after Election.

R: Well, I think they waited because I do know that it would come back to me that there were certain things pending for me and nothing ever happened, and then after the election it all seemed to gather momentum.

Q: Right in the middle of the promotion discussion, this Blaze incident happened. Of course, this started the whole mess.

R: That brought the Adjutant General's Office down on my head. I had a team over from the AG's office and they inspected every unit that I had from top to bottom. I had a list of things that were wrong that was as long as your arm.

But the main thing, that really ticked me off probably worse than anything else was that they found me guilty of permitting our aircraft, when they returned from a mission, to have the wings washed down with gasoline because we threw a lot of oil. There was no way that you could get that oil off in a hurry - we were flying with each aircraft; we were flying two missions a day - that you could possibly get that off without using aviation gas. In the record book, that is strictly against regulations. But I couldn't see not using it because it was the only way I could get the oil off.

Q: There was a period of time where you were kind of discouraged about this promotion hassle, and perhaps the command that you had. You wrote Arnold a letter and you wanted to resign from the AF. You wrote him in pencil. Do you remember this?

R: Yes sir.

Q: You felt that you were being put upon?

R: Well, no, I really felt that there was not much useful service that I could render. By this time, with all of the center of attention on me, and not on what the outfit was doing, that it made me practically useless.

Q: Well, sort of overall looking, summarizing, do you think anybody could have done the job that Arnold did? Anybody in the AF?

R: Not in my opinion.

Q: There were several people who you know, could have done it. Many people tell me that Andrews had a warmer quality about him, of communication with his men, men who served. Arnold had this forbidding manner, some felt it forbidding. Perhaps you didn't?

R: No, I didn't feel that way. I can understand because he could be quite short with you and say: "All right. This is it! Get it done!" And probably, I know that for instance, Tooey Spaatz was more informal with his men, and also, was able to get a lot of affection from them. But at the same time, I don't think that he could have accomplished nearly the job that Arnold could drive people to do. I always felt that Arnold felt: "Well, I've got you in the AF. You've been a headache to me, and you've got to prove to everybody."

That's why I always felt that I had to really get in there and pitch.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

R: Not that I know of. He may have.

Q: To your face?

R: No, never to my face.

Q: But you saw him get mad at people?

R: Oh yes. Many times.

Q: Do you remember any situations?

R: Particular one? Well, I was at one time in his office with Minton Kaye when he really blew his stack at Minton Kaye, when Minton Kaye was making excuses, and actually, was downgrading the information that I had given. Of course, I flared too. I said: "All right, why don't you come on out to the theater and see how it is."

Q: And then he...

R: He just landed both feet on top of Kaye.

Q: And I guess he was not long for this world after that?

R: No.

Q: Arnold had this smile on his face which could be deceptive. People say, if you mistook this for pleasure at what you were doing, it could be very misleading.

R: Did you ever know the elder Donald Douglas?

Q: Yes, I talked to Donald Douglas about a year ago. He lives in Rolling Hills, California, now.

R: He does? Well, Donald Douglas was, I would say, he was an extremely close friend of Hap Arnold's.

Q: Yes, his daughter married Arnold's son.

R: Right, and I would say that the personalities of these two people was a very interesting parallel, because Don Douglas was very taciturn individual during those years. I don't know what he is like today, but during those years he was a type of person that would sit, and he would talk technical things with Arnold by the hour. I was there both as a civilian, and in later years, but I would say

that there was a great deal of similarity between the personalities of Don Douglas and Arnold. They were two peas in a pod.

Q: In what respect?

R: In the fact that they were absolutely steely in their requirements for the people that worked for them. They were completely "go, man, go," type individuals. They couldn't brook any interference, or any excuses for not getting the job done. You had to find a way around a problem.

Q: Never accepted defeat?

R: Never.

Q: On another subject, did you ever hear Arnold talk about the Russians?

R: I had an occasion to talk to him about the Russians after I had been over to Poltava, when I went over there on the installation of our air base over there, and making arrangements for our recon airplanes to fly in there. He asked me what I thought of the Russians, not only the Russians in their relationship with us, but also their aircraft. I told him I thought they had a system that was fantastic, because I had never seen aircraft that were designed to fly for 2 or 3 weeks, and then throw it in the junkpile.

Q: Their regard for the human life was....

R: Absolutely nil. They had, for instance, I got one engine shot out flying down the corridor by a P-39.

Q: Which corridor?

R: The corridor coming in from Poland to Poltava. You know, that was supposed to be protected by the Russian aircraft. I was flying a P-38, and got my left engine out. It was a P-39, and I was flying at 34,000 feet. I said: "This is impossible. A P-39 is not supposed to get up there, but I later found out that they took out P-39 and stripped it, and it could go up to 38,000 feet.

Q: That reminds me that you wanted to fly one of the first reconnaissance missions in the FRANTIC operation. You got shot down. They were afraid that if the President's son was captured, it would create a severe incident.

R: Right.

Q: Was Harris Hull involved in that? I can't remember who told me. But you had volunteered for this. Kessler was in on it. Remember he was in that? They shot you down on it. Were you disappointed?

R: I was very disappointed.

Q: Did you appeal to Arnold?

R: No, he was too far away.

Rose, Elmer P.

3 May 70

December 22, 1969

Colonel Elmer P. Rose, USAF (Ret.)
518 Oakleaf Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78200

Dear Colonel Rose:

John Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of thekkey personalities who either knew General Arnold or had some connection with his policies.

One of the pieces of unfinished business in this work has to do with a war plan, which I believe was prepared by Colonel William Farthing, Captain Lawrence Coddington and yourself while you were assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force under Major General Fred Martin.

As you no doubt know, Generals Farthing and Coddington have passed away, and I had pretty much given up the ghost as I had been given an incorrect first name for you. Recently, in a conversation with Colonel Tom "Chuck" Mustain, he mentioned his association with you in Hawaiiibefore Pearl Harbor and correctly identified your full name.

I am taking this opportunity to write you because I would be interested to learn about what happened to this plan to defend Pearl Harbor by using 180 reconnaissance planes. The plan seemed to get lost upon its arrival in

Washington sometime around August 1941. In any event, I am planning to visit the San Antonio area in February and hope to have an opportunity to meet you and talk about the above subject and some related matters.

Please advise me if this would be a convenient time for a meeting. Enclosed is an envelope for your response.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

Case Sunday afternoon or early in week

824-6233

21 April 1970.

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division
Hq. USAF.

Dear Dr. Green :

I was really delighted to receive your letter of 1 April 1970 and especially ~~of~~ that you sent me the attachment. Tis the first time I've seen that document from Hq.Hawaiin Air Force.

A good friend who lives here and who had considerable Pentagon time after reading your letters and the Plan, suggested that the Army archives might contain interesting information on this Plan. He also suggested that you not be specific in your request for an examination of their files. Assume that you know the "why".

Tho't you might be interested in a few comments on the Plan. The Plan we submitted was quite simple. By "we", I refer to Col.W.E.Farthing,later M/Gen, Lt. L.C. Coddington,later B/Gen. and Major Elmer P.Rose, later Col.

We were well aware that he Navy would be quite jelous of their rights (?) and since they were equipped with dive bombers and torpedo planes, would fight to the last ditch to prevent us from entering those feilds, and since we wanted the basic Plan for the use of the B-17s authorized, we kept it simple. Col. Farthing coached us in writing the comcept,urging us to keep it simple and to not infringe on the suthorities of higher command. We tho't that by obtaining approval of the basic concept of the use of the B-17s, all else would then fall in place, such as air bases, etc. We attached charts showing the performance etc. of the B-17s, air bases, personnel, but did not include them in the Plan,as they were of secondary importance. This concept was was of such importance that we did not want the Plan to be cluttered with secondary matters. As Col.Farthing said, The more words you give them the more ammo they have to shoot you down.

Oh,yes, have you seen the Joint Army-Navy Board report, findings or what, submitted in 1940 concerning the defence of Pearl Harbor? Lt.Col.St.Clair Street,later M/Gen.was the only air member and submitted a minority report, which did not endear him to the walking Army nor to the Navy. Believe you'll find it intersting.

Am pleased that you will finally get to San Antonio,as you say, around the first of May. Many thanks for the Plan.

Sincerely
Elmer P. Rose
Col.USAF ret.

done 3-May 70

1 April 1970

Colonel Elmer P. Rose, USAF (Ret.)
518 Oakleaf Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78200

Dear Colonel Rose:

I have run down that "imaginary" plan to defend Pearl Harbor with 180 B-17's and 36 torpedo planes, which was sent to General Arnold by General Freddie Martin through General Short under date of 20 August 1941.

If you have time to read it through, I think you will agree it is, indeed, a remarkable report. It virtually predicts that, if ORANGE (the Japs) attacks, they would come in from the northern sector using a maximum of six carriers. The authors of the plan postulated four different times of the day and then suggested a dawn attack as the most likely possibility. Their recommendation for a 360° search, using 72 B-17D's (the rest in reserve), would enable us to detect such an attack during the daylight hours of D minus 1 and thwart it. General Martin's covering letter suggested that these 180 planes would assure "a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands...without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action."

My great interest now is to find out what happened to that report when it came to Washington. I have seen no response to that communication, hence the reference to a mysterious void in the files.

I hope to see you around the first of May.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

SAFAAR

January 28, 1970

Colonel Elmer P. Rose, USAF (Ret.)
518 Oakleaf Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78200

Dear Colonel Rose:

I was delighted to "find" you. I had just about given up hope that anybody with knowledge of the "Plan" was still alive.

Actually I first saw the plan over 20 years ago, and gave it to Harold Hinton for whom I was researching at the time.

Right now I'm primarily interested in what happened to the Plan when it arrived in Washington. My guess is that it was sequestered after Pearl Harbor because the answers to it, if any were made, would make Generals Marshall and Arnold look bad. In the months before December 7, 1941, the emphasis was on reinforcing the Philippines and 180 planes were hard to come by.

My plans are slightly changed. It will probably be March before I can get down to San Antonio. In any event, I'll try to notify you in advance.

I'm looking forward to our visit in the near future.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division

Atch

824-6233

January 2, 1969

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division
Hq. USAF, The Pentagon

Dear Dr. Green:

I was quite pleased to receive your letter of December 22, 1969 and to learn that some one of competence will write of Gen Arnold. Of course, there was additional pleasure that you searching for the "lost " Plan For the Defence of Pearl Harbor, as that plan was originally entitled.

As you mentioned, this Plan was originated and developed by Capt. Coddington while in the 5th Bomb.Group at Hickam Field and was submitted to Colonel Farthing who was the Group Commander Col. Farthing then submitted the Plan to Gen.Martins Hq., where it may have been changed, or additions made. I was told that Lt.Gen. Short, Commander of our area submitted it on to the War Department, probably in May or June of 1941. I was told that Gen Short fully approved of the Plan and urged its imediate adoption. Ca, yes, when Gen. Martin was called to testify before the Roberts Commission, he submitted a copy of this Plan to that Commission.

It does seem that the disappearing routine started shortly after the Plan's arrival in Washington, D.C. However, when I arrived in the Pentagon from Hickam Field in March 1943, there were persons in the Air Force Plans Division who were aware of this Plan and who would not discuss it--ancient history, as one described it.

The Plan did call for about 180 B-17s plus the necessary operating and support personnel and facilities.

I cannot recal the names on anyone who was aware of the Plan who are presently alive. However, it is possible that Gen. Kuter, ret., Gen. O.P.Weyland, ret. might recall names if requested for names of senior officers in Air Force Plans in the late spring-early summer of 1941. Of importa ce, when I used the word "told" it was quite unofficial and not for goutes. Another "told", was that the Action copy of this Plan went to the War Dept. Operations-Plans Div. which was then neared by a B.Gen.named Eisenhower. Yes, the Plan surely was "lost" and its being classified as SECRET aided in this action.

And I shall be happy to meet with you here in February or at any other date you deem convenient. In the meantime, shall be cudgeling my alleged memory and making notes to aid me in our meeting.

My best Regards to Chuck Mustain, and I'll be happy to supply such information as I can to you, tho tis "ancient history" to some.

Sincerely

Elmer P. Rose
Col.USAF ret.
518 Oakleaf Dr.
San Antonio, Texas

P.S. Assume you know that Lt.Gen Barney Giles lives here.

December 22, 1969

Colonel Elmer P. Rose, USAF (Ret.)
518 Oakleaf Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78200

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Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

Interview - Colonel Elmer P. Rose, San Antonio, Texas, May 3, 1970

Q: You mentioned that you met Arnold on three occasions. Do you recall the occasions?

R: Yes, the first time I ever met him was in 1938, with reference to the B-18 deficiency, and again about 2 years later on the combat deficiencies with the B-17. I found him to be an amazingly intelligent and knowledgeable individual. He was a BG at that time.

Q: In 1938, this must have been before Westover was killed?

R: I don't remember.

Q: Yes, because he made two stars when he took over. So this must have been early 1938. Now you say the deficiencies of the B-18. It had short range?

R: It had long range. But as a combat airplane it was without value.

Q: Why?

R: It lacked armament, and defensive armament. It lacked altitude and it lacked speed.

Q: Why were we buying them?

R: I don't know. It was the best available airplane, I presume, because I was a very junior Captain at the time.

Q: You weren't privy to the higher procurement secrets?

R: I was strictly a working man.

Q: And the second occasion was the B-17's deficiency. When did that occur?

R: It must have been early 1940.

Q: He was then two star?

R: Right.

Q: Chief of the Air Corps.

R: And the B-17B also lacked defensive armament, and it had metal tanks which were easily penetrated, and fire could be started by a hostile aircraft. There was no defense from a forward attack. Neither was there any defense from a rear attack. We were very concerned. I was a member of the 7th Bombardment Group, stationed at Hamilton Field, and later, Salt Lake City.

Q: Those were the two occasions of personal contact. You had no personal contact with Arnold during the war?

R: No, none at all.

Q: When were you assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force?

R: I was assigned in February 1940. I left the 7th Bombardment Group at Salt Lake City and went to Hickam Field, and was assigned to the 5th Bombardment Group commanded by then Colonel, later MG William Farthing. I was assigned as his Executive and Materiel Officer. The Group Operations Officer of this 5th Bombardment Group was 1st LT, later, BG Lawrence C. Coddington.

Q: He died within the past year.

R: I believe so, about a year ago. There were two groups, the 11th and the 5th, and the 18th Bombardment Wing, which was the bombardment component of what was then called the Hawaiian, later the 7th AF under General Fred L. Martin.

Q: You worked on a plan. How did this plan start? Whose idea was it?

R: It was evolution. When I arrived out there, there were a grand total of six of us who were qualified in B-17s. I was a very junior Major, but senior of the six, the others were very junior Captains, with little experience with B-17s, recently arrived also. Each of the two bomb groups had five overstrength squadrons, as far as personnel was concerned, but understrength in aircraft. The B-18s with two or three B-10s. The 5th Bomb Group was assigned additional squadron of A-20s. However, we had no bombing targets. So precision bombing was totally impossible. I ran an inventory of our personnel, and I discovered in the 18th Bombardment Wing there were a grand total of 3 celestial navigators, two of them squadron commanders, and the third one was me. None of them was in a position where we could practice the art. I also discovered that there were two expert bombardiers, one enlisted man and myself. So we were not exactly combat capable at that time. We were told that we would be equipped with B-17s, and I had come from about 2 ½ years of B-17 experience. So I took along with me technical publications giving the capabilities of the B-17. I was expecting to set up schools, and so forth. In discussion with different individuals, principally, the group commander, Col Farthing, as to our mission, I discovered

that our mission was to assist in the defense of Pearl Harbor. I also discovered a very unusual document which should be of great interest. This was the joint Army-Navy Board, the subject of which was probably the defense of Pearl Harbor, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, or something like that. It was submitted, I believe, in 1940. Then LTCOL, later MG St. Clair Streett was the only Air member on the Army side. He submitted a minority report which did not endear him to the walking Army.

Q: What was the majority conclusion of this Air Board report.

R: I did not read all of it.

Q: Do you remember any of the substantive parts?

R: I remember that in the event of hostilities, all Army bombardment aircraft would immediately be transferred to the operational control of the senior officer assigned to the Navy organization, stationed at Pearl Harbor, called Patrol Wing One.

Q: Was that under Admiral Bellinger?

R: That was under the famous Admiral Bellinger. So all bombardment aircraft, when the whistle blew, was to go under his operational control. The Navy, at that time, took unto themselves the responsibility for all offshore patrols. They patrolled with their PBYs 100 miles out, and returned to land before dark. It became very obvious to me, and to the others with whom I discussed it, that that was no protection whatsoever. We knew the c capabilities of the B-17. We knew that we had to hit the enemy before they hit us. So how were we going to do it. Coddington and I worked after hours for weeks on end, trying to evolve a plan whereby we could find the enemy and hit him before he could hit us. And how long it took us, I've long since forgotten.

Q: But you worked on it from 1940 to 1941?

R: No, I arrived out there in Feb 1941. We worked on it for probably a month, maybe even 6 weeks, before we finally got the plan going. Lt. Coddington, as Group Operations Officer, at Col Farthing's insistence, ceased going to the office, and I took over his duties as Group Operations Officer. He would work day and up until midnight. When I finished my duties I would go

down and work with him.

Q: He was working full time and you were working part time on it?

R: Yes. So the plan was in evolution. Col Farthing, as he mentioned one day, he said: "I don't know what the hell you guys are doing, but keep on with it because I know you guys have got something." And we didn't know what we had, but we knew we had something.

Q: Was part of this thinking, a plan to get some B-17s out into Hawaii. Of course, everybody wanted B-17s.

R: We had always been told that we would be equipped with B-17s during the summer, and the reason for this plan evolving was that we knew we had to develop a use for the B-17.

Q: But you weren't going to get 180.

R: Oh no, just one group.

Q: That would be how many B-17s?

R: I think they said we would get 36.

Q: Three squadrons?

R: They said the group would be equipped, as I remember. But we never did get the number that was promised for us, because the deliveries were all delayed.

Q: And then you fellows came up with 180?

R: Yes, based on this plan. We knew that we had, we finally worked out the plan, assuming that our enemy would be the Japanese, which was expected. They would come in with their carriers. And we assumed that it would be best for them to make a night takeoff and hit us at dawn. But we did not know whether or not they would cooperate. So we worked it out with a dawn takeoff, because we did not know whether or not they were equipped for night takeoffs. So we worked the plan with a dawn takeoff, and with a dawn attack. Where would the carriers be at that time? Well, that wouldn't do us any good because they still would hit us after the aircraft were launched. They would hit us. We had to catch them while the birds were still in the nest. So that meant the day before. So how far out, and what type of an airplane could find them in time? That he could radio back for a strike force, and the strike

force would have time to take off and fly out there, make the interception and the attack before dark, which, of course, had to be the day before the hostile planned attack.

Q: And the only weapon system that could possibly achieve this goal was the B-17?

R: The B-17 was the only airplane in existence that had the capabilities of doing that.

Q: With something like 2½ hours before dusk? It could go out 800 miles? Isn't that the way you computed it?

R: I've forgotten what the length of time was. It had to be more than 2 ½ hours, because the B-17 strike force which with the crews would be on alert for them to get in their airplanes, be briefed on the location of the target, and the type of attack and so forth, it would take an hour for that probably. Then they would have to fly out, locate the targets....

Q: Three or four hours?

R: It would take a minimum of three hours, I've forgotten the exact time, but we worked it out very carefully on what we believed would be a reasonable period of time.

Q: You wanted 72 B-17s on alert, and the others in reserve and also for a strike force?

R: Well, the plan that Clint Coddington and I worked out, was somewhat different from the plan that was submitted, not in the basic principle, but it was different. I don't remember the exact number of airplanes, but it was around 180 B-17s to search around the clock.

Q: This plan that I sent you is somewhat different from the plan that you prepared?

R: Only slightly.

Q: But the basic numbers are...?

R: Are probably the same.

Q: All right. Now, you submitted this plan to Farthing, and Farthing bought it all the way. And then, Farthing....

R: Then we submitted to Gen Rudolph who was the 18th Bombardment Wing Commander, which later became the 18th Bomber Command. We submitted to General Rudolph. He approved, and we sent it to the Hawaiian AF, General Martin's command. Of course, they had the responsibility for fighters and so forth.

Q: And Martin bought it?

R: Completely.

Q: And Martin sent it on to...?

R: LTGEN Short, and he spent very, very little time studying it. As a matter of fact, he had been briefed on it before it was submitted.

Q: Do you know what he wrote about the report?

R: No.

Q: Two words - "I concur" - and sent it on to Washington.

R: He became very air-minded during the mid-summer of 1941, and I expect he spent more time with us than he did any of his other subordinate commands, and I personally briefed him on the entire plan, prefaced of course, that it was in General Martin's headquarters. Somehow or other, Gen Short had become aware of it, and he asked for the briefing, so I personally briefed him during the summer of 1941. While it was being studied in the Hawaiian Air Force Hqs., and he was well aware of the entire contents and the basic premise of our plan. We, in our original plan, varied in our concept, in our basic desires, from that which was submitted by the Hawaiian AF. We knew of the joint Army-Navy Board, wherein the Navy was given the full responsibility for all offshore aerial searches. We knew there would be a fight in order for the Army to get any portion of that offshore service. So we wanted to keep it as simple as possible. We put in there that the requirements for additional personnel, air bases, etc., would be submitted at a later date. What we wanted was to get through and be approved with the basic concept of this plan, that is, the B-17s to do this long range searching, go out the 820 odd miles, the day before, and catch them, rather than go out 100 miles the way the Navy was doing. We wanted to keep it as simple as possible so as to get this one concept approved, if we could get that approved, then all the fighter support, the air base, the additional

air bases, the additional personnel, all of that would just fall into place.

Q: Did you brief the Navy -- Admiral Kimmel?

R: No.

Q: Did the Navy ask for a briefing?

R: As far as I know, they did not, and I would be of the belief that they were not aware of the plan.

Q: Well, Short concurred in the plan, but since he had only partial responsibility for defense of Hawaii, didn't it occur to him - I'm sure it did - to say: "Well, we ought to brief the Navy on this plan, because it involves the total defense."

R: I don't know, I never asked General Short about that.

Q: Did this ever come up in your discussions with Coddington and Farthing?

R: No, we probably discussed whether or not the Navy should be brought into it, but since it was strictly an Army matter at our level, we immediately decided to not let that enter into our thinking at all.

Q: I'm just speculating now. Perhaps, Short sent this in to get War Dept reaction, in Washington, before he went to the Navy and stirred up a hornet's nest?

R: To me, it would have been very inappropriate for him to have contacted Adm Kimmel, because they were subordinate commanders. They had sent in their recommendations the preceding year on the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor area. And since Gen Short wanted a modification, I believe he might have considered it. At least I would have considered it inappropriate to have contacted the Navy because it had been strictly between the War Dept and the Navy Dept in Washington, to work out those differences.

Q: The possibility is, the likelihood is, that Short wanted to get War Dept General Staff reaction, and if they went with it, then they could take it up with the Navy in Washington, rather than him to do it on a local basis.

R: I believe that he would have been, as we say, out of line, to have done anything at that level, because it was the responsibility of the War Dept

and the Navy Dept only. The War Dept may have decided the plan was inappropriate, so why contact the Navy.

Q: I'm interested in what happened to that plan after it came to Washington.

R: I haven't the remotest idea.

Q: Do you know that Fred Martin sent that plan two different ways to Washington. One went through Short who concurred and to the War Dept General Staff. He sent another copy of the plan with a letter in August to Arnold, telling him that: "I'm sending this plan to you out of channels to be sure that you get it."

R: I know about that.

Q: From what I said or from other sources?

R: No, Colonel Farthing told me about it. He and Gen Martin were old friends, and Col Farthing told me, he asked me to write up a letter of transmittal. And I said: "Well, I do not know the relationship between a MG and a LTGEN, and I would not be qualified to write a letter of transmittal because he's writing as one person, one friend to another. But Col Farthing had convinced Gen Martin that a subject such as this can get bogged down in staff, and it was of such great importance, that it should be sent direct, and Col Farthing is responsible for Gen Martin sending it to Gen Arnold.

Q: But you drafted the letter?

R: No, I didn't.

Q: Who drafted the letter?

R: I don't know, I did not draft the letter.

Q: You begged off.

R: I begged off for lack of qualification.

Q: One copy of the letter - there may have been several copies of the letter - had written on it, "To Spaatz," Spaatz was Chief of Air Staff, which was the equivalent of Vice Chief of Staff. Then it disappears from the record, and I'm wondering if you have any ideas, or did this ever come up for discussion

among you, Farthing and Coddington: "what happened to our plan?"

R: Coddington came back first, and he was assigned Asst Base Commander, somewhere in New Mexico.

Q: Was this before Pearl Harbor?

R: No, this was after Peral Harbor. This was about several months after Pearl Harbor. He was reassigned back in the States as Asst Base Commander in New Mexico. General Farthing was later reassigned, and was assigned to command the port of Newark, New Jersey. I came back in April 1943, and was assigned to the Pentagon in Materiel. None of the three of us was ever assigned to operational activities until Coddington, oh, sometime in the 1950s, got back into it.

Q: Were any of you called before the Pearl Harbor Board?

R: General Martin was the only one.

Q: Farthing was not?

R: He was not.

Q: This thing appeared in the Pearl Harbor report. Did anybody ever discuss with you the testimony of Gen Martin?

R: Yes, General Martin himself.

Q: What did he say?

R: We were both hospitalized at Hickam Field, at the time. We had a bathroom between us.

Q: When was this?

R: Right after Pearl Harbor. And General Martin had had an ulcer for many, many years, and he was hospitalized. He was called to testify before the Roberts Commission. Col Farthing came into my room, showed me what he had. He said he had gone down to General Martin's hqs., gone to the Chief Clerk, a Warrant Officer whom he had known, and swiped a copy of this plan out of the files. He said: "Come along with me." And we went into Gen Martin's room. He was dressing to go down and appear before the Roberts Commission. Col Farthing told him what his suggestion was: "That when you appear, you say all of my recommendations concerning my mission are contained

in this file which was submitted," whatever date it was. When General Martin returned, he was all smiles. Of course, I peeked in. He motioned me to come in. He said: "Where's Bill?" meaning Col Farthing. We were both waiting. I sent somebody down to get him. He came in very quickly. Gen Martin said: "Well, Bill, it worked out better than you thought. I took it in and told them exactly what you had suggested I say." General McNarney said: "Oh!" Gen McNarney was the senior military man on the board. Gen McNarney said: "Oh, let me see it, Fred." He flipped through it a little while, and Gen McNarney said: "Gen Martin, if we need you to testify, we will call for you. That's all for today."

Q: And that was it?

R: General Martin was never recalled by the Roberts Commission.

Q: Well, it would have been embarrassing to make an issue about this because Gen Martin and your plan had pretty much anticipated what happened.

R: Oh yes; oh yes.

Q: So McNarney was probably protecting his boss, General Marshall and maybe General Arnold? Did this occur to you?

R: A lot of things occurred to us.

Q: Like what?

R: Well, mainly, we did not know what the situation was back here in the States. We knew that there was a lot going on of which we were not aware, and why people did the things they did. On many, many of the things, we could not assign any logical reason for. We had no way of knowing what their reasons were.

Q: Did you ever mention the possibility, or did the word "cover-up" enter into your discussions?

R: We honestly didn't do a great deal of discussion on it because we were all too damn busy. We were way under strength in the Personnel at Hickam Field, and practically everybody was working 7 days a week, from 12 to 16 hours a day. That didn't give you much time for discussion of why Justice Roberts and the Commission members ....

Q: ....never pursued the matter further with you? Is this a fair statement? I'm saying that Justice Roberts and his Commission never pursued the matter further.

R: I had no way of knowing, because I had never seen the Roberts Commission Report.

Q: But you knew that McNarney had called Martin to testify and you knew that your plan is the one that was carried out almost as a scenario by the Japanese. It was almost perfect by way of predicting their attack?

R: They launched a bit closer than we expected them to, than we had assumed they would. While we are on this subject, I mentioned earlier that we were a little bit different from this plan. We assumed that they would come in as close as they possibly could, and launch their aircraft, and then, turn their fleet and head out. The Hawaiian AF ausumed the other way, that they would launch at a max range and steam on in toward the Hawaiian Islands and recover their aircraft at shorter range. We assumed they would do it the other way so as to have the fleet farther out to sea.

Q: What did they do?

R: I don't know for sure. Because at the time the people got over there and started questioning the Japanese, they didn't delve into that.

Q: In other words, you are talking about the Hawaiian AF variation of your plan, the plan that ultimately was finished?

R: And neither did we include anything about torpedo planes, because we knew the Navy was well equipped with highly trained crews in torpedo work. We also knew doggone well that if we started to take part of their missions away from them, we'd get some locks thrown at us, and it would be justified.

Q: In other words, you were trying to get this plan adopted without making too many waves?

R: We tried to make it logical because, to repeat, the Navy was well equipped with the latest model torpedo planes, and their crews were well trained as they could possibly be, and for us to try to infringe on a brand new trade in the AF, torpedo work, seems to us to be very illogical.

Q: We weren't trined for that kind of mission?

R: No.

Q: Then the 36 planes was added on by the Hawaiian AF?

R: Right.

Q: It wasn't in your original plan?

R: The torpedo planes were added on.

Q: By Martin's staff?

R: Right.

Q: And, of course, this was something the Navy would never buy. As it was, the Navy would not accept 180 planes, I guess, if it was ever presented to them. And they certainly would fight the 36 torpedo planes, because this was part of their mission as they saw it.

R: Frankly, I think it was ridiculous to expect us to go into torpedo work. We tried it a couple of times during the war.

Q: In your discussions with Coddington and Farthing, did the issue of somebody's covering up the fact that - "we never got a response to our plan" - did that ever come up in your discussion? It seems to me that if you had hit so close to what actually happened, you predicted virtually what happened, with some minor adjustments. Yet, there was a disaster at Pearl Harbor. It could have been averted. Did this subject ever come up?

R: Oh yes, we discussed it a lot, we three, and just among we three, because there was no need to bring the other people into it.

Q: Did you feel that Fred Martin got a bad deal? Of course, he didn't get court martialed, but he was taken back to the US and give a backwater post.

R: His health was such that he could not have taken on, withstood, a combat duty assignment with a great deal of pressure. And he knew it.

Q: So he was not necessarily unhappy?

R: I doubt that he was, because he knew his physical condition quite well.

Q: He has a son in NY, I was supposed to contact him, but I didn't have

time when I was up there. I wonder if he has any papers? You don't have any papers of your participation in the plan, do you? You didn't save any memos?

R: They were classified, and I was moving around a lot, we weren't permitted to transfer classified documents in personal possession.

Q: Did you keep in contact with Coddington in the postwar period?

R: Oh, after a fashion.

Q: Did you ever discuss it?

R: Couple of times. We laughed about it. What else can you do?

Q: Well, it seems to me it was a lot more serious than that. You know, the thing that I've tried to run down, and I have not yet, I hope that I will. My question: What happened to that plan when it got to Washington?

R: I don't know who was in the Plans Division under Gen Arnold at that time.

Q: Well, they had Harold George and Kuter - Kuter came in a little later - Ken Walker, Possum Hansell, four of them.

R: Well, Kuter and Possum are still around.

Q: Well, they say they don't remember it. Harold George is still around.

R: In 1948 - I was at Maxwell Field, MG Orvil Anderson had been in AF Plans. One evening, at a party I mentioned the plan to him. He is quite a voluble individual, very fluent. He did quite a bit of talking about it. So I know Orvil Anderson was amazingly familiar with the entire plan.

Q: What did he say about the plan?

R: I remember he said it was very illogical, totally impractical and unrealistic.

Q: The plan?

R: I asked him what parts of it were unrealistic, and so forth, and he kept on talking.

Q: In other words, he didn't give you any satisfaction?

R: There was nothing to be gained.

Q: It is true that it's spilt milk, but you guys should have been elected as heroes.

R: No, none of us considered ourselves as that, and I'm sure they never did. We were very disgusted, and probably, our emotions were stronger than that, that they totally disregarded our plan. However, we did get a bit of satisfaction out of it because the Navy in their fleet maneuvers would always search out ahead 100 nautical miles, and the plane returned to the ship before dark. Somehow or other they became aware of this plan, and they started using that plan.

Q: But going out only 100 miles.

R: Not going out only 100 miles, but going out far enough to catch the hostile force.

Q: In other words, the Navy PBYs adopted your plan?

R: The Fleet did not use PBYs. They used either carrier aircraft, and usually carrier aircraft in their searches, but they modified the plan to suit the performance of their aircraft. It was very interesting. I heard a lecture by then Capt Red Rubel, later RADM, and he told of how they originated the plan. After the lecture was over with - I'd know Red for some time - I said: "Red, you big liar." He laughed and he said: "Well, you characters won't take credit for it. So why shouldn't we?"

Q: So he acknowledged that he had borrowed or lifted your plan?

R: There was a strong inference. He said: "You characters won't take credit for it."

Q: Were you aware of the 100 mile limitation which was said to have been imposed upon Air Corps planes. This was in 1938. Was it a real limitation?

R: Oh yes, indeed.

Q: Were you fellows told not to go out more than 100 miles?

R: Yes, indeed, without permission of the Navy.

Q: Do you remember, there was a MacArthur-Pratt agreement about 10 years before, 1931. They called it "paramount interest." The N vy was to have control of operations over water, and the Army had control of operations over land. So this was part of that plan, that you fellows going out 800 miles over water, were intruding on the Navy's mission. The Navy and War

Dept would never permit this kind of thing to happen. Remember what happened to the guys on the Rex, remember in 1938, the Rex mission?

R: Yes, that was not a happenstance. That is why we wanted to keep our plan as simple as possible - not put all of this airbase, divebombers, torpedo bombers, additional personnel, and stuff in there. Because, as Col Farthing said, the more words you give them, the more words they'll add. The more ammunition you give them to shoot you down with. So we kept it as simple as possible in order to get this basic concept of using the B-17s for search and attack. That was what we were interested in. And to repeat, if that had been approved, the use of B-17s for search and attack - then these other things would have fallen in place automatically.

Q: But you never felt that you ought to be justified, that the record ought to show that you fellows had thought of it first, and that Pearl Harbor happened exactly as you predicted, and that somebody ought to recognize your contribution?

R: Oh....

Q: Did you and Coddington talk about this?

R: Yes, also General Farthing. We talked about it. But, what would be gained? What useful purpose would be served?

Q: You were told in the 27 Nov '41 miessage that...

R: Any attack by the Japanese would be preceded by intensive and extensive sabotage.

Q: Was there any sabotage prior to the attack?

R: Not at all, not a bit of it.

Q: But the planes were set in revetments for sabotage?

R: We had no revetments.

Q: But they were huddled together?

R: We gathered them in as directed by the War Dept., close to the hangars. We parked them in very closely together, and lighted them at night with armed guards patrolling, as directed by the War Dept., for protection against sabotage.

Q: This made them easier targets for strafing and bombing?

R: Oh yes, much easier.

Q: You know, Arnold sent a message like that, too. There was one Arnold message that came in against sabotage. Of course, this was the belief, you see, that Hawaii was not a prime target for attack, but that the Philippines were. This is why the B-17s were just being shuttled through. In fact, Sgt. Lockhart, when he saw these blips on the screen, he thought they were the B-17s, and they were the Jzp Zeroes. Am I correct on that?

R: Oh, he didn't know what it was. He didn't know the B-17s were coming in.

Q: But I think the Lieutenant...

R: The LT. I've forgotten his name at the moment. He was a fighter pilot. The Navy was in control of all aircraft more than 100 miles offshore. We had to get information concerning these B-17s coming in through surreptitious channels. The Navy never did inform us officially that the B-17s were coming in. But we knew all about it. This LT telephoned and was told that it was probably the B-17s coming in. That was just the time they were expected. Everybody came in together.

Q: You know, my speculation is that Arnold or Marshall, or Arnold and Marshall, wrote some message, or some message was written by them to either Short or to Fred Martin, saying: "Forget about Pearl Harbor. It's not a prime target for attack, but the Philippines are." Something like that, which in the light of events at Pearl Harbor, would make them look very bad. And, I'm guessing now, that this message was expunged from the record.

R: If such a message were sent - of course, I was a Major at that time - sometime in the summer of 1941 I was moved up to be Operations Officer of what was later the Bomber Command, and was also acting as Intelligence Officer. If such a message came in, it was not there.

Q: Well, it could have been in a personal letter to Martin.

R: Anyone who had considered the conditions out there would have been quickly aware of the fact that the Navy in the Philippines were no particular threat to the Japanese. Whereas, the Fleet in Pearl Harbor in it's area was a

very great threat to the carriers and the battleships.

Q: We had 20/20 hindsight, all of us, including Arnold and Marshall, could reconsider our thoughts before.

R: You see, everybody was concerned in Europe. Of course, they speak our language, and I don't know of more than one or two people in the Pentagon at that time, and even later on, who was familiar with the Pacific area. They were quite startled at the distances. I talked to some of them, high ranking officers, and they just couldn't believe the distances in the Philippines.

Q: Do you remember when the RAINBOW FIVE war plan was published in the Chicago Tribune, three days before Pearl Harbor?

R: No,I was in Hawaii at the time.

Q: McNarney worked for Marshall. He couldn't tell you what happened on the AAF side of it. But, certainly, Arnold would not write to Fred Martin commenting on airplanes, without clearing this, or checking it through the War Dept. So Marshall would have been consulted on any letter Arnold wrote to Fred Martin, and if Marshall was consulted, he would have turned it over to McNarney. This makes me very curious as to McNarney's statement to Fred Martin: "Forget about it!"

R: No, no, he said, if we need any more information from you, we'll call you.

Q: "Don't call me, I'll call you." Is that what he said?

R: No, he said, if we need anything more from you, General Martin, we'll call you.

Q: In effect, he was saying: "Don't call me, I'll call you."

R: Justice Roberts on that Commission, he was a sick man.

Q: He was a sick man, but it seems to me that you fellows, who worked up this magnificent prophecy, would have wanted some vindication, if for only selfish reasons, for promotional purposes. You say, when you came to the Pentagon, you asked somebody what happened to the plan?

R: This was in the Spring of 1943. I mentioned this plan on the defense of Pearl Harbor, and this officer said that he was new.

Q: Do you remember his name?

R: Oh yes.

Q: Would you tell it?

R: No, he said that he had never seen the plan, but he had heard people talk about the plan. He couldn't remember who it was who talked about the plan, and he said, "Elmer, if I were you, I wouldn't mention the damn thing again."

Q: Did you ask him why?

R: No, because he was....

Q: Was he inferior to you?

R: Yes, he was in a position to know more of what was going on in the inner circles than I was, and I knew him well enough to respect his judgment.

Q: So you never brought it up again?

R: I did not.

Q: You mean the fact that they did nothing with your plan was embarrassing?

R: It arrived there probably in late August, I don't know. It required quite a bit of staff study. There weren't 180 planes available of any kind. We knew that, but that was our requirements in order to accomplish our mission.

Q: You weren't being selfish about this, trying to corner all the B-17s for the Hawaiian AF.

R: Of course not. We had a mission; we were charged with a mission, and the mission was with minimum requirements, for us to accomplish our mission. As Col Farthing stated, without this equipment, we cannot accomplish our mission.

Q: After giving you some, did they take some away?

R: Well, they sent us the first contingent. The 19th Bombardment Group came out in the late spring, early summer of 1941. Then, along in the summer, we got orders to send a wartime strength squadron of B-17s to the Philippines.

Q: This ties in with what I say. The Philippines was the critical area and Hawaii was not.

Interview - Colonel Elmer P. Rose, San Antonio, Texas, May 3, 1970

Q: You mentioned that you met Arnold on three occasions. Do you recall the occasions?

R: Yes, the first time I ever met him was in 1938, with reference to the B-18 deficiency, and again about 2 years later on the combat deficiencies with the B-17. I found him to be an amazingly intelligent and knowledgeable individual. He was a BG at that time.

Q: In 1938, this must have been before Westover was killed?

R: I don't remember.

Q: Yes, because he made two stars when he took over. So this must have been early 1938. Now you say the deficiencies of the B-18. It had short range?

R: It had long range. But as a combat airplane it was without value.

Q: Why?

R: It lacked armament, and defensive armament. It lacked altitude and it lacked speed.

Q: Why were we buying them?

R: I don't know. It was the best available airplane, I presume, because I was a very junior Captain at the time.

Q: You weren't privy to the higher procurement secrets?

R: I was strictly a working man.

Q: And the second occasion was the B-17's deficiency. When did that occur?

R: It must have been early 1940.

Q: He was then two star?

R: Right.

Q: Chief of the Air Corps?

R: And the B-17B also lacked defensive armament, and it had metal tanks which were easily penetrated, and fire could be started by a hostile aircraft. There was no defense from a forward attack. Neither was there any defense from a rear attack. We were very concerned. I was a member of the 7th Bombardment Group, stationed at Hamilton Field, and later, Salt Lake City.

Q: Those were the two occasions of personal contact. You had no personal contact with Arnold during the war?

R: No, none at all.

Q: When were you assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force?

R: I was assigned in February 1940. I left the 7th Bombardment Group at Salt Lake City and went to Hickam Field, and was assigned to the 5th Bombardment Group commanded by then Colonel, later MG William Farthing. I was assigned as his Executive and Materiel Officer. The Group Operations Officer of this 5th Bombardment Group was 1st LT, later, BG Lawrence C. Coddington.

Q: He died within the past year.

R: I believe so, about a year ago. There were two groups, the 11th and the 5th, and the 18th Bombardment Wing, which was the bombardment component of what was then called the Hawaiian, later the 7th AF under General Fred L. Martin.

Q: You worked on a plan. How did this plan start? Whose idea was it?

R: It was evolution. When I arrived out there, there were a grand total of six of us who were qualified in B-17s. I was a very junior Major, but senior of the six, the others were very junior Captains, with little experience with B-17s, recently arrived also. Each of the two bomb groups had five overstrength squadrons, as far as personnel was concerned, but understrength in aircraft. The B-18s with two or three B-10s. The 5th Bomb Group was assigned additional squadron of A-20s. However, we had no bombing targets. So precision bombing was totally impossible. I ran an inventory of our personnel, and I discovered in the 18th Bombardment Wing there were a grand total of 3 celestial navigators, two of them squadron commanders, and the third one was me. None of them was in a position where we could practice the art. I also discovered that there were two expert bombardiers, one enlisted man and myself. So we were not exactly combat capable at that time. We were told that we would be equipped with B-17s, and I had come from about 2 ½ years of B-17 experience. So I took along with me technical publications giving the capabilities of the B-17. I was expecting to set up schools, and so forth. In discussion with different individuals, principally, the group commander, Col Farthing, as to our mission, I discovered

that our mission was to assist in the defense of Pearl Harbor. I also discovered a very unusual document which should be of great interest. This was the joint Army-Navy Board, the subject of which was probably the defense of Pearl Harbor, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, or something like that. It was submitted, I believe, in 1940. Then LTCOL, later MG St. Clair Streett was the only Air member on the Army side. He submitted a minority report which did not endear him to the walking Army.

Q: What was the majority conclusion of this Air Board report.

R: I did not read all of it.

Q: Do you remember any of the substantive parts?

R: I remember that in the event of hostilities, all Army bombardment aircraft would immediately be transferred to the operational control of the senior officer assigned to the Navy organization, stationed at Pearl Harbor, called Patrol Wing One.

Q: Was that under Admiral Bellinger?

R: That was under the famous Admiral Bellinger. So all bombardment aircraft, when the whistle blew, was to go under his operational control. The Navy, at that time, took unto themselves the responsibility for all offshore patrols. They patrolled with their PBYs 100 miles out, and returned to land before dark. It became very obvious to me, and to the others with whom I discussed it, that that was no protection whatsoever. We knew the capabilities of the B-17. We knew that we had to hit the enemy before they hit us. So how were we going to do it. Coddington and I worked after hours for weeks on end, trying to evolve a plan whereby we could find the enemy and hit him before he could hit us. And how long it took us, I've long since forgotten.

Q: But you worked on it from 1940 to 1941?

R: No, I arrived out there in Feb 1941. We worked on it for probably a month, maybe even 6 weeks, before we finally got the plan going. Lt. Coddington, as Group Operations Officer, at Col Farthing's insistence, ceased going to the office, and I took over his duties as Group Operations Officer, He would work day and up until midnight. When I finished my duties I would go

down and work with him.

Q: He was working full time and you were working part time on it?

R: Yes. So the plan was in evolution. Col Farthing, as he mentioned one day, he said: "I don't know what the hell you guys are doing, but keep on with it because I know you guys have got something." And we didn't know what we had, but we knew we had something.

Q: Was part of this thinking, a plan to get some B-17s out into Hawaii. Of course, everybody wanted B-17s.

R: We had always been told that we would be equipped with B-17s during the summer, and the reason for this plan evolving was that we knew we had to develop a use for the B-17.

Q: But you weren't going to get 180.

R: Oh no, just one group.

Q: That would be how many B-17s?

R: I think they said we would get 36.

Q: Three squadrons?

R: They said the group would be equipped, as I remember. But we never did get the number that was promised for us, because the deliveries were all delayed.

Q: And then you fellows came up with 180?

R: Yes, based on this plan. We knew that we had, we finally worked out the plan, assuming that our enemy would be the Japanese, which was expected. They would come in with their carriers. And we assumed that it would be best for them to make a night takeoff and hit us at dawn. But we did not know whether or not they would cooperate. So we worked it out with a dawn takeoff, because we did not know whether or not they were equipped for night takeoffs. So we worked the plan with a dawn takeoff, and with a dawn attack. Where would the carriers be at that time? Well, that wouldn't do us any good because they still would hit us after the aircraft were launched. They would hit us. We had to catch them while the birds were still in the nest. So that meant the day before. So how far out, and what type of an airplane could find them in time? That he could radio back for a strike force, and the strike

force would have time to take off and fly out there, make the interception and the attack before dark, which, of course, had to be the day before the hostile planned attack.

Q: And the only weapon system that could possibly achieve this goal was the B-17?

R: The B-17 was the only airplane in existence that had the capabilities of doing that.

Q: With something like 2½ hours before dusk? It could go out 800 miles? Isn't that the way you computed it?

R: I've forgotten what the length of time was. It had to be more than 2 ½ hours, because the B-17 strike force which with the crews would be on alert for them to get in their airplanes, be briefed on the location of the target, and the type of attack and so forth, it would take an hour for that probably. Then they would have to fly out, locate the targets....

Q: Three or four hours?

R: It would take a minimum of three hours, I've forgotten the exact time, but we worked it out very carefully on what we believed would be a reasonable period of time.

Q: You wanted 72 B-17s on alert, and the others in reserve and also for a strike force?

R: Well, the plan that Clint Coddington and I worked out, was somewhat different from the plan that was submitted, not in the basic principle, but it was different. I don't remember the exact number of airplanes, but it was around 180 B-17s to search around the clock.

Q: This plan that I sent you is somewhat different from the plan that you prepared?

R: Only slightly.

Q: But the basic numbers are...?

R: Are probably the same.

Q: All right. Now, you submitted this plan to Farthing, and Farthing bought it all the way. And then, Farthing....

R: Then we submitted to Gen Rudolph who was the 18th Bombardment Wing Commander, which later became the 18th Bomber Command. We submitted to General Rudolph. He approved, and we sent it to the Hawaiian AF, General Martin's command. Of course, they had the responsibility for fighters and so forth.

Q: And Martin bought it?

R: Completely.

Q: And Martin sent it on to...?

R: LTGEN Short, and he spent very, very little time studying it. As a matter of fact, he had been briefed on it before it was submitted.

Q: Do you know what he wrote about the report?

R: No.

Q: Two words - "I concur" - and sent it on to Washington.

R: He became very air-minded during the mid-summer of 1941, and I expect he spent more time with us than he did any of his other subordinate commands, and I personally briefed him on the entire plan, prefaced of course, that it was in General Martin's headquarters. Somehow or other, Gen Short had become aware of it, and he asked for the briefing, so I personally briefed him during the summer of 1941. While it was being studied in the Hawaiian Air Force Hqs., and he was well aware of the entire contents and the basic premise of our plan. We, in our original plan, varied in our concept, in our basic desires, from that which was submitted by the Hawaiian AF. We knew of the joint Army-Navy Board, wherein the Navy was given the full responsibility for all offshore aerial searches. We knew there would be a fight in order for the Army to get any portion of that offshore service. So we wanted to keep it as simple as possible. We put in there that the requirements for additional personnel, air bases, etc., would be submitted at a later date. What we wanted was to get through and be approved with the basic concept of this plan, that is, the B-17s to do this long range searching, go out the 820 odd miles, the day before, and catch them, rather than go out 100 miles the way the Navy was doing. We wanted to keep it as simple as possible so as to get this one concept approved, if we could get that approved, then all the fighter support, the air base, the additional

air bases, the additional personnel, all of that would just fall into place.

Q: Did you brief the Navy -- Admiral Kimmel?

R: No.

Q: Did the Navy ask for a briefing?

R: As far as I know, they did not, and I would be of the belief that they were not aware of the plan.

Q: Well, Short concurred in the plan, but since he had only partial responsibility for defense of Hawaii, didn't it occur to him - I'm sure it did - to say: "Well, we ought to brief the Navy on this plan, because it involves the total defense."

R: I don't know, I never asked General Short about that.

Q: Did this ever come up in your discussions with Coddington and Farthing?

R: No, we probably discussed whether or not the Navy should be brought into it, but since it was strictly an Army matter at our level, we immediately decided to not let that enter into our thinking at all.

Q: I'm just speculating now. Perhaps, Short sent this in to get War Dept reaction, in Washington, before he went to the Navy and stirred up a hornet's nest?

R: To me, it would have been very inappropriate for him to have contacted Adm Kimmel, because they were subordinate commanders. They had sent in their recommendations the preceding year on the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor area. And since Gen Short wanted a modification, I believe he might have considered it. At least I would have considered it inappropriate to have contacted the Navy because it had been strictly between the War Dept and the Navy Dept in Washington, to work out those differences.

Q: The possibility is, the likelihood is, that Short wanted to get War Dept General Staff reaction, and if they went with it, then they could take it up with the Navy in Washington, rather than him to do it on a local basis.

R: I believe that he would have been, as we say, out of line, to have done anything at that level, because it was the responsibility of the War Dept

and the Navy Dept only. The War Dept may have decided the plan was inappropriate, so why contact the Navy.

Q: I'm interested in what happened to that plan after it came to Washington.

R: I haven't the remotest idea.

Q: Do you know that Fred Martin sent that plan two different ways to Washington. One went through Short who concurred and to the War Dept General Staff. He sent another copy of the plan with a letter in August to Arnold, telling him that: "I'm sending this plan to you out of channels to be sure that you get it."

R: I know about that.

Q: From what I said or from other sources?

R: No, Colonel Farthing told me about it. He and Gen Martin were old friends, and Col Farthing told me, he asked me to write up a letter of transmittal. And I said: "Well, I do not know the relationship between a MG and a LTGEN, and I would not be qualified to write a letter of transmittal because he's writing as one person, one friend to another. But Col Farthing had convinced Gen Martin that a subject such as this can get bogged down in staff, and it was of such great importance, that it should be sent direct, and Col Farthing is responsible for Gen Martin sending it to Gen Arnold.

Q: But you drafted the letter?

R: No, I didn't.

Q: Who drafted the letter?

R: I don't know, I did not draft the letter.

Q: You begged off.

R: I begged off for lack of qualification.

Q: One copy of the letter - there may have been several copies of the letter - had written on it, "To Spaatz," Spaatz was Chief of Air Staff, which was the equivalent of Vice Chief of Staff. Then it disappears from the record, and I'm wondering if you have any ideas, or did this ever come up for discussion

among you, Farthing and Coddington: "what happened to our plan?"

R: Coddington came back first, and he was assigned Asst Base Commander, somewhere in New Mexico.

Q: Was this before Pearl Harbor?

R: No, this was after Peral Harbor. This was about several months after Pearl Harbor. He was reassigned back in the States as Asst Base Commander in New Mexico. General Farthing was later reassigned, and was assigned to command the port of Newark, New Jersey. I came back in April 1943, and was assigned to the Pentagon in Materiel. None of the three of us was ever assigned to operational activities until Coddington, oh, sometime in the 1950s, got back into it.

Q: Were any of you called before the Pearl Harbor Board?

R: General Martin was the only one.

Q: Farthing was not?

R: He was not.

Q: This thing appeared in the Pearl Harbor report. Did anybody ever discuss with you the testimony of Gen Martin?

R: Yes, General Martin himself.

Q: What did he say?

R: We were both hospitalized at Hickam Field, at the time. We had a bathroom between us.

Q: When was this?

R: Right after Pearl Harbor. And General Martin had had an ulcer for many, many years, and he was hospitalized. He was called to testify before the Roberts Commission. Col Farthing came into my room, showed me what he had. He said he had gone down to General Martin's hqs., gone to the Chief Clerk, a Warrant Officer whom he had known, and swiped a copy of this plan out of the files. He said: "Come along with me." And we went into Gen Martin's room. He was dressing to go down and appear before the Roberts Commission. Col Farthing told him what his suggestion was: "That when you appear, you say all of my recommendations concerning my mission are contained

in this file which was submitted," whatever date it was. When General Martin returned, he was all smiles. Of course, I pecked in. He motioned me to come in. He said: "Where's Bill?" meaning Col Farthing. We were both waiting. I sent somebody down to get him. He came in very quickly. Gen Martin said: "Well, Bill, it worked out better than you thought. I took it in and told them exactly what you had suggested I say." General McNarney said: "Oh!" Gen McNarney was the senior military man on the board. Gen McNarney said: "Oh, let me see it, Fred." He flipped through it a little while, and Gen McNarney said: "Gen Martin, if we need you to testify, we will call for you. That's all for today."

Q: And that was it?

R: General Martin was never recalled by the Roberts Commission.

Q: Well, it would have been embarrassing to make an issue about this because Gen Martin and your plan had pretty much anticipated what happened.

R: Oh yes; oh yes.

Q: So McNarney was probably protecting his boss, General Marshall and maybe General Arnold? Did this occur to you?

R: A lot of things occurred to us.

Q: Like what?

R: Well, mainly, we did not know what the situation was back here in the States. We knew that there was a lot going on of which we were not aware, and why people did the things they did. On many, many of the things, we could not assign any logical reason for. We had no way of knowing what their reasons were.

Q: Did you ever mention the possibility, or did the word "cover-up" enter into your discussions?

R: We honestly didn't do a great deal of discussion on it because we were all too damn busy. We were way under strength in the Personnel at Hickam Field, and practically everybody was working 7 days a week, from 12 to 16 hours a day. That didn't give you much time for discussion of why Justice Roberts and the Commission members ....

Q: ....never pursued the matter further with you? Is this a fair statement? I'm saying that Justice Roberts and his Commission never pursued the matter further.

R: I had no way of knowing, because I had never seen the Roberts Commission Report.

Q: But you knew that McNarney had called Martin to testify and you knew that your plan is the one that was carried out almost as a scenario by the Japanese. It was almost perfect by way of predicting their attack?

R: They launched a bit closer than we expected them to, than we had assumed they would. While we are on this subject, I mentioned earlier that we were a little bit different from this plan. We assumed that they would come in as close as they possibly could, and launch their aircraft, and then, turn their fleet and head out. The Hawaiian AF ausumed the other way, that they would launch at a max range and steam on in toward the Hawaiian Islands and recover their aircraft at shorter range. We assumed they would do it the other way so as to have the fleet farther out to sea.

Q: What did they do?

R: I don't know for sure. Because at the time the people got over there and started questioning the Japanese, they didn't delve into that.

Q: In other words, you are talking about the Hawaiian AF variation of your plan, the plan that ultimately was finished?

R: And neither did we include anything about torpedo planes, because we knew the Navy was well equipped with highly trained crews in torpedo work. We also knew doggone well that if we started to take part of their missions away from them, we'd get some locks thrown at us, and it would be justified.

Q: In other words, you were trying to get this plan adopted without making too many waves?

R: We tried to make it logical because, to repeat, the Navy was well equipped with the latest model torpedo planes, and their crews were well trained as they could possibly be, and for us to try to infringe on a brand new trade in the AF, torpedo work, seems to us to be very illogical.

Q: We weren't trined for that kind of mission?

R: No.

Q: Then the 36 planes was added on by the Hawaiian AF?

R: Right.

Q: It wasn't in your original plan?

R: The torpedo planes were added on.

Q: By Martin's staff?

R: Right.

Q: And, of course, this was something the Navy would never buy. As it was, the Navy would not accept 180 planes, I guess, if it was ever presented to them. And they certainly would fight the 36 torpedo planes, because this was part of their mission as they saw it.

R: Frankly, I think it was ridiculous to expect us to go into torpedo work. We tried it a couple of times during the war.

Q: In your discussions with Coddington and Farthing, did the issue of somebody's covering up the fact that - "we never got a response to our plan" - did that ever come up in your discussion? It seems to me that if you had hit so close to what actually happened, you predicted virtually what happened, with some minor adjustments. Yet, there was a disaster at Pearl Harbor. It could have been averted. Did this subject ever come up?

R: Oh yes, we discussed it a lot, we three, and just among we three, because there was no need to bring the other people into it.

Q: Did you feel that Fred Martin got a bad deal? Of course, he didn't get court martialed, but he was taken back to the US and give a backwater post.

R: His health was such that he could not have taken on, withstood, a combat duty assignment with a great deal of pressure. And he knew it.

Q: So he was not necessarily unhappy?

R: I doubt that he was, because he knew his physical condition quite well.

Q: He has a son in NY, I was supposed to contact him, but I didn't have

time when I was up there. I wonder if he has any papers? You don't have any papers of your participation in the plan, do you? You didn't save any memos?

R: They were classified, and I was moving around a lot, we weren't permitted to transfer classified documents in personal possession.

Q: Did you keep in contact with Coddington in the postwar period?

R: Oh, after a fashion.

Q: Did you ever discuss it?

R: Couple of times. We laughed about it. What else can you do?

Q: Well, it seems to me it was a lot more serious than that. You know, the thing that I've tried to run down, and I have not yet, I hope that I will. My question: What happened to that plan when it got to Washington?

R: I don't know who was in the Plans Division under Gen Arnold at that time.

Q: Well, they had Harold George and Kuter - Kuter came in a little later - Ken Walker, Possum Hansell, four of them.

R: Well, Kuter and Possum are still around.

Q: Well, they say they don't remember it. Harold George is still around.

R: In 1948 - I was at Maxwell Field, MG Orvil Anderson had been in AF Plans. One evening, at a party I mentioned the plan to him. He is quite a voluble individual, very fluent. He did quite a bit of talking about it. So I know Orvil Anderson was amazingly familiar with the entire plan.

Q: What did he say about the plan?

R: I remember he said it was very illogical, totally impractical and unrealistic.

Q: The plan?

R: I asked him what parts of it were unrealistic, and so forth, and he kept on talking.

Q: In other words, he didn't give you any satisfaction?

R: There was nothing to be gained.

Q: It is true that it's spilt milk, but you guys should have been elected as heroes.

R: No, none of us considered ourselves as that, and I'm sure they never did. We were very disgusted, and probably, our emotions were stronger than that, that they totally disregarded our plan. However, we did get a bit of satisfaction out of it because the Navy in their fleet maneuvers would always search out ahead 100 nautical miles, and the plane returned to the ship before dark. Somehow or other they became aware of this plan, and they started using that plan.

Q: But going out only 100 miles.

R: Not going out only 100 miles, but going out far enough to catch the hostile force.

Q: In other words, the Navy PBYs adopted your plan?

R: The Fleet did not use PBYs. They used either carrier aircraft, and usually carrier aircraft in their searches, but they modified the plan to suit the performance of their aircraft. It was very interesting. I heard a lecture by then Capt Red Rubel, later RADM, and he told of how they originated the plan. After the lecture was over with - I'd know Red for some time - I said: "Red, you big liar." He laughed and he said: "Well, you characters won't take credit for it. So why shouldn't we?"

Q: So he acknowledged that he had borrowed or lifted your plan?

R: There was a strong inference. He said: "You characters won't take credit for it."

Q: Were you aware of the 100 mile limitation which was said to have been imposed upon Air Corps planes. This was in 1938. Was it a real limitation?

R: Oh yes, indeed.

Q: Were you fellows told not to go out more than 100 miles?

R: Yes, indeed, without permission of the Navy.

Q: Do you remember, there was a MacArthur-Pratt agreement about 10 years before, 1931. They called it "paramount interest." The N vy was to have control of operations over water, and the Army had control of operations over land. So this was part of that plan, that you fellows going out 800 miles over water, were intruding on the Navy's mission. The Navy and War

Dept would never permit this kind of thing to happen. Remember what happened to the guys on the Rex, remember in 1938, the Rex mission?

R: Yes, that was not a happenstance. That is why we wanted to keep our plan as simple as possible - not put all of this airbase, divebombers, torpedo bombers, additional personnel, and stuff in there. Because, as Col Farthing said, the more words you give them, the more words they'll add. The more ammunition you give them to shoot you down with. So we kept it as simple as possible in order to get this basic concept of using the B-17s for search and attack. That was what we were interested in. And to repeat, if that had been approved, the use of B-17s for search and attack - then these other things would have fallen in place automatically.

Q: But you never felt that you ought to be justified, that the record ought to show that you fellows had thought of it first, and that Pearl Harbor happened exactly as you predicted, and that somebody ought to recognize your contribution?

R: Oh....

Q: Did you and Coddington talk about this?

R: Yes, also General Farthing. We talked about it. But, what would be gained? What useful purpose would be served?

Q: You were told in the 27 Nov '41 miessage that...

R: Any attack by the Japanese would be preceded by intensive and extensive sabotage.

Q: Was there any sabotage prior to the attack?

R: Not at all, not a bit of it.

Q: But the planes were set in revetments for sabotage?

R: We had no revetments.

Q: But they were huddled together?

R: We gathered them in as directed by the War Dept., close to the hangars. We parked them in very closely together, and lighted them at night with armed guards patrolling, as directed by the War Dept., for protection against sabotage.

Q: This made them easier targets for strafing and bombing?

R: Oh yes, much easier.

Q: You know, Arnold sent a message like that, too. There was one Arnold message that came in against sabotage. Of course, this was the belief, you see, that Hawaii was not a prime target for attack, but that the Philippines were. This is why the B-17s were just being shuttled through. In fact, Sgt. Lockhart, when he saw these blips on the screen, he thought they were the B-17s, and they were the Jzp Zeroes. Am I correct on that?

R: Oh, he didn't know what it was. He didn't know the B-17s were coming in.

Q: But I think the Lieutenant...

R: The LT. I've forgotten his name at the moment. He was a fighter pilot. The Navy was in control of all aircraft more than 100 miles offshore. We had to get information concerning these B-17s coming in through surreptitious channels. The Navy never did inform us officially that the B-17s were coming in. But we knew all about it. This LT telephoned and was told that it was probably the B-17s coming in. That was just the time they were expected. Everybody came in together.

Q: You know, my speculation is that Arnold or Marshall, or Arnold and Marshall, wrote some message, or some message was written by them to either Short or to Fred Martin, saying: "Forget about Pearl Harbor. It's not a prime target for attack, but the Philippines are." Something like that, which in the light of events at Pearl Harbor, would make them look very bad. And, I'm guessing now, that this message was expunged from the record.

R: If such a message were sent - of course, I was a Major at that time - sometime in the summer of 1941 I was moved up to be Operations Officer of what was later the Bomber Command, and was also acting as Intelligence Officer. If such a message came in, it was not there.

Q: Well, it could have been in a personal letter to Martin.

R: Anyone who had considered the conditions out there would have been quickly aware of the fact that the Navy in the Philippines were no particular threat to the Japanese. Whereas, the Fleet in Pearl Harbor in it's area was a

very great threat to the carriers and the battleships.

Q: We had 20/20 hindsight, all of us, including Arnold and Marshall, could reconsider our thoughts before.

R: You see, everybody was concerned in Europe. Of course, they speak our language, and I don't know of more than one or two people in the Pentagon at that time, and even later on, who was familiar with the Pacific area. They were quite startled at the distances. I talked to some of them, high ranking officers, and they just couldn't believe the distances in the Philippines.

Q: Do you remember when the RAINBOW FIVE war plan was published in the Chicago Tribune, three days before Pearl Harbor?

R: No,I was in Hawaii at the time.

Q: McNarney worked for Marshall. He couldn't tell you what happened on the AAF side of it. But, certainly, Arnold would not write to Fred Martin commenting on airplanes, without clearing this, or checking it through the War Dept. So Marshall would have been consulted on any letter Arnold wrote to Fred Martin, and if Marshall was consulted, he would have turned it over to McNarney. This makes me very curious as to McNarney's statement to Fred Martin: "Forget about it!"

R: No, no, he said, if we need any more information from you, we'll call you.

Q: "Don't call me, I'll call you." Is that what he said?

R: No, he said, if we need anything more from you, General Martin, we'll call you.

Q: In effect, he was saying: "Don't call me, I'll call you."

R: Justice Roberts on that Commission, he was a sick man.

Q: He was a sick man, but it seems to me that you fellows, who worked up this magnificent prophecy, would have wanted some vindication, if for only selfish reasons, for promotional purposes. You say, when you came to the Pentagon, you asked somebody what happened to the plan?

R: This was in the Spring of 1943. I mentioned this plan on the defense of Pearl Harbor, and this officer said that he was new.

Q: Do you remember his name?

R: Oh yes.

Q: Would you tell it?

R: No, he said that he had never seen the plan, but he had heard people talk about the plan. He couldn't remember who it was who talked about the plan, and he said, "Elmer, if I were you, I wouldn't mention the damn thing again."

Q: Did you ask him why?

R: No, because he was....

Q: Was he inferior to you?

R: Yes, he was in a position to know more of what was going on in the inner circles than I was, and I knew him well enough to respect his judgment.

Q: So you never brought it up again?

R: I did not.

Q: You mean the fact that they did nothing with your plan was embarrassing?

R: It arrived there probably in late August, I don't know. It required quite a bit of staff study. There weren't 180 planes available of any kind. We knew that, but that was our requirements in order to accomplish our mission.

Q: You weren't being selfish about this, trying to corner all the B-17s for the Hawaiian AF.

R: Of course not. We had a mission; we were charged with a mission, and the mission was with minimum requirements, for us to accomplish our mission. As Col Farthing stated, without this equipment, we cannot accomplish our mission.

Q: After giving you some, did they take some away?

R: Well, they sent us the first contingent. The 19th Bombardment Group came out in the late spring, early summer of 1941. Then, along in the summer, we got orders to send a wartime strength squadron of B-17s to the Philippines.

Q: This ties in with what I say. The Philippines was the critical area and Hawaii was not.

Roth, Marshall S. 29 Apr 72

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20910
May 24, 1979

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
14505A Club Villa Dr
Colorado Springs, CO 80908

Dear General Roth:

Congratulations to you and to the West Point Class of 1929. Off the top, I seem to recall that Larry Kuter and Rosey O'Donnell were members of that distinguished class.

It's kind of interesting to attend one of these reunions. We attended my wife's 40th from Dubuque (Iowa) H.S. last Summer. While there were obvious architectural changes in the faces and bodies of the graduates, the personalities did not change that much. For example, Bea pointed out the "class pill" who is now a minor league tycoon in Houston, Texas. When we were introduced and it was mentioned that we came from the Washington, D. C. area, he confronted me with: "What about that radical, communistic Washington Post?" He hasnt forgiven them for what they did to Richard Nixon. I declined to get into a hissing contest on that social occasion. In any event, I doubt anything I could have said would have persuaded him.

Anyway, hope you have a great reunion with no such unpleasantness.

On the subject of tracking down the source of that swell Knudsen story, I've rechecked my files. Evidently, I attributed this one as well as the other - "VORS ARE NOT VUN DIS VAY" that appeared in AF Magazine a couple of years ago. The Air University Review wishes to use this story which you say you've heard. Inasmuch as it gives no offense to anybody living or dead, could I impose upon you to accept source credit?

Would appreciate your reply in the enclosure. You wont be hearing from me for awhile. Bea and I are taking off for England on June 6.

Next time I write, I'll try to remember to fill you in on the "progress" being made on the Arnold Biography.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl: "The Unflappable Gen Knudsen"

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR UNIVERSITY (ATC)
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112

8 May 1979

Dr. Murray Green
1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring MD 20910

Dear Dr. Green

Thank you for your letter of 3 May. The article you describe about the 100-mile limit does seem interesting to me. Although I cannot make any commitment at this point, I would like to see it. As always, the shorter the better--within the bounds of necessary scholarship. The filler was interesting, too. May we have the citation for it?

Sincerely

David R. Mets

DAVID R. METS, Lt Colonel, USAF
Editor
Air University Review

P.S. Keep an eye open for supporting art work.

Dear Col Mets:

I am trying not to bite off more than I can digest in the short time. We have my son's wedding in Las Vegas to attend next week. He met his fiancee at Nellis AFB last year. He's now stationed in Korea (He's a Navigator on F-4's). When Mrs Green and I settle down, I am fat ready to leave for England and another family reunion early in June.

This is by way of saying I may not finish the 100-mile limit article for another month or so.

To answer your request for citation, my note card says the story was told me by my friend Marshall "Mickey" Rothrock of 280 Wrigley Dr

enclosed for the Hon. Arnold Kirkpatrick, I am writing
to ask [illegible] permission to cite them to
you. As suggested by [illegible] who was told me
the enclosed letter from [illegible] the anonymous staff officer
by General Paul Emrick, [illegible] Emrick was to be of
required to air the article [illegible] CIA official. Upon
[illegible] Opinion, and later a [illegible] this one [illegible] Emrick for
think you can use it. I'll write
permission to cite.

All good wishes

Sincerely

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112
HEADQUARTERS AIR UNIVERSITY (ATC)
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20904
May 13, 1979

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colo 80904

Dear General Roth:

Remember me? I'm the fellow working on a biography of Hap Arnold. Still grinding away and see light at the end of the tunnel.

Anyway, I've been doing some magazine work. Have a piece in the current Air University Review (March/April 1979) issue which I call the "Shasta Disaster: Forgotten Lesson in Interservice Relations". Have you seen?

The AUR editors were interested in a shortie about William Knudsen and asked me for a documentary citation. On my research card, I have your name, and so guess you told me this one. If you did, they will credit you.

Enclosed pls find self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

I havent been out to the Academy since my son graduated in 1975. He's now in Korea - Navigator on F-4s.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

TO:

SUBJECT:

6

THE UNFLAPPABLE GENERAL KNUDSEN

William Knudsen, acknowledged expert on mass production for Ford Motor Company, and later for General Motors, was brought on active duty during World War II, given a uniform with six stars, three on each shoulder, and virtual carte blanche to use his rank and authority to organize and speed up defense production. He preferred moral suasion and a native Danish sense of humor to achieve results.

During one of the recurring shortages of critical metals, Knudsen conferred with Secretaries Henry L. Stimson (War) and Frank Knox (Navy). They informed him that drastic cutbacks in weapons production would be necessary unless he came up with additional supplies of metals.

"It can't be as bad as all that," said Knudsen, as he pulled out a paper from his desk drawer. "I see here an order from the Army for 20,000 aluminum tables and 20,000 aluminum chairs." Secretary Stimson shifted uneasily in his seat while a self-righteous smile started to form on Secretary Knox's face. The General looked again at his paper and this time read from a Navy requisition for 300 brass cuspidors. "Can't the sailors spit out to sea," he asked?

++

Dear Murray,
I've heard this, but I did not tell it to you — don't know where it came from. Martha and I are leaving in a couple of hours for Chicago and New York. Hope to get to West Point for my 50th the end of the month. Hence this quick note. Nice to

hear from you.

Please note my new address – just east of the north entrance to the academy

M/Gen. Marshall S. Roth Ret.
14505A Club Villa Dr.
Colorado Springs, CO 80908

Sincerely

Mish Roth

P.S. Took seven days for your letter to get here

MISH ROTH

12 August 1972

Dear Murry Green,

Just received your letter along with the copy of the interview. I thank you very much.

In your letter you said that, speaking of Carroll, "He hasnt responded to either you or me----". I'm sorry, but I did write him and he answered my letter. I thought that I sent this letter on to you for I do not have it here. In his letter to me he said that he would be glad to talk to you about Arnold at almost any time. I sent him your address hoping that he would also contact you directly. Apparently he has not.

Since you are going to be in Denver shortly I suggest that you write him telling him of your plans and that you will contact him via phone when you get to Denver and make a date. You can tell him that I said he would talk to you----as per his letter to me.

I hope that you have excellent success.

Sincerely

Marshall J Roth

20314

10 August 1972

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt (J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colo 80904

Dear General Roth:

I'm pleased to make available to you a copy of our fine interview. It was meaty and lucid and I didnt make some mistakes as I often do, like tell the interviewee how much I know, instead of letting him frame it in his own way.

I've been making good progress on the book and now have Arnold approaching his flying career with some trepidation.

By next winter I shall be into the area where Franklin Carroll can help me. He hasnt responded to either you or me, and I'm disappointed.

It so happens I'll be coming out that way in two weeks. I have set up interviews with General Arnold's sister in law who lives in Denver, and his oldest boy, Hank, now retired from the Army as a Colonel, and residing in Wyoming.

I've left a day open at either end of the trip, just in case the unexpected happens. If you can think of a way to persuade General Carroll to give me an hour or two of his time, I would be grateful.

In any event, I appreciate what you have done for me.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History

Encl

Q: Arnold is supposed to have had pet likes and dislikes. He took a liking to a guy, and he really elevated him. Rosie O'Donnell and Norstad....

R: Yes, yes.

Q: Did this cause some resentment?

R: I guess the answer is yes. You've got to look at these guys, too. You can't just say Arnold just picked these men out. Well, you take Frank Carroll. He should have been promoted.

Q: He made two stars, didn't he?

R: Yes.

Q: Did he make it after Arnold's time?

R: Yes.

Q: Maybe this is why he hasn't corresponded?

R: There was resentment because the promotion frequency in the operating forces was much faster than it was in the technical field. And, yet, it wasn't

too bad in the technical field, either, if you take a look at it.

Q: This could be the reason that I have not heard from Carroll. Of course, he later got involved in that B-36 investigation.

R: Yes.

MISH ROTH

[about June 10]

Dear Frank,

Recently I had a visit from Dr Green who is composing the "Hap" Arnold story. He wanted to know what I knew about Hap. I found the interview very interesting and worthwhile.

He would like to talk to you about Hap and some of the interesting things that happened, and with which you were connected in one way or another, at the time. I'm sure you could give him an earful.

It does'nt make any difference whether you liked Hap or not—lots of people didn't as you know. But regardless of how you feel about the things he did, it all is part of the story Dr Green wants to tell.

He told me that he wrote you once and received no answer. I offered to try again. I am enclosing his last letter along with his address. He would like to hear from you.

Another couple of months and the football season will be upon us and I hope that I will see you at one of the games. Drop in for some refrshment.

Sincerely

MISH ROTH

Dear Dr Green

Enclosed is a copy of the letter I wrote Frank Carroll. I hope that it works.

Thank you for the copy of the Aerospace Historian. I've passed it along to a friend as I get it regularly.

In case you do not have Frank's present address its:

1107 Juniper Ave
Boulder Colorado 80302

I hope that I was in a small way helpful. But needless to say, I did enjoy metting you again.

Sincerely

20314

24 September 1971

Major General Franklin O. Carroll, USAF (Ret)
1107 Juniper Avenue
Boulder, Colorado 80302

Dear General Carroll:

I'm the fellow working on the biography of General Hap Arnold. I wrote you in June but did not hear from you. In the possibility the letter did not arrive, I'm writing again in the hopes that we could get together at some time convenient for you.

There is a likelihood that I would be out your way in November and would try to make it my business to visit Boulder to talk about my favorite subject, Hap Arnold.

I'm taking the liberty of sending a return envelope and would like to hear from you, one way or another. Many interviewees have advised me to be sure to see "Frank Carroll" on the Hap Arnold story. I am hopeful you will afford me this opportunity.

There was a sad item in the New York Times the other day. In case you missed it, I enclose a copy. I know you were associated with K.B. Wolfe in many an enterprise.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encls.

20314

26 May 1972

Maj Gen Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colo 80904

Dear General Roth:

Played back our tape and thought I captured a couple of good items about General Hap. Thanks again.

Just happen to have an extra copy of current Aerospace Historian. In case, you missed it....

In our conversation, you mentioned that you would contact Frank Carroll. It just so happens that I shall be coming out again in about two months. I sure would like to get a green light from him. Anything you can do will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Check Chidlaw on Jet - Whittle
per Craigie -

Craigie p. 17 Frank Carroll

Carroll
on Knick

Arthur Raymond Carroll - on p. 73
p. 2 for Doolittle ft

Chidlaw
+ Carrol

Jake Harmond
West Coast
Franklin Canoes

20314

24 April 1972

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colo 80904

Dear General Roth:

I'm glad to have your letter for more than one reason. My trip has been advanced a week to this coming weekend in order for me to make another key interview I had been planning for some time.

I'll be in on the courier Friday night, April 28th and would hope we could consummate your plan to meet at the Garden of the Gods Club this coming Saturday AM, April 29th at about 8:30 AM.

In any event, I shall phone you at about 7:30 AM, Saturday, and if it is convenient for you we can meet an hour later, or at any other time convenient for you.

I hope this change in plans has not caused you any trouble. I look forward to the opportunity to get together.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

done
4-29-72
Jake Vaman
West Coast

Dear Dr Green,

I have just returned from California and have your letter of April 4th. That is the day I left Colorado.

I plan on being here on May 6th. I think that it would be nice to hold the meeting either at the Officer's Club at the Academy or at the Garden of the Gods Club. The latter is just 20 minutes from the Academy.

To get there take the Interstate south to the Garden of the Gods road THEN towards the mountains to the end, turn left, and about 3/4 mile south there is a road that goes up the hill to the left and the Club is on your right at the top. I live nearby and I could meet you there.

If, on the other hand, you prefer the Officer's Club I can meet you there.

My telephone number is 473-4586. You might not get me on Friday night, but that's no problem for we are always up by six thirty and we can confirm the meeting place at that time.

Hope that I can be of some help to you.

Sincerely

Marshall S Balch

MJG. Marshall S. Balch (ret)
5304 Kissing Camel Dr., Apt. J-2
Colorado Springs, Colo. 80904

20314

4 April 1972

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80904

Dear General Roth:

I'm the fellow up to here in that Biography of General Hap Arnold. You'll recall that we missed connections last October when I came out.

Anyway, it looks right now that I will be coming out over the weekend of May 6/7. This is going to be a "quickie", but I can see my way clear to set up an appointment for Saturday AM, May 6th. If this time is convenient for you, I have in mind 9 AM or 9:30 AM. I figure 60 to 90 minutes ought to do it.

I hope to stay out at the VOQ at the Academy and would be renting a car. If this time is convenient, some general driving instructions would be helpful. I'm fairly familiar with Colorado Springs, having done quite a bit of driving in the area.

Also, your telephone number would be helpful. If my plane arrives in time, I might phone you Friday night, May 5th, at about 2100 to confirm.

I've been lucky to catch some of the top-notchers around the country who had dealings with General Hap. I talked to Elliott Roosevelt in Goulds, Florida, last month, and will be going up to N.Y.C. to see Lowell Thomas and Juan Trippe. On my last go-around in Fun City, I got to see Rickenbacker, de Seversky (who didnt like Arnold at all) and Dr. Howard Rusk.

Kind wishes,

20314

28 October 1971

Maj General Marshall S.Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80904

Dear General Roth:

My trip to Colorado Springs was moved up by a month. I had just left town when your letter arrived. However, I shall have other occasions to come out and will alert you in advance when I do. The opportunity to learn of your unique experiences with General Arnold is a great incentive for me to come back. I shall try to combine this mission with some other one on a later trip.

The changed schedule for the trip last week was occasioned by Maj General Hugh Knerr's dying request that I arrange to screen his historical papers now in Florida which he has endowed to the Air Force Academy. General Knerr passed away last night. He will be buried in Arlington Cemetery tomorrow.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

MAJOR GENERAL MARSHALL S. ROTH
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, retired

[Oct. 20, 1971]

November 20 1971

Dear Doctor Green,

I regret that this answer to your letter is so late, but I have been away since the date of your writing and just returned this last week-end.

Of course I shall be happy to spend any amount of time with you when you come out here next month providing that I can make some worthwhile contributions to the work you are doing in behalf of Air Force history.

I am not quite sure what I can contribute but I did have some interesting experiences with Genereal Arnold and I will attempt to recall some things of interest which may not be generally known.

Looking forward to your visit, I am

Sincerely

Marshall S. Roth

M/G. Marshall S. Roth (ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Dr., Apt. J-1
Colorado Springs, Colo. 80904

20314

24 September 1971

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5204 Kissing Camels Drive
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80904

Dear General Roth:

As you may know, I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and have been at it for a couple of years now. I moved over here after a quarter of a century in the Secretary's Office to work on this fascinating project. I was fortunate enough to obtain a Brookings Institution Fellowship which allowed me to work through the Arnold Manuscript Collection (about 90,000 documents) at the Library of Congress. While there I went into the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Andrews, Eaker, LeMay, Knerr, etc., Collections.

Of recent date, I have been interviewing some key AAF personalities who were associated with General Hap at various times during his colorful career in aviation stretching for nearly 40 years, from 1911 to 1950, when he passed away. I've talked to Generals Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, O'Donnell, Kuter, Kenney, Norstad, Cabell, Smart, K.B. Wolfe (who has just passed on), Jimmy Doolittle, and probably 100 others. Outside the regular Air Force, I have interviewed Hon. Robert Lovett, de Seversky, Charles Lindbergh, Jackie Cochran, Howard Rusk, and some other key people.

Needless to state, this is intended as a "warts and all" book, and will be published by Random House. Because of my association with the Air Force in an official capacity, I've waived any royalties. Most will go to Mrs. Arnold who, as you may know, could use the income.

While I appreciate the fact that you were junior during World War II, I've seen your name in the files. General Arnold was free-wheeling in his impatience to get things done, and it just may be that you had some interesting dealings with him. If so, I would be delighted to have an opportunity to reminisce with you for an hour or so when I come out to Colorado Springs late in November. I should mention that I have been out on an earlier trip and have been fortunate enough to talk with Generals Atkinson, Gerhart, Strother, Partridge, Chidlaw, Bob Lee and O.K. Niess. Oh yes, I visited General Rush Lincoln in Boulder, too.

If memory serves me, you and I had some association when you were in the Washington area some years ago - and they were all pleasant. In any event, I would appreciate hearing from you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

MAJOR GENERAL MARSHALL S. ROTH, USAF (RET'D)

Marshall Stanley Roth was born in Chicago, Illinois on April 18, 1904. After graduating from Northwestern Military and Naval Academy in Wisconsin in 1925, he entered the U. S. Military Academy, graduated on June 13, 1929 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Quartermaster Corps.

Assigned pilot training in September 1929, a year later General Roth was graduated from flying school and rated a pilot. He transferred to the Air Corps on December 11, 1930.

General Roth's first assignment as an Air Corps officer was as supply, mess and armament officer of the 55th Pursuit Squadron, with which he served successively at Mather Field, California. He returned to Randolph Field, Texas in July 1932 to become a flying instructor at the Air Corps Flying School.

Entering the Air Corps Engineering School at Wright Field, Ohio in August 1935, General Roth was graduated in June 1936, remaining at Wright Field in the Special Projects Section and later becoming Chief of the Alighting Gear Laboratory, Engineering Division. Appointed Chief of the Special Research and Development Section there in March 1939, in July 1942, General Roth was appointed Chief of the Fighter Branch in the Engineering Division.

From December 2, 1942 to January 8, 1943 General Roth served as an aeronautical engineer advisor to the Eighth Air Force in England. Returning to the United States in February 1943 he was named Chief of the Aircraft Project Section, Engineering Division, at Wright Field, From November 1, 1943 to February 1944 General Roth had temporary duty in the Southwest Pacific, China-Burma-India and European theaters as an aeronautical engineer advisor to the Fifth, Fourteenth, Tenth, Ninth, Fifteenth and Eighth Air Forces.

Named Acting Chief of the Technical Staff, Engineering Division at Wright Field, Ohio in March 1944, a year later General Roth entered the Army-Navy Staff College, from which he was graduated in August 1945.

Going overseas in September 1945 to assume command of the 375th Troop Carrier Group in Japan, the following January he became Commander of the 317th Troop Carrier Group and Tachakawa Army Air Base, Japan.

OVER

Don Keirn
Ben Kelsey
Lawrence Craigie
Benny Meyers

Returning to the United States, in March 1947 General Roth was named Chief of the Guided Missiles Section, Air Materiel Command Headquarters, Wright Field, Ohio. He entered the National War College in August 1948, was graduated in June 1949 and appointed Deputy Director of Research and Development at Air Force Headquarters, with additional duty as Chief of the Engineering Division. In January 1951 he became Assistant for Development Programming in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Development at Air Force Headquarters.

Joining the Air Defense Command in August 1953, the General was named Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel at ADC Headquarters, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, becoming Chief of Staff for ADC on November 21, 1956.

Assigned to Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D. C. on June 14, 1957, General Roth was designated Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

General Roth retired from active Air Force duty on July 31, 1957.

His decorations include the Legion of Merit. He is rated a command pilot and technical observer.

General Roth and his wife, the former Miss Martha Rathje, have two sons, William Edward and Robert Seven.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) October 1, 1934; to captain (permanent) June 13, 1939; to major (temporary) March 21, 1941; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) January 23, 1942; to colonel (temporary) June 22, 1942; to major (permanent) June 19, 1946; to colonel (permanent) April 2, 1948; to brigadier general (temporary) December 22, 1950; to brigadier general (permanent) October 27, 1954; to major general (temporary) October 27, 1954; to major general (permanent) July 31, 1957.

END

Up to date as of September 1957

Marshall Rose

20314

24 June 1971

Major General Franklin O. Carroll, USAF (Ret)
1107 Juniper Avenue
Boulder, Colo. 80302

Dear General Carroll:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and have come across your name in several contexts associated with General Arnold's dealings with Wright Field. Perhaps I should mention that I'm a professional historian and have been connected with the Secretary's office for nearly 25 years. Only recently, I moved over to the Office of the Historian to develop my material and put full time in on it.

In between the cracks, so to speak, in the documents, are the things that happened that never got written down. To this end, I've had the privilege of interviewing most of the Air Force greats, including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Norstad, Kuter, Kenney and perhaps 100 others. I also interviewed Generals Billy Streett and "Pre" Cabell before they passed away, which was recently, as you may know.

In fact, I was in Boulder over a year ago to talk to General Rush Lincoln. I didn't then know you were in the same city.

In any event, I'll be coming back the first week in September. I hope to arrange my schedule to permit a visit to Boulder from Colorado Springs, where I shall be most of the time. If you expect to be in town at that time, I'll try to fix it so I can come up to Boulder.

Of course, I would be particularly interested in any contacts you had with General Arnold, good and bad. This is to be a "warts and all" biography published by Random House.

I have a long standing note to mention Pete Croker and Jim Monroe to you. I know them and have worked with Col. Monroe on PsyWar problems.

I would be pleased to hear from you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Spec. Assistant to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

Encl
Saw K. B. Wolfe

GEN. K. B. WOLFE, B-29'S DEVELOPER

Leader of Bomber Program in World War II Is Dead

Sept 22 1971

Special to The New York Times

SOLANO BEACH, Calif., Sept. 21 — Lieut. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe, Air Force, retired, who directed the development and production of the B-29 bomber in World War II, died yesterday at his home here after a brief illness. He was 75 years old.

Began Career in 1918

General Wolfe's career took in 33 years of service with the Air Force, followed by 15 years as a top-ranking business executive.

He was born in Denver on Aug. 12, 1896, and began his military career as a flying cadet in 1918. At his retirement in 1951 he had risen to the rank of lieutenant general.

He had many assignments in the uneasy peace that was maintained in the years between 1918 and 1941, when this country entered World War II.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, General Wolfe was named assistant chief of the production division of the Air Matériel Command at Wright Field, Ohio. He later became chief of the division.

The development of the Boeing B-29, the giant bomber that was to drop the atomic bomb on Japan, was the assignment given to him. He was ordered to expedite production when output was lagging and the big planes were badly needed.

The global bomber made its first test flight on Sept. 21, 1942, without a blueprint for the plane as a whole. The plans were made after a completed plane took off and stayed aloft for as long as its pilot wanted.

3 Planes L[illegible] in '43

By early 1943 three experimental planes were ready. However, on Feb. 18 a disaster almost wrecked the bomber program. The first B-29 crashed into a packing-company plant at Seattle, killing 14 persons on board, including Edmund T. Allen, Boeing's long-range bomber expert. Besides Mr. Allen, the entire flight-test crew perished.

U.S. Air Force, 1950

Lieut. Gen. Kenneth Wolfe

With the loss, the situation seemed hopeless. For five months hardly any progress was made until General Wolfe initiated a plan—get the planes into production and then train men to fly them and fight with them by simulating their operation in B-17's and B-24's.

The B-29 was known as the Superfortress, the B-24 as the Liberator and the B-17 as the Flying Fortress. The B-29, at the time the most complicated piece of flying machinery in the world, cost $1.5-million.

As the B-29's began to be produced in quantity, General Wolfe followed through as commander of the first B-29 combat group, striking at Japan from bases in India and China.

Led 5th Air Force

Following an interim period as commanding general of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, he was named Chief of Staff for the Fifth Air Force, at Okinawa, and later commanded that organization during the occupation of Japan.

When he retired from the Air Force in 1951 he was deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, for the Air Force.

After his retirement, he became president of the Oerlikon Tool and Arms Company. In 1956 he joined the Garrett Corporation in Los Angeles as a vice president. In 1963 General Wolfe was elected senior vice president and a director and in 1966 he retired from Garrett but continued to serve as a consultant.

General Wolfe leaves his wife, Margaret, and a daughter, Mrs. Beverly Chickering of Longwood, Fla.

A funeral service is planned for Friday at Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Va.

N.Y. Times
9-22-71

9 Sept 1974

Maj General Marshall S. Roth, USAF (Ret)
5304 Kissing Camels Drive (Apt J-1)
Colorado Springs, Colo 80904

Dear General Roth:

Just got back from an eight-week, 24-interview trip. I got to see Colonel Leonard "Jake" Harman in Laguna Hills, California. He was deeply involved in the B-29 program, and seems to be the man I had in mind when I wrote you.

And now, I wonder who the fellow in Independence, Mo. could be.

Incidentally, I interviewed Harman on 2 August, so it couldnt be that he moved since you wrote. It's a bit confusing.

Work on the book is moving. Appreciate your help.

Best Regards,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

MISH ROTH

22 July 1974

Dear Dr Green,

Just got word that "Jabe" Harman's Address Is:

12129 Shady Bend Drive

Independence Mo. 64052

I hope that this is not too late for you on this next trip west.

Sincerely

Maurice Roth

Q: Do you recall the first time you met Hap Arnold?

R: I don't believe I do. I was at Wright Field for so many years and he used to come out there quite frequently. The Commander out there at the time was Oliver P. Echols, and my particular boss was Lawrence Craigie. Craigie headed up the Aircraft Projects Section. At that time I had the Fighter Branch under the Aircraft Project Section, interested in the development of new fighters.

Q: I've talked to Craigie, Kelsey and Keirn.

R: Oh, you have? Don J. Keirn.

Q: Yes.

R: Kelsey is my brother-in-law.

Q: Oh really? You know, he is a big time farmer in Stevensburg, Va. I was there. He was in overalls, and had this big farm hat. I didn't realize that.

R: His sister is my wife's sister. His wife is my wife's sister. He's a very interesting fellow.

Q: Anyway, Hap Arnold....

R: He used to come out quite frequently. In view of your visit, I've been trying to recollect some of the things that happened. Arnold always used to come out with an aide, and I can't remember the aide's name.

Q: Beebe?

R: No, it wasn't Gene Beebe.

Q: Horace Shelmire? The fellow with a moustache?

R: No, that doesn't ring a bell either.

Q: Toward the end of the war?

R: No, during the early part of the war. I can't remember who it was. But Gen Arnold always went to see Echols, and the aide would always run off. And the aide would always contact the fellow that was in charge of the project which Arnold wanted to discuss, and he'd always get ahold of the Project Officer. Arnold never wanted to talk to anyone in between. He never asked Echols about this airplane or that airplane, maybe in a casual way. But when it got down to what he

wanted to know; when was it going to be ready? How much was it going to cost? Why isn't it ready 9 months ahead of time? Or 6 months ahead of time? He was very, shall I say, pushy - is that the right word? Demanding, on getting things done. He would always talk directly to the Project Officer because he figured that that's the guy that knew more of the details about what was going on. This is what he was after. At that time, I had the Fighter Branch. Under those conditions, I talked to him on frequent occasions.

Q: What projects did you talk about?

R: Well, we were building a group of airplanes at that time, like the XP-54, XP-55 and XP-56. They were all pushers....

Q: That's with the prop in the back?

R: Prop in the back, yes. We developed those purely for aerodynamic reasons. But he always used to say: "You're not going to get any one to fly it." And he was exactly right, because you couldn't convince a pilot to jump out of a cockpit with that type propeller which Arnold referred to as a meat chopper - to jump out of that airplane with that thing behind you. So he said, he told us at that time: "You've got to solve that problem." Well, we did solve the problem, because we had various devices. When your seat was released, the escape seat - they all had them on at that time - spring loaded, the same release would release the prop, would throw the prop off. So the prop would be out of the way, and they were all equipped that way.

Q: They never panned out - the P-54, P-55, P-56?

R: No, no, the P-54 was built by Vultee. That's another story on that one because he, I'll mention it in a minute. The P-54 built by Vultee was a big airplane. It was too big for a fighter. Arnold was basically a small airplane man. P-55 was by Curtiss Wright. I think one of those crashed, and they only built two. And the P-56 they built one of. That was completed and flown, that was Northrop's. That was the flying wing fighter with an R-2800 engine in it, but he would have no part of it. Going back to the P-54, he came out there one day, just after I had flown the thing from the Vultee plant to Wright Field. He came out just a few days after and took a look at it, and he said: "Where is the

turbosupercharger?" If you remember, at that time, the Navy was in two-stage, two-speed compressor engines, and the AF was 100%, and Arnold was pushing for turbosuperchargers. He thought that was the answer, and I think it was. We took the airplane back, and put turbosuperchargers on it, and only increased the weight about 2,000 or 3,000 pounds, and it really spoiled the airplane, because it was too heavy with the extra weight on it. It had to be made a little longer, etc. But that's not the reason it was dropped. The reason it was really dropped was because people were not going to fly with that fan behind them. But it was an interesting experience.

Q: Was the fact that the P-51 had come into its own the last year of the war, and the fact that you also had the jet coming into being....

R: The jet was in the picture, and we didn't think it was in time, and it wasn't, but the P-51 was an excellent airplane, and admittedly the P-54, P-55 and P-56 and the P-77 would not have fitted into that picture at all, anyway

Q: The improvement over the P-51 was not great enough to warrant going into a new type?

R: No, no, it was too big an airplane for this type of thing they wanted. And they were looking forward to Pacific operations, and of course, the European operations.

Q: I suppose you felt you could not foreclose any possibility of research?

R: Well, these were research airplanes, in large extent. The P-55 was Canard-type, with the empennage out front, and that was sort of, none of them had previously been real successful. Although the SR-71 is a Canard type. He had another airplane, though, that he was very much interested in, and that was the P-77. This was Arnold's, and they used to call it "Hap's 444." Maybe you noticed, or picked it up. Everything was 4. It was supposed to weigh 4,000 pounds, go 400 mph, go to 40,000 feet, carry 4 guns, 4,000 rounds of ammunition. Everything had a four in it, and it was sort of known as "Hap's 444 airplane." It was originally built by Bell and it was a little one, a real small one. You could just barely get a man into it. And it was made all in wood. Bell

Aircraft built it. They built three, and it was a pretty fancy, little airplane. But it was unsatisfactory for major conflict. It was too small, but the philosophy behind it was to have thousands of them built, a little like the Hughs transports, you know. They were going to build just hundreds of these and move troops all over. Of course, it was Hughes. But there were so many of these to be involved. They were going to have a squadron of maybe 50 or 60 or 100 of them, just like Mosquitoes all over. That fell by the board. Not because it didn't fly nice, etc. But we had to have more, just more firepower on those little airplanes. The engines were a problem. They were Offenhauser racing engines, two of them tied together. They are still building engines, Offenhauser is dead, but they are still building them.

Q: And Arnold had a special interest?

R: He had a special interest in this because it was a numbers racket at that time. He used to call us every once in a while: "How's that getting along?" We said: "Well, it is doing all right."

Q: Did he call you personally?

R: No, he used to call Bill Craigie. Bill and I would get on the phone. I don't know whether Bill was actually there when it finally came out, because I relieved Bill Craigie as Chief Project Officer. At that time, the trainers and the bombers and so on.

Q: I talked to him out at Burbank, and I don't remember it coming up.

R: When Bill left, I relieved him. But he had special interest in beginning, in getting these things done. Arnold always went to the man. He'd check you too; he would call the contractor. Sometimes we wondered why, he, in his position, when he had so many things on his mind, so many problems, that he would take a personal interest in a particular airplane. For instance, the helicopter. Frank Gregory, I don't know if you have ever talked to Gregory. He wrote the book, "Anything A Horse Could Do."

Q: I've heard of his name. Is he still around?

R: He's in Tulsa, lives in Tulsa. I don't remember who he works for down there, but he's in Tulsa. Well, he was the Project Officer on helicopters,

and of course, he had a Sikorsky airplane, or helicopter, coming out. They were going to fly it. Arnold and Echols and Frank Gregory and "Ski"(?) Omstead, who was the head chief pilot, test pilot at Wright Field, were standing out on the line, and Frank, the Sikorsky pilot was demonstrating this helicopter. They didn't fly too well at that time because the controls were slow and somewhat reversible, and so forth. But this fellow did a marvelous job of demonstrating this helicopter, and he set it down on a quarter out in the middle of the runway. Arnold didn't say one word. He just turned around and walked away. And he said: "It's a damn lie." We asked him later, why he, what he was referring to. And he said: "Just can't believe it!" But he used the words "Its a damn lie."

Q: It was just incredible.

R: Just incredible, well the way it happened..He was interested in that type of thing, he was not a technician or an engineer in the way he approached it.

Q: Was he sort of a gadgeteer, sort of interested in these new things?

R: He got into things like that. I think I would call him a "gadgeteer," not in his own right. But he would foresee or have knowledge of how to accomplish s omething. But when somebody else made a gadget, he was tremendously interested in it.

Q: I know there are many, many things that people sold him on that didn't turn out, explosive pencils, etc.

R: Oh yes, this is true. We were in a position, during the war, of trying to keep ahead of the state of the art, of trying to build new things, and whatnot. A good engineer could sit down and convince you of almost anything, except you could never convince me that we could go to the moon. As a matter of fact, I sold out. But a lot of these things were good ideas. There were funds available to put some of these ideas in. Arnold, sometimes, would say: "All right, go ahead." And then you would go back and tell your boss, who didn't like it anyway, and say: "I talked to Gen Arnold," and Arnold would talk to him, Gen Arnold said: "We ought to take a look at this."That changed the whole picture.

Q: When he said, go ahead, did he refer this back to a committee, or a

group, or was it simply his own say so, his own judgment?

R: Well, it was basically his own judgment.

Q: Did he follow up on these things? Did he call?

R: Most of them he did.

Q: Personally?

R: Well, no, not personally, but every once in a while you would get a blurb out of Washington that would say: "Gen Arnold would like a report on this." I never thought that he was very much of a reporter, as far as supplying data of what went on into Washington. He wanted a short, sweet, concise report on one subject. He didn't want these, say like: "I want a report every two weeks." And then you'd get stuck, get the paperwork going. He wasn't that type.

Q: When you replaced Craigie as Chief of the Fighter Branch, did Arnold start calling you up?

R: Yes, he'd always call me. He called me one night, I might add, at home. He was a great friend of Don Douglas, Sr. North of San Francisco there is a club, name of which slips my mind.(Note: Bohemian Groves?) He called me one night, and I don't know whether I was in bed or not, but I wasn't too alert, I think. But he said: "I want you to go over the Aircraft Program" - this included the fighters at that time - and he said: "I want $10 million taken out of that development program." What do you say, you know. I said: "Yes, sir." At that time, Frank Carroll, was Chief of Development up there. Frank Carroll lives up there in Boulder.

Q: I've been trying to get to see him but he has never answered me. Do you contact him?

R: I see him at the ball games. He comes down to the AF Academy ball games.

Q: I wrote him twice and he never answered me.

R: He looks fine.

Q: Good shape?

R: Yes, real good shape.

Q: I thought perhaps he was ill.

R: No, no, he's in good shape. But, I went to Frank Carroll the next morning and said I had a telephone call last night from Gen Arnold: "What did he want?" Well, I said: "He just wants $10 million taken out of this program". Carroll: "What for?" I said: "They are going to start a new organization which is a subsidiary of the Douglas Company, and they really have got a lot of people out there in this organization to do some research and development thinking." Well, this was the RAND Corporation that was cooked up by Arnold and Douglas.

Q: Was a fellow named Ed L. Bowles in it?

R: Dr. Bowles, is he from Stanford or MIT?

Q: MIT.

R: Yes.

Q: I talked to him in Massachusetts. He claims the major share of the credit for setting RAND up, and selling that to Arnold.

R: Well, he may have been up there, I don't know.

Q: You don't remember him in that picture?

R: Yes, he was in the picture, yes. He had, I can't remember the year...

Q: Late 1945. The war was over.

R: Yes, I guess it was. During that summer or the following summer, Douglas Company rented a lot of houses along the beach out there, and they brought in a lot of wonderful talent from the different universities, the people that were on sabbatical leave for 3 or 4 months. They worked in the building which was right across the street from the Douglas Company. That was the original RAND building. They started working on all kinds of different projects, they had aerodynamist people, and then they had a bunch of geologists for one reason I will never know. But they were studying the construction of runways in various parts of the world. It was interesting but personally, at that time, I thought it was just a hell of a waste of money, because they were paying pretty good salaries to these philosophers and doctors, whatnot, that were on sabbatical leave. But that was sort of the beginning of the RAND group.

Q: Arnold had this great vision that, instead of going back, like the Army

would go back to the arsenals, and the Navy would go back to the shipyards, and the in-house research, that he would try to latch on permanently to the greatest brains in the world on a postwar basis. It was a marvelous idea.

R: He's a little bit like Tom McDonnell of McDonnell Aircraft. When he thinks that somebody in these US knows something, and he wants to know what it is, he'll have no restriction in getting that guy to help him. This is, of course, what made McDonnell a strong organization.

Q: Anyway, you got this telephone call from Arnold, and that was the beginning.

R: Beginning of RAND. He and this group, I don't know who was there besides Douglas and Gen Arnold.

Q: Was Frank Collbohm in it?

R: Collbohm was the head of it. Frank was put in charge of the operation. He was the so-called manager, I guess, I don't know whether he hired the people or not, but set up the buildings. He did all that, I never knew what happened to Frank Collbohm.

Q: I interviewed him, he's out in Huntington Beach.

R: For a long period of time we didn't know what RAND was. But Bowles at that time, I think headed up the scientific group.

Q: Yes, he was sort of perhaps Arnold's honcho, if that is the correct word.

R: Yes, the other fellow involved in that was a fellow by the name of Stark Draper. Draper was head of the electronics group there at MIT, and he and Leighton Davis were the ones who put the electronics on the old Norden bombsight, and made the fancy bombsight on it.

Q: Going back to your experience with Arnold when you became head of the Fighter Branch. When he called you up, or did he call up frequently?

R: No.

Q: Did he ever bawl you out?

R: Yes, he did. I remember he was just madder than hell about something. I think it was probably my fault, because I'd told him we were going to have this airplane on such and such a date. We didn't get it.

Q: Do you remember which airplane it was?

R: It was either the P-54, P-55, P-56 or P-77 and the P-61 was involved, the Black Widow. I remember, it was late, and we didn't get it. There was something wrong here, and we had engine trouble, etc. He said: "Well, if you can't do it, I'll get somebody who can." You know, that type of thing. I think it was probably true because he would get exasperated at delays. Everything had to be done the day before yesterday. Maybe that's where that expression came from.

Q: In this case, you mention he bawled you out on the telephone. Did he ever bawl you out in person?

R: No, no.

Q: He had a penchant for grabbing people in the hall of the Pentagon?

R: Oh yes.

Q: And sending them on missions. Did you ever hear about this?

R: Yes, I've heard many stories on that, I can't recall any specific one. But I know that was true, because when I would be in Washington, I would go in to see somebody. "Where is so and so?" I was told: "I don't know where he is. Arnold sent him somewhere." And Arnold would do that, even though it was not in the man's own field of endeavor.

Q: And the guy couldn't pass it off to somebody?

R: No, he had to do it. One time, I think it was about 4:00 in the afternoon or 5:00 - probably 2 PM or 3:00 in the afternoon in California. The phone rang, and we were....I can't remember this airplane either because it was a Douglas Co. He said: "I want you out there." I had been head of the Project Branch, and they were building a bomber out there, a 26 or something. And he said: "I want you out here tomorrow morning at 7:00." This was creating a problem because how do you get out there. So I picked up Eddie Perrin who was in the Power Plant Lab.

Q: Was this before he came into Arnold's shop?

R: Oh yes.

Q: He became Deputy.

R: Oh yes, I know. I picked up Eddie Perrin, and Eddie and I got up and went down to get an airplane to go out to the West Coast. Olmstead, who was head of the Flying Branch there, he said: "We don't have any airplanes." So I said: "Well, I've got to get out there." He said the only thing we have is a C-45, or something like that. It was a little Lockheed, which looked like the...I can't remember, C something, a little one, two engine. I said: "This is fine, but I've never flown the damn thing." And Olmstead said: "Well, they all fly alike. You pull the stick back, and it goes up." Eddie Perrin and I matched to see who would fly the thing out after looking at the guages, and we flew in. We got into March Field the next morning about 3:00 AM.

Q: Was Arnold out at March Field?

R: No, Arnold was at Douglas Company. So we got in there about 3 AM. The next morning, we got up to fly into Los Angeles. It was full of fog. But Arnold wanted us at 8:00 the next morning at the Douglas plant. We got a car and drove in there, and I think when we got there, the problem had all been solved, and it wasn't any reason. But he wanted us out there so he could talk about this airplane. I think it was the A-26, Douglas Company. I'll tell you somebody that he really liked, though, that was Kelly Johnson.

Q: He's the one that designed the SR-71 and U-2?

R: Yes.

Q: He liked Kelly Johnson?

R: Yes, he thought the world of Kelly Johnson.

Q: Is he around?

R: Oh yes. He's Vice President at Lockheed. There was - the real start of that, the P-80, was started by Kelly Johnson and myself. There is an argument about who started this damned thing. But Arnold was down at Eglin Field, and there was some kind of a demonstration going on, and Kelly Johnson was there, and Kelly Johnson and Arnold and a group of us were talking about jet aircraft, and the P-60, the first jet that was built with the....

Q: P-59.

R: P-59, which was just getting going out at Muroc, and they brought

the engines over, Ralph Swofford was the man.

Q: He's in Montgomery, Alabama.

R: He was the project officer on that airplane. We got to talking about the airplane and Kelly said: "Hell, I can build a better airplane than that in 8 months." This, as I say, Arnold liked Kelly Johnson. So Arnold said, why don't you build one. Kelly said: "Who's going to pay for it?" Well, that brought me into the picture because Kelly wanted to talk to the R&D people at Wright Field. And so, he came up and we had quite a go-round about getting engines for it, and all that sort of thing, and the GE engine was due out. Kelly went to work on that one, and that thing just leapfrogged and he had that - Kelly's think tank - or whatever it is, they build the airplanes right next to where they were drawing them.

Q: Skunk works.

R: Yes, Skunk Works. And that thing flew on time, and that was quite a good show.

Q: This is probably one of the reasons Arnold highly regarded Kelly Johnson, because he met his deadlines?

R: Well, that's one reason, but Kelly you see, was also in the P-38 business, too, with Lockheed. He did a lot of work on that, did most of the work I guess on the P-38.

Q: It would be interesting to try to get to talk to him. I didn't know that Arnold and he were close.

R: Yes, Arnold had great respect for Kelly, because you know, Kelly used to talk right back.

Q: Really?

R: Oh, yes. He's a real tough Irishman, awfully nice guy, but when he thinks he's right....

Q: He's not intimidated?

R: Arnold couldn't change his mind one single bit. This is what he would do; this is what he could do.

Q: Let me ask you. Were a lot of people intimidated by Arnold?

R: I would say yes. Arnold would say this is what I want, and lot of people wanted to think of whether it could be done or not. There were mental processes. They'd start out: "Well, gee, can we do this?" And this is fine. But, if you gave him an answer: "Yes, we will do it." Well, Arnold wouldn't believe you, really, because he thinks you are going to be a yes man. And if you hesitated, and sort of argued with him, then he would get madder than hell. So you were between the devil and the deep blue. You had to be what you say be tactful with it, and say: "Well, I think there is a possibility there, and we will really work on it," this he would accept. But you couldn't argue that you can't do it, and you couldn't say "yes" right off the bat, he wouldn't accept either answer.

Q: I was told one of the things that infuriated Arnold was somebody who said: "Leave it to me, I'll take care of it, General." If something went bad, and Arnold called a man in for a report on it, he wanted to know what went wrong and when it was going to be fixed. If a man gave him a stall, or tried to put him off with something like: "Leave it to me, General; I'll take care of it," this, according to one of the people I interviewed, this would infuriate Arnold. He felt that he was being put off.

R: Left out of the picture?

Q: Yes. Was his wrath monumental? I mean when he got angry, did he splutter or was he articulate?

R: No, I think he was sort of articulate in that respect. But, if you are referring to a man getting red faced and furious, I would say "no." I think he was too calm for that.

Q: I have been told that Arnold "shot from the hip" oftentimes. Did he ever make unfair judgments in this sense. He made a lot of judgments. Obviously some of them were impulsive. But did he think through some of these things beforehand, or did he shoot from the hip?

R: Well, if we take this P-77, just as an example, I think he shot from the hip on that. I think that when everything had to be 4,000 feet, 4,000 rounds, 4,000 this and that, that was a shot from the hip, because I don't think anyone

could meet the requirements. No one could. We can't do it today. But I think that was just a shot in the dark. Now, he may have been told that this could be done. Larry Bell may have told him this, that we could build this many airplanes.

Q: They were very close? Larry Bell and Arnold?

R: Yes, I think they....

Q: Not quite as close as Douglas and Arnold?

R: No, no, I think that the Douglas people....

Q: Arnold's son married Douglas' daughter.

R: Yes.

Q: The middle son. I see Bruce often.

R: He was also fond of Jack Northrop, because Jack Northrop was very quiet, and never got excited. Jack was just too damned honest, really. Jack Northrop is one of the most honest guys in the world. If something went wrong with the airplane, it was personally Jack's fault. Jack said: "We'll take care of it." Well, financially, this wasn't good from a business point of view, to take care of all these things, because they weren't all his fault.

Q: One of the projects was that B-35, the Flying Wing. That never really worked out.

R: No, the jet engine spoiled it, in my opinion. When we had the four engines, the four propellers on the back, of reciprocating type engines, the gyroscopic action of these four propellers back there had a stabilizing effect on the flying wing. Wherein when you put the jets on, you lose that stabilizing gyroscopic effect. It then became unstable. The damned thing tumbled, which it did.

Q: Do you think that Arnold gave Douglas preference, in a sense, that is, because of their friendship, Douglas was favored? Did he ever lean towards Douglas in making a procurement decision that perhaps he would not have done if they were not such close friends?

R: I don't think so, because he had, Larry Bell was a close friend, Jack Northrop was a close friend. He got along very well with the powers that be.

Q: Kindelberger?

R: And Dutch, of course, he liked, I don't think that he was....

Q: In other words, Douglas had to work for every contract?

R: Douglas had to work the same as the rest of them. Now when it came to the establishment of RAND, this is something else again. This may have been a group of people, who were up at the club, and they got to talking and he was convinced that this was the right thing to do, and Douglas said: "Well, I'll supply the building," and this is the way it may have gotten started. You can't quote me on that, I don't know. Maybe Douglas was, you see, Douglas had a lot of good engineers up there.

Q: Drew Pearson didn't like Arnold for some reason.

R: Drew Pearson didn't like a lot of people.

Q: On one or two occasions he made such an insinuation that Douglas got preferences that he was not otherwise entitled to.

R: I wouldn't accuse him of that. Of course, the only funds that I had available in the Aircraft Project Section were those that were for R&D, and we spread that out pretty much.

Q: Arnold was very fond of Benny Meyers. Why?

R: Because Benny Meyers could get things done the way Arnold wanted them done. I've got to correct that. He could get the end result that Arnold wanted, out of Benny Meyers, regardless of how Benny Meyers did it. When we were building some of these airplanes in the production, there was an outfit by the name of, built generators. They ran out of generators, and they couldn't get generators, things like that...

Q: Is this for the B-29?

R: Yes, and so Benny Meyers went to Jack & Heintz. Jack was quite the playboy type of guy. He would come down with these very fancy clothes on, golf suits. He and Meyers were fairly close. But Jack & Heintz were paying tremendous salaries. The secretary was getting $20,000 a year, something like that. They were spending this money pretty well. Anyway, they got results out of it, until Jack couldn't get castings. So Benny set up this little organization down there,

and they had the castings made. He wasn't exactly the President, but Meyers was running it. Knudsen was there, and Benny was the boss and Knudsen was the Assistant. Knudsen was quite a guy, I thought. I thought that Benny Meyers was all right, too, really. When the war broke out on the 7th of December, the telephones rang, and all hell broke loose. Benny Meyers had to go to Washington right away, immediately, to get some airplanes. The President at the time wanted 25,000 or something like that. Benny Meyers had already ordered the damned things by telephone, without one damn bit of authority. Arnold liked that type of operation, and decorated the guy, you know.

Q: He did it himself. You know, Arnold in one instance that I recall well, yes. Benny Meyers was sort of cut in that pattern. You know, when Benny Meyers got in trouble, he tried to enlist Arnold's sympathy, and he almost did. Arnold had drafted a letter of support, but it didn't get sent out, for the probable reason that somebody called Arnold who was in retirement, and told him Benny was in trouble with this company, Bleriot LaMarre, the company. He was fooling around with the guy's wife, and he had this company in his pocket, and he was giving him subcontracts. Do you remember that one?

R: ....Snow White, who was a girl, was Benny Meyers secretary.

Q: Wasn't she married to the President of this little company?

R: Yes, but the President was the guy who owned the gas station in town.

Q: He set this guy up. He couldn't resist the temptation of a couple of dollars?

R: There was a great conflict of interest there.

Q: Benny Meyers always rode around in Cadillacs and always lived very well. Mrs. Arnold told me people thought he was just smart and made money in the stock market.

R: He did, that's where he made his money. Knudsen was sitting there as his Assistant.

Q: Even though he outranked Meyers?

R: Yes. Actually, Knudsen was given that title as a management expert.

Q: How did Knudsen and Arnold get along?

R: Well, I don't know. Arnold put him there.

Q: He wasn't much of a General, but he was a great production man?

R: He was a great production guy. That's why he was there. I might throw a little something in here. It doesn't have anything to do with it. But one of the things that I quote to my son and a few other people once in a while about Knudsen. It hasn't really got the bearing on Knudsen so much as it has on McNamara. But they brought 10 people down to the Ford Company - 10 apostles or whatever you call them - and the spokesman for this group was McNamara.

Q: He was a LTCOL, probably, wasn't he?

R: Yes, I think something like that. Anyway, they had a big group in there and they were working out on the logistic plans for the North African invasion. They had figured out down to the last nut and bolt what supplies were needed in North Africa, so many rations, so many rounds of ammunition, so many trucks and so many gallons of gasoline. They had it down. One of the things that came up real strong was the fact that we were sending enough stuff for the whole AAF contingent that was going over there. And McNamara always discounted about 5% for casualties. Then our philosophy was send it over. Give them all the gasoline and trucks and airplanes that they can possible use and never limit it, because of the possible casualties. Well, we were in the office one day with Benny Meyers, Knudsen and a whole group of us. I guess maybe 15, 20 of us. McNamara was supposed to put on this briefing for Meyers on how they were going to operate this logistics situation. He went through, and somebody asked him: "Well,"McNamara said: "With air cover and the Navy, we shouldn't lose any." And old Knudsen leaned back - and I can just see him today - he leaned back and in his Norwegian accent, he said: "Mr. McNamara, vors aren't von this vay."

Q: McNamara was a disciple of using the last bullet in the last gun, on the last day of the war?

R: That's correct.

Q: So they would have no surplus?

R: That's exactly correct. He had it all figured out on a computer or something. He didn't have computers. He really had a brilliant, really sharp mind.

Q: Tex Thornton was in there, wasn't he, among the statisticians. Ed Learned?

R: Learned was there.

Q: Learned must have been the senior man. He was a doctor from Harvard, and McNamara started making his name right at the time?

R: Right at that point, yes. We never paid any attention to him.

Q: Well, he didn't have the rank then.

R: No, but he would come out with these brilliant analyses of logistics problems, of production problems. Frankly, Benny Meyers was sort of the boss. He didn't pay any attention to him. And yet, Arnold I think, and McNamara got along all right. The AAF didn't pay much attention to him. That's one of the reasons I thought McNamara was always sort of anti-military, anti-service.

Q: He felt that he wasn't getting enough attention for his brilliant ideas? This is a marvelous story. Let me just try to place it in time. It was around the North African invasion, before it,planning the TORCH?

R: Yes, just planning for TORCH.

Q: And McNamara and this team came in to brief Knudsen.

R: And Meyers.

Q: In Wright Field?

R: Yes, at Wright Field.

Q: On what logistics would be required for the invasion. And he figured it very closely?

R: He figured it right down to the last thing. They did a fine job, if they hadn't lost anything, but I can still remember Knudsen remarking: "Vors aren't von that vay."

Q: It's a great line. I've never heard that story. It's a great story. I want to get back to Arnold and Meyers. I have been told that one of the reasons - you touched on the sort of periphery of this - that Meyers did things the way

Arnold liked. I have been told that Meyers sort of exaggerated statistics in order to please Arnold. He would anticipate what Arnold wanted, and then knowing that this would probably come true next month, he would give him next month's production figure today?

R: I can't make a statement in that regard because that was basically a production problem. Although I sat in lots of meetings and conferences, it didn't have anything to do with me. I was just there because of the position I held. I didn't get in the production. The only one airplane that I did really know something about, the production, was the P-47. That was a fighter, of course. What he told Arnold as far as the production of these things, I wouldn't know. I think that question could be answered real well by Mark Bradley.

Q: I talked to him out on the Coast.

R: That question could be answered because Mark Bradley had, he was the production manager for the P-47. He ran that whole show, incidentally, quite well.

Q: I'll fire a question at him on that score. This brings me to another question. Benny Meyers was actually the No. 2 man in MM&D, so-called. Echols was the No. 1 man. Yet Arnold very often bypassed Echols and went to Meyers?

R: This is correct.

Q: Why?

R: I think Echols was in the Engineering end, head of the Engineering Division. Meyers kept his fingers more on the production thing. I think it was probably natural, if Arnold wanted to find figures on production, why, the person to go to would be Meyers.

Q: Is there any truth in assumption that Echols being a southerner, slow talking, sort of gentle man, didn't cut it?

R: Personality wise, it may have something to do with it.

Q: And Benny Meyers was a fast talker, Arnold wanted an answer immediately?

R: And he'd get it right or wrong. He would get an answer out of Meyers, but Echols was basically an engineer.

Q: This brings me back to Meyers, right or wrong. Did Meyers knowing that Arnold needed a figure of 100 B-29s, let's say, did he give him that figure even knowing that it wasn't quite true yet? Was he likely to do that?

R: I think he was likely to do that, plus or minus. Because I think this was always true of Meyers. You couldn't always get an answer out of Meyers. I used to go over there once in a while: "I want to do this;" or "I want some money," or "I want to get an engine." This is one of the contacts I always had with Meyers. Meyers lived a block away, as a matter of fact. I had to get my engines for experimental airplanes out of a production schedule, and this was like pulling teeth, because the Production Division, which Meyers oversaw fairly closely, they wouldn't give a damned nickel: "It would spoil the whole production schedule." I could hear it. But, we got them eventually because there were other pressures brought to bear. If we couldn't get it out of Meyers, we would go to Washington and say this development is being withheld for lack of engines, and you would get one.

Q: There was an incipient scandal involving Meyers about 1943. Some rumors or anonymous letters written that he had carpeted his office, and put in some very fancy furnishings. A Congressional committee looked into that, and he denied it and the thing was sort of quieted in a while. Do you remember that?

R: Yes, but I didn't think it was his office. I thought it was his quarters.

Q: Maybe it was.

R: He re-did his quarters over there.

Q: With government furnished equipment?

R: He married a gal by the name of Ila.

Q: This was his second marriage, I believe?

R: Yes. Name of Ila, and he had, beautiful set of General's quarters, in black, black tile. Right in the middle, in three great big letters, was ILA. Of course, he used to entertain Congressmen that came in. They'd walk in and see this. I never heard about the office particularly. I think the offices were

pretty decent, he had nice offices.

Q: Well, apparently, he had generated a lot of envy and emnity, and there were anonymous letters about him. In 1943, just before Stratemeyer left as Chief of Air Staff - he was the No. 2 man to Arnold - a questionnaire was prepared, and all the people involved in procurement in Wright Field were required to sign it, stating their assets, stating their stock holdings, and so forth. In other words, it was sort of a financial statement. All people involved in AAF procurement signed. This was in response to some anonymous letters that were coming into Washington that guys in Procurement were feathering their nests. So Arnold had Stratemeyer do this. In fact, I talked to, remember Bill Nuckols, he was the guy who drafted this questionnaire. Did you have to fill out this questionnaire?

R: No.

Q: You weren't in procurement?

R: No, I was not.

Q: Do you remember this causing some flap in Wright Field?

R: Really, I don't. I don't recall it.

Q: In 1945, Knudsen had had enough. The European war had ended. This was like May or June, right after VE Day. Knudsen went back to building cars. Benny Meyers had aspirations to fill that job. It was a three-star job. He didn't get the job and he suddenly decided to retire, this was in June 1945. Were you at Wright Field at that time?

R: Yes.

Q: At the very same time, an anonymous letter came in to the FBI or to the AAF, and then it was shunted around. It made accusations against Benny Meyers which turned out to be substantially true, about he and Bleriort LaMarre, this Aviation Electric, the name of the company he was running. The AAF suppressed it at the time, and it wasn't until two years later that the Ferguson Committee dug it up. They were looking for some dirt about Elliott Roosevelt and Howard Hughes, and they came upon the Benny Meyers business. Do you remember anything that I'm saying here?

R: No. I might tell you a little incident that came to mind while we were talking about Benny Meyers receiving gifts. Arnold put out a letter, about the 1st of December each year, about accepting gifts from contractors. It came out every year, the same old letter. According to AAF regulations, so and so, personnel in the military will not accept gifts from contractors. It was generally known that people did get gifts from contractors on Thanksgiving Day, contractors like Bell Aircraft used to send a turkey around to every one. Mr. Symington of Emerson Electric used to send stuff around. There were a lot of things that came out. Arnold was quite annoyed with this, and he was going to put a stop to it. His staff wrote this letter, it came out about the 1st of December, on one of the years, about these gifts. They would not accept, and anyone who received and accepted a gift from a contractor would be on the "black list" for the rest of his life, that sort of thing. It was a real strong letter. Well, Christmas time came around and I got a pocketbook, a billfold, with my name on it. I got it from Jack Northrop, of Northrop Aircraft Co. I was out at Northrop a couple of weeks afterwards, and I had this thing with me, in the box it came in. I said: "Mr. Northrop, you know as well as I do, that I cannot accept this gift. You know the regulations just as well as anyone else.

Q: This was something like a $5 billfold.

R: Oh, a $5 billfold. I said: "You know I can't accept this." And he said: "Well, I know that." But, he said: "It's a little thing, and it's got your name on it. I can't tak it back. What am I going to do with it?" I said: "That's not my problem; it's your problem." And he said: "Just a minute." He said: "Margaret" - Margaret was his secretary - "Margaret get that letter that I just got." So she came barging in with this letter. And he said: "Here, read it." It said: "Dear Jack, Thank you so much for your kindness with this gift. I appreciate your thoughtfulness." Signed H.H. Arnold.

Q: This was the billfold.

R: The billfold, he sent one to Arnold. So I said: "OK, Jack, give it back." I put it in my pocket, and carried it for years.

Q: You know, General, what you say, brings up an interesting point.

R: I thought one instance, the way he took care of Eddie Perrin. I think that Arnold should have kicked Perrin out. As a matter of fact, he did.

Q: He did, because of his drinking?

R: Because of his drinking. That was Arnold's fault to start with.

Q: Really, why?

R: Eddie Perrin was down in Australia. There was an advance AAF group down there, and MacArthur at that time was in Brisbane, and MacArthur had some respect for the AAF, respect for them, but he didn't realize that they could help him too much. But MacArthur - this is the way I understand the story - I have no firsthand knowledge of this, except what Eddie told me himself, because I knew Eddie. He lived next door.

Q: Did he work for Brett at that time?

R: Yes. Anyway, they wanted a senior AF guy on MacArthur's staff. They looked around and said: "Well, who's over there?" At that time Eddie Perrin was in China, Chungking. They said: "Well, here's China and Australia. They are just 2 or 3 miles apart," that type of thing. They sent Eddie down there, and they made him a BG, and he was a Captain, you know. Arnold made him a BG, just like that, overnight. That didn't set well with Eddie. He was not knowledgeable enough to carry the ball. Then he got pretty bigheaded and got to be the hotshot, and then he started to drink. Of course, when he got down to Florida - they brought him back, didn't break him - and put him in Arnold's office.

Q: Why did Arnold put him in his office?

R: Because they couldn't assign him anywhere. He was so low ranking. At the time he was a real junior officer, and you couldn't put him in a BG's job, over all the old Colonels, you know, the experienced guys had been in the service for 20 or 30 years. There was just no place to put him. So they put him in Arnold's office. Then he went down to Florida, that rest camp down there near Miami, Coral Gables. Eddie started throwing his weight around down there. He ran into a Major one night, and told the Major off. The Major reported

him for being drunk. Arnold pulled the rug out from under him then. They sent him out to Sacramento, and he was out near Sacramento for awhile. One day he came through Wright Field for something, I can't remember. He got a quart of liquor and drank it all in the hotel. He died from alcoholic poisoning.

Q: Did he commit suicide?

R: Yes, Arnold made him. Eddie was a real smart guy. He was real fine. If Arnold had busted him when he came back from overseas, after that particular thing, put him in a regular position on the promotion list, I think Eddie would have turned out to be a real fine officer.

Q: You know Arnold had a strong aversion to people who drank. That's why I'm surprised that he put him in. You see, Arnold....

R: He tried to protect him.

Q: Did he have some special interest? Did they work together? Arnold took sort of a fatherly interest in a number of guys like Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell. Was Eddie Perrin one of those favored?

R: Yes, yes. But you see, the other fellows were much senior. You see, Norstad was out of '31 or '32, or somewheres there. Rosie was, I guess, '26 out of the Academy. Here comes Eddie Perrin. He came in there, Class of '38, or something like that. The war came on a couple of years later, and all of a sudden, he was promoted to a Captain. At that time, you were 5 years a 2nd LT, 5 years a 1st LT, 7 years a Captain. All these other fellows like Rosie had gone through this process, but not Eddie. They suddenly made him...and there weren't many Generals in the AF at that time when Eddie was made, just a few.

Q: I saw a cable from MacArthur to Washington complaining about promotion of a number of AF officers in Australia under Brett. This was a contributing cause to the alienation between Brett and MacArthur. As you know, MacArthur kicked Brett out of there. Then Kenney came in, this is like July '42, I wonder if Perrin was one of the cases that made MacArthur upset?

R: I can't answer the question, I don't know. But I do know that Perrin was with Kenney at that time in Australia, but Kenny was running the 5th AF, I

think, and Perrin was on MacArthur's staff.

Q: As a BG?

R: As a BG. I think Kenney and Perrin got along all right. But I say that I think they did, although Perrin was sent home.

Q: What was his specialty -- Perrin's?

R: Perrin - power plant?

Q: He must have had something on the ball?

R: Oh sure, he was in the Power Plant Lab at Wright Field.

Q: I mentioned earlier Arnold's hate-love relationship with Wright Field. He was at Wright Field for 3 years and he was very unhappy. This is 1929-31. Chidlaw told me some of this. And Arnold didn't have enough to do when he was at Wright Field. He saw some of the things that went on there. There was a lot of things about Wright Field he didn't like. Of course, he respected Wright Field. Yet, there were some things about it he didn't like. Did you ever sense that he was equivocal in his attitude toward Wright Field, or even irrational sometimes?

R: I would say not. When I saw him at Wright Field, which I did frequently, I thought he was generally pleased with Wright Field, and the things they were doing. His previous experience might have been the fact that Wright Field never had any money. They couldn't do things. Then, when the war came on, that solved the money problem. You could get things done.

Q: One of the problems that Arnold jumped on Wright Field for - at least I think he did - had to do with the wing tanks for the fighters. These are the P-47s and P-38s.

R: The self-seal....

Q: In the middle of '43, Schweinfurt-Regensburg, all these losses. The P-51 is not quite ready. It came in around Jan '44. So they had these paper, or cardboard wingtanks, and they were pushing to get those in. Did this problem come to your attention?

R: Not from the production standpoint. We were experimenting with the wing tanks and we had self sealing tanks. We had fire problems. But I know there was

just one hell of a lot of effort put on wing tanks, and it was all coming out of Washington daily. We also had another problem which Arnold was really up in the air about, and that was the exhaust manifolds on the B-17s. I know that Arnold at one time came to Wright Field, and the next place he hit was Ryan Aeronautical in San Diego, because the so-and-so exhaust pipes. The exhaust pipes would break and crack - they were stainless steel - and cause fires, and those two things - and brakes. Brakes were the other thing, at Goodyear.

Q: On the B-17?

R: Yes, they dumped over a lot of B-17s, the brakes. They had these multiple-disc brakes. The damned things would get real hot, or get practically red hot. The wheel would get so hot, it would blow the tire. It would just melt the innertubes. Things like that. Arnold would - as I said earlier, sort of called technical details - he would just raise hell about them, and he wanted them solved day before yesterday.

Q: Right, they ended up buying some of these cardboard wing tanks from the British. Do you remember that?

R: No, I do not.

Q: This is the fall of '43.

R: I know of the wing tank thing. I think that Kelsey was over there at that time when they were putting the wing tanks on P-38s, if I'm not mistaken.

Q: They were, but they didn't have enough. Of course, Eaker slowed down the deep penetration raids after the second Schweinfurt raid. Do you remember the Black Thursday raid of October 14th? They stopped raiding the German factories. One of the things they were waiting for was wing tanks. And of course, the P-51 came in a little later. But you didn't directly get involved in that?

R: No.

Q: Did you have anything to do with the B-29 engines?

R: No.

Q: They were catching fire. This was one of the problems. Remember

Benny Meyers and Arnold going out to Salina, Kansas, to get the B-29 program moving?

R: No.

Q: This is March 1944.

R: I remember that, it was Salina or Wichita....operational base?

Q: Right. See, they had all these B-29s in various stages of modification. Some lacked this and some lacked that.

R: This was a modification program which we had at Evansville, Indiana, which we had on the P-47s; too.

Q: Right. And the President was putting all kinds of heat on Arnold to get the B-29s bombing Japan....He and Meyers are supposed to have gone out to Salina, Kansas. They ran a sort of modification central to get all these planes out there?

R: I remember this happening, when they had the big conflabs out of there. The Boeing people were all down there raising hell about getting all this stuff, but I was never involved in that. That was basically a production job.

Q: Arnold is supposed to have had pet likes and dislikes. He took a liking to a guy, and he really elevated him. Rosie O'Donnell and Norstad....

R: Yes, yes.

Q: Did this cause some resentment?

R: I guess the answer is yes. You've got to look at these guys, too. You can't just say Arnold just picked these men out. Well, you take Frank Carroll. He should have been promoted.

Q: He made two stars, didn't he?

R: Yes.

Q: Did he make it after Arnold's time?

R: Yes.

Q: Maybe this is why he hasn't corresponded?

R: There was resentment because the promotion frequency in the operating forces was much faster than it was in the technical field. And, yet, it wasn't

too bad in the technical field, either, if you take a look at it.

Q: This could be the reason that I have not heard from Carroll. Of course, he later got involved in that B-36 investigation.

R: Yes.

Q: You were overseas, I know you said that you were technical advisor to various AFs. Did you have any contact with Arnold in this job?

R: No. Do you remember the incident where Gen Vanaman went flying over Germany, you know, as a passenger in one of the bomber missions? It was shot down. Well, that put the clamp on everyone at Wright Field that was involved in these first developments.

Q: Did Arnold feel that this was a bad one, a security loss?

R: Yes. They didn't want anyone else to go. Vanaman, of course, knew everything that was going on - the Research and Development program, the production program, some of the logistics programs....

Q: I was going to see him, he lives in Sacramento.

R: I think so. He had all this stuff on his fingertips. A lot of the other, the rest of us did, too, as far as developments, of what was coming up, etc. If I remember correctly, we were then playing with Whittle and Bell on the jet aircraft. This was, you know, so damn supersecret you couldn't go to sleep at night without brainwashing yourself.

Q: Did you get involved in the jet at all?

R: Yes.

Q: Arnold was pushing it very hard?

R: Oh yes. Swofford was the project officer on the Bell Aircraft, and he personally went and got the engines out of Great Britain.

Q: What was Keirn's job?

R: D.J. Keirn ran the Power Plant Lab. Now, there is a fellow that had dealings with Arnold, too.

Q: I talked to him, he lives out in Delaplane, Va.

Interview - MG Marshall S. Roth, Colorado Springs, April 29, 1972

Q: Do you recall the first time you met Hap Arnold

R: I don't believe I do, I was at Wright Field for so many years and he used to come out there quite frequently, the Commander out there at the time was Oliver P. Echols, and my particular boss was Lawrence Craigie, ~~and~~ Craigie headed up the Aircraft Project, at that time I had the Fighter Branch, ~~end of~~ under the Aircraft Project Section, interested in the development of new fighters.

Q: I've talked to Craigie, Kelsey and ~~Kearne~~ Keirn

R: Oh you have. ~~Carl~~ ~~Kearne~~ Don J. Keirn.

Q: Yes

R: Kelsey is my brother in law.

Q Oh really? You know, he is a big time farmer ~~fitman~~ [redacted] in Stevensburg, Va. I was there, he was in overalls and this big farm hat, I didn't realize that.

R: His sister is my wife's sister. His wife is my wife's sister.

~~Q I didn't know that. That's interesting, we had a long talk~~

R He's a very interesting fellow.

~~Q: Yes he is. We spent a number of hours together. I drove down there, beautiful drive~~

~~R: Yes it is~~

~~Q: You've been there~~ ?

~~R: Yes, I've been to the farm several times.~~

Q: Anyway, Hap Arnold . . .

R: He used to come out quite frequently, ~~and~~ I've been trying to, in view of your visit, trying to recollect some of the things that happened, ~~and~~ he always used to come out with an aide, and I can't remember the aides' name

Q: Beebe?

R: No, it wasn't Gene Beebe

Q: Horace Shelmire? the fellow with a moustache?

R: No, that doesn't ring a bell either

Q: Toward the end of the war

R: No, during the early part of the war, I can't remember who it was, but Gen Arnold always went to see Echols, and the aide would always run off. And the aide would always contact the fellow that was in charge of the project which Arnold wanted to discuss, and he'd always get ahold of the Project Officer. Arnold never wanted to talk to anyone in between, he never asked Echols about this airplane or that airplane, maybe in a casual way, but when it got down to what he wanted to know, when was it going to be ready? how much was it going to cost? why isn't it ready 9 months ahead of time? or 6 months ahead of time? he was very, shall I say, pushy, is that the right word? demanding, on getting things done, he would always talk directly to the project officer because he figured that that's the guy that knew more of the details about what was going on. This is what he was after, and I, at that time, had the Fighter Branch, so under those conditions, I talked to him on frequent occasions.

Q: What projects did you talk about?

R: Well, we were building a group of airplanes at that time, like the XP-54, XP-55 and XP-56. They were all pushers, and . . .

Q: That's with the prop in the back?

R: Prop in the back, yes, and we developed those purely for aerodynamic reasons, and what not, but he always used to say, you're not going to get any one to fly it, and he was exactly right, because you couldn't convince a pilot to jump out of a cockpit with that type, which Arnold referred to as a meat chopper, to jump out of that airplane with that thing behind you. So he said, he told us at that time, you've got to solve that problem. Well, we did solve the problem, because we had various devices, so, when

your seat was released, the escape seat, they all had them on at that time, spring loaded, the same release would release the prop, would throw the prop off. So the prop would be out of the way, and they were all equipped that way, ~~so the~~

Q: They never panned out - the P-54, P-55, P-56?

R: No, no, the P-54 was built by Vultee, ~~and~~ that's another story on that one because he, I'll mention it in a minute, ~~but~~ the P-54 built by Vultee was a big airplane. It was too big for a fighter, ~~he~~ Arnold was basically a small airplane man. P-55 was by Curtiss Wright, I think one of those crashed, and they only built two. And the P-56 they built one of, that was completed and flown, that was Northrup's, that was the flying wing fighter, ~~another~~ with an R-2800 engine in it, but he would have no part of it. Going back to the P-54, he came out there one day, just after I had flown the thing from the Vultee plant to Wright Field, ~~and~~ he came out just a few days after and took a look at it, and he said, where is the turbosupercharger, if you remember, at that time, the Navy was two-stage, two-speed compressor engines, and the AF was 100%, and Arnold was pushing for turbosuperchargers, he thought that was the answer, and I think it was. We took the airplane back, and put turbosuperchargers on it, and only increased the weight about ~~2or~~ 2000 or 3,000 pounds, and it really spoiled the airplane, because it was too heavy with the extra weight on it, it had to be made a little longer, ~~so forth~~, but that's not the reason it was dropped, the reason it was really dropped was because people were not going to fly with that fan behind them, but it was an interesting experience.

Q: Was the fact that the P-51 had come into its own the last year of the war, and the fact that you also had the jet coming into being....

R: The jet was in the picture, and we didn't think it was in time, and it wasn't, but the P-51 was an excellent airplane, and admittedly the P-54, P-55 and P-56 and the P-77 would not have fitted into that picture at all, anyway.

Q: The improvement over the P-51 was not great enough to warrant going into a new type?

R: No, no, it was too big an airplane for this type of thing they wanted. And they were looking forward to Pacific operations, and of course, the European operations.

Q: I suppose you felt you could not foreclose any possibility of research.

R: Well, these were research airplanes, in large extent. The 55 was Canard type, with the empennage out front, and that was sort of none of them had previously been real successful. Although the 71 is a Canard type. He had another airplane, though, that he was very much interested in, and that was the P-77. This was, and they used to call it Haps 444, maybe you noticed, or picked it up. Everything was 4, it was supposed to go, weigh 4,000 pounds, go 400 mph, go to 40,000 feet, carry 4 guns, 4,000 rounds of ammunition. Everything had a four in it, and it was sort of known as Hap's 444 airplane. It was originally built by Bell and it was a little one, real small one. You could just barely get a man into it. And it was made all in wood. Bell built it, Bell Aircraft, they built three, and it was a pretty fancy, little airplane. But it was unsatisfactory for major conflict, it was too small, but the philosophy behind it was to have thousands of them, build, little like the Hughes transports, you know, they were going to build just hundreds of these ~~little~~ and move troops all over, of ~~course~~ course, it was Hughes, but there were so many of these to be involved, they ~~didn't~~ didn't have the squadron maybe of 50, or 60, or 100 of them, just like mosquitoes. That fell by the board. Not because it didn't fly nice ~~and so forth~~, but we had to have more just more firepower on those little airplanes, and the engines were a problem, they were Ofenhauser racing engines, two of them tied together. They are still building engines, Offenhauser is dead, but they are still building them.

Q: And Arnold had a special interest ~~in this~~?

R: He had a special interest in this because it was a numbers racket at that time, and he used to call us every once in a while, how's that getting along, and said,

well, it was doing all right.

Q: Did he call you personally?

R: No, he used to call Bill Craigie, and Bill and I would get on the phone, and I don't know whether Bill was actually there when it finally came out, because I relieved Bill Craigie as Chief Project Officer, and at that time, the trainers and the bombers and so on.

Q: I talked to him out at Burbank, and I don't remember it coming up, or not.

R: When Bill left, I relieved him. But he had special interest in beginning, in getting these things done, and he always went to the contractor, he'd check you to, he would call the contractor.

Sometimes we wondered why, he, in his position, when he had so many things on his mind, so many problems, that he would take a personal interest in a particular airplane. For instance, the helicopter. Frank Gregory, I don't know if you have ever talked to Gregroy, he wrote the book, "Anything A Horse Could Do"

Q: I've heard of it. Is he still around?

R: He's in Tulsa, lives in Tulsa. I don't remember who he works for down there, but he's in Tulsa. Well, he was the project officer on helicopters, and of course, he had a Sikorsky airplane, or helicopter, coming out, they were going to fly it, and Arnold and Echols and Frank Gregroy and Omstead, who was the head chief pilot, test pilot at Wright Field, were standing out on the line, and Frank, the Sikorsky pilot was demonstrating this helicopter, and they didn't fly too well at that time because the controls were slow and somewhat reversible, and so forth, but this fellow did a marvelous job of demonstrating this helicopter, and he set it down on a quarter out on the middle of the runway, and Arnold didn't say one word, he just turned around and walked away, and he said, "it's a damn lie." We asked him later, why he, what he was referring to, and he said, "just can't believe it." But he used the words

it's a damn lie,

Q: It was just incredible

R: Just incredible, well, the way it happened

He was interested in that type of thing, he was not a technician or an engineer in the way he approached it.

Q: Was he sort of a gadgeteer, sort of interested in these new things?

R: He got into things like that. I think I would call him a "gadgeteer," not in his own right, but he would foresee or have knowledge of how to accomplish something, but when somebody else made a gadget, he was tremendously interested in it.

Q: I know there are many, many things that people sold him on, that didn't turn out, explosive pencils, etc.

R: Oh yes, this is true. We were in a position, during the war, trying to keep ahead of the state of the art, trying to build new things and whatnot, ~~and you could give~~, a good engineer could sit down and convince you ~~that~~ almost anything, except you could never convince me that we could go to the moon, as a matter of fact I sold out, but a lot of these things were good ideas, ~~and~~ There ~~was~~ were funds available to put some of these ideas in, ~~and~~ Arnold, sometimes, would say, "all right, go ahead." And then you would go back and tell your boss, who didn't like it anyways, and say, "I talked to Gen Arnold," and Arnold would talk to him, Gen Arnold said "we ought to take a look at this." That changed the whole picture.

Q: When he said, go ahead, did he refer this back to a committee, or a group, or was it simply his own say so, his own judgment?

R: Well, it was basically his own judgment.

Q: Did he follow up on these things? Did he call?

R: Most of them he did.

Q Q: Personally?

R: Well, no, not personally, but every once in a while you would get a blubb

out of Washington, say, Gen Arnold would like a report on this, and I never thought that he was very much a reporter, as far as supplying data of what went on into Washington, short, sweet, concise report on one subject, he didn't want these, say like I want a report every two weeks, and then you'd get stuck, paperwork, he wasn't that type.

Q: When you replaced Craigie as Chief of the Fighter Branch, did Arnold start calling you up?

R: Yes, he'd always call me. He called me one night, I might add, at home, he was a great friend of Don Douglas, Sr., and north of San Francisco there is a club, name of which slips my mind, and he called me one night, and I don't know whether I was in bed or not, but I wasn't too alert, I think, but he said, I want you to go over to the Aircraft Program, this included the fighters at that time, and he said, I want $10 million taken out of that development program, and what do you say, you know, and at that time, Frank Carroll, was Chief of Development, up there, Frank Carroll lives up there in Boulder

Q: I've been trying to get to see him but he has never answered me. Do you contact him?

R: I see him at ball games, he comes down to the AF Academy ballgames.

Q: I wrote him twice and he never answered me.

R: He looks fine.

Q: Good shape

R: Yes, real good shape

Q: I thought perhaps he was ill.

R: No, no, he's in good shape. But, I went to Frank Carroll the next morning and I said I had a telephone call last night from Gen Arnold, what did he want, well, he just wants $10 million taken out of this program. What for? he said, they are going to start a new organization which is a subsidiary of the Douglas Company, and they really have got a lot of people out there in this organization, to do some research

and development thinking, well, this ~~is~~ the RAND Corporation that was cooked up by Arnold and Douglas, ~~well, it was~~

Q: Was a fellow named Ed Bowles in it?

R: Dr. Bowles, is he from Stanford or MIT?

Q: MIT.

R: Yes.

Q: I talked to him in Massachusetts, ~~and~~ he claims the major share of the credit for setting RAND up, selling that to Arnold.

R: Well, he may have been up there, I don't know.

Q: You don't remember him in that picture?

R: Yes, he was in the picture, yes. He had, ~~this was~~, I cant remember the year,

Q: Late 1945, the war was over.

R: Yes, I guess it was, ~~and~~ during that summer ~~and~~ the following summer, Douglas Co. rented a ~~lot~~ lot of houses along the beach out there, and they brought in a lot of wonderful talent, from the different universities, the people that were on sabbatical leave for 3 or 4 months, ~~and~~ they worked in the building, which was right across the street from the Douglas A/C Co., that was the original RAND building, ~~and~~ they started working on all kinds of different projects, they had ~~an~~ aerodynamist people, and then they had a bunch of geologists for one reason I will never know, but they were studying the construction of ~~ways and~~ various parts of the world, ~~and~~ it was interesting but personally, at that time, I thought it was just a hell of a waste of money, because they were paying pretty good salaries to these philosophers and doctors, whatnot, that were on sabbatical leave. But that was sort of the beginning of the RAND group.

Q: Arnold had this great vision that, instead of going back, like the Army would go back to the arsenals, and the Navy would go back to the shipyards, and the inhouse research, that he would try to latch on permanently to the greatest brains in the world

on a postwar basis, it was a marvelous idea.

R: He's a little bit like the ~~Colonel~~ Tom McDonnell of McDonnell Aircraft, when he ~~it~~ thinks that somebody in the US knows something, and he wants to know what it is, he'll ~~spend no,~~ have no restriction in getting that guy to help him. This is of course what made McDonnell a strong organization.

Q: Anyway, you got this telephone call from Arnold, and that was the beginning.

R: Beginning of RAND. He and this group, I don't know who was there besides Douglas and Gen Arnold.

Q: Was Frank ~~Cobaum~~ Callbohm in it?

R: ~~Cobaum~~ Callbohm was the head of it, ~~he,~~ Frank was put in charge of the operation. He was the so-called manager, I guess, I don't know whether he hired the people or not, but set up the buildings, he did all that, I never knew what happened to Frank ~~Cobaum~~ Callbohm.

Q: I interviewed him, he's out in Huntington Beach.

R: ...long period of time for we didn't know what RAND was. But Bowles at that time, I think headed up the scientific group

Q: Yes, he was sort of perhaps Arnold's honcho, if that is the correct ~~way~~ word

R: Yes, the other fellow involved in that was a fellow by the name of Stark Draper. Draper was head of the electronics group there at MIT, and he and Leighton Davis, ~~he and Draper~~ were the ones who put the electronics on the old Norden bombsight and made the fancy bombsight on it.

Q: Going back to your experience with Arnold when you became head of the Fighter Branch. When he called you up, or did he call up frequently?

R: No.

Q: Did he ever bawl you out?

R: Yes, he did. I remember he was just madder than hell about something, I think it was probably my fault, because I'd told him we were going to have this airplane on such and such a date, we didn't get it.

Q: Do you remember which airplane it was?

R: It was either the P-54, P-55, P-56, or P-57, and the P-61 was involved, the Black Widow, and I remember, it was late, and we didn't get it. There was something wrong here, and we had engine trouble, etc, he said, well, if you can't do it, I'll get somebody who can. You know, that type of thing. I think it was probably true because he would get exasperated at delays. Everything had to be done the day before yesterday. Maybe that's where that expression came from.

Q: In this case, you mention he bawled you out on the telephone, did he ever bawl you out in person?

R: No, no.

Q: He had a penchant for grabbing people in the hall of the Pentagon?

R: Oh yes

Q: And sending them on missions, did you ever hear about this?

R: Yes, I've heard many stories on that, I can't recall any specific one, but I know that was true, because when I was in the, would be in Washington, I would go in to see somebody, and where is so, and so, "I don't know where he is, I was told; Arnold sent him somewhere, and he'd would do that, even though it was not in the man's own field of endeavor.

Q: And the guy couldn't pass it off to somebody?

R: No, he had to do it. One time, I think it was about 4:00 in the afternoon or 5:00, probably 2 or 3:00 PM in the afternoon in California, the phone rang, and we were I can't remember this airplane either because it was a Douglas Co., he said, I want you out there, I had been head of the project branch, and they were building a bomber out there, B-26 or something, and he said, I want you out here tomorrow morning at 7:00. This was creating a problem because how do you get out there, so I picked up Eddie Perri, who was in the Power Plant Lab.

Q: Was this before he came into Arnolds shop?

R: Oh yes.

Q: He became deputy.

R: Oh yes, I know. I picked up Eddie Perrin, and Eddie and I got up and went down to get an airplane to go out to the West Coast, and Omstead, who was head of the Flying Branch there, he said, we don't have any airplanes, so I said, well, I've got to get out there, he said the only thing we have is a C-45, or something like that, it was a little Lockheed, which looked like the C-[illegible], I can't remember, C something, little one, two engine, I said this is fine, but I've never flown the damn thing, and Omstead said, well, they all fly alike, you pull the stick back, and it goes up, Eddie Perrin and I matched to see who would fly the thing out after looking at the gauges, and we flew in, we got into March Field the next morning about 3:00 AM.

Q: Was Arnold out at March Field?

R: No, Arnold was at Douglas Company, so we got in there about 3:00 AM. The next morning, we got up to fly into Los Angeles, it was full of fog, but Arnold wanted us at 8:00 the next morning, at the Douglas plant. We got a car and drove in there, and I think when we got there, the problem had all been solved, and it wasn't any reason, but he wanted us out there so he could talk about this airplane. I think it was the A-26, Douglas Company. I'll tell you somebody that he really liked, though, that was [illegible]/Kelly Johnson,

Q: He's the one, the SR-71 and the U-2?

R: Yes, and

Q: He liked Kelly Johnson?

R: Yes, he thought the world of Kelly Johnson

Q: Is he around?

R: Oh yes, he's Vice President at Lockheed. There was, the real start of that, P-80, was started by Kelly Johnson and myself, there is an argument about who started this damned thing, but Arnold was down at Eglin Field, and there was some kind of a demonstration

going on, and Kelly Johnson was there, and Kelly Johnson and Arnold and a group of us were talking about ~~airplanes~~, jet aircraft, and the P-60, the first jet that was built with the

Q: P-59

R: P-59, which was just getting going out at Muroc, and they brought the engines over, Ralph Swaffard(?)was the man

Q: He's in Montgomery, Alabama.

R: He was the project officer on that airplane. We got to talking about the airplane and Kelly said, "hell, I can build a better airplane than that in 8 months," and this, as I say, Arnold liked Kelly Johnson, and Arnold said, why don't you build one, Kelly said; "who's going to pay for it?" well, that brought me into the picture because Kelly wanted to talk to the R&D people at Wright Field, and so, he came up and we had quite a go-round about getting engines for it, and all that sort of thing, and the GE engine was due out, ~~well~~ Kelly went to work on that one, and that thing just leapfrogged and he had that, Kelly's think tank, or whatever it is, they build the airplanes right next to where they were drawing them

Q: Skunk works...

R: Yes Skunk Works. And that thing flew on time, and that was quite a good show.

Q: This is probably one of the reasons Arnold highly regarded Kelly Johnson, because he met his deadlines?

R: Well that's one reason, but Kelly you see, was also in the P-38 business, too with Lockheed, He did a lot of work on that, did most of the work I guess on the P-38.

Q: It would be interesting to try to get to talk to him. I didn't know that Arnold and he were close.

R: Yes, ~~he was,~~ he had great respect for Kelly, because you know, Kelly used to talk right back, ~~oh~~ yes, he's a real tough Irishman, awfully nice guy, but when he

Q: Really?
R: Oh

thinks he's right,

Q: He's not intimidated?

R: Arnold couldn't change his mind one single bit. This is what he would do, this is what he could do.

Q: Let me ask you. Were a lot of people intimidated by Arnold?

R: I would say yes. Arnold would say this is what I want, and lot of people wanted to wouldn't think of whether it could be done or not, their mental processes. They start out, "well, gee, can we do this?" and this is fine, but if you gave him an answer "yes, that we will do it, well, Arnold wouldn't believe you, really, because he thinks you are going to be a "yes man." And if you hesitated, and sort of argued with him, then he would get madder than hell. So you were between the devil and the deep blue, so you had to be what you say be tactful with it, and say, "well, I think there is a possibility there, and we will really work on it, this he would accept, but you couldn't argue that you can't do it, and you couldn't say "yes" right off the bat, he wouldn't accept either answer

Q: I was told one of the things that infuriated Arnold was somebody who said "leave it to me, I'll take care of it, General," if something went bad, and Arnold called a man in for a report on it, he wanted to know what went wrong and when it was going to be fixed, and if a man gave him, or tried to put him off with something like "leave it to me General, I'll take care of it," this, according to one of the people I interviewed, this would infuriate Arnold, he felt that he was being put off.

R: Left out of the picture.

Q: Yes. Was his wrath monumental? I mean when he got angry, did he splutter, or was he articulate, or

R: No, I think he was sort of articulate in that respect, but, if you are referring to a man getting red faced and furious, I would say no. I think he was too calm for that. ~~He didn't like it in terms that he could express.~~

Q: I have been told that Arnold shot from the hip oftentimes, did he ever make unfair judgments, he made a lot of judgments, obviously some of them impulsive, but did he think through some of these things beforehand, or did he shoot from the hip?

R: Well, if we take this B-77, just as an example, I think he shot from the hip on that. I think that when everything had to be 4,000 feet, 4,000 rounds, 4,000 this and that, that was a shot from the hip, because I don't think anyone could meet the requirements, no one could, can't do it today, but I think that was just a shot in the dark. Now, he may have been told that this could be done, Larry Bell may have told him this, that we could build this many airplanes.

Q: They were very close? Larry Bell and Arnold?

R: Yes, I think they

Q: Not quite as close as Douglas and Arnold?

R: No, no, I think that the Douglas people . . .

Q: Arnold's son married Douglas' daughter?

R: Yes

Q: The middle son, I see Bruce often

R: He was also fond of Jack Northrup, because Jack Northrup was very quiet, and never got excited, and was just too damned honest, really, Jack is one of the most honest guys in the world. If something went wrong with the airplane, it was personally Jack's fault, and Jack said, "we'll take care of it." Well, financially, this wasn't very good from a buisness point of view, to take care of all these things, because they weren't all his fault.

Q: One of the projects was that B-35, the Flying Wing, that never really worked out?

R: No, the jet engine spoiled it, in my opinion. When we had the four engines, the four propellers on the back, of reciprocating type engines, the gyroscopic action of these four propellers back there had a stabilizing effect on the flying wing. Wherein

when you put the jets on, you lose that stabilizing gyroscopic effect, and it then became unstable, and the damned thing tumbled, which it did.

Q: Do you think that Arnold gave Douglas preference, in a sense, that is, because of their friendship, Did he ever lean towards Douglas in making procurement decisions that perhaps he would not have done if they were not such close friends.

R: Idon't think so, he had, Larry Bell was close friend, Jack Northrop was a close friend, he got along very well with the powers that be.

Q: Kindelberger ?

R: And Dutch, of course, he liked, I don't think that he was ...

Q: In other words, Douglas had to work for every contract.

R: Douglas had to work the same as the rest of them . Now when it came to the establishment of RAND, this is something else again, this may have been a group of people, who were up at the club, and they got to talking and he was convinced that this was the right thing to do, and Douglas said, well, I'll supply the building, and this is the way it may have gotten started. You can't quote me on that, I don't know. Maybe Douglas was, you see, Douglas had a lot of good engineers up there

Q: Drew Pearson didn't like Arnold for some reason

R: Drew Pearson didn't like a lot of people

Q: On one or two occasions he made such an insinuation that Douglas got preferences that he was not otherwise entitled to.

R: I wouldn't accuse him of that. Of course, the only funds that I had available in the aircraft project station, were those that were for R&D, and we spread that out pretty much.

Interview - MG Marshall Roth, Colorado Springs, 29 April 1972

Q: ~~We started talking about Benny Meyers~~. Arnold was very fond of Benny Meyers?

~~R: Yes~~

~~Q: Why?~~

R: Because Benny Meyers could get things done the way Arnold wanted them done. I've got to correct that. He could get the end result that ~~he~~ Arnold wanted. Out of Benny Meyers, regardless of how ~~Benny Meyers~~ Benny Meyers did it. When we were building some of these airplanes in the production, there was an outfit by the name of, built generators, ~~and~~ they ran out of generators, and they couldn't get generators, things like that...

Q: Is this for the B-29?

R: Yes, and so Benny Meyers went to Jack ~~Heintz~~ Heintz, Jack was quite the playboy type of guy, ~~I don't know,~~ he would come down with these very fancy clothes on, golf suits, ~~and~~ he and Meyers were fairly close, but Jack Heintz was paying tremendous salaries, (secretary was getting $20,000 a year, something like that, ~~and~~ they were spending this money pretty well, anyway, they got results out of it, until Jack couldn't get castings, so ~~then he~~ set up this little organization down there, and they had the castings made, he wasn't exactly the president, but ~~he~~ was running it, ~~actually~~, ~~Meyers was~~. ~~And then he had, I think~~, Knudsen was there, and Benny was the boss and Knudsen was the Asst. Knudsen was quite a guy, I thought, I thought that Benny Meyers was all right, too, really, when the war broke out, on the 7th of December, the telephones rang, and all hell broke loose, ~~and~~ Benny Meyers had to go to Washington right away, immediately, get some airplanes, ~~and I don't know~~, the president at that time wanted 25,000 or something like that. Benny Meyers had already ordered the damned things by telephone, without one damn bit of authority, ~~and~~ Arnold liked that type of ~~business, that type of~~ operation, and decorated the guy, you know.

Q: He did it himself. You know, ~~with~~ Arnold in one instance that I recall,

well, yes, Benny Meyers was sort of cut in that pattern. You know, when Benny Meyers got in trouble, he tried to enlist Arnold's sympathy, and he almost did. Arnold had drafted a letter of support, but it didn't get sent out, for the probable reason that somebody called Arnold ~~and he~~ who was in retirement, and told him Benny was in trouble with this company, Bleriot LaMarre ~~Larry O'Connor~~, the company, ~~tha's the one~~ he was fooling around with the guys wife, and he had this company in his pocket, and he was giving him subcontracts. Do you remember that one?

M: ....Snow White, who was a girl, was Benny Meyers secretary.

Q: Wasn't she married to the President of this little company?

M: Yes, but the President was the guy who owned the gas station in town.

Q: He set this guy up, he couldn't resist the temptation of a couple dollars?

M: There was a great conflict of interst there.

Q: Benny Meyers always rode around in Cadillacs and always lived very well, ~~and~~ Mrs. Arnold told me people thought he was just smart and made money in the stock market?

R: He did, that's where he made his money, ~~and~~ Knudsen was sitting there as his Assistant

Q: Even though he outranked Meyers?

R: Yes, actually, Knudsen was given that title ~~to~~ as a management expert.

Q: How did Knudsen and Arnold get along?

R: Well, I don't know. Arnold put him there.

Q: He wasn't much of a general, but he was a great production man?

R: He was a great production guy. That's why he was there. I ~~saw~~ might throw a little something in there, it doesn't have anything to do with it, but one of the things that I quote to my son and a few other people once in a while, about Knudsen, it hasn't really got the bearing on Knudsen so much as it has on McNamara, but they brought 10 people down to the Ford Company, 10 apostles or whatever you call them, and the spokesman for this group was McNamara.

Q: He was a LTCOL, probably, wasn't he?

R: Yes, I think something like that. Anyway, they had a big group in there and they were working out on the logistic plans for the North African invasion. They had figured out down to the last nut and bolt what supplies were needed in North Africa, ~~some were needed~~ so many rations, so many rounds of ammunition, so many trucks and so many gallons of gasoline, ~~and whatnot, and~~ they had it down, ~~and~~ one of the things that came up real strong ~~in this thing,~~ was the fact that we were sending enough stuff for the whole AF contingent that was going over there. And McNamara always discounted about 5% for casualties. Then our philosophy was send it over, give them all the gasoline and trucks and airplanes that they can possibly use, and never limit it, because of the possible casualties. Well, we were in the office one day with ~~Eddie~~ Benny Meyers, ~~Knudsen~~ Knud sen, and ~~(Whatnot)~~ a whole group of us, I guess maybe 15, 20 of us, and McNamara was supposed to put on this briefing for Meyers, ~~how~~ on how they were going to operate this logistics situation, and he went through, and somebody asked him, "how about losses at sea? How are all these ships going to get over there?" Well, ~~he~~ McNamara said, "with air cover ~~of~~ and the Navy, we shouldn't lose any." and old Knudsen leaned back, and I can just see him today, leaned back, he said in his Norwegian accent, ~~Norwegian~~, he said, "Mr. McNamara, ~~dot~~ vors aren't von this vay."

Q: McNamara was a disciple of using the last bullet, in the last gun, on the last day of the war.

R: That's correct. ~~Exactly dot~~

Q: So they would have no surplus?

R: That's exactly correct. He had it all figured out on a computer or something. He didn't have computers, he really had a brilliant, really sharp mind.

Q: Tex Thornton was in there, wasn't he, among the statisticians? Ed learned?

~~Q: Ed Learned~~

R: ~~Learned~~ Learned was there.

Q: Learned must have been the senior man, he was a doctor from Harvard, and

McNamara started making his name right at the time

R: Right at that point, yes. Never paid any attention to him.

Q: Well, he didn't have the rank then.

R: No, but he would come out with these brilliant analyses of logistics problems, production problems, and frankly, Benny Meyers was sort of the boss, he didn't pay any attention to him. And yet, Arnold I think, and McNamara got along all right. The AF didn't pay much attention to him, that's one of the reasons I thought McNamara was always sort of antimilitary, anti-service.

Q: He felt that he wasn't getting enought attention for his brilliant ideas. This is a marvelous story. Let me just try to place it in time, it was around the North African invasion, the/ before it, planning for TORCH.

R: Yes, just planning for TORCH.

Q: And McNamara and this team came in to brief Knudsen

R: And Meyers

Q: In Wright Field.

R: Yes, at Wright Field

Q: On what logistics would be required for the invasion, and he figured it very closely.

R: He figured it right down to the last thing. They did a fine job, they hadn't lost anything, but I can still remember Knudsen remarking, "vors aren't von that way."

Q: It's a great line. I've never heard that story, it's a great story. I want to get back to Arnold and Meyers. I have been told that one of the reasons, you touched on the sort of periphery of this, that Meyers did things the way Arnold liked. I have been told that Meyers sort of exaggerated statistics, in order to please Arnold, ~~in other words~~ would anticipate what Arnold wanted, and then knowing that this would probably come true next month, he would give him next month's production figure today.

R: I can't make a statement in that regard because that was basically a

production problem, and although I sat in loss of meetings and conferences, it didn't have anything to do with me, I was just there because of the position I held, I didn't get in the production. The only one airplane that I did really know something about, the production, was the P-47, and that was a fighter, of course, and what he told Arnold as far as the production of these things, I wouldn't know. I think that question, that question could be answered real well by Mark Bradley.

Q: I talked to him out on the Coast

R: That question could be answered because Mark Bradley had, he was the production manager for the P-47. He ran that whole show, incidentally, quite well.

Q: I'll fire a question at him on that score. This brings me to another question. Benny Meyers was actually the No. 2 man in MM&D, so-called, Echols was the No. 1 man. Yet Arnold very often bypassed Echols and went to Meyers?

R: This is correct.

Q: Why?

R: I think Echols was ~~the, his title, he was, Echols was~~ in the Engineering, end, head of the Engineering Division. Meyers kept his fingers more on the production thing, and I think it was probably natural, if Arnold wanted to find figures on production, why, the person to go to would be Meyers.

Q: Is there any truth in assumption that Echols being a southerner, slow talking, sort of gentle man, didn't cut it?

R: Personality wise, it may have something to do with it.

Q: And Benny Meyers was a fast talker, Arnold wanted an answer immediately?

R: And he'd get it right or wrong, he would get an answer out of Meyers. But Echols was, basically an engineer.

Q: This brings me back to Meyers, right or wrong, did Meyers knowing that Arnold needed a figure of 100 B-29s, let's say, did he give him that figure even knowing that it wasn't quite true yet? Was he likely to do that?

R: I think he was likely to do that, plus or minus. Because I think this was

always true of Meyers. You couldn't always get an answer out of Meyers. I used to go over there once in a while; I want to do this; or I want some money, or I want to get an engine, and this is one of the contacts I always had with Meyers. Meyers lived a block away, as a matter of fact. I had to get my engines for experimental airplanes out of a production schedule, and this was like pulling teeth, because Meyers wouldn't give the Production Division, which Meyers oversaw fairly closely, they wouldn't give a damned nickel; it would spoil the whole production schedule. I could hear it, but, we get them eventually because they were other pressures brought to bear. If we couldn't get it out of Meyers, we would go to Washington and say this development is being withheld for lack of engines, and you would get one.

Q: There was an incipient scandal involving Meyers about 1943. Some rumors or anonymous letters written that he had redecorated his office, and put some very fancy furnishings, and a Congressonal committee looked into that, and he denied it and the thing was sort of quieted in a while. do you remember that?

R: Yes, but I didn't think it was his office. I thought it was his quarters?

Q: Maybe it was

R: He redid his quarters over there.

Q: With government furnished equipment. He married a gal by the name of [redacted], Ila

Q: This was his second marriage, I believe?

R: Yes. Name of Ila, and he had, beautiful set of General's quarters, in black, black tile, and right in the middle, in three great big letters, was ILA. of course, he used to entertain congressman that came in, they'd walk in and see this, I never heard about the office particularly. I think the officers were pretty decent, he had nice offices.

Q: Well apparently he had generated a lot of envy and emnity, and there were anonymous letters about him. In 1943, just before Stratemeyer left as Chief of Air Staff, he was the No. 2 man to Arnold, a questionnaire was prepared, and all the pepple

involved in procurement in Wright Field were required to sign it, stating their assets, stating their stock holdings, and so forth, in other words, it was sort of a financial statement, all people involved in AF procurement, signed. This was in response to some anonymous letters that were coming into Washington that guys in procurement were feathering their nests, so Arnold had Stratemeyer do this, in fact, I talked to, remember Bill ~~Knuckles,~~ Nuckols, he was the guy who drafted this questionnaire. Did you have to fill out this questionnaire?

R: No

Q: You weren't in procurement?

R: No, I was not

Q: Do you remember this causing some flap in Wright Field?

R: Really, I don't. I don't recall it.

Q: In 1945, Knudsen had had enough, the European war had ended, This was like May or June, right after VE Day, Knudsen went back to building cars, Benny Meyers had aspirations to fill that job, it was a three-star job, he didn't get the job and he suddenly decided to retire, this was in June 1945. ~~At the same~~, were you at Wright Field at that time?

R: Yes

Q: At the very same time, an anonymous letter came in to the FBI or to the AF, and then it was shunted around, ~~and~~ it made accusations against Benny Meyers, which ~~, it was~~ turned out to be substantially true, about he and Elliott LaMarr, this Aviation Electric, the name of the company that he was running, ~~and~~ the AF suppressed it at the time, and it wasn't until two years later that the Ferguson Committee dug it up. They were looking for something/ dirt about Elliott Roosevelt and Howard Hughes, and they came upon the Benny Meyers business, and do you remember anything that I'm saying here?

R: No. I might tell you a little incident that came to mind while we were talking about Benny Meyers receiving gifts, ~~and so forth, Benny Meyers~~ Arnold ~~, time to~~, put out a letter, about the 1st of Dec each year about ~~on~~ accepting gifts from contractors,

~~Q: December of what year~~

~~R: I don't know,~~ It came out every year, same old letter, according to AF regulations, ~~uppteupm,~~ personnel in the military will not aceept gifts from contractors. It was generally known that ~~some~~ did get gifts from contractors on Thanksgivng Day, contractors like Bell Aircraft used to send a turkey around to every one, ~~and~~ Mr. Symington used to send stuff around, Emerson Electric, there were a lot of things that came out, ~~and~~ Arnold was quite annoyed with this, and he ~~wanted~~ to put a stop to it, ~~and he wrote,~~ His staff wrote this letter, came out about the 1st of December, one of the years, ~~and~~ about these gifts, ~~and~~ they would not, anyone who received and accepted a gift from a contractor would be on the "black list" for the rest of his life, that sort of thing, ~~and~~ It was a real strong letter. Well, Christmas time came around and I got a pocketbook, billfold, with my name on it. I got it from Jack Northrop, Northrop Aircraft Co., ~~well,~~ I was out ~~that~~ at Northrop a couple of weeks afterwards, and I had this thing with me, in the box it came in, ~~and~~ I said, Mr. Northrop, you know as well as I do, that I cannot accept this gift, ~~I said~~, you know the regulations just as well as anyone else,

Q: This was something like a $5 billfold.

R: Oh, a $5 billfold. I said, you know I can't accept this. And he said, well, I know that, but, he said, it's little thing, and it's got your name on it. I can't take it back, what am I going to do with it, I said, that's not my problem, it's your problem, and he said, just a minute, he said, Margaret, Margaret was his secretary, Margaret get that letter that I just got, so she came barging in with this letter, and he said, here, Read it, It said, "Dear Jack, Thank you so much for your kindness with this gift, ~~and~~ I appreciate your thoughtfulness, ~~so on and so forth~~, signed H.H. Arnold.

Q: This was the billfold

R: The billfold, he sent one to Arnold. So I said, ~~okay~~ OK, Jack, give it back, I put it in my pocket, and carried it for years.

Q: You know, General, what you say, brings up an interesting point.

R: I thought one instance, the way he took care of Eddie Perrin. I think that Arnold should have kicked Perrin out, as a matter of fact, he did.

Q: He did, because of his drinking?

R: Because of his drinking. That was Arnold's fault to start with?

Q: Really, why?

R: Eddie Perrin was down in Australia, and there was an advance AF group down there, and MacArthur at that time was in Brisbane, and MacArthur had some respect for the AF, respect for them, but he didn't realize that they could help him too much. But MacArthur, this is the way I understand the story, I have no firsthand knowledge, except what Eddie told me himself, because I knew Eddie. He lived next door.

Q: Did he work for Brett at that time?

R: Yes, anyway, they wanted a senior AF guy on MacArthur's staff, and they looked around and said, "well, who's over there?" at that time Eddie Perrin was in China, Chungking. They said, "well, here's China and Australia, they are just 2 or 3 miles apart," that type of thing, and they sent Eddie down ther, and they made him a BG, and he was a Captain, you know, and Arnold made him a BG, just like that, overnight, and that didn't set well with Eddie, he was not knowledgeable enough to carry the ball, and then he got pretty big headed and got to be the hotshot, and then he started to drink, and then he, of course, when he got down to Florida, they brought him back, didn't break him, and put him in Arnold's office.

Q: Why did Arnold put him in his office?

R: Because they couldn't assign him any where, he was so low ranking, at that time he was a real junior officer, and you couldn't put him in a BG's job, over all the old Colonels, you know, and the experienced guys had been in the service for 20 30 years, whatever; and there was just no place to put him. So they put him in Arnold's office, and then he went down to Florida, that rest camp down there near Miami, Coral Gables, yes, and Eddie started throwing his weight around down there, he ran into a Major one night, and told the Major off, the Major reported him for being drunk, and,

Arnold pulled the rug out from under him then, and sent him out to Sacramento, and he was out near Sacramento, and one day he came through Wright Field for something, I can't remember, got a quart of liquor and drank it all, in the hotel, died from alcoholic poisoning. you see, Arnold

Q: Did he commit suicide?

R: Yes, Arnold made him. Eddie was a real smart guy, he was real fine, if Arnold had busted him when he came back from overseas, from that particular thing, put him in a regular position on promotion list, I think Eddie would have turned out to be a real fine officer

Q: You know Arnold had a strong aversion to people who drank, that's why I'm surprised that he put him in. You see, Arnold...

R: He tried to protect him.

Q: Did he have some special interest? did they work together. Arnold took sort of a fatherly interest in a number of guys like Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell, was Eddie Perrin one of those favored?

R: Yes, yes. But you see, the other fellows were much senior, you see, Eddie Perrin was out of class, Norstad was out of '31 or '32, or somewheres there, and Rosie was, I guess, '26 out of the Academy, and here comes Eddie Perrin, came in there, class of '38, or something like that, and the war came on a couple of years later, and all of a sudden, he was promoted to a Captain, and at that time, you were 5 years a 2nd LT, 5 years a 1st LT, 7 years a Captain, and all these other fellows like Rosie, had gone through this process, but not Eddie. They suddenly made him....and there weren't many Generals in the AF at that time when Eddie was made, just a few.

Q: I saw a cable from MacArthur to Washington, complaining about promotion of a number of AF officers in Australia under Brett, this was a contributing cause to the alienation between Brett and MacArthur, as you know, MacArthur kicked Brett out of there, and then Kenney came in, this is like July '42. I wonder if Perrin was one of the cases that made MacArthur upset?

R: I can't answer the question, I don't know. But I do know that Perrin was with Kenney at that time in Australia, but Kenny was runnig the 5th AF, I think, and Perrin was on MacArthur's staff.

Q: As a BG?

R: As a BG, and I think Kenney and Perrin got along all right, but I say that I think they did, although Perrin was sent home.

Q: What was his specialty - Perrin's?

R: Perrin - power plant.

Q: He must have had something on the ball?

R: Oh sure, he was in the Power Plant Lab at Wright Field.

Q: I mentioned earlier Arnold's hate-love relationship with Wright Field. He was at Wright Field for 3 years and he was very unhappy. This is 1929-31. Chidlaw told me some of this, and Arnold didn't have enough to do when he was at Wright Field, and he saw some of the things that went on there, there was and a lot of things about Wright Field he didn't like, and of course, he respected Wright Field, yet there were some things about it he didn't like. Did you ever sense that he was equivocal in his attitude toward Wright Field, or even irrational sometimes?

R: I would say not. When I saw him at Wright Field, which I did frequently, ~~interpret it,~~ I thought he was generally pleased with Wright Field, and the things they were doing. His previous experience might have been the fact that Wright Field never had any money. They couldn't do things. Then, when the war came on, that's solved the money problem. You could get things done.

Q: One of the problems that Arnold jumped on Wright Field for, at least I think he did, had to do with the wing tanks for the fighters. These are the P-47s and P-38s, ~~self-seal, in the~~ middle of '43, Schweinfurt-Regensburg, all these losses. The P-51 is not quite ready, it came in around Jan '44, so they had these paper, or cardboard wingtanks, and they were pushing to get those in. did this problem come to your attention?

R: Not from the production standpoint. We were experimenting with the wing tanks

and we had self sealing tanks ~~because this~~, we had fire, ~~they had fire~~ problems, but I know there was just one hell of a lot of effort put on wing tanks, and it was all coming out of Washington daily. we also had another problem, which Arnold was really up in the air about, and that was the exhaust manifolds on the B-17s. I know that Arnold at one time ~~would~~, came to Wright Field, and the next place he hit was Ryan Aeronautical in San Diego, because the so-and-so exhaust pipes. the exhaust pipes would break and crack, they were stainless steel, and caused fires, and those two things, and brakes. Brakes were the other thing, at Goodyear.

Q: On the B-17?

R: Yes, they ~~built~~ dumped over a lot of B-17s, ~~with~~ the brakes, they had these multiple-disc ~~brakes~~ brakes. The damned things would get real hot, or get practically red hot, and the wheel would get so hot, it would blow the tire, It would just melt the innertubes. things like that. Arnold would, as I said earlier, sort of called technical details, he would just raise hell about them, and he wanted them solved day before yesterday.

Q: Right, they ended up buying some of these cardboard wing tanks from the British. Do you remember that?

R: No, I do not

Q: This is the fall of '43

R: I know of the wing tank thing, and I think that Kelsey was over there at that time when they were putting the wing tanks on P-38s, if I'm not mistaken?

Q: They were, but they didn't have enough. Of course, Eaker slowed down the deep penetration raids, after the second Schweinfurt raid, Do you remember the Black Thursday raid of Oct 14, they stopped raiding the German factories, and one of the things they were waiting for was wing tanks. And of course, the P-51 came in a little later. But you didn't directly get involved in that?

R: No

Q: Did you have anything to do with the B-29 engines?

R: No

Q: They were catching fire. This was one of the problems. Remember Benny

Meyers and Arnold going out to Salina, Kansas, to get the B29 program moving.

R: No

Q: This is 1944, March 1944.

R: I remember that, was it Salinas or Wichita.....operational base,

Q: Right. See, they had all these B-29s in various stages of modification, some lacked this and some lacked that.

R: This was a modification program which we had at Evansville, Indiana which we had on the P-47s, too

Q: Right. And the President was putting all kinds of heat on Arnold to get the B-29s bombing Japan, ~~and he had promised, I was told he had promised raids by the second anniversary of Doolittle, which was April 18th, and here it was March and these planes were still strewn all over the US~~. He and Meyers are supposed to have gone out to Salina, Kansas, ~~and run~~ a sort of modification central to get all these planes out there.

R: I remember this happening, when they had the big conflabs out of there. The Boeing people were all down there, raising hell about getting all this stuff, but I was never involved in that. That was basically a production job.

Q: Arnold is supposed to have had pet likes and dislikes. He took a liking to a guy, and he really elevated him. Rosie O'Donnell and Norstad,...

R: Yes, yes

Q: Did this cause some resentment?

R: I guess the answer is yes. You've got to look at these guys, too. You can't just say Arnold just ~~took~~ picked these men out, ~~all~~, well you take ~~Carroll~~ Frank Carroll, he should have been promoted,

Q: He made two stars didn't he?

R: Yes

Q: Did he make it after Arnold's time?

R: Yes.

Q: Maybe this is why he hasn't corresponded?

R: There was resentment becase the promotion frequency in the operating forces was much faster than it was in the technical field. And, yet, it wasn't too bad in the technical field, either, if you take a look at it.

Q: This could be the reason that I have not heard from Carroll. Of course, he later got involved in that ~~B-29 thing, not the B-29, the~~ B-36 investigation?

R: Yes

~~Q: He got involved in that~~

~~R: But, this was after that~~

Q: You were overseas, I know you said that you were ~~a~~ technical advisor ~~British~~ to various AFs. Did you have any contact with Arnold in this job?

R: ~~No.~~ No. Do you remember the incident where Gen Vanneman naman went flying over Germany, you know, as a passenger in one of the bomber missions, ~~so~~?, it was shot down, well, that put the clamp on everyone at Wright Field that was involved in these first developments.

Q: Did Arnold feel that this was a bad one, a security loss?

R: Yes. They didn't want anyone else to go. Vanneman, of course, knew everything that was going on, the Research and development program, the production program, some of the logistics programs....

Q: I was going to see him, he lives in Sacramento?

R: Ithink so, ~~and~~ he had all this stuff on his fingertips, A lot of the other the rest of us did, too, as far as developments, of what was coming up, ~~so on and so forth, and~~ etc. if I remember correctly, we were then playing with Whittle and Bell on the jet aircraft, ~~and~~ this was, you know, so damn supersecret you couldn't go to sleep at night without brainwashing yourself

Q: Did you get involved in the jet at all?

R: Yes

Q: Arnold was pushing it very hard?

R: Oh yes. Swofford was the project officer on the Bell aircraft, and he personally went and got the engines out of Great Britain.

Q: What was Kern's job

D.J. Kern

R: ~~Kern~~ ran the Power plant lab, [redacted]. Now, there is a fellow that had dealings with Arnold, too

Q: I talked to him, he lives out in [redacted], Delaplane, Va.

Interview - MG Marshall S. Roth, Colorado Springs, Colorado, April 29, 1972

Q: Do you recall the first time you met Hap Arnold?

R: I don't believe I do. I was at Wright Field for so many years and he used to come out there quite frequently. The Commander out there at the time was Oliver P. Echols, and my particular boss was Lawrence Craigie. Craigie headed up the Aircraft Projects Section. At that time I had the Fighter Branch under the Aircraft Project Section, interested in the development of new fighters.

Q: I've talked to Craigie, Kelsey and Keirn.

R: Oh, you have? Don J. Keirn.

Q: Yes.

R: Kelsey is my brother-in-law.

Q: Oh really? You know, he is a big time farmer in Stevensburg, Va. I was there. He was in overalls, and had this big farm hat. I didn't realize that.

R: His sister is my wife's sister. His wife is my wife's sister. He's a very interesting fellow.

Q: Anyway, Hap Arnold....

R: He used to come out quite frequently. In view of your visit, I've been trying to recollect some of the things that happened. Arnold always used to come out with an aide, and I can't remember the aide's name.

Q: Beebe?

R: No, it wasn't Gene Beebe.

Q: Horace Shelmire? The fellow with a moustache?

R: No, that doesn't ring a bell either.

Q: Toward the end of the war?

R: No, during the early part of the war. I can't remember who it was. But Gen Arnold always went to see Echols, and the aide would always run off. And the aide would always contact the fellow that was in charge of the project which Arnold wanted to discuss, and he'd always get ahold of the Project Officer. Arnold never wanted to talk to anyone in between. He never asked Echols about this airplane or that airplane, maybe in a casual way. But when it got down to what he

wanted to know; when was it going to be ready? How much was it going to cost? Why isn't it ready 9 months ahead of time? Or 6 months ahead of time? He was very, shall I say, pushy - is that the right word? Demanding, on getting things done. He would always talk directly to the Project Officer because he figured that that's the guy that knew more of the details about what was going on. This is what he was after. At that time, I had the Fighter Branch. Under those conditions, I talked to him on frequent occasions.

Q: What projects did you talk about?

R: Well, we were building a group of airplanes at that time, like the XP-54, XP-55 and XP-56. They were all pushers....

Q: That's with the prop in the back?

R: Prop in the back, yes. We developed those purely for aerodynamic reasons. But he always used to say: "You're not going to get any one to fly it." And he was exactly right, because you couldn't convince a pilot to jump out of a cockpit with that type propeller which Arnold referred to as a meat chopper - to jump out of that airplane with that thing behind you. So he said, he told us at that time: "You've got to solve that problem." Well, we did solve the problem, because we had various devices. When your seat was released, the escape seat - they all had them on at that time - spring loaded, the same release would release the prop, would throw the prop off. So the prop would be out of the way, and they were all equipped that way.

Q: They never panned out - the P-54, P-55, P-56?

R: No, no, the P-54 was built by Vultee. That's another story on that one because he, I'll mention it in a minute. The P-54 built by Vultee was a big airplane. It was too big for a fighter. Arnold was basically a small airplane man. P-55 was by Curtiss Wright. I think one of those crashed, and they only built two. And the P-56 they built one of. That was completed and flown, that was Northrop's. That was the flying wing fighter with an R-2800 engine in it, but he would have no part of it. Going back to the P-54, he came out there one day, just after I had flown the thing from the Vultee plant to Wright Field. He came out just a few days after and took a look at it, and he said: "Where is the

turbosupercharger?" If you remember, at that time, the Navy was in two-stage, two-speed compressor engines, and the AF was 100%, and Arnold was pushing for turbosuperchargers. He thought that was the answer, and I think it was. We took the airplane back, and put turbosuperchargers on it, and only increased the weight about 2,000 or 3,000 pounds, and it really spoiled the airplane, because it was too heavy with the extra weight on it. It had to be made a little longer, etc. But that's not the reason it was dropped. The reason it was really dropped was because people were not going to fly with that fan behind them. But it was an interesting experience.

Q: Was the fact that the P-51 had come into its own the last year of the war, and the fact that you also had the jet coming into being....

R: The jet was in the picture, and we didn't think it was in time, and it wasn't, but the P-51 was an excellent airplane, and admittedly the P-54, P-55 and P-56 and the P-77 would not have fitted into that picture at all, anyway

Q: The improvement over the P-51 was not great enough to warrant going into a new type?

R: No, no, it was too big an airplane for this type of thing they wanted. And they were looking forward to Pacific operations, and of course, the European operations.

Q: I suppose you felt you could not foreclose any possibility of research?

R: Well, these were research airplanes, in large extent. The P-55 was Canard-type, with the empennage out front, and that was sort of, none of them had previously been real successful. Although the SR-71 is a Canard type. He had another airplane, though, that he was very much interested in, and that was the P-77. This was Arnold's, and they used to call it "Hap's 444." Maybe you noticed, or picked it up. Everything was 4. It was supposed to weigh 4,000 pounds, go 400 mph, go to 40,000 feet, carry 4 guns, 4,000 rounds of ammunition. Everything had a four in it, and it was sort of known as "Hap's 444 airplane." I It was originally built by Bell and it was a little one, a real small one. You could just barely get a man into it. And it was made all in wood. Bell

Aircraft built it. They built three, and it was a pretty fancy, little airplane. But it was unsatisfactory for major conflict. It was too small, but the philosophy behind it was to have thousands of them built, a little like the Hughs transports, you know. They were going to build just hundreds of these and move troops all over. Of course, it was Hughes. But there were so many of these to be involved. They were going to have a squadron of maybe 50 or 60 or 100 of them, just like Mosquitoes all over. That fell by the board. Not because it didn't fly nice, etc. But we had to have more, just more firepower on those little airplanes. The engines were a problem. They were Offenhauser racing engines, two of them tied together. They are still building engines, Offenhauser is dead, but they are still building them.

Q: And Arnold had a special interest?

R: He had a special interest in this because it was a numbers racket at that time. He used to call us every once in a while: "How's that getting along?" We said: "Well, it is doing all right."

Q: Did he call you personally?

R: No, he used to call Bill Craigie. Bill and I would get on the phone. I don't know whether Bill was actually there when it finally came out, because I relieved Bill Craigie as Chief Project Officer. At that time, the trainers and the bombers and so on.

Q: I talked to him out at Burbank, and I don't remember it coming up.

R: When Bill left, I relieved him. But he had special interest in beginning, in getting these things done. Arnold always went to the man. He'd check you too; he would call the contractor. Sometimes we wondered why, he, in his position, when he had so many things on his mind, so many problems, that he would take a personal interest in a particular airplane. For instance, the helicopter. Frank Gregory, I don't know if you have ever talked to Gregory. He wrote the book, "Anything A Horse Could Do."

Q: I've heard of his name. Is he still around?

R: He's in Tulsa, lives in Tulsa. I don't remember who he works for down there, but he's in Tulsa. Well, he was the Project Officer on helicopters,

and of course, he had a Sikorsky airplane, or helicopter, coming out. They were going to fly it. Arnold and Echols and Frank Gregory and "Ski"(?) Omstead, who was the head chief pilot, test pilot at Wright Field, were standing out on the line, and Frank, the Sikorsky pilot was demonstrating this helicopter. They didn't fly too well at that time because the controls were slow and somewhat reversible, and so forth. But this fellow did a marvelous job of demonstrating this helicopter, and he set it down on a quarter out in the middle of the runway. Arnold didn't say one word. He just turned around and walked away. And he said: "It's a damn lie." We asked him later, why he, what he was referring to. And he said: "Just can't believe it!" But he used the words "Its a damn lie."

Q: It was just incredible.

R: Just incredible, well the way it happened..He was interested in that type of thing, he was not a technician or an engineer in the way he approached it.

Q: Was he sort of a gadgeteer, sort of interested in these new things?

R: He got into things like that. I think I would call him a "gadgeteer," not in his own right. But he would foresee or have knowledge of how to accomplish something. But when somebody else made a gadget, he was tremendously interested in it.

Q: I know there are many, many things that people sold him on that didn't turn out, explosive pencils, etc.

R: Oh yes, this is true. We were in a position, during the war, of trying to keep ahead of the state of the art, of trying to build new things, and whatnot. A good engineer could sit down and convince you of almost anything, except you could never convince me that we could go to the moon. As a matter of fact, I sold out. But a lot of these things were good ideas. There were funds available to put some of these ideas in. Arnold, sometimes, would say: "All right, go ahead." And then you would go back and tell your boss, who didn't like it anyway, and say: "I talked to Gen Arnold," and Arnold would talk to him, Gen Arnold said: "We ought to take a look at this."That changed the whole picture.

Q: When he said, go ahead, did he refer this back to a committee, or a

group, or was it simply his own say so, his own judgment?

R: Well, it was basically his own judgment.

Q: Did he follow up on these things? Did he call?

R: Most of them he did.

Q: Personally?

R: Well, no, not personally, but every once in a while you would get a blurb out of Washington that would say: "Gen Arnold would like a report on this." I never thought that he was very much of a reporter, as far as supplying data of what went on into Washington. He wanted a short, sweet, concise report on one subject. He didn't want these, say like: "I want a report every two weeks." And then you'd get stuck, get the paperwork going. He wasn't that type.

Q: When you replaced Craigie as Chief of the Fighter Branch, did Arnold start calling you up?

R: Yes, he'd always call me. He called me one night, I might add, at home. He was a great friend of Don Douglas, Sr., North of San Francisco there is a club, name of which slips my mind.(Note: Bohemian Groves?) He called me one night, and I don't know whether I was in bed or not, but I wasn't too alert, I think. But he said: "I want you to go over the Aircraft Program" - this included the fighters at that time - and he said: "I want $10 million taken out of that development program." What do you say, you know. I said: "Yes, sir." At that time, Frank Carroll, was Chief of Development up there. Frank Carroll lives up there in Boulder.

Q: I've been trying to get to see him but he has never answered me. Do you contact him?

R: I see him at the ball games. He comes down to the AF Academy ball games.

Q: I wrote him twice and he never answered me.

R: He looks fine.

Q: Good shape?

R: Yes, real good shape.

Q: I thought perhaps he was ill.

R: No, no, he's in good shape. But, I went to Frank Carroll the next morning and said I had a telephone call last night from Gen Arnold: "What did he want?" Well, I said: "He just wants $10 million taken out of this program". Carroll: "What for?" I said: "They are going to start a new organization which is a subsidiary of the Douglas Company, and they really have got a lot of people out there in this organization to do some research and development thinking." Well, this was the RAND Corporation that was cooked up by Arnold and Douglas.

Q: Was a fellow named Ed L. Bowles in it?

R: Dr. Bowles, is he from Stanford or MIT?

Q: MIT.

R: Yes.

Q: I talked to him in Massachusetts. He claims the major share of the credit for setting RAND up, and selling that to Arnold.

R: Well, he may have been up there, I don't know.

Q: You don't remember him in that picture?

R: Yes, he was in the picture, yes. He had, I can't remember the year...

Q: Late 1945. The war was over.

R: Yes, I guess it was. During that summer or the following summer, Douglas Company rented a lot of houses along the beach out there, and they brought in a lot of wonderful talent from the different universities, the people that were on sabbatical leave for 3 or 4 months. They worked in the building which was right across the street from the Douglas Company. That was the original RAND building. They started working on all kinds of different projects, they had aerodynamist people, and then they had a bunch of geologists for one reason I will never know. But they were studying the construction of runways in various parts of the world. It was interesting but personally, at that time, I thought it was just a hell of a waste of money, because they were paying pretty good salaries to these philosophers and doctors, whatnot, that were on sabbatical leave. But that was sort of the beginning of the RAND group.

Q: Arnold had this great vision that, instead of going back, like the Army

would go back to the arsenals, and the Navy would go back to the shipyards, and the in-house research, that he would try to latch on permanently to the greatest brains in the world on a postwar basis. It was a marvelous idea.

R: He's a little bit like Tom McDonnell of McDonnell Aircraft. When he thinks that somebody in these US knows something, and he wants to know what it is, he'll have no restriction in getting that guy to help him. This is, of course, what made McDonnell a strong organization.

Q: Anyway, you got this telephone call from Arnold, and that was the beginning.

R: Beginning of RAND. He and this group, I don't know who was there besides Douglas and Gen Arnold.

Q: Was Frank Collbohm in it?

R: Collbohm was the head of it. Frank was put in charge of the operation. He was the so-called manager, I guess, I don't know whether he hired the people or not, but set up the buildings. He did all that, I never knew what happened to Frank Collbohm.

Q: I interviewed him, he's out in Huntington Beach.

R: For a long period of time we didn't know what RAND was. But Bowles at that time, I think headed up the scientific group.

Q: Yes, he was sort of perhaps Arnold's honcho, if that is the correct word.

R: Yes, the other fellow involved in that was a fellow by the name of Stark Draper. Draper was head of the electronics group there at MIT, and he and Leighton Davis were the ones who put the electronics on the old Norden bombsight, and made the fancy bombsight on it.

Q: Going back to your experience with Arnold when you became head of the Fighter Branch. When he called you up, or did he call up frequently?

R: No.

Q: Did he ever bawl you out?

R: Yes, he did. I remember he was just madder than hell about something. I think it was probably my fault, because I'd told him we were going to have this airplane on such and such a date. We didn't get it.

Q: Do you remember which airplane it was?

R: It was either the P-54, P-55, P-56 or P-77 and the P-61 was involved, the Black Widow. I remember, it was late, and we didn't get it. There was something wrong here, and we had engine trouble, etc. He said: "Well, if you can't do it, I'll get somebody who can." You know, that type of thing. I think it was probably true because he would get exasperated at delays. Everything had to be done the day before yesterday. Maybe that's where that expression came from.

Q: In this case, you mention he bawled you out on the telephone. Did he ever bawl you out in person?

R: No, no.

Q: He had a penchant for grabbing people in the hall of the Pentagon?

R: Oh yes.

Q: And sending them on missions. Did you ever hear about this?

R: Yes, I've heard many stories on that, I can't recall any specific one. But I know that was true, because when I would be in Washington, I would go in to see somebody. "Where is so and so?" I was told: "I don't know where he is. Arnold sent him somewhere." And Arnold would do that, even though it was not in the man's own field of endeavor.

Q: And the guy couldn't pass it off to somebody?

R: No, he had to do it. One time, I think it was about 4:00 in the afternoon or 5:00 - probably 2 PM or 3:00 in the afternoon in California. The phone rang, and we were....I can't remember this airplane either because it was a Douglas Co. He said: "I want you out there." I had been head of the Project Branch, and they were building a bomber out there, a 26 or something. And he said: "I want you out here tomorrow morning at 7:00." This was creating a problem because how do you get out there. So I picked up Eddie Perrin who was in the Power Plant Lab.

Q: Was this before he came into Arnold's shop?

R: Oh yes.

Q: He became Deputy.

R: Oh yes, I know. I picked up Eddie Perrin, and Eddie and I got up and went down to get an airplane to go out to the West Coast. Olmstead, who was head of the Flying Branch there, he said: "We don't have any airplanes." So I said: "Well, I've got to get out there." He said the only thing we have is a C-45, or something like that. It was a little Lockheed, which looked like the...I can't remember, C something, a little one, two engine. I said: "This is fine, but I've never flown the damn thing." And Olmstead said: "Well, they all fly alike. You pull the stick back, and it goes up." Eddie Perrin and I matched to see who would fly the thing out after looking at the guages, and we flew in. We got into March Field the next morning about 3:00 AM.

Q: Was Arnold out at March Field?

R: No, Arnold was at Douglas Company. So we got in there about 3 AM. The next morning, we got up to fly into Los Angeles. It was full of fog. But Arnold wanted us at 8:00 the next morning at the Douglas plant. We got a car and drove in there, and I think when we got there, the problem had all been solved, and it wasn't any reason. But he wanted us out there so he could talk about this airplane. I think it was the A-26, Douglas Company. I'll tell you somebody that he really liked, though, that was Kelly Johnson.

Q: He's the one that designed the SR-71 and U-2?

R: Yes.

Q: He liked Kelly Johnson?

R: Yes, he thought the world of Kelly Johnson.

Q: Is he around?

R: Oh yes. He's Vice President at Lockheed. There was - the real start of that, the P-80, was started by Kelly Johnson and myself. There is an argument about who started this damned thing. But Arnold was down at Eglin Field, and there was some kind of a demonstration going on, and Kelly Johnson was there, and Kelly Johnson and Arnold and a group of us were talking about jet aircraft, and the P-60, the first jet that was built with the....

Q: P-59.

R: P-59, which was just getting going out at Muroc, and they brought

the engines over, Ralph Swofford was the man.

Q: He's in Montgomery, Alabama.

R: He was the project officer on that airplane. We got to talking about the airplane and Kelly said: "Hell, I can build a better airplane than that in 8 months." This, as I say, Arnold liked Kelly Johnson. So Arnold said, why don't you build one. Kelly said: "Who's going to pay for it?" Well, that brought me into the picture because Kelly wanted to talk to the R&D people at Wright Field. And so, he came up and we had quite a go-round about getting engines for it, and all that sort of thing, and the GE engine was due out. Kelly went to work on that one, and that thing just leapfrogged and he had that - Kelly's think tank - or whatever it is, they build the airplanes right next to where they were drawing them.

Q: Skunk works.

R: Yes, Skunk Works. And that thing flew on time, and that was quite a good show.

Q: This is probably one of the reasons Arnold highly regarded Kelly Johnson, because he met his deadlines?

R: Well, that's one reason, but Kelly you see, was also in the P-38 business, too, with Lockheed. He did a lot of work on that, did most of the work I guess on the P-38.

Q: It would be interesting to try to get to talk to him. I didn't know that Arnold and he were close.

R: Yes, Arnold had great respect for Kelly, because you know, Kelly used to talk right back.

Q: Really?

R: Oh, yes. He's a real tough Irishman, awfully nice guy, but when he thinks he's right....

Q: He's not intimidated?

R: Arnold couldn't change his mind one single bit. This is what he would do; this is what he could do.

Q: Let me ask you. Were a lot of people intimidated by Arnold?

R: I would say yes. Arnold would say this is what I want, and lot of people wanted to think of whether it could be done or not. There were mental processes. They'd start out: "Well, gee, can we do this?" And this is fine. But, if you gave him an answer: "Yes, we will do it." Well, Arnold wouldn't believe you, really, because he thinks you are going to be a yes man. And if you hesitated, and sort of argued with him, then he would get madder than hell. So you were between the devil and the deep blue. You had to be what you say be tactful with it, and say: "Well, I think there is a possibility there, and we will really work on it," this he would accept. But you couldn't argue that you can't do it, and you couldn't say "yes" right off the bat, he wouldn't a ccept either answer.

Q: I was told one of the things that infuriated Arnold was somebody who said: "Leave it to me, I'll take care of it, General." If something went bad, and Arnold called a man in for a report on it, he wanted to know what went wrong and when it was going to be fixed. If a man gave him a stall, or tried to put him off with something like: "Leave it to me, General; I'll take care of it," this, according to one of the people I interviewed, this would infuriate Arnold. He felt that he was being put off.

R: Left out of the picture?

Q: Yes. Was his wrath monumental? I mean when he got angry, did he splutter or was he articulate?

R: No, I think he was sort of articulate in that respect. But, if you are referring to a man getting red faced and furious, I would say "no." I think he was too calm for that.

Q: I have been told that Arnold "shot from the hip" oftentimes. Did he ever make unfair judgments in this sense. He made a lot of judgments. Obviously some of them were impulsive. But did he think through some of these things beforehand, or did he shoot from the hip?

R: Well, if we take this P-77, just as an example, I think he shot from the hip on that. I think that when everything had to be 4,000 feet, 4,000 rounds, 4,000 this and that, that was a shot from the hip, because I don't think anyone

could meet the requirements. No one could. We can't do it today. But I think that was just a shot in the dark. Now, he may have been told that this could be done. Larry Bell may have told him this, that we could build this many airplanes.

Q: They were very close? Larry Bell and Arnold?

R: Yes, I think they....

Q: Not quite as close as Douglas and Arnold?

R: No, no, I think that the Douglas people....

Q: Arnold's son married Douglas' daughter.

R: Yes.

Q: The middle son. I see Bruce often.

R: He was also fond of Jack Northrop, because Jack Northrop was very quiet, and never got excited. Jack was just too damned honest, really. Jack Northrop is one of the most honest guys in the world. If something went wrong with the airplane, it was personally Jack's fault. Jack said: "We'll take care of it." Well, financially, this wasn't good from a business point of view, to take care of all these things, because they weren't all his fault.

Q: One of the projects was that B-35, the Flying Wing. That never really worked out.

R: No, the jet engine spoiled it, in my opinion. When we had the four engines, the four propellers on the back, of reciprocating type engines, the gyroscopic action of these four propellers back there had a stabilizing effect on the flying wing. Wherein when you put the jets on, you lose that stabilizing gyroscopic effect. It then became unstable. The damned thing tumbled, which it did.

Q: Do you think that Arnold gave Douglas preference, in a sense, that is, because of their friendship, Douglas was favored? Did he ever lean towards Douglas in making a procurement decision that perhaps he would not have done if they were not such close friends?

R: I don't think so, because he had, Larry Bell was a close friend, Jack Northrop was a close friend. He got along very well with the powers that be.

Q: Kindelberger?

R: And Dutch, of course, he liked, I don't think that he was....

Q: In other words, Douglas had to work for every contract?

R: Douglas had to work the same as the rest of them. Now when it came to the establishment of RAND, this is something else again. This may have been a group of people, who were up at the club, and they got to talking and he was convinced that this was the right thing to do, and Douglas said: "Well, I'll supply the building," and this is the way it may have gotten started. You can't quote me on that, I don't know. Maybe Douglas was, you see, Douglas had a lot of good engineers up there.

Q: Drew Pearson didn't like Arnold for some reason.

R: Drew Pearson didn't like a lot of people.

Q: On one or two occasions he made such an insinuation that Douglas got preferences that he was not otherwise entitled to.

R: I wouldn't accuse him of that. Of course, the only funds that I had available in the Aircraft Project Section were those that were for R&D, and we spread that out pretty much.

Q: Arnold was very fond of Benny Meyers. Why?

R: Because Benny Meyers could get things done the way Arnold wanted them done. I've got to correct that. He could get the end result that Arnold wanted, out of Benny Meyers, regardless of how Benny Meyers did it. When we were building some of these airplanes in the production, there was an outfit by the name of, built generators. They ran out of generators, and they couldn't get generators, things like that...

Q: Is this for the B-29?

R: Yes, and so Benny Meyers went to Jack & Heintz. Jack was quite the playboy type of guy. He would come down with these very fancy clothes on, golf suits. He and Meyers were fairly close. But Jack & Heintz were paying tremendous salaries. The secretary was getting $20,000 a year, something like that. They were spending this money pretty well. Anyway, they got results out of it, until Jack couldn't get castings. So Benny set up this little organization down there,

and they had the castings made. He wasn't exactly the President, but Meyers was running it. Knudsen was there, and Benny was the boss and Knudsen was the Assistant. Knudsen was quite a guy, I thought. I thought that Benny Meyers was all right, too, really. When the war broke out on the 7th of December, the telephones rang, and all hell broke loose. Benny Meyers had to go to Washington right away, immediately, to get some airplanes. The President at the time wanted 25,000 or something like that. Benny Meyers had already ordered the damned things by telephone, without one damn bit of authority. Arnold liked that type of operation, and decorated the guy, you know.

Q: He did it himself. You know, Arnold in one instance that I recall well, yes. Benny Meyers was sort of cut in that pattern. You know, when Benny Meyers got in trouble, he tried to enlist Arnold's sympathy, and he almost did. Arnold had drafted a letter of support, but it didn't get sent out, for the probable reason that somebody called Arnold who was in retirement, and told him Benny was in trouble with this company, Bleriot LaMarre, the company. He was fooling around with the guy's wife, and he had this company in his pocket, and he was giving him subcontracts. Do you remember that one?

R: ....Snow White, who was a girl, was Benny Meyers secretary.

Q: Wasn't she married to the President of this little company?

R: Yes, but the President was the guy who owned the gas station in town.

Q: He set this guy up. He couldn't resist the temptation of a couple of dollars?

R: There was a great conflict of interest there.

Q: Benny Meyers always rode around in Cadillacs and always lived very well. Mrs. Arnold told me people thought he was just smart and made money in the stock market.

R: He did, that's where he made his money. Knudsen was sitting there as his Assistant.

Q: Even though he outranked Meyers?

R: Yes. Actually, Knudsen was given that title as a management expert.

Q: How did Knudsen and Arnold get along?

R: Well, I don't know. Arnold put him there.

Q: He wasn't much of a General, but he was a great production man?

R: He was a great production guy. That's why he was there. I might throw a little something in here. It doesn't have anything to do with it. But one of the things that I quote to my son and a few other people once in a while about Knudsen. It hasn't really got the bearing on Knudsen so much as it has on McNamara. But they brought 10 people down to the Ford Company - 10 apostles or whatever you call them - and the spokesman for this group was McNamara.

Q: He was a LTCOL, probably, wasn't he?

R: Yes, I think something like that. Anyway, they had a big group in there and they were working out on the logistic plans for the North African invasion. They had figured out down to the last nut and bolt what supplies were needed in North Africa, so many rations, so many rounds of ammunition, so many trucks and so many gallons of gasoline. They had it down. One of the things that came up real strong was the fact that we were sending enough stuff for the whole AAF contingent that was going over there. And McNamara always discounted about 5% for casualties. Then our philosophy was send it over. Give them all the gasoline and trucks and airplanes that they can possible use and never limit it, because of the possible casualties. Well, we were in the office one day with Benny Meyers, Knudsen and a whole group of us. I guess maybe 15, 20 of us. McNamara was supposed to put on this briefing for Meyers on how they were going to operate this logistics situation. He went through, and somebody asked him: "Well,"McNamara said: "With air cover and the Navy, we shouldn't lose any." And old Knudsen leaned back - and I can just see him today - he leaned back and in his Norwegian accent, he said: "Mr. McNamara, vors aren't von this vay."

Q: McNamara was a disciple of using the last bullet in the last gun, on the last day of the war?

R: That's correct.

Q: So they would have no surplus?

R: That's exactly correct. He had it all figured out on a computer or something. He didn't have computers. He really had a brilliant, really sharp mind.

Q: Tex Thornton was in there, wasn't he, among the statisticians. Ed Learned?

R: Learned was there.

Q: Learned must have been the senior man. He was a doctor from Harvard, and McNamara started making his name right at the time?

R: Right at that point, yes. We never paid any attention to him.

Q: Well, he didn't have the rank then.

R: No, but he would come out with these brilliant analyses of logistics problems, of production problems. Frankly, Benny Meyers was sort of the boss. He didn't pay any attention to him. And yet, Arnold I think, and McNamara got along all right. The AAF didn't pay much attention to him. That's one of the reasons I thought McNamara was always sort of anti-military, anti-service.

Q: He felt that he wasn't getting enough attention for his brilliant ideas? This is a marvelous story. Let me just try to place it in time. It was around the North African invasion, before it,planning the TORCH?

R: Yes, just planning for TORCH.

Q: And McNamara and this team came in to brief Knudsen.

R: And Meyers.

Q: In Wright Field?

R: Yes, at Wright Field.

Q: On what logistics would be required for the invasion. And he figured it very closely?

R: He figured it right down to the last thing. They did a fine job, if they hadn't lost anything, but I can still remember Knudsen remarking: "Vors aren't von that vay."

Q: It's a great line. I've never heard that story. It's a great story. I want to get back to Arnold and Meyers. I have been told that one of the reasons - you touched on the sort of periphery of this - that Meyers did things the way

Q: This brings me back to Meyers, right or wrong. Did Meyers knowing that Arnold needed a figure of 100 B-29s, let's say, did he give him that figure even knowing that it wasn't quite true yet? Was he likely to do that?

R: I think he was likely to do that, plus or minus. Because I think this was always true of Meyers. You couldn't always get an answer out of Meyers. I used to go over there once in a while: "I want to do this;" or "I want some money," or "I want to get an engine." This is one of the contacts I always had with Meyers. Meyers lived a block away, as a matter of fact. I had to get my engines for experimental airplanes out of a production schedule, and this was like pulling teeth, because the Production Division, which Meyers oversaw fairly closely, they wouldn't give a damned nickel: "It would spoil the whole production schedule." I could hear it. But, we got them eventually because there were other pressures brought to bear. If we couldn't get it out of Meyers, we would go to Washington and say this development is being withheld for lack of engines, and you would get one.

Q: There was an incipient scandal involving Meyers about 1943. Some rumors or anonymous letters written that he had carpeted his office, and put in some very fancy furnishings. A Congressional committee looked into that, and he denied it and the thing was sort of quieted in a while. Do you remember that?

R: Yes, but I didn't think it was his office. I thought it was his quarters.

Q: Maybe it was.

R: He re-did his quarters over there.

Q: With government furnished equipment?

R: He married a gal by the name of Ila.

Q: This was his second marriage, I believe?

R: Yes. Name of Ila, and he had, beautiful set of General's quarters, in black, black tile. Right in the middle, in three great big letters, was ILA. Of course, he used to entertain Congressmen that came in. They'd walk in and see this. I never heard about the office particularly. I think the offices were

pretty decent, he had nice offices.

Q: Well, apparently, he had generated a lot of envy and emnity, and there were anonymous letters about him. In 1943, just before Stratemeyer left as Chief of Air Staff - he was the No. 2 man to Arnold - a questionnaire was prepared, and all the people involved in procurement in Wright Field were required to sign it, stating their assets, stating their stock holdings, and so forth. In other words, it was sort of a financial statement. All people involved in AAF procurement signed. This was in response to some anonymous letters that were coming into Washington that guys in Procurement were feathering their nests. So Arnold had Stratemeyer do this. In fact, I talked to, remember Bill Nuckols, he was the guy who drafted this questionnaire. Did you have to fill out this questionnaire?

R: No.

Q: You weren't in procurement?

R: No, I was not.

Q: Do you remember this causing some flap in Wright Field?

R: Really, I don't. I don't recall it.

Q: In 1945, Knudsen had had enough. The European war had ended. This was like May or June, right after VE Day. Knudsen went back to building cars. Benny Meyers had aspirations to fill that job. It was a three-star job. He didn't get the job and he suddenly decided to retire, this was in June 1945. Were you at Wright Field at that time?

R: Yes.

Q: At the very same time, an anonymous letter came in to the FBI or to the AAF, and then it was shunted around. It made accusations against Benny Meyers which turned out to be substantially true, about he and Bleriort LaMarre, this Aviation Electric, the name of the company he was running. The AAF suppressed it at the time, and it wasn't until two years later that the Ferguson Committee dug it up. They were looking for some dirt about Elliott Roosevelt and Howard Hughes, and they came upon the Benny Meyers business. Do you remember anything that I'm saying here?

R: No. I might tell you a little incident that came to mind while we were talking about Benny Meyers receiving gifts. Arnold put out a letter, about the 1st of December each year, about accepting gifts from contractors. It came out every year, the same old letter. According to AAF regulations, so and so, personnel in the military will not accept gifts from contractors. It was generally known that people did get gifts from contractors on Thanksgiving Day, contractors like Bell Aircraft used to send a turkey around to every one. Mr. Symington of Emerson Electric used to send stuff around. There were a lot of things that came out. Arnold was quite annoyed with this, and he was going to put a stop to it. His staff wrote this letter, it came out about the 1st of December, on one of the years, about these gifts. They would not accept, and anyone who received and accepted a gift from a contractor would be on the "black list" for the rest of his life, that sort of thing. It was a real strong letter. Well, Christmas time came around and I got a pocketbook, a billfold, with my name on it. I got it from Jack Northrop, of Northrop Aircraft Co. I was out at Northrop a couple of weeks afterwards, and I had this thing with me, in the box it came in. I said: "Mr. Northrop, you know as well as I do, that I cannot accept this gift. You know the regulations just as well as anyone else.

Q: This was something like a $5 billfold.

R: Oh, a $5 billfold. I said: "You know I can't accept this." And he said: "Well, I know that." But, he said: "It's a little thing, and it's got your name on it. I can't tak it back. What am I going to do with it?" I said: "That's not my problem; it's your problem." And he said: "Just a minute." He said: "Margaret" - Margaret was his secretary - "Margaret get that letter that I just got." So she came barging in with this letter. And he said: "Here, read it." It said: "Dear Jack, Thank you so much for your kindness with this gift. I appreciate your thoughtfulness." Signed H.H. Arnold.

Q: This was the billfold.

R: The billfold, he sent one to Arnold. So I said: "OK, Jack, give it back." I put it in my pocket, and carried it for years.

Arnold liked. I have been told that Meyers sort of exaggerated statistics in order to please Arnold. He would anticipate what Arnold wanted, and then knowing that this would probably come true next month, he would give him next month's production figure today?

R: I can't make a statement in that regard because that was basically a production problem. Although I sat in lots of meetings and conferences, it didn't have anything to do with me. I was just there because of the position I held. I didn't get in the production. The only one airplane that I did really know something about, the production, was the P-47. That was a fighter, of course. What he told Arnold as far as the production of these things, I wouldn't know. I think that question could be answered real well by Mark Bradley.

Q: I talked to him out on the Coast.

R: That question could be answered because Mark Bradley had, he was the production manager for the P-47. He ran that whole show, incidentally, quite well.

Q: I'll fire a question at him on that score. This brings me to another question. Benny Meyers was actually the No. 2 man in MM&D, so-called. Echols was the No. 1 man. Yet Arnold very often bypassed Echols and went to Meyers?

R: This is correct.

Q: Why?

R: I think Echols was in the Engineering end, head of the Engineering Division. Meyers kept his fingers more on the production thing. I think it was probably natural, if Arnold wanted to find figures on production, why, the person to go to would be Meyers.

Q: Is there any truth in assumption that Echols being a southerner, slow talking, sort of gentle man, didn't cut it?

R: Personality wise, it may have something to do with it.

Q: And Benny Meyers was a fast talker, Arnold wanted an answer immediately?

R: And he'd get it right or wrong. He would get an answer out of Meyers. but Echols was basically an engineer.

Q: You know, General, what you say, brings up an interesting point.

R: I thought one instance, the way he took care of Eddie Perrin. I think that Arnold should have kicked Perrin out. As a matter of fact, he did.

Q: He did, because of his drinking?

R: Because of his drinking. That was Arnold's fault to start with.

Q: Really, why?

R: Eddie Perrin was down in Australia. There was an advance AAF group down there, and MacArthur at that time was in Brisbane, and MacArthur had some respect for the AAF, respect for them, but he didn't realize that they could help him too much. But MacArthur - this is the way I understand the story - I have no firsthand knowledge of this, except what Eddie told me himself, because I knew Eddie. He lived next door.

Q: Did he work for Brett at that time?

R: Yes. Anyway, they wanted a senior AF guy on MacArthur's staff. They looked around and said: "Well, who's over there?" At that time Eddie Perrin was in China, Chungking. They said: "Well, here's China and Australia. They are just 2 or 3 miles apart," that type of thing. They sent Eddie down there, and they made him a BG, and he was a Captain, you know. Arnold made him a BG, just like that, overnight. That didn't set well with Eddie. He was not knowledgeable enough to carry the ball. Then he got pretty bigheaded and got to be the hotshot, and then he started to drink. Of course, when he got down to Florida - they brought him back, didn't break him - and put him in Arnold's office.

Q: Why did Arnold put him in his office?

R: Because they couldn't assign him anywhere. He was so low ranking. At the time he was a real junior officer, and you couldn't put him in a BG's job, over all the old Colonels, you know, the experienced guys had been in the service for 20 or 30 years. There was just no place to put him. So they put him in Arnold's office. Then he went down to Florida, that rest camp down there near Miami, Coral Gables. Eddie started throwing his weight around down there. He ran into a Major one night, and told the Major off. The Major reported

him for being drunk. Arnold pulled the rug out from under him then. They sent him out to Sacramento, and he was out near Sacramento for awhile. One day he came through Wright Field for something, I can't remember. He got a quart of liquor and drank it all in the hotel. He died from alcoholic poisoning.

Q: Did he commit suicide?

R: Yes, Arnold made him. Eddie was a real smart guy. He was real fine. If Arnold had busted him when he came back from overseas, after that particular thing, put him in a regular position on the promotion list, I think Eddie would have turned out to be a real fine officer.

Q: You know Arnold had a strong aversion to people who drank. That's why I'm surprised that he put him in. You see, Arnold....

R: He tried to protect him.

Q: Did he have some special interest? Did they work together? Arnold took sort of a fatherly interest in a number of guys like Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell. Was Eddie Perrin one of those favored?

R: Yes, yes. But you see, the other fellows were much senior. You see, Norstad was out of '31 or '32, or somewheres there. Rosie was, I guess, '26 out of the Academy. Here comes Eddie Perrin. He came in there, Class of '38, or something like that. The war came on a couple of years later, and all of a sudden, he was promoted to a Captain. At that time, you were 5 years a 2nd LT, 5 years a 1st LT, 7 years a Captain. All these other fellows like Rosie had gone through this process, but not Eddie. They suddenly made him...and there weren't many Generals in the AF at that time when Eddie was made, just a few.

Q: I saw a cable from MacArthur to Washington complaining about promotion of a number of AF officers in Australia under Brett. This was a contributing cause to the alienation between Brett and MacArthur. As you know, MacArthur kicked Brett out of there. Then Kenney came in, this is like July '42, I wonder if Perrin was one of the cases that made MacArthur upset?

R: I can't answer the question, I don't know. But I do know that Perrin was with Kenney at that time in Australia, but Kenny was running the 5th AF, I

think, and Perrin was on MacArthur's staff.

Q: As a BG?

R: As a BG. I think Kenney and Perrin got along all right. But I say that I think they did, although Perrin was sent home.

Q: What was his specialty -- Perrin's?

R: Perrin - power plant?

Q: He must have had something on the ball?

R: Oh sure, he was in the Power Plant Lab at Wright Field.

Q: I mentioned earlier Arnold's hate-love relationship with Wright Field. He was at Wright Field for 3 years and he was very unhappy. This is 1929-31. Chidlaw told me some of this. And Arnold didn't have enough to do when he was at Wright Field. He saw some of the things that went on there. There was a lot of things about Wright Field he didn't like. Of course, he respected Wright Field. Yet, there were some things about it he didn't like. Did you ever sense that he was equivocal in his attitude toward Wright Field, or even irrational sometimes?

R: I would say not. When I saw him at Wright Field, which I did frequently, I thought he was generally pleased with Wright Field, and the things they were doing. His previous experience might have been the fact that Wright Field never had any money. They couldn't do things. Then, when the war came on, that solved the money problem. You could get things done.

Q: One of the problems that Arnold jumped on Wright Field for - at least I think he did - had to do with the wing tanks for the fighters. These are the P-47s and P-38s.

R: The self-seal....

Q: In the middle of '43, Schweinfurt-Regensburg, all these losses. The P-51 is not quite ready. It came in around Jan '44. So they had these paper, or cardboard wingtanks, and they were pushing to get those in. Did this problem come to your attention?

R: Not from the production standpoint. We were experimenting with the wing tanks and we had self sealing tanks. We had fire problems. But I know there was

just one hell of a lot of effort put on wing tanks, and it was all coming out of Washington daily. We also had another problem which Arnold was really up in the air about, and that was the exhaust manifolds on the B-17s. I know that Arnold at one time came to Wright Field, and the next place he hit was Ryan Aeronautical in San Diego, because the so-and-so exhaust pipes. The exhaust pipes would break and crack - they were stainless steel - and cause fires, and those two things - and brakes. Brakes were the other thing, at Goodyear.

Q: On the B-17?

R: Yes, they dumped over a lot of B-17s, the brakes. They had these multiple-disc brakes. The damned things would get real hot, or get practically red hot. The wheel would get so hot, it would blow the tire. It would just melt the innertubes. Things like that. Arnold would - as I said earlier, sort of called technical details - he would just raise hell about them, and he wanted them solved day before yesterday.

Q: Right, they ended up buying some of these cardboard wing tanks from the British. Do you remember that?

R: No, I do not.

Q: This is the fall of '43.

R: I know of the wing tank thing. I think that Kelsey was over there at that time when they were putting the wing tanks on P-38s, if I'm not mistaken.

Q: They were, but they didn't have enough. Of course, Eaker slowed down the deep penetration raids after the second Schweinfurt raid. Do you remember the Black Thursday raid of October 14th? They stopped raiding the German factories. One of the things they were waiting for was wing tanks. And of course, the P-51 came in a little later. But you didn't directly get involved in that?

R: No.

Q: Did you have anything to do with the B-29 engines?

R: No.

Q: They were catching fire. This was one of the problems. Remember

Benny Meyers and Arnold going out to Salina, Kansas, to get the B-29 program moving?

R: No.

Q: This is March 1944.

R: I remember that, it was Salina or Wichita....operational base?

Q: Right. See, they had all these B-29s in various stages of modification. Some lacked this and some lacked that.

R: This was a modification program which we had at Evansville, Indiana, which we had on the P-47s; too.

Q: Right. And the President was putting all kinds of heat on Arnold to get the B-29s bombing Japan....He and Meyers are supposed to have gone out to Salina, Kansas. They ran a sort of modification central to get all these planes out there?

R: I remember this happening, when they had the big conflabs out of there. The Boeing people were all down there raising hell about getting all this stuff, but I was never involved in that. That was basically a production job.

Q: Arnold is supposed to have had pet likes and dislikes. He took a liking to a guy, and he really elevated him. Rosie O'Donnell and Norstad....

R: Yes, yes.

Q: Did this cause some resentment?

R: I guess the answer is yes. You've got to look at these guys, too. You can't just say Arnold just picked these men out. Well, you take Frank Carroll. He should have been promoted.

Q: He made two stars, didn't he?

R: Yes.

Q: Did he make it after Arnold's time?

R: Yes.

Q: Maybe this is why he hasn't corresponded?

R: There was resentment because the promotion frequency in the operating forces was much faster than it was in the technical field. And, yet, it wasn't

too bad in the technical field, either, if you take a look at it.

Q: This could be the reason that I have not heard from Carroll. Of course, he later got involved in that B-36 investigation.

R: Yes.

Q: You were overseas, I know you said that you were technical advisor to various AFs. Did you have any contact with Arnold in this job?

R: No. Do you remember the incident where Gen Vanaman went flying over Germany, you know, as a passenger in one of the bomber missions? It was shot down. Well, that put the clamp on everyone at Wright Field that was involved in these first developments.

Q: Did Arnold feel that this was a bad one, a security loss?

R: Yes. They didn't want anyone else to go. Vanaman, of course, knew everything that was going on - the Research and Development program, the production program, some of the logistics programs....

Q: I was going to see him, he lives in Sacramento.

R: I think so. He had all this stuff on his fingertips. A lot of the other, the rest of us did, too, as far as developments, of what was coming up, etc. If I remember correctly, we were then playing with Whittle and Bell on the jet aircraft. This was, you know, so damn supersecret you couldn't go to sleep at night without brainwashing yourself.

Q: Did you get involved in the jet at all?

R: Yes.

Q: Arnold was pushing it very hard?

R: Oh yes. Swofford was the project officer on the Bell Aircraft, and he personally went and got the engines out of Great Britain.

Q: What was Keirn's job?

R: D.J. Keirn ran the Power Plant Lab. Now, there is a fellow that had dealings with Arnold, too.

Q: I talked to him, he lives out in Delaplane, Va.

Ruestow, Paul E. 8 Jan 72

done
1-8-12

PAUL E. RUESTOW
[illegible] AVENUE
Sarasota, Florida 33577
[illegible] 1565

Ap + 243

3 December 1971

Mr. Murray Green:
Office of Air Force History
Dear Mr. Green:

I will be in Sarasota at the time of your visit. You will be welcome. The telephone number is correct.

Sincerely Yours
Paul Ruestow
Maj Gen., USAF, Ret'd.

Pass
Bayfront
4 I.S. - Starts
east - 6 blocks
2 red lights
= Wood Streets
100 yds left.
Ron Florsta
4 = Valley
opts on
R.

2 December 1971

Maj General Paul E. Ruestow, USAF (Ret)
Florasota Gardens
243 Florasota Avenue
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Dear General Ruestow:

I'm the fellow working on Hap Arnold and will be coming through your area about January 5th, give or take a day. I have your phone number as AC 813-955-1925.

Incidentally, one of my missions in Florida will be to screen the papers of General Hugh Knerr who passed away last month in Bethesda Naval Hospital. As you may know, General Knerr lived in Coral Gables. I mention this particularly because General Knerr was your boss, I believe, for a period in the ETO.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

20314

19 April 1971

Major General Paul E. Ruestow, USAF (Ret)
Florasota Gardens
243 Florasota Avenue
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Dear General Ruestow:

I was very pleased to have your prompt response to my inquiry. I will be passing through Sarasota when I make my trip South and would be delighted to phone you to say hello. At that time, if you can think of any Arnold anecdotes which may be helpful to me, I would be pleased to stop by for a few moments.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

MG/sjp

write
refer to
Knerr

write
5-6

PAUL E. RUESTOW
249 Florencia Ave.
Sarasota, Florida 33577

16 April 1971

Dear Dr. Green

My direct personal contacts with General Arnold were so minor that I can not contribute to his autobiography. I appreciate your flattering suggestion and your thoroughness in going to all possible sources.

Nevertheless, you would, of course, be welcome here. I will be going north for the summer in June, the date not yet firm.

My telephone is 813-955-1925. I am listed in the Sarasota directory.

With my best wishes for your book.

Sincerely

P.E. Ruestow

20314

14 April 1971

Major General Paul E. Ruestow, USAF (Ret)
Florasota Gardens
243 Florasota Avenue
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Dear General Ruestow:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold which is to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian presently assigned to General Grussendorf's office in order to complete this assignment.

In spending about 18 months on a Brookings Institution Fellowship, I was able to research all of the vast Arnold collection at the Library of Congress. I also went through the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Eaker, Andrews, Knerr, LeMay, and other collections.

Aside from the written word, I have tried to interview the most important Air Force people who had contacts with General Arnold some time during his colorful career. Among those interviewed: Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, and perhaps 100 others. I have also been privileged to talk to Charles A. Lindbergh, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, Robert Lovett, Jackie Cochran, and a number of others.

I have run across your name in a couple of contexts which may have brought you in some contact with General Arnold. If you feel you can contribute any anecdotes, insights, or even scuttlebut which you think has validity, I would be pleased to stop by for a chat during a pending trip to the Southland in early June.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

MAJOR GENERAL PAUL E. RUESTOW, USAF

PART I - Narrative

Paul E. Ruestow was born the second of five children, in Rockville Center, Long Island, N. Y., on December 29, 1908. He was graduated from Lynbrook, L.I., High School in 1926. He received a Congressional appointment to the U. S. Military Academy and entered the Academy in the fall of 1926. He graduated eighth in the class of 1930 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers.

His first assignment was Engineer Corps Officer on River & Harbor Duty in New York City. His duties were to improve navigable waterways around New York City and New Jersey.

In 1932 he attended the Princeton Graduate School of Engineering, where he received the degree of Civil Engineer and was elected to the honorary Engineering Research Society of Sigma Zi.

From 1933 to 1935 Lt. Ruestow had his first troop duty as Company Commander and Regimental Adjutant of the First Combat Engineers at Ft. Dupont, Delavare. In the spring of 1935 he attended a two weeks' ground-school conducted by the Air Corps at Mitchel Field N. Y., for officers of other branches. Soon after he applied for admission to Flying School, was accepted, and entered school at Randolph Field, Texas, in September 1935. He graduated at Kelly Field in 1936 and was assigned to Bombardment.

Lt. Ruestow's first Air Corps assignment was to Luke Field, Hawaii, where he was with the 72nd Bombardment Squadron.

In January, 1939, Lt. Ruestow was transferred to Mitchel Field, L.I., and assigned to the 9th Bomb Group and later as Base Engineering Officer. In this job he coped with a wide variety of technical problems concerning the new aircraft of that day. This led to his work in 1942 in developing mobile technical units used in World War II, followed by his assignment to Hq USAF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In November, 1944, Colonel Ruestow went to England with the War Department Gasser Manpower Board, to France as Deputy Commander Air Technical Service Command Europe and eventually to Wiesbaden as A-4, United States Air Forces in Europe. Colonel Ruestow was awarded the Legion of Merit for his work on mobile technical units and an oak leaf cluster for his work in Europe.

On his return from Europe in 1947 Colonel Ruestow went to DCS/M, Hq USAF, as Assistant for Logistics Plans and Assistant for Materiel Program Control. He attended the National War College in 1948 and 1949, and served as Air Force member of the Joint Logistics Plans Committee in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In May 1952 Brigadier General Ruestow became Commander of the Far East Air Materiel Command with Headquarters at Tachikawa, Japan. During his three and a half years there, his Command supported the U.S.A.F. and U.N. forces in Korea, maintained equipment in the war in Indo-China, and deployed American forces and equipment to Formosa. He came in clost contact with all our allies in the Far East, Japan, Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, and Australia. He worked constantly to improve our relations with them and to build up their aviation industry capability to support our military operation. He received the Distinguished Service Medal and the Order of the British Empire for his work in the Far East.

In 1955 he returned to the United States and was assigned as Director of Personnel and Support Operations at Headquarters, AMC, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

PART II - Personalized Material

A. Interests

Golf has always been an absorbing interest, starting with a summer caddying job as a young boy, on the West Point golf team, and continuing now wherever he happens to be all over the world; shoots in the 80s.

Enjoys chess, bridge and gin rummy.

Dislikes night life, and when not at work or on the golf course, prefers to be home.

Director of American Social Hygiene Association; Shriner.

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations

Likes seafood and rare beef.

Very conservative as to clothes - prefers to wear jacket and tie.

Likes to read history; doesn't have enough time for fiction.

Likes classical music of the lighter variety, especially Chopin.

Has travelled extensively in both Europe and the Far East and enjoyed all of it.

"You've got to be flexible"; "Master the fundamentals".

Demands honesty and real effort - has no patience with laziness or complainers.

Emphasizes physical fitness and has promoted athletic programs in his commands. In Japan all his FEALCGFOR teams excelled in competition, the football team winning the Far Eastern championship.

Rather quiet; does not talk unless he has something of value to contribute.

Dislikes the too-glib talker and the smart-alec.

Detects insincerity immediately.

His work comes before all personal considerations.

Is very conscientious and a hard worker, but knows the value of delegating responsibility to his subordinates.

"He has a mind like a steel trap".

PART III - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

Born 29 December 1908, Rockville Center, N.Y.
Father - Ernest William Ruestow
Mother - Luella Mae Ruestow
Married 18 May 1935; Wife - Clara Frances Grant; Children - George F., 22, University of Dayton; Edward G., 20, University of Penn.; Claire, 13.
Home address - 9 Orbach, Malverne, N.Y.

B. Education

Graduate Lynbrook H.S., Lynbrook, N.Y., 1926.
Graduate U.S. Military Academy, 1930.
Princeton Grad. School of Engineering, C.E., 1933.
Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, 1936.
National War College, 1949.

C. Service Dates

1930-1935 - Corps of Engineers
1935-1936 - Flying School
1936-1938 - Luke Field, Hawaii - Bomb Sq. Officer
1938-1942 - Mitchel Air Force Base - 9th Bomb Gp; Base Engineering Officer; Commander Air Base Group
1942-1944 - Hq USAF Materiel Joint Chiefs of Staff
1945-1947 - Europe; War Department Manpower Board; Deputy Commander Air Technical Service Command; Europe; A-4, USAFE
1947-1948 - Hq USAF - Materiel
1948-1949 - National War College
1949-1952 - Hq USAF - Materiel and JCS Logistics
1952-1955 - Commander, Far East Air Logistic Force
1955-1958 - Director, Personnel and Support Operations, AMC

Interview - MG Paul Ruestow, Sarasota, Florida, 8 January 1972

Q You say you had one important contact with Hap Arnold?

R Well, I didn't mean that it was important. I meant that it was a very personal one. It came about when I went on a trip with him to NY. We spent the night in a hotel up there.

Q Was it the Astor Hotel?

R I think it was the Astor

Q That was the favorite hotel.

R Well the years have passed and the memory is not so good.

Q The Astor is not there any more.

R I'm quite sure it was the Astor because we didn't walk very far up Broadway to the theater. Well, I didn't go, because he selected me to go with him, because he told my boss to send one of his men.

Q What was your job?

R I was working for Lyman Whitten; I think you know him.

Q Yes, I interviewed Lyman Whitten.

R Yes, so it was in Materiel and he told Lyman to send one of his men, and Lyman pointed his finger at me, and that's how I got there.

Q You were what, a Major or Lt Colonel?

R I was a LTCOL. You see, there was a whole generation, I expect, a full generation between myself and General Arnold age-wise.

Q You were very junior?

R I don't know what class General Arnold was

Q He was '07.

R Well, there was more than a generation gap. It was 23 years because I was '30, At any rate, the thing that sticks in my mind at this date, after the work was done, the work was inspection of the air defense activities up there in NY and Philadelphia.

Q Was Chaney in charge of that?

R No, at this time Pete Quesada was the big wheel. This was just before Pete went to North Africa.

Q This was late '42 or early '43?

R I'm not sure whether it was late '41 or early '42.

Q It was right after Pearl Harbor?

R Yes, very early.

Q Quesada was head of the Air Defense?

Well, I forget precisely what job Quesada had, but he was one of the prime movers.

Q Was Gordon Saville involved in that?

R Gordon Saville was very much involved in that, but I have a vague recollection that he had left by that time.

Q You know the guy I'm thinking of was Partridge. Was Partridge involved in that?

R I don't remember Partridge being involved. Of course, I know Partridge. I served under him in Japan.

Q In any event, this was an Air Defense problem.

R Yes, just a general looksee. He had to get an idea what their needs were

Q Did you get to visit with General Hugh Drum? Hugh Drum was in charge of the Eastern Sector. He was the Army...

R No, no, we only visited at the operational level of this. This was Arnold to me. This is what typified Arnold to me. He wanted to get in where the boys were doing the job, to find out what they needed, how they were getting along.

Q This was characteristic of him?

R I thought so. He was strictly business, I thought. He had his eye on the ball all the time, and the ball was these boys that had to

go fight the war. The idea was to give them what they needed to do it, in both training and materiel, and see that their job got done. It was a mammoth job.

Q They had this, I think it was the First Concentration Command. Could that have been? It was dissolved shortly after the war started. But this was a sort of Port of Embarkation, to see if the troops were ready.

R No, this had nothing to do with that. In NY City, Fighter Aircraft Defense...

Q At Mitchel Field?

R. Originally the Hqs was at Mitchel Field. Some of the airplanes were based at Mitchel Field. But at the time, they had a control center in NY City and in Philadelphia where these civilian watchers would send in reports - spotters.

Q The Ground Observer Corps?

R Yes, there were a lot of them around where we went, because we were in the Control Center.

Q Did you fly up with him or come up by train?

R Yes, we flew up to Mitchel, and then spent the night in the hotel, because the facility we were to visit that morning was in the heart of NY City, It was the Control Center for the air defenses of NY. That was its purpose. We were in the heart of it, the meat of the matter, you might say. We had the control people and the Fighter Group Command in there. The question was, what do these control people need and what does this Fighter Group Commander need to carry out his mis mission in the defense of NY and Philadelphia. This is Arnold, see, the man. Of course, involved, also, was the training needed to go overseas and so the same thing. So the training aspect was there, for this Fighter Defense job and Air Control job.

Q Did he find out what the problems were?

R Well, I'll tell you, I was more or less nuts and bolts and I was looking at it from my angle, and I wasn't involved in the weighty matter of operations.

Q Your angle was materiel shortages?

R Yes.

Q What kind of material were you interested in?

R All AAF materiel.

Q This is radar detection stuff?

R Actually, I didn't have to bother much with the communications because Maj Gen Ray Maude was there and he was athe communicator, MG Maude.

Q He must have been Army.

R He was Army transferred to AF, same as I was, got started in the Corps of Engineers. I went AF in '36 and Ray Maude went in as Communicator, and came a little later. But everything else materiel-wise.

Q Do you remember Sanderford Jarman, he was an Army man, Air Defense? He was trying to get into the AF at a high level. Do you remember his name?

R No, of course the name is a familiar military name, Army and there was a Jarman in the AF, you man.

Q Might have been the son?

R So I recognized the name but I can't fix the particular man.

Q Was your mission a success in NY?

R Obviously, it was always a success. At any rate, the personal aspect that stayed with me, it gave me an insight into him, because that night we came to his hotel room for a little chat, and then all went to dinner together and then on to a show. I saw a different side of General Arnold. As we gathered, and all through that evening,

I found a very warm, considerate and friendly man. I can still remember that picture with that smile on his face, an affectionate smile. So I think personally he was a very warm man.

Q He had a smile on his face most of the time, maybe all of the time. Some people said that this smile could precede a storm?

R I don't agree with that, because the contrast between his face, the smile, and the next morning when we met in the control center, it was so marked, the expression on his face, then, was one like I feel I have when I'm trying to hit the golf ball. He had his eye on the ball, strictly business, and I think that's all what it was.

Q Did he ask pertinent questions? Was he briefed? Did you brief him, well you didn't know the operational side of it?

R No, we all sat there and listened to the operational briefing. I was in on all that, but my purpose was to pick up any problems in the materiel area.

Q Anybody else accompany him from the operational side?

R But he asked very pertinent questions to the people there, not at me. I was supposed to listen.

Q Did anybody else accompany you from Washington?

R Yes, sure, people you know, Bozo McKee, I'm sure you know. He was the Exec Officer, he was a Colonel then.

Q Mervin Gross might have had it then.

R But you see, Bozo at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, Bozo had been Coast Artillery, and Anti Aircraft Artillery with the Army. So he was a valuable aide on this trip because of his knowledge of the Anti Aircraft activities of the Army because they were immediately involved in any aircraft defense problems. At that time, well, today too, you have them very carefully coordinated. So Bozo was a very important aide on that trip for that purpose.

Q He liked Bozo, he became very close to Arnold.

R That's understandable, Bozo is quite a doer.

Q What Broadway show?

R It was a Broadway show and Gen Arnold, as I say, was the most pleasant company. He just enjoyed it, and I still have a delightful picture of that evening with him. But he did, which is another indicator of what Gen Arnold is like. At dinner, the talk before dinner in the room, and just chitchat.

Q Where did you have dinner?

R I don't even remember that.

Q Was it a restaurant in downtown NY?

R I don't remember. But the thing that stuck with me about Gen Arnold about that evening was that at dinner he drank nothing. Promptly after the show, he said: "Excuse me, gentlemen, I'm going to my bed." And he did. He knew he had a lot to do the next day and it seemed to me, from that one occasion, he meticulously took care of himself. Although I do think the way he drove himself through the war, I

Q He had a heart attack, he had a bad one later on in 1945, and the doctor told him to go to bed early.

R From that one brief insight into his personal life, I got the impression, at least, at that stage, meticulous.

Q Did you ever see him again after that?

R Oh yes, I'd see him frequently but only when he was a member of large groups, like when he was giving a lecture, a large conference, where I was just one of the smaller cogs, and he was up front. I saw him many times but I wasn't meeting him eyeball-to-eyeball.

Q He and Mrs. Arnold, too, by the way, both of them had outstanding memories for identifying faces with names. In fact, Buster Briggs told me yesterday he hadn't seen Arnold for many years and he came up

and said: "How are you Buster, and how's your wife, Kay?" Mrs. Arnold had that faculty, too, a wonderful memory for names of people. I just wonder if this occurred to you.

R I couldn't comment. I don't doubt it, though.

Q You never met him again in a personal basis where he could recall you?

R Usually people that achieve the positions that he did, often have that ability.

Q Was Arnold articulate at these staff meetings?

R He was clear, eminently clear.

Q One of the impressions I get from people is that when people walked away from these large meetings, each man had a clear idea of what he was supposed to do. If Arnold asked somebody: "I want you to see me in 10 days," if the guy didn't come back in 10 days, he got a call. I mean Arnold gave responsibility and then he followed up to see that they were carried out. Do you have any recollections along this line?

R That was what I understood, and I'm sure, I can't do it based on any personal experience but that was common understanding. Of course, that's what it took in those days for the job had to be done. He just had to be that way.

Q He had a reputation as a doer rather than a thinker. Does this fit in with your conception?

R I think General Arnold, for my book, has to be characterized as a great administrator. So in a sense that a great administrator is a doer instead of a thinker, although no one can be a great administrator without being a good thinker.

Q I don't mean a thinker, a conceptual type of thinker, Fairchild had a great reputation of being a great ideologue.

R That's like this old story about whether it was Hindenburg or Ludendorff. I'll go with Hindenburg and give Ludendorff all the credit for his great planning. But still Hindenburg had to make the decisions, and so did Arnold.

Q Of course, he had to make tremendous decisions.

R He was the one who finally had to say "yes" and "no" to make the decision, so I can't take anything from him in the thinking.

Q When you got out of flying school in '36 where did you go?

R We went to Hawaii for two years and from there to Mitchel Field. I was at Mitchel Field when the Japs struck Pearl Harbor. It was as a result of that blow at Pearl Harbor that I received a telephone call at 7:00 one morning from Lyman Whitten of whom I had never heard of before, up in the Pentagon. He said: "I've got this urgent job. Can you get it done? It involved getting some fighter aircraft in crates off in Boston and getting them down to Mitchel and get them assembled. They were headed to Russia at that point. I must have done a good job of that, because the next thing I knew he yanked me into the Pentagon. That's how I got there. I had never known him before.

Q Lyman Whitten told me a story that Arnold grabbed him in the hall and said: "What happened to those guns?" something involving guns in North Africa, and probably the guns didn't work or didn't have some equipment, and Whitten had to take off within hours to North Africa to solve some problem involving guns. Maybe they were turret, power turrets. I can't recall precisely what the issue was. But he had to take off immediately. Arnold grabbed him in the hall, this thing was on his mind. The issue had come up and he saw Whitten and he knew whe was in Materiel and he grabbed him and he said: "Get out there and see what the problem is."

R That's what Whitten did to me.

Q Did he send you on that mission?

R No, I received the 7:00 in the morning telephone call, I didn't

even know who he was. But I didn't ask any questions; I got it done. Apparently that caused him to summon me.

Q Right. Arnold was a great one for grabbing people in the ahall and sending them on missions, to the CBI or to Europe, and some people avoided the E Ring.

R The only story that I ever heard, and not by personal knowledge, but everybody came back laughing about this reported incident, because everybody heard it. There was only one man who could ever tell him no and that was MG Johnson, I think he had 2nd AF at that time.

Q Oh, Davenport Johnson.

R Davenport Johnson, he was reputedly an old friend of Arnolds. And it seems Davenport was coming down the corridor...

Q Right after Steve Ferson died in Arnold's office?

R Yes, and Davenport heard about it, you see, and Davenport, the story went, was coming down the corridor, in front of Arnold's office. Arnold came out the door, and saw him there in the corridor, and said: "Davenport, just a moment, I want you to come in here." And Davenport, the story goes, said: "Oh, no, you're not going to get me in there."

Q Well, this is one of those, I'm not sure it's real. It may have been a little embellished.

Q You say you had one important contact with Hap Arnold?

R Well, I didn't mean that it was important. I meant that it was a very personal one. It came about when I went on a trip with him to NY. We spent the night in a hotel up there.

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R No, this had nothing to do with that. In NY City, Fighter Aircraft Defense...

Q At Mitchel Field?

R. Originally the Hqs was at Mitchel Field. Some of the airplanes were based at Mitchel Field. But at the time, they had a control center in NY City and in Philadelphia where these civilian watchers would send in reports - spotters.

Q The Ground Observer Corps?

R Yes, there were a lot of them around where we went, because we were in the Control Center.

Q Did you fly up with him or come up by train?

R Yes, we flew up to Mitchel, and then spent the night in the hotel, because the facility we were to visit that morning was in the heart of NY City, It was the Control Center for the air defenses of NY. That was its purpose. We were in the heart of it, the meat of the matter, you might say. We had the control people and the Fighter Group Command in there. The question was, what do these control people need and what does this Fighter Group Commander need to carry out his mission in the defense of NY and Philadelphia. This is Arnold, see, the man. Of course, involved, also, was the training needed to go overseas and so the same thing. So the training aspect was there, for this Fighter Defense job and Air Control job.

Q Did he find out what the problems were?

R Well, I'll tell you, I was more or less nuts and bolts and I was looking at it from my angle, and I wasn't involved in the weighty matter of operations.

Q Your angle was materiel shortages?

R Yes.

Q What kind of material were you interested in?

R All AAF materiel.

Q This is radar detection stuff?

R Actually, I didn't have to bother much with the communications because Maj Gen Ray Maude was there and he was the communicator, MG Maude.

Q He must have been Army.

R He was Army transferred to AF, same as I was, got started in the Corps of Engineers. I went AF in '36 and Ray Maude went in as Communicator, and came a little later. But everything else materiel-wise.

Q Do you remember Sanderford Jarman, he was an Army man, Air Defense? He was trying to get into the AF at a high level. Do you remember his name?

R No, of course the name is a familiar military name, Army and there was a Jarman in the AF, you man.

Q Might have been the son?

R So I recognized the name but I can't fix the particular man.

Q Was your mission a success in NY?

R Obviously, it was always a success. At any rate, the personal aspect that stayed with me, it gave me an insight into him, because that night we came to his hotel room for a little chat, and then all went to dinner together and then on to a show. I saw a different side of General Arnold. As we gathered, and all through that evening,

I found a very warm, considerate and friendly man. I can still remember that picture with that smile on his face, an affectionate smile. So I think personally he was a very warm man.

Q He had a smile on his face most of the time, maybe all of the time. Some people said that this smile could precede a storm?

R I don't agree with that, because the contrast between his face, the smile, and the next morning when we met in the control center, it was so marked, the expression on his face, then, was one like I feel I have when I'm trying to hit the golf ball. He had his eye on the ball, strictly business, and I think that's all what it was.

Q Did he ask pertinent questions? Was he briefed? Did you brief him, well you didn't know the operational side of it?

R No, we all sat there and listened to the operational briefing. I was in on all that, but my purpose was to pick up any problems in the materiel area.

Q Anybody else accompany him from the operational side?

R But he asked very pertinent questions to the people there, not at me. I was supposed to listen.

Q Did anybody else accompany you from Washington?

R Yes, sure, people you know, Bozo McKee, I'm sure you know. He was the Exec Officer, he was a Colonel then.

Q Mervin Gross might have had it then.

R But you see, Bozo at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, Bozo had been Coast Artillery, and Anti Aircraft Artillery with the Army. So he was a valuable aide on this trip because of his knowledge of the Anti Aircraft activities of the Army because they were immediately involved in any aircraft defense problems. At that time, well, today too, you have them very carefully coordinated. So Bozo was a very important aide on that trip for that purpose.

Q He liked Bozo, he became very close to Arnold.

R That's understandable, Bozo is quite a doer.

Q What Broadway show?

R It was a Broadway show and Gen Arnold, as I say, was the most pleasant company. He just enjoyed it. I still have a delightful picture of that evening with him. But he did, which is another indicator of what Gen Arnold is like. At dinner, the talk before dinner in the room, and just chitchat.

Q Where did you have dinner?

R I don't even remember that.

Q Was it a restaurant in downtown NY?

R I don't remember. But the thing that stuck with me about Gen Arnold about that evening was that at dinner he drank nothing. Promptly after the show, he said: "Excuse me, gentlemen, I'm going to my bed." And he did. He knew he had a lot to do the next day and it seemed to me, from that one occasion, he meticulously took care of himself. Although I do think the way he drove himself through the war, I

Q He had a heart attack, he had a bad one later on in 1945, and the doctor told him to go to bed early.

R From that one brief insight into his personal life, I got the impression, at least, at that stage, meticulous.

Q Did you ever see him again after that?

R Oh yes, I'd see him frequently but only when he was a member of large groups, like when he was giving a lecture, a large conference, where I was just one of the smaller cogs, and he was up front. I saw him many times but I wasn't meeting him eyeball-to-eyeball.

Q He and Mrs. Arnold, too, by the way, both of them had outstanding memories for identifying faces with names. In fact, Buster Briggs told me yesterday he hadn't seen Arnold for many years and he came up

and said: "How are you Buster, and how's your wife, Kay?" Mrs. Arnold had that faculty, too, a wonderful memory for names of people. I just wonder if this occurred to you.

R I couldn't comment. I don't doubt it, though.

Q You never met him again in a personal basis where he could recall you?

R Usually people that achieve the positions that he did, often have that ability.

Q Was Arnold articulate at these staff meetings?

R He was clear, eminently clear.

Q One of the impressions I get from people is that when people walked away from these large meetings, each man had a clear idea of what he was supposed to do. If Arnold asked somebody: "I want you to see me in 10 days," if the guy didn't come back in 10 days, he got a call. I mean Arnold gave responsibility and then he followed up to see that they were carried out. Do you have any recollections along this line?

R That was what I understood, and I'm sure, I can't do it based on any personal experience but that was common understanding. Of course, that's what it took in those days for the job had to be done. He just had to be that way.

Q He had a reputation as a doer rather than a thinker. Does this fit in with your conception?

R I think General Arnold, for my book, has to be characterized as a great administrator. So in a sense that a great administrator is a doer instead of a thinker, although no one can be a great administrator without being a good thinker.

Q I don't mean a thinker, a conceptual type of thinker, Fairchild had a great reputation of being a great ideologue.

R That's like this old story about whether it was Hindenburg or Ludendorff. I'll go with Hindenburg and give Ludendorff all the credit for his great planning. But still Hindenburg had to make the decisions, and so did Arnold.

Q Of course, he had to make tremendous decisions.

R He was the one who finally had to say "yes" and "no" to make the decision, so I can't take anything from him in the thinking.

Q When you got out of flying school in '36 where did you go?

R We went to Hawaii for two years and from there to Mitchel Field. I was at Mitchel Field when the Japs struck Pearl Harbor. It was as a result of that blow at Peari Harbor that I received a telephone call at 7:00 one morning from Lyman Whitten of whom I had never heard of before, up in the Pentagon. He said: "I've got this urgent job. Can you get it done? It involved getting some fighter aircraft in crates off in Boston and getting them down to Mitchel and get them assembled. They were headed to Russia at that point. I must have done a good job of that, because the next thing I knew he yanked me into the Pentagon. That's how I got there. I had never known him before.

Q Lyman Whitten told me a story that Arnold grabbed him in the hall and said: "What happened to those guns?" something involving guns in North Africa, and probably the guns didn't work or didn't have some equipment, and Whitten had to take off within hours to North Africa to solve some problem involving guns. Maybe they were turret, power turrets. I can't recall precisely what the issue was. But he had to take off immediately. Arnold grabbed him in the hall, this thing was on his mind. The issue had come up and he saw Whitten and he knew he was in Materiel and he grabbed him and he said: "Get out there and see what the problem is."

R That's what Whitten did to me.

Q Did he send you on that mission?

R No, I received the 7:00 in the morning telephone call, I didn't

even know who he was. But I didn't ask any questions; I got it done. Apparently that caused him to summon me.

Q Right. Arnold was a great one for grabbing people in the hall and sending them on missions, to the CBI or to Europe, and some people avoided the E Ring.

R The only story that I ever heard, and not by personal knowledge, but everybody came back laughing about this reported incident, because everybody heard it. There was only one man who could ever tell him no and that was MG Johnson, I think he had 2nd AF at that time.

Q Oh, Davenport Johnson.

R Davenport Johnson, he was reputedly an old friend of Arnolds. And it seems Davenport was coming down the corridor...

Q Right after Steve Ferson died in Arnold's office?

R Yes, and Davenport heard about it, you see, and Davenport, the story went, was coming down the corridor, in front of Arnold's office. Arnold came out the door, and saw him there in the corridor, and said: "Davenport, just a moment, I want you to come in here." And Davenport, the story goes, said: "Oh, no, you're not going to get me in there."

Q Well, this is one of those, I'm not sure it's real. It may have been a little embellished.

Rusk, Howard A. 13 Apr 70

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine
400 EAST 34TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016
AREA 212 679-3200
CABLE ADDRESS: NYU MEDIC

March 31st, 1970

Move 4-13-70

My dear Dr. Green:

In reference to your letter of March 26th, I will be delighted to see you on Monday, April 13th at 11:00 a.m. We can talk for a while and then have lunch here at the Institute.

I look forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

Howard A. Rusk

HAR:mc

Howard A. Rusk, M. D.
Director

Dr. Murray Green, SAFAAR
Deputy Chief, Research & Analysis Div.
The Pentagon - 4C881
Washington, D. C. 20330

Monday

26 March 1970

Dr. Howard A. Rusk, M.D.
Director, New York University Medical Center
400 East 34th Street
New York, New York 10016

Dear Dr. Rusk:

I'm delighted to have your letter of March 11. May I suggest Monday, April 13, at 10:30 A.M. We can talk for an hour or so and then have lunch.

I am putting together a schedule of interviews in New York City built around the one with you. Could you please confirm the time and date for me.

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Atch

Rider would be
pers physician to Truman
went with Arnold to Potsdam

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine
400 EAST 34TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016
AREA 212 679-3200
CABLE ADDRESS: NYU MEDIC

March 11, 1970

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of March 4th regarding the biography of General Hap Arnold. I will be delighted to see you and discuss my contacts with General Arnold.

I am free on April 13, 16 and 17th at 12:30 and would be happy if you could join me for lunch here at the Institute on one of these dates.

I look forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

Howard A. Rusk, M.D.
Director

HAR:mt

Dr. Murray Green, Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

P.S. Please let me know your choice so that I can reserve the date.

April 13 10 AM
then lunch

March 4, 1970

Brig. General Howard A. Rusk, USAF (Ret)
c/o New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York 10036

Dear General Rusk:

John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House.

I am normally in the Office of the Secretary Robert Seamans, Jr. and am a trained historian. I've been on a Brookings Institution Fellowship to search the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, Mitchell, et al collections at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division.

I've also been up to the FDR Library at Hyde Park for several weeks.

As we have completed our research of the written word, we are engaged in interviewing the key personalities who were associated with General Arnold some time during his career. I've talked with Robert Lovett and Generals Kuter, Norstad and Kenney in New York.

I'm especially interested in your contacts with General Arnold on the trip to Potsdame in July 1945 and I'm hopeful it will be possible for you to spare me an hour or two in mid-April during a planned visit to New York. May I suggest some time during the week of April 13-17th.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Atch

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

From

HOWARD A. RUSK, M. D.
~~The New York Times~~
c-o Institute of Rehabilitation
Medicine
400 East 34 Street
New York, N. Y. 10016

Dr. Rusk is retiring from The Times as of March 30, 1970. He will no longer maintain an office here.

Your letter has been forwarded to him at The Institute.

3-6-70

PLEASE DISCONTINUE SENDING RELEASES AND OTHER INFORMATION TO DR. HOWARD A. RUSK AND EUGENE J. TAYLOR AT THE NEW YORK TIMES, 229 West 43 Street, New York, N. Y. 10036 after March 31, 1970.

Dr. Rusk will no longer maintain an office at The Times.

Dr. Rusk and Mr. Taylor use the same material so please send only ONE COPY to:

Dr. Howard A. Rusk
Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine
400 East 34 Street
New York, N. Y. 10016

Interview, Brig General Howard A. Rusk, New York City Univ., Medical Center, New York City, April 13, 1970

R: Prior to the war, I practiced internal medicine in St. Louis for 16 years, but I felt that I couldn't stay on that in the practice of medicine making house calls and looking after old Miss Pryor's back for $10 a visit with three kids, and two of them boys. I didn't want the war to end. When my boys would say in the future: "What did you do in the war?" I'd have to say: "I sat it out." So I went into the AF overage. I was assigned to Jefferson Barracks, which had been taken over by the Army as a basic training center. I was in charge of the medical program, medical wards, medical service. I was surprised and disturbed by seeing my several hundred patients, most of them--80% at least--walking around in their purple bathrobes looking perfectly well and getting into all kinds of mischief. So, being brash and naive, I discharged about 80% of my patients the first week I was there. I was amazed to find that 90% of them were back in the hospital in 24 hours. Then, I suddenly realized that there was no "go home and take it easy for a couple of weeks." You are either in or out. If you are in, you are a patient. If you are not a patient, you were a soldier. That might mean a 10-mile hike the first day. So I came to the profound conclusion that you didn't get ready for a 10-mile hike playing blackjack in the hospital sun parlor and listen to a bedside radio. It seemed rather logical if these boys were recovering from accidents over the obstacle course, or the flu, or bad colds, or sore throats, or what have you, that while they were in the hospital, they could use this time to send them back to duty in the best condition possible. But I had a terrible time in getting

this idea started. But I got some impetus in late September of 1942 when BG Hugh Morgan came to visit Jefferson Barracks. I had gone in August 19, 1942 and as we walked through these miles of corridors, and these boys walking by, he said: "This is really awful, and something should be done about it." He said: "You are averaging 50,000 men a day in your AF hospitals, and you are the smallest unit. But that's 50,000 non-effectives every day." He said: "You know, it is touch and go as to who is going to win this war, and this is a lot of people. We would to do something about capturing this convalescent time that is wasted." He said: "If you get any ideas, let me know." Then, I decided that we should start a program on our wards to see if it would work. I had a terrible time to get any personnel assigned, but I happened to have two patients in the hospital--one was a teacher, and one was a wonderful photographer, so I kept them in as patients. They became the first teachers. Then a crafty Army administrative Major, who had been a Master Sergeant said: "If you can't get anybody, I can tell you a trick that I think will work." He said: "you are President of the CDD Board. Why don't you bring them up before the Board and discharge them. Then reconvene the Board the next day, and because you have gotten other evidence, you rescind the discharge. Then they become members of our detail, and you can use them as you want." That's how I got the first two people. So we started, and it looked like it was going to work. We got physical educators that would come into a ward. The beds were tagged with various colors. If it was red, they were still in a dangerous stage. If it was yellow, it was medium, and if it was green, they got the green light. They came in and exercised the ward twice a day. Then we brought teachers

in to teach the usual things they did in a basic training center--military courtesy, airplane identification. That started in an interesting way. I was making rounds one morning and one of the boys in a cast--broken leg--he was very disgruntled. I said: "What's the matter with you?" He said: "I could kill that orderly." I said: "What did he do?" and he said: "There's a spider web up over my bed, and he took a broom and brushed it away. I had more fun watching that spider make its web, and have young. The one thing that I enjoyed, now it is gone." So I said to myself: "Gee, if they are going to look at the ceiling all day, let's put airplane models on the ceiling." So we strung these little black plastic models on a long string that went the whole distance of the ward on a pulley, and they would look at one airplane for two hours, and then they would pull the string and look at the next one for two hours, and we found it was a most effective way of teaching aircraft identification. The first time that we were sure the program was going to work, was when we took 500 kids that had had virus pneumonia, all treated in the same acute wards, and sent over to alternate convalescent wards. In War 1 they sat around and waited for nature to take its course and went back to duty when they and the doctors felt they were able. Group 2, 24 hours after their temperature was normal, we put them in a training program for 12 days. It started with 1/2 hour activity on the first day and ended on the 12th day with 8 full hours and ended with a 10 mile hike. Group 1, unsupervised, averaged 45 days in the hospital, with a readmission rate of just a little over 90%. Group 2 in the program averaged 31 days in the hospital with a readmission rate of only 10%. That was the first time that we knew we really had something.

Q: This was when?

R: This was early spring of 1943. I wrote a short report on the success of the first rehabilitation program at Jefferson Barracks to Gen David Grant. He became my great supporter--just on one page about what we had done--and he immediately ordered me to come to Washington. After two hours he said: "You are going to be assigned here to start this program in all AF hospitals. I had never written a directive, an order. I knew absolutely nothing about it. I had a card table and a bunch of very sharp pencils and a lot of yellow tablets. A friend helped me write the directive that set this program up. I can't remember the number, but it was AF No. so and so, and it was two paragraphs, and I gave the mission, what we were going to try to do, and what we wanted them to do in the field. That's the way the program started, and the whole mission was run on this two paragraph directive. Now, we didn't have enough teachers, so anybody that came into the hospital filled out a questionnaire, and he gave his service experience and education. And if we felt that he had something to give the other people, his other buddies, then he became a convalescent teacher. In the spring of 1945, we were teaching about 350 subjects in AF hospitals that varied from everything military courtesy, to the training of war dogs, to airplane assembly. The radio schools were very interesting. First visit I made out of Washington was to a radio school up in Sioux Falls. The camp up there was in an area they called "Pneumonia Gulch," because they had more pneumonia there then any place in the whole AF. And if a boy went to radio school and missed as much as two days, he had to repeat the whole course, so I went up to see this program, and I saw the CO. He gave me short shrift. He said: "What is it you want to do?" I told him and he said: "I don't have

any time for this. I have too many other things to do." Then he said: "What is it you really want to do?" And I said: "I want to wire all the wards for code, and I want it to come over at given times of day, and I want these boys to take their course right in their beds." I said: "We've got the basic people and we've got the numbers, but you won't assign us anybody." "No," he said, "we don't have any people." I said: "I'm going to leave this afternoon. I'm going down to Scott Field. They have a radio school, and we'll set it up down there. Gen Grant and Gen Arnold are very much interested in this program." He said: "You mean, the Old Man is interested?" I said: "The Old Man has read about it and he is interested in it." He said: "Can you possibly stay over till tomorrow morning?" And I said: "No, I can't." He said: "I will tell you that by tomorrow morning we will have all the wards in these hospitals wired for code, and Sioux Falls will be the first center to have this program, and I will telegraph you tomorrow that this has been accomplished." That's exactly what happened. Then, when I went down to Scott Field I could tell the General there, who also wasn't interested, that Sioux Falls was in a race to have the first one. Then I learned that when you said: "Gen Arnold was interested."

Q: Boy it really opened the doors.

R: Then we got into the early ambulation after surgery. Instead of keeping patients in bed the conventional 2 or 3 weeks, or 10 days, or whatever it was, they got up on the day after surgery. Then we found that we saved--in this group--50% hospital time. We had 50% less complications, and they required 50% less sedatives and pain killers. I can remember when Gen (Norman) Kirk was made the Surgeon General. He was coming back from Africa.

Q: He was Army Surgeon General?

R: Army. His relationship was a close one with Secy Stimson because when Stimson was in the Philippines, Kirk was the Surgeon there, and Stimson's sister broke her leg, and Kirk looked after her. He was a good orthopedic surgeon, but he had no patience with our program at all. On his way back from Africa, Kirk stopped in Miami, and we were going like mad there. He went unannounced into one of our hospitals on the beach, which was directed by Capt Donald Covalt, who has been with me ever since, and is now Associate Director of this Institute, and Dr. Covalt had his hernia patients out exercising on the beach, and the boys were running up and down in casts, and whatnot. He described Gen Kirk's reaction. He said: "I thought he was going to have a stroke." He got as red as a beet and said: "What's this?" And I told him with great pride. And he said: "We'll stop this nonsense, and left." The first order that Kirk gave out to the field when he went back was that a hernia patient, instead of getting up the day after an operation, must stay in bed two weeks, that he would be in the hospital another two weeks, and would get 30 days sick leave. We were getting our boys back to duty in 10 days. We followed a prepared series of 300 boys that had hernias repaired at Miami Beach into all theaters of operation six months later, to see what had happened to them. There was one recurrence in the group that got up the day of operation, and there were 7 recurrences among those who stayed in bed. So again we thought we had something. So I went to Washington--I think it was Feb or March 1943--and we saw immediately that our great problem was one that we could handle, manage and have responsibility for the boys in the AF hospitals. But the casualties were coming back from overseas. The AF got the first from the 8th AF.

They went into Army General Hospital, and we didn't get them for a long, long time. Gen Grant was then having a great feud with Gen Kirk, and Gen Arnold was supporting Grant, to try to get AF hospitals separated. We realized that this program was a kindergarten compared to what we had to have for casualties returning from combat.

Q: How did you get some help? (from General Kirk's opposition)

R: Shortly after I went to Washington, I met Mrs. Arnold who was head of the Ladies Air Force Auxiliary Emergency Relief. I got to tell my story to her and she became greatly interested in it. And she made an appointment for us to have lunch with Mrs. Roosevelt, and the three of us had lunch at the White House. I remember that this was the period when Mrs. Roosevelt decided that they would be on the same rations as everybody else was. We had the worst lunch I almost ever tasted. It was hard boiled eggs with some kind of a cream sauce and a little wisp of salad, and that was it. But Mrs. Roosevelt became tremendously interested in the program, and Mrs. Arnold had arranged for Mrs. Roosevelt and me to come to dinner at their home the following week.

Q: You hadn't met Gen Arnold yet?

R: No. We went there (to the Arnolds) for dinner, and I was sitting next to the General so I could give him the briefing, and hopefully, the treatment, during dinner. He became very, very interested and right in the middle of the dinner--he was late getting down because his boy was having trouble with his algebra and the General wanted to help him with his homework.

Q: That must be the youngest, David.

R: Yes. So then in the middle of dinner, there was a big flourish, and in barged C.R. Smith, wonderful person, we became great friends,

well, he had just arrived an hour before with the first copy of that documentary, The Memphis Belle, and he had brought the crew up, and he showed it to all of us that night. It was tremendously impressive. Well, I was sorry it wasn't on another night, because it sort of took away a little from my presentation. But I had been able to sow the basic seed, and then the next event, was really the thing that was the catch stone. Mrs. Roosevelt became interested in a young man named Henry Viscardi, a brilliant fellow, young lawyer, 25 years old from NY, who was born without legs, both off above the knee. Hank had gotten a job with the Red Cross, working at Walter Reed to teach amputees to walk. But the union--that's the physical therapist--didn't approve of this. They were practically all AF youngsters. So Hank used to bootleg his program out behind the bushes, and he had a car on which he'd give driving lessons. He came to me, and I met General Grant. We were very sympathetic, but also we were powerless. But he came over to me one afternoon in the very early spring of 1943, with three AF boys--air crew, as I remember--a pilot, a navigator, and I think, a gunner. They were all amputees, and according to the Army Surgeon General's policy, they were fitted with the cheapest kind of temporary leg, really made of papier mache and rivets, because the book said that this was the Veteran's Administration's job. So they were to go to the Veterans Administration. Everybody that knew anything about it, knew that this was nothing but a hoax, because the VA had no program, not only not for rehabilitation but the most primitive kind of program for orthopedic appliances of all kinds. VA had no training program whatever. Two of these boys were waiting for a bus, and for one of them, the rivets came out, and he fell down in the street, and almost got run over. So the

other boys helped him, and with the leg under his arm, he finally got back to the hospital and they put another rivet in. But these boys were absolutely livid. They said: "This is what you get for fighting for your country. Look at this SOB, coming apart. I can't walk. I almost got killed yesterday." They were the angriest kids you ever saw, and properly so. So I said: "Wait a minute." Gen Grant was in his office and I said: "I want you to see three airmen," and I marched them down to his office, along with Mr. Viscardi. I didn't get halfway through my story with David Grant until he got red as a beet, and he buzzed Gen Arnold's buzzer, and asked if the General was in, and if so, it was very important that we come down and see him. Arnold said: "Come down." So we all marched down. Grant said: "Howard, tell the story." So I got about halfway through, and I thought Gen Arnold was going to have a stroke. His face was flaming, and he reached over and pressed down every button on his squawk box--Barney Giles, and 4 star generals and Bob Lovett. They thought--everybody came rushing in, and the Old Man shook his head and said: "This is the damndest outrage I ever saw." He said: "Im' too old to fly these crates, and you all are too old." He said: "These are the boys that are fighting this war," and he said: "I spend my time--90% of it--trying to get the best airplanes, the best gasoline, the best clothing, the best food, and the best weather information that I can get, so they can fight for us." And he said: "By God they are going to have the best legs, or I'll know why." And he picked up the telephone and got the Army Surgeon General on the phone, and he repeated this with plenty of mustard, and he ended by saying: "There will be a program set up for these boys within two weeks or I will personally go to the President of the US,

do you understand? Completely." Apparently, he did, and he banged up the phone. Within 30 days a bill was put through Congress that all allocated $1 million dollars to set up the first research program in orthopedic development--artificial limbs. A national committee was set up. I can remember an engineer from Chicago whose name was Klapsteg, and the head of the Hospital then called the Ruptured and Crippled. It is now called the Hospital for Special surgery here that was headed by Dr. Philip Wilson, who was an outstanding orthopedist and they were the two. I can only say that now, 25 years later, that this program would still operate. The monies have gone out, and this was the nucleus that started the whole research program in artificial limbs in this country. The first thing, you see, we didn't have any arms. If a man had both arms off above the elbow prior to WW II, he was dead as far as life was concerned, the rest of his life. He had to have somebody with him. The first modification of these limbs, was a special wire that was developed in a large aircraft company in California. This was a special cable that would attach. It went through a certain number of holes, and it was strong enough and had enough resilience so that then, arms worked, if a boy raises his shoulder, and that opens his hand on the other side. I remember seeing a boy, both arms off, above the elbow, and blind, which is very, very difficult, because they have to have their fingers to read braille. But he had been taught to read Braille with his lips. I remember that we talked about what we had before, and what we developed then, and he was quite self-sufficient with these hooks. He could dress himself, and he was going back to college, although he was blind with this disability. Well, our program then started in all of our AF stations and regional hospitals. We operated the first year and a half without a dollar or

without a greater rating. We stole everything. I hate to confess this, but it's true. Maybe it's more polite to say we borrowed everything. Doctors took this on in addition to their other duties, and we had a publication once a month in which they would write in if they developed anything new in their programs, if they thought somebody else could use it. They had Victory Gardens, and they raised chickens and we had airplane motors on the sun parlor where they could go in and take them down and put them back together again. I told you about the radio schools. That's why we only needed a little two-page directive. We passed it back and forth, and then word got down of Gen Arnold's continuing and increasing interest in that program.

Q: Anytime you had trouble, mentioning Hap Arnold opened doors for you?

R: Oh sure, completely. Through Gen Grant, I had a pipeline, and I see Arnold myself, which I did on one or two occasions. Well, then we realized that this program in the regional hospitals was not enough, that we had to have was not enough, that we had to have special rehabilitation centers and this is when the concept of the whole program, as it operates today, was first conceived. This is, it is just not enough to meet the physical needs of the individual, but you have to meet the physical, the emotional, the social, and the vocational and educational needs. Then we evolved this saying which is now mostly cliche, that you had to treat "the whole man." We were ready to start. Lowell Thomas then became very much interested in the program for the reason that his boy got rheumatic fever down at Montgomery, Alabama, at Maxwell Field. Lowell came to see me about what could be done for his boy, and we knew that then that we got them in a dry

climate and in a training program, and went on slow and easy. Instead of having to discharge 90%, that there was anumber that we could save. I will finish this story of Lowell Thomas, Jr., went to this center at Davis-Monthan Field in Tucson. He made a brilliant recovery, and then he became a convalescent teacher, until he got very restless and then he went back to Flight School and became a pilot, and instructor. The only man that I know that got his pilot's wings after he had rheumatic fever. It was heart damage. So Lowell was very much interested to do something, and he said: "We have a boy's school up at Pawling that is empty." And he said: "Consolidated Edison has a big farm adjacent to it that convalescents could use. It could take a couple hundred people, and I know that we can get it for the AF, and I think it would be ideal."

Q: He got to be a very close friend of Arnold's?

R: And he talked to Hap about it. So General Grant and I went up to Pawling, and we decided that this would be grat. So we took over the refurbishing of this school and staffing it, and that was our first rehabilitation center, and of course, it was backed up medically--if somebody got very sick--by the hospital over at Mitchel Field the big base where we brought all our evacuees back. Ollie Niess was then CO at Mitchel and afterwards became Surgeon General.

Q: I saw him last month.

R: And he got interested in it and gave us great backup and we began. We started the program up there, bringing these boys out of the General Hospitals. This was not a hospital, this was a combination of dispensary, country club, school, community center, and a little of the informal atmosphere of home about it. The program was successful

because of one man and one concept. That man was in the person of the junior officer that we called the personal physician. He had his office in the barracks, and he knew his patients. He lived with them. We told these boys when they came in, the old Regular Army people would collapse when they came out to see us. We said: "Here's what's available. You can play golf twice a day. You can take these vocational courses. You can go to special school. That we have. You can do one of a hundred different things. Of course, you don't have to. However, if you don't do something, then we will know you are too sick to have a weekend pass. In other words, you have to do something. If you have any problems, you take them to this young doctor, because he is just like your family doctor at home. You can go to him with any of your problems." I was out at Ft. George Wright in Spokane. They had there the 3rd program. They had about 1,000 patients there, then. This boy had come in from the Pacific three days before. They told me this story with great glee. He had a very bad injury of the back and he had also chronic malaria, and he was in bad shape. The doctor gave him this indoctrination business--"if you have any problems, you bring them to me, I'm your doctor, etc." About an hour after this fellow was in, he came in to see the doctor and he said: "I need a 48 hour pass." The doctor: "I can't give you a pass. You've only been in the hospital an hour." He said: "Doctor, I've got to have a pass. Read this letter." He threw this letter at him, and it read about as follows: "This is to let you know that I don't give a damn about you any more, and I never really have. I'm going out with every man that I speak to, yours truly, your wife." So he said: "This doesn't mean anything to me. She's no good, and I've known it for a long time. But," he said: "I've

got a two-year old boy at home, and I've got to know if he is being taken care of." So he got the pass and he came back on time. When the doctor made rounds the next morning, there was an extra head. He had the two year old boy in bed with him. He said: "Doctor, you said if I had any problems bring them to you." He said: "This is my problem." The doctor was a damned good doctor, and he said: "You did exactly right." So he got the Red Cross in immediately, and they got a foster home near the base. They got the Judge Advocate General in and he started divorce proceedings, and he eventually was divorced. His sister took the boy, and he went back to fight. You could have treated his back and his malaria for a thousand years, and nothing would have ever happened if you hadn't met this basic problem. We began to get really beat up boys from all over the workd--amputees, and all kinds of problems. I would say that more than half of them had all the symptoms of terrific flying fatigue. They wanted to sock the first civilian that they say, and it was very difficult. We had one pilot there, with a leg off, very high, who flew in the first Ploesti raid. He had a young wife and lots of problems. He rehabilitated well, went back to school in Texas, and is in the real estate business. I still hear from him. We had another boy, one of the very famous ones, who was shot down in the Pacific. He was a tail gunner. The Japs came back over and strafed after they landed in the water. His parachute only inflated halfway, all the rest were killed, but he stayed halfway under water, very strong boy--had been a Maine guide. He finally got to shore with a broken legl. He lived for six weeks in the bush, going out at night, eating shellfish and what not. This boy's name was Gordon Manuel and I saw his son last year up in Maine. Wonderful boy, graduated from

college, and now has a television station there. I remember another patient up there, particularly, a boy who had flown too many missions. He came back, and he wouldn't talk to doctors, nurses, anybody. Nobody could get to him. After he had been there several weeks, one day, one of the Gray Ladies said to this boy: "Is there anything in the world that you want?" And he said: "Yes, there is." She said: "What is it?" And he said: "Why should I tell you, I can't have it." She said: "Well tell me." He said: "I would like to have a dog." And she said: "Why?" And he said: "Because I've always liked dogs, and I like to train dogs, and I like to work with dogs. If I had a dog, I could take walks with the dog, and I could talk to him, and he wouldn't ask me a lot of silly questions." She said: "What kind of a dog do you want?" He said: "I would like to have cocker spaniel about 6 weeks old. They're my favorite. But I would take any dog." That night we had a cocker spaniel for that boy, and that was his whole rehabilitation. Then, all the boys wanted dogs. So, we said: "Fine." We got one of the dog training units assigned up there, and said: "You can have a dog. Get the kind you want, but you have to train it and housebreak it, and when you do, he can sleep under your bed." You'd go up there and you would see 50 dogs tied up outside, but it was therapeutically wonderful. Well, to open the place, it was in the dead of winter, and General and Mrs. Arnold came out to the opening. He was excited about it, and we all were. They landed up at West Point and came over. We started on our tour. We didn't have any people stand at attention, or bands or anything. Everybody worked. I remember one instance, particularly, we went over to the farm, and there were half a dozen airmen with the long billed cap and the old fatigues on, and they were

butchering hogs, and the place was, water going up, blood running around. They had big scrapers scrapling hogs. When the General came in, they didn't even look around, and finally he hedged around where they could see him. They still kept on scraping. He said: "Hello boys." And they said: "Hello General." And he said: "What are you doing." And they said: "We are butchering hobs." And he said: "Why?" And they said, "Because we want to. We all come from the farm, and we like to butcher hogs." He said: "Well, don't let me stop you from your work." And they said: "No, General, we couldn't stop now. The hogs are hot, and we've got to work while they are hot." Well, it went on from this kind of thing. Finally we ended with the basic program in 250 station and region hospitals and we had 12 rehabilitation centers.

Q: You were running all these centers?(12 centers)

R: I was, yes. Then we had one center that we operated for a while out in New Guinea on a regional basis. But we never had any centers in the ETO because they were evacuated back. Really, our program belonged in the US, because it was long term for the severely disabled. To finish with one other event, and that ties this phase up. I was invited to tell our story to the Herald Tribune Forum here. Mrs. Ogden Reid, who was also a good friend of Hap's, and I made the presentation and Mr. Baruch was on the same program. I had gone on a committee of his, and through that committee, he'd gotten interested and knew pretty well what we were doing. So I had to go up and see him, and I was told I could have 20 minutes after lunch and no more. So, I got in to see him and began to tell him my story, and at the end of 20 minutes, he said: "No, wait, I've got a little more time." And so I was there for an hour. And he said: "I'm going to speak at the Herald Tribune Forum tonight, I've got to go down and get my

throatsprayed." He said: "Ride down and tell me more." And I said: "I'm going to speak there, too." Baruch said: "What do you want from me?" And I said: "Mr. Baruch, I don't want anything. I'm getting along just fine." He said: "Everybody that comes to see me wants something." He said: "You must want something." "Well," I said, "I guess if I was to tell the truth, there is something I want. I'd like to see the boys in the Army and Navy get the same break I think the AF is getting." So, he said: "Can you write this on one page?" Well, I said: "It will be awfully hard, I'll sure try." So I got it on a page, and that much. And I went up to see him the next morning and we worked two hours to get this program outlined. Now, he said: "That's okay. Now, this is what we are going to do," and he dictated this letter to FDR. He said: "Dear Mr. President: I know that you are deeply disturbed with the problems of our casualties returning from overseas. The AF has a great program. I've gone into it, and the other don't have it, and I'd like to see all the boys have the same break the AF boys are getting, and I know you would, too. If you feel this way, I would suggest that you sign the attached letter." This went to Stimson: "My Dear Mr. Secretary: I am deeply disturbed by our physical and emotional casualties returning from combat, as I know you are. I would like you to see that no man is discharged from the service until he has had the full opportunities for restoration, rehabilitation, resocialization, and vocational placement. Sincerely yours, FDR." Well, he signed it. It was in the Secy's office in less than 48 hours. By the time I got to Washington, all hell had broken loose. They had set up a special committee in the War Dept. General Staff to expedite this. They recognized my wording, and they said:

"We don't know how it happened, but they said: 'That bastard Howard Rusk put us in this soup.'" They immediately took over some bases but they never got them set up, because they never had the spirit. They tried to do it by the numbers, e.g., you play basketball from 11:10 to 11:17. It never got off the ground. They had a guy who wrote a 250 page book. It wasn't published until a year after the war was over. So it never happened. But this carried over into the Veterans Administration. This was the basis on which, well, we learned in establishing the veteran's program which Dr. Covalt set up, that disabled civilians outnumbered disabled veterans by about 12 to 1. Then we started the first program here. I came to NY, gave up my practice, came here to write and teach in December 1945. And we started the first program at Bellview in the post war and now its every place. That's when I started to write on the NY Times because Arthur Sulzberger had become interested in the program and the AF. He tried to get the Red Cross to take it on as an active peacetime program, but they thought it was too big. He said that he would like to give me a platform that he thought. He said: "If there is anything good about wars, take the things that develop because of wars, and make them available to all people." He said: "If you can do a public education job, and professional education job, at the same time, and not get kicked out of the union," he said, "you will save a decade," which is absolutely true. So I wrote a column every Sunday without a miss for 24 years in the NY Times. Now, I just write when I have something special I want to write about--which is a great relief. Anyway, now we get in to the summer of 1945. And there was great concern then. The war was over in Europe, and the 20th AF was setting

up in Japan. We knew we had a tremendous problem on our back after the war. Already there was talk about reorganizing the Veterans Administration. Mr. Truman was President then, and I had known him a good number of years, and he had confidence in me. He wanted me to have a hand in it. He thought it would be good if I went to the Potsdam conference, and it seemed the best way to go was as Hap Arnold's doctor. By then he had about 4 or 5 coronaries. Mr. Truman suggested it, and I was invited to go as his doctor. I got more advice from well wishing friends about how to look after the Old Man, including one from Gen Charles Glenn. Charlies was an old AF regular and a very fine personal and tough. He said: "Howard, you've got the greatest responsibility of anybody in the US in the next 3 or 4 weeks." He said: "Hap has to be preserved to take this 20th AF mission through." He said: "I've known him for longer than anybody. He gets in these meetings, and his temper gets up, and his blood pressure goes up, and he beats on the table and gets red in the face. When that happens, you've got to get him out. You try to get him out and he won't want to go, and he will call you every name in the book. You just stand there and talk right back to him, and eventually you will wear him down." And I said: "Thank you, General Glenn." We took off the last week in June from National Airport in an old done over DC-4. There were General Marshall, Gen Arnold, Norstad, and Gen Hull and myself. We flew to Mingan, Quebec in weather and got up there about 5 o'clock in the morning. It was overcast, a rainy, awful day.

Q: To do a little fishing there. That was fishing grounds.

R: They did. We went into breakfast and the General said: "I want to tell you a story about this mess, George." He said: "I landed

here the first or second of Jan 1942, on the way to London." He said: "We got here about 4 o'clock in the morning, and went to mess," and he said, "You know what we had? We had cold boiled potatoes, and we had mutton with the fat congealed on it, and tea, and brussel sprouts. I screamed, 'what in the hell kind of mess is this?' They said: 'shhh, don't say anything." They said: "We are on contract with the Canadians, and they run the mess." Arnold said: "I'll be goddamned if they run my mess." He said: "These boys are up here in the most God awful hole, and no recreation, no nothing. Terrible climate. At least they are going to have good food." Arnold said: "Get Barney Giles on the phone for me in Washington." They got Barney out of bed about 4 in the morning, and Arnold said: "I called Barney and told him what I'd had for breakfast, and I said: 'Damn it Barney, I want a plane to take off from Washington tomorrow morning, and I want it to be loaded with pancake flour and sausages and fresh eggs and oranges and what not." Arnold said: "I'll be back here in 5 days. If this isn't the best mess in the AF, Barney, you'd better look for another job." He said: "You know, I came back 5 days later and we had pancakes and sausage and orange juice and maple syrup. I never had a better breakfast."

Q: They had his brother up there, Ben Giles, Barney Giles' brother. They took the commander out of there, and they put Ben Giles in there. Barney probably entrusted it to his brother. I'm going to see Barney Giles.

R: Then General Arnold and General Marshall went off fishing, I think they wanted to talk as well as fish, and the rest of us wandered arould. I came back about 5 o' clock and we had dinner and

we took off in this old DC-4 and the General said: "Can't we fly non-stop to Pairs? Why do we have to go in the Azores?" Well, the pilot said, "We'll be very close General."

Q: Was it Peter Peterson?

R: No. Peterson was the co-pilot. They had another fellow who had come to them from the airlines, a Colonel. But Pete was on. Then we flew non-stop to Paris, I don't think we had much left when we got there, but we got there. We stayed there a day or so in the Ritz. We had our hair cut be Goering's barber. Then we went down into Berchlesgarten, then spent a week at the Potsdam conference. Well, the morning out of Mingan, I couldn't sleep and I got up. Gen Arnold was the only person up. He was looking out the window, and I took a seat beside him, and I said: "General, I feel a tremendous responsibility looking after you. I know, not only personally how important it is, but I've had more advice than you can put in your hat as to how to manage you--that you are awful tough, that you pound on the table, and that stuff." And I said: "I just don't operate that way. I do feel this responsibility, and there are times when I'm going to feel that you've got to kind of take the heat off a little. When I find that to be true, I'm going to get over right in front of you and start tightening my necktie." And I said: "If you don't want to leave, I'll tighten it to the point where they think I'm going to choke to death, and I'll break up the meeting that way." He laughed like hell; he said: "My God, that is the best idea that I have ever heard." He said: "There are a lot of meetings that I want to get out of." He said: "If you see me straightening my necktie," he said, "that means I want you to get me out of there." You know,

from that time on, he called me by my first name. We didn't have one single word all that trip. He was like a father to me, almost. He insisted that I go over to London on Churchill's election day with Adm. King. He cut me in on everything. His pressure, when he came back, was 40 points lower than when he left. It was one of the great experiences of my life. I sat next to him in the plane coming back, when he wrote his message to the Japanese people: "Throw down your arms, cease resistance. We have a new and terrible weapon. If you don't do it, we are going to destroy you." And that was 4 days before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Then, the war was over and he went back to California. My old friend, Russell Lee, looked after him out there, flew back and forth. I would see him whenever we would go out. We would go up and visit. Then we invited them to come here when David was graduating from West Point, 1949. We had a big house in Scarsdale then--3 kids and our two mothers living with us. This was a great event. But the schedule didn't go quite right, and Hap landed a day early which was rather disconcerting to the household, if you didn't know Hap and Bee. So hell, we all bustled in. I can see him now, wearing an apron in the kitchen helping get dinner, and helping to serve. We had the best time, and then we went up to West Point the next day. It was on that trip, was the last time I saw him. He went back and then you remember he had this accident, the horse knocked him down and then he just deteriorated. When did he die?

Q: Jan 15, 1950, about 7 months after that graduation.

R: I still keep in touch with Bee and I hear from her every year, heard from her again this Christmas.

Q: I saw her about two weeks ago, she's in very good shape, she has these respiratory situations, she had hay fever, and so, we try to —

get her to come here for a special dedication in the fall, but her doctor forbid her to come to Washington in December, Washington is a very bad place in the wintertime.

R: A little anecdote I remember at the Potsdam meeting. They had a big luncheon before the great parade they had for Churchill. Bradley was there, and Ike and Marshall and Patton, everybody. Gen Arnold asked me to ride down in the car with him and Gen Marshall. As they got in the car, he turned, grinning from ear to ear, and he said: "George, you were 5 stars and I wear 5 stars," but he said, "you know, old Georgie Patton has got twice as many stars as we have put together." He said: "He's got them on his swagger stick. He's got them on his cufflinks, damn," he said, "I never saw a man with so many stars in my life. They both laughed.

Q: One of the reasons that Arnold suggested, or wanted you to come--of course, he had gotten to know you pretty well--but one of the reasons that you went to Potsdam was because you were close to Harry Truman. And Arnold had taken a rehabilitation trip, a sort of convalescent trip after his major heart attack in Jan-Feb 1945. In April he was in Europe, Cannes and the Riviera. They had a big AF pow wow, on April 19. This was one week after Pres. Roosevelt passed away. One of the things they talked about was: "How do we get next to Harry Truman?" Because the previous incumbent had all these ships on his desk. The AF was always the last thing. Gil Marquardt was Arnold's doctor. He was the heart specialist. He had accompanied Arnold to Cannes and accompanied him on the Pacific trip in June. This thing sort of developed and he had to tell Marquardt that he wasn't going on this trip. Marquardt assume that this was sort of his job. So Arnold had to indicate to him that one of the reasons that

he was switching doctors was that he wanted to get, in his words, a means by which he could, when he went to Potsdam, get closer to the President, because he apparently knew that you were friend of Truman's.

R: I know that Gil was very unhappy about it, and I can understand how he felt. But one man's bad luck is another man's good luck. He took wonderful care of Hap.

Q: He passed away about two years ago. He lived in Chicago. His widow sent me a number of letters, one of which was a letter which Arnold wrote to him, telling him that he had decided to make this change, and that it had no reflection upon his professional capacities. But there were other considerations that Arnold had in mind.

R: Gil took him back over when we came back from Potsdam. But I think we worked quite differently. I can remember when Gen Arnold was down at Coral Gables, and I was there once. Gil is the kind of person that would go and talk to him an hour, an hour and a half in the morning, and again in the afternoon. I never worked that way as a doctor. I'm an in and out kind of fellow. Talk and crack a joke, have a drink, and then I've got to get on. Let me tell you one other thing related to this. One reason that Mr. Truman wanted me to go on this trip, he would have liked to have me take over the medical reorganization of the Veteran's Administration. But he felt this was Gen Bradley's prerogative, and one of the main reasons that I was to go was to talk to Bradley about this. I think Bradley had been warned about it before. He didn't know me professionally, but we started to converse about it, and the President asked him to talk about it, and he said: "I'm coming back and I have arranged for Gen. Hawley to come as my Chief Medical Officer. We have worked together all these years. He knows how I work and I have every confidence. And I said: "Well,

I think you are absolutely right. It's great. If I can help in any way, you know you can call on me." They came back and took over. I went up and had lunch with Hawley, and I took all the responsibility for organizing the rehabilitation program in the Veterans Administration. That left a very close friendship with both Hawley and Bradley, who as I say, I had known casually. He came from Moberly, Mo., and I came from a little town called Brookfield. He married a girl named Gwayle, whose sister I used to go with. I thought she was the most beautiful gal in the world. So we had contact. After the war, I saw him all the time. But I think fate saved me from a job that I would have hated and probably not done very well. But that was one of the compelling reasons that I went on this trip.

Q: You might not know anything about this because it was during Marquardt's term. Arnold had this severe heart attack, just about Inauguration Day, 1945. It might have been a day or two either side of that, and then they hustled him do n to Coral Gables. He was there just about two months, and Marquardt was in charge of the case. Mrs. Arnold came down there to see him, and something happened. Mrs. Arnold left in a tizzy, a huff. She never came back down again. Of course, I talked to her about this, and she blamed Marquardt. Marquardt was in there talking to him, playing gin rummy with him. She wanted to come in and bring him his night time pill, or something, and Marquardt wouldn't let her in there. Marquardt said the orders were that he was to have no visitors. She said she saw them playing gin rummy so she felt very much put out.

R: I don't blame her, I think it was bad judgment, but that verifies the fact--the point that I made--Gil just kind of moved in.

I heard about the incident. I didn't know what the specifics were, but I know she was very, very upset.

Q: I know she was upset, but knowing this incident, I can't understand why Marquardt would not have allowed her to come in to see the General. There must be something else to it. I didn't want to pry too much with Mrs. Arnold. We talked for many hours, but I just wondered if there was something else to it.

R: You know there were times when they had very tense relationships, and I haven't the slightest idea of what it was.

Q: I figured there must have been, Mrs. Arnold had a little emotional problem for some time after that. Then she got straightened out.

R: If I had to try to reconstruct it, I would have said that they were probably playing, and she had been waiting, and somebody said: "Mrs. Arnold's out here," and Hap might have said: "Oh, let's finish the game," or "I don't want to talk any more tonight or something like that," so then, but it was a hell of a stink.

Q: She felt very badly about it, and she still remembers it with great poignancy and as a result, her relationship with Marquardt just disintegrated.

R: Did she recall going to lunch with Mrs. Roosevelt?

Q: No, she never mentioned that, at least I don't remember her talking about it. But that's a very critical point, of course, you know.

R: Mrs. Roosevelt was the one that indoctrinated FDR.

Q: You know, something you said reminded me of something I saw up at Hyde Park. I was up there last year, looking at the FDR papers.

There was an altercation between the AF and the Army on the medical side of it. And this has to do with the mental rehabilitation, the men who came back with combat fatigue and the AF had a program. The Army doctors felt they were coddling the AF men who came back, you had these special psychiatric programs for them, were you involved in that?

R: Yes, I was on the sidelines, and to a degree, I was. I got to know--well I had many friends in psychiatry on both sides. But again we got the first casualties back, and I got to know Howard McSnyder very well. He was a very good friend of Gen Grant. Then as this feud developed, the pressure developed. Roosevelt decided that he would send Gen Grant and the Surgeon General of the Army, who I've forgotten if it was McGee or Kirk then, on a trip around the world, and he would send Dr. Stecker, who was the senior psychiatric consultant, with them as a referee. At that time, they were having a hellish time in North Africa, both in the Army and the AF. With all these problems. The AF had two psychiatrists, one was Roy Brinker of Chicago, and Dr. Spiegel who was his associate. And then they brought Bill Meuninger in on the Army side a little later, as I remember. At least he hadn't gotten off the ground then. We began to evacuate these boys back and we set up a specially qualified group at a rehabilitation center in St. Augustine at the Don Caesar Hotel. Well, Brinker is a scientific pursit, and he wanted to set this up as purely a psychiatric thing. He didn't want anything but psychiatry. He didn't want any activity. He didn't want anything; he didn't want any other cases. Gen Grant had told him that he didn't want a psychiatric institution straight; that he wanted them mixed in with other people. Grant thought it was, and then all of a sudden, he found out that it wasn't. There

was no activity, no other patients. Brinker and a Colonel, regular AF. Anyway, Gen Grant found out about it. He called them up in Washington, and he called them in his office and I've never heard such a bang as these two got. I was embarrassed having to sit there and listen to it. Grant said: "I want the other type patient brought in by tomorrow, and I want this activity program, and I want the rehabilitation in there. Do you understand me? If you don't, I will relieve you both right now." Well, I would say this, we got an activity program in there very fast. I don't think we coddled these people at all. I think we had an organized program, that the Army never had. For example, they had the worst hospital group down there that I ever saw. The civilians in St. Augustine were afraid to go out at night, because these boys would get tight and fight and swing. Before we got an activity program, they had a physical education officer down there, who said: "The orders came out. Tomorrow morning, turn out for calistenics at 8 AM." Well, they said, to hell with it, and nobody showed. They tried it 2 or 3 times, and they just didn't come. It was really a revolt, so they said I had to go down there, and they said, "What the hell are we going to do about it?" I said: "Well, we are going to do something different." We let it quiet down a couple of days and then I get a very, very savvy fellow down there. He got the ringleaders together, and said: "I hear you have some trouble about calisthenics. I don't blame you, I had calisthenics," But he said: "I have been thinking about, maybe we could get you to help me, that we could organize a softball league down here. I would like to organize it from the AF, the 5th and the 8th and the 9th. There are enough of you here. Would you like it?" I said: "Yes, they love that kind of thing." So he said: "I only have one piece of advice

for you." If you are going to do it, to get into the real hard playing, you'd better come out and limber up and condition a bit, and I'll have some equipment ready tomorrow about 10:00, if you want to come out and play around a little." Then, they all came; there was no trouble at all.

Q: I think part of the intramural hostility was jealousy, in a sense. The Army had spawned the AF, and the AF had the forward-looking program, and the Army felt that they had been left behind.

R: In the early days of the AF program, the Army spent half their time trying to prove that the Army had started this. Gen McGee, in one of their publications, pointed out that this was just a continuation of the AF program. He said: "We had a rehabilitation program in WW I," he said that same hospital, "I just read the directions the other day where they got all these convalescents out and made them march around the hospital 10 times every day." It was childish, but oh, it was a bitter fight. Another thing that I've got to tell you, and that's about the Pawling program. We had a terrible time up there with these young married couples fighting. Some had only been married a few days or a few weeks and they had been under terrible tension, living at home, and the boys came back wacky and it was very bad. So "Jo" Doolittle came up, an old friend of ours, from St Louis days. They were my patients out there. Jo got very disturbed about this, and the wives confided in her. She said: "Well, these wives need rehabilitation as bad as the husbands. Why don't we set up a program?" I said: "Jo, will you take the responsbility?" and she said: "Sure." So she got them together, and she gave them a little questionnaire. She asked them to write. She gave them about 10 activities, said you have all

day up here, you might just as well have some fun and have a program, too." The activities were beauty grooming, interior decoration, child care, golf, this and that. 98% chose the course to make them more attractive, and the next was home decorating. We didn't have any money or anything, so we went to see Helena Rubenstein, whom I had met, and told her this. She said: "I'll take this over." So she assigned a couple of gals up there, 3 or 4 times a week. She furnished all of the cosmetics. It went like crazy. Then Jo established this in every rehabilitation center we had throughout the country. It was extremely successful. The subtle psychological thing behind this is the fact that they were terribly tense, and they wanted to do something to get along better with their husbands, and they thought if they were more attractive, it would help with some of these problems.

Q: I was supposed to see Gen Doolittle about 10 days ago, but he took off for Venezula on a hunting trip. He wrote me a nice letter and said he wants to see me when I get back to California, and I'm going to talk to Jo Doolittle.

R: She was a great therapist.

R: I've been asked on occasion in the past, how would you describe Gen Arnold as a personality? What was he like? And I always rely this way: that if he liked you and believed in you and what you were doing, he would give you the world with a neon halo. If he didn't like you, he wouldn't give you the time of day. If he trusted you and you misplaced that trust, or were dishonest, then he would cut your throat from ear to ear and never bat an eye while you bled to death. A great man he was.

Q: You've seen him get mad a number of times. Did he cook off fairly quickly?

R: Oh yes, but he didn't forget. He's one of these volatile people that gives themselves a tremendous shot of his own adrenalin, and then he cools off, but I don't know him well enough to really know. But he had a memory like an elephant.

Q: Did you visit him out at the Ranch?

R: Yes.

Q: Was he pretty calmed down?

R: Oh yes. He loved it and was so proud of it.

Q: He dreamed about this ranch for a long time. While he was fighting the war he was writing letters to a man named Hansen who helped build the ranch, and he was telling him he wanted the water supply here, and he wanted the tiles here, and he wanted the flower bed over there. He had a tremendous interest in everything.

R: He was extremely happy there.

Q: It's a terrible shame that he never knew how to relax.

R: Well, he was an active person. I thought he was more relaxed there than I had ever seen him, from the one mission that I went one. The other times I saw him, his relaxation was "go-go" I mean he was active.

Q: Of course, he retired to the ranch, but he was leaving it constantly for one thing or another. So he really didn't know how to relax. I think he thought about relaxing, but this is my own evaluation, but I don't think he knew how to relax for any sustained period. On the ranch he decided he was going to write that book, his memoir, and based on what I have found, he was dictating part of it while he was horizontal. In his last months, he was a sick man. He also

contracted to write a series of 10 articles for the McNaught Syndicate and he was desperately sick. They wanted him to rewrite some of the articles, and they wanted him to jazz them up, they wanted him to write an antagonistic sort of thing toward the Russians, you know. He was a sick man. Why did he make these commitments when he really was so ill?

R: Because he felt that he needed the financial help. That's my guess.

Q: Do you think it was financial?

R: I don't know. I'm sure that must have been a factor, because he knew the tenure in which Mrs. Arnold was to be left. That was in the book, and I would suspect, if not consciously, certainly, subconsciously, that this was bound to have been a factor.

Q: He had some high hopes for some royalties from that book. The book was a financial flop. It did not get good reviews, and it did not sell well at all. There were recriminations between him and Laidlaw, the man who helped him, and with Harper's. The probable reason for that, in my opinion, is he didn't want to hurt people so he never got below the surface. Did you read Global Mission?

R: I read it years ago, and I didn't read it carefully. But I can see why it would not have been a great seller.

Q: It was strung together, it was a bunch of superficial anecdotes, and it really didn't get down to the heart of his task, and the heart of his personality, and I guess Laidlaw may have tried to do this, but Arnold had his own idea about what sort of book it was going to be, and he certainly was not going to be a muckraker. It wasn't the kind of book that he could have written himself. But you think it was

more financial than just a sense of wanting to write?

R: I sense it, because, as I said, he had, by that time, learned the problems of the Ranch, and he knew what Mrs. Arnold was going to have after his death. So that was in the book. I would think that in his deepest inner heart, he had a hope that this book might alleviate the problem. A great man, he was.

Q: Did he have a sense of humor?

R: Yes, he had a twinkle. Yes, I would say he had a sense of humor, like getting Barney Giles out of bed at 3:00 in the morning. He enjoyed it tremendously, and he enjoyed telling about it 5 years later.

Q: He was a bit of a practical joker. But was he a practical joker if he was the butt of it?

R: That I wouldn't know. I would guess that when he was CG of the AAF during the tensions of the war that he had very few practical jokes played on him. I think the only ones who could have gotten by with that were his kids.

Goals of the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation

The Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation founded in small temporary quarters in Bellview Hospital Center in NY City. Its first and present director is Dr. Howard A. Rusk, who was the wartime Chief of Convalescent Services of the Army Air Forces.

In 1951 the Institute moved to a specially designed four-story building in its present location overlooking the East River in NY City. With increasing demands for service, three additional floors were completed in 1958.

Today, the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation is one of the world's largest private non-profit organizations devoted to the rehabilitation of disabled adults and children.

In the flyleaf is a quotation from Louis Pasteur: "Not to destroy, but to construct..I hold the unconquerable belief that science and peace will triumph over ignorance and war, that nations will come together, not to destroy, but to construct, and that the future belongs to those who accomplish most for humanity."

Interview, Brig General Howard A. Rusk, New York City Univ., Medical Center, New York City, April 13, 1970

R: Prior to the war, I practiced internal medicine in St. Louis for 16 years, but I felt that I couldn't stay on that in the practice of medicine making house calls and looking after old Miss Pryor's back for $10 a visit with three kids, and two of them boys. I didn't want the war to end. When my boys would say in the future: "What did you do in the war?" I'd have to say: "I sat it out." So I went into the AF overage. I was assigned to Jefferson Barracks, which had been taken over by the Army as a basic training center. I was in charge of the medical program, medical wards, medical service. I was surprised and disturbed by seeing my several hundred patients, most of them--80% at least--walking around in their purple bathrobes looking perfectly well and getting into all kinds of mischief. So, being brash and naive, I discharged about 80% of my patients the first week I was there. I was amazed to find that 90% of them were back in the hospital in 24 hours. Then, I suddenly realized that there was no "go home and take it easy for a couple of weeks." You are either in or out. If you are in, you are a patient. If you are not a patient, you were a soldier. That might mean a 10-mile hike the first day. So I came to thepprofound conclusion that you didn't get ready for a 10-mile hike playing blackjack in the hospital sun parlor and listen to a bedside radio. It seemed rather logical if these boys were recovering from accidents over the obstacle course, or the flu, or bad colds, or sore throats, or what have you, that while they were in the hospital, they could use this time to send them back to duty in the best condition possible. But I had a terrible time in getting

this idea started. But I got some impetus in late September of 1942 when BG Hugh Morgan came to visit Jefferson Barracks. I had gone in August 19, 1942 and as we walked through these miles of corridors, and these boys walking by, he said: "This is really awful, and something should be done about it." He said: "You are averaging 50,000 men a day in your AF hospitals, and you are the smallest unit. But that's 50,000 non-effectives every day." He said: "You know, it is touch and go as to who is going to win this war, and this is a lot of people. We would to do something about capturing this convalescent time that is wasted." He said: "If you get any ideas, let me know." Then, I decided that we should start a program on our wards to see if it would work. I had a terrible time to get any personnel assigned, but I happened to have two patients in the hospital--one was a teacher, and one was a wonderful photographer, so I kept them in as patients. They became the first teachers. Then a crafty Army administrative Major, who had been a Master Sergeant said: "If you can't get anybody, I can tell you a trick that I think will work." He said: "you are President of the CDD Board. Why don't you bring them up before the Board and discharge them. Then reconvene the Board the next day, and because you have gotten other evidence,yyou rescind the discharge. Then they become members of our detail, and you can use them as you want." That's how I got the first two people. So we started, and it looked like it was going to work. We got physical educators that would come into a ward. The beds were tagged with various colors. If it was red, they were still in a dangerous stage. If it was yellow, it was medium, and if it was green, they got the green light. They came in and exercised the ward twice a day. Then we brought teachers

in to teach the usual things they did in a basic training center--military courtesy, airplane identification. That started in an interesting way. I was making rounds one morning and one of the boys in a cast--broken leg--he was very disgruntled. I said: "What's the matter with you?" He said: "I could kill that orderly." I said: "What did he do?" and he said: "There's a spider web up over my bed, and he took a broom and brushed it away. I had more fun watching that spider make its web, and have young. The one thing that I enjoyed, now it is gone." So I said to myself: "Gee, if they are going to look at the ceiling all day, let's put airplane models on the ceiling." So we strung these little black plastic models on a long string that went the whole distance of the ward on a pulley, and they would look at one airplane for two hours, and then they would pull the string and look at the next one for two hours, and we found it was a most effective way of teaching aircraft identification. The first time that we were sure the program was going to work, was when we took 500 kids that had had virus pneumonia, all treated in the same acute wards, and sent over to alternate convalescent wards. In War 1 they sat around and waited for nature to take its course and went back to duty when they and the doctors felt they were able. Group 2, 24 hours after their temperature was normal, we put them in a training program for 12 days. It started with 1/2 hour activity on the first day and ended on the 12th day with 8 full hours and ended with a 10 mile hike. Group 1, unsupervised, averaged 45 days in the hospital, with a readmission rate of just a little over 90%. Group 2 in the program averaged 31 days in the hospital with a readmission rate of only 10%. That was the first time that we knew we really had something.

Q: This was when?

R: This was early spring of 1943. I wrote a short report on the success of the first rehabilitation program at Jefferson Barracks to Gen David Grant. He became my great supporter--just on one page about what we had done--and he immediately ordered me to come to Washington. After two hours he said: "You are going to be assigned here to start this program in all AF hospitals. I had never written a directive, an order. I knew absolutely nothing about it. I had a card table and a bunch of very sharp pencils and a lot of yellow tablets. A friend helped me write the directive that set this program up. I can't remember the number, but it was AF No. so and so, and it was two paragraphs, and I gave the mission, what we were going to try to do, and what we wanted them to do in the field. That's the way the program started, and the whole mission was run on this two paragraph directive. Now, we didn't have enough teachers, so anybody that came into the hospital filled out a questionnaire, and he gave his service experience and education. And if we felt that he had something to give the other people, his other buddies, then he became a convalescent teacher. In the spring of 1945, we were teaching about 350 subjects in AF hospitals that varied from everything military courtesy, to the training of war dogs, to airplane assembly. The radio schools were very interesting. First visit I made out of Washington was to a radio school up in Sioux Falls. The camp up there was in an area they called "Pneumonia Gulch," because they had more pneumonia there then any place in the whole AF. And if a boy went to radio school and missed as much as two days, he had to repeatethe whole course, so I went up to see this program, and I saw the CO. He gave me short shrift. He said: "What is it you want to do?" I told him and he said: "I don't have

any time for this. I have too many other things to do." Then he said: "What is it you really want to do?" And I said: "I want to wire all the wards for code, and I want it to come over at given times of day, and I want these boys to take their course right in their beds." I said: "We've got the basic people and we've got the numbers, but you won't assign us anybody." "No," he said, "we don't have any people." I said: "I'm going to leave this afternoon. I'm going down to Scott Field. They have a radio school, and we'll set it up down there. Gen Grant and Gen Arnold are very much interested in this program." He said: "You mean, the Old Man is interested?" I said: "The Old Man has read about it and he is interested in it." He said: "Can you possibly stay over till tomorrow morning?" And I said: "No, I can't." He said: "I will tell you that by tomorrow morning we will have all the wards in these hospitals wired for code, and Sioux Falls will be the first center to have this program, and I will telegraph you tomorrow that this has been accomplished." That's exactly what happened. Then, when I went down to Scott Field I could tell the General there, who also wasn't interested, that Sioux Falls was in a race to have the first one. Then I learned that when you said: "Gen Arnold was interested."

Q: Boy it really opened the doors.

R: Then we got into the early ambulation after surgery. Instead of keeping patients in bed the conventional 2 or 3 weeks, or 10 days, or whatever it was, they got up on the day after surgery. Then we found that we saved--in this group--50% hospital time. We had 50% less complications, and they required 50% less sedatives and pain killers. I can remember when Gen (Norman) Kirk was made the Surgeon General. He was coming back from Africa.

Q: He was Army Surgeon General?

R: Army. His relationship was a close one with Secy Stimson because when Stimson was in the Philippines, Kirk was the Surgeon there, and Stimson's sister broke her leg, and Kirk looked after her. He was a good orthopedic surgeon, but he had no patience with our program at all. On his way back from Africa, Kirk stopped in Miami, and we were going like mad there. He went unannounced into one of our hospitals on the beach, which was directed by Capt Donald Covalt, who has been with me ever since, and is now Associate Director of this Institute, and Dr. Covalt had his hernia patients out exercising on the beach, and the boys were running up and down in casts, and whatnot. He described Gen Kirk's reaction. He said: "I thought he was going to have a stroke." He got as red as a beet and said: "What's this?" And I told him with great pride. And he said: "We'll stop this nonsense, and left." The first order that Kirk gave out to the field when he went back was that a hernia patient, instead of getting up the day after an operation, must stay in bed two weeks, that he would be in the hospital another two weeks, and would get 30 days sick leave. We were getting our boys back to duty in 10 days. We followed a prepared series of 300 boys that had hernias repaired at Miami Beach. into all theaters of operation six months later, to see what had happened to them. There was one recurrence in the group that got up the day of operation, and there were 7 recurrences among those who stayed in bed. So again we thought we had something. So I went to Washington--I think it was Feb or March 1943--and we saw immediately that our great problem was one that we could handle, manage and have responsibility for the boys in the AF hospitals. But the casualties were coming back from overseas. The AF got the first from the 8th AF.

They went into Army General Hospital, and we didn't get them for a long, long time. Gen Grant was then having a great feud with Gen Kirk, and Gen Arnold was supporting Grant, to try to get AF hospitals separated. We realized that this program was a kindergarten compared to what we had to have for casualties returning from combat.

Q: How did you get some help? (from General Kirk's opposition)

R: Shortly after I went to Washington, I met Mrs. Arnold who was head of the Ladies Air Force Auxiliary Emergency Relief. I got to tell my story to her and she became greatly interested in it. And she made an appointment for us to have lunch with Mrs. Roosevelt, and the three of us had lunch at the White House. I remember that this was the period when Mrs. Roosevelt decided that they would be on the same rations as everybody else was. We had the worst lunch I almost ever tasted. It was hard boiled eggs with some kind of a cream sauce and a little wisp of salad, and that was it. But Mrs. Roosevelt became tremendously interested in the program, and Mrs. Arnold had arranged for Mrs. Roosevelt and me to come to dinner at their home the following week.

Q: You hadn't met Gen Arnold yet?

R: No. We went there (to the Arnolds) for dinner, and I was sitting next to the General so I could give him the briefing, and hopefully, the treatment, during dinner. He became very, very interested and right in the middle of the dinner--he was late getting down because his boy was having trouble with his algebra and the General wanted to help him with his homework.

Q: That must be the youngest, David.

R: Yes. So then in the middle of dinner, there was a big flourish, and in barged C.R. Smith, wonderful person, we became great friends,

well, he had just arrived an hour before with the first copy of that documentary, The Memphis Belle, and he had brought the crew up, and he showed it to all of us that night. It was tremendously impressive. Well, I was sorry it wasn't on another night, because it sort of took away a little from my presentation. But I had been able to sow the basic seed, and then the next event, was really the thing that was the catch stone. Mrs. Roosevelt became interested in a young man named Henry Viscardi, a brilliant fellow, young lawyer, 25 years old from NY, who was born without legs, both off above the knee. Hank had gotten a job with the Red Cross, working at Walter Reed to teach amputees to walk. But the union--that's the physical therapist--didn't approve of this. They were practically all AF youngsters. So Hank used to bootleg his program out behind the bushes, and he had a car on which he'd give driving lessons. He came to me, and I met General Grant. We were very sympathetic, but also we were powerless. But he came over to me one afternoon in the very early spring of 1943, with three AF boys--air crew, as I remember--a pilot, a navigator, and I think, a gunner. They were all amputees, and according to the Army Surgeon General's policy, they were fitted with the cheapest kind of temporary leg, really made of papier mache and rivets, because the book said that this was the Veteran's Administration's job. So they were to go to the Veterans Administration. Everybody that knew anything about it, knew that this was nothing but a hoax, because the VA had no program, not only not for rehabilitation but the most primitive kind of program for orthopedic appliances of all kinds. VA had no training program whatever. Two of these boys were waiting for a bus, and for one of them, the rivets came out, and he fell down in the street, and almost got run over. So the

other boys helped him, and with the leg under his arm, he finally got back to the hospital and they put another rivet in. But these boys were absolutely livid. They said: "This is what you get for fighting for your country. Look at this SOB,coming apart. I can't walk. I almost got killed yesterday." They were the angriest kids you ever saw, and properly so. So I said: "Wait a minute." Gen Grant was in his office and I said: "I want you to see three airmen," and I marched them down to his office, along with Mr. Viscardi. I didn't get halfway through my story with David Grant until he got red as a beet, and he buzzed Gen Arnold's buzzer, and asked if the General was in, and if so, it was very important that we come down and see him. Arnold said: "Come down." So we all marched down. Grant said: "Howard, tell the story." So I got about halfway through, and I thought Gen Arnold was going to have a stroke. His face was flaming, and he reached over and pressed down every button on his squawk box--Barney Giles, and 4 star generals and Bob Lovett. They thought--everybody came rushing in, and the Old Man shook his head and said: "This is the damndest outrage I ever saw." He said: "Im' too old to fly these crates, and you all are too old." He said: "These are the boys that are fighting this war," and he said: "I spend my time--90% of it--trying to get the best airplanes, the best gasoline, the best clothing, the best food, and the best weather information that I can get, so they can fight for us." And he said: "By God they are going to have the best legs, or I'll know why." And he picked up the telephone and got the Army Surgeon General on the phone, and he repeated this with plenty of mustard, and he ended by saying: "There will be a program set up for these boys within two weeks or I will personally go to the President of the US,

do you understand?" Completely." Apparently, he did, and he bagged up the phone. Within 30 days a bill was put through Congress that all allocated $1 million dollars to set up the first research program in orthopedic development--artificial limbs. A national committee was set up. I can remember an engineer from Chicago whose name was Klapsteg, and the head of the Hospital then called the Ruptured and Crippled. It is now called the Hospital for Special surgery here that was headed by Dr. Philip Wilson, who was an outstanding orthopedist and they were the two. I can only say that now, 25 years later, that this program would still operate. The monies have gone out, and this was the nucleus that started the whole research program in artificial limbs in this country. The first thing, you see, we didn't have any arms. If a man had both arms off above the elbow prior to WW II, he was dead as far as life was concerned, the rest of his life. He had to have somebody with him. The first modification of these limbs, was a special wire that was developed in a large aircraft company in California. This was a special cable that would attach. It went through a certain number of holes, and it was strong enough and had enough resilience so that then, arms worked, if a boy raises his shoulder, and that opens his hand on the other side. I remember seeing a boy, both arms off, above the elbow, and blind, which is very, very difficult, because they have to have their fingers to read braille. But he had been taught to read Braille with his lips. I remember that we talked about what we had before, and what we developed then, and he was quite self-sufficient with these hooks. He could dress himself, and he was going back to college, although he was blind with this disability. Well, our program then started in all of our AF stations and regional hospitals. We operated the first year and a half without a dollar or

without a greater rating. We stole everything. I hate to confess this, but it's true. Maybe it's more polite to say we borrowed everything. Doctors took this on in addition to their other duties, and we had a publication once a month in which they would write in if they developed anything new in their programs, if they thought somebody else could use it. They had Victory Gardens, and they raised chickens and we had airplane motors on the sun parlor where they could go in and take them down and put them back together again. I told you about the radio schools. That's why we only needed a littlettwo-page directive. We passed it back and forth, and then word got down of Gen Arnold's continuing and increasing interest in that program.

Q: Anytime you had trouble, mentioning Hap Arnold opened doors for you?

R: Oh sure, completely. Through Gen Grant, I had a pipeline, and I see Arnold myself, which I did on one or two occasions. Well, then we realized that this program in the regional hospitals was not enough, that we had to have was not enough, that we had to have special rehabilitation centers and this is when the concept of the whole program, as it operates today, was first conceived. This is, it is just not enough to meet the physical needs of the individual, but you have to meet the physical, the emotional, the social, and the vocational and educational needs. Then we evolved this saying which is now mostly cliche, that you had to treat "the whole man." We were ready to start. Lowell Thomas then became very much interested in the program for the reason that his boy got rheumatic fever down at Montgomery, Alabama, at Maxwell Field. Lowell came to see me about what could be done for his boy, and we knew that then that we got them in a dry

climate and in a training program, and went on slow and easy. Instead of having to discharge 90%, that there was anumber that we could save. I will finish this story of Lowell Thomas, Jr., went to this center at Davis-Monthan Field in Tucson. He made a brilliant recovery, and then he became a convalescent teacher, until he got very restless and then he went back to Flight School and became a pilot, and instructor. The only man that I know that got his pilot's wings after he had rheumatic fever. It was heart damage. So Lowell was very much interested to do something, and he said: "We have a boy's school up at Pawling that is empty." And he said: "Consolidated Edison has a big farm adjacent to it that convalescents could use. It could take a couple hundred people, and I know that we can get it for the AF, and I think it would be ideal."

Q: He got to be a very close friend of Arnold's?

R: And he talked to Hap about it. So General Grant and I went up to Pawling, and we decided that this would be grat. So we took over the refurbishing of this school and staffing it, and that was our first rehabilitation center, and of course, it was backed up medically--if somebody got very sick--by the hospital over at Mitchel Field the big base where we brought all our evacuees back. Ollie Niess was then CO at Mitchel and afterwards became Surgeon General.

Q: I saw him last month.

R: And he got interested in it and gave us great backup and we began. We started the program up there, bringing these boys out of the General Hospitals. This was not a hospital, this was a combination of dispensary, country club, school, community center, and a little of the informal atmosphere of home about it. The program was successful

because of one man and one concept. That man was in the person of the junior officer that we called the personal physician. He had his office in the barracks, and he knew his patients. He lived with them. We told these boys when they came in, the old Regular Army people would collapse when they came out to see us. We said: "Here's what's available. You can play golf twice a day. You can take these vocational courses. You can go to special school. That we have. You can do one of a hundred different things. Of course, you don't have to. However, if you don't do something, then we will know you are too sick to have a weekend pass. In other words, you have to do something. If you have any problems, you take them to this young doctor, because he is just like your family doctor at home. You can go to him with any of your problems." I was out at Ft. George Wright in Spokane. They had there the 3rd program. They had about 1,000 patients there, then. This boy had come in from the Pacific three days before. They told me this story with great glee. He had a very bad injury of the back and he had also chronic malaria, and he was in bad shape. The doctor gave him this indoctrination business--"if you have any problems, you bring them to me, I'm your doctor, etc." About an hour after this fellow was in, he came in to see the doctor and he said: "I need a 48 hour pass." The doctor: "I can't give youaa pass. You've only been in the hospital an hour." He said: "Doctor, I've got to have a pass. Read this letter." He threw this letter at him, and it read about as follows: "This is to let you know that I don't give a damn about you any more, and I never really have. I'm going out with every man that I speak to, yours truly, your wife." So he said: "This doesn't mean anything to me. She's no good, and I've known it for a long time. But," he said: "I've

got a two-year old boy at home, and I've got to know if he is being taken care of." So he got the pass and he came back on time. When the doctor made rounds the next morning, there was an extra head. He had the two year old boy in bed with him. He said: "Doctor, you said if I had any problems bring them to you." He said: "This is my problem." The doctor was a damned good doctor, and he said: "You did exactly right." So he got the Red Cross in immediately, and they got a foster home near the base. They got the Judge Advocate General in and he started divorce proceedings, and he eventually was divorced. His sister took the boy, and he went back to fight. You could have treated his back and his malaria for a thousand years, and nothing would have ever happened if you hadn't met this basic problem. We began to get really beat up boys from all over the workd--amputees, and all kinds of problems. I would say that more than half of them had all the symptoms of terrific flying fatigue. They wanted to sock the first civilian that they say, and it was very difficult. We had one pilot there, with a leg off, very high, who flew in the first Ploesti raid. He had a young wife and lots of problems. He rehabilitated well, went back to school in Texas, and is in the real estate business. I still hear from him. We had another boy, one of the very famous ones, who was shot down in the Pacific. He was a tail gunner. The Japs came back over and strafed after they landed in the water. His parachute only inflated halfway, all the rest were killed, but he stayed halfway under water, very strong boy--had been a Maine guide. He finally got to shore with a broken legl. He lived for six weeks in the bush, going out at night, eating shellfish and what not. This boy's name was Gordon Manuel and I saw his son last year up in Maine. Wonderful boy, graduated from

college, and now has a television station there. I remember another patient up there, particularly, a boy who had flown too many missions. He came back, and he wouldn't talk to doctors, nurses, anybody. Nobody could get to him. After he had been there several weeks, one day, one of the Gray Ladies said to this boy: "Is there anything in the world that you want?" And he said: "Yes, there is." She said: "What is it?" And he said: "Why should I tell you, I can't have it." She said: "Well tell me." He said: "I would like to have a dog." And she said: "Why?" And he said: "Because I've always liked dogs, and I like to train dogs, and I like to work with dogs. If I had a dog, I could take walks with the dog, and I could talk to him, and he wouldn't ask me a lot of silly questions." She said: "What kind of a dog do you want?" He said: "I would like to haveacocker spaniel about 6 weeks old. They're my favorite. But I would take any dog." That night we had a cocker spaniel for that boy, and that was his whole rehabilitation. Then, all the boys wanted dogs. So, we said: "Fine." We got one of the dog training units assigned up there, and said: "You can have a dog. Get the kind you want, but you have to train it and housebreak it, and when you do, he can sleep under your bed." You'd go up there and you would see 50 dogs tied up outside, but it was therapeutically wonderful. Well, to open the place, it was in the dead of winter, and General and Mrs. Arnold came out to the opening. He was excited about it, and we all were. They landed up at West Point and came over. We started on our tour. We didn't have any people stand at attention, or bands or anything. Everybody worked. I remember one instance, particularly, we went over to the farm, and there were half a dozen airmen with the long billed cap and the old fatigues on, and they were

butchering hogs, and the place was, water going up, blood running around. They had big scrapers scrapling hogs. When the General came in, they didn't even look around, and finally he hedged around where they could see him. They still kept on scraping. He said: "Hello boys." And they said: "Hello General." And he said: "What are you doing." And they said: "We are butchering hobs." And he said: "Why?" And they said, "Because we want to. We all come from the farm, and we like to butcher hogs." He said: "Well, don't let me stop you from your work." And they said: "No, General, we couldn't stop now. The hogs are hot, and we've got towwork while they are hot." Well, it went on from this kind of thing. Finally we ended with the basic program in 250 station and region hospitals and we had 12 rehabilitation centers.

Q: You were running all these centers?(12 centers)

R: I was, yes. Then we had one center that we operated for a while out in New Guinea on a regional basis. But we never had any centers in the ETO because they were evacuated back. Really, our program belonged in the US, because it was long term for the severely disabled. To finish with one other event, and that ties this phase up. I was invited to tell our story to the Herald Tribune Forum here. Mrs. Ogden Reid, who was also a good friend of Hap's, and I made the presentation and Mr. Baruch was on the same program. I had gone on a committee of his, and through that committee, he'd gotten interested and knew pretty well what we were doing. So I had to go up and see him, and I was told I could have 20 minutes after lunch and no more. So, I got in to see him and began to tell him my story, and at the end of 20 minutes, he said: "No, wait, I've got a little more time." And so I was there for an hour. And he said: "I'm going to speak at the Herald Tribune Forum tonight, I've got to go down and get my

throatsprayed." He said: "Ride down and tell me more." And I said: "I'm going to speak there, too." Baruch said: "What do you want from me?" And I said: "Mr. Baruch, I don't want anything. I'm getting along just fine." He said: "Everybody that comes to see me wants something." He said: "You must want something." "Well," I said, "I guess if I was to tell the truth, there is something I want. I'd like to see the boys in the Army and Navy get the same break I think the AF is getting." So, he said: "Can you write this oneone page?" Well, I said: "It will be awfully hard, I'll sure try." So I got it on a page, and that much. And I went up to see him the next morning and we worked two hours to get this program outlined. Now, he said: "That's okay. Now, this is what we are going to do,"and he dictated this letter to FDR." He said: "Dear Mr. President: I know that you are deeply disturbed with the problems of our casualties returning from overseas. The AF has a great program. I've gone into it, and the other don't have it, and I'd like to see all the boys have the same break the AF boys are getting, and I know you would, too. If you feel this way, I would suggest that you sign the attached letter." This went to Stimson: "My Dear Mr. Secretary: I am deeply disturbed by our physical and emotional casualties returning from combat, as I know you are. I would like you to see that no man is discharged from the service until he has had the full opportunities for restoration, rehabilitation, resocialization, and vocational placement. Sincerely yours, FDR." Well, he signed it. It was in the Secy's officerin less than 48 hours. By the time I got to Washington, all hell had broken loose. They had set up a special committee in the War Dept. General Staff to expedite this. They recognized my wording, and they said:

"We don't know how it happened, but they said: 'That bastard Howard Rusk put us in this soup.'" They immediately took over some bases but they never got them set up, because they never had the spirit. They tried to do it by the numbers, e.g., you play basketball from 11:10 to 11:17. It never got off the ground. They had a guy who wrote a 250 page book. It wasn't published until a year after the war was over. So it never happened. But this carried over into the Veterans Administration. This was the basis on which, well, we learned in establishing the veteran's program which Dr. Covalt set up, that disabled civilians outnumbered disabled veterans by about 12 to 1. Then we started the first program here. I came to NY, gave up my practice, came here to write and teach in December 1945. And we started the first program at Bellview in the post war and now its every place. That's when I started to write on the NY Times because Arthur Sulzberger had become interested in the program and the AF. He tried to get the Red Cross to take it on as an active peacetime program, but they thought it was too big. He said that he would like to give me a platform that he thought. He said: "If there is anything good about wars, take the things that develop because of wars, and make them available to all people." He said: "If you can do a public education job, and professional education job, at the same time, and not get kicked out of the union," he said, "you will save a decade," which is absolutely true. So I wrote a column every Sunday without a miss for 24 years in the NY Times. Now, I just write when I have something special I want to write about--which is a great relief. Anyway, now we get in to the summer of 1945. And there was great concern then. The war was over in Europe, and the 20th AF was setting

up in Japan. We knew we had a tremendous problem on our back after the war. Already there was talk about reorganizing the Veterans Administration. Mr. Truman was President then, and I had known him a good number of years, and he had confidence in me. He wanted me to have a hand in it. He thought it would be good if I went to the Potsdam conference, and it seemed the best way to go was as Hap Arnold's doctor. By then he had about 4 or 5 coronaries. Mr. Truman suggested it, and I was invited to go as his doctor. I got more advice from well wishing friends about how to look after the Old Man, including one from Gen Charles Glenn. Charlies was an old AF regular and a very fine personal and tough. He said: "Howard, you've got the greatest responsibility of anybody in the US in the next 3 or 4 weeks." He said: "Hap has to be preserved to take this 20th AF mission through." He said: "I've known him for longer than anybody. He gets in these meetings, and his temper gets up, and his blood pressure goes up, and he beats on the table and gets red in the face. When that happens, you've got to get him out. You try to get him out and he won't want to go, and he will call you every name in the book. You just stand there and talk right back to him, and eventually you will wear him down." And I said: "Thank you, General Glenn." We took off the last week in June from National Airport in an old done over DC-4. There were General Marshall, Gen Arnold, Norstad, and Gen Hull and myself. We flew to Mingan, Quebec in weather and got up there about 5 o'clock in the morning. It was overcast, a rainy, awful day.

Q: To do a little fishing there. That was fishing grounds.

R: They did. We went into breakfast and the General said: "I want to tell you a story about this mess, George." He said: "I landed

here the first or second of Jan 1942, on the way to London." He said: "We got here about 4 o'clock in the morning, and went to mess," and he said, "You know what we had? We had cold boiled potatoes, and we had mutton with the fat congealed on it, and tea, and brussel sprouts. I screamed, 'what in the hell kind of mess is this?' They said: 'shhh, don't say anything." They said: "We are on contract with the Canadians, and they run the mess." Arnold said: "I'll be goddamned if they run my mess." He said: "These boys are up here in the most God awful hole, and no recreation, no nothing. Terrible climate. At least they are going to have good food." Arnold said: "Get Barney Giles on the phone for me in Washington." They got Barney out of bed about 4 in the morning, and Arnold said: "I called Barney and told him what I'd had for breakfast, and I said: "Damn it Barney, I want a plane to take off from Washington tomorrow morning, and I want it to be loaded with pancake flour and sausages and fresh eggs and oranges and what not." Arnold said: "I'll be back here in 5 days. If this isn't the best mess in the AF, Barney, you'd better look for another job." He said: "You know, I came back 5 days later and we had pancakes and sausage and orange juice and maple syrup. I never had a better breakfast."

Q: They had his brother up there, Ben Giles, Barney Giles' brother. They took the commander out of there, and they put Ben Giles in there. Barney probably entrusted it to his brother. I'm going to see Barney Giles.

R: Then General Arnold and General Marshall went off fishing, I think they wanted to talk as well as fish, and the rest of us wandered arould. I came back about 5 o'oclock and we had dinner and

we took off in this old DC-4 and the General said: "Can't we fly non-stop to Pairs? Why do we have to go in the Azores?" Well, the pilot said, "We'll be very close General."

Q: Was it Peter Peterson?

R: No. Peterson was the co-pilot. They had another fellow who had come to them from the airlines, a Colonel. But Pete was on. Then we flew non-stop to Paris, I don't think we had much left when we got there, but we got there. We stayed there a day or so in the Ritz. We had our hair cut be Goering's barber. Then we went down into Berchlesgarten, then spent a week at the Potsdam conference. Well, the morning out of Mingan, I couldn't sleep and I got up. Gen Arnold was the only person up. He was looking out the window, and I took a seat beside him, and I said: "General, I feel a tremendous responsibility looking after you. I know, not only personally how important it is, but I've had more advice than you can put in your hat as to how to manage you--that you are awful tough, that you pound on the table, and that stuff." And I said: "I just don't operate that way. I do feel this responsibility, and there are times when I'm going to feel that you've got to kind of take the heat off a little. When I find that to be true, I'm going to get over right in front of you and start tightening my necktie." And I said: "If you don't want to leave, I'll tighten it to the point where they think I'm going to choke to death, and I'll break up the meeting that way." He laughed like hell; he said: "My God, that is the best idea that I have ever heard." He said: "There are a lot of meetings that I want to get out of." He said: "If you see me straightening my necktie," he said, "that means I want you to get me out of there." You know,

from that time on, he called me by my first name. We didn't have one single word all that trip. He was like a father to me, almost. He insisted that I go over to London on Churchill's election day with Adm. King. He cut me in on everything. His pressure, when he came back, was 40 points lower than when he left. It was one of the great experiences of my life. I sat next to him in the plane coming back, when he wrote his message to the Japanese people: "Throw down your arms, cease resistance. We have a new and terrible weapon. If you don't do it, we are going to destroy you." And that was 4 days before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Then, the war was over and he went back to California. My old friend, Russell Lee, looked after him out there, flew back and forth. I would see him whenever we would go out. We would go up and visit. Then we invited them to come here when David was graduating from West Point, 1949. We had a big house in Scarsdale then--3 kids and our two mothers living with us. This was a great event. But the schedule didn't go quite right, and Hap landed a day early which was rather disconcerting to the household, if you didn't know Hap and Bee. So hell, we all bustled in. I can see him now, wearing an apron in the kitchen helping get dinner, and helping to serve. We had the best time, and then we went up to West Point the next day. It was on that trip, was the last time I saw him. He went back and then you remember he had this accident, the horse knocked him down and then he just deteriorated. When did he die?

Q: Jan 15, 1950, about 7 months after that graduation.

R: I still keep in touch with Bee and I hear from her every year, heard from her again this Christmas.

Q: I saw her about two weeks ago, she's in very good shape, she has these respiratory situations, she had hay fever, and so, we try to

get her to come here for a special dedication in the fall, but her doctor forbid her to come to Washington in December, Washington is a very bad place in the wintertime.

R: A little anecdote I remember at the Potsdam meeting. They had a big luncheon before the great parade they had for Churchill. Bradley was there, and Ike and Marshall and Patton, everybody. Gen Arnold asked me to ride down in the car with him and Gen Marshall. As they got in the car, he turned, grinning from ear to ear, and he said: "George, you were 5 stars and I wear 5 stars," but he said; "you know, old Georgie Patton has got twice as many stars as we have put together." He said: "He's got them on his swagger stick. He's got them on his cufflinks, damn," he said, "I never saw a man with so many stars in my life. They both laughed.

Q: One of the reasons that Arnold suggested, or wanted you to come--of course, he had gotten to know you pretty well--but one of the reasons that you went to Potsdam was because you were close to Harry Truman. And Arnold had taken a rehabilitation trip, a sort of convalescent trip after his major heart attack in Jan-Feb 1945. In April he was in Europe, Cannes and the Riviera. They had a big AF pow wow, on April 19. This was one week after Pres. Roosevelt passed away. One of the things they talked about was: "How do we get next to Harry Truman?" Because the previous incumbent had all these ships on his desk. The AF was always the last thing. Gil Marquardt was Arnold's doctor. He was the heart specialist. He had accompanied Arnold to Cannes and accompanied him on the Pacific trip in June. This thing sort of developed and he had to tell Marquardt that he wasn't going on this trip. Marquardt assume that this was sort of his job. So Arnold had to indicate to him that one of the reasons that

he was switching doctors was that he wanted to get, in his words, a means by which he could, when he went to Potsdam, get closer to the President, because he apparently knew that you were friend of Truman's.

R: I know that Gil was very unhappy about it, and I can understand how he felt. But one man's bad luck is another'man's good luck. He took wonderful care of Hap.

Q: He passed away about two years ago. He lived in Chicago. His widow sent me a number of letters, one of which was a letter which Arnold wrote to him, telling him that he had decided to make this change, and that it had no reflection upon his professional capacities. But there were other considerations that Arnold had in mind.

R: Gil took him back over when we came back from Potsdam. But I think we worked quite differently. I can remember when Gen Arnold was down at Coral Gables, and I was there once. Gil is the kind of person that would go and talk to him an hour, andhour and a half in the morning, and again in the afternoon. I never worked that way as a doctor. I'm an in and out kind of fellow. Talk and crack a joke, have a drink, and then I've got to get on. Let me tell you one other thing related to this. One reason that Mr. Truman wanted me to go on this trip, he would have liked to have me take over the medical reorganization of the Veteran's Administration. But he felt this was Gen Bradley's prerogative, and one of the main reasons that I was to go was to talk to Bradley about this. I think Bradley had been warned about it before. He didn't know me professionally, but we started to converse about it, and the President asked him to talk about it, and he said: "I'm coming back and I have arranged for Gen. Hawley to come as my Chief Medical Officer. We have worked together all these years. He knows how I work and I have every confidence. And I said: "Well,

I think you are absolutely right. It's great. If I can help in any way, you know you can call on me." They came back and took over. I went up and had lunch with Hawley, and I took all the responsibility for organizing the rehabilitation program in the Veterans Administration. That left a very close friendship with both Hawley and Bradley, who as I say, I had known casually. He came from Moberly, Mo., and I came from a little town called Brookfield. He married a girl named Gwayle, whose sister I used to go with. I thought she was the most beautiful gal in the world. So we had contact. After the war, I saw him all the time. But I think fate saved me from a job that I would have hated and probably not done very well. But that was one of the compelling reasons that I went on this trip.

Q: You might not know anything about this because it was during Marquardt's term. Arnold had this severe heart attack, just about Inauguration Day, 1945. It might have been a day or two either side of that, and then they hustled him down to Coral Gables. He was there just about two months, and Marquardt was in charge of the case. Mrs. Arnold came down there to see him, and something happened. Mrs. Arnold left in a tizzy, a huff. She never came back down again. Of course, I talked to her about this, and she blamed Marquardt. Marquardt was in there talking to him, playing gin rummy with him. She wanted to come in and bring him his night time pill, or something, and Marquardt wouldn't let her in there. Marquardt said the orders were that he was to have no visitors. She said she saw them playing gin rummy so she felt very much put out.

R: I don't blame her, I think it was bad judgment, but that verifies the fact--the point that I made--Gil just kind of moved in.

I heard about the incident. I didn't know what the specifics were, but I know she was very, very upset.

Q: I know she was upset, but knowing this incident, I can't understand why Marquardt would not have allowed her to come in to see the General. There must be something else to it. I didn't want to pry too much with Mrs. Arnold. We talked for many hours, but I just wondered if there was something else to it.

R: You know there were times when they had very tense relationships, and I haven't the slightest idea of what it was.

Q: I figured there must have been, Mrs. Arnold had a little emotional problem for some time after that. Then she got straightened out.

R: If I had to try to reconstruct it, I would have said that they were probably playing, and she had been waiting, and somebody said: "Mrs. Arnold's out here," and Hap might have said: "Oh, let's finish the game," or "I don't want to talk any more tonight or something like that," so then, but it was a hell of a stink.

Q: She felt very badly about it, and she still remembers it with great poignancy and as a result, her relationship with Marquardt just disintegrated.

R: Did she recall going to lunch with Mrs. Roosevelt?

Q: No, she never mentioned that, at least I don't remember her talking about it. But that's a very critical point, of course, you know.

R: Mrs. Roosevelt was the one that indoctrinated FDR.

Q: You know, something you said reminded me of something I saw up at Hyde Park. I was up there last year, looking at the FDR papers.

There was an altercation between the AF and the Army on the medical side of it. And this has to do with the mental rehabilitation, the men who came back with combat fatigue and the AF had a program. The Army doctors felt they were coddling the AF men who came back, you had these special psychiatric programs for them, were you involved in that?

R: Yes, I was on the sidelines, and to a degree, I was. I got to know--well I had many friends in psychiatry on both sides. But again we got the first casualties back, and I got to know Howard McSnyder very well. He was a very good friend of Gen Grant. Then as this feud developed, the pressure developed. Roosevelt decided that he would send Gen Grant and the Surgeon General of the Army, who I've forgotten if it was McGee or Kirk then, on a trip around the world, and he would send Dr. Stecker, who was the senior psychiatric consultant, with them as a feferee. At that time, they were having a hellish time in North Africa, both in the Army and the AF. With all these problems. The AF had two psychiatrists, one was Roy Brinker of Chicago, and Dr. Spiegel who was his associate. And then they brought Bill Meuninger in on the Army side a little later, as I remember. At least he hadn't gotten off the ground then. We began to evacuate these boys back and we set up a specially qualified group at a rehabilitation center in St. Augustine at the Don Caesar Hotel. Well, Brinker is a scientific pursit, and he wanted to set this up astpurely a psychiatric thing. He didn't want anything but psychiatry. He didn't want any activity. He didn't want anything; he didn't want any other cases. Gen Grant had told him that he didn't want a psychiatric institution straight; that he wanted them mixed in with other people. Grant thought it was, and then all of a sudden, he found out that it wasn't. There

was no activity, no other patients. Brinker and a Colonel, regular AF. Anyway, Gen Grant found out about it. He called them up in Washington, and he called them in his office and I've never heard such a bang as these two got. I was embarrassed having to sit there and listen to it. Grant said: "I want the other type patient brought in by tomorrow, and I want this activity program, and I want the rehabilitation in there. Do you understand me? If you don't, I will relieve you both right now." Well, I would say this, we got an activity program in there very fast. I don't think we coddled these people at all. I think we had an organized program, that the Army never had. For example, they had the worst hospital group down there that I ever saw. The civilians in St. Augustine were afraid to go out at night, because these boys would get tight and fight and swing. Before we got an activity program, they had a physical education officer down there, who said: "The orders came out. Tomorrow morning, turn out for calistenics at 8 AM." Well, they said, to hell with it, and nobody showed. They tried it 2 or 3 times, and they just didn't come. It was really a revolt, so they said I had to go down there, and they said, "What the hell are we going to do about it?" I said: "Well, we are going to do something different." We let it quiet down a couple of days and then I get a very, very savvy fellow down there. He got the ringleaders together, and said: "I hear you have some trouble about calisthenics." I don't blame you, I had calisthenics," But he said: "I have been thinking about, maybe we could get you to help me, that we could organize a softball league down here. I would like to organize it from the AF, the 5th and the 8th and the 9th. There are enough of you here. Would you like it?" I said: "Yes, they love that kind of thing." So he said: "I only have one piece of advice

for you." If you are going to do it, to get into the real hard playing, you'd better come out and limber up and condition a bit, and I'll have some equipment ready tomorrow about 10:00, if you want to come out and play around a little." Then, they all came; there was no trouble at all.

Q: I think part of the intramural hostility was jealousy, in a sense. The Army had spawned the AF, and the AF had the forward-looking program, and the Army felt that they had been left behind.

R: In the early days of the AF program, the Army spent half their time trying to prove that the Army had started this. Gen McGee, in one of their publications, pointed out that this was just a continuation of the AF program. He said: "We had a rehabilitation program in WW I," he said that same hospital, "I just read the directions the other day where they got all these convalescents out and made them march around the hospital 10 times every day." It was childish, but oh, it was a bitter fight. Another thing that I've got to tell you, and that's about the Pawling program. We had a terrible time up there with these young married couples fighting. Some had only been married a few days or a few weeks and they had been under terrible tension, living at home, and the boys came back wacky and it was very bad. So "Jo" Doolittle came up, an old friend of ours, from St Louis days. They were my patients out there. Jo got very disturbed about this, and the wives confided in her. She said: "Well, these wives need rehabilitation as bad as the husbands. Why don't we set up a program?" I said: "Jo, will you take the responsbility?" and she said: "Sure." So she got them together, and she gave them a little questionnaire. She asked them to write. She gave them about 10 activities, said you have all

day up here, you might just as well have some fun and have a program, too." The activities were beauty grooming, interior dedoration, child care, golf, this and that. 98% chose the course to make them more attractive, and the next was home decorating. We didn't have any money or anything, so we went to see Helena Rubenstein, whom I had met, and told her this. She said: "I'll take this over." So she assigned a couple of gals up there, 3 or 4 times a week. She furnished all of the cosmetics. It went like crazy. Then Jo established this in every rehabilitation center we had throughout the country. It was extremely successful. The subtle psychological thing behind thisiis the fact that they were terribly tense, and they wanted to do something to get along better with their husbands, and they thought if they were more attractive, it would help with some of these problems.

Q: I was supposed to see Gen Doolittle about 10 days ago, but he took off for Venezula on a hunting trip. He wrote me a nice letter and said he wants to see me when I get back to California, and I'm going to talk to Jo Doolittle.

R: She was a great therapist.

R: I've been asked on occasion in the past, how would you describe Gen Arnold as a personality? What was he like? And I always rely this way: that if he liked you and believed in you and what you were doing, he would give you the world with a neon halo. If he didn't like you, he wouldn't give you the time of day. If he trusted you and you misplaced that trust, or were dishonest, then he would cut your throat from ear to ear and never bat an eye while you bled to death. A great man he was.

Q: You've seen him get mad a number of times. Did he cook off fairly quickly?

R: Oh yes, but he didn't forget. He's one of these volatile people that gives themselves a tremendous shot of his own adrenalin, and then he cools off, but I don't know him well enough to really know. But he had a memory like an elephant.

Q: Did you visit him out at the Ranch?

R: Yes.

Q: Was he pretty calmed down?

R: Oh yes. He loved it and was so proud of it.

Q: He dreamed about this ranch for a long time. While he was fighting the war he was writing letters to a man named Hansen who helped build the ranch, and he was telling him he wanted the water supply here, and he wanted the tiles here, and he wanted the flower bed over there. He had a tremendous interest in everything.

R: He was extremely happy there.

Q: It's a terrible shame that he never knew how to relax.

R: Well, he was an active person. I thought he was more relaxed there than I had ever seen him, from the one mission that I went one. The other times I saw him, his relaxation was "go-go" I mean he was active.

Q: Of course, he retired to the ranch, but he was leaving it constantly for one thing or another. So he really didn't know how to relax. I think he thought about relaxing, but this is my own evaluation, but I don't think he knew how to relax for any sustained period. On the ranch he decided he was going to write that book, his memoir, and based on what I have found, he was dictating part of it while he was horizontal. In his last months, he was a sick man. He also

contracted to write a series of 10 articles for the McNaught Syndicate and he was desperately sick. They wanted him to rewrite some of the articles, and they wanted him to jazz them up, they wanted him to write an antagonistic sort of thing toward the Russians, you know. He was a sick man. Why did he make these commitments when he really was so ill?

R: Because he felt that he needed the financial help. That's my guess.

Q: Do you think it was financial?

R: I don't know. I'm sure that must have been a factor, because he knew the tenure in which Mrs. Arnold was to be left. That was in the book, and I would suspect, if not consciously, certainly, subconsciously, that this was bound to have been a factor.

Q: He had some high hopes for some royalties from that book. The book was a financial flop. It did not get good reviews, and it did not sell well at all. There were recriminations between him and Laidlaw, the man who helped him, and with Harper's. The probable reason for that, in my opinion, is he didn't want to hurt people so he never got below the surface. Did you read Global Mission?

R: I read it years ago, and I didn't read it carefully. But I can see why it would not have been a great seller.

Q: It was strung together, it was a bunch of superficial anecdotes, and it really didn't get down to the heart of his task, and the heart of his personality, and I guess Laidlaw may have tried to do this, but Arnold had his own idea about what sort of book it was going to be, and he certainly was not going to be a muckraker. It wasn't the kind of book that he could have written himself. But you think it was

more financial than just a sense of wanting to write?

R: I sense it, because, as I said, he had, by that time, learned the problems of the Ranch, and he knew what Mrs. Arnold was going to have after his death. So that was in the book. I would think that in his deepest inner heart, he had a hope that this book might alleviate the problem. A great man, he was.

Q: Did he have a sense of humor?

R: Yes, he had a twinkle. Yes, I would say he had a sense of humor, like getting Barney Giles out of bed at 3:00 in the morning. He enjoyed it tremendously, and he enjoyed telling about it 5 years later.

Q: He was a bit of a practical joker. But was he a practical joker if he was the butt of it?

R: That I wouldn't know. I would guess that when he was CG of the AAF during the tensions of the war that he had very few practical jokes played on him. I think the only ones who could have gotten by with that were his kids.

Goals of the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation

The Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation founded in small temporary quarters in Bellview Hospital Center in NY City. Its first and present director is Dr. Howard A. Rusk, who was the wartime Chief of Convalescent Services of the Army Air Forces.

In 1951 the Institute moved to a specially designed four-story building in its present location overlooking the East River in NY City. With increasing demands for service, three additional floors were completed in 1958.

Today, the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation is one of the world's largest private non-profit organizations devoted to the rehabilitation of disabled adults and children.

In the flyleaf is a quotation from Louis Pasteur: "Not to destroy, but to construct..I hold the unconquerable belief that science and peace will triumph over ignorance and war, that nations will come together, not to destroy, but to construct, and that the future belongs to those who accomplish most for humanity."

END OF ROLL



USAF ACADEMY MICROFILM SERVICE CENTER

ROLL NUMBER: 92-221

END DATE: 24 Nov. 92

START FRAME: 1

END FRAME: 1600

HQ USAF ACADEMY/REPROGRAPHICS DIVISION