ROLL No. 43828
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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

FRAME NUMBER	CLASS NUMBER	DATE PERIOD	VOL	PT	TITLE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REMARKS	DNGRAD/ DECLASS.
29-31	1103240	19-Oct-70			Folder 1 Thompson, "Stouter"	UNCLASS/FOUO		NONE
32-44	1103241	7-Jan-70			Folder 2 Tibbets, Paul W.	UNCLASS		NONE
45-53	1103242	29-May-72			Folder 3 Timberlake, E. J. "Ted"	UNCLASS		NONE
54-58	1103243	7-May-70			Folder 4 Timberlake, Patrick	UNCLASS		NONE
59-63	1103244	28-Feb-74			Folder 5 Towle, Stuart	UNCLASS		NONE
64-65	1103245	28-Jan-76			Folder 6 Trafton, David	UNCLASS		NONE
65-75	1103246	3-Nov-67			Folder 7 Twining, Nathan F.	UNCLASS		NONE
		2-Jan-70			Tape 2,17			
76-86	1103247	20-Aug-74			Folder 8 Vanaman, Arthur W.	UNCLASS		NONE
87-94	1103248	13-May-70			Folder 9 Viccellio, Henry	UNCLASS		NONE
					Wagner, Bill Tape Only Tape 85 (Box83)			
95-103	1103249	19-Feb-70			Folder 10 Walsh, Robert L.	UNCLASS		NONE
104-116	1103250	10-May-71			Folder 11 Watkins, John C.A.	UNCLASS		NONE
117-121	1103251	2-Aug-74			Folder 12 Watkins, Tarleton	UNCLASS		NONE
122-124	1103252	23-Nov-71			Folder 13 Watts, George B.	UNCLASS		NONE
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125-141	1103253	5/8OCT70			Folder 14 Wedemeyer, Albert C.	UNCLASS		NONE
142-145	1103254	5-Jan-70			Folder 15 Weikert, John M & Mrs	UNCLASS		NONE
145-149	1103255	2-Jan-76			Folder 1 Weil, Kurt	UNCLASS		NONE
150-177	1103256	12-Feb-70			Folder 2 Westlake, William	UNCLASS		NONE
		6-Feb-74						

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184-192	1103258	9-Nov-70			Folder 4 Wetzel, Emery	UNCLASS		NONE
193-198	1103259	23-Jul-74			Folder 5 Weyland, O.P.	UNCLASS		NONE
199-203	1103260	23-Nov-70			Folder 6 Wheeler, Burton K.	UNCLASS		NONE
204-212	1103261	7-Jan-72			Folder 7 White, Edward	UNCLASS		NONE
213-218	1103262	9-Dec-70			Folder 8 Whitten, Lyman	UNCLASS		NONE
219-END	1103263	21-Aug-70			Folder 9 Wilson, Donald	UNCLASS		NONE
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
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

USAF ACADEMY MICROFILM SERVICE CENTER

ROLL NUMBER: 92-223

PROJECT #: I-71

SUBJECT: "Hap" Arnold - Green Collection

START FRAME: 1

START DATE: Nov. 30, 1992

PHOTOGRAPHER: K. Lentz

HQ USAF ACADEMY/REPROGRAPHICS DIVISION

Thompson, "Stouter" 19 Oct 70

Interview, "Col "Stouter" Thompson, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, October 19, 1970.

Q: We're now in the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and I was very fortunate to meet outside the Officers' Club, Colonel Stouter Thompson who is retired from the Air Force. Colonel Thompson flew in both wars and has some vivid recollections of General Arnold and Mrs. Arnold in both wars. So I am interviewing him at the Club here.

Q: Colonel Thompson, you were telling me an interesting story about your brother-in-law and General Arnold, and how your brother-in-law got commissioned. What was his name?

T: His name was Ogden Pleissner. He is a well-known artist in New York City. He was later relieved from his duties from the Air Force in order to become a Life correspondent, because Life correspondents could get around overseas much easier than an officer in theAArmy Air Forces. But what I thought might be interesting in relation to General Arnold's life was his interest in art, and it is really the birth of what they call the documentary art program which is still going on, and which has left a great deal of beautiful works of art that we wouldn't have had in photographs. But it started in Fort Worth in the Training Command at a visit of Mrs. Arnold down there. I had had some paintings by this brother-in-law of mine, who was Ogden Pleissner.

Q: What was Mrs. Arnold's occasion for being down there in Ft. Worth?

T: She was the head of the woman's organization...

Q: Army Emergency Relief?

T: That's right, and volunteer what it was. Anyway, Woman's Relif. And Mrs. Yount who was General Barton K. Yount's wife was

head of it in the Training Command.

Q: This was what year?

T: I would guess this was about 1943 or '44.

Q: You worked for General Yount?

T: I was on General Yount's staff. General Yount was my commanding officer in World War I, and I was responsible partly for flying General Yount to get his wings. Because you see, those fellows didn't have wings and they had to... So I flew Yount to Kelly Field.

Q: On this particular occasion, he was head of the Flying Training?

T: Flying Training Command.

T: Training Command and that, of course, was the major thing. We didn't have any Tactical Air Force then.

Q: Mrs. Arnold saw your brother-in-law's paintings?

T: Yes, I showed them to her because I was very enthusiastic about the fact that a documentary art program had better be started. Because we had officers that were wonderful painters. We had them doing just nothing at all that was any good. We had one in the Training Command who later became very famous. So I showed these to Mrs. Arnold, and we had quite a talk. She became very enthusiastic about this project. The next thing I knew, I'd sent the paintings to Washington. The next thing I knew, I was ordered into Washington by General Arnold. And we got this artist, Pleissner in his office. He was commissioned and sent to the Aleutians and was responsible for a great deal of art which is now in the National Gallery, and also in the Pentagon.

Q: It wan't easy to commission him, was it?

T: I'll say it wasn't. Because if you had to have a real reason for doing it -- and I don't think anybody but General Arnold could have done it at the time.

Q: Who was the man you first contacted in the Pentagon when you came in?

T: Bevans. Jim Bevans was then a Colonel. He later became head of Personnel, I believe.

Q: He was in Personnel then?

T: Yes, that's true. I ran into General Arnold again because I had served all through World War I as an instructor and a pilot.

Q: I want to cover that later, but at this particular session Colonel Bevans didn't want to commission him?

T: No, he wanted to commission him as a Second Lieutenant and I said that that didn't give him enough stature to get around where he should be to paint, and so he was commissioned as a Captain.

Q: How did Arnold take to that. Was he pleased?

T: I never talked to Arnold about it until later. I guess all right because, heavens, what he did is really on file now every place. I would be priceless. You see, later on, this artist was commissioned by the Chrysler Corporation to paint something, and he painted the battle of Sant Lo which is in the Chrysler collection in their Director's office. So, a great deal of documentary work was started there.

Q: Yoummentioned some other contacts with Arnold in World War I?

T: I have some movies of General Arnold at Wright-Patterson Field in 1921. I was a civilian then. I got out in 1920. The war

only lasted, you know, 24 months, and I was a civilian, but I took photographs of General Foulois and General Arnold down here at the first National Air Races. I have those. In '20 or '21. And they're available to anyone that wants part of them. I sent them out.

Q: Arnold was a Major, then?

T: Yes, all fields were commanded by majors at that time. In fact, in World War I, I never saw anything higher than a Major.

Q: Do you remember anything about that contract? You took those movies yourself?

T: Yes, I took them myself. I'd have to run them again. I sent them out to the air base of California -- you know where.

Q: Travis?

T: No, where the movies are made.

Q: Norton.

T: No; there was a lot of trouble on account of these service commands on equipping pilots that were being sent overseas.

Q: When was this?

T: This was World War II. I was at several of the Ploesti raids, and there was all kinds of trouble and complaints. So General Arnold ordered me to take 2,500 basic Air Force replacements to Italy, just after we took Naples. And I was to report back what happened all the way along because we were getting some bad treatment.

Q: This was after the Anzio operation?

T: We hadn't bombed -- we were just starting to bomb Anzio. We hadn't taken Rome yet. That was about the time. Because, you see, I was taken off of active flying service at that time. Because, right now, I'm 80 years old.

Q: You sure don't look it.

T: I've been pretty active all my life. There was a lot of trouble and I had all kind of reports sent back. That's another story completely. But General Arnold sent me over.

Q: He personally sent you over?

T: On his orders. I didn't see him personally, but those were my orders.

Q: You were working for Yount at that time?

T: Yes, I got leave of the Training Command, and I was in Italy for two months. In fact, Tommy Power and I were the same grade, and Tommy and I flew all over in the Training Command. Tommy was a pilot, and I was with General Yount. We got to be great friends. That was, of course, before he took over the Strategic Air Command.

Q: B-29s. He went into B-29s later.

T: Yes, when I was in Italy. Then I went up to Tommy's. He was then in Foggia and was in charge of the -- I forget what wing it was.

Q: You were saying something about Yount and Arnold. They were contemparies.

T: Yes. They graduated in the same class. And they were really rivals. Except that they were men of two different classes. General Yount was a terrific organizer. He was. He was not a combat man. He was strong but, as I say, the Training Command was an organization.

Q: Arnold was more of a combat man?

T: I'll tell you. Gen Arnold was tougher than hell. He would go to our bases, and he had the same ideas that Weaver had. Give 'em hell. Justly or unjustly. Find out something on that field that you're going to criticize, because that always peps them up all the way along the line.

Q: In other words whenever he came out on an inspection tour, he always looked for something?

T: Oh yes.

Q: Did this make General Yount unhappy?

T: Yes, it did. Because General Yount was proud of the Training Command, of course. Naturally, it made him unhappy. But he and Hap were very good friends. They never tangled in any way.

Q: Would you say he was a little scared of Hap?

T: Oh yes. I can tell you some stories about that. When the WASPS opened up...

Q: In Sweetwater?

T: Yes, were all to go to that thing and we all did. I was here; General Yount was here, and Hap was here. Anyway, Gen Yount says: "We got to get out of here before this thing is over." He says to Tommy Power: "Got to get out of here before this thing is over," and so we did. We got out about five minutes later because he said, "You know, Yount, Hap's bound to pass us, and I've got to get there first."

Q: Why?

T: Because he was afraid?

Q: Pass us where?

T: We were going to another base. We were going to Albuquerque after Sweetwater -- flying to Albuquerque for an inspection there and Yount wanted to get there first.

Q: So he could alert them?

T: Yes. Arnold is coming. So we go out there and we jumped into this old ship. The B-25 is going to pass us. We know damn well it is. So we start off.

Q: Arnold had a B-25?

T: Yes. We could hardly get around there and all at once we hit the stairway up to the tower and hit it hard. So I said: "Tommy, Jeez, we hit that stairway."

Q: You mean flying?

T: Oh no, taxiing. I got out there in a hell of a hurry.

Q: Oh, you mean with your wing?

T: Yes. So we get out there, and we don't dare tell General Yount that we've hit this thing. Tommy Power says: "Get out there and look and see what's damaged." So I jumped out on the end of the wing and the light out here is all busted and the wing. I says: "Tommy, we're all right. We can make it. This is just minor damage, but now it's late." And we take off and we're flying as fast as we can....

Q: What kind of plane was this?

T: I think at that time we had a DC-3 that was modified. You see it was a plane for the General and so all at once ZZZZ.

Q: Arnold passed you?

T: Here comes Arnold and he passed us and by the time we get there, why the band is playing, "Hail to the Chief," and everything else, and we come in there. Anyway, we get up there and Arnold is just...the commander of the base was a Brigadier General and he was away.

Q: Do you remember his name.

T: No, I don't. This base was in charge of this Colonel. I mean this Major. Well, Arnold gave that Major--I just felt so damn sorry for that Major--he just gave him ned. He wanted to know about the "EAT" program. You see, everybody had to eat everything on their plates.

Q: This is Arnold?

T: All the signs up. Everyone was rated as to whether they cleaned their plates. You had to clean your plate. So theyhhad set up a beautiful luncheon there in the Cadet mess. And for some reason or other I was unfortunate enough to get between Arnold and Yount. They had ham. The ham was good. Well, I ate my ham, and it was fine. I looked over at General Arnold's plate, and it was pretty full of ham, and somebody said something to me, and I turned my head to look back. And turned around and there was a hell of a great big piece of ham on my plate. So I got to eat the hame And Yount can't stand it. He was laughing like hell.

Q: Well, whose ham was it?

T: Yount's ham. So he said: "Did you see that sign there?" I'd been looking at the sign and I turned around, and there was another great big piece of ham. That was Arnold's ham.

Q: You had to eat or else?

T: I was so damn full of ham. You know it is the funny things you remember in years of service.

Q: Were you stationed here as a civilian in 1929, '30, '31?

T: No, I came here as a Cadet and I stayed here. I didn't get my commission here. I flew here but the British took us over here.

Q: And they had the first National Air Races here? When?

T: In '21, I'm pretty sure. I can tell you when we go over--Frey can tell you when we go over there. Royal Frey. So that's about all I can add.

Q: Training in World War I? Was it a very dangerous occupation?

T: Oh, look at the record. We couldn't--in a storm--we had to land and we had forced landings every place. We didn't have any equipment.

Q: Lot of casualties in World War I?

T: Yes, sixty-five boys killed in Ft. Worth when I got down there. I was in the RAF to start with. I started with the RAF.

Q: I wanted to ask you about Arnold and Yount. They were, you say, rivals. Of course, they were contemporaries.

T: I'd scarcely call them rivals, but really, if it was civilian life that was what it would be.

Q: Well, you know, when Westover was killed in 1938 and Arnold was Assistant Chief. There was a lot of sentiment in Washington for Yount. Did you know that. Yount was competitor for the job as Chief of the Air Corps.

T: I know that. That's well known.

Q: Do you have any recollection of anything about that? Did Yount ever talk to you?

T: I knew Yount. Yount and I were born in the same town. I knew him well, as a personal friend before, And I was down in Washington to try to lease the Terminal Tower building, the Terminal Garage in Cleveland to the Army, and Imet him on the street. And he said: "What are you doing?" And I said, "I'm with this big outfit in Cleveland." And he said, "You'd better get back into the Air Force because I need you." And I said: "What for, at my age?" And he said, "I need you badly. Why don't you go out to Walter Reed Hospital and have an examination this afternoon?" So I go out there, and they passed me.

Q: This was when Arnold became Chief of the Air Corps?

T: He was Chief of the Air Corps at that point.

Q: So how did he suggest the division? That Arnold would head Tactical?

T: General Yount didn't say that, but I say that was what happened. I don't know who made the decision. Of course, this now

became the Army Air Forces. You see, we were all connected with the Army.

Q: Did Yount ever talk to you about Arnold? Tell you about Arnold?

T: He never said anything derogatory, in any way. But General Yount was a man who you never heard criticize anyone.

Q: But there was an element of competition between them?

T: No question about it. He used to laugh about Patton because I think Patton was in the same class. He used to laugh at George Patton. As General Yount said, his pearl handled revolvers. Of course, they weren't. I just saw the movie. But I couldn't give you anything that would reflect on the competition.

Q: I don't mean to reflect on it. Sort of observations about-- Did Arnold have some of the characteristics of Patton? Very aggressive?

T: He did. Listen. I knew very well why Roosevelt didn't take Arnold to Yalta.

Q: He was sick.

T: That may do as an excuse. But I don't think that Roosevelt dared to take Arnold to Yalta.

Q: Why?

T: Because I don't think he would have given--made all the concessions to the Russians.

Q: Arnold had a heart attack.

Q: We're talking about Mrs. Yount and the Robert Crawford song. You helped to establish it?

T: Yes. You know, the story of Crawford coming in and playing the Air Force song to General Yount and Mrs. Yount. And they--this

Colonel who had started this other one, that was then the one recognized. But they thought the Air Force song was the best, and Mrs. Yount really, I would say, pushed it so darn hard that she had it adopted. But, it's very hard to get a song started. So I went to New York and met with all the famous songwriters to talk about how we would do it. I'm talking of professionsals now. Every big-nam song writer was at this meeting.

Q: How did you popularize the song?

T: All right. We made records of it, and we put them on the Post Exchange juke boxes, and we said: "When that juke box quits, you put on the Air Force song." Now if somebody wants to play something else, all right. But every single minute that that juke box is not playing, the Air Force song goes on it.

Q: Did you have to put something in their hats, too?

T: Oh yes. We took the words and we had every cadet at all the Reception Centers paste it in their hats. So they knew the words. And not only that, but General Arnold, you see, issued an order to us. So that down in Miami Beach they sang the Air Force song from one march to the other.

Q: Did you spend any time down at the Miami Beach Center?

T: Yes, quite a bit.

Q: Jim Stowell was down there, wasn't he?

T: I didn't know very many of the officers there because I went in with some big shots and you don't. I wouldn't remember a single name at Miami Beach.

Q: What did Arnold say about soldiers?

T: He said a singing soldier is a better soldier, and singing promotes spirit and so forth.

Q: When did he say this?

T: Well, he said that at the time that we got that singing program handed to us, which is about '45. And I went to field after field, and I'd say that to the commander of the field--now the orders are "singing." They're not my orders and they're not General Yount's orders. Those come from top brass. I said, "That's an order from General Arnold."

Q: You came in and said, "This is General Arnold's order." Did you get some better response?

T: Sure.

Q: Were they scared of him?

T: No, but they thought, what the hell, why this singing business? Kind of crazy. Not all of them did, but a lot of hard-boiled eggs didn't believe in singing, you see.

Q: Was he a dominating figure, but was he a domineering figure?

T: I'd have to say yes. He was domineering, he really was.

Q: In respect to Yount? Yount was sort of mild?

T: He was not domineering at all. Yount was an organization man, really.

Q: Arnold was an organization, because he worked for Marshall.

T: Yes, but he was an organization man in the fact that he and Yount were very close. That was good judgment. The selection of those two men couldn't have been more perfect.

Q: Their relations were good?

T: Yes, they were. If they weren't, General Yount never let on.

Q: What about Weaver? He created some problems?

T: Yes, he did.

Q: What sort of problems?

T: Well, Weaver was terribly hard boiled in the first place. Anyway, he established his headquarters over at that golf club that was just a plaything.

Q: Was this down in North Cardina? Knollwood, the Technical Training Command?

T: Yes, it was a country club. That was the Technical Training Command, and they went on and played golf every afternoon. When we got down there, we were working 12 or 14 hours a day.

Q: Did Arnold know about this?

T: He must have. Because--I don't know why Weaver was relieved.

Q: Yes, he was relieved.
T: I wasn't in on the very top flight.
Q: You think that was one of the reasons?

T: I think so.

Q: I want to talk to you particularly about the Civilian Contract Schools--C.C. Moseley and others.

T: There were a lot of them.

Q: This was a great feat in turning out flying graduates at a time when we needed a lot of pilots. Who was responsible for that civilian contract school idea?

T: Well, it must have been Arnold.

Q: Did Yount have a role?

T: Yount and Arnold would confer on these things. Yount would go to Washington quite often. In fact, I've taken him to Washington a number of times, flown down there with him. We had that penthouse on the top of the Statler Hotel.

Q: Who's "we"? You mean the Training Command.

T: No, it belonged to Jackie Cochran. And there were four bedrooms up there and 22 uniforms, too. Jackie had the uniforms?

Q: You mean her husband rented the suite?

T: Oh yes, he was amultimillionaire. Jackie was wealthy, too. But we had access to that place.

Q: She rented that suite?

T: It was rented for the duration of the war, on top of the Statler.

Q: Your job was what?

T: I went into Training first. And then on account of my age and on account of my experience I took over Special Services and I was the Public Relations Officer for the Training Command.

Q: Did Jackie Cochran and her girls do a great job?

T: I would say so.

Q: They tried to get them commissioned?

T: Well, they were commissioned.

Q: No, they weren't. Never were commissioned.

T: Hell, they weren't.

Q: She was, but not the WASP.

T: I didn't know that.

Q: They deactivated them late in '44.

T: Now you're telling me something. I thought they were all commissioned at that graduation.

Q: No.

T: I thought they were at least a Second Lieutenant.

Q: They tried. Oveta Culp Hobby tried to get them into the WACs but Jackie was opposed to that. You remember that?

T: Oh yes, I remember Hobby. Hobby didn't like the WASPs at all.

Q: I know, and vice versa, too.

Pibbets, Paul H. 7 Jan 70

April 30, 1970

BG Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., USAF(Ret)
7341 S.W. 84th Court
Miami, Florida 33143

Dear General Tibbets:

I've meant to write to thank you and Mrs. Tibbets for an interesting and informative interview. However, now an occasion presents itself to provide more than a bread-and-butter reason.

Air Force/Space Digest accepted my proposal to do a 25th Anniversary article of the Hiroshima mission. Based on our previous conversation. I propose an article which would place the whole undertaking in a favorable light.

As you pointed out to me, in the circumstances as we then knew them, we would respond precisely the same way.

The silver anniversary commemoration would provide a suitable platform to place things back in proper perspective.

It just so happens that I will be in Florida during the first week in June. I would like to supplement my information with a few additional questions plus a couple of pictures of General and Mrs. Paul Tibbets at ease in retirement.

John Loosbrock has promised this article feature treatment and I hope it will be convenient for you and Mrs. Tibbets to see me.

Incidentally, Ken Rogers is not our man. He was cut back, but for a different reason.

I hope you feel positively disposed toward this undertaking as I am enthused about doing it.

The enclosed self-addressed envelope is for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

PAUL W. TIBBETS
11240 S. W. 93rd ST.
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33156

13 May 1970

Dear Dr. Green,

I held off answering your letter of April 30th until some developments, in the mill, matured.

Between the 21st of this month and until about the 15th of June, I will not be in Miami. I will be between here, Texas and Honolulu. Following that it is not too far out of line to say I may be in the Washington area for a while.

I appreciate your interest in doing the article and would like to cooperate. It might be a good idea to plan that I contact you around June 15th and we can then determine how we can get together. In the meantime when you are in Miami, do call the house. My wife will be here and can inform you as to where I am at the moment.

Sincerely,

Paul Tibbets

Telephone (305) 274 3416

Wooten 305 - 284 - 4173

December 1, 1969

Brig.Gen. Paul W Tibbets, Jr.,USAF(Ret)
7341 SW 84th Court
Miami, Florida 33143

Dear General Tibbets:

My plans to visit Florida are firming up. I will be there during the 2nd week of January, and will phone you for an appointment at your convenience.

Please advise me if this is satisfactory. Would you also include your telephone number.

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Deputy Chief
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July 11, 1969

Brig.General Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., USAF(Ret)
4200 Shorecrest Drive
Orlando, Florida 32804

Dear General Tibbets:

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We are now hopeful of filling in some of the cracks and have a number of interviews planned for the immediate future. We have appointments in New York City next week with Hon. Robert Lovett, and Generals Lauris Norstad, Larry Kuter and George Kenney.

In mid-or late August, I hope to visit Florida to conduct a few key interviews. I would be honored if you could find some time to talk of your association with General Arnold in the origin and development of Operation SILVERPLATE and some related matters.

Incidentally, I have been with the Office of the Secretary some 23 years now. Perhaps you may recall the occasion in 1947 when I interviewed you in connection with an article that Zeb Courtney (later Collie Small) did for Collier's Magazine on the Hiroshima mission. That's a long time ago.

Just for ball-park estimates, I expect to be coming through Orlando or near it on the way down to Southern Florida about Sunday or Monday, August 24-25, and will be coming back North about Friday, September 5th. I should also mention that I have another tentative visit to Florida scheduled for the end of December, if next month is unsuitable for you.

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Very sincerely,

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Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

August 20, 1969

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4200 Shorecrest Drive
Orlando, Florida 32804

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If for any reason we miss connections, as I have a fairly tight schedule for the limited time I will be there, we can try to set up another appointment for late December or early January when I expect to return.

I am very much looking forward to getting together with you.

Very sincerely,

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Deputy Chief
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P.S. We have misplaced your Miami address, and hope this will be forwarded to you.

October 7, 1969

Brig.Gen. Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., USAF(Ret)
7341 S.W. 84th Court
Miami, Fla. 33143

Dear General Tibbets:

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I called back to Washington and was even given an address in Geneva, Switzerland as an alternative to your Orlando address.

In any event it got messed up, and it was all my fault, for which I am truly sorry.

I hope to be down in the Southland around the turn of the year and will look you up at that time. I have just finished reading Arthur Compton's Atomic Quest. It's a very good account and I learned quite a few things I didn't know before.

Our research of General Arnold is nearly complete and now the writing starts. However there are a few holes in the research which I hope to fill up when you and I get together.

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Telephone (305) 274 3416

Worden 305 - 284-4173

23 Dec.

Dr. Green,

When in Miami you can reach me at Tel. # 274-3416.

The address you have is that of my Sister - Change your records to show my address as

11240 S.W. 93rd ST.
Miami, 33156

Sincerely
Paul Tibbets

December 19, 1969

Brig.Gen. Paul W. Tibbets, USAF(Ret)
7341 S.W. 84th Court
Miami, Florida 33143

Dear General Tibbets:

My plans are firming up and I hope to see you sometime between January 8-10, if this is convenient. In any event, I will phone before hand for an appointment.

Incidentally, in August, they had no phone listing under your name. If they now have it, there is no problem, but if it is unlisted, could you send it to me in the enclosure?

I'm looking forward to our meeting.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

done 1-7-70

December 1, 1969

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7341 SW 84th Court
Miami, Florida 33143

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Research & Analysis Div

PAUL W. TIBBETS, JR.
7341 S. W. 84th Court
MIAMI, FLA. 33143

30 September

Dear Dr. Green,

Guess you were pushed for time if you got to this area around Labor Day. I was not here all of the time either. Will look for word in late Dec. or early Jan.

Sincerely

Paul Tibbets

M

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644-9890

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INTERVIEW WITH B/GEN PAUL W. TIBBETS
MIAMI, FLORIDA
JANUARY 7, 1970

Q: When did you first meet General Arnold?

T: My first actual meeting with the man was in his office, shortly after I had been selected to take on the Manhattan Project for the Air Force.

Q: Who selected you?

T: This is something that has never been exposed. It's never been explained to me, and I can only go on certain conjecture, derived from different pieces of conversation with different senior General Officers in the Air Force at the time. So let me try to put it this way. At the very first part of the North African campaign, I was down there under Gen Doolittle. I had been flying my combat tours in the B-17s, and I got called back to Doolittle's office to be a bombardment expert in the 12th AF, headquarters in Algiers. In early '43, right after Christmas, January, February and March of 1943, there was some correspondence that went back and forth between Arnold and Doolittle. The B-29 was in trouble back here at the Boeing factory. So, Gen Doolittle called me in to his office one day and said: "You are going back to the United States." And I looked at him in amazement, and figured maybe I had done something wrong. And he said: "No, I have been in correspondence with Gen Arnold. Gen Arnold wants somebody of combat experience - reasonably senior - I was a LTCOL then at the time - and seasoned

in combat operations to come back and go to work on the B-29." Doolittle said: "I nominated you," and he said: "I've just received the reply." He showed me a telex message from Arnold which said: "Send Tibbets back!" Eventually, after this conversation, I got back into the Pentagon and my sponsor, I guess you could call him that, was Gene Eubanks, Gen Eubanks. He was back there then.

Q: Orlando - was he (Eubanks) the head of SAT?

T: Yes, he had that here. But anyway, he was in Washington at this particular point, and so I met Gen Eubanks for the first time. He took me and introduced me to Gen Arnold. And here is Tibbets, the guy that Gen Arnold had told Doolittle to send back to work on the B-29. Well, at that particular point in time, the B-29 appeared to be a dead issue, because of Eddie Allen's crash at Seattle. It killed all of the Boeing people, and Boeing didn't want to build the airplane. So they said: "okay. Here we got you; what are we going to do with you?" So that's when Gen Eubanks said: "You go to Orlando." And he said: "Go down to AFTAC." He said: "We've got some things you can do down there with B-17s. So I went down there and worked under Gordon Saville, until the B-29 appeared to be coming out of its great problems when K.B. Wolfe took over, and I immediately got a call to come in to Mariatta, Georgia.

Q: Big problem was engines catching fire?

T: This is what happened. They had nothing but problems with the airplanes. Yes, the engines was a terrible problem. But on the other hand, there were other design problems in the

airplane. Let's leave it at that point, because we're talking about me and Arnold. I'm working on B-29s now, out in Alamogordo, New Mexico, with Dr. Workman from the University of New Mexico. We were trying to find out what we could do to a B-29 to make it survive, should we say, fighter attacks by the Japanese Zeroes, and what not. This is a problem of trying to arrange the best defenses for the B-29. The telephone rings in my operations down there one morning, and it's Gen Ent, at Colorado Springs. He said: "I want you to come to Colorado Springs. Be here tomorrow morning at such and such a time." And he said: "Bring your suitcase with you, because you are not coming back to Alamogordo." I complied with that order, So P.D. Ent says: "You are going to take on this job." I am then, a little bit later after I got started in the project, I am then directed to go back to Washington, and I have to meet Bim Wilson there for the first time. Bim Wilson was a Colonel at the time.

Q: Is that Roscoe?

T: Roscoe C. Wilson, yes.

Q: Bim Wilson in Hqs had been designated back there as the project officer for SILVERPLATE. On my first visit, to meet Bim Wilson, he says: "Gen Arnold wants to see you." Well, okay, I go back and I see Gen Arnold again for the second time. Of course, it's like meeting him for the first time, he didn't even remember that I had been there.

Q: You have no knowledge of SILVERPLATE?

T: I did when I went back now with Wilson, yes. I did. Yes, I was full briefed out then. My point was that to ge back

to Hqs., to meet Wilson and we would have to deal with each other intimately, by telephone, and what not, on SILVERPLATE, and that's ehen he, Wilson, tells me: "Okay, Gen Arnold wants to meet you." So we go to Gen Arnold's office. We are ushered in a reasonably short time. A man stands up behind his desk there, and he shakes hands with me, and wants to know what I think of the job, and I tell him I think it's a great challenge. He said, very matter of fact about it, you could almost say, coldly indifferent, because he said: "Okay. I've told them here to give you anything you want. If you have any trouble, let me know." "Yes sir" - I saluted and walked out. That's the end of my interview with Gen Arnold, in this particular case. Now later in the phase of the project where we have to select targets, I am again back in Gen Arnold's office with Gen Leslie Groves, and a group of other people, that are concerned with target selection - a group of other people, I think there were about 6 of us in there. Norman Ramsey was there; Parsons was there, Groves, myself and Dr. - that meterologist, that's the father of air mass analysis. Whatever his name, I can't remember that old gentleman, the Norwegian. Anyway, he's there, too. Somebody in the intelligence business had given Arnold some list of Japanese targets. He then said: "All right, these are the targets that they tell me - that this is the conference with Groves. Arnold and Groves are really talking, and the rest of us are standing in the background.

Q: Groves is worth seeing? He is in Washington. Should I see Groves?

T: You will meet something when you meet him too. He can out-Norstand. But anyway, we are in this conference, I am given an opportunity to look with the other people, at the various target layouts that they had on these Japanese targets that were made available to us. From a bombing point of view, and an approach point of view, they all looked good, as far as I was concerned. There was no problem whatsoever and that's the only thing that I was consulted on. They asked me: (1) can you approach these targets? (2) can you bomb them? The answer was yes to any one of them. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Niigata, Kokura.

Q: Kyoto - that was stricken by the Secretary?

T: You are getting me in a bind - I don't remember that.

Q: Kyoto,which somebody said was a religious shrine, and Stimson struck it.

T: You are right, wasn't that the ancestral home of the Japanese rulers? I think it was. There were 6 of them anyway,and so, my reaction was that there was, this all took a little time, I think we were in there possibly an hour, an hour and 15 or 20 minutes with Arnold and Groves are talking. We all got together. The air mass analysis expert. I can't remember that man's name. He's the father of air mass analysis. He gave us, or he looked at the targets. He asked when we anticipated that we would be able to make the bombing, take place. It was said to him that we would probably be ready the first week of August, and his remark at that time, was "Fine, I'll give you a long range forecast for that time period." He said: "It will take me a few days to work it out." Now this, as I remember, this

was along about the month of April. In due time, we did. I was back at Wendover by this time, but we did. We got this man's long range forecast and we took it to the islands with us, and we watched it. As the first week of August rolled around, it was amazingly accurate, as to what he said would exist in this forecast he had made several months before. So, on the basis that he was right on the track, the 6th day of August looked like the day we should shoot for. The meterologist down at Guam in LeMay's headquarters also agreed on their three-day forecast. So, on the basis of that, we went full steam ahead. That is the sum total of my experience with Arnold.

Q: Several other points of interest. Not necessarily involving Arnold, but interesting in the atomic bomb picture. There was a Scientific Panel convened by Stimson, Arthor Comptom, Enrico Fermi, William Laurence and J. Robert Oppenheimer, and this was in June 1945. They were asked to take a look at the whole situation, on whether we should drop the bomb on a live target or on a desert island target. Do you remember the Franek Committee - this group of subordinate scientists - wanted it dropped on a sterile target. I think the four leading scientists decided that we just didn't have enough to do it, or it would not be convincing enough, we did not have enough fissionable material to convince the Japanese by the second or third attack to get out of the war. Anyway, they decided, they recommended to the Secretary that we hit a live target. Were you brought in on any of that?

T: We were in on it. You are right. I won't try to get down to the minute details. But generally, yes, you are exactly

correct, because here we are working our heads off out there in Utah trying to get this thing to go. There was an awful lot that took place that isn't necessarily a part of the official record. Meaning this: despite the fact that we had a large group of very dedicated people wearing all different kinds of uniforms, there were a lot of vested interests by individuals being exhibited, even at this time frame. Some people were a lot smarter than me. And they started feathering their own nests well ahead of time. They started working. These little things began to come down. Everybody would start talking about, this, that and the other thing. I know that myself, Adm Parsons, Norman Ramsay, all of the people that were directly associated with the Air Force end of it. This particular group and Dr. Oppenheimer - he was also of the opinion that this ghing should be used for real, if we were going to use it.

Q: He changed later. You know, this is something I tell my friends about Oppenheimer, and they are quite surprised that he was in favor of dropping it on a live target, because he has since acquired another reputation.

T: I like Oppy. I got to know the man reasonably well, and I recognized him for what he was. His various political beliefs, and so forth, I didn't pay any attention to that. My personal reaction was - and I was supported by these people whose names I mentioned - my reaction was this: from a military point of view, this is probably a very silly thing to do. You don't advertise all of these things, because surprise is 90% of the battle. We want the element of surprise. And I felt that if

we were going to have to work under the conditions that we did, the hours that we worked, you know, the trying times that we put up with, to go out and see this thing dropped on a dummy target or to be blown up that way, really took an awful lot of enthusiasm out of us, and our willingness to work on this thing. Because here we've got friends, and cohorts that are getting killed every day, and I mean I was one of the strongest supporters, I think everybody else did. This thing is going to stop the war. It is going to shorten it, anyhow. It's going to probably stop it. It's going to save all kinds of lives. Let's use it! American lives at stake. Let's use it! On that basis, then, on that far end of the chain down there, we heard what was going on. And of course, nobody breathed a greater sigh of relief than we did when we heard that it's going to go for real.

T: Now, there was another element working in here that you may not be aware of. There was an element of theoreticians - I guess that's the correct word - and they had to have every element of this particular bomb so perfect that it could only have a chance of failure of 1 in a million. Well, as we worked on this thing from day to day, and different pieces, and then modified pieces, and all of the hodge podge that we had to go throughto try to get a workable unit, we finally got down to one that worked pretty reliably. It worked reliably enough for me that I was willing to put in in an airplane and go use it. But it wasn't reliable enough for these theoreticians. They wanted a greater reliability built into it. Here we are, we are talking about a Japanese invasion, and you've just solved this problem of, shall we use it for real or shouldn't we. But the

questionis, when are we going to use it? This is the thing. I had been given a real powerful stick that nobody knew about, and that is, the Air Force told me when you....

Q: You say Air Force - Arnold?

T: Actually, it had to emanate from Arnold, and it was a piece of staff work, no question about it. But yet in a sense of the word, it was routine. Nobody could inspect my outfit. Nobody was supposed to know about my outfit. How do you take one of these outfits with 1500 people in it, and move it around like another Air Force unit? You've got to get into channels somewhere. I was told, then, this comes through 2nd AF now and Gen Williams by this time was commanding, because P.D. Ent had had his accident, you see. So Gen Bob Williams was in there now. Bob Williams said when do you think your outfit is really to go overseas, because nobody can inspect it and approve it - and I forgot what they used to call those things that have the shakedown inspections. The Inspector General would listen and say: "okay, they are ready to go overseas." And finally, they'd get their orders. But nobody could do this to me. Williams said: "When you are ready, you send me - and he gave me a code name, I can't remember what it was - he said, you send that to me, and I will put the ball in motion, and the orders will be issued and your outfit will be shipped overseas. When we got to this point - the theoreticians vs. the operators on the issue, do we go or don't we go, and have we got enough reliability, or don't we have enough reliability - one day, I just got to the point. I got my own people together, my bombardier, in particular, Tom Ferebee, who was probably closer

to me than anybody else, and Clifford J. Hefflin, who lives in California now, but he was in my upper class at the flying school, and we became great friends. Anyway, Cliff Hefflin was a Colonel. I had asked for him to be the base commander at Wendover, when I took the project. He was senior to me, but he agreed he'd be perfectly happy to come in there and work under me, so to speak, without any arguments. Cliff, Tom and I and Dutch Van Kirk were sitting around. Cliff said: "well, how are we going to resolve this prolbem?" Well, all of a sudden, and being a real gungho 29 year old LTCOL at that point, I said: "I'm going to solve it." So I just got on the telephone and I called up 2nd AF and I sent this code name to Gen Williams, meaning, I'm going to move this outfit overseas. I knew that I had the upper hand in the situation because, if I moved the outfit overseas, there was nobody or nothing left for the scientists to have as a group of experimenters. We were gone, so they had to go along with us. Of course, I heard from Leslie Groves on this. It is only time that he really got after me, and he got after me good. He used real strong language - impertinent pup that I was, LTCOL. And how did I get the idea that I could order this outfit overseas. You see, he was "Mr. God." And how did I get the idea that I could order this unit out, and so forth. And I told him that I thought we were pretty close to being ready to go, and it was going to take me about 6 weeks to get this outfit moved over, because most of them would have to go by ground. I said: "if we are going to operate in the month of August, like we had said, we've got to start this movement now. We've got to get these people over

there, and then we'll be lucky if we get set up in time." Well, somehow or other, he accepted this, and no further issue was made out of it. I mean, he was mad. He could have court martialed me if he wanted to. But again, secrecy wouldn't let him do it, so he almost had to go along with it. I take full responsibility and blame and credit for getting this outfit overseas, because I wouldn't be too surprised that they might have been dilly-dallying around with that thing yet. That's a far fetched, but they could have carried that thing on for a long time, trying to receive this one in a million perfection.

Q: From an operational standpoint you were satisfied with something less than 999 out of k,000?

T: Definitely. You have to take something less. So what is the reliability factor? We had it figured out in our own way. Tom and I and our crew had dropped - now we are talking dummies with fuzes - the fuzing mechanism was the problem, of trying to get this fuzing to work correctly. Now, I think Tom and I... about 30 drops and we hadn't had a failure in 30 drops. We got to figuring, well okay, this, if you take this thing based on the number of drops that we had made and then 30 straight with no particular troubles. We figured: okay, this was good enough. We were dropping them out in the Saltan Sea area, yes. As a matter of fact, we did that, and we dropped them in the salt flats of Utah, and out around 29-Palms in California. The Navy had an armament experimental testing base out there. Se did some more out there.

Q: The dummy had the same weight as the real one?

T: No, actually it only had the same fuzing mechanism. You are talking ballistics now. This introduces a different factor. No, we were not dropping. I dropped them in a long tube arrangement, you see. This shape was never put in. Well, we dropped two of these for a ballistic check before we actually made a regular drop. We dropped two for a ballistic check. We were interested in the fuzing at that time.

Q: You told me a very interesting story about the security. (addressing Mrs. Tibbets) I remember this back from 1946.

Q: I talked to Spaatz. He said that he was opposed to having the atomic bomb dropped. I disagreed with him. As a matter of fact, I have his written request to drop a third one on Tokyo. Were you aware of that?

T: Yes, I was aware of it. Actually, I was in on that, because of the very fact that I had Cliff Hefflin sitting back at Wendover at that time with another airplane with a bomb in the airplane, in a B-29 to fly out.

Q: You had another one?

T: Oh yes.

Q: I thought they only had two?

T: No, out on the islands they only had the nuclear elements for two. But we had another unit at Wendover all assembled and ready to go, but the nuclear component for that bomb would have come by a different airplane, not with Cliff. He was going to fly the bomb really to have the nuclear part inserted. He was going to fly that out in an airplane, to get it ghere the quickest way possible.

Q: As I have put this thing together; looking at Spaatz' file and Arnold's file, on Aug 9, the second was dropped on Nagasaki, on Aug 11, the Jap emissaries came to IeShima. They started negotiations. This went on for two or three days. They were - nobody knew - they were stalling. Spaatz, who was then USASTAF Commander, felt we need something to tip the scales, because there was a struggle within the Japanese government. And they figured they needed one more hit to tip the scales over towards unconditional surrender. So he called for a third one.

T: I know, because I was down there in LeMay's headquarters. I was in Guam. My base was Tinian, but I got called down while all this was going on. LeMay and Butch Blanchard, and they asked me: "have you got another unit," because they didn't know. Can you do another one? And I said: "Yes," and that was when I knew, I was made aware of them....

Q: How long would it have taken Hefflin to bring the other one out?

T: Cliff would have been there in roughly 25 hours. There was no problem.

Q: I guess on the 14th or 15th?

T: I would have dropped the (third) bomb. If it had gone, I would have dropped it, because LeMay was a little bit unhappy with the series of events that took place with Chuck Sweeney - in trying to get that bomb on Nagasaki. I mean there is a lot to that story, too. They did a marvelous job and if it hadn't been Sweeney and Behan in there, God knows what would

have happened. Anyway, LeMay said: "look, I don't want another think like this. You are going to do it." He told me.

Q: What was that problem?

T: In the first place, when they took off to rendezvous with their escorts at Iwo Jima, I had told them how I rendezvoused and I wanted them to do the same thing up there over Mt. Suribachi, Iwo Jima. I wanted them to use that as a visual reference point, to circle it - I think it was 8,000 feet - and at that particular time, when he made that circle of 360 degrees, theoretically the escort airplanes were supposed to come in on his wing. They would all three of them take off and start for Japan. Boy by the name of Hopkins was flying one of the escort aircraft, and when he got up there, he couldn't find Sweeney, and Sweeney couldn't find him. They kept circling for about 30 minutes trying to get together. I had told them specificall: "you make one circle of 360 degrees - this was a fuel problem - I said: "you make one 360 degree turn and go, if you go alone." Well, of course, the scientists were interested. They were putting on pressure because we need these airplanes with their instrumentation. The point was, they didn't do what they were told to do, and from there on, they had a series of problems.

Q: They didn't rendezvous?

T: They did not rendezvous. Two airplanes did, but Hopkins never made it with his airplane. So this caused a shortage of fuel to begin with. The next thing that happens is, they can't transfer fuel out of their bomb bay tank which further aggravates the fuel problem, and they get up there, and they

have to go from one target to another one, because they can't see anything....

Q: Was Kokura the first target, and they were socked in?

T: They were socked in so they went to Nagasaki. They made a bomb run on Nagasaki, and it closed in under them while they were on the run on their primary aiming point. So, the thing was Behan, the bombardier, told Chuck: "Turn around and go back again." He said, I see an opening over here and I can probably get it this time, because they had been told: "You drop that bomb visually; no radar drops on this deal." So they came around and got ready to go back. They can't carry this weapon back with them, because they don't even think they have enough fuel to make it to Okinawa, to land. And so, Behan and Weeney and Ashworth sat there in consultation. While they are making this turn, Behan said: "Okay, bring it on around," because Pete told me later he saw an opening, not where the primary aiming point was, but offset by about 2,000 feet from where the primary was. And he knew, because these fellows could draw each one of these targets - a mental picture. They could sit right down like an artist and draw that thing. So Behan knew exactly what he was talking about, and he knew he had to get rid of the bomb, so they came around, and he made a visual release offset from his primary aiming point. Originally, they came out and said he missed by 2,000 feet, or something like this. Well, sure he did, it was deliberate, because they had to drop the unit, and he, Ashworth and Sweeney knew that the bomb damage assessment wouldn't be hurt too much by being offset that particular amount. It was either that or not knowing what to do with that airplane, and the bomb.

Q: You couldn't bring the bomb back?

T: You couldn't bring the bomb back because it was armed, and there was no way to de-arm it, you see?

Q: Your plane, too? The Enola Gay?

T: Yes.

Q: No way to dis-arm it?

T: Let's put it this way: we could have done it. But on the other hand, after you have set that mechanism into motion, what they would have had to do was depressurize the airplane, and go back with oxygen masks at altitude and that sort of thing, to take that thing out of there. And you can imagine what a job that would have been. Because of barometric fuzing, they couldn't descend.

Q: You said something that interest me because I had a long talk with Twining last week, and you talked about LeMay's headquarters. Wasn't Twining the mission commander?

T: If you want to base it on seniority, yes. But remember this, LeMay was the 20th AF. Let's give the man credit. He was the 20th AF. The war in Europe folds up. The air war against Japan is going to get all the emphasis, so what do they do, they've got Spaatz and they've got Twining. What are they going to do with them? Just send them out, because they are going to bring Doolittle's air force and everything, re-equip them with B-29s and what not. They are going to bring them on out, so they have a problem. They've got to keep this thing in the proper channel. They come out and they decide well, fine: "We will make Spaatz the theater air commander." No argument about that. He was going to be the theater air commander. Well, we've got Twining....

Q: You had Giles, too. Giles was the Deputy Commander. He wore two hats.

T: Well, I'm thinking of the people who are directly in it. Of course, Barney Giles was another special individual in his own right. He was doing a lot of things, I mean I don't think he did anything tactical at all.

Q: No, he had to keep Nimitz happy.

T: The situation gets itself out there. You've got Spaatz out there, and then Twining is sent out. So what do you do with Twining? Well, they have to designate him 20th AF Commander because he is senior and LeMay his deputy. But, in fact, nothing changed on that island. LeMay was "Mr. Jesus." He ran the whole show....

Q: Didn't they move LeMay up and make him Chief of Staff of the USASTAF? In other words, in the picking order, you had Spaatz, Giles, LeMay in USASTAF?

T: They put them all in there, in proper order of seniority.

Q: At least on paper, Twining was the 20th AF Commander. But you say Twining did not exercise any real authority?

T: As far as I am concerned, he didn't, because I still dealt with LeMay and Butch Blanchard. The conferences and things that we sat in on, it was LeMay. Nobody opened their mouth but LeMay. He did all the talking, and you know, he didn't talk very much. All that was done, he did it. Nobody that was out there at that time, I don't believe that anybody looked at anybody for running the 20th AF except Curt LeMay, no matter what they called him.

Q: I was told that LeMay, because of his gruff manner, had made himself personna non grata with the Navy?

T: I don't think so. I doubt that seriously. I think they respected him, because LeMay wouldn't take a back seat to any of them. He was only a M/Gen, and he was dealing with five-star admirals and four-star admirals out there. But still, he was the 20th AF. He was the United States Air Force. He took that position, and he held it.

Q: Well, that is interesting because I have another interpretation last week, a high level interpretation of that.

T: Well, I went with LeMay, I went up there to Guam. I was taken into Nimitz' office and Forrest Sherman was there. When I first got out there, LeMay took me over and introduced me.

Q: Well, you've seen LeMay's book, the one with MacKinlay Kautor. He criticized the Navy. It is a pretty sad book.

T: As I say, I don't think much of it either.

Q: MacKinlay Kantor was a very good writer. But I don't think LeMay gave him all the material to write his book.

T: The though never occurred to me, I don't think, at any time I can't think of anything other than this: LeMay was running the show. Spaatz and Twining were there. Even when we got through dropping the bomb, when they came up to Tinian to meet me after I landed, and sit in on a debriefing, it was LeMay. It was LeMay!

Q: Twining really didn't know the score. He had just come out.

T: He didn't really know. I have the greatest respect in the world for Twining. He's a fine man, and I think it's a sign of his greatness that he did just what he did, because he didn't know and understand the B-29. He didn't understand the tactical situation existing out there in those islands, so he let LeMay run it. And Spaatz did the same thing. I had been lucky, I'd been around Gen Spaatz in Europe and I got to know him personally, and knew him quite well. On Tinian, after we got back and even down on Guam, I was up at his house, and ate with him, and visited with him on a friendly basis. But no, LeMay ran that show.

Q: Twenty-three years ago you told me, several interesting stories. I'd like to recall them. One was the security problem. To be sure that all the men of the 509th respected the security of the problem, I believe you mentioned the story about giving them leave....

T: This was at the very first. You tell people that they are going to be constantly under surveillance. If they don't do what you tell them to do, you are going to know about it right away, and you are going to do something. How do you prove this? Well, the only way that I could figure to prove it was, I had these people out there, I didn't have any airplanes, and I'd given them all this big guff about security. They really could see no reason to have any security at all, since, as I say, we didn't have any airplanes. We were just all a bunch of people out there, trying to get organized at Wendover, Utah.

Q: Did you also have some cover plans to leade people to believe the plane was going to be used for something else?

T: No, you are getting things mixed up here now. The thing that you had reference to is what I am trying to explan. If we are going to impress these people, we've got to make a definite issue of it, and we have to do it correctly. We didn't have anything for these people to do. A lot of them hadn't had a furlough in Lork knows how long, so I said: "Okay, let's give everybody furloughs." But in the meantime, let's get all of the security boys spotted at strategic places. They will know who these guys are because they are in uniform. The security people are in civilian clothing. We put them at the airport in Salt Lake City; we had them at the train station and the bus station in Salt Lake City; we sent them to Elko, Nevada. We had them out there, and we even had them in Los Angeles. So, when these guys would come through, why they would try to strike up a conversation with them; they'd try to buy them a beer, you know - get them into conversation. The minute they got anything out of them, they would get on the telephone and call back to us. Well, we knew where the man was going, because he gave us his leave address. We just sent a telegram. It was waiting on him when he got there to return to the base immediately. He would come back, and as soon as he did, we walked in and said: "At such and such a time, you said this, in such and such a place." And, of course, their mouths dropped open. How did all of this happen? And on the basis of that, we lovingly forgave everybody. We weren't going to court martial or shoot them. We forgave them, but said: "Boy, you already have one strike against you; don't get another one." Well, it had its effect.

They were impressed. They never knew how it happened until after things were over with, or until they had a chance really to thing about it.

Q: How much had they been told?

T: Nothing. Absolutely nothing. They didn't know anything to tell. But the thing that they were able to talk about was that they were big shots and that they were on a special project. This is what made them talkative when somebody bought them a beer.

Q: The cover plan I referred to...

T: On the island of Tinian.

Q: When you got there, you allowed people to believe different things about what you were going to do?

T: That's right. Now, specifically, one of the things that we did, was we placed one of these dummy crates, really, out on the island, in a place where we had guards on it. It looked like a reasonably secure place, but yet it was a selected place that we knew that the curious could see it, and would want to know what was going on. The guards were specifically instructed to be not too alert. In other words, let people try to take a picture of it. Let people try to sneak up and see what it is, because when they see it, they won't know what they have seen, and it doesn't mean anything, anyway. So, this was one thing we did. Now, the next thing we did was that when we got ready to load up, we put a dummy airplane out, too. When we loaded the bomb, we put a dummy airplane out to attract the attention. We had an awful lot of stuff going on it. We took

the airplane that we wanted to load, took it off to another place, and loaded it up and nobody paid any attention to it. We had all of the guards on the dummy.

Q: Was this in the movie?

T: No. The fellows got mad at me about this movie deal because they said really they didn't have one movie, they had three.

Q: The story that you told me many years ago they bowdlerized this story. This was the story of SILVERPLATE, code name SILVER-PLATE. I wonder if you would tell me that again. The story where instructions were sent out, when people in the Pentagon saw SILVERPLATE....

T: They were to do what they were told. In other words, they were any requisition that has SILVERPLATE on it, they were to comply.

Q: I remember this from 23 years ago.

T: This is where we butt heads with Maxwell. Wendover being an isolated spot, I wasn't in the normal line of supply for anything. Secrecy wouldn't let me be supplied by normal channels, so I have to supply myself. I have to become self supporting, this is part of my directive. I am not too far awary from the Salt Lake City, or the one at Ogden. I'm too far away from Ogden, but yet, Oklahoma City is my primary supply depot for B-29s. I've got to get back and forth constantly, so the only way myself clear to do it, is to have airplanes that would allow me to do it. So I went in and said I want transport airplanes. I sent in a requisition through channels. I never used SILVERPLATE unless I had to use it. I tried to do everything

without using this code name, because the less you use it, the less inclined you are to attract a lot of attention. They honored my requisition for transport-type airplanes and gave me 7 C-46s. This was fine, it suited my purpose until I began to see that if I went to the islands, I would never be able to get my supplies through ATC. The Air Transport Command was snowed under. I have to be my own supply source. The next thing is, I'm going to be carrying things that they don't want ATC to know anything about. So I go back in this time for C-54s, and my requisition bounces. It comes right back, there are no C-54s. They're all allocated...

Q: You wanted what, 2 or 3?

T: No. I asked for 5 to replace the 7 other airplanes. When my requisition came back - it wasn't justified - so then I pick up my rejected requisition and I go with it myself to Washington. Gen Maxwell is in charge of the aircraft allocations. I go in to him with Bim Wilson, and we talk about this thing. He says: "Well, now, what do you need these airplanes for? Well, I gave him all kinds of razzle-dazzle talk, because I had become a champion liar by this time. Boy, I could think up things faster than you could possibly imagine, and I was even pretty good at remembering what I told different people. I could go back and repeate it. Anyway, I go in and I try to justify this thing. Well, he's very abrupt. He doesn't want to give me the time of day, and this is what I'm asking for is silly. And I keep trying to convince the man that I need it. So he gets out his sheet of paper there and he sees that I have

so many B-29s, and I had all these C-46s, and now I want some C-54s. So he said: "what are you trying to do, start Tibbet's first individual air force?" Well, of course, by this time, I was a little bit exasperated, so I took the requisition back out of a bunch of papers that I had there, which was an official requisition for airplanes, and then with a great big pencil, I just wrote SILVERPLATE across the top of it, and handed it to him. Well, he turned about two different shades of white, when I did this. But that ended the conversation, and it ended all opposition, he just took it and slapped it over on his desk - no comment, no nothing. Well, I find out later, and this is something that I have not been able to pin down. But somewhere along the line, with Bim Wilson trying to get something done for SILVERPLATE, some General put in too much interference, tried to find out too much what was going on. And this came to me from Wilson, that Arnold had specifically said there would be no question by anybody in his staff. He had held a staff meeting and said there would be no question by anybody in his staff. When the word SILVERPLATE came in on a requisition, it would be honored. Apparently, according to Wilson, somebody, a general officer, failed to adhere to this.

Q: Not Maxwell?

T: No, somebody else. I got a long shot possibility, but I won't mention the name, because again I might be doing an injustice, but I think I know who it was. (Off the Record). The way the thing happened is that when this general officer refused, word got back through Wilson to Arnold that they couldn't get this thing done. Arnold sends for this general and

when he walk in the office, Arnold says to him: "Good morning Major," with no further to do. The man's permanent rank was Major.

Q: And he was two-star?

T: No, he was a BG.

Q: He was reduced in rank?

T: That's right. No chance, I mean that Arnold was just exactly that blunt about it. Afterwards, he said, I said once. I wanted nobody to question SILVERPLATE requisitions. So I could believe this about him from other stories that I'd heard as blunt and direct as he was.

Q: Did this general officer get in some other kind of trouble, like at Bolling Field. I heard some variations. At that time, I was trying to check out this story, you had told me this story way back, and apparently there was some social affair at Bolling. And apparently he was making a pass at somebody's wife? Apparently, the man was cut back at that time. There was some disagreement as to why he was cut back. Apparently, he acted unbecoming an officer and gentleman, and maybe this was a contributory factor?

T: Yet it doesn't sound like the man we mentioned, because I knew him at the flying school.

Q: He wasn't the type to get into situations like that?

T: I wouldn't think so. I had no knowledge really. I could see he was a man, I remember from the Flying School, he was an instructor down there. I remember that he was, should we say, a very precise individual. He was one that didn't take any answer lightly. He searched pretty deeply into things.

He was one to question deeply. As I say now, I don't know this to be a fact....

Q: I'll check it out. That's one of my favorite occupations - checking out stories.

T: As I say, I don't know it for sure, I do know this, anytime I ever wrote SILVERPLATE on a requisition, I never had any trouble.

Q: What sort of relationship did you have with Bim Wilson? He was your boss or sort of mentor?

T: No, Bim Wilson was my representative. He was my liaison officer.

Q: What was his rank at that time?

T: He was a full Colonel.

Q: Higher rank than you?

T: He outranked me by years, and everything else, a long way. Bim resented me. There is no question in my mind; he has always resented me. He resented me because I think he wanted it badly.

Q: This was one of the greatest jobs in the air force.

T: Yes, now the next thing is that Bim Wilson gets himself taken out of that job after Frank Armstrong gets a wing of B-29s out in Nebraska, and Bim wants to... You see, here he is a senior officer, a Colonel, and he hasn't had a tactical command, so he thinks his career is in real jeopardy. So he goes out. Oh, he pulled a little cutie; Before I got on this project, I had run all of the B-29 tests on fuel injector engines. You know, engines, cowl flaps and carburetors were our big nemesis in the B-29, and this fuel injector engine was a beauty. In addition to that,

I ran the tests on the Curtiss reversible electric props. I knew those propellors and knew them well. They had been scheduled for the B-32, which you may have heard.

Q: Oh yes, they flew 15 of them down to Kenney in SWPac.

T: Well, they had been scheduled to be put on the B-32. A man that was my roomate at the flying school, and a very close friend of mine, Whitnell T. Rison, Colonel Rison, was at Wright Field - I can't tell you his job title now, but anything that had to do with new engineering developments and what not, Whit Rison was sitting in the driver's seat. So, when I was to get my B-29's modified, where did I want them modified? I selected the Omaha facility by Martin, because Martin was building the best B-29. They built one better than Boeing. The next thing: I had run the tests on these fuel injector engines, and I got ahold of Whit Rison, up at Wright Field, and I told him. Whit knew I was on some kind of special project, and had a lot of priority. So I said: "Whit, can I get fuel injector engines for my airplanes?" He said: "I think I might be able to swing it." Fine, so I get the first fuel injector engines. Now, this goes through Bim Wilson in Washington. The next thing that happens is, Whit calls me and he says: "Look, Ihave a bunch of Curtiss electric props sitting here in these warehouses, but they are not going to put them on B-32s. Do you want them?" I said: "you know I want them." He said: "I'll send them to Omaha and have them put on your airplanes." I said: "That's fine with me." So this comes back through Bim Wilson. Whit says: "You send in your requisition." Bim Wilson goes out to Nebraska. He is assigned as a Commander of one of the bomb wings under Frank Armstrong. But he goes back

and has my engines and my propellors transferred to his airplanes, and Whit Rison calls me on the telephone, and he says: "How come you had these things transferred over to the other airplanes?" I said: "I didn't do it." Whit says: "You don't mean it?" I said: "That's right." He said: "Okay, I'll take care of it." So the engines came back, and I got ahold of Bim at one of our staff meetings, because I was working under the sponshorship of Frank Armstrong. He knew I had some kind of special project, but he didn't know what it was. But I had to be assigned to some kind of wing so they assigned me to the 315th Wing under Frank. This was an administrative procedure only, so I wouldn't lose out here. Anyway, since we were such good friends, I'd go to Frank Armstrong's staff meetings every now and then just because I wanted to get away from Wendover. And I went into a meeting right after this happened, and there was Bim Wilson, and I told him: Bim, you couldn't get away with it." He said: "What do you mean?" I said: "You had those engines and propellors transfered over, and Bim," I said: "I happened to find out about it, so I got them transfered back with my SILVERPLATE requisition." And he turned a couple shades of red, and said: "Well, it was worth trying anyway."

Q: Your estimate of his atitute is accurate, because when I talked to you, I talked to him subsequently. I think he was head of AFSWP at that time. And he disagreed with a lot of things you said at that time. There was this element of friction.

T: Remember this. As I say, this man was looking out for Bim Wilson. He's one of these people that I calssify as being a

lot smarter than me in thinking about his future. Because he got himself into a position immediately after the war was over with where this A-bomb business gets him his first star, gets him his second star, and puts him in a position for his third star. He capitalized on this like nobody I've ever known.

Q: It took a lot of jockeying among a lot of people. You know, I wondered often why you stopped at the first star.

T: I wouldn't haven't even got this if it weren't for J.P. McConnell. There was too much resentment against me. I got to much publicity.

Q: I can see it building up like that. If a man sticks his head up high above everybody else, he's a target.

T: I was told one day - in 1947, I believe it was - I was called by Gen Spaatz, he was Chief. He called me and told me that I was to go with him to the White House and meet Harry Truman. It turns out that myself, Jimmy Doolittle, Carl Spaatz and Dave Schilling were riding in one of those old Cadillac sedans over to meet Harry Truman. While riding in this thing, Dave Schilling and I are sitting upon the jump seats, and the old men - Spaatz and Doolittle - are sitting in the back. And they are talking about something. I wasn't trying to listen to their conversation, and Dave Schilling were talking about refueling airplanes at that time - aerial refueling. Jimmy Doolittle just made the remark. He said: "You know," he said, "if there is any place that it's true, it's true in the military service, that an individual just can't become popular." Jimmy was crucified, you know, that's when he made this remark. He said: "You cannot become popular." What he meant was obvious. "The minute you

are, then everybody is out for you because you are a potential threat to their well-being for the future."

Q: There was another factor in Jimmy's case. He left the air force in the '20s and he made himself some money, where all the other guys stayed on and suffered through all the economy waves and the parsimonious defense policy during the '30s, and Jimmy came back into the picture in the late '30s or early '40s.

T: Right. Take what has happened to your World War aces, for instance. What happened to them, none of them ever made General.

Q: Gabreski?

T: That's right. And Dave Schilling was one of the best, and Jabara, Gabreski, and Bong was killed. But I mean, the guys that hung on; the fellows that became aces even others...

Q: I think your analysis is correct. I think you had stuck out too far above the rest of the group.

Mrs. T: Now public opinion has reversed. Those who had done so much for the atomic bomb. Now, everybody says they didn't do anything. Nobody wants any part of it.

Q: Nobody wants any part of it. It's an ironic twist. The morality, of course - the Russians said that we are inhuman this kind of thing. And its ridiculous.

T: This is another side of the story. I'm sorry that it happened that way. I'm not bitter about it. I'm not resentful, I don't care because there is one thing that I tell myself, and I think I do it honestly, and that is this: I did it. Nobody can change that.

Q: You had one of the most difficult jobs in the history of the war.

T: It was a real satisfying experience...

Q: And you did it perfectly; it came out exactly as planned.

T: Exactly as we planned to do it. Almost, and of course, as i say....

Q: Did you ever meet Arnold when you came back?

T: no.

Q: He was retired.

T: He was an ill man about that time.

Q: He'd had this heart attack. He'd had several heart attacks. Of course, right after FV-Day, he rapidly lost interest in Washington. He had this ranch. He was a frustrated farmer and rancher.

Mrs. T: Did he die there?

Q: He died in Sonoma, yes. But he'd had several heart attacks. He was a man who wore himself out. He gave himself, as you know, without stint.... I was asking about the pressure the President was putting on Arnold to get those B-29s out. He had promised the President - I was up at Hyde Park - by the way, he promised the President sometime late in 1943, and here it was, I believe, around March 1944, the planes were still having their problems. He and Meyers flew out to Salina, Kansas. Would you tell me about that?

T: Let's go back, let's put this thing in the right perspective. I had gotten on the B-29 with K.B. Wolfe and Blondie Saunders. Pearl Robey, Bill Irvine. That group of people were all put together as a team, as a unit, under K.B. Wolfe to

get this B-29 going out of the factory and into the hands of tactical units. I started flying the B-29 in July, I think it was on maybe it was August of 1943. I flew the No. 2X. Eddie Arnold got killed. They built two XB Models and Eddie got killed in one, and the other one was at Marietta, Georgia, and there wasn't anybody to fly it. And so being a brave and intrepid airman, I immediately volunteered to fly that airplane. That was a real privilege and a challenge as far as I was concerned, because the bigger the better. So K.B. Wolfe got me down there right away, and I was able to find somebody that had made a flight in the airplane. By the time the Salinas incident occurs, which is in Jan or Feb 1944, and we are trying to get the 73rd Wing out of Salina and over to China, by this time, I had over a 1,000 hours in the B-29s. I was, at that time, classified as "Mr. B-29" because, in my work, I had teams of people doing different things to B-29s at Marietta, Georgia; at Omaha, Nebraska; at Cheyene, Wyoming; at Birmingham, Alabama and at Eglin Field, Florida. I had 5 places.

Q: You had not yet been selected?

T: No, I hadn't been. I was just B-29 project officer, trying to get B-29s flying. And, as I say, I had those 5 places, and I had teams of people doing different things with B-29s at each of them. I had under me then, a group of people about 130, and they were very highly skilled in all phases of the B-29. They decided that they were going to take Salina, Kansas and get the 73rd Wing all concentrated there, fix all of the airplanes on a production-line basis, and fly them

as fast as we could get them fixed -- they would fly them out to the CBI. So I am called up and told to get my people and bring them to Salina. At the same time they could get the civilians from Marietta, Wichita and everywhere else, and bring them in to Salina, to form this taks group of maintenance people to work on each of these airplanes 24 hours around-the-clock until we can get them going. This is a hectic thing, I'm telling you, because 40 mph winds in February with snow blowing on those plains in Kansas. It is mighty cold, and it was. Gosh, we got people with pneumonia, flu, and what not. It was a tragic situation, ill prepared for it as they were to do it. This came down to us from Washington. Roosevelt directed that these things get out and get overseas, and this was the only way we could do it. So we did. We had a terrible time out there for about 20 days or some period of time like that. We were working night and day getting those airplanes out.

Q: Didn't Arnold come out there?

T: Yes, he was there; everybody was out there. Arnold was out there definitely.

Q: Diddn't he use that as sort of a command headquarters? He was trying to get parts from here, maintenance experts from there....

T: This was K.B. Wolfe. K.B. Wolfe came out and sat up there with Pearl Robey, they did, they sat themselves in a building and they ran everything from there. They ran the factories from there. All the supply depots...

Q: In Salina.

T: That's right.

Q: Did Arnold come out there for a period?

T: He was out there to see how things were going, but he didn't stay any length of time.

Q: Was Benny Meyers there?

T: Benny Meyers was out there frequently and stayed quite a bit. Hugh Knerr was there. He came there quite a bit.

Q: You know, Benny Meyers reminded Arnold of the good old days "when we worked together." He was trying to elicit sympathy from Arnold after that incident occurred to Meyers. But they finally got those planes out....pulling teeth?

T: Yes. We drove them, you might say, we just drove them out by force. We fixed these airplanes, and we got each one of them to work, we put the crews in and sent them, but we knew they wouldn't keep working. It was just that simple. You see, so much of the stuff that went into the B-29 was inherently designed wrong. It couldn't work right. But you could make it work for once or twice, you see.

Q: Who was the first commander? Was it Blondie Saunders?

T: Yes, Blondie Saunders.

Q: What happened - he went out there. He had an accident out there, didn't he?

T: Yes, he did. He had an accident.

Q: Did he get sick?

T: No, Blondie got messed up. If I'm not too far mistaken, he got messed up in flying a B-25, you know, in trying to go around and see what was going on. P.D. Ent got messed in a B-25.

Q: Who replaced Blondie Saunders? Did Hansell go out there?

T: If I'm not mistaken, Hansell was out there about the same time that Blondie was. Hansell took over, but he didn't last very long. Hansell was never a tactical commander. He could never hold a tactical command.

Q: Well, Hansell had the 21st Bom Command in the Marianas, and he was relieved by LeMay. Do you know that story, anything about it? This in Jan 1945. I know at this time you were getting ready for your mission...

T: Let me - you are talking about Hansell, and I mentioned Newt Longfellow, so let me explain both of them back to the European theater, now, at the very start of the war. In early 1942, when in the 97th Bomb Group we would give a combat indoctrination ride to let them see what it was like to fly in combat. And one of the first ones was Newt Longfellow, because he was my boss. And he was flying with me, standing up in the front part of the B-17. If you are familiar with the way they are laid out, they had the big turrets spin in there, and then there was the pilot and copilot, but a little tiny space between their seats and the top turret. Newt Longfellow was riding with me. We had gone - I don't know what we had bombed. But we were on our way back when a German fighter made a pass at us, and he put a 20 mm cannon shell through the co-pilot's window into the cockpit. He took out all of the cockpit instruments and took part of my co-pilot's hand off. Some of his machine gun bullets, before he fired the 20 mm, hit my top turret gunner in the side of the head. It didn't kill him, but it cut him and knocked him out. Of course, when

this 20 mm cannon shell exploded in the cockpit, there was pandemonium, I can assure you. Well, Newt immediately panicked. He lost his head. He started grabbing for the throttles and we had critical situation at altitude with the B-17 with the hand controlled turbos. If you got them to surging, you were in a hell of a fix. And he started grabbing throttles and turbo controls. I'm trying to fly the airplane. I'd gotten hit too, but my copilot wasn't any good to me. So I tried to get this thing under control and here's Newt reaching over, grabbing all of these controls. I told him to quit; he didn't even hear me - not knowing what he was doing. The only thing I could do was to hit him, and I was able to with my right elbow. I was able to come right up and catch him under the chin, while he was leaning over. I got him under the chin with this elbow and I knocked him flat on his fanny, back in the bottom of the turret. Well, of course, that ended it, as far as he was concerned. He calmed down, then, and when he got back on his feet, he got his first aid kit and started bandaging people up, and I was able to bring the airplane under control and come on back. So, that's the experience with Newt. Now, on another mission, at another time, Gen Hansell was sent. But the experience with Newt Longfellow made me never let somebody ride up in the front with me again, because I didn't know what they might do, like him, if anything happened. So I put them all back in the radio compartment with the radio operator where he could watch him, and see what was going on. Well, we took Gen Hansell on this trip over, and we made our flight over and back. We had the usual trouble with flak and fighters and everything

and when we got back. We had the usual trouble with flak and fighters and everything, and when we got back, Hansell was down on the floor, sitting on the floo on the radio operator's compartment, and he was paralyzed. He could not move. We had to pick him up. As I say, he was sitting down there with his back up against the bulkhead. He had his hands wrapped around his knees and that's the way we carried him out of the airplane. We couldn't unfreeze him until the medics got ahold of him and did something and got him loose. He was paralzyed with fear.

Q: This was in 1943?

T: 1942. He [Hansell] was paralyzed with fear. As far as I know, this probably had something to do with what happened to him over again at the CBI. Let's put it this way; if he didn't have an experience of that type, at least, he wasn't combat-oriented to the point that he could confront and solve the problems that that outfit was confronted with in the CBI theater. They not only had airplane troubles; they had supply problems; they had weather problems that were insurmountable. They had nothing but problems, and Possum Hansell was not combat-oriented to the point to be able to meet these things.

Q: However, Arnold gave him a top job?

T: Yes, but he was a very close and personal friend of Arnold's.

Q: Yes he was, he was a great planner. A great intellect.

T: Yes, that's right. And he did his job in the right place, but he was not a commander.

Q: Arnold probably made an impulsive decision in this cae because, a week or 8 days before, he sent Norstad out there with

bad news that LeMay was coming in and Hansell was coming out. But a week before that, he had sent him a letter of congratulations for the great job he was doing. So Arnold must have made up his mind in a hurry.

T: You see, LeMay ran up against Hansell in the European Theater. Now this was something about LeMay. If you ever worked for LeMay once, and was a failure, you never worked for him again.

Q: You know LeMay was a chip off the Arnold block, in my opinion. Arnold had put Hansell in the job, but then LeMay had done this outstanding job in the CBI, Arnold realized that LeMay was the better commander. Do you honor a friendship with Hansell, or do you put the man in who can do the best job? I think Arnold came to this recognition - though it was probably a very tough decision for him to make - but better to offend Hansell, and get the job done. Arnold did this many times in his career. He took people out of jobs; he took Eaker out of his job, and he put Spaatz in there because, in the final analysis, he decided Spaatz could do the better job. Yet, Eaker was very close to him. They wrote books together; they were close for 25 years, but when he got down to the numb of the situation, I think Arnold made the decision, put the man in who could do the best job.

T: Quite true. I think you are right there.

A: For this probable reason -- I've had many critical comments. I talked to Hansell last week, and of course, Hansell had some praise for Arnold, but basically, he was a bitter man, because he felt that Arnold took him out without adequate explanation. In justification of Hansell, the B-29 was not a perfected instrument in Jan 1945.

T: It was still experimental. Definitely.

Q: So it was not Hansell's fault. Weather or not Arnold knew this, we don't know, but I think he looked at the job LeMay was doing, and in a very difficult situation and he figured that here's the man that could do it.

T: I don't think there is any doubt about that. Now again, I was in on a part of the transfer of LeMay from the European theater to the Pacific. I'm at Grand Island, Nebraska, just before I get the bomb project assignment. I was working for Frank Armstrong. We are trying to organize and put together a B-29 instructor's transition school. Again, as I say, I've got an awful lot of experience with the B-29. I've got a thousand hours, I don't think anybody in the air force, except guys who worked for me, ahd a hundred hours in the airplane. And here I am with a thousand. Because I lived in that airplane. I flew it day and night, and did everything with it. So, the friendship of LeMay and Frank Armstrong from the European theater, for one thing, is the cause of it. But on the other hand, LeMay, when he goes anywhere, he wants to know what he is running into. He knew nothing about a B-29, and one of the reasons he was such a successful commander is that nobody in the Air Force knew as much about a B-17 as LeMay knew. LeMay got started early on a B-17 as a navigator, so he knew this airplane. That's why he was such a great commander in the European theater. A crew couldn't come in and say: "Well, I couldn't do this because..." LeMay would just say: "You are a liar. This airplane will do this; it will do that, and so forth, because I've done it. Now don't

tell me that. Let's start over - where did you goof?" I mean this was him. So, he came out. I got a call from Frank Armstrong, saying LeMay had called him, and LeMay was going to come out and spend a week or ten days at Grand Island with us out there. And he says: "you have got to indoctrinate the Old Man on B-29s." I said: "Fine." I did. I flew with the Old Man on the B-29. I was at midnight down in the maintenance hangar where he was watching maintenance crews work on these airplanes to see where the weaknesses were. He lived with that airplane for about 10 days out there with us. As a matter of fact, I had to laugh because he came and told me that he was going to take that airplane when he got out there. He was going to fly them at high altitude and in formation. I told him:"Gen LeMay, you can't fly this airplane at high altitude in formation." And he said: "What in the hell do you mean I can't....." He said: "I'll show you!" I said: "yes, sir." So I got three airplanes together with LeMay flying one of them, and a couple of wing men, and I said: "Here we go." So we went up, and boy he flew around, and my boys stayed with him a few minutes, and then they were gone, you couldn't push the power necessary to hold a wing airplane in position on a lead airplane. You didn't have it. Your engines heated up and everything got hot and quit. You lost power, and there you were. You just dropped down. So LeMay got up there and everything was fine, because I was sitting with him, and I had that thing throttled down and the guys were flying formation. This is excellent. So he said: "There's nothing to it." I said: "All right, there's nothing to it." I said: "now, you fly wing position."

So we changed and got one of the fellows to fly the lead. But, at this time, I said: "Okay, get her up to normal cruise speed." The first turn we made, I had LeMay on the outside of the turn. Of course, the airplane pulls away like this, and here, LeMay starts to try to get him. Well, when the cylinder-head temperatures got up to about 380 degrees, I pointed to him, I said: "Look, the cowl flaps are open; the airplane's slowing down." He was trying to keep the thing going, and he's fighting. Of course, in that airplane, you can just sweat like a Trojan. It was hot, awfully hot in there. I had him sitting in a pool of his own water, he was sweating so hard trying to fly it.

Q: Object lesson...

T: When we landed, he said: "I guess you are right. We'll have to do something else." That's when he decided to go to night, single airplanes.

Q: Do you know anything about that decision? Was this a sort of extemporaneous decision, or did he carefully think this thing out? Had he been planning this? The low level, 7000 foot mission.

T: No, you see. This is a complete reversal from what he wanted to do. I'll take another little bit of credit here, that people might argue with. Again, in my business of testing and working with B-29s, we had a fire cluster bomb that nobody had much to do with. I tried this fire-cluster bomb.

Q: Is that the M-69?

T: I don't remember what it was now. But it was a small cluster. It was the one that we used during the war. I tried this

this thing, and found out what a beautiful pattern it was. At Grand Island, Nebraska, when LeMay came out there, and he was talking about how he was going to fly this airplane at altitude and formation. He was going to drop these big block busters. I said: "This is the wrong tactics." At this particular point in the conversation, we were in Frank Armstrong's house haveing a barbecue out in the backyeard, about 7:00 at night. LeMay looked at me like I was crazy. He was uded to the European theater business 0 the structures that you are up against over there - bombing submarine pens with armor-piercing bombs and this kind of stuff. I said: "I wouldn't do it; I'd use fire-bombs, and bomb at low altitude." Well, of course, if I had called him a bad name, it wouldn't have been any more of an insult, and he really bit back at me: "What do you mean; you are crazy as you know." And I said: "No sir, you don't neet it. Number one, the Japanese don't have the antiaircraft defenses that the Germans' have; Number two, this airplane isn't going to fly at high altitude; and Number three, the Japanese structures don't have to have these big blockbusters, but if you can start a fire, you can burn them up. The Old Man never opened his mouth after that. He just said: "Ridiculous!" When I went out to Guam, to brief him that I was coming out there with an A-bomb outfit, and what this thing was, after I gave him the briefing, and everything, the Old Man says: "Come on, I want to show you something." He took me into his intelligence room and showed me all the pictures of Tokyo burned out, and everything burned out, he turned around and looked at me and says: You are right."

Q: Then you can claim credit for that. You had him thinking on a new trend of thought. I don't think you have gotten recognition for that. I think everybody thinks LeMay communed with God, and he came up with the great decision.

T: No. There are several things that have been involved with SAC since that time, too, that I never quite got credit for. I did a bunch of things that Butch Blanchard got credit for, because Butch was an insulator against the Old Man. He kept LeMay insulated and isolated.

Q: This is unfortunate.

Q: Groves is worth seeing? He is in Washington. Should I see Groves?

I think it's V. Stefansson[4]

-Tibbets, Miami Fla

Jan 7, 1970

T: You will meet something when you meet him too. He can out-Norstad, Norstad. But anyway, we are in this conference, I am given an opportunity to look with the other people, at the various target layouts that they had on these Japanese targets that were made available to us. From a bombing point of view, and an approach point of view, they all looked good, as far as I was concerned. There was no problem whatsoever and that's the only thing that I was consulted on. They asked me: (1) can you approach these targets? (2) can you bomb them? The answer was yes to any one of them. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Niigata, Kokura.

Q: Kyoto - that was stricken by the Secretary?

T: You are getting me in a bind - I don't remember that.

Q: Kyoto,which somebody said was a religious shrine, and Stimson struck it.

T: You are right, wasn't that the ancestral home of the Japanese rulers? I think it was. There were 6 of them anyway,and so, my reaction was that there was, this all took a little time, I think we were in there possibly an hour, an hour and 15 or 20 minutes with Arnold and Groves are talking. We all got together. The air mass analysis expert. I can't remember that man's name. He's the father of air mass analysis. He gave us, or he looked at the targets. He asked when we anticipated that we would be able to make the bombing, take place. It was said to him that we would probably be ready the first week of August, and his remark at that time, was "Fine, I'll give you a long range forecast for that time period." He said: "It will take me a few days to work it out." Now this, as I remember, this

was along about the month of April. In due time, we did. I was back at Wendover by this time, but we did. We got this man's long range forecast and we took it to the islands with us, and we watched it. As the first week of August rolled around, it was amazingly accurate, as to what he said would exist in this forecast he had made several months before. So, on the basis that he was right on the track, the 6th day of August looked like the day we should shoot for. The meterologist down at Guam in LeMay's headquarters also agreed on their three-day forecast. So, on the basis of that, we went full steam ahead. That is the sum total of my experience with Arnold.

Q: Several other points of interest. Not necessarily involving Arnold, but interesting in the atomic bomb picture. There was a Scientific Panel convened by Stimson, Arthor Compton, Enrico Fermi, William Laurence and J. Robert Oppenheimer, and this was in June 1945. They were asked to take a look at the whole situation, on whether we should drop the bomb on a live target or on a desert island target. Do you remember the Franck Committee - this group of subordinate scientists - wanted it dropped on a sterile target. I think the four leading scientists decided that we just didn't have enough to do it, or it would not be convincing enough, we did not have enough fissionable material to convince the Japanese by the second or third attack to get out of the war. Anyway, they decided, they recommended to the Secretary that we hit a live target. Were you brought in on any of that?

T: We were in on it. You are right. I won't try to get down to the minute details. But generally, yes, you are exactly

correct, because here we are working our heads off out there in Utah trying to get this thing to go. There was an awful lot that took place that isn't necessarily a part of the official record. Meaning this: despite the fact that we had a large group of very dedicated people wearing all different kinds of uniforms, there were a lot of vested interests by individuals being exhibited, even at this time frame. Some people were a lot smarter than me. And they started feathering their own nests well ahead of time. They started working. These little things began to come down. Everybody would start talking about, this, that and the other thing. I know that myself, Adm Parsons, Norman Ramsay, all of the people that were directly associated with the Air Force end of it. This particular group and Dr. Oppenheimer - he was also of the opinion that this ghing should be used for real, if we were going to use it.

Q: He changed later. You know, this is something I tell my friends about Oppenheimer, and they are quite surprised that he was in favor of dropping it on a live target, because he has since acquired another reputation.

T: I like Oppy. I got to know the man reasonably well, and I recognized him for what he was. His various political beliefs, and so forth, I didn't pay any attention to that. My personal reaction was - and I was supported by these people whose names I mentioned - my reaction was this: from a military point of view, this is probably a very silly thing to do. You don't advertise all of these things, because surprise is 90% of the battle. We want the element of surprise. And I felt that if

we were going to have to work under the conditions that we did, the hours that we worked, you know, the trying times that we put up with, to go out and see this thing dropped on a dummy target or to be blown up that way, really took an awful lot of enthusiasm out of us, and our willingness to work on this thing. Because here we've got friends and cohorts that are getting killed every day, and I mean I was one of the strongest supporters, I think everybody else did. This thing is going to stop the war. It is going to shorten it, anyhow. It's going to probably stop it. It's going to save all kinds of lives. Let's use it! American lives at stake. Let's use it! On that basis, then, on that far end of the chain down there, we heard what was going on. And of course, nobody breathed a greater sigh of relief than we did when we heard that it's going to go for real.

T: Now, there was another element working in here that you may not be aware of. There was an element of theoreticians - I guess that's the correct word - and they had to have every element of this particular bomb so perfect that it could only have a chance of failure of 1 in a million. Well, as we worked on this thing from day to day, and different pieces, and then modified pieces, and all of the hodge podge that we had to go throughto try to get a workable unit, we finally got down to one that worked pretty reliably. It worked reliably enough for me that I was willing to put in in an airplane and go use it. But it wasn't reliable enough for these theoreticians. They wanted a greater reliability built into it. Here we are, we are talking about a Japanese invasion, and you've just solved this problem of, shall we use it for real or shouldn't we. But the

questionis, when are we going to use it? This is the thing. I had been given a real powerful stick that nobody knew about, and that is, the Air Force told me when you....

Q: You say Air Force - Arnold?

T: Actually, it had to emanate from Arnold, and it was a piece of staff work, no question about it. But yet in a sense of the word, it was routine. Nobody could inspect my outfit. Nobody was supposed to know about my outfit. How do you take one of these outfits with 1500 people in it, and move it around like another Air Force unit? You've got to get into channels somewhere. I was told, then, this comes through 2nd AF now and Gen Williams by this time was commanding, because P.D. Ent had had his accident, you see. So Gen Bob Williams was in there now. Bob Williams said when do you think your outfit is really to go overseas, because nobody can inspect it and approve it - and I forgot what they used to call those things that have the shakedown inspections. The Inspector General would listen and say: "okay, they are ready to go overseas." And finally, they'd get their orders. But nobody could do this to me. Williams said: "When you are ready, you send me - and he gave me a code name, I can't remember what it was - he said, you send that to me, and I will put the ball in motion, and the orders will be issued and your outfit will be shipped overseas. When we got to this point - the theoreticians vs. the operators on the issue, do we go or don't we go, and have we got enough reliability, or dont we have enough reliability - one day, I just got to the point. I got my own people together, my bombardier, in particular, Tom Ferebee, who was probably closer

to me than anybody else, and Clifford J. Hefflin, who lives in California now, but he was in my upper class at the flying school, and we became great friends. Anyway, Cliff Hefflin was a Colonel. I had asked for him to be the base commander at Wendover, when I took the project. He was senior to me, but he agreed he'd be perfectly happy to come in there and work under me, so to speak, without any arguments. Cliff, Tom and I and Dutch Van Kirk were sitting around. Cliff said: "well, how are we going to resolve this prolbem?" Well, all of a sudden, and being a real gungho 29 year old LTCOL at that point, I said: "I'm going to solve it." So I just got on the telephone and I called up 2nd AF and I sent this code name to Gen Williams, meaning, I'm going to move this outfit overseas. I knew that I had the upper hand in the situation because, if I moved the outfit overseas, there was nobody or nothing left for the scientists to have as a group of experimenters. We were gone, so they had to go along with us. Of course, I heard from Leslie Groves on this. It is only time that he really got after me, and he got after me good. He used real strong language - impertinent pup that I was, LTCOL. And how did I get the idea that I could order this outfit overseas. You see, he was "Mr. God." And how did I get the idea that I could order this unit out, and so forth. And I told him that I thought we were pretty close to being ready to go, and it was going to take me about 6 weeks to get this outfit moved over, because most of them would have to go by ground. I said: "if we are going to operate in the month of August, like we had said, we've got to start this movement now. We've got to get these people over

there, and then we'll be lucky if we get set up in time." Well, somehow or other, he accepted this, and no further issue was made out of it. I mean, he was mad. He could have court martialed me if he wanted to. But again, secrecy wouldn't let him do it, so he almost had to go along with it. I take full responsibility and blame and credit for getting this outfit overseas, because I wouldn't be too surprised that they might have been dilly-dallying around with that thing yet. That's a far fetched, but they could have carried that thing on for a long time, trying to receive this one in a million perfection.

Q: From an operational standpoint you were satisfied with something less than 999 out of k,000?

T: Definitely. You have to take something less. So what is the reliability factor? We had it figured out in our own way. Tom and I and our crew had dropped - now we are talking dummies with fuzes - the fuzing mechanism was the problem, of trying to get this fuzing to work correctly. Now, I think Tom and I... about 30 drops and we hadn't had a failure in 30 drops. We got to figuring, well okay, this, if you take this thing based on the number of drops that we had made and then 30 straight with no particular troubles. We figured: okay, this was good enough. We were dropping them out in the Saltan Sea area, yes. As a matter of fact, we did that, and we dropped them in the salt flats of Utah, and out around 29-Palms in California. The Navy had an armament experimental testing base out there. We did some more out there.

Q: The dummy had the same weight as the real one?

T: No, actually it only had the same fuzing mechanism. You are talking ballistics now. This introduces a different factor. No, we were not dropping. I dropped them in a long tube arrangement, you see. This shape was never put in. Well, we dropped two of these for a ballistic check before we actually made a regular drop. We dropped two for a ballistic check. We were interested in the fuzing at that time.

Q: You told me a very interesting story about the security. (addressing Mrs. Tibbets) I remember this back from 1946.

Q: I talked to Spaatz. He said that he was opposed to having the atomic bomb dropped. I disagreed with him. As a matter of fact, I have his written request to drop a third one on Tokyo. Were you aware of that?

T: Yes, I was aware of it. Actually, I was in on that, because of the very fact that I had Cliff Hefflin sitting back at Wendover at that time with another airplane with a bomb in the airplane, in a B-29 to fly out.

Q: You had another one?

T: Oh yes.

Q: I thought they only had two?

T: No, out on the islands they only had the nuclear elements for two. But we had another unit at Wendover all assembled and ready to go, but the nuclear component for that bomb would have come by a different airplane, not with Cliff. He was going to fly the bomb really to have the nuclear part inserted. He was going to fly that out in an airplane, to get it ghere the quickest way possible.

Q: As I have put this thing together; looking at Spaatz' file and Arnold's file, on Aug 9, the second was dropped on Nagasaki, on Aug 11, the Jap emissaries came to IeShima. They started negotiations. This went on for two or three days. They were - nobody knew - they were stalling. Spaatz, who was then USASTAF Commander, felt we need something to tip the scales, because there was a struggle within the Japanese government. And they figured they needed one more hit to tip the scales over towards unconditional surrender. So he called for a third one.

T: I know, because I was down there in LeMay's headquarters. I was in Guam. My base was Tinian, but I got called down while all this was going on. LeMay and Butch Blanchard, and they asked me: "have you got another unit," because they didn't know. - Can you do another one? And I said: "Yes," and that was when I knew, I was made aware of them....

Q: How long would it have taken Hefflin to bring the other one out?

T: Cliff would have been there in roughly 25 hours. There was no problem.

Q: I guess on the 14th or 15th?

T: I would have dropped the [third] bomb. If it had gone, I would have dropped it, because LeMay was a little bit unhappy with the series of events that took place with Chuck Sweeney - in trying to get that bomb on Nagasaki. I mean there is a lot to that story, too. They did a marvelous job and if it hadn't been Sweeney and Behan in there, God knows what would

have happened. Anyway, LeMay said: "look, I don't want another think like this. You are going to do it." He told me.

Q: What was that problem?

T: In the first place, when they took off to rendezvous with their escorts at Iwo Jima, I had told them how I rendezvoused and I wanted them to do the same thing up there over Mt. Suribachi, Iwo Jima. I wanted them to use that as a visual reference point, to circle it - I think it was 8,000 feet - and at that particular time, when he made that circle of 360 degrees, theoretically the escort airplanes were supposed to come in on his wing. They would all three of them take off and start for Japan. Boy by the name of Hopkins was flying one of the escort aircraft, and when he got up there, he couldn't find Sweeney, and Sweeney couldn't find him. They kept circling for about 30 minutes trying to get together. I had told them specificall: "you make one circle of 360 degrees - this was a fuel problem - I said: "you make one 360 degree turn and go, if you go alone." Well, of course, the scientists were interested. They were putting on pressure because we need these airplanes with their instrumentation. The point was, they didn't do what they were told to do, and from there on, they had a series of problems.

Q: They didn't rendezvous?

T: They did not rendezvous. Two airplanes did, but Hopkins never made it with his airplane. So this caused a shortage of fuel to begin with. The next thing that happens is, they can't transfer fuel out of their bomb bay tank which further aggravates the fuel problem, and they get up there, and they

have to go from one target to another one, because they can't see anything....

Q: Was Kokura the first target, and they were socked in?

T: They were socked in so they went to Nagasaki. They made a bomb run on Nagasaki, and it closed in under them while they were on the run on their primary aiming point. So, the thing was Behan, the bombardier, told Chuck: "Turn around and go back again." He said, I see an opening over here and I can probably get it this time, because they had been told: "You drop that bomb visually; no radar drops on this deal." So they came around and got ready to go back. They can't carry this weapon back with them, because they don't even think they have enough fuel to make it to Okinawa, to land. And so, Behan and Weeney and Ashworth sat there in consultation. While they are making this turn, Behan said: "Okay, bring it on around," because Pete told me later he saw an opening, not where the primary aiming point was, but offset by about 2,000 feet from where the primary was. And he knew, because these fellows could draw each one of these targets - a mental picture. They could sit right down like an artist and draw that thing. So Behan knew exactly what he was talking about, and he knew he had to get rid of the bomb, so they came around, and he made a visual release offset from his primary aiming point. Originally, they came out and said he missed by 2,000 feet, or something like this. Well, sure he did, it was deliberate, because they had to drop the unit, and he, Ashworth and Sweeney knew that the bomb damage assessment wouldn't be hurt too much by being offset that particular amount. It was either that or not knowing what to do with that airplane, and the bomb.

Q: You couldn't bring the bomb back?

T: You couldn't bring the bomb back because it was armed, and there was no way to de-arm it, you see?

Q: Your plane, too? The Enola Gay?

T: Yes.

Q: No way to dis-arm it?

T: Let's put it this way: we could have done it. But on the other hand, after you have set that mechanism into motion, what they would have had to do was depressurize the airplane, and go back with oxygen masks at altitude and that sort of thing, to take that thing out of there. And you can imagine what a job that would have been. Because of barometric fuzing, they couldn't descend.

Q: You said something that interest me because I had a long talk with Twining last week, and you talked about LeMay's headquarters. Wasn't Twining the mission commander?

T: If you want to base it on seniority, yes. But remember this, LeMay was the 20th AF. Let's give the man credit. He was the 20th AF. The war in Europe folds up. The air war against Japan is going to get all the emphasis, so what do they do, they've got Spaatz and they've got Twining. What are they going to do with them? Just send them out, because they are going to bring Doolittle's air force and everything, re-equip them with B-29s and what not. They are going to bring them on out, so they have a problem. They've got to keep this thing in the proper channel. They come out and they decide well, fine: "We will make Spaatz the theater air commander." No argument about that. He was going to be the theater air commander. Well, we've got Twining....

Q: You had Giles, too. Giles was the Deputy Commander. He wore two hats.

T: Well, I'm thinking of the people who are directly in it. Of course, Barney Giles was another special individual in his own right. He was doing a lot of things, I mean I don't think he did anything tactical at all.

Q: No, he had to keep Nimitz happy.

T: The situation gets itself out there. You've got Spaatz out there, and then Twining is sent out. So what do you do with Twining? Well, they have to designate him 20th AF Commander because he is senior and LeMay his deputy. But, in fact, nothing changed on that island. LeMay was "Mr. Jesus." He ran the whole show....

Q: Didn't they move LeMay up and make him Chief of Staff of the USASTAF? In other words, in the picking order, you had Spaatz, Giles, LeMay in USASTAF?

T: They put them all in there, in proper order of seniority.

Q: At least on paper, Twining was the 20th AF Commander. But you say Twining did not exercise any real authority?

T: As far as I am concerned, he didn't, because I still dealt with LeMay and Butch Blanchard. The conferences and things that we sat in on, it was LeMay. Nobody opened their mouth but LeMay. He did all the talking, and you know, he didn't talk very much. All that was done, he did it. Nobody that was out there at that time, I don't believe that anybody looked at anybody for running the 20th AF except Curt LeMay, no matter what they called him.

Q: I was told that LeMay, because of his gruff manner, had made himself persona non grata with the Navy?

T: I don't think so. I doubt that seriously. I think they respected him, because LeMay wouldn't take a back seat to any of them. He was only a M/Gen, and he was dealing with five-star admirals and four-star admirals out there. But still, he was the 20th AF. He was the United States Air Force. He took that position, and he held it.

Q: Well, that is interesting because I have another interpretation last week, a high level interpretation of that.

T: Well, I went with LeMay, I went up there to Guam. I was taken into Nimitz' office and Forrest Sherman was there. When I first got out there, LeMay took me over and introduced me.

Q: Well, you've seen LeMay's book, the one with MacKinlay Kautor. He criticized the Navy. It is a pretty sad book.

T: As I say, I don't think much of it either.

Q: MacKinlay Kantor was a very good writer. But I don't think LeMay gave him all the material to write his book.

T: The though never occurred to me, I don't think, at any time I can't think of anything other than this: LeMay was running the show. Spaatz and Twining were there. Even when we got through dropping the bomb, when they came up to Tinian to meet me after I landed, and sit in on a debriefing, it was LeMay. It was LeMay!

Q: Twining really didn't know the score. He had just come out.

T: He didn't really know. I have the greatest respect in the world for Twining. He's a fine man, and I think it's a sign of his greatness that he did just what he did, because he didn't know and understand the B-29. He didn't understand the tactical situation existing out there in those islands, so he let LeMay run it. And Spaatz did the same thing. I had been lucky, I'd been around Gen Spaatz in Europe and I got to know him personally, and knew him quite well. On Tinian, after we got back and even down on Guam, I was up at his house, and ate with him, and visited with him on a friendly basis. But no, LeMay ran that show.

Q: Twenty-three years ago you told me, several interesting stories. I'd like to recall them. One was the security problem. To be sure that all the men of the 509th respected the security of the problem, I believe you mentioned the story about giving them leave....

T: This was at the very first. You tell people that they are going to be constantly under surveillance. If they don't do what you tell them to do, you are going to know about it right away, and you are going to do something. How do you prove this? Well, the only way that I could figure to prove it was, I had these people out there, I didn't have any airplanes, and I'd given them all this big guff about security. They really could see no reason to have any security at all, since, as I say, we didn't have any airplanes. We were just all a bunch of people out there, trying to get organized at Wendover, Utah.

Q: Did you also have some cover plans to leade people to believe the plane was going to be used for something else?

T: No, you are getting things mixed up here now. The thing that you had reference to is what I am trying to explan. If we are going to impress these people, we've got to make a definite issue of it, and we have to do it correctly. We didn't have anything for these people to do. A lot of them hadn't had a furlough in Lork knows how long, so I said: "Okay, let's give everybody furloughs." But in the meantime, let's get all of the security boys spotted at strategic places. They will know who these guys are because they are in uniform. The security people are in civilian clothing. We put them at the airport in Salt Lake City; we had them at the train station and the bus station in Salt Lake City; we sent them to Elko, Nevada. We had them out there, and we even had them in Los Angeles. So, when these guys would come through, why they would try to strike up a conversation with them; they'd try to buy them a beer, you know - get them into conversation. The minute they got anything cut of them, they would get on the telephone and call back to us. Well, we knew where the man was going, because he gave us his leave address. We just sent a telegram. It was waiting on him when he got there to return to the base immediately. He would come back, and as soon as he did, we walked in and said: "At such and such a time, you said this, in such and such a place." And, of course, their mouths dropped open. How did all of this happen? And on the basis of that, we lovingly forgave everybody. We weren't going to court martial or shoot them. We forgave them, but said: "Boy, you already have one strike against you; don't get another one." Well, it had its effect.

They were impressed. They never knew how it happened until after things were over with, or until they had a chance really to thing about it.

Q: How much had they been told?

T: Nothing. Absolutely nothing. They didn't know anything to tell. But the thing that they were able to talk about was that they were big shots and that they were on a special project. This is what made them talkative when somebody bought them a beer.

Q: The cover plan I referred to...

T: On the island of Tinian.

Q: When you got there, you allowed people to believe different things about what you were going to do?

T: That's right. Now, specifically, one of the things that we did, was we placed one of these dummy crates, really, out on the island, in a place where we had guards on it. It looked like a reasonably secure place, but yet it was a selected place that we knew that the curious could see it, and would want to know what was going on. The guards were specifically instructed to be not too alert. In other words, let people try to take a picture of it. Let people try to sneak up and see what it is, because when they see it, they won't know what they have seen, and it doesn't mean anything, anyway. So, this was one thing we did. Now, the next thing we did was that when we got ready to load up, we put a dummy airplane out, too. When we loaded the bomb, we put a dummy airplane out to attract the attention. We had an awful lot of stuff going on it. We took

the airplane that we wanted to load, took it off to another place, and loaded it up and nobody paid any attention to it. We had all of the guards on the dummy.

Q: Was this in the movie?

T: No. The fellows got mad at me about this movie deal because they said really they didn't have one movie, they had three.

Q: The story that you told me many years ago they bowdlerized this story. This was the story of SILVERPLATE, code name SILVERPLATE. I wonder if you would tell me that again. The story where instructions were sent out, when people in the Pentagon saw SILVERPLATE....

T: They were to do what they were told. In other words, they were any requisition that has SILVERPLATE on it, they were to comply.

Q: I remember this from 23 years ago.

T: This is where we butt heads with Maxwell. Wendover being an isolated spot, I wasn't in the normal line of supply for anything. Secrecy wouldn't let me be supplied by normal channels, so I have to supply myself. I have to become self supporting, this is part of my directive. I am not too far awary from the Salt Lake City, or the one at Ogden. I'm too far away from Ogden, but yet, Oklahoma City is my primary supply depot for B-29s. I've got to get back and forth constantly, so the only way myself clear to do it, is to have airplanes that would allow me to do it. So I went in and said I want transport airplanes. I sent in a requisition through channels. I never used SILVERPLATE unless I had to use it. I tried to do everything

without using this code name, because the less you use it, the less inclined you are to attract a lot of attention. They honored my requisition for transport-type airplanes and gave me 7 C-46s. This was fine, it suited my purpose until I began to see that if I went to the islands, I would never be able to get my supplies through ATC. The Air Transport Command was snowed under. I have to be my own supply source. The next thing is, I'm going to be carrying things that they don't want ATC to know anything about. So I go back in this time for C-54s, and my requisition bounces. It comes right back, there are no C-54s. They're all allocated...

Q: You wanted what, 2 or 3?

T: No. I asked for 5 to replace the 7 other airplanes. When my requisition came back - it wasn't justified - so then I pick up my rejected requisition and I go with it myself to Washington. Gen Maxwell is in charge of the aircraft allocations. I go in to him with Bim Wilson, and we talk about this thing. He says: "Well, now, what do you need these airplanes for? Well, I gave him all kinds of razzle-dazzle talk, because I had become a champion liar by this time. Boy, I could think up things faster than you could possibly imagine, and I was even pretty good at remembering what I told different people. I could go back and repeate it. Anyway, I go in and I try to justify this thing. Well, he's very abrupt. He doesn't want to give me the time of day, and this is what I'm asking for is silly. And I keep trying to convince the man that I need it. So he gets out his sheet of paper there and he sees that I have

so many B-29s, and I had all these C-46s, and now I want some C-54s. So he said: "what are you trying to do, start Tibbet's first individual air force?" Well, of course, by this time, I was a little bit exasperated, so I took the requisition back out of a bunch of papers that I had there, which was an official requisition for airplanes, and then with a great big pencil, I just wrote SILVERPLATE across the top of it, and handed it to him. Well, he turned about two different shades of white, when I did this. But that ended the conversation, and it ended all opposition, he just took it and slapped it over on his desk - no comment, no nothing. Well, I find out later, and this is something that I have not been able to pin down. But somewhere along the line, with Bim Wilson trying to get something done for SILVERPLATE, some General put in too much interference, tried to find out too much what was going on. And this came to me from Wilson, that Arnold had specifically said there would be no question by anybody in his staff. He had held a staff meeting and said there would be no question by anybody in his staff. When the word SILVERPLATE came in on a requisition, it would be honored. Apparently, according to Wilson, somebody, a general officer, failed to adhere to this.

Q: Not Maxwell?

T: No, somebody else. I got a long shot possibility, but I won't mention the name, because again I might be doing an injustice, but I think I know who it was. (Off the Record). The way the thing happened is that when this general officer refused, word got back through Wilson to Arnold that they couldn't get this thing done. Arnold sends for this general and

when he walk in the office, Arnold says to him: "Good morning Major," with no further to do. The man's permanent rank was Major.

Q: And he was two-star?

T: No, he was a BG.

Q: He was reduced in rank?

T: That's right. No chance, I mean that Arnold was just exactly that blunt about it. Afterwards, he said, I said once. I wanted nobody to question SILVERPLATE requisitions. So I could believe this about him from other stories that I'd heard as blunt and direct as he was.

Q: Did this general officer get in some other kind of trouble, like at Bolling Field. I heard some variations. At that time, I was trying to check out this story, you had told me this story way back, and apparently there was some social affair at Bolling. And apparently he was making a pass at somebody's wife? Apparently, the man was cut back at that time. There was some disagreement as to why he was cut back. Apparently, he acted unbecoming an officer and gentleman, and maybe this was a contributory factor?

T: Yet it doesn't sound like the man we mentioned, because I knew him at the flying school.

Q: He wasn't the type to get into situations like that?

T: I wouldn't think so. I had no knowledge really. I could see he was a man, I remember from the Flying School, he was an instructor down there. I remember that he was, should we say, a very precise individual. He was one that didn't take any answer lightly. He searched pretty deeply into things.

He was one to question deeply. As I say now, I don't know this to be a fact....

Q: I'll check it out. That's one of my favorite occupations - checking out stories.

T: As I say, I don't know it for sure, I do know this, anytime I ever wrote SILVERPLATE on a requisition, I never had any trouble.

Q: What sort of relationship did you have with Bim Wilson? He was your boss or sort of mentor?

T: No, Bim Wilson was my representative. He was my liaison officer.

Q: What was his rank at that time?

T: He was a full Colonel.

Q: Higher rank than you?

T: He outranked me by years, and everything else, a long way. Bim resented me. There is no question in my mind; he has always resented me. He resented me because I think he wanted it badly.

Q: This was one of the greatest jobs in the air force.

T: Yes, now the next thing is that Bim Wilson gets himself taken out of that job after Frank Armstrong gets a wing of B-29s out in Nebraska, and Bim wants to... You see, here he is a senior officer, a Colonel, and he hasn't had a tactical command, so he thinks his career is in real jeopardy. So he goes out. Oh, he pulled a little cutie: Before I got on this project, I had run all of the B-29 tests on fuel injector engines. You know, engines, cowl flaps and carburetors were our big nemesis in the B-29, and this fuel injector engine was a beauty. In addition to that,

I ran the tests on the Curtiss reversible electric props. I knew those propellors and knew them well. They had been scheduled for the B-32, which you may have heard.

Q: Oh yes, they flew 15 of them down to Kenney in SWPac.

T: Well, they had been scheduled to be put on the B-32. A man that was my roomate at the flying school, and a very close friend of mine, Whitnell T. Rison, Colonel Rison, was at Wright Field - I can't tell you his job title now, but anything that had to do with new engineering developments and what not, Whit Rison was sitting in the driver's seat. So, when I was to get my B-29's modified, where did I want them modified? I selected the Omaha facility by Martin, because Martin was building the best B-29. They built one better than Boeing. The next thing: I had run the tests on these fuel injector engines, and I got ahold of Whit Rison, up at Wright Field, and I told him. Whit knew I was on some kind of special project, and had a lot of priority. So I said: "Whit, can I get fuel injector engines for my airplanes?" He said: "I think I might be able to swing it." Fine, so I get the first fuel injector engines. Now, this goes through Bim Wilson in Washington. The next thing that happens is, Whit calls me and he says: "Look, Ihave a bunch of Curtiss electric props sitting here in these warehouses, but they are not going to put them on B-32s. Do you want them?" I said: "you know I want them." He said: "I'll send them to Omaha and have them put on your airplanes." I said: "That's fine with me." So this comes back through Bim Wilson. Whit says: "You send in your requisition." Bim Wilson goes out to Nebraska. He is assigned as a Commander of one of the bomb wings under Frank Armstrong. But he goes back

and has my engines and my propellors transferred to his airplanes, and Whit Rison calls me on the telephone, and he says: "How come you had these things transferred over to the other airplanes?" I said: "I didn't do it." Whit says: "You don't mean it?" I said: "That's right." He said: "Okay, I'll take care of it." So the engines came back, and I got ahold of Bim at one of our staff meetings, because I was working under the sponshorship of Frank Armstrong. He knew I had some kind of special project, but he didn't know what it was. But I had to be assigned to some kind of wing so they assigned me to the 315th Wing under Frank. This was an administrative procedure only, so I wouldn't lose out here. Anyway, since we were such good friends, I'd go to Frank Armstrong's staff meetings every now and then just because I wanted to get away from Wendover. And I went into a meeting right after this happened, and there was Bim Wilson, and I told him: Bim, you couldn't get away with it." He said: "What do you mean?" I said: "You had those engines and propellors transfered over, and Bim," I said: "I happened to find out about it, so I got them transfered back with my SILVERPLATE requisition!" And he turned a couple shades of red, and said: "Well, it was worth trying anyway."

Q: Your estimate of his atitute is accurate, because when I talked to you, I talked to him subsequently. I think he was head of AFSWP at that time. And he disagreed with a lot of things you said at that time. There was this element of friction.

T: Remember this. As I say, this man was looking out for Bim Wilson. He's one of these people that I calssify as being a

lot smarter than me in thinking about his future. Because he got himself into a position immediately after the war was over with where this A-bomb business gets him his first star, gets him his second star, and puts him in a position for his third star. He capitalized on this like nobody I've ever known.

Q: It took a lot of jockeying among a lot of people. You know, I wondered often why you stopped at the first star.

T: I wouldn't haven't even got this if it weren't for J.P. McConnell. There was too much resentment against me. I got to much publicity.

Q: I can see it building up like that. If a man sticks his head up high above everybody else, he's a target.

T: I was told one day - in 1947, I believe it was - I was called by Gen Spaatz, he was Chief. He called me and told me that I was to go with him to the White House and meet Harry Truman. It turns out that myself, Jimmy Doolittle, Carl Spaatz and Dave Schilling were riding in one of those old Cadillac sedans over to meet Harry Truman. While riding in this thing, Dave Schilling and I are sitting upon the jump seats, and the old men - Spaatz and Doolittle - are sitting in the back. And they are talking about something. I wasn't trying to listen to their conversation, and Dave Schilling were talking about refueling airplanes at that time - aerial refueling. Jimmy Doolittle just made the remark. He said: "You know," he said, "if there is any place that it's true, it's true in the military servite, that an individual just can't become popular." Jimmy was crucified, you know, that's when he made this remark. He said: "You cannot become popular." What he meant was obvious. "The minute you

are, then everybody is out for you because you are a potential threat to their well-being for the future."

Q: There was another factor in Jimmy's case. He left the air force in the '20s and he made himself some money, where all the other guys stayed on and suffered through all the economy waves and the parsimonious defense policy during the '30s, and Jimmy came back into the picture in the late '30s or early '40s.

T: Right. Take what has happened to your World War aces, for instance. What happened to them, none of them ever made General.

Q: Gabreski?

T: That's right. And Dave Schilling was one of the best, and Jabara, Gabreski, and Bong was killed. But I mean, the guys that hung on; the fellows that became aces even others...

Q: I think your analysis is correct. I think you had stuck out too far above the rest of the group.

Mrs. T: Now public opinion has reversed. Those who had done so much for the atomic bomb. Now, everybody says they didn't do anything. Nobody wants any part of it.

Q: Nobody wants any part of it. It's an ironic twist. The morality, of course - the Russians said that we are inhuman this kind of thing. And its ridiculous.

T: This is another side of the story. I'm sorry that it happened that way. I'm not bitter about it. I'm not resentful, I don't care because there is one thing that I tell myself, and I think I do it honestly, and that is this: I did it. Nobody can change that.

Q: You had one of the most difficult jobs in the history of the war.

T: It was a real satisfying experience...

Q: And you did it perfectly; it came out exactly as planned.

T: Exactly as we planned to do it. Almost, and of course, as i say.....

Q: Did you ever meet Arnold when you came back?

T: no.

Q: He was retired.

T: He was an ill man about that time.

Q: He'd had this heart attack. He'd had several heart attacks. Of course, right after FV-Day, he rapidly lost interest in Washington. He had this ranch. He was a frustrated farmer and rancher.

Mrs. T: Did he die there?

Q: He died in Sonoma, yes. But he'd had several heart attacks. He was a man who wore himself out. He gave himself, as you know, without stint.... I was asking about the pressure the President was putting on Arnold to get those B-29s out. He had promised the President - I was up at Hyde Park - by the way, he promised the President sometime late in 1943, and here it was, I believe, around March 1944, the planes were still having their problems. He and Meyers flew out to Salina, Kansas. Would you tell me about that?

T: Let's go back, let's put this thing in the right perspective. I had gotten on the B-29 with K.B. Wolfe and Blondie Saunders. Pearl Robey, Bill Irvine. That group of people were all put together as a team, as a unit, under K.B. Wolfe to

get this B-29 going out of the factory and into the hands of tactical units. I started flying the B-29 in July, I think it was on maybe it was August of 1943. I flew the No. 2X. Eddie Arnold got killed. They built two XB Models and Eddie got killed in one, and the other one was at Marietta, Georgia, and there wasn't anybody to fly it. And so being a brave and intrepid airman, I immediately volunteered to fly that airplane. That was a real privilege and a challenge as far as I was concerned, because the bigger the better. So K.B. Wolfe got me down there right away, and I was able to find somebody that had made a flight in the airplane. By the time the Salinas incident occurs, which is in Jan or Feb 1944, and we are trying to get the 73rd Wing out of Salina and over to China, by this time, I had over a 1,000 hours in the B-29s. I was, at that time, classified as "Mr. B-29" because, in my work, I had teams of people doing different things to B-29s at Marietta, Georgia; at Omaha, Nebraska; at Cheyene, Wyoming; at Birmingham, Alabama and at Eglin Field, Florida. I had 5 places.

Q: You had not yet been selected?

T: No, I hadn't been. I was just B-29 project officer, trying to get B-29s flying. And, as I say, I had those 5 places, and I had teams of people doing different things with B-29s at each of them. I had under me then, a group of people about 130, and they were very highly skilled in all phases of the B-29. They decided that they were going to take Salina, Kansas and get the 73rd Wing all concentrated there, fix all of the airplanes on a production-line basis, and fly them

as fast as we could get them fixed -- they would fly them out to the CBI. So I am called up and told to get my people and bring them to Salina. At the same time they could get the civilians from Marietta, Wichita and everywhere else, and bring them in to Salina, to form this taks group of maintenance people to work on each of these airplanes 24 hours around-the-clock until we can get them going. This is a hectic thing, I'm telling you, because 40 mph winds in February with snow blowing on those plains in Kansas. It is mighty cold, and it was. Gosh, we got people with pneumonia, flu, and what not. It was a tragic situation, ill prepared for it as they were to do it. This came down to us from Washington. Roosevelt directed that these things get out and get overseas, and this was the only way we could do it. So we did. We had a terrible time out there for about 20 days or some period of time like that. We were working night and day getting those airplanes out.

Q: Didn't Arnold come out there?

T: Yes, he was there; everybody was out there. Arnold was out there definitely.

Q: Diddn't he use that as sort of a command headquarters? He was trying to get parts from here, maintenance experts from there....

T: This was K.B. Wolfe. K.B. Wolfe came out and sat up there with Pearl Robey, they did, they sat themselves in a building and they ran everything from there. They ran the factories from there. All the supply depots...

Q: In Salina.

T: That's right.

Q: Did Arnold come out there for a period?

T: He was out there to see how things were going, but he didn't stay any length of time.

Q: Was Benny Meyers there?

T: Benny Meyers was out there frequently and stayed quite a bit. Hugh Knerr was there. He came there quite a bit.

Q: You know, Benny Meyers reminded Arnold of the good old days "when we worked together." He was trying to elicit sympathy from Arnold after that incident occurred to Meyers. But they finally got those planes out....pulling teeth?

T: Yes. We drove them, you might say, we just drove them out by force. We fixed these airplanes, and we got each one of them to work, we put the crews in and sent them, but we knew they wouldn't keep working. It was just that simple. You see, so much of the stuff that went into the B-29 was inherently designed wrong. It couldn't work right. But you could make it work for once or twice, you see.

Q: Who was the first commander? Was it Blondie Saunders?

T: Yes, Blondie Saunders.

Q: What happened - he went out there. He had an accident out there, didn't he?

T: Yes, he did. He had an accident.

Q: Did he get sick?

T: No, Blondie got messed up. If I'm not too far mistaken, he got messed up in flying a B-25, you know, in trying to go around and see what was going on. P.D. Ent got messed in a B-25.

Q: Who replaced Blondie Saunders? Did Hansell go out there?

T: If I'm not mistaken, Hansell was out there about the same time that Blondie was. Hansell took over, but he didn't last very long. Hansell was never a tactical commander. He could never hold a tactical command.

Q: Well, Hansell had the 21st Bom Command in the Marianas, and he was relieved by LeMay. Do you know that story, anything about it? This in Jan 1945. I know at this time you were getting ready for your mission...

T: Let me - you are talking about Hansell, and I mentioned Newt Longfellow, so let me explain both of them back to the European theater, now, at the very start of the war. In early 1942, when in the 97th Bomb Group we would give a combat indoctrination ride to let them see what it was like to fly in combat. And one of the first ones was Newt Longfellow, because he was my boss. And he was flying with me, standing up in the front part of the B-17. If you are familiar with the way they are laid out, they had the big turrets spin in there, and then there was the pilot and copilot, but a little tiny space between their seats and the top turret. Newt Longfellow was riding with me. We had gone - I don't know what we had bombed. But we were on our way back when a German fighter made a pass at us, and he put a 20 mm cannon shell through the co-pilot's window into the cockpit. He took out all of the cockpit instruments and took part of my co-pilot's hand off. Some of his machine gun bullets, before he fired the 20 mm, hit my top turret gunner in the side of the head. It didn't kill him, but it cut him and knocked him out. Of course, when

this 20 mm cannon shell exploded in the cockpit, there was pandemonium, I can assure you. Well, Newt immediately panicked. He lost his head. He started grabbing for the throttles and we had critical situation at altitude with the B-17 with the hand controlled turbos. If you got them to surging, you were in a hell of a fix. And he started grabbing throttles and turbo controls. I'm trying to fly the airplane. I'd gotten hit too, but my copilot wasn't any good to me. So I tried to get this thing under control and here's Newt reaching over, grabbing all of these controls. I told him to quit; he didn't even hear me - not knowing what he was doing. The only thing I could do was to hit him, and I was able to with my right elbow. I was able to come right up and catch him under the chin, while he was leaning over. I got him under the chin with this elbow and I knocked him flat on his fanny, back in the bottom of the turret. Well, of course, that ended it, as far as he was concerned. He calmed down, then, and when he got back on his feet, he got his first aid kit and started bandaging people up, and I was able to bring the airplane under control and come on back. So, that's the experience with Newt. Now, on another mission, at another time, Gen Hansell was sent. But the experience with Newt Longfellow made me never let somebody ride up in the front with me again, because I didn't know what they might do, like him, if anything happened. So I put them all back in the radio compartment with the radio operator where he could watch him, and see what was going on. Well, we took Gen Hansell on this trip over, and we made our flight over and back. We had the usual trouble with flak and fighters and everything

and when we got back. We had the usual trouble with flak and fighters and everything, and when we got back, Hansell was down on the floor, sitting on the floo on the radio operator's compartment, and he was paralyzed. He could not move. We had to pick him up. As I say, he was sitting down there with his back up against the bulkhead. He had his hands wrapped around his knees and that's the way we carried him out of the airplane. We couldn't unfreeze him until the medics got ahold of him and did something and got him loose. He was paralzyed with fear.

Q: This was in 1943?

T: 1942. He [Hansell] was paralyzed with fear. As far as I know, this probably had something to do with what happened to him over again at the CBI. Let's put it this way; if he didn't have an experience of that type, at least, he wasn't combat-oriented to the point that he could confront and solve the problems that that outfit was confronted with in the CBI theater. They not only had airplane troubles; they had supply problems; they had weather problems that were insurmountable. They had nothing but problems, and Possum Hansell was not combat-oriented to the point to be able to meet these things.

Q: However, Arnold gave him a top job?

T: Yes, but he was a very close and personal friend of Arnold's.

Q: Yes he was, he was a great planner. A great intellect.

T: Yes, that's right. And he did his job in the right place, but he was not a commander.

Q: Arnold probably made an impulsive decision in this cae because, a week or 8 days before, he sent Norstad out there with

bad news that LeMay was coming in and Hansell was coming out. But a week before that, he had sent him a letter of congratulations for the great job he was doing. So Arnold must have made up his mind in a hurry.

T: You see, LeMay ran up against Hansell in the European Theater. Now this was something about LeMay. If you ever worked for LeMay once, and was a failure, you never worked for him again.

Q: You know LeMay was a chip off the Arnold block, in my opinion. Arnold had put Hansell in the job, but then LeMay had done this outstanding job in the CBI, Arnold realized that LeMay was the better commander. Do you honor a friendship with Hansell, or do you put the man in who can do the best job? I think Arnold came to this recognition - though it was probably a very tough decision for him to make - but better to offend Hansell, and get the job done. Arnold did this many times in his career. He took people out of jobs; he took Eaker out of his job, and he put Spaatz in there because, in the final analysis, he decided Spaatz could do the better job. Yet, Eaker was very close to him. They wrote books together; they were close for 25 years, but when he got down to the numb of the situation, I think Arnold made the decision, put the man in who could do the best job.

T: Quite true. I think you are right there.

A: For this probable reason -- I've had many critical comments. I talked to Hansell last week, and of course, Hansell had some praise for Arnold, but basically, he was a bitter man, because he felt that Arnold took him out without adequate explanation. In justification of Hansell, the B-29 was not a perfected instrument in Jan 1945.

T: It was still experimental. Definitely.

Q: So it was not Hansell's fault. Weather or not Arnold knew this, we don't know, but I think he looked at the job LeMay was doing, and in a very difficult situation and he figured that here's the man that could do it.

T: I don't think there is any doubt about that. Now again, I was in on a part of the transfer of LeMay from the European theater to the Pacific. I'm at Grand Island, Nebraska, just before I get the bomb project assignment. I was working for Frank Armstrong. We are trying to organize and put together a B-29 instructor's transition school. Again, as I say, I've got an awful lot of experience with the B-29. I've got a thousand hours, I don't think anybody in the air force, except guys who worked for me, ahd a hundred hours in the airplane. And here I am with a thousand. Because I lived in that airplane. I flew it day and night, and did everything with it. So, the friendship of LeMay and Frank Armstrong from the European theater, for one thing, is the cause of it. But on the other hand, LeMay, when he goes anywhere, he wants to know what he is running into. He knew nothing about a B-29, and one of the reasons he was such a successful commander is that nobody in the Air Force knew as much about a B-17 as LeMay knew. LeMay got started early on a B-17 as a navigator, so he knew this airplane. That's why he was such a great commander in the European theater. A crew couldn't come in and say: "Well, I couldn't do this because..." LeMay would just say: "You are a liar. This airplane will do this; it will do that, and so forth, because I've done it. Now don't

tell me that. Let's start over - where did you goof?" I mean this was him. So, he came out. I got a call from Frank Armstrong, saying LeMay had called him, and LeMay was going to come out and spend a week or ten days at Grand Island with us out there. And he says: "you have got to indoctrinate the Old Man on B-29s." I said: "Fine." I did. I flew with the Old Man on the B-29. I was at midnight down in the maintenance hangar where he was watching maintenance crews work on these airplanes to see where the weaknesses were. He lived with that airplane for about 10 days out there with us. As a matter of fact, I had to laugh because he came and told me that he was going to take that airplane when he got out there. He was going to fly them at high altitude and in formation. I told him:"Gen LeMay, you can't fly this airplane at high altitude in formation." And he said: "What in the hell do you mean I can't....." He said: "I'll show you!" I said: "yes, sir." So I got three airplanes together with LeMay flying one of them, and a couple of wing men, and I said: "Here we go." So we went up, and boy he flew around, and my boys stayed with him a few minutes, and then they were gone, you couldn't push the power necessary to hold a wing airplane in position on a lead airplane. You didn't have it. Your engines heated up and everything got hot and quit. You lost power, and there you were. You just dropped down. So LeMay got up there and everything was fine, because I was sitting with him, and I had that thing throttled down and the guys were flying formation. This is excellent. So he said: "There's nothing to it." I said: "All right, there's nothing to it." I said: "now, you fly wing position."

So we changed and got one of the fellows to fly the lead. But, at this time, I said: "Okay, get her up to normal cruise speed." The first turn we made, I had LeMay on the outside of the turn. Of course, the airplane pulls away like this, and here, LeMay starts to try to get him. Well, when the cylinder-head temperatures got up to about 380 degrees, I pointed to him, I said: "Look, the cowl flaps are open; the airplane's slowing down." He was trying to keep the thing going, and he's fighting. Of course, in that airplane, you can just sweat like a Trojan. It was hot, awfully hot in there. I had him sitting in a pool of his own water, he was sweating so hard trying to fly it.

Q: Object lesson...

T: When we landed, he said: "I guess you are right. We'll have to do something else." That's when he decided to go to night, single airplanes.

Q: Do you know anything about that decision? Was this a sort of extemporaneous decision, or did he carefully think this thing out? Had he been planning this? The low level, 7000 foot mission.

T: No, you see. This is a complete reversal from what he wanted to do. I'll take another little bit of credit here, that people might argue with. Again, in my business of testing and working with B-29s, we had a fire cluster bomb that nobody had much to do with. I tried this fire-cluster bomb.

Q: Is that the M-69?

T: I don't remember what it was now. But it was a small cluster. It was the one that we used during the war. I tried this

this thing, and found out what a beautiful pattern it was. At Grand Island, Nebraska, when LeMay came out there, and he was talking about how he was going to fly this airplane at altitude and formation. He was going to drop these big block busters. I said: "This is the wrong tactics." At this particular point in the conversation, we were in Frank Armstrong's house haveing a barbecue out in the backyeard, about 7:00 at night. LeMay looked at me like I was crazy. He was uded to the European theater business 0 the structures that you are up against over there - bombing submarine pens with armor-piercing bombs and this kind of stuff. I said: "I wouldn't do it; I'd use fire-bombs, and bomb at low altitude." Well, of course, if I had called him a bad name, it wouldn't have been any more of an insult, and he really bit back at me. "What do you mean; you are crazy as you know." And I said: "No sir, you don't neet it. Number one, the Japanese don't have the antiaircraft defenses that the Germans' have; Number two, this airplane isn't going to fly at high altitude; and Number three, the Japanese structures don't have to have these big blockbusters, but if you can start a fire, you can burn them up. The Old Man never opened his mouth after that. He just said: "Ridiculous!" When I went out to Guam, to brief him that I was coming out there with an A-bomb outfit, and what this thing was, after I gave him the briefing, and everything, the Old Man says: "Come on, I want to show you something." He took me into his intelligence room and showed me all the pictures of Tokyo burned out, and everything burned out, he turned around and looked at me and says: You are right."

Q: Then you can claim credit for that. You had him thinking on a new trend of thought. I don't think you have gotten recognition for that. I think everybody thinks LeMay communed with God, and he came up with the great decision.

T: No. There are several things that have been involved with SAC since that time, too, that I never quite got credit for. I did a bunch of things that Butch Blanchard got credit for, because Butch was an insulator against the Old Man. He kept LeMay insulated and isolated.

Q: This is unfortunate.

Timberlake, E. J. "Ted" 29 May 72

December 19, 1969

Lt Gen E.J. Timberlake, USAF(Ret)
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

I appreciate your fine response of December 6th. My delay in responding was occasioned by a trip out to Colorado Springs to do some work on the Kuter Papers and to interview some of the many retired friends and associates of General Arnold's.

I hope to be in the area of Hilton Head Island on Saturday, January 3rd. It it would be possible to reserve an hour or so for me in the A.M., I would very much appreciate it.

If my plans change in any material way I'll phone or write you. In all likelihood, I'll phone you the night before to confirm this date.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Lieutenant General E. J. Timberlake U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
Sea Pines Plantation, Hilton Head Island, S. C. 29928

6 DECEMBER 1969

DEAR MURRAY—

I THINK LOOSBROCK'S AND YOUR PROJECT TO WRITE A BIOGRAPHY ON GENERAL ARNOLD IS AN EXCELLENT ONE—AND ONE LONG OVERDUE.

I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO DISCUSS MY RECOLLECTIONS, WITH YOU, OF GENERAL ARNOLD, BUT THEY ARE EXTREMELY MEAGRE.

MY ONLY CONNECTIONS WITH HIM WERE ON TWO OCCASIONS WHEN HE PAID A SHORT VISIT TO UNITS I COMMANDED.

MY BROTHER PAT KNEW HIM RATHER WELL.

YOU WONT COME UP EMPTY ON HILTON HEAD HOWEVER AS GENERAL TWINING AND GENERAL HANSELL BOTH LIVE HERE.

GOOD LOOK IN YOUR PROJECT

SINCERELY

E J Timberlake

December 1, 1969

Lt.Gen. Edward J. Timberlake, USAF(Ret)
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

20314

25 July 1972

Lieut General E.J. Timberlake, USAF (Ret)
55 Beach Lagoon Road
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

Enclosed are two items for your interest, a copy of our fine interview and a published item in the current issue of Air Force magazine. If you come up this way some time, I'd like to spend that $10 loot on our version of the the Bloody Mary. You made a fan out of me and Bea Green.

Looking over the interview, if it triggers any further recollections of General Hap, please let me know. I will have further occasion to come through there as one of my prime "suspects", General Fred Dean, has just settled down there and has agreed to talk to me.

Thanks again for many favors. Please call on me if there is anything I can do for you up here.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

20314

18 May 1972

Lieut General E. J. Timberlake, USAF (Ret)
55 Beach Lagoon Road
Hilton Head Island, South Car 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

As my Southern trip evolves, it looks like Monday, May 29th is the best day for me. I suggest about 10:30 AM and will phone about an hour before to confirm.

I'll be staying at the Charleston AFB V.O.Q. the night before, just incase something comes up for you that will change it. The number they gave me on the Autovon is 630-1420, ext. 3201.

I'm very much looking forward to an interesting session.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Ramsey Potts

Done
5-29-72

7/25/72
Sent Gen T.
Copy of
transcript

19 April 1972

Lieut General E. J. Timberlake, USAF (Ret)
55 Beach Lagoon Road
Hilton Head Island, South Car 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

My Southern trip is shaping up and it looks like I'll be coming through your area on Monday, May 29th (which they now celebrate up thisaway as Decoration Day), or Tuesday, May 30th. If one or either day is convenient, I'll arrange my travel plans accordingly.

You will be interested to know that I "sold" the anecdote involving you and the Polish squadron to Air Force Magazine for $10. It will appear in a forthcoming issue under the title "Duel In The Sun - Narrowly Scotched". Therefore I suggest that we blow it on a drink, or lunch, or both.

It's not firmly settled yet, but Mrs. Green may come along on this trip, as I have a number of stops down in Florida to make.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force
History (AFHHO)

Encl

P.S. I've had four shorties published in AF Mag so far, the latest in the April issue (p. 55)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL E. J. TIMBERLAKE, USAF (RET.)
755 BEACH LAGOON DRIVE
HILTON HEAD ISLAND, S. C. 29928

5 FEBRUARY 1972

DEAR MURRAY—

THE POLISH SQUADRON WERE FLYING SPITFIRES. BUT I DONT KNOW WHAT SERIES.

INCIDENTALLY I ALWAY THOUGHT THE SPITFIRE LOOKED SO BEAUTIFUL WHEN IN THE AIR. IT SEEMED TO MOVE THROUGH THE AIR LIKE AN ARROW. I HAVE OFTEN WONDERED, BUT NEVER HEARD, HOW IT COMPARED WITH OUR P-51 IN COMBAT. THE P-51 HAD THE RANGE BUT I WONDER HOW THEY WOULD COME OUT IN AN ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT.

SINCERELY

Ted Timberlake

5 February 1972

Lieut General E. J. Timberlake, USAF (Ret)
55 Beach Lagoon Road
Hilton Head Island, South Car 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

Thanks much for your letter of the 2nd. That's a great story. I will pass a copy along to General Smart. In the telling and re-telling, the Poles got shifted a little to the South and became Czechs.

One last detail: do you happen to recall what kind of planes the Poles were flying? Assumed they were Spitfires, but dont know for sure. Could you drop me a note in the enclosure on this?

I'll be looking forward to getting together with you. My plans are not yet firm, but I may be coming through around Decoration Day weekend, one or two days on either side of it. If you plan to be at home at that time, I'll try to firm up my plans to be built around that stop.

Again, many thanks.

Very sincerely,

Murray S.

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

LIEUTENANT GENERAL E. J. TIMBERLAKE, USAF (RET.)
55 BEACH LAGOON ROAD
HILTON HEAD ISLAND, S. C. 29928

2 FEBRUARY 1972

DEAR MURRAY-

APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER. HOPE I SEE YOU WHEN YOU COME THROUGH.

THE ENCLOSURE IS APPROXIMATELY CORRECT. IT WAS A POLISH SQUADRON NOT A CZECHOSLOVAKIAN OUTFIT.

WE WERE STAGING OUT OF A BASE IN SOUTHERN ENGLAND WHERE THE POLES WERE BASED. THE POLISH COMMANDER CAME OVER TO MY TEMPORARY HEADQUARTERS, COMPLETE WITH INTERPRETER, TO APOLOGIZE FOR HIS PASS AT US.

THE SCOTCH PART WAS CORRECT.

INCIDENTALLY I HAD JUST CHEWED OUT MY SQUADRON COMMANDERS FOR HAVING SUCH LOUSY GUNNERS. AFTER ALL THE POLISH SQUADRON MADE THEIR PASS AT US IN FORMATION - A BIG TARGET.

AT LEAST, AT THE DEBRIEFING, THE KIDS WERE HONEST - THEY DIDN'T CLAIM ANY HITS.

SINCERELY

Ted Timberlake

Duel In The Sun - Narrowly Scotched

Early in 1943, Lieut. General E.J. "Ted" Timberlake (then a Colonel) commanded the 93rd Bomb Group out of a base in Southern England. His group of B-24s was ordered to destroy or neutralize the German submarine bases sited around the Bay of Biscay that were harassing our North African convoys. It was a disagreeable mission. The Sub-pens were protected with six feet of concrete in some cases; the flak was intense; and the fighter opposition pesky to heavy.

One day, while the Liberators were still over enemy territory, a Polish Spitfire squadron made a playful pass at them. The B-24 gunners did not recognize them and opened fire. An incongruous element developed at the later debriefing. The "enemy" fighters had made their pass in formation without evasive tactics. As General Timberlake now recalls: "The kids were honest - they didnt claim any hits."

At a later staff meeting, he writes, "I had just chewed out my squadron commanders for having such lousy gunners", when the Polish fighter squadron commander arrived at Timberlake's headquarters, flanked by seconds, and ready to fight a duel.

A moment fraught with danger to our international relations was eased when Timberlake broke out a couple of bottles of Scotch. By the time it was gone, the Polish commander announced that he would be honored, if permitted to escort the 93rd Bomb Group on all its missions.

31 January 1972

Lieut General Edward J. Timberlake, USAF (Ret)
55 Beach Lagoon Road
Hilton Head, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

I'm the fellow working on a Biography of General Hap Arnold. You may recall that you were unable to keep our tentative appointment about a year and a half ago. I believe Mrs. Timberlake was not feeling well at that time. In any event, I did have fine interview sessions with Generals Twining and Possum Hansell at that time.

My reasons for writing are two:

1) I ran across a funny item apparently involving you. I'm enclosing a copy for your interest. Did it really happen that way, and also, can you add any more details?

2) I'll be coming through your area in a few months, and would welcome the opportunity to talk with you about your recollections of General Arnold. I've talked to over 200 people who knew General Arnold, including practically all the greats: Spaatz, Eaker, Lovett, Kuter, Kenney, O'Donnell, Smart, K.B. Wolfe, Leslie Groves, Lindbergh, de Seversky, Howard Rusk, and many others. My tapes will be donated to the Air Force Academy Library when I have completed my work, so posterity will have a living record of the voices and recollections of the men who made the Air Force what it is today.

I didnt mean to speechify, but would welcome the opportunity to talk with you, if you feel you can contribute. Incidentally, I left out of the above recitation Lieut Gen Pat Timberlake whom I saw in San Antonio during that Daedalian meetings of 1970.

All good wishes. The attachment is for your retention.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

P.S. Col. Jay Timberlake, who commands the B-24 Combat Wing, tells a story about an incident that happened when he commanded the 93rd Gp. Returning from a raid on Sub-bases on the Bay of Biscay, but while still over enemy territory, a Czechoslovakian Sqdn. playfully made a pass at his group. The gunners not recognizing them, opened up on the fighters. Shortly after they returned to their base, the Czechoslovakian Sqdn. Commander came to the 93rd's base, complete with seconds, to fight a duel with Timberlake. Fortunately, Timberlake had a couple of bottles of Scotch which was judiciously used to avoid an international incident. When the Scotch was gone the Sqdn. Commander returned to his base and reported that his Sqdn. would be honored if permitted to give fighter cover to the 93rd Gp. on all missions.

You should tell this one to the WCTU.

Answered by
John Turner with
Letter 6-17-43

Biography

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD J. TIMBERLAKE

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He was born in Fort Hunt, Virginia, November 10, 1909. He was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and appointed a second lieutenant of Infantry June 11, 1931.

Three months later he enrolled in the Air Corps Primary Flying School at Randolph Field, Texas, from which he was graduated in June 1932. He then entered the Air Corps Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, completed the course in November 1932, and went to Luke Field, Hawaii, for service with the 72nd Bomb Squadron. The following January he transferred from the Infantry to the Air Corps.

While at Luke Field, General Timberlake was assigned as engineering officer of the 40th Attack Squadron. In January 1935 he became a flying instructor at the Air Corps Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, and during the next five years instructed at Kelly and Brooks Fields in pursuit, bombardment, and observation aviation. He went to MacDill Field at Tampa, Florida, in July 1940, as Adjutant of the 6th Bomb Squadron, and later its Commanding Officer. In February 1942 he became Executive Officer of the 98th Bomb Group at Barksdale Field, Louisiana and later commanded the 93rd Bomb Group there.

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In May 1945, General Timberlake was assigned to Hq. AAF and two months later was transferred to Bolling Field, D.C., as Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Continental Air Forces. From September 1946 to June 1947, he attended the National War College. After he completed the course he was appointed Chief of the Operations Division, Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations, Hq. USAF.

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General Timberlake then returned to the United States, and in August 1951, was assigned to the Ninth Air Force, which he commanded for six years. He assumed command of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO) in July 1957.

In July 1958, General Timberlake became Vice Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe, at Wiesbaden, Germany. He became Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, USAF, in July 1961.

He became Commander of the nationwide Continental Air Command on July 1, 1962.

General Timberlake has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters, Silver Star, Legion of Merit with one cluster, Air Medal with four clusters, and Distinguished Unit Citation. He is rated a command pilot.

General Timberlake and his wife, the former Marjorie Campbell of San Antonio, Texas, have three children -- Mrs. Marjorie Foster, Mrs. Shirley Martin, and Ted III, who is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and a Captain in the U.S. Air Force.

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2. Married to Marjorie Campbell Timberlake; children - Marjorie Campbell Foster; Shirley Marie Martin; Capt. Edward J. Timberlake III.

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Bronze Star Medal
Air Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Distinguished Unit Citation
American Defense Service Medal
European-African-Middle East Campaign Medal with three bronze stars
American Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal
Korean Service Medal with three bronze stars
United Nations Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Air Force Longevity Service Award with one silver and one bronze oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Flying Cross (Great Britain)
Croix de Guerre with Palm (France)
Legion d'Honneur (France)
Croix de Guerre with Palm (Belgium)
Royal Order of Sword (Sweden)
Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation

E. Effective Dates of Promotions.

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Colonel	14 Aug 1942	2 April 1948
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END

PART III. Personalized Material

A. Interests

1. Amateur photographer; avid golfer maintaining a low handicap.

2. BPOE Elks Lodge #855, Sumter, South Carolina. Carolinas Professional Golf Association (Advisory Council).

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations

1. Prefers French cooking; conservative dresser, wears predominantly gray and blue in civilian dress.

2. Reads extensively, especially fond of fiction and history. Lover of semi-classical music and has a fine collection of Hi-Fi Records. In travel, he prefers Europe and the Caribbean.

Lieutenant General E. J. Timberlake U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
Sea Pines Plantation, Hilton Head Island, S. C. 29928

22 DECEMBER

DEAR MURRAY—

I'll BE HERE ON 3 JANUARY BUT AS I HAVE SAID I REALLY DIDN'T KNOW GEN ARNOLD—

GEN TWINING, WHO LIVES HERE IS YOUR BOY

MERRY CHRISTMAS

Ted Timberlake

2 Jan 70
Didn't want to see me
(see below)

December 19, 1969

Lt Gen E.J. Timberlake, USAF(Ret)
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

I appreciate your fine response of December 6th. My delay in responding was occasioned by a trip out to Colorado Springs to do some work on the Kuter Papers and to interview some of the many retired friends and associates of General Arnold's.

I hope to be in the area of Hilton Head Island on Saturday, January 3rd. It it would be possible to reserve an hour or so for me in the A.M., I would very much appreciate it.

If my plans change in any material way I'll phone or write you. In all likelihood, I'll phone you the night before to confirm this date.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Phoned AM
2 Jan '70 - Timberlake
didn't want to talk to me.
Said he didn't know Arnold.
Told me to see his brother
"Pat". We'll do.
Said his wife was
sick - I suggested
we skip it - He
said OK skip it

Lieutenant General E. J. Timberlake U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
Sea Pines Plantation, Hilton Head Island, S. C. 29928

6 DECEMBER 1969

DEAR MURRAY-

I THINK LOOSBROCK'S AND YOUR PROJECT TO WRITE A BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL ARNOLD IS AN EXCELLENT ONE AND CAN HAVE GREAT POTENTIAL.

I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO DISCUSS MY RECOLLECTIONS, WITH YOU, OF GENERAL ARNOLD, BUT THEY ARE EXTREMELY NEGATIVE.

MY ONLY CONNECTIONS WITH HIM WERE THE OCCASIONS WHEN HE PAID A SHORT VISIT TO UNITS I COMMANDED AND I THINK PAT KNEW HIM RATHER WELL.

WE WON'T COME UP EMPTY ON HILTON HEAD HOWEVER AS GENERAL TWINING AND GENERAL HANSELL BOTH LIVE HERE.

GOOD LUCK IN YOUR PROJECT

SINCERELY

E J Timberlake

Ramsay Potts

December 1, 1969

Lt.Gen. Edward J. Timberlake, USAF(Ret)
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Timberlake:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Biography

Fla

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B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations

1. Prefers French cooking; conservative dresser, wears predominantly gray and blue in civilian dress.

2. Reads extensively, especially fond of fiction and history. Lover of semi-classical music and has a fine collection of Hi-Fi Records. In travel, he prefers Europe and the Caribbean.

Interview - LTGEN E. J. Ted Timberlake, Hilton Head Island, S.C., May 29, 1972

Q: Do you remember your first exposure to the man, Hap Arnold?

T: I think the first time I met Arnold, we were training, I was stationed at MacDill Field. I was in a B-17 outfit, we had just opened up MacDill Field.

Q: This was before the war?

T: This was during the war, I would say - we got in it in 1941 - this was about 1939, he came down. He had either been over to England, or had heard a lot about their operations. The English were taking a lot of losses at night with the German night fighters coming in and hitting the bombers as they were landing. So Arnold took the group together, and said that we have got to learn how to fly, without using landing lights, or the permanent lights around the perimeter of the field - lighting up the runway. He made quite an impression because he said: "Some of you are going to go over to England, and you are going to have to learn to fly on a blackout field." So it happened - I don't know why they picked on poor me - but Gene Beebe and myself were picked out to go out and try this out. There was a field north of MacDill. They didn't want us to fly from MacDill. They were afraid we would damage the runway, I think. We flew out of this grass field - Drew Field - which is about 5,000 feet square. We had all the lights turned out. We took a B-17 in and landed it without lights, without lights from the airplane, without runway lights. We did this about three times, and I was sweating so much that we quit, and that was the first time that I ever had contact with Arnold. And I must say, that I didn't want to see much of him thereafter.

Q: You felt he was a real tough nut?

T: Well, he had this idea, and he said: "This is the way you are going to do it." And I sort of got an impression --I was just a 1st LT at the time....

Q: Was he two stars at the time?

T: I don't know. I think so.

Q: Beebe was his Exec at the time?

T: Later on. Beebe was stationed with me down there, down in Florida. Then, when the war started, Beebe went up to Washington and was one of his Execs at one time or another. Gene Beebe. Then Beebe later went off to the Pacific, and was with Kenney, I believe.

Q: Yes, 308th Bomb Group. Then he came back and worked with Arnold till the end of the war. He had a heart attack, too.

T: That was the first time I saw Gen Arnold, and I must say, it scared me to death. The next time I saw him, I took over to Europe the first B-24 group, the 93rd Bomb Group, on three days notice, after the African landing. Gen Eaker called me down to the 8th AF, and said: "How long would it take you to get ready to fly down to Tafaraoui, North Africa?" I was a little bit cocky at the time. This was on a Friday. I said: "Well, let me get back, and I'll brief my boys tonight, and we will load on Saturday. We will fly down to the southern part of England on Sunday, and I'll be in Tafaraoui on Monday." He said: "That's impossible. It will take you at least 10 days." Well, anyway, we flew down there. Then we operated out of North Africa, and then flew over and operated out of Libya for three months, I guess. Went down to spend 10 days and spent three months. When we got back - it was considered a pretty good feat - when we got back, Gen Arnold was visiting over in England, and he came out to the 93rd Group, and we assembled the whole group. He made a very nice talk, complimenting me on the operation.

Q: Was that just about Labor Day 1943?

T: Let's see, we went down there, December 1942. We got back in March 1943, and it was, I'll say a month or so after that, as best as I can recall, don't remember.

Q: Was this after Sicily?

T: No, this was prior to Sicily. This was mostly, well, the Army hadn't cleared up out to Algiers yet. They were still fighting back there. We were far off from the invasion of Italy. We were flying, actually, we moved from Tafaraoui, which was under Doolittle's AF.

Q: 12th AF?

T: Yes, and then they moved us over to Libya, and we flew out of the command of the 9th Air Command. My brother was in command of the thing. Our targets were, mostly, say up in Naples and Palermo, up in that area. We flew out of the desert. We stayed there about three months and went back to England, then they very nicely gave us a two-day rest, and the third day we flew a mission to Wilhelmshaven, which I think was the first penetration of Germany proper. But, anyway, Arnold came out and he was very, very kind to us, in the words he said, and he was very impressive man. And, really, I think those are the only two times that I ever saw him, except when he was addressing large groups of people.

Q: This visit of Arnold's, was this about the time of the Schweinfurt-loss, the first Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid?

T: No, that was in August, because, you see, at the same time the Schweinfurt deal was going on, the B-24s again, we moved down to North Africa, and flew out of Libya and we were conducting the Ploesti low level attacks.

Q: Were you in on that SOAPSUDS?

T: Yes, not SOAPSUDS, no, but I was in on it. What did we call it? It was a low level attack on Ploesti.

Q: TIDAL WAVE, was that it?

T: I think it was TIDAL WAVE. I don't know. I was a planner for it.

Q: Was Jake Smart in it also?

T: Yes. Where this thing happened, to bring Arnold indirectly. Jake was working for Arnold, and they concocted this scheme, that if they could get the oil output from Rumania there - the Ploesti oilfields - that this would be a great blow. So Jake came over as Arnold's emissary, and came over to my group in England, and said: "Do you believe that you could take your B-24s and make a low level pass and fly line abreast against a target? And I said: "Well, there is only one way to find out. Go out and try the damn thing." So, Gen Hodges, who commanded the B-24 Division, stood us down a week, and I took a squadron, and we went out and practiced flying, and making a right angle turn, and then ending up being all fully abreast, because we had to drop these bombs simultaneously,

because we were going to hit them below 300 feet.

Q: You practiced in North Africa?

T: No, we practiced in England, and we caught hell from all the RAF and everything else, because all of a sudden, these 24 airplanes would appear at about 300 feet. Well, then, the answer was "Yes." It was feasible to do it. I didn't think it was a very smart thing, but it was feasible. So Jake went back to Washington, as I got the story, got the go-ahead from Arnold. And then came one, two, three groups from England. They were sent down to North Africa to participate in it, and then, there were two groups over there under the 9th AF. So there were five groups all together. Brereton was commanding the AF then, I forget the name of it.

Q: It was probably the 9th AF.

T: I think it was the 9th AF. My brother had the 9th Bomber Command. And there we practiced for a month. We made a model of Ploesti itself. We had five targets, and we took the five groups, and then, we had to maneuver all five of them, so they could go line abreast. It took us about a month and we finally worked out the tactics of it. I was the head planner of it. And then, actually, we flew it on the 31st of August.

Q: Was it the last day of July?

T: The reason we flew it - I think it was the last day of August - because we had broken the German weather code, only through that month, and we didn't have it for the next month. So, therefore, we had to fly when we still had a weather deal. Actually, the mission, a lot of people called it a success, and some called it a failure. Unfortunately, there were two groups that when they cross the Danube River, didn't believe that the lead group was going in the right direction. They flew up the Danube River to the Iron Gates, and alerted the defenses up there. Then, they knew something was happening. By the time we got to Ploesti, the thing was alerted, and that thing was loaded with anti-aircraft. As I recall, we sent over 153, took off 153, and lost about 53. Some number like that.

Q: One-third or more?

T: Yes. But those groups that did exactly as briefed - there was one group, the 389th, which was led by Jack Wood - we put them on this isolated target because they were the newest group there. We thought they would have the least chance to cause any trouble. They did an absolutely perfect job, just as they were briefed. That was the one refinery that the Germans never tried to put back together again. The rest of it was about 25% successful. There was this mistake made in the approach, but again, that was an Arnold....

Q: Was there another mistake besides going up the Danube the wrong way?

T: Yes, as a matter of fact, the lead pilot, the lead aircraft, there was a railroad running oorth and south into the Ploesti oilfields. This was to be the turning point where they turned right. Well, they were coming up to this at right angles, to the railroad at right angles, and the navigator was doing just fine. The Germans had built an additional railroad in there, which our pictures didn't show. The leader took it upon himself to challenge the navigator, and said: "This is the road we should turn on." So he turned right on that one, and they actually went into Bucharest. Then, they came back and had to hit the target from the wrong direction. In the meantime, these two had gone up the wrong way to the Iron Gates, were just coming in, and they hit the target in the right direction, and we had airplanes at 300 feet, crossing each other. It was pretty tough and go there. It's like so many military things that happen. It came so close to being perfect, but then human error comes in. What's that old law we used to call it, Murphy's Law. "If something can go wrong, it will go wrong." But it was just so close. It makes you, you do all this planning, and you have the thing all laid on. Then, just that little Murphy's law comes in, and there you are.

Q: Did Jake Smart take a beating for his role in that?

T: No, as a matter of fact. He, at that time, when Jake Smart was still not assigned to the units in Europe. He was still assigned to Gen Arnold's Hqs. He was just over there with me. He and I were, you might say, joint planners. Then the afternoon before, I was supposed to fly - as a matter of

fact, I was going to fly with George Brown, who now commands the System Command, and Jake was going to fly with somebody else. For some reason, which I have never been able to understand, the day before the mission, Brereton called Jake and I in and said that they had gotten word from Washington that neither Jake nor I were to fly the mission because we had too much, knew too much. Well, so then we were in the position of having to go out to these kids - they were under us - and say: "Excuse me boys, but we can't fly, you go up and I can't go." It made me feel like a heel. Later on, one of the kids, this fellow Stewart, that wrote the book on Ploesti, tried to research that. Brereton said that he could not remember it. I simply think that since I came from another theater, the British theater, and since Jake Smart was working out of Washington, that Brereton wanted this people in there, and didn't want us in there. So neither one of us actually flew the mission, and its always been sort of a feeling of, not shame, but....

Q: Regret?

T: "Regret," I guess, is a better word. Then Jake went back to Washington and went to work for Arnold. Then Arnold released him about a year later, and he joined the 15th AF. He got a group under Nate Twining. And then, oddly enough, started bombing Ploesti from high altitude. He was shot down and was a prisoner of war. This happened about a year after the occasion that I talk about.

Q: I happen to recall that Arnold did not want Smart to be on the mission because he felt he knew too much. I didn't know about you, but....

T: Well, both of us. I remember Brereton called us in both together. And we went in, and he was adamant that neither one of us should fly.

Q: He might have gotten instructions from Arnold.

T: He might have, when Stewart, and incidentally, the most accurate report of that whole thing is written by this Cal Stewart, who is a public relations officer in my group, as a matter of fact. The way he got the true story was, when I was Deputy Commander of USAFE, Stewart gave up his job as an editor of a newspaper in Wisconsin, I believe, wrote me and said: "Can I get introduced to the German Command?" He wanted to talk to the Germans who were

down around the defense of Ploesti. So he talked to both sides. He got our side, and then he got the German side. I've checked it out, and I think it is very accurate.

Q: Let me ask this. That Ploesti raid was before or after Arnold's visit to your group?

T: This was after. In the early part, we had gotten back there about March 1943, and Arnold visited us between then and when we went back. In other words, I would put it probably around July 1943.

Q: (reading) There's an article from Time Magazine, the date is not indicated, entitled "Three Brothers, Three Stars." It was probably sometime in 1943, and it stated that Col Edward J. Timberlake was promoted to BG, thus to become the youngest general officer since the Civil War.

It referred to his brother, BG Patrick Timberlake, age 43, former Chief of the 9th AF Bomber Command, who was at that time, one of the 9th's top planners. Their elder brother BG Edward Waenne Timberlake, became an expert in shooting planes down and commanded the anti-aircraft defenses in Washington.

T: I was promoted to a Captain in October 1940.

Q: Then Arnold saw you when you were a 1st LT.

T: Right.

Q: He was probably down at MacDill sometime before October 1940. It might have been 1939.

T: 1939, then I was promoted to a BG on 7 October 1943, three years later.

Q: Do you remember that in relation to Arnold's visit? Was it right after that? Were you promoted right after he came there?

T: No, it was sometime after he came in, because he came there before we went down to Ploesti. Then we came back and I know Gen Eaker came up and pinned the stars on me on this time here. It works out. As I say, I had 12 years. I graduated from West Point in 1931. I had 12 years as a 1st LT, and then all the rest of my service was as a Brigadier General.

Q: Let me ask you about another phase of the European experience. I talked to a man who said that many of the others in the 8th AF welcomed the B-24s. I asked why? He said: "Because the B-24s attracted all the German fighters, and they left us and the B-17s alone." Is that a fair estimate?

T: Yes, that's an actual true story. Really, the reason is, I don't know, the B-24 was a specially designed aircraft. It had what is known as the Davis wing, which is a very specifically designed wing. It's a very thin wing. It was designed to carry a certain load at a certain speed at a certain altitude. Well, the powers that be decided that we should carry more turrets; that we should carry more armor; that we should carry more this; that we should carry more of that. When we first got to Europe we used to fly the B-24 easily up to 25,000 feet. At cruising, we could indicate around 170 mph. We would fly above the B-17s. We had greater range. We had greater speed, and the limitation imposed by the factory - now I'm slightly guessing on this - was 56,000 lbs. gross. That's the heaviest that we were supposed to fly. By the time we got through, within a year, they were loading us so that we were flying about 65,000 pounds gross. Well, as I say, the Davis wing is a very critical wing. This put us at a semi--stall position. When we flew, it was extremely difficult to hold a tight formation. If you so much as fell off a little bit, or lost power on one engine, you'd have a straggler. The Germans would hit that straggler very nicely. The B-17s, for instance, I've heard them say, they'd brief their people and say: "We are not going to get any fighters for today, but don't worry, because the B-24s will attract all the fighters." And that would happen! There was that. They mismanaged the aircraft, which often higher commands will do. They ought to pay attention to engineers, because they know what the limitations and capabilities are.

Q: Who was responsible for that, could you say?

T: I wouldn't know.

Q: Wright Field or Washington?

T: It's a combination of Wright Field, and Washington, and people

who actually didn't know what in the hell they were talking about, because we were doing fine until this overloading thing came up. There was that about the B-24, and then there was another thing about the B-24. We were a hydraulic airplane. In other words, all of our systems worked with hydraulic fluid which is highly flammable, which we didn't know. The B-17 was an electric airplane. Everything was operated by electric motors. So whenever we got hit by anti-aircraft, or something like that, we had a very big tendency to burn. We were burners, they called them. And the B-17 wasn't. As a result, a lot of this wasn't everybody's favorite piece of cake at the B-24. But we finally licked the problem. And, really, the basic thing was, they overextended its capabilities. I shouldn't have done it. I came back one time. They sent me out to the factory to make a talk. By this time I was sick and tired of flying overweight and half stalling through the sky. I made a talk to the people who made the B-24s at Consolidated Vultee.

Q: Out at San Diego?

T: Right. And, as a matter of fact, I had a drink or two too many, and I said: "Well, the best thing about the B-24s are the pilots and the people who fly them." That didn't go over too well. My brother was with me at the time, and he said that wasn't the most tactful thing he had ever heard of. It worked good out in the Pacific.

Q: Out in the Pacific it was the most suitable - longer range, and where speed and high altitude were less critical.

T: We had to depend on tight compact formations to get firepower against fighters.

Q: Mutual protection?

T: Yes. Once you lost position, you didn't have the capability of getting back in formation again.

Q: Did you have a great morale problem among your pilots who would prefer to fly B-17s instead of B-24s.

T: I don't really believe so, because I think they took this as a challenge. The only time we came near a morale factor, was at the first part

part of the war we were losing pilots at a pretty good rate, and we weren't getting replacements. We'd have, say, 20 pilots in the barracks. You'd walk in this barracks, and there would be two in there. The rest of them would be gone. This wasn't a very happy feeling. For a period of time there, they weren't in the greatest of moods, but I never felt that we really had a morale problem. As I say, it was a challenge, and they met the challenge and said: "The hell with it; off we go."

Q: They had a 25-mission rotation policy, and then they scrapped that.

T: And then went to 35.

Q: They went to 35?

T: Yes. They had an expression. You see, Eaker commanded the 8th AF first, and then Eaker and Doolittle were switched. Doolittle came to the 8th and Eaker came down into the Mediterranean. Doolittle decided that they would - I think they switched to 30 - and kids had a little statement: "Do Five for Doolittle." That was the idea. Actually, on the number of missions - it is a very peculiar thing - but statistically, if you got through the first five or six, your chances of getting through the rest of them were up in the 90% factor.

Q: You mean, based on experience?

T: Experience, and capabilities and you learn how to keep that airplane together. But this was generally true. If you got through that, you'd get through the rest of them. We had a lot of people flew, Col Potts, who has just retired. He was a great guy. Gen Potts flew 2 or 3 sets of missions. Another great leader we had was Jimmy Stewart. He was my operations officer. He did a fine job. I had three very outstanding officers when we went over, and that was Ramsey Potts, and George Brown, and Keith Compton. They were all 1st LTS when they came to me in the latter part of 1941. And all of them were made Colonels within 13 months. I mean they were so outstanding. We just moved them right up.

Q: I worked with Ramsey Potts in the Secy's office. He worked for Symington, in fact, I have his name right here.

Q: Let me ask about Arnold and Andrews. Andrews got back, right, this was after the Casablanca Conference. He was to get this big job as CG/ETO.

T: That's right, the 8th AF called us and told us to prepare a B-24, a war weary B-24, and convert it to a semi-transport plane because they wanted to use it to fly Gen Andrews to various points of his command. One of the first missions - and we took this crew that had flown their 25 missions - the best crew we had. The first time they flew Gen Andrews was to Iceland, and they hit a mountain over there in Iceland.

Q: And that was the first mission?

T: This wasn't really a mission. It was just an inspection tour. It was the first ride. Of course, we felt very badly about it.

Q: Did you know Gen Andrews?

T: Yes,but not extremely well. You see, until I got in during WWII, I was such a low ranking officer, I didn't know anybody. But I thought he was one of the warmest, kindest, most human individuals I've ever known.

Q: May I ask you to compare your recollections of Andrews and Arnold?

T: You were talking about Gen Andrews and Gen Arnold, and I said that I knew neither one of them real well, and you asked if I had any feeling about a comparison of the two. What I am about to say is what I get from hearing their contemporaries talk, and not from my personal knowledge. I would sort of sum it up this way, that you have two types of leaders, one that leads by having people follow them and one that leads by driving. I think Gen Andrews was the former, and Gen Arnold was the latter. I think he was a driver. I'm not criticizing. They had just different ways of being a leader.

Q: Do you think - I've asked this question before, it is interesting to get some of these comments - that somebody who led like Andrews did, by setting an example, and being friendly, and articulate, and persuasive - do you think that could have done the job that Arnold did by driving, getting his viewpoint across and sort of intimidating at times?

T: I think so, but perhaps I'm biased, because I generally adopted, let's say, the Andrews style, rather than the other style. It doesn't mean that

if you lead by people following you, when you see something go wrong,you take proper action. They know you are fair. But I don't think you have to be riding people all the time, which a lot of folks do. We had recent examples which occurred within the AF. I won't mention any names, where we've had a man who was just an absolute driver. He got good results, and he's had successors who were leaders in the other sense of the word, and they got good results. It's just different ways to do things.

Q: On the subject of Arnold driving....

T: I'll tell you one. I can give you a good example, and this is not AAF, but let's take Gen Omar Bradley.

Q: A gentle man?

T: Yes. Now he is the type of leader that I think is great. He did a great job. Now, Patton, I think, is equally great, but he certainly didn't use the Bradley method.

Q: In my mind, I have compared Arnold to Patton - their same approach, a driving approach.

T: Yes. You know, Patton and Doolittle were very good friends. Doolittle was very fond of him.

Q: On the subject of Arnold driving people, do you think he drove Eaker? They had those severe losses, the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid in August 1943, and then the "Black Thursday" raid in October 1943. Then the long, the deep raids ceased for several months, until the P-51s came in to support. By that time Eaker was out of there.

T: Yes. I can't really answer that. I have my surmise. I think that probably was the reason. Frankly, I think Eaker did an absolutely superb job as commander of the 8th AF. Actually, he organized it. He fought the battle down at Casablanca, when they wanted us to go into night bombing....

Q: He's the one who sold Churchill?

T: That's right. I believe Arnold, as I understand it, had a tendency to lean toward going that way because of the losses we were taking in night bombing, and we weren't set up for that. I thought Eaker just did an outstanding

job, but the events did happen as you say. Now, the only one person who could have created that was Gen Arnold.

Q: Eaker, I think felt - well, I saw his letters. He wrote to Gen Fechet. Gen Jim Fechet was the man for whom Eaker had flown as pilot in the late 1920s. Eaker felt quite bitter toward Arnold for taking him out of the 8th AF.

T: He did?

Q: Yes. Even though they elevated him in position. He became commander of the MAAF. So, in a sense, it was a promotion, yet Eaker felt that I guess like a man is in the Major Leagues, and is being sent out to another league.

T: I think that is true. He built this thing up by hand, and he had the leaders there that he wanted. The thing was working pretty good at that time.

Q: Well, he had two leaders, both of whom were taken out. Newton Longfellow of the Bomber Command was taken out of there, and Frank O.D. Hunter was teken out of the Fighter Command.

T: On the first one, Longfellow was my boss when I first went over there and I think Eaker did quite right to relieve him.

Q: Did he lose his nerve - Newton Longfellow?

T: No, he just...I don't know what his background had been. For instance, when I first flew my 93rd Group over there, we were the first outfit to fly nonstop across the Atlantic in formation. We took off from Newfoundland and landed at Prestwick, and refueled, and went down to our base over by Norwich. And we were rather tired. Our ground echelon had come over by the Queen Mary, I think it was. We met there on the same day. We were exhausted really, and about 45% of the people were living in tents. Just there we were in tents. Longfellow wasn't even there when we arrived. He called the next morning. He called me and said: "You're here," and then came over. He said: "I want to talk to your group." So we got all our people together and Longfellow, here we had just gotten there, we hadn't even had time to shave, and he said that he was sick and tired of having us sitting around on our dead fannies. He said: "Get out there and get to work." You can't be loafing over here." You see, we

hadn't even had a chance to get organized. He didn't know what was going on. Larry Kuter replaced him. Larry Kuter is here, incidentally.

Q: Is he down here, I thought he was in Naples, Florida.

T: Well, he came through here. So Longfellow is not one of my favorites.

Q: He just passed away, in California.

T: Now, Hunter, I believe he lives in Savannah, and is a tremendous person. I think what happened there was that Eaker wanted somebody more dynamic. It was Hunter's job to lay out the airfields for the Fighter Command that was coming in. Hunter had fought a wonderful war in WWII (World War I?) He was a little older guy, just didn't have the....well, Eaker was a dynamic person. Unless you were with a guy like that, you were out. For instance, I think the reason I was promoted was because he said it would take 10 days to get down to Africa, and I made it in 3.

Q: I'm sure that he felt you were doing a great job.

T: I can well imagine there might have been some feeling between Eaker and Arnold. I've always been an Eaker man, and I still am.

Q: I feel that there is no question of his stature. Then, why did we stop bombing Germany?

T: Because of the losses and it was too damned dangerous to go to Germany, and they realized we couldn't go there without fighter protection.

Q: So they were waiting for the P-51s to come in?

T: Our targets were limited there for a period of oh, quite a while, say like Belgium and France and the occupied countries. The raid that I mentioned earlier on the Wilhelmshaven was the first time we penetrated the German setup over there.

Q: Could it have been that Arnold felt Eaker lost his nerve?

T: No, I was just - while we were talking there- this is just a guess, but I spent about 9/10ths of my career as a commander, I had the 9th AF for six years and the 4th ATAF. Every once in a while, one of your wings would got a little off. It wouldn't go really bad, but you suddenly have a rash of accidents.

T: Change in tempo might do it.

Q: Might spur them to greater effort. He changed the whole top command, really.

Q: On another subject....Why Gen Arnold hand't captured the imagination like Billy Mitchell did?

T: I just don't know. I've often thought. I live down here in a rather sophisticated area. That is, we have people from all over the country live here. They know quite a lot about the military. They know about Gen Bradley of the Army. They know about Gen Doolittle. They know about LeMay. And they know about this fellow, and that fellow. But they don't know about Gen Arnold, and why, I don't know.

Q: I hope to rectify that to some degree.

T: I hope you do. Because, definitely, I think, we mentioned before a leader who leads by example, and one who drives. The things that he did in Washington in WWII, although I was not there, I don't think could have been accomplished except by a person of that type, that character. I think you had to have a very strong, powerful dominant man doing it, and he had it. As I say, I didn't know the man personally. I knew people that worked for him, and they said it was hell.

Q: I'm glad you said that. This is somewhat my sentiment, too. Whereas Andrews might have been a better man as a combat leader, able to lead by example, in Washington where you had to fight the Russians, you had to fight the Chinese, the War Production Board, the Navy, the aircraft manufacturers - all of the, everybody was pulling and tugging for some other interest. Arnold was perhaps a tougher man and could operate in these political infights better than Andrews might have done. What do you think?

T: I think so. And also, the terrifically hard job that man had, because none of us, I thought I was a tremendous expert on bombardment, and I didn't know a damn thing about it. There was nobody, there was no one, in the AAF, that had any idea how the AF's were doing. We were working with the unknown, and when you work with an unknown and you build a thing up as tremendous as that AAF was and had the thing work, you are working with a substance that there never has been any precedents to this thing.You couldn't adopt cavalry tactics; you couldn't adopt former procurement tactics. You had to innovate. This man had the brains to do that. My closest contact with Arnold would be through people like Gene Beebe that we mentioned before. My brother used to be one of his Special Assistants. They'd say that this man was just a terrific pusher. I heard a statement one time - and maybe you could corroborate this - and it was a statement about making decisions. The way the story was told me that Gen Arnold said it is much better to make 100 decisions a day and be 10% wrong then to make 3 decisions a day and be 100% right. He said: "Anybody can sit and study a problem long enough." Did he ever say anything like that?

Q: Yes. Well, I've heard several people say, but some will say 30% wrong or 20% wrong. The percentage varies with the telling. But this basically was his philosophy, to get moving?

T: Get something done....

Q: Get something done and make some mistakes, but get the thing moving.

T: We used to have a statement - Do something, even if it is wrong.

Q: I want to tell you something about Pat Partridge. I interviewed him at Colorado Springs, and he said that he avoided Arnold.

T: I should know. That's about all he says. Pat was my boss in FEAF.

Q: He said he spent his time avoiding Arnold. Arnold almost demoted him.

T: Oh, he got in a hell of a jam with Arnold.

Q: In the 1st AF?

T: Yes, it was Air Defense situation up there. I forget exactly what

it was. Pat told me about it. They had an alert up in New England. They either responded, over responded, or under responded....

Q: Gen Hugh Drum was in the middle of that. He had the Eastern Defense Command, and Partridge came very near getting demoted by Arnold.

T: That's right.

Q: And after that, he said he avoided Arnold.

T: Pat Partridge was a very tremendous person, and was one of my candidates to be Chief of the AF. Certain things came up, and he didn't. But when the Korean War started, Pat had the 5th AF and I was his Deputy, and I took over the Hqs. of the 5th AF over at Taegn. I stayed there during the first year, and Pat and I, who had both been brought up in the strategic idea, both of us had been bombardment, suddenly found ourselves in the tactical side of the field. There are two different ball games, and we had quite a time over there. As a matter of fact, Korea is one of my favorite subjects. It has nothing to do with Gen Arnold.

Q: I want to ask you something, you said reminded me. We were very late in recognizing the merit of the P-51. We had the P-51. We dropped it, and then the English put the new engine in it, the Merlin, and then we suddenly realized that it was a fine airplane. Do you know anything about that?

T: No, I don't. I had heard a slightly different variation of the story. That came back to Gen Arnold, that he had great faith in this P-51 and even before it had come up to production schedules, he knew it was going to be - by putting on wing tip tanks - was going to have great range. So he had two or three Spitfires flown over to the US, and put on wing tanks on them, showing, trying to get the RAF to say that they could escort our fighters into, say Berlin, before the P-51 came into production. Whether that is true or not, I don't know, but I'd never heard that story. I was a bomber pilot, and I flew B-24s in the 8th AF, and we got credit for doing an awful lot. But we couldn't have done a thing if it hadn't been for those P-51s up there, and the P-47s, of course.

Q: The P-47 and the P-38 had these wing tanks on - the cardboard wing

tanks. They did a lot of improvisation. But we could have had the P-31 a year before.

T: I didn't know that.

Q: We had it when it had the Allison engine in it. It wasn't any good. It was a low level fighter. The British put the Merlin-61 in it.

T: I didn't realize that.

Q: So it was late. Some people say it was Arnold's fault; some people say it was Wright Field's fault....

T: You know, just to go back to this Eaker-Doolittle thing. Doolittle was basically - has always been, all his life, a fighter pilot. Eaker, I guess, did some fighter pilot work, some bomber, whatnot. But when Eaker was there - and this is not critical of Eaker, because I just love him; I just think he is great. But when we would fly over Germany, the fighters would be hovering over us. You know, they would be right there, where you could look and see them. The Germans could break through and knock us down. After the change was made from Eaker, and Doolittle came up there, he said he didn't want the bombers to see the fighters. He wanted the fighters so far out, looking for the German fighters, that he didn't want the bombers to either see a German fighter, or an American fighter. So there were two different methods of operation here, and the latter method proved a hell of a lot more successful.

Q: Free ranging fighter escort rather than hovering?

T: That's right, rather than hovering. You see, because you are flying along here and somebody comes down from there, and you don't have time enough to maneuver.

Q: Well, Kepner was the Fighter Commander. Would Kepner have had a role in that new tactic?

T: No, he was a Fighter Commander. But when Doolittle came up, he transferred Kepner. He dissolved the Fighter Command, and made its units part of the various divisions that were already in existence. Then Kepner came up and took over the 2nd Air Division, which was B-24s, and then it consisted of B-24s and some P-47s and P-51s. So he was my boss up there, but his heart was always in fighters.

Q: Did you get into the hassle - this is right before OVERLORD - when a disagreement occurred as to whether the bombers should be hitting strategic targets or whether they should be hitting railroad stations and marshalling yards. In other words, the problem of getting ready for OVERLORD. The British, like Leigh Mallory, wanted us to do that, and Spaatz and somebody else wanted us to hit the oil targets. The issue went up to Eisenhower, and he sort of compromised. Do you remember this?

T: Oh definitely. I wasn't in on the planning, but I was in on the results, because we suddenly found ourselves, we were suddenly pulled off the oilfields, the refineries, the ball--bearings, and centers of transportation, on to a little target that we considered piddling, to cover the landing. There, for a period of about 6 months, we were a purely tactical air force, as it were. We weren't particularly crazy about it. I don't know whether history will show that this was a good move or a bad move. It certainly isolated that battlefield when they landed at Normandy there. But, we weren't used properly, I don't think. We had spent 80% of our time on targets just across the Channel over there. Of course, we had to do the V-1 targets.

Q: That was the CROSSBOW?

T: Is that what they called it? I never knew names.

Q: The British didn't want to hit those. Of course, they worked at night, and you needed precision targeting?

T: That's right.

Q: This reminds me of the sub pens. Did you get involved in hitting the sub pens? There were La Pallice and Lorient and St. Nazaire. That was rugged, wasn't it?

T: Oh brother! They were just as rugged as could be. I mentioned before how at one time the B-24 was a real first class airplane with that Davis wing, but then they overloaded it. You asked who did it, and I said I didn't know, some knucklehead sitting up there in higher headquarters. Well, one time there was a mission down to La Pallice, let's say. I guess the sub pens. Somebody had decided that the automatic weapon was only effective up to 7,000

feet, and the big 75 was effective only above 10,000 feet. So, therefore, if you went in between 8,000 and 10,000 you had a free ride. Well, anybody that had this sort of thought, should have been put in Mattawan, or some place.

Q: Or he should have been put in that airplane?

T: And, so this happened, and we went in there at that altitude. It so happened that I was in a position that I could say that we were unable to take off because of bad weather, therefore, I had to go late. So they let me go in at 18,000 or 19,000 feet, and I took no losses that day and the other ones took quite a bit. But I always think a white lie is acceptable once in a while. This one was. The kids liked it anyway, I'll tell you that.

Q: You came back toward the end of the war. Did you get to see Arnold?

T: No, I cam back....

Q: You came back to Bolling Field right about VE Day?

T: Well, I came back in April and I was supposed to take a B-29 group over to the Far East. Then they put me on this special project to evaluate the B-29 and the B-32. I was told in no uncertain terms that if I didn't come up with the answer that the B-29 was the right one, that I might as well take that star off. So I said the B-29 was good.

Q: Who gave you this indication? Somebody in high place?

Q: Yes, the B-32, well, this was probably your honest evaluation?

T: Oh yes, it was.

Q: The B-32 was sort of an extension of the B-24 was it not?

T: Yes, they did it badly. I think they built, probably only a dozen of them, and they used them out in the Philippines.

Q: Yes, briefly, I think Kenney had one wing, or one squadron of them. They used them in the last month of the war.

T: I went out to San Diego and evaluated it. No, they were building them at the Ft. Worth factory. For instance, the bombsight which should have a traverse of at least something like 45 degrees to cover the target, one way it traversed 5 degrees and the other way about 10 degrees. It was not a very well built airplane. Then I went to Bolling Field at that time, and took over

Personnel, of what they called the Continental Air Command.

Q: Sort of a redeployment AF, wasn't it?

T: Yes.

Q: Did you work under Billy Streett?

T: Yes, he was my boss.

Q: He died you know.

T: Oh, did he, I didn't know that. Bill Streett, Sam Anderson was Operations man.

Q: You didn't think much of the B--32. You didn't need this urging?

T: No, no. What I did, I took two crews from Europe, one B-17 trained crewand one B-24 trained crew. We got two, we got a B-32 and a B-29 from the factory. Then we took them down to Eglin and then we just sort of ran a race against each other. There was no doubt about the thing.

Q: I want to ask you one more question. Eaker, by this time, was Deputy Commander of the AF. He was brought back. Did he have any ideas to succeed Arnold that you know?

T: I don't know, I used to see Eaker. For instance, he put me on that job with Ben Davis, to locate the Negro units, and I had to report to him directly. At the same time, he was what we would now call Vice Chief.

Q: He was Deputy Commander.

T: At the same time that was going on, you could see preparations were being made for a change of command thing, that Spaatz was coming in, and that group. Eaker - of course, I think so highly of him - I think he saw the handwriting on the wall, but he was just going to do his damnest as long as he could. I think inwardly, if you could dig way in there, and find out about it, he sort of had aspirations, but they weren't there. I mean it didn't come about, but he still did a job as well as he could.

Q: Of course, Arnold wanted Spaatz to succeed him. Obviously, he felt that Spaatz was senior man and was the rightful heir to the throne.

T: When Spaatz came in, who was his Vice Commander?

Q: Eaker for awhile. He never talked to you about his decision to get out?

T: No.

Q: I'm just guessing that he felt that he should succeed Spaatz. But he didn't. He got out.

T: I think probably the same. If you looked deeply inside of him. But he was too much of a soldier to say anything about it, and I think he would have been a great Chief. A lot of people didn't like Eaker because they thought he was cold. What he really was, was supremely efficient officer and man. He still is, in the articles he writes now. I think they are just great. He is kind enough to send me a copy of them, and I run around the country here making speeches about how great things are going in the military, and I use his articles.

Interview - LTGEN E. J. Ted Timberlake, Hilton Head Island, S.C., May 29, 1972

Q: Do you remember your first exposure to the man, Hap Arnold?

T: I think the first time I met Arnold, we were training, I was stationed at MacDill Field. I was in a B-17 outfit, we had just opened up MacDill Field.

Q: This was before the war?

T: This was during the war, I would say - we got in it in 1941 - this was about 1939, he came down. He had either been over to England, or had heard a lot about their operations. The English were taking a lot of losses at night with the German night fighters coming in and hitting the bombers as they were landing. So Arnold took the group together, and said that we have got to learn how to fly, without using landing lights, or the permanent lights around the perimeter of the field - lighting up the runway. He made quite an impression because he said: "Some of you are going to go over to England, and you are going to have to learn to fly on a blackout field." So it happened - I don't know why they picked on poor me - but Gene Beebe and myself were picked out to go out and try this out. There was a field north of MacDill. They didn't want us to fly from MacDill. They were afraid we would damage the runway, I think. We flew out of this grass field - Drew Field - which is about 5,000 feet square. We had all the lights turned out. We took a B-17 in and landed it without lights, without lights from the airplane, without runway lights. We did this about three times, and I was sweating so much that we quit, and that was the first time that I ever had contact with Arnold. And I must say, that I didn't want to see much of him thereafter.

Q: You felt he was a real tough nut?

T: Well, he had this idea, and he said: "This is the way you are going to do it." And I sort of got an impression --I was just a 1st LT at the time....

Q: Was he two stars at the time?

T: I don't know. I think so.

Q: Beebe was his Exec at the time?

T: Later on. Beebe was stationed with me down there, down in Florida. Then, when the war started, Beebe went up to Washington and was one of his Execs at one time or another. Gene Beebe. Then Beebe later went off to the Pacific, and was with Kenney, I believe.

Q: Yes, 308th Bomb Group. Then he came back and worked with Arnold till the end of the war. He had a heart attack, too.

T: That was the first time I saw Gen Arnold, and I must say, it scared me to death. The next time I saw him, I took over to Europe the first B-24 group, the 93rd Bomb Group, on three days notice, after the African landing. Gen Eaker called me down to the 8th AF, and said: "How long would it take you to get ready to fly down to Tafaraoui, North Africa?" I was a little bit cocky at the time. This was on a Friday. I said: "Well, let me get back, and I'll brief my boys tonight, and we will load on Saturday. We will fly down to the southern part of England on Sunday, and I'll be in Tafaraoui on Monday." He said: "That's impossible. It will take you at least 10 days." Well, anyway, we flew down there. Then we operated out of North Africa, and then flew over and operated out of Libya for three months, I guess. Went down to spend 10 days and spent three months. When we got back - it was considered a pretty good feat - when we got back, Gen Arnold was visiting over in England, and he came out to the 93rd Group, and we assembled the whole group. He made a very nice talk, complimenting me on the operation.

Q: Was that just about Labor Day 1943?

T: Let's see, we went down there, December 1942. We got back in March 1943, and it was, I'll say a month or so after that, as best as I can recall, don't remember.

Q: Was this after Sicily?

T: No, this was prior to Sicily. This was mostly, well, the Army hadn't cleared up out to Algiers yet. They were still fighting back there. We were far off from the invasion of Italy. We were flying, actually, we moved from Tafaraoui, which was under Doolittle's AF.

Q: 12th AF?

T: Yes, and then they moved us over to Libya, and we flew out of the command of the 9th Air Command. My brother was in command of the thing. Our targets were, mostly, say up in Naples and Palermo, up in that area. We flew out of the desert. We stayed there about three months and went back to England, then they very nicely gave us a two-day rest, and the third day we flew a mission to Wilhelmshaven, which I think was the first penetration of Germany proper. But, anyway, Arnold came out and he was very, very kind to us, in the words he said, and he was very impressive man. And, really, I think those are the only two times that I ever saw him, except when he was addressing large groups of people.

Q: This visit of Arnold's, was this about the time of the Schweinfurt loss, the first Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid?

T: No, that was in August, because, you see, at the same time the Schweinfurt deal was going on, the B-24s again, we moved down to North Africa, and flew out of Libya and we were conducting the Ploesti low level attacks.

Q: Were you in on that SOAPSUDS?

T: Yes, not SOAPSUDS, no, but I was in on it. What did we call it? It was a low level attack on Ploesti.

Q: TIDAL WAVE, was that it?

T: I think it was TIDAL WAVE. I don't know. I was a planner for it.

Q: Was Jake Smart in it also?

T: Yes. Where this thing happened, to bring Arnold indirectly. Jake was working for Arnold, and they concocted this scheme, that if they could get the oil output from Rumania there - the Ploesti oilfields - that this would be a great blow. So Jake came over as Arnold's emissary, and came over to my group in England, and said: "Do you believe that you could take your B-24s and make a low level pass and fly line abreast against a target? And I said: "Well, there is only one way to find out. Go out and try the damn thing." So, Gen Hodges, who commanded the B-24 Division, stood us down a week, and I took a squadron, and we went out and practiced flying, and making a right angle turn, and then ending up being all fully abreast, because we had to drop these bombs simultaneously,

because we were going to hit them below 300 feet.

Q: You practiced in North Africa?

T: No, we practiced in England, and we caught hell from all the RAF and everything else, because all of a sudden, these 24 airplanes would appear at about 300 feet. Well, then, the answer was "Yes." It was feasible to do it. I didn't think it was a very smart thing, but it was feasible. So Jake went back to Washington, as I got the story, got the go-ahead from Arnold. And then came one, two, three groups from England. They were sent down to North Africa to participate in it, and then, there were two groups over there under the 9th AF. So there were five groups all together. Brereton was commanding the AF then, I forget the name of it.

Q: It was probably the 9th AF.

T: I think it was the 9th AF. My brother had the 9th Bomber Command. And there we practiced for a month. We made a model of Ploesti itself. We had five targets, and we took the five groups, and then, we had to maneuver all five of them, so they could go line abreast. It took us about a month and we finally worked out the tactics of it. I was the head planner of it. And then, actually, we flew it on the 31st of August.

Q: Was it the last day of July?

T: The reason we flew it - I think it was the last day of August - because we had broken the German weather code, only through that month, and we didn't have it for the next month. So, therefore, we had to fly when we still had a weather deal. Actually, the mission, a lot of people called it a success, and some called it a failure. Unfortunately, there were two groups that when they cross the Danube River, didn't believe that the lead group was going in the right direction. They flew up the Danube River to the Iron Gates, and alerted the defenses up there. Then, they knew something was happening. By the time we got to Ploesti, the thing was alerted, and that thing was loaded with anti-aircraft. As I recall, we sent over 153, took off 153, and lost about 53. Some number like that.

Q: One-third or more?

T: Yes. But those groups that did exactly as briefed - there was one group, the 389th, which was led by Jack Wood - we put them on this isolated target because they were the newest group there. We thought they would have the least chance to cause any trouble. They did an absolutely perfect job, just as they were briefed. That was the one refinery that the Germans never tried to put back together again. The rest of it was about 25% successful. There was this mistake made in the approach, but again, that was an Arnold....

Q: Was there another mistake besides going up the Danube the wrong way?

T: Yes, as a matter of fact, the lead pilot, the lead aircraft, there was a railroad running oorth and south into the Ploesti oilfields. This was to be the turning point where they turned right. Well, they were coming up to this at right angles, to the railroad at right angles, and the navigator was doing just fine. The Germans had built an additional railroad in there, which our pictures didn't show. The leader took it upon himself to challenge the navigator, and said: "This is the road we should turn on." So he turned right on that one, and they actually went into Bucharest. Then, they came back and had to hit the target from the wrong direction. In the meantime, these two had gone up the wrong way to the Iron Gates, were just coming in, and they hit the target in the right direction, and we had airplanes at 300 feet, crossing each other. It was pretty tough and go there. It's like so many military things that happen. It came so close to being perfect, but then human error comes in. What's that old law we used to call it, Murphy's Law. "If something can go wrong, it will go wrong." But it was just so close. It makes you, you do all this planning, and you have the thing all laid on. Then, just that little Murphy's law comes in, and there you are.

Q: Did Jake Smart take a beating for his role in that?

T: No, as a matter of fact. He, at that time, when Jake Smart was still not assigned to the units in Europe. He was still assigned to Gen Arnold's Hqs. He was just over there with me. He and I were, you might say, joint planners. Then the afternoon before, I was supposed to fly - as a matter of

fact, I was going to fly with George Brown, who now commands the System Command, and Jake was going to fly with somebody else. For some reason, which I have never been able to understand, the day before the mission, Brereton called Jake and I in and said that they had gotten word from Washington that neither Jake nor I were to fly the mission because we had too much, knew too much. Well, so then we were in the position of having to go out to these kids - they were under us - and say: "Excuse me boys, but we can't fly, you go up and I can't go." It made me feel like a heel. Later on, one of the kids, this fellow Stewart, that wrote the book on Ploesti, tried to research that. Brereton said that he could not remember it. I simply think that since I came from another theater, the British theater, and since Jake Smart was working out of Washington, that Brereton wanted his people in there, and didn't want us in there. So neither one of us actually flew the mission, and its always been sort of a feeling of, not shame, but....

Q: Regret?

T: "Regret," I guess, is a better word. Then Jake went back to Washington and went to work for Arnold. Then Arnold released him about a year later, and he joined the 15th AF. He got a group under Nate Twining. And then, oddly enough, started bombing Ploesti from high altitude. He was shot down and was a prisoner of war. This happened about a year after the occasion that I talk about.

Q: I happen to recall that Arnold did not want Smart to be on the mission because he felt he knew too much. I didn't know about you, but....

T: Well, both of us. I remember Brereton called us in both together. And we went in, and he was adamant that neither one of us should fly.

Q: He might have gotten instructions from Arnold.

T: He might have, when Stewart, and incidentally, the most accurate report of that whole thing is written by this Cal Stewart, who is a public relations officer in my group, as a matter of fact. The way he got the true story was, when I was Deputy Commander of USAFE, Stewart gave up his job as an editor of a newspaper in Wisconsin, I believe, wrote me and said: "Can I get introduced to the German Command?" He wanted to talk to the Germans who were

down around the defense of Ploesti. So he talked to both sides. He got our side, and then he got the German side. I've checked it out, and I think it is very accurate.

Q: Let me ask this. That Ploesti raid was before or after Arnold's visit to your group?

T: This was after. In the early part, we had gotten back there about March 1943, and Arnold visited us between then and when we went back. In other words, I would put it probably around July 1943.

Q: (reading) There's an article from Time Magazine, the date is not indicated, entitled "Three Brothers, Three Stars." It was probably sometime in 1943, and it stated that Col Edward J. Timberlake was promoted to BG, thus to become the youngest general officer since the Civil War.

It referred to his brother, BG Patrick Timberlake, age 43, former Chief of the 9th AF Bomber Command, who was at that time, one of the 9th's top planners. Their elder brother BG Edward Waenne Timberlake, became an expert in shooting planes down and commanded the anti-aircraft defenses in Washington.

T: I was promoted to a Captain in October 1940.

Q: Then Arnold saw you when you were a 1st LT.

T: Right.

Q: He was probably down at MacDill sometime before October 1940. It might have been 1939.

T: 1939, then I was promoted to a BG on 7 October 1943, three years later.

Q: Do you remember that in relation to Arnold's visit? Was it right after that? Were you promoted right after he came there?

T: No, it was sometime after he came in, because he came there before we went down to Ploesti. Then we came back and I know Gen Eaker came up and pinned the stars on me on this time here. It works out. As I say, I had 12 years. I graduated from West Point in 1931. I had 12 years as a 1st LT, and then all the rest of my service was as a Brigadier General.

Q: Let me ask you about another phase of the European experience. I talked to a man who said that many of the others in the 8th AF welcomed the B-24s. I asked why? He said: "Because the B-24s attracted all the German fighters, and they left us and the B-17s alone." Is that a fair estimate?

T: Yes, that's an actual true story. Really, the reason is, I don't know, the B-24 was a specially designed aircraft. It had what is known as the Davis wing, which is a very specifically designed wing. It's a very thin wing. It was designed to carry a certain load at a certain speed at a certain altitude. Well, the powers that be decided that we should carry more turrets; that we should carry more armor; that we should carry more this; that we should carry more of that. When we first got to Europe we used to fly the B-24 easily up to 25,000 feet. At cruising, we could indicate around 170 mph. We would fly above the B-17s. We had greater range. We had greater speed, and the limitation imposed by the factory - now I'm slightly guessing on this - was 56,000 lbs. gross. That's the heaviest that we were supposed to fly. By the time we got through, within a year, they were loading us so that we were flying about 65,000 pounds gross. Well, as I say, the Davis wing is a very critical wing. This put us at a semi--stall position. When we flew, it was extremely difficult to hold a tight formation. If you so much as fell off a little bit, or lost power on one engine, you'd have a straggler. The Germans would hit that straggler very nicely. The B-17s, for instance, I've heard them say, they'd brief their people and say: "We are not going to get any fighters for today, but don't worry, because the B-24s will attract all the fighters." And that would happen! There was that. They mismanaged the aircraft, which often higher commands will do. They ought to pay attention to engineers, because they know what the limitations and capabilities are.

Q: Who was responsible for that, could you say?

T: I wouldn't know.

Q: Wright Field or Washington?

T: It's a combination of Wright Field, and Washington, and people

who actually didn't know what in the hell they were talking about, because we were doing fine until this overloading thing came up. There was that about the B-24, and then there was another thing about the B-24. We were a hydraulic airplane. In other words, all of our systems worked with hydraulic fluid which is highly flammable, which we didn't know. The B-17 was an electric airplane. Everything was operated by electric motors. So whenever we got hit by anti-aircraft, or something like that, we had a very big tendency to burn. We were burners, they called them. And the B-17 wasn't. As a result, a lot of this wasn't everybody's favorite piece of cake - the B-24. But we finally licked the problem. And, really, the basic thing was, they overextended its capabilities. I shouldn't have done it. I came back one time. They sent me out to the factory to make a talk. By this time I was sick and tired of flying overweight and half stalling through the sky. I made a talk to the people who made the B-24s at Consolidated Vultee.

Q: Out at San Diego?

T: Right. And, as a matter of fact, I had a drink or two too many, and I said: "Well, the best thing about the B-24s are the pilots and the people who fly them." That didn't go over too well. My brother was with me at the time, and he said that wasn't the most tactful thing he had ever heard of. It worked good out in the Pacific.

Q: Out in the Pacific it was the most suitable - longer range, and where speed and high altitude were less critical.

T: We had to depend on tight compact formations to get firepower against fighters.

Q: Mutual protection?

T: Yes. Once you lost position, you didn't have the capability of getting back in formation again.

Q: Did you have a great morale problem among your pilots who would prefer to fly B-17s instead of B-24s.

T: I don't really believe so, because I think they took this as a challenge. The only time we came near a morale factor, was at the first part

part of the war we were losing pilots at a pretty good rate, and we weren't getting replacements. We'd have, say, 20 pilots in the barracks. You'd walk in this barracks, and there would be two in there. The rest of them would be gone. This wasn't a very happy feeling. For a period of time there, they weren't in the greatest of moods, but I never felt that we really had a morale problem. As I say, it was a challenge, and they met the challenge and said: "The hell with it; off we go."

Q: They had a 25-mission rotation policy, and then they scrapped that.

T: And then went to 35.

Q: They went to 35?

T: Yes. They had an expression. You see, Eaker commanded the 8th AF first, and then Eaker and Doolittle were switched. Doolittle came to the 8th and Eaker came down into the Mediterranean. Doolittle decided that they would - I think they switched to 30 - and kids had a little statement: "Do Five for Doolittle." That was the idea. Actually, on the number of missions - it is a very peculiar thing - but statistically, if you got through the first five or six, your chances of getting through the rest of them were up in the 90% factor.

Q: You mean, based on experience?

T: Experience, and capabilities and you learn how to keep that airplane together. But this was generally true. If you got through that, you'd get through the rest of them. We had a lot of people flew, Col Potts, who has just retired. He was a great guy. Gen Potts flew 2 or 3 sets of missions. Another great leader we had was Jimmy Stewart. He was my operations officer. He did a fine job. I had three very outstanding officers when we went over, and that was Ramsey Potts, and George Brown, and Keith Compton. They were all 1st LTS when they came to me in the latter part of 1941. And all of them were made Colonels within 13 months. I mean they were so outstanding. We just moved them right up.

Q: I worked with Ramsey Potts in the Secy's office. He worked for Symington, in fact, I have his name right here.

Q: Let me ask about Arnold and Andrews. Andrews got back, right, this was after the Casablanca Conference. He was to get this big job as CG/ETO.

T: That's right, the 8th AF called us and told us to prepare a B-24, a war weary B-24, and convert it to a semi-transport plane because they wanted to use it to fly Gen Andrews to various points of his command. One of the first missions - and we took this crew that had flown their 25 missions - the best crew we had. The first time they flew Gen Andrews was to Iceland, and they hit a mountain over there in Iceland.

Q: And that was the first mission?

T: This wasn't really a mission. It was just an inspection tour. It was the first ride. Of course, we felt very badly about it.

Q: Did you know Gen Andrews?

T: Yes,but not extremely well. You see, until I got in during WWII, I was such a low ranking officer, I didn't know anybody. But I thought he was one of the warmest, kindest, most human individuals I've ever known.

Q: May I ask you to compare your recollections of Andrews and Arnold?

T: You were talking about Gen Andrews and Gen Arnold, and I said that I knew neither one of them real well, and you asked if I had any feeling about a comparison of the two. What I am about to say is what I get from hearing their contemporaries talk, and not from my personal knowledge. I would sort of sum it up this way, that you have two types of leaders, one that leads by having people follow them and one that leads by driving. I think Gen Andrews was the former, and Gen Arnold was the latter. I think he was a driver. I'm not criticizing. They had just different ways of being a leader.

Q: Do you think - I've asked this question before, it is interesting to get some of these comments - that somebody who led like Andrews did, by setting an example, and being friendly, and articulate, and persuasive - do you think that could have done the job that Arnold did by driving, getting his viewpoint across and sort of intimidating at times?

T: I think so, but perhaps I'm biased, because I generally adopted, let's say, the Andrews style, rather than the other style. It doesn't mean that

if you lead by people following you, when you see something go wrong,you take proper action. They know you are fair. But I don't think you have to be riding people all the time, which a lot of folks do. We had recent examples which occurred within the AF. I won't mention any names, where we've had a man who was just an absolute driver. He got good results, and he's had successors who were leaders in the other sense of the word, and they got good results. It's just different ways to do things.

Q: On the subject of Arnold driving....

T: I'll tell you one. I can give you a good example, and this is not AAF, but let's take Gen Omar Bradley.

Q: A gentle man?

T: Yes. Now he is the type of leader that I think is great. He did a great job. Now, Patton, I think, is equally great, but he certainly didn't use the Bradley method.

Q: In my mind, I have compared Arnold to Patton - their same approach, a driving approach.

T: Yes. You know, Patton and Doolittle were very good friends. Doolittle was very fond of him.

Q: On the subject of Arnold driving people, do you think he drove Eaker? They had those severe losses, the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid in August 1943, and then the "Black Thursday" raid in October 1943. Then the long, the deep raids ceased for several months, until the P-51s came in to support. By that time Eaker was out of there.

T: Yes. I can't really answer that. I have my surmise. I think that probably was the reason. Frankly, I think Eaker did an absolutely superb job as commander of the 8th AF. Actually, he organized it. He fought the battle down at Casablanca, when they wanted us to go into night bombing....

Q: He's the one who sold Churchill?

T: That's right. I believe Arnold, as I understand it, had a tendency to lean toward going that way because of the losses we were taking in night bombing, and we weren't set up for that. I thought Eaker just did an outstanding

job, but the events did happen as you say. Now, the only one person who could have created that was Gen Arnold.

Q: Eaker, I think felt - well, I saw his letters. He wrote to Gen Fechet. Gen Jim Fechet was the man for whom Eaker had flown as pilot in the late 1920s. Eaker felt quite bitter toward Arnold for taking him out of the 8th AF.

T: He did?

Q: Yes. Even though they elevated him in position. He became commander of the MAAF. So, in a sense, it was a promotion, yet Eaker felt that I guess like a man is in the Major Leagues, and is being sent out to another league.

T: I think that is true. He built this thing up by hand, and he had the leaders there that he wanted. The thing was working pretty good at that time.

Q: Well, he had two leaders, both of whom were taken out. Newton Longfellow of the Bomber Command was taken out of there, and Frank O.D. Hunter was teken out of the Fighter Command.

T: On the first one, Longfellow was my boss when I first went over there and I think Eaker did quite right to relieve him.

Q: Did he lose his nerve - Newton Longfellow?

T: No, he just...I don't know what his background had been. For instance, when I first flew my 93rd Group over there, we were the first outfit to fly nonstop across the Atlantic in formation. We took off from Newfoundland and landed at Prestwick, and refueled, and went down to our base over by Norwich. And we were rather tired. Our ground echelon had come over by the Queen Mary, I think it was. We met there on the same day. We were exhausted really, and about 45% of the people were living in tents. Just there we were in tents. Longfellow wasn't even there when we arrived. He called the next morning. He called me and said: "You're here," and then came over. He said: "I want to talk to your group." So we got all our people together and Longfellow, here we had just gotten there, we hadn't even had time to shave, and he said that he was sick and tired of having us sitting around on our dead fannies. He said: "Get out there and get to work. You can't be loafing over here." You see, we

hadn't even had a chance to get organized. He didn't know what was going on. Larry Kuter replaced him. Larry Kuter is here, incidentally.

Q: Is he down here, I thought he was in Naples, Florida.

T: Well, he came through here. So Longfellow is not one of my favorites.

Q: He just passed away, in California.

T: Now, Hunter, I believe he lives in Savannah, and is a tremendous person. I think what happened there was that Eaker wanted somebody more dynamic. It was Hunter's job to lay out the airfields for the Fighter Command that was coming in. Hunter had fought a wonderful war in WWII (World War I?) He was a little older guy, just didn't have the....well, Eaker was a dynamic person. Unless you were with a guy like that, you were out. For instance, I think the reason I was promoted was because he said it would take 10 days to get down to Africa, and I made it in 3.

Q: I'm sure that he felt you were doing a great job.

T: I can well imagine there might have been some feeling between Eaker and Arnold. I've always been an Eaker man, and I still am.

Q: I feel that there is no question of his stature. Then, why did we stop bombing Germany?

T: Because of the losses and it was too damned dangerous to go to Germany, and they realized we couldn't go there without fighter protection.

Q: So they were waiting for the P-51s to come in?

T: Our targets were limited there for a period of oh, quite a while, say like Belgium and France and the occupied countries. The raid that I mentioned earlier on the Wilhelmshaven was the first time we penetrated the German setup over there.

Q: Could it have been that Arnold felt Eaker lost his nerve?

T: No, I was just - while we were talking there- this is just a guess, but I spent about 9/10ths of my career as a commander, I had the 9th AF for six years and the 4th ATAF. Every once in a while, one of your wings would got a little off. It wouldn't go really bad. but you suddenly have a rash of accidents.

A lot of times, I have relieved commanders, and moved them to other places, just because I thought a change of blood in there would cause a new thing. Now, it may have been something like that.

Q: Arnold felt that just a change of top commanders?

T: Change in tempo might do it.

Q: Might spur them to greater effort. He changed the whole top command, really.

Q: On another subject....Why Gen Arnold hand't captured the imagination like Billy Mitchell did?

T: I just don't know. I've often thought. I live down here in a rather sophisticated area. That is, we have people from all over the country live here. They know quite a lot about the military. They know about Gen Bradley of the Army. They know about Gen Doolittle. They know about LeMay. And they know about this fellow, and that fellow. But they don't know about Gen Arnold, and why, I don't know.

Q: I hope to rectify that to some degree.

T: I hope you do. Because, definitely, I think, we mentioned before a leader who leads by example, and one who drives. The things that he did in Washington in WWII, although I was not there, I don't think could have been accomplished except by a person of that type, that character. I think you had to have a very strong, powerful dominant man doing it, and he had it. As I say, I didn't know the man personally. I knew people that worked for him, and they said it was hell.

Q: I'm glad you said that. This is somewhat my sentiment, too. Whereas Andrews might have been a better man as a combat leader, able to lead by example, in Washington where you had to fight the Russians, you had to fight the Chinese, the War Production Board, the Navy, the aircraft manufacturers - all of the, everybody was pulling and tugging for some other interest. Arnold was perhaps a tougher man and could operate in these political infights better than Andrews might have done. What do you think?

T: I think so. And also, the terrifically hard job that man had, because none of us, I thought I was a tremendous expert on bombardment, and I didn't know a damn thing about it. There was nobody, there was no one, in the AAF, that had any idea how the AF's were doing. We were working with the unknown, and when you work with an unknown and you build a thing up as tremendous as that AAF was and had the thing work, you are working with a substance that there never has been any precedents to this thing.You couldn't adopt cavalry tactics; you couldn't adopt former procurement tactics. You had to innovate. This man had the brains to do that. My closest contact with Arnold would be through people like Gene Beebe that we mentioned before. My brother used to be one of his Special Assistants. They'd say that this man was just a terrific pusher. I heard a statement one time - and maybe you could corroborate this - and it was a statement about making decisions. The way the story was told me that Gen Arnold said it is much better to make 100 decisions a day and be 10% wrong then to make 3 decisions a day and be 100% right. He said: "Anybody can sit and study a problem long enough." Did he ever say anything like that?

Q: Yes. Well, I've heard several people say, but some will say 30% wrong or 20% wrong. The percentage varies with the telling. But this basically was his philosophy, to get moving?

T: Get something done....

Q: Get something done and make some mistakes, but get the thing moving.

T: We used to have a statement - Do something, even if it is wrong.

Q: I want to tell you something about Pat Partridge. I interviewed him at Colorado Springs, and he said that he avoided Arnold.

T: I should know. That's about all he says. Pat was my boss in FEAF.

Q: He said he spent his time avoiding Arnold. Arnold almost demoted him.

T: Oh, he got in a hell of a jam with Arnold.

Q: In the 1st AF?

T: Yes, it was Air Defense situation up there. I forget exactly what

it was. Pat told me about it. They had an alert up in New England. They either responded, over responded, or under responded....

Q: Gen Hugh Drum was in the middle of that. He had the Eastern Defense Command, and Partridge came very near getting demoted by Arnold.

T: That's right.

Q: And after that, he said he avoided Arnold.

T: Pat Partridge was a very tremendous person, and was one of my candidates to be Chief of the AF. Certain things came up, and he didn't. But when the Korean War started, Pat had the 5th AF and I was his Deputy, and I took over the Hqs. of the 5th AF over at Taegn. I stayed there during the first year, and Pat and I, who had both been brought up in the strategic idea, both of us had been bombardment, suddenly found ourselves in the tactical side of the field. There are two different ball games, and we had quite a time over there. As a matter of fact, Korea is one of my favorite subjects. It has nothing to do with Gen Arnold.

Q: I want to ask you something, you said reminded me. We were very late in recognizing the merit of the P-51. We had the P-51. We dropped it, and then the English put the new engine in it, the Merlin, and then we suddenly realized that it was a fine airplane. Do you know anything about that?

T: No, I don't. I had heard a slightly different variation of the story. That came back to Gen Arnold, that he had great faith in this P-51 and even before it had come up to production schedules, he knew it was going to be - by putting on wing tip tanks - was going to have great range. So he had two or three Spitfires flown over to the US, and put on wing tanks on them, showing, trying to get the RAF to say that they could escort our fighters into, say Berlin, before the P-51 came into production. Whether that is true or not, I don't know, but I'd never heard that story. I was a bomber pilot, and I flew B-24s in the 8th AF, and we got credit for doing an awful lot. But we couldn't have done a thing if it hadn't been for those P-51s up there, and the P-47s, of course.

Q: The P-47 and the P-38 had these wing tanks on - the cardboard wing

tanks. They did a lot of improvisation. But we could have had the P-31 a year before.

T: I didn't know that.

Q: We had it when it had the Allison engine in it. It wasn't any good. It was a low level fighter. The British put the Merlin-61 in it.

T: I didn't realize that.

Q: So it was late. Some people say it was Arnold's fault; some people say it was Wright Field's fault....

T: You know, just to go back to this Eaker-Doolittle thing. Doolittle was basically - has always been, all his life, a fighter pilot. Eaker, I guess, did some fighter pilot work, some bomber, whatnot. But when Eaker was there - and this is not critical of Eaker, because I just love him; I just think he is great. But when we would fly over Germany, the fighters would be hovering over us. You know, they would be right there, where you could look and see them. The Germans could break through and knock us down. After the change was made from Eaker, and Doolittle came up there, he said he didn't want the bombers to see the fighters. He wanted the fighters so far out, looking for the German fighters, that he didn't want the bombers to either see a German fighter, or an American fighter. So there were two different methods of operation here, and the latter method proved a hell of a lot more successful.

Q: Free ranging fighter escort rather than hovering?

T: That's right, rather than hovering. You see, because you are flying along here and somebody comes down from there, and you don't have time enough to maneuver.

Q: Well, Kepner was the Fighter Commander. Would Kepner have had a role in that new tactic?

T: No, he was a Fighter Commander. But when Doolittle came up, he transferred Kepner. He dissolved the Fighter Command, and made its units part of the various divisions that were already in existence. Then Kepner came up and took over the 2nd Air Division, which was B-24s, and then it consisted of B-24s and some P-47s and P-51s. So he was my boss up there, but his heart was always in fighters.

Q: Did you get into the hassle - this is right before OVERLORD - when a disagreement occurred as to whether the bombers should be hitting strategic targets or whether they should be hitting railroad stations and marshalling yards. In other words, the problem of getting ready for OVERLORD. The British, like Leigh Mallory, wanted us to do that, and Spaatz and somebody else wanted us to hit the oil targets. The issue went up to Eisenhower, and he sort of compromised. Do you remember this?

T: Oh definitely. I wasn't in on the planning, but I was in on the results, because we suddenly found ourselves, we were suddenly pulled off the oilfields, the refineries, the ball--bearings, and centers of transportation, on to a little target that we considered piddling, to cover the landing. There, for a period of about 6 months, we were a purely tactical air force, as it were. We weren't particularly crazy about it. I don't know whether history will show that this was a good move or a bad move. It certainly isolated that battlefield when they landed at Normandy there. But, we weren't used properly, I don't think. We had spent 80% of our time on targets just across the Channel over there. Of course, we had to do the V-1 targets.

Q: That was the CROSSBOW?

T: Is that what they called it? I never knew names.

Q: The British didn't want to hit those. Of course, they worked at night, and you needed precision targeting?

T: That's right.

Q: This reminds me of the sub pens. Did you get involved in hitting the sub pens? There were La Pallice and Lorient and St. Nazaire. That was rugged, wasn't it?

T: Oh brother! They were just as rugged as could be. I mentioned before how at one time the B-24 was a real first class airplane with that Davis wing, but then they overloaded it. You asked who did it, and I said I didn't know, some knucklehead sitting up there in higher headquarters. Well, one time there was a mission down to La Pallice, let's say. I guess the sub pens. Somebody had decided that the automatic weapon was only effective up to 7,000

feet, and the big 75 was effective only above 10,000 feet. So, therefore, if you went in between 8,000 and 10,000 you had a free ride. Well, anybody that had this sort of thought, should have been put in Mattawan, or some place.

Q: Or he should have been put in that airplane?

T: And, so this happened, and we went in there at that altitude. It so happened that I was in a position that I could say that we were unable to take off because of bad weather, therefore, I had to go late. So they let me go in at 18,000 or 19,000 feet, and I took no losses that day and the other ones took quite a bit. But I always think a white lie is acceptable once in a while. This one was. The kids liked it anyway, I'll tell you that.

Q: You came back toward the end of the war. Did you get to see Arnold?

T: No, I cam back....

Q: You came back to Bolling Field right about VE Day?

T: Well, I came back in April and I was supposed to take a B-29 group over to the Far East. Then they put me on this special project to evaluate the B-29 and the B-32. I was told in no uncertain terms that if I didn't come up with the answer that the B-29 was the right one, that I might as well take that star off. So I said the B-29 was good.

Q: Who gave you this indication? Somebody in high place?

Q: Yes, the B-32, well, this was probably your honest evaluation?

T: Oh yes, it was.

Q: The B-32 was sort of an extension of the B-24 was it not?

T: Yes, they did it badly. I think they built, probably only a dozen of them, and they used them out in the Philippines.

Q: Yes, briefly, I think Kenney had one wing, or one squadron of them. They used them in the last month of the war.

T: I went out to San Diego and evaluated it. No, they were building them at the Ft. Worth factory. For instance, the bombsight which should have a traverse of at least something like 45 degrees to cover the target, one way it traversed 5 degrees and the other way about 10 degrees. It was not a very well built airplane. Then I went to Bolling Field at that time, and took over

Personnel, of what they called the Continental Air Command.

Q: Sort of a redeployment AF, wasn't it?

T: Yes.

Q: Did you work under Billy Streett?

T: Yes, he was my boss.

Q: He died you know.

T: Oh, did he, I didn't know that. Bill Streett, Sam Anderson was Operations man.

Q: You didn't think much of the B--32. You didn't need this urging?

T: No, no. What I did, I took two crews from Europe, one B-17 trained crew and one B-24 trained crew. We got two, we got a B-32 and a B-29 from the factory. Then we took them down to Eglin and then we just sort of ran a race against each other. There was no doubt about the thing.

Q: I want to ask you one more question. Eaker, by this time, was Deputy Commander of the AF. He was brought back. Did he have any ideas to succeed Arnold that you know?

T: I don't know, I used to see Eaker. For instance, he put me on that job with Ben Davis, to locate the Negro units, and I had to report to him directly. At the same time, he was what we would now call Vice Chief.

Q: He was Deputy Commander.

T: At the same time that was going on, you could see preparations were being made for a change of command thing, that Spaatz was coming in, and that group. Eaker - of course, I think so highly of him - I think he saw the handwriting on the wall, but he was just going to do his damnest as long as he could. I think inwardly, if you could dig way in there, and find out about it, he sort of had aspirations, but they weren't there. I mean it didn't come about, but he still did a job as well as he could.

Q: Of course, Arnold wanted Spaatz to succeed him. Obviously, he felt that Spaatz was senior man and was the rightful heir to the throne.

T: When Spaatz came in, who was his Vice Commander?

Q: Eaker for awhile. He never talked to you about his decision to get out?

T: No.

Q: I'm just guessing that he felt that he should succeed Spaatz. But he didn't. He got out.

T: I think probably the same. If you looked deeply inside of him. But he was too much of a soldier to say anything about it, and I think he would have been a great Chief. A lot of people didn't like Eaker because they thought he was cold. What he really was, was supremely efficient officer and man. He still is, in the articles he writes now. I think they are just great. He is kind enough to send me a copy of them, and I run around the country here making speeches about how great things are going in the military, and I use his articles.

Timberlake, Patrick 7 May 70

December 2, 1969

Lt.Gen. Patrick W. Timberlake, USAF(Ret)
800 Ivy Lane
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Timberlake:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the San Antonio area early in February to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

done
5-7-70

828-0046

1 April 1970

Lt. General Patrick W. Timberlake, USAF (Ret.)
800 Ivy Lane
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Timberlake:

My plans are finally set for a visit to San Antonio. I hope to catch the courier to Randolph on Thursday, April 30th. I'll be staying at the base for about 10 days.

I'll phone for an appointment, if I may.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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LIEUT. GENERAL PATRICK W. TIMBERLAKE, RTD.

800 Ivy Lane
San Clemente, Ca.
January 6 1969

Dear Dr Green:

The delay in answering your letter was due to my being out of town, and not a lack of interest or a willingness to cooperate on my part.

I plan to be out of town in February but my plans are not definite at this time If I am in town I can be available most any time.

I really don't know whether I can contribute anything worth while, but I am willing to try.

Sincerely,

Patrick W Timberlake

Arnold grabbed in hall - Gen Joe (per Tanning)

December 2, 1969

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800 Ivy Lane
San Antonio, Texas 78209

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DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

Sam Hurt

LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK W. TIMBERLAKE, USAF (RETIRED)

Patrick Weston Timberlake was born in Fort Greble, Rhode Island, December 25, 1901. He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy on June 12, 1923 and commissioned a second lieutenant of Field Artillery.

Assigned to the Sixth Field Artillery at Fort Holye, Maryland in July 1925, General Timberlake transferred to the 17th Field Artillery at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. That September he entered Primary Flying School at Brooks Field, Texas, and was graduated from Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, in March 1926. He was then assigned to the Second Bomb Group at Langley Field, Virginia, returning to Brooks Field in June 1927 for temporary duty. That October he went to March Field, California, as a flying instructor and in February 1928 he was transferred to the Air Force.

Going to the Panama Canal Zone in December 1929, General Timberlake was assigned to the 24th Pursuit Squadron at France Field, and in June 1931 assumed command of the 78th Pursuit Squadron there. That November he was appointed Assistant Engineering Officer at Fairfield Air Depot, Patterson Field, Ohio. Entering the Air Corps Engineering School at Wright Field, Ohio in August 1933, he was graduated the following July. He then became Project Officer with the Aircraft Branch of the Air Corps Materiel Division, and In October 1935 was appointed Chief of the Attack and Observation Engineering Unit there.

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Entering the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama in August 1937, General Timberlake was graduated the following June and in June 1939 was graduated from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Moving to Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D. C. he was assigned to the Engineering Section, and the following October took charge of production and engineering in the Materiel Division.

AC Hq 1939 to 1942

1943

Ordered to North Africa in July 1942, General Timberlake assumed command of the Ninth Bomber Command. The following February he was named Director of Operations and Plans for British Air Chief Marshal Tedder, and soon after the organization of the Mediterranean Air Command, General Timberlake was appointed Chief of Staff under Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

OVER

Returning to Air Force Headquarters in April 1944, General Timberlake was named Deputy Chief of Air Staff, and that November assumed additional duty as a member of the Air Force Board on Transfer of Radar and Communications Responsibilities. Joining the Eighth Air Force at Peterson Field, Colorado in July 1945, he went with it to Okinawa, becoming its Chief of Staff, and that December assumed command of the Eighth Air Force. In July 1946 he assumed command of the First Air Division in the South Pacific.

Joining the Army-Navy Munitions Board in December 1946 (redesignated the Department of Defense Munitions Board the following month), in October 1947 General Timberlake was appointed Air Force Member of the Executive Committee. The following August he was named Director for Military Programs, with additional duty as Deputy Director of the Staff, and in October 1949 was designated Director of the Staff of the Munitions Board.

Reassigned to Air Force Headquarters in December 1950, General Timberlake was named Director of Installations in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel, and in January 1952 became Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations there. That June he assumed command of the Air Proving Ground Command at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

Transferred to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, in April 1955, General Timberlake was appointed Commander, Allied Air Forces in Southern Europe, with Headquarters in Naples, Italy.

The General retired from active military service on July 31, 1957.

His decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Bronze Star Medal. He is rated a command pilot, combat observer, and aircraft observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant in December 1927, to captain (permanent) August 1, 1935; to major (temporary) March 11, 1940; to major (permanent) July 1, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) November 15, 1941; to colonel (temporary) March 1, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) November 2, 1942; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) June 12, 1946; to major general (temporary) October 23, 1947; to colonel (permanent) April 2, 1948; to brigadier general (permanent) February 19, 1948; to major general (permanent) October 9, 1951; to lieutenant general (temporary) May 10, 1955.

END

Up to date as of September 1957

Pat Tumbulty[illegible] : Sent out on mission by A (per Tuning)

Interview, Gen Patrick Timberlake, San Antonio, Texas, May 7, 1970.

Q: General, do you remember your first encounter with Hap Arnold?

T: Yes, it was considerably before the war, maybe two years before the war. He had been in the Operational side of the business, and at that time I was in the Materiel side. I was a project officer at Dayton, and they had the Air Force maneuvers down in Florida.

Q: Oh, this is in 1935 at Vero Beach, wasn't it?

T: Yes, that's right.

Q: It was December 1935.

T: Yes, that's right. I took a test airplane down there so the operational people could see it, so we could test it in certain types of missions. General Arnold commanded the forces.

Q: I think he had just made a star?

T: Yes, a Brigadier General, as I remember it. He came from March Field. He was quite interested in this airplane because it was the first A-17 version. True attack airplane. It was built to fly at low levels. He didn't quite believe in that concept. I flew his pilots around in it and they flew it some of the time.

Q: What did he believe in? The big bombers?

T: No, he was a bomber man himself, but when it came to attack, he had the idea, and I think he's correct, and proven now--the fighter bomber, rather than the attacker. An airplane that can be a fighter and a bomber but does it from high altitude rather than at low altitude. For instance, this airplane had a critical altitude of 2,500 feet. That is what the supercharge would peak at, 2500 feet,

and they arrived at that, because that is the average level of the terrain in the United States, 2500 feet. Now, you know, that most airplanes even during the war peaked at 36,000 feet or 28,000 feet somewhere up there.

Q: Did you say 25000 feet?

T: No, 2,500 feet. That was it.

Q: So Arnold wasn't much impressed with this plane?

T: No.

Q: Even after your briefing? What sort of guy did he strike you as, in your conversations?

T: Oh, quite business like, a very dynamic man--a very opinionated man. However, he had a good sense of humor, and you could cross him and his opinion without him getting upset about it.

Q: When he criticized or questioned you, was it an impersonal type of criticism?

T: Oh yes, it was--the concept behind the airplane that he was critical of.

Q: What was the next time you saw him?

T: Well, the next time I saw him was when I was called into his Headquarters in 1939. I joined the staff in Washington in the old Munitions Building.

Q: You were in the Engineering Section?

T: That's right.

Q: Who did you work for?

T: General Echols. And of course, Benny Myers came into that section.

Q: Benny Meyers was the No. 2 man in that outfit?

T: That's right. Well at first he wasn't. There was a man by the name of Al Lyons, and Benny came in and took Al Lyons' place. I worked with Bennie Chidlaw. We had desks together. I stayed in that business until I was in charge of Production Liaison, that is, I was the man who gave the production orders to Wright Field, wrote out the orders. I didn't have the authority to do it, but I was the liaison guy for Wright Field, right into the war.

Q: So you were in Munitions Buildings when the war started?

T: Oh yes, andhad been for about a year or more.

Q: The Air Force was trying to get some B-17s and they were having trouble getting them?

T: The Air Force had B-17s.

Q: Well, they had a few. They had a lot of B-18s.

T: They had a lot of B-18s which were kind of worthless.

Q: Was the Air Force forced into that type of procurement? I say this in light of some correspondence back in 1936 when General Spaulding who was G-4 for a time, and people like Harry Woodring, who was Secretary of War, who didn't understand air power, figured you could get more airplanes per dollar by getting B-18s or some other plane, instead of the B-17. The B-17 cost a lot of money and in point of numbers you don't get too many for X dollars. Was this a factor in that calculation?

T: Oh yes, definitely. And of course the Air Corps, being part of the Army, was competing for the dollar. I don't know how many tanks, weapon carriers you can get for one B-17. And the Army was controlled by ground officers. There were only a very few Air officers in the General Staff.

Q: Who were some of the people in the Army that you had to deal with in trying to get more money or more for the Air Corps? Do you remember?

T: In the early days I didn't do the dealing. Later, when we got into the war or just before us getting into the war, we formed a thing called the Joint Aircraft Committee. This was made up of General Arnold, and one of his staff, Admiral Jack Towers (BuAer), and Lord Ferry for the British Purchasing Commission. These three men would decide on something. Then, if it was an Army matter, then General Arnold would have to take it to the Army General Staff. So I didn't deal with those people.

Q: You dealt with Wright Field?

T: I dealt generally with Wright Field; I carried out the orders.

Q: Somebody told me that Arnold always had a problem with Wright Field, or that he was sort of prejudiced about Wright Field, because of his own negative experience in 1929 through to '31, and he always gave Wright Field a hard time.

T: That's right. I think that's quite right.

Q: Is this a fair evaluation? He seemed to have a chip on his shoulder with respect to Wright Field?

T: No, I think any man in the field in Operations is always going to be critical of the people who fulfill his requirements. Particularly when they don't give him what he wants. I'll get back to that question about the B-17, the Flying Fortress. It might be interesting, that I graduated from the Ft. Leavenworth Army Staff College in 1939, and I put in for two weeks delay en route, leave,

reporting to Washington. I had my orders to go to the Munitions Building to go to the staff. And I got a wire back which said I could have one day, because they had such a tremendous procurement that year. They needed people in the Engineering Section to follow through and to execute this procurement. And I think the total was something like 50 airplanes, all together, This includes trainers and everything else. And I think the total was $11,000,000. This is the first time the Air Corps ever had an adding machine that went to seven figures. They had to do that by pencil. So that gives you an idea of how tight the dollar was.

Q: In this period from '39 to '41, of course Arnold was like a buzz-saw, trying to build up the procurement, and the pilot training and facilities--the whole Air Corps was in the process of expansion. Did you have any personal contact with Arnold during this period?

T: With him, oh, quite frequently.

Q: Did he call you in?

T: Oh yes, I talked to him quite frequently. In fact, we had a lot of trouble with spare parts. I was the whipping boy in the spares parts business, because I was supposed to give the orders. You know, an airplane manufacturer wants to put out airplanes, and doesn't want to set aside parts that are critical to his production. And they didn't ever tool up properly to make spares and airplanes at the same time, so it was always a question.

Q: This is shown in the reading of the records. I get this, that we always seemed to be one step behind in the spare parts business. We never did solve it until late in the war, when guys like Knerr went out to the ETO and organized the depots out in Europe,

that the problem was solved to some degree. When Arnold wanted you, did he want you or did he want your boss, Echols?

T: It depended on the problem. Arnold was not a protocol guy. He would just as soon call me, if he thought I had the answer, and he could pin the responsibility on me, rather than the courteous and proper military way to go through my boss. He didn't worry about that at all. A very impetuous man.

Q: Did he make impulsive decisions? He made fast decisions but....

T: I would say he made impulsive decisions of a minor nature. I don't ever recall him making a major decision impulsively. It might have seemed impulsive to somebody who didn't know, but he usually had gone into the thing pretty thoroughly before-hand.

Q: When he got to you, was it via the squawk box? Were you hooked into his squawk box? Or was Echols?

T: No, Echols was hooked in at that time.

Q: You were a Colonel?

T: Oh, I was a Major. I was a Major when I went there and I left as a Colonel.

Q: So if he wanted you he'd call Echols and say, "Send Timberlake down."

T: No, he would just have his secretary call my secretary and say get him down here right away.

Q: Susie Adkins was his secretary. Was she helpful to you?

T: I thought Susie was quite helpful.

Q: In other words, when you came down, did you voluntarily come down, when you had a problem? You would go to your boss?

T: I would go to my Boss, and he would take it down, or he would send me down, particularly on small matters.

Q: Did Susie ever give you an inkling, say, "He's on the warpath today?" Tread carefully."

T: Yes, she would give you a hint of what he was going to talk about, because usually, you would walk into see her first. The aide sat across the room, and she would say, "He is going to talk about so and so."

Q: Did you ever think he was going to talk about so and so and then he would hit with something else? Did he ever catch you unprepared?

T: Oh sure, I'm saying I'm sure. I'm talking about my whole experience with him.

Q: You are thinking about later on when you were DC/AS. If something didn't go right, was it propitious to tell him about it, say: "General, I'm sorry we goofed on it." Or did you try to tell him: "We will take care of it; don't worry about it; leave it to me."

T: That's a hard one, because I can't put it in time. When I was Deputy Chief of Staff was one thing, and when, at this time, if I'd made a goof, I'd tell my boss about it. Or a goof was made on something I knew about, I would tell my boss, and it would be up to him to tell.

Q: Let's talk about your experiences in 1944 with him. You came back in 1944 to become Deputy Chief of Air Staff, which is one of the key men in the AAF Hqs there. Do you know why Arnold chose you for this job?

T: He was anxious to get people who had combat experience in his staff, so he wouldn't have this criticism from the field all the

time, "You guys sitting back there in Washington in an ivory tower. What the hell do you know about war?" You know, he was very anxious to get in people who had had considerable experience, and by that time, I had had about two years of commanding a bomber outfit overseas. And my job overseas had dwindled. I was Chief of Staff for the Mediterranean Air Command, and the Mediterranean Air Command was commanded by Lord Tedder.

Q: Eaker was in there, too, wasn't he? Eaker was MAAF.

T: Eaker replaced Tedder, and then Eaker moved up to Caserta. We had invaded Italy by that time, and I was kept back to handle the more or less administration part of the headquarters. The large part of the Mediterranean Command was still in Algiers. And my job was dwindled to nothing, really.

Q: As the invasion moved across, the rear echelon was left. So you were ready to do something else. Did Eaker recommend you for that job to Arnold?

T: I don't know. Eaker recommended me to General Eisenhower for promotion, I know that. My name did got in. But it was about that time that I came home. I was a BG, and he recommended me for a MG.

Q: Then you came to Arnold's office as DC/AS, and your job was handling communications and radar?

T: Well, we were kind of freelancers. There were three of us, and one of them was this man, Donald Wilson. Freddy Smith came in later.

Q: Was Reuben Hood in there?

T: Later, after I left.

Q: You were one of three: Donald Wilson and yourself and somebody else.

T: There was one before Donald Wilson came in.

Q: Do you know who you replaced? Whose job did you take, or was it a new job?

T: Oh, some guy got busted. No, it wasn't a new job.

Q: Tom Hanley?

T: No, I thought it was a guy named Perrin.

Q: Yes, Ed Perrin.

T: He got reduced to Captain, got in a little trouble and whatnot. When I went in there, he hadn't been in office maybe two months or so.

Q: Yes, I know about that. So you took his job and probably expanded it.

T: The general subjects. We weren't specific in any assignment. I generally handled Materiel matters, Communication matters, and things of a more or less technical side of it, so construction...

Q: In a sense, this was an expansion of the job you had in '39 to '41 because it was sort of Materiel. Only now you were closer to the throne, you had direct access.

T: That's right, and I would relay my orders to the guy that took Gen Echols' place, Pop Powers.

Q: I saw him in New Jersey a couple of weeks ago. He was a golfing partner of Arnold's some years ago. Well, in this job, then, you were on Arnold's squawk box. I guess you heard from him?

T: I heard from him a lot. As a matter of fact, for quite a while I was the senior one of the three. You see, Giles was the Chief of Staff. And when he went on a trip, I would got and sit in

his office, and I was on the squawk box all the time. I'll tell you an interesting anecdote. As the war was going to close in England, things lightened up a little bit. But before that, we worked every Sunday, we had maybe half the staff there on Sunday, General Arnold, on advice of his doctors, he already had a little heart business...

Q: You are talking 1945 now?

T: Yes.

Q: He had a major heart attack.

T: This was before the major one, He had had.

Q: He had one in 1943?

T: Yes, and Dr. White was really the head man on his heart.

Q: White?

T: White from Chicago.

Q: Wasn't it Gil Marquardt?

T: Before, and then he finally got White, and White came to see him quite frequently, he came from Chicago.

Q: Did White come after Marquardt, or before?

T: I thought he came after. He went home around noon. Every time, before he went home, he'd hit the squawk box, and when I was sitting over in Barney Giles' office, he said: "Pat, I'm going home now, you hold the fort," something like that.

Q: This was on Sunday.

T: And so, I thought I gave him time enough to get out of the building, and then I'd put all the squawk boxes, going to all the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, right on the line. I would say: "Well, the Old Man just left." You could hear the stampede. So one Sunday, he

called me in, and evidently he got in conversation with somebody downstairs, we are now in the Pentagon--he got in to a conversation with somebody down on the main floor and delayed his departure, after he told me he was leaving. All these guys went on by him, they didn't see him, on out the door, to get in their cars, and go home. So, I turned it over to somebody else, and I left, too. And he said: "Hey, Pat, come here." He said: "Next time, wait till I get out of the building, will you?" He knew damn well what happened.

Q: He must have been feeling pretty good that day, otherwise....

T: Oh yes. That's what I said, he did have a fine sense of humor. But he let me know that he didn't like it.

Q: I guess you were the target for explosions when things went wrong?

T: Oh sure. When I was acting, I was one of the three that were really the targets. All three of us were.

Q: When things went wrong, you would catch it. Do you remember some of these specific explosions, or reasons therefore?

T: Another funny one....

Q: This is all for background.

T: Two items that kind of tickled me. One is, he would always have a tough time with General Somervell.

Q: Services of Supply?

T: Yes, and Somervell felt that General Arnold was doing things for the future of the Air Force, rather than to get the war over. He thought he could see something in the back of his mind, particularly in the infrastructure, or the construction business. But he also used to give Hap a hard time on discipline. One month I was the keeper of

the files for venereal disease, among other things. We would get out reports, and then, I was supposed to see that they stop having high rates of venereal disease here, there and everywhere. I would give the COs hell and whatnot. Then, one month the rate came in from St. Louis. We had a woman's large establishment there. Women of the AF, WAF. They had the highest venereal disease of any woman's organization in the Army and the Air Corps. It was part of Jefferson Barracks. And so, I sent the report in, and I went in to tell General Arnold. And General Arnold said: "That's a hell of a thing," really blew his top on this one. I went back to my office kind of jittery, and I knew that this was going to happen. That Somervell was going to jump him the next day. And I heard a report on what happened, and sure enough, Gen Somervell did call Arnold down for having this high rate and asked him why it occurred. And Hap Arnold, in spite of giving me a hard time the day before, said very quietly to Gen Somervell: "You know, these Air Corps girls will get around." Just like this was a perfectly plausible thing, so what he told you was not necessarily what he told other people.

Q: You said there was another story?

T: General Somervell gave him a hard time on construction. I mentioned the was,maybe he was building things for the future of the AF after thewar. And so I think Gen Arnold made a promise that he personally would approve every construction project. One day, he had a pile of papers on his desk. Every project was a lot of projects in this construction business, and it seemed down here in Galveston, an outhouse, a latrine on the end of a pier that went out into the water blew over, in a kind of hurricane or storm wind. They wanted

to replace it. Here he was wading through this bunch of papers, and the total bill on this thing was $700. So he blew his top (imitating General Arnold), and he called me in. General Giles happened to be there, but he knew I was doing the construction stuff because my initials were on all the things. He said: "Now, Barney, this can't go on." He says, "Hereafter, I'm going to approve everything above $10,000, andyyou approve everything below $10,000." Well, actually, we had one item in a thousand that was under $10,000. So Barney says, "Yes sir." And he said,to me: "Do you understand that, Pat?" and I said: "Yes sir." So we walked out of the room, and Barney said: "The Old Man is upset this morning about that outhouse down there in Galveston." And he said: "Tell you what we are going to do." He said, "I'll approve them up to $6 million, and you approve them up to $1 million, but if you get me in trouble between one million and six million, I'm going to giveyyou hell." So we just stopped sending in the things, except great big projects, that went in there. Maybe a $7 million project, extending the runways at Langley Field, for instance, would go into Gen Arnold, so he would know it was going on. But a lot of the small ones were just maintenance.

Q: Was there some feeling, after his first heart attack, well, he had at least two that I know about. One was in May 1943, during the TRIDENT Conference, when Churchill came over, and this is when Marshall sent him to Oregon. He was out looking for a ranch anyway; he was thinking about building a ranch, he always had this on his mind, this ranch. Did Arnold ever talk to you about what he wanted to do in the postwar period?

T: No.

Q: You know, he was, in the last year of the war, busy corresponding with a couple of people, including a man named Hansen, who was building this ranch that he bought at Sonoma. It was amazing correspondence. I wonder if he ever talked to you about what he hoped to do when the war ended?

T: Never. No, I didn't know this was going on. Offcourse, I never felt any lack of decision on histpart, or delay of decision. Of course, he was interested in something else.

Q: You just wonder, either he had an outstanding personal staff, who handled some of these things for him, or the man never slept. You wonder when he had time to think about these things. But, we are talking about his heart attack. Was there some feeling, or did Giles, or when Eaker came in after Giles, did they sort of say, "Let's ease up on the Old Man, and not give him any controversial things." Did they take some of the controversy out of his office, and not tell him about some of these things? Was there any feeling...?

T: I had a feeling like that. They didn't issue instructions like that, not that I knew of. We all felt that if we could just keep him from having to blow his top, get overly emotional about things, the better off he would be in the AF, because he was very valuable to the Air Force.

Q: But he would have these daily explosions?

T: No.

Q: Were they daily?

T: No, it was his way of expressing himself.

Q: Sometimes it could be proceeded by a smile?

T: Oh, mostly, mostly proceeded by a smile. It was hard to tell which way he was going when he smiled.

Q: You know, I talked to Bruce Simmons, this Sergeant, and Bruce Simmons saw him close up as much as anybody ever did, and he said, when the spittle began to form in the corners of his mouth, he said: "Watch out." See this was his sign that the Old Man was ready to blow. Did you have a telltale sign? In his eyes, or in his facial expression, or in somethinghe did, which gave you a warning?

T: Oh, I got a warning, but I can't remember the details of why things were going bad instead of good.

Q: Sometimes, you got a warning, but you couldn't do anything, you were headed for disaster. Some of the problems that arose. One of the problems was long-range escort, this was when you were there. Although when you came in in 1944, it was on the way to being solved. In 1943, it was unsolved, they didn't have the P-51, and they had the problem with the wing tanks, and Wright Field wasn't getting the wing tanks. They had to buy them from the British. Did you get involved in that problem?

T: No, you see, I was down there without any escort, on all our missions. When I was running the bombing in the Mediterranean, we had no escort at all.

Q: Of course, by that time, the Mediterranean was not a critical area?

T: No, but it had been.

Q: For a period of time, right. What I mean is, when you came back into Washington, and you were handling Materiel problems as DC/AS, did you get involved in wing tanks?

T: Oh yes, we got involved in wing tanks; we got involved in the self-sealing tanks. Those and the wing tanks both came up as

big problems. Because we started putting self-sealing tanks in C-47s, things of that sort.

Q: When you mention self-sealing tanks I think of Drew Pearson. This was one of his favorite subjects. He used to sock it into Giles and Arnold. Drew Pearson seldom had a good word for the Air Corps. Were you aware of this, that Drew Pearson was no friend of the AAF?

T: Oh yes.

Q: Arnold, of course, was aware of this? Did he ever do anything about it? Try to either silence Drew Pearson, or bring him in, and explain the Air Force position to him?

T: I don't remember. We had a staff meeting every morning,and it started about a half hour before the Pentagon generally opened.

Q: This was at what time?

T: 7:30 A.M., and he had the key people there. We reviewed--we had to get there early--because we reviewed yesterday's operations, worldwide, big things, and what was planned for today, as we knew it. Then we always ended up these meetings with what happened in the Drew Pearson column this morning, because there was always an Air Force item in there.

Q: I went through six years of Drew Pearson and I seldom saw a pro-AF article. He managed to take a swipe at the AF in one respect or another, and Giles was one of his favorite targets.

T: That's right, Giles' brother.

Q: Ben Giles, out in the Persian Gulf?

T: Yes, no it was out in Cairo. Middle East, he was down there. You ought to ask Barney about that one, because Barney took Ben's side, and he got into a row with Drew Pearson. It wasn't the wrong doing on Barney's part, it was Barney took up Ben's side, and took

it upon himself to call Drew Pearson about it, and something happened. I don't know.

Q: Well, it would be interesting to find out. I know that Barney Giles himself was a target for Drew Pearson's barbs. Maybe Pearson wasn't aware they were brothers?

T: No, I think he knew.

Q: You know, Pearson was right about 50% of the time, in some of his attacks, not on the AF necessarily. But I say, Pearson shot it out of a shotgun.

T: He was bound to hit something.

Q: Yes, but once he got on a target, he never let go. There were certain people who could never do right, and certain people who could never do wrong. And Giles was on the other list. Arnold was on the other list, too. So Pearson never mentioned Arnold or Giles without taking a swipe to remind people that here's the guy that failed to provide self-sealing tanks.

T: That's right. This was his meat. This made Arnold perfectly furious because we had the choice. We had limited production, no matter what you say, about 50,000 airplanes a year. We had a limited production in every model, and one of the limits was the C-47s. We needed them for troop carrier work, and we couldn't get the airplanes out, if we insisted on self-sealing tanks, because it was a new process. It just took longer, and it meant slowing up the production, and not having enough airplanes for the invasion. Got them in as fast as we could.

Q: Remember the planes that were shot down--the C-47s were shot down over Sicily. This was one of Drew Pearson's favorite targets.

T: That was one of the early invasions I was talking about. That was the first, really, over-the-water invasion that had been made on that scale, ever.

Q: You didn't get involved in that in any way, did you?

T: I was in Europe at the time. I was Chief of Plans for the Mediterranean Air Command.

Q: What happened in that, did the Navy have an itchy trigger finger?

T: The Navy always had an itchy trigger finger.

Q: Was there a miscalculation by AF people in flying over the ships at night?

T: There were two things that happened. The ships, yes. They weren't properly routed to miss the ships, but the Navy knew they were there, but they let go at them. And then when they got up there to Sicily, the planes came in, instead of coming in from east to west, they miscalculated their landfall and came in this direction, and the First Division let fire at them, and knocked a lot of them down. It's one of those kinds of things. That was the most carefully prepared and planned operation I've ever known about. Of course, I wasn't interested in TORCH. I was back in Washington and didn't know what was going on. This operation was perfectly planned, but men are men, In the darkness they miscalculated the landfall by six miles, with a 300 mile trip; it's not much of a thing, you see.

Q: I'd read somewhere that the ships had been subject to a German attack a short time before. So somebody started firing on these planes, and everybody assumed they were enemy planes, and everybody let loose, it was sort of a snowballing type thing, a disaster. I think Ray Dunn caught it for that.

T: Yes, he was the Troop Carrier Commander down at Tebessa. That's where we had most of our troops carriers airplanes training.

Q: Well, he was one of Arnold's boys there, for a while, and then I think this finished him with Arnold?

T: Arnold liked him very much and he did a lot for Arnold and Mrs. Arnold. He's an insurance expert, and they are few and far between. He would help widows and things like that, not for pay, just as an aid for them.

Q: Do you mean in the postwar period?

T: Postwar and prewar.

Q: I talked to Ray Dunn. He lives in Alexandria, Virginia, and I just sort of got the feeling that after that incident, the relationship between him and Arnold was weakened.

T: I'm sure. He must have thought so. I don't think he got promoted.

Q: No, he didn't.

T: And this was pretty tough on a lot of young squirts like me, my brother and whatnot. We were just going up rapidly and the old timers were left behind. I'd feel bad about it.

Q: This was part of that process. What were some of the other issues between you and Arnold? I don't mean between you, I mean that came to you and you had to deal with Arnold, in the Materiel field? How about the B-29s, did you have any part?

T: Oh yes. I was really more interested in a thing called the B-32.

Q: This was the backup plane?

T: Yes, the backup plane for the B-29. As you know, we had a lot of trouble with the B-29s, the engines catching fire and whatnot.

We got it so, I don't know if you heard about it, the WASPS. Well, Jackie Cochran had some girl pilots called WASPS.

Q: Oh yes.

T: And morale was getting pretty low on the B-29 people. Either Arnold or Jackie Cochran or the two of them together, came up with this great plan. They got some of these WASPS trained out at the factory, and then delivered the B-29s to the operational base with these WASPS. The first one came in, and the people were out there to watch the airplane come in, and the door opened, and this dainty little WASP gets out, powdering her face, seeing that her hat's on straight, and then she prances down. She's the pilot of the damn thing, the command pilot. Then the copilot gets out, and another WASP, the whole crew was WASP. It's funny, this didn't go on for long, because there wasn't enough of them, but it was a hell of a morale feature.

Q: Did this sort of come in there when some of the men said the B-29 was too dangerous to fly, and this is the way Arnold met that problem? So it was he and Jackie Cochran, I'll have to ask Jackie Cochran about that. I interviewed her, but I don't recall that that specific thing came up.

T: The B-32. I was sitting there fat and happy one day, and I got a buzz from General Arnold, and he said, "Pat, what do you think f the B-32?" And I said, "Well, I think it is a fine airplane. I think maybe it is limited in growth. However, up to now, we had needed something to back up the B-29, if things went bad." And he said: "Well, I'm worried about it, continuing the production of it. I want you to go down to Dallas-Ft. Worth, and talk to those people, and get a ride or two in it, and then see what you think. Tell me

what you personally think." And I said: "General Arnold, my brother, who has been with the 8th AF is on leave back here for two weeks." The war wasn't over with. I said: "Do you mind if I take him with me," because he had more experience in this than I had, and I had only unescorted bombers down in the Middle East. General Arnold said: "Why, sure, that's a good idea." So Ted and I went down there. We got there in lousy weather, and we didn't fly. But we looked the airplane over, and went into all the characteristics. We came back and confirmed what I told him before. I thought it was limited growth. If we had B-29s vs. B-32s, I would take the B-29, because it could be added on.

Q: It had more potential?

T: More potential, well, like the B-17 started out as a little thing, how it grew and grew, and bombs and bombs went on it, machine guns, everything. The B-24 was a lot like the B-32. It had limited growth. It was up to itssmaximum when it was built. So that's my interest in that.

Q: They never did produce B-32s in great number, there were just a few of them used in combat. I think George Kenney, who wanted the B-29, ended up with ne squadron of B-32s.

T: That's right, either a squadron or a group, I can't remember which.

Q: Well, I know it was one unit of B-32s, and that was their only combat experience.

T: Yes, for a time, they were on a little island, Ie Shima, out in Okinawa, when I was out there with the 8th AF, but they were just coming home.

Q: That's where the Jap emissaries came, right after the atomic bomb was dropped. I wanted to ask you, I have a note here, Twining mentioned for me to ask you about the time Arnold grabbed you in the hall, or grabbed you by the arm, and had you sent out some place, and told you to go take care of something.

T: That was, I think maybe he was referring to, when I went to war the first time. I had something less than 24 hours to get out of town, but we had two things to do. I had two missions; one, I would carry a message, it was right when Rommel had broken through, and Cairo was threatened.

Q: This was in 1942, right before El Alamain?

T: Right before, a few months before. That's where they stopped. They'd run out of gasoline, they just couldn't go anyplace, short of Alexandria. Well, he wanted a message carried to the British, of what we were going to do to support them. He had been in contact with the British in Washington and London. Then the message had to go out to the British. The British had broken our code from our Embassy out there, and a guy by the name of Fellers, Bonner Fellers, sent in a lot of criticism of the British operation out there. It was broken by the British, and they were madder than hell of what Fellers said, because he was an observer with them, credited to them. Then the AF that had been out in India was redeployed to the Middle East, and I was to join it as Operations Officer.

Q: HALPRO?

T: No, the HALPRO was there. It was a group. This was General Lewis Brereton, and his staff from India. They came back to become Middle East AF, US Middle East AF. I went in that staff, as their

Operations, for a short period, and then I became the Bomber Commander.

Q: That's when Arnold grabbed you?

T: Yes, I was walking down the hall just as happy as could be, and he said: "I want you over there, leaving tomorrow."

Q: What was your specific mission, to be Operations officer, or deliver the message?

T: Well, two of them, and the reason for the hurry was the message, and I carried some code men with me. We got in the airplane and flew all night. We made a forced landing in the desert. We also had fuses. The bottom of the airplane was loaded with fuses. There was a shortage, I think that is what Twining is talking about.

Q: This was typical Arnold. He had a problem on his mind, and if he had seen somebody else, he might have grabbed him. He just happened to see you. Was there some feeling among the middle executive or junior executive level to stay out of the E-ring? Arnold might grab you and get you to do something? Or he might jump you or something? Was there any of that feeling in the Pentagon, in the late stages of the war, that you recall?

T: Not that I recall, I mean I had "no," I mean I lived there, I was right across the hall from Gen Arnold.

Q: You'd come in early in the morning, before he came in so you could get ready?

T: Oh, you'd have to get the messages, to be able to brief your part of the staff meeting.

Q: When you briefed at the daily meetings, starting at 7:30, if he asked you a question, and you didn't know the answer to it, did

you tell him you didn't know the answer to it, or try to bluff your way through it, and then figure you'll get the answer from your staff later on?

T: Oh, I guess both ways. I don't think you could bluff your way through it. My first impression is so and so, but I will find out.

Q: Was he short tempered with procrastination? If somebody said, or did he remember, if he said: "I want you, Timberlake, I want you to do so and so." And then he'd talk about 50 other things. Did he come back to you the next day and remember he told you to do so and so?

T: No, only if that went wrong. He would remember who he told to do it.

Q: Did he have somebody taking notes there, Suzy Adkins taking notes about who got different assignments?

T: No, not Suzy. She didn't come into that meeting.

Q: Shelmire or Beebe?

T: Beebe was there often. And Beebe would take notes every once in a while, but not a complete transcript. We didn't have minutes with the meeting, or anything.

Q: Did he give people a second chance, in other words, would he jump somebody and say, "You failed to do thus and so?" Would it depend on the guy? If he had a reputation for achievement, he had a better chance of staying, otherwise, he might go? Or am I fuzzing up the issue?

T: No, it's a hard question, in that he would give people a second chance. If they had to him, a clean record, other than this particular thing. You must remember, we had a lot of new officers in the AF that he had never known before. If one of the people he knew from the old days goofed it really bad, he didn't get a second chance.

Q: In other words, a newer officer might have a better chance?

T: Yes, or a doer.

Q: A man who had a record for achievement?

T: Yes. Suppose a guy had been a good combat commander, suppose LeMay, for instance, that type of man that came in and had just been overseas and done a fine job and whatnot, came back, and it just didn't happen. I shouldn't mention LeMay, but somebody who wasn't an old, old timer in the old Air Corps days, pulled a goofer, than he wouldn't, he would catch hell, but he'd get a second chance. But if he ran into a man that had been in the old days and he didn't like particularly, because he was maybe not a doer, for some reason he was prejudiced against him, then he very seldom got a second chance.

Q: Was there a feeling that the guys who came up with Arnold, as opposed to the guys who came up with Andrews, got better jobs? Like Spaatz and Eaker, and some of the people who came up the West Coast route. On the other side, there were guys like Knerr, and Royce and Tony Frank who came up with Andrews.

T: I never noticed that.

Q: Tony Frank, for example, was one of the old timers; he wanted a combat command, and Arnold wouldn't give him one, and he was bitter about it.

T: Yes, I knew about that.

Q: And he felt that Arnold discriminated against him. Knerr felt, Knerr was one of the close associates of Andrews'. Knerr had retired when Andrews was taken out of the GHQ AF in 1939, or finished his tour. Knerr could not get back on active duty for two years, three years.

T: Knerr had a heart condition.

Q: Yes, but he was also writing articles for a separate Air Force. Were you aware of this?

T: Yes, I believe I was; I mean at that time.

Q: American Mercury, Reader's Digest.

T: Yes, I read some of them.

Q: Calling for a separate air force. And he was also writing Andrews, denouncing Arnold as being the guy blocking the separate air force. And, of course, the Navy didn't like him. He helped this guy, William Bradford Huie, write the book, you know.

T: Yes, Case Against the Admirals.

Q: Also, We Fight for Airpower. So the Navy didn't want him back on active duty, but he came back on active duty, probably because he was a good man.

T: Knerr was a hell of a good man.

Q: And he came on and did a great job as Deputy to Spaatz for Administration, or Logistics, ETO. He did a fine job. This reminds me of something. Knerr is no fan of Arnold. He was a fan of Andrews. He thought Andrews was the greatest air commander we had. He should have been head of the Air Force. And he said that Arnold had loyalty up but not down, to his superiors, but not to his staff. In other words, if you messed up, he'd cut you off, and ditto on the promotion side of it. That's his attitude. Of course, everybody has his own feeling about it. Did you feel Arnold was loyal to his staff down?

T: I think it would depend on personalities. I couldn't say that he was disloyal to them, because he was very loyal to some of them, and he just didn't care much about what happened to the others.

Q: Did he give you a fair shake?

T: Oh yes, all the time.

Q: He did well by you, I think, but some others felt he didn't do well by them, on promotion side of it. Kuter is one example who got his promotion through Marshall, rather than through Arnold. Several others felt that Arnold didn't do right by them. You worked in Headquarters, when the Big Switch occurred, this is when Eaker was moved out of Europe, and Spaatz moved in.

T: Yes, that's when Eaker came to the Mediterranean and Tedder went with Eisenhower, getting ready for TORCH.

Q: A lot of people were shifted around.

T: Yes, I was at the meeting Churchill held in Marakeh, in which the British changes were announced for this particular change. Jumbo Wilson came out and took Eisenhower's place; Eisenhower came to the States, and went up to Europe.

Q: Eaker was quite unhappy leaving Europe. Were you aware of his feeling?

T: Yes, I was generally aware that he was unhappy. He brought some of his staff with him, and they resented it, too.

Q: This was sort of being taken out of the big leagues, and being put in the minor leagues. By that time the Mediterranean was a minor league, the big show was Europe. Did you ever talk to Eaker, or Eaker talk to you about that?

T: No.

Q: You were too far down the staff.

T: I was his Chief of Staff, but my job was to stay in Algiers, and he went out with Wilson to Caserta.

Q: Arnold made a lot of changes. He took guys out of jobs, he took Shepler Fitzgerald out of the Middle East, took him out of there, and Fitzgerald appealed to him, but he wouldn't honor it, he took a lot of guys out, Arnold fired a lot of guys; Henry Harms, Douglas Netherwood, Shepler Fitzgerald, Ed Perrin, a couple of other people. Was he regarded as ruthless?

T: Yes. Ruthless in the sense that he didn't care. The job was more important. He didn't care whether it hurt somebody's feelings or not; that's what I mean by ruthless. Maybe, hardshelled or hardnosed, is a better word than ruthless.

Q: There was no sentiment in him on that?

T: No.

Q: I mean, you knew that if you didn't cut the mustard with him, the fact that he might have liked you, or socialized with you, that made no difference?

T: That made no difference.

Q: This is the general impression, and this is the feeling that Knerr has about Arnold being tough in that respect.

Q: When you were there, Arnold made a tough decision to move Hansell out and put LeMay in. Do you remember that, this was in January 1945?

T: You're talking about the B-29s at Guam.

Q: He sent Norstad out there to give Hansell the bad news?

T: I went with Norstad.

NOTE: Timberlake here confused January and March 1945 trip.

Q: Then you were at the meeting?

T: No, I went for another reason; I went on the airplane with Norstad to look at my part of the operations that was going on, and it was still expanding.

Q: This is January 9, 1945, and you were there. You weren't at the particular meeting where Norstad gave Possum Hansell the news?

T: No.

Q: Did Norstad ever talk to you about that?

T: Yes, I knew. We went out together; I had dinner with Norstad, and I think this was Norstad's decision.

Q: Really, you mean Arnold had not decided?

T: Arnold had decided, but on Norstad's recommendation.

Q: Arnold said: "Go out there and if you think the situation ought to be changed, change it." He gave Norstad the prerogative.

T: You've got me a little bit mixed up, now, so many things. Rosie O'Donnell is involved in this, Hansell, and LeMay.

Q: Well, Rosie O'Donnell had the 73rd Wing; he worked for Hansell. Hansell had the 21st BomCom. It was just set up; they started operating around Thanksgiving 1944. LeMay had the 20th BomCom. He was in the CBI. Hansell just started operating or had been operating for two months out of the Marianas, and Arnold made a decision, or maybe it wasn't made. Maybe he sent Norstad out: "Take a look at it, and give me a recommendation." Was that it, or don't you remember?

T: No, I think the decision had been made. This was Norstad's second trip when I went with him, so I think the decision had been made before Norstad went out there, and he had the authority to give him the word. Now, I think that's the way it happened. But this was a long time ago.

Q: Norstad, did he talk to you about it?

T: Yes, he told me what he was going to do.

Q: Did he say that he was going to see whether Hansell could do the job?

T: No. I think he had the decision in his hand. He had been before to look.

Q: I know he made two trips out there, but there was one trip he went out there on, Arnold had had his heart attack already. When you went out with him, had Arnold had his heart attack?

T: Yes, I think so.

Q: Well, then that was his second trip. And I'll tell you, this was at the beginning of March, LeMay already had the job. LeMay had decided, or recommended, low-level attacks. Norstad came out there when LeMay wanted some headquarters opinion. Of course, in Europe, if you went in 7,000 feet, it was disastrous. LeMay was going to radically change the tactics of the B-29s coming in at low level.

T: To hit Tokyo.

Q: Tokyo, right, the famous five attacks, and Norstad came out there; Norstad, in a sense, was running the 20th AF, because Arnold was in Coral Gables.

T: That's right. That's the trip I went on, because the first mission came back while we were out there.

Q: The first LeMay mission; LeMay already had the job.

T: Yes, that's right.

Q: Did Norstad give LeMay permission to do so, or did LeMay ask his permission?

T: I don't know, I wasn't in that change. See, that was a command within a command. What went between LeMay and Norstad and Arnold, I was not privy to those conversations.

Q: Arnold had his heart attack and they sort of, they kept it very quiet, for several reasons. One of which was Arnold's wish to keep it quiet; he didn't want to be retired. And he was afraid that Marshall would let him go. So they kept this thing very quiet. You were aware immediately that Arnold was not at the helm, and then Giles, was Giles running the AF side of the war?

T: Yes.

Q: What did Lovett have to do with that?

T: A lot. He was the sage man that they went to for advice, political, military type of matters. He had a greal deal of influence with the Secretary of War. He had a great deal of influence with General Marshall, and everybody listened to Bob Lovett.

Q: Was he a calming influence on Arnold?

T: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold ever take off on some impulsive journey, or start to, and then Lovett sort of kidded or talked him out of it? Was that his reputation, sort of a balance wheel?

T: Yes.

Q: Did people go to Lovett and say, the Old Man is bent on doing thus and so, can you talk him out of it? Did you ever go to Lovett and try to get him to change Arnold's course, or did Giles ever go to him?

T: Oh, I think Giles probably did. I didn't go to Lovett. Lovett called me in, from time to time. I'd known him for a long time.

Q: I talked to him in NY, and I got this sort of impression, that he acted as a balance wheel, sort of kept Arnold on course. How about Eaker?

T: I'd like to tell you one incident before I go. I don't like to comment on Eaker, he's a very good friend of mine. You are getting into a controversy between personalities, and I'm not competent...

Q: I'm trying to fix Arnold's role, and it had to deal with Lovett, Eaker, Giles and deal with people, and I'm trying to find out how he dealt with them, and what sort of relationship he had with them, I don't mean, I'm not going to muckrake. I'm trying to establish his position in this complex arrangement.

T: In between these two tours I had in the Munitions Building, I had the 9th Bomber Command over in the Middle East. As you know, we had no fighter escort and our job was to cutt off gasoline from Rome. We bombed the ports, and the towns, Naples and supported the British. As a matter of fact, they put the British Bomber Command which was a night Bomber Command, under my operational control. So I had the American groups, the B-24s, and the British Liberators. Well, General Arnold was giving us a hard time, in that he couldn't understand why we wanted de-icing equipment, way down in the tropics. He didn't understand why we wanted airplanes painted pink, instead of olive drab. So he came over to visit, and we kept asking for more pilots. The day he came there during January 1943. He went up and he spent one day in Cairo, and then went up to my advance command post, which was up near Mersa Matruh, up in the eastern desert sand. A strip, it wasn't paved or anything. On that peculiar day, we had a sandstorm, we had rain, and the temperature got down to around 30 degrees, all in the time he was up in this tent, in the headquarters we had up there. He talked to the men after the mission was over, out in the open; I have some pictures of this. But it showed

General Arnold with the wind shipping, and whatnot. Took some great pictures, on the way back, he said: "Pat, what do you really need? I thought you all were living a plush war down here." And I said: "Well, first, I need more pilots."

NOTE: General Timberlake said he needed more materiel, and de-icing equipment and all the rest. After that experience, Arnold gave Timberlake everything he asked for, and then Arnold went on his way to the Middle East. This was the time of Casablanca Conference.

Towle, Stuart "Froggy"

28 Feb 74

Interview with Col Stuart Towle, Arlington, Va. 28 Feb 74

Q When was the first time you ever ran into Hap Arnold?

T I guess when he came to duty at March Field in '32 or '33 and my first experience with him was when he was out there for maneuvers. They had a big Air Force maneuver out there in the summer of '33. And, unfortunately, all of the March Field units were taken out of the maneuver because the squadron commanders were taken by General Arnold and put on Civilian Conservation Corps, CCC duty.

Q Were you assigned to that duty?

T I was at Lytle Creek on CCC duty. And, of course, General Arnold had what we called the March Field district. There were some 28 camps in his district. It ran all the way from Fresno down to San Diego.

Q Is that the precise number? 28?

T I think that's about right. It ran from Fresno up to Charleston Mountain, up near Las Vegas, and then down to San Diego. So he had quite a large area in the Civilian Conservation Corps.

Q When were you assigned to March Field?

T In the fall of '31.

Q He came there about then?

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Q You were with what squadron?

T Initially I was with the 73d squadron and then I took over the 95th squadron when Dawson went down to Hollywood to be a consultatnt on a movie they were making down there.

Q What plane did you fly?

T P-12 and P-26. We got the P-26's just when the air mail started, in '34. In fact I ferried the first one down from Seattle to March Field in February or March '34. I was ordered to come by way of Salt Lake, so Frank Hunter could see the airplane he was getting in his pursuit

group at March Field. Arnold had Eaker up there. He was there, too. They'd just started the air mail operation.

Q The CCC started in '33. This is right after Roosevelt came in. You were at Lytle Creek, you say?

T Just above San Bernardino.

Q You were in charge of one of these camps? You were what?

T I think I was a First Lieut.

Q How many boys in your camp?

T 220. Two hundred boys and twenty experts, so-called. They were plumbers and carpenters. We built the camp. All the camps were built from scratch. Arnold had, I'm sure, many citations for good camps. In fact, I had one because my foresters cleared the most number of miles of fire-breaks and roads in the San Bernardino forest.

Q Did he ever come up to visit your camp?

T Oh yes. He was up several times.

Q What did he do? Did he give them a pep talk?

T No. He just looked around. He was very complimentary with everything that was being done.

Q I was told that he had this idea that if you get young men out in the woods in clean fresh air and good food, and get them to do something useful, it would make good men out of them. Did you ever hear him expound on that concept of juvenile delinquency?

T Yes, I did, many times. That was one of his great beliefs. You get kids out and get them to work, let them do something productive, They'd go out in life, and continue.

Q He really thought it was a useful undertaking, the CCC.

T Oh yes. He was in favor of the CCC at that time. It did a lot of good. It got the boys off the streets, and they made a little money to send hom

Q Were there any problems in the camp? Some had racial problems.

T I didn't have any in my camp. They did have some where they sent

mixed groups out in Kentucky, colored and white boys. Of course they got into trouble.

Q Where did your boys come from?

T They were mostly local boys, in my recollection.

Q Right before the CCC there was an earthquake at Long Beach. Do you remember that?

T Yes indeed. We were involved in it. The first thing Gen Arnold did was order all the mobile mess kitchens and blankets. He corralled everything he could on the base and sent it down to Long Beach. I don't think he had permission to do it.

Q That same night?

T Oh yes. We moved out that night. It happened, to my recollection, about 3:30 in the afternoon.

Q He caught the devil for doing this without authorization?

T Yes, he did.

Q Later they straightened it out. Did you hear anything about that?

T No, I didn't really hear about it. There was a lot of conversation about it.

Q Malin Craig over at the Presidio?

T Didn't get down to my level.

Q But you heard some static?

T He was criticized. But he was a man of action. He didn't have to wait for authority when he felt the need for something.

Q Your overall boss was Mark Hunter, wasn't he? Head of the group. You were in the 17th Pursuit Group?

T That's right. Frank O'Driscoll Hunter. Now in Savannah, Georgia

Q I saw him in Savannah recently. Do you remember anything else about Arnold at March Field?

T Yes. I don't know if it is of particular use. I never had any really direct dealings with Arnold except, once I was on the carpet for speeding

from Riverside to March Field. I was apprehended just before I reached the gate. And I came in the gate so the police couldn't pick me up. I was on the carpet the next morning. Gen Arnold told me in no uncertain way that I shouldn't have done that. I was picked up by the police and fined for speeding.

Q You were a Lieutenant; he was a Lieutenant Colonel, way above your level. Were you awed by him? Frightened?

T No. He was very sociable and very reasonable man. Always had a smile on his face. You shouldn't think that's a friendly smile because it might mean the earth's going to fall on you in the next minute.

Q It could be deceptive?

T Yes.

Q Do you remember anything about the club? There was one time when they wouldn't allow aviation cadets in the club?

T I don't recall that at all.

Q Do you remember anything on Mrs. Arnold?

T Delightful woman. Well liked, adored by all the women of the post. She didn't try to run the women or do anything like that.

Q She wasn't the usual CO's

T She certainly was not.

Q They did a lot of planting on the base of these poplar trees.

T She brought in palm trees, hundreds of them, planted them around the base. I don't think it cost anybody anything.

Q I think they all chipped in. Didn't they tax everybody 50¢ or $1?

T I don't remember.

Q He made it more livable?

T Oh yes. It was pretty barren when we first arrived, when I first got there from Rockwell Field. When the bombers and fighters moved up to Rockwell Field there was a pretty barren base. He put in a beautification program.

Q Remember Tinker coming in there?

T Clarence L. Tinker. Very well. I used to go hunting with him.

Q Did he take Spatz's place as group commander?

T Yes. He took Spatz's place as the fighter group commander. First he had a squadron, I believe.

Q Where did Hunter fit in?

T He had the group.

Q What did Tinker have?

T Tinker had, as I recall, the 73d Squadron.

Q And then he moved up?

T Yes.

Q What do you remember about the air mail?

T I got out of it pretty fast because when I took delivery of the plane to March Field after making a trial aun between Salt Lake and Denver with a P-12. I was under orders to come to Bolling Field and I asked Colonel Arnold if I should stay on the mail, or whether I should go to follow my orders. He said: "You'd better follow your orders because your baggage had already gone." I came to Bolling Field.

Q When was that?

T Spring of '34. Barton Yount was in command of Bolling at the time.

Q So you were not there when Arnold was promoted to General, in '35?

T No.

Q Any more experiences, any recollections of March Field? Any amusing, or otherwise, anecdotes?

T No, I can't think of any. It was a very well run, very well organized base

Q Remember Ernest Lohman, the Post Exec, "Fud" Lohman?

T I remember his name, that's all.

Q Did you encounter Arnold after your March Field experience with him? During the war or in the late thirties?

T No. He was in the Chief's office when I finished schools and went on National Guard duty.

Q This was when? late thirties?

T Yes.

Q What was your assignment after the National Guard?

T I went with Gen Eaker to Europe, the advanced echelon of the 8th Fighter Command.

Q 8th Air Force. You were assigned to Bolling first and then you served in the 8th Air Force?

T I served in the 8th Fighter Command. Part of the 8th Air Force. Hunter was the Commander, and I was his Chief of Staff.

Q You were his Chief of Staff. How long did you stay there?

T I was there for two years.

Q Were you there when Hunter left, and Kepner came in?

T Yes. We left about the same time.

Q Was there any causal relationship? Did Kepner bring in his own man?

T Yes. Kepner brought in Gen Griswold, "Butch" Griswold.

Q I talked to him out in Omaha.

T I came back and went to Mitchel Field under Hunter, and McPherson. First Fighter Command.

Q Why did Hunter get taken out of there?

T There are lots of stories about it. I don't think they were quite satisfied back here with the way things were going in England. Of course we didn't have any airplanes.

Q You didn't have any P-51's. They were the best ones. Did Kepner have a different of using the pursuits?

T I don't think so. I don't think he had any different concept than Hunter did, but we really hadn't gotten into operation. We'd laid all the groundwork. We'd picked out all the airfields for bombers and fighters. The Fighter Command only functioned, well, at first as a staging area. First, they picked out fields, and get the headquarters established, and then, to furnish a cadre that went down with the 9th Air Force.

Q You were flying what? P-38's?

T First we had P-38's and then P-47's.

Q You didn't have any P-51's. I guess they came later?

T The P-51's came later.

Q Did Hunter ever talk to you about his departure, being unhappy with Arnold?

T I think Hunter was a little unhappy about being sent back just about the time they were going to get into operations.

Q Just when the thing was getting good.

T We'd done all the dirty work, setting up bases.

Q Then Kepner came in. The same thing happened to Eaker. Then Eaker got taken out. He has never forgiven Arnold since.

T I'm sure of that.

Q Do you remember anything about your 8th Air Force experience involving Arnold? Arnold came out there a couple of times, didn't he?

T I don't recall him visiting there.

Q He came there Labor Day '43, but I think you may have been gone by then. You were gone in August '43?

T I left in September '43.

Q He was there just about the time you left. Remember him coming?

T No, I don't remember him coming.

Q Let's talk about your coming back to the First Air Force. Hunter was actually promoted, wasn't he?

T Oh yes. He was brought back and promoted. He was given a second star at Mitchel Field when he took command of the First Air Force.

Q So, in a sense it wasn't a demotion or punishment to be taken out of there. I guess he was an old friend of Hap Arnold's?

T He was an old friend of Gen Arnold's.

Q Did they have a strained relationship after that?

T I don't think so.

Q This brings me to another thing. This is Selfridge Field and the blacks.

All the things that came in under Hunter in Detroit. Did you get involved in any of that?

T Yes. A little bit. That was the most secret troop movement of the war. When they moved the colored group from Selfridge Field down to Walterboro, South Carolina. We equipped them with winter flying equipment, heavy coast, and all this stuff. We put them on the train, and they didn't have the foggiest idea where they were going. And they went through New York and started south then they got the idea that they were going down to a base in the south.

Q You mean they were being taken out of Selfridge because of the friction?

T Yes.

Q Was this the 332nd, or the 99th?

T Yes, the 99th was part of the 332nd, I think. I didn't get too involved in that.

Q Do you remember a situation occurring when they decided that they were going to build another officers club on Selfridge, for the blacks..

T No, I didn't get into that.

Q They disguised it. They said one was for the permanent party and one for the training people. I think Hunter got into a thing with Arnold about that. Arnold told them not to build it, and they went ahead and built it anyway.

T Probably did.

Q The whites wouldn't have the blacks at their club. "Would you want one dancing with your sister," and this kind of thing. (off-tape)

Q Hunter told me this. I guess he's the only living man for whom a field is named.

T I guess that's right.

Q He was unhappy with Arnold toward the end because Hunter, being a man from Savannah, had a certain approach to the blacks in service. I guess Arnold got into trouble with Mrs. Roosevelt and Stimson because of

that. Do you remember hearing any static on that?

T No, I didn't.

Q Did you stay with the 1st Air Force the rest of the war?

T No, I left. We had a dual assignment there at Mitchel Field, in the 1st Fighter Command. We had the training responsibility of the troops going overseas. They were training down at Richmond and at McGuire. And we also had the air defense of the East Coast, the New York Fighter Wing. We had the early warning and ground observers, and all of those people, from Maine to Florida, and the New York Fighter Wing which was part of the 1st Fighter Command.

Q You did some anti-submarine work?

T Yes. They did anti-submarine work, too, but that generally came under the Eastern Sea Frontier.

Q Did you get into any hassles with the Navy?

T No. Had nothing but the finest relations with the Navy.

Q You remember a guy named Dick Nugent?

T I knew Dick Nugent very well.

Q He was in that. Did you know anything about him and Arnold?

T No. Never did. We had wonderful cooperation from the Navy. When we were training anti-aircraft units in the 1st Fighter Command, the Navy would send in airplanes to simulate attack. Their last training base was out at Suffolk, Long Island, anti-aircraft units that were going overseas. We put them in camp out there for about six weeks, two months. And the Navy would send people down from Quonset, airplanes down. They were extremely cooperative.

Q Was Earle Partridge there when you were there?

T No.

Q Did you have any contact with Arnold at all when you were in 1st Air Forc

T None at all.

Q He'd come up to New York. In '44, they had this Winged Victory. He and Mrs. Arnold were very busy with Moss Hart's play.

T Oh yes.

Q Did the 1st Air Force get involved?

T I don't recall.

Q Did you have any further contact with Arnold during the war?

T Not to my recollection. After I left the 1st Air Force I went out and took over the 319th Night Fighter Wing at Fresno, California, P-61's. Then I came back to the Chief's office 1945-56. I was Assistant Chief of Personnel.

Q Idwal Edwards, was he your boss?

T Yes, then Fred Anderson. I was retired then, in what we called the "Arnold purge." Arnold decided everyone in the Air Force had to be 100% physically qualified for overseas duty. And at this time I was having a hearing loss, although I was still on flying status. I started wearing a hearing aid. I went down to Oklahoma for my physical retirement. I was retired in '46.

Q They called that the "Arnold purge"?

T That's what we called it. Forty people caught that. We thought we still could do some useful work. Matter of fact I got a job right away with Northrop Corporation. Been there for 22 years. My hearing didn't bother me too much.

Q Did you wear an aid?

T I wore an aid, then I had the operation.

Q Do you recall any other experiences you had with Hap Arnold during your career? Any other personal contacts?

T No. Except on social occasions here in Washington.

Q How did you get the name "Woggy?" Where did you acquire it? At March Field?

T It followed me from the time I left my Iowa home to West Point. Stuck with me ever since.

Q What class were you in at West Point?

T 1923.

Q Was Kuter in that class?

T No. Thank you very much. Eaker (?) was about three or four years later. Gen Vandenberg was my illustrious classmate.

Q Do you have any opinions about Arnold? Whether he was the best man for the job he did during the war or whether Emmons or Andrews or anybody else could have done it better.

T No question about it. He was the outstanding officer in the Air Force for the job.

Q Why?

T He always thought things to be done. Never a negative thought in his head that something couldn't be done. Outstanding leader.

Q Did he inspire the men at March Field?

T Yes.

Q To get things done?

T Yes.

Q Many people have told me that when he came there sparks started to fly, things moved.

T He had a way of getting things done, getting people interested.

Q Did he get mad?

T Yes, he'd get pretty mad, I guess.

Q What did he look like when he was mad?

T He never got mad at me.

Q Except for that driving thing.

T Yes

Q Did he get red; did he splutter?

T No.

Q You didn't see him after you retired?

T No.

Q When was the first time you ever ran into Hap Arnold?

T I guess when he came to duty at March Field in '32 or '33 and my first experience with him was when he was out there for maneuvers. They had a big Air Force maneuver out there in the summer of '33. And, unfortunately, all of the March Field units were taken out of the maneuver because the squadron commanders were taken by General Arnold and put on Civilian Conservation Corps, CCC duty.

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Q I saw him in Savannah recently. Do you remember anything else about Arnold at March Field?

T Yes. I don't know if it is of particular use. I never had any really direct dealings with Arnold except, once I was on the carpet for speeding

from Riverside to March Field. I was apprehended just before I reached the gate. And I came in the gate so the police couldn't pick me up. I was on the carpet the next morning. Gen Arnold told me in no uncertain way that I shouldn't have done that. I was picked up by the police and fined for speeding.

Q You were a Lieutenant; he was a Lieutenant Colonel, way above your level. Were you awed by him? Frightened?

T No. He was very sociable and very reasonable man. Always had a smile on his face. You shouldn't think that's a friendly smile because it might mean the earth's going to fall on you in the next minute.

Q It could be deceptive?

T Yes.

Q Do you remember anything about the club? There was one time when they wouldn't allow aviation cadets in the club?

T I don't recall that at all.

Q Do you remember anything on Mrs. Arnold?

T Delightful woman. Well liked, adored by all the women of the post. She didn't try to run the women or do anything like that.

Q She wasn't the usual CO's

T She certainly was not.

Q They did a lot of planting on the base of these poplar trees.

T She brought in palm trees, hundreds of them, planted them around the base. I don't think it cost anybody anything.

Q I think they all chipped in. Didn't they tax everybody 50¢ or $1?

T I don't remember.

Q He made it more livable?

T Oh yes. It was pretty barren when we first arrived, when I first got there from Rockwell Field. When the bombers and fighters moved up to Rockwell Field there was a pretty barren base. He put in a beautification program.

Q Remember Tinker coming in there?

T Clarence L. Tinker. Very well. I used to go hunting with him.

Q Did he take Spatz's place as group commander?

T Yes. He took Spatz's place as the fighter group commander. First he had a squadron, I believe.

Q Where did Hunter fit in?

T He had the group.

Q What did Tinker have?

T Tinker had, as I recall, the 73d Squadron.

Q And then he moved up?

T Yes.

Q What do you remember about the air mail?

T I got out of it pretty fast because when I took delivery of the plane to March Field after making a trial aun between Salt Lake and Denver with a P-12. I was under orders to come to Bolling Field and I asked Colonel Arnold if I should stay on the mail, or whether I should go to follow my orders. He said: "You'd better follow your orders because your baggage had already gone." I came to Bolling Field.

Q When was that?

T Spring of '34. Barton Yount was in command of Bolling at thet time.

Q So you were not there when Arnold was promoted to General, in '35?

T No.

Q Any more experiences, any recollections of March Field? Any amusing, or otherwise, anecdotes?

T No, I can't think of any. It was a very well run, very well organized base.

Q Remember Ernest Lohman, the Post Exec, "Fud" Lohman?

T I remember his name, that's all.

Q Did you encounter Arnold after your March Field experience with him? During the war or in the late thirties?

T No. He was in the Chief's office when I finished schools and went on National Guard duty.

Q This was when? late thirties?

T Yes.

Q What was your assignment after the National Guard?

T I went with Gen Eaker to Europe, the advanced echelon of the 8th Fighter Command.

Q 8th Air Force. You were assigned to Bolling first and then you served in the 8th Air Force?

T I served in the 8th Fighter Command. Part of the 8th Air Force. Hunter was the Commander, and I was his Chief of Staff.

Q You were his Chief of Staff. How long did you stay there?

T I was there for two years.

Q Were you there when Hunter left, and Kepner came in?

T Yes. We left about the same time.

Q Was there any causal relationship? Did Kepner bring in his own man?

T Yes. Kepner brought in Gen Griswold, "Butch" Griswold.

Q I talked to him out in Omaha.

T I came back and went to Mitchel Field under Hunter, and McPherson. First Fighter Command.

Q Why did Hunter get taken out of there?

T There are lots of stories about it. I don't think they were quite satisfied back here with the way things were going in England. Of course we didn't have any airplanes.

Q You didn't have any P-51's. They were the best ones. Did Kepner have a different of using the pursuits?

T I don't think so. I don't think he had any different concept than Hunter did, but we really hadn't gotten into operation. We'd laid all the groundwork. We'd picked out all the airfields for bombers and fighters. The Fighter Command only functioned, well, at first as a staging area. First, they picked out fields, and get the headquarters established, and then, to furnish a cadre that went down with the 9th Air Force.

Q You were flying what? P-38's?

T First we had P-38's and then P-47's.

Q You didn't have any P-51's. I guess they came later?

T The P-51's came later.

Q Did Hunter ever talk to you about his departure, being unhappy with Arnold?

T I think Hunter was a little unhappy about being sent back just about the time they were going to get into operations.

Q Just when the thing was getting good.

T We'd done all the dirty work, setting up bases.

Q Then Kepner came in. The same thing happened to Eaker. Then Eaker got taken out. He has never forgiven Arnold since.

T I'm sure of that.

Q Do you remember anything about your 8th Air Force experience involving Arnold? Arnold came out there a couple of times, didn't he?

T I don't recall him visiting there.

Q He came there Labor Day '43, but I think you may have been gone by then. You were gone in August '43?

T I left in September '43.

Q He was there just about the time you left. Remember him coming?

T No, I don't remember him coming.

Q Let's talk about your coming back to the First Air Force. Hunter was actually promoted, wasn't he?

T Oh yes. He was brought back and promoted. He was given a second star at Mitchel Field when he took command of the First Air Force.

Q So, in a sense it wasn't a demotion or punishment to be taken out of there. I guess he was an old friend of Hap Arnold's?

T He was an old friend of Gen Arnold's.

Q Did they have a strained relationship after that?

T I don't think so.

Q This brings me to another thing. This is Selfridge Field and the blacks.

All the things that came in under Hunter in Detroit. Did you get involved in any of that?

T Yes. A little bit. That was the most secret troop movement of the war. When they moved the colored group from Selfridge Field down to Walterboro, South Carolina. We equipped them with winter flying equipment, heavy coast, and all this stuff. We put them on the train, and they didn't have the foggiest idea where they were going. And they went through New York and started south then they got the idea that they were going down to a base in the south.

Q You mean they were being taken out of Selfridge because of the friction?

T Yes.

Q Was this the 332nd, or the 99th?

T Yes, the 99th was part of the 332nd, I think. I didn't get too involved in that.

Q Do you remember a situation occurring when they decided that they were going to build another officers club on Selfridge, for the blacks..

T No, I didn't get into that.

Q They disguised it. They said one was for the permanent party and one for the training people. I think Hunter got into a thing with Arnold about that. Arnold told them not to build it, and they went ahead and built it anyway.

T Probably did.

Q The whites wouldn't have the blacks at their club. "Would you want one dancing with your sister," and this kind of thing. (off-tape)

Q Hunter told me this. I guess he's the only living man for whom a field is named.

T I guess that's right.

Q He was unhappy with Arnold toward the end because Hunter, being a man from Savannah, had a certain approach to the blacks in service. I guess Arnold got into trouble with Mrs. Roosevelt and Stimson because of

that. Do you remember hearing any static on that?

T No, I didn't.

Q Did you stay with the 1st Air Force the rest of the war?

T No, I left. We had a dual assignment there at Mitchel Field, in the 1st Fighter Command. We had the training responsibility of the troops going overseas. They were training down at Richmond and at McGuire. And we also had the air defense of the East Coast, the New York Fighter Wing. We had the early warning and ground observers, and all of those people, from Maine to Florida, and the New York Fighter Wing which was part of the 1st Fighter Command.

Q You did some anti-submarine work?

T Yes. They did anti-submarine work, too, but that generally came under the Eastern Sea Frontier.

Q Did you get into any hassles with the Navy?

T No. Had nothing but the finest relations with the Navy.

Q You remember a guy named Dick Nugent?

T I knew Dick Nugent very well.

Q He was in that. Did you know anything about him and Arnold?

T No. Never did. We had wonderful cooperation from the Navy. When we were training anti-aircraft units in the 1st Fighter Command, the Navy would send in airplanes to simulate attack. Their last training base was out at Suffolk, Long Island, anti-aircraft units that were going overseas. We put them in camp out there for about six weeks, two months. And the Navy would send people down from Quonset, airplanes down. They were extremely cooperative.

Q Was Earle Partridge there when you were there?

T No.

Q Did you have any contact with Arnold at all when you were in 1st Air Force

T None at all.

Q He'd come up to New York. In '44, they had this Winged Victory. He and Mrs. Arnold were very busy with Moss Hart's play.

T Oh yes.

Q Did the 1st Air Force get involved?

T I don't recall.

Q Did you have any further contact with Arnold during the war?

T Not to my recollection. After I left the 1st Air Force I went out and took over the 319th Night Fighter Wing at Fresno, California, P-61's. Then I came back to the Chief's office 1945-56. I was Assistant Chief of Personnel.

Q Idwal Edwards, was he your boss?

T Yes, then Fred Anderson. I was retired then, in what we called the "Arnold purge." Arnold decided everyone in the Air Force had to be 100% physically qualified for overseas duty. And at this time I was having a hearing loss, although I was still on flying status. I started wearing a hearing aid. I went down to Oklahoma for my physical retirement. I was retired in '46.

Q They called that the "Arnold purge"?

T That's what we called it. Forty people caught that. We thought we still could do some useful work. Matter of fact I got a job right away with Northrop Corporation. Been there for 22 years. My hearing didn't bother me too much.

Q Did you wear an aid?

T I wore an aid, then I had the operation.

Q Do you recall any other experiences you had with Hap Arnold during your career? Any other personal contacts?

T No. Except on social occasions here in Washington.

Q How did you get the name "Woggy?" Where did you acquire it? At March Field?

T It followed me from the time I left my Iowa home to West Point. Stuck with me ever since.

Q What class were you in at West Point?

T 1923.

Q Was Kuter in that class?

T No. Thank you very much. Eaker (?) was about three or four years later. Gen Vandenberg was my illustrious classmate.

Q Do you have any opinions about Arnold? Whether he was the best man for the job he did during the war or whether Emmons or Andrews or anybody else could have done it better.

T No question about it. He was the outstanding officer in the Air Force for the job.

Q Why?

T He always thought things to be done. Never a negative thought in his head that something couldn't be done. Outstanding leader.

Q Did he inspire the men at March Field?

T Yes.

Q To get things done?

T Yes.

Q Many people have told me that when he came there sparks started to fly, things moved.

T He had a way of getting things done, getting people interested.

Q Did he get mad?

T Yes, he'd get pretty mad, I guess.

Q What did he look like when he was mad?

T He never got mad at me.

Q Except for that driving thing.

T Yes

Q Did he get red; did he splutter?

T No.

Q You didn't see him after you retired?

T No.

Trafton, David 28 Jan 76

Interview, David Trafton, St Petersburg, Florida, January 28, 1976

Q You were in radio electronics in World War II?

T Wally Smith was my boss. We started out in the Munitions Building. We moved over to the Pentagon about 2 or 3 years later.

Q What brought you to General Arnold's attention? How did you meet him.

T He was the big boss. Every once in awhile, he'd have meetings. Sometimes, very few times, I'd go along with Gen Wally Smith. His boss was Davidson.

Q Did you work for Gen McClelland?

T Yes, but that was years later. McClelland was successor to the No. 1 job.

Note: Mr. Trafton has a severe hearing loss. We were unable to communicate effectively.

Mr. David C. Trafton, St. Petersburg, Fla, May 7, 1969,

(Interviewed by Col George S. Wolburn)

Excerpts

(Told of graduating from University of Florida in 1930, after 4 years of High School in St. Petersburg. After Florida, went up to RCA as radio design engineer at Camden, N.J. In 1937, applied for job in Air Corps. Accepted. Got into radio work. At the time, a Major Bill Suza was Chief of Office; Major Wallace Smith was Assistant, and Trafton was 3rd individual in Air Corps communications)

(Told of General Arnold insisting that the office was to be operated by military personnel. Office started building up in 1941)

Told of discussions with the British. It was assumed we would be their ally. In communications, worked with the British a lot. They had a big office building on Mass Ave. Trafton and others visited all the time.

General Arnold visited England and returned him tremendously impressed with British developments in electronics. When he returned from this trip, he wrote a buckslip to Major Wallace Smith. He told of seeing a British radar that was very efficient in picking up German fights. It was called the 10 centimeter radar. He told Smith to take all means at his disposal to get that set or one like it. Arnold thought the obvious advantage of 10 centimeter radar was that it was only 10 centimeters squared and could be used in small fighter planes. All our radar sets then were big.

That "kind of floored us". He said Arnold was serious in believing the British had a radar that was only 10 cm across. Smith rushed up to the General's office to explain that 10 cm radar was a radar set that detected on a 10 cm wave length. It wasnt the physical size of length of set but the wavelength. When told, Arnold was kind of taken aback

20314

14 January 1976

Mr. David C. Trafton
11625 6th Street East
Treasure Island, Fla 33706

Dear Mr. Trafton

I have your good letter and hope to be in your neighborhood on Wednesday, January 28th at about 10:30 AM. If I cannot make it then I'll phone.

If you wish to reach me in the interim about a change in plans:

Dr. Murray Green
% Susan Green
1603 - I Post Oak Drive
Clarkston, Ga 30021

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

done
1-28-76

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

11625 6th St. East
Treasure Island, Fla. 33706
Jan. 10,1976

Dr. Murry Green
1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md.20910

Dear Dr.Green:

I will be glad to talk with you about General Arnold but with the most of other people on your list, I am afraid I will not be able to contribute anything new or different. General Arnold was at the top of the ladder and I was on the bottom rung. However there are one or two humorous anecdotes that I could mention that you may find of some interest if you are interested in that sort of thing.

General Hives lives only a few miles from here and General Smith lives across Tampa Bay in Bradenton. General White is still on Snell Isle in St. Petersburg.

I will look forward to hearing from you when you are in the neighborhood and I wish you the best on your biography.

Sincerely,

David C. Trafton

David C. Trafton

My telephone number is 367-1271.

Wed Jan 28 - 10 AM

20314

31 December 1975

Mr. David Trafton
11125 6th Street E.
Treasure Island
St. Petersburg, Fla 33740

Dear Mr. Trafton:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold and have in the past several years interviewed some of the key people associated with him during his wartime career. I've talked to Charles Lindbergh, Robert Lovett, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker and a host of General Officers starting with Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Kuter, Smart, Dean, K.B. Wolfe, and about 200 others.

General Tom Rives mentioned your name along with that of General Wally Smith. I've written to General Smith in connection with a forthcoming interview trip to the Southland and hope to see him. If you feel that your contacts with General Arnold might be meaningful in the work that I'm doing, I would be pleased to spend an hour or so with you at your convenience.

I'll be in the St. Pete area during the last week of January. Incidentally, I also talked with General Ed White (who lives over on Snell Island) a couple of years ago during a previous trip.

I presume your specialty was in the electronics field and that leads me to mention that I talked with Dr. David Griggs out at UCLA last year. He had much to do with the H2X radar system and working on the B-29 program. Oh, yes, I talked with Dr. Ed Bowles (once of MIT) up in Massachusetts.

Enough name-dropping . . . I do want to get across the idea that it is a serious Biography. Arnold is among the very few senior people who served in World War II who has not yet been "done." We hope to rectify this.

In any event, I would be pleased to hear from you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

Twining, Nathan F. 3 Nov 67
2 Jan 70

Turning

INTERVIEW OF GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING
NOVEMBER 3, 1967
(Re-transcription)

(Question about General Arnold and General Spaatz)

T: My experience with those fine officers was very rewarding. I served quite a bit with General Arnold, and probably more with Gen Spaatz. Gen Spaatz, you know, was in command of the strategic air forces in Europe and which had the 8th AF, based in England. The 15th, the one I commanded in Italy. He was my immediate boss. I saw a great deal of him then. Wonderful man to work for, he had great vision and wonderful tactical sense, and that's what made him such a great leader. Of course, Arnold was in the position where he had to do all the hard work in Washington. His job was fantastic. He couldn't do the things he wanted to do. He had to do the things that would build this Air Force up, which meant spending lots of his time with logistics, something he didn't like. But it was vital to the cause and he went into this war with great vim and vigor and I think to him is due to the great success of the Air Force in the war - more than anybody else.

(The next questions pertain to the B-29s and the use of the atomic bomb in the Pacific)

T: Basically, it was a real good airplane. Did have a certain engine trouble with it - difficulty. But we mastered most of those by the time the offensive on Japan was going on, they operated very well. And I think I got there when the war was about over. I got out in July and took command. I was there

when the war ended a month later. But the operation was excellent. Saw the pictures, saw all the bombing. There was no need for anything else.

Q: Was it necessary for us to drop the atomic bomb, do you think, sir?

T: Looking back at it, no. They were defeated. But here is the thing that brought it to the issue. The atomic bomb, for my money, saved the invasion. We would have invaded when there was no need for it at all.

Q: Was the Air Force, particularly, or the Army Air Corps, at that time, particularly behind the invasion?

T: No, the people out there - LeMay - even sent in some pictures to Arnold. And I sent a message in - saw no reason for the bombing. And when the invasion force came out there - the leaders - a classmate of mine was a Chief of Staff to Hodges, who led the Army to go into the Tokyo area. And he spent the night with me at Guam. I showed him the pictures, and I talked to him like a Dutch uncle and said this invasion is unnecessary. We shouldn't do it, and he said: "Ah, you Air Force people always were crazy." Well, they went ahead, were still planning it when we dropped the bomb, and finally the message came through in about 24 hours. Now, if they had been trying to get ahold of us for a peace settlement, I don't think they were myself. They were just quibbling. They were just hoping for a miracle to happen. I don't think they would have volunteered until those bombs hit. But they did hit, and they were hit.

Q: General, although most of your experience in the war was in the Pacific, do you happen to know how you were selected to head 15th AF in Italy, later in 1943?

T: Well, that's where Hap Arnold - he came out there twice. He saw what was going on out there, and he realized it was a terrific war to fight in the Pacific. It was just touch and go all the time, we had practically nothing, and it was terrible, and wasn't anybody's fault, except it developed to quick and too fast for our logistics to back it up. He saw what I was doing down there, and he selected me - I came back at Christmas-time. In fact Harmon - we hadn't gotten into Rabaul yet, and Harmon gave me his lead(?) General Sutherland. We came back to Washington, Christmastime. I walked into Arnold's, to say hello to him, and pay my respects, and I said: "Well Miff wants us back in a couple or three weeks out there." And Arnold says: "You aren't going back." And I said: "What?" He said:"You're not going back. What day is this? I give you a week to get over to Italy and take over the 15th AF." I said: "Can't I stay home Christmas day?" Arnold said: "No, get going." I said: "Well, I haven't seen my wife for about 3 years, I'd sure like - the kids - I'd sure like to see them." "Well," he said, "tell you what I'll do. I'll give you Christmas day. Be ready to go Christmas night." The next day, Gen Vandenberg called me up and said: "Get out there!"

Q: What difficulties were encountered between the Russian air forces and your 15th AF forces - bombing activities in the same area?

T: Well, it was very, very difficult. It was practically impossible to work out liaison. You couldn't - going back to the Kremlin where they came from to get back to the forward echelon of troops. It never seemed to work out and nobody knew what

they were doing. They would do terrible things to us. We had a line that we were supposed to stay West of after the Russians got into an area. Most of our fighting was over in the Posen area. We were going way up northeast..... When we came back, we had signals for the day - what we would do in case there were people in trouble. They would shoot our bombers down - a cripple. Never got a good bomber, but they knocked the cripples down, with an engine out or something else. They were funny people up there, and we couldn't - we had orders from Washington, not to let our crews land across this imaginary line, into the Russian area under any circumstances. I just told these crews to forget that line. If you have engine trouble, you get down to the first place you can get. Of course, you may get in trouble in Washington. But go; you've got my support. So many of them did that. And the Russians were determined; they wouldn't let them go. We had a lot of trouble. And they held our prisoners, when the war was over. I don't know - we still had several thousand prisoners unaccounted for in that area. But the ones that were alive, the Russians wouldn't help them get home. I went over and picked up 2,500 boys in one day. I grounded the whole Air Force, and found out where they were, and an Air Force boy who had just been knocked down, and in good health, Dunn his name was, he convinced the Romanian pilot who was very much interested in getting the P-51s for Romania, from the United States, to fly him back to tell me what the problem was in that hospital. Dunn crawled in the back end of a Messerschmitt, black as coal in there, just the baggage compartment. Didn't know if the boy could fly or not. This Romanian flew him right through all the stuff to my base. He got in all right. Our fighter boys were smart enough to see that he

wasn't an enemy - and landed. He wanted to see what was going on. He said look in the back.... I grounded the air force the next day, and landed over there in_____and picked up 2,500 men, and some were in terrible shape, awful - gangrene setting in. We saved practically all. The Russians reported this violation to Washington, and Washington did a little reprimanding - not very severe. Then, a funny thing about the Russians. When you got to the Russians, when you got to the frontline units, and talked to them, it was perfect. They understood, they were fighting a war, but it was the back echelon that caused all the trouble. For instance, Gen Eaker and I, we had so many losses at Ploesti. We attacked 19 times, you know, and we attacked through overcast, smoke. We contributed all the fighters, 250 of them, took them out of there, and the Germans couldn't send any more back, but they put up a great defense of flak there. And smoke, it was terrible, and the crews didn't like this. They didn't know what they were hitting, if anything. And it took so many losses. I flew over to this area with Eaker. We landed in a cow pasture there, and we got ahold of the Russians, talked to their frontline leader, told them my problem, and he was very cooperative. He did everything, in fact, he got the Romanian who ran the whole complex of 15 refineries, and took us out to the thing. We saw it then. I just talked to this Romanian, and I said: "Well, we thought we destroyed 90% of your capacity." He said, General, its been out 30 days - 100%." So we felt pretty good. Much better about the losses we were taking. But then again, if we asked the Russians for permission, they wouldn't let you go near that place.

We would have never know, if you asked beforehand, and that's happened right down the line. To work with those Russians was absolutely impossible.

(Q: Did the AF, or did the AAF for too long hold to the concept that the bomber would get through and neglect the development of fighters. Twining comments on the fighter situation out in the South Pacific where he was early in the war.)

T: We were fighting with the Airacobra at Guadalcanal. They had a 15,000-foot ceiling. That was terrible. We couldn't get any fighters. Hap Arnold came out, told me we weren't going to get any. Finally, we got the P-38. Then, somebody came out there - a civilian, I guess one of the Secretaries of the Navy - Forrestal. We told him, Miff Harmon, my boss, was one of the great fighter pilots of the AF. He was so sick about the fact that we couldn't help the Navy out, all we had was some old airplanes, and the Navy had some good ships, but the carriers couldn't stay in there. You know, they would hit and run, do a good job, but they were gone. The poor guys up there in Guadalcanal were just having a terrible time, holding on to that real estate. Forrestal came back and he apparently had quite a battle. And we got word that we were getting the P-38s. And, boy, the day they came, they came in 2 days ahead of the big Japanese air attack on Guadalcanal. The Navy shot down 116 Japs. We gave a squadron to Lanphier. He was the one who shot down Yamamoto. Anyway, they came in 2 days, and I wasn't there at Guadalcanal at the time, but when the P-38s came in, even the troops who were worried about the situation, came out of the trenches all over the island, waving hats, to the fellows in the P-38s.... They saved the day.

(Q: About change of tactics that LeMay brought in on the low level fire bomb raids on Tokyo. He had three wing commanders, Gen O'Donnell, Davis and Tommy Power.) Most people seem to think that it was LeMay's decision to go ahead and change the tactics, unknown to Gen Arnold. And yet a Reader's Digest of 2 years ago, in an interview with Gen Power, said he was the one who decided to change tactics.

T: I don't know that. But I'm sure LeMay wouldn't do it without telling Gen Arnold. They thought so highly of the 29's. Curt, I think, was the one who brought it up, and recommended it to Arnold. That would be my guess, I don't know.

(Q: You do think it was Gen LeMay's idea)?

T: Yes, Yes.

(Q: Would you give us your opinions and impressions of General Arnold)?

T: Yes. He was, I think, with anybody other than his temperament, strength and courage, we wouldn't have made it. I mean the Air Force might have folded. Arnold did a real, marvelous job. Tough, rough, he told them off, he was wrong half the time. When we were in trouble, it was a Navy theater. Harmon was my boss, Harmon was the commanding general of the whole Army Air Forces in the South Pacific, under Ghormley, Naval Commander of the South Pacific area. Then we had MacArthur in the SwPac. We were moving to Rabaul - that was our goal. Miff had been writing letters to Handy. And the Navy was mad as hell at him. Anyway, Arnold came down. He said: "I want to see Harmon." I said: "Fine, Harmon is up at Guadalcanal. I'll get him right away." He said: "No, I'll go out there. Where does Ghormley hang out?" I said: "He's out on his ship." He never left the ship. This shows you how the Navy operates. This is very important, I think. Ghormley was a

real smart naval officer of the old school. He was based at New Zealand, and New Zealand was 1500 miles from Noumea, and 3,000 miles from his frontlines. And he said: "Well, this is the place." We were ordered, we shipped all of our Army of the South Pacific equipment, office supplies, and my whole headquarters was shipped - to New Zealand, of all things. Against our advice, they went there. I never saw the headquarters. I never got there. Ghormley came up to visit us at Noumea with his staff. He never went back; he never went back.

Arnold knows all this background. He knows all the things that are going on out there. He knews we need stuff, but he just won't admit it, and won't give it to us. He said: "This is a Navy theater, so let them fight the damn war." That's the way he talked. So he said: "I want to get to that ship out there." And Ghormley had never left that ship all through the war. He would not go ashore and have lunch with Harmon. Now this is a fact. He said: "My place is here by these dispatches." He had his dispatches button up here. "Here's where I belong, Miff." And he never left. This is a fact. And to the day he was released, he never left the Argonne, not even to the beach. I'm telling you the truth. They are used to a ship, when they go on an operation, getting up provisions, arms, ammunition and support. Then they go out and fight their battle and come back. I kept telling him we had to have a logistic supply to support Guadalcanal, it's a hell of a mess. Daddy Breene was my supply officer. We had to fly stuff in by night, all kinds of things to get it up there. "Let's set up a system"

(Twining told Ghormley). "Oh, don't send any ships up there." (Ghormley told him). "You've got to feed these people," said Twining. There is a division up there." And he wouldn't do it. And it went on and on. His own planner, Peck, a Marine Colonel, was telling him the same story I was telling him, and he'd been telling him for a couple of years. And he still didn't believe it. And one day, we are out there talking, and Ghormley turns to me and said: "You know, I've been thinking this over," he said. "There is something to this logistic support thing, isn't there?"

That's an absolute fact, it's unbelievable. Halsey came down on an inspection trip. Adm Halsey from up in the Pacific. My boss, Miff knew him very well. And another thing, Ghormley wouldn't let the boys take their ties off. The Navy had to wear the damn neckties and we had our collars open. It was hotter than hell. They called up from the boat and said: "Halsey is here and they'd like to see Harmon and you. Come on out and have lunch." So we had to go out there. Everyday we had to go out to see him. We went out there, who comes down the gang-plank, but Halsey with no necktie on. And the first thing Harmon said: "How about this necktie business?" And Halsey said: "We changed that." We wondered how could he change an order. And he went in, and Ghormley said: "Well, there have been some changes. Yesterday I got a message from Nimitz that Halsey is to take over command." Halsey knew nothing about it. To this day, he said, he knew nothing about it. But he took over that command that day, and the, and things started popping.

Arnold came down just before Halsey got there. I'm sorry, Halsey wasn't there when Arnold came. But Ghormley was still in command. He walked out there on that Argonne, and took it over - bodily - Arnold did. I was with him, and "Cracker" McCain was there, and he was no pushover. He was a great airman. Well, Arnold got pretty tough. He told them off. He said they'd better start fighting the war instead of trying to get somebody else to fight the war for them. Apparently, the word got back to Nimitz, and that's probably why Halsey was sent down there. I tried to get Halsey - Halsey was a fighter. This is Doc Strother again. We tried to get up to that Rabaul area, and we just couldn't reach it. Didn't have the legs. We'd go as far as we could, but none of my escort could reach it. So Doc Strother came to me and said: "Here, you tell Halsey that we will take all my fighters and go as far north as we can, and then support these carriers from that land base. Then he can send his whole stack into Rabaul." I said: "That would be pretty risky." So I went to Halsey who thought it sounded good. He said: "I don't know, I guess we can't do it." He said: "You know, Nimitz is telling me all the time I'm always getting his ships shot up." I said: "Why don't you ask him about this? He did and we had a hellave show.

So we were very close, and every time Halsey came north, he lived with me. He said, one day: "You know, you and Strother are probably the only two people who have been out here any length of time that haven't gotten the malaria. Everybody else got the malaria." He said: "how do you account for that?" I said: "Well,

quart of whiskey a day keeps the malaria away."

He said: "You're not going to run out of whiskey?" He had a good supply. He had plenty of whiskey.

But there's a man. To show you how different people are, he learned this logistic thing quick. He didn't have to be tarught a second time. Ghormley never did pick it up. Now a lot of the Navy are that way, really. They don't understand the different way an air force or army operates, as against a naval operation. Always used to fixed bases. And while you couldn't insist the key to this war in the Pacific is forward bases, you've got to have forward bases to get your stuff up, and there was no capacity for it for a long time.

It was pitiful. My brother was a Marine. He was up there in Operations in Guadalcanal. He landed there. And he would say when I'd go up to see him: "Can't you air force guys do any good," and all we had was some Airacobras. And we had to fly them from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. We were just about to lose the island. Hap said: "Get everything up there you can to help support them. Everything." So we couldn't fly the Airacobras across the water. They didn't have enough range. So I sent a message to Hap. Hap sent back, and said: "I'm sending you some planes to put belly tanks on them." And then we fabricated belly tanks and put them on the Airacobras and flew them. And the first fight they got into, they got the hell shot out of them. Used them for ground strafing after that, and they were terrific for that and Vandegrift told me - he called them a long nosed fighter - he said, best thing I ever saw in the Air Force.

November 28, 1969

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF (Ret)
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Twining:

My plans to visit the Southland are firming up. I estimate that I will be passing through South Carolina in mid-January. If it is convenient, I would very much appreciate to visit you for as long a time as your health will permit, but not more than an hour.

Since I last wrote to you, I've talked to Generals Streett and George Goddard.

I'm hopeful that you can spare me a little time to talk about your acquaintance with General Hap Arnold.

A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Enclosure

Nathan Twining, Retired Air Force General, Dies

By Richard Pearson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Nathan F. Twining, 84, a retired Air Force general who was chief of staff of the Air Force and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, died of cardiopulmonary arrest yesterday at the Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

Gen. Twining began his military career as an infantryman in the Oregon National Guard in the Mexican border campaign in 1916. In World War II, he commanded three air forces—two in the Pacific and one in the Mediterranean—and flew combat missions with all three.

He was Air Force chief of staff from 1953 to 1957. He served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation's highest military post, from 1957 until retiring from active duty in September 1960.

His decorations included three Distinguished Service Medals, two Legions of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star Medal, and two Air Medals.

In January 1943, Gen. Twining took command of the 13th Air Force, whose mission was to provide air cover for operations in the Solomon Islands.

Later that year, the heavy bomber on which he was flying a mission was forced down in the sea at night. The plane sank in less than a minute. Gen. Twining and 14 others were left with two rafts, each designed for six men. For provisions the group had one chocolate bar, a can of sardines, and a canteen only half full of water.

During the six days they spent on the rafts, they beat off a shark attack with their paddles. They survived on rain water they were able to collect and two albatrosses they shot and ate raw. All 15 men were suffering from starvation, fatigue and sunburn when they were rescued by Navy seaplanes.

In January 1944, Gen. Twining succeeded Gen. James Doolittle as commander of the 15th Air Force in the Mediterranean. Under Gen. Twining's direction the 15th gave tactical support to Gen. Mark Clark's Fifth Army, covered landings in southern France, and carried strategic bombing forays into Germany, Austria, and the Balkans. These strikes included the famed raid on the Ploesti oil fields in Romania.

After the fall of Germany, Gen. Twining returned to the Pacific, this time as commander of the 20th Air Force. His B29 Superfortresses pounded the Japanese home islands and dropped the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.



NATHAN F. TWINING

After the war, Gen. Twining headed the Air Materiel Command and the Alaskan unified command before becoming a deputy Air Force chief of staff for personnel in May 1950. Later that year he was appointed Air Force vice chief of staff, a post he held until succeeding Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg as chief of staff in June 1953.

During his years as head of the Air Force and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Twining gained a reputation for easing the acrimonious controversies that characterized inter-service relations in the immediate post-war years. He played an important role in the development of nuclear weapons and the supersonic aircraft and missiles designed to deliver them.

After leaving the Air Force, he was vice chairman of the Holt, Rinehart, and Winston publishing company. In recent years he had lived in San Antonio.

Gen. Twining was born in Wisconsin and reared in Oregon. After serving as a National Guard corporal in the Mexican border campaign, he entered the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1918. He later graduated from the Command and General Staff School and the Army's advanced flying school. Before World War II, his assignments included service with fighter squadrons, as a flying instructor and in a number of staff posts.

Survivors include his wife, the former Maude McKeever of San Antonio; two sons, Nathan A. of Baltimore, and retired Air Force Maj. Richard G. of Clearwater, Fla., and a daughter, Olivia Twining Hansell of San Antonio.

Charles Thomas, 82

ST. LOUIS (UPI)—Charles Allen ... develop the

December 19, 1969

Gen N.F. Twining, USAF(Ret)
25 N. Live Oak Road
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Twining:

Thank you for your fine response to my recent letter. My delay in acknowledging was occasioned by a visit to the Air Force Academy to research the Kuter Papers and to interview Generals Chidlaw, Atkinson, Thatcher, Partridge, Low, O.K. Niess and several others.

Incidentally, I viewed a very fine TV tape which you did a couple of years ago for the History Department faculty. I want to pursue some of those items you mentioned, with a little emphasis upon General Arnold's role.

My plans now call for me to be in the vicinity of Hilton Head Island on Saturday, January 3rd. I'm hopeful we can get together for an hour or two in the forenoon, perhaps 10:30-11:00 A.M. Please let me know if this is convenient. In any event, I'll phone before hand to confirm an appointment.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

GEN. N. F. TWINING, USAF (RET.)
25 N. Live Oak Road
Hilton Head Island, S. C. 29928

Dr Murray Green
The Pentagon
Washington DC.

Dear Mr. Green:

Relative your plans to visit South Carolina I do expect to be here the first two weeks of January and probably even for a longer period.

Will be glad to see you

Sincerely

Nathan F. Twining

October 15, 1969

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF(Ret)
Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Twining:

As you may know, John Loosbrock editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I should mention that I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the days of Stuart Symington back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up SAFOI.

I should also mention that I have been through your correspondence at the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, as I have the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr and other manuscript collections. Within the past three months, Jack Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete my interviews and am hoping that I shall have the opportunity to talk to you about General Hap Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which give some insight into his character.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well earned respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience.

There is a self-addressed envelope enclosed for your convenience.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

---- 20314

15 December 1971

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF (Ret)
25 North Live Oak Road
Hilton Head, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Twining:

I have your nice letter of the 11th and wish to assure you that your interview will never be published in any shape or form, and that your candor, which I much appreciate, will be respected by me.

Your interview is valuable, more so than most, because you "called it like it was." As such it is helpful to me to keep the facts straight and to sort out the ever-increasing volume of fiction which I find in print about World War II and other historic events of recent date.

After I'm long gone, which I dont anticipate for some time yet, I shall dedicate my files to the scholars at the Air Force Academy. I was out there a short time ago and talked to three history classes about Hap Arnold - and also to visit my boy, a "doolie" in the Class of '75. These young professors at the Academy are doing a fine job and have expressed great interest in about 180 interviews which I have conducted to date. As I say, I will some day make them available with the caveat of no direct quotation.

And now, with that lengthy preface, I invite you to make any changes you desire. To that end, I enclose an envelope. If you wish to send the text back with the changes, I'll make them on the original clean draft and the rough copy that came right off the tape. These are the only two copies of your interview extant - besides your copy.

Still trying to run down "Woggy" Towle. I guess General Mike Scanlon's information was just rumor.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF (Ret.)
25 North Live Oak Road
Hilton Head Island, S. C. 29928

Dec 11, 1971.

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History:
Dear Murray:

I have received your letter of December 2d & the copy of the interview about the Arnold Biography.

With regard to the Biography I feel, though it is factual, it should be re-edited some what. and it would not be good to publish in its present form with regards to some personal remarks of my own. I m other words it can be improved for the readers. & still have the facts. This should be done before any release.

I will be glad to edit from this end on the copy you sent to me.

With regard to Woggit Fowle- he is not Lesa on Hilton Head Island because I would have known about it, am sure he still lives in Washington D.C.

Drop me a line about my redditing my comments.

With best regards
Sincerely
Vito Turnino

2 December 1971

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF (Ret)
25 North Live Oak Road
Hilton Head, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Twining:

I'm the fellow working on the Hap Arnold story. I'm surprised but it's nearly two years ago since we had our talk.

I have three reasons for writing:

1) To Congratulate you on your recent birthday. General Eaker told me that he was going down with a group to pay tribute to you. I know that must have been a wonderful success. Many more happy and healthy years ahead for you, we hope.

2) I never did send you a copy of our interview. I thought you might like to have one. It is enclosed.

3) I interviewed General Mike Scanlon the other day and he said that Stewart "Woggy" Towle was now settled in Hilton Head. If that is true, I'd like to talk to him about his recollections of Hap Arnold. If it is, do you happen to know his present address?

The Arnold Biography is bogged down in a political morass. It should have been finished by now but has a long way to go. My collaborator got out of it which left me, a Government person, doing it alone. I dont mind that so much, but we had a contract with Random House which placed me in a situation of working on a private enterprise while on the Air Force payroll. We are just now in a process of working it out so that I may proceed.

Read about that fine golf tournament down your way. I'm sure it caused a lot of excitement and brought many tourists "which aint so good". Once they see what you have, they dont want to leave.

Did you know that Hugh Knerr passed away last month? I've been given the task of going through his papers which he has endowed to the U.S. Air Force Academy Library, and so I'll be heading for Florida next month.

All good wishes to you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Lt. Stewart W. Towle Jr

O-15360

done
7 Jan 70

December 19, 1969

Gen N.F. Twining, USAF(Ret)
25 N. Live Oak Road
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

Dear General Twining:

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My plans now call for me to be in the vicinity of Hilton Head Island on Saturday, January 3rd. I'm hopeful we can get together for an hour or two in the forenoon, perhaps starting 10:30-11:00 A.M. Please let me know if this is convenient. In any event, I'll phone before hand to confirm an appointment.

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Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

GEN. N. F. TWINING, USAF (RET.)
25 N. Live Oak Road
Hilton Head Island, S. C. 29928

Dr Murray Green
The Pentagon
Washington DC.

Dear Mr. Green:

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Sincerely

Nathan F. Twining

November 28, 1969

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Sea Pines Plantation
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina 29928

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DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Enclosure

S Pac

Turning

1. Cabell said - talk to T. about Arnold's trip to So Pac - About McCain + Ghormley.

2. Re Jack up Cabell to Pacific Ocean Areas Sept 1943 - Re loss rates - Also to Hamon

Trubshaw granted in E-Ring
OK Tom Handy / Army


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DEPARTMENT OF THE [illegible]
WASHINGTON [illegible]

SECRETARY

ber 15, 1969

ral Nathan F. Twining, USAF (Ret
Pines Plantation
on Head Island, South Carolina

General Twining:

As you may know, John Loosbrock [illegible] ce/Space
ht, and I are writing a history [illegible] rnold. I
d mention that I'm a professional [illegible] ned to the
ce of the Secretary since the [illegible] gton back
947. In those days I worked for [illegible] ach and
ral Rosie O'Donnell who then [illegible]

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script collections. Within the [illegible] Jack Loosbrock
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ey, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, [illegible] eral others.

I plan to be down in the Southern [illegible] ty to
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n give some insight into the [illegible]

I hope this letter finds you [illegible] hat you are
roughly enjoying your well earned [illegible] Washington
ther "wars." I also hope that [illegible] e for you
ive me an hour or two of time [illegible]

There is a self-addressed envelope [illegible] our
nience.

lysis Div

INTERVIEW OF GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING
NOVEMBER 3, 1967
(Re-transcription)

(Question about General Arnold and General Spaatz)

T: My experience with those fine officers was very rewarding. I served quite a bit with General Arnold, and probably more with Gen Spaatz. Gen Spaatz, you know, was in command of the strategic air forces in Europe and which had the 8th AF, based in England. The 15th, the one I commanded in Italy. He was my immediate boss. I saw a great deal of him then. Wonderful man to work for, he had great vision and wonderful tactical sense, and that's what made him such a great leader. Of course, Arnold was in the position where he had to do all the hard work in Washington. His job was fantastic. He couldn't do the things he wanted to do. He had to do the things that would build this Air Force up, which meant spending lots of his time with logistics, something he didn't like. But it was vital to the cause and he went into this war with great vim and vigor and I think to him is due to the great success of the Air Force in the war - more than anybody else.

(The next questions pertain to the B-29s and the use of the atomic bomb in the Pacific)

T: Basically, it was a real good airplane. Did have a certain engine trouble with it - difficulty. But we mastered most of those by the time the offensive on Japan was going on, they operated very well. And I think I got there when the war was about over. I got out in July and took command. I was there

when the war ended a month later. But the operation was excellent. Saw the pictures, saw all the bombing. There was no need for anything else.

Q: Was it necessary for us to drop the atomic bomb, do you think, sir?

T: Looking back at it, no. They were defeated. But here is the thing that brought it to the issue. The atomic bomb, for my money, saved the invasion. We would have invaded when there was no need for it at all.

Q: Was the Air Force, particularly, or the Army Air Corps, at that time, particularly behind the invasion?

T: No, the people out there - LeMay - even sent in some pictures to Arnold. And I sent a message in - saw no reason for the bombing. And when the invasion force came out there - the leaders - a classmate of mine was a Chief of Staff to Hodges, who led the Army to go into the Tokyo area. And he spent the night with me at Guam. I showed him the pictures, and I talked to him like a Dutch uncle and said this invasion is unnecessary. We shouldn't do it, and he said: "Ah, you Air Force people always were crazy." Well, they went ahead, were still planning it when we dropped the bomb, and finally the message came through in about 24 hours. Now, if they had been trying to get ahold of us for a peace settlement, I don't think they were myself. They were just quibbling. They were just hoping for a miracle to happen. I don't think they would have volunteered until those bombs hit. But they did hit, and they were hit.

Q: General, although most of your experience in the war was in the Pacific, do you happen to know how you were selected to head 15th AF in Italy, later in 1943?

T: Well, that's where Hap Arnold - he came out there twice. He saw what was going on out there, and he realized it was a terrific war to fight in the Pacific. It was just touch and go all the time, we had practically nothing, and it was terrible, and wasn't anybody's fault, except it developed to quick and too fast for our logistics to back it up. He saw what I was doing down there, and he selected me - I came back at Christmas-time. In fact Harmon - we hadn't gotten into Rabaul yet, and Harmon gave me his lead(?) General Sutherland. We came back to Washington, Christmastime. I walked into Arnold's, to say hello to him, and pay my respects, and I said: "Well Miff wants us back in a couple or three weeks out there." And Arnold says: "You aren't going back." And I said: "What?" He said:"You're not going back.. What day is this? I give you a week to get over to Italy and take over the 15th AF." I said: "Can't I stay home Christmas day?" Arnold said: "No, get going." I said: "Well, I haven't seen my wife for about 3 years, I'd sure like - the kids - I'd sure like to see them." "Well," he said, "tell you what I'll do. I'll give you Christmas day. Be ready to go Christmas night." The next day, Gen Vandenberg called me up and said: "Get out there!"

Q: What difficulties were encountered between the Russian air forces and your 15th AF forces - bombing activities in the same area?

T: Well, it was very, very difficult. It was practically impossible to work out liaison. You couldn't - going back to the Kremlin where they came from to get back to the forward echelon of troops. It never seemed to work out and nobody knew what

they were doing. They would do terrible things to us. We had a line that we were supposed to stay West of after the Russians got into an area. Most of our fighting was over in the Posen area. We were going way up northeast..... When we came back, we had signals for the day - what we would do in case there were people in trouble. They would shoot our bombers down - a cripple. Never got a good bomber, but they knocked the cripples down, with an engine out or something else. They were funny people up there, and we couldn't - we had orders from Washington, not to let our crews land across this imaginary line, into the Russian area under any circumstances. I just told these crews to forget that line. If you have engine trouble, you get down to the first place you can get. Of course, you may get in trouble in Washington. But go; you've got my support. So many of them did that. And the Russiand were determined; they wouldn't let them go. We had a lot of trouble. And they held our prisoners, when the war was over. I don't know - we still had several thousand prisoners unaccounted for in that area. But the ones that were alive, the Russians wouldn't help them get home. I went over and picked up 2,500 boys in one day. I grounded the whole Air Force, and found out where they were, and an Air Force boy who had just been knocked down, and in good health, Dunn his name was, he convinced the Romanian pilot who was very much interested in getting the P-51s for Romania, from the United States, to fly him back to tell me what the problem was in that hospital. Dunn crawled in the back end of a Messerschmitt, black as coal in there, just the baggage compartment. Didn't know if the boy could fly or not. This Romanian flew him right through all the stuff to my base. He got in all right. Our fighter boys were smart enough to see that he

wasn't an enemy - and landed. He wanted to see what was going on. He said look in the back.... I grounded the air force the next day, and landed over there in_____and picked up 2,500 men, and some were in terrible shape, awful - gangrene setting in. We saved practically all. The Russians reported this violation to Washington, and Washington did a little reprimanding - not very severe. Then, a funny thing about the Russians. When you got to the Russians, when you got to the frontline units, and talked to them, it was perfect. They understood, they were fighting a war, but it was the back echelon that caused all the trouble. For instance, Gen Eaker and I, we had so many losses at Ploesti. We attacked 19 times, you know, and we attacked through overcast, smoke. We contributed all the fighters, 250 of them, took them out of there, and the Germans couldn't send any more back, but they put up a great defense of flak there. And smoke, it was terrible, and the crews didn't like this. They didn't know what they were hitting, if anything. And it took so many losses. I flew over to this area with Eaker. We landed in a cow pasture there, and we got ahold of the Russians, talked to their frontline leader, told them my problem, and he was very cooperative. He did everything, in fact, he got the Romanian who ran the whole complex of 15 refineries, and took us out to the thing. We saw it then. I just talked to this Romanian, and I said: "Well, we thought we destroyed 90% of your capacity." He said, General, its been out 30 days - 100%." So we felt pretty good. Much better about the losses we were taking. But then again, if we asked the Russians for permission, they wouldn't let you go near that place.

We would have never know, if you asked beforehand, and that's happened right down the line. To work with those Russians was absolutely impossible.

(Q: Did the AF, or did the AAF for too long hold to the concept that the bomber would get through and neglect the development of fighters. Twining comments on the fighter situation out in the South Pacific where he was early in the war.)

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INTERVIEW OF GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING
NOVEMBER 3, 1967
(Re-transcription)

(Question about General Arnold and General Spaatz)

T: My experience with those fine officers was very rewarding. I served quite a bit with General Arnold, and probably more with Gen Spaatz. Gen Spaatz, you know, was in command of the strategic air forces in Europe and which had the 8th AF, based in England. The 15th, the one I commanded in Italy. He was my immediate boss. I saw a great deal of him then. Wonderful man to work for, he had great vision and wonderful tactical sense, and that's what made him such a great leader. Of course, Arnold was in the position where he had to do all the hard work in Washington. His job was fantastic. He couldn't do the things he wanted to do. He had to do the things that would build this Air Force up, which meant spending lots of his time with logistics, something he didn't like. But it was vital to the cause and he went into this war with great vim and vigor and I think to him is due to the great success of the Air Force in the war - more than anybody else.

(The next questions pertain to the B-29s and the use of the atomic bomb in the Pacific)

T: Basically, it was a real good airplane. Did have a certain engine trouble with it - difficulty. But we mastered most of those by the time the offensive on Japan was going on, they operated very well. And I think I got there when the war was about over. I got out in July and took command. I was there

when the war ended a month later. But the operation was excellent. Saw the pictures, saw all the bombing. There was no need for anything else.

Q: Was it necessary for us to drop the atomic bomb, do you think, sir?

T: Looking back at it, no. They were defeated. But here is the thing that brought it to the issue. The atomic bomb, for my money, saved the invasion. We would have invaded when there was no need for it at all.

Q: Was the Air Force, particularly, or the Army Air Corps, at that time, particularly behind the invasion?

T: No, the people out there - LeMay - even sent in some pictures to Arnold. And I sent a message in - saw no reason for the bombing. And when the invasion force came out there - the leaders - a classmate of mine was a Chief of Staff to Hodges, who led the Army to go into the Tokyo area. And he spent the night with me at Guam. I showed him the pictures, and I talked to him like a Dutch uncle and said this invasion is unnecessary. We shouldn't do it, and he said: "Ah, you Air Force people always were crazy." Well, they went ahead, were still planning it when we dropped the bomb, and finally the message came through in about 24 hours. Now, if they had been trying to get ahold of us for a peace settlement, I don't think they were myself. They were just quibbling. They were just hoping for a miracle to happen. I don't think they would have volunteered until those bombs hit. But they did hit, and they were hit.

Q: General, although most of your experience in the war was in the Pacific, do you happen to know how you were selected to head 15th AF in Italy, later in 1943?

T: Well, that's where Hap Arnold - he came out there twice. He saw what was going on out there, and he realized it was a terrific war to fight in the Pacific. It was just touch and go all the time, we had practically nothing, and it was terrible, and wasn't anybody's fault, except it developed to quick and too fast for our logistics to back it up. He saw what I was doing down there, and he selected me - I came back at Christmastime. In fact Harmon - we hadn't gotten into Rabaul yet, and Harmon gave me his lead(?) General Sutherland. We came back to Washington, Christmastime. I walked into Arnold's, to say hello to him, and pay my respects, and I said: "Well Miff wants us back in a couple or three weeks out there." And Arnold says: "You aren't going back." And I said: "What?" He said:"You're not going back.. What day is this? I give you a week to get over to Italy and take over the 15th AF." I said: "Can't I stay home Christmas day?" Arnold said: "No, get going." I said: "Well, I haven't seen my wife for about 3 years, I'd sure like - the kids - I'd sure like to see them." "Well," he said, "tell you what I'll do. I'll give you Christmas day. Be ready to go Christmas night." The next day, Gen Vandenberg called me up and said: "Get out there!"

Q: What difficulties were encountered between the Russian air forces and your 15th AF forces - bombing activities in the same area?

T: Well, it was very, very difficult. It was practically impossible to work out liaison. You couldn't - going back to the Kremlin where they came from to get back to the forward echelon of troops. It never seemed to work out and nobody knew what

they were doing. They would do terrible things to us. We had a line that we were supposed to stay West of after the Russians got into an area. Most of our fighting was over in the Posen area. We were going way up northeast..... When we came back, we had signals for the day - what we would do in case there were people in trouble. They would shoot our bombers down - a cripple. Never got a good bomber, but they knocked the cripples down, with an engine out or something else. They were funny people up there, and we couldn't - we had orders from Washington, not to let our crews land across this imaginary line, into the Russian area under any circumstances. I just told these crews to forget that line. If you have engine trouble, you get down to the first place you can get. Of course, you may get in trouble in Washington. But go; you've got my support. So many of them did that. And the Russiand were determined; they wouldn't let them go. We had a lot of trouble. And they held our prisoners, when the war was over. I don't know - we still had several thousand prisoners unaccounted for in that area. But the ones that were alive, the Russians wouldn't help them get home. I went over and picked up 2,500 boys in one day. I grounded the whole Air Force, and found out where they were, and an Air Force boy who had just been knocked down, and in good health, Dunn his name was, he convinced the Romanian pilot who was very much interested in getting the P-51s for Romania, from the United States, to fly him back to tell me what the problem was in that hospital. Dunn crawled in the back end of a Messerschmitt, black as coal in there, just the baggage compartment. Didn't know if the boy could fly or not. This Romanian flew him right through all the stuff to my base. He got in all right. Our fighter boys were smart enough to see that he

wasn't an enemy - and landed. He wanted to see what was going on. He said look in the back.... I grounded the air force the next day, and landed over there in_____ and picked up 2,500 men, and some were in terrible shape, awful - gangrene setting in. We saved practically all. The Russians reported this violation to Washington, and Washington did a little reprimanding - not very severe. Then, a funny thing about the Russians. When you got to the Russians, when you got to the frontline units, and talked to them, it was perfect. They understood, they were fighting a war, but it was the back echelon that caused all the trouble. For instance, Gen Eaker and I, we had so many losses at Ploesti. We attacked 19 times, you know, and we attacked through overcast, smoke. We contributed all the fighters, 250 of them, took them out of there, and the Germans couldn't send any more back, but they put up a great defense of flak there. And smoke, it was terrible, and the crews didn't like this. They didn't know what they were hitting, if anything. And it took so many losses. I flew over to this area with Eaker. We landed in a cow pasture there, and we got ahold of the Russians, talked to their frontline leader, told them my problem, and he was very cooperative. He did everything, in fact, he got the Romanian who ran the whole complex of 15 refineries, and took us out to the thing. We saw it then. I just talked to this Romanian, and I said: "Well, we thought we destroyed 90% of your capacity." He said, General, its been out 30 days - 100%." So we felt pretty good. Much better about the losses we were taking. But then again, if we asked the Russians for permission, they wouldn't let you go near that place.

We would have never know, if you asked beforehand, and that's happened right down the line. To work with those Russians was absolutely impossible.

(Q: Did the AF, or did the AAF for too long hold to the concept that the bomber would get through and neglect the development of fighters. Twining comments on the fighter situation out in the South Pacific where he was early in the war.)

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INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING
HILTON HEAD ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA
JANUARY 2, 1970

Q: Do you recall the first time you met General Arnold?

T: No, I don't - the first time I had any close association was just before they made that Alaska flight, do you remember?

Q: That would be 1934?

T: Right; he called me up. I was the Technical Supervisor down at Texas, to join the group, and I was Asst Engineering Officer to Johnny Corkille, and Johnny was a fine engineer. Wonderful pilot; top pilot. I worked along, and I was first alternate to Jack Mills, a LT down there. We had the alternate airplanes, the spare, and if anything happened toanother airplane we got to go. Otherwise we were just equipped and going as far as Minneapolis. If everybody got off - the senior fellows - we didn't go, we came home. That's the way it turned out. All the ships got off.

Q: Well, they only had one slight accident - after they got up there. So you never made that Alaskan trip?

T: No. Never did.

Q: I wanted to ask you, you were fairly close to that trip. Somebody that I have interviewed has told me that he thought Arnold didn't look after the guys who made that trip - by way of recognition. They never got an award for that flight.

T: Well, I certainly got nothing out of it. He was - I don't think he did follow up too much on it.

Q: Arnold got the Mackay trophy, and then he later, three years later, he got the DFC.

T: I don't think he did a thing for anyone. No awards. He thanked them, of course. They were glad to go and happy to go.

Q: This was a tremendous feat.

T: For those days, it was pretty good.

Q: For those days, getting all those planes up there and getting them all back, and doing the job of photographic reconnaissance, and making a good will flight. Of course, the Air Corps was trying to erase the air mail black eye. Wasn't this one of the reasons they authorized the Alaskan flight?

T: No, I think they just wanted it - a wonderful airplane. The Martin B-10 with first monoplane airplane we had, and it was a real fine flying machine. We had flown it quite a bit and we knew it would do great things, and that's why it was selected for this flight.

Q: Do you know why Arnold was chosen to head it up?

T: No. I mean he came in and got us all together the first day. He came in from California. He was complaining about it; he was pulled off a trout fishing trip.

Q: He was in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. With his wife. He was taking a/vacation deferred because he was working on this air mail thing, and they yanked him out of this vacation and gave him the job. Do you know why they gave it to him instead of somebody else?

T: No, I don't know why except they thought he was a pretty good leader, and pretty close to the boss.

Q: The boss being Foulois?

T: Yes.

Q: How did Arnold and Foulois get along?

T: I thought they got along pretty well.

Q: Have you seen Foulois' book?

T: No.

Q: We are talking about the air mail...

T: I was on duty at Texas, we had just gotten some brand new airplanes, A-12, Ft. Clark at Texas. Col Hickam was my commanding officer and they called him and told him they wanted me to take the Central Zone of the air mail which was based in Chicago. We had no warning, we just moved. We took all these brand new airplanes we had - the A-12, which is about the only airplane the Air Corps had which had a two-way radio, brand new. We were way ahead of any other unit. We were based in Chicago. We couldn't use the hangars; we couldn't use any facilities. They got that on 1 February. The weather got down to below zero, and there we are maintaining this stuff outdoors. And that's what I got mad about. We could have done a pretty good job if they had given us a break. But they didn't give us a break. But they didn't give us a break. They said: "No." The airlines wouldn't give us the stuff they had. Of course we couldn't move up there in the winter and operate anything. And that's what happened there in that area. In the NY area and north of there - Buffalo and through there, it was pretty rugged.

Q: Foulois has the implication that the airlines were sabotaging the air mail.

T: They were trying, I think he was right. They weren't helping us a bit.

Q: Well, why should they help you, they lost their contracts.

T: Sure, that's natural.

Q: In fact, you were on your own. But you were in the Central Zone under Hickam. Did you have any contact with Arnold? Arnold was in the Western Zone.

T: Very little. We had a wonderful record, we lost one airplane.

Q: It was a bad winter. It was one of the worst winters in history.

T: I was running my engines all night. The eastern zone sent in those Keystone bombers. They were sitting out on the front porch - that bomber was wide open - in below zero weather. And they come in to Chicago and I had to service them. Run engines all night and the crews almost died - the ground crews. Hickam, he's pretty tough. He finally called them, and said: "Don't you ever send another airplane in here. We're through." Rosie O'Donnell came in one night. He had that brand new big monoplane thing, the new one. It hadn't been flown at all.

Q: B-12?

T: No. The B-9. Anyway, he landed and went down to the one place. We had heat within an old privy. The airport had an old wood stove going, and everybody was keeping warm. Rosie came in there with his Indian head on his jacket. Hickam looked at him, and knew him from his football days. Hickam said: "Rosie what are you doing here?" Rosie said: "I flew this leg of the

air mail in from the Selfridge Field area." Hickam said: "How much time have you had on that bomber, the B-9." Rosie said: "Just about the first time I've flown it." It was the middle of the night, below zero. Well, Hickam said: "I have a car right outside. You go get in that car and go down to the hotel, and get a night's rest." Rosie said: "No sir, I can't do that. I can't do that. I'm supposed to go back on this flight." Hickam said: "I'm running this place." Rosie replied: "I'm in the Eastern Zone." Hickam:"You get in that car and get out of here right now." Rosie left, and Hickam called up B.Q. Jones and told him: "Don't you ever pull this again." He told him about Rosie - young and didn't know much about flying. It was suicide. But that's what we had to do.

Q: The Eastern had to fly over the Appalachians, that was rough. And then, the Western Zone had to fly over the Rockies, minimal communications, radio and weather information.

T: Maintenance, you couldn't get any maintenance. They were flying fighters down South - P-12s, and all that stuff.

Q: Well, part of the black eye resulted from questions that were raised in Congress and in the press. If they couldn't fly the mail, how ere they going to fight a war? And this was one of the reasons that some people have ascribed to the Alaskan flight. They want to show that the Air Corps could do something. Then they had the Baker Board come in there. You had no contact with Arnold in the '30s? When was your first contact, during the war, or before the war?

T: That was during the air mail thing. That would be the first close contact.

Q: Actually, your first direct contact with him may have been during the war, when he came out to the Pacific in Sept 1942?

T: Oh, no. I'd known him in Washington, I was stationed in the Pentagon later but I mean in the early, yes, I knew him in the Pentagon.

Q: What was your job in the Pentagon?

T: I was Asst to Earl Naiden who had the A-3 part of the war operations, and I was in that section. Hayt Vandenberg and I were together in that section. War Organization and Movement was the name of it.

Q: Then you knew a guy named Ferson.

T: Very well. He was my boss.

Q: What happened to Ferson?

T: Steve Ferson. He had a heart attack.

T: He died in Arnold's office.

Q: That's what I want to know. I have two different stories on that.

T: He had a heart attack in Arnold's office. Arnold just raised hell with him.

Q: Arnold raised hell with him, and he dropped dead.

T: But Arnold liked him. Ferson was with us in the Chicago air mail and did a good job.

Q: Steve is that what they called him?

T: Yes.

Q: I have two different versions of this. This reminds me out of something like Arsenic and Old Lace. You know, moving the bodies, I suspect that he died in Arnold's office, and they

carried him next door to Lovett's office, because Streett tells me that he saw him in Lovett's office. They may have carried him in to Lovett's office because they didn't want the story to get out.

T: I don't know where he passed away. But he had the attack in Arnold's office. Arnold raised hell; scared him to death.

Q: Did Arnold ever raise hell with you?

T: No. He pulled some phonies - some bad ones - but most of them turned out pretty good.

Q: Like waht?

T: Well, I shouldn't tell this. I won't tell this one about the Navy. Here we are down there in Guadacanal, fighting a losing war. We were losing the war, and the Air Force was getting no equipment whatsoever. Miff Harmon was the boss of the Air, and he was highly respected by the Navy, and Arnold wouldn't give him a damn thing. He wouldn't give him a decent airplane to fly in. That's how he got killed, flying a bunch of junk when he should have had a decent airplane. Miff would write longhand letters to him. Nobody ever knew this but me, I was his Chief of Staff. Miff is one of the greatest guys that ever lived. Capable. He wasn't a hard tough guy, but he was really a brilliant tactician. Everybody loved him. He went down there with the Navy. Arnold sent him down there because he knew he could handle the Navy; get along with the Navy. Nobody else could. Miff was doing a helleva job. Ghormley was the first commander. He was no good. Harmon saved his life several times. He was no good. And finally, Arnold convinced Nimitz to get rid of him.

Q: Get rid of Ghormley?

T: And they sent in Bull Halsey. Bull came down there. The war changed overnight. Really, he and Harmon went to town; did a hell of a job. And Arnold never gave Miff Harmon one iota of credit. Arnold came down on an inspection trip; moved in on the Navy. I don't know if I should tell this.

Q: We are not going to use all this...

T: He just moved in on the Navy ship.

Q: Arnold moved in on the Navy ship?

T: Moved in and told them off. How to run the Navy, how to run the whole damned business and he wasn't going to give the Air Force outfit a damned thing. It was the Navy who was supposed to run it, and he wasn't going to give the Air Force down there a damned thing. He had a war in Europe and wasn't going to give them a thing.

Q: Were you present during this discussion?

T: Yes. All of it.

Q: Was this on Ghormley's command ship?

T: On Noumea base. They had a tough Marine planner on Ghormley's staff and he told Hap Arnold off. Told him he didn't know what he was talking about. He was no damned good; he wasn't supporting his forces. Real tough.

Q: I guess a Marine could talk to Arnold like this, but you guys had to take it from Arnold.

T: Ghormley finally kicked him off the ship. It was insulting to all. Very. He thought he would get more done with the Navy, and he wouldn't have to give anything to the Air Force

to help. None of us liked it a bit. That's the way the guys felt. I was there 18 months. Arnold called me back to Washington. I was going to get a month's leave, and then I would come back down again for the spring offensive. I hit Washington around Christmas time (1943 and paid my respects to Arnold. He said: "How are things going down in that awful place." I said: "Going pretty good; picking up a little bit. He said, well get ready to go, you are leaving tomorrow for Europe." I said: "What's that?" He said: "You are not going back. You're not going back to Guadalcanal." There were three of us - Hank Everest, Doc Strother and me." He said: "You're going to take over from Jimmy Doolittle; Jimmy's going up to take the 8th Air Force." I said: "I can't go over there; I don't feel good; I'm in bad shape." And I thought I had everything - malaria. Well, it ended up - he gave me two or three days. I wanted to go quail shooting awful bad. He said: "Pat Partridge is going over; and you're going over with him in an airplane. Day after tomorrow." Christmas Day, I think it was. I talked but I couldn't get out of it. I left, I went over and spent about 18 months over there' 15th AF. Then I really got to feeling bad. The war is over - VE Day. I said: "Thank God this thing is over. I came back and paid my respects again. And he said: "How are you feeling?" And I said: "I've got a cancer - bad shape." He said: "What? You are going out to Guam. You are going over to relieve LeMay!" And I said: "I can't do that!" And he said: "You are going over to relieve LeMay right now!" I said: "I'm in bad shape." I hadn't seen my family. I'd been gone for over a year and a half. I couldn't go

back to Guam. I had no interest in the damn war. I'd fought those Japs once before. I said: "I don't want to go back there." He said: "You are going." Tell you what I'm going to do, if you think that your're sick. I have a cabin down there... You take the wife and kids to go down."

Q: Was this down in Coral Gables, Florida?

T: Yes, and he said: "They've got some fine doctors down there - most of them Navy, but they are good doctors." And he said: "They will put you through the mill, and I'll tell them to find out what's wrong with you. If you've got this sickness you say you have, ok. But if you are normal, you are going to Guam, period." So I went down there, went through this thing, and the doctors told me, they gave me the works. They called me before the board - most of them Navy. They told me: "We can't find a damn thing wrong with you." So I went to Guam.

Q: Well, actually, you became the 20th AF Commander. And then LeMay moved up to USASTAF?

T: Yes. They didn't want to send LeMay back. It would look bad, LeMay coming back.

Q: Why didn't they want to send him back?

T: It would have looked good. LeMay was a big shot, coming back - No. That's what I told Hap. I said: "He's doing great, I don't want to go over there." Arnold said: "He's not!"

Q: Really!

T: LeMay (Nimitz?) was then getting his fifth star and the Navy was about to cut his throat from ear to ear, and LeMay was most of his trouble. LeMay was insulting the Navy every day at his headquarters.

Q: Well, this is because the Navy wasn't giving them any air base logistic support?

T: Oh, he had everything.

Q: He did?

T: Oh yes. He had everything. But he said the Navy wasn't doing any good out there; to quit bombing and he'd take it over. There's some truth in that.

Q: So Nimitz was having trouble with LeMay.

T: Oh yes.

Q: So they didn't want LeMay to come back because it wouldn't look good?

T: The big hero? If it wasn't for his combat record...he would have been fired. But that's where I ended up.

Q: Actually, you were the commander of the atomic bomb. Were you not?

T: I'd never heard of it. I moved out there and the first greeting I got when I landed in an old B-17 on the water. I was there 8 days. I was tired of that ocean....

Q: That's right, you were down for 8 days. Was that coming out there then?

T: No, that was at Guadalcanal during the first part of the war. So I landed at Guam midnight. Just my aide and I took off. LeMay met me. I'd never seen him before. Midnight -- all alone, nobody else. He said: "What the hell are you doing here?" And I said: "Move over, I'm taking over." And that was it.

Q: Well, they moved him up to become...

T: Chief of Staff to Tooey. He had just organized the two air forces - Jimmy in Okinawa.

Q: Tooey Spaatz - wasn't Giles in there and LeMay was the third man. He was Deputy Chief of Staff.

T: Just holding him over. Trying to be nice to him, so he wouldn't have to come back here...until the war was over.

Q: Everybody has associated LeMay with having dropped the atomic bomb.

T: He had nothing to do with it. On the decision and the responsibility, you couldn't find him.

Q: I was the only one there? Where was Spaatz?

T: I told them I wasn't going to drop the bomb. They were there, but you couldn't see them. I didn't even talk to them. The decision came that they were going to drop this bomb....

Q: The decision came to you? Where did it come from?

T: First, it came to the 20th AF. Tooey knew, and Tooey told me about it. In the 20th AF. I said I'm in command. I'm not going to drop any A-bomb. I'd never heard of it. Why should I stick my neck out. I'll go on home, but I won't drop the A-bomb. That went on for a little while, and they wouldn't tell me anything about it.

Q: Oh, you didn't know anything about it?

T: Never heard of the thing; I'd been fighting a war.

Q: But they asked you to drop a weapon? They didn't describe it?

T: They said it wasn't going to be escorted. It wasn't going to be this; it wasn't going to be that." I said: "what's going on?" "And you can't bring it back." He said: "You get up over Japan and you can't drop it - Spaatz said:...you've got to drop it, under visual -impossible conditions. Field conditions

had to exist, and they never had it up there that I ever knew of. It was 2,000 miles away. They never had any idea what the weather was. Had to drop it visually; you couldn't bring it back; and you couldn't drop it in the ocean. Now, what do you do? Of course, that never had to be answered. I had that question to solve. And I was going to bring it back and land it on Tinian...

Q: You were going to bring it back? If you couldn't find... Didn't they pass up the first target?

T: No, the first one was perfect.

Q: I mean, with Hiroshima the primary target?

T: Yes, Number 1 and they got clear weather. It went up there unescorted, because we had sent the photo planes up before and they didn't get attacked. So that one made sense. But it was never touched, and it had clear visibility, and the mission was 100% perfect. The second one was messed up.

Q: The second one, I believe, was Kokura, was it not? Or Niigata?

T: No, it was, when we got down on the coast, Nagasaki...

Q: Nagasaki was where they dropped it. But didn't they pass up some target to drop it on Nagasaki?

T: It was an alternate target; it was a good target. But the bombing was bad.

Q: Wasn't the primary target Kokura?

T: Yes. Another target.

Q: That was socked in and Nagasaki was the "lucky" target. I read something where Spaatz wanted to drop a third one on Tokyo. Do you ever see anything like that?

T: No.

Q: There was a period of time after the second one was dropped. The second one was dropped on the 9th, and then the Japs started negotiating, they sent a team into Ie Shima, do you remember that. There was a period of stalling, and there was some discussion with Washington, about pushing the Japs over. The Japs were on the brink. They were struggling between the military and the civilian authorities about who should control the government. And Spaatz had this idea - at least this is what I saw in some document - of tipping the scales over toward surrender. He wanted to drop a third one on Tokyo. But I don't think they had a third one. You didn't have a third one. Did you?

T: The third one was on the way. It was not out there.

Q: When did you find out about the atomic bomb?

T: When I got out to Guam. I heard people talk about this creation they were building, and I didn't know what it was. They wouldn't tell me about it. They told me -- I'm talking about the scientists -- and I'm supposed to get the information from them, but they didn't tell me anything. So I said: "Sorry, gentlemen, but the 20th AF is not dropping its bombs with me here. Somebody else can do it, but I won't. They they went back to Tooey and talked to everybody in Washington. So I was cleared to go inside and get the whole dope on the bomb. And that took a couple of days. And I walked into a room which wasn't much bigger than this, and here was that bomb sitting there. Ralson was the name of the top scientist. Helleva fine fine fellow. I walked over and I saw this "bucket" sitting over there. I pretty near

threw up when I saw it - protuberances, junk hanging all over it. I thought it was a model - a dummy. No that's the bomb, that was the bomb.

Q: That was "The Fat Boy?"

T: Yes, and it had junk hanging all over it. And that's the way it was going to be dropped. So, they gave me all the business, it was a real fine briefing. They told me what they were going to do, and I couldn't believe that.

Q: Did you understand what they were talking about?

T: Oh yes. They told me what it would do when it hit the target; suck up all the water out of the ocean; do all these terrible things; kill all these people. I said: "That's for the birds." I said: "I'll trust you if you say that's what it'll do." We've got to go ahead and drop this bomb, drop it on a target; it's all cut and dried. I said: "Well, one more thing. I want to talk to the crew." They said: "Okay." We went out, got the crew lined up and went out. I stepped up to the crew. They had the top bombardier of the 15th AF.

Q: Was that Farrell or Ferrell?

T: Farrell, that's the guy. Wonderful fellow. And "Greasy" Groves was there. But bombardier was my head bombardier, and I said: "I'm glad to see you. Maybe I can get some information." I said: "What about this pumpkin I just looked at up there?" He said: "Don't you worry about it. We had some dummies made like it. We've been practicing with it. And from what I understand we can bomb with great accuracy for the job. We can't miss." He said: "If we can get a clear day."

Q: That was a tremendous experience. You know, nobody associates you with it. Maybe it's just as well. Nobody associates you with dropping the bomb; everybody associates LeMay with it.

T: Yes.

Q: You mentioned Ghormley. McCain was in on that South Pacific?

T: Yes. Tiger McCain. He died on the way back. I brought him home from the surrender. He was a great guy. He was with us in Guadalcanal. He was Air Operations officer for a long time. And he was a terrific guy. He was a sick man. I took him up in the B-17, up to the surrender in Tokyo. I brought him back to Guam. He was sick as hell. He'd drink about a quart of whiskey on the way back. I begged him to go to bed and stay there. We had an extra room at the house. He wouldn't do it; he had to go back on that airplane. He got to San Francisco and he never got home. He died on the way. He was a real fine commander.

Q: Wasn't his son captured in Vietnam?

T: Yes.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of why Arnold decided to take Eaker out of the 8th AF and put him in the Mediterranean?

T: No. I've always been very fond of Eaker, and Arnold was very close to Eaker. Eaker was probably his closest friend and confidante.

Q: Do you think Arnold was quick on the trigger in taking Eaker out of there?

T: I don't know the politics of that thing. I don't know I've talked to Hansell who served in the 8th, and he doesn't know.

Q: I talked to Eaker. He never criticized Arnold.

T: He's very fond of Arnold, always has been...

Q: Well, he was very close to Arnold. You know, Eaker's letters were very bitter. He was saying to people - he used to write to Jim Fechet, and he would refer to the guy that worked with the team the whole season, and then he was pitching for the World Series and then they took him out of the box.

T: I know it must have hurt Ira pretty bad.

Q: Spaatz had a very good role in that particular circumstance; Spaatz wouldn't take the job unless they elevated the Mediterranean job and gave it a theater air commander status. They elevated that job to the MAAF, and they gave it to Eaker. Why didn't Eaker get his fourth star?

T: You got me, I don't know. I could never understand it.

Q: He was probably the only senior commander of WWII not to make four. Do you have any knowledge as to why?

T: Must have been old Hap. If Hap had wanted him to have four stars he would have had them.

Q: Do you feel that Hap Arnold tried to get promotions for his men, or not enough?

T: I don't think Hap was - loyalty extended down. His loyalty with his superiors was supreme; his loyalty to people on his level, perfect, but he didn't reach down and pick guys up, because....

Q: Loyalty to his men to his staff was not as much as it should have been?

T: In other words, a guy that worked his heart off for him, he wouldn't help as much as he would some guy across the street

who looked like he would do more...

Q: How about Kuter, he liked Norstad....

T: He liked the guys with the brains who he thought had brains. Eaker had more sense than all of them put together. None of those guys were commanders. Norstad and Kuter werent' commanders. They weren't combat commanders; Eaker was. He was a builder.....

Q: Eaker, of course, has at least told me. He may think differently, but he told me that once Eisenhower was given the job as Commander of OVERLORD, then Eaker knew that Spaatz would be his commander, because Eisenhower and Spaatz worked very closely together. Spaatz was Eisenhower's air commander. And once Eisenhower got the main job, Spaatz was going to follow. At least this is the way Eaker has rationalized it, or he believes it now. But of course, I have seen correspondence, and he was not happy with Arnold at all. As a matter of fact, a number of people who were very close to Arnold, who had a parting of the ways with him. For example, Norstad was given a job after the war - this is where he rose to high position. Norstad was given the job of working out a reconciliation with the Navy on the unification bill. And Arnold apparently felt that Norstad had conceded too much to the Navy - that the bill did not reflect a strong Air Force. Did you get in on any of this?

T: No, not with the Navy.

Q: This is the postwar period, you were in Alaska, at that time, were you aware of any differences that Arnold had with Norstad?

T: Yes, I thought it was a little rough there. Could see it. I wasn't in on it, but I could see it happen. I was gone, I got shanghaied out...

Q: You were lucky to be away from it. That was one of the worst period when the Air Force and the Navy were cutting each other up?

T: They sent me out to Wright Field, I wanted no part of that. I was no damn engineer, but they sent me out there. In the worst stage.

Q: When did you go out to Wright Field?

T: Right after the war. When they had that awful mess out there - a financial mess and everything else. All these contracts hanging fire - a terrible mess. They sent me out there. So I went out there, and Ed Rawlings was there. He helped me....

Q: Benny Meyers had already left.

T: Benny Meyers was out, was just out, and Chidlaw was there. A lot of my friends were there, running that place. I had no problems that way. I had problems with Washington with the Symington. I wasn't doing things the way he wanted them done. This is political. I had a couple of tough Jew-boys working for me who knew their business-civilians. We had two or three sessions in Washington. Stu was always trying to pick these guys, tying them up on something. Just couldn't do it; they were right. He kept putting the heat on me because I wasn't getting into some of these problems. Stu had been on a board, I forget the name.

Q: What time are you talking about - before unification?

T: Yes.

Q: Well, he was in the Surplus Properties Board.

T: Yes, Surplus Properties - and he thought he was a great expert and these guys knew more about surplus war property than Stud ever knew. And finally, he got mad at me. I had to go to Washington, and told him: "Stu, you keep your two bits out of Wright Field. I'm going to run it; or you are going to run it. We both can't be running it." He said: "I'm running it." I was tickled to death to get out of there.

Q: Well, of course, he was "in" like this with President Truman - peas in a pod from Missouri.

T: He changed his tune about four times during those little meetings. These boys from Wright Field were doing a hell of a good job. We were on the other side. Secretary Royall was patting us on the back because we were the best people in the world to get rid of surplus property and handle the job. We were doing the job. We had the record, we were doing great. It was these boys who were doing it, not me. I was just signing the letters. These boys were terrific. They did a great job, but they were crossing Stu up. Now this is true.

Q: Were you in on the B-36 thing. This was when it was having its great troubles in 1946. They couldn't get it to fly. They finally got it up in the air on Aug 8, 1946. They got that plane up in the air for the first time. That was Stuart Symington's baby. I did a doctoral dissertation on Stuart Symington and the B-36. But the thing you're telling me - I wish I'd interviewed you before I wrote that thing.

T: Those were rough days.

Q: Did you have any contact with Benny Meyers, at all?

T: No, poker games...

Q: He was a great poker player...

T: Too bad about Benny - smart son-of-a-gun.

Q: Why wasn't that thing investigated. Somebody wrote this anonymous letter in June 1945. Benny Meyers got out on a medical disability, and Hugh Knerr was coming into that job. That letter came into Washington, and Jake Smart initialed it, and it was sort of sent to the files. It wasn't two years later, but that the Ferguson Committee dusted that thing off and blew it up, and of course, Arnold got very angry about it. Arnold, whatever one could say he did wrong, he was the soul of integrity. You know Arnold had $19,000 in his estate when he died in 1950.

T: Actually, the reason I went to Wright Field was because of Eaker. I'm sure, because Arnold was having so much trouble. Arnold worried. Stu put the heat on him. He was in real trouble. So Arnold wanted to get the thing cleaned up so I went out there and I couldn't understand it.

Q: Right before he retired?

T: Yes, I couldn't understand why they sent me out there. The last thing I knew was to go out to Wright Field. Eaker told me that I was going. He called me in and said I'm going out to Wright Field. Hap and I had been talking. I raised the dickens. So I went out there and I did some good, and moved out quick.

Q: Where was Knerr at this time? Did Knerr move out; Knerr didn't stay too long?

T: Knerr was gone.

Q: He was on the Air Board or something?

T: He preceded me out there....

Q: He was there for a few months, and then you succeeded Knerr?

T: Yes.

Q: To get the chronology of it, see, Knudsen was leaving, Benny Meyers didn't get that job, which is one of the reasons he probably quit, and Knerr got the job. This was ATSC, Air Technical Service Command. Now, did you succeed Knerr or was it a different job? Or what was the job you had?

T: Chidlaw was running it.

Q: Maybe Chidlaw succeeded Knerr. What was your job at Wright Field?

T: I was the Commanding General.

Q: You were Commanding General; then you succeeded Chidlaw?

T: No, Chidlaw and Rawlings were there, Knerr, I took over from Knerr.

Q: There were two commands. There was the Air Tactical Service and then there was Commander of Wright Field.

T: Well I commanded both of them.

Q: When you went out there, Arnold was just about leaving, wasn't he?

T: Yes.

Q: Did you ever visit him out at Sonoma?

T: One time, after he retired. I went through there, and he took me all over the place, and he showed me the wine cellars and everything.

Q: He was very proud of that. He talked about retiring

for years. When he was fighting this war - you wonder how the hell he ever did it - he had all these things on his mind, and he was corresponding with some guy out there named Hansen, who was building his ranch. Arnold wanted certain title on his roof, and he gave the guy designs for the rooms, and he wanted his water wells over here, and he wanted the cattle over here. You wonder where he found time to do all those things.

T: He's a hell of a guy.

Q: He just wore himself out. He didn't know how to pace himself.

T: And he rushed into things awful fast lots of times.

Q: Was he every impulsive?

T: Very. Like when he came down and moved in on the Navy ship. Tore them apart; it was unreasonable.

Q: Unreasonably impulsive. Without having studied the issues?

T: He'd go out, run out of the office, when the war was on in those days, in the Pentagon, and grab the first guy he saw and send the guy to Timbuktu or someplace. This is true. He grabbed guys....

Q: Do you know anybody he sent?

T: Yes, Timberlake...

Q: Which one?

T: Pat.

Q: Well, Pat...he's in Texas?

T: You ask Pat. I don't want to...he tell's the story about how he was walking down the hall, minding his own business.

Arnold busts open his door and grabs him and sends him around the world...

Q: What did he ask him to do?

T: I forget now...but Pat knows the story, don't tell him I told you. He'll tell you.

Q: I have another instance where Arnold grabbed somebody in the hall to give them jobs. Why do you think he did something like that?

T: I don't know, he did some awful things.

Q: He had so many things on his mind he had to turn it over to somebody?

T: He had to get it off, get rid of it.

Q: He had all these things on his mind.

T: Like his sending me all over the place; 3 times he sent me...

Q: Well, he liked you, and he trusted you. If he trusted you, he'd give you a job to do.

T: Then he came over to see me in Italy, at the end. This is the damndest story.

Q: Oh, this was the end of the war?

T: He didn't know it was. He hit my place the day the surrender came out. And he had no idea of it. Nobody did.

Q: Oh really?

T: And he was just raising hell.

Partridge is a hell of a fine officer, as you know. Arnold moved kind of fast sometimes. Pat was always afraid he was in trouble. Hap was, I think for the period. I don't know of

of anybody who could have done the job he did. With a going Air Force, half trained, not ready, and all this. He had one job which was gigantic and he did a hell of a fine job, I'll tell you. He made my life miserable several times. But by God, he got the results. He did very well with the senior navy guy - King. That was a success. And he also wanted that fifth star, at the end; that has a lot to do with this thing I want to show you. He came over there right at the end - this was about the 6th of May when he hit my outfit. He made an inspection in Europe and just raised hell.

Q: He was in Cannes and the Riviera. He was on a recuperation trip.

T: Yes, and then he visited units. He came down in my place and I've got the picture....

Q: Caserta or Foggia?

T: Caserta. Foggia is where my Hqs were. My office - I was on the Adriatic side. I had 30 some groups there - big outfit, hell of a big outfit.

Q: This was...

T: Actually the headquarters was at Bari. Caserta was the Hqs where Ira was. Ira was there, that's where the British were, too. The British Allied Headquarters.

Q: He came down the 5th or 6th of May?

T: That's when he signed the thing, 6th of May. That's the day the word came down about the surrender. Everybody was over to Caserta. But Hap came over to the other side of the boot to see us. He was in my Hqs., raising hell, tearing the place

apart, how bad we were dong, this, that and the other thing - how we were losing the war. He'd say: "What's the matter with you people? Can't you do this?" Everybody, had the group in there, my officers, eating their tails out, and said he wanted to see Col Steed. Col Steed, I didn't know at the time. Steed was in the class of '28 and had a wing in my outfit - B-17 wing, and a damned good one. He was a fine commander, and he was goat in the class - the bottom. All the boys loved him; he was a capable leader,...

T: Steed - "Sadie" - nickname. Hap knew him way back, probably at West Point or someplace, and very fond of him, too. I didn't realize at the time, he said I want to go see that stupid Steed, and see what the hell he is doing helping to lose the war, too.

Q: Was Steed the goat of your class?

T: No, Class of '28, Hank Everest and that crowd. I was the class of '18; class of '21 originally. We were smart and got out in '18. But I said: "Oh, I feel sorry, poor old Sadie is going to catch it." But Hap did like him, so we went over there. Sadie put on a very fancy briefing and his airplanes were all shined up, and lined up out there...

Q: What was Steed's job?

T: He was a Colonel, head of a wing of B-17's. He had about 40 B-17s in his command - big unit, and doing well, and proud of it. He had pictures of his bombing. He was all fixed up. Hap was just giving us the business, you see, about how lousy everything was, and how we were losing the war, and all this other stuff. Sadie was feeling lower and lower, and finally, the message came in. The message was handed to Hap, came down

from London to Caserta. McNarney sent it over to him - knew where he was. He read it, and didn't say. He took his glasses off and put the message down and he said: "Sadie, have you got a good camera?" He said: "Yes, why?" Arnold said: "Get it!" Sadie: "General, what do you want a camera for; we aren't through yet." Arnold said: "Get the camera!" They got a camera. "Now" Arnold said: "I'm going out to take some pictures of the flowers and the fauna. Read this message!" And it said: "Unconditional surrender, 6th of May." Sadie read it, and said: "Aren't you going to inspect my airplanes, General?" He said: "The hell with your airplanes." He said: "I've seen my last airplane."

Q: He really wanted to get out. He couldn't wait till he left Washington after VJ Day. And this is probably why he wanted you and Tooey Spaatz out in the Pacific, because he wanted his best men in there to get the thing over with as soon as possible. At this time, he was corresponding with people there to get his ranch in shape. He couldn't wait until he got out of Washington. He'd had it up to here with the war. And of course, he'd had this terrible heart attack, and he probably thought he wasn't going to live long to enjoy the ranch, and he didn't live too long after that.

T: He was his own worst enemy the way he would boil inside; he had to let it out. The first guy he saw, good, bad or indifferent. He would catch him in the hall, no matter where. He just gave Ferson the death, and he liked Ferson, I know that. Ferson was a very pleasant chap. But Steve would just come out of there just shaking - all those meetings. He had to go see him about 3 times a day.

Q: He was head of War Operations and Movements?

T: War Organization and Movement. Real likeable chap, and smart as hell. He ran the air mail for us (Ferson) did a hell of a job in Chicago. He was tops. We had the best mail when Hickam was in command there. Best mail run of the bunch.

Q: Hickam he died in a crash?

T: I was down there then.

Q: Where did this happen?

T: Ft. Crockett, Texas. He just took command of that place. He was just as happy as a bird dog. That's the airplane we were talking about when we took the air mail. Hickam led us on the air mail. He took us to Chicago - the whole group moved into Chicago with these airplanes. No problem at all; not one of them, and he couldn't see, and he insisted on flying. I got Chauncey; I was commander of one of the groups. The boys said when he flew the airplane, he didn't do very well. Hickam was going to do anything anybody else did. So we went to talk to his wife, Charlie Chauncey was the operations officer. He told her that he can't see, and he was going to fly at night, and it was dangerous. Hickam couldn't see well enough." "And you'd better talk him out of it." And his wife said: "I know exactly what you are talking about. The doctor told me." She said: "I can't do a thing with him. He insists, if he is going to command this group, he's going to fly in anything the rest of the boys fly. "And he was killed that night at Ft. Crockett which was just a sod field. No boundary markers of any degree, you know. And it was just about big enough to land that A-12 in, just comfortably, not with an overrun, in

the daytime. We were all out there worried about him, and sure enough, he dropped it in, broke his neck. Hickam to me was one of the greatest commanders I'd ever served with.

Q: In the Mediterranean, you had another problem, the Negro Squadron, the 99th. They brought this group out there, and then they got adverse reports that they weren't good fighters. Was this true, or was this prejudice?

T: What happened there. Eaker called me over to Caserta one day, and Joe Cannon, had the Tactical Air Force then. I was on the east side and Joe Cannon was on the west side.

Q: That was the 12th AF?

T: Yes. The tactical air force. I had the 15th, the strategic air force, and I had all the long range fighters - the P-51s.

Q: This was sometime in 1944?

T: Yes. So they told me - Ira got us together, Joe Cannon and Doc Strother, who was my fighter commander. We were sitting there. He said: "Tell you what we are going to do, Nate. We are going to give you a big hand." I said: "What are you going to do?" And he said: "We are going to give you another fighter unit." I said that was fine. Old Doc Strother started beaming. Eaker said: "Not only are we going to give you a fighter unit. They are going to give you one with Mustangs. We only had about 4 Mustang wings. The rest of them were P-38s, which weren't bad.

Q: Most of them were going to the UK?

T: Yes, we had quite a few Mustangs, but not as many we'd like to have, because they were a lot better. He told me about a

squadron, under Joe Cannon; a fighter squadron, but different type of fighter, not long range fighters, just tactical fighters. He said: "We are going to take that as a nucleus, and we are going to give you two squadrons from the states, to give you a complete wing. I said: "Are they all going to be colored?" He said: "yeah." And Joe Cannon said: "Listen, these guys are great." And he told me how good they were, and I said: "Listen Joe. If they were that good, you wouldn't be giving them up. and Ira smiled. Doc was there. He didn't like it. Anyway, we got them, they had four squadrons in this group. All the others had three squadrons; all the other flight outfits had three. This squadron had four. They had the brand new Mustang. They had everything we could give them, and that Eaker could give them to help them down there. They weren't too hot, but the squadron worked hard on them, and towards the end they were really doing better, and they had this boy who was leading them who was just tops.

Q: Benjamin Davis?

T: And he'd come down and cry to me: "General, I'm getting out of here, they just don't cooperate." If the bombers are going out, they like to stay close to the bombers, fighters. They didn't want to go out there charging. No, they weren't eager. That was the difference. But they would have been all right. You see that was close to the end of the war.

Q: You know they had a terrible problem with them in the states. They wouldn't allow them into an officer's club like Selfridge Field. Frank Hunter had some terrible trouble. In fact, I'm going to be talking to him, tonight or tomorrow.

T: Monk is a great guy.

Q: Yes, and he lives in Savannah, do you ever get to see him?

T: Oh yes. I saw him a little while ago. Wonderful chap.

Q: He was involved in that because he was the first Air Force Commander. Selfridge Field came under him and they started to build this separate officer's club for the colored, you know. The whites wouldn't let them in the officer's club, do you remember this?

T: Yes, yes.

Q: There were several of these incidents but the worst one happened at Selfridge. These guys mutineed out there and they ended up talking about court martial. Of course, they didn't because political reasons they let it go. But that thing was right in his lap. Terrible problem.

Q: Well, it was a great war.

T: Oh boy, I wish we had fought the next one like that. It'd been over a long time ago.

Q: Yes, that's right.

T: That war was, really, on the command line, was almost perfect.

Q: Were you involved in the shuttle bombing to Russia?

T: Yes. We did it. You mean that Poltava stuff? Yes, we did. You know how that developed? The 8th was going to do all that stuff. They had trouble. So they called me, and I had to go up there. And I said: "I don't want any part of it." But we went up twice and clobbered them - wonderful missions. The 8th

figured this looks pretty easy, so they tried it. They staggered back through my bases in Italy; they were all shot up, rough, rough...

Q: Was it your unit in Poltava that got clobbered by the Germans?

T: No, that was the 8th. We had been there 3 times. We went there, landed, serviced up and taxiied out of there, and went clear up to the NE, way way up there. I was scared to death we'd never get back and great success - three big missions. Gen Strother went on that. We sent the fighters over there with him, and they made it. And then the 8th came in, and they got caught. They came back through my bases to recuperate.

Q: Arnold didn't think much of the Russians. He didn't trust them.

T: I never did either.

Q: Did you have any dealings with them?

T: Oh, all bad. All bad. You couldn't believe them. They wouldn't pay any attention to the rules of the day, that you had a certain zone you were going to fly by, that they wouldn't violate them. Russians were our allies then. They shot down several of my bombers with the engines out; trying to get sanctuary, getting home, engines shot up. They shot them down.

Q: Well we shot down a couple of their Yaks toward the end of the war in air incident involving....

T: That was a mistake on our part. Yes, we did that. And we had an order to attack this column - very detailed instructions. And what happened was, we put our best fighter leader in charge of

it, and he had to go on the deck so he wouldn't be picked up by these enemy forces. He crossed the Adriatic and went up into Yugoslavia, somewhere. He had exact direction they were moved, where they would be, and the whole thing. And he saw the column and he came in on his dive, and he saw way before he started to shoot, it was thw wrong column. They were Russians, moving in the same direction. He had gone three miles too far. They were that close together, so he pulled up, and couln't break his formation up and they kept right on going into the column, and the Russian Yaks jumped them. They jumped my fighters, and they shot all the Russians down - couldn't stop them. Well, I packed up my bag...

Q: You figured you were being sent home?

T: I'd had it. And this one time, the Russians came through with the damndest message you ever saw. Absolutely beautiful - on the great support we had been giving them. The 15th AF had done innumerable things for them. They are greatly appreciative. They could understand this mistake; they knew it was a mistake, and so forth, and patted me on the back.....

Q: What was Arnold's reaction?

T: Fine, then. I don't know what it would have been if he hadn't gotten that message.

Q: If you got in trouble like with the British or in this Russian situation, did Arnold support you?

T: He did. When I first went over there - everything was Regensburg - everything was Regensburg. Tooey up in England, was saying: "Get going; get going. I've got a terrific output of fighters coming up. Get Regensburg - No. 1 on the hit parade."

It was clear beyond our fighter range. We had to go in there naked - bombers without fighter cover. England could get down, and it was our No. 1 priority target for both air forces, 8th and the 15th. Our bases were always good. But the target was socked in. And this particular time, the English bases were all socked in, and then they cleared up, but this target was still zero-zero, you couldn't bomb it.

Q: Regensburg was a hardy target.

T: Was a fighter, Messerschmitt. So the 23rd of Feb, I had my boys watch it like a hawk, 23rd of February....

Q: The Big Week?

T: Here we go, it's open. So we go, but our bases are socked in for the first time. Well, we got off about 700 bombers, and about not more than a third of them got together, and they went. An old boy Rice was leading, he was leading. He was a Colonel, and he'd just get his head down in the cockpit and kept going. My operations officer had just come in to the command, and I told him, now you get out and get some experience with these milk runs. Don't get into any tough runs. You just go across the Adriatic, learn what they are doing and learn the stuff, but don't stick your neck out. I didn't know until it was over, but he was sitting in a nose turret of the lead B-17, and they go into Regensburg, naked. When they got to the Alps they said, everything, the trainers, anything that could fly or shoot or bomb was in the air.

Q: That one week they really plastered the Germans.

T: We knocked it out. We never had to go back to Regensburg. We got the pictures and it snowed, fresh snow all over,

and boy it was really knocked out. I know there is something, I think we got about 200 or less bombers over the target, and we lost about 50. I said: "Charlie, I think old Hap's on the warpath. I'm afraid to go home." I went back thinking I'd be relieved. This was a hell of a thing. I'd been trying for six weeks to get up there. Arnold sent me the finest message I have ever received, and Tooey too.

Q: Because you knocked the target out? If your boys didn't do what Arnold thought they could have done, or you didn't get enough planes up, you heard from him?

T: Oh yes, and I didn't get many messages like that. I was pretty lucky.

Q: Did he forgive, in other words, if he jumped you, about something. Did it linger?

T: What he'd do, he'd move like flash in the pan, lots of times, you know. He'd move without enough information. He was worried about this particular thing. He'd move fast and hard and give people hell. And I think he realized later that he had done wrong and he was very nice to come around and tell you.

Q: Did he apologize?

T: He hadn't quite had the information. He was sorry. Keep up the good work. But if you were wrong, he'd fire you, you're gone.

Q: He fired guys?

T: Oh yes, quick. And he probably made some mistakes.

Q: Of course, you were not in the Pacific at the time, but he pushed Hansell out of his job. He put LeMay in it. What do you think of that?

T: I think that if Hansell had stayed there - Hansell was finding out the things that Curt had had to learn. There were some things brand new to him over there. Terrific high winds, and the fact that you couldn't get any weather. You never knew what the weather was over the target.

Q: Didn't they have over 100 mile an hour winds?

T: That's right. And that's why Curt, because he couldn't do anything until he went low level, that was forced on him. That wasn't a brilliant stroke of his. He couldn't hit anything so he came down and burned the thing up.....

Q: He came out smelling like a rose?

T: Yes.

Q: In other words, this was not a carefully planned maneuver, or you don't know?

T: Well, it is now, of course.

Q: Was this unprovisation on LeMay's part?

T: I guess he figured the winds and the weather, and all the damn stuff, the best whay to do was go in low so when you got up there, you wouldn't have to abort and come back. Being up there at 35,000 feet. So you have to give him credit for it. He did it.

Q: Norstad had the job, I guess you might call him "hatchet man." Norstad went out to give them the bad news. Hansell probably felt badly. Of course, he tried not to criticize Arnold, but you can detect certain things. Did Arnold do wrong in sending Norstad out there instead of telling him himself?

T: I don't know why he had to send Norstad out. Norstad had never been a commander. People don't like a guy like that to come out. If Arnold himself or some commander came out and said: "The old man feels this, that and the other thing." Rather than send a staff guy out.

Q: In the research that I have done, general, Arnold had sent a very positive message on New Year's Day, Jan 1945. Eight days later, Norstad shows up in Guam and tells Hansell he is being relieved. So apparently, Arnold had made an impulsive decision within the 8 days from Jan 1 to Jan 8. Because I don't see anything that happened in that period.

T: He's quick tempered; that's his danger. And sometimes it works, but apparently he pulled some bad ones. When the guys would go over him, his seniors on the staff. Marshall knew this. So they'd take him down, so those kind. He didn't get through that gang. But to the Air Force, when he issued orders like that, he made some bad decisions.

Q: Was Lovett a balance wheel?

T: Oh yes.

Q: Keep him from making some big mistakes?

T: No question about it. Lovett liked Arnold, and that's it. Arnold needed that advice, and Eaker helped him a lot.

Q: When Arnold was out of Washington, when he had his heart attack, it was kept very secret. I guess you knew it in the field. It got out there after a while, and they put Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. Eaker was acting for Arnold. In some of his correspondence, I think Eaker had the idea that he was going to succeed Arnold.

T: Is that right?

Q: Do you have any information on this?

T: No, I don't think so.

Q: Why didn't Eaker make his fourth star?

T: That's the thing I don't know.

Q: Did he do anything to antagonize Arnold?

T: I don't think so - that I know of. They wrote a book together, you know.

Q: They wrote several books together. Eaker wrote 3/4 of the book, and Arnold got 3/4 of the credit. This was always so.

Q: You don't have any information as to why? Spaatz was senior to Eaker. Spaatz succeeded Arnold, and then Eaker should have succeeded Spaatz?

T: I don't know, that's something that I don't know anything about. I've never understood it. Why Eaker didn't get his fourth star.

Q: Never got his fourth star, never succeeded to the top job. I just wondered if there was some friction in the last year of Arnold's tour in Washington?

T: I've been around Eaker and Spaatz so much since then. We go fishing together - the closest relationship. Very good friends.

Q: But they don't talk about that.

T: Never, I just don't know, and I didn't want to ask Ira.

Q: Well, I asked him about it, but as I say, he just had this opportunity at Hughes, and he took it. I just accepted it at that.

T: Maybe Ira saw the handwriting, and though he'd better get out.

(Looking at a picture in Gen Twining's study)

Q: This is a picture of Gen Twining, and Col Steed, commanding the 456th Bomb Group, and Gen Arnold in the middle. Arnold personally autographed it, 10 AM, May 6, 1945: "Hitler and German Army surrender unconditionally! General H.H. Arnold, Commanding, AAF." Arnold was beaming as this picture was taken only moments after he learned the impending surrender of the German Army.

Vanaman, Arthur H. 20 Aug 74

7/16/74

from the desk of . . .

ARTHUR W. VANAMAN
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

Dear Dr Green—

It would be better for me if you could meet me at the below address at 10 a m Tuesday 20 August.

AWV.

MAJ. GEN. A. W. VANAMAN, RET.
2843 Corabel Lane, Apt. 2
Sacramento, Calif. 95821

Tel. 482 3970

19

20314

9 July 1974

Maj General Arthur W. Vanaman, USAF (Ret)
2848 Corabel Lane - Apt 2
Sacramento, CA 95821

Dear General Vanaman

The Good Lord and the gasoline shortage permitting, I'll be in the Sacramento area, coming in from Sonoma, on Monday, 19 August. May I suggest early afternoon as a suitable meeting time?

You may drop me a note at Mrs. Arnold's, in the enclosure, if you wish.

I'll be in your area on Tuesday, 20 August, as well, and could meet with you any time that day, if more convenient for you.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

Encl

A Wright Fd - 1930-31
B Secty Air Staff - 1941
C ATSC - 1945 - Kuter
D Short bum - security - felt.
E Etc - in shoes - German Proposal
F Replaced Koenig as air attaché - 1939?
G Henkel mention Germans tried to impress Chief of AAF - Lindbergh too?
H. What did Germans really think of L.
I medal. Lindbergh reaction? Gen present?
J. Lindbergh + Arnold?
K Lindbergh + Gen AF?

1939-1970

L. Lindbergh seeking Gen - AC to Exc
M What about Lindbergh?
N Arguments.

GENERAL VANAMAN

1. Does General Vanaman know how he was selected for the job of Asst. Military Attache for Air in Berlin?

   (The background is that Capt Koenig was not completely satisfactory in that job. It appears that Lindbergh, possibly on a return trip to the U.S., informed someone at high level that Truman Smith needed a new Asst. Air Attache, and General Vanaman was selected for the job.)

2. In his book, Heinkel tells about the visits of Lindbergh and the Chief of the French Air Force to Germany in the 1937-1938 period. He describes how a show was put on for the French Air General, moving aircraft, etc., to impress him with German air might and that he was shaken by what he saw. Heinkel, however, mentions no such attempt to influence Lindbergh.

   Does Gen Vanaman believe that the Germans deliberately showed aircraft and equipment to Lindbergh just so that he could report back on them. If so, does he believe that Lindbergh was taken in by this, or that he was too knowledgeable to be duped? What did the Germans really think of Lindbergh?

3. General Vanaman will readily recall the famous medal that Goering presented to Lindbergh at a reception at the American Embassy. Could he describe the presentation, Lindbergh's reaction to it, and, if General Vanaman was within earshot, what Goering said to Lindbergh as he presented the medal. Did Lindbergh later discuss the presentation with Truman Smith or General Vanaman, what he should do with the medal, etc.

   The presentation was apparently a complete surprise to Ambassador Wilson, Truman Smith, and Lindbergh. According to one account I have, the Germans notified General Vanaman that a medal would be presented that evening but that he somehow failed to alert Smith.

4. Does General Vanaman have any recollections of the flap caused by Lindbergh's low opinion (later published) of the Soviet Air Force following a visit to Russia about August 1938? I am particularly interested in the efforts of the US Attache in Moscow, Faymonville, to elicit some kind of retraction from Lindbergh which he refused to make. Faymonville, in fact, appealed to Lee, the US Attache in London, to reason with Lindbergh.

5. Does General Vanaman have any recollections of a deal promoted by Lindbergh after the Munich [illegible] whereby the Germans were to sell aircraft engines to the French for their airframes. The hope was that such trade would foster peace between the two countries. According to General Stehlin (then Capt and French Air Attache in Berlin), however, the Germans entertained the proposal only as a ploy.

6. Any interesting anecdote, incident, colorful detail, impression, or comment General Vanaman may care to make would be most welcomed. I would particularly like to have his candid assessment of Lindbergh as a person and phenomenon that he was. This assessment may be made on or off the record, or any other condition that General Vanaman may wish to stipulate.

7. The immediate goal is essentially a military biography of Lindbergh with the possibility of a more definitive work to follow. It is the only undertaking of this type that Lindbergh has agreed to cooperate in its completion. The project entails the collection of tens of thousands of pages of copied material from scores of sources, including Lindbergh's own closed files. This collection will be eventually donated to some appropriate archives for permanent retention.
If General Vanaman has any records such as a diary, letters (some have already been obtained from the Lindbergh Papers stored at the Sterling Library, Yale University), photos or other items relative to himself and Lindbergh, copies of such material for my files would be greatly appreciated.
Such material could be sent to AFCHO and would be returned promptly via registered mail after copying.

Raymond H. Fredette

Raymond H. Fredette
Lt Col, USAF (Ret)

Office:

Hq USAF (CHO)
Washington, DC 20314
Phone: (202) 69-37404

Home:

1127 Powhatan St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: (703) 683-1638

20314

4 June 1974

Major General Arthur W. Vanaman
2848 Corabel Lane - Apt 2
Sacramento, Calif. 95821

Dear General Vanaman

I'm very sorry to learn of your loss. It seems so tragic and unnecessary, after all you and Mrs. Vanaman went through. I know a little of your extraordinary career, and can only say that you were fortunate to be spared when all seemed lost, and that you and Mrs. Vanaman were able to enjoy each other's company for many years after the war. I wish I could express properly more appropriate words of consolation.

I feel also than an early visit would be an intrusion, at least until you are feeling a bit better. I will try to delay my visit to Sacramento, perhaps until about the last week in August.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

ARTHUR W. VANAMAN
Maj. Gen. USAF (Ret.)
2848 Corabel Lane - Apt. 2
Sacramento, California 95821

Dear Dr Green—

My plans are at the present time very much "up in the air", having just lost my wife, May 14. Please contact me the latter part of July. I might be of some help to you but the late 1930 are a long way back and I have very few papers to use as reminders. I might give you a few impressions.

Sincerely
A W Vanaman

20314

24 May 1974

Maj General Arthur W. Vanaman, USAF (Ret)
2848 Corabel Lane - Apt 2
Sacramento, Calif. 95821

Dear General Vanaman

I trust this letter will find you at home - and not in Cathedral City. As you may recall, I'm working on the Hap Arnold Biography to be published by Random House.

It's about half done and I'm getting into the area where you and Hap Arnold had some business dealings (starting in the late 1930's).

I'm planning an interview trip this summer and, if my plans are consummated, will be passing through Sacramento in mid-August. I wonder if you will be available at that time.

I trust this finds you in good health.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

BACHELOR AND VISITING OFFICER QUARTERS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

26 February 1973

Major General Arthur W. Vanaman, USAF (Ret)
69850 Highway 111
Cathedral City, Calif 92234

Dear General Vanaman:

I'm writing for two reasons, one to make available to you a copy of a nice letter about you which I found in General Arnold's file.

The other is to say hello and to mention that I'm still working away on the Arnold Biography and still hope to get out to see you.

When you return to Sacramento might be a good time for me. If you could let me knowyour schedule, I can try to arrange mine for mid-year.

All good wishes for your good health. Incidentally, Bruce Arnold just returned from a visit to Sonoma. He reports that Mrs. Arnold is in great shape.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
AF/CHO

Encl

x Kuhlberger letter
Aug 18, 1938

Vanaman Praised for German Attache Assignment - Aug 1938

J.H.

Ltr to Arnold from Dutch Kindelberger, Pres North American, Aug 16, 1938

Said "I would like to tell you again that Vanaman is doing a magnificent job over there and going far beyond the requirements of the job in every respect. He is expremely popular personally and socially with all of the big shots in research and production and is making good contacts with some tactical People. I dont believe we have ever had an attache who took his job so seriously, worked so hard, or was so well fitted for it. Van is going quite deeply into his own pocket for entertainment and other expenses and I think he should have plenty of credit for the job he is doing."

Bissell Att.

20314

28 July 1972

Maj. General Arthur W. Vanaman, USAF (Ret)
2848 Corabel Lane - Apt 2
Sacramento, Calif 95821

Dear General Vanaman:

Thanks for your letter of the 22nd. I've done some checking around for that report you mentioned and drew some blanks. I've written to General Bissell. I've been trying to get down to interview General Bissell, anyway. Maybe I'll hear from him and he can clue us in to that report, if he recalls it.

I will keep on looking. The problem with these Intelligence people is that they dont seem to be aware of the fact that the report you are interested in is 27 years old and has long since lost a reason for high classification. If you can recall a specific title, it might help me.

Anyway, I have plans to come down to the Southwest next winter, and if I do, getting together with you will be high on my agenda. Meanwhile keep well.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

ARTHUR W. VANAMAN
Maj. Gen. USAF (Ret.)
2848 Corabel Lane - Apt. 2
Sacramento, California 95821

7/22/72

Dear Dr. Green —

We are now in Sacramento for the summer and will return to Cathedral City in November. If you come west this winter I will be glad to talk to you about Gen. Arnold. In the meantime I am going to venture to ask a favor of you. In 1945 after a "tour" as POW I wrote a report which I gave to Gen Bissell (then A-2 of the

Air Staff covering a plot
or plan for a seperate peace
between Germany and the Allies
Western
The report and my shoes
containing a built in code
for contact with Gen. Berger
of the German Headquarters.
of this proposal was to be
delivered to the "top" through
Gen. Marshall.
When I returned again to the
United States later that year
the report had disappeared.
I know the report is somewhere
and I would like to have
a copy.

Sincerely
Arthur Owen

27 July 72

Dr Greer

Murray:

1. Noted

2 T Lanks

BG

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

27 July

General Gunderson:

For your interest. This is the first I've heard of this one, but I'll poke around and inquire.

I've been trying to get hold of General Vanaman for an interview for a couple of years now. I missed him on my last trip out to the West Coast.

Vanaman was our Air Attache in Germany just before WW II and had some dealings also with Charles Lindbergh - so I'll pass this for info to Ray Predette who may also wish to interview him.

As you know, I'm sure, General Vanaman was shot down over Germany and spent a couple of years in a Stalag.

MLG

Q: You were overseas, I know you said that you were technical advisor to various AFs. Did you have any contact with Arnold in this job?

R: No. Do you remember the incident where Gen Vanaman went flying over Germany, you know, as a passenger in one of the bomber missions? It was shot down. Well, that put the clamp on everyone at Wright Field that was involved in these first developments.

Q: Did Arnold feel that this was a bad one, a security loss?

R: Yes. They didn't want anyone else to go. Vanaman, of course, knew everything that was going on - the Research and Development program, the production program, some of the logistics programs....

Q: I was going to see him, he lives in Sacramento.

R: I think so. He had all this stuff on his fingertips. A lot of the other, the rest of us did, too, as far as developments, of what was coming up, etc. If I remember correctly, we were then playing with Whittle and Bell on the jet aircraft. This was, you know, so damn supersecret you couldn't go to sleep at night without brainwashing yourself.

20314

31 July 1972

Major General Clayton L. Bissell, USAF (Ret)
102 River Point Road
Signal Mountain, Tenn 37377

Dear General Bissell:

I'm well along into a Biography of General Hap Arnold and I have come across your name in many important contexts. I have interviewed most of the great men who served with General Arnold, including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Norstad, LeMay, Cabell, Kuter, Kenney, and perhaps 150 others. I've also talked to important people like Jackie Cochran, Alex de Seversky, Charles Lindbergh and some others.

Recently I got a letter from Major General Arhhur Vaneman who I hope to see before too long. He wrote about a report he sent you concerning a plan to arrange a separate peace between Germany and the Allies. I had not heard of that report and am trying to check it out, as General Vanaman would like to have a copy.

I wonder if you might recall that report and perhaps furnish a clue. Meanwhile, I should appreciate hearing from you concerning the possibility that we could get together for an hour or two at a time convenient for you.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

cc: General Vanaman

ARTHUR W. VANAMAN
Maj. Gen. USAF (Ret.)
3945 Cordell Lane - Apt. 2
Sacramento, California 95821

7/22/72

Dear Dr. Greene —

We are now in Sacramento for the summer and will return to Cathedral City in November. If you come west this winter I will be glad to talk to you about Gen. Arnold. In the meantime I am going to venture to ask a favor of you. In 1945 after a "tour" as POW I wrote a report which I gave to Gen. Dixie Wilson A-2 of the

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The report and map shows
containing a basis in code
for contact with Gen. Berger
of the German Headquarters
of this proposal was to be
delivered to the "Top" through
Gen. Marshall.
When I returned again to the
United states later that year
the report had disappeared.
I know the report is somewhere
and I would like to have
a copy. Sincerely
Alex Kaufman

20314

24 February 1972

Maj General Arthur W. Vanaman, USAF (Ret)
69850 Highway 111
Cathedral City, Calif 92234

Dear General Vanaman:

Thank you for your real nice letter. According to my map, Cathedral City is near Riverside, California. Wish I had checked with you before because I was in that area last March. However, I will have to make another trip out there, perhaps next winter. So I'll check with you further, as to your whereabouts.

Meanwhile, keep well. I shall be in touch when my plans become more firm.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

2/17/72

Dear Dr. Green -

My mail reaches me in a round-about way therefore the delay. Regarding Gen H's letter of Oct. 21, 1940 I do not have a copy as all of my files have been lost, strayed or ——, but I remember that the letter was typical Gen H - plenty carrot plenty whip. I served with General Arnold three times, once very close, when he was the boss and I was Sec. of the Air Staff. I have some very strong feelings for him and his memory. I will be at this address perhaps all through April and then back to Sacramento address. I would be glad to talk with you about Gen H.

Sincerely yours Olds Sacramento

69850 Hwy 111
328-2756 Cathedral City Ca. 92234

31 January 1972

Maj General Arthur W. Vanaman, USAF (Ret)
2848 Corabel Lane (Apt 2)
Sacramento, Calif 95821

Dear General Vanaman:

I'm a professional historian in the Air Force and I have been working on a Biography of General Hap Arnold for some time. I had hoped to write you in connection with another visit out your way, but I havent been able to arrange that. As you know, I'm sure, Mrs. Arnold lives at the Ranch in Sonoma - the Valley of the Moon - not too far away from you. Whenever I go out to see her I spend most of my time reminiscing with her and digging through the vast collection of personal archives she still retains.

Interviewing the many associates of General Arnold has been one of the enjoyable parts of this assignment. I've talked to most of the greats, including: Spaatz, Baker, Lovett, Kenney, Kuter, O'Donnell, K.B. Wolfe, Norstad, Smart and about 200 others. Recently, I caught up with Charles Lindbergh and had a fine interview with him. Your name, naturally, entered the conversation. General Lindbergh gave me access to his papers at the Sterling Library at Yale University.

I'm still hopeful of catching you some time in the not too distant future, if you are willing to talk about your recollections of General Arnold. For the present, I came across a letter you wrote him. Do you recall some of the circumstances surrounding it? And would you have his letter to you of October 21, 1940, referred to in the enclosure? It's a long time back, but I've found that many people saved these important memories of some very memorable times.

I hope this letter finds you in good health. I'd welcome hearing from you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

P.S. Arnold sent your letter to Bob Candee, then head of Information Division, Office CAC. General Candee passed away a few years ago. He sold me some Mutual Funds which I still retain today.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PARISER PLATZ 2
BERLIN

January 7, 1941

Major General H.H. Arnold,
Deputy Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Arnold,

As you can well imagine I more than appreciate your letter of October 21, 1940. There are so many ways of ... ing it and so many suggestions and requests that are possible ... answer to your suggestion "just let us know what we can do ... you", that I must forgo any of them- When I am relieved of ... duty (believe I must be in the USA on June 11, 1941) I will be glad to do my best at anything you see fit to assign to me. I have now in addition to any qualifications which you know, a fairly good working knowledge of the German Air Force, a working knowledge of the German language and I have for the past two years studied the French language but cannot say that I am proficient therein, only a real start upon which I hope to build.

You, of course, can appreciate that upon the outbreak of war the veil of secrecy dropt with a bang and now we can only guess. We guess but you in the U.S.A. must realize it is only guessing. I have sent in some reports since the outbreak, which I considered valuable guesses. I wonder though if any have been valuable enough to reach you, as you start your letter with "I have not heard from you officially or unofficially in quite some time". It is impossible to do more than we are doing as I positively refuse to make up figures and stories out of thin air and forward them just to have something in the pouch. There is nothing I can put on paper that would be interesting to you regarding the situation that I have not written in reports. If I

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could talk to you, I could give you my "feel", but I cannot base on "feel".

Again let me thank you for your kind letter. My very best regards to Mrs. Arnold. It sounds very strange to say Mrs. Arnold when one is always "Bee" to Sally and to me, but I must pay the highest respect to our Deputy Chief of Staff whom I know "when". I wish to congratulate you on reaching your present position which we all know you deserved but which you were always too true and sincere to actually strive for.

As ever,

Sincerely,

Van.

(Vanaman)

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As ever,

Sincerely,

Van.

(Vanaman)

2848 Cordelane
Apt 2
Sacramento Calif
95821

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR W. VANAMAN, USAF (RETIRED)

Arthur William Vanaman was born in Millville, New Jersey, May 9, 1892. He was graduated from Drexel Institute of Technology with a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering in 1915, and received an honorary Doctor of Science degree from it in June 1942. After graduation (1915-16) he did postgraduate work at the Postgraduate School of the Westinghouse Electric Company.

Enlisting in the Aviation Section of the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps, General Vanaman completed flying school and on December 22, 1917, was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Signal Officers Reserve Corps. He took the advanced aeronautical engineering course at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1918. On July 1, 1920, he was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Air Service, Regular Army. During his early career in the Air Corps he specialized in engineering assignments.

Going to Air Service Command Headquarters at Dayton, Ohio, in 1930, General Vanaman became chief of Procurement Engineering and assistant chief of Procurement for the Air Corps. He was graduated from the Air Corps Engineering School in 1930, the Air Corps Tactical School in 1935, the Army Industrial College in 1936, and the Army War College in 1937. Appointed Assistant Air attache in Berlin, Germany, General Vanaman moved to Air Corps Headquarters at Washington, D. C., as Secretary of the Air Staff in August 1941.

The following March General Vanaman was named commanding general of the Air Corps Materiel Center at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. In April 1943 he was appointed commanding general of the Oklahoma City Air Service Command at Tinker Field, Oklahoma, and the following March assumed command of the San Antonio Air Service Command at Kelly Field, Texas.

In May 1944 General Vanaman went to Eighth Air Corps Headquarters in England as assistant chief of staff for intelligence. Shot down over German territory in June 1944, he was captured and remained a prisoner of war for a year.

Joing the Air Technical Service Command in June 1945, General Vanaman assumed command of the Mobile ATSC at Brookley Field, Alabama, and became commanding general of the Sacramento ATSC at McClellan Field, California the following January. He was designated Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort McNair, Washington, D. C., in April 1948, and in June 1952 returned to McClellan Air Force Base, California, as commanding general of the Sacramento Air Materiel Area, Air Materiel Command.

General Vanaman retired from active duty May 31, 1954.

His decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Bronze Star Medal, and the Belgian Croix de Guerre with Palms.

MORE

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to captain (permanent) December 1, 1930; to major (temporary) June 16, 1936; to major (permanent) June 12, 1939; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) November 16, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) October 15, 1941; to colonel (temporary) January 5, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) March 16, 1942. He reverted to the rank of colonel April 30, 1946, and was promoted to major general (temporary) April 27, 1948; to major general (permanent) June 11, 1948.

E N D

Up to date as of May 31, 1954.

20314

1 October 1971

Maj General Clayton L. Bissell, USAF (Ret)
102 River Point Road
Signal Mountain, Tenn 37377

Dear General Bissell:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold which is to be published by Random House. I've been associated with the Air Force since the days of Stuart Symington as Secretary and recently came over here from the Secretary's Office in order to work on this book.

Perhaps I should also mention that I'm a professional historian and spent over a year at the Library of Congress on a Brookings Fellowship which enabled me to work thru the Arnold Papers over there.

I've interviewed many Air Force people, including most of the living greats: Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, LeMay, Kuter, Norstad, etc. I would like some time to have the pleasure of talking to you about your many contacts with the man, Hap Arnold. But for the present, I'd welcome any comments you may have about an item involving strategic bombing which you sent him, perhaps in your capacity as G-2.

I'll look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

No, twice

L/C Box 42

7.34

Re-evaluation of Bomb Damage in Germany - January 1945

Arnold had received a memo from Gen Bissell, Jan 9, 1945 (not attached) Apparently what Bissell said in this memo shocked Arnold because it indicated that the destruction due to bombing was much less than he had been led to believe.

In a memo to Giles, Jan 14, 1945, Arnold wrote: "It is quite apparent that we have either been too optimistic in our ideas of what we could do with bombing attacks, or we have missed tremendously in our evaluation of the effect that the destruction which we did cause, would have on the German war machine. I would like to have a group of several people just sit down in the corner somewhere and think the thing out materialistically, practically, and give me the results of their thoughts on this subject."

Arnold said this was not a subject for D'Olier nor for Spaatz, nor for Doolittle, nor for the bomb target board. "It is a job for some people with practical ideas right here in this office. HHA"

with Gen Bissell.

1 April 1970

Maj. General Clayton L. Bissell, USAF (Ret.)
102 River Point Road
Signal Mountain, Tennessee 37377

Dear General Bissell:

I'm working in collaboration with John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest magazine, on a biography of General Hap Arnold for Random House. Im a professional historian assigned to the Secretary's Office and have spent the past two years researching the subject.

Now I'm interviewing key people who knew General Arnold or his policies. In recent months I've seen Hon. Robert Lovett and Generals Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, O'Donnell, Smart, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter and perhaps 30 more who had some role in the AAF during World War II. You had many contacts with General Arnold during your G-2 four and your tour in the CBI. I'm most anxious to talk to you.

I'm planning to come through your area about 25-26 May 1970. If this time is convenient and you feel that an interview about your association with General Arnold would be helpful, I'd be delighted to fit such an interview of perhaps 90 minutes duration into my schedule.

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division

Atch

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL CLAYTON LAWRENCE BISSELL, USAF (Retired)

Clayton L. Bissell was born on July 29, 1896, at Kane, Pennsylvania. He was graduated from Valparaiso University, Indiana, in 1917, with a degree of Doctor of Laws.

He enlisted in the Aviation Section, Signal Reserve, on August 15, 1917, and was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Aviation Section, Signal Reserve, on January 12, 1918. He was promoted to captain (temporary) on March 11, 1919, and was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Air Service, Regular Army, on July 1, 1920.

He began his aviation training at Mohawk, Canada, in September, 1917, and was subsequently stationed at Taliaferro Field, Texas, from November, 1917 to January, 1918.

He sailed for England with the 22nd Aero Squadron, and received additional flying training at Salisbury Plains in England and aerial gunnery training in Scotland. He served in the Overseas Ferry Service before he was ordered to duty at the front with the 148th Aero Squadron in July, 1918. He served with that unit and with the 41st Aero Squadron until the armistice. He was credited officially with destroying five enemy planes, qualifying him as an ace. He commanded the 638th American Fighter Squadron with the American Forces in Germany until May, 1919, when he returned to the United States.

His first assignment in the United States was Kelly Field, Texas, where he organized and commanded the 27th Aero Squadron. In January, 1920, he became education and recreation officer at Kelly Field, and commanded the Air Service Group.

He was ordered to Washington, D. C., in June, 1920, for service as chief of the Tactical Operations Section in the office of Chief of Air Service. In December, 1920, he went to Langley Field, Virginia, where he was graduated from the Air Service Field Officers' School in June, 1921. He then remained at Langley Field as flight commander of the 14th Squadron, and later became an instructor in the Air Service Field Officers' School.

In November, 1921, he was ordered to Washington for duty in the office of the Chief of the Air Service, as assistant to Brigadier General William Mitchell, serving in that capacity for four years. In January, 1924, he was detailed as advanced agent for the round-the-world flight in British Columbia, Alaska, the Aleutians, Greenland, Labrador, Newfoundland, and the Maritime Provinces. On return to Washington, he was transferred to Langley Field, Virginia, in December, 1924, to serve as Secretary of the Air Service Board.

MORE

He was an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field, from September, 1926, to August, 1931, when he was assigned to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a student. He was graduated in June, 1933, and two months later was assigned to the Army War College at Washington, D. C. He was graduated in June, 1934, and then entered the Chemical Warfare School at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, in July, 1934, completing the course there a month later.

In October, 1934, he was stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, as intelligence and operations officer of the 18th Pursuit Group, becoming commanding officer in October, 1937. In July, 1938, he went to the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, and was graduated in 1939. In July, 1939, he became a member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff at Washington, remaining on this duty until the beginning of World War II.

In January, 1942, he was assigned to duty in the Asiatic theater as principal aviation officer on Major General Stilwell's staff in China; in August, 1942, he assumed command of all American Air Forces in India, Burma, and China, and commanded all U. S. combat aviation in the theater. When the 14th Air Force was activated, he continued in command of the 10th Air Force in India and Burma. He returned to the United States in August, 1943.

A month later he became Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence at Air Force headquarters in Washington. In January, 1944, he was assigned to the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence on the War Department General Staff, and served in that capacity during the last two years of World War II. He was the Army member of Joint Security Control and on the Joint Intelligence Committee and the U. S. Army memberof the Combined Intelligence Committee. He also serves the Army head of psychological warfare and as head of the War Department historical program.

In May, 1946, he became Military Attache to Great Britain, and in October, 1948, returned to the United States, where he was assigned to the Officers' Pool at Bolling AFB, D. C.

The following month he was transferred to headquarters of the U. S. Air Forces in Europe, with station at Wiesbaden, Germany, where he remained until he returned to the United States in April, 1950, for assignment to Air Force headquarters in Washington, D. C.

He retired from active duty October 31, 1950.

General Bissell has been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, and Air Medal.

His foreign decorations include the British Distinguished Flying Cross, the Italian Order of the Crown (Royal Decree), Italian Croce de Guerra (Ministerial Decision), Polish Order of Polonia Restituta, Commander's Cross, Chilean Order del Merito in the Grade of Gran Commander, and the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Degree of Honorary Commander.

MORE

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to captain on November 1, 1930; to major (temporary) on March 12, 1935; to major (permanent) on June 12, 1939; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) on November 16, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on October 15, 1941; to colonel (temporary) on January 5, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) on April 21, 1942; to major general (temporary) on March 18, 1943; to brigadier general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, with date of rank from January 23, 1945.

END

Up to date as of October 31, 1950.

N. Watt Ave

South from McClellan – Watt Ave
R – Golf Course on Right – 1½ miles
R. Marconi – past country Club – 3 blocks
Left – Canada Lane

Interview, Maj General Arthur W. Vanaman, Sacramento, Calif, 20 Aug 1974

Q Do you recall when you first encountered Hap Arnold

V Yes I can't give you the exact date. It was in '22 or '23. He came out to Rockwell and took command. That was the first time that I knew him

Q What were you doing out there.

V At that time the title was Chief Engineer Officer. Rockwell was made a depot. I guess we went out there in 1921. I had been at Middletown with Daddy Kirkland and started it up as a depot. That's a long story. I was going to get out of the service and then they persuaded me to go out to Rockwell with Daddy Kirk So then Kirk, then Shep Fitzgerald, then Arnold came there. I think probably about a year before I left.

Q This was in the middle of all those world records? The world cruisers?

A Yes. Jimmy Doolittle came in there, and then, Tooey Spaatz . The round-the-world was later; I saw them in Shanghai

Q You remember anything about Arnold at Rockwell in '22 or '23.

V I can't say that I remember anything that would be of any value for your history. He was a Major and I remember some of the things that he said at Officers' Call. We started real early in the morning and then we had Officess' Call at noon. One of the things he said that if an Army officer couldn't start at daybreak and get his work done by noon and then take care of his physical body , sports, athletics, polo, something like that in the afternoon, he was not an efficient officer. Of course that suited a lot of us to play golf in the afternoon down at Coronado. I remember that he was very keen and asked some very pertinent questions about the operation and took particular delight in asking you a question that you couldn't answer. He seemed to get a lot of kick out of asking you a question that you couldn't answer about your own work. Just as an illustration of that --he wanted to know what dry ice was, and he had looked it up, he had found out what it was and he just wanted to know whether anybody else knew what dry ice was. He took particular delight in asking

some very pertinent questions.

Q Did this put you on the defensive?

V Yes. That was one of the things, and I think it was another thing to satisfy his ego. He always did have or took a delight to take someone over the coals. This was later brought out when I was Secretary of the Air Staff and Arnold then seemed to pick on Mike Scanlon who was Air Intelligence on the first Air Staff. One day I was in the office with Hap and he called Mike in, When Mike shut the door he started in on him. So I tried to slip out. When I got to the door Arnold said "Wait a minute, Van. I'm not through with you." Then he went on blistering Scanlon, and so I tried to get out again, and was called back. It was something that Mike hadn't done Arnold thought he should do. He ended and said "Get out of here and never let me see you again." Then when the door closed on Mike, Arnold said: "That's telling them, isn't it man!" He wanted somebody to witness the superiority of him over some other person.

Q Scanlon did n't last long in that job. Right after Pearl Harbor, he was sent out to the Far East.

V Yes

Q A-2 was a tough job

V I remember. I had it with the 8th Air Force.

Q The reason it was so tough, I think, was that you didnt have your own sources of Intelligence. You had to rely on G-2.

V That was a bad thing. Arnold didnt get a lot that came out of Germany.

Q I wanted to ask about that. You were sent over there to replace Koenig as Air Attache. Was he unsatisfactory in the job, or was it just a routine transfer?

V He didn't have the contacts that it was necessary to have over there

Q Social side?

V Yes He was heavy on the social side of it.

Q When did you come to Germany?

V It was in July of '37. I left there in July of '41

Q Truman Smith was your superior?

V Truman Smith was Military Attache, and at that time Air was part of the Army

Q You were there when Charles Lindbergh came?

V Yes, between '37 and '38

Q Do you remember the circumstances of his visit?

V What do you mean by the circumstances?

Q The Germans invited him over there. They showed him a lot.

V Truman Smith had a lot to do with getting him over there, in the first place. He got the invitation for Lindbergh. Because Truman thought that Charles Lindbergh should see what was doing over there.

Q Were the Germans flattered to have Lindbergh come over. (Very) Showed him a lot?

V Very flattered. They showed him a lot. They didn't show him any more than they --let me go back here, because I started to say something. When I went over there, I met Udet rightaway and a fellow by the name of Walter Wendtland who had worked with Larry Bell and Dutch Kindelberger and Don Douglas when they were up with Martin. So I found from the German that they wanted to show the United States their strength. So I immediately tried to capitalize on that by inviting Dutch Kindelberger to come over. Glenn Martin, Larry Bell, Kemp Joyce, Van Dusen, who was with Martin at that time, Burdette Wright, a lot of people like that. Inviting them to come over. They immediately took--like Dutch Kindelberger, I think was in every airplane factory, not all the engine factories, but all the airplane factories that the Germans had. Now I had gridded Germany and had flown and they didn't have much hidden from me. I had a little Messerschmitt airplane. So Dutch was into every one of them. I immediately saw that that was my chance to get into every factory by having them there which they wanted to show people like that. It just suited my purpose because Dutch Kindelberger could walk through a factory and tell the production and potential production, and so could Glenn Martin and the other people.

Then, Truman wanted to get Lindbergh over there which was a very... He felt that they would even open up a little bit more. Dutch and Larry had everything that Lindbergh ever saw, and more. They opened up and showed Lindbergh, and, of course, they had a lot of social stuff for Lindbergh. They did all right for Dutch and the others, but they did more social stuff for Lindbergh.

Q Did they show Lindbergh any technical equipment that they didn't show others?

V Yes The only thing--and I can't think of the name of the plane. It was the new... This was up at Rechlin --it was their Wright Field. None of manufacturers were at that place and all of their secret stuff and the new stuff was up there. And the way Lindbergh got to Rechlin was, the night he got the Golden Eagle Award. Goering put it on him. I stood right alongside of him as he got this award. Then Goering and Lindbergh wanted to talk and there were three or four of us that were doing the interpreting because Lindbergh's German was not too good and Goering's English was not good at all

Q You were translating for both?

V I wasn't doing it all. There were three of us in there. I don't remember who the other two were Anyway, Goering was on his bragging bit, and he was telling about this particular plane they had up there and what it could do and so forth. A light bomber. So actually what happened, Lindbergh didn't understand it at all. I mean he didn't understand the German. When Goering was bragging about this, I said to Goering I didn't believe that Lindbergh believed that, that it was impossible. Goering flushed up, and he said: "I'll show you!" So then he called an aide in and he gave an order that Lindbergh and myself were to go to Rechlin the next morning. Leave from Templehof, and go directly. And the Aide kind of paled when these foreigners were going to Rechlin. But, anyway, they showed him this new airplane. We didnt get too much out of what they had in process,

but this particular airplane he was bragging about, he showed him. Lindbergh saw that, we saw Rechlin although we didn't get into the details of the operation. But that was the only thing that he saw that the only people hadn't seen. And so reported to Arnold

Q He and Arnold wwere corresponding. In '38 Arnold was very intersted in getting information from Lindbergh because he as was getting a heck of a lot from G-2. Arnold had the responsibility as Chief and he had to know about German characteristics because he was trying to build an air force.

V I knew that they were corresponding, but I didn't see any of the correspondence. There is the thing. Arnold was apparently not getting my reports. Every three months I made a summary report. Gave the characteristics of the airplanes and my estimate of the potential production, and the production then. And it was all based on experts. I was using Dutch Kindelberger and Larry Bell and these people as experts. And Kemp Joyce, the old Berliner Joyce, the first two-seater fighter we ever had.

Q Did Lindbergh talk to you about his reactions to Rechlin?

V No except that he visited there. Because he was going to make a report. And he took all my files. He spent days in my office going through all my reports on which I had reported what these other manufacturers had said about the thing. So, Arnold had everything that Lindbergh could give him except Lindbergh's political ideas. As for the technical side of it, Arnold had every bit that he ever got from anybody. He had it before he talked to Lindbergh.

Q From whom?

V Dutch Kindelberger. All these people went right in and talked to Arnold. But they didnt have the big name to connect to the Germans.

Q You said Arnold wasn't getting your reports?

V Everything that I forwarded went to G-2

Q How do you know Arnold was not getting your reports?

V I don't know that he was not getting my reports. But from letters that I had from him, I just judged that he didn't.

Q These letters you dont have? What happened to them?

V No. When I came out of Germany I came out with a suit of underclothes and a toothbrush.

Q As a POW?

V No, No. As Attache. I flew out of Berlin before they went into Russia. Flew down to Lisbon.

Q So you left all your papers there?

V Everything

Q Wouldn't they let you take them out.

V I had to leave in pretty much of a hurry, and not only that, all the papers, along before knowing how this was going to go, most of my papers had been destroyed, for safety.

Q Did you have any idea the Russians were going to be attacked?

V I surely did. I won, but didn't collect, a lot of whiskey on it from our Embassy. Our Embassy said "No, that's impossible." We were reporting, --Wolfenbarger was with me--I left him there, he was my assistant.

Q You were right alongside Lindbergh when he received the Golden Eagle. Did he receive the award reluctantly? Without any emotion?

V Without any emotion at all. He was very much surprised. You know, if you criticize Lindbergh, there wasnt anything else he could do. This was in the Ambassador's home. It was our Embassy. Hugh Wilson was Ambassador. Goering came in. The Aide had this box. Came right over to where we were standing, said something in German and put it around Lindbergh's neck. He didn't say anything. He was flabbergasted. The Ambassador didn't say anything. There wasn't anything said about the thing except he was congratulated by some people. We went through the formality of it. But Hugh Wilson was over there, I know, with the idea of trying to ease the tension between the US and Germany, and trying to smooth it up, and to have made any fuss at that time, I don't think anybody even thought of political

repercussions.

Q Did Lindbergh ever talk to you about his political ideas?

V Very little.

Q He wrote Arnold one letter in November 1938, saying we should not get involved in the war. There should not be a war between the Western nations and Germany, becuawe it could end Western civilization as he knew it. He did not want the U.S. aligned with Britain and France against Germany because he was kindly disposed towards Germany. Is that a fair statement? He felt Germany was a buffer against Soviet Russia?

V I think that would be more the thing I think he was kindly disposed toward Germany, but not Hitler Germany, and the people that were following Hitler

V He thought that if the Western nations went to war with Germany, it would serve Russia's purpose?

V I don't know Very little was ever said about it.

Q Lindbergh tried to sell German aircraft to the French. He made some proposals. The French were in bad shape aviation wise. Apparently Lindbergh got involved in a proposal to sell German aircraft or German engines to the French. This would have made the French beholden to Germany for a resupply. Did you know about this?

V No. When was this?

Q During one of his visits Probably the '38 visit

V The second one

Q How many times was he over there

V Two

Q He did this after the Munich crisis. September 1938

V I don't have any recollection except that it rings a bell that there was something going on like that

Q To sell German aircraft to the French

V Something like that. I never got into the details.

Q Did you know Stalin?

V Yes

Q What sort of a guy was he?

V Very, very keen and a very square shooter.

Q He says that the Germans entertained this proposal, presumably using Lindbergh as the intermediary to sell German engines to the French. As a ploy. They really had no intention to do this. I presume that's what he meant. Do you recall the flap caused by Lindbergh's low opinion of the Soviet Air Force? Lindbergh visited Russia in August 1938.

V I only know he had a low opinion of its ability.

Q Our attache in Moscow, Faymonville, tried to get some sort of retraction from Lindbergh who made negative comments about the Soviet air force. Lindbergh refused to retract. Faymonville appealed to Raymond Lee, our Attache in London, to reason with Lindbergh. Do you have knowledge of that?

V No

Q Did Lindbergh discuss the presentation of the medal with either Truman Smith or yourself?

V No, he didn't know anything about it

Q After the medal was given, did he discuss it?

V No. Maybe he discussed it with Truman, but he never discussed it with me.

Q Do you remember anything else about Lindbergh's visit to Germany that might be of interest?

V He was received with great favor, and we went down and attended the Lilienhall Gesellshaft (?) down at Munich. And there, all the top Nazis, including Hess. That's when Hess told Lindbergh that he had flown the Atlantic Ocean before. Hess was a little cuckoo. He told Lindbergh that he flew the Atlantic before Lindbergh ever flew it. Hess could speak English. He and Lindbergh had quite a long conversation.

Q What did the Germans really think of Lindbergh? After he left, did you hear any comments? Did they put on a show, or did they really like him?

V I think it came from deep down admiration of Lindbergh.

I really think, because Udet had quite a bit to do with it, and Udet was sympathetic with the United States, of course, and he was anti-Hitler from the word "go"

Q The Germans must have had some knowledge that Lindbergh was of a political mind, that he didnt want the West to go to war with Germany?

V They knew that much, yes. Of course, the Germans taught in their Kriegsacademie they could not win a war in which they were against the United States allied with anybody.

Q How about a two-front war?

V They didn't want a two-front war. You could put a period after that. They didn't want to have a war with the United States.

Q Perhaps they felt that Lindbergh's influence would be persuasive in keeping the U S out of any fracas with Germany?

V What they were trying to do--their psychology as I get it, and as I reported it was this: that they wanted to show the United States that any time that the US would get in it would be too late That they were blitz krieging things, and it would be over. So the U.S. had better keep their cotton-picking hands off of the thing.

Q Lindbergh could have been a means by which they might have been using him to influence a certain part of American public opinion. In effect, to deter the US from getting into a war against Germany?

V Yes. They would have like to have used Lindbergh in that way and they wanted to use him, but what I was starting to say --that as far as my observation , from the Attaché viewpoint, was that was the reason that they were showing all of our manufacturers, and allowing me to go into every factory that they had so, that I would report back, and these manufacturers visiting Germany would report back that Germany was too strong and we had better keep away from it.

Q You mentioned that the only installation for secret materiel, that Lindbergh saw that you knew about was Rechlin, that other Americans did not see. Could it be They showed Lindbergh something that you didn't know about?

V No I was with him all the time

Q They never took him off

V We lived together down at Hohenashe (?) down below Munich. Charles /_ Lindbergh _/ and Truman and Katie and Sally and myself were living down there together.

Q You were sending reports in. Were they going to Truman Smith first, and was he sending them out, or did you send them directly?

V I think at first Truman just put an endorsement on it. But no evaluation, or anything

Q These were going to G-2, and Arnold, apparently was not getting them, or at least not getting enough?

V I don't know what he felt, but as he said in Global Mission, or some place that I read it, that he was not getting information even from the good Attachés like Vanaman and Truman Smith

Q You and he were corresponding directly?

V Very little

Q Did he ever indicate in his correspondence that he would like more information than he was getting?

V Yes Which made me believe--because, if I remember correctly, I got a letter from him, maybe two weeks after I had sent in a very, very complete study of all of the airplanes and their characteristics, and the amount that they had, and the production, and the potential production of them. I mean it was a rather thoroughgoing report. And then, I get a letter that he hadn't heard from me for a long time, or something to that effect.

Q You couldn't understand what happened to that which you were sending?

V No.

Q Was somebody short-circuiting it?

V I dont know what the score was. Whether he got them or was just prodding me, Hap was prone to do that, to prod.

Q You gave him a lot, and he wanted more? (Yes)

Q In April 1939 when Lindbergh came back Arnold sent him a cable. They met at West Point, and had this conversation. Because Arnold was walking on eggshells because Lindbergh by that time had become a dirty

word in the White House And Arnold was the new Chief of Air Corps. There was a problem for Arnold being seen with Lindbergh. Did you know about any of this?

V I knew a little bit about it.

Q Did Arnold ever talk to you about meeting with Lindbergh secretly?

V No

Q Did Lindbergh ever talk to you about it?

V I can't remember that he did. It seemed to me that I knew all about it, and not from a book. But I can't remember where the information came from. I don't know.

Q Arnold was walking on eggshells for another reason. In January 1939 he had this fracas with Morgenthau. This had to do with a French mission man, a man named Paul Chmedlin in an airplane in Santa Monica and crashed in a parking lot. The Frenchman was ostensibly given access to a classified American airplane There was a Senate hearing on it and [illegible] Arnold was the man in the middle because he had to disclose the fact that Morgenthau had authorized this Frenchman to be in that airplane. Which made Arnold persona non grata with Roosevelt There was a time when Arnold's job was in jeopardy. So he really took a chance meeting with Lindbergh.

V I didn't know anything about Morgenthau

Q Let me take you to another era. You were at Wright Field in 1930-31 Arnold was there at the time. He was head of the Fairfield Air Depot. Did you see him?

V Played golf with him I remember him, [illegible] -we were standing on the first tee just chewing the fat --I think just the two of us were playing And he said: "I'm finished. I'm through. I'm going to Leavenworth this was what I'm talking about before he was sort of in disgrace

Q You mean the Billy Mitchell affair in the middle 20's

V No I didn't go to Dayton until 1928

Q Arnold went to Dayton in 1929 and you were playing golf with him when

V Probably in '28, '29 , '30 was there until 34

Q And he said he was going to Leavenworth

V Was it Leavenworth or Fort Riley

Q He was at Fort Riley before he was at Wright Field. Maybe you were playing golf with him at Rockwell ?

V No this was at Dayton. When was he in sort of disgrace?

Q 1926.

V No, this was later when he was made Air Officer.

Q Way back, at the Presidio?

V No.

Q He had orders to go to Texas and Frank Lahm would not have him And Fechet wrote Arnold a letter and sent him to March Field as a second alternative. Perhaps you were playing golf with him about that time ?

V It was '29 or '30 as I recollect, At that time he felt that his career was in jeopardy.

Q You remember any other thing about him at Wright Field? Chidlaw told me he had not enough to do at Wright Field ?

V I don't think he did. Arnold, wherever he was, wanted to be the top dog. And he was not familiar enough with the technical side to talk down to Howard. Howard was the Engineering Officer. I was Assistant to Procurement, and I also had Procurement Engineering . I had Roy Jones; I had Mark Strauss, Oliver Echols. And each one of them told me you're familiar with the procurement picture and the negotiating. We were negotiating all the contracts then. And the negotiations --you just continue on each one of them said this, So I negotiated all the contracts all the way through. So he did not have enough background in engineering; he did not have enough background in procurement Arnold was, I think, more of a tactical man, anyway.

Q So he was out of place at Wright Field

V Yes When he left Wright Field I am positive in my own mind now -- I have been mistaken in my life once or twice--he was satisfied that he was under a cloud.

Q He wanted to get out of Wright Field. He was unhappy for several reasons He did not know enough engineering and there was another factor his relationship with Jan Howard. Jan Howard was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister, and there was constant friction between them.

V I know that if they passed in the hall there were sparks and I was a little sympathetic with Arnold in the thing because I had a lot of battles with Howard.

Q Howard was described to me as a brilliant man but corrosive personality. He couldn't get along with people

V I remember saying at the time about Jan Howard, "If they would build a solid brick place and put all of the engineering in there and have a little door, and people could go to that little door and talk to Jan Howard and say, 'Our problem is this' and then close the door and Jan Howard would work it out --he was a brilliant man--and he would work it out inside this thing and then they'd open the door and put the result out" But he didn't have any contact. He couldn't sit down with anybody Just "we want this; here it is." His ability to work with a group of people was nil. But brilliant mind.

Q I get this from Chidlaw, So Arnold because of that personal conflict and because of his own lack of engineering knowledge was very unhappy at Wright Field and wanted to get away. Tried to get to Texas and Lahm would not have him. So he went to March Field and this was the beginning of his return to great eminence, You remember anything else about Arnold at Wright Field?

V No. But I back up what you said that he didn't have enough to do in headquarters. Because Pratt would deal direct with Jan Howard and he'd deal direct with me or ~~Mark~~ and Strauss or Roy Jones or Oliver Echols.

Q Chidlaw described it to me He said Arnold's biggest job was painting the fireplugs red and seeing that the cars were parked at a proper angle. Basically he did not have enough to do for his active mind and personality.

V I agree wholeheartedly with that

Q Let's go to your duty in the Secretary of the Air Staff. You replaced Sandy Fairchild. Then you had daily contact with Arnold in 1941.

V He came in early and left early. We all said he was going over to the White House. And Tooey Spaatz came in late and stayed late. That's what made the Secretary of the the Air Staff's job such a tough one. Had to be there with Arnold and then about 8:00 or 8:30, Tooey would say, "Let's go and have a little dinner"

Q You had a 12 hour day?

V More than that

Q In March 1942 you were appointed Commanding General of the Materiel Center of Wright Field Let me ask you about Pearl Harbor you were in Washington.

A Just before Pearl Harbor there was a leak of Rainbow 5 or AWPD-1, our war plan. It was published in the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald. There was a big flap about it.

V Just before Pearl Harbor?

Q Three days before

V I don't remember it. I think I would remember it if the Staff worked on it. If Arnold worked on it alone

Q Do you remember AWPD-1. It was the air war plan. Hansell and Kuter and Ken Walker worked on it. Harold George was head of this Air War Plan Division. Did you have contact with those people

V Yes. Actually what the Secretary of the Air Staff was was a paper carrier. Hap would say, "I want this done, I want that done " and I would go to the proper person on the staff and give it to them, and then I was responsible to collect it from them, see it was in proper form to present to Arnold, and if it wasn't, to get it then in proper form, and

then present it to Arnold and that was that. It was just shuffling papers.

Q The Air Staff was expanding by leaps and bounds. Arnold became Chief of the Army Air Forces. George Brett was brought in. You worked for Brett too I suppose

V No

Q Brett became Chief of Air Corps in 1940 In June 1941 just before you came back, the Army Air Forces was established. When you became Secretary of the Air Staff the Army Air Forces was established by that time.

V That was the first Air Staff

Q Was that Twining? (picture)

V ~~No~~xx Yes the first staff

Q Do you remember anything about Arnold in that situation?

V His impatience and his keenness on picking things up. Arnold, to my way of thinking, ~~was the~~ was the only man that we had in the Air Force that could have done the job that was done. We had lost Horace Hickam; we had lost Andrews. I think either one of them, in my book, could have done the job, and done it smoothly. Arnold, everybody was afraid. He just terrorized. I don't know whether that is the proper word or not. He intimidated, at least. And he got his results by doing this. Now he did some very

Q After you left the Air Staff you went to the 8th Air Force

V No. I went down to command Oklahoma City area

Q Did you have any contact with Arnold there?

V Only in the fact that he wanted to get the B-29's big tank engineered. He gave the job to me, and gave me also San Antonio. So I had both Depots. Jimmy Doolittle had been working to get me over with him I didn't know anything about it. Frank kept it from me. (Tony Frank) said that he had a promotion, that I was coming up to Wright Field , I think the head of all the engineering, or all the depot area and so forth and so on

Q Jimmy Doolittle knew you from way back?

He wanted you in his command to handle Materiel?

V To handle Intelligence. So I guess Jimmy finally got to Arnold and Arnold ordered that I go over with Jimmy, which I did. I went over there and took A-2. Jimmy said at the time that he knew that I was in for a promotion . He couldn't give me a promotion right then. He knew that I had come over there sacrificing one star.

Q You were there a short time when you were shot down?

V How it happened was this. After I got there--the Intelligence was absolutely haphazard So I got it organized. I worked pretty hard. I can't think of his name

Q Was Harris Hull in there?

V I don't even remember who it was. Because he wasn't functioning. The place wasn't functioning. So I got working right with Orvil Anderson and we formed the A-2, A-3 team.

Q This was right before OVERLORD?

V Yes So we got the thing working the way it should work with the A-2 and A-3 as a team. So then I started to go out and inspect the different bases, the Operations of the Intelligence out there. Because that was the next thing after getting the headquarters working. So I went out there, just put on overalls with no insignia on and went down and listened to the briefing. To make a long story short I found that my Intelligence officers of the various places were briefing these people about "here you'll find flak, and here you'll find this and that" and very few of them had ever been out on a mission. And I went to Jimmy and said, "Jimmy, it can't go this way. You can't send those boys out, being briefed, and told what to do and stuff by people that have never been out there, that have never seen flak and never had a Messerschmitt on their tails" And I said "We've got to get them out. The only way I can do it,; I can't send them out unless I go out first.. So I want to do a series of missions." And Jimmy said: "Oh my God, you can't do that. You were just briefed on 'Ultra'" That was the code name for the fact that we had

broken the German code.

Q They used Ultra for the Japanese code, too.

V So Jimmy said "You can't do it" and I said "we've got to do something" Finally he said: "We won't say anything about it and you just go ahead. Oh God, if anything happens to you it's going to be bad."

Q Did you also know about the Whittle jet? You knew about some of these secrets at Wright Field?

V Yes So I went out a mission.

Q How many did you go out on?

V I think that was the third or fourth.

Q On a B-17, got shot down.

V Yes I went down right over Amiens, in France. We were after some V-2 installations which were...

Q This was in August '44.

V June '44. Probably about two weeks after D-Day 10 days, 2 weeks something like that. We were going after the V-2

Q They hadn't used the V-2 yet.

V No, but we knew about it We were getting all the codes. Back there I was taking different place, co-pilot, observer, this and that I was down below. So the right inboard engine was on fire and the bombardier and the radio operator, navigator, went out. Then I went out. Then the fire went out. And they got the plane back, but I parachuted out. I was captured the next morning

Q Did the Germans identify you immediately?

V I gave my rank and serial number, I was one star then

Q How did the Germans receive you?

V They started to question me. But I kept just repeating my serial number. This was at this little place at Amiens. Then he got mad and threatened me this and that and the othr thing. So I got mad and pounded on the table just as hard as he did. I had had

four years with the Germans and I knew a little bit about their psychology

Q Did you tell them that you had been attache?

V No I didn't even let on that I could speak German. I remember an amusing incident. They were questioning me --I had covered myself up with dirt and leaves and stuff. I was dirty and didn't look much like a general, and didn't have any insignia on my coveralls. So I almost gave away the fact that I could understand German because --I was saying: "My rank is __ My serial number is ___ and so forth " One of these Germans that was there said, in German: "He doesn't look like a general to me. He looks like a goddamn farmer."

They took me to a little place called Bueff In France. And put me in a little jail house there and treated me the best they could. They took me to Brussels. I had flak in my leg and I had hurt my back pretty bad. I was not in too good shape. They took me to Brussels and put me in prison there for a couple days and then they took me to Frankfurt in Germany and put me in a hospital

Q Had they learned you had been the Air Attache

V I wouldn't know. There was no evidence

Buenker , he was the head of all Intelligence Development in Germany Air and Navy, He came to me in the hospital. I had known him very well when I was an Attache. He phoned to me and warned me that these people were trying to get information from me and to keep mum He was very sympathetic to me. They let me go out into the yard

Q They had decided that Germany had lost the war.

V They were beginning to say it

Q. The Saturday Evening Post wanted to write up your story?

V There was so much that was still classified that they wouldn't allow it, and I couldnt get this report.

Q A month after you were captured, there was this plot against Hitler. There was already a dissident group in Germany?

V Oh yes There was a dissident group in there even in '41

Q Did you go to a Stalag?

V No What happened was that down at Dresden they had a castle where they had the general officers that they had captured. No Americans. I was the senior American that they had captured. But they had French and Russians, etc. The life down there was the way the Germans --you know they're rank conscious, very much and they --you had two orderlies and all this stuff I said: "No, I'm not going there." I was a prisoner but still I said "No I'm not going there." I'm going to make a fuss about it. I'm going to the largest Stalag, the largest camp that we have, where we have officers of the Air Force. so that I can work with them." They said: "No it's impossible, You won't have accommodations there for a general officer so you can't go there" So I said Well , I'm not going there, I'm going to there. I want to go to Berlin.

Q Did they tolerate this?

V Oh yes. If you pounded on the table and say "Now look, this is this and so forth," they--especially, I only had one star, but still I was a General and that made an awful lot of difference to them. Anyway, they took me to Berlin. I can't think of the guy's name. Head of the Attaché Group when I was there as an attaché. Then had been promoted up and was a bigger guy. Anyway I had named him and I wanted to see him. Because he had been very friendly and I knew where he stood.
So they took me to see him, and I went through the same rigmarole, that that's where I was going. So finally he said "Go." So they took me then to Sagon, in upper Silesia , that's the Stalag

Q They'd been pumping you all the time for information?

V Yes

Q And you were resisting them?

V No. I talked very freely, but about things that were way very old. And I substituted--the British psychologist was very fascinated by the method that I used. Because they were investigating a little bit why they had never gotten any information out of me. They never tortured me, or did anything like that. It was all very friendly, this trying to get the information. So I substituted in my own mind . Actually, I displaced all of the Ultra by another plan, and told them that. I let them worm it out of me. I never volunteered but they could get inference.

Q What was this plan about?

V The one that I substituted? It was a method of locating--I'd better go back a little bit--I told them that I was there on temporary duty observing. They never found out that I was the A-2 of the 8th Air Force. I told them that I was there--and they had orders that they were sending me on another duty and cancelled it when I came to England . This was a temporary job that I was going on. But they had those orders. I found out, so it worked in. So I was only over there on a temporary job and I was trying to find out how the airplanes were located at various places, how they were intercepted with their messages and and like that. I got a whole big plan, a very elaborate plan and let them bleed it out of me. Then I was never interrogated after I left the hospital. But, by that time they had made their plans to use me. They were going to use me in a group that was going to try to make a separate peace

Q You mentioned in a letter something about a secret code in a shoe.

V That's later on and that's how they were trying to use me.

Q They put you in a group of American prisoners?

V Yes

Q They were trying to use a sort of fulcrum to wangle a separate peace?

V No. They didn't let me know anything about it. But I could see by the people that visited me, former newspaper correspondent from Berlin visited me there at Sagon --I mean German--a writer visited me, an

officer visited me. I could see what they were doing.

Q Was this already in 1945

V Still in 1944. Then in December or January of 45 that we started out on the march. We marched from Sagon when the Russians were coming in in Upper Silesia. We marched to Spremberg. There, I got a message from Berlin to the effect that I would be repatriated, and to choose four people, five including myself, to go with me That they would be repatriated. People that had helped out on this march. We took absolute charge of this march because the German were--we had no dogs or anything on us--Goering had seen to the fact that we had fairly good treatment, as good as they could give.

Q Were the other four higher rank?

V No they were. Delmar Spivey he was one of them He was a Colonel. And he was my Chief of Staff while we-- We had a regular military organization in prison camp

Q Sounds like "Hogan's Heroes."

V Bill Kennedy was A-2. We had the whole thing lined up. Anyway, there was Spivey, Bill Kennedy, and a fellow named Brown, PopGeorge. There were five of us. I knew in my own mind that it was a cover, this repatriation, but I felt - and talked this over with Spivey. If they wanted to use me, then we could get something in return. We went to Berlin. We were prisoners; we had to go anyway. Not too much choice. We went to berline where we were sent to a place called Luckenwald, and kept there. Verious things happened. There were delays, but we finally got up to Berlin again. Del and I sent the others back. Del and I went to a Red Cross Medical Conference with German and American officers who were prisoners - medical officers in prison camps. We had this medical conference, and then, I was notified that General Gottlob Berger - he was the head of all the Prisoner of War Affairs

for Germany. He was the one that had been given the job of exterminating all American and English air officers of the whole outfit. He got the job because they couldn't talk Hitler out of it. People tried to talk him out of it. But Eva Braun, who was then his girl friend, was very sympathetic to the American and English prisoners and was not going to have anything to do with that. So she got Hitler to give this job to Berger and he was a friend of Eva Braun's, and had promised her that the orders would not be carried out.

Q To exterminate the British and American air officers?

V That's right. And that's how it happened. That's coming out in a book. I think a fellow by the name of McClean or something like that is writing it.

Q This is an item out of the Veterans' Administration. It's from D. Carroll PO Box 1321 Boca Raton, Florida 33432 And the question about Adolf Hitler's sweetheart, Eva Braun Did she save thousands of Jews from the gas chamber by intervening with Hitler in their behalf? The answer given by D. Carroll is that she did not intervene with Hitler on behalf of the Jews. She did become deeply involved in saving the lives of hundreds of Allied prisoners of war. When the war began going badly for Hitler , he ordered the execution of all prisoners of war, especially the American fliers who had so devastatingly bombed Germany. Hitler's officers tried to reason with Der Fuehrer but he was maniacally obstinate.

Eva Braun however employed a different tactic. She arranged for the execution assignment to go to Gottlob Berger, General of the Waffen SS, who secretly promised her that the executions would not be carried out. He kept his word. An American author, Glenn Infield, of Beaver Falls, Penna discovered these facts in a heretofore undisclosed interview of General Berger by the late Judge Michael Musmanno, a jurist at Nuremberg. Infield had just finished a book on Hitler's germany. The Musmanno archives will be published by Grosset & Dunlop later this year - 1974, P. W. Bulletin of August 1974.

Q The facts in this little flier are essentially correct

V Yes. That is, they're borne out by our contacts with Berger. Then we were taken to Berger's headquarters and Berger greeted us, and wined us and dined us, and so forth. And then he explained what he was trying to do. He and a group. One of them was Hitler's Intelligence Officer, Schellenberger. I don't know whether you've read any of his stuff? He mentions in the book that he published on Hitler's Intelligence Officers that about this plan, the Berger plan to save Germany, which is quite fantastic. He told us that this was his plan. He wanted to get in touch with our topside and what he wanted to do, he and this group. They had Russian prisoners and they had enough troops of their own. What they wanted to do--this was before the Bulge, before they expended themselves--their idea was this: that Germany turn her back on the Western allies and go right toward the Russians; and that the Americans , the Western allies, were to allow only supplies to come through the line; they were to follow them right up but not shoot them in the back and let supplies come through only for one day. As soon as they drove the Russians back to the border, then we were to shut off their supplies and they were to lay down their arms and surrender to the Western Allies, but not to Russia. That was the Berger plan and he wanted us, first to take that plan back and argue it with our people.

Q He was to let you loose?

V That was the repatriation. So we said we would not argue that plan at all but act as a messenger. And that was when they built that stuff in the shoe.

Q The Germans had this idea? They put a code in your shoe and were going to let you loose?

V They were going to let us go back, just Del Spivey and myself. So we got down on Lake Constance and after very, very --which is all coming out in an article in the Air Force Magazine by Arthur Durant, under the auspices of the Historical Department at the Air Academy. We got down there and Himmler--you see the plan included the bumping off of

Hitler and Himmler. Because Berger said no one in their right mind would make peace with Hitler or Himmler. Because they'd be doublecrossed, or what have you. So the plan included that. So Himmler got on to it, and ordered Del and myself taken out and shot. So there was cat and mouse business there at Lake Constance and finally

Q Berger was protecting you from Himmler?

V Yes. Berger kept his word. We said we would do this on the basis that our prisoners of war would not be moved, that they would allow trucks, Western Allied trucks, to come in through Germany, through the lines, up to the prison camps with Red Cross parcels, our own parcels. Which they did, painted white with big red crosses on them. We found them when we were down on Lake Constance.

Q They came in through the border there? Swiss Border? (Yes)

V Came in right through Constance. Anyway, Berger kept his word We would take this message back and make a report to our topside and that's a report that I made to Bissell, that we can't get

Q Bissell got the report?

V Bissell got it. Took my shoes, and he brought them back and said the codes were in there, but they never did anything about it, of course, because it was too late then

Q We wouldn't dare to make a separate peace This would be disloyalty to the Russians at that time?

V Yes, but Berger said, and has maintained all the time and maintains to this day that he had absolute proof that the Russians had made a separate peace agreement with Japan. And he said when the US gets that, they will not have any qualms about making a separate peace.

Q Has any documentation ever come out about that separate peace treaty between Russia and Japan?

V No, not anything that I know of.

Q They sent the breaking of this code to the US separately so that if

you were captured nobody would know what you were carrying. Is that right? How did this code work? They had a secret code; they put it in the heel of your shoe

V As soon as the authorities over here--if they wanted to pursue this--they started sending messages on this wavelength using this code as a symbol

Q The code said, "If you wish to pursue this matter of a separate peace treaty, contact us on a certain kilocycle?"

V Certain kilocycles and certain call letters and so forth and so on

Q Did Arnold get involved in this at all? (No) This was to go from Bissell to Marshall And of course it was much too late then for negotiating a separate peace. And had Roosevelt died by then?

V Yes He died while we were at Lake Constance

Q While you were still negotiating?

V It was too late because we were delayed four weeks at Luckenwald, and three weeks at Lake Constance

Q Ducking Himmler's agents?

V Yes.

Q The war ended in Europe. You came back to the U.S. to take a Technical job under Hugh Knerr in the Air/Service Command?

V I was supposed to go on leave for two months - decompression. I went up to Butler, Penna, and on the third day, I was on the phone to Hugh Knerr. I said: "I can't take this at all. There's a war still on and I've been in the service too long to sit on my duff up here in Butler Pa, Sally's home up there. So Hugh said: "All right, we're in trouble down at Mobile. You can get down there and take command, if you want to." And I said: "Okay, when do I leave? And he said "You say when you leave." And Isaid "I'LL leave tomorrow then." So I went down there and took command. And then he told me that he wanted to send me out here to take command of McClellan. And he said: "After you get things cleaned up down there at Mobile, then you can come out and take command of

McClellan

Q Hugh Knerr had that job, he took it from Knudsen. Benny Meyers wanted that job but he retired. Maybe the scandal about him came out, or had it? That anonymous letter. Was it generally known that Benny Meyers was playing games?

V We knew it. Certain ones of us knew he was crooked as a dog's hind leg a long time ago. But I don't know. I think it was --I don't think it came out right then

Q It came out later when the Ferguson Committee investigated?

V I know it didn't. Because he when Knerr took that job, Benny Meyers came out and took my old job at the Wright Field Air Materiel Center, or whatever it was called.

Q He didn't last. He retired shortly after

V Shortly after they got on to him. They found out about his business out there in Dayton But he took those quarters there and had them....

Q Really fixed them up

V Really fixed them up

Q Knerr was supposed to get his third star when he took over from Knudsen. But he didn't Do you know anything about that?

V No But I don't think that Knerr was very popular with Arnold

Q No he wasn't Did he ever talk to you about his relations with Arnold?

V No. He was too square shooting.

Q But you knew that they weren't great friends?

V Yes I knew that

Q Did you ever see Arnold after that When you came back

V Yes. Even after Arnold retired, he and Bee came over and stayed with us at McClellan here.

Q Any special recollections of Arnold?

V No My only special recollection of Arnold is what I said He was the only man that could have done the job that he did. That the world

lost their very best actor that could ever tread the boards (I don't know whether it's fair to say that he was an opportunist. Because he made his opportunities a lot of times.

Q He was an actor but he was always a performer, a performer by way of getting things done. Is that a fair statement?

V His greatest asset, I think, was guts. There were very few people that we had that would make the decisions, the big decisions, that he made--to take over all of the hotels down in Miami there. That is the way he would do it.

Q How about buying the B-29, an untried concept?

V Arnold didn't have too many original ideas. But he knew when he heard a good idea. And then he had the guts to carry it out. He took it and ran down the field with it to beat the devil.

Q He could recognize a good idea from a bad idea?

V He could do that He was very good at it. He was keen.

Q Did he have some bad ideas? Bad decision or bad procurement?

V There were bad ones, yes. But overall I feel positive in my own mind that we didn't have anybody else that could have done the job that Arnold did. I guess Jesus is the only one that we have any history of that didn't have any faults.

Q Postscript. Gen Vanaman told me about Arnold and Benny Meyers. Arnold catered to Benny Meyers because Arnold was a name dropper and Arnold used Benny Meyers to gain entree to the presence of Harry Hopkins. Benny Meyers and Hopkins were very close and Arnold used this means to establish this close tie with Hopkins This relationship between Arnold and Meyers was a strange one Benny Meyers got a lot of his factual material from Vanaman, and misused it in representing it to Hap Arnold. A lot of people didn't understand why Arnold had this close tie to Benny Meyers

END

Q Do you recall when you first encountered Hap Arnold

V Yes I can't give you the exact date. It was in '22 or '23. He came out to Rockwell and took command. That was the first k that I knew him

Q What were you doing out there.

V At that time the title was Chief Engineer Officer. Rockwell was made a depot. I guess we went out there in 1921. I had been at Middletown with Daddy Kirkland and started it up as a depot. . That's a long story. I was going to get out of the service and then they persuaded me to go out to Rockwell with Daddy Kirk So then Kirck, then Shep Fitzgerald, then Arnold came there. I think probably about a year before I left.

Q This was in the middle of all those world records? the world cruisers?

A Yes. Jimmy Doolittle came in there, and then, Tooey Spaatz . The round-the-world was later; I saw them in Shanghai.

Q You remember anything about Arnold at Rockwell in '22 or '23.

V I can't say that I remember anything that would be of any value for your history. He was a Major and I remember some of the things that he said at Officers' Call. We started real early in the morning and then we had Officess' Call at noon. One of the things he said that if an Army officer couldn't start at daybreak and get his work done by noon and then take care of his physical body , sports, athletics, polo, something like that in the afternoon, he was not an efficient officer. Of course that suited a lot of us to play golf in the afternoon down at Coronado. I remember that he was very keen and asked some very pertient questions about the operation and took particular delight in asking you a question that you couldn't answer. He seemed to get a lot of kick out of asking you a question that you couldn't answer about your own work. Just as an illustration of that --he wanted to know what dry ice was, and he had looked it up, he had found out what it was and he just wanted to know whether anybody else knew what dry ice was. He took particular delight in asking

some very pertinent questions.

Q Did this put you on the defensive?

V Yes. That was one of the things, and I think it was another thing to satisfy his ego. He always did have or took a delight to take someone over the coals. This was later brought out when I was Secretary of the Air Staff and Arnold then seemed to pick on Mike Scanlon who was Air Intelligence on the first Air Staff. One day I was in the office with Hap and he called Mike in. When Mike shut the door he started in on him. So I tried to slip out. When I got to the door Arnold said "Wait a minute, Van. I'm not through with you." Then he went on blistering Scanlon, and so I tried to get out again, and was called back. It was something that Mike hadn't done Arnold thought he should do. He ended and said "Get out of here and never let me see you again." Then when the door closed on Mike, Arnold said: "That's telling them, isn't it man!" He wanted somebody to witness the superiority of him over some other person.

Q Scanlon did n't last long in that job. Right after Pearl Harbor, he was sent out to the Far East.

V Yes

Q A-2 was a tough job

V I remember. I had it with the 8th Air Force.

Q The reason it was so tough, I think, was that you didnt have your own sources of Intelligence. You had to rely on G-2.

V That was a bad thing. Arnold didnt get a lot that came out of Germany.

Q I wanted to ask about that. You were sent over there to replace Koenig as Air Attache. Was he unsatisfactory in the job, or was it just a routine transfer?

V He didn't have the contacts that it was necessary to have over there

Q Social side?

V Yes He was heavy on the social side of it.

Q When did you come to Germany?

V It was in July of '37. I left there in July of '41

Q Truman Smith was your superior?

V Truman Smith was Military Attache, and at that time Air was part of the Army

Q You were there when Charles Lindbergh came?

V Yes, between '37 and '38

Q Do you remember the circumstances of his visit?

V What do you mean by the circumstances?

Q The Germans invited him over there. They showed him a lot.

V Truman Smith had a lot to do with getting him over there, in the first place. He got the invitation for Lindbergh. Because Tryman thought that Charles Lindbergh should see what was doing over there.

Q Were the Germans flattered to have Lindbergh come over. (Very)? Showed him a lot,

V Very flattered. They showed him a lot. They didn't show him any more than they --let me go back here, because I started to say something. When I went over there, I met Udet rightaway and a fellow by the name of Walter Wendtland who had worked with Larry Bell and Dutch Kindelberger and Don Douglas when they were up with Martin. So I found from the Germans that they wanted to show the United States their strength. So I immediately tried to capitalize on that by inviting Dutch Kindelberger to come over. Glenn Martin, Larry Bell, Kemp Joyce, Van Dusen, who was with Martin at that time, Burdette Wright, a lot of people like that. Inviting them to come over. They immediately took--like Dutch Kindelberger, I think was in every airplane factory, not all the engine factories, but all the airplane factories that the Germans had. Now I had guided Germany and had flown and they didn't have much hidden from me. I had a little Messerschmitt airplane. So Dutch was into every one of them. I immediately saw that that was my chance to get into every factory by having them there which they wanted to show people like that. It just suited my purpose because Dutch Kindelberger could walk through a factory and tell the production and potential production, and so could Glenn Martin and the other people.

Then, Truman wanted to get Lindbergh over there which was a very . . . He felt that they would even open up a little bit more. Dutch and Larry had everything that Lindbergh ever saw, and more. They opened up and showed Lindbergh, and, of course, they had a lot of social stuff for Lindbergh. They did all right for Dutch and the others, but they did more social stuff for Lindbergh.

Q Did they show Lindbergh any technical equipment that they didn't show others?

V Yes The only thing--and I can't think of the name of the plane. It was the new. This was up at Rechlin --it was their Wright Field. None of manufacturers were at that place and all of their secret stuff and the new stuff was up there. And the way Lindbergh got to Rechlin was, the night he got the Golden Eagle Award. Goering put it on him. I stood right alongside of him as he got this award. Then Goering and Lindbergh wanted to talk and there were three or four of us that were doing the interpreting because Lindbergh's German was not too good and Goering's English was not good at all

Q You were translating for both?

V I wasn't doing it all. There were three of us in there. I don't remember who the other two were Anyway, Goering was on his bragging bit, and he was telling about this particular plane they had up there and what it could do and so forth. A light bomber. So actually what happened, Lindbergh didn't understand it at all. I mean he didn't understand the German. When Goering was bragging about this, I said to Goering I didn't believe that Lindbergh believed that, that it was impossible. Goering flushed up, and he said: "I'll show you!" So then he called an aide in and he gave an order that Lindbergh and myself were to go to Rechlin the next morning. Leave from Templehof, and go directly. And the Aide kind of paled when these foreigners were going to Rechlin. But, anyway, they showed him this new airplane. We didnt get too much out of what they had in process,

but this particular airplane he was bragging about, he showed him. Lindbergh saw that, we saw Rechlin although we didn't get into the details of the operation. But that was the only thing that he saw that the only people hadn't seen. And so reported to Arnold

Q He and Arnold wwere corresponding. In '38 Arnold was very intersted in getting information from Lindbergh because he as was getting a heck of a lot from G-2. Arnold had the responsibility as Chief and he x had to know about German characteristics because he was trying to build an air force

V I knew that they were corresponding, but I didn't see any of the correspondence. There is the thing. Arnold was apparently not getting my reports. Every three months I made a summary report. Gave the characteristics of the airplanes and my estimate of the potential production, and the production then. And it was all based on experts. I was using Dutch Kindelberger and Larry Bell and these people as experts. And Kemp Joyce, the old Berliner Joyce, the first two-seater fighter we ever had.

Q Did Lindbergh talk to x you about his reactions to Rechlin?

V No except that he visited there. Because he was going to make a report. And he took all my files. He spent days in my office going through all my reports on which I had reported what these other manufacturers had said about the thing. So, Arnold had everything that Lindbergh could give him except Lindbergh's political ideas. As for the technical side of it, Arnold had every bit that he ever got from anybody. He had it before he talked to Lindbergh.

Q From whom ?

V Dutch Kindelberger. All these people went right in and talked to Arnold. But they didnt have the big name to connect to the Germans.

Q You said Arnold wasn't getting your reports?

V Everything that I forwarded went to G-2

Q How do you know Arnold was not getting your reports?

V I don't know that he was not getting my reports. But from letters that I had from him, I just judged that he didn't.

Q These letters you dont have? What happened to them?

V No. When I came out of Germany I came out with a suit of underclothes and a toothbrush.

Q As a POW?

V No, No. As Attache. I flew out of Berlin before they went into Russia. Flew down to Lisbon.

Q So you left all your papers there?

V Everything

Q Wouldn't they let you take them out.

V I had to leave in pretty much of a hurry, and not only that, all the papers, long before knowing how this was going to go, most of my papers had been destroyed, for safety.

Q Did you have any idea the Russians were going to be attacked?

V I surely did. I won, but didn't collect, a lot of whiskey on it from our Embassy. Our Embassy said "No, that's impossible." We were reporting, --Wolfenbarger was with me--I left him there, he was my assistant.

Q You were right alongside Lindbergh when he received the Golden Eagle. Did he receive the award reluctantly? Without any emotion?

V Without any emotion at all. He was very much surprised. You know, if you criticize Lindbergh, there wasnt anything else he could do. This was in the Ambassador's home. It was our Embassy. Hugh Wilson was Ambassador. Goering came in. The Aide had this box. Came right over to where we were standing, said something in German and put it around Lindbergh's neck. He didn't say anything. He was flabbergasted. The Ambassador didn't say anything. There wasn't anything said about the thing except he was congratulated by some people. Went through the formality of it. But Hugh Wilson was over there, I know, with the idea of trying to ease the tension between the US and Germany, and trying to smooth it up, and to have made any fuss at that time, I don't think anybody even thought of political

repercussions.

Q Did Lindbergh ever talk to you about his political ideas?

V Very little.

Q He wrote Arnold one letter in November 1938, saying we should not get involved in the war. There should not be a war between the Western nations and Germany, becuawe it could end Western civilization as he knew it. He did not want the U.S. aligned with Britain and France against Germany because he was kindly disposed towards Germany. Is that a fair statement? He felt Germany was a buffer against Soviet Russia?

V I think that would be more the thing I think he was kindly disposed toward Germany, but not Hitler Germany, and the people that were following Hitler

V He thought that if the Western nations went to war with Germany, it would serve Russia's purpose?

V I don't know Very little was ever said about it.

Q Lindbergh tried to sell German aircraft to the French. He made some proposals. The French were in bad shape aviation wise. Apparently Lindbergh got involved in a proposal to sell German aircraft or German engines to the French. This would have made the French beholden to Germany for a resupply. Did you know about this?

V No. When was this?

Q During one of his visits Probably the '38 visit

V The second one

Q How many times was he over h there

V Two

Q He did this after the Munich crisis. September 1938

V I don't have any recollection except that it rings a bell that there was something going on like that

Q To sell German aircraft to the French

V Something like that. I never got into the details.

Q Did you know Stahlin?

V Yes

Q What sort of a guy was he?

V Very, very keen and a very square shooter.

Q He says that the Germans entertained this proposal, presumably using Lindbergh as the intermediary to sell German engines to the French. As a ploy. They really had no intention to do this. I presume that's what he meant. Do you recall the flap caused by Lindbergh's low opinion of the Soviet Air Force? Lindbergh visited Russia in August 1938.

V I only know he had a low opinion of its ability.

Q Our attache in Moscow, Faymonville, tried to get some sort of retraction from Lindbergh who made negative comments about the Soviet air force. Lindbergh refused to retract. Faymonville appealed to Raymond Lee, our Attach in London, to reason with Lindbergh. Do you have knowledge of that?

V No

Q Did Lindbergh discuss the presentation of the medal with either Truman Smith or yourself?

V No, he didn't know anything about it.

Q After the medal was given, did he discuss it?

V No. Maybe he discussed it with Truman, but he never discussed it with me.

Q Do you remember anything else about Lindbergh's visit to Germany that might be of interest?

V He was received with great favor, and we went down and attended the Lilienhall Gesellshaft (?) down at Munich. And there, all the top Nazis, including Hess. That's when Hess told Lindbergh that he had flown the Atlantic Ocean before. Hess was a little cuckoo. He told Lindbergh that he flew the Atlantic before Lindbergh ever flew it. Hess could speak English. He and Lindbergh had quite a long conversation.

Q What did the Germans really think of Lindbergh? After he left, did you hear any comments? Did they put on a show, or did they really like him?

V I think it came from deep down admiration of Lindbergh.

I really think, because Udet had quite a bit to do with it, and Udet was sympathetic with the United States, of course, and he was anti-Hitler from the word "go"

Q The Germans must have had some knowledge that Lindbergh was of a political mind, that he didnt want the West to go to war with Germany?

V They, knew that mch, yes. Of course, the Germans taught in their Kriegsacademie they could not win a war in which they were against the United States allied with anybody.

Q How about a two-front war?

V They didn't want a two-front war. You could put a period after that. They didn't want to have a war with the United States.

Q Perhaps they felt that Lindbergh's influence would be persuasive in keeping the U S out of any fracas with Germany?

V What they were trying to do--their psychology as I get it, and as I reported it was this: that they wanted to show the United States that any time that the US would get in it would be too late That they were blitz krieging things, and it would be over. So the U.S. had better keep their cotton-picking hands off of the thing.

Q Lindbergh could have been a means by which they might have been using him to influence a certain part of American public opinion. In effect, to deter the US from getting into a war against Germany?

V Yes. They would have like to have used Lindbergh in that way and they wanted to use him, but what I was starting to say --that as far as my observation , from the Attaché viewpoint, was that was the reason that they were showing all of our manufacturers, and allowing me to go into every factory that they had so, that I would report back, and these manufacturers visiting Germany would report back that it was too strong and we had better keep away from it.

Q You mentioned that the only installation for secret materiel, that Lindbergh saw that you knew about was Rechlin, that other Americans did not see. Couldn't he They showed Lindbergh something that you didn't know about?

Q They never took him off.

V We lived together down at Hohenashe (?) down below Munich. Charles /_Lindbergh_/ and Truman and Katie and Sally and myself were living down there together.

Q You were sending reports in. Were they going to Truman Smith first, and was he sending them out, or did you send them directly?

V I think at first Truman just put an endorsement on it. But no evaluation, or anything.

Q These were going to G-2, and Arnold, apparently was not getting them, or at least not getting enough?

V I don't know what he felt, but as he said in Global Mission, or some place that I read it, that he was not getting information even from the good Attachés like Vanaman and Truman Smith.

Q You and he were corresponding directly?

V Very little.

Q Did he ever indicate in his correspondence that he would like more information than he was getting?

V Yes. Which made me believe--because, if I remember correctly, I got a letter from him, maybe two weeks after I had sent in a very, very complete study of all of the airplanes and their characteristics, and the amount that they had, and the production, and the potential production of them. I mean it was a rather thoroughgoing report. And then, I get a letter that he hadn't heard from me for a long time, or something to that effect.

Q You couldn't understand what happened to that which you were sending?

V No.

Q Was somebody short-circuiting it?

V I dont know what the score was. Whether he got them or was just prodding me, Hap was prone to do that, to prod.

Q You gave him a lot, and he wanted more? (Yes)

Q In April 1939 when Lindbergh came back Arnold sent him a cable. They met at West Point, and had this conversation. Because Arnold was walking on eggshells because Lindbergh by that time had become a dirty

word in the White House · And Arnold was the new Chief of Air Corps. There was a problem for Arnold being seen with Lindbergh. Did you know about any of this?

V I knew a little bit about it.

Q Did Arnold ever talk to you about meeting with Lindbergh secretly?

V No

Q Did Lindbergh ever talk to you about it?

V I can't remember that he did. It seemed to me that I knew all about it, and not from a book. But I can't remember where the information came from. I don't know.

Q Arnold was walking on eggshells for another reason. In January 1939 he had this fracas with Morgenthau. This had to do with a French mission man, a man named Paul Chmedlin in an airplane in Santa Monica and crashed in a parking lot. The Frenchman was ostensibly given access to a classified American airplane There was a Senate hearing on it and -- .. .. Arnold was the man in the middle because he had to disclose the fact that Morgenthau had authorized this Frenchman to be in that airplane. Which made Arnold persona non grata with Roosevelt There was a time when Arnold's job was in jeopardy. So he really took a chance meeting with Lindbergh.

V I didn't know anything about Morgenthau

Q Let me take you to another era. You were at Wright Field in 1930-31 Arnold was there at the time. He was head of the Fairfield Air Depot. Did you see him?

V Played golf with him I remember him, -we were standing on the first tee just chewing the fat --I think just the two of us were playing And he said: "I'm finished. I'm through. I'm going to Leavenworth this was what I'm talking about before he was sort of in disgrace

Q You mean the Billy Mitchell affair in the middle 20's

V No I didn't go to Dayton until 1928

Q Arnold went to Dayton in 1929 and you were playing golf with him when

V Probably in '28, '29 , '30 was there until 34

Q And he said he was going to Leavenworth

V Was it Leavenworth or Fort Riley

Q He was at Fort Riley before he was at Wright Field. Maybe you were playing golf with him at Rockwell ?

V No this was at Dayton. When was he in sort of disgrace?

Q 1926.

V No, this was later when he was made Air Officer.

Q Way back at the Presidio?

V No.

Q He had orders to go to Texas and Frank Lahm would not have him And Fechet wrote Arnold a letter and sent him to March Field as a second alternative. Perhaps you were playing golf with him about that time ?

V It was '29 or '30 as I recollect , At that time he felt that his career was in jeopardy.

Q You remember any other thing about him at Wright Field? Chidlaw told me he had not enough to do at Wright Field ?

V I don't think he did. Arnold, wherever he was, wanted to be the top dog. And he was not familier enough with the technical side to talk down to Howard. Howard was the Engineering Officer. I was Assistant to Procurement and I also had Procurement Engineering . I had Roy Jones; I had Mark Strauss, Oliver Echols. And each one of them told me you're familiar with the procurement picture and the negotiating. We were negotiating all the contracts then. And the negotiations --you just continue on each one of them said this. So I negotiated all the contracts all the way through. So he did not have enough background in engineering; he did not have enough background in procurement Arnold was, I think, more of a tactical man, anyway

Q So he was out of place at Wright Field

V Yes When he left Wright Field I am positive in my own mind now -- I have been mistaken in my life once or twice--he was satisfied that he was under a cloud.

Q He wanted to get out of Wright Field. He was unhappy for several reasons He did not know enough engineering and there was another factor his relationship with Jan Howard. Jan Howard was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister, and there was constant friction between them.

V I know that if they passed in the hall there were sparks and I was a little sympathetic with Arnold in the thing because I had a lot of battles with Howard.

Q Howard was described to me as a brilliant man but corrosive personality. He couldn't get along with people

V I remember saying at the time about Jan Howard, "If they would build a solid brick place and put all of the engineering in there and have a little door, and people could go to that little door and talk to Jan Howard and say, 'The problem is this' and then close the door and Jan Howard would work it out --he was a brilliant man--and he would work it out inside this thing and then they'd open the door and put the result out" But he didn't have any contact. He couldn't sit down with anybody Just "we want this; here it is." His ability to work with a group of people was nil. But brilliant mind.

Q I get this from Chidlaw, So Arnold because of that personal conflict and because of his own lack of engineering knowledge was very unhappy at Wright Field and wanted to get away. Tried to get to Texas and Lahm would not have him. So he went to March Field and this was the beginning of his return to great eminence, You remember anything else about Arnold at Wright Field?

V No. But I back up what you said that he didn't have enough to do in headquarters. Because Pratt would deal direct with Jan Howard and he'd deal direct with me or ~~Mark~~ Claud Strauss or Roy Jones or Oliver Echols.

Q Chidlaw described it to me He said Arnold's biggest job was painting the fireplugs red and seeing that the cars were parked at a proper angle. Basically he did not have enough to do for his active mind and personality.

V I agree wholeheartedly with that

Q Let's go to your duty in the Secretary of the Air Staff. You replaced Sandy Fairchild. Then you had daily contact with Arnold in 1941.

V He came in early and left early. We all said he was going over to the White House. And Tooey Spaatz came in late and stayed late. That's what made the Secretary of the the Air Staff's job such a tough one. Had to be there with Arnold, and then about 8:00 or 8:30, Tooey would say, "Let's go, and have a little dinner"

Q You had a 12 hour day?

V More than that

Q In March 1942 you were appointed Commanding General of the Materiel Center of Wright Field. Let me ask you about Pearl Harbor You were in Washington. Just before Pearl Harbor there was a leak of Rainbow 5 or AWPD-1, our war plan. It was published in the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald. There was a big flap about it.

V Just before Pearl Harbor?

Q Three days before

V I don't remember it. . . I think I would remember it if the Staff worked on it. If Arnold worked on it alone

Q Do you remember AWPD-1. It was the air war plan. Hansell and Kuter and Ken Walker worked on it. Harold George was head of this Air War Plan Division. Did you have contact with those people .

V Yes. Actually what the Secretary of the Air Staff was was a paper carrier. Hap would say, "I want this done; I want that done " and I would go to the proper person on the staff and give it to them, and then I was responsible to collect it from them, see it was in proper form to present to Arnold, and if it wasn't, to get it then in proper form, and

then present it to Arnold and that was that. It was just shuffling papers.

Q The Air Staff was expanding by leaps and bounds. Arnold became Chief of the Army Air Forces. George Brett was brought in. You worked for Brett too I suppose

V No

Q Brett became Chief of Air Corps in 1940 In June 1941 just before you came back, the Army Air Forces was established. When you became Secretary of the Air Staff the Army Air Forces was established by that time.

V That was the first Air Staff

Q Was that Twining? (spelling)

V ~~No~~ Yes the first staff

Q Do you remember anything about Arnold in that situation?

V His impatience and his keenness on picking things up. Arnold, to my way of thinking, ~~was the~~ was the only man that we had in the Air Force that could have done the job that was done. We had lost Horace Hickam; we had lost Andrews. I think either one of them, in my book, could have done the job, and done it smoothly. Arnold, everybody was afraid. He just terrorized. I don't know whether that is the proper word or not. He intimidated, at least. And he got his results by doing this. Now he did some very

Q After you left the Air Staff you went to the 8th Air Force

V No. I went down to command Oklahoma City area

Q Did you have any contact with Arnold there?

V Only in the fact that he wanted to get the B-29's big tank engineered. He gave the job to me, and gave also San Antonio. So I had both Depots. Jimmy Doolittle had been working to get me over with him I didn't know anything about it. Frank kept it from me. (Tony Frank) said that he had a promotion, that I was coming up to Wright Field , I think the head of all the engineering, or all the depot area and so forth and so on

Q Jimmy Doolittle knew you from way back?

He wanted you in his command to handle Materiel?

V To handle Intelligence. So I guess Jimmy finally got to Arnold and Arnold ordered that I go over with Jimmy, which I did. I went over there and took A-2. Jimmy said at the time that he knew that I was in for a promotion . He couldn't give me a promotion right then. He knew that I had come over there sacrificing one star.

Q You were there a short time when you were shot down?

V How it happened was this. After I got there--the Intelligence was absolutely haphazard So I got it organized. I worked pretty hard. I can't think of his name

Q Was Harris Hull in there?

V I don't even remember who it was. Because he wasn't functioning. The place wasn't functioning. So I got working right with Orvil Anderson and we formed the A-2, A-3 team.

Q This was right before OVERLORD?

V Yes So we got the thing working the way it should work with the A-2 and A-3 as a team. So then I started to go out and inspect the different bases, Operations of the Intelligence out there. Because that was the next thing after getting the headquarters working. So I went out there, just put on overalls with no insignia on and went down and listened to the briefing. To make a long story short I found that my Intelligence officers of the various places were briefing these people about "here you'll find flak, and here you'll find this and that" and very few of them had ever been out on a mission. And I went to Jimmy and said, "Jimmy, it can't go this way. You can't send those boys out, being briefed and told what to do and stuff by people that have never been out there, that have never seen flak and never had a Messerschmitt on their tails" And I said "We've got to get them out. The only way I can do it,; I can't send them out unless I go out first.. So I want to do a series of missions." And Jimmy said: "Oh my God, you can't do that. You were just briefed on 'Ultra" That was the code name for the fact that we had

broken the German code.

Q They used Ultra for the Japanese code, too.

V So Jimmy said "You can't do it" and I said "we've got to do something" Finally he said: "We won't say anything about it and you just go ahead. Oh God, if anything happens to you it's going to be bad."

Q Did you also know about the Whittle jet? You knew about some of these secrets at Wright Field?

V Yes So I went out a mission.

Q How many did you go out on?

V I think that was the third or fourth.

Q On a B-17, got shot down.

V Yes I went down right over Amiens, in France. We were after some V-2 installations which were ...

Q This was in August '44.

V June '44. Probably about two weeks after D-Day 10 days, 2 weeks something like that. We were going after the V-2

Q They hadn't used the V-2 yet.

V No, but we knew about it. We were getting all the codes. Back there I was taking different place, co-pilot, observer, this and that I was down below. So the right inboard engine was on fire and the bombardier and the radio operator, navigator, went out. Then I went out. Then the fire went out. And they got the plane back, but I parachuted out. I was captured the next morning

Q Did the Germans identify you immediately?

V I gave my rank and serial number, I was one star then

Q How did the Germans receive you?

V They started to question me. But I kept just repeating my serial number. This was at this little place at Amiens.

Then he got mad and threatened me this and that and the othr thing. So I got mad and pounded on the table just as hard as he did. I had had

four years with the Germans and I knew a little bit about their psychology

Q Did you tell them that you had been attache?

V No I didn't even let on that I could speak German. I remember an amusing incident. They were questioning me --I had covered myself up with dirt and leaves and stuff. I was dirty and didn't look much like a general, and didn't have any insignia on my coveralls. So I almost gave away the fact that I could understand German because --I was saying: "My rank is __ My serial number is ___ and so forth " One of these Germans that was there said, in German: "He doesn't look like a general to me. He looks like a goddamn farmer.

They took me to a little place called Bueff In France. And put me in a little jail house there and treated me the best they could. They took me to Brussels. I had flak in my leg and I had hurt my back pretty bad. I was not in too good shape. They took me to Brussels and put me in prison there for a couple days and then they took me to Frankfurt in Germany and put me in a hospital

Q Had they learned you had been the Air Attache

V I wouldn't know. There was no evidence

Buenker , he was the head of all Intelligence Development in Germany Air and Navy, He came to me in the hospital. I had known him very well when I was an Attache. He phoned to me and warned me that these people were trying to get information from me and to keep mum He was very sympathetic to me. They let me go out into the yard

Q They had decided that Germany had lost the war.

V They were beginning to say it

Q, The Saturday Evening Post wanted to write up your story?

V There was so much that was still classified that they wouldn't allow it, and I couldnt get this report.

Q A month after you were captured, there was this plot against Hitler. There was already a dissident group in Germany?

V Oh yes There was a dissident group in there even in '41

Q Did you go to a Stalag?

V No What happened was that down at Dresden they had a castle where they had the general officers that they had captured. No Americans. I was the senior American that they had captured. But they had French and Russians, etc. The life down there was the way the Germans --you know they're rank conscious, very much and they --you had two orderlies and all this stuff I said: "No, I'm not going there." I was a prisoner but still I said "No I'm not going there." I'm going to make a fuss about it. I'm going to the largest Stalag, the largest camp that we have, where we have officers of the Air Force. so that I can work with them." They said: "No it's impossible, You won't have accommodations there for a general officer so you can't go there" So I said Well , I'm not going there, Im going to there. I want to go to Berlin.

Q Did they tolerate this?

V Oh yes. If you pounded on the table and say "Now look, this is this and so forth," they--especially, I only had one star, but still I was a General and that made an awful lot of difference to them. Anyway, they took me to Berlin. I can't think of the guy's name. Head of the Attaché Group when I was there as an attaché. Then had been promoted up and was a bigger guy. Anyway I had named him and I wanted to see him. Because he had been very friendly and I knew where he stood.
So they took me to see him, and I went through the same rigmarole, that that's where I was going. So finally he said "Go" So they took me then to Sagon, in upper Silesia , that's the Stalag

Q They'd been pumping you all the time for information?

V Yes

Q And you were resisting them?

V No. I talked very freely, but about things that were way very old. And I substituted--the British psychologist was very fascinated by the method that I used. Because they were investigating a little bit why they had never gotten any information out of me. They never tortured me, or did anything like that. It was all very friendly, this trying to get the information. So I substituted in my own mind . Actually, I displaced all of the Ultra by another plan, and told them that. I let them worm it out of me. I never volunteered but they could get inference.

Q What was this plan about?

V The one that I substituted? It was a method of locating--I'd better go back a little bit--I told them that I was there on temporary duty observing. They never found out that I was the A-2 of the 8th Air Force. I told them that I was there--and they had orders that they were sending me on another duty and cancelled it when I came to England . This was a temporary job that I was going on. But they had those orders. I found out, so it worked in. So I was only over there on a temporary job and I was trying to find out how the airplanes were located at various places, how they were intercepted with their messages and and like that. I got a whole big plan, a very elaborate plan and let them bleed it out of me. Then I was never interrogated after I left the hospital. But, by that time they had made their plans to use me. They were going to use me in a group that was going to try to make a separate peace

Q You mentioned something about a secret code in a shoe.

V That's later on and that's how they were trying to use me.

Q They put you in a group of American prisoners?

V Yes

Q They were trying to use a sort of fulcrum to wangle a separate peace?

V No. They didn't let me know anything about it. But I could see by the people that visited me, former newspaper correspondent from Berlin visited me there at Sagon --I mean German--a writer visited me, an

officer visited me. I could see what they were doing.

Q Was this already in 1945

V Still in 1944. Then in December or January of 45 that we started out on the march. We marched from Sagon when the Russians were coming in in Upper Silesia. We marched to Spremberg. There, I got a message from Berlin to the effect that I would be repatriated and to choose four people, five including myself, to go with me That they would be repatriated. People that had helped out on this march. We took absolute charge of this march because the German were--we had no dogs or anything on us--Goering had seen to the fact that we had fairly good treatment, as good as they could give.

Q Were the other four higher rank?

V No they were. Delmar Spivey he was one of them He was a Colonel. And he was my Chief of Staff while we-- We had a regular military organization in prison camp

Q Sounds like "Hogan's Heroes."

V Bill Kennedy was A-2. We had the whole thing lined up. Anyway, there was Spivey, Bill Kennedy, and a fellow named Brown, PopGeorge. There were five of us. I knew in my own mind that it was a cover, this repatriation, but I felt - and talked this over with Spivey. If they wanted to use me, then we could get something in return. We went to Berlin. We were prisoners; we had to go anyway. Not too much choice. We went to berline where we were sent to a place called Luckenwald, and kept there. Verious things happened. There were delays, but we finally got up to Berlin again. Del and I sent the others back Del and I went to a Red Cross Medical Conference with German and American officers who were prisoners - medical officers in prison camps. We had this medical conference, and then, I was notified that General Gottlob Berger - he was the head of all the Prisoner of War Affairs

for Germany. He was the one that had been given the job of exterminating all American and English air officers of the whole outfit. He got the job because they couldn't talk Hitler out of it. People tried to talk him out of it. But Eva Braun, who was then his girl friend, was very sympathetic to the American and English prisoners and was not going to have anything to do with that, so she got Hitler to give this job to Berger and he was a friend of Eva Braun's, and had promised her that the orders would not be carried out.

Q To exterminate the British and American air officers?

V That's right. And that's how it happened. That's coming out in a book. I think a fellow by the name of McClean or something like that is writing it.

Q This is an item out of the Veterans' Administration. It's from D. Carroll PO Box 1321 Boca Raton, Florida 33432 And the question about Adolf Hitler's sweetheart, Eva Braun Did she save thousands of Jews from the gas chamber by intervening with Hitler in their behalf? The answer given by D. Carroll is that she did not intervene with Hitler on behalf of the Jews. She did become deeply involved in saving the lives of hundreds of Allied prisoners of war. When the war began going badly for Hitler , he ordered the execution of all prisoners of war, especially the American fliers who had so devastatingly bombed Germany. Hitler's officers tried to reason with Der Fuehrer but he was maniacally obstinate.

Eva Braun however employed a different tactic. She arranged for the execution assignment to go to Gottlob Berger, General of the Waffen SS, who secretly promised her that the executions would not be carried out. He kept his word. An American author, Glenn Infield, of Beaver Falls, Penna discovered these facts in a heretofore undisclosed interview of General Berger by the late Judge Michael Musmanno, a jurist at Nuremberg. Infield had just finished a book on Hitler's germany. The Musmanno archives will be published by Grosset & Dunlop later this year - 1974, P. W. Bulletin of August 1974.

q The facts in this little flier are essentially correct

V Yes. That is, they're borne out by our contacts with Berger. Then we were taken to Berger's headquarters and Berger greeted us, and wined us and dined us, and so forth, and then he explained what he was trying to do. He and a group. One of them was Hitler's Intelligence Officer, Schellenberger. I don't know whether you've read any of his stuff? He mentions in the book that he published on Hitler's Intelligence Officers that about this plan, the Berger plan to save Germany, which is quite fantastic. He told us that this was his plan. He wanted to get in touch with our topside and what he wanted to do, he and this group, they had Russian prisoners and they had enough troops of their own. What they wanted to do--this was before the Bulge, before they expended themselves--their idea was this: that Germany turn her back on the Western allies and go right toward the Russians; and that the Americans , the Western allies, were to allow only supplies to come through the line; they were to follow them right up but not shoot them in the back and let supplies come through only for one day. As soon as they drove the Russians back to the border we were to shut off their supplies and they were to lay down their arms and surrender to the Western Allies, but not to Russia. That was the Berger plan and he wanted us, first to take that plan back and argue it with our people.

Q He was to let you loose?

V That was the repatriation. So we said we would not argue that plan at all but act as a messenger. And that was when they built that stuff in the shoe.

Q The Germans had this idea? They put a code in your shoe and were going to let you loose?

V They were going to let us go back, just Del Spivey and myself. So we got down on Lake Constance and after very, very --which is all coming out in an article in the Air Force Magazine by Arthur Durant, under the auspices of the Historical Department at the Air Academy. We got down there and Himmler--you see the plan included the bumping off of

Hitler and Himmler. Because Berger said no one in their right mind would make peace with Hitler or Himmler. Because they'd be doublecrossed, or what have you. So the plan included that. So Himmler got on to it, and ordered Del and myself taken out and shot. So there was cat and mouse business there at Lake Constance and finally

Q Berger was protecting you from Himmler?

V Yes. Berger kept his word. We said we would do this on the basis that our prisoners of war would not be moved, that they would allow trucks, Western Allied trucks, to come in through Germany, through the lines, up to the prison camps with Red Cross parcels, our own parcels. Which they did, painted white with big red crosses on them. We found them when we were down on Lake Constance.

Q They came in through the border there? Swiss Border? (Yes)

V Came in right through Constance. Anyway, Berger kept his word We would take this message back and make a report to our topside and that's a report that I made to Bissell, that we can't get.

Q Bissell got the report?

V Bissell got it. Took my shoes, and he brought them back and said the codes were in there, but they never did anything about it, of course, because it was too late then

Q We wouldn't dare to make a separate peace This would be disloyalty to the Russians at that time?

V Yes, but Berger said, and has maintained all the time and maintains to this day that he had absolute proof that the Russians had made a separate peace agreement with Japan. And he said when the US gets that, they will not have any qualms about making a separate peace.

Q Has any documentation ever come out about that separate peace treaty between Russia and Japan?

V No, not anything that I know of.

Q They sent the breaking of this code to the US separately so that if

you were captured nobody would know what you were carrying. Is that right? How did this code work? They had a secret code; they put it in the heel of your shoe

V As soon as the authorities over here--if they wanted to pursue this--they started sending messages on this wavelength using this code as a symbol

Q The code said: "If you wish to pursue this matter of a separate peace treaty, contact us on a certain kilocycles?"

V Certain kilocycles and certain call letters and so forth and so on

Q Did Arnold get involved in this at all? (No) This was to go from Bissell to Marshall And of course it was much too late then for negotiating a separate peace. And had Roosevelt died by then?

V Yes He died while we were at Lake Constance

Q While you were still negotiating?

V It was too late because we were delayed four weeks at Luckenwald, and three weeks at Lake Constance

Q Ducking Himmler's agents?

V Yes.

Q The war ended in Europe. You came back to the U.S. to take a Technical job under Hugh Knerr in the Air/Service Command?

V I was supposed to go on leave for two months - decompression. I went up to Butler, Penna, and on the third day, I was on the phone to Hugh Knerr. I said: "I can't take this at all. There's a war still on and I've been in the service too long to sit on my duff up here in Butler Pa, Sally's home up there. So Hugh said: "All right, we're in trouble down at Mobile. You can get down there and take command, if you want to." And I said: "Okay, when do I leave? And he said "You say when you leave." And I said "I'LL leave tomorrow then." So I went down there and took command. And then he told me that he wanted to send me out here to take command of McClellan. And he said: "After you get things cleaned up down there at Mobile, then you can come out and take command of

Q Hugh Knerr had that job; he took it from Knudsen. Benny Meyers wanted that job but he retired. Maybe the scandal about him came out, or had it? That anonymous letter. Was it generally known that Benny Meyers was playing games?

V We knew it. Certain ones of us knew he was crooked as a dog's hind leg a long time ago. But I don't know. I think it was --I don't think it came out right then

Q It came out later when the Ferguson Committee investigated?

V I know it didn't. Because he when Knerr took that job, Benny Meyers came out and took my old job at the Wright Field Air Materiel Center, or whatever it was called.

Q He didn't last. He retired shortly after

V Shortly after they got on to him. They found out about his business out there in Dayton But he took those quarters there and had them....

Q Really fixed them up

V Really fixed them up

Q Knerr was supposed to get his third star when he took over from Knudsen. But he didn't Do you know anything about that?

V No But I don't think that Knerr was very popular with Arnold

Q No he wasn't Did he ever talk to you about his relations with Arnold?

V No. He was too square shooting.

Q But you knew that they weren't great friends?

V Yes I knew that

Q Did you ever see Arnold after that When you came back

V Yes. Even after Arnold retired, he and Bee came over and stayed with us at McClellan here.

Q Any special recollections of Arnold?

V No My only special recollection of Arnold is what I said He was the only man that could have done the job that he did. That the world

lost their very best actor that could ever tread the boards I don't know whether it's fair to say that he was an opportunist. Because he made his opportunities a lot of times.

Q He was an actor but he was also a performer, a performer by way of getting things done. Is that a fair statement?

V His greatest asset, I think, was guts. There were very few people that we had that would make the decisions, the big decisions, that he made--to take over all of the hotels down in Miami there. That is the way he would do it.

Q How about buying the B-29, an untried concept?

V Arnold didn't have too many original ideas. But he knew when he heard a good idea. And then he had the guts to carry it out. He took it and ran down the field with it to beat the devil.

Q He could recognize a good idea from a bad idea?

V He could do that He was very good at it. He was keen.

Q Did he have some bad ideas? Bad decision or bad procurement?

V There were bad ones, yes. But overall I feel positive in my own mind that we didn't have anybody else that could have done the job that Arnold did. I guess Jesus is the only one that we have any history of that didn't have any faults.

Q Postscript. Gen Vanaman told me about Arnold and Benny Meyers. Arnold catered to Benny Meyers because Arnold was a name dropper and Arnold used Benny Meyers to gain entree to the presence of Harry Hopkins. Benny Meyers and Hopkins were very close and Arnold used this means to establish this close tie with Hopkins This relationship between Arnold and Meyers was a strange one Benny Meyers got a lot of his factual material from Vanaman, and misused it in representing it to Hap Arnold. A lot of people didn't understand why Arnold had this close tie to Benny Meyers

Viccellio, Henry

Wagner, Bill

13 May 70

AF Lt. Gen. Henry Viccellio, 67

SAN ANTONIO, Tex. (AP)—Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry Viccellio, whose pilots were credited with shooting down Japanese Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto during World War II, died here Wednesday.

He commanded the 13th Air Force Fighter Command Detachment based at Guadalcanal from October 1942 until August 1943.

It was during that period that some of his pilots, tipped off by American code breakers, ambushed and shot down Yamamoto's plane over Shortland Island on April 7, 1943.

Yamamoto, then commander of the Combined Japanese Fleet and the man who directed the attack at Pearl Harbor, was killed along with a host of high-ranking Japanese officers.

Gen. Viccellio was a lieutenant colonel at the time. He came a lieutenant general in July 1964.

The highly-decorated Gen. Viccellio, who held the Army and Air Force Distinguished Service medals and a Distinguished Flying Cross, was a native of Chatham, Va. He is survived by his wife, Jane, and two children.

May 18, 1970

L/Gen Henry Viccellio, USAF(Ret)
413 Candleglo
Wing Crest
San Antonio, Texas 78239

Dear General Viccellio:

The time you took off from more pressing business to help me out with a very informative interview is very much appreciated by me.

I certainly hope to do as good a job as Burke Davis did on Yamamoto.

If any other recollections of your association with Gen Arnold come to mind, I hope you will jot them down and send them to me in the enclosure.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

done
13 May 70

Interview, LTGEN Henry Viccellio, San Antonio, Texas, 13 May 1970.

Q: I usually start off by asking people whether they recall their first encounter with Hap Arnold. Do you remember yours?

V: Yes. I was stationed at Hamilton Field in the 35th Pursuit Group, and he made a visit to March Field; of course, he was stationed in Washington at that time. This was 1940, so they had all of the pilots up and down the West Coast come down to March Field, big barbecue.

Q: He was Chief of the Air Corps at that time. In other words, it was one of these formal type meetings.

V: Yes, that's right.

Q: They had everybody meet him? The AF was just in the process of expansion. So you didn't have any direct person-to-person contact with him?

V: No, the second time I saw him. It was about six or eight months later, up at Hamilton Field, he made a very short visit to Ira Eaker, actually.

Q: Yes, Ira Eaker had a Fighter Group?

V: Fighter Group.

Q: And you worked for Ira Eaker at the time?

V: Yes.

Q: Eaker was brought in shortly after that, to Washington.

V: Yes, Miff Harmon came up and took his place; Eaker left about six months before the war started.

Q: And when is the next time you saw Arnold?

V: The next time I saw him was in the Fiji Islands. I commanded the 7th Fighter Squadron. He came through on a visit on the way to Australia.

Q: This was September 1942? I think Jake Smart was with him?

V: Yes, yes, he was.

Q: He was on his way to see MacArthur and George Kenney. He just passed through?

V: Well, he spent the night there.

Q: Do you recall anything special?

V: No, he seemed to be quite happy with the progress we had made in training these people we'd taken out there, the status we'd reached combat-wise. He continued to preach--one of his old theories--not old theories, but new theory, actually, that everybody had to do their very best with what they had, because there was only so much available. He said that several times.

Q: The Fiji Islands were a stopping off point on the route to Australia; it became a sort of critical spot.

V: Very much so.

Q: Marshall and Arnold were very concerned about getting reinforcements to Australia. I think they called that "X" in those days, didn't they? A lot of the paperwork which showed "Destination X." They wouldn't identify it, because they felt it was secret.

V: Of course, they had code names for all those places. Strange enough, I don't remember the X designation, no.

Q: Brett was out of there by the time Arnold came through. George Brett had been the senior Allied Air Officer in SWPac.

V: He was in Australia, he had nothing to do with us. We were under the Navy, under first, Admiral Ghormley, who was in New

Caledonia, of course. Then Halsey took over after Ghormley had kind of lost his nerve, or lost something, I guess.

Q: I want to ask you about that. Arnold was supposed to have had some role in the departure of Ghormley who never left his ship. Did you know anything about that?

V: No, I do know this. Ghormley had a long history as a Naval Attache, and everybody was extremely surprised that they would pick somebody from the Attache job. Actually, his last assignment, I believe, had been at London. They sent him out in a thing, where it was going to get real hot combat-wise, apparently, in a very short while. I do know that he and Twining had many, many go rounds. Well, he and Harmon, because Harmon was actually over Twining. When the first initial landings were made at Guadalcanal, the Japs reacted much more violently with their Navy then they had been expected to. Gen Harmon, who was Ghormley's Air Advsior, was very outspoken in trying to get Ghormley to do something about what the Japanese Fleet would do to our people if they landed, and Ghormley's answer was: "I can't risk my ships." I'm certain he said this 100 times. Now, I certainly have no knowledge of what Harmon might have done to Arnold in the way of prodding him to do something in Washington about relieving Ghormley, but...

Q: I talked to Twining recently, and he attributes to Arnold a role in relieving Ghormley.

V: I'm certain he must have been.

Q: Of course, they were also screaming for planes, and the South Pacific was far down on the priority list. So this was a problem. The Navy wanted some land-based planes, and Arnold didn't have enough to go around. Did you have any conversation with Arnold when he stopped at theFiji Islands?

V: I spent the entire evening with him.

Q: I see, you were his host? Do you recall anything? Did he talk about the war?

V: No, I don't recall anything specific, other than the fact that we were fighting in many places. Obviously, we were going to be fighting in additional places. Again, the thing that I heard him say later on, when I was in the Pentagon, many, many times--"You've just got to do what's got to be done with what you've got because there isn't anything else."

Q: I guess this might have come up in connection with, if we only had more planes out there, we could do a job. I think Guadalcanal

only had more planes out there, we could do a job. I think Guadalcanal had started.

V: Guadalcanal had just started, and no one really knew what the situation was. It started about a month before. No one really knew what was going on out there, actually. At least, we didn't.

Q: You went to Guadalcanal later on, I believe. You were transferred there, the situation got very desperate.

V: It was desperate for a long, long time. In fact, it was desperate from about the end of September 1942 until mid-January 1943.

Q: You couldn't use Henderson Field. The Japs were bombing that all the time.

V: Well, we used it, but they were bombing it all the time.

Q: The Navy didn't have much out there. They had some carriers out there.

V: When I went there, in December 1, 1942, of course, there were about 100 AAF aircraft, mainly fighters. There were some bombers. The bombers operated. They would come in there and bomb a place, and go back to New Hebrides, or some other place. In addition to the 100 AAF

airplanes there, there were roughly 75 to 100 Marine Corps airplanes, and the Navy varied They would come in off a carrier and maybe with 50, 60 or 75 airplanes. They would operate for a week. Then the carrier would pick them up and they would go again. Sometimes there were none there. It was like that on into till the next summer, summer of 1943--when we began to move north, so to speak.

Q: How long did you stay at Guadalcanal?

V: I stayed there essentially from the 1st of December 1942 to the end of May 1943. I went there the first of December and stayed there till about the 20th of January, which was a normal six weeks' tour, in command of one squadron of P-39s. I went to Australia. Also, somewhat by default, people were killed. After I had been there two or three weeks, essentially, although I had no specific orders as such, I commanded all of the AAF fighter aircraft, and I left there sometime around the 20th of January and went on a 10-day trip to Australia, which is a normal thing, Australia being a recreation thing. I returned there after 10 days, about the 1st of February 1943, with a different assignment. This time I was assigned to the 13th Fighter Command, which was down in New Hebrides, Gen Strother being the commander. But my duty station was Guadalcanal. This time I was specifically in command of all the Army Air Corps fighter aircraft.

Q: Who was in command of New Hebrides?

V: Twining. Well, the Navy was actually in command.

Q: And Twining was the senior AF man.

V: In fact, he was Commander of the 13th AF. I stayed there until about two or three days after Yamamoto was shot down, which was the 18th of April. Then I went back to New Hebrides again, about

the 22nd of April, and then I had two or three additional three or four day trips at Guadalcanal, between then and the end of July which I actually came back to the States.

Q: Let me ask you about the Yamamoto incident. Lanphier has been given credit, or Lanphier has taken credit. There was a guy named Rex Barber there, who shot down one of the other, I think there were two Bettys. Based on some reading that I have done, nobody really knows which Betty held Yamamoto. Is this an accurate analysis?

V: No, that isn't quite true. At the time, no one knew which one he was in, but it was presumed, being a big wheel and everything, that he was in the front one. Lanphier definitely shot down the front one. So Lanphier didn't really claim that he shot Yamamoto down, Lanphier was a trained journalist. He was a journalist graduate of Stanford University. So he wrote an article for the NY Times, and made some considerable money out of it. Well, this made a hell of a lot of other people mad. I happened to be the main planner for this thing. There is a very good book, just hasn't been written very long, that you might want to read, "Get Yamamoto."

Q: That Burke Davis book is being published by the same house that hopefully will publish ours on Arnold. You say there was a guy named Mitchell.

V: He was in my squadron, all these people except one or two were in my squadron.

Q: Mitchell and Rex Barber. Well, does Rex Barber feel about this thing? Is he still alive?

V: Oh yes. I don't really believe he claims he shot him down. There was another fellow there, there were four of them who were supposed to do the shooting. One of them was killed, and no one

really knows what happened to him. There was another boy named Holesm. Definitely the bomber that Lanphier was shooting at, was the one that Yamamoto was in. The one that Barber shot down, the Chief of Staff was in, and he is still alive, the bomber crashed in the water. He is still alive, he was an Admiral so.

Q: Then he acknowledged that the lead bomber....

V: Had Yamamoto in it, yes.

Q: Then that's fairly conclusive?

V: In fact, it's almost 100% conclusive. I've known it all the time, I mean I was right there when they landed and I was certain.

Q: That Lanphier did not ursurp the claim?

V: That's right. The whole animosity of the thing was created by the fact that Lanphier made some money out of it, not because he was a member of the fighter squadron, but because he was a journalist. If any of the rest of them could have written, if I could write, I would have gotten some money out of it also. This book, is the first time, that I've really, in a public way, told my part of the thing.

Q: Did Burke Davis interview you?

V: Yes, numerous times.

Q: Then you were in right from the ground floor.

V: Right.

Q: Where did you, you came back to Washington in '43. You were assigned to....

V: Hqs., Army Air Corps, yes.

Q: What job did you have there?

V: I had a job as Chief of the Fighter and Air Defense Branch of the Requirements Division, OC&R. Barney Giles was my boss.

Q: Then he moved up the line to become Chief of Air Staff. I think it was about the middle of the year, when Stratemeyer moved on. Stratemeyer moved overseas. Who was your direct boss in that job?

V: General Gross, who has long since been killed, he was killed in a P-80 accident.

Q: Did you get to see Arnold in this job?

V: I was there exactly two years. I left the day the Japanese threw in the hat. I saw him in the hall a lot of times, but to actually discuss problems and things with him, probably 8 to 10 times, something like that.

Q: Did you get in on the problem of long-range escorts?

V: Oh, that was mine completely. I had everything to do with establishing the requirements, on what a fighter plane would do in the way of performance, guns, the electronic gear aboard it, and also establishing the requirements, or what the pilot should be capable of doing. That was our job completely.

Q: Well, the time you got there, the fighter situation was in a desperate way, was it not? The P-38 and the P-47 could not make the long run. There were several serious losses at Schweinfurt and Regensburg in August 1943 and October 1943.

V: That's right. The greatest drive was to get longer range into the fighter planes so that they could escort bombers. That was the greatest effort we ever had on.

Q: When you first came in there, I expect one of the priority tasks was to get some wing tanks to put on the P-38s and the P-47s?

V: Well, that was underway, but they were very unsatisfactory at the beginning. That was being done, of course, they were pretty much underway. An unbelievable modification program. We were building

in January 1944; we were manufacturing about 1,700 first-class fighters a month. I chased them down one month. At one particular time, every one of them had to go to some other place to be modified. One of the big modification plants up at Rome, NY, Griffiss AFB. They had something like 600 fighter airplanes in there that were desperately needed in New Guinea, England and North Africa, and every other place. They had the worst winter they had in history. They were all covered up with snow. It was really a tremendous problem.

Q: Did Arnold get on you or your boss?

V: Well, he was continually going. I talked to him about this several times myself.

Q: Did he ring his squawk box and get you in there?

V: No, just telephone calls when he wanted one of his aides to come in.

Q: I guess Mervin Gross was on his direct line?

V: I'm sure he was, yes.

Q: Did he give you a lot of heartburn?

V: No, really he was very abrupt, of course. But I was always able to provide some sort of satisfactory answer to his questions. At least I could tell him the truth without any qualms about it, and he said: "Get on with this," or something.

Q: Were you there when they tried an expedient of putting armor on bombers--the B-40 and the B-41? This was a task of loading them up with guns and armor--a B-17 and they called it a B-40. The B-24, they called the B-41?

V: I dimly remember this, but I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

Q: We came to recognize the P-51 for what it was, or what it

could have been, because at one time it was a low-level plane. I think the British recognized it before we did?

V: Unfortunately, everything we were building, with the exception of the P-38 was a low-level plane.

Q: We are talking about the fighter problem and the poor engine which we had.

V: I wouldn't exactly say the poor engine. It was a low altitude engine. Unfortunately, no one had recognized the extreme importance of fighters, even though all of our bombers, not all of them, but too many, the B-17 and the B-24, were built for high altitude operations. No one had realized the extreme importance of having this in the fighter aircraft. All of our original airplanes, except the P-38, were designed as a low altitude airplanes. They just couldn't do the job. If we had been faced with somebody that had bombers like a B-17 in any appreciable number, we would have "had" it. That's all there is to it. We couldn't do anything about it. Of course, the British realized what they were up against in the Spitfire. Actually, both of their airplanes were built as high altitude airplanes. The Spitfire and the Hurricane, and one or two others they had, the Mosquito fighters. So they used the P-51 as a low-level harassing type plane against occupied Europe. Someone, I presume, North American Aviation, had more to do with it than anyone else. They came up with a British engine in the P-51.

Q: Merlin engine. Somebody has given Tommy Hitchcock credit for recognizing this. He was, I think in Amb. Wynant's office.

V: Right. I met him several times. He was a very energetic and high spoken person. This may have been true. I have no knowledge of it.

Q: Do you feel that Arnold and some of the Air Force leaders dropped the ball in not preparing for this possibility? The fact that we had this Strategic Bombing doctrine; we had the capability, but we didn't have the escorts?

V: I'm certain that the greatest amount of thought, time, and everything else, went into the strategic bombing, or the bombing part of it, which I agree with, no question about it.

Q: Well, one of the arguments made on the other side of it, is that it was so hard to come by some money, if you got any, you put it into bombers, the No. 1 priority.

V: That's right.

Q: If you had more money, you would have looked at a related problem, that of protecting the bombers. But in those days, the bombers out sped the fighters. I guess they felt that the bombers didn't need protection.

V: I'm sure. Some of the papers that caused Roosevelt to announce that he was going to manufactur, or needed 50,000 airplanes, was papers prepared by Arnold's staff--I don't mean Arnold himself--other people like Norstad, Kuter. I've seen these papers. I don't remember the details. But they came up with what we need to win the war, and the fighter part was just sort of an appendage stuck on.

Q: You are probably talking about AWPD-1, Air War Plans No. 1. This was done by Harold George and Kuter, where they stressed the bomber, and the fighters were not.

V: Just sort of an appendage to it.

Q: When you got there, there was an intensive effort to catch up on the P-51. They started coming in around the first of 1944. Is that about right?

V: Well, let's see. We had some P-51s then. We had a P-51B, I believe it was, which was a reasonably good airplane, it had the Merlin engine in it. The P-51A had the old Allison engine in it. Like I said, there was nothing wrong with that Allison engine for what it was designed. It could produce the horsepower, but the one that really did the job, mainly in Europe, and other places also, was the P-51D model. That really started coming into the inventory in numbers in the fall of 1944. That was the one that had roughly an 800 miles radius of action. It had a much larger tank than the B model. It had the first bubble canopy on it; it was the one that really did it.

Q: In 1944, the German Air Force was sort of flattened, the "Big Week" was in late February 1944. I guess you had some role in planning that, or getting the planes in for that big show. I think it was in one week where they launched several thousand of sorties each day.

V: Of course, I had a lot to do with getting the planes to Europe, but as far as doing that one specific thing, I had nothing to do with that, whatsoever.

Q: Do you recall any specific meetings you had with Arnold, where certain business was transacted: Was there any give and take between you and Arnold?

V: Oh yes, we had two situations. Well, neither one was of too great importance, but they were quite interesting. No. 1, the British began moaning and crying for P-51s, and Arnold said: "Well, we can't give them to them, and we've got to do something to keep them from bothering us." Arnold said: "What we want to do is get three of their

airplanes, Spitfires, and modify them to give them increased range and show the British that they could do the same thing, they could go the same route we did." So we got two of their airplanes and sent them out to Wright Field, Dayton. These were Spitfires. We had them modified with additional internal fuel and big wing tanks on them, and flew them to England.

Q: This surprised the British?

V: This surprised the "be-Jesus" out of the British. We flew them across the ocean. They had never done anything like this. They never dreamed anything like this. I was the Project Officer on this one specific thing. I talked to Arnold several times about it. Another thing, the Navy came up with their last model of the Grumman which was F-8F. It was a real good airplane. But, again, they had sacrificed any appreciable range to get high maneuverability and speed out of the thing. So, we had a thing every year, called a "Fighter Conference," where all the manufacturers and people that were charged with flying these things would meet at some experimental place and have about a week of exchange where actually, test pilots and military pilots flew other people's airplanes. We had all kinds of symposiums on armament and so forth. It was called a "Fighter Conference." And we had two or three of these at Eglin Field. I was in charge of running these things, also. We had one down at the Navy Proving Ground, which is just outside of Washington.

Q: Dahlgreen?

V: No, the Navy Air Proving Ground.

Q: Patuxent Naval Air Station.

V: Yes, and the F-8F just showed up. So at a cocktail party, Admiral McCain who was high up...

Q: John McCain, he had lost his son?

V: He lost his grandson, his son is the Admiral McCain who runs the Pacific now. This is John McCain I, I guess. The III is the one who is in Vietnam. Anyway, McC in was in charge of naval air. So at some kind of a cocktail party he told Arnold, he just mentioned to him: "Boy, that F-8 we've got is really showing everything you've got up." Well, of course, the next morning, I got a big blast of why can't we keep up with the F-8. Why don't we have something that will do this? I got all of this secondhand, of course. I must have written 500 pages of stuff trying to explain that it was getting hotter and hotter all the time. Finally, I got in to see General Arnold, and all it took was just a statement that the F-8F was a short-range, highly maneuverable airplane that has no ... it would in no way be anything that the Army Air Forces needs or could use. We would be foolish to even think of building a thing like this, and that was it.

Q: And Arnold dropped it right there?

V: That's what he wanted to hear. But nobody really knew what he wanted to hear.

Q: Arnold was unhappy with the British, because he thought they were stashing away a lot of planes in reserve. Do you remember this? He got over there a couple of times, and he found that the British were always worried that the Luftwaffe would come in, and they were stashing away planes in reserve. They kept asking for a lot of planes, and then they had a lot of planes in storage. He sent a couple of people over there to sort of find out how many planes the British actually had "on hand," how many they had in storage, and what their

real requirements were. Did you ever get into this?

V: No, that would have been long before I was in Washington.

Q: But when you were in Washington, you did not have this business of the British asking for more planes than they needed, or that Arnold thought they needed?

V: No, other than they were trying to get the P-51--after the put the high altitude engine in it--which they never did, of course.

Q: I guess they felt that since they, the British, had made this discovery, the least we ought to do was to give them some?

V: I'm sure they did. They argued like hell for them. They particularly wanted them, as I remember, for India. They didn't have much in India, but what they had, they needed something like that for the Burma thing. And, of course, we used them in India. Eventually, we got them into China, on a small scale. If we had them to send to China, much earlier, we would have really wrapped that thing up months earlier than we did.

Q: Did you get involved with the problem of how do we contend with the German jets, the ME-262.

V: Oh God, yes.

Q: That was a big project? Do you remember confrontations you had with Arnold, or any directions he gave, or any business with him on that subject?

V: No, I sure didn't.

Q: General Gross was your boss at this time, but did you have to work out some plans or tactics for coping with the German jets?

V: No, that wouldn't have been our business anyway. That was something that was done in Europe.

Q: The greatest weakness of course, was the very short range, it would only last 30 minutes.

V: A lot of people wished, of course, that we had jets. But by the time they came out, we had such a gigantic numerical superiority that everybody realized they really weren't going to be able to do anything about the situation anyway.

Q: How about the V-1, V-2? This was a question of trying to chase--well, the V-2 you couldn't--but the V-1, I think they were trying to chase down?

V: W 11, that was a British problem. In other words, the British never relinquished to us in any way, any responsibility, or anything else to do with the defense of England, or any other kind of defense, for that matter. That was their problem. Now, we did use our medium bombers on a real gigantic scale and the big bombers, also. Bombing the sites where the Germans were launching the V-1s and V-2s. But the actual business of trying to shoot them down, was a British responsibility and we were doing all kinds of studies on the thing and that kind of stuff. But we never really, it was never our responsibility.

Q: Do you remember something called the "Jeb Stuart" concept? Robert Lovett was the great admirer of this idea. This idea was to send 500 to 1,000 fighter bombers low level and plastering the heck out of a lot of German targets all over the landscape.

V: I remember that, yes.

Q: It had some currency. I think Arnold was having his major heart attack when this got on. Remember he was down to Florida?

V: I remember when he went to Orlando, yes.

Q: Well, it was Coral Gables.

V: Yes, wherever it was.

Q: They kept it very quiet, because one reason, Arnold felt that Marshall might retire him. So he was away from his desk for quite a bit during this period. Did you have any involvement in that "Jeb Stuart" idea, or were you asked to comment on it? Is this an operational thing out of your area?

V: It's an operational question.

Q: What were some of the finer questions that arose during your stint in OC&R?

V: All kinds of things every day. The P-47 was one big thing that came up, when the B-29s arrived. Another thing involved the airplanes that had fought the European war. There were modifications, the modifications mainly being increasing the power of the engine, some of which were very successful, and some of which weren't. Getting better ammunition, this was an ordnance problem really, incendiary ammunition, explosive ammunition, etc., that pretty much was all in the mill when I got there. The basic thing of how many P-51s you can manufacture? How many P-47s you can manufacture, etc. Those questions were pretty well set. The biggest thing that came up on the P-47, and P-51, also, for that matter, was when the Japs began to shoot down the B-29s at a pretty high rate. Again, we had to do something, but in order to get some method of escorting them to Japan. That was the reason that it took the island of Iwo Jima, to be exact, in order to get closer. So we did some quick and dirty studies, and we came up with a P-47 N model, which again, increased the engine size and increased the wings, with sort of a square wing tip. Those changes gave it a fair range of almost 3,000 miles, and a combat radius of action around

900. We hurriedly organized about 500 of these airplanes into units, and sent them to Okinawa and to Iwo Jima, one P-51 unit, and four of these P-47s units, where they escorted B-29s over Japan.

Q: Didn't they have some kind of disaster on Iwo Jima, I believe it was around June 1945? I think the B-29s were navigating for the P-47s, and they went in bad weather. I think a couple of groups of fighters turned into the bombers, or the bombers turned into the fighters, and I think 27 planes were lost.

V: I remember losing a lot of them.

Q: I think Arnold was on his trip out to the Pacific, this was the early part of June. He rushed up to Iwo Jima, to make a determination of responsibility. I think he had to decide whether Mickey Moore was going to stay on the job. Mickey Moore had the 7th Fighter Command, and Moose Mussett. Did you get into that business of that foul-up? This was strictly operational?

V: That's a theater type problem, nothing back in the Pentagon.

Q: It wasn't anything, just somebody's miscalculation. You had a lot to do with North American, Dutch Kindelberger and his people?

V: Yes, yes.

Q: Needling them, getting modifications on the P-51.

V: Oh yes, continuously.

Q: There was always something. This was so they would put the plane out, and they would lack something?

V: A lot of these engineers, when they build something, when they design something and build it, the first one is real good. That's all they care about. They don't give a damn about building 10,000 of them. The next thing they want to do is design something

else, so a lot of this stuff was to battle them to perfect the one that you are making now, because we need numbers, and don't come up here with some junk about building another one, see.

Q: Was that the P-82?

V: The P-82 is a prime example. I guess it might have been Kindelberger. Actually, the man I dealt with most of the time was Atwood, who is the president now, of course. But, then, they came up with the P-51H, to try to go from producing one model into another one like that, and they always told Arnold, and told a lot of people, that this was almost the same thing: "We can go right from the D to this, without any trouble." That was a big lie, because it wasn't the same thing at all. They were always trying to do something. The engineer, once he designs and builds a thing, he's happy. He wants to go somewhere else. What we were after, was to get numbers.

Q: You wanted to get those planes so they wouldn't be accepted by the AF, and then sit on a modification ramp, waiting for some small piece of equipment.

V: Right, right.

Q: Did you have any business with Knerr?

V: I know who he is--no.

Q: I think he was in Europe at the time. Who did you deal with when you went to Arnold? Did you deal with Giles, or one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff handling this?

V: I had all kinds of people that I dealt with.

Q: How about Fred Dean?

V: Fred Dean, I dealt with him. Dean was a fighter man, Smart and one other guy in that office. In this business about getting proper escort for the B-29s, I dealt with Norstad, who was handling

that for the 20th AF. But on most of my stuff, I would go to Giles, and from Giles, I would either be sent to Arnold's office, or Giles would go with me to Arnold's office.

Q: And then you would brief Arnold?

V: Yes.

Q: Arnold had a reputation for exploding.

V: I'll tell you what. Of course, so many other people like Barney Giles--he knew him far more than I did--but I think his exploding, to the best of my knowledge, was during.... When something came up suddenly, as I understand it--I never attended one of his daily staff meetings--but as I understand it, he would be reading this memorandum that they prepared for him on what was happening. If he just happened to read onto something that said all the tires were blowing out on the runways in India, or something, I know this actually happened, well, he would explode, and want to know why in the hell they couldn't build better tires. He might explode at the doctor about this. Well, the doctor said he didn't know what the hell to do about the tires, or anything else. But n a case where he was trying to get some specific briefing on something, and sent for somebody that was supposed to be the expert, to the best of my knowledge, this didn't ever occur, because most of the people that went there, he wouldn't know what they were talking about, anyway, see.

Q: When something unforeseen or unpredicted happened?

V: That's right, that was something else again. I also worked later on for five years for General Grunther. He is explodable, too, I'll tell you, and strangely enough, I must have given him, I'd say, 40 or 50 briefings a year for five years, and I never got thrown out

of his office one time. So maybe I have a quiet, tranquilizing effect on those type people. The times I went in to talk to General Arnold, it was to answer some kind of a problem, whether we could do this or not.

Q: Did Mervin Gross get thrown out of his office?

V: I don't know, there was a hell of a lot of people around there who had been thrown out.

Q: Somebody told me that if Arnold hadn't exploded at you, you hadn't really experienced the Pentagon. Arnold had a penchant for grabbing people in the hall, and tell them--"go to China, or Europe, and get this straightened out." Sometimes the individual so grabbed, did not have experience in that area.

V: The way he would do in the staff meeting. As I say, he would ask the doctor, why all the tires are blowing out.

Q: Is this an actual occurrence?

V: Yes, actual occurrence. And then what would happen, pandemonium after that. Because when the staff meeting was over, everybody in there would go running out, to try to find out what happened about the tires, including the guy that should have known. So that you never knew where in the hell you were. I remember very well, the general thing was a little memorandum said: "OC&R, give me the answer!" and that was it. "Give me the answer!"

Q: Then you had to track back to find out what the question was. I guess the doctor had to run around...?

V: That's right, he didn't dare not go look.

Q: Who was this, David Grant?

V: I've forgotten. I believe it was.

Q: Did you get together with some of the people after it was

all over, and sort of laugh at this thing? Or was it too painful?

V: Well, you were running so damn fast up and down the Pentagon. Every time I go back there, I think I should have worn a track between my office and Barney Giles' office.

Q: Where was your office located?

V: I was on the E ring looking over the airport. The day before the war was over, a MG walked up to the door, and I said: "Won't you come in?" And he said: "Well, I'm just looking around to see where I might move to." So we moved out the next day.

Q: Where did you move to?

V: Down in the bowels of the place. Incidentally, Bruce Holloway took my job. Yes, he was my assistant.

Q: Did he have any contact with Arnold?

V: I'm sure he did. He wouldn't have had much because the war was over, and that was sort of it.

Q: I was told that Arnold lost interest in Washington right after the war ended.

V: I'm sure he did. I wasn't there, though. I left the day the war was over.

Q: Where did you go?

V: Went down to Eglin Field.

Q: You worked for Grandison Gardner?

V: Yes.

Q: Grandison Gardner is somebody who had direct contact with Arnold?

V: Oh yes, very much so.

Q: He is out in Tucson; I'm going to write him and see if we can get together some time. Arnold was a great gadgeteer.

V: Oh yes.

Q: Andhe was always trying out new things. Did he put the bite on you or on Mervin Gross for some new gadgetry using fighters?

V: Lord, yes.

Q: Or some gadgetry within fighters, new guns, or some new thing?

V: There was all kinds of homing stuff, direction finding equipment, so they could be able to join the bombers. There was a saddist drive on to get better instruments for weather flying, and he had a very great personal interest in all this.

Q: Kettering and Arnold had developed the "Flying Bug" which was a very primitive kind of guided missile in WW I. Arnold always had this great interest in gadgetry. Somebody would come in with one of these explosive pencils, or some gadget like that. He really went, hookline and sinker for this. So, I guess he was badgering Gross then to try to develop navigation homing equipment, and some of the stuff fell on you. Did you ever have to report to him on any of this gadgetry?

V: Not any specific thing like that, no, not that I know of.

V: This is an amusing thing, you have probably heard it from somebody else. Approximately a month or two after we got down to Eglin Field, Arnold came down on a visit. This would have been two or three months after the war was over. And I might add he looked very, very bad.

Q: He had a severe heart attack before this.

V: My wife and my son, who was seven years old, and all the other ladies, everybody else that had interest, came up to the Officers' Club to try to get to see him. They had a special place where you could stand out there, you know, when he came out from lunch. They also had a very strange Provost Marshal at Eglin Field

who was a former Brooklyn policeman. His name was Smith. His nickname was "Bag'em" Smith, and he wore two live pearl handled .45 guns all the time, and he was dressed with white leggings and all this business.

Q: A Junior George Patton?

V: Yes to be exact. As Arnold walked out of the Officers' Club, and waved at all these wives and children, "Bag'em" Smith was right behind Arnold and Gardner. My young son said: "Mommy, look at those guns he's wearing." The youngster thought this was Arnold. Just the guns excited him. Of course, it was this Provost Marshal, "Bag'em" Smith, I'll never forget it. Smith had on a silver helmet. The boy assumed this was General Arnold.

Q: What did General Arnold say?

V: He didn't hear this.

Q: You had no other contact with him down at Eglin Field?

V: No, just general.

Q: What was he looking at, do you remember? He was interested in the JB-2. The JB-2 was a Chinese copy of the V-1, and Arnold, when he was over around OVERLORD, he was in England, and then he went to the beachhead, three or four days after OVERLORD. The Germans started lobbing these V-1s over, just about that time, and Arnold put the bite on Grandison Gardner to perfect the JB-2. Arnold had a plan to launch a couple of thousand a month at the Germans. Did you know about that?

V: That was Japan actually.

Q: Then the German war was ending. Then he got sick, so I think the War Dept killed this project.

V: They did. In fact, Arnold was going to try to launch them from ships. Kaiser, the shipbuilder, came around, with a big plan to build hundreds of ships that you could launch one of these things a minute, launch them on Japan. And Arnold went for that.

Q: Also, the "Weary Willies," the "Willie Orphan," do you remember this?

V: I remember the "Wearies." Oh, I know what that's all about. They would take the old war weary B-17s, B-24s and load them up, and put an automatic pilot in them, and send them over.

Q: This would have done two things: (1) it would have dropped bombs on the enemy; and (2) it would have gotten rid of some old planes. Arnold, and some of the old timers were very much concerned, because they remembered after WW I. The authorities made them use the DH4 for 10 years after WW I ended. They didn't want to get saddled with all these war weary planes. This is one way of killing two birds. Did you get in on any of that?

V: No, because it was all bombers; it wasn't fighters.

V: I'll tell you one thing I haven't told you about. I told you Bruce Holloway was my assistant up there. I had an Executive who was a NY corporation lawyer named John Holbrook, called to active duty as a LTCOL. This one day, I guess I had been there about six months, I heard someone say: "What's going on in here?" And I looked up, and there stood General Arnold and one of his aides. In fact, this is the first time I had seen him since I had come back to the Pentagon. I, of course, leap to my feet, and I didn't have my glasses on. He said: "Don't bother reaching for your glasses. I want to know what the hell you do up here." I've always been a fairly

good talker, and I told him what we did, etc. He said: "Well, that sounds pretty good." Then he asked some questions about a couple of the things. The kind of projects we were involved in. He said: "Well, keep up the good work." Then he kind of smiled and left. When it was all over, this Holbrook said--everybody else in the room was sort of pale--and he said: "Well, I can't imagine where in the world you got all that off. I wonder what he thinks the other 30,000 people around here do, because you seem to be doing it all."

Q: You had a lot of presence of mind to recite your whole mission. But, Arnold had a commanding presence?

V: Very much so.

Q: Was it because of his rank, or his personality?

V: His personality, I'm sure.

Q: Did you ever see him and Marshall together?

V: No, no.

Q: How about any contact between him and Lovett?

V: No.

Q: Or any of the other brass in the War Dept, like Stimson, or McCloy, or Patterson. Any knowledge of their association?

V: No, I sure didn't.

Q: Did you ever see him in action in the JCS meetings, or one of the high level meetings? Was he pretty quiet at those meetings?

V: One time. I was called in to give some specific information on one small thing. I was only in the room for maybe three minutes, or something like that. General Marshall wasn't there. McNarney was presiding.

Q: And Arnold didn't say much?

V: No one really said anything.

Q: Was this on the fighter problem?

V: It was a much more complicated thing than that. We started sending out bombers from Europe, to bomb Germany and land in Russia.

Q: Oh the FRANTIC operation?

V: And a bunch of them got buggered up over there. So they

Q: At Poltava?

V: Right. So they were desperately trying to get some defense into the thing. The Russians said: "What are you excited about? This has been happening to us for four years." This was nothing unusual. So, no one knew, in the first place, whether the Russians would allow us in there or not. But they wanted to know what we should do. So that was thrown to me and actually, Barney Giles, I got the word from him as to what we could do. Well, this has to be a night fighter, an all-weather plane.

Q: The P-61?

V: That's right. There was no way to get them over there, because they were short range. We had some in Europe, and they couldn't even get over there. But there was a squadron of airplanes in a convoy on the way to India. In fact, their final destination was Chengtu, China, to protect the B-29s. So, we finally came up with a thing, that we could unload these people in Oran, put the airplanes together, and take them to Turkey, or take them on down to Oran, and up that way to Poltava. It was the hellish, complicated thing, it could be done. So we could the Russians had no radar over there. So we had an experimental sort of a medium weight--wasn't anything like a light weight--radar down in Orlando. Well, we determined that this could be cut up and taken apart and load them in C-54s. We could take

about eight of them, and that could be hauled over there. So we made all these arrangements to do all these things; and actually took the people off the ships, and started putting the airplanes together in Oran, around Algiers, and the Russians turned thumbs down on the thing. And that was it.

Q: After you'd already done these things. The Russians were not too interested in too many Americans coming into Russia, and that thing sort of fied on the vine.

V: I went down to this meeting they were having on the capability of what we could do.

Q: Well, they told you to go ahead on it?

V: We were already going ahead on it.

Q: You were telling them what you were doing, and then the Russians threw cold water on it?

V: Of course, in those days, money was a little easier to come by.

Q: Money was no object.

Q: Talk about the Advisory Council now, Jake Smart and Rosie O'Donnell?

V: Fred Dean was a reasonably good friend of mine.

Q: Was there a guy named McRae?

V: I barely remember him. Jake Smart had been my instructor in the Flying School here. I knew him quite well, and thought a hell of a lot of him, and he thought quite a bit of me, I think. Rosie O'Donnell is a pretty good friend of mine. Because of the fact, when these questions would arise in addition to the people that were supposed to know the answer, or provide the answer, or to have cognizance of that, this Advisory Council, they took the

same thing, because they had to. I don't blame them for doing it, because they didn't know what minute Arnold was going to come to them for some answer, just exactly like Nixon is going to somebody else outside the State Department right now. They had to find out. In other words, when a real hot thing happened, if it was in your area, you get a barrage of stuff from many different directions, very quickly.

Interview, LTGEN Henry Viccellio, San Antonio, Texas, 13 May 1970.

Q: I usually start off by asking people whether they recall their first encounter with Hap Arnold. Do you remember yours?

V: Yes. I was stationed at Hamilton Field in the 35th Pursuit Group, and he made a visit to March Field; of course, he was stationed in Washington at that time. This was 1940, so they had all of the pilots up and down the West Coast come down to March Field, big barbecue.

Q: He was Chief of the Air Corps at that time. In other words, it was one of these formal type meetings.

V: Yes, that's right.

Q: They had everybody meet him? The AF was just in the process of expansion. So you didn't have any direct person-to-person contact with him?

V: No, the second time I saw him. It was about six or eight months later, up at Hamilton Field, he made a very short visit to Ira Eaker, actually.

Q: Yes, Ira Eaker had a Fighter Group?

V: Fighter Group.

Q: And you worked for Ira Eaker at the time?

V: Yes.

Q: Eaker was brought in shortly after that, to Washington.

V: Yes, Miff Harmon came up and took his place; Eaker left about six months before the war started.

Q: And when is the next time you saw Arnold?

V: The next time I saw him was in the Fiji Islands. I commanded the 7th Fighter Squadron. He came through on a visit on the way to Australia.

Q: This was September 1942? I think Jake Smart was with him?

V: Yes, yes, he was.

Q: He was on his way to see MacArthur and George Kenney. He just passed through?

V: Well, he spent the night there.

Q: Do you recall anything special?

V: No, he seemed to be quite happy with the progress we had made in training these people we'd taken out there, the status we'd reached combat-wise. He continued to preach--one of his old theories--not old theories, but new theory, actually, that everybody had to do their very best with what they had, because there was only so much available. He said that several times.

Q: The Fiji Islands were a stopping off point on the route to Australia; it became a sort of critical spot.

V: Very much so.

Q: Marshall and Arnold were very concerned about getting reinforcements to Australia. I think they called that "X" in those days, didn't they? A lot of the paperwork which showed "Destination X." They wouldn't identify it, because they felt it was secret.

V: Of course, they had code names for all those places. Strange enough, I don't remember the X designation, no.

Q: Brett was out of there by the time Arnold came through. George Brett had been the senior Allied Air Officer in SWPac.

V: He was in Australia, he had nothing to do with us. We were under the Navy, under first, Admiral Ghormley, who was in New

Caledonia, of course. Then Halsey took over after Ghormley had kind of lost his nerve, or lost something, I guess.

Q: I want to ask you about that. Arnold was supposed to have had some role in the departure of Ghormley who never left his ship. Did you know anything about that?

V: No, I do know this. Ghormley had a long history as a Naval Attache, and everybody was extremely surprised that they would pick somebody from the Attache job. Actually, his last assignment, I believe, had been at London. They sent him out in a thing, where it was going to get real hot combat-wise, apparently, in a very short while. I do know that he and Twining had many, many go rounds. Well, he and Harmon, because Harmon was actually over Twining. When the first initial landings were made at Guadalcanal, the Japs reacted much more violently with their Navy then they had been expected to. Gen Harmon, who was Ghormley's Air Advsior, was very outspoken in trying to get Ghormley to do something about what the Japanese Fleet would do to our people if they landed, and Ghormley's answer was: "I can't risk my ships." I'm certain he said this 100 times. Now, I certainly have no knowledge of what Harmon might have done to Arnold in the way of prodding him to do something in Washington about relieving Ghormley, but...

Q: I talked to Twining recently, and he attributes to Arnold a role in relieving Ghormley.

V: I'm certain he must have been.

Q: Of course, they were also screaming for planes, and the South Pacific was far down on the priority list. So this was a problem. The Navy wanted some land-based planes, and Arnold didn't have enough to go around. Did you have any conversation with Arnold when he stopped at theFiji Islands?

V: I spent the entire evening with him.

Q: I see, you were his host? Do you recall anything? Did he talk about the war?

V: No, I don't recall anything specific, other than the fact that we were fighting in many places. Obviously, we were going to be fighting in additional places. Again, the thing that I heard him say later on, when I was in the Pentagon, many, many times--"You've just got to do what's got to be done with what you've got because there isn't anything else."

Q: I guess this might have come up in connection with, if we only had more planes out there, we could do a job. I think Guadalcanal had started.

V: Guadalcanal had just started, and no one really knew what the situation was. It started about a month before. No one really knew what was going on out there, actually. At least, we didn't.

Q: You went to Guadalcanal later on, I believe. You were transferred there, the situation got very desperate.

V: It was desperate for a long, long time. In fact, it was desperate from about the end of September 1942 until mid-January 1943.

Q: You couldn't use Henderson Field. The Japs were bombing that all the time.

V: Well, we used it, but they were bombing it all the time.

Q: The Navy didn't have much out there. They had some carriers out there.

V: When I went there, in December 1, 1942, of course, there were about 100 AAF aircraft, mainly fighters. There were some bombers. The bombers operated. They would come in there and bomb a place, and go back to New Hebrides, or some other place. In addition to the 100 AAF

airplanes there, there were roughly 75 to 100 Marine Corps airplanes, and the Navy varied They would come in off a carrier and maybe with 50, 60 or 75 airplanes. They would operate for a week. Then the carrier would pick them up and they would go again. Sometimes there were none there. It was like that on into till the next summer, summer of 1943--when we began to move north, so to speak.

Q: How long did you stay at Guadalcanal?

V: I stayed there essentially from the 1st of December 1942 to the end of May 1943. I went there the first of December and stayed there till about the 20th of January, which was a normal six weeks' tour, in command of one squadron of P-39s. I went to Australia. Also, somewhat by default, people were killed. After I had been there two or three weeks, essentially, although I had no specific orders as such, I commanded all of the AAF fighter aircraft, and I left there sometime around the 20th of January and went on a 10-day trip to Australia, which is a normal thing, Australia being a recreation thing. I returned there after 10 days, about the 1st of February 1943, with a different assignment. This time I was assigned to the 13th Fighter Command, which was down in New Hebrides, Gen Strother being the commander. But my duty station was Guadalcanal. This time I was specifically in command of all the Army Air Corps fighter aircraft.

Q: Who was in command of New Hebrides?

V: Twining. Well, the Navy was actually in command.

Q: And Twining was the senior AF man.

V: In fact, he was Commander of the 13th AF. I stayed there until about two or three days after Yamamoto was shot down, which was the 18th of April. Then I went back to New Hebrides again, about

the 22nd of April, and then I had two or three additional three or four day trips at Guadalcanal, between then and the end of July which I actually came back to the States.

Q: Let me ask you about the Yamamoto incident. Lanphier has been given credit, or Lanphier has taken credit. There was a guy named Rex Barber there, who shot down one of the other, I think there were two Bettys. Based on some reading that I have done, nobody really knows which Betty held Yamamoto. Is this an accurate analysis?

V: No, that isn't quite true. At the time, no one knew which one he was in, but it was presumed, being a big wheel and everything, that he was in the front one. Lanphier definitely shot down the front one. So Lanphier didn't really claim that he shot Yamamoto down, Lanphier was a trained journalist. He was a journalist graduate of Stanford University. So he wrote an article for the NY Times, and made some considerable money out of it. Well, this made a hell of a lot of other people mad. I happened to be the main planner for this thing. There is a very good book, just hasn't been written very long, that you might want to read, "Get Yamamoto."

Q: That Burke Davis book is being published by the same house that hopefully will publish ours on Arnold. You say there was a guy named Mitchell.

V: He was in my squadron, all these people except one or two were in my squadron.

Q: Mitchell and Rex Barber. Well, does Rex Barber feel about this thing? Is he still alive?

V: Oh yes. I don't really believe he claims he shot him down. There was another fellow there; there were four of them who were supposed to do the shooting. One of them was killed, and no one

really knows what happened to him. There was another boy named Holesm. Definitely the bomber that Lanphier was shooting at, was the one that Yamamoto was in. The one that Barber shot down, the Chief of Staff was in, and he is still alive, the bomber crashed in the water. He is still alive, he was an Admiral so.

Q: Then he acknowledged that the lead bomber....

V: Had Yamamoto in it, yes.

Q: Then that's fairly conclusive?

V: In fact, it's almost 100% conclusive. I've known it all the time, I mean I was right there when they landed and I was certain.

Q: That Lanphier did not ursurp the claim?

V: That's right. The whole animosity of the thing was created by the fact that Lanphier made some money out of it, not because he was a member of the fighter squadron, but because he was a journalist. If any of the rest of them could have written, if I could write, I would have gotten some money out of it also. This book, is the first time, that I've really, in a public way, told my part of the thing.

Q: Did Burke Davis interview you?

V: Yes, numerous times.

Q: Then you were in right from the ground floor.

V: Right.

Q: Where did you, you came back to Washington in '43. You were assigned to....

V: Hqs., Army Air Corps, yes.

Q: What job did you have there?

V: I had a job as Chief of the Fighter and Air Defense Branch of the Requirements Division, OC&R. Barney Giles was my boss.

Q: Then he moved up the line to become Chief of Air Staff. I think it was about the middle of the year, when Stratemeyer moved on. Stratemeyer moved overseas. Who was your direct boss in that job?

V: General Gross, who has long since been killed, he was killed in a P-80 accident.

Q: Did you get to see Arnold in this job?

V: I was there exactly two years. I left the day the Japanese threw in the hat. I saw him in the hall a lot of times, but to actually discuss problems and things with him, probably 8 to 10 times, something like that.

Q: Did you get in on the problem of long-range escorts?

V: Oh, that was mine completely. I had everything to do with establishing the requirements, on what a fighter plane would do in the way of performance, guns, the electronic gear aboard it, and also establishing the requirements, or what the pilot should be capable of doing. That was our job completely.

Q: Well, the time you got there, the fighter situation was in a desperate way, was it not? The P-38 and the P-47 could not make the long run. There were several serious losses at Schweinfurt and Regensburg in August 1943 and October 1943.

V: That's right. The greatest drive was to get longer range into the fighter planes so that they could escort bombers. That was the greatest effort we ever had on.

Q: When you first came in there, I expect one of the priority tasks was to get some wing tanks to put on the P-38s and the P-47s?

V: Well, that was underway, but they were very unsatisfactory at the beginning. That was being done, of course, they were pretty much underway. An unbelievable modification program. We were building

in January 1944; we were manufacturing about 1,700 first-class fighters a month. I chased them down one month. At one particular time, every one of them had to go to some other place to be modified. One of the big modification plants up at Rome, NY, Griffiss AFB. They had something like 600 fighter airplanes in there that were desperately needed in New Guinea, England and North Africa, and every other place. They had the worst winter they had in history. They were all covered up with snow. It was really a tremendous problem.

Q: Did Arnold get on you or your boss?

V: Well, he was continually going. I talked to him about this several times myself.

Q: Did he ring his squawk box and get you in there?

V: No, just telephone calls when he wanted one of his aides to come in.

Q: I guess Mervin Gross was on his direct line?

V: I'm sure he was, yes.

Q: Did he give you a lot of heartburn?

V: No, really he was very abrupt, of course. But I was always able to provide some sort of satisfactory answer to his questions. At least I could tell him the truth without any qualms about it, and he said: "Get on with this," or something.

Q: Were you there when they tried an expedient of putting armor on bombers--the B-40 and the B-41? This was a task of loading them up with guns and armor--a B-17 and they called it a B-40. The B-24, they called the B-41?

V: I dimly remember this, but I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

Q: We came to recognize the P-51 for what it was, or what it

could have been, because at one time it was a low-level plane. I think the British recognized it before we did?

V: Unfortunately, everything we were building, with the exception of the P-38 was a low-level plane.

Q: We are talking about the fighter problem and the poor engine which we had.

V: I wouldn't exactly say the poor engine. It was a low altitude engine. Unfortunately, no one had recognized the extreme importance of fighters, even though all of our bombers, not all of them, but too many, the B-17 and the B-24, were built for high altitude operations. No one had realized the extreme importance of having this in the fighter aircraft. All of our original airplanes, except the P-38, were designed as a low altitude airplanes. They just couldn't do the job. If we had been faced with somebody that had bombers like a B-17 in any appreciable number, we would have "had" it. That's all there is to it. We couldn't do anything about it. Of course, the British realized what they were up against in the Spitfire. Actually, both of their airplanes were built as high altitude airplanes. The Spitfire and the Hurricane, and one or two others they had, the Mosquito fighters. So they used the P-51 as a low-level harassing type plane against occupied Europe. Someone, I presume, North American Aviation, had more to do with it than anyone else. They came up with a British engine in the P-51.

Q: Merlin engine. Somebody has given Tommy Hitchcock credit for recognizing this. He was, I think in Amb. Wynant's office.

V: Right. I met him several times. He was a very energetic and high spoken person. This may have been true. I have no knowledge of it.

Q: Do you feel that Arnold and some of the Air Force leaders dropped the ball in not preparing for this possibility? The fact that we had this Strategic Bombing doctrine; we had the capability, but we didn't have the escorts?

V: I'm certain that the greatest amount of thought, time, and everything else, went into the strategic bombing, or the bombing part of it, which I agree with, no question about it.

Q: Well, one of the arguments made on the other side of it, is that it was so hard to come by some money, if you got any, you put it into bombers, the No. 1 priority.

V: That's right.

Q: If you had more money, you would have looked at a related problem, that of protecting the bombers. But in those days, the bombers out sped the fighters. I guess they felt that the bombers didn't need protection.

V: I'm sure. Some of the papers that caused Roosevelt to announce that he was going to manufactur, or needed 50,000 airplanes, was papers prepared by Arnold's staff--I don't mean Arnold himself--other people like Norstad, Kuter. I've seen these papers. I don't remember the details. But they came up with what we need to win the war, and the fighter part was just sort of an appendage stuck on.

Q: You are probably talking about AWPD-1, Air War Plans No. 1. This was done by Harold George and Kuter, where they stressed the bomber, and the fighters were not.

V: Just sort of an appendage to it.

Q: When you got there, there was an intensive effort to catch up on the P-51. They started coming in around the first of 1944. Is that about right?

V: Well, let's see. We had some P-51s then. We had a P-51B, I believe it was, which was a reasonably good airplane, it had the Merlin engine in it. The P-51A had the old Allison engine in it. Like I said, there was nothing wrong with that Allison engine for what it was designed. It could produce the horsepower, but the one that really did the job, mainly in Europe, and other places also, was the P-51D model. That really started coming into the inventory in numbers in the fall of 1944. That was the one that had roughly an 800 miles radius of action. It had a much larger tank than the B model. It had the first bubble canopy on it; it was the one that really did it.

Q: In 1944, the German Air Force was sort of flattened, the "Big Week" was in late February 1944. I guess you had some role in planning that, or getting the planes in for that big show. I think it was in one week where they launched several thousand of sorties each day.

V: Of course, I had a lot to do with getting the planes to Europe, but as far as doing that one specific thing, I had nothing to do with that, whatsoever.

Q: Do you recall any specific meetings you had with Arnold, where certain business was transacted: Was there any give and take between you and Arnold?

V: Oh yes, we had two situations. Well, neither one was of too great importance, but they were quite interesting. No. 1, the British began moaning and crying for P-51s, and Arnold said: "Well, we can't give them to them, and we've got to do something to keep them from bothering us." Arnold said: "What we want to do is get three of their

airplanes, Spitfires, and modify them to give them increased range and show the British that they could do the same thing, they could go the same route we did." So we got two of their airplanes and sent them out to Wright Field, Dayton. These were Spitfires. We had them modified with additional internal fuel and big wing tanks on them, and flew them to England.

Q: This surprised the British?

V: This surprised the "be-Jesus" out of the British. We flew them across the ocean. They had never done anything like this. They never dreamed anything like this. I was the Project Officer on this one specific thing. I talked to Arnold several times about it. Another thing, the Navy came up with their last model of the Grumman which was F-8F. It was a real good airplane. But, again, they had sacrificed any appreciable range to get high maneuverability and speed out of the thing. So, we had a thing every year, called a "Fighter Conference," where all the manufacturers and people that were charged with flying these things would meet at some experimental place and have about a week of exchange where actually, test pilots and military pilots flew other people's airplanes. We had all kinds of symposiums on armament and so forth. It was called a "Fighter Conference." And we had two or three of these at Eglin Field. I was in charge of running these things, also. We had one down at the Navy Proving Ground, which is just outside of Washington.

Q: Dahlgreen?

V: No, the Navy Air Proving Ground.

Q: Patuxent Naval Air Station.

V: Yes, and the F-8F just showed up. So at a cocktail party, Admiral McCain who was high up...

Q: John McCain, he had lost his son?

V: He lost his grandson, his son is the Admiral McCain who runs the Pacific now. This is John McCain I, I guess. The III is the one who is in Vietnam. Anyway, McCain was in charge of naval air. So at some kind of a cocktail party he told Arnold, he just mentioned to him: "Boy, that F-8 we've got is really showing everything you've got up." Well, of course, the next morning, I got a big blast of why can't we keep up with the F-8. Why don't we have something that will do this? I got all of this secondhand, of course. I must have written 500 pages of stuff trying to explain that it was getting hotter and hotter all the time. Finally, I got in to see General Arnold, and all it took was just a statement that the F-8F was a short-range, highly maneuverable airplane that has no ... it would in no way be anything that the Army Air Forces needs or could use. We would be foolish to even think of building a thing like this, and that was it.

Q: And Arnold dropped it right there?

V: That's what he wanted to hear. But nobody really knew what he wanted to hear.

Q: Arnold was unhappy with the British, because he thought they were stashing away a lot of planes in reserve. Do you remember this? He got over there a couple of times, and he found that the British were always worried that the Luftwaffe would come in, and they were stashing away planes in reserve. They kept asking for a lot of planes, and then they had a lot of planes in storage. He sent a couple of people over there to sort of find out how many planes the British actually had "on hand," how many they had in storage, and what their

real requirements were. Did you ever get into this?

V: No, that would have been long before I was in Washington.

Q: But when you were in Washington, you did not have this business of the British asking for more planes than they needed, or that Arnold thought they needed?

V: No, other than they were trying to get the P-51--after the put the high altitude engine in it--which they never did, of course.

Q: I guess they felt that since they, the British, had made this discovery, the least we ought to do was to give them some?

V: I'm sure they did. They argued like hell for them. They particularly wanted them, as I remember, for India. They didn't have much in India, but what they had, they needed something like that for the Burma thing. And, of course, we used them in India. Eventually, we got them into China, on a small scale. If we had them to send to China, much earlier, we would have really wrapped that thing up months earlier than we did.

Q: Did you get involved with the problem of how do we contend with the German jets, the ME-262.

V: Oh God, yes.

Q: That was a big project? Do you remember confrontations you had with Arnold, or any directions he gave, or any business with him on that subject?

V: No, I sure didn't.

Q: General Gross was your boss at this time, but did you have to work out some plans or tactics for coping with the German jets?

V: No, that wouldn't have been our business anyway. That was something that was done in Europe.

Q: The greatest weakness of course, was the very short range, it would only last 30 minutes.

V: A lot of people wished, of course, that we had jets. But by the time they came out, we had such a gigantic numerical superiority that everybody realized they really weren't going to be able to do anything about the situation anyway.

Q: How about the V-1, V-2? This was a question of trying to chase--well, the V-2 you couldn't--but the V-1, I think they were trying to chase down?

V: W ll, that was a British problem. In other words, the British never relinquished to us in any way, any responsibility, or anything else to do with the defense of England, or any other kind of defense, for that matter. That was their problem. Now, we did use our medium bombers on a real gigantic scale and the big bombers, also. Bombing the sites where the Germans were launching the V-1s and V-2s. But the actual business of trying to shoot them down, was a British responsibility and we were doing all kinds of studies on the thing and that kind of stuff. But we never really, it was never our responsibility.

Q: Do you remember something called the "Jeb Stuart" concept? Robert Lovett was the great admirer of this idea. This idea was to send 500 to 1,000 fighter bombers low level and plastering the heck out of a lot of German targets all over the landscape.

V: I remember that, yes.

Q: It had some currency. I think Arnold was having his major heart attack when this got on. Remember he was down to Florida?

V: I remember when he went to Orlando, yes.

Q: Well, it was Coral Gables.

V: Yes, wherever it was.

Q: They kept it very quiet, because one reason, Arnold felt that Marshall might retire him. So he was away from his desk for quite a bit during this period. Did you have any involvement in that "Jeb Stuart" idea, or were you asked to comment on it? Is this an operational thing out of your area?

V: It's an operational question.

Q: What were some of the finer questions that arose during your stint in OC&R?

V: All kinds of things every day. The P-47 was one big thing that came up, when the B-29s arrived. Another thing involved the airplanes that had fought the European war. There were modifications, the modifications mainly being increasing the power of the engine, some of which were very successful, and some of which weren't. Getting better ammunition, this was an ordnance problem really, incendiary ammunition, explosive ammunition, etc., that pretty much was all in the mill when I got there. The basic thing of how many P-51s you can manufacture? How many P-47s you can manufacture, etc. Those questions were pretty well set. The biggest thing that came up on the P-47, and P-51, also, for that matter, was when the Japs began to shoot down the B-29s at a pretty high rate. Again, we had to do something, but in order to get some method of escorting them to Japan. That was the reason that it took the island of Iwo Jima, to be exact, in order to get closer. So we did some quick and dirty studies, and we came up with a P-47 N model, which again, increased the engine size and increased the wings, with sort of a square wing tip. Those changes gave it a fair range of almost 3,000 miles, and a combat radius of action around

900. We hurriedly organized about 500 of these airplanes into units, and sent them to Okinawa and to Iwo Jima, one P-51 unit, and four of these P-47s units, where they escorted B-29s over Japan.

Q: Didn't they have some kind of disaster on Iwo Jima, I believe it was around June 1945? I think the B-29s were navigating for the P-47s, and they went in bad weather. I think a couple of groups of fighters turned into the bombers, or the bombers turned into the fighters, and I think 27 planes were lost.

V: I remember losing a lot of them.

Q: I think Arnold was on his trip out to the Pacific, this was the early part of June. He rushed up to Iwo Jima, to make a determination of responsibility. I think he had to decide whether Mickey Moore was going to stay on the job. Mickey Moore had the 7th Fighter Command, and Moose Mussett. Did you get into that business of that foul-up? This was strictly operational?

V: That's a theater type problem, nothing back in the Pentagon.

Q: It wasn't anything, just somebody's miscalculation. You had a lot to do with North American, Dutch Kindelberger and his people?

V: Yes, yes.

Q: Needling them, getting modifications on the P-51.

V: Oh yes, continuously.

Q: There was always something. This was so they would put the plane out, and they would lack something?

V: A lot of these engineers, when they build something, when they design something and build it, the first one is real good. That's all they care about. They don't give a damn about building 10,000 of them. The next thing they want to do is design something

else, so a lot of this stuff was to battle them to perfect the one that you are making now, because we need numbers, and don't come up here with some junk about building another one, see.

Q: Was that the P-82?

V: The P-82 is a prime example. I guess it might have been Kindelberger. Actually, the man I dealt with most of the time was Atwood, who is the president now, of course. But, then, they came up with the P-51H, to try to go from producing one model into another one like that, and they always told Arnold, and told a lot of people, that this was almost the same thing: "We can go right from the D to this, without any trouble." That was a big lie, because it wasn't the same thing at all. They were always trying to do something. The engineer, once he designs and builds a thing, he's happy. He wants to go somewhere else. What we were after, was to get numbers.

Q: You wanted to get those planes so they wouldn't be accepted by the AF, and then sit on a modification ramp, waiting for some small piece of equipment.

V: Right, right.

Q: Did you have any business with Knerr?

V: I know who he is--no.

Q: I think he was in Europe at the time. Who did you deal with when you went to Arnold? Did you deal with Giles, or one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff handling this?

V: I had all kinds of people that I dealt with.

Q: How about Fred Dean?

V: Fred Dean, I dealt with him. Dean was a fighter man, Smart and one other guy in that office. In this business about getting proper escort for the B-29s, I dealt with Norstad, who was handling

that for the 20th AF. But on most of my stuff, I would go to Giles, and from Giles, I would either be sent to Arnold's office, or Giles would go with me to Arnold's office.

Q: And then you would brief Arnold?

V: Yes.

Q: Arnold had a reputation for exploding.

V: I'll tell you what. Of course, so many other people like Barney Giles--he knew him far more than I did--but I think his exploding, to the best of my knowledge, was during.... When something came up suddenly, as I understand it--I never attended one of his daily staff meetings--but as I understand it, he would be reading this memorandum that they prepared for him on what was happening. If he just happened to read onto something that said all the tires were blowing out on the runways in India, or something, I know this actually happened, well, he would explode, and want to know why in the hell they couldn't build better tires. He might explode at the doctor about this. Well, the doctor said he didn't know what the hell to do about the tires, or anything else. But n a case where he was trying to get some specific briefing on something, and sent for somebody that was supposed to be the expert, to the best of my knowledge, this didn't ever occur, because most of the people that went there, he wouldn't know what they were talking about, anyway, see.

Q: When something unforeseen or unpredicted happened?

V: That's right, that was something else again. I also worked later on for five years for General Grunther. He is explodable, too, I'll tell you, and strangely enough, I must have given him, I'd say, 40 or 50 briefings a year for five years, and I never got thrown out

of his office one time. So maybe I have a quiet, tranquilizing effect on those type people. The times I went in to talk to General Arnold, it was to answer some kind of a problem, whether we could do this or not.

Q: Did Mervin Gross get thrown out of his office?

V: I don't know, there was a hell of a lot of people around there who had been thrown out.

Q: Somebody told me that if Arnold hadn't exploded at you, you hadn't really experienced the Pentagon. Arnold had a penchant for grabbing people in the hall, and tell them--"go to China, or Europe, and get this straightened out." Sometimes the individual so grabbed, did not have experience in that area.

V: The way he would do in the staff meeting. As I say, he would ask the doctor, why all the tires are blowing out.

Q: Is this an actual occurrence?

V: Yes, actual occurrence. And then what would happen, pandemonium after that. Because when the staff meeting was over, everybody in there would go running out, to try to find out what happened about the tires, including the guy that should have known. So that you never knew where in the hell you were. I remember very well, the general thing was a little memorandum said: "OC&R, give me the answer!" and that was it. "Give me the answer!"

Q: Then you had to track back to find out what the question was. I guess the doctor had to run around...?

V: That's right, he didn't dare not go look.

Q: Who was this, David Grant?

V: I've forgotten. I believe it was.

Q: Did you get together with some of the people after it was

all over, and sort of laugh at this thing? Or was it too painful?

V: Well, you were running so damn fast up and down the Pentagon. Every time I go back there, I think I should have worn a track between my office and Barney Giles' office.

Q: Where was your office located?

V: I was on the E ring looking over the airport. The day before the war was over, a MG walked up to the door, and I said: "Won't you come in?" And he said: "Well, I'm just looking around to see where I might move to." So we moved out the next day.

Q: Where did you move to?

V: Down in the bowels of the place. Incidentally, Bruce Holloway took my job. Yes, he was my assistant.

Q: Did he have any contact with Arnold?

V: I'm sure he did. He wouldn't have had much because the war was over, and that was sort of it.

Q: I was told that Arnold lost interest in Washington right after the war ended.

V: I'm sure he did. I wasn't there, though. I left the day the war was over.

Q: Where did you go?

V: Went down to Eglin Field.

Q: You worked for Grandison Gardner?

V: Yes.

Q: Grandison Gardner is somebody who had direct contact with Arnold?

V: Oh yes, very much so.

Q: He is out in Tucson; I'm going to write him and see if we can get together some time. Arnold was a great gadgeteer.

V: Oh yes.

Q: Andhe was always trying out new things. Did he put the bite on you or on Mervin Gross for some new gadgetry using fighters?

V: Lord, yes.

Q: Or some gadgetry within fighters, new guns, or some new thing?

V: There was all kinds of homing stuff, direction finding equipment, so they could be able to join the bombers. There was a saddist drive on to get better instruments for weather flying, and he had a very great personal interest in all this.

Q: Kettering and Arnold had developed the "Flying Bug" which was a very primitive kind of guided missile in WW I. Arnold always had this great interest in gadgetry. Somebody would come in with one of these explosive pencils, or some gadget like that. He really went, hookline and sinker for this. So, I guess he was badgering Gross then to try to develop navigation homing equipment, and some of the stuff fell on you. Did you ever have to report to him on any of this gadgetry?

V: Not any specific thing like that, no, not that I know of.

V: This is an amusing thing, you have probably heard it from somebody else. Approximately a month or two after we got down to Eglin Field, Arnold came down on a visit. This would have been two or three months after the war was over. And I might add he looked very, very bad.

Q: He had a severe heart attack before this.

V: My wife and my son, who was seven years old, and all the other ladies, everybody else that had interest, came up to the Officers' Club to try to get to see him. They had a special place where you could stand out there, you know, when he came out from lunch. They also had a very strange Provost Marshal at Eglin Field

who was a former Brooklyn policeman. His name was Smith. His nickname was "Bag'em" Smith, and he wore two live pearl handled .45 guns all the time, and he was dressed with white leggings and all this business.

Q: A Junior George Patton?

V: Yes to be exact. As Arnold walked out of the Officers' Club, and waved at all these wives and children, "Bag'em" Smith was right behind Arnold and Gardner. My young son said: "Mommy, look at those guns he's wearing." The youngster thought this was Arnold. Just the guns excited him. Of course, it was this Provost Marshal, "Bag'em" Smith, I'll never forget it. Smith had on a silver helmet. The boy assumed this was General Arnold.

Q: What did General Arnold say?

V: He didn't hear this.

Q: You had no other contact with him down at Eglin Field?

V: No, just general.

Q: What was he looking at, do you remember? He was interested in the JB-2. The JB-2 was a Chinese copy of the V-1, and Arnold, when he was over around OVERLORD, he was in England, and then he went to the beachhead, three or four days after OVERLORD. The Germans started lobbing these V-1s over, just about that time, and Arnold put the bite on Grandison Gardner to perfect the JB-2. Arnold had a plan to launch a couple of thousand a month at the Germans. Did you know about that?

V: That was Japan actually.

Q: Then the German war was ending. Then he got sick, so I think the War Dept killed this project.

V: They did. In fact, Arnold was going to try to launch them from ships. Kaiser, the shipbuilder, came around, with a big plan to build hundreds of ships that you could launch one of these things a minute, launch them on Japan. And Arnold went for that.

Q: Also, the "Weary Willies," the "Willie Orphan," do you remember this?

V: I remember the "Wearies." Oh, I know what that's all about. They would take the old war weary B-17s, B-24s and load them up, and put an automatic pilot in them, and send them over.

Q: This would have done two things: (1) it would have dropped bombs on the enemy; and (2) it would have gotten rid of some old planes. Arnold, and some of the old timers were very much concerned, because they remembered after WW I. The authorities made them use the DH4 for 10 years after WW I ended. They didn't want to get saddled with all these war weary planes. This is one way of killing two birds. Did you get in on any of that?

V: No, because it was all bombers; it wasn't fighters.

V: I'll tell you one thing I haven't told you about. I told you Bruce Holloway was my assistant up there. I had an Executive who was a NY corporation lawyer named John Holbrook, called to active duty as a LTCOL. This one day, I guess I had been there about six months, I heard someone say: "What's going on in here?" And I looked up, and there stood General Arnold and one of his aides. In fact, this is the first time I had seen him since I had come back to the Pentagon. I, of course, leap to my feet, and I didn't have my glasses on. He said: "Don't bother reaching for your glasses. I want to know what the hell you do up here." I've always been a fairly

good talker, and I told him what we did, etc. He said: "Well, that sounds pretty good." Then he asked some questions about a couple of the things. The kind of projects we were involved in. He said: "Well, keep up the good work." Then he kind of smiled and left. When it was all over, this Holbrook said--everybody else in the room was sort of pale--and he said: "Well, I can't imagine where in the world you got all that off. I wonder what he thinks the other 30,000 people around here do, because you seem to be doing it all."

Q: You had a lot of presence of mind to recite your whole mission. But, Arnold had a commanding presence?

V: Very much so.

Q: Was it because of his rank, or his personality?

V: His personality, I'm sure.

Q: Did you ever see him and Marshall together?

V: No, no.

Q: How about any contact between him and Lovett?

V: No.

Q: Or any of the other brass in the War Dept, like Stimson, or McCloy, or Patterson. Any knowledge of their association?

V: No, I sure didn't.

Q: Did you ever see him in action in the JCS meetings, or one of the high level meetings? Was he pretty quiet at those meetings?

V: One time. I was called in to give some specific information on one small thing. I was only in the room for maybe three minutes, or something like that. General Marshall wasn't there. McNarney was presiding.

Q: And Arnold didn't say much?

V: No one really said anything.

Q: Was this on the fighter problem?

V: It was a much more complicated thing than that. We started sending out bombers from Europe, to bomb Germany and land in Russia.

Q: Oh the FRANTIC operation?

V: And a bunch of them got buggered up over there.

Q: At Poltava?

V: Right. So they were desperately trying to get some defense into the thing. The Russians said: "What are you excited about? This has been happening to us for four years." This was nothing unusual. So, no one knew, in the first place, whether the Russians would allow us in there or not. But they wanted to know what we should do. So that was thrown to me and actually, Barney Giles, I got the word from him as to what we could do. Well, this has to be a night fighter, an all-weather plane.

Q: The P-61?

V: That's right. There was no way to get them over there, because they were short range. We had some in Europe, and they couldn't even get over there. But there was a squadron of airplanes in a convoy on the way to India. In fact, their final destination was Chengtu, China, to protect the B-29s. So, we finally came up with a thing, that we could unload these people in Oran, put the airplanes together, and take them to Turkey, or take them on down to Oran, and up that way to Poltava. It was the hellish, complicated thing, it could be done. So we could the Russians had no radar over there. So we had an experimental sort of a medium weight--wasn't anything like a light weight--radar down in Orlando. Well, we determined that this could be cut up and taken apart and load them in C-54s. We could take

about eight of them, and that could be hauled over there. So we made all these arrangements to do all these things; and actually took the people off the ships, and started putting the airplanes together in Oran, around Algiers, and the Russians turned thumbs down on the thing. And that was it.

Q: After you'd already done these things. The Russians were not too interested in too many Americans coming into Russia, and that thing sort of fied on the vine.

V: I went down to this meeting they were having on the capability of what we could do.

Q: Well, they told you to go ahead on it?

V: We were already going ahead on it.

Q: You were telling them what you were doing, and then the Russians threw cold water on it?

V: Of course, in those days, money was a little easier to come by.

Q: Money was no object.

Q: Talk about the Advisory Council now, Jake Smart and Rosie O'Donnell?

V: Fred Dean was a reasonably good friend of mine.

Q: Was there a guy named McRae?

V: I barely remember him. Jake Smart had been my instructor in the Flying School here. I knew him quite well, and thought a hell of a lot of him, and he thought quite a bit of me, I think. Rosie O'Donnell is a pretty good friend of mine. Because of the fact, when these questions would arise in addition to the people that were supposed to know the answer, or provide the answer, or to have cognizance of that, this Advisory Council, they took the

same thing, because they had to. I don't blame them for doing it, because they didn't know what minute Arnold was going to come to them for some answer, just exactly like Nixon is going to somebody else outside the State Department right now. They had to find out. In other words, when a real hot thing happened, if it was in your area, you get a barrage of stuff from many different directions, very quickly.

Walsh, Robert L. 19 Feb 70

done
2-19-70

call monday 2/16
NO7-6827
10 or AM for appt that week
Thurs

January 28, 1970

Maj. General Robert L. Walsh, USAF (Ret)
2540 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear General Walsh:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, Editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. You and I have met on several occasions. I have a Mobilization Assignment in Air Force Intelligence.

To help me do the vast research required, I have been on a Brookings Institution Fellowship. During the past two years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who either knew General Arnold or had some connection with his policies.

Of course, you were associated with General Arnold in many key undertakings. I can think of at least three "right off the top":

(1) Your work for him in Brazil and South America.

(2) Operation FRANTIC - the shuttle bombing based out of Poltava, etc.

(3) Air Intelligence.

It may be of interest to know that within the past month I've been interviewing former associates of General Arnold's in Colorado Springs and in the Southland. Among

them are Generals Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Hansell, Partridge, Everest, Kepner, P.D. Weikert, Bob Lee, Thatcher, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others whose names do not readily come to mind.

Jack Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney and Kuter in New York City, and we have also talked with Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell and Smart here in Washington within the past six months.

I would like to take the liberty of phoning you in the next week for an interview lasting perhaps 90 minutes at a time and place convenient for you. If it is more convenient for you to phone me, my Pentagon numbers are OX 5-3862 or OX 7-5587.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT LeGROW WALSH, USAF

Robert LeGrow Walsh was born in Walla Walla, Washington, July 25, 1894. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy June 13, 1916, and commissioned a second lieutenant of Cavalry. His first service was on border patrol duty with the Third Cavalry, between September, 1916, and February, 1917, when he moved to Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

General Walsh went to France with the American Expeditionary Forces in November, 1917, for duty at the First Corps School at Gondrecourt, France. In February, 1918, he moved to Issodun with the Air Service. He was attached to the 22nd Aero Squadron during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives and then moved to headquarters of the Air Service of the First Army.

In March, 1919, General Walsh was assigned to the Division of Military Aeronautics at Washington, D. C., where he served for one year before moving to Mather Field, Sacramento, California. In July, 1921, he enrolled in the Air Corps Engineering School at Dayton, Ohio, and was graduated a year later. He was then assigned to Bolling Field D. C., as engineering officer.

In January, 1924, General Walsh joined Office, Chief of Air Corps, as Engineering Division Representative in Washington, D. C., and later was chief of its Information Division and assistant military aide to the White House. He enrolled in the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field, Virginia, and after graduation a year later entered the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was graduated in June, 1929, and became assistant attache for air in the American Embassies at Paris, France, and Madrid, Spain.

General Walsh, in July, 1931, was assigned to Wright Field, Ohio, in the Air Corps Materiel Division, and in January, 1933, became chief of the Administrative Branch, Field Service Section, there. In July, 1933, he assumed command of Albrook Field, Panama Canal Zone, and in September became commanding officer of the 16th Pursuit Group in addition to his other duties.

In September, 1935, he was assigned in the Office, Chief of Air Corps, and Chief of the Reserve Division. In September, 1938, he enrolled in the Army Industrial College and was graduated in June, 1939. The following September he was detailed to the Army War College from which he was graduated in June, 1940. He then was assigned at Langley Field where he became Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at General Headquarters Air Forces and Air Force Combat Command at Langley Field, and Bolling Field, D. C.

MORE

General Walsh, in February, 1942, was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Air Force headquarters, and in June became commander of the South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command, with station in Brazil. In November, 1942, he was made commanding General of U. S. Army Forces in the South Atlantic, continuing as wing commander of the South Atlantic Wing of ATC. He subsequently was assigned overseas and in June, 1944, was announced as commanding general of the Eastern Command of the United States Strategic Air Forces in the U.S.S.R. and Air Member of the U. S. Military Mission to Moscow.

In November, 1944, General Walsh was appointed special assistant to the commanding general of the AAF at Washington, D. C., and in December was given additional duty as U. S. Air Member of the Inter-American Defense Board. In March, 1946, he became U. S. Army Air Member on the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, in addition to his other duties. In October, 1946, he joined the U. S. Air Forces in Europe, and the following month was designated commanding general of headquarters and headquarters squadron of the 12th Tactical Air Command. In April, 1947, he became Director of Intelligence of the European Command, with station at Berlin, Germany.

General Walsh was assigned, in October, 1948 to Air Force headquarters, Washington, D. C., and soon afterward to the Central Control Group as Air Force steering and coordinating member for the military representation on the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for Canada and the United States and the Joint Mexico-United States Defense for Canada and the United States and the Joint Mexico-United States Defense Commission. In addition, he was named senior Air Force member on the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission and senior Air Force delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board. On July 1, 1952, he was given another additional duty as Director of the Continental U. S. Defense Planning Group.

On January 22, 1953, General Walsh was appointed chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board at Washington, D. C.

General Walsh has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster and the Legion of Merit. He is rated a command pilot, combat observer, and aircraft observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) July 1, 1916; to captain (permanent) July 27, 1917, and to major (temporary) July 30, 1918. He reverted to his permanent rank of captain March 15, 1920 and was promoted to major (permanent) July 1, 1921; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) March 4, 1935; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) October 1, 1937; to colonel (temporary) March 1, 1940; to brigadier general (temporary) June 21, 1942; to major general (temporary) September 29, 1943; to colonel (permanent) December 1, 1944; to brigadier general (permanent) February 19, 1948.

END

Up to date as of 30 January 1953

MG Robert L. Walsh, Pentagon, Washington, DC, February 19, 1970

Q: When did you first meet General Arnold?

W: I first met Gen Arnold in WW I. He came to Souilly, which was the headquarters of the 1st Army. Gen Liggett was in command of the 1st Army and had charge of the Meuse-Argonne operations in that area. Souilly is right under the Verdun front. Gen Arnold came there shortly before the Armistice, I would say, maybe 10 days to a week. About three or four days before the Armistice was to take place, we had instructions that it was going to take place. We issued a number of orders to keep our planes off the front by about 10 or 15 miles and also at that particular time, we had a great deal of difficulty in flying because one of these fogs set in and it was there for days and days. General Arnold, in some way, wanted to fly on the front lines--if there was any way possible. We had practically on our whole front practically no airplanes flying at this time. Maybe a few on the sides were able to get a few feet up but for all intents and purposes we were really grounded.

Q: He was anxious to get into action?

W: He was anxious to get into action, so we arranged for him to go to the front and be with the ground troops for a while. He was up there, I think, two or three days under the Verdun front, and although that was not the satisfaction he wanted, it was still some satisfaction to him, because he came all the way over, he had a very prominent position, practically running the Air Service, Aviation Section, Signal Corps. He was one of the early flyers. He knew about flying; he knew about organization, and he was one whom

Gen Kenly, I'm sure, depended on a great deal. Then he left and went over to Europe and we had the Armistice, in the meantime, he came back and he asked, I'm sure, to be assigned to Rockwell Field in San Diego. Gen Spaatz had come off the front, and Spaatz was over there flying with the 2nd Group--same as I was with.

Q: You were a Lt. at the time?

W: I was a Major. Gen Spaatz had had his experience on the front, and he had his fighting experience, and he got his DFC--well deserved. Spaatz was sent back to put the training program in. It would contribute to the effort on the front.

Q: Let me ask you about Arnold in France? He came there with Reuben Fleet? Didn't he have some company there?

W: I don't think so, when he was with us, he didn't have anybody.

Q: He was taking a tour by car. The car broke down several times, did he ever tell that story? He was traveling around.

W: That's what he came over there for.

Q: He wrote letters to Mrs. Arnold describing his experience. She saved them all. I have all those letters that he wrote. In his book he mentioned that one of the reasons he went over there was to inquire about the possible usefulness of this "Flying Bug."

W: That I don't know.

Q: This was a thing that he and Kettering were working on--one of the first guided missiles. Did this subject ever come up?

W: Sperry was one of the first on that, I don't remember Kettering in it, maybe later. Jack Sperry was the one who really founded the Sperry aviation. But he was the first one with the "Bug," as I remember.

Q: That's all you remember of Arnold. He had just come out of a hospital in Hensley. When he got over there, on the **Olympic**, he got to England and he was hospitalized because of a respiratory condition.

W: I didn't know about that. Anyway, I saw him. He had known my family years before when he was stationed in the Philippines. My father was stationed there, too. Anyway, we were at Rockwell Field, and Gen Spaatz', his old friend was there. Then, shortly after that, I assume he moved to the Presidio and became the Air Officer of the 9th Corps Area, or maybe it had another name, "Dept of the Pacific," or something like that at the time. Anyway, Gen Liggett was the Commander, and he had been previously the commander of the 1st Army. Then Gen. Arnold, he was never a person to be without an objective,and to do something, I'm sure it was definitely through his interest that we started the Forest Fire patrol. When he moved up to San Francisco, he had a very close association with the Forestry Service, and then we did a little bit of the work on the forestry the year before I got there. I got to Mather Field at Sacramento in 1920, and Gen Arnold had then had it going. That summer I had command of the 9th Squadron, and Lowell Smith had command of the 91st Squadron. I worked and had the Forest Fire Patrols in California, and Lowell Smith had the corresponding ones up in Oregon and he moved his 91st Squadron to Medford, and had that for his headquarters. This was General Arnold's great interest, and rightfully so. He was a person who could select and do things like that.

Q: Do you remember any special incidents, stories, involving him, either in his military activity, or socially, at that time?

W: Socially?

Q: He had ulcers around 1921.

W: Yes, I think so.

Q: He was in Letterman Hospital for a while.

W: That I didn't remember exactly, but I remember I went to San Francisco very often and had to go down and talk to him. Gen Spaatz was his No. 2 man there, he moved up from Rockwell.

Q: Let me ask you about the ranks, on July 1, 1920, he reverted to his permanent rank of Major. He had been a Colonel and reverted to Major. Did you have to step back a rank or two?

W: No, I think just about that time, I went back to a Captain. My class was very fortunate. We came out of West Point in 1916, and I guess we were 15 days a 2nd LT, and then we were one year a 1st LT, and then we were one year a Captain, from there on we went to Majority, and we were ahead of the hump, so then we were right behind the class of 1915. There were just a few people in between so we went with the top of the move.

Q: Gen Spaatz told me a story recently about for a very brief period when Arnold was set back to his permanent rank of Major, Spaatz outranked him.

W: That could be, that happened just be administrative things that happened.

Q: And Tooey Spaatz refused to accept a situation where he outranked Arnold and I think he wanted to go to Mather Field in Sacramento. He went up there around 1920.

W: I don't know if you have heard the story about the Le Pere airplane that Gen. Arnold had. It was a very special airplane, we only made a few of them and this was Gen Arnold's favorite airplane and he flew it everywhere--for those times, a very great airplane and there was quite a story behind the Le Pere airplane design. It was designed by a Frenchman named Le Pere. We brought him over from Europe and gave him a

design crew. Mr. Laddon was one of those who was on the design crew, and he learned a great deal from Le Pere.

Q: Is that the same Laddon of Consolidated? Mac Laddon?

W: That's right. I once asked Laddon when we were in conversation about his association with the old Engineering Division which was at McCook Field, andhe had one of the design groups there. This is a little foreign to our subject, but I would be glad to give you the benefit of it. He said that he came down with an automotive group from Detroit to Dayton.to our Engineering Division at McCook Field and he didn't get along too well with some of the other designers there. They gave him another assignment and he went up to join this fellow LePere in Detroit, who had his design crew up there. Laddon learned a great deal from Le Pere. He was sent back to Dayton practically after the war was over. He would go into these conferences where they would be about ready to make a decision. Laddon would say: "Well, that's not right. I don't think you can do this. I don't think it will work out." They all kind of looked at him, and then would go ahead and do it anyway. Laddon always proved to be right. He said that he learned from La Pere the fundamentals of aircraft design.

Q: Why did Arnold like the Le Pere so much?

W: It was a beautiful airplane--a beautiful airplane to fly. It was a little faster. It was a very heavy airplane. This Le Pere went everywhere with it. Finally, they could hardly put it together any longer. They landed some place and taxiied on in. When they got to the line, the back part of it fell apart.

Q: Was Arnold a little disenchanted with the de Havilland?

W: I don't think anybody knew enough to be disenchanted with it. It was all we had in those days. It was not as good as the Salmson,

or those other French planes.

Q: He told a story somewhere in his papers about Newton Baker, the Secretary of War, coming into Rockwell, I believe. The Secretary told everybody to stand fast, that we were not spending any more money on military things. This is right at the end of the war--that they were cut back immediately on all military activities. Did you have any knowledge of that incident?

W: No. That was perfectly normal with all we had to do. We were down to rock bottom. For instance, I remember Mather Field as being myself, Capt Moore, LT Carter, LT Coning, seven enlisted men, three clerks and about 6 guards. That was it. I think I've covered the Forest Fire Patrol. It was a very, it was indicative of Arnold's character. He was absolutely progressive in every way. He saw this opportunity for the Air Service to move in, and to do a good job for the country. Those were usually his principles--when you could do it that way--and he was to my mind, definitely the developer, if not the founder, of Forest Fire Patrols.

Q: I want to ask one other question about the Forest Fire Patrol. Arnold had a psychological interest in Forestry. This existed all throughout his life. He had an idea, if you go out, and take a walk in the woods, or go fishing, somehow it had a cleansing effect on one's character. He loved the CCC, he used to write to the Foresters.

W: He was an outdoors man, but when you bring it in with forestry, I'd rather see the light on the other side. Here was something that would produce for the country, that would help save the resources of the country, and that was more his interest, he was an outdoors man that would help the resources, rather than a particular interest in forestry because he loved to go through the forest. He loved to go through the Plains.

Q: He had friendship throughout his life with a couple of men in the US Forestry Service--Joe Elliott and a couple of other fellows--in fact, they were always writing him and Gen Marshall to go out on a fishing trip. They went out on a couple of hunting and fishing trips, but this friendship must have started at this time.

W: Yes, without any questions Arnold was a fellow that could envision what you could do. I don't have much to add under that particular phasing. I had a squadron under him. He watched every operation; he watched every patrol; he was very interested in the morale of the squadrons and the morale of the people.

Q: What did he do to improve morale? Do you remember anything specific? Did he have a rest camp?

W: Yes, we had those up in the hills, but he inspired you. All you needed from him was that and you did the rest of it.

Q: Was he a man of command presence?

W: Very much so.

Q: Was he articulate when he got up to talk to give the boys a pep talk? Did he read from notes? Or did he talk off the cuff?

W: I think mostly off the cuff, well, it depends on what it is. If it was before Congress, he talked on notes.

Q: Right, but I mean as far as morale-building was concerned, and his relation ship to the men?

W: He was not a crusader. It was all natural with him. He had no spontaneous part of that.

Q: Were they calling him "Hap" at this time, when did they start to call him Hap?

W: I suppose as a cadet, I don't know.

Q: Well, they didn't call him Hap until probably the 1920's, he was called Harley, his name is Henry Harley, Harley by family anyway, for a long while, and the first indications we have of him being called Hap was probably in the '20s. Did you call him "Hap?"

W: No, I never called him "Hap." I called him "Major" or "General," never changed. He always called me "Bob." Of course, you've got to figure out, when I was a younger officer, by probably about 10 years, that was quite a bit of difference. There was a great deal of etiquette in the military services in those days, so you did call him by his rank, and then when he was Chief of our Air Force, the position definitely designated that you call him by his rank.

Q: Let's take the story to the middle '20s.

W: Let's go to 1923, Information Division, Air Service, in the Munitions Building, and he was Chief of the Information Division.

Q: He didn't come until 1924.

W: Hickam was the first one, but after the war was Hickam and then Arnold.

Q: He didn't come in until early 1925 as Information. He stayed in Rockwell until through the summer of 1924, and then Mason Patrick had come through there and liked what he saw out at Rockwell and brought him in, but he sent him to the Army Industrial College.

W: That's right, I had forgotten.

Q: Then he came in as the Information Officer, I believe it was late 1924 or early 1925.

W: Let me put it this way, '26 I think, I took over the Information Division.

Q: Right, that's when he left.

W? No, Harmon came in then. "Doodles" Harmon came in after Arnold, and I came after Harmon.

Q: Arnold came in just before the Billy Mitchell thing started to heat up, so it was either late 1924 or early 1925.

W: Arnold came in and he took over the Information Division, which had all the public relations in it; it had all the Intelligence from our attaches in it; it had publications.

Q: Congressional relations?

W: No, not exactly, maybe some of that, but not too much. But it was more Information Division and they had the pictorial outfit that Albright had, that ran for so many years. That was part of it. Anyway, he took it over. There was a Congressional investigation, I would say sometime, not immediately, but sometime after, I think it could have been possibly the Morrow Board or a follow-up after the Billy Mitchell trial, one or the other. Arnold went up and was very much interested in following the hearings. Now that, I think, he did on his own. He may have been sent up there, and that was peffectly logical that he would be sent up there to keep track of that and have the responsibility more or less for our relations with the committee. He came back and saw that there was a possibility --and we all saw there was a possibility-- of having a separate air force at the time, like the British had. So he sensed the fact that he might be able to get some support from the reserve officers of the Air Force. And he concocted a letter--and he had the addresses and sent it out--to each reserve Air Force officer, to promote the separate air force. General Patrick found out about it, and it came up before the Committee and was exposed. This letter was exposed, General Patrick issued a statement that this was without his knowledge or without his endorsement, and thathe was very much

embarrassed by it, and he was assigning Major Arnold to the smallest place that he could possibly find for him.

Q: Ft. Riley? Then Arnold was not sent out because of his role in the Billy Mitchell business?

W: They were associated.

Q: Herbert Dargue got sent out, too. Do you remember that? Both of them were sent out.

W: It wasn't. I don't remember. But Dargue was never in these things with the spirit that Arnold put in. Dargue always gave himself a way out and I never had, I don't remember Dargue being associated on this. I would say that he endorsed it and might do things, but never was a front man like Arnold.

Q: Well, Mrs. Arnold told us that Mason Patrick getting madeat Arnold, but she wasn't specific as to the reason as you are, but it was this letter.

W: Yes. Letter to the Reserves.

Q: Arnold was very strong for a separate air force at this time?

W: I think we all were. We had seen the operations of the British Air Force and we realized the possibilities. Arnold above all, would be one who would.

Q: Did you attend the Billy Mitchell court martial?

W: I was here, but I did not.

Q: Were you aware of the strategy sessions that went on, Congressman Reed was his attorney. They met in one of the hotels in town. Mrs. Arnold tells about some of the evening sessions. They were trying to get Billy Mitchell to be more responsive to questioning.

W: As I remember, during the Billy Mitchell trial, most of the

strategy was done at Billy Mitchell's house up there on S Street, and I think his mother was alive and living with him at the time.

Q: Did Arnold participate in those sessions?

W: I would think possibly he would.

Q: Who else was close to Mitchell?

W: Bill Sherman, Tommy Milling; Bissell, of course, definitely.

Q: I see Bissell's name quite a bit in the strategy sessions.

W: Would be, and he represented Billy Mitchell.

Q: Arnold had a reception for Billy Mitchell at the Racquet Club or the Army-Navy Club. Do you remember this? This probably infuriated some people in Washington.

W: No question about it. When Arnold was ordered to Riley, a number of us went out to see them and help in any way we could. They never forgot it, either Arnold or Mrs. Arnold. I remember Mrs. Arnold saying that the telephone would ring and somebody would say: "You know we are having a party, maybe a week from today and I'm sorry we are going to have to cancel the party because somebody is sick." It was just a subterfuge because the Arnolds were kind of ostracized by a number of the official people.

Q: So they probably were glad to get out of town. ..

W: Well, it wouldn't have come up except for this confrontation between Gen Patrick and Arnold on that letter.

Q: Were you aware of that particular confrontation? Was it known in the office? You were in the office at the time. You were the Engineering Officer, weren't you?

W: I had the Washington office of the Engineering Division.

Q: Did you attend Staff Meetings over which Mason Patrick presided?

W: From time to time.

Q: And Arnold was present at those sessions?

W: Oh yes. Heewas usually always there. He would be one of the satellites.

Q: Did Mason Patrick sock it to him for some of these things?

W: Just this one incident. He had a good deal of confidence in him.

Q: Did Mason Patrick throw an inkwell at him?

W: I never have heard of that with Mason Patrick that he threw anything at anybody. I've seen the toupee get up a couple of inches. That's about all. No, I don't remember about an inkwell. But Arnold is alleged to have thrown a book at somebody.

Q: This is later on.

W: Yes. Later on.

Q: Did Arnold take his medicine pretty bravely, or was he bitter? When he was told he's got to go, how did he react?

W: That was just another thing in his life.

Q: Did he feel that it was the end of his career in the Air Force? Did he talk to you about going to Riley?

W: No, he never talked to me, but I don't think so, when you look at the spirit. When he went out there, he went to a Cavalry post. He had a little bit of detachment at Marshall Field there. His job was to familiarize the cavalry officers with the air force. He got into the school, and got them instructed, and got them interested in riding in airplanes. He took them out on these various maneuvers. He would have these various officers out, and he got the confidence of the Cavalry without any question as to what they could do with an airplane. In addition,to that, he used to go around to all the small towns in Kansas

and Missouri, and in the area where he was, he'd land, right near a little bit of a town. Of course, an airplane in those days was quite an attraction, so the people from town would come out. He'd go in and look the town over--see the city fathers....

Q: He was very good at community relations?

W: Oh, wonderful that way, and he understood the people, and the interest of the people. I remember him telling one story that he landed on a farm or ranch. An old fellow came out to see him, and he said: "How old are you?" And the man said: "I'm 75." Arnold said: "My goodness, you get along pretty well for a fellow 75." The man said: "You ought to see my father, he's 95," and he said: "Grandaddy's still alive, too, he's 105." So he told this story very often, and that's very typical of the things that he would find when he went out.

Q: He loved to talk to people.

W: Maybe my figures are a little off on that, but that's about the sequence, the old fellow might have been 65 and 75, and then you'd get to 95, but anyway the top one was awfully close to 100.

Q: Were these people astonished to see an airplane land in a field?

W: Always.

Q: So he sort of acted as a missionary for the Air Corps?

W: No, it wasn't that. He just wanted to see. He wanted to know what it was all about. He didn't do it for the Air Corps. It was an interest to him. He was interested in the people and the country.

Q: Did you ever hear of an incident involving him and Lowell Thomas? They had to make a forced landing in a corn field or wheat field in Kansas during this period?

W: We had those things all the time, because the engines were not reliable. But I don't remember the incident with Lowell.

Q: In about 1926, Arnold was importuned by Juan Trippe. Pan Am was just getting off the ground. Arnold had several offers to go with the commercial airlines. Inasmuch as his career was limited at this time--I mean he was sent out to pasture--why didn't he accept one of these offers?

W: From my angle, as I remember it, Arnold had the Information Division. The fellow who had the German airlines--was it Lufthansa, I don't remember--was going around South America making deals for the rights to come into these countries for the German airline. They had projected the South Atlantic crossing. They weren't quite making it at that time, but Mamos (?) had made the flight from Dakar to Natal. Arnold got these reports from the Intelligence side about this German going around and making deals with these various countries, more or less on a monpolistic premise. When they went through Panama, which was a very critical point for us, Arnold picked it up from there. Then he started to get busy. There was a fellow named Montgomery, who was very closely associated with Arnold (in 1925-26). He was a civilian, and he was a boy who didn't have much substance to him. He was interested in aviation. He was a pilot. Nobody knew where his existence came from but he was around Arnold's office a great deal of the time, and around the AF headquarters.

Q: When was this, before he left for Riley? Was this in '25?

W: Yes, before he left for Riley. So Arnold got this boy, and he got him interested in the thing, and the first route that Juan Trippe came out with was Key West to Havana. So then Arnold got Montgomery working with Juan Trippe and Arnold was doing the engineering of the government side of it, and I think Monty then left Arnold and went in, and Arnold never got anything either out of the directing. He did the

prompting and did everything. Montgomery came on out and got certain rights of some kind, and he sold them to Trippe. Arnold never got anything at all out of that, nor would he have taken it. But Montgomery, who had no affiliation, no responsibility, was able to move in on it. Then Montgomery did that, and then he decided that this was pretty good gravy so he would go down and do another one, called the New York, Rio and Buenos Aires. He founded that line, NERBA, to go down there into South America. Finally, Trippe had to buy him out on that. But Arnold was the one who alerted the country that this was going on. He masterminded the thing insofar as helping Trippe was concerned, and he did it through Montgomery. That's as near as I can put the story together.

Q: Didn't they offer Major Arnold a Presidency or Vice Presidency of one of these airlines?

W: I don't know.

Q: But he decided against going in. In his book he tells about these offers, that he had, to go in with these various airlines. One wonders why he did not accept an offer because he was, if not in disgrace, then in exile.

W: I don't think he ever felt that way. That was just the circumstances.

Q: You said that Mason Patrick found him the smallest post in the Army?

W: That's right, I don't know that he said that or not, but...

Q: In effect that's what he did. When a fellow gets put out there....?

W: Arnold didn't take it too badly.

Q: He didn't feel this was the end of his career?

W: I don't think so.

Q: He didn't feel he was being punished?

W: No, he may have felt that he was being punished. But he wasn't going to desert at the time. He was going to stay and take it.

Q: He figured there would be better days.

W: He was going to stay and take it. That was his medicine he was going to take it. That would be the man.

Q: Well, you came in as information officer after Doodles Harmon. When was that, in the late '20s?

W: Let me see. I was at Leavenworth, '28-'29, I was at Langley '27-'28, so that would be summer of '26-'27.

Q: Then Doodles Harmon must have been there just a few months after Arnold?

W: A year about, and then he was assigned as Air Attache.

Q: Arnold left Washington around Feb 1926. So Harmon was there only about six months in the summer of 1926.

W: I came in when Harmon left for Europe.

Q: Maston Patrick was still there? He stayed till 1927. This is not generally known, but he was really the first Chief of the Air Corps, as such. He remained on for several months after we became the Air Corps. Many people say that Fechet was the first Chief of the Air Corps, but actually Mason Patrick was. Did you have any trouble with Mason Patrick?

W: Never a bit, and he was wonderful to me. Let me tell you, I learned a lot from General Patrick--a great deal--and particularly in the position I was in. We had the Engineering Division out there,

and I had the Washington office, and was responsible for the contact with Gen. Patrick. It gave me an insight into industry. I had previously been to the Engineering School, so I was technically quite well qualified at that time.

Q: But Mason Patrick didn't give you any trouble?

W: Not in the least. He was wonderful.

Q: Did you give him any trouble.

W: No, I remember one thing particularly that happened with Gen. Patrick. He, the Goodyear people were involved in building airships for us, and everything had been a postponement from this and a postponement from that. They were feeling their way; they didn't know exactly what they were doing. They had these contracts, and the contracts were definitely of a sum. In any one of these things, they had to come to us to get more money for the procreastination. Mr. Litchfield called in one day and Gen Patrick wasn't there.

Q: Who was he?

W: He was head of the Goodyear Company, and said he'd like to have acconference with Gen. Patrick. So I went up front. I don't think I saw Gen. Patrick that time. He was away, and I told Mr. Litchfield that we tentatively set it up for this, but Gen Patrick had to approve it when he got back. Mr. Litchfield asked that we bring in McGill, who was a Chief Engineer at Dayton at that time. So we brought in McGill and maybe one other person, Mr. Litchfield came in with about 15 or 20 engineers and designers, and we all paraded into Gen Patrick's office. Mr. Litchfield had seen Gen Patrick just casually, so he knew him. He made this proposal and a presentation and he put the things up with all the drawings on to illustrate what they talked about. Gen Patrick

just asked Mr. Litchfield two questions: "Mr. Litchfield, how much is this going to delay?" and Mr. Litchfield said: "Well, we don't know but it will probably be at least a year; it could be two years." Gen Patrick said: "I'm sorry, sir, we will not be able to do it." Mr. Litchfield stayed and talked to Gen Patrick afterwards. We all went out, but the decision was made quickly, right then and there. Mr. Litchfield came down to the office later, and said: "You know, I have never been more beautifully handled. I didn't realize we had people in government who were of that kind, and who are as smart as General Patrick." Gen Patrick was a very smart man.

Q: That's interesting to me. But I wonder if there was any bitterness among Air Corps people because of Mason Patrick's role in the Billy Mitchell and Arnold situation. Did they accept this, that Mitchell was exiled to San Antonio, Arnold was sent out to Riley?

W: There was no free thinking in those days. You just went down the line. You loved to go down the line because you knew you were being damned well directed, and the fellow who got the top usually got there by having the ability.

Q: Well, you were directed, but you didn't have to feel good about it?

W: Well, that's very true, but in those days, if you missteped, and if it was taken as a misstep--as in this case of Arnold--you figured that there was something, if it went wrong. If it came out nicely, why you would get a nice big plum out of it. When I say a plum, that was the feeling of other people.

Q: Benny Foulois had come back from Berlin in '24 or '25, he was Air Attache there, and he put in a bid for Billy Mitchell's job as Asst Chief.

W: Everybody put in a bid for Billy Mitchell's job in those days. Billy Mitchell told us it was going to be Fechet.

Q: Fechet for the next Chief? Or Assistant Chief?

W: No, Fechet was coming in to take his place.

Q: When Fechet got the job, Foulois got his job. Foulois put in for that job in '25, I believe. Did you know about that?

W: No, but I would think that probably he did. I knew them all very well. They knew me. I was an Army boy, and they had known the family all the time which gave me quite a confidence with them.

Q: Didn't people like Andrews and Spaatz--some of the strong air adherents--feel somewhat bitter about the way Mitchell and Arnold were treated?

W: No, I wouldn't say there was any bitterness, just a lost cause.

Q: You just drop it and keep going?

W: And, eventually, maybe you will make it.

Q: Let's move on, you went to Leavenworth in '28 or '29?

W: 1928.

Q: Arnold was at Leavenworth at that time.

W: I think so, he was in my class, I think.

Q: He was in your class. Do you remember anything about him during that period?

W: No, he was like all the rest of us, we were students.

Q: I believe Gen Edward King was the Commandant, was he not?

W: Yes, Eddy King was the Commandant.

Q: And there is some correspondence between Arnold and King that I have seen. King liked Arnold, apparently.

W: He was a most likeable fellow, without any question. It wasn't altogether likeness, it was a tremendous admiration, don't

forget that, for a great man.

Q: Arnold went to Dayton in '29, I guess it was the embryo of the Air Service Command, Fairfield, Ohio. Did he hope to get another job?

W: We moved over from McCook Field to Wright Field. It was later Wright-Patterson. We started moving about '25 or '26. As I remember Arnold, I don't remember who had the division at the time, maybe Arnold had it himself.

Q: This was in '29? What period are you talking about?

W: '28 or '29.

Q: You graduated from Leavenworth in June '29. Arnold graduated at the same time. Then he went to Fairfield, and I believe you went abroad. He was in Fairfield in the Service Command, and Jan Howard was his brother-in-law, in Engineering. They both were under Conger Pratt, who was the Commanding General.

W: I think Arnold, I remember, under Conger Pratt, and I remember Jan Howard. Arnold, I believe, was the Exec Officer for Pratt.

Q: A little bit of friction between Arnold and Howard for several reasons.

W: Jan is a lovable guy, and I thought the world of him, and he was very good to me. I had a tremendous respect for his ability--a man of great ability. I'm sure that the both of them bent over backwards to keep their personalities out of it. But in those days of engineering and supplying and all the other things, and the backbone of the service was to get something to work with, I'm sure there would be a question of disagreement many times.

Q: I've been told that one of the reasons for their disagreement,

or friction was that Jan Howard had a lot to do, an important job. Arnold didn't have enough to do during this period. His job, as described to me, was to see that the cards were parked at 30 degree angles and keep the fireplugs painted red. Of course, it is an exaggeration, but basically he didn't have enough to do, and Jan Howard had a more important job, although lower in the hierarchy.

W: Let me put it this way. Howard had the technical side of it, and that's what Dayton was, and he knew it. Howard had been to the Engineering School--one of the first classes there. I think he was a class ahead of me, and Arnold did not have the technical background. Then Howard went to MIT and studied under Warner up there, so he had the background which Arnold didn't have for the technical decisions. I would say, generally speaking, that Howard, being a very ambitious fellow, and wanting to be always the king, and he had all these guys under him with the knowledge, it would be pretty hard for Arnold to not get in. But Arnold had the practical side that Howard didn't have. Arnold knew from his experience in the field, the Forest Fire patrol, and all the things that he was involved in, he had a great experience of Operations, and Howard did not. Howard had the engineering. So you have your engineering for your operations, and Howard never recognized that.

Q: All these things probably contributed to some friction between them.

W: Naturally.

Q: Were you aware of this? Of course you weren't there?

W: I was there later, 1931.

Q: Was Arnold still there?

W: I think Arnold was still there.

Q: Arnold left late in '31.

W: Very quickly after, somewhat soon after.

Q: But you saw some of the friction that went on between the two of them?

W: I had thought that in those instances there would always be disagreement, because Howard never got along with anybody. As I say, I loved old Jan and I knew him so well, and I remember one time I went into his office and he said: "Is Donald Douglas out there?" And I said: "Yes." And he said, "Well, I've kept him cooling his heels now for about two hours. Guess you better bring him in."

Q: You know, he was brought in under Frank Andrews, Frank Andrews was G-3 for a brief period under Marshall. This is 1940, Jan Howard worked for him and got into trouble there, in the General Staff and they had to push him out of there.

W: Yes.

Q: Now, you came into Wright Field in July 1931.

W: And left in 1933.

Q: So from July until about October, you and Arnold were stationed at the same place.

W: Yes, and he was a very close friend of mine, I admired Arnold tremendously.

Q: Did he have aspirations to go to the Training Command down in San Antonio after that Wright Field tour?

W: I don't think Arnold ever had aspirations. He was a guy that just went along and took it, and did a beautiful job. But anything he got, he made it. He picked the thing up and put it on its feet. You could have made a statue out of it. It didn't make any difference where he went, he was going right on in. Another thing, I think it

was when he was in Riley that he wrote those boys books, didn't he?

Q: Yes. He also finished writing them when he was at Wright Field. This is possibly because he didn't have enough to do there.

W: Let me tell you, there was always enough for him to do, he found it if it wasn't there. He knew how to do it.

Q: Did you have any knowledge that he and St. Clair Streett were working on a patent for a toy airplane? They were trying to peddle that?

W: Yes, I don't remember what it was. But I remember it being there.

Q: They were trying to raise some money so they could sell it. Were you in on that? Did he ask you to contribute to that?

W: No.

Q: It never panned out.

W: Well, Moseley picked it up out on the West Coast, put a motor on the thing and there it went. It would have been the same idea.

Q: C. C. Moseley?

W: Yes.

Q: Let me ask you one more question about that Wright Field tour. Do you know anything about Arnold's relations with Frank Lahm?

W: Well, I would think that both of them were--had feelings of admiration for the other. I wouldn't think that there would be. I know Frank Lahm, of course, was ahead of Arnold in rank, and he was one of the early flyers, almost the first flyer out there at Ft. Myer, before College Park. I would guess there was a respect, one for the other, between Arnold and Lahm.

Q: Was there any friendship between them?

W: Yes, not a deep friendship that I ever saw, but there could be.

Q: Middle '30s.

W: Let's go up, I think I came back in '36 from Panama. Westover was the Chief; Arnold was Asst Chief.

Q: Did you have any contact with him in the late '30s?

W: Yes, let's pick this up about '38.

Q: Westover died on Sep 21, 1938.

W: That's where I want to come in. Westover was out on a flight on the West Coast. Arnold was the Asst Chief at the time. Westover and--I've forgotten the name of the sergeant who was always with him--were killed in an airplane around Los Angeles. Arnold as Asst Chief moved in, I'm sure, as Acting Chief. We had quite a turnover in the picture in the office, because Westover was more of an administration and not an operator. Arnold was an operator, and the whole tempo of the show changed just about that time. The guys that were active in the Air Force, and not paperwork fellows, particularly, I refer to a fellow named Hobley who was a financial man, and right next to Westover all the time. Many decisions that Westover made were basically Hobley decisions. Hobley was a fellow who got his wings but never flew, and he was not sympathetic to people who were operators at all.

Q: Probably not sympathetic to the B-17 either?

W: No, and he knew nothing about that. He would go up to Congress. Anyway, Arnold came in, and soon after that, we had the invasion of Poland.

Q: Well, that was nearly a year later.

W: Well, the office had just changed about that time. We had come along; we had all been with Westover, for whom I had a tremendous feeling, and he was very good to me, too. But Arnold got Spaatz and

and Eaker, and he got a couple of other fellows and he formed a committee. Let's see what we do right now. Here is the Polish situation, and we've seen what the Germans are up to.

Q: Did they have some kind of board, the Kilner Board?

W: No, this wasn't the Kilner Board; Spaatz was the head of it. Anyway, I remember, this fellow Hobley came back after the Westover accident. He was out there with Westover. He went on a train, of course. He came flying back, but by the time he had got back, this committee had been organized. Hobley was quite sensitive to his old position of practically influencing everything and being made a part of everything because of Westover's confidence in him. He kind of sensed around a little bit and saw what was going on--that these fellows were in there doing this--and they were working up plans for expansion of the Air Force, and he wasn't innit. He picked up some little quirks, and went into them and said: "Well, you can't do this, and you can't do that, and this is all wrong." So Spaatz just grabbed him by the back of the neck and they waltzed over to Arnold's office. There was no question about where Arnold stood because he knew the situation. After that, Hobley was told to stay out there. It was none of his business. That in a way, ties into the fact that Arnold was going to the Congress to get our appropriations, and at that particular time the House had acted on the next year's appropriations, and the Army had held us down to a few airplanes--I think less than 100.

Q: You are talking about the big planes?

W: Any planes, the whole thing was that we were really pinched because they said we had enough airplanes.

Q: Didn't they have a program of 2,320 planes, this was the total?

W: As I remember, something like that. And so this thing came along and to meet that objective, the Army said we only needed about 100 airplanes and, of course, our attrition was much greater. They said that was all that we could have. The War Dept set it up, and we weren't able to get any more at all from the Congress. Then the invasion of Poland came and the appropriations bill moved over to the Senate and Cabot Lodge came down to see Arnold, as I remember, and had a long talk with him, and said: "My God, this thing has to be corrected. We couldn't have a situation of this kind." Here was the Republican, Cabot Lodge was the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the Senate, or the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.

Q: He must have been minority leader. He couldn't have been Chairman, because this was all Democratic leadership in those years.

W: This was all Roosevelt. You're right.

Q: So, he probably was the Republican leader in the Senate.

W: Well, there is some explanation in there, and I don't know what it is. Anyway, Cabot Lodge is the one who came down to Arnold and said the Committee could not be under a situation of where all these world things were happening. The Air Force was being pushed down further, and it was a great weapon that would be coming into existence in any future military operations. So he told Arnold: "My goodness, We;ve got to correct this in the Senate immediately, with appropriations." So he asked Arnold: " How many airplanes and how much money can you possibly use?" Arnold said: "I have no facilities. Everything is done on a piecemeal basis." He said: "I've got into a great big expansion." Lodge told him to get as much as he could together, and come on up and that's where Spaatz and probably Eaker who were on this

committee. They were called to come on in after Cabot Lodge had seen Arnold and told him he had to have a big air program. Arnold has often told the story. He said: "I just didn't know what to tell him. We've got the figures and everything." Arnold said the Committee told him any amount of money that you can take, we will give you. So they changed the whole appropriation around when it went into the Senate.

Q: Well, I've heard variations of several stories. Was this before Roosevelt made his famous, 50,000 plane speech? He made that on May 16, 1940. After that Arnold could have anything he wanted. This must have been before that, I think.

W: I'll give you another way you may be able to trace it. When Arnold was in there and it was right after the Polish invasion, the British were over here to get airplanes from us. They were working with Morgenthau. Arnold, of course, was not for having anybody without knowledge, or some knowledge, taking over the thing and just putting out airplanes by numbers to satisfy a public issue, you might say. Rather he wanted them of quality and usefulness, and we had by the first war, or by that Howard Coffin statement, always been 50,000 over the front by the 1st of January, something like that. Here was another thing coming along. So Arnold had this fight with Morgenthau, and then Mr. Roosevelt called him and said he didn't have an island small enough for him in the Pacific to put him on.

Q: Were you in on that? Were you close to that situation? Where were you at this time?

W: I was in the Munitions Building. I was the first Chief of Reserve Affairs that they ever had, as a designated separate show. Westover showed me the testimony in the Congress, where he said that

I was coming back from Panama and that he was going to assign me to this job, I had that from '35 to about '38, I would guess. Then I went to the Industrial College, and then I went to the War College, and then I went to the GHQ AF.

Q: When did you get into the GHQ AF?

W: I think 1940.

Q: Let me ask you about Arnold and Morgenthau. This is a very interesting chapter. Do you remember?

W: I can only give you more or less, but I would like to know myself. But I don't know any of the background, except that Arnold told me that the statement that Roosevelt made to him.

Q: This is probably correct, but this resulted, I believe, from a situation that developed between him and Morgenthau in 1939, over the crash of a test plane, one of the Douglas test planes in the Douglas parking lot. It became an issue before the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

W: I don't know any more. There was another situation. That was between Emmons and Brett and Arnold, and nobody knew who was going to be Chief of Air Force. I think in some way Brett was named Chief of the Air Corps.

Q: Brett was named Chief of Air Corps when Arnold moved up to be Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Q: Anyway, Arnold had the organization in his hands, and Brett was given a little bit of an office up on the top floor of Munitions Building, and he was the Chief of Air Force to carry out the things that the Chief had to do by law.

Q: And then Emmons was Chief GHQ AF. Now, Emmons got his third star before Arnold got his third star, and this caused some friction between them.

W: There was friction anyway, because Emmons was awfully ambitious and he wanted the top job.

Q: Why didn't he get it?

W: He didn't have the ability Arnold had.

Q: Well, Arnold was close to Marshall. Was this a factor?

W: Well, Brett was supposed to be the closest one to Marshall. They were both VNI. That was always understood.

Q: Was Brett a rival for Arnold's job?

W: I think so.

Q: Did Arnold ever tell you about his concern? Did he ever mention it?

W: Just gossip in the building.

Q: It was known that Arnold had two competitors for this job?

W: There were many more than two competitors, but these were two on the scene. They had all kinds of guys that wanted bigger jobs.

Q: Did you ever hear of Arnold sending out of town his competitors?

W: No. He didn't have anything to do with Emmons going to Hawaii or any of the other things. I was in GHQ AF at the time. When Pearl Harbor came, Arnold was up on Mt. Whitney somewhere; Emmons was up politicking in Connecticut and we couldn't reach him to tell him what happened, and he was somewhat isolated. A fellow named Clint Russell, who was Chief of Staff of the GHQ AF, ran the whole show in the first few days there, Spaatz ran it for Arnold.

Q: Arnold was out quail shooting with Donald Douglas near Sacramento when Pearl Harbor occurred. They had to call him in. Spaatz ran the show for him. You were in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor?

W: I was at GHQ AF at Bolling. (NOTE: Air Force Combat Command) We had moved up to Bolling. I was the Staff OD of the GHQ AF that

Sunday afternoon when they hit Pearl Harbor. Vic Stromme (Strahm?) was the Operations Officer. We went on with everything. We were up to our necks. We were sending people out. We were briefing them. We were giving them maps. We were finding out about this to-do. Larry Norstad was with me at the time.

Q: He worked for you?

W: Yes, he was Deputy, and I had the Intelligence out there. We had all the maps and all the information we gave people. We kept as alert as we could on that, with the missions that were going out of which there were a tremendous number. Larry Norstad had come down. The family came out, and we walked up to the Officer s Mess at Bolling, and had Sunday dinner. Then I walked on down and the family went on home, and I had to get the reports on the B-17s that were going to Hawaii.

Q: Right, Arnold had just seen them off the night before, it was either Hamilton or Mather.

W: Hamilton.

Q: He saw them off, and then he went quail shooting the next day.

W: Anyway, that was the thing I was to do, to get the reports as quickly as possible. I was waiting, and it was getting pretty near that time, and Larry Norstad called me on the phone and he said: "I just heard a funny thing over the radio." He said: "Pearl Harbor has been bombed." And I said: "Larry, it must be another one of those Orson Welles' things." He said: "It could be." But then he said the radio just said now that the President, the White House is going to make an announcement." So he called me a little later, said that the White House said it was a fact that Pearl Harbor had been bombed.

So I said: "Larry get your uniform on, and come on down." He said: "I haven't got a guarded phone here," and he said, "Let's go up to Scanlon's office. He's got one up there. It comes over here (to Bolling) direct." So he went up there, and the door was locked. In the tension of the excitement, he couldn't think in those days too much, and he couldn't get the guard to unlock the phone up there. He came on down and got on his own phone and said: "Hell, I'll give it to you over the open phone." He said: "Put RAINBOW FIVE in." We had to call up Selfridge, we had to call the West Coast and all the others, and gave them instruction to put in the RAINBOW FIVE plan. That's been often publicized, and I don't think, really, described what the RAINBOW FIVE plan was. It was to move that defense that was on the West Coast.

Q: The RAINBOW FIVE basic strategy was that we go offensive in Europe and hold in the Pacific, was it not?

W: Protect the aircraft factories on the West Coast.

Q: Yes. That was part of RAINBOW FIVE.

W: I don't remember the European side at all. Itthought that was completely a commitment to the West Coast for defense.

Q: Well, in RAINBOW FIVE, that was part of it for defense. But in offense, they talked about building up an AEF and going into Europe in 1943. I want to ask you about RAINBOW FIVE. Do you remember what happened 3 days before Pearl Harbor. The Chicago Tribune published the whole segment of RAINBOW FIVE.

W: It's been referred to any number of times. That I didn't know. But I guess-eevery year or so I read something about RAINBOW FIVE.

Q: Do you remember the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald published big segments of it, with the headline: "Roosevelt

Is Taking Us To War."?

W: No, I didn't know. I don't remember that at all.

Q: And there was a big investigation.

W: I was too busy at that time.

Q: Well, you see the investigation of RAINBOW FIVE leak was sort of overtaken a couple of days later by Pearl Harbor and this is why a lot of people have forgotten this. But somebody had turned over to the Chicago Tribune a copy of RAINBOW FIVE, and they published it. You don't remember anything about that?

W: No, I don't remember anything until 10 or 15 years ago, reading about RAINBOW FIVE. It was a great tribute to our Air Force. I well remember that we got word to the 1st Group out at Selfridge probably about 2:00 that afternoon. By midnight that night they were going through Cheyenne on their way to protect the Boeing Company. The rest of them were doing the same, but they were fastest out there, that 1st Group out of Selfridge.

Q: Arnold has been accused by a newsman of leaking RAINBOW FIVE to the Chicago Tribune.

NOTE: Gen Walsh wouldn't or couldn't comment on that statement. He laughed, but would not say anything.

Q: Now, you took over from Scanlon as Chief of Intelligence?

W: Yes, that would be about February 1942.

Q: You probably had a lot to do with Arnold in those days. He was wanting all kinds of intelligence reports, no doubt? Wasn't he?

W: Yes. We had a bank in the office.

W: After they busted up the GHQ AF, and it was not an air force scheme to break it up at all. It was an Army scheme, because Gen McNair was then ordered to take command of the Continental Defense.

And here was Emmons, Chief Air Force Combat Command with the Air side over here. The Army didn't want the two of them, so they busted up Emmons and sent him to Hawaii. Gen McNair took us over for a while in the GHQ AF, and then we were gradually disbanded, and then I came over, I would guess, probably about Jan or Feb of 1942, to the Munitions Building. I took Scanlon's place when he went to Australia.

Q: Do you remember anything in your relationship with Arnold when you were A-2?

W: Yes, I remember a good many things. One of them, I think probably, we were having trouble going through Brazil and one of the stipulations, because Brazil was neutral, was that our men would be in civilian clothes and no arms would be carried. That didn't bother our men a bit. They went down there, and they carried arms and were very brazen about it. The Brazilians were quite alarmed, because they had a large...

Q: You mean American forces?

W: Yes.

Q: Army or Marines?

W: No, they were AAF, taking airplanes to Europe.

Q: Down through the southern route?

W: Also to China and Cairo and everywhere. That was the only line open except the northern line.

Q: Right, but that wasn't good in the wintertime?

W: No, it wasn't good in the wintertime and it was much longer because we could go from Natal I think to Fisherman's Lake in Liberia, on the southern way, and just barely make it with extra fuel.

Q: Anyway, you were telling about your relations with Arnold at that time, and the trouble with Brazil.

W: So Bob Olds (heading the Air Corps Ferry Command) went down there. We commandeered a plane from the United Airlines, and went ondown in one of those Stratocruisers, which was the latest passenger plane. And he couldn't get to first base down there with Brazil. Nobody would talk to him. We were trying to get an agreement to let us go through. So finally he wired back and said he'd like to bring General Gomez up here. He was the only man who would talk to him.

Q: He was head of the Brazilian Air Force?

W: No, he was the head of Air Routes & Air Lines, and he was also commander of the 2nd Region, which was the Natal region. Gomez came up and Bob said thathe said he'd help us if we would give them the means to protect themselves. Bob said Gomez wanted so many B-25s, and so many fighter airplanes lined up at Bolling Field for General Gomez to see, and that those were the ones we would be committed to give him if he would give us free passage through Brazil. Well, Gomez came up and we had a ceremony in February. It was cold as the devil at Bolling. We showed him all the airplanes and took him down the line to review them. We had him set up at the Shoreham and then he came over to talk to Gen Arnold several times, and then Eisenhower was then, I think, a Colonel, or was just made a General and was OPD for General Marshall. We went in and talked to Gen Eisenhower and then Eisenhower told Gen. Gomez: "You are going to see Gen. Marshall this afternoon, and he wants you to talk up to him. You tell him anything that's on your mind. We all want you to do this." That gave Gomez confidence, and he went on in there. I was sent down in the meantime, to go down and try to work out something with the Brazilians as an agreement, and I was still A-2.

Q: yYou were terribly interested in getting these bases because the northern route was closed off in winter.

W: The northern route was a problem to us.

Q: Well, it was wintertime.

W: Well, we got people through in the winter sometimes.

Q: Yes, but you couldn't get as many planes as you wanted to?

W: It wasn't as operational.

Q: And wasn't there also a crisis in the Middle East at this time?

W: Yes, we had Rommel in North Africa. This was before El Alamein. Jefferson Caffery was the Ambassador down in Rio. I had known Mrs. Caffery before, so that helped to pave the way, and Col Barber and I went down there and Barber was the representative from OPD, so he was in charge of the negotiations, and I went down merely as the AAF advisor. We worked up one scheme, and we met with a few Brazilians. I don't think that there was the spirit or the understanding of the State Dept of what they had to do to help us. Anyway, we worked out some sort of agreement. In the meantime, Gen. Gomez came back from his trip up there and Leigh Wade and a fellow named Champion flew him down to Mexico and through Panama all the way. That took much longer than Barber and I going direct. And when Gen Gomez got there, he came over and asked us how far along we were. We told him and showed him what we had, translated into Portuguese for him. We had it as a tentative agreement, and he said: "Oh, that's not worth anything." He said: "You don't say anything." And we said: "We would like to say something, but we don't dare." So Gomez said: "Say what you want." So we did. We put it in, and rigged up these various commissions we had between us--one down there and one up here. This

gave a certain amount of leeway for us to fly through. He took it, looked it over, and took it and went over and got Vargas, the President, to sign it. So the thing was all done right there, and done by Gomez. And never, never have we appreciated what that man did for us, and I would say this: he saved us many lives in the war, and he saved us a good deal of time in the war.

Q: Arnold was greatly interested in Brazil?

W: I'm coming to that. This Gomez, plus the general knowledge he had, and his love of South America.

Q: How about the Navy at this time? Were they cooperative? Admiral Ingram down there?

W: Yes, perfect. I put myself under him, and it worked very nicely. We just worked right together, and there was never any question.

Q: Let me ask you, that was one important mission when you were A-2. Do you remember any other jobs you did for Arnold when you were A-2, any special things that came up?

W: No, we just had the normal thing, staying close to the message center, reading cables, and the things that came through, plotting them. Most of the contacts of that kind were done by sections in the office. They would go in and brief Arnold and brief me, too, very often.

Q: There wasn't much combat going on, because we didn't have any forces overseas.

W: No.

W: Back on South America, we finally got the agreement signed, and in effect, which is the founding of the Joint Brazil and US Defense Commission here, and the Joint Brazil-US Military Commission in Rio. Anyway, I came back from this, and I thought I was slated to go with

Spaatz to Europe, as part of his contingent.

Q: Part of the 8th AF?

W: I guess it was. And I met Arnold in the hall, and he said: "Bob, you're going back to Brazil." I said: "Oh no, you can't do that to me!" Arnold said: "Yes. Your're going back to Brazil. You are going back and take over the job of organizing the situation down there." I would meet Arnold and just looked at him out of the corner of my eye. My heart was broken and all the rest of it. And finally, one day, the buzzer rang, and he said: "Come on in here. I'm tired of all this business." He was standing up, and he said: "Come on over here." We went over to the radiator, and he looked out the window and put his arm around me, and he says: "You know, you are going to thank me for this someday." I said: "You make me think, and I understand." So that's when I went down, and took over the South Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command. That extended from Miami to the shores of Africa, 7,000 miles. Believe me, it wasn't easy in those days to make it. I tried to make it twice a month. Sometimes I wouldn't even make it once a month, but I tried to get over the route all the time to see how the thing was working. Then, finally, we got so big, and we got so much going on, and we were clearing about 100 airplanes a night across the South Atlantic--and that in itself was quite a job--and we had two bases there, and we had then feeding in. So the first thing they did was to cut off the part from Miami to Puerto Rico. I was very happy to get rid of that, it was up on the other end and they could run it much easier. Then they cuttoff the part from Puerto Rico to the Brazilian border. Maybe it was only to British Guiana, and then the next time they cut off to Brazilian border. But each

time, we were building up. I needed the attention down there, and I wasn't a bit against it. I wanted to get some load off my shoulders. Then the Miami Command came in and took over gradually, to the Brazilian border. But that was the way that it was. It was a boot-strp job for us to pull the thing up. We had one airplane that was assigned, and I would ride in it once in a while, but the rest of the time I was coming up here to get supplies, bringing people down, radio operators, code operators, everything of the kind--critical, mechanical personnel. This one airplane did a beautiful job, and then, we finally got some help and we got the Air Transport Command on the regular run. Eastern Airlines took a contract and we gave them C-46s and then ran them alone so then they supplied us from there on. That was a year and a half after they got down there.

Q: Tell me about Pan Am. Pan Am had the contract to build a lot of these bases.

W: The ADP--Airport Development Program, and it was a subterfuge to let us get into South America and build airports that we might be able to use. It was definitely oriented toward this route to Africa that was going to be, maybe, our main line, and to do that you had to do other things. So we built an airport at Bahia in Brazil which we would never use. The Navy used it for some reason, and that was another thing. Those airports down there were joint Army and Navy airports with the Navy having responsibility for submarines patrol.

Q: Did you have some trouble with Pan Am?

W: I never had any trouble with Pan Am? I don't remember the name of the man. H was a Colonel in the U.S. Army Engineers. This

fellow was the contact man with the ADP people. The Engineers were responsible for those bases. This fellow would come through the line. I never got to know him too well, I never knew particularly what he was doing. I would always ask him for this, or ask him for that or something. He came through without any question. Finally, the thing got to a critical point. Maybe, I brought the point up, but anyway, it was a critical point. I wanted to know a little bit more about the thing. They said they were going to send an inspector down on it. They sent a fellow named Fred Strong. A very fine man, and a West Point graduate. This fellow got out of the service after the first war, and went with some company in Detroit. A very successful businessman and they brought him back, so they sent him down to make this inspection.

Q: The Army sent Viney down?

W: Yes, very fine man. He did a beautiful job. I came up somewhere in the intermediate period, after Fred Strong had made this trip. I went in to see Arnold. Arnold had sent forme to come up on some other matter, and I told him I would like to get some equipment down there, that I had been trying to get Panama to loosen up with all the equipment that they had shucked away in the woods in Trinidad. It was just exactly the stuff that I needed to build up these airfields and improve them. I talked to Arnold and he said, well, go over and talk to Gen. Reybold, who was the Chief of Army Engineers at that time. He said he was just through constructing pretty much these airfields in the Southeast. He had this job down there to Bragdon's job, because Bragdon was the engineer of the Southeast. He had finer equipment than Panama had so I was made. We never had any trouble with our engineering and ground facilities. That was the end. The ADP faded into the Corps of Engineers' responsibility for the airports.

Q: And then Pan Am faded out of the picture and the Corps of Engineers took over?

W: Faded out of the picture.

Q: There was an IG report by Ted Hill. Do you remember that report?

W: I don't remember Ted Hill coming down.

Q: This might have been before your time. It might have been in '41, before the war. This was a report which was rather critical of Pan Am.

W: All the reports were critical of Pan Am; all of them were.

Q: Why?

W: As an example, I was in Belem one night--this was during the time of the bootstrap. The hotel manager came in about 10:30 or 11 P.M. and woke me up and said that he was having trouble with the ADP workers. They had a room up on the top floor, and they had quite a party. Then they were throwing chairs out the window at the Brazilians, as they walked by.

Q: These workers were from the US?

W: Yes, so I went up, and I couldn't do anything. Then I went on out to the field. There were some airplanes going through, and I got some crew chiefs and some other fellows, and explained to them what it was about. We got two or three trucks and went on in and went on up. One fellow said: "Are you going peacefully with us?" The reply: "You don't have anything to do with us. We are completely independent of you. We are not Army people. We don't have anything to do with you." I said: "I would like to warn you that this is a war zone, therefore you come under military dictates." I said: "Are you coming or not?" And they said: "No, we're not coming." And I said: "Sergeant, go over and take this guy." They went over, and these guys were drunk,

you see. They just socked them, and pretty soon, we loaded up about six or eight of them, in one of the trucks. We hite them pretty hard that night. We took them out to the base and put a guard on them. The next day, I wried Arnold that I was sending them back, one apiece per airplane, to the States, and told him what had happened. Then I didn't think anything about it. From then on, we had no trouble with the rest of our ADP people. They knew they were under military authority. They had done some terrible things. Anyway, these fellows were met when they got to Miami, the police, something like that. They were told to go home and report to their draft board. Word was sent out to draft them immediately. It must have been a year or two later that I ran into one of them, and he said: "You certainly put us in our place. We went back and we tried to get the unions, and the unions tried to do all they could. But the evidence was against us," and he said: "We had relied on the fact that the union could pull us out."

Q: Let me ask you about Pan Am management? Did they doa a good job?

W: No, I don't think you could do a good job in a thing of that kind. You had to feel your way into it, a little bit here, and little bit there. Remember, we were incognito in there, and we weren't recognized at that time. Now, after this agreement was made, we were.

Q: There were three Axis airlines that were flying into the Latin American countries -- SCADTA, LATI and TACA.

W: Yes. LATI was Italian and TACA was Colombian--that was the German airline in Colombia.

Q: Was Arnold worried about Axis agents infiltrating into that area? Didn't he want to get rid of them?

W: I got a letter from him saying that the intelligence forces had decided that they were going to send people into Brazil, and he wanted me to know about it, and that the agents would be coming down there.

Q: This is after you had taken over?

W: Yes, when I was down there. I went down in June of 1942. You might as well figure this was about October or November. These agents were coming down there, and that they tried to stop it, but he wasn't able to stop it. He wanted me warned on it. So I wired back that I understood, but could I tell General Gomez, and he wired back: "By all means." So I told Gomez, and I was quite embarrassed that I had to tell him this thing. And I said:that our people had decided to do it, and I wouldn't know of the agents. And it was all subterfuge, but I would have a little bit of control in guiding them, somehow. General Gomez looked up at me, and he said: "Why shouldn't you have yours? The British have theirs; the French have theirs; the Germans have theirs; the Italians have theirs;" He said: "We are just filled with secret agents."

Q: Was there a ny truth in the fact that Pan Am had an interest in these Axis airlines?

W: I don't know. I wouldn't think so, no.

Q: You never saw Ted Hill's report on Pan Am, did you?

W: No, but I knew Ted Hill very well. He relieved me in Russia.

Q: You saw him later on in the FRANTIC operation.

W: He wasn't in the FRANTIC operation. It was afterwards.

Q: Okay, you are down in Brazil. Why was Arnold so interested in Brazil?

W: Arnold was interested in all of Latin America. It was a part of the makeup of the man. It was pioneering, and he loved it.

Q: Did he feel that Brazil could be a counter balance to Peron of Argentina?

W: I don't think he ever gave it any thought. He was mainly interested in the vastness, and the possibilities of improving in the development, and things of that kind. That's the way his mind worked. Arnold was not a selfish man, but he loved to direct. Here was pioneering. He was interested in it even from his days in Alaska.

Q: When you were down there, the Brazilians indicated an interest in getting into the war?

W: No, what actually happened was that we got word that there were some submarines off the coast. We had asked for protection from the Brazilians and it came back to this agreement that we had. They were sending some regiments up to the northeast and they had the families and the soldiers, and everything on these transports coming up. The only communication we had other than that was the sea. They were coming up to guard our coastline. I found out later that there was an Italian submarine, probably under German command, that made the attacks on these troop ships, and sunk them. That's what put Brazil in the war.

Q: They came in '42 sometime; they declared war?

W: August 1942.

Q: And then the Brazilians were interested in getting an air squadron or two trained.

W: That was part of this Gomez thing that I told you about, where we had the planes up at Bolling and all lined up for Gomez to see. We already had a mission down there long before that. So when they got these airplanes, then we sent the people down to train them.

Q: Was there another motive on Arnold's part to try to get rid of WW II airplanes?

W: No.

Q: Unload the surplus? He got a letter from George Kenney who warned him about what happened in WW I. We had to use up all these DHs before we could get any more money for planes.

Q: After 1943 they weren't scarce anymore, they were running out of our ears?

W: No, we were still right up to....

Q: Anyway, the kind of planes that the Brazilians were getting, there were plenty of them. They were getting second line planes, weren't they?

W: Those they got were the best airplanes we had--B-25s and I've forgotten the rest.

Q: But toward the end of the war they were sort of getting lesser...

W: Toward the end of the war, but we didn't sluff on them, as a matter of fact. Some of us wanted to give them B-17s, but we didn't know whether they could handle them or not. They got them eventually, but that was after the war.

Q: Did Arnold foresee a postwar alliance between Brazil and the U.S? Brazil could be the strongest country in South America, sort of a bellwether. Did he look at that?

W: I don't think Arnold ever thought about those things, or ever gave a damn about them. He was far more of a practical person. He wasn't a schemer at all, he was a doer.

Q: Well, he had a couple of guys doing his thinking for me, as he put it--his Advisory Council, Norstad and Cabell and...

W: That was at the start of the war.

Q: Well, he had these guys going, but then Jake Smart came in, and Rosie O'Donnell came in after him. He always had these men who were sort of "thinker" types.

W: In the '42 period, he realized that he had nothing but a bunch of old flyers, and old pilots--a good many of them, WW I people. We had this younger generation coming on, far more technical, and far more a lert to the things you had to operate. He told Miff Harmon, who then had come in to be Chief of Staff, to look around to see if he couldn't get a couple of young fellows to use. Where he had a problem, he could just throw it at them, and he could get their side of it that way. Miff said he had tentatively selected Cabell, and he said to me: "Do you know anybody to suggest?" And I said: "Why the hell don't you get Larry Norstad? He's right over at Bolling Field."

Q: He was working for you?

q W: Not then, I'd moved in, and he was on what was left of the Emmons show over at Bolling. So he said: "Sure, that's a good idea," so that's how the two original ones were Cabell and Norstad.

Q: Then you recommended Norstad to Arnold?

W: To Miff Harmon, he just asked for some names. I didn't recommend anybody. I just suggested their names, I knew the ability, and that's when Norstad and Arnold got very close, and always have been.

Q: You know, Arnold and Norstad had a disagreement, a falling out toward the end of the war. Did you know about that?

W: Yes, they made up, though.

Q: Why did they have a falling out?

W: I don't know.

Q: Was it on account of unification?

W: No, I don't know. I don't remember. I was told at the time, but...

Q: Norstad was one of our chief planners to set up the unification bill with the Navy--Forestal and Radford. Maybe Arnold thought that the Navy had won too many concessions. The Air Force Unification Bill was not as strong as Arnold hoped.

W: I don't really know. I do know there was a falling out, and I can't remember. There was a very, very amicable feeling afterwards between them. The tension was all gone.

Q: Let's go back to 1943. Anything interesting in 1943, or maybe 1942?

W: I've still got one on '42. Arnold and Somervell were very good friends. At Christmas of '42, the turkeys didn't get to the troops on Ascension Island, and Arnold used to kid the life out of Somervell by saying: "Bill, you are going to starve my troops on Ascension Island again?" I didn't know about this till it was all over, Anyway, after that, I was there every Christmas, and they laughed about this thing. He used to use that a good deal, that turkeys got everywhere else--to the North Pole and everywhere, but they didn't get to his Ascension Island,and this was a little repartee that went between them.

Q: Did you have any dealings with getting Ascension Island? That was a remarkable job of getting that island ready as an airfield, wasn't it?

W: It was done by a fellow named Coughlin, a Colonel in the Engineers. One of the most beautiful jobs that was done in the war. And I don't think he ever got credit for it. Beautiful job. There

they were in isolation, and they took everything over, and when we got word that they were ready for us, we went out from the town. I didn't go on this trip, for some reason I didn't go over at the start of it, but very soon afterwards. I don't know of anything that compares--some of the CBI stuff would be the same, but these fellows did a beautiful job.

Q: There's a little jingle, "If I don't make Ascension; my wife will get a pension," didn't they have these birds out there on the runways?

W: Gooney birds.

Q: How about the Azores?

W: I didn't have the Azores.

W: In 1943, now, I'm trying to figure out something here, I'm trying to say. I think it was after the Cairo conference or after the Casablanca conference.

Q: Casablanca was in Jan '43; Cairo was around Nov '43.

W: Jan '43, Arnold went to China and he had Bill Somervell and Sir John Dill with him.

Q: Did he have Jake Smart with him, too?

W: May have, I'm not sure.

Q: But he came around there, and came back through...

W: Came back through in Feb '43. We had notice two or three days ahead, and the Brazilian Air Minister came up. Gen Gomez was already there. We all had a nice dinner together at the hotel in Recife. They all had a swim that afternoon, and a good rest, and we had a nice place. And then, Arnold turned to me and he said: "You better get ready and come on up with me." I had a bag always packed and got in the airplane, and came on up. I had a nice time with Arnold

on the way up. Of course, Somervell, I'd known very well, too. He was a cadet when I was there. We came through Puerto Rico and stayed all night there at Borinquen (now Ramey). Then I went on to Washington, and Arnold had a couple of things he wanted me to do up here. I told him about the situation down there. He said: "You come on up and get these straightened out," but they were internal administration. After this meeting with the Brazilians, in which they brought up about 10 or 12 subjects. Arnold was very, very quick to say "yes" or say "no." So after that they had a tremendous respect. They said, there's a man that decides.

Q: He was a man of decision. Was the Navy giving you any trouble at this period?

W: I never had any trouble with the Navy. The problem with the Navy was, and we got along very well together. Any time Ingram wanted anything that I had, he got it. We handled Vargas--he did most of the handling of Vargas--I worked very closely with the foreign minister, Oswaldo Aranha. We worked very closely. I think when Ingram made one trip up there, he came back, and they told him that they wanted him to be more independent with his Air arm, and I think we sent some people down there.

Q: I think there was trouble toward the end of the war. I think Ralph Wooten took your place. There was trouble at the end of the war about who was going to retain the bases. The Navy wanted something, and the AAF was not going to relinquish it.

W: I do remember when a fellow by the name of Brownell came down.

Q: George Brownell. He was Stimson's aide, wasn't he? Or was he Patterson's aide? He was aide to the Secretary of War.

W: The Union Pacific guy. He was Gen Marshall's Assistant Secretary over in the State Department. George Brownell worked out of Lovett's office.

Q: Right, well Lovett was Asst Secretary for Air. He and Arnold worked together. And they gave you some trouble down there, or had some trouble down there?

W: George Brownell came down there with the idea that we take over the bases in the postwar period. They wanted to make the agreements.

Q: Navy didn't want that, though?

W: The Brazilians objected to that, so there was no problem on it.

W: It was coming up on one of these trips. Usually, Arnold would send for me or tell Harold George he would want me for something. I tried to get up about every three or four months. I could keep track of things much better that way. When I got to Richmond, I was up front flying and I got a call on the radio asking if I was on the airplane, and I called back and said, yes, I was on the airplane. They said fine, so then we got to the Fredericksburg down here and I got another call, wanting to know if I was on the airplane. And I said, yes, and then finally we were coming in over the airport. They wanted to know if I was on the plane, and I said yes, and then I just wondered what the hell this was about. We landed, and I saw Gen Arnold's car and I saw Sergeant Simmons. He said: "You all come on and get in here. He's asked after you all the time. You've got to get in here and see him." He said: "Don't go on, don't do anything. I was sent here to bring you right up here." So I came on in and Miss Adkins, his secretary, said: "He's asking for you every 10 minutes. Now he's called a meeting in there." She waited a little bit, and finally she took a note in,

and then they all came out, each one had on his mind the thought: "Glad to have known you," I suppose. I went on in and he said: "Sit down." Then I knew it was all right.

Q: You mean if he jumped on you, he wouldn't tell you to sit down?

W: No, it was just the expression. He said: "You are going to Russia tomorrow." He said: "Haven't you got anything to say?" And I said: "Hell no, you already said it." So, I said: "I think it would be a good thing if I could be allowed time to hurry back to Brazil, and thank them for all they've done for us." He said: "Harriman is leaving tomorrow, and he wants to take you with him." I said: "All right," and he said: "Go over and see Harriman. So I went on over and saw Harriman and he said; no, he had to postpone a week, so I went right back and saw Arnold, and I called the crew and said: "Get ready, We are going back as fast as we can, and then coming back." So we got down to Puerto Rico and I think the plane had trouble. We had an engine go out. So I took up the first plane going down. Then I got a few things together, saw a few people, went to each place to see the Brazilians, the military commanders, and the civilian people who had been good to us, and thanked them. Then I went on down to Rio, and came on back, and had a day here, I think, and then went off to Russia.

Q: You went to Russia with Harriman?

W: I went with Harriman and I took over the formation from a fellow named Kessler. It was the Eastern Command of USSTAF.

Q: When was this?

W: Well, we got to Moscow, the first of second of June, maybe the 31st of May, 1944.

Q: This was two or three days before the first mission.

W: The first mission was June 2nd.

Q: So this was a couple of days before.

W: Couple of days before, I got down to Poltava the next day, and they came in that afternoon. Kessler ahd the whole thing set up.

Q: Was Elliott Roosevelt supposed to go on one of those missions, a photo reconnaissance mission?

W: I don't know, but I would guess so. I think he was supposed to. He came over there. Anyway, I went over there, and we had the shuttle bombing and that all speaks for itself. But I was under Spaatz, so I had no contact with Arnold.

Q: Were you at Poltava when the Germans came in and clobbered the place?

W: I sure as hell was.

Q: June 23rd.

W: June 22nd or 23rd.

Q: Did that sour the Russians on that whole mission?

W: Well, I think they were more sour,but they were sour in the first place. They never wanted us over there. They didn't want us over there.

Q: Why did they agree to this?

W: Pressure.

Q: From Roosevelt?

W: I suppose so. Well, Harriman put the pressure on, he wanted the operation and John Russell Deane who had the military mission there. Anyway, there's not much more to add that affects Arnold, as far as that is concerned.

Q: How did Arnold feel about the shuttle mission? Did he favor it or was he neutral to it?

W: Well, things got to be so political by that time. Of course, the whole thing was, I think, political. It was to get us in with the Russians. Objective-wise they always said it was to get bases on the Pacific to go against Japan.

Q: Arnold had a great interest in these Siberian bases, especially for the B-29s. He was always trying to make a deal with the Russians. Somehow he never succeeded.

W: No, we never did get to first base with them. They didn't want to get involved with Japan.

Q: Did he ever ask you to work on this form him, on these Siberian bases?

W: I had nothing to do except in a vague way. That was all done by Russ Deane and Harriman.

Q: Now your mission in Russia was to operate the shuttle bombing?

W: Shuttle bombing. They would send them over from England; send them in from Italy. I'd get two missions out of them from the bases in Russia. Then they would go back. Ostensibly the objective was to reach the German factories in Eastern Germany and in Poland that had been moved by the Germans.

Q: Eaker came in on the first mission, didn't he?

W: Came in on the first mission.

Q: So you spent some time with him there.

W: I'd just seen Eaker, when Harriman and I were on our way over. We came by Caserta. Saw Eaker.

Q: Does Harriman know anything about Arnold?

W: Oh, I don't know.

Q: Is it worth talking to him about Arnold?

W: I don't know.

Q: I have the feeling they didn't operate on the same wave length.

W: No. The next thing, after we closed the thing up.

W: The next thing, after we closed the thing up.

Q: September or October?

W: No, I think, November 1944. We left a small group in there. We had all our prisoners up on the Baltic, and they were the aviation people. They were prisoners.

Q: Our people?

W: Our people and we were aching to get in to them because we knew of the suffering. And that's why we left, and we left a hospital there. We knew of the pneumonia thing that came along. We left more nurses than absolutely needed in there. But we did it with the idea that we would get into these places, and I remember going over, General Perminov, who was the Russian commander. He said: "Well, why are you interested in your prisoners?" And I said: "Well, they've done a beautiful job." He said: "They haven't done any job for you at all. They are prisoners. They got taken as prisoners." I said: "What do you do when you have an engine go out. You can't do any more damage." He said: "Well, that's the guys misfortune, not yours." So I told him. The Russians never did understand why we were interested in prisoners. That's one of the great tributes to our country--in the first war, and in the second war, and to aviation. We always keep an eye on the prisoners, so they must know that we still have an interest in them.

Q: Did you have anything to do with the operation via Amb Steinhart. Steinhart was our Amb. to Turkey and he was acting as a shuttle to get a lot of interned flyers out through Turkey?

W: No, I didn't know that. Anyway, after this was over, Harriman and I came on back together. As a matter of fact, what actually happened, I left my B-17 in there. He came out and made the first flight, I think, over Turkey. He went down to Poltava and then took off from Poltava and then right straight across Turkey to Cairo. That was the first time that had been done in the war that I know of. Then I met him in Casablanca, and we came home together. On the way home, he said: "Bob, I don't think you had better go back." And I said: "I don't want to go back, and I don't think I had either." So then I came on back, and when we were coming in here, I got a message from Arnold to be at a staff meeting. We landed about 3 o'clock in the morning, a staff meeting the next morning at 8:00.

Q: When was this?

W: November 1944. And it could have been late October or November. So I came on down, I went home took a bath, did a little freshening up--didn't dare go to sleep. Arnold went all around the table at the staff meeting. Finally he came to me. I was sitting right on his right, and he put on a good old tirade about the Russians, about this and about that, and I looked at him and I said: "I agree every bit, and you haven't even made it as bad as it was."

Q: He was very disillusioned?

W: He was disillusioned.

Q: Did he feel they broke their agreements with us?

W: No. We pushed. I saw the very good documentation Tom Julian has done on that, it sort of gave me a different light on the whole thing.

Q: Did he give you a copy of the thesis?

W: Yes. So, anyway, when we were just going into this staff meeting, somebody met me in the hall, and said: "Harriman has sent

word over, just got the message that he wants to see Arnold as soon as possible." And he said: "Can you tell us anything about what he wants?" He said: "Wait a minute. I think it's about me." Apparently, Harriman went in and he didn't want me over there any more. I didn't want to go over there. My job had been finished. Arnold called me in and said he wanted me to go. I said: "You don't understand, you really don't. This is not the place for me to go right now." I said: "The trouble is right here in your office and in Washington. I would like to be here so that when things come up, I can get a little thing in. If you would send somebody else over there, I can carry the ball here for our operation." So I walked around the building here for three or four days not knowing what was going to happen, and finally Barney Giles, the Chief of Staff, came in and he said: "Bob, we worked it all out. You are going to stay here, and you are going to Latin America." And I said: "Fine." And I said: "I would like for the time being to be called in and I was called in on almost everything that was going on after that.

Q: You were sort of special assistant to Arnold on Russia?

W: I was special assistant to him for Latin America. That was the designation. This was just a kind of side thing that I kept an interest in, and kept an eye on our Russian desk to help them. They used to come in and ask me a number of questions.

Q: Did you get to see Harry Hopkins or have any dealings with him?

W: Yes, but that was not with the Russians.

Q: Wasn't he pushing Lend Lease?

W: Yes, but I didn't have anything to do with the Russians. Mine was always with Latin America.

W: Every once in a while--this would be '44-'45 winter--Miss Adkins would call and say: "Come over, he wants to see you." So it would be 4:00 in the afternoon, something like that. He's say: "Let's go on in here and have a cup of tea." And he said: "Now tell me about Latin America," and goodness, I would talk, and talk about this, etc., and finally he would look at his watch and say: "My goodness, I'm a half hour late." But he just loved to talk about Latin America, about the various things and the people.

Q: Why?

W: He had no objective other than an interest in Latin America, and realizing how close they were to us.

Q: I wonder if this factor involving Peron is involved. I don't know where I got this impression.

W: I don't think Peron ever was a factor.

Q: Peron was an enemy of ours.

W: I don't think he was an enemy at all. I think it was entirely Spruille Braden's stuff that was built up down there. I think Braden made an enemy of Peron. I'll always think so.

Q: You were in Washington in that winter of '44-'45. Arnold made his 5th star then?

W: I don't know when he made it. I always thought that he had. He was on the original list.

Q: Arnold had his heart attack in Jan 1945. Remember that? Were you involved?

W: Yes. I may have been here about that time. Then they took him home and he had that very famous doctor from Chicago, Marquardt. He really knew his stuff and he walked right in there and he got Arnold back in shape.

Q: He died a couple of years ago, I never got to talk to him.

W: He was a wonderful fellow.

Q: He went on several trips with him, didn't he?

W: He was always with him.

Q: Except when Truman came in. Then Arnold had to get a man from Missouri--Howard Rusk--do you remember that?

W: I think Marquardt wanted to get out, anyway.

Q: Well, Marquardt wanted to go with him, Arnold had to write him a letter, he said: "We had a new President here, he had to play the game."

W: '45--it was wintertime, and I was in San Francisco, and a part of the U.S. delegation to the Preparatory Commission, you'd probably call it, for the United Nations.

Q: This is probably the early spring, they met in March and April of 1945, UNCIO, United Nations Commission on Internationa Organization, that was.

W: Run by a fellow named Pasvosky of the State Dept. He rant it. He ran most of Mr. Roosevelt's foreign relations. Anyway, I got this call on the telephone that they had just gotten this word from Arnold in Europe to meet him in Brazil in about three days hence. So I called up, got ahold of Frank O'Brien, who had the airplane. He had just come back from Washington, then, bringing some people out for UNCIO, I said: "Frank, get busy, we've got to go right away. Pick yourself up another pilot and a navigator. We're gone. I'll get there as quick as I can."

Q: I'll tell you when this probably happened. It happened right around the first day of May 1945, because Arnold was on a recuperation trip in April. Marshall sent him out. He went to Cannes, the Riviera.

He went through Europe, and then he came back through Africa, and through Brazil. Right around the first week in May, and you were in San Francisco, and then you were called to come down.

W: I came back here and got in here, and changed clothes, and started on down. We got to Recife. In the meantime, we had gotten the Brazilian officials to come on up, and we had a big banquet for him up in Recife.

Q: Ralph Wooten was down there?

W: Yes.

Q: Can he tell me something about Arnold and Brazil?

W: He's dead. Died about three months ago. Anyway, we had the banquet and had the meeting with the Brazilians, and it all went off. He always had a tremendous feeling. Each one of them. He may not have seen their face before, but he knew the name.

Q: Was he kind of weakened at this time? He was recuperating from that heart attack.

W: I don't ever remember Arnold being weakened. He was always interested.

Q: Always on the go?

W: Yes, then you say he had the heart attack before.

Q: He had the heart attack in January.

W: I had it after that.

Q: He was in Miami, down at the Biltmore for two months. Then he came home for a couple of weeks. Then Marshall sent him on this trip. He went to Europe and came back through South America, and that's when he probably called you.

W: And then before retiring he wanted to see Latin America.

Q: Did he take you on this trip?

W: I went down as far as Colombia to start him on it, and...

Q: Mrs. Arnold was with him.

W: Was she? I don't remember. She could be. Yes, she was.

Q: He went down to Mexico on this one.

W: We didn't do Mexico on this one.

Q: No, that was a short trip. But in Jan 1946, he went on this Latin American trip.

W: We got to Colombia, first stop. Wiley was the Ambassador. I went down to see Wiley before. I went down and went through the thing and made the arrangements in all the places for him. Colombia is a high altitude. We kept telling him to take it easy; and I kept insisting that he was to get a rest. But Wiley, the Ambassador there, he hadaa prominent guy, and he had a big guy, and so he would pick it up a little bit the other way They pushed the Old Man too much, and he had a heart attack that night. Then he said: "Well, let's go on; let's get to a lower altitude." So we brought him down to Lima, and that's when the doctor said he had to come back home.

Q: And you were with him there?

W: I wasn't in Lima with him, I was with him as far as Wiley and Colombia.

Q: I think his daughter Lois was there, I think she went along on that trip. When he came back, he was in Lima for several days?

W: Trying to recover as best he could.

Q: And they sent him back to Miami, did they not?

W: I guess so.

Q: And he was back in the Biltmore. You didn't go with him on that phase.

W: I went down before. He had me doing something else. I just went down to line it up.

Q: Apparently, he had great confidence in you, and your association with the Brazilians, andhe knew if you set it up, he would be in good shape.

W: He did have a confidence with me over South America.

W: I have one little story and that ends it. Do you remember telling about when he came back from the Pacific. He decided he was going to live in California, and he got a car from Harmilton, and went over to the Valley of the Moon, and he'd already bought the Ranch. Somebody bought the place for him beforehand. As they drove in, and he was in civilian clothes, as they drove into town, he saw this saloon sign, or whatever it was, having a drink. So they went on in, and there were about six or eight people in there. He walked up to the bartender and put out his hand and said: "I'm Hap Arnold. I'm going to come down here and live here." These other fellows were playing cards or doing something like that. You've heard this story? Finally he said: "Well, I want to set them up for all the people who are here." So the bartender called around, and they started coming to the bar. Some fellow said: "You aren't General Arnold, are you?" And he said: "Well, they call me that." The word went out in the town, and they all came in to see him. And they said: "Have you seen your place?" Andhhe said: "Yes, I saw it on the way in." I wasn't there; he told me. Well, a fellow came up and said: "Now look, we've got to cut the grass out on your place. I'll do that Monday." Another fellow said: "You know, you ought to have a tool shed out there. We'll get that up by the time you get back." And the thing went that way. So they fixed his whole place up.

Q: Let me ask you, General, did you ever see him and Marshall together?

W: Lot's of times.

Q: What sort of relationship did they have?

W: Well, I think they had a very fine relationship. Many times, he would take the phone out from under his desk, and call Gen Marshall.

Q: Special phone?

W: Yes. Special phone. Finally, they got so they had buttons and the other one would be for Jimmy Burns.

Q: Jimmy Burns is still around, isn't he?

W: Yes, he's in North Carolina, and I don't believe he is available. He's too old.

Q: I saw General Burns. Is there another Jimmy Burns?

W: We had another Burns, a young fellow, Bobby Burns.

Q: But Jimmy Burns is too old?

W: Only one that I know. There are two Jimmy Burns, one at the State Dept. and the other was the Ordnance fellow who had the Russians.

Q: Byrnes, Burns.

W: Burns who had the ADP, the Russian material thing?

Q: Right, he worked under Harry Hopkins. He and Arnold were very close. They played golf together. Did you ever play golf with Arnold?

W: No, I didn't play golf.

Q: Did Arnold ever call Marshall "George?"

W: I would never think he would call him anything else, far as I know.

Q: You know, in their correspondence, it was always: "Dear Arnold" and "Dear General." He never called him "Dear George."

W: Well, I think when you are talking about correspondence, neither one of them ever bothered about it, and their letters were prepared by somebody else.

Q: Well, this is so. But I think, this is a matter of protocol. Marshall called him "Dear Arnold," never "Dear Hap."

W: Marshall always called me "Walsh."

Q: This was Army protocol?

W: Not necessarily.Army protocol. Didn't know me well enough to call me "Bob." So he always called me "Walsh."

Q: He was a very distant man, was he not? Was he hard to get close to? Did you ever brief Marshall?

W: Yes, lots of times, World War I. I would think that Marshall would say "Arnold" and Arnold would say "George."

Q: You think so. Most people don't remember him having said George.

W: I'm always sure that I would have noticed it. When he had this under-the-desk telephone, he said: "Now, George, I think this...."

Q: When just the two of them alone probably, informal. But when others were around, it was more formal. Did the Walshs and the Arnolds have social relationships in Washington? Did you go out together?

W: All our Air Force parties, we were both there. We had a very deep feeling for each other. Mrs. Walsh was a very good friend of Mrs. Arnold's and admired her tremendously.

Q: Mrs. Arnold is a grand lady. Did you ever visit the ranch?

W: Never been to the ranch. She's asked me up there a number of times, and I've never gone.

Q: I've been up there. She saved all these documents.

W: I'm glad she did. Tell me now, what are you going to do, you're going to write the Arnold biography?

Q: Yes.

Q: Arnold and Andrews. Andrews was a year ahead of Arnold. Were they competitors for the top job? Of course, Andrews was a combat man and Arnold was sort of a production and organization.

W: No. Arnold was the other, too. Not to the extent that Andrews was, he was not a combat man, but I would say that they were good friends and good, close friends, but I think that Andrews came to light more through the situation of his position, and the situation that the Congress and the people were not too happy about the air force after the Air Mail and they had the investigation and I guess Foulois took most of the bunt of that.

W: But, anyway, if you ask me about Foulois and Andrews, I would say that they would be friends, but they would not be close friends. I would say that Andrews and Arnold could be close friends.

Q: Did you ever see them together?

W: Yes, they'd been together lots of times.

Q: And they were good friends, no problems?

W: I don't think there was any friction.

Q: Did you know of the relationship between Hugh Knerr and Andrews?

W: Yes, Knerr was...

Q: Chief of Staff of GHQ back in '35-'39. He was the Chief of Staff to Andrews, and then he retired when Andrews went down to San Antonio. Then he tried to come back.

W: Russell was the Chief of Staff when I was down at GHQ.

Q: Right. Russell was Chief of Staff under Emmons.

W: That's right, too. But Knerr and Andrews always had been friendly, and I think Knerr and Arnold were very friendly.

Q: Well, not too.

W: And Knerr and Emmons were friendly.

Q: Did you know Hugh Knerr was writing a lot of articles about unification--this was about 1940-41, and he embarrassed Arnold? He tried to come back on duty and it took him two years to get back on active duty.

W: Well, he sure made it, when he did.

Watkins, John C.A. 10 May 71

Interview John C. A. Watkins, Providence, R.I., 10 May 1971

Q: We're talking about your duty on the Air Staff under....

W. Giles. First of all, I was a very low ranking member of the AC/AS Plans, and I think I started as a Captain, when I came back to the States in December 1943. There were a bunch of bright young guys in there. I was one of the first ones to come back that had actual combat experience, and we were free under Kuter. We would sit around and discuss planning. There wasn't any rank involved in it. We would just sit around and throw things back and forth regardless of what your rank was, whether you were a reserve officer or a regular. Well, you mentioned Gen Giles, Mr. Lovett not having too much confidence in his competency, we didn't think he had any competency at all. Rightly or wrongly, we, I mean the younger officers in the planning group, thought he was stupid, and when the YALTA conference was set up, we were horrified at the thought that Gen Giles should represent the AAF. We set up a little sort of cabal to persuade somebody to send Gen Kuter instead of Gen Giles. I don't remember how it worked, but it worked, and that was how Kuter went, because the younger element in the AAF, and I guess Gen Marshall and Mr. Lovett, all agreed that Giles would be a disaster. I'll tell you the sort of thing he did. We got a report - see, we were working with the JCS and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We got a report that the Navy had prepared a paper which would have set up strategic air force in the Pacific under the Navy. It would be another strategic air force. Of course, that made no sense at all. Gen Giles was told this, and his immediate reaction was: "All right, we'll show those bastards, we'll put in a paper to the JCS setting up a US Army Air Forces carrier fleet. That was his theory as to how to handle this situation. You see, we had no confidence in him at all. Of course, the sad part of that was Larry Kuter may or may not tell you - he was so low ranking.

Q: He was perhaps one-star then?

W: No, he was two stars. Maybe not. If you look at pictures of the YALTA conference, poor Larry is standing practically out on the frontyard.

Q: I know he was like the messenger boy there.

W: Yes.

Q: He was one or two stars below all the other ranks. This created, well contributed to the difficulty of the AAF.

W: Oh yes, it was just like he didn't have a voice. He was very,very upset when he got back because he briefed us all on the whole thing, when he got back.

Q: He was sending reports out to Arnold from MALTA first, then YALTA, and Arnold, who was either prostrate,

W: He was down in Coral Gables.

Q: Yes, taking it very easy. He was writing instructions through each paragraph. They were sending him paragraphs on different situations. I don't know if you contributed to some of this.

W: No, I didn't.

Q: And he was trying to give some direction to the AAF position, by two or three words, "write-throughs" the paragraphs. He'd say: "Do it, or "No," or some such direction. Gene Beebe and Peterson were coming down. I guess every other day, shuttling down to Coral Gables.

W: I thought Beebe had left by then...

Q: Well, Beebe had his own heart attack.

W: Yes, I know but...

Q: Maybe it was Peterson.

W: It was Peterson. It wasn't Beebe. Beebe had already gone to the Pacific. He had been given a bomb group or something.

Q: That's right, I talked to him very recently, he's in Long Beach, Calif. Anyway, he was very close to Arnold.

Q: On the subject of Giles, Lovett realized that Giles didn't have the standing, and of course, you put a little more strongly than Lovett put it to me, but Lovett realized that the AF needed somebody of strength and Arnold accepted this because if he was not on the job, Marshall might appoint somebody else. He had this fear he would be retired. So I think he acceded to the selection of Eaker, being perhaps the No. 3 man in experience in the AAF. Spaatz was going out to the Pacific to finish the thing out there. So, Eaker came in to Hqs. as Deputy, Eaker proceeded to wheel and deal. I was told by

Arnold's Exec. Do you remember Jim Maher? I saw him very recently. He indicated that Eaker simply bypassed Arnold's office. Nothing came in to Susie Adkins, who was Arnold's secretary. It all came into Eaker's office. There was a strong belief in Arnold's office - I guess Fred Dean was there; Maher was there. There was a strong feeling that Eaker had pretensions to the top post, and in the belief that perhaps Arnold wouldn't come back. So there was a great deal of plotting going on and counterplotting going on. Eaker and Maher had a confrontation. Maher was a tough old Irishman, who with a couple of drinks in him, would say anything to anybody. This is his own estimate of himself. He simply went up to Eaker and told him off. He told him that he was representing Gen Arnold, and they were not getting the paperwork coming through Gen Arnold's office and he intended for General Arnold to be briefed. So they had a "knockdown-dragout" with Eaker. Eaker was three stars, and he was like a LTCOL. Mrs. Arnold told me some of this.

W: Arnold set me up all the time.

Q: Did he think through beforehand, some of his decisons, would you say?

W: Yes, I think he must have. He was pretty impetuous at times, I remember, on a very trivial level, he let me go through flying school as an officer two years over grade. I'd had a pilot's rating before the war, but I wanted to be a military pilot, a combat pilot rather than service pilot. So he let me go through flying school, and it was resisted bitterly by several of the general officers, notably, Luke Smith, who had the Training Command as his staff function in Washington. Arnold's only stipulation to me was that after I had completed the course, that I would give him my impressions of the training program from a student's point of view, and not an expert's point of view, but a student point of view. So, when I finished up, I came up to Washington and you know, you couldn't avoid answering him on it. It was impossible, you couldn't pass it off. I was sitting in his office. He said: "What did you think of your flight training?" And I said: "It was fine." He said, "Well, what was wrong with it?" I said "Well, nothing particularly." He said: "Well, there must have been something wrong with it." So I said, "Well, I wouldn't like to repeat

the basic, which was at Greenville, Miss. He said: "Why?" And I said: "Because I've never seen such a low grade of officers as there, anywhere else in the world." I said I thought they were lousy. He flipped on his intercom to General Smith, and said: "I've got a young officer down here in whom I have complete confidence. He has just completed the training program and he's said our basic flying schools are lousy." I said: "General, I didn t say the basic flying schools were lousy," I said that there were certain things about this particular basic flying school that was terrible. "I didn't say they were all." He said: "Never mind. You go up and tell Luke Smith all about it." So I went up to see Smith and Smith actually - I'd known him for years - he actually made me hit a brace, stand at attention and gave me a thorough going-over. He said that I was a nosy kind that was never satisfied to stay out of other people's business, and I had no business telling General Arnold this. I should have told Gen Arnold that everything was fine in flying school. And I said: "Well, sir, I wouldn't tell Gen Arnold any such thing, if I didn't believe it." Well, this went on and on, and finally he let me go, and I went back down to Gen Arnold's office, because I was going back with him to Ft. Myer to spend the night and Col Shelmire.

Q: I missed talking to him, he died.

W: It's too bad, because he was one of Gen Arnold's really closest friends.

Q: They went to school together.

W: Oh yes, but anyway, I went back down to Arnold's office, and "Uncle Horace," as we called him, was sitting there. He was a flamboyant character. He said: "What's the matter?" I said: "Nothing." He said: "Yes, there is. Did Luke Smith give you a hard time?" And I said: "How did you guess?" He said: "You are as pale as a sheet." I told him what Smith had done, and I never have thought out to this day how it happened, but Luke was relieved of his job, and reverted to his original, regular rank. He was sent down to Panama some place, and later on became a General again.

Q: I was told that Luke Smith, who lives in either Ft. Worth or Dallas....

W: He's dead. The curious sequel to that was...

Q: Did he die recently?

W: I think he's been dead a long time, unless I'm really mistaken, but...

Q: I think he was alive in February of this year, unless he died since then.

W: I'd like to know, because I'm reasonably sure that he died a long time ago. I'm pretty sure he died in 1945 or 1946, maybe while he was still in Europe, because he finally made it back up the ladder again. I was in a year and a half later. I think I was in Gen Norstad's office when he had relieved Kuter, and he said: "There's an old friend of yours in the building. He wants to see you." And I said: "Who is that, General?" And he said: "Luke Smith." And I said: "Oh, my God." And he said: "Don't worry about it. He has something he wants to discuss with you." So I went over to the Visiting General's Office, and saluted sharply. Gen Smith said: "Oh, don't do this saluting, John. We don't salute here in the Pentagon." He greeted me like a long lost son. He told me he was going to Germany. As I remember it, he was going to be the AF General on General Clay's staff after the surrender.

Q: High Commissioner of Germany.

W: He wanted me to go over there as his Executive Officer and pilot, and which I thought was a very interesting job. So I told him I would go if I was ordered to go, but I wouldn't go as a volunteer. He said: "Why not?" I said: "Because I don't want to serve under you." And he said: "I'm sorry you feel that way about it."

Q: You were a brash young officer. I think that's probably why General Arnold respected you. You know, he got this kind of information from Rosie O'Donnell, too. Rosie O'Donnel was a brash young man.

W: I know he was, except he used foul language.

Q: I don't mean there was a complete parallel there, but Rosie O'Donnell was very blunt with Gen Arnold.

W: And so was I.

Q: I think he didn't have enough people who were willing to stand up and tell him the facts straight.

W: I imagine the Luke Smith episode was very disappointing to him, but he did respect people who were honest with him, and those are really the only people

he did respect, in my opinion. He told me when I first went into the service, in June 1941, I was assigned to Air Intelligence under a Colonel - I've forgotten his name now, but I didn't work for him, I worked for General Arnold.

Q: Was it General Hodges

W: I think it was Hodges, but this Colonel was my immediate superior, he was with Public Relations. But anyway, I did all my work for General Arnold. He said in effect one day: "Now, you are a damned good reporter. That's what I want you to do for me. I'm going to send you around to places, where if I sent somebody from the IG office the balloon would go up, but if I send a 2nd LT, nobody pays any attention to it. So I went to places. One time I went up to Alaska with the then Colonel Lucius Clay, then LTCOL Freddy von H. Kimble of the AAF. They were going. General Arnold called me in and said: "General Marshall is sending Col Clay and Col Kimble up there to Alaska, ostensibly to look at airfield sites." This was in maybe October 1941. General Arnold said: "I want you to go with them and find out what the hell they are really doing up there. And while you are up there, take a look at the two fields, Fairbanks and Anchorage, and tell me how things are going, the morale of the troops, and the whole works. So much to their dismay - Clay's and Kimble's - they found this 2nd LT in a B-17 with them. So I went up there, and I find out they were up there for exactly what Gen Marshall had told Gen Arnold they were going for. But, I talked to a lot of the young pilots, and I found out, among other things, that they had a squadron of bombers and two squadrons of P-36s fighters, but they didn't have any ammunition for the guns in the fighters, and they had no bombs for the bombers. Up at Fairbanks, they sent an Army anti-aircraft outfit, a National Guard outfit from New Mexico.

Q: We are talking about pre-Pearl Harbor?

W: Oh yes, quite a while before Pearl Harbor. These guys were up there. It was getting pretty cold, and all they had was a summer uniform, and tents without any heat in them. A Col Carr was the Base Commander, and he put these guys in the hangar. He let them sleep in the hangars. So I came back and I reported all this to General Arnold in a typewritten report.

W: On another occasion, much later on in the war, probably in the summer

of 1944, some people got the idea that heavy bombers crews from Britain were deliberately defecting to Sweden and Switzerland, claiming battle damage, because somebody had told Arnold that these guys just put their B-4 bags in that airplane. Of course, quite a few of them were going into Sweden and Switzerland, but that was all by pre-arrangement with the Swedish Government. So he called me and Bruce Holloway into his office. Bruce was then a LTCOL or Colonel maybe. Arnold told us he wanted us to go to these redistribution bases.

Q: Louisville had one

W: They had one in Miami, and one in Atlantic City. He sent Bruce to Atlantic City, and he sent me to Miami, and he told us he didn't care how we operated, but to find out whether or not there was any truth in this defection story. And he didn't want us to talk to each other when we did come back. He just wanted us to give him a report, directly to him, which we did. I think I stayed in Miami Beach about 10 days as a returnee. We found out that if there was an occasional defector, it was an incident

Q: Not an organized affair?

W: Not at all, but they were really teed off at some of their General Officers, the General Officers in the 8th AF. I mentioned all this. I was a reporter, as far as I was concerned, on assignment.

Q: You were performing at the highest level. You were giving Arnold information that he could not get through the staff, because it got filtered down and watered and sanitized, while you were giving him straight dope, and he seemed to appreciate it.

W: I'll never forget though, when I finished typing this thing out, I took it into Larry Kuter and I said: "General, I would like to have you look at this before I turn it in." Which was a violation of my instructions, by the way. When Kuter - or maybe it was Norstad, I've forgotten which - read it through, he said: "Well, it is a very courageous report." Of course, what he meant was that I repeated the criticism of at least one General Officer by name which meant nothing to me, and besides my instructions were to find out what I could. I guess I have a lot of enemies in the AF.

Q: Well, I think Arnold probably deliberately chose somebody who was not a Regular, because a Regular would have been thinking about his career. If he was confronted with a situation where he had to criticize a superior officer, he made an enemy out of him. This could hurt his career, whereas you were a short termer. Arnold knew it, and you knew it, and you probably indicated to him that when the war was over, you'd be out of there.

W: Oh, he knew that.

Q: So he could get an honest report from you, and this is what he wanted. So you did a lot of work through Kuter, or sort of worked out of his office?

W: Well, I was actually, when I came back, I left Washington in January 1942, to go through the Training Command. Then, after I'd done my 50 missions in the Mediterranean, and was ordered home,I was ordered to Washington to be on the Air Staff, in Plans. So I was Exec Officer in the Asiatic Theater Branch, in Plans, apparently because I had lived in the Philippines Islands when I was a child. It struck me as being sort of unusual, because when I got there, I was the only officer in Plans who had combat experience in the Mediterranean theater. But, anyway, I was in the Asiatic Theater Branch. But, from then on, I had no formal association with Gen rnold. Just once in a while, when he would have a letter to reply to somebody - I remember one in particular - Adm Mountbatten, or Generalissimo C-K-S, or somebody like that, he would call me down to the office, and hand me their letter and say: "Do me a reply." And I would say: "What do you want me to say?" He replied: Well, tell them I think it's a good idea, something like that. "Be diplomatic." I'll never forget one, I think it was a day after the Cairo Conference when Mountbatten was chosen as the Supreme Allied Commander in SE Asia. All of these guys, after the conference, sent congratulatory letters: "I think you are wonderful," and "you think I'm wonderful." So Arnold told me to write a letter to Mountbatten, congratulating him on his appointment- this SE Asia thing. So he didn't tell me what to say. I wrote this letter for him. They all called each other "Dickie" and "Hap," and all that sort of thing. So I said in the letter - I, meaning General Arnold - "hope that you will achieve the same success in melding together these highly

heterogeneous forces under your command that Ike accomplished in Algiers." Mountbatten wrote back and thanked him for his congratulations and said: "As a matter of fact, Ike told me as we were leaving Cairo, that history would hold me as wanting, if I didn't do as well in this area as he had." I've never forgotten it....

W: Mrs. Yount, did she remember my part in this song?

Q: No, because when I talked to her, I didn't know that you had a part in it. I talked to her a number of months ago, because you had mentioned her in your letter to Claude, you said something about "that damn song, Wild Blue Yonder." Claude passed that part of the letter on to me. So then I mentioned to you that I talked to Mrs. Yount about her role in it. So if I had known, I would have mentioned it. Anyway, maybe you can tell me about it.

W: That was really funny. Apparently she ran across this lad that wrote the song.

Q: Robert Crawford, I think.

W: Right, I think the Younts were living out on the West Coast then. He was head of the Training Command then. And she ran across this fellow out there, I believe. He showed her this song, and all kinds of people were sending in proposed Air Force songs.

Q: They had a competition, you know, Bernarr McFadden, Liberty Magazine, had run this competition, I think he would give $1,000 to the winner. This was competition for the Air Corps.

W: I had forgotten completely about that, and I wonder if Gen Arnold sanctioned the contest?

Q: Oh yes, General Arnold sanctioned it, because he was a man who was very much concerned about morale. The Army Air Corps needed its own song. I didn't know if he had any contacts with Bernarr McFadden, but it might have been through Mrs. Yount, or through Gen Yount. But anyway, you got involved?

W: I got involved in it because it must have been in 1941. Anyway, General Arnold just handed me this correspondence with Mrs. Yount, and it was sort of voluminous. She was also calling him once in a while on the phone. She was promoting this thing, and she wanted everybody in the AAF to love this

song. As I remember it now - this is why I wish Col Shelmire was still around, because he and I were great buddies - I was writing letters to her about it, for his signature, of course. Finally, I took it over to the Ft. McNair, the National War College, it wasn't that then.

Q: They called it Fort Humphreys.

W: But anyway, the US Army Band was based there, and I took it over there, and I got this guy that was Director of the US Army Band to do a march version of it. Then, Col Shelmire and I went over there and the Army Band put on a performance of it just for the two of us, a 2nd LT and Temporary LTCOL Shelmire, and this sounded all right, but the words, of course, were lousy. Every pilot in the Army Air Forces was revolted by the words. But it was officially declared the US Army Air Forces song, but that was all there was to it. I guess Gen Arnold figured that as long as he wasn't bothered anymore, that his could be the US Army Air Forces song. And, then, the next thing we heard was that Mrs. Yount had persuaded Gen Yount to require that everybody in the Training Command sing the damn thing, going to and from classes. Of course, that got the biggest promotion, probably in the history of the world. So General Arnold used to kid me about it, claimed that I was the father of the "Wild Blue Yonder" song.

Q: Well, I was told that the trainees, the Aviation Cadets were required to carry the words in their hats. They took their hats off, and sang the words.

W: Right. I'll never forget one time when Col Shelmire first came on duty. He had been a National Guardsman from Philadelphia. Gen Arnold really brought him in because he was somebody that was a contemporary, a lifelong friend he could talk to, as he could never have talked to me. He insisted that Col Shelmire go through that Replacement Training Center at Miami Beach. Col Shelmire, as I said, was a flamboyant old cavalryman, with the wax moustache. Gen Arnold was going to be down in the Miami area one time. He thought it would be good to go over and see how Col Shelmire was doing. This was the time when people like Clark Gable were going in to that thing, you know. All these old duffers, all younger than you and I then, but they were old duffers then. They marched to and from classes just like the Flying Cadets did. Gen Arnold was

waiting at the hotel, which was where Col Shelmire and his company of delegates were billeted. You could hear these guys coming up the street: "Off we go into the wild blue yonder." Gen Arnold was really pleased to think that his old buddy was going to be leading this squadron of officer trainees. And he was, in his yellow Buick convertible with the top down. Arnold just about blew a gasket. It was the funniest thing I've ever heard in my life. That was Colonel Shelmire for you.

Q: Well, he got away with murder with Arnold because he was close to Arnold...

W: Sure.

Q: A lot of fellows couldn't get away with that.

W: Right. But there again, he had no aspirations for grandeur or greatness. He was a successful businessman in Philadelphia, and he had every intention of going back to it.

Q: Based on what you tell me, it seems that Arnold used you in the same way that he set up this Advisory Council. Cabell and Norstad, right at the beginning of the war. They were troubleshooters. Apparently, he lost confidence of getting stuff, or maybe he was impatient to get stuff through the staff, as it worked it's way up, each staff agency sanitized information as it came through. Let's not offend anybody.

W: They always did.

Q: And apparently, Arnold was quite aware, quite sensitive to the fact that he wasn't getting full information. So he needed external sources.

W: The thing he could do with me. He knew that I was not an expert in any phase of the AAF. I'd been Aviation Editor of the Baltimore Sun, before that, the Dayton Journal Herald, and I was a pilot and had grown up in the AF, but that didn't make me an expert in anything.

Q: You were a reporter and he had confidence.

W: I was a reporter, so he would evaluate what I told him. I wouldn't e valuate what I saw. I'd just report what I saw or heard, and he would evaluate it. Unfortunately, lots of times he would tell me to go up and see so and so, "And I want you to tell him that this is stupid." I'd make the mistake of saying: "Well, General Arnold says this is a stupid arrangement," and I'd get

torn to pieces by the guy. But I was trying to think of one particular incident. There was the glider program, Fred Dent, and Fred Dent is definitely dead.

Q: He died in Shalimar, Florida, last year.

W: Oh, I think it has been longer than that. Oh yes, he's been dead a long time, I think. But, anyway, the international soaring competitions were being held at Elmira, NY. This was in the fall of 1941. I went up there with Gen Arnold and some others. I had nothing special to do. We went out and watched the glider contest. You remember, that was shortly after the Germans took Crete with gliders. Everybody was asking what the US was doing with gliders. Around 4:00 in the afternoon, somebody told Gen Arnold that he was speaking at the banquet that night, he was the guest speaker, and that this was going to be on a coast-to-coast Mutual Broadcasting System network. He didn't have a speech. There were 4 or 5 officers in his room in the hotel, and he turned to me, and he said: "Write me a speech." Well, I'd never written a speech in my life, for anybody. I said: "Well, what do you want me to say?" He said: "Talk about gliders." And I said: "What?" and he said: "Stop talking and write the speech. Goddam it, can't you ever stop talking?" And I said: "Yes sir." So I left the room, and I couldn't, I didn't know what to say about gliders. I knew it had to be related somehow to what the Germans were doing, and I'd figured we'd better say that we were abreast of the situation. Well, I'd met Fred, who was then, I believe, a LTCOL, and he was stationed at Wright Field. And I said: "What do you know about gliders?" And he said - now remember, I'm speaking from memory - he said: "I'm in charge of the glider program." I said: "What does it consist of?" He said: "It consists of me and a couple of other junior officers, and two or three civilians." And I said: "Well, do we have a glider program"? And he said: "No. Nobody listens to us."

Q: This was '41, prewar?

W: Yes.

Q: That's right, because the Germans had gone to Crete around April or May of 1941.

W: Yes, and this must have been around August or September. So I said:

"Surely, you've been out there this long. You've figured out what kind of a glider program we ought to have?" And he said: "Well, I have, but we aren't getting anywhere with it." And I said: "Now's your chance. You want a program? Here's your opportunity." So I said: "You just tell me what kind of a glider program you guys have worked out," and he did, and I wrote a speech, saying: "This is what we are doing." The Old Man didn't bat an eye. He read it at the banquet, coast-to-coast, over about 800 stations, and there was the glider program. But that's a helluva way to get a program.

Q: Was it soundly based? Was it a good speech? Looking back at it, was the information he gave you sound?

W: Yes, of course, I don't think the US Army Air Forces ever pulled off a successful glider action.

Q: You know, this guy Richard Dupont got into it later on.

W: He was up there at Elmira. He was international soaring champion.

Q: He was killed during the war.

W: Yes.

Q: One of the reasons the glider program never got off the ground was that Eisenhower, some of the Army high brass, did not have confidence in gliders, or the whole airborne concept.

W: Sort of an ironic sequel to it because, two years later, when we invaded Sicily, I was Operations Officer of a fighter group. We were in on the invasion of Sicily and that was, of course, a complete debacle, the glider part of it.

Q: Well, did you know about this business when over 100 C-47s got shot up flying over our own forces?

W: We were there. I was there. I remember one case, we let one of those airborne, those paratroopers outfits use our field. We were operating out of a dry lakebed up near a place called Matera, Tunisia, not far from Bizerte, where the invasion fleet formed up. We told these guys that they could use our strip. It was just a four fifty-fallon drums on a dry lakebed. We said they could use it if they would give way to us because we were coming back with low fuel. That morning they started coming in there firing red flags,

which meant they had wounded aboard. I remember one guy ran in a C-47 - I'd already been out and back - and I got into my jeep and drove up to his airplane. The paratroopers had all gotten out of the airplane, but his co-pilot was sitting there, in the right hand seat with no head, and the pilot was hysterical, naturally, flying all the way back with this headless body next to him, blood all over the place. It was a mess, and this is part of that unfortunate incident. Of course, you know, in the Mediterranean during 1943, the United States Navy shot at any airplane. It didn't make any difference what it looked like, or what.

Q: I'm not sure of the facts of this, but apparently, a day before, perhaps the night before, the Luftwaffe came over there, and they had a session bombing the invasion fleet. So, everybody was trigger happy. One or two ships opened up on planes flying overhead, and everybody figured they must be good targets, so they let loose.

W: I was sitting right there watching the whole thing. They used to do this all the time. When we moved up, you see, we would move forward across NW Africa every two or three months. We had to have a base in that area. There was a big, permanent hospital on a knoll, and it had been there for years, and it had been there for years, and the Germans had had it. When they moved out, as I understand it, they left their wounded and even a lot of their doctors there. By the time we got up there, the US Army had taken it over. We deliberately selected this landing strip right underneath the hospital because we knew the Germans knew it was a hospital. We figured they wouldn't dare bomb us for fear of hitting the hospital. Also, there were nurses there, which was nice to have around. So, every night, almost every night, the Germans would come over, during the time of the invasion was forming up, and mostly, they were just photo reconnaissance. But, once in a while, they sent over 7 or 8 JU-88s. There was no flak discipline in the US Navy, and there was no flak discipline among the crews of these landing craft. You would see in the dark some stupid guy with a 40 mm anti-aircraft gun start firing, because it looked like bright red tennis balls going into the air, one after another. Then another one would start. The first thing, you know, everybody in Lake Bizerte was shooting. We were laying low.

We had a British anti-aircraft outfit defending us. We gave them strict orders that they were not to open fire on anybody unless we were being strafed, because we didn't want to attract anybody's attention.

Q: I think General Joe Swing was in charge of the airborne then, wasn't he?

W: I don't know.

Q: And another guy - Arnold held him responsible, at least partly responsible, was Ray Dunn, Mike Dunn. Do you remember him? Gen Mike Dunn. He was one of Arnold's favorites. He had come up with him through the March Field route. He had gotten his star, and then, he got broken back after that incident.

W: I don't remember Dunn at all.

Q: He was not in Arnold's office, but he was one of Arnold's favorites. He had been his Adjutant for a number of years at March Field. He was brought into the office in the late '30s, and then, he went overseas and he got a star. He was later involved in that airborne operation and Arnold held him partly responsible for it. I think there was some justice in shooting at these planes because the Navy had not been properly notified that these planes would be flying in that area.

W: In the beginning, that is, in the summer of 1941, one of the things that General Arnold always wanted was something like Air Force Magazine. We had a thing called the Air Corps Newsletter, which was a two-page mimeographed sheet put out by an old civil servant named Oscar somebody or other, who worked in the Army Air Corps Hqs., as long as I can remember. I'd been there on active duty perhaps two or three months. One day I was in General Arnold's office, and he had a copy of the Coast Artillery Journal, which was a thick, slick, four color operation, very expensive. He said: "Why can't we have something like this for the Air Corps? " And I said: "We could." He said: "Well, what's preventing it?" I said: "Incentive and money." He said: "All right, let's have one." I said: "Let's who have one?" And he said: "You!"

Q: You made a mistake asking that.

W: Well, I went back down to the office I was in, and I got hold of Oscar. I said: "General Arnold has given us carte blanche to really improve the Newsletter, which just came out occasionally. It was just two sides of a mimeographed

sheet.

Q: Right, it came out I think twice a month. I've been looking through early issues, in the early '30s. It was mimeographed.

W: Yes. So, I just took it over. I changed the name of it from "Air Corps Newsletter" to "Air Force", something like that. It was no good on a mimeographed machine, of course. So I went down to the printing department of the Army Air Forces, and asked them what they had there that would do a decent job of printing a magazine. Well, they didn't have anything. And I said: What do we need?" I told them what I wanted to do. And they said: "Well, you need a couple of multilith machines." I said: "How much do they cost?" This guy looked at me and said: "$7,000 a piece." So I said: "All right. Buy two." So he did. His boss, some Colonel, called me in and said: "What the hell is this, two $7,000 lithograph machines?" I said: "This is for the new Air Force Magazine." And he said: "Who in the hell authorized that?" I said: "Verbal orders from the CG." So I got these two machines, and then, I formed a little staff, and I think we got Bob Hotz into the Air Corps.

Q: This is probably before he went over to China; he was with Chennault.

W: Oh yes, this was a long time before that. Summer 1941, and so, anyway, I won't bore you with the details of what I had to do. But I set this thing up, and borrowed a lot of material from the Royal Air Force, and got a lot of stuff from other publications, and started putting it out on a regular basis. You've probably seen that effort.

Q: Yes, it became a marvelous effort, toward the end of the war, they put out these special editions, tactical air and strategic air.

W: That was after Jim Straubel took it over.

Q: Really, you are the father of Air Force Magazine?

W: Yes, and I have a letter of commendation for it. But when Straubel ran a history of the magazine, some years ago, he didn't mention my name at all.

Q: Well, I'm going to jog him on that.

W: But I have a commendation. As a matter of fact, I selected Straubel to take over the editorship of it, so I could get the hell out of Washington

and go to the Training Command.

Q: Does Claude know this?

W: Sure. But if Straubel gives you any flak on it, let me know, and I'll show you a letter of my commendation. It said: "As one of your original assignments, you are ordered to originate or create Air Force magazine. Straubel took it over and then, in my opinion, has done a marvelous job with it over the years. And then, of course, it began to be printed professionally. We were printing it, pasting in the type on these matts, you know what I mean.

Q: Your work in Kuter's office, you mentioned planning the possibility of invading Formosa and the feasibility of giving fighter protection to bombing raids. Some of the other people in Kuter's office, like Curley Wolfinbarger. Did you work with him? And Moffat?

W: No, the guys I worked with were George Carey, who was my boss. He was a retread. Hell of a nice guy. He lives in Green Spring Valley, Md. Art Carlson was one. He was a Regular.

Q: Arnold complained at one time, I believe it was in Quebec, that he was not getting, that the Army -- Gen Handy and McNarney on the other side -- were getting better air information about our capabilities and incapabilities than Arnold was getting from his Air Plans. And then, I think - this was around 1944 - he beefed up his staff. Do you remember, any unhappiness on his part, on the background information getting through Plans and preparation for some of the Conferences?

W: No, he never said anything about it to me, and I never heard anything. I don't remember any flak about it; I always thought he was satisfied with Kuter.

Q: Well, he was.

W: He had Gen Loutzenheizer there. In fact, Joe Loutzenheizer was my direct boss, and then, of course, he was lost. There were a lot of guys in Plans that I thought, fairly or unfairly, didn't really belong there. They knew even less about the Air Force and airpower than I did. I regarded myself at that point as pretty much of a pro, because I had combat experience. But Col Carey, whom I regarded very highly, hadn't any connection with the Air Force since WWI. He was a civilian. Sonny Whitney was in there. We began to get in Plans a lot of bright young Regular officers with combat experience. I can't

remember many of their names any more.

Q: Arnold never had experience in combat himself.

W: No.

Q: He was very sensitive to the entreaties of fellows like Norstad and Kuter who wanted to get out. While they liked working for Arnold, I think - they liked the responsibilities he gave them - yet they wanted to make their mark as combat leaders. Arnold, I guess, was vulnerable to this kind of plea, because he himself tried to get overseas in WWI and never made it. Did he ever talk to you about this?

W: No, never did.

Q: But it was known that he never was in combat?

W: Yes.

Q: And perhaps some people used this as a vulnerable point.

W: I never heard any criticism of Gen Arnold like that.

Q: Oh, I don't mean criticism. No, I didn't mean it this way. But the argument: "You didn't have a chance to go overseas; let me have my chance to go overseas."

W: Oh yes, I think there is no question about that. He let Gene Beebe go. Of course, Fred Dean, I think, had combat experience, before he came to work for the General. Then, of course, Gen Arnold finally issued orders that no pilot could go out on a second tour of combat duty until every pilot in the AAF had had a tour, which delighted a lot of us, because the Air Training Command was full of combat dodgers, you know. That's one of the things I told General Arnold about.

Q: You know, he was very unhappy about some of the training. You mentioned one incident before about the training. He became very unhappy with the 2nd AF at one time, Davenport Johnson. Did you get involved in that?

W: No.

Q: There were complaints overseas that the B-29s, and also in Europe, that high aerial gunnery, for example, they were not adequately trained in deflection shooting.

W: Well, they were trained, but they were trained wrong. They were 180

degrees off in their training. They were teaching these guys in such a way that they couldn't possibly hit the target. If they were well trained, they couldn't hit the target, because they were shooting at the wrong angle.

Q: This is one of the things that caused him to get exercised at Davenport Johnson, who commanded the 2nd AF. I was told that he peremptorily dismissed him, sent him up to Alaska. This was in 1943.

W: I was overseas then.

Q: He was always unhappy with the Training Command, and he was not always, but oftentimes, unhappy with Wright Field about one thing or another. Did any of these situations ever come to your attention, where you had to do some troubleshooting for him?

W: No, because when I came back from overseas - I went to work in the Pentagon the day after Christmas 1943 - and the only out-of-town assignment that I remember his giving me then was at the time when we went to the Redistribution Station. But I know he was unhappy about that. I remember I told him, although I didn't tell him any names. But I remember an officer who later on became a LTGEN, now retired. He came out to the Mediterranean in the summer of 1943. He came to our group. He looked me up because I'd known him when he was a 2nd LT, and he told me he was there from Wright Field, to find out what we the combat pilots thought about our airplanes, and what we needed. And I said: "Well, let's take a look at my airplane." We were flying P-40s then. I sat in the cockpit, and I said: "Now, for example, this throttle, the throttle handle itself, we come back from missions with grooves in our hands, fighter pilots going back and forth all the time." I said: "Why can't we have it molded with a sort of Bakelite handle there?" He said: "Oh, this one is the one we've used in the AF for many years. This is fine." Well, every time I mentioned something - I mentioned the oil shutter doors, the shutters on the oil cooler. You had to use a lever, and it was very hard to use. I said: "Why can't we have something like the Spitfire has?" He said, "Oh, this one is perfect." When we got all through - he was a Colonel then and I was a Major - I said: "Don, I don't think that you came out here to find anything out. I think you just came out here to confirm what you guys at Wright Field already believe. You are living

in the past. All these things may be okay on an AT-6, when you are flying from Wright Field to Washington." I said: "You said you wanted to improve the equipment that we are fighting with. But you obviously are not interested in that. He got very angry, and insisted that was not the case. Well, I told Arnold about that when I came home.

Q: Did he do something about that?

W: Well, the P-47 had a different throttle, I don't know if it came from that. He wanted to do a lot of things that he was never able to do. He would give instructions to people and they weren't carried out. They would just sort of shunt it off. He had so many responsibilities. I don't think he had anybody to follow up on things. He depended on his immediate staff, and they didn't always do it.

Q: Is this why he grabbed people in the hall? He has this reputation for grabbing people in the hall. There was also a story that you avoided the E-Ring unless you wanted to get sent to the CBI on two hours notice, or something.

W: Well, he would, of course. I was working in the E-Ring, and I couldn't avoid him anyway. But, several times - well, I remember one time. I hadn't been back in the States very long and I was walking down the E-Ring, and I had just finished lunch. He grabbed me, and he said: "I'm going up to lunch. Come along." And I said: "Well, General, I've already had my lunch." He said: "Never mind. Come on and have some more. So I went, and got in the car with Sgt Simmons and Gen Arnold and we drove out and I sat there.

Q: Is that Bruce Simmons?

W: Simmons - I guess it was. And I had a second lunch, and he wanted to talk about the P-40, and I told him about the P-40 and he got very annoyed with me because I was critical of the P-40. Finally, I said: "Now, look, General. It has lots of good qualities, but it is an obsolescent airplane, and then we had quite an argument.

Q: The last thing you said on the other tape was that you told Gen Arnold the P-40 was obsolescent. How did he respond to that?

W: He was angry, and we discussed it in great detail. I told him that the ME 109, which was our principal competition, could outclimb us and could outdive us and outrun us. And he said: "Well, why did you do so well then?" because we did very well, and I said: "Well, we just developed tactics that were superior to those of the Germans. The Germans weren't nearly so imaginative in their use of their aircraft as we were, or thought we were." And it was true that the P-40, that the gunnery system was excellent. We thought it was better than the ME. It had six 50 caliber guns. It was rugged. It would take an awful lot of abuse, and it had plenty of range - not as much as we wanted - but it had range. But I contended - I had flown a P-51, an attack version of the P-51 - they'd sent one squadron over there. I had just flown one of these airplanes and I thought it was a wonderful airplane. Well, the P-51 was a great embarrassment to the AF, because they wouldn't touch it.

Q: When it had the earlier engine in it, when it had the Allison liquid cooled engine. They put a Rolls Royce in it.

W: They put Rolls Royces in the P-40's, too, That's when they became good airplanes.

Q: Is that right?

W: Sure.

Q: I didn't realize that. Did they fly in the late stages of the war, fly P-40s against the Germans?

W: No, but we flew P-40s against the Germans until about Sept 1943. My brother, for example, Jack, he had a squadron of them down there in the Western Desert AF. But, we, the 325th Group, was the first fighter group in the Mediterranean to get P-47s, and subsequently, we were the first group to get P-51s. But the reason that the AAF didn't like the P-51 was

because it wasn't of US design. The AAF had the same opportunity as the British had to get the P-51. They wouldn't accept it until it had already been demonstrated to be superior to anybody else's airplane.

Q: You are hitting on a very sensitive point now. This is the one that historians have jumped all over, Noble Frankland and Emerson. I don't know whether you have followed some of the recent literature in this area.

W: Not very much.

Q: But the AAF is accused of having dallied in recognizing the superior merit of the P-51.

W: I don't think there is any question at all of that. Even my father admits it. Dad was Chief of the Power Plant Branch at Wright Field during the war. Dad was always in the research and development part of the AAF, and I was talking to Dad about it the other day. And he admits that we "just missed the bus." We should have had that airplane. We could have the airplane in the summer of 1943, there is no question about that. But we didn't get it. I think my group didn't get them until sometime in 1944.

Q: It was around January 1944 when they first started getting them. By that time you had already come back?

W: Yes, I was home, unfortunately.

Q: Some desperate measures were taken to try to make up for the inability of our escorts to escort the bombers all the way to target. They could take them part of the way, and then catch them on the way back. But there was a vulnerable period when the bombers were all by themselves. They tried all kinds of jerry-built devices. They had the XB-40, the XB-41. Do you remember those?

W: Yes, I never saw one.

Q: Well, they didn't last too long, for the reason that, you know, this armored B-17 would help you on the way there, but when you had dropped your bombs, and you were lightened and you wanted to get the h--- out of there, and go home, these planes were unable to move. So you had to protect them. In effect, the protectors had to be protected on the way back from

target, so this thing was dropped very quickly. And then, they were using cardboard wing tanks there for a period.

W: Really? I didn't know that.

Q: Yes, in 1943, the British - here is another thing. Arnold was unhappy with Wright Field. I indicated before. They wanted to put these wingtanks on the P-47s and P-38s, and Wright Field was very slow in coming up with a suitable design. So they were getting them from the British, cardboard, disposable wingtanks. This is for a period of several months. Do you think Arnold shares in a major way the responsibility for being slow on recognition of the P-51?

W: Yes, well, he's got to take the responsibility. He was the boss, I think every senior officer in the AAF had to share in the responsibility for it. I don't know, but there may be senior officers in the AAF who were advocates of the P-51. But, you remember, they went to the P-47, rather than the P-51. The P-47 fundamentally, was the old P-35, that airplane that Seversky produced.

Q: A Republic plane.

W: The P-47 was a good airplane. It was a great airplane. I'll never forget how elated I was when we got the first two or three of them, and I took one and flew it around and went out looking for Italian ships all by myself. By comparison, the P-51 which I've never had the good fortune to fly in combat - that was just, that was superior.

Q: Tommy Hitchcock, the playboy polo player, who had been assigned to Winant's office in London, has been given by some, recognition, or credit for recognizing the P-51 and pushing it. Have you heard about that?

W: I've never heard about it, but it's possible. But I remember they sent this squadron - I mentioned this squadron of an attack version of the thing in the Mediterranean. I think it was just one squadron. I think the only difference between it and the eventual P-51, it had dive-brakes, or something on it. There was a guy on Gen Spaatz' staff, his name I've forgotten now, a Colonel, and he got hold of one somewhere.

Q: Curtis, maybe?

W: No, Curtis didn't fly. No, a Colonel something. Anyway, he brought it down to our field one day and he let me fly it. I remember, it was like a Spitfire, which is a most wonderful little airplane to fly, plus a lot of improvements. It was just a joy to fly. I'll never forget, I took this airplane, after he checked me out in it. I took off and I flew around the field two or three times. It was such a wonderful experience, that I dove down over the field. I remember some men were having a baseball game, and I went right straight across the dry lake, and slow rolled it about three times, right on the deck, you see. This Colonel was just absolutely livid when I landed. He said: "Goddam it, you're going to bust up my airplane." But, boy, I was sold on that airplane, then and there. This was in 1943.

Q: It wasn't until Dec '43 or Jan '44 when the P-51 started coming out in some numbers, where they could put a whole squadron in protection of strikes. Of course, by that time, Eaker was out of there, and Spaatz was in. We were talking in the car about Eaker's being taken out of there. Well, you were overseas at the time, so you probably were not aware of some of the in-fighting?

W: No, I wasn't. You see, when I came back, in Nov 1943, Gen Spaatz was still there, because I remember, I went up, the last weekend I was in Africa, I went up and spent it at his villa. I used to go up there because I would get a big bed. The food was no good, because we ate the same food that was issued to the troops. But, I used to go up there and spend weekends occasionally. Larry Norstad was there, and Col W.W. Dick - if he is still alive, he could give you a lot of information about what was going on in Hqs. He's a non-flying guy.

Q: Well, when you came back around Christmas of 1943, or thereabouts, this change was right in the process of being made.

W: Yes.

Q: There was a great deal of bitterness in Eaker's camp. He blamed Kuter and perhaps Norstad. In fact, there is a lot of derogatory comments I have heard about Kuter and Norstad, that they were great staff officers

but not commanders. They make this differentiation. Part of that is probably due to the fact that Kuter had a hand in Arnold's decision to take Eaker out of there.

W: Well, I think that, I don't remember either Norstad or Kuter ever having a combat command.

Q: No, well, I say, they were....

W: They were staff officers; there is no question about it.

Q: They were staff officers, but they tried to get out. Norstad was sent out to the Mediterranean for a while. He was in North Africa, and so was Kuter.

W: Yes, but Norstad was on Gen Spaatz' staff, and he was strictly a staff officer. Kuter was in the Pentagon.

Q: Kuter went out to North Africa for a while, and then Arnold recalled him.

W: I didn't know that. I'm sure that both Kuter and Norstad must have flown combat missions, but not regularly, because they didn't have that kind of a job.

Q: Right.

W: Doolittle flew some missions, but they were discouraged and properly so, I think. Well, they even had a rule there for awhile, that in the bomber groups, that bomb group and fighter group commanders and operations officers were only allowed to fly one mission or two missions a week, because so many were being lost. Well, Gordy Austin who was my group commander, and by coincidence, a lifelong friend, he'd fly missions, and I'd do the same thing. If we didn't encounter any opposition, if nothing happened, we just didn't even record the mission. So, officially I had 49 missions, but actually, I guess maybe I had 75. You might get shot at, but if you didn't participate in something requiring making a claim, you know, something of that sort, you just didn't record the flight at all. But this is all apropros about what you say about these senior staff officers.

Q: Well, when you came back in 1944, you went into Plans, and you worked for Loutzenheizer?

W: Yes. Gen Kuter was the Asst Chief of Air Staff, Plans, and Loutzenheizer was the head of the Operational Plans Division, and I went into his office. I was in there for a long time, in the Asiatic Theater Branch. Then, I was lent to Reuben Hood, who was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and I spent about 3 months as his Exec Officer.

Q: What special assignment?

W: Just as his Executive Officer.

Q: I saw him down in Florida. He lives near Orlando.

W: How is he?

Q: Very good.

W: I haven't seen him in years and years.

Q: He lives in a suburb, Mt. Dora, Florida.

W: Never heard of it. He was a great guy.

Q: I started to ask about any special assignments you had when you were in Loutzenheizer's office, which brought you into Arnold's presence.

W: I don't remember anything specifically.

Q: Building up toward OVERLORD then. Then, there was this issue about do we bomb oil targets, or there was a guy named Leigh Mallory who was in the picture at that time.

W: Yes, RAF.

Q: Right, and they put him in charge of this AEAF; then they didn't give him any forces to command. The British were trying to get us to start hitting tactical targets, and Spaatz was pushing to hit strategic targets for a continued time, because he felt the oil campaign was paying off and paying some dividends. Did you get involved in any of this?

W: No, you see, we were involved in the sense that we were all kept apprised, in the sense that all sections of Plans were kept acquainted with what all other sections were doing because Kuter believed in having us, sort of a Boy's Club operation where everybody was involved. But, specifically, no, I was strictly working in the Asiatic Theater, and the Hump operation. Technically, we weren't supposed to be involved in the Pacific operation. They

had a Pacific section too, and we were concerned only with mainland, with the Asian mainland, but I don't remember anything in particular. The things I remember most about that time, was being able to read every morning, the "Eyes Only" messages that passed back and forth between Marshall and Churchill and the President. You know, just wonderful for an ex-newspaperman to be reading all this stuff.

Q: Was Arnold a sick man at this time? He had a small heart attack in 1943, and I was told that they had a wheelchair available for him. Did he ride around in a wheelchair?

W: I never saw Gen Arnold in a wheelchair in my life. I don't think that you would have gotten him in a wheelchair in the Pentagon under any circumstances. I never saw him that way.

Q: It might have been later, sometimes time telescopes. I know Trubee Davison was in a wheelchair. Did you ever see him that way?

W: Remember, he was crippled anyway, but...

Q: He's still around, I talked to him recently. He't out on Long Island.

W: How about that flack of his, Hans Christian Adamson.

Q: He died.

W: That was no loss.

Q: Well, you know something about that side of it, the Personnel Narratives Division. Hans Christian Adamson set up this outfit that was going to write some popular histories, and Arnold gave him the green light. Do you remember that? Did you get involved in that?

W: No, I didn't get involved. I had nothing but contempt for Adamson.

Q: Why?

W: I just thought he was, I didn't like Public Relations men as a class. That is strictly what he was. I always had the idea that he was in there strictly to promote Davison, and then, later on, old Capt "Ricketyback", Rickenbacker.

Q: He was on a raft with "Ricketyback."

Q: Oh yes, and that's, their version of what happened on that raft is an absolute fabrication.

Q: Is that right?

W: Yes, I met two or three of the other people who were on board. I was told by someone who was on the raft, that at one point, this young guy that was the pilot of this airplane, actually told Rickenbacker that if he didn't keep his mouth shut and stop interfering, he was going to shoot him right between the eyes.

Q: If you read Rickenbacker, the modest title of the biography, it's something else.

W: That wasn't the way we heard it in the AF.

Q: I know. I interviewed him, and he passed his 80th birthday.

W: How did you get away?

Q: Well, he, I started asking him some specific questions, and he didn't want to talk. (Off tape) Arnold used him for inspiration for the troops because he had 26 planes to his credit. There was a time when - you know, Gen Stanley Wray, remember him? He was in the 8th AF - he told me that based on computations, you had one chance in four. Well, your chance of getting back were .287. In other words, you had about 1/4 chance to get back, after completing 25 missions, based on the loss rate. That wasn't very good, and you needed something to boost morale. Rickenbacker was a guy who had been through it, and I think Arnold was using him for that purpose.

W: I don't think it worked, though. I know, he came down to Africa, and some of the groups had to order their pilots to attend his speeches. Going back to what you said, I saw some actual aerial tables that were worked up in the 8th AF, worked up on the 8th AF, and it seemed to me, if they were flying 25 missions and the life expectancy was about 16 missions. I don't know how that works out with your tables.

Q: I'm sure that these two figures are not necessarily contradictory, it might have been taken at a different times, but the chances were less than half that you would get back, which is not a very good percentage for guys fighting a war. So they needed something to get these guys going.

W: What we needed more than anything else, at least in Africa, was decent food, which we didn't have. The Services of Supply used to segregate on the docks, all the good food that came in. Remember, Argentine tinned beef and tinned chicken, things like that. They'd cut them right out and keep t hem right there for themselves, and we had a forced issue of Spam. I remember we moved from one base to another one time and we left behind us a stack of cases of Spam that was 8 feet high and 10 feet long. The reason I know that the Services of Supply were doing this, is because our Chaplain, Roy Terry, who is now Chief Chaplain of the AF, went down to the docks one time, and was checking this stuff. They threw him off the docks. Have you talked to him, by the way?

Q: No.

W: Well, I don't think he ever had anything to do with Gen Arnold. But he just happened to be our group chaplain, hell of a guy.

Q: I was in the Navy, I was aboard an aircraft carrier, and I can vouch for much of what you say. A lot of this stuff never got past the Navy.

W: Yes, I know that, too.

Q: Because aboard ship we ate better than most.

W: I know it. What carrier were you on?

Q: I was on three. I was on an Admiral's staff in the Pacific. I was on three CVEs, the Marcus Island (CVE 77) the Sangamon (CVE 26) and the Suwanee (CVE 27). I was on four invasions.

Q: I asked Gene Beebe, did he ever see Arnold mad? He said he got mad every day.

W: Oh, absolutely, absolutely. He had the shortest fuse of anybody I k now.

Q: Do you think that was sort of a release for him, or was it deliberate? Did he plan to get mad?

W: No, I don't think so. I just think he was a hot tempered fellow, and he may have done it deliberately, I don't know. But he used to take the skin right off Gene Beebe's back, and mine. You'd walk out the door and you were hoping that he would pause to take a breath, so everybody in the outer

office Miss Atkins, is she around?

Q: No, she died.

W: Did she? That's too bad. She could have given you more information on Gen Arnold than any person alive.

Q: I know.

W: Including Mrs. Arnold.

Q: Right. In fact, I was told that she was sort of a weathervane. People would call her and say: "Is this a good time?" And she would say, "yes" or "no." She might call somebody up: "You know, you have this problem. Today may be a good day to see him about it."

W: That's right. I remember when Arnold wanted me, with great effort she would call me LT Watkins, because she had known me ever since I was a kid, as Johnny, you see. She would call me on the phone and say: "Joh....uh, LT Watkins, the General wants to see you." And I'd head down the hall. I lived about half a block down the hall, and I'd walk in and I would say: "Is it safe?" And she'd say: "Yes," or she'd say: "Be careful." And I 'd go in there, and he would just go right through the roof at something. He'd say: "Listen to this." And he'd get madder and madder as he read it, and he would say: "Go tell that SOB that I think this is nuts." Then, as you said earlier, he would grab people in the hall and it didn't make any difference w hat they were...if he recognized the guy as being in a certain staff section, t hat he was interested in, he would call this guy in, and he'd get the information from him. It might be a 1st LT, or it might be a Colonel, but it wasn't necessarily the guy that was responsible directly to him, the General.

Q: Did this play hob with the whole organization?

M: Oh, sure. It was bound to. What the hell, if you are the General in charge of a staff section, and your boss calls you down and says: "I just understood that this is what you are doing," and he got it from one of your underlings. You know what your reaction would be. But he didn't go through channels.

Q: And he didn't care about hurting the feelings of a senior to get information about the project from a junior?

W: No.

Q: He just wanted to get the job done?

W: Yes.

Q: Impatient man.

W: Very, very.

Q: And if he made a mistake, as he probably made some - shooting from the hip all the time - and found that he was wrong, did he apologize, or simply take another tack without admitting he was wrong? Was he contrite?

W: I think he was, yes. Otherwise, I don't think I would have had as much respect and love for him as I did. Because when we were kids, we were always afraid of Major Arnold, but I never hesitated to spend time in his house.

Q: I'm going to get to that, this is another question, about knowing the Arnold family in earlier times, but this business of his getting mad at people. He got mad at you?

W: Oh sure.

Q: For something you did, or didn't do?

W: Usually for not moving fast enough, for asking too many questions.

Q: I was told that he got very impatient with somebody who said: "I'm taking care of it, General," or made some vague statement:"Leave it to me, I'll take care of it."

W: Yes.

Q: This infuriated him?

W: Yes.

Q: Is this an accurate statement?

W: Yes,yes.

Q: He wanted hard facts, and what have you done about this, or what has been done?

W: Right. He didn't want any evasions. He wanted specific answers to

direct questions, and he didn't want to explain what he wanted done. Just like I told you about that speech. I was asking concerned questions. I didn't know anything about the subject,and I didn't know what he wanted to say, and his reply to that was: "Stop talking and write the speech! Goddam it, stop talking, and write the speech."

Q: He had confidence in you, and he apparently had confidence in some people, and he had no confidence in other people. He wouldn't give them anything to do. Many times, in his correspondence, I've seen the word, "deadwood." That's the word. Now, you probably heard him say: "We've got a lot of deadwood around here".

W: Oh yes. I will tell you one thing though. He was tremendously loyal to his classmates, I mean Giles, both Giles brothers, Eaker and Spaatz, and Barton Yount, and he took care of them. I sometimes thought that that was a weakness on his part.

Q: I have been told that same comment in another way, that he was partial to the men who came up with him on the West Coast, the March Field group. Those who came up with Andrews on the East Coast route, through Langley Field, Ralph Royce and Tony Frank, who wanted a combat command, never got one. Hugh Knerr, some of these others, did not fare as well as the Spaatz' and Eakers, who came up with him.

W: I think that is probably logical, though, because he wanted to be surrounded by people in whom he had complete personal confidence. Whether he was wrong in his judgment or not, I mean, I would...

Q: You tend to give responsible jobs to people you know?

W: You knew, or thought you knew.

Q: But I was also told that despite his frequent comments about deadwood he didn't have the heart in some cases to unload people who were not doing the job. He carried them.

W: I think that was true of General Giles. Of course, I don't want him to be my whipping boy. But he had no reputation, at least among the younger officers. He was regarded as completely dead from the ears up, but he was there right to the bitter end. I don't know what happened to him after he left.

Q: He went out to the Pacific. You know, when Miff Harmon was lost, Giles went out to the Pacific and they brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. That's how they moved him out of Hqs.

W: I'd forgotten that.

Q: Another man I was told who had the same kind of reputation as Giles had, was Stratemeyer. He was also a lightweight, I was told.

W: He was in my theater, that is the Asiatic Theater Branch, when he was out in the CBI. We thought he was an absolute nothing. You remember now, these judgments are the judgments of a then very young man, and we probably didn't understand all the problems.

Q: It occurs to me that maybe Arnold selected weaker men to be his second in command because a strong man like McNarney who, everybody has told me, had tremendous competenence, was a very hard-headed guy, and he was an AF guy, and Marshall appropriated him to be his Deputy Chief.

W: With complete cooperation by General Arnold.

Q: Right, maybe Gen Arnold couldn't tolerate a strong second man?

W: Well, it would have been a very difficult decision to make, for anybody to make.

Q: It would have caused some friction because, maybe a strong second man like McNarney was an organization man. He believed in going right through proper channels. Arnold, having these impulses, would probably have gotten into a battle with McNarney.

W: He probably would have. I'm surprised, frankly, that Gen Arnold got along so well with Gen Marshall.

Q: Yes. Why do you think that existed?

W: I guess it is because Gen Arnold had such tremendous respect for Marshall, as most people did.

Q: But, in the other direction, why did Marshall accept Arnold like he did?

W: Well, there is no question that Arnold was a leader.

Q: Inspirational, and got things done?

W: Right. As evidenced by the history of Eisenhower and Patton, when Marshall reposed his confidence in someone he put up with an awful lot from them.

Q: Well, Marshall turned a lot of things over to Arnold and I guess Arnold did the job for him. Arnold did it himself, in a sense that he had, I like to use this figure of his bouncing 50 balls in the air. He would see a man like Watkins - he has some trust in Watkins, he has done a good job for him before, and he gives him one of the balls, and he only has 49 to bounce in the air.

W: Yes.

Q: And he couldn't wait for an organized meeting and delegation of responsibility through Watkins' boss, and his boss, and so forth. This might take a week to get these things out to the man. If he grabbed you out in the hall, he got you going within the hour?

W: Yes, but of course, you see, inthe beginning when I was first called up, it was understood while I was under Col Art Ennis (Public Relations) it was understood that I was really working for Gen Arnold. I was not officially part of Ennis' staff, because he had a full complement.

Q: You were in his office through 1941?

W: I was called up in June 1941, I was in his office until January 1942.

Q: All right, I want to ask you about something very critical. The RAINBOW FIVE leak. Do you remember the Chicago Tribune leak?

W: The code?

Q: No. This was the war plan, our VICTORY plan. The Tribune published huge gobs of the war plan three days before Pearl Harbor.

W: I don't remember that at all. (Off record)

Q: This is very crucial to another side of my story. You say there are officers on Andrews staff who were pushing for a separate air force in 1941?

W: Before that, in 1939 and 1940.

Q: At this time you were Aviation Editor of the Baltimore Sun?

W: Yes, and this fellow's name I can't remember. He and I had lunch together in Washington. The whole idea was for me to promote three things:

promote the GHQ AF; promote it with Gen Andrews as No. 1, promote a separate AF right away; and most important of all, to overcome President Roosevelt's refusal to buy more heavy bombers, and I was all for that. I thought at the time that Gen Arnold wasn't being very aggressive, that we needed all the heavy bombers we could get our hands on. And I remember, I wrote an article for Flying Magazine, then called Popular Aviation, in which I made a statement that made President Roosevelt very angry. I think I called this thing: "The Future of the AF." It ran in two parts, the only time the magazine ever printed anything that ran in two parts. I talked about the necessity for more heavy bombers, and said that Roosevelt was the principal obstacle in the path of a heavy bomber fleet, probably because he couldn't fish from a heavy bomber, but he could from a cruiser.

Q: Wow, you hit him where he lived!

W: Yes.

Q: Was this 1940, or maybe 1939?

W: Oh, it could have been as early as 1938.

Q: Was Andrews still Commander of the GHQ AF?

W: As I remember it, I think he was.

Q: He retired, or reverted to Colonel in March 1939, so it must have been prior to that?

W: It was before that.

Q: And Knerr, who was one of his leading drum beaters....

W: Right. I never had any contact with him.

Q: Who is a good friend of mine now by the way. He lives in Coral Gables, Florida. He was beating the drum. He was writing stuff for William Bradford Huie, The Fight For Air Power, and all this other stuff. There was the Fortune article right before Pearl Harbor.

W: What happened on that was that they wanted an article on the heavy bomber program. I thought it was John Osborne who wrote it, but I'm not sure. It was somebody on the staff.

Q: Well, Knerr supplied the data for it.

W: They finally got permission to do it. General Arnold was very reluctant,

but they finally got permission to do it, and they went out to Wright Field, as I remember it, and they completely - I'm talking about the Fortune group -- completely misrepresented their authority, and they agreed in advance that they would submit the article to the War Dept for possible breaches of security. They did send it down to the War Dept, and I remember - for some reason I was carrying it through - and it was very heavily censored because of the complete description of the entire heavy bomber program. They also went out to Seattle, talked to the people at Boeing. They submitted the article. It was very heavily censored. I can remember it. I can see it as plainly, I thought: "My God! I'm glad I didn't have to write this thing, and have it subjected to this." But they had agreed in advance. So they took it back to NY and they published the original article. Of course, all hell broke loose because Gen Arnold said the German and Japanese governments would have paid $500,000 for it. They raised hell with Mr. Luce, and Mr. Luce wrote a letter back to General Marshall or General Arnold - probably Gen Marshall - in which he said: "Yes, that they had agreed to submit it for censorship, but they didn't agree with the censorship and they thought they were more competent to determine what should be printed in the public interest than the War Dept was." I thought of all the arrogant bastards.

Q: Right. Well, this was the higher moral law. An interesting footnote to that is that Hugh Knerr was then retired. He left the War Dept on a disability when his mentor, Andrews, was sent down to San Antonio as a Colonel. In 1939, Knerr retired. Then when Andrews was on his way back - Marshall thought a great deal of Andrews - he put him in as G-3 in 1940, and then he put him in the Caribbean in 1941. Knerr was trying to come back. But Arnold was not breaking any world's records in letting him come back. He finally let him come back, only because Knerr was a genius at logistics. Of course, Knerr rose to two stars in Europe, not because Arnold liked him, and he hated Arnold.

Q: On Pearl Harbor Day, Arnold was not in town on Dec 7th.

W: No.

Q: He was shooting quail with Donald Douglas.

W: I don't know where he was, but I guess he got home that night.

Q: They flew all night, I'm not sure they got home that night. Beebe was with him. By the way, they flew all night and he got home, perhaps the next morning. Arnold didn't find out about Pearl Harbor until about three hours after it happened. He was out shooting quail.

W: I was in Washington, I had that apartment up on 16th St. I was giving a cocktail party, and we heard on the radio. Then the Duty Officer down at the old Munitions Building called me and he said: "John,you'd better get down here in uniform and I went down, and I spent the night there, I remember. The next day, sometime on Monday, I was in Gen Arnold's office, Gene Beebe and I, and Gen Arnold told me. Was it Gen Frank in Pearl Harbor?

Q: No, his son-in-law.

W: Who was the CG of the Air Force?

Q: Oh, the Air CG was Fred Martin.

W: Yes, Gen Arnold said to me: "Try to get Gen Martin on the telephone." So I spent the next two or three hours trying to get Martin on the phone. Just to show how Arnold was, he said: "By the way, ask him how Jack is." My brother, Jack, was there.

Q: What was his job?

W: Jack was either Engineering Officer or Operations Officer of an A-20 squadron, those light bombers, twin engine bombers. He was telling me about that the other day, that they thought that the one Jap carrier was off Barber's Point, 50 miles off Barber's Point. They had 4 airplanes, 4 A-20s, and his squadron commander picked out three other pilots, including Jack. He said: "Now, we are going after that carrier." They loaded two 300# bombs on each A-20 and Jack said they took off. Jack said he knew that he wasn't coming back because the squadron commander said: "Now, we are going to go right through their fighter screen. We are going to go right down on the deck of the carrier about 20 feet, and let these bombs go. They went out. Fortunately, there wasn't any carrier out there. They came back and he said

they were shot at by everybody, even while they were taxiing after landing.

Q: It must have been complete chaos?

W: Oh, it was terrible. Then it was Monday morning or Tuesday morning, Gen Arnold told me and Col Shelmire to go out to Bolling Field and see what the antiaircraft defenses were. I'll never forget, we went out there, and there were about four 50 caliber machine guns scattered around the field. God, it was a mess.

Q: Let me ask you one more thing about your early days when you knew the Arnold children.

W: My father was at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. The Arnolds came east.

Q: Was this '30-'31?

W: Yes, it was '30 or '31, somewhere in there. Our quarters were very close to theirs. And Lois Arnold, Gen Arnold's oldest daughter was my age, and we were particularly good friends. In fact, at that time, I've forgotten how old Lois was.

Q: She was born in 1915.

W: That's about right, she was 3 years youngers that I. He wouldn't let her go out on dates with anybody. But he would let me take her to the movies, things like that, you see. So Lois and I knocked around together for years. We were friends for as long, well, not as long as she lived. She married a Navy officer, who was a bad egg,by the way. The last time I saw Lois was, oh, must have been about 1947-48. The boys were great friends of my brother, Jack, and Bob and Bill Dudley. But I haven't seen the boys in years and years. In fact, I haven't seen any of them.

Q: Three Colonels - one's Army and retired.

W: Which one is that?

Q: This is Hank, and then two Colonels. Bruce, he is in the Senate Liaison Office. Then Dave who is now in Thailand. both of them have a small chance to make a star.

W: Give Bruce my best.

Q: Yes, I certainly will.

W: He won't remember me nearly so well as he will remember Jack.

Q: Do you remember anything about Arnold at Wright Field? Major Arnold. Did you know a guy named Jan Howard there?

W: Vaguely, I remember the name.

Q: You have no other recollections of Arnold at that period?

W: Not particularly. I remember him very well, of course, but I don't remember any stories.

Q: This was at Fairfield. Where was your dad stationed?

W: He was stationed at Wright Field, but we lived on the old Fairfield Air Depot.

Q: What was his job?

W: He was Chief of the Power Plant Branch. He was then a Major or a a Captain, I've forgotten which. He must have been a Captain.

Q: What was your dad's first name?

W: Dudley W. Watkins. He is living here now, here in town. He has an apartment here. We were just around the Arnold house all the time, or they were around our house. I just remember Arnold as being somewhat short tempered and particular.

Q: Was he then too?

W: Yes, yes, and we knew who was running the Arnold quarters. He was a great guy, though. I never at any time lost my respect for Gen Arnold. I never at any time was angry with him, even when he would give me hell. But I don't know why particularly. He was quite different from my father.

Q: Well, I think you probably respected him.

W: Tremendously, yes.

Q: As a man of competence, perhaps?

W: I remember once before, it was in the fall of 1939. I was on the Baltimore Sun then. I had written an article for, I'd made the first scheduled trans-Atlantic passenger flight with Pan American Airways. After I got over there, I looked over the French Air Ministry, and some of their factories, and went to England and did the same thing. I came back and wrote an article for Flying Magazine about the efforts of the French to build up their Air Force. It was a pretty naive article. But they put a title on it: "France Will Be

Ready!" And I ran into Gen Arnold at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. It was some kind of demonstration. He grabbed me and said in a voice you could hear all over the place: "France Will Be Ready, ha, ha, ha." And he gave me hell, he said, for being sucked in by the French Government.

Q: Did you know about this Paul Chemidlin incident?

W: (No, he didn't).

W: Before I was called on active duty, the last couple of years on the Sun, I was there as military correspondent, a job that Mark Watson eventually took, and did so much with. I was in Washington a lot, and I would frequently go out to the Arnold house, which was at, it was in....

Q: Bradley Lane, was that it?

W: Maybe that was it, it was in Washington. It wasn't military quarters. And I would go out there for dinner and spend the evening or whatever it was.

Q: Hampden Lane.

W: I have no idea what it was. But I remember Gen Arnold's two slot machines in the playroom. But I remember on at least two occasions when he would come home from work, and he would shake his head, and he would say, right in my presence to Mrs. Arnold: "Well, I was over to the White House today, and I think we are going to be relieved. I think we are going to have to move." He said: "The President gave me hell again." He was serious about it. But he would not truckle to the President, I mean he was respectful to him, I'm sure. But he wouldn't tell the President what the President wanted to hear. He told him what he thought, just the way I would tell him what I thought. But I remember how discouraged he was on numerous occasions. Mrs. Arnold probably has said the same thing.

Q: Yes, she said about his being in Roosevelt's doghouse. For a time he was walking on eggs.

W: Oh yes.

Q: Right at the time he was trying to get some information from Lindbergh. I had a conversation with Lindbergh, and looked at his papers. Arnold was walking on eggs there, because Lindbergh was persona non grata with Roosevelt.

Arnold took a lot of chances in that job of his. But he did such a good job, I think, that this overcame misgivings that either Marshall or FDR had.

W: That reminds me of something. Do you remember C.B. Allen.

Q: I don't, but C.B. Allen is very close to Lindbergh. I have an article that he wrote. Is he still around?

W: He lives in West Virginia and he's retired. I think he worked for the Martin Company and he is retired now. He was one of my best friends years ago. He was Aviation Editor of NY Herald Tribune. He is very close to Lindbergh. He and Deke Lyman are Lindbergh's closest friends. But C.B. would be a good man for you to talk to.

Q: One of the things Allen said, in an article he wrote for the Saturday Evening Post in 1940, was that Roosevelt tried to buy Lindbergh off, by offering him Secy of the AF, a separate AF. I talked to Mr. Lovett about this. He denied that such an offer was made.

W: What does Lindbergh say about it?

Q: Lindbergh is, well. Actually, I should have asked this question more directly, I was kind of beating around the bush about it. But I didn't get a clear indication from Lindbergh about whether he did or not, but C.B. Allen did mention it in his article. So I really don't know whether this was fact. But Lindbergh in his new book says Roosevelt made a number of offers to try to buy him off, so he probably hinted this. I don't know. My guess is that they hinted that they would have an important job for him, and C.B. Allen simply assumed that it was Secy of an AF. I'm just guessing now.

W: I remember once in President Truman's second administration, I hadn't been up here terribly long. I got a call from a guy in the White House that, just sort of a pleasant conversation. He said: "Would you be interested in being Under Secy of the AF." And I said: "Give me 15 seconds, No!" So it could have been something like that. But knowing what I know of Roosevelt, it is entirely possible that he did try to buy Lindbergh off. But I think C.B. Allen, he would have some peripheral information. He was never close to Arnold that I know of.

Q: When I send you some information, I'll send you an envelope, and if you think of his address, I'll ask you for it, if I may. I'll drop him a note because West Virginia is not too far from where I am.

W: Oh yes, it is an easy drive from the District. He seems to be very alert, because Lyman had some kind of an accident. He was doing an article on Lindbergh, C.B. came up here, I understand about 6 months ago, a nd helped him complete it.

Interview John C. A. Watkins, Providence, R.I., 10 May 1971

Q: We're talking about your duty on the Air Staff under....

W. Giles. First of all, I was a very low ranking member of the AC/AS Plans, and I think I started as a Captain, when I came back to the States in December 1943. There were a bunch of bright young guys in there. I was one of the first ones to come back that had actual combat experience, and we were free under Kuter. We would sit around and discuss planning. There wasn't any rank involved in it. We would just sit around and throw things back and forth regardless of what your rank was, whether you were a reserve officer or a regular. Well, you mentioned Gen Giles, Mr. Lovett not having too much confidence in his competency, we didn't think he had any competency at all. Rightly or wrongly, we, I mean the younger officers in the planning group, thought he was stupid, and when the YALTA conference was set up, we were horrified at the thought that Gen Giles should represent the AAF. We set up a little sort of cabal to persuade somebody to send Gen Kuter instead of Gen Giles. I don't remember how it worked, but it worked, and that was how Kuter went, because the younger element in the AAF, and I guess Gen Marshall and Mr. Lovett, all agreed that Giles would be a disaster. I'll tell you the sort of thing he did. We got a report - see, we were working with the JCS and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We got a report that the Navy had prepared a paper which would have set up strategic air force in the Pacific under the Navy. It would be another strategic air force. Of course, that made no sense at all. Gen Giles was told this, and his immediate reaction was: "All right, we'll show those bastards, we'll put in a paper to the JCS setting up a US Army Air Forces carrier fleet. That was his theory as to how to handle this situation. You see, we had no confidence in him at all. Of course, the sad part of that was Larry Kuter may or may not tell you - he was so low ranking.

Q: He was perhaps one-star then?

W: No, he was two stars. Maybe not. If you look at pictures of the YALTA conference, poor Larry is standing practically out on the frontyard.

Q: I know he was like the messenger boy there.

W: Yes.

Q: He was one or two stars below all the other ranks. This created, well contributed to the difficulty of the AAF.

W: Oh yes, it was just like he didn't have a voice. He was very,very upset when he got back because he briefed us all on the whole thing, when he got back.

Q: He was sending reports out to Arnold from MALTA first, then YALTA, and Arnold, who was either prostrate,

W: He was down in Coral Gables.

Q: Yes, taking it very easy. He was writing instructions through each paragraph. They were sending him paragraphs on different situations. I don't know if you contributed to some of this.

W: No, I didn't.

Q: And he was trying to give some direction to the AAF position, by two or three words, "write-throughs" the paragraphs. He'd say: "Do it, or "No," or some such direction. Gene Beebe and Peterson were coming down. I guess every other day, shuttling down to Coral Gables.

W: I thought Beebe had left by then...

Q: Well, Beebe had his own heart attack.

W: Yes, I know but...

Q: Maybe it was Peterson.

W: It was Peterson. It wasn't Beebe. Beebe had already gone to the Pacific. He had been given a bomb group or something.

Q: That's right, I talked to him very recently, he's in Long Beach, Calif. Anyway, he was very close to Arnold.

Q: On the subject of Giles, Lovett realized that Giles didn't have the standing, and of course, you put a little more strongly than Lovett put it to me, but Lovett realized that the AF needed somebody of strength and Arnold accepted this because if he was not on the job, Marshall might appoint somebody else. He had this fear he would be retired. So I think he acceded to the selection of Eaker, being perhaps the No. 3 man in experience in the AAF. Spaatz was going out to the Pacific to finish the thing out there. So, Eaker came in to Hqs. as Deputy, Eaker proceeded to wheel and deal. I was told by

Arnold's Exec. Do you remember Jim Maher? I saw him very recently. He indicated that Eaker simply bypassed Arnold's office. Nothing came in to Susie Adkins, who was Arnold's secretary. It all came into Eaker's office. There was a strong belief in Arnold's office - I guess Fred Dean was there; Maher was there. There was a strong feeling that Eaker had pretensions to the top post, and in the belief that perhaps Arnold wouldn't come back. So there was a great deal of plotting going on and counterplotting going on. Eaker and Maher had a confrontation. Maher was a tough old Irishman, who with a couple of drinks in him, would say anything to anybody. This is his own estimate of himself. He simply went up to Eaker and told him off. He told him that he was representing Gen Arnold, and they were not getting the paperwork coming through Gen Arnold's office and he intended for General Arnold to be briefed. So they had a "knockdown-dragout" with Eaker. Eaker was three stars, and he was like a LTCOL. Mrs. Arnold told me some of this.

W: Arnold set me up all the time.

Q: Did he think through beforehand, some of his decisons, would you say?

W: Yes, I think he must have. He was pretty impetuous at times, I remember, on a very trivial level, he let me go through flying school as an officer two years over grade. I'd had a pilot's rating before the war, but I wanted to be a military pilot, a combat pilot rather than service pilot. So he let me go through flying school, and it was resisted bitterly by several of the general officers, notably, Luke Smith, who had the Training Command as his staff function in Washington. Arnold's only stipulation to me was that after I had completed the course, that I would give him my impressions of the training program from a student's point of view, and not an expert's point of view, but a student point of view. So, when I finished up, I came up to Washington and you know, you couldn't avoid answering him on it. It was impossible, you couldn't pass it off. I was sitting in his office. He said: "What did you think of your flight training?" And I said: "It was fine." He said, "Well, what was wrong with it?" I said "Well, nothing particularly." He said: "Well, there must have been something wrong with it." So I said, "Well, I wouldn't like to repeat

the basic, which was at Greenville, Miss. He said: "Why?" And I said: "Because I've never seen such a low grade of officers as there, anywhere else in the world." I said I thought they were lousy. He flipped on his intercom to General Smith, and said: "I've got a young officer down here in whom I have complete confidence. He has just completed the training program and he's said our basic flying schools are lousy." I said: "General, I didn t say the basic flying schools were lousy," I said that there were certain things about this particular basic flying school that was terrible. "I didn't say they were all." He said: "Never mind. You go up and tell Luke Smith all about it." So I went up to see Smith and Smith actually - I'd known him for years - he actually made me hit a brace, stand at attention and gave me a thorough going-over. He said that I was a nosy kind that was never satisfied to stay out of other people's business, and I had no business telling General Arnold this. I should have told Gen Arnold that everything was fine in flying school. And I said: "Well, sir, I wouldn't tell Gen Arnold any such thing, if I didn't believe it." Well, this went on and on, and finally he let me go, and I went back down to Gen Arnold's office, because I was going back with him to Ft. Myer to spend the night and Col Shelmire.

Q: I missed talking to him, he died.

W: It's too bad, because he was one of Gen Arnold's really closest friends.

Q: They went to school together.

W: Oh yes, but anyway, I went back down to Arnold's office, and "Uncle Horace," as we called him, was sitting there. He was a flamboyant character. He said: "What's the matter?" I said: "Nothing." He said: "Yes, there is. Did Luke Smith give you a hard time?" And I said: "How did you guess?" He said: "You are as pale as a sheet." I told him what Smith had done, and I never have thought out to this day how it happened, but Luke was relieved of his job, and reverted to his original, regular rank. He was sent down to Panama some place, and later on became a General again.

Q: I was told that Luke Smith, who lives in either Ft. Worth or Dallas....

W: He's dead. The curious sequel to that was...

Q: Did he die recently?

W: I think he's been dead a long time, unless I'm really mistaken, but...

Q: I think he was alive in February of this year, unless he died since then.

W: I'd like to know, because I'm reasonably sure that he died a long time ago. I'm pretty sure he died in 1945 or 1946, maybe while he was still in Europe, because he finally made it back up the ladder again. I was in a year and a half later. I think I was in Gen Norstad's office when he had relieved Kuter, and he said: "There's an old friend of yours in the building. He wants to see you." And I said: "Who is that, General?" And he said: "Luke Smith." And I said: "Oh, my God." And he said: "Don't worry about it. He has something he wants to discuss with you." So I went over to the Visiting General's Office, and saluted sharply. Gen Smith said: "Oh, don't do this saluting, John. We don't salute here in the Pentagon." He greeted me like a long lost son. He told me he was going to Germany. As I remember it, he was going to be the AF General on General Cla 's staff after the surrender.

Q: High Commissioner of Germany.

W: He wanted me to go over there as his Executive Officer and pilot, and which I thought was a very interesting job. So I told him I would go if I was ordered to go, but I wouldn't go as a volunteer. He said: "Why not?" I said: "Because I don't want to serve under you." And he said: "I'm sorry you feel that way about it."

Q: You were a brash young officer. I think that's probably why General Arnold respected you. You know, he got this kind of information from Rosie O'Donnell, too. Rosie O'Donnel was a brash young man.

W: I know he was, except he used foul language.

Q: I don't mean there was a complete parallel there, but Rosie O'Donnell was very blunt with Gen Arnold.

W: And so was I.

Q: I think he didn't have enough people who were willing to stand up and tell him the facts straight.

W: I imagine the Luke Smith episode was very disappointing to him, but he did respect people who were honest with him, and those are really the only people

he did respect, in my opinion. He told me when I first went into the service, in June 1941, I was assigned to Air Intelligence under a Colonel - I've forgotten his name now, but I didn't work for him, I worked for General Arnold.

Q: Was it General Hodges

W: I think it was Hodges, but this Colonel was my immediate superior, he was with Public Relations. But anyway, I did all my work for General Arnold. He said in effect one day: "Now, you are a damned good reporter. That's what I want you to do for me. I'm going to send you around to places, where if I sent somebody from the IG office the balloon would go up, but if I send a 2nd LT, nobody pays any attention to it. So I went to places. One time I went up to Alaska with the then Colonel Lucius Clay, then LTCOL Freddy von H. Kimble of the AAF. They were going. General Arnold called me in and said: "General Marshall is sending Col Clay and Col Kimble up there to Alaska, ostensibly to look at airfield sites." This was in maybe October 1941. General Arnold said: "I want you to go with them and find out what the hell they are really doing up there. And while you are up there, take a look at the two fields, Fairbanks and Anchorage, and tell me how things are going, the morale of the troops, and the whole works. So much to their dismay - Clay's and Kimble's - they found this 2nd LT in a B-17 with them. So I went up there, and I find out they were up there for exactly what Gen Marshall had told Gen Arnold they were going for. But, I talked to a lot of the young pilots, and I found out, among other things, that they had a squadron of bombers and two squadrons of P-36s fighters, but they didn't have any ammunition for the guns in the fighters, and they had no bombs for the bombers. Up at Fairbanks, they sent an Army anti-aircraft outfit, a National Guard outfit from New Mexico.

Q: We are talking about pre-Pearl Harbor?

W: Oh yes, quite a while before Pearl Harbor. These guys were up there. It was getting pretty cold, and all they had was a summer uniform, and tents without any heat in them. A Col Carr was the Base Commander, and he put these guys in the hangar. He let them sleep in the hangars. So I came back and I reported all this to General Arnold in a typewritten report.

W: On another occasion, much later on in the war, probably in the summer

of 1944, some people got the idea that heavy bombers crews from Britain were deliberately defecting to Sweden and Switzerland, claiming battle damage, because somebody had told Arnold that these guys just put their B-4 bags in that airplane. Of course, quite a few of them were going into Sweden and Switzerland, but that was all by pre-arrangement with the Swedish Government. So he called me and Bruce Holloway into his office. Bruce was then a LTCOL or Colonel maybe. Arnold told us he wanted us to go to these redistribution bases.

Q: Louisville had one

W: They had one in Miami, and one in Atlantic City. He sent Bruce to Atlantic City, and he sent me to Miami, and he told us he didn't care how we operated, but to find out whether or not there was any truth in this defection story. And he didn't want us to talk to each other when we did come back. He just wanted us to give him a report, directly to him, which we did. I think I stayed in Miami Beach about 10 days as a returnee. We found out that if there was an occasional defector, it was an incident

Q: Not an organized affair?

W: Not at all, but they were really teed off at some of their General Officers, the General Officers in the 8th AF. I mentioned all this. I was a reporter, as far as I was concerned, on assignment.

Q: You were performing at the highest level. You were giving Arnold information that he could not get through the staff, because it got filtered down and watered and sanitized, while you were giving him straight dope, and he seemed to appreciate it.

W: I'll never forget though, when I finished typing this thing out, I took it into Larry Kuter and I said: "General, I would like to have you look at this before I turn it in." Which was a violation of my instructions, by the way. When Kuter - or maybe it was Norstad, I've forgotten which - read it through, he said: "Well, it is a very courageous report." Of course, what he meant was that I repeated the criticism of at least one General Officer by name which meant nothing to me, and besides my instructions were to find out what I could. I guess I have a lot of enemies in the AF.

Q: Well, I think Arnold probably deliberately chose somebody who was not a Regular, because a Regular would have been thinking about his career. If he was confronted with a situation where he had to criticize a superior officer, he made an enemy out of him. This could hurt his career, whereas you were a short termer. Arnold knew it, and you knew it, and you probably indicated to him that when the war was over, you'd be out of there.

W: Oh, he knew that.

Q: So he could get an honest report from you, and this is what he wanted. So you did a lot of work through Kuter, or sort of worked out of his office?

W: Well, I was actually, when I came back, I left Washington in January 1942, to go through the Training Command. Then, after I'd done my 50 missions in the Mediterranean, and was ordered home,I was ordered to Washington to be on the Air Staff, in Plans. So I was Exec Officer in the Asiatic Theater Branch, in Plans, apparently because I had lived in the Philippines Islands when I was a child. It struck me as being sort of unusual, because when I got there, I was the only officer in Plans who had combat experience in the Mediterranean theater. But, anyway, I was in the Asiatic Theater Branch. But, from then on, I had no formal association with Gen Arnold. Just once in a while, when he would have a letter to reply to somebody - I remember one in particular - Adm Mountbatten, or Generalissimo C-K-S, or somebody like that, he would call me down to the office, and hand me their letter and say: "Do me a reply." And I would say: "What do you want me to say?" He replied: Well, tell them I think it's a good idea, something like that. "Be diplomatic." I'll never forget one, I think it was a day after the Cairo Conference when Mountbatten was chosen as the Supreme Allied Commander in SE Asia. All of these guys, after the conference, sent congratulatory letters: "I think you are wonderful," and "you think I'm wonderful." So Arnold told me to write a letter to Mountbatten, congratulating him on his appointment- this SE Asia thing. So he didn't tell me what to say. I wrote this letter for him. They all called each other "Dickie" and "Hap," and all that sort of thing. So I said in the letter - I, meaning General Arnold - "hope that you will achieve the same success in melding together these highly

heterogeneous forces under your command that Ike accomplished in Algiers." Mountbatten wrote back and thanked him for his congratulations and said: "As a matter of fact, Ike told me as we were leaving Cairo, that history would hold me as wanting, if I didn't do as well in this area as he had." I've never forgotten it....

W: Mrs. Yount, did she remember my part in this song?

Q: No, because when I talked to her, I didn't know that you had a part in it. I talked to her a number of months ago, because you had mentioned her in your letter to Claude, you said something about "that damn song, Wild Blue Yonder." Claude passed that part of the letter on to me. So then I mentioned to you that I talked to Mrs. Yount about her role in it. So if I had known, I would have mentioned it. Anyway, maybe you can tell me about it.

W: That was really funny. Apparently she ran across this lad that wrote the song.

Q: Robert Crawford, I think.

W: Right, I think the Younts were living out on the West Coast then. He was head of the Training Command then. And she ran across this fellow out there, I believe. He showed her this song, and all kinds of people were sending in proposed Air Force songs.

Q: They had a competition, you know, Bernarr McFadden, Liberty Magazine, had run this competition, I think he would give $1,000 to the winner. This was competition for the Air Corps.

W: I had forgotten completely about that, and I wonder if Gen Arnold sanctioned the contest?

Q: Oh yes, General Arnold sanctioned it, because he was a man who was very much concerned about morale. The Army Air Corps needed its own song. I didn't know if he had any contacts with Bernarr McFadden, but it might have been through Mrs. Yount, or through Gen Yount. But anyway, you got involved?

W: I got involved in it because it must have been in 1941. Anyway, General Arnold just handed me this correspondence with Mrs. Yount, and it was sort of voluminous. She was also calling him once in a while on the phone. She was promoting this thing, and she wanted everybody in the AAF to love this

song. As I remember it now - this is why I wish Col Shelmire was still around, because he and I were great buddies - I was writing letters to her about it, for his signature, of course. Finally, I took it over to the Ft. McNair, the National War College, it wasn't that then.

Q: They called it Fort Humphreys.

W: But anyway, the US Army Band was based there, and I took it over there, and I got this guy that was Director of the US Army Band to do a march version of it. Then, Col Shelmire and I went over there and the Army Band put on a performa ce of it just for the two of us, a 2nd LT and Temporary LTCOL Shelmire, and this sounded all right, but the words, of course, were lousy. Every pilot in the Army Air Forces was revolted by the words. But it was officially declared the US Army Air Forces song, but that was all there was to it. I guess Gen Arnold figured that as long as he wasn't bothered anymore, that his could be the US Army Air Forces song. And, then, the next thing we heard was that Mrs. Yount had persuaded Gen Yount to require that everybody in the Training Command sing the damn thing, going to and from classes. Of course, that got the biggest promotion, probably in the history of the world. So General Arnold used to kid me about it, claimed that I was the father of the "Wild Blue Yonder" song.

Q: Well, I was told that the trainees, the Aviation Cadets were required to carry the words in their hats. They took their hats off, and sang the words.

W: Right. I'll never forget one time when Col Shelmire first came on duty. He had been a National Guardsman from Philadelphia. Gen Arnold really brought him in because he was somebody that was a contemporary, a lifelong friend he could talk to, as he could never have talked to me. He insisted that Col Shelmire go through that Replacement Training Center at Miami Beach. Col Shelmire, as I said, was a flamboyant old cavalryman, with the wax moustache. Gen Arnold was going to be down in the Miami area one time. He thought it would be good to go over and see how Col Shelmire was doing. This was the time when people like Clark Gable were going in to that thing, you know. All these old duffers, all younger than you and I then, but they were old duffers then. They marched to and from classes just like the Flying Cadets did. Gen Arnold was

waiting at the hotel, which was where Col Shelmire and his company of delegates were billeted. You could hear these guys coming up the street: "Off we go into the wild blue yonder." Gen Arnold was really pleased to think that his old buddy was going to be leading this squadron of officer trainees. And he was, in his yellow Buick convertible with the top down. Arnold just about blew a gasket. It was the funniest thing I've ever heard in my life. That was Colonel Shelmire for you.

Q: Well, he got away with murder with Arnold because he was close to Arnold...

W: Sure.

Q: A lot of fellows couldn't get away with that.

W: Right. But there again, he had no aspirations for grandeur or greatness. He was a successful businessman in Philadelphia, and he had every intention of going back to it.

Q: Based on what you tell me, it seems that Arnold used you in the same way that he set up this Advisory Council. Cabell and Norstad, right at the beginning of the war. They were troubleshooters. Apparently, he lost confidence of getting stuff, or maybe he was impatient to get stuff through the staff, as it worked it's way up, each staff agency sanitized information as it came through. Let's not offend anybody.

W: They always did.

Q: And apparently, Arnold was quite aware, quite sensitive to the fact that he wasn't getting full information. So he needed external sources.

W: The thing he could do with me. He knew that I was not an expert in any phase of the AAF. I'd been Aviation Editor of the Baltimore Sun, before that, the Dayton Journal Herald, and I was a pilot and had grown up in the AF, but that didn't make me an expert in anything.

Q: You were a reporter and he had confidence.

W: I was a reporter, so he would evaluate what I told him. I wouldn't e valuate what I saw. I'd just report what I saw or heard, and he would evaluate it. Unfortunately, lots of times he would tell me to go up and see so and so, "And I want you to tell him that this is stupid." I'd make the mistake of saying: "Well, General Arnold says this is a stupid arrangement," and I'd get

torn to pieces by the guy. But I was trying to think of one particular incident. There was the glider program, Fred Dent, and Fred Dent is definitely dead.

Q: He died in Shalimar, Florida, last year.

W: Oh, I think it has been longer than that. Oh yes, he's been dead a long time, I think. But, anyway, the international soaring competitions were being held at Elmira, NY. This was in the fall of 1941. I went up there with Gen Arnold and some others. I had nothing special to do. We went out and watched the glider contest. You remember, that was shortly after the Germans took Crete with gliders. Everybody was asking what the US was doing with gliders. Around 4:00 in the afternoon, somebody told Gen Arnold that he was speaking at the banquet that night, he was the guest speaker, and that this was going to be on a coast-to-coast Mutual Broadcasting System network. He didn't have a speech. There were 4 or 5 officers in his room in the hotel, and he turned to me, and he said: "Write me a speech." Well, I'd never written a speech in my life, for anybody. I said: "Well, what do you want me to say?" He said: "Talk about gliders." And I said: "What?" and he said: "Stop talking and write the speech. Goddam it, can't you ever stop talking?" And I said: "Yes sir." So I left the room, and I couldn't, I didn't know what to say about gliders. I knew it had to be related somehow to what the Germans were doing, and I'd figured we'd better say that we were abreast of the situation. Well, I'd met Fred, who was then, I believe, a LTCOL, and he was stationed at Wright Field. And I said: "What do you know about gliders?" And he said - now remember, I'm speaking from memory - he said: "I'm in charge of the glider program." I said: "What does it consist of?" He said: "It consists of me and a couple of other junior officers, and two or three civilians." And I said: "Well, do we have a glider program"? And he said: "No. Nobody listens to us."

Q: This was '41, prewar?

W: Yes.

Q: That's right, because the Germans had gone to Crete around April or May of 1941.

W: Yes, and this must have been around August or September. So I said:

"Surely, you've been out there this long. You've figured out what kind of a glider program we ought to have?" And he said: "Well, I have, but we aren't getting anywhere with it." And I said: "Now's your chance. You want a program? Here's your opportunity." So I said: "You just tell me what kind of a glider program you guys have worked out," and he did, and I wrote a speech, saying: "This is what we are doing." The Old Man didn't bat an eye. He read it at the banquet, coast-to-coast, over about 800 stations, and there was the glider program. But that's a helluva way to get a program.

Q: Was it soundly based? Was it a good speech? Looking back at it, was the information he gave you sound?

W: Yes, of course, I don't think the US Army Air Forces ever pulled off a successful glider action.

Q: You know, this guy Richard Dupont got into it later on.

W: He was up there at Elmira. He was international soaring champion.

Q: He was killed during the war.

W: Yes.

Q: One of the reasons the glider program never got off the ground was that Eisenhower, some of the Army high brass, did not have confidence in gliders, or the whole airborne concept.

W: Sort of an ironic sequel to it because, two years later, when we invaded Sicily, I was Operations Officer of a fighter group. We were in on the invasion of Sicily and that was, of course, a complete debacle, the glider part of it.

Q: Well, did you know about this business when over 100 C-47s got shot up flying over our own forces?

W: We were there. I was there. I remember one case, we let one of those airborne, those paratroopers outfits use our field. We were operating out of a dry lakebed up near a place called Matera, Tunisia, not far from Bizerte, where the invasion fleet formed up. We told these guys that they could use our strip. It was just a four fifty-fallon drums on a dry lakebed. We said they could use it if they would give way to us because we were coming back with low fuel. That morning they started coming in there firing red flags,

which meant they had wounded aboard. I remember one guy ran in a C-47 - I'd already been out and back - and I got into my jeep and drove up to his airplane. The paratroopers had all gotten out of the airplane, but his co-pilot was sitting there, in the right hand seat with no head, and the pilot was hysterical, naturally, flying all the way back with this headless body next to him, blood all over the place. It was a mess, and this is part of that unfortunate incident. Of course, you know, in the Mediterranean during 1943, the United States Navy shot at any airplane. It didn't make any difference what it looked like, or what.

Q: I'm not sure of the facts of this, but apparently, a day before, perhaps the night before, the Luftwaffe came over there, and they had a session bombing the invasion fleet. So, everybody was trigger happy. One or two ships opened up on planes flying overhead, and everybody figured they must be good targets, so they let loose.

W: I was sitting right there watching the whole thing. They used to do this all the time. When we moved up, you see, we would move forward across NW Africa every two or three months. We had to have a base in that area. There was a big, permanent hospital on a knoll, and it had been there for years, and it had been there for years, and the Germans had had it. When they moved out, as I understand it, they left their wounded and even a lot of their doctors there. By the time we got up there, the US Army had taken it over. We deliberately selected this landing strip right underneath the hospital because we knew the Germans knew it was a hospital. We figured they wouldn't dare bomb us for fear of hitting the hospital. Also, there were nurses there, which was nice to have around. So, every night, almost every night, the Germans would come over, during the time of the invasion was forming up, and mostly, they were just photo reconnaissance. But, once in a while, they sent over 7 or 8 JU-88s. There was no flak discipline in the US Navy, and there was no flak discipline among the crews of these landing craft. You would see in the dark some stupid guy with a 40 mm anti-aircraft gun start firing, because it looked like bright red tennis balls going into the air, one after another. Then another one would start. The first thing, you know, everybody in Lake Bizerte was shooting. We were laying low.

We had a British anti-aircraft outfit defending us. We gave them strict orders that they were not to open fire on anybody unless we were being strafed, because we didn't want to attract anybody's attention.

Q: I think General Joe Swing was in charge of the airborne then, wasn't he?

W: I don't know.

Q: And another guy - Arnold held him responsible, at least partly responsible, was Ray Dunn, Mike Dunn. Do you remember him? Gen Mike Dunn. He was one of Arnold's favorites. He had come up with him through the March Field route. He had gotten his star, and then, he got broken back after that incident.

W: I don't remember Dunn at all.

Q: He was not in Arnold's office, but he was one of Arnold's favorites. He had been his Adjutant for a number of years at March Field. He was brought into the office in the late '30s, and then, he went overseas and he got a star. He was later involved in that airborne operation and Arnold held him partly responsible for it. I think there was some justice in shooting at these planes because the Navy had not been properly notified that these planes would be flying in that area.

W: In the beginning, that is, in the summer of 1941, one of the things that General Arnold always wanted was something like Air Force Magazine. We had a thing called the Air Corps Newsletter, which was a two-page mimeographed sheet put out by an old civil servant named Oscar somebody or other, who worked in the Army Air Corps Hqs., as long as I can remember. I'd been there on active duty perhaps two or three months. One day I was in General Arnold's office, and he had a copy of the Coast Artillery Journal, which was a thick, slick, four color operation, very expensive. He said: "Why can't we have something like this for the Air Corps? " And I said: "We could." He said: "Well, what's preventing it?" I said: "Incentive and money." He said: "All right, let's have one." I said: "Let's who have one?" And he said: "You!"

Q: You made a mistake asking that.

W: Well, I went back down to the office I was in, and I got hold of Oscar. I said: "General Arnold has given us carte blanche to really improve the Newsletter, which just came out occasionally. It was just two sides of a mimeographed

sheet.

Q: Right, it came out I think twice a month. I've been looking through early issues, in the early '30s. It was mimeographed.

W: Yes. So, I just took it over. I changed the name of it from "Air Corps Newsletter" to "Air Force", something like that. It was no good on a mimeographed machine, of course. So I went down to the printing department of the Army Air Forces, and asked them what they had there that would do a decent job of printing a magazine. Well, they didn't have anything. And I said: What do we need?" I told them what I wanted to do. And they said: "Well, you need a couple of multilith machines." I said: "How much do they cost?" This guy looked at me and said: "$7,000 a piece." So I said: "All right. Buy two." So he did. His boss, some Colonel, called me in and said: "What the hell is this, two $7,000 lithograph machines?" I said: "This is for the new Air Force Magazine." And he said: "Who in the hell authorized that?" I said: "Verbal orders from the CG." So I got these two machines, and then, I formed a little staff, and I think we got Bob Hotz into the Air Corps.

Q: This is probably before he went over to China; he was with Chennault.

W: Oh yes, this was a long time before that. Summer 1941, and so, anyway, I won't bore you with the details of what I had to do. But I set this thing up, and borrowed a lot of material from the Royal Air Force, and got a lot of stuff from other publications, and started putting it out on a regular basis. You've probably seen that effort.

Q: Yes, it became a marvelous effort, toward the end of the war, they put out these special editions, tactical air and strategic air.

W: That was after Jim Straubel took it over.

Q: Really, you are the father of Air Force Magazine?

W: Yes, and I have a letter of commendation for it. But when Straubel ran a history of the magazine, some years ago, he didn't mention my name at all.

Q: Well, I'm going to jog him on that.

W: But I have a commendation. As a matter of fact, I selected Straubel to take over the editorship of it, so I could get the hell out of Washington

and go to the Training Command.

Q: Does Claude know this?

W: Sure. But if Straubel gives you any flak on it, let me know, and I'll show you a letter of my commendation. It said: "As one of your original assignments, you are ordered to originate or create Air Force magazine. Straubel took it over and then, in my opinion, has done a marvelous job with it over the years. And then, of course, it began to be printed professionally. We were printing it, pasting in the type on these matts, you know what I mean.

Q: Your work in Kuter's office, you mentioned planning the possibility of invading Formosa and the feasibility of giving fighter protection to bombing raids. Some of the other people in Kuter's office, like Curley Wolfinbarger. Did you work with him? And Moffat?

W: No, the guys I worked with were George Carey, who was my boss. He was a retread. Hell of a nice guy. He lives in Green Spring Valley, Md. Art Carlson was one. He was a Regular.

Q: Arnold complained at one time, I believe it was in Quebec, that he was not getting, that the Army -- Gen Handy and McNarney on the other side -- were getting better air information about our capabilities and incapabilities than Arnold was getting from his Air Plans. And then, I think - this was around 1944 - he beefed up his staff. Do you remember, any unhappiness on his part, on the background information getting through Plans and preparation for some of the Conferences?

W: No, he never said anything about it to me, and I never heard anything. I don't remember any flak about it; I always thought he was satisfied with Kuter.

Q: Well, he was.

W: He had Gen Loutzenheizer there. In fact, Joe Loutzenheizer was my direct boss, and then, of course, he was lost. There were a lot of guys in Plans that I thought, fairly or unfairly, didn't really belong there. They knew even less about the Air Force and airpower than I did. I regarded myself at that point as pretty much of a pro, because I had combat experience. But Col Carey, whom I regarded very highly, hadn't any connection with the Air Force since WWI. He was a civilian. Sonny Whitney was in there. We began to get in Plans a lot of bright young Regular officers with combat experience. I can't

remember many of their names any more.

Q: Arnold never had experience in combat himself.

W: No.

Q: He was very sensitive to the entreaties of fellows like Norstad and Kuter who wanted to get out. While they liked working for Arnold, I think - they liked the responsibilities he gave them - yet they wanted to make their mark as combat leaders. Arnold, I guess, was vulnerable to this kind of plea, because he himself tried to get overseas in WWI and never made it. Did he ever talk to you about this?

W: No, never did.

Q: But it was known that he never was in combat?

W: Yes.

Q: And perhaps some people used this as a vulnerable point.

W: I never heard any criticism of Gen Arnold like that.

Q: Oh, I don't mean criticism. No, I didn't mean it this way. But the argument: "You didn't have a chance to go overseas; let me have my chance to go overseas."

W: Oh yes, I think there is no question about that. He let Gene Beebe go. Of course, Fred Dean, I think, had combat experience, before he came to work for the General. Then, of course, Gen Arnold finally issued orders that no pilot could go out on a second tour of combat duty until every pilot in the AAF had had a tour, which delighted a lot of us, because the Air Training Command was full of combat dodgers, you know. That's one of the things I told General Arnold about.

Q: You know, he was very unhappy about some of the training. You mentioned one incident before about the training. He became very unhappy with the 2nd AF at one time, Davenport Johnson. Did you get involved in that?

W: No.

Q: There were complaints overseas that the B-29s, and also in Europe, that high aerial gunnery, for example, they were not adequately trained in deflection shooting.

W: Well, they were trained, but they were trained wrong. They were 180

degrees off in their training. They were teaching these guys in such a way that they couldn't possibly hit the target. If they were well trained, they couldn't hit the target, because they were shooting at the wrong angle.

Q: This is one of the things that caused him to get exercised at Davenport Johnson, who commanded the 2nd AF. I was told that he peremptorily dismissed him, sent him up to Alaska. This was in 1943.

W: I was overseas then.

Q: He was always unhappy with the Training Command, and he was not always, but oftentimes, unhappy with Wright Field about one thing or another. Did any of these situations ever come to your attention, where you had to do some troubleshooting for him?

W: No, because when I came back from overseas - I went to work in the Pentagon the day after Christmas 1943 - and the only out-of-town assignment that I remember his giving me then was at the time when we went to the Redistribution Station. But I know he was unhappy about that. I remember I told him, although I didn't tell him any names. But I remember an officer who later on became a LTGEN, now retired. He came out to the Mediterranean in the summer of 1943. He came to our group. He looked me up because I'd known him when he was a 2nd LT, and he told me he was there from Wright Field, to find out what we the combat pilots thought about our airplanes, and what we needed. And I said: "Well, let's take a look at my airplane." We were flying P-40s then. I sat in the cockpit, and I said: "Now, for example, this throttle, the throttle handle itself, we come back from missions with grooves in our hands, fighter pilots going back and forth all the time." I said: "Why can't we have it molded with a sort of Bakelite handle there?" He said: "Oh, this one is the one we've used in the AF for many years. This is fine." Well, every time I mentioned something - I mentioned the oil shutter doors, the shutters on the oil cooler. You had to use a lever, and it was very hard to use. I said: "Why can't we have something like the Spitfire has?" He said, "Oh, this one is perfect." When we got all through - he was a Colonel then and I was a Major - I said: "Don, I don't think that you came out here to find anything out. I think you just came out here to confirm what you guys at Wright Field already believe. You are living

in the past. All these things may be okay on an AT-6, when you are flying from Wright Field to Washington." I said: "You said you wanted to improve the equipment that we are fighting with. But you obviously are not interested in that. He got very angry, and insisted that was not the case. Well, I told Arnold about that when I came home.

Q: Did he do something about that?

W: Well, the P-47 had a different throttle, I don't know if it came from that. He wanted to do a lot of things that he was never able to do. He would give instructions to people and they weren't carried out. They would just sort of shunt it off. He had so many responsibilities. I don't think he had anybody to follow up on things. He depended on his immediate staff, and they didn't always do it.

Q: Is this why he grabbed people in the hall? He has this reputation for grabbing people in the hall. There was also a story that you avoided the E-Ring unless you wanted to get sent to the CBI on two hours notice, or something.

W: Well, he would, of course. I was working in the E-Ring, and I couldn't avoid him anyway. But, several times - well, I remember one time. I hadn't been back in the States very long and I was walking down the E-Ring, and I had just finished lunch. He grabbed me, and he said: "I'm going up to lunch. Come along." And I said: "Well, General, I've already had my lunch." He said: "Never mind. Come on and have some more. So I went, and got in the car with Sgt Simmons and Gen Arnold and we drove out and I sat there.

Q: Is that Bruce Simmons?

W: Simmons - I guess it was. And I had a second lunch, and he wanted to talk about the P-40, and I told him about the P-40 and he got very annoyed with me because I was critical of the P-40. Finally, I said: "Now, look, General. It has lots of good qualities, but it is an obsolescent airplane, and then we had quite an argument.

Interview - Mr. John C.A. Watkins, Providence, RI, May 10, 1971 - Part II

Q: The last thing you said on the other tape was that you told Gen Arnold the P-40 was obsolescent. How did he respond to that?

W: He was angry, and we discussed it in great detail. I told him that the ME 109, which was our principal competition, could outclimb us and could outdive us and outrun us. And he said: "Well, why did you do so well then?" because we did very well, and I said: "Well, we just developed tactics that were superior to those of the Germans. The Germans weren't nearly so imaginative in their use of their aircraft as we were, or thought we were." And it was true that the P-40, that the gunnery system was excellent. We thought it was better than the ME. It had six 50 caliber guns. It was rugged. It would take an awful lot of abuse, and it had plenty of range - not as much as we wanted - but it had range. But I contended - I had flown a P-51, an attack version of the P-51 - they'd sent one squadron over there. I had just flown one of these airplanes and I thought it was a wonderful airplane. Well, the P-51 was a great embarrassment to the AF, because they wouldn't touch it.

Q: When it had the earlier engine in it, when it had the Allison liquid cooled engine. They put a Rolls Royce in it.

W: They put Rolls Royces in the P-40's, too, That's when they became good airplanes.

Q: Is that right?

W: Sure.

Q: I didn't realize that. Did they fly in the late stages of the war, fly P-40s against the Germans?

W: No, but we flew P-40s against the Germans until about Sept 1943. My brother, for example, Jack, he had a squadron of them down there in the Western Desert AF. But, we, the 325th Group, was the first fighter group in the Mediterranean to get P-47s, and subsequently, we were the first group to get P-51s. But the reason that the AAF didn't like the P-51 was

because it wasn't of US design. The AAF had the same opportunity as the British had to get the P-51. They wouldn't accept it until it had already been demonstrated to be superior to anybody else's airplane.

Q: You are hitting on a very sensitive point now. This is the one that historians have jumped all over, Noble Frankland and Emerson. I don't know whether you have followed some of the recent literature in this area.

W: Not very much.

Q: But the AAF is accused of having dallied in recognizing the superior merit of the P-51.

W: I don't think there is any question at all of that. Even my father admits it. Dad was Chief of the Power Plant Branch at Wright Field during the war. Dad was always in the research and development part of the AAF, and I was talking to Dad about it the other day. And he admits that we "just missed the bus." We should have had that airplane. We could have the airplane in the summer of 1943, there is no question about that. But we didn't get it. I think my group didn't get them until sometime in 1944.

Q: It was around January 1944 when they first started getting them. By that time you had already come back?

W: Yes, I was home, unfortunately.

Q: Some desperate measures were taken to try to make up for the inability of our escorts to escort the bombers all the way to target. They could take them part of the way, and then catch them on the way back. But there was a vulnerable period when the bombers were all by themselves. They tried all kinds of jerry-built devices. They had the XB-40, the XB-41. Do you remember those?

W: Yes, I never saw one.

Q: Well, they didn't last too long, for the reason that, you know, this armored B-17 would help you on the way there, but when you had dropped your bombs, and you were lightened and you wanted to get the h--- out of there, and go home, these planes were unable to move. So you had to protect them. In effect, the protectors had to be protected on the way back from

target, so this thing was dropped very quickly. And then, they were using cardboard wing tanks there for a period.

W: Really? I didn't know that.

Q: Yes, in 1943, the British - here is another thing. Arnold was unhappy with Wright Field. I indicated before. They wanted to put these wingtanks on the P-47s and P-38s, and Wright Field was very slow in coming up with a suitable design. So they were getting them from the British, cardboard, disposable wingtanks. This is for a period of several months. Do you think Arnold shares in a major way the responsibility for being slow on recognition of the P-51?

W: Yes, well, he's got to take the responsibility. He was the boss, I think every senior officer in the AAF had to share in the responsibility for it. I don't know, but there may be senior officers in the AAF who were advocates of the P-51. But, you remember, they went to the P-47, rather than the P-51. The P-47 fundamentally, was the old P-35, that airplane that Seversky produced.

Q: A Republic plane.

W: The P-47 was a good airplane. It was a great airplane. I'll never forget how elated I was when we got the first two or three of them, and I took one and flew it around and went out looking for Italian ships all by myself. By comparison, the P-51 which I've never had the good fortune to fly in combat - that was just, that was superior.

Q: Tommy Hitchcock, the playboy polo player, who had been assigned to Winant's office in London, has been given by some, recognition, or credit for recognizing the P-51 and pushing it. Have you heard about that?

W: I've never heard about it, but it's possible. But I remember they sent this squadron - I mentioned this squadron of an attack version of the thing in the Mediterranean. I think it was just one squadron. I think the only difference between it and the eventual P-51, it had dive-brakes, or something on it. There was a guy on Gen Spaatz' staff, his name I've forgotten now, a Colonel, and he got hold of one somewhere.

Q: Curtis, maybe?

W: No, Curtis didn't fly. No, a Colonel something. Anyway, he brought it down to our field one day and he let me fly it. I remember, it was like a Spitfire, which is a most wonderful little airplane to fly, plus a lot of improvements. It was just a joy to fly. I'll never forget, I took this airplane, after he checked me out in it. I took off and I flew around the field two or three times. It was such a wonderful experience, that I dove down over the field. I remember some men were having a baseball game, and I went right straight across the dry lake, and slow rolled it about three times, right on the deck, you see. This Colonel was just absolutely livid when I landed. He said: "Goddam it, you're going to bust up my airplane." But, boy, I was sold on that airplane, then and there. This was in 1943.

Q: It wasn't until Dec '43 or Jan '44 when the P-51 started coming out in some numbers, where they could put a whole squadron in protection of strikes. Of course, by that time, Eaker was out of there, and Spaatz was in. We were talking in the car about Eaker's being taken out of there. Well, you were overseas at the time, so you probably were not aware of some of the in-fighting?

W: No, I wasn't. You see, when I came back, in Nov 1943, Gen Spaatz was still there, because I remember, I went up, the last weekend I was in Africa, I went up and spent it at his villa. I used to go up there because I would get a big bed. The food was no good, because we ate the same food that was issued to the troops. But, I used to go up there and spend weekends occasionally. Larry Norstad was there, and Col W.W. Dick - if he is still alive, he could give you a lot of information about what was going on in Hqs. He's a non-flying guy.

Q: Well, when you came back around Christmas of 1943, or thereabouts, this change was right in the process of being made.

W: Yes.

Q: There was a great deal of bitterness in Eaker's camp. He blamed Kuter and perhaps Norstad. In fact, there is a lot of derogatory comments I have heard about Kuter and Norstad, that they were great staff officers

but not commanders. They make this differentiation. Part of that is probably due to the fact that Kuter had a hand in Arnold's decision to take Eaker out of there.

W: Well, I think that, I don't remember either Norstad or Kuter ever having a combat command.

Q: No, well, I say, they were....

W: They were staff officers; there is no question about it.

Q: They were staff officers, but they tried to get out. Norstad was sent out to the Mediterranean for a while. He was in North Africa, and so was Kuter.

W: Yes, but Norstad was on Gen Spaatz' staff, and he was strictly a staff officer. Kuter was in the Pentagon.

Q: Kuter went out to North Africa for a while, and then Arnold recalled him.

W: I didn't know that. I'm sure that both Kuter and Norstad must have flown combat missions, but not regularly, because they didn't have that kind of a job.

Q: Right.

W: Doolittle flew some missions, but they were discouraged and properly so, I think. Well, they even had a rule there for awhile, that in the bomber groups, that bomb group and fighter group commanders and operations officers were only allowed to fly one mission or two missions a week, because so many were being lost. Well, Gordy Austin who was my group commander, and by coincidence, a lifelong friend, he'd fly missions, and I'd do the same thing. If we didn't encounter any opposition, if nothing happened, we just didn't even record the mission. So, officially I had 49 missions, but actually, I guess maybe I had 75. You might get shot at, but if you didn't participate in something requiring making a claim, you know, something of that sort, you just didn't record the flight at all. But this is all apropros about what you say about these senior staff officers.

Q: Well, when you came back in 1944, you went into Plans, and you worked for Loutzenheizer?

W: Yes. Gen Kuter was the Asst Chief of Air Staff, Plans, and Loutzenheizer was the head of the Operational Plans Division, and I went into his office. I was in there for a long time, in the Asiatic Theater Branch. Then, I was lent to Reuben Hood, who was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and I spent about 3 months as his Exec Officer.

Q: What special assignment?

W: Just as his Executive Officer.

Q: I saw him down in Florida. He lives near Orlando.

W: How is he?

Q: Very good.

W: I haven't seen him in years and years.

Q: He lives in a suburb, Mt. Dora, Florida.

W: Never heard of it. He was a great guy.

Q: I started to ask about any special assignments you had when you were in Loutzenheizer's office, which brought you into Arnold's presence.

W: I don't remember anything specifically.

Q: Building up toward OVERLORD then. Then, there was this issue about do we bomb oil targets, or there was a guy named Leigh Mallory who was in the picture at that time.

W: Yes, RAF.

Q: Right, and they put him in charge of this AEAF; then they didn't give him any forces to command. The British were trying to get us to start hitting tactical targets, and Spaatz was pushing to hit strategic targets for a continued time, because he felt the oil campaign was paying off and paying some dividends. Did you get involved in any of this?

W: No, you see, we were involved in the sense that we were all kept apprised, in the sense that all sections of Plans were kept acquainted with what all other sections were doing because Kuter believed in having us, sort of a Boy's Club operation where everybody was involved. But, specifically, no, I was strictly working in the Asiatic Theater, and the Hump operation. Technically, we weren't supposed to be involved in the Pacific operation. They

had a Pacific section too, and we were concerned only with mainland, with the Asian mainland, but I don't remember anything in particular. The things I remember most about that time, was being able to read every morning, the "Eyes Only" messages that passed back and forth between Marshall and Churchill and the President. You know, just wonderful for an ex-newspaperman to be reading all this stuff.

Q: Was Arnold a sick man at this time? He had a small heart attack in 1943, and I was told that they had a wheelchair available for him. Did he ride around in a wheelchair?

W: I never saw Gen Arnold in a wheelchair in my life. I don't think that you would have gotten him in a wheelchair in the Pentagon under any circumstances. I never saw him that way.

Q: It might have been later, sometimes time telescopes. I know Trubee Davison was in a wheelchair. Did you ever see him that way?

W: Remember, he was crippled anyway, but...

Q: He's still around, I talked to him recently. He't out on Long Island.

W: How about that flack of his, Hans Christian Adamson.

Q: He died.

W: That was no loss.

Q: Well, you know something about that side of it, the Personnel Narratives Division. Hans Christian Adamson set up this outfit that was going to write some popular histories, and Arnold gave him the green light. Do you remember that? Did you get involved in that?

W: No, I didn't get involved. I had nothing but contempt for Adamson.

Q: Why?

W: I just thought he was, I didn't like Public Relations men as a class. That is strictly what he was. I always had the idea that he was in there strictly to promote Davison, and then, later on, old Capt "Ricketyback", Rickenbacker.

Q: He was on a raft with "Ricketyback."

Q: Oh yes, and that's, their version of what happened on that raft is an absolute fabrication.

Q: Is that right?

W: Yes, I met two or three of the other people who were on board. I was told by someone who was on the raft, that at one point, this young guy that was the pilot of this airplane, actually told Rickenbacker that if he didn't keep his mouth shut and stop interfering, he was going to shoot him right between the eyes.

Q: If you read Rickenbacker, the modest title of the biography, it's something else.

W: That wasn't the way we heard it in the AF.

Q: I know. I interviewed him, and he passed his 80th birthday.

W: How did you get away?

Q: Well, he, I started asking him some specific questions, and he didn't want to talk. (Off tape) Arnold used him for inspiration for the troops because he had 26 planes to his credit. There was a time when - you know, Gen Stanley Wray, remember him? He was in the 8th AF - he told me that based on computations, you had one chance in four. Well, your chance of getting back were .287. In other words, you had about 1/4 chance to get back, after completing 25 missions, based on the loss rate. That wasn't very good, and you needed something to boost morale. Rickenbacker was a guy who had been through it, and I think Arnold was using him for that purpose.

W: I don't think it worked, though. I know, he came down to Africa, and some of the groups had to order their pilots to attend his speeches. Going back to what you said, I saw some actual aerial tables that were worked up in the 8th AF, worked up on the 8th AF, and it seemed to me, if they were flying 25 missions and the life expectancy was about 16 missions. I don't know how that works out with your tables.

Q: I'm sure that these two figures are not necessarily contradictory, it might have been taken at a different times, but the chances were less than half that you would get back, which is not a very good percentage for guys fighting a war. So they needed something to get these guys going.

W: What we needed more than anything else, at least in Africa, was decent food, which we didn't have. The Services of Supply used to segregate on the docks, all the good food that came in. Remember, Argentine tinned beef and tinned chicken, things like that. They'd cut them right out and keep them right there for themselves, and we had a forced issue of Spam. I remember we moved from one base to another one time and we left behind us a stack of cases of Spam that was 8 feet high and 10 feet long. The reason I know that the Services of Supply were doing this, is because our Chaplain, Roy Terry, who is now Chief Chaplain of the AF, went down to the docks one time, and was checking this stuff. They threw him off the docks. Have you talked to him, by the way?

Q: No.

W: Well, I don't think he ever had anything to do with Gen Arnold. But he just happened to be our group chaplain, hell of a guy.

Q: I was in the Navy, I was aboard an aircraft carrier, and I can vouch for much of what you say. A lot of this stuff never got past the Navy.

W: Yes, I know that, too.

Q: Because aboard ship we ate better than most.

W: I know it. What carrier were you on?

Q: I was on three. I was on an Admiral's staff in the Pacific. I was on three CVEs, the Marcus Island (CVE 77) the Sangamon (CVE 26) and the Suwanee (CVE 27). I was on four invasions.

Q: I asked Gene Beebe, did he ever see Arnold mad? He said he got mad every day.

W: Oh, absolutely, absolutely. He had the shortest fuse of anybody I know.

Q: Do you think that was sort of a release for him, or was it deliberate? Did he plan to get mad?

W: No, I don't think so. I just think he was a hot tempered fellow, and he may have done it deliberately, I don't know. But he used to take the skin right off Gene Beebe's back, and mine. You'd walk out the door and you were hoping that he would pause to take a breath, so everybody in the outer

office Miss Atkins, is she around?

Q: No, she died.

W: Did she? That's too bad. She could have given you more information on Gen Arnold than any person alive.

Q: I know.

W: Including Mrs. Arnold.

Q: Right. In fact, I was told that she was sort of a weathervane. People would call her and say: "Is this a good time?" And she would say, "yes" or "no." She might call somebody up: "You know, you have this problem. Today may be a good day to see him about it."

W: That's right. I remember when Arnold wanted me, with great effort she would call me LT Watkins, because she had known me ever since I was a kid, as Johnny, you see. She would call me on the phone and say: "Joh....uh, LT Watkins, the General wants to see you." And I'd head down the hall. I lived about half a block down the hall, and I'd walk in and I would say: "Is it safe?" And she'd say: "Yes," or she'd say: "Be careful." And I 'd go in there, and he would just go right through the roof at something. He'd say: "Listen to this." And he'd get madder and madder as he read it, and he would say: "Go tell that SOB that I think this is nuts." Then, as you said earlier, he would grab people in the hall and it didn't make any difference w hat they were...if he recognized the guy as being in a certain staff section, t hat he was interested in, he would call this guy in, and he'd get the information from him. It might be a 1st LT, or it might be a Colonel, but it wasn't necessarily the guy that was responsible directly to him, the General.

Q: Did this play hob with the whole organization?

M: Oh, sure. It was bound to. What the hell, if you are the General in charge of a staff section, and your boss calls you down and says: "I just understood that this is what you are doing," and he got it from one of your underlings. You know what your reaction would be. But he didn't go through channels.

Q: And he didn't care about hurting the feelings of a senior to get information about the project from a junior?

W: No.

Q: He just wanted to get the job done?

W: Yes.

Q: Impatient man.

W: Very, very.

Q: And if he made a mistake, as he probably made some - shooting from the hip all the time - and found that he was wrong, did he apologize, or simply take another tack without admitting he was wrong? Was he contrite?

W: I think he was, yes. Otherwise, I don't think I would have had as much respect and love for him as I did. Because when we were kids, we were always afraid of Major Arnold, but I never hesitated to spend time in his house.

Q: I'm going to get to that, this is another question, about knowing the Arnold family in earlier times, but this business of his getting mad at people. He got mad at you?

W: Oh sure.

Q: For something you did, or didn't do?

W: Usually for not moving fast enough, for asking too many questions.

Q: I was told that he got very impatient with somebody who said: "I'm taking care of it, General," or made some vague statement:"Leave it to me, I'll take care of it."

W: Yes.

Q: This infuriated him?

W: Yes.

Q: Is this an accurate statement?

W: Yes,yes.

Q: He wanted hard facts, and what have you done about this, or what has been done?

W: Right. He didn't want any evasions. He wanted specific answers to

direct questions, and he didn't want to explain what he wanted done. Just like I told you about that speech. I was asking concerned questions. I didn't know anything about the subject, and I didn't know what he wanted to [illegible] it, stop talking, and write the speech."

Q: He had confidence in you, and he apparently had confidence in some people, and he had no confidence in other people. He wouldn't give them anything to do. Many times, in his correspondence, I've seen the word, "deadwood." That's the word. Now, you probably heard him say: "We've got a lot of deadwood around here".

W: Oh yes. I will tell you one thing though. He was tremendously loyal to his classmates, I mean Giles, both Giles brothers, Eaker and Spaatz, and Barton Yount, and he took care of them. I sometimes thought that that was a weakness on his part.

Q: I have been told that same comment in another way, that he was partial to the men who came up with him on the West Coast, the March Field group. Those who came up with Andrews on the East Coast route, through Langley Field, Ralph Royce and Tony Frank, who wanted a combat command, never got one. Hugh Knerr, some of these others, did not fare as well as the Spaatz' and Eakers, who came up with him.

W: I think that is probably logical, though, because he wanted to be surrounded by people in whom he had complete personal confidence. Whether he was wrong in his judgment or not, I mean, I would...

Q: You tend to give responsible jobs to people you know?

W: You knew, or thought you knew.

Q: But I was also told that despite his frequent comments about deadwood he didn't have the heart in some cases to unload people who were not doing the job. He carried them.

W: I think that was true of General Giles. Of course, I don't want him to be my whipping boy. But he had no reputation, at least among the younger officers. He was regarded as completely dead from the ears up, but he was there right to the bitter end. I don't know what happened to him after he left.

Q: He went out to the Pacific. You know, when Miff Harmon was lost, Giles went out to the Pacific and they brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. That's how they moved him out of Hqs.

W: I'd forgotten that.

Q: Another man I was told who had the same kind of reputation as Giles had, was Stratemeyer. He was also a lightweight, I was told.

W: He was in my theater, that is the Asiatic Theater Branch, when he was out in the CBI. We thought he was an absolute nothing. You remember now, these judgments are the judgments of a then very young man, and we probably didn't understand all the problems.

Q: It occurs to me that maybe Arnold selected weaker men to be his second in command because a strong man like McNarney who, everybody has told me, had tremendous competenence, was a very hard-headed guy, and he was an AF guy, and Marshall appropriated him to be his Deputy Chief.

W: With complete cooperation by General Arnold.

Q: Right, maybe Gen Arnold couldn't tolerate a strong second man?

W: Well, it would have been a very difficult decision to make, for anybody to make.

Q: It would have caused some friction because, maybe a strong second man like McNarney was an organization man. He believed in going right through proper channels. Arnold, having these impulses, would probably have gotten into a battle with McNarney.

W: He probably would have. I'm surprised, frankly, that Gen Arnold got along so well with Gen Marshall.

Q: Yes. Why do you think that existed?

W: I guess it is because Gen Arnold had such tremendous respect for Marshall, as most people did.

Q: But, in the other direction, why did Marshall accept Arnold like he did?

W: Well, there is no question that Arnold was a leader.

Q: Inspirational, and got things done?

W: Right. As evidenced by the history of Eisenhower and Patton, when Marshall reposed his confidence in someone he put up with an awful lot from them.

Q: Well, Marshall turned a lot of things over to Arnold and I guess Arnold did the job for him. Arnold did it himself, in a sense that he had, I like to use this figure of his bouncing 50 balls in the air. He would see a man like Watkins - he has some trust in Watkins, he has done a good job for him before, and he gives him one of the balls, and he only has 49 to bounce in the air.

W: Yes.

Q: And he couldn't wait for an organized meeting and delegation of responsibility through Watkins' boss, and his boss, and so forth. This might take a week to get these things out to the man. If he grabbed you out in the hall, he got you going within the hour?

W: Yes, but of course, you see, inthe beginning when I was first called up, it was understood while I was under Col Art Ennis (Public Relations) it was understood that I was really working for Gen Arnold. I was not officially part of Ennis' staff, because he had a full complement.

Q: You were in his office through 1941?

W: I was called up in June 1941, I was in his office until January 1942.

Q: All right, I want to ask you about something very critical. The RAINBOW FIVE leak. Do you remember the Chicago Tribune leak?

W: The code?

Q: No. This was the war plan, our VICTORY plan. The Tribune published huge gobs of the war plan three days before Pearl Harbor.

W: I don't remember that at all. (Off record)

Q: This is very crucial to another side of my story. You say there are officers on Andrews staff who were pushing for a separate air force in 1941?

W: Before that, in 1939 and 1940.

Q: At this time you were Aviation Editor of the Baltimore Sun?

W: Yes, and this fellow's name I can't remember. He and I had lunch together in Washington. The whole idea was for me to promote three things:

promote the GHQ AF; promote it with Gen Andrews as No. 1, promote a separate AF right away; and most important of all, to overcome President Roosevelt's refusal to buy more heavy bombers, and I was all for that. I thought at the time that Gen Arnold wasn't being very aggressive, that we needed all the heavy bombers we could get our hands on. And I remember, I wrote an article for Flying Magazine, then called Popular Aviation, in which I made a statement that made President Roosevelt very angry. I think I called this thing: "The Future of the AF." It ran in two parts, the only time the magazine ever printed anything that ran in two parts. I talked about the necessity for more heavy bombers, and said that Roosevelt was the principal obstacle in the path of a heavy bomber fleet, probably because he couldn't fish from a heavy bomber, but he could from a cruiser.

Q: Wow, you hit him where he lived!

W: Yes.

Q: Was this 1940, or maybe 1939?

W: Oh, it could have been as early as 1938.

Q: Was Andrews still Commander of the GHQ AF?

W: As I remember it, I think he was.

Q: He retired, or reverted to Colonel in March 1939, so it must have been prior to that?

W: It was before that.

Q: And Knerr, who was one of his leading drum beaters....

W: Right. I never had any contact with him.

Q: Who is a good friend of mine now by the way. He lives in Coral Gables, Florida. He was beating the drum. He was writing stuff for William Bradford Huie, The Fight For Air Power, and all this other stuff. There was the Fortune article right before Pearl Harbor.

W: What happened on that was that they wanted an article on the heavy bomber program. I thought it was John Osborne who wrote it, but I'm not sure. It was somebody on the staff.

Q: Well, Knerr supplied the data for it.

W: They finally got permission to do it. General Arnold was very reluctant,

but they finally got permission to do it, and they went out to Wright Field, as I remember it, and they completely - I'm talking about the Fortune group -- completely misrepresented their authority, and they agreed in advance that they would submit the article to the War Dept for possible breaches of security. They did send it down to the War Dept, and I remember - for some reason I was carrying it through - and it was very heavily censored because of the complete description of the entire heavy bomber program. They also went out to Seattle, talked to the people at Boeing. They submitted the article. It was very heavily censored. I can remember it. I can see it as plainly, I thought: "My God! I'm glad I didn't have to write this thing, and have it subjected to this." But they had agreed in advance. So they took it back to NY and they published the original article. Of course, all hell broke loose because Gen Arnold said the German and Japanese governments would have paid $500,000 for it. They raised hell with Mr. Luce, and Mr. Luce wrote a letter back to General Marshall or General Arnold - probably Gen Marshall - in which he said: "Yes, that they had agreed to submit it for censorship, but they didn't agree with the censorship and they thought they were more competent to determine what should be printed in the public interest than the War Dept was." I thought of all the arrogant bastards.

Q: Right. Well, this was the higher moral law. An interesting footnote to that is that Hugh Knerr was then retired. He left the War Dept on a disability when his mentor, Andrews, was sent down to San Antonio as a Colonel. In 1939, Knerr retired. Then when Andrews was on his way back - Marshall thought a great deal of Andrews - he put him in as G-3 in 1940, and then he put him in the Caribbean in 1941. Knerr was trying to come back. But Arnold was not breaking any world's records in letting him come back. He finally let him come back, only because Knerr was a genius at logistics. Of course, Knerr rose to two stars in Europe, not because Arnold liked him, and he hated Arnold.

Q: On Pearl Harbor Day, Arnold was not in town on Dec 7th.

W: No.

Q: He was shooting quail with Donald Douglas.

W: I don't know where he was, but I guess he got home that night.

Q: They flew all night, I'm not sure they got home that night. Beebe was with him. By the way, they flew all night and he got home, perhaps the next morning. Arnold didn't find out about Pearl Harbor until about three hours after it happened. He was out shooting quail.

W: I was in Washington, I had that apartment up on 16th St. I was giving a cocktail party, and we heard on the radio. Then the Duty Officer down at the old Munitions Building called me and he said: "John,you'd better get down here in uniform and I went down, and I spent the night there, I remember. The next day, sometime on Monday, I was in Gen Arnold's office, Gene Beebe and I, and Gen Arnold told me. Was it Gen Frank in Pearl Harbor?

Q: No, his son-in-law.

W: Who was the CG of the Air Force?

Q: Oh, the Air CG was Fred Martin.

W: Yes, Gen Arnold said to me: "Try to get Gen Martin on the telephone." So I spent the next two or three hours trying to get Martin on the phone. Just to show how Arnold was, he said: "By the way, ask him how Jack is." My brother, Jack, was there.

Q: What was his job?

W: Jack was either Engineering Officer or Operations Officer of an A-20 squadron, those light bombers, twin engine bombers. He was telling me about that the other day, that they thought that the one Jap carrier was off Barber's Point, 50 miles off Barber's Point. They had 4 airplanes, 4 A-20s, and his squadron commander picked out three other pilots, including Jack. He said: "Now, we are going after that carrier." They loaded two 300# bombs on each A-20 and Jack said they took off. Jack said he knew that he wasn't coming back because the squadron commander said: "Now, we are going to go right through their fighter screen. We are going to go right down on the deck of the carrier about 20 feet, and let these bombs go. They went out. Fortunately, there wasn't any carrier out there. They came back and he said

they were shot at by everybody, even while they were taxiing after landing.

Q: It must have been complete chaos?

W: Oh, it was terrible. Then it was Monday morning or Tuesday morning, Gen Arnold told me and Col Shelmire to go out to Bolling Field and see what the antiaircraft defenses were. I'll never forget, we went out there, and there were about four 50 caliber machine guns scattered around the field. God, it was a mess.

Q: Let me ask you one more thing about your early days when you knew the Arnold children.

W: My father was at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. The Arnolds came east.

Q: Was this '30-'31?

W: Yes, it was '30 or '31, somewhere in there. Our quarters were very close to theirs. And Lois Arnold, Gen Arnold's oldest daughter was my age, and we were particularly good friends. In fact, at that time, I've forgotten how old Lois was.

Q: She was born in 1915.

W: That's about right, she was 3 years youngers that I. He wouldn't let her go out on dates with anybody. But he would let me take her to the movies, things like that, you see. So Lois and I knocked around together for years. We were friends for as long, well, not as long as she lived. She married a Navy officer, who was a bad egg,by the way. The last time I saw Lois was, oh, must have been about 1947-48. The boys were great friends of my brother, Jack, and Bob and Bill Dudley. But I haven't seen the boys in years and years. In fact, I haven't seen any of them.

Q: Three Colonels - one's Army and retired.

W: Which one is that?

Q: This is Hank, and then two Colonels. Bruce, he is in the Senate Liaison Office. Then Dave who is now in Thailand. both of them have a small chance to make a star.

W: Give Bruce my best.

Q: Yes, I certainly will.

W: He won't remember me nearly so well as he will remember Jack.

Q: Do you remember anything about Arnold at Wright Field? Major Arnold. Did you know a guy named Jan Howard there?

W: Vaguely, I remember the name.

Q: You have no other recollections of Arnold at that period?

W: Not particularly. I remember him very well, of course, but I don't remember any stories.

Q: This was at Fairfield. Where was your dad stationed?

W: He was stationed at Wright Field, but we lived on the old Fairfield Air Depot.

Q: What was his job?

W: He was Chief of the Power Plant Branch. He was then a Major or a a Captain, I've forgotten which. He must have been a Captain.

Q: What was your dad's first name?

W: Dudley W. Watkins. He is living here now, here in town. He has an apartment here. We were just around the Arnold house all the time, or they were around our house. I just remember Arnold as being somewhat short tempered and particular.

Q: Was he then too?

W: Yes, yes, and we knew who was running the Arnold quarters. He was a great guy, though. I never at any time lost my respect for Gen Arnold. I never at any time was angry with him, even when he would give me hell. But I don't know why particularly. He was quite different from my father.

Q: Well, I think you probably respected him.

W: Tremendously, yes.

Q: As a man of competence, perhaps?

W: I remember once before, it was in the fall of 1939. I was on the Baltimore Sun then. I had written an article for, I'd made the first scheduled trans-Atlantic passenger flight with Pan American Airways. After I got over there, I looked over the French Air Ministry, and some of their factories, and went to England and did the same thing. I came back and wrote an article for Flying Magazine about the efforts of the French to build up their Air Force. It was a pretty naive article. But they put a title on it: "France Will Be

Ready!" And I ran into Gen Arnold at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. It was some kind of demonstration. He grabbed me and said in a voice you could hear all over the place: "France Will Be Ready, ha, ha, ha." And he gave me hell, he said, for being sucked in by the French Government.

Q: Did you know about this Paul Chemidlin incident?

W: (No, he didn't).

W: Before I was called on active duty, the last couple of years on the Sun, I was there as military correspondent, a job that Mark Watson eventually took, and did so much with. I was in Washington a lot, and I would frequently go out to the Arnold house, which was at, it was in....

Q: Bradley Lane, was that it?

W: Maybe that was it, it was in Washington. It wasn't military quarters. And I would go out there for dinner and spend the evening or whatever it was.

Q: Hampden Lane.

W: I have no idea what it was. But I remember Gen Arnold's two slot machines in the playroom. But I remember on at least two occasions when he would come home from work, and he would shake his head, and he would say, right in my presence to Mrs. Arnold: "Well, I was over to the White House today, and I think we are going to be relieved. I think we are going to have to move." He said: "The President gave me hell again." He was serious about it. But he would not truckle to the President, I mean he was respectful to him, I'm sure. But he wouldn't tell the President what the President wanted to hear. He told him what he thought, just the way I would tell him what I thought. But I remember how discouraged he was on numerous occasions. Mrs. Arnold probably has said the same thing.

Q: Yes, she said about his being in Roosevelt's doghouse. For a time he was walking on eggs.

W: Oh yes.

Q: Right at the time he was trying to get some information from Lindbergh. I had a conversation with Lindbergh, and looked at his papers. Arnold was walking on eggs there, because Lindbergh was persona non grata with Roosevelt.

Arnold took a lot of chances in that job of his. But he did such a good job, I think, that this overcame misgivings that either Marshall or FDR had.

W: That reminds me of something. Do you remember C.B. Allen.

Q: I don't, but C.B. Allen is very close to Lindbergh. I have an article that he wrote. Is he still around?

W: He lives in West Virginia and he's retired. I think he worked for the Martin Company and he is retired now. He was one of my best friends years ago. He was Aviation Editor of NY Herald Tribune. He is very close to Lindbergh. He and Deke Lyman are Lindbergh's closest friends. But C.B. would be a good man for you to talk to.

Q: One of the things Allen said, in an article he wrote for the Saturday Evening Post in 1940, was that Roosevelt tried to buy Lindbergh off, by offering him Secy of the AF, a separate AF. I talked to Mr. Lovett about this. He denied that such an offer was made.

W: What does Lindbergh say about it?

Q: Lindbergh is, well. Actually, I should have asked this question more directly, I was kind of beating around the bush about it. But I didn't get a clear indication from Lindbergh about whether he did or not, but C.B. Allen did mention it in his article. So I really don't know whether this was fact. But Lindbergh in his new book says Roosevelt made a number of offers to try to buy him off, so he probably hinted this. I don't know. My guess is that they hinted that they would have an important job for him, and C.B. Allen simply assumed that it was Secy of an AF. I'm just guessing now.

W: I remember once in President Truman's second administration, I hadn't been up here terribly long. I got a call from a guy in the White House that, just sort of a pleasant conversation. He said: "Would you be interested in being Under Secy of the AF." And I said: "Give me 15 seconds, No!" So it could have been something like that. But knowing what I know of Roosevelt, it is entirely possible that he did try to buy Lindbergh off. But I think C.B. Allen, he would have some peripheral information. He was never close to Arnold that I know of.

Q: When I send you some information, I'll send you an envelope, and if you think of his address, I'll ask you for it, if I may. I'll drop him a note because West Virginia is not too far from where I am.

W: Oh yes, it is an easy drive from the District. He seems to be very alert, because Lyman had some kind of an accident. He was doing an article on Lindbergh, C.B. came up here, I understand about 6 months ago, a nd helped him complete it.

The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin

PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02902

JOHN C. A. WATKINS
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

May 19, 1971

done
5-10-71

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Mr. Watkins asked me to write and tell you that you will be hearing from him shortly; also, to send you Mr. C. B. Allen's address -- it's Moorefield, West Virginia. 26836

Sincerely,

Beta Clentemann

Secretary

Wrote Allen
5/25/71

20314

14 May 1971

Mr. John C. A. Watkins
Publisher, The Providence Journal
Providence, Rhode Island 02902

Dear Mr. Watkins:

I promised you a copy of the Waldrop article and here it is. A scurrilous piece which is not startling for Waldrop and the Times Herald, but it unjustly puts the finger on General Arnold.

Several publications, including Tristram Coffin's Passion of the Hawks, have amplified on this tale.

I believe I have 90 percent of the truth and am hot on the trail of the other 10 percent. When I have the story in full (I'm optimistic) I will approach Ben Bradlee of the Post which published the original lie. My publisher (Random House) wants me to wait until just before my book is ready, so as to enhance interest in the Arnold Biography.

It has occurred to me that the Providence Journal might be interested in the story.

One other point: you mentioned C.B. Allen living in West Virginia. I would like to write him, and set up an interview, if possible.

The luncheon and the interview last Monday were first class and I'm most grateful to you. I hope my effort will do justice to the memory of General Hap Arnold.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

Agawam Hunt

Telephone Calls

OUTSIDE OF LOCAL

Members are requested to give the following information

Date ..... Telephone Number ..... Place Called .....

(Member's Name) .....

Please make out a slip for all calls outside of local

Juan Trippe

212-973-4220

9:30 AM

May 25

20314

20 April 1971

Mr. John C. A. Watkins
Publisher, The Providence Journal
Providence, Rhode Island 02902

Dear Mr. Watkins:

Some fellow over on East 67th Street in New York City did not get the word. I am sending the enclosure along as returned to me so that you may take remedial action if you wish. My best interview times right now seem to be Friday afternoon, May 7th, or Saturday morning, May 8th. I will phone you before I leave Washington to confirm a date.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

1. AAF Song
2. Dent glider program
3. Non flying 2nd Lt - all visibility of grad on wall
4. Occasional reporting jobs to Stuart etc.
5. In Chg of Mountbatten.

Letter of Apr 15 sent back "unknown"

Phoned 4/27 - out of town until May 4th - call Miss Bennett AC 401-331-0600 for Monday noon 5-10 Providence

20314

15 April 1971

Mr. John C. A. Watkins
17 East 67th Street (Apt 5-D)
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Watkins:

I hope the A.N.P.A. sessions will be very productive.

Just received a letter from Mrs. Arnold. She mentioned you and I thought you would get a kick out of reading it. She's a great lady. We have a thing going....she calls me "The Mole" because I keep digging for things when I come out to the Ranch, and I call her "Eleanor The Pack Rat" because she is always saving things. By the way, she will celebrate her 84th on May 30th.

I plan to call you in about a week to firm up our appointment. However, as my schedule is developing, my best times seem to be Friday afternoon, May 7th, or Saturday morning, May 8th. I thought I would mention those times to stake a claim, if they are not already taken.

Incidentally, my following trip to catch some interviewees I missed last year will take me to Naples, Florida. General Larry Kuter is retired down there, as you may know. And so is your brother. I have dropped him a line, but dont know whether he had any contacts with General Hap.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Encl - Copy Mrs A Letter
4/15/71

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

(401)331-0600

The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin

PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02902

JOHN C. A. WATKINS
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

18 March 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I can make myself available on Saturday, 17 April, and, depending on the time of day, on the 20th, 21st or 22nd. I will be in New York for the annual meeting of the American Newspaper Publishers Association and there are various board and other meetings I have to attend from time to time during the week.

We will be staying at our own apartment, 5-D, 17 East 67th Street. My telephone number is UNiversity 1-4492. If you can't reach me there, you might leave a message for me at The Brook, 111 East 54th Street, PLaza 3-7020.

Perhaps you could have lunch with me on Saturday, 17 April. In any event, I will be looking forward to seeing you.

Yours sincerely,

John C. A. Watkins

W:b

16 March 1971

Mr. John C.A. Watkins
President & Publisher
The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin
Providence. R.I. 02902

Dear Mr. Watkins:

Enjoyed your letter of the 11th. It increased my interest in getting together with you to chat about General Hap Arnold.

My wife's illness and impending surgery causes me to defer my previous plans. However, I am particularly mindful of your availability in New York City for a week starting April 16th. By the end of the month my situation will be clarified, and I will notify you accordingly.

A couple of new interview possibilities have just opened up. I shall be talking to Charles Lindbergh in two days. In his recently published Wartime Journals, Lindbergh mentions frequent meetings with Arnold, with Mr. Lovett sitting in. Mr. Lovett has kindly consented to talk to me again, so I may try to set up something in New York City so that I can see both you and him on the one trip.

In any event, I shall take the liberty of contacting you again. Meanwhile, can you foresee any day during the week starting April 16th when you are likely to have about 90 minutes free time? If you could let me have some alternate possibilities, also where you will be staying, I'll try to arrange my schedule accordingly.

Sincerely

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

16 March 1971

Mr. John C.A. Watkins
President & Publisher
The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin
Providence. R.I. 02902

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Encl

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin

PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02902

JOHN C. A. WATKINS
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

11 March 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I am sorry that I will not be able to see you during the week of 20 March. Unfortunately, I will be out of the country on business until the 27th.

I will be in Providence and could be available on fairly short notice from 29 March through 15 April, however. I will also be in New York City for a week beginning Friday, 16 April.

Your remark that Mrs. Yount played a "major role" in the "Wild Blue Yonder" project may be the understatement of the year. General Arnold at one point threw up his hands and said to me, in effect, "she's your problem". I even arranged to have the U. S. Army Band make a march version of the song and went over to the National War College with Col. Horace W. Shelmire, to hear a performance of the song. I am sure you know the rest; Mrs. Yount then persuaded her husband to require all the aviation cadets to sing the damn thing when marching to and from classes. I suspect that no other song in the history of the world ever received such mass promotion and, I might add, I got damned sick of the whole affair.

If we do manage to get together, please remind me to tell you about the late Gen. Fred Dent and the Air Force glider program. It might make an amusing sidelight on how the military sometimes operated in those days of improvisation.

With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin

PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02902

JOHN C. A. WATKINS
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

11 March 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20314

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With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

John C. A. Watkins

W:b

20314

AF/CHO 10 March 1971

Mr. John C. A. Watkins
President and Publisher
The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin
Providence, R.I. 02902

Dear Mr. Watkins

You may recall that we exchanged letters just a year ago after Claude Witze was kind enough to put me in touch.

I will have occasion to be heading north during the week following March 20th and hope to complete some key interviews - among them Robert Lovett and Juan Trippe. Both had frequent contacts or association with General Arnold. My dates are a bit vague yet, but I hope to nail them down in the week ahead.

If time will permit, I would want to dash up to Providence and spend an hour reminiscing with you about your interesting association with General Arnold and your service as amanuensis.

I'm also interested in your role in pushing the "Wild Blue Yonder" song. I recently talked with Mrs. Barton K. Yount. She lives in Army Distaff Hall here in Washington. She had a major role in "selling" the Crawford song to General Arnold. You may be able to help me to pull this whole bit together.

In any event, I would be pleased to learn (via the enclosure) of your availability during the week beginning March 21st. A phone number to reach you would also be helpful.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History

x Possible change

The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin

PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02902

JOHN C. A. WATKINS
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

12 March 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

I will be very happy to see you if you are in New England this summer. If I happen to come to Washington (which I normally avoid like the plague), I'll get in touch with you.

Best regards,

JCAW

W:b

3 March 1970

Mr. John C. A. Watkins
President & Publisher
The Providence Journal
Providence, Rhode Island 02902

Dear Mr. Watkins:

Claude Witze passed along to me an extract of your letter of 2 February and it sounds as if you saw General Arnold at his more informal moments.

I'm hopeful of making a trip to New England this summer and would welcome the chance to talk with you, if this is alright. Should you have an opportunity to visit Washington I would hope we could get together here.

In any event, I'll be in touch at a later time when my plans firm up.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Murray - FYI - wire

The Providence Journal and The Evening Bulletin

PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02902

FROM:

JOHN C. A. WATKINS
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

2 February 1970

Dear Claude,

I'm glad to hear that someone finally is doing a comprehensive biography of General Arnold. Confidentially, I was afraid that General Eaker might have chosen to do it himself. I do hope that it will not be a stuffy, pedantic DoD job, because he was a very colorful character with some considerable talents outside the military field.

I don't think I could add much, if anything, of value to Dr. Green's research, although I'd be glad to talk to him sometime if he wishes. When I was working for him, I was a non-flying second lieutenant with all the visibility of the fly on the wall---altho I am told that some of his associates might have regarded me as a gnat. He sent me occasionally on reportorial jobs where the arrival of someone from the Inspector General's office might have sent up the warning signals; I wrote replies to many letters he received from people like Admiral Mountbatten; I was unofficial "officer in charge" of thatdamned Wild Blue Yonder song, etc., etc. Not very monumental chores !

HAP

20314

26 April 1971

Brig General Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF (Ret)
L-307
3852 Jewell Street
San Diego, California 92109

Dear General Watkins:

I have your fine letter of April 21st. I hope to see your brother in Providence within the next fortnight.

I can only wish I had known you resided in San Diego because I spent some time last August at the Kona Kai Club as a guest of Major Reuben Fleet. During my stay there, I interviewed Jimmie Doolittle, K. B. Wolfe, Arthur Raymond, Mac Laddon, and other Air Force luminaries. I did not know you were so close. However, I am still trying to get hold of Merion C. Cooper who had some close ties to General Arnold for a period. General Cooper lives in Coronado, as you may know. So I may yet make another trip.

Let's leave it at that for the present. If I cannot get out your way any time in the next six months, I will presume at a later time to ask for some written recollections of your associations with Hap Arnold.

I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of our correspondence to your brother.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

Tarleton H. Watkins
Brigadier General
United States Air Force Retired

21 April 1971

Dear Dr. Green,

Your letter relative to Gen. Arnold finally caught up with me out here in California where I now live. The Air Force seems to be having its trouble in keeping up with my correct address altho I have been careful to let them know where I reside.

I am afraid that I can be of little help to you in your project. While I saw Gen. Arnold often when I was a boy, I only saw him twice after I was in the Air Force. Once just before the war when he visited our unit in Hawaii and once shortly after the war started when he called me to Washington to brief some of his staff on my views of the attack on Pearl Harbor as I was one of the pilots who managed to get into the air that interesting morning.

My brother will be of great help as he had many contacts with Gen. Arnold and did a number of special projects for him. Also, Gen. Arnold seem to place a special trust in John and I am sure that John saw the good general in a more relaxed manner than most people did.

I am sorry that I can't be of help, but if anything does come to my mind I will drop you a line.

Sincerely,

Tarleton H. Watkins
L-307
3852 Jewell St.
San Diego, Ca. 92109

Watkins, Parleton 2 Aug 74

20314

12 July 1974

Brig General Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF (Ret)
7362 Caminito Carlotta
San Diego, CA 92120

Dear General Watkins

As I fine-tune the schedule, I find that Friday, August 2nd, perhaps 10:30 AM, might be my best time. I'll phone to confirm.

Look forward to seeing you.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

8-2

FROM THE DESK OF

TARLETON H. WATKINS

11

24 June 1974

Great – See you in August.

Friday Aug 2 – AM or PM

20314

20 June 1974

Brig General Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF (Ret)
7362 Caminito Carlotta
San Diego, CA 92120

Dear General Watkins:

I was most interested in your letter of June 3rd and have been holding back my response pending clarification of my plans.

At present writing, I will be in the San Diego area a bit later than previously indicated, sometime around 15 August, give and take a day on either side.

If this is a convenient time, I'll give you a call and we can have our interview session.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

P.S. Morn or afternoon?

Tarleton H. Watkins
Brigadier General
United States Air Force Retired

3 June 1974

Dear Doctor Green,

It was nice to hear from you again, but as far as the plan that you mentioned, I can be no help. While I knew all three officers named, I was so far down the"totem pole" in those days, I am sure that they would never even consider talking to me about any plan.

Elmer Rose had been impressive to me for a long time, but shortly after the attack, I suggested to him that he shortstop one of the B-17's coming through Hawaii and take me as his co-pilot out to where the fighting was going on. His answer was a shocker to me at that time. He said, " Jack that is a great suggestion. You go ahead but I will stay here as this is a young mans war." I have often wondered if he ever saw another shot fired in anger. Needless to say, my respect for him vanished.

I am glad to hear that you will be on the West Coast soon and I will be most happy to talk to you. My new address is:

7362 Caminito Carlotta
San Diego, Ca. 92120
Phone: 583-9743

Sincerely,

Tarleton H. Watkins

20314

24 May 1984

Brig General Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF (Ret)
Penthouse G
5060 La Jolla Boulevard
San Diego, CA 92109

Dear General Watkins

You may recall our brief correspondence a couple of years ago about my interest in General Hap Arnold. Of course, I interviewed your brother in Providence, R.I. a couple of years back. I'm planning a trip out to the West Coast and want to catch a couple of important people I missed in an earlier go-around.

In yo
In your letter to me of 21 April 1971 you mentioned having only brief contactwwith Arnold during the war, and that you gave a briefing on a certain event at Pearl Harbor on December 7th. I'm especially interested in a plan that was supposed to have been put together by Colonel Bill Farthing, Major Elmer Rose, and Captain Lawrence Coddington in August 1941. That plan was submitted to General Fred Martin and then sent to higher headquarters and promptly lost or "filed." Does this stir any recollections?

Also, I would be pleased to have the benefit of any reminiscences about your boyhood contacts with Hap Arnold - Harley, they called him in those days.

Incidentally, I've had some contacts with Major Reuben Fleet and hope to see him when I come out your way. That ought to be about the last week in July, and I wonder if you would be able to spare me an hour or so?

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

Encl

20314

26 April 1971

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L-307
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San Diego, California 92109

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Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
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Enclosure

MG/sjp

Tarleton H. Watkins
Brigadier General
United States Air Force Retired

21 April 1971

Dear Dr. Green,

Your letter relative to Gen. Arnold finally caught up with me out here in California where I now live. The Air Force seems to be having its trouble in keeping up with my correct address altho' I have been careful to let them know where I reside.

I am afraid that I can be of little help to you in your project. While I saw Gen. Arnold often when I was a boy, I only saw him twice after I was in the Air Force. Once just before the war when he visited our unit in Hawaii and once shortly after the war started when he called me to Washington to brief some of his staff on my views of the attack on Pearl Harbor as I was one of the pilots who managed to get into the air that interesting morning.

My brother will be of great help as he had many contacts with Gen. Arnold and did a number of special projects for him. Also, Gen. Arnold seem to place a special trust in John and I am sure that John saw the good general in a more relaxed manner than most people did.

I am sorry that I can't be of help, but if anything does come to my mind I will drop you a line.

Sincerely,

Tarleton H. Watkins

Tarleton H. Watkins
L-307
3852 Jewell St.
San Diego, Ca. 92109

20314

14 April 1971

Relocated to San Diego

Brigadier General Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF (Ret)
2820 Crayton Road
Naples, Florida 33940

Dear General Watkins:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold which is to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian presently assigned to General Grussendorf's office in order to complete this assignment.

In spending about 18 months on a Brookings Institution Fellowship, I was able to research all of the vast Arnold collection at the Library of Congress. I also went through the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Eaker, Andrews, Knerr, LeMay, and other collections.

Aside from the written word, I have tried to interview the most important Air Force people who had contacts with General Arnold some time during his colorful career. Among those interviewed: Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, and perhaps 100 others. I have also been privileged to talk to Charles A. Lindbergh, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, Robert Lovett, Jackie Cochran, and a number of others. I have been in touch with your brother and hope to see him in Providence next month. He was promised a couple of good stories.

I have run across your name in a couple of contexts which may have brought you in some contact with General Arnold. If you feel you can contribute any anecdotes, insights, or even scuttlebutt which you think has validity, I would be pleased to stop by for a chat during a pending trip to the Southland in early June.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

BRIGADIER GENERAL TARLETON H. WATKINS

Part I - Narrative

Tarleton Harvin Watkins was born in Corpus Christi, Texas, on 5 December 1914. He enlisted in the Air Force in June 1938, as an aviation cadet at Kelly Field, Texas.

He served in Hawaii and North Africa during World War II, flying over 120 combat missions as pilot of A-20 and P-40 aircraft. His combat record which accounted for three enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, merited the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal with seven oak leaf clusters, and the Presidential Citation with one cluster.

His post-war service began with a tour in Bermuda where he served first as Deputy Commander, then as Executive Officer for Kindley AFB. In July, 1951 he was assigned to Germany as Administrative Assistant to the Commander of the 1602nd Air Transport Wing. On January 1, 1952, he became Deputy Wing Commander, a position he held until August of that year when he was appointed Commander of the 1708th Ferrying Group (MATS) at Kelly AFB, Texas.

He was named Commander of the 1708th Ferrying Wing at Kelly in October 1955. Following a year at the National War College (Ft. McNair, Washington, D. C.), General Watkins was named Deputy for Operations for the 322nd Air Division at Evreux-Fauville AB, France, in July 1957, and became Deputy Commander of that unit in January 1958. He assumed command of the

322nd in June 1959 and held that post until his assignment to Headquarters Ninth Air Force as Deputy for Operations in June 1961.

His promotion to Brigadier General became effective on the first of April, 1961.

BIOGRAPHY - Brig Gen T. H. Watkins

Part ~~III~~ II - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

1. Born 5 December 1914, Corpus Christi, Texas, parents are Dudley W. and Ruth W. Watkins

2. Married 20 July 1943; Wife - Sarah Lee Daniels, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; children: Sarah Woodruff, 18; son Tarleton Harvin, II, 16.

3. Hometown Address: None.

B. Education

1. Fairview High School, Dayton, Ohio, 1935.

2. Texas A&M College, College Station, Texas, 1938.

3. Air Force Flying School, Texas, 1939.

4. Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va, 1949.

5. National War College, Ft McNair, D. C., 1957.

C. Service Dates

1.	Jun 1938 - May 1939	Enlisted as aviation cadet, principal duty pilot training
2.	May 1939 - Aug 1949	Principal duty fighter pilot, commanding officer, Air National Guard instructor
3.	Aug 1949 - Feb 1950	Student officer at Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
4.	Feb 1950 - May 1950	Deputy Commander Hq and Hq 1604th Sq, Kindley AFB, Bermuda
5.	May 1950 - Jul 1951	Executive Officer, 1604th Hq Sq, Kindley AFB.
6.	Jul 1951 - Aug 1951	Administrative Asst to Comdr, Hq 1602d ATW
7.	Jan 1952 - Aug 1952	Deputy Wing Commander, Hq 1602d ATW
8.	Aug 1952 - Sep 1952	Commander, 1708th Ferrying Group, Kelly AFB, Texas.

1-1-1

B-B-B BIOGRAPHY - Brig Gen T. H. Watkins

9.	Sep 1952 - Oct 1952	Student Officer, George Washington U.
10.	Oct 1952 - Oct 1955	Commander, 1708th Ferrying Gp, Kelly AFB.
11.	Oct 1955 - Jun 1956	Commander, 1708th Ferrying Wg, Kelly AFB.
12.	Jun 1956 - Aug 1956	Special Asst to Comdr, 1708th Ferrying Wing, Kelly AFB.
13.	Aug 1956 - Jul 1957	Student Officer, National War College, DC.
14.	Jul 1957 - Jan 1958	Deputy for Operations, 322d Air Division, Evreux-FauvilleAB, France
15.	Jan 1958 - Jun 1959	Deputy Commander, 322d Air Division.
16.	Jun 1961 -	Deputy for Operations, Hq 9AF, Shaw AFB, SC.

D. Decorations and Medals

Air Medal with 7 oak leaf clusters

Presidential Unit Citation with 1 oak leaf cluster

Distinguished Flying Cross

E. Promotions

Rank	Temporary Date of Rank	Perm Date of Rank
2d Lt	25 May 39	25 May 39
1st Lt	20 Feb 41	5 Dec 42
Captain	1 Mar 42	
Major	29 Oct 42	
Lt Colonel	4 Nov 43	1 Jul 48
Colonel	19 Jan 51	23 Jul 53
Brig Gen	1 Apr 61	

July 62

Edited mcj

Interview, Brig General Tarleton Watkins, San Diego, Calif, 2 Aug 1974

Q You met Arnold in about 1930?

W Yes, about 1930. Actually, it was Patterson Field. He was commander of the base.

Q I think they called it Fairfield AirDepot

W Yes. His children are about my age, ranged in my age. Lois, the daughter, and Henry, Bruce and David. They lived right up the street from us. Of course, we played together all the time. I never thought of General Arnold. He was a Major at that time, other than being a very impressive man. He was senior man on the base, so we looked up to him in that respect. Always to me - and I'm not saying this because you are writing a book about him - he stands out in my mind very clearly. Of course, there are many other people that I've met that, actually, were higher ranking and everything else. I just dont recall them at all. But he was always very pleasant to the children. He played; you know, he gave you a feeling of friendship. One of the outstanding things I remember, just as if it happened the other day, when he came back from the Alaskan Flight in those old B-10s. I remember they landed at Patterson with no fuss or feathers. I dont remember a newspaper man being out there. I went down the line with a few of the families. No fuss, it was just like they had come in from across town. I can remember what he looked like when he climb ed out of the plane. He had on his leather jacket with insignia on it.

Q Was his hair white by then?

W It was graying. But he was a very handsome chap. He stood out, and in my mind, he always stood out. Of course I had not reason to think that some day he would be Chief of the Air Force. Being a kid, you never even gave any thought to any of this stuff.

Q I guess they now call it charisma.

W Charisma, yes.

Q Was he the center of attention when he came into a room?

W Yes. At least this was the impression I got as a kid. The remarkable thing was that he had a couple of characteristics of my later friends in the Air Force. He never changed. He was always the same great human guy. I ran into him later when he was running the Air Force. To me, he had not changed. He was just as humble; he was just as friendly. He was the same gentleman, so to speak. He had the same characteristics, I mean, Bruce Holloway, one of our later Generals, had the same characteristics, very intelligent, down-to-earth, very honest chap.

Q Did your father ever talk about him? Of course, you were born just about the time he went to the Philippines. I was trying to think of the Fort (Thomas) they were stationed at. It went out of my head. In Kentucky.

W He was in Texas for many years when I was small. In 1926, he went to the Philippines. We stayed there until 1929. In 1929, we went to Patterson. It was then near Wright Field.

Q What job did your father have?

W He was in the Power Plant Lab. He was an aeronautical engineer. We lived on Patterson. He was CO of Patterson.

Q Did you know Jan Howard while there?

W Yes. (Discussion by Interviewer of Howard, no response)* * *

Q What was your next contact with Arnold?

W The next real contact, I was stationed out in Hawaii. By that time I had gone through flying school. Stationed with 18th Pursuit Group.

Q This was before Pearl Harbor?

W Yes. I was there at Pearl Harbor too. About a year before Pearl Harbor, Arnold came out to make an inspection trip.

Q I think that was in 1939?

W Could have been, 1939 or 1940. Because I got out there in June 1939. He came out, and being typical Arnold, where he liked to get the facts himself. He had all the pilots gathered around. We were flying P-26s in those days. We were at Bellows

Field at gunnery camp. Our home base was Wheeler. Roger Ramey, he was a Captain then, and Sam Anderson, he was a Captain, too. They were the two Squadron Commanders. Of course, we only had a few pilots in a squadron. We had about 12 pilots in those days in a squadron. General Arnold sat us all down in the mess hall there and wanted to discuss our thoughts of what an American fighter should have.: Armament, requirements, the whole thing. He told us what was on the drawing board. We had heard rumors. He told us about the P-38 coming along. We'd never seen it. He was very interested in what we, the line pilots, had to say, especially in the fighter business. I remember Stan Holtener, who was kind of the top dog among the pilots, who was an aeronautical engineer and a superb pilot and a very bright, stable individual. I remember Stan told him that we needed at least five machine guns on every airplane. In those days we had two. He couldnt have realized we were going to have six and eight on them later on. He thought we ought to have at least five which showed that he was sound in his thinking.

Q Of course, the power plants were not strong enough to carry too much armament.

W Not in those days. The P-36s just started to come into our inventory then.

W P-36 was Curtiss. It carried two .30 cal firing through the propellor

Mpt Not too good an arrangement. Arnold stayed out there several days. But again, I had the same impression of him, just a real fantastic individual.

Q Was he articulate?

W Oh yes. In fact he made everybody feel you could relax with him. We didnt get to see too many senior people. In fact, if he was a Major, he was kind of senior.. Lieut. Col or a Colonel, once in a great while. And so, here was the head man. He had everybody sitting there discussing things with him freely. Nobody was trying to hide him. Then, I didnt see him again until about - well, the Japs hit us December 7th - I stayed out until about the following June or July. When I came home, I was sent up to

a fighter outfit in New England. General Arnold sent a message up, a wire saying he wanted to see me in Washington. So I jumped into an old P-40 and went down to Washington. I went to the old Munitions Building. He wanted to see me, because I had just come back from Hawaii. I had been there during the attack. I was one of the pilots who got into the air during the attack. He wanted to get the worm's eye view of what had happened out there and was going on, because things had been pretty disorganized All this big buildup. Nobody knew what they were going to be doing. Our personnel problems were bad. Nobody knew if they would be stuck out in Hawaii instead of out fighting the war.

Q You flew back in about June 1942?

W It was June 1942. They had sent me to his fighter outfit being organized up in New England. It wasnt organized yet, and that's when he called me down. I talked to him briefly about Pearl Harbor, and he wanted me to go around and talk to the different Chiefs of Staff, which I did. They questioned me about different things.

Q You mean the Deputies?

W Yes.. Was Strat

Q Was Stratemeyer there?

W I dont remember. There was a number of them, none of whom I'd met before. General Arnold had told them specifically that I was coming, and he wanted them to talk to me. I went a round and I couldnt add very much. All I could tell them was from a Lieutenant's point of view - well, I was Captain by then by past promotion - So I was pretty low on the totem pole. So I could tell them what the line pilot was thinking. Most of them were concerned that they would be stuck in Hawaii, and not get out and fight the war.

Q Some questions about the situation in Hawaii? Fred Martin was the Hawaiian Air Force commander. On his staff were three men who prepared a report: Col Bill Farthing; Major Elmer Rose, and Lawrence Coddington.

W I knew Farthing, Rose and Coddington.

Q Elmer Rose is the only one still alive. Those fellows produced an interesting report. Did you ever hear of their report?

W No

W No.

Q They produced a theoretical report, and they projected an attack by the Japanese (Note: Discussion of F-R-C Report)

W I didnt understand it as that. But I knew there was a plan. It was mostly rumor. They could use this thing to protect the Hawaiian Islands. The whole sea frontier would be covered. The scoop we had was that the Navy just absolutely would not hear of the Air Force doing this. And I can remember very plainly an Intelligence briefing that was given to a number of us by a Navy Captain of Intelligence. This thing really stuck in my mind all these years, and I've often quoted this. He said there was no reason for the Air Force or anyone else to be concerned except the Navy about the protection of Hawaii. This was a Navy job, and his statement was - I remember this clearly because it shocked me - he said: "Not even a rowboat could get within 150 miles of Hawaii without the Navy knowing about it." Of course, that morning, when those bombs were dropping, I kept thinking: "The Japanese didnt come in rowboats." But they got through.

Q How much time before Pearl Harbor did that briefing occur?

W About six months, as I recall.

Q That was about the time of the report. It was sent by General Martin in two directions. First, he sent it to his boss, General Walter Short, the overall Army commander, who wrote two words on it: "I concur." And then Martin sent it separately to Hap Arnold by mail. There is no reply to that letter. I'm guessing: asking for 180 B-17s at a time when we had just a handful of B-17s was like asking for the moon.

W Oh yes, I'm sure.

Q There is no reply from Arnold in the files. Again, I'm guessing that Arnold's reply was expunged from the files. (off record: Arnold always answered mail) You remember these B-17s coming in?

W They came in right in the middle of the attack. Of course, the Navy,

thought, I understand, that they were Jap airplanes, and they were shooting at them. They depressed their guns and were shooting at them. We didnt know - the average guy - didnt know they were coming in. We, the pilots, recognized them as B-17s, but at that stage of the game everybody was shooting at everybody else. But the very interesting thing about that attack; Some months before, they had put the AAF on alert. We were flying dawn and dusk patrols while we had P-26s and a few P-36s. I remember, we had to get up before daylight. This went on for about six weeks, as I recall. We would take off and patrol, and come back in. We were getting real tired of it. We couldnt leave the base, and there were so few of us to fly. But when th ings started to get tighter, they put us on this darn, stupid anti-sabotage alert where we had all the planes jammed up, and it was all the young officers, the more junior officers, we discussed this, and thought it was absurd. If there was going to be an attack - and we used to discuss the possibility of attack - We really didnt think it would happen, but we felt that what they were doing was just exactly opposite of what they should be doing, and it turned out we were right. It might have been because we were not wildly enthusiastic about seeing all of our airplanes grouped up.

Q You were flying P-40s?

W Just about a year before the war, maybe less than that, they brought some A-20s in. They didnt know what to do with them, so they made kind of a special attack task force out of them. They got a bunch of fighter pilots to fly them. I volunteered. They were new airplanes. We had one squadron of those. We were using them as night fighter strike airplanes. They were faster than the P-40. At the time we had this squadron we were based on Hickam. When the attack was on, we were at the far end of the ramp, and we were the first airplanes to get into the air; about four of us got into the air.

Q Did you get to shoot at any of them?

W No, but I got shot at by everybody else. One of the U.S. Navy

minesweepers put about 50 rounds through my airplane. What happened was: most airplanes were badly damaged in the attack. All of them would have been out of commission by today's standard. Word came down that there was a Jap carrier off Barber'sPoint. We had never dropped a live bomb. We had dropped smoke bombs. They put in, came down with a 300-lb bomb load. I had never heard of a 300- lb bomb. Where they got them, I'll never know. As I recall, they put 3 x 300-lb bombs on each of the A-20s with a .10 sec delay fuse in the nose, and instantaneous fuse in the tail. Our Squadron commander was a great fellow named Bill Holzapple. He selected three people - we only had four a irplanes tha t could fly - to go along with him. I had the second section; he had the first section. His plan was to take off, and go out and find that carrier. His tactics were: we knew we didnt have a prayer of getting through that fighter screen unless we took Draconian measures. So his plan was to go in full throttle at about 6,000 feet, dive down on the carrier, go across the carrier's deck at minimum altitude, and jettison our bombs. You didn't have to be very bright to figure out what was going to happen to you. I know I accepted it. It didn't enter my mind. I knew that in 20 minutes I'd be dead. There was no doubt in my mind. I think the rest of the fellows felt the same way. But there was absolutely no doubt, or any hesitation at all. We were scared; at least I know I was scared. In fact, I was as scared that morning as I have ever been in my life. It was the last time I've ever been really frightened, although I have had closer calls. But, anyway, we were still alive. The carrier wasnt there. We came back after awhile. We patrolled off shore.

Q Did you jettison the bombs?

W No, we brought them back. I dont think they were ever dropped during the war.

Q Did you leave Hawaii before Midway?

W No, I was out there during Midway. I was out at Hawaii when Midway was on.

Q They were recruiting a lot of fellows to fly in the B-17s to serve as crewmembers. Makeshift crews.

W It could be. I wasnt aware of it. As fighter guys we considered ourselves fighters.

Q You were flying patrol?

W Yes, patrols all the time around Hawaii. I remember when the Battle of Midway was on. The only think I ever knew about it, the fellows said there was a tremendous battle going on over Midway. A few days later, the people came back and I heard about the losses of our B-26s. They were almostcleaned out.

Q It was sort of a suicide attack. I think there were four B-26's lost.

W Were you in Hawaii when Gen Delos Emmons took over? (No response) Were you there when Willis Hale took over?

W Yes. Willis Hale. I was there only until the following summer. With the war on, we were moved around, and all things going on. Frankly, I wasnt paying any attention to what was going on in the higher echelons.

Q (Discussion of Emmons putting heat on for planes; Arnold took a calculated risk in not sending too many)

W Once the war started you had practically no contact with higher echelons. We were out flying patrols. We were spread all over and moving around. Of course, new people were flooding in. Our whole world was right there in a day-to-day operation.

Q (Re Arnold visit to Hawaii in 1939) Many people have told me that he avoided the red carpet treatment when he went to a base. He went down and talked to the Lieuts and Sgts in the maintenance shack. Oftentimes he would recognize some Sgt who had served under him somewhere along the line. He went there because that's where the problems were. Did you ever experience Arnold in this mode?

W Oh, yes, yes. One of the amazing things, in all the years, I have never, now I know there have been some back-biting about him, but in all the years that I have been in the Air Force, I have never heard one

soul say one detrimental thing about General Arnold. I'm sure there was a lot of that at the higher levels. But among the enlisted men and the junior officers - some of them not so junior officers - he was extremely well liked. I thought he was also admired. They looked up to him, you know.

Q He never served in combat in both wars. He was a frustrated man. (Discussion of WW I) In consequence it affected his attitude towards junior officers in World War II. People like Rosey O'Donnell, Carmichael, and Saunders. He brought them back into his HQ and perhaps brought you back to relate your experiences. He had high admiration for men who had been in combat- not that they didn't deserve high admiration - but his attitude was affected, in my opinion, by his own misfortune. Did you ever hear this said about Arnold, that he had not served in combat?

W No. I never heard anything about that. I believe that anybody who did some thinking realized that he was doing a fantastic job. We were pretty down-trodden at times. For example, right up to and after the war started, as I recall, we werent allowed to wear our wings on our uniforms. On our blouses, we could. We were under the Army, and they wouldn't allow us to wear our wings on our shirts. Everything was geared down. We knew Arnold was trying to get us a place in the sun, and to get the Air Corps in a proper position vis a vis the Army, Navy and the Marines. To this day, I feel he was the greatest officer the Air Force ever had, and probably one of the greatest the U.S. has ever had.

Q I've been trying to bring that fact to some wider attention.

Q Did you ever hear Gen Arnold talk about a separate Air Force?

W I dont know whether I ever heard him talk about it, but I know my father had talked about it. It was common knowledge that Arnold was fighting to get a separate Air Force.

Q He deferred this battle for the duration. He worked for General Marshall, and it was agreed between the two that the AAF should wait until after the war. (Ref to separate medical & supply, etc) So Arnold had de facto autonomy during the war. Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

W No, but I met Marshall. He was one of the most impresive people I have ever known. Just before the war, he came over to Hawaii...

Q Did Andrews fly him there?

W I dont remember, but he came over. At the time, I was dating the daughter of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Dept. Gen eral Herron. He was a top standing officer in my opinion., not because I was dating his daughter, but that I saw a lot of him., compared to what most Lieuts would see of a Lieut General. I met General Marshall at General Herron's quarters. I kind of saw him in that environment. The thing that impressed me most, Gen Marshall got all the officers of the Hawaiian Department together up at the auditorium at the Schofield Barracks and laid into us - boy, did he lay into us. We had just finished maneuvers and he had gone over the maneuver reports, etc. He told us how badly we had done. I'll never forget. He said: "Get those damned tanks off the road. I dont care if you have to tear up every pineapple field and sugar cane field in Hawaii. We'll meet that legal and monetary problem when we come to it." He said: "There is a war coming on. Tanks on the road are dead and they are useless. I want these officers out of the staff cars, too. I want these maneuvers to stop being directed out of a shiny staff car." Oh, he laid it on. We stood there. And the j unior officers, boy, we were really impressed. And he was so right.

Q I dont recall exactly when he came there, but it could have been after the Germans finished off Poland?

W Could have been.

Q The Panzers came in there. It might have been after the war in the West, when Hitler knocked off France and Britain?

W I dont remember. He really shocked a bunch of the troops. This is what happens. Maneuvers tend to degenerate into a stage show, an yway. In fact, the man euvers I participated in after the war, when I was in Tactical

Air Command

Air Command, the Strike Command - the show must go on. I didnt think they were too realistic, I didnt think. A lot of them, in my opinion, were for public relations.

Q Another hangup attributed to Arnold: when he came into a field and saw planes sitting around, he got very exercised about it. He would jump on the CO, or whoever was responsible, and want to know why these planes were sitting there. He felt every plane ought to be doing something: either training somebody, or out in combat, etc. I've been told that if they knew Arnold was coming, they would hide the planes.

W I never heard that.

Q The next time you saw Arnold after 1942?

W I never saw him again after he - I went down to the old Munitions Building, and cant recall ever seeing him again. The only contact I ever had with him was when I was a base commander. We were having a special function. I invited him and got a very nice note that he would like to but he was busy, etc.

Q Arnold was supposed to have had "pets" - people who werent afraid to speak up to him. Rosey O'Donnell, for example, was a brash sort of guy.

W I knew Rosey.

Q (Ref to O'Donnell and Norstad taking liberties with Arnold) (Ref to Advisory Counsil) Do you recall anything along that line?

W The only thing I recall is, my older brother, Arnold sent him through flying school a couple of years overage. Before that, he had given John a Reserve Commission. John sat right outside his office, and there was another non-professional. I dont know the chap's name. He was a successful business man. I think he was a lawyer.

Q Horace Shelmire? Did he have a moustache?

W Yes, must have been Shelmire.

Q He came from the same home town.

W My brother was sent to various places for General Arnold. He had carte blanche. He could go into a base and there would be no questions asked. I think the other

chap had the same deal. General Arnold did this because he wanted somebody around him that he had known a long time, and he knew would tell him exactly what was going on with no reservations, because neither of them were interested in being Regular officers. They were interested in the Air Force. They were friends of General Arnold's,and they could level with him.

Q I think your brother was one of those who spoke up to him and told him the truth rather than try to embellish things. Maybe this is why your brother spent some time there. He wanted to get away from writing speeches.

W He finally got General Arnold to send him out to Africa. He flew fighters out there and was quite successful at it. John told me, like anything else inthat position, Arnold felt that a lot of things were being kept from him, not to cover up, but to take the load off him. Of course, you'd be pretty naive if you didnt think there were self-seekers around a man like General Arnold. By using people he knew that were successful, intelligent, this was a good idea. Because he was primarily interested in welfare of the junior guy, the enlisted man. That was what my brother seemed to be looking into more than anything else. He wasnt looking into the idea of false reports, or anything like that. On morale and the way the younger officers and enlisted men were being taken care of.

Q Arnold had this reputation, of grabbing people in the halls of the Pentagon and sending them on a mission, etc

W I wouldn t be a bit surprised.

Q Did you ever hear of this happening?

W No, I didnt. But of course, I was so far removed from the power center by then, I really wouldnt have any reason to....

Q Was there anybody else who could have done the job Arnold did? Andrews?

W In my opinion, no. I dont think we ever had another officer in the Air Force like him. When I got more senior and dealt with some of the top people, close to the horse's mouth, I was more and more impressed with the fantastic job and his vision. He had seen what was needed. He obviously,

while he wasnt the hack politician, he was a great politician as far as the Air Force was concerned. He knew when to charge, and he knew when to fall back. I heard, and I dont know whether this is right, but to get Army support, that he actually conferred navigator wings or observer wings on some Army Generals, such as the Commander of the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and they drew flying pay. Whether this was correct, I dont know, but this was heard on what I thought was good authority. He felt by doing this he could win a lot of support for the Air Force, looking toward the day when we were trying to get to be a separate branch.. Adm King lived on a yacht on the Potomac to draw sea pay.

Q They set up the Potomac River Naval Command.

W Frankly, I've never seen anyone else, met any other general - the Air Force has been extremely lucky in the large number of outstanding officers that we had in all grades. We have had some "hamburgers" too, some terrible "hamburgers". But across the board, we have been extremely lucky. I have never met any that ever impressed me the way Arnold did. As I stated earlier, the impression started at an age when I never knew that I would be in the service. There was no reason: he was just another man. But he always stood out. I remember when we were up at his house - a big old farm house- playing with his kids at Patterson Field that he would walk into the room, and he was bigger than life. He was just another Major. There werent that many Majors around, but there was something he had...

Q They did a lot of riding in these days?

W Yes, did you say writing? He wrote these boys books about the border patrol. Yes, he rode horse back too. No, I never rode with him

Q Hank was a problem in those days wasnt he? They restricted him off the bus at school...

W He was just a normal kid and he was a little bigger than most of us. He was high spirited, but he wasnt a mean kid. All the kids were liked.

END

Edited mcj

Interview, Brig General Tarleton Watkins, San Diego, Calif, 2 Aug 1974

Q You met Arnold in about 1930?

W Yes, about 1930. Actually, it was Patterson Field. He was commander of the base.

Q I think they called it Fairfield AirDepot

W Yes. His children are about my age, ranged in my age. Lois, the daughter, and Henry, Bruce and David. They lived right up the street from us. Of course, we played together all the time. I never thought of General Arnold. He was a Major at that time, other than being a very impressive man. He was senior man on the base, so we looked up to him in that respect. Always to me - and I'm not saying this because you are writing a book about him - he stands out in my mind very clearly. Of course, there are many other people that I've met that, actually, were higher ranking and everything else. I just dont recall them at all. But he was always very pleasant to the children. He played; you know, he gave you a feeling of friendship. One of the outstanding things I remember, just as if it happened the other day, when he came back from the Alaskan Flight in those old B-10s. I remember they landed at Patterson with no fuss or feathers. I dont remember a newspaper man being out there. I went down the line with a few of the families. No fuss, it was just like they had come in from across town. I can remember what he looked like when he climb ed out of the plane. He had on his leather jacket with insignia on it.

Q Was his hair white by then?

W It was graying. But he was a very handsome chap. He stood out, and in my mind, he always stood out. Of course I had not reason to think that some day he would be Chief of the Air Force. Being a kid, you never even gave any thought to any of this stuff.

Q I guess they now call it charisma.

W Charisma, yes.

Q Was he the center of attention when he came into a room?

W Yes. At least this was the impression I got as a kid. The remarkable thing was that he had a couple of characteristics of my later friends in the Air Force. He never changed. He was always the same great human guy. I ran into him later when he was running the Air Force. To me, he had not changed. He was just as humble; he was just as friendly. He was the same gentleman, so to speak. He had the same characteristics, I mean, Bruce Holloway, one of our later Generals, had the same characteristics, very intelligent, down-to-earth, very honest chap.

Q Did your father ever talk about him? Of course, you were born just about the time he went to the Philippines. I was trying to think of the Fort (Thomas) they were stationed at. It went out of my head. In Kentucky.

W He was in Texas for many years when I was small. In 1926, he went to the Philippines. We stayed there until 1929. In 1929, we went to Patterson. It was then near Wright Field.

Q What job did your father have?

W He was in the Power Plant Lab. He was an aeronautical engineer. We lived on Patterson. He was CO of Patterson.

Q Did you know Jan Howard while there?

W Yes. (Discussion by Interviewer of Howard, no response)* * *

Q What was your next contact with Arnold?

W The next real contact, I was stationed out in Hawaii. By that time I had gone through flying school. Stationed with 18th Pursuit Group.

Q This was before Pearl Harbor?

W Yes. I was there at Pearl Harbor too. About a year before Pearl Harbor. Arnold came out to make an inspection trip.

Q I think that was in 1939?

W Could have been, 1939 or 1940. Because I got out there in June 1939. He came out, and being typical Arnold, where he liked to get the facts himself. He had all the pilots gathered around. We were flying P-26s in those days. We were at Bellows

Field at gunnery camp. Our home base was Wheeler. Roger Ramey, he was a Captain then, and Sam Anderson, he was a Captain, too. They were the two Squadron Commanders. Of course, we only had a few pilots in a squadron. We had about 12 pilots in those days in a squadron. General Arnold sat us all down in the mess hall there and wanted to discuss our thoughts of what an American fighter should have.: Armament, requirements, the whole thing. He told us what was on the drawing board. We had heard rumors. He told us about the P-38 coming along. We'd never seen it. He was very interested in what we, the line pilots, had to say, especially in the fighter business. I remember Stan Holtener, who was kind of the top dog among the pilots, who was an aeronautical engineer and a superb pilot and a very bright, stable individual. I remember Stan told him that we needed at least five machine guns on every airplane. In those days we had two. He couldnt have realized we were going to have six and eight on them later on. He thought we ought to have at least five which showed that he was sound in his thinking.

Q Of course, the power plants were not strong enough to carry too much armament.

W Not in those days. The P-36s just started to come into our inventory then.

W P-36 was Curtiss. It carried two .30 cal firing through the propellor Not too good an arrangement. Arnold stayed out there several days. But again, I had the same impression of him, just a real fantastic individual.

Q Was he articulate?

W Oh yes. In fact he made everybody feel you could relax with him. We didnt get to see too many senior people. In fact, if he was a Major, he was kind of senior.. Lieut. Col or a Colonel, once in a great while. And so, here was the head man. He had everybody sitting there discussing things with him freely. Nobody was trying to hide him. Then, I didnt see him again until about - well, the Japs hit us December 7th - I stayed out until about the following June or July. When I came home, I was sent up to

a fighter outfit in New England. General Arnold sent a message up, a wire saying he wanted to see me in Washington. So I jumped into an old P-40 and went down to Washington. I went to the old Munitions Building. He wanted to see me, because I had just come back from Hawaii. I had been there during the attack. I was one of the pilots who got into the air during the attack. He wanted to get the worm's eye view of what had happened out there and was going on, because things had been pretty disorganized All this big buildup. Nobody knew what they were going to be doing. Our personnel problems were bad. Nobody knew if they would be stuck out in Hawaii instead of out fighting the war.

Q You flew back in about June 1942?

W It was June 1942. They had sent me to his fighter outfit being organized up in New England. It wasnt organized yet, and that's when he called me down. I talked to him briefly about Pearl Harbor, and he wanted me to go around and talk to the different Chiefs of Staff, which I did. They questioned me about different things.

Q You mean the Deputies?

W Yes..

Q Was Stratemeyer there?

W I dont remember. There was a number of them, none of whom I'd met before. General Arnold had told them specifically that I was coming, and he wanted them to talk to me. I went a round and I couldnt add very much. All I could tell them was from a Lieutenant's point of view - well, I was Captain by then by past promotion - So I was pretty low on the totem pole. So I could tell them what the line pilot was thinking. Most of them were concerned that they would be stuck in Hawaii, and not get out and fight the war.

Q Some questions about the situation in Hawaii? Fred Martin was the Hawaiian Air Force commander. On his staff were three men who prepared a report: Col Bill Farthing; Major Elmer Rose, and Lawrence Coddington.

W I knew Farthing, Rose and Coddington.

Q Elmer Rose is the only one still alive. Those fellows produced an interesting report. Did you ever hear of their report?

W No.

W No.

Q They produced a theoretical report, and they projected an attack by the Japanese (Note: Discussion of F-R-C Report)

W I didnt understand it as that. But I knew there was a plan. It was mostly rumor. They could use this thing to protect the Hawaiian Islands. The whole sea frontier would be covered. The scoop we had was that the Navy just absolutely would not hear of the Air Force doing this. And I can remember very plainly an Intelligence briefing that was given to a number of us by a Navy Captain of Intelligence. This thing really stuck in my mind all these years, and I've often quoted this. He said there was no reason for the Air Force or anyone else to be concerned except the Navy about the protection of Hawaii. This was a Navy job, and his statement was - I remember this clearly because it shocked me - he said: "Not even a rowboat could get within 150 miles of Hawaii without the Navy knowing about it." Of course, that morning, when those bombs were dropping, I kept thinking: "The Japanese didnt come in rowboats." But they got through.

Q How much time before Pearl Harbor did that briefing occur?

W About six months, as I recall.

Q That was about the time of the report. It was sent by General Martin in two directions. First, he sent it to his boss, General Walter Short, the overall Army commander, who wrote two words on it: "I concur." And then Martin sent it separately to Hap Arnold by mail. There is no reply to that letter. I'm guessing: asking for 180 B-17s at a time when we had just a handful of B-17s was like asking for the moon.

W Oh yes, I'm sure.

Q There is no reply from Arnold in the files. Again, I'm guessing that that Arnold's reply was expunged from the files. (off record: Arnold always answered mail) You remember these B-17s coming in?

W They came in right in the middle of the attack. Of course, the Navy.

thought, I understand, that they were Jap airplanes, and they were shooting at them. They depressed their guns and were shooting at them. We didnt know - the average guy - didnt know they were coming in. We, the pilots, recognized them as B-17s, but at that stage of the game everybody was shooting at everybody else. But the very interesting thing about that attack: Some months before, they had put the AAF on alert. We were flying dawn and dusk patrols while we had P-26s and a few P-36s. I remember, we had to get up before daylight. This went on for about six weeks, as I recall. We would take off and patrol, and come back in. We were getting real tired of it. We couldnt leave the base, and there were so few of us to fly. But when th ings started to get tighter, they put us on this darn, stupid anti-sabotage alert where we had all the planes jammed up, and it was all the young officers, the more junior officers, we discussed this, and thought it was absurd. If there was going to be an attack - and we used to discuss the possibility of attack. We really didnt think it would happen, but we felt that what they were doing was just exactly opposite of what they should be doing, and it turned out we were right. It might have been because we were not wildly enthusiastic about seeing all of our airplanes grouped up.

Q You were flying P-40s?

W Just about a year before the war, maybe less than that, they brought some A-20s in. They didnt know what to do with them, so they made kind of a special attack task force out of them. They got a bunch of fighter pilots to fly them. I volunteered. They were new airplanes. We had one squadron of those. We were using them as night fighter strike airplanes. They were faster than the P-40. At the time we had this squadron we were based on Hickam. When the attack was on, we were at the far end of the ramp, and we were the first airplanes to get into the air; about four of us got into the air.

Q Did you get to shoot at any of them?

W No, but I got shot at by everybody else. One of the U.S. Navy

minesweepers put about 50 rounds through my airplane. What happened was: most airplanes were badly damaged in the attack. All of them would have been out of commission by today's standard. Word came down that there was a Jap carrier off Barber'sPoint. We had never dropped a live bomb. We had dropped smoke bombs. They put in, came down with a 300-lb bomb load. I had never heard of a 300- lb bomb. Where they got them, I'll never know. As I recall, they put 3 x 300-lb bombs on each of the A-20s with a .10 sec delay fuse in the nose, and instantaneous fuse in the tail. Our Squadron commander was a great fellow named Bill Holzapple. He selected three people - we only had four a irplanes tha t could fly - to go along with him. I had the second section; he had the first section. His plan was to take off, and go out and find that carrier. His tactics were: we knew we didnt have a prayer of getting through that fighter screen unless we took Draconian measures. So his plan was to go in full throttle at about 6,000 feet, dive down on the carrier, go across the carrier's deck at minimum altitude, and jettison our bombs. You didn't have to be very bright to figure out what was going to happen to you. I know I accepted it. It didnt enter my mind. I knew that in 20 minutes I'd be dead. There was no doubt in my mind. I think the rest of the fellows felt the same way. But there was absolutely no doubt, or any hesitation at all. We were scared; at least I know I was scared. In fact, I was as scared that morning as I have ever been in my life. It was the last time I've ever been really frightened, although I have had closer calls. But, anyway, we were still alive. The carrier wasnt there. We came back after awhile. We patrolled off shore.

Q Did you jettison the bombs?

W No, we brought them back. I dont think they were ever dropped during the war.

Q Did you leave Hawaii before Midway?

W No, I was out there during Midway. I was out at Hawaii when Midway was on.

Q They were recruiting a lot of fellows to fly in the B-17s to serve as crewmembers. Makeshift crews.

W It could be. I wasnt aware of it. As fighter guys we considered ourselves fighters.

Q You were flying patrol?

W Yes, patrols all the time around Hawaii. I remember when the Battle of Midway was on. The only think I ever knew about it, the fellows said there was a tremendous battle going on over Midway. A few days later, the people came back and I heard about the losses of our B-26s. They were almostdeaned out.

Q It was sort of a suicide attack. I think there were four B-26's lost.

W Were you in Hawaii when Gen Delos Emmons took over? (No response) Were you there when Willis Hale took over?

W Yes. Willis Hale. I was there only until the following summer. With the war on, we were moved around, and all things going on. Frankly, I wasnt paying any attention to what was going on in the higher echelons.

Q (Discussion of Emmons putting heat on for planes; Arnold took a calculated risk in not sending too many)

W Once the war started you had practically no contact with higher echelons. We were out flying patrols. We were spread all over and moving around. Of course, new people were flooding in. Our whole world was right there in a day-to-day operation.

Q (Re Arnold visit to Hawaii in 1939) Many people have told me that he avoided the red carpet treatment when he went to a base. He went down and talked to the Lieuts and Sgts in the maintenance shack. Oftentimes he would recognize some Sgt who had served under him somewhere along the line. He went there because that's where the problems were. Did you ever experience Arnold in this mode?

W Oh, yes, yes. One of the amazing things, in all the years, I have never, now I know there have been some back-biting about him, but in all the years that I have been in the Air Force, I have never heard one

soul say one detrimental thing about General Arnold. I'm sure there was a lot of that at the higher levels. But among the enlisted men and the junior officers - some of them not so junior officers - he was extremely well liked. I thought he was also admired. They looked up to him, you know.

Q He never served in combat in both wars. He was a frustrated man. (Discussion of WW I) In consequence it affected his attitude towards junior officers in World War II. People like Rosey O'Donnell, Carmichael, and Saunders. He brought them back into his HQ and perhaps brought you back to relate your experiences. He had high admiration for men who had been in combat- not that they didn't deserve high admiration - but his attitude was affected, in my opinion, by his own misfortune. Did you ever hear this said about Arnold, that he had not served in combat?

W No. I never heard anything about that. I believe that anybody who did some thinking realized that he was doing a fantastic job. We were pretty down-trodden at times. For example, right up to and after the war started, as I recall, we werent allowed to wear our wings on our uniforms. On our blouses, we could. We were under the Army, and they wouldn't allow us to wear our wings on our shirts. Everything was geared down. We knew Arnold was trying to get us a place in the sun, and to get the Air Corps in a proper position vis a vis the Army, Navy and the Marines. To this day, I feel he was the greatest officer the Air Force ever had, and probably one of the greatest the U.S. has ever had.

Q I've been trying to bring that fact to some wider attention.

Q Did you ever hear Gen Arnold talk about a separate Air Force?

W I dont know whether I ever heard him talk about it, but I know my father had talked about it. It was common knowledge that Arnold was fighting to get a separate Air Force.

Q He deferred this battle for the duration. He worked for General Marshall, and it was agreed between the two that the AAF should wait until after the war. (Ref to separate medical & supply, etc) So Arnold had de facto autonomy during the war. Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together?

W No, but I met Marshall. He was one of the most impresive people I have ever known. Just before the war, he came over to Hawaii...

Q Did Andrews fly him there?

W I dont remember, but he came over. At the time, I was dating the daughter of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Dept. Gen eral Herron. He was a top standing officer in my opinion., not because I was dating his daughter, but that I saw a lot of him., compared to what most Lieuts would see of a Lieut General. I met General Marshall at General Herron's quarters. I kind of saw him in that environment. The thing that impressed me most, Gen Marshall got all the officers of the Hawaiian Department together up at the auditorium at the Schofield Barracks and laid in to us - boy, did he lay into us. We had just finished maneuvers and he had gone over the maneuver reports, etc. He told us how badly we had done. I'll never forget. He said: "Get those damned tanks off the road. I dont care if you have to tear up every pineapple field and sugar cane field in Hawaii. We'll meet that legal and monetary problem when we come to it." He said: "There is a war coming on. Tanks on the road are dead and they are useless. I want these officers out of the staff cars, too. I want these maneuvers to stop being directed out of a shiny staff car." Oh, he laid it on. We stood there. And the j unior officers, boy, we were really impressed. And he was so right.

Q I dont recall exactly when he came there, but it could have been after the Germans finished off Poland?

W Could have been.

Q The Panzers came in there. It might have been after the war in the West, when Hitler knocked off France and Britain?

W I dont remember. He really shocked a bunch of the troops. This is what happens. Maneuvers tend to degenerate into a stage show, an yway. In fact, the man euvers I participated in after the war, when I was in Tactical

Air Command, the Strike Command - the show must go on. I didnt think they were too realistic, I didnt think. A lot of them, in my opinion, were for public relations.

Q Another hangup attributed to Arnold: when he came into a field and saw planes sitting around, he got very exercised about it. He would jump on the CO, or whoever was responsible, and want to know why these planes were sitting there. He felt every plane ought to be doing something: either training somebody, or out in combat, etc. I've been told that if they knew Arnold was coming, they would hide the planes.

W I never heard that.

Q The next time you saw Arnold after 1942?

W I never saw him again after he I went down to the old Munitions Building, and cant recall ever seeing him again. The only contact I ever had with him was when I was a base commander. We were having a special function. I invited him and got a very nice note that he would like to but he was busy, etc.

Q Arnold was supposed to have had "pets" - people who werent afraid to speak up to him. Rosey O'Donnell, for example, was a brash sort of guy.

W I knew Rosey.

Q (Ref to O'Donnell and Norstad taking liberties with Arnold) (Ref to Advisory Council) Do you recall anything along that line?

W The only thing I recall is, my older brother, Arnold sent him through flying school a couple of years overage. Before that, he had given John a Reserve Commission. John sat right outside his office, and there was another non-professional. I dont know the chap's name. He was a successful business man. I think he was a lawyer.

Q Horace Shelmire? Did he have a moustache?

W Yes, must have been Shelmire.

Q He came from the same home town.

W My brother was sent to various places for General Arnold. He had carte blanche. He could go into a base and there would be no questions asked. I think the other

chap had the same deal. General Arnold did this because he wanted somebody around him that he had known a long time, and he knew would tell him exactly what was going on with no reservations, because neither of them were interested in being Regular officers. They were interested in the Air Force. They were friends of General Arnold's, and they could level with him.

Q I think your brother was one of those who spoke up to him and told him the truth rather than try to embellish things. Maybe this is why your brother spent some time there. He wanted to get away from writing speeches.

W He finally got General Arnold to send him out to Africa. He flew fighters out there and was quite successful at it. John told me, like anything else in that position, Arnold felt that a lot of things were being kept from him, not to cover up, but to take the load off him. Of course, you'd be pretty naive if you didnt think there were self-seekers around a man like General Arnold. By using people he knew that were successful, intelligent, this was a good idea. Because he was primarily interested in the welfare of the junior guy, the enlisted man. That was what my brother seemed to be looking into more than anything else. He wasnt looking into the idea of false reports, or anything like that. On morale and the way the younger officers and enlisted men were being taken care of.

Q Arnold had this reputation, of grabbing people in the halls of the Pentagon and sending them on a mission, etc

W I wouldn t be a bit surprised.

Q Did you ever hear of this happening?

W No, I didnt. But of course, I was so far removed from the power center by then, I really wouldnt have any reason to....

Q Was there anybody else who could have done the job Arnold did? Andrews?

W In my opinion, no. I dont think we ever had another officer in the Air Force like him. When I got more senior and dealt with some of the top people, close to the horse's mouth, I was more and more impressed with the fantastic job and his vision. He had seen what was needed. He obviously,

while he wasnt the hack politician, he was a great politician as far as the Air Force was concerned. He knew when to charge, and he knew when to fall back. I heard, and I dont know whether this is right, but to get Army support, that he actually conferred navigator wings or observer wings on some Army Generals, such as the Commander of the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and they drew flying pay. Whether this was correct, I dont know, but this was heard on what I thought was good authority. He felt by doing this he could win a lot of support for the Air Force, looking toward the day when we were trying to get to be a separate branch.. Adm King lived on a yacht on the Potomac to draw sea pay.

Q They set up the Potomac River Naval Command.

W Frankly, I've never seen anyone else, met any other general - the Air Force has been extremely lucky in the large number of outstanding officers that we had in all grades. We have had some "hamburgers" too, some terrible "hamburgers". But across the board, we have been extremely lucky. I have never met any that ever impressed me the way Arnold did. As I stated earlier, the impression started at an age when I never knew that I would be in the service. There was no reason: he was just another man. But he always stood out. I remember when we were up at his house - a big old farm house- playing with his kids at Patterson Field that he would walk into the room, and he was bigger than life. He was just another Major. There werent that many Majors around, but there was something he had...

Q They did a lot of riding in these days?

W Yes, did you say writing? He wrote these boys books about the b order patrol. Yes, he rode horse back too. No, I never rode with him

Q Hank was a problem in those days wasnt he? They restricted him off the bus at school...

W He was just a normal kid and he was a little bigger than most of us. He was high spirited, but he wasnt a mean kid. All the kids were liked.

END

Watts, George D. 23 Nov 71
16 Dec 71



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22 December 1971

Mr. George B. Watts
3435 N. Walrond
Kansas City, Mo 64117

Dear Mr. Watts:

Again many things of interest in your letter of the 16th. I can only hope that you may find some occasion to visit Washington. I'm sure we could dig out of that fine memory of yours some other gems.

I'd like to hear that Presidential story some time.

We just happen to have an extra copy of an earlier edition of the retired list. You may have it.

I'm sending back the two pictures as requested. I have some shots of Arnold reviewing a flyby from that balcony.

Many thanks for your help. Let me know when you plan to be in town.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

December 16, 1971

Dr. Murray Green:

Answers to your questions are as follows:

1. I can't recall any speech that "Hap" gave to the boys. I recall some of the lectures were in theater. Many of the boys also slept in tents behind the hospital - most due to a health problem.

2. Hollywood movie stars from different studios - this really gets to me (I can't recall in person) as I stated before many were there on week-ends. Wallace Berry - Mary Pickford - Buddy Rogers - Susan Haywood. NOTE: As a young man I used to play extra or mob scene's. Ree $5.00 an a box lunch.

3. Radio board cast of Forman - Hap and Governor of California was made as you say - some where over Los Angeles or Long Beach area. It made the news the next day - I recall reading about it in the Los Angeles paper.

4. 11th Bomb Sqd. This operation was when Hap was a Major or C.O. of Sqd. Two - books I've read told about this - one written by some Lt. Col.

5. Colonel E. A. Lohman was C.O. at March, had strick, reserve personality hard to get to. Very dark complexion. I've often wondered if he was part Indian. Our old friend Major Clarence Tinker was part Indian - he and Hap were good friends. Both from old bomb group 11th, 9th and 31st.
The fallen tree does bring back memory's some where next to Hap quarters or block to theater - one tree was down for some time. Lohman and Hap were not close friends. I've only seen them together at inspection tour or parade on Saturaday.

6. Major Vic Beau Jr. was a fine officer, had military dignity - was liked by all people. Believe he was on staff of Colonel John H. Pirie Base C. O. 1936. NOTE: Colonel Pirie was one of my better friends made many flights together.

7. Minton Kaye - you got me on this one, but a Mr. Lane was one who made many photo at March. Lt. Kennth Habson (later 4 star retired) was C.O. of 23rd photo sqd. Took pictures from old Fairchild and Fokker aircraft. (Had a nice talk with General in Kansas City occasion was 16th Anniversary of U.S.A.F. honoring President Truman and Stuart Symington.

8. Wing Ding's Wergat officer club - plenty to drink, good band an all the fly boys had girls - some real beauties from Los Angeles and Hollywood. Being just a new man I never got to attend. But can recall some good stories I can't repeat - top personal I'm sorry.

9. Arnold - Vacation --- recall No information.

10. Arnold to Brig. General at March was a big day for Hap and all the staff. Had party at club and some went to Riverside at the hotel where the Flyers club is. This one room is all famous flyers and etc. there memoir - (can't think of the name of hotel.) Believe its the Riverside Inn?

11. Hap departure from March was a loss to community relations. All Riverside payed respect to him. City Officials knew him well. Church people had a high respect of him for his kelping the little fellow that was down and out. Hap never forgot the old days of climing up the ladder the hard way - People all around the valley knew Hap as man of his word. One of Hap's old friends and General Beau was Capt. Hix - he built the rock house between Riverside and March at top of hill - with fresh running water from spring running through house. One more thing about Hap departure from March - One of the officers took off in Beech craft with Hap furniture and police dog - had wrong prop setting - plane made rough landing at end of field - Hap came out in his jeep - Sir - if that dog is hurt your an inlisted man tomorrow. Check this out - I've heard this for years.

12. Please don't get me started on Sweet "Sue" Claggett as he didn't go over to well at March. I would say Hap and Sue were not friends. He didn't last long. For many years I've wondered how did he ever got his wings - he was too fat in front to fly! I heard he was old horse Lt. Calvary! I can see him in a cock-pit of a P-12 and later P-26.

13. Will send pictures to you also please return drum and bugle corps - only one I have, you can copy. Other pictures I'm sending are for your collection you can keep if you wish. (1) Alaskan Flight (2) Crash of Gen. Westover (3) My old Sqd. 34 Pursuit Sqd. (4) Parade and Review - Hap - your friend Capt. Eaker - out in front - Next a friend of Lt. H. Harris Jr. Standing by staff on end is Major Early E. W. Duncan. (5) Airman's Hymn.

I may be in Washington D. C. after the year - I'll try and call you. I've got one more story about a certain President of the United State - he told me one night at an Air Force dinner. I felt very humble - put his arm around me an wispered a little story in my ear. You will love it, its about some Colonel's I was with. Believe I was the only enlisted man there.

Its been nice to hear from you, I appreciate it.

Question - Where can I buy a list of retired personal, both officer and enlisted - Supt of Dacut?

Sincerely,

George B. Wallis

NB
watts gave
me lead on
Col Taro - Wrote -
Reply 12/10/71 -
Dry Hole - filed

29 November 1971

Mr. George B. Watts
3435 N. Walrond
Kansas City, Mo. 64117

Dear Mr. Watts:

Your long and meaty letter of the 23rd was welcome. Naturally, it raises other questions. Since you were so willing to answer the others, I'm going to impose on your hospitality:

1) The C.C.C. - In my reading, Lieut Colonel Arnold was at first a reluctant dragon because CCC took Army officers away from their regular flying duties. But then he came to realize that it was a "cure" for Juvenile Delinquency. The CCC experience lived with him the rest of his life. Do you have any recollection of speeches or pep talks he would give to the boys?

2) Do you recall Wallace Beery coming out to March Field? How about Bebe Daniels and Ben Lyons? Also Mary Pickford?

3) Do you have any recollection of this radio broadcast Ivan Farman was supposed to make from an airborne plane, with Col Arnold and the Gov of Calif at the other end? Farman's script blew away and he had to improvise with some amusing results. Does this stir a memory?

4. That was interesting about the 11th Squadron flying supplies to help the Indians. Would you have any news clippings or official orders which clearly involve Arnold in this?

5. Do you have any recollection of Eugene A. Lohman? He was 2nd in command of March Field. Arnold did not think too much of him, I was told. There was one instance of a fallen tree in the yard or driveway which Lohman took a long time to remove. Do you have any memories of the Arnold-Lohman relationship?

6. I will be having lunch tomorrow with General "Vic" Beau. Any recollections of Major Beau?

7. How about Minton Kaye? He was the Photo Officer and was supposed to have an "in" with Colonel Arnold.

8. Arnold introduced the "Wing Ding" as a morale factor. Did the airmen get in on this too?

9. Arnold had just finished the Air Mail mission. This was in June 1934. He was suddenly alerted to get ready for the Alaskan flight. He had started on his vacation to Jackson Hole, Wyoming and was called back. Any memory of this?

10. There was a big party for Arnold when he received his first star. This was February 1935, I believe. Any recollections of that, or of Arnold as General. He apparently skipped the rank of Colonel, although he was a Colonel in WW I.

11. What about his departure from March Field late in 1935? It was represented to me as a great loss to Riverside because he was so good on community relations.

12. His successor was General Henry "Sue" Clagett who didnt last long as Commander, 1st Wing at March Field. He is supposed to have blamed Arnold for his departure. Any memories?

First I'd heard of the Drum and Bugle Corps. Would like to see those pictures. Will return to you.

Will also get in touch with Colonel Toro. You have been very helpful and I appreciate it.

Incidentally, I talked to General Hunter Harris not too long ago.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

November 23, 1971

Dear Dr. Green:

I shall try to answer some of the questions you asked. It's been a long time for this old soldier to try to remember places, names and interesting events, but it was a pleasure to receive your letter.

1. Earthquake of March 1933. I was not in the Air Corps at this time, however, I do remember the day the quake hit southern California. The Long Beach area was the worst area in lives lost, plus millions of dollars in damage. The 19th Bomb Squad plus 17th Pursuit Group and service squadrons were called to help deliver supplies, including shelter tents, cots and mattresses from Air Corps supply. The personnel at March did a wonderful job and had a good write-up in the local paper. Hap and I believe Major Clarence Tinker helped lead this operation.

2. Again, this is before my enlistment, but I can recall some events plus some "hangar flying" later. The Air Mail mission of the early 1934's, Feb-June, by Air Corps from March Field was flown from Burbank airport. The Air Corps pilots were good pilots, but still their equipment, experience, plus cross country flying was not like the airline pilots. Navigational aids were only by radio, and the weather conditions at this time were some of the worst in flying history in the area of the west. Again, Captain Baker and Major Tinker were head of some of the operations. The boys I remember used to fly the old Fontiana Beam. As you know, 12 lives were lost and approximately 66 accidents occurred during this operation.

3. The Alaskan flight was flown by the old Martin airplanes known as B-10 and B-12, which were stationed at March Field, part of the old 19th Bomber Group, one of the most noted flights in early Air Corps history due to timing of world events; Not much money from Congress and the airplane was new. Over 20,000 square miles of land was photographed and the big day was August 19th. Flew 942 miles over waste land - non-stop. When they landed in Alaska, I know you have heard the story about Hap. When he got out of his airplane and started walking, someone said, "Who is the old white-haired man?" Hap, at this time, was 48 years old, I believe.

4. The C.C.C. missions were in operation when I was at March Field. I can remember the boys coming to March Field for instructions, medical aid, and light military training in field operation. They were stationed up in the San Bernardino mountains around Hemet, Red Land, etc. My personal observation of the C.C.C. operation was not too good for two reasons: President Roosevelt gave the C.C.C. boys part of our pay, $1.50 and when someone got in trouble in town, C.C.C. boys would say they were Air Corps personnel! However, the Air Corps did save C.C.C. workers life in Minnesota. Two Air Corps pilots flew in a blinding snow storm to pick up two tanks of oxygen at a hospital and flew in a small canyon blind. On their return trip the next day, they could see they had only 10 feet clearance on each wing tip.

5. Hollywood. March Field, at times, as you stated, was a hangout for some of the movie stars, 1933 to 1937. Especially, the young pilots that flew the P-26 Boeing, later A-17 Northrop. The girls and boys of movieland were at the officer's club most of the time with some young pilot for escort. Tobey Wing and her sister used to come to March Field.

6. First Wing Commander. I can't recall, but I will send you Squad information around 1934 and 1935 time. I'll send you the address of Sgt. Toro who retired as Colonel Toro, Denver, Colorado. The Colonel was an old friend of Hap during G.H.Q. area, 1935. NOTE: 1942, I received my A.G.O. card from Colonel Toro in Washington, D.C., when I was ATC - TWA 1942 to 1946.

7. Mrs. Arnold was a grand lady. Her home, or quarters, at March was well kept. The lawn, flowers, shrubbery and trees were all her specialty. In back of the quarters, she planted many flowers and around the walls enclosing the patio, plants and climbing vines lined this area. NOTE: One day, Sgt. Dempsey asked all new men who wanted to be engine mechanics to step forward. I did, and we received lawn mowers to cut grass around quarters and parade grounds. With new G.I. shoes, I had nice big blisters on both feet. It took three days to walk correctly.

8. Things in general about Hap. Many people did know know that Hap liked music. His Drum and Bugle Corps at March Field was his pride and joy. Also, Mrs. Arnold enjoyed greeting the other Generals and dignitaries; such as Westover, Fabalois, Andrews and Clagett. Sometimes, we would fly to Rockwell Field and play for weddings, etc. You can see about 8 to 10 men getting in an old C-14 Forker A/C No. 142 with bugles and drums, flying blind down the coast or inland, and finally landing in the fog at the base. NOTE: As I look back to the old days of navigation, I sometimes think we were playing for our own funeral!

When Hap came to March, he set up many important items for Air Corps personnel to follow later in life, such as night flying, landing at night by flares, and using flares to take pictures at night. San Diego Exposition was taken at night by using flares. Hap also started the bombing runs, or practice, at Muroc Lake; also dropping bombs at night. White powder or lime was used on Muroc dry lake to indicate where bombs hit target. We also made some bombs at the engineering base. I have one picture of a bomb made at March. Also, bombs were filled with sand or water. We didn't have much equipment, nor money from Congress. One night, three Martin bombers left March to bomb Muroc Lake area. "A" went up the coast; "B" went up on the mountains to the east; "C" over inland, over L.A. One was late over the target, due to engine trouble, and dropped the bomb through the aileron of the lower aircraft. The pilot, when landing at March, could not even hold a cigarette. The 11th Bomb Squad flew supplies to the Arizona Mesa to help save the lives of the Indians caught in a snow storm. 15 tons were dropped in a 24 hour period.

First Lt. Robert M. Lasey, A.C. West Point, was the first officer to be killed in WWII. First Lt. Hunter Harris, Jr., 34th Pursuit Group, later retired as a full 4-star General. I talked to the General about two years ago at TWA. During Hap's early days, 1933 to 1935, who could forget Capt. W.O. Eareckson--balloon pilot of 1927-28. Capt. and I made many flights in the new A-17 Northrop. What a wonderful new attack plane. Later in life during WWII, I was at Washington, D.C. TWA-ATC, and was one of the crew chiefs on the old Boeings and C-54 Douglas. Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Ike, General Marshall, Hap, were all part of our operation. Another

story about Hap was when he and Ike went overseas. Larry Trimble, Captain-TWA, was on flight also as one of the pilots. Larry received a telegram-report to the draft board. He is A/C pilot. Hap took the telegram and said "I'll handle it".

I wish to thank my old friend and wonderful man, General Robert Hughes for his thoughtfulness in remembering an old soldier.

Sincerely,

George B. Watts

George B. Watts
1934-1937 March Field

GBW:elb

---- 20314

Lee Watts Letter

8 November 1971

Brig General Robert B. Hughes, USAF (Ret)
2505 Rigel Drive
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80906

Dear General Hughes:

I have your fine letter of recent date. I guess we missed connections. I had to make my trip early. General Hugh Knerr, who just passed away, appointed me administrator of his historical effects which he wanted to donate to the Air Force Academy. And so, I came out there about 10 days ago.

It is likely that I shall have future occasion to come out again and I will at least phone you - are you in the book? - to say hello and thanks for the tip on George Watts. I've written to him and hope he can help me fill in this gigantic jig-saw puzzle entitled: "Hap Arnold".

My last couple of trips to Colorado Springs have been very profitable. I've been able to see and interview Generals Thatcher; Bob Lee, Joseph Atkinson, Ben Chidlaw, Walter Jensen, Tom Moore. O.K. Niess and a couple of others. All had some useful recollections on Hap Arnold.

Thanks again for your help. I hope you enjoy your new home.

As if I needed other incentive, I just happen to have a boy out at the Academy, Class of '75.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Send Copy of Watts Letter (this date)

2505 Rigel Drive
Colarado Springs Colo.
80906

Mr Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Hq. United States Air Force
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr Green

Plase forgive me for being so tardy in answering your letter but we have been moving from one location to another in Colarado Springs Colo.

I did not know Gen Hap Arnold during my career in the Air Force. although I have nothing but the highest respect for his great organizational and

leadership genius. It was so apparent to all of us at the lower levels of command during World War II that we had a great leader who was completely dedicated to his country. I have met Mrs Arnold a few times when I was the Commander of the 4th Air Force at Hamilton Air Force Base. She is truly a wonderful lady and a remarkable person.

I would like to refer you to George B. Watts, 3435 W. Walrond Kansas City Mo. 64117. He is a senior mechanic with T W A. He was at March Field in 1935 as a Sgt.

was in Capt. Ira C. Eakers Sq. of B-10's and B-12's. He sent me some pictures of B/Gen. Hap Arnold reviewing the troops at March after his famous "Alaskan flight". You are welcome to these pictures if they are any help to you. (really only one good picture of Hap reviewing the troops, and one of B-10's on ramp.) I have a feeling George Watts may have some information you could use. He is an old friend of mine from Observation school days.

Would be pleased to see you late in Nov. if I could add anything further

Sincerely
Robert B. Hughes B/Gen USAF Ret.

---- 20314

8 November 1971

Mr. George B. Watts
3435 N Walrond
Kansas City, Mo. 64117

Dear Mr. Watts:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and was referred to you by General Robert Hughes. He mentioned your service at March Field under General Arnold. I am very interested in this period, because it is a key turning point in his career.

I've had the pleasure of talking to many of those who served with or under Lieut Colonel Arnold during those years, including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Knerr (who passed away just last week) George Goddard, Ralph Snavely, Lawrence Carr, Ray Dunn and a fewothers.

I'm esppcially interested in any special recollections you may have of Lieut Colonel Arnold in respect to:

1) The Earthquake of March 1933
2) The Air Mail Mission of Feb/May 1934
3) The Alaskan Flight
4) The CCC Mission
5) Courting Hollywood - as you may recall, Arnold invited many Hollywood stars out to March Field and aviation received good publicity during that period
6) 1st Wing Commander
7) Mrs. Arnold (including her interest in planting those poplars which are now over 100 feet tall)
8) Anything else I havent thought of.

I had lunch with General Spaatz and Eaker not too long ago and we talked about Hap Arnold -my favorite subject.

I would be pleased to hear from you in the enclosure. The most desirable thing would be an interview, but I dont have any current travel plans, as I'm working under some tight deadlines.

Sgt. Henry Puzenski, General Arnold's flight engineer, passed away some years ago, a great loss in many respects.

I didnt see your name on the Alaskan flight roster and assume that you did not make that mission.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

2505 Rigel Drive
Colorado Springs Colo.
80906

Mr Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Hq. United States Air Force
Washington, D.C.

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Would be pleased to see you late in Nov. if I could add anything further

Sincerely
Robert B. Hughes Lt. USNR Ret.

20314

24 September 1971

Brig General Robert B. Hughes, USAF (Ret)
~~302~~ 2505 RIGEL DR.
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80906

Dear General Hughes:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and have been at it for a couple of years now. I was fortunate enough to obtain a Brookings Institution Fellowship which allowed me to work through the Arnold Manuscript Collection (about 90,000 documents) at the Library of Congress. While there, I went into the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Andrews, Eaker, LeMay, Knerr, etc., Collections.

More recently, I have been interviewing some key AAF personalities who were associated with General Arnold at various times during his colorful career in aviation stretching for nearly 40 years, from 1911 to 1950 when he passed away. I've talked to Generals Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, O'Donnell, Kuter, Kenney, Norstad, Pre Cabell, K.B. Wolfe (who just passed away), Jimmy Doolittle and probably 100 others. Outside the regular Air Force, I have interviewed Hon. Robert Lovett, de Seversky, Charles Lindbergh, Jackie Cochran, Howard Rusk, and many members of the Arnold family.

Needless to state, this is intended as a "warts and all" biography and will be published by Random House. Because of my association with the Air Force in an official capacity, I've waived any royalties. Most will go to Mrs. Arnold who, as you may know, could use the income.

While I appreciate the fact that you were very junior during World War II, I've seen your name in the files and there is no way to tell whether you had some personal dealings with General Hap. If so, I would be delighted to have an opportunity to reminisce with you for an hour or so when I come out to the Colorado Springs area late in November. I should mention that I have been out on an earlier trip and have been fortunate enough to interview Generals Atkinson, Gerhart, Strother, Partridge, Chidlaw, Bob Lee and O.K. Niess. I've also talked to General Rush Lincoln in Boulder.

In any event, I would appreciate hearing from you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Wedemeyer, Albert C. 5d8 Oct 70

October 9, 1970

L/Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA(Ret)
Friends Advice Farm
Boyds, MD 20720

Dear General Wedemeyer:

Upon playing back the tapes of our two interviews, I find that they confirm a first impression, that our four hours together will produce indispensable resource material in several key areas. I believe we agreed there are two items that remain unfinished business:

1. The leak of RAINBOW FIVE. If your contacts in a certain investigative office are still viable, you will strike a solid blow for decency and truth. They may not wish to make the whole file available, but if we cannot determine who is guilty of this lapse, of a lesser objective I would be satisfied with an official statement that Hap Arnold is innocent. It is important to his memory, and to the good name of the military establishment to clear him of any association of this dastardly act, if the facts point in this direction, as you and I think they do.

2. An interview with Charles Lindbergh through your mutual friend, John Chamberlain. I've just finished reading the 1,000 page Lindbergh's Wartime Journals. There are 12 or 15 references to Hap Arnold in them. Only a few of them are complete; some leave a portion of the particular contact unsettled. In the Arnold files, I've run across a couple of letters from Lindbergh, but none going the other way. It is likely that General Arnold kept his written communications to Lindbergh down to a bare minimum because Arnold was in a difficult political position. Arnold was working for FDR and he greatly admired Lindbergh's technical talents. I did not write to Lindbergh

for an interview because I felt it would result in an almost certain turn down. If perhaps through your good offices this could be arranged, I would settle for one hour with Lindbergh.

My great wish for you in that medical breakthrough Sloan-Kettering to help your son and so many others who endure this terrible scourge.

As you would say, and I like it, "God Bless".

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

September 18, 1970

L/Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, US Army(Ret)
Friends Advice Farm
Boyds, Maryland 20720

Dear General Wedemeyer:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold for Random House and have been researching for three years. I was on a Brookings Fellowship and worked on the Arnold collection in the Library of Congress where I met your associate and friend, Keith Eiler, who is working on a biography of Robert Patterson.

I know you had many dealings with General Arnold and would hope to profit from your recollections of him.

One subject of very great interest is the "leak" of RAINBOW FIVE which they tried to pin on you. I was most interested in your account in your book, Wedemeyer Reports. As you may know, some people are trying to pin responsibility for the disclosure on Hap Arnold. I'd be especially interested in your thoughts on this subject.

In any event you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of some of them at a time and place convenient for you. Local phone OX-53862. I live in Silver Spring and could come out to your farm with no trouble at all.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

29 December 1971

General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret)
Friends Advice
Boyds, Maryland 20720

Dear General Wedemeyer:

Just returned from General Rosie O'Donnell's funeral. He was among the greatest the Air Force had to offer. I was very fortunate to have had an interview with him last year. He was very close to Hap Arnold, as you know.

I'm trying to wrap up some loose ends, as I'm heading South for an extended interview trip starting Monday, 3 January.

Thanks for the invitation. I will take you up on it before too long.

Good wishes to you and to yours, and mostly, a healthy and happy New Year.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

P.S. Just received in mail a letter from young Cabell. We had a little ceremony at our Air Force Intelligence Reserve Officers Christmas banquet to honor "Pearre" Cabell who started it all and we invited his two sons.

A. C. WEDEMEYER
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED
FRIENDS ADVICE
BOYDS, MARYLAND
20720

December 24, 1971

Dear Murray:

Several months ago you phoned the office, and I presume you phoned back again, but we were out. I think your inquiries at that time concerned the Ellsberg disclosures of classified material. Anyway, we are now at home and doing business, so you could come out and we will have a good chat covering not only the Ellsberg case, but it would be fun to get your views about the Middle East and the Far East.

Sincere good wishes to you and your loved ones for health and happiness during the New Year.

As ever,

A. C. Wedemeyer

A. C. WEDEMEYER
General, U. S. Army (Ret.)

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20314

A. C. WEDEMEYER
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED
FRIENDS ADVICE
BOYDS, MARYLAND
20720

April 16, 1971

Dear Murray:

I am happy that you had such a good contact with General Lindbergh. I look forward to your book and am sure that he made some contribution because of his own vast experience as well as his knowledge of the Air Force during Hap Arnold's day.

I am deeply touched by your interest and concern in my elder son, Albert. So far, the reports are encouraging, and we are very very grateful.

Sincere good wishes to you and your loved ones for health and happiness.

Faithfully,

A. C. WEDEMEYER
General, U. S. Army (Ret.)

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C.

12 April 1971

General A.C. Wedemeyer, U.S. Army (Ret)
Friends Advice
Boyds, Maryland 20720

Dear General Wedemeyer:

I meant to write before, but I wanted to send you a copy of the enclosure because you did so much to make it possible for me to see General Lindbergh. We had a fine, frank talk, and I think I have a better understanding of the whole era as a result.

Your comment about MASH and other associated obscenity was well taken and historically correct. I am hopeful that we are not yet past the peak of our Western Culture and will have a few more contributions to make before they write us off. I'm hopeful the President will terminate our role in the Southeast Asian conflict at an early date. When that happens, a lot of the emotional aberrations like MASH will disappear. If they don't, I agree we are in real trouble.

I was just delighted to learn that your son made such a remarkable recovery. It is like a miracle and it couldnt happen to a nicer father.

Good luck in your own writing endeavors. I hope to have the opportunity to chat with you again some time soon. I had hoped to stop by to see how Keith Eiler is doing on Patterson, but havent had the chance.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

Dear Copy L. Letter 4/12/71

A. C. WEDEMEYER
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED
FRIENDS ADVICE
BOYDS, MARYLAND
20720

January 25, 1971

Dear Murray:

Apropos of my agreement to send you an extract from a letter I received recently from General Charles Lindbergh, I am enclosing an extract of same.

I enjoyed visiting on the phone, and I sense that you are making good progress with your book.

I do wish that a man with your literary skill or power of expression would write to the appropriate authorities in our government and stop the showing of filthy, disreputable films. I refer specifically at the moment to MASH, but the use of four letter words and pornographic scenes in our films has increased to such an extent that I cannot help but recall the debaucheries in Rome so vividly depicted by Gibbon. I fear that the same fate awaits our western world, of which we are a pivotal nation, as that which befell Rome.

Sincerely,

A. C. WEDEMEYER
General, U. S. Army (Ret.)

Enclosure

Dr. Murray Green
Office of the Secretary
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330

The following is an extract from a letter, dated January 17, 1971, received by General A. C. Wedemeyer from Brig. General Charles A. Lindbergh, USAFR. This extract was prompted by a request on General Wedemeyer's part to General Lindbergh for an audience by Dr. Murray Green, who is writing a biography of General "Hap" Arnold, USAF (deceased).

. . . . .

"Of course I will be glad to talk to Dr. Green about Hap Arnold. The problem, largely because of my travelling, will be to set a mutually convenient date for a meeting. I suggest that I telephone Dr. Green when I am back on the east coast. Hap Arnold was a good friend. Iwill be delighted to do what I can to help with the biography. Somehow, I'll find the time. Would you please ask Dr. Green to send me his phone number (addressed to 21 Tokeneke Trail, Darien, Conn. 06820)?

"Please ask him to mark on the outside of the envelope Arnold Biography so it doesn't get stacked in with mail that will probably never be opened."

. . . . .

A. Green

October 9, 1970

L/Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA(Ret)
Friends Advice Farm
Boyds, MD 20720

Dear General Wedemeyer:

Upon playing back the tapes of our two interviews, I find that they confirm a first impression, that our four hours together will produce indispensable resource material in several key areas. I believe we agreed there are two items that remain unfinished business:

1. The leak of RAINBOW FIVE. If your contacts in a certain investigative office are still viable, you will strike a solid blow for decency and truth. They may not wish to make the whole file available, but if we cannot determine who is guilty of this lapse, as a lesser objective I would be satisfied with an official statement that Hap Arnold is innocent. It is important to his memory, and to the good name of the military establishment to clear him of any association of this dastardly act, if the facts point in this direction, as you and I think they do.

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for an interview because I felt it would result in an almost certain turn down. If perhaps through your good offices this could be arranged, I would settle for one hour with Lindbergh.

My great wish for you is that medical breakthrough Sloan-Kettering to help your son and so many others who endure this terrible scourge.

As you would say, and I like it, "God Bless".

Sincerely,

SIGNED

DR. MURRAY GREEN

Interview General A.C. Wedemeyer, Rockville, Md., Oct 5, 1970

Q: General, you started talking about Hap Arnold as a writer and thinker. You say he was not the greatest writer in the world?

W: Well, I didn't say that because it would compare writers. But I do feel that Hap Arnold was not an intellectual man. He was an intelligent man, he grasped situations very quickly, and was intolerant, really, of delays once he made a decision that caused him to rub some people the wrong way. But I had a relationship with him that was quite unique, in that I was a junior to him in rank, yet he did confide in me quite often when we would be together. I'll give you an example very quickly. After the Casablanca conference was over, General Marshall and I were scheduled to go to Moscow, not actually to Moscow, to the Kiev (Kuibyshev?). We were to go and confer, he of course with Stalin, and I was to confer with the Planners for our continued war effort. Stalin notified President Roosevelt that he didn't see where any useful purpose could be served by having General Marshall and General Wedemeyer come there. So General Marshall then said the President wanted me to go and talk to Chiang Kai-shek with Hap Arnold, and explain to CKS what had happened at Casablanca as it pertained to the China theater. From there, I was to go on and talk to General MacArthur. So I started out from Casablanca with Hap Arnold, and he stopped at a few of the overseas along the African littoral, and talked to the young American fighter pilots, and this was absolutely remarkable, the rapport that he immediately established with these young, brave youngsters, that were out in these overseas little satellite fields, you know, along the African littoral. I admired him so much, his ability to reach them, to understand their problems, and to encourage them, to inspire them. Then we went on, and I won't discuss the trip except that we continued along the African littoral to Cairo, refueled, and went on to Karachi, and then to New Delhi, and on up to Chungking, crossing the Hump. And one thing that occurred, we had terrible storms there, had no communications, no weather information, over the Himalayas in those days. It was really a risk, everyone took when they went over the Hump, and he was in a B-17. And they got into 100 mile an hour winds and it blew them far beyond Kunming, the terminal.

Q: Were you in that airplane?

W: No, but I knew about it. See, later when I had command of that theater, I know how these conditions would quickly develop, you couldn't foresee them.

Q: They came very close to disaster on that one.

W: Surely. And then when he landed at Kunming, I was at the airport, because I was terribly concerned. I was a BG - a Planner, Marshall's representative, really. But the tire blew out, with a bang. Did anybody ever tell you that?

Q: No

W: One of the tires, maybe two of them, blew out just after they landed. Anyway, we got up to Chungking, and again, I went into these conferences that he had with CKS, and listened. He did not do very well, frankly. Everything was done through an interpreter, and Parker, I think was him name, Colonel Parker was with him.

Q: Yes, Lewis Parker

W: Yes, Colonel in the Air Force, very fine man, but again, not an intellectual man. He was an operator.

Q: Jake Smart with him?

W: I think Jake was with us, but I don't remember Jake going into the conferences up there at Chungking, I don't remember that. Brehon Somervell was with us.

Q: Was Sir John Dill on that trip?

W: Oh yes, and Sir John Dill, when were in New Delhi, I went pig-sticking with him, and he hurt himself. He ruptured himself. Then when we got to Chungking, just as an anecdote, I mean I spent most of the night with him, he had such terrible pains in his back, and had a hell of a time getting heat for him there. It was cold. Then he did go on up to Chungking with us, yes. But he was not actually in the conferences with the American commanders, as I recall it, I don't remember.

Q: You say, Arnold did badly with CKS?

W: I did not say that. I said he did not do well, he did not do as well as a King or a Marshall would have done, in talking to him. He was not a penetrating thinker, Hap Arnold. I attended all the JCS meetings, all of them, til I was sent out with Mountbatten, and that was in the winter of 1943. Why Hap never contributed

much on an intellectual plane. But Hap - you realize that at that time the Air Force was an integral part of the Army, and Hap more or less acceded everything George Marshall said. They were very close in goals, and I never heard Marshall admonish Arnold ever, never.

Q: Or disagree publicly?

W: Never, not in front of the other people there. But I do know in Marshall's office, that they did discuss. And I'll tell you, frankly, one time I was present when they were discussing the Cross-channel operation, and I think Tooey Spaatz was in the room, too. I'm not sure, but I think I'm right about this, in Washington, General Marshall's office. We were talking about the Cross-channel operation, and I maintained - as a matter of fact, that was my operation - I started the thought of having this, because I had gone to the German War College. I was confident that the Germans, that the bulk of them fighting their real enemies, they hated the guts out of the Soviet Union - the Bolshevekis, as they called them - so I was confident that if we got across, there were enough people there, who felt as you and I do more or less, even though loyal Germans like Beck, von Staufmenberg was a close friend of mine, and classmate of mine at the German War College. Did you know that? He was the man that put the bomb under the table. So I had these wonderful contacts. Now, I knew the attitude toward us, their attitude toward the Soviet Union. I knew that better, perhaps, than any other American could know it. I was with them for 2½ years in school. So, I kept talking about this, and I said that the Air Force could form a canopy over our forces and go across in '43. That's what I wanted to do - go across in '43.

Q: This was ROUNDUP?

W: Well, it had all kinds of names, ROUNDUP was the last name given to it. But anyway, of course, the British opposed it, they wanted to go behind a Scotch band, marching, they were in favor of peripheral operations. Now, I must say, Hap Arnold helped me in this operation, supported it with what the Air Force could do. But the British kept urging us to do things down in the Mediterranean area, and that did usurp or did take resources like air, and water and landing craft, things like that, postponing further that operation which, if we had got across in 1943, and swept eastward, today we wouldn't have the Soviet Union commissars, and so forth, all through middle Europe. You wouldn't be having the difficulties you have today.

And the British could have carried out what they promised the Poles. They promised the Poles their territory.

Q: Do you believe that if TORCH were postponed, or not carried through...

W: I opposed any operations that militated against the main...

Q: Divergence from the main thrust?

W: That is correct. My idea was to get to the industrial area of the Ruhr, that was the heartbeat of the whole German-Italian war effort. Dynamo of the war effort, and fellows like Rommel, all credit to the guy, who was a great tactician, he would have died on a limb out there. And then we would have had Anglo-American forces sweeping into Western-Central Europe, Eastern and Central Europe. But Hap Arnold supported that idea, he was very loyal to us on that. The man who destroyed it, stopped it, was a guy named Churchill, who was the most articulate man of the whole group that I came in contact with. Now, Hap Arnold, that day in Marshall's office, concerning the airpower there, he turned to me, and said he was going to put wings on my chest, and Marshall laughed and said: "Well, General Wedemeyer has had some experience with the tactics of the Germans." And Hap said: "I know that." The Germans taught us, you see, the tactics of the Stuka and these wide-sweeping, not off-tackle plays, but wide sweeps around the end, when they gobbled up all these,...remember when they did that, beginning of the war, to the Poles, thousands and thousands of prisoners?

Q: They did this to Western Europe too in May 1940. They got the French...

W: Yes, but they didn't have to do quite so much, because the resistance wasn't quite as great. The French capitulated quite quickly. You are right, though, the tactics were the same. But Hap Arnold was smart enough to see the efficacy, the desirability of doing this, bringing the war to a quick conclusion. Hap Arnold did not get along well with Ernest King. Admiral King in my book was one of the finest Americans on the JCS. I said that in my book. He really was, but you and I could say no to each other without hurting the other's feelings, but he couldn't. He was rather a difficult person.

Q: I think Arnold used to needle him from time to time.

W: Well, he may have done that I wouldn't have known that. But I felt sorry because here were two fine Americans, both dedicated Americans. And at the meetings,

now, of course, whatever Marshall said, Arnold invariably went right along with it, and they may have resolved these questions back alone later on. I don't know. But I never heard Hap take issue with Marshall.

Q: Well, Marshall regarded Arnold as equal, but not quite equal, in a sense that it was "Dear General" from Arnold to Marshall, and then the other direction, it was "Dear Arnold."

Q: Never "Hap" though. I never heard him call anybody. He told my wife once that he liked me as much as if I were his own son, something like that. Well, by God, I didn't know it, by anything he ever said to me.

Q: Did he call you "Al?"

W: Oh no! King did and Hap did, and I've got autographed photographs to Al Wedemeyer, all that stuff.

Q: I understand even President Roosevelt didn't call him "George," or did he?

W: No, no, that's wrong, Harry Hopkins and the President, many times I went to the White House will Marshall, and it was "George," yes sir.

Q: Roosevelt liked to call people by their first name.

W: He called me, a little pipsqueak, by mine. That wasn't anything, Happy Hopkins did the same thing, Judge Rosenman...

Q: But Marshall was great, but frosty man?

W: Very impersonal man.

Q: Hard to get close to?

W: You take after the Casablance conference. I told you I was sent to go talk to these people. So I didn't come home with the others. We lived at Ft. Myer. General Marshall, as busy as he was, was thoughtful enough to call my wife and say don't worry about your husband, he's on a little detail. Lots of men wouldn't have done that. See, I didn't come home till after a month after the others did.

Q: Right, he was a very considerate man. When Arnold had that major heart attack, he was very solicitous of Mrs. Arnold, and gave her reports, or came to her to ask about how he was doing, when he was in Coral Gables for a period of time. So he was a very considerate man, but he had this austerity...

W: Pershing had the same thing, and Marshall was devoted to Pershing. In fact, Pershing was responsible that Marshall was picked up and given an opportunity to go on up higher, I was told. This is scuttlebutt, but I believe that's the way it was.

Q: You know, I think I agree 100% with your analysis of Arnold as not a giant intellect, but a doer.

W: It's an objective analysis, because I loved him. But you are in a position it would ruin your book if you got nothing but drool over him. Make him a human being, and he was a human being, fine American.

Q: As a matter of fact, he recongized his own limitations in that respect.

W: I'll tell you one thing that would interest you. That's why I want to talk a minute about the Victory Program, because he was involved in this.

Q: Yes, I know.

W: Well, I would like to know sometime how much you know, because I don't know all about it. Burton Wheeler, Senator Wheeler of Montana, is involved in this, too, and he is still living.

Q: Well, I'll tell you everything I know, and you tell me everything you know and maybe we will come up with something.

W: In July of 1941, my chief named Gerow, gave me an assignment to write a Victory Program, and I just didn't know exactly how to start this thing. I'd just been in the War Plans Division about 6 months. I had read over all the plans that we had, the Green plan, the Orange plan, the White plan, you know, the RAINBOW. Well, that was sort of the last one. But the idea was that the White plan was against rioting in this country, stuff like that. But I saw a hell of a lot of plans over in Germany, and these plans weren't comparable. They weren't realistic. It was like reading a Baedeker. An I, a little pipsqueak Major, was criticizing our war plans. So I got this job, not in a mean way. Gerow, my chief, I loved the guy.

Q: Is he in good shape,? he's down in Virginia?

W: No, he's senile. His brother I see right along, Lee Gerow. Leonard was a wonderful fellow, both of them are VMI man. Now to come back to this Victory Program, in July this directive came up and the President said he wanted some basis for mobilization, mobilization of our industry and everything. So I made a study, I went to all these various - I was given carte blanche to talk to anybody, by Marshall. It was Top Secret and all this baloney, so I drew up this Victory Program what I estimated to be necessary for a two front wars, against the Japs concurrent to a two front war against the Germans. Well, you and I are friends. You would go by

office, and I would be busy there, and you would say: "Hello, Al," and I would say: "Hello, come in and sit down." You'd come in, and you'd say: "What are you doing, Al?" And I'd say: "Well, I'm looking on this. Look, I've admired you," and say, "look this over will you, and give me your ideas." Because I was groping. Nobody had ever done this before. And here I was talking about an Army of 8,700,000 men, people laughed at me, older officers, when I went around and talked to them, in G-3 of our Department - I never shall forget, I was so embarrassed - he was a BG and I was a Major, and he said: "You'll never get that many men overseas." Four million men, that's what I would be getting over there. And I said: "We need them over there." So anyway sounds a little bit immodest what I am saying, but it is the truth. What I wanted to say was that when I got around to the Air Force people, the Air Planners were always under me.

Q: Harold George?

W: Harold George and O.A. Anderson, Anderson was one of my first pilots.

Q: Possum Hansell, Ken Walker?

W: That's right, all of them, Ken got killed out at Rabaul. Well, anyway, the Air Force people were wonderful to me, they were very loyal to me, and I was to them. I believed in the use of airpower. I told you already about the cross-channel business, So anyway, I must have asked somebody to come in. I don't know, but this Top Secret plan, every night, would be locked up in a safe. And when it was finally issued, copies were all numbered. The President got Copy 1 and 2. No. 3 went to the Secretary of War Stimson, No. 4 went to the Chief of Staff. I had it all numbered.

Q: How many copies were there in all.

W: (I think the initial one was about 9, I think that's right, plus a couple I had in sort of draft form in my office. The FBI descended upon me, of course, when this appeared in the Chicago Tribune, and Washington Times Herald. You know about that?

Q: Yes, I do.

W: Now, there was, of course, it was terrible. They descended upon me, and I had a German name, I had spent 2½ years at the German War College, and what else

Q: Didn't you make a deposit in the Riggs Bank or something?

W: Oh yes, my father died, or somebody died, and left me some money. Oh, everything was agin me. It looked awful, and it is an awful experience, when you know that you had nothing like that.

Q: You were like a butler, the obvious suspect?

W: Yes, so, well Hap Arnold talked to me one time. Senator Wheeler told me that Hap Arnold did not approve of this business of going to war until he had raised an Air Force, and he would do all he could to retard it. Now this is what Senator Wheeler told me, now Hap Arnold had a copy of this, and the inference was, what Wheeler told me, that he made it available to Wheeler, and had one of his boys low down. Arnold made it available to Wheeler. Wheeler wouldn't have a copy of it, nobody outside the Pentagon except the President. But some young officer is supposed to have taken it over down in the bowels of the Capitol Building where the photostat is. They took pictures of it, and brought it right back, so it wasn't out of the Pentagon, maybe only several hours, but that's the story that I heard.

Q: That Wheeler told you?

W: Yes. Senator Wheeler. Now look, I wouldn't hurt Hap Arnold's memory for anything in the world, and

Q: Well, the sense of this appeared in Waldrop's column in 1963?

W: No, I didn't know that, but Wheeler didn't tell me this until many years later. But the guy - Genau of the FBI - I became a great friend of all the FBI, because they all had looked into my background, Hoover and Tamms and Genau and all of them investigated me. So they were all. Today, Hoover and I are on a few boards together. Little League baseball, I mentioned to you earlier, well, he is also a trustee, well, anyway, I've talked to Hoover, we've flown down to Houston, Texas, a few months ago to a meeting, and we talked about this a little bit. He doesn't think that Hap Arnold did that. He thinks Wheeler got that from some other source.

Q: I want to explore this with you. What possible motive would Arnold have had to make that available to Wheeler?

W: Well, what possible motive did the person who made it available to Wheeler, whether it was Hap Arnold, that's the first point. And here was the President saying: "We will not go to war," he had given the quarantine speech again and again and again, and told people we would not send boys over there. But he was giving a directive to his war making - part of his machinery here to determine what would be necessary if we did go to war. And this would prove to the potential enemy, potential at the time, that we meant business over here, that we were going to war, by God. We were going to prepare to go to war. So that would be the broad look at it. That's the only justification that anybody could have. Right? Now, you come down to Hap Arnold. Hap Arnold had a big responsibility, he knew the few airplanes, and the industrial complex was so limited in producing airplanes - the number of airplanes we needed and at the same time, the competition with the tremendous demand that King's people. It wasn't King then, it was Betty Stark. The big demand that they came in, and the big part of industry that they would take, and that would conflict with industry, for the air industry, you see. Hap knew that, that's where Hap was really not dumb, he was pretty intelligent when it came to knowing the implications of building so many submarines, or so many aircraft carriers, on his own air people. And he would fight, and he would fight well.

Q: You are talking about a conflict that happened after Pearl Harbor. This is AWPD-42.

W: I beg your pardon, I'm talking about, you see, the Navy was given a directive through Betty Stark. And I think an Admiral named Turner prepared this, I'm not sure.

Q: Would it be Jack Towers?

W: Towers is the Air, but I mean the senior planner over in the Navy was an Admiral named Turner at that time, before the war. Savry Cook came in later, but Garner had to make up a plan for the Navy, and that of course, would include the Marine Corps and their Air. Now, I made up a plan, that all the ground forces and the air, and a fellow named Larry Kuter, and Possum Hansell, people like that, helped me there.

Q: They came up with AWPD-1, the Air War Annex to your RAINBOW FIVE

W: I'm not sure, I don't know. But we had many a session together in my office.

Q: In their discussions...

W: I may tell you, excuse me, to cover a point that you made. It's important, that Hap Arnold had a copy of what the Navy put in. I got a copy right away, and made it available to your air planners. When you compared what they were going to have, and Hap Arnold was going to have for his Air Force, there was a strong conflict right away, not only as to the industrial side, but also as to the strategic implications, the application of this part. The Navy was going to usurp a lot of the mission.

Q: There was a conflict, right. The conflict intensified after Pearl Harbor. The conflict began before Pearl Harbor. The contest for A-1 priority between the Navy and the Air Force.

W: For munitions...

Q: Well, for materiel?

W: Yes, industry.

Q: It was a question of, you only had so much aluminum, you only had so much steel...

W: That's right, ball bearings...

Q: Right, and the Air Force wanted it, and the Navy and the Air Force did have a conflict. Assuming that there was a conflict, and that there was antagonism between Arnold and the Navy, why should Arnold want to leak that report? I mean, what motive would he have to leak that report to the Chicago Tribune?

W: You're just asking me a question. I have no idea why Hap would do it. I just conjectured to help you. I can't believe that he would.

Q: Right, well, this is why I think that Wheeler got it someplace else, and is trying to pin it. Actually this guy Waldrop with this clever article is trying to pin it on Arnold. Now, let's go back...

W: Is Waldrop dead?

Q: No, I interviewed him. He lives on Loughboro Road in Washington, D.C., and he pins it on Arnold too. But you see, he has a guilt complex, I don't mean "too." He pinned in on Arnold. You saw his article in the Washington Post?

W: I'm getting old and senile. I'm probably forgetting...

Q: Well, let me turn this off, and I'll tell you what I know (off tape)

Q: Getting involved in TORCH. TORCH, the decision for TORCH was made in July 1942. The decision came by, I think Marshall went over there, I think Marshall and Hopkins went over there, and they had this big discussion with Arnold didn't go.

W: I was with them. April 1942.

Q: But the decision, I guess Churchill advocated, I think they called it CYMNAST at that time. This was the North African operation. But the decision to go into TORCH was made in July 1942, I believe and Arnold was very unhappy about that. And I can document that, because, first of all, they wanted three groups which wer going to the UK, they wanted them diverted toward Africa. Tooey Spaatz and Eaker, who were trying to build up the UK bomber force, were told, you are not getting any more. It's all going down to Africa, and they opposed that. And Arnold was unhappy about any diversion. I mean this was sort of an article of faith with the Air Force, that a successful campaign against Germany depended upon strategic bombing operation coming out of the UK, and anything that diverted from that, either to the Pacific, or to other operations, they opposed. Marshall opposed it, too, but Marshall wanted the Cross-channel operation, but Churchill and other factors intervened. They were persuaded that it was, you know Dieppe had happened in 1942, and it was a disaster, so they agreed to hold off the operation in 1943. But that is something else. But my point is that Arnold had absolutely no motive, absolutely no motive for leaking RAINBOW FIVE. This man, Waldrop says in his article, and it is a very tenuous and tortured rationale, he says that Arnold was unhappy with Gerow and the Army War Plans because they were not giving enough attention, enough weight, to the Air Force in Air planning.

W: Here was a man who was the Chief planner, and there isn't an officer in the Army who by conviction, wanted a huge airpower. They wanted airpower to carry the strike force, decisive blows. I felt that we had to have forces on the ground, but I felt we should have a canopy of air over any amphibious operation which is the most critical time in any military operation, when you are going ashore. You've got to have a canopy of air, and we had it, when we went over in OVERLORD. We would have had it, if we hadn't of diverted our resources, air resources, all along the perimeter there, that long line of communications, 2,200 miles from the Strait

of Gilbrater to the Suez Canal. I fought this thing tooth and nail at the Casablanca Conference with the British planners, and I was supported - I must be honest about it - by Savvy Cook, the Navy planner. He was very loyal to me at that time, but he had his tongue in his cheek. He told me after the thing was over, he never believed the British ever wanted to go across the Channel. And therefore, in order - this is important to you - in order to get them to do it, he wanted to use a lever, that all right, we will go against the Japanese first priority, if you don't want to do this, you see. And he was convinced that we ought to get to this dynamo of the Axis war effort first. So that should never be forgotten. And I think he epitomized, I think he expressed King's philosophy. Now, in going to these conferences, I flew with a guy named King, and because I was another service, he talked to me very frankly, I noticed the man was quite human. And who flew with Marshall? Savvy Cook. In case the plane went down, then you had an Army and a Navy man both knowledgeable about the plan that we were going to present to our opposites in the British.

Q: This rationale that Waldrop presented...have you seen the article, General? I'll send you a copy. I'll send it to you in the next couple of days. But the rationale behind this, and I think your knowledge is critical in this, that Arnold was unhappy with the role given to air in the summer of 1941. The result was that he was bitter. This was at the time when the air was trying to establish itself as an entity within the War Dept, the planners in the War Dept...

W: That was a Joint Board decision. We didn't have the Joint Chiefs then.

Q: No, but Arnold, according to this account, was bitter at the failure of the War Dept to recognize the role of airpower. Hence, as an act of reprisal, or an act of spite, Arnold, through this Army Air Forces Captain, turned this plan over to Burton K. Wheeler, who in turn, turned it over the Chesly Manly, who died, incidentally. He died 2 months ago. I woke up too late. I don't know if he would have told me anything, but he died very recently.

W: Do you know Walter Trohan here

Q: No, I don't

W: He's the Chicago Tribune correspondent here

Q: I don't know if he would have any knowledge of this thing.

W: Well, Walter was around here at that time. You might talk to him. I wouldn't hesitate to.

Q: Well, Waldrop tried to pin this on Arnold in this article. It was a cleverly written article,

W: I don't remember it, but I may have seen it years ago (off tape)

W: Maybe it was the same morning, the morning paper was on my desk and Leonard Gerow was standing there when I got into my office. I had worked all night the night before, I got in late, got in about 10:00, and there was Leonard Gerow, always loyal to me, always. So was Marshall, on this thing, anyway. They knew I didn't do anything like that. But Leonard Gerow said: "Look at this!" And showed it to me. And I read the headlines, I don't know whether you know it or not, it was so important to me in my lifetime, that I put it in my book

Q: Yes, I know. I read your book right through, you had several chapters about it.

W: No, not several chapters...

Q: About the incident

W: Oh yes, sure. So you can see, how much it meant to me. But this, is an exact, what my secretary and I did. We sat down and I read from the newspaper and she took my copy of my War Plan there, and she underlined it in red, and it was all verbatim. So it couldn't have been from RAINBOW FIVE, because I didn't use RAINBOW FIVE, as a basis for this, I had to srart out from scratch.

Q: Well then, you know, I've talked to Kuter and

W: This is all my old phraseology stuff

Q: Well, what was it they copied then, was it AWPD-1, Air War Plans 1, what was it that the Chicago Tribune got hold of?

W: It must have been my Victory Program. Because look, when you are told that the President wants to know whay size Army, Navy and Air Force he needs, and then have to notify industry what they have to build. I was given the Army and Air Force part of it. Now, I talked to the planners, Kuter and that crowd, and you say, what did they want to know. He wanted to know exactly how much he needed to win a war, in case we go to war. Now, I went back to my Chief, and he sent me back up to Marshall, and Marshall said to me, I said: "What are the assumptions? Are we going

to fight the Japanese and the Germans concurrently? Or are we going to just fight that area, and what are the assumptions? And he said: "You make the assumptions." So these were the basis. And that was the beginning that you read there. So we didn't take anything from any other war planners. I told you the war plans that I saw were not entirely practical. We had to apply limited judgment. So it wasn't deviating one iota from that damned thing. I don't remember how much of the Victory Program they took

Q: Did you accept from the Air, from Harold George and Kuter, as part of your plan, their Air War Plan?

W: I'm glad to get it recorded. I never did anything involving air. When I don't know all about something, I'm not hesitant to admit it, I go to people who do. I never wrote anything pertaining to it. I had a pretty good knowledge of Air, especially the strategic or tactical use of it, perhaps as much as any American officer could in $2\frac{1}{2}$ years in German War College where we were taught this, the use of the Luftwaffe. But never did I put anything down and submit to my Chief. Before I submitted it to my Chief, Leonard Gerow, it was shown to Larry Kuter and Harold George and Ken Walker and those fellows, who were bright as hell, and who knew. They would clear it with Hap, too. Hap would get a whack at it, then I would give it to my Chief, and then it would go to George Marshall. So, now the final plan that came out - those boys brought to me their draft, and I went over that, to see that it dovetailed in to my concept of the employment of Air.

Q: In other words, you were incorporating their ideas into the Victory Plan?

W: Absolutely, I accepted their ideas almost in toto

Q: And that Victory Program is what appears in this newspaper?

W: Yes sir, verbatim. I would say verbatim, but I don't know how much, I can get you, have you ever seen it?

Q: No, I have not. Another aspect of it. This thing came out on the 4th of December, it was published in both newspapers, and immediately there was an FBI investigation. You were the subject of an intensive inquiry.

W: Yes

Q: Other people were too. According to Waldrop, the FBI found the culprit and everybody,

W: (Shaking his head)

Q: No, they did not find the culprit?

W: I don't think so.

Q: They don't know who did it?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Well, in his account, he says they found the culprit, in any event, Harold George told me...

W: I'll tell you what I will do for you on that. I like you, I think you are a decent guy, I don't think you are going to be unobjective, because some civilians with whom I deal, of course, they don't like the Army or the military. I'm going to call, I'll check with the FBI. I have a way of doing it. I haven't done it for years, just talked on a plane going down to the Little League baseball with Edgar Hoover. We sat together, and we talked all kinds of things, and we just touched lightly on that one.

Q: You say the FBI never found out who did it?

W: I didn't say that categorically. I said I don't think so. I don't know.

Q: Well, you will be interested for another reason, in what Waldrop writes in his nasty article. He says that, at the end of the war, he talked to the man who was involved in the investigation. He doesn't mention a name, the implication is that he talked to Hoover,

W: Genau and Tamm were the two men

Q: Yes, you mention them both in your book.

W: They were both very thorough, Genau was the most, a great guy.

Q: In this article he says that he talked to the man involved in the investigation and the man said that we found out who did it. This is at the end of the war

W: When did Waldrop talk to the man?

Q: After the war ended, and he said: "Now the war is over, and it is not a military secret. Could you tell me his name?"

W: One of the most closely kept secrets I know of. In 1947-48, because in 1947 Marshall was Secy of State and I talked to him about it, and as far as I know, he didn't know. When he was Secy of State he sent me, with Ambassadorial rank, to the Far East and God knows, I had an opportunity to visit with him, just like you and I are talking here, now.

Q: This is critical to this whole analysis. When Waldrop says he talked to the man who was involved in the investigation, and he said to the man, presumably FBI Director Hoover, or perhaps somebody close to Hoover: "Can you tell me the culprit's name?" He says: "The war is over and it's not a secret anymore." And he said the man told him the guilty party's name, He says: "His name shall not escape from my lips, because he was a distinguished Air Force General, and he served in the war, and I will not besmirch his reputation." (paraphrased)

W: Well, that's already doing that.

Q: Right, and since there was only one man he named who was unhappy - at the beginning of this long article - Hap Arnold, the implication derived by this fellor Tristam Coffin and McIlvain and all the other people who are writing these nasty things about Hap Arnold today. You see, Hap Arnold's reputation is being besmirched. I think this man is trying to pin on somebody else the guild. You see, he had a sense of guilt, because he leaked a military secret. This is treason, I mean Waldrop, Chesly Manly, and the editors of that publication. That was a secret plan, this was very close. Of course we were not in a war when that thing was published, but I think it was a terrible thing that they did.

W: The Wall St. Journal had an article about this maybe a week or two before that, and the Wall St. Journal man who wrote it had a conference with President Roosevelt, did you know that?

Q: No

Q: Here is a reference to the Wall St. Journal article in Wedemeyer's Reports pps. 28-29. It refers to an article by Eugene S. Duffield, Chief of the Wall St. Journal, Washington Bureau. According to this account, he had written practically the same story, as Chesly Manly did, and the date of that is Oct 20, 1941. The Duffield article made reference to the "Victory Program" a newly evolved munitions schedule, by which Washington and London expected to beat Hitler.

Q: You say the FBI, to your knowledge, did not find the guilty party.

W: That's as far as I know.

Q: Let me ask this question. You know, Harold George told me that he was told: "Forget about who did it, and get on with the war." You see, Pearl Harbor happened three days later, and the whole investigation was overtaken by events - war. The Air Force fellows were told: "Get on with your job and forget about this who-done-it, so to speak." Now, if the FBI had come up with the culprit, whether

it be Wedemeyer, or whether it be Arnold, or somebody else, would Arnold [Marshall] have allowed that man to stay in that job. In other words, suppose

W: I got you, just give it thought. I think he would. I think he would subordinated anything to win the war.

Q: Was Wedemeyer or Arnold or anybody, I'm just naming two suspects in the case, were they important enough to this war effort so that they were not vulnerable to being tossed out? Were they indispensable at this time? Was Arnold indispensable to Marshall at this time?

W: No, not indispensable, in my judgment. We had replacements when I was moved out, another man moved in as planner.

Q: This was in the war, 1943

W: No, but even in the early stages, we had some excellent Air Force officers. One of them I think would have been the Eisenhower of the war if he hadn't been killed in Iceland.

Q: Yes, Andrews. All right, if we accept the Waldrop thesis, that Arnold was the guilty party, then Marshall would have fired him?

W: Because Marshall didn't even know about that thesis at that time.

Q: Yes, but he knew about the results of the investigation, if Waldrop is telling the truth. You see, this man

W: I don't think that Marshall knew when he was Secy of State

Q: Well, then, Waldrop is lying?

W: May be, I don't know

Q: In other words, at least part of his story is a lie. Because he said that right after the war he had talked to the man who conducted the investigation and the man told him who the guilty party was, and he would not mention his name because he didn't want to besmirch his memory. All right, if this is to, then Marshall must have known who the guilty party was. He must have known the result of the investigation, and if Arnold was the guilty party, why wasn't he fired. If Wedemeyer was the guilty party, why wasn't he fired? This is my theory. Would either Arnold or Wedemeyer have survived in their jobs if they had been designated or proved to be the guilty party by whoever conducted the investigation.

(Interview Continued - Several Days later)

W: The other day when we were conferring about these matters, I mentioned that I did discuss, there came up in some way or other, the same subject about the person who made available to the newspapers this very secret document. I did discuss it with George Marshall when he was Secy of State, and that time he didn't seem to have any more knowledge, at least he gave me no more information. He gave me the impression that he didn't know any more about it then. And that was some years later, than he did at the time it happened.

Q: I don't think this thing was working when you made what I think a very important statement. Namely, if Wedemeyer or Arnold had been proved to be the culprit in disclosure of this document, what do you think their fate would have been?

W: I indicated that to you, I'm prefacing the following remarks by the fact that is just conjecture on my part. But I feel quite confident after so many years of service, professional ethics of a military man, and knowing the traditions of the service, that had Wedemeyer or Arnold or any other individual in a responsible position in this Dept of War, released or made available to unauthorized parties any secret documents that that individual after thorough investigation would have been court martialed, assuming he was guilty of doing it, found guilty. No doubt about it, he would have been released, summarily from his job while he was under suspicion.

Rainbow 5

Q: I feel this way myself, in fact, when I started investigating this issue...

W: Then I added, however, the fact that George Marshall was accused by people, and I must say, to you that lots of people - lots is not a good term - many people in uniform, felt that George Marshall knew where he was and should have been very forthright, no matter whom it involved, many people. And I incline that way,

Q: Assuming that Marshall was not wholly candid about his actions on the morning of December 7th, in testimony before the Roberts Commission and other investigating committees

W: Richardson Committee

Q: Richardson Committee, yes, would he have, would this have an affect in his attitude toward Arnold, if Arnold had been designated the guilty party?

W: Not at all, no. See, Arnold was a very personable man anyway, and he put, before his personal feelings - I'm confident of this - that he was the type of man who put his responsibilities to his country. You know, they differentiate between a statesman and a politician, a politician thinks the country belongs to him, and the statesman believes that he belongs to the country, and I think George Marshall thought he was a statesman, with regard to such decisions.

Q: You know, Harry Truman once said, a statesman is a dead politician. I'm interested in why Waldrop, many years after the event, came out with a thing like this, trying to pin this act on Hap Arnold. Now, in the article that you will read, he makes a very flimsy case. He goes back to Cline. Cline is one of the Army historians who wrote the Washington Command Post, and he talks about the Air Corps being somewhat unhappy with the role assigned to it by the War Dept General Staff. He tried to establish Arnold as being one of the unhappy people in the Air Corps.

W: Now, you and I are constantly using the term Air Corps and Army. And who in the hell are we to speak for the entire, or even for the official policy hierarchy, we aren't, so there were young, enthusiastic and emotional Air Force officers, who were fliers, and probably better mechanics than they were strategists, but chauvinists, very definitely chauvinism played a role, and they did critize their role.

Q: I accept this, and it is possible that somebody in the Air Corps may have had some role in this particular disclosure. I personally think that Arnold would not have touched it with a 10 foot pole, and if he had touched it, he would not have survived in his job. This is why when I started to...

W: I would confirm with my knowledge of Arnold, and my experiences in the professional military game - both statements that you made - namely that General Arnold would not have taken any cognizance of such a thing, except to hold others subordinate to him responsible if they were involved. Then, the other is that you stated that he would have been definitely relieved and punished, summarily, if they had proven that he was responsible.

Q: You know, when I first started playing with this, I came upon circumstantial evidence that Wedemeyer could have been involved in that. But that thesis ran smack against the fact that Wedemeyer was promoted, honored, sent out to important commands, and I don't think Marshall would have done that even though Wedemeyer was close.

W: I don't know how thoroughly, how much you have been allowed to see the FBI reports.

Q: I haven't seen any, this is why I wrote the letter.

W: If you could know how thoroughly they investigated me, I'd give you my word of honor. But I wouldn't do a thing like that, I'm devoted to my country.

Q: As a matter of fact, I was curious as to where did you have access to some of the investigative reports because you quote Tamm and this other fellow?

W: My dear little mother - my father was dead - but my little Irish mother was questioned, Of course the banks out in Omaha where I was born and raised, they were . . . more people were questioned. They probably have, according to Edgar Hoover, a longer file on me than most culprits. But no, it would have been a terrible thing, of course, Mr. McCloy, sent for me, he was Asst Secy of the Army, and I'll never forgive him for saying what he did, because the presumption of guilt, he called me in and I was a Major at the time, maybe a LT COL. He said; "There is blood on the fingers of the man who did this. And I looked at him. I'll never forgive him, he knows that I was a pall bearer at Bill Donovan's funeral and he and I were standing together in the pew. He reached over; "Wedemeyer", he says, "I understand you took a crack at me in your book." And I said; "Well, everything I said in the book is straightforward and true." There was a woman who wrote into the War Department and said that everybody knows that General Wedemeyer and his father, Secy Stimson showed me the

letter. She was ananymous, but. . .

Q: You were sort of like the butler in the case, the obvious suspect, because there are certain circumstantial things which you did or were involved.

W: Oh, of course, and I realize that, I told Mr. Tamm, but he was awfully nice to me. He said; "We don't think it's you for a minute, but we've got to investigate this thing thoroughly." And I said; "I understand sir. Anything I can do to help. I may have been negligent in that, if you had been a friend of mine - I told you this the other day - in going by my office, there was so much that was nebulous, so much that was based on imponderables, when I was writing the basic idea, the concept of a two-front war. Then I might have said; "Look Green, look this over and give me your reaction, and you'd say, well, I'm so damned busy, could I take it up to my office." And I'd say; "Yes, be careful of it, 'Top Secret', would be marked on it." So you would go away with it now. So I had to tell the FBI that I did not always have it in my possession. But when it was completed, when it was in one whole part, then I did not realize it to Dr. Green, or any friends. It was locked up in the safe, how many copies through. There is some confusion about that, even in my memory. I don't remember it. I always kept one or two working copies that I would, double space, stuff like that, so I don't know.

Q: Let me tell you what Harold George told me, I'll turn this off. . .

W: A copy was brought down to the Capitol Building, downstairs in the photographic place. Wheeler told me that much. He didn't

tell me who, I don't know who. I'd like to find out. But Senator Wheeler said a copy of this was brought to the Capitol Building, and it wasn't out of the safe, or wherever it was brought from, more than an hour or two because they microfilmed it right away, and then returned it. Wheeler told me this.

Q: Then it could have been put back?

W: I remember because he said they had a photographic place down underneath the Capitol Building.

Q: It could have been put back on the desk if it was taken from there. Does that sound like a possible thesis to you?

W: Yes, because, another thing, I had a good connection with Harry Hopkins. I say good. I know he liked me, because he asked me to go to the Soviet Union with him, and different things like that. General Marshall didn't let me go. I was busy on something else. But he always showed a friendship for me, called me by my nickname and all that. Now, for one thing, we were coming back from London in April 1942, we had been over there to explain the plan to the British, we were on this plane alone together. Marshall, Harry Hopkins and myself, Pinky Craig was on that trip, but he spent most of the time up in the cockpit with the pilot, Pan American Clipper, just the three of us, We were talking, and Harry Hopkins, out of the blue - this may be of interest to you - said; "I think someone ought to be telling ex-President Hoover what's going on, - keep him informed." General Marshall said, "Yes, I think so." And he said; "Well, George,

I think you ought to detail Al here to do this." And I was detailed to go up and tell the Chief from time to time. At the same time Harry said; "I would like to have Al come over about once a week and talk to me about the dispositions of what's going on. I was detailed to do it. Now, I went over there, before I went over the first time, Harry Hopkins' secretary would call me when it was convenient for him to receive me, on the Treasury end of the White House, the Executive Offices. And I kept going over there about 3 or 4 months, sitting down and visiting with him. He had a retentive memory, and then he would go in and talk to the "Big Boy" and the Big Boy thought that he was just one of these geniuses.

Q: Was Harry Hopkins a bad housekeeper?

W: I couldn't say. Anyway. . .

Q: Would Harry Hopkins have had any motive to do this?

W: No, not that I know of. One day I was in there though, and there was someone sitting over in the corner when I went into his office. And Marshall had admonished me not to say anything about any of these things over in the White House, except to Mr. Hopkins. So I went over there and over sitting in the corner was a very genial, fat fellow named Judge Rosenman, and he was sitting there, stretched back sort of comfortably and Harry said; "Well, Al, what have you got to say?" And I hesitated; "Well." When I went in, he had said; "You know Judge Rosenmen, and I said; "No." And I shook hands with him.

Q: Roosevelt's chief speech writer?

W: Yes, very genial, sort of happy fellow, fat, and I never saw him again. But anyway, the reason I tell you this, this is what happened. I said to Harry; "I cannot tell you anything about it. I can't relate the strategies and stuff in front of anyone. I was admonished by General Marshall." And this fellow (Rosenman) got up.

He was mad then. He was angry. I didn't mean to. I didn't know the position he enjoyed there, I was just a young Major or Lt Col. Anyway, that would indicate that Harry wasn't too careful about security.

Q: Military security. You know, that thesis ties in to what was told to many people, and they have told me this, all the people I have interviewed. . . .

W: I can't imagine him doing a thing like that.

Q: They all said that right after Pearl Harbor they were told, forget about the investigation, get on with your job, we have a war to win. Now, this would have tied in to Hopkins thesis, because if it was disclosed by the FBI or whoever investigated it, that Harry Hopkins was indeed the culprit, then it would have been very embarrassing to Roosevelt. He would have wanted to quash any further investigation. And therefore, all the suspects, or all the possible participants in this little drama could have been told; "forget about it; go back to your jobs; and let's get the war won."

W: You must realize there is sort of a philosophy behind all this, that you have missed apparently. Or you haven't dovetailed it all in. Many people feel that the publication of the Victory Program precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. The plan was always present to attack Manila, Pearl Harbor or Singapore, but this thing really, and they had ordered, the "Tora Tora" crowd, to turn, of course, in the event, that their attack . . . . A lot of people in the Pentagon among the "American Firsters"

Q: Do you accept that?

W: No, no I don't.

Q: The Japanese plan started ten days before. The Fleet had been started out.

W: Yes, but they were also equipped, and I've talked to Japanese officers about this who were in this thing. I had a good talk about that strategy with the man who was my opposite number, he commanded all the Japs against me in China. His name was Okita. He just died a couple years ago. No, Okamura, he commanded all the Jap forces against me. We talked about this. We sat there and talked about this, and it was very interesting.

Q: Well, I don't accept that.

W: I don't either, but a lot of people who did, Dr. Green, really, military men who felt that it actually precipitated because they were cautious. Just like the Germans were, they marched into the Rhineland, they had orders to turn right around. I know they did, I talked to German officers about it.

Q: I think they were instructed that if they were detected, several days before they launched, they should turn around or just say that they were on a maneuver, or not to go through with the attack.

W: No, I don't mean to contradict you,

Q: Please do, if you must.

W: The Japanese with whom I talked said that if they had any inclination that it would not be a lucrative target, the Pearl Harbor area, that they definitely would go to the Philippines, because they wanted to get down to oil down in South America.

Q: I'm not disagreeing with that at all. But I'm just saying that the disclosure by the Chicago Tribune was not related to the Japanese attack, or was it?

W: No, I don't think it was.

Q: I mean these were two independent things. They just happened to come very close together. My main concentration here is to find out not necessarily who did it. If the FBI could tell me: "We have documentary evidence that Arnold did not do it," that would satisfy me. I would be happier if I knew who did, but I would like to clear his name, or involve him if that's the way the evidence shows. And I think, let me turn this off.

W; None of us is perfect . . .

Q: Arnold had a great inspirational type of man. As you say, he was not an intellect, but he was a driving man. He was a man who could get an intellectual idea that someone else conceived and drive it through to a program.

W: I would agree with that 100%. I don't believe he was a man who ever read anything.

Q: He did a lot of reading. . .

W: Detective stories, or cowboy stories. . .

Q: You know, he was a good writer. You know that he wrote six boys books? Did I mention that to you?

W: Yes, you did and I knew it before, I knew that he collaborated with Eaker.

Q: But he was an outgoing man, he was an extrovert.

W: That's right.

Q: And you know, he had this sense. You know he was involved in the CCC, he had the whole West Coast CCC. Malin Craig gave him this job in 1933, when he was at March Field. He supervised all the CCC camps, over 25 of them on the West Coast, but out of that, came an attitude that if young people could get out into the forest, do something constructive, somehow they would solve the juvenile delinquency problem and will be morally and physically cleansed of imperfections. He had this attitude. Maybe it was a little bit on the naive side but he believed in the outdoors, and I, having looked at thousands of letters written to him and that he wrote, anybody that talked about fishing or hunting or something like this, had an open door to Arnold. He and Marshall were always talking about going off on a trip hunting and fishing, and of course, they went twice that I know of. They went up to the High Sierras in 1944. I think you were overseas at that time. They stole a week on a pack trip. Then they went pheasant hunting in Bismarck, ND, in 1945. Then, I'll turn this off.

Q: There was an exchange of correspondence that you had, several letters - let's say, when you were in the Pacific, when you were in the CBI - with Arnold, discussing philosophic and the Chinese war and the role of Chiang Kai-shek, do you remember that exchange?

W: I've got copies of everything. If you'd recall to me, if you had copies of them.

Q: I have excerpts, I should have taken some of them. But Arnold went to the CBI in 1942. You mentioned that he and Chiang Kai-shek, didn't do well in that situation.

W: No, he didn't, but he never would do well in conferences with people at high level. He never did with the British. He antagonized, and I really think, and I was embarrassed about this, two times that I was embarrassed with contacts on a high level. When I went with Marshall and Hopkins to London in April 1942 - I told you Harry Hopkins liked me, took me over when he addressed Parliament, he asked me to go with him. I sat there. I'd see Anthony Eden over opposite me on the other side. He put his hands up in sort of a smirk as Hopkins talked, he was telling them they were going to give them all help, and this stuff, all the wheels of industry would be turning around for London. I was embarrassed, really, because they sort of gave me the impression - these British people, House of Lords there - that, you know, making fun of him, but they were very cautious in showing too strongly that way. The next time I was embarrassed involved Hap, in discussing the JCS King would go after it hard, and he didn't come back well. Marshall had to come help him, and then it was the British, the British again, sort of - "see if we can get it out of old Hap," you know. No opposition from Hap. The British Joint Chiefs of Staff hated the guts of a fellow named Ernest King, but in my judgment, Ernest King was the finest American on the whole damned works, because he did watch American resources.

Q: You say the British could get it out of Hap but they had more trouble getting it out of King or Marshall?

W: Oh yes, no doubt about it. This fellow Portal was the strongest

man in the British JCS, Air Marshal Portal - a great fellow, very strong man.

Q: You know, he and Arnold had some confrontations.

W: Well, Portal liked Hap, though. I know. I got on an "Al" and "Portal" basis, we were good friends. I was with the British, you see, with Mountbatten. That ingratiated me a little bit with the JCS for the British. One time they thought I was anti-British, Anglophile, is that what you call them?

Q: Anglo-phobe.

W: Yes, but they got over that, I know Mountbatten disabused their minds of that. I was pro-American. I knew they were taking advantage of us.

Q: Well, you know Arnold

W: Arnold liked Portal, I think.

Q: Yes, I think they liked each other, but they had some disagreements?

W: I know Portal liked Arnold, I know he did.

Q: But you think the British, they got more out of Hap Arnold then out of the other Joint Chiefs?

W: I didn't say that. I said they could handle him better than they could Ernie King. And they were always after our Navy units, elements of our fleet - the British were. They wanted the aircraft carriers. They wanted - one thing that the American Navy developed during the war was a mobile logistic support business, Ben Moreel evolve d the Seabees. The British were always trying to get, and King resisted. Now the other thing, he never believed that they wanted to

go across the Channel in '43, although that had been decided on the highest level, that our principal enemy was the German-Italian setup, and we would defeat them first and them go out and conduct strategic defensive operations. But he never felt that they were sincere about this. And he thought they would just carry on this peripheral war, protecting British interests, and using our resources -- landing craft. He began to stake out to the Far East, landing craft, that were, really, supposed to go to the Atlantic. And that's the reason that the War in the Pacific ended almost concurrently with the war in the Atlantic, really.

Q: I think that Marshall had some misgivings, too, about whether the British were sincere.

W: Oh, of course. Marshall supported that Cross-Channel operation believe me, all the way through. And then unfortunately, this fellow Senator McCarthy, if he'd come and talked to me, I would have told this poor devil. I think he was a little bit emotional. But if he had come and told me -- he accused Marshall of trying to help the Soviet Union. I'm the one that was responsible for that concept, and Marshall bought it, so did the President.

Q: You mean, of helping the Soviet Union

W: No sir, not so much helping them, but we were doing what we thought was best, get the dynamo of the war effort under our control. Then to proceed as far East as we could with Anglo-Saxon forces, so the communist commissars wouldn't come in, in other words, the political objectives of the war.

Q: You had that in mind?

W: I started the damn concept in Marshall's mind. If Marshall were alive, he would tell you that, I'm not bragging. I've been very

careful about saying things in group efforts, people making contributions, valuable contributions.

Q: The Russians were trying to get all kinds of aircraft, including four engine bombers, and they were putting...

W: They weren't playing the game with us at all.

Q: Well, this Marshal Belyaev, remember him?

W: Yes.

Q: Belyaev and Arnold had a lot of contracts. They were trying to get B-17s and B-24s out of Arnold. Arnold had tentatively accepted this possibility in exchange for Siberian bases. You see, Arnold had been trying, all throughout the war to get bases in Siberia from which to attack Japan. The Russians stalled him off all the time. So Arnold had misgivings about the Russians. He never trusted them completely.

W: Well, I don't think George Marshall did. I think the people who were trusting were on the political level, Harry Hopkins, Averell Harriman, Franklin Roosevelt, people like that. "Trusted" isn't quite the word, maybe.

Q: This Alsif route...did you have anything to do withthe concept of flying planes to Fairbanks, Alaska, and let the Russians fly it over Siberia?

W: I was knowledge about it, but nothing, how do you mean... concept?

Q: I mean did you work on that plan, did you have any involvement?

W: Yes, I would have involvement while I was Chief Planner, I tell you they were very loyal to me, the AF people. They knew they

had in me, a person who believed in airpower, but I didn't let them push me around, I had no trouble with them.

Q: Was Kuter?

W: Sometimes he was my assistant, I think he was at. I'm not sure, I know Smart was at Casablanca, I think Kuter was, I'm not sure. But they were all up in Quebec with me. They were awfully good, I'll tell you truthfully. I had trouble with Anderson, who was very emotional, Orvil Anderson, and we would rotate them, the Navy man and I, name of Cook, Well Savvy and I rotated as Chairman, he would recognize the Air man as on an equal basis with him, Savvy would. So I was sitting in the middle between Savvy on the right, and it was my day to chair the Planners meeting. And the two of them said awful things to each other, and so I told Savvy Cook: "You can't talk". This fellow was a BG and Savvy was two stars in the Navy, you have no idea how much rank, terrible. Anyway, I told Cook: "I said I'm going to go and report you to Adm King, and I want you to be present. I'm going right over there now and tell him I cannot work with you if you are going to insult my Air Planner here." And I said: "I will take Anderson with me, if youwwant." And he said "No, don't bring him. I'll go over with you." And I went and I told Adm King that Adm Cook was...

Q: Abusive?

W: Oh, he was very abusive, but he also accused him of lying, accused the AF of lying, They were fighting for resources all the time. We were paying the bill, the Army was. But, if I do say so, in retrospect, the AF was fortunate in having a man like myself who was objective. I could be, and I didn't let either side get too out of hand.

Q: Well, did the Navy feel they were being outvoted in the Planner's in the JSP.

W: Oh, not at that time, a little bit. But the time that they really did, after the war was over, and, Ike asked me to come back up and take Plans over from China. Larry Kuter had been there. Larry hadn't done a damn thing for War Planning. He went all-out, and very ably, smart as hell, for a separate AF, at that particular time, this was '47. So I was returned, I attended all the JCS meetings you see, and Bradley now was JCS Chief, and not a very good one, not near as good as Ike. I mean he wasn't as creative, his mind wasn't as sharp, but a nice guy. But one day we had an awful argument, Bradley relied upon me to discuss things with the Navy, and Vandenberg was the Chief of AF then, and I think Larry was his assistant, and I was with Bradley and then there was Carney, and Denfeld. Denfeld was dumb as hell, but nice, he was a nice man. When I tell you they were dumb, they weren't creative. But anyway, we had an awful battle you know about the budget -- how much money would go to the Army and the AF and the Navy, and so I said to the assemblee there, I said: "If we are going to remove $20 million, I am in favor, General Bradley, of giving it to the AF." Carney hit the ceiling, he said: "Of course, you always favor the AF, don't you, over the Navy." Well, I said: "I want strategic bombing to be retained by the AF, not by the Navy, they want to control it."

Q: The Navy played an equivocal role at that time. They attacked strategic bombing as a faulty concept, and yet they wanted a part of it.

W: They wanted all responsibility for it because they claimed they had floating bases, you know, that weren't vulnerable to attack, and all this.

Q: I want to get back to the JCS. You indicated that Gen Arnold was sort of silent at JCS meetings?

W: He rarely said anything, I never heard him say very many things that were constructive. He didn't help Gen Marshall very much.

Q: Could it be that...

W: He didn't help him very much in the JCS meetings. Sometimes I think he embarrased him a little, at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting.

Q: By something he said, or failure to say?

W: Failure to come forth, you know, and take a strong stand against Portal or against Alanbrooke. In other words, there could have been another Chief of AF who was dynamic and articulate. Hap Arnold was not an articulate man in an argument. He either got embarrassed or angry, one or the other. Sometimes it seemed like he was embarrassed, and he would smile a lot.

Q: He had this perennial smile. I guess that's why they called him Hap, but it didn't mean he was happy, it was just sort of a facial expression?

W: I never analyzed that, He did have a nice expression on his face.

Q: Did he have a nice manner about him?

W: Yes he did. I saw him only once angry, and that was one of his AF officers in his own office, personnel matters. Somebody wanted somebody promoted or something.

Q: Do you remember Curly Wolfinbarger?

W: Very well

Q: He was in the Plans business, in Arnold's staff, and he made the same comment that you have made. They used to get mad sitting at the back of the JCS meeting when somebody made some point that was hostile to the AF position, and Arnold failed to defend it at the JCS meetings.

W: Well, I must tell you that Gen Marshall was very loyal to the AF.

Q: Could it be that Arnold was loyal to Marshall and he didn't want to appear to be in contradiction?

W: Definitely, I think Arnold was very meticulous in his manner and in his approach to problems involving himself and the Chief of

Staff of the Army. At all times, I think he was very courteous to him, and very loyal to him. I think he was capable of deep loyalty to friends, and also to principles.

Q: Well, these characteristics in my conception, lie in direct contradiction to the actions involving the Chicago Tribune disclosure. They seem out of character for Arnold to have done, that's why I don't believe he would have had a motive to do it, and I don't believe that his personal characteristics were such that he would have done a thing of this sort.

W: There is one thing I think you have a misconception on, and that is, the AF was unhappy about the role that they were given in the Victory Program, in the war as a whole. Because I repeat, and I'm not saying it in a bragadocio manner, I just completed 2½ years of German War College where I had learned a great deal and lots of ground officers were fortunate enough to have access to this kind of tactics and techniques, that is, Stutka and the armored columns and I came back imbued with the deployment of air. In fact, I tried to get into the Air Force at one time. I've always been enthusiastic about air-power, tried to get in on it, but couldnt' because of my eyes. So I know, I didn't fight, I had no opposition, I was all alone in writing this thing, but when the AF people came in, they would fight for what they need for this, and we would discuss it, munitions that were visualized, contributions they would in support, ground support, or strategic bombing where we would get ball bearings, focal points of communication, ball bearing plants, things like that. Yes, I went along with it, I could see the contribution it would make to the overall concept of maneuvers.

Q: I didn't suggest that you were hostile.

W: No, sir, I know you didn't. But they were not in a position

of authority at the time that Victory Program went in...

Q: Gerow...

W: No sir, Gerow was all right

Q: Gerow came around later, but he was slow for a while. Spaulding, remember him.

W: I would say that he wouldn't come around quickly

Q: He was slow to come around.

W: I would say that he wouldn be. These are men that are unimaginative, Gerow wasn't unimaginative, but Spaulding was, in my judgment.

Q: In any event, it is a documented fact that on Pearl Harbor day we had less than 50 B-17s.

W: Oh yes, but ; this program.

Q: The program was delayed. You see, the B-17 was a going airplane four years before Pearl Harbor, but Spaulding and Harry Woodring and several others...

W: Oh my own father-in-law, Embick, he was one of the scholars of our Army considered a brilliant man. He admitted that he was wrong.

Q: Stanley Embic came around during the war.

W: Deputy Chief of Staff when he came around, now that's wrong, Deputy Chief of Staff when he made a decision to. Craig was Chief of Staff, Embick was Deputy. He made the decision to put a lot of money on, I think fixed fortifications guarding the Golden Gate, that should have gone into the bomber program. But he told me this after the war was under way, and he was so glad to see that I was up there.

Q: There was another technique they employed in the War Dept General Staff, this is in the late '30s. There was 2,320 plane program, which was approved.

W: Yes, I sort of remember that.

Q: H

Q: Well, what they did was give the AF small planes, so they would get more planes for less money, instead of giving them more bombers. So they got a lot of small planes that were totally undesirable insofar as fighting an overseas war.

W: Well, they certainly got a plethora of T-6s and they gave them to the Russians up the Persian Gulf.

Q: There were several other inferior planes likedthe P-39. It was a low level plane, it was not a good fighter.

W: I can assure you it was not General Marshall and not General Wedemyer had anything to do with that. I took the advice of the technical men in the AF.

Q: Well this brings me to say that there were several people in the Air Corps, Hugh Knerr...

W: I remember him, he was a very brilliant man.

Q: He was a brilliant man but he was a malcontent. He was writing articles under the table. You know, the William Bradford Huie book, We Fight For Airpower.

W: I knew Huie too.

Q: Do you know who wrote his book?

W: No.

Q: Knerr. Do you have his book here?

W: I may have it out at the house

Q: All right, well, you look at that book. Look at other books, The Case Against the Admirals, and in the preface, it says: "To my friend, Hugh Knerr." You see, Knerr either wrote it or helped. Knerr was writing all these articles under the table for American Mercury magazine, or Reader's Digest, or what not,, Now, Knerr was devoted to

Andrews, that was his Chief, that was his God.

W: Andrews was supposed to be the Eisenhower of the war?

Q: Yes, if he had lived, he might have been.

W: He would have been!

Q: Marshall had great confidence in Andrews.

W: Of course he did, and rightly, he was a very scholarly, able man.

Q: Did you ever get into any of the discussions of whether Andrews or Arnold ought to be the top man in the AF?

W: No. What happened, when you travel with a man a great deal, as I did with Marshall, he would talk to me, tell me these things. I could tell you quite a few things on personnel matters, I wasn't a personnel expert at all; I wasn't a kingmaker, but once in a while he would ask my suggestions, now, I'll tell you something if you will turn that off.

Q: (Aside) General Wedemeyer told me of his visit to the UK in April 1942 with Gen Marshall and Harry Hopkins, in which Wedemeyer came up with an adverse opinion of General Jim Chaney, as the man not qualified to handle the BOLERO buildup for the Cross-Channel invasion. Of course, Arnold had the same conception when he visited the UK in May 1942, and as we know, Chaney was relieved a month later. (end aside)

W: In my dealing with the senior AF officers in the Far East, I had Chennault, and I had Stratemeyer. Both were good friends; both were loyal to me, and I was loyal to them. I had trouble between LeMay and Chennault. Chennault was a fighter pilot, and LeMay was a bomber, and Chennault's people were stealing gasoline that came over the Hump. We had a tenous line of communications with the outside world. We were completely surrounded as you know.

Q: This is when you had the 20th Bomb Com at Chengtu?

W: Up at Chengtu, yes, they were not under me for operational. I just had administrative, you might say, logistic responsibility. But I think it was Orley, I know that both General Marshall and General Hap Arnold did not have confidence in Chennault. They resented him. Chennault's aide was a Captain named Alsop.

Q: Joseph Alsop.

W: When I went there to take over from Stilwell, Chennault -- and I think with good intentions -- asked me to take Alsop as my aide. I was theater commander, a higher position for him, and he thought very highly of Joe. I didn't know Joe Alsop, I had just met him. But General Marshall was furious when he learned about that because Joe Alsop was related to President Roosevelt, related to both sides of the Roosevelts. He is related to Alice Longworth and related to the other Roosevelts. I didn't take him, I had an aide already, and didn't want to surround myself with any empire building, and Chennault...

Q: Did you distrust Alsop?

W: No, never, the only people... I never distrusted anybody. I should make it clear to you, I'm not that type, but if I had known what I know now about those four political advisors I had over there, Davies, Jack Service, Luddeu, and Emerson, then I would have relieved them. They were my political advisors, I inherited them, but that's the only distrusting that I can be associated with in all my service. That was only after the event. But now, to come back to Alsop and Chennault. Chennault was a fighter pilot, and he didn't want emphasis on the bombers. Also, Chennault had tried, again and again, he told me, to get some Black Widows, we were getting bombed, at night.

Q: The P-61 night fighter.

W: Right, and we couldn't get them. Hap Arnold wouln't give them to us. At least he told me this. People on Hap's staff, or maybe Hap himself, I don't know, and also we wanted to make a bombing raid with all concerted effort. I did, it was my idea, on the Hankow, the focal point of communications.

Q: With B-29s.

W: With everything, everything I had, B-25s, B-29s, the P-47s, everyhing I had. Because they were just building up a big supply place there, warehousing and so forth, so, according to.

end of tape

Interview General A.C. Wedemeyer, Rockville, Md., Oct 5, 1970

Q: General, you started talking about Hap Arnold as a writer and thinker. You say he was not the greatest writer in the world?

W: Well, I didn't say that because it would compare writers. But I do feel that Hap Arnold was not an intellectual man. He was an intelligent man, he grasped situations very quickly, and was intolerant, really, of delays once he made a decision that caused him to rub some people the wrong way. But I had a relationship with him that was quite unique, in that I was a junior to him in rank, yet he did confide in me quite often when we would be together. I'll give you an example very quickly. After the Casablanca conference was over, General Marshall and I were scheduled to go to Moscow, not actually to Moscow, to the Kiev (Kuibyshev?). We were to go and confer, he of course with Stalin, and I was to confer with the Planners for our continued war effort. Stalin notified President Roosevelt that he didn't see where any useful purpose could be served by having General Marshall and General Wedemeyer come there. So General Marshall then said the President wanted me to go and talk to Chiang Kai-shek with Hap Arnold, and explain to CKS what had happened at Casablanca as it pertained to the China theater. From there, I was to go on and talk to General MacArthur. So I started out from Casablanca with Hap Arnold, and he stopped at a few of the overseas along the African littoral, and talked to the young American fighter pilots, and this was absolutely remarkable, the rapport that he immediately established with these young, brave youngsters, that were out in these overseas little satellite fields, you know, along the African littoral. I admired him so much, his ability to reach them, to understand their problems, and to encourage them, to inspire them. Then we went on, and I won't discuss the trip except that we continued along the African littoral to Cairo, refueled, and went on to Karachi, and then to New Delhi, and on up to Chungking, crossing the Hump. And one thing that occurred, we had terrible storms there, had no communications, no weather information, over the Himalayas in those days. It was really a risk, everyone took when they went over the Hump, and he was in a B-17. And they got into 100 mile an hour winds and it blew them far beyond Kunming, the terminal.

Q: Were you in that airplane?

W: No, but I knew about it. See, later when I had command of that theater, I know how these conditions would quickly develop, you couldn't foresee them.

Q: They came very close to disaster on that one.

W: Surely. And then when he landed at Kunming, I was at the airport, because I was terribly concerned. I was a BG - a Planner, Marshall's representative, really. But the tire blew out, with a bang. Did anybody ever tell you that?

Q: No

W: One of the tires, maybe two of them, blew out just after they landed. Anyway, we got up to Chungking, and again, I went into these conferences that he had with CKS, and listened. He did not do very well, frankly. Everything was done through an interpreter, and Parker, I think was him name, Colonel Parker was with him.

Q: Yes, Lewis Parker

W: Yes, Colonel in the Air Force, very fine man, but again, not an intellectual man. He was an operator.

Q: Jake Smart with him?

W: I think Jake was with us, but I don't remember Jake going into the conferences up there at Chungking, I don't remember that. Brehon Somervell was with us.

Q: Was Sir John Dill on that trip?

W: Oh yes, and Sir John Dill, when were in New Delhi, I went pig-sticking with him, and he hurt himself. He ruptured himself. Then when we got to Chungking, just as an anecdote, I mean I spent most of the night with him, he had such terrible pains in his back, and had a hell of a time getting heat for him there. It was cold. Then he did go on up to Chungking with us, yes. But he was not actually in the conferences with the American commanders, as I recall it, I don't remember.

Q: You say, Arnold did badly with CKS?

W: I did not say that. I said he did not do well, he did not do as well as a King or a Marshall would have done, in talking to him. He was not a penetrating thinker, Hap Arnold. I attended all the JCS meetings, all of them, til I was sent out with Mountbatten, and that was in the winter of 1943. Why Hap never contributed

much on an intellectual plane. But Hap - you realize that at that time the Air Force was an integral part of the Army, and Hap more or less acceded everything George Marshall said. They were very close in goals, and I never heard Marshall admonish Arnold ever, never.

Q: Or disagree publicly?

W: Never, not in front of the other people there. But I do know in Marshall's office, that they did discuss. And I'll tell you, frankly, one time I was present when they were discussing the Cross-channel operation, and I think Tooey Spaatz was in the room, too. I'm not sure, but I think I'm right about this, in Washington, General Marshall's office. We were talking about the Cross-channel operation, and I maintained - as a matter of fact, that was my operation - I started the thought of having this, because I had gone to the German War College. I was confident that the Germans, that the bulk of them fighting their real enemies, they hated the guts out of the Soviet Union - the Bolshevekis, as they called them - so I was confident that if we got across, there were enough people there, who felt as you and I do more or less, even though loyal Germans like Beck, von Staufmenberg was a close friend of mine, and classmate of mine at the German War College. Did you know that? He was the man that put the bomb under the table. So I had these wonderful contacts. Now, I knew the attitude toward us, their attitude toward the Soviet Union. I knew that better, perhaps, than any other American could know it. I was with them for 2½ years in school. So, I kept talking about this, and I said that the Air Force could form a canopy over our forces and go across in '43. That's what I wanted to do - go across in '43.

Q: This was ROUNDUP?

W: Well, it had all kinds of names, ROUNDUP was the last name given to it. But anyway, of course, the British opposed it, they wanted to go behind a Scotch band, marching, they were in favor of peripheral operations. Now, I must say, Hap Arnold helped me in this operation, supported it with what the Air Force could do. But the British kept urging us to do things down in the Mediterranean area, and that did usurp or did take resources like air, and water and landing craft, things like that, postponing further that operation which, if we had got across in 1943, and swept eastward, today we wouldn't have the Soviet Union commissars, and so forth, all through middle Europe. You wouldn't be having the difficulties you have today.

And the British could have carried out what they promised the Poles. They promised the Poles their territory.

Q: Do you believe that if TORCH were postponed, or not carried through...

W: I opposed any operations that militated against the main...

Q: Divergence from the main thrust?

W: That is correct. My idea was to get to the industrial area of the Ruhr, that was the heartbeat of the whole German-Italian war effort. Dynamo of the war effort, and fellows like Rommel, all credit to the guy, who was a great tactician, he would have died on a limb out there. And then we would have had Anglo-American forces sweeping into Western-Central Europe, Eastern and Central Europe. But Hap Arnold supported that idea, he was very loyal to us on that. The man who destroyed it, stopped it, was a guy named Churchill, who was the most articulate man of the whole group that I came in contact with. Now, Hap Arnold, that day in Marshall's office, concerning the airpower there, he turned to me, and said he was going to put wings on my chest, and Marshall laughed and said: "Well, General Wedemeyer has had some experience with the tactics of the Germans." And Hap said: "I know that." The Germans taught us, you see, the tactics of the Stuka and these wide-sweeping, not off-tackle plays, but wide sweeps around the end, when they gobbled up all these,...remember when they did that, beginning of the war, to the Poles, thousands and thousands of prisoners?

Q: They did this to Western Europe too in May 1940. They got the French...

W: Yes, but they didn't have to do quite so much, because the resistance wasn't quite as great. The French capitulated quite quickly. You are right, though, the tactics were the same. But Hap Arnold was smart enough to see the efficacy, the desirability of doing this, bringing the war to a quick conclusion. Hap Arnold did not get along well with Ernest King. Admiral King in my book was one of the finest Americans on the JCS. I said that in my book. He really was, but you and I could say no to each other without hurting the other's feelings, but he couldn't. He was rather a difficult person.

Q: I think Arnold used to needle him from time to time.

W: Well, he may have done that I wouldn't have known that. But I felt sorry because here were two fine Americans, both dedicated Americans. And at the meetings,

now, of course, whatever Marshall said, Arnold invariably went right along with it, and they may have resolved these questions back alone later on. I don't know. But I never heard Hap take issue with Marshall.

Q: Well, Marshall regarded Arnold as equal, but not quite equal, in a sense that it was "Dear General" from Arnold to Marshall, and then the other direction, it was "Dear Arnold."

Q: Never "Hap" though. I never heard him call anybody. He told my wife once that he liked me as much as if I were his own son, something like that. Well, by, God, I didn't know it, by anything he ever said to me.

Q: Did he call you "Al?"

W: Oh no! King did and Hap did, and I've got autographed photographs to Al Wedemeyer, all that stuff.

Q: I understand even President Roosevelt didn't call him "George," or did he?

W: No, no, that's wrong, Harry Hopkins and the President, many times I went to the White House will Marshall, and it was "George," yes sir.

Q: Roosevelt liked to call people by their first name.

W: He called me, a little pipsqueak, by mine. That wasn't anything, Happy Hopkins did the same thing, Judge Rosenman...

Q: But Marshall was great, but frosty man?

W: Very impersonal man.

Q: Hard to get close to?

W: You take after the Casablance conference. I told you I was sent to go talk to these people. So I didn't come home with the others. We lived at Ft. Myer. General Marshall, as busy as he was, was thoughtful enough to call my wife and say don't worry about your husband, he's on a little detail. Lots of men wouldn't have done that. See, I didn't come home till after a month after the others did.

Q: Right, he was a very considerate man. When Arnold had that major heart attack, he was very solicitous of Mrs. Arnold, and gave her reports, or came to her to ask about how he was doing, when he was in Coral Gables for a period of time. So he was a very considerate man, but he had this austerity...

W: Pershing had the same thing, and Marshall was devoted to Pershing. In fact, Pershing was responsible that Marshall was picked up and given an opportunity to go on up higher, I was told. This is scuttlebutt, but I believe that's the way it was.

Q: You know, I think I agree 100% with your analysis of Arnold as not a giant intellect, but a doer.

W: It's an objective analysis, because I loved him. But you are in a position it would ruin your book if you got nothing but drool over him. Make him a human being, and he was a human being, fine American.

Q: As a matter of fact, he recongized his own limitations in that respect.

W: I'll tell you one thing that would interest you. That's why I want to talk a minute about the Victory Program, because he was involved in this.

Q: Yes, I know.

W: Well, I would like to know sometime how much you know, because I don't know all about it. Burton Wheeler, Senator Wheeler of Montana, is involved in this, too, and he is still living.

Q: Well, I'll tell you everything I know, and you tell me everything you know and maybe we will come up with something.

W: In July of 1941, my chief named Gerow, gave me an assignment to write a Victory Program, and I just didn't know exactly how to start this thing. I'd just been in the War Plans Division about 6 months. I had read over all the plans that we had, the Green plan, the Orange plan, the White plan, you know, the RAINBOW. Well, that was sort of the last one. But the idea was that the White plan was against rioting in this country, stuff like that. But I saw a hell of a lot of plans over in Germany, and these plans weren't comparable. They weren't realistic. It was like reading a Baedeker. An I, a little pipsqueak Major, was criticizing our war plans. So I got this job, not in a mean way. Gerow, my chief, I loved the guy.

Q: Is he in good shape,? he's down in Virginia?

W: No, he's senile. His brother I see right along, Lee Gerow. Leonard was a wonderful fellow, both of them are VMI man. Now to come back to this Victory Program, in July this directive came up and the President said he wanted some basis for mobilization, mobilization of our industry and everything. So I made a study, I went to all these various - I was given carte blanche to talk to anybody, by Marshall. It was Top Secret and all this baloney, so I drew up this Victory Program what I estimated to be necessary for a two front wars, against the Japs concurrent to a two front war against the Germans. Well, you and I are friends. You would go by

office, and I would be busy there, and you would say: "Hello, Al," and I would say: "Hello, come in and sit down." You'd come in, and you'd say: "What are you doing, Al?" And I'd say: "Well, I'm looking on this. Look, I've admired you," and say, "look this over will you, and give me your ideas." Because I was groping. Nobody had ever done this before. And here I was talking about an Army of 8,700,000 men, people laughed at me, older officers, when I went around and talked to them, in G-3 of our Department - I never shall forget, I was so embarrassed - he was a BG and I was a Major, and he said: "You'll never get that many men overseas." Four million men, that's what I would be getting over there. And I said: "We need them over there." So anyway sounds a little bit immodest what I am saying, but it is the truth. What I wanted to say was that when I got around to the Air Force people, the Air Planners were always under me.

Q: Harold George?

W: Harold George and O.A. Anderson, Anderson was one of my first pilots.

Q: Possum Hansell, Ken Walker?

W: That's right, all of them, Ken got killed out at Rabaul. Well, anyway, the Air Force people were wonderful to me, they were very loyal to me, and I was to them. I believed in the use of airpower. I told you already about the cross-channel business. So anyway, I must have asked somebody to come in. I don't know, but this Top Secret plan, every night, would be locked up in a safe. And when it was finally issued, copies were all numbered. The President got Copy 1 and 2. No. 3 went to the Secretary of War Stimson, No. 4 went to the Chief of Staff. I had it all numbered.

Q: How many copies were there in all.

W: (I think the initial one was about 9, I think that's right, plus a couple I had in sort of draft form in my office. The FBI descended upon me, of course, when this appeared in the Chicago Tribune, and Washington Times Herald. You know about that?

Q: Yes, I do.

W: Now, there was, of course, it was terrible. They descended upon me, and I had a German name, I had spent 2½ years at the German War College, and what else

Q: Didn't you make a deposit in the Riggs Bank or something?

W: Oh yes, my father died, or somebody died, and left me some money. Oh, everything was agin me. It looked awful, and it is an awful experience, when you know that you had nothing like that.

Q: You were like a butler, the obvious suspect?

W: Yes, so, well Hap Arnold talked to me one time. Senator Wheeler told me that Hap Arnold did not approve of this business of going to war until he had raised an Air Force, and he would do all he could to retard it. Now this is what Senator Wheeler told me, now Hap Arnold had a copy of this, and the inference was, what Wheeler told me, that he made it available to Wheeler, and had one of his boys low down. Arnold made it available to Wheeler. Wheeler wouldn't have a copy of it, nobody outside the Pentagon except the President. But some young officer is supposed to have taken it over down in the bowels of the Capitol Building where the photostat is. They took pictures of it, and brought it right back, so it wasn't out of the Pentagon, maybe only several hours, but that's the story that I heard.

Q: That Wheeler told you?

W: Yes. Senator Wheeler. Now look, I wouldn't hurt Hap Arnold's memory for anything in the world, and

Q: Well, the sense of this appeared in Waldrop's column in 1963?

W: No, I didn't know that, but Wheeler didn't tell me this until many years later. But the guy - Genau of the FBI - I became a great friend of all the FBI, because they all had looked into my background, Hoover and Tamms and Genau and all of them investigated me. So they were all. Today, Hoover and I are on a few boards together. Little League baseball, I mentioned to you earlier, well, he is also a trustee, well, anyway, I've talked to Hoover, we've flown down to Houston, Texas, a few months ago to a meeting, and we talked about this a little bit. He doesn't think that Hap Arnold did that. He thinks Wheeler got that from some other source.

Q: I want to explore this with you. What possible motive would Arnold have had to make that available to Wheeler?

W: Well, what possible motive did the person who made it available to Wheeler, whether it was Hap Arnold, that's the first point. And here was the President saying: "We will not go to war," he had given the quarantine speech again and again and again, and told people we would not send boys over there. But he was giving a directive to his war making - part of his machinery here to determine what would be necessary if we did go to war. And this would prove to the potential enemy, potential at the time, that we meant business over here, that we were going to war, by God. We were going to prepare to go to war. So that would be the broad look at it. That's the only justification that anybody could have. Right? Now, you come down to Hap Arnold. Hap Arnold had a big responsibility, he knew the few airplanes, and the industrial complex was so limited in producing airplanes - the number of airplanes we needed and at the same time, the competition with the tremendous demand that King's people. It wasn't King then, it was Betty Stark. The big demand that they came in, and the big part of industry that they would take, and that would conflict with industry, for the air industry, you see. Hap knew that, that's where Hap was really not dumb, he was pretty intelligent when it came to knowing the implications of building so many submarines, or so many aircraft carriers, on his own air people. And he would fight, and he would fight well.

Q: You are talking about a conflict that happened after Pearl Harbor. This is AWPD-42.

W: I beg your pardon, I'm talking about, you see, the Navy was given a directive through Betty Stark. And I think an Admiral named Turner prepared this, I'm not sure.

Q: Would it be Jack Towers?

W: Towers is the Air, but I mean the senior planner over in the Navy was an Admiral named Turner at that time, before the war. Savry Cook came in later, but Garner had to make up a plan for the Navy, and that of course, would include the Marine Corps and their Air. Now, I made up a plan, that all the ground forces and the air, and a fellow named Larry Kuter, and Possum Hansell, people like that, helped me there.

Q: They came up with AWPD-1, the Air War Annex to your RAINBOW FIVE

W: I'm not sure, I don't know. But we had many a session together in my office.

Q: In their discussions...

W: I may tell you, excuse me, to cover a point that you made. It's important, that Hap Arnold had a copy of what the Navy put in. I got a copy right away, and made it available to your air planners. When you compared what they were going to have, and Hap Arnold was going to have for his Air Force, there was a strong conflict right away, not only as to the industrial side, but also as to the strategic implications, the application of this part. The Navy was going to usurp a lot of the mission.

Q: There was a conflict, right. The conflict intensified after Pearl Harbor. The conflict began before Pearl Harbor. The contest for A-1 priority between the Navy and the Air Force.

W: For munitions...

Q: Well, for materiel?

W: Yes, industry.

Q: It was a question of, you only had so much aluminum, you only had so much steel...

W: That's right, ball bearings...

Q: Right, and the Air Force wanted it, and the Navy and the Air Force did have a conflict. Assuming that there was a conflict, and that there was antagonism between Arnold and the Navy, why should Arnold want to leak that report? I mean, what motive would he have to leak that report to the Chicago Tribune?

W: You're just asking me a question. I have no idea why Hap would do it. I just conjectured to help you. I can't believe that he would.

Q: Right, well, this is why I think that Wheeler got it someplace else, and is trying to pin it. Actually this guy Waldrop with this clever article is trying to pin it on Arnold. Now, let's go back...

W: Is Waldrop dead?

Q: No, I interviewed him. He lives on Loughboro Road in Washington, D.C., and he pins it on Arnold too. But you see, he has a guilt complex, I don't mean "too." He pinned in on Arnold. You saw his article in the Washington Post?

W: I'm getting old and senile. I'm probably forgetting...

Q: Well, let me turn this off, and I'll tell you what I know (off tape)

Q: Getting involved in TORCH. TORCH, the decision for TORCH was made in July 1942. The decision came by, I think Marshall went over there, I think Marshall and Hopkins went over there, and they had this big discussion with Arnold didn't go.

W: I was with them. April 1942.

Q: But the decision, I guess Churchill advocated, I think they called it CYMNAST at that time. This was the North African operation. But the decision to go into TORCH was made in July 1942, I believe and Arnold was very unhappy about that. And I can document that, because, first of all, they wanted three groups which wer going to the UK, they wanted them diverted toward Africa. Tooey Spaatz and Eaker, who were trying to build up the UK bomber force, were told, you are not getting any more. It's all going down to Africa, and they opposed that. And Arnold was unhappy about any diversion. I mean this was sort of an article of faith with the Air Force, that a successful campaign against Germany depended upon strategic bombing operation coming out of the UK, and anything that diverted from that, either to the Pacific, or to other operations, they opposed. Marshall opposed it, too, but Marshall wanted the Cross-channel operation, but Churchill and other factors intervened. They were persuaded that it was, you know Dieppe had happened in 1942, and it was a disaster, so they agreed to hold off the operation in 1943. But that is something else. But my point is that Arnold had absolutely no motive, absolutely no motive for leaking RAINBOW FIVE. This man, Waldrop says in his article, and it is a very tenuous and tortured rationale, he says that Arnold was unhappy with Gerow and the Army War Plans because they were not giving enough attention, enough weight, to the Air Force in Air planning.

W: Here was a man who was the Chief planner, and there isn't an officer in the Army who by conviction, wanted a huge airpower. They wanted airpower to carry the strike force, decisive blows. I felt that we had to have forces on the ground, but I felt we should have a canopy of air over any amphibious operation which is the most critical time in any military operation, when you are going ashore. You've got to have a canopy of air, and we had it, when we went over in OVERLORD. We would have had it, if we hadn't of diverted our resources, air resources, all along the perimeter there, that long line of communications, 2,200 miles from the Strait

of Gilbrater to the Suez Canal. I fought this thing tooth and nail at the Casablanca Conference with the British planners, and I was supported - I must be honest about it - by Savvy Cook, the Navy planner. He was very loyal to me at that time, but he had his tongue in his cheek. He told me after the thing was over, he never believed the British ever wanted to go across the Channel. And therefore, in order - this is important to you - in order to get them to do it, he wanted to use a lever, that all right, we will go against the Japanese first priority, if you don't want to do this, you see. And he was convinced that we ought to get to this dynamo of the Axis war effort first. So that should never be forgotten. And I think he epitomized, I think he expressed King's philosophy. Now, in going to these conferences, I flew with a guy named King, and because I was another service, he talked to me very frankly, I noticed the man was quite human. And who flew with Marshall? Savvy Cook. In case the plane went down, then you had an Army and a Navy man both knowledgeable about the plan that we were going to present to our opposites in the British.

Q: This rationale that Waldrop presented...have you seen the article, General? I'll send you a copy. I'll send it to you in the next couple of days. But the rationale behind this, and I think your knowledge is critical in this, that Arnold was unhappy with the role given to air in the summer of 1941. The result was that he was bitter. This was at the time when the air was trying to establish itself as an entity within the War Dept, the planners in the War Dept...

W: That was a Joint Board decision. We didn't have the Joint Chiefs then.

Q: No, but Arnold, according to this account, was bitter at the failure of the War Dept to recognize the role of airpower. Hence, as an act of reprisal, or an act of spite, Arnold, through this Army Air Forces Captain, turned this plan over to Burton K. Wheeler, who in turn, turned it over the Chesly Manly, who died, incidentally. He died 2 months ago. I woke up too late. I don't know if he would have told me anything, but he died very recently.

W: Do you know Walter Trohan here

Q: No, I don't

W: He's the Chicago Tribune correspondent here

Q: I don't know if he would have any knowledge of this thing.

W: Well, Walter was around here at that time. You might talk to him. I wouldn't hesitate to.

Q: Well, Waldrop tried to pin this on Arnold in this article. It was a cleverly written article,

W: I don't remember it, but I may have seen it years ago (off tape)

W: Maybe it was the same morning, the morning paper was on my desk and Leonard Gerow was standing there when I got into my office. I had worked all night the night before, I got in late, got in about 10:00, and there was Leonard Gerow, always loyal to me, always. So was Marshall, on this thing, anyway. They knew I didn't do anything like that. But Leonard Gerow said: "Look at this!" And showed it to me. And I read the headlines, I don't know whether you know it or not, it was so important to me in my lifetime, that I put it in my book

Q: Yes, I know. I read your book right through, you had several chapters about it.

W: No, not several chapters...

Q: About the incident

W: Oh yes, sure. So you can see, how much it meant to me. But this, is an exact, what my secretary and I did. We sat down and I read from the newspaper and she took my copy of my War Plan there, and she underlined it in red, and it was all verbatim. So it couldn't have been from RAINBOW FIVE, because I didn't use RAINBOW FIVE, as a basis for this, I had to srart out from scratch.

Q: Well then, you know, I've talked to Kuter and

W: This is all my old phraseology stuff

Q: Well, what was it they copied then, was it AWPD-1, Air War Plans 1, what was it that the Chicago Tribune got hold of?

W: It must have been my Victory Program. Because look, when you are told that the President wants to know whay size Army, Navy and Air Force he needs, and then have to notify industry what they have to build. I was given the Army and Air Force part of it. Now, I talked to the planners, Kuter and that crowd, and you say, what did they want to know. He wanted to know exactly how much he needed to win a war, in case we go to war. Now, I went back to my Chief, and he sent me back up to Marshall, and Marshall said to me, I said: "What are the assumptions? Are we going

to fight the Japanese and the Germans concurrently? Or are we going to just fight that area, and what are the assumptions? And he said: "You make the assumptions." So these were the basis. And that was the beginning that you read there. So we didn't take anything from any other war planners. I told you the war plans that I saw were not entirely practical. We had to apply limited judgment. So it wasn't deviating one iota from that damned thing. I don't remember how much of the Victory Program they took

Q: Did you accept from the Air, from Harold George and Kuter, as part of your plan, their Air War Plan?

W: I'm glad to get it recorded. I never did anything involving air. When I don't know all about something, I'm not hesitant to admit it, I go to people who do. I never wrote anything pertaining to it. I had a pretty good knowledge of Air, especially the strategic or tactical use of it, perhaps as much as any American officer could in 2½ years in German War College where we were taught this, the use of the Luftwaffe. But never did I put anything down and submit to my Chief. Before I submitted it to my Chief, Leonard Gerow, it was shown to Larry Kuter and Harold George and Ken Walker and those fellows, who were bright as hell, and who knew. They would clear it with Hap, too. Hap would get a whack at it, then I would give it to my Chief, and then it would go to George Marshall. So, now the final plan that came out - those boys brought to me their draft, and I went over that, to see that it dovetailed in to my concept of the employment of Air.

Q: In other words, you were incorporating their ideas into the Victory Plan?

W: Absolutely, I accepted their ideas almost in toto

Q: And that Victory Program is what appears in this newspaper?

W: Yes sir, verbatim. I would say verbatim, but I don't know how much, I can get you, have you ever seen it?

Q: No, I have not. Another aspect of it. This thing came out on the 4th of December, it was published in both newspapers, and immediately there was an FBI investigation. You were the subject of an intensive inquiry.

W: Yes

Q: Other people were too. According to Waldrop, the FBI found the culprit and everybody,

W: (Shaking his head)

Q: No, they did not find the culprit?

W: I don't think so.

Q: They don't know who did it?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Well, in his account, he says they found the culprit, in any event, Harold George told me...

W: I'll tell you what I will do for you on that. I like you, I think you are a decent guy, I don't think you are going to be unobjective, because some civilians with whom I deal, of course, they don't like the Army or the military. I'm going to call, I'll check with the FBI. I have a way of doing it. I haven't done it for years, just talked on a plane going down to the Little League baseball with Edgar Hoover. We sat together, and we talked all kinds of things, and we just touched lightly on that one.

Q: You say the FBI never found out who did it?

W: I didn't say that categorically. I said I don't think so. I don't know.

Q: Well, you will be interested for another reason, in what Waldrop writes in his nasty article. He says that, at the end of the war, he talked to the man who was involved in the investigation. He doesn't mention a name, the implication is that he talked to Hoover,

W: Genau and Tamm were the two men

Q: Yes, you mention them both in your book.

W: They were both very thorough, Genau was the most, a great guy.

Q: In this article he says that he talked to the man involved in the investigation and the man said that we found out who did it. This is at the end of the war

W: When did Waldrop talk to the man?

Q: After the war ended, and he said: "Now the war is over, and it is not a military secret. Could you tell me his name?"

W: One of the most closely kept secrets I know of. In 1947-48, because in 1947 Marshall was Secy of State and I talked to him about it, and as far as I know, he didn't know. When he was Secy of State he sent me, with Ambassadorial rank, to the Far East and God knows, I had an opportunity to visit with him, just like you and I are talking here, now.

Q: This is critical to this whole analysis. When Waldrop says he talked to the man who was involved in the investigation, and he said to the man, presumably FBI Director Hoover, or perhaps somebody close to Hoover: "Can you tell me the culprit's name?" He says: "The war is over and it's not a secret anymore." And he said the man told him the guilty party's name, He says: "His name shall not escape from my lips, because he was a distinguished Air Force General, and he served in the war, and I will not besmirch his reputation." (paraphrased)

W: Well, that's already doing that.

Q: Right, and since there was only one man he named who was unhappy - at the beginning of this long article - Hap Arnold, the implication derived by this fellor Tristam Coffin and McIlvain and all the other people who are writing these nasty things about Hap Arnold today. You see, Hap Arnold's reputation is being besmirched. I think this man is trying to pin on somebody else the guild. You see, he had a sense of guilt, because he leaked a military secret. This is treason, I mean Waldrop, Chesly Manly, and the editors of that publication. That was a secret plan, this was very close. Of course we were not in a war when that thing was published, but I think it was a terrible thing that they did.

W: The Wall St. Journal had an article about this maybe a week or two before that, and the Wall St. Journal man who wrote it had a conference with President Roosevelt, did you know that?

Q: No

Q: Here is a reference to the Wall St. Journal article in Wedemeyer's Reports pps. 28-29. It refers to an article by Eugene S. Duffield, Chief of the Wall St. Journal, Washington Bureau. According to this account, he had written practically the same story, as Chesly Manly did, and the date of that is Oct 20, 1941. The Duffield article made reference to the "Victory Program" a newly evolved munitions schedule, by which Washington and London expected to beat Hitler.

Q: You say the FBI, to your knowledge, did not find the guilty party.

W: That's as far as I know.

Q: Let me ask this question. You know, Harold George told me that he was told: "Forget about who did it, and get on with the war." You see, Pearl Harbor happened three days later, and the whole investigation was overtaken by events - war. The Air Force fellows were told: "Get on with your job and forget about this who-done-it, so to speak." Now, if the FBI had come up with the culprit, whether

it be Wedemeyer, or whether it be Arnold, or somebody else, would Arnold [Marshall] have allowed that man to stay in that job. In other words, suppose

W: I got you, just give it thought. I think he would. I think he would subordinated anything to win the war.

Q: Was Wedemeyer or Arnold or anybody, I'm just naming two suspects in the case, were they important enough to this war effort so that they were not vulnerable to being tossed out? Were they indispensable at this time? Was Arnold indispensable to Marshall at this time?

W: No, not indispensable, in my judgment. We had replacements when I was moved out, another man moved in as planner.

Q: This was in the war, 1943

W: No, but even in the early stages, we had some excellent Air Force officers. One of them I think would have been the Eisenhower of the war if he hadn't been killed in Iceland.

Q: Yes, Andrews. All right, if we accept the Waldrop thesis, that Arnold was the guilty party, then Marshall would have fired him?

W: Because Marshall didn't even know about that thesis at that time.

Q: Yes, but he knew about the results of the investigation, if Waldrop is telling the truth. You see, this man

W: I don't think that Marshall knew when he was Secy of State

Q: Well, then, Waldrop is lying?

W: May be, I don't know

Q: In other words, at least part of his story is a lie. Because he said that right after the war he had talked to the man who conducted the investigation and the man told him who the guilty party was, and he would not mention his name because he didn't want to besmirch his memory. All right, if this is to, then Marshall must have known who the guilty party was. He must have known the result of the investigation, and if Arnold was the guilty party, why wasn't he fired. If Wedemeyer was the guilty party, why wasn't he fired? This is my theory. Would either Arnold or Wedemeyer have survived in their jobs if they had been designated or proved to be the guilty party by whoever conducted the investigation.

(Interview Continued - Second day Loan)

W: The other day when we were conferring about these matters, I mentioned that I did discuss, there came up in some way or other, the same subject about the person who made available to the newspapers this very secret document. I did discuss it with George Marshall when he was Secy of State, and that time he didn't seem to have any more knowledge, at least he gave me no more information. He gave me the impression that he didn't know any more about it then. And that was some years later, than he did at the time it happened.

Q: I don't think this thing was working when you made what I think a very important statement. Namely, if Wedemeyer or Arnold had been proved to be the culprit in disclosure of this document, what do you think their fate would have been?

W: I indicated that to you, I'm prefacing the following remarks by the fact that is just conjecture on my part. But I feel quite confident after so many years of service, professional ethics of a military man, and knowing the traditions of the service, that had Wedemeyer or Arnold or any other individual in a responsible position in this Dept of War, released or made available to unauthorized parties any secret documents that that individual after thorough investigation would have been court martialed, assuming he was guilty of doing it, found guilty. No doubt about it, he would have been released, summarily from his job while he was under suspicion.

Q: I feel this way myself, in fact, when I started investigating this issue...

W: Then I added, however, the fact that George Marshall was accused by people, and I must say, to you that lots of people - lots is not a good term - many people in uniform, felt that George Marshall knew where he was and should have been very forthright, no matter whom it involved, many people. And I incline that way,

Q: Assuming that Marshall was not wholly candid about his actions on the morning of December 7th, in testimony before the Roberts Commission and other investigating committees

W: Richardson Committee

Q: Richardson Committee, yes, would he have, would this have an affect in his attitude toward Arnold, if Arnold had been designated the guilty party?

W: Not at all, no. See, Arnold was a very personable man anyway, and he put, before his personal feelings - I'm confident of this - that he was the type of man who put his responsibilities to his country. You know, they differentiate between a statesman and a politician, a politician thinks the country belongs to him, and the statesman believes that he belongs to the country, and I think George Marshall thought he was a statesman, with regard to such decisions.

Q: You know, Harry Truman once said, a statesman is a dead politician. I'm interested in why Waldrop, many years after the event, came out with a thing like this, trying to pin this act on Hap Arnold. Now, in the article that you will read, he makes a very flimsy case. He goes back to Cline. Cline is one of the Army historians who wrote the Washington Command Post, and he talks about the Air Corps being somewhat unhappy with the role assigned to it by the War Dept General Staff. He tried to establish Arnold as being one of the unhappy people in the Air Corps.

W: Now, you and I are constantly using the term Air Corps and Army. And who in the hell are we to speak for the entire, or even for the official policy hierarchy, we aren't, so there were young, enthusiastic and emotional Air Force officers, who were fliers, and probably better mechanics than they were strategists, but chauvinists, very definitely chauvinism played a role, and they did criticize their role.

Q: I accept this, and it is possible that somebody in the Air Corps may have had some role in this particular disclosure. I personally think that Arnold would not have touched it with a 10 foot pole, and if he had touched it, he would not have survived in his job. This is why when I started to...

W: I would confirm with my knowledge of Arnold, and my experiences in the professional military game - both statements that you made - namely that General Arnold would not have taken any cognizance of such a thing, except to hold others subordinate to him responsible if they were involved. Then, the other is that you stated that he would have been definitely relieved and punished, summarily, if they had proven that he was responsible.

Q: You know, when I first started playing with this, I came upon circumstantial evidence that Wedemeyer could have been involved in that. But that thesis ran smack against the fact that Wedemeyer was promoted, honored, sent out to important commands, and I don't think Marshall would have done that even though Wedemeyer was close.

W: I don't know how thoroughly, how much you have been allowed to see the FBI reports.

Q: I haven't seen any, this is why I wrote the letter.

W: If you could know how thoroughly they investigated me, I'd give you my word of honor. But I wouldn't do a thing like that, I'm devoted to my country.

Q: As a matter of fact, I was curious as to where did you have access to some of the investigative reports because you quote Tamm and this other fellow?

W: My dear little mother - my father was dead - but my little Irish mother was questioned, .Of course the banks out in Omaha where I was born and raised, they were . . . more people were questioned. They probably have, according to Edgar Hoover, a longer file on me than most culprits. But no, it would have been a terrible thing, of course, Mr. McCloy, sent for me, he was Asst Secy of the Army, and I'll never forgive him for saying what he did, because the presumption of guilt, he called me in and I was a Major at the time, maybe a LT COL. He said; "There is blood on the fingers of the man who did this. And I looked at him. I'll never forgive him, he knows that I was a pall bearer at Bill Donovan's funeral and he and I were standing together in the pew. He reached over; "Wedemeyer", he says, "I understand you took a crack at me in your book." And I said; "Well, everything I said in the book is straightforward and true." There was a woman who wrote into the War Department and said that everybody knows that General Wedemeyer and his father, Secy Stimson showed me the

letter. She was ananymous, but. . .

Q: You were sort of like the butler in the case, the obvious suspect, because there are certain circumstantial things which you did or were involved.

W: Oh, of course, and I realize that, I told Mr. Tamm, but he was awfully nice to me. He said; "We don't think it's you for a minute, but we've got to investigate this thing thoroughly." And I said; "I understand sir. Anything I can do to help. I may have been negligent in that, if you had been a friend of mine - I told you this the other day - in going by my office, there was so much that was nebulous, so much that was based on imponderables, when I was writing the basic idea, the concept of a two-front war. Then I might have said; "Look Green, look this over and give me your reaction, and you'd say, well, I'm so damned busy, could I take it up to my office." And I'd say; "Yes, be careful of it, 'Top Secret', would be marked on it." So you would go away with it now. So I had to tell the FBI that I did not always have it in my possession. But when it was completed, when it was in one whole part, then I did not realize it to Dr. Green, or any friends. It was locked up in the safe, how many copies through. There is some confusion about that, even in my memory. I don't remember it. I always kept one or two working copies that I would, double space, stuff like that, so I don't know.

Q: Let me tell you what Harold George told me, I'll turn this off. . .

W: A copy was brought down to the Capitol Building, downstairs in the photographic place. Wheeler told me that much. He didn't

tell me who, I don't know who. I'd like to find out. But Senator Wheeler said a copy of this was brought to the Capitol Building, and it wasn't out of the safe, or wherever it was brought from, more than an hour or two because they microfilmed it right away, and then returned it. Wheeler told me this.

Q: Then it could have been put back?

W: I remember because he said they had a photographic place down underneath the Capitol Building.

Q: It could have been put back on the desk if it was taken from there. Does that sound like a possible thesis to you?

W: Yes, because, another thing, I had a good connection with Harry Hopkins. I say good. I know he liked me, because he asked me to go to the Soviet Union with him, and different things like that. General Marshall didn't let me go. I was busy on something else. But he always showed a friendship for me, called me by my nickname and all that. Now, for one thing, we were coming back from London in April 1942, we had been over there to explain the plan to the British, we were on this plane alone together. Marshall, Harry Hopkins and myself, Pinky Craig was on that trip, but he spent most of the time up in the cockpit with the pilot, Pan American Clipper, just the three of us. We were talking, and Harry Hopkins, out of the blue - this may be of interest to you - said; "I think someone ought to be telling ex-President Hoover what's going on, - keep him informed." General Marshall said, "Yes, I think so." And he said; "Well, George,

I think you ought to detail Al here to do this." And I was detailed to go up and tell the Chief from time to time. At the same time Harry said; "I would like to have Al come over about once a week and talk to me about the dispositions of what's going on. I was detailed to do it. Now, I went over there, before I went over the first time, Harry Hopkins' secretary would call me when it was convenient for him to receive me, on the Treasury end of the White House, the Executive Offices. And I kept going over there about 3 or 4 months, sitting down and visiting with him. He had a retentive memory, and then he would go in and talk to the "Big Boy" and the Big Boy thought that he was just one of these geniuses.

Q: Was Harry Hopkins a bad housekeeper?

W: I couldn't say. Anyway. . .

Q: Would Harry Hopkins have had any motive to do this?

W: No, not that I know of. One day I was in there though, and there was someone sitting over in the corner when I went into his office. And Marshall had admonished me not to say anything about any of these things over in the White House, except to Mr. Hopkins. So I went over there and over sitting in the corner was a very genial, fat fellow named Judge Rosenman, and he was sitting there, stretched back sort of comfortably and Harry said; "Well, Al, what have you got to say?" And I hesitated; "Well." When I went in, he had said; "You know Judge Rosenmen, and I said; "No." And I shook hands with him.

Q: Roosevelt's chief speech writer?

W: Yes, very genial, sort of happy fellow, fat, and I never saw him again. But anyway, the reason I tell you this, this is what happened. I said to Harry; "I cannot tell you anything about it. I can't relate the strategies and stuff in front of anyone. I was admonished by General Marshall." And this fellow (Rosenman) got up.

He was mad then. He was angry. I didn't mean to. I didn't know the position he enjoyed there, I was just a young Major or Lt Col. Anyway, that would indicate that Harry wasn't too careful about security.

Q: Military security. You know, that thesis ties in to what was told to many people, and they have told me this, all the people I have interviewed. . . .

W: I can't imagine him doing a thing like that.

Q: They all said that right after Pearl Harbor they were told, forget about the investigation, get on with your job, we have a war to win. Now, this would have tied in to Hopkins thesis, because if it was disclosed by the FBI or whoever investigated it, that Harry Hopkins was indeed the culprit, then it would have been very embarrassing to Roosevelt. He would have wanted to quash any further investigation. And therefore, all the suspects, or all the possible participants in this little drama could have been told, "Forget about it; go back to your jobs, and let's get the war won."

W: You must realize there is sort of a philosophy behind all this, that you have missed apparently. Or you haven't dovetailed it all in. Many people feel that the publication of the Victory Program precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. The plan was always present to attack Manila, Pearl Harbor or Singapore, but this thing really, and they had ordered, the "Tora Tora" crowd, to turn, of course, in the event, that their attack . . . . A lot of people in the Pentagon among the "American Firsters"

Q: Do you accept that?

W: No, no I don't.

Q: The Japanese plan started ten days before. The Fleet had been started out.

W: Yes, but they were also equipped, and I've talked to Japanese officers about this who were in this thing. I had a good talk about that strategy with the man who was my opposite number, he commanded all the Japs against me in China. His name was Okita. He just died a couple years ago. No, Okamura, he commanded all the Jap forces against me. We talked about this. We sat there and talked about this, and it was very interesting.

Q: Well, I don't accept that.

W: I don't either, but a lot of people who did, Dr. Green, really, military men who felt that it actually precipitated because they were cautious. Just like the Germans were, they marched into the Rhineland, they had orders to turn right around. I know they did, I talked to German officers about it.

Q: I think they were instructed that if they were detected, several days before they launched, they should turn around or just say that they were on a maneuver, or not to go through with the attack.

W: No, I don't mean to contradict you,

Q: Please do, if you must.

W: The Japanese with whom I talked said that if they had any inclination that it would not be a lucrative target, the Pearl Harbor area, that they definitely would go to the Philippines, because they wanted to get down to oil down in South America.

Q: I'm not disagreeing with that at all. But I'm just saying that the disclosure by the Chicago Tribune was not related to the Japanese attack, or was it?

W: No, I don't think it was.

Q: I mean these were two independent things. They just happened to come very close together. My main concentration here is to find out not necessarily who did it. If the FBI could tell me: "We have documentary evidence that Arnold did not do it," that would satisfy me. I would be happier if I knew who did, but I would like to clear his name, or involve him if that's the way the evidence shows. And I think, let me turn this off.

W; None of us is perfect . . .

Q: Arnold had a great inspirational type of man. As you say, he was not an intellect, but he was a driving man. He was a man who could get an intellectual idea that someone else conceived and drive it through to a program.

W: I would agree with that 100%. I don't believe he was a man who ever read anything.

Q: He did a lot of reading. . .

W: Detective stories, or cowboy stories. . .

Q: You know, he was a good writer. You know that he wrote six boys books? Did I mention that to you?

W: Yes, you did and I knew it before, I knew that he collaborated with Eaker.

Q: But he was an outgoing man, he was an extrovert.

W: That's right.

Q: And you know, he had this sense. You know he was involved in the CCC, he had the whole West Coast CCC. Malin Craig gave him this job in 1933, when he was at March Field. He supervised all the CCC camps, over 25 of them on the West Coast, but out of that, came an attitude that if young people could get out into the forest, do something constructive, somehow they would solve the juvenile delinquency problem and will be morally and physically cleansed of imperfections. He had this attitude. Maybe it was a little bit on the naive side but he believed in the outdoors, and I, having looked at thousands of letters written to him and that he wrote, anybody that talked about fishing or hunting or something like this, had an open door to Arnold. He and Marshall were always talking about going off on a trip hunting and fishing, and of course, they went twice that I know of. They went up to the High Sierras in 1944. I think you were overseas at that time. They stole a week on a pack trip. Then they went pheasant hunting in Bismarck, ND, in 1945. Then, I'll turn this off.

Q: There was an exchange of correspondence that you had, several letters - let's say, when you were in the Pacific, when you were in the CBI - with Arnold, discussing philosophic and the Chinese war and the role of Chiang Kai-shek, do you remember that exchange?

W: I've got copies of everything. If you'd recall to me, if you had copies of them.

Q: I have excerpts, I should have taken some of them. But Arnold went to the CBI in 1942. You mentioned that he and Chiang Kai-shek, didn't do well in that situation.

W: No, he didn't, but he never would do well in conferences with people at high level. He never did with the British. He antagonized, and I really think, and I was embarrassed about this, two times that I was embarrassed with contacts on a high level. When I went with Marshall and Hopkins to London in April 1942 - I told you Harry Hopkins liked me, took me over when he addressed Parliament, he asked me to go with him. I sat there. I'd see Anthony Eden over opposite me on the other side. He put his hands up in sort of a smirk as Hopkins talked, he was telling them they were going to give them all help, and this stuff, all the wheels of industry would be turning around for London. I was embarrassed, really, because they sort of gave me the impression - these British people, House of Lords there - that, you know, making fun of him, but they were very cautious in showing too strongly that way. The next time I was embarrassed involved Hap, in discussing the JCS King would go after it hard, and he didn't come back well. Marshall had to come help him, and then it was the British, the British again, sort of - "see if we can get it out of old Hap," you know. No opposition from Hap. The British Joint Chiefs of Staff hated the guts of a fellow named Ernest King, but in my judgment, Ernest King was the finest American on the whole damned works, because he did watch American resources.

Q: You say the British could get it out of Hap but they had more trouble getting it out of King or Marshall?

W: Oh yes, no doubt about it. This fellow Portal was the strongest

man in the British JCS, Air Marshal Portal - a great fellow, very strong man.

Q: You know, he and Arnold had some confrontations.

W: Well, Portal liked Hap, though. I know. I got on an "Al" and "Portal" basis, we were good friends. I was with the British, you see, with Mountbatten. That ingratiated me a little bit with the JCS for the British. One time they thought I was anti-British, Anglophile, is that what you call them?

Q: Anglo-phobe.

W: Yes, but they got over that, I know Mountbatten disabused their minds of that. I was pro-American. I knew they were taking advantage of us.

Q: Well, you know Arnold

W: Arnold liked Portal, I think.

Q: Yes, I think they liked each other, but they had some disagreements?

W: I know Portal liked Arnold, I know he did.

Q: But you think the British, they got more out of Hap Arnold then out of the other Joint Chiefs?

W: I didn't say that. I said they could handle him better than they could Ernie King. And they were always after our Navy units, elements of our fleet - the British were. They wanted the aircraft carriers. They wanted - one thing that the American Navy developed during the war was a mobile logistic support business, Ben Moreel evolve d the Seabees. The British were always trying to get, and King resisted. Now the other thing, he never believed that they wanted to

go across the Channel in '43, although that had been decided on the highest level, that our principal enemy was the German-Italian setup, and we would defeat them first and them go out and conduct strategic defensive operations. But he never felt that they were sincere about this. And he thought they would just carry on this peripheral war, protecting British interests, and using our resources -- landing craft. He began to stake out to the Far East, landing craft, that were, really, supposed to go to the Atlantic. And that's the reason that the War in the Pacific ended almost concurrently with the war in the Atlantic, really.

Q: I think that Marshall had some misgivings, too, about whether the British were sincere.

W: Oh, of course. Marshall supported that Cross-Channel operation believe me, all the way through. And then unfortunately, this fellow Senator McCarthy, if he'd come and talked to me, I would have told this poor devil. I think he was a little bit emotional. But if he had come and told me -- he accused Marshall of trying to help the Soviet Union. I'm the one that was responsible for that concept, and Marshall bought it, so did the President.

Q: You mean, of helping the Soviet Union

W: No sir, not so much helping them, but we were doing what we thought was best, get the dynamo of the war effort under our control. Then to proceed as far East as we could with Anglo-Saxon forces, so the communist commissars wouldn't come in, in other words, the political objectives of the war.

Q: You had that in mind?

W: I started the damn concept in Marshall's mind. If Marshall were alive, he would tell you that, I'm not bragging. I've been very

careful about saying things in group efforts, people making contributions, valuable contributions.

Q: The Russians were trying to get all kinds of aircraft, including four engine bombers, and they were putting...

W: They weren't playing the game with us at all.

Q: Well, this Marshal Belyaev, remember him?

W: Yes.

Q: Belyaev and Arnold had a lot of contracts. They were trying to get B-17s and B-24s out of Arnold. Arnold had tentatively accepted this possibility in exchange for Siberian bases. You see, Arnold had been trying, all throughout the war to get bases in Siberia from which to attack Japan. The Russians stalled him off all the time. So Arnold had misgivings about the Russians. He never trusted them completely.

W: Well, I don't think George Marshall did. I think the people who were trusting were on the political level, Harry Hopkins, Averell Harriman, Franklin Roosevelt, people like that. "Trusted" isn't quite the word, maybe.

Q: This Alsif route...did you have anything to do with the concept of flying planes to Fairbanks, Alaska, and let the Russians fly it over Siberia?

W: I was knowledge about it, but nothing, how do you mean... concept?

Q: I mean did you work on that plan, did you have any involvement?

W: Yes, I would have involvement while I was Chief Planner, I tell you they were very loyal to me, the AF people. They knew they

had in me, a person who believed in airpower, but I didn't let them push me around, I had no trouble with them.

Q: Was Kuter?

W: Sometimes he was my assistant, I think he was at. I'm not sure, I know Smart was at Casablanca, I think Kuter was, I'm not sure. But they were all up in Quebec with me. They were awfully good, I'll tell you truthfully. I had trouble with Anderson, who was very emotional, Orvil Anderson, and we would rotate them, the Navy man and I, name of Cook. Well Savvy and I rotated as Chairman, he would recognize the Air man as on an equal basis with him, Savvy would. So I was sitting in the middle between Savvy on the right, and it was my day to chair the Planners meeting. And the two of them said awful things to each other, and so I told Savvy Cook: "You can't talk". This fellow was a BG and Savvy was two stars in the Navy, you have no idea how much rank, terrible. Anyway, I told Cook: "I said I'm going to go and report you to Adm King, and I want you to be present. I'm going right over there now and tell him I cannot work with you if you are going to insult my Air Planner here." And I said: "I will take Anderson with me, if you want." And he said "No, don't bring him. I'll go over with you." And I went and I told Adm King that Adm Cook was...

Q: Abusive?

W: Oh, he was very abusive, but he also accused him of lying, accused the AF of lying, They were fighting for resources all the time. We were paying the bill, the Army was. But, if I do say so, in retrospect, the AF was fortunate in having a man like myself who was objective. I could be, and I didn't let either side get too out of hand.

Q: Well, did the Navy feel they were being outvoted in the Planner's in the JSP.

W: Oh, not at that time, a little bit. But the time that they really did, after the war was over, and, Ike asked me to come back up and take Plans over from China. Larry Kuter had been there. Larry hadn't done a damn thing for War Planning. He went all-out, and very ably, smart as hell, for a separate AF, at that particular time, this was '47. So I was returned, I attended all the JCS meetings you see, and Bradley now was JCS Chief, and not a very good one, not near as good as Ike. I mean he wasn't as creative, his mind wasn't as sharp, but a nice guy. But one day we had an awful argument, Bradley relied upon me to discuss things with the Navy, and Vandenberg was the Chief of AF then, and I think Larry was his assistant, and I was with Bradley and then there was Carney, and Denfeld. Denfeld was dumb as hell, but nice, he was a nice man. When I tell you they were dumb, they weren't creative. But anyway, we had an awful battle you know about the budget -- how much money would go to the Army and the AF and the Navy, and so I said to the assemblee there, I said: "If we are going to remove $20 million, I am in favor, General Bradley, of giving it to the AF." Carney hit the ceiling, he said: "Of course, you always favor the AF, don't you, over the Navy." Well, I said: "I want strategic bombing to be retained by the AF, not by the Navy, they want to control it."

Q: The Navy played an equivocal role at that time. They attacked strategic bombing as a faulty concept, and yet they wanted a part of it.

W: They wanted all responsibility for it because they claimed they had floating bases, you know, that weren't vulnerable to attack, and all this.

Q: I want to get back to the JCS. You indicated that Gen Arnold was sort of silent at JCS meetings?

W: He rarely said anything, I never heard him say very many things that were constructive. He didn't help Gen Marshall very much.

Q: Could it be that...

W: He didn't help him very much in the JCS meetings. Sometimes I think he embarrased him a little, at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting.

Q: By something he said, or failure to say?

W: Failure to come forth, you know, and take a strong stand against Portal or against Alanbrooke. In other words, there could have been another Chief of AF who was dynamic and articulate. Hap Arnold was not an articulate man in an argument. He either got embarrassed or angry, one or the other. Sometimes it seemed like he was embarrassed, and he would smile a lot.

Q: He had this perennial smile. I guess that's why they called him Hap, but it didn't mean he was happy, it was just sort of a facial expression?

W: I never analyzed that. He did have a nice expression on his face.

Q: Did he have a nice manner about him?

W: Yes he did. I saw him only once angry, and that was one of his AF officers in his own office, personnel matters. Somebody wanted somebody promoted or something.

Q: Do you remember Curly Wolfinbarger?

W: Very well

Q: He was in the Plans business, in Arnold's staff, and he made the same comment that you have made. They used to get mad sitting at the back of the JCS meeting when somebody made some point that was hostile to the AF position, and Arnold failed to defend it at the JCS meetings.

W: Well, I must tell you that Gen Marshall was very loyal to the AF.

Q: Could it be that Arnold was loyal to Marshall and he didn't want to appear to be in contradiction?

W: Definitely, I think Arnold was very meticulous in his manner and in his approach to problems involving himself and the Chief of

Staff of the Army. At all times, I think he was very courteous to him, and very loyal to him. I think he was capable of deep loyalty to friends, and also to principles.

Q: Well, these characteristics in my conception, lie in direct contradiction to the actions involving the Chicago Tribune disclosure. They seem out of character for Arnold to have done, that's why I don't believe he would have had a motive to do it, and I don't believe that his personal characteristics were such that he would have done a thing of this sort.

W: There is one thing I think you have a misconception on, and that is, the AF was unhappy about the role that they were given in the Victory Program, in the war as a whole. Because I repeat, and I'm, not saying it in a bragadocio manner, I just completed 2½ years of German War College where I had learned a great deal and lots of ground officers were fortunate enough to have access to this ~~kind~~ kind of tactics and techniques, that is, Stutka and the armored columns and I came back imbued with the deployment of air. In fact, I tried to get into the Air Force at one time. I've always been enthusiastic about air-power, tried to get in on it, but couldnt' because of my eyes. So I know, I didn't fight, I had no opposition. I was all alone in writing this thing, but when the AF people came in, they would fight for what they need for this, and we would discuss it, munitions that were visualized, contributions they would in support, ground support, or strategic bombing where we would get ball bearings, focal points of communication, ball bearing plants, things like that. Yes, I went along with it, I could see the contribution it would make to the overall concept of maneuvers.

Q: I didn't suggest that you were hostile.

W: No, sir, I know you didn't. But they were not in a position

of authority at the time that Victory Program went in...

Q: Gerow...

W: No sir, Gerow was all right

Q: Gerow came around later, but he was slow for a while. Spaulding, remember him.

W: I would say that he wouldn't come around quickly

Q: He was slow to come around.

W: I would say that he would be. These are men that are unimaginative, Gerow wasn't unimaginative, but Spaulding was, in my judgment.

Q: In any event, it is a documented fact that on Pearl Harbor day we had less than 50 B-17s.

W: Oh yes, but ; this program.

Q: The program was delayed. You see, the B-17 was a going airplane four years before Pearl Harbor, but Spaulding and Harry Woodring and several others...

W: Oh my own father-in-law, Embick, he was one of the scholars of our Army considered a brilliant man. He admitted that he was wrong.

Q: Stanley Embic came around during the war.

W: Deputy Chief of Staff when he came around, no, that's wrong, Deputy Chief of Staff when he made a decision to. Craig was Chief of Staff, Embick was Deputy. He made the decision to put a lot of money on, I think fixed fortifications guarding the Golden Gate, that should have gone into the bomber program. But he told me this after the war was under way, and he was so glad to see that I was up there.

Q: There was another technique they employed in the War Dept General Staff, this is in the late '30s. There was 2,320 plane program, which was approved.

W: Yes, I sort of remember that.

Q: W

Q: Well, what they did was give the AF small planes, so they would get more planes for less money, instead of giving them more bombers. So they got a lot of small planes that were totally undesirable insofar as fighting an overseas war.

W: Well, they certainly got a plethora of T-6s and they gave them to the Russians up the Persian Gulf brief.

Q: There were several other inferior planes like the P-39. It was a low level plane, it was not a good fighter.

W: I can assure you it was not General Marshall and not General Wedemyer had anything to do with that. I took the advice of the technical men in the AF.

Q: Well this brings me to say that there were several people in the Air Corps, Hugh Knerr...

W: I remember him, he was a very brilliant man.

Q: He was a brilliant man but he was a malcontent. He was writing articles under the table. You know, the William Bradford Huie book, We Fight For Airpower.

W: I knew Huie too.

Q: Do you know who wrote his book?

W: No.

Q: Knerr. Do you have his book here?

W: I may have it out at the house

Q: All right, well, you look at that book. Look at other book; The Case Against the Admirals, and in the preface, it says: "To my friend, Hugh Knerr." You see, Knerr either wrote it or helped. Knerr was writing all these articles under the table for American Mercury magazine, or Reader's Digest, or what not.. Now, Knerr was devoted to

Andrews, that was his Chief, that was his God.

W: Andrews was supposed to be the Eisenhower of the war?

Q: Yes, if he had lived, he might have been.

W: He would have been!

Q: Marshall had great confidence in Andrews.

W: Of course he did, and rightly, he was a very scholarly, able man.

Q: Did you ever get into any of the discussions of whether Andrews or Arnold ought to be the top man in the AF?

W: No. What happened, when you travel with a man a great deal, as I did with Marshall, he would talk to me, tell me these things. I could tell you quite a few things on personnel matters, I wasn't a personnel expert at all; I wasn't a kingmaker, but once in a while he would ask my suggestions, now, I'll tell you something if you will turn that off.

Q: (Aside) General Wedemeyer told me of his visit to the UK in April 1942 with Gen Marshall and Harry Hopkins, in which Wedemeyer came up with an adverse opinion of General Jim Chaney, as the man not qualified to handle the BOLERO buildup for the Cross-Channel invasion. Of course, Arnold had the same conception when he visited the UK in May 1942, and as we know, Chaney was relieved a month later. (end aside)

W: In my dealing with the senior AF officers in the Far East, I had Chennault, and I had Stratemeyer. Both were good friends; both were loyal to me, and I was loyal to them. I had trouble between LeMay and Chennault. Chennault was a fighter pilot, and LeMay was a bomber, and Chennault's people were stealing gasoline that came over the Hump. We had a tenous line of communications with the outside world. We were completely surrounded as you know.

Q: This is when you had the 20th Bomb Com at Chengtu?

W: Up at Chengtu, yes, they were not under me for operational. I just had administrative, you might say, logistic responsibility. But I think it was Orley, I know that both General Marshall and General Hap Arnold did not have confidence in Chennault. They resented him. Chennault's aide was a Captain named Alsop.

Q: Joseph Alsop.

W: When I went there to take over from Stilwell, Chennault -- and I think with good intentions -- asked me to take Alsop as my aide. I was theater commander, a higher position for him, and he thought very highly of Joe. I didn't know Joe Alsop, I had just met him. But General Marshall was furious when he learned about that because Joe Alsop was related to President Roosevelt, related to both sides of the Roosevelts. He is related to Alice Longworth and related to the other Roosevelts. I didn't take him, I had an aide already, and didn't want to surround myself with any empire building, and Chennault...

Q: Did you distrust Alsop?

W: No, never, the only people... I never distrusted anybody. I should make it clear to you, I'm not that type, but if I had known what I know now about those four political advisors I had over there, Davies, Jack Service, Luddeu, and Emerson, then I would have relieved them. They were my political advisors, I inherited them, but that's the only distrusting that I can be associated with in all my service. That was only after the event. But now, to come back to Alsop and Chennault. Chennault was a fighter pilot, and he didn't want emphasis on the bombers. Also, Chennault had tried, again and again, he told me, to get some Black Widows, we were getting bombed, at night.

Q: The P-61 night fighter.

W: Right, and we couldn't get them. Hap Arnold wouln't give them to us. At least he told me this. People on Hap's staff, or maybe Hap himself, I don't know, and also we wanted to make a bombing raid with all concerted effort. I did, it was my idea, on the Hankow, the focal point of communications.

Q: With B-29s.

W: With everything, everything I had, B-25s, B-29s, the P-47s, everyhing I had. Because they were just building up a big supply place there, warehousing and so forth, so, according to.

end of tape

Part II

Q: You were talking about Hankow.

W: Well, Hankow, was a focal point of Japanese communications, so I wanted to bomb them and retard their progress in the theatre. It worked out that Chennault people had an excellent plan, bringing the 20th Bomber Command. I believe LeMay was commander of the B-29s. K.B. Wolfe was first. Anyway, without any problem at all, we got two squadrons (p. 61) of Widows and we got bombers. Now there's the type of man that Hap was with me. I had no trouble with him at all. He was very cooperative. But all of these Joint Chiefs were. With the Navy, later, I had other problems involved by direct dealing with King. King was very good to me. Of course, Marshall always was. But anyway, so we got permission to use this Bomber Command, but LeMay reported to me two or three times that his gasoline was being stolen. They were doing it down there at Kunming, the terminal. It was supposed to be shipped up there to Chengtu.

Q: They were stealing it for the 14th Air Force. Chennault?

W: Sure, for the fighters and for the B-25s. So I had to get these two men out to my headquarters and resolve it. I reported it to Hap Arnold. I don't know whether there's anything in the files about it, but I just wrote him a nice letter and told him what I had done. I told him that if they couldn't get along I'd have to release both of them, and request that they be brought home.

Q: You mean...

W: LeMay and Chennault. I talked to them in my office. They acted like children. You've got to resolve these things.

Q: Well, this brings up something else, whether you or even Hap Arnold or Marshall could relieve Chennault. And I say this based

on observing a lot of correspondence up at Hyde Park. I was up at Hyde Park, Chennault used to write letters to President Roosevelt.

W: Let me tell this...so when I got there I knew, and I don't know why I think I was told before I even took command of the theater by Marshall, maybe in conversations with George Marshall and with Hap Arnold that--Hap Arnold recognized Chennault as an intrepid leader, a fighter pilot, a good organizer--but they resented the private letters that were written by Joe Alsop to his relatives, you see.

Q: He'd write to the President's secretary, Grace Tully.

W: Sure, I knew her well. Also, when they had a famous meeting here that involved Chennault and Stilwell and some of the British were in on it too, right here in Washington. Roosevelt called it, and Stilwell didn't make a very good impression on Roosevelt at the time. He was not very good. At that time Roosevelt told Chennault to write to him any time he wanted anything. And Chennault was writing direct to the President of the United States, apparently.

Q: I'm sure that General Marshall was unhappy about that?

W: He was, and so was Hap. Don't you see? The President would tell me that. He did, he talked to me. But you know, I wouldn't do it. I had sense enough to know that the President shouldn't do that. I should write, if I do, through General Marshall, who was my Chief on the Chief of Staff level. And I didn't communicate with the President or Harry Hopkins or anybody.

Q: Well, my feeling was that Chennault would not have done that if he didn't have Chiang Kai-shek's support. He knew that...

W: Well, they worshiped him; they just worshiped him. He was a legend over there.

Q: Well, if some other General could not write a letter to the President and bypass all these superiors, without getting fired.

W: When I got there though I was met at the airport at Kunming by Chennault guard of honor and all that. Stilwell went out on the green. He didn't stay there and say, "Wedemeyer, these are people you can trust. This man has these capabilities," etc. It was awfully difficult. He shouldn't have done that. He didn't like being relieved by a man 20 years his junior. I had nothing to do with it, nothing at all. As a matter of fact, I just talked to Barbara Tuchman. Do you know her?

Q: Yes, I was just going to ask you about her book on Stilwell.

W: She is writing a book on Stilwell?

Q: She wrote it.

W: I haven't seen it, but anyway, she's a wonderful writer. I don't know anything about her character. I don't know whether she'll be honest, objective or not. But that Guns of August is one of the finest books written on the war. But, anyway, Barbara Tuchman asked me some questions about it, about my feelings toward Stilwell. I was then Deputy Chief of Staff down under Mountbatten in '43, spring of '44. Stilwell was a Lieutenant General at the time, the commander of the China-Burma Theater--Americans. I could see that he was having trouble. The British didn't like him at all, and he didn't like the British. But they were all four-star people. Mountbatten was. Air Marshal Peirse, all four-star people, so in my contact with Marshall again, I wrote a letter, or maybe I sent him a message--I don't remember. But, anyway, I recommended that Stilwell be made a four-star G neral, and he got it. And, then, to treat me the way he did

about a month later, when he was relieved. I had nothing to do with his trouble with CKS. I thought it was pretty stinking of him. If you'd been coming to relieve me, I'd have felt that, I owed it to him as an American, this fellow here, this American general here. We had a lot of Generals over there and Colonels. You can rely on him to do this. These were Chinese, too. He was supposed to be an expert on the Chinese and he should have done that. I don't know why he didn't do it, but they called him "Vinegar Joe." I didn't know him very well. That's water over the damn. But he was having trouble with Chennault. They didn't speak to one another. Hap knew that. Hap told me about it. Then, there was a man named Bissell who apparently was rather a mysterious man, and a gossipy sort of a man. I don't know. I didn't know Bissell very well.

Q: He got into a lot of trouble later on.

W: I know about that.

Q: But Clayton Bissell was taken out of there, the 10th Air Force.

W: Well, he and Chennault, they hated each other's guts. So it was hard for me to decide what kind of a man Chennault really was. But I'd get something from Marshall, and something from ...., and yet he was one of my principal commanders over there. As a matter of fact, when I got off the plane--as I started to tell you--he said to me: "I was terribly disappointed, Wedemeyer, that I wasn't made theatre commander here."

Q: You had taken the job that Chennault wanted?

W: Yes. He said it right out to me, and I appreciated his frankness. I thought, well, I could work with a guy like that. And

I said: "I had nothing to do with it, General Chennault. You probably know that. I didn't know that General Stilwell was going to be relieved. And anyway...

Q: Why didn't Chennault get the job?

W: They didn't trust him back home. I don't think so. Because, later on, after the operations were moving along successfully in Burma, then Stratemeyer wanted to come over and be with me, be my overall commander, and move another air command. What did they call it?

Q: They called it the Eastern Command, I believe.

W: Anyway, I wrote him, and said I would do all I could to absorb him logistically and support him. And they brought him over. They brought the Tenth Air Force over. And I had the 14th and the 10th over. And Stratemeyer never was brought over, and Chennault then asked to be retired.

Q: Well, Chennault actually retired from the war a month before the war ended?

W: That is correct.

Q: He came back, and this caused great consternation in Washington because there was political dynamite in that.

W: Of course there was, and I was in a spot. You can imagine being in the spot that I was, knowing that all of the innuendoes, nuances, and so forth. Anyway, Chennault retired, and I recommended him for a DSM. He got it, and the Generalissimo gave him the second highest award. I knew it meant a lot to him. But I know that he was very much loved. Then he went into commercial aviation. He asked me to be chairman of the board of an airline he was going into. I

didn't do that. But, at that time, it was difficult for me because it was revealed to me that I was the one.... Neither one of them in my opinion had the ....

Q: Are you talking about Chennault and Stilwell?

W: I'm talking about two men back here, Hap Arnold and General Marshall. Neither one of them would assume responsibility for his relief. Chennault didn't want me to bring Stratemeyer over. He wanted to be made a Lieutenant General. And there I was on the spot knowing that they wouldn't do it for him. Knowing that I couldn't come out and say: "Neither General Marshall and Hap Arnold, don't like you."

Q: That's both Arnold and Marshall.

W: They wanted me to insist upon Stratemeyer coming over, but they didn't want it on the record. And I had to put it on the record.

Q: Is that right? They that Chennault was political dynamite?

G: Well, you see, I didn't. I didn't know it, and that's why, let me finish because I wanted to hear what you were going to say. That is the first time I knew it, the strength that the had politically.

Q: Oh, he had tremendous strength.

W: I didn't know it.

Q: You know that Chennault would write a letter complaining about all the deficiencies. He wasn't getting this--supplies. He wasn't getting planes, pilots and what not. And then Joseph Alsop would write a little buck slip to Grace Tully, and write some chatty note, "I hope you will get this right to the President." I'm guessing now that this letter came right to the President, and the President sent it to Marshall or Arnold and say: "George (or Hap), What shall I do about these complaints?" I'm sure they knew that if they fired Chennault, Generalissimo Chian Kai-shek would be up in arms.

W: The steps they took were tantamount to firing Chennault. Don't you see that they were? You didn't know that before?

Q: No.

W: They were urging me to urge Stratemeyer to come over, and I wasn't particularly, I loved Stratemeyer.

Q: But this was very late in the war?

W: Almost the end of the war.

Q: Was it as a result of Stratemeyer's coming in that Chennault decided to resign from the war?

W: That's what he told me. And I think he was a little disappointed that I didn't fight stronger against it. But I couldn't. I was fighting the two senior men in the service.

Q: It was extremely difficult, the whole situation, the whole CBI area. Let me ask you just one question about Arnold. Of course, Arnold was committed to major concentration upon Europe, getting the invasion going, so Asia, the CBI, was always getting what was left over. Did Arnold do right by you within the limits of his capability?

W: More than right. Never had any question about it. You know, the British were pretty angry because I would take some of their transport planes away. They were American transport planes, and I hauled over one of the Chinese-American trained and equipped divisions over in Burma once, because I was being pushed back by the Japs to such a degree, that I was losing satellite airfields, and I was also in jeopardy of my Kunming terminal. If I had lost that, I would have been in trouble. Incidentally, I interpreted my objective over there, my overall directive, the objective of my directive, to be to contain, to pin down, as many Japanese as I possibly could in the Indochina area, all of which were in my area, and I did that as much as we could. We pinned down 1.2 Japs that might have been employed against MacArthur

elsewhere.

Q: I would say you properly understood your role. It was a strategic holding action, until other actions could be completed and then emphasis would shift. Others wanted to win the war right there, and this wasn't the capability to go in there to win the war.

W: Didn't have the resources.

Q: So I think from your Washington experience you understood the situation.

W: And then, the wonderful training I had over at the German War College.

Q: Right, you understood what was going on and I think some of the others out there did not.

Q: There was another problem. Everybody, all of the VIPs, wanted C-54s for their personal transport. And everybody was importuning Arnold, such as MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek. Now the Chinese wanted transport. They were playing a double game. This is what Barbara Tuchman brings out in her brook, that Chiang Kai-shek was spending more time fighting Communists than he was fighting Japs.

W: This is not fair, very unfair. You couldn't have talked to anybody who really could tell you a bit more about that. Let me give you the big example. They always say that the Yenan communists were encircled by excellent Nationalist troops. So when I got over there, first thing I did, for about a month was try to analyze, to make no changes. Just look around, because I didn't have the benefit of the advice of the top man. And I sent the Chief of Staff home, a classmate of Eisenhower's. He was Chief of Staff to Stilwell. He was getting over to my office about 10 AM and leaving about 4 PM. We were at war. I was getting over there at 7 AM.

Q: Who was that?

W: General Hearn. A nice man, but I sent him home. Tom Hearn, nice fellow and I think we're still friends. I don't know but Marshall didn't bust him, but Marshall brought him back home. Marshall supported me 100 percent. Arnold supported me. No problems. But it's unfair to say that Generalissimo did that, because here's what happened. The Japs were advancing on Kweiling and Kweiling was a focal point in communications. The next hop would be up an escarpment, and on to Kunming and then I would have been out of the war, at least, as any kind of a factor. So I was determined to hold my logistical setup, if I could. And I sold the plan to the Japanese that I was bringing all four of the American-trained divisions back across the Hump, and then I brought two of them back and left two of them over there with Gen. Danny Sulton in Burma. I found out after the war, talking to Okanwra that they thought I brought all four back. They couldn't tell how many planes were coming over. You got them all the time, you know, with troops. We flew them over the Hump, brought them in there, interceded there, put them, blunt, because the Nationalist force that I had, they weren't strong enough to hold them. They would have kept on advancing. But this did block the advance and it saved our situation there. I had trouble with Mountbatten. He was my former chief, here. Because I took some Air Force transport away from him. But everything that I wanted, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff supported me.

Q: Then you disagree with Tuchman?

W: That's why I wanted to tell you. So I told Chiang Kai-shek them I had to have more Chinese troops. So I told him I was going to take these troops away to Hsian. Those were the ones that were

supposed to be.... No problem at all. He'd do anything I asked him to do. That was all. It's so unfortunate, really. Now you're going to say: "Well, General Wedemeyer is biased."

Q: No.

W: My problems over there; I was first an American. I didn't give a damn. But you can belieye me. But she was wrong (Tuchman), and she also heard from my lips what I'm telling you. I'm sorry she did that.

W: It's one of the things that I can sort of see what this Vice President (Agnew) has in mind. It's the effort. You get an idea about an individual; you're going to tear him down. You're going to find information that will do it.

Q: Then you think...

W: I don't think, I know. I know that the man (Chiang) did not do that, I moved those troops. If I didn't move them then you can say, "I think." But I know because I had no opposition. God, it makes me angry, because it's so mean of her to do that. She can criticize me or anybody else, but it's got to be a just criticism. Believe me though, Dr. Green.

Q: I know, General. This is outside my direct interest.

W: I know. I know, because Generalissimo's devotion, dedication, whatever you call it, to Chennault, is involved.

W: She gave the impression that you could stop these advances by airpower. You couldn't.

Q: Well then you reject the Tuchman.... I don't want to ascribe something to Barbara Tuchman until you've read it yourself but I've read....the Tuchman thesis is sympathetic to Stilwell.

W: Mrs. Stilwell got her to do this.

W: If my wife, when I die, gets you to write a book about me you're (interruption). Now, you have to understand my part in getting his fourth star. They made Stilwell right away.

Q: Well the thing just reached an impossible situation when Chiang Kai-shek asked for his relief?

W: Well, that's something else, you know. When I got over there I made up my mind, because I had a press conference every week, that would know all the details. They kept pressing me, they were all pro-Stilwell. Most of them were Left-wingers or liberals. Not all of them. Art Steele of the New York Times wasn't. He was very good. But anyway, a big press conference, about a hundred; TASS Agency was there. From India they had reporters. We had about 20 Americans over there. They had this once a week conference, and I had to go talk to them and to give them whatever information I could. But they were always digging. They wanted to know why. They were against CKS. Stilwell called him "the Peanut." He referred to CKS as "Peanut." I took the attitude--you said something earlier that's just about right--that I was not the senior man, anyway. We had an Ambassador there. In diplomatic or political matters, I had to be in on them because my troops would be going across certain provinces. You're talking about the Communists pinning down a lot of the Nationalist forces. I found that wasn't true. And I found out that the Communists were contributing to the war effort. I'll bet you, when Barbara talks about how they did. I know. I was there, and I have no reason to tell you this. It's so silly and so unfair.

Q: Was Chiang Kai-shek or some of his government, such as Louis King and some of his officers, were they stashing away airplanes and logistics for a post-war period?

W: Well, I'll tell you what I did, when I got over there. As quickly as I could, I organized you might call it an American web, because I was familiar, being a planner back here, with reports coming in, and all this crap coming in from reading the papers, I established a web. In my web--take one quickie--a Chinese division. I had probably an American Major or Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, a few officers, staff officers who knew our staff command procedures, our tactics and techniques. They were equipped with communications. Every Chinese division had that little nucleus of Americans, and what they were, was my "watchdogs," my eyes. And we had a rule. I got it established with the Generalissimo--this was no problem--that they were advisors to the Chinese commander, and if they had any difference as to the tactical employment of the division, then the American would notify me, and the Chinese, he'd be the one to make the final decision. It was his responsibility. He was in command. If he didn't take the American advisor's advice, the American was told to notify me up in Chungking. The other man, when he didn't take the American's advice, was told to notify the Chief of Staff of the Chinese army, Ho Yin Jin. And that way we began to get control of these people in their remote areas. The China theatre was big as the United States. A lot of people don't realize that.

Q: Ho Yin Jin, the Chief of Staff?

W: I had him relieved. The guy who took his place was more amenable.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the decision to take Hansell out of the 20th Air Force and put LeMay in? This was in Saipan, or the Marianas?

W: No. Possum told me that that was Larry Norstad. Norstad was jealous of Hansell. And that happens in the Service. I was supposed, I was told, that I would be Chief of Staff. Joe Collins was the one that got it. Joe Collins was older than I. Of course, I was senior to him because it just happened that I was made Lieutenant General before he was. But those things happen. I don't know whether Joe Collins underminded me or not, but some newspapermen told me he did. Those things happen.

W: Of the two men, I would say Possum Hansell was the better man. I had both of them. I had opportunities to size up both of them. They're both friends of mine.

Q: Hansell was a great intellect and a planner?

W: Creative, imaginative.

Q: Was he as good a combat leader as LeMay?

W: There were very few in the Air Force who were better commanders, practical men than LeMay. He knew how to handle men, to inspire them. I would say that he was better than Larry or Possum. I don't believe there was anybody better.

Q: I think Arnold made his decision simply that Hansell might do an adequate job and LeMay would do a superb job, and he simply made that hard decision.

W: Well, I don't know. I think Larry Norstad hurt Possum some way or other, some report that he made out. At least, that's what Possum tells me. Possum doesn't feel bitter about it.

Q: No. I had a talk at great length with him.

W: He's an awfully nice man.

Q: He's a marvelous man.

W: He's a big man, you know. He doesn't dispute whether he would have been the better commander. I really liked him better than Larry. Larry is brilliant, too, smart as hell. They're both good friends of mine.

W: Marshall, I think equally, may be cooperatively determined that Chennault would not be given the high command as theatre commander No. 1, when that opportunity developed but still was relieved. He had no idea. He told me so. And then the other thing was that they wanted Chennault out of there. He refused to serve under Stratemeyer. And how they knew that, I don't know. He didn't tell me.

Q: Bill Streett was very close to Arnold. You know, he and Arnold were very close. Mrs. Streett, Mary Streett and Bea Arnold were very close. This contributed to that.

W: I thought that Bill Streett was just terrific.

Q: Well, he was a planner there for a while, wasn't he?

W: Yes, and he was one of the men that I would show what I was doing, too.

Q: He was in Lovett's office for a while. Did you have any knowledge of Lovett's relationship with Arnold?

W: No, I didn't. I don't know what his relationship was. I know that Lovett was a great admire, almost worshipped Marshall.

Q: I have been told that Lovett was sort of a balance wheel in Arnold's office. Arnold was an impulsive man. He made a lot of decisions, sometimes shot from the hipe and Lovett was the kind of a guy who sometimes got him back on keel.

W: He was very much like Jeff Keys was in Patton's command. Jeff Keys was a sort of a balance wheel.

Q: Patton, too, was an impulsive man.

Q: What about McNarney?

W: He was a dour Scotchman. I never knew anyone for whom that applied more. He was terrific: But he was--I think he deserved a great deal of credit for reorganizing, temporarily, at least, the War Department. They created War Plans Division. I had Strategy and Policy. Ed Hull had Operations. We would make the plan. Then they would decide the elements to into the units, and so forth, to go into the plans.

Q: You were in the middle of--let me tell you something that you may not know. Right after Pearl Harbor there was an intensive campaign among air zealots. These were the guys who were pushing for a separate Air Force.

W: That was no time to do it.

Q: Right. That was not time to do it, but a fellow like Knerr was doing it and he was pushing his mentor, Andrews, toward getting Congressmen to submit a bill and get a separate Air Force. Now McNarney was given the job of giving all the Army Air Forces autonomy within the War Department. So this reorganization which came into effect on March 9, 1942, elevated the AAF to equality with the AAF under McNair and the ASF under Brehon Somervell. So they got <u>de facto</u> autonomy. Well, Knerr wrote a letter to Andrews, and said: "Arnold has betrayed us," in the sense that he blamed Arnold for this half-way plan which gave the Army Air Forces equality, but not autonomy. McNarney is the guy who did it, helped by Gil Harrison and Kuter. They were the ones that put this plan together. Did you have any part in it?

W: Oh yes. He had another man named Olson, wasn't it? Swedish or Scandinavian name.

Q: Was it Nelson?

W: Yes, Otto Nelson.

W: McNarney called me and asked--just like I was called in to Pearl Harbor and asked to meet Admiral Richardson and Justice Owen Roberts, all those people, just to appear as a witness.

Q: Were you aware that this move was intended to take the wind out of the sails of the separate Air Force group?

W: You know I never felt that that had any credence. I felt that there were a few. I recognized, in the Army, when people become so imbued, so enthusiastic, and they make extravagant claims for their ideas. They ought to have this and this. But this bothered me, and I always felt they were people who were emotionally very excitable people, and it didn't bother me. The people whose feet were on the ground, by and large, they didn't want that to happen right away. The Air Force ones that I talked to, Kuter, for example, never pulled that on me or Hal George. They were very confidential with me. They all talked very confidentially with me. Now, they may have talked otherwise to other people. But they knew that they could trust me. We talked about the Army and about the units that they would get. They confided in me when they didn't agree with Hap, and stuff like that. But it wasn't disloyal; it wasn't emotional.

Q: McNarney was Marshall's agent.

W: McNarney said to me, "It's inevitable, Al." And I said: "Of course, it is Joe, but I agree with you that this should be done in increments, by steps." That's the way he talked to me. He was an

Air Force officer, McNarney.

Q: But he was a team fighter, too. Marshall gave him many jobs.

W: Damn right he was. And most of them were. Now, in retrospect you can dig up this Barbara Tuchman doing things.... We all make mistakes. I've made some serious ones. One thing I'll tell you something about jealousy in the service. Before the war began, I had gone to the German War College. In using the pronoun "I" a lot, with you.

Q: That's all right.

W: But I have to give you examples. I'd come back from Germany. I had written a fine report. I do say it was fine, a very comprehensive report of my experiences over there for two and a half years. It was a very good experience for me. Among other things I served with German troops in the field during the summer. Between the first and second year, I served in the Panzer Abwehr--a title which means an anti-tank battalion, in the field. Then I wrote up a report on the anti-tank battalion. We didn't have any anti-tank battalions in the U.S. Army. So then I came back and they were going to send me to Ft. Leavenworth as an instructor. I asked to be sent to Ft. Benning to be with troops because I had been away from troops for many years. And they did that. They were very nice to me about it. Then I was down in Ft. Benning for a year, and they brought me up here in the Spring of 1940. I was brought to the Chief of Infantry's office, and I was writing a regulation for an anti-tank battalion--the first U.S. anti-tank battalion. We were going to have equipment, organization and tactics, technique and all that. I was in my office one day, and I was sent for by General Marshall. He was Chief of Staff. I didn't like my

Chief of Infantry. His name was Lynch, great big blustery sort of fellow, with a mustache. Huge--as tall as I am or bigger. Anyway, I didn't know what General Marshall was going to talk to me about, although I knew that he had read my report on my experience in Germany, and liked it very much. I knew that. So he said: "Wedemeyer, I've got a problem. I'd like to get your help." This is the Chief of Staff talking to a Major. So I said: "Yes sir." He said: "We're developing tanks, as you know, in great quantities, and in increased quantities. The Chief of Infantry, your Chief feels that they are an Infantry weapon--that they should furnish close fire support to the Infantry, at the cadence of the advance of Infantry." Marshall said General Herr said: "The Chief of Cavalry says he'll resign if that's the way it's going to be."

Q: Johnny Herr?

W: Yes, I didn't know him. All these were older men than I, but Herr said he was going to resign if they don't give him the tanks, the development of the tanks, and the development of the technique, tactics, also the development of the equipment. They think it's mobile firepower supplanting the mobility of the horse, etc. And Marshall said that was the situation. "They are both very much wrought up about it, both the Infantry ranks and their Chief, and the Cavalry Branch and their Chief." So he said: "What would you recommend that I do?" I said: "I'd create a separate corps, sir, an armored corps. That's what the Germans have got." You know, he did it. Nobody knows that story. I had to go back to my old Chief, you know, and sit there. And Herr did resign. He asked for retirement. They created the Armored Corps at Ft. Knox. A fellow named Chaffee.

Q: Adna Chafee...

W: I think he died prematurely. So then I think Jakie Devers made his reputation. He doesn't know this story, but that's exactly what happened. Now listen. About a week went by and my Chief sent for me. General Lynch sent for me. He said: "Sit down." I sat down. He was walking back and forth like a lion. Since he didn't sit down himself I stood up. That's the way I was brought up. He said, "I said 'Sit down!'" So I sat down. He said, "Wedemeyer, the god damn General Staff, what do you think they're going to do?" And I said: "I don't know, sir." He said, "They're going to take the tanks away from the Infantry. What do you think about that?" Before I had a chance to answer he blubbered out something like, "The Germans wouldn't do anything like that, would they?" And then he answered. So I kept quiet.

Q: One reason I told you this story about Knerr and his resentment about this McNarney plan was that it also proves that Arnold at that time was a player.

W: I told you I never heard him say anything against the setup.

Q: And it removes any vestige of a possibility that Arnold would run around the end, and give the thing to the Chicago Tribune because he felt a resentment the War Department was not being fair to the Air Corps. So this is why I say that Waldrop, in respect to Arnold, lies. That's my honest opinion.

W: It looks very much like that. From the information you've given me. I didn't have all that information. It's going to help an awful lot.

W: It's a fascinating experience.

Q: I want to ask you one more question--Arnold and Lindbergh. Have you seen the Lindbergh Journals? They're just out.

W: No. He and I are good friends.

Q: Arnold had great admiration for Lindbergh. He gave him a lot of jobs.

W: For good reason.

Q: And Lindbergh became personna non grata to the Roosevelt Administration, and Arnold was in a difficult situation.

W: Because he was "America Firster" and made those speeches.

Q: Right. Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Lindbergh in the pre-war period? Or during the war period? Lindbergh actually flew combat missions during the war as a civilian. I have two hand-written letters by Lindbergh to Arnold in 1938 when he came back from Germany. He reported on the German Air Force and said it was a tremendous Air Force, and it was an accurate report.

W: That's when I met Lindbergh. I was sent along to be his interpreter.

Q: Were you at the meeting when he got the medal from Goering?

W: Yes, Goering.

Q: He says in his book that he received it. He downrates the experience.

W: He does everything. I just saw him the other day. He asked me to lunch--I couldn't go, but I did meet because I wanted to talk to him at the Army & Navy Club the other day.

Q: Do you think he would talk to me about Arnold? Lindbergh doesn't like to talk to outsiders? Do you get to see him frequently?

W: No, not frequently. He's been out to my farm, and we're friends. I mentioned it in my book.

Q: Yes, I know. That's one reason I asked.

W: And I like her, too.

Q: Could I ask a favor? The next time you see him, would you ask him if he would see me?

W: I don't like to do it that way. I can do it faster. John Chamberlain, who's a very close friend. He was just down to my house. We were talking about Lindbergh's book. I know I'm getting an autographed copy of it.

Q: I've just read it and there are 15 or 20 references to Hap Arnold. He had a respect for Arnold, and Arnold had a respect for him. But their relationship was hampered because Arnold was working for Roosevelt, and he couldn't get too close to Lindbergh.

W: I'll ask John Chamberlain. Mrs. Chamberlain and Mrs. Lindbergh are together all the time. They are very close friends. John lives up there. Do you know John Chamberlain?

Q: No. I know of him.

W: A fine writer.

Q: I didn't want to write Lindbergh, because if I got a "no" that would be it.

W: I can ask John to tell Lindbergh that you are interested in talking to him about Hap Arnold, and you're writing a biography. Is it a biography?

Q: Yes sir.

Q: You were talking about Hankow.

W: Well, Hankow, was a focal point of Japanese communications, so I wanted to bomb them and retard their progress in the theatre. It worked out that Chennault's people had an excellent plan, bringing the 20th Bomber Command. I believe LeMay was commander of the B-29s. K.B. Wolfe was first. Anyway, without any problem at all, we got two squadrons (p. 61) of Widows and we got bombers. Now there's the type of man that Hap was with me. I had no trouble with him at all. He was very cooperative. But all of these Joint Chiefs were. With the Navy, later, I had other problems involved by direct dealing with King. King was very good to me. Of course, Marshall always was. But anyway, so we got permission to use this Bomber Command, but LeMay reported to me two or three times that his gasoline was being stolen. They were doing it down there at Kunming, the terminal. It was supposed to be shipped up there to Chengtu.

Q: They were stealing it for the 14th Air Force. Chennault?

W: Sure, for the fighters and for the B-25s. So I had to get these two men out to my headquarters and resolve it. I reported it to Hap Arnold. I don't know whether there's anything in the files about it, but I just wrote him a nice letter and told him what I had done. I told him that if they couldn't get along I'd have to release both of them, and request that they be brought home.

Q: You mean...

W: LeMay and Chennault. I talked to them in my office. They acted like children. You've got to resolve these things.

Q: Well, this brings up something else, whether you or even Hap Arnold or Marshall could relieve Chennault. And I say this based

on observing a lot of correspondence up at Hyde Park. I was up at Hyde Park, Chennault used to write letters to President Roosevelt.

W: Let me tell this...so when I got there I knew, and I don't know why I think I was told before I even took command of the theater by Marshall, maybe in conversations with George Marshall and with Hap Arnold that--Hap Arnold recognized Chennault as an intrepid leader, a fighter pilot, a good organizer--but they resented the private letters that were written by Joe Alsop to his relatives, you see.

Q: He'd write to the President's secretary, Grace Tully.

W: Sure, I knew her well. Also, when they had a famous meeting here that involved Chennault and Stilwell and some of the British were in on it too, right here in Washington. Roosevelt called it, and Stilwell didn't make a very good impression on Roosevelt at the time. He was not very good. At that time Roosevelt told Chennault to write to him any time he wanted anything. And Chennault was writing direct to the President of the United States, apparently.

Q: I'm sure that General Marshall was unhappy about that?

W: He was, and so was Hap. Don't you see? The President would tell me that. He did, he talked to me. But you know, I wouldn't do it. I had sense enough to know that the President shouldn't do that. I should write, if I do, through General Marshall, who was my Chief on the Chief of Staff level. And I didn't communicate with the President or Harry Hopkins or anybody.

Q: Well, my feeling was that Chennault would not have done that if he didn't have Chiang Kai-shek's support. He knew that...

W: Well, they worshiped him; they just worshiped him. He was a legend over there.

Q: Well, if some other General could not write a letter to the President and bypass all these superiors, without getting fired.

W: When I got there though I was met at the airport at Kunming by Chennault guard of honor and all that. Stilwell went out on the green. He didn't stay there and say, "Wedemeyer, these are people you can trust. This man has these capabilities," etc. It was awfully difficult. He shouldn't have done that. He didn't like being relieved by a man 20 years his junior. I had nothing to do with it, nothing at all. As a matter of fact, I just talked to Barbara Tuchman. Do you know her?

Q: Yes, I was just going to ask you about her book on Stilwell.

W: She is writing a book on Stilwell?

Q: She wrote it.

W: I haven't seen it, but anyway, she's a wonderful writer. I don't know anything about her character. I don't know whether she'll be honest, objective or not. But that Guns of August is one of the finest books written on the war. But, anyway, Barbara Tuchman asked me some questions about it, about my feelings toward Stilwell. I was then Deputy Chief of Staff down under Mountbatten in '43, spring of '44. Stilwell was a Lieutenant General at the time, the commander of the China-Burma Theater--Americans. I could see that he was having trouble. The British didn't like him at all, and he didn't like the British. But they were all four-star people. Mountbatten was. Air MarshallPeirse, all four-star people, so in my contact with Marshall again, I wrote a letter, or maybe I sent him a message--I don't remember. But, anyway, I recommended that Stilwell be made a four-star G neral, and he got it. And, then, to treat me the way he did

about a month later, when he was relieved. I had nothing to do with his trouble with CKS. I thought it was pretty stinking of him. If you'd been coming to relieve me, I'd have felt that, I owed it to him as an American, this fellow here, this American general here. We had a lot of Generals over there and Colonels. You can rely on him to do this. These were Chinese, too. He was supposed to be an expert on the Chinese and he should have done that. I don't know why he didn't do it, but they called him "Vinegar Joe." I didn't know him very well. That's water over the damn. But he was having trouble with Chennault. They didn't speak to one another. Hap knew that. Hap told me about it. Then, there was a man named Bissell who apparently was rather a mysterious man, and a gossipy sort of a man. I don't know. I didn't know Bissell very well.

Q: He got into a lot of trouble later on.

W: I know about that.

Q: But Clayton Bissell was taken out of there, the 10th Air Force.

W: Well, he and Chennault, they hated each other's guts. So it was hard for me to decide what kind of a man Chennault really was. But I'd get something from Marshall, and something from ...., and yet he was one of my principal commanders over there. As a matter of fact, when I got off the plane--as I started to tell you--he said to me: "I was terribly disappointed, Wedemeyer, that I wasn't made theatre commander here."

Q: You had taken the job that Chennault wanted?

W: Yes. He said it right out to me, and I appreciated his frankness. I thought, well, I could work with a guy like that. And

I said: "I had nothing to do with it, General Chennault. You probably know that. I didn't know that General Stilwell was going to be relieved. And anyway...

Q: Why didn't Chennault get the job?

W: They didn't trust him back home. I don't think so. Because, later on, after the operations were moving along successfully in Burma, then Stratemeyer wanted to come over and be with me, be my overall commander, and move another air command. What did they call it?

Q: They called it the Eastern Command, I believe.

W: Anyway, I wrote him, and said I would do all I could to absorb him logistically and support him. And they brought him over. They brought the Tenth Air Force over. And I had the 14th and the 10th over. And Stratemeyer never was brought over, and Chennault then asked to be retired.

Q: Well, Chennault actually retired from the war a month before the war ended?

W: That is correct.

Q: He came back, and this caused great consternation in Washington because there was political dynamite in that.

W: Of course there was, and I was in a spot. You can imagine being in the spot that I was, knowing that all of the innuendoes, nuances, and so forth. Anyway, Chennault retired, and I recommended him for a DSM. He got it, and the Generalissimo gave him the second highest award. I knew it meant a lot to him. But I know that he was very much loved. Then he went into commercial aviation. He asked me to be chairman of the board of an airline he was going into. I

didn't do that. But, at that time, it was difficult for me because it was revealed to me that I was the one.... Neither one of them in my opinion had the ....

Q: Are you talking about Chennault and Stilwell?

W: I'm talking about two men back here, Hap Arnold and General Marshall. Neither one of them would assume responsibility for his relief. Chennault didn't want me to bring Stratemeyer over. He wanted to be made a Lieutenant General. And there I was on the spot knowing that they wouldn't do it for him. Knowing that I couldn't come out and say: "Neither General Marshall and Hap Arnold, don't like you."

Q: That's both Arnold and Marshall.

W: They wanted me to insist upon Stratemeyer coming over, but they didn't want it on the record. And I had to put it on the record.

Q: Is that right? They that Chennault was political dynamite?

G: Well, you see, I didn't. I didn't know it, and that's why, let me finish because I wanted to hear what you were going to say. That is the first time I knew it, the strength that the had politically.

Q: Oh, he had tremendous strength.

W: I didn't know it.

Q: You know that Chennault would write a letter complaining about all the deficiencies. He wasn't getting this--supplies. He wasn't getting planes, pilots and what not. And then Joseph Alsop would write a little buck slip to Grace Tully, and write some chatty note, "I hope you will get this right to the President." I'm guessing now that this letter came right to the President, and the President sent it to Marshall or Arnold and say: "George (or Hap), What shall I do about these complaints?" I'm sure they knew that if they fired Chennault, Generalissimo Chian Kai-shek would be up in arms.

W: The steps they took were tantamount to firing Chennault. Don't you see that they were? You didn't know that before?

Q: No.

W: They were urging me to urge Stratemeyer to come over, and I wasn't particularly, I loved Stratemeyer.

Q: But this was very late in the war?

W: Almost the end of the war.

Q: Was it as a result of Stratemeyer's coming in that Chennault decided to resign from the war?

W: That's what he told me. And I think he was a little disappointed that I didn't fight stronger against it. But I couldn't. I was fighting the two senior men in the service.

Q: It was extremely difficult, the whole situation, the whole CBI area. Let me ask you just one question about Arnold. Of course, Arnold was committed to major concentration upon Europe, getting the invasion going, so Asia, the CBI, was always getting what was left over. Did Arnold do right by you within the limits of his capability?

W: More than right. Never had any question about it. You know, the British were pretty angry because I would take some of their transport planes away. They were American transport planes, and I hauled over one of the Chinese-American trained and equipped divisions over in Burma once, because I was being pushed back by the Japs to such a degree, that I was losing satellite airfields, and I was also in jeopardy of my Kunming terminal. If I had lost that, I would have been in trouble. Incidentally, I interpreted my objective over there, my overall directive, the objective of my directive, to be to contain, to pin down, as many Japanese as I possibly could in the Indochina area, all of which were in my area, and I did that as much as we could. We pinned down 1.2 Japs that might have been employed against MacArthur

elsewhere.

Q: I would say you properly understood your role. It was a strategic holding action, until other actions could be completed and then emphasis would shift. Others wanted to win the war right there, and this wasn't the capability to go in there to win the war.

W: Didn't have the resources.

Q: So I think from your Washington experience you understood the situation.

W: And then, the wonderful training I had over at the German War College.

Q: Right, you understood what was going on and I think some of the others out there did not.

Q: There was another problem. Everybody, all of the VIPs, wanted C-54s for their personal transport. And everybody was importuning Arnold, such as MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek. Now the Chinese wanted transport. They were playing a double game. This is what Barbara Tuchman brings out in her brook, that Chiang Kai-shek was spending more time fighting Communists than he was fighting Japs.

W: This is not fair, very unfair. You couldn't have talked to anybody who really could tell you a bit more about that. Let me give you the big example. They always say that the Yenan communists were encircled by excellent Nationalist troops. So when I got over there, first thing I did, for about a month was try to analyze, to make no changes. Just look around, because I didn't have the benefit of the advice of the top man. And I sent the Chief of Staff home, a classmate of Eisenhower's. He was Chief of Staff to Stilwell. He was getting over to my office about 10 AM and leaving about 4 PM. We were at war. I was getting over there at 7 AM.

Q: Who was that?

W: General Hearn. A nice man, but I sent him home. Tom Hearn, nice fellow and I think we're still friends. I don't know but Marshall didn't bust him, but Marshall brought him back home. Marshall supported me 100 percent. Arnold supported me. No problems. But it's unfair to say that Generalissimo did that, because here's what happened. The Japs were advancing on Kweiling and Kweiling was a focal point in communications. The next hop would be up an escarpment, and on to Kunming and then I would have been out of the war, at least, as any kind of a factor. So I was determined to hold my logistical setup, if I could. And I sold the plan to the Japanese that I was bringing all four of the American-trained divisions back across the Hump, and then I brought two of them back and left two of them over there with Gen. Danny Sulton in Burma. I found out after the war, talking to Okanwra that they thought I brought all four back. They couldn't tell how many planes were coming over. You got them all the time, you know, with troops. We flew them over the Hump, brought them in there, interceded there, put them, blunt, because the Nationalist force that I had, they weren't strong enough to hold them. They would have kept on advancing. But this did block the advance and it saved our situation there. I had trouble with Mountbatten. He was my former chief, here. Because I took some Air Force transport away from him. But everything that I wanted, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff supported me.

Q: Then you disagree with Tuchman?

W: That's why I wanted to tell you. So I told Chiang Kai-shek them I had to have more Chinese troops. So I told him I was going to take these troops away to Hsian. Those were the ones that were

supposed to be.... No problem at all. He'd do anything I asked him to do. That was all. It's so unfortunate, really, Now you're going to say: "Well, General Wedemeyer is biased."

Q: No.

W: My problems over there; I was first an American. I didn't give a damn. But you can believe me. But she was wrong (Tuchman), and she also heard from my lips what I'm telling you. I'm sorry she did that.

W: It's one of the things that I can sort of see what this Vice President (Agnew) has in mind. It's the effort. You get an idea about an individual; you're going to tear him down. You're going to find information that will do it.

Q: Then you think...

W: I don't think, I know. I know that the man (Chiang) did not do that, I moved those troops. If I didn't move them then you can say, "I think." But I know because I had no opposition. God, it makes me angry, because it's so mean of her to do that. She can criticize me or anybody else, but it's got to be a just criticism. Believe me though, Dr. Green.

Q: I know, General. This is outside my direct interest.

W: I know. I know, because Generalissimo's devotion, dedication, whatever you call it, to Chennault, is involved.

W: She gave the impression that you could stop these advances by airpower. You couldn't.

Q: Well then you reject the Tuchman.... I don't want to ascribe something to Barbara Tuchman until you've read it yourself but I've read....the Tuchman thesis is sympathetic to Stilwell.

W: Mrs. Stilwell got her to do this.

W: If my wife, when I die, gets you to write a book about me you're (interruption). Now, you have to understand my part in getting his fourth star. They made Stilwell right away.

Q: Well the thing just reached an impossible situation when Chiang Kai-shek asked for his relief?

W: Well, that's something else, you know. When I got over there I made up my mind, because I had a press conference every week, that would know all the details. They kept pressing me, they were all pro-Stilwell. Most of them were Left-wingers or liberals. Not all of them. Art Steele of the New York Times wasn't. He was very good. But anyway, a big press conference, about a hundred; TASS Agency was there. From India they had reporters. We had about 20 Americans over there. They had this once a week conference, and I had to go talk to them and to give them whatever information I could. But they were always digging. They wanted to know why. They were against CKS. Stilwell called him "the Peanut." He referred to CKS as "Peanut." I took the attitude--you said something earlier that's just about right--that I was not the senior man, anyway. We had an Ambassador there. In diplomatic or political matters, I had to be in on them because my troops would be going across certain provinces. You're talking about the Communists pinning down a lot of the Nationalist forces. I found that wasn't true. And I found out that the Communists were contributing to the war effort. I'll bet you, when Barbara talks about how they did. I know. I was there, and I have no reason to tell you this. It's so silly and so unfair.

Q: Was Chiang Kai-shek or some of his government, such as Louis King and some of his officers, were they stashing away airplanes and logistics for a post-war period?

W: Well, I'll tell you what I did, when I got over there. As quickly as I could, I organized you might call it an American web, because I was familiar, being a planner back here, with reports coming in, and all this crap coming in from reading the papers, I established a web. In my web--take one quickie--a Chinese division. I had probably an American Major or Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, a few officers, staff officers who knew our staff command procedures, our tactics and techniques. They were equipped with communications. Every Chinese division had that little nucleus of Americans, and what they were, was my "watchdogs," my eyes. And we had a rule. I got it established with the Generalissimo--this was no problem--that they were advisors to the Chinese commander, and if they had any difference as to the tactical employment of the division, then the American would notify me, and the Chinese, he'd be the one to make the final decision. It was his responsibility. He was in command. If he didn't take the American advisor's advice, the American was told to notify me up in Chungking. The other man, when he didn't take the American's advice, was told to notify the Chief of Staff of the Chinese army, Ho Yin Jin. And that way we began to get control of these people in their remote areas. The China theatre was big as the United States. A lot of people don't realize that.

Q: Ho Yin Jin, the Chief of Staff?

W: I had him relieved. The guy who took his place was more amenable.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the decision to take Hansell out of the 20th Air Force and put LeMay in? This was in Saipan, or the Marianas?

W: No. Possum told me that that was Larry Norstad. Norstad was jealous of Hansell. And that happens in the Service. I was supposed, I was told, that I would be Chief of Staff. Joe Collins was the one that got it. Joe Collins was older than I. Of course, I was senior to him because it just happened that I was made Lieutenant General before he was. But those things happen. I don't know whether Joe Collins underminded me or not, but some newspapermen told me he did. Those things happen.

W: Of the two men, I would say Possum Hansell was the better man. I had both of them. I had opportunities to size up both of them. They're both friends of mine.

Q: Hansell was a great intellect and a planner?

W: Creative, imaginative.

Q: Was he as good a combat leader as LeMay?

W: There were very few in the Air Force who were better commanders, practical men than LeMay. He knew how to handle men, to inspire them. I would say that he was better than Larry or Possum. I don't believe there was anybody better.

Q: I think Arnold made his decision simply that Hansell might do an adequate job and LeMay would do a superb job, and he simply made that hard decision.

W: Well, I don't know. I think Larry Norstad hurt Possum some way or other, some report that he made out. At least, that's what Possum tells me. Possum doesn't feel bitter about it.

Q: No. I had a talk at great length with him.

W: He's an awfully nice man.

Q: He's a marvelous man.

W: He's a big man, you know. He doesn't dispute whether he would have been the better commander. I really liked him better than Larry. Larry is brilliant, too, smart as hell. They're both good friends of mine.

W: Marshall, I think equally, may be cooperatively determined that Chennault would not be given the high command as theatre commander No. 1, when that opportunity developed but still was relieved. He had no idea. He told me so. And then the other thing was that they wanted Chennault out of there. He refused to serve under Stratemeyer. And how they knew that, I don't know. He didn't tell me.

Q: Bill Streett was very close to Arnold. You know, he and Arnold were very close. Mrs. Streett, Mary Streett and Bea Arnold were very close. This contributed to that.

W: I thought that Bill Streett was just terrific.

Q: Well, he was a planner there for a while, wasn't he?

W: Yes, and he was one of the men that I would show what I was doing, too.

Q: He was in Lovett's office for a while. Did you have any knowledge of Lovett's relationship with Arnold?

W: No, I didn't. I don't know what his relationship was. I know that Lovett was a great admire, almost worshipped Marshall.

Q: I have been told that Lovett was sort of a balance wheel in Arnold's office. Arnold was an impulsive man. He made a lot of decisions, sometimes shot from the hipe and Lovett was the kind of a guy who sometimes got him back on keel.

W: He was very much like Jeff Keys was in Patton's command. Jeff Keys was a sort of a balance wheel.

Q: Patton, too, was an impulsive man.

Q: What about McNarney?

W: He was a dour Scotchman. I never knew anyone for whom that applied more. He was terrific. But he was--I think he deserved a great deal of credit for reorganizing, temporarily, at least, the War Department. They created War Plans Division. I had Strategy and Policy. Ed Hull had Operations. We would make the plan. Then they would decide the elements to into the units, and so forth, to go into the plans.

Q: You were in the middle of--let me tell you something that you may not know. Right after Pearl Harbor there was an intensive campaign among air zealots. These were the guys who were pushing for a separate Air Force.

W: That was no time to do it.

Q: Right. That was not time to do it, but a fellow like Knerr was doing it and he was pushing his mentor, Andrews, toward getting Congressmen to submit a bill and get a separate Air Force. Now McNarney was given the job of giving all the Army Air Forces autonomy within the War Department. So this reorganization which came into effect on March 9, 1942, elevated the AAF to equality with the AAF under McNair and the ASF under Brehon Somervell. So they got <u>de facto</u> autonomy. Well, Knerr wrote a letter to Andrews, and said: "Arnold has betrayed us," in the sense that he blamed Arnold for this half-way plan which gave the Army Air Forces equality, but not autonomy. McNarney is the guy who did it, helped by Gil Harrison and Kuter. They were the ones that put this plan together. Did you have any part in it?

W: Oh yes. He had another man named Olson, wasn't it? Swedish or Scandinavian name.

Q: Was it Nelson?

W: Yes, Otto Nelson.

W: McNarney called me and asked--just like I was called in to Pearl Harbor and asked to meet Admiral Richardson and Justice Owen Roberts, all those people, just to appear as a witness.

Q: Were you aware that this move was intended to take the wind out of the sails of the separate Air Force group?

W: You know I never felt that that had any credence. I felt that there were a few. I recognized, in the Army, when people become so imbued, so enthusiastic, and they make extravagant claims for their ideas. They ought to have this and this. But this bothered me, and I always felt they were people who were emotionally very excitable people, and it didn't bother me. The people whose feet were on the ground, by and large, they didn't want that to happen right away. The Air Force ones that I talked to, Kuter, for example, never pulled that oneme or Hal George. They were very confidential with me. They all talked very confidentially with me. Now, they may have talked otherwise to other people. But they knew that they could trust me. We talked about the Army and about the units that they would get. They confided in me when they didn't agree with Hap, and stuff like that. But it wasn't disloyal; it wasn't emotional.

Q: McNarney was Marshall's agent.

W: McNarney said to me, "It's inevitable, Al." And I said: "Of course, it is Joe, but I agree with you that this should be done in increments, by steps." That's the way he talked to me. He was an

Air Force officer, McNarney.

Q: But he was a team fighter, too. Marshall gave him many jobs.

W: Damn right he was. And most of them were. Now, in retrospect you can dig up this Barbara Tuchman doing things.... We all make mistakes. I've made some serious ones. One thing I'll tell you something about jealousy in the service. Before the war began, I had gone to the German War College. In using the pronoun "I" a lot, with you.

Q: That's all right.

W: But I have to give you examples. I'd come back from Germany. I had written a fine report. I do say it was fine, a very comprehensive report of my experiences over there for two and a half years. It was a very good experience for me. Among other things I served with German troops in the field during the summer. Between the first and second year, I served in the Panzer Abwehr--a title which means an anti-tank battalion, in the field. Then I wrote up a report on the anti-tank battalion. We didn't have any anti-tank battalions in the U.S. Army. So then I came back and they were going to send me to Ft. Leavenworth as an instructor. I asked to be sent to Ft. Benning to be with troops because I had been away from troops for many years. And they did that. They were very nice to me about it. Then I was down in Ft. Benning for a year, and they brought me up here in the Spring of 1940. I was brought to the Chief of Infantry's office, and I was writing a regulation for an anti-tank battalion--the first U.S. anti-tank battalion. We were going to have equipment, organization and tactics, technique and all that. I was in my office one day, and I was sent for by General Marshall. He was Chief of Staff. I didn't like my

Chief of Infantry. His name was Lynch, great big blustery sort of fellow, with a mustache. Huge--as tall as I am or bigger. Anyway, I didn't know what General Marshall was going to talk to me about, although I knew that he had read my report on my experience in Germany, and liked it very much. I knew that. So he said: "Wedemeyer, I've got a problem. I'd like to get your help." This is the Chief of Staff talking to a Major. So I said: "Yes sir." He said: "We're developing tanks, as you know, in great quantities, and in increased quantities. The Chief of Infantry, your Chief feels that they are an Infantry weapon--that they should furnish close fire support to the Infantry, at the cadence of the advance of Infantry." Marshall said General Herr said: "The Chief of Cavalry says he'll resign if that's the way it's going to be."

Q: Johnny Herr?

W: Yes, Iddidn't know him. All these were older men than I, but Herr said he was going to resign if they don't give him the tanks, the development of the tanks, and the development of the technique, tactics, also the development of the equipment. They think it's mobile firepower supplanting the mobility of the horse, etc. And Marshall said that was the situation. "They are both very much wrought up about it, both the Infantry ranks and their Chief, and the Cavalry Branch and their Chief." So he said: "What would you recommend that I do?" I said: "I'd create a separate corps, sir, an armored corps. That's what the Germans have got." You know, he did it. Nobody knows that story. I had to go back to my old Chief, you know, and sit there. And Herr did resign. He asked for retirement. They created the Armored Corps at Ft. Knox. A fellow named Chaffee.

Q: Adna Chafee...

W: I think he died prematurely. So then I think Jakie Devers made his reputation. He doesn't know this story, but that's exactly what happened. Now listen. About a week went by and my Chief sent for me. General Lynch sent for me. He said: "Sit down." I sat down. He was walking back and forth like a lion. Since he didn't sit down himself I stood up. That's the way I was brought up. He said, "I said 'Sit down!'" So I sat down. He said, "Wedemeyer, the god damn General Staff, what do you think they're going to do?" And I said: "I don't know, sir." He said, "They're going to take the tanks away from the Infantry." What do you think about that?" Before I had a chance to answer he blubbered out something like, "The Germans wouldn't do anything like that, would they?" And then he answered. So I kept quiet.

Q: One reason I told you this story about Knerr and his resentment about this McNarney plan was that it also proves that Arnold at that time was a player.

W: I told you I never heard him say anything against the setup.

Q: And it removes any vestige of a possibility that Arnold would run around the end, and give the thing to the Chicago Tribune because he felt a resentment the War Department was not being fair to the Air Corps. So this is why I say that Waldrop, in respect to Arnold, lies. That's my honest opinion.

W: It looks very much like that. From the information you've given me. I didn't have all that information. It's going to help an awful lot.

W: It's a fascinating experience.

Q: I want to ask you one more question--Arnold and Lindbergh. Have you seen the Lindbergh Journals? They're just out.

W: No. He and I are good friends.

Q: Arnold had great admiration for Lindbergh. He gave him a lot of jobs.

W: For good reason.

Q: And Lindbergh became personna non grata to the Roosevelt Administration, and Arnold was in a difficult situation.

W: Because he was "America Firster" and made those speeches.

Q: Right. Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Lindbergh in the pre-war period? Or during the war period? Lindbergh actually flew combat missions during the war as a civilian. I have two hand-written letters by Lindbergh to Arnold in 1938 when he came back from Germany. He reported on the German Air Force and said it was a tremendous Air Force, and it was an accurate report.

W: That's when I met Lindbergh. I was sent along to be his interpreter.

Q: Were you at the meeting when he got the medal from Goering?

W: Yes, Goering.

Q: He says in his book that he received it. He downrates the experience.

W: He does everything. I just saw him the other day. He asked me to lunch--I couldn't go, but I did meet because I wanted to talk to him at the Army & Navy Club the other day.

Q: Do you think he would talk to me about Arnold? Lindbergh doesn't like to talk to outsiders? Do you get to see him frequently?

W: No, not frequently. He's been out to my farm, and we're friends. I mentioned it in my book.

Q: Yes, I know. That's one reason I asked.

W: And I like her, too.

Q: Could I ask a favor? The next time you see him, would you ask him if he would see me?

W: I don't like to do it that way. I can do it faster. John Chamberlain, who's a very close friend. He was just down to my house. We were talking about Lindbergh's book. I know I'm getting an autographed copy of it.

Q: I've just read it and there are 15 or 20 references to Hap Arnold. He had a respect for Arnold, and Arnold had a respect for him. But their relationship was hampered because Arnold was working for Roosevelt, and he couldn't get too close to Lindbergh.

W: I'll ask John Chamberlain. Mrs. Chamberlain and Mrs. Lindbergh are together all the time. They are very close friends. John lives up there. Do you know John Chamberlain?

Q: No. I know of him.

W: A fine writer.

Q: I didn't want to write Lindbergh, because if I got a "no" that would be it.

W: I can ask John to tell Lindbergh that you are interested in talking to him about Hap Arnold, and you're writing a biography. Is it a biography?

Q: Yes sir.

Noted Military Planner for U.S.

Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, a noted American military planner and commander in World War II, died Sunday at Fort Belvoir, Va. He was 92 years old and had been in declining health.

The general died at the Belvoir Woods Health Care Center, a retirement community at Fort Belvoir where he moved earlier this year, his son Albert D. Wedemeyer said. He previously lived for years on a farm in Montgomery County, Md.

General Wedemeyer was "one of the most intellectual and farsighted military minds America has ever produced," John Keegan, a military historian formerly at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, wrote in The New York Times in 1987.

The general was a protégé of Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army during World War II. He served as a staff officer under General Marshall and then became commander of American forces in China late in the war. He subsequently played a prominent role in the postwar evolution of American policy toward China.

> 'One of the most intellectual and farsighted military minds.'

Role in World War II

A highly regarded career officer, the future general joined the Plans Group of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff in 1941. His assignment was to formulate an overall war plan for the United States. That plan, after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, was the basis of the American war effort.

Advancing rapidly in the Army, he became a general officer and an important man in overall strategy. He went on most of General Marshall's trips abroad and played a major role in Allied strategy in the Mediterranean and in the planning for the Normandy invasion.

In 1943 General Wedemeyer was named American deputy chief of staff to Adm. Lord Mountbatten, the British head of the Southeast Asia Command. When the general became the commander of the United States-China Theater in the next year, he simultaneously took the post of chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist leader, and was thus intimately involved in the tortuous political and military developments in China as the war came to an end.

The general was remarkably successful in working harmoniously with Chiang and in training, equipping and paring the scattered and poorly organized forces of Nationalist China. Together with Chinese headquarters, he had prepared an offensive designed to recapture much of the South China coast from the Japanese. But the war ended, making the move unnecessary.

Strains on China Policy

General Wedemeyer's attitude toward General Marshall cooled when his old chief was Secretary of State in the Truman Administration. General Wedemeyer differed with the Administration's China policy, favoring stronger intervention in support of Chiang than did Administration leaders.

His special knowledge of Chinese affairs led to his being sent in 1947 as head of a mission to investigate the situation in China and Korea. General Wedemeyer's report was so controversial that it eventually led to his retirement from military service for a career in business.

The report called, among other things, for an American-led South Korean force strong enough "to cope with the threat from the north." It was not made public at the time, and the general charged that President Harry S. Truman had suppressed it.

When the report was released in 1951, the general, having already applied for retirement, testified at Senate hearings, but his testimony appeared to confuse senators and neutral observers as to where he stood.

Albert Coady Wedemeyer was born July 9, 1897, in Omaha, the son of Capt. Albert Anthony Wedemeyer, an Army bandmaster in the Spanish-American War. He graduated from the United States Military Academy, held a variety of posts and studied Chinese on an assignment in Tientsin, China, in the early 1930's.

Military Studies in Berlin

In 1934 he entered the Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth, Kan. Two years later he graduated with such high honors that he was chosen to attend the Kriegsakademie in Berlin — the General Staff School.

He returned to the United States in 1938, it was said, with a suggestion of his tutors' "monocled aplomb." He turned in a report on the German military mind and machine. It was read by General Marshall, who was assistant chief of staff of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff at the time.

After the war, General Wedemeyer returned to the United States and was appointed deputy chief of staff for plans and combat operations at the Pentagon. After the China-Korea report, he became commander of the Sixth Army in San Francisco.

From that time on, he thought of himself as cut off from further military policy making, and consequently he retired in 1951 as a lieutenant general. In 1954 he received his fourth star by act of Congress.



Blackstone, 1954

Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer

After his retirement, he lived for some years on the Upper East Side of Manhattan and was an executive of the Avco Manufacturing Corporation and later of the Rheem Manufacturing Company.

In the 1952 Presidential campaign he was national chairman of the Citizens for Taft Committee, supporting the conservative Ohio Senator over Dwight D. Eisenhower for the Republican nomination.

He wrote the book "Wedemeyer Reports" in 1958.

He was awarded the Medal of Freedom by President Ronald Reagan and held other American and foreign decorations.

He is survived by his wife, the former Elizabeth Dade Embick, whom he married in 1925; two sons, Albert Dunbar Wedemeyer of Boyds, Md., and Robert Dade Wedemeyer of Arivaca, Ariz.; six grandchildren and nine great-grandchildren.

A funeral service is to be held at 11 A.M. today in the Fort Myer Chapel adjoining Arlington National Cemetery. Burial will be in the cemetery.

Heikert, John M. & Mrs

5 Jan 70

January 27, 1970

Maj General John M. Weikert
129 Whitecap Circle
Maitland, Florida 32751

Dear General Weikert:

Back home after a long, exhausting but most interesting trip during which I was able to interview 13 former associates and one relative (brother-in-law) of General Arnold.

You suggested that I write to inquire about any documents of memorabilia which General Stratemeyer left which might throw some light on his relationship with General Arnold. At an appropriate time, you may wish to raise this subject with Mrs. Stratemeyer.

Again, many thanks for lunch and the good company of Mrs. Weikert and yourself. I saw Bruce Arnold in the Pentagon steam room and passed to him some sticky best regards. He was happy to know that you are well and active.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

July 24, 1969

Mrs. Annalee Stratemeyer
P.O. Box 424
Winter Park, Florida 32789

Dear Mrs. Stratemeyer:

I am very sorry to learn of the General's illness. I hope that he will come out of it in good shape and feel better before too long.

I would like to have the privilege of contacting him toward the end of the year as I will be coming down to Florida again at that time. Perhaps he will be feeling well enough to reminisce about what has proved to be a favorite subject with many of the men who served with General Arnold.

Mr. Lovett told me last week that our two-hour talk about "the old days" made him feel a quarter-of-a-century younger, so apparently the opportunity to talk about General Arnold sometimes has a mutually beneficial effect.

In any event, I will contact General Stratemeyer later on this year.

My best wishes for his speedy recovery.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Sent condolence
8-18-69

Winter Park, Florida
21 July, 1969

Dear Dr. Green:

In reply to your letter of
11 July to Leonard Stratemeier.
He has been seriously ill and
was in the hospital for two months.
He is home now but still is very
far from being a well man. He
is sorry not to be able to see
you but cannot say of his
plans when he would be
available.

Sincerely
Amalee Stratemeier.

July 11, 1969

Lt.General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 424
Winter Park, Florida 32789

Dear General Stratemeyer:

Jack Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine, and I are doing a biography of General Hap Arnold for Random House. The research phase is nearly completed. We have been through the huge Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress and have plumbed a number of other key sources, including the FDR Library at Hyde Park.

We are now hopeful of filling in some of the cracks and have a number of interviews planned for the immediate future. We have appointments in New York City next week with Hon. Robert Lovett, and Generals Lauris Norstad, Larry Kuter and George Kenney.

In mid- or late August, I hope to visit Florida to conduct a few key interviews, and I would be honored if you could find some time to talk of your close association with General Arnold, especially the war years when you were his right-hand man as Chief of Air Staff.

Just for ball-park estimates, I could arrange my schedule to come through Winter Park on the way down about Sunday or Monday, August 24-25, and will be coming back North about Friday, September 5th. I should also mention that I have another tentative visit to Florida scheduled for the end of December, if next month is unsuitable for you.

I am enclosing an envelope for your convenience. I hope that we can get together, even if only for a short visit. I hope, also, that this letter finds you in good health and that you are enjoying your retirement.

Very sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Aug 12, 1969

GEN. STRATEMEYER

Commander Of Air Force In Far East

WINTER PARK, Fla., Aug. 11 (AP) — Retired Lt. Gen. George Stratemeyer, former commander of the Continental Air Command and of the U.S. Air Force in the Far East, died Saturday at the age of 78.

Born in Cincinnati, he retired in 1956 after suffering a heart attack. He had lived with a heart condition ever since.

Stunned by the assassination of President Kennedy, Gen. Stratemeyer had hoisted in front of his home the American flag—upside down and at half-mast—in nautical distress signal, friends said.

Gen. Stratemeyer graduated from West Point in 1915, in the same class as President Eisenhower, and entered the Army Signal Corps' aviation section.

Chief of training and operations for the Air Corps at the onset of World War II, he took charge of the corps in the Indian-Burma Theater. Later he headed the Eastern Air Command and was commander of the U.S. Air Force in China.

Following the war he headed the Continental Air Command, assigned to provide air defense for the North American continent.

He held the Distinguished Service Cross and the Distinguished Service Medal, with three clusters.

Gen. Stratemeyer is survived by his wife, Annalee, and a sister, Mrs. Mary Griffith of Santa Monica, Calif.

'Green H Sgt. Hog Dies in V

Sgt. Ronnie E. H member of the "G Special Forces list ing in action sin was killed that da tle of Ben Het in Highlands of Viet fense Departmen nounced.

Sgt. Hogbin, f 7000 Highview T ville, was born in H W.Va. He enlisted trooper while a st school, served t Germany and re to work.

Two years lat listed and serve before volunteer nam. He woul pleted his third nam in July.

Sgt. Hogbin i his wife, Georg ville, N.C.; his stepfather, Dor M. Moore; his W. Hogbin, of N ter, Sandra G ford, Conn a nal grandfathe of Martinsburg.

Compensatio

Rev

WELLINGTO land, Aug. 11- will compensate two Vietnam killed Aug. 3 v land artillery shelled the to miles southea Prime Ministe oake announce

Card o

GEIST, CLARENCE We wish to expre ciation to our fr relatives for the sympathy during ment.

MRS. CLAREN

In M

ERCOLI, LUIGI In loving memor husband who pas ago today, August Somewhere above Safe beyond all father rests in grant someday w Loving wife, GR Daughters, CARC

FARLEY, GLEN A. In memory of m father, GLEN A. August 11, 1968. Died and gone, forgotten.

TOZZOLO, MARY V In loving memory MARY V. TOZZOL 12 years ago tod GONE BUT NO LUCILLE, CARME

WATSON, MARGAR In

dom, Former ard Chairman

129 WHITECAP CIRCLE
MAITLAND, FLORIDA 32751

16 February 1970,

Dr. Murray Green, Deputy Chief,
Research & Analysis Division,
Office of The Secretary,
Department of the Air Force,
Washington, D. C. 20330.

Dear Dr. Green:

Reference your letter to me dated January 27th 1970, regarding documents which General Stratemeyer may have lefted which might throw some light on his relationship with General Arnold.

Mrs. Stratemeyer says he left no such documents. I asked if she could recall anything which would add to your collection. She was unable to relate anything humorous or serious.

It was a pleasure meeting you here at McCoy AFB. Should you return for any reason, please call.

Best regards,

Sincerely yours,

John M. Weikert

John M. Weikert,
Major General USAF(Ret)

file

Interview, Maj/General and Mrs. John "P.D." Weikert, Orlando, Florida, Jan 5,'70.

Q: Do you recall the first time you met Gen Arnold, your first impression of him?

W: I don't recall when I first met Gen Arnold the first time. Do you recall, Mary?

Mrs. W: No.

W: Was it at West Point?

Mrs. W: I didn't meet him until he came up to West Point. I don't know when you met him.

W: I knew him before then, yes. I had met him several times before then, but I can't describe to you just where they were. When he got back from the Alaskan flight I saw him then.

Q: 1934?

W: I saw him then because he went into Maxwell Field and I was there and the whole group flew in there in those Martin bombers. That wasn't the first time, because I had met him years before that, maybe out in Kansas.

Q: Was he a dominating personality?

W: He was a very dominating personality. You have to be in a job like he had.

Q: Do you know that he was there the moment you entered the room?

W: You sure did.

Q: Just be commanding presence? Speech or manner? What?

W: Well, it was more or less his manner and the way he addressed people and the way people addressed him. Definitely put him in command.

Q: Did he remember names?

W: He remembered names very well.

Mrs. W: And if he didn't, he always had somebody behind hi
him, like when he would oome up to West Point, he would say to me "who's that?" And I would tell him their name, and he'd rush up and say: "How do you do, Mrs. Jones," or "Colonel Jones," somebody.

W: He either remembered the name, or he had a good prompter.

Q: His occasion for coming up to West Point, I guess 1940, was it, '39 or '40?

W: Well, he started coming to West Point in 1936, because his oldest boy was there then. Hank. Hank graduated in 1940 and all during that time, Gen and Mrs. Arnold would come there from time to time.

Q: And your job was?

W: At that time, I was instructor in the Mechanics Dept, and in command at the Air Corps detachment at the Military Academy.

Q: He was interested - especially after he became Chief of the Air Corps - interested in building up the air training program at West Point, was he not?

W: Well, during the period from '37 to '43, let's say '39 to '43, his second son, Bruce, was there. He came up quite often to see Bruce. As a matter of fact, we used to have Bruce at our house. He would see him at our quarters there at West Point, and he told me one weekend that he was there. It was in January of 1942. He said: "We don't have enought West Point graduates in the Army Air Forces, and I'm going to spend next weekend with Gen Marshall at his home in Leesburg, Va., and I'm going to sell him the idea of putting flying training into the curriculum at

West Point, and if I am successful, you are the one who is going to have to do it. Well, the Monday following the next weekend, he called me on the phone and said that he and Gen Marshall would arrive at Stewart Field at 4:00 on Wednesday. This was the second Wednesday in February 1942, andtthey wanted to see the Academic Board and myself. I relayed that message to the Superintendent at the Military Academy. The Superintendent and I met Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall at Stewart Field, brought them to West Point. The Superintendent had a dinner that night to which he invited all the all the Academic Board and myself. It was after dinner that night that Gen Marshall announced to the Academic Board that it was his wish that the flying training be added to the curriculum at West Point and that P.D. Weikert be put in charge of it. That was the beginning of the building of Stewart Field, the beginning of putting flying training into the curriculum at West Point. Gen Arnold called me about a week later and gave me 5 days to draw up all of the plans, the organization, and everything for Stewart Field. Stewart Field, prior to that, was just a strip, a gravel strip which had been made by the NYA,

Q: Yes, National Youth Administration - the the middle 1930's.

W: It had a runway of about 2,400 feet long, and that was it; and a little hangar. So, now we had to expand Stewart Field by buying land, putting in runways and facilities to take care of about 2,000 men to train about 300 cadets.

Q: Was there some opposition among Army types to the extension of the Air training program?

W: That was anticipated by Gen Arnold, and by myself. But it was easily overcome.

Q: Well, when Gen Marshall comes up there and says: "We do it, starting almost immediately," that's it.

W: No, that didn't do it. The thing that did it was this. That night after General Marshall and Gen Arnold left, I had many things to think about. So I said, now, who on the Academic Board will oppose this the most, and I decided who that would be. That was Col Fenton, Professor of Chemistry. So, the next morning, at my next opportunity, I went to see Col Fenton, and I said: "Colonel, you were present last night when I was given a pretty big job, and Colonel, I can't do this job alone. I need help. You're the most qualified to help me here. And I've come to you now to ask you to help me, because there is going to be opposition to this. I'm going to need help to get things from the Military Academy, and I'd be most grateful if you would kind of be my godfather on this project." He was flattered, he said he would be glad to, and that eliminated all of the opposition.

Q: You hit the strongest point of potential opposition, and melted that, and the rest of it faded. Did Arnold ever talk to you about an Air Force Academy?

W: He often talked to me about an Air Force Academy. He talked to me about a lot of things. He'd come up there, and he'd come to West Point. I think he just wanted somebody that was far away of some distance away from his office to talk about things to try it out on them. Because it was new to me. For instance, he said to me one time: "I think transports are more important to winning the war than bombers. What do you think about it?" And we discussed that, and

and he said: "We need an Air Force Academy. Someday we will get it, but now is not the time. But the thing we need to do now is to get flying training put into the curriculum at West Point." And he said: "That I will work on next weekend."

Q: Did he ever talk to you about a National War College concept of training senior officers or commanders?

W: I don't recall that he did.

Q: You know, he was involved, he, or Cabell--who was then one of his key advisors--was involved in setting up, first it was called the United States War College and then they toned it down because Admiral King wouldn't go for that, and they eneded up with Army-Navy Staff College. They had a dedication two weeks ago, Mrs. Arnold was supposed to have been there. She wasn't able to make it because of her health, and they dedicated an Arnold Room, and Eisenhower room and Admiral Hill room.

W: That's the National War College in Washington?

Q: Yes.

Q: Arnold pushed what he called the "United States War College," and Marshall thought that name was too pretentious, but did settle for the Army-Navy Staff College which started out around May 1943, and you, Cabell, and...

W: Wallace Whitson.

Q: Schlatter?

W: No.

Q: Wasn't he in on it?

W: No, Whitson.

Mrs. W: There were six.

W: Bob Webster, Pearre Cabell, Wallace Whitson.

Mrs. W: You, and there are two more...Evans is one.

Q: The reason I bring this up, is that G-1 sent a note to Arnold, and said: "Give us names of candidates and we will advise you." Arnold said: "I'm naming the candidates and I'm not going to G-1 on this." He just named the men he wanted to attend the first course, and Cabell was hot for going overseas. You know, Eaker wanted him because he had come up with this strategic plan for bombing. Arnold made him attend the course to be sure that it was exactly the kind of course, and he probably dragooned you, too, for this purpose, because you knew the difference between a good course and a bad course, having had this experience at West Point. He wanted to be sure that this Staff College started off on the right track. Of course, Ernie King was dragged by the heels in to accepting this. But this is the grandfather of the National War College. Anyway, I got all of this information from these people and I got Norstad to come down, was supposed to come down here for the dedication, and then he couldn't make it. Mrs. Arnold was sick, and her doctor said absolutely no, and as a result, they made a very low-level thing out of it. Mrs. Eisenhower was there, and they treated it on the "Woman's Page" in the Washington Post.

Q: Did Arnold tell you why he was selecting you to attend that first course?

W: He never mentioned it to me.

Q: You just got orders?

W: I just got orders. As a matter of fact, I had orders to command a bomb group and they were cancelled and I was sent to Army-Navy Staff College.

Q: Well, education was one of the dearest things to his heart. He placed tremendous stock in this thing. At West Point, in 1940, Arnold was a sponsor, if not the sponsor, of a dinner for the brass, "Air Force brass," I guess they called them, at West Point. Bruce was then in attendance, and Bruce and his father were corresponding. All kinds of correspondence about the menu they were going to serve.

Mrs. W: I helped them make up the menu.

Q: General, were you in on the planning for that dinner?

W: I don't remember.

Mrs. W: I remember. I helped him make arrangements for it.

W: Oh, he had it at the hotel.

Q: At the Thayer Hotel?

Mrs. W: Yes, arrangements, and then afterwards. Of course, we always had them at Christmas...

Q: Mrs. Weikert, you mentioned an incident at the chapel, with General Arnold. Would you tell that story?

Mrs. W: Well, we went to take Gen Arnold up to the chapel one Sunday morning when he was supposed to go to chapel with Gen Eichelberger. We arrived up there, and I said: "Now, you go up and sit in the front seat," and he said: "And where are you going?" Aren't you going to chapel?" I said: "Yes, but we sit back here, and you sit in the front seat." And he said: "I won't go sit in the front unless you sit there." And we said: "But there isn't room up there. You must go up there and sit down, and we will sit back here, and all meet you afterwards." He said: "Well, I won't go unless you go." So, finally we had to go. There was nothing else we could do. And we got up there, and there happened to be room, because Gen Eichelberger

had a very bad cold and didn't go. But then they passed the plate around, and he looked down and we all looked at him and smiled politely, and afterwards, it turned out that he had no money to put in the plate. And he said: "I looked down at all of you, and nobody even gave me a button to put in the plate." He was quite indignant over the whole deal. We finally got him out of there in great style, but I was afraid there was going to be a problem, that there wouldn't be room for all of us.

Q: Did you ever see him get mad?

Mrs. W: Oh my, yes. Lots of times.

Q: How did he look when he was mad? Did he have a smile on his face? Some people say that this smile was deceptive, this might be the calm before a storm. Was this your experience?

Mrs. W: Well, I don't know that he ever, at the house he never really got into a great tizzy. You know, he only drank one kind of sherry, and it was much more expensive sherry than we could afford to drink at that time. So we always had one bottle at our house, which we kept put away very carefully until he came, and then we brought it out for his benefit.

Q: What was the name of that?

W: Gordon Amantillada.

Q: This is interesting, because there was a rumor in Washington which was started probably by somebody who opposed his appointment to the job as Chief of the Air Corps. There was a rumor which was kicked around that he had a drinking problem.

Mrs. W: I know about that sherry because Mrs. Arnold's mother liked that particular sherry, and she was very old. Whenever he went to see her, they always had a little drink of sherry with dinner.

Q: Her mother tickled him. He was very fond of her.

Mrs. W: He was very fond of her.

Q: She lived up in Locust Valley, New York.

Mrs. W: He talked about her very often. He always drank that sherry.

Q: She was a grand lady. Do you recall having any experiences with the Arnolds socially? I know you are very fond of Mrs. Arnold...

Mrs. W: Well, when the war started, it was very hard for us to get anything to eat for a large quantity of people. So we were having a reunion, our class was having a reunion.

Q: This was up at West Point?

Mrs. W: Up at West Point, the last year we were there. We were allowed to go to the cadet mess when we had official visitors. So we were having the Arnold's one evening, and when I went to the mess to get something to feed them, I asked if I could have a ham for the next night. They said: "Oh, that was very fine." So when Gen Arnold appeared, I said: "You know, I took your name in vain, because we are having a class reunion and nobody could get anything to eat, so I asked for an extra ham for us." And he laughed. He thought that was very funny, so we had them for dinner one night, and had the ham the next night for the class reunion.

W: When the Arnolds came up to visit their son or sons--they came after the two at different times, because they were cadets at different times--we had them to our house any number of times, not just once, a number of times.

Mrs. W: Informally.

W: Yes, because it was so easy for them to visit with their son at our house. They had no privacy at all otherwise, except Gen Arnold

did go to his son's room, which he was allowed to do, but he would go in civilian clothes. It gave the cadet OD all kinds of trouble because he didn't know who Gen Arnold was, and Gen Arnold thought he should know.

Mrs. W: Of course, he couldn't take Mrs. Arnold there.

Q: Do you remember his secret meeting with Lindbergh up there at the Thayer Hotel? Lindbergh had expressed strong opposition to the policies of the government because he was associated with the isolationists. Arnold basically was a non-political individual, based on my determination. He tried to stay out of the partisan issues. But he had great admiration for Lindbergh, and they corresponded with one another. When Lindbergh gave up his commission and Roosevelt called him "Copperhead," and all that sort of stuff, Lindbergh tried to get back, right after Pearl Harbor. Lindbergh tried to get back into uniform, and Arnold met him under the stands at West Point around '41, or '42. It must have been '42 because they were having a baseball game and Lindbergh came up there, nobody recognized him. Then, they met in a room at the Thayer Hotel. Do you remember this?

W: I remember the occasion because Lindbergh used Stewart Field as a place of landing when he would come in there, even if he was going to his home in New Jersey. He came in there quite often.

Q: He lives in Englewood.

W: That's right, and he came in there in order to avoid landing at Newark or some place where there would be newspaper people. When he came in, it was always marked "Secret," and we never told anybody and we never let it leak out. Nobody ever knew he was there. I didn't know about the meeting in the room in the hotel, but I know that they were both in there not once, but maybe, several times.

Q: Well, there was one particular meeting that they rendezvoused there. Of course, Lindbergh went to work. He was actually performing some kind of duties in civilian clothes. He's reputed to have shot down two Jap planes. I don't know if this is true or not in the P-38. But Lindbergh did a great job in the Pacific, extending the range of the P-38. Many people I've talked to have great admiration for Lindbergh. Of course, he did his work in an unsung role because Roosevelt possibly, he made it difficult.

Q: When you got out of the War College in 1943, where did you go from there?

W: I went to CINCPAC Staff in Honolulu. From there I got command of the 7th Fighter Wing, which is within the Central Pacific.

Q: Did you command them when they were in Iwo Jima?

W: That was the 7th Fighter Command that went to Iwo Jima. The 7th Fighter Wing took over the duties of the 7th Fighter Command in the Central Pacific.

Q: Where was that?

W: Honolulu, Hawaii.

Q: Were you present, then you were there the rest of the war?

W: I was there the rest of the war.

Q: Were you at a meeting when Arnold came through there in June 1945, on the way to the Pacific?

W: Not 1945, was it?

Q: Yes, June 1945. June 7, 1945.

W: I was there in the meeting.

Q: And he jumped on Mike Scanlon?

W: Yes, before the meeting even started.

Q: Well, I was told about that, and the man who told me about it was absolutely aghast that Arnold should divert like this from the stated purpose of the meeting to jump on Scanlon. Do you know why he jumped on Scanlon?

W: I've forgotten the details; at the time I knew. I was sitting right next to Mike.

Q: Were you shocked by it?

W: I was amazed. And I tell you, things in that room got pretty quiet after that.

Q: Did Arnold stomp out of there?

W: No, the meeting hadn't started.

Q: Oh, he spotted that mustache?

W: He spotted Mike, and I've forgotten what he said to Mike, but it was very damaging, and he asked Mike to say something, and Mike said: "I have nothing to say at this time." That was his answer.

Q: Well, I'm going to see him in about three weeks. Of course, he is no friend of Arnold's. When we conclude, I will tell you why. The guy that told me this story, originally, was Gen Grussendorf.

W: Grussy was there. Grussey was my Chief of Staff.

Q: Well, he told me this story, and then I told him what happened. I don't want to waste any time telling you what I know...

Q: Did you have any contact with Arnold in the late war, or post-war period?

W: The only time I saw him, was I made a trip to the States one time. I saw him then, and when he came through there, you say, in June 1945, I saw him then. Those are the only two times I saw him after I went to the Pacific.

Q: Did you ever visit him at Sonoma?

W: No, we never did.

Q: Have you maintained contact?

W: At Christmas time only.

Q: Well, they came in for David's graduation in 1949. Well, they came in several times because he had...

Mrs. W: We were in Japan.

Q: Were you up in Alaska?

W: No, I'd been through there, one time only.

Q: Well, I think that pretty well covers it.

Q: Where did you get the "P.D." moniker?

Mrs. W: Oh, who told you that?

Q: Nobody.

W: Well, the nickname "P.D.," of course, my real name is John Morris. I got the "P.D." on Friday, June 13, 1919, at lunchtime at West Point--my first meal at the Academy when I was a cadet. There was one upperclassman and nine plebes at the table. I wanted to get as far away from the upperclassman as possible. So I sat at the foot of the table, and that was like jumping out of the frying pan into the fire, because I found out my position was called "the gunner." The gunner had to serve the water, milk or coffee. He had to carve the roast, if there was one. And he had to see that the waiter kept the food in the serving dishes, because the food there, at that time, was served like you would serve a family of 10 in your home. Well, with much instruction, I got the meal underway and near the end of the meal, the upperclassman asked me where the potatoes were. And I got my eyes off of my plate for the first time, and looked in the serving dish

where the potatoes were, and there were no potatoes in the dish. So with much gusto, I said: "Sir, the potatoes is all." He asked me to say it again, which I did. He had me repeat it; he called other upperclassmen. He had me repeat it to them. I have never been so embarrassed in my life. When I got all finished with all this, he said: "Are you a P.D.?" And I said: "No sir." I didn't know what a "PD" was. I didn't know if it was something contagious, a disease or what. He said: "Well, you are a "PD"" and from that minute till now, I've been "PD" Weikert, and most of the people who have known me since then don't even know my real name.

Q: As a matter of fact, I had to think a couple of times, because I'd seen John M. many times. Then I'd see letters to "PD" or references to "PD" and I couldn't figure it out.

Mrs. W: Well, Gen Marshall, when he came up to West Point that time, thought his real name was "PD."

W: That night at the meeting of the Academic Board, he said: "I want P.D. Weikert to be in charge of it." I'm sure they knew that he didn't know my real name, because he wouldn't be calling me by my nickname knowingly.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold and Marshall together other than that?

W: No, that's the only time I ever saw Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold together at one time.

Q: How about Admiral King?

W: I never saw them together. You see, I was away from Washington. The times that I saw Gen Arnold, practically all of them were at West Point.

Q: Did Gen Arnold ever talk to you about his aspiration or hopes for a separate air force?

W: Oh definitely. He said it would come; it had to come, because the Air Force was building up, becoming larger and stronger. He said we'll be larger than the Army some day.

Q: But he acknowledged he would have to wait until after the war?

W: Definitely, he said: "You can't do it now; we've got a war on. We've got to win the war first."

Q: Did he ever talk about the zealots who were pushing for unification now?

W: He talked about it, but he said it was absolutely fruitless to try to do it. We had to spend all of our efforts in winning the war, and the reorganization should come afterwards.

Q: There were several Air Force officers who were trying to get a separate Air Force. Did you have any dealings with Andrews?

W: I know. When I was a 2nd LT I was down in Kelly Field when he was in command there.

Q: How about Knerr?

W: Knerr, none. I never was stationed at Langley, and that's where he spent most of his time.

Q: Did you have any dealing with Sue Clagett?

W: Very few.

Q: He didn't like Arnold.

W: I know, Arnold didn't like him any better.

Q: He succeeded Arnold at March Field.

Q: Did Arnold ever express those wishes for his sons, as to what he hoped they would do when they left West Point?

W: The only wish he had regarding his sons when they left West Point, he would have liked to have seen them stay a bachelor for at

least two years before getting married. He was more interested in the older of the two boys that were there--Hank--than he was for Bruce.

Q: And they both married shortly after they graduated?

W: I don't think Bruce did.

Q: Bruce married a year later.

Mrs. W: I think so, but Hank married right after that.

Q: In fact, Arnold did not attend Bruce's wedding. It happened the weekend of D-Day, 1944. That's right; it was a year later. He graduated in 1943, and he married Barbara a year later.

Q: You know, he was trying to get Hank and Bruce to join the Air Force. Hank resisted and Bruce came over.

W: Hank couldn't come into the Air Force because of his eyes. He couldn't pass the eye examination.

Q: Bruce had physical disability; he couldn't fly either. Arnold had Bozo McKee working on Bruce. Bruce didn't want to come into the Air Force, because he said: "If you were not rated, your chances of rising high up in the tree were negligible." And Bozo McKee is probably an exception to the rule.

Mrs. W: Yes. He's one of the only ones.

Q: So he had Bozo McKee working on Bruce. He finally got to him to come over to the Air Force. I don't know whether he worked on Hank. Do you know?

W: Hank was before Bozo McKee. Bozo McKee was in the Army when Hank was in.

Q: You know, Hank had a great combat record. He was in many engagements in Italy.

Q: Tell us about the story about Stewart Field and the Superintendent's house.

Mrs. W: Well, it was the last party we had at Stewart Field before we left there, we asked Gen and Mrs. Arnold if they would come up. Gen Arnold said, yes he would be there, and Mrs. Arnold said: "Hap, you are going to the Superintendent's house." And he said: "I'm going to Stewart Field." And she said: "No, you are going to the Superintendent's house." Well, finally he said, well he would go to the Sup's house, but he was going to Stewart Field right away, and he got there almost as soon as we did. He must have just swallowed his food down whole. So we got up there, and he sat down beside me, and he said: "You love it here, don't you?" And I said: "Yes, I do, because it is my home, and we built the field, and I just feel as though I belong here." And he said: "I built three fields and it broke my heart when I left every one of them." That was amazing for him, because he didn't generally say sentimental things like that.

Q: Well, one of them was probably North Island, and one other was probably March Field where he had very close ties; I don't know what the third one could be.

Mrs. W: I don't know what the third one was.

W: It...

Q: Maybe it was Marshall Field out at Ft. Riley?

W: That's where they sent him when he was a bad boy, wasn't it?

Q: That's right. Why did they have this disagreement? Why did he want to go to the field?

Mrs. W: He wanted to go because it was his field. He built that. He thought he built it, anyway. He didn't want to go down there and sit with all of those old Army people.

W: He wanted to be with Air Force, I think, rather than Army. Here was a new field, it was more or less the opening of the club. It was our swansong. I think he did appreciate what was done for him at West Point.

Q: You know, I've seen some correspondence or comments, and of course, he spoke the highest of Gen Weikert, and this is one of the reasons I wanted to get to see him.

Mrs. W: Well, he really was; we were very fond of him, and I think he liked to come to our house.

Q: He liked young people, and he liked education. He felt education was really the key to solving problems. Since Gen Weikert was associated with educating people, and since West Point was the best thing we'd had for the Air Force, he was trying to mold West Point into such a way that it would start producing air officers.

Mrs. W: Well, he came up when we graduated the first class, you remember, and he pinned the wings on them, you and General Arnold and...

Q: Didn't he give a speech up there?

Mrs. W: Yes.

W: He gave the graduation address.

Q: What kind of a speaker was he?

W: He was a very fine speaker.

Q: Was he articulate?

W: Very articulate.

Q: Did he read his notes, or did he speak off the cuff?

W: Mostly followed notes. Followed his notes very closely.

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Mrs. W: Oh definitely.

Q: Because she's a charmer.

Mrs. W: She certainly is.

Q: Did she anticipate his moods and put the lid on him before he blew?

Mrs. W: Yes. She was always there to calm him down.

Q: You know, Bruce Simmons told me that he watched Gen Arnold. When he saw saliva forming at the sides of his mouth, this was the

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Q: Was he articulate?

W: Very articulate.

Q: Did he read his notes, or did he speak off the cuff?

W: Mostly followed notes. Followed his notes very closely.

Mrs. W: But he said what he had to say, and didn't talk a whole lot, and not say very much, like so many graduation speakers do. He just said his piece and that was it. Then he pinned the wings on, and I remember he had such a terrible time with the first cadet, getting the wings pinned on.

Q: Did he say anything about that?

Mrs. W: I kidded him about that afterwards. I said: "You didn't do very well. You must have pinned wings on before." And he said: "Yes, but I never had very much practice with those pins." He wasn't very good.

W: He couldn't get his hand under the coat?

Q: In the case of being in professional military, a wife sometimes tends to make or break an officer. If she's not much help to him, she can hurt him, and if she is a great help to him, she can really advance him up the line.

Mrs. W: Well, Mrs. Arnold was always right there to soothe him down. Hap, you know, was apt to fly off the handle if something happened that he didn't like. She was always there.

Q: It's my feeling that she is a major force in his getting to where he got, because ...

Mrs. W: Oh definitely.

Q: Because she's a charmer.

Mrs. W: She certainly is.

Q: Did she anticipate his moods and put the lid on him before he blew?

Mrs. W: Yes. She was always there to calm him down.

Q: You know, Bruce Simmons told me that he watched Gen Arnold. When he saw saliva forming at the sides of his mouth, this was the

danger signal for him. Now, somebody else told me they saw him with his jaw muscles working excessively. This was the sign of impending blowup.

W: There was one room in the club which was right near a washroom. I always asked the Club to place the table there. It was the only time in all the time he came up there, did he ever throw up.

Q: Note: Gen Weikert wanted it off the record, but he said that in addition to other nervous traits that Arnold exhibited, he had a tendency when he got agitated, to "upchuck." Consequently, whenever Arnold came up to West Point, Weikert arranged for a table to be near a bathroom, so that if Arnold got agitated, or if they had a meeting of some kind which presented some difficult problems, Weikert made this arrangement so Arnold could bail out in short order.

Q: Did he have this problem? Was it in 1940, or 1941?

Mrs. W: I don't remember.

W: This is during the war, that he had this problem. During the war, definitely.

Mrs. W: But it was usually when there were a lot of people, a lot of excitement.

W: It was when he was getting a little worked up over something. After the upchuck, then, he could come back and sit down, and be relaxed.

Q: This sort of relieved the pressure?

W: Apparently.

Heil, Kurt

2 Jan 46

KURT H. WEIL
BROWNSVILLE, VERMONT 05037

15. August 1979

Dear Murray Green,

your letter from the day of your departure to Great Britain had been forwarded to our above summer retreat where we usually spend July, Aug. September. – Now together with your letter of August 1 came my copy of the Sept. August issue of "Air Force Magazine" with your "Idea that did not stick" – all forwarded here.

I much regret that in Scotland, Wales & England the (for americans) excessive prices spoiled the full benefits of your vacation. Europeans (and other non-americans) always paid the countervalue of $2.- and $2.50 per gallon, and the high price for coffee is the result of the reduced value of the £ (for the import from non-colonial countries) plus the even much more devaluated $ in relation to the £. 50, in my opinion, we are not entirely innocent in their high prices for everything they have to import. All our governments since Eisenhower delayed the painful, but necessary "surgery" here & left them to their successors, preferably for the other party to be blamed by the voters, I hope, post festum, you could let the pain disappear behind the pleasures.

Your letter to "Air Force Magazine" deserves praise all over, including your diplomatic skill. There are 2 errors, as far as I am concerned – both insignificant:
1. I was not professor of "aerodynamics", but head of the department and professor for Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at STEVENS.
2. The glue was developed after Junkers (and I, heading the list of his close co-workers) had been kicked out of the Junkers Concern by the Nazis. We developed the glue subsequently with Dr. Hans Klemm at the Klemm Aircraft Factory in Stuttgart – Dr. Klemm's consultant. Later, I left for USA and end of 1938 we already anticipated plastic glue for metal aircraft – but a lot of development work had to be done before it became ripe for that.

Kindest regards sincerely K.H. Weil

P.S. Did you get Professor Arnold Cook's (Cornell) check?

An Idea That Didn't Stick

Your "Aerospace World" column (May '79) tells of current optimism among Wright-Patterson AFB engineers about PABST (Primary Adhesively Bonded Structure Technology), a concept of using "superglue" to bond large aircraft sections like wings and fuselages. If this adhesive technique proves successful, it could increase substantially payloads while reducing the cost of maintenance.

I am reminded of a recent interview with Professor Kurt H. Weil, Professor-Emeritus of Aerodynamics at the Stevens Institute of Technology. Professor Weil, brought safely out of prewar Nazi Germany by American friends, had worked for Junkers Aircraft. In 1939, he was brought down to Washington and introduced to General "Hap" Arnold, then Chief of the Army Air Corps.

Weil proposed a scheme to save scarce aluminum by using a plastic glue he had helped develop at Junkers that had proved effective in the construction of plywood aircraft. He argued that American manufacturers could safely substitute plywood for aluminum sections in the construction of trainers, needed in the thousands by a rapidly expanding Air Corps.

However, Arnold, always on the lookout for new and better ways to do his job (*e.g.*, his keen interest in missile technology long before most of his contemporaries) took a dim view of Weil's proposal. Doubtlessly, his decision was colored with visions of several narrow escapes he had over the years in flimsy aircraft. The interview ended in rancor as the General regarded plywood in aircraft a step back in technology and aircraft safety.

Arnold was spared a later accounting of his decision by America's vaunted production genius. By 1943–44, enough aluminum was being stamped out to provide airframes for nearly 300,000 military aircraft, an incredible production record for a six-year period that is likely never to be equaled.

Murray Green
Silver Spring, Md.

Airmail

false hypothesis—namely, that every person in an organization like the Air Force needs to rise to the top; that if a person is not advanced, he becomes nonproductive and ends up as a liability to the organization rather than an asset.

Sure, there is the temptation to rest on one's laurels and draw a paycheck for minimal work. If an organization is successful, however, it has developed a means of eliminating this type of individual that is very effective, and does not degrade morale in the least. The organization also recognizes the fact that a person might be performing a task that to him is very satisfactory, and that he is productive because he enjoys the work itself, and not because he is laying the groundwork for future promotion.

This is the primary reason for the pilot exodus. Most pilots enjoy flying; I flew for fourteen years, the last nine of which were as a fighter pilot. The sheer joy of flight was enough to keep me in the Air Force for the rest of my life. I couldn't duplicate my flying experience outside the military, and felt pride in the fact that I was serving my country and that my job was important. To put it in Mr. Cordella's words, I found "job satisfaction near the hardware level." I wanted to stay in the cockpit; after all, I joined the Air Force to fly airplanes—and nothing else. Unfortunately, under the present policy, my career didn't have much of a chance.

Many younger pilots see me, or people like me, and wonder if their treatment will be the same. They see the chance to stay in a cockpit much higher on the outside, flying for an airline, and maybe performing weekend duty with the Air Guard or Reserve.

A separate "Pilot Corps" has been proposed along with many other suggestions for stopping the loss of pilots. I don't know which is the best; I do know that the Air Force has to recognize the fact that flying is an end in itself, and not a means to another end.

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20910
August 1, 1979

Prof Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

Dear Professor Weil:

We were glad to escape from the clutches of the assorted British, Scottish and Welsh. Seven weeks in Britain - a very long time when you are spending $2.60 a gallon of gas and $2.00 for a cup of coffee.

Anyway, I have arranged for a copy of my letter to the editor, in "Air Mail" (Air Force Magazine, August 1979, p. 13) to be sent you. I hope you'll feel it does justice to your views on plastic glue.

I hope you received my letter of June 6, the day before we left for Britain. It seems a very long time ago.

Also hope you had a pleasant summer

Warmly

P.S. Still trying to get a publisher for my book

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20910
June 6, 1979

Prof. Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

Dear Professor Weil:

Your good letter was shunted around the Air Force for about 10 days before being forwarded to me - and just in time, as my wife and I leave for England tonight. We hope to tour Scotland, Wales, and the usual tourist spots. We shall be back towards the end of July.

Yes, indeed, I vividly recall our excellent interview of January 2, 1976, to be exact. In fact, I've taken liberty to write a letter-to-the-editor of Air Force pointing out there is very little new-under-the-sun while saying some nice (and accurate, I hope) words about your work. If they use, it ought to be published in September or October.

I keep in occasional touch with Ray Fredette who is still working away on his Lindbergh Biography. He lives at 1127 Powhatan Street, Alexandria, VA 22314, phone: 703-683-1638.

It should be mentioned that I've been retired for some time, still working on the Arnold Biography when I'm not traveling. Publishing a book is tough business. Doubleday had my partial MS for the betterpart of a year before deciding not to publish. As I was sharpening a blade to slit my throat, another major N.Y. publisher came forward to express an interest. He is now reading chapters.

Hope this letter finds you in good health.

Sincerely,

KURT H. WEIL
47 Union Street
MONTCLAIR, New Jersey 07042

26 May 1979

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green,

A report in "Air Force Magazine" of May 1979 on progress in application of plastic glue for bonding of major assemblies of metal aircraft at the Flight Dynamics Lab., Wright- Patterson AFB,Ohio remind-me of our interesting discussions in 1975 about General Arnold and your project of writing a book on the General.

I have not seen any indication that your book has been published. So I would like to re-establish connection originally created by our common friend Ray Fredette, whom I consistantly missed when he was in Hoboken.

Hoping that this letter will reach you at the above address or will be forwarded, I am looking forward to hearing from you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

K. H. Weil

STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CASTLE POINT STATION
HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY 07030

DEPARTMENT OF
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

12 January 1975

Professor Kurt H. Weil

Dr. Murray Green
1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910

Dear Dr. Green:

Many thanks for sending me so promptly the transcript of our conversation at the Gate House.

Because I have earlier experienced some unpleasantness when such transcripts were kept unedited and much later became serious misinterpretations, I made some corrections to eliminate misunderstandings although I realize that the transcript is meant only for your own book on General Arnold.

For the same reasons, but also in your interest, I would appreciate your undertaking to let me see , in time, that part of your manuscript which may refer to the incidents we discussed so that I may correct actual mistakes-if any.

Finally, I much appreciate your sending me a Xerox copy of the pertinent part of "Back Door to War". That, indeed, opens a new aspect of possible mistrust owing to Davis' record. In fact, my wife wrote me from Germany that "american official in the Berlin Consulate suggested such mistrust of Davis. I did not suspect that, because it was my first experience with politics in government-at least in the western world.

Isnt it a strange coincident that my 3 first relations to americans were or had been engaged in peace endeavors: A.U.Pope on Henry Ford's peace ship in WWI, Davis in the peace mission described (he for maintenance of business opportunities -not ideology) and Oswald Garrison Villard, founder of the "Nation" whose nephew was the State Department official and later ambassador whom I had befriended in Teheran about 1928 and who introduced me here to his uncle. (Harry V. is long retired from the foreign service.)

Sincerely,

K. H. Weil

Encl.(please return to me)

Returned 1/15/75

Tues: = Jan 2

12 hrs
55 mph

Wash St
Hoboken
~~8th St up branch~~

~~5th St~~
5th St Pav
Hudson 11
old red Bldg
turn left to River
St - 1 block
R. to 6th St

old fash
gate
Gate house
Old Stevens
Campus

KURT H. WEIL
~~AMERICAN EMBASSY~~
~~USAID -- USET~~
~~KABUL, --- AFGHANISTAN~~

47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

15 December 1975

Dr. Murray Green
1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910

Dear Dr. Green:

My schedule is now cleared up and I can make the appointment for January 2(Friday) at about 1330 hours as agreed upon.

However, in the spirit of our recent time, a new complication arose. To save fuel and electricity, Stevens will be closed Jan.1,2,3 and worse, no office will be heated. I. therefore,made arrangements for us to meet at

901 Hudson Street (corner of Hudson and 9th Str)

This building will be heated. I will be waiting for you there.

Ray Fredette who called last night can give you directions how to get to Hudson Street with one way traffic from north to south. You will have to turn off Hudson into 8th St. (one way to East) up to the 13 storey Center, turn there to the right and come down 9th Street to corner at Hudson.- I am looking forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

K. H. Weil

Thanks for your letter of Dec. 10.

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md 20910
December 10, 1975

Professor Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

Dear Professor Weil:

I have your good letter of December 5. My preference would be Friday January 2nd/in Hoboken at 1330 hours. I would try to get there a little before. It would give us a solid 90 minutes.

Noting that your schedule must remain fluid until your daughter arrives from Europe, I'll try to keep my Monday, January 5 time open until I hear from you in the enclosure.

Appreciate the opportunity to talk with you. I've made your letter available to Ray Predette.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CASTLE POINT STATION
HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY 07030

DEPARTMENT OF
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

Professor Kurt H. Weil

5 December 1975

Dr. Murray Green
1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910

Dear Dr. Geen:

I take it from your letter that you will be in New York at least from Friday, Jan. 2nd to Monday noon or so.

Basically, I would prefer a morning meeting at about 10^{15} (to take care of a possible train delay which brings me from Montclair usually to be at my office around 10.) That would apply to your proposal for Monday which, however, is not your preferred day.- I could make it on Friday, too, at 1400 hours. But because I have to leave at 1500 hours that may possibly make it too tight. Could you come Friday to Hoboken already at about 1330 ?

There is just a possibility that I cannot go to Hoboken on Monday but postpone my trip to Tuesday and substitute Thursday for Friday, Our daughter is coming from Europe in about a week to stay with us over the holidays. Her schedules may require my shifting Hoboken as described. But I should be able to make a decision about December 17 after her arrival here. Would that still do?.- Ray Fredette called me on his way to Yale and will call again on his way home. Of course, I would welcome his coming, too, Let me know how it shapes up on your side.

Sincerely, K. H. Weil

STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CASTLE POINT STATION
HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY 07030

DEPARTMENT OF
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

Professor Kurt H. Weil

5 December 1975

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1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910

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Sincerely, K H Weil

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md 20910
December 3, 1975

Professor Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

Dear Professor Weil:

My plans are firming up for a visit to the New York City area early next month. I am hopeful we can get together for an interview on the subject of General Hap Arnold and Theodore von Karman.

It would be convenient for me to meet with you on Friday, January 2nd, early afternoon; or on Monday, January 5th, let us say, at 10:00 AM. Your letter of October 16th indicated that you are at STEVENS on both those days at the approximate time indicated.

I wonder if we could schedule perhaps an hour, or longer if your schedule permits it:

Preferred: Friday, January 2nd at 1400 hours (At STEVENS Institute)

Alternative: Monday, January 5th at 10:00 hours (Also at STEVENS)

I've made this letter available to Ray Fredette and offer myself as a conduit for any questions/answers he and you may have on subjects of interest to him.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

The enclosure is for your convenience

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md 20910
December 3, 1975

Professor Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

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Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

The enclosure is for your convenience

Phone numbers if you must reach me on short notice
Office OX 3-7388 (AC 202) Then changed
Home JU 5-0059 (AC 301)

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md 20910
December 3, 1975

Professor Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

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Sincerely,

Murray Green

The enclosure is for your convenience

Phone numbers if you must reach me on short notice
Office OX 3-7358 (AC 202) Then as changed
Home JU 5-0054 (AC 301)

1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md 20910
October 22, 1975

Professor Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

Dear Professor Weil:

Thanks for your good letter of the 16th. I am trying to arrange a schedule of interviews in the New York area for December. When my plans firm up, I'll call or write to inquire about a mutually satisfactory date for our interview. Perhaps I can persuade Ray Predette to join me.

Your comments about von Karman are intriguing. I was under the impression that General Arnold was most hospitable to scientists going back to Robert A. Millikan at Cal Tech in the early 1930's. My understanding is that Millikan introduced von Karman to Arnold who gave von Karman virtually a free hand because of his total fascination with the work von Karman was doing. The Wind And Beyond, von Karman's autobiography, seems to add to this impression. Naturally, I would be most interested in your views on this and related subjects.

A couple of years ago, I visited Montclair to interview General E,M. "Pop" Powers. We had a good session.

You will be hearing from me again. Incidentally, I prefer to use a tape recorder in my interviews. I too am hopeful of making arrangements for preserving the interviews for future historians to ponder over and use. Many key personalities who served with, or worked for General Arnold are no longer with us, so I feel fortunate to have preserved some of their views for posterity. Among them: Generals Tooey Spaatz, Rosie O'Donnell, K.B. Wolfe, Leslie Groves, Charles "Pre" Cabell, Merian Cooper, Claude Duncan, Hugh Knerr, and some others. Oh yes, Eddie Rickenbacker, too.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

KURT H. WEIL
47 Union Street
MONTCLAIR, New Jersey 07042

16 October 1975

Dr. Murray Green
1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910

Dear Dr. Green:

Just returned from a longer absence, I found your letter of 10 September.

I would be much interested in talking to you about your work on Hap Arnold and other air historical areas. You have my home phone number. At STEVENS, where I am now 3 days a week on an ARPA/ONR research contract the number is (201) 792-2700 ext.495 or if I am not in ext.250 where a message for me will be forwarded to me. Most of the time I am at Stevens on Monday, Wednesday and Friday from 10-15[00] but not always.

Ray Fredette is right that Gen Arnold gave me first hand opportunity, not to admire his judgement and vision. But later,I admit, his appointment of my old teacher and friend Theodore von Karman for the Air Force Advisory Committee and then AGARD would indicate that this shortcoming had been recognized and mended by him- provided <u>he</u> deserves credit for the appointment. I never talked with v. Karman about this.

I was,of course, delighted to hear from Ray Fredette whom I had missed at least two times when he was at Stevens. Please, give him my best regards and ask him to let me know in advance next time he comes to Hoboken so that I can make sure that I see him again. Also tell him, that, upon request of Dave Fox of the N.W. Air Historical Society, I started during my summer vacation to dictate on reels my recollections of my own experience in military aviation during WWI and then in early civil aviation. I dictated,so far, 9 reels which I understand the Air Force Academy is going to transcribe as soon as possible for my review and editing.

Sincerely,

K. H. Weil

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

10 September 1975

Professor Kurt H. Weil
47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J.

Dear Professor Weil:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold and have had a contract with Random House for publication. I've been working on the book for six years and have spent two of it researching the Arnold Papers on a Brookings Institution Fellowship. I have also interviewed over 300 personalities who had contacts with General Arnold during his lifetime. In fact, I was in Montclair a couple of years ago to talk to General E.M."Pop" Powers who served in the Army Air Forces in key supply posts.

In a nearby office sits my colleague Lieut Colonel Ray Fredette, a friend of yours, now working on two books, one a biography of Charles A. Lindbergh. We were talking about the Lindbergh-Arnold relationship, encouraged by General Arnold because he knew so little of Germany's military aviation before World War II, and Ray mentioned your wartime contacts with General Arnold.

I will have occasion in the months ahead to visit the New York area and would be delighted to make your accuaintance and reminisce with you about General Arnold. Fredette mentioned that the General may not have been one of your heroes. That does not feaze me at all, as I'm trying to draw a "warts and all" biographical picture. In fact, Mrs. Arnold, who still lives in Sonoma, California, has strongly encouraged me in these efforts.

The enclosed envelope is for your convenience. I would be pleased to hear from you. I have your telephone number and would be pleased to have your permission to phone to arrange for an interview at a time convenient for you. (AC 201-744-4688)

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
(AF/CHO)

Office Phone: OX 3-7404 (AC 202)
Home Phone: JU-5-0059 (AC 301)

The collaboration, in the best light that could be put upon it, left something to be desired from Baker's standpoint. While he did most of the work, it was Arnold's name and rank that publishers wanted on their book covers. George T. Bye, the literary agent who couldnt sell Arnold's work at any price three and four years before, congratulated him on his "new honors" in December 1936 and, trying to say something nice, suggested that Arnold "must look like an animated Christmas tree when you are in full

KURT H. WEIL
~~AMERICAN EMBASSY~~
~~USAID--USET~~
~~KABUL---AFGHANISTAN~~

47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

15 December 1975

Dr. Murray Green
1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910

Dear Dr. Green:

My schedule is now cleared up and I can make the appointment for January 2(Friday) at about 1330 hours as agreed upon.

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901 Hudson Street (corner of Hudson and 9th Str)

This building will be heated. I will be waiting for you there.

Ray Fredette who called last night can give you directions how to get to Hudson Street with one way traffic from north to south. You will have to turn off Hudson into 8th St. (one way to East) up to the 13 storey Center, turn there to the right and come down 9th Street to corner at Hudson.- I am looking forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

K. H. Weil

Thanks for your letter of Dec. 10.

Edited by Prof Weil 1/18/76

Prof. Kurt Weil, Stevens Institute, Hoboken, N.J. Jan 2, 1976

Q Prof. Weil will tell us of his experiences and how he got into aerodynamics.

W I got into aerodynamics very early in my life. I learned to fly in 1916. I'd run away from high school in my last year when the war broke out. . .I was wounded at the end of August 1914 and spent quite some time in the hospital. Then I applied to the air force but was not accepted. I was not in shape. I was in charge of an ammunition truck at the Verdun front and was blown up with my ammunition truck. In early 1916, I felt I was ready to fly, but my commander would not let me go. So I had to wait until he was on furlough. Then, I applied and was accepted. I went into flying school. As I high school boy, I had been building models which was unusual for that time. I became a specialist in lightweight decign later in my career and I'm still teaching a course in lightweight design, the only one in the United States.

When the war was over, I went to Aachen, the only technical university in Germany, which was in the occupied territory where I thought my father could give me some money. That was a complete joke. The last check he sent me was for 90,000 marks. At that time, with inflation, I could just pay for a local telephone call. During the war I met Prandtl and he told me that one of his brilliant disciples, Theodore von Karman, had just accepted a Fellowship at Aachen. Von Karman did some work for the Hungarian Army then, after the war, he came to Aachen. I was there already.

After the conclusion of my studies I met the great Prof Junkers who was a great pioneer of the modern, all-metal monoplane. While I was doing my final work on my thesis, I got a brilliant offer to go to the Luxembourgh Steel Industry. Junkers told me he could not give me anything like that. In fact, he could not promise to pay my salary the next month.

KURT H. WEIL
~~AMERICAN EMBASSY~~
~~USAID - USET~~
~~KABUL - AFGHANISTAN~~

47 Union Street
Montclair, N.J. 07042

15 December 1975

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1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910

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Sincerely,

K. H. Weil

Thanks for your letter of Dec. 10.

Civil aviation at the time was in a terrible state, but we both agreed that civil aviation, self-supporting, was our aim. So I worked for Junkers for ten years. This has a bearing on your interest in Arnold. As a budding engineer, I was convinced of the advantages of metal, especially of aluminum alloys which had just been developed in the 1930s in Germany.

I had the idea that we were doing something wrong in the design of aircraft and convinced Junkers that we should design a new three-engine transport plane. Junkers and a few others saw the immediate justification of my point, while all the others were completely against me, especially in the Engineering Department. They were absolutely against me and said I would ruin the company. In order to prove that I was right, I chose to go into an underdeveloped country and start an airline there using Junkers planes without any subsidies from anybody.

He accepted it. I went to Iran. I went in 1927 and started the first entirely, unsubsidized self-supporting airline in the world, and ran it for five years without accidents, proving it could be done. Of course, it was an enormous sacrifice for all my co-workers and for myself, too. From the technical and financial reports, they saw that I was right. I was called back. I designed this plane. It was built and became the most successful transport plane ever. It was built in 18,000 copies, about 50% more than the DC-3. It was called the Junkers JU-52 which was also a cause for my downfall in Germany. The clandestine War Ministry wanted us to re-design this plane as an auxiliary cruiser to be used as a bomber. I refused. I said it would be a poor bomber, and much worse from my standpoint, it would be a poor transport.

Q Did you leave Germany then?

W I had left Germany in 1927 and stayed five years and became Special Advisor to the Shah, of Iran, father of the present Shah. I knew the present [redacted]

Shah when he was 10 years old. When I came back in 1932, the Nazis had just taken over the Junkers company. And while I was in Germany at that time to get married, I was told that the Junkers company in Iran had been closed and Junkers kicked out.

Q You have touched on something that may be of interest in my Arnold work. Arnold in 1926-27, thought he might like to leave the Air Corps and go into commercial air transport. He and a couple of other fellows started a company that later became Pan Am. They were trying to get a route into South America.

W Juan Trippe. . .

Q Yes, Juan Trippe took over the company from them. There was a fellow named von Bauer, a German. . .

W Oh yes, in South America, he flew Junkers single engine planes with floats, in Colombia. They have often claimed they were the first unsubsidized airline. That is not entirely correct. They didnt get money but had a monopoly on air mail.

Q Subsidy?

W Not subsidy, they didnt get money from the Colombian government. They had a monopoly, not subsidy. They mail they transported was paid.

Q There was some concern that von Bauer's company - SCADTA - that it also had an espionage function, of flying past the Panama Canal.

W They didnt fly there; they flew in Colombia.

Q Yes, but they flew south of the Canal. They wanted a franchise to the Canal Zone as well. Anyway, they almost received a franchise from the U.S. Government, but there was some pressure from the U.S.Army. Finally, they did not get it, because of the fear of espionage. Have you heard of that?

W No. I was very innocent (referred to Point Four opposition to

his building a sugar factory in Iran)

Q When did you come to America?

W (Told of getting married and going back to Iran in 1932. Took his wife. Lufthansa asked him to negotiate for them to persuade Shah to re-open up commercial airline. But it was hopeless. Shah offended that Germans closed the airline while Weil was away). (Wife did not want to go back to Germany. Back to Germany for one year to 1933. Then to England Had special permission to have his assets outside Germany).(Said he did come back to Germany every month or so. Was working on "the ultimate fuel.") In Berlin, I met an American whom I had met in oil negotiations in Iraq through a friend of mine. I was then also acting as advisor to the King of Iraq, King Feisal. I took this American to where I was living in Teheran which was 2,000 metres up. It was much cooler. His name was W.R. Davis - independent oil man, who had great interests in Mexico and Venezuela, especially, and sold oil to the German Navy. He had amassed a considerable fortune in Germany which he couldnt take out. It was blocked. He saw me and said: "Hey, where to you run?" I turned around. It was W. R. Davis in Berlin. He said: "Why dont you come to America? You cant live in a country like this." I said: "It is my country." He said: "Why dont you come to America?" He took me to the Adlon Hotel where he was living. He told me what he needed me for. He had a big reserve of money in Germany and said: "I want you to start thinking. I know you are an engineer, but you have learned to think in realities, to think of how I can get out that money in a legal way." This was in 1938. I found a way. I said: "You buy American patent rights from German patent owners, which America will need, no doubt, in my opinion. You can buy sell licenses in America and so you will have your money." He said: "Why hasnt anybody else thought of that?" Also: "When can you go to America?"

Anyway, he got me a visa and I got on a boat - the only time I crossed theAtlantic on a boat. I came by the end of 1938 to America. Among the patents I had advised him to buy was the design of plywood airplanes which could be built very cheaply and simply and fast. It could be built strongly with a new method we had developed, a new plastic glue. I was a metal man but owing to my being kicked out of Junkers, I did what I could.

So I came here with these things and W.R. Davis had been supporting financially the campaign of Franklin Roosevelt. Had a big picture of FDR in a silver frame which said:"To Major W.R.Davis from his friend, Franklin Roosevelt."

I came, and Davis said: "Look here. You are working on this thing that could be useful." I said: "Yes, since I know when the war will start. My friends in the Party told me when the war will start." It was a very precise forecast.

Davis said: "Why do you think our Air Force should be interested in this?"

I said: "In the first place, they will not have enough aluminum when the war starts. They will just have enough for the battleplanes. But for training they should have these plywood planes. Secondly, they cant build up fast enough production of aluminum as they can with plywood."

Davis asked: "Are you willing to talk to the head of the Air Force?"

I said: "Who is that?"

He said:"General Arnold."

I said: "Yes, I'm willing and ready."

So he pulled his political clout, the door was opened to me. He said: "If it doesnt work with Arnold, we'll go to Roosevelt himself." Davis had a lobbyist in Washington, and if he couldnt handle it, Davis went himself to Washington.

(Some confusion about dates. Finally pinned down to May 1939)

W I was introduced to Arnold as being one of the pioneers of all-metal aircraft designed and operated in Europe, that I was a close associates of Junkers, and that I was one of the old pilots which should appeal to him. I was introduced as a formidable man, as an engineer and in aviation.

Q Did Davis introduce you to Arnold?

W I dont know. I tried to find this out but Davis arranged it. He had a big office in the RCA (New York) Tower and I had an office there

(Told of how Davis helped to get him out through a German Admiral friend)

Q You came down to Washington in May 15, 1939?

W I came down on the 14th, stayed at the hotel and met with Arnold on the 15th, in a temporary building

Q Probably the Munitions Building. On Constitution Avenue?

W Yes, yes. I had heard of Arnold as a person. I knew, of course,

what he did for the development of the Air Force. But I had heard he was one of those happy-go-lucky fellows who were more interested in having a flair for something and getting it done than looking into the substance and background of things. So, I met him with not only open mind, but also with the intention of becoming friendly with him. Giving him all credit, I can do that. Even if I know something detrimental about you, I can open my mind and create the atmosphere where I can appreciate you completely. You can show me that what I heard of you was shown in the wrong perspective. That would be the end of it.

So I went there and met Arnold in the presence of a Major Lingle (checking his diary) Chief of Supply Division. He came in, not immediately, but soon. And Arnold tried to make fun of me. I have started very early in my life with responsibilities, Acting Squadron Leader when I was 21 years old, and had to lead my squadron every day and every night into danger. I learned not to take things so seriously.

Since I knew that what I I had been introduced to him in writing as I in words, I was rather shocked that he said: "Do I understand correctly that you want to sell us wooden airplanes?"

I said: "General, I come about wooden airplanes. I'm not trying to sell you anything. If you dont see and are not convinced that this is important, I am not trying to sell you something."

So he looked for a moment at me, and then he said: "You probably were born yesterday."

At the time, I was about 44 or 45 years old. I said: "Would you explain this to me, General?"

He said: "You may not have heard that we have passed already from the era of old fashioned wooden planes as you probably have there into all-metal planes."

I had been since 1923 with Junkers working exclusively on all metal planes. I was quite shocked that he should take such a attitude. In addition, he said: "You dont seem ro know anything about aviation."

I said:"General, I have to ask you when you learned to fly. I learned to fly in 1916, and from that day on to the Armistice, I was flying at the front. And if you were at the front in Flanders, I may have flown against you."

Q How did he react to that?

W He was very off-handed. He may have had some other things on his mind. And I have now, looking, since we have been in contact, at my diary, and I have come to the conclusion that there may have been something going on about which I know nothing about.

He said: "If you really mean to sell us wooden airplanes or the idea of going to wooden airplanes, you are wasting my time and yours." That's how he started out.

I said: General, you probably dont know exactly what I want to do, and I'm not going to waste my time or yours. But I want to save your aluminum alloys for your military planes while you might use a new method of building very fast and very cheap wooden trainers."

Oh, he said, "that doesnt interest me. We have all the aluminum in the world." We are the biggest country in the world, and we have all the aluminum we need." In a sloppy way, you know, and very shocking for a man in a responsible position.

Something happened after this which should have given me at that time already food for thought. It came up again when I looked at my time-table in connection with this discussion. After about half an hour that we were together, I took my leave: MI said: "Well, General, I have no intention of wasting your time. I think I had better go now," before he said it.

I went, and the General and this Major looked at each other. He walked me very courteously to the door, and that was the end of it.

What later happened, I didnt know, and I really didnt care at the time. Nor could I discover anything like that. The fact is, on June 27th 1939 I was asked to come to Washington to have a meeting with Captain Benjamin W. Chidlaw, who was the Materials man in the Air Corps Supply Division. I concluded that this Major Lingle had told the General: "Let me handle it." Or he did not tell him anything and said: "I'm going to look a little deeper into what that man said."

Anyhow, I was asked to see Chidlaw. . .

Q He lives in Colorado Springs.

W Ray Fredette told me he became a four-star General, head of NORAD. He is now with TRW. I had a meeting with him and this Captain Chidlaw impressed me as a thorough, serious and knowledgeable man in his field. I had no opportunity to see how good he was in other fields, but he impressed

me very much. And he spent two or three hours with me discussing this. He said he had heard of the old casein glue made from milk or from cheese. The plastic glue made at first did not work. A German aircraft builder and I went at it and found out why the first glue didnt work and found a solution to it. I tell my students: "Once you ask the right questions you have half the solution."

So we had this with the I.G. Farben, the biggest chemical concern in the world at the time. I had negotiated in England with a group there to sell it. So I brought that patent with me. It belonged to a plywood manufacturer. I had bought it for Davis.

Chidlaw asked: "Have you done anything over here with people who would manufacture this?"

"As a matter of fact I have," I said.

"Who is it?" he said.

"The President of Plaskon - one of the chemical factories concentrating on the specific plastic on which our solution was based. They became later a division of one of the larger corporations. (Mentioned that head of Plaskon had studied in Heidelberg- Weil could talk to him)

Chidlaw was impressed that, before I had seen anybody in the Air Force I had tried to establish a basc to get this glue manufactured. Chidlaw asked: "Get me all the information, with test results. I like your glue and the design of your aircraft."

(Told of mafufacturing process, split the fuselage into two parts to allow several workers to insert parts.)

(Had a patent on this procedure - could be done fast and cheap)

So, this is what Arnold threw away.

Q After your conversation with Arnold - I'm just speculating - is it possible that Major Lingle did some homework and came to him and said: "We dont have as much aluminum as you may think, General. We may have a shortage of aluminum. Maybe we should look into Weil's idea."

W I have been thirking of this possibility, too. I mentioneded whether Lingle talked to him again, or did it upon his own. If it didnt lead to anything, he didnt need to disturb Arnold. If it led to something, he could show Arnold the results. Anyway, Chidlaw said he needed all the test information done in Germany, details on the design, results on the glue, and "whether you can get from Germany a trainer plane built that way, so we can send it to Wright

Field so we can test it and break it, find out how strong it is." He was a professional man. You could see immediately. He spoke my language, or I spoke his language. We understood each other quite well. I'm sure he may have forgotten all this.

Anyway, in Ohidlaw's office on June 27, 1939, I met a Lieut C.K. Moore who was from Wright Field, but happened to be in Washington and was sitting in this meeting. He went back to Wright Field, and discussed things. He invited me on July 18th to Wright Field, and there we continued the discussion. And so the thing went on but I never saw Arnold again. I didnt want to see him again. I was so shocked by the way he had treated me with his questions, in the interest of his country. What was the matter if I was going to do something for Davis, to get him his royalties. It was really, when my wife and I decided to come here.

(Discussed wife's strong desire to leave Germany before their child was born)

(Told of his shift of loyalty once he came to America. Was now an American. If Germany and America fought each other, his loyalty was here)

(Told of trouble bringing wife and child here on visitor's visa. Got help from W.R. Davis and friend in State Dept)

(Between June and October 1939 when he flew to Mexico to arrange for normal immigration of Mrs. Weil, he worked with Air Corps)

W Lingle may have taken it upon himself because of the way Arnold had decided this was unfair to the country, not necessarily to me. Lingle felt that he should do something. Another speculation:Davis, from his financial point of view, had a good thing and may have gone to Roosevelt or one of his people.

Q What happened to your concept?

W (Left for Mexico) Told of visit to Wright Field in July 1939. On July 29, W.R. Davis and he used Arnold to get extension of my visa for a year longer. It was expiring. Arnold had promised, on August 18, 1939, I had arranged by telephone to Germany that one of those plywood planes would be delivered from Germany for testing. On the afternoon, a telephone call between Davis and Walter Jones saying that General Arnold wanted to talk to me about my personal situation, and will then make a corresponding

demand for extension of my visa. Probably, he wanted to hear whether I was a Nazi or proved that I was not a Nazi. That is all I have in my diary.

On August 21, 1939, W.R. Davis wrote Arnold asking that he act because my visa was running out. The Germans would not give me a new passport which was also running out, unless I got the promised visa here. On August 29th, W.R. Davis came back from Germany. He had flown over via Pan American Clipper, one of the first people to do it. He showed me a letter, according to which, General Arnold had passed the decision about my visa to the Secretary of War.

Q Approving it, or just passing it on?

W Didnt say. I should, he believes, get an exteption and get a new passport. On September 1, 1939, the German-Polish war broke out. On Sept 2nd, the German Consul in N.Y. gave me a new passport for six m nths. On Sept 3rd, theEnglish and French declared war on Germany. My visa was prolonged. (Discussion of visa problems)

Q The fact that your visa extension was going through Arnold, he must have had 2nd thoughts about your development? Either he or someone on his staff had 2nd thoughts.

W What you say has bearing on another development. Captain Gavin on Governor's Island wanted to talk to me about conditions in Germany. I saw Gavin more than two times. He asked me lots of questions about the German buildup of industry and aviation. I knew all the leading people who had decided already to go over to the Nazis. Not all, but most.

(Gavin told Weil he had performed an important service for his future country)

(Possibly, report from Gavin to Arnold which persuaded him to change mind about Weil.)

Q Did the U.S. use your concept during the war?

W I had left for Mexico to arrange visa (Had to stay until 1941 and came back just before Pearl Harbor) (Established residence in Havana in order to arrive by ship - to comply with U.S. law)

(Meanwhile Davis had died of heart attack, after falling out with FDR. Davis tied in to John L. Lewis who opposed 3rd term for FDR.) Davis came under suspicion because he was delivering oil to Nazi Navy. Slapped $10 million levy on W.R. Davis. Left Weil as enemy alien without strong sponsor.

Q When did you renew contacts with von Karman?

W 1941, before Pearl Harbor. I was trying to establish myself as aircraft consultant. I went to the West Coast to negotiate with Vultee. It later became Consolidated-Vultee, then General Dynamics.

Q Did you know Reuben Fleet?

W I was introduced to Fleet

(Discussed relations with von Karman who visited Stevens Institute and stayed with Weil)

Q I wonder, you know he had great admiration for Arnold. . .

W I talked to him about Arnold later. I told him this. He said: "This doesnt surprise me. Arnold was a man without whose call on me, I would not been able to build up this program of the Air Force which has proven to me. Without Arnold this would not have been possible. No pedestrian man could have done it." Arnold certainly was not a pedestrian man, and once he flared up in enthusiasm he went across every barrier.

Q He had complete confidence in von Karman. He arranged to so von Karman did not have to report to anybody else in the Pentagon, only to Arnold. A very unusual procedure.

W Yes, I know.. Von Karman appreciated Arnold very much. He saw the necessity, not of him, but of an outstanding man who would use his authority and intuition about it. Von Karman never identified himself as a scientist but as an engineer who had to do things. I'm not trying to hold things against Arnold.

Q I'm not trying to apologize for him.

W I know, but on the other hand, I have quite often talked to people about Arnold who make him out to be the "Golden Boy". That wasnt for my experience. As you said in your letter, he had "warts."

Q In this circumstance, in my knowledge, his reaction to you was uncharacteristic of him. I'm trying to speculate as to why he seemed rude towards you. No. 1 possibility: he was pre-occupied when you came in and gave you short shrift.

W That I can understand.

Q No. 2: He had his experience trying to build the airline in 1926-27 with Jouett and Montgomery. Their chief competitor was von Bauer, in South America. There was an article in Fortune Magazine in 1941 which discussed the espionage ties of von Bauer in the 1920s. The very fact that you had

recent ties to Germany may have made him hesitant or suspicious about the whole project. No. 3: He may have resented Davis who was selling oil to the Nazis.

W Davis pushed things through the political channels.

Q Arnold may have resented the political pressure.

W Davis may have been related to Arnold in that way. When he wanted to do something, he used his claws, his elbows and his teeth. In the last few years, I've had a more mellow attitude about the incident. Yet, Arnold's attitude towards a fellow early flier, one who had a record as an engineer, early flier, pioneering metal aircraft ~~m~~ the Americans bought the Junkers metal aircraft in 1919. Knowing all this this, he treated me as though I were a swindler.

Q There is still another possibility. He never fought in war. He tried to get into combat in the first war, but never did.

W Yes, he winced when I said: "We might have flown against each other in 1917."

Q When you say that now, this seems to me to be a key to his behavior.

W When I say that it was the result, not the origin of his attitude. He had already taken a hostile attitude. Not only hostile but contemptuous.

Q (Discussion of Arnold buying a lot of hare-brained ideas, bats, pencils)

W Arnold had a lot of luck of his life to find a man like von Karman to develop this program for the Air Force, to open a realistic future.

Q Arnold had a lot of respect for scientists like yourself.

W (Discussed wartime career, consultant to B.E.W. and as consultant to Bendix) None of aircraft companies would hire him, as enemy alien)

W You know, Arnold was responsible for some of the hysteria when he created the first hero, the first Air Force man who was shot down. . .

Q Colin Kelly

W He was never shot down as he described.

Q He didnt sink the Jap battleship . . .

W He never did. . .

Q Roosevelt created that hero

W No, I had heard it was originated with Air Force, Arnold

(Told of trying to get job with U.S. Navy, getting testimonials supporting his loyalty - Arthur Upham Pope, Oswald Garrison Villard)

1942 to 1946 W.W.II. Worked for Gen Motors at $300 per month, great responsibility and never promoted him)

END

Westlake, William

12 Feb 70
6 Feb 74

Died: Col. William W. Westlake, USAF (Ret.), of cancer at Andrews AFB, Md., in mid-November. He was eighty-one. During his Air Force career, the long-time AFA member served Gen. H. H. "Hap" Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces, as senior public affairs officer. ■

Interview, Col William Westlake, Arlington, Va. Feb 6, 1974

Q You mentioned in the last interview that they called Louis Johnson "Leaky Louie". You didn't develop that. Why did they?

W I don't know exactly why they called him that "Leaky"

Q Was he agarrulous?

W Apparently yes. He talked--I heard him when I was in Chicago make a speech out there when he said: "All the air force manufacturers are going to get behind the mountains. They're going to move their factories in the middle of the country. And I am going to have them move there because I am the Secretary of War...

Q He was the Assistant Secretary of War.

W "And I am the one who signs the orders and I'm going to have them do it, make them do it."

Q Not many of them moved?

W None of them moved.

Q How did Arnold get along with him? He was politically well situated with Roosevelt. He was head of the American Legion there.

W Did you just see that Robert E. L. Eaton became the head of the Legion? Do you know who Gen Eaton is?

Q He used to be head of L & L.

W Yes. Actually, "Leaky Louie" was called that--behind his back of course, because he spouted off. He spouted off whenever he got a chance.

Q You mean this was sort of inverse--he didn't talk?

W No, he did talk. He liked to make speeches.

Q I want touask you about the glider program. There were several brothers in the Army Air Forces, the Barringer baothers.

W One of them was later killed.

Q Lewin Barringer. He was in the glider program.

W He was the one who sparked the whole glider program.

Q I talked to his brother, Brandon Barringer, last month up in Philadelphia. And he said Lewin, his brother, who was killed in a plane that was lost somewhere in the Caribbean, was the one that sparked it.

W He really was.

Q Where did Richard Dupont fit into it?

W Also too, I think he was in it. I don't remember exactly how he did it but I do know that he was in it. I think it was at their behest that this whole glider program which was not exactly the most successful program in the world, as you know.

Q Barringer told me about a guy named Hicks whose name exploded in Drew Pearson's column. They almost brought this guy Hicks in to run the glider program. Barringer got exercised and went to "Hungry" Gates, his boss, and wanted to know: "Since when does Drew Pearson run the Army Air Forces glider program?" You remember anything about that?

W No

Q We're talking about A-2 and public relations. There were two guys who had the A-2 job for very short periods of time and didn't last very long. You mentioned in our interview Sorenson.

W Yes. Arnold didn't like him. And if you looked at the chart you'd see all the rest: A-1, -2, -3, and -4 were all generals except Sorensen. He was a Colonel Sorensen.

Q He was just a short-termer then? Arnold didn't promote him?

W Arnold didn't promote him because he didn't like him.

Q Why did he keep him on the job?

W I don't know. He did eventually promote him. But Sorensen had a sort of a scratchy personality with Arnold. He came to me one day and said--by the way, I think I may have told you about Sorensen saying: "I'm supposed to deal with public relations and I have not the slightest idea or concern." He admitted that he knew nothing about it.

Q There were two other men who had A-2 for a short time and

apparently were moved out. I would say A-2 was a hot spot. One man was Hume Peabody.

W I remember him.

Q He didn't last very long. He was there around Pearl Harbor. Do you remember anything about him?

W No. I don't think he was very effective man.

Q I talked to him. He lived at Chaptico, down in southern Maryland.

W I knew him only vaguely.

Q Then there was Mike Scanlon.

W Mike Scanlon's still around.

Q Yes, I know. I talked to him three times. Mike got into trouble with Arnold. Do you remember?

W I don't remember why but I do know that at his zenith he was our Air Attaché in London, and made himself up fiercely like a lion, and drove around, and I think he still drives around, in that old Continental. A hell of a nice guy.

Q He is a nice guy. I talked to him about his trouble with Arnold. This was a report that became infamous or famous depending on your viewpoint. This is Scanlon Report No. 3.

W I don't know this story. There are a lot of things public relations wise, intelligence wise, that didn't get into my ken, if there were no bugs in it with the press.

Q Here's another question. Somebody told me that FDR wanted the B-29's ready so they could hit Japan by the Democratic National Convention time which was, I guess, July 1944.

W I don't know the date but there was a target date. I can't remember what it was. I know the first target was to have been Sasebo, Japan.

Q But do you remember anything involving a political drive or pressure against Arnold? I know FDR was pushing Arnold. Arnold and Benny Meyers went out to Salina, Kansas to try to expedite the program.

W There was some one thing wrong with the B-29's.

Q There were several things but one was the engines catching fire.

W One was something else, a little device that Arnold called--what was the Big Shot's name at Chrysler?

Q Keller?

W K. T. Keller. Arnold said: "If you don't get that thing out I'll make it in my own basement."

Q That was a little piece. Let me just check this out.

W My impression--did I tell you this story? I wish I had this piece of paper. I know where it is. Arnold signed a piece of paper saying: "I practically give you the Air Force to work up a cover." Some newspaper man hit the nail on the head. He wrote a story about the B-29's is going to be ready on a certain day; is going to hit the Japanese base at Sasebo, and Arnold hit the ceiling because it was the truth. That was the plan. But I cautioned him and counseled him not to get too excited about this because any official recognition of this story would give it away. So at that time he directed me to prepare a cover which I did. And it's a long story what plans were in the cover, but among other things--I wanted to have several B-29's but he let me have at least one and maybe two B-29's to send to Europe. I leaked the story around that the B-29's were going to be used in the OVERLORD invasion, which was completely wrong. Also I heard that there were other things, pieces were marked B-29 when they were shipped over the Hump. The Intelligence people could have seen in fact what they were.

Q Then you were involved in this so-called cover plan?

W I was. Did I ever tell you I worked out a whole cover plan. Arnold directed me to do it until one guy came into my office, asked to see me, and asked my secretary to get outside. Then he revealed that he was Colonel Doakes of the General Staff and he was in charge of all cover plans

And he wanted me to tell him exactly everything I'd done in this cover plan. He was very fine about it.

Q This was War Department?

W War Department GHQ.

Q What's his name?

W I don't remember. I said: "How in hell, you're so secret that not only I--neither did I ever know about you, nor did Arnold. So apparently whatever I had done fit on. He said it had to fit in to the circles, the overall circles, in Plans. And this seemed to be--whatever I had done--which, among other things, was to send a B-29 to Europe--he said was just all right. After he found out everything that had been done, he went away happy.

Q Somebody told me that the word was around in Arnold's immediate staff: "Don't cozy up to him because after a while he'll get tired of you, and then get rid of you."

W I think maybe that's based on the fact of Shelmire, maybe. But I don't think you could cozy up to the old Man. I've seen experts try it. I've seen any number of people try it with presents like crates of oranges that "happened to be present when his airplane was leaving." All that sort of thing which I've seen where experts try to cozy up to Arnold. It didn't work.

Q Not in the sense of a small bribe. But I mean the fact that if you became too familiar in his presence that he got tired of you. Is there any basis for that?

W I don't think so. He did get tired of Horace Shelmire I think. You know why.

Q No, I don't

W Horace had more little things like. Horace and he were schoolboys, chums. Horace is now dead. I think his widow lives in Pennsylvania in Downingtown. Horace had little projects of his own. One time we were out hunting pheasant out in North Dakota and Horace almost shot Arnold.

I think Arnold did get shot another time when he was with Marshall. He got shot in the head. Some of the pellets were in his skull. Shelmire said to me: "I'm rather worried about the General." The General was rather short with Shelmire. It wasn't long after that that Shelmire got the old heave-ho. But I think he knew it was coming and it wasn't the fact that Arnold got tired of him but got tired of what Shelmire did. Had little things like an Air Force tie--just an example of what I mean--he got mixed up with some manufacturer who was going to make a fortune selling these ties of "Air Force U" or something.

Q This petty corruption?

W Yes, did I ever tell you a story about Arnold and the gun that he said: "I want it!"

Q Yes, you did.

W I said: "Of course you want it but you can't have it. You might get away with it, but you keep on doing that, and Mrs. Pearson or somebody else is going to raise hell abut the fact that you "take."

Q Emmett McCabe, he's a sort of a shadowy figure?

W I don't--Sarah died and he married again and had a child and he went to work in San Diego, and I think he lives in Point Loma.

Q McCabe is still alive?

W Yes. He lives in Point Loma. He worked for General Dynamics.

Q Are you thinking of Beebe?

W No. McCabe. I know Emmett very well. In fact, as I started to tell you earlier at lunch, when I was looking for personnel, among other people who came in to be interviewed and people came in, there's the one reason Emmett got a job. He came in and...

Q He was a protege of a Congressman?

W This is why he got a job. He came in and he did as everybody else did. He said he was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, and went to Notre Dame, or wherever it was, and he went along and I said: "That sounds pretty good." By the way, as he was leaving, I said: "Here is your

authority for a physical and an application to fill out. We had many of them come in that we didn't want to have anything to do with them because they were no good. They were saloon keepers and things like that. So I said to him: "By the way, McCabe, what are you doing now?" And he said: "I'm Administrative Assistant for a Congressman." At that time I didn't even say "Who?" I found out of course--McCabe didn't say: "I'm a pal of Congressman Costello." He didn't say: "Sarah and I are old pals with Costello and Arnold." He didn't mention that. So he got his authority to do that. I forgot him. The next time I was up in Shelmire's office or one time later--several months later--I saw a 2d Lieut wandering around there. He said: "Do you remember me?" And I said: "Your face if familiar." He said: "My name is McCabe." and I said "Oh yes. I re remember you, McCabe. What are you doing here?" And he said "I'm the General's new Aide."

Q Was this the same job that Sheffield had later on?

W Sheffield had it for a very short time. Sheffield got it because some general, some buck general, recommended him, or somebody else recommended him. I knew Tommy Sheffield when he was a newspaper man in Chicago. Sheffield didn't really work as an Aide, not very long, anyway. There was another guy from Chicago Tribune who was an Aide for a short time.

Q I want to ask you about a guy named Sol Rosenthal. What was his role?

W Mystery man. He was supposed to be...wait a minute--Sol Rosenthal?

Q Somebody told me that he was sort of a front man for Harry Hopkins, and he was funneling money into the Democratic National Committee.

W I don't know but he was a mystery man--every once in a while--I'll tell you who you ought to get an interview with--Maury Carr.

Q Where's he?

W I don't know but he had a sister who was a movie actress.

Q That's not Laurence Carr, is it?

W No, this is Maurice, a nogoodnick. You want to be careful, but-- He is the one who told Arnold he worked for Lovett and he told Lovett he worked for Arnold. Maybe I could find out because Chuck Kerwood is keeping track of the girl. Maury had a girl, an Air Force secretary, who was a wonderful gal in protecting him, covering him right and left. I have to find out if Chuck knows where the girl is. If he knows where she is, he can find Maury.

Q Would he know something about Sol Rosenthal?

W Yes, Rosenthal? Was that quite the name? One had to do with the Democratic National Committee. One of them was always throwing parties.

Q Is there any basis, in your opinion, that he was sort of a bag man to collect money?

W Nothing to do with Benny Meyers, I don't think. But he had something to do with politicians, in my opinion.

Q How about Pinky Craig's role. He was in Plans there for a while.

W He was a spoiled know-it-all. Not very efficient man who married a very wealthy woman. "The Pulitzer Prize" as they called him. He married a Miss Pulitzer. And between me and the gatepost, he was a very much overrated man.

Q I want to ask you about Ira Eaker. We talked about him at lunch.

W Very careful man. You about his demanding and I think got away with it. He was the first one that demanded he be sent to school. He was a Regular Air Force officer.

Q You mean Columbia University? He went to journalism school there.

W He went to school. I think the Air Force paid the bill which is the first time it ever happened.

Q I think Mason Patrick arranged it.

W He did. He worked at it for a long time.

Q When he came to Washington in April 1945 the war was practically over in Europe and Spaatz was slated to take the top strategic command

of the Pacific. Eaker was considered like No. 3 man, Arnold being #1 and Spaatz #2. He came in to become Deputy Commander AAF. And he acted, at least in the opinion of half a dozen people or more, he acted as if he was the heir to the throne.

W Well, I think he thought he was.

Q Did you accept this? That he was the next heir to the throne?

W No. I did not. Because, in my opinion, Spaatz was the next heir. I think that Eaker probably believed he was.

Q I wanted to ask you about Jim Bevans. I talked to him several times.

W I'd be prejudiced, I'm afraid.

Q Jim Bevans claimed that he did not handle high level policy, just sort of middle level policy, for Arnold.

W Next time you talk to him ask him what about the Hesse jewels.

Q I'll ask him.

W Don't you say I told you to.

Q Was he involved in that? Weren't they hidden in a cave or something.

W I don't know. I know more than I'm going to tell you.

Q How about Elliott Roosevelt's promotion?

W That's--you're treading on...

Q Thin ice?

W I'm also prejudiced there because I don't have a very high regard for him.

Q Arnold was opposed to it. I talked to Elliott Roosevelt.

W Did you ask him about the charges that he wanted to knock off the Bahama Prime Minister? You know I'm so prejudiced.

Interview, Colonel William Westlake, Pentagon, February 12, 1970

W: As I told you earlier, I considered my service working with General Arnold one of the greatest privileges of my whole life. He was a most unusual man.

Q: When did you first meet General Arnold?

W: I met him when I was a Captain, when I came into the office in the Munitions Building, when I'd been called to duty in my National Guard Unit. For five or six months they wouldn't break up the unit.

Q: Was this before the war?

W: Yes. I was called for a year's duty. General Candee had heard about me and wanted to get me down here, and they kept turning down the request. Eventually, by that time they were going to keep the squadrons together, I don't know what they were going to do, we were an observation squadron, I don't know what we were going to observe in the war, but they said, no, they would keep them all together. But eventually, Bill Newhall and I were the two to break out of the squadron; Bill became a MG. He is now dead, at any rate, I was finally ordered down to Washington. I was a Captain, I had just made Captain. I'd been 18 years as a first LT. Candee was the boss.

Q: This was public relations?

W: Public relations, yes.

Q: Was there a man named Richards in Public Relations?

W: Frank Miller was the boss, Frank Marion S. Miller, they called him HMS Pinafore Miller.

Q: The Air Corps at that time did not have a public relations. It was part of the Army?

W: Yes, but during that time, it was under Intelligence. One time I was out of town, I was transferred to Intelligence.

Q: PR was transferred to Intelligence late in the war?

W: Yes.

Q: Do you know why?

W: No.

Q: The Historical people under Information were asking for a lot of planning classified documents. When Marshall heard about it, he was incensed about it, and he ordered the Historical people to disgorge all classified data. The only way they could retain it, so they could understand what they were writing about, was to put them under Intelligence, and this sort of blanketed them.

Q: What were some of the things Arnold gave you to do, do you remember?

W: Well, I didn't know him in the beginning. I was just a Captain in the outfit. He brought in later some people who had been in the Air Force, and because of their age they were brought in with ranks above us.

Q: Was this Arthur Ennis?

W: Art Ennis was an old friend of mine, Art and I went to school together, and Art had not come in yet. Art was well known in the Air Force as a public relator, and one who used to handle the mikes at the National Air Races, so on, but eventually Art came to head up the group which didn't make it too bad for me, because Art was ahead of me in school, but, I went to school with his younger sister, but Art became the head of the thing. I was a head of a department, but in those days nobody told you what to do. You did what was wanted to be

done, like after a death, you come into a house, and you do what needs doing.

Q: There were so many fires burning that there was enough work to go around?

W: You stepped in and you did what was necessary, and I just ran into some commendations from Art and from the people tacking on Muir Fairchild and all of them saying they were glad I got this thing, tack on their endorsement. We were busy, and we didn't have time. I don't actually remember some of the early details, and I don't remember my first meeting with the General.

Q: But Arnold came to know you, after Pearl Harbor?

W: Yes, I think so. I don't really remember how I first met him. Suzy Adkins was his girl. She had more time with the Old Man, and Suzy probably liked me, because Suzy could have dinged you with anybody, you know. She is the kind who would say: "General, you remember that nice Capt Westlake, he wants to see you." She could prepare the way, or she should could give you, by saying: "You don't want to see that guy; he's a pest, you remember?" Suzy was, of course, competent, and I could tell you some funny stories about Suzy. Maybe this is a good time to tell you about Suzy. The need for officers was critical. The Old Man could see that it was.

Q: You are talking pre-Pearl Harbor?

W: I'm not so sure it was pre-Pearl Harbor. But anyway, you can date this by that. He conceived the idea of having a great big OTS, rather than OCS which was in operation at the time. He conceived the Miami Beach program. So he called in Walter Weaver, who was head of Technical Training, Walter Weaver was sort of a mad man. He was the

boss of all technical training, but the Old Man called him and said: "Walter, we need a lot of officers and we need them quick." Now he gave the Miami Beach plan of hotels. Arnold said: "We will do it at Miami, and we will take over all the property down there and we will start maybe a three-month course. Now I want you to start the wheels in motion to take over the hotels and whatever other buildings are necessary. Get your professors, and your teachers, and your curriculum. Can you do this?" Well, the Old Man had thought that Walter was going to stall. So he had Suzy all primed on the phone. Weaver said: "Now, it will take so much to do the buildings, and so much to do that, so much to do the curriculum." Weaver said it was going to take a long, long time." Weaver said: "Well, I can do it by three months." And the Old Man said: "Well, I figured about Monday morning." Arnold said: "Just a minute," and he picked up the phone and Suzy was on the other end of the line. He said: "Yes, un huh, okay, Miff, okay, all right, now I'll let you know on this, by next Wednesday, by Thursday, yes, okay, all right, Miff, well, I'll let you know." So he hung up and he said: "Well now, if you can't do it, Miff Harmon can." And by God, Walter Weaver struck out there like a mad man. He went out and he tilted at windmills until he got the whole thing set up in no time.

Q: Did Weaver have a reputation for dragging a bit?

W: Well, I don't think he ever expected to do it overnight. But the Old Man, when he decided to do something, he wanted it done now. Incidentally, he was so human, though, when something, he knew the Philippines. He knew all about when this guy came back from the "death march," he had the guy tell him the whole story.

Q: Was that Eubanks, maybe?

W: No, not Eubanks. He was a prisoner and he was in the "death march."

Q: Well, anyway, you were talking about Miami. Let me ask you: Why was Miami chosen?

W: That I don't know, but I think it is on account of the fact that it was a luxury resort which we could get along without.

Q: And they already had the buildings. We didn't have any facilities

W: No, they just took over the hotels, and everything else, because it was a gigantic thing and the Old Man had the vision of it. He knew we needed it.

Q: He figured that the hotels would be suffering anyway because of transportation shortage?

W: And also the blackouts which were necessary down there during the war, which they did have, because they had submarines come in there.

Q: Are there any more incidents about Suzy Adkins and him?

W: Oh, there are so many of Suzy. One time the Old Man had Rosie O'Donnell working in his office.

Q: Yes,he was Advisory Council.

W: He was a Colonel at that time. Rosie worked right in the office with Shelmire and all the rest of them. Shelmire is dead, yes? Shelmire and the Old Man were boyhood buddies. By the way, when McCabe came in, one of my jobs after Pearl Harbor, was to find commissionable material. We needed people badly, but we didn't want everybody. And one of the jobs Art Ennis gave me was to find people to commission. Suddenly, I had, toward the end, I had about five good guys in the mill,and they clamped it off,and said: "No more direct commissions," and the Navy got all my people. Several of them turned

out to be Captains in the Navy. Long after I ran out of people I knew that were any good, I had a file that high with people like Harry Richman who wanted to be a PRO. We had people come in who said they just came from the White House. They'd seen Eleanor and they wanted a job as a public relations officer.

Q: There is a letter in Arnold's file on W.C. Fields trying to get a job for one of the people on his staff.

W: The one from Harry Richman was one of the worst ones I've ever seen. Harry was a cafe entertainer. He came in to see me. Julius Klein.

Q: The professional...head of the Jewish War Veterans?

W: Julius is now a MG in Chicago, retired. Julius was close to Gen Marshall because he worked with him in my guard days, and I saw him coming out of Gen Marshall's office one day. He was trying to get a commission for his brother, Ernest. They brought me some Parker pencils and after they sent them over. As soon as they came in, I made a record of them, and sent them back by special messenger to the hotel. That was about the time Tony Bennett in the Navy gave somebody an automobile, remember? I think we got him in the Air Force later on as a sergeant. We had everybody in the world in our outfit.

Q: Public relations, I can see where you would get involved.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and the Kentucky Derby.

W: Arnold loved to go to the races. He had this little B-25. Well, there was only room in it for Arnold and Pete. By the way, you probably know that Roosevelt told Arnold, although he was a command pilot, he didn't want him to fly alone anymore because of his health, and so on. So Arnold was not allowed to fly alone.

Q: Probably also because of Andrews?

W: Yes, but this was before Andrews. And so this B-25 which was lightened up, and was fairly plush. But you had to crawl through the tunnel and everything. But usually in the thing would be Pete, McCabe and the General and I. Well, I am a command pilot, but, and you probably know, as a command pilot you can take command time. In those days we had to have four hours for pay purposes. Do you think the Old Man would take command time? He certainly would not, although he was a five-star general. He was boss of the airplane, and he would take co-pilot time and I would take the command time, because I needed flying time. Often he would get up with Peterson and fly the airplane. One time when we landed at Albuquerque, there were two generals there, two BGs, I can't remember who they were now, somebody we both knew very well. They were the bosses of that area, and we came into Albuquerque.

Q: They were AAF?

W: Yes, they were both Air Force, and I think they were out hunting at the time when the word got to them. They sped down to the hotel. When we landed, Pete said to the tower, "Give me, for heaven's sake do this, I have a five-star general with me," And the Old Man looked, I was in the back with him. So we taxiied up to the place, and of course, it was about the time they had just changed the WAC insignia, and there was a little WAC standing there, and you know the Old Man was very compassionate and very fond of the enlisted people and used to talk to them as equals and get their views on things. He wanted them, as I say, nothing stuffy about him at all. If we had a big airplane, and had vacant seats, he would load them down with the mine run of GIs and WACs and go and talk to them about what's wrong with this, and what's

wrong with that. Sometimes he would get the picture that a lot of other people couldn't get. Same as Lovett did one time when he was a bald old man. Lovett told me: "If you want to know what's wrong with the Air Force, be a bald old man. Nobody knows who you are at the Biltmore hospital. They tell me all their tales of woe, and they didn't know who I was." Well, at Albuquerque, we finally got in there, and the Old Man saw one of the WACs wearing an Army insignia--Athena--and he said: "Don't you know you're now allowed to wear the Air Force wings--the propeller and the wings." She said, no, she hadn't been told. So he said: "Well, now I'll tell you, you can." He said: "Do you need somebody else here to tell you?" She said: "No sir." From that time on. By the way, McCabe got a Sergeant friend who was at Albuquerque. We all went over to the hotel while we were waiting for the two generals to come and join us. We went to the lobby, so all of us stood there in the lobby and played the pinball machines. The Old Man too, and the sergeant. He was seen by everybody at Kirtland Field after we left the next day. McCabe said that that Sergeant became one of the most popular guys at Kirtland because everybody knew about his playing the pinball machine with the Old Man.

Q: You were talking about the horse races?

W: Yes, the horse races. He liked to go down to the races and in fact, any races. He liked to go to them, and whenever we would go to a place that was anywhere near around a race, Mac and I would schedule his time so that he would have time to sneak away for a little recreation.

Q: Did he bet?

W: Yes.

Q: $2 bettor?

W: Yes, not a great plunger, not a compulsive bettor. But we

were sitting in the box somewhere with Matt Wynn one time.

Q: Matt Wynn is the head of the Kentucky Derby, isn't he?

W: Yes. Col Matt Wynn. We were sitting there during one of these recreation periods on one of our trips. At that time the Navy was having no trouble at all getting all sorts of money. The apple of the Old Man's eye was the Air Force Aid Society. He wanted money. No matter how much we got, we had to share it with the Army. We had no special fund of our own.

Q: That's the Army Emergency Relief Fund?

W: Yes, and we had no Air Force Aid Society at the time. We got our minor share. So the Navy had to stop some of these things because people were pouring so much money into their coffers. Arnold said to Wynn: "I see all this money to all these charities. I see you are having charities, Navy charities. I don't see any for the Air Force." Matt Wynn said: "Well, why don't we have an Air Force Day at the races?" So Arnold said, that would be fine. Well that was about all the conversation then. Next I heard of it, and please go easy on this, because we had a MG whose name I don't quite remember. He was a Materiel Command guy, and he was out on the West Coast. He was always spouting off about the high absenteeism rate, and the dirty tracks, how they were taking the people away from their jobs in the airplane factories, and I think some survey was made.

Q: Was it Echols?

W: No, it wasn't Red Echols, he was a wonderful person.

Q: Orval Cook?

W: No. At any rate, the next I heard of it, the Old Man really did want to have money for an Air Force Aid Society. He felt this

would be a wonderful way to get it. As I say, at that time, this is late because Patterson had become the Secretary of War. You know Patterson was sort of an old woman as far as that, he didn't like horse racing or anything else, His wife used to have these salons, like rivaling Cissy Patterson. All the people would come to her parties and she was sort of a lion chaser.

Q: She would have a trio in the salon playing Beethoven?

W: The current lion was sought, a fight between Mrs. McLean and Mrs. Patterson and Mrs. Cissy Patterson too, she was also.

W: The guy on the West Coast had been shooting his mouth off in the papers about the high absenteeism rate in the factories and how it was caused by these dirty tracks taking all the workers away and everything. I think a survey showed at that time that whether the tracks were open or not had no real bearing on the absenteeism rate. But at any rate, Judge Patterson went along with the idea too. I don't remember when he succeeded Stimson.

Q: He succeeded Stimson right around the end of the war.

W: Well, this is when it happened. This is to show you a little humanism about the Old Man, too. So I got a call from Evan Stanley who was a Colonel and worked for Ralph Cousins at Santa Ana. He said: "Bill, while the Old Man was out here he talked to the people ~~at~~ about this." I can't recall the name of the race track, but it was right south of Santa Monica, Evan said: "The Old Man was here. We arranged for an Air Force Day at the such and such track." But, he said: "Now people at the track are in my hair to promote this thing. The more promotion we do on it, the more money comes into the Air Force Aid Society coffers. So they want some airplanes from the 4th AF to fly over the race track

and to whoop it up to promote the track." And I said: "Evan, the Old Man is somewhere in a B-25 between here and there." He said: "We've got to have action now." I said: "I can't give you any airplanes at all, Evan, with the atmosphere as it is, with Judge Patterson and that other General out there who was shouting about the dirty tracks." I said: "There's too much static. I can't give you any support on this."

Q: Was this General, Air Force or Army?

W: He was Air Force, he was Materiel Command General. I don't recall his name, but it doesn't make any difference. He was hyped on that subject of absenteeism. I said: "Evan, I can't give you one airplane through the 4th AF to fly over the track, under the present atmosphere." But I told him the Old Man gave me a project which I was running myself, which the Old Man called "the shot from the sky" show. It was a purely military show. Its function was to show these Japanese planes and shot-down things, whatever they were, relics, which we moved around the country to recruit WACs, to sell war bonds, and to take a bow on some of the stuff we had knocked down out of the sky. Not all of it was Air Force, but we had promoted it. We had no money to do it, and believe it or not, it is the only thing I've ever heard of during the war where we sold hot dogs and Coca Colas and things like that to pay the expenses on the trip. We didn't have any money. The Old Man said: "I want that tour." So my job was to tour it, and I did it. But I said to Evan: "Right at the moment, it is south of Santa Monica in some space there being set up." It was going to open the day of the races, or whatever. I told him: "I can give you 4th AF airplanes to fly over 'Shots in the Sky', because this is a pure Air Force military deal. But I can't help it if some of those airplanes should happen to fly

over the racetrack." So, I said: "I don't know what the Old Man promised you." He said: "He promised him the world." I said: "Well, he's somewhere in the air." He said: "You have to do it now!" So I said: "All right, I'll send orders"which we did a lot of things on orders those days that we would be shot for today. In those days there were things to be done and you did them. Nowadays, I run into Maurey Casey and he says: "For God's sake, we used to do those things, and tell him about them afterwards." He said: "You can't now," which is true. In those days it was a lot different, we assumed a lot of authority, and got away with it. I sent the orders out, and I had a dual position about that time. I was Assistant to General Surles, Asst for Air to the head of War Dept Bureau of Public Relations, also I had another shoulder which I was to work for the Old Man, it was a peculiar division. At any rate I sent the order out for the 4th AF to do it, and they did it. Well, there was hell to pay. I think Judge Patterson's office called the General when he was on his way in the air, and asked if he would come by to see the General as soon as he came back. We knew that hell was popping about these airplanes going over the racetrack. In fact, I think one of the local papers on the Coast shouted bloody murder about it. I've forgotten the details of it. But to make a long story short, I found out the ETA of the Old Man at National Airport, and I got into a buggy and went right over there. When he landed I got into the car on the way in, and I said: "General, Judge Patterson wants to see you," and I told him the story.

Q: And Judge Patterson was by now Secretary of War?

W: Secy of War. He said: "Who did this on the airplanes?" And I said: "General, I did." And I said: "You are in the clear." And

I told him the story about how the racetrack had nothing to do with it. I told him the thing on the way into the office. He went to see the Judge, and it turned out everything was fine because he had the alibi that had nothing to do with the racetrack, which is what I did.

Q: He got off the hook on it?

W: He got off.

Q: Do you know of any other incident involving him and Patterson? They did not have the same chemistry.

W: I know, Patterson was sort of an old lady, I can tell you that. Maybe you know this story about when he was at March Field. Did you ever know the story about him? Ammunition was scarce. Somebody should tell you the story who knows it better than I do. He told it to me but I've forgotten about it. He wanted to see if these bullets would penetrate a certain type of aircraft wings. They forbid him to use up the ammunition, but he did it anyway, when he was at March Field. The Army had a big investigation in..that Corps Area about the utilization of this ammunition, and how it had either gone through the wings or had not gone through the wings, or whatever it was. It became quite an issue. It became almost a scandal. The Old Man had to go to his pal, Mr. Woodring, I think it was, to square it. Nobody knew how that thing got squared, but he squared it himself with Woodring, who was at that time the Secretary of War. He had to square it, because they were being pickayunish about the expenditure of the ammunition.

Q: Well, expenditures were very tight in the early 1930s and, of course, he took the initiative, just like you did on the race track. When there was an earthquake in Long Beach, I just want to make this comment because we can tie this in. Arnold told the initiative with the earthquake aid.

W: The same thing. He didn't know anything about rules and regulations any more than I did. I used to say: "Don't you know that under 6213-11 you can't do this?" He would say: "That's right, you can't." We used to swear by numbers when we were kids. That was a swear word. People who were impressed by that.

Q: Arnold was not impressed by that? If he felt that the common sense thing was to do it, he did it.

W: He didn't care what the regulation was, and I used to say to my people: "Find me the regulation that says you can do this. Don't find me the one that says you can't." And he was the same way.

Q: Right, he was a doer. Do you recall any other incidents involving him and Patterson?

W: No.

Q: There was some incident involving him and Patterson about some pilots who had come back, and apparently one guy flew under the Brooklyn Bridge. You know these guys were put in sedentary jobs. They were used to some action. But they had violated flying regulations, and Arnold was a stickler about people not playing around when they were in the air. He was going to throw the book at them, court martial, and Patterson interceded for them with Marshall, from the legal standpoint. He felt that the AAF was being too harsh with them and Arnold was in favor of throwing the book at them. Do you remember this?

W: No.

W: I remember a case where he went to Marshall. We had lousy relations on the Hill. In the Air Force. Maurie Carr was in that. I used to get half the calls in my office. Maurie Carr was no good--a phony, but he wiggled himself. He told Arnold he worked for Lovett;

he told Lovett he worked for Arnold. At any rate, our relationship on the Hill was very, very bad. We never could get anybody in the office we had up there. Being a newspaperman, I wasn't fearful. I didn't know who the hell the Congressmen were. Let me go back to the time when McCabe came to me to get a job, see. Everybody in the world came in to get a job. I listened to McCabe's story, and he told me he was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, and he went to Notre Dame. He went on, and I said: "What are you doing now, Mr. McCabe?" He said: "Well, I work for a Congressman." And I didn't even say which one. I didn't know at the time that the Congressman he worked for was a pal of Arnold's that both McCabe and Arnold knew.

Q: Was this Rep. Costello?

W: Yes, he worked for Costello. And I said, I didn't even ask him. I didn't know who Costello was. Costello was a congressman from California. They were pals of Arnold, and quite close to Arnold, but McCabe never used that. So I said to him: "Mr. McCabe, in spite of the fact that you work for a Congressman, we are very interested in you. Here is your authority for a physical. Here's an application." Now that was unusual because at that time we only wanted a few people. I'd say one out of 50 who came in to get interviewed, didn't make the authority for a physical, and that was only the beginning. Later on, I was up in Shelmire's office and I saw a new 2nd LT around the place. He said to me: "Sir, I don't believe you remember me." I said: "Your face is familiar," and he said, "My name is McCabe." I said: "Oh yes, LT McCabe, what are you doing in here?" I said: "I haven't seen you." He said: "I've been to OTS for three months," and I said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I'm the General's new aide."

Q: Did Congressional relations improve?

W: Congressional relations, to get back to that. The Old Man wanted one, so he and McCabe knew a Colonel McIntyre. He was in Artillery. He had been quite close.

Q: We are talking about Col. James McIntyre, who lives in Alabama now. How did Arnold get him?

W: Arnold knew him and McCabe knew him. Earlier he had been up on the Hill. He had been a legislative liaison guy.

Q: Yes, what did they call Johnson?

W: "Leaky Louis." One time I remember, as a reporter, on the Examiner, I interviewed him, and he told me he said: "These aircraft factories are going to get behind the mountains, they are going to be in the center of the country. They are going to do this because I say so. Because I signed the appropriations bill for these manufacturers, and they are going to get behind the mountains." I didn't see any behind the mountains. He was thinking about Lockheed and Douglas and all of those who were on the other side of the mountains. Johnson's idea was to bring them in.

Q: What's this story about McIntyre? Arnold recruited him?

W: Arnold recruited him because he knew all of the background on the Hill. So did McCabe, having worked for Costello and McIntyre was only a Colonel, so Arnold had to go to Marshall. I don't know who told me this, maybe Arnold did, that when he asked Gen Marshall for McIntyre, Marshall said: "He must be pretty good, General. If you want him, we will make him a General to come and work with you." This is what Arnold did, to make him take over Air Force L&L, which was the first time we'd had a decent thing on the Hill. I used to get

these calls from Congressmen and they would raise hell over the phone about, because they could never get the guys in the AAF.

Q: I want to go back over a couple of items that you mentioned. You know you were talking about OCS in Miami Beach. This is right at the beginning, he and Walt Weaver. Did Arnold ever have an idea to have enlisted pilots, because he couldn't get officer pilots?

W: I don't think so, because that had been worked earlier.

Q: They had tried that, and it didn't work?

W: Yes, well it worked, I think later on a lot of them got commissioned. There was a time in there where the glider was a problem and a lot of those fliers became not really warrant officers, flight officers, which are the same as warrant officers.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that program? Richard DuPont?

W: No, but I knew DuPont before he got killed. Yes, I knew vaguely about it. In fact, everything going on, I probably had my finger in something.

Q: You probably had your finger in a lot of things. Let me take you back, you were in Arnold's office right before Pearl Harbor. Three days before Pearl Harbor, the Chicago Tribune published a good hunk of the RAINBOW FIVE, the war plan, do you remember that?

W: Yes, I do. I'll tell you who did it. I knew the reporters involved in the case. They claimed that they only hit upon it by accident. That they didn't know anything about it.

Q: Well they got the plan from Sen. Wheeler, who gave it to the Chicago Tribune reporter. (NOTE: Told Westlake the story of Waldrop's article.)

W: I have heard that, but it's not true.

Q: Well, Frank Waldrop told me this a few years ago.

W: I don't believe it.

Q: Well, I don't believe it either because whoever leaked that plan had two qualifications. One, he had access to the plan, and two, he wanted to turn our strategy toward the Pacific. The RAINBOW FIVE strategy was "all-out in Europe and to hold in the Pacific."

W: I'm sure it was not so.

Q: There was an investigation and of course the investigation was overtaken by Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about the investigation?

W: No.

Q: Were you asked any questions?

W: No.

Q: To show you how human the guy was. You know, the Old Man liked to work with wood. One time we were out at Sonoma, his wife bought that 40 acres out there from Spreckels, before the Old Man saw it. But at any rate, when "Savvy" Cook had a place out there. He was an Admiral. He had all his furniture sent up from Honduras, with a bunch of mahogany. So we went over and got that furniture with the help of some of his help around the house.

Q: Savvy Cook had this Honduras furniture?

W: He had his furniture sent up from Honduras, beautiful wood, looked like hell, but the Old Man when he got it to his place, he had it all taken from Ft. Myer out there. When he got there, he took one piece of that, and he shined it down, and said: "This is how it's going to look." To me it looked like a bunch of packing boxes. But at any rate, he had made just a beautiful new thing. It had a lot of little

cubbyholes in it--a beautiful piece of furniture. I happened to be there one day when another medal arrived from the starving Armenians or something. He opened it up, and put it in this thing he had made himself, for his medals, hundreds of them in there you know. He looked at me and he said with a frustrated look--he put the thing in the little chest and he said: "What am I going to do with all this? But I tell you, there is a time when I could have used them." He said: "Look, I used to go to that mausoleum on Constitution Avenue on Tuesday to attend the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

Q: Public Health Building?

W: Yes, he'd sit there and look at the big map. I'll tell you a thing about the map to show you what a curious mind he had. He said: "I used to sit there in the Combined Chiefs of Staff," and he looked around and all the rest of those guys, he said had fruit salad all over their chests. And he said: "What did I have on my tunic? One WW I ribbon. I had a lot of other things, like a medal for the 6,000 ft. altitude record, but none of those showed on my tunic. Here I saw sitting there with all those other characters with all the fruit salad in the world. Now, I've got all these medals, and what good are they now." Gives you an idea that he felt himself a little outclassed as far as "spinach" was concerned.

Q: He always had a sensitivity about the fact that he never was in combat. Did he ever say anything to you about that?

W: No.

Q: In WW I, he was in Washington trying to get overseas, and he got there in time for the war to be over. This is why he was sort of vulnerable when some of his staff said they wanted to get overseas.

W: Everybody had an idea, Minton Kaye, he didn't know about Hank

Pool, see Hank Pool was his brother-in-law, and by the way you should talk to Hank.

Q: I have. But tell me about Minton Kaye.

W: I don't know too much about the fact that Minton Kaye never denied it, I think, when people thought he was the Old Man's brother-in-law.

Q: Why did Arnold like Minton Kaye?

W: I don't know. I don't think he particularly liked him.

Q: But he was close to the Old Man?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Well, you know Goddard had a lot of trouble with Minton Kaye.

W: If you haven't seen McCabe. McCabe did a lot of things on his own, too. One day, when, I was at McCabe's desk, and the Old Man came on the squawk box. I had the Old Man on my squawk box. I used to say to people in my office: "Would you like to see me summon my five-star general?" I'd push the thing down and the Old Man would answer. He was peculiar. If he buzzed me, he didn't want anybody in my office to answer that thing except me. If the girl answered the phone, it made him mad. So, if I wasn't there, they let go. But it was sort of funny. I just can't imagine myself ringing for my five-star general, but I would do it. His rank rested very lightly on his shoulders. Of course, as you say, the chemistry, we got along fine. We really did, I don't think the Old Man ever bawled me out once, but I can tell you about bawlings out. When he had his air staff, and everybody was a general, except his A-2, the A-2 was a character named Sorenson. One day I brought in some young 2nd LTs whom I went down surreptitiously and looked at the records. Flint DuPre was one. I found his record

down in Miami. I ordered these guys up into Washington. Strictly they shouldn't have let me see anything down there, but I got away with it. I took these guys, about four of them, up to Sorenson, and he said: "More newspapermen!" He was very anti-public information. He had no conception of what it could do for you. In fact, he didn't know the score. The Old Man had a feeling for public relations, as you know. At any rate, Sorenson was anti-public information, anti-everything except Intelligence. One day because he had done something, the Old Man called him up, and I went up with him. I've forgotten what it was. After the Old Man ate him out, on whatever this was, Sorenson stood there. He was only a Colonel, A-2 was a Colonel and all the rest of them were generals. The Old Man didn't go for him, because of this idea that he had a constricted feeling.

Q: Why did he give him the job in the first place?

W: I don't know, but he was there, and he didn't last forever. Clayton Bissell came later, and Bissell had been in trouble, but Bissell had a feeling for public information.

Q: George McDonald had this job for a while?

W: Yes, and he had a feeling for public information.

Q: Tommy White had the job for a while?

W: Yes, he did. Tom White in the beginning knew nothing about it, but that was missing in a lot of their West Point curriculum, they didn't understand. This was new.

Q: This is probably why Arnold went outside the regular military?

W: Yes, this was new. It was not thought of in those days. Well, back in the days of Sorenson. Sorenson stood there and I saw perspiration come out. He went down the hall, and he said to me, I

remember the words: "I'm neither fitted by my training nor by my inclination to know a damn thing about public information." I said: "Col Sorenson, why the hell don't you turn to somebody who--this is not an exact science, it is a trial and error thing. But why don't you turn to somebody who might help you?" That was the beginning of a rapprochement between me and Sorenson. I found out later on what he did. I found Sorenson receiving the press and the newspapers and the magazines. Somebody wrote a story flattering to him in a magazine, and he said: "How long has that thing been going on?" And I found him receiving people from the press without any clearance at all.

Q: In other words, the pendulum shifted?

W: He went from the sublime to the ridiculous, and this is what could happen to an Intelligence man.

Q: Did he get in trouble with Arnold for this?

W: He got in trouble for his, no, for his anti public information attitude in the beginning.

Q: He got in trouble with MacArthur because of the difference in reporting of the Bismarck sea operation, March 1943. Sorenson questioned the figures. MacArthur and Kenney claimed they had sunk 19 ships. Sorenson raised some questions from some other reports he received, and MacArthur was irate at Sorenson.

W: I mentioned to you about the map in the Combined Chiefs of Staff room, to show you what a curiosity the Old Man had. He sat there and looked at the thing, and he called me and McCabe in one day, and he said: "I sit there in those CCS meetings, and I look at a map, and it shows the Ural Mountains--a great big crack about 3,000 feet high." He

said: "We have everything in the Air Force. I want to know why those Ural Mountains are there." You see: he was sitting there woolgathering while these things were going on, and looking at the map. So McCabe and I went through, and we found out here that we had a young captain who was a geologist. We had everything in the AAF. McCabe called him at home. His wife answered. McCabe said: "General Arnold would like to see this fellow in his inner office at 9:00 AM tomorrow." The wife thought they were kidding her. Finally the Captain got on the line and said: "Yes sir." He did come in and he had written his thesis on the Ural Mountains. So he explained the theory on how the mountains existed. But here the Old Man was sitting there at a meeting and instead of being entranced with all the dissertations on the war, he was looking at the map wondering how they happened to be there. When there was the B-24 vs. B-17 business, about which was the better aircraft, I was present when he picked the crew of the B-24s in combat, bring them into his inner office and ask them all about it. He would bring the B-17 guys in there and ask them all about it. He did the same thing on the P-38s. His idea was to ask the man who owns one.

Q: Talking about Arnold and K.T. Keller?

W: Arnold called up K.T. Keller one time. There was some part hold up the B-29. There was some small thing that was holding it up. It wasn't perfect, I've forgotten what it was now. Finally, it got to be sort of a hot conversation, and Arnold said: "I want that thing by next week, or I will make it in my own basement at Ft. Myer." K.T. Keller got off his fat duff and produced it. Arnold had made some promises on the B-29, as you know, to Roosevelt, and these things were behind schedule. It was all just a little item.

Q: I want to ask you about the B-29. You say Roosevelt was bugging Arnold?

W: He made a certain commitment to Roosevelt about the B-29s and when they could be ready, and they were delayed beyond a reasonable time.

Q: Trouble with the engines, they caught fire?

W: Whatever the damn thing was, there was one other little part, Arnold and I went out to the Cleveland, to the NACA Laboratory.

Q: Ames Laboratory?

W: Yes, and we went out there, Arnold got in there and they were talking about these various things. They had shown him a lot of things that were coming out. He got up and said: "You tell me all about these beautiful things that are coming up." He said the trouble with you eggheads--he called them that to their face--"you are never willing to quit and say this is far enough and use it. Why don't I see some of these wonderful things on my airplanes now? You go on to the nth degree and to get them perfect as perfect as perfect, but let's quit somewhere along the line and put what you have on our airplanes." And he laid it on the line with them.

Q: Was John Victory out there?

W: Yes, sure John Victory?

Q: He was bugging John Victory about a 400 mile per hour airplane, wasn't he?

W: I don't remember that, but I do know that these very things that they told about how nice they were. We went out to see the first Bell jet too, in fact, in the hangar there at Muroc Lake. I knew that it had gone through downtown Buffalo because not very many people knew it. It had a prop on it to truck it through the streets. The jet had a prop

fixed on the front of it, so it would like an airplane.

Q: The B-29, did you go out to Salina with him? He went out there with Benny Meyers and they were trying to rush that thing, trying to get them out to the CBI.

W: I didn't go to Salina, but I know.

Q: Didn't he spend some time out there trying to get the airplane ready?

W: Well, I'm sure he did, because as you know, the first thing they planned was to strike Sasebo naval base with the B-29s at a certain date. Do you know what caused the cover plan to be developed? Some damned reporters hit the nail on the head. It was only one of a lot of stories that were printed. This is bad, though. When the Old Man saw that story--whoever it was, I've forgotten now, that printed the story--that they were going to use the B-29 to strike this Sasebo naval base in Japan, which happened to be the McCoy; it happened to be the plan. So the Old Man was quite concerned. Well I said: "To be concerned about it, would be to substantiate it." So the thing to do was to further confuse the issue.

Q: Well, tell me about your involvement in the cover plan?

W: The Old Man said to let this guy do what he pleased. It was not a very erudite thing to do. We just decided that these B-29s were being shipped to Chungking and so on. There was a bunch of security violations all over them. We did a number of things to make it apparent, not to purposely lie, but to imply.

Q: One of the thing you tried to imply was that they were going to use the European theater. Didn't you send one to England?

W: One, yes, I wanted to send more. This thing was like the

cornfield. The crows can count how many there are. The crows have a certain amount. If you have five people going into the cornfield, the crows count them and they know. If you have seven, the crows are limited on their counting ability. So I said the idea was at least two B-29s and we want to imply wherever we can to counteract this story, not to mention it at all. It hit the nail on the head, or that we were even concerned.

Q: You pretended you were being security conscious, but allowed word to get out?

W: Yes, that maybe these B-29s would be ready for OVERLORD.

Q: Was there also a plan to make people think it was being used as a supertransport across the Hump?

W: Yes, that was one of the things. The Hump flights were dangerous, and the loads were small, and we were sending those things down there. This was discussed. Why were we sending them down there? Well, we were sending them to be used as a transport across the mountains.

Q: You didn't want the Japs to think that we were going to attack Japan with them?

W: No, because one of the reporters, whoever it was, in a think piece, said these were going to be used at Sasebo naval base. I think if I remember rightly, that that was exactly the plan. So everybody was concerned. But as I pointed out to the Old Man, if you show your concern, you give it away.

Q: Let me ask you about Arnold and Drew Pearson?

W: Drew Pearson, I knew Drew, I knew his life very well. I knew his father was a minister.

Q: Why didn't he like Arnold?

W: I don't know that he didn't really like him. Pearson would call me at 5 minutes to 6 and try to clear a story, when he wanted to go on the air at 6:00. He tried all the tricks, now, Pearson would do this, for instance. Let me give you the case of some General. Pearson had the story that this General got on his own airplane in India and ran back through Africa, and somewhere in Africa there was a wounded Army man, and the crew wouldn't refuse to let the wounded guy on the airplane, and came back, playing cards and hi-jinxing all the way back to Washington. Well, when he called me with the story, I said that isn't right, that isn't true. Of course, Pearson observed the voluntary censorship but he tried to get around it every way he could. The voluntary censorship said you can't mention movements of general officers. Actually, his brother got on the line and we...

Q: What was his brother's name?

W: Can't remember. At any rate, I said, first of all, whenever we had a Drew Pearson thing, we'd say: "What are we stuck with? Let's find out the truth." I tried to find out the whole truth, and I called Drew and told him the whole damned truth, that it was an ATC ship. It was a full ship when it came in here, maximum gross load, with nobody put off, some disgruntled Army persons, of course, a lot of people used to drop notes, like you who we didn't like was one of the Giles' twin, Ben.

Q: He didn't like Barney Giles either.

W: He didn't like Ben either. Pearson was good because he kept a lot of generals from doing stuff that they would have gotten away with murder. But there was also the other extreme where some WAC, every time this WAC took a ride anywhere in Cairo, Ralph Royce was

mixed up in that too. Ralph Royce gave somebody a jeep.

Q: I've been through six years of Drew Pearson, and that's like 360 columns a year. He didn't like Arnold, and he didn't like Giles.

W: You know what Arnold told me once. There was an anti-Arnold feeling in the Herald Tribune in NY.

Q: Walter Millis.

W: Now, wait, it was deeper than that. It was. I corrected that. The Old Man said to me one day, we sat down like this, and he said: "The Herald Tribune doesn't like me." And I said: "Well, General, I don't think that is true. But let me say, if you can't fight them, join them." So I worked on Mrs. Reed Ogden--this is between you and me and the gate post--I gave Mrs. Reed a ride in a B-29, I authorized it. I did a lot of things like that. The first thing you know, Mrs. Reed was having us for lunch at the NY Herald Tribune, and the guy who didn't like him was the editorial guy whose son was on the Herald Tribune in Paris. The guy who didn't like him was the guy who controlled the editorial page.

Q: One man that didn't like him, didn't like the Air Force, was Walter Millis.

W: Well, the guy that didn't like Arnold apparently, was when Mrs. Reed became friendly. I kidnapped her one time when she came in to Marshall's office. She had had her time set different, and the tall Sergeant didn't know it. I took her into Arnold's office and I had a rapproachement between him and Mrs. Reed who was a fine woman. When her husband died, I sent some flowers to her husband's funeral in NY. I got about a six-page letter from Mrs. Reed in her own handwriting. She was a lady. I said to the Old Man: "Now, all right, just assume that

that they don't like you. If you can't fight them, join them. Let's work on them."

Q: One more item on Pearson. He never failed to take a potshot at Arnold. For example, he blamed him on the leak on the sealant on the transports.

W: The sealed tanks?

Q: Yes.

W: We had a guy who did that. He used to feed that to Pearson.

Q: Who was that, you mean an Air Force type?

W: Yes. They found him. If I remember rightly, and I'm not sure, he had some financial interest in the invention, and he kept shouting that they should have these things on the troop carrier gas tanks.

Q: He kept hitting this one. Well, Pearson also hit him on the marriage of Bruce Arnold to Barbara Douglas.

W: Well, what's wrong with that?

Q: Well, in the industrial-military complex, they didn't call it that as such, but he was hitting on it. You know he wrote several nasty columns about Douglas. He wrote that Douglas had sold his patents to the Japanese, you know, in 1939.

W: He gave them an airplane that wouldn't work. He sold them his first DC-4,and it was no good. Is that bad? Pratt Whitney sold them an engine.

Q: This was authorized by the State Dept at the time, but Pearson kept coming back?

W: He thought this was good journalism.

Q: How about Seversky?

W: Oh, don't get me into that one. Have you found the file on Seversky?

Q: I found several things on Seversky.

W: You know, that's Harry Bruno.

Q: Rockefeller Center?

W: He's still got Seversky. If you'd like to know the facts about Seversky.

Q: He and Arnold, they didn't have the right chemistry?

W: Because Sasha Seversky is a big phony. Art Ennis went out to see Disney and told him not to make the picture. Disney wishes they'd paid attention to Art because it was one of the few Disney flops. I hope this doesn't get me into libel with Harry Bruno.

Q: What was his connection with Seversky?

W: He's a press agent for Jackie Cochran, Floyd Odlum, and I see that he got Jackie something or other. Harry Bruno...

Q: Tell me about Seversky.

W: Well, as you know, there is a file somewhere around here on Seversky that will show that he didn't lose his leg in the war at all. It was from an accident. That he is no more of an engineer than you are. He didn't design. I was in the Old Man's office, when either, I can't remember if he talked to him on the phone. Yes, he called him. Sasha came out with something. He was a good Monday morning quarterback, and so the Old Man said to him with sarcasm: "Sasha now if you were Chief of the Air Force, how would you do this, and how would you do that?"

Q: Did he bring him into the office one time?

W: Well, he may have, yes, he brought him in.

Q: Did he show him some charts and ask "what would you do if you were in my place?"

W: What would you do? It is like asking your office boy: "What would you do to build the Pentagon?" In my opinion, Seversky was simply built up by Harry Bruno, the press agent. Harry Bruno is now head of the Lotus Club or whatever it is. Actually, he is strictly a no good phoney.

Q: Were Arnold and Seversky reconciled late in the war?

W: I don't think so.

Q: They were always at odds?

W: Well, because Seversky didn't know what the answers were. He was a Monday morning quarterback. I didn't finish the story, because when Arnold got him and said: "What would you do on this," Seversky said: "It would take me a little time." Arnold said: "How long, tomorrow, next week, a month, how long do you need?" And the guy said: "A month," let's say, I don't remember what it was. Arnold said: "All right, you have a month. You come back and tell me what to do in these cases,"and Seversky never showed.

Q: I've heard stories that are slightly varied, I'm not sure which one is true. I mean these are recollections. But basically Arnold threw the monkey on Seversky's back and said: "Show me where I'm doing wrong, and how you could do better?"

W: What was the one, who threw the inkwell at who? Do you know that story?

Q: No.

W: Ask Rosie who threw the inkwell at what. I don't remember the details. But somebody threw an inkwell, whether it was Arnold or not, I'm not sure.

W: Ask Rosie when you talk to him. (NOTE: Rosie O'Donnell threw an inkwell at a clock that was buzzing.)

Q: You know, Kuter was involved in a campaign to cozy up to the Washington Post and Eugene Meyer?

W: Kuter was appointed to the Academy by the Lt. Governor of Illinois and he came from Rockford, Illinois; Larry Kuter, in my opinion, was strictly a big phoney. His wife, Ethel, liked the theatrical people, and she thought, they were also involved with my little deal with C.R. Smith, because they thought you knew. I could tell you about theatrical people. Let's skip Kuter, because if he cozied up, he would be doing it as an amateur, not knowing how.

Q: He tried, he got them together for dinner.

W: Kuter with Pan Am now?

Q: Yes.

W: I congratulated him. He said he wasn't going to Pan Am the last time I saw him. But any rate, Arnold, you know, was human, and I had Clark Gable come in to see me a couple of times. One time I made the mistake of telling the guards at the door, when I came in for the day, that he was coming. By the time he came in, the place was hanging with human flies all around. Everybody wanting to see Clark Gable. Gable, of course, was a pretty good guy. He used to tell some stories on himself about how they always figured him to be a superman, and he really wasn't. He came in my office. The guy with him was from MGM. He went into the service with him as a sort of Damon and Pythias deal. When Gable was being promoted, the Old Man was this human like for the theatrical, he insisted upon pinning the insignia on Gable.

W: Arnold demoted Eddie Perrin from a full BG to a Captain. Later on he committed suicide. He was a BG.

Q: Was this in connection with the SILVERPLATE operation?

W: What was his name? He was a nice guy. He took it on the lam, they sent him up to Rome after he was out.

Q: Where was he stationed?

W: Here in the Pentagon.

Q: Why did he demote him?

W: Alcoholic.

Q: I want you to tell me about Eaker, do you have some other anecdotes?

W: One of the shotgun. To show you how careful the Old Man was with his image, he didn't think of it in that way, but the Old Man liked to hunt, and he told me one day that some company was getting up a special gun--the 100,000th shotgun that they had sold the Air Force for their gunnery practice. He was pretty naive about it. I said: "They are getting you up a special gun?" He said: "Yes, it's going to be mounted this way and that way, it's the 100,000th gun." After I listened to him, I said: "General, you can't take the gun." He said: "But I want it." I said: "Of course, you want it." He was just like a child. "But this business. Now I know you've done nothing for the company. It doesn't look right. Just because they think it's a good press agent stunt to give you the 100,000th gun and you like to hunt, this is going to look bad in print." In case anybody prints the story, it looks like Arnold is taking. I said: "You don't want people to think so," and he never took the gun. So that's why some of the letters I have which . said, while I didn't always agree with you, as far as I was concerned, I never pulled any punches with the boss. That's why I think I got along so well. A lot of people would say: "Yes, General Arnold,"

when it was wrong, and they should have said: "No, General Arnold!"

Q: Were you aware of an order that Stratemeyer put out, asking all people in procurement to list their assets, and to list their stockholdings?

W: No, but it sounds like Peru, Indiana to me (Stratemeyer was from Peru, Indiana). Arnold got unhappy with Horace Shelmire who was not above having little doodads like having the Air Force tie, and things like that, which the Old Man got unhappy with because it looked like--even though it was not--there was no money involved, it looked like somebody was making some money on the Air Force. It was a tie by which a civilian could recognize he was an Air Force officer.

Q: He was very scrupulous about the appearance of conflict of interest?

W: Very much.

Q: In this case of the gun, he couldn't resist.

W: He said: "I want it." As soon as I pointed out it was liable to do something, he was off.

W: I wasn't present at the one in which he and Marshall were hunting, but somewhere.

Q: Bismarck, North Dakota, wasn't it?

W: Actually, it wasn't there, it was hunting pheasantwhen I almost shot him. Shelmire was along and Hank Pool was along.

Q: Where was this?

W: This was in North Dakota, Bismarck.

Q: 1944?

W: Yes, the General used to give a game dinner once a year at Bolling Field. It was a time when the Old Man got out of patience with Horace Shelmire, and soon after that, Horace disappeared from his office.

I'm not a very good hunter. The pheasants were so fat, they didn't want to take off, so we hid in the cornfield, and one group would go to one end and the other would go towards the other, and these birds had to rise then. They used to run otherwise. I got so excited that I just pulled up my gun one time, and if it hadn't been a miracle I would have shot the Old Man with a shotgun. But, however, somebody did the very same thing later on. They were hunting with Marshall and somebody pulled up a gun and shot it, and the Old Man got so mad and he got some B-B shot in his head. Arnold got the B-B.

W: Talking about a cover plan, the Old Man had a very bad heart attack. He went down to the Biltmore. He had been due to go to some big conference.

Q: YALTA, it was in January 1945.

W: So somebody came to me and said, well now--talk about a cover plan, Dr. David Grant and I had figured what we could say. We didn't want it known he had a heart attack.

Q: This was right around Roosevelt's Inauguration Day, was it not?

W: I think so, it was when the Old Man had this very bad heart attack.

Q: Was it in the Pentagon when he had it?

W: No, I think it was at Ft. Myer. They took him down to the hospital at Biltimore, in Miami. They put him in that tower. By the way, I met somebody here the other day, some woman, who had been present. So we discussed the Old Man's heart attack, I don't remember her name.

Q: In this building?

W: No, out in California. She talked about Arnold and his heart attack at the Biltmore. But any rate, they got him down to nothing. When he came back from that, he poked me in my fat gut and he said:

"Bill"--and of course, I've always been a little too heavy, and I like to eat. But he said: "We ought to get you down there and give you a little milk toast and some lettuce." He said: "That would be good for you," and I said, "General, I'm sorry, I'm a meat and potato guy, I can't go." They had him on nothing, but he was ambulatory, and we didn't want the public to know. Dr. Grant and I got together, and we didn't ever tell anybody what it was that he had, but we implied also that it might have been--I remember because I had never heard of it before--a typical virus pneumonia because first of all it was thought, I don't know who I was in on this with, maybe Giles, I've forgotten. Anyway, we didn't want the Old Man to be downgraded for not being present at YALTA. He was supposed to be there, and we didn't want to have anybody think well why...

Q: Kuter replaced him on that.

W: Who is this guy that is different, married a wealthy woman--Pinky Craig. The Old Man called McCabe one day and he said to McCabe: "What do you mean by threatening to do something to my generals?" And McCabe said: "Sir, what part of my daily activities to you refer to?" And the Old Man said: "You have threatened to remove one of my general officers from his job." And McCabe said: "Sir, I threatened to remove no general from his job because that is not my function. I have no ability to remove any general from his job." He said: "That is purely your function, and if you asked me what I would recommend about it, I would recommend that you do." So it was sort of funny, because Pinky Craig had called Arnold and said McCabe had threatened him.

Q: Back to this cover plan, where you and Grant worked out this thing on virus pneumonia.

W: And we sort of dropped the hint. We didn't mention heart attack, we mentioned a typical ailment, because the Old Man was ambulatory and he was seen. We said: "What can he have, where he could be seen?" He was around driving the cart, and picked up some WACs down there, and inquired of the WACs all about their troubles in the AAF. The Old Man was, after he was ambulatory, they kept him in there quite a while.

Q: He was there for two months.

W: This is something I haven't thought about in years.

Q: I wanted to ask about, remember Dr. Marquardt, the heart specialist? Now he accompanied Arnold on several trips.

W: They gave him a phony thing to look good. They gave him an aide's badge. Dr. Marquardt had a five-star badge.

Q: There was some trouble between Dr. Marquardt and Mrs. Arnold. Mrs. Arnold went down there, and I guess they didn't let her in to see the General and she sort of left in a huff.

W: I don't know about that.

Q: Arnold was worried--we are talking about his heart attack now--he was worried that Marshall was going to retire him, that he could no longer cut the mustard?

W: This was part of the idea, the image that Dr. Grant kept alive.

Q: Is Grant alive?

W: Yes, he's around Washington somewhere. Go and get it from him. Don't pin it on me.

Q: I know a lot about this. He was worried that Marshall would retire him?

W: I think justifiably so.

Q: Didn't, McCabe and Peterson were coming down every couple of days and Arnold, in his record, very elaborate.

W: This phony character named Maury Carr, tried to get aboard that airplane.

Q: Is that the Major you were talking about?

W: Yes, he tried.

Q: Arnold was trying to conduct Air Force business from a horizontal position?

W: Well in the tower of the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables. There are so many things I haven't thought of in 20 years.

Q: Was he successful at this? Was he able to conduct operations?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Lovett became very much concerned in February and March 1945, that the Air Force was sort of leaderless in Washington. You know, you have all those conferences, because Arnold would give instructions to his aides. But you'd have all these top level conferences, Arnold wasn't present. And Giles did not have the stature that Arnold had. This is why the decision was made to bring in Eaker, am I correct in that? They brought in Eaker as Deputy Commander, this is April 1945. The war in Europe was winding down, Arnold had come back to Washington.

W: I don't even know that Eaker was called in, I don't remember that.

Q: Arnold came back to Washington, and they sent him on a recuperation trip. He went to Cannes.

Q: Eaker came in as Deputy Commander. Now Arnold took a trip to Cannes, the Riviera, it was supposed to be an inspection trip, but actually Marshall wanted him to take it easy.

W: Please be careful on the Eaker thing.

Q: Well, I want to get into the Eaker business.

W: I think I'd better stay out, because Eaker is around town.

Q: This is just very private. Nobody has access to this but Loosbrock and Green. This is one of the things, I have a great deal on it. Perhaps I can tell you more than you can tell me on this, but there are some things that you can tell me that I don't know. But anyway, Arnold went to Europe and they had a meeting on April 19, 1945, and Spaatz was there.

W: Right after '45 I left at my own request, to go to Berlin.

Q: Around the end of the war, VE Day?

W: Yes.

Q: Right before VE Day, now Roosevelt had died a month before, and Arnold and Eaker....

W: I had been tied here and every time I tried to get out, Eaker gave the compliment of trying to get to Europe.

Q: Well, they had this little meeting.

W: I'd have been a buck general. He took Harris Hull. I saw him one day, and I said, how did you make Buck General, I had a letter which I meant to bring with me, Colonel...

Q: Why didn't Arnold promote you?

W: I wanted to show you the letter, he recommended me to be promoted, nobody acted on it.

Q: Was this about the time he was leaving Washington?

W: No, June 11, 1945, and a glowing letter.

Q: You'd been in Washington all through the war, then?

W: Yes, and every time I tried to get away, I was over in Europe and Stratemeyer was there. Eaker and he got together, and Eaker wanted me to come. The only ones to go out to that part at Widewing were Jock Whitney and I. We were two colonels, the others were all generals. At

that time, Eaker had been trying to get me to come work for him, and Stratemeyer said: "I'll handle it." So he did whatever he did, I got a wire a couple of days later, Arnold said: "Your services needed here immediately. Return at once." I hadn't been planning to come back for about two weeks, and when he said return at once, that meant everything I had a booking on the ATC around through the north, but because it said: "Return at once," they insisted that Arnold meant: "Return at once." I came home on Pan Am from Ireland. But we had to wear civilian clothes, a nd we had to go down in a boat, and it took us eight days to get from Shannon River. We came down eight days around South America, across the South Atlantic, and up to Bermuda and up to New York. It took us eight days.

Q: When was this?

W: Pan American was using boats...commercial. I came back about the week that Governor Lehman was named head of UNRRA and he was on the ship.

Q: Must have been around 1944. Well, anyway, this meeting I started to tell you about, when they said they want to get closer to Truman than they were to Roosevelt, and they were going to try to get Quesada into the White House as Aide to the President.

W: That would have been an awful thing.

Q: But it didn't happen that way. Truman wanted Missouri people in.

W: He didn't want "Greasy Pete" in there. Quesada hung onto the tails of Spaatz and Eaker and everything else.

Q: When did you first become aware that Arnold was dissatisfied with the job that Eaker was doing?

W: I don't know the date.

Q: Let me try to place it in time--Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid in August 1943.

W: The losses were awful, and who's the guy that got the Medal of Honor, Leon Johnson?

Q: The guy who wrote the story of RAINBOW FIVE plan that Roosevelt was supposed to be getting us into a war was Chesly Manly.

W: The only thing, I know Chesly Manly well. I know nothing about the leak on the plan, as I haven't the slightest idea who gave it to him, but I do know that I was in Chicago once and Wayne Thomis, who is on the Tribune with Chesly Manly.

Q: Well, Chesly Manly said, or Wheeler said that he gave it to Chesly Manly, and they thought they were duty bound to publish it. Now Wheeler claims that this Air Force captain gave it to him.

W: In my opinion, the implication that Arnold had anything to do with feeding that thing to the Tribune is absolutely hogwash.

Q: Well, I believe so, too. But in order to do this, we may have to find out who did it.

W: Wayne told me that he had been called in and they finally decided to let it go since they had no further investigation or any showdown about it, that it had been dreamed up. Manly, if I remember correctly, had said that he just dreamed this up on his own, he had no, it just happened to be a coincidence that he dreamed up this plan. I don't know much about it.

Q: No, he quoted extensively from this plan. He had the plan.

W: If I remember though, when it got into the Federal Court or the investigation in Chicago, they decided to let the thing drop.

Q: Well, they let the thing drop because it was overtaken. You see, theAxis really couldn't take advantage of it, because what it said

was: "We'll go all out in Europe and hold in the Pacific." The Axis could not act upon it because Pearl Harbor happened soon after that.

Q: You say Chesly Manly was helped in writing this article?

W: I think as I remember it, that Chesly Manly, not only was he helped in writing the story by Wayne Thomis from the Chicago Tribune who maybe is still there. If I remember correctly, Wayne Thomis--and I didn't pay much attention to it, and if anything had been done, if Arnold were to have leaked it, he would have to have been a superman to do it. I would say impossible to do anything like that without my knowing it, or without McCabe knowing it, because he would have no contacts with the Chicago Tribune. He had no contacts with the Chicago Tribune. He couldn't have dispatched a Captain to do it.

Q: Waldrop has compounded his association of Arnold with this leak.

W: How does Waldrop know? What does he say? How does he know it?

(OFF THE RECORD)

Q: Let's talk about Eaker. Schweinfurt-Regensburg, when Arnold had misgivings about that. Arnold came to see you?

W: I was up there one day. I can't remember the details of this. He said: "Bill, I've got, more or less, a problem, and I just don't know how to do it exactly," because he said he knew that, how Eaker and he had been buddy-pals, and written books together and all that sort of thing, and here he was going to have to do something about it because, words to the effect that he was in dutch because of the heavy losses and other things in the 8th AF. So I had suggested when the politicians wanted to get rid of a police captain out in Chicago, they had a game of musical chairs on the deal, and everybody would change hands, and you could never tell who exactly went where and why, and

who was in the doghouse. So I said: "Why don't you do it?" So I think, when they did change Eaker, if you notice....

Q: They changed around the whole staff.

W: That was one of the reasonings behind the changes of staff. Arnold could do it.

Q: Arnold had great qualms about this because of a personal association with Eaker.

W: They had been friends for life, but when you are fighting a war, and maybe you have other pressures like Marshall and Spaatz, and President Roosevelt. When you have all those people on your back. Arnold, of course, never socialized with Roosevelt. Did you notice that? There was no socialization there. He wanted to keep away from that. He mentioned to me. He wanted to keep away from this socialization because he didn't go to parties or anything else. But Roosevelt was his boss, and Arnold, of course, started out in Pennsylvania. His family wanted him to be a doctor. They were good, conservative Republicans. Roosevelt was a liberal Democrat. He didn't want to get mixed up in this business of politics. That's why he kept away from this.

Q: Was he introduced to Willkie in the campaign of 1940?

W: I don't know.

Q: I've been told this. Willkie came out for unification and maybe this is one of the reasons that Roosevelt did not cotton to the Air Force because he felt that they were siding with the GOP.

W: I don't know. I met Willkie's brother.

Q: Somebody had told me that he introduced him to Willkie. But the man who told me is not one of the highest reputation.

W: Let me tell you, Arnold was not the type to go around and do this thing, anymore than he would go around and slide something to the Chicago Tribune. He wouldn't do that. He did know Casey Jones at the Post, personally. If he got mixed in something, he'd get on the phone. He'd tell Suzy to get Casey Jones on the line, Casey would ask him various things, because Casey was managing editor of the Post--not the same crowd at all that is there now. But I'll tell you, Arnold just couldn't have been involved in that Chicago Tribune thing. Is Chesly Manly in this area?

Q: I don't know. I can find out.

W: If Chesly Manly is around here, I can run into him. I'm a member of the Press Club, but I would take special efforts.

Q: I'll find out if Chesly Manley is in the area.

W: Because I think I can say: "Hey, I just ran into a book by Tristram Coffin who implied that Arnold had been involved...

Q: You see he doesn't mention right off, but if you look in the index, the publisher might have taken it out of the text to avoid libel.

W: That could be my wedge about getting into there.

Q: You mentioned a lot of little things about Arnold. Did he always have a smile on his face?

W: You know the smile meant absolutely nothing because his smile--he always had a smile, almost always--but a smile didn't necessarily mean that he was loving you.

Q: Could it precede a storm?

W: Yes, indeed, it often did.

Q: Did he have a pretty good vocabulary when he cussed somebody out, or how did he cuss somebody out?

W: I don't think he used any swear words at all, but if you have ever been cussed out by him, I never have been. I saw him cuss out Col Sorenson and there was no mistake about what he meant, when he got through, and Col Sorenson understood it, because he went out of there perspiring heavily. He didn't use any bad words, but you knew it if you displeased him.

Q: Did he grab people in the hall to do jobs for him?

W: Yes.

Q: Sometimes the jobs were alien to their experience?

W: Might be. That didn't make any difference to him. The table of organization, that meant nothing to him.

Q: He was too impatient to go through channels?

W: He didn't know anything about channels. Talking about channels, I remember one time we went down from Sonoma down to Los Angeles to give a medal to Jack Warner over at March Field. We stopped to pick up the Warners in Los Angeles. We were riding in a plush DC-3. Up to that time the Old Man had been able to get only bucket jobs, so he said: "How in the world did he ever get this?" Somebody had arranged this thing, probably Lou Quinn had arranged it. So he went over, one of those little fan things which the Air Force agreed to give to the Corps Area. When Arnold was at Sonoma, whenever he wanted an airplane--I could tell you some other things about how they sort of forgot he was once Chief of the Air Force--but he went over and asked a young Captain who was flying him--he said he was tickled to death to get a nice plush airplane, but how, do I get on an airplane like this, when I don't get a bucket job. He didn't know anything about channels, didn't know how

to work it either. And didn't care much. He didn't care about any Army regulations.

Q: Just wanted to get it done.

Q: What about his relations with Lovett?

W: They were very, very cordial. They were warm. They were tenuous. I could see that they were warm and cordial, and Lovett also was a very fine man who was like an effete Easterner. You never thought that he came from Texas.

Q: Effete snob?

W: Yes, he looked like, he married Baby Brown, of Brown Harriman, as you might know. He had a guy named Col Brownell in his office, who was a brother or cousin of Herbert Brownell. Arnold sort of got to counteract that, and got a lawyer in his office named Proctor.

Q: Right, he died a couple of years ago.

W: I heard that Bob Lovett was offered the Secretary of the Air Force job. Turned it down. You know who his partner was, his partner was Jim Douglas who became Secretary of the Air Force.

Q: This was a great loss, because Bob Proctor could have told us a lot.

W: Absolutely. Bob Proctor was a great member of that society that wants to mediate everything?

W: The first time I met Douglas was when he was a Colonel in ATC, he brought over all the Elliott Roosevelt dog letters, which I had to handle. Blaze was the dog's name. Blaze had a stable mate which almost became another cause celebre. He was coming over on a boat, and Army Transport Service almost got their neck in a jam. They made a General in ATC who used to work for United Airlines.

Q: The Blaze incident happened within a day or two of Arnold's heart attack?

W: Well, I don't think it had any connection with it.

Q: No, I don't mean any connection, but Arnold wasn't there personally to handle it.

W: I don't think so. But I had to handle all the Blaze correspondence, and people I knew everywhere would call me up on the phone, and say: "Ruff, ruff, ruff," and it got to be a pain in the neck.

Q: Were you aware, at this very time, Elliott's promotion was up for debate, for BG.

W: Don't go into the business of Elliott Roosevelt and his promotion.

W: But he got the promotion. Arnold and Spaatz had correspondence on his promotion. Of course, legally.

Q: What did Arnold say. (OFF THE RECORD)

Q: These pictures Elliott took?

W: Arnold said: "Why don't I see those beautiful air pictures in the paper?" And I said: "Because Elliott Roosevelt snagged on to them with his men in Africa and takes the negatives and blows them up and takes a bow with Marshall for saying, 'look at the beautiful pictures that my men took today,' and 99% of them were all classified. So we cannot print them." I told Arnold: "This is why you don't see them in the papers." This is what the Old Man wanted to know why he didn't see these things. He went to a meeting and Gen Marshall showed him a bunch of pictures taken by Elliott, and he asked me: "Why didn't I see them in the paper?"

Q: You know he corresponded with Spaatz on Elliott's promotion. Spaatz wanted to promote him,and Arnold said "no," we were going to get into trouble on it. And as I piece it together, it was just about

this time that Arnold had his heart attack, and a week or two later Elliott had his star.

Q: On related issue, what were the relations between Arnold and Marshall?

W: They were very cordial.

Q: But it was always on a slightly unequal level. I noticed correspondence.

W: Marshall was the boss.

Q: It was "Dear Arnold," and Arnold would write, "Dear General," and this was always maintained.

W: Yes, because of the fact that General Marshall, much to everybody's surprise. When VMI got into the picture. You know the old story about Gen Drum?--"you can't beat our Drum." They said one of the reasons Roosevelt didn't make Gen Drum the Chief of Staff was because of his wife's sister who lived with him, who ran the show, and because of the fact that everybody went around saying, "you can't beat our Drum." So when Marshall was made Chief of Staff, he <u>was</u> the Chief of Staff, and Arnold knew this. He knew that even though they had been friends since the days of the Philippines.

Q: Drum had hoped to succeed Malin Craig?

W: He expected to be Chief.

Q: And then they appointed Marshall who was junior to him.

W: They appointed Marshall who was not even a West Pointer. He was a VMI man and that just about killed all the West Pointers. But Roosevelt did, and it was the smartest thing he ever did, or otherwise we might have lost the war. As for General Drum, his wife and sister lived with him and it was said she ran the roost. Wife and the sister

ran him, so that was one reason he didn't make it.

Q: Did you ever hear the story that Arnold drank a lot?

W: It's not true. Not in my days of association with him.

Q: There was one story. Do you remember John Callan O'Laughlin, who was the editor of the Army Navy Journal?

W: Yes.

Q: There was a story around Washington about Roosevelt hesitating about Arnold because of Arnold's reputation of a drinker.

W: That's not so. He might have been a drinker as a younger man, but...

Q: Not in your experience?

W: He didn't drink anything except a little sherry and I can tell you a funny story about that. One time in Seattle, we all went to have dinner, and the people who promoted the dinner, after the thing was over--Chuck Kerwood was involved in this. Chuck is a great guy, but we were in this hotel in Seattle, and in the night time these people sent over a bunch of scotch and Chuck Kerwood who was in the lobby when the stuff came, glommed on it, and snitched all of it, including the bottle of sherry which the Old Man wanted for himself. The Old Man drank sherry once in a while, not very much. I don't know of any hard liquor I saw him drink. But the hard liquor disappeared, and some drunken woman came into my office one day, and I told Chuck that that was a dirty trick, and Chuck was only there on another matter, he wasn't on that at all. He glommed on to all the liquor they sent over and threw a big party. The reason I found out about it was I didn't go to the party. I wasn't invited, but I found out a lot of people had gone to Chuck's party, he was a typical Robin Hood, he's rob the

rich to pay the poor. He didn't do it for himself, he just stole all the liquor.

Q: Arnold mentioned that Roosevelt invited him over for an old-fashioned, and he knew he was back in the good graces of Roosevelt, this was following Arnold's problems with Morgenthau.

W: No, I wasn't aware of the Morgenthau problem.

Q: This probably preceded your tour. Morgenthau wanted to ship all our planes out to the English and French. This was right before the start of the war, and Arnold was given the job to build up the Air Corps, it was pretty hard to do both of these because there weren't enough planes coming off the assembly lines.

W: Did you know that one hassle involved in that was the 299, the prototype of the B-17? I remember the first one, was cracked up at Wright Field in a takeoff on a testing flight, because somebody forgot to unlock the airlines, or something. In the Congress they shouted: "No more money for those expensive airplanes!"

Q: This must have been before the war?

W: Yes, it was. Well, I heard about it as I was covering aviation on a paper in Chicago.

Q: How about Roosevelt and King?

W: I told you about the five stars which I gave to Arnold, and I had them all made in England, months before Arnold knew what shape they were going to be in.

Q: Who thought of that idea?

W: Admiral King's design, and I have a letter. I'll send you a copy. I gave some to Marshall. I had a little note back from Marshall saying he was glad to get them, but Arnold said: "How in the world did

you ever know the shape they were going to be in,"because they had brought the first five stars in a line. He said in the letter: "Is that a military secret?" He was kidding me.

Q: But you knew that King thought it up first.

W: I never told Arnold. I found out who had been responsible. They told me Admiral King, but not to mention it.

Q: If he had known then he probably wouldn't wear them. Were they on pretty distant, cool relationship?

W: I don't think so. I think King was distant and cool to everybody. Here's another little item about after the Old Man had retired and was out in Sonoma.

W: Yes, and he, one time for Christmas, their new house had just been, I knew that the Old Man like liqueurs and things like that, things that he could serve at a party, and particularly one time when I had been overseas, I brought back some Goldvasser which was hard to find, a liqueur that you couldn't find, so this time, after the house was done. For Christmas I sent out a little basket of stuff for their new house guest room in their house and it happened to be some cologne with speckles of gold water in it, and when the Old Man got it he thought it was Goldvasser, something to drink, and he put it aside. When I went out to visit him, he said they kept it for a long time and one night they had some guests and he thought about the gold water, and he asked Bea to get it and they served it. He asked: "What are you trying to do, kill all my guests?" He served them cologne.

Q: What did it say?

W: I think it said: Goldvasser Cologne, I just did it because he liked "Goldvasser," and didn't have the slightest idea.

Q: When you were out at the Ranch to see him. Was he pretty tired? Did he slow up quite a bit when he was out at the Ranch?

W: No, actually, he didn't. As I tell you, we went over to Savvy Cook's, and he had Bruce Simmons to help us, I guess. We went over and brought the stuff back in a jeep.

Q: How did he decide to write the book? Did you have any connection with Laidlaw?

W: No, no, I didn't. He wanted to do that. I think why it didn't go so well. It was too damned late; everybody put out a book.

Q: Well, of course, it was two-dimensional. He didn't get into any issues.

W: I was not involved in the book at all.

Q: He wrote a series of articles for the McNaught Syndicate.

Q: You were talking about some other articles he wrote?

W: He went to work, when he was in Sonoma. They loved him there. He had his own collection of model planes, and I think they still have them on exhibit there. But Ceely Murphy, who owned the Sonoma Index, was a newspaper brat, an ink-stained wretch, who had run away from her father. He had owned an Oakland paper. She ran away and married an itinerant, drunken typesetter, and she was really quite a power in that area politically. They lived in the General Vallejo barracks there in Sonoma which had been given to the State of California.

W: He worked for the Sonoma Index Tribune, he'd write pieces for it once in a while. He said to me: "I write for it, but I have to subscribe to it, because she said you are not a professional. She makes me pay $3.00 a year. But here she comes along and gives you free copies of it." And I said: "Well, because I'm one of the specials." One time when Ceely and her husband came to Washington, it was when Truman was here. He was away, down at Key West and through my connections at

the White House I then had, I took Ceely and put her at Mr. Truman's desk, and that was the night of the windstorm. I called her "Madame President." She was really quite a power in her own way in Sonoma. But Arnold was well received in Sonoma, as you know.

Q: You were in the office during Pearl Harbor, weren't you?

W: I was in NY in a hotel on that weekend.

Q: He was down in Sacramento shooting quail with Donald Douglas, was he not?

W: I don't know. We all got ordered--I had an AT-6 at Newark. I remember getting ordered to come back to Washington. I was a little hung over, but came back anyway.

Q: Do you remember a guy named McRae or Fred Dean?

W: Freddy Dean, Freddy used to sit outside the General's office. I used to say to him, Freddy, quit wearing the Old Man's stars. I'd known Freddy for a long time. He used to be the guard, he was St. Peter at the Old Man's gate.

Q: How about Norstad? Was he on pretty good terms with Arnold?

W: Well, Arnold thought pretty much of him. He was a dapper boy.

Q: Cabell and Norstad were the first Advisory Council.

W: Cabell went into Intelligence and became the great sphinx, didn't he?

Q: Right, but Norstad, Arnold was very devoted to Norstad, was he not?

W: Yes. When Arnold was Chief of the 20th AF and ran it from the Pentagon, Norstad was sitting right there. He was a buck general.

Q: Did Norstad go out, was he a hatchet man to tell Hansell? Do you know anything about Hansell being relieved by LeMay?

W: Possum Hansell, I don't know, but I'll tell you that Norstad didn't have the stuff. Some woman named Alice Rogers Hagen had written a piece. She had gone out and had an interview with LeMay. She was with North American Newspaper Alliance. She sat down and wrote the whole piece and it was bad stuff. I've forgotten what it was. This was bad public relations. Whatever LeMay told her we were not quite so sure that LeMay wasn't stupid, whatever he said. So I went up to Norstad and he said: "I'm going out there next week," and he said: "I'll see, I'll take care of this matter." He was a buck general in the Pentagon, and working for the Old Man--sort of a No. 2 Deputy Commander of the 20th AF, which was run out of the Pentagon. Well, so Norstad went out and marched up the hill and marched back down again. Here's what LeMay said: "Yes, I said it, and I'll say it again." That was the end of the whole deal. That's how Norstad handled it.

Q: I would guess that this happened after LeMay got the job, because up to that time he wasn't so cocksure, I think. Do you know anything about Hansell, Hansell was one of Arnold's close young men?

W: I think it was something to do with his hearing, too. Possum was once public relations chief of the Air Force. He was in this chain somewhere of mine.

Q: Maybe he was in that, but he was in Plans.

W: Yes, but he was...

Q: Kuter, Ken Walker and Harold George.

W: Kuter was supposed to be the great brain.

Q: You don't think so? Arnold had great confidence in him, did he not?

W: I think so.

Q: Did Arnold ever question that?

W: No, I think he thought Kuter was good.

Q: But some others didn't?

W: Well, I didn't, particularly.

Q: Hanseli was a broken man when he came back.

W: I think Possum Hansell wasn't probably the great brain that Arnold thought he was.

Q: I think he was a great intellectual, but not a leader like LeMay.

W: Yes.

Q: But he was not a leader. LeMay was after Arnold's own heart.

W: LeMay was sort of a "butcher" leader though. He was a butcher; he was a Patton.

Q: But he got the job done, and as you pointed out, Arnold wanted the job done.

W: Well, Arnold did have, but he didn't want to face the issue. When I talk about Patton, Patton had done the thing, hang the costs, and LeMay was "hang the cost." Some of the others, you know LeMay's dictum to his pilots that he wanted nobody in the Strategic Air Command that was either unlucky or no good. He said: "If you're unlucky, goodbye." LeMay had a lot of good rugged ideas, which were cold. There was no sentiment involved. He could send a guy out. He didn't like to kill them, but he knew when they came back that there would be certain files missing up there.

Q: What do you mean?

W: LeMay knew there would be certain losses. He accepted those. He didn't like them any more than anybody does. But he knew this was war.

Q: What about Arnold and Spaatz?

W: I think Arnold and Spaatz got along very well.

Q: Spaatz was inarticulate, but he must have been a good leader?

W: Yes, he was. I remember, barber used to cut Spaatz' hair when he was a Major. Ruthie Spaatz was pushing, she changed his name. Put the extra 'a' in it.

Q: That's because people were calling him "Spatz." When did he change his name? Around '38,'39 or '40?

W: I don't know, but I know she put the extra 'a' in there. Didn't make a difference. A lot of people still called him "Spatz."

Q: This was a ticket to the Aleutians? Was he very sensitive about that?

W: I don't know that he was.

Q: She was?

W: I've forgotten. Spaatz is the one who said to me--was it Spaatz or was it Giles, I can't remember. Talk about gentlemen blowing security. One of them said something to me about OVERLORD. I'd never heard about OVERLORD till he mentioned it. The story was, you know, you said to somebody the way to find out if you were bigoted. If the guy said no, I'm pretty reasonable, he wasn't in on it.

Q: You know, the word OVERLORD appeared in a crossword puzzle in the London Telegraph, two days before the event. Somebody was trying to transmit a message. There is a book on this right now, last Sunday's paper there was a review.

W: Did somebody really try to do it?

Q: I don't know, just speculating about it.

W: OVERLORD appeared, it could be happenstance. I do crossword puzzles. OVERLORD is not a normal crossword word.

Q: We are talking about OVERLORD and the leak of D-Day.

W: This is what I understand actually happened in that case. This, I don't know of my own knowledge, but I was told. I can't remember by whom, at the time it happened. Gen Miller was at a dinner in London. Also at the same dinner was a high woman official of the Red Cross. At the time, he made a speech and so on, and sat down. The woman said to him--there were a group of people there, including some BG, I don't remember who. I didn't hear his name, and I understand he did not love Gen Miller very much. He had been a classmate of his. At any rate, Gen Miller walked over to the woman and said: "Where is my mobile Red Cross canteen machine?" And she said: "Well General, we don't have enough to give everybody we want." He said: "You have been promising me that for a long time." She said: "Well, we just don't have enough to go around, but the way things work out now, we are going to have this one to you by June 15," or whatever the date was. The General looked at her and said: "June 15th, me eye, that will be just too late." That is supposed to have been the basis of his blowing the D-Day date. It came from somebody who worked for Gen Miller who told me that it was not a legitimate leak. That this BG who heard, went over and told somebody, you heard what he said, you heard it now.

Q: The account that I saw is that he said this more than once, whatever he leaked, or whatever indication he gave, he gave more than once. So there are probably some varying accounts.

W: My part of it was that they revealed in England all about this demotion and sending him away, and all that, except one thing. They didn't give his name. All the press came into my office, like a bunch of vultures, saying, who is the general?

Q: What about Tom Hanley, he just died you know?

W: Oh, did he? Gen Hanley I liked, he came back, I don't remember, I had a few dealings with him, but I can't remember what my dealings were with him, but I had some which Ithought were all right.

Q: What about Reuben Hood?

W: Oh, yes, poor Reuben Hood.

Q: How about him and Arnold? How about Hanley and Arnold?

W: I think they got along all right, but they were not the great do-its. Neither was Reuben Hood, he was a careful, sort of professional type of guy. Hanley, I think they sent him down to University or something, didn't they? I think they sent him down to Montgomery, or some place. I would just say that they were nice guys but somebody used to say: "He's a nice guy, but there's no market for them." And Reuben and I got along fine. I used to judge people by their ability.

Q: You say you saw Arnold get mad. Did he ever get mad at Hanley?

W: Not that I know of.

Q: Did he ever get mad at Stratemeyer?

W: I'm sure he must have.

Q: Did Stratemeyer do a good job? He must have because he got a promotion?

W: Well, he was, believe it or not, quite a naive man. Stratemeyer was a very naive person. He came from Peru, Indiana. We used to call him behind his back "PERU" because that was the winter home of some circus.

W: He was pretty good, but this is only my personal opinion. Stratemeyer was not a great brain. I think Spaatz was a great brain, and some of the others he had around him were.

Q: Arnold was very devoted to Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Very much, yes indeed.

Q: Was he a great brain? Or a humorist, or what?

W: Rosie, at one time would have liked to quit and taken the job as baseball commissioner. They offered it to him, but the Old Man wouldn't let him go. They offered it to him, and when he got out and was ready to go, it was gone, so he settled for USO.

Q: Was Arnold a practical joker? Did he like jokes?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Didn't he hire Vince Barnett?

W: Barnett, now I can tell you. Have you seen Hank Pool, I saw Hank Pool take the bait. I'll tell you about Vince. We were out at a party that the Warner Brothers threw. It was a big party, and everybody and his brother was there at the Dark Canyon Studio. Vince Barnett was on the MGM payroll. I asked him one time if he ever got hit, and he said, yes, once by Admundsen. He was ribbing Admundsen. He got up after a dinner in which Admundsen was asking for funds to go back to the South Pole. Vince got up and said, you know, in a fake accent: "Admundsen is a crook and he belongs in jail with Dr. Cook," and with that, Admundsen got up and said: "I trust you will forgive me for what I am about to do," and hit him right square at the table. But Barnett was going along at this party at Warner Bros. Hank Pool was with us, and I'm sure General Arnold was there. Along came the Commandant of the Marines, who later became the Ambassador to South Africa. He had all this fruit salad. Barnett said to him: "Oh, good evening, General. Those are honorable ribbons you have. Are they ROTC?" And you could see the Marine bristle. He finally thought better of it, and didn't open his mouth, and about that time Hank had a say.

Q: Hank didn't know about Vince Barnett?

W: No, he saw Barnett do this with the General, but he didn't know about Barnett, I guess. Then Barnett turned to Hank and he said: "You Americans are going to make us all hate you forever, killing our defenseless women and children." Hank said: "What did you say?" And Barnett said: "You Americans, we are going to hate you forever, killing our women with your bombs." Pool said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I'm making money. I decide how much money I make, how long I stay in this country." That was all Hank needed, he took the bait. From that time on Barnett wiped the floor with him. He's an expert, and once you take the hook, he never lets you off. He knows exactly what to say to make you furious.

Q: Did Arnold know this?

W: I don't know, I think he did later.

Q: Didn't Arnold put Barnett on to rag Marshall one time? I saw something in the Marshall Library down in Virginia.

W: He might have, I don't know. The Quiet Birdman hired him to rib Ernest Udet. Barnett studied up on that thing, and made Udet think he was in one of his squadrons. He can't speak German, if Udet had ever spoken to him in German, with that fake German accent he had. He gave him the numbers of the squadron.

Q: Let me ask you one more question. How about Hank Pool? What was his role?

W: I've forgotten what department Hank was in.

Q: He was a Colonel and he used to go hunting.

W: He was a Colonel, he was usually along, because he was Mrs. Arnold's brother.

Q: He's a brother-in-law, but was he a sort of court jester or did he perform a serious role? Did Arnold give him any important things to do?

W: I really don't know. I've never thought about it. Hank seemed to always be along, and good company, and I never thought about what his military job was. I don't even know. Hank later on tried to run for office, and didn't make it. I'd say whatever Hank had to do.

Q: He married into wealth, didn't he, into the Woolworth family?

W: Oh, did he? We'd got out to a factory, and be on schedule. So I would sit down on the way out to the factory and write a piece for the boss to speak at the factory. Arnold was a quick study. You'd think he had this all his life. He could read my dirty writing, sometimes when an emergency came, he had to have something to say, I'd sit there and write it on the way out there.

Q: He'd do this, like he put in a full day here, and fly all night?

W: Arnold would have his occasional pleasure, like hunting and going to the races, but that was only a minor part of the trip.

Q: Did you go overseas with him on any trips?

W: No.

Q: Just domestic. I wanted to ask you about Tony Frank. You said you know some stories about him. He wanted to have a combat command, and Arnold didn't give him one. Do you know anything about that?

W: The last time I saw him...

Q: He died recently.

W: Oh, did he? I saw him in the hall of the Pentagon with his coterie of friends. It was supposed to be the gravy train for promotion, everybody said. Get into Tony Frank's command, whatever it was.

Q: The ASC?

W: Yes, it was supposed to be a gravy train, because people would get in there and get promoted all beyond their other friends. He had a guy who used to work as a reporter on the Examiner with him who used to scare him to death. I can't remember his name, it was an Irish name. He worked as a correspondent on the old Examiner. I can't remember his name now.

Q: Did he have some trouble with Arnold?

W: Not that I know of, I don't think Arnold had the greatest admiration. He is a man who had charts and graphs and statistics and stuff like that.

Q: He wanted a combat command. You didn't know anything about that?

W: I do know that when they sort of gave him the old heave-ho, I saw him in the hall one day in the Pentagon. He had his coterie of people with him. He said: "Westlake, I thought about you the other day. I've got an airplane now and I fly around to every one of the Air Force installations in the world." He had a nervous tick, and so he said: "I have one seat vacant in this plane and I think, not for me you know, but it would be good for the Air Force to have some good reporter go along with me on all these trips, and I'd be glad to have him." And he said: "Can you think of anybody?" And I said: "Well, right off the bat, General, the only one I can think of just exactly down that alley would be Gil Robb Wilson." And he said: "Oh, I

couldn't have Gil Robb Wilson with me." He said: "He goes snort, snort, snort." So I could just visualize two guys getting off a plane, Tony, with his tick, and Wilson with his snort."

Q: What about Knerr? Knerr was doing a lot of writing under the table for Andrews, did you know this?

W: No, Hugh Knerr, I can't think much about him. No, I know him.

Q: He and Tony Frank worked for Andrews in the GHQ AF. This was before you came in.

W: I remember when Andrews, of course Andrews was a great guy. I sent Andrews a guy who was killed with him.

Q: How about Arnold and Andrews?

W: Got along fine. No, I think there was mutual respect.

Q: Let's talk about Arnold and Trubee Davison.

W: Be very careful with this please. Although Trubee knows it and so does Mr. Barnum. Mr. Barnum had been head of the Newspaper Publishers Association. As such, he was one time head of a paper up in Binghamton, NY. He was a publisher, I think he married the paper. He was no great brain, and he got to be head of the NPA. Mr. Barnum finally woke up one morning to find out he was no longer publisher of the Binghamton paper. But he had been a very close friend of Davison's. He'd been a Republican, loyal, stalwart friend of Trubee's--at least however the connection I never knew exactly. One fine day, Mr. Barnum who was out of a job, had an appointment arranged with General Arnold by Trubee Davison. So the General called me on the squawk box and asked if I would come up, which I did. I got into his office. I had to be nimble, some good friend had warned me that there was a guy in the office named Barnum who was after my job. He was a friend of Trubee's

and Trubee had figured the guy was out of a job. He was a publisher and he needed a job of some sort of stature and some little money coming in too. So I went in to meet Mr. Barnum for the first time with Trubee who was there. You could see he had been introduced to the whole thing by Trubee, and Trubee has become my good friend. I don't want this to be used against him. But General Arnold listened to Barnum and Trubee. Barnum had the nerve to tell Arnold that he only had one good speech in him. He should make that speech and not make any more. This was Mr. Barnum's great brain idea. He had no idea of the value of public information as it is used to inform the public who own us. This whole story, I listened to it, and Arnold turned to me, and he said to me: "What do you think about Mr. Barnum coming to work?" I said: "General we need more workers, we need more busy bees, and we need workers. We don't need any more great thinkers and great 'Rodins'. You asked me," and Trubee sat there, and I said: "We don't need him," which is a hell of a thing to say before Trubee and the guy, but it was the truth.

Q: Did Trubee get mad?

W: Well, you don't think he loved me because he was trying to get the guy a job.

Q: How did you keep his friendship since then?

W: I don't know. Anyway, Arnold, without saying anything more to me, said: "When can you come to work Mr. Barnum?" Barnum by a strange accident, could come to work the next day, so Arnold set him up in an office somewhere in the Pentagon, gave him a secretary. Believe it or not, that is the last time Arnold ever saw Mr. Barnum. Barnum went around, I had to do something about him, because he was around interfering. He was arranging art shows. I said: "Mr. Barnum we are

not trying to paint the Germans to death." He finally got Trubee, of course. Arnold respected Davison because he had been his boss.

Q: Didn't he replace Trubee and put Bevans in there as A-1?

W: Oh yes, but Jim Bevans, he was hot as a firecracker, that character. His crowd, his whole crowd, Bevans had a whole coterie. The last time I saw General Bevans, I saw him sitting in the office of General Joe Carroll.

Schweinfurt

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

Londry House

19 November 1973

Colonel William Westlake, USAF (Ret)
1001 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Interview
Feb 74

Dear Colonel Westlake:

I'm the guy still working away on the Arnold Biography. Have just finished Chapter XI and counting.

You may recall that we had a good interview and lunch at the Pentagon about two years ago.

Anyway, I ran into your name out in Wichita, Kansas, during an interview with J. Earle Schaefer, former head of Beeing. He reproduced copies of his guest log which included one page for January 12, 1944. You, along with "Pete" Peterson, Arnold's pilot, and J. Henry Pool, his brother in law, visited Wichita.

I have superimposed on this photostat another excerpt which indicates that Arnold put on a show at the plant by piping in the progress of a raid on one of the German ball bearing complexes.

My question is: did this "show" occur during your visit of January 12, 1944?

Incidentally, the interview left a couple of loose ends. Did I ever send you a copy? I'd be glad to if you desire one. Maybe we could get together for a "shortie" at a time convenient for you?

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

575-0216

Encl

P.S. I've had long interviews with Bill Nuckols and Harold Bowman on Arnold

1/12/44

H H Arnold — Wash — D.C.

C V Peterson, Lt. Col. A.A.F. " "

J Henry Doolittle, Col AAF " "

Orbeam Wallace, Col. AAF

1/26/44

Ed Webb — Seattle.

E. M. Allison Wichita, Kansas.

Florence Allison

A. A. A.

10. At the height of the bombing raids over Berlin, General Arnold and his party stopped off in Wichita to have luncheon with me in the Executive Dining Room at the Boeing plant. He made this special trip enroute to Washington from the west coast because he was particularly interested in this raid. He was connected by telephone with his office in Washington since a big bombing raid on one of the German ball bearings complexes was scheduled for the noon hour, Wichita time. At the same time of the raid, he was in touch with the Air Corps Headquarters in Europe who relayed the progress of the raid over the telephone and all of us in attendance at the luncheon in Wichita were able to listen in. As General Arnold described that encounter, he was greatly concerned over its progress. On several occasions he relayed to his staff and to those of us present certain details with which he had firsthand knowledge. He was connected with Air Corps staff personnel in Europe who gave him a running account of the raid and some of the results. It was quite a privilege to be included in this conference and, of course, some of the details were not released to the public until much later.

11. On frequent trips to Wichita, he spoke to all Boeing personnel over the "Loud Speaker" system. These talks were general in nature and lasted about 10 minutes. They were repeated on all shifts. At one time our payroll ran as high as 29,192 employees (December, 1943 -- wartime peak). To our employees, "Hap" was called "The General." During the entire war period, we never had any serious labor problems. I attributed this excellent morale to visits like those of General Arnold and other military personnel. We [illegible] there were several close calls. As

Interview, Colonel William Westlake, Pentagon, February 12, 1970

W: As I told you earlier, I considered my service working with General Arnold one of the greatest privileges of my whole life. He was a most unusual man.

Q: When did you first meet General Arnold?

W: I met him when I was a Captain, when I came into the office in the Munitions Building, when I'd been called to duty in my National Guard Unit. For five or six months they wouldn't break up the unit.

Q: Was this before the war?

W: Yes. I was called for a year's duty. General Candee had heard about me and wanted to get me down here, and they kept turning down the request. Eventually, by that time they were going to keep the squadrons together, I don't know what they were going to do, we were an observation squadron, I don't know what we were going to observe in the war, but they said, no, they would keep them all together. But eventually, Bill Newhall and I were the two to break out of the squadron; Bill became a MG. He is now dead, at any rate, I was finally ordered down to Washington. I was a Captain, I had just made Captain. I'd been 18 years as a first LT. Candee was the boss.

Q: This was public relations?

W: Public relations, yes.

Q: Was there a man named Richards in Public Relations?

W: Frank Miller was the boss, Frank Marion S. Miller, they called him HMS Pinafore Miller.

Q: The Air Corps at that time did not have a public relations. It was part of the Army?

W: Yes, but during that time, it was under Intelligence. One time I was out of town, I was transferred to Intelligence.

Q: PR was transferred to Intelligence late in the war?

W: Yes.

Q: Do you know why?

W: No.

Q: The Historical people under Information were asking for a lot of planning classified documents. When Marshall heard about it, he was incensed about it, and he ordered the Historical people to disgorge all classified data. The only way they could retain it, so they could understand what they were writing about, was to put them under Intelligence, and this sort of blanketed them.

Q: What were some of the things Arnold gave you to do, do you remember?

W: Well, I didn't know him in the beginning. I was just a Captain in the outfit. He brought in later some people who had been in the Air Force, and because of their age they were brought in with ranks above us.

Q: Was this Arthur Ennis?

W: Art Ennis was an old friend of mine, Art and I went to school together, and Art had not come in yet. Art was well known in the Air Force as a public relator, and one who used to handle the mikes at the National Air Races, so on, but eventually Art came to head up the group which didn't make it too bad for me, because Art was ahead of me in school, but, I went to school with his younger sister, but Art became the head of the thing. I was a head of a department, but in those days nobody told you what to do. You did what was wanted to be

done, like after a death, you come into a house, and you do what needs doing.

Q: There were so many fires burning that there was enough work to go around?

W: You stepped in and you did what was necessary, and I just ran into some commendations from Art and from the people tacking on Muir Fairchild and all of them saying they were glad I got this thing, tack on their endorsement. We were busy, and we didn't have time. I don't actually remember some of the early details, and I don't remember my first meeting with the General.

Q: But Arnold came to know you, after Pearl Harbor?

W: Yes, I think so. I don't really remember how I first met him, Suzy Adkins was his girl. She had more time with the Old Man, and Suzy probably liked me, because Suzy could have dinged you with anybody, you know. She is the kind who would say: "General, you remember that nice Capt Westlake, he wants to see you." She could prepare the way, or she should could give you, by saying: "You don't want to see that guy; he's a pest, you remember?" Suzy was, of course, competent, and I could tell you some funny stories about Suzy. Maybe this is a good time to tell you about Suzy. The need for officers was critical. The Old Man could see that it was.

Q: You are talking pre-Pearl Harbor?

W: I'm not so sure it was pre-Pearl Harbor. But anyway, you can date this by that. He conceived the idea of having a great big OTS, rather than OCS which was in operation at the time. He conceived the Miami Beach program. So he called in Walter Weaver, who was head of Technical Training, Walter Weaver was sort of a mad man. He was the

said. Just a minute, and he picked up the phone and Miff was on the other end of the line. He said: "Yes, un huh, okay, Miff, okay, all right, now I'll let you know on this, by next Wednesday, by Thursday, yes, okay, all right, Miff, well, I'll let you know." So he hung up and he said: "Well now, if you can't do it, Miff Harmon can." And by God, Walter Weaver struck out there like a mad man. He went out and he tilled at windmills until he got the whole thing set up in no time.

Q: Did Weaver have a reputation for dragging a bit?

W: Well, I don't think he ever expected to do it overnight. But the Old Man, when he decided to do something, he wanted it done now. Incidentally, he was so human, though, when something, he knew the Philippines. He knew all about when this guy came back from the "death march," he had the guy tell him the whole story.

Q: Was that Eubanks, maybe?

W: No, not Eubanks. He was a prisoner and he was in the "death march."

Q: Well, anyway, you were talking about Miami. Let me ask you: Why was Miami chosen?

W: That I don't know, but I think it is on account of the fact that it was a luxury resort which we could get along without.

Q: And they already had the buildings. We didn't have any facilities.

W: No, they just took over the hotels, and everything else, because it was a gigantic thing and the Old Man had the vision of it. He knew we needed it.

Q: He figured that the hotels would be suffering anyway because of transportation shortage?

W: And also the blackouts which were necessary down there during the war, which they did have, because they had submarines come in there.

Q: Are there any more incidents about Suzy Adkins and him?

W: Oh, there are so many of Suzy. One time the Old Man had Rosie O'Donnell working in his office.

Q: Yes,he was Advisory Council.

W: He was a Colonel at that time. Rosie worked right in the office with Shelmire and all the rest of them. Shelmire is dead, yes? Shelmire and the Old Man were boyhood buddies. By the way, when McCabe came in, one of my jobs after Pearl Harbor, was to find commissionable material. We needed people badly, but we didn't want everybody. And one of the jobs Art Ennis gave me was to find people to commission. Suddenly, I had, toward the end, I had about five good guys in the mill,and they clamped it off,and said: "No more direct commissions," and the Navy got all my people. Several of them turned

out to be Captains in the Navy. Long after I ran out of people I knew that were any good, I had a file that high with people like Harry Richman who wanted to be a PRO. We had people come in who said they just came from the White House. They'd seen Eleanor and they wanted a job as a public relations officer.

Q: There is a letter in Arnold's file on W.C. Fields trying to get a job for one of the people on his staff.

W: The one from Harry Richman was one of the worst ones I've ever seen. Harry was a cafe entertainer. He came in to see me. Julius Klein.

Q: The professional...head of the Jewish War Veterans?

W: Julius is now a MG in Chicago, retired. Julius was close to Gen Marshall because he worked with him in my guard days, and I saw him coming out of Gen Marshall's office one day. He was trying to get a commission for his brother, Ernest. They brought me some Parker pencils and after they sent them over. As soon as they came in, I made a record of them, and sent them back by special messenger to the hotel. That was about the time Tony Bennett in the Navy gave somebody an automobile, remember? I think we got him in the Air Force later on as a sergeant. We had everybody in the world in our outfit.

Q: Public relations, I can see where you would get involved.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and the Kentucky Derby.

W: Arnold loved to go to the races. He had this little B-25. Well, there was only room in it for Arnold and Pete. By the way, you probably know that Roosevelt told Arnold, although he was a command pilot, he didn't want him to fly alone anymore because of his health, and so on. So Arnold was not allowed to fly alone.

Q: Probably also because of Andrews?

W: Yes, but this was before Andrews. And so this B-25 which was lightened up, and was fairly plush. But you had to crawl through the tunnel and everything. But usually in the thing would be Pete, McCabe and the General and I. Well, I am a command pilot, but, and you probably know, as a command pilot you can take command time. In those days we had to have four hours for pay purposes. Do you think the Old Man would take command time? He certainly would not, although he was a five-star general. He was boss of the airplane, and he would take co-pilot time and I would take the command time, because I needed flying time. Often he would get up with Peterson and fly the airplane. One time when we landed at Albuquerque, there were two generals there, two BGs, I can't remember who they were now, somebody we both knew very well. They were the bosses of that area, and we came into Albuquerque.

Q: They were AAF?

W: Yes, they were both Air Force, and I think they were out hunting at the time when the word got to them. They sped down to the hotel. When we landed, Pete said to the tower; "Give me, for heaven's sake do this, I have a five-star general with me," And the Old Man looked, I was in the back with him. So we taxiied up to the place, and of course, it was about the time they had just changed the WAC insignia, and there was a little WAC standing there, and you know the Old Man was very compassionate and very fond of the enlisted people and used to talk to them as equals and get their views on things. He wanted them, as I say, nothing stuffy about him at all. If we had a big airplane, and had vacant seats, he would load them down with the mine run of GIs and WACs and go and talk to them about what's wrong with this, and what's

wrong with that. Sometimes he would get the picture that a lot of other people couldn't get. Same as Lovett did one time when he was a bald old man. Lovett told me: "If you want to know what's wrong with the Air Force, be a bald old man. Nobody knows who you are at the Biltmore hospital. They tell me all their tales of woe, and they didn't know who I was." Well, at Albuquerque, we finally got in there, and the Old Man saw one of the WACs wearing an Army insignia--Athena--and he said: "Don't you know you're now allowed to wear the Air Force wings--the propeller and the wings." She said, no, she hadn't been told. So he said: "Well, now I'll tell you, you can." He said: "Do you need somebody else here to tell you?" She said: "No sir." From that time on. By the way, McCabe got a Sergeant friend who was at Albuquerque. We all went over to the hotel while we were waiting for the two generals to come and join us. We went to the lobby, so all of us stood there in the lobby and played the pinball machines. The Old Man too, and the sergeant. He was seen by everybody at Kirtland Field after we left the next day. McCabe said that that Sergeant became one of the most popular guys at Kirtland because everybody knew about his playing the pinball machine with the Old Man.

Q: You were talking about the horse races?

W: Yes, the horse races. He liked to go down to the races and in fact, any races. He liked to go to them, and whenever we would go to a place that was anywhere near around a race, Mac and I would schedule his time so that he would have time to sneak away for a little recreation.

Q: Did he bet?

W: Yes.

Q: $2 bettor?

W: Yes, not a great plunger, not a compulsive bettor. But we

were sitting in the box somewhere with Matt Wynn one time.

Q: Matt Wynn is the head of the Kentucky Derby, isn't he?

W: Yes. Col Matt Wynn. We were sitting there during one of these recreation periods on one of our trips. At that time the Navy was having no trouble at all getting all sorts of money. The apple of the Old Man's eye was the Air Force Aid Society. He wanted money. No matter how much we got, we had to share it with the Army. We had no special fund of our own.

Q: That's the Army Emergency Relief Fund?

W: Yes, and we had no Air Force Aid Society at the time. We got our minor share. So the Navy had to stop some of these things because people were pouring so much money into their coffers. Arnold said to Wynn: "I see all this money to all these charities. I see you are having charities, Navy charities. I don't see any for the Air Force." Matt Wynn said: "Well, why don't we have an Air Force Day at the races?" So Arnold said, that would be fine. Well that was about all the conversation then. Next I heard of it, and please go easy on this, because we had a MG whose name I don't quite remember. He was a Materiel Command guy, and he was out on the West Coast. He was always spouting off about the high absenteeism rate, and the dirty tracks, how they were taking the people away from their jobs in the airplane factories, and I think some survey was made.

Q: Was it Echols?

W: No, it wasn't Red Echols, he was a wonderful person.

Q: Orval Cook?

W: No. At any rate, the next I heard of it, the Old Man really did want to have money for an Air Force Aid Society. He felt this

would be a wonderful way to get it. As I say, at that time, this is late because Patterson had become the Secretary of War. You know Patterson was sort of an old woman as far as that, he didn't like horse racing or anything else, His wife used to have these salons, like rivaling Cissy Patterson. All the people would come to her parties and she was sort of a lion chaser.

Q: She would have a trio in the salon playing Beethoven?

W: The current lion was sought, a fight between Mrs. McLean and Mrs. Patterson and Mrs. Cissy Patterson too, she was also.

W: The guy on the West Coast had been shooting his mouth off in the papers about the high absenteeism rate in the factories and how it was caused by these dirty tracks taking all the workers away and everything. I think a survey showed at that time that whether the tracks were open or not had no real bearing on the absenteeism rate. But at any rate, Judge Patterson went along with the idea too. I don't remember when he succeeded Stimson.

Q: He succeeded Stimson right around the end of the war.

W: Well, this is when it happened. This is to show you a little humanism about the Old Man, too. So I got a call from Evan Stanley who was a Colonel and worked for Ralph Cousins at Santa Ana. He said: "Bill, while the Old Man was out here he talked to the people about this." I can't recall the name of the race track, but it was right south of Santa Monica, Evan said: "The Old Man was here. We arranged for an Air Force Day at the such and such track." But, he said: "Now people at the track are in my hair to promote this thing. The more promotion we do on it, the more money comes into the Air Force Aid Society coffers." So they want some airplanes from the 4th AF to fly over the race track

and to whoop it up to promote the track." And I said: "Evan, the Old Man is somewhere in a B-25 between here and there." He said: "We've got to have action now." I said: "I can't give you any airplanes at all, Evan, with the atmosphere as it is, with Judge Patterson and that other General out there who was shouting about the dirty tracks." I said: "There's too much static. I can't give you any support on this."

Q: Was this General, Air Force or Army?

W: He was Air Force, he was Materiel Command General. I don't recall his name, but it doesn't make any difference. He was hyped on that subject of absenteeism. I said: "Evan, I can't give you one airplane through the 4th AF to fly over the track, under the present atmosphere." But I told him the Old Man gave me a project which I was running myself, which the Old Man called "the shot from the sky" show. It was a purely military show. Its function was to show these Japanese planes and shot-down things, whatever they were, relics, which we moved around the country to recruit WACs, to sell war bonds, and to take a bow on some of the stuff we had knocked down out of the sky. Not all of it was Air Force, but we had promoted it. We had no money to do it, and believe it or not, it is the only thing I've ever heard of during the war where we sold hot dogs and Coca Colas and things like that to pay the expenses on the trip. We didn't have any money. The Old Man said: "I want that tour." So my job was to tour it, and I did it. But I said to Evan: "Right at the moment, it is south of Santa Monica in some space there being set up." It was going to open the day of the races, or whatever. I told him: "I can give you 4th AF airplanes to fly over 'Shots in the Sky,' because this is a pure Air Force military deal. But I can't help it if some of those airplanes should happen to fly

over the racetrack." So, I said: "I don't know what the Old Man promised you." He said: "He promised him the world." I said: "Well, he's somewhere in the air." He said: "You have to do it now!" So I said: "All right, I'll send orders"which we did a lot of things on orders those days that we would be shot for today. In those days there were things to be done and you did them. Nowadays, I run into Maurey Casey and he says: "For God's sake, we used to do those things, and tell him about them afterwards." He said: "You can't now," which is true. In those days it was a lot different, we assumed a lot of authority, and got away with it. I sent the orders out, and I had a dual position about that time. I was Assistant to General Surles, Asst for Air to the head of War Dept Bureau of Public Relations, also I had another shoulder which I was to work for the Old Man, it was a peculiar division. At any rate I sent the order out for the 4th AF to do it, and they did it. Well, there was hell to pay. I think Judge Patterson's office called the General when he was on his way in the air, and asked if he would come by to see the General as soon as he came back. We knew that hell was popping about these airplanes going over the racetrack. In fact, I think one of the local papers on the Coast shouted bloody murder about it. I've forgotten the details of it. But to make a long story short, I found out the ETA of the Old Man at National Airport, and I got into a buggy and went right over there. When he landed I got into the car on the way in, and I said: "General, Judge Patterson wants to see you," and I told him the story.

Q: And Judge Patterson was by now Secretary of War?

W: Secy of War. He said: "Who did this on the airplanes?" And I said: "General, I did." And I said: "You are in the clear." And

I told him the story about how the racetrack had nothing to do with it. I told him the thing on the way into the office. He went to see the Judge, and it turned out everything was fine because he had the alibi that had nothing to do with the racetrack, which is what I did.

Q: He got off the hook on it?

W: He got off.

Q: Do you know of any other incident involving him and Patterson? They did not have the same chemistry.

W: I know, Patterson was sort of an old lady, I can tell you that. Maybe you know this story about when he was at March Field. Did you ever know the story about him? Ammunition was scarce. Somebody should tell you the story who knows it better than I do. He told it to me but I've forgotten about it. He wanted to see if these bullets would penetrate a certain type of aircraft wings. They forbid him to use up the ammunition, but he did it anyway, when he was at March Field. The Army had a big investigation in that Corps Area about the utilization of this ammunition, and how it had either gone through the wings or had not gone through the wings, or whatever it was. It became quite an issue. It became almost a scandal. The Old Man had to go to his pal, Mr. Woodring, I think it was, to square it. Nobody knew how that thing got squared, but he squared it himself with Woodring, who was at that time the Secretary of War. He had to square it, because they were being pickayunish about the expenditure of the ammunition.

Q: Well, expenditures were very tight in the early 1930s and, of course, he took the initiative, just like you did on the race track. When there was an earthquake in Long Beach, I just want to make this comment because we can tie this in. Arnold told the initiative with the earthquake aid.

W: The same thing. He didn't know anything about rules and regulations any more than I did. I used to say: "Don't you know that under 6213-11 you can't do this?" He would say: "That's right, you can't." We used to swear by numbers when we were kids. That was a swear word. People who were impressed by that.

Q: Arnold was not impressed by that? If he felt that the common sense thing was to do it, he did it.

W: He didn't care what the regulation was, and I used to say to my people: "Find me the regulation that says you can do this. Don't find me the one that says you can't." And he was the same way.

Q: Right, he was a doer. Do you recall any other incidents involving him and Patterson?

W: No.

Q: There was some incident involving him and Patterson about some pilots who had come back, and apparently one guy flew under the Brooklyn Bridge. You know these guys were put in sedentary jobs. They were used to some action. But they had violated flying regulations, and Arnold was a stickler about people not playing around when they were in the air. He was going to throw the book at them, court martial, and Patterson interceded for them with Marshall, from the legal standpoint. He felt that the AAF was being too harsh with them and Arnold was in favor of throwing the book at them. Do you remember this?

W: No.

W: I remember a case where he went to Marshall. We had lousy relations on the Hill. In the Air Force. Maurie Carr was in that. I used to get half the calls in my office. Maurie Carr was no good--a phony, but he wiggled himself. He told Arnold he worked for Lovett;

he told Lovett he worked for Arnold. At any rate, our relationship on the Hill was very, very bad. We never could get anybody in the office we had up there. Being a newspaperman, I wasn't fearful. I didn't know who the hell the Congressmen were. Let me go back to the time when McCabe came to me to get a job, see. Everybody in the world came in to get a job. I listened to McCabe's story, and he told me he was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, and he went to Notre Dame. He went on, and I said: "What are you doing now, Mr. McCabe?" He said: "Well, I work for a Congressman." And I didn't even say which one. I didn't know at the time that the Congressman he worked for was a pal of Arnold's that both McCabe and Arnold knew.

Q: Was this Rep. Costello?

W: Yes, he worked for Costello. And I said, I didn't even ask him. I didn't know who Costello was. Costello was a congressman from California. They were pals of Arnold, and quite close to Arnold, but McCabe never used that. So I said to him: "Mr. McCabe, in spite of the fact that you work for a Congressman, we are very interested in you. Here is your authority for a physical. Here's an application." Now that was unusual because at that time we only wanted a few people. I'd say one out of 50 who came in to get interviewed, didn't make the authority for a physical, and that was only the beginning. Later on, I was up in Shelmire's office and I saw a new 2nd LT around the place. He said to me: "Sir, I don't believe you remember me." I said: "Your face is familiar," and he said, "My name is McCabe." I said: "Oh yes, LT McCabe, what are you doing in here?" I said: "I haven't seen you." He said: "I've been to OTS for three months," and I said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I'm the General's new aide."

Q: Did Congressional relations improve?

W: Congressional relations, to get back to that. The Old Man wanted one, so he and McCabe knew a Colonel McIntyre. He was in Artillery. He had been quite close.

Q: We are talking about Col. James McIntyre, who lives in Alabama now. How did Arnold get him?

W: Arnold knew him and McCabe knew him. Earlier he had been up on the Hill. He had been a legislative liaison guy.

Q: Yes, what did they call Johnson?

W: "Leaky Louis." One time I remember, as a reporter, on the Examiner, I interviewed him, and he told me he said: "These aircraft factories are going to get behind the mountains, They are going to be in the center of the country. They are going to do this because I say so. Because I signed the appropriations bill for these manufacturers, and they are going to get behind the mountains." I didn't see any behind the mountains. He was thinking about Lockheed and Douglas and all of those who were on the other side of the mountains. Johnson's idea was to bring them in.

Q: What's this story about McIntyre? Arnold recruited him?

W: Arnold recruited him because he knew all of the background on the Hill. So did McCabe, having worked for Costello and McIntyre was only a Colonel, so Arnold had to go to Marshall. I don't know who told me this, maybe Arnold did, that when he asked Gen Marshall for McIntyre, Marshall said: "He must be pretty good, General. If you want him, we will make him a General to come and work with you." This is what Arnold did, to make him take over Air Force L&L, which was the first time we'd had a decent thing on the Hill. I used to get

these calls from Congressmen and they would raise hell over the phone about, because they could never get the guys in the AAF.

Q: I want to go back over a couple of items that you mentioned. You know you were talking about OCS in Miami Beach. This is right at the beginning, he and Walt Weaver. Did Arnold ever have an idea to have enlisted pilots, because he couldn't get officer pilots?

W: I don't think so, because that had been worked earlier.

Q: They had tried that, and it didn't work?

W: Yes, well it worked, I think later on a lot of them got commissioned. There was a time in there where the glider was a problem and a lot of those fliers became not really warrant officers, flight officers, which are the same as warrant officers.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that program? Richard DuPont?

W: No, but I knew DuPont before he got killed. Yes, I knew vaguely about it. In fact, everything going on, I probably had my finger in something.

Q: You probably had your finger in a lot of things. Let me take you back, you were in Arnold's office right before Pearl Harbor. Three days before Pearl Harbor, the Chicago Tribune published a good hunk of the RAINBOW FIVE, the war plan, do you remember that?

W: Yes, I do. I'll tell you who did it, I knew the reporters involved in the case. They claimed that they only hit upon it by accident. That they didn't know anything about it.

Q: Well they got the plan from Sen. Wheeler, who gave it to the Chicago Tribune reporter. (NOTE: Told Westlake the story of Waldrop's article.)

W: I have heard that, but it's not true.

Q: Well, Frank Waldrop told me this a few years ago.

W: I don't believe it.

Q: Well, I don't believe it either because whoever leaked that plan had two qualifications. One, he had access to the plan, and two, he wanted to turn our strategy toward the Pacific. The RAINBOW FIVE strategy was "all-out in Europe and to hold in the Pacific."

W: I'm sure it was not so.

Q: There was an investigation and of course the investigation was overtaken by Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about the investigation?

W: No.

Q: Were you asked any questions?

W: No.

Q: To show you how human the guy was. You know, the Old Man liked to work with wood. One time we were out at Sonoma, his wife bought that 40 acres out there from Spreckels, before the Old Man saw it. But at any rate, when "Savvy" Cook had a place out there. He was an Admiral. He had all his furniture sent up from Honduras, with a bunch of mahogany. So we went over and got that furniture with the help of some of his help around the house.

Q: Savvy Cook had this Honduras furniture?

W: He had his furniture sent up from Honduras, beautiful wood, looked like hell, but the Old Man when he got it to his place, he had it all taken from Ft. Myer out there. When he got there, he took one piece of that, and he shined it down, and said: "This is how it's going to look." To me it looked like a bunch of packing boxes. But at any rate, he had made just a beautiful new thing. It had a lot of little

cubbyholes in it--a beautiful piece of furniture. I happened to be there one day when another medal arrived from the starving Armenians or something. He opened it up, and put it in this thing he had made himself, for his medals, hundreds of them in there you know. He looked at me and he said with a frustrated look--he put the thing in the little chest and he said: "What am I going to do with all this? But I tell you, there is a time when I could have used them." He said: "Look, I used to go to that mausoleum on Constitution Avenue on Tuesday to attend the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

Q: Public Health Building?

W: Yes, he'd sit there and look at the big map. I'll tell you a thing about the map to show you what a curious mind he had. He said: "I used to sit there in the Combined Chiefs of Staff," and he looked around and all the rest of those guys, he said had fruit salad all over their chests. And he said: "What did I have on my tunic? One WW I ribbon. I had a lot of other things, like a medal for the 6,000 ft. altitude record, but none of those showed on my tunic. Here I saw sitting there with all those other characters with all the fruit salad in the world. Now, I've got all these medals, and what good are they now." Gives you an idea that he felt himself a little outclassed as far as "spinach" was concerned.

Q: He always had a sensitivity about the fact that he never was in combat. Did he ever say anything to you about that?

W: No.

Q: In WW I, he was in Washington trying to get overseas, and he got there in time for the war to be over. This is why he was sort of vulnerable when some of his staff said they wanted to get overseas.

W: Everybody had an idea, Minton Kaye, he didn't know about Hank

Pool, see Hank Pool was his brother-in-law, and by the way you should talk to Hank.

Q: I have. But tell me about Minton Kaye.

W: I don't know too much about the fact that Minton Kaye never denied it, I think, when people thought he was the Old Man's brother-in-law.

Q: Why did Arnold like Minton Kaye?

W: I don't know. I don't think he particularly liked him.

Q: But he was close to the Old Man?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Well, you know Goddard had a lot of trouble with Minton Kaye.

W: If you haven't seen McCabe. McCabe did a lot of things on his own, too. One day, when, I was at McCabe's desk, and the Old Man came on the squawk box. I had the Old Man on my squawk box. I used to say to people in my office: "Would you like to see me summon my five-star general?" I'd push the thing down and the Old Man would answer. He was peculiar. If he buzzed me, he didn't want anybody in my office to answer that thing except me. If the girl answered the phone, it made him mad. So, if I wasn't there, they let go. But it was sort of funny. I just can't imagine myself ringing for my five-star general, but I would do it. His rank rested very lightly on his shoulders. Of course, as you say, the chemistry, we got along fine. We really did, I don't think the Old Man ever bawled me out once, but I can tell you about bawlings out. When he had his air staff, and everybody was a general, except his A-2, the A-2 was a character named Sorenson. One day I brought in some young 2nd LTs whom I went down surreptitiously and looked at the records. Flint DuPre was one. I found his record

down in Miami. I ordered these guys up into Washington. Strictly they shouldn't have let me see anything down there, but I got away with it. I took these guys, about four of them, up to Sorenson, and he said: "More newspapermen!" He was very anti-public information. He had no conception of what it could do for you. In fact, he didn't know the score. The Old Man had a feeling for public relations, as you know. At any rate, Sorenson was anti-public information, anti-everything except Intelligence. One day because he had done something, the Old Man called him up, and I went up with him. I've forgotten what it was. After the Old Man ate him out, on whatever this was, Sorenson stood there. He was only a Colonel, A-2 was a Colonel and all the rest of them were generals. The Old Man didn't go for him, because of this idea that he had a constricted feeling.

Q: Why did he give him the job in the first place?

W: I don't know, but he was there, and he didn't last forever. Clayton Bissell came later, and Bissell had been in trouble, but Bissell had a feeling for public information.

Q: George McDonald had this job for a while?

W: Yes, and he had a feeling for public information.

Q: Tommy White had the job for a while?

W: Yes, he did. Tom White in the beginning knew nothing about it, but that was missing in a lot of their West Point curriculum, they didn't understand. This was new.

Q: This is probably why Arnold went outside the regular military?

W: Yes, this was new. It was not thought of in those days. Well, back in the days of Sorenson. Sorenson stood there and I saw perspiration come out. He went down the hall, and he said to me, I

remember the words: "I'm neither fitted by my training nor by my inclination to know a damn thing about public information." I said: "Col Sorenson, why the hell don't you turn to somebody who--this is not an exact science, it is a trial and error thing. But why don't you turn to somebody who might help you?" That was the beginning of a rapprochement between me and Sorenson. I found out later on what he did. I found Sorenson receiving the press and the newspapers and the magazines. Somebody wrote a story flattering to him in a magazine, and he said: "How long has that thing been going on?" And I found him receiving people from the press without any clearance at all.

Q: In other words, the pendulum shifted?

W: He went from the sublime to the ridiculous, and this is what could happen to an Intelligence man.

Q: Did he get in trouble with Arnold for this?

W: He got in trouble for his, no, for his anti public information attitude in the beginning.

Q: He got in trouble with MacArthur because of the difference in reporting of the Bismarck sea operation, March 1943. Sorenson questioned the figures. MacArthur and Kenney claimed they had sunk 19 ships. Sorenson raised some questions from some other reports he received, and MacArthur was irate at Sorenson.

W: I mentioned to you about the map in the Combined Chiefs of Staff room, to show you what a curiosity the Old Man had. He sat there and looked at the thing, and he called me and McCabe in one day, and he said: "I sit there in those CCS meetings, and I look at a map, and it shows the Ural Mountains--a great big crack about 3,000 feet high." He

said: "We have everything in the Air Force. I want to know why those Ural Mountains are there." You see: he was sitting there woolgathering while these things were going on, and looking at the map. So McCabe and I went through, and we found out here that we had a young captain who was a geologist. We had everything in the AAF. McCabe called him at home. His wife answered. McCabe said: "General Arnold would like to see this fellow in his inner office at 9:00 AM tomorrow." The wife thought they were kidding her. Finally the Captain got on the line and said: "Yes sir." He did come in and he had written his thesis on the Ural Mountains. So he explained the theory on how the mountains existed. But here the Old Man was sitting there at a meeting and instead of being entranced with all the dissertations on the war, he was looking at the map wondering how they happened to be there. When there was the B-24 vs. B-17 business, about which was the better aircraft, I was present when he picked the crew of the B-24s in combat, bring them into his inner office and ask them all about it. He would bring the B-17 guys in there and ask them all about it. He did the same thing on the P-38s. His idea was to ask the man who owns one.

Q: Talking about Arnold and K.T. Keller?

W: Arnold called up K.T. Keller one time. There was some part hold up the B-29. There was some small thing that was holding it up. It wasn't perfect, I've forgotten what it was now. Finally, it got to be sort of a hot conversation, and Arnold said: "I want that thing by next week, or I will make it in my own basement at Ft. Myer." K.T. Keller got off his fat duff and produced it. Arnold had made some promises on the B-29, as you know, to Roosevelt, and these things were behind schedule. It was all just a little item.

Q: I want to ask you about the B-29. You say Roosevelt was bugging Arnold?

W: He made a certain commitment to Roosevelt about the B-29s and when they could be ready, and they were delayed beyond a reasonable time.

Q: Trouble with the engines, they caught fire?

W: Whatever the damn thing was, there was one other little part, Arnold and I went out to the Cleveland, to the NACA Laboratory.

Q: Ames Laboratory?

W: Yes, and we went out there, Arnold got in there and they were talking about these various things. They had shown him a lot of things that were coming out. He got up and said: "You tell me all about these beautiful things that are coming up." He said the trouble with you eggheads--he called them that to their face--"you are never willing to quit and say this is far enough and use it. Why don't I see some of these wonderful things on my airplanes now? You go on to the nth degree and to get them perfect as perfect as perfect, but let's quit somewhere along the line and put what you have on our airplanes." And he laid it on the line with them.

Q: Was John Victory out there?

W: Yes, sure John Victory?

Q: He was bugging John Victory about a 400 mile per hour airplane, wasn't he?

W: I don't remember that, but I do know that these very things that they told about how nice they were. We went out to see the first Bell jet too, in fact, in the hangar there at Muroc Lake. I knew that it had gone through downtown Buffalo because not very many people knew it. It had a prop on it to truck it through the streets. The jet had a prop

fixed on the front of it, so it would like an airplane.

Q: The B-29, did you go out to Salina with him? He went out there with Benny Meyers and they were trying to rush that thing, trying to get them out to the CBI.

W: I didn't go to Salina, but I know.

Q: Didn't he spend some time out there trying to get the airplane ready?

W: Well, I'm sure he did, because as you know, the first thing they planned was to strike Sasebo naval base with the B-29s at a certain date. Do you know what caused the cover plan to be developed? Some damned reporters hit the nail on the head. It was only one of a lot of stories that were printed. This is bad, though. When the Old Man saw that story--whoever it was, I've forgotten now, that printed the story--that they were going to use the B-29 to strike this Sasebo naval base in Japan, which happened to be the McCoy; it happened to be the plan. So the Old Man was quite concerned. Well I said: "To be concerned about it, would be to substantiate it." So the thing to do was to further confuse the issue.

Q: Well, tell me about your involvement in the cover plan?

W: The Old Man said to let this guy do what he pleased. It was not a very erudite thing to do. We just decided that these B-29s were being shipped to Chungking and so on. There was a bunch of security violations all over them. We did a number of things to make it apparent, not to purposely lie, but to imply.

Q: One of the thing you tried to imply was that they were going to use the European theater. Didn't you send one to England?

W: One, yes, I wanted to send more. This thing was like the

cornfield. The crows can count how many there are. The crows have a certain amount. If you have five people going into the cornfield, the crows count them and they know. If you have seven, the crows are limited on their counting ability. So I said the idea was at least two B-29s and we want to imply wherever we can to counteract this story, not to mention it at all. It hit the nail on the head, or that we were even concerned.

Q: You pretended you were being security conscious, but allowed word to get out?

W: Yes, that maybe these B-29s would be ready for OVERLORD.

Q: Was there also a plan to make people think it was being used as a supertransport across the Hump?

W: Yes, that was one of the things. The Hump flights were dangerous, and the loads were small, and we were sending those things down there. This was discussed. Why were we sending them down there? Well, we were sending them to be used as a transport across the mountains.

Q: You didn't want the Japs to think that we were going to attack Japan with them?

W: No, because one of the reporters, whoever it was, in a think piece, said these were going to be used at Sasebo naval base. I think if I remember rightly, that that was exactly the plan. So everybody was concerned. But as I pointed out to the Old Man, if you show your concern, you give it away.

Q: Let me ask you about Arnold and Drew Pearson?

W: Drew Pearson, I knew Drew, I knew his life very well. I knew his father was a minister.

Q: Why didn't he like Arnold?

W: I don't know that he didn't really like him. Pearson would call me at 5 minutes to 6 and try to clear a story, when he wanted to go on the air at 6:00. He tried all the tricks, now, Pearson would do this, for instance. Let me give you the case of some General. Pearson had the story that this General got on his own airplane in India and ran back through Africa, and somewhere in Africa there was a wounded Army man, and the crew wouldn't refuse to let the wounded guy on the airplane, and came back, playing cards and hi-jinxing all the way back to Washington. Well, when he called me with the story, I said that isn't right, that isn't true. Of course, Pearson observed the voluntary censorship but he tried to get around it every way he could. The voluntary censorship said you can't mention movements of general officers. Actually, his brother got on the line and we...

Q: What was his brother's name?

W: Can't remember. At any rate, I said, first of all, whenever we had a Drew Pearson thing, we'd say: "What are we stuck with? Let's find out the truth." I tried to find out the whole truth, and I called Drew and told him the whole damned truth, that it was an ATC ship. It was a full ship when it came in here, maximum gross load, with nobody put off, some disgruntled Army persons, of course, a lot of people used to drop notes, like you who we didn't like was one of the Giles' twin, Ben.

Q: He didn't like Barney Giles either.

W: He didn't like Ben either. Pearson was good because he kept a lot of generals from doing stuff that they would have gotten away with murder. But there was also the other extreme where some WAC, every time this WAC took a ride anywhere in Cairo, Ralph Royce was

mixed up in that too. Ralph Royce gave somebody a jeep.

Q: I've been through six years of Drew Pearson, and that's like 360 columns a year. He didn't like Arnold, and he didn't like Giles.

W: You know what Arnold told me once. There was an anti-Arnold feeling in the Herald Tribune in NY.

Q: Walter Millis.

W: Now, wait, it was deeper than that. It was. I corrected that. The Old Man said to me one day, we sat down like this, and he said: "The Herald Tribune doesn't like me." And I said: "Well, General, I don't think that is true. But let me say, if you can't fight them, join them." So I worked on Mrs. Reed Ogden--this is between you and me and the gate post--I gave Mrs. Reed a ride in a B-29, I authorized it. I did a lot of things like that. The first thing you know, Mrs. Reed was having us for lunch at the NY Herald Tribune, and the guy who didn't like him was the editorial guy whose son was on the Herald Tribune in Paris. The guy who didn't like him was the guy who controlled the editorial page.

Q: One man that didn't like him, didn't like the Air Force, was Walter Millis.

W: Well, the guy that didn't like Arnold apparently, was when Mrs. Reed became friendly. I kidnapped her one time when she came in to Marshall's office. She had had her time set different, and the tall Sergeant didn't know it. I took her into Arnold's office and I had a rapproachement between him and Mrs. Reed who was a fine woman. When her husband died, I sent some flowers to her husband's funeral in NY. I got about a six-page letter from Mrs. Reed in her own handwriting. She was a lady. I said to the Old Man: "Now, all right, just assume that

that they don't like you. If you can't fight them, join them. Let's work on them."

Q: One more item on Pearson. He never failed to take a potshot at Arnold. For example, he blamed him on the leak on the sealant on the transports.

W: The sealed tanks?

Q: Yes.

W: We had a guy who did that. He used to feed that to Pearson.

Q: Who was that, you mean an Air Force type?

W: Yes. They found him. If I remember rightly, and I'm not sure, he had some financial interest in the invention, and he kept shouting that they should have these things on the troop carrier gas tanks.

Q: He kept hitting this one. Well, Pearson also hit him on the marriage of Bruce Arnold to Barbara Douglas.

W: Well, what's wrong with that?

Q: Well, in the industrial-military complex, they didn't call it that as such, but he was hitting on it. You know he wrote several nasty columns about Douglas. He wrote that Douglas had sold his patents to the Japanese, you know, in 1939.

W: He gave them an airplane that wouldn't work. He sold them his first DC-4,and it was no good. Is that bad? Pratt Whitney sold them an engine.

Q: This was authorized by the State Dept at the time, but Pearson kept coming back?

W: He thought this was good journalism.

Q: How about Seversky?

W: Oh, don't get me into that one. Have you found the file on Seversky?

Q: I found several things on Seversky.

W: You know, that's Harry Bruno.

Q: Rockefeller Center?

W: He's still got Seversky. If you'd like to know the facts about Seversky.

Q: He and Arnold, they didn't have the right chemistry?

W: Because Sasha Seversky is a big phony. Art Ennis went out to see Disney and told him not to make the picture. Disney wishes they'd paid attention to Art because it was one of the few Disney flops. I hope this doesn't get me into libel with Harry Bruno.

Q: What was his connection with Seversky?

W: He's a press agent for Jackie Cochran, Floyd Odlum, and I see that he got Jackie something or other. Harry Bruno...

Q: Tell me about Seversky.

W: Well, as you know, there is a file somewhere around here on Seversky that will show that he didn't lose his leg in the war at all. It was from an accident. That he is no more of an engineer than you are. He didn't design. I was in the Old Man's office, when either, I can't remember if he talked to him on the phone. Yes, he called him. Sasha came out with something. He was a good Monday morning quarterback, and so the Old Man said to him with sarcasm: "Sasha now if you were Chief of the Air Force, how would you do this, and how would you do that?"

Q: Did he bring him into the office one time?

W: Well, he may have, yes, he brought him in.

Q: Did he show him some charts and ask "what would you do if you were in my place?"

W: What would you do? It is like asking your office boy: "What would you do to build the Pentagon?" In my opinion, Seversky was simply built up by Harry Bruno, the press agent. Harry Bruno is now head of the Lotus Club or whatever it is. Actually, he is strictly a no good phoney.

Q: Were Arnold and Seversky reconciled late in the war?

W: I don't think so.

Q: They were always at odds?

W: Well, because Seversky didn't know what the answers were. He was a Monday morning quarterback. I didn't finish the story, because when Arnold got him and said: "What would you do on this," Seversky said: "It would take me a little time." Arnold said: "How long, tomorrow, next week, a month, how long do you need?" And the guy said: "A month," let's say, I don't remember what it was. Arnold said: "All right, you have a month. You come back and tell me what to do in these cases,"and Seversky never showed.

Q: I've heard stories that are slightly varied, I'm not sure which one is true. I mean these are recollections. But basically Arnold threw the monkey on Seversky's back and said: "Show me where I'm doing wrong, and how you could do better?"

W: What was the one, who threw the inkwell at who? Do you know that story?

Q: No.

W: Ask Rosie who threw the inkwell at what. I don't remember the details. But somebody threw an inkwell, whether it was Arnold or not, I'm not sure.

W: Ask Rosie when you talk to him. (NOTE: Rosie O'Donnell threw an inkwell at a clock that was buzzing.)

Q: You know, Kuter was involved in a campaign to cozy up to the Washington Post and Eugene Meyer?

W: Kuter was appointed to the Academy by the Lt. Governor of Illinois and he came from Rockford, Illinois; Larry Kuter, in my opinion, was strictly a big phoney. His wife, Ethel, liked the theatrical people, and she thought, they were also involved with my little deal with C.R. Smith, because they thought you knew. I could tell you about theatrical people. Let's skip Kuter, because if he cozied up, he would be doing it as an amateur, not knowing how.

Q: He tried, he got them together for dinner.

W: Kuter with Pan Am now?

Q: Yes.

W: I congratulated him. He said he wasn't going to Pan Am the last time I saw him. But any rate, Arnold, you know, was human, and I had Clark Gable come in to see me a couple of times. One time I made the mistake of telling the guards at the door, when I came in for the day, that he was coming. By the time he came in, the place was hanging with human flies all around. Everybody wanting to see Clark Gable. Gable, of course, was a pretty good guy. He used to tell some stories on himself about how they always figured him to be a superman, and he really wasn't. He came in my office. The guy with him was from MGM. He went into the service with him as a sort of Damon and Pythias deal. When Gable was being promoted, the Old Man was this human like for the theatrical, he insisted upon pinning the insignia on Gable.

W: Arnold demoted Eddie Perrin from a full BG to a Captain. Later on he committed suicide. He was a BG.

Q: Was this in connection with the SILVERPLATE operation?

W: What was his name? He was a nice guy. He took it on the lam, they sent him up to Rome after he was out.

Q: Where was he stationed?

W: Here in the Pentagon.

Q: Why did he demote him?

W: Alcoholic.

Q: I want you to tell me about Eaker, do you have some other anecdotes?

W: One of the shotgun. To show you how careful the Old Man was with his image, he didn't think of it in that way, but the Old Man liked to hunt, and he told me one day that some company was getting up a special gun--the 100,000th shotgun that they had sold the Air Force for their gunnery practice. He was pretty naive about it. I said: "They are getting you up a special gun?" He said: "Yes, it's going to be mounted this way and that way, it's the 100,000th gun." After I listened to him, I said: "General, you can't take the gun." He said: "But I want it." I said: "Of course, you want it." He was just like a child. "But this business. Now I know you've done nothing for the company. It doesn't look right. Just because they think it's a good press agent stunt to give you the 100,000th gun and you like to hunt, this is going to look bad in print." In case anybody prints the story, it looks like Arnold is taking. I said: "You don't want people to think so," and he never took the gun. So that's why some of the letters I have which said, while I didn't always agree with you, as far as I was concerned, I never pulled any punches with the boss. That's why I think I got along so well. A lot of people would say: "Yes, General Arnold,"

when it was wrong, and they should have said: "No, General Arnold!"

Q: Were you aware of an order that Stratemeyer put out, asking all people in procurement to list their assets, and to list their stockholdings?

W: No, but it sounds like Peru, Indiana to me (Stratemeyer was from Peru, Indiana). Arnold got unhappy with Horace Shelmire who was not above having little doodads like having the Air Force tie, and things like that, which the Old Man got unhappy with because it looked like--even though it was not--there was no money involved, it looked like somebody was making some money on the Air Force. It was a tie by which a civilian could recognize he was an Air Force officer.

Q: He was very scrupulous about the appearance of conflict of interest?

W: Very much.

Q: In this case of the gun, he couldn't resist.

W: He said: "I want it." As soon as I pointed out it was liable to do something, he was off.

W: I wasn't present at the one in which he and Marshall were hunting, but somewhere.

Q: Bismarck, North Dakota, wasn't it?

W: Actually, it wasn't there, it was hunting pheasantwhen I almost shot him. Shelmire was along and Hank Pool was along.

Q: Where was this?

W: This was in North Dakota, Bismarck.

Q: 1944?

W: Yes, the General used to give a game dinner once a year at Bolling Field. It was a time when the Old Man got out of patience with Horace Shelmire, and soon after that, Horace disappeared from his office.

I'm not a very good hunter. The pheasants were so fat, they didn't want to take off, so we hid in the cornfield, and one group would go to one end and the other would go towards the other, and these birds had to rise then. They used to run otherwise. I got so excited that I just pulled up my gun one time, and if it hadn't been a miracle I would have shot the Old Man with a shotgun. But, however, somebody did the very same thing later on. They were hunting with Marshall and somebody pulled up a gun and shot it, and the Old Man got so mad and he got some B-B shot in his head. Arnold got the B-B.

W: Talking about a cover plan, the Old Man had a very bad heart attack. He went down to the Biltmore. He had been due to go to some big conference.

Q: YALTA, it was in January 1945.

W: So somebody came to me and said, well now--talk about a cover plan, Dr. David Grant and I had figured what we could say. We didn't want it known he had a heart attack.

Q: This was right around Roosevelt's Inauguration Day, was it not?

W: I think so, it was when the Old Man had this very bad heart attack.

Q: Was it in the Pentagon when he had it?

W: No, I think it was at Ft. Myer. They took him down to the hospital at Biltimore, in Miami. They put him in that tower. By the way, I met somebody here the other day, some woman, who had been present. So we discussed the Old Man's heart attack, I don't remember her name.

Q: In this building?

W: No, out in California. She talked about Arnold and his heart attack at the Biltmore. But any rate, they got him down to nothing. When he came back from that, he poked me in my fat gut and he said:

"Bill"--and of course, I've always been a little too heavy, and I like to eat. But he said: "We ought to get you down there and give you a little milk toast and some lettuce." He said: "That would be good for you," and I said, "General, I'm sorry, I'm a meat and potato guy, I can't go." They had him on nothing, but he was ambulatory, and we didn't want the public to know. Dr. Grant and I got together, and we didn't ever tell anybody what it was that he had, but we implied also that it might have been--I remember because I had never heard of it before--a typical virus pneumonia because first of all it was thought, I don't know who I was in on this with, maybe Giles, I've forgotten. Anyway, we didn't want the Old Man to be downgraded for not being present at YALTA. He was supposed to be there, and we didn't want to have anybody think well why...

Q: Kuter replaced him on that.

W: Who is this guy that is different, married a wealthy woman--Pinky Craig. The Old Man called McCabe one day and he said to McCabe: "What do you mean by threatening to do something to my generals?" And McCabe said: "Sir, what part of my daily activities to you refer to?" And the Old Man said: "You have threatened to remove one of my general officers from his job." And McCabe said: "Sir, I threatened to remove no general from his job because that is not my function. I have no ability to remove any general from his job." He said: "That is purely your function, and if you asked me what I would recommend about it, I would recommend that you do." So it was sort of funny, because Pinky Craig had called Arnold and said McCabe had threatened him.

Q: Back to this cover plan, where you and Grant worked out this thing on virus pneumonia.

W: And we sort of dropped the hint. We didn't mention heart attack, we mentioned a typical ailment, because the Old Man was ambulatory and he was seen. We said: "What can he have, where he could be seen?" He was around driving the cart, and picked up some WACs down there, and inquired of the WACs all about their troubles in the AAF. The Old Man was, after he was ambulatory, they kept him in there quite a while.

Q: He was there for two months.

W: This is something I haven't thought about in years.

Q: I wanted to ask about, remember Dr. Marquardt, the heart specialist? Now he accompanied Arnold on several trips.

W: They gave him a phony thing to look good. They gave him an aide's badge. Dr. Marquardt had a five-star badge.

Q: There was some trouble between Dr. Marquardt and Mrs. Arnold. Mrs. Arnold went down there, and I guess they didn't let her in to see the General and she sort of left in a huff.

W: I don't know about that.

Q: Arnold was worried--we are talking about his heart attack now--he was worried that Marshall was going to retire him, that he could no longer cut the mustard?

W: This was part of the idea, the image that Dr. Grant kept alive.

Q: Is Grant alive?

W: Yes, he's around Washington somewhere. Go and get it from him. Don't pin it on me.

Q: I know a lot about this. He was worried that Marshall would retire him?

W: I think justifiably so.

Q: Didn't, McCabe and Peterson were coming down every couple of days and Arnold, in his record, very elaborate.

W: This phony character named Maury Carr, tried to get aboard that airplane.

Q: Is that the Major you were talking about?

W: Yes, he tried.

Q: Arnold was trying to conduct Air Force business from a horizontal position?

W: Well in the tower of the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables. There are so many things I haven't thought of in 20 years.

Q: Was he successful at this? Was he able to conduct operations?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Lovett became very much concerned in February and March 1945, that the Air Force was sort of leaderless in Washington. You know, you have all those conferences, because Arnold would give instructions to his aides. But you'd have all these top level conferences, Arnold wasn't present. And Giles did not have the stature that Arnold had. This is why the decision was made to bring in Eaker, am I correct in that? They brought in Eaker as Deputy Commander, this is April 1945. The war in Europe was winding down, Arnold had come back to Washington.

W: I don't even know that Eaker was called in, I don't remember that.

Q: Arnold came back to Washington, and they sent him on a recuperation trip. He went to Cannes.

Q: Eaker came in as Deputy Commander. Now Arnold took a trip to Cannes, the Riviera, it was supposed to be an inspection trip, but actually Marshall wanted him to take it easy.

W: Please be careful on the Eaker thing.

Q: Well, I want to get into the Eaker business.

W: I think I'd better stay out, because Eaker is around town.

Q: This is just very private. Nobody has access to this but Loosbrock and Green. This is one of the things, I have a great deal on it. Perhaps I can tell you more than you can tell me on this, but there are some things that you can tell me that I don't know. But anyway, Arnold went to Europe and they had a meeting on April 19, 1945, and Spaatz was there.

W: Right after '45 I left at my own request, to go to Berlin.

Q: Around the end of the war, VE Day?

W: Yes.

Q: Right before VE Day, now Roosevelt had died a month before, and Arnold and Eaker....

W: I had been tied here and every time I tried to get out, Eaker gave the compliment of trying to get to Europe.

Q: Well, they had this little meeting.

W: I'd have been a buck general. He took Harris Hull. I saw him one day, and I said, how did you make Buck General, I had a letter which I meant to bring with me, Colonel...

Q: Why didn't Arnold promote you?

W: I wanted to show you the letter, he recommended me to be promoted, nobody acted on it.

Q: Was this about the time he was leaving Washington?

W: No, June 11, 1945, and a glowing letter.

Q: You'd been in Washington all through the war, then?

W: Yes, and every time I tried to get away, I was over in Europe and Stratemeyer was there. Eaker and he got together, and Eaker wanted me to come. The only ones to go out to that part at Widewing were Jock Whitney and I. We were two colonels, the others were all generals. At

that time, Eaker had been trying to get me to come work for him, and Stratemeyer said: "I'll handle it." So he did whatever he did, I got a wire a couple of days later, Arnold said: "Your services needed here immediately. Return at once." I hadn't been planning to come back for about two weeks, and when he said return at once, that meant everything I had a booking on the ATC around through the north, but because it said: "Return at once," they insisted that Arnold meant: "Return at once." I came home on Pan Am from Ireland. But we had to wear civilian clothes, a nd we had to go down in a boat, and it took us eight days to get from Shannon River. We came down eight days around South America, across the South Atlantic, and up to Bermuda and up to New York. It took us eight days.

Q: When was this?

W: Pan American was using boats...commercial. I came back about the week that Governor Lehman was named head of UNRRA and he was on the ship.

Q: Must have been around 1944. Well, anyway, this meeting I started to tell you about, when they said they want to get closer to Truman than they were to Roosevelt, and they were going to try to get Quesada into the White House as Aide to the President.

W: That would have been an awful thing.

Q: But it didn't happen that way. Truman wanted Missouri people in.

W: He didn't want "Greasy Pete" in there. Quesada hung onto the tails of Spaatz and Eaker and everything else.

Q: When did you first become aware that Arnold was dissatisfied with the job that Eaker was doing?

W: I don't know the date.

Q: Let me try to place it in time--Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid in August 1943.

W: The losses were awful, and who's the guy that got the Medal of Honor, Leon Johnson?

Q: The guy who wrote the story of RAINBOW FIVE plan that Roosevelt was supposed to be getting us into a war was Chesly Manly.

W: The only thing, I know Chesly Manly well. I know nothing about the leak on the plan, as I haven't the slightest idea who gave it to him, but I do know that I was in Chicago once and Wayne Thomis, who is on the Tribune with Chesly Manly.

Q: Well, Chesly Manly said, or Wheeler said that he gave it to Chesly Manly, and they thought they were duty bound to publish it. Now Wheeler claims that this Air Force captain gave it to him.

W: In my opinion, the implication that Arnold had anything to do with feeding that thing to the Tribune is absolutely hogwash.

Q: Well, I believe so, too. But in order to do this, we may have to find out who did it.

W: Wayne told me that he had been called in and they finally decided to let it go since they had no further investigation or any showdown about it, that it had been dreamed up. Manly, if I remember correctly, had said that he just dreamed this up on his own, he had no, it just happened to be a coincidence that he dreamed up this plan. I don't know much about it.

Q: No, he quoted extensively from this plan. He had the plan.

W: If I remember though, when it got into the Federal Court or the investigation in Chicago, they decided to let the thing drop.

Q: Well, they let the thing drop because it was overtaken. You see, theAxis really couldn't take advantage of it, because what it said

was: "We'll go all out in Europe and hold in the Pacific." The Axis could not act upon it because Pearl Harbor happened soon after that.

Q: You say Chesly Manly was helped in writing this article?

W: I think as I remember it, that Chesly Manly, not only was he helped in writing the story by Wayne Thomis from the Chicago Tribune who maybe is still there. If I remember correctly, Wayne Thomis--and I didn't pay much attention to it, and if anything had been done, if Arnold were to have leaked it, he would have to have been a superman to do it. I would say impossible to do anything like that without my knowing it, or without McCabe knowing it, because he would have no contacts with the Chicago Tribune. He had no contacts with the Chicago Tribune. He couldn't have dispatched a Captain to do it.

Q: Waldrop has compounded his association of Arnold with this leak.

W: How does Waldrop know? What does he say? How does he know it? (OFF THE RECORD)

Q: Let's talk about Eaker. Schweinfurt-Regensburg, when Arnold had misgivings about that. Arnold came to see you?

W: I was up there one day. I can't remember the details of this. He said: "Bill, I've got, more or less, a problem, and I just don't know how to do it exactly," because he said he knew that, how Eaker and he had been buddy-pals, and written books together and all that sort of thing, and here he was going to have to do something about it because, words to the effect that he was in dutch because of the heavy losses and other things in the 8th AF. So I had suggested when the politicians wanted to get rid of a police captain out in Chicago, they had a game of musical chairs on the deal, and everybody would change hands, and you could never tell who exactly went where and why, and

who was in the doghouse. So I said: "Why don't you do it?" So I think, when they did change Eaker, if you notice....

Q: They changed around the whole staff.

W: That was one of the reasonings behind the changes of staff. Arnold could do it.

Q: Arnold had great qualms about this because of a personal association with Eaker.

W: They had been friends for life, but when you are fighting a war, and maybe you have other pressures like Marshall and Spaatz, and President Roosevelt. When you have all those people on your back. Arnold, of course, never socialized with Roosevelt. Did you notice that? There was no socialization there. He wanted to keep away from that. He mentioned to me. He wanted to keep away from this socialization because he didn't go to parties or anything else. But Roosevelt was his boss, and Arnold, of course, started out in Pennsylvania. His family wanted him to be a doctor. They were good, conservative Republicans. Roosevelt was a liberal Democrat. He didn't want to get mixed up in this business of politics. That's why he kept away from this.

Q: Was he introduced to Willkie in the campaign of 1940?

W: I don't know.

Q: I've been told this. Willkie came out for unification and maybe this is one of the reasons that Roosevelt did not cotton to the Air Force because he felt that they were siding with the GOP.

W: I don't know. I met Willkie's brother.

Q: Somebody had told me that he introduced him to Willkie. But the man who told me is not one of the highest reputation.

W: Let me tell you, Arnold was not the type to go around and do this thing, anymore than he would go around and slide something to the Chicago Tribune. He wouldn't do that. He did know Casey Jones at the Post, personally. If he got mixed in something, he'd get on the phone. He'd tell Suzy to get Casey Jones on the line, Casey would ask him various things, because Casey was managing editor of the Post--not the same crowd at all that is there now. But I'll tell you, Arnold just couldn't have been involved in that Chicago Tribune thing. Is Chesly Manly in this area?

Q: I don't know. I can find out.

W: If Chesly Manly is around here, I can run into him. I'm a member of the Press Club, but I would take special efforts.

Q: I'll find out if Chesly Manly is in the area.

W: Because I think I can say: "Hey, I just ran into a book by Tristram Coffin who implied that Arnold had been involved...

Q: You see he doesn't mention right off, but if you look in the index, the publisher might have taken it out of the text to avoid libel.

W: That could be my wedge about getting into there.

Q: You mentioned a lot of little things about Arnold. Did he always have a smile on his face?

W: You know the smile meant absolutely nothing because his smile--he always had a smile, almost always--but a smile didn't necessarily mean that he was loving you.

Q: Could it precede a storm?

W: Yes, indeed, it often did.

Q: Did he have a pretty good vocabulary when he cussed somebody out, or how did he cuss somebody out?

W: I don't think he used any swear words at all, but if you have ever been cussed out by him, I never have been. I saw him cuss out Col Sorenson and there was no mistake about what he meant, when he got through, and Col Sorenson understood it, because he went out of there perspiring heavily. He didn't use any bad words, but you knew it if you displeased him.

Q: Did he grab people in the hall to do jobs for him?

W: Yes.

Q: Sometimes the jobs were alien to their experience?

W: Might be. That didn't make any difference to him. The table of organization, that meant nothing to him.

Q: He was too impatient to go through channels?

W: He didn't know anything about channels. Talking about channels, I remember one time we went down from Sonoma down to Los Angeles to give a medal to Jack Warner over at March Field. We stopped to pick up the Warners in Los Angeles. We were riding in a plush DC-3. Up to that time the Old Man had been able to get only bucket jobs, so he said: "How in the world did he ever get this?" Somebody had arranged this thing, probably Lou Quinn had arranged it. So he went over, one of those little fan things which the Air Force agreed to give to the Corps Area. When Arnold was at Sonoma, whenever he wanted an airplane--I could tell you some other things about how they sort of forgot he was once Chief of the Air Force--but he went over and asked a young Captain who was flying him--he said he was tickled to death to get a nice plush airplane, but how, do I get on an airplane like this, when I don't get a bucket job. He didn't know anything about channels, didn't know how

to work it either. And didn't care much. He didn't care about any Army regulations.

Q: Just wanted to get it done.

Q: What about his relations with Lovett?

W: They were very, very cordial. They were warm. They were tenuous. I could see that they were warm and cordial, and Lovett also was a very fine man who was like an effete Easterner. You never thought that he came from Texas.

Q: Effete snob?

W: Yes, he looked like, he married Baby Brown, of Brown Harriman, as you might know. He had a guy named Col Brownell in his office, who was a brother or cousin of Herbert Brownell. Arnold sort of got to counteract that, and got a lawyer in his office named Proctor.

Q: Right, he died a couple of years ago.

W: I heard that Bob Lovett was offered the Secretary of the Air Force job. Turned it down. You know who his partner was, his partner was Jim Douglas who became Secretary of the Air Force.

Q: This was a great loss, because Bob Proctor could have told us a lot.

W: Absolutely. Bob Proctor was a great member of that society that wants to mediate everything?

W: The first time I met Douglas was when he was a Colonel in ATC, he brought over all the Elliott Roosevelt dog letters, which I had to handle. Blaze was the dog's name. Blaze had a stable mate which almost became another cause celebre. He was coming over on a boat, and Army Transport Service almost got their neck in a jam. They made a General in ATC who used to work for United Airlines.

Q: The Blaze incident happened within a day or two of Arnold's heart attack?

W: Well, I don't think it had any connection with it.

Q: No, I don't mean any connection, but Arnold wasn't there personally to handle it.

W: I don't think so. But I had to handle all the Blaze correspondence, and people I knew everywhere would call me up on the phone, and say: "Ruff, ruff, ruff," and it got to be a pain in the neck.

Q: Were you aware, at this very time, Elliott's promotion was up for debate, for BG.

W: Don't go into the business of Elliott Roosevelt and his promotion.

W: But he got the promotion. Arnold and Spaatz had correspondence on his promotion. Of course, legally.

Q: What did Arnold say. (OFF THE RECORD)

Q: These pictures Elliott took?

W: Arnold said: "Why don't I see those beautiful air pictures in the paper?" And I said: "Because Elliott Roosevelt snagged on to them with his men in Africa and takes the negatives and blows them up and takes a bow with Marshall for saying, 'look at the beautiful pictures that my men took today,' and 99% of them were all classified. So we cannot print them." I told Arnold: "This is why you don't see them in the papers." This is what the Old Man wanted to know why he didn't see these things. He went to a meeting and Gen Marshall showed him a bunch of pictures taken by Elliott, and he asked me: "Why didn't I see them in the paper?"

Q: You know he corresponded with Spaatz on Elliott's promotion. Spaatz wanted to promote him,and Arnold said "no," we were going to get into trouble on it. And as I piece it together, it was just about

this time that Arnold had his heart attack, and a week or two later Elliott had his star.

Q: On related issue, what were the relations between Arnold and Marshall?

W: They were very cordial.

Q: But it was always on a slightly unequal level. I noticed correspondence.

W: Marshall was the boss.

Q: It was "Dear Arnold," and Arnold would write, "Dear General," and this was always maintained.

W: Yes, because of the fact that General Marshall, much to everybody's surprise. When VMI got into the picture. You know the old story about Gen Drum?--"you can't beat our Drum." They said one of the reasons Roosevelt didn't make Gen Drum the Chief of Staff was because of his wife's sister who lived with him, who ran the show, and because of the fact that everybody went around saying, "you can't beat our Drum." So when Marshall was made Chief of Staff, he <u>was</u> the Chief of Staff, and Arnold knew this. He knew that even though they had been friends since the days of the Philippines.

Q: Drum had hoped to succeed Malin Craig?

W: He expected to be Chief.

Q: And then they appointed Marshall who was junior to him.

W: They appointed Marshall who was not even a West Pointer. He was a VMI man and that just about killed all the West Pointers. But Roosevelt did, and it was the smartest thing he ever did, or otherwise we might have lost the war. As for General Drum, his wife and sister lived with him and it was said she ran the roost. Wife and the sister

ran him, so that was one reason he didn't make it.

Q: Did you ever hear the story that Arnold drank a lot?

W: It's not true. Not in my days of association with him.

Q: There was one story. Do you remember John Callan O'Laughlin, who was the editor of the Army Navy Journal?

W: Yes.

Q: There was a story around Washington about Roosevelt hesitating about Arnold because of Arnold's reputation of a drinker.

W: That's not so. He might have been a drinker as a younger man, but...

Q: Not in your experience?

W: He didn't drink anything except a little sherry and I can tell you a funny story about that. One time in Seattle, we all went to have dinner, and the people who promoted the dinner, after the thing was over--Chuck Kerwood was involved in this. Chuck is a great guy, but we were in this hotel in Seattle, and in the night time these people sent over a bunch of scotch and Chuck Kerwood who was in the lobby when the stuff came, glommed on it, and snitched all of it, including the bottle of sherry which the Old Man wanted for himself. The Old Man drank sherry once in a while, not very much. I don't know of any hard liquor I saw him drink. But the hard liquor disappeared, and some drunken woman came into my office one day, and I told Chuck that that was a dirty trick, and Chuck was only there on another matter, he wasn't on that at all. He glommed on to all the liquor they sent over and threw a big party. The reason I found out about it was I didn't go to the party. I wasn't invited, but I found out a lot of people had gone to Chuck's party, he was a typical Robin Hood, he's rob the

rich to pay the poor. He didn't do it for himself, he just stole all the liquor.

Q: Arnold mentioned that Roosevelt invited him over for an old-fashioned, and he knew he was back in the good graces of Roosevelt, this was following Arnold's problems with Morgenthau.

W: No, I wasn't aware of the Morgenthau problem.

Q: This probably preceded your tour. Morgenthau wanted to ship all our planes out to the English and French. This was right before the start of the war, and Arnold was given the job to build up the Air Corps, it was pretty hard to do both of these because there weren't enough planes coming off the assembly lines.

W: Did you know that one hassle involved in that was the 299, the prototype of the B-17? I remember the first one, was cracked up at Wright Field in a takeoff on a testing flight, because somebody forgot to unlock the airlines, or something. In the Congress they shouted: "No more money for those expensive airplanes!"

Q: This must have been before the war?

W: Yes, it was. Well, I heard about it as I was covering aviation on a paper in Chicago.

Q: How about Roosevelt and King?

W: I told you about the five stars which I gave to Arnold, and I had them all made in England, months before Arnold knew what shape they were going to be in.

Q: Who thought of that idea?

W: Admiral King's design, and I have a letter. I'll send you a copy. I gave some to Marshall. I had a little note back from Marshall saying he was glad to get them, but Arnold said: "How in the world did

you ever know the shape they were going to be in,"because they had brought the first five stars in a line. He said in the letter: "Is that a military secret?" He was kidding me.

Q: But you knew that King thought it up first.

W: I never told Arnold. I found out who had been responsible. They told me Admiral King, but not to mention it.

Q: If he had known then he probably wouldn't wear them. Were they on pretty distant, cool relationship?

W: I don't think so. I think King was distant and cool to everybody. Here's another little item about after the Old Man had retired and was out in Sonoma.

W: Yes, and he, one time for Christmas, their new house had just been, I knew that the Old Man like liqueurs and dthings like that, things that he could serve at a party, and particularly one time when I had been overseas, I brought back some Goldvasser which was hard to find, a liqueur that you couldn't find, so this time, after the house was done. For Christmas I sent out a little basket of stuff for their new house guest room in their house and it happened to be some cologne with speckles of gold water in it, and when the Old Man got it he thought it was Goldvasser, something to drink, and he put it aside. When I went out to visit him, he said they kept it for a long time and one night they had some guests and he thought about the gold water, and he asked Bea to get it and they served it. He asked: "What are you trying to do, kill all my guests?" He served them cologne.

Q: What did it say?

W: I think it said: Goldvasser Cologne, I just did it because he liked "Goldvasser," and didn't have the slightest idea.

Q: When you were out at the Ranch to see him. Was he pretty tired? Did he slow up quite a bit when he was out at the Ranch?

W: No, actually, he didn't. As I tell you, we went over to Savvy Cook's, and he had Bruce Simmons to help us, I guess. We went over and brought the stuff back in a jeep.

Q: How did he decide to write the book? Did you have any connection with Laidlaw?

W: No, no, I didn't. He wanted to do that. I think why it didn't go so well. It was too damned late; everybody put out a book.

Q: Well, of course, it was two-dimensional. He didn't get into any issues.

W: I was not involved in the book at all.

Q: He wrote a series of articles for the McNaught Syndicate.

Q: You were talking about some other articles he wrote?

W: He went to work, when he was in Sonoma. They loved him there. He had his own collection of model planes, and I think they still have them on exhibit there. But Ceely Murphy, who owned the Sonoma Index, was a newspaper brat, an ink-stained wretch, who had run away from her father. He had owned an Oakland paper. She ran away and married an itinerant, drunken typesetter, and she was really quite a power in that area politically. They lived in the General Vallejo barracks there in Sonoma which had been given to the State of California.

W: He worked for the Sonoma Index Tribune, he'd write pieces for it once in a while. He said to me: "I write for it, but I have to subscribe to it, because she said you are not a professional. She makes me pay $3.00 a year. But here she comes along and gives you free copies of it." And I said: "Well, because I'm one of the specials." One time when Ceely and her husband came to Washington, it was when Truman was here. He was away, down at Key West and through my connections at

the White House I then had, I took Ceely and put her at Mr. Truman's desk, and that was the night of the windstorm. I called her "Madame President." She was really quite a power in her own way in Sonoma. But Arnold was well received in Sonoma, as you know.

Q: You were in the office during Pearl Harbor, weren't you?

W: I was in NY in a hotel on that weekend.

Q: He was down in Sacramento shooting quail with Donald Douglas, was he not?

W: I don't know. We all got ordered--I had an AT-6 at Newark. I remember getting ordered to come back to Washington. I was a little hung over, but came back anyway.

Q: Do you remember a guy named McRae or Fred Dean?

W: Freddy Dean, Freddy used to sit outside the General's office. I used to say to him, Freddy, quit wearing the Old Man's stars. I'd known Freddy for a long time. He used to be the guard, he was St. Peter at the Old Man's gate.

Q: How about Norstad? Was he on pretty good terms with Arnold?

W: Well, Arnold thought pretty much of him. He was a dapper boy.

Q: Cabell and Norstad were the first Advisory Council.

W: Cabell went into Intelligence and became the great sphinx, didn't he?

Q: Right, but Norstad, Arnold was very devoted to Norstad, was he not?

W: Yes. When Arnold was Chief of the 20th AF and ran it from the Pentagon, Norstad was sitting right there. He was a buck general.

Q: Did Norstad go out, was he a hatchet man to tell Hansell? Do you know anything about Hansell being relieved by LeMay?

W: Possum Hansell, I don't know, but I'll tell you that Norstad didn't have the stuff. Some woman named Alice Rogers Hagen had written a piece. She had gone out and had an interview with LeMay. She was with North American Newspaper Alliance. She sat down and wrote the whole piece and it was bad stuff. I've forgotten what it was. This was bad public relations. Whatever LeMay told her we were not quite so sure that LeMay wasn't stupid, whatever he said. So I went up to Norstad and he said: "I'm going out there next week," and he said: "I'll see, I'll take care of this matter." He was a buck general in the Pentagon, and working for the Old Man--sort of a No. 2 Deputy Commander of the 20th AF, which was run out of the Pentagon. Well, so Norstad went out and marched up the hill and marched back down again. Here's what LeMay said: "Yes, I said it, and I'll say it again." That was the end of the whole deal. That's how Norstad handled it.

Q: I would guess that this happened after LeMay got the job, because up to that time he wasn't so cocksure, I think. Do you know anything about Hansell, Hansell was one of Arnold's close young men?

W: I think it was something to do with his hearing, too. Possum was once public relations chief of the Air Force. He was in this chain somewhere of mine.

Q: Maybe he was in that, but he was in Plans.

W: Yes, but he was...

Q: Kuter, Ken Walker and Harold George.

W: Kuter was supposed to be the great brain.

Q: You don't think so? Arnold had great confidence in him, did he not?

W: I think so.

Q: Did Arnold ever question that?

W: No, I think he thought Kuter was good.

Q: But some others didn't?

W: Well, I didn't, particularly.

Q: Hansell was a broken man when he came back.

W: I think Possum Hansell wasn't probably the great brain that Arnold thought he was.

Q: I think he was a great intellectual, but not a leader like LeMay.

W: Yes.

Q: But he was not a leader. LeMay was after Arnold's own heart.

W: LeMay was sort of a "butcher" leader though. He was a butcher; he was a Patton.

Q: But he got the job done, and as you pointed out, Arnold wanted the job done.

W: Well, Arnold did have, but he didn't want to face the issue. When I talk about Patton, Patton had done the thing, hang the costs, and LeMay was "hang the cost." Some of the others, you know LeMay's dictum to his pilots that he wanted nobody in the Strategic Air Command that was either unlucky or no good. He said: "If you're unlucky, goodbye." LeMay had a lot of good rugged ideas, which were cold. There was no sentiment involved. He could send a guy out. He didn't like to kill them, but he knew when they came back that there would be certain files missing up there.

Q: What do you mean?

W: LeMay knew there would be certain losses. He accepted those. He didn't like them any more than anybody does. But he knew this was war.

Q: What about Arnold and Spaatz?

W: I think Arnold and Spaatz got along very well.

Q: Spaatz was inarticulate, but he must have been a good leader?

W: Yes, he was. I remember, barber used to cut Spaatz' hair when he was a Major. Ruthie Spaatz was pushing, she changed his name. Put the extra 'a' in it.

Q: That's because people were calling him "Spatz." When did he change his name? Around '38,'39 or '40?

W: I don't know, but I know she put the extra 'a' in there. Didn't make a difference. A lot of people still called him "Spatz."

Q: This was a ticket to the Aleutians? Was he very sensitive about that?

W: I don't know that he was.

Q: She was?

W: I've forgotten. Spaatz is the one who said to me--was it Spaatz or was it Giles, I can't remember. Talk about gentlemen blowing security. One of them said something to me about OVERLORD. I'd never heard about OVERLORD till he mentioned it. The story was, you know, you said to somebody the way to find out if you were bigoted. If the guy said no, I'm pretty reasonable, he wasn't in on it.

Q: You know, the word OVERLORD appeared in a crossword puzzle in the London Telegraph, two days before the event. Somebody was trying to transmit a message. There is a book on this right now, last Sunday's paper there was a review.

W: Did somebody really try to do it?

Q: I don't know, just speculating about it.

W: OVERLORD appeared, it could be happenstance. I do crossword puzzles. OVERLORD is not a normal crossword word.

Q: We are talking about OVERLORD and the leak of D-Day.

W: This is what I understand actually happened in that case. This, I don't know of my own knowledge, but I was told. I can't remember by whom, at the time it happened. Gen Miller was at a dinner in London. Also at the same dinner was a high woman official of the Red Cross. At the time, he made a speech and so on, and sat down. The woman said to him--there were a group of people there, including some BG, I don't remember who. I didn't hear his name, and I understand he did not love Gen Miller very much. He had been a classmate of his. At any rate, Gen Miller walked over to the woman and said: "Where is my mobile Red Cross canteen machine?" And she said: "Well General, we don't have enough to give everybody we want." He said: "You have been promising me that for a long time." She said: "Well, we just don't have enough to go around, but the way things work out now, we are going to have this one to you by June 15," or whatever the date was. The General looked at her and said: "June 15th, me eye, that will be just too late." That is supposed to have been the basis of his blowing the D-Day date. It came from somebody who worked for Gen Miller who told me that it was not a legitimate leak. That this BG who heard, went over and told somebody, you heard what he said, you heard it now.

Q: The account that I saw is that he said this more than once, whatever he leaked, or whatever indication he gave, he gave more than once. So there are probably some varying accounts.

W: My part of it was that they revealed in England all about this demotion and sending him away, and all that, except one thing. They didn't give his name. All the press came into my office, like a bunch of vultures, saying, who is the general?

Q: What about Tom Hanley, he just died you know?

W: Oh, did he? Gen Hanley I liked, he came back, I don't remember, I had a few dealings with him, but I can't remember what my dealings were with him, but I had some which I thought were all right.

Q: What about Reuben Hood?

W: Oh, yes, poor Reuben Hood.

Q: How about him and Arnold? How about Hanley and Arnold?

W: I think they got along all right, but they were not the great do-its. Neither was Reuben Hood, he was a careful, sort of professional type of guy. Hanley, I think they sent him down to University or something, didn't they? I think they sent him down to Montgomery, or some place. I would just say that they were nice guys but somebody used to say: "He's a nice guy, but there's no market for them." And Reuben and I got along fine. I used to judge people by their ability.

Q: You say you saw Arnold get mad. Did he ever get mad at Hanley?

W: Not that I know of.

Q: Did he ever get mad at Stratemeyer?

W: I'm sure he must have.

Q: Did Stratemeyer do a good job? He must have because he got a promotion?

W: Well, he was, believe it or not, quite a naive man. Stratemeyer was a very naive person. He came from Peru, Indiana. We used to call him behind his back "PERU" because that was the winter home of some circus.

W: He was pretty good, but this is only my personal opinion. Stratemeyer was not a great brain. I think Spaatz was a great brain, and some of the others he had around him were.

Q: Arnold was very devoted to Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Very much, yes indeed.

Q: Was he a great brain? Or a humorist, or what?

W: Rosie, at one time would have liked to quit and taken the job as baseball commissioner. They offered it to him, but the Old Man wouldn't let him go. They offered it to him, and when he got out and was ready to go, it was gone, so he settled for USO.

Q: Was Arnold a practical joker? Did he like jokes?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Didn't he hire Vince Barnett?

W: Barnett, now I can tell you. Have you seen Hank Pool, I saw Hank Pool take the bait. I'll tell you about Vince. We were out at a party that the Warner Brothers threw. It was a big party, and everybody and his brother was there at the Dark Canyon Studio. Vince Barnett was on the MGM payroll. I asked hime one time if he ever got hit, and he said, yes, once by Admundsen. He was ribbing Admundsen. He got up after a dinner in which Admundsen was asking for funds to go back to the South Pole. Vince got up and said, you know, in a fake accent: "Admundsen is a crook and he belongs in jail with Dr. Cook," and with that, Admundsen got up and said: "I trust you will forgive me for what I am about to do," and hit him right square at the table. But Barnett was going along at this party at Warner Bros. Hank Pool was with us, and I'm sure General Arnold was there. Along came the Commandant of the Marines, who later became the Ambassador to South Africa. He had all this fruit salad. Barnett said to him: "Oh, good evening, General. Those are honorable ribbons you have. Are they ROTC?" And you could see the Marine bristle. He finally thought better of it, and didn't open his mouth, and about that time Hank had a say.

Q: Hank didn't know about Vince Barnett?

W: No, he saw Barnett do this with the General, but he didn't know about Barnett, I guess. Then Barnett turned to Hank and he said: "You Americans are going to make us all hate you forever, killing our defenseless women and children." Hank said: "What did you say?" And Barnett said: "You Americans, we are going to hate you forever, killing our women with your bombs." Pool said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I'm making money. I decide how much money I make, how long I stay in this country." That was all Hank needed, he took the bait. From that time on Barnett wiped the floor with him. He's an expert, and once you take the hook, he never lets you off. He knows exactly what to say to make you furious.

Q: Did Arnold know this?

W: I don't know, I think he did later.

Q: Didn't Arnold put Barnett on to rag Marshall one time? I saw something in the Marshall Library down in Virginia.

W: He might have, I don't know. The Quiet Birdman hired him to rib Ernest Udet. Barnett studied up on that thing, and made Udet think he was in one of his squadrons. He can't speak German, if Udet had ever spoken to him in German, with that fake German accent he had. He gave him the numbers of the squadron.

Q: Let me ask you one more question. How about Hank Pool? What was his role?

W: I've forgotten what department Hank was in.

Q: He was a Colonel and he used to go hunting.

W: He was a Colonel, he was usually along, because he was Mrs. Arnold's brother.

Q: He's a brother-in-law, but was he a sort of court jester or did he perform a serious role? Did Arnold give him any important things to do?

W: I really don't know. I've never thought about it. Hank seemed to always be along, and good company, and I never thought about what his military job was. I don't even know. Hank later on tried to run for office, and didn't make it. I'd say whatever Hank had to do.

Q: He married into wealth, didn't he, into the Woolworth family?

W: Oh, did he? We'd got out to a factory, and be on schedule. So I would sit down on the way out to the factory and write a piece for the boss to speak at the factory. Arnold was a quick study. You'd think he had this all his life. He could read my dirty writing, sometimes when an emergency came, he had to have something to say, I'd sit there and write it on the way out there.

Q: He'd do this, like he put in a full day here, and fly all night?

W: Arnold would have his occasional pleasure, like hunting and going to the races, but that was only a minor part of the trip.

Q: Did you go overseas with him on any trips?

W: No.

Q: Just domestic. I wanted to ask you about Tony Frank. You said you know some stories about him. He wanted to have a combat command, and Arnold didn't give him one. Do you know anything about that?

W: The last time I saw him...

Q: He died recently.

W: Oh, did he? I saw him in the hall of the Pentagon with his coterie of friends. It was supposed to be the gravy train for promotion, everybody said. Get into Tony Frank's command, whatever it was.

Q: The ASC?

W: Yes, it was supposed to be a gravy train, because people would get in there and get promoted all beyond their other friends. He had a guy who used to work as a reporter on the Examiner with him who used to scare him to death. I can't remember his name, it was an Irish name. He worked as a correspondent on the old Examiner. I can't remember his name now.

Q: Did he have some trouble with Arnold?

W: Not that I know of, I don't think Arnold had the greatest admiration. He is a man who had charts and graphs and statistics and stuff like that.

Q: He wanted a combat command. You didn't know anything about that?

W: I do know that when they sort of gave him the old heave-ho, I saw him in the hall one day in the Pentagon. He had his coterie of people with him. He said: "Westlake, I thought about you the other day. I've got an airplane now and I fly around to every one of the Air Force installations in the world." He had a nervous tick, and so he said: "I have one seat vacant in this plane and I think, not for me you know, but it would be good for the Air Force to have some good reporter go along with me on all these trips, and I'd be glad to have him." And he said: "Can you think of anybody?" And I said: "Well, right off the bat, General, the only one I can think of just exactly down that alley would be Gil Robb Wilson." And he said: "Oh, I

couldn't have Gil Robb Wilson with me." He said: "He goes snort, snort, snort." So I could just visualize two guys getting off a plane, Tony, with his tick, and Wilson with his snort."

Q: What about Knerr? Knerr was doing a lot of writing under the table for Andrews, did you know this?

W: No, Hugh Knerr, I can't think much about him. No, I know him.

Q: He and Tony Frank worked for Andrews in the GHQ AF. This was before you came in.

W: I remember when Andrews, of course Andrews was a great guy. I sent Andrews a guy who was killed with him.

Q: How about Arnold and Andrews?

W: Got along fine. No, I think there was mutual respect.

Q: Let's talk about Arnold and Trubee Davison.

W: Be very careful with this please. Although Trubee knows it and so does Mr. Barnum. Mr. Barnum had been head of the Newspaper Publishers Association. As such, he was one time head of a paper up in Binghamton, NY. He was a publisher, I think he married the paper. He was no great brain, and he got to be head of the NPA. Mr. Barnum finally woke up one morning to find out he was no longer publisher of the Binghamton paper. But he had been a very close friend of Davison's. He'd been a Republican, loyal, stalwart friend of Trubee's--at least however the connection I never knew exactly. One fine day, Mr. Barnum who was out of a job, had an appointment arranged with General Arnold by Trubee Davison. So the General called me on the squawk box and asked if I would come up, which I did. I got into his office. I had to be nimble, some good friend had warned me that there was a guy in the office named Barnum who was after my job. He was a friend of Trubee's

and Trubee had figured the guy was out of a job. He was a publisher and he needed a job of some sort of stature and some little money coming in too. So I went in to meet Mr. Barnum for the first time with Trubee who was there. You could see he had been introduced to the whole thing by Trubee, and Trubee has become my good friend. I don't want this to be used against him. But General Arnold listened to Barnum and Trubee. Barnum had the nerve to tell Arnold that he only had one good speech in him. He should make that speech and not make any more. This was Mr. Barnum's great brain idea. He had no idea of the value of public information as it is used to inform the public who own us. This whole story, I listened to it, and Arnold turned to me, and he said to me: "What do you think about Mr. Barnum coming to work?" I said: "General we need more workers, we need more busy bees, and we need workers. We don't need any more great thinkers and great 'Rodins'. You asked me," and Trubee sat there, and I said: "We don't need him," which is a hell of a thing to say before Trubee and the guy, but it was the truth.

Q: Did Trubee get mad?

W: Well, you don't think he loved me because he was trying to get the guy a job.

Q: How did you keep his friendship since then?

W: I don't know. Anyway, Arnold, without saying anything more to me, said: "When can you come to work Mr. Barnum?" Barnum by a strange accident, could come to work the next day, so Arnold set him up in an office somewhere in the Pentagon, gave him a secretary. Believe it or not, that is the last time Arnold ever saw Mr. Barnum. Barnum went around, I had to do something about him, because he was around interfering. He was arranging art shows. I said: "Mr. Barnum we are

not trying to paint the Germans to death." He finally got Trubee, of course. Arnold respected Davison because he had been his boss.

Q: Didn't he replace Trubee and put Bevans in there as A-1?

W: Oh yes, but Jim Bevans, he was hot as a firecracker, that character. His crowd, his whole crowd, Bevans had a whole coterie. The last time I saw General Bevans, I saw him sitting in the office of General Joe Carroll.

Edited by Col Westlake
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Interview, Colonel William Westlake. Pentagon, February 12, 1970

W: As I told you earlier, I considered my service working with General Arnold one of the greatest privileges of my whole life. He was a most unusual man.

Q: When did you first meet General Arnold?

W: I met him when I was a Captain, when I came into the office in the Munitions Building, when I'd been called to duty in my National Guard Unit. For five or six months they wouldn't break up the unit.

Q: Was this before the war?

W: Yes. I was called for a year's duty. General Candee had heard about me and wanted to get me down here, and they kept turning down the request. ~~Eventually,~~ At that time they were going to keep all the squadrons together, I don't know what they were going to do with us; we were an observation squadron. I don't know what we were going to observe in the war, but they said, no, they would keep them all together. But eventually, Bill Newhall (the late Maj. Gen. Wilson V. Newhall) and I were the two to break out of the squadron; Bill became a MG. ~~He is now dead,~~ at any rate, I was finally ordered down to Washington. I was a Captain. I had just made Captain. I'd been 18 years as a first LT. Candee was the boss.

Q: This was public relations?

W: Public relations, yes.

Q: Was there a man named Richards in Public Relations?

W: Frank Miller was the boss, Frank Marion S. Miller (FRANCIS), they called him HMS Pinafore Miller.

Q: The Air Corps at that time did not have a public relations. It was part of the Army?

W: Yes, but during that time, it was under Intelligence. One time while I was out of town, I was transferred to Intelligence.

Q: PR was transferred to Intelligence late in the war?

W: Yes.

Q: Do you know why?

W: No. (Power struggle — back & forth)

Q: The Historical people under Information were asking for a lot of planning classified documents. When Marshall heard about it, he was incensed about it, and he ordered the Historical people to disgorge all classified data. The only way they could retain it, so they could understand what they were writing about, was to put them under Intelligence, and this sort of blanketed them.

Q: What were some of the things Arnold gave you to do, do you remember?

W: Well, I didn't know him in the beginning. I was just a Captain in the outfit. He brought in later some people who had been in the Air Force in World War I, and because of their age they were brought in with ranks above us.

Q: Was this Arthur Ennis?

W: No. Art Ennis was an old friend of mine, Art and I went to school together in Chicago. ~~and Art had not come in yet~~ was a regular, but he was not assigned to headquarters then. Art was well known in the Air Force as a public relator, and one who used to handle the mikes at the National Air Races, so on, but eventually Art came to head up the group, which didn't make it too bad for me, ~~because~~ Art was ahead of me in school, but, I ~~went to school with his~~ in classes with him younger sister, but Art became the head of the thing. I was named head of a department, but in those days nobody told you what to do. You did what was ~~wanted~~ needed to be

done. Like after a death, you come into a house, and you do what needs doing.

Q: There were so many fires burning that there was enough work to go around?

W: Yes, indeed. You stepped in and you did what was necessary, ~~and I just ran into some commendations from Art and from the people tacking on Murr Fairchild and all of them saying they were glad I got this thing, tack on their endorsement~~. We were busy, and we didn't have time. I don't actually remember some of the early details, and I don't remember my first meeting with the General.

Q: But Arnold came to know you, after Pearl Harbor?

W: Yes, I think so. I don't really remember how I first met him. Suzy Adkins was his ~~girl~~ secretary. She had more time with the Old Man, and Suzy probably liked me, because Suzy could have dinged you with anybody, you know. She is the kind who would say: "General, you remember that nice Capt Westlake, he wants to see you." She could prepare the way, or she should could ding you, by saying: "You don't want to see that guy; he's a pest, you remember?" Suzy was, of course, most competent, and I could tell you some funny stories about Suzy. Maybe this is a good time to tell you about Suzy and Uncle Walter Weaver. The need for officers was critical. The Old Man could see that it was.

Q: You are talking pre-Pearl Harbor?

W: I'm not so sure it was pre-Pearl Harbor. It was probably after PH, But anyway, you can date this by that. He conceived the idea of having a great big OTS, rather than OCS which was in operation at the time. He conceived the Miami Beach program. So he called in Maj Gen Walter Weaver, who was head of Technical Training, Maj Gen Walter Weaver had the reputation of being a sort of a mad man. He was the

boss of all technical training, ~~and~~ the Old Man called him and said: "Walter, we need a lot of officers and we need them quickly. ~~Now He gave the~~ described lies Miami Beach plan for hotels. Arnold said: "We will do it at Miami, and we will take over the property we need down there and we will start-maybe a three-month course. Now I want you to start the wheels in motion to take over the hotels and whatever other buildings are necessary. Get your professors, and your teachers, and your curriculum together. Can you do this?" Well, the Old Man had thought that Walter was going to stall for time. So he had Suzy all primed on the phone. Weaver said: "Now, it will take so much time to get the buildings, and so much to get instructors ~~to do that,~~ so much to do the curriculum." Weaver said it was going to take a long, ~~long~~ time." Weaver said: "Well, I can do it in three months." And the Old Man said: "Well, I figured was about Monday morning." Arnold said: "Just a minute," and he picked up the phone and Suzy was on the other end of the line. ~~He said~~: "Yes, un huh, okay, Miff, okay, all right, now I'll let you know on this, by next Wednesday, by Thursday, yes, okay, all right, Miff, well, I'll let you know." So he hung up and he said: "Well now, if you can't do it, Miff Harmon can." ~~And~~ Walter Weaver ~~struck~~ strode out there like a mad man. He went out and he tittled at windmills ~~until he~~ got the whole thing set up in ~~no~~ a very short time.

Q: Did Weaver have a reputation for dragging a bit?

W: Well, I don't think he ever expected to do it overnight. But the Old Man, when he decided to do something, he wanted it done now. Incidentally, he ~~was so human, though, when something, he~~ knew the Philippines very well. He and General Marshall had served there early. ~~He knew all about~~ When ~~this guy~~ came back from the "death march," he ~~had the guy tell him~~ mailed him with lies the whole story.

Q: Was that Eubanks, maybe?

Can't remember his name but he'd been

W: No, not Eubanks. ~~He was~~ a prisoner and he was in the "death march."

Q: Well, anyway, you were talking about Miami. Let me ask you: Why was Miami chosen?

W: That I don't know, but I think it is on account of the fact that it was a luxury resort which we could get along without during the war

Q: And they already had the buildings. We didn't have any facilities

W: No, they just took over the hotels, and everything else, needed, ~~because~~ It was a gigantic thing and the Old Man had ~~the~~ a vision of it. He knew we needed it. The coast was being blacked out & tourist business was practically at an end.

Q: He figured that the hotels would be suffering anyway because of transportation shortage?

W: And also the blackouts which were necessary down there during the war, which they did have, because they had submarines enemy activity ~~in~~ there.

Q: Are there any more incidents about Suzy Adkins and him?

W: Oh, there are so many of Suzy. One time the Old Man had Rosie O'Donnell working in his office.

Q: Yes, he was Advisory Council.

W: He was a Colonel at that time. Rosie worked right in the office with Shelmire and all the rest of them. Shelmire ~~is dead, yes~~ died a short while ago. Shelmire and the Old Man were boyhood buddies. By the way, when McCabe came in, one of my jobs after Pearl Harbor, was to find commissionable material. We needed people badly, but we didn't want just ~~everybody~~ anybody. And one of the jobs Art Ennis gave me was to find people to commission. ~~Suddenly~~, I had hundreds of applicants toward the end, I had about five good guys in the mill, ~~and~~ [illegible] working they clamped it off, and said: "No more direct commissions," ~~and~~ the Navy got all five of my people in the pipeline. Several of them turned

out to be Captains in the Navy. Long after I ran out of people I knew that were any good, I had a file that high with people like Harry Richman who wanted to be a PRO. We had people come in who said they just came from the White House. They'd seen Eleanor and they wanted a job as a public relations officer.

Q: There is a letter in Arnold's file on W.C. Fields trying to get a job for one of the people on his staff.

W: The one from Harry Richman was one of the worst ones I've ever seen. Harry was a cafe entertainer. He came in to see me. Julius Klein.

Q: The professional...head of the Jewish War Veterans?

W: Julius is now a MG in Chicago, retired. Julius was close to Gen Marshall because he worked with him in my guard days, and I saw him coming out of Gen Marshall's office one day. I asked him what he was up to + he ~~He~~ trying to get a commission for his brother, Ernest. He said he was + later Ernest sent ~~They brought me some~~ a Parker pen~~cils~~ + pencil set by messenger ~~and after they sent them over~~. As soon as they came in, I made a record of them, and sent them back by special messenger to the hotel. That was about the time Tony Bennett I believe it was, offered a naval officer ~~in the Navy gave somebody~~ an automobile, for a commission remember? I think we got him in the Air Force later on as a sergeant. We had just about all types ~~everybody~~ in the world in ~~our outfit~~. the Air Force *

Q: Public relations, I can see where you would get involved.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and the Kentucky Derby.

W: Arnold loved to go to the races. He had this little B-25. Well, there was only room in it for Arnold and Pete. In the cockpit + 3 in the rear By the way, you probably know that Roosevelt told Arnold, although he was a command pilot, he didn't want him to fly alone anymore because of his health, and so on. So Arnold was not allowed to fly alone.

*NB. Remind me to tell you the story of General Arnold + the Wrist Mtn.

Q: Probably also because of Andrews?

W: Yes, but this was before Andrews' death. And so this B-25 which was lightened up, and was fairly plush. But you had to crawl through the tunnel and everything. But usually in the thing would be Pete, McCabe and the General and I. Well, I am a command pilot, but, and you probably know, as a command pilot you could take "command" time for pay purposes. In those days we had to have four hours for pay purposes. Do you think the Old Man would take command time? He certainly would not, although he was a five-star general. He was boss of the airplane, and he would take "co-pilot" time and I would take the "command" time, because I needed flying time. Often he would get up with Peterson and fly the airplane. One time when we landed at Albuquerque, there were two generals there, two BGs, I can't remember who they were now, somebody we both knew very well. They were the bosses of that area, and we came into Albuquerque.

Q: They were AAF?

W: Yes, they were both Air Force, and I think they were out hunting at the time when the word got to them. They sped down to the hotel. When we landed, Pete said to the tower, "Give me taxying directions for heaven's sake do this, I have a five-star general with me." And the Old Man looked at me and said, "As if anybody cared." was in the back with him. So we taxiied up to the ~~place, and of course,~~ operations office, so that Air Wacs ~~It~~ Just was about the time they had just changed the WAC insignia, ~~and~~ there was a little WAC standing there, and you know the Old Man was very compassionate and very fond of the enlisted people and used to talk to them as equals and get their views on things. He wanted them, as I say, nothing stuffy about him at all. If we had a big airplane, and had vacant seats, he would load them down with the mine run of GIs and WACs and go and talk to them about what's wrong with this, and what's

along with that. Sometimes he would get the pictures that a lot of

the Officers Hospital. They tell me all their tales of woe, and they didn't know who I was." Well, at Albuquerque, we finally got in there, and the old man saw one of the WACs wearing an Army insignia--Athena-- and he said: "Don't you know you're now allowed to wear the Air Force wings--the propeller and the wings." She said, no, she hadn't been told. So he said: "Well, now I'll tell you, you can." He said: "Do you need somebody else here to tell you?" She said: "No sir." From that time on. By the way, McCabe ~~got~~ had a Sergeant friend who was at Albuquerque. We all went over to the hotel while we were waiting for the two generals to come and join us. We went to the lobby, so all of us stood there in the lobby and played the pinball machines. The Old Man too, and the sergeant. ~~He~~ was seen by ~~everybody at~~ Kirtland Field ~~after~~ we left the next day, McCabe said, that that Sergeant ~~became~~ one of the most popular guys at Kirtland because everybody knew about his playing the pinball machine with the Old Man.

Q: You were talking about the horse races?

W: Yes, the horse races. He liked to go down to the races and in fact, any races. He liked to go to them, and whenever we would go to a place that was anywhere near around a race, Mac and I would schedule his time so that he would have time to sneak away for a little recreation.

Q: Did he bet?

W: Yes.

Q: $2 bettor?

W: Yes, not a great plunger, not a compulsive bettor. But we

were sitting in the box somewhere with Matt Wynn one time.

Q: Matt Wynn is the head of the Kentucky Derby, isn't he?

W: Yes. Col Matt Wynn. We were sitting there during one of these recreation periods on one of our trips. At that time the Navy was having no trouble at all getting all sorts of money. The apple of the Old Man's eye was the Air Force Aid Society. He wanted money. No matter how much we got, we had to share it with the Army. We had no special fund of our own.

Q: That's the Army Emergency Relief Fund?

W: Yes, and we had no Air Force Aid Society at the time. We got our minor share. So the Navy had to stop some of these things because people were pouring so much money into their coffers. Arnold said to Wynn: "I see all this money to all these charities. I see you are having charities, Navy charities. I don't see any for the Air Force." Matt Wynn said: "Well, why don't we have an Air Force Day at the races?" So Arnold said, that would be fine. Well that was about all the conversation then. Next I heard of it, and please go easy on this, because we had a MG whose name I don't quite remember. He was a Materiel Command guy, and he was out on the West Coast. He was always spouting off about the high absenteeism rate, and the dirty tracks, how they were taking the people away from their jobs in the airplane factories, and I think some survey was made.

Q: Was it Echols?

W: No, it wasn't Red Echols. He was a wonderful person.

Q: Orval Cook?

W: No. At any rate, the next I heard of it, the Old Man really did want to have money for an Air Force Aid Society. He felt this

would be a wonderful way to get it. As I say, at that time, this is late because Patterson had become the Secretary of War. You know Patterson was sort of an old woman as far as that, he didn't like horse racing or anything else, His wife used to have these salons, ~~like~~ rivaling Cissy Patterson. ~~All the~~ important people would come to her parties and she was sort of a lion chaser.

Q: She would have a trio in the salon playing Beethoven?

W: ~~The~~ when a current lion was sought, there was liable to be a fight between Mrs. McLean and ~~Mrs. Patterson~~ Evalyn Walsh and Mrs. Cissy Patterson ~~, she was also~~.

W: The guy on the West Coast had been shooting his mouth off in the papers about the high absenteeism rate in the factories and how it was caused by these dirty tracks taking all the workers away and everything. I think a survey showed at that time that whether the tracks were open or not had no real bearing on the absenteeism rate. But at any rate, Judge Patterson went along with the idea too. I don't remember exactly when he succeeded Stimson.

Q: He succeeded Stimson right around the end of the war.

W: Well, this is when it happened. This is to show you a little humanism about the Old Man, too. So I got a call from ~~Evan~~ Eben Stanley who was a Colonel and worked for MAJ GEN Ralph Cousins at Santa Ana. He said: "Bill, while the Old Man was out here he talked to the people ~~at~~ about this." I can't recall the name of the race track, but it was right south of Santa Monica (Hollywood Park ?). Evan said: "The Old Man was here. We arranged for an Air Force Day at the ~~such and such~~ track." But, he said: "Now people at the track are in my hair to promote this thing. The more promotion we do on it, the more money comes into the Air Force Aid Society coffers. So they want some airplanes from the 4th AF to fly over the race track

and to whoop it up to promote the track." And I said: "Evan, the Old Man is somewhere in a B-25 between here and there." He said: "We've got to have action now." I said: "I can't give you any airplanes at all, Evan, with the atmosphere as it is, with Judge Patterson and that other General out there who was shouting about the dirty tracks." ~~He said: "There's too much static. I can't give you any support on this."~~

Q: Was this General, Air Force or Army?

W: He was Air Force, he was the Materiel Command General. I don't recall his name, but it doesn't make any difference. He was hyped on that subject of absenteeism. I said: "Evan, I can't give you one airplane ~~through~~ from the 4th AF to fly over the track, under the present atmosphere." But I told him the Old Man gave me a project which I was running myself, which ~~the Old Man~~ we called "the shot from the sky" show. It was a purely military show. Its function was to show these Japanese planes and shot-down things, whatever they were, relics, which we moved around the country to recruit WACs, to sell war bonds, and to take a bow on some of the stuff we had knocked down out of the sky. Not all of it was Air Force, doing but we had promoted it. We had no money to do it, and believe it or not, it is the only thing I've ever heard of during the war where we sold hot dogs and Coca Colas and things like that to pay the expenses on the trip. We didn't have any money. The Old Man said: "I want that ~~tour~~ toured." So my job was to tour it, and I did it. But I said to Evan: "Right at the moment, it ~~is south of~~ in Santa Monica in some space there being set up." It was going to open about the day of the races, or whatever. I told him: "I can give you 4th AF airplanes to fly over 'Shots in the Sky', because this is a pure Air Force military deal. But I can't help it if some of those airplanes should happen to ~~fly~~ "Stray"

over the racetrack." So, I said: "I don't know what the Old Man promised you." He said: "He promised him the world." I said: "Well, he's somewhere in the air." He said: "You have to do it now!" So I said: "All right, I'll send orders" which we did a lot of things on orders those days that we would be shot for today. In those days there were things to be done and you did them. Sometime ago I ran into Maurey Casey and he says: "For God's sake, we used to do those things, and tell him about them afterwards." He said: "You can't now," which is now true. In those days it was a lot different, we assumed a lot of authority, and got away with it. I sent the orders out. I had a dual position about that time. I was Assistant to General Surles, Asst for Air to the head of War Dept Bureau of Public Relations, also I had another hat which I worked for the Old Man, it was a peculiar division. At any rate I sent the order out for the 4th AF to do it, and they did it. Well, there was hell to pay. I think Judge Patterson's office called the General when he was on his way in the air, and asked if he would come by to see the General as soon as he came back. We knew that hell was popping about these airplanes going over the racetrack. (West Coast Papers printed) In fact, I think one of the local papers on the Coast shouted bloody murder about it. I've forgotten the details of it. But to make a long story short, I found out the ETA of the Old Man at National Airport, and I got right over there to meet him. When he landed I got into the car on the way in, and I said: "General, Judge Patterson wants to see you," and I told him the story.

Q: And Judge Patterson was by now Secretary of War?

W: Secy of War. He said: "Who did this on the airplanes?" And I said: "General, I did." And I said: "But you are in the clear." And

I told him the story about how the racetrack had nothing to do with it. I told him the thing on the way into the office. He went to see the Judge, and it turned out everything was fine because he had the alibi that it had nothing to do with the racetrack, ~~which is what I did~~.

Q: He got off the hook on it?

W: He got off.

Q: Do you know of any other incident involving him and Patterson? They did not have the same chemistry.

W: I know, Patterson was sort of an old lady, I can tell you that. Maybe you know this story about when General Arnold was at March Field. Did you ever know the story about him? Ammunition was scarce. Somebody should tell you the story who knows it better than I do. He told it to me but I've forgotten ~~about it~~ details. He wanted to see if these bullets would penetrate a certain type of aircraft wings. They forbid him to use up the ammunition, but he did it anyway, when he was at March Field. The Army had a big investigation in that Corps Area about the utilization of this ammunition, and how it had either gone through the wings or had not gone through the wings, or whatever it was. It became quite an issue. It became almost a scandal. The Old Man had to go to his pal, Harry Woodring, I think it was, to square it. Nobody knew how that thing got squared, but he squared it himself with Woodring, who was at that time the Secretary of War. He had to square it, because they were being pickayunish about the expenditure of the ammunition (I believe Arnold was only a major at the time)

Q: Well, expenditures were very tight in the early 1930s and, of course, he took the initiative, just like you did on the race track. When there was an earthquake in Long Beach, I just want to make this comment because we can tie this in. Arnold told the initiative with the earthquake aid.

W: The same thing. He didn't learn to know anything about rules and regulations any more than I did. I used to say to someone who opposed action, "Don't you know that under Regulation 6213-11 you can't do this?" He would say: "That's right, you can't." We used to swear by numbers when we were kids. That was a swear word. People who were impressed by that.

Q: Arnold was not impressed by that? If he felt that the common sense thing was to do it, he did it.

W: He didn't care what the regulation was when he wanted something done. I used to say to my people: "Find me the regulation that says you can do this. Don't find me the one that says you can't." And he was the same way.

Q: Right, he was a doer. Do you recall any other incidents involving him and Patterson?

W: No.

Q: There was some incident involving him and Patterson about some pilots who had come back, and apparently one guy flew under the Brooklyn Bridge. You know these guys were put in sedentary jobs. They were used to some action. But they had violated flying regulations, and Arnold was a stickler about people not playing around when they were in the air. He was going to throw the book at them, court martial, and Patterson interceded for them with Marshall, from the legal standpoint. He felt that the AAF was being too harsh with them and Arnold was in favor of throwing the book at them. Do you remember this?

W: No.

W: I remember a case where he went to Marshall. We had lousy relations on the Hill. In the Air Force. Maurie Carr was in that. I used to get half the calls in my office. Maurie Carr was no good--a phony, but he wiggled himself into good graces of others by sheer brass. He told Arnold he worked for Lovett;

he told Lovett he worked for Arnold. At any rate, our relationship on the Hill was very, very bad. We ~~never~~ hardly ever could get anybody in the office we had up there. Being a newspaperman, I wasn't fearful of Congressmen. I didn't know who the hell the Congressmen were. Let me go back to the time when McCabe came to me to get a job, see. Everybody in the world came in to get a job. I listened to McCabe's story, and he told me he was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, and he went to Notre Dame. He went on, and I said: "What are you doing now, Mr. McCabe?" He said: "Well, I work for a Congressman." And I didn't even ~~say~~ ask which one. I didn't know at the time that the Congressman he worked for was a pal of Arnold's that both McCabe and Arnold knew.

Q: Was this Rep. Costello?

W: Yes, he worked for Costello. And I said, I didn't even ask him. I didn't know who Costello was. Costello was a congressman from California. They were pals of Arnold, and quite close to Arnold, but McCabe never used that to get a commission. So I said to him: "Mr. McCabe, in spite of the fact that you work for a Congressman, we are very interested in you. Here is your authority for a physical. Here's an application." Now that was unusual because at that time we only wanted a few people. I'd say one out of 50 who came in to get interviewed, didn't make the authority for a physical, and that was only the beginning. Later on, I was up in Shelmire's office and I saw a new 2nd LT around the place. He said to me: "Sir, I don't believe you remember me." I said: "Your face is familiar," and he said, "My name is McCabe." I said: "Oh yes, LT McCabe, what are you doing in here?" I said: "I haven't seen you since our interview." He said: "I've been to OTS for three months," and I said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I'm the General's new aide."

Q: Did Congressional relations improve?

W: Congressional relations, to get back to that. The Old Man wanted one, so he and McCabe knew a Colonel McIntyre. He was in Artillery. He had been quite close.

Q: We are talking about Col. James McIntyre, who lives in Alabama now. How did Arnold get him?

W: Arnold knew him and McCabe knew him. Earlier he had been up on the Hill. He had been a legislative liaison guy.

Q: Yes, what did they call Johnson?

W: "Leaky Louie." One time I remember, as a reporter, on the Examiner (in Chicago), I interviewed him, and he told me he said: "These aircraft factories are going to get behind the mountains. They are going to be in the center of the country. They are going to do this because I say so. Because I sign the appropriations for these manufacturers, and they are going to get behind the mountains." I didn't see any behind the mountains. He was thinking about Lockheed and Douglas and all of those who were on the other side of the mountains. Johnson's idea was to bring them into the center of the country.

Q: What's this story about McIntyre? Arnold recruited him?

W: Arnold recruited him because he knew all of the background on the Hill. So did McCabe, having worked for Costello and McIntyre was only a Colonel, so Arnold had to go to Marshall. ~~I don't know who told me this, maybe Arnold did~~, that when he asked Gen Marshall for McIntyre, Marshall said: "He must be pretty good, General, if you want him, ~~you want him~~; we will make him a General good enough to promote him. Do and let come and work with you." This is what Arnold did, to make him take over Air Force L&L, which was the first time we'd had a decent thing on the Hill. I used to get

these calls from Congressmen and they would raise hell over the phone about, because they could never get the guys in the AAF on the list.

Q: I want to go back over a couple of items that you mentioned. You know you were talking about OCS in Miami Beach. This is right at the beginning, he and Walt Weaver. Did Arnold ever have an idea to have enlisted pilots, because he couldn't get officer pilots?

W: I don't think so, because that had been ~~worked~~ tried earlier in WW I

Q: They had tried that, and it didn't work?

W: Yes, well it worked, I think later on a lot of them got commissioned. There was a time in there where the glider was a problem and a lot of those fliers became ~~not really warrant~~ something like warrant officers, flight officers, which are the same as warrant officers.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that program? Richard DuPont?

W: No, but I knew DuPont before he got killed. Yes, I knew vaguely about it. In fact, everything going on, I probably had my finger in something.

Q: You probably had your finger in a lot of things. Let me take you back, you were in Arnold's office right before Pearl Harbor. Three days before Pearl Harbor, the Chicago Tribune published a good hunk of the RAINBOW FIVE, the war plan, do you remember that?

W: Yes, I do. I'll tell you who did it. (wrote the story) I knew the reporters involved in the case. They claimed that they only hit upon it by accident. That they didn't know anything about it. Chesly Manly Wayne Thomis

Q: Well they got the plan from Sen. Wheeler, who gave it to the Chicago Tribune reporter. (NOTE: Told Westlake the story of Waldrop's article.)

W: I have heard that, but it's not true. slow 2 raced to Arnold.

Q: Well, Frank Waldrop told me this a few years ago.

W: I don't believe it.

Q: Well, I don't believe it either because whoever leaked that plan had two qualifications. One, he had access to the plan, and two, he wanted to turn our strategy toward the Pacific. The RAINBOW FIVE strategy was "all-out in Europe and to hold in the Pacific."

W: I'm sure it was not so. (Arnold's involvement)

Q: There was an investigation and of course the investigation was overtaken by Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about the investigation?

W: No.

Q: Were you asked any questions?

W: No.

Q: To show you how human the guy was. You know, the Old Man liked to work with wood. One time we were out at Sonoma, his wife bought that 40 acres out there from Spreckels, before the Old Man saw it. But at any rate, when "Savvy" Cook had a place out there near Arnold's. He was an Admiral. He had all his furniture sent up from Honduras, with a bunch of mahogany. So we went over and got ~~that~~ the furniture Crates with the help of some of his help around the house.

Q: Savvy Cook had this Honduras furniture?

W: He had his furniture sent up from Honduras, crated in beautiful wood, looked like hell, but the Old Man when he got it to his place, he had ~~it~~ all his woodworking equipment taken from Ft. Myer out there. When he got there, he took one piece of that, and he shined it down, and said: "This is how it's going to look." To me it looked like a bunch of packing boxes. But at any rate, he had made just a beautiful new thing. It had a lot of little

cubbyholes in it--a beautiful piece of furniture. I happened to be there one day when another medal arrived from the starving Armenians or something. He opened it up, and put it in this thing he had made himself, for his medals, hundreds of them in there you know. He looked at me and he said with a frustrated look--he put the thing in the little chest and he said: "What am I going to do with all ~~this~~ those medals? But I tell you, there is a time when I could have used them." He said: "Look, I used to go to that mausoleum on Constitution Avenue on Tuesday to attend the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

Q: Public Health Building?

W: Yes, he'd sit there and look at the big map. I'll tell you a thing about the map to show you what a curious mind he had. He said: "I used to sit there in the Combined Chiefs of Staff," and he looked around and all the rest of those guys, he said had fruit salad all over their chests. And he said: "What did I have on my tunic? One WW I ribbon. I had a lot of other things, like a medal for the 6,000 ft. altitude record, but none of those showed on my tunic. Here I saw sitting there with all those other characters with all the fruit salad in the world. Now, I've got all these medals, and what good are they now." Gives you an idea that he felt himself a little outclassed as far as "spinach" was concerned.

Q: He always had a sensitivity about the fact that he never was in combat. Did he ever say anything to you about that?

W: No.

Q: In WW I, he was in Washington trying to get overseas, and he got there in time for the war to be over. This is why he was sort of vulnerable when some of his staff said they wanted to get overseas.

W: Everybody had an idea, Minton Kaye, he didn't know about Hank

Q: I have. But tell me about Minton Kaye.

W: I don't know too much about the fact that Minton Kaye never denied it, I think, when people thought he was the Old Man's brother-in-law.

Q: Why did Arnold like Minton Kaye?

W: I don't know. I don't think he particularly liked him.

Q: But he was close to the Old Man?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Well, you know Goddard had a lot of trouble with Minton Kaye.

W: If you haven't seen McCabe. McCabe did a lot of things on his own, too. One day, when, I was at McCabe's desk, and the Old Man came on the squawk box. I had the Old Man on my squawk box. I used to say to people in my office: "Would you like to see me summon my five-star general?" I'd push the thing down and the Old Man would answer. He was peculiar. If he buzzed me, he didn't want anybody in my office to answer that thing except me. If the girl answered the phone, it made him mad. So, if I wasn't there, they let it go. But it was sort of funny. I just can't imagine myself ringing for my five-star general, but I would do it. His rank rested very lightly on his shoulders. Of course, as you say, the chemistry, we got along fine. We really did, I don't think the Old Man ever bawled me out once, but I can tell you about bawlings out. When he had his air staff, and everybody was a general, except his A-2, the A-2 was a character named Sorenson. One day I brought in some young 2nd LTs whom I ~~went~~ got assigned by going down surreptitiously to ~~and looked~~ manit looking at the records. Flint DuPre was one. I found his record

down in Miami. I ordered these guys up into Washington. Strictly they shouldn't have let me see anything down there, but I got away with it. I took these guys, about four of them, up to Sorenson, and he said: "More newspapermen!" He was very anti-public information. He had no conception of what it could do for you. In fact, he didn't know the score. The Old Man had a feeling for public relations, as you know. At any rate, Sorenson was anti-public information, anti-everything except Intelligence. One day because he had done something, the Old Man called him up, and I went up with him. I've forgotten what it was. After the Old Man ate him out, on whatever this was, Sorenson stood there. He was only a Colonel, A-2 was a Colonel and all the rest of them were generals. The Old Man didn't go for him, because of this idea that he had a constricted feeling.

Q: Why did he give him the job in the first place?

W: I don't know, but he was there, and he didn't last forever. Clayton Bissell came later, and Bissell had been in trouble, but Bissell had a feeling for public information.

Q: George McDonald had this job for a while?

W: Yes, and he had a feeling for public information.

Q: Tommy White had the job for a while?

W: Yes, he did. Tom White in the beginning knew nothing about it, but that was missing in a lot of their West Point curriculum, they didn't understand. This was new.

Q: This is probably why Arnold went outside the regular military?

W: Yes, this was new. It was not thought of in those days. Well, back in the days of Sorenson. Sorenson stood there and I saw perspiration come out. He went down the hall, and he said to me, I

remember the words: "I'm neither fitted by my training nor by my inclination to know a damn thing about public information." I said: "Col Sorenson, why the hell don't you turn to somebody who--this is not an exact science, it is a trial and error thing. But why don't you turn to somebody who might help you?" That was the beginning of a rapprochement between me and Sorenson. I found out later on what he was "up to" ~~did~~. I found Sorenson receiving the press and the newspapers and the magazines. Somebody wrote a story flattering to him in a magazine, and he said: "How long has that thing been going on?" And I found him receiving people from the press without any clearance at all.

Q: In other words, the pendulum shifted?

W: He went from the sublime to the ridiculous, and this is what could happen to an Intelligence man.

Q: Did he get in trouble with Arnold for this?

W: He got in trouble ~~for this, no~~, for his anti public information attitude in the beginning.

Q: He got in trouble with MacArthur because of the difference in reporting of the Bismarck sea operation, March 1943. Sorenson questioned the figures. MacArthur and Kenney claimed they had sunk 19 ships. Sorenson raised some questions from some other reports he received, and MacArthur was irate at Sorenson.

W: I mentioned to you about the map in the Combined Chiefs of Staff room, to show you what a curiosity the Old Man had. He sat there and looked at the thing, and he called me and McCabe in one day, and he said: "I sit there in those CCS meetings, and I look at a map, and it shows the Ural Mountains--a great big crack about 3,000 feet high." He

said: "We have everything in the Air Force. I want to know why those Ural Mountains are there." You see: he was sitting there woolgathering while these things were going on, and looking at the map. So McCabe and I went through, and we found out here that we had a young captain who was a geologist. We had everything in the AAF. McCabe called him at home. His wife answered. McCabe said: "General Arnold would like to see ~~this fellow~~ you in his inner office at 9:00 AM tomorrow." The wife thought they were kidding her. Finally the Captain got on the line and said: "Yes sir." He did come in, ~~and~~ he had written his thesis on the Ural Mountains. So he explained the theory on how the mountains existed. But here the Old Man was sitting there at a meeting and instead of being entranced with all the dissertations on the war, he was looking at the map wondering how ~~they~~ the mountains happened to be there. When there was the B-24 vs. B-17 business, about which was the better aircraft, I was present when he picked the crew of the B-24s in combat, bring them into his inner office and ask them all about it. He would bring the B-17 guys in there and ask them all about it. He did the same thing on the P-38s. His idea was to ask the man who owns one.

Q: Talking about Arnold and K.T. Keller?

W: Arnold called up K.T. Keller one time. There was some part hold up the B-29. There was some small thing that was holding it up. It wasn't perfect, I've forgotten what it was now. Finally, it got to be sort of a hot conversation, and Arnold said: "I want that thing by next week, or I will make it in my own basement at Ft. Myer." K.T. Keller got off his fat duff and produced it. Arnold had made some promises on the B-29, as you know, to Roosevelt, and these things were behind schedule. It was all just a little item.

Q: I want to ask you about the B-29. You say Roosevelt was bugging Arnold?

W: He made a certain commitment to Roosevelt about the B-29s and when they could be ready, and they were delayed beyond a reasonable time.

Q: Trouble with the engines, they caught fire?

W: Whatever the damn thing was, there was one other little part, Arnold and I went out to the Cleveland, to the NACA Laboratory.

Q: Ames Laboratory?

W: Yes, and we went out there, Arnold got in there and they were talking about these various things. They had shown him a lot of things that were coming out. He got up and said: "You tell me all about these beautiful things that are coming up." He said the trouble with you eggheads--he called them that to their face--"you are never willing to quit and say this is far enough and use it. Why don't I see some of these wonderful things on my airplanes now? You go on to the nth degree and to get them perfect as perfect as perfect, but let's quit somewhere along the line and put what you have on our airplanes." And he laid it on the line with them.

Q: Was John Victory out there?

W: Yes, sure John Victory?

Q: He was bugging John Victory about a 400 mile per hour airplane, wasn't he?

W: I don't remember that, but I do know that these very things that they told about how nice they were. We went out to see the first Bell jet too, in fact, in the hangar there at Muroc Lake. I knew that it had gone through downtown Buffalo because not very many people knew it. It had a prop on it to truck it through the streets. The jet had a prop

fixed on the front of it, so it would like a conventional airplane.

Q: The B-29, did you go out to Salina with him? He went out there with Benny Meyers and they were trying to rush that thing, trying to get them out to the CBI.

W: I didn't go to Salina, but I know.

Q: Didn't he spend some time out there trying to get the airplane ready?

W: Well, I'm sure he did, because as you know, the first thing they planned was to strike Sasebo naval base with the B-29s at a certain date. Do you know what caused the cover plan to be developed? Some damned reporters hit the nail on the head. It was only one of a lot of stories that were printed. This is bad, though. When the Old Man saw that story--whoever it was, I've forgotten now, that printed the story--that they were going to use the B-29 to strike this Sasebo naval base in Japan, which happened to be the McCoy; it happened to be the plan. So the Old Man was quite concerned. Well I said: "To be concerned about it, would be to substantiate it." So the thing to do was to further confuse the issue.

Q: Well, tell me about your involvement in the cover plan?

W: The Old Man said to let this guy do what he pleased. It was not a very erudite thing to do. We just decided that these B-29s were being shipped to Chungking and so on. There was a bunch of security violations all over them. We did a number of things to make it apparent, not to purposely lie, but to imply.

Q: One of the thing you tried to imply was that they were going to use in the European theater. Didn't you send one to England?

W: One, yes, I wanted to send more. This thing was like the

cornfield. The crows can count how many there are. The crows have a certain amount. If you have five people going into the cornfield, the crows count them and they know. If you have seven, the crows are limited on their counting ability. So I said the idea was at least two B-29s and we want to imply wherever we can to counteract this story, not to mention it at all. It hit the nail on the head, or that we were even concerned.

Q: You pretended you were being security conscious, but allowed word to get out?

W: Yes, that maybe these B-29s would be ready for OVERLORD.

Q: Was there also a plan to make people think it was being used as a supertransport across the Hump?

W: Yes, that was one of the things. The Hump flights were dangerous, and the loads were small, and we were sending those things down there. This was discussed. Why were we sending them down there? Well, we were sending them to be used as a transport across the mountains.

Q: You didn't want the Japs to think that we were going to attack Japan with them?

W: No, because one of the reporters, whoever it was, in a think piece, said these were going to be used at Sasebo naval base. I think if I remember rightly, that that was exactly the plan. So everybody was concerned. But as I pointed out to the Old Man, if you show your concern, you give it away.

Q: Let me ask you about Arnold and Drew Pearson?

W: Drew Pearson, I knew Drew, I knew his life very well. I knew his father was a minister.

Q: Why didn't he like Arnold?

W: I don't know that he didn't really like him. Pearson would call me at 5 minutes to 6 and try to clear a story, when he wanted to go on the air at 6:00. He tried all the tricks, now, Pearson would do this, for instance. Let me give you the case of some General. Pearson had the story that this General got on his own airplane in India and ran back through Africa, and somewhere in Africa there was a wounded Army man, and the crew ~~wouldn't~~ refused to let the wounded guy on the airplane, and came back, playing cards and hi-jinxing all the way back to Washington. Well, when he called me with the story, I said that ~~isn't right, that isn't~~ true. Of course, Pearson observed the voluntary censorship but he tried to get around it every way he could. The voluntary censorship said you can't mention movements of general officers. Actually, his brother got on the line and we...

Q: What was his brother's name?

W: Can't remember. At any rate, I said, first of all, whenever we had a Drew Pearson thing, we'd say: "What are we stuck with? Let's find out the truth." I tried to find out the whole truth, and I called Drew and told him the whole damned truth, that it was an ATC ship. It was a full ship when it came in here, maximum gross load, with nobody put off, some disgruntled Army persons, of course, a lot of people used to drop notes, like ~~you~~ who we didn't like was ~~one of~~ the Giles' twin, Ben.

Q: He didn't like Barney Giles either.

W: He didn't like Ben either. Pearson was good because he kept a lot of generals from doing stuff that they would have gotten away with murder. But there was also the other extreme where some WAC, every time this WAC took a ride anywhere in Cairo, Ralph Royce was

mixed up in that too. Ralph Royce gave somebody a jeep.

Q: I've been through six years of Drew Pearson, and that's like 360 columns a year. He didn't like Arnold, and he didn't like Giles.

W: You know what Arnold told me once. There was an anti-Arnold feeling in the Herald Tribune in NY.

Q: Walter Millis.

W: Now, wait, it was deeper than that. It was. I corrected that. The Old Man said to me one day, we sat down like this, and he said: "The Herald Tribune doesn't like me." And I said: "Well, General, I don't think that is true. But let me say, if you can't fight them, join them." So I worked on Mrs. Reed Ogden--this is between you and me and the gate post--I gave Mrs. Reed a ride in a B-29, I authorized it. I did a lot of things like that. The first thing you know, Mrs. Reed was having us for lunch at the NY Herald Tribune, and the guy who didn't like him was the editorial guy whose son was on the Herald Tribune in Paris. The guy who didn't like him was the guy who controlled the editorial page.

Q: One man that didn't like him, didn't like the Air Force, was Walter Millis.

W: Well, the guy that didn't like Arnold apparently, was when Mrs. Reed became friendly. I kidnapped her one time when she came in to Marshall's office. She had had her time set different, and the tall Sergeant didn't know it. I took her into Arnold's office and I had a rapproachement between him and Mrs. Reed who was a fine woman. When her husband died, I sent some flowers to her husband's funeral in NY. I got about a six-page letter from Mrs. Reed in her own handwriting. She was a lady. I said to the Old Man: "Now, all right, just assume that

that they don't like you. If you can't fight them, join them. Let's work on them."

Q: One more item on Pearson. He never failed to take a potshot at Arnold. For example, he blamed him on the leak on the sealant on the transports.

W: The sealed tanks?

Q: Yes.

W: We had a guy who did that. He used to feed that to Pearson.

Q: Who was that, you mean an Air Force type?

W: Yes. They found him. If I remember rightly, and I'm not sure, he had some financial interest in the invention, and he kept shouting that they should have these things on the troop carrier gas tanks.

Q: He kept hitting this one. Well, Pearson also hit him on the marriage of Bruce Arnold to Barbara Douglas.

W: Well, what's wrong with that?

Q: Well, in the industrial-military complex, they didn't call it that as such, but he was hitting on it. You know he wrote several nasty columns about Douglas. He wrote that Douglas had sold his patents to the Japanese, you know, in 1939.

W: He gave them an airplane that wouldn't work. He sold them his first DC-4,and it was no good. Is that bad? Pratt Whitney sold them an engine.

Q: This was authorized by the State Dept at the time, but Pearson kept coming back?

W: He thought this was good journalism.

Q: How about Seversky?

W: Oh, don't get me into that one. Have you found the file on Seversky?

Q: I found several things on Seversky.

W: You know, that's Harry Bruno.

Q: Rockefeller Center?

W: He's still got Seversky. If yodd like to know the facts about Seversky.

Q: He and Arnold, they didn't have the right chemistry?

W: Because Sasha Seversky is a big phony. Art Ennis went out to see Disney and told him not to make the picture. Disney wishes they'd paid attention to Art because it was one of the few Disney flops. I hope this doesn't get me into libel with Harry Bruno.

Q: What was his connection with Seversky?

W: He's a press agent for Jackie Cochran, Floyd Odlum, and I see that he got Jackie something or other. Harry Bruno...

Q: Tell me about Seversky.

W: Well, as you know, there is a file somewhere around here on Seversky that will show that he didn't lose his leg in the war at all. It was from an accident. That he is no more of an engineer than you are. He didn't design. I was in the Old Man's office, when either, I can't remember if he talked to him on the phone. Yes, he called him. Sasha came out with something. He was a good Monday morning quarterback, and so the Old Man said to him with sarcasm: "Sasha now if you were Chief of the Air Force, how would you do this, and how would you do that?"

Q: Did he bring him into the office one time?

W: Well, he may have, yes, he brought him in.

Q: Did he show him some charts and ask "what would you do if you were in my place?"

W: What would you do? It is like asking your office boy: "What would you do to build the Pentagon?" In my opinion, Seversky was simply built up by Harry Bruno, the press agent. Harry Bruno is now head of the Lotus Club or whatever it is. Actually, he is strictly a no good phoney.

Q: Were Arnold and Seversky reconciled late in the war?

W: I don't think so.

Q: They were always at odds?

W: Well, because Seversky didn't know what the answers were. He was a Monday morning quarterback. I didn't finish the story, because when Arnold got him and said: "What would you do on this," Seversky said: "It would take me a little time." Arnold said: "How long, tomorrow, next week, a month, how long do you need?" And the guy said: "A month," let's say, I don't remember what it was. Arnold said: "All right, you have a month. You come back and tell me what to do in these cases,"and Seversky never showed.

Q: I've heard stories that are slightly varied, I'm not sure which one is true. I mean these are recollections. But basically Arnold threw the monkey on Seversky's back and said: "Show me where I'm doing wrong, and how you could do better?"

W: What was the one, who threw the inkwell at who? Do you know that story?

Q: No.

W: Ask Rosie who threw the inkwell at what. I don't remember the details. But somebody threw an inkwell, whether it was Arnold or not, I'm not sure.

W: Ask Rosie when you talk to him. (NOTE: Rosie O'Donnell threw an inkwell at a clock that was buzzing.)

Q: You know, Kuter was involved in a campaign to cozy up to the Washington Post and Eugene Meyer?

W: Kuter was appointed to the Academy by the Lt. Governor of Illinois and he came from Rockford, Illinois; Larry Kuter, in my opinion, was strictly a big phoney. His wife, Ethel, liked the theatrical people, and she thought, they were also involved with my little deal with C.R. Smith, because they thought you knew. I could tell you about theatrical people. Let's skip Kuter, because if he cozied up, he would be doing it as an amateur, not knowing how.

Q: He tried, he got them together for dinner.

W: Kuter with Pan Am now?

Q: Yes.

W: I congratulated him. He said he wasn't going to Pan Am the last time I saw him. But any rate, Arnold, you know, was human, and I had Clark Gable come in to see me a couple of times. One time I made the mistake of telling the guards at the door, when I came in for the day, that he was coming. By the time he came in, the place was hanging with human flies all around. Everybody wanting to see Clark Gable. Gable, of course, was a pretty good guy. He used to tell some stories on himself about how they always figured him to be a superman, and he really wasn't. He came in my office. The guy with him was from MGM. He went into the service with him as a sort of Damon and Pythias deal. When Gable was being promoted, the Old Man was this human like for the theatrical, he insisted upon pinning the insignia on Gable.

W: Arnold demoted Eddie Perrin from a full BG to a Captain. Later on he committed suicide. He was a BG.

Q: Was this in connection with the SILVERPLATE operation?

W: What was his name? He was a nice guy. He took it on the lam, they sent him up to Rome after he was out.

Q: Where was he stationed?

W: Here in the Pentagon.

Q: Why did he demote him?

W: Alcoholic.

Q: I want you to tell me about Eaker, do you have some other anecdotes?

W: One of the shotgun. To show you how careful the Old Man was with his image, he didn't think of it in that way, but the Old Man liked to hunt, and he told me one day that some company was getting up a special gun--the 100,000th shotgun that they had sold the Air Force for their gunnery practice. He was pretty naive about it. I said: "They are getting you up a special gun?" He said: "Yes, it's going to be mounted this way and that way, it's the 100,000th gun." After I listened to him, I said: "General, you can't take the gun." He said: "But I want it." I said: "Of course, you want it." He was just like a child. "But this business. Now I know you've done nothing for the company. It doesn't look right. Just because they think it's a good press agent stunt to give you the 100,000th gun and you like to hunt, this is going to look bad in print." In case anybody prints the story, it looks like Arnold is taking. I said: "You don't want people to think so," and he never took the gun. So that's why some of the letters I have which said, while I didn't always agree with you, as far as I was concerned, I never pulled any punches with the boss. That's why I think I got along so well. A lot of people would say: "Yes, General Arnold,"

when it was wrong, and they should have said: "No, General Arnold!"

Q: Were you aware of an order that Stratemeyer put out, asking all people in procurement to list their assets, and to list their stockholdings?

W: No, but it sounds like Peru, Indiana to me (Stratemeyer was from Peru, Indiana). Arnold got unhappy with Horace Shelmire who was not above having little doodads like having the Air Force tie, and things like that, which the Old Man got unhappy with because it looked like--even though it was not--there was no money involved, it looked like somebody was making some money on the Air Force. It was a tie by which a civilian could recognize he was an Air Force officer.

Q: He was very scrupulous about the appearance of conflict of interest?

W: Very much.

Q: In this case of the gun, he couldn't resist.

W: He said: "I want it." As soon as I pointed out it was liable to do something, he was off.

W: I wasn't present at the one in which he and Marshall were hunting, but somewhere.

Q: Bismarck, North Dakota, wasn't it?

W: Actually, it wasn't there, it was hunting pheasantwhen I almost shot him. Shelmire was along and Hank Pool was along.

Q: Where was this?

W: This was in North Dakota, Bismarck.

Q: 1944?

W: Yes, the General used to give a game dinner once a year at Bolling Field. It was a time when the Old Man got out of patience with Horace Shelmire, and soon after that, Horace disappeared from his office.

I'm not a very good hunter. The pheasants were so fat, they didn't want to take off, so we hid in the cornfield, and one group would go to one end and the other would go towards the other, and these birds had to rise then. They used to run otherwise. I got so excited that I just pulled up my gun one time, and if it hadn't been a miracle I would have shot the Old Man with a shotgun. But, however, somebody did the very same thing later on. They were hunting with Marshall and somebody pulled up a gun and shot it, and the Old Man got so mad and he got some B-B shot in his head. Arnold got the B-B.

W: Talking about a cover plan, the Old Man had a very bad heart attack. He went down to the Biltmore. He had been due to go to some big conference.

Q: YALTA, it was in January 1945.

W: So somebody came to me and said, well now--talk about a cover plan, Dr. David Grant and I had figured what we could say. We didn't want it known he had a heart attack.

Q: This was right around Roosevelt's Inauguration Day, was it not?

W: I think so, it was when the Old Man had this very bad heart attack.

Q: Was it in the Pentagon when he had it?

W: No, I think it was at Ft. Myer. They took him down to the hospital at Biltimore, in Miami. They put him in that tower. By the way, I met somebody here the other day, some woman, who had been present. So we discussed the Old Man's heart attack, I don't remember her name.

Q: In this building?

W: No, out in California. She talked about Arnold and his heart attack at the Biltmore. But any rate, they got him down to nothing. When he came back from that, he poked me in my fat gut and he said:

"Bill"--and of course, I've always been a l… …avy, and I like to eat. But he said: "We ought to get you … …d give you a little milk toast and some lettuce." He sai… …ould be good for you," and I said, "General, I'm sorry, I'm a … …ato guy, I can't go." They had him on nothing, but he … …ory, and we didn't want the public to know. Dr. Grant and I go… …and we didn't ever tell anybody what it was that he had, b… …d also that it might have been--I remember because I had ne… …it before--a atypical virus pneumonia because first of all … …ght, I don't know who I was in on this with, maybe Giles, … …ten. Anyway, we didn't want the Old Man to be downgraded … …g present at YALTA. He was supposed to be there, and we … …to have anybody think well why...

Q: Kuter replaced him on that.

W: Who is this guy that is different, m… …althy woman-- Pinky Craig. The Old Man called McCabe one d… …aid to McCabe: "What do you mean by threatening to do someth… …enerals?" And McCabe said: "Sir, what part of my daily act… …you refer to?" And the Old Man said: "You have threatened t… …ne of my general officers from his job." And McCabe said: "Si… …tened to remove no general from his job because that is not m… …. I have no ability to remove any general from his job." … …"That is purely your function, and if you asked me what I woul… …d about it, I would recommend that you do." So it was sort … …because Pinky Craig had called Arnold and said McCabe had th… …im.

Q: Back to this cover plan, where you a… …orked out this thing on virus pneumonia.

atypical

W: And we sort of dropped the hint. We didn't mention heart attack, we mentioned a typical ailment, because the Old Man was ambulatory and he was seen. We said: "What can he have, where he could be seen?" He was around driving ~~the~~ a car, and picked up some WACs down there, and inquired of the WACs all about their troubles in the AAF. The Old Man was, after he was ambulatory, they kept him in there quite a while.

Q: He was there for two months.

W: This is something I haven't thought about in years.

Q: I wanted to ask about, remember Dr. Marquardt, the heart specialist? Now he accompanied Arnold on several trips.

W: They gave him a phony thing to look good. They gave him an aide's badge. Dr. Marquardt had a five-star aide badge.

Q: There was some trouble between Dr. Marquardt and Mrs. Arnold. Mrs. Arnold went down there, and I guess they didn't let her in to see the General and she sort of left in a huff.

W: I don't know about that.

Q: Arnold was worried--we are talking about his heart attack now--he was worried that Marshall was going to retire him, that he could no longer cut the mustard?

W: This was part of the idea, the image that Dr. Grant kept alive.

Q: Is Grant alive?

W: Yes, he's around Washington somewhere. Go and get it from him. Don't pin it on me.

Q: I know a lot about this. He was worried that Marshall would retire him?

W: I think justifiably so.

Q: Didn't, McCabe and Peterson were coming down every couple of days and Arnold, in his record, very elaborate.

W: This phony character named Maury Carr, tried to get aboard that airplane.

Q: Is that the Major you were talking about?

W: Yes, he tried.

Q: Arnold was trying to conduct Air Force business from a horizontal position?

W: Well in the tower of the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables. There are so many things I haven't thought of in 20 years.

Q: Was he successful at this? Was he able to conduct operations?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Lovett became very much concerned in February and March 1945, that the Air Force was sort of leaderless in Washington. You know, you have all those conferences, because Arnold would give instructions to his aides. But you'd have all these top level conferences, Arnold wasn't present. And Giles did not have the stature that Arnold had. This is why the decision was made to bring in Eaker, am I correct in that? They brought in Eaker as Deputy Commander, this is April 1945. The war in Europe was winding down, Arnold had come back to Washington.

W: I don't even know that Eaker was called in, I don't remember that.

Q: Arnold came back to Washington, and they sent him on a recuperation trip. He went to Cannes.

Q: Eaker came in as Deputy Commander. Now Arnold took a trip to Cannes, the Riviera, it was supposed to be an inspection trip, but actually Marshall wanted him to take it easy.

W: Please be careful on the Eaker thing.

Q: Well, I want to get into the Eaker business.

W: I think I'd better stay out, because Eaker is around town.

Q: This is just very private. Nobody has access to this but Loosbrock and Green. This is one of the things, I have a great deal on it. Perhaps I can tell you more than you can tell me on this, but there are some things that you can tell me that I don't know. But anyway, Arnold went to Europe and they had a meeting on April 19, 1945, and Spaatz was there.

W: Right after '45 I left at my own request, to go to Berlin.

Q: Around the end of the war, VE Day?

W: Yes.

Q: Right before VE Day, now Roosevelt had died a month before, and Arnold and Eaker....

W: I had been tied here and every time I tried to get out, Eaker gave the compliment of trying to get me to Europe.

Q: Well, they had this little meeting.

W: I'd have been a buck general. He took Harris Hull. I saw him one day, and I said, how did you make Buck General, I had a letter which I meant to bring with me, Colonel...

Q: Why didn't Arnold promote you?

W: I wanted to show you the letter, he recommended me to be promoted, nobody acted on it.

Q: Was this about the time he was leaving Washington?

W: No, June 11, 1945, and a glowing letter.

Q: You'd been in Washington all through the war, then?

W: Yes, and every time I tried to get away, I was over in Europe and Stratemeyer was there. Eaker and he got together, and Eaker wanted me to come. The only ones to go out to that party at Widewing were Jock Whitney and I. We were two colonels, the others were all generals. At

that time, Eaker had been trying to get me to come work for him, and Stratemeyer said: "I'll handle it." So he did whatever he did, I got a wire a couple of days later, Arnold said: "Your services needed here immediately. Return at once." I hadn't been planning to come back for about two weeks, and when he said return at once, that meant everything I had a booking on the ATC around through the north, but because it said: "Return at once," they insisted that Arnold meant: "Return at once." I came home on Pan Am from Ireland. But we had to wear civilian clothes, and we had to go down in a boat, and it took us eight days to get from Shannon River. We came down eight days around South America, across the South Atlantic, and up to Bermuda and up to New York. It took us eight days.

Q: When was this?

W: Pan American was using boats...commercial. I came back about the week that Governor Lehman was named head of UNRRA and he was on the ship.

Q: Must have been around 1944. Well, anyway, this meeting I started to tell you about, when they said they want to get closer to Truman than they were to Roosevelt, and they were going to try to get Quesada into the White House as Aide to the President.

W: That would have been an awful thing.

Q: But it didn't happen that way. Truman wanted Missouri people in.

W: He didn't want "Greasy Pete" in there. Quesada hung onto the tails of Spaatz and Eaker and everything else.

Q: When did you first become aware that Arnold was dissatisfied with the job that Eaker was doing?

W: I don't know the date.

Q: Let me try to place it in time--Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid in August 1943.

W: The losses were awful, and who's the guy that got the Medal of Honor, Leon Johnson?

Q: The guy who wrote the story of RAINBOW FIVE plan that Roosevelt was supposed to be getting us into a war was Chesly Manly.

W: The only thing, I know Chesly Manly well. I know nothing about the leak on the plan, as I haven't the slightest idea who gave it to him, but I do know that I was in Chicago once and Wayne Thomis, who is on the Tribune with Chesly Manly.

Q: Well, Chesly Manly said, or Wheeler said that he gave it to Chesly Manly, and they thought they were duty bound to publish it. Now Wheeler claims that this Air Force captain gave it to him.

W: In my opinion, the implication that Arnold had anything to do with feeding that thing to the Tribune is absolutely hogwash.

Q: Well, I believe so, too. But in order to do this, we may have to find out who did it.

W: Wayne told me that he had been called in and they finally decided to let it go since they had no further investigation or any showdown about it, that it had been dreamed up. Manly, if I remember correctly, had said that he just dreamed this up on his own, he had no, it just happened to be a coincidence that he dreamed up this plan. I don't know much about it.

Q: No, he quoted extensively from this plan. He had the plan.

W: If I remember though, when it got into the Federal Court or the investigation in Chicago, they decided to let the thing drop.

Q: Well, they let the thing drop because it was overtaken. You see, theAxis really couldn't take advantage of it, because what it said

was: "We'll go all out in Europe and hold in the Pacific." The Axis could not act upon it because Pearl Harbor happened soon after that.

Q: You say Chesly Manly was helped in writing this article?

W: I think as I remember it, that Chesly Manly, not only was he helped in writing the story by Wayne Thomis from the Chicago Tribune who maybe is still there. If I remember correctly, Wayne Thomis--and I didn't pay much attention to it, and if anything had been done, if Arnold were to have leaked it, he would have to have been a superman to do it. I would say impossible to do anything like that without my knowing it, or without McCabe knowing it, because he would have no contacts with the Chicago Tribune. He had no contacts with the Chicago Tribune. He couldn't have dispatched a Captain to do it.

Q: Waldrop has compounded his association of Arnold with this leak.

W: How does Waldrop know? What does he say? How does he know it? (OFF THE RECORD)

Q: Let's talk about Eaker. Schweinfurt-Regensburg, when Arnold had misgivings about that. Arnold came to see you?

W: I was up there one day. I can't remember the details of this. He said: "Bill, I've got, more or less, a problem, and I just don't know how to do it exactly," because he said he knew that, how Eaker and he had been buddy-pals, and written books together and all that sort of thing, and here he was going to have to do something about it because, words to the effect that he was in dutch because of the heavy losses and other things in the 8th AF. So I had suggested when the politicians wanted to get rid of a police captain out in Chicago, they had a game of musical chairs on the deal, and everybody would change hands, and you could never tell who exactly went where and why, and

who was in the doghouse. So I said: "Why don't you do it?" So I think, when they did change Eaker, if you notice....

Q: They changed around the whole staff.

W: That was one of the reasonings behind the changes of staff. Arnold could do it.

Q: Arnold had great qualms about this because of a personal association with Eaker.

W: They had been friends for life, but when you are fighting a war, and maybe you have other pressures like Marshall and Spaatz, and President Roosevelt. When you have all those people on your back. Arnold, of course, never socialized with Roosevelt. Did you notice that? There was no socialization there. He wanted to keep away from that. He mentioned to me. He wanted to keep away from this socialization because he didn't go to parties or anything else. But Roosevelt was his boss, and Arnold, of course, started out in Pennsylvania. His family wanted him to be a doctor. They were good, conservative Republicans. Roosevelt was a liberal Democrat. He didn't want to get mixed up in this business of politics. That's why he kept away from this.

Q: Was he introduced to Willkie in the campaign of 1940?

W: I don't know.

Q: I've been told this. Willkie came out for unification and maybe this is one of the reasons that Roosevelt did not cotton to the Air Force because he felt that they were siding with the GOP.

W: I don't know. I met Willkie's brother.

Q: Somebody had told me that he introduced him to Willkie. But the man who told me is not one of the highest reputation.

W: Let me tell you, Arnold was not the type to go around and do this thing, anymore than he would go around and slide something to the Chicago Tribune. He wouldn't do that. He did know Casey Jones at the Post, personally. If he got mixed in something, he'd get on the phone. He'd tell Suzy to get Casey Jones on the line, Casey would ask him various things, because Casey was managing editor of the Post--not the same crowd at all that is there now. But I'll tell you, Arnold just couldn't have been involved in that Chicago Tribune thing. Is Chesly Manly in this area?

Q: I don't know. I can find out.

W: If Chesly Manly is around here, I can run into him. I'm a member of the Press Club, but I would take special efforts.

Q: I'll find out if Chesly Manly is in the area.

W: Because I think I can say: "Hey, I just ran into a book by Tristram Coffin who implied that Arnold had been involved...

Q: You see he doesn't mention right off, but if you look in the index, the publisher might have taken it out of the text to avoid libel.

W: That could be my wedge about getting into there.

Q: You mentioned a lot of little things about Arnold. Did he always have a smile on his face?

W: You know the smile meant absolutely nothing because his smile--he always had a smile, almost always--but a smile didn't necessarily mean that he was loving you.

Q: Could it precede a storm?

W: Yes, indeed, it often did.

Q: Did he have a pretty good vocabulary when he cussed somebody out, or how did he cuss somebody out?

W: I don't think he used any swear words at all, but if you have ever been cussed out by him, I never have been. I saw him cuss out Col Sorenson and there was no mistake about what he meant, when he got through, and Col Sorenson understood it, because he went out of there perspiring heavily. He didn't use any bad words, but you knew it if you displeased him.

Q: Did he grab people in the hall to do jobs for him?

W: Yes.

Q: Sometimes the jobs were alien to their experience?

W: Might be. That didn't make any difference to him. The table of organization, that meant nothing to him.

Q: He was too impatient to go through channels?

W: He didn't know anything about channels. Talking about channels, I remember one time we went down from Sonoma down to Los Angeles to give a medal to Jack Warner over at March Field. We stopped to pick up the Warners in Los Angeles. We were riding in a plush DC-3. Up to that time the Old Man had been able to get only bucket jobs, so he said: "How in the world did he ever get this?" Somebody had arranged this thing, probably ~~Lou~~ Luke Quinn had arranged it. So he went over, one of those little fan things which the Air Force agreed to give to the Corps Area. When Arnold was at Sonoma, whenever he wanted an airplane--I could tell you some other things about how they sort of forgot he was once Chief of the Air Force--but he went over and asked a young Captain who was flying him--he said he was tickled to death to get a nice plush airplane, but how, do I get on an airplane like this, when I don't get a bucket job. He didn't know anything about channels, didn't know how

to work it either. And didn't care much. He didn't care about any Army regulations.

Q: Just wanted to get it done.

Q: What about his relations with Lovett?

W: They were very, very cordial. They were warm. They were tenuous. I could see that they were warm and cordial, and Lovett also was a very fine man who was like an effete Easterner. You never thought that he came from Texas.

Q: Effete snob?

W: Yes, he looked like, he married Baby Brown, of Brown Harriman, as you might know. He had a guy named Col Brownell in his office, who was a brother or cousin of Herbert Brownell. Arnold sort of got to counteract that, and got a lawyer in his office named Bob Proctor.

Q: Right, he died a couple of years ago.

W: I heard that Bob Lovett was offered the Secretary of the Air Force job. Turned it down. You know who his partner was, his partner was Jim Douglas who became Secretary of the Air Force.

Q: This was a great loss, because Bob Proctor could have told us a lot.

W: Absolutely. Bob Proctor was a great member of that society that wants to mediate everything?

W: The first time I met Douglas was when he was a Colonel in ATC, he brought over all the Elliott Roosevelt dog letters, which I had to handle. Blaze was the dog's name. Blaze had a stable mate which almost became another cause celebre. He was coming over on a boat, and Army Transport Service almost got their neck in a jam. They made a General in ATC who used to work for United Airlines. He took the rap for it. Actually, Ray Ireland was involved were C.R. Smith & Anna Elina Roosevelt Boettger

Q: The Blaze incident happened within a day or two of Arnold's heart attack?

W: Well, I don't think it had any connection with it.

Q: No, I don't mean any connection, but Arnold wasn't there personally to handle it.

W: I don't think so. But I had to handle all the Blaze correspondence, and people I knew everywhere would call me up on the phone, and say: "Ruff, ruff, ruff," and it got to be a pain in the neck.

Q: Were you aware, at this very time, Elliott's promotion was up for debate, for BG.

W: Don't go into the business of Elliott Roosevelt and his promotion.

W: But he got the promotion. Arnold and Spaatz had correspondence on his promotion. Of course, legally.

Q: What did Arnold say. (OFF THE RECORD)

Q: These pictures Elliott took?

W: Arnold said: "Why don't I see those beautiful air pictures in the paper?" And I said: "Because Elliott Roosevelt snagged on to them with his men in Africa and takes the negatives and blows them up and takes a bow with Marshall ~~for~~ saying, 'look at the beautiful pictures that my men took today,' and 99% of them were all classified. So we cannot print them." I told Arnold: "This is why you don't see them in the papers." This is what the Old Man wanted to know why he didn't see these things. He went to a meeting and Gen Marshall showed him a bunch of pictures taken by Elliott, and he asked me: "Why didn't I see them in the paper?"

Sends them to General Marshall

Q: You know he corresponded with Spaatz on Elliott's promotion. Spaatz wanted to promote him, and Arnold said "no," we were going to get into trouble on it. And as I piece it together, it was just about

(C B Allen + Elliott ask me)

this time that Arnold had his heart attack, and a week or two later Elliott had his star.

Q: On related issue, what were the relations between Arnold and Marshall?

W: They were very cordial.

Q: But it was always on a slightly unequal level. I noticed correspondence.

W: Marshall was the boss.

Q: It was "Dear Arnold," and Arnold would write, "Dear General," and this was always maintained.

W: Yes, because of the fact that General Marshall, much to everybody's surprise. When VMI got into the picture. You know the old story about Gen Drum?--"you can't beat our Drum." They said one of the reasons Roosevelt didn't make Gen Drum the Chief of Staff was because of his wife's sister who lived with him, who ran the show, and because of the fact that everybody went around saying, "you can't beat our Drum." So when Marshall was made Chief of Staff, he <u>was</u> the Chief of Staff, and Arnold knew this. He knew that even though they had been friends since the days of the Philippines.

Q: Drum had hoped to succeed Malin Craig?

W: He expected to be Chief.

Q: And then they appointed Marshall who was junior to him.

W: They appointed Marshall who was not even a West Pointer. He was a VMI man and that just about killed all the West Pointers. But Roosevelt did, and it was the smartest thing he ever did, or otherwise we might have lost the war. As for General Drum, his wife and sister lived with him and it was said she ran the roost. Wife and the sister

ran him, so that was one reason he didn't make it.

Q: Did you ever hear the story that Arnold drank a lot?

W: It's not true. Not in my days of association with him.

Q: There was one story. Do you remember John Callan O'Laughlin, who was the editor of the Army Navy Journal?

W: Yes.

Q: There was a story around Washington about Roosevelt hesitating about Arnold because of Arnold's reputation of a drinker.

W: That's not so. He might have been a drinker as a younger man, but...

Q: Not in your experience?

W: He didn't drink anything except a little sherry and I can tell you a funny story about that. One time in Seattle, we all went to have dinner, and the people who promoted the dinner, after the thing was over--Chuck Kerwood was involved in this. Chuck is a great guy, but we were in this hotel in Seattle, and in the night time these people sent over a bunch of scotch and Chuck Kerwood who was in the lobby when the stuff came, glommed on it, and snitched all of it, including the bottle of sherry which the Old Man wanted for himself. The Old Man drank sherry once in a while, not very much. I don't know of any hard liquor I saw him drink. But the hard liquor disappeared, and some drunken woman came into my ~~office~~ hotel room one day, and I told Chuck that that was a dirty trick, and Chuck was only there on another matter, he wasn't on that at all. He glommed on to all the liquor they sent over and threw a big party. The reason I found out about it was I didn't go to the party. I wasn't invited, but I found out a lot of people had gone to Chuck's party, he was a typical Robin Hood, he's rob the

rich to pay the poor. He didn't do it for himself, he just stole all the liquor. And the admiral [illegible] Sherry. I got back half a bottle for General Arnold.

Q: Arnold mentioned that Roosevelt invited him over for an old-fashioned, and he knew he was back in the good graces of Roosevelt, this was following Arnold's problems with Morgenthau.

W: No, I wasn't aware of the Morgenthau problem.

Q: This probably preceded your tour. Morgenthau wanted to ship all our planes out to the English and French. This was right before the start of the war, and Arnold was given the job to build up the Air Corps, it was pretty hard to do both of these because there weren't enough planes coming off the assembly lines.

W: Did you know that one hassle involved in that was the 299, the prototype of the B-17? I remember the first one, was cracked up at Wright Field in a takeoff on a testing flight, because somebody forgot to unlock the ~~airlines, or something~~ ailerons. In the Congress they shouted: "No more money for those expensive airplanes!"

Q: This must have been before the war?

W: Yes, it was. Well, I heard about it as I was covering aviation on a paper in Chicago.

Q: How about Roosevelt and King?

W: I told you about the five stars which I gave to Arnold, and I had them all made in England, months before Arnold knew what shape they were going to be in.

Q: Who thought of that idea?

W: Admiral King's design, and I have a letter. I'll send you a copy. I gave some to Marshall. I had a little note back from Marshall saying he was glad to get them, but Arnold said: "How in the world did

you ever know the shape they were going to be in,"because others had brought the first five stars in a line. He said in the letter: "Is that a military secret?" He was kidding me.

Q: But you knew that King thought it up first.

W: I never told Arnold. I found out who had been responsible. They told me Admiral King, but not to mention it.

Q: If he had known then he probably wouldn't wear them. Were they on pretty distant, cool relationship?

W: I don't think so. I think King was distant and cool to everybody. Here's another little item about after the Old Man had retired and was out in Sonoma.

W: Yes, and he, one time for Christmas, their new house had just been, I knew that the Old Man like liqueurs and dthings like that, things that he could serve at a party, and particularly one time when I had been overseas, I brought back some Goldvasser which was hard to find, a liqueur that you couldn't find, so this time, after the house was done. For Christmas I sent out a little basket of stuff for their new house guest room in their house and it happened to be some cologne with speckles of gold water in it, and when the Old Man got it he thought it was Goldvasser, something to drink, and he put it aside. When I went out to visit him, he said they kept it for a long time and one night they had some guests and he thought about the gold water, and he asked Bea to get it and they served it. He asked: "What are you trying to do, kill all my guests?" He served them cologne.

Q: What did it say?

W: I think it said: Goldvasser Cologne, I just did it because he liked "Goldvasser," and didn't have the slightest idea.

Q: When you were out at the Ranch to see him. Was he pretty tired? Did he slow up quite a bit when he was out at the Ranch?

W: No, actually, he didn't. As I tell you, we went over to Savvy Cook's, and he had Bruce Simmons to help us, I guess. We went over and brought the stuff back in a jeep.

Q: How did he decide to write the book? Did you have any connection with Laidlaw?

W: No, no, I didn't. He wanted to do that. I think why it didn't go so well. It was too damned late; everybody put out a book.

Q: Well, of course, it was two-dimensional. He didn't get into any issues.

W: I was not involved in the book at all.

Q: He wrote a series of articles for the McNaught Syndicate.

Q: You were talking about some other articles he wrote?

W: He went to work, when he was in Sonoma. They loved him there. He had his own collection of model planes, and I think they still have them on exhibit there. But Ceely Murphy, who owned the Sonoma Index, was a newspaper brat, an ink-stained wretch, who had run away from her father. He had owned an Oakland paper. She ran away and married an itinerant, drunken typesetter, and she was really quite a power in that area politically. They lived in the General Vallejo barracks there in Sonoma which had been given to the State of California.

W: He worked for the Sonoma Index Tribune, he'd write pieces for it once in a while. He said to me: "I write for it, but I have to subscribe to it, because she said you are not a professional. She makes me pay $3.00 a year. But here she comes along and gives you free copies of it." And I said: "Well, because I'm one of the specials." One time when Ceely and her husband came to Washington, it was when Truman was here. He was away, down at Key West and through my connections at

the White House I then had, I took Ceely and put her at Mr. Truman's desk, and that was the night of the windstorm. I called her "Madame President." She was really quite a power in her own way in Sonoma. But Arnold was well received in Sonoma, as you know.

Q: You were in the office during Pearl Harbor, weren't you?

W: I was in NY in a hotel on that weekend.

Q: He was down in Sacramento shooting quail with Donald Douglas, was he not?

W: I don't know. We all got ordered--I had an AT-6 at Newark. I remember getting ordered to come back to Washington. I was a little hung over, but came back anyway.

Q: Do you remember a guy named McRae or Fred Dean?

W: Freddy Dean, Freddy used to sit outside the General's office. I used to say to him, Freddy, quit wearing the Old Man's stars. I'd known Freddy for a long time. He used to be the guard, he was St. Peter at the Old Man's gate.

Q: How about Norstad? Was he on pretty good terms with Arnold?

W: Well, Arnold thought pretty much of him. He was a dapper boy.

Q: Cabell and Norstad were the first Advisory Council.

W: Cabell went into Intelligence and became the great sphinx, didn't he?

Q: Right, but Norstad, Arnold was very devoted to Norstad, was he not?

W: Yes. When Arnold was Chief of the 20th AF and ran it from the Pentagon, Norstad was sitting right there. He was a buck general.

Q: Did Norstad go out, was he a hatchet man to tell Hansell? Do you know anything about Hansell being relieved by LeMay?

W: Possum Hansell, I ~~don't~~ know, but I'll tell you that Norstad didn't have the stuff. Some woman named Alice Rogers Hager had written a piece. She had gone out and had an interview with LeMay. She was with North American Newspaper Alliance. She sat down and wrote the whole piece and it was bad stuff. I've forgotten what it was. This was bad public relations. Whatever LeMay told her we were not quite so sure that LeMay wasn't stupid, whatever he said. So I went up to Norstad and he said: "I'm going out there next week," and he said: "I'll see, I'll take care of this matter." He was a buck general in the Pentagon, and working for the Old Man--sort of a No. 2 Deputy Commander of the 20th AF, which was run out of the Pentagon. Well, so Norstad went out and marched up the hill and marched back down again. Here's what LeMay said: "Yes, I said it, and I'll say it again." That was the end of the whole deal. That's how Norstad handled it.

Q: I would guess that this happened after LeMay got the job, because up to that time he wasn't so cocksure, I think. Do you know anything about Hansell, Hansell was one of Arnold's close young men?

W: I think it was something to do with his hearing, too. Possum was once public relations chief of the Air Force. He was in this chain somewhere of mine, but way before me.

Q: Maybe he was in that, but he was in Plans.

W: Yes, but he was...

Q: Kuter, Ken Walker and Harold George.

W: Kuter was supposed to be the great brain.

Q: You don't think so? Arnold had great confidence in him, did he not?

W: I think so.

Q: Did Arnold ever question that?

W: No, I think he thought Kuter was good.

Q: But some others didn't?

W: Well, I didn't, particularly.

Q: Hansell was a broken man when he came back.

W: I think Possum Hansell wasn't probably the great brain that Arnold thought he was.

Q: I think he was a great intellectual, but not a leader like LeMay.

W: Yes.

Q: But he was not a leader. LeMay was after Arnold's own heart.

W: LeMay was sort of a "butcher" leader though. He was a butcher; he was a Patton.

Q: But he got the job done, and as you pointed out, Arnold wanted the job done.

W: Well, Arnold did have, but he didn't want to face the issue. When I talk about Patton, Patton had done the thing, hang the costs, and LeMay was "hang the cost." Some of the others, you know LeMay's dictum to his pilots that he wanted nobody in the Strategic Air Command that was either unlucky or no good. He said: "If you're unlucky, goodbye." LeMay had a lot of good rugged ideas, which were cold. There was no sentiment involved. He could send a guy out. He didn't like to kill them, but he knew when they came back that there would be certain files missing up there.

Q: What do you mean?

W: LeMay knew there would be certain losses. He accepted those. He didn't like them any more than anybody does. But he knew this was war.

Q: What about Arnold and Spaatz?

W: I think Arnold and Spaatz got along very well.

Q: Spaatz was inarticulate, but he must have been a good leader?

W: Yes, he was. I remember, barber used to cut Spaatz' hair when he was a Major. Ruthie Spaatz was pushing, she changed his name. Put the extra 'a' in it.

Q: That's because people were calling him "Spatz." When did he change his name? Around '38,'39 or '40?

W: I don't know, but I know she put the extra 'a' in there. Didn't make a difference. A lot of people still called him "Spatz."

Q: This was a ticket to the Aleutians? Was he very sensitive about that?

W: I don't know that he was.

Q: She was?

W: I've forgotten. Spaatz is the one who said to me--was it Spaatz or was it Giles, I can't remember. Talk about gentlemen blowing security. One of them said something to me about OVERLORD. I'd never heard about OVERLORD till he mentioned it. The story was, you know, you said to somebody the way to find out if you were "bigoted." If the guy said no, ~~I'm pretty reasonable~~, he wasn't "in" on it. But there were many misunderstandings. People would say "No, I'm liberal."

Q: You know, the word OVERLORD appeared in a crossword puzzle in the London Telegraph, two days before the event. Somebody was trying to transmit a message. There is a book on this right now, last Sunday's paper there was a review.

W: Did somebody really try to do it?

Q: I don't know, just speculating about it.

W: OVERLORD appeared, it could be happenstance. I do crossword puzzles. OVERLORD is not a normal crossword word.

Q: We are talking about OVERLORD and the leak of D-Day.

W: This is what I understand actually happened in that case. This, I don't know of my own knowledge, but I was told. I can't remember by whom, at the time it happened. Gen Miller was at a dinner in London. Also at the same dinner was a high woman official of the Red Cross. At the time, he made a speech and so on, and sat down. The woman said to him--there were a group of people there, including some BG, I don't remember who. I didn't hear his name, and I understand he did not love Gen Miller very much. He had been a classmate of his. At any rate, Gen Miller walked over to the woman and said: "Where is my mobile Red Cross canteen machine?" And she said: "Well General, we don't have enough to give everybody we want." He said: "You have been promising me that for a long time." She said: "Well, we just don't have enough to go around, but the way things work out now, we are going to have this one to you by June 15," or whatever the date was. The General looked at her and said: "June 15th, me eye, that will be just too late." That is supposed to have been the basis of his blowing the D-Day date. It came from somebody who worked for Gen Miller who told me that it was not a legitimate leak. That this BG who heard, went over and told somebody, you heard what he said, you heard it now.

Q: The account that I saw is that he said this more than once, whatever he leaked, or whatever indication he gave, he gave more than once. So there are probably some varying accounts.

W: My part of it was that they revealed in England all about this demotion and sending him away, and all that, except one thing. They didn't give his name. All the press came into my office, like a bunch of vultures, saying, who is the general?

Q: What about Tom Hanley, he just died you know?

W: Oh, did he? Gen Hanley I liked, he came back, I don't remember, I had a few dealings with him, but I can't remember what my dealings were with him, but I had some which Ithought were all right.

Q: What about Reuben Hood?

W: Oh, yes, poor Reuben Hood.

Q: How about him and Arnold? How about Hanley and Arnold?

W: I think they got along all right, but they were not the great do-its. Neither was Reuben Hood, he was a careful, sort of professional type of guy. Hanley, I think they sent him down to University or something, didn't they? I think they sent him down to Montgomery, or some place. I would just say that they were nice guys but somebody used to say: "He's a nice guy, but there's no market for them." And Reuben and I got along fine. I used to judge people by their ability.

Q: You say you saw Arnold get mad. Did he ever get mad at Hanley?

W: Not that I know of.

Q: Did he ever get mad at Stratemeyer?

W: I'm sure he must have.

Q: Did Stratemeyer do a good job? He must have because he got a promotion?

W: Well, he was, believe it or not, quite a naive man. Stratemeyer was a very naive person. He came from Peru, Indiana. We used to call him behind his back "PERU" because that was the winter home of some circus.

W: He was pretty good, but this is only my personal opinion. Stratemeyer was not a great brain. I think Spaatz was a great brain, and some of the others he had around him were.

Q: Arnold was very devoted to Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Very much, yes indeed.

Q: Was he a great brain? Or a humorist, or what?

W: Rosie, at one time would have liked to quit and taken the job as baseball commissioner. They offered it to him, but the Old Man wouldn't let him go. They offered it to him, and when he got out and was ready to go, it was gone, so he settled for USO.

Q: Was Arnold a practical joker? Did he like jokes?

W: I don't think so.

Q: Didn't he hire Vince Barnett?

W: Barnett, now I can tell you. Have you seen Hank Pool, I saw Hank Pool take the bait. I'll tell you about Vince. We were out at a party that the Warner Brothers threw. It was a big party, and everybody and his brother was there at the Dark Canyon Studio. Vince Barnett was on the MGM payroll. I asked hime one time if he ever got hit, and he said, yes, once by Admundsen. He was ribbing Admundsen. He got up after a dinner in which Admundsen was asking for funds to go back to the South Pole. Vince got up and said, you know, in a fake accent: "Admundsen is a crook and he belongs in jail with Dr. Cook," and with that, Admundsen got up and said: "I trust you will forgive me for ~~wht~~ I am about to do," and hit him right square ~~at the table~~ on the nose. But Barnett was going along at this party at Warner Bros. Hank Pool was with us, and I'm sure General Arnold was there. Along came the Commandant of the Marines, who later became the Ambassador to South Africa. He had all this fruit salad. Barnett said to him: (in fake German accent) "Oh, good evening, General. Those are ~~honorable~~ wonderful bunch of ribbons you have. Are they ROTC?" And you could see the Marine bristle. He finally thought better of it, and didn't open his mouth, ~~and~~ About that time Hank ~~had a say.~~ came along.

Q: Hank didn't know about Vince Barnett?

W: No, he saw Barnett do this with the General, but he didn't know about Barnett, I guess. Then Barnett turned to Hank and he said: "You Americans are going to make us all hate you forever, killing our defenseless women and children." Hank said: "What did you say?" And Barnett said: "You Americans, we are going to hate you forever, killing our women with your bombs." Pool said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I'm making money. I decide how much money I make, how long I stay in this country." That was all Hank needed, he took the bait. From that time on Barnett wiped the floor with him. He's an expert, and once you take the hook, he never lets you off. He knows exactly what to say to make you furious.

Q: Did Arnold know this?

W: I don't know, I think he did later.

Q: Didn't Arnold put Barnett on to rag Marshall one time? I saw something in the Marshall Library down in Virginia.

W: He might have, I don't know. The Quiet Birdman hired him to rib Ernest Udet. Barnett studied up on that thing, and made Udet think he was in one of his squadrons. He can't speak German, if Udet had ever spoken to him in German, with that fake German accent he had. He gave him the numbers of the squadron.

Q: Let me ask you one more question. How about Hank Pool? What was his role?

W: I've forgotten what department Hank was in.

Q: He was a Colonel and he used to go hunting.

W: He was a Colonel, he was usually along, because he was Mrs. Arnold's brother.

Q: He's a brother-in-law, but was he a sort of court jester or did he perform a serious role? Did Arnold give him any important things to do?

W: I really don't know. I've never thought about it. Hank seemed to always be along, and good company, and I never thought about what his military job was. I don't even know. Hank later on tried to run for office, and didn't make it. I'd say whatever Hank had to do, he did well,

Q: He married into wealth, didn't he, into the Woolworth family?

W: ~~Oh, did he~~? We'd got out to a factory, and be on schedule. So I would sit down on the way out to the factory and write a piece for the boss to speak at the factory. Arnold was a quick study. You'd think he had this all his life. He could read my dirty writing, sometimes when an emergency came, he had to have something to say, I'd sit there and write it on the way out there.

Q: He'd do this, like he put in a full day here, and fly all night?

W: Arnold would have his occasional pleasure, like hunting and going to the races, but that was only a minor part of the trip.

Q: Did you go overseas with him on any trips?

W: No.

Q: Just domestic. I wanted to ask you about Tony Frank. You said you know some stories about him. He wanted to have a combat command, and Arnold didn't give him one. Do you know anything about that?

W: The last time I saw him...

Q: He died recently.

W: Oh, did he? I saw him in the hall of the Pentagon with his coterie of friends. It was supposed to be the gravy train for promotion, everybody said. Get into Tony Frank's command, ~~whatever it was~~. the Air Service Command.

Q: The ASC?

W: Yes, it was supposed to be a gravy train, because people would get in there and get promoted all beyond their other friends. He had a guy who used to work as a reporter on the Chicago Examiner with him who used to scare him to death. I can't remember his name, it was an Irish name. He worked as a correspondent on the old Examiner. I can't remember his name now.

Q: Did he have some trouble with Arnold?

W: Not that I know of, I don't think Arnold had the greatest admiration for him. He is a man who had charts and graphs and statistics and stuff like that. — all over the place.

Q: He wanted a combat command. You didn't know anything about that?

W: I do know that when ~~they~~ Arnold sort of gave him the old heave-ho, I saw him in the hall one day in the Pentagon. He had his coterie of people with him. He said: "Westlake, I thought about you the other day. I've got an airplane now and I fly around to every one of the Air Force installations in the world." He had a nervous tick, and so he said: "I have one seat vacant in this plane and I think, not for me you know, but it would be good for the Air Force to have some good reporter go along with me on all these trips, and I'd be glad to have him." And he said: "Can you think of anybody?" And I said: "Well, right off the bat, General, the only one I can think of just exactly down that alley would be Gil Robb Wilson." (N.Y. Herald Tribune) And he said: "Oh, I

couldn't have Gil Robb Wilson with me." He said: "He goes snort, snort, snort." So I could just visualize two guys getting off a plane, Tony, with his tick, and Wilson with his snort."

Q: What about Knerr? Knerr was doing a lot of writing under the table for Andrews, did you know this?

W: No, Hugh Knerr, I can't think much about him. No, I know him.

Q: He and Tony Frank worked for Andrews in the GHQ AF. This was before you came in.

W: I remember ~~when~~ Andrews, of course Andrews was a great guy. I sent Andrews a guy who was killed with him. (Col. Morrow Krum)

Q: How about Arnold and Andrews?

W: Got along fine. No, I think there was mutual respect.

Q: Let's talk about Arnold and Trubee Davison. (arrived nice world for Trubee before the war when Trubee was asst Sec)

W: Be very careful with this please. Although Trubee knows it and so does Mr. Barnum. Mr. Barnum had been head of the Newspaper Publishers Association. As such, he was one time head of a paper up in Binghamton, NY. He was a publisher, I think he married the paper. He was no great brain, and he got to be head of the NPA. Mr. Barnum finally woke up one morning to find out he was no longer publisher of the Binghamton paper. But he had been a very close friend of Davison's. He'd been a Republican, loyal, stalwart friend of Trubee's--at least however the connection I never knew exactly. One fine day, Mr. Barnum ~~who~~ was suddenly out of a job, had an appointment arranged with General Arnold by Trubee Davison. So the General called me on the squawk box and asked if I would come up, which I did. I got into his office. I had to be nimble, some good friend had warned me that there was a guy in the office named Barnum who was after my job. He was a friend of Trubee's

and Trubee had figured the guy was out of a job. He was a publisher and he needed a job of some sort of stature and some little money coming in too. So I went in to meet Mr. Barnum for the first time with Trubee who was there. You could see he had been introduced to the whole thing by Trubee, ~~and~~ Trubee has Bruce become my good friend. I don't want this to be used against him. But General Arnold listened to Barnum and Trubee. Barnum had the nerve to tell Arnold that he only had one good speech in him. He should make that speech and not make any more. This was Mr. Barnum's great brain idea. He had no idea of the value of public information as it is used to inform the public who own us. This whole story, I listened to it, and Arnold turned to me, and he said to me: "What do you think about Mr. Barnum coming to work?" I said: "General we need more workers, we need more busy bees, and we need workers. We don't need any more great thinkers and great 'Rodins'. You asked me," and Trubee sat there, and I said: "We don't need him," which is a hell of a thing to say before Trubee and the guy, but it was the truth.

Q: Did Trubee get mad?

W: Well, you don't think he loved me because he was trying to get the guy a job.

Q: How did you keep his friendship since then?

W: I don't know. Anyway, Arnold, without saying anything more to me, said: "When can you come to work Mr. Barnum?" Barnum by a strange accident, could come to work the next day, so Arnold set him up in an office somewhere in the Pentagon, gave him a secretary. Believe it or not, that is the last time Arnold ever saw Mr. Barnum. Barnum went around, I had to do something about him, because he was around "interfering". He was arranging art shows. I said: "Mr. Barnum we are

not trying to paint the Germans to death." He finally ~~got Trubee~~, ~~of course~~. Arnold respected Davison because he had been his boss.

picked up his big earlier

quarrels + went home, Resigned.

Q: Didn't he replace Trubee and put Bevans in there as A-1?

W: Oh yes, but Jim Bevans, he was hot as a firecracker, that character. His crowd, his whole crowd, Bevans had a whole coterie. The last time I saw General Bevans, I saw him sitting in the office of General Joe Carroll. (Remind me to tell you the story of Art Ennis + Jim Bevans + Hesse.)

- 525-0296 Thursday Est. 1966 Blue Card VA plate A-447969

SAFAAR

January 29, 1970

Colonel William Westlake, USAF (Ret)
1001 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Colonel Westlake:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past two years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I've come across your name in the Arnold Papers several times and know that you were rather close to him for a period during the war. For example, I believe you worked out the "cover plan" to disguise the true purpose of the B-29, a project close to General Arnold's heart.

I would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise, which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, and non-attributable, if you so desire.

Wash Post - campaign - Kuter - Eugene Meyer

I can thank my good friend, Flint DuPre, and I believe yours as well, for apprising me that you were in town.

I will call you for an appointment, if I may. If it is more convenient for you to phone me, my Pentagon numbers are OX 5-3862 or OX 7-5587.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Interview, Col William Westlake, Arlington, Va. Feb 6, 1974

Q You mentioned in the last interview that they called Louis Johnson "Leaky Louie". You didn't develop that. Why did they?

W I don't know exactly why they called him that "Leaky"

Q Was he garrulous?

W Apparently yes. He talked--I heard him when I was in Chicago make a speech out there when he said: "All the air force manufacturers are going to get behind the mountains. They're going to move their factories in the middle of the country. And I am going to have them move there because I am the Secretary of War...

Q He was the Assistant Secretary of War.

W "And I am the one who signs the orders and I'm going to have them do it, make them do it."

Q Not many of them moved?

W None of them moved.

Q How did Arnold get along with him? He was politically well situated with Roosevelt. He was head of the American Legion there.

W Did you just see that Robert E. L. Eaton became the head of the Legion? Do you know who Gen Eaton is?

Q He used to be head of L & L.

W Yes. Actually, "Leaky Louie" was called that--behind his back of course, because he spouted off. He spouted off whenever he got a chance.

Q You mean this was sort of inverse--he didn't talk?

W No, he did talk. He liked to make speeches.

Q I want to ask you about the glider program. There were several brothers in the Army Air Forces, the Barringer baothers.

W One of them was later killed.

Q Lewin Barringer. He was in the glider program.

W He was the one who sparked the whole glider program.

Q I talked to his brother, Brandon Barringer, last month up in Philadelphia. And he said Lewin, his brother, who was killed in a plane that was lost somewhere in the Caribbean, was the one that sparked it.

W He really was.

Q Where did Richard Dupont fit into it?

W Also too, I think he was in it. I don't remember exactly how he did it but I do know that he was in it. I think it was at their behest that this whole glider program which was not exactly the most successful program in the world, as you know.

Q Barringer told me about a guy named Hicks whose name exploded in Drew Pearson's column. They almost brought this guy Hicks in to run the glider program. Barringer got exercised and went to "Hungry" Gates, his boss, and wanted to know: "Since when does Drew Pearson run the Army Air Forces glider program?" You remember anything about that?

W No

Q We're talking about A-2 and public relations. There were two guys who had the A-2 job for very short periods of time and didn't last very long. You mentioned in our interview Sorensen.

W Yes. Arnold didn't like him. And if you looked at the chart you'd see all the rest: A-1, -2, -3, and -4 were all generals except Sorensen. He was a Colonel Sorensen.

Q He was just a short-termer then? Arnold didn't promote him?

W Arnold didn't promote him because he didn't like him.

Q Why did he keep him on the job?

W I don't know. He did eventually promote him. But Sorensen had a sort of a scratchy personality with Arnold. He came to me one day and said--by the way, I think I may have told you about Sorensen saying: "I'm supposed to deal with public relations and I have not the slightest idea or concern." He admitted that he knew nothing about it.

Q There were two other men who had A-2 for a short time and

apparently were moved out. I would say A-2 was a hot spot. One man was Hume Peabody.

W I remember him.

Q He didn't last very long. He was there around Pearl Harbor. Do you remember anything about him?

W No. I don't think he was very effective man.

Q I talked to him. He lived at Chaptico, down in southern Maryland.

W I knew him only vaguely.

Q Then there was Mike Scanlon.

W Mike Scanlon's still around.

Q Yes, I know. I talked to him three times. Mike got into trouble with Arnold. Do you remember?

W I don't remember why but I do know that at his zenith he was our Air Attaché in London, and made himself up fiercely like a lion, and drove around, and I think he still drives around, in that old Continental. A hell of a nice guy.

Q He is a nice guy. I talked to him about his trouble with Arnold. This was a report that became infamous or famous depending on your viewpoint. This is Scanlon Report No. 3.

W I don't know this story. There are a lot of things public relations wise, intelligence wise, that didn't get into my ken, if there were no bugs in it with the press.

Q Here's another question. Somebody told me that FDR wanted the B-29's ready so they could hit Japan by the Democratic National Convention time which was, I guess, July 1944.

W I don't know the date but there was a target date. I can't remember what it was. I know the first target was to have been Sasebo, Japan.

Q But do you remember anything involving a political drive or pressure against Arnold? I know FDR was pushing Arnold. Arnold and Benny Meyers went out to Salina, Kansas to try to expedite the program.

W There was some one thing wrong with the B-29's.

Q There were several things but one was the engines catching fire.

W One was something else, a little device that Arnold called--what was the Big Shot's name at Chrysler?

Q Keller?

W K. T. Keller. Arnold said: "If you don't get that thing out I'll make it in my own basement."

Q That was a little piece. Let me just check this out.

W My impression--did I tell you this story? I wish I had this piece of paper. I know where it is. Arnold signed a piece of paper saying: "I practically give you the Air Force to work up a cover." Some newspaper man hit the nail on the head. He wrote a story about the B-29's is going to be ready on a certain day; is going to hit the Japanese base at Sasebo, and Arnold hit the ceiling because it was the truth. That was the plan. But I cautioned him and counseled him not to get too excited about this because any official recognition of this story would give it away. So at that time he directed me to prepare a cover which I did. And it's a long story what plans were in the cover, but among other things--I wanted to have several B-29's but he let me have at least one and maybe two B-29's to send to Europe. I leaked the story around that the B-29's were going to be used in the OVERLORD invasion, which was completely wrong. Also I heard that there were other things, pieces were marked B-29 when they were shipped over the Hump. The Intelligence people could have seen in fact what they were.

Q Then you were involved in this so-called cover plan?

W I was. Did I ever tell you I worked out a whole cover plan. Arnold directed me to do it until one guy came into my office, asked to see me, and asked my secretary to get outside. Then he revealed that he was Colonel Doakes of the General Staff and he was in charge of all cover plans

And he wanted me to tell him exactly everything I'd done in this cover plan. He was very fine about it.

Q This was War Department?

W War Department GHQ.

Q What's his name?

W I don't remember. I said: "How in hell, you're so secret that not only I--neither did I ever know about you, nor did Arnold. So apparently whatever I had done fit on. He said it had to fit in to the circles, the overall circles, in Plans. And this seemed to be--whatever I had done--which, among other things, was to send a B-29 to Europe--he said was just all right. After he found out everything that had been done, he went away happy.

Q Somebody told me that the word was around in Arnold's immediate staff: "Don't cozy up to him because after a while he'll get tired of you, and then get rid of you."

W I think maybe that's based on the fact of Shelmire, maybe. But I don't think you could cozy up to the old Man. I've seen experts try it. I've seen any number of people try it with presents like crates of oranges that "happened to be present when his airplane was leaving." All that sort of thing which I've seen where experts try to cozy up to Arnold. It didn't work.

Q Not in the sense of a small bribe. But I mean the fact that if you became too familiar in his presence that he got tired of you. Is there any basis for that?

W I don't think so. He did get tired of Horace Shelmire I think. You know why.

Q No, I don't

W Horace had more little things like. Horace and he were schoolboys, chums. Horace is now dead. I think his widow lives in Pennsylvania in Downingtown. Horace had little projects of his own. One time we were out hunting pheasant out in North Dakota and Horace almost shot Arnold.

I think Arnold did get shot another time when he was with Marshall. He got shot in the head. ome of the pellets were in his skull. Shelmire said to me: "I'm rather worried about the General." The General was rather short with Shelmire. It wasn't long after that that Shelmire got the old heave-ho. But I think he knew it was coming and it wasn't the fact that Arnold got tired of him but got tired of what Shelmire did. Had little things like an Air Force tie--just an example of what I mean--he got mixed up with some manufacturer who was going to make a fortune selling these ties of "Air Force U" or something.

Q This petty corruption?

W Yes, did I ever tell you a story about Arnold and the gun that he said: "I want it!"

Q Yes, you did.

W I said: "Of course you want it but you can't have it. You might get away with it, but you keep on doing that, and Mr. Pearson or somebody else is going to raise hell abut the fact that you "take."

Q Emmett McCabe, he's a sort of a shadowy figure?

W I don't--Sarah died and he married again and had a child and he went to work in San Diego, and I think he lives in Point Loma.

Q McCabe is still alive?

W Yes. He lives in Point Loma. He worked for General Dynamics.

Q Are you thinking of Beebe?

W No. McCabe. I know Emmett very well. In fact, as I started to tell you earlier at lunch, when I was looking for personnel, among other people who came in to be interviewed and people came in, there's the one reason Emmett got a job. He came in and...

Q He was a protege of a Congressman?

W This is why he got a job. He came in and he did as everybody else did. He said he was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, and went to Notre Dame, or wherever it was, and he went along and I said: "That sounds pretty good." By the way, as he was leaving, I said: "Here is your

authority for a physical and an application to fill out. We had many of them come in that we didn't want to have anything to do with them because they were no good. They were saloon keepers and things like that. So I said to him: "By the way, McCabe, what are you doing now?" And he said: "I'm Administrative Assistant for a Congressman." At that time I didn't even say "Who?" I found out of course--McCabe didn't say: "I'm a pal of Congressman Costello." He didn't say: "Sarah and I are old pals with Costello and Arnold." He didn't mention that. So he got his authority to do that. I forgot him. The next time I was up in Shelmire's office or one time later--several months later--I saw a 2d Lieut wandering around there. He said: "Do you remember me?" And I said: "Your face if familiar." He said: "My name is McCabe." and I said "Oh yes. I remember you, McCabe. What are you doing here?" And he said "I'm the General's new Aide."

Q Was this the same job that Sheffield had later on?

W Sheffield had it for a very short time. Sheffield got it because some general, some buck general, recommended him, or somebody else recommended him. I knew Tommy Sheffield when he was a newspaper man in Chicago. Sheffield didn't really work as an Aide, not very long, anyway. There was another guy from Chicago Tribune who was an Aide for a short time.

Q I want to ask you about a guy named Sol Rosenthal. What was his role?

W Mystery man. He was supposed to be...wait a minute--Sol Rosenthal?

Q Somebody told me that he was sort of a front man for Harry Hopkins, and he was funneling money into the Democratic National Committee.

W I don't know but he was a mystery man--every once in a while--I'll tell you who you ought to get an interview with--Maury Carr.

Q Where's he?

W I don't know but he had a sister who was a movie actress.

Q That's not Laurence Carr, is it?

W No, this is Maurice, a nogoodnick. You want to be careful, but-- He is the one who told Arnold he worked for Lovett and he told Lovett he worked for Arnold. Maybe I could find out because Chuck Kerwood is keeping track of the girl. Maury had a girl, an Air Force secretary, who was a wonderful gal in protecting him, covering him right and left. I have to find out if Chuck knows where the girl is. If he knows where she is, he can find Maury.

Q Would he know something about Sol Rosenthal?

W Yes, Rosenthal? Was that quite the name? One had to do with the Democratic National Committee. One of them was always throwing parties.

Q Is there any basis, in your opinion, that he was sort of a bag man to collect money?

W Nothing to do with Benny Meyers, I don't think. But he had something to do with politicians, in my opinion.

Q How about Pinky Craig's role. He was in Plans there for a while.

W He was a spoiled know-it-all. Not very efficient man who married a very wealthy woman. "The Pulitzer Prize" as they called him. He married a Miss Pulitzer. And between me and the gatepost, he was a very much overrated man.

Q I want to ask you about Ira Eaker. We talked about him at lunch.

W Very careful man. You about his demanding and I think got away with it. He was the first one that demanded he be sent to school. He was a Regular Air Force officer.

Q You mean Columbia University? He went to journalism school there.

W He went to school. I think the Air Force paid the bill which is the first time it ever happened.

Q I think Mason Patrick arranged it.

W He did. He worked at it for a long time.

Q When he came to Washington in April 1945 the war was practically over in Europe and Spaatz was slated to take the top strategic command

of the Pacific. Eaker was considered like No. 3 man, Arnold being #1 and Spaatz #2. He came in to become Deputy Commander AAF. And he acted, at least in the opinion of half a dozen people or more, he acted as if he was the heir to the throne.

W Well, I think he thought he was.

Q Did you accept this? That he was the next heir to the throne?

W No. I did not. Because, in my opinion, Spaatz was the next heir. I think that Eaker probably believed he was.

Q I wanted to ask you about Jim Bevans. I talked to him several times.

W I'd be prejudiced, I'm afraid.

Q Jim Bevans claimed that he did not handle high level policy, just sort of middle level policy, for Arnold.

W Next time you talk to him ask him what about the Hesse jewels.

Q I'll ask him.

W Don't you say I told you to.

Q Was he involved in that? Weren't they hidden in a cave or something.

W I don't know. I know more than I'm going to tell you.

Q How about Elliott Roosevelt's promotion?

W That's--you're treading on...

Q Thin ice?

W I'm also prejudiced there because I don't have a very high regard for him.

Q Arnold was opposed to it. I talked to Elliott Roosevelt.

W Did you ask him about the charges that he wanted to knock off the Bahama Prime Minister? You know I'm so prejudiced.

Westover, C. B. 30 Apr 71

Susan Smith

CHARLES B. WESTOVER
Second Vice President
Agency Operations

THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY
OF THE UNITED STATES

1285 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

31st Fl - 31E - (12 Noon / lunch

April 23, 1971

done 4-30-71

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Ins response to your letter of 13 April, I would be happy to visit with you when you come up this way next month.

I work here in New York City and can be contacted "during duty hours" at area code 212 telephone number 554-4457. Call me at your convenience and we'll work out a time and place to meet.

Sincerely,

C. B. Westover

Charles B. Westover

13 April 1971

Lt. General Charles B. Westover, USAF (Ret)
6 Lighthouse Way
Darien, Conn. 06820

Dear General Westover:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I should say also that I'm a professional historian presently assigned to General Grussendorf's office to complete this work.

Naturally, I've run across a great deal of material involving your father and General Arnold, and I wondered if you had any recollections or material that would throw light on my subject of interest. This is to be a "warts and all" biography, so I'm hopeful of getting any anecdotes or insights, so long as they could be documented or vouched for as true.

My reason for writing now is that I will be coming up your way in a couple of weeks. I recently interviewed General Charles Lindbergh in Washington, and he has given me access to his manuscript files in the Sterling Library at Yale. I plan to be in that neighborhood the first week in May.

If you feel we could chat for a half hour or so about your recollections of General Hap Arnold, I would be very pleased to adjust my schedule to stop in at an hour convenient for you. In that event, if you would send your phone number in the enclosure, I'll call you to confirm.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Retired 31 July 67

Biography

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES B. WESTOVER

Lieutenant General Charles Bainbridge Westover is Vice Commander of the U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command (ADC), Ent Air Force Base, Colo. ADC organizes, trains, equips and provides forces for defense of the North American continent against aerospace attack.

General Westover was born at Fort Gibbon, Tanana, Alaska, on July 10, 1915. He graduated from high school at Leavenworth, Kans., in 1932; the Military Academy in June 1937; and the Army Air Corps Flying Training School at Kelly Field, Tex., in October 1938.

His first assignment was with the 19th Bomb Group at March Field, Calif., and it was as a member of this unit that he took part in a pioneering mass flight of bombers to Hawaii from California in 1941. He was reassigned in June 1941 to Headquarters Air Force Combat Command, Bolling Field, Washington, D.C., and in August 1941 to the 3d Bomb Wing which soon became the 3d Bomb Command, MacDill Field, Fla. For the next three months, he participated in both the Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers as an Operations Officer of a provisional Army Air Support Command.

In March 1942, he became Aide to the Commanding General, First Air Force and Eastern Air Defense Command, Mitchel Field, N.Y. During the period June 1942 to December 1942, he served as executive officer of a special U.S. air mission in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Shortly after his return to the United States, he was transferred to the Second Air Force, Fort George Wright, Wash., and was subsequently assigned to command the 34th Bomb Group, Blythe Army Air Field, Calif.

In June 1943, he was responsible for organizing and moving the 396th Bombardment Group to Moses Lake, Wash., serving as its Commander until the following September when he was reassigned to the Eighth Air Force in England. There he served first as Chief of Staff of the Second Bomb Division and then as Commander of the 448th Bomb Group.

In July 1945, he returned to Washington, D.C., where he served for two years with the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and for one year with the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.

He graduated from the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., in June 1949, and was then assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC)

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(Current as of March 15, 1967)

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where he served as Chief of the Programs Division in the Directorate of Plans until September 1952. His next move took him to the Far East Air Forces as Commander of the 98th Bomb Wing, Yokota, Japan.

Upon his return to the United States in July 1953, he was named Commander of the 12th Air Division, March Air Force Base, Calif. He remained there until March 1956, when he was reassigned to Dyess Air Force Base, Tex., as Commander of the newly organized 819th Air Division.

General Westover served as Director of Plans at Headquarters SAC from October 1957 until January 1960, when he was named Commander of the 7th Air Division (SAC), in England.

Returning to the United States in August 1961, he was assigned as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, at Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He served in that position until August 1962 when he was transferred to Headquaters Tactical Air Command (TAC). He was named Vice Commander of TAC on Nov. 1, 1962.

General Westover assumed his present post of Vice Commander, ADC, in August 1965.

His decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal with four oak leaf clusters, Croix de Guerre with Palm (France) and the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. He is a command pilot and is credited with 300 combat flying hours on 42 combat missions.

General Westover is married to the former Alice Frink of Greensboro, N.C. They have three children; Charles B., Jr., Timothy O. and Susanna.

PERSONAL FACT SHEET

A. Personal Data

1. Born - July 10, 1915, Ft. Gibbon, Tanana, Alaska; both parents are deceased.

2. Married - June 21, 1937; wife - Alice M. Frink Westover; children - Charles B., Jr., Timothy O. and Susanna.

3. Hometown - Bay City, Mich.

B. Education

1. Graduate High School, Leavenworth, Kans., 1932.

2. Graduate U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1937.

3. Graduate Army Air Corps Flying Training School, Kelly Fld., Tex., 1938.

4. Graduate Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1949.

C. Service

1. June 1933 - June 1937 Cadet, U.S. Military Academy West Point, N.Y.

2. June 1937 - Oct 1938 Army Air Corps Flying Training School, Kelly Fld., Tex.

3. Nov 1938 - June 1941 Assigned to the 19th Bomb Gp., March Fld., Calif.

4. June 1941 - Aug 1941 Asst. A-2, Hq. Air Force Combat Command, Bolling Fld., Wash., D.C.

5. Aug 1941 - Feb 1942 Asst. A-3, 3d Bomb Wing; later Asst. A-3, 3d Bomb Command, MacDill Fld., Fla.

6. Mar 1942 - Mar 1943 Aide to the Commanding General & Asst. A-3, 1st Air Force, Mitchel Fld., N.Y.

7. Apr 1943 - May 1943 Commander, 34th Bomb Gp., Blythe AAF, Calif.

8. June 1943 - Sept 1943 Commander, 396th Bomb Gp., Moses Lake, Wash.

9. Sept 1943 - Nov 1944 Chief of Staff, 2nd Bomb Div., 8th Air Force, England.

10. Nov 1944 - June 1945 Commander, 448th Bomb Gp., 8th Air Force, England.

11. July 1945 - June 1946 Member, European Section, Theater Gp., Operations Div., War Dept. General Staff, Wash., D.C.

12. July 1946 - Dec 1946 Staff Officer, European Section, Operations Gp., War Dept. General Staff, Wash., D.C.

13. Jan 1947 - Nov 1947 Staff Officer, Politico-Military Survey Section, Plans & Policy Gp., War Dept. General Staff, Wash., D.C.

14. Dec 1947 - Aug 1948 Asst. Executive Officer to the Asst. Secretary of the Air Force, Wash., D.C.

15. Aug 1948 - June 1949 Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

16. June 1949 - Sept 1952 Chief, Policy Section; later Programs Div., Directorate of Plans, SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebr.

17. Oct 1952 - June 1953 Commander, 98th Bomb Wg., FEAF, Yokota, Japan.

18. July 1953 - Mar 1956 Commander, 12th Air Div., March AFB, Calif.

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19. Mar 1956 - Oct 1957 Commander, 819th Air Div., Dyess AFB, Tex.

20. Oct. 1957 - Dec 1959 Director of Plans, SAC., Offutt AFB, Nebr.

21. Jan 1960 - Aug 1961 Commander, 7th Air Div., England.

22. Aug 1961 - Aug 1962 Asst. Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Hq. U.S. Air Force, Wash., D.C.

23. Aug 1962 - Oct 1962 Special Asst. to Commander, TAC, Langley AFB, Va.

24. Nov 1962 - July 1965 Vice Commander, TAC, Langley AFB, Va.

25. Aug 1965 - Present Vice Commander, ADC, Ent AFB, Colo.

D. Decorations and Service Awards

Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
w/2 oak leaf clusters
Distinguished Flying Cross
w/1 oak leaf cluster
Bronze Star Medal
Air Medal
w/4 oak leaf clusters
Distinguished Unit Citation Ribbon
American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal
European-African-Middle Eastern
Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal
National Defense Service Medal
w/1 bronze star
Korean Service Medal
Air Force Longevity Service Award
Ribbon w/1 silver oak leaf cluster
Republic of Korea Presidential Unit
Citation Ribbon
Croix de Guerre w/Palm (France)
The Most Excellent Order of the British
Empire
United Nations Service Medal

E. Effective Dates of Promotions

Grade	Temporary	Permanent
2nd Lt		June 12, 1937
1st Lt		June 19, 1940
Capt	Oct 2, 1940	July 22, 1947
Maj	May 6, 1942	
Lt Col	Jan 1, 1943	July 2, 1948
Col	Oct 25, 1943	July 28, 1951
Brig Gen	Aug 25, 1953	Nov 20, 1958
Maj Gen	Mar 10, 1958	Mar 7, 1961
Lt Gen	July 31, 1962	
(Date of Rank)	July 31, 1962	

E N D

PART II - Personalized Material

A. Interests.

1. Hobbies: painting and drawing.

2. Sports: swimming, water skiing, sailing, golf, pistol marksmanship, riding.

3. Diversions: none.

4. Habits: none.

5. Unusual talents and skills: none.

6. Civic and religious activities: none.

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations.

1. Preferences as to food, clothing, housing, etc: American Cooking, informal clothing.

2. Tastes in reading, music, art, travel, climate, etc: Early Western stories, historical novels, political and military histories, modern music, modern art, air and auto travel, temperate climates.

3. Personal epigrams, mottoes, etc: none.

4. Points or qualities emphasized, etc: General Westover places constant emphasis on conscientious effort at all times.

5. Hardships or difficulties overcome, etc: none.

6. Evaluations: none.

1-12-76

Dear Doctor Green

My mother's name was

Adelaide Bainbridge Westover

Sincerely C. B. Westover

Charles B. Westover
6 Lighthouse Way
Darien, Conn. 06820

23014

7 January 1976

LieutGeneral Charles B. Westover, USAF (Ret)
6 Lighthouse Way
Darien, Conn 06820

Dear General Westover:

You may recall our good interview a few years back in connection with my Biography of General Hap Arnold.

By way of a progress report, I'm about through researching and am 20 chapters into an estimated 35 chapter work, so there is about another year of writing to go.

My request: The first name of your mother. I need it in a dialogue sequence recalled by Mrs. Arnold when Hap first came to Washington to take on the job as Assistant Chief of Air Corps.

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

A50 833
Office of the Commanding General
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
HEADQUARTERS

Interview - LTGEN C. B. Westover, NY City, NY, April 30, 1971

Q: General, do you have any recollections of Gen Westover's relations with Arnold? Did you ever see them together?

W: Yes, but most of the occasions, an occasional visit to the office. Occasionally, they let me see the two of them. That didn't really count for anything. The occasions when I did see them together was socially. On a social basis, of course, there was no idea, no opportunity there, you might say, to form any opinions as to how they might have reacted to things on a policy level, whether they were together or opposed, or what.

Q: Mrs. Arnold told me, on this subject of social relationship, that Gen Westover was not much for, he just didn't like the Washington cocktail circuit.

W: Right, there was just too much of it. He attended everything he had to attend, I'm sure, from a protocol point of view. But from the point of view of having to go and imbibe cocktails day after day and go to work, he just wasn't for that.

Q: She mentioned that when Arnold came into Washington as Asst Chief - this was like Jan 1936 - Gen Westover told him: "I'm expecting you to stand in for me in a lot of this cocktail circuit."

W: I'm not a bit surprised.

Q: Arnold, being the junior man, said: "Yes, sir." Did you have any knowledge of the big bomber problem at the time, say 1935, 1936 and 1937, when they were trying to get some B-17s. Westover and Arnold were not as active or aggressive in trying to get those B-17s as people like Knerr and Andrews. Andrews was then GHQ. He was at Langley, and he was pushing very hard for these B-17s. Of course, Westover and Arnold were in the so-called Establishment, and had to ply ball with Woodring and Louis Johnson, etc. Did you have any recollection of that?

W: I do have a little recollection there, strictly on the personal side again During those years I was in the Academy, West Point. Of course, I visited home on leave from the Academy. My father visited me up at the Academy.

We did discuss airpower, air force, the Air Corps, because my leanings were toward the Air Corps. Of course, he was very anxious that I do lean that way. I should put it this way, I was interested in it, it was something that would make him happy to begin with. Now, we discussed frequently, the merits of fighters vs. bombers, and that sort of thing. I would say, we discussed it in the sense that he was telling me, you might say, what are these components, and what are their futures. I can say this, without a doubt, that he felt the future was the bomber. As early as I can remember of my days at the Academy. Prior to that time, there was no discussion. We are talking about 1934--35.

Q: There was a fellow named General Spaulding, who was the Army Supply - G-4. He was no advocate of airpower. He was trying to sit on the Air Corps, which was then trying to expand. We are talking about the period, immediately following the Baker Board, the establishment of the GHQ AF. They were trying to expand, trying to get some B-17s, and the Army General Staff was sitting on the Air Corps, trying to keep it contained. Westover was in this dichotymous position of running the AF and yet trying to keep in good with his superiors. Did he ever tell you about his problem in that respect?

W: Not in any detail. I was aware of the problem, certainly was aware of it. Now, let me say here, again, the way you put it, perhaps you mean it differently than I think, when you say "Try and stay in good with his superiors." There was an organizational setup that you either believed in or you didn't believe in. And my Dad just happened to have been brought up to believe in the chain of command, and you present your cases, you take your decisions, and from the time the decision is made you support it wholeheartedly as though it were your own. That's the kind of man my father was. There were several times during the course of his tenure as Chief, when his problems with the Secy of War for Air were such that he was on the verge of getting out.

Q: This was probably Louis Johnson?

W: Yes.

Q: He was the Asst Secy.

W: Yes, and my Dad was on the verge of getting out rather than continuing to do some of the things he was directed. Now, I don't want to mislead you,

either. At the same time there, he had his own ideas also about the other part of the organizational problem which you haven't brought up, yet, but I'm sure you will soon. So let me hit it here, and that is the separate Air Corps, the separate Air Force. His views on that were, perhaps, quite conservative at that time. There was, no time, that is, in our informal discussions - the few times that we would get into these discussions, he thought it was no time for them to be bouncing off on their own. I think as we got closer and closer to war, he felt more and more strongly in that regard. I can remember going with him to the movie. I can't remember the title of the movie, but I can remember the newsreels that were shown at the time, of the German troops marching through....

Q: Poland or France?

W: I guess it was at the time, and walking home after that, and just talking lightly about the problem of being out there. It was no time to be breaking off, too much to support, too much to be done to support a separate outfit, to pull away from an organization that knows how to get these things done.

Q: Did he ever rationalize? Arnold rationalized in this respect?

W: You see, I don't know much about Arnold in that regard. The times that I was in contact with both of them were almost purely a social basis, and very infrequently, either they were over at our hourse for some function, or the folks were over at their house, and I happened to be home from the Academy on leave, or something, and would be taken along with them - purely a social type of thing.

Q: Actually, during the crucial point in their relationship between '36 and '38 you were not present, or seldom present?

W: Seldom present, I guess, is a good point.

Q: On this subject of "no separate AF", Arnold, of course, was a zealot during the Billy Mitchell era, then he was exiled and came back, and he moderated his views. During the 1930's when he was working for Gen Westover, he had moderated his views. He testified in 1935 in favor of a separate AF some day, but not now. So he had already made this change in his own position.

Did Gen Westover believe in a separate AF, "but now is not the time?"

W: Well, that's kind of a tough one to, for me to say, but I'm thinking back now on papers and speeches and things that I am aware of that he did make in that era. You probably already have access to all of them because they are in AF files. But I can acknowledge his position in there. It was strictly a thing of the future, but certainly not now.

Q: It wasn't a realistic idea?

W: At that time it was not realistic. As to GHQ AF, I know that from a personal point of view. I think it wouldn't hurt to say that he was perhaps disappointed that he never had a crack at command. But, nevertheless, he was a great believer in it. I have no idea what his official papers say on it. I don't think I've ever seen any official papers.

Q: I have not seen too many of his official papers. I concentrated on the Arnold era. But in what I have read, I have a feeling that some of the oldtime Air people - like Andrews and Arnold, and perhaps others, took a patronizing attitude towards Westover, because they thought he was like a johnny-come-lately into the Air. Did he have this feeling that they felt this way?

W: If he did, he never let on to us at home. Now, I do know this, that they were all about the same era at West Point. Frank Andrews and he were close, personal friends.

Q: I think he preceded Frank Andrews by a year or two. Andrews was '06.

W: And so was Dad, classmates. Arnold was '07. But Dad and Frank Andrews were very close personal friends, and I don't think they were ever anything else but. Even when they were put in these positions of Arnold having to keep pressure on the Chief, for the things he needed for his force, and the Chief, of course, having to split the dollar for training and supplies.....

Q: You mean Andrews?

W: Yes, didn't I say Andrews? So, those, I'm sure they certainly had their differences of opinion about how much money and how many planes and what should be afforded when, budgetwise, and all that. But their friendship never flagged one bit, that I know of. You might think it strange that I can

remember that so clearly, but I can't remember that much of a close relationship with Arnold. I think all it does is perhaps reinforce what you have already said, that there was more of an aloofness, perhaps, I shouldn't say "aloofness," but....

Q: But it was not the intimacy that existed among some of the other oldtime air people.

W: Lack of intimacy.

Q: Gen Westover, I guess, flew heavier-than-air around '23.

W: Yes, he went through in '22 and graduated in '23.

Q: He was supposed to lead the Alaskan flight. Was it a disappointment to him?

W: It was his greatest disappointment.

Q: The Alaskan flight, why?

W: Well, he expected to lead it. It was a disappointment that he didn't get to lead it. He expected to, he certainly hoped to, and wanted to, and he volunteered to.

Q: He was the logical man to lead it. Why didn't he? Do you know?

W: I have no idea what happened on that. The Chief of Staff was General MacArthur at the time, I can't even remember.

Q: [redacted] MacArthur was Chief then. Malin Craig came in a year later. This was '34, MacArthur was still Chief.

W: Dad had led a couple of big maneuvers on those things. He felt in pretty good shape to give a crack at this. He was also an old Alaskan man. He had served up there, a great supporter of our retaining Alaska and developing it, as a key to a strategic military area.

Q: Let me tell you why I think he didn't lead it. (Off-tape statement that Air Corps needed a successful mission after Air Mail disaster. Arnold had more experience). Do you think that analysis has merit?

W: Could be. I would say that it is probably as good as any if you don't know facts.

Q: Right. This brings me to a small role that Gen Westover had in this. Nobody got an award for this flight, and Arnold came in and talked to General

Charles Kilbourne who was then the Asst Chief of Staff for Plans, and to Gen Hugh Drum, who was Deputy Chief of Staff. Arnold complained about the flyers not getting a DFC. Well, six months later, Gen Westover wrote to Mrs. Arnold, and I don't know why he wrote to Mrs. Arnold. He must have gone out and talked to her about it. But he wrote to her and said that he had just learned - he was about to become the Chief of the Air Corps. This was, like in early '35. He said he just learned that Henry and the flyers did not receive an award, and he thought this is wrong. He thought they ought to get an award. Due to your father's intervention, Arnold two years later, in 1937, received the DFC, but he was the only one to have received recognition. Westover is the man who got that recognition for him. Did you ever hear any talk about this?

W: Never heard a word about it. It's the kind of thing my Dad would do. Now, the award, I'm a little hazy in my own memory, right here and now, was the GHQ in being at this time?

Q: Yes.

W: See, that would have been the channel for the award, and it would have been through Frank Andrews to MacArthur, I guess, if he was Chief then, on that particular selection.

Q: They didn't operate, you see, the flight was authorized directly from Washington. It didn't come through GHQ, so it was not under command of Andrews.

W: All right, the point still is, the point that you just made, makes it a little more understandable, perhaps, who is going to do it. Probably nobody did, and maybe even thinking it was already taken care of. I can't imagine any other reason for not pushing it fairly quickly. Because those events were so few and far between in those days. Somebody would have thought someone was working on it, I'm sure.

Q: Another point I wanted to ask about, and that was Gen Westover's appointment as Asst Chief in 1931. This was after the Billy Mitchell business. The War Dept General Staff wanted to root out of there all those who were associated with Mitchell. Arnold was in exile, and Herbert Dargue, who was

another participant, was sent off some place. Foulois got the job as Chief. They brought in Westover, who had no connection with the Billy Mitchell school. Apparently, they plumbed his views and found he was not in favor of a separate AF which may have been a reason that he was given the Asst Chief's job. They wanted to get this Billy Mitchell business out of Washington. This is my analysis of that period.

W: It's interesting to hear. I can't help you on that, I know that his selection as Asst Chief was an absolute, complete, surprise, to him and all the rest of us, at the time. It couldn't have been a greater surprise. So I guess I suppose that there could have been some discussions but I think it would have been highly unlikely, he was instructor at the school, Command and General Staff School, a senior air instructor there. He was, as I remember it, fairly well known there for the positions he had taken, and for the strategies he taught in the school.

Q: I would guess that the War Dept General Staff said: "Who is senior enough but untainted by Billy Mitchell poison?"

W: Yes, could well be.

Q: Perhaps he was selected on that basis. I've seen correspondence between Arnold and Donald Douglas. Donald Douglas wrote Arnold and said: "Who is Westover"? He had never heard of Westover.

W: Yes.

Q: And Arnold and Douglas, of course, were very close friends. Their children married. Douglas was an aviation back in the first war. Of course, he was unfamiliar with Westover's record, and he was interested in selling airplanes. When Westover received the appointment, he asked: "Who was Westover?" Did you ever get any static, did your dad ever mention anything along this line, that some of the oldtime air people were not familiar with him, or that he didn't know some of the oldtime flyers? Was this a handicap to him?

W: No, I don't think so. I don't think it was as much a handicap as one might believe. I'll have to qualify that. I will in a minute. But, I think what I'm trying to say, is I don't think it was a case of them not knowing him.

or knowing of him, or knowing their records and their views, that sort of thing. I think he was fairly well familiar with that. Because you remember he was not a newcomer to aviation. He only took heavier-than-air training in '22, after having been denied the opportunity since about 1917. He had been associated with aviation in one way or another since about 1916 or 1917, I guess. He was involved with the Spruce Production Corporation, getting all the spruce together to build the airplanes with. He was shipped to France. His work with that organization, as well as his work with the Port of Embarkation here, all of that was still in connection with the Air Service. He was an Infantry officer, basically, but at this stage of the game, it was all Air Service support work that he was involved in. From there, of course, going into Washington in the Office of the Chief at that time, General Menoher, immediately after WWI. All of these oldtimers, beating on the doors, all the time. I don't think that you can say that he didn't know them, didn't know their positions, didn't know their attitudes, and so forth. He perhaps knew them better than they knew him.

W: Of course, I would like to say that Arnold commanded March Field. My dad commanded Langley for 5 years, longer, perhaps than Arnold commanded March Field. He had amassed a lot of flying hours in operational experience at that time in all of the types of aircraft that we had, including the bombers that were available at that point. You had the Air Corps Tactical School under him. No question about it, he was not considered one of these guys that started out in the box kite days in 1911. No question about it. It certainly led the others, to perhaps, have the attitude that you spoke of earlier.

Q: If memory serves me correctly, I've been through the Foulois papers. Foulois was not consulted in Westover's appointment as Asst Chief. You think this was a logical part of the selection process, to ask the Chief about the man who would be No. 2. But I think, if my memory serves me, I'd really have to go back on this, but I think he was not consulted.

W: Isn't that the way it still goes on.

Q: Yes, yes. I started asking about Billy Mitchell. Did your dad ever

talk about Billy Mitchell, the trial?

W: Now you are really taking me way back to early boyhood days. But I do have one recollection of it only, and it is strange that I do. I can recall driving from Fort Monroe, Va., back to Langley Field, where we lived, where Dad was in command at that time. I guess the news had just broken about the court martial. And I can remember him merely commenting on the fact: "Well, I guess they are going to do it after all." In effect, that they were going to have a court martial. That's about all there was. He never discussed it one way or another. I gave him no reason to. I was what, nine or ten years old at the time. The only reason I can recall it, I guess, is because I was able to read at that age. Things were beginning to hit the papers, and I do recall that.

Q: I want to take you to his fatal accident, in September 1938. He was doing a lot of flying. He tried very hard to keep up with all developments. He went and flew around the country in a lot of bad weather. He took chances.

W: He flew in all sorts of weather. I flew with him as a cadet, in weather that scared me to death. On vacation....

Q: Sgt. Hymes was with him.

W: He flew every one of those air mail routes in all sorts of weather at the instigation of that air mail, personally.

Q: You know, K.B. Wolfe told me he saw the plane crash. He was at the airport at Burbank.

W: He and Lahm, I guess.

Q: He called Arnold up and told him the terrible news. This was a very sad occasion.

W: Yes, I remember, I got a call, I was at my roommate's wedding, wedding reception at San Antonio. The wedding had just concluded, at Fort Sam Houston.

Q: Had you graduated then?

W: Graduated from the Academy yes. I was within a week of graduating from Flying School. Dad was going to make the graduation address at the Flying School

at Kelly. But that particular afternoon was the wedding and wedding reception of my roommate at the Academy who was stationed at Ft. Sam, and we were over there. Word came to me that Dad had been in a flight accident and was in the hospital, etc. It wasn't until after the reception was over, that anybody told me it was not just a little accident, a quite serious one. It wasn't, I guess, until a couple of hours later that I really realized what the situation was.

Q: (Delay in Arnold's appointment)

W: Something I read recently, in a book which was just recently put out.

Q: Allan Andrews' book, The Air Marshals. He mentions something in there about Arnold being a drinker.

W: It may have been that book and he gives the same story you just gave. He indicates that Arnold had been on the wagon for four or five years apparently before and goes on to say that once Roosevelt finally did give the okay, and he had him over in the White House, I guess, and offered him a drink. At that point, Arnold said I haven't touched a drop in five years or soeething to that effect. That's the kind of story in this book. This is a funny thing tor me to be saying at this stage of the game, but I think I know Dad well enough to know what he wouldn't tolerate drinkers. If Arnold had been a drinker, I think the two of them would have had words about it. When I say a drinker, I'm not talking about somebody who has a cocktail or so. My dad had that, and enjoyed that as much as anyone else. You know what I mean. If you've got a guy whose an alcoholic or can't hold it.

Q: I think based on what I know of your Dad, he would not have tolerated a second-in-command who couldn't handle it.

W: My belief is this story that I told you is probably 1000% right. Arnold may well have not had a drop in 4 years. But he pretended he did, ginger ale, or whatever, on the cocktail circuit in Washington. I would say that anyone who tried to have a cocktail with everyone else on that circuit in Washington in those days, and probably today, is....

Q: In danger of being an alcoholic?

W: He's headed for trouble.

Q: Did you have any contacts with the Arnold family, the Arnold boys?

W: No, we were never stationed together. And they were a little bit younger than we were, as I recall. Not much, but in those days a difference of two or three years growing up meant quite a bit, yes. Young Andrews, Allan Andrews, I knew real well. I knew Josie Andrews well.

Q: During your father's stewardship, an incident occurred in May 1938, when three B-17s flew out 700 miles to sea, and photographed the REX. This caused a big flap, essentially with the Navy. They felt that the Air Corps had intruded upon its mission. As a result of this flight, unofficially, a 100-mile limit on planes flying out to sea was supposed to have been imposed on the Air Corps. Several people, including Eaker, told me that this was so but it never got written down. Did your father ever say anything about that? Or do you have any knowledge of that particular incident?

W: No, I honestly don't. The only knowledge I have in that respect is when I went to March AFB for station in Oct 1938, I'd never seen anything in writing out there either. But I know that in all our briefings, we were limited as to how far we could fly out to sea.

Q: Oh, you were? And this was ostensibly for safety purposes, or for safety sake?

W: It may have ostensible been for safety's sake, but I don't think there was any doubt in our minds. We as 2nd LTS then, knew that it had something to do with, if I can put it that way, interservice interests.

Q: You know, Arnold kept diaries of almost every trip. Arnold wrote in his own hand, at night, long commentaries. I have many of them. Arnold, as I say, was historically minded. Of course, he was interested in preserving his own position. Forrestal was like this too.

W: My Dad had to carry notebooks with him on his trips and at night wrote down, little pocket notebooks, wrote down the gist of the things he wanted to cover, and the speeches he had to make, the various places, you know, a few notes.

Q: Was he a good speaker, your dad?

W: I thought he was.

Q: Did he enjoy speaking at functions?

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Q: Does the same apply to Harry Woodring?

W: Yes.

Q: And how about Malin Craig? Remember his relationship with your father?

W: I think I just gave you a "yes" when I should have given you a "no", because I wasn't quite sure. The feeling that there was a problem. I can put it this way, of a deep sense of frustration in getting anything done with Woodring, as I did have that feeling in the relationship with Johnson. I don't have that feeling regarding General Malin Craig at all.

Q: They had a good relationship, as far as you recall?

W: As far as I know, it was.

Q: Well, they were both organization men, and they played the game, so I don't see any personality conflict.

W: I don't think there were. At least, I'd have to qualify that, at least insofar as our family relations were concerned, there were no indications of that at all. There was every indication of it with Johnson.

NOTE: OFF THE RECORD: General Westover did not want this on the record and it had to do with the fact that his mother was totally ignored in the Washington community, after General Westover passed on in Sept 1938. This may reinforce the idea which I suggested and which his son accepted: that Westover was a johnny-come-lately to the heavier-than-air business and was not regarded as part of the inner sanctum among the early flyers, and that included Arnold, Foulois, and Andrews. Gen Charles Westover cited a specific instance of his assignment to March Field in 1938-39, as 2d Lieut when Gen Arnold passed through. Gen Arnold was then Chief of the Air Corps. Gen Arnold asked LT or perhaps Capt Westover how his mother was getting on. Young Westover thought this was a strange comment coming from Arnold because Westover was in March Field, and Arnold was in Washington, not too many blocks away from where his mother lived. I told him that Gen Arnold died with a very small cash estate and Mrs. Arnold had to go out and work for a living. He said he had never contacted Mrs. Arnold for the reason that the Arnolds had not gone out of their way to look after his mother. When I told him this, it made him feel kind of bad and a bit guilty. Gen Charles Westover said this without any rancor, because he said that his father's relationship with Hap Arnold was a very good one when they both were in Washington. He said he also realized that Arnold was very busy with the expansion of the Air Corps in the immediate prewar period, and that socializing went out with the onset of the war emergency.

Interview - LTGEN C. B. Westover, NY City, NY, April 30, 1971

Q: General, do you have any recollections of Gen Westover's relations with Arnold? Did you ever see them together?

W: Yes, but most of the occasions, an occasional visit to the office. Occasionally, they let me see the two of them. That didn't really count for anything. The occasions when I did see them together was socially. On a social basis, of course, there was no idea, no opportunity there, you might say, to form any opinions as to how they might have reacted to things on a policy level, whether they were together or opposed, or what.

Q: Mrs. Arnold told me, on this subject of social relationship, that Gen Westover was not much for, he just didn't like the Washington cocktail circuit.

W: Right, there was just too much of it. He attended everything he had to attend, I'm sure, from a protocol point of view. But from the point of view of having to go and imbibe cocktails day after day and go to work, he just wasn't for that.

Q: She mentioned that when Arnold came into Washington as Asst Chief,- this was like Jan 1936 - Gen Westover told him: "I'm expecting you to stand in for me in a lot of this cocktail circuit."

W: I'm not a bit surprised.

Q: Arnold, being the junior man, said: "Yes, sir." Did you have any knowledge of the big bomber problem at the time, say 1935, 1936 and 1937, when they were trying to get some B-17s. Westover and Arnold were not as active or aggressive in trying to get those B-17s as people like Knerr and Andrews. Andrews was then GHQ. He was at Langley, and he was pushing very hard for these B-17s. Of course, Westover and Arnold were in the so-called Establishment, and had to ply ball with Woodring and Louis Johnson, etc. Did you have any recollection of that?

W: I do have a little recollection there, strictly on the personal side again During those years I was in the Academy, West Point. Of course, I visited home on leave from the Academy. My father visited me up at the Academy.

We did discuss airpower, air force, the Air Corps, because my leanings were toward the Air Corps. Of course, he was very anxious that I do lean that way. I should put it this way, I was interested in it, it was something that would make him happy to begin with. Now, we discussed frequently, the merits of fighters vs. bombers, and that sort of thing. I would say, we discussed it in the sense that he was telling me, you might say, what are these components, and what are their futures. I can say this, without a doubt, that he felt the future was the bomber. As early as I can remember of my days at the Academy. Prior to that time, there was no discussion. We are talking about 1934--35.

Q: There was a fellow named General Spaulding, who was the Army Supply - G-4. He was no advocate of airpower. He was trying to sit on the Air Corps, which was then trying to expand. We are talking about the period, immediately following the Baker Board, the establishment of the GHQ AF. They were trying to expand, trying to get some B-17s, and the Army General Staff was sitting on the Air Corps, trying to keep it contained. Westover was in this dichotymous position of running the AF and yet trying to keep in good with his superiors. Did he ever tell you about his problem in that respect?

W: Not in any detail. I was aware of the problem, certainly was aware of it. Now, let me say here, again, the way you put it, perhaps you mean it differently than I think, when you say "Try and stay in good with his superiors." There was an organizational setup that you either believed in or you didn't believe in. And my Dad just happened to have been brought up to believe in the chain of command, and you present your cases, you take your decisions, and from the time the decision is made you support it wholeheartedly as though it were your own. That's the kind of man my father was. There were several times during the course of his tenure as Chief, when his problems with the Secy of War for Air were such that he was on the verge of getting out.

Q: This was probably Louis Johnson?

W: Yes.

Q: He was the Asst Secy.

W: Yes, and my Dad was on the verge of getting out rather than continuing to do some of the things he was directed. Now, I don't want to mislead you,

either. At the same time there, he had his own ideas also about the other part of the organizational problem which you haven't brought up, yet, but I'm sure you will soon. So let me hit it here, and that is the separate Air Corps, the separate Air Force. His views on that were, perhaps, quite conservative at that time. There was, no time, that is, in our informal discussions - the few times that we would get into these discussions, he thought it was no time for them to be bouncing off on their own. I think as we got closer and closer to war, he felt more and more strongly in that regard. I can remember going with him to the movie. I can't remember the title of the movie, but I can remember the newsreels that were shown at the time, of the German troops marching through....

Q: Poland or France?

W: I guess it was at the time, and walking home after that, and just talking lightly about the problem of being out there. It was no time to be breaking off, too much to support, too much to be done to support a separate outfit, to pull away from an organization that knows how to get these things done.

Q: Did he ever rationalize? Arnold rationalized in this respect?

W: You see, I don't know much about Arnold in that regard. The times that I was in contact with both of them were almost purely a social basis, and very infrequently, either they were over at our hourse for some function, or the folks were over at their house, and I happened to be home from the Academy on leave, or something, and would be taken along with them - purely a social type of thing.

Q: Actually, during the crucial point in their relationship between '36 and '38 you were not present, or seldom present?

W: Seldom present, I guess, is a good point.

Q: On this subject of "no separate AF", Arnold, of course, was a zealot during the Billy Mitchell era, then he was exiled and came back, and he moderated his views. During the 1930's when he was working for Gen Westover, he had moderated his views. He testified in 1935 in favor of a separate AF some day, but not now. So he had already made this change in his own position.

Did Gen Westover believe in a separate AF, "but now is not the time?"

W: Well, that's kind of a tough one to, for me to say, but I'm thinking back now on papers and speeches and things that I am aware of that he did make in that era. You probably already have access to all of them because they are in AF files. But I can acknowledge his position in there. It was strictly a thing of the future, but certainly not now.

Q: It wasn't a realistic idea?

W: At that time it was not realistic. As to GHQ AF, I know that from a personal point of view. I think it wouldn't hurt to say that he was perhaps disappointed that he never had a crack at command. But, nevertheless, he was a great believer in it. I have no idea what his official papers say on it. I don't think I've ever seen any official papers.

Q: I have not seen too many of his official papers. I concentrated on the Arnold era. But in what I have read, I have a feeling that some of the oldtime Air people - like Andrews and Arnold, and perhaps others, took a patronizing attitude towards Westover, because they thought he was like a johnny-come-lately into the Air. Did he have this feeling that they felt this way?

W: If he did, he never let on to us at home. Now, I do know this, that they were all about the same era at West Point. Frank Andrews and he were close, personal friends.

Q: I think he preceded Frank Andrews by a year or two. Andrews was '06.

W: And so was Dad, classmates. Arnold was '07. But Dad and Frank Andrews were very close personal friends, and I don't think they were ever anything else but. Even when they were put in these positions of Arnold having to keep pressure on the Chief, for the things he needed for his force, and the Chief, of course, having to split the dollar for training and supplies.....

Q: You mean Andrews?

W: Yes, didn't I say Andrews? So, those, I'm sure they certainly had their differences of opinion about how much money and how many planes and what should be afforded when, budgetwise, and all that. But their friendship never flagged one bit, that I know of. You might think it strange that I can

remember that so clearly, but I can't remember that much of a close relationship with Arnold. I think all it does is perhaps reinforce what you have already said, that there was more of an aloofness, perhaps, I shouldn't say "aloofness," but....

Q: But it was not the intimacy that existed among some of the other oldtime air people.

W: Lack of intimacy.

Q: Gen Westover, I guess, flew heavier-than-air around '23.

W: Yes, he went through in '22 and graduated in '23.

Q: He was supposed to lead the Alaskan flight. Was it a disappointment to him?

W: It was his greatest disappointment.

Q: The Alaskan flight, why?

W: Well, he expected to lead it. It was a disappointment that he didn't get to lead it. He expected to, he certainly hoped to, and wanted to, and he volunteered to.

Q: He was the logical man to lead it. Why didn't he? Do you know?

W: I have no idea what happened on that. The Chief of Staff was General MacArthur at the time, I can't even remember.

Q: [redacted] MacArthur was Chief then. Malin Craig came in a year later. This was '34, MacArthur was still Chief.

W: Dad had led a couple of big maneuvers on those things. He felt in pretty good shape to give a crack at this. He was also an old Alaskan man. He had served up there, a great supporter of our retaining Alaska and developing it, as a key to a strategic military area.

Q: Let me tell you why I think he didn't lead it. (Off-tape statement that Air Corps needed a successful mission after Air Mail disaster. Arnold had more experience). Do you think that analysis has merit?

W: Could be. I would say that it is probably as good as any if you don't know facts.

Q: Right. This brings me to a small role that Gen Westover had in this. Nobody got an award for this flight, and Arnold came in and talked to General

Charles Kilbourne who was then the Asst Chief of Staff for Plans, and to Gen Hugh Drum, who was Deputy Chief of Staff. Arnold complained about the flyers not getting a DFC. Well, six months later, Gen Westover wrote to Mrs. Arnold, and I don't know why he wrote to Mrs. Arnold. He must have gone out and talked to her about it. But he wrote to her and said that he had just learned - he was about to become the Chief of the Air Corps. This was, like in early '35. He said he just learned that Henry and the flyers did not receive an award, and he thought this is wrong. He thought they ought to get an award. Due to your father's intervention, Arnold two years later, in 1937, received the DFC, but he was the only one to have received recognition. Westover is the man who got that recognition for him. Did you ever hear any talk about this?

W: Never heard a word about it. It's the kind of thing my Dad would do. Now, the award, I'm a little hazy in my own memory, right here and now, was the GHQ in being at this time?

Q: Yes.

W: See, that would have been the channel for the award, and it would have been through Frank Andrews to MacArthur, I guess, if he was Chief then, on that particular selection.

Q: They didn't operate, you see, the flight was authorized directly from Washington. It didn't come through GHQ, so it was not under command of Andrews.

W: All right, the point still is, the point that you just made, makes it a little more understandable, perhaps, who is going to do it. Probably nobody did, and maybe even thinking it was already taken care of. I can't imagine any other reason for not pushing it fairly quickly. Because those events were so few and far between in those days. Somebody would have thought someone was working on it, I'm sure.

Q: Another point I wanted to ask about, and that was Gen Westover's appointment as Asst Chief in 1931. This was after the Billy Mitchell business. The War Dept General Staff wanted to root out of there all those who were associated with Mitchell. Arnold was in exile, and Herbert Dargue, who was

another participant, was sent off some place. Foulois got the job as Chief. They brought in Westover, who had no connection with the Billy Mitchell school. Apparently, they plumbed his views and found he was not in favor of a separate AF which may have been a reason that he was given the Asst Chief's job. They wanted to get this Billy Mitchell business out of Washington. This is my analysis of that period.

W: It's interesting to hear. I can't help you on that, I know that his selection as Asst Chief was an absolute, complete, surprise, to him and all the rest of us, at the time. It couldn't have been a greater surprise. So I guess I suppose that there could have been some discussions but I think it would have been highly unlikely, he was instructor at the school, Command and General Staff School, a senior air instructor there. He was, as I remember it, fairly well known there for the positions he had taken, and for the strategies he taught in the school.

Q: I would guess that the War Dept General Staff said: "Who is senior enough but untainted by Billy Mitchell poison?"

W: Yes, could well be.

Q: Perhaps he was selected on that basis. I've seen correspondence between Arnold and Donald Douglas. Donald Douglas wrote Arnold and said: " "Who is Westover"? He had never heard of Westover.

W: Yes.

Q: And Arnold and Douglas, of course, were very close friends. Their children married. Douglas was an aviation back in the first war. Of course, he was unfamiliar with Westover's record, and he was interested in selling airplanes. When Westover received the appointment, he asked: "Who was Westover?" Did you ever get any static, did your dad ever mention anything along this line, that some of the oldtime air people were not familiar with him, or that he didn't know some of the oldtime flyers? Was this a handicap to him?

W: No, I don't think so. I don't think it was as much a handicap as one might believe. I'll have to qualify that. I will in a minute. But, I think what I'm trying to say, is I don't think it was a case of them not knowing him

or knowing of him, or knowing their records and their views, that sort of thing. I think he was fairly well familiar with that. Because you remember he was not a newcomer to aviation. He only took heavier-than-air training in '22, after having been denied the opportunity since about 1917. He had been associated with aviation in one way or another since about 1916 or 1917, I guess. He was involved with the Spruce Production Corporation, getting all the spruce together to build the airplanes with. He was shipped to France. His work with that organization, as well as his work with the Port of Embarkation here, all of that was still in connection with the Air Service. He was an Infantry officer, basically, but at this stage of the game, it was all Air Service support work that he was involved in. From there, of course, going into Washington in the Office of the Chief at that time, General Menoher, immediately after WWI. All of these oldtimers, beating on the doors, all the time. I don't think that you can say that he didn't know them, didn't know their positions, didn't know their attitudes, and so forth. He perhaps knew them better than they knew him.

W: Of course, I would like to say that Arnold commanded March Field. My dad commanded Langley for 5 years, longer, perhaps than Arnold commanded March Field. He had amassed a lot of flying hours in operational experience at that time in all of the types of aircraft that we had, including the bombers that were available at that point. You had the Air Corps Tactical School under him. No question about it, he was not considered one of these guys that started out in the box kite days in 1911. No question about it. It certainly led the others, to perhaps, have the attitude that you spoke of earlier.

Q: If memory serves me correctly, I've been through the Foulois papers. Foulois was not consulted in Westover's appointment as Asst Chief. You think this was a logical part of the selection process, to ask the Chief about the man who would be No. 2. But I think, if my memory serves me, I'd really have to go back on this, but I think he was not consulted.

W: Isn't that the way it still goes on.

Q: Yes, yes. I started asking about Billy Mitchell. Did your dad ever

talk about Billy Mitchell, the trial?

W: Now you are really taking me way back to early boyhood days. But I do have one recollection of it only, and it is strange that I do. I can recall driving from Fort Monroe, Va., back to Langley Field, where we lived, where Dad was in command at that time. I guess the news had just broken about the court martial. And I can remember him merely commenting on the fact: "Well, I guess they are going to do it after all." In effect, that they were going to have a court martial. That's about all there was. He never discussed it one way or another. I gave him no reason to. I was what, nine or ten years old at the time. The only reason I can recall it, I guess, is because I was able to read at that age. Things were beginning to hit the papers, and I do recall that.

Q: I want to take you to his fatal accident, in September 1938. He was doing a lot of flying. He tried very hard to keep up with all developments. He went and flew around the country in a lot of bad weather. He took chances.

W: He flew in all sorts of weather. I flew with him as a cadet, in weather that scared me to death. On vacation....

Q: Sgt. Hymes was with him.

W: He flew every one of those air mail routes in all sorts of weather at the instigation of that air mail, personally.

Q: You know, K.B. Wolfe told me he saw the plane crash. He was at the airport at Burbank.

W: He and Lahm, I guess.

Q: He called Arnold up and told him the terrible news. This was a very sad occasion.

W: Yes, I remember, I got a call, I was at my roommate's wedding, wedding reception at San Antonio. The wedding had just concluded, at Fort Sam Houston.

Q: Had you graduated then?

W: Graduated from the Academy yes. I was within a week of graduating from Flying School. Dad was going to make the graduation address at the Flying School

at Kelly. But that particular afternoon was the wedding and wedding reception of my roommate at the Academy who was stationed at Ft. Sam, and we were over there. Word came to me that Dad had been in a flight accident and was in the hospital, etc. It wasn't until after the reception was over, that anybody told me it was not just a little accident, a quite serious one. It wasn't, I guess, until a couple of hours later that I really realized what the situation was.

Q: (Delay in Arnold's appointment)

W: Something I read recently, in a book which was just recently put out.

Q: Allan Andrews' book, The Air Marshals. He mentions something in there about Arnold being a drinker.

W: It may have been that book and he gives the same story you just gave. He indicates that Arnold had been on the wagon for four or five years apparently before and goes on to say that once Roosevelt finally did give the okay, and he had him over in the White House, I guess, and offered him a drink. At that point, Arnold said I haven't touched a drop in five years or soeething to that effect. That's the kind of story in this book. This is a funny thing tor me to be saying at this stage of the game, but I think I know Dad well enough to know what he wouldn't tolerate drinkers. If Arnold had been a drinker, I think the two of them would have had words about it. When I say a drinker, I'm not talking about somebody who has a cocktail or so. My dad had that, and enjoyed that as much as anyone else. You know what I mean. If you've got a guy whose an alcoholic or can't hold it.

Q: I think based on what I know of your Dad, he would not have tolerated a second-in-command who couldn't handle it.

W: My belief is this story that I told you is probably 1000% right. Arnold may well have not had a drop in 4 years. But he pretended he did, ginger ale, or whatever, on the cocktail circuit in Washington. I would say that anyone who tried to have a cocktail with everyone else on that circuit in Washington in those days, and probably today, is....

Q: In danger of being an alcoholic?

W: He's headed for trouble.

Q: Did you have any contacts with the Arnold family, the Arnold boys?

W: No, we were never stationed together. And they were a little bit younger than we were, as I recall. Not much, but in those days a difference of two or three years growing up meant quite a bit, yes. Young Andrews, Allan Andrews, I knew real well. I knew Josie Andrews well.

Q: During your father's stewardship, an incident occurred in May 1938, when three B-17s flew out 700 miles to sea, and photographed the REX. This caused a big flap, essentially with the Navy. They felt that the Air Corps had intruded upon its mission. As a result of this flight, unofficially, a 100-mile limit on planes flying out to sea was supposed to have been imposed on the Air Corps. Several people, including Eaker, told me that this was so but it never got written down. Did your father ever say anything about that? Or do you have any knowledge of that particular incident?

W: No, I honestly don't. The only knowledge I have in that respect is when I went to March AFB for station in Oct 1938, I'd never seen anything in writing out there either. But I know that in all our briefings, we were limited as to how far we could fly out to sea.

Q: Oh, you were? And this was ostensibly for safety purposes, or for safety sake?

W: It may have ostensible been for safety's sake, but I dont' think there was any doubt in our minds. We as 2nd LTS then, knew that it had something to do with, if I can put it that way, interservice interests.

Q: You know, Arnold kept diaries of almost every trip. Arnold wrote in his own hand, at night, long commentaries. I have many of them. Arnold, as I say, was historically minded. Of course, he was interested in preserving his own position. Forrestal was iike this too.

W: My Dad had to carry notebooks with him on his trips and at night wrote down, little pocket notebooks, wrote down the gist of the things he wanted to cover, and the speeches he had to make, the various places, you know, a few notes.

Q: Was he a good speaker, your dad?

W: I thought he was.

Q: Did he enjoy speaking at functions?

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Hetzel, Emery 9 Nov 70

NAME EMERY S. WETZEL
LT.-GEN, USAF (RET)
Print or Type - Last Name, First Name, Middle Initial

OLD ADDRESS P.O. Box 64
No. and Street, Apt., Suite, P. O. Box or R. D. No. (In care of)

LAWRENCEVILLE N-J 08648
Post Office, State and ZIP Code

NEW ADDRESS Lt/G. E. S. WETZEL
1730 Avenida Del Mundo (Apt. 703-A)
Coronado, California 92118
No. and Street, Apt., Suite, P. O. Box or R. D. No. (In care of)

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CHANGE OF ADDRESS NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS

Dr Murray Green

(Name of Correspondent)

No. and Street, Apt., Suite, P. O. Box or R. D. No. (In care of)

(Post Office, State, and ZIP Code)

September 18, 1970

L/Gen Emery S. Wetzel, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 64
Lawrenceville, New Jersey 08648

Dear General Wetzel:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davision, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name popping up in a couple of contexts. Minton Kaye, for one, suggested that I should talk to you.

In any event, you probably have some memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of them at a time and place convenient for you. If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

September 29, 1970

L/Gen Emery S. Wetzel, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 64
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648

Dear General Wetzel:

I have your note of September 22nd and would be delighted to get together with you in the Pentagon, or anywhere else.

If you could let me know your plans in advance, I will arrange my schedule to fit yours.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

Interview - LTGEN Emery Wetzel - McGuire AFB, NJ, Nov 9, 1970.

Q: Do you remember your first encounter with Arnold? Was it at March Field?

W: Oh yes. I was there, a LT. I came to March Field from Rockwell in the fall of '31, October or November of 1931.

Q: He had just arrived on the scene?

W: He hadn't gotten there yet.

Q: He came around Thanksgiving time.

W: Yes, he came shortly afterward. I think my first encounter was in a receiving line.

Q: He stayed with the Spaatz'. Do you remember a guy named Minton Kaye?

W: Oh yes, sure. He was the photographic officer.

Q: Kaye was one of his favorites.

W: Yes. But I don't know what happened to Mint.

Q: He was his favorite up till the end of the war. And then they had a falling out.

W: I don't know why.

Q: Yes, he was one of his favorites at March Field.

W: Yes, he always liked Mint.

Q: Can I speculate one of the reasons? Mrs. Arnold liked Helen Kaye. They were honeymooners and the Arnolds met them on the ship coming around the Canal. Did you know that?

W: I didn't know that.

Q: And Mrs. Arnold sort of took her under her wing, and Mint Kaye had ready access to Arnold's office, did he not? Did he abuse that privilege?

W: I don't think so, no.

Q: The Kayes and the Arnolds saw a lot of each other?

W: Yes, I do remember that. I think maybe more than the Waltons. The Waltons lived right next door to Hap and Mrs. Arnold. More than the average I would say.

Q: Do you have any recollection of that Bear Lake Camp? It was a recreation camp which was scrounged. They put it together.

W: Yes, my most scary recollection is the fact that we used to take those Curtiss Condor bombers up there. I'd forgotten the elevation of that field, but it was to hell and gone up there. It was all right going in, but we went out of there fully loaded too, many times.

Q: Was it the scrounged materials?

W: I don't know what we took out, but we took in scrounged things. Old Pappy Wood was the quartermaster. He painted more buildings at March Field, and did things. They all ended up up there. But the scary thing was that these were Curtiss Condor bombers. This was before manifold pressure, and nobody knew - God help us - that at that altitude you don't get the power unless you had blowers. Some of those takeoffs, it was real scary up there, oh yes, I remember that camp.

Q: Right over the tops of trees?

W: Yes.

Q: Arnold wanted this recreation camp set up?

W: Yes.

Q: He was interested in the welfare of the men?

W: Correct, always was.

Q: Did this endear him to the troops?

W: Oh yes. Oh, I don't think there was ever an enlisted man that didn't think

he was God. Because when he landed at any station around the world during the war or in the US, he'd go right to mess halls. He'd go right to maintenance shops. He'd talk to the Sergeants, the Privates. They all knew when Hap Arnold visited a station, unlike many other very senior people. They got whisked to the Officer's Club and sit in great briefings, not Hap Arnold.

Q: Organization charts and lights and briefing aids.

W: Not Arnold.

Q: He was impatient with formal briefings, wasn't he?

W: Oh yes.

Q: This camp was a great morale booster and he was very interested in it, and I guess he wanted it built. Of course, you didn't have any money.

W: Of course not, these were the depression years.

Q: Do you remember the Economy Act of 1934? Didn't they give everybody an enforced furlough?

W: Sure. They took a month's pay away from us.

Q: But you were expected to work?

W: Yes sir, without pay.

Q: So this was in effect, an 8% cut, 1/12 of your salary was taken away?

W: Yes. I believe the first time I ever saw Gen Arnold was in a receiving line, but at that time I was down in the 11th Bombardment Squadron with Charlie Howard. Then, little Joe McNarney ran the Bombardment Group, and they were fresh out of an Adjutant at some point, and I had to go up there and be the Group Adjutant. I got along with McNarney pretty well, and then later on, the Base Adjutant got sick - I can't remember his name - so I guess somebody said to McNarney: "Who can we send up?" And he sent Wetzel up, and then is when I got to know Hap Arnold. His secretary then was named Miss Mitchell.

Q: Emma?

W: I don't know, but Hap would call her " My God Miss Mitchell" and she loved him. But he would give her hell, in a nice way, "My God, Miss Mitchell," is this so and so?

Q: Robbie Mitchell?

W: I don't know, she was an old girl, and I think she followed him to Washington, as I recall.

Q: I think she became his secretary after he left, when he went back to Hamilton Field.

W: Could be. This is true. She did, because I saw her out there.

Q: She was Robbie Mitchell, I think she was married, and I don't know where she is now. He called her "Robbie." When did Suzy Adkins come in?

W: Damned if I remember. I left March Field in December 1934, and went up to Hamilton and then went to Hawaii. I came back to Mitchel in 1937, and by then, he was an Asst Chief of the Air Corps.

Q: Under Oscar Westover?

W: Yes. At one time he came up to Mitchel for some kind of inspection and a review. There was a great big receiving line, and of course, he was nice. I was a Captain then.

Q: He remembered you?

W: Oh, we came through the receiving line, just stopped. I guess it took 10 minutes. Everybody else -- but this doesn't hurt my stature a damned bit. And, you know, he was like that. I'm sure he knew a great many more people like that.

Q: A lot of people probably figures: "Who's this guy Wetzel?"

W: Yes, gee. Then from Mitchel I went to Pittsburgh, was in Pittsburgh for

a year, then I was ordered into Washington in August 1941.

Q: At what job?

W: Personnel.

Q: You were under Bevans?

W: Yes, but during the war I was Chief of Military Personnel.

Q: Did you work with Trubee Davison?

W: Trubee was A-1, and then later Bevans was A-1. This was the Policy stuff. The guys that filled the ships and the airplanes and so on, the working stiffs, I was Chief of Military Personnel. I was fortunate enough to have a couple of civilian guys in uniform who ran my Overseas Assignments Branch...

Q: This was probably a real sticky job?

W: Carl Goetz, overseas assignments. Anyway, they staff all of Doolittle's business, and Jimmy used to come in and sit and talk to Carl. He wouldn't talk to me. He'd wave to me and say: "How you doing, General?" And these two, they got AF people on the Queens, when nobody else could. (Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary).

Q: This Goetz and Doolittle? Yes, Carl Goetz. He ran Country Club beer. He owned that. He is dead now. Beasley and Goetz ran Overseas Assignments.

Q: I'm anxious to get back to the WWII period, but first I want to cover a couple of points in the March Field experience. In 1933 there was an earthquake.

W: I remember it well.

Q: March 1933. What do you remember about it?

W: Oh well, we were in quarters on the base. The reason we had quarters on the base, we moved up from Rockwell, and Tooey Spaatz, who was with us down at

Rockwell, saw to it that his Rockwell boys got quarters on the base. Anyway, our son Scott, who is now about to become a LTCOL was just a little bitty baby, then. It rumbled and these great big thick walled quarters there, they used to rattle and shake, and you knew something was going on. My wife said: "It's probably a bunch, a formation of bombers going over." I said: "No, sir." So we went out in the backyard. Then of course, we began to get the report, Long Beach, as I recall it.

Q: It was March 9, 1933.

W: Yes, that was something I'll never forget.

Q: Did Arnold do something in the way of rescue?

W: I don't remember that.

Q: Arnold's reported response to the earthquake was a very positive one. When everybody was sort of stunned by the whole event, the first reaction in 9th Corps Area Commander Hqs. in the Presidio was negative to rescue. But when the newspaper reaction - radio, whatnot - praised Arnold for his quick response, then they took another look at this at the Presidio. You have no special recollection?

W: I don't remember that at all. I do remember the earthquake, and as you mention, it does seem to me now that we did send a lot of stuff over there. But I didn't know the reaction of the Corps Area Commander.

Q: Do you have any recollection of the Arnolds socially at March Field. They would have receptions and things at the club. No special recall?

W: Nothing special.

Q: Did Arnold like parties?

W: I really don't know.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold drink?

W: Never. I just don't think he did.

Q: I had heard that possibly in the early '20s he had an ulcer and was in Letterman Hospital for a short period of time. He might have had some drinking experience as a youngster, but most people who knew him in the late '20s, or during the '30s, said at most he carried a glass of sherry around.

W: I believe this is exactly right. Of course, he came out to March Field from somewhere in Kansas, from the doghouse.

Q: He was in Kansas, then he went to Leavenworth, and then he went to Dayton.

W: That's right, he came from Dayton.

Q: Let's go to WWII, or right before it. You came to Washington in '41? Before Pearl Harbor?

W: Oh yes.

Q: In August, all right. Did you have anything to do with that war plan, AWPD-1?

W: No.

Q: You worked for Trubee Davison. Was he on the job at that time?

W: Yes. And then later for Bevans.

Q: What was the relation, Bevans was there too, but what was the relationship between Davison and Bevans? I never could figure it out.

W: I think Jim Bevans was a little awed by Trubee. Trubee was kind of an operator, a big wheel guy, and Jim Bevans...

Q: Was he a sick man - Trubee Davison - cripplied?

W: Yes, he was crippled. He had a wheelchair to get around on. But Bevans, God bless him, helped me get promoted. Jim was a little in awe of Trubee Davison,

and Jim was scared to death of Hap Arnold. Scared green. He would not...if he just had to ask Arnold a question he'd get it all written down on a piece of paper, and he would go up and sit outside of Hap Arnold's office for half the morning, when all he had to do was push the button down on the squawk box, and ask the question and kick it off, don't hang on. Many times, when he would have these questions, and he'd be up there to see the Old Man, he would come back at lunch time, and it was my day to sit at the squawk box, or something. I would say: "Did you get to see the Old Man?" He'd say: "No." I pushed the button down. I said: "All you would do is push it down and start talking, and you would get an answer, and just kick it off."

Q: Of course, you had had this experience with Arnold at March Field?

W: I knew that he knew I wouldn't take up his time unless it was important.

Q: But then again, he had an experience with Arnold at Ft. Riley?

W: Bevans did?

Q: Yes.

W: I didn't realize that.

Q: Ft. Riley - 1926-27. So, actually he had a prior experience. He was a horseman, and he told me several experiences. I saw him at Ft. Lauderdale.

W: He's down in Florida?

Q: Yes.

W: Did he tell you that he was scared of Hap Arnold?

Q: No, of course, he wouldn't.

W: No, I suppose not.

Q: Who else was scared of Hap Arnold? Frozen?

W: I don't think many people. Joe Loutzenheizer, who was with Kuter in Plans, and McKee was never scared of him, and McNaughton.

Q: McNaughton had the Pilot Training, didn't he?

W: Yes under Bob Harper. Most of those people weren't. Oh, I'll tell you who was not frightened of him, but George Stratemeyer.

Q: He died last year.

W: Yes. We would have these staff meetings, and I guess Stratemeyer...

Q: He was Chief of Air Staff. No. Two man.

W: Yes, and we would get in there and Strat would say: "Now, fellows, let's not say anything to upset the Old Man, because this is not a very good day for him. Let's just play this cool."

Q: Did he try to keep things, sticky problems away from the Old Man?

W: Oh sure, you know, he was afriad that he would get into them. You know what they always said about Strat - if he'd been a girl he'd been pregnant all the time. He could never say "no." Annalee, was great, his wife.

Q: I want to ask you about Suzy Adkins. Did Suzy Adkins act as a weather-vane for you? In other words, would she call you and say: "General Wetzel," maybe you were a Colonel at that time?

W: Yes, I was, I got promoted in Oct 1944.

Q: Did she call up, or if you called up, would you ask her: "Is this a good day to see the Old Man?"

W: Right, yes.

Q: So she acted as a weathervane?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Did she ever call you and say: "That problem you were talling me about, today's a good day." Or, "today is not a good day."

W: No, not to me, she may have to Bevans, never to me.

Q: Did you generally ask her, or just occasionally?

W: Occasionally. As I say, I never hesitated to see the Old Man about anything. One time, I remember this, Tommy DuBose and I - he ended up a General - but he was Training, and I was Personnel, and McKee was Operations Commitments and Requirements (OC&R). Anyway, I had been to Europe with Mr. Lovett earlier on a trip, so I knew him pretty well, and I guess he...

Q: I just talked to him on the telephone.

W: And anyway, this one Sunday morning or something, Lovett got DuBose and Wetzel in there and he really said some, I felt, critical things about Gen Arnold. And he was Asst Secy of War for Air.

Q: Lovett said these critical things?

W: Yes, and you know, I wonder why the old man does this? Why doesn't he do it the other way, you know. We tried...we went straight into the Old Man and I did the talking, I said: "We have just been with the Secy and this is what he said, and I didn't like it." The Old Man was standing there grinning, and he said: "Let me handle the Secretary, you guys worry about your own problems. I'll handle the Secy. I never knew to this day whether there was any feeling between the two, or not.

Q: There was a warm feeling between the two in most instances. I talked to Lovett at great length and on several issues. Of course, I have been told that Lovett acted as a balance wheel. In a sense, that Arnold would make impulsive decisions and in some cases, Lovett, without trying, overtly to steer him back on course, would sweet talk him out of some of these changes.

W: That's very possible.

Q: Does this fit in with your recollection?

W: Yes, I think so. But Arnold would make, I remember he came back one time from a trip to North Africa, and there were just no spare airplanes over there

on the ground at all. In other words, the commanders were hurting. They didn't have their TOs filled with aircraft. He came back and raised hell. Six months later he went over again and came back, apparently, North Africa, according to Hap was just covered with airplanes. His famous statement, I thought: "Just because I turned it on, can't somebody turn it off?" You know what I mean: He said get some airplanes over there, well, he didn't mean to keep doing it forever.

Q: Right. This is one of the things that caused him some pain. When he would come into a place and see a lot of airplanes sitting around, and he would ask questions: "Well, why are these planes here?" He wanted to see planes in action. He didn't want anybody sitting around. Did you ever encounter this concern of his? He had this great concern when he landed in a new place.

W: No. I will tell you one thing that the AAF were way ahead of the Army, that was in keeping track of our people. Our air crews were critical teams, you know. If you didn't watch them, the damned Army would unload them in North Africa and have them sweeping our barracks. They weren't getting through. So Tex Thornton and Stat Control, Ed Learned, all those people, and Personnel....

Q: Guy named McNamara was in that, wasn't he?

W: Yes, he was one of the whiz kids. We devised a way to keep track of our crews, and saw that the Overseas Assignment Branch, Goetz and Beasley, would keep track of these crews until it got all the way to their squadron. And so, our Stat. Control was really good. And it did us in good stead. I remember at the end of the European war, I was in G-1 of the War Dept. The war was over, and all these troops were coming home from Europe and they had to go to separation centers. The Army ran the separation centers, and the Army commanders were screaming for

people, for typists, for this, for that, and the other. They put the bee on the AAF and I was in G-1 representing the AAF and I said: "All right. You need people? What is your requirement, and how many do you have?" The Army didn't know how many they had. All they knew was that they needed some more, and I said: "The AF knows how many it's got, and how many in excess of our needs we have. We'll give you all of those. But until you know what you are talking about, we just won't deal with you."

Q: Did they ever come around with a figure?

W: Oh yes, they worked on it. Right at the tail end of the war, air crew material was really critical. The Army had this profile. To be a combat infantryman you had to be such and such. They were just taking our combat crew personnel and putting them into Infantry.

Q: I want to ask you about this. Right about the time of the Battle of the Bulge, the AAF got laid upon by Gen Marshall for Infantry.

W: That's right.

Q: You had to convert a lot of Aviation Cadets into Infantry. Now this was a sore point?

W: Right, it sure as hell was.

Q: Could you tell me about that?

W: Well, yes. I was up in the War Dept. I guess I went to the War Dept to help that solve that one.

Q: Is that part of the reason you went over there?

W: Yes, part of the reason I went up there. And I solved it all right, because it was very simple. Every division that went to Europe went full, qualified combat infantrymen. I knew precisely what they were. I knew every combat infantryman replacement we had sent. I knew all casualties. I had these

figures. I had to put it on the back of an envelope. This convinced Marshall, he thought that was cute. And 80% of all casualties went back into the front lines. So, there were one million qualified combat infantrymen in excess in Europe at the time they were asking the AAF for our combat crews. Where were they? They were the second crews on trucks from Antwerp. They didn't need those qualifications. So what we did was tell Eisenhower, you find your replacement combat infantrymen right from your own outfits.

Q: But they still took...Didn't Marshall put the bee on Arnold?

W: Yes, that was before I got up, but I stopped it.

Q: They took many thousands of Aviation Cadets in the AAF?

W: That's right, yes.

Q: Did this cause a great problem among parents of, let's say, aircrewmen, men who had been sent to navigation school, pilot school, and then, suddenly, they are yanked out of there? A great hardship.

W: I don't know. The one thing I do want to remember; I do want to tell you. During the war we had what was known as service pilots. These were people not trained in AAF or Air Corps schools, but they were a pilot to begin with, and they wanted to get in and get a commission, and wear service pilot wings, not combat, but service pilots. We were pretty damned selective in the way we took in a service pilot. We looked at his record, and we examined him carefully. Well, this was a political thing. All the Senators had dozens of service pilots that we had turned down, and they wanted us to commission. So it got so hot that Gen Arnold....

Q: These service pilots were not commissioned at first?

W: Oh, they were commissioned, if we accepted them as a service pilot he was commissioned. But we didn't accept them all. Of course, everybody graduated....

Q: Was this a thinly disguised draft dodge?

W: Well, prestige, probably, to get commissioned to be a service pilot. You didn't fly combat, but you flew supply runs. Anyway, it was a hot political subject. And we kept getting letters all the time from Congress. We finally went, I guess it was to the Senate, maybe it was the Joint group, Senate and House, and Arnold himself, and Wetzel went. And Arnold said to me: "Now, you know all these guys on the committee. Look through your letters from them, and be prepared to shoot down everyone of those that we turned down, because he was a drunkard or he didn't have this, or he was no good." So we, of course, we didn't commission him. Well, we got to the hearing and they started taking Hap Arnold apart. "Why do you do this, and why haven't you done that?" And so and so, and he got mad. You may have heard this story?

Q: No.

W: I didn't open my mouth. I was prepared. He stood up and said: "So many years ago, you put one star on my shoulder, and made me Asst Chief of the AF. At such and such a time you put two stars on, and did so and so," and he was getting madder all the time he was saying this. And I don't remember how many he had then. But he got to this point, and he said: "You made me Chief of the Army Air Forces, and so on." He said: "If you can get somebody to do it better, you go right ahead." He turned right on his heel. This whole group, there must have been 40 Senators, all stood up and gave him a standing ovation. That solved it. We never heard one additional word.

Q: You know, he had this great sense of public relations. If he could wave the flag, this would answer the whole issue, rather than answer it by ifs and buts.

W: He just didn't want to get nitpicked on all these little damned things, so he said: "If you can get somebody to do it better, go right ahead, good

morning." And I just looked at the whole Committee, as they stood up there applauding, and I looked out, and turned and followed him out.

Q: He gambled. He put his whole prestige on the line, and he won.

W: Oh yes, they applauded him.

Q: A very good story. Let me ask you a sticky one. Elliott Roosevelt. Do you remember anything about that? Did you get involved in that?

W: No, I didn't get involved in that.

Q: Especially in his being promoted to a Brig. General.

W: I didn't get involved in that.

Q: They didn't get it down to your level?

W: No.

Q: Handled at a higher level?

W: Right.

Q: Elliott was promoted when Arnold got sick. Spaatz had recommended that they promote him. Eisenhower had recommended that they promote him. Arnold didn't want him promoted. But Arnold got sick and then they promoted him. This was the end of January 1945. You don't remember?

W: No.

Q: Let me ask you another personnel problem. This was the ratio of combat crews to airplanes. This got to be a very sticky issue.

W: Sure did.

Q: We were losing men at Schweinfurt-Regensburg; all these losses we were suffering.

W: It was the number of missions you had to fly before you came home. Is that what you mean?

Q: Right, the number of missions. We were suffering great losses there for

a time, at first they had 25 missions, and then Arnold wrote a piece of paper that said we should not go by a number. Then they went back to the 25 missions thing, because...Can you tell me something about the problems this created for you, created for him?

W: There was a personnel shortage. Even though we at one time were turning out our pilots at the rate of 125,000 a year - can you beat that - this is not what we planned to turn out, but it just happened that way. There were so many little variables. But we just didn't have the combat crews to support the operation, and support the losses that we were getting. So you can only do two things; you keep them there a little longer, or you hold down your operations.

Q: This is when they repealed the 25 mission clause?

W: Yes.

Q: And this hurt morale?

W: Oh sure, because if there is one....

Q: A guy figures I've got one or two more mssions to go, and then they change the signals on him. So this created a great morale problem?

W: Sure did.

Q: You know, Arnold sent Eddie Rickenbacker overseas to talk to the boys. Here was the guy who shot down 26 enemy planes. Do you have any knowledge or any involvement in that program to improve morale?

W: No, I knew Eddie, of course, but I didn't know anything about that.

Q: Do you remember a man named Steve Ferson, Oliver Ferson. Died....

W: ...In Arnold's office...

Q: It was Arnold's office, as far as your recollection?

W: Yes.

Q: You were in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor. Do you remember the leak of the RAINBOW FIVE plan by the Chicago Tribune. Three days before Pearl Harbor, it was published, you don't remember?

W: No.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack in 1945?

W: Yes, but I don't remember much about it.

Q: They kept it very quiet. This was in January 1945. He had a major heart attack, and they took him down to Coral Gables.

W: Yes, I remember. I remember him saying once I get this war over, I'm going to go out to California and sit under a tree, and I don't want an airplane to get within 1,000 miles of me.

Q: He said that to you?

W: Yes.

Q: He said that several times. They brought Eaker in when Arnold came back from his heart attack, from his recuperation. They brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. Were you there? This is in the Spring of 1945.

W: I was up in the War Dept.

Q: Do you remember when Eaker came in as Deputy Commander, AAF? Giles moved out to the Pacific.

W: Yes, I remember when Barney went out there.

Q: Do you remember when Eaker came in?

W: No, I was up in the War Dept.

Q: Talking about Arnold and Andrews. He thought Andrews was a great one?

W: A great one, I believe, and I'm sure Andrews thought Arnold was.

Q: Was there any rivalry, they were contemporaries. Andrews was a year ahead of Arnold.

W: That's right. I think Hap would have been happy to have seen Andrews the top dog.

Q: Well, he was the top dog in Europe. He had been appointed CG, ETO, and if not for that plane crash, he might have had the job Eisenhower had.

W: Yes, he had a presence - Andrews.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of their relationship?

W: No, no.

Q: You were saying something earlier that if Arnold liked you, you could do no wrong, but if he didn't like you, you could do no right.

W: That's so.

Q: Related to that is something somebody told me that those who came up with Arnold on the West Coast, those he knew and those he trusted, those who had come up with him, got the better jobs. Those who had come up with Andrews at Langley -- Tony Frank, Knerr, some of the others, did not get as good jobs.

W: I think that's true. I think simply because Arnold knew them, knew the individuals, and knew what he could expect from them.

Q: And you tend to give an important job to somebody you have learned to depend upon?

W: Yes.

Q: Tony Frank wanted a combat command, and he never got one, and he became rather bitter at Arnold.

W: Right.

Q: Knerr was very close to Andrews, as you may know. He retired when Andrews was sent out of Washington, and he had a hard time coming back. Now, you were in Personnel, you might know something about that?

W: I wasn't dealing in the Generals then.

Q: But do you remember that Knerr had retired. He was trying to come back right after Pearl Harbor and it took him over a year to come back. Do you remember anything about that?

W: Nope, but he later did a fine job in England and Europe.

Q: He was a very competent guy.

W: Oh yes.

Q: But Arnold did not trust him?

W: Yes. See, today, to run an AF you need so many people to help you. The Chief doesn't know everybody, and even when in the '50s when I was down there in DCS/P I don't think we promoted a single man to General that at least I didn't know or that Vandenberg didn't know. But, today, I mean, you can't know them all. Now, back when WWII started, Hap Arnold promoted those that he knew, that he had served with. He had to take somebody else's word for those he didn't know quite as well, and I think he hesitated to do that.

Q: Knerr told me that Arnold had loyalty up, and laterally, but not loyalty down, in a sense in getting promotions or decorations for his troops.

W: I don't believe that.

Q: You don't accept that?

W: No, sir.

Q: Kuter was one of his favorites, and Kuter got his promotion through Marshall.

W: Yes, because he was up on the General Staff. Well, Kuter was not really one of his favorites. I think Hap Arnold appreciated his talent.

Q: Kuter was sort of a cold guy. His intellectual grasp....

W: Right, I don't think he ever really got close to Arnold. I don't think Arnold really ever liked him. You know what I mean?

Q: As compared to Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Oh no. You've talked to Rosie? You know, Rosie has always said, I never heard Hap tell the story, but Rosie always said that Hap's favorite story.

Q: About the clock?

W: No, but I remember that story. When O'Donnell took the damn inkwell and threw it.

Q: What story is this?

W: Hap's favorite story was who sleeps with Cat - Mrs. Cat, and sometimes Mrs. Hussbaum. That was supposed to be Arnold's favorite story.

Q: Did Rosie O'Donnell tell this story?

W: He says that it was Hap Arnold's favorite story, and may very well have been.

Q: Rosie O'Donnell is a great story teller.

W: Oh yes.

Q: Do you know any stories involving O'Donnell and Arnold?

W: Yes, I think when Gen Arnold came back, right at the beginning of the war, came back from India, O'Donnell was over there. He came back in and he got ahold of me and he said: "Who is this O'Donnell guy?" And I said: "Well, he's a pretty good guy." I said: "I taught him how to fly a B-18 when he was at Mitchel. He did a lot of football coaching and so on." Hap said: "Do you think he would be any good on my Advisory Council?" And I said: "Yeah." So, anyway, Hap said: "Get him home." So he got him home, and O'Donnell came in to see me, and I told him the story. And O'Donnell said: "Who is this guy Arnold?

Q: Do you know why he came to Arnold's attention? When Arnold was out there

somebody had given a briefing and said the British were going to invade Burma in May. O'Donnell said they are not going to invade in May. Arnold looked at this guy, and said: "How do you know?" He was an awfully brash guy.

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: O'Donnell said he knew the British and they were not going to invade Burma in May and he was right. Arnold admired a guy who would stand up for his convictions. This was after the Casablanca conference. Arnold came back in Feb 1943. He went to India and China after the Casablanca Conference, and that's when he first encountered O'Donnell.

W: Apparently, he didn't know O'Donnell. Their paths had never crossed. He said: "Who is this guy O'Donnell?" He said to me.

Q: You see, this guy who had stood up for his convictions and disagreed with the briefing that Arnold was getting, he was the kind of guy Arnold wanted on his staff. Tell me about the Advisory Council. Arnold had Cabell and Norstad right at the beginning.

W: Yes, he had Cabell and Norstad; he had Jake Smart, O'Donnell and Fred Dean.

Q: A guy named McRae?

W: No, I don't think so. I really don't know what use Hap made of them. I don't know how he used them. They never talked.

Q: They were sort of Ministers without Portfolio. They were idea men.

W: Yes.

Q: Did they interfere with operations?

W: No, because they were talented enough to know how to handle themselves.

Q: But they went by twos. He gave them sort of special assignments, to dig up research information. Did he ever give the same assignment to two or

three people, to see what kind of answers he got?

W: I can't answer that, I just don't know. He might have, I don't know.

Q: Tell me about Benny Meyers.

W: The only thing I know is that Hap always thought Benny Meyers was pretty good operator, and I don't know whether he ever got really mad at him. Of course, Benny caused us a hell of a lot of embarrassment in the Air Force.

Q: Later?

W: Yes.

Q: Well, Arnold thought he was great.

W: Yes.

Q: Why?

W: I don't know.

Q: I was told he would give Arnold figures that Arnold wanted to hear.

W: Oh, I don't know that. That's possible.

Q: He gave Arnold optimistic information I'm told. Arnold accepted optimistic information, knowingly, or knowing that this information was somewhat inflated. But Meyers gave the information with the belief that our production process would make a falsehood come true. And Arnold, knowing that the President wanted optimistic information, gave him what he wanted, knowing that Benny was feeding him incorrect information. Is this feasible?

W: Quite possible. I would expect that it would be pretty hard to fool Hap Arnold.

Q: But wasn't this slightly unethical on Arnold's part?

W: Well, I guess so.

Q: In a sense, he was slightly unethical on a lot of things, in that, there was a regulation that said: "You can't do it." And he said: "Forget about the

regulation; let's get it done."

W: "Write a new regulation." He told me that several times.

Q: In other words, he was looking at the larger picture. If he thought that the objective was worth obtaining, he was not interested in the paper regulation which said he couldn't do it that way. Is this your estimate of his character?

W: Exactly my estimate.

Q: I think Benny Meyers anticipated that Arnold was a guy like this, and Benny Meyers gave him what he wanted. Why didn't Arnold go to Echols? You know, he was Meyers' boss.

W: I don't know.

Q: Maybe he couldn't get the information from him?

W: That's probably true. On Personnel, I just thought of something. Some very high powered British came over to visit us one time. We had a great to-do at Bolling for them. We opened up the gymnasium.

Q: Was this Churchill?

W: No, I don't think it was Churchill.

Q: Was it Trenchard?

W: It could have been Trenchard. But anyway, when I saw this evening, we were all suited up, black tie, whatever, tuxedo, I've forgotten, and I looked at that crowd and I said: "Oh, oh," and it happened. The Hqs. was cut, and I put down 25%. It may have been just 10, but I saw that coming.

Q: Let me ask you about the factor of strong love or hate towards Arnold. Why were people so emotionally charged about him?

W: Just because he was Hap Arnold. The way he operated. But you soon learned that he either liked you or he didn't like you, and of course, this was about the middle strata. His contemporaries, I think most of them respected him, they

were jealous as hell, because he was a big man, Hap Arnold was. Let me tell you about this Lou Parker story. Lou Parker was in CCC Hqs., this was early in the CCC business.

Q: In 1933, maybe?

W: Yes, but we were still building our camps. And I was Hap's Adjutant, I moved up from Base Adjutant, and I was his Base Adjutant when we got the message from Malin Craig, coded. We had to sit up all evening and decode the damn thing. The first message on CCC, and it said: "Be prepared to accept so many people." Anyway, that night, Malin Craig did call Hap Arnold. The only time I ever saw Hap sit on the edge of a chair, in other words, be other than his usual self. And he was saying "Yes, sir" and "no, sir" to Malin Craig, the Corps Area Commander. Anyway, I moved from there when Hap became, when he took on the CCC problem. I was his Adjutant, and that little old headquarters there at March Field. Down at one end of the hall was quite a bit of room where most of the staff on the CCC problem worked. Lou Parker was in charge of recreation, I think, for these jerks that came out from the East. We did a weekly report of camp completion, which we had to send to Malin Craig, either 80% or 85%. Well, Camp Lone Pine had gone along fairly well. It had got to about 85%, and it stuck there for about 3 weeks. Hap Arnold was just, you know, you could hear it whenever he got mad, the whole top floor of that headquarters. Anyway, called in Lou Parker. "Parker." We went in and talked a few minutes, and out came Parker, and he said to Gene Beebe, who was Operations Officer at that time, he said: "Say, I need an airplane early tomorrow, to go up to Lone Pine."

Q: This is Parker?

W: Yes, and Gene said: "Tomorrow is Saturday. You can't take off until

three people, to see what kind of answers he got?

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Q: This is Parker?

W: Yes, and Gene said: "Tomorrow is Saturday. You can't take off until

after the review, and the parade, which will be about 10:30," Lou said: "Gee, the Old Man's sent me up there, and I've got to complete that camp." So, anyway, Gene, he went in to see the Old Man. There were loud voices in there. Gene came out, and said: "The Old Man wants to see you again, Louis." Louis went in, and you could hear the Old Man. "Early, hell, I said daylight." And, by God, the next morning at whatever the official hour of daylight was, a BT-2 took off with Parker to go to Lone Pine. He didn't know anything about finishing a camp. This was Saturday. By Monday afternoon it was 100% complete. Parker came back down. Of course, we all said: "How did you do it?" He said: "I knew I had to do it, and I got to Lone Pine, the little village of Lone Pine." And he called a town meeting, and it was probably the only emotional speech that Lou Parker made, and he got the whole town out. Now, this was the Arnold effect. When Arnold gave you a job, you knew you had it. In other words, that was his gift. He could put this responsibility down on your shoulders, and brother, you had it.

Q: And it made you want to do it for him?

W: Mostly. I say, yes, I don't know why you did. You either did it because you were frightened to death, or because you loved him, or because you just knew you had to do it.

Q: How about respect?

W: Oh yes, sure.

Q: Was this Lone Pine one of the first CCC camps?

W: No, one of our 25, we had 25 camps.

Q: How many boys did you have under your control?

W: Gee, I don't know.

Q: How many in each camp?

W: Oh, 150, something like that.

Q: So you must have had...

W: 35,000, something like that. I've just forgotten.

Q: You had 25 camps, and 150 in each camp, that's 4,000 or so. I got a figure that there were 25,000 CCC boys in the March Field district.

Q: No, we had 25 camps, and there may have been 500 in a camp. But I don't know, I've just really forgotten, but it was a sizable amount, it was a hell of a big job.

Q: And was this Lone Pine the first of the group?

W: No, that was one of the later ones. The earlier ones were close in to Riverside, Temecular. We had one up the hill at Idlewild. This Lou Parker story simply is what Hap Arnold could do. He could get the absolute best out of you. Now, I'm sure if Louis didn't tell you that story. I don't know why, because this was one of the great emotional things that had happened to Lou Parker. The next story, the note I have here, the story of taking Hap to Chungking. And I'm sure I don't want to repeat the story, but the thing I remember was that they knew they were lost. They went back to speak to the Old Man, and I don't know why they thought, if he would come up and help, he just sat there and grinned. And he said to Lou Parker, he said: "You're the pilot." And Lou said: "I knew I had to get him there." In other words, Hap gave him the responsibility: "You're the pilot." And of course, they made it. Now, that was my part of that story.

W: So many crazy things happened. In this CCC business, Hap would visit all these camps, and early in the morning, very early in the morning. When he did, he'd fly his P-12 up to the closest field, and always, as he did later as a five-star General, he always would talk to the lowliest enlisted man and the

lowliest CCC boy to find out. That was his trick.

Q: He did this often during the war?

W: Oh yes.

Q: When he went on inspection trips, he always went to the maintenance shack, or down to talk to the people where the problems began.

W: Oh yes, and a lot of commanders didn't appreciate this. Because he would go up to the dumbest looking GI and ask him crazy questions, you know, real solid questions.

Q: The lowest common denominator. If you got a good answer out of that fellow then you had a good camp?

W: That's right. This particular morning, this was before we got into, no, I hadn't moved down to CCC Hqs., I was just Base Adjutant, and he came in. And I never once got to Base Headquarters before him, he always beat me. We made kind of a joke out of it, you know, he'd kind of kid me. But this morning he came in madder than hell, he started to climb into his P-12, and his parachute came undone and blew in the wind. Oh, was he mad. He came in there and he glared at me, and he said: "Do we have formal retreat?" And I said: "No, sir, we don't have formal retreat." And he said: "We will from now on, every afternoon, formal retreat with boots on." You know, in the old days, we would just wear our flight jackets, blouses, boots, Sam Brownes, everything. And I said: "Why?" He said: "My God damned parachute came open." Now that was his letting off steam, and we did it for about three months, yes sir.

Q: Then he cooled off on it?

W: Oh yes. He forgot it. I think he would get mad and not hold a grudge and forget it, if he liked you.

Q: Was he a spit and polish man?

W: No, not in the sense say that Tony Frank was. I don't think Hap Arnold ever opened up a GI can in a quarters area, to see if it was clean, you know. Although he demanded that his aircraft be clean, he didn't make a great thing of it, like some people that I have known. Another note I've got here is that he used to say: "The trick is to get this carrot just the right distance out in front. If it is too far, the guy will give up, and he can't make it. If it's too close, it's too easy. The trick is to get that goal out, the carrot, at the right distance," and he seemed to know.

Q: Get the guy running at his maximum, get the most out of people. What you say, it reminds me of something someone else told me. Arnold had this knack of knowing when a man was going beyond his endurance.

W: He knew that, it was some instinctive thing, he just knew.

Q: He drove people but not to a point of making the guy despair or break up? He knew a man's breaking point?

W: This is absolutely true in my opinion. In this CCC staff meeting, this was a big thing to thrust on him. You know, all these 25 camps, and many problems. We had quartermaster problems, and there were about 8 or 9 on the staff, and I was the Adjutant who would sit in at the staff meetings, and all these various officers would report their problems and Hap would just sit there. Then he would start assigning responsibility: "You do this; you, you, you," just that quickly, and he would say: "Okay, goodbye, gentlemen. Thank you." And this impressed me so that I once asked Mrs. Arnold - I knew her well, she was a dear friend - and I'd said: "Does Col Arnold, when he gets home, does he worry about these things, because he just assigns these responsibilities, and it seems to me that just, what's next, you know." She said she really didn't know, and I really don't know either. But he just had that trick. Anyway, the people that got the

responsibility knew that they had it, no one else.

Q: Did he remember that they had it?

W: Yes. In the CCC days he did. In the later days, this is one of his traits, you may have heard this a thousand times before. But on inspections, or in the Pentagon or anywhere, if he wanted, if he just thought of something, and he wanted it done, he'd turn to the first guy and he would say: "Do so and so; get it done." We all learned, though, you never said: "General, this is not my job." No one ever said that to him. What you did was say: "Yes, sir," and then you would go find the guy whose responsibility it was, and tell him you'd just gotten the word. Now, I don't think Hap ever remembered who he told to get it done. One time they were flying into Wright Patt during the war, and some of the civilian employees came out to take care of the airplane, and they weren't snappy - maybe he was a spit and polish guy - they weren't snappy enough. So it was on the airplane. He just turned to somebody and he had nothing to do with Wright Patterson or anything, and said: "I want, in the future, all of these people that come out to meet airplanes here in a nice uniform." And so the guy said to Lou Parker: "Lou, what am I supposed to do?" And Lou said: "Get it done!" So he went to whoever was necessary, but this was Hap.

Q: I've heard at least 20 times, people have told different stories about being grabbed in the hall and being sent to the CBI or to Europe or to the Middle East, and it was foreign to their expertise, but when they approached their middle superiors along the line, and they said, if Gen Arnold said "Do it," they had to do it. Take off for the Middle East or Pacific.

W: I can't confirm that. I do know that, whenever he thought of something that needed done, if you were handy, he told you to do it.

Q: If he had confidence in you?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: I mean he knew you as somebody he had confidence in, and even though the thing was foreign to your field....

W: I don't really knew anybody that just took off to go that far to do things. Usually they went to the fellow who was responsible and said: "The Old Man said he wanted this done."

Q: I can see how these stories would get embellished.

W: I can't confirm....

Q: Arnold was a man impatient with organizational charts, plumbing charts, and having the thing work its way down through to the man who was to do the job. He wanted direct action. Was this his trait?

W: Yes, this was Hap Arnold.

Q: He had a man named "Hungry Gates" who was organizing the place, and organizing a big bureacracy?

W: Yes.

Q: Do you remember anything along that line?

W: I remember that famous story about - I was there. Of course, Tex Thornton, Litton Industry, he was the one. You know Lovett wanted to get the whole AF on three pieces of paper, three big pieces of paper, and Tex said you can't do that. He finally got it in three big books, as I recall. But, anyway, there was a Dr. Learned, too, from Harvard, hell of a fellow. You may have heard this story, we were trying to find people for the B-29 program, and there was a limit. The President had put a limit, I think it was 7.7 million people, or something, and the military had already exceeded that, but we had to get the B-29s rolling. So at that particular conference was one that Hap was invited to. The room was full. I think Kuter was running it, overall responsibility, but Dr. Learned, and I think

Tex Thornton was there, too. Anyway, the nut of it was they showed him a hell of a lot of charts, and the nut of it was you couldn't do it.

Q: You would be exceeding the 7.7 million Army ceiling.

W: You'd need that many additional people, and you just couldn't do it. In other words, he was unhappy with it, and he stood up - and I'll never forget this - you may have heard this story - and he said: "You people make me sick to my stomach." And he turned and went out of the room. Well, dead silence, absolute silence. Kuter, he was Chief of Plans, he went over to the window and looked out. And nobody said a word. Pretty soon Hap Arnold came marching back in, and he said, "I want every man in this room out of Washington by sundown. I don't want you back until Monday morning." Turned on his heel and went out again. Everybody in that room got the hell out. He thought we were all foggy, and weren't thinking straight, and weren't doing the right thing.

Q: He wanted you out where?

W: Go out, leave Washington, get away from the Pentagon. Go do whatever you wanted to do. I don't know. But he just didn't like what he had heard, and this was Hap Arnold.

Q: Perhaps he didn't like for somebody to tell him that it cannot be done?

W: Right. Now, along this same line, later on we were back. It was the same group, and they were giving him a little better answer. Maybe, you know, and oh, he wouldn't accept that, and he said: "Don't give me that. With all the fat there is in the system." And nobody said a damn word, except me, and I stood up and I said: "What do you mean, fat?" And he said: "I mean fat." That was all there was to it. Wetzel went down to the Training Command. I discovered the fat. You know what it was. It was the railroad population. We had a system, we took the inducted people in and they went into the Training Command and got

shuttled out in little balls. They couldn't make this system, and they went into that one, and they fell out there. We had enough people on trains. There was the fat, and Hap knew that.

Q: Did that issue come up?

W: No, that whole issue hadn't come up. We discovered, just because he said: "I mean fat."

Q: What made you center on the Training Command?

W: There wasn't any other place, there was the vast majority of our people, in flying schools and in the mechanic schools.

Q: This was in Barton Yount's command?

W: Yes, right. And Ken McNaughton was the big wheel down there. What we did, we changed the system, so that a guy if he couldn't do this thing, he did that. He didn't bounce out of this and get on a train. I've forgotten the figures, but the train population was just enormous, guys riding trains.

Q: In other words, what you really did was thin out the in-transit population and the pipeline?

W: We cut the pipeline. I'm sure it looked good on paper. If a man didn't qualify for this, he got on a train, went halfway across the country, and then he got there, anyway, that was....

Q: When did this happen, this business of the "fat story?" Was it later - '43 or early '44?

W: Yes. I'm just telling you these things to tell you my view of the Old Man.

Q: An impressionistic thing, and that's what I want.

W: For instance, he never, in all the years that I was close to him, he never chewed me out. He never gave me hell, because I think he knew if he had,

it would just kill me. I just thought that he was so great that he sensed that.

Q: This was again, knowing that you perhaps had a short fuse, or that he did not have to beat you too much?

W: That's right.

Q: You know, Beebe told me that, when I asked, did Arnold get mad, he said: "He got mad every day."

W: Oh yes, oh sure. But he got over it.

Q: Did he harbor a grudge?

W: I don't think so, no. For instance, many times, he would be mad at me, but he wouldn't say anything to me. He just wouldn't speak to me. There would be three people or something, and he would come in and say: "Hello, so-and-so; and so-and-so." And he would just look. He wouldn't say a damn word, but the next half hour, he might have his arm around you, you know. But he knew that that was enough to get you to work harder.

Q: This technique of putting his arm around you worked wonders?

W: Oh yes. He had his likes and dislikes, and we covered that before. I don't believe they ever changed.

Q: Of people, you mean?

W: Of people. If he liked them. Now, this is probably a very bad trait. Because you could like somebody that's no damn good at all. There was one officer - I won't mention his name, but he flew an airplane one day into Chicago, he had been drinking the whole way, you may have heard the story...(Off record).

Q: This officer fell flat on his face?

W: Yes, drunk. Later on the Old Man made him a General.

Q: Because he liked him?

W: Because he thought he was good, and he was good. But, anyway. In my

opinion, people either loved Hap Arnold, or they didn't. And they either didn't because they were jealous of him, or because they thought he didn't like them. There's an interesting story on this subject of "they thought he didn't like them." After the war, the end of the war, I was out working for Ennis Whitehead and gosh knows he was quite a guy.

Q: 5th AF?

W: Yes, then he became PACAF - PACUSA, we called it - and he knew that I used to be close to Hap Arnold, for two reasons: One, that was my job; two, he'd seen the list of Generals to be retained, and I never saw my name on the list, but I gather I was quite a ways up there, because this impressed Ennis Whitehead. I'd never fired a shot in anger or even heard one, except some buzz bombs in London, which didn't make you a big guy with Ennis Whitehead, on account I was so high up on Arnold's list. Ennis thought there must be something to me. So, anyway, one night at a New Year's Eve, he and I got loaded together and he told me that Hap Arnold didn't like him, didn't like him at all, and he wasn't sure he liked Hap Arnold either. Well, anyway, this remained in my mind. On a trip into Washington one time with Ennis, to go to the Pentagon to see if he could get more people, or some damn thing, I went into the Statler Hotel, the taxi entrance, and ran into Gen and Mrs. Arnold. Oh, you know, he was so glad to see me, and after talking just a few minutes, I said: "Sir, will you do me a favor?" He said: "Sure, I'll do anything for you." I quickly told him that Ennis was in town. Ennis had the idea that Hap didn't like him, even though he was a LTGEN, for God's sake. And I said: "Why don't you fix that?" And Hap said: "I will." And he got ahold of Ennis, and he and Mrs. Arnold had him to tea, and all the way home from then on, in all my association with Ennis Whitehead he said: "That Arnold, he's the greatest guy in the world." He had

just turned his charm on, he could turn his charm on for you.

Q: Let me add something to that which may help fill in this whole story. Ennis Whitehead was Kenney's man for the 13th AF. Arnold had two other candidates like Bill Streett and Tommy White. This is perhaps why Ennis Whitehead thought Arnold didn't like him.

Q: This Ennis Whitehead - a rough and tough guy?

W: Oh yes. He wasn't really that tough. He was chicken as far as people went. But I've got to tell you a story about Ennis Whitehead.

Q: Was Arnold the same sort of guy, in that he had a gruff exterior as a facade sometimes?

W: He could change. As I say, he could be madder than hell.. In the next half hour he'd turn the charm on. He was, he had all these various facets.

Q: Was his anger controlled? In other words, when he exploded, could he turn it off?

W: I think he could turn it off the next instant, if he wanted to, yes. Loudest I ever heard him, the maddest I ever heard him was way back in the CCC days when he was sending Chuck Stone up to Camp Idlewild. Chuck hadn't even gone yet. He'd just learned right while he was in his office that he had the assignment, and the Old Man just yelled at him, and chewed him out to beat the band. I couldn't tell everything that was going on, but Chuck came out, and I said: "What the hell happened?" And he said: "The Old Man gave me hell about...." I said: "You haven't even been there yet." He said, "Yeah, I know, but it's what will happen to me if I don't fix it." And Chuck fixed it. Hap had his tricks. I think a lot of the things, weren't just instinctive. He was thinking all the time, how to get the very best out of people.

Q: Then I'm thinking a lot of this was planned, that is, if he could get

more out of Stone by screaming at him, he did it.

W: Correct.

Q: Perhaps in your case, putting his arm around your shoulder?

W: Right, same thing. He was just that smart.

Q: I want to ask about a related issue, that smile.

W: Oh yes, look out! This is what my wife always used to say when Hap Arnold got that grin on his face. This didn't mean he was very happy about anything. It would mean "watch everything," because the Old Man is up to something.

Q: You couldn't tell whether he was happy or not?

W: No, you couldn't really tell. I think it was my wife. He liked her. He liked us both. One time when all the people came back from the Alaskan flight and came into the March Field, and we had quite a to-do for them, and later we were all at tables, pretty cramped tables out on the patio. My wife and I were leaving. I don't know why we left before everybody else, babies or something. We went over to say goodbye to the Arnolds, and my wife - Hap had no intention of getting up - my wife said: "Don't get up, Colonel Arnold." And that grin, and he stood up, but he never held that kind of grudge.

W: It seems to me,was the fact that in the Air Corps we were, belonged to Corps Area Commanders. On the Chuck Stone subject - Chuck Stone was in 11th Bombardment Squadron. He got married over in Tucson. We had to get permission from two Corps Area Commanders, one the 9th Corps Area, and one the 4th Corps Area to fly a few bombers over to Tucson to Chuck Stone's wedding. Well, this rankled. Part of this is the background that led to a separate Air Force. Another thing here, he never did believe in planting units overseas at the end of the war. He told me many, many times, he said: "Now, you'll be around a lot longer than I am, but you've got to not do that. Don't get too many

people over. Just have a cadre over there, and the wives and kids at home in the US. Fly your airplanes over, and bring them back." Well, of course, he didn't last long enough to carry it on.

Q: He believed in a mobile concept rather than stationing....?

W: Yes, he sure did. Yes, small housekeeping units over there, and rotate the tactical units. I had a classmate, Doowillie Williamson in the Air Corps, who reported into March Field one day for duty. I don't know whether he came and visited us in our quarters, and which we didn't appreciate, because we didn't even know he was coming. So, anyway, the next day I brought him in to Hap Arnold's office, I think I told Hap that morning that he was a classmate. And he parked himself on the Wetzel family, and he was coming in to report, and, "Can I bring him in to see you?" He said: "Sure". So I brought him in. Well, he just turned all of his charm on. Well, he said, "This is wonderful." Now, he said, "we are so glad to have you, and there are no quarters available on base, but you take all the time you want to get settled, because you probably will be in that house the whole time you are here" and so on. And he turned around and said: "Take two days." Hap Arnold was getting him out of the Wetzel house, "take two days and find a place to live and move." He was always thinking.

Q: Always thinking ahead?

W: Yes. An air mail story. I wasn't on the air mail, I stayed on the CCC, and with Col "Fred" Lohman, No. 2 guy.

Q: This is Eugene "Fred" Lohman. He was the No. 2 man.

W: No good at all, and every time something would come up with the CCC, and I mentioned it to him, he said: "What do you think the Colonel would say?" And I said: "I don't know what the Colonel would say, but this is the way it ought to be done." And he would say: "Well, I don't know what the Colonel would

say." And I said: "Why don't you let me worry about it." And he never made a decision the whole time.

Q: I heard a story about Lohman that a tree fell down one time, and Arnold asked him to remove it. This was near the CO's house.

W: I can remember that.

Q: Lohman took forever and a day to move it. This put him on Arnold's list. This is probably characteristic of this fellow's indecision.

W: Yes, you know, I think through the years Hap got fed up with senior people that weren't any good.

Q: This Lohman was one of these senior people hanging around?

W: Yes, and of course, when we got into the war, and then, he really discovered that he had a hell of a lot of people way up at the top that weren't any good.

Q: I saw lots of correspondence about "deadwood."

W: Right. Oh boy! I know. But he was softhearted, because he had the staff through all the years that during the war, he tried to figure out a way to ease these guys out. He even talked about setting up a separate station - put them all in there, let them do something, deadwood.

Q: Did he talk to you about this?

W: Oh yes; oh Lord yes. I said: "All you have to do is just tell them to move over, make room." These were people that..He never did it. We'd move them around. We'd hide them, we'd do things....

Q: From him, or hide them with his knowledge?

W: Well, and without his knowledge. In other words, we wouldn't let them create a problem.

Q: In other words, when you felt that his attention would be called to a

man not competent?

W: We'd ease him into some other assignment. I remember one day he called up and said: "I want Parker to run Bolling." Yes sir, there were three old guys at Bolling senior to Lou Parker. We had to move three of them by nightfall. When Arnold said he wanted something done, he didn't mean tomorrow. He meant now. Well, everybody understood that. Even the guys that got moved. They were probably a little annoyed about it, but the Old Man wanted it, so be it. But that's just the way he was. One day in the Pentagon, in the early days the main squawk boxes to the Old Man were the A's, A-1, etc. They were supposed to be manned at all times. Then the lesser lights were tied into the A-s squawkboxes. Well, this noontime, I don't know who Hap Arnold was calling, but some secretary or somebody answered. This, I guess made him mad, because it should have been an officer. We had enough officers. We didn't have to have a secretary answer the old man's squawkbox. So he said something, and she must have said something, and he said: "This is Arnold." And she said: "Arnold, who?" You've probably heard this story. But God almighty, from that day forward there was at least a Colonel sitting at the squawkbox. Back to right after the air mail, I guess things were pretty casual up on air mail, uniformwise, and so on. This particular morning, Hap was walking directly in front of headquarters down toward one of the squadrons, and some Master Sergeant or Tech Sergeant or something, who had been with him on air mail kind of shuffled by, didn't salute. He kind of nodded, or something. Hap got about 5 steps down there and he turned around and called him, busted him right on the spot. That same morning, Crosswaite - I don't know if you have ever heard of him - anyway, he was a squadron commander and one of his sergeants came in and kind of leaned on the desk and Crosswaite said: "Say, you didn't hear what happened to Sergeant so and so, did you?" No, I didn't

hear, and Crosswaite told him, well, about a half an hour later, in comes this guy, shook up. Anyway, that was all that was necessary. That place bucked up. I don't know, I've forgotten whether he had the authority to bust them all the way down, but he did. Which reminds me, too, of during the war. You never told General Arnold that a regulation prohibited something. You know why? He said: "Write a new regulation; don't give me that stuff." He got away with it. All the way up to General Marshall. Later, I moved up to G-1 of the War Dept, and knew Tom Handy very well and he....

Q: I just talked to him.

W: Did you, oh, I loved him, because I always felt that I was keeping him. He was the No. 2 guy, you know, and I'd come in and always sat on the edge of chair so I could get my business done and leave. And he'd fling back in his chair and put his feet up and said "Relax." He'd like to sit and talk.

Q: You say Arnold got away with changing regulations?

W: Oh yes, just because they were toward a good end.

Q: Did he ever insist on setting up some regulation and then he found out that it hampered him, and he had it changed?

W: I don't remember.

Q: What I'm leaning to is, sometimes he made quick decisions, perhaps not an impulsive decision, but a quick decision. He might have thought about it beforehand, but then did he realize that he had made a mistake, and if so, did he say: "I'm sorry, let's do something else." Or did he do the other thing without admitting error?

W: I can't really answer. I don't remember him every saying...

Q: Saying "I goofed"?

W: No, I don't remember that. But he may have. When I was Base Adjutant

just for a short time, somebody got sick. I was too junior to be the Base Adjutant. I was acting as Base Adjutant for several months. But there was quite a lot of talent on that base - Spaatz, McNarney and Monk Hunter. Anyway, I think it had something to do with efficiency reports or something, that I had tied it up and I'd made a mistake. I'd given either Spaatz hell, in my fashion, and they raised hell with the Old Man. You know who he backed? Me! I'd misunderstood what I thought he wanted, he didn't let me down, he could handle the other fellows. So he was pretty good.

Q: You feel that you needed the support, and they didn't?

W: I think that's what he felt, yes. He didn't want to lose me, and he had them. They could take it.

Q: What were his relations with Spaatz and Eaker on the base?

W: I think, what's the word, not cold or cool, but I think professional. I don't think he was buddy with them.

Q: With Spaatz and Eaker?

W: No.

Q: Spaatz was a Major when Arnold was a LTCOL. Arnold had a great admiration for Spaatz' ability.

W: Oh yes, no question about it. He retained that, too.

Q: Spaatz called him "Hap," didn't he?

W: I guess he did, yes.

Q: He was one of his few contemporaries who could to his face.

W: That's right.

Q: Everybody else called him Col Arnold or Gen Arnold, as the case might be?

W: Right, right.

Q: Were you there when he made his star, in 1935?

W: No, I'd left for Hawaii. I'd moved up to Hamilton with the 7th Bombardment Group, and Hap took me off the CCC, or whatever I was on. He put me back in the group, and sent me up there as a reward for being a good guy. And I got to Hamilton. Within 24 hours I was ordered to Hawaii, because the Chief's office didn't recognize a group movement as being such. So, I beat it back down to March to Hap and I said: "Gee, what can we do about this?" Well, he said: "You can go to see Gen Craig, if you want to," but he said, "I don't think it will do you any good." He said: "I would just take it, and accept it." So I did, I went to see Gen Craig, went back to Hamilton and went into San Francisco and saw Gen Craig. I told him the story that I had been sent up there as a reward and to be back in a tactical outfit. Craig said: "Well, you're going to Hawaii. You'll like it." And that's all there was to that.

Q: We are talking about "deadwood."

W: He never did solve it, but as we looked ahead toward the postwar, new regulations on the subject, he told me, and at that time I was working for G-1.

Q: Is that Idwal Edwards?

W: No, G-1 of the War Dept.

Q: You were working for Gen Steve Henry in G-1. When did you go up there?

W: In January 1945. Hap Arnold told me about the assignment, at the five-star final dinner. Do you have one of those pictures taken at the 5-star dinner?

Q: No, I don't think I have.

W: Oh, it was beautiful.

Q: This was December 1944, right before this?

W: Right, yes, that's when he got his 5-stars. Anyway, Hap Arnold said: "Never let them so organize the military that you keep people beyond their usefulness." In other words, wars are fought and won by the youngsters, not

the oldsters. In other words, you don't want to enter the war with a whole lot of deadwood around. So the AF has done it very well, I mean 30 years, you are out. Or if you are a senior officer, 35 years, the only time it was ever violated outside of the Chief, was Tommy Moorman at the AF Academy. I hated to see them make that exception too, because once you make an exception, why you are going to have guys. Of course, the Army, they fought like hell about this, and they retained a lot of people well beyond their time. Look at Lemnitzer, now Lem's a good guy, but....

Q: Beyond his time?

W: Yes.

Q: We were talking about personnel, and getting rid of the deadwood. Arnold believed that whether a man was rated or not, should not be the ultimate criterion of his promotion to higher office. He used this argumentation with his own sons, to persuade them to transfer from the Army to the AAF. Yet the AF violated this. Do you have any thought on that? Why they did not follow Arnold's direction? Or did he ever talk about this?

W: No, not really, not really. I'm not sure, if Hap had stayed on, I was there when he made the speech to the old Air Staff. He said the next war they were going to be pushing buttons; there won't be a pilot in a damned one of them. So don't...lay off this emphasis on pilots.

Q: He believed this.

W: That's right. But it didn't turn out that way. No, because we still, my two kids are in the AF, and they are both pilots. If you are going to command a flying outfit, you've got to be a pilot. Now, you can be a lot of other things. But if you are going to command a bunch of guys that are going to fly airplanes, you've got to be a pilot.

Q: All right, but why do you need a pilot to command a missile unit?

W: I don't think you do.

Q: They are all rated.

W: Well, I think it just, once again, happenstance. SAC went from bombers to missiles, and they had the people, and once you get in SAC you don't get out. My kid is still in there. I don't know whether he is going to get out.

Q: He thought it would be more missiles than AF?

W: Yes, for instance, he just finished a great big war. He didn't think we would have another one. No one did at that time, so then we got into Korea. Then we got into SE Asia.

Q: But he was going to be ready, he had von Karman thinking 20 years ahead.

W: Yes.

Q: He did not anticipate that the AF would become conservative?

W: That's right.

Q: And the AF has become conservative. Like any organization, once it gets its roots into the ground, it becomes more stable, and it doesn't seek great changes like it did when it was a fledgling.

W: That's right.

Q: So I think that Arnold misread the AF.

W: You will remember, I think it was MacArthur had said, after that first atomic weapon, never again would American kids crawl up anybody's beaches or through anybody's swamps, through machine gun fire. We didn't have to do that anymore, we had the weapon. We don't use it.

Q: A lot of people thought that.

W: I know why we haven't used it too.

Q: Well, it's political, not military.

W: It's the US Army.

Interview - LTGEN Emery Wetzel - McGuire AFB, NJ, Nov 9, 1970.

Q: Do you remember your first encounter with Arnold? Was it at March Field?

W: Oh yes. I was there, a LT. I came to March Field from Rockwell in the fall of '31, October or November of 1931.

Q: He had just arrived on the scene?

W: He hadn't gotten there yet.

Q: He came around Thanksgiving time.

W: Yes, he came shortly afterward. I think my first encounter was in a receiving line.

Q: He stayed with the Spaatz'. Do you remember a guy named Minton Kaye?

W: Oh yes, sure. He was the photographic officer.

Q: Kaye was one of his favorites.

W: Yes. But I don't know what happened to Mint.

Q: He was his favorite up till the end of the war. And then they had a falling out.

W: I don't know why.

Q: Yes, he was one of his favorites at March Field.

W: Yes, he always liked Mint.

Q: Can I speculate one of the reasons? Mrs. Arnold liked Helen Kaye. They were honeymooners and the Arnolds met them on the ship coming around the Canal. Did you know that?

W: I didn't know that.

Q: And Mrs. Arnold sort of took her under her wing, and Mint Kaye had ready access to Arnold's office, did he not? Did he abuse that privilege?

W: I don't think so, no.

Q: The Kayes and the Arnolds saw a lot of each other?

W: Yes, I do remember that. I think maybe more than the Waltons. The Waltons lived right next door to Hap and Mrs. Arnold. More than the average I would say.

Q: Do you have any recollection of that Bear Lake Camp? It was a recreation camp which was scrounged. They put it together.

W: Yes, my most scary recollection is the fact that we used to take those Curtiss Condor bombers up there. I'd forgotten the elevation of that field, but it was to hell and gone up there. It was all right going in, but we went out of there fully loaded too, many times.

Q: Was it the scrounged materials?

W: I don't know what we took out, but we took in scrounged things. Old Pappy Wood was the quartermaster. He painted more buildings at March Field, and did things. They all ended up up there. But the scary thing was that these were Curtiss Condor bombers. This was before manifold pressure, and nobody knew - God help us - that at that altitude you don't get the power unless you had blowers. Some of those takeoffs, it was real scary up there, oh yes, I remember that camp.

Q: Right over the tops of trees?

W: Yes.

Q: Arnold wanted this recreation camp set up?

W: Yes.

Q: He was interested in the welfare of the men?

W: Correct, always was.

Q: Did this endear him to the troops?

W: Oh yes. Oh, I don't think there was ever an enlisted man that didn't think

he was God. Because when he landed at any station around the world during the war or in the US, he'd go right to mess halls. He'd go right to maintenance shops. He'd talk to the Sergeants, the Privates. They all knew when Hap Arnold visited a station, unlike many other very senior people. They got whisked to the Officer's Club and sit in great briefings, not Hap Arnold.

Q: Organization charts and lights and briefing aids.

W: Not Arnold.

Q: He was impatient with formal briefings, wasn't he?

W: Oh yes.

Q: This camp was a great morale booster and he was very interested in it, and I guess he wanted it built. Of course, you didn't have any money.

W: Of course not, these were the depression years.

Q: Do you remember the Economy Act of 1934? Didn't they give everybody an enforced furlough?

W: Sure. They took a month's pay away from us.

Q: But you were expected to work?

W: Yes sir, without pay.

Q: So this was in effect, an 8% cut, 1/12 of your salary was taken away?

W: Yes. I believe the first time I ever saw Gen Arnold was in a receiving line, but at that time I was down in the 11th Bombardment Squadron with Charlie Howard. Then, little Joe McNarney ran the Bombardment Group, and they were fresh out of an Adjutant at some point, and I had to go up there and be the Group Adjutant. I got along with McNarney pretty well, and then later on, the Base Adjutant got sick - I can't remember his name - so I guess somebody said to McNarney: "Who can we send up?" And he sent Wetzel up, and then is when I got to know Hap Arnold. His secretary then was named Miss Mitchell.

Q: Emma?

W: I don't know, but Hap would call her " My God Miss Mitchell" and she loved him. But he would give her hell, in a nice way, "My God, Miss Mitchell," is this so and so?

Q: Robbie Mitchell?

W: I don't know, she was an old girl, and I think she followed him to Washington, as I recall.

Q: I think she became his secretary after he left, when he went back to Hamilton Field.

W: Could be. This is true. She did, because I saw her out there.

Q: She was Robbie Mitchell, I think she was married, and I don't know where she is now. He called her "Robbie." When did Suzy Adkins come in?

W: Damned if I remember. I left March Field in December 1934, and went up to Hamilton and then went to Hawaii. I came back to Mitchel in 1937, and by then, he was an Asst Chief of the Air Corps.

Q: Under Oscar Westover?

W: Yes. At one time he came up to Mitchel for some kind of inspection and a review. There was a great big receiving line, and of course, he was nice. I was a Captain then.

Q: He remembered you?

W: Oh, we came through the receiving line, just stopped. I guess it took 10 minutes. Everybody else -- but this doesn't hurt my stature a damned bit. And, you know, he was like that. I'm sure he knew a great many more people like that.

Q: A lot of people probably figures: "Who's this guy Wetzel?"

W: Yes, gee. Then from Mitchel I went to Pittsburgh, was in Pittsburgh for

a year, then I was ordered into Washington in August 1941.

Q: At what job?

W: Personnel.

Q: You were under Bevans?

W: Yes, but during the war I was Chief of Military Personnel.

Q: Did you work with Trubee Davison?

W: Trubee was A-1, and then later Bevans was A-1. This was the Policy stuff. The guys that filled the ships and the airplanes and so on, the working stiffs, I was Chief of Military Personnel. I was fortunate enough to have a couple of civilian guys in uniform who ran my Overseas Assignments Branch...

Q: This was probably a real sticky job?

W: Carl Goetz, overseas assignments. Anyway, they staff all of Doolittle's business, and Jimmy used to come in and sit and talk to Carl. He wouldn't talk to me. He'd wave to me and say: "How you doing, General?" And these two, they got AF people on the Queens, when nobody else could. (Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary).

Q: This Goetz and Doolittle? Yes, Carl Goetz. He ran Country Club beer. He owned that. He is dead now. Beasley and Goetz ran Overseas Assignments.

Q: I'm anxious to get back to the WWII period, but first I want to cover a couple of points in the March Field experience. In 1933 there was an earthquake.

W: I remember it well.

Q: March 1933. What do you remember about it?

W: Oh well, we were in quarters on the base. The reason we had quarters on the base, we moved up from Rockwell, and Tooey Spaatz, who was with us down at

Rockwell, saw to it that his Rockwell boys got quarters on the base. Anyway, our son Scott, who is now about to become a LTCOL was just a little bitty baby, then. It rumbled and these great big thick walled quarters there, they used to rattle and shake, and you knew something was going on. My wife said: "It's probably a bunch, a formation of bombers going over." I said: "No, sir." So we went out in the backyard. Then of course, we began to get the report, Long Beach, as I recall it.

Q: It was March 9, 1933.

W: Yes, that was something I'll never forget.

Q: Did Arnold do something in the way of rescue?

W: I don't remember that.

Q: Arnold's reported response to the earthquake was a very positive one. When everybody was sort of stunned by the whole event, the first reaction in 9th Corps Area Commander Hqs. in the Presidio was negative to rescue. But when the newspaper reaction - radio, whatnot - praised Arnold for his quick response, then they took another look at this at the Presidio. You have no special recollection?

W: I don't remember that at all. I do remember the earthquake, and as you mention, it does seem to me now that we did send a lot of stuff over there. But I didn't know the reaction of the Corps Area Commander.

Q: Do you have any recollection of the Arnolds socially at March Field. They would have receptions and things at the club. No special recall?

W: Nothing special.

Q: Did Arnold like parties?

W: I really don't know.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold drink?

W: Never. I just don't think he did.

Q: I had heard that possibly in the early '20s he had an ulcer and was in Letterman Hospital for a short period of time. He might have had some drinking experience as a youngster, but most people who knew him in the late '20s, or during the '30s, said at most he carried a glass of sherry around.

W: I believe this is exactly right. Of course, he came out to March Field from somewhere in Kansas, from the doghouse.

Q: He was in Kansas, then he went to Leavenworth, and then he went to Dayton.

W: That's right, he came from Dayton.

Q: Let's go to WWII, or right before it. You came to Washington in '41? Before Pearl Harbor?

W: Oh yes.

Q: In August, all right. Did you have anything to do with that war plan, AWPD-1?

W: No.

Q: You worked for Trubee Davison. Was he on the job at that time?

W: Yes. And then later for Bevans.

Q: What was the relation, Bevans was there too, but what was the relationship between Davison and Bevans? I never could figure it out.

W: I think Jim Bevans was a little awed by Trubee. Trubee was kind of an operator, a big wheel guy, and Jim Bevans...

Q: Was he a sick man - Trubee Davison - crippled?

W: Yes, he was crippled. He had a wheelchair to get around on. But Bevans, God bless him, helped me get promoted. Jim was a little in awe of Trubee Davison,

and Jim was scared to death of Hap Arnold. Scared green. He would not...if he just had to ask Arnold a question he'd get it all written down on a piece of paper, and he would go up and sit outside of Hap Arnold's office for half the morning, when all he had to do was push the button down on the squawk box, and ask the question and kick it off, don't hang on. Many times, when he would have these questions, and he'd be up there to see the Old Man, he would come back at lunch time, and it was my day to sit at the squawk box, or something. I would say: "Did you get to see the Old Man?" He'd say: "No." I pushed the button down. I said: "All you would do is push it down and start talking, and you would get an answer, and just kick it off."

Q: Of course, you had had this experience with Arnold at March Field?

W: I knew that he knew I wouldn't take up his time unless it was important.

Q: But then again, he had an experience with Arnold at Ft. Riley?

W: Bevans did?

Q: Yes.

W: I didn't realize that.

Q: Ft. Riley - 1926-27. So, actually he had a prior experience. He was a horseman, and he told me several experiences. I saw him at Ft. Lauderdale.

W: He's down in Florida?

Q: Yes.

W: Did he tell you that he was scared of Hap Arnold?

Q: No, of course, he wouldn't.

W: No, I suppose not.

Q: Who else was scared of Hap Arnold? Frozen?

W: I don't think many people. Joe Loutzenheizer, who was with Kuter in Plans, and McKee was never scared of him, and McNaughton.

Q: McNaughton had the Pilot Training, didn't he?

W: Yes under Bob Harper. Most of those people weren't. Oh, I'll tell you who was not frightened of him, but George Stratemeyer.

Q: He died last year.

W: Yes. We would have these staff meetings, and I guess Stratemeyer...

Q: He was Chief of Air Staff. No. Two man.

W: Yes, and we would get in there and Strat would say: "Now, fellows, let's not say anything to upset the Old Man, because this is not a very good day for him. Let's just play this cool."

Q: Did he try to keep things, sticky problems away from the Old Man?

W: Oh sure, you know, he was afriad that he would get into them. You know what they always said about Strat - if he'd been a girl he'd been pregnant all the time. He could never say "no." Annalee, was great, his wife.

Q: I want to ask you about Suzy Adkins. Did Suzy Adkins act as a weather-vane for you? In other words, would she call you and say: "General Wetzel," maybe you were a Colonel at that time?

W: Yes, I was, I got promoted in Oct 1944.

Q: Did she call up, or if you called up, would you ask her: "Is this a good day to see the Old Man?"

W: Right, yes.

Q: So she acted as a weathervane?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Did she ever call you and say: "That problem you were talling me about, today's a good day." Or, "today is not a good day."

W: No, not to me, she may have to Bevans, never to me.

Q: Did you generally ask her, or just occasionally?

W: Occasionally. As I say, I never hesitated to see the Old Man about anything. One time, I remember this, Tommy DuBose and I - he ended up a General - but he was Training, and I was Personnel, and McKee was Operations Commitments and Requirements (OC&R). Anyway, I had been to Europe with Mr. Lovett earlier on a trip, so I knew him pretty well, and I guess he...

Q: I just talked to him on the telephone.

W: And anyway, this one Sunday morning or something, Lovett got DuBose and Wetzel in there and he really said some, I felt, critical things about Gen Arnold. And he was Asst Secy of War for Air.

Q: Lovett said these critical things?

W: Yes, and you know, I wonder why the old man does this? Why doesn't he do it the other way, you know. We tried...we went straight into the Old Man and I did the talking, I said: "We have just been with the Secy and this is what he said, and I didn't like it." The Old Man was standing there grinning, and he said: "Let me handle the Secretary, you guys worry about your own problems. I'll handle the Secy. I never knew to this day whether there was any feeling between the two, or not.

Q: There was a warm feeling between the two in most instances. I talked to Lovett at great length and on several issues. Of course, I have been told that Lovett acted as a balance wheel. In a sense, that Arnold would make impulsive decisions and in some cases, Lovett, without trying, overtly to steer him back on course, would sweet talk him out of some of these changes.

W: That's very possible.

Q: Does this fit in with your recollection?

W: Yes, I think so. But Arnold would make, I remember he came back one time from a trip to North Africa, and there were just no spare airplanes over there

on the ground at all. In other words, the commanders were hurting. They didn't have their TOs filled with aircraft. He came back and raised hell. Six months later he went over again and came back, apparently, North Africa, according to Hap was just covered with airplanes. His famous statement, I thought: "Just because I turned it on, can't somebody turn it off?" You know what I mean: He said get some airplanes over there, well, he didn't mean to keep doing it forever.

Q: Right. This is one of the things that caused him some pain. When he would come into a place and see a lot of airplanes sitting around, and he would ask questions: "Well, why are these planes here?" He wanted to see planes in action. He didn't want anybody sitting around. Did you ever encounter this concern of his? He had this great concern when he landed in a new place.

W: No. I will tell you one thing that the AAF were way ahead of the Army, that was in keeping track of our people. Our air crews were critical teams, you know. If you didn't watch them, the damned Army would unload them in North Africa and have them sweeping our barracks. They weren't getting through. So Tex Thornton and Stat Control, Ed Learned, all those people, and Personnel....

Q: Guy named McNamara was in that, wasn't he?

W: Yes, he was one of the whiz kids. We devised a way to keep track of our crews, and saw that the Overseas Assignment Branch, Goetz and Beasley, would keep track of these crews until it got all the way to their squadron. And so, our Stat. Control was really good. And it did us in good stead. I remember at the end of the European war, I was in G-1 of the War Dept. The war was over, and all these troops were coming home from Europe and they had to go to separation centers. The Army ran the separation centers, and the Army commanders were screaming for

people, for typists, for this, for that, and the other. They put the bee on the AAF and I was in G-1 representing the AAF and I said: "All right. You need people? What is your requirement, and how many do you have?" The Army didn't know how many they had. All they knew was that they needed some more, and I said: "The AF knows how many it's got, and how many in excess of our needs we have. We'll give you all of those. But until you know what you are talking about, we just won't deal with you."

Q: Did they ever come around with a figure?

W: Oh yes, they worked on it. Right at the tail end of the war, air crew material was really critical. The Army had this profile. To be a combat infantryman you had to be such and such. They were just taking our combat crew personnel and putting them into Infantry.

Q: I want to ask you about this. Right about the time of the Battle of the Bulge, the AAF got laid upon by Gen Marshall for Infantry.

W: That's right.

Q: You had to convert a lot of Aviation Cadets into Infantry. Now this was a sore point?

W: Right, it sure as hell was.

Q: Could you tell me about that?

W: Well, yes. I was up in the War Dept. I guess I went to the War Dept to help that solve that one.

Q: Is that part of the reason you went over there?

W: Yes, part of the reason I went up there. And I solved it all right, because it was very simple. Every division that went to Europe went full, qualified combat infantrymen. I knew precisely what they were. I knew every combat infantryman replacement we had sent. I knew all casualties. I had these

figures. I had to put it on the back of an envelope. This convinced Marshall, he thought that was cute. And 80% of all casualties went back into the front lines. So, there were one million qualified combat infantrymen in excess in Europe at the time they were asking the AAF for our combat crews. Where were they? They were the second crews on trucks from Antwerp. They didn't need those qualifications. So what we did was tell Eisenhower, you find your replacement combat infantrymen right from your own outfits.

Q: But they still took...Didn't Marshall put the bee on Arnold?

W: Yes, that was before I got up, but I stopped it.

Q: They took many thousands of Aviation Cadets in the AAF?

W: That's right, yes.

Q: Did this cause a great problem among parents of, let's say, aircrewmen, men who had been sent to navigation school, pilot school, and then, suddenly, they are yanked out of there? A great hardship.

W: I don't know. The one thing I do want to remember; I do want to tell you. During the war we had what was known as service pilots. These were people not trained in AAF or Air Corps schools, but they were a pilot to begin with, and they wanted to get in and get a commission, and wear service pilot wings, not combat, but service pilots. We were pretty damned selective in the way we took in a service pilot. We looked at his record, and we examined him carefully. Well, this was a political thing. All the Senators had dozens of service pilots that we had turned down, and they wanted us to commission. So it got so hot that Gen Arnold....

Q: These service pilots were not commissioned at first?

W: Oh, they were commissioned, if we accepted them as a service pilot he was commissioned. But we didn't accept them all. Of course, everybody graduated....

Q: Was this a thinly disguised draft dodge?

W: Well, prestige, probably, to get commissioned to be a service pilot. You didn't fly combat, but you flew supply runs. Anyway, it was a hot political subject. And we kept getting letters all the time from Congress. We finally went, I guess it was to the Senate, maybe it was the Joint group, Senate and House, and Arnold himself, and Wetzel went. And Arnold said to me: "Now, you know all these guys on the committee. Look through your letters from them, and be prepared to shoot down everyone of those that we turned down, because he was a drunkard or he didn't have this, or he was no good." So we, of course, we didn't commission him. Well, we got to the hearing and they started taking Hap Arnold apart. "Why do you do this, and why haven't you done that?" And so and so, and he got mad. You may have heard this story?

Q: No.

W: I didn't open my mouth. I was prepared. He stood up and said: "So many years ago, you put one star on my shoulder, and made me Asst Chief of the AF. At such and such a time you put two stars on, and did so and so," and he was getting madder all the time he was saying this. And I don't remember how many he had then. But he got to this point, and he said: "You made me Chief of the Army Air Forces, and so on." He said: "If you can get somebody to do it better, you go right ahead." He turned right on his heel. This whole group, there must have been 40 Senators, all stood up and gave him a standing ovation. That solved it. We never heard one additional word.

Q: You know, he had this great sense of public relations. If he could wave the flag, this would answer the whole issue, rather than answer it by ifs and buts.

W: He just didn't want to get nitpicked on all these little damned things, so he said: "If you can get somebody to do it better, go right ahead, good

morning." And I just looked at the whole Committee, as they stood up there applauding, and I looked out, and turned and followed him out.

Q: He gambled. He put his whole prestige on the line, and he won.

W: Oh yes, they applauded him.

Q: A very good story. Let me ask you a sticky one. Elliott Roosevelt. Do you remember anything about that? Did you get involved in that?

W: No, I didn't get involved in that.

Q: Especially in his being promoted to a Brig. General.

W: I didn't get involved in that.

Q: They didn't get it down to your level?

W: No.

Q: Handled at a higher level?

W: Right.

Q: Elliott was promoted when Arnold got sick. Spaatz had recommended that they promote him. Eisenhower had recommended that they promote him. Arnold didn't want him promoted. But Arnold got sick and then they promoted him. This was the end of January 1945. You don't remember?

W: No.

Q: Let me ask you another personnel problem. This was the ratio of combat crews to airplanes. This got to be a very sticky issue.

W: Sure did.

Q: We were losing men at Schweinfurt-Regensburg; all these losses we were suffering.

W: It was the number of missions you had to fly before you came home. Is that what you mean?

Q: Right, the number of missions. We were suffering great losses there for

a time, at first they had 25 missions, and then Arnold wrote a piece of paper that said we should not go by a number. Then they went back to the 25 missions thing, because...Can you tell me something about the problems this created for you, created for him?

W: There was a personnel shortage. Even though we at one time were turning out our pilots at the rate of 125,000 a year - can you beat that - this is not what we planned to turn out, but it just happened that way. There were so many little variables. But we just didn't have the combat crews to support the operation, and support the losses that we were getting. So you can only do two things; you keep them there a little longer, or you hold down your operations.

Q: This is when they repealed the 25 mission clause?

W: Yes.

Q: And this hurt morale?

W: Oh sure, because if there is one....

Q: A guy figures I've got one or two more mssions to go, and then they change the signals on him. So this created a great morale problem?

W: Sure did.

Q: You know, Arnold sent Eddie Rickenbacker overseas to talk to the boys. Here was the guy who shot down 26 enemy planes. Do you have any knowledge or any involvement in that program to improve morale?

W: No, I knew Eddie, of course, but I didn't know anything about that.

Q: Do you remember a man named Steve Ferson, Oliver Ferson. Died....

W: ...In Arnold's office...

Q: It was Arnold's office, as far as your recollection?

W: Yes.

Q: You were in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor. Do you remember the leak of the RAINBOW FIVE plan by the Chicago Tribune. Three days before Pearl Harbor, it was published, you don't remember?

W: No.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack in 1945?

W: Yes, but I don't remember much about it.

Q: They kept it very quiet. This was in January 1945. He had a major heart attack, and they took him down to Coral Gables.

W: Yes, I remember. I remember him saying once I get this war over, I'm going to go out to California and sit under a tree, and I don't want an airplane to get within 1,000 miles of me.

Q: He said that to you?

W: Yes.

Q: He said that several times. They brought Eaker in when Arnold came back from his heart attack, from his recuperation. They brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. Were you there? This is in the Spring of 1945.

W: I was up in the War Dept.

Q: Do you remember when Eaker came in as Deputy Commander, AAF? Giles moved out to the Pacific.

W: Yes, I remember when Barney went out there.

Q: Do you remember when Eaker came in?

W: No, I was up in the War Dept.

Q: Talking about Arnold and Andrews. He thought Andrews was a great one?

W: A great one, I believe, and I'm sure Andrews thought Arnold was.

Q: Was there any rivalry, they were contemporaries. Andrews was a year ahead of Arnold.

W: That's right. I think Hap would have been happy to have seen Andrews the top dog.

Q: Well, he was the top dog in Europe. He had been appointed CG, ETO, and if not for that plane crash, he might have had the job Eisenhower had.

W: Yes, he had a presence - Andrews.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of their relationship?

W: No, no.

Q: You were saying something earlier that if Arnold liked you, you could do no wrong, but if he didn't like you, you could do no right.

W: That's so.

Q: Related to that is something somebody told me that those who came up with Arnold on the West Coast, those he knew and those he trusted, those who had come up with him, got the better jobs. Those who had come up with Andrews at Langley -- Tony Frank, Knerr, some of the others, did not get as good jobs.

W: I think that's true. I think simply because Arnold knew them, knew the individuals, and knew what he could expect from them.

Q: And you tend to give an important job to somebody you have learned to depend upon?

W: Yes.

Q: Tony Frank wanted a combat command, and he never got one, and he became rather bitter at Arnold.

W: Right.

Q: Knerr was very close to Andrews, as you may know. He retired when Andrews was sent out of Washington, and he had a hard time coming back. Now, you were in Personnel, you might know something about that?

W: I wasn't dealing in the Generals then.

Q: But do you remember that Knerr had retired. He was trying to come back right after Pearl Harbor and it took him over a year to come back. Do you remember anything about that?

W: Nope, but he later did a fine job in England and Europe.

Q: He was a very competent guy.

W: Oh yes.

Q: But Arnold did not trust him?

W: Yes. See, today, to run an AF you need so many people to help you. The Chief doesn't know everybody, and even when in the '50s when I was down there in DCS/P I don't think we promoted a single man to General that at least I didn't know or that Vandenberg didn't know. But, today, I mean, you can't know them all. Now, back when WWII started, Hap Arnold promoted those that he knew, that he had served with. He had to take somebody else's word for those he didn't know quite as well, and I think he hesitated to do that.

Q: Knerr told me that Arnold had loyalty up, and laterally, but not loyalty down, in a sense in getting promotions or decorations for his troops.

W: I don't believe that.

Q: You don't accept that?

W: No, sir.

Q: Kuter was one of his favorites, and Kuter got his promotion through Marshall.

W: Yes, because he was up on the General Staff. Well, Kuter was not really one of his favorites. I think Hap Arnold appreciated his talent.

Q: Kuter was sort of a cold guy. His intellectual grasp....

W: Right, I don't think he ever really got close to Arnold. I don't think Arnold really ever liked him. You know what I mean?

Q: As compared to Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Oh no. You've talked to Rosie? You know, Rosie has always said, I never heard Hap tell the story, but Rosie always said that Hap's favorite story.

Q: About the clock?

W: No, but I remember that story. When O'Donnell took the damn inkwell and threw it.

Q: What story is this?

W: Hap's favorite story was who sleeps with Cat - Mrs. Cat, and sometimes Mrs. Hussbaum. That was supposed to be Arnold's favorite story.

Q: Did Rosie O'Donnell tell this story?

W: He says that it was Hap Arnold's favorite story, and may very well have been.

Q: Rosie O'Donnell is a great story teller.

W: Oh yes.

Q: Do you know any stories involving O'Donnell and Arnold?

W: Yes, I think when Gen Arnold came back, right at the beginning of the war, came back from India, O'Donnell was over there. He came back in and he got ahold of me and he said: "Who is this O'Donnell guy?" And I said: "Well, he's a pretty good guy." I said: "I taught him how to fly a B-18 when he was at Mitchel. He did a lot of football coaching and so on." Hap said: "Do you think he would be any good on my Advisory Council?" And I said: "Yeah." So, anyway, Hap said: "Get him home." So he got him home, and O'Donnell came in to see me, and I told him the story. And O'Donnell said: "Who is this guy Arnold?

Q: Do you know why he came to Arnold's attention? When Arnold was out there

somebody had given a briefing and said the British were going to invade Burma in May. O'Donnell said they are not going to invade in May. Arnold looked at this guy, and said: "How do you know?" He was an awfully brash guy.

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: O'Donnell said he knew the British and they were not going to invade Burma in May and he was right. Arnold admired a guy who would stand up for his convictions. This was after the Casablanca conference. Arnold came back in Feb 1943. He went to India and China after the Casablanca Conference, and that's when he first encountered O'Donnell.

W: Apparently, he didn't know O'Donnell. Their paths had never crossed. He said: "Who is this guy O'Donnell?" He said to me.

Q: You see, this guy who had stood up for his convictions and disagreed with the briefing that Arnold was getting, he was the kind of guy Arnold wanted on his staff. Tell me about the Advisory Council. Arnold had Cabell and Norstad right at the beginning.

W: Yes, he had Cabell and Norstad; he had Jake Smart, O'Donnell and Fred Dean.

Q: A guy named McRae?

W: No, I don't think so. I really don't know what use Hap made of them. I don't know how he used them. They never talked.

Q: They were sort of Ministers without Portfolio. They were idea men.

W: Yes.

Q: Did they interfere with operations?

W: No, because they were talented enough to know how to handle themselves.

Q: But they went by twos. He gave them sort of special assignments, to dig up research information. Did he ever give the same assignment to two or

three people, to see what kind of answers he got?

W: I can't answer that, I just don't know. He might have, I don't know.

Q: Tell me about Benny Meyers.

W: The only thing I know is that Hap always thought Benny Meyers was pretty good operator, and I don't know whether he ever got really mad at him. Of course, Benny caused us a hell of a lot of embarrassment in the Air Force.

Q: Later?

W: Yes.

Q: Well, Arnold thought he was great.

W: Yes.

Q: Why?

W: I don't know.

Q: I was told he would give Arnold figures that Arnold wanted to hear.

W: Oh, I don't know that. That's possible.

Q: He gave Arnold optimistic information I'm told. Arnold accepted optimistic information, knowingly, or knowing that this information was somewhat inflated. But Meyers gave the information with the belief that our production process would make a falsehood come true. And Arnold, knowing that the President wanted optimistic information, gave him what he wanted, knowing that Benny was feeding him incorrect information. Is this feasible?

W: Quite possible. I would expect that it would be pretty hard to fool Hap Arnold.

Q: But wasn't this slightly unethical on Arnold's part?

W: Well, I guess so.

Q: In a sense, he was slightly unethical on a lot of things, in that, there was a regulation that said: "You can't do it." And he said: "Forget about the

regulation; let's get it done."

W: "Write a new regulation." He told me that several times.

Q: In other words, he was looking at the larger picture. If he thought that the objective was worth obtaining, he was not interested in the paper regulation which said he couldn't do it that way. Is this your estimate of his character?

W: Exactly my estimate.

Q: I think Benny Meyers anticipated that Arnold was a guy like this, and Benny Meyers gave him what he wanted. Why didn't Arnold go to Echols? You know, he was Meyers' boss.

W: I don't know.

Q: Maybe he couldn't get the information from him?

W: That's probably true. On Personnel, I just thought of something. Some very high powered British came over to visit us one time. We had a great to-do at Bolling for them. We opened up the gymnasium.

Q: Was this Churchill?

W: No, I don't think it was Churchill.

Q: Was it Trenchard?

W: It could have been Trenchard. But anyway, when I saw this evening, we were all suited up, black tie, whatever, tuxedo, I've forgotten, and I looked at that crowd and I said: "Oh, oh," and it happened. The Hqs. was cut, and I put down 25%. It may have been just 10, but I saw that coming.

Q: Let me ask you about the factor of strong love or hate towards Arnold. Why were people so emotionally charged about him?

W: Just because he was Hap Arnold. The way he operated. But you soon learned that he either liked you or he didn't like you, and of course, this was about the middle strata. His contemporaries, I think most of them respected him, they

were jealous as hell, because he was a big man, Hap Arnold was. Let me tell you about this Lou Parker story. Lou Parker was in CCC Hqs., this was early in the CCC business.

Q: In 1933, maybe?

W: Yes, but we were still building our camps. And I was Hap's Adjutant, I moved up from Base Adjutant, and I was his Base Adjutant when we got the message from Malin Craig, coded. We had to sit up all evening and decode the damn thing. The first message on CCC, and it said: "Be prepared to accept so many people." Anyway, that night, Malin Craig did call Hap Arnold. The only time I ever saw Hap sit on the edge of a chair, in other words, be other than his usual self. And he was saying "Yes, sir" and "no, sir" to Malin Craig, the Corps Area Commander. Anyway, I moved from there when Hap became, when he took on the CCC problem. I was his Adjutant, and that little old headquarters there at March Field. Down at one end of the hall was quite a bit of room where most of the staff on the CCC problem worked. Lou Parker was in charge of recreation, I think, for these jerks that came out from the East. We did a weekly report of camp completion, which we had to send to Malin Craig, either 80% or 85%. Well, Camp Lone Pine had gone along fairly well. It had got to about 85%, and it stuck there for about 3 weeks. Hap Arnold was just, you know, you could hear it whenever he got mad, the whole top floor of that headquarters. Anyway, called in Lou Parker. "Parker." We went in and talked a few minutes, and out came Parker, and he said to Gene Beebe, who was Operations Officer at that time, he said: "Say, I need an airplane early tomorrow, to go up to Lone Pine."

Q: This is Parker?

W: Yes, and Gene said: "Tomorrow is Saturday. You can't take off until

after the review, and the parade, which will be about 10:30," Lou said: "Gee, the Old Man's sent me up there, and I've got to complete that camp." So, anyway, Gene, he went in to see the Old Man. There were loud voices in there. Gene came out, and said: "The Old Man wants to see you again, Louis." Louis went in, and you could hear the Old Man. "Early, hell, I said daylight." And, by God, the next morning at whatever the official hour of daylight was, a BT-2 took off with Parker to go to Lone Pine. He didn't know anything about finishing a camp. This was Saturday. By Monday afternoon it was 100% complete. Parker came back down. Of course, we all said: "How did you do it?" He said: "I knew I had to do it, and I got to Lone Pine, the little village of Lone Pine." And he called a town meeting, and it was probably the only emotional speech that Lou Parker made, and he got the whole town out. Now, this was the Arnold effect. When Arnold gave you a job, you knew you had it. In other words, that was his gift. He could put this responsibility down on your shoulders, and brother, you had it.

Q: And it made you want to do it for him?

W: Mostly. I say, yes, I don't know why you did. You either did it because you were frightened to death, or because you loved him, or because you just knew you had to do it.

Q: How about respect?

W: Oh yes, sure.

Q: Was this Lone Pine one of the first CCC camps?

W: No, one of our 25, we had 25 camps.

Q: How many boys did you have under your control?

W: Gee, I don't know.

Q: How many in each camp?

W: Oh, 150, something like that.

Q: So you must have had...

W: 35,000, something like that. I've just forgotten.

Q: You had 25 camps, and 150 in each camp, that's 4,000 or so. I got a figure that there were 25,000 CCC boys in the March Field district.

Q: No, we had 25 camps, and there may have been 500 in a camp. But I don't know, I've just really forgotten, but it was a sizable amount, it was a hell of a big job.

Q: And was this Lone Pine the first of the group?

W: No, that was one of the later ones. The earlier ones were close in to Riverside, Temecular. We had one up the hill at Idlewild. This Lou Parker story simply is what Hap Arnold could do. He could get the absolute best out of you. Now, I'm sure if Louis didn't tell you that story. I don't know why, because this was one of the great emotional things that had happened to Lou Parker. The next story, the note I have here, the story of taking Hap to Chungking. And I'm sure I don't want to repeat the story, but the thing I remember was that they knew they were lost. They went back to speak to the Old Man, and I don't know why they thought, if he would come up and help, he just sat there and grinned. And he said to Lou Parker, he said: "You're the pilot." And Lou said: "I knew I had to get him there." In other words, Hap gave him the responsibility: "You're the pilot." And of course, they made it. Now, that was my part of that story.

W: So many crazy things happened. In this CCC business, Hap would visit all these camps, and early in the morning, very early in the morning. When he did, he'd fly his P-12 up to the closest field, and always, as he did later as a five-star General, he always would talk to the lowliest enlisted man and the

lowliest CCC boy to find out. That was his trick.

Q: He did this often during the war?

W: Oh yes.

Q: When he went on inspection trips, he always went to the maintenance shack, or down to talk to the people where the problems began.

W: Oh yes, and a lot of commanders didn't appreciate this. Because he would go up to the dumbest looking GI and ask him crazy questions, you know, real solid questions.

Q: The lowest common denominator. If you got a good answer out of that fellow then you had a good camp?

W: That's right. This particular morning, this was before we got into, no, I hadn't moved down to CCC Hqs., I was just Base Adjutant, and he came in. And I never once got to Base Headquarters before him, he always beat me. We made kind of a joke out of it, you know, he'd kind of kid me. But this morning he came in madder than hell, he started to climb into his P-12, and his parachute came undone and blew in the wind. Oh, was he mad. He came in there and he glared at me, and he said: "Do we have formal retreat?" And I said: "No, sir, we don't have formal retreat." And he said: "We will from now on, every afternoon, formal retreat with boots on." You know, in the old days, we would just wear our flight jackets, blouses, boots, Sam Brownes, everything. And I said: "Why?" He said: "My God damned parachute came open." Now that was his letting off steam, and we did it for about three months, yes sir.

Q: Then he cooled off on it?

W: Oh yes. He forgot it. I think he would get mad and not hold a grudge and forget it, if he liked you.

Q: Was he a spit and polish man?

W: No, not in the sense say that Tony Frank was. I don't think Hap Arnold ever opened up a GI can in a quarters area, to see if it was clean, you know. Although he demanded that his aircraft be clean, he didn't make a great thing of it, like some people that I have known. Another note I've got here is that he used to say: "The trick is to get this carrot just the right distance out in front. If it is too far, the guy will give up, and he can't make it. If it's too close, it's too easy. The trick is to get that goal out, the carrot, at the right distance," and he seemed to know.

Q: Get the guy running at his maximum, get the most out of people. What you say, it reminds me of something someone else told me. Arnold had this knack of knowing when a man was going beyond his endurance.

W: He knew that, it was some instinctive thing, he just knew.

Q: He drove people but not to a point of making the guy despair or break up? He knew a man's breaking point?

W: This is absolutely true in my opinion. In this CCC staff meeting, this was a big thing to thrust on him. You know, all these 25 camps, and many problems. We had quartermaster problems, and there were about 8 or 9 on the staff, and I was the Adjutant who would sit in at the staff meetings, and all these various officers would report their problems and Hap would just sit there. Then he would start assigning responsibility: "You do this; you, you, you," just that quickly, and he would say: "Okay, goodbye, gentlemen. Thank you." And this impressed me so that I once asked Mrs. Arnold - I knew her well, she was a dear friend - and I'd said: "Does Col Arnold, when he gets home, does he worry about these things, because he just assigns these responsibilities, and it seems to me that just, what's next, you know." She said she really didn't know, and I really don't know either. But he just had that trick. Anyway, the people that got the

responsibility knew that they had it, no one else.

Q: Did he remember that they had it?

W: Yes. In the CCC days he did. In the later days, this is one of his traits, you may have heard this a thousand times before. But on inspections, or in the Pentagon or anywhere, if he wanted, if he just thought of something, and he wanted it done, he'd turn to the first guy and he would say: "Do so and so; get it done." We all learned, though, you never said: "General, this is not my job." No one ever said that to him. What you did was say: "Yes, sir," and then you would go find the guy whose responsibility it was, and tell him you'd just gotten the word. Now, I don't think Hap ever remembered who he told to get it done. One time they were flying into Wright Patt during the war, and some of the civilian employees came out to take care of the airplane, and they weren't snappy - maybe he was a spit and polish guy - they weren't snappy enough. So it was on the airplane. He just turned to somebody and he had nothing to do with Wright Patterson or anything, and said: "I want, in the future, all of these people that come out to meet airplanes here in a nice uniform." And so the guy said to Lou Parker: "Lou, what am I supposed to do?" And Lou said: "Get it done!" So he went to whoever was necessary, but this was Hap.

Q: I've heard at least 20 times, people have told different stories about being grabbed in the hall and being sent to the CBI or to Europe or to the Middle East, and it was foreign to their expertise, but when they approached their middle superiors along the line, and they said, if Gen Arnold said "Do it," they had to do it. Take off for the Middle East or Pacific.

W: I can't confirm that. I do know that, whenever he thought of something that needed done, if you were handy, he told you to do it.

Q: If he had confidence in you?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: I mean he knew you as somebody he had confidence in, and even though the thing was foreign to your field....

W: I don't really knew anybody that just took off to go that far to do things. Usually they went to the fellow who was responsible and said: "The Old Man said he wanted this done."

Q: I can see how these stories would get embellished.

W: I can't confirm....

Q: Arnold was a man impatient with organizational charts, plumbing charts, and having the thing work its way down through to the man who was to do the job. He wanted direct action. Was this his trait?

W: Yes, this was Hap Arnold.

Q: He had a man named "Hungry Gates" who was organizing the place, and organizing a big bureacracy?

W: Yes.

Q: Do you remember anything along that line?

W: I remember that famous story about - I was there. Of course, Tex Thornton, Litton Industry, he was the one. You know Lovett wanted to get the whole AF on three pieces of paper, three big pieces of paper, and Tex said you can't do that. He finally got it in three big books, as I recall. But, anyway, there was a Dr. Learned, too, from Harvard, hell of a fellow. You may have heard this story, we were trying to find people for the B-29 program, and there was a limit. The President had put a limit, I think it was 7.7 million people, or something, and, the military had already exceeded that, but we had to get the B-29s rolling. So at that particular conference was one that Hap was invited to. The room was full. I think Kuter was running it, overall responsibility, but Dr. Learned, and I think

Tex Thornton was there, too. Anyway, the nut of it was they showed him a hell of a lot of charts, and the nut of it was you couldn't do it.

Q: You would be exceeding the 7.7 million Army ceiling.

W: You'd need that many additional people, and you just couldn't do it. In other words, he was unhappy with it, and he stood up - and I'll never forget this - you may have heard this story - and he said: "You people make me sick to my stomach." And he turned and went out of the room. Well, dead silence, absolute silence. Kuter, he was Chief of Plans, he went over to the window and looked out. And nobody said a word. Pretty soon Hap Arnold came marching back in, and he said, "I want every man in this room out of Washington by sundown. I don't want you back until Monday morning." Turned on his heel and went out again. Everybody in that room got the hell out. He thought we were all foggy, and weren't thinking straight, and weren't doing the right thing.

Q: He wanted you out where?

W: Go out, leave Washington, get away from the Pentagon. Go do whatever you wanted to do. I don't know. But he just didn't like what he had heard, and this was Hap Arnold.

Q: Perhaps he didn't like for somebody to tell him that it cannot be done?

W: Right. Now, along this same line, later on we were back. It was the same group, and they were giving him a little better answer. Maybe, you know, and oh, he wouldn't accept that, and he said: "Don't give me that. With all the fat there is in the system." And nobody said a damn word, except me, and I stood up and I said: "What do you mean, fat?" And he said: "I mean fat." That was all there was to it. Wetzel went down to the Training Command. I discovered the fat. You know what it was. It was the railroad population. We had a system, we took the inducted people in and they went into the Training Command and got

shuttled out in little balls. They couldn't make this system, and they went into that one, and they fell out there. We had enough people on trains. There was the fat, and Hap knew that.

Q: Did that issue come up?

W: No, that whole issue hadn't come up. We discovered, just because he said: "I mean fat."

Q: What made you center on the Training Command?

W: There wasn't any other place, there was the vast majority of our people, in flying schools and in the mechanic schools.

Q: This was in Barton Yount's command?

W: Yes, right. And Ken McNaughton was the big wheel down there. What we did, we changed the system, so that a guy if he couldn't do this thing, he did that. He didn't bounce out of this and get on a train. I've forgotten the figures, but the train population was just enormous, guys riding trains.

Q: In other words, what you really did was thin out the in-transit population and the pipeline?

W: We cut the pipeline. I'm sure it looked good on paper. If a man didn't qualify for this, he got on a train, went halfway across the country, and then he got there, anyway, that was....

Q: When did this happen, this business of the "fat story?" Was it later - '43 or early '44?

W: Yes. I'm just telling you these things to tell you my view of the Old Man.

Q: An impressionistic thing, and that's what I want.

W: For instance, he never, in all the years that I was close to him, he never chewed me out. He never gave me hell, because I think he knew if he had,

it would just kill me. I just thought that he was so great that he sensed that.

Q: This was again, knowing that you perhaps had a short fuse, or that he did not have to beat you too much?

W: That's right.

Q: You know, Beebe told me that, when I asked, did Arnold get mad, he said: "He got mad every day."

W: Oh yes, oh sure. But he got over it.

Q: Did he harbor a grudge?

W: I don't think so, no. For instance, many times, he would be mad at me, but he wouldn't say anything to me. He just wouldn't speak to me. There would be three people or something, and he would come in and say: "Hello, so-and-so; and so-and-so." And he would just look. He wouldn't say a damn word, but the next half hour, he might have his arm around you, you know. But he knew that that was enough to get you to work harder.

Q: This technique of putting his arm around you worked wonders?

W: Oh yes. He had his likes and dislikes, and we covered that before. I don't believe they ever changed.

Q: Of people, you mean?

W: Of people. If he liked them. Now, this is probably a very bad trait. Because you could like somebody that's no damn good at all. There was one officer - I won't mention his name, but he flew an airplane one day into Chicago, he had been drinking the whole way, you may have heard the story...(Off record).

Q: This officer fell flat on his face?

W: Yes, drunk. Later on the Old Man made him a General.

Q: Because he liked him?

W: Because he thought he was good, and he was good. But, anyway. In my

opinion, people either loved Hap Arnold, or they didn't. And they either didn't because they were jealous of him, or because they thought he didn't like them. There's an interesting story on this subject of "they thought he didn't like them." After the war, the end of the war, I was out working for Ennis Whitehead and gosh knows he was quite a guy.

Q: 5th AF?

W: Yes, then he became PACAF - PACUSA, we called it - and he knew that I used to be close to Hap Arnold, for two reasons: One, that was my job; two, he'd seen the list of Generals to be retained, and I never saw my name on the list, but I gather I was quite a ways up there, because this impressed Ennis Whitehead. I'd never fired a shot in anger or even heard one, except some buzz bombs in London, which didn't make you a big guy with Ennis Whitehead, on account I was so high up on Arnold's list. Ennis thought there must be something to me. So, anyway, one night at a New Year's Eve, he and I got loaded together and he told me that Hap Arnold didn't like him, didn't like him at all, and he wasn't sure he liked Hap Arnold either. Well, anyway, this remained in my mind. On a trip into Washington one time with Ennis, to go to the Pentagon to see if he could get more people, or some damn thing, I went into the Statler Hotel, the taxi entrance, and ran into Gen and Mrs. Arnold. Oh, you know, he was so glad to see me, and after talking just a few minutes, I said: "Sir, will you do me a favor?" He said: "Sure, I'll do anything for you." I quickly told him that Ennis was in town. Ennis had the idea that Hap didn't like him, even though he was a LTGEN, for God's sake. And I said: "Why don't you fix that?" And Hap said: "I will." And he got ahold of Ennis, and he and Mrs. Arnold had him to tea, and all the way home from then on, in all my association with Ennis Whitehead he said: "That Arnold, he's the greatest guy in the world." He had

just turned his charm on, he could turn his charm on for you.

Q: Let me add something to that which may help fill in this whole story. Ennis Whitehead was Kenney's man for the 13th AF. Arnold had two other candidates like Bill Streett and Tommy White. This is perhaps why Ennis Whitehead thought Arnold didn't like him.

Q: This Ennis Whitehead - a rough and tough guy?

W: Oh yes. He wasn't really that tough. He was chicken as far as people went. But I've got to tell you a story about Ennis Whitehead.

Q: Was Arnold the same sort of guy, in that he had a gruff exterior as a facade sometimes?

W: He could change. As I say, he could be madder than hell.. In the next half hour he'd turn the charm on. He was, he had all these various facets.

Q: Was his anger controlled? In other words, when he exploded, could he turn it off?

W: I think he could turn it off the next instant, if he wanted to, yes. Loudest I ever heard him, the maddest I ever heard him was way back in the CCC days when he was sending Chuck Stone up to Camp Idlewild. Chuck hadn't even gone yet. He'd just learned right while he was in his office that he had the assignment, and the Old Man just yelled at him, and chewed him out to beat the band. I couldn't tell everything that was going on, but Chuck came out, and I said: "What the hell happened?" And he said: "The Old Man gave me hell about...." I said: "You haven't even been there yet." He said, "Yeah, I know, but it's what will happen to me if I don't fix it." And Chuck fixed it. Hap had his tricks. I think a lot of the things, weren't just instinctive. He was thinking all the time, how to get the very best out of people.

Q: Then I'm thinking a lot of this was planned, that is, if he could get

more out of Stone by screaming at him, he did it.

W: Correct.

Q: Perhaps in your case, putting his arm around your shoulder?

W: Right, same thing. He was just that smart.

Q: I want to ask about a related issue, that smile.

W: Oh yes, look out! This is what my wife always used to say when Hap Arnold got that grin on his face. This didn't mean he was very happy about anything. It would mean "watch everything," because the Old Man is up to something.

Q: You couldn't tell whether he was happy or not?

W: No, you couldn't really tell. I think it was my wife. He liked her. He liked us both. One time when all the people came back from the Alaskan flight and came into the March Field, and we had quite a to-do for them, and later we were all at tables, pretty cramped tables out on the patio. My wife and I were leaving. I don't know why we left before everybody else, babies or something. We went over to say goodbye to the Arnolds, and my wife - Hap had no intention of getting up - my wife said: "Don't get up, Colonel Arnold." And that grin, and he stood up, but he never held that kind of grudge.

W: It seems to me,was the fact that in the Air Corps we were, belonged to Corps Area Commanders. On the Chuck Stone subject - Chuck Stone was in 11th Bombardment Squadron. He got married over in Tucson. We had to get permission from two Corps Area Commanders, one the 9th Corps Area, and one the 4th Corps Area to fly a few bombers over to Tucson to Chuck Stone's wedding. Well, this rankled. Part of this is the background that led to a separate Air Force. Another thing here, he never did believe in planting units overseas at the end of the war. He told me many, many times, he said: "Now, you'll be around a lot longer than I am, but you've got to not do that. Don't get too many

people over. Just have a cadre over there, and the wives and kids at home in the US. Fly your airplanes over, and bring them back." Well, of course, he didn't last long enough to carry it on.

Q: He believed in a mobile concept rather than stationing....?

W: Yes, he sure did. Yes, small housekeeping units over there, and rotate the tactical units. I had a classmate, Doowillie Williamson in the Air Corps, who reported into March Field one day for duty. I don't know whether he came and visited us in our quarters, and which we didn't appreciate, because we didn't even know he was coming. So, anyway, the next day I brought him in to Hap Arnold's office, I think I told Hap that morning that he was a classmate. And he parked himself on the Wetzel family, and he was coming in to report, and, "Can I bring him in to see you?" He said: "Sure". So I brought him in. Well, he just turned all of his charm on. Well, he said, "This is wonderful." Now, he said, "we are so glad to have you, and there are no quarters available on base, but you take all the time you want to get settled, because you probably will be in that house the whole time you are here" and so on. And he turned around and said: "Take two days." Hap Arnold was getting him out of the Wetzel house, "take two days and find a place to live and move." He was always thinking.

Q: Always thinking ahead?

W: Yes. An air mail story. I wasn't on the air mail, I stayed on the CCC, and with Col "Fred" Lohman, No. 2 guy.

Q: This is Eugene "Fred" Lohman. He was the No. 2 man.

W: No good at all, and every time something would come up with the CCC, and I mentioned it to him, he said: "What do you think the Colonel would say?" And I said: "I don't know what the Colonel would say, but this is the way it ought to be done." And he would say: "Well, I don't know what the Colonel would

say." And I said: "Why don't you let me worry about it." And he never made a decision the whole time.

Q: I heard a story about Lohman that a tree fell down one time, and Arnold asked him to remove it. This was near the CO's house.

W: I can remember that.

Q: Lohman took forever and a day to move it. This put him on Arnold's list. This is probably characteristic of this fellow's indecision.

W: Yes, you know, I think through the years Hap got fed up with senior people that weren't any good.

Q: This Lohman was one of these senior people hanging around?

W: Yes, and of course, when we got into the war, and then, he really discovered that he had a hell of a lot of people way up at the top that weren't any good.

Q: I saw lots of correspondence about "deadwood."

W: Right. Oh boy! I know. But he was softhearted, because he had the staff through all the years that during the war, he tried to figure out a way to ease these guys out. He even talked about setting up a separate station - put them all in there, let them do something, deadwood.

Q: Did he talk to you about this?

W: Oh yes; oh Lord yes. I said: "All you have to do is just tell them to move over, make room." These were people that..He never did it. We'd move them around. We'd hide them, we'd do things....

Q: From him, or hide them with his knowledge?

W: Well, and without his knowledge. In other words, we wouldn't let them create a problem.

Q: In other words, when you felt that his attention would be called to a

man not competent?

W: We'd ease him into some other assignment. I remember one day he called up and said: "I want Parker to run Bolling." Yes sir, there were three old guys at Bolling senior to Lou Parker. We had to move three of them by nightfall. When Arnold said he wanted something done, he didn't mean tomorrow. He meant now. Well, everybody understood that. Even the guys that got moved. They were probably a little annoyed about it, but the Old Man wanted it, so be it. But that's just the way he was. One day in the Pentagon, in the early days the main squawk boxes to the Old Man were the A's, A-1, etc. They were supposed to be manned at all times. Then the lesser lights were tied into the A-s squawkboxes. Well, this noontime, I don't know who Hap Arnold was calling, but some secretary or somebody answered. This, I guess made him mad, because it should have been an officer. We had enough officers. We didn't have to have a secretary answer the old man's squawkbox. So he said something, and she must have said something, and he said: "This is Arnold." And she said: "Arnold, who?" You've probably heard this story. But God almighty, from that day forward there was at least a Colonel sitting at the squawkbox. Back to right after the air mail, I guess things were pretty casual up on air mail, uniformwise, and so on. This particular morning, Hap was walking directly in front of headquarters down toward one of the squadrons, and some Master Sergeant or Tech Sergeant or something, who had been with him on air mail kind of shuffled by, didn't salute. He kind of nodded, or something. Hap got about 5 steps down there and he turned around and called him, busted him right on the spot. That same morning, Crosswaite - I don't know if you have ever heard of him - anyway, he was a squadron commander and one of his sergeants came in and kind of leaned on the desk and Crosswaite said: "Say, you didn't hear what happened to Sergeant so and so, did you?" No, I didn't

hear, and Crosswaite told him, well, about a half an hour later, in comes this guy, shook up. Anyway, that was all that was necessary. That place bucked up. I don't know, I've forgotten whether he had the authority to bust them all the way down, but he did. Which reminds me, too, of during the war. You never told General Arnold that a regulation prohibited something. You know why? He said: "Write a new regulation; don't give me that stuff." He got away with it. All the way up to General Marshall. Later, I moved up to G-1 of the War Dept, and knew Tom Handy very well and he....

Q: I just talked to him.

W: Did you, oh, I loved him, because I always felt that I was keeping him. He was the No. 2 guy, you know, and I'd come in and always sat on the edge of chair so I could get my business done and leave. And he'd fling back in his chair and put his feet up and said "Relax." He'd like to sit and talk.

Q: You say Arnold got away with changing regulations?

W: Oh yes, just because they were toward a good end.

Q: Did he ever insist on setting up some regulation and then he found out that it hampered him, and he had it changed?

W: I don't remember.

Q: What I'm leaning to is, sometimes he made quick decisions, perhaps not an impulsive decision, but a quick decision. He might have thought about it beforehand, but then did he realize that he had made a mistake, and if so, did he say: "I'm sorry, let's do something else." Or did he do the other thing without admitting error?

W: I can't really answer. I don't remember him every saying...

Q: Saying "I goofed"?

W: No, I don't remember that. But he may have. When I was Base Adjutant

just for a short time, somebody got sick. I was too junior to be the Base Adjutant. I was acting as Base Adjutant for several months. But there was quite a lot of talent on that base - Spaatz, McNarney and Monk Hunter. Anyway, I think it had something to do with efficiency reports or something, that I had tied it up and I'd made a mistake. I'd given either Spaatz hell, in my fashion, and they raised hell with the Old Man. You know who he backed? Me! I'd misunderstood what I thought he wanted, he didn't let me down, he could handle the other fellows. So he was pretty good.

Q: You feel that you needed the support, and they didn't?

W: I think that's what he felt, yes. He didn't want to lose me, and he had them. They could take it.

Q: What were his relations with Spaatz and Eaker on the base?

W: I think, what's the word, not cold or cool, but I think professional. I don't think he was buddy with them.

Q: With Spaatz and Eaker?

W: No.

Q: Spaatz was a Major when Arnold was a LTCOL. Arnold had a great admiration for Spaatz' ability.

W: Oh yes, no question about it. He retained that, too.

Q: Spaatz called him "Hap," didn't he?

W: I guess he did, yes.

Q: He was one of his few contemporaries who could to his face.

W: That's right.

Q: Everybody else called him Col Arnold or Gen Arnold, as the case might be?

W: Right, right.

Q: Were you there when he made his star, in 1935?

W: No, I'd left for Hawaii. I'd moved up to Hamilton with the 7th Bombardment Group, and Hap took me off the CCC, or whatever I was on. He put me back in the group, and sent me up there as a reward for being a good guy. And I got to Hamilton. Within 24 hours I was ordered to Hawaii, because the Chief's office didn't recognize a group movement as being such. So, I beat it back down to March to Hap and I said: "Gee, what can we do about this?" Well, he said: "You can go to see Gen Craig, if you want to," but he said, "I don't think it will do you any good." He said: "I would just take it, and accept it." So I did, I went to see Gen Craig, went back to Hamilton and went into San Francisco and saw Gen Craig. I told him the story that I had been sent up there as a reward and to be back in a tactical outfit. Craig said: "Well, you're going to Hawaii. You'll like it." And that's all there was to that.

Q: We are talking about "deadwood."

W: He never did solve it, but as we looked ahead toward the postwar, new regulations on the subject, he told me, and at that time I was working for G-1.

Q: Is that Idwal Edwards?

W: No, G-1 of the War Dept.

Q: You were working for Gen Steve Henry in G-1. When did you go up there?

W: In January 1945. Hap Arnold told me about the assignment, at the five-star final dinner. Do you have one of those pictures taken at the 5-star dinner?

Q: No, I don't think I have.

W: Oh, it was beautiful.

Q: This was December 1944, right before this?

W: Right, yes, that's when he got his 5-stars. Anyway, Hap Arnold said: "Never let them so organize the military that you keep people beyond their usefulness." In other words, wars are fought and won by the youngsters, not

the oldsters. In other words, you don't want to enter the war with a whole lot of deadwood around. So the AF has done it very well, I mean 30 years, you are out. Or if you are a senior officer, 35 years, the only time it was ever violated outside of the Chief, was Tommy Moorman at the AF Academy. I hated to see them make that exception too, because once you make an exception, why you are going to have guys. Of course, the Army, they fought like hell about this, and they retained a lot of people well beyond their time. Look at Lemnitzer, now Lem's a good guy, but....

Q: Beyond his time?

W: Yes.

Q: We were talking about personnel, and getting rid of the deadwood. Arnold believed that whether a man was rated or not, should not be the ultimate criterion of his promotion to higher office. He used this argumentation with his own sons, to persuade them to transfer from the Army to the AAF. Yet the AF violated this. Do you have any thought on that? Why they did not follow Arnold's direction? Or did he ever talk about this?

W: No, not really, not really. I'm not sure, if Hap had stayed on, I was there when he made the speech to the old Air Staff. He said the next war they were going to be pushing buttons; there won't be a pilot in a damned one of them. So don't...lay off this emphasis on pilots.

Q: He believed this.

W: That's right. But it didn't turn out that way. No, because we still, my two kids are in the AF, and they are both pilots. If you are going to command a flying outfit, you've got to be a pilot. Now, you can be a lot of other things. But if you are going to command a bunch of guys that are going to fly airplanes, you've got to be a pilot.

Q: All right, but why do you need a pilot to command a missile unit?

W: I don't think you do.

Q: They are all rated.

W: Well, I think it just, once again, happenstance. SAC went from bombers to missiles, and they had the people, and once you get in SAC you don't get out. My kid is still in there. I don't know whether he is going to get out.

Q: He thought it would be more missiles than AF?

W: Yes, for instance, he just finished a great big war. He didn't think we would have another one. No one did at that time, so then we got into Korea. Then we got into SE Asia.

Q: But he was going to be ready, he had von Karman thinking 20 years ahead.

W: Yes.

Q: He did not anticipate that the AF would become conservative?

W: That's right.

Q: And the AF has become conservative. Like any organization, once it gets its roots into the ground, it becomes more stable, and it doesn't seek great changes like it did when it was a fledgling.

W: That's right.

Q: So I think that Arnold misread the AF.

W: You will remember, I think it was MacArthur had said, after that first atomic weapon, never again would American kids crawl up anybody's beaches or through anybody's swamps, through machine gun fire. We didn't have to do that anymore, we had the weapon. We don't use it.

Q: A lot of people thought that.

W: I know why we haven't used it too.

Q: Well, it's political, not military.

W: It's the US Army.

Heyland, O.P. 23 Jul 74

August 7, 1970

General Otto P. Weyland, USAF (Ret.)
P. O. Box 2049
Pebble Beach, California 93953

Dear General Weyland:

I'm coming out to California again on the General Hap Arnold research. I hope to see you around August 21 or 22, if possible.

I'll be on the road so could you drop a note to me c/o Col Marshall Ryder, 805 Leonard Road, Los Angeles, 90049 (Code 213-476-5062), if this is convenient.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division

20314

12 June 1974

General O. P. Weyland, USAF (Ret)
202 Oakhurst Place
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear General Weyland

Thanks for your good letter of June 6th.

May I suggest Tuesday, July 23rd, about 9:30 AM, or possibly 9 AM, if you are an early riser.

I have your local telephone number and will try to phone the night before to confirm.

I'm a bit familiar with San Antonio, but if there are any special driving instructions, I'd welcome having them.

We should have a good session, and I'm very much looking forward to meeting you.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

General O. P. Weyland, USAF Retired
202 Oakhurst Place
San Antonio, Texas 78209

6 June 1974

Dear Dr. Green:

Reference your letter of 3 June — If you do indeed come to San Antonio in late July, I probably shall be here. Give me a buzz Tel # 828-4273. Will try to fit in but won't hold my breath.

Sincerely

O P Weyland

Dr. Murray Green
AECHO
Washington DC

20314

24 May 1974

General Otto P. Weyland, USAF (Ret)
P.O. Box 2049
Pebble Beach, CA 93953

Letter to San Antonio

Dear General Weyland

You may recall that we missed connections twice in getting together to talk about my favorite subject: General Hap Arnold. My biography is about half finished and, as you might expect, I'm working on some deadlines.

In any event, I will be out your way about the second week in August and wonder if you would be available at that time for an hour or so of reminiscence?

The enclosure is for your convenience.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Ac 408 373-1023

August 7, 1970

General Otto P. Weyland, USAF (Ret.)
P. O. Box 2049
Pebble Beach, California 93953

Dear General Weyland:

I'm coming out to California again on the General Hap Arnold research. I hope to see you around August 21 or 22, if possible.

I'll be on the road so could you drop a note to me c/o Col Marshall Ryder, 805 Leonard Road, Los Angeles, 90049 (Code 213-476-5062), if this is convenient.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division

GENERAL O. P. WEYLAND, USAF RETIRED
POST OFFICE BOX 2049
PEBBLE BEACH, CALIFORNIA 93953

18 August 1970

Dear Doctor Green:

With reference to your letter of August 7th on your Arnold Research Trip to California, I'm afraid I shall be away at the time you suggested – Aug 21-22. I am leaving on a trip and shan't be back until next week-end late.

Sincerely,

O. P. Weyland

March 26, 1970

General Otto P. Weyland, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 2049
Pebble Beach, California 93953

Dear General Weyland:

I'm sorry to have alerted you and then not have been able to visit Pebble Beach last week. I had planned to drive down to Southern California from Mrs. Arnold's ranch, but the demands to meet deadlines on this movie script, which is being prepared at Norton AFB, dictated our flying down to L.A. from San Francisco.

It was otherwise a most successful trip. I got to see and talk to Generals LeMay, Harold George, K.B. Wolfe, Archie Old, and Reuben Fleet and Donald Douglas.

I missed out on J mmy Doolittle, you, and a couple of others, so I hope to be back and will alert you at that time.

This time I will plan my schedule around some people in Northern California whom I should see.

Very sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

GENERAL O. P. WEYLAND, USAF RETIRED
POST OFFICE BOX 2049
PEBBLE BEACH, CALIFORNIA 93953

7 March 1970.

Dr. Murray Green,
El Rancho Feliz,
Sonoma, California 95476.

Dear Dr. Grden;

Reference is made to your recent letter from Washington concerning a possible visit here in connection with your biographical research on General Hap Arnold.

At the moment I expect to be home during the period March 8-11. My plans are, however, somewhat unsettled, and it would be well to give me a call. My telephone is area code 408, 375-1023.

Sincerely,

O. P. Weyland

O. P. Weyland

General O. P. Weyland, USAF (Ret)
P. O. Box 2049
Pebble Beach, Calif. 93953

Dear General Weyland:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past couple of months I've been interviewing some friends and associates of yours and of General Arnold's. Among them are Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Hansell, McKee, Quesada, Bob Walsh, Howard Davidson, Idwal Edwards, Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others. I also had a long interview with Jackie Cochran the other day.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City within the past six months.

You were associated with General Arnold, in some critical undertakings and I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you at a time and place convenient for you.

I'll be going out to Norton AFB next week to help on a documentary movie of General Arnold. I'm planning to visit the Arnold Ranch in Sonoma on March 8-11 and will then head down the Coast toward the LA. area. If some time between March 12-14 is convenient I would like to stop by Pebble Beach for an hour or two and have our talk, if this is possible.

The enclosed envelope can be used to reach me at the Arnold Ranch. If my plans work out right, I'll call you for an appointment.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Encl

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

GENERAL O. P. WEYLAND, USAF

PART I - Narrative

General "Opie" Weyland was born in Riverside, California on 27 January 1902. He graduated from Texas A&M College in 1923 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in mechanical engineering. In 1945 Texas A & M College conferred upon General Weyland an honorary LL D.

After accepting a commission in the Air Reserve in 1923, Second Lieutenant Weyland served a tour of active duty at Brooks Field, Texas and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of the Air Service, Regular Army. He completed flying training at Kelly Field, Texas and was assigned to the 12th Observation Squadron, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

In July 1927 Lieutenant Weyland became an instructor at the advanced flying school at Kelly Field, where he served until late 1931, at which time he was appointed Commander of the 4th Observation Squadron, Luke Field, T. H. He returned to Kelly Field in November 1934 as an instructor and in 1935 he was named Chief of the Observation Section.

Captain Weyland attended the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama from August 1937 until his graduation in June 1938. He then entered the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and was graduated in June 1939. From that time until April 1941 he was Assistant to the Chief of Aviation Division in the National Guard Bureau at Washington, D. C.

From May 1941 until March 1942, Major, Lieutenant Colonel and later Colonel Weyland served at Albrook Field, Panama Canal Zone, as commanding officer of the 16th Pursuit Group, and then Chief of Staff of the Sixth Air Force.

Colonel Weyland returned to Washington in June 1942 as Deputy Director of Air Support at AAF Headquarters. In March 1943 he was appointed Chief of Allocations and Programs Division in the Office of the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. Nine months later, in November 1943 and now a Brigadier General, he went overseas as Commanding General of the 84th Fighter Wing. This was General Weyland's first combat service in World War II.

In February 1944 General Weyland was assigned as Commanding General of the XIX Tactical Air Command, the combat unit which gained widespread recognition and acclaim for its classic air support of the late General George E. Patton's famed Third Army in its historic dash across France in the Spring of 1945. Shortly before the end of World War II he was promoted to Major General and became commander of the Ninth Air Force. General Weyland participated in six major campaigns of World War II.

General Patton, who was a close friend, referred to General Weyland as "the best damn General in the Air Corps".

General Weyland was named Assistant Commandant of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in September 1945. In June 1946 he was named Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Plans at Air Force Headquarters in Washington.

Following the reorganization of the Air Force as a separate service, General Weyland became USAF Director of Plans and Operations on 10 October 1947. From February 1948 until July 1950 he was Deputy Commandant of the National War College in Washington.

In July 1950 General Weyland was named Commanding General of Tactical Air Command - for one week - prior to his assignment as Vice Commander for Operations of the Far East Air Forces for service in the Korean conflict.

In April 1951 General Weyland returned to the United States and served two months temporary duty with Tactical Air Command.

He was recalled to Japan in June 1951 to assume command of the Far East Air Forces and United Nations Air Forces. At this time he received his fourth star. He participated in ten major campaigns of the Korean conflict.

As a result of his guidance and assistance to the Japanese in reorganizing their Air Defense forces and aircraft industry, General Weyland became known as the "father of the new Japanese Air Force".

General Weyland's assignment as Commander of Tactical Air Command was announced in April 1954 and he assumed command one month later.

General Weyland is married to the former Kathryn Houston McFarland of San Antonio and Houston, Texas. They have one daughter, Mary Kathryn, married to Lieutenant Benjamin E. Tabler, U. S. Navy, and a grandson, Paul Edward Tabler.

General Weyland is rated a Command Pilot and Combat Observer.

PART II

A. Interests

1. Hobbies: handy with tools -- maintains, refinishes or repairs furniture, household and gardening equipment

2. Sports: Hunting -- especially likes duck shooting.

Fishing -- salt water trolling preferred.

Golf -- enjoys for exercise and social contact. Doesn't play regularly and is poor golfer.

Boating -- likes power cruising and handles boats up to medium sized cruisers. Wife a good "mate" in handling boats

3. Member of Rotary Club. Cannot be considered religious, but conforms to tenets of the Ten Commandments, and believes in treating others as he would have others treat him. Favors the Episcopal Church.

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations

1. Parents were of moderate circumstances. Father a trained musician and gave sons some musical training. Used this talent to help work way through college Also sold stationery and candy, cut grass and did other chores in college to pay off notes he signed for tuition, board and room.

2. Was Captain of Texas A & M's 100-piece band in 1922 - 23 -- played trumpet. Claimed that if not the best, he was at least the loudest.

3. Prefers classical or semi-classical music. Mild "hi-fi" addict.

4. Like many men, considers himself a good cook. Specialties: Mexican food, barbecued chicken and game hen; clam chowder; wild game and fish

5. Has one brother, A. H. Weyland of Shreveport, Louisiana -- a well known executive in the petroleum industry, listed in WHO'S WHO.

6. Is a staunch advocate of the efficacy, efficiency and economy of tactical air power. "A single modern tactical fighter with nuclear weapons carries more destruction than the entire fleet of heavy bombers its World War II predecessor escorted over Germany or Japan in 1944-45."

7. A "team player." Is respected and trusted by contemporaries of other military services. Has had extensive combined and joint experience with other services and gets along well with them while insisting on proper doctrine and employment of airpower. Believes in essentiality of other services and understands and appreciates their problems. In inter-service and other matters believes in "laying the cards on the table" in quickly arriving at workable solutions. His team-mate and close friend in World War II, General Patton, referred to him as the "best damn general in the Air Corps."

8. Among his classmates in flying schools in Texas were James S. McDonnell, founder and President of the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, and Charles Lindbergh.

9. Believes in being willing and able to do anything required of subordinates. Quotes a former Air Service officer of German descent: "Any time I vant some tam fool to do something, py golly I do it myself."

PART III

A. Personal Data

1. Born 27 January 1902 in Riverside, California. Moved to Texas with family in 1909.

2. Parents: Father: Charles Weyland (deceased); born and educated in Germany. Naturalized U. S. citizen.

Mother: Mary Harris Weyland (deceased). Born in England. Moved with family to U. S. as child becoming U. S. citizen.

3. Married to Kathryn Houston McFarland of Houston and San Antonio, Texas, on 25 October 1931. One daughter -- Mary Kathryn, now married to Lieutenant Benjamin E. Tabler, U. S. Navy. One grandson, Paul Edward Tabler.

4. No fixed address -- simply a Texan.

B. Education

1. Elementary schools -- Riverside, California; Mercedes, Texas and Taft, Texas.

2. High Schools - - Taft, Sinton and Hempstead, Texas. Graduated 1919.

3. Texas A&M College, 1919-1923. Graduated with B. S. degree in Mechanical Engineering; Honorary LL D 1945.

4. Military education --

a. ROTC training at Texas A&M College, receiving commission as 2nd Lt. Air Service upon graduation.

b. Primary Flying School, Brooks Field, Texas, 1923 - 24.

c. Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, Texas, 1924 - 25. Rated upon graduation as Airplane Pilot and Airplane Observer.

d. Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama 1937 - 38. Graduated No. 1 in class of 100 officers.

e. Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1938 - 39.

C. Service in different types of Air Force units -- reconnaissance, bombers and fighters. Tactical duty interspersed with school details as student or instructor, and with staff duty.

1. Successively commanded tactical units of increasing size and scope.

a. Commander 1st and 24th Photo Sections, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, March 1925 - June 1927.

b. Commander 4th Observation Squadron, Luke Field, T. H., Nov 1931 - Sept 1934.

c. Commander 16th Pursuit Group, Albrook Field, C. Z., May 1941 - Feb 1942.

d. CG 84th Fighter Wing, U. S. and Europe, November 1943 - February 1944.

e. CG XIX Tactical Air Command, European Theater of Operations, Feb 1944 to May 1945.

f CG Ninth U. S. Air Force, European Theater, May 1945 - August 1945.

g. Vice Commander, Far East Air Forces, July 1950 - May 1951.

h. Commander Far East Air Forces and United Nations Air Forces in Korean War, May 1951 - March 1954.

i. Commander Tactical Air Command, April 1954 to date.

2. Key staff and instructing assignments:

a. Flying Instructor (Advanced Flying School) June 1927 - November 1931, and Oct 1934 - Aug 1937.

b. Asst Chief, National Guard Aviation, Washington, D. C. June 1934 - April 1941.

c. Deputy Chief of Staff, Sixth Air Force, Feb - June 1942.

d. Deputy Director Air Support, and Chief Allocations and Programs Division, Hq AAF, June 1942 - Nov 1943.

e. Asst Commandant C&GSSchool, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Oct 1943 - June 1945.

f. Asst Chief of Staff -- Plans, and Director of Plans and Operations, Hq USAF, June 1946 - Feb 1948.

g. Deputy Commandant National War College, Feb 1948 - July 1950.

D. Decorations and Medals.

1. U. S. decorations:

a. Distinguished Service Medal -- for service as CG XIX TAC in European Theater of Operations in six major engagements.

1st Oak Leaf Cluster to DSM for service as VC and Commander FEAF and UN Air Forces in Korean War involving 10 major engagements.

b. Silver Star Medal -- for gallantry in action in Korean War.

c. Distinguished Flying Cross -- for personally leading a bomber formation against important Communist target in North Korea when base weather prevented friendly fighter cover and escort, and in face of anti-aircraft defenses and enemy MIG-15 fighter opposition.

d. Legion of Merit.

e. Bronze Star Medal -- awarded by U. S. Third Army for combat air support of their operations.

f. Air Medal -- for combat missions.

2. Foreign decorations:

a. Great Britain -- Commander, Order of the British Empire -- for air cover of Normandy invasion and air aspects joint XIX TAC-Third U. S. Army Operations in Europe.

Knight Commander, Order of British Empire -- for services as U. N. Air Commander in Korean War and air support of British Commonwealth forces.

b. French Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre with Palms -- for World War II actions.

c. Luxembourg Commander with Crown, Order Adolph of Nassau and Croix de Guerre. World War II.

d. Belgium Commander Order of Crown and Croix de Guerre with Palm. World War II, including air action over Battle of Bulge, Bastogne.

e. Republic of Korea, Order of Military Merit Taiguk with Star. Korean War.

f. Thailand Knight Commander Order of White Elephant, and Knight Grand Cross Order of Crown. For Korean War action.

g. Philippine Commander Legion of Honor. For Korean action and support of Philippine ground forces.

h. Japan Order of Rising Sun -- for assistance and guidance in establishing Japanese Air Self Defense Forces.

i. Brazil Order of Aeronautical Merit.

3. Other service medals:

a. American Defense.

b. American Theater.

c. EAME medal with 6 battle stars.

d. WWII Victory Medal.

e. Korean Service Medal, with 10 battle stars.

f. UN Service Medal.

g. National Defense Service Medal.

E. Promotions:

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2nd Lt.	AS ORC		5 June 23
2nd Lt.	AS Regular Army		15 June 24
1st Lt.	AS Regular Army		2 June 30
Captain	Temporary		16 Mar 35
Captain	Reg Army		1 Aug 35
Major	Temporary		11 Mar 40
Major	AUS		31 Jan 41
Major	Regular Army		15 June 41
Lt. Col.	Temporary		5 Dec 41
Lt. Col.	AUS		24 Dec 41
Colonel	Air Corps		1 Mar 42
Colonel	AUS		21 Jan 43
Brig General	AUS		26 Sep 43
Maj General	AUS		5 Jan 45
Brig General	USAF	19 Feb 48	27 Sept 43
Major General	USAF	27 June 50	2 June 44
Lt. General	USAF	11 April 51	11 Apr 51
General	USAF	5 July 52	5 July 52

F. Unusual Experiences, etc.

1. Has had an unusual amount of combat experience, totalling 4 1/2 years, in two wars -- one an "all out" war, and one a "limited" or "brush fire" war. Includes a total of 16 major engagements.

2. In World War II, General Weyland closely associated with General Patton. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command and Patton's Third Army generally

accepted as the most successful air-ground team in history. The tactics and techniques developed in their joint operations accepted as model of air-ground teamwork.

3. General Weyland's XIX TAC by air action protected other-wise exposed 500-mile southern flank of U. S. Third Army during August of 1944. Prevented German Army in south of France first from attacking U. S. troops, and then prevented their escape back to Germany as Allied forces advanced. Air attacks on German forces culminated 16 September in surrender of German General Elster and 20,000 German troops to American forces. General Weyland was present on Beugency bridge over Loire River to accept surrender, marking first time in history ground forces surrendered to air action.

4. When Korean "incident" started, Air Force Chief of Staff General Vandenberg immediately sent Weyland to the Far East for two or three months "temporary duty" to lend his tactical know-how to the fighting as Vice Commander for Operations. These few months of temporary duty stretched out to nearly four years in the Far East after the Chinese Communists entered the conflict, and Weyland was made Commander of the Far East Air Forces. Weyland provided tri-service continuity in teamwork as Army and Naval Commanders were successively rotated.

5. While leading an unescorted daylight bomber mission deep in enemy territory over North Korea, General Weyland's formation was jumped by Russian-built MIG-15 fighters. The only known officer who, as a general, has looked down the business end of a MIG's gun barrels in combat.

6. By reason of his guidance and assistance to the Japanese in re-organizing their air defense forces and aircraft industry to take over their own security, General Weyland became known as the "father of the new Japanese Air Force."

7. From his extensive and intimate experience with limited war in Korea, Indo-China and Malaya was convinced of the necessity for development of tactical air forces as the primary air element capable of deterring or righting the increasingly probable brush-fire type of war, and of backing U. S. policy in peripheral areas of the world. The organization, equipping, doctrine and tactics of his TAC units accordingly have stressed mobility, flexibility and quick reaction to emergency situations. Within Tactical Air Command was developed the now well-known "Composite Air Strike Forces" for dealing quickly and effectively with limited war situations. This concept paid off handsomely in the recent Middle East and Far East crises when Composite Air Strike Forces were speedily deployed to those areas of tensions.

8. His insistence on mobility was honestly acquired -- during World War II he operated from 23 successive headquarters' locations.

9. General Weyland is an active pilot at 56 and is nearly always at the controls of his DC-6B Command Post airplane when he inspects units of his command at home and abroad. He learned to fly in the old Curtis "Jenny" and DeHaviland "Flaming Coffin," and has flown over 50 different models of aircraft, including the fastest tactical jet fighters in the world today. He now has nearly 10,000 hours flying time. He has honorary pilot's insignia from France, the Republic of Korea, Brazil, the Republic of China and Thailand.

10. His war-time commands have included air units of the air forces of France, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, the Union of South Africa, and Greece, as well as U. S. Marine Corps air units. In joint combat operations he has supported the ground force operations not only of the U. S. Army and Marine Corps, but ground forces of France, Republic of Korea, Turkey, the British Commonwealth, Philippine Republic, Columbia, Greece, Belgium and other members of the United Nations.

11. Not long after his return from the Korean War, General Weyland was named Maneuver Director of Exercise SAGE BRUSH, the largest joint maneuver to be held in this country since World War II. As Maneuver Director he directly commanded the two opposing field armies and two opposing tactical air forces engaged in developing and testing new concepts of organization and tactics under conditions of atomic warfare. He was heard to remark that as Commander of both sides he couldn't lose.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Edited Carded
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General O.P. Weyland, San Antonio, Texas, July 23, 1974

Q. You started to reminisce about General Arnold.....?

W Of course, he was a tremendously dynamic character. I first knew General Arnold long before World War II. I do recall right here in San Antonio, we had some maneuvers down here. I've forgotten the nature of it. The old 2nd Division was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, and I was part of the 2nd Division aviation, the 12th Observation Squadron. Hap Arnold was at that time commanding an Observation Squadron out at Fort Riley, Kansas, and his squadron was down here. I was based at a place called Dodd Field. I recall that we were in-between or in the midst of maneuvers, and the two squadrons were having a baseball game out on the flying field. Hap was pretty active in those days, physically and otherwise. We were playing baseball and this was the day that Lindbergh was making his flight across the Atlantic.

Q May 21, 1927.

W I was at Fort Sam. Anyway, somebody flashed the word, "Lindbergh Landed in Paris." Everybody froze. Anyway, somebody had thrown a baseball and it hit Hap on the side of the head, which didnt hurt him at all. But, I recall that. I dont remember very much about the maneuvers. He was younger in those days, but still the same, old dynamic Hap. Later, all the work was coming along. I was down in Panama. I had a fighter group down there under General Andrews. That Panama things I had a little command down there. We thought they were going to attack the Canal and I was protecting it. But, anyway, I was ordered back to the Pentagon. You dont say "no" to Hap.

Q About Panama, General Andrews had the theatre command there, and had a problem with General Van Voorhees, who was the overall Army commander. Then, he had a little trouble with the Navy about who was going to command the whole theatre. Did you get into any of that?

W No, I didnt get involved in that. I'm aware of it. Since I had the fighters down there. We had some radar installed down there, so we had some pretty strict stuff. Well, the Navy sent down a bunch of planes with no advance notice. They just showed up on our radar. I asked the Navy liaison officer if they had anything coming in. "No, we have nothing coming in." So I sent up the fighters. They were PBY's. U.S. Obviously Navy. So we fired across the bows of these Navy aircraft and

they landed out on the water, offshore. That was that. Andrews was a great guy and could have been another Hap Arnold. He was actually. Then I went to work over in the Munitions Building - the Pentagon wasnt finished yet - and General Arnold was of course Chief of Staff, and probably the only one. He certainly was the man for the job at the time. No doubt about it. Hex was extremely dynamic and he kept the Staff just busier than hell. I started in in what was called the Air Support Directorate. That was organized at the beginning of World War II. So we had the Air Support Directorate, the Fighter Directorate and we had a Bomber Directorate. Each of these ~~groups~~ directorates did everything for their chunk of the service which included everything ~~xxxxx~~ like Personnel, airplanes and everything else. So we were always in competition. But it was a good way to start off. Hap reorganized, we reorganized every few months there, and we went into a different type of Directorate system, and I found myself in something called Operations, Commitments & Requirements which I think Sandy Fairchild was then heading up. And I had the most interesting work which was I think, Allocations & Programs. In that, I was really in the numbers racket up to my ears. ~~xxxxx~~ We developed this 273-group program, which you may recall, and which I think that "Poss" Hansell was the ramrod on that. Of course, everybody pitched in, naturally. But we came out with this 273-group program which then established a program for the manufacture and procurement of aircraft which Benny Meyers...He was the guy...Pardon my expression on your tape. Benny Meyers was the production expert, and he was quite an expert, that rascal. But ~~xx~~ you couldnt believe anything he said, really. So I had to take people, get them inducted according to a program....X number of ~~B-17~~ B-17 groups, etc. So Benny Meyers had established this 10,000 planes per year which would win the war. Included in that were supposed to be ~~X xxxxxx~~ thousands of B-17s, B-24s, P-51s, etc. ~~xxxx~~ In my racket, I had to induct the people at least a year in advance before they were deployed overseas, which I also did, and then, funnel them off to the Training Command to become cooks, bakers, pilots, navigators, etc, into various specialties. Then, automatically, a year later, these airplanes were supposed to flow out and we were supposed to match them up. Well, Benny, you see, would get a little behind. So instead of getting P-38s or B-17s, he'd grind out a couple thousand extra L-4s and L-5s to meet his numbers racket which kept me in a state of utter confusion.

Q They were useless for the purpose of combat?

W Yes, so anyhow, I was in constant trouble with Hap Arnold because we had this program. Oddly enough, it worked, but we were changing Tables of Organization constantly, which kept my numbers racket in a turmoil. We didnt have computers in those days. We did all this by pencil and great big charts..

Q Butcher paper charts?

W Great big charts and charts around walls. Well, the thing went along, and we had to make adjustments on these things, and therein comes along, my reminiscences about Hap Arnold. Id get down to the office. He got there about 7 AM. Well, I had to get there about 6:30 AM and I had to read what Drew Pearson had to say, because Arnold would immediately get me on the squawk-box: "Weyland, get on down here. What's this about Pearson saying thus and so?"

Q Pearson had a thing about Arnold, didnt he?

W. I guess so.

Q Was there any reason for that?

W I dont think so. He wanted to be spectacular, I suppose. Arnold was there and airpower was a growing thing, and what not, and Pearson had to become an expert in it, naturally. I'd go down to Arnold's office on that.

Q This was a daily thing because Pearson was appearing almost every day.

W Every day, every day. Well, that was just a sideline, but I did have to read Pearson every morning and be down at the office and read all the dispatches from Europe and Pacific, etc. Everybody was yelling for more airplanes, more crews, etc. We were trying to grind out new units, so there was a conflict because George Kenney out in the Pacific was on a lower priority. En Europe, Eaker and Spaatz were over there, and they were supposed to have first priority. I recall that once, Kenney sent a....he was an expert at writing persuasive, personal TWX's to Hap Arnold, and he wrote them himself, and they were dandies. But they were wrong. So I'd go in, and He (Kenney) particularly loved P-38s, the two engined plane. They had pretty good range, both of which he needed out there. They also needed them out in Europe, and the priority on the aircraft and units was to send them to Europe. In the early parts of the war we were always short of aircraft because of Benny Meyers' juggling of his numbers. Well, George Kenney sent in this very persuasive TWX wanting, say, 100 P-38's, actually I dont know how many. Well I learned one good lesson. Hap called me down on the squawk-box:

"Come down and see me, and bring that TWX from Kenney. I want to talk to you about it." So I came down and he said: "What about this? What do you think?" I said: "We cant do it." He said: "You cant do it!" Well you just dont tell Hap Arnold that you cant do it. He picked up his inkwell and threw it at me.

Q Are you the man he threw an inkwell at?

W Yes, he threw an inkwell at me. I dodged. He said: "Why not, goddammit. Dont tell me I cant do anything." I said: "Here is the reason: (A) We are behind schedule on P-38 units for England, and they need them over there. I think ..."

(new tape)

I told General Arnold that I didnt think he could send P-38s to George Kenney in the Pacific, for the reason that they were short of them in Europe which was a higher priority theatre, etc. So he threw this inkwell. I discovered then that you dont tell Hap Arnold he cant do something. It made a lasting impression. He really didnt throw it at me. It hit the wall. So then we went into it. "Well", he said, and pulled out his little black book which was furnished by Benny Meyers, saying that there were 150 P-38s just sitting around. He said: "Send some of those!" I said: "They wont do anybody any good, because for your information, Meyers has accepted them, but they dont have any propellors." Lockheed was turning out the airplanes at a faster rate than Hamilton, or whoever made the propellors. So they put a set of propellors on an airplane, fly it out to someplace in Arizona and park it on a field.

Q Well, did he get angry at Benny Meyers for giving false information?

W Eventually, eventually. When I finally had to document that business about Benny Meyers which is another story. And another instance, again this was George Kenney. So I told Arnold, explained why those P-38s which he thought were available were not available to anybody for the time being, and I felt that they should go, and he finally backtracked and agreed that they should go on. Then, another time, George Kenney was yelling for some P-47s. He wanted 100 of them. It was more or less the same situation, except that I didnt tell Hap Arnold that he couldnt do it. I argued against it, again. The bombers in England were having a pretty tough time with the German Air Force, and they sure as hell needed fighter escort. So I explained that this would mean that the only aircraft available was a brand new P-47 group that had

just gotten their aircraft, was just about to take off for England, where I felt they were gravely needed. Well, he said, "I want them to go to Kenney." I said: "I understand the radios in them are for Europe, and in the S.W. Pacific they have a different radio communications system than they use in Europe." He used some language, the effect of which was: "Get 'em going. Quit giving me all this stuff. /I have to do everything around this place." I said: "You want me to scrub that flight to England? Then you are going to have to tell the Joint Chiefs that this group is not going to Europe." He said: "That's my business. Forget it and send those airplanes to Kenney." Well, it happened I didnt know how the hell to get them there. We had been loading them on top of tankers, freighters, and everything else. Occasionally, we put them on carriers. It happenned I called the Navy. They had a small carrier leaving the West Coast the next morning, out in that direction.

Q. This was in '42?

W '42 or '43, somewhere along in there. I dont remember the dates. This small carrier was going empty. The Navy said: "Yeah", they'd take my airplanes. Boy, we flew them out there that night. I rounded up some Philco tech-reps.

Q Did they take the wings off?

W No, I think they just deck-loaded them aboard that carrier.

Q Were they CVE's, small carriers?

W Something like that. Philco's tech-reps were out there with their types of radios. Got aboard the carrier. We had ferry crews and got them out to the West Coast. They were on this carrier the next morning.

Q What about the radio installation?

W Which they were doing on the carrier enroute. So then, later in the afternoon. Meanwhile we had told England they were not going to get those P-47s, and Eaker and Spaatz just raised hell. And so, Hap called me down. He said: "I've changed my mind about the P-47s." I'd seen the cables and I'd told him that I felt they were needed more in England. But he had overruled me. So he said to me: "I changed my mind. Dont send those." I said: "Too late. You said to get 'em going, and they're on their way." He said: "Waddayou mean?" Isaid: "They're on their way." He said: "How did you do that?" I said: "Well, we flew them out to the West Coast last night. They were loaded aboard at 6 AM this morning. The Navy carrier left at 9 AM this morning and they are on

You said to get them going."

their way. He said: "God dammit, dont talk to the Navy any more." So that was an experience. Everytime I went in there, sometimes I'd throw my hat in and grin, wondering whether he was goingg to throw something at me. He'd say: "Wipe that silly grin off your face and come on in."

Q He had a grin grin on his face. Some people mistook that for pleasure, but it was dangerous.

W Here is one on navigators in England. For some reason or other, we were deploying these units. Eventually, they were supposed to have a navigator for every bomber, which I didnt think was necessary. They flew in great formations. The lead navigator took over. I was a fighter guy and a recce guy, so I was less / enthused about that /. So they screamed for navigators in advance of when they were scheduled. We were behind so they had about three or four navigators per squadron which I thought was ample because the lead group navigator did the navigating what about that in my mind. Fighter pilots, they navigated themselves; they did their own radio operating and everything else. So I told Hap I didn't tell him "You can't do it." but I said "this will be a very difficult proposition. Suddenly, a year in advance, give them all these navigators they're supposed to get next year" "Well" he says "do I have to do everything. How long does it take. . . " First of all, he said: "What navigators do we now have graduating?" I told him: "They are supposed to go into B-26 groups, etc, B-17 groups." "OK", he said, "Scrub a B-26 group, take the navigators out, send the B-26s without navigators, and give them to the 8th AF. Then, how long does it take to train a navigator?" It took not quite a year, but pushing a year. He said:"I want that training time cut down to six months. Cut it in half. That will give us twice as many at least." I said: "We'll have some lousy navigators, probably. I'm not in the training racket." He called in Bob Harper, and said: "How long does it take to train a navigator?" Same answer. Bob wouldn't talk back to him. Arnold said: "Cut it in half. Turn them out faster." So we got over that hurdle.

Q This created a problem because some people came out of there who weren't fully trained.

W I thought so.

Q Did Arnold catch any static from higher up on that?

W No, not to my knowledge. We were part of the Army, and they didn't know. We didn't know everything ourselves, to tell you the truth. We were growing and learning day by day.

Q And General Marshall gave him carte blanche

W Absolutely. To the best of my knowledge. He had absolute trust, and it was well placed. I will say that. I will repeat, that Arnold was an innovator, and he took stern measures to make things click when they had to click. Whether it was right or wrong to cut navigation training down is, shall we say, a moot question. But it was done, and we kept on with the program. I wouldn't have done it, but he did

Q Another thing he did along that line that made some of the men, especially out in the airplanes, unhappy. They had the 25 missions-and-out policy in England. Arnold changed that policy. He saw no reason why, if a man had 25 missions, he had just acquired the skills he needed. Why should be be put to pasture, and a fresh face inserted in there who would have to acquire the skills all over again. Perhaps you recall, they rescinded the 25 missions-and out policy late in the war, right before Normandy. This is when they sent these men to Atlantic City, or to Miami Beach. They wined and dined them, gave them 30 days leave, and the treatment. Some of the fellows got sent back for another series of missions. They weren't too happy.

W I dont recall that specifically, but there was a pretty fair reason for that 25 mission policy. I never was a big bomber guy myself. I was a Tactical guy as you know. We flew 100 missions. We took losses, too, some very severe losses in the 8th AF. As long as they didnt lose more than 15 percent on a mission, we fell, well, they could make it. The empty breakfast table sort of business. They were getting kind of low in their spirits over there. So they felt that they had to have a 50-50 chance of survival. And that just sort of barely made it, you know. So I sympathized and felt they were right on the 25 missions.

Q These fellows felt: "We did our time; let somebody else do his."

W That's quite right. Another thing, Arnold was a bit of a showman, but he didn't operate in that way. He was not a Patton . He was not a showman, but on the other hand he didn't pass up a chance. I dealt with groups, which was B-17's, 40 or 50 bombers; with a fighter group, it was 75 aircraft. I couldn't care less about numbers of airplanes, getting the numbers of aircraft to fill up these units, to furnish replacements. And to furnish modern aircraft for training which Hap was against. He just raised hell if I put B-17s for example into training. I felt I just had to, so I'd pull some skulduggery, as a matter of fact. I put some B-17s that were configured differently and didn't turn out too good in combat. So I put some brand new ones into training. He saw them sitting on the ground, or flying out there at some of these training fields. He called me in and said: "Have you been giving the Training Command some new B-17's?" I said "Yes sir." he said "Godammit, I told you not to" "I know you did. But they have to have them and these are non-combat airplanes, the ones that didn't prove out."

Q How did you take your defiance, mild as it was? Inkwell throwing?

W I was more diplomatic after that But I would argue with him, disagree with him. And he took it because he was smart enough to know he could push things. He'd make the judgment. He'd let me get by with this. I think he respected people who challenged him?

Q Rosie O"Donnell?

W Of course. Rosie would tell a good joke along with it.

Q And soften the impact?

W Yes, well I'm not a kokester, so I had to sort of be diplomatic, and try to reason the thing out, which was my way, and which he accepted - not always. And whenthe evidence seemed to be predominantly the way I was putting it, he'd go along with it sort of grudgingly, shall we say.

Q One of his phobias, hangups, was when he came into a base and saw planes sitting on the ground. . .

W Oh, yes, sitting on the ground. . .

Q Many have told me he'd jump on the CO, or somebody, and find

out why these planes were not doing something.

And sometimes when they knew he was coming they would hide these planes, get them in the air?

W I was aware of that. That's particularly true of training of course. Everything was training in the States. We had sort of an Air Defense Command but it wasn't needed as such and we'd rotate those units.

Q Did you ever go for an inspection trip with him for some days?

W No I didn't. He had his own little group. I was too damn busy.

Q I've been told several times that when he came into a base he would try to avoid the red carpet treatment that the base commander had all set up, with the charts and the lights and magic tape. and He'd go to the maintenance shack and grab some sergeant who had served under him and that's where the real problems were. Was this characteristic of him?

W I think it probably was, though I was not on any of those trips I started to say this. I dealt in groups and he like to deal in numbers of airplanes. He'd get projected numbers from Benny Meyers and then I had to fit them into this program, and try to fit the people, which didn't always fit. One day he called me down. He says "Weyland, do you know that yesterday the 1,000th B-17 landed in England?" I didn't. I wasn't particularly interested in 999, or 1,000, or 1,350. "Damn you" he said, "That is news!" I said "Yessir, but I'm not in the PIO business" So he kind of chewed me out about that. This is the numbers racket business on airplanes. He counted airplanes. Meyers would make these projections starting a year in advance. "A year from now we'll turn out 200 B-17's, and 20 B-24's a month. We'll have 400 B-51's, 22 250 P-38's" and so on. That was the point in time where I had to get people inducted, feed them into the training command to make mechanics, pilots, and so on. Benny Meyers rosy projections, as I mentioned earlier, would change month by month. One month before the actual delivery dates he was quite accurate. And I was always in trouble because for some reason or another, I didn't have the combat airplanes. I was told I was going to get a year prior to that. It took some time for me. Finally a civilian out at Wright Field clued

me in on it. He was apparently making up these charts, and sending them in. Which was, that he would slip them, and slip them, slide in a few hundred L-5s and L-4s to keep his 10,000 planes a year going on. It looked rosy to General Arnold, you see. He didn't detect it. But I did, and I should have. We didnt have the sophisticated equipment to track these things down. They were up on walls, charts.

Q I was told Benny Meyers was a marvel with figures. He could add a column of four figures simultaneously.

W He was an extremely smart guy, but I didn't think he was entirely honest. So I finally made quite a chart on this business showing that he was deliberately sliding the real guts combat aircraft in the numbers, and substituting useless liaison aircraft, or something of that nature to pad his numbers, which of course threw the program out of gear. So I finally caught on to this thing after I got a tip as to what was going on. Then I went back and spent about a day charting this business which showed that Benny Meyers was consistently lying in advance about this business. Well I was mad as could be.

Q You remember the civilian who clued you in?

W No

Q He was a high level civilian at Wright Field?

W He must have been. Maybe his wife was mixed up in something. Anyway Then I went down to whats-his-name, one of the two twins Barney Giles, was then the executive in the front office

Q Barney Giles became Chief of Air Staff, He took Stratemeyers place.

W He was in the front office directly under Arnold. He was a good solid citizen, still is. I took all of this, and I had documented that pretty thoroughly. And I was mad as I could be. And I took it down to Barney Giles not into Gen Arnold. And I said here's what's going on and this is ~~the reason~~, one reason, that we've been in a hell of a lot of unnecessary trouble Shortly after that was when Benny Meyers got fired.

He got into other types of trouble.

Q I want to ask before we get off Benny Meyers. Arnold had a great deal of confidence in him early in the war. and It was at the end of the war that Arnold found out about him. When the dénouement occurred and Benny Meyers was exposed as having had his hand in the till. Arnold said something about there being a rotten apple in the barrel You remember he testified. This was after the war when they had that big scandal about Benny Meyers. And Arnold felt very much ashamed because he had put so much trust in him

W yes he did. I was always in conflicts on the airplane business because, as I say, he'd have a black book, everybody carried black books, And his was filled with figures, And he was taking Benny Meyers' figures which were not practical from my viewpoint because they were like P-38's, they weren't combat ready and there was all this calculated slippage in combat aircraft which threw the program, So he had his set of figures and I had a different set of figures which were more practical working figures, the ones that were actually coming off the line, and were usable. So I had to explained to Gen Arnold why it was we couldn't send these aircraft to combat, or to new units, or whatnot, on the schedule that we had originally put out

Q Did he ever go back to Meyers?

W Eventually I'm sure he did when he was caught up with. After I had docmented this slippage . And it was not long after that that Meyers went on the skids. But I passed the buck to Barney Giles who carried the ball on that thing. I merely exposed it from the standpoint of headquarters as to what was going on.

Q There was a man named Jim Powell. He's a Brigadier General. Does that name mean anything? He lives in Vienna, Va.

W Yes, I know Jim Powell

Q He was bounced out of his job because he blew the whistle on Ben ny Meyers - there being two sets of books, one, the real production, and the other, Benny Meyers'.

W Was he out at Wright Field?

Q He was in Washington He might have had a job similar to yours before you came in

W No, but he probably was in Procurement

Q He wouldn't talk to me. He was trying to forget that. Arnold at that time sided with Meyers against Powell who was bounced out of that job. It wasn't until later that he got his star.

W Jim Powell's a great guy. I'm very fond of him. He was a student of mine. He originally was lighter-than-air. He came to Kelly Field as a heavier-than-air pilot later. He was my boss at Luke Field in Hawaii for a short while. Wonderful gentleman. He's too much of a gentleman to talk about it.

Q He said this is a bad thing in my life I just don't want to talk about it.

W I can see. He's very much of a gentleman, and he wouldn't want to say bad things about anyone.

Q I think he probably felt that Arnold didn't do right by him in this controversy that Powell had had with Benny Meyers. There were several people that crossed Benny Meyers Arnold seemed to stick with Meyers.

W He did for a long time, until this time I had the goods on him.

Barney Giles carried the ball on that, ~~So anyhow~~

Q Did you go overseas with the B-29 thing? When did you leave Washington?

W I left Washington in January 1944 about six months before the Normandy invasion. ~~So~~ Oddly enough, I'd argued with Hap and I didn't know that I'd get bounced ~~up~~ out. Quite a number of people who'd argued with him got bounced out. They suddenly found themselves some place else, out in the Training Command or something. By golly, I got a star in the Pentagon. I was the most surprised guy you've ever seen.

Then the war was pretty well getting along. Like every body I wanted to get ~~up~~ out and get into combat. So I went again to Barney Giles and said "Look". I kind of fancied myself as a recce or a fighter guy, and my last command group had been a fighter group in Panama. I said "I'd like to take

a fighter group overseas. I'm a BG now. Hell, I have to get into combat." Barney was pretty sympathetic. He said he'd talk to the Old Man. I said: "I wish you would talk to him and see if he'd let me go. These fighter wings are about to run out". I said: "I'd like to go to Europe." I wanted to go to Europe which was a higher priority and I thought a little more interesting perhaps and a little more challenging. So I got it. The Old Man apparently agreed.

Q You got the 19th TAC?

W I got the 84th Fighter Wing which I took overseas. A week after, they changed me over to the 19th TAC which then I fought in Europe.

Q One of the reasons that you didn't go to the Pacific--of course you didn't want the Pacific--but Kenney ~~he~~ didn't want to take senior people. He wanted to promote his own

W That's right exactly--precisely! I've seen general officers sent out there--some of them weren't the best I've ever seen, ~~He~~ just packed them up and sent them back home

Q White went out there with the 13th Air Force and Kenney ~~he~~ was trying to promote his own man, "Squeeze" Wurtsmith. So Arnold had trouble sending senior people out there.

W I knew that. So that was one reason. But the main reason was that Europe was a bigger show, more action, and so on. Anyhow, that's where I went. It was a fun time, and Gen Arnold visited us over there. There's a picture over there. He decided to hang a gong on me somewhere and I don't know where it was. Probably in Luxembourg.

Q This was in '45

W I guess. We had been Rampaging all over the country and I was teamed up with the Third Army which was Patton. We had a hell of a lot of fun

Q Did you serve as consultant on that movie?

W No. That was all Army. Of course we were Army at the time.

Patton was writing his memoirs as a sort of a book. He'd give it me chapter by chapter. He had glowing things to say about Weyland and the 19th TAC. Boy, he thought there was nothing I couldn't do. He had implicit confidence. With pretty good reason. We had what it took. And we had a bunch of goddamned primas. I'm telling you. And he had never had any air support like that. Down in Africa we didn't have air superiority and the Germans did, and so he got beat up down there. He was never hurt by German airplanes in Europe. So we were very close friends, actually. In England he came around and visited ~~me~~ my units, and he saw some professionalism and he learned about military precision that he didn't know anything about. We operated in terms of fractions of seconds--things like that, you know. We had rendezvous, and times of takeoff, and checkpoints, and so on. He thought we were pulling his leg: I explained to him! This air group you're hearing briefed is going out to meet 8th Air Force bombers leaving Berlin, damn near 500 miles away. They're flying out there at 25,000 feet and meeting somebody coming back at 200 miles an hour. They're going out at 300 miles an hour or 350. A meeting speed of better than 500 miles an hour, Above the clouds, no checkpoints, You don't have a map where you can read "crossroads, so-and-so" He was astonished by it. He learned about military precision, and got a new respect, at least, for airpower. And then, when we went in combat together, we had what it took, and we had air superiority, and we just cleared the way for him All he had to do was keep gasoline

13 in his tanks and trucks, and just keep rolling. That amazed him. He had to bulldoze German artillery and trucks and wagons off the roads to advance. Found out my fighter-bombers had done that. Well, he was just amazed and delighted. He said: "Hot dog!" He got together one night over there. He called me down. They just had to break out from Avranches. They were moving down a single highway. The only obstacle was having to bulldoze Germans off the road so they could go ahead. When he got excited, he had a high squeaky voice. He says: "Come on down." We were out in some woods

My headquarters was woods on one side, and his on the other. So I went on down. He says: "I just came from down the line here, and the only obstacles are these trucks you have to bulldoze across the road. He said: "Your fighter-bombers did that. "Hot dog! How about a drink." We sat there, and he pulled out a full quart of bourbon that was hard to come by. And to make a long story short, he and I killed one quart of bourbon. From the standpoint of mutual respect which we had over in England, we had an agreement that he'd run the ground and I'd run the air, without any question. He respected that. That respect, over this quart of bourbon, it ripened into warm, deep friendship. We had a rather happy time.

Q Did Arnold --was he partial to bombers vs. fighters, or was he pretty flexible about it.

W I think he was pretty flexible. Of course he was pushing the heavies, and rightly so, because that was pretty much the key. The heavies were pretty much the key to the preparation for the invasion of Europe. Germany simply had to be beat down, their industry, and so on. Only heavy bombers could do it. Fighter-bombers didn't have that capability. In the Pacific it was a little bit different I think. They depended a great deal on fighter bombers. They had light bombers but it was all really fighter-bomber tactics. They'd attack convoys and whatnot by skip bombing and that sort of thing. Europe was a different ball game and it was a real tough one for the heavy bombers. Shall we say, he was partial to the heavy bombers . When they had found that they had to have fighters for protection , he decided they had to have fighters.

Q This was a problem in 1943, while you were still in the Pentagon. Inadequate support for the bombers. They took a beating.

W Originally, the bombers thought they could fight their way in and out by themselves, which they found out and screamed for more fighters, which they sure as hell needed.

Q Arnold made some changes. For example, he took Monk Hunter out of the 8th Ftr Comd and put in Kepner. Were you familiar with his thinking on that?

W No. It was probably sound

Q He was dissatisfied with the job the fighters were doing as escort. Of course, they didn't have P-51s then. This was in 1943. P-51s didnt come in until the time you left Washington.

W Just about. We didnt have many P-51s. I had some. Initially, I used mine almost exclusively for escort and in the 8th AF. They were the best we had. They had the legs; they had the speed; and for some reason or other, they were just more agile than a P-38. They didn't do as well in Europe as they did in the Pacific. It was made to order for the Pacific. Kenney just loved them. But the P-51 was a dandy in Europe.

Q There was a big hassle just about the time you got to Europe about whether they should switch targets from oil. Spaatz and the British had this go around on when to start hitting tactical targets, pre-invasion. Do you recall anything? Leigh Mallory was in that?

W I was not in on that. I think just prior to the invasion. Of course they did rather an abortive effort for the breakouts when Hoyt used them. That's when some Army general (McNair) got clobbered by short bombs. But I was not in on it. That was a different ball game I knew Leigh-Mallory, and he didn't last too long. We operated pretty well by ourselves. Then when Vandenberg took over.

Q Bruce Butler was brought in as Leigh-Mallory's assistant. But he didn't last long in that job. Do you remember?

W I knew Bruce. I didn't think Leigh-Mallory's headquarters was a very good one . Theoretically, it was. The way we made it work, actually, Just prior to and during the invasion I took over what was called the 9th Fighter Command which consolidated all of the 9th Air Force

Q You worked for Vandenberg?

W At that time I was working for Quesada he had a tactical air

command just as I did I was working under Louis Brereton ~~Bradford~~ who had the 9th Air Force at that time Fortunately I set up Fighter Command HQ at a place called Uxbridge, which was the British Fighter Command Hq. Underground setup which controlled the radars. We used predominantly British radars, though I had the one and only MEW. It was the newest radar, so we used that. Otherwise we used the British communications system. I insisted on using our own controllers and so on. Way we worked there really was ... Four of us, American officers were living together in a British house close to Uxbridge. Each of us was in different headquarters. One was 9th Air Force Hq, ops. Another was Leigh-Mallory's HQ. Another one was some place else, and I had the Fighter Command. We did really more business over a drink every night, which was pretty late. Then we'd get our ducks in a row, without any fuss or feathers. And that's the way we kept these things going at Uxbridge. Leigh-Mallory's Hq, to my mind, was rather ineffectual and nobody was too satisfied with it.

Q Wasn't one of the reasons that it was ineffectual that he had the command, the Americans had the chips and they didn't want to turn it over to him?

W I suppose so. Then there was intermediate headquarters. We actually had a pretty good working arrangement there with representatives from these four different headquarters We just, over a drink in the evening and we generally had dinner together every night--about the only time we'd see each other--we'd say what the problems were, ~~and~~ We'd work it out that way rather than go through channels. One way of doing it.

Q There was not much German opposition over the beachhead. Was this a surprise?

W A little bit, yes. Not entirely because, again, a combination of the 8th Air Force who hit factories and POL largely, and 9th Air Force in preinvasion tactics, we beat up airfields, that was part of the business, as well as interdiction ~~and~~ etc. So I expected more opposition than actually happened. Yes, They showed up, but not very effectively. Because, we had, on the day of the invasion , my units --I think on the day of the invasion,

most of my fighter units flew five missions on that first day. The beachhead area was ten-tenths fighters, all Allied.

Q Eisenhower is supposed to have told his men as they embarked. "If you see any planes, they'll be ours"

W That's right. What I did, to cover the Navy forces going across, I put up P-38's, hoping they wouldn't mistake them. Because they were awfully trigger-happy. They shot down one P-51. It was a recce airplane. Well it did look a good bit like an ME-109, which is an honest mistake.

Q I guess they wanted to avoid what happened in Sicily where ...

W That was fresh in our minds. Indeed it was. So I put all P-38's over the shipping and the stream of warships and landing barges and all that sort of business which was just a solid mass of shipping going across. But there was very little opposition in the air. There was a hell of a lot on the ground

Q Did you see Gen Arnold? He and Marshall and King came to the beachhead two or three days after the Normandy thing started. They visited England just about the time the Germans started using V-1s, about a week after the invasion. Did you get into any of that?

W Yes. kind of exciting. In my fighter HQ, the radar plotted all these things. Somehow or other, we had the right signature. So they'd be plotted, and one of my controllers downstairs: "Hey, one's headed right for us. Look out your window." I'd look out. This thing would come sputtering along. Well, if it sputtered on over, OK, but if it quit, look out! One or two hit somewhere before you could hear them. Downtown in London, did a lot of damage. But they were exciting. And my fighter boys, they were pretty fast little aircraft, you know. My 19th TAC fighter fields were down in the Kent area, right next to the coast, that's where all these V-1's flew right across that area. Well, they'd be coming back from missions, and occasionally see one.

Q Could they catch them?

W Occasionally, but they had to be well above. The P-51's could catch them and dive down. They shot down a few, not very many. I remember one,

the guy was out of ammunition, the P-51. So he came diving down, came up under, nudged the wing and flipped it and made it dive in So he got credit for a V-1.

Q Arnold put the pieces of some of these crashed V-1's together and before long we had the JB-2, the Chinese version of the V-1. And Arnold would have sent them over by the thousands against Germany.

W I didnt know about that. That was after I left, I'm sure.

Q Arnold was all for mass airborne operations. Louis Brereton had that Airborne Army. Did you ever hear Arnold talk, his philosophy, about airborne?

W I can't say that I did. I do know that he was extremely interested, and we were turning out gliders by the thousands. And we had glider training schools. I'd go down for some little exercise in which they landed at night, and Arnold would be there. He was very interested in it and, aside from that the Germans used it very effectively as a surprise thing and the Germans of course were prepared for us on the landing in Normandy, would have gone without them but I think they were reasonably effective in that they were back behind the beachhead area. So those two, three divisions were put in that first airborne

Q Eisenhower was no fan of airborne, nor were Spaatz and Eaker

W I wasn't either. Later on, Brereton took over that airborne army, and which all he commanded was the airborne troops which were sitting back behind the lines doing nothing which annoyed the rest of the ground forces, people like Patton. At least then, they had to put on this operation. I was keeping the Third Army going because I borrowed bombers from Jimmy Doolittle to haul over gas, the "Red Ball Express" just couldn't keep up with them, Jimmy Doolittle knew Patton, and used to visit us. So he was very sympathetic. He'd come up and bring over B-24's and tear up my fighter fields which was all right with me, and then we'd load gas right out of B-24's into the tanks and trucks of the Third Army and kept them going. Then they started an airborne operation in France. They used C-47's too to haul gas in cans When they called that off, the Third Army came to a dead stop.

Just couldn 't have any more gas. So we stopped them. Our HQ at least were in Nancy. I wasn't very fond of them. They kept us from getting to Berlin much sooner.

Q Did you ever hear Arnold talk about a separate Air Force? I will say that about Gen Marshall. He obviously gave Gen Arnold carte blanche. In effect, although we were part of the Army, he was running it as a separate air force. He was an operator.

Q Marshall had that confidence in him

W Evidently did

Q Did you ever see them together? At JCS meetings or?

W No I didn't attend JCS meetings until after the war when Tooey Spaatz was Chief.

Q I was told that Arnold was deferential to Gen Marshall in a the sense that he never would criticize or take a position other than the one Gen Marshall took, either at Combined or JCS meetings. He never forget that he was working for Gen Marshall, and I guess, Gen Marshall never forgot it, either.

W I suppose. I was not at that level at that time. But it was obviously a very good relationship and complete confidence, as far as I know.

Q ~~Let me ask you about~~ Arnold's staff in his office. Susie Adkins Did ~~you~~ she serve as a traffic cop? How did you get to see Gen Arnold?

W Usually at his command. No, I'm sure I went into see him many times but I never had the slightest trouble seeing him. I guess I just kind of marched in and opened the door , poked my head in.

Q You didn't go through any filter?

W No, I was in and out so damn much they just didn't try, I guess. Usually he'd get me on the squawk box and tell me to get the hell on down there So I'd grab my black book.

Q Did General Arnold just shoot the bull in the office ~~time~~ some time, when you werent talking shop?

W I think he did occasionally, but not to any great extent. It was predominantly business when I was in there. I'm sure he did this with some people, I suppose. I don't know

Q How did he make out at staff meetings when he spoke to a group of people? Was he articulate?

W I don't recall any staff meetings, per se. I guess I didn't attend his staff meetings. I guess Sandy Fairchild or people like that did, who were one rung above me.

Q You worked for Sandy Fairchild part of the time. He was considered a great intellect

W He was . He was an intellectual guy but he was extremely sound from the standpoint of the development of air power. He'd been down at ~~not the Air University but~~ the old Air Corps Tactical School Much of the stuff that was developed in World War II had been developed at the old Air Corps Tactical School. I attended it.

Q Did you get involved in the bomber vs fighter argument. Chennault vs I guess Ken Walker

W Yes. Larry Kuter was one. ~~He'd never~~ I challenged Larry once, Before the class caught him off base. He's quite an intellectual, too. I took a little pleasure in cutting him down to size He was pretty cocky and rather superior, and rather junior. Very little experience so I took a little pleasure in cutting him down to size when he was off base. But he was quite a guy, a very smart young man. ~~You'll have to ask questions I've about run out~~

Q Arnold had this reputation for grabbing people in the hall and sending them on missions Did this ever happend to you?

W Yes. I've forgotten what about That was rather famous. He'd be racing down the hall. He'd see somebody "What are you doing?" And

he'd send them off on something completely foreign to their field. One of these reorganizations, I remember, I had this allocations bit This had to do with allocations of--we had these air sea rescue boats, 63 foot boats. And there was a lot of them being rolled off, and in one of these reorganizations somebody lost them all so I was allocating these rescue boats to everybody. My main job was aircraft and crews and units and whatnot. That I thought came under the Materiel people. It really didn't For about a month I was peddling air-sea rescue boats all over the world until somebody got mad about it and said: "What are you doing with that" Whether that was something Arnold told me to do, I don't know. But he was famous for that. He'd just tell somebody to do something. They shook their heads "Who does this?"

Q Did he have a memory. If he told you to do something foreign to your expertise did he pick you up on it next time he saw you say: "did you take care of that?"

W Probably did. He sure had a memory, there's no doubt about that.

Q Did he know a lot of people by name? Did he have a good memory for names?

W I think he did. He sure as hell knew mine. Called me every morning just about. . .

Q You had to be there at 6:30 AM to beat him into the office?

W Yes.

Q In 1943, while you were there, during the TRIDENT Conference when the British came to Washington - in May 1943 - Arnold had a mild heart attack. It was kept quiet.

W I dont remember that.

Q He had a major heart attack later on. They sent him to the Biltmore, Coral Gables.

W I have a vague recollection. It didn't impinge on me directl . I thought he might a time or two. He was pretty hale and hearty.

Q He had his two principal seconds: Stratemeyer for the first part of the war, and Giles for the second part of the war. Both men were not considered dynamic, outspoken, strong-willed types. True?

W That certainly goes for Stratemeyer

Q Probably for Giles too

W To a lesser degree. Giles, I considered a doer. But he was pretty diplomatic, unlike his brother Ben.

Q Somebody had made the comment that Arnold didn't want a strong second man?

W Could be. There's no doubt about it. He was the operator regardless of . . He might have had more trouble with somebody else. He would still have beenthe principal operator. There's no doubt about that in my mind.

Q He got mad at you when he threw that inkwell in your general direction. Did he ever get angry at you on another occasion, that you recall?

W No. He would be annoyed , particularly when my figures prevailed, or something like that, when I showed him that I was right, and that what he though was right wasn't, He did not get mad. Obviously he promoted me while I was in there. So obviously he wasn't really mad at me But he was pretty flashy , pretty volatile, all right. I felt I could ride with the punches. I was kind of insistent tried at least the lay the thing on the line the way I saw it. Be sure he saw it the way I did. I presented my side, or whatever it was, or what I considered to be my side. He very frequently changed over and acceded. Didnt get made about it. Probably got a little irritated at somebody else, because whatever data he had didnt add up to mine. Then he believed mine.

Q Pinky Craig took over OC&R a little later. Were you there?

W I think maybe I had gone by that time Pinky was around there. But we reorganized several times Sometimes it was a problem really knowing who was doing what.

Q On the other side from OC&R was MM&D , Materiel, Maintenance & Distribution. The head of that was Oliver Echols . Benny Meyers was his second in command but Arnold seemed to bypass Echols to go to Benny Meyers

W I think he did

Q Did you know anything that?

W I don't really, but I know he did have, he referred directly to Benny Meyers' figures on aircraft production, which he was naturally very interested. ~~and~~ So was I, the only trouble being that they didn't always match up. We never had any dealings with Gen Echols, directly.

Q Echols was a Southern gentleman, and I was told he was a courtly man. I think he proceeded at a more even pace. Arnold was being pressured from above for numbers, and the guy who had quick numbers available was Benny Meyers

W He sure was an expert at it That's about it. And he must have been a wizard. He certainly manipulated the industry.

Q He must have done some good things for Arnold,?

W I'm sure he did, yes. He was apparently quite a dynamo. He was just slightly dishonest from where I sat. But he was a wizard at getting production going, and he was a busy boy.

Q One man told me that Benny Meyers had his hands in the till; he was running this little company on the side. And he said it was general knowledge that Benny was taking for two; he was taking for Arnold as well. Have you ever heard that?

W No.

Q Arnold had almost no estate when he did. Where could it have gone? If he did take, Meyers, that is, he wasnt taking it for Arnold. Did you hear that?

W I never heard the story, and I wouldn't believe it if I heard it. I'm just as sure as I sit here that Arnold would never take a thing.

Q One of the big points I hope to make in the book about the so-called military-industrial-complex has to do with the fact that Arnold ran the whole procurement. If he ~~wanted~~ decided to buy one plane against another there was no one to gainsay him. If he had sticky fingers, he could have done it.

W He could have, but he wouldn't. He was out to win the war. And he was the right man, in the right place, at the right time.

Q Most people I've talked to have this impression. Some others who are

highly regarded like Horace Hickam. Everybody had a high opinion of his ability

W If he'd lived he would have been a great guy

Q And Andrews, of course.

W Great, not quite as dynamic as Arnold. Though he wasn't any patsy. For example, he loved to fly his own airplane. Of course, that's what got him killed. And he would, I was in Panama when he was running the theater. He had a forerunner of the C-47. I flew the thing once or twice. It wasn't a C-47, smaller engines or something. But he would take off--he had a son-in-law who was an aide who was a damn good pilot. Well, he would remonstrate with the old man and say: "You can't do it". and Andrews would say "The hell we aren't. We're going" And he'd go and when he shouldn't have gone.

Q Many have told me this. Did you know Hugh Knerr. Knerr was very close to him

W Yes, I knew Knerr

Q He came down to Panama to visit Andrews. He was retired. Worked for Sperry. Did you see them together?

W I cant say that I have. I knew Knerr, not well or intimately. Dont remember them together, to my recollection.

Q Did you hear of any competition between Andrews and Arnold for the top spot? There was talk about it.

W I suppose there was. At that time, I was a Fighter Group Commander, and that was above my level. They were both extremely capable people, and Andrews could have run it. Andrews was supposed to take over - at least the way I understood it - the job that Ike had.

Q Eisenhower - Supreme Commander?

W And I think he would have done very, very well. I think in the job in Washington that Arnold was better than Andrews would have been. I think Andrews would have been better in combat than Arnold. Although I don't know why I'm saying that. That's just kind of a feeling. I sure as

hell couldnt back it up. God knows, it would have been an interesting thing with Arnold running the show over there in Europe.

Q It would have been a different kind of a show?

W We wouldnt have been quite as much, being nice to the British, which was sort of the name of the game. Eisenhower had to keep the British in, and gosh, he bent over backwards in doing it.

Q Too far, in your opinion?

W In my opinion. Right

Q I was told that Andrews had more of a rapport with his troops than Arnold had. Arnold was perhaps feared by some; Andrews was more respected. How does that strike you?

W That could have been. I never served under either. I was a Group Commander when Andrews had a theater. As you say, he was very approachable. I was not directly under him.

Q Did people fear Arnold in the Pentagon?

W I suppose there were some because, you think he's going to bite your head off

Q If you didn't have the job done?

W Sure. He fired some people. There's no doubt about that. People left the Pentagon - "Bing!"

I never did. I was kind of surprised that I wasn't busted after the war. I got two stars overseas, and of course, we collapsed afterwards

Q I think you disagreed with him but never to the point of open rebellion?

W No, it wasn't any open rebellion. Sure. If he said to send a hundred airplanes to Kenney, I sent them. Much to his dismay, a day later.

Q General, you said you went to flying school with Lindbergh?

W That is correct. I joined a class at Brooks Field in 1924 about September when I took a regular commission. He was in that class

was just graduating from Brooks Field. I took a little refresher at Brooks Field, Went to Kelly Field with Lindbergh. In those days it was six months at Brooks Field and six months at Kelly. I didn't know him well at all. The only thing that I recall--and I wasn't there, actually, at the time, --When he arrived at Brooks Field he flew his own airplane into Brooks Field to go there to learn how to fly. He was an excellent pilot. We were in different sections. He was in the pursuit section; I was in observation at Kelly. We graduated from Kelly at the same time in about March of 1925. He went back to civilian life, started flying mail, as I recall. Used to see him off and on. We had a speaking acquaintance, but he was, even in those days, somewhat of a loner. I don't recall that he had any real close friends. Certainly I was not. No reason, one way or the other, really. But occasionally I'd see him, run into him, and we'd yak a few minutes, That's all so I'm not great expert on Lindbergh

Q Did you have any other contacts with him later?

W Only when I'd see him some place, St Louis or some place like that He had a good friend whom I knew better. A boy named Phil Love who probably was his best friend And Phil Love, I think, was killed. But they were good friends. They both, I think, were from St. Louis, I'm not real sure about that.

END OF INTERVIEW

Wheeler, Burton K. 23 Nov 70

Interview - Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Washington, D.C., Nov 23, 1970

W: I met General Foulois in 1923, in Europe when he was Military Attache over there, and he talked to me about McNair and his early training at the start. He convinced me that the AF was something that was going to grow and be important and he and I became very great friends from that time on. But, with reference to General Arnold, I only met him on not more than two occasions. The first time I met him - I was just trying to think - it was at his office. I went up to see him on something. I haven't any recollection what it was. It was undoubtedly something in connection with....

Q: Appropriations, probably?

W: Probably. The second time that I went to see him, after I had disagreed with Roosevelt on the court-packing. I led the fight.

Q: Yes, 1937.

W: Yes, then the people in Montana, many of them thought that I couldn't get anything from the Administration because I disagreed with Roosevelt. As a matter of fact, Roosevelt did more for me than he did for any of the Senators in the way of getting projects to Montana. I have disagreed with him on the issue of silver. I came within one vote of passing it in the Senate. When I did, Jack Garner and some of them told him that I would pass it the next time it came up. Well, he called in Key Pittman, and he called in Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. He called in Jimmy Byrnes, and perhaps one or two others. But he never...I was the one who was leading the fight. He never called me in at all. I was at the Mayflower Hotel, in the lobby, when a fellow who was kind of a lobbyist came up and spoke to me. He said: "Have you ever met Father Coughlin?" I said: "No." He said: "Would you like to meet him?" And I said: "I'd be glad to meet him."

And he said: "Well, he's upstairs, come on up." So I went up, and Father Coughlin was pacing up and down the room, with his collar off. He told me that they were having a meeting over at the White House. He told me who was there, on many questions. I said: "What are they going to do about silver?" And he said: "Nothing." I said: "Well, if they don't, I'll raise hell." We talked for awhile, and I came back. The next morning, Frank Walker called me from NY. He said: "I understand you were on the warpath last night. You can't afford to get into a fight with Roosevelt." I said: "I can disagree with him over silver." And he said: "No," and he went on. I said: "You take a message. You tell him I said he could go to hell with him." Back in my office, and when I got over there, the Secy, not McIntyre...

Q: Steve Early?

M: No.

Q: Louis Howe?

M: No.

Q: This is a Presidential secretary? Not McIntyre?

M: McIntyre. McIntyre called me up, and said: "The President wants to see you. He wants you to come over." I said: "No, I won't come." "Oh," he said: "Now, Burt, you come over here." And I went over. I went in to see him, and I said to him: "Mr. President, I don't like this kind of treatment," and I said: "I'm not entitled to this kind of treatment from you, and I'm not going to take it." FDR said: "Oh now, Burt." He said: "Bryan killed silver." I said: "Mr. President, before this thing is over you are going to take a lot worse than silver, before you get through." And we argued. I said: "I'm going to offer an amendment to this bill to remonetize." Well, he called Key in. It was because of my fight over coinage, that these people came down from Great Falls, Montana. There was the

President of the Chamber of Commerce, the Secy of the Chamber of Commerce, the head of the American Legion, the Mayor of Great Falls. They were around here for about a month, and they didn't come to see me. They went to see the Congressman, and they talked with Senator Walsh, and Senator Murray. They weren't getting any place. They finally came up to see me, and I said: "Well, who have you talked to?" Well, they saw some Major, some Colonel, but they hadn't got any place. I said: "Would you like to see General Arnold of the AF?" "Oh," he said, "could we see him?" I said: "I think so," so I called him up. He said for them to come up and see him, so I brought them up, and I said to him: "General, this is the Secy of the Chamber of Commerce, this is the Mayor of Great Falls, and this is the head of the American Legion. They all think the Army won't do anything for me because I disagreed with Roosevelt on the coinage issue." And he said: "That's silly." He pressed a button, and he called in two or three generals. I can't think of the three anyway, and he said to them: "Look into this thing of Great Falls," because these people were down here to get the air base at Great Falls. I think somebody in Seattle and different places were after it. In about less than a month's time, General Arnold announced that it was going to be in Great Falls. That was the second time, and the last time I saw him.

Q: Was he Chief of the Air Corps at this time, or was he second in command?

W: No, he was the head, Chief.

Q: This must have been after 1938?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Was this during the buildup for WWII?

W: This must have been in the early part of 1940.

Q: Do you remember the other time you met Arnold?

W: The other time - I was trying to think of it. I met him at his office, and at that time, I had said something to him about the war.

Q: Was this during the war?

W: Oh no.

Q: Before the war?

W: Oh yes, before the war. I gathered that he wasn't very favorable to it, anyway. I made some remark, and told him something. I can't recollect what it was, but those were the only two times that I ever saw him.

Q: Anyway, Great Falls became one of the biggest bases the AAF had.

W: Exactly, yes.

Q: They were using that to shuttle planes to the Russians.

W: Shuttle planes to the Russians. Of course, it made Great Falls. It was the greatest thing that ever happened to Great Falls. This was after the Court-fight, and after the time that I had with Roosevelt I spoke to you about.

Q: I'd like to ask you. You started to talk about, before we put the tape on. The article by Frank Waldrop - did you read that article?

W: Yes.

Q: What did you think of it?

W: I didn't think much of it, to be frank with you. I knew that Frank Waldrop couldn't have known any more than I did about it, and for him to say that Arnold was the man, so forth, was ridiculous, in my judgment because I think that if that had been so, I would have known it was Arnold, and as I have said, I wouldn't trust Waldrop. I mean I used to know him quite well. He was all for keeping out of the war, and all that. Then he switched over and went over to State Dept., and then, in connection with the paper, in connection with Cissy Patterson, poor thing. She had asked me to come down to see her, rewrite her will,

you know. I was to go down there Sunday. Saturday she died.

Q: And in this will she left the paper to a number of people.

W: Sure, to Waldrop and these others.

Q: Do you think she wanted to change that will?

W: She would have changed it had I gone down there, because I would have told her she was crazy not to. Well, afterwards, they found out that they had been stealing from her. And not only that, but they used to go down there, and get drunk with her, and so forth. That whole crowd...rotten, nasty mess. Steve Early's sister. She was down there one time....

Q: Was she connected with the paper?

W: No, no, but there was a woman here, very prominent. She told me about this, and come away one time. This woman said: "Well, we wonder if the old bitch will live through this one, see?" Steve's sister thought they did away with her.

Q: Do you think that Waldrop had a guilty conscience, by virtue of the fact that the Washington Times-Herald published the RAINBOW FIVE plan?

W: No, he didn't have a damned thing to do with it. I talked with Walter Trohan the other day, and Walter said if he had known about it, why he wouldn't have had it published. Well, Walter Trohan said: "Hell, he didn't have a damned thing to do with it."

Q: Well, Chesly Manly died recently, he's the fellow who got ahold of it. You mention in your book, I read your book - very good book. I enjoyed it very much, but you mentioned that an Army Air Forces Captain was coming up to see you. Now, who sent him, do you know?

W: That I don't know, I haven't the slightest idea.

Q: Do you remember his name?

W: No, I wish to God I did, but I haven't the slightest. I said if I was called before a Grand Jury...

Q: Was he a tall, thin man?

W: As I recall him, you see. I saw so many damned people. I had made a speech. No, Adm Hooper had come to see me, and he said he had to see somebody and he wanted to talk to me, because he knew he could talk to me. I said: "What's on your mind?" He said: "The man at the other end of the Capitol is going to get you in this war." And I said: "Oh, I can't believe that." And he said: "But, Senator," he said, "I know what I'm talking about." Now, I didn't know what his position was at that time. I knew him, I was friendly with him in a general way. I didn't know him too well. But I think Mrs. Wheeler and I had visited him in his home one time for dinner with other people. But, I said to him: "I just don't believe it." And he said: "But, Senator, I know what I'm talking about." Then he went on. I said: "Roosevelt had made the statement to the effect that, the Germans could come over here and bomb NY City, Philadelphia," and he talked about New Orleans and St. Louis. And I said, "The next thing he will have them come out to Butte, Montana." But at any rate, I said to the Admiral, what about that, Roosevelt said so and so. He said: "The Germans' haven't got a bomber that can fly more than 1,000 miles - 500 miles out and 500 miles back." I said: "Well, what about going down to Dakar, and crossing over to Brazil?" He said: "When they get to Brazil, they are further away from NY then they were in Berlin." And he said: "By the time they come up through the jungles and across the river, and into Texas, what do you suppose we'll be doing?" Well, I said, "What about their having aircraft carriers?" He said: "Well, they would be perfect targets for us." He said: "We've got the necessary bombers and so forth, to be a target for us." So, I said, "What can I do?" And he said: "You can stop it." I had

fought FDR on the coinage issue, because the Republicans and Democrats had selected me to head up the fight against him. A lot of people thought if I could beat him at that, I could stop this, I guess. And I said:"How can I stop it?" Well, Hooper said: "You can't do it by making one speech, but if you will keep on making speeches, you can stop him. I said: "How do the rest of the Admirals feel about this?" And he said: "All the older heads feel as I do." It turned out that he was head of the Dept that handled all the telegrams and cablegrams and everything that went through the Navy. So he had access to them, and that's why he said: "I know what I'm talking about." Well, I finally said: "I'm not a military or Naval expert," and I said: "Will you give me some facts?" He wrote them out in longhand, and set them down. I made one speech. After I made that speech, within a few days, a young officer came into the office. One of the girls in the outer office came in and said: "There is a man in the office who wants to see you." And I said: "Well, bring him in." So she brought him in. He said: "Are you going to keep up this fight?" I thought he was going to criticize me. And I said: "I certainly am." He said: "Do you want some facts?" And I said: "Yes." He said: "We haven't got a single solitary plane that is fit for overseas service." I said: "What are you talking about?" I said: "Stimson said we've got 4,000 planes on hand." He said: "He's either lying to the American people, or he doesn't know what he's talking about."

Q: Who was this AF man - was this an Army Air Corps man?

W: I don't know.

Q: But he was an Army officer?

W: An Army officer. Frankly, I didn't look to see...

Q: What his rank was?

W: I didn't see what his rank was.

Q: Do you remember his name?

W: No, that's what I said. I've tried to rack my brain.

Q: This must be 1940, because Stimson came on as Secy of War in 1940.

W: Oh yes, it was 1940.

Q: Is this the same man who delivered the document to you?

W: Same man, later on. He came up to see me, and he said: "We haven't got a single solitary plane that's fit for overseas service." He said: "We've got to have three things, armor plates, self-sealing tanks, and...."

Q: Was he a General, you said he was a Captain?

W: Oh no, I wouldn't be sure he was a Captain. But what's his name /Healy/ put it in the book. He said it was a Captain, I frankly don't know if he was a Captain, or whether he wasn't, to be sure about it. He was writing the book, he put it in as Captain, and I'm not sure. I'm not sure whether he was a Captain or not. I wouldn't know from his insignia. I haven't the slightest idea.

Q: Do you know that he was Air Corps? Did he have wings?

W: No, no, that's what I say, I don't know whether he was Air Corps, or Army, or what he was. As a matter of fact, I assumed he was the Army at the time. I have no indication.

Q: Your book says it was an Army Air Corps Captain.

W: Oh no, I don't think so. Are you sure of it?

Q: Do you have a copy of it - your book? On page 27 of your book /Yankee From The West/ you say: "Early in February, while Congress was debating the Lend Lease Bill, I received another visit from the Army Air Corps Captain. He gave me statistics to show the country was little better equipped with airpower than it was at the time of his first conversation with me. I changed the figures around slightly to discourage suspicions that I had an informant inside the Air Corps,

and then issued a statement." This is on page 27, and then you go on to say: "I called for an Air Force second to none, as 'the most effective big stick that we could have,' and I asserted that none of the war planes on hand, as of January 1st, had all three requisites for combat, self--sealing tanks, armor plates and firepower." That's the end of that quotation. You say that Secy Stimson said your statement was unfair. All right, you see, you go on to say...

W: I wrote Stimson a letter, and I never got any answer. Fritz changed the figures a little bit.

Q: Now, on page 32 of your book you said: "I had had several more visits from the worried Army Captain" /here you identify him simply as Army/"in Sept 1941, he told me that the armed forces, at the direction of the President himself, had drawn up a master plan for a gigantic American Expeditionary Force. After Lowell Mellett tried to convince me FDR was sincere about the role of a peacemaker, I was eager to see how far the President was actually going in facing both ways at the same time." Then you go on to say: "I asked the Captain if I could see the plan". Yes, the plan that Roosevelt allegedly had. "On December 3rd, he brought to my house a document as thick as an average novel, wrapped in brown paper and labeled 'The Victory Program', etc." Now, did you ask him why he brought it to you?

W: Well, I can tell you. Just let me go back to that a little later. You say "the Captain." When he came - I'll swear. Paul says in there Air Force. The only thing, well, I'll tell you. I don't think I ever called him myself. You see, what's his name wrote the book. He took it from what I told him.

Q: Somebody helped you write this book?

W: Sure, Paul Healy. I didn't actually write the book. You see, I told him, sat down and talked with him, told him and gave him these facts. But he says "an

Air Force Captain." Now, I'm frank to say to you, I didn't know. But I just assumed later on that my conversation with him that he must have been Air Corps.

Q: However, you don't recall that he was?

W: No, no, because I never saw his insignia. I haven't the slightest recollection. When he first talked to me, I certainly didn't know, think he was a, I never placed him except for what he told me about it, and said that Arnold had to have these three things. I saw him after that.

Q: You saw this Captain after that?

W: He came up to my office in the Interstate Commerce Committee Room. He came in broad daylight, and then he came, two or three times, several times he came to talk to me at the office, so forth. Then he talked to me, at the house, I think it was. He told me about this plan, and I asked him, could I see the thing, and he said yes. And he brought it out to the house, and he left it there overnight with me, and Manly, who was a very good friend of mine, and Manly was at the house, and we were talking about it, and I showed it to him. I showed it to him. I didn't show it to him with the idea that he was going to write it up. But he did.

Q: He must have, did he make a picture of it, a photostat of it?

W: No, no, but he took and looked at it and then made some notes on the thing,you see.

Q: He never had it in his possession?

W: No, no, he never had it in his possession. It was never out of my house. The only thing he did, that night, he made some notes on it, and I didn't give it much thought.

Q: Did you know he was going to publish an article on it?

W: No, I didn't know that he was going to publish an article on it. I was

perfectly willing to publish an article of what I had told him about it, and so forth. We talked generally about it. I didn't know he was going to put it in such detail. Anyway, it didn't make any difference.

Q: Did anybody ever suggest that you had released classified information to the press?

W: No, not at that time, later on. But they didn't accuse me of it.

Q: Was there an FBI investigation?

W: Oh yes,sure, FBI investigation, not only an FBI, but a military, Secret Service, and so forth. But they suspected Sen Walsh of Mass., who was head of the Naval Affairs Committee, and they suspected....

Q: They suspected Wedemeyer, didn't they?

W: Yes, they suspected Wedemeyer, although I didn't know it at the time.

Q: He was a Major in War Plans, and he had access to this plan.

W: He drafted the plan.

Q: But he was innocent?

W: Oh, of course.

Q: One of Waldrop's main arguments was that Hap Arnold was disgruntled that the War Dept did not give enough money and enough attention to the Air Corps, and as a result of his unhappiness, Arnold had a role in handing over, or allowing this Air Corps Captain to turn over the documents.

W: Well, if he did, I didn't know anything about it.

Q: You did not know that Hap Arnold was unhappy?

W: As I said, I only saw him at the most, a few times in my life, both times in his office, and if he was unhappy, he never indicated it to me, to the slightest degree that he was unhappy about anything. He wouldn't anyway, because I didn't know him well enough.

Q: Well, Senator, I visited Waldrop at his home, and I asked him point blank: "Was it Hap Arnold?" And he said: "Yes."

W: How did he know?

Q: I asked him how he knew, and he wouldn't tell me. Now, you see. Who gave the Army Captain permission to let you see the plan?

W: I haven't the slightest idea.

Q: He could have done this on his own?

W: So far as I know, he could. They were supposed to be top, top secret.

Q: They were Top Secret.

W: I didn't know it at the time, I didn't know it was Top, Top Secret.

Q: Did it have Secret on it labeled, or inside?

W: I didn't see it.

Q: Did you know Laurence Kuter? Larry Kuter?

W: Never heard of him.

Q: He was in the Army at the time, and he was in War Plans. Do you have any other thought as to who it might have been who came to see you?

W: Not the slightest.

Q: Did the FBI ask you about this man?

W: No, they never came to me.

Q: They never came to you - because you were a Senator?

W: They might have come to me. They wouldn't hesitate to come to me, but they never did. The only thing, as I said, the little Jewish boy who was in Army Intelligence told me afterwards, that one time they were checking up on me and they saw some fellow coming out of my office, rather late at night, at the Inter-State Commerce Committee, and the found it was one of the clerks, and so forth. No, they never, they never had any intimation at all that I was the one that....

Q: You know, somebody told me that Harry Hopkins was involved in that leak. He was a very sloppy housekeeper. Is this possible?

W: I wouldn't think so. This young man came to me as I said. What he said to me is this. You asked me about that a moment ago. He said to me, I asked him: "How do you give these out?" Well, I said to him: "How do the rest of the people in the Army feel about this? Your top, head men." He said: "They all agree with you." He said: "They are not giving Roosevelt the truth about the situation." He said that he thought they were lying to Roosevelt as to what the conditions were generally in the Army. But he had never intimated to me at any time that it was Gen Arnold, any more than it was some other general. At the time, I never gave it a thought.

Q: Did you ever talk to Waldrop when this article came out, and ask him why he did that?

W: No, I didn't. I saw him one time, at a meeting, and he said he did it to give the book a boost.

Q: Which book?

W: My book.

Q: Your book a boost? When did your book come out, in 1963? Your book was published in 1962, and Waldrop said he published this article to give your book a boost?

W: Yes.

Q: Well, that was very kind of him. Did it give your book a boost?

W: No, no, I thought as a matter of fact, he just did the opposite.

Q: My guess is that he was the editor at the time, and of course, he published a classified document, and that he may have had a guilty conscience about what he did. Is this possible?

W: It might be, because, I'll tell you, as I said, Walter Trohan told me a few nights ago that Walter had said that he wouldn't have published this if he had known about it, if he had thought about it. He said he didn't have a damn thing to do with it.

Q: Did Walter Trohan ever speculate as to why Waldrop did this?

W: No, he didn't. If he did, he didn't say anything to me about it. I didn't ask him.

Q: You know, Waldrop has repeated this. He wrote a book about McCormick, McCormick of Chicago. It's a biography of McCormick, and he repeats this insinuation about Arnold, once again, in that book. You know, several people have picked this up, you see, and I've tried to clear Gen Arnold's name.

W: As far as General Arnold was concerned, I never had any contact with him about it in the slightest degree. It never occurred to me that he was the man, in any way, shape or form.

Q: Let me ask you this: If General Arnold was the guilty man, do you think he would have been fired from his job by General Marshall?

W: Oh, I think so.

Q: Same thing with Wedemeyer. If he was guilty, he would have been fired. Don't you think so?

W: Sure, they would have fired him. If he had been guilty. Didn't Wedemeyer tell you that what's his name (McCloy) called him in and said: "The man who gave this out has blood on American soldier's hand?"

Q: Who called Wedemeyer in - Stimson?

W: No.

Q: Marshall?

W: No.

Q: A man who is in the State Dept now?

W: Yes, one of the top men.

Q: He's a General now. McCloy is the one who called Wedemeyer in?

W: That's my recollection.

Q: Called Wedemeyer in.

W: Yes.

Q: And told him what?

W: Wedemeyer told me that the man who gave this out, there's blood on his hands. Wedemeyer said: "I resent it, and I walked out." Of course, afterwards they kind of indicated they were glad it was given out because then it had let the Germans know. There was a story around to the effect that they suspected that Roosevelt was the one who gave it out, because Roosevelt was (2 words) to show you. I had a conversation with Roosevelt at the White House, oh, a month, I guess, before we crossed the Channel. He told me that, I told him that Jimmy Byrnes had said that if we cross the Channel we'd lose 500,000 people. And he said: "Jimmy didn't have any right to say that." And he said: "We are going to cross the Channel, and told me the exact time of it, within 3 days, depending upon the weather. Well, I was scared to death. I didn't want him to tell me that because if it should get out, he would say: "Wheeler is the one who gave it out." Well, I never even told my wife, but happened just exactly that way, exactly. Also, there was an intimation of this, Gen Wedemeyer will tell you about it. I'd forgotten about it, in the NY Times, I think, or Wall St. Journal.

Q: You mean before Pearl Harbor?

W: Yes.

Q: I wanted to ask you, Senator, I've seen pictures of Charles Lindbergh up on the wall. Have you read Lindbergh's book or heard about it?

W: I haven't, but I'm going to.

Q: Of course, Lindbergh was a friend of Hap Arnold's. Do you know anything about their relationship?

W: No, I didn't even know that they were friends.

Q: Arnold gave Lindbergh several assignments, and of course, Lindbergh got in dutch with President Roosevelt. And so, Lindbergh mentions Arnold in his book.

W: He got in dutch with all the Jews. He came out and said that the English and the Jews. They wanted me to repudiate it, and I said: "Why should I repudiate something that somebody said, when I think the same thing."

Q: You think Lindbergh made a mistake in publishing his Diary?

W: I don't know why, I don't think so.

Q: He said that the communists would take over if we allowed this to happen. And you know, he tried to justify what he said then.

W: I said repeatedly in speech after speech, you are making the world safe for Communism.

Q: Do you think we could have negotiated a peace with Hitler?

W: I'm not prepared to say that. I said to Roosevelt one time. I was up to see Roosevelt at the time when he told me they were going to cross the Channel. I said to him: "Why don't you tell the Germans what you want. Tell them to get rid of Hitler, and tell them to settle." And I said: "They probably won't take it, but you will be in a stronger position, if you do it." Because, I said, "I felt that Wilson did, by telling it in 14 points." Well, during that conversation, Roosevelt also talked about it. I said to him: "Why? How are you going to keep Europe from going Communits, and for Russia from taking over?" And he said: "Well, he didn't think Stalin wanted to take it over." I said, he didn't need to take it over, it would fall into his lap, and he said: "Burt, you'd like Stalin." I said:

"Do you trust Stalin?" He hesitate, and then he said: "Up to the present time, yes." I said: "Let me tell you something, Mr. President. When I as in a fight for the Presidency of the Anaconda Company, when I ran for governor,"I said, "I have the support of all the I.W.W. and the Socialists and everybody else." And I said: "Not because they love me, but because they hated the Anaconda Company more." And I said: "Bill Dunn" who afterwards was Associate Editor of the Daily Worker, supported me one time. And I said: "Of course, you won't go along with it," but I said, "I think I know these communists." And I said: "They want to channel your mind, and unless they can 100%, they will cut your throat. You just remember that." Well, FDR said: "Burt, as long as we know them". The trouble is, he didn't know them. And I said: "Jimmy Byrnes is the same way in the Senate and the United Nations. I made a speech against it, but I voted it for it, but I wouldn't believe in it. I said it wouldn't work. He said on the floor that the reason that the League of Nations didn't work was because we didn't go into it. I said: "They won't have that excuse this time," but I said I bet it won't work because Russia won't permit it to work. Afterwards I talked to Senator Connally and Barkley and Austin and Vandenberg and I said: "Do you think this is going to work?" Oh yes. I said: "Do you think you are going to work it out with Russia?" Oh, they said we are going to get by. I said: "Either you are crazy or I am."

Q: Did you ever have any contact with Andrews, Frank Andrews? He was a three star general?

W: No.

Q: Did you have any contact with any other AF people besides Arnold, that you remember?

W: The only one, I told you, Gen Foulois.

Q: Did you have some contact during the air mail trouble. Remember the Air

Corps flew the air mail in 1934?

W: Yes, yes.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that?

W: Yes, the only thing is, you know, they blamed Foulois, and I defended Foulois, I think, on the floor of the Senate.

Q: Foulois said that they could fly the mail if they gave him 10 days preparation time, so they gave him 10 days, and of course, he stubbed his toe. I mean, do you remember anything about that?

W: No, no.

Q: You know, they divided up the control of the air mail into three zones. Hap Arnold had the Western Zone, he was flying the air mail out of Salt Lake City to the West Coast, up through Montana, Boise, and Seattle. Do you remember that?

W: No, I never heard of him at that time.

Q: He was a Colonel at that time. He had the Western Zone. So they had a lot of accidents, and Roosevelt was very embarrassed, and he caused the air mail to stop, or the Army to stop flying the mail.

W: All I remember is what I read in the newspapers. Farley criticized Foulois and I defended him on the floor of the Senate.

Q: Did you ever have any contact with Westover? He was the Chief of Air Corps before Arnold had it.

W: No, I never had any contact with any of them, that I can ever recall.

Q: The fellow who delivered this plan to you.

W: He was rather tall, nice looking, as I recall, blondish hair, light hair.

Q: Did he wear glasses?

W: No.

Q: Do you remember if he had wings on?

W: No, no.

Q: Didn't have?

W: If he did, I didn't see them.

Q: You didn't see them. You cannot identify him, all you can identify him as is Army. But not Air Corps. He could have been Air Corps, but you didn't notice?

W: He could have been Air Corps, but the only thing that I saw was identifying with the Air Corps, was that he told me

Q: He talked about airplanes.

W: And I said would you give me a breakdown of the airplanes, and he did. He gave me a breakdown and I gave out the statement, changing the figures. That's when Roosevelt blasted it and criticized it. That's when I wrote a letter to Stimson.

Q: I can think of several possibilities. There were some people in the Air Corps who were unhappy with Roosevelt, and Wilkie had promised the Air Corps separate status if he was elected. Of course, he was defeated, and some people could have been disgruntled. But, in my opinion, Arnold was not one of them. Arnold had been given a very big job by Marshall, and Arnold was going to wait until the emergency was over before he pushed for a separate air force. But there were several people in the Air Corps who were pushing for a separate air corps. One of these people could have fed this information to you to cause embarrassment to the Administration, you see. I mean there is a possible motive within the Air Corps of young officers to do this.

W: The only qu4estion was as to how he got access to the plan.

Q: Was it a photostat, or original type, do you remember, the plan itself. Was it a picture of the plan or was it a carbon copy of the plan, or a printed copy?

W: I think it was a printed copy, I'm not sure.

Q: Did it have a number on it?

W: I don't remember.

Q: But it was in a brown wrapper.

W: He brought it to me in a brown wrapper.

Q: And the plan never got out of your possession. You actually let Chesly Manly look at it?

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: But it never left your possession. He took notes on it.

W: Yes. It never left my possession. I only had it overnight.

Q: And you gave it back to the War Dept?

W: Yes, to the same fellow.

Q: He came back the next day?

W: Yes.

Q: Did you tell him that Chesly Manly had looked at it?

W: No, no.

Q: Did this man see you after the plan was published by the Chicago Tribune?

W: Oh no.

Q: He never came again?

W: He never came again.

Q: Did you report this to the authorities at the time? Did you report this to Stimson or to Marshall?

W: No, nobody. Nobody came to see me or talk to me about it.

Q: Because you were a Senator, is that why they didn't approach you?

W: I don't know, they never did.

Q: But you do know that there were several investigations?

W: Oh, I know that they were after Manly, and I know that they suspected Senator Walsh of Mass.

Q: Who were some of the other suspects?

W: I've forgotten now.

Q: Wedemeyer was a suspect?

W: Yes, Wedemeyer was a suspect. They went after Manly pretty hard.

Q: Did they go after McCormick, too?

W: No, no. I don't know. I just don't know. I did know once, my recollection...

Q: How should I approach this thing? I mean, here is an attack on Arnold, and it is being picked up by several writers. Several people have called me on this thing and asked me what I know about Arnold. And I want to clear his name. How should I go about this, Senator?

W: Well, as far as I am concerned. You can say that I never even thought, I never met Arnold only twice in my life, and I never talked with him about this, or ever came in contact with him. I never heard him to mention this, and I never thought of him, really, of this thing coming from him.

Q: Why should Waldrop try to pin it on him? Do you have any idea?

W: I don't know.

Q: You know, Waldrop was a graduate of West Point. Did you know that?

W: No.

Q: I don't know if he graduated there, but he went to West Point.

W: He didn't graduate from West Point.

Q: Well, he went to West Point for some years.

W: As I say, I always thought him a pretty slippery fellow. Even when I thought he was friendly, I thought he was pretty damn slippery. There is certainly something strange about Cissy Patterson dying and leaving the paper

to him.

Q: Do you have any thought as to how I could try to clear Arnold's name, if....

W: I wish I did.

Q: Do you think that the FBI, if I contacted them, would they let me have... if not....

W: I'll tell you what I'll do, there is one fellow in the FBI. I'll get ahold of him.

Q: I would appreciate even a negative report. In other words, they might say to me: "We cannot let you have this report, but I can tell you that based on this report, Arnold did not do it." If I had a report like that, that would satisfy my requirement, too.

W: I'll tell you what I will do, I'll get ahold of this fellow, who is a good friend of mine. He may not know or may not be able to help.

Q: You don't know if Waldrop knew Arnold?

W: No, I don't.

Q: But you don't think he knows any more about it than perhaps you do?

W: That's right. I don't think he knew any more about it than I did, and I don't know who it was.

Q: This is really the important thing I wanted to get.

Interview - Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Washington, D.C., Nov 23, 1970

W: I met General Foulois in 1923, in Europe when he was Military Attache over there, and he talked to me about McNair and his early training at the start. He convinced me that the AF was something that was going to grow and be important and he and I became very great friends from that time on. But, with reference to General Arnold, I only met him on not more than two occasions. The first time I met him - I was just trying to think - it was at his office. I went up to see him on something. I haven't any recollection what it was. It was undoubtedly something in connection with....

Q: Appropriations, probably?

W: Probably. The second time that I went to see him, after I had disagreed with Roosevelt on the court-packing. I led the fight.

Q: Yes, 1937.

W: Yes, then the people in Montana, many of them thought that I couldn't get anything from the Administration because I disagreed with Roosevelt. As a matter of fact, Roosevelt did more for me than he did for any of the Senators in the way of getting projects to Montana. I have disagreed with him on the issue of silver. I came within one vote of passing it in the Senate. When I did, Jack Garner and some of them told him that I would pass it the next time it came up. Well, he called in Key Pittman, and he called in Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. He called in Jimmy Byrnes, and perhaps one or two others. But he never...I was the one who was leading the fight. He never called me in at all. I was at t[illegible] and spoke to me. He said: "Have you ever met Father Coughlin?" I said: "No." He said: "Would you like to meet him?" And I said: "I'd be glad to meet him."

And he said: "Well, he's upstairs, come on up." So I went up, and Father Coughlin was pacing up and down the room, with his collar off. He told me that they were having a meeting over at the White House. He told me who was there, on many questions. I said: "What are they going to do about silver?" And he said: "Nothing." I said: "Well, if they don't, I'll raise hell." We talked for awhile, and I came back. The next morning, Frank Walker called me from NY. He said: "I understand you were on the warpath last night. You can't afford to get into a fight with Roosevelt." I said: "I can disagree with him over silver." And he said: "No," and he went on. I said: "You take a message. You tell him I said he could go to hell with him." Back in my office, and when I got over there, the Secy, not McIntyre...

Q: Steve Early?

M: No.

Q: Louis Howe?

M: No.

Q: This is a Presidential secretary? Not McIntyre?

M: McIntyre. McIntyre called me up, and said: "The President wants to see you. He wants you to come over." I said: "No, I won't come." "Oh," he said: "Now, Burt, you come over here." And I went over. I went in to see him, and I said to him: "Mr. President, I don't like this kind of treatment," and I said: "I'm not entitled to this kind of treatment from you, and I'm not going to take it." FDR said: "Oh now, Burt." He said: "Bryan killed silver." I said: "Mr. President, before this thing is over you are going to take a lot worse than silver, before you get through." And we argued. I said: "I'm going to offer an amendment to this bill to remonetize." Well, he called Key in. It was because of my fight over coinage, that these people came down from Great Falls, Montana. There was the

President of the Chamber of Commerce, the Secy of the Chamber of Commerce, the head of the American Legion, the Mayor of Great Falls. They were around here for about a month, and they didn't come to see me. They went to see the Congressman, and they talked with Senator Walsh, and Senator Murray. They weren't getting any place. They finally came up to see me, and I said: "Well, who have you talked to?" Well, they saw some Major, some Colonel, but they hadn't got any place. I said: "Would you like to see General Arnold of the AF?" "Oh," he said, "could we see him?" I said: "I think so," so I called him up. He said for them to come up and see him, so I brought them up, and I said to him: "General, this is the Secy of the Chamber of Commerce, this is the Mayor of Great Falls, and this is the head of the American Legion. They all think the Army won't do anything for me because I disagreed with Roosevelt on the coinage issue." And he said: "That's silly." He pressed a button, and he called in two or three generals. I can't think of the three anyway, and he said to them: "Look into this thing of Great Falls," because these people were down here to get the air base at Great Falls. I think somebody in Seattle and different places were after it. In about less than a month's time, General Arnold announced that it was going to be in Great Falls. That was the second time, and the last time I saw him.

Q: Was he Chief of the Air Corps at this time, or was he second in command?

W: No, he was the head, Chief.

Q: This must have been after 1938?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Was this during the buildup for WWII?

W: This must have been in the early part of 1940.

Q: Do you remember the other time you met Arnold?

W: The other time - I was trying to think of it. I met him at his office, and at that time, I had said something to him about the war.

Q: Was this during the war?

W: Oh no.

Q: Before the war?

W: Oh yes, before the war. I gathered that he wasn't very favorable to it, anyway. I made some remark, and told him something. I can't recollect what it was, but those were the only two times that I ever saw him.

Q: Anyway, Great Falls became one of the biggest bases the AAF had.

W: Exactly, yes.

Q: They were using that to shuttle planes to the Russians.

W: Shuttle planes to the Russians. Of course, it made Great Falls. It was the greatest thing that ever happened to Great Falls. This was after the Court-fight, and after the time that I had with Roosevelt I spoke to you about.

Q: I'd like to ask you. You started to talk about, before we put the tape on. The article by Frank Waldrop - did you read that article?

W: Yes.

Q: What did you think of it?

W: I didn't think much of it, to be frank with you. I knew that Frank Waldrop couldn't have known any more than I did about it, and for him to say that Arnold was the man, so forth, was ridiculous, in my judgment because I think that if that had been so, I would have known it was Arnold, and as I have said, I wouldn't trust Waldrop. I mean I used to know him quite well. He was all for keeping out of the war, and all that. Then he switched over and went over to State Dept., and then, in connection with the paper, in connection with Cissy Patterson, poor thing. She had asked me to come down to see her, rewrite her will,

you know. I was to go down there Sunday. Saturday she died.

Q: And in this will she left the paper to a number of people.

W: Sure, to Waldrop and these others.

Q: Do you think she wanted to change that will?

W: She would have changed it had I gone down there, because I would have told her she was crazy not to. Well, afterwards, they found out that they had been stealing from her. And not only that, but they used to go down there, and get drunk with her, and so forth. That whole crowd...rotten, nasty mess. Steve Early's sister. She was down there one time....

Q: Was she connected with the paper?

W: No, no, but there was a woman here, very prominent. She told me about this, and come away one time. This woman said: "Well, we wonder if the old bitch will live through this one, see?" Steve's sister thought they did away with her.

Q: Do you think that Waldrop had a guilty conscience, by virtue of the fact that the Washington Times-Herald published the RAINBOW FIVE plan?

W: No, he didn't have a damned thing to do with it. I talked with Walter Trohan the other day, and Walter said if he had known about it, why he wouldn't have had it published. Well, Walter Trohan said: "Hell, he didn't have a damned thing to do with it."

Q: Well, Chesly Manly died recently, he's the fellow who got ahold of it. You mention in your book, I read your book - very good book. I enjoyed it very much, but you mentioned that an Army Air Forces Captain was coming up to see you. Now, who sent him, do you know?

W: That I don't know, I haven't the slightest idea.

Q: Do you remember his name?

W: No, I wish to God I did, but I haven't the slightest. I said if I was called before a Grand Jury...

Q: Was he a tall, thin man?

W: As I recall him, you see. I saw so many damned people. I had made a speech. No, Adm Hooper had come to see me, and he said he had to see somebody and he wanted to talk to me, because he knew he could talk to me. I said: "What's on your mind?" He said: "The man at the other end of the Capitol is going to get you in this war." And I said: "Oh, I can't believe that." And he said: "But, Senator," he said, "I know what I'm talking about." Now, I didn't know what his position was at that time. I knew him, I was friendly with him in a general way. I didn't know him too well. But I think Mrs. Wheeler and I had visited him in his home one time for dinner with other people. But, I said to him: "I just don't believe it." And he said: "But, Senator, I know what I'm talking about." Then he went on. I said: "Roosevelt had made the statement to the effect that, the Germans could come over here and bomb NY City, Philadelphia," and he talked about New Orleans and St. Louis. And I said, "The next thing he will have them come out to Butte, Montana." But at any rate, I said to the Admiral, what about that, Roosevelt said so and so. He said: "The Germans' haven't got a bomber that can fly more than 1,000 miles - 500 miles out and 500 miles back." I said; "Well, what about going down to Dakar, and crossing over to Brazil?" He said: "When they get to Brazil, they are further away from NY then they were in Berlin." And he said: "By the time they come up through the jungles and across the river, and into Texas, what do you suppose we'll be doing?" Well, I said, "What about their having aircraft carriers?" He said: "Well, they would be perfect targets for us." He said: "We've got the necessary bombers and so forth, to be a target for us." So, I said, "What can I do?" And he said: "You can stop it." I had

fought FDR on the coinage issue, because the Republicans and Democrats had selected me to head up the fight against him. A lot of people thought if I could beat him at that, I could stop this, I guess. And I said:"How can I stop it?" Well, Hooper said: "You can't do it by making one speech, but if you will keep on making speeches, you can stop him. I said: "How do the rest of the Admirals feel about this?" And he said: "All the older heads feel as I do." It turned out that he was head of the Dept that handled all the telegrams and cablegrams and everything that went through the Navy. So he had access to them, and that's why he said: "I know what I'm talking about." Well, I finally said: "I'm not a military or Naval expert," and I said: "Will you give me some facts?" He wrote them out in longhand, and set them down. I made one speech. After I made that speech, within a few days, a young officer came into the office. One of the girls in the outer office came in and said: "There is a man in the office who wants to see you." And I said: "Well, bring him in." So she brought him in. He said: "Are you going to keep up this fight?" I thought he was going to criticize me. And I said: "I certainly am." He said: "Do you want some facts?" And I said: "Yes." He said: "We haven't got a single solitary plane that is fit for overseas service." I said: "What are you talking about?" I said: "Stimson said we've got 4,000 planes on hand." He said: "He's either lying to the American people, or he doesn't know what he's talking about."

Q: Who was this AF man - was this an Army Air Corps man?

W: I don't know.

Q: But he was an Army officer?

W: An Army officer. Frankly, I didn't look to see...

Q: What his rank was?

W: I didn't see what his rank was.

Q: Do you remember his name?

W: No, that's what I said. I've tried to rack my brain.

Q: This must be 1940, because Stimson came on as Secy of War in 1940.

W: Oh yes, it was 1940.

Q: Is this the same man who delivered the document to you?

W: Same man, later on. He came up to see me, and he said: "We haven't got a single solitary plane that's fit for overseas service." He said: "We've got to have three things, armor plates, self-sealing tanks, and...."

Q: Was he a General, you said he was a Captain?

W: Oh no, I wouldn't be sure he was a Captain. But what's his name /Healy/ put it in the book. He said it was a Captain, I frankly don't know if he was a Captain, or whether he wasn't, to be sure about it. He was writing the book, he put it in as Captain, and I'm not sure. I'm not sure whether he was a Captain or not. I wouldn't know from his insignia. I haven't the slightest idea.

Q: Do you know that he was Air Corps? Did he have wings?

W: No, no, that's what I say, I don't know whether he was Air Corps, or Army, or what he was. As a matter of fact, I assumed he was the Army at the time. I have no indication.

Q: Your book says it was an Army Air Corps Captain.

W: Oh no, I don't think so. Are you sure of it?

Q: Do you have a copy of it - your book? On page 27 of your book /Yankee From The West/ you say: "Early in February, while Congress was debating the Lend Lease Bill, I received another visit from the Army Air Corps Captain. He gave me statistics to show the country was little better equipped with airpower than it was at the time of his first conversation with me. I changed the figures around slightly to discourage suspicions that I had an informant inside the Air Corps,

and then issued a statement." This is on page 27, and then you go on to say: "I called for an Air Force second to none, as 'the most effective big stick that we could have,' and I asserted that none of the war planes on hand, as of January 1st, had all three requisites for combat, self--sealing tanks, armor plates and firepower." That's the end of that quotation. You say that Secy Stimson said your statement was unfair. All right, you see, you go on to say...

W: I wrote Stimson a letter, and I never got any answer. Fritz changed the figures a little bit.

Q: Now, on page 32 of your book you said: "I had had several more visits from the worried Army Captain" /here you identify him simply as Army/"in Sept 1941, he told me that the armed forces, at the direction of the President himself, had drawn up a master plan for a gigantic American Expeditionary Force. After Lowell Mellett tried to convince me FDR was sincere about the role of a peacemaker, I was eager to see how far the President was actually going in facing both ways at the same time." Then you go on to say: "I asked the Captain if I could see the plan". Yes, the plan that Roosevelt allegedly had. "On December 3rd, he brought to my house a document as thick as an average novel, wrapped in brown paper and labeled 'The Victory Program', etc." Now, did you ask him why he brought it to you?

W: Well, I can tell you. Just let me go back to that a little later. You say "the Captain." When he came - I'll swear. Paul says in there Air Force. The only thing, well, I'll tell you. I don't think I ever called him myself. You see, what's his name wrote the book. He took it from what I told him.

Q: Somebody helped you write this book?

W: Sure, Paul Healy. I didn't actually write the book. You see, I told him, sat down and talked with him, told him and gave him these facts. But he says "an

Air Force Captain." Now, I'm frank to say to you, I didn't know. But I just assumed later on that my conversation with him that he must have been Air Corps.

Q: However, you don't recall that he was?

W: No, no, because I never saw his insignia. I haven't the slightest recollection. When he first talked to me, I certainly didn't know, think he was a, I never placed him except for what he told me about it, and said that Arnold had to have these three things. I saw him after that.

Q: You saw this Captain after that?

W: He came up to my office in the Interstate Commerce Committee Room. He came in broad daylight, and then he came, two or three times, several times he came to talk to me at the office, so forth. Then he talked to me, at the house, I think it was. He told me about this plan, and I asked him, could I see the thing, and he said yes. And he brought it out to the house, and he left it there overnight with me, and Manly, who was a very good friend of mine, and Manly was at the house, and we were talking about it, and I showed it to him. I showed it to him. I didn't show it to him with the idea that he was going to write it up. But he did.

Q: He must have, did he make a picture of it, a photostat of it?

W: No, no, but he took and looked at it and then made some notes on the thing,you see.

Q: He never had it in his possession?

W: No, no, he never had it in his possession. It was never out of my house. The only thing he did, that night, he made some notes on it, and I didn't give it much thought.

Q: Did you know he was going to publish an article on it?

W: No, I didn't know that he was going to publish an article on it. I was

perfectly willing to publish an article of what I had told him about it, and so forth. We talked generally about it. I didn't know he was going to put it in such detail. Anyway, it didn't make any difference.

Q: Did anybody ever suggest that you had released classified information to the press?

W: No, not at that time, later on. But they didn't accuse me of it.

Q: Was there an FBI investigation?

W: Oh yes,sure, FBI investigation, not only an FBI, but a military, Secret Service, and so forth. But they suspected Sen Walsh of Mass., who was head of the Naval Affairs Committee, and they suspected....

Q: They suspected Wedemeyer, didn't they?

W: Yes, they suspected Wedemeyer, although I didn't know it at the time.

Q: He was a Major in War Plans, and he had access to this plan.

W: He drafted the plan.

Q: But he was innocent?

W: Oh, of course.

Q: One of Waldrop's main arguments was that Hap Arnold was disgruntled that the War Dept did not give enough money and enough attention to the Air Corps, and as a result of his unhappiness, Arnold had a role in handing over, or allowing this Air Corps Captain to turn over the documents.

W: Well, if he did, I didn't know anything about it.

Q: You did not know that Hap Arnold was unhappy?

W: As I said, I only saw him at the most, a few times in my life, both times in his office, and if he was unhappy, he never indicated it to me, to the slightest degree that he was unhappy about anything. He wouldn't anyway, because I didn't know him well enough.

Q: Well, Senator, I visited Waldrop at his home, and I asked him point blank: "Was it Hap Arnold?" And he said: "Yes."

W: How did he know?

Q: I asked him how he knew, and he wouldn't tell me. Now, you see. Who gave the Army Captain permission to let you see the plan?

W: I haven't the slightest idea.

Q: He could have done this on his own?

W: So far as I know, he could. They were supposed to be top, top secret.

Q: They were Top Secret.

W: I didn't know it at the time, I didn't know it was Top, Top Secret.

Q: Did it have Secret on it labeled, or inside?

W: I didn't see it.

Q: Did you know Laurence Kuter? Larry Kuter?

W: Never heard of him.

Q: He was in the Army at the time, and he was in War Plans. Do you have any other thought as to who it might have been who came to see you?

W: Not the slightest.

Q: Did the FBI ask you about this man?

W: No, they never came to me.

Q: They never came to you - because you were a Senator?

W: They might have come to me. They wouldn't hesitate to come to me, but they never did. The only thing, as I said, the little Jewish boy who was in Army Intelligence told me afterwards, that one time they were checking up on me and they saw some fellow coming out of my office, rather late at night, at the Inter-State Commerce Committee, and the found it was one of the clerks, and so forth. No, they never, they never had any intimation at all that I was the one that....

Q: You know, somebody told me that Harry Hopkins was involved in that leak. He was a very sloppy housekeeper. Is this possible?

W: I wouldn't think so. This young man came to me as I said. What he said to me is this. You asked me about that a moment ago. He said to me, I asked him: "How do you give these out?" Well, I said to him: "How do the rest of the people in the Army feel about this? Your top, head men." He said: "They all agree with you." He said: "They are not giving Roosevelt the truth about the situation." He said that he thought they were lying to Roosevelt as to what the conditions were generally in the Army. But he had never intimated to me at any time that it was Gen Arnold, any more than it was some other general. At the time, I never gave it a thought.

Q: Did you ever talk to Waldrop when this article came out, and ask him why he did that?

W: No, I didn't. I saw him one time, at a meeting, and he said he did it to give the book a boost.

Q: Which book?

W: My book.

Q: Your book a boost? When did your book come out, in 1963? Your book was published in 1962, and Waldrop said he published this article to give your book a boost?

W: Yes.

Q: Well, that was very kind of him. Did it give your book a boost?

W: No, no, I thought as a matter of fact, he just did the opposite.

Q: My guess is that he was the editor at the time, and of course, he published a classified document, and that he may have had a guilty conscience about what he did. Is this possible?

W: It might be, because, I'll tell you, as I said, Walter Trohan told me a few nights ago that Walter had said that he wouldn't have published this if he had known about it, if he had thought about it. He said he didn't have a damn thing to do with it.

Q: Did Walter Trohan ever speculate as to why Waldrop did this?

W: No, he didn't. If he did, he didn't say anything to me about it. I didn't ask him.

Q: You know, Waldrop has repeated this. He wrote a book about McCormick, McCormick of Chicago. It's a biography of McCormick, and he repeats this insinuation about Arnold, once again, in that book. You know, several people have picked this up, you see, and I've tried to clear Gen Arnold's name.

W: As far as General Arnold was concerned, I never had any contact with him about it in the slightest degree. It never occurred to me that he was the man, in any way, shape or form.

Q: Let me ask you this: If General Arnold was the guilty man, do you think he would have been fired from his job by General Marshall?

W: Oh, I think so.

Q: Same thing with Wedemeyer. If he was guilty, he would have been fired. Don't you think so?

W: Sure, they would have fired him. If he had been guilty. Didn't Wedemeyer tell you that what's his name (McCloy) called him in and said: "The man who gave this out has blood on American soldier's hand?"

Q: Who called Wedemeyer in - Stimson?

W: No.

Q: Marshall?

W: No.

Q: A man who is in the State Dept now?

W: Yes, one of the top men.

Q: He's a General now. McCloy is the one who called Wedemeyer in?

W: That's my recollection.

Q: Called Wedemeyer in.

W: Yes.

Q: And told him what?

W: Wedemeyer told me that the man who gave this out, there's blood on his hands. Wedemeyer said: "I resent it, and I walked out." Of course, afterwards they kind of indicated they were glad it was given out because then it had let the Germans know. There was a story around to the effect that they suspected that Roosevelt was the one who gave it out, because Roosevelt was (2 words) to show you. I had a conversation with Roosevelt at the White House, oh, a month, I guess, before we crossed the Channel. He told me that, I told him that Jimmy Byrnes had said that if we cross the Channel we'd lose 500,000 people. And he said: "Jimmy didn't have any right to say that." And he said: "We are going to cross the Channel, and told me the exact time of it, within 3 days, depending upon the weather. Well, I was scared to death. I didn't want him to tell me that because if it should get out, he would say: "Wheeler is the one who gave it out." Well, I never even told my wife, but happened just exactly that way, exactly. Also, there was an intimation of this, Gen Wedemeyer will tell you about it. I'd forgotten about it, in the NY Times, I think, or Wall St. Journal.

Q: You mean before Pearl Harbor?

W: Yes.

Q: I wanted to ask you, Senator, I've seen pictures of Charles Lindbergh up on the wall. Have you read Lindbergh's book or heard about it?

W: I haven't, but I'm going to.

Q: Of course, Lindbergh was a friend of Hap Arnold's. Do you know anything about their relationship?

W: No, I didn't even know that they were friends.

Q: Arnold gave Lindbergh several assignments, and of course, Lindbergh got in dutch with President Roosevelt. And so, Lindbergh mentions Arnold in his book.

W: He got in dutch with all the Jews. He came out and said that the English and the Jews. They wanted me to repudiate it, and I said: "Why should I repudiate something that somebody said, when I think the same thing."

Q: You think Lindbergh made a mistake in publishing his Diary?

W: I don't know why, I don't think so.

Q: He said that the communists would take over if we allowed this to happen. And you know, he tried to justify what he said then.

W: I said repeatedly in speech after speech, you are making the world safe for Communism.

Q: Do you think we could have negotiated a peace with Hitler?

W: I'm not prepared to say that. I said to Roosevelt one time. I was up to see Roosevelt at the time when he told me they were going to cross the Channel. I said to him: "Why don't you tell the Germans what you want. Tell them to get rid of Hitler, and tell them to settle." And I said: "They probably won't take it, but you will be in a stronger position, if you do it." Because, I said, "I felt that Wilson did, by telling it in 14 points." Well, during that conversation, Roosevelt also talked about it. I said to him: "Why? How are you going to keep Europe from going Communits, and for Russia from taking over?" And he said: "Well, he didn't think Stalin wanted to take it over." I said, he didn't need to take it over, it would fall into his lap, and he said: "Burt, you'd like Stalin." I said:

"Do you trust Stalin?" He hesitate, and then he said: "Up to the present time, yes." I said: "Let me tell you something, Mr. President. When I as in a fight for the Presidency of the Anaconda Company, when I ran for governor,"I said, "I have the support of all the I.W.W. and the Socialists and everybody else." And I said: "Not because they love me, but because they hated the Anaconda Company more." And I said: "Bill Dunn" who afterwards was Associate Editor of the Daily Worker, supported me one time. And I said: "Of course, you won't go along with it," but I said, "I think I know these communists." And I said: "They want to channel your mind, and unless they can 100%, they will cut your throat. You just remember that." Well, FDR said: "Burt, as long as we know them". The trouble is, he didn't know them. And I said: "Jimmy Byrnes is the same way in the Senate and the United Nations. I made a speech against it, but I voted it for it, but I wouldn't believe in it. I said it wouldn't work. He said on the floor that the reason that the League of Nations didn't work was because we didn't go into it. I said: "They won't have that excuse this time," but I said I bet it won't work because Russia won't permit it to work. Afterwards I talked to Senator Connally and Barkley and Austin and Vandenberg and I said: "Do you think this is going to work?" Oh yes. I said: "Do you think you are going to work it out with Russia?" Oh, they said we are going to get by. I said: "Either you are crazy or I am."

Q: Did you ever have any contact with Andrews, Frank Andrews? He was a three star general?

W: No.

Q: Did you have any contact with any other AF people besides Arnold, that you remember?

W: The only one, I told you, Gen Foulois.

Q: Did you have some contact during the air mail trouble. Remember the Air

Corps flew the air mail in 1934?

W: Yes, yes.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that?

W: Yes, the only thing is, you know, they blamed Foulois, and I defended Foulois, I think, on the floor of the Senate.

Q: Foulois said that they could fly the mail if they gave him 10 days preparation time, so they gave him 10 days, and of course, he stubbed his toe. I mean, do you remember anything about that?

W: No, no.

Q: You know, they divided up the control of the air mail into three zones. Hap Arnold had the Western Zone, he was flying the air mail out of Salt Lake City to the West Coast, up through Montana, Boise, and Seattle. Do you remember that?

W: No, I never heard of him at that time.

Q: He was a Colonel at that time. He had the Western Zone. So they had a lot of accidents, and Roosevelt was very embarrassed, and he caused the air mail to stop, or the Army to stop flying the mail.

W: All I remember is what I read in the newspapers. Farley criticized Foulois and I defended him on the floor of the Senate.

Q: Did you ever have any contact with Westover? He was the Chief of Air Corps before Arnold had it.

W: No, I never had any contact with any of them, that I can ever recall.

Q: The fellow who delivered this plan to you.

W: He was rather tall, nice looking, as I recall, blondish hair, light hair.

Q: Did he wear glasses?

W: No.

Q: Do you remember if he had wings on?

W: No, no.

Q: Didn't have?

W: If he did, I didn't see them.

Q: You didn't see them. You cannot identify him, all you can identify him as is Army. But not Air Corps. He could have been Air Corps, but you didn't notice?

W: He could have been Air Corps, but the only thing that I saw was identifying with the Air Corps, was that he told me

Q: He talked about airplanes.

W: And I said would you give me a breakdown of the airplanes, and he did. He gave me a breakdown and I gave out the statement, changing the figures. That's when Roosevelt blasted it and criticized it. That's when I wrote a letter to Stimson.

Q: I can think of several possibilities. There were some people in the Air Corps who were unhappy with Roosevelt, and Wilkie had promised the Air Corps separate status if he was elected. Of course, he was defeated, and some people could have been disgruntled. But, in my opinion, Arnold was not one of them. Arnold had been given a very big job by Marshall, and Arnold was going to wait until the emergency was over before he pushed for a separate air force. But there were several people in the Air Corps who were pushing for a separate air corps. One of these people could have fed this information to you to cause embarrassment to the Administration, you see. I mean there is a possible motive within the Air Corps of young officers to do this.

W: The only qu4estion was as to how he got access to the plan.

Q: Was it a photostat, or original type, do you remember, the plan itself. Was it a picture of the plan or was it a carbon copy of the plan, or a printed copy?

W: I think it was a printed copy, I'm not sure.

Q: Did it have a number on it?

W: I don't remember.

Q: But it was in a brown wrapper.

W: He brought it to me in a brown wrapper.

Q: And the plan never got out of your possession. You actually let Chesly Manly look at it?

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: But it never left your possession. He took notes on it.

W: Yes. It never left my possession. I only had it overnight.

Q: And you gave it back to the War Dept?

W: Yes, to the same fellow.

Q: He came back the next day?

W: Yes.

Q: Did you tell him that Chesly Manly had looked at it?

W: No, no.

Q: Did this man see you after the plan was published by the Chicago Tribune?

W: Oh no.

Q: He never came again?

W: He never came again.

Q: Did you report this to the authorities at the time? Did you report this to Stimson or to Marshall?

W: No, nobody. Nobody came to see me or talk to me about it.

Q: Because you were a Senator, is that why they didn't approach you?

W: I don't know, they never did.

Q: But you do know that there were several investigations?

W: Oh, I know that they were after Manly, and I know that they suspected Senator Walsh of Mass.

Q: Who were some of the other suspects?

W: I've forgotten now.

Q: Wedemeyer was a suspect?

W: Yes, Wedemeyer was a suspect. They went after Manly pretty hard.

Q: Did they go after McCormick, too?

W: No, no. I don't know. I just don't know. I did know once, my recollection...

Q: How should I approach this thing? I mean, here is an attack on Arnold, and it is being picked up by several writers. Several people have called me on this thing and asked me what I know about Arnold. And I want to clear his name. How should I go about this, Senator?

W: Well, as far as I am concerned. You can say that I never even thought; I never met Arnold only twice in my life, and I never talked with him about this, or ever came in contact with him. I never heard him to mention this, and I never thought of him, really, of this thing coming from him.

Q: Why should Waldrop try to pin it on him? Do you have any idea?

W: I don't know.

Q: You know, Waldrop was a graduate of West Point. Did you know that?

W: No.

Q: I don't know if he graduated there, but he went to West Point.

W: He didn't graduate from West Point.

Q: Well, he went to West Point for some years.

W: As I say, I always thought him a pretty slippery fellow. Even when I thought he was friendly, I thought he was pretty damn slippery. There is certainly something strange about Cissy Patterson dying and leaving the paper

to him.

Q: Do you have any thought as to how I could try to clear Arnold's name, if....

W: I wish I did.

Q: Do you think that the FBI, if I contacted them, would they let me have... if not....

W: I'll tell you what I'll do, there is one fellow in the FBI. I'll get ahold of him.

Q: I would appreciate even a negative report. In other words, they might say to me: "We cannot let you have this report, but I can tell you that based on this report, Arnold did not do it." If I had a report like that, that would satisfy my requirement, too.

W: I'll tell you what I will do, I'll get ahold of this fellow, who is a good friend of mine. He may not know or may not be able to help.

Q: You don't know if Waldrop knew Arnold?

W: No, I don't.

Q: But you don't think he knows any more about it than perhaps you do?

W: That's right. I don't think he knew any more about it than I did, and I don't know who it was.

Q: This is really the important thing I wanted to get.

White, Edward 7 Jan 12

20314

19 January 1973

Major General Edward H. White, USAF (Ret)
386 Bayview Drive, N.E.
St. Petersburg, Florida 33704

Dear General White:

Thanks for your letter and article. I enjoyed them both, I cant say that I blame you for passing up the opportunity to visit Washington in January. I still recallethe Kennedy inauguration of 1961. Took us four hours to get home from the Pentagon the day before.

As it turns out, theweather has been balmy and spring-like for nearly a week now. You will miss not only the Inauguration but a ceremony at the Pentagon which I know you would have enjoyed attending, if you were in town. Our xerox machine is out, so I'm sending the rough draft for your reading.

I dont think Allen Green has contacted Ed White III at the Academy. He is basically shy and Ed is somewhat of a celebrity. Maybe Ed will stop by some time and say hello to Allen Green who is in Squadron 19. That Squadron came out 3rd in a competition and was slated to be among five squadrons invited to the Inaugural. But a last minute economy move cut the participating Squadrons to two. So there you go. Those darned Budget Officers in the Pentagon! (Present company excepted)

Best wishes to you and to Mrs. White. Hope our paths will cross again before too long.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD H. WHITE
U. S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED)
386 BAYVIEW DRIVE, N.E.
ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA 33704

December 24, 1972

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force Hostory(AFCHO)
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Murray:

Sorry I've let nearly two months slip by before answering your thoughtful note and inclosed draft of our conversation some months ago. We have been doing a bit of travel in the southern climes, but not northward. In addition I have been quite busy with an interesting assignment for our local Congressman Bill Young, namely screening, interviewing and recommending his appointees to the three Service Academies. I am chairman of his Military Academy Advisory Board, consisting of senior graduates of each academy and we endeavor to pick his best prospects to fill his annual vacancies.

Young Ed White III is a third classmen at the AF Academy and doing fine. Of course, he thought the first year was pretty tough and had some rather doubtful moments, but after the gloom period cleared away things began to look better. His mother, Astronaut Ed White's widow, was remarried to a Mr. Lloyd Davis, of Houston, and we are very happy and pleased about it. They stopped over with us about six weeks ago on their way home from a yachting trip in the Caribbean. He is a widower and just about five years older than Patricia.

I enjoyed reading over the copy of our taped interview and it brought back a number of other recollections of the past 45 years. Last summer I was asked to write an article for the Exchange and Commissary News describing my recollections of the birth of the United States Air Force for their 25th Anniversary edition of the Department of the Air Force. I haven't seen it in print because I do not subscribe for the periodical, but I received a check for my effort.

I'm inclosing a copy for your information and certain aspects may be of interest to you. I have never been sure of the reason for Ira Baker being retired in August, 1947, the month before the advent of the new U.S. Air Force. I have always thought it may have been partially influenced by the rather farcial incident of which I was an innocent victim. It seemed strange that he was never a member of the U.S. Air Force.

We have been invited to the inauguration in January but have declined because of the strong possibility of cold blizzardy weather at that time which we abhore. So we'll settle for a souvenir invitation and suthern Florida.

I can't recall young Eddie III's squadron number since they all have individual post boxes, but I hope our young hopefuls do get together soon. Cordially,

MY RECOLLECTIONS OF THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Major General Edward H. White
U. S. Air Force(Retired)

* * * * *

The United States Air Force was born a weak and sickly child in September, 1947, suffered serious growing pains, but has survived to become the strong and sturdy guardian of our Nation.

For one who has lived the entire gamut of the aeronautical age, recollections of any particular period must be tempered and balanced by thoughts and memories of personal achievements of pioneers, their trials and tribulations, heartaches and bitterness, that accompanied the long struggle for recognition of air power.

I was born too late to remember the early flights of the Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk in 1903. However, my youthful years were filled with awe and excitement as I witnessed the dare-devil fledgling accomplishments of early "birdmen" in their enthusiastic attempts to prove the "coming of age" of a miracle phase of man's existence. Thus, to fully understand my recollections of those formative years of the U. S. Air Force I must think, in retrospect, to the pioneer days of military flying, to such names as Foulois, Lahm, Patrick, Fechet, Andrews, Arnold and the renowned Billy Mitchell, all of whom at one time or another put their careers on the line to express their convictions that air power would be a major factor in future warefare.

POST WORLD WAR II DEMOBILIZATION

The Army Air Force was at peak strength of 2,400,000 men,

243 combat groups and nearly 80,000 aircraft in March, 1945. The frenzied demobiliation after World War II left it with just 303,000 men, in December, 1946 with only two combat groups fit and ready for any emergency. By September 18, 1947, when the separate Air Force was born and legalized, less than one-fourth of the approved 52 group program was in a reasonable state of readiness.

I remember the rapid reduction in personnel, aircraft and crews and the numbers of combat ready modern aircraft. And the drastic curtailment of appropriated funds certainly gave no happy promise for the long sought separate Air Force. The traditional practice of providing equal amounts of funds for each of the services precluded any possibility of special priority for building up the newly established Department of the Air Force.

MORE MODERNITY AND FLEXIBILITY

The Department of the Air Force had no Congressional sanction for its composition and organization. This had its advantages for it permitted more flexibility and modernity in organizing its headquarters and field structure.

Stuart Symington had been sworn in as Secretary of the Air Force and his Assistant Secretary was Eugene Zuckert. These men were strong advocates of sound management and cost control methods, both powerful tools when faced with rebuilding the Air Force with limited funds. General Carl Spaatz was named Chief of Staff with General Hoyt Vandenberg as his Deputy. This combination was logical and probably premeditated, for "Touhy" Spaatz had been Chief of the Army Air Force for nineteen months and during World War II had established a proud and enviable record in ending the air operations

in Europe and then arriving on the scene in the Far East to direct the final air operation against Japan.

INFUSION OF NEW AND YOUNGER BLOOD

The assignment of General Hoyt Vandenberg as Deputy Chief of Staff presaged a new era of leadership by the infusion of new and younger blood in the top echelon of the Air Force command. After Vandenberg came Rawlings, Norstad, McKee, LeMay, Kuter, Twining, Quesada, Chidlaw and others. All of these men were of a younger generation of ~~Ivyrssandd~~ more suseptible to a business-like approach to running the new Air Force. Gradually, the older leaders and pioneers of early military flying were retired or assigned to lesser specialized commands to await retirement. This action was not immediate, but by 1951 the transfusion was practically complete. The new top management was imbued with the concept of sound business efficiency and effective cost control.

Secretary Symington and his Assistant Secretary Zuckert had been earlier assigned as a team to the Army Air Force prior to the official approval of the Department of the Air Force. They were actually putting their business approach to work in 1946. The Comptroller concept had already been initiated, but apparently had met with some resistance.

MY MOST VIVID RECOLLECTION

My most vivid recollection of the establishment of the U. S. Air Force involved the one and only "dressing down" that I received from a superior officer during my entire 33 years of commissioned service. It resulted from a farcial interplay of personalities during the early transition and establishment of the Air Comptroller's office.

Under the new Air Force management concept the financial aspects of the new department were to be administered by an Air Comptroller with the rank of Major General, along with cost and statistical control activities. I had been Budget Director for the Army Air Force and been designated Acting Air Comptroller. However, I was only a colonel and was not eligible for consideration.

In early June, 1946, I received a call to report to Assistant Secretary Zuckert's office. We had frequently discussed financial matters and especially the introduction of computerized operations for the new Comptrollers office. We talked informally for a few minutes on budgetary problems. Then casually Mr. Zuckert asked me whom I thought should be named Air Comptroller. Without hesitation I said that General Rawlings was the only general officer qualified for the job. He smiled and nodded as if in agreement and then asked what I thought of General Grandison Gardner? I laughed and told him that General Gardner did not want the job, was not qualified for it and had remarked to me that he couldn't keep his own check book in order. It so happened that General Gardner had visited my office the day before and had used practically the same words that I reported to Mr. Zuckert, and had expressed concern that he might be considered for the job and certainly didn't want it. Secretary Zuckert thanked me for my opinion and I returned to my office.

No more than 20 minutes elapsed until I received a call to report immediately to General Ira Baker's office. He was then Deputy Chief of Staff under General Spaatz. I entered his office, briskly saluted and stated I was reporting as ordered.

I have never in my life faced a man with more anger and furious frustration on his face. I waited for the storm to break, having no

inkling what was coming. In an icy voice and an angry ~~fahenh~~face stated that he was not accustomed to having his orders questioned or criticized by junior officers and he would be ruthless with anyone who did. Still not knowing what it was all about I stated that I hadn't the slightest idea what he was talking about. Then in a somewhat milder voice he said,"Do you mean to say that you did not ridicule and question my appointment of General Gardner as Air Comptroller?" It suddenly dawned! I replied that i had no idea that such an order had been issued or was considered, that I had been asked ~~hy~~ opinion by Secretary Zuckert and I had given him my frank and honest statement that was supported by General Gardner's own remarks.

Apparently Secretary Symington had had an earlier disagreement with General Baker regarding the appointment of the new Air Comptroller and had championed General Rawlings. Secretary Zuckert had sought my opinion based on my on-the-job experience as Budget Director and had immediately crossed the hall and repeated my comments concerning General Gardner to Secretary Symington, who wasted no time in confronting General Baker.

Apparently General Gardner's orders were actually in the mill and were issued a few days later. However, in less than three months he was relieved and General Rawlings assigned as Air Comptroller as one of the early evidences of new and younger blood. General Baker was also relieved a short time later and retired in August, 1957, a month before the establishment of the U. S. Air Force. General Hoyt Vandenberg was assigned as the new Deputy Chief of Air Staff and was further evidence of the infusion of new blood in the top echelon of the new Air Force.

The incident delayed my promotion to Brigadier General. A week earlier General Baker had told me personally that I would be on the next next general officer promotion list, but when the list appeared my name had been scratched. However, I believe that Secretary Symington recognized the injustice and I received my promotion a few months later.

A "SHOE-STRING" AIR FORCE

When General Vandenberg relieved General Spaatz as Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1948 he was given a "shoe-string" Air Force with which to fight the Korean War just two years later. To make matters worse in 1949 President Truman refused to release funds that had been appropriated by Congress to expand the Air Force. I had been transferred to Tokyo, Japan, in July, 1949, to take command of the western wing of the Military Air Transport Service. At that time we were already hearing rumblings of unrest in South Korea and frequent incidents were occurring along the border between North and South Korea. Within 12 months we were confronted with the actual outbreak of hostilities. For the third time in my memory we were caught woefully unprepared.

CONGRESS IMPRESSED WITH YOUNG LEADERS

The new young leaders, all with enviable and distinguished World War II records, provided a healthy change and I sensed that it increased the confidence of the Congress in the new regime. I am sure that the sincerity and determination expressed by these new leaders prompted the acceptance of a new principle of allocating appropriated funds for National Defense in accordance with the priority assigned to the missions of the respective services,

rather than an arbitrary equal division. This was a milestone in the history of the Air Force and provided a recognition of the key position of the land-based airpower in today's military operations. In 1951 the Department of Defense approved a 143 group program for the Air Force. Beginning in Fiscal Year 1952 the Air Force was provided with an increasing percentage of the Defense Dollar which permitted the gradual approach to the 143 group strength.

DIVIDING THE DEFENSE DOLLAR
(billions of dollars)

Year	Army	Navy	Air Force	AF%
1950	4.2	4.1	4.7	36
1951	19.4	12.5	15.9	33
1952	21.6	16.1	22.3	44
1953	13.6	12.5	20.3	44
1954	13.0	9.4	11.4	31
1955	7.1	9.7	11.6	41
1956	7.1	9.6	15.7	48
1957	7.8	10.4	17.7	49

From the above table it can be seen that the Air Force was being built to an effective status for the first time during a relatively peacetime period. Since contracts for new aircraft usually require at least three years before deliveries start the Air Force was assuming a strong and efficient stature at the outbreak of our next emergency.

VIETNAM WAR

The justification for our participation in the Vietnam War can only await the verdict of history. However, one thing is crystal clear! Had air power been fully utilized in the early days of the war to administer a decisive aerial conquest of North Vietnam the result would now be history. The United States Air Force was ready.

Interview - MG Edward White and Mrs. White, Snell Island, St Petersburg, Fla., 7 January 1972

Q Do you remember your first encounter, if that's what it was, with Hap Arnold?

W Yes, I think I do. I've been trying to think aback to the dates. Just when was his tour in Washington, do you have that?

Q Yes, I know that. He came into Washington as Asst Chief on Jan 1, 1936. Then Westover spun in on the 21st of Sept 1938, and Arnold took the job on the day Chamberlain waved his thing at Munich and said: "Peace in Our Time," Sept 30, 1938.

W About that time, when I was Asst Budget Officer at Wright Field. At that time it was called Wright Field. I had responsibility for the preparation and general knowledge of the budget in those days. In 1938, as you remember, or probably will remember, or recall, our AF was only about 38,000 total. I think we had about 1,200 or 1,400 officers. We all practically knew each other in the small AF at that time. Of course, I had met Gen Westover, and met Gen Arnold, in Washington, at briefing discussions in 1938 and 1939. In particular I remember one instance when Gen Arnold had become Chief. He was reviewing our budget. We were in his office, discussing the budget, the various items in the budget. We weren't talking in billions of dollars in those days, as they are now. We were talking in a few million dollars. Our total AAF budget was probably about $40 or $50 million at that time. So each item was very important to Gen Arnold's mind. He went over each item, item by item. He wanted to know. We came to one item that was for pilot's watches. It was a wristwatch that, in those days, the pilots were all supposed to wear. They were supposed to coordinate their missions and their activities. So everyone had to have a watch and these watches were more or less for general issue, allegedly, for pilots--pilots only.

So Gen Arnold was not too familiar with them. There was an item for, I think, $200 or $300 of these watches. He was not familiar with this, because he did not have one. He didn't know what that was, and what the necessity for it was. Well, I guess I was a young Major, I wasn't a Colonel until '41. I thought I knew all about this. I knew about these watches, at least, to the extent that I had one on, I pulled up my sleeve, and I said: "Here, General, Here's what they are." He hit the ceiling. He said: "There you are. /There is no reason for you to have one of those watches. Here you are a desk jockey, a desk pilot here. What the hell are you wearing one of those things for?" So he was economy-minded at that time, to the extent of being concerned about a single watch, and that the non-pilot on desk jobs at that time--even though they were pilots--weren't supposed to have these watches. So that, I think, my really first impression of Gen Arnold, and that was in 1938. We had the first budget hearings after his accession to the office.

Q Shortly thereafter, they had this big meeting at the White House--I think Nov 24th, to be exact, 1938, when the President decided that airpower was going to be expanded. In Jan 1939, the first big budget for airpower--$300 million--was asked for. Gen Marshall and some of the Army people, didn't want the Air Corps to get all the money. They tried to dilute it and crank in other non-Air items into that $300 million that the President had requested. I think it was a request of 10,000 airplanes. At that time, that was a great number. Do you remember that?

W We didn't get that many. But I think that was the year in which we got our first service test order of 13 B-17s. Also, I think that was the year they contracted for the B-19, just one airplane.

Q Big monster?

W That's right, the one that flew the medical supplies down to Peru.

Q There were two monsters, one B-15, and a B-19?

W That's right, this was the B-19, I think the B-15 had been a research & development item before that.

Q Were you in Arnold's office when the President made that famous 50,000-plane speech? This was in 1940?

W No, I don't believe I was. At that time, I was at Wright-Patterson.

Q Do you remember that speech that the President made?

W I remember it at the time

Q The President sort of took all of the constraints off airpower. Up to this time they were talking about a couple hundred planes here, and a thousand planes there. Then the President called for 50,000 planes a year, and the Air Corps could have anything it wanted. Do you remember that? Was there pandemonium at Wright Field? Do you remember any special reactions?

W No, I don't. I was stationed at Wright Field as Assistant Budget Officer at that time. But I don't recall that situation, except that I know that it was just about that time when we started to get increased interest in buying airplanes in large quantities.

Q Let me try to place it in historical context for you. There was a so-called "sitzkrieg" between Germany and France. After the Germans knocked off Poland, Dec 1939, there was nothing through that winter and early into the spring. On May 10, 1940, the Germans crashed through the Western Front. Within a week, they had taken over Belgium and had swallowed Holland and penetrated to France. It looked desperate for France and the British Army. Of course, a month later, there was Dunkirk. But in May, 6 days after the Germans broke through, or started the western war--this is when everybody started to scream we need airplanes--They didn't have airplanes. This is when the President got up and made that 50,000 plane speech. This was out in the stratosphere. You know, when you are talking of a few.

Q Were things disorganized when they suddenly said: "You can have anything you want?"

W I don't think we ever got the impression we could have anything we want. But, we did get to work there, and the procurement people started to make these tremendous production orders. Of course, there was no financial ilimit on it at that time. The sky was the limit. There was no dollar limitation. They could put the orders through, and we checked them through if the funds were available. The appropriations, of course, they had to be appropriated for before we could run out and buy them.

Q Did Arnold come out to Wright Field?

W Oh, a number of times, he came out there two or three times.

Q I have been told that Arnold always had a sort of negative attitude toward Wright Field, coming from his own experience. He was at Wright Field from '29 to '31, and he didn't have a happy tour there. He always seemed to be picking on Wright Field.

W I don't recall that getting down to my level at that time.

Q I guess maybe the procurement people. He always seemed to be asking for more than they could possibly produce.

Wq Well, there were 2 or 3 little scandals out there among procurement people that came to light later on. A lot of us, a number of us, suspected some of those things, but it was awfully hard to break into it. Do you remember Aaron Jones? He was a procurement officer out there. I went over to talk to Aaron one time about what was going on among those procurement people, some of the bribes and things they were--that some of them were taking. He got very mad, he said: "Don't you criticize my people. I trust them implicitly, and I don't want any criticism from you people." Well, it worked out about a year later, he found out what was happening, and he fell down on it.

Q Let's talk about Benny Meyers

W I've got a definite opinion. Benny was my boss out there, as a BG. I never particularly liked him, but he had a great deal of

ability along that procurement line, or the budget line. He was a graduate of the Harvard Business School up there--the Babson School of Finance--and he went back and he stayed on as an instructor up there, Roger Babson for a couple years after he completed the course.

Q I was told he was a marvelous man with figures?

W He was, very capable.

Q Somebody said he could add up a column of four figures simultaneously?

W Practically, He was very capable in that respect, but his fingers got a little too sticky. I think he was actually prosecuted as a result of something that was not his fault. They brought the woman into the case.

Q This Bleriot LaMarr

W Yes, Snow White, she became my secretary out there after Benny left. After he went to Washington, she was my secretary.

Q He was having a relationship with her, wasn't he?

W Well, trying to, but with frustration, I don't think she gave. That caused him to have sort of a nervous breakdown. But anyway, he had her behind frosted glass in his office out there. Lots of talk about what was going on behind the frosted glass. So when I took her over as my secretary, immediately the frosted glass became clear, so anybody could see what was going on.

Q There were several anonymous letters involving Benny Meyers, one of which was earlier in the war. He had put some plush carpeting a and plush furnishings in his office. There was some kind of investigation there for a time. They justified it on grounds that they needed to replace it or some such thing

W I don't think that was necessarily in his office, but it was in his quarters that he occupied at Patterson Field. He had some very fancy floorings and drapes.

Q And he drove fancy cars all the time?

W Oh, he always had Cadillacs

Q I know there were rumors about him, but what conclusion did they come to as to his source of income? It wasn't his Government income?

W I don't think so. I think that was perhaps a small portion of it. There is no question about it. He had some shenanigans going on with small contractors, one right in Dayton, making a small part for some Bell Aircraft airplane.

Q Is this Aviation Electric, or another?

W I think it was something Aviation Electric, in Dayton it was. LaMarr's husband was made manager of that plant. He sort of worked him in, to get in there. So as a sop to her, he made him the owner, manager of the plant. They were making a small item that cost a few dollars. For contracting, Bell got about $49 for this little item. That cost about $7 or $8, and it was excessive profit. He probably benefited from that to a wide extent. But he was very shrewd and he had money, and he was accused of profiteering on Liberty bonds at that time. He was smart. That's all. Those bonds were paying about 2%, and he could go to the bank at that time and borrow money at 1%, and immediately turn it over for 2%, and that's what he was doing. But you had to put in $100,000 or $200,000 before you could make a reasonable amount to worry about. Arnold loved him, though.

Q Arnold loved him - why?

W Well, because of his ability. I don't think he ever deceived Arnold. He was shrewd, though, and he advised him in financial matters, fiscal affairs. But I don't think he deceived him.

Q Didn't he mislead Arnold on a number of things?

W No, I don't think so, I think Arnold knew it. He wanted to present those figures to the President. In that respect, I think Arnold

knew that they weren't paying for more airplanes than they were getting. Let's put it that way. There was no hanky panky, financially, It was just a question of dating when the airplane was full, fit, and ready to fly.

Q That's correct. If the President asked how many B-29s can we get out in the next month? And Arnold goes to Meyers, and Meyers gives him a figure, and he goes to the President and said: "We can get out 100 next month." Well, actually, there are only 50 available, or that could be available. But they didn't tell the President that the other 50 were sitting on the line, or needed modification, or something. The question is, why did Arnold accept figures that he might have known were somewhat inflated?

W I think he was under pressure by the President

Q He bypassed Echols, didn't he? Didn't Arnold bypass Echols? Echols was Meyers' boss in Washington at that time.

W Yes, I imagine he did. I imagine he called Meyers up to his office directly. I knew that, but of course I was at Wright Patterson. I heard those things, and knew that Arnold was dealing directly with Meyers on these things. We knew the figures were not 100% accurate. We kept all the records right at Wright Field. We knew the status of every airplane on the production line, almost on a daily basis. We kept it on IBM machines. That was the biggest computer--IBM unit--in the country at that time. That was bigger than the Census Bureau. We had every one of them pegged.

Q The story that I get is that Powell, for one, did not want to play this game

W Maybe Jimmy Powell was then in Washington in G-4, I don't know. He may have been under Echols in that Dept somewhere.

Q This is early in the war? Does this register?

W Oh yes, it was early in the war. In 1944 I went to Washington, and was with Lee Miller then.

Mrs. W Meyers had a breakdown?

W Yes, Benny Meyers had a nervous breakdown, and that's why I was called to Washington. That's why I was called into Wright Patterson first, and then, to Washington. He had a breakdown in '45, no, no.

Mrs. W That was Lee Miller, and you were supposed to leave immediately

W I know but he had had his breakdown at Wright Patterson in 1942 as a result of LaMarr. What's her first name. But that was it, he had a nervous breakdown there. As I told you earlier, it was a matter of frustration. You know what I mean. He had his nervous breakdown while I was down at Command & Staff School down at Maxwell, They graduated me 3 weeks early and said: "Report immediately to Wright Patterson to take over Benny Meyers' job." Then, when he recovered several months later, he went to Washington.

Q Let me take you to 1945. Benny Meyers wanted Knudsen's job when Knudsen was going to leave to retire. He didn't get the job

W I didn't know that. I didn't know he wanted it.

Q He wanted the job. They had combined the Air Service Command with the Air Materiel Command, into the Air Technical Service Command, ATSC. Knudson wanted to get back to building automobiles. Benny Meyers wanted that job. He didn't get the job. Hugh Knerr reported back from Europe, and he got the job. This is June 1945. This just happened. It may be coincidence or it may not. This is precisely the time that an anonymous letter was written to the AAF, spilling the beans on Benny Meyrs. This is the letter that was sent to file. It was sent to file with "JES" initials on it--Jake Smart's initials.

W He had to initial, read the letter though. He hadn't written the letter

Q No, he had initialed it and sent it to the file. He was in the office, and somebody told me.

W I don't think he should have gotten credit for it. One of them was a mistake he made when they adjourned the court at noontime and

Benny went off with somebody, and had about 3 or 4 martinis, and it loosened his tongue, and he started shouting off or speeling off to some reporters whom he was with, about the woman in the case.

Q This is 1947

W Yes, when he was court martialed

Q He never was court martialed.

W He had some sort of a trial. A Congressional investigation. It was during that investigation that he brought the woman into the case, blamed her for his trials and tribulations, Well, that was a mistake, bringing the woman into the case, he was not chivalrous. The press went after him. I think, if you dig back into the newspaper records there, you will find how they jumped all over him for blaming the poor woman. He was telling the truth, I think, in that case. When they accused him of making money on Liberty bonds, there were many bankers who were doing the same thing, only on a much bigger scale than he was. So, in that respect, I think Benny improperly accused. But he was guilty of some of the other things, as far as the manipulation of contracts, and throwing contracts in certain directions.

Q In 1943, Arnold was getting a little bit worried about some of the rumors that were coming in about procurement people at Wright Field. He had Stratemeyer, then Chief of Air Staff, prepare a questionnaire about his stocks and bonds, and his financial holdings. Do you remember this?

W Yes, I had one. It was a blank as far as I was concerned. I remember that.

Q And Benny Meyers filled out his questionnaire, and he misstated the facts. He didn't tell about his holdings. During the Congressional investigation, he claimed that he put down the wrong information on the questionnaire with Arnold's knowledge and consent. Of course,

Arnold was very angry. Arnold was a very sick man, when he came to Washington, and he called Meyers the "one rotten apple in the barrel."

W Yes, I remember

Q This made Arnold heartsick because he was scrupulously honest throughout his life, and here this one man blackened the reputation of the whole AF.

Mrs W Heartbreaking

Q Let's talk a little about your budget experiences during the war, with Arnold. You came into Washington..?

W In 1944. We took a vacation. I thought I would come back and go to Europe. When I got back I found orders to the Pentagon.

Q So you were Budget Officer or Asst Budget Officer?

W Asst Budget Officer, at that time, under Lee Miller.

Q Then you saw Arnold in a lot of hot situations? Congressional things?

W Oh yes, up on the Hill, Congressional hearings. Lee Miller and I would usually accompany him up there. We'd have the answers for him when something stumped him. He knew pretty well what was in this budget though, when he went up there, and he knew the basis for it all. But statistics he left to Gen Miller and myself.

Q Did the Congressmen treat him with respect?

W Oh definitely yes, I don't think they ever had too...I'm just recalling now, trying to recall what happened in the Senate one day. There was a little incident that came up in the Senate. Well, it's not clear in my mind. I wouldn't even try to guess, but there was an incident that came up there, some of the oldtimers...

Q They jumped on him?

W Yes, there was an exchange of words. I don't know whether it was old Senator Hayden (Arizona) or not. Of course, he was pretty old even then. But it was one of the elder statesmen in the Senate at the time.

Q You don't remember what the issue was?

W No, I don't

Q It wasn't about money, dollars?

W Oh, undoubtedly it was about dollars, the appropriation.

Q Do you remember Arnold performing at Staff meetings?

W I didn't attend staff meetings, no.

Q Did Miller attend them?

W Miller would attend the staff meetings in Washington, with Gen Arnold. I was always Deputy Budget Officer while Arnold was in Washington.

Q Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and sending them on missions foreign to their expertise. Did you ever hear of that?

W No, I never heard of that.

Q Did you ever see Arnold in the hall, and did he recognize you?

W I don't recall, but I'm sure he knew who I was, because I appeared with him on hearings.

Q Did you ever have to brief him in his office?

Wq Oh yes, I had briefed him on budget matters.

Q You had to go through Suzy Adkins, his secretary?

W That's right, yes.

Q She passed away some years ago. She was sort of a weathervane?

W She could tell when he was in a good humor or not.

Q Several people have told me that they would call Suzy Adkins up, and say: "I have this difficult problem; is this a good day?"

W (laughter) Paegelow in the Lighter-than-Air Service. He had an English bulldog

Q Paegelow?

W That's right, and when that bulldog was 20 feet behind the Colonel, that was no time to approach him. But if the dog was right

up beside him, it was a good day. So that was sort of a weathervane too, but I never had occasion to call on Suzy Adkins to find out whether the time was right for approaching Arnold.

Q How about anybody else in his office? Eugene Beebe? Did you have dealings?

W I know Gene Beebe well

Q And also he had a brother-in-law there, Mrs. Arnold's brother, J. Henry Pool. Do you remember Hank Pool?

W Very faintly, he had a moustache?

Q Oh, that's Horace Shelmire

W Oh, that's right

Q He was an old school crony from Pennsylvania. Did you have any dealings with him?

W No, but I remember those people. This all happened in the Munitions Bldg. We didn't move into the Pentagon until 1944

Q 1943

W Later 1943 then. Are you sure of that? I thought I moved into the Pentagon from the Munitions Bldg in 1944

Q You didn't serve in the Muntions Bldg?

W Yes, I did

Q You came in in 1944

W Oh, I served there, before that, in '38

Q Yes, but I mean when you came back in 1944, you went right to the Pentagon? Did you not?

W I don't think so, no

Q Maybe the Budget was left over in Munitions?

W We were in there a short time, and I could almost walk into Gen Arnold's office, right now. Maybe that was going back before then though. Before I came into Washington at that time, I was back and forth in Washington probably every 2 or 3 weeks from Wright Patterson

Q Let's go back to the '38-'39 period. There were some big battles over the B-17. Gen Andrews and Knerr, his Exec--his Chief of Staff--were pushing very hard for B-17s. Some have felt that Arnold had become an organization man. He had sort of been burned by his Billy Mitchell experience, and he was more mellow about fighting the Establishment. This was 1938-39. Do you have any recollections of Arnold, especially in terms of dollars. They wanted, Andrews wanted more money for the GHQ AF, and for heavy bombers, and Arnold did not fight as hard for that as they did.

W Well, I think he had a balance to strike for the Air Corps, and heavy bombers were beginning to cost money then, quite a bit of money. I think the number of B-17s that they would have wanted would have probably taken the entire AF appropriation, or their share of it. So Arnold would have to temper the situation, and obviously Andrews and Knerr wanted more than they could get.

Q This is part of the gripe that Arnold didn't try harder for more money. Is that a fair statement?

W No, I don't think so, I think he appeared before the Congress and tried to get as much as he could for the AF

Q Did you ever hear him talk about a separate AF?

W Well there was talk before athat about this.

Q Well, Marshall took the position that you can have your separate AF after the war. Arnold was willing to wait. Some others weren't. Some others were pushing very hard, like Knerr, he was pushing.

W Knerr, oh yes, Knerr was strong for a separate AF

Q Knerr helped write a couple books on the side, the William Bradford Huie books, The Case Against The Admirals, and We Fight for Airpower. Knerr left the service for a while, and then came back. There were some who didn't want him back. He almost got court martialed for a while, because he was a strong partisan for separate AF.

W I was sort...

Q A middle rank?

W That's right. That element, my element, and then you get down in "Buster" Briggs' element. Buster and I, incidentally, took flying training together in 1931. I happened to be the senior officer in the flight class at that time, and I led the graduation parade. Buster was my left wing man, and Otto Winnecke was my other wing. We were all LTs. I was a 1st LT and they were 2nd LTs.

Q Were you in balloons?

W Dirigibles, yes, I was four years in lighter-than-air.

Q Westover came up that route

W That's right. He was one of the early balloon pilots. Jimmy Powell was a balloon pilot too, airship pilot. Bill Kepner, have you talked to him yet?

Q Yes, I have

W He's over at Orlando

Q He succeeded Monk Hunter out in the 8th Fighter Command

W We had this Aircraft Plant operating in the southern part of India

Q Is this after the war ended

W No, it wasn't over yet, it was in June 1945. They sent back to the US to have somebody come over to survey the situation and see whether they should keep that plant, Stanley Aircraft Plant, open down at Bangalore, southern part of India, very nice summer resort in India. So Lee Miller told me. He wanted to know if I wanted to go there. And I said: "Sure, I'll go there." So he said: "All right, write your own orders." So I wrote my own orders, and had a few stopovers on the way and got over there. Down at Bangalore, they had a regular AAF post down there. I looked the situation over. While I was there, Tom Hanley came down. He was the AAF commander up at Calcutta at the jute mill up there, and Gen Wheeler was the CBI Commander. I was a

Colonel then. I was sent out from Washington. Well, they had to have a lunch one noon down at the officers' club with Wheeler, and Tom Hanley, and a couple of Australian brigadiers.

Q Tom Hanley had come out of Arnold's office? He was sort of a deputy to Arnold?

W Yes, he had been. Anyway, we had lunch there, got the conversation going and we were talking about the war, and how long it was going to last. Well, I had the intemperance to spout off early, and I said: "Well, gentlemen, I don't think this war is going to last very much longer. I think it will be over within 3 weeks." I was just making a guess, but I knew the B-29s were just bombing the hell out of Japan, and they couldn't stand much more of it. They were just burning all over the place.

Q You didn't have any knowledge of that secret weapon?

W No, no. But Gen Wheeler, he looked down at me, and he said; "That's the way with you young squirts coming out here from the Pentagon, and telling us how this war is going to be fought, and when it's going to be over. We're dug in over here. We're going to fight this war for the next two years, and don't you let anybody tell you we're not." Well, I just sunk down in my chair. I didn't say another word. When he got back to the US, he came running up to the Pentagon and my office, and said: "Ed, why in the hell didn't you tell us that the atomic bomb was going to drop?" He thought I knew all about it, because it was over.

Q Hap Arnold had what some have described as a perennial smile on his face. He had this built-in smile, but if you took it for pleasure, you could be mistaken. Is this correct?

W I think that's right. He always had a happy look on his face. That's why they called him "Hap", of course. But behind it he could be pretty severe once in a while.

Q Did you ever see him explode?

W About as near an explosion as I can recall is when I showed him my issue watch in his office one day.

Q That was around '38 or '39?

W Yes, early days

Q But when you were Asst Budget Officer to Lee Miller. There must have been some tense moments?

W I don't know, they were tense, but understandable. I don't think he ever blew up. He ahd a great deal of respect for Lee Miller, and our Budget organization. I don't recall any instances where he was the least bit antagonistic in that way.

Q Did you get involved in the Truman Committee investigations? The watch dog committee?

W No

Lockland-

Q They moseyed around the Lackland plant, and several other investigations?

W No, I was never involved in that. I was involved in one little incident which might be of interest. You've heard of the B-35 airplane, the batwing, the big one. Well, we contracted for a wservice contract for 13 of those airplanes.

Q During the war?

W No, before the war, this was along about 1938 or '39, sometime along there. We contracted for them, and they were delivered very slowly. The contractor wasvvery slow in delivering. By the time they had received 6 of them, they knew they weren't ever going to use them, that they had outlived their design usefulness, that they had thought they were going to be useful for. But, all of a sudden, the service contract, the change order contract, came through on the seven remaining, that were still on the production line for $14 million. That was a lot of money in those days. And I, as Budget Officer at the time, objected

to the contract. Here these airplanes weren't going to be flown. They were never going to be flown in service. Why spend $14 million more getting the last 7 of them out on the production line, at least, and out on the field, only to fly them off to the graveyard? Well, it was a logical argument. No one argued that they were going to be used for anything. But it was the same early story of Lockheed, then. If they hadn't given them that $14 million, Lockheed would have faced serious financial difficulties at that time, and I was told from the topside to let that contract go through, assign money to that.

Q Like Arnold or Giles?

W Yes, somebody from up there. I think Arnold directed this It was the B-35 which was never flown. They flew them from the Lockheed plant to the graveyard at Tucson, Davis Monthan AFB. They are still out there. Never one of them was flown, but they put that $14 million on it, just to keep Lockheed going then.

Q Things haven't changed very much?

W No, they haven't

Q The B-49, the wingless plane, came after the war. Remember the B-49? Did it use the knowhow of the B-35?

W I don't recall that there was any connection. I never knew much about that B-49. Don't know whether that was after I retired or not.

Q That was around Symington's period. You were still around

W I must have been

Q That was one of the planes they had on the board

W I left the Pentagon in 1949, before Symington did, and that must have come up after that

Q Let me ask this. Were you involved in the B-36? The B-36 was authorized in 1941, right before Pearl Harbor. Consolidated lagged too in putting those in.

W They were way behind. I remember the contract, but I don't remember the circumstances, of course. They put them through an expedited production.

A At the time they were authorized because there was the thought that we might have to bomb Germany from the Western Hemisphere. They had to fly 3,000 miles, drop bombs, and fly back. England was under great pressure, and potentially, under invasion

W That's exactly the situation they are facing now. We're going to have to use the B-52s for that purpose, maybe. That's their only justification, now, for the long distance bombing. Rather amusing for myself. When I was handed 2-1/2 million dollars, $2,600,000 worth of negotiable bonds, I was told: "Here, you take these, and keep them until we decide what we are going to do with them."

Q Who handed them to you?

W The money came in from all of the deactivated clubs and messes, all over the US and foreign countries at that time. When they were getting out of war and deactivating bases, they all had clubs, and all these clubs had large sums of money on hand.

Q They all had slot machines?

W Well, yes, they had plenty of resources. But they weren't going to hand it back to the ones that were there at the time, because they weren't the ones that developed those funds

Q You had $2.6 million?

W $2.6, I put it down in the Riggs National Bank in a safe deposit vault down there. I didn't know what they were going to do with it.

Q Did Arnold know you had the money?

W He must have known, but Lee Miller turned it over to me, and said: "Here, put it in the bank. Put it somewhere. We don't know what we are going to do with it." So I had it down there and it was in the

bank, in Riggs National, oh, I would say for about a year. Then, they decided to establish the Arnold Aid Society, which is in existence, now

Q The AF Aid Society.

W Yes, the AF Aid Society, but the Arnold Educational Foundation. That's what that money was for and I kept that in the bank down there, wondering what in the world. No one ever checked on it. To thisddate, they don't know whether I might have slipped two or three of them off in my own account somewhere. But I always was amused at that, no one checked on me on that money.

Q What about postwar?

W Vandenberg was not, he didn't think he was himself qualified to be Chief of Staff of the AF

Q I've been told this on tape, and you arennot going to be quoted. I'm not going, you are not going to be put on a stand and told: "You said thus and such." Nobody is going to hold you responsible.

Mrs. W I admired Mrs. Arnold as the Chief's wife, because she was so very gracious, and you wanted to help her. She appreciated your efforts, too.

Q She had a memory for names, did she?

Mrs. W Well, one day when I was junior officer's wife in Washington, we were working for the Red Cross in the basement of the Bolling Field Club. It was a very icy, rainy day. When I did finally skid into a parking place outside theeclub, and went downstairs, Mrs. Arnold was there. There were very few girls who had come, and she looked up and called me by my first name. And from then one I was married to her, and I've loved her always, and admired her more than any other Chief's cwife.

Q She was a very gracious lady. People who served under Arnold at various posts, like March Field, remember her with affection.

Mrs. W Great

Q Right, and Don Darrow told me that when she first met him she associated his face with his name, and she never forgot it. She called him something, a nickname.

Interview - MG Edward White and Mrs. White, Snell Island, St Petersburg, Fla., 7 January 1972

Q Do you remember your first encounter, if that's what it was, with Hap Arnold?

W Yes, I think I do. I've been trying to think back to the dates. Just when was his tour in Washington, do you have that?

Q Yes, I know that. He came into Washington as Asst Chief on Jan 1, 1936. Then Westover spun in on the 21st of Sept 1938, and Arnold took the job on the day Chamberlain waved his thing at Munich and said: "Peace in Our Time," Sept 30, 1938.

W About that time, when I was Asst Budget Officer at Wright Field. At that time it was called Wright Field. I had responsibility for the preparation and general knowledge of the budget in those days. In 1938, as you remember, or probably will remember, or recall, our AF was only about 38,000 total. I think we had about 1,200 or 1,400 officers. We all practically knew each other in the small AF at that time. Of course, I had met Gen Westover, and met Gen Arnold, in Washington, at briefing discussions in 1938 and 1939. In particular I remember one instance when Gen Arnold had become Chief. He was reviewing our budget. We were in his office, discussing the budget, the various items in the budget. We weren't talking in billions of dollars in those days, as they are now. We were talking in a few million dollars. Our total AAF budget was probably about $40 or $50 million at that time. So each item was very important to Gen Arnold's mind. He went over each item, item by item. He wanted to know. We came to one item that was for pilot's watches. It was a wristwatch that, in those days, the pilots were all supposed to wear. They were supposed to coordinate their missions and their activities. So everyone had to have a watch and these watches were more or less for general issue, allegedly, for pilots--pilots only.

So Gen Arnold was not too familiar with them. There was an item for, I think, $200 or $300 of these watches. He was not familiar with this, because he did not have one. He didn't know what that was, and what the necessity for it was. Well, I guess I was a young Major, I wasn't a Colonel until '41. I thought I knew all about this. I knew about these watches, at least, to the extent that I had one on, I pulled up my sleeve, and I said: "Here, General, Here's what they are." He hit the ceiling. He said: "There you are. There is no reason for you to have one of those watches. Here you are a desk jockey, a desk pilot here. What the hell are you wearing one of those things for?" So he was economy-minded at that time, to the extent of being concerned about a single watch, and that the non-pilot on desk jobs at that time--even though they were pilots--weren't supposed to have these watches. So that, I think, my really first impression of Gen Arnold, and that was in 1938. We had the first budget hearings after his accession to the office.

Q Shortly thereafter, they had this big meeting at the White House--I think Nov 24th, to be exact, 1938, when the President decided that airpower was going to be expanded. In Jan 1939, the first big budget for airpower--$300 million--was asked for. Gen Marshall and some of the Army people, didn't want the Air Corps to get all the money. They tried to dilute it and crank in other non-Air items into that $300 million that the President had requested. I think it was a request of 10,000 airplanes. At that time, that was a great number. Do you remember that?

W We didn't get that many. But I think that was the year in which we got our first service test order of 13 B-17s. Also, I think that was the year they contracted for the B-19, just one airplane.

Q Big monster?

W That's right, the one that flew the medical supplies down to Peru.

Q There were two monsters, one B-15, and a B-19?

W That's right, this was the B-19, I think the B-15 had been a research & development item before that.

Q Were you in Arnold's office when the President made that famous 50,000-plane speech? This was in 1940?

W No, I don't believe I was. At that time, I was at Wright-Patterson.

Q Do you remember that speech that the President made?

W I remember it at the time

Q The President sort of took all of the constraints off airpower. Up to this time they were talking about a couple hundred planes here, and a thousand planes there. Then the President called for 50,000 planes a year, and the Air Corps could have anything it wanted. Do you remember that? Was there pandemonium at Wright Field? Do you remember any special reactions?

W No, I don't. I was stationed at Wright Field as Assistant Budget Officer at that time. But I don't recall that situation, except that I know that it was just about that time when we started to get increased interest in buying airplanes in large quantities.

Q Let me try to place it in historical context for you. There was a so-called "sitzkrieg" between Germany and France. After the Germans knocked off Poland, Dec 1939, there was nothing through that winter and early into the spring. On May 10, 1940, the Germans crashed through the Western Front. Within a week, they had taken over Belgium and had swallowed Holland and penetrated to France. It looked desperate for France and the British Army. Of course, a month later, there was Dunkirk. But in May, 6 days after the Germans broke through, or started the western war--this is when everybody started to scream we need airplanes--They didn't have airplanes. This is when the President got up and made that 50,000 plane speech. This was out in the stratosphere. You know, when you are talking of a few.

Q Were things disorganized when they suddenly said: "You can have anything you want?"

W I don't think we ever got the impression we could have anything we want. But, we did get to work there, and the procurement people started to make these tremendous production orders. Of course, there was no financial limit on it at that time. The sky was the limit. There was no dollar limitation. They could put the orders through, and we checked them through if the funds were available. The appropriations, of course, they had to be appropriated for before we could run out and buy them.

Q Did Arnold come out to Wright Field?

W Oh, a number of times, he came out there two or three times.

Q I have been told that Arnold always had a sort of negative attitude toward Wright Field, coming from his own experience. He was at Wright Field from '29 to '31, and he didn't have a happy tour there. He always seemed to be picking on Wright Field.

W I don't recall that getting down to my level at that time.

Q I guess maybe the procurement people. He always seemed to be asking for more than they could possibly produce.

Wq Well, there were 2 or 3 little scandals out there among procurement people that came to light later on. A lot of us, a number of us, suspected some of those things, but it was awfully hard to break into it. Do you remember Aaron Jones? He was a procurement officer out there. I went over to talk to Aaron one time about what was going on among those procurement people, some of the bribes and things they were--that some of them were taking. He got very mad, he said: "Don't you criticize my people. I trust them implicitly, and I don't want any criticism from you people." Well, it worked out about a year later, he found out what was happening, and he fell down on it.

Q Let's talk about Benny Meyers

W I've got a definite opinion. Benny was my boss out there, as a BG. I never particularly liked him, but he had a great deal of

ability along that procurement line, or the budget line. He was a graduate of the Harvard Business School up there--the Babson School of Finance--and he went back and he stayed on as an instructor up there, Roger Babson for a couple years after he completed the course.

Q I was told he was a marvelous man with figures?

W He was, very capable.

Q Somebody said he could add up a column of four figures simultaneously?

W Practically, He was very capable in that respect, but his fingers got a little too sticky. I think he was actually prosecuted as a result of something that was not his fault. They brought the woman into the case.

Q This Bleriot LaMarr

W Yes, Snow White, she became my secretary out there after Benny left. After he went to Washington, she was my secretary.

Q He was having a relationship with her, wasn't he?

W Well, trying to, but with frustration, I don't think she gave. That caused him to have sort of a nervous breakdown. But anyway, he had her behind frosted glass in his office out there. Lots of talk about what was going on behind the frosted glass. So when I took her over as my secretary, immediately the frosted glass became clear, so anybody could see what was going on.

Q There were several anonymous letters involving Benny Meyers, one of which was earlier in the war. He had put some plush carpeting a and plush furnishings in his office. There was some kind of investigation there for a time. They justified it on grounds that they needed to replace it or some such thing

W I don't think that was necessarily in his office, but it was in his quarters that he occupied at Patterson Field. He had some very fancy floorings and drapes.

Q And he drove fancy cars all the time?

W Oh, he always had Cadillacs

Q I know there were rumors about him, but what conclusion did they come to as to his source of income? It wasn't his Government income?

W I don't think so. I think that was perhaps a small portion of it. There is no question about it. He had some shenanigans going on with small contractors, one right in Dayton, making a small part for some Bell Aircraft airplane.

Q Is this Aviation Electric, or another?

W I think it was something Aviation Electric, in Dayton it was. LaMarr's husband was made manager of that plant. He sort of worked him in, to get in there. So as a sop to her, he made him the owner, manager of the plant. They were making a small item that cost a few dollars. For contracting, Bell got about $49 for this little item. That cost about $7 or $8, and it was excessive profit. He probably benefited from that to a wide extent. But he was very shrewd and he had money, and he was accused of profiteering on Liberty bonds at that time. He was smart. That's all. Those bonds were paying about 2%, and he could go to the bank at that time and borrow money at 1%, and immediately turn it over for 2%, and that's what he was doing. But you had to put in $100,000 or $200,000 before you could make a reasonable amount to worry about. Arnold loved him, though.

Q Arnold loved him - why?

W Well, because of his ability. I don't think he ever deceived Arnold. He was shrewd, though, and he advised him in financial matters, fiscal affairs. But I don't think he deceived him.

Q Didn't he mislead Arnold on a number of things?

W No, I don't think so, I think Arnold knew it. He wanted to present those figures to the President. In that respect, I think Arnold

knew that they weren't paying for more airplanes than they were getting. Let's put it that way. There was no hanky panky, financially, It was just a question of dating when the airplane was full, fit, and ready to fly.

Q That's correct. If the President asked how many B-29s can we get out in the next month? And Arnold goes to Meyers, and Meyers gives him a figure, and he goes to the President and said: "We can get out 100 next month." Well, actually, there are only 50 available, or that could be available. But they didn't tell the President that the other 50 were sitting on the line, or needed modification, or something. The question is, why did Arnold accept figures that he might have known were somewhat inflated?

W I think he was under pressure by the President

Q He bypassed Echols, didn't he? Didn't Arnold bypass Echols? Echols was Meyers' boss in Washington at that time.

W Yes, I imagine he did. I imagine he called Meyers up to his office directly. I knew that, but of course I was at Wright Patterson. I heard those things, and knew that Arnold was dealing directly with Meyers on these things. We knew the figures were not 100% accurate. We kept all the records right at Wright Field. We knew the status of every airplane on the production line, almost on a daily basis. We kept it on IBM machines. That was the biggest computer--IBM unit--in the country at that time. That was bigger than the Census Bureau. We had every one of them pegged.

Q The story that I get is that Powell, for one, did not want to play this game

W Maybe Jimmy Powell was then in Washington in G-4, I don't know. He may have been under Echols in that Dept somewhere.

Q This is early in the war? Does this register?

W Oh yes, it was early in the war. In 1944 I went to Washington, and was with Lee Miller then.

Mrs. W Meyers had a breakdown?

W Yes, Benny Meyers had a nervous breakdown, and that's why I was called to Washington. That's why I was called into Wright Patterson first, and then, to Washington. He had a breakdown in '45, no, no.

Mrs. W That was Lee Miller, and you were supposed to leave immediately

W I know but he had had his breakdown at Wright Patterson in 1942 as a result of LaMarr. What's her first name. But that was it, he had a nervous breakdown there. As I told you earlier, it was a matter of frustration. You know what I mean. He had his nervous breakdown while I was down at Command & Staff School down at Maxwell, They graduated me 3 weeks early and said: "Report immediately to Wright Patterson to take over Benny Meyers' job." Then, when he recovered several months later, he went to Washington.

Q Let me take you to 1945. Benny Meyers wanted Knudsen's job when Knudsen was going to leave to retire. He didn't get the job

W I didn't know that. I didn't know he wanted it.

Q He wanted the job. They had combined the Air Service Command with the Air Materiel Command, into the Air Technical Service Command, ATSC. Knudson wanted to get back to building automobiles. Benny Meyers wanted that job. He didn't get the job. Hugh Knerr reported back from Europe, and he got the job. This is June 1945. This just happened. It may be coincidence or it may not. This is precisely the time that an anonymous letter was written to the AAF, spilling the beans on Benny Meyrs. This is the letter that was sent to file. It was sent to file with "JES" initials on it--Jake Smart's initials.

W He had to initial, read the letter though. He hadn't written the letter

Q No, he had initialed it and sent it to the file. He was in the office, and somebody told me.

W I don't think he should have gotten credit for it. One of them was a mistake he made when they adjourned the court at noontime and

Benny went off with somebody, and had about 3 or 4 martinis, and it loosened his tongue, and he started shouting off or speeling off to some reporters whom he was with, about the woman in the case.

Q This is 1947

W Yes, when he was court martialed

Q He never was court martialed.

W He had some sort of a trial. A Congressional investigation. It was during that investigation that he brought the woman into the case, blamed her for his trials and tribulations, Well, that was a mistake, bringing the woman into the case, he was not chivalrous. The press went after him. I think, if you dig back into the newspaper records there, you will find how they jumped all over him for blaming the poor woman. He was telling the truth, I think, in that case. When they accused him of making money on Liberty bonds, there were many bankers who were doing the same thing, only on a much bigger scale than he was. So, in that respect, I think Benny improperly accused. But he was guilty of some of the other things, as far as the manipulation of contracts, and throwing contracts in certain directions.

Q In 1943, Arnold was getting a little bit worried about some of the rumors that were coming in about procurement people at Wright Field. He had Stratemeyer, then Chief of Air Staff, prepare a questionnaire about his stocks and bonds, and his financial holdings. Do you remember this?

W Yes, I had one. It was a blank as far as I was concerned. I remember that.

Q And Benny Meyers filled out his questionnaire, and he misstated the facts. He didn't tell about his holdings. During the Congressional investigation, he claimed that he put down the wrong information on the questionnaire with Arnold's knowledge and consent. Of course,

Arnold was very angry. Arnold was a very sick man, when he came to Washington, and he called Meyers the "one rotten apple in the barrel."

W Yes, I remember

Q This made Arnold heartsick because he was scrupulously honest throughout his life, and here this one man blackened the reputation of the whole AF.

Mrs W Heartbreaking

Q Let's talk a little about your budget experiences during the war, with Arnold. You came into Washington..?

W In 1944. We took a vacation. I thought I would come back and go to Europe. When I got back I found orders to the Pentagon.

Q So you were Budget Officer or Asst Budget Officer?

W Asst Budget Officer, at that time, under Lee Miller.

Q Then you saw Arnold in a lot of hot situations? Congressional things?

W Oh yes, up on the Hill, Congressional hearings. Lee Miller and I would usually accompany him up there. We'd have the answers for him when something stumped him. He knew pretty well what was in this budget though, when he went up there, and he knew the basis for it all. But statistics he left to Gen Miller and myself.

Q Did the Congressmen treat him with respect?

W Oh definitely yes, I don't think they ever had too...I'm just recalling now, trying to recall what happened in the Senate one day. There was a little incident that came up in the Senate. Well, it's not clear in my mind. I wouldn't even try to guess, but there was an incident that came up there, some of the oldtimers...

Q They jumped on him?

W Yes, there was an exchange of words. I don't know whether it was old Senator Hayden (Arizona) or not. Of course, he was pretty old even then. But it was one of the elder statesmen in the Senate at the time.

Q You don't remember what the issue was?

W No, I don't

Q It wasn't about money, dollars?

W Oh, undoubtedly it was about dollars, the appropriation.

Q Do you remember Arnold performing at Staff meetings?

W I didn't attend staff meetings, no.

Q Did Miller attend them?

W Miller would attend the staff meetings in Washington, with Gen Arnold. I was always Deputy Budget Officer while Arnold was in Washington.

Q Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and sending them on missions foreign to their expertise. Did you ever hear of that?

W No, I never heard of that.

Q Did you ever see Arnold in the hall, and did he recognize you?

W I don't recall, but I'm sure he knew who I was, because I appeared with him on hearings.

Q Did you ever have to brief him in his office?

Wq Oh yes, I had briefed him on budget matters.

Q You had to go through Suzy Adkins, his secretary?

W That's right, yes.

Q She passed away some years ago. She was sort of a weathervane?

W She could tell when he was in a good humor or not.

Q Several people have told me that they would call Suzy Adkins up, and say: "I have this difficult problem; is this a good day?"

W (laughter) Paegelow in the Lighter-than-Air Service. He had an English bulldog

Q Paegelow?

W That's right, and when that bulldog was 20 feet behind the Colonel, that was no time to approach him. But if the dog was right

up beside him, it was a good day. So that was sort of a weathervane too, but I never had occasion to call on Suzy Adkins to find out whether the time was right for approaching Arnold.

Q How about anybody else in his office? Eugene Beebe? Did you have dealings?

W I know Gene Beebe well

Q And also he had a brother-in-law there, Mrs. Arnold's brother, J. Henry Pool. Do you remember Hank Pool?

W Very faintly, he had a moustache?

Q Oh, that's Horace Shelmire

W Oh, that's right

Q He was an old school crony from Pennsylvania. Did you have any dealings with him?

W No, but I remember those people. This all happened in the Munitions Bldg. We didn't move into the Pentagon until 1944

Q 1943

W Late 1943 then. Are you sure of that? I thought I moved into the Pentagon from the Munitions Bldg in 1944

Q You didn't serve in the Muntions Bldg?

W Yes, I did

Q You came in in 1944

W Oh, I served there, before that, in '38

Q Yes, but I mean when you came back in 1944, you went right to the Pentagon? Did you not?

W I don't think so, no

Q Maybe the Budget was left over in Munitions?

W We were in there a short time, and I could almost walk into Gen Arnold's office, right now. Maybe that was going back before then though. Before I came into Washington at that time, I was back and forth in Washington probably every 2 or 3 weeks from Wright Patterson

Q Let's go back to the '38-'39 period. There were some big battles over the B-17. Gen Andrews and Knerr, his Exec--his Chief of Staff--were pushing very hard for B-17s. Some have felt that Arnold had become an organization man. He had sort of been burned by his Billy Mitchell experience, and he was more mellow about fighting the Establishment. This was 1938-39. Do you have any recollections of Arnold, especially in terms of dollars. They wanted, Andrews wanted more money for the GHQ AF, and for heavy bombers, and Arnold did not fight as hard for that as they did.

W Well, I think he had a balance to strike for the Air Corps, and heavy bombers were beginning to cost money then, quite a bit of money. I think the number of B-17s that they would have wanted would have probably taken the entire AF appropriation, or their share of it. So Arnold would have to temper the situation, and obviously Andrews and Knerr wanted more than they could get.

Q This is part of the gripe that Arnold didn't try harder for more money. Is that a fair statement?

W No, I don't think so, I think he appeared before the Congress and tried to get as much as he could for the AF

Q Did you ever hear him talk about a separate AF?

W Well there was talk before that about this.

Q Well, Marshall took the position that you can have your separate AF after the war. Arnold was willing to wait. Some others weren't. Some others were pushing very hard, like Knerr, he was pushing.

W Knerr, oh yes, Knerr was strong for a separate AF

Q Knerr helped write a couple books on the side, the William Bradford Huie books, The Case Against The Admirals, and We Fight for Airpower. Knerr left the service for a while, and then came back. There were some who didn't want him back. He almost got court martialed for a while, because he was a strong partisan for separate AF.

W I was sort...

Q A middle rank?

W That's right. That element, my element, and then you get down in "Buster" Briggs' element. Buster and I, incidentally, took flying training together in 1931. I happened to be the senior officer in the flight class at that time, and I led the graduation parade. Buster was my left wing man, and Otto Winnecke was my other wing. We were all LTs. I was a 1st LT and they were 2nd LTs.

Q Were you in balloons?

W Dirigibles, yes, I was four years in lighter-than-air.

Q Westover came up that route

W That's right. He was one of the early balloon pilots. Jimmy Powell was a balloon pilot too, airship pilot. Bill Kepner, have you talked to him yet?

Q Yes, I have

W He's over at Orlando

Q He succeeded Monk Hunter out in the 8th Fighter Command

W We had this Aircraft Plant operating in the southern part of India

Q Is this after the war ended

W No, it wasn't over yet, it was in June 1945. They sent back to the US to have somebody come over to survey the situation and see whether they should keep that plant, Stanley Aircraft Plant, open down at Bangalore, southern part of India, very nice summer resort in India. So Lee Miller told me. He wanted to know if I wanted to go there. And I said: "Sure, I'll go there." So he said: "All right, write your own orders." So I wrote my own orders, and had a few stopovers on the way and got over there. Down at Bangalore, they had a regular AAF post down there. I looked the situation over. While I was there, Tom Hanley came down. He was the AAF commander up at Calcutta at the jute mill up there, and Gen Wheeler was the CBI Commander. I was a

Colonel then. I was sent out from Washington. Well, they had to have a lunch one noon down at the officers' club with Wheeler, and Tom Hanley, and a couple of Australian brigadiers.

Q Tom Hanley had come out of Arnold's office? He was sort of a deputy to Arnold?

W Yes, he had been. Anyway, we had lunch there, got the conversation going and we were talking about the war, and how long it was going to last. Well, I had the intemperance to spout off early, and I said: "Well, gentlemen, I don't think this war is going to last very much longer. I think it will be over within 3 weeks." I was just making a guess, but I knew the B-29s were just bombing the hell out of Japan, and they couldn't stand much more of it. They were just burning all over the place.

Q You didn't have any knowledge of that secret weapon?

W No, no. But Gen Wheeler, he looked down at me, and he said; "That's the way with you young squirts coming out here from the Pentagon, and telling us how this war is going to be fought, and when it's going to be over. We're dug in over here. We're going to fight this war for the next two years, and don't you let anybody tell you we're not." Well, I just sunk down in my chair. I didn't say another word. When he got back to the US, he came running up to the Pentagon and my office, and said: "Ed, why in the hell didn't you tell us that the atomic bomb was going to drop?" He thought I knew all about it, because it was over.

Q Hap Arnold had what some have described as a perennial smile on his face. He had this built-in smile, but if you took it for pleasure, you could be mistaken. Is this correct?

W I think that's right. He always had a happy look on his face. That's why they called him "Hap", of course. But behind it he could be pretty severe once in a while.

Q Did you ever see him explode?

W About as near an explosion as I can recall is when I showed him my issue watch in his office one day.

Q That was around '38 or '39?

W Yes, early days

Q But when you were Asst Budget Officer to Lee Miller. There must have been some tense moments?

W I don't know, they were tense, but understandable. I don't think he ever blew up. He ahd a great deal of respect for Lee Miller, and our Budget organization. I don't recall any instances where he was the least bit antagonistic in that way.

Q Did you get involved in the Truman Committee investigations? The watch dog committee?

W No

Q They moseyed around the Lackland plant, and several other investigations?

W No, I was never involved in that. I was involved in one little incident which might be of interest. You've heard of the B-35 airplane, the batwing, the big one. Well, we contracted for a service contract for 13 of those airplanes.

Q During the war?

W No, before the war, this was along about 1938 or '39, sometime along there. We contracted for them, and they were delivered very slowly. The contractor was very slow in delivering. By the time they had received 6 of them, they knew they weren't ever going to use them, that they had outlived their design usefulness, that they had thought they were going to be useful for. But, all of a sudden, the service contract, the change order contract, came through on the seven remaining, that were still on the production line for $14 million. That was a lot of money in those days. And I, as Budget Officer at the time, objected

to the contract. Here these airplanes weren't going to be flown. They were never going to be flown in service. Why spend $14 million more getting the last 7 of them out on the production line, at least, and out on the field, only to fly them off to the graveyard? Well, it was a logical argument. No one argued that they were going to be used for anything. But it was the same early story of Lockheed, then. If they hadn't given them that $14 million, Lockheed would have faced serious financial difficulties at that time, and I was told from the topside to let that contract go through, assign money to that.

Q Like Arnold or Giles?

W Yes, somebody from up there. I think Arnold directed this It was the B-35 which was never flown. They flew them from the Lockheed plant to the graveyard at Tucson, Davis Monthan AFB. They are still out there. Never one of them was flown, but they put that $14 million on it, just to keep Lockheed going then.

Q Things haven't changed very much?

W No, they haven't

Q The B-49, the wingless plane, came after the war. Remember the B-49? Did it use the knowhow of the B-35?

W I don't recall that there was any connection. I never knew much about that B-49. Don't know whether that was after I retired or not.

Q That was around Symington's period. You were still around

W I must have been

Q That was one of the planes they had on the board

W I left the Pentagon in 1949, before Symington did, and that must have come up after that

Q Let me ask this. Were you involved in the B-36? The B-36 was authorized in 1941, right before Pearl Harbor. Consolidated lagged too in putting those in.

W They were way behind. I remember the contract, but I don't remember the circumstances, of course. They put them through an expedited production.

A At the time they were authorized because there was the thought that we might have to bomb Germany from the Western Hemisphere. They had to fly 3,000 miles, drop bombs, and fly back. England was under great pressure, and potentially, under invasion

W That's exactly the situation they are facing now. We're going to have to use the B-52s for that purpose, maybe. That's their only justification, now, for the long distance bombing. Rather amusing for myself. When I was handed 2-1/2 million dollars, $2,600,000 worth of negotiable bonds, I was told: "Here, you take these, and keep them until we decide what we are going to do with them."

Q Who handed them to you?

W The money came in from all of the deactivated clubs and messes, all over the US and foreign countries at that time. When they were getting out of war and deactivating bases, they all had clubs, and all these clubs had large sums of money on hand.

Q They all had slot machines?

W Well, yes, they had plenty of resources. But they weren't going to hand it back to the ones that were there at the time, because they weren't the ones that developed those funds

Q You had $2.6 million?

W $2.6, I put it down in the Riggs National Bank in a safe deposit vault down there. I didn't know what they were going to do with it.

Q Did Arnold know you had the money?

W He must have known, but Lee Miller turned it over to me, and said: "Here, put it in the bank. Put it somewhere. We don't know what we are going to do with it." So I had it down there and it was in the

bank, in Riggs National, oh, I would say for about a year. Then, they decided to establish the Arnold Aid Society, which is in existence now

Q The AF Aid Society.

W Yes, the AF Aid Society, but the Arnold Educational Foundation. That's what that money was for and I kept that in the bank down there, wondering what in the world. No one ever checked on it. To this date, they don't know whether I might have slipped two or three of them off in my own account somewhere. But I always was amused at that, no one checked on me on that money.

Q What about postwar?

W Vandenberg was not, he didn't think he was himself qualified to be Chief of Staff of the AF

Q I've been told this on tape, and you are not going to be quoted. I'm not going, you are not going to be put on a stand and told: "You said thus and such." Nobody is going to hold you responsible.

Mrs. W I admired Mrs. Arnold as the Chief's wife, because she was so very gracious, and you wanted to help her. She appreciated your efforts, too.

Q She had a memory for names, did she?

Mrs. W Well, one day when I was junior officer's wife in Washington, we were working for the Red Cross in the basement of the Bolling Field Club. It was a very icy, rainy day. When I did finally skid into a parking place outside the club, and went downstairs, Mrs. Arnold was there. There were very few girls who had come, and she looked up and called me by my first name. And from then on, I was married to her, and I've loved her always, and admired her more than any other Chief's wife.

Q She was a very gracious lady. People who served under Arnold at various posts, like March Field, remember her with affection.

Mrs. W Great

Q Right, and Don Darrow told me that when she first met him she associated his face with his name, and she never forgot it. She called him something, a nickname.

Interview - MG Edward White and Mrs. White, Snell Island, St Petersburg, Fla., 7 January 1972

Q Do you remember your first encounter, if that's what it was, with Hap Arnold?

W Yes, I think I do. I've been trying to think back to the dates. Just when was his tour in Washington, do you have that?

Q Yes, I know that. He came into Washington as Asst Chief on Jan 1, 1936. Then Westover spun in on the 21st of Sept 1938, and Arnold took the job on the day Chamberlain waved his thing at Munich and said: "Peace in Our Time," Sept 30, 1938.

W About that time, when I was Asst Budget Officer at Wright Field. At that time it was called Wright Field. I had responsibility for the preparation and general knowledge of the budget in those days. In 1938, as you remember, or probably will remember, or recall, our AF was only about 38,000 total. I think we had about 1,200 or 1,400 officers. We all practically knew each other in the small AF at that time. Of course, I had met Gen Westover, and met Gen Arnold, in Washington, at briefing discussions in 1938 and 1939. In particular I remember one instance when Gen Arnold had become Chief. He was reviewing our budget. We were in his office, discussing the budget, the various items in the budget. We weren't talking in billions of dollars in those days, as they are now. We were talking in a few million dollars. Our total AAF budget was probably about $40 or $50 million at that time. So each item was very important to Gen Arnold's mind. He went over each item, item by item. He wanted to know. We came to one item that was for pilot's watches. It was a wristwatch that, in those days, the pilots were all supposed to wear. They were supposed to coordinate their missions and their activities. So everyone had to have a watch and these watches were more or less for general issue, allegedly, for pilots--pilots only.

So Gen Arnold was not too familiar with them. There was an item for, I think, $200 or $300 of these watches. He was not familiar with this, because he did not have one. He didn't know what that was, and what the necessity for it was. Well, I guess I was a young Major, I wasn't a Colonel until '41. I thought I knew all about this. I knew about these watches, at least, to the extent that I had one on, I pulled up my sleeve, and I said: "Here, General, Here's what they are." He hit the ceiling. He said: "There you are. There is no reason for you to have one of those watches. Here you are a desk jockey, a desk pilot here. What the hell are you wearing one of those things for?" So he was economy-minded at that time, to the extent of being concerned about a single watch, and that the non-pilot on desk jobs at that time--even though they were pilots--weren't supposed to have these watches. So that, I think, my really first impression of Gen Arnold, and that was in 1938. We had the first budget hearings after his accession to the office.

Q Shortly thereafter, they had this big meeting at the White House--I think Nov 24th, to be exact, 1938, when the President decided that airpower was going to be expanded. In Jan 1939, the first big budget for airpower--$300 million--was asked for. Gen Marshall and some of the Army people, didn't want the Air Corps to get all the money. They tried to dilute it and crank in other non-Air items into that $300 million that the President had requested. I think it was a request of 10,000 airplanes. At that time, that was a great number. Do you remember that?

W We didn't get that many. But I think that was the year in which we got our first service test order of 13 B-17s. Also, I think that was the year they contracted for the B-19, just one airplane.

Q Big monster?

W That's right, the one that flew the medical supplies down to Peru.

Q There were two monsters, one B-15, and a B-19?

W That's right, this was the B-19, I think the B-15 had been a research & development item before that.

Q Were you in Arnold's office when the President made that famous 50,000-plane speech? This was in 1940?

W No, I don't believe I was. At that time, I was at Wright-Patterson.

Q Do you remember that speech that the President made?

W I remember it at the time

Q The President sort of took all of the constraints off airpower. Up to this time they were talking about a couple hundred planes here, and a thousand planes there. Then the President called for 50,000 planes a year, and the Air Corps could have anything it wanted. Do you remember that? Was there pandemonium at Wright Field? Do you remember any special reactions?

W No, I don't. I was stationed at Wright Field as Assistant Budget Officer at that time. But I don't recall that situation, except that I know that it was just about that time when we started to get increased interest in buying airplanes in large quantities.

Q Let me try to place it in historical context for you. There was a so-called "sitzkrieg" between Germany and France. After the Germans knocked off Poland, Dec 1939, there was nothing through that winter and early into the spring. On May 10, 1940, the Germans crashed through the Western Front. Within a week, they had taken over Belgium and had swallowed Holland and penetrated to France. It looked desperate for France and the British Army. Of course, a month later, there was Dunkirk. But in May, 6 days after the Germans broke through, or started the western war--this is when everybody started to scream we need airplanes--They didn't have airplanes. This is when the President got up and made that 50,000 plane speech. This was out in the stratosphere. You know, when you are talking of a few.

Q Were things disorganized when they suddenly said: "You can have anything you want?"

W I don't think we ever got the impression we could have anything we want. But, we did get to work there, and the procurement people started to make these tremendous production orders. Of course, there was no financial limit on it at that time. The sky was the limit. There was no dollar limitation. They could put the orders through, and we checked them through if the funds were available. The appropriations, of course, they had to be appropriated for before we could run out and buy them.

Q Did Arnold come out to Wright Field?

W Oh, a number of times, he came out there two or three times.

Q I have been told that Arnold always had a sort of negative attitude toward Wright Field, coming from his own experience. He was at Wright Field from '29 to '31, and he didn't have a happy tour there. He always seemed to be picking on Wright Field.

W I don't recall that getting down to my level at that time.

Q I guess maybe the procurement people. He always seemed to be asking for more than they could possibly produce.

Wq Well, there were 2 or 3 little scandals out there among procurement people that came to light later on. A lot of us, a number of us, suspected some of those things, but it was awfully hard to break into it. Do you remember Aaron Jones? He was a procurement officer out there. I went over to talk to Aaron one time about what was going on among those procurement people, some of the bribes and things they were--that some of them were taking. He got very mad, he said: "Don't you criticize my people. I trust them implicitly, and I don't want any criticism from you people." Well, it worked out about a year later, he found out what was happening, and he fell down on it.

Q Let's talk about Benny Meyers

W I've got a definite opinion. Benny was my boss out there, as a BG. I never particularly liked him, but he had a great deal of

ability along that procurement line, or the budget line. He was a graduate of the Harvard Business School up there--the Babson School of Finance--and he went back and he stayed on as an instructor up there, Roger Babson for a couple years after he completed the course.

Q I was told he was a marvelous man with figures?

W He was, very capable.

Q Somebody said he could add up a column of four figures simultaneously?

W Practically, He was very capable in that respect, but his fingers got a little too sticky. I think he was actually prosecuted as a result of something that was not his fault. They brought the woman into the case.

Q This Bleriot LaMarr

W Yes, Snow White, she became my secretary out there after Benny left. After he went to Washington, she was my secretary.

Q He was having a relationship with her, wasn't he?

W Well, trying to, but with frustration, I don't think she gave. That caused him to have sort of a nervous breakdown. But anyway, he had her behind frosted glass in his office out there. Lots of talk about what was going on behind the frosted glass. So when I took her over as my secretary, immediately the frosted glass became clear, so anybody could see what was going on.

Q There were several anonymous letters involving Benny Meyers, one of which was earlier in the war. He had put some plush carpeting a and plush furnishings in his office. There was some kind of investigation there for a time. They justified it on grounds that they needed to replace it or some such thing

W I don't think that was necessarily in his office, but it was in his quarters that he occupied at Patterson Field. He had some very fancy floorings and drapes.

Q And he drove fancy cars all the time?

W Oh, he always had Cadillacs

Q I know there were rumors about him, but what conclusion did they come to as to his source of income? It wasn't his Government income?

W I don't think so. I think that was perhaps a small portion of it. There is no question about it. He had some shenanigans going on with small contractors, one right in Dayton, making a small part for some Bell Aircraft airplane.

Q Is this Aviation Electric, or another?

W I think it was something Aviation Electric, in Dayton it was. LaMarr's husband was made manager of that plant. He sort of worked him in, to get in there. So as a sop to her, he made him the owner, manager of the plant. They were making a small item that cost a few dollars. For contracting, Bell got about $49 for this little item. That cost about $7 or $8, and it was excessive profit. He probably benefited from that to a wide extent. But he was very shrewd and he had money, and he was accused of profiteering on Liberty bonds at that time. He was smart. That's all. Those bonds were paying about 2%, and he could go to the bank at that time and borrow money at 1%, and immediately turn it over for 2%, and that's what he was doing. But you had to put in $100,000 or $200,000 before you could make a reasonable amount to worry about. Arnold loved him, though.

Q Arnold loved him - why?

W Well, because of his ability. I don't think he ever deceived Arnold. He was shrewd, though, and he advised him in financial matters, fiscal affairs. But I don't think he deceived him.

Q Didn't he mislead Arnold on a number of things?

W No, I don't think so, I think Arnold knew it. He wanted to present those figures to the President. In that respect, I think Arnold

knew that they weren't paying for more airplanes than they were getting. Let's put it that way. There was no hanky panky, financially, It was just a question of dating when the airplane was full, fit, and ready to fly.

Q That's correct. If the President asked how many B-29s can we get out in the next month? And Arnold goes to Meyers, and Meyers gives him a figure, and he goes to the President and said: "We can get out 100 next month." Well, actually, there are only 50 available, or that could be available. But they didn't tell the President that the other 50 were sitting on the line, or needed modification, or something. The question is, why did Arnold accept figures that he might have known were somewhat inflated?

W I think he was under pressure by the President

Q He bypassed Echols, didn't he? Didn't Arnold bypass Echols? Echols was Meyers' boss in Washington at that time.

W Yes, I imagine he did. I imagine he called Meyers up to his office directly. I knew that, but of course I was at Wright Patterson. I heard those things, and knew that Arnold was dealing directly with Meyers on these things. We knew the figures were not 100% accurate. We kept all the records right at Wright Field. We knew the status of every airplane on the production line, almost on a daily basis. We kept it on IBM machines. That was the biggest computer--IBM unit--in the country at that time. That was bigger than the Census Bureau. We had every one of them pegged.

Q The story that I get is that Powell, for one, did not want to play this game

W Maybe Jimmy Powell was then in Washington in G-4, I don't know. He may have been under Echols in that Dept somewhere.

Q This is early in the war? Does this register?

W Oh yes, it was early in the war. In 1944 I went to Washington, and was with Lee Miller then.

Mrs. W Meyers had a breakdown?

W Yes, Benny Meyers had a nervous breakdown, and that's why I was called to Washington. That's why I was called into Wright Patterson first, and then, to Washington. He had a breakdown in '45, no, no.

Mrs. W That was Lee Miller, and you were supposed to leave immediately

W I know but he had had his breakdown at Wright Patterson in 1942 as a result of LaMarr. What's her first name. But that was it, he had a nervous breakdown there. As I told you earlier, it was a matter of frustration. You know what I mean. He had his nervous breakdown while I was down at Command & Staff School down at Maxwell, They graduated me 3 weeks early and said: "Report immediately to Wright Patterson to take over Benny Meyers' job." Then, when he recovered several months later, he went to Washington.

Q Let me take you to 1945. Benny Meyers wanted Knudsen's job when Knudsen was going to leave to retire. He didn't get the job

W I didn't know that. I didn't know he wanted it.

Q He wanted the job. They had combined the Air Service Command with the Air Materiel Command, into the Air Technical Service Command, ATSC. Knudson wanted to get back to building automobiles. Benny Meyers wanted that job. He didn't get the job. Hugh Knerr reported back from Europe, and he got the job. This is June 1945. This just happened. It may be coincidence or it may not. This is precisely the time that an anonymous letter was written to the AAF, spilling the beans on Benny Meyrs. This is the letter that was sent to file. It was sent to file with "JES" initials on it--Jake Smart's initials.

W He had to initial, read the letter though. He hadn't written the letter

Q No, he had initialed it and sent it to the file. He was in the office, and somebody told me.

W I don't think he should have gotten credit for it. One of them was a mistake he made when they adjourned the court at noontime and

Benny went off with somebody, and had about 3 or 4 martinis, and it loosened his tongue, and he started shouting off or speeling off to some reporters whom he was with, about the woman in the case.

Q This is 1947

W Yes, when he was court martialed

Q He never was court martialed.

W He had some sort of a trial. A Congressional investigation. It was during that investigation that he brought the woman into the case, blamed her for his trials and tribulations, Well, that was a mistake, bringing the woman into the case, he was not chivalrous. The press went after him. I think, if you dig back into the newspaper records there, you will find how they jumped all over him for blaming the poor woman. He was telling the truth, I think, in that case. When they accused him of making money on Liberty bonds, there were many bankers who were doing the same thing, only on a much bigger scale than he was. So, in that respect, I think Benny improperly accused. But he was guilty of some of the other things, as far as the manipulation of contracts, and throwing contracts in certain directions.

Q In 1943, Arnold was getting a little bit worried about some of the rumors that were coming in about procurement people at Wright Field. He had Stratemeyer, then Chief of Air Staff, prepare a questionnaire about his stocks and bonds, and his financial holdings. Do you remember this?

W Yes, I had one. It was a blank as far as I was concerned. I remember that.

Q And Benny Meyers filled out his questionnaire, and he misstated the facts. He didn't tell about his holdings. During the Congressional investigation, he claimed that he put down the wrong information on the questionnaire with Arnold's knowledge and consent. Of course,

Arnold was very angry. Arnold was a very sick man, when he came to Washington, and he called Meyers the "one rotten apple in the barrel."

W Yes, I remember

Q This made Arnold heartsick because he was scrupulously honest throughout his life, and here this one man blackened the reputation of the whole AF.

Mrs W Heartbreaking

Q Let's talk a little about your budget experiences during the war, with Arnold. You came into Washington..?

W In 1944. We took a vacation. I thought I would come back and go to Europe. When I got back I found orders to the Pentagon.

Q So you were Budget Officer or Asst Budget Officer?

W Asst Budget Officer, at that time, under Lee Miller.

Q Then you saw Arnold in a lot of hot situations? Congressional things?

W Oh yes, up on the Hill, Congressional hearings. Lee Miller and I would usually accompany him up there. We'd have the answers for him when something stumped him. He knew pretty well what was in this budget though, when he went up there, and he knew the basis for it all. But statistics he left to Gen Miller and myself.

Q Did the Congressmen treat him with respect?

W Oh definitely yes, I don't think they ever had too...I'm just recalling now, trying to recall what happened in the Senate one day. There was a little incident that came up in the Senate. Well, it's not clear in my mind. I wouldn't even try to guess, but there was an incident that came up there, some of the oldtimers...

Q They jumped on him?

W Yes, there was an exchange of words. I don't know whether it was old Senator Hayden (Arizona) or not. Of course, he was pretty old even then. But it was one of the elder statesmen in the Senate at the time.

Q You don't remember what the issue was?

W No, I don't

Q It wasn't about money, dollars?

W Oh, undoubtedly it was about dollars, the appropriation.

Q Do you remember Arnold performing at Staff meetings?

W I didn't attend staff meetings, no.

Q Did Miller attend them?

W Miller would attend the staff meetings in Washington, with Gen Arnold. I was always Deputy Budget Officer while Arnold was in Washington.

Q Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and sending them on missions foreign to their expertise. Did you ever hear of that?

W No, I never heard of that.

Q Did you ever see Arnold in the hall, and did he recognize you?

W I don't recall, but I'm sure he knew who I was, because I appeared with him on hearings.

Q Did you ever have to brief him in his office?

Wq Oh yes, I had briefed him on budget matters.

Q You had to go through Suzy Adkins, his secretary?

W That's right, yes.

Q She passed away some years ago. She was sort of a weathervane?

W She could tell when he was in a good humor or not.

Q Several people have told me that they would call Suzy Adkins up, and say: "I have this difficult problem; is this a good day?"

W (laughter) Paegelow in the Lighter-than-Air Service. He had an English bulldog

Q Paegelow?

W That's right, and when that bulldog was 20 feet behind the Colonel, that was no time to approach him. But if the dog was right

up beside him, it was a good day. So that was sort of a weathervane too, but I never had occasion to call on Suzy Adkins to find out whether the time was right for approaching Arnold.

Q How about anybody else in his office? Eugene Beebe? Did you have dealings?

W I know Gene Beebe well

Q And also he had a brother-in-law there, Mrs. Arnold's brother, J. Henry Pool. Do you remember Hank Pool?

W Very faintly, he had a moustache?

Q Oh, that's Horace Shelmire

W Oh, that's right

Q He was an old school crony from Pennsylvania. Did you have any dealings with him?

W No, but I remember those people. This all happened in the Munitions Bldg. We didn't move into the Pentagon until 1944

Q 1943

W Late 1943 then. Are you sure of that? I thought I moved into the Pentagon from the Munitions Bldg in 1944

Q You didn't serve in the Muntions Bldg?

W Yes, I did

Q You came in in 1944

W Oh, I served there, before that, in '38

Q Yes, but I mean when you came back in 1944, you went right to the Pentagon? Did you not?

W I don't think so, no

Q Maybe the Budget was left over in Munitions?

W We were in there a short time, and I could almost walk into Gen Arnold's office, right now. Maybe that was going back before then though. Before I came into Washington at that time, I was back and forth in Washington probably every 2 or 3 weeks from Wright Patterson

Q Let's go back to the '38-'39 period. There were some big battles over the B-17. Gen Andrews and Knerr, his Exec--his Chief of Staff--were pushing very hard for B-17s. Some have felt that Arnold had become an organization man. He had sort of been burned by his Billy Mitchell experience, and he was more mellow about fighting the Establishment. This was 1938-39. Do you have any recollections of Arnold, especially in terms of dollars. They wanted, Andrews wanted more money for the GHQ AF, and for heavy bombers, and Arnold did not fight as hard for that as they did.

W Well, I think he had a balance to strike for the Air Corps, and heavy bombers were beginning to cost money then, quite a bit of money. I think the number of B-17s that they would have wanted would have probably taken the entire AF appropriation, or their share of it. So Arnold would have to temper the situation, and obviously Andrews and Knerr wanted more than they could get.

Q This is part of the gripe that Arnold didn't try harder for more money. Is that a fair statement?

W No, I don't think so, I think he appeared before the Congress and tried to get as much as he could for the AF

Q Did you ever hear him talk about a separate AF?

W Well there was talk before that about this.

Q Well, Marshall took the position that you can have your separate AF after the war. Arnold was willing to wait. Some others weren't. Some others were pushing very hard, like Knerr, he was pushing.

W Knerr, oh yes, Knerr was strong for a separate AF

Q Knerr helped write a couple books on the side, the William Bradford Huie books, The Case Against The Admirals, and We Fight for Airpower. Knerr left the service for a while, and then came back. There were some who didn't want him back. He almost got court martialed for a while, because he was a strong partisan for separate AF.

W I was sort...

Q A middle rank?

W That's right. That element, my element, and then you get down in "Buster" Briggs' element. Buster and I, incidentally, took flying training together in 1931. I happened to be the senior officer in the flight class at that time, and I led the graduation parade. Buster was my left wing man, and Otto Winnecke was my other wing. We were all LTs. I was a 1st LT and they were 2nd LTs.

Q Were you in balloons?

W Dirigibles, yes, I was four years in lighter-than-air.

Q Westover came up that route

W That's right. He was one of the early balloon pilots. Jimmy Powell was a balloon pilot too, airship pilot. Bill Kepner, have you talked to him yet?

Q Yes, I have

W He's over at Orlando

Q He succeeded Monk Hunter out in the 8th Fighter Command

W We had this Aircraft Plant operating in the southern part of India

Q Is this after the war ended

W No, it wasn't over yet, it was in June 1945. They sent back to the US to have somebody come over to survey the situation and see whether they should keep that plant, Stanley Aircraft Plant, open down at Bangalore, southern part of India, very nice summer resort in India. So Lee Miller told me. He wanted to know if I wanted to go there. And I said: "Sure, I'll go there." So he said: "All right, write your own orders." So I wrote my own orders, and had a few stopovers on the way and got over there. Down at Bangalore, they had a regular AAF post down there. I looked the situation over. While I was there, Tom Hanley came down. He was the AAF commander up at Calcutta at the jute mill up there, and Gen Wheeler was the CBI Commander. I was a

Colonel then. I was sent out from Washington. Well, they had to have a lunch one noon down at the officers' club with Wheeler, and Tom Hanley, and a couple of Australian brigadiers.

Q Tom Hanley had come out of Arnold's office? He was sort of a deputy to Arnold?

W Yes, he had been. Anyway, we had lunch there, got the conversation going and we were talking about the war, and how long it was going to last. Well, I had the intemperance to spout off early, and I said: "Well, gentlemen, I don't think this war is going to last very much longer. I think it will be over within 3 weeks." I was just making a guess, but I knew the B-29s were just bombing the hell out of Japan, and they couldn't stand much more of it. They were just burning all over the place.

Q You didn't have any knowledge of that secret weapon?

W No, no. But Gen Wheeler, he looked down at me, and he said; "That's the way with you young squirts coming out here from the Pentagon, and telling us how this war is going to be fought, and when it's going to be over. We're dug in over here. We're going to fight this war for the next two years, and don't you let anybody tell you we're not." Well, I just sunk down in my chair. I didn't say another word. When he got back to the US, he came running up to the Pentagon and my office, and said: "Ed, why in the hell didn't you tell us that the atomic bomb was going to drop?" He thought I knew all about it, because it was over.

Q Hap Arnold had what some have described as a perennial smile on his face. He had this built-in smile, but if you took it for pleasure, you could be mistaken. Is this correct?

W I think that's right. He always had a happy look on his face. That's why they called him "Hap", of course. But behind it he could be pretty severe once in a while.

Q Did you ever see him explode?

W About as near an explosion as I can recall is when I showed him my issue watch in his office one day.

Q That was around '38 or '39?

W Yes, early days

Q But when you were Asst Budget Officer to Lee Miller. There must have been some tense moments?

W I don't know, they were tense, but understandable. I don't think he ever blew up. He ahd a great deal of respect for Lee Miller, and our Budget organization. I don't recall any instances where he was the least bit antagonistic in that way.

Q Did you get involved in the Truman Committee investigations? The watch dog committee?

W No

Q They moseyed around the Lackland plant, and several other investigations?

W No, I was never involved in that. I was involved in one little incident which might be of interest. You've heard of the B-35 airplane, the batwing, the big one. Well, we contracted for a service contract for 13 of those airplanes.

Q During the war?

W No, before the war, this was along about 1938 or '39, sometime along there. We contracted for them, and they were delivered very slowly. The contractor was very slow in delivering. By the time they had received 6 of them, they knew they weren't ever going to use them, that they had outlived their design usefulness, that they had thought they were going to be useful for. But, all of a sudden, the service contract, the change order contract, came through on the seven remaining, that were still on the production line for $14 million. That was a lot of money in those days. And I, as Budget Officer at the time, objected

to the contract. Here these airplanes weren't going to be flown. They were never going to be flown in service. Why spend $14 million more getting the last 7 of them out on the production line, at least, and out on the field, only to fly them off to the graveyard? Well, it was a logical argument. No one argued that they were going to be used for anything. But it was the same early story of Lockheed, then. If they hadn't given them that $14 million, Lockheed would have faced serious financial difficulties at that time, and I was told from the topside to let that contract go through, assign money to that.

Q Like Arnold or Giles?

W Yes, somebody from up there. I think Arnold directed this It was the B-35 which was never flown. They flew them from the Lockheed plant to the graveyard at Tucson, Davis Monthan AFB. They are still out there. Never one of them was flown, but they put that $14 million on it, just to keep Lockheed going then.

Q Things haven't changed very much?

W No, they haven't

Q The B-49, the wingless plane, came after the war. Remember the B-49? Did it use the knowhow of the B-35?

W I don't recall that there was any connection. I never knew much about that B-49. Don't know whether that was after I retired or not.

Q That was around Symington's period. You were still around

W I must have been

Q That was one of the planes they had on the board

W I left the Pentagon in 1949, before Symington did, and that must have come up after that

Q Let me ask this. Were you involved in the B-36? The B-36 was authorized in 1941, right before Pearl Harbor. Consolidated lagged too in putting those in.

W They were way behind. I remember the contract, but I don't remember the circumstances, of course. They put them through an expedited production.

A At the time they were authorized because there was the thought that we might have to bomb Germany from the Western Hemisphere. They had to fly 3,000 miles, drop bombs, and fly back. England was under great pressure, and potentially, under invasion

W That's exactly the situation they are facing now. We're going to have to use the B-52s for that purpose, maybe. That's their only justification, now, for the long distance bombing. Rather amusing for myself. When I was handed 2-1/2 million dollars, $2,600,000 worth of negotiable bonds, I was told: "Here, you take these, and keep them until we decide what we are going to do with them."

Q Who handed them to you?

W The money came in from all of the deactivated clubs and messes, all over the US and foreign countries at that time. When they were getting out of war and deactivating bases, they all had clubs, and all these clubs had large sums of money on hand.

Q They all had slot machines?

W Well, yes, they had plenty of resources. But they weren't going to hand it back to the ones that were there at the time, because they weren't the ones that developed those funds

Q You had $2.6 million?

W $2.6, I put it down in the Riggs National Bank in a safe deposit vault down there. I didn't know what they were going to do with it.

Q Did Arnold know you had the money?

W He must have known, but Lee Miller turned it over to me, and said: "Here, put it in the bank. Put it somewhere. We don't know what we are going to do with it." So I had it down there and it was in the

bank, in Riggs National, oh, I would say for about a year. Then, they decided to establish the Arnold Aid Society, which is in existence now

Q The AF Aid Society.

W Yes, the AF Aid Society, but the Arnold Educational Foundation. That's what that money was for and I kept that in the bank down there, wondering what in the world. No one ever checked on it. To this date, they don't know whether I might have slipped two or three of them off in my own account somewhere. But I always was amused at that, no one checked on me on that money.

Q What about postwar?

W Vandenberg was not, he didn't think he was himself qualified to be Chief of Staff of the AF

Q I've been told this on tape, and you are not going to be quoted. I'm not going, you are not going to be put on a stand and told: "You said thus and such." Nobody is going to hold you responsible.

Mrs. W I admired Mrs. Arnold as the Chief's wife, because she was so very gracious, and you wanted to help her. She appreciated your efforts, too.

Q She had a memory for names, did she?

Mrs. W Well, one day when I was junior officer's wife in Washington, we were working for the Red Cross in the basement of the Bolling Field Club. It was a very icy, rainy day. When I did finally skid into a parking place outside the club, and went downstairs, Mrs. Arnold was there. There were very few girls who had come, and she looked up and called me by my first name. And from then on, I was married to her, and I've loved her always, and admired her more than any other Chief's wife.

Q She was a very gracious lady. People who served under Arnold at various posts, like March Field, remember her with affection.

Mrs. W Great

Q Right, and Don Darrow told me that when she first met him she associated his face with his name, and she never forgot it. She called him something, a nickname.

W. Sutton, Lyman 9 Dec 70

1. Carleton FA - 1921 - Brig?
2. Any time in early 1930's
3. 1939 - Field Service Section - OC AC
4. Asst to ASC - Tony Frank? 1941
5. HQ AF in war - Director of Base Services
6. Cairo Conf 1943
7. Jun 1944 - Logist. support of 20 AF
8. Turrets?

1. Benny M.
2. Jan Howard

Love
9 Dec 70

done
9 Dec 70

EM 2-0826

September 18, 1970

1030 Army Navy Club

M/Gen Lyman P. Whitten, USAF(Ret)
4319 Cathedral Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Dear General Whitten:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name coming up in several contexts, serving in Hq. Air Corps in 1939 when General Arnold first took over. You were also involved in turret procurement which was a big pain.

In any event you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of some of them at a time and place convenient for you. Local phone OX5-3862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Hassle with Saville 1945 control of units in France

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL LYMAN P. WHITTEN, USAF

Lyman P. Whitten was born in Malden, Massachusetts, March 25, 1897. He was attending Massachusetts Institute of Technology when he enlisted as an aviation cadet in the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps on November 3, 1917. The following February he was graduated from the U.S. School of Military Aeronautics at Princeton University, and sent to Taliaferro Field, Fort Worth, Texas, for primary flying instruction.

Upon completion of his flying training, General Whitten entered the School of Aerial Gunnery at Taliaferro Field and was a member of the first class to graduate. On May 23, 1918 he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Aviation Section of the Signal Reserve Corps and rated a reserve military aviator. He then served for a short time at Camp Dick, Texas, and took advanced flying training at Ellington Field, Texas. After completing the course in November 1918, he acted as graduate Bombing Pilot at that station until honorably discharged the following January.

General Whitten then returned to Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from which he was graduated in 1921. In November of that year he was appointed a second lieutenant of Air Service in the Regular Army and immediately promoted to first lieutenant. A month later he reported for duty and pilot training at the Air Service pilots school at Carlstrom Field, Florida. In April 1922 he was transferred to the Advanced Bombardment School at Kelly Field, Texas. Upon completing the course the following August, he joined the 42nd Squadron at Kelly Field where he served as flying instructor and squadron engineering, communications and operations officer.

In September 1923 General Whitten was detailed to Massachusetts Institute of Technology for graduate study. He completed the course in October 1924 and was assigned to McCook Field, Ohio, where he served in the Materials Laboratory and as secretary of the Engineering School. In February 1926, accompanied by a civilian navigator, Bradley Jones, to test navigation instruments under development, he established a non-stop record from Dayton to Boston in a specially built "long-range" DH-4 airplane.

General Whitten went to Luke Field, Hawaii, in June 1926 for duty with the 19th Pursuit Squadron. He was transferred to the 65th Service Squadron at that station and later served as assistant engineering officer and chief inspector of the Hawaiian Air Depot. In February 1928 he was transferred to Fort Armstrong, Hawaii, where he became commanding officer of the Air Service Detachment and chief inspector of the Air Section of the Hawaiian General Depot.

In June 1929 General Whitten was assigned to the Office, Chief of Air Corps, at Washington, D.C. for service in the newly-established Inspection Division. In July 1933, he entered the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, was graduated the following June. He then was assigned to Wright Field, Ohio, with the Maintenance Branch of the Field Service Section. He entered the Command and General Staff

MORE

School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in August 1936, completed the course the following June, and returned to his duties at Wright Field. There he helped organize and establish the First Transport Group, of which he was commanding officer of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron. In April 1939 he was transferred to the Office, Chief of Air Corps as chief of the Field Service Section. He was named assistant to the commanding general of Air Service Command in November 1941 and the following March became director of Base Services at Air Force headquarters. In August 1943, he became Air Force member of the Joint Logistic Committee and Combined Administrative Committee, an agency of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Three months later he attended the Cairo Conference of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, following which he visited the China-Burma-India, Mediterranean and European theaters in connection with logistical problems and organization. In June 1944 he headed a group of officers to determine the feasibility of logistical support by air transport of planned operations of the 20th Air Force against Japan.

In July 1944 General Whitten was assigned to headquarters in North Africa and then became commanding general of the Air Force Service Command in the Mediterranean Theater. In August 1945 he was transferred to Germany and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters, United States forces, European theater. In March 1946 he was assigned to Air Force Headquarters as deputy assistant chief of staff for materiel.

In October 1947 after the establishment of USAF headquarters, General Whitten was named Director of Maintenance, Supply and Services in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel. In April 1948 he was assigned to the office of the Secretary of Defense for temporary duty. In July 1949 he became commanding general of the Newfoundland Base Command at Fort Pepperell, Newfoundland. On October 1, 1950 that Command was inactivated and he was appointed commander-in-chief of the U.S. Northeast Command with headquarters at Fort Pepperell with additional duties as commanding general.

In February 1952 General Whitten was named commanding general of the Middletown Air Materiel Area with station at Olmsted Air Force Base, Pennsylvania.

General Whitten has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster and the Bronze Star Medal.

His foreign decorations include the Italian Order of Sts. Maurizio and Lazarro, the French Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre with Palm and the Polish Order of Virtuti Militari, III Class.

He is rated a command pilot, combat observer and aircraft observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to captain (permanent) August 1, 1935; to major (temporary) January 18, 1940; to major (perm) July 1, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (temp) July 22, 1941; to colonel (temp) March 1, 1942; to brigadier general (temp) December 11, 1942; to lieutenant colonel (perm) November 1, 1944; to brigadier general (perm) February 19, 1948, with date of rank from December 11, 1942; to major general (temp) February 19, 1948; to major general (perm) June 11, 1948, with date of rank from March 1, 1944. E N D

Up to date as of 14 February 1942. -2-

Interview - MG Lyman Whitten, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1970

Q: Do you recall the first time you met Arnold?

W: I can't recall exactly the first time I met him, no. But, as you probably know, I was in the Munitions Building in 1939, having been ordered in there from the Field Service Section out at Wright Field, which was primarily responsible for the maintenance and supply activities.

Q: You know,he had this job ten years before, the Field Service Section. He was out in Dayton from 1929 to 1931. Did you know that?

W: No, I did not know that. He didn't have the Field Service Section.

Q: Well, he was, it was called Field Service Section I believe. It was Fairfield Air Depot, he was in charge of that end of it. This was in 1929-31.

W: I was at that time in the newly established Inspection Division in the Munitions Building, coming there from Hawaii, and I'm amazed that I don't recall that Arnold had the Field Service Section at that time. In fact, I thought that Gen Knerr had the Field Service Section.

Q: This is like in '29?

W: Yes. The Inspection Division was organized, about that time. Major Martin, later General Martin, was at that time, the Chief. Fred Martin, he was Chief of the Inspection Division. I was in there with him in 1929-33.

Q: Out at Wright Patt?

W: No, right here in the Munitions Building, Hqs., Air Corps.

Q: And you had no dealings with Arnold when he was at the Fairfield Air Depot?

W: Not directly, no. In fact, I had forgotten that he was there at that time.

Q: When you came to the Chief of Air Corps in 1939, Arnold had just taken

the job as Chief of Air Corps.

W: That's right.

Q: A few months before he had become Chief when Westover was killed. Did you have any direct contact with him?

W: Yes, I had quite a bit of direct contact, soon after that, because we had sold a lot of P-40s to the British, which they were using in Egypt, and on the desert. They were having tremendous amount of problems with them, particularly with the engines, because of the sand and dust out there. A LT Perrin was out there, Eddie Perrin, liaison with the Air Corps, to assist the British in the maintenance of these aircraft. They soon had a lot of them grounded. Arnold, of course, was getting reports of these aircraft that were grounded, and the screams of the RAF for us to do something about it. I recall very vividly that very soon after that, I was directed, told by General Arnold that he was going to hold me personally responsible for the aircraft over there in Egypt being flown by the RAF, which was a pretty long way off for me to have any responsibility on it.

Q: Was he unreasonable?

W: Well, to that extent, it was unreasonable to say that I was being held personally responsible, I mean, for the flying of the aircraft in Egypt. However, his point was that it was up to us, the Air Corps, to find the spare engines and spare parts, and ship them over there to the British in Egypt so as to keep those airplanes flying. So he told me and said - I had to report to him every morning at 8:00 in his office and give him a report as to the number of airplanes reported out-of-commission, and what we were doing about it to get them back into flying commission. And, of course, the only thing I could do, being in the Chief's office, was to relay the information to Dayton to the Field Service Section to do all they

could to get these parts over there. Of course, since they were initially purchased by the British, and we, at that time, hadn't yet gotten into production to any great extent for our own, it was a pretty difficult proposition.

Q: Do you remember an incident that happened early in 1939? This Frenchman was in an airplane that crashed in the parking lot in Santa Monica. Arnold was put on the hot seat by Morgenthau?

W: No, I don't recall that.

Q: It was a prototype of the Douglas light bomber. This was a few months before you came on duty in the Office, Chief of Air Corps. This happened, I believe, in January 1939.

W: I was out at Dayton.

Q: You don't remember this?

W: No, I don't recall.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of his relationship with Morgenthau?

W: No, I do not, that was way up on high.

Q: What was your rank there, Major or LTCOL?

W: Major.

Q: What were some of the other problems or issues on which you had to deal with Arnold?

W: That was the first one at that time, I mean the outstanding one.

Q: Status of the planes on the desert of the British?

W: The fact that flying in the desert with those aircraft resulted in many, many airplanes grounded because of the sand getting in the engines. We had a terrific job in trying to replace the necessary parts and also get the technical information to them, as to what to do about it. The other particular incident I

remember is the attack aircraft that had been sent to Gen Kenney and General MacArthur. No, I think Gen Brett must have been there in Australia.

Q: You are talking right at the start of WWII?

W: After Pearl Harbor, and they had come out of the Philippines and gone to Australia, and then we were starting to equip our forces over there, and we had shipped attack type aircraft, I guess it was the A-20, probably. The aircraft were getting over there. They had them set up and were flying them. But for battle purposes they were not very effective because they could not fire their armament. There was just one part missing in the actuating mechanism of the firing mechanism of the guns which they could not find in the parts and supplies that had been shipped over there to them. That resulted, of course, in many hard exchanges of communications back and forth. There again, I was jumped on by Arnold to get that thing corrected, and do it right now. Even if I had to find them myself and take them over there in my pocket or my suitcase to get them over there.

Q: Did he tell you this?

W: Yes, something to that effect. So we said we'd tried to collect the necessary parts at the Field Service Section out at Dayton, and they were being shipped to them by air and they were shipped to them around the world by boat, and several different sets of them in order to get them to them as fast as we could.

Q: What were these parts?

W: I can't remember the particular item, but it had something to do with the armament, the firing of the guns. The old story about the lack of a nail, the Kingdom was lost. This was just one particular part that they could not locate amongst the supplies. So we had to send them several more sets. It seems as though every time we shipped them something, they would get lost. We continued

to follow up.

Q: Arnold did not delegate these things, he looked after them himself? Did he have someone else to see that these parts were taken care of?

W: Of course, he was very much involved in these individual things of that nature, because that meant the grounding of the aircraft. That was a very serious thing. I think he was justified in getting into it, putting his personal weight behind it to get something done about it.

Q: Was he a very persuasive man?

W: He was not so persuasive as he was domineering.

Q: Did he strike fear in the staff?

W: He had that tendency, yes.

Q: Did you dread that 8:00 briefing?

W: No, I didn't actually dread it, it was just I never knew what to expect in the way of his holding me responsible, naturally. But I realized that it was, he was trying to get a job done, and all I could do was the best I could. I thought it was a little absurd, but I didn't particularly dread it after the first few times.

Q: This was his way of getting things done.

W: That's right, I'm sure many people have told you that the common understanding around the headquarters there was that if you were walking down the hall and ran into Gen Arnold, if he had something on his mind that he wanted done, he would grab you by the shoulder and tell you to get it done, and it might be completely foreign to what you had to do, or what your responsibilities were. It could be almost anything. People, after that, it became common knowledge that which he did on many occasions, so I was told - it never happened to me, but people I think, if you saw him coming down the hall, try to avoid him, because you never

knew what he had on his mind, what he might direct you to do.

Q: Duck in the men's room?

W: Duck in the men's room or something to get out of the way, because as I say, he would grab the first person he saw and tell them to get something done about it.

Q: As I try to understand his personality, this problem of the part for the guns was one of maybe 30 or 40 problems he was trying to bounce simultaneously.

W: That's right.

Q: If he could delegate to somebody he had trust in, one of these problems, he had one fewer ball to bounce in the air. Did he ever buttonhole you or grab you by the elbow and say: "Do this," and this was foreign to your expertise?

W: No, it never happened to me, that I recall.

Q: Do you recall it happening to any other people, specifically?

W: Only by hearsay and I wouldn't be able at this time to say specifically what it was, or who it was, but it was general knowledge. That was a common expression around there.

Q: Was he very perceptive in these 8:00 briefings to this degree. I've given briefings myself and try to put the best picture, or present the best picture of it. If there were some negative aspects, you sort of leave them in the background. This is a natural tendency. Was he perceptive enough to put his finger on those negative aspects and pin you down?

W: No, I wouldn't be able to put it in that light, because I don't recall that in these cases - it was just a matter of presenting the facts to him - getting reports as to how many aircraft were grounded, and what had been done to get them ungrounded. So this was just a matter of factual presentation. I think that he would be unreasonable in what he expected to be accomplished,

under the circumstances existing. But there again, I suppose considering his position and his nature, it was merely his way of putting the pressure on to get the thing corrected even though he may, in his own mind, realize that he was demanding the impossible.

Q: He was trying to get you to produce 110%.

W: Yes, or more.

Q: At the time you may have not appreciated it, but if you look back at it you have a better picture.

W: As I look back, I realize that was the point. That was what he was trying to do.

Q: Did he ever give you an unreasonable requirement or request? This one incident that you cite, he asked you to deliver it yourself if necessary?

W: In a sense, those things were unreasonable, yes.

Q: In one of the discussions, I can't recall specifically what it was, but the question of turrets, the difficulty with the turrets came up. Do you recall?

W: What aircraft,do you remember?

Q: For the bombers, were you involved in that? The B-17s?

W: Yes, but I think that was more of a procurement problem, and a design in procurement which was more in the bailiwick of some of the other people rather than myself, such as Gen Chidlaw or some of those people. They were on the procurement side. So I just remember there was a lot of difficulties over the turrets, but I don't recall that I was particularly involved, other than just the usual supply problems and maintenance problems.

Q: You were assistant to Tony Frank for awhile in ASC, the Air Service Command?

W: Yes. Not so much Tony Frank as to Henry Miller.

Q: Is he the guy that got in trouble later on?

W: Yes. Henry Miller had the Air Service Command and he had his hqs. here in one of these temporary buildings that are now torn down, and I was in there as one of his assistants.

Q: I think Hugh Knerr took his place in Europe as the Deputy for Administration and Logistics.

W: That could be so, I'm not sure about that. I didn't think they had that same job, but maybe they did.

Q: Wasn't he in Europe for awhile?

W: Yes, Miller? Yes. He went over there from here, and had the Service Command, I think, I'm not sure. I can't recall which one it was.

Q: Didn't Knerr take his place? In effect, they changed the job somewhat. But Knerr became Deputy to Spaatz.

W: Knerr became Deputy for Services, Logistics with Gen Spaatz, but I do not recall Henry Miller had that particular assignment before that. He was over there, but I don't remember the specific job.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Knerr?

W: Yes, quite a few. From time to time. He had the Field Service Section out at Dayton, he's the one I recall at the Field Service, Dayton. He was responsible for my coming here for assignment to duty in the Field Service Section after I graduated from the Tactical School in 1934 at Maxwell. I had hoped to get with a combat unit, which I hadn't been in for some time, and I figured it was my last chance, and Knerr had me assigned back to Wright Field, in the Field Services Section.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that Alaskan flight? Knerr helped plan

that flight in 1934.

W: No, I was in Tactical School.

Q: Knerr was not a fan of Arnold's; he was a fan of Andrews.

W: Well, I think that would apply to a majority of the people.

Q: They were fans of Andrews?

W: Oh yes, I think everyone loved Gen Andrews and felt that he was a terrifically well-qualified invididual as a wonderful leader. I think everyone was heartbroken when he was killed, because I think they thought he would have been the leader for the AF.

Q: Were you aware that there was a movement right around the time of Pearl Harbor to supplant Arnold as Chief of the AAF, and put Andrews in?

W: No, I wasn't in on anything like that.

Q: Knerr was in that.

W: No, that particular thing I do not recall hearing. I do recall one thing that I have always held against Gen Arnold, and maybe unjustly so, was his success in banishing Gen Brett to the far corners of the world where Gen Brett would be out of the picture as far as taking an important responsible position.

Q: When he came back from the Far East he went to the Caribbean and he was in a sense, banished, yes.

W: Yes, the general feeling was that when Gen Brett was, I think he was sent over to Egypt or around-the-world trip, something like this.

Q: He was in Egypt and he ended up in the Far East.

W: It successfully kept him out of the picture here in this country, and we all, I know all my associates felt that very, very unreasonable, unfair, thing to do, and of course, I suppose it was politics.

Q: Well, I don't know how much of it was Arnold's doing. Much of it was MacArthur's doing. Brett and MacArthur had a knockdown, dragout fight.

W: That was later, was it not?

Q: No, it was, Brett was sent overseas just before Pearl Harbor to survey AF equipment, to see how it performed in Egypt. He was in the Middle East for awhile, and then he went to the Far East. He was out in the Far East when war broke out, as far as we were concerned, Pearl Harbor. He became the senior AF officer in Australia. This is in '42. He and MacArthur did not see things the same way, and there was a big battle between them, and MacArthur fired him out of there. This is when Kenney came out and he was sent back to the States and that was pretty much the end of his career. So was it Arnold?

W: I think it was Arnold starting it by sending him on this inspection trip because that got him out of there. That got him out of Washington, where the decisions were being made as to who was going to get what job, I suppose, and I think the general feeling was amongst my contemporaries, was that that was a very, well....

Q: You mean for political reasons? Was he a rival to Arnold, you mean?

W: Yes, I would think he would be, yes.

Q: I have been told by several people who don't like Arnold that Arnold got all his rivals out of Washington, like Emmons, another rival.

W: I think that's so.

Q: Do you remember that Emmons got his third star before Arnold did?

W: I can't recall that, no.

Q: He was a rival for the top job, so was Andrews. But actually, Brett was junior to Arnold, I don't know if he was so much of a threat.

W: I don't recall the relative position, the relative rank, except Gen Brett

was here in Washington at that time.

Q: Brett had the No. 2 job.

W: So Arnold sent him out on this inspection trip to the other side of the world. It was out of the way, and as far as being in contact with General Marshall, the White House, or whoever else might be making decisions.

Q: I don't want to necessarily defend Arnold in this situation, but a lot of people wanted to get out of Washington. They wanted to get into a combat situation. And it seems to me that Brett had a very positive opportunity. He was sent to, when Arnold was moved up in early 1941, to become Chief of the AAF, Brett became Chief of the Air Corps. This was sort of the supply, training and logistics, administrative, whereas, Emmons was head of the GHQ AF, and it was called the AF Combat Command. This is in 1941. Now Brett's overseas, and he ends up in the Far East, and here he is, the top AF Commander in the Far East, which is a job which many people would prefer to sitting in Washington. But he stubbed his toe, at least he stubbed his toe as far as MacArthur was concerned.

W: You have a different angle on it.

Q: You can't blame Arnold, you see, Brett could have gotten the job that Kenney ultimately got, but he didn't get along with MacArthur. There were some who say that Brett saw himself as the senior Army officer out there. And that he was going to supersede MacArthur. MacArthur wasn't going to allow anybody to supersede him.

W: That's another angle which I'm not familiar with.

Q: But many people in Washington would have been hungry for a job like he had, because he was a top combat commander. But he didn't cut the mustard as far as MacArthur was concerned. So he was sent back. Once he was sent back, he was

discredited and then, well, they just gave him a job in the Caribbean. You are right, he was put on the shelf. But I don't think in that particular case you can blame Arnold.

W: No, I'm not blaming Arnold for that aspect of it, because I don't know that background that you bring up. The only point I was making was, the general feeling was that Brett was here in Washington, and in line for one of the key positions here in Washington, and he was sent on a trip, inspection trip just to get him out of Washington, get him out of the way. That is the feeling that my contemporaries had.

Q: At the time?

W: Yes. I'm not saying my position was the correct one. I'm just saying that was what our feeling was.

Q: This was gossip. But actually there are two ways of looking at it. Some people would say, well, this is a great opportunity to get out of Washington. Since Brett was the No. 2 man in the AF at the time, this chance to get a combat command was...

W: It wasn't really a chance for a combat command, just an inspection trip, to see how the airplanes were being maintained by the British.

Q: But it ended up as a combat command.

W: Yes, but when he was sent out, they didn't know that.

Q: But he could have....

W: As you say, the war had not yet started.

Q: No, right, the war had not yet started when he started out, but he could have used the opportunity to become a great combat commander. But for some reason, he and MacArthur did not get along, MacArthur had more political weight than he did.

Q: You were at the Cairo Conference, did you have any dealings with Arnold at the Cairo Conference?

W: Only in a sense, not directly, usually, but I sat in on all the meetings of the Chiefs, and I was the AF member of the Joint Logistics Committee and the Combined Logistics Committee with the British. I was the AF man on that, and Gen Knudsen was the Army. Of course, I was in on all the logistical studies and work for those programs.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Knudsen and Arnold?

W: Just general, I mean I had no personal contact with them.

Q: Knudsen was a great production man, but what kind of a job did he do as a three-star Army general? Did he do the job?

W: I would not be in a position to pass an opinion on that. As far as I know, he did.

Q: You were involved in planning the logistic support for the 20th AF for the B-29s. Did you have any dealings with Arnold in that work? Did you have to brief him?

W: I don't recall any particular personal contact with him on that. I took a team, I headed up a team. We went over to Hawaii and we went over to Johnston Island and Eniwebok. We studied the feasibility of supplying the 20th AF by air transport instead of by boat, but I don't recall any personal contacts with General Arnold on that, just, except that he had directed that we do everything we can to support them and make sure that we got material to them as promptly as possible.

Q: Did Arnold ever get mad at you? You mention this one situation - the parts for the guns. Do you remember any specific instances where he jumped on you for something? Right or wrong?

W: Amazingly, no, I cannot recall anything other than these times I've mentioned, which I have reported to his office, and in which, of course, at that time he would let me know in no uncertain terms what he expected to be done.

Q: Did he remember things? If he jumped on you for something last week and you saw him again, did he remind you that he had mentioned this last week, or that he felt you hadn't done it, or should have done better?

W: No, I don't recall that he did. I think he would have remembered, but I don't recall in that particular way.

Q: Let me put it another way, did he harbor a grudge?

W: Insofar as I, myself, am concerned, I couldn't say that he did. But from general hearsay and observation, I would say that he did. That was the general opinion.

Q: Was there a general opinion along this line that there were some people he favored and some people who could do no right?

W: Yes, and I think George Goddard was a good example of that.

Q: What do you recall about the George Goddard-Arnold situation? Do you have any knowledge of that?

W: Only as to what happened to George Goddard. We all thought he was one of the most capable and foremost man of photography, and that he was suddenly bounced out of his job, and this Kaye was put in, who was nowhere near as well qualified, and I think everybody thought that was a terrible thing. Not only from the point of view individually as George was concerned, but as far as the AF itself was concerned. I think the AF suffered very severely from that.

Q: Did they attribute this decision by Arnold to personal reasons, in the sense that Minton Kaye was close to him?

W: I think most everybody did, yes. Because he had been misled by Kaye.

Q: Why was Kaye so influential with him?

W: I have no idea; I don't know.

W: ...that's where I think he made a terrible blunder.

Q: When he took Goddard out of Washington?

W: Yes, he said he is not to have anything to do whatsoever with photography!

Q: Were you in on that decision, or I mean, did you know about it.

W: Oh yes, everybody was bitter about it. Everybody felt very bitter about it because they recognized George Goddard's talent as well as his idiosyncrasies, and to take him out of photography during the war, when we needed idea men like him was really a very shortsighted thing to do.

Q: Minton Kaye got his comeuppance. He was pushed out to the CBI before the end of the war, and Goddard was ultimately recognized.

W: Yes, he finally was.

Q: The genius he was. Of course, he doesn't credit that to Arnold, credits that to others, like Lovett.

W: Fortunately, Elliott Roosevelt finally recognized him also.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Elliott Roosevelt and Arnold?

W: No, not personal.

Q: How about Lovett and Arnold? Do you know anything about their relationship?

W: No, I would not be able to say that I did, just as a distant observer.

Q: How about Benny Meyers? You had some dealings with Benny Meyers?

W: Well, I had quite a few dealings with Benny Meyers.

Q: What was your impression of him?

W: My impression of him was that he was a very capable individual, and in spite of his many serious shortcomings and faults, and as to the things that he did to advance his own personal cause, I think that Hap recognized that he did do a lot for the AF, as well as doing a lot to hurt the AF.

Q: What did he do to hurt the AF? I'm talking about during the war. You didn't know of his hanky-panky did you, or did you?

W: Not specifically, until it came out, no. But I think that everybody felt that he was a ruthless individual who would cut anybody's throat or stab them in the back in order to advance his own interests.

Q: Did you know that he had a close relationship with Arnold during the war?

W: Oh yes, oh sure, he had a close relationship with every commander, under whom he served. That was one of his attributes.

Q: Why do you think Arnold reposed such high confidence in him?

W: I think everybody wonders why. And I think because Arnold did, that everybody else was very hesitant to bring up, or to point out anything which they felt things were being done wrong, because they felt they would not get anywhere.

Q: You were in the logistics area - can you recall any specific case or instance of where Benny Meyers shaded the truth, or shaded integrity to gain a personal end? I mean, you are talking of generalities.

W: I'm talking about generalities and I would not be able to say specifically. I would say that the general impression was with all the things he had, the reports of aircraft production, and that sort of thing, he always made it look pretty good. He was in a position to make his forecast come true by directing that certain things be done to improve the situation which might be

to a disadvantage of something else. But I could not say, specifically, that is just a general feeling we had about him, that he was a manipulator.

Q: A number of people have told me when Arnold asked him for numbers of planes on hand, he would count numbers off tail sections, which were still on the assembly lines, and represent these to be completed planes.

W: That was the general, yes, I've heard that too. I think that's what I meant by saying he would make that statement and then to prevent being actually caught in a lie, or caught short, he then perhaps would issue directives to the factories that things would be speeded up and pushed out regardless of whether or not they were really in a finished condition.

Q: But ultimately wouldn't he get caught? Arnold was a perceptive man was he not? Wouldn't he caught a lie?

W: Well, he was too clever. He would find, he was able to get around that. I don't know, I would think Arnold would, but he apparently didn't.

Q: Do you think Arnold knowingly accepted inflated figures?

W: I can't say as to that.

Q: The President was always pressing Arnold on the B-29s, this one case where the President was pushing the B-29s to get started.

W: That's right.

Q: Arnold was pushing that thing, and as you know well, we had a heck of a lot of trouble with the B-29, the engines catching fire, the de-icing equipment, and various maintenance and mechanical problems of the B-29s. Do you remember when Arnold and Benny Meyers went out to Salina, Kansas, in March 1944. You may have been in the Mediterranean at that time.

W: March 1944? I was still in the Chief's office.

Q: Do you remember Arnold and Benny Meyers coming out to Salina and working

around the clock on the B-29 program to get those planes out to the CBI?

W: Yes, I have a vague recollection of that, period of time, but I do not have any information on the details.

Q: Well, Benny Meyers recalled fondly their working together. This is later on, when he was on the hot seat, and he tried to evoke Arnold's sympathy for him by recall how they had worked together, and he had helped Arnold. You have no special recollection?

W: No, I have no special personal knowledge of that.

Q: Arnold used to bypass Benny Meyers' boss, actually the Nol 1 man, Echols.

W: Echols was admired by everyone I knew.

Q: And Arnold went to Benny Meyers to get information rather than go to Echols?

W: That's right, and I think that is an indication showing the fact that Benny Meyers would do things to advance his own position, even at the expense of his boss.

Q: Well, maybe Arnold went to Benny Meyers because he was more likely to get the answer he wanted to hear from him. He might have gotten the blast right(?) from Echols.

W: I think that's probably right. I think that's one of the things that Benny Meyers promoted.

Q: You know, so there are two sides to this thing. Arnold didn't want to hear the blunt truth, sometimes, and Benny Meyers would give him facts that made music.

W: Quite possibly.

Q: Did you ever know a man named Jan Howard?

W: Yes, I knew him. He used to be Chief Engineer at McCook Field in the

old days.

Q: What do you recall about him?

W: I don't know. I, being a 1st LT then, and he being a very high ranking Major, why, all I recall is that he was supposed to be a very capable Chief Engineer.

Q: Was he a hard man to get along with?

W: But he was supposed to be a hard man to get along with, and I never had any personal dealings with him because I was not in Engineering. At that time, I was in the Engineering School.

Q: Did you know of his relationship with Arnold?

W: Only by hearsay.

Q: What did you know by hearsay?

W: Not too much.

Q: I have a note here about you and Saville in 1945, a hassle over control of units in France. I guess this has to do with the invasion, DRAGOON?

W: Units? I don't remember any hassle. Where was Saville?

Q: He was in Air Defense. This is in the Mediterranean.

W: 1945?

Q: In 1944.

W: I was in the Mediterranean in July 1944.

Q: You don't remember any problems in air defense?

W: At that time?

Q: Did you have any problems with where units would be deployed?

W: No, as CG of the Mediterranean Allied AF, I would be responsible for deployment of the depots, the service units, but I don't recall any hassle with Saville. Where did that come from?

Q: I don't know, I have a note here. I guess Saville told me something of it.

W: The only thing that would possibly have to do, would be the backup depots or the service groups. The service groups belonged to the combat forces and they would have direct control of those. The depots we tried to retain under control of the theater service command, because they had responsibilities of supporting not one unit, but different AFs. It might have been a hassle in some respect there. Now, what was Saville's job at that time?

Q: He was in Italy, and then he was involved in the DRAGOON operation, the invasion of France, in August 1944.

W: All of that had been accomplished before I got there, I think.

Q: You got there around July.

W: The invasion hadn't happened yet, but the planning had been done before that, and I know that I was responsible. We set depots up in France, and perhaps it had to do with the fact whether or not we would continue to retain control of one of our depots which we sent up to France to support the AF on the invasion forces. That may have been, but I don't recall it.

Q: Did you see Arnold when he came through the Mediterranean on a couple of occasions? He came through after D-Day, and he came through in 1945.

W: To Italy?

Q: Yes.

W: No, I don't recall.

Q: You worked for Eaker in the MAAF?

W: Eaker was my senior Commander, I reported to him and to Gen Idwal Edwards.

Q: Did Eaker ever talk to you about his relationship with Arnold?

W: No.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the background of his transfer from Europe to the Mediterranean? Any gossip on that?

W: No, I don't recall any. I think I was on duty there before he was.

Q: You came in 1939.

W: Westover was the Chief when I came in 1939.

Q: Westover died in '38.

W: You see, I told you my memory was pretty lousy. As far as details like that go. Arnold - when did he take over Chief of the Air Corps?

Q: September 1938.

W: He had already been there for a year before I got there. No, I came in. I probably reported up to the Executive, was that Eaker then?

Q: Well, Eaker was in his office then, Mike Kilner was in there.

W: I remember Mike Kilner and E ker, but I don't remember particularly, I suppose there was General Arnold?

Q: Well, he was the top man, and you might not have any connection.

W: I might have and I might not have, I don't know. I was a pretty junior officer then.

Q: You don't remember, did you go and brief him. Or why were you selected for that job, do you know?

W: I came in to represent the Field Service Section, Materiel Division, and Gen Brett, they sent out. They said they wanted somebody from out there at Wright Field to come into the office and be the liaison between the Chief's office and the Materiel Division, Field Service Section. So they selected me. I wasn't very happy about it. I spoke to Gen Brett, asked them to change the orders and let me stay at Wright Field, but Gen Brett was very nice about it and said we needed somebody in there, and I'm not sure whether he said I had

been selected, so I would have to go.

Q: You admired Gen Brett?

W: Yes, I admired him a lot.

Q: Is he the man you admired the most in the AF at that time?

W: Oh no, I wouldn't say that, I think probably one of the officers I admired the most, he was dead, General Hickam, I probably would have been one of his leading men. Of course, I never served with Gen Andrews, but I had great admiration for him.

Q: Almost everybody I've talked to who recalls the old days said that Horace Hickam would have risen to the top if he had lived.

W: Without any question, everybody felt that way.

Q: There is almost universal admiration for Hickam and almost universal admiration for Andrews, a man who generated a great deal of empathy.

W: That's right, they did, and combined with that they had tremendous ability.

Q: I have been told by some who did not particularly care for Arnold that he got rid of all potential rivals. Now you have implied this in respect to Brett, but there were others like Emmons and Andrews, who were sent out of Washington, which kept Arnold on top. Do you think there is truth to this?

W: I think that is the reputation he had, that was the general gossip. I think that people felt that he was ruthless, as I've said. You had to be one of the fairhaired boys to do no wrong.

Q: Who were his fairhaired boys?

W: I wouldn't want to identify.

Q: Say Eaker, Spaatz.

W: I don't think there was any question, Eaker was very close to Arnold

throughout the years, and I wouldn't impugn any motives in that regard that Eaker wasn't entitled. I'm a great admirer of Gen Eaker and I don't think that in Gen Eaker's case. Some people, I'm sure, feel that perhaps he curried favor with Arnold, but I don't think he did so any more than any one, human nature being what it is. He certainly wouldn't turn it down.

Q: Is there any truth to the belief which is shared by some that beyond ability there were some people who came up with Arnold who got top jobs, and others who came up with Andrews - like Knerr and Ralph Royce, and Tony Frank - who didn't get top jobs. Is there any truth in that?

W: I don't feel competent to judge that.

Q: You know, Tony Frank was one of the senior officers. He was only a year or two behind Arnold. Frank was unhappy in the ETO because Spaatz was junior to him. He wanted a combat command and Arnold wouldn't give him one. Did you know about that?

W: No, not specifically. I worked for Gen Frank, and I had known him ever since 1918 when he took command at Ellington Field during the first war as a Major, when I was there getting trained. But, Gen Frank was a very difficult person, too, to know, and to get along with. He was pretty ruthless in many respects, and I think he played favorites. I think any commander, pretty much, in a way, does, now that I look back upon it, because it is human nature. You have certain people that you feel that you can depend upon, and naturally, you favor them.

Q: This is human nature, if you came up with a man, and you had given him trust, and he fulfilled that trust, then you tend to give it to him again.

W: Exactly, surely. In later years, I became quite fond of Tony Frank, although there were times when I didn't like him very much at all.

Q: Is it your personal feeling that Arnold was ruthless, or is it hearsay?

W: The only thing I have to back it up with is that...I can't recall specific cases.

Q: Did he tolerate excuses?

W: No, not very well; not at all.

Q: A legitimate excuse?

W: Well, of course, I don't think he felt that any excuse was legitimate.

Q: He wanted it done yesterday?

W: Yes. Exactly. And I suppose to be a successful commander, maybe that's what you have to do. You can't listen to your subordinates reasons for not getting something done. The idea is to get it done. It seemed to me that he, as many of our strictly combat commanders, had failed to realize that in order to get a job done, your logistics had to be reasonably well done, too, and has to be done ahead of time.

Q: Did he have an appreciation of logistics?

W: Well, it's hard to say, I would say in a way it doesn't seem like he did, but I haven't, for instance, during the Berlin airlift.

Q: This was after his time, the Berlin airlift. He was retired by then. 1948.

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: He should have had a great appreciation for logistics because he was involved in that throughout his career. In fact, during WWI this was one of his main jobs.

W: He probably did have more than many others.

Q: In fact, some said that he was more concerned with that then he was as a commander. He did not have actual combat experience as a commander. Arnold never had combat experience, and this was a hangup with him.

W: Quite possible.

Q: There were some who felt that he did not push unification, a separate air force, during the war, as hard as he could have. He had informally agreed with Marshall that we would wait for a separate AF until the war ended. There were some who disagreed with that judgment. Do you have any knowledge of that? In other words, Arnold sold out on the separate AF idea? Did you ever hear anything about that?

W: No, I never heard that, but the thing that I felt he sold us out on in connection with ASW, perhaps unjustly. But, myself, as well as others, have felt that he did sell the Air Corps short on that. And it came about through a very personal, good friend of mine, Adm Gardner, who at that time, had a position in the Office, Chief of Naval Operations. He was one of the senior airmen. I don't think he was heading up the aviation at that time, although he may have.

Q: Swede Larsen had the AF part of it, remember?

W: All right, the story I have, now this is purely hearsay. I can't vouch for it, it's hearsay, but my understanding is that Adm Gardner came over and talked to Gen Arnold, and convinced Gen Arnold that the AAF should turn that responsibility and job over to the Navy because it was primarily a Navy responsibility, in spite of the fact that it was the Air Corps that had built up the whole system for ASW. We had all the equipment; we had the airfields; we had the design for it; and we were doing the job, and doing it quite successfully. Then Adm Gardner came over to Gen Arnold and convinced Gen Arnold that the Navy should be doing it, so the Air Corps gives it up and what do we have to do. Then we have to turn our own people, our own equipment, our own operations, they were put under the Navy. I think most everybody in the AAF at that time

felt that that was really selling us out. If the Navy had come in and said: "Look, this is our job. We have the equipment. We can do the job," that would have been different. But to come over and say it was our responsibility, but we have no equipment, and no knowledge to do it with, you've got to give it to us. We felt that was pretty bad.

Q: Adm Gardner was a friend of yours?

W: Yes, he was a personal friend of mine, known him since he was a LT and I was a LT in 1929 living up at Alban Towers.

Q: He profited by that, but yet he criticized Arnold.

W: No, he didn't criticize Arnold; I criticized him.

Q: He just told you this?

W: Since I talked to him later, he has told me this, yes, he was able to convince Arnold that that job should be done by the Navy Air, and not by the AF, and turn it all back to the Navy when they weren't qualified to do it. And yet, Adm Gardner was a personal friend of mine, who was the one responsible for it. He takes full responsibility for having convinced Gen Arnold that it should be done.

Q: I think Gen Marshall had some role in that.

W: Maybe he did, I don't know.

Q: It was a subsidiary role for the AF, and Adm King wasn't going to let loose of it. We had our own problems, trying to conduct a bombing campaign. It's true that the Navy didn't do it's job, and that's why the Army Air Forces Anti Submarine Command got into it.

W: We had to do it and we were doing it.

Q: We got out of it in 1943?

W: That's when Gen Arnold sold it out to the Navy. At least, that's the

impression those of us in the lower ranks saw it; it was a sell-out.

Q: Do you have any other knowledge?

W: Did you ever talk to Swede Larsen about it. How does he feel about it?

Q: Well, he felt, Swede Larsen felt that the AAF was doing the best job it could, and it couldn't lick the Navy on this. This was an issue. In other words, there are some issues you have to yield on, but some you push for. Now, this is something, really a subsidiary issue for us. At that time, we were trying to build up our strategic bombing capability in Europe, and Arnold yielded on a minor issue, in order to get the other.....

W: Put the effort and resources into the other, which was more important.

Q: Yes.

W: Well, on that basis, he was right.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor to your personal knowledge?

W: He had a constant smile on his face, which everybody thought was humor, but it turned out that he was not really smiling at all. It was just an expression.

Q: I see, just a facial expression?

W: Just a facial expression which people sometimes got into trouble over, so I'm told, there again. In a discussion or argument with him, or reporting to him, he would put what appeared to be a smile on his face, and everybody would think, they are doing fine. And then they would find out.

Q: It was a prelude to an explosion?

W: Yes.

Q: Did he explode almost every day at somebody?

W: I suppose he did, I don't know.

Q: I mean at these briefings?

W: Yes.

Q: Did he get mad at one thing or another, every day?

W: I think he probably did, although I think that is a pretty general statement.

Q: Was there a state of tension on the part of the staff at that 8:00 meeting?

W: At that 8:00 meeting I was talking about, I was the only one there. Reporting to him at 8:00.

Q: How long did that last?

W: That lasted for weeks, months.

Q: When was this, early in the war - '42?

W: This was before the war - 1940.

Q: This had to do with getting the planes to the British?

W: Yes, this was supporting the British, not supporting ourselves. Which was not really our responsibility, other than to support the aircraft which had been sold to them. It was only our responsibility to that effect. We weren't even in the war at that time.

Q: Can you evaluate Arnold's role, looking back at it now, in a quiet perspective a quarter of a century later? Do you think he was an indispensable man or do you think somebody could have done a better job in the job that he had? For example, Andrews, do you think Andrews would have done a better job at that job?

W: Well, I probably am not qualified to make a judgment. My only reason for saying that I think Gen Andrews might have done a better job is because everybody's feeling towards him of his tremendous capability, and liking him so well. Whereas, our feeling toward Arnold is that he was rather ruthless,

and not necessarily justifiably so, in many respects. He did things on the spur of the moment, which I don't think in the long run, is the way to get things done. You are bound to make many mistakes that way. But I do think -- I give him full credit - for having accomplishing a tremendous job, particularly under Roosevelt, particularly with such contemporaries as Adm King. He really had a tough job, and I'm sure that he did well at it.

Q: It would be fair to say, that they responded to him out of fear and to Andrews out of love or devotion?

W: Yes, I think that would probably be a correct statement.

Interview - MG Lyman Whitten, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1970

Q: Do you recall the first time you met Arnold?

W: I can't recall exactly the first time I met him, no. But, as you probably know, I was in the Munitions Building in 1939, having been ordered in there from the Field Service Section out at Wright Field, which was primarily responsible for the maintenance and supply activities.

Q: You know, he had this job ten years before, the Field Service Section. He was out in Dayton from 1929 to 1931. Did you know that?

W: No, I did not know that. He didn't have the Field Service Section.

Q: Well, he was, it was called Field Service Section I believe. It was Fairfield Air Depot, he was in charge of that end of it. This was in 1929-31.

W: I was at that time in the newly established Inspection Division in the Munitions Building, coming there from Hawaii, and I'm amazed that I don't recall that Arnold had the Field Service Section at that time. In fact, I thought that Gen Knerr had the Field Service Section.

Q: This is like in '29?

W: Yes. The Inspection Division was organized, about that time. Major Martin, later General Martin, was at that time, the Chief. Fred Martin, he was Chief of the Inspection Division. I was in there with him in 1929-33.

Q: Out at Wright Patt?

W: No, right here in the Munitions Building, Hqs., Air Corps.

Q: And you had no dealings with Arnold when he was at the Fairfield Air Depot?

W: Not directly, no. In fact, I had forgotten that he was there at that time.

Q: When you came to the Chief of Air Corps in 1939, Arnold had just taken

the job as Chief of Air Corps.

W: That's right.

Q: A few months before he had become Chief when Westover was killed. Did you have any direct contact with him?

W: Yes, I had quite a bit of direct contact, soon after that, because we had sold a lot of P-40s to the British, which they were using in Egypt, and on the desert. They were having tremendous amount of problems with them, particularly with the engines, because of the sand and dust out there. A LT Perrin was out there, Eddie Perrin, liaison with the Air Corps, to assist the British in the maintenance of these aircraft. They soon had a lot of them grounded. Arnold, of course, was getting reports of these aircraft that were grounded, and the screams of the RAF for us to do something about it. I recall very vividly that very soon after that, I was directed, told by General Arnold that he was going to hold me personally responsible for the aircraft over there in Egypt being flown by the RAF, which was a pretty long way off for me to have any responsibility on it.

Q: Was he unreasonable?

W: Well, to that extent, it was unreasonable to say that I was being held personally responsible, I mean, for the flying of the aircraft in Egypt. However, his point was that it was up to us, the Air Corps, to find the spare engines and spare parts, and ship them over there to the British in Egypt so as to keep those airplanes flying. So he told me and said - I had to report to him every morning at 8:00 in his office and give him a report as to the number of airplanes reported out-of-commission, and what we were doing about it to get them back into flying commission. And, of course, the only thing I could do, being in the Chief's office, was to relay the information to Dayton to the Field Service Section to do all they

could to get these parts over there. Of course, since they were initially purchased by the British, and we, at that time, hadn't yet gotten into production to any great extent for our own, it was a pretty difficult proposition.

Q: Do you remember an incident that happened early in 1939? This Frenchman was in an airplane that crashed in the parking lot in Santa Monica. Arnold was put on the hot seat by Morgenthau?

W: No, I don't recall that.

Q: It was a prototype of the Douglas light bomber. This was a few months before you came on duty in the Office, Chief of Air Corps. This happened, I believe, in January 1939.

W: I was out at Dayton.

Q: You don't remember this?

W: No, I don't recall.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of his relationship with Morgenthau?

W: No, I do not, that was way up on high.

Q: What was your rank there, Major or LTCOL?

W: Major.

Q: What were some of the other problems or issues on which you had to deal with Arnold?

W: That was the first one at that time, I mean the outstanding one.

Q: Status of the planes on the desert of the British?

W: The fact that flying in the desert with those aircraft resulted in many, many airplanes grounded because of the sand getting in the engines. We had a terrific job in trying to replace the necessary parts and also get the technical information to them, as to what to do about it. The other particular incident I

remember is the attack aircraft that had been sent to Gen Kenney and General MacArthur. No, I think Gen Brett must have been there in Australia.

Q: You are talking right at the start of WWII?

W: After Pearl Harbor, and they had come out of the Philippines and gone to Australia, and then we were starting to equip our forces over there, and we had shipped attack type aircraft, I guess it was the A-20, probably. The aircraft were getting over there. They had them set up and were flying them. But for battle purposes they were not very effective because they could not fire their armament. There was just one part missing in the actuating mechanism of the firing mechanism of the guns which they could not find in the parts and supplies that had been shipped over there to them. That resulted, of course, in many hard exchanges of communications back and forth. There again, I was jumped on by Arnold to get that thing corrected, and do it right now. Even if I had to find them myself and take them over there in my pocket or my suitcase to get them over there.

Q: Did he tell you this?

W: Yes, something to that effect. So we said we'd tried to collect the necessary parts at the Field Service Section out at Dayton, and they were being shipped to them by air and they were shipped to them around the world by boat, and several different sets of them in order to get them to them as fast as we could.

Q: What were these parts?

W: I can't remember the particular item, but it had something to do with the armament, the firing of the guns. The old story about the lack of a nail, the Kingdom was lost. This was just one particular part that they could not locate amongst the supplies. So we had to send them several more sets. It seems as though every time we shipped them something, they would get lost. We continued

to follow up.

Q: Arnold did not delegate these things, he looked after them himself? Did he have someone else to see that these parts were taken care of?

W: Of course, he was very much involved in these individual things of that nature, because that meant the grounding of the aircraft. That was a very serious thing. I think he was justified in getting into it, putting his personal weight behind it to get something done about it.

Q: Was he a very persuasive man?

W: He was not so persuasive as he was domineering.

Q: Did he strike fear in the staff?

W: He had that tendency, yes.

Q: Did you dread that 8:00 briefing?

W: No, I didn't actually dread it, it was just I never knew what to expect in the way of his holding me responsible, naturally. But I realized that it was, he was trying to get a job done, and all I could do was the best I could. I thought it was a little absurd, but I didn't particularly dread it after the first few times.

Q: This was his way of getting things done.

W: That's right, I'm sure many people have told you that the common understanding around the headquarters there was that if you were walking down the hall and ran into Gen Arnold, if he had something on his mind that he wanted done, he would grab you by the shoulder and tell you to get it done, and it might be completely foreign to what you had to do, or what your responsibilities were. It could be almost anything. People, after that, it became common knowledge that which he did on many occasions, so I was told - it never happened to me, but people I think, if you saw him coming down the hall, try to avoid him, because you never

knew what he had on his mind, what he might direct you to do.

Q: Duck in the men's room?

W: Duck in the men's room or something to get out of the way, because as I say, he would grab the first person he saw and tell them to get something done about it.

Q: As I try to understand his personality, this problem of the part for the guns was one of maybe 30 or 40 problems he was trying to bounce simultaneously.

W: That's right.

Q: If he could delegate to somebody he had trust in, one of these problems, he had one fewer ball to bounce in the air. Did he ever buttonhole you or grab you by the elbow and say: "Do this," and this was foreign to your expertise?

W: No, it never happened to me, that I recall.

Q: Do you recall it happening to any other people, specifically?

W: Only by hearsay and I wouldn't be able at this time to say specifically what it was, or who it was, but it was general knowledge. That was a common expression around there.

Q: Was he very perceptive in these 8:00 briefings to this degree. I've given briefings myself and try to put the best picture, or present the best picture of it. If there were some negative aspects, you sort of leave them in the background. This is a natural tendency. Was he perceptive enough to put his finger on those negative aspects and pin you down?

W: No, I wouldn't be able to put it in that light, because I don't recall that in these cases - it was just a matter of presenting the facts to him - getting reports as to how many aircraft were grounded, and what had been done to get them ungrounded. So this was just a matter of factual presentation. I think that he would be unreasonable in what he expected to be accomplished,

under the circumstances existing. But there again, I suppose considering his position and his nature, it was merely his way of putting the pressure on to get the thing corrected even though he may, in his own mind, realize that he was demanding the impossible.

Q: He was trying to get you to produce 110%.

W: Yes, or more.

Q: At the time you may have not appreciated it, but if you look back at it you have a better picture.

W: As I look back, I realize that was the point. That was what he was trying to do.

Q: Did he ever give you an unreasonable requirement or request? This one incident that you cite, he asked you to deliver it yourself if necessary?

W: In a sense, those things were unreasonable, yes.

Q: In one of the discussions, I can't recall specifically what it was, but the question of turrets, the difficulty with the turrets came up. Do you recall?

W: What aircraft,do you remember?

Q: For the bombers, were you involved in that? The B-17s?

W: Yes, but I think that was more of a procurement problem, and a design in procurement which was more in the bailiwick of some of the other people rather than myself, such as Gen Chidlaw or some of those people. They were on the procurement side. So I just remember there was a lot of difficulties over the turrets, but I don't recall that I was particularly involved, other than just the usual supply problems and maintenance problems.

Q: You were assistant to Tony Frank for awhile in ASC, the Air Service Command?

W: Yes. Not so much Tony Frank as to Henry Miller.

Q: Is he the guy that got in trouble later on?

W: Yes. Henry Miller had the Air Service Command and he had his hqs. here in one of these temporary buildings that are now torn down, and I was in there as one of his assistants.

Q: I think Hugh Knerr took his place in Europe as the Deputy for Administration and Logistics.

W: That could be so, I'm not sure about that. I didn't think they had that same job, but maybe they did.

Q: Wasn't he in Europe for awhile?

W: Yes, Miller? Yes. He went over there from here, and had the Service Command, I think, I'm not sure. I can't recall which one it was.

Q: Didn't Knerr take his place? In effect, they changed the job somewhat. But Knerr became Deputy to Spaatz.

W: Knerr became Deputy for Services, Logistics with Gen Spaatz, but I do not recall Henry Miller had that particular assignment before that. He was over there, but I don't remember the specific job.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Knerr?

W: Yes, quite a few. From time to time. He had the Field Service Section out at Dayton, he's the one I recall at the Field Service, Dayton. He was responsible for my coming here for assignment to duty in the Field Service Section after I graduated from the Tactical School in 1934 at Maxwell. I had hoped to get with a combat unit, which I hadn't been in for some time, and I figured it was my last chance, and Knerr had me assigned back to Wright Field, in the Field Services Section.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that Alaskan flight? Knerr helped plan

that flight in 1934.

W: No, I was in Tactical School.

Q: Knerr was not a fan of Arnold's; he was a fan of Andrews.

W: Well, I think that would apply to a majority of the people.

Q: They were fans of Andrews?

W: Oh yes, I think everyone loved Gen Andrews and felt that he was a terrifically well-qualified invididual as a wonderful leader. I think everyone was heartbroken when he was killed, because I think they thought he would have been the leader for the AF.

Q: Were you aware that there was a movement right around the time of Pearl Harbor to supplant Arnold as Chief of the AAF, and put Andrews in?

W: No, I wasn't in on anything like that.

Q: Knerr was in that.

W: No, that particular thing I do not recall hearing. I do recall one thing that I have always held against Gen Arnold, and maybe unjustly so, was his success in banishing Gen Brett to the far corners of the world where Gen Brett would be out of the picture as far as taking an important responsible position.

Q: When he came back from the Far East he went to the Caribbean and he was in a sense, banished, yes.

W: Yes, the general feeling was that when Gen Brett was, I think he was sent over to Egypt or around-the-world trip, something like this.

Q: He was in Egypt and he ended up in the Far East.

W: It successfully kept him out of the picture here in this country, and we all, I know all my associates felt that very, very unreasonable, unfair, thing to do, and of course, I suppose it was politics.

Q: Well, I don't know how much of it was Arnold's doing. Much of it was MacArthur's doing. Brett and MacArthur had a knockdown, dragout fight.

W: That was later, was it not?

Q: No, it was, Brett was sent overseas just before Pearl Harbor to survey AF equipment, to see how it performed in Egypt. He was in the Middle East for awhile, and then he went to the Far East. He was out in the Far East when war broke out, as far as we were concerned, Pearl Harbor. He became the senior AF officer in Australia. This is in '42. He and MacArthur did not see things the same way, and there was a big battle between them, and MacArthur fired him out of there. This is when Kenney came out and he was sent back to the States and that was pretty much the end of his career. So was it Arnold?

W: I think it was Arnold starting it by sending him on this inspection trip because that got him out of there. That got him out of Washington, where the decisions were being made as to who was going to get what job, I suppose, and I think the general feeling was amongst my contemporaries, was that that was a very, well....

Q: You mean for political reasons? Was he a rival to Arnold, you mean?

W: Yes, I would think he would be, yes.

Q: I have been told by several people who don't like Arnold that Arnold got all his rivals out of Washington, like Emmons, another rival.

W: I think that's so.

Q: Do you remember that Emmons got his third star before Arnold did?

W: I can't recall that, no.

Q: He was a rival for the top job, so was Andrews. But actually, Brett was junior to Arnold, I don't know if he was so much of a threat.

W: I don't recall the relative position, the relative rank, except Gen Brett

was here in Washington at that time.

Q: Brett had the No. 2 job.

W: So Arnold sent him out on this inspection trip to the other side of the world. It was out of the way, and as far as being in contact with General Marshall, the White House, or whoever else might be making decisions.

Q: I don't want to necessarily defend Arnold in this situation, but a lot of people wanted to get out of Washington. They wanted to get into a combat situation. And it seems to me that Brett had a very positive opportunity. He was sent to, when Arnold was moved up in early 1941, to become Chief of the AAF, Brett became Chief of the Air Corps. This was sort of the supply, training and logistics, administrative, whereas, Emmons was head of the GHQ AF, and it was called the AF Combat Command. This is in 1941. Now Brett's overseas, and he ends up in the Far East, and here he is, the top AF Commander in the Far East, which is a job which many people would prefer to sitting in Washington. But he stubbed his toe, at least he stubbed his toe as far as MacArthur was concerned.

W: You have a different angle on it.

Q: You can't blame Arnold, you see, Brett could have gotten the job that Kenney ultimately got, but he didn't get along with MacArthur. There were some who say that Brett saw himself as the senior Army officer out there. And that he was going to supersede MacArthur. MacArthur wasn't going to allow anybody to supersede him.

W: That's another angle which I'm not familiar with.

Q: But many people in Washington would have been hungry for a job like he had, because he was a top combat commander. But he didn't cut the mustard as far as MacArthur was concerned. So he was sent back. Once he was sent back, he was

discredited and then, well, they just gave him a job in the Caribbean. You are right, he was put on the shelf. But I don't think in that particular case you can blame Arnold.

W: No, I'm not blaming Arnold for that aspect of it, because I don't know that background that you bring up. The only point I was making was, the general feeling was that Brett was here in Washington, and in line for one of the key positions here in Washington, and he was sent on a trip, inspection trip just to get him out of Washington, get him out of the way. That is the feeling that my contemporaries had.

Q: At the time?

W: Yes. I'm not saying my position was the correct one. I'm just saying that was what our feeling was.

Q: This was gossip. But actually there are two ways of looking at it. Some people would say, well, this is a great opportunity to get out of Washington. Since Brett was the No. 2 man in the AF at the time, this chance to get a combat command was...

W: It wasn't really a chance for a combat command, just an inspection trip, to see how the airplanes were being maintained by the British.

Q: But it ended up as a combat command.

W: Yes, but when he was sent out, they didn't know that.

Q: But he could have....

W: As you say, the war had not yet started.

Q: No, right, the war had not yet started when he started out, but he could have used the opportunity to become a great combat commander. But for some reason, he and MacArthur did not get along, MacArthur had more political weight than he did.

Q: You were at the Cairo Conference, did you have any dealings with Arnold at the Cairo Conference?

W: Only in a sense, not directly, usually, but I sat in on all the meetings of the Chiefs, and I was the AF member of the Joint Logistics Committee and the Combined Logistics Committee with the British. I was the AF man on that, and Gen Knudsen was the Army. Of course, I was in on all the logistical studies and work for those programs.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Knudsen and Arnold?

W: Just general, I mean I had no personal contact with them.

Q: Knudsen was a great production man, but what kind of a job did he do as a three-star Army general? Did he do the job?

W: I would not be in a position to pass an opinion on that. As far as I know, he did.

Q: You were involved in planning the logistic support for the 20th AF for the B-29s. Did you have any dealings with Arnold in that work? Did you have to brief him?

W: I don't recall any particular personal contact with him on that. I took a team, I headed up a team. We went over to Hawaii and we went over to Johnston Island and Eniwebok. We studied the feasibility of supplying the 20th AF by air transport instead of by boat, but I don't recall any personal contacts with General Arnold on that, just, except that he had directed that we do everything we can to support them and make sure that we got material to them as promptly as possible.

Q: Did Arnold ever get mad at you? You mention this one situation - the parts for the guns. Do you remember any specific instances where he jumped on you for something? Right or wrong?

W: Amazingly, no, I cannot recall anything other than these times I've mentioned, which I have reported to his office, and in which, of course, at that time he would let me know in no uncertain terms what he expected to be done.

Q: Did he remember things? If he jumped on you for something last week and you saw him again, did he remind you that he had mentioned this last week, or that he felt you hadn't done it, or should have done better?

W: No, I don't recall that he did. I think he would have remembered, but I don't recall in that particular way.

Q: Let me put it another way, did he harbor a grudge?

W: Insofar as I, myself, am concerned, I couldn't say that he did. But from general hearsay and observation, I would say that he did. That was the general opinion.

Q: Was there a general opinion along this line that there were some people he favored and some people who could do no right?

W: Yes, and I think George Goddard was a good example of that.

Q: What do you recall about the George Goddard-Arnold situation? Do you have any knowledge of that?

W: Only as to what happened to George Goddard. We all thought he was one of the most capable and foremost man of photography, and that he was suddenly bounced out of his job, and this Kaye was put in, who was nowhere near as well qualified, and I think everybody thought that was a terrible thing. Not only from the point of view individually as George was concerned, but as far as the AF itself was concerned. I think the AF suffered very severely from that.

Q: Did they attribute this decision by Arnold to personal reasons, in the sense that Minton Kaye was close to him?

W: I think most everybody did, yes. Because he had been misled by Kaye.

Q: Why was Kaye so influential with him?

W: I have no idea; I don't know.

W: ...that's where I think he made a terrible blunder.

Q: When he took Goddard out of Washington?

W: Yes, he said he is not to have anything to do whatsoever with photography!

Q: Were you in on that decision, or I mean, did you know about it.

W: Oh yes, everybody was bitter about it. Everybody felt very bitter about it because they recognized George Goddard's talent as well as his idiosyncrasies, and to take him out of photography during the war, when we needed idea men like him was really a very shortsighted thing to do.

Q: Minton Kaye got his comeuppance. He was pushed out to the CBI before the end of the war, and Goddard was ultimately recognized.

W: Yes, he finally was.

Q: The genius he was. Of course, he doesn't credit that to Arnold, credits that to others, like Lovett.

W: Fortunately, Elliott Roosevelt finally recognized him also.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Elliott Roosevelt and Arnold?

W: No, not personal.

Q: How about Lovett and Arnold? Do you know anything about their relationship?

W: No, I would not be able to say that I did, just as a distant observer.

Q: How about Benny Meyers? You had some dealings with Benny Meyers?

W: Well, I had quite a few dealings with Benny Meyers.

Q: What was your impression of him?

W: My impression of him was that he was a very capable individual, and in spite of his many serious shortcomings and faults, and as to the things that he did to advance his own personal cause, I think that Hap recognized that he did do a lot for the AF, as well as doing a lot to hurt the AF.

Q: What did he do to hurt the AF? I'm talking about during the war. You didn't know of his hanky-panky did you, or did you?

W: Not specifically, until it came out, no. But I think that everybody felt that he was a ruthless individual who would cut anybody's throat or stab them in the back in order to advance his own interests.

Q: Did you know that he had a close relationship with Arnold during the war?

W: Oh yes, oh sure, he had a close relationship with every commander, under whom he served. That was one of his attributes.

Q: Why do you think Arnold reposed such high confidence in him?

W: I think everybody wonders why. And I think because Arnold did, that everybody else was very hesitant to bring up, or to point out anything which they felt things were being done wrong, because they felt they would not get anywhere.

Q: You were in the logistics area - can you recall any specific case or instance of where Benny Meyers shaded the truth, or shaded integrity to gain a personal end? I mean, you are talking of generalities.

W: I'm talking about generalities and I would not be able to say specifically. I would say that the general impression was with all the things he had, the reports of aircraft production, and that sort of thing, he always made it look pretty good. He was in a position to make his forecast come true by directing that certain things be done to improve the situation which might be

to a disadvantage of something else. But I could not say, specifically, that is just a general feeling we had about him, that he was a manipulator.

Q: A number of people have told me when Arnold asked him for numbers of planes on hand, he would count numbers off tail sections, which were still on the assembly lines, and represent these to be completed planes.

W: That was the general, yes, I've heard that too. I think that's what I meant by saying he would make that statement and then to prevent being actually caught in a lie, or caught short, he then perhaps would issue directives to the factories that things would be speeded up and pushed out regardless of whether or not they were really in a finished condition.

Q: But ultimately wouldn't he get caught? Arnold was a perceptive man was he not? Wouldn't he caught a lie?

W: Well, he was too clever. He would find, he was able to get around that. I don't know, I would think Arnold would, but he apparently didn't.

Q: Do you think Arnold knowingly accepted inflated figures?

W: I can't say as to that.

Q: The President was always pressing Arnold on the B-29s, this one case where the President was pushing the B-29s to get started.

W: That's right.

Q: Arnold was pushing that thing, and as you know well, we had a heck of a lot of trouble with the B-29, the engines catching fire, the de-icing equipment, and various maintenance and mechanical problems of the B-29s. Do you remember when Arnold and Benny Meyers went out to Salina, Kansas, in March 1944. You may have been in the Mediterranean at that time.

W: March 1944? I was still in the Chief's office.

Q: Do you remember Arnold and Benny Meyers coming out to Salina and working

around the clock on the B-29 program to get those planes out to the CBI?

W: Yes, I have a vague recollection of that, period of time, but I do not have any information on the details.

Q: Well, Benny Meyers recalled fondly their working together. This is later on, when he was on the hot seat, and he tried to evoke Arnold's sympathy for him by recall how they had worked together, and he had helped Arnold. You have no special recollection?

W: No, I have no special personal knowledge of that.

Q: Arnold used to bypass Benny Meyers' boss, actually the Nol 1 man, Echols.

W: Echols was admired by everyone I knew.

Q: And Arnold went to Benny Meyers to get information rather than go to Echols?

W: That's right, and I think that is an indication showing the fact that Benny Meyers would do things to advance his own position, even at the expense of his boss.

Q: Well, maybe Arnold went to Benny Meyers because he was more likely to get the answer he wanted to hear from him. He might have gotten the blast right(?) from Echols.

W: I think that's probably right. I think that's one of the things that Benny Meyers promoted.

Q: You know, so there are two sides to this thing. Arnold didn't want to hear the blunt truth, sometimes, and Benny Meyers would give him facts that made music.

W: Quite possibly.

Q: Did you ever know a man named Jan Howard?

W: Yes, I knew him. He used to be Chief Engineer at McCook Field in the.

old days.

Q: What do you recall about him?

W: I don't know. I, being a 1st LT then, and he being a very high ranking Major, why, all I recall is that he was supposed to be a very capable Chief Engineer.

Q: Was he a hard man to get along with?

W: But he was supposed to be a hard man to get along with, and I never had any personal dealings with him because I was not in Engineering. At that time, I was in the Engineering School.

Q: Did you know of his relationship with Arnold?

W: Only by hearsay.

Q: What did you know by hearsay?

W: Not too much.

Q: I have a note here about you and Saville in 1945, a hassle over control of units in France. I guess this has to do with the invasion, DRAGOON?

W: Units? I don't remember any hassle. Where was Saville?

Q: He was in Air Defense. This is in the Mediterranean.

W: 1945?

Q: In 1944.

W: I was in the Mediterranean in July 1944.

Q: You don't remember any problems in air defense?

W: At that time?

Q: Did you have any problems with where units would be deployed?

W: No, as CG of the Mediterranean Allied AF, I would be responsible for deployment of the depots, the service units, but I don't recall any hassle with Saville. Where did that come from?

Q: I don't know, I have a note here. I guess Saville told me something of it.

W: The only thing that would possibly have to do, would be the backup depots or the service groups. The service groups belonged to the combat forces and they would have direct control of those. The depots we tried to retain under control of the theater service command, because they had responsibilities of supporting not one unit, but different AFs. It might have been a hassle in some respect there. Now, what was Saville's job at that time?

Q: He was in Italy, and then he was involved in the DRAGOON operation, the invasion of France, in August 1944.

W: All of that had been accomplished before I got there, I think.

Q: You got there around July.

W: The invasion hadn't happened yet, but the planning had been done before that, and I know that I was responsible. We set depots up in France, and perhaps it had to do with the fact whether or not we would continue to retain control of one of our depots which we sent up to France to support the AF on the invasion forces. That may have been, but I don't recall it.

Q: Did you see Arnold when he came through the Mediterranean on a couple of occasions? He came through after D-Day, and he came through in 1945.

W: To Italy?

Q: Yes.

W: No, I don't recall.

Q: You worked for Eaker in the MAAF?

W: Eaker was my senior Commander, I reported to him and to Gen Idwal Edwards.

Q: Did Eaker ever talk to you about his relationship with Arnold?

W: No.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of the background of his transfer from Europe to the Mediterranean? Any gossip on that?

W: No, I don't recall any. I think I was on duty there before he was.

Q: You came in 1939.

W: Westover was the Chief when I came in 1939.

Q: Westover died in '38.

W: You see, I told you my memory was pretty lousy. As far as details like that go. Arnold - when did he take over Chief of the Air Corps?

Q: September 1938.

W: He had already been there for a year before I got there. No, I came in. I probably reported up to the Executive, was that Eaker then?

Q: Well, Eaker was in his office then, Mike Kilner was in there.

W: I remember Mike Kilner and Eaker, but I don't remember particularly, I suppose there was General Arnold?

Q: Well, he was the top man, and you might not have any connection.

W: I might have and I might not have, I don't know. I was a pretty junior officer then.

Q: You don't remember, did you go and brief him. Or why were you selected for that job, do you know?

W: I came in to represent the Field Service Section, Materiel Division, and Gen Brett, they sent out. They said they wanted somebody from out there at Wright Field to come into the office and be the liaison between the Chief's office and the Materiel Division, Field Service Section. So they selected me. I wasn't very happy about it. I spoke to Gen Brett, asked them to change the orders and let me stay at Wright Field, but Gen Brett was very nice about it and said we needed somebody in there, and I'm not sure whether he said I had

been selected, so I would have to go.

Q: You admired Gen Brett?

W: Yes, I admired him a lot.

Q: Is he the man you admired the most in the AF at that time?

W: Oh no, I wouldn't say that, I think probably one of the officers I admired the most, he was dead, General Hickam, I probably would have been one of his leading men. Of course, I never served with Gen Andrews, but I had great admiration for him.

Q: Almost everybody I've talked to who recalls the old days said that Horace Hickam would have risen to the top if he had lived.

W: Without any question, everybody felt that way.

Q: There is almost universal admiration for Hickam and almost universal admiration for Andrews, a man who generated a great deal of empathy.

W: That's right, they did, and combined with that they had tremendous ability.

Q: I have been told by some who did not particularly care for Arnold that he got rid of all potential rivals. Now you have implied this in respect to Brett, but there were others like Emmons and Andrews, who were sent out of Washington, which kept Arnold on top. Do you think there is truth to this?

W: I think that is the reputation he had, that was the general gossip. I think that people felt that he was ruthless, as I've said. You had to be one of the fairhaired boys to do no wrong.

Q: Who were his fairhaired boys?

W: I wouldn't want to identify.

Q: Say Eaker, Spaatz.

W: I don't think there was any question, Eaker was very close to Arnold

throughout the years, and I wouldn't impugn any motives in that regard that Eaker wasn't entitled. I'm a great admirer of Gen Eaker and I don't think that in Gen Eaker's case. Some people, I'm sure, feel that perhaps he curried favor with Arnold, but I don't think he did so any more than any one, human nature being what it is. He certainly wouldn't turn it down.

Q: Is there any truth to the belief which is shared by some that beyond ability there were some people who came up with Arnold who got top jobs, and others who came up with Andrews - like Knerr and Ralph Royce, and Tony Frank - who didn't get top jobs. Is there any truth in that?

W: I don't feel competent to judge that.

Q: You know, Tony Frank was one of the senior officers. He was only a year or two behind Arnold. Frank was unhappy in the ETO because Spaatz was junior to him. He wanted a combat command and Arnold wouldn't give him one. Did you know about that?

W: No, not specifically. I worked for Gen Frank, and I had known him ever since 1918 when he took command at Ellington Field during the first war as a Major, when I was there getting trained. But, Gen Frank was a very difficult person, too, to know, and to get along with. He was pretty ruthless in many respects, and I think he played favorites. I think any commander, pretty much, in a way, does, now that I look back upon it, because it is human nature. You have certain people that you feel that you can depend upon, and naturally, you favor them.

Q: This is human nature, if you came up with a man, and you had given him trust, and he fulfilled that trust, then you tend to give it to him again.

W: Exactly, surely. In later years, I became quite fond of Tony Frank, although there were times when I didn't like him very much at all.

Q: Is it your personal feeling that Arnold was ruthless, or is it hearsay?

W: The only thing I have to back it up with is that...I can't recall specific cases.

Q: Did he tolerate excuses?

W: No, not very well; not at all.

Q: A legitimate excuse?

W: Well, of course, I don't think he felt that any excuse was legitimate.

Q: He wanted it done yesterday?

W: Yes. Exactly. And I suppose to be a successful commander, maybe that's what you have to do. You can't listen to your subordinates reasons for not getting something done. The idea is to get it done. It seemed to me that he, as many of our strictly combat commanders, had failed to realize that in order to get a job done, your logistics had to be reasonably well done, too, and has to be done ahead of time.

Q: Did he have an appreciation of logistics?

W: Well, it's hard to say, I would say in a way it doesn't seem like he did, but I haven't, for instance, during the Berlin airlift.

Q: This was after his time, the Berlin airlift. He was retired by then. 1948.

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: He should have had a great appreciation for logistics because he was involved in that throughout his career. In fact, during WWI this was one of his main jobs.

W: He probably did have more than many others.

Q: In fact, some said that he was more concerned with that then he was as a commander. He did not have actual combat experience as a commander. Arnold never had combat experience, and this was a hangup with him.

W: Quite possible.

Q: There were some who felt that he did not push unification, a separate air force, during the war, as hard as he could have. He had informally agreed with Marshall that we would wait for a separate AF until the war ended. There were some who disagreed with that judgment. Do you have any knowledge of that? In other words, Arnold sold out on the separate AF idea? Did you ever hear anything about that?

W: No, I never heard that, but the thing that I felt he sold us out on in connection with ASW, perhaps unjustly. But, myself, as well as others, have felt that he did sell the Air Corps short on that. And it came about through a very personal, good friend of mine, Adm Gardner, who at that time, had a position in the Office, Chief of Naval Operations. He was one of the senior airmen. I don't think he was heading up the aviation at that time, although he may have.

Q: Swede Larsen had the AF part of it, remember?

W: All right, the story I have, now this is purely hearsay. I can't vouch for it, it's hearsay, but my understanding is that Adm Gardner came over and talked to Gen Arnold, and convinced Gen Arnold that the AAF should turn that responsibility and job over to the Navy because it was primarily a Navy responsibility, in spite of the fact that it was the Air Corps that had built up the whole system for ASW. We had all the equipment; we had the airfields; we had the design for it; and we were doing the job, and doing it quite successfully. Then Adm Gardner came over to Gen Arnold and convinced Gen Arnold that the Navy should be doing it, so the Air Corps gives it up and what do we have to do. Then we have to turn our own people, our own equipment, our own operations, they were put under the Navy. I think most everybody in the AAF at that time

felt that that was really selling us out. If the Navy had come in and said: "Look, this is our job. We have the equipment. We can do the job," that would have been different. But to come over and say it was our responsibility, but we have no equipment, and no knowledge to do it with, you've got to give it to us. We felt that was pretty bad.

Q: Adm Gardner was a friend of yours?

W: Yes, he was a personal friend of mine, known him since he was a LT and I was a LT in 1929 living up at Alban Towers.

Q: He profited by that, but yet he criticized Arnold.

W: No, he didn't criticize Arnold; I criticized him.

Q: He just told you this?

W: Since I talked to him later, he has told me this, yes, he was able to convince Arnold that that job should be done by the Navy Air, and not by the AF, and turn it all back to the Navy when they weren't qualified to do it. And yet, Adm Gardner was a personal friend of mine, who was the one responsible for it. He takes full responsibility for having convinced Gen Arnold that it should be done.

Q: I think Gen Marshall had some role in that.

W: Maybe he did, I don't know.

Q: It was a subsidiary role for the AF, and Adm King wasn't going to let loose of it. We had our own problems, trying to conduct a bombing campaign. It's true that the Navy didn't do it's job, and that's why the Army Air Forces Anti Submarine Command got into it.

W: We had to do it and we were doing it.

Q: We got out of it in 1943?

W: That's when Gen Arnold sold it out to the Navy. At least, that's the

impression those of us in the lower ranks saw it; it was a sell-out.

Q: Do you have any other knowledge?

W: Did you ever talk to Swede Larsen about it. How does he feel about it?

Q: Well, he felt, Swede Larsen felt that the AAF was doing the best job it could, and it couldn't lick the Navy on this. This was an issue. In other words, there are some issues you have to yield on, but some you push for. Now, this is something, really a subsidiary issue for us. At that time, we were trying to build up our strategic bombing capability in Europe, and Arnold yielded on a minor issue, in order to get the other.....

W: Put the effort and resources into the other, which was more important.

Q: Yes.

W: Well, on that basis, he was right.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor to your personal knowledge?

W: He had a constant smile on his face, which everybody thought was humor, but it turned out that he was not really smiling at all. It was just an expression.

Q: I see, just a facial expression?

W: Just a facial expression which people sometimes got into trouble over, so I'm told, there again. In a discussion or argument with him, or reporting to him, he would put what appeared to be a smile on his face, and everybody would think, they are doing fine. And then they would find out.

Q: It was a prelude to an explosion?

W: Yes.

Q: Did he explode almost every day at somebody?

W: I suppose he did, I don't know.

Q: I mean at these briefings?

W: Yes.

Q: Did he get mad at one thing or another, every day?

W: I think he probably did, although I think that is a pretty general statement.

Q: Was there a state of tension on the part of the staff at that 8:00 meeting?

W: At that 8:00 meeting I was talking about, I was the only one there. Reporting to him at 8:00.

Q: How long did that last?

W: That lasted for weeks, months.

Q: When was this, early in the war - '42?

W: This was before the war - 1940.

Q: This had to do with getting the planes to the British?

W: Yes, this was supporting the British, not supporting ourselves. Which was not really our responsibility, other than to support the aircraft which had been sold to them. It was only our responsibility to that effect. We weren't even in the war at that time.

Q: Can you evaluate Arnold's role, looking back at it now, in a quiet perspective a quarter of a century later? Do you think he was an indispensable man or do you think somebody could have done a better job in the job that he had? For example, Andrews, do you think Andrews would have done a better job at that job?

W: Well, I probably am not qualified to make a judgment. My only reason for saying that I think Gen Andrews might have done a better job is because everybody's feeling towards him of his tremendous capability, and liking him so well. Whereas, our feeling toward Arnold is that he was rather ruthless,

and not necessarily justifiably so, in many respects. He did things on the spur of the moment, which I don't think in the long run, is the way to get things done. You are bound to make many mistakes that way. But I do think - I give him full credit - for having accomplishing a tremendous job, particularly under Roosevelt, particularly with such contemporaries as Adm King. He really had a tough job, and I'm sure that he did well at it.

Q: It would be fair to say, that they responded to him out of fear and to Andrews out of love or devotion?

W: Yes, I think that would probably be a correct statement.

Wilson, Donald 21 Aug 70

August 26, 1970

M/Gen Donald Wilson (USAF, Ret)
P.O. Box 2488
Carmel, CA 93921

Dear General Wilson:

I'm returning your memorandum after having made a copy of it for my files. I was especially interested in the comment that Arnold might have been a beneficiary of Benny Meyers' peculations. I hope you are convinced by the evidence at hand that there was absolutely no basis for these rumors.

In addition to the facts I cited to you, there is evidence that General Arnold toyed with the idea of returning to active duty as a 5-Star General so he could rate the Enlisted men that went with that rank. He was persuaded that the embarrassment that could ensue might counter balance any benefits he could derive. These are not the thoughts and actions of a financially well situated man.

In the book I will cover the fact of Arnold's genteel poverty in retirement, an unseemly neglect of a General of the Air Force by the country he served so well.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

September 2, 1970

M/Gen Donald Wilson
P.O. Box 2488
Carmel, CA 93921

Dear General Wilson:

You may wish to send your paper to Dr. Robert Futrell at the Air Archives, Air University, Maxwell AFB. He is writing a history of the evolution of ideas and concepts in the Air Force. Certainly your contribution to this field, developed in the attachment in an interesting way, ought to be recognized.

I enjoyed our get together which proved to be very fruitful for my purposes.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

20314

31 May 1973

Maj General DonaldWilson, USAF (Ret)
P.O. Box 2488
Carmel, Calif 93921

Dear General Wilson:

Sorry to be late in responding, but I've been out west on some fill in interviews related to the Arnold book which is coming along, but at least a year away.

I'm no longer assigned to the Pentagon and figure you'd be better off explaining your need to the people most likely to act on your request, if they act at all. It being a private publication, it may suffer the same fate as my Arnold book - to be accomplished outside of official channels, by private means.

At first I thought to send your request on to the man most likely to respond affirmatively, but then thought you should explain your need directly to him and hope for the best. I suggest your write to:

Mr. Sam Sullivan
Chief of Graphics
Audio-Visual Division
1143d Air Base Squadron
Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20330

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

DONALD WILSON
POST OFFICE BOX 2488
CARMEL, CALIFORNIA 93921

n 7 September 1970

Dr Murray Green
Office of the Secretary, U S Air Force
Research and Analysis Division
Washingtom D.C. 20330.

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of 26th August, and the comments concerning rumored connection between HHA and the bright Benny. I hope this thing may fade away, but, as you know, such gossip persists on juiceness rather than truth, and denial is necessarily negative in approach. Whether you should dignify such a story by mention in your account is debatable – my guess would be that its demise should be encouraged by neglect.

Since our session here one incident comes to mind. Early in 1942 General Arnold called WD G-1 office where I was working and asked that I come to his office. He had a candidate for induction into Air Service, and together we would go to lunch. When I arrived at his office he introduced Clark Gable who was anxious to enlist and go to war. Almost without notice we got out of the building and into the big Government car, and then on over to Army and Navy Club, where we had a pleasant chat and a good lunch. I was pleasantly surprised to have my prejudice against movie heroes badly shaken by Gable's attractive personality. By the time we returned to Munitions Building the word had got around. Excitement ran higher than when Patton, with his two pearl-handled revolvers slapping his legs, strode thos corridors on his way to call on General Marshall. As we three walked thru the dingy hallways every door along our path was jammed with secretaries and clerks. The atmosphere was heavy with "oohs" and "AAhs and dumfounded admiration. But with Gable in the middle and hurried step, we saved him from being captured before he met the enemy in his later role as an airplane gunner.

Sincerely,

Donald Wilson

Major General, USAF, Retired.

DONALD WILSON
POST OFFICE BOX 2488
CARMEL, CALIFORNIA 93921

26 April 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Research and Analysis Div
Office of the Secretary, U S Air Force
Washington 20330.

Dear Dr. Green:

Nearly two years have elapsed since my pleasure with our chat here. Presuming upon that acquaintance I asking your help.

Before long I expect to publish privately a book of memoirs. For this, perhaps on the cover (to be of a new material which will take printing) and on a leading fly leaf I should like to use in black and white a line drawing of Command Pilot's Wings and two stars (five pointed rank insignia, paired side by side on horizontal line, with single star points toward top of page). Proportion should be about the same as that of natural size for such wings and outer garment shoulder stars. These illustrations should be suitable for "cold type" printing.

I bother you because I feel you can get my desire to the Air Force picture people, and with the further hope they can supply the needed cuts.

In my book there may be an item or two of interest to Air Force historians, and I plan on givinga few copies for that purpose. And by the way, how is the Arnold book coming?

Thank you and with kind regards - -

Sincerely,

Donald Wilson

Maj Gen USAF Ret.

Done 21 Aug 70

August 7, 1970

Maj General Donald Wilson, USAF (Ret)
P. O. Box 2488
Carmel, California 93921

Dear General Wilson:

I'm coming out to California again on the General Hap Arnold research. I hope to see you around August 21 or 22, if possible.

I'll be on the road so could you drop a note to me c/o Col Marshall Ryder, 805 Leonard Road, Los Angeles, 90049 (Code 213-476-5062), if this is convenient.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division

Interview, MG Donald Wilson, Carmel, Calif, 21 August 1970

Q: Do you recall your first encounter with Him? When didyou first meet him?

W: No, I can't say that I do. I can recall several, not, I wouldn't call them "encounters", either, because all of my dealings with Gen Arnold had been quite pleasant. I can remember a few incidents that might be worth repeating in that I was walking through the hallway one day when I was on duty in the War Dept General Staff. Gen Arnold came along and walked in step with me, along in the hallway, and said:"General Marshall wants you to go down to SW Pacific as Chief of Staff for George Kenney. What do you think of it?" And I said:"Gen Arnold, that reminds me of what John Hilldring G-1 of the War Dept, told Gen Marshall when Gen Marshall asked him if he wanted to get out of the office there, and take a division." He said:"Well, General, I don't know of any other better way of getting to Heaven. And that's what this situation reminds me of. No better way to get to Heaven." So I was assigned to the SW Pacific. That was mid-1942. I served with Gen Kenney out there until March 1944, at which time, General Arnold came out and the agreement was that he would take me back into the office and promote me, if Kenney would let me go. Well, I went back into the office and there we ran into one of the things that Gen Arnold could do, and this was perhaps to forget a promise, because it was a year later before I was promoted from one star to two stars. Meanwhile, I was serving as Gen Arnold's Acting Chief of Staff while Barney Giles was away on his trip around through the theaters. I had made such a trip myself, because when I came back from Australia I convinced the authorities that since I was going to duty in the office in Washington, it would be a good idea that I visit the theaters on the way back. Instead of taking the short way, eastward across the Pacific, I was allowed to go westward across the Indian Ocean, aone of the longest airplane flights that was being made at that time. I think perhaps it was the second airplane flight that was ever made over the Indian Ocean with stop. We went from Western Australia over to Ceylon in 15 hours, mostly during the night, at which time we had to pass the Cocos Islands, then in the hands of the Japanese. We were somewhat concerned about whether or not the Japanese would intercept our undefended transport plane. Nothing of that sort happened. And then, my trip took me up through India, and over to China where I visited with Chennault, and back over the Hump,westward

until finally into Washington.

Q: Do you remember the approximate time of this trip?

W: That was in April 1944.

Q: You were on your way back?

W: I was on my way back from duty in Australia to take up duty in Washington once again. Another incident that might tell about Gen Arnold and myself was that early in 1945, when the war was still quite strenuous, or active, or precarious in the Pacific, and we were leading up to what everyone thought would require an invasion of the home islands of Japan. Gen Arnold called me in one day and he said:"You haven't been out of this office since you got back here last year, have you?" I said:"Why no, I haven't." He said: "How would you like to go as the official observer on the assault landing at Iwo Jima?" Well, I paid no attention to Iwo Jima, because that wasn't one of my concerns at the time. I thought that that would be a very fine opportunity,which I grabbed, and provided the highlight of my career. So as I say, Gen Arnold was not entirely unmindful of the people who were working for him, because I was surprised that he realized that I had not been out of that office during the year or so that I had been back from Australia. However, just at that same time, he had forgotten his promise that afterwards appeared important to me, but at the time, was not at all a concern of mine because I never was sensible enough of how promotions were made to work at.

Q: In other words, he did not put you in for a promotion at that time?

W: The agreement was with Kenney that, if Kenney would let me go from my Chief of Staff job down in SW Pacific which was one star...

Q: Arnold would give you two to come back?

W: Would give me two because I would come back, I would act as his Chief of Staff.

Q: Was that Deputy Chief of Air Staff?

W: No, it was actual Chief of Staff, and because Barney Giles, who was then Chief of Staff was going on a world trip. So I acted as Arnold's principal staff officer. Then when I finished, when Barney got back, I was...

Q: This trip he did, was it 1944, Giles?

W: Yes, this was May, June, perhaps into July.

Q: Really? During the invasion of Europe?

W: Yes, but I don't know whether he looked in on this invasion or not. The trip took Barney Giles to all of the theaters andperhaps around the world. I don't know.

Q: So that second tour in Washington, you were in Arnold's office, between April 1944 and the time you went to Iwo Jima? Iwo Jima was in Feb 1945.

W: The time is actually May 1944, June and July. Probably those three months.

Q: That he was away?

W: That Barney Giles was away.

Q: And you left again, around, say end of January or early February 1945?

D: On the trip to Iwo Jima. I was, at that time, the Asst Chief of Staff, OC&R.

Q: Operations, Commitments and Requirements?

W: That's right. Which is what would now be A-3, something of that sort.

Q: Did you leave before Arnold had his major heart attack, or after?

W: I believe that that happened while I was in command at Eglin Field. I left the office in late June or early July of 1945. Went to Orlando, which was then called the AF Center.

Q: Is that SAT, School of Applied Tactics?

W: School of Applied Tactics was there at the time, I think.

Q: But you weren't in that?

W: No, I was the commander, I was the top commander at Orlando.

Q: Of the SAT?

W: No, of the whole thing, it was called "AF Center", or Air Force Center, I guess. We closed up the Orlando part, moved the Hqs and what was left into Eglin Field as we demobilized. I think it was at that time that Gen Arnold went down to Coral Gables.

Q: He was down there January,February and March of 1945. He was there before then.

W: All right, I was in the office at that time.

Q: Were you in the office when Eaker came in to be the Deputy?

W: I was not only in the office when Eaker came in, but I was kicked out with all the rest of the pricipal staff officers at that time.

Q: You mean moved out of your office?

W: Moved out, yes. Vandenberg came back, took my job. As a matter of fact, Eaker replaced all the principal staff officers by other officers, practically all at one time

Q: That is right?

W: That is right!

Q: Then he had pretentions to succeed Arnold?

W: I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know.

Q: Was that the scuttlebutt?

W: I don't know. I didn't get in on that sort of thing. I think Eaker was an ambitious person. Is, perhaps. The only thing that I know along that line is that he and Fred Anderson had a tie-in during a staff meeting one time. It looked to me as though Eaker thought Fred Anderson was bucking for the job because someone had said: "It would be a young person, who had recent war experience." So on and so forth. Eaker, as Chief of Staff, undertook to put Fred Anderson in his place for having such thoughts as he might have, and which I didn't know about.

Q: Fred Anderson was one of the heir-apparents, too. I'm asking?

W: I don't know.

Q: At least, Eaker thought he was being groomed for a top job, as a rival possibly?

W: I think that's what caused this verbal encounter during a staff meeting between them.

Q: What was the nature of this verbal encounter?

W: Just simply that, well, not knowing the background of the thing, it looked to me like it exploded on some thoughts that were in Eaker's head, that perhaps Fred Anderson had given him occasion to think, about which I knew nothing.

Q: But in this verbal encounter, Eaker was putting Fred Anderson in his place?

W: He did, in no uncertain terms.

Q: Okay, let me place your situation in the Air Staff, you went to Iwo Jima. Iwo Jima I think was Feb 19,1945, so you were there for a couple of weeks, and then came back.

W: I was there until early March.

Q: Then you came back, and then Eaker came in in April. Then, that's when he moved you out?

W: Yes.

Q: So you had come back and then a month later you were moved out of your job?

W: Yes, I don't like to keep bragging about my position in the Staff, but through Chauncey, Eaker asked me to stay on. It looked to me like Eaker wanted at least one person of the former regime to stay on, perhaps for some continuity. Or perhaps, Eaker

had a liking for me. I don't know.

Q: Did this sit well with Arnold, where was Arnold at this time? I know he was down at Coral Gables, but he came back at the end of March. He came back briefly and then went to Europe.

W: Yes, I feel that Arnold was not taking an active part in the maneuvering of the office at that time, knowing that his regime was closing. And also, you will perhaps recall that there had been some criticism of Arnold's reluctance to leave thejob and to let someone else take over. There was a feeling among the staff, including myself, that things were somewhat slowed up because Arnold refused to...

Q: Delegate?

W: Not to delegate, no, but to step down from his job as Commander, Army Air Forces, and let the next man take over and let things move on in normal fashion.

Q: You mean when he was ill?

W: When he was ill. There were too many decisions that seemed to require the top man's word that weren't made, simply because Arnold was not on the job, but he was still the commander.

Q: Right. I saw some correspondence between Lovett and other people in which Lovett expressed such a view that Marshall and King were bypassing the Army Air Forces because Arnold was the titular head of the Army Air Forces, but he wasn't present. They didn't go to Giles, who was the next man in the job, they simply made the decision without concurrence or consulting the Army Air Forces.

W: I didn't realize that, but I can...

Q: Does this fit in with your thought?

W: Yes, I can believe the situation would have resulted in just such action.

Q: Was Giles not a strong enough man to pick up all the marbles and carry on in Arnold's stead?

W: I don't know. As a matter of fact, I was never closely associated with Barney Giles. I never served with him to know about his work, and my association in the office there was to come in and relieve him, and he'd come back and relieve me. So that I have no way of evaluating his work. I had no difficulty with Barney in my job as Asst Chief of Staff, OC&R, while he was Chief of Air Staff of the AAF.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold got sick? I think it was right around Inauguration

Day of Roosevelt. Roosevelt's last inauguration in January?

W: That would be in 1945?

Q: Jan 20,1945, this was right before YALTA. Do you remember? YALTA began about a week or 10 days later, and Arnold was unable to attend, and this was when Kuter was chosen to represent him. Do you remember that?

W: I remember Kuter going to the YALTA thing. I remember that, but I feel that my duties, kept my nose so close to the grindstone. OC&R was a very large, and a very complicated activity. There were so many ramifications in the thing, that I felt that my efforts had to be expended there. I had very little time to dig my nose into something that wasn't my direct concern, so those things, such as Kuter going to YALTA. Until now, I didn't realize that Arnold didn't go. Those things would not make any particular difference, I mean, particular impression on me at the time because of this necessity for whole application on my own work.

Q: You know, they kept Arnold's illness secret. Why?

W: I don't know. I feel that that, and I think I have heard some of the Flight Surgeon people say that that was Arnold's own work, of keeping the thing secret. But I don't know. There is a former Flight Surgeon and a former Asst Chief Flight Surgeon right here in this area, I don't know whether you would want to go into this sickness part?

Q: Who is that?

W: BG Charlie Glenn, Ret., who lives here at the Parklane, and I think that he would have a very good slant on this incapicatation of Arnold.

Q: Was Arnold his patient?

W: I don't believe that he was a direct patient, but Glenn's being in the Chief Flight Surgeon's office at the time would, I think, be very close to what was going on. As I say, he was Asst to the Chief Flight Surgeon, and also - if I'm not mistaken - made the trip with Arnold, out to the Pacific, when he made his trip out there in early 1944.

Q: 1945?

W: 1944.

Q: Was he out in the Pacific in 1944, too?

W: That's right, that's when it was arranged that I go back to Washington. As I say, I think that, as I think of it now, it may be the Flight Surgeon was along.

because Arnold was afraid of what might happen.

Q: Well, he had had a heart attack in 1943, a small one, a minor one.

W: Well, that probably explains the inclusion of a Flight Surgeon in the trip.

Q: I wasn't aware that he went out to the Pacific in 1944. Was this early 1944?

W: This was early 1944, perhaps as early as, I wouldn't, I'm not certain on that either because the only thing that I know is, that it was a month or two before I left. at the end of March. Now it could have been late 1943.

Q: I'm thinking that he was out to Tehran and Cairo in December 1943. He was in that area, and he may have extended his trip. Remember the Tehran and Cairo conferences in Nov and Dec 1943? Could it have been that early?

W: December 1943, I think that it couldn't have been very much after that, but I also do not feel that he flew eastward from Cairo to get to Australia.

Q: He did that in 1942. In Sept 1942, he flew to Australia and he conferred with MacArthur.

W: Well, I feel that this is another trip.

Q: Do you remember that. Were you out there? When did you come in under Kenney?

W: Early Sept 1942.

Q: All right, Arnold came out within a month. He came out with Jake Smart.

W: I don't recall that.

Q: Remember, he conferred with MacArthur out in New Guinea, and Brisbane. I guess he met MacArthur in Brisbane but he also went to New Guinea. They flew him out there. This was at the end of Sept 1942, early October 1942.

W: Yes, well, I was there, but I have no recollection of his visit. I don't know why. I was at Brisbane at the time. It may be that his stop there was brief, that I dïn't even see him.

Q: But you were Chief of Staff to Kenney at the time?

W: I was Chief of Staff to Kenney - a separate office. However, if he were there?

Q: You say, you came early September 1942?

W: Early September 1942, that's right. I don't think it is possible that I was away from the office that early, because I was getting onto the work there.

Q: He also stopped at Noumea and he was a factor in the relief of Ghormley by Halsey. Do you remember that happened just about that time?

W: No, I don't.

Q: You see, a month or two after Guadalcanal, things were going very badly in the South Pacific. They took Ghormley out of there and put Halsey in. Do you remember?

W: No, I don't recall that. Too far from our own show.

Q: You were just starting out. Well, MacArthur was starting out in New Guinea. This was really the beginning of his push.

W: As a matter of fact, at that time, in Sept 1942, no forward push had started as I recall it. I think we were still wondering whether we could maintain our position which had been a hqs push forward. If it had gone any father south, it would have been in the ocean south of Australia. But, the headquarters had been brought up to Brisbane before I got there.

Q: You stayed with Kenney through the Big Push up the coast of New Guinea, Buna...

W: Up until they were going into Hollandia. When the Hollandia position was being consolidated, that was when I left to go back to Washington.

Q: Yes, you were the No. 2 man under Kenney?

W: No, not quite, the No. 2 man was Ennis Whitehead, and he was in New Guinea. I was in the office at Brisbane with Kenney.

Q: You were more "Administration?"

W: Very much so. I considered my job taking off of Kenney's shoulders all of the little details that had to be done around an AF Hqs., so that he could pay attention to his tactical and strategical operations.

Q: He had a number of men there who he trained, you know, "Squeeze" Wurtsmith and Ennis Whitehead, and a couple of others. There was some trouble with Arnold, or with Washington. Arnold wanted to send people out to Kenney, some of his staff. Arnold wanted to rotate some of his senior staff members out there. Kenney wanted to promote his own boys to the big job. Do you remember this?

W: No, I don't recall that. My recollection of the fight with Washington was to get equipment out there.

Q: Yes, that was another fight. Kenney was always pushing to get more airplanes.

W: Yes.

Q: Do you remember the circumstances where he cut a truck in half and flew it in half, and then welded it together again when a plane flew it to New Guinea? Did he do

things like this?

W: I wouldn't be at all surprised. I don't remember that one, but I do remember the business of putting eight forward machine guns on a B-25 airplane and then, Kenney, coming back to the States to convince Arnold and the factories that they should do that in the US. We were doing it in our shop in Australia.

Q: Did it work?

W: It worked very,very well. We had a fellow out there who was the top enthusiast in this business by the name of Pappy Gunn, who said:"When you open up with these things, and hit a Jap cargo ship, it looks like a neon sign lighting up." And that was about correct.

Q: What was Pappy Gunn's job? Was he in charge of Ordnance?

W: He was sort of overall ordnanace enthusiastic sparkplug, directly under Ennis Whitehead. George Kenney wrote a little story about Gunn which was in Reader's Digest some years ago, which is perhaps a little bit overdrawn, as George Kenney was accustomed to doing when he became enthusiastic. George Kenney was one of the most loquacious enthusiasts I ever ran into.

Q: Would you say he sold MacArthur on airpower?

W: Yes, I rather think so. I think MacArthur had pretty much an old ground officer's attitude about air power, and perhaps egged on by the experiences he had had with airpower before George Kenney got out there. I think that George Kenney was very largely, perhaps principally responsible for teaching MacArthur that this business of clearing the way for the ground troops was the only way against a hostile air action that the forward motion of ground troops could be made. I think MacArthur ended up thoroughly sold on that idea. In order to be sold in that way, he had to change what I feel were his ideas, his prejudices, which were gained with all the conviction that ground people had in those days, and at least some exposure to the battle that we air people had with the ground people. In those days, this partial recognition of airpower was very,very new, and not at all generally accepted. And,of course, the operations in the Pacific, the so-called Island-hopping business was a matter of knocking out the resistance, and then, the troops landing on the shore. Although the movement was around the shore of New Guinea, each movement was as though the next place were a separate island.

Q: They worked out a very effective technique of air-ground cooperation. Did they not?

W: Yes, they did, and that was the only possible way, but as long as the Japanese opposition existed, that was the only possible way that this thing could have been done.

Q: Just before you left, the B-29 came into the picture as an operational weapon. Kenney and MacArthur made a pitch for the B-29. Do you remember that? Were you involved in that?

W: No directly. Kenney and MacArthur were always trying to get the mostest and the bestest, all sorts of equipment. MacArthur tried to make a war of that theater long before the War Dept would accept that as an important piece of our overall strategy.

Q: In other words, he was trying to raise his priority? It had a second or a third priority?

W: All the time.

Q: And he wanted to move it to No. 1, I guess?

W: Well, yes, being MacArthur, it would have to move to No. 1, or no place, or it would not be anywhere.

Q: Did Kenney understand how to use the B-29?

W: Weel, Kenney understood that the B-29 could carry a larger bomblod than anything we had in SW Pacific, and that's what we needed was B-29s to move this thing forward to a place where we could reach Japan.

Q: I was told that Kenney had a conception of the B-29 like he had - you mentioned the B-15 - put eight forward guns on it, and go and strafe the opposition, and drop bombs in a close air support, rather than in a strategic role.

W: I rather doubt that, I suspected that's one of the myths that grew up after the war.

Q: This is somebody that doesn't think muct of Kenney's strategic thinking.

W: Perhaps so, perhaps so. I think George Kenney was as well imbued with the use of strategic airpower as any of our commanders.

Q: You had great admiration for Kenney?

W: Yes, I did, I did have great admiration for Kenney because he was one of these

fellows - I think Arnold is in the class - who are willing to push ahead without seeing the obstacles on the way. And that again, I think, is a very necessary requirement on the part of a great leader.

Q: He was a driver?

W: He was a driver, and he was also an enthusiast whose enthusiasm would rub off - fail to see - I think these people failed to see the obstacles in this thing that they are trying to do. I think the difference between great leaders and nearly-great leaders, are that the latter make the wrong guess. Now Arnold and Kenney very seldom made the wrong guess. Since they didn't see the obstacles, it really gets to be a sort of intuitive thing. There again, you have that indefinable thing that goes to make for leadership, particularly in warfare.

Q: In other words, they were the opposite of the "Hamlet" psychology - "to do or not to do, that is the question". You know, the idea of some intellecturals reflectively weighing alternatives, and while they were weighing the alternatives, sometimes the war was lost. Where Arnold and Kenney made the choices, made decisions and drove forward to solutions?

W: That's right.

Q: Did you ever hear Arnold express Himself, say that it is better to make a decision, that not make a decision, and do nothing? That if 60% of your decisions are right, then it was worth making all of them?

W: No, I never heard him express that, but I know that he operated that way. And I feel that Arnold, either through his own selection or otherwise, had good staff officers around him which allowed him to make these decisions which sometimes seemed rather farfetched, but because of this good staff work that he usually had, he was able to put this thing across.

Q: Do you say that a lot of his so-called impulsive decisions had behind them careful staff work?

W: Yes, I think so, I think that is a fact. Because, with my own inclination, to look for what might happen in trying to accomplish this thing, I have started out on propositions that were proposed and directed by Arnold with the thought that this thing just doesn't work, there is too much in the way. However, as you work with such things, and have other people with them, they did come out, and they did come out the

right way, and...

Q: Did that surprise you sometimes?

W: It surprised me sometimes.

Q: Were you inclined to be more cautious than Arnold?

W: Quite so; quite so. There is only one occasion that I recall when Arnold got out on a limb, and I don't remember what the propostion was. But he called an unusual staff meeting. We always had an early morning staff meeting, and if anything special was to come up that Arnold wanted to present to the staff, at any hour of the day he would call in the pricipal officers. On this occasion he called us tinto his staff meeting room, which was next door to his office. We all sat and listened for 10 or 15 minutes to this new proposition.

Q: Did he present it?

W: He presented it without notes, someone had sold him an idea.

Q: When was this? About late '44 maybe?

W: I think it was in early '45, though I'm not sure, because as you mention his sickness now, it was more likely in late '44, because I can't recall that Arnold had entered upon his real sickness.

Q: But he presented this proposition?

W: He presented this proposition to perhaps a dozen staff officers all around the big table, and toward the end, he ran down a little bit with his enthusiasm, and then stopped with his presentation. No one said a word, for a long, perhaps a minute, minute and a hlaf, which would see like quite a long time at a session of that sort. And then, Arnold blurted:"Why doesn't someone say something?" And I blurted:"It sounds screwy to me." Well Arnold was sharp enough to see that I had expressed the consensus around the table, and he turned his back and walked into his office. That's the only time that I can recall that Arnold backed away, or was on the wrong side of a proposition that he wanted to put over. And I think it's important in that, with my association with Arnold, it is the only time that I know of, where he was on the wrong side of this thing.

Q: The silence overwhelmed him?

W: The silence overwhelmed him, and not only that, but he was sharp enough to see while he was talking this thing...

Q: As he was talking it through, it didn't look as it did...

W: It didn't look as good to him and he could see that these people around the table were not taking it, were not swallowing it. With this one expression - "it sounds screwy" - I think he was convinced then, I mean at least that was the thing that pushed it over the divide. With no argument whatsoever he turned and went into his office.

Q: Who were some of the people present, do you remember? Was Giles present?

W: I can't recall.

Q: Norstad?

W: No, if Norstad were in the office he would be there, if Barney Giles were in the office he would be there.

Q: Kuter?

W: Kuter would be there, I forget who was A-1.

Q: A-1, was it Bevans?

W: Probably.

Q: And maybe Hodges is A-2?

W: Hodges, yes, and I can't remember the A-4.

Q: Pop Powers, or did he come in later?

Q: His secretary, Suzy Adkins, was she present at this?

W: No, Susy Adkins was the one who was there for years and year. At these staff meetings, we did not prdomaro;u. amd O cam't even recall an occasion, when we had a secretary.

Q: Was it research and development, or an operational problem?

W: I have no recollection of what the problem was, and I think maybe I dismissed it because the proposition was dismissed.

Q: Was dead?

W: Dead! Killed! Then and there.

Q: I wanted to ask you if it might have been the JB-2. Arnold was very interested in guided missiles. Or maybe it was the glide bomb?

W: No, doesn't ring a bell.

Q: McNarney is one of the key figures in WWII.

W: Yes, McNarney would know of the reorganization of the War Dept.

Q: Did you get in on that?

W: No, I was then Chief of Staff, 3rd AF at Tampa, Florida, and I was pulled in after the reorganization decided that there would be, I believe, two Air Corps staff officers in each principal War Dept General Staff Section. At that time, I was pulled into G-1 and...

Q: Did you work for Hilldring?

W: I worked for Hilldring until Hilldring moved out, and then I was G-1 of the War Dept, under General Marshall, a position that I felt I was very poorly suited for.

Q: Was this right after Pearl Harbor?

W: This was in the reoganization that took place in the Spring, March 1942. I came into the G-1 office about March 1942.

Q: How long did you stay there?

W: I stayed there until I went out to SW Pacific, which was early Sep '42.

Q: Did you get to see Marshall and Arnold function together?

W: No, I didn't. I felt that Arnold was quite good in working with General Marshall. General Marshall is one of the...

Q: Marshall and Arnold - you thought they were quite good?

W: Arnold was quite good in working with Gen Marshall, and Gen Marshall is the most conscientious and all around proper person in the proper place that I can recall, in the war.

Q: He was sort of a distant man, wasn't he?

W: My contacts with General Marshall were not frequent nor close, but I had the feeling that he was a person with whom you never would become close.

Q: He always referred to Arnold as "Dear Arnold", and Arnold would refer to him as "Dear General". There was always a differentiation between them.

W: Yes, I think that Arnold was conscious of his subordinate position to the Chief of Staff, War Dept. At that time, we didn't have a separation between Air and Ground

We had only separation between Ground, which included the Air, and the Navy. General Arnold felt, perhaps for his own good, that he was in a subordinate position to General Marshall. I felt that General Arnold, whether he was thoroughly sold on strategic air operations or not, was not inclined to fight for, or jeopardize his own career to put forward the idea that his invasion of Europe might possibly be abrogated, sidestepped, by a pounding of Germany and by air operations. I don't think we will ever know whether it would have been possible to do so or not, I know that a few of us air enthusiasts at that time felt that this is the golden opportunity to prove the thing that wehad just invented a few years ago at the Air Corps Tactical School. However, there was not sufficient acceptance of the Air idea. As I look back on it now, I think that it is probably entirely impracticable to think that such a thing could have been tried with the US military effort to win the war in Europe. However, I'll never be convinced that it was impossible to accomplish it in that way with a great saving of effort and lives. Simply because this very thing happened in Japan, and an example that is quite shining, quite clear, and is so often missed by people who were never bitten by that early Air bug enthusiasm. We were headed for a grand invasion of the Japanese home island, but the pounding that they took through the Air, and the sinking of their ships by submarines and airplanes, give us a shining example of how ground invasion is not necessarily required to subdue a nation. Japan of course, was an island empire. With Germany in the interior of Europe, we can visualize that as an island also, because we had not only our allies on the western and southern side of Germany, but we had Russia fighting on the other side, so that the resultant effect was that Germny was fighting as an island situation. It's one of those things that is nice to contemplate and now, with the military art moving on into different sort of strategic operations by overseas rocket business, it's quite a different thing.

Q: Do you think that Air could have broken Germany down sufficiently to move up the invasion, instead of waiting until 1944, perhaps to 1943. When I ask this question, I think of a number of diversions that took place at critical times. For example, there was a diversion in 1942 actually two diversions, one for Guadalcanal and another diversion for TORCH, North Africa. They took groups which had been earmarked for the UK and diverted them down into the Mediterranenan. Then in 1943 there were

official diversions. In other words, the so-called BOLERO, the buildup of air strength into the UK was delayed on several occasions so that they were not able to mount the kind of strength that Eaker, among others, thought was necessary to break down Germany, or soften up Germany until 1944. For this reason, the invasion was successively postponed. There was an emergency invasion scheduled for 1942, SLEDGEHAMMER, and that was postponed. Then ROUNDUP was the invasion of Europe in 1943. That was postponed, because the British wanted it postponed.

W: Yes, the thing that I was trying to bring out was that I have a feeling there were two ways in which the US could approach this war. One was the traditional way of finally invading Germany, and the other was to place principal dependence upon beating Germany down with air action, and of course, sea actions, as well. We didn't start out to do either one of those things as a principal overall effort. We straddled the problem as too often is done. We had ground action with air support. Of course, the air support was necessary to have the ground action. But, on the other hand, at the same time, we poured effort, money and time into building aircraft to hammer at theinterior of Germany that had nothing to do with the ground action. Now the point that I was trying to make is that if we had decided to do a thing that was unheard of and very little accepted, such as defeat Germany by air action as the principal effort, then we would have had a different war.

Q: There were some who advocated that, but Marshall and King who were in the dominiant positions in the JCS did not accept that. Marshall did not accept that.

W: I doubt very much whether it was put forward by anyone as a serious, plausible plan.

Q: Well, it was put forward at the CBO, Casablanca, remember Eaker made the case for daylight strategic bombing, and Churchill bought it. Remember the combined bomber offensive (CBO) and then, they started to build it up. This was a plan accepted. But they no sooner built it up when they started to take planes away from them.

W: That's what I'm saying. We were doing both; we were doing a ground action, we were doing an air action.

Q: Do you think that Arnold failed, in some way, to convey this thought that air action could be the principal weapon in Europe?

W: Without knowing, actually, I feel that Arnold with his own personal ambition would have been reluctant to push this thing to any extent that would jeopardize his position.

Q: As Chief of the AAF under Marshall?

W: Yes.

Q: In other words, you are saying that Marshall did not accept that?

W: I haven't any idea that Marshall ever could have accepted it, because he came up as a ground officer. He was thoroughly convinced that ground action was necessary. I think the thing that possibly put our air effort on the map was Roosevelt's acceptance of this thing as something sensational or different, or a possibility and perhaps good for industry in the US - that sort of thing.

Q: But he didn't understand airpower, either?

W: He didn't understand it, but very,very few people did understand airpower.

Q: Did Andrews understand airpower.

W: I don't know, I rather think he did, because Andrews as the first commander of what was called the GHQ AF and he had with him,officers who were either directly connected recently with the Air Coprs Tactical School, such as Ken Walker and Harold George and Bob Olds. Whether or not they had been in on the actual beginning of this airpower essence, which began only in the Spring of 1934. Before that time there was quite a conversion to the idea of rear area bombing, but nothing specific. Now rear area bombing was invented way back in WWI, by Mitchell and Trenchard and Douhet.

Q: Let me ask you to speculate. You say Arnold was exiled from Washington after Billy Mitchell?

W: Arnold was exiled, right about the time of Billy Mitchell trial because he had issued a paper and circulated the paper that was made up in his Information Division which he, at the time, was handling for General Patrick. He was exiled because the War Dept took objection to what he had in the paper. I don't know if I ever saw the paper, and don't know what was in it, but for that, he was exiled.

Q: He circulated thatpaper? Let me ask you about that paper. He circulated it to whom?

W: I don't know, and as a matter of fact, it is hearsay that I'm starting now, that Arnold was exiled because of the circulation of a paper

Q: Herbert Dargue was also exiled at that time.

W: At the time I didn't know Dargue, so he made no impression on me. But as a matter of fact, I didn't know Arnold, either. But I think maybe because Arnold afterwards became more or less famous and, in the news, I remembered his exile. Now another incident that also is in connection with this. Arnold, during his exile, was probably prettt close to despondency. I have been told by my Flight Surgeon friends that Arnold walked the streets of Ft Riley night after night with a Flight Surgeon by the name of Fabian Pratt trying to bring him out of this despondency.

Q: You mean Pratt was trying to bring Arnold out of his despondency?

W: Right, now Arnold was very much concerned very much about this exile ruining his career, and for that reason, was pretty low.

Q: Fabian Pratt is not alive?

W: I think he died.

Q: Would Glenn know anything about that?

W: Yes, I feel pretty sure he would, because it would be scuttlebutt among the Flight Surgeons, don't you know. My information on that line comes more from BG Gene Reinartz, who died last year. He was also a Flight Surgeon.

Q: Would Charlie Glenn know something about that?

W: I rather think he would.

Q: Perhaps I could call him up?

W: Do you want me to call him?

Q: Yes, when we conclude here, you can call him.

Q: Back on the subject of Andrews. The reason I dwell on that, Andrews and Knerr were pushing for a separate air force at the time McNarney came up with his compromise plan in March 1942. That was a compromise to give the AF equality with theground forces and the service forces. I have seen correspondence between Knerr and Andrews indicating that Arnold had betrayed the cause of separate air power.

W: Well, there again, I think it's a matter of personal career. I don't know how much Arnold knew about this new idea. The argument for a separate air power was largely on the basis that ground people were just not suited to running air power. Their thinking and their maneuvering was so restricted. Here was this airplane that could reach out

much farther and do things that people had never heard of doing.

Q: Do you think that Arnold, being the supreme pragmatist that he was, saw that Marshall would never buy this proposition, and did not want to push it?

W: I think it's quite possible; I think that's quite possible.

Q: You know, I am remined of another incident which occured in 1945.

(Told about LeMay briefing in May or June 1945 and Arnold's neutrality)

Q: We are talking about your reaction to the LeMay briefing of Marshall in 1945.

W: Yes, and I say these things have a momentum, the whole of the military effort of the US had the momentum of ground invasion. Ground inasion had succeeded in Europe, and we were poised for ground invasion of Japan. Human minds had a fixity that prevents upsetting that momentum. Right now, today, we are in he greatest danger that we were ever in. As a nation, and the world shares that danger with us, because the momentum of more of everything in the way of military weapons keeps us building rockets and ABMs because the momentum of thinging - the more we have, the better we areprotected. Now, the thing that we must all realize, and the sooner the better, is that there is no outcome to this thing, which depends upon the non-action of one or two nervous fingers, except annihilation of the people who are building things to protect themselves. Now, our side and the Red side are building these things through this momentum of thinking that we are providing protection, whereas if we use this thing that we are setting up for defense, it can do nothing except wipe out both sides, and the rest of the world. Right now, today, we have at least one thousand ICBMs on our side, and we can assume that Russia has 1,000 ICBMs on their side, poised for certain targets in each of these opposing territories. We are beginning the building of ABMs. We claim Russia has already deployed ABMs and we can assume that both sides provide enough ABMs to combat the ICBMs of the other side. Now, if we let the ICBMs stay where they are, and eliminate for easy figuring the submarines that are going to fire similar rockets, we will have with a perfect ABM approximately 4,000 atomic explosions at the time.

Q: We are talking about the military conception today -" the more the better"- we and Russia seem to be heading for a collison in the, let, us hope, distant future.

W: So long as we maintain these armatments that can ruin each side, and President Nixon, himself, in his July 30 news conference here in California said that each side

has enough rockets to ruin the other side, many times over.....

Q: You said you thought Arnold was an opportunist; what did you mean by that?

W: Well, as we are talking of these theoretical things and teorectical battles that one might enter into. I don't feel that Arnold was inclined to enter into a knock-down dragout fight for a principle that might interfere with a personal career. Of course, there is no...

Q: In other words, he was not Billy Mitchell?

W: Not a Billy Mitchell.

Q: And you think his experience in 1925 cured him of that?

W: I feel that his experience in you say '25, I think it was '24.

Q: Well, '25 was the Mitchell trial.

W: Well, about that time, I think that his experience and also the depression dependency that brought him into, would probably be a reflection when it came time to enter into such a fight. There is no way of hard evaluation of such things. One gains impressions from seeing and working with people. That would be my impression of Arnold.

Q: You were with him on two different tours, so you saw him almost every day for a period of time in 1944 to 1945, you saw him almost every day?

W: Well, frequently, at least.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

W: No, Arnold never did get mad at me. He never had a cross word with me. Also, he did me a little favor, which is perhaps a sidelight on Arnold's character and thinking. When I came back from the Iwo Jima landing, we were in a staff meeting and Arnold leaned over and asked me:"Well, how did you get along? How are you." or some such words as that. I said:"Well, everything went all right, and I'm whole, except that I lost my pocketknife." "Oh, you did? Well, here's one." He reached in his pocket and gave me a super-pocketknife. But he said:"You must give me a penny." Well, I didn't know the superstition at the time. He said:"You must give me a penny to avoid cutting a friendship." (Showed the pocket-knife)

Q: This must have been late in March 1945, because he was in Washington for about a week or 10 days between the time he came back from Florida until he went to Europe. Remember he went to Europe on a so-called convalescent trip?

W: No, I don't recall that.

Q: He went to the Riviera and Cannes. This is right around VE Day.

W: I have a vague recollection, yes.

Q: But you stayed in Washington at this time?

W: Yes, I was in Washington.

Q: And when he left - this is when Eaker came in. When Eaker moved everyone around and moved you out of your job, Arnold wasn't there, right?

W: I'm not certain, but it could easily be that he wasn't there.

Q: Eaker would not have taken these moves if Arnold was his boss, right?

W: Oh no. I think it could well have happened with Arnold there. Yes, because, as I say, I think that Arnoldhad ceased the hand on the helm activity at that time.

Q: But Arnold later came back did he not for a brief period? After the war ended, like VJ Day, he was around for a few months, and then he turned it over to Spaatz.

W: He was off and on the job, and as we said before, I thought that things didn't get done because he wasn't sufficiently on the job.

Q: Right, well, during the last year, he was on convalescent leave a lot of the time. He was also busy getting his ranch ready. He made several visits out there, busily in correspondence with the man who was building his ranch for him. At the end of the war, he had lost interest in Washington, and he was anxious to leave Washington for his ranch.

W: Yes, and that's the period when the feeling was that he should have stepped out earlier,and let the next man actually take over, make the decisions, and carry on.

Q: Who did you think the next man should have been?

W: I don't remember speculating on that.

Q: Did many people think it should be Spaatz, or Eaker, or somebody else?

W: I think the feeling was the Spaatz was a natural selection because he had been in command in Europe, and Spaatz was apparently always close to Arnold.

Q: Yes, a little closer than Eaker.

W: I wouldn't say "closer than Eaker", but perhaps, well, Spaatz was always ahead of Eaker in positions.

Q: During this time Spaatz had been sent to the Pacific, so perhaps it was regarded that Eaker was in a holding position?

W: Could easily be, I don't know.

Q: Was there any speculation that Eaker was trying to seize control in the sense that when he changed around these staff officers, to solidify himself in control?

W: You know, I have no recollection on that sort of thing, and I doubt very much whether I have any feeling on it, because my nature was never such, that let me get into this, oh what do you call it, the royal household maneuvering, the kitchen politics or that sortof thing. I always felt that my talents and efforts were insufficient to take care of the duties that I felt were my responsibilities.

Q: Was Fred Dean there when you were there?

W: Fred Dean was in General Arnold's front office, yes, and I think, would have a - I don't know whether you have talked to him or not.

Q: I did, but without my recorder. I saw him on an airplane.

W: Yes, and how about Cabell?

Q: I talked to Cabell. Cabell was there earlier in the war. He wasn't there later in the war.

W: There was a George Schulgen.

Q: He was in Public Relations, I don't know where he is.

W: I thought he was in the front office. Didn't George Schulgen have a scheme for establishing atomic bombs around the world, to keep the world at peace at theend of the war?

Q: I hadn't heard that. Do you remember any other specific dealings you had with Arnold during this year that you were back, 1944-45? Any difficult problems where he perhaps made a decision that stuck in your mind? Maybe didn't make a decision or anything about his attitude?

W: No, our relationship was always so smooth that I have no recollection of difficulty with Arnold. This little incident that I recounted inthe staff meeting was not something that I felt created any animosity or any feeling. I don't remember ever presenting a proposition through my staff section that Arnold didn't approve. So, as I said before, never a cross word, so our relationship was very, very amiable.

Q: Do you remember him and von Karman?

W: I remember when von Karman was making his study of what should be the future of the AF.

Q: "Toward New Horizons".

W: Yes.

Q: Do you remember Arnold's relationship with Grandison Garner? He was down in Eglin Field?

W: I know Grand, yes.

Q: And Arnold was a gadgeteer, in OC&R you may have gotten into this. Arnold had a great feeling for guided missiles. Were you aware of that?

W: No, that more in Grand Garner's running of the experimental business at Eglin Field than in mine. It was also something that hadn't yet entered the actual operational phase. That's how it would come into my staff section.

Q: One item that came in to the OC&R at this time was the shifting of thousands of men from the Air Corps to the Infantry. Do you remember that?

W: Yes, I remember that. We felt very badly about that, and we felt that the Ground forces shouldhave known more about how to provide for replacements, and we thought it was a very inefficient way of using military talent to take airplane mechanics and put them in infantry lines to fire a rifle.

Q: Well, they needed men in a hurry. Yours were the only available men in uniform, so they grabbed what they could.

W: And of course, it's a natural development, and particularly, since we were not trying to make air business the principal effort.

Q: Right, How about the rotation policy, the 25-mission business? Did you get into that, about what it should be, and when they should rotate? Rotation after 25 missions in Europe?

W: Yes, in one way I got into it that shortly after I took on the job as Acting Chief of Staff. Some lady in Congress called me to protest about some constituent who had, who was not going to have a leave after training here in the US, who was going to be sent directly from training to Europe. We talked for 20 minutes on the telephone. The lady in Congress tried to convince me that the AF should give these men leave after training here, rather then sending them direct to the battle front. And of course, my argument with the lady was that those men who were at the front had already had their quota of missions, and were coming down with war fatigue and should be relieved. These other men training in the US were so much more suitable then those that were already on the job.

Q: Do you remember who this was - Edith Green or Margaret Chase Smith?

W: I have a feeling that it was a New Englander. But there again, the incident and the principle involved...

Q: It could have been Margaret Chase Smith?

W: I don't know. The incident and the principles involved were the things that impressed me, and not personalities.

Q: Were you involved in the postwar planning?

W: No, I'm thinking of redeployment. Redeployment was in our section and a fellow by the name of...

Q: Was Trubee Davison involved in that?

W: No, Trubee Davision was still in the A-1 business, I guess.

W: Lessig was our man in OC&R who handled the redeployment. Did a very,very good job.

Q: Arnold was gungho for redeployment,wasn't he?

W: Well, I don't know. It was a War Dept thing. The War Dept and the AF worked together on it, carefully as we could. We could have used a lot more staff in the Pacific. except that we didn't have the ground facilities to take care of them. We probably didn't redeploy to the Pacific as fast as they were available in Europe.

Q: Were you involved in the deployment of B-29s, theproblem of getting them out to the Pacific?

W: Yes, in a way. The big problem there was working the bugs out of the B-29. That was one of the things that Arnold was very much excited about, and very intent on curing, and getting people in from factories and Materiel Division, Wright Patterson in working out the bugs, mostly down in the SW part of the US,where the work was done.

Q: Do you remember the thing out at Salinas, Kansas, they were trying to get the first wing of theB-29s out there, and Arnold went out. I think Benny Meyers went out there briefly. They were modifying theplanes, to get each of the planes ready and ship them out. Do you remember that?

W: No.

Q: This was in 1944, just before you got back. So you remember anything that Arnold did, any decisions he took on the B-29 problem to push them out?

W: No, I wasn't close enough to it, our job in OC&R was to pick up available, I mean ready airplanes and people, and get them out to the theater. The other people, the Materiel people, had the job of getting these planes ready.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's decision to relieve Possum Hansell and put LeMay in the job? This happened in January 1945.

W: No, I didn't. I was, perhaps going, at that time, out to the Pacific to get ready for Iwo Jima. I was a little early for joining up with the Navy, and went on down to see Australia again, and see what had happened down there. And then came back north again, and joined up with the Navy at Ulithi.

Q: Do you recall that Norstad had an important role in this. I think Norstad was sent out there to tell "Possum" Hansell the bad news. Do you remember that?

W: No, I remember Norstad running the 20th AF business as an office man. Norstad was in the office in Washington.

Q: You and Benny Meyers...

W: Yes, we used to work together in the early part of the war on the allocation of airplanes between different types so that we could reach a pre-determined figure of the number of airplanes. That's when we were playing the numbers racket.

Q: He was very quick with numbers?

W: He was not only quick with numbers, he was the sharpest brain that I encountered during my military experience.

Q: Did you feel that he was a little bit on the shady side?

W: Yes, yes, I did. I regret speakingof anyone in that way, but I felt that Benney was real smart, and also, that he might throw a number of airplanes into a manufacturer whom he wanted to favor, rather than consider the strategic requirements for airplanes.

Q: Arnold had great confidence in him?

W: I really don't know of the relationship between Arnold and Benny Meyers.

Q: My reading of it is thatthey both were doers,

W: Oh yes.

Q: Arnold needed quick answers and Benny had them?

Q: Benny had them, whether they were right or wrong, but he could make them sound plausible.

Q: Actually, his boss was Echols?

W: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold bypass Echols to go to Benny Meyers for answers?

W: I really don't know. That would be in the Materiel Division and their own internal business. I think Benney Meyers had quite an influence on Arnold and on the Materiel setup

Q: You had no inkling, though, during the war that he was engaged in illegal business?

W:No, I had no inkling or idea of that kind.

Q: There were several rumors about him during the war, but you didn't know about these?

W: Benny, at one time, told me of makingmoney on buying bonds and borrowing money on the bonds as security. But that was such high finance that I wouldn't even understand what it was, or how it was done?

Q: But he was living high all the time, wasn't he?

W: Apparently.

Q: Didn't he drive Cadillacs?

W: I don't know about that, but Benny was a very lavish dresser, you might say, In that way, he stood out.

Q: He was a lavish liver, too. Mrs Arnold said that some people thought his second wife had money, and that's why he was living it up.

m (Record 2)

Q: General Wilson wrote this note about Arnold: "I admired Hap Arnold for his willingness (or ignorance) to push ahead despite or without seeing obstacles. Sometimes his propositions seemed far fetched, but his faith and luck in his staff allowedhim to announce his decisions with seeming disregard or failure to see obstacles. This is a great asset for a high commander so long as his vision, luck and staff do not lead him out on a limb. Although he was generally correct and his schemes worked out, he was not faultless in judgement. I recall one occasion..."

W: There is something else that I would like to get in the record here, in that I would like very much to be assured that you will edit this thing because undoubtedly I have said things about people that, if I were writing, I would put in a different words, so that the inpact would not be quite so personal, and quite so pointed, and quite so critical.

Q: All right. Now let me say something, this is for background purposes only.

Q: General, you said that near the ned of WWII, there was a scheme for General Marshall to take command in the Pacific, with Arnold to serve as Air Commander. This ting didn't take, but it was serious enough a project that Arnold gave you a task of gathering information?

W: That's correct.

Q: Could you tell me a little bit about that?

W: I was assigned the business of forming a small staff section.

Q: Was this at the end of the European war?

W: This was, yes. I'm not certain whether the European War had actually finished, or whether it was coming to a finish. Wait a minute, I think maybe I'm gettingthe time fixed, in that it was late. No. Time has escaped me. I had a small section of 3 or 4 officers and myself with the duty of finding out something about the geographical climatic, industrial and overall setup in Japan, what we might be doing in the Pacific, as an AF working against Japan. This was to be used as a part of Gen Arnold's air hqs., should he be sent to the Pacific as the Air officer under General Marshall.

Q: You mean this was a serious propostion to send Marshall out to finish the Pacific War?

W: This was sufficiently serious on Arnold's part to feel thathe could be the Air Man. on this show. It was my understanding that Gen Marshall was to be the overall commander.

Q: I have not seen that before. You say this promised promotion, if you were to be taken back from Kenney's staff and brought back to Washington was delayed for a year, and Arnold wrote a letter of apology?

W: Yes.

Q: Do you have that letter?

W: Yes, I'll look for that now.

Q: You raised a question about whether Arnold was superstitious when he asked for a penny for the knife.

W: I never saw any other indication of superstition on his part, and I don't know now whether he was following just the custom,or whether he was actually superstitious.

Q: You were not one of these who were very close to him? You were not in his inner circle, like Kuter or Rosie O'Donnell?

W: No, I was one of the working boys.

Q: You said something about he could cut your throat and never lose the famouse smile. He had this smile on his face...

W: Yes, that was a built-in physical characterisiic. I think it had no indication of what he was thinking. It wasn't the ordinary smile that we know, and it was a thing perhaps, with which he was born, because that was what won him the name "Hap". I think he got that name at the Military Academy. It was a common thing that he could cut your throat and smile would never change.

Q: You talked about working for Arnold. He worked you 12 hours a day,6 days a week?

W: That was not necessarily Arnold's requirement. It was a conscientious matter on my part and on the part of others who were working on the staff at that time, who felt that the only limit to o r working hours was our own physical and mental capacity. We were there very early in the morning, and we worled until late in the evening, after ordinary dinnertime. This went on for 6 days a week, and oftentimes, Sunday morning.

Q: You had an interesting comment that he was not exposed to the doctrines of the AirCorps Tactical School after 1934. Why do you use that date?

W: I use the date "1934" to indicate the beginning of what got to be the overall basic strategic principle for the employment of strategic air forces. I happen to know about that because I was charged with the instruction of the Air Corps Tactical School class in the year 1933-34, and I was to take over the AF course. The AF course was a culmination of all the things that we had been leading up to in the year's course at the Air Corps Tactical School. When I was saddled with this job, I didn't know where to start, but I felt that there was more to this business of strategic bombing than simply bombing the rear areas. Unless we could get to something more specific in that, we would be doing somewhat as Douhet had claimed was the way to do a long before WWI, when he said that the thing to do was to take your bombers,put them in a formation and lay down a carpet of destruction in hostile territory, thus hoping that something of value might be hit. The idea struck me that in industrial nations, that this war-making potential was a web of interwoven things, interdependent, and that by picking out the critical, essential items in various systems, that we could actually produce a worthwhile effort with the relatively small number of airplanes of such bombing accuracy as we had at the time. As most everyone knows now, that was adopted as the basic strategic scheme for the employment of strategic air forces. That beginning was the Srping of 1934.

Q: You mention here AWPD-1,the Air War Plan that Harold George and Ken Walker and a couple of others put together right before Pearl Harbor.Did you have any involvement in that?

W: No,I was not directly involved,except that they were using the scheme that I have just been talking about.

Q: In other words,they adopted some of the ideas that were developed at the Tactical School in the '30s?

W: That;s right, they were putting into practice this thing that had been advanced as a pure and simple theory at the time. There was no experience in this...

Q: In which you have played an important role?

W: I played the primary originating role in this.

Q: And you mentioned that Arnold did not pick up this theorectical concept when he became Chief of Air Corps in the late '30s, possibly because he got burned for having performed the role of a maverick in the '20s, and he was going to play it straight?

W: I think that is generally correct . I don't know to what extent Arnold's thinking went into this theorizing thatI have been talking about.

Q: Were you aware that there was some little friction in the late '30s between Arnold and Andrews. Andrews being the BHQ AF, and he was pushing for B-17s. The War was not disposed to give the Air Coprs B-17s because they cost too much money. You could get a lot more smaller planes for the same amount of money by buying B-18s and other planes. Andrews was unhappy about that when he was heading the GHQ AF.

W: I had no direct connection with that. As a matter of fact, at that time, I was still busily engaged in my school activities at Maxwell Field. In the latter 1930s we cut down on the size of classes, and we were trying to get this strategic concept in the heads of more people, as we saw the war approaching.

Q: You mentioned Fabian Pratt at Ft Riley walking the streets to bring Arnold back from his despondency. Now, where did you get thisinformation?

W: That is hearsay information from my Flight Surgeon friend.

Q: Including Charles Glenn?

W: I'm not sure whether Charlie Glenn ever mentioned that or not. I feel sure that the late BG Gene Reinartz is the one who first mentioned it to me.

Q: You say it is your impression, without personal knowledge, that Arnold sold Roosevelt and Knudsen on the need for the great initial airplane expansion. I guess you are talking about the 50,000 plane program?

W: No, I think it was much smaller than that, I think it was either the 10,000 or 25,000 or 23,500 something like that.

Q: You say you thought he had wired in from some conference that we were to have 25,000 planes, which at that time was an exorbitant figure.

W: Yes, I'm not at all sure that we are in war, I think we are not in the war.

Q: Yes, this is prior to the war. You don't have any more information; you are just making an observation?

W: I'm making an observation, and we people, in the back room, went to work on, this is one of the places where Benny Meyers would come in with his fast figures, and we would allocate these numbers to different types of airplanes.

Q: Here's something you say: you talk about rumors of Arnold's final trip from his ranch to Washington, the disappearance of his securities and the possible connection of that with Benny Meyers shady deals. Now, what do you have in mind?

W: I have nothing in mind there except that there were such rumors afload, and that some people even seem to go so far as to believe that Arnold was tied in with Benny Meyers on this nefarious operations that finally got Benny into jail. But, as for personal knowledge,I have none whatsoever.

Q: Well, I can tell you this, if Arnold was involved in such dealings, he had to get rid of his money someplace that Mrs. Arnold didn't know about, because when he died, in 1950 - I saw his probated will - his total cash will was $19,000. That was his assets. That was his cash. That was his estate. Other than the ranch, which Mrs Arnold had, which has increased in value considerably from the day he got it, Mrs Arnold had very few assets. She had to go to work andsell real estate in order to keep body and soul together. She had three sons in the service, and they couldn't help her. They were in financially need themselves. So they were unable to help her. She had to go to work, so I think they may answer your question.

W: Well, that is perhaps what brought up these rumors, in that some people feel thatGen Arnold had much more assets than this, that he made this very trip to Washington, andwhen he got through with that trip, he didn't have the assets. Now, as I say, as far as I am concerned, that's pure rumor.

Q: You mean he gave them away or threw then away?

W: The implication is that he used those in some way in this Benny Meyers imbroglio.

Q: There is no basis for that, because when he came to Washington,he was a sick man. It wasn't his last trip. He came in 1949. That was his last one. When his son,David, graduated from West Point. But he had come in 1947, and testitifed againstBenny Meyers and he called him " theone rotten apple in the barrel." Arnold was heartbroken because he had placed so much confidence in Benny Meyers, and Benny Meyers had betrayed that confidence. He didn't want the American people and these rumor-mongers to think that Benny Meyers was characteristic. He wantedto make it clear that Meyes was an exception.

WL The way the rumors blew up is that he was wealthy, and hemakes this trip to Washington, and comes back without the securities, and thereby leaves Mrs Arnold in the straits that you had mentioned.

Q: You mean he just threw them away? Gave them away?

W: No,no, used them in some way or other. Well, the implication is to get himself out of the tie-in with Benny Meyers.

Q: It doesn't make sense, As a matter of fact, Arnold required every one of his top people, who had a procurement responsisibility, to fill out a questionnaire about their assets, I don't know if you had to fill one out? Benny Meyers had to fill one out.

W: No.

Q: Cook, Echols, all the men who had responsibility. Chidlaw, all the men who had materiel procurement responsibilities. Benny Meyers lied on his questionnaire about his assets. Then, when he testified, he said that he misstated the facts on his questionnaire, and that he had told Arnold that he had misstated them, and Arnold knew it. Arnold of course, vehemently denied this. So it doesn't make any sense to me. If Arnold was hard pressed for money, as he was at retirement. I'll tell you something else.

W: I'm glad to hear this.

Q: I'll tell you something else that throws this all cocked hat, and I'm almost angry. You know, people to think of this. I have documented evidence thatArnold tried to come back on active duty in 1949. Muir Fairchild, who was Vice Chief, and Bozo McKee, talked him out of it, Do you know why he wanted to come back? When he was on active duty, he had three enlisted men assigned to him. He was a five-star general. When he retired, he lost them. He had nobody.

W: Oh, didn't he have a Captain or someone, an officer and a man?

Q: No, he lost them all. As a required 5 star, after he protested, they worked out some kind of a deal, because the Navy had one man assigned to Nimitz. So, this fellow Bruce Simmons was reassigned to Arnold. But Arnold wanted to come back on active duty in order to be entitled to the staff, because he said he needed a staff to answer his mail. He needed somebody to help him out, to drive him to official functions, and all these things. He didn't havethe ⊠ money to pay anybody. He had a farm, he had to give up farming for profit. Now Mrs Arnold just piddles around.

Interview, MG Donald Wilson, Carmel, Calif, 21 August 1970

Q: Do you recall your first encounter with him? When didyou first meet him?

W: No, I can't say that I do. I can recall several, not, I wouldn't call them "encounters", either, because all of my dealings with Gen Arnold had been quite pleasant. I can remember a few incidents that might be worth repeating in that I was walking through the hallway one day when I was on duty in the War Dept General Staff. Gen Arnold came along and walked in step with me, along in the hallway, and said:"General Marshall wants you to go down to SW Pacific as Chief of Staff for George Kenney. What do you think of it?" And I said:"Gen Arnold, that reminds me of what John Hilldring G-1 of the War Dept, told Gen Marshall when Gen Marshall asked him if he wanted to get out of the office there, and take a division." He said:"Well, General, I don't know of any other better way of getting to Heaven. And that's what this situation reminds me of. No better way to get to Heaven." So I was assigned to the SW Pacific. That was mid-1942. I served with Gen Kenney out there until March 1944, at which time, General Arnold came out and the agreement was that he would take me back into the office and promote me, if Kenney would let me go. Well, I went back into the office and there we ran into one of the things that Gen Arnold could do, and this was perhaps to forget a promise, because it was a year later before I was promoted from one star to two stars. Meanwhile, I was serving as Gen Arnold's Acting Chief of Staff while Barney Giles was away on his trip around through the theaters. I had made such a trip myself, because when I came back from Australia I convinced the authorities that since I was going to duty in the office in Washington, it would be a good idea that I visit the theaters on the way back. Instead of taking the short way, eastward across the Pacific, I was allowed to go westward across the Indian Ocean, aone of the longest airplane flights that was being made at that time. I think perhaps it was the second airplane flight that was ever made over the Indian Ocean with stop. We went from Western Australia over to Ceylon in 15 hours, mostly during the night, at which time we had to pass the Cocos Islands, then in the hands of the Japanese. We were somewhat concerned about whether or not the Japanese would intercept our undefended transport plane. Nothing of that sort happened. And then, my trip took me up through India, and over to China where I visited with Chennault, and back over the Hump,westward

until finally into Washington.

Q: Do you remember the approximate time of this trip?

W: That was in April 1944.

Q: You were on your way back?

W: I was on my way back from duty in Australia to take up duty in Washington once again. Another incident that might tell about Gen Arnold and myself was that early in 1945, when the war was still quite strenuous, or active, or precarious in the Pacific, and we were leading up to what everyone thought would require an invasion of the home islands of Japan. Gen Arnold called me in one day and he said:"You haven't been out of this office since you got back here last year, have you?" I said:"Why no, I haven't." He said: "How would you like to go as the official observer on the assault landing at Iwo Jima?" Well, I paid no attention to Iwo Jima, because that wasn't one of my concerns at the time. I thought that that would be a very fine opportunity,which I grabbed, and provided the highlight of my career. So as I say, Gen Arnold was not entirely unmindful of the people who were working for him, because I was surprised that he realized that I had not been out of that office during the year or so that I had been back from Australia. However, just at that same time, he had forgotten his promise that afterwards appeared important to me, but at the time, was not at all a concern of mine because I never was sensible enough of how promotions were made to work at.

Q: In other words, he did not put you in for a promotion at that time?

W: The agreement was with Kenney that, if Kenney would let me go from my Chief of Staff job down in SW Pacific which was one star...

Q: Arnold would give you two to come back?

W: Would give me two because I would come back, I would act as his Chief of Staff.

Q: Was that Deputy Chief of Air Staff?

W: No, it was actual Chief of Staff, and because Barney Giles, who was then Chief of Staff was going on a world trip. So I acted as Arnold's principal staff officer. Then when I finished, when Barney got back, I was...

Q: This trip he did, was it 1944, Giles?

W: Yes, this was May, June, perhaps into July.

Q: Really? During the invasion of Europe?

W: Yes, but I don't know whether he looked in on this invasion or not. The trip took Barney Giles to all of the theaters andperhaps around the world. I don't know.

Q: So that second tour in Washington, you were in Arnold's office, between April 1944 and the time you went to Iwo Jima? Iwo Jima was in Feb 1945.

W: The time is actually May 1944, June and July. Probably those three months.

Q: That he was away?

W: That Barney Giles was away.

Q: And you left again, around, say end of January or early February 1945?

D: On the trip to Iwo Jima. I was, at that time, the Asst Chief of Staff, OC&R.

Q: Operations, Commitments and Requirements?

W: That's right. Which is what would now be A-3, something of that sort.

Q: Did you leave before Arnold had his major heart attack, or after?

W: I believe that that happened while I was in command at Eglin Field. I left the office in late June or early July of 1945. Went to Orlando, which was then called the AF Center.

Q: Is that SAT, School of Applied Tactics?

W: School of Applied Tactics was there at the time, I think.

Q: But you weren't in that?

W: No, I was the commander, I was the top commander at Orlando.

Q: Of the SAT?

W: No, of the whole thing, it was called "AF Center", or Air Force Center, I guess. We closed up the Orlando part, moved the Hqs and what was left into Eglin Field as we demobilized. I think it was at that time that Gen Arnold went down to Coral Gables.

Q: He was down there January,February and March of 1945. He was there before then.

W: All right, I was in the office at that time.

Q: Were you in the office when Eaker came in to be the Deputy?

W: I was not only in the office when Eaker came in, but I was kicked out with all the rest of the pricipal staff officers at that time.

Q: You mean moved out of your office?

W: Moved out, yes. Vandenberg came back, took my job. As a matter of fact, Eaker replaced all the principal staff officers by other officers, practically all at one time

Q: That is right?

W: That is right!

Q: Then he had pretentions to succeed Arnold?

W: I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know.

Q: Was that the scuttlebutt?

W: I don't know. I didn't get in on that sort of thing. I think Eaker was an ambitious person. Is, perhaps. The only thing that I know along that line is that he and Fred Anderson had a tie-in during a staff meeting one time. It looked to me as though Eaker thought Fred Anderson was bucking for the job because someone had said: "It would be a young person, who had recent war experience." So on and so forth. Eaker, as Chief of Staff, undertook to put Fred Anderson in his place for having such thoughts as he might have, and which I didn't know about.

Q: Fred Anderson was one of the heir-apparents, too. I'm asking?

W: I don't know.

Q: At least, Eaker thought he was being groomed for a top job, as a rival possibly?

W: I think that's what caused this verbal encounter during a staff meeting between them.

Q: What was the nature of this verbal encounter?

W: Just simply that, well, not knowing the background of the thing, it looked to me like it exploded on some thoughts that were in Eaker's head, that perhaps Fred Anderson had given him occasion to think, about which I knew nothing.

Q: But in this verbal encounter, Eaker was putting Fred Anderson in his place?

W: He did, in no uncertain terms.

Q: Okay, let me place your situation in the Air Staff, you went to Iwo Jima. Iwo Jima I think was Feb 19,1945, so you were there for a couple of weeks, and then came back.

W: I was there until early March.

Q: Then you came back, and then Eaker came in in April. Then, that's when he moved you out?

W: Yes.

Q: So you had come back and then a month later you were moved out of your job?

W: Yes, I don't like to keep bragging about my position in the Staff, but through Chauncey, Eaker asked me to stay on. It looked to me like Eaker wanted at least one person of the former regime to stay on, perhaps for some continuity. Or perhaps, Eaker

had a liking for me. I don't know.

Q: Did this sit well with Arnold, where was Arnold at this time? I know he was down at Coral Gables, but he came back at the end of March. He came back briefly and then went to Europe.

W: Yes, I feel that Arnold was not taking an active part in the maneuvering of the office at that time, knowing that his regime was closing. And also, you will perhaps recall that there had been some criticism of Arnold's reluctance to leave thejob and to let someone else take over. There was a feeling among the staff, including myself, that things were somewhat slowed up because Arnold refused to...

Q: Delegate?

W: Not to delegate, no, but to step down from his job as Commander, Army Air Forces, and let the next man take over and let things move on in normal fashion.

Q: You mean when he was ill?

W: When he was ill. There were too many decisions that seemed to require the top man's word that weren't made, simply because Arnold was not on the job, but he was still the commander.

Q: Right. I saw some correspondence between Lovett and other people in which Lovett expressed such a view that Marshall and King were bypassing the Army Air Forces because Arnold was the titular head of the Army Air Forces, but he wasn't present. They didn't go to Giles, who was the next man in the job, they simply made the decision without concurrence or consulting the Army Air Forces.

W: I didn't realize that, but I can...

Q: Does this fit in with your thought?

W: Yes, I can believe the situation would have resulted in just such action.

Q: Was Giles not a strong enough man to pick up all the marbles and carry on in Arnold's stead?

W: I don't know. As a matter of fact, I was never closely associated with Barney Giles. I never served with him to know about his work, and my association in the office there was to come in and relieve him, and he'd come back and relieve me. So that I have no way of evaluating his work. I had no difficulty with Barney in my job as Asst Chief of Staff, OC&R, while he was Chief of Air Staff of the AAF.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold got sick? I think it was right around Inauguration

Day of Roosevelt. Roosevelt's last inauguration in January?

W: That would be in 1945?

Q: Jan 20,1945, this was right before YALTA. Do you remember? YALTA began about a week or 10 days later, and Arnold was unable to attend, and this was when Kuter was chosen to represent him. Do you remember that?

W: I remember Kuter going to the YALTA thing. I remember that, but I feel that my duties, kept my nose so close to the grindstone. OC&R was a very large, and a very complicated activity. There were so many ramifications in the thing, that I felt that my efforts had to be expended there. I had very little time to dig my nose into something that wasn't my direct concern, so those things, such as Kuter going to YALTA. Until now, I didn't realize that Arnold didn't go. Those things would not make any particular difference, I mean, particular impression on me at the time because of this necessity for whole application on my own work.

Q: You know, they kept Arnold's illness secret. Why?

W: I don't know. I feel that that, and I think I have heard some of the Flight Surgeon people say that that was Arnold's own work, of keeping the thing secret. But I don't know. There is a former Flight Surgeon and a former Asst Chief Flight Surgeon right here in this area, I don't know whether you would want to go into this sickness part?

Q: Who is that?

W: BG Charlie Glenn, Ret., who lives here at the Parklane, and I think that he would have a very good slant on this incapicatation of Arnold.

Q: Was Arnold his patient?

W: I don't believe that he was a direct patient, but Glenn's being in the Chief Flight Surgeon's office at the time would, I think, be very close to what was going on. As I say, he was Asst to the Chief Flight Surgeon, and also - if I'm not mistaken - made the trip with Arnold, out to the Pacific, when he made his trip out there in early 1944.

Q: 1945?

W: 1944.

Q: Was he out in the Pacific in 1944, too?

W: That's right, that's when it was arranged that I go back to Washington. As I say, I think that, as I think of it now, it may be the Flight Surgeon was along.

because Arnold was afraid of what might happen.

Q: Well, he had had a heart attack in 1943, a small one, a minor one.

W: Well, that probably explains the inclusion of a Flight Surgeon in the trip.

Q: I wasn't aware that he went out to the Pacific in 1944. Was this early 1944?

W: This was early 1944, perhaps as early as, I wouldn't, I'm not certain on that either because the only thing that I know is, that it was a month or two before I left. at the end of March. Now it could have been late 1943.

Q: I'm thinking that he was out to Tehran and Cairo in December 1943. He was in that area, and he may have extended his trip. Remember the Tehran and Cairo conferences in Nov and Dec 1943? Could it have been that early?

W: December 1943, I think that it couldn't have been very much after that, but I also do not feel that he flew eastward from Cairo to get to Australia.

Q: He did that in 1942. In Sept 1942, he flew to Australia and he conferred with MacArthur.

W: Well, I feel that this is another trip.

Q: Do you remember that. Were you out there? When did you come in under Kenney?

W: Early Sept 1942.

Q: All right, Arnold came out within a month. He came out with Jake Smart.

W: I don't recall that.

Q: Remember, he conferred with MacArthur out in New Guinea, and Brisbane. I guess he met MacArthur in Brisbane but he also went to New Guinea. They flew him out there. This was at the end of Sept 1942, early October 1942.

W: Yes, well, I was there, but I have no recollection of his visit. I don't know why. I was at Brisbane at the time. It may be that his stop there was brief, that I didn't even see him.

Q: But you were Chief of Staff to Kenney at the time?

W: I was Chief of Staff to Kenney - a separate office. However, if he were there?

Q: You say, you came early September 1942?

W: Early September 1942, that's right. I don't think it is possible that I was away from the office that early, because I was getting onto the work there.

Q: He also stopped at Noumea and he was a factor in the relief of Ghormley by Halsey. Do you remember that happened just about that time?

W: No, I don't.

Q: You see, a month or two after Guadalcanal, things were going very badly in the South Pacific. They took Ghormley out of there and put Halsey in. Do you remember?

W: No, I don't recall that. Too far from our own show.

Q: You were just starting out. Well, MacArthur was starting out in New Guinea. This was really the beginning of his push.

W: As a matter of fact, at that time, in Sept 1942, no forward push had started as I recall it. I think we were still wondering whether we could maintain our position which had been a hqs push forward. If it had gone any father south, it would have been in the ocean south of Australia. But, the headquarters had been brought up to Brisbane.before I got there.

Q: You stayed with Kenney through the Big Push up the coast of New Guinea, Buna...

W: Up until they were going into Hollandia. When the Hollandia position was being consolidated, that was when I left to go back to Washington.

Q: Yes, you were the No. 2 man under Kenney?

W: No, not quite, the No. 2 man was Ennis Whitehead, and he was in New Guinea. I was in the office at Brisbane with Kenney.

Q: You were more "Administration?"

W: Very much so. I considered my job taking off of Kenney's shoulders all of the little details that had to be done around an AF Hqs., so that he could pay attention to his tactical and strategical operations.

Q: He had a number of men there who he trained, you know, "Squeeze" Wurtsmith and Ennis Whitehead, and a couple of others. There was some trouble with Arnold, or with Washington. Arnold wanted to send people out to Kenney, some of his staff. Arnold wanted to rotate some of his senior staff members out there. Kenney wanted to promote his own boys to the big job. Do you remember this?

W: No, I don't recall that. My recollection of the fight with Washington was to get equipment out there.

Q: Yes, that was another fight. Kenney was always pushing to get more airplanes.

W: Yes.

Q: Do you remember the circumstances where he cut a truck in half and flew it in half, and then welded it together again when a plane flew it to New Guinea? Did he do

things like this?

W: I wouldn't be at all surprised. I don't remember that one, but I do remember the business of putting eight forward machine guns on a B-25 airplane and then, Kenney, coming back to the States to convince Arnold and the factories that they should do that in the US. We were doing it in our shop in Australia.

Q: Did it work?

W: It worked very,very well. We had a fellow out there who was the top enthusiast in this business by the name of Pappy Gunn, who said:"When you open up with these things, and hit a Jap cargo ship, it looks like a neon sign lighting up." And that was about correct.

Q: What was Pappy Gunn's job? Was he in charge of Ordnance?

W: He was sort of overall ordnanace enthusiastic sparkplug, directly under Ennis Whitehead. George Kenney wrote a little story about Gunn which was in Reader's Digest some years ago, which is perhaps a little bit overdrawn, as George Kenney was accustomed to doing when he became enthusiastic. George Kenney was one of the most loquacious enthusiasts I ever ran into.

Q: Would you say he sold MacArthur on airpower?

W: Yes, I rather think so. I think MacArthur had pretty much an old ground officer's attitude about air power, and perhaps egged on by the experiences he had had with airpower before George Kenney got out there. I think that George Kenney was very largely, perhaps principally responsible for teaching MacArthur that this business of clearing the way for the ground troops was the only way against a hostile air action that the forward motion of ground troops could be made. I think MacArthur ended up thoroughly sold on that idea. In order to be sold in that way, he had to change what I feel were his ideas, his prejudices, which were gained with all the conviction that ground people had in those days, and at least some exposure to the battle that we air people had with the ground people. In those days, this partial recognition of airpower was very,very new, and not at all generally accepted. And,of course, the operations in the Pacific, the so-called Island-hopping business was a matter of knocking out the resistance, and then, the troops landing on the shore. Although the movement was around the shore of New Guinea, each movement was as though the next place were a separate island.

Q: They worked out a very effective technique of air-ground cooperation. Did they not?

W: Yes, they did, and that was the only possible way, but as long as the Japanese opposition existed, that was the only possible way that this thing could have been done

Q: Just before you left, the B-29 came into the picture as an operational weapon. Kenney and MacArthur made a pitch for the B-29. Do you remember that? Were you involved in that?

W: No directly. Kenney and MacArthur were always trying to get the mostest and the bestest, all sorts of equipment. MacArthur tried to make a war of that theater long before the War Dept would accept that as an important piece of our overall strategy.

Q: In other words, he was trying to raise his priority? It had a second or a third priority?

W: All the time.

Q: And he wanted to move it to No. 1, I guess?

W: Well, yes, being MacArthur, it would have to move to No. 1, or no place, or it would not be anywhere.

Q: Did Kenney understand how to use the B-29?

W: Weel, Kenney understood that the B-29 could carry a larger bomblod than anything we had in SW Pacific, and that's what we needed was B-29s to move this thing forward to a place where we could reach Japan.

Q: I was told that Kenney had a conception of the B-29 like he had - you mentioned the B-15 - put eight forward guns on it, and go and strafe the opposition, and drop bombs in a close air support, rather than in a strategic role.

W: I rather doubt that, I suspected that's one of the myths that grew up after the war.

Q: This is somebody that doesn't think muct of Kenney's strategic thinking.

W: Perhaps so, perhaps so. I think George Kenney was as well imbued with the use of strategic airpower as any of our commanders.

Q: You had great admiration for Kenney?

W: Yes, I did, I did have great admiration for Kenney because he was one of these

fellows - I think Arnold is in the class - who are willing to push ahead without seeing the obstacles on the way. And that again, I think, is a very necessary requirement on the part of a great leader.

Q: He was a driver?

W: He was a driver, and he was also an enthusiast whose enthusiasm would rub off - fail to see - I think these people failed to see the obstacles in this thing that they are trying to do. I think the difference between great leaders and nearly-great leaders, are that the latter make the wrong guess. Now Arnold and Kenney very seldom made the wrong guess. Since they didn't see the obstacles, it really gets to be a sort of intuitive thing. There again, you have that indefinable thing that goes to make for leadership, particularly in warfare.

Q: In other words, they were the opposite of the "Hamlet" psychology - "to do or not to do, that is the question". You know, the idea of some intellecturals reflectively weighing alternatives, and while they were weighing the alternatives, sometimes the war was lost. Where Arnold and Kenney made the choices, made decisions and drove forward to solutions?

W: That's right.

Q: Did you ever hear Arnold express himself, say that it is better to make a decision, that not make a decision, and do nothing? That if 60% of your decisions are right, then it was worth making all of them?

W: No, I never heard him express that, but I know that he operated that way. And I feel that Arnold, either through his own selection or otherwise, had good staff officers around him which allowed him to make these decisions which sometimes seemed rather farfetched, but because of this good staff work that he usually had, he was able to put this thing across.

Q: Do you say that a lot of his so-called impulsive decisions had behind them careful staff work?

W: Yes, I think so, I think that is a fact. Because, with my own inclination, to look for what might happen in trying to accomplish this thing, I have started out on propositions that were proposed and directed by Arnold with the thought that this thing just doesn't work, there is too much in the way. However, as you work with such things, and have other people with them, they did come out, and they did come out the

right way, and...

Q: Did that surprise you sometimes?

W: It surprised me sometimes.

Q: Were you inclined to be more cautious than Arnold?

W: Quite so; quite so. There is only one occasion that I recall when Arnold got out on a limb, and I don't remember what the propostion was. But he called an unusual staff meeting. We always had an early morning staff meeting, and if anything special was to come up that Arnold wanted to present to the staff, at any hour of the day he would call in the pricipal officers. On this occasion he called us tinto his staff meeting room, which was next door to his office. We all sat and listened for 10 or 15 minutes to this new proposition.

Q: Did he present it?

W: He presented it without notes, someone had sold him an idea.

Q: When was this? About late '44 maybe?

W: I think it was in early '45, though I'm not sure, because as you mention his sickness now, it was more likely in late '44, because I can't recall that Arnold had entered upon his real sickness.

Q: But he presented this proposition?

W: He presented this proposition to perhaps a dozen staff officers all around the big table, and toward the end, he ran down a little bit with his enthusiasm, and then stopped with his presentation. No one said a word, for a long, perhaps a minute, minute and a hlaf, which would see like quite a long time at a session of that sort. And then, Arnold blurted:"Why doesn't someone say something?" And I blurted:"It sounds screwy to me." Well Arnold was sharp enough to see that I had expressed the consensus around the table, and he turned his back and walked into his office. That's the only time that I can recall that Arnold backed away, or was on the wrong side of a proposition that he wanted to put over. And I think it's important in that, with my association with Arnold, it is the only time that I know of, where he was on the wrong side of this thing.

Q: The silence overwhelmed him?

W: The silence overwhelmed him, and not only that, but he was sharp enough to see while he was talking this thing...

Q: As he was talking it through, it didn't look as it did...

W: It didn't look as good to him and he could see that these people around the table were not taking it, were not swallowing it. With this one expression - "it sounds screwy" - I think he was convinced then, I mean at least that was the thing that pushed it over the divide. With no argument whatsoever he turned and went into his office.

Q: Who were some of the people present, do you remember? Was Giles present?

W: I can't recall.

Q: Norstad?

W: No, if Norstad were in the office he would be there, if Barney Giles were in the office he would be there.

Q: Kuter?

W: Kuter would be there, I forget who was A-1.

Q: A-1, was it Bevans?

W: Probably.

Q: And maybe Hodges is A-2?

W: Hodges, yes, and I can't remember the A-4.

Q: Pop Powers, or did he come in later?

Q: His secretary, Suzy Adkins, was she present at this?

W: No, Susy Adkins was the one who was there for years and year. At these staff meetings, we did not prdomaro;u. amd O cam't even recall an occasion, when we had a secretary.

Q: Was it research and development, or an operational problem?

W: I have no recollection of what the problem was, and I think maybe I dismissed it because the proposition was dismissed.

Q: Was dead?

W: Dead! Killed! Then and there.

Q: I wanted to ask you if it might have been the JB-2. Arnold was very interested in guided missiles. Or maybe it was the glide bomb?

W: No, doesn't ring a bell.

Q: McNarney is one of the key figures in WWII.

W: Yes, McNarney would know of the reorganization of the War Dept.

Q: Did you get in on that?

W: No, I was then Chief of Staff, 3rd AF at Tampa, Florida, and I was pulled in after the reorganization decided that there would be, I believe, two Air Corps staff officers in each principal War Dept General Staff Section. At that time, I was pulled into G-1 and...

Q: Did you work for Hilldring?

W: I worked for Hilldring until Hilldring moved out, and then I was G-1 of the War Dept, under General Marshall, a position that I felt I was very poorly suited for.

Q: Was this right after Pearl Harbor?

W: This was in the reoganization that took place in the Spring, March 1942. I came into the G-1 office about March 1942.

Q: How long did you stay there?

W: I stayed there until I went out to SW Pacific, which was early Sep '42.

Q: Did you get to see Marshall and Arnold function together?

W: No, I didn't. I felt that Arnold was quite good in working with General Marshall. General Marshall is one of the...

Q: Marshall and Arnold - you thought they were quite good?

W: Arnold was quite good in working with Gen Marshall, and Gen Marshall is the most conscientious and all around proper person in the proper place that I can recall, in the war.

Q: He was sort of a distant man, wasn't he?

W: My contacts with General Marshall were not frequent nor close, but I had the feeling that he was a person with whom you never would become close.

Q: He always referred to Arnold as "Dear Arnold", and Arnold would refer to him as "Dear General". There was always a differentiation between them.

W: Yes, I think that Arnold was conscious of his subordinate position to the Chief of Staff, War Dept. At that time, we didn't have a separation between Air and Ground

We had only separation between Ground, which included the Air, and the Navy. General Arnold felt, perhaps for his own good, that he was in a subordinate position to General Marshall. I felt that General Arnold, whether he was thoroughly sold on strategic air operations or not, was not inclined to fight for, or jeopardize his own career to put forward the idea that his invasion of Europe might possibly be abrogated, sidestepped, by a pounding of Germany and by air operations. I don't think we will ever know whether it would have been possible to do so or not, I know that a few of us air enthusiasts at that time felt that this is the golden opportunity to prove the thing that wehad just invented a few years ago at the Air Corps Tactical School. However, there was not sufficient acceptance of the Air idea. As I look back on it now, I think that it is probably entirely impracticable to think that such a thing could have been tried with the US military effort to win the war in Europe. However, I'll never be convinced that it was impossible to accomplish it in that way with a great saving of effort and lives. Simply because this very thing happened in Japan, and an example that is quite shining, quite clear, and is so often missed by people who were never bitten by that early Air bug enthusiasm. We were headed for a grand invasion of the Japanese home island, but the pounding that they took through the Air, and the sinking of their ships by submarines and airplanes, give us a shining example of how ground invasion is not necessarily required to subdue a nation. Japan of course, was an island empire. With Germany in the interior of Europe, we can visualize that as an island also, because we had not only our allies on the western and southern side of Germany, but we had Russia fighting on the other side, so that the resultant effect was that Germny was fighting as an island situation. It's one of those things that is nice to contemplate and now, with the military art moving on into different sort of strategic operations by overseas rocket business, it's quite a different thing.

Q: Do you think that Air could have broken Germany down sufficiently to move up the invasion, instead of waiting until 1944, perhaps to 1943. When I ask this question, I think of a number of diversions that took place at critical times. For example, there was a diversion in 1942 actually two diversions, one for Guadalcanal and another diversion for TORCH, North Africa. They took groups which had been earmarked for the UK and diverted them down into the Mediterranenan. Then in 1943 there were

official diversions. In other words, the so-called BOLERO, the buildup of air strength into the UK was delayed on several occasions so that they were not able to mount the kind of strength that Eaker, among others, thought was necessary to break down Germany, or soften up Germany until 1944. For this reason, the invasion was successively postponed. There was an emergency invasion scheduled for 1942, SLEDGEHAMMER, and that was postponed. Then ROUNDUP was the invasion of Europe in 1943. That was postponed, because the British wanted it postponed.

W: Yes, the thing that I was trying to bring out was that I have a feeling there were two ways in which the US could approach this war. One was the traditional way of finally invading Germany, and the other was to place principal dependence upon beating Germany down with air action, and of course, sea actions, as well. We didn't start out to do either one of those things as a principal overall effort. We straddled the problem as too often is done. We had ground action with air support. Of course, the air support was necessary to have the ground action. But, on the other hand, at the same time, we poured effort, money and time into building aircraft to hammer at theinterior of Germany that had nothing to do with the ground action. Now the point that I was trying to make is that if we had decided to do a thing that was unheard of and very little accepted, such as defeat Germany by air action as the principal effort, then we would have had a different war.

Q: There were some who advocated that, but Marshall and King who were in the dominiant positions in the JCS did not accept that. Marshall did not accept that.

W: I doubt very much whether it was put forward by anyone as a serious, plausible plan.

Q: Well, it was put forward at the CBO, Casablanca, remember Eaker made the case for daylight strategic bombing, and Churchill bought it. Remember the combined bomber offensive (CBO) and then, they started to build it up. This was a plan accepted. But they no sooner built it up when they started to take planes away from them.

W: That's what I'm saying. We were doing both; we were doing a ground action, we were doing an air action.

Q: Do you think that Arnold failed, in some way, to convey this thought that air action could be the principal weapon in Europe?

W: Without knowing, actually, I feel that Arnold with his own personal ambition would have been reluctant to push this thing to any extent that would jeopardize his position.

Q: As Chief of the AAF under Marshall?

W: Yes.

Q: In other words, you are saying that Marshall did not accept that?

W: I haven't any idea that Marshall ever could have accepted it, because he came up as a ground officer. He was thoroughly convinced that ground action was necessary. I think the thing that possibly put our air effort on the map was Roosevelt's acceptance of this thing as something sensational or different, or a possibility and perhaps good for industry in the US - that sort of thing.

Q: But he didn't understand airpower, either?

W: He didn't understand it, but very,very few people did understand airpower.

Q: Did Andrews understand airpower.

W: I don't know, I rather think he did, because Andrews as the first commander of what was called the GHQ AF and he had with him,officers who were either directly connected recently with the Air Coprs Tactical School, such as Ken Walker and Harold George and Bob Olds. Whether or not they had been in on the actual beginning of this airpower essence, which began only in the Spring of 1934. Before that time there was quite a conversion to the idea of rear area bombing, but nothing specific. Now rear area bombing was invented way back in WWI, by Mitchell and Trenchard and Douhet.

Q: Let me ask you to speculate. You say Arnold was exiled from Washington after Billy Mitchell?

W: Arnold was exiled, right about the time of Billy Mitchell trial because he had issued a paper and circulated the paper that was made up in his Information Division which he, at the time, was handling for General Patrick. He was exiled because the War Dept took objection to what he had in the paper. I don't know if I ever saw the paper, and don't know what was in it, but for that, he was exiled.

Q: He circulated thatpaper? Let me ask you about that paper. He circulated it to whom?

W: I don't know, and as a matter of fact, it is hearsay that I'm starting now, that Arnold was exiled because of the circulation of a paper

Q: Herbert Dargue was also exiled at that time.

W: At the time I didn't know Dargue, so he made no impression on me. But as a matter of fact, I didn't know Arnold, either. But I think maybe because Arnold afterwards became more or less famous and, in the news, I remembered his exile. Now another incident that also is in connection with this. Arnold, during his exile, was probably prettt close to despondency. I have been told by my Flight Surgeon friends that Arnold walked the streets of Ft Riley night after night with a Flight Surgeon by the name of Fabian Pratt trying to bring him out of this despondency.

Q: You mean Pratt was trying to bring Arnold out of his despondency?

W: Right, now Arnold was very much concerned very much about this exile ruining his career, and for that reason, was pretty low.

Q: Fabian Pratt is not alive?

W: I think he died.

Q: Would Glenn know anything about that?

W: Yes, I feel pretty sure he would, because it would be scuttlebutt among the Flight Surgeons, don't you know. My information on that line comes more from BG Gene Reinartz, who died last year. He was also a Flight Surgeon.

Q: Would Charlie Glenn know something about that?

W: I rather think he would.

Q: Perhaps I could call him up?

W: Do you want me to call him?

Q: Yes, when we conclude here, you can call him.

Q: Back on the subject of Andrews. The reason I dwell on that, Andrews and Knerr were pushing for a separate air force at the time McNarney came up with his compromise plan in March 1942. That was a compromise to give the AF equality with theground forces and the service forces. I have seen correspondence between Knerr and Andrews indicating that Arnold had betrayed the cause of separate air power.

W: Well, there again, I think it's a matter of personal career. I don't know how much Arnold knew about this new idea. The argument for a separate air power was largely on the basis that ground people were just not suited to running air power. Their thinking and their maneuvering was so restricted. Here was this airplane that could reach out

much farther and do things that people had never heard of doing.

Q: Do you think that Arnold, being the supreme pragmatist that he was, saw that Marshall would never buy this proposition, and did not want to push it?

W: I think it's quite possible; I think that's quite possible.

Q: You know, I am remined of another incident which occured in 1945.

(Told about LeMay briefing in May or June 1945 and Arnold's neutrality)

Q: We are talking about your reaction to the LeMay briefing of Marshall in 1945.

W: Yes, and I say these things have a mementum, the whole of the military effort of the US had the momentum of ground invasion. Ground inasion had succeeded in Europe, and we were poised for ground invasion of Japan. Humand minds had a fixity that prevents upsetting that momentum. Right now, today, we are in he greatest danger that we were ever in. As a nation, and the world shares that danger with us, because the momentum of more of everything in the way of military weapons keeps us building rockets and ABMs because the momentum of thinging - the more we have, the better we areprotected. Now, the thing that we must all realize, and the sooner the better, is that there is no outcome to this thing, which depends upon the non-action of one or two nervous fingers, except annihilation of the people who are building things to protect themselves. Now, our side and the Red side are building these things through this momentum of thinking that we are providing protection, whereas if we use this thing that we are setting up for defense, it can do nothing except wipe out both sides, and the rest of the world. Right now, today, we have at least one thousand ICBMs on our side, and we can assume that Russia has 1,000 ICBMs on their side, poised for certain targets in each of these opposing territories. We are beginning the building of ABMs. We claim Russia has already deployed ABMs and we can assume that both sides provide enough ABMs to combat the ICBMs of the other side. Now, if we let the ICBMs stay where they are, and eliminate for easy figuring the submarines that are going to fire similar rockets, we will have with a perfect ABM approximately 4,000 atomic explosions at the time.

Q: We are talking about the military conception today -" the more the better"- we and Russia seem to be heading for a collison in the, let, us hope, distant future.

W: So long as we maintain these armatments that can ruin each side, and President Nixon, himself, in his July 30 news conference here in California said that each side

has enough rockets to ruin the other side, many times over.....

Q: You said you thought Arnold was an opportunist; what did you mean by that?

W: Well, as we are talking of these theoretical things and teorectical battles that one might enter into. I don't feel that Arnold was inclined to enter into a knock down dragout fight for a principle that might interfere with a personal career. Of course, there is no...

Q: In other words, he was not Billy Mitchell?

W: Not a Billy Mitchell.

Q: And you think his experience in 1925 cured him of that?

W: I feel that his experience in you say '25, I think it was '24.

Q: Well, '25 was the Mitchell trial.

W: Well, about that time, I think that his experience and also the depression dependency that brought him into, would probably be a reflection when it came time to enter into such a fight. There is no way of hard evaluation of such things. One gains impressions from seeing and working with people. That would be my impression of Arnold.

Q: You were with him on two different tours, so you saw him almost every day for a period of time in 1944 to 1945, you saw him almost every day?

W: Well, frequently, at least.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

W: No, Arnold never did get mad at me. He never had a cross word with me. Also, he did me a little favor, which is perhaps a sidelight on Arnold's character and thinking. When I came back from the Iwo Jima landing, we were in a staff meeting and Arnold leaned over and asked me:"Well, how did you get along? How are you." or some such words as that. I said:"Well, everything went all right, and I'm whole, except that I lost my pocketknife." "Oh, you did? Well, here's one." He reached in his pocket and gave me a pocketknife. But he said:"You must give me a penny." Well, I didn't know the superstition at the time. He said:"You must give me a penny to avoid cutting a friendship." (Showed the pocket-knife)

Q: This must have been late in March 1945, because he was in Washington for about a week or 10 days between the time he came back from Florida until he went to Europe. Remember he went to Europe on a so-called convalescent trip?

W: No, I don't recall that.

Q: He went to the Riviera and Cannes. This is right around VE Day.

W: I have a vague recollection, yes.

Q: But you stayed in Washington at this time?

W: Yes, I was in Washington.

Q: And when he left - this is when Eaker came in. When Eaker moved everyone around and moved you out of your job, Arnold wasn't there, right?

W: I'm not certain, but it could easily be that he wasn't there.

Q: Eaker would not have taken these moves if Arnold was his boss, right?

W: Oh no. I think it could well have happened with Arnold there. Yes, because, as I say, I think that Arnoldhad ceased the hand on the helm activity at that time.

Q: But Arnold later came back did he not for a brief period? After the war ended, like VJ Day, he was around for a few months, and then he turned it over to Spaatz.

W: He was off and on the job, and as we said before, I thought that things didn't get done because he wasn't sufficiently on the job.

Q: Right, well, during the last year, he was on convalescent leave a lot of the time. He was also busy getting his ranch ready. He made several visits out there, busily in correspondence with the man who was building his ranch for him. At the end of the war, he had lost interest in Washington, and he was anxious to leave Washington for his ranch.

W: Yes, and that's the period when the feeling was that he should have stepped out earlier,and let the next man actually take over, make the decisions, and carry on.

Q: Who did you think the next man should have been?

W: I don't remember speculating on that.

Q: Did many people think it should be Spaatz, or Eaker, or somebody else?

W: I think the feeling was the Spaatz was a natural selection because he had been in command in Europe, and Spaatz was apparently always close to Arnold.

Q: Yes, a little closer than Eaker.

W: I wouldn't say "closer than Eaker", but perhaps, well, Spaatz was always ahead of Eaker in positions.

Q: During this time Spaatz had been sent to the Pacific, so perhaps it was regarded that Eaker was in a holding position?

W: Could easily be, I don't know.

Q: Was there any speculation that Eaker was trying to seize control in the sense that when he changed around these staff officers, to solidify himself in control?

W: You know, I have no recollection on that sort of thing, and I doubt very much whether I have any feeling on it, because my nature was never such, that let me get into this, oh what do you call it, the royal household maneuvering, the kitchen politics or that sortof thing. I always felt that my talents and efforts were insufficient to take care of the duties that I felt were my responsibilities.

Q: Was Fred Dean there when you were there?

W: Fred Dean was in General Arnold's front office, yes, and I think, would have a - I don't know whether you have talked to him or not.

Q: I did, but without my recorder. I saw him on an airplane.

W: Yes, and how about Cabell?

Q: I talked to Cabell. Cabell was there earlier in the war. He wasn't there later in the war.

W: There was a George Schulgen.

Q: He was in Public Relations, I don't know where he is.

W: I thought he was in the front office. Didn't George Schulgen have a scheme for establishing atomic bombs around the world, to keep the world at peace at theend of the war?

Q: I hadn't heard that. Do you remember any other specific dealings you had with Arnold during this year that you were back, 1944-45? Any difficult problems where he perhaps made a decision that stuck in your mind? Maybe didn't make a decision or anything about his attitude?

W: No, our relationship was always so smooth that I have no recollection of difficulty with Arnold. This little incident that I recounted in the staff meeting was not something that I felt created any animosity or any feeling. I don't remember ever presenting a proposition through my staff section that Arnold didn't approve. So, as I said before, never a cross word, so our relationship was very, very amiable.

Q: Do you remember him and von Karman?

W: I remember when von Karman was making his study of what should be the future of the AF.

Q: "Toward New Horizons".

W: Yes.

Q: Do you remember Arnold's relationship with Grandison Garner? He was down in Eglin Field?

W: I know Grand, yes.

Q: And Arnold was a gadgeteer, in OC&R you may have gotten into this. Arnold had a great feeling for guided missiles. Were you aware of that?

W: No, that more in Grand Garner's running of the experimental business at Eglin Field than in mine. It was also something that hadn't yet entered the actual operational phase. That's how it would come into my staff section.

Q: One item that came in to the OC&R at this time was the shifting of thousands of men from the Air Corps to the Infantry. Do you remember that?

W: Yes, I remember that. We felt very badly about that, and we felt that the Ground forces shouldhave known more about how to provide for replacements, and we thought it was a very inefficient way of using military talent to take airplane mechanics and put them in infantry lines to fire a rifle.

Q: Well, they needed men in a hurry. Yours were the only available men in uniform, so they grabbed what they could.

W: And of course, it's a natural development, and particularly, since we were not trying to make air business the principal effort.

Q: Right, How about the rotation policy, the 25-mission business? Did you get into that, about what it should be, and when they should rotate? Rotation after 25 missions in Europe?

W: Yes, in one way I got into it that shortly after I took on the job as Acting Chief of Staff. Some lady in Congress called me to protest about some consiituent who had, who was not going to have a leave after training here in the US, who was going to be sent directly from training to Europe. We talked for 20 minutes on the telephone. The lady in Congress tried to convince me that the AF should give these men leave after training here, rather then sending them direct to the battle front. And of course, my argument with the lady was that those men who were at the front had already had their quota of missions, and were coming down with war fatigue and should be relieved. These other men training in the US were so much more suitable then those that were already on the job.

Q: Do you remember who this was - Edith Green or Margaret Chase Smith?

W: I have a feeling that it was a New Englander. But there again, the incident w and the principle involved...

Q: It could have been Margaret Chase Smith?

W: I don't know. The incident and the principles involved were the things that impressed me, and not personalities.

Q: Were you involved in the postwar planning?

W: No, I'm thinking of redeployment. Redeployment was in our section and a fellow by the name of...

Q: Was Trubee Davison involved in that?

W: No, Trubee Davision was still in the A-1 business, I guess.

W: Lessig was our man in OC&R who handled the redeployment. Did a very,very good job.

Q: Arnold was gungho for redeployment,wasn't he?

W: Well, I don't know. It was a War Dept thing. The War Dept and the AF worked together on it, carefully as we could. We could have used a lot more staff in the Pacific. except that we didn't have the ground facilities to take care of them. We probably didn't redeploy to the Pacific as fast as they were available in Europe.

Q: Were you involved in the deployment of B-29s, theproblem of getting them out o to the Pacific?

W: Yes, in a way. The big problem there was working the bugs out of the B-29. That was one of the things that Arnold was very much excited about, and very intent on curing, and getting people in from factories and Materiel Division, Wright Patterson in working out the bugs, mostly down in the SW part of the US,where the work was done.

Q: Do you remember the thing out at Salinas, Kansas, they were trying to get the first wing of theB-29s out there, and Arnold went out. I think Benny Meyers went out there briefly. They were modifying theplanes, to get each of the planes ready and ship them out. Do you remember that?

W: No.

Q: This was in 1944, just before you got back. So you remember anything that Arnold did, any decisions he took on the B-29 problem to push them out?

W: No, I wasn't close enough to it, our job in OC&R was to pick up available, I mean ready airplanes and people, and get them out to the theater. The other people, the Materiel people, had the job of getting these planes ready.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's decision to relieve Possum Hansell and put LeMay in the job? This happened in January 1945.

W: No, I didn't. I was, perhaps going, at that time, out to the Pacific to get ready for Iwo Jima. I was a little early for joining up with the Navy, and went on down to see Australia again, and see what had happened down there. And then came back north again, and joined up with the Navy at Ulithi.

Q: Do you recall that Norstad had an important role in this. I think Norstad was sent out there to tell "Possum" Hansell the bad news. Do you remember that?

W: No, I remember Norstad running the 20th AF business as an office man. Norstad was in the office in Washington.

Q: You and Benny Meyers...

W: Yes, we used to work together in the early part of the war on the allocation of airplanes between different types so that we could reach a pre-determined figure of the number of airplanes. That's when we were playing the numbers racket.

Q: He was very quick with numbers?

W: He was not only quick with numbers, he was the sharpest brain that I encountered during my military experience.

Q: Did you feel that he was a little bit on the shady side?

W: Yes, yes, I did. I regret speakingof anyone in that way, but I felt that Benney was real smart, and also, that he might throw a number of airplanes into a manufacturer whom he wanted to favor, rather than consider the strategic requirements for airplanes.

Q: Arnold had great confidence in him?

W: I really don't know of the relationship between Arnold and Benny Meyers.

Q: My reading of it is thatthey both were doers,

W: Oh yes.

Q: Arnold needed quick answers and Benny had them?

Q: Benny had them, whether they were right or wrong, but he could make them sound plausible.

Q: Actually, his boss was Echols?

W: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold bypass Echols to go to Benny Meyers for answers?

W: I really don't know. That would be in the Materiel Division and their own internal business. I think Benney Meyers had quite an influence on Arnold and on the Materiel setup

Q: You had no inkling, though, during the war that he was engaged in illegal business?

W:No, I had no inkling or idea of that kind.

Q: There were several rumors about him during the war, but you didn't know about these?

W: Benny, at one time, told me of makingmoney on buying bonds and borrowing money on the bonds as security. But that was such high finance that I wouldn't even understand what it was, or how it was done?

Q: But he was living high all the time, wasn't he?

W: Apparently.

Q: Didn't he drive Cadillacs?

W: I don't know about that, but Benny was a very lavish dresser, you might say, In that way, he stood out.

Q: He was a lavish liver, too. Mrs Arnold said that some people thought his second wife had money, and that's why he was living it up.

(Record 2)

Q: General Wilson wrote this note about Arnold: "I admired Hap Arnold for his willingness (or ignorance) to push ahead despite or without seeing obstacles. Sometimes his propositions seemed far fetched, but his faith and luck in his staff allowedhim to announce his decisions with seeming disregard or failure to see obstacles. This is a great asset for a high commander so long as his vision, luck and staff do not lead him out on a limb. Although he was generally correct and his schemes worked out, he was not faultless in judgement. I recall one occasion..."

W: There is something else that I would like to get in the record here, in that I would like very much to be assured that you will edit this thing because undoubtedly I have said things about people that, if I were writing, I would put in a different words, so that the impact would not be quite so personal, and quite so pointed, and quite so critical.

Q: All right. Now let me say something, this is for background purposes only.

Q: General, you said that near the ned of WWII, there was a scheme for General Marshall to take command in the Pacific, with Arnold to serve as Air Commander. This ting didn't take, but it was serious enough a project that Arnold gave you a task of gathering information?

W: That's correct.

Q: Could you tell me a little bit about that?

W: I was assigned the business of forming a small staff section.

Q: Was this at the end of the European war?

W: This was, yes. I'm not certain whether the European War had actually finished, or whether it was coming to a finish. Wait a minute, I think maybe I'm gettingthe time fixed, in that it was late. No. Time has escaped me. I had a small section of 3 or 4 officers and myself with the duty of finding out something about the geographical climatic, industrial and overall setup in Japan, what we might be doing in the Pacific, as an AF working against Japan. This was to be used as a part of Gen Arnold's air hqs., should he be sent to the Pacific as the Air officer under General Marshall.

Q: You mean this was a serious propostion to send Marshall out to finish the Pacific War?

W: This was sufficiently serious on Arnold's part to feel thathe could be the Air Man. on this show. It was my understanding that Gen Marshall was to be the overall commander.

Q: I have not seen that before. You say this promised promotion, if you were to be taken back from Kenney's staff and brought back to Washington was delayed for a year, and Arnold wrote a letter of apology?

W: Yes.

Q: Do you have that letter?

W: Yes, I'll look for that now.

Q: You raised a question about whether Arnold was superstitious when he asked for a penny for the knife.

W: I never saw any other indication of superstition on his part, and I don't know now whether he was following just the custom,or whether he was actually superstitious.

Q: You were not one of these who were very close to him? You were not in his inner circle, like Kuter or Rosie O'Donnell?

W: No, I was one of the working boys.

Q: You said something about he could cut your throat and never lose the famouse smile. He had this smile on his face...

W: Yes, that was a built-in physical characteristic. I think it had no indication of what he was thinking. It wasn't the ordinary smile that we know, and it was a thing perhaps, with which he was born, because that was what won him the name "Hap". I think he got that name at the Military Academy. It was a common thing that he could cut your throat and smile would never change.

Q: You talked about working for Arnold. He worked you 12 hours a day,6 days a week?

W: That was not necessarily Arnold's requirement. It was a conscientious matter on my part and on the part of others who were working on the staff at that time, who felt that the only limit to o r working hours was our own physical and mental capacity. We were there very early in the morning, and we worled until late in the evening, after ordinary dinnertime. This went on for 6 days a week, and oftentimes, Sunday morning.

Q: You had an interesting comment that he was not exposed to the doctrines of the AirCorps Tactical School after 1934. Why do you use that date?

W: I use the date "1934" to indicate the beginning of what got to be the overall basic strategic principle for the employment of strategic air forces. I happen to know about that because I was charged with the instruction of the Air Corps Tactical School class in the year 1933-34, and I was to take over the AF course. The AF course was a culmination of all the things that we had been leading up to in the year's course at the Air Corps Tactical School. When I was saddled with this job, I didn't know hwhere to start, but I felt that there was more to this business of strategic bombing than simply bombing the rear areas. Unless we could get to something more specific in that, we would be doing somewhat as Douhet had claimed was the way to do a long before WWI, when he said that the thing to do was to take your bombers,put them in a formation and lay down a carpet of destruction in hostile territory, thus hoping that something of value might be hit. The idea struck me that in industrial nations, that this war-making potential was a web of interwoven things, interdependent, and that by picking out the critical, essential items in various systems, that we could actually produce a worthwhile effort with the relatively small number of airplanes of such bombing accuracy as we had tat the time. As most everyone knows now, that was adopted as the basic strategic scheme for the employment of strategic air forces. That beginning was the Srping of 1934.

Q: You mention here AWPD-1,the Air War Plan that Harold George and Ken Walker and a couple of others put together right before Pearl Harbor.Did you have any involvement in that?

W: No,I was not directly involved,except that they were using the scheme that I have just been talking about.

Q: In other words,they adopted some of the ideas that were developed at the Tactical School in the '30s?

W: That;s right, they were putting into practice this thing that had been advanced as a pure and simple theory at the time. There was no experience in this...

Q: In which you have played an important role?

W: I played the primary originating role in this.

Q: And you mentioned that Arnold did not pick up this theorectical concept when he became Chief of Air Corps in the late '30s, possibly because he got burned for having performed the role of a maverick in the '20s, and he was going to play it straight?

W: I think that is generally correct . I don't know to what extent Arnold's thinking went into this theorizing thatI have been talking about.

Q: Were you aware that there was some little friction in the late '30s between Arnold and Andrews. Andrews being the BHQ AF, and he was pushing for B-17s. The War was not disposed to give the Air Coprs B-17s because they cost too much money. You could get a lot more smaller planes for the same amount of money by buying B-18s and other planes. Andrews was unhappy about that when he was heading the GHQ AF.

W: I had no direct connection with that. As a matter of fact, at that time, I was still busily engaged in my school activities at Maxwell Field. In the latter 1930s we cut down on the size of classes, and we were trying to get this strategic concept in the heads of more people, as we saw the war approaching.

Q: You mentioned Fabian Pratt at Ft Riley walking the streets to bring Arnold back from his despondency. Now, where did you get thisinformation?

W: That is hearsay information from my Flight Surgeon friend.

Q: Including Charles Glenn?

W: I'm not sure whether Charlie Glenn ever mentioned that or not. I feel sure that the late BG Gene Reinartz is the one who first mentioned it to me.

Q: You say it is your impression, without personal knowledge, that Arnold sold Roosevelt and Knudsen on the need for the great initial airplane expansion. I guess you are talking about the 50,000 plane program?

W: No, I think it was much smaller than that, I think it was either the 10,000 or 25,000 or 23,500 something like that.

Q: You say you thought he had wired in from some conference that we were to have 25,000 planes, which at that time was an exhorbitant figure.

W: Yes, I'm not at all sure that we are in war, I think we are not in the war.

Q: Yes, this is prior to the war. You don't have any more information; you are just making an observation?

W: I'm making an observation, and we people, in the back room, went to work on, this is one of the places where Benny Meyers would come in with his fast figures, and we would allocate these numbers to different types of airplanes.

Q: Here's something you say: you talk about rumors of Arnold's final trip from his ranch to Washington, the disappearance of his securities and the possible connection of that with Benny Meyers shady deals. Now, what do you have in mind?

W: I have nothing in mind there except that there were such rumors afload, and that some people even seem to go so far as to believe that Arnold was tied in with Benny Meyers on this nefarious operations that finally got Benny into jail. But, as for personal knowledge,I have none whatsoever.

Q: Well, I can tell you this, if Arnold was involved in such dealings, he had to get rid of his money someplace that Mrs. Arnold didn't know about, because when he died, in 1950 - I saw his probated will - his total cash will was $19,000. That was his assets. That was his cash. That was his estate. Other than the ranch, which Mrs Arnold had, which has increased in value considerably from the day he got it, Mrs Arnold had very few assets. She had to go to work andsell real estate in order to keep body and soul together. She had three sons in the service, and they couldn't help her. They were in financially need themselves. So they were unable to help her. She had to go to work, so I think they may answer your question.

W: Well, that is perhaps what brought up these rumors, in that some people feel thatGen Arnold had much more assets than this, that he made this very trip to Washington, andwhen he got through with that trip, he didn't have the assets. Now, as I say, as far as I am concerned, that's pure rumor.

Q: You mean he gave them away or threw then away?

W: The implication is that he used those in some way in this Benny Meyers imbroglio.

Q: There is no basis for that, because when he came to Washington,he was a sick man. It wasn't his last trip. He came in 1949. That was his last one. When his son,David, graduated from West Point. But he had come in 1947, and testitifed againstBenny Meyers and he called him " theone rotten apple in the barrel." Arnold was heartbroken because he had placed so much confidence in Benny Meyers, and Benny Meyers had betrayed that confidence. He didn't want the American people and these rumor-mongers to think that Benny Meyers was characteristic. He wantedto make it clear that Meyes was an exception.

WL The way the rumors blew up is that he was wealthy, and hemakes this trip to Washington, and comes back without the securities, and thereby leaves Mrs Arnold in the straits that you had mentioned.

Q: You mean he just threw them away? Gave them away?

W: No,no, used them in some way or other. Well, the implication is to get himself out of the tie-in with Benny Meyers.

Q: It doesn't make sense, As a matter of fact, Arnold required every one of his top people, who had a procurement responsisibility, to fill out a questionnaire about their assets, I don't know if you had to fill one out? Benny Meyers had to fill one out.

W: No.

Q: Cook, Echols, all the men who had responsibility. Chidlaw, all the men who had materiel procurement responsibilities. Benny Meyers lied on his questionnaire about his assets. Then, when he testified, he said that he misstated the facts on his questionnaire, and that he had told Arnold that he had misstated them, and Arnold knew it. Arnold of course, vehemently denied this. So it doesn't make any sense to me. If Arnold was hard pressed for money, as he was at retirement. I'll tell you something else.

W: I'm glad to hear this.

Q: I'll tell you something else that throws this all cocked hat, and I'm almost angry. You know, people to think of this. I have documented evidence thatArnold tried to come back on active duty in 1949. Muir Fairchild, who was Vice Chief, and Bozo McKee, talked him out of it, Do you know why he wanted to come back? When he was on active duty, he had three enlisted men assigned to him. He was a five-star general. When he retired, he lost them. He had nobody.

W: Oh, didn't he have a Captain or someone, an officer and a man?

Q: No, he lost them all. As a required 5 star, after he protested, they worked out some kind of a deal, because the Navy had one man assigned to Nimitz. So, this fellow Bruce Simmons was reassigned to Arnold. But Arnold wanted to come back on active duty in order to be entitled to the staff, because he said he needed a staff to answer his mail. He needed somebody to help him out, to drive him to official functions, and all these things. He didn't havethe money to pay anybody. He had a farm, he had to give up farming for profit. Now Mrs Arnold just piddles around.

DONALD WILSON
POST OFFICE BOX 2488
CARMEL, CALIFORNIA 93921

11 August 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research and Analysis Division
Office Secretary, Dept of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330.

Dear Dr. Murray Green:

Re your 7 August letter.

I'll be happy to see you in an attempt to be helpful on your General Arnold research.

My schedule indicates possible interference on August 21st but practical assurance for necessary time, preferably 22d anytime; on 23d before 1400 hours; or 24th anytime.

Here the unlisted telephone number is (408) 624-6959. If you can let me know place and time of arrival in the area I'll be glad to meet you. We often have delayed delivery of telegrams or mail, so these are out for short-notice situations.

Here's hoping we make connection better than last go-round - -

Sincerely,

Donald Wilson

Major General USAF Retired.

½ M S Carmel HS. Highway 1
Carmel Exit - 1st
Ocean Ave Highway 1
0.3 on
½ rt turn
Mesa Dr.
0.3 - Wilson

Hatton Rd
&
Mesa Dr.

10 am

March 26, 1970

Maj Gen Donald Wilson
P.O. Box 2488
Carmichael, California 93921

Dear General Wilson:

I m sorry that we could not coordinate our schedules last week. It was otherwise a very successful trip. I got to see Generals LeMay, Harold George, K.B. Wolfe, Archie Old plus Donald Douglas and Reuben Fleet.

However, I missed out on a couple of key interviews, including yours, and therefore must plan another trip to California.

I will try to arrange my schedule well enough in advance to fit into yours.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

DONALD WILSON
POST OFFICE BOX 2488
CARMEL, CALIFORNIA 93921

5 March 1970

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning your gathering information for a biography of General H.H. (Hap) Arnold. I welcome the opportunity for helping in any possible way, but it appears we must seek some time other than that you have suggested.

Mrs. Wilson and I are about to go to San Francisco for several days wherein we shall be engaged in medical checks at Letterman and Travis AF Base, respectively. Our return here is somewhat indefinite but appears now to fall late in March.

If at all practicable for you I should prefer you stop by here where records are available, and where we can spend as much time as you like.

Sincerely,

Donald Wilson

Major General, USAF (Ret)

Telephone (Unlisted) (408) 624-6959.

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief, Research and Analysis Division
Office of The Secretary, United States Air Force
Washington 20330.

done
8/21/70 (?)

Major General Donald Wilson, USAF (Ret)
P.O. Box 2488
Carmel, Calif. 93921

Dear General Wilson:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past couple of months I've been interviewing some friends and associates of yours and of General Arnold's. Among them are Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Hansell, McKee, Quesada, Bob Walsh, Howard Davidson, Idwal Edwards, Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others. I also had a long interview with Jackie Cochran the other day.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City within the past six months.

You were associated with General Arnold, in some critical undertakings and I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you at a time and place convenient for you.

I'll be going out to Norton AFB next week to help on a documentary movie of General Arnold. I'm planning to visit the Arnold Ranch in Sonoma on March 8-11 and will then head down the Coast toward the L.A. area. If some time between March 12-14 is convenient, I would like to stop by Carmel for an hour or two and have our talk, if this is possible.

The enclosed envelope can be used to reach me at the Arnold Ranch. If my plans work out right, I'll call you for an appointment.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Encl