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29-56	1103264	18-Mar-70		Folder 10 Wolfe, Kenneth B.	UNCLASS/FOUO		NONE
		15-Aug-70					
57-62	1103265	5-Jan-70		Folder 1 Wolfinbarger, Willard	UNCLASS		NONE
63-66	1103266	13-May-70		Folder 2 Woods, Lawrence S.	UNCLASS		NONE
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84-102	1103269	9-Jan-70		Folder 5 Yates, Donald	UNCLASS		NONE
103-END	1103270	28-Sep-70		Folder 6 Yount, Barton K. Mrs.	UNCLASS		NONE
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				SERIES THREE ORAL HISTORY TAPE RECORDING	S		
				Box 80 Tapes 1-24			
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				RESEARCH TAPES			
				Morgenthau Research Notes			
				Elliott Roosevelt's book, "As he saw it "			
				Stimpson papers			
				Soviet entry into the Pacific War			
				Frank Tony's correspondence, Arnold and Bug, etc.			
				Eisenhower's papers			
		100000000000000000000000000000000000000		Arnold's 201 file			202. Jan 19 19 19 19 19 19
				West Point Military Archives			
				Riverside Press			


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
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					Retranscription French Mission 1939			
					Retranscription Arnold 201 file 1907-16			
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				1.4	Retranscription Arnold 201 file 1907-16			
	1				Herbert Hoover Material			
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
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
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CADEMY /REPROGRAPHICS DIVISIO





Wolfe, Kenneth B.

18 Mar 70 15 Aug 70

K. B. WOLFE C 714 -0710 Lake San Marcos. Calif. March 5-1970 Dear Dr. Murray Green: I will be very dappy to respect to biography of Smeral March 16-20 will be soles factory. Jake San Marcos is eight miles inland from the beach Town of Carlsbod, and eight miles west of the town of Escondido to fly you into Palomon Ceriport, located west of Lake Sa Marcos. On dimedown Route \$ 395 to Escondido thin mto the Lake. On Son Diego Freeway #\$05 and Freeway # 5, to the off samp, Palaman airport.

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Road, follow the signs past the an port, to the intrance of Jake Dan Marcas. of you can fly, I could meet you at Palamas airport, we could have our meeting these and you could hold the air plane for a return trip Sincerely. ToRWalle P.S. Grendound bus lines run from Dan Diego into Escondido d could puck up up at the bus stop in Escondido, if you phone me number of bus and time of arrival. 18malle Please give mis landd my very best regards. 163

3 March 1970

Lieut. General Kenneth B. Wolfe, USAF (Ret) 1222 San Julian Place San Marces, Calif: 92069

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold, I Dear General Wolfe:

an a professional historian assigned to the Office of the am a processional discortan assigned to the ottice of Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. During the past three years I have been through the very

extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies. It may be of interest to know that within the past couple

of months I've been interviewing some friends and associates of yours and of General Arnold's. Among them are Generals or yours and or General Arnold S. Among them are Generate Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Hansell, McKee, Quesada, Bob Walsh, Howard Davidson, Idwal Edwards, Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others. I also had a long interview with Jackie Cochran the other day. Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and

Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City within the You were associated with General Arnold, in some critical undertakings and I would welcome the opportunity to talk with past six months.

you at a time and place convenient for you. I'll be going out to Norton AFB next week to help on a documentary movie of General Arnold to be used by the Arnold Air Society and other Air Force groups. I'll be in your area

for several days in mid-March and will take the liberty to phone for an appointment. I had in mind some time during the week of 16-20 March an interview of about 90 minutes.

I assume San Marcos is near Los Angeles but it doesn't show up in my Rand-McNally. Could you please advise me of your availability and how I could get there in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Division

Encl

KB Worfe 12 Mon Gentham . 1939 2. B-29 Michelans 2. B-29 Michelans

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION PRESS BRANCH

LIEUTENIANT GENERAL KENNETH BONNER WOLFE, USAF

Kenneth B. Wolfte was born in Denver, Colorado, August 12, He attended high school in Portland, Oregon, and San , California, and in January, 1918, enlisted as a private class in the Aviation Section of the Signal Reserve Corp 1896. Diego, first

He received ground and flying training at Berkeley, Cali-formin, and Fark Field, Tennessee, and in July, 1918, was commis-sioned a temporary second lieutenant in the Air Service. He served for a brief period at Fark Field as a flying instructor and then moved to Souther Field, Georgio, in the same expacity. In January, 1919, he returned to Park Field and in March of that year went to Carlstrom Field, Florida. In July, 1919, he was made officer in Charge of Flying at Souther Field, Georgia, and the following January was appointed chief angineer officer at the following January was appointed chief angineer officer at the Air Intermediate Depot at Americus, Georgia. On July 1, 1920, he received his Begular Army commission as a second lieutenant in the Air Service, and was promoted to first lieuten-ant that same day.

in November, 1922, and during instructor at Brooks Field, Texas repair at that station in addition to his other duties. In May, 1926, he moved to Clark Field, Philippine Islands, as plans and operations officer.

engineering Returning to the States in August, 1928, he became engineerin July, 1930, he entered the Air Corps Engineering School at Wrighta. In Field, Ohio, and after graduation in June, 1931, remained for duty in the Inspection Branch, of which he later became chief. He was detailed to the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabema, in August, 1935, and was graduated in June, 1936. A year later he was graduated from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavworth, Kapsas, and assigned as Air Corps representative at the Douglas Aircraft Company in El Segundo,

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OTC Air For In March, 1939, he was named assistant chief of the Pro-duction Engineering Section at Wright Field and the following February became chief of that section. As chief of the B-29 Special Project Staff he hud charge of the initial flight and service testing of the B-29 Superfortness for the Army Air Po He later was appointed chief of the Production Division of th Materiel Center at Wright Field.

58th al Wolfe's bases B-29 brug Irst b ined, the , 1943, he became commanding general of the Wing at Salina, Kansas. Later, under Generatine 20th Bomter Command was organized, train the 20th Bomter Command was organized, train ia for its initial strikes against Japan frachine. On June 15, 1944, he directed the fil 23 from secret staged which in western China. O strike against Japan western China. Bombardment Wing at leadership, the 20t moved to India for June stern in we

8-41379, AF

-2-	ng month he returned to the States to tak al Command at Wright Field. In September, al Command and Air Service Command were co the Air Technical Service Command, he bece aring and procurement. He left Wright Fie for a temporary assignment at AAF headque	He joined the Fifth Air Force on Okinawa in August, 1945, as chief of staff and become commanding general two months later. After assuming command of the Fifth, he directed its transition from a mighty assault force to the occupational air arm of Jopan and southern Korea, operating from headquarters at Nagoya, Jupan.	In January, 1948, he returned to the United States and was appointed Director of Procurement and Industrial Mobilization Planning at Air Materiel Command hendugarters at Wricht, Field, Ohio. He was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel at BSAF Headquarters in September, 1949. Rated a Command Filot, Combat Observer, and Aircraft Observer, General Wolfe has over 7,000 hours flying time. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster and the Order of the British Empire.	He and Mrs. Wolfe have one daughter, Beverly, who is married to an Air Force officer.	He was promoted to captain on December 1, 1933; to major (termporery) on March 2, 1935; to major (permanent) on July 1, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (termporary) on March 1, 1941; to colonel (termporary) on January 5, 1942; to brigadier general (termporery) on March 1, 1942; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on November 4, 1942; to major general (termporary) on November 8, 1944, to major general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, with date of rank from Feecember 14, 1942; to lieutenant general (termporary) on September 16, 1849.	END	Up to Dete as of 16 Lipril 1951			

B. Wolfe, Aug 1970 B. 15 General K. Calif., 15 .l Wagner, C San Diego, Bill Sparky Siebold, Bi Maj. Reuben Fleet, Interview,

...

Incident parking lot the talking about American North the 1nto and crashed Wolfe General to talking are We ä

sentative? repre sident plane th You when 1939 Monica January Santa. 5 2 aircraft industry for the Representative AF the right That's

area the In

Wag t fly? receive instructions to let the Frenchman Did you plane? et secr

A-26 Douglas the what later original, the WAS it Yes, . M

you authorization? Did Arnold send ö

Yes ething? 01 telegr Was ä

telegram đ would be 11 days thos 4n ally Well, plane? conducted on this heen had that test first the this Nas ä

No - 14 to view? foreigner had been present đ that test The ä order original the ectly ght That' : 14

order. ench airplane tho Secretary Morgenthau? instruction from any ceive DId ö

No. 3

ened? ä

can't Instructions н do VP, not would verbal ine i gave what Cover, Company, and Carl do, and Douglas would he th what Douglas for ot PIL 88 p11ot Test Well Chief Len - 14 this the

really

and

the

who

ench Colonel of

the

Chemidlin? Paul ä

2 and Don bim Cover rouldn Carl and airplane "No" decided: the 1n dn 00 ddl to captian ranted In I Duy Vell this but Douglas 17 "dn

French captain? đ Was 1t Chmedlin? captain th Maybe ö

robatics tanding voted the cut off, peran Re with engine went nuts. off altitude Captain Field there. that single absolutely WA lot parking engine officers Mine: Douglas pilot the 8 monstr the this the 0 three French ther an against And pilot not 80 t0 him to going lot. turned allowed told do Dougla Cover pe pe there unbelievably then old Carl wouldn't th1 Carl spin for know, the ad.joining pilot. then that c) of e l went into don't Colonel thing everything 8 formance that the "M he thi French south there and and d1d and

e,e

A-20? 26. the this said You ä forgotten That the DB-7. H series, French designation the whole 20 the give of Our beginning going that Vell airplane ** tþ what the

instructed to try to keep it you then, and crashed, It Then ö

secret?

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Washington decided to crackup Cover who to Re In but report Carl instructed, OF coulà 5 that Dougla until Washington Don whether could WBB Into know whether don't telepho MOU forgotten Well report by : M I've keep the

tt. Macy reported act 1ndec other to keep trying Post. Mashington 11ke secret But. to keep ä secret.

because it fell right in the parking lot, just about noon It. SBW erybody Sure ·M tim

a BG when this episode Colonel, by order of Hap Arnold made Just been ø to had back Elsenhow nan busted Dund Claude WBB happene

10

Hap

Ę

ä

a1d: 8 by order of Eisenhower. day. Hap one from call back đ busted him got н Hap of. B-29 order this

China and to India over you Claude with project, take. P.I. when

N

for finally rep saw that he wonderful job the liaison But he had Hap all. Hap on, at around. Be did side, Later me. He drinking that went job for Which I did. China a wonderful Chengtu on the story the problem can do to help him. In g That's drinking he did party Now, advanced gain đ a BG. you of made him utation made see WBB nan Be.

CBI with the 73rd or 58th Bomb Wing? to the out t You ä

CO Bomber 20th the there, out first unit the ÷

That was the first group of B-29s.

Q: Was that the 58th Wing?

called the B-29 Special based the the ETO in India and uo Japan, In boys no TUNB we had base the WBB bombing course, reason it first and. of The later, Com the WBT yes. 20th Bomber the then, n in wings, and the the Chine over steelworks come going to Ch . M. Project up in Yawata

guys had gotten the thing off the ground, some out ? come you to afte: of the ETO leaders Is that

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operation and the rest would in the beginning with MacArthur shots a holding hot Twining the to operate a and all Eaker, LeMay. and then, suppos won, ordered out. War the plan only ETO got the He WBB always this Speatz in the Pacific until go had there This check come out can of them You

fellows who had come out the the top jobs? got among you and In resentment come could any guys there these Was that ä first,

and he'd thought there that all out We orders like got course, they 8 When t0 at. contrary raspberries. resentme Artbur, any royal wouldn't say won. the them boys been for н FTO ob. War ady the the ÷.M alr gave had MON

Q: Kenney had some ideas to get the B#29s, did he not?

out in the Pacific against he kept fighting till the very He wanted to use them Yes, Oh boy, that's a long story. last about that to get them. W: Japan.

Q: Did he understand how to use B-291

W: He understood the use of airpower as well as anybody?

bave Did he tactically. airplanes used But ö

an area before It was interdiction, strategic or destroy goes in air suppert somebody gave Mac_Arthur the slogan which MacArthur fellow that the He's ïM

This was "Advance the bomber line. on it sold MacArthur through his operation: and he concept, used all Kenney's

Q: Why didn^{*}t Arnold give him some B-29s?

W: Because he had committed them at either Yalta or Tehran.

Q: At Tehran.

committed them to the operation out of India against Japan . М Was Roosevelt putting the heat on Arnold to get the B-29s started ö

earlier?

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W: NO. (Note: Sec below)

Wagner: It started about as early as it could have been.

with the engines? problems were having terrible the B-29s Well 3 and so than any new airplane that was later on, not any more Ob. ...

engine.

Q: Weren't they catching fire

but significantly, the first unit flew any problems a lot of problems, without and into India had Atlantic Oh sure the ·M BCTOBB

Q: They flew out of Salina, Kansas, I believe,

training original That was of the training bases That was . М base

account of frenzied activity at Salina, Kansas, in March an I have April 1944 ä and

"We training in the all hell was said: They Of course, the heat of Tehran. do the at Then we had to a commitment Arnold made certain date." things out. get these because ದ will hit Japan on Sure, t0 everybody : M

ed B-29 which was back Kansas. Going Salina god-awful you p story, the Seattle in the Long before, at there **Enyway** this t.he down you accident winter told H of I think 5 middle proout

Q: Eddy Egan?

- W: No, Eddy Allen, and his whole crew.
- F: Did Eddy get killed in that?

with anywa. onto contro finally antim do WOrk of build lot 5 would tha order there LL B airplane Of course story. ť ould 8 that his this out: Crew Industry Stebold the vhol lcking and with ž had ah gur right · M got so Arnold versy gung hand went Too

ILLe th B-296 to th atio didn 131 and Roeing stuff

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telv by sald: t Rot with telegra ahead fe what to 7.a.1.1 bl own Tell rell said: Putt ontroll General 11ght controll mil remotel from the "Gr

F: By the way, what ever happened to Don Putt?

California Gates. in Los ŝ Aircraf United orking ŝ

F: Still with them, isn't he?

Cent

Technology

United

(pja) to Atheve retired Put has Dow いてて ::

Q: Would he be a good man to talk to

S: Oh ye

good pretty cechnical good man, because he He'd be i,

W8.8 was involved; he He lot to do with the B-17. had a he course å . М

involved in the first crash.

Don Putt?

On the B-17?

i.

W: Yes, when they killed the Boeing test pilot

F: You mean Eddy Allen

W: No, on the B-17.

Eddy Allen used to work for us. Eddy Allen was on the B-29. McCook Field. know, at ä

After Eddy Allen crashed, wasn't there a very close shave with the ö

second B-29.

W: Yes, I told you about that one,

F: Who was that; who was flying it?

W: Jake Harman

Harman we were thinking about yesterday and couldn't was the That ö

think of his name, three Harmans.

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F: Big boy - you mean the lawyer?

W: No, no.

F: Brother of Miff and Hubert.

W: No, no relation. believe

Q: It is spelled Harman, I

W: Leonard Harman, Everybody called him Jake.

crvine secret get into testify before Affairs Committee, 2 they 20 access but they French having 20 spot a becaus the Senate Military called foreigner no authorizing Arnold spot, WBB đ on the Arnold against the 1n him role Champ Clark Committee, some law talking about 1939 sort of put some who had really. there They Wasn't to getAMorgenthau, to get Morgenthau, Bennett believe it that plane equipment? ä this

permission **authorization** get they had to manufacturer very tight controls on it, and the representative WBB plane there the and then the local In Well to let them W: It was their aircraft and we took it over really.

things, 50 access have to had they result, đ And so ŝ

certain people.

against against this a law WBB that there to recall I seem ä

foreigner having access to secret ...

W: Unless he was approved.

Q: And you reactived written approval.

but I assume it would usually had the Me telephone, usually written or written WB.B 11 Was days, It ÷ in those mbe I can't be written, ż

teletype system.

Q: Were you called to testify?

W: No, I was never called.

questions about it? a few you ask and out come Did they ä

a full report of what had made course 3 recollection happened . M

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Were you aware that Arnold was on the hot seat with Morgenthau ö

Roosevelt?

seat with you pretty tough damn fast. the hot uo fast moved moving but he they Patton an instance becaus about Lovett Talk 8.8 recall that Bob with them. He couldn't keep up don't people a lot of - 1 target. seat with Roesevelt becau Is that unan't? time. that Well, he was supposed to have been on the hot at show the proc was running aircraft Morgenthau running the incident. statement, ö of that a fair

any got never that In WBB because recollection, signed "Morgenthau" Not to my Instructions -

Morgenthau had some of his people, like a Navy WBB, there Collins but Harry Captain the original guy in charge who put in He's the one WBB whatever it was called. He Georgia head. the big Lockheed plant at Marietta, Collins of Aircraft War Production, Ellis Harry ::

carry basis orders had sevelt they on practice Morgenthau and 18, that planes α going as I recall, it, French, some st.111 them buy and 2 British trying Instance industry the to and British particular they afreraft getting planes and to stimulate the this delegation here French Р of ä the charge for

contracts took

gave him with trying not particular quipment This is **åir**planes "We have seat seat who steering this the ecret nou said: this Did you know that? put 50 look to have testify ssing Arnold access firsthand Morgentha Arnold to supposed put have Just had time This 20 he that that inspection take and foreigner for people like that testify, Show Roosevelt to about, Morgenthau wanted đ tha. when authorizing had of French But 18 he This but Later. the the on Guam CB instructions, Congress for what they to testify, that Roosevelt. ö program places before That's crash

- No
- that. heard
- of the Congressional Record? out that get DIG
- that Roosevelt. think I don
- of Arnold's book out that. ä
- Eaker? written by
- Mission" "Global Arnold, Written by ä
- He didn"t write it. i.
- wrote it, he wrote it with this RUY Anoth ä
- guy? other Who wa
- fixed it manuscript and this guy was Arnold's g Laidlaw **ILLEN** ä
 - account Arnold' this is But -din

happe s who l ever 14 don't think had н that overlooked difficult Arnold think Vell ÷ I'II

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where

tell

dow said: went B н Army, action. the 5 to give Navy the asked him to get action from either and of occasions, Nevy, a numb the uo and to Roosevelt the Army

eally said: to pay do it through Morgenthau. Morgentha choice acro they Britain c the You ren had n France' over and tell "On bring Frenci and ssions too. billed of his 40 coming. let him British wit) Foley. didn toe 00 3 Pa the ğ turned Yǒu took both thos tb bim "Let's do 1t. rally delegate dot. with tell 3 th said: way to Morgenthau him IL'II When Morgenthau P2 did н didn Ask good contr for PBYs. WOLK qq 1t?" ouldn thr do 1t "ubluo pe nged by told thei and French British and UMM qo ω 0 folle ship at' ould office th over al so BrrB to that him #4tish the said: wha him told says, ht and all bliud stayed with Ť 5 suggest tly ssion asked contra Чh Morgentha ove shan B-24 ission the do you -Channel right, 000 In dan g for and Morgentha Morgentha late: occasion ÷ t00 the British French CO French "We 11 age commit agent prefe weren "How When suit, TIN" two 488 ber the °S out B

Q: At that time they didn^ft have money either?

the

3 built a plant according we just to death cities. Worth. so much, old 50 and else other booked him. anybody In bad for We twelv oursel Run built work build out Willow tuff. for with expand a plant But Ċ, wouldn't staggering our we laid onsiderably Sunday building built Ford 8 just for and confidence Wer insiste for Douglas in Tulsa airolan building We handle th No. his Ford that couldn't dope improved -He had turned with B-24 Knudi the

making When the war was over, đ auto in while his father was called stay Ford Henry B-248 assemble what Ford made up there in Willow Run. recon here, 650 Fleet been har him he had Run WILLOW dn. think Be of called disposal young Henry with (Story of deal

88)

could drive his ever 7 psychologist, Did he be point good words đ breaking other Arnold them? IL WBB BAnam eaking point? you. of ask breaking of 5 point 10 persuades knew beyond đ exceed This not that or seldom but a sense men,

He knew when to break That's a fair analysis. opinion. That's my tension. ïM the

the with him; honest; something about Hap. I think that Hap did not hold with him okay. He ship back with him, overseas that he would the of he went I know day H the next and Ĥ stateroom over and traps (World WBB hornet, same board ship the the war something, in the shot ø than day on and upper him; you want to say madder month with I had the single tell there a got chess I swam every and I played I staye grudge Now I lower

Q: Was he a swimmer?

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flight with swim, but Arnold was had a forced landing on Fisher's Island Long of ength say might have known how to to regr flew н sick States him and He the left Jennies, that 00 London didn't thing damn those to him the one of wanted sick

Q: He was inspecting something up there, wasn't he?

- F: He was inspecting the submarine station there.
- Q: What was he doing inspecting submarines?
- F: Well, I suppose he had a curiosity.
- Q: You mean it wasn't official?

"Hap, if you want to go over both slated to leave du mid wheeh flew to land on Fisher's Island, 8 there. said: ND din to fly him And I offfcialdom. and I had New London. with asked a cylinder, from Sound morning and I lost the ŝ BCTOBS newt

IL'I bus boat put fly can the here have over eady Can ship you ದ and the put have ready, to them IL'I 1t get get hope and airplane, н over that time phone the 函 We'll fix meantime you back there, back g any part uo Was there a fellow named Reynolds accompanying you turip? ö this

got him, the biggest ship He had trouble with him troops before cockpit job, diplomatic We Reynolds was Major. where out håm took him open 1,500 That's commissioned him Leviathan. kept letters. Arnold lost Yes In and Commerce. We that that night the overseas Senators, Arnold' so badly, uo good of were wrote that au Chamber and hack 1t We accompanied a got got who 1t Indianapolis the harbor at He man Congre Job when c flu. Reynolds successful to way, the of letter He especially the out got the Nobody. of writer pulled a professional ¢ A Arnold really such 80 overseas language ever Arnold' afloat He did been g

Q: You mean died? You say lost ...

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but he insisted grabbed was the peopl ship. motor trip g flu epidemic 11ke man to the this care 20 the left, Arnold the a sick Reynolds on him, everything on "Hap, take said đ how harbor. right, 20 Arnold really and truly was man, went out, staterooms. know н pot belly said: got gangplank, sick left, the to bed you You've Jo of that WBB forced landing, lockstepped, our charge out right and of Hap from the day. two got had kind 50 boat, And an h1m In single the recovered ediately walked WBS of of the short. length who c and one them off had 8 and had really Reynolds know, you, vent We the CO rubdown this and that, here ship, **KI11** you never at 90 mph. pulled doctor Job. 1,500 right So and the Or cockpit this, him they left uo had Arnold gangplank, 80 And officer flu cockpit, and all 11ke We No. got do 20 hands yourself i. sir doctor senior going short were, this, open yes M Ln uo đ B

H

remember н course, 5 -

casual everything Vaterla 9th biggest a ship called the Olympic' organizations old you, the Baltic, told which on the Incidentally, etical alphab Leviathan back there Cem WRR anifest Mission, un 2 been. over the Global all might ship. his п B afloat i. ö no ship that done

Arnol.d"7 Colonel 05 Order "By thing did Vou å

his

In

of

charge

had

rervthing.

troops

Captain Wheeler word. Arnold; Lloyd daughter the to and "The we would with Arnold' way up first ebody night Swift Packing ship Colonel going Colonel Here he t.he He trouble, No. third who Arnold groped Wher wit.h eyond of the said: waiting. kn dark nough, Harm any who Nobody 5 Absolute A d Clifford th tabl. the couple shoulder Fun balloonist Captain Wheeler morning countersign him of word; おちの with Hot of eople out front It ssloned Out Colonel Also, third LTCOL deck 20 day th table In that got top fourth the COM ත් 1 dad this with and d chi tapp 0 Vanderbilt; that Belmont Trophy 11ke going word wher Revnolds 11ke and 8 a different word lat Cornelius couldn pla whisp Aug Company sald stopped second aboard to the Spain George Ma.101 this 08880 And gave had not Len you mee e H eq

12

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of

said:

Col

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was with the Consolidation

said he

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78.8

well.

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table You know Clifford Clifford After Okay, whispe tickets who that had and Invited the Loyd thought King George invited Captain dinner her gentlemen Ethel Levy with Geor says: seler Arnold London, de lo went Leffingwell Clifford forgotten London dinner get balloonist King Hap only Ě 8 Into and Can both wing d Invited "We dinner SOB Ē and 11ttle out George of give got Bals buy Says: that said: Arnold. but picture Levi CV this He VIII to thi CB 8 four Lloyd н When who big B allowed Why nothing daughter Now Ethel. BAVB out aviator this 20 couldn' CO.C đ 1d: show toppers? 20 with both Mr. allowe dinne off SAV because COM find Cohan untry asked Captain afte dinn London 0 40 s н Arnold st ening. Wings 50 later, We people Coha had el × d able her George of Arnold George 11 hands th think George his him 8 the M of of cha have wit.h 9 shake King MM wife 0 ntir you aft 20 peopl COULT White Pad gla with han George LLLW girl 35 divorced that aid: hour t.hat Hap the other ticket did probably the hands for England н at 1 ful Grah other Arnold 8t8 Lloyd during 5 shu last day, through within I says Harr could th variou George shook happe Claude that Every next this Ha A bes But thes Mr. any 78.8 put got top the 20 Be. 50 00 в. B.

asked him, if he when I'm in partner Davison' t la Trubee thoroughl I wrote him and Intend because in Life Magazine, and ship, not find on the 50 said Wheeler" never the a Morgan partner, "Captain wrote who although was the father, And

Q: I saw Trubee Davison just about a month ago.

good to know that g LILI \$100 give d thing ROM tell LL'I [[eh I haven friends

That his father was the Captain Wheeler aboard the ship, aboard Leviathan³ ä the

there In Trube left baggage down rather didn 60 6:00 Hap to know over He **K**now said: EH said: Lieutenant in London It. said I'd like said: verpool don th back 6:00 ooked ember H sir hook Coming 1918. him of Dec Str tor 5 Mtth Guards write did there 23rd Grenadies sa1d 8 Oct C could ar write the found nadle said: wooden on 00: said: SD an ould Gre Okav him he give đ the he And and friend called F Servi Liverpool believe that said: ٤ don "Driver Sailing good discharge in the Flying think Hap uo Re there Han at I checked the 4:00, England I said: I said: I don't I told landed quicke to go long from and look H æ

Q: JMA ?

in the taxi se

F: We created the RMA in late '17

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of the Aviation allowan s day Hap' and when In rank, pay .well, the th and back have had regulations WBY and he would Corps, the Signal 11 already AMC the a of 48.8 part AMC highe 26. The i, Section if he grade

1f you ade? say, high You 8 license of **ABDC** had He all a 8 No DBJ to entitled believe were ö JMA you

circle, a 100-foot allow the this and In to land rank the had Ircle you Ø allow founded Instance 300 vou For AMIC er hell high Wer you next 9 of When needed the 5 time of

included AMC the that That n pay, about .50. upset \$167 Buing got 25% dr really E got RMA guy -pilot the correctly, Army The nher the H i'M 25% 50 got the

F: Not only that, but KB was Lieutenant for years and year

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W: For 17 years.

Q: We are talking about Wright Field in 1930.

understand world Howard the to Jan people Chidlaw probably Well there. 1930 ğ he most In went thought him students about gave he felt 8.8 attitude opinion the went N the P both right thi conceited belleve greatest. ·M: there very and

Q: You didn't think he was that good?

the charge 80 ¥ 9 d neophyt Evel to matter he don't clas tions office too school employe this ering various the about that JO vice thing any Ser thing the a long time befor CIVID other report him division 1d th or did quite Chidlaw but ticula and No, t Chid ----know this fact and Same of of

He was West Jan Howard prejudiced against the military? Why wes Point himself? ö

would We'd sections b you bus the wasn't. one just felt that from ngineering these damn not graduated with F.ver. engineers there this H 8 are business about over aduate boys sure jobs. anything you the knew for 5 responsible to learn WOU got never speech you've and the of had didn't CB MOU number all and WAR and We'd popular officer and he he school I think and 분 all been pilots; pilots, people to We would go, engineering report younger W: us we: call and

erally between him and Arnold, This animosity? arose that there specific issue that. knew any Just remember You 1ssue? Do you like policy ö known?

W: That's all I knew about it.

General K. B. Wolfe, Calif., 15 Aug 1970 Bill Wagner, (st. San Diego, Sparky Siebold, Maj. Reuben Flee Interview,

ncident lot out ab talking North entative are the Into and crashed Wolfe esident General plane test to talking ದ when are LTV 1939 Monica Me Sante 3 Janı 1n in

Industry ti Repr th right 03 That * TA "M

area

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H PLV? receive instructions to let the Frenchm Did you plane? ä secret

A-26. Dougl e c the original, what later Was it Yes, .M.:

you authorization? send Arnold Did 3

Yes ething? telegran ...

telegram Mould it days those 1n vilan Well 3 on this plane? conducted had that first Nas ö

1.14

view? to that a foreigner had been present test ö

for order the original correctly, remember н II right. -That' ·M.

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order. French đ dirplane those thau? Secretary Morge instruction from any receive Did ö

No. :M What happened? 3

would he Wb what Cover Company, Carl do, nch Colonel and would 23 he what Douglas the 3 of ot Don Mell test Chief ·M: this the

Paul ö

80 and Don let him up in the airplane and Carl Cover wouldn't We "ON" decided: We 60 **buddle** captian d got g thi Dougles but : 14 "đn

a French Was it Chmedlin? captain Mavio ö

captain?

acrobatics standing off, engine per-We voted with th He ent up th cut uo nut wer off altitude Field, Captain there. single that Ne absolutely parking lot took at Miner engine officers Douglas low the the pilot onstrate 05 do. went the this there to I don't know, there were three French an against And Just de not pilot into E0 to hangar him lot. going down test turned allowed told eason parking Dougla Cover, SD be CON unbelievably adjoining this Wouldn't old Carl Carl the spin for the pilot, else, then that cj 0.5 into Colonel everything and everything front So test went side. formance this that the he French there south and did and and

Q: You said this was the A-26, or was it the A-20? U. Uall 44 was the beginning of the whole series, I've

forgotten That . DB-7 th the French designation give to our 50 beginning going WBS were constion thev Was dest that French Well airplane the -M. what the

were you instructed to try to keep it and then, crashed, Then 1t ä secret? decided to Washingto crackup who to Cover In this but report Carl had instructed, P could ğ 3 that Dougl were until Washington We Don whether could, Was 14 into We know whether telephone don't long MOU H forgotten Well, V.q report 11 W.: I've keep the

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Trying Window it. LCY' in Ma reported cent indec pape an othe among ke to trying Post, Washington like Was secret the But It to keep ö secret.

fell right in the parking lot, just about noon Sure, because it Everybody ·M: time

episode Arnold. this Hap of **BG** when order by ಡ made Colonel, just been ರ to had back busted Ã Claude Was Well happened 1.1

Q: Was it Hap or Eisenhower?

said: 3 He Eisenhower. Chin day. and India Hap one back by order of 20 from over call you Claude with ದ him got busted н project, Han B-29 of. this 3 н P.I. when

for finally rep. saw that he Job liaison đ But he had Hap Wonderful the Hap all C, at on, around. did He side, Later He me drinking story that went job for China. Which I did. in Chengtu, problem on the a wonderful That's the help him. a drinking man. dn did party any he to Now, never BG again. qo advanced can being Was a BG. you There ವ on the utation of him what made made see W0.S man me.

Q: You went out to the CBI with the 73rd or 58th Bomb Wing?

Bomber Com 20th the there, out first unit first group of B-29s. the took the No. Was -M-That

Q: Was that the 58th Wing?

Special ETO Were baset the called the "-29 do India and Japan, the boys in the in' no bombing runs reason it was ba had course, the first Command, And then, later, of The win the war. 20th Bomber of the wings, yes. and made and China, the over Yawata steelworks up in Chengtu, come One it Project, going to . M.:

you guys had gotten the thing off the ground, out? come were to after the ETO leaders Is that ä of

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holding operation the rest would with MacArthur shots and hot Twining the beginning 88 the operate and ILB Eaker, LeMay, and then, to in sed even soddins in the Pacific until we got the ETO war won, Spaatz was ordered out, been the plan, only WBS He always this had there. This check come out can them. .M. You of

out ther fellows who had con the top jobs? got among you and In any resentment could come these guys there Was that ö first,

We the war he'd thought, and there that all out orders like We got course. they S to When contrary resentment raspberries. Arthur royal say Mac wouldn't boys the been won for them н ETO War 9p the won the had alre - M gave

Q: Kenney had some ideas to get the B-29s, did he not?

:	
W: Oh boy, that's a long story. Yes, he kept fighting till the very	
last about that to get them. He wanted to use them out in the Pacific against	
Japan.	
Q: Did he understand how to use B-297	
W: He understood the use of airpower as well as anybody?	1
Q: But he used airplanes tactically. Did he have , was he a close	
air support. It was interdiction, strategic or destroy an area before	
somebody goes in.	
W: He's the fellow that gave Mac Arthur the slogan which MacArthur	
used all through his operation: "Advance the bomber line." This was	
Kenney's concept, and he sold MacArthur on it.	
Q: Why didn't Arnold give him some B-29s?	
W: Because he had committed them at either Yalta or Tehran.	
Q: At Tehran.	
W: He committed them to the operation out of India against Japan.	
Q: Was Roosevelt putting the heat on Arnold to get the B-29s started	
earlier?	
W: NO. (Note: Sec below)	
Wagner: It started about as early as it could have been.	
Qi. Well, the B-29s were having terrible problems with the engines?	
W: Oh, that was later on, not any more so than any new airplane and	
engine.	
Q: Weren't they catching fire.	
W: Oh sure, we had a lot of problems, but significantly, the first unit flew	
across the Atlantic and into India without any problems.	
Q: They flew out of Salina, Kansas, I believe.	
W: That was one of the training bases. That was my original training	
base.	
Q: I have an account of frenzied activity at Selina, Kansas, in March	
W: Sure, because Arnold made a commitment at Tehran. They said: "We 🤟	
will hit Japan on a certain date." Of course, the heat of all hell was on	
everybody to get these things out. Then we had to do the training in the	
4	
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was wiped the B-29 c which was t do back test. Kansas Going unde Salina, SCC. 8 god-awful you first Bstory, at Seattle. the in the before, down there unyway there this accident told you outrit winter of Bn I think I middle In pro-G out

- Eddy Egan? ö
- Eddy Allen, and his whole crew. No, : M
- get killed in that? Did Eddy il.

with work anyway onto lot of contro remote control finally meantime got do H build the pressure never 50 th these Was order work, would there firepow had lla that an that this airplane never It had B-17 got Of course, story, controlled would side like the 8 knows this heavy wingload 1t guns out; his whole crew. remote industry to have hand-held far the Siebold EB too sticking out this damn aircraft fust. Sparky with and he and versy within the right ahead had H and hand held guns Yesa. Too damn big Me it. so bad guns on : M Arnold went got

our gave all +1 We from them B-29s t0 What happened the In ratic we? didn't more B-32s got 131 and We made Boeing to ** stuff

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and remotely Worth used by It said: at Ft. pressurization got. never go ahead with telegram which had from ¢ what to changed pressurization remember about. Was us н talking blowup" Tell B-32 Well and the said: with g that B-32 that War. controlled Putt in do the military General "Green light remotely controll ŝ from

to Don Putt? happened ever what way, the

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California up there United Technology Center working He ŝ

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
to. talk man to Would he ö

oh yes. ő

good pretty technical cđ Was man, because he good He'd be ŝ

5

The



F: They were buying our aircraft.
W: It was their aircraft and we took it over really.
S: And so as a result, they had to have access to certain things,
certain people.
Q: I seem to recall that there was a law against this, against a
foreigner having access to secret
W: Unless he was approved.
Q: And yourcecived written approval.
W: I can't remember if it was written or telephone, but I assume it would
be written, because in those days, it was usually written. We usually had the
teletype system.
Q: Were you called to testify?
W: No, I was never called.
Q: Did they come out and ask you a few questions about it?
W: Not to my recollection. Of course I made a full report of what had
happened.
Q: Were you aware that Arnold was on the hot seat with Morganthau and
Roosevelt?
W: I don't recall that as an instance, but he was on the hot seat with
a lot of people. He and Bob Lovett, because they moved so damn fast, you
couldn't keep up with them. Talk about Fatton moving fast, pretty tough
target.
Q: Well, he was supposed to have been on the hot seat with Roosevelt because
of that incident. Morgenthau was running the show at that time. Is that
a fair statement, running the aircraft procurement in a sense, he wasn't?
W: Not to my recollection, because I was in that. I never got any
instructions signed "Morggathau".
Q: Yes, but there was, Morgentheu had some of his people, like a Navy
Captain Harry Collins.
S: Harry Ellis Collins was the head. He was the original guy in charge
of Aircraft War Production, whatever it was called. He's the one who put in
the big Lockheed plant at Marietta, Georgia.
7

W: No, you'd better check that one

arry basis orders ctic that going scall it on French still them buy and get wer 3 British th ticul plane th Ba 03 getti th to stimulat of delegati 3 charge + he for

We took over the French and British contracts.

gave hi not particular This is squipment airplanes seat trying og bot this the đ nou this teering C look Arnold 20 ŝ Morgenth Arnold stha gue asoddns fir Did ction take that oosevelt shor 0 forei people like tha hen French of Thi Guam 3 Tater for to testify, instruction do Roosevelt ö program Congres That's places before crash

F: We never heard

- 3

- W: Did you get that out of the Congressional Record?
- F: I don't think that Roosevelt ...
- Q: I got that out of Arnold's book.
- F: You mean written by Eaker?
- Q: Written by Arnold, "Global Mission"
- F: He didn"t write it
- Q: Another guy wrote it, he wrote it with this m
- F: Who was the other guy?
- 5 this guy fixed and was Arnold's manuscript 11 an Laidlaw Willie 0
- up. But this is Arnold's account

down said: went happe symbol н action Army ever 4 the think had give OF Navy don't actor the him contr action from either asked that and overlooked who sions, difficult. get Irnold 0 think **ILIAN** tell to Rooi TT.I the

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111 B-24 built a plant an th Henry Ford cording d old him dyn Run our 29 out Willow 20 d for th plant wouldn 0 laid rablv building 8 onfidence Tur insis He had Ë improve couldn turned with Knudi B-24 the for

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making over, auto .0 Was in i Wa called stay War while his father When the Ford Henry recommends B-24s. assignble what Ford made up there in Willow Run. been here, 650 Fleet let him have Run. he had of Willow me up. think called disposal н deal with us young Henry (Story of

hf drive psychologist Did could point good ವೆ breaking other Arnold breaking them? In Was ants breaking point? you, đ of ask of to point me Was 0 knew beyond persu d, exceed he This that not or seldom but ä sense men. ದ

knew when to break He analysis. fair cð That's opinion N 23 That' tension : M the

the ship with him; had honest; with him Hap did not hold He okay. Was with him d blue that he the of that know ent ğ 24 I think н next Ĥ over the War stater over, something about Hap. and traps (World same board ship hornet, the something, the shot the cj In than do and the upper him; day say month you madder with want to tell d Rot 0 H I stayed I played in grudge. lower SW Now н

Q: Was he a swimmer?

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He Long Island Arnold flight on Fisher's Island but 7m of Swim length say. 20 landing how the known regr I flew a forced н might have sick. States. him and had He the left 80 34 Jennies. see New London didn't thing dav before damn those man the in the of wanteo sick him one

- Q: He was inspecting something up there, wasn't he?
- F: He was inspecting the submarine station there.
- Q: What was he doing inspecting submarines?
- F: Well, I suppose he had a curiosity.
- Q: You mean it wasn't official?

over just. Leave đ to him which want flew slated you Island, н If 8 were both "Hap, w there. on Fisher' said: We đ'n fly him н to land do with officialdom. And me to had н asked and New cylinder, from he 50 And Nothing Sound ದ morning I lost in the second acros next and

boat put and I'll can fly can have ready ship you and the to put have ready, them IL'I 14 and get get hope airplane, н we'll phone over time that the By fix you back. meantime there, back.

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g Was there a fellow named Reynolds accompanying you on any part tuip? ... this

him, ship He had trouble took him with him That's where we got Job, troops befor the biggest in diplomatic open cockpit out of commissioned him a Major. Reynolds was him 1,500 Leviathan, letters, and kept Arnold Yes, an lost i'n Commerce night it so badly, we that overseas. were on the Arnold's Senators, good that that we of the Indianapolis Chamber 30 accompanied us wrote and got back We Was to Congressmen it, got who He we ever pulled out of the harbor. at He man Job writer when cd the flu. Reynolds Was successful way, letter He especially the Arnold really got Nobody. manager of writer a professional A c such Arnold's overseas language did afloat been He

Q: You mean died? You say lost ...

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1,500 people he insisted left, right, was the Reynolds grabbed everything on the ship. motors trip care of "Hap, this is flu epidemic, like man to the an bad Arnold sick 4 the on him, to take but d I said long way how the harbor, right, Was cđ and we went out, man, staterooms. you know a pot belly That I said: You've got gangplank, truly đ left, sick to bed of we got out of that and the length of Long Island and lockstepped, a forced landing, Was was in charge him right ano who had kind of So Arnold really two. from Hap up the single day, boat, And of the recovered ediately walked put Me and them off the short and and he to one every We had had really So Reynolds, come you, 1,500 troops know. went rubdown this and that, right here ship, en en **LLLIX** doctors never at 90 mph. they pulled cockpit job, ĝ bedly the ರ 50 like this, And he gave him had you left Arnold do on wanting to go. gangplank, and all officer flu We cure cockpit, No, We open got the my hands t0 yourself ÷. sir in the up the had senior doctor going short. were, this, open yes He

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everything old Vaterl 9th biggest the Olympic' you, the Baltic, told or a ship called Was PV н which on the Incidentally, alphabetical in his the Leviathan, back there of charge Nas can manifests Mission Ger on been. over from the н the have thing, Global went all might aken everyt We ship. his In Oh. had afloat 20 done on 3 14 troops. that ship

Arnold" Colonel Of Order BV things You did ö

and

Captain Wheeler of word. in Paris Colonel Arnold; He's daughter Mr. Iloyd whispe feeling th House g going over Arnold's we would so dark n1ght, with first dn ebody Packing ship word. said: onel Can third HP 501 from who Jas trouble Swift de L'h rried with groped Jhe. 14: 14 knew an dark Harn any enough Nobody Who Col of A and Coal Cliffor -abl the House Captain Wheeler Consolidation oulder acro morning him Swift of with of nate Colonel Out ball ssione Also. LTCOL deck this day table th In that urth top th decided aft the and tapped 0 NO. that COL Vanderbilt; your manifest SO countersign myself of 680 ebody Trophy going "I.T." word Belm said rolds Tha Yes S a different word Cornelius Company; Augn ne whisp vou coul this pla th He said in a on econd aboard" to the George Spain oassed Major stoppe Well gave the Was And meet lot nad

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well, B.Y table You know, Ok N After Clifford EL1 whisper Okay, agents thought you Harmon who Wbe ticket Lloyd invited nau +1 even see Captain invited 503 Levy, that Georg n her 44.4 μ. say 2

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Lloyd George

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Clifford fiscal Arnold "Wheeler London, think Clifford dinner episode balloonist Ethel King forgotte Londi HP with Hap 5 you Into 8 wing with 1n eler: đ nuited hands SOB 8 the d G dinn buy got littl alla g bot.h that U.B.U says: WR R hand said: shake Arnold We this can N to this 3 н plct "HOI big When Why to Shake He for nothing It NOW says CO. By daughte: and couldn't out of aviator ed d H.H.H show all do said: toppers?" me dinne Hap country. because SAV dinner find Cohan better after all going Captain asked cđ 03 н to 0 Arnold vening. to St н 20 Cohan 10 later, sople Pir 02 two p truth hi LI able orge to t it orge d his George think in the Lon him the pefor th Wheele 2 5 not 50 with figur with King 9 10 to you te. cours be' peopl he started Whit you Lloyd George girl 35 because that HD said. says: few that divorc "Hap tha. Graham did probably thos hands tifn] sts So during Harmon Harmon 0 Everybody hell Engl through happene gue I says Claude George could rario shook these that Be this next for = But the Vir. top Was and got any 20 0 ä B. 4

if he Trubee Davison' convinced when asked him, sometime Morgan thoroughly ವೆ I wrote him and Was I intend Was ago man he 日 month ĥ because and NOW c that Col, about in Life Magazine, and ship, out not 3 Morgan just Was find the Davison and said he uo to of tried "Captain Wheeler" hedd never the Trube back Morgan partner, Was I've he wrote Who н although the father, ä WGS And ರ

to be good to know that. H LLid and \$100 Trube d give but H something, and years you for tell IL'II Trube seen Mell I haven't ÷. friends

That his father was the Captain Wheeler aboard the ship, aboard Leviathan? 3 the

red damn liar time there c Fleet?" down ther but out baggage in over haven't had Trubee shot we left down stop. get ulled COL address, take it, rather go cab driver, had been We'll got 0 didn I'd like to know it. 6:00 and had co. overseas your had You I don't know his When 1t Haro' 20 H pocket He that He decided He I took said: London. said: taxi from no train London Lieutenant said 1t. said: his to Liverpool us the н H g in back of December. 6:00 booked 50, In t0 He int a hook Street sir name And more out Guards Coming are good friends and I could write him. ರ = ed Sailing from the US on Oct 7, 1918. miles H Was ancestors NH NH Fleet Limited That gives you two hours with cam 4:00 did Guard nadier said: there OML .. 23rd "That": me. He H arm Then, it to Grenadier write A says. on the M4 00:4 and found and said: wooden Gre the said: after the called him up that he would "he "Okay. before how far And he Was ದ down to catch the he the named sir, I checked on the train knee down and Flying Service it And from Liverpool said: your pardon I believe It's "Driver, to go there yet, н Yes. discharge the 4:00, Hap. think He I told Hap. 14 at from the quicker. look at said: I said: "I beg in the England, don't landed a taxi long н and н н

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Q: JWA?

in the taxi service

F: We created the RMA in late '17

the of when Aviation Hap's day LLS and In rank, pay .Well, the the In. and back had regulations have Way Corps, would in the and he Signal already JAIA the d of Was part JUA he xt higher ರ 26. The if he was i. Section grade

You say, if you grade? next high had license 29. of the allowances He and was No 29. to pay it entitled believe Were H JMA you ö

circle and allowances a 100-foot set this because schools for them. In pay to land We rank you had ground the circle allowed foot founded instance, 300 were also ರ you For Was We The RMA JMA, higher. hell. you were to beat next 0 of When grade out men i. 5 times needed of the

That included the JMA that increase in pay, upset about \$167.50. drawing really got 25% a LT got The Army non-pilot guys the RMA Was H cent. correctly, the MA go 75 per remember increase. н H and 25% 50, W: got the

- F: Not only that, but KB was Lieutenant for years and years
- W: For 17 years.
- Q: We are talking about Wright Field in 1930.

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understand WBS 0 went world' Jan Howard н Chidlaw and the to people probably Well, younger went there, 1930. he in most thought about him students gave first He he when I felt as attitude opinion. way th that' went R the the in right, both man. That's conceited and believe. He greatest, . M. there. very and

Q: You didn't think he was that good?

in charge 80 to Mr. neophytes matter of Every got because he don't report class just As officers ug sections too school employees. of most about this. npon these engineering various thing that He looked of Service any report to the something a long time before Civil other him division. the said the favored th about from 20 nated told did, section adı he quite ğ and Chidla business No, Chid .M: whi Clo so. a ne of us this know fact same and of

He was West Why was Jan Howard prejudiced against the military? Point himself? ö

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would Werd engineering business we wer to go over there with these sections of not what you the wasn't. one just felt that are graduated from damn н Every Was engineers So he anything about this He learn the business. sure. were graduate now you boys responsible jobs for knew you've got them know speech, never and of had we didn't so, н d and number and now all been pilots; we'd all was. made so and officer he and We would go, and he engineering school I think and report to Mr us were pilots, younger people, a popular . M. call

generally arose between him and Arnold, This animosity? that specific issue ther that any just Do you remember You issue? like policy ö known?

W: That's all I knew about it



Mar 18, 1970 Calif. Interview LG Kenneth B. Wolfe, Lake San Marcos,

they op you ask people is: Q Hap Arnold. usually General encounter with him? of the first questions I they time your first first One the remember remember ö

happened served WAS s when that had never conference and that thing all these factories March 1938 one day, н First at way. 1s cd on the phone tim me this situation in knew three with Pentagon, or think here two unusual called the out don't him met at AF representative an Eaker old office had ls him. This Ira know Hap. the . M under 'nbib to me had the

Q: I see, that was the Munitions Building.

"Get in here without wants to said: year you here in to tell you and And went are going He earlier George Kenney I had been here was ordered out "Hap and here man: time "yes. So Field Production Division out said 2 And he said: We Now!" going to be No. little station "Well, said: said: Wright as Wright Field. in here. and н and Santa Monica. take he said: to duty Staff College, Building, there?" phone out going on?" to uo is back get going And the got come at 1 man; Pop Powers out Munitions 08 representative in uo to run it MOU a Production Division and "What's 0 career airplanes see Hap. to Command "It' called has you them, と目 said: want old going to finished the General months when Ira said: of that all any in the one have trying going to be No. And I And went So three guys are Colonel Robins "Take Yes to be the AF you No.13 organize had been see you. ·M delay." there said: "Don" and 7 are

Q: This is Warner Robins?

within 60 days after he took the job when November 1938? thing that come in here introduced So President. told 'Here's Colonel Wolfe," I think April 1938. to do. come by next around talk with the President, and me say me the to left killed? The you told office was see This was March or to my job through, So he want which he This to started got the over I... Westover get back me into ö ·M: ö W: thing going said: in," you 80

did

never

started

when

That's

that

were building

they el

when

Puerto Rico

down in

Was

Kenney

meantime

So

of the business

that was the beginning

So

Yes.

·M

and

, dn

me

called

Hap that and he

happened and bring

the

got

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SO

se

place

SOTIO

And Powers was

there.

operation

big

took

He

with

over

So me

said:

President

the went in

to

we are

MOU him. and

said

I went

production plan

"When Arnold said: in there with Franklin.

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going little Was cţ he So I had do, that and the other to going = see me. was he and what and this, the office me airplanes, build 50,000 to

get didn' He time? that at 50,000 airplanes later year talk đ Did he till 50,000 ö the

interested in getting the production was he right, capability going That's :M

planes "10,000 talking they were At that time ö

see am President sent with. along get the to So cuss forgotten. He was an ornery L've Yes, Johnson. W:

War? of Secretary Assistant the Johnson, Louis ö

up this in building started got we was how So that Yes :M

don't know

н

it.

Arnold picked me for

Why

production capacity.

to the South Pacific who Echols, dn wound Gen. н to SO assistant Washington, sent then into Washington to be was in thing Kenney Division teriel ше Production tell Ma the did taken dn never heading the was of Powers and he head was

started war the after until 80 Kenney didn't Was That ö

ranking he might have a desk In to Washington and was the that meetings Puerto Rico, So that's how tied to You Kenney several get enroute find Arnold. stayed there. in to had down about band. were н and stil1 to beat the to wasn't we were trying Kenney We earlier was He the day the Nips hit Honolulu. from Douglas he on, but said war. so he was maneuvering there We the right, and from into gotten that story And officer on duty, c, get So That Washington. to happened. ·M: wanted job,

out near Bakersfield. knew nobody and hunting expedition, were hunting quail ರ Well, I know that they were out on Yes, they they were. ö ·M: where

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Q: He didn't tell you?

W: No. He didn't tell any of his staff.

at that flew into Pearl Harbor during the -17s 'n these off kiss to night before are the ones the out He had gone They Hamilton. ö attack

finally Anyway there So flight. located him out where he was. fly then Ted Landon led that to to find out sparks began They from the Highway Patrol. that best and our barging in, that's the one trying were he came a call Yes, and I boy, we got Kenney And

guess н show up till the next day, Arnold didn't Well, ö

W: Yes, second day after, I think.

C-47 c think he had н fly, had to He country after? across day second fly to had The they ö and

said: and and Production the eboy he radio yesterday found hous Anyway the Mexican patrol beginning of with him. industry this on the highway up the think Gene Beebe was Harbor heard it the So that was the when build Pear1 н was, to about that. that program him about t tell them. about and told Division and the knew Yes, story Doug las н he didn' amusing ·M yes "oh Don

H

under there bad experience out He Was there c Jan Howard, Arnold had out was His former brother-in-law that when me Chidlaw told '30-31, in back know, at Wright Field You Conger Pratt ö

He was Chief Engineer -M

to adverse to do in his action reason Field an had or some C) Arnold' Service Command, Arnold a lot For that a heck of time Most of the job was being done by Howard. jumping on Wright Field thinks that have the Air after Chidlaw and Arnold didn't negative sort of and reaction to Wright Field, And Arnold had always to be was seemed Service Command, Field always ö Wright job. he

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all things Control there a good dn and Quality a Colonel think for tried to be н had Procurement but Howard We right about that, While he was Chief Engineer, Jan Howard. Strauss was head of opposed was was reason, and the reason Ben always I think named Strauss. were to all men. they ·M: and

to be brilliant You think think that Arnold had reaction to Wright Field. it was for good cause? the kind of guy who seemed You don't jumped on Wright Field, psychological negative along with people. Jan Howard was couldn't get Well sort of when he ö this that but

had been pick this with anadium beginning because chrome so, with Hap, And rightly the putting experience just done Was on my things he based get Production Division to Well, everybody ·M: In

this, was op he and to money plan c OL and appropriations program going big get đ without any had 10 he erybody And for years other. with cain the going along and raising that

representaat building Air Corps Douglas MAS as assignment What Segundo. your about El plant, talk **Douglas** to want the н time? at ö that tive

American remembered those North it in always called later We then We adopted the names AT-6. And single-engine. the A-17 trainer the never was building this airplane advanced number; an attack airplanes by started building ground He ·M: days the

in 1939 A-20, the prototype of đ uo working was Doug las 't he? ö wasn

the French for building them was he French, the For . M remember Chemidlin parking lot Paul of the in crashed by enchman who enchman then Fr The And name? ö his

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thing Don Douglas and when this lot. cracked up. the uo there that airplane standing the were in н and was He Culver ... spun in Carl

secret but it's like keeping tried to keep that secret window C. Macy And they In event ö some

American of the North parking lot the in right fell 1t Well. ·M plant.

Q: Was it North American or Douglas?

uo street the across was plant which plant. from Douglas' was North American Boulevard, It Imperial W:

get to the Frenchman permit to instructions given were plane? You that ö in

W: That's right.

W: Well, I think it came out of Washington

to you instructing telegram, đ you sent Arnold I recall that Frenchmen the ö show

of any to show anything -called allies permission to were we had to get though they even be, Could foreigners ·M: the

in Washington, this thing, for testimony? seat hot Congressional Arnold got on the then you remember And ö op

W: No, I don't remember.

Do a thing going and Morgenthau had that he anything between them? problem was The know ö you

was going sent got the war н when Was while with Morgenthau ad hoc committee over there to Europe, experience only My No. that : M uo uo

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the at what of them let aware to he told to look a hard place. Were you instruct Wolfe If the Frenchman. trouble in trouble with Roosevelt. and to rock in truth that Morgenthau had ordered him the to was access he between then gave caught airplane, that Ken Wolfe Frenchmen, then he was Arnold was classified dilemma? admitted ö this the was

duty in Washington uo were Unless you Not in those days. never got that you

property Clark and dn been to called Morgenthau the Frenchman Champ Committee yet Douglas not Senator Bennett had Affairs Was plane authorize still And they the Military it testimony, that therefore Douglas had the right to Therefore, Senate it to him. took was They called him up, the Corps. that Morgenthau giving of others, Air were really the couple by line pted ö they accel and The and

that distinction? of into the nusances called get ever Did you No, in it. : M fly

thing

that

uo

all

at

testify

to

never

was

would 1t because 1t of out you keep to wanted problem they guess the to add ö just

at all that aware of I wasn't ...M

very the President couple evelt boog "Hap" we he letting Wer Santa Monica, in Roos some called him said that c "in dutch" with the and the President did of This instrument was he Global Mission you? President had allegedly and Arnold course at of the doghouse consul offered him an old fashioned, of this incident And the of And then Morgenthau Arnold got were = didn s book, you. you Arnold out like Arnold' started. course But because Was course, President through Morgenthau. guys this is when the But knew he and according to for of war that. led, of And Guam the and that's how he in and in until uo This years later trouble Frenchman And aces him doghouse ö pl things, In called close. have got the of

was This anything. or interviewed Westover? dn called to Assistant never was was H No. Arnold ·M: when

3 was probably you at the White House that This 1939. January that conference In after was after this mentioned before two No, month or ö

relieved Was H after job that Was to White House back went the never at conference AF representative. The . M as

later House was at the White conference Then this ö

timewise been, have Must : M

you mentioned 16, 1940 in with the 50,000 planes speech on May đ in that ties used that Roosevelt Then ö because

see Hap, to there back to the President ordered was talk H when to , won back 38 second time C. This the .M and

2

might there plane? more that one that you you in ask to Frenchman me occur Let it the Did telescope let violation to Frenchman events this these security about All question ö some be

authorized they because were else they everything concerned which they did was and it, as in far ride as them, because airplane going to buy No, see the . M were to

Didn't it have aboard, equipment classified it had things? But of ö couple

nothing but instruments some and engine and propeller my knowledge No, to ·M: else

agents foreign allowing about the books material in classified military law cd Was There view ö to

of my Three question uniform. Washington no In was officers, there from So zation people were French AF Captain author ದ and the Major had These because -Colonel :M themmind

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Orleans Rosenblatt New in So1 plant a guy named đ opening Was about the French? business for some some planes there in this? Was build [] involved ö to

W: Well, Sol was in the Washington office.

problem? this uo him with contact any have Did you ö

Washington there around procurement In things hovered or and He production papers trades, writing with many op of heen man nothing have c of mav Sort had he Was No, knowledge He ö :M h

flit name saw his to do wondered jobs just of and I couple thing. đ him Arnold gave of this out and and

present Arnold uo later being where time; him War that remember the at during him Washington, with problems contact in some any meetings remamber had never several you H No, Can were ·M ö there

to wing involved trying these were get mind. you they Did to my tanks problem. comes range? wing problem portable to give them some big đ One was the This remember to Wright Field. on the fighters B-17s you the Do for out in that? tanks came put

escort get to damnest their trying was AF the When Oh yes. fighters :M

43 Right, ö

Mean and the oxygen tanks put shell through them indirectly when we came out with the P-51s. which "Jug," P-47, Arnold came out on that deal, hell with him about They'd get a old on the airplane raising how damned explosive they were. mad this is like the whole been right, machine guns on. working Kenney had throw That' were could We ·M: because time. the İt

"Jug?" the on ö

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So my brother with They fired one burst found 50 the was fighting the (Franklin Wolfe) was in damned 30 eight Arnold how "Well set the oxygen tanks up at arguing Kenney ever with these we said: been a P-47 there. against this I don't think insisting on. show had Kenney and to a P-47 Arnold the P-47. wants brother carried oxygen, brother brother had and he was and the British were Armament Division had Kenney course standing by in my We off, my and where = took So, are. Of Division, My Kenney that bomb. gas tank-oxygen tank uo these oxygen tanks over. there. that test airplane SO c of us were it Armament like the range in the sung this machine gun, of changing off put any machine the group rest went on to end of explosive charge of got the the and his It problem caliber caliber W: Kenney have and far and it.

"Frank, anything said: say and gracefully brother, to my to about subject over wasn't He turned the see. you lt, So he about it. about

absolutely .50 caliber edge showed true?' Frank this We of In of this?" turned "I've got to my far Norden bombsight end "Frank, trailing cooked up had the and he rid all went to with that uo armament illustration, He he11 20 how the calibers?" directive op getting was more Arnold, never, people, Arnold c the and served you the officer Was He to showed 80, Arnold said: said, the brother little and date the In That happen showing "General out. others will off about few Ordnance had cd else. what 50 He and for caliber the bombardment got kindergarten the c "Eight coming coming brother Dismissed." did you Si l "I'm off airplane?" airplane ahead sponsible Arnold everything "Frank, we to and dance said: knowledge." except . 50 He falling access the 20 how 08 said, she11 So Kenney My said: ರ to and ed the his he might presentation quite farther the re said: briefing B showed had in that "Well ones and and Arnold song as he was was and 30's Kenney empty all And н that plus gu Field He best of my impact, Corps this presentation top Corps much little It blank little Corps. andardizi of P-47. said: got đ to days = well. here?" the there, give like waterfall tanks ockwel1 off. you there "boo" Ordnance some and how Ordnance the blankety him a the Arnold those real out have and and falling gues to the sn dn and oxygen Ordnance in of said the gave In drew 08 coming to show brother So ·out The in the 50 calibers another the conference what in the hell those velocity 08 of will ever -caliber here few the "Yes, staff with in brother wingsbrother the to Part thing seY 30-caliber all all out out the 30 MG my trying knowledge, just deal of overcome said: 30 knew the the to this the coming Arnold change the one of Arnold change eight there. Chief So my said: so my armor were this you the out had of He He of

10

two-star đ Was Campbel1 Campbell? Ordnance been of charge have in Could that Was He ö general

Ordnance the with feuding Was н because been, have could Well time ·M. the all

labor of Division either time? that, the of all control with them any trouble relinquish You had ÷ wouldn' ö They

single turrets cd have ou 1 buying had didn' one. that War were of this WP care into U. The B-17' they took went we airplane. when Hap, and well. Lovett for any No, Bob W: turret And

Q: How did they do that?

brother airplanes playing way only Arnold and said what British that took of the Army didn't get the license the called my noX at had been them over in way these the "Well, who, this the the of from said: But Arnold for the British have get Stu Symington two phone They That's said: right turrets the and Arnold on the business fast that the rest Louis. there My brother So What they did on that: . WOU license some typical called him right over knew "okay in St. turret have the (:) 80 it brother going to do about it?" said and Electric got Bolton Pauls to and the op Frank got and caliber Symington cockeyed and in industry my we've started us was head of Emerson happened England Bolton Pauls (?) friends. going on. 30 ed in ran so and "Look is 5 20 somebody of, SO good what op This over They was ust you know in and said: s were what are he wanted went and that' It ahold of the н England W: worked thing know What time golf, for off. was

later document anonymous little c in ended up This business ö uo

W: It did

Q: Don't you remember, on the B-36?

- Q: Yes, about six years later.
- the Air Force and Navy the vas That ·M:
- docu Worth Cedric that subjects big the of one This ö

ument?

W: I spent days in there in that investigation

was wheel and sort he he balanc everything impulsive that mentioning 0 sort out get to đ figure as tend your Ve Serv he Arnold and did Did Lovett Arnold or Did off. about track? 80 great team. beforehand? talking and the C on are Arnold enthu do, We going to keep ö Lovett get to of

When Arnold couldn't In other words wouldn't was Corps, Signal two of them They together Bob. could. other with the each other. were against Bob these them them, like dn experience of buck complemented and the rest of two • military to the scared mv but and the who recollection Hap were done with pair Corps, against they great Engineer get something opinion bucking đ My Corps mind they In

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Q: They worked together?

"Here What -just end one day going opinion: the Fri the initiative they any IFF. you're tha General Identification in there sir my than have oN'' in now, Well instruction called don't took psychologist said: "Beginning the always We said: got and furnishing н other were. Arnold great War example. said: It? any the they and 8 about for and had of Was mean give you one responsible middle never and Lovett He doing noX to urned jump on you. the you said: 0 Arnold In will are And Bob Lovett get the IFF right He Corps hell to = :M Signal are the or Foe loved Here In we to

that? sold and to Marshall went he think you Do ö ·M:

happened Sil got SO H because just it time, And had office they their think in ÷ Don afternoon know that don instructions

noX icepick really and my We gave ahead, take goodbye. said: them out there me up know Well, and

8

"That's fine.

said:

н

within four or five days."

can get

н

I need.

the drawings

have all

said

and

phone

the

called him on

name--I

guy's

that

could remember

I wish

н

do something for the war.

to

wanted

he

that

him

reminded

is,

IFF

the

what

you

show

and

here,

out

get

"Well

said:

He

:

Air Corps

the

them for

to buy omebody

going it is

soon can you get him out here."

woH"

said:

н

of

couple

Wright Field

me

to

In

the head of Philco had been

He'd

war.

the

for

op

to see

something

wanted

He

weeks before.

couldn't

and

Corps

Signal

the

of that

out

contracts

some

get

to just

trying

left Washington

н

before

So

of

think

to

happened

So

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five days later he came out there with two "Are they that IFF called there he had the IFF. "That's good, about Arnold: doing .dn Ξ Arnold: follow got Philco building them. you are and Arnold "What Ξ sir. train, typical ityes said: đ So four or uo said: and e cars In day н baggage contract. "Well. phone one going ahead?" for it." special I said: word the him

things? follow up on these always he Did ö

was the end of that

That

then and vanadium do, to something chrome the you of give exponent would great He c of him. Was he typical no, ho .dn you was : M call That

something you should have done jump you for ever it wasn't done? Did he ö and

suit him to done ever was nothing oh, ·M:

more: something wanted he did, you Whatever ö

done?" he then that do, get to chore to "When are you going ed you give would He and say: him. of would call you up Typical ·M

six He'd come done in it about six months." long as you get as going to be you need it's time this! "Well, all the did Always "Take You'd reply: weeks." back:

- said six weeks, he would have said six days had If you ö
- W: Right.
- Q: And he always followed up on these things?
- W: Yes.

held 50 that he didn't He too impatient things these Arnold was was of and he send things down to the staff for coordination. many at One of the criticisms leveled SO air He did in the of these balls bouncing staff. the to anything ö give all

- us caught up with That's why the Army and Navy never : M
- Q: He just went ahead and did things?
- W: Well, like that IFF I was telling you about.

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other drove some Arnold there where Were instances time? short other đ any consummation in remember Do you to something problems? ö

new and And the uo which at that always gave who the One year he would get enough money to start a when this big criticism came Echols sat there So, done OL an airplane, to do this, message an escort. could be Echols was turrets. who teletype start the airplane, or the thought as get money don't know order--but Echols had been talking about building foil in Echols. used He had a good foil in Oliver Echols. ct got to Hap what he to be the P-51, which could be trying to just -So, in Europewe he had a great coming up with something to do. there, years, recommending escorts out but he couldn't these knew and all the other. lack of Wright Field all who could do it, we Echo1s thing out the ·M: through engine, turned about first

North Bradley of with Lee Atwood Mark was who fighters get together fighter uo project officer new to e with Captain or Major, dn come The and call. American e phone then.

put low the British as War the didn't in early engine P-51 another the have using they It was didn't Merlin in there? plane? Well altitude ö the

W: That was later on

Q: But the first P-51 wasn't too good, was it?

get He cleared Was von Karman P-40 was the airplane, the fighter The "Drop and outside that Echols supposed to of us back This industry." couldn' which Echols people, perfect use them in time. we said: opinion So we decided to do against the recommendations of over and we engine theory the and was else." things They rest -great sent three of of their Battle of Britain pilots of out which service seance and held the The top it. been rated at about 1,400 or 1,700 horsepower consensus the boys saidhave anything relate these turn make the Allison engine, had a big correctly. in never all them out never The in you excused them, can't the So they don't brought what will engine remember of Dunkirk SU until you get see what happened, the engine heard We of Now, He any Allison The P-40 had out of it. can't drop it. , you So Echols the ίf fall than Field. the hot shots hp, this was "Well the time of the engine better 700 Wright horsepower military diagnosed = You said: at is what had. the project. or "We had -40 at airplane British we all ·M: of the called and he always have that said: that that This they and at

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Q: That was June 1940.

and The on fighters to Toronto the project officer there flew up DC-3 took the Bradley, fellow couple others, this So W: and i,

Well there eve ever to biggest Officer -M Hap hooked whole back after a dr for sat the had vas

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put We There wasn't the British Merlin engine and the the room going fly competition of Dunkirk. great cocktail hourtake the British Merlin that going middle this in back of Dunkirk. the fall when the result came had the days the in Right We in the middle of He boys, three fall time had Packard build as called Bishop aside. "Well, did So. the radio the the OL party two we both ourselves and the British the P-40. was dinner Atwood, three said: That right and and been and then we over Lee the house. threw guess between the Spitfire radio, We'd and heard Bradley and Bishop, in up the and Spitfire. in came party in the P-51, ace servant dinner the IMM

to

were

we

and

the P-40

British fly

let the

to

idea

You were Special Project the War probably the of headaches and project, biggest pet . WOII the ŝ B-29 Arndd' of to the -one was etc This war over engines catching fire, headache of the to go B-29. want the for

of Nobody And big the Arnold called our group But all are got the job being the project to build -too and even all-"We airplane is going to be built accelerated program. dn it. futureproblems pilot, what wing-loaded airplane we had ever had, at time said: look test god knows far in the cry "Yes, no of Hap and c the all kinds take same damned thing happened. big hue Allen, too So, to control, was: real the aircraft industry had It was Eddy đ group and the other cd when I was We was fire with "This There this it a job like that. else. 00 automatic that' sure because one of said: every place civilians. that consensus So heavy that = had the this, top people out of It. the real Arnold build Again, done crew of the lost Congress and an airplane; visualized. first So, to going this. new. the

sometime one probably first the but crackup of B-29, the took the after You was 1943? This was this B-29. the Right, uo manager ö

of 1943 the middle In

people to took over got the ready We had two other get We these one. we there 80 There is one other very interesting episode all first places, out with the pilots drawn contracts other dn Wright Field test cracked three Allen 1n them had Eddy we build I took Meantime, jobs. to going experimental project. out. were W: the job Ne

Q: Martin was going to build them?

president gunbutts officer the Jake this thing Was They had tried name of see sudden wound up with over in the bank and the wing and Boeing at Wichita we could went Finally project he was Well '11 be got this and machine đ out the bank, of who ailerons." that He and Look All one. copilot by the chief guy warehouse where was to of them thing all West. a day said: could talking about, second the ground, little easing lot start take off. airplane of the Oliver đ What And he two you ರ were the was would incre turn This and this at Marietta; And the where he end to lose building and the ground. Was was off Seattle field big every time she and get was "Jake, noncoms forth. what happened guicp to đ there north н Colonel, the ramp, the was on the going too. 1n building It SO said: Bell was of oldtime floor the and died sn act, end the ground. thing back he đ н of Omaha; passed us into this uo at so was the Jake And the third we to this all around Johnson the front dn there ailerons at who God in and of at ready asked up on the in know. got Down back on Martin out dn WM the bombers--two al off, Harmon, after Right back he getting and I mers got if I the got that. it I thought: Boeing sergeant, righted, Jake they : M finally taxiied pull sitting crossed damned field there movie them they like uo So of to So

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the lost almost and wing, the of They had to change the tip second one dragging.

29 h the of end the been have it might that, If you'd done ö program

that fact the for except "sn this of to build end the going almost are was we The first "Well said: . M Hap

to commitments ties these facili all manufacturing made had Arnold of kinds meantime and the In plants ö three

Chinese, and the Russians the to things commitment these use made to also going had were He We ... where

tail made on his And he's really lengtu. was f The President bas the President. for an no the 2 Right, commitments to B-29 this ö for

the In people of lot đ and the industry in tail people his uo lot were Force in in Air

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Q: This would have been a tragic thing.

W: You can see what would have happened.

Q: It could have been the end of Arnold

would They Never 1t op War to bloody wanted the Army lost the have way the might Japan landing we with that, thing only Not the MON . M ÷ have didn

the way would have taken the Truly and we had landed in Japan. Japan They uo landing islands bloody littl ίf đ with them, been these escape have in fighting would Americans fantastic, narrow It were million ö Japs

about seeing that thing felt imagine how can you oh yes dn crack :M t0

of I'm going to check the date There's a book on the B-29, out ö that

W: Yes, there's a book by Mansfield.

SO came one second the that I didn't know don't recall. cracking up ö near

hydrant, K-9 mentioned this President, 1t ed called to dn Vice He walking never and made. Engineer dog We film damned quiet. đ shows had Chief film with Douglas, the the awfully through starting MOU Company kept Beale, caption We Boeing Wellwood ·M: and the well, The

Q: Relieving himself.

W: Well, that's the way this airplane looked.

escape? the narrow about this about Arnold to talk ever Did you ö

W: He found out somehow, long afterwards

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Q: Oh, you didn't tell Arnold?

W: Hell, no, we didn't dare.

Q: He didn't know about it.

would It We minimized it. secrecy. to erybody terrible We been W: have

believe against Japan was having that 44 H wasn you know President, plane trouble It operating Did farther. the the of course problems kinds promised would be little of all modification, And take the B-29 story a had encountering B-29 he 1943 the back. that on his production, 1943 Nov plane was in Oc tober late and the President Let of kinds date ö I think ready, some all the

very the from 5th, June Was The date date the story. made the we and not CC) 1944 That beginning,

Q: It was June 15th-ethe date of the first raid.

- That was the date? ö
- was it think н YALTA, at date set that Arnold And ·M:
- YALTA before No ö
- B-29's? use to commitment the make did Where ·M
- 1943. November This Cairo or Tehran probably It ö
- date the made he and **Tehran** ·M
- 15th? June as gave the date And he ö
- made it and Yes . M
- don't know H date had been postponed. the impression that thought that got ö where I

recollection to my knowledge or not No, ·M:

Salinas? to out come ever Benny Meyers and Arnold Did ö

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And first over got this took else Salina as somebody soon at there see and out you it out to India act after I left, the in' got took until when Meyers н Not going, :M s wing that

nappened? what Yes ö

airplanes engine some gunnery the new was all have problem like We problems, main problems the all kinds of but we had engine ret problems having have tur some equipment We problems :M and

- Engine catching fire ö
- overheating were They : M
- Salina? at out weeks of couple spend and Did -M: ö

there

Was

Not

to trying There were dragging they were sometime like March 1944 they and sitting on Salina the CBI, to of thinking out of planes plane E these a bunch ö get

too. the factories, at Bunch of planes sitting out . M didn't Arnold and out? problems, planes the some expedite each plane had to try and and Yes, there out ö get

wing first the got H After there wasn't н know I don't I took them out ·M:

Q: The 58th, and Blondie Saunders had the 73rd?

me 00 from that' over And then Blondie took production picture the into 58th, of out F-80 on the was the he deputy I was called back to put and up, Blondie was my cracked Blondie :M when when

Q: Who took his place?

and all win By and Guam and Eaker over to come the 58th in out, going to came and then Ramey moved Spaatz hotshots from Europe were war when MacArthur had it won. of those hotshots Roger Ramey, these time, rest ·M: that the the

on breathing hard about it? was President know Of you didn't the that recall subject: ÷ , uop Arnold on this You ö

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W: I had problems of my own.

the that was up at Hyde Park, is the first mission?' impression when I "what Arnold: asking this got President was ö

W: I'm sure he could, I wouldn't know.

back doesn't files here, that it held know This Arnold you might not don't have my delayed. Maybe was mission course, scheduled. course, first Of of to be it. impression, the of first mission was that with your knowledge because he didn't know the impression the got the ö I got when jibe

I wouldn't date the all ready and make delay to had them blood advance sweat н weeks Ίf all records of that, given me two we that know have up my All may I could look He that. ·M: know

trouble, mentioned Benny Meyers, when he got in You know, ö THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

worked together have and In private support 18 must he reached was This Meyers s help and omebody Benny Meyers some of out. Benny and letter fn S course sent engaged solicit Arnold' Salina Field that idea that got him Of ton feeling to never write Hamil. out CBI he any that letter gone the any at trying to to Arnold didn't have dn into going have had OL because the typed out you they means was was Did was and Arnold that his He off letter than time tipped Arnold off, stuff the good old days. the B-29s In 1947 when the Arnold's file the living higher pulling this mentioned activity? Arnold. then to

debt means with supported by people who initially in i always had independent him Was AF supplied he had money the In that had the who else about him was woman Benny Meyers, everybody always that he wealthy Benny when was of the stories that we heard very Well, my impression of banks War e to the known him before the the first marriage was before ears So to their money. ·M had One his the dn

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Q: Always drove a fancy car and lived well

W: Where it came from, I never knew.

accepted the fact that just well people living Benny Meyers had money and was said that Arnold Mrs ö

Was could find, when he H as far as that, Hawaii started originally he Well, duty .M uo

had Stratemeyer production In that involved assets sign that letter and his Everybody stocks called upon to Staff? his Air ating of st you was Chief letter Were sign when he ö to

W: That came along every week almost.

Q: There was more than one letter?

to be "You've got about: always haranguing use were They : M

accept and industry L shouldn' the You with Associating that. shouldn't do uo SO and you and SO industry and this, gifts about from accepting careful things

dismissed and everybody procure when he claimed In Arnold living in this đ Was -but had and that Meyers round robin letter, and later interest ends course that Meyers is alive people both that? of denied this. an And playing about his. all he had Meyers listed assets verbally anything was đ state that was the hearing in 1947 he his heard that Arnold particular letter heard stocks, Benny н didn't Company, told you You know, his Have had he responsibility list Aviation Electric course, at he This from his job. Francisco to that testified asked -of claimed ö thatment San was he

told ago and years Be 9 to OL dn ŝ came this has been chap ರ golf course heard of Meyers, Meyers the Benny uo The last I seen Saw had General he that ·M: This

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Q: Pop Powers told you this?

ct and worked in Benny's office in Washington working the of one place, stores some the Ohrbach department there in New Jersey heard of him the AF was ever of Meyers in one н Ohrbach boys was for That's the last That comptroller . M

If see talk this thing write Ohrbach's and would he in involved know + get 11'11 nob to н lead, might not want with him. interesting touch he an in him, S That' see put did can ö they H If

Powers since about Meyers word another never heard I've ·M: me told

took and they away medals his term and they took ಡ served away pension He ö his

W: And his wife took his money away

around LeMarre. fooling Bleriot was around with Mrs. and he up, set he fooling president was he dummy wife course, this 0 with LeMarre Of was ö LeMarre

divorced His wife, who This is America, somebody. knowledge. South an Argentinian or Brazilian, or to common and went but that was she took off around going s right, him the twins, was Benny and married rumor that That' : M bore the

for one and Arnold for twins those of one name he Didn't Marshall? ö

W: I believe so

devoted to Meyers to one and a godfather Arnold was very Arnold was It was either that or You know, Marshall the other. ö

lot though and other staff people didn't gall of even he11 mean he had the point, bib certain but he up, a lot of the to in Washington. firmed dn this been say the brass to do things that really things there would never Oh yes. it had fine of good, . M guess have. н

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And Arno1d a soft spoken it. doer. op and was out Echols as that he "get yesterday a picture of Oliver is him lt Benny Meyers, to op Arnold people to attracted and liked I was given southern gentleman, liked doers; he could have ö this

a column of three digits Meyers was He understood this ever run into up to that of guy. that's right, Meyers was that kind that. sit down and add up no doubt about than anybody I'd sharp real character, financial business better I've seen that guy was He a real brilliant just like that. Yes ·M: time.

Q: He was sharp but not quite ethical.

W: That's right; not at all

remember You attack you Arnold. heart Do about his Gables had things Coral had general Arnold from Washington some 1945. attack? ask you just April heart in ack Washington à, come me had Let just Arnold to ö He had that came

W: Yes, I remember hearing about that

didn't Do you the end of short period, Commander back at Deputy ರ came for Eaker in to be he and for Commander? quiet They brought Eaker worked very And you Deputy it kept that? They when he March 1945. remember ö you

W: You're talking about '45? No

months between 4 or 3 about for AAF, You were assigned to Hqs and VJ Day? ö Day VE

the uo Japan into went н with the 5th AF. 48. in back came out 145; I was occupation in No, .M

about get that? just to Arnold to 1945 prior by into production August right India in from NOU AF 5th Wer back owned the Where called we joined (P-80) bomb was you when I atomic fighter 1s of the This jet first time . M ö the the

couple of months time short very đ in Washington were You ö

Wright Field

at

I was

temporarily;

I was only in there

No,

. M

Immediately biography assign You August were in Day. temporary 1n your months time you you in Wright Field? in Okinawa ſΛ paper. have bug for assigned on VE They 1945 between AF 5th 4 Washington. April to this paper, the just were say In joined maybe you were Field join the 5th AF, period to and then you assigned Wright according the was left were don't remember that, and this to You were you before you went in AAF Hqs But So you were Washington, ö you ment 1945 as

25

Yes

W:

carried me in Washington they could have guess they, Knudsen? н worked for Then. ö You

production Knudsen when with Knudsen of charge Pacific In duty was the of to н days out production went had many of before head н and even brought in the the Air Corps, Well ·M was of

- Q: How did he and Arnold get along?
- W: Wonderfully well, I would say.
- Q: He was a great production man, wasn't he?
- W: The world's best.
- Q: Not a very good officer, though.

officer an be to want didn't He about that. made no bones fellow wonderful He W: was He

Q: Did this create some problems?

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P,I talked with quite going loading plants the tonight mad at do you think up the -they uo was this Was are through the sir 5 and man about When he stopped uo you Corps seY walking stairs fly and one Ordnance "Vulf Air about what time towers to said: still Going Was to these there. and want place going anything says, big plant He Navy you And was back, walking up old boy. sidelight First great General He Ξ "Do the Ordnance Wer get everything ready. man, -Army didn't know plant there?" "Vulf. before loved the DC-3 productionone Navy "We11 little before loading me out C-47 things of н said, cd night called Everybody Air Corps man, you through the head the tion plant. all and So I those tell the always uo of I1'11 with Knudsen took ammunition loading be us head So will around anything else no. told going to He the to California. we stories high. the assigned one No. trip He to been accent. factories assigned W: are stairs first Ogden never with an DL we

going to blow up, you dove fallen on the looked out around fellow So long handled said: and stepped on of to, floor slides, turned powder that might have this н he

looked like it was

If the thing

you did.

the chute

down

and went

a window,

out

1n people some grabbing beyond Arno1d him about about Anything stories any discussed remember example? you haven for Do the halls, where we ö

op right "You heard ran office want you to in he told was was-He and her there Was I've forgotten what it Arnold's Kuter. squawk box, but story said: hall; н "Colonel, uo out the And he in the eyewitness guys converged intercom he11 on, out later the And he said: sir. had a big not an :xoq place Arnold walked blasted "But Well, something. squawk the am said: he He of H harangue the hall. And this story out got riled up about colonel this meeting, one day no everybody that said another stops coming up The Kuter office Well. the Got had after so. something Arnold's all colonel -M: and really away!" And he that down 80

what

that

park

amusement

these

were

and there

window,

the

=

window.

out the

jump

just

you

"Vulf,

he said:

floor

And and

"Yes.

And

";qu

"Blow

said:

up.

would blow

place

to

Knudsen

And

";qu

blows

11

1 E

"What

I said:

that, this

if you

"Well,

had?"

it

1£

"What

said:

And

any

dn

sweeping

ŝ

he'

'Well

put

dus tpan said

æ

and

handled brush.

long

ct

with

chap

to

immaculate

sweeping up this

he was going round

doing?"

1s

world

the

In

"What

general

Ordnanc

this

your

when

"Vulf,

said

and

around

turned

Knudsen

climb." ran up

tough

đ

"Ye Gods, this is

said:

H

a comment to this Ordnance general

was

here

top and

to the

got up

We

So

stairs.

all the

age,

white

painted

deal,

creamery

ದ

like

1ooked This

thing

big

great bit there

this

there

chamber

mixing

the

was

room

of

Littl

27

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foreign the want many because all heard assignment him hitting "Norstad E-Ring ve the but of saying: of kind around Chaplain, this story some and then walk in the me to dragooned in about afraid Norstad told everybody you can go. it being and heard grabbed calling people expertise. L, haven' rest of about might be and н the to their buttons, ö stories sou; they

- and Norstad started between he argument whole The ·M
- Kuter? or Norstad Was ö
- too, there, was but Norstad was Kuter, 1t knowledge To my . M

Norstad guys strategy statisticians he Norstad; one of the big brains he was Well, because

he ran down all the button people before full of office was The ö ·M:

at

mad

Was

maybe

been

could have

buttons the hit when he responded really They ö

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got him H meeting this for India from back me too. called one He on that W: mad

What about? ö we

out plenty that -they you of the a cable to boys excused called are did were having could guyswhen some airplanes "What airplanes be other guess, So getting all to said: like and the troubles that we were having, we engines. taking about go send these the н damn off, weren't would bad and asking these popped how was me, "I want to н at The basic problem me them how lousy Was started "General was raising cain because telling **looked** So н said: little bit. and he this thing. He cain, said: н .nok and tell told him, raising for?" and I told of engine troubles. ರ uo dn "What shouldn't have, has in India everybody started dander н staff And wings out, said: :M there back, from your say?' got He

afternoon We the would report to Arnold the except once into it. is Arnold had been through this all hell This one got call friends to would get him crossed up, and then talking about,

close personal

were real

and they

Mitchell thing

đ

got

story

this

told you

Kenney may have

. dod

and

night

that

train Kenney

Pennsylvania

the

uo

to get

and

course

Of

morning.

next

one

had

mission and

one

launched

already kind

We

rumors.

these

the

"You get

said:

And

guys

thes

asking

arted

and

amounted

it

all

And that'

to India.

out

back

he11

was

he

what

knew

always

way he was.

staff

awhile the

In

at

looked

He

top.

my he

blew finally

of

when had

1s

this

So

way

on the heard

- at this time? Wright Field at were You ö
- Kenney was SO Yes ·M
- war? the before been this must have Now ö

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was the old Munitions Building Arnold sitting forget you office. Fairchild George terrible. grabbed me by boat George "Boy, hell "oh in this against NOW said: said: this is unmilitary and here was am He me We George there with Eaker and pushed me up "Here I helping before ŝ "Oh boy, got mad into Eaker' S.I. Anyway, George walked in, nobody is Harbor said: this really and said: office Fairchild was kind of a nervous guy. He who was George. belt there just and We head in his hands. the We and my before in Arnold an rowing like hell, after Fairchild, went of hall with = trouble. out the blouse WAS taking off; and both this sounding the train walked in, are in big started sn Yes of walked down desk pushed the by myself back started ·M at his and he uo guys and the it. got As

do? What did Eaker ö office if he was still in the I can't remember moment s Fairchild the At ·M or

didn't He out of his presence? just pushing you you? with op to he more Was any ö want

grabbed doors swing he deliberately 80 of out type started bar something like this, these already and act, -George had of his was always doing part me just grabbed is This He : M he So me

Q: Did you feel that he liked you?

thing he hadn't. only 1f The with me was it left. dn and that put right and have op people could wouldn firing best he the sure was op he yes, way was ho the could do . M S That н

Q: He fired a lot of people out of jobs?

wouldn't matter WOW other au 80 to we get on down something good of the for fault were yesterday, Kenney "We don' stiff He'd listen time then, boy the both broke said: the the and sent George my put on 1s this with in the thought So н you back, it's in there hell who said: So So on the way in, went ".uok at bad, ourselves along u l sir, guess 08 we place. looked "What the this as F this? thing good or and come back see "Nothing, So be so unmilitary news said, Fairchild, the = train like to behave This we don't know, Arnold sitting there General the bad right. he over facts, wants Arnold: acting damn to was Kenney, "Well, thing out. them all let' train again and go back in there. called Eaker or the Old Man call are him if you didn't give him the "Well the you for us." Now you give shouldn't uo = telephone "Sir boys are said: relieved think this This get all. you why in; good sent = cut But if at H saluted. that we So 33 anyway to him that way. he uo "Well laughing; he get "Yeah be military ŝ "Sir you and come George let' to right yes done. and Arnold: I told George you guys trying morning his top better said: ho to a ramrod, but wasn be we said: got :M are George σ look, blew with talk you, next know the you' and day us. It we

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Q: Did George Kenney call him Hap?

W: Oh yes

Q: But you didn't call him "Hap?"

W: Oh no

called him Spaatz Who called him "Hap," George Kenney ö

"Hap," and

we of none But did. old timers other would do that the of guys Som guess called young ·M -0S

always called him "General;" Eaker Eaker didn't. I know "General ö

deliberately things, the He of tension office) some looking back at the his relieve of out people to that gone by, (push did just As years have things he these well, would do I think, .W:

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man' uo each jump where would knew that Arnold but he them, interesting, uo pressure something tremendous told Was people and put point I was breaking ö

W: That's right.

Q:and he never went beyond that point?

the time Kenney one at me see. uo one You to be given to MacArthur pulled Australia. He that. down to ٥f convinced get supposed cain E B-29s were raising : M

Q: Not supposed to--MacArthur was asking for them.

I thought the could changed into Kenney get factories. So was So know to Then it commitment. wanted me to let out too. fixed up with Gene (Beebe) to always and the 80 part of the plan, sneak off, made ther they out was come to used it to was or wherever -he get this Hap to Well, So raising cain at Tehran, too. I had it : M war,

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afternoon the orders had Hap got just to never did This been again factories. go to yesterday Tuls go out to н at North out puy had the to Then, 80 and gave relieved CC) chance In said I to н A-20s relieved guy the Coast that was these t t them. Late orders the wanted other orders the es and dn you all 5 Vas get and and to me the I have crissakes, K.B. building Now, Hap is out on in Washington at and I the this "Sir called Doug las and back Representatives-Colonels , won phone whatever would issue and desk said: for me, papers that, well he the here Don And ALL N this But me on they up Personnel thought, with been asking And for unpacking 1s the okay, they replacement , and Doug las where "oh, put them. hell called me off. forth. and schedule Tulsa holy told because started Arnold: OL and called SO unpacked my bag Kenney has said, trigger AF been raising what Don into think MUV than \$700 that. the behind fine and н So they Pacific." So off goes didn't this. 3:00-4:00. me can, relieved, yesterday got out the war. trigger So Hap madder suited op just Ameri find -They war. Gene the 5 So

fly all night? What did he do, these unscheduled trips. yes Sometimes took He - 1 ö

wasn't he? time, at that him for flying was Peterson ö

the I kno This effects, Beebe China psychological Gene went to Was and SO the and transferred for him. just for relieved, flying those things Was was Peterson of before Gene lot he did a pressure : M was

the relinquish was this because would never was his greatest love He airpower it. kept strategic always B-29 he the of of this ntality Well, instrume control ö

W: I went out there, I didn't report to anybody.

W: Oh, no.

with Chennault out there? any dealings have you Did ö

W: Oh yes

73rd, or the 58th? the for supplies getting was it Trouble ö

11ke see to get my this You to the ÷ giving didn and no China. was trying reported only He would be In Stilwell horn of to go out to uo Chennault, He where tried work missions said supplies Chennault to He that times so he, these AF OWD paper Chinese of told orders mount my number handling of just the to change my piece c supposed running tried So MAS little Staff. Stratemeyer to He was was the orders No. q all. Chennault I had of airlift : M Chief and me me

Q: So you would make your report to him?

W: Yes, Stilwell would never go for it.

when Are You know, relieved by LeMay business? Was LeMay-Hansell and then he of the BombCom, aware the 21st aware of that? Are you got ö Hansell you

wasn н I had my own problems, relieved. outfit was that I knew he about worrying : M

about that? talk any there was or surprised you Were ö

and India Why was out there in relieved he had been this day and I knew that to Guam, dn outat just were find they to No, never took time Well. to China. . M dn

of sort news? as bad using Norstad the give to was there Arnold out that went Did you know Norstad man? ö hatchet

popular very not was Norstad that. for Norstad used day he this Yes, isn't to ·M

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8th from the about comments relief some his about made have you people to talk Several ever Did Eaker I know. or transfer? Norstad. ö AF

wouldn't н Of course, many times. dn it with Eaker brought never been he I've and up, No, bring it : M

disappointed very Was he 1unch at were talking We ö out there guy -No. was Spaatz, pal Particularly because his ·M:

Command

the 8th Fighter

Kepner

gave

Arnold

·M

Q: Over Frank Hunter?

was bad blood between always felt that there and I Yes, ·M:

all and and relieved firnds, 0 close Command Eaker' very in and given the Fighter there. been out they had sudden this thing happens because Kepner is brought and Kepner, Eaker of

Q: You mean, Hunter was relieved?

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W: No, Eaker was relieved

and they brought in Doolittle relieved, was Eaker ö

E and Eaker Kepner two, I'm talking now about the guessing now No, ·M just

created some friction between Kepner and Eaker? That this ö

them. estimation of just about Eaker. with both OWN SO No. anything about Kepner is been anything This ve H that? and say never heard Kepner friends of evidence or Eaker say close no very had have verv have way or the other, H been You Since then, had wondered ·M: They

any of his uo Arnold shot from the hip cause? without somebody Relieved Do you think that changes? personnel ö

of over there knew н that because they were say can't Now with Hunter, -no. ofknew or, Eaker that of Cases problem W: the

H cases But the problems here. having my relieved people being Was and in Europe, of, know

to Arnold a number 850 Eaker -Kuter talked paper Eaker there knockdown-dragout only flying "You have else that finally talked to over waste eager end. something said, went to Esker were the the And are dispatches: H that In of staff you đ for beginning beavers close of messages had it there come dropped Arnold was Arnold Arno1d were very How eager over who the just at there isi and sending this kind and uo went Was bitter inventory Idwal Edwards he fellows Eaker Arnold this Eaker of Eaker, and others is me that So in, for Hunter operating these Segregation Problem) of these Hote1 made this change. coming worked In the case figured in early Sep 1943. And he told Arnold kept Claridges 80 your stuff of people who -some to he going this ö Norstad basket, the planes just 60?" him. saw was (re in

W: Coleman, yes, he got fired out there

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- Q: Where, Selfridge?
- W: Yes.
- Q: He might have been the commanding officer.
- W: He could have been the base commander.

fired this thing He uo MOU files name first of lot forgotten his c have remember ve H Coleman, can W: ö

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

there

of

out

"yes trips with him and shoot the time say the would all took around with the boys pressure know, н took, under people that we Was of he lot these trips to sit times of didn't have time thinking those some of during Well on course, just ·M: breeze Of He

He, Knudsen and I went to some of the factories.

factory? đ or plant ರ to came do when he he What did ö

the and workmen the with and affable pleasant company very of the was He officers . M

area? he maintenance him, with the to time factory; right Every through the to walked right ust 08 he Did No ö ·M:

about the just he and much man know production really didn't the Was Arnold anyway and Knudsen with him. business along Knuds manufacturing with followed was

Q: Did he ask some tough questions?

Was would and Knudsen who forth erything 80 and was coming, ware it him, tin was the with sen uo Knuds was beating н heard everytime start they When because would stop, and they at him man. No, front yelling : M the

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Field for some se There It aspirations COUL anonymous 2 (ATSC) Meyers Wright Was filed? got Of came on it. the that there Command Benny at that? of Was this the had were attention which and know why Benny Meyers Service Knerr you This is how the committee rumors Is you Meyers 1945 to This the investigate Did Technical any it in to Benny Meyers gave and Did you hear Benny file. quit came job They come back, Air that written about to it when Knudsen didn the and uo against to him. sent eye it a disability. letter, And they just later. called AF his it letter made charges the document You know, You had give anonymous years they and it didn't uo retired on committee, 2 job, Mey anonymous I guess. trouble dn ö an Benny that they came Nas

W: That's what triggered the whole investigation?

with started later 2 years investigation the Well, ö

Wolfes the you never anything The he and Arnold? levels made op and they upon this Inspector, ÷ didn' trip with different course and they Air of the fishing were at And Arnold? case. Was you Jones e material they had this with uo 000 course Junius relations ever the of you And suppressed that Arnolds Did social Howard Hughes Meyers AF, the the any who Benny about and for had guy

uo

material

Roosevelt

and Elliott

served my brother Arnold, served with never H because No, him : M with

Has he passed away? ö 44 He retired in to him, becaus anything Arnold say referring '65 from cancer. Mrs. been friends. have in died and Arnold were real good may they brother SO bad heart, brother? h Yes, about my : M with he

talking, have been may She General Wolfe. about talked General? she No, he make ö did

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in 1944 retired colonel ರ he was No, ...

death about his Westover and Arnold ö step. Let's go back a the They lunatics, people the air it between than about heavier feeling one that told Arnold the were hard and We of than people a lot ranking I'm the There was always ai than higher ·M: lighter all

than air? was lighter And Westover ö

himself. lot of these lunatics down there to learn to help. a11 Brooks Field didn't including order was That did wings, at by. he instructor thing their of them got first get an to I was the percentage March Field chief, and s right, c smal1 became sent to guys back They various That' Westover ·M 1922-26 these When fly,

going and too. We Burbank spin and Arnold out, over saw him sage airport WAS at went washed and for plant and I was not the big there asked got been So Lockheed waiting for him, night called Washington, and dead. and Kepner them the then at the It he had spending of there out before, meet him. both there news standing there, out that Was and field first representative t C Westover telephone washed Saw there little the and Westover had been WAS that to be I was into the over, of the It AF Field rushed and for me the now know. told him. hold fly I was March got in, 2

Q: That was a change in fortunes

by and he got there that day good pilot of wings, c ÷ over wasn a pair flying because he and he wanted business himself than the man in the moon, more took him had no But he was the boss man, what Westover That's ·M them.

50s when was in his mountain in Iceland Andrews Andrews about was flying and crashed into story đ I heard ö he

W: That's right.

Did you Did you know anything about Arnold and Andrews? see them together? ö ever

the of charge being In Andrews put was about Andrews stories versa these vice all heard or s, of Hap No, first GHQ AF protege ·M:

and Arnold ed was kill that job? 90, Westover He was about Andrews being made for When a year ahead of Arnold. job? for the they rivals anything Andrews was Were you hear 107. ö did was

Arnold any anything that have day didn't heard next wouldn't have was the Coast. It the н uo so forth. going on, here out and was sitting to the intrigue anything was made Chief If about it ·M: access

for was no lengthy time there thereafter, shortly Well maneuvering . M

rumors you? by occasioned urprise S tha possibly Do delay, drinker some Arnold was there was that You know, Washington ö in

W: It certainly would.

Q: You didn't see him drink?

late with an Arnold a drink call his been always He said: Arnold had going around the plants there socially get in course, and Knudsen and I would have Was rather than In this Ford Knudsen was always fussing at him about that damned Ford. it would get position to go out of General Motors. acquainted with him, Knudsen, would dn time quarters would bring what and of about Knudsen. hard day to and drive it to his know Field went aides didn't then that he Bolling Was and e the MAS after never story years, We do know of because when evening a cute One Ford many that say and -down evening. out, you the for in Arnolds, on business. As Ford broken two in I'11 tell would get chauffeur :M In the with old the OL

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tt H and back see the Hap brought and he said: smile That and came Knudsen I just would sergeant comes us Ford doesn airplane drive home. that just ribbing him, Hap get. "Sir, see the aide, = car. of the can said: my around not and out the The Sergeant got S it doesn't drive ; op a roar and "That' you take all can your for, We looking all around the place, Arnold: and best seeing Now out that car." trip the i'u brand new Chevrolet. let of my is α, do you ride tired finally he "Where's it night from there "Well damned says: d own ; "Why car, say: one got

and the near miss you had the B-29 are talking about We ö

Arnold had great confidence, eggs as up all B-32 ground his He had set cd all had off the put he to Yet B-32 never got going production. everything. wasn't getting washed out. up the So he the and course, training set fall-back position had And, of whole program he the because facilities in one basket. of obviously the really. sort these with ct

W: I think we had about two of them.

They sent them down to used them. Kenney Southwest Pacific them, of You had 15 s theater ö Kenney¹

there, who was Assistant Project Officer just before and out dn I knew there were two of them flying it This is a way out, was He there. Frank Cook, boy's look at it. Jake Harmon brought that out know that. I got to Okinawa. didn't the letting surrender . M under when down the

eggs in that a fall-back his and he had put he it it's kind of interesting, there, make eggs in ÷ didn of his just in case the B-29 all have So Arnold, didn't position ö basket,

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W: The reason for that was because....

Q: Was that his idea?

because industry go on far out airplane, heavy wing-loaded the probably Echols' we should "Well, back on B-29. said: think it was the I'm sure it was Echols who finally to fall analyze something to đ industry know. is have It don' 1 the So we better is against the B-29. having called on This with it, ·M thing.

Q: Then you think it might have been Echols' idea?

Echo1s let faith in the wouldn't Poor sight. Arnold had the greatest and he of his War into the confidence in him out let him get tried to wouldn't Was it of sure lot us, He đ I'm rest of world in Echols. He had oh, like the ·M him go.

into a while never got got said they In never Once He yourself that he in WWI. tolerant. like experience with him guys was more hangup when an had he đ consequently into battle, Arnold was and this 80 know, guy and đ get You he would let combat. fight, wanted to ö into the

W: That's what happened to me

cd Echo1s given of was picture Echols go. the given let was never -Echols Southernman but of in different picture got gentle, You of ö sort

W: He was.

That Arnold put more faith in Benny Meyers than Echols ö

guno about just you' who inspired the I'm talking greatest Was before Howard **Echols** said the Jan and us. reason. thought he was you in-law in the world and the rest of done, as a different job And brother the engineer fellow never got his Harmon, for that but he engineering Echols so, greatest sources engineers like Chidlaw, think in the world around, was the I don't the other way from from thought he the other engineer :M Echols, heard

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Q: Echols was a modest man, soft spoken

W: Soft spoken, Southern gentleman.

of things? lot cd uo go to Meyers Arnold did Why ö

financially and the only and Meyers brilliant guy, good act ve often thought about that, anybody đ uo running roughshod over very could put đ was Meyers He knew the financial business about because never hesitated about think Well can . M reason

Q: Even Echols?

the damned rest ed the Was -he all experience in the AF-But with that. away got only never His he there. No. out W: boys

business. financial and lousy pilot--was in the budget engineering? for on Echols Arnold relied Could it be that Absolutely ö in

Q: And then for Meyers as an expediter?

He on Meyers to give him was right busines **11ke** photographic 8 B 4 ea fight for long anything mechanical or just different because about somewhat lt come expediting made and you that to figures what manufacturers in when was had say he went Meyers in the can't He could stand up quote relied think car was McNamara needed when Benny You did the with I think he He H up these that he uo listen to him. we found out later experience respects, All fan say of Defense the on the phone and call really Arnold, you see. initially. He thought many ou would and Benny had he, like McNamara Secretary LD LD front, Benny their fannies out not that sit around as Because a big No, on the make, support engineering. it, the former McNamara. get to ·M uo money. memory you'd down put the was

served a purpose that Arnold wanted to have things did and he out a way, went In ö done

Arnold more gone and gave you one a job to do and Benny, were you then why he difference between Arnold He gave you why you didn't, done you didn't get it didn't run roughshod over people. and if it, the you to do see. And if You expected chance.

Q: Did he give you two chances, general?

spur of the moment, acted on the know, he never н as knew As far : M far as

Don't you think On the subject of Arnold's relations with the aircraft limb. đ uo he really put himself out manufacturers, ö

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without that I think them, and get tried to War Production, He they? to 4 kind of vision? didn convert feet their commitment some dragged took real this they

must have industry Kenney aircraft of them went ahead. rate convincing the terrific that had in at s ome expand of them did. we the problems going to Some were you we told that

Q: No, he didn't.

before We And an and many original down then, at Wright Field Another brilliant guy REM Chidlaw was the no tossup then busy We drew time knor died and he told us how dn 80 who airplanes and the long thing them them C, never You get and He figured the and such rest of when. called B-18, factory got c I'11 Lyons what was big and trainers. wanted such old and the Chidlaw was one of them; Crawford was the other. attacks, it Al it, decide down đ paper big the of instance, at going to have by bombers, transports. he sat how nam a guess or to follow-on of with the A-20 and the B-25, planes sat butcher heart we had just Field fighters the need, and we and For t have made many WP by and uo Wright you Then fighters So war. Echols out or the how time trainers We 'ubib you are money bombers was drawn in going to put in the going act. which was ns airplanes. what to place them transports, told of in that 2 uo got "Look, at many kind some of No top project man Arnold Some and which really B-23, was SO way making these what all said: of who he wanted why schedule same schedule Trainers the var M: We were output there just were tell the boy for The

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money the that on with the Douglas B-23 with range at all get could ou we It had best the a bust? was follow it B-18 We time, the available. that Ļ Wasn For was ö ...M that

struggle? ted interes are mor We that get Was Johnson. could anything of tment Depar trouble with Louis because Do you remember War The B-17s the Mou some ' 30s than less money. late mentioned rather the **B-18s** for about You in buying airplanes ö talking

out of drew on the basis We competition. performance 1t lost and Douglas lower had We and that. price competition, remember higher 44 rules of the deliveries I don' ·M: later the

overbidding And by engine bomber? bought 50 evaluated wanted it. of the cost and and one We was the performance delivery the people every four possession of the B-18 c Anyway what performance of most in our underbidding uowas man at Douglas follow and This put of service, basis and huh? -engine for bought the 2 and had them in responsible two was the No. lost uo were team The B-23. Doug las that valuation was price, airplanes them guy ö :M the the of an

that were that that said, There Arnold, Do you remember OL me implied, and reminded Douglas who you between production contracts example something married? relationship for you Pearson were ask Bruce Douglas got breaks on family Drew to wanted and by of the when Barbara reports н ö because some

was know Pearson but I connection, something that remember away always hammering don't ·M

see Pearson? to going about Knudsen talking You are ö

against another see to over Pearson never went was by and there and he out came it, that got, about н attack that real upset remember story one Was the Knudsen got Yes, there This is far As ·M: Knudsen Pearson attack.

had Douglas never this He about Arnold. you attacking ask to wanted always And I Was Pearson Arnold. know word for You ö good đ

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in breaks special evaluation board any got Do you feel that Douglas You mentioned this production? thing.

W: That's right, they lost the bomber contract..

Q: On the B-23?

buying Me it shaken of wanted instead had people airplane, So our medium bomber. we bought the B-25 from Kindelberger of the most about which is what We knew α would have been bought 50 of them. B-23, the And it on the B-23, :M d own. had

1t case where performance đ There's and time American. and dollars to North of They lost out tter ma strictly ö was

of our ability because They who had been know Lyons. as I Field and Al far As at Wright Echo1s was loaded down to the best things. time, headed up by there these boys we judged handful of how long the rules manufacturer had in the business We out ·M every laid

the To and B-24? the XB-40 the and B-17 idea of the the uo with armor dn put came to who one Wolfe, was the escorts Gen. This as them ö XB-41? use

capacity out

we had to get our

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Field Wright at Branch there the Bomber That came out of :M

Q: Was that Lyons?

course Of correctly. remember H if it was Harmon, No. : M Lyons about role in that thing sitting Echol c had and where Lyons Harmon above somewhere dn sitting I saw WB ö Lyons

That was a bust.

have Wa the B-17 to time supposed that uo turret about was but it correctly, chin the and the side guns, out, remember turrets ίf the because turret. get to gunship began Well, and the belly ·M we ø been when

the off to take it it were going stay back and then so heavily loaded down, could they bombers load, well when the their to too had work was dropped all right It ÷ ÷ didn' couldn't. me, bombers to L. Was seems SO it it the But liability It just slow speed once but go home ö target, became had and

lot c tried We tried. We things those busts of really jus Wer MAS that It things of

I'm In to -and late harking back this harking backuntil casualtie one know have some no didn't suffered all MOU We course had Shaughnes escort Of time range bust) guy that XB-40 this long by ofa like and (Re lack sounding war, ö the t he

of 248 part and early 17s that the the İn dn range those equireme uo real fighter escort get. Ther able to for W: war were the

foresight? of matter was blame E0 anybody Is ö

believ Tactical the need fighter get long Then when certain type that daylight of other and would thing the development the firepower of making each never the then In said fighters. with npon was philosophy ou day We more vould then the possibility interdependent said th daylight old the along of adding enal strategy the British with history that phenom the all in in that it because and the ept homb the The Becaus to the vas bombers Ũ get precision and range take It away practical would long ranges, SO target. was the You more ering think per formance then We with there answer adding was Ļ the power air policy don Ē and these But kept from bombing the н fire you kept better the of formations No, out the to of out good daylight And getting bombing came :M control turned escort School with B-17 it. it

College 08 carrier to only have Staff the place of General you know, the and take Command You to thing. the was that the airplane the whole out to find upset of said the role that 1937 back to ranges, pigeon.

ground forces the to auxiliary Or as strictly ö

б/н

close Department and artillery War the In the dn where written offshore S That auxiliary in 1937 reach. roles and missions, 4 Strictly couldn defenses W:

S

named George Goddard? guy đ with any contact Did you have Oh yes, ·M: ö

George Goddard about Tell me ö

sure

guys. Field eccentric type of the 1u Wright pest at Biggest there capable, office drive real my and of these imagination out him of he's one throw wonderful to I used Well, time after tim Beautiful, ·M: world.

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He's carrying pictures all the time ö

something done And getting . M

You know ö Have you read his book? ·M: something (off-tape) tell you me Let have. sure ö

this friction between Minton Kaye and Goddard? becaus Pasadena last You know list 0 in Arnold you about Goddard and Arnold. out to see Minton Kaye uo got the book, Goddard I was ask Do you remember read And to as you I want of Minton Kaye Goddard, ö week.

jealousy professional Yes W:

struggle? that of evaluation you What ö

much maybe worldas contributed this country, has or in much about photography anybody think there is as I don't that knows ·M: wide,

that statement ever tell you about when he took over the Jena to get over two years it took ше and Took there Optical Company in Europe? over walked Did he just as George. He out

Q: After the war?

and over in going over and took dn requisitioning, it cover walked to years He was he of war folded up. couple guy That dn as the Took Company Just taking things **Optical** . M Jena

=

Air Force? George optical glass people getting it, in the name of the Instead of the Russians outstanding it away, the were took they mean and he just took it over. because do you What Yes, ö ·M: it. got

Q: Then he did a good thing?

W: Sure, without any authority.

Q: He got you into trouble on this?

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W: I had to clean the thing up, later on.

Q: I'm going to see him next week.

photographs Eorth to the South take and water and islands went down of the there, the We the depth out of When maps 80 to good best regards. group show any and photographic have islands Give him my didn' those little George got his they Pacific, : M of

eye to eye see ÷ and Minton Kaye didn' Arnold to close he reason, Minton Kaye was very For some ö and

W: For a while.

Do you in that position. Kaye lost out, And then Minton that? anything about ö know

heard Arnold tell that I send him far away day the there and be fire Minton to I happened to somebody : M

Q: So he fired him, do you know why?

with George Goddard, why? raise hell to Arnold used ö

And real always in there t? time tha George was op next the t don And MAS Ξ. bulldozers why He George And George pest. of here 10,000 do this? damn "Okay ed of out such we say tenacity hell L. don' was would the Because he Why had the "Get he time Arnold. .. He say the i.M pest. after would half

months just know him several op than better him know You ö

credit due got never He guy great đ He' · M of

heck

đ

up working his book mad? wasn't -and I've read good As you other get simply didn' of 1t turned of Arnold camera. out But couple get later bookdid Force strip н ed -Arnold which did Why and he is what and this Air the Lovett to value -bib the Washington developing This camera, according for to its think due work talent. ecognize strip of But in was least out genius back his it this obnoxious sent then L. ecognized at I don't know had didn came 00 and Was recognize Goddard carefully he he rnold Goddard Well Navy that who and for the ·M. people, 0 verv Arnold I know know, job It

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recognized Goddard? finally Who :M Mrs

great "Colonel due camer partly has strip man it He conflict, and the used his 1962 calls obstruction, in ed They he Cuba and Arnold had read the book, in people. German missiles Minton Kaye the other he you exposed Russian that some ust and that the They Lovett expose and other It Normandy to this ö used to Nemesis genius at

Arnold but right there, do with it away far him That might have a lot to sent and got off Kaye, ·M finally

all these ideas once In the go back down to the laboratory bet that the he next day But boy, money, up with couldn't give you listen it. "George we can't do for " The about always coming wanted where there was no need wonderful. and bothered We he anybody. everything money was that's idea: much all hot irritate He George, another have ran week. would get that George would in Europe, "George, didn't last "Fine, be back in with Goddard uo we he he got over there sold me days say: Then you say photographic lab Well, just went wild and those you he would things." meantime Goddard. W: 2 t hing and

I got the impression that Goddard did some great things but to him When wanted else. you something direction, did in this and that way away going going turned him Goddard was had you sometimes if you and way, came back, this ö 80

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that way are things inventors or people who conceive All : M

unreconstructed of sort was genius, but he e was He ö

W: It's hard to explain.

Did you have any contact with Elliott Roosevelt? ö

0 there "That comes you people out sending you one a character "KB, said: out he And I said: Well more Boy, what and get m, I., officers." was Elliott Roosevelt. day to said: one Arnold this is Captain Elliott Roosevelt. more dn He Hap called me about some get them?" at fussing It so he Hell, me right, when do I was been pressing Wright Field tomorrow." ·M:

Q: Did he give you a lot of trouble?

And God knows I'11 cal1 about that, poppa. Always WOLLY you we'll get that done." "Don't say: He'd God. poppa and ho ·M: ny dn

He god pike. to a lot just real Elliott. the think was sons. along from treated her would And she had two cam troubles. directly you ever gals character that came the sweetest ass all Franklin from Texas most conceited damn poppa the that with anything his of gal way -one telling had the the and he couldn't do He was the just remarried But troubles (Scoggins) nice boys. the awful. meet had of

was

he

whether

- Emerson. Faye for her left He ö
- Elliott? of rid get you How did ö
- from there to Europe went He A lot of maneuvering. : M

read his book last week н Newfoundland, to went No, he He Saw it." ö "As

some And he said: you club into the and this Captain against the bar had one night. Have He officer's story and there. came over there. pilot that Elliott Roosevelt?" bar He an right α prove the learning up as bragging, shooting off his mouth, Was squadron under Elliott. him dn outfit in ÷ captain coming can cold-cocked reconnaissance and Elliott was young pilot "Are you BG the world. London This he young Pow, in đ ಹ home way in dn about officer's club there, said: everything what?" this rough missions it was going around He headed old Rothschild walked over and tight as usual, story goes SO called him story the : M heard real Yes The The

What would you consider Arnold's greatest attribute, his airpow OL Air Corps, toethe or War the to contribution greatest ö

great going cd Was đ Was was he this but he saying I think what him, see like could to start off by didn't He inspiration. people of I'd have lot And he had 4 Well leader. ·M: leader. great

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of of was thinking magnitude the else see Nobody could one who knowledge. that he was thinking of only had to have--to my the was he mean these numbers what we to be.

did little In or shocked figure this Roosevelt's 1ª talking that which putting number were they Was the with time This was 50,000 plane figure op speech? to this anything to his Arnold suggest this number? dn in because or hav that he Roosevelt's head people Did In ers. ö of numbe lot

that think word I'm saying--that the original airpower boys people that thought that big, н those Arnold. of was rest the them the were spokesman for all martial ರ can't prove and Mitchell And that group were the court Frank And the support the Tony and after think who way. sure Siberia gang, I'm that George, original thought to :M people. went Hal

too? Siberia, t t Did Tony Frank go ö

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story? You know that Siberia to went Kenney I don't sure. No, Yes ·M: ö

Arnold vation one. that obser Georgia you of tell squadron Benning, He didn't Frank half Camp Tony one Was assignment; I'm disappointed in George. He had which Siberia Kansas his was to Riley That sent to Ft was airplanes ·M George went

Billy Mitchell Siberia? to the sent during be to Washington caused him to do that assigned Frank Frank Tony Tony did What Was ö trial?

supported Mitchell ·M:

He

in Washington was he Then ö

of But lot don't know and supported him, н was. he George Kenney imagine н know, supported him; supported him L. don just juniors George ·M: the Hal

Was He too? out, sent get did he junior, đ was Brereton too. there, ö in

sent book the job-MacArthur by was 00 chap him guy infantry Kenney gave for AF met this top Staff George the they the So George rewrote So he of Se out. there, Chie ther guy shifted smart was down Sutherland he got c sent And while an infantry base. them George was of Brett and all Benning on machine guns Suther1 Yes, Australia. Was Camp ·M of this name 2 In

Q: This was around the time of Pearl Harbor?

station and stuck was in like of "George said: doing one sent building up Australia get with the a proponent know the Philippines no was the were sn't 1u gal And I knew Was He didn't And they down there Benning she was said: he had Brereton over there "Well, We H Sutherland maiden George when Brett So he flight. ls he Camp when South So c too He got guy And Tennessee, Sutherland said: of as married MacArthur told MacArthur knew Jean timers This out c George there dinner down started airman uo he? down MacArthur came went cross country out Is old here s how for George a real in Murfreesboro We He ohW He S came the and Mr out man that' So too. Sutherland. that. So Of course, known known of S said: us she she of there an air He' one and Indies, East Indies invited there after all had 1926 having thereafter him. MacArthur was have serving his tour 11.ving George in right out recommended by through the get = she He thur Sutherland 2 all. Philippines MacArthur escaped the and can got And And there Shortly Faircloth, at went you down to It us any good ather Philippines with out H MacArthur W: he was in the Kenney along visit. Flynn, Brett "Look then. Jean went chap airp the

with

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- Q: Did MacArthur understand airpower?
- W: No
- Q: But he trusted Kenney?

George With 5 talking these stuff by coined effect. and message and re beginning localizer going out Army Army reconnaissance alrpower Air can find. there idea. where who you with that boog airpower You're the the the the were top dropped the uo one the fell the areas MOU was MacArthur to got soul in t P littl there, They uo you the the "From was That pooh-poohed supply Words "Okay stuff proponent of has dependent the day 0 in sent those got that whatnot. he he single MacArthur rge in called the : said: time WOLST you and And When Kenney said: George George unition line. and beams course Ge before And be 3 they air," the 010 and and he the that. converted couldn't find they the bomber finally maybe radio feed day, So Of door. all course and pick barge years meeting by Guinea could and like I can a bad would be. islands air dropped these you the said problems seance MacArthur Of few food proving tugboat, 4 đ jus advance forth, how New by out you that they picked was "Well called it vou with people a big it. developed in the over it he they qo had his So op anding every will on, kicked down through time He it said: had selected to away of you and they SO Let air. day turned that demonstrate So We lot ered bogged just It. and and Kenney and George hammering to move by from that ande 1t see gre to weather beams phrase: He we had ammunition out people had amongst commanders parachute, op dn to comm the so, W: 2 planes it. radio there going kept make 11,1 they And bad And And the had MOU way big of

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was he say because shanghaied Mitchell to word good that had one that martial that vintage court of the Corps of a member

they 10 Pearl between OL that 00 uo like warning MacArthur attack about this business action for, the that? after about any Brereton was failed to take anything anything this about planes hear hear and MacArthur, ever disperse the ever and MacArthur Did you you Did ought to Brereton ö Harbor hours.

but firsthand, nothing know н heard Eubank you what Gene and about story Just same W: the

Q: He's in Mississippi.

W: Yes, he's down in Gulfport.

didn't he? some contact with Arnold, he had seeing, worth Is he ö

Philippines the about story the you give can he and Yes : M

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Didn Tactics Applied war? for the during School this down in Orlando, SAT at down that up He head ö he

W: I don't remember.

there In name see his н with Arnold, contact But he had some bit ö quite a

W: He's quite a guy.

Q: You say Lovett and Arnold worked very close?

that Bob Lovett's the against the department always felt and I have off the civilian side of team. perfect Oh yes, fending side military Was in job

Q: Maybe fending off Roosevelt, too?

99 the Ordnance Signal Corps said, and the there ίf it, in op stepped wi11 he why, when this, do it like t do will Yes, can Corps this,

đ was That like this C-76. some planes, Were there wasn't it? ö bust,

bib and were We airplanes too bust, wooden cd were to build that there others program some build some wooden planes were 1 had There We frantic. ż

trouble with those production problem? some They had into that you get gliders Did the about didn't they? How ö too,

every it on top of to lay just had We I had that too, Yes, else. ·M: thing

Q: Richard Dupont?

were we could possibly had just Navy and the French out, was the eke and country could everybody building gliders that to have theirs some this We getting whatever capacity of had were So The Army industrial British Russians. the absolutely overloaded. the we had The whole and and to have theirs, Yes, some, would eke out think of. ż getting

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and Harry Did you get into any hassles with Jimmy Burns planes? supplying the Russians with about ö Hopkins

W: No.

Q: That was above your level?

out. it get and built stuff the get to just qo W :M

Q: Did Arnold ever get mad at you?

With all and irritated. him all upset and crotchety blame couldn't you had, get he σ problems He W: the

Q: When he got mad, did he use profanity?

•

Not much, a little. Not really

: M

Q: Raise his voice?

But screaming and shrieking. but never voice, mad was Raise his he could tell :M you

mean didn' 1t But face on his smile perennial c He had was happy? ö he

W: No, I don't think he ever was happy

4 tha the him uo Saw dn feet never put his You and afternoon? office this his in relax sit S ever "Let he say: Did and ö desk way?

Europe over giving his running In there and Between over Roosevelt) Spaatz to do it. for e. battle have the time to Franklin the crowd hell and fighting reporting just didn't the British and He Congress against -1 UMO Ę

to keep against the Navy? The Pacific? Europe trying buildup in Was the Spaatz Arnold of out for the and stuff was battle the Pacific, BOLERO the the keeping fighting and this BOLERO. in out that about B-24s into How get wanted down you ö them Navy Did

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Navy the with problems them. our production-wise with had We that. about problems, forgotten my had P,I mean I ·M н

Q: What kind of problems did you have?

W: Getting priorities and so forth.

of a lot lot of their ships, c in priority? crank into the AlA try Navy the lesser things Did ö

out could move got and H dn that wake We expediters and Hap, They'd Lovett could. tough said, between real Navy the some than I had industry н faster as Then But automotive much would have it. Yes doggone 3 the SO of

Q: Was Orville Cook involved?

W: Yes, he was working for me

him? of out anything get you bib did you ho ·M

He approach production the basically the high regard things couple of A ö doesn't

you have

that

Arnold

for

have

Arnold? of ism critic his What doesn't? He -----

organized was not He haphazard of sort Arnold was That ö

them Deputy Was Cook put He would thing that. and he of puty same decisions explanation the through wasn't the it he an it making and ramrod you over give was and when he took him can decision When type н course ethodical e Then make real Of wouldn't through. : M he did very cd

you? from did he take over When ö

but Wright chances engineer He the there guy good take brilliant out wouldn't world He đ was the He Laboratory he in way But engineers in would 1943 **Propellor** fellow propeller in others left a colorless the the top ran When some of the He : M kind of of Field. that one

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impression this got of I sort ö

00 That' awfully good them out. an carry he made would he me and to ourself and decisions good man, them the making 30 make was But he P th easier man. : M a lot No

organization? just didn't have staff. He had the better going. them in He had đ Arnold should have had for he bust. wait anything đ ÷ was probably couldn' uo comments he and Arnold that coordinated decisions feel administrator you Did too many get to ö an time make As

because done gotten to, that have 4 say wouldn to felle he around, wrong the organization maybe big Well he had had

was not I had production the Wasn't there trouble with bomb shortage? into the Like So because it guns production supported you got do it, over short? guns machine told you to take machine others uo just Lovett Corps E0 of caliber you gun number he and with the Ordnance the told when 50 he ರ reduced and But and of well production day thing, You knew damn bombs. to do guns never one of hassle IFF caliber machine there about the orthodox thing had sure the the Corps called in over How Yes uo supported. kind you Ordnance to take ö ·M told same . 50 was

of

and you

to do

job

cd

give you

would

he

Because

done.

what he got

being about bombs complaining Was Knerr 3

since can -to this Corps You the Ordnance Corps am н SOB Ordnance an what fought the you н for tell -because regard will high alive who officers still time had of beginning find Ordnance if they day, the

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and ba bomb great to charge of logistics in the European theater failure 500# such requirement shortage of 1u that. any them about this the dropping Was dire hass1e anticipate ದ ordnance were big was they there possibly was right course. There War the couldn't of the was in that? Of hay need? in the last year remember that you Knerr didn the they ö foresee you number that Do

remember the the every rubber of in priority of who you part uo If hand, And down credit. the other first cut Patton's were Corps he had we of uo Ordnance But operation gasoline cross Europe too. the down that uo give down to cut mount to cut started You have to were Corps forth. when Patton We -M Ordnanc thing. and

using? Germany uo the Germany of really Kassel losses through were into the we went went guess that could the consumption when I had was Who that there far assignment thing foresee that only guess could Morgenthau The could Force bombers? Nobody that Air

Q: What was that assignment?

And that great In troops except would would of staff of I got don't We'd into building the B-17 there always that and he in charge this the number fighters staff. The day = chance; man one day. place. philosophy was production behind they had head me same there of diate "Our the the put the around Kassel headquarters. terms take and day the The over down. and and about interviewed said: 11 Don'1 ende: went into ustry his companies staff all committee number. we knocked talking next and He surr bombers indi got everything. So engineering their The Arnold same and aircraft ù got a heartbreaker we put three SO ad hoc od group around Kassel had knock down B-29s No matter how many place through with the We the there, them. with of an write German English. the the vering the got with started in dn plenty into building which and conjured why still really of really good go out there today co have centers th had unco That' were coming factories we job over very tower Was Just They through. Force "Well, were the they "It the run short. spoke three flak somebody ·M and as they Echols. of there, I was these said: come say: and the was big who it,

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was war, he Arnold it like McNamara played this war. the of happen day last to things last bullet on the these play allow Arnold didn't to use the afford going to couldn't ö

was MAre There argument about: way that Was any It was never program through his There ordered. way stuff th of ·M plenty

you all You build 75." or build we going to build 50 this month, can.

Did they just and just men. Pearre Cabell guys were idea Did they? told job and they these Sil are hired Norstad and guys operations. after Pearl Harbor, Council had a noX what 1s They said: be his "Advisory out of This He without portfolio. think and stay think. men right in your hair? idea to Norstad to Arnold, time be to to have ministers you get supposed ö Larry d on want ever

W: No. Never. They stayed out of operations.

end put push them toward him came to Smart Deane close would Fred Jake had he then and Arnold liked them. and uo that late Norstad left. eople In if came and Donne11 course, think ideas These C Of of the war. Rosie told to ö then

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light He'd been with Arnold selected Was ŝ of the war Lockheed Hudson' and people that he outfit outfit part the an Early run British of Joe Dawson. in these couldn't down. the confidence them fell real close boys was over just nos Arnold. took Daw Joe 50 Joe of We great debac le great disappointment lot when put had Arnold SO C, unfortunately his He but years, of them. nothing : M bombers many

Q: Where did he fit into Arnold's staff?

liking of the bomb took one And he in War brother. the the In He had been with Arnold before like my timers old just the groups, of one bomb was he squadrons, him, .W to

Q: How about Ray Dunn?

was kind of He him was another protege of Arnold's. of became ever what don't know Ray Yes aide : M super ಹ

was I think that's where he -he trouble got in think he Sicily, н operation over He's in Washington. in this airborne in trouble ö got

W: He was another disappointment to Arnold.

Q: How about some others like Sue Clagett?

W: Oh yes, I knew him.

Q: He got in trouble, too

He was through. time came one never setup at and opportunities Selfridge Field many that had command of Sue : M in

when and ed twice blam toe China he demoted stubbed his in And Commission was too and then he there Magruder twice and toe general succeeded Arnold at March Field, stubbed his the with made was he and he Then and down. He was started Arnold for it taken ö war was the He

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W: His problem was the bottle.

He too. taken down, He was Do you remember him? about Shepler Fitzgerald? in the Middle East. How ö was

that any the Coast Is there old timers than We positions Coast. the uo were better Arnold fellows who came up with Andrews on the East Those -got with him. dn others came remember of the who judgment? Guys sure I some .dn that Spaatz Yes coming in .M merit Eaker were

for Hap, chance say this contemporaries I'11 before --his old timers that about those I hadn't thought of every one them of one he gave W: Every

like he took them down, didn't make it, if they And Jakey Fickel ö

Jones B.Q. Jones, "Jingling Willy" Jakey Fickel, -M:

Brereton, Tony Frank....

position high got to Frank Tony and Brereton Well. ö

W: Yes, but they didn't last very long.

three made He airborne the of head was Brereton Well, ö stars.

and 9th AF from around was shifted too mean he commands good but Yes, some had : M Tony

to command; Arnold wouldn't give it combat đ wanted Tony ö him

you good. 1f old It's odd, of those their made -had through vervone with Fitzgerald today é say that that they realize those didn't. what way And and damn same others see Hap. c right, give to with of That's car uo opportuniti look back take . M time well

1970 Mar 18, Lake San Marcos, Calif. Wolfe, Interview LG Kenneth B

they op 18: you 20 people Arno1d ask ually an him? enera stions 5 D first T the firs of your One the remember ö embe rem

happened served H en that had nevel and conferenc that First thing factories day March one WAV the me phone T in this knev three ituation the ith entagon or think two called him the representativ Eaker office him This old knor Hap the ·M: under didn had the 5

Q: I see, that was the Munitions Building

without to said year vou here vants tell NOA And ent going Parlier out here and here ordered So Field been Division eorge said out 95 ti had littl Now Wright statio said: "Well be as Production here. Field And and duty Santa Monica take said: going College In out Wright Building there? phone on? to he uo hack ge going going Staff And out 80 t COM 03 in run it Division MOU no Munition and airplanes CO L "It" see Hap ee Command esentative alled What ar VOU ũ to said: t Production old going to aid: neral that of any a l In repr the when have Ge no trying are went And No **Colonel Robins** AF Yes the "Tak months three guys you đ ã, H to be the 3 5 organize been finished vou "Don't No going said: there delay had are see pur

Q: This is Warner Robins?

that and took the plan are building dn, He said: So productio him. non and So that was the beginning of the business. 80 called were said with President else when they Hap ho over place thing that happened, bring the went in some down in Puerto Rico t0 went н and Was So me F here introduced So And Powers President. In s Colonel Wolfe," I think to do. come next and the was there. The you told office see Kenney want Yes. operation started ho to the which over meantime ·M. into going thing said: in," 'Here big me

Q: This was around November 1938?

did never H started н That's when 1938. April March or job to my back W: 80

within 60 days after he took the job when say got killed? was This Westover ö

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he was going "When little Arnold said: So I had going to do, the other = ne Franklin. and told me what he was see that and in there with the office this and airplanes, by talk with the President, ше come So he left get through, 50,000 build .M. you 5

get didn't He time? that at airplane later 50,000 year talk Did he 50,000 till ö the

interested in getting the production he was That's right, capability going ·M

were talking "10,000 planes they time At that ö

see sent with. President along the ge So cuss forgotten. ornery an I've Was Yes, He Johnson. ·M:

Q: Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of War?

this started in building up So that was how we got Yes. . M

know

don't

н

It.

for

Arnold picked me

Why

production capacity.

2

Pacific, who Echols. dn South wound Gen the 80 to in Washington, assistant sent then to be Was Kenney thing Washington Division the Materiel me Production into tell did taken dn never the heading was of he Powers head and was

the war started after until 80 Kenney didn't was That ö

ranking he You might have meetings in to Washington and that the to in Puerto Rico how tied Kenney that several get enroute were trying to find Arnold. So 5 stayed there I had about down were band and still the wasn't Kenney We earlier he was He hit Honolulu. from Douglas uo but war said maneuvering there We the That's right, and as into from gotten that story And the Nips officer on duty So to get Washington. he happened. 80 W: the day wanted job,

Bakersfield knew nobody near and out expedition quail hunting hunting were cđ they uo out that were know they н where they were Well Yes, ö .M.

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Q: He didn't tell you?

W: No. He didn't tell any of his staff.

the during these Harbor off that flew into Pearl night before to kiss the They are the ones He had gone out Hamilton. ö attack

finally Anyway, there So flight. located him out where he was sparks began to fly then that Ted Landon led that to find out They the Highway Patrol. best and trying our that's the one barging in, from were he came call Yes, Kenney and I And boy, W: we got

gue н next day, Arnold didn't show up till the Well, ö

W: Yes, second day after, I think.

C-47 đ I think he had He had to fly, across country after? day fly second to had The they ö and

said: and he and Production Anyway, the Mexican houseboy ay yesterd found the patrol radio of and I think Gene Beebe was with him. industry beginning the -this the highway uo the about Pearl Harbor it i the heard dn when build was н that was, to that. that So program told him knew about them. about the t tell Yes, story and Douglasн didn' Division yes, amusing . M Don 40" he

under out there experience Was He WAS bad there đ Jan Howard Arnold had out Was former brother-in-law, that he when told me '30-31, Chidlaw Wright Field back in His You know. Conger Pratt, ö at

W: He was Chief Engineer.

reaction to adverse his reason Field Į, op OL had some 0 to Arnold' Command, Arnold lot For thinks that of time. Service Howard. heck Field that c Wright Air have by after and Chidlaw done the uo didn negative of being jumping sort Arnold Field And Arnold had alway be job and to Wright the Was seemed Command of Wright Field to Most always reaction Service ö job. he

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things Control ther a good all dn Quality think for be Colonel 5 tried and н had Procurement right about that, but Howard Engine Howard. of head Chief Jan opposed was was Was Was and the reason he I think Ben alway While Strauss were men. they ·M: reason. all named and t0

brilliant You think think that Arnold had to be reaction to Wright Field. cause? the kind of guy who seemed good for You don't was it Wright Field, psychological negative people. was with Jan Howard along uo jumped get Well, when he sort of couldn' ö that this but

had been pick this with vanadium beginning because chrome so, Hap, And rightly putting the with experience just done things was **M** uo he based get Production Division to Well everybody In

this, op plan and he to money c appropriations or and program going big get any had to without And he erybody years and the other. cain with along for raising going that

nta at Douglas. building repre Corps Was 20 assignment What Segundo. your El 'about the Douglas plant, talk to want н time? at ö tive that

American remembered those North in 1t always called then later We We names 9 And AT -engine. adopted the the A-17 trainer single the never this airplane advanced building number an attack started building airplanes by ground days the

fn 1939 working on a prototype of the A-20, Douglas was t he? ö wasn

the French for them building Was he French, the For ä

emember Chemidlin lot parking Paul of the name in crashed the by Frenchman who Frenchman then The And name? ö his

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and when this thing Douglas Don and I were standing there on the lot, acked up. Cr that airplane the Carl Culver ·M: spun in

secret but it's like keeping keep that secret window tried to Macy And they event ö some

American North the of parking lot in the fell right 1t Well, ·M. plant.

Douglas? OL it North American Was ö

uo street the across Was plant which plant. Douglas American from North Boulevard, Was It Imperial W:

get enchi the permit t instructions given You ö Į1

plane? that That's right

W

of Washington out came I think it Well, ·M.

to instructing you telegram đ sent you Arnold that I recall the ö

Frenchme

show

of show anything to any permission to get had to be Could :3

allies

called

were

they

though

foreigners

the

Washington, In thing, this for got Arnold then And ö qo

testimony?

Congressional

the

remember

you

remember ب don' 1 H No. ·M:

g thing going had and Morgenthau he anything between them? that The problem was know ö you

going sent Was got War H when the Was while with Morgenthau Europe t c there experience over committee only My ad hoc No. that :M uo uo

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the at what of If he let ther Were you aware instruct Wolfe to told look a hard place. he to If Frenchman, trouble trouble with Roosevelt. and to rock the In ordered him the to was access he caught between then truth that Morgenthau had airplane, in Wolfe Frenchmen, then he was Arnold was that Ken classified dilemma? admitted ö this the was

duty in Washington uo were Unless you those days. got that Not never you

t Clark and proper dn to called Morgenthau Senator Bennett Champ Committee vet Doug Las French not had the Affairs Was plane authorize still And they Military the 1t that testimony right to Therefore, Senate it to him. took was the called him up, the had Corps that Morgenthau really giving others, Douglas Air the couple of They therefore by were line accepted ö đ they and The and

into the nusances of that distinction? thing that BO all at testify to called get was never ever Did you No, fly in it. .w would because 1t of out you keep to wanted problem they guess to the add ö just

W: I wasn't aware of that at all.

the President couple good "Hap' letting were in Roos And then of course he did some that called him Monica the President of said with was Global Mission, instrument Santa you? allegedly "dutch" and Arnold the doghouse consult fashioned. incident and ui." And the had Morgenthau got the were didn s book, President you. this old of rnold you Arnold like an of Arnold started. course him because the guys Morgenthau But offered he and according to when for of doghouse until the war knew that But And is Guam and Led President through this no trouble later 1n This Frenchman And places him 00 years ö things, 12 called close have got and the of

Was This anything. or interviewed Westover? up, called to Assistant never Arnold was No. W: when

probably that was House This White 1939 the anuary at conference L after that after this mentioned before No, two or ö month

relieved Was н after job that was White House to back went the at conference representative The ·M: **B**S

later at the White House was conference this Then ö

W: Must have been, timewise.

mentioned 1940. you 16, planes on May .000 50 speech the with -In that In used th Roose The because ö

Hap see 5 there was ordered back President the ç talk when I to . WOII back 38 time 18 second This the W: and

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might there plane you one more that th you In ask to Frenchman occur Let me it. the Did events telescope. let Frenchman t C violation this All these security about question ö some pe

authorized they because were else. they everything concerned pip and I was they It, as which Ę far ride as them because airplane, buy to No, going the -M see were 2

have 1t Didn't aboard. equipment classified had of things? 1t But ö couple

nothing but instruments some and propeller and engine knowledge No, ·M: to else

agents foreign allowing about law in the books material classified military was There view ö to

of Si Three question uniform Washington 00 In officers, from So authorization AF Captain French were and the people Major had These because -Colonel mind. them

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Orleans enblat New In Sol plant nam ct guy opening Was about French? business the for some some planes there in this? Was **involved** to build ö

W: Well, Sol was in the Washington office

problem? this him with contac any you Did ö

Washington procurement 1¹ things or and production papers writing with qo nothing have nav had He knowledge No, ä Na la

there flit around nam hovered saw his He trades, to do. wondered many jobs just of of man couple and of thing Sort him gave Was of this He Arnold out ö and and

present Arno1d later being time; him that the at rem during with him E Washington, problems contact In any etings had never vou No, Can ä ö there

5 wing involved trying these were get to my mind, they you DId tanks a big problem. One problem comes range? wing portable some them was the give This remember to Wright Field. to fighters B-17 you the å the for out in that?. uo tanks came put

get to damnest their trying WAS AF the When yes ho fighters ·M

Q: Right, '43

Mean and tanks put them indirectly which we came out with the P-51s oxygen through the P-47 deal, about shell = that like mad on the old "Jug, him đ get uo with out P we They he11 when Arnold came airplane raising this is they whole been right, working guns on explosive had the Kenney throw That' machine were damned could because W: time the how Ft

Q: On the "Jug?'

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"Frank brother found with burst 50 the any thing fighting the In eight 30 Was show Arnold how "Well, oxygen tanks up at said: arguing Kenney one ever damned **N** (Franklin Wolfe) fired Say So these and said: Arnold had been a P-47 there. this gracefully was think uo with They brother and I insisting Kenney against to 7-47 don P-47 wants h the brother 5 oxygen brother My brother had 50 Was the about set had and were Kenney turned the subject over course he in We Division and my off. carried and wasn't my by are." where took Of So, Bri standing Division, Kenney He that the tank uo bomb tanks over range there that see. test 80 airplane were tank-oxygen cđ oxygen charge of the Armament It like you gun, guns this th changing sn off So he It. of put any these machine machine of the group about rest uo gas to of explosive got about it end the the W: problem caliber caliber Kenney have and far and and 1t

caliber absolutely that true?" showed edge this We Frank of went in of Arnold turned the Norden bombsight end "Frank, got this? NI and he trailing 20 mm had the cooked up all getting rid with He 5 armament 50 illustration, uo the calibers?" a directive op more people, was and the served never you 18 Was officer the He Arnold said: to bed 20. the said, But he and brother date show little That "General happen the w111 Arnold out. off had few Ordnance about what everything else calibers bombardment got the and 50 for He got kindergarten brother others coming coming airplanes. "Eight Dismissed. did you and my off ahead responsible Arnold that had access to airplane?" "Frank except we dance. said: knowledge." .50-He falling 20 the shells 80 My said: how Kenney đ said 5 he the his and might quite said: farther the presentation 0 briefing showed ones. and and all those blankety blank 30's. that "Well as he Arnold song and uo was presentation was empty So Kenney all And ield best of my plus He standardizing impact, top Corps Corps this In much in little Corps. of P-47. said: t C got days well the tanks, here?' like give waterfall Rockwell there off how Ordnance "bood" Ordnance some there vou the đ Arnold the little real those guess the him out and and ling and sn oxygen dn Ordnance said of in and of the In show at to gave coming brother drew in the out in the the conference So The another velocity, calibers hell 08 here .30-caliber few NYes and staff the t0 overcome with brother brother Part to e wings the thing. the 30-caliber MG ivyes all out the ny. 30 trying out just deal knowledge 50 He knew said to this the in the change Arnold' Arnold of change coming the there. Chief o my So my eight this said: what were you one out had the He of

Campbell was. a two-star Campbell? Ordnance Could that have been of charge in Was He ö general feuding with the Ordnance Was H because been have could Well, time the . M all

labor Division of either the time? that of all control them with any You had trouble relinquish wouldn't ö They single turrets c have didn't were buying had that one of this care into 00 B-17 they took went The when airplane and Hap, well Lovett No for Bob ä curret And

Q: How did they do that?

brother playing the way airplanes only British what Arnold that them took the license didn't Myou ge the No. said 18 way called the these But this Army Well, over and who of the from said: two the Stu Symington phone Arnold for gei 0 They British hav That' said: right of and the Arnold the business the rest So Louis brother there that: license now. uo typical him SOT the uo right knew "okay over turret St that the My called did nave (2) 80 brother it and said got fast It? Electric they Pauls the to and q and got Symington caliber and in What cockeyed industry my Bolton sn happened Emerson England qo (2) started on. We friends 30 and Pauls So going "Look going of ran somebody SO good what P P of This Bolton ust They Was you 20 know said: 0 inted Was went that' what It of England. the ·M: worked In and thing ahold golf What was. time and know off. for he

later document anonymous little cđ in 1 ended up This business ö

W: It did

uo

Q: Don't you remember, on the B-36?

11

later about Yes ö

the Air Force and battle between the Navy Was That .M

document? Cedric Worth that subjects, the big of one was This ö

investigation that in there in days spent W:

wheel ort and he ance thing that bal Indur mentioning of sort get out cţ to figure as your tend serve he about Arnold and Arnold bib Did Lovett or Did off. track? go great team. and beforehand? talking the enthusiastic uo are Arnold do, We were to keep ö Lovett get going ç of

couldn't words wouldn was other Corps, Signal In other When Arnold two of them, They together could. Bob with the other. against were these them, Bob them each like experience dn of buck complemented of two done with the military and the rest to the scared n J but and who Hap, recollection were pair Corps, Engineer Corps, they great opinion, something bucking đ My in my mind they get

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together? worked They ö

"Here What ust Friend day going opinion: the initiative-IFF. they one that Identification now, you're General any in there in my instruction than have ON ... the "Well, don't called psychologist, took said: "Beginning the said: we always got н and furnishing other were. Arnold great war said: example it? any the they and đ and about for had was of mean will give you one me responsible never and Lovett middle doing He noXrr to turned jump on you. you in the said: 00 Arnold are Lovett get the IFF Corps right He hell loved to ÷ And Bob are Signal the or Foe Here we Ln I 2

happened Au got 80 because just 1t time, And had their office they think Ín ÷ Do you think he went Don afternoon know that don' Instructions W:

that?

sold

and

to Marshall

ö

noX and and M OM: uo take phone gar said: goodbye couldn' Washington can get them out there dn with IFF. been they We "Well, know and Go ahead, the there that He'd called "Are and TFF good uo 1 S War "Well = left about him out the the IFF war. Corps here Arnold the He 0 "That's fine. "That' н called came had doing for the So before out follow-up. said: Signal what he = he him Arnold: ething them. н are you there He later op NON can you get the need. name building 5 show and Arnold that. days of Corps said: "What something = drawings I sir. out guy train five of Air н typical inyes that Philco contracts 800n said: think anted and five days." the or end of that wanted uo ember four said: WOH all the got to for and here cars In happened rem them So He Som that day said: out baggage I have within four or "Well could contract get phone one ahead?" the before. to buy it. somebody just Was for special I said: wish trying going weeks going That said, word the him get So Et

couple of

Wright Field

at

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to

in

the head of Philco had been

н

things? these uo dn follow always Did ö -vanadium icepick then and do, 5 something chrome the you of give exponent would great He of him typical ho dn was you call That

done should have you something for jump you ever done? 44 Did wasn ö it and

him. suit to done ever was Oh, nothing ä

more: something wanted he bib you Whatever ö

done?" then that op get to chore to "When are you going ¢ you give would He and say: him of dn Typical you call would

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six He'd come it done in six months." long as you get about you need as to be it's going time this! "Take all the "Well. did Always You'd reply: weeks." back:

six days he would have said said six weeks, If you had ö

W: Right.

Q: And he always followed up on these things?

W: Yes

He held to that he didn't and he was too impatient things. Arnold was of these send things down to the staff for coordination many One of the criticisms leveled at SO air He did In the of these balls bouncing anything to the staff. :0 give all *.* .

us caught up with never and Navy That's why the Army . M

Q: He just went ahead and did things?

W: Well, like that IFF I was telling you about.

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other drove some where Arnold there Were instances a short time? other something to consummation in any remember you 00 problems ö

and And the uo which at gave who the alway when this big criticism came done or Echols sat there So start teletype message airplane this escort recommending to Hap what he thought could be Was the turrets. op Echols don't know who money to an an building as money enough used OL Echols He had a good foil in Oliver Echols. get got airplane get be about in to could just H would foil trying So of escorts in Europe talking the we which a great op there, start years, year to been P-51, something out he had One couldn't Wright Field all these -but Echols had the knew other. be who could do it, Echols the lack coming up with to thing but the out through all : M engine, turned about order first and

North The project officer on fighters who was Mark Bradley of Atwood Lee with together fighter to get new with Captain or Major, dn come and call. American đ phone then,

put low British War the in the didn't early engine P-51 another the have using they didn't there? It plane? Well, Merlin in altitude ö the

no was later That in the it? was wasn't too good, P-51 the first But ö

Was ared von Karman get He The the fighter "Drop and outside Echols 5 This back c1 Echols use them supposed industry perfect couldn time engine people that of us said: of opinion of So over things in which airplane, the ommendations theory and which was They rest -great Britain pilots and else out service seance and held the horsepower, top The consensus saidrelate these 1t turn anything the the make engine, big boys in was never re correctly all them out đ never the of P-40 The have the had 1,700 you in Allison them, Battle against can't the they will heard what ÷ brought engine. Dunkirk don' or 115 excused until you get what happened, H of their 1,400 of So The P-40 had the engine op We Now. any He Allison to of It. you can't drop it. about Echols fall ĹΕ than decided was the Field. of of shots "Well, hp, out diagnosed this engine British sent three the at better So see 700 Wright We the hot been rated horsepower military of = what You said: had. time OL project "We had, 40 airplane we Is and all called of the and he alway said: that This have that that they the

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1940. June Was That ö

the

at

and The the project officer on fighters Toronto 5 there dn flew DC-3 the fellow Bradley, took couple others, this So -M and i.

we had Packard build the British Merlin over and and over and Lee the and the house and then 80 B-29. catching Spitfire job of that heard sure and radio 50 ourselves every the headache want the Bradley Arnold and done Well of Lost the in and in the P-51, the for eye there both

Officer

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of Nobody big And Was the group It - too and even accelerated program. built an Arnold called our it. futureproblems pilot came had, at look test far in the cry ever of going take a and had kinds the big hue Allen, So, too to all real airplane airplane industry was had đ Eddy other c Was It We was with wing-loaded "This the There etc. it aircraft that. else. because and one fire said: like place that civilians the first real heavy this of out airplane; engines people Congress ever ·M: whole afte the top Was the had Bn

project to build "We are a11 the time said: the job being knows ou Hap "Yes bog damned thing happened. was: control got group that's when I fire this automatic of consensus So had the It. It build Again, the visualized So, to going this. new

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probably

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project,

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Arndd'

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Special Project

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was P-40

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There

Dunkirk

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the radio the

of Dunkirk

fall

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"Well

said:

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came

Bishop

called

came party

servant dinner

hooked

sat

hour

cocktail

the

of

middle aside.

the

right

guess

4 Į1

the middle

Right in

party

dinner ŗ

threw

Bishop

ace

IMM

were going to fly

the P-40 and we

let the British fly

to

Was

idea

great

this

when

three days

or

two

three

been C,

We'd

Spitfire

the

sometime one probably first of .the but B-29. crackup the took the after You was 1943? This 1943 this the B-29. of Right, the middle uo manager ö Ln I

people I took over got the ready We had two oth get We We first one the there 80 episode all out places with the pilots interesting dn other contracts test cracked three Field very drawn in Allen one other Wright them had Eddy build took jobs. Meantime is to There going experimental project. were out W: the job We

Q: Martin was going to build them?

president gunbutts. officer the thing Jake had this Was tried of sudden could see up with over was in the bank a copilot by the name and the wing and Boeing at Wichita They went Finally he this chief project Was machine Well and out 11 . I. of bank, wound and I who ailerons." got that could look All one guy warehouse where It. to of them all a day West about, said: econd ground, start lot off. increasing airplane thing itt1 the of turn the Oliver What And he talking you take two were would the was was off the and this Marietta; Thi where And the and he end to building and the lose Seattle, field ground was big time she ramp, get of the oldtime noncoms building I was "Jake forth. happened. doing to c there the north Colonel, Was the at going in It t00 80 I said: every Was of Bell uo floor us, the the died what and act, ground. end he thing back of Omaha; passed us into this uo at SO the And this Jake who was third all the pun Johnson front there dn the ailerons at and God 1u ready at 50 asked on the in Down got know uo -two out dn Martin after "My the off. Harmon Right back back getting got 1f I the got bombersd'n and 1t that. I thought: of Boeing sergeant, Jake righted, they pull in sitting finally taxiied crossed damned field there movie they them like uo So 20 So

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the lost almost and wing, the of tip the change to had They second one ragging.

3 À the of end the have been it might that, If you'd done ö program

fact that the for except this us of build end the to going almost first "Well The said: ·M: Hap

50 commit then ts faciliti the all manufacturing made had Arnold of kinds anti al and t plants Ľ ö three

and the Chinese the Russians, commitment to things these use also made to going He had were ·M: where

on his he And really Chengtu President base The the FOL President you the Right to B-29 commit tments this ö for

the In people of lot đ and the industry people in tail his of uo A lot were Force ·M: AIr

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Q: This would have been a tragic thing.

W: You can see what would have happened.

Q: It could have been the end of Arnold.

would They Never It. op War 5 wanted bloody the Army lost the way have Japan the might landing the MON L didn' have

the way taken the Truly have and would Japan Japan They Į, uo landed landing islands had bloody we little Ϊf 9 with them, these been escape in have fighting ould narro American fantastic, million ö Japs

about that thing seeing felt Mod imagine can vou 40 dn crack to W: Yes, there's a book by Mansfield

cam that the second one know didn't don't recall cracking up ö near

hydrant K-9 this President H mentioned called 5 dn Vice He walking never and made. the Chief Engineer dog We film đ awfully damned quiet. đ shows had film with Douglas, the through starting it MOU Company kept caption Beale Boeing Wellwood and the well. The

Q: Relieving himself.

W: Well, that's the way this airplane looked.

pe? abou about this Arnold to talk ever vou Did ö

W: He found out somehow, long afterwards

Q: Oh, you didn't tell Arnold?

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W: Hell, no, we didn't dare.

Q: He didn't know about it.

would H It. minimized We secrecy erybody terrible been iN have

believe Japan having that against know Was President trouble you It operating Did farther 다 the of kinds COULS promised be little proble would of all And modification, he had đ countering B-29 story 1943 the B-29 back. that Novembe on his the production. in 1943 take President was Oc tober date late the s of and kind think ö ready some the all

the from 5th, June Was date date The the storv made the and not 1944 That beginning,

Q: It was June 15th -- the date of the first raid.

Q: That was the date?

was think it н YALTA at date that rnold And W:

Q: No, that was before YALTA.

83 B-29' use to commitment the make he did Wher i.M

1943 ember Nov Was This probably Cairo or Tehran H ö

W: Tehran and he made the date.

Q: And he gave the date as June 15th?

W: Yes, and we made it.

don't know н been postponed had date impression that the I thought that got ö where

W: No, not to my knowledge or recollection

Salinas? to out come ever Arnold and Benny Meyers Did ö

And first over got this took else н Salina as soon somebody 38 there see and out you India act after I left, the to out in got t took until Not when going, W: 0 wing that

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Q: Yes, what happened?

airplanes engine gunnery the all new some was have problem like We having all kinds of problems, main problems the but had engine turret problems We were some equipment We problems :M and

Q: Engine catching fire

W: They were overheating.

Salina? at out weeks of couple spend Arnold Did ö

W: Not while I was there

trying There they were dragging. sometime like March 1944, were they and the CBI, sitting on Salina to of m thinking out of planes plan these bunch ö get

too. factories. the at sitting out planes Bunch 'of ·M:

problems, and didn't Arnold planes out? the some expedite had plane 50 each try and and Yes, there out ö get

wing first the got After I there wasn't H know don't out them ·M: took н

Q: The 58th, and Blondie Saunders had the 73rd?

that over And then took production the picture Blondie into the 58th. of out F-80 uo the he deputy put and to cracked up, back was called Blondie Blondie -M when when

Q: Who took his place?

all WIN By pue Guam Eaker to and come <u>in</u> the 58th 5 out going Cam moved were Spaatz Europe Ramey MON then from had and hotshots hotshots rthur Ramey these Roger of rest til : M that the the

breathing hard on about .it? Was the President know you didn't that Of recall subject: You don this Arnold on ö

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W: I had problems of my own.

the that Park, mission?" was up at Hyde first the is н "what impression when Arnold: asking this I got President was ö

W: I'm sure he could, I wouldn't know.

1 it back doesn' files here that held This know Maybe Arnold **N** might not delayed. don't have Non was mission course, scheduled. course first Of of be 1t 5 the ssion of WAS that knowledge mission because he didn't know impression with your first the th I got jibe when

wouldn' the н ready and make delay all them blood advance had weeks 1f all that, two of me tha given records knot have ny N dn may I could look He that. .M know

mentioned trouble. Į1 got when he Benny Meyers, You know ö

debt and In with who some private initially Was must reached suppor WAS people independent This Was Meyers supplied him s omebody Benny Meyers the AF he had of out. supported by Benny engaged in course <u>in</u> sent had that ton Field who that that got alway woman him Was JO F feeling he was idea never Benny Meyers Hamilt about him write CBI. wealthy any that that any into the letter at 5 when have have dn going or heard verv typed because the Arnold didn't you and out means wâs

Did

pulling this stuff

than his

living higher

activity?

Was

letter

the

then

off,

Arnold

tipped

Arnold's file

Arnold

off

the B-29s In 1947

get Arnold

5

worked together

and

Salina

5

out

gone

had

they

that

time

mentioned the

solicit Arnold's help and he

He was trying to

the good old days.

money had the else everybody always Benny Well, my impression of war banks đ the to the the that was So before before at marriage stories ears him to their the first known money ·M: had One his the dn

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well and lived Car a fancy Always drove ö

knew never from, I came t Where ·M:

that fact accepted the just well people living that Was and said Arnold had Mrs Meyers ö Benny

Was when he could find, as I as far started that in Hawaii originally he Well ·M on duty

ad Stratemeyer Everybody involved in production sign that letter that assets and his stocks t C Staff? uodn his called of Air stating Were you was Chief a letter sign ö when he 2

almost week every along cam ä

one letter? than more Ther ö

be "You've got to about: always haranguing us were They ·M:

and accept with the industry You shouldn't Associating shouldn't do that. on. SO and you and So from industry, and about this accepting gifts careful things

everybody procure dismissed when In claim Arnold living this c and had -but Was and that Meyers round robin letter Later ends course alive people both anything about that? and of this 1s And playing all his had that Meyers denied listed verbally assets that 1947 was Meyers stocks, his heard state particular letter that Arnold In Have you heard Benny hearing н told You know list his had the esponsibility ctri at he This San Francisco to that testified Fle from his job asked Aviation ö claimed ment that Was he

told ago years and 9 20 or dn S been can has chap this of Meyers, cours golf heard Benny th uo last had The General he that W: This me

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Q: Pop Powers told you this?

and worked in Benny's office in Washington working the one place stores some Jersey the Ohrbach departmen New of him 1¹ there heard AF was in the of ever Meyers one H was for last That Ohrbach boys comptroller That's the : M

see talk thing and would this Ohrbach's In involved knov write get don to lead, want with him. might not interesting touch he an í.n him That' see put did can ö I JI they

Power since about Meyers word another heard never I've ·M: and. told

took they and away medals took his term and they đ served away He pension ö his

W: And his wife took his money away

around Of course, he was fooling around with Mrs. Bleriot LeMarre fooling and he was set up, he president was this dummy wife with LeMarre's ö LeMarre

wife, who divorced This His America, somebody but that was common knowledge. South OL Brazilian, to went and or off Argentinian around she took going That's right, an twins, married that the and rumor him ...M Benny bore the

for one twins for Arnold and of those one name he Didn't Marshall? ö

W: I believe so.

to Meyers a godfather to one and devoted very It was either that or Arnold was was Arnold know, You the other. Marshall ö

lot though and people didn't gall of did a hell had the point, staff mean he but he certain other H, been firmed up, the to Washington. dn of this lot ct say in that really things there would things never H р yes had fine 5 ho ť the brass of good, ·M: I guess have

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And Arno1d soft spoken Lt doer op and was out Echols as that he "get yesterday đ a picture of Oliver 18 ÷ Meyers, to people to do Arnold Benny attracted and liked given gentleman, he have was liked doers; could southern this

column of three digits Was understood this that Meyers run into up to of guy. He s right, Meyers was that kind that. ever down and add up a about anybody I'd doubt sharp than character, no sit real financial business better I've seen that guy was that' brilliant like that. Yes a real just time.

Q: He was sharp but not quite ethical.

W: That's right; not at all.

You attack you general things about Arnold. heart og had had his Coral Gables Arnold from Washington some 1945. attack? Let me ask you just April to a heart Į, back Washington come had Arnold ust 50 ö had that came He

er

W: Yes, I remember hearing about that.

4 you didn' end of å a short period back at the Commander Deputy came for be Eaker he and to in And you worked for Commander? quiet, Eaker brought Deputy kept They when he was remember that? They March 1945. ö you,

W: You're talking about '45? No.

months between 4 or 3 about for AAF. assigned to Hqs Day? You were and VJ ö Day VE

the uo Japan into went н 5th AF. 148 came back in with the out н 145; Was H occupation in No, : M

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just about from India by Arnold to get that? to AF in August 1945 prior right you were 5th called back you joined the Where This is when I was bomb atomic I have here of the time :M ö the

into production owned we (P-80) fighter first jet the

months Wright Field of couple at Was time short temporarily very ದ there Washington in only in were You No. ö :M

diately They have your blography assign-You in August time you were in Day for temporary Wright Field? 5N Okinawa paper and months VE uo in 1945 between assigned 5th AF in 4 you April Washington paper, joined the just say were in according to this period, were left Wright Field AF to join the 5th then you you assigned the maybe was and were this that, to You So you were But you and went AAF Hqs er rememb were. Washington, you Į1 ö before as you 1945. ment - uop

W: Yes.

carried me in Washington they could have guess they Knudsen? Then, worked for ö You

of production when Knudsen with Knudsen in charge Pacific, duty the Was days of to out production vent had many of before н head and even the Corps Well brought Air the was of

along get Arnold and he did How ö

say would well Wonder fully in he? ÷ wasn' great production man, He ö

world's best The N though. officer good very Not ö

officer an be to want didn't He that. about fellow bone wonderful He ·M: He

problems? some create this Did ö

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quite going plants tonight the do you think the they with uo WAS through the this are sir and loading an 50 he stopped Corps inyes you abo inspect talked walking stairs fly When Ordnanc about time ιVulf t0 said Going towe up these to Was want and there what place going anything one plant big says Navy And vou sidelight and old boy great First General was back, walking He were the Ordnance å ady Army know man plant "Vulf before the there? DC-3 Navy verything the night before didn't little production "Well oved ammunition loading one out C-47 things of e H said called you Everybody through head man the plant. and all those tell Corps So the uo of with Knudsen took be us loading around So will head Air told going to no the el He California high. the one anything No trip ammunition een to He accent assigned assigned W: factori are stairs first Ogden stori nevel with 5 an JL ve

P

fallen on the floor." and And and dove areas in he that, this doing?" dus tpan, the "Yes." turned around to me you said and Was looked out that up, fellow SO

and blow

slides

park

amusement

these

and there

window,

out the window."

just jump

you

"Vulf,

he said:

And Knudsen

it blows up?"

"What if

said:

to

going

was

it

looked like

thing were

the

Τf

did.

the chute

down

went

and

a window,

out you

said:

he

And

"Blow up?"

said:

.dn

would blow

place

stepped on

if you

"Well,

had?"

Ļ

1.F

"What

have

might

powder that

any

dn

sweeping

he's said:

Well. And I

this

world is

the

in

"What

general:

Ordnance

this

grabbing people stories about Arnold beyond some Anything about him any discussed Do you remember example? 4 haven' for the halls, We ö where

ran right "You heard office told, there was He you in here was Arnold's want of Kuter box but said: story in the hall; come н squawk am not an eyewitness to, "Colonel, forgotten uo out the And he "You guys converged intercom the hell on, later 've that after this meeting, Arnold walked out said: sir. a big the place squawk box: And he blasted "But Well, something. he And had said: He out of that story I another harangue. this hall about day. colonel uo coming up the everybody said. one dn down all the stops The riled Well, office Kuter Got had got something 80 Arnold's colonel ž away!" and And he really 80

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your

was

"Vulf, when I

and said,

around

Knudsen turned

climb." ran up

tough

"Ye Gods, this is

I said:

comment to this Ordnance general.

top and here

the

to

dn

got

we

So

=

stairs

all the

painted white

deal,

a creamery

big thing looked like

great

this age,

So there was

This was the mixing chamber.

a room.

Little bit of

handled

long

¢

and

brush,

handled

long

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with

there

chap

floor

maculate

this

dn

sweeping

round

going

he

foreign the aant many all heard assignment him hitting "Norstad E-Ring ve the but of saying: of around kind Chaplain, this story some then walk in the and am to dragooned 1u about afraid Norstad told everybody it 80 being grabbed and heard can people calling yoi L, expertise of haven about be and res н might to their the ö buttons storie they you;

- and Norstad started between he lent reum whole The ·M
- Kuter? or Norstad it. Was ö

t00 guys there strategy was Norstad statisticians but er brains Kut the big 1t knowledge of one ny was Io he ·M: because

- Norstad at mad was he maybe Norstad; have been could Well, ö
- buttons the all down ran he before people of full Was office The ·M:
- buttons ţ hit he sponded eally They ö

too one that uo mad

about? What ö the

SOMP

ren

out plenty H thev 끉 to boys used of bib having could when airplanes guy "What cable airplanes be other were getting So guess all said: like the about send these engines damn having, off. vould bad and 80 taking asking these popped to was how were want lousy at problem me started "General we telling looked cain becaus So H that how basic said: little bit. and he this thing. them He troubles said: cain, The н raising tell you told him raising for?" told and and the and troubles CID "What was has have in India verybody dander н And staff wings out, ÷ engine shouldn' He said: : M there say?' your from back got of

got him

н

meeting

this

for

India

from

back

me

called

He

·M

one afternoon would the Arnold the launched one mission and had one the Arnold had been through this hell get 1ooked This noXII all to call friends He to and then report about ದ amounted said: top. got personal and talking my he up, night blew it finally crossed story all close of that and this kind had already And that him real train Kenney told you н get And S were when guy Pennsylvania ou1d course and they We is thes India this rumors. asking Of out to mav So thing on the the morning. Kenney these Was way arte back awhile Mitchell to get heard on th he11 next . dod way and Ln.

- Q: You were at Wright Field at this time?
- W: Yes, so was Kenney.
- Q: Now this must have been before the war?

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Munitions Building Arnold sitting forget We you = Fairchild by terrible. George boat George "Boy, hell. H grabbed me "oh got into this against Now said: said: this is was unmilitary office. 5 He we old George and here with Eaker dn before helping "Oh boy, mad. me "Here the office into Eaker pushed Anyway, got Was George walked in, Is Harbor there said: -this really and said: nobody and He a nervous guy Was belt George there just and who hands. We and my the before i, Arnold with us hell after Fairchild of went in his trouble. out like Fairchild was kind of taking off: blous and the hall this both head rowing the train sounding big the in tarted us Yes walked desk, of down In pushed myself the back im walked no at his star guys and got and İt. As þ

Q: What did Eaker do?

he was still in the office ΤŦ remember can't moment Fairchild the At ·M 1 OF

He didn't of his presence? out pushing you with you? just p to he more Was any ö want

grabbed doors swing deliberately 80 of outpe ty started bar something like this, these already and had act, -George his of doing me part just grabbed always This was He ·M: So he me

Q: Did you feel that he liked you?

thing hadn't only The 1F me tt left. with WAS that dn and put right and have op people could vouldn firing best he the sure op yes, way qo op the could :M s That'

Q: He fired a lot of people out of jobs?

wouldn't matter 80 WOW of us other something uo D broke dow "We don't fault good for get yesterday and the Kenney stiff He'd listen time both boy the the said: the my George thought uo ourselves this in, then, the with So H go back, vou there he11 put So said: tt were went In, at 3 along see you. bad the gues in **looked** H way as this who place we this? and thing or back be so unmilitary the So What "Nothing said, news good the train Fairchild like wants to behave know General So on This there come he bad right over Arnold: facts acting damn we don't "Well, t0 the sitting Kenney C, out. all are back in there. OL 01d Man let call "Well the him the you Eaker thing them you = Now shouldn't was give uo telephone you didn't give him Arnold an are boys "Sir said: think the for This relieved this called Se all you why boog in; you sent 80 cut at we saluted. Τf anyway "Well uo to him that way laughing; he be 'Yeah But and that he get military 00 and to come George let' right. again "S1r yes trying and George done. guys Arnold: said: top better norning to ho ίf wasn't all train you got ramrod we said: but his you'd be told i.M George Lt was with talk ". sn 1ook blew know and lext the day you ve н

30

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Q: Did George Kenney call him Hap?

W: Oh yes

Q: But you didn't call him "Hap?"

W: Oh no

him called Spaatz Who called him "Hap," George Kenney, ö

and

"Hap,

of none But did. timers of the other old that. would do I guess some guys so-called young ·M: *,*

always "General;" called him Eaker I know Eaker didn't. "General ö

deliberately things the He of tension. (push people out of his office) some at the looking back relieve to that gone by, did As years have just things these well would do I think W:

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where would but he knew Arnold that them something interesting, uo pressure tremendous told Was I was people and put point breaking ö

W: That's right.

Q:and he never went beyond that point?

the time Kenney one at me see. uo You one to be given to MacArthur pulled Australia. He that. down to θf convinced me get B-29s were supposed to cain raising :M

for them asking Was -MacArthur ţ supposed Not ö

thought the could changed into get 80 factories was So know Then it the commitment wanted to Let out too. always part of the plan, there made sneak off (Beebe) to out was they come 10 with Gene used ţ, to was wherever get this dn to fixed Well, at Tehran, or raising cain I had it : M war,

night? afternoon orders out to the Hap got just 5 yesterday all again go to been This North out

Then,

the

issue

they

okay, been

So they

Coast

the dn

uo

out

Hap is

Now

off.

trigger said

didn'

Gene war.

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to said

wanted orders

and

asking

Kenney has

relieved

had the

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and

Washington

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Personnel

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called

3:00-4:00

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late

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-this

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unpacking

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Douglas

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you relieved

"Sir

said:

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And 1s for the

forth.

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this,

qo Ameri

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I had

And

A-20s

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building

were

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where

Tulsa

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goes

So Hap

trigger

at

guys

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Dougla

Don

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factories

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off the AF Representatives-Colonels

never did Tulsa

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orders

I have

and

here

replacement

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yesterday

that

K.B

crissakes,

"0h,

Arnold:

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Pacific

the So

back

papers

put

and

unpacked my bag

H

fly do, did he What trips. unscheduled these took Sometim He ö ·M.

wasn't he? time, that at flying for him son Peter ö

know the This effect Beebe China psychological Gene 5 went Was and 80 the and transferred for him. those things just for flying relieved was Peterson of before Gene lot did a pressure ·M: was he

the relinquish was this would because never greatest love. He airpower kept it his ategic was always B-29 t he the of this Well, instrumentali of control ö

anybody to didn't report out there, went н .M.

any dealings with Chennault out there? Did you have ö

W: Oh yes.

getting supplies for the 73rd, or the 58th? was 1t Trouble, ö

11ke You see No. to get this tho would be giving He didn' to and of China. only He was trying 12 Stilwell horn reported to go out tried to work on Chennault, where missions said I supplies to He told Chennault paper that times he, these AF UMO SO running the Chinese of orders mount my a number handling of just to piece change my supposed So I tried little Chief of Staff. He to was the orders No Stratemeyer all. I had Chennau1t airlift ·M and ne ne

Q: So you would make your report to him?

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W: Yes, Stilwell would never go for it.

when Are You know, by LeMay relieved business? and then he was -Hansell LeMay of the the 21st BombCom, Are you aware that? of got aware ö Hansell you

Wasn' н I had my own problems, relieved. worrying about that outfit was I knew he : M

and H was out there in India about that? Why relieved. was there any talk I just knew that he had been -up to this day and Guam, or Were you surprised, outat were find they to No, time Well, up to China. took : M ö never

of sort news? bad Norstad, the give using to was there Arnold out that went Norstad know you Did man? ö hatchet

popular, very not NAS Norstad that. he used Norstad for this day Yes, isn't to

8th the comments about from relief some his about Several people have made you to talk ever Did Eaker I know. transfer? ö Norstad or AF

wouldn't н Of course, many times. .dn <u>t</u>t with Eaker brought never been he I've and No, up, bring it .M

very disappointed Was he lunch at talking were We ö

there out guy was No. Particularly because his.pal Spaatz, ·M:

W: Arnold gave Kepner the 8th Fighter Command

Q: Over Frank Hunter?

all and always felt that there was bad blood between and relieved firnds, 60 close Command Eaker very Fighter there been had the out given they happens because and thing in н and is brought Kepner, this Yes sudden and ·M Kepner Eaker ¢ JO

Q: You mean, Hunter was relieved?

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W: No, Eaker was relieved.

Doolittle brought in they and relieved was Eaker ö

E Kepner and Eaker about the two, I'm talking now now guessing No, W: just

and Eaker? Kepner some friction between created this That ö

own estimation. them. one with both of just Eaker н So about is my about Kepner ve been anything This н that? and say anything friends heard Kepner of evidence say close or Eaker never had no very have been very You have way or the other, H then, had wondered in Since They

his of any uo cause? hip the without from shot somebody Arnold Relieved that think changes? Do you personnel ö

of there knew over that because they were can't say н Now with Hunter, I knew of--no. or, Eaker that Cases the problem of W:

H cases But the here. problems All N relieved having being people and In Europe of, know

2 Arnold 850 numbe Eaker Kuter paper calked there -dragout flying "You have that finally to waste over eager end. ething only knockdown alked said. Eeker the the were And patches: of Įn that staff 2 1t a beginning beavers ages had ther dropped Arnold Ę COT Arnold' Arnold were eager over HOT who of the e ns there kind uo and and vent bitter were torv fellows this Eake this Arnold Eaker and others Edv S that SO Idwa1 nding these Hunter for Problem) Hotel these change coming worked figured told 1943 of Claridges 80 this Segregatio th your stuf some Sep to Arnold 2 he going And made people early Norstad ö the basket Just plane 60?" Saw him Was (re P Įn of

W: Coleman, yes, he got fired out there

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Q: Where, Selfridge

W: Yes.

Q: He might have been the commanding officer.

W: He could have been the base commander

fired thing this He uo MOU files nam of forgotten his first ot ha rememb I've can Colem ö in

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humon

there

of

out

trips with him shoot the would say "ye tl the and all took boys ssure н the pres took, with under people that we around was of lot sit trips time to of these time thinking those of have during SOW Well didn' uo cours just 3 breeze Of He

He, Knudsen and I went to some of the factories.

. .

factory? plant to can he do when What did he ö

the and workmen the with affable and pleasant company very was the He of : M officer

area? maintenance the to right factory; the to walked right just 50 Did No ö ·M

he about the just him, with he and much went man know time production ÷ didn Every really the through Was Arnold anyway Knudsen him business and with c Knudse along nanufacturing with followed was

Q: Did he ask some tough questions?

vould and who forth Knudsen 08 and Was coming, ware it i him, tin Was with the uo Knud beating heard time start they When would becaus and they man. at him No. front yelling in stop. the

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Wright Field for some There course It aspirations In (ATSC) Was filed? got Of It. there the Command Benny AF at uo that? of Was this the had were that came attention which know why and Meyers Service Knerr you committee you Meyers 1945, 5 This the Benny investigate Technical Did any 1t in to is how the Benny Meyers Benny gave hear and file. quit job came They Did you back, Air that about t 0 when Knudsen it. didn This the and come uo him. against written sent it eye letter, they disability to just called AF later his 14 And letter made charges ent the You had You know give anonymous docume years they and it ದ 00 uo 2 didn anonymous ittee job. I guess. ö dn retired trouble an Benny that they came Was 000

W: That's what triggered the whole investigation?

with started later, years 2 investigation the Well, ö

Wolfe the never material on WOLS anything The he you 1t and Arnold? made levels 90 and Elliott Roosevelt and they upon this Inspector 14 didn with different course, they trip Air and And of the at fishing Arnold? case. was đ you Jones material this uo with 000 had Junius relations ever the they And you suppressed that Arnolds Did social Howard Hughes Benny Meyers. the AF, 1t who the any about for had guy and

served brother All I Arnold, served with never н because No. with him : M

Q: Has he passed away?

44 He retired in anything becaus him, say to Arnold referring from cancer. Mrs been friends 165 have in Sood died may they real my brother SO were a bad heart, brother? Arnold Yes. my and ·M: about with he

talking have been She may General Wolfe. about talked General? she No, he make ö pip

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W: No, he was a colonel, retired in 1944.

Q: Arnold and Westover, about his death

step. đ the Let's go back They lunatics people the air it between than about the heavier feeling Arnold were told hard and that of people than lot one higher ranking the ways alv than Was lighter W: There all

Q: And Westover was lighter than air?

including himself to help all learn at Brooks Field order didn to there That did wings, down instructor he by got thing their lunatics them get first an of these of 5 and I was the percentage to March Field chief lot right small sent Decan back They various That guys 1922-26. ·M fly, When thes

Arnold and going spin and too from Burbank over saw him airport washed out message was went and for plant н the big asked H there and got So and Kepner been Lockheed н for him, night called Washington, and not both of them dead out there then, spending the the waiting It news he had at before, there him there meet and was that Westover had been washed out field first representative March Field that Westover standing telephone to and saw little there the It was was be over. the of the to the AF into rushed got hold know told him fly I was MOU in, and 2

Q: That was a change in fortunes.

by got that day good pilot and he there wings, over wasn ų pair flying he đ becau business wanted moon and he no more the took him in man had man boss what Westover the the That's than was ·M: himself them. But

'50s when Andrews was in his Iceland in mountain Andrews, đ about flying and crashed into story đ I heard ö WAS he

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W: That's right.

Did you Did you know anything about Arnold and Andrews? together? them see ö ever

the of in charge being Andrews was put about Andrews stories versa these vice all OL heard of Hap's No, first GHQ AF protege ·M

and Arnold was killed job? 90 that When Westover was for He made a year ahead of Arnold. being for the job? Andrews anything about rivals Andrews was they Were did you hear .07. ö was

Arnold any anything that have next day didn't heard H have was the Coast. wouldn't the It uo H forth. °uo here going SO out and was sitting the intrigue anything was was made Chief Τf access to ä about

for time lengthy ou there thereafter shortly Well, suvering :M mane

umor s you? à occasioned surpris that possibly Doe delay drinker some WAS there was Arnold that You know, Washington ö Į1

W: It certainly would.

didn

You

ö

see him drink?

there late Arnold his drink an socially with back been and Hap' said: always Arnold had smile plants call In came course. get have was than would In the this Ford airplane it. would Ford get would to go out of rather around acquainted with him, Hap General Motors get. would damned Knudsen н the dn him. can do know that he and Knudsen and going time quarters, We would bring of position ribbing what and best out of Knudsen day know to it to his Bolling Field :op ust a hard him all in aides didn't then about Was and н for the drive was after hest fussing never story because we that of and when the evening One cute Ford In always that say ride and it đ old broken-down evening. out. you or two in the for was you As "Well Arnolds on business get tell chauffeur op Knudsen i.M in the would "Why 11,1 with say: the

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1t and 0 see the he said: That and Knudsen an ust doesn Ford comes that home aide, car." "Sir sergeant In drive see the around said: N and not the Sergeant it got doesn't and seeing your drive "That take a roar you The place Arnold: and Now s out car the trip, Chevrolet. of let around tired finally he from Where there looking all damned brand new night down; says: got car one

you had the B-29 and the near miss about talking are We ö

confidence, eggs up all B-32 ground Arnold had great He had set đ a11 had the off Yet he got going production. never and everything. with the whole program getting washed out. wasn B-32 up the he the So training course set position. had of the because he And, fall-back facilities, in one basket. obviously, a sort of really these

They two of them I think we had about W:

sent them down to them. used Kenney Pacific them, Southwest of You had 15 theater, ö Kenney there, Officer just before and out dn Project them flying a way out, of Assistant two were He 1s WAS there This there. who I knew Cook, out at it. that Frank s look I didn't know that. brought I got to Okinawa. boy the Jake Harmon letting surrender W: under when down t he

eggs in that fall-back had he put his and he t it's kind of interesting, there make In ÷ 'ubib eggs just in case the B-29 of his all So Arnold, have didn't position ö basket,

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W: The reason for that was because

Q: Was that his idea?

, because the industry go on wing-loaded I think it was probably Echols' we should "Well, heavy B-29, said: back far out airplane, analyze the fall finally something to who to was Echols the industry don't know. is have It I'm sure it So we better B-29. uc is against the This called with it, ·M having thing.

Q: Then you think it might have been Echols' idea?

Echols wouldn't let faith in the Poor sight. greatest and he his into the war the let him out of confidence in him had Arnold tried to get wouldn't of lot sure He us, cđ like the rest of Echols. He had oh. world in ·M: him go.

into never got got they never In said He Onc ourself that he in WWI. tolerant like experience him with guys more hangup was when an Arnold had he consequently battle, was this 80 into guy You know, and and wanted to get let combat fight, would ö into the he

W: That's what happened to me.

đ of Echols was given picture н let Echols go. the given never he Echols Southernman but of in picture You got gentle different of ö sort

W: He was.

than Echols Meyers in Benny faith more put Arnold That ö

young about just you who the talking greatest Was inspired Howard before hola m'I the said Jan 12 and was eason world. you -in-law done, thought he the different job And brother in the engineer and fellow never got his for that but he ering Echols greatest sources engine Chidlaw think world around the the other in the like Was way from engineers he the other engineer thought Echols heard

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Q: Echols was a modest man, soft spoken.

W: Soft spoken, Southern gentleman.

things? of lot uo Meyers to 80 Arnold did Why ö

financially only Meyer and the and very brilliant guy act that, good anybody about 57 uo over thought put roughshod C could was often Meyers business running ve about because about He knew the financial think never hesitated Well can : M reason

Q: Even Echols?

the of rest the all -he But AF the with that In experience away got only never His there. No. out W: boys

engineering? for on Echols Could it be that Arnold relied Absolutely ö .W.

Q: And then for Meyers as an expediter?

He Was to give him busines right and just eat 88 a photographic somewhat like run fight for long or was different because about 1t come chanical expediting 38 made on Meyers that VOU to figures up these manufacturers what in was when had say anything went the Meyers He You can't could stand up quote relied think, car in he McNamara. the All he did Benny when He with H he that uo think him. found out later. needed experience fan respects say Defense. to н call the see. really listen Arnold initially thought and He many you Benny had no of would get on the phone and he, like McNamara tarv 5 we front fannies out Benny not Secre sit around that as Because big engineering. the make, No. it, support former McNamara. to ·M: uo you'd money. memory their down put vas the the uo

have to served a purpose that Arnold wanted things did and he out way went đ In ö done.

Arnold more gone and one op difference between Arnold and Benny, you you were to gave job B why then why he He gave you didn't, done get it you people. and if you didn't over it, the roughshod you to do see Τ£ And You expected chance. didn't

Q: Did he give you two chances, general?

moment the of spur the uo acted he never I know, as knew As far : M far as

Don't you think subject of Arnold's relations with the aircraft limb. đ uo really put himself out he the manufacturers. ő ö

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without think that He tried to get them, н and War Production, they? to didn't vision? convert feet, kind of to their commitment some dragged this took real they

have must Industry Kenney aircraft ahead. rate the terrific went convincing of them that In at s ome had expand of them did, We problems to going Some the were vou :M we told that

didn' ö

died before And bug B-17 many brilliant guy original tossup then uo know busy We drew who 80 rplanes and the called them up and he told us how them long thing Wright and never He figured the such of Chidlaw You **a1** wanted when. old B-18, rest Lyons. factory got ct at 11 Another what and ī big and then, trainers still the such attacks, 1t Al decide other đ down it paper the big and down of at by ve fighters and bombers, instanc transports he sat how to follow-on of guess have or t sat some of them didn't have heart the B-25 butcher planes had 44 was fighters Field the jus need. t For we Crawford and made going many to Echols by we uo and and Wright you Then So war. the or drawn out time, We are with the A-20 us how trainers money bombers going. in the in them; that act. was you what airplanes place told of transports which 2 got of uo 'Look, was put kind at many NO one Arnold Some in and really which to way what -23 SO these all was ect going said: who of he wanted proj why schedule schedule Trainers the Chidlaw making output there just were tell the for The boy Ne

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money the B-23 get with all Douglas at ange could that on with the ou We had best It the bust? follow was ರ 1t B-18 We time the available that Wasn For ·M: ö that

same

struggle? intereste more are We get that The War Department was could trouble with Louis Johnson. of anything you because remembe B-17s Do you .won. than the some 130s money You mentioned about the late rather less B-18s for in buying airplanes talking ö

out of drew basis We lost it on the competition. performance and Douglas and lower had We that. price competition, remember higher later deliveries, of the nob rules ·M the

overbidding And by engine bomber? We bought 50 evaluated the 1t and cost of wanted and one delivery performance the people every a four of the B-18 possession Anyway was, what performance of the most in our follow-on underbidding Doug las and This put basis of service. huh? and two-engine for bought it, the 2 and had them in responsible uo Douglas lost No were evaluation team the The B-23. that was airplanes price them guy ö ·M: the t he of an ...

that There were that said, Arnold OL rememb E and who implied reminded you Doug las g you between contracts example something, married? relationship for production you Drew Pearson were ask Bruce uo family to breaks wanted and reports by of the Barbara got because Doug las ö some when

I know Pearson but that connection, something remember at always hammering away don't н ·M

Pearson? see to talking about Knudsen going You are ö against anothe to Pearson over never went Was out by and he there attack that came and it, got, about н that real upset remember one story Was got the Yes, there Knudsen is far This As Knudsen Pearson :M attack. never had Douglas this He about attacking Arnold. you ask to wanted always н Pearson was And word for Arnold. You know ö a good

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breaks in special evaluation any got Do you feel that Douglas this mentioned You production? thing.

contract bomber the lost they right, That 3

Q: On the B-23?

buying We 1t shaken of wanted instead had people So airplane our Kindelberger medium bomber. of the which is what most about from đ We knew And it would have been B-25 the the B-23, bought 50 of them bought uo B-23 ·M: d own. had the

1t where performance case There's and time erican and dollars North to of out matter They strictly ö was

of our ability because They who had been as I know Lyons. Field Al far and As Wright Echols things. was loaded down to the best at by there dn judged these headed boys of time, We handful long the rules how every manufacturer We had business laid out . M the Ę

the To and B-24? the XB-40 the and of the B-17 idea the uo with armor dn put came to who one was the Wolfe escorts Gen This as them ö XB-41? use

out

capacity

our

to get

we had

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Field Branch there at Wright the Bomber out of came That ä

Q: Was that Lyons?

Of course, correctly remember н ίf was Harmon, it No, . M

Lyons about thing tting that in role **Echols** đ had and Lyons Harmon where above lewhere dn SOI tting :0 Lyons

a bust

Was

That

supposed to have B-17 time the that uo about turret was but it correctly, chin the and the side guns, out, remember turrets the because the belly turret, get to a gunship. began Well :3 been when and

off going and then down could vere heavily loaded they back bombers load stay too well the their had to SO right when work it was dropped It 44 didn' couldn't all me bombers 1 to was seems it the a liability But just slow speed once It but home target, 80 became e had and

lot c tried We tried. things we of those really busts one just were It was that things iM of

I'B in late -and back all this harking backunt11 harking casualties one know have some -you didn suffered MOU Of course, We Shaughnessy had scort time (Re XB-40 bust) range guy that this long bγ like and of lack sounding war, ö the t he

of and 24s part early ranges that the 17s the In dn u se equirement those uo-fightersreal. ou was escort able to get There for war ·M were the

foresight? of matter c it was to blame; anybody Is ö

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did believe the Tactical the fighter certain types when get long that daylight of each other would the thing Then the Was development need never making then said in 1 ever fighters -with uodn way strategy then was old days philosophy of ou We would more the the and with the bombers interdependent The British said daylight possibility along. the of phenomenal adding that we the with history the all in in that it because bomb concept the it Because and the take the to was at and get precision range It away practical SO. ou would ranges target then was You was hammering more think per formance We there answer, long adding power. the air. policy don from But these kept bombing the good fire kept is the better of formations out out. the of to you And daylight bombing escorts control came getting turned School with B-17 It. Įt.

College You know, you only have to go carrier Staff place of the General and the take the Command to upset the whole thing. the airplane was to find out that said the role of 1937 that back to ranges, pigeon

forces the ground to auxiliary Or as strictly ö

00 close the War Department and artillery the written up in where offshore ŝ That' auxiliary roles and missions, in 1937 reach. Strictly couldn' defenses : M

Goddard? named George a guy with contact any Did you have ö

W: Oh yes, sure.

Q: Tell me about George Goddard.

guys. at Wright Field type of in the pest eccentric Biggest there capable, of my office drive. real and these imagination out throw him of one wonderful 0 he used to time after time Well, н Beautiful :M world.

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Q: He's carrying pictures all the time.

W: And getting something done.

Q: You know

W: Have you read his book?

tell you something (off-tape) me Let have. ö

Goddard? because out to see Minton Kaye in Pasadena last You know and list Kaye Arnold's and Arnold. between Minton uo got you about Goddard Goddard friction book, this Was the ask H Do you remember And read to want as you of Minton Kaye Goddard ö week.

: Yes, professional jealousy.

Q: What is your evaluation of that struggle?

much worldmaybe much about photography or has contributed country chis Ín anybody is there I don't think 88 knows that ·M: wide,

statemen Jena took over the that get t over. Did he ever tell you about when he two years 1t took there and me Took in Europe? over walked **Optical Company** He.just as George. out.

Q: After the war? -

and over and took over requisitioning, going in dn it cover walked to years He he of folded up. a couple guy That war dn Took as the Company Just things Optical W: taking Jena

Force? George people. Air glass getting name of the outstanding optical Russians in the the away Instead of the it were took they mean over. because you took it op What Yes he just ·M ö 1t and got

Q: Then he did a good thing?

W: Sure, without any authority

Q: He got you into trouble on this?

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W: I had to clean the thing up, later on.

Q: I'm going to see him next week.

photographs the islands and so forth to the South and take the water down out there. went the depth of We of When maps 80 to good group show regards any and photographic best have islands didn't my him little George got his Give they of those ·M: Pacific

eye, to ey didn't see and Minton Kay Arnold to close he reason, Minton Kaye was very some For ö and

W: For a while

Do you position. that in then Minton Kaye lost out, that? anything about And ö

the day that I heard Arnold tell there be to happened ·M: know

somebody to fire Minton and send him far away

Q: So he fired him, do you know why?

Goddard,

raise hell with

ž there that? time why? next op we alway the don't And George why And George pest. this? damn "Okay cd op such Arnold used to was don ould he Why Because he time Arnold the ·M: ö after half

And

real

Was

George

George!"

here,

of

out

hell

the

"Get

would say:

months just know him several of 10,000 bulldozers н do. than I better tenacity him You know He had the ö pest.

credit. due got never He guy great ಥ He . ·M:

working his book mad? wasn't good As you other get dn -Arnold simply didn't out of turned of Why did Arnold But -and strip camera which did a heck couple get later book-Force н is what this and he and Air the vett value. to -bib the developing Washington This according Lo for to its think work due talent. ecognize strip But Ín out of was least genius it back Arnold who recognized his this obnoxious then sent at I don't know didn and U recognize Goddard know, Goddard was carefully Arnold that Navy I know he and the : M people, ö it very for job

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recognized Goddard? finally Who W: Mrs.

"Colonel due partly strip man conflict. the and used his 1962 calls obstruction in They he Cuba and Arnold had read the book, in people. German missiles Minton Kaye the other he exposed Russian that some just and that They the Lovett expose and other Normandy. ö used to this Nemesis genius. at to

Arnold but right there, do with it away sent him far lot to cţ and have got off Kaye, might That W: finally

thes In the ideas But boy, once that he give the day you listen to money, with to the laboratory. Set next t coming up couldn't for The wanted need If wonderful bothered We ou George always he anybody. Was everything money and ŝ where there down WAS that Goddard would irritate idea: much hot He back all have = ran George another go week get in Europe, that George "George didn would "Fine, last with' uo We in he days he got over there say: me Say photographic lab back sold wild Well. you and those be went t hing you he would meantime :M Goddard things. just and

great things but 5 him When wanted something else you some direction, that Goddard did and did this way that in away going impression going turned him was had you Goddard the and you got sometimes if way back, this ö came 80

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- way that unrecons tructed are things conceive of sort who was he people but or genius, inventors All He : M ö
- W: It's hard to explain.
- with Elliott Roosevelt? contact any have you Did ö

0 there you have "That' come out one character "KB, said: he sending you more people out said: And I Well what and m' I " to get officers." Roosevelt. Boy, one day said: at Hap Arnold Roosevelt more dn Elliott He me some them?" called Was Elliott fussing about get ţ he So me do I Hell Captain pressing Field when = tomorrow. 1s i.M right, Wright been this

Q: Did he give you a lot of trouble?

call And God knows 11,11 that, about poppa WOLLY Always "Don't you that done." say: get He'd 111 God and ho poppa ·M Sin d'n

god He 5 the pike a lot just 11ke real from Elliott. was I. think ever along sons her would two came treated directly the troubles. And she had you ever gals character that came sweetest ass all with Franklin gal from Texas damn conceited telling his poppa the that anything one of way most had the the the op we remarried meet (Scoggins), But troubles ÷ was couldn' He whether he nice boys. just the and he awful. had of

for Faye Emerson left her He ö

Elliott? of rid How did you get ö

his book last week Europe read н to Newfoundland, maneuvering. went of No, he A lot ö 'As

ft.

Saw

He

to

there

from

went

He

. M

a pilot and had some said: an officer's club. Have you the but this Captain against the bar night into And he that story one cold-cocked him right there came there. and bar Roosevelt? He can't prove over the 38 and Elliott was learning up mouth, was under Elliott dn in outfit captain fixed his coming Elliott off н reconnaissance in London was This young pilot in the world. shooting BG squadron "Are you he young Pow, bragging, đ way đ đ old Rothschild home in what?" called him everything dn said: about there, this real rough missions going around headed story story goes officer's club SO usual over am, heard the as was valked tight "Yes, The The

airpower? his attribute, OL to the Air Corps, greatest Arnold's or consider war to the you contribution would What greatest ö

great going was c WAS Was he what this he think but H him, saying see could like by people didn't off He start And he had inspiration. to have of lot P Well, great leader leader.

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of of thinking magnitude was the only one who could see the else Nobody had to have--to my knowledge. thinking of was was he that he mean numbers what we these to be

did little with putting that figure in OL shocked <u>i</u>n Roosevelt's talking which number were this they the was was up to this time figure, anything to do speech? This plane number? in his 50.000 because he have OL this that Roosevelt's head suggest Did people In numbers. lot of Arnold

that I think saying--that the airpower boys thought that big those was Arnold. original of rest a word I'm the spokesman for them that and all the were people martial can't prove support Mitchell the court I think Tony Frank, were the the group And -and after who that sure way Siberia gang, I'm that And Hal George, original went to :M thought people.

Q: Did Tony Frank go to Siberia, too?

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story? You know that Kenney went to Siberia. -uop sure. Yes No. .M ö

Arnold observation one. He didn't tell you that Georgia of squadron Camp Benning, Tony Frank. half one Was George. assignment; He had which in Siberia. Kansas. disappointed his was to Riley, That sent went to Ft. airplanes ·M George

Billy Mitchell Siberia? to sent Washington during the be to caused him assigned to that Frank do Tony Frank did Tony What Was ö trial?

W: He supported Mitchell.

Q: Then he was in Washington.

of But lot don't know. and supported him, н was. he George Kenney I imagine t know, supported him; supported him don the juniors George W: Hal

Was He too? out, sent get did he junior, đ was Brereton too there ö Į,

sent the job MacArthur was by him chap guy Intry George Kenney for gave AF this the top Staff they met t rewrote So of shifted out Chief there there guy George smart Was down Sutherland So he got đ sent is while them base George And of infantry Brett Sutherland all Benning. gung Australia. Yes an achine Camp of ·M: this name 5 Ľ uo

Q: This was around the time of Pearl Harbor?

stuck nd was in like said: doing of "George stati the one sent started building up Australia get with the know proponent uo of the Philippines were gal they And I knew there Was Benning she was there said: And maiden "Well George So he Brett when down flight. over Suth Camp when C, So down South got too And guy said: Tennessee. married MacArthur Brereton told MacArthur knew Jean This out timers there George dinner he?" airman uo Sutherland down MacArthur cam country out went here old he had George how for in Murfreesboro real He He We Mrs came and the out man Sc that Sutherland. that. known So course, too known cros of she there, said: air she He East Indies. and one after all Indies there had an aving 1926 thereafter rthur Of of Vas have tour George living out right by the through ÷ she rthur Sutherland his recommended all escaped Philippine and the can And WAS And got Short1y Faircloth, there at serving went 50 you H good ather Philippines with MacArthur. down MacArthur ĥ :M us any in the Kenney he was Flynn, visit "Look along Jean went Breti chap then the

with

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- Q: Did MacArthur understand airpower?
- W: No
- Q: But he trusted Kenney?

With coined going to by effect. talking these and the airman has got the message and we're little localizer the beginning tuff out Army Army sent reconnaissance airpower? not AIr find where there and they pooh-poohed the idea. And he's the one who you with that was the on, real good Was You're airpower the the were 00 in these top the that' can MOU fell areas MacArthur to 12 dropped there, They uo you "From was soul Words said supply That of stuff dependent "Okay đ in the day those air," and that got proponent was whatnot. said, maybe MacArthur George he single called and said: 4 And the time When Kenney George George ammunition said: course, WOLS line. beams before, you be all the 010 and he and the that. converted couldn't find they bomber So MacArthur finally feed radio So they picked a bad day, course, So Of pick few years door meeting barge Guinea. and through the islands by like could it can the dropped these be air you the problems seance food proving Of just tugboat, would đ advance forth, how in New by that out "Well called do it." developed a people, you down with it a big He turned it over he they it op you and his landing every will will time kicked He 0 uo said: of and had see you away selected had to Let and they SO air. day lot "We that bogged commandeered demonstrate just and it Kenney and hammering great George that move see ammunition by 1t to weather phrase: radio beams had amongst planes out had commanders Let op were parachute to to dn the ·M to people going of it. there kept they make now. 11'11 the big And had bad And way And I,

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was he word to say because shanghaied Mitchell of that vintage that had one good that martial of the court member Corps ed

they 10 Pearl between OL that uo 00 like MacArthur attack about this busihéss for the that? warning action after about any Brereton was anything anything take this about planes failed hear hear and MacArthur, ever the ever MacArthur disperse Did you you Did and to Brereton ö Harbor hours. ought

but sthand fir nothing know heard Eubank you Gene what about and story Just same ... the

Q: He's in Mississippi.

W: Yes, he's down in Gulfport.

he? 4 didn' Arnold, contact with some had he seeing, worth Is ö

the Philippines about story the you give can and Yes ·M

1 Didn Tactics Applied for School this SAT. at down He ö

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he head that up, down in Orlando, during the war?

W: I don't remember

there 12 see his name н Arnold, contact with some had But he bit. ö quite

W: He's quite a guy.

Q: You say Lovett and Arnold worked very close?

00 Lovett the against that Bob department felt always the have of side н and off the civilian team perfect fending side ho military was :M job

Q: Maybe fending off Roosevelt, too?

op the Ordnance Corps Signal said, and the ίf there it, i'n qo stepped will he why, when this like op will Yes ÷ can ·M Corps this

was That like this C-76. planes, some Were there it? Sn ö bust,

did and We anes airpl too bust, wooden were build that to there some others program planes were wooden had There We some frantic build

with those problem trouble production They had some that into gliders. get you Did about the didn't they? How ö too, every of top uo lay to had just too, that had Yes else :3 thing

Richard Dupont? ö

were could possibly had just out Was the eke and this country could that theirs gliders have whatever capacity of building to 80 had were So The Army industrial British everybody Russians the overloaded. the whole we had and and The theirs some, would eke out Yes. absolutely of to have getting ż think

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and Harry Burns with planes? get into any hassles with Jimmy Russians Hopkins about supplying the Did you ö

No ·M: level? your above That ö

out and get it stuff built the Be M ·M

you? Did ö all With irritated and crotchety blame and couldn upset all ·M:

44

you probl the

had

profanity? did he use mad got Whe ö

really Not little. much, Not ·M:

voice? his Raise ö

But screaming and shrieking. Raise his voice, but never mad he tell could : M you

mean Ļ But it didn' face. smile on his perennial ¢ He had was happy? ö he

W: No, I don't think he ever was happy.

that the him uo dn Saw and put his feet You never afternoon?" office relax this sit in his 0 ever "Let he say: Did and ö desk way?

Europe Between running over his In giving there and over Roosevelt) Spaatz to do it. for ė battle just didn't have the time Franklin the to fighting reporting British and and crowd hell He to Congress the :M against OWD

keep against the Navy? The to Pacific? was the buildup in Europe trying Arnold was the fighting the battle for Spaatz of out and stuff in the Pacific BOLERO keeping the and this BOLERO. into that, out about B-24s How get wanted down you them Navy Did

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the Navy with problems them our with had production-wise We about that. problems, forgotten my P,I had ·M: an me н

Q: What kind of problems did you have?

W: Getting priorities and so forth

of lot ships, their of lot ದ 1n priority? to crank Ala Did the Navy try the into things ö lesser

out move and could dn that wake We expediters and Hap, σ They between Lovett tough could Navy real the some I said, than had industry faster as Then But of the automotive doggone much it. Yes would have in. so

Q: Was Orville Cook involved?

W: Yes, he was working for me

him? of qut anything get did you you did, ho ·M:

He approach production the basically things, couple of A ö

have

no

of

critic

Arnold for regard high the have doesn't

Arnold? his What snt? in

organized Cook of that. uo He xplanati haphazard of SOL 81 can Arnold course Of ·M: ö

not

them a Deputy put He would as thing and he . Deputy ecisions the ramrod it through 44 wasn the he making and type himself 0 WAS and took decision When when ethodical he did real well Then make wouldn't through very đ

from you? take over he did When ö

but Wright He was chances engineer the there a brilliant guy take good out wouldn't world He he was engineers in the He Laboratory. way But in others would in 1943. **Propellor** fellow top propeller left colorless the the ran When of He of the some of ·M: Field. kind that one

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this impression got of sort ö

Tha good out. awfully them carry an made would he and to yourself and the decisions man them good making make than P,I he But easier man 2 a lot No

have had a better organization? to have staff He had just didn't the had going. in them He for he bust. wait anything 0 ÷ should probably couldn' uo Arnold ments and he was COU *Arnold 21 th coordinated decisions administrator many Did to get t00 time make As

near done hecause gotten to have that wouldn't say to fellow he around. wrong the organization maybe big Well had W: he had

of a job to do and you were was not had over production got into the the Like So It gung production supported you. do it, machine guns н there one day and told you just take when he told you to of others. machine mass uo Because he would give you and Lovett Corps to caliber gun a number Ordnance reduced the 50 he and well But of the production thing, damn the orthodox thing to do. with never machine guns You knew told you on the IFF hassle had done. the Corps in of over what he got caliber called supported. same kind Ordnance Was .50 to

*

How about bombs. Wasn't there trouble with bomb shortage? sure Yes, ö W:

Q: Knerr was complaining about bombs being short?

since You can -to this Corps fought the Ordnance Ordnance Corps am tell you what an SOB I the н regard for alive--because who will high c; officers if they're still of time had I never find Ordnance the beginning ... day,

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and claimed bombs great Knerr was in charge of logistics in the European theater, failure to 500# they were dropping them in such He requirement of that. any shortage Was this about anticipate the dire hassle the right ordnance. đ big was there possibly was course, There the war, couldn't Of have that? last year of foresee the need? 44 that you remember didn' they ö in the you number that o

If you remember the hand, who in the first priority of every on rubber And part of down give the Ordnance Corps credit. the other of Patton's. cut were he had uo we But operation to cross Europe, gasoline down too. that uo down cut mount You have to when Patton started cut was to were **Ordnance Corps** forth, We . М thing. and

really using? Germany uo the Germany losses of into Kassel, through were the we went went guess that н н when consumption could that Morgenthau assignment that I had, was Who there far. foresee the thing that only Nobody could guess could The Air Force bombers?

Q: What was that assignment?

And that they had this great troops except would of So of would got We'd B-17 there don' always staff that charge and he behind the Germany building the number fighters = staff day chance; day place. sophy production was 11 The head one of day the same there ediate phil "Our the the put around the terms Kassel take headquarters and into about down, and over The 1 mm and interviewed said: ÷ surrender into went Don' and his industry companies staff all committee talking knocked umber next He got bombers everything. So engineering their The = Arnold aircraft St. and we heartbreaker three bo 80 hoc group. place had many down B-29 We the the got them. with ad there put Kassel of how German knock with write good English. the which the the with started dn in We plenty matter đ uncovering through building and why ured around to really of really there have centers today No in had That We qo over factories coming into tower was Just verv Force They through. were there the "Well they "It the sent short. spoke three flak somebody and they ·M of go out Echols aid: I was these there come say: run who big and the vas ŝ it

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was he Arnold war, this war. played the of happen it like McNamara day to last things the uo these bullet play allow Arnold didn't last to the afford use going to ö couldn'

was "Are There about: way argument that Was any 1t was never program through his There ordered the stuff All of ·M: plenty

You build all you build 75." or this month, to build 50 we going can.

Did they just and just H Cabel1 men were idea me. Did they? guy Pearre told they hun the are hired Norstad and guys out of operations. job Harbor Council noX cd what had Pearl They said: "Advisory This after He portfolio. think and stay think men. right in your hair? idea to 20 withou Arnold, have time be Norstad to to get you supposed ö Ļ Larry ever d on mini want

operations of out stayed They Never No. ·M:

end and the to him who he would push them toward came Smart Deane close Fred Jake had then and Arnold if he liked them no and people that in later stad came and Nor 0'Donnell These idea think Of of the war. then Rosie ö told to

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light Arnold cd selected 1t NAS Lockheed Hudson's, with and the he outfit, been outfit people that of part 7 He the an Early of run British Dawson these command couldn't down. Joe the in 1n great confidence over fell just Dawson Arnold them took Joe Joe of close debacle disappointment put lot when ಹ He had Arnold đ unfortunately his nothing but years them bombers -M: great many of

staff? Arnold's into fit did he Where ö

liking of the bomb took one he And in War AF brother the the ţ, before the old timers my like Arnold just with groups of been one had homb Was He he squadrons him, W: 20

Dunn? about Ray How ö

of kind WAS He of him of Arnold's. became ever protege don't know what another Was Ray Yes aide ·M:

super

Vas where -he trouble-0 that think he got in I think Sicily, н operation over He's in Washington. airborne trouble in this ö In got

W: He was another disappointment to Arnold.

Q: How about some others like Sue Clagett?

W: Oh yes, I knew him.

Q: He got in trouble, too.

WAS He came through. time one never at setup and tunities Selfridge Field oppor many that command of Sue .M In

when and b1amed twice in China toe he demoted his And stubbed Commission Was too. and he there then Magruder twice, toe and general stubbed his the Field with made March he at Then and and Arnold started Was down Arnold for it succeeded ö the was He

W: His problem was the bottle.

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He to0. taken down, Was him? He remember Shepler Fitzgerald? you B East. about in the Middle How ö Was

that any the West Coast there timers than Is positions old the Coast the uo were better Arnold East Those the -got with uo dn him others Andrews came emb the who with judgment? of Guys dn some sure cam dn that Yes coming who Sp fellows merit Eaker were

Hap for this contemporari say 11,1 before -his timers that about old those I hadn't thought of one them every of one he gave Every

down took them he It, didn't make they ίf And Jakey Fickel ö

Brereton, Tony Frank ..

position high to got Frank Tony and Ē Brere Well ö

W: Yes, but they didn't last very long.

three made He airborne the of head was Brereton Well ö stars and AF from 9th around was shifted too he commands an good but Yes, some had ä Tony

2 Arnold wouldn't give command; combat wanted Tony ö him

you boog Ιf odd, made thei It 010 had through veryone with Fitzgerald Lodav Ü say that th th those reali didn't way And and same others Hap right give to ith of That' no t look back i'N timer toddo well

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- 91 da UNOGRE.

that and took production plan 문 building He said: dn So with him. nou and called that was the beginning of the business said President they that he over and when pla bring ened the went Rico happ to went and me So that Puerto come in here introduced So President. Power thing think in do. down And to next and the Wolfe," to me The you told me into the office ther So see Kenney want **Colonel** Yes. t0 tarted over which meantime going thing said: 'Here big in,

1938? November around This

did never H started when That' 1938. April or Job March to my back -3 8

after he took the job when within 60 days was say killed? This got Westove ö

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going When littl said: had 9 other Arnold to So going the there with Franklin. and that and what office this and told the in airplanes by nt. me come eside So he left through, 50,000 the with build get W: you tal t0

didn't He time? that at 50,000 airplanes later a year talk Did he 50,000 till ö the

interested in getting the production he was right, That's capability going ·M:

plane "10,000 talking were they time that At ö

see 20 sent with President along the So CUS forgotten ornery He ·M. Johnson

of War? Secretary Assistant the Johnson, Louis ö

this know an building I don It, Įn for started Why Arnold picked me got we we So that was how Yes. i.M

production capacity

South Pacific, who Echols wound up Gen the н 80 5 to sistant Washington, sent then Was ā, <u>in</u> to thing Kenney Washington Division Materiel me Production into tell 라 did taken dn never ading the was of Powers head Vas

WAr the after until 80 didn' Kenney That ö

canking have desk meetings in Washington that and the might how Rico to You tied nnev 00 5 that' Puerto several get enroute Arnold So there in 50 I had down about find band were stayed and +111 ÷ Ne 50 the wasn trying Kenney beat earlier He Honolulu. 50 Doug 1 uo said maneuvering but the the hit right and as from into stor) And the day the Nips duty get So that uo Washington happened 80 officer gotten vanted job,

Bakersfield. knew nobody ar ne and out expedition quail hunting hunting were they uo out that were know they Well, Yes, they in ö where

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Q: He didn't tell you?

W: No. He didn't tell any of his staff.

during the off these B-17s Harbor Pearl kiss to into before flew night that the ones Ino the gone are had Hamilton ö attack

finally Anyway So th flight then him he Ted Landon led that located fly where 20 find out began They sparks Patrol to best that and the Highway one our In trying barging s the that' from cam call Yes he and And boy, -M got Kenney we

H day, next the till an show didn Arnold Well ö

W: Yes, second day after, I think

C-47 think he had н fly, He had to country after? day second The ö

and they had to fly across count

aid: and Production the eboy he found house Anyway, ye the Mexican patrol radio of Beebe was with him. industry beginning the -this the highway uo the Harbor heard it the dn when build WAS Pearl H Gene that was, to about that. think So and the program that him about them about told and knew tell Yes, story Doug las н ÷ Division he didn' yes. amusing im 40" Don

under experience there WAS out He Was bad there Jan Howard, cd had out Arnold His former brother-in-law he that when told '30-31, Engineer Chidlaw In was Chief back You know, at Wright Field Conger Pratt ö

adverse do in his or Field had to Command, lot Arnold of Service heck Howard Alr bv have done of the ÷ and Arnold didn being sort Arnold had job Command, And ö Service

He

·M:

Was

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reaction to reason good For some for S Arnold' think thinks that that time but Wright Field about that, after Chidlaw uo negative jumping and Field always be to Wright of the seemed Wright Field to Most always reaction job. he

things there Control all dn Quality tried to be Colonel and had of Procurement Howard de Engine Howard head Chief Jan right opposed was was Was Strauss reason While he Ben I think the named Strauss were and and they i'M reason, all to

You think brilliant Arnold had to be Wright Field cause? that seemed good think who for 1 guy You don' reaction Was the kind of it people. psychological negative Field umped on Wright Was with Howard along Jan et Well of when he couldn't sort this that but

had been pick with this ice vanadium beginning because the chrom And rightly so, Hap, with just putting experience done. get things Was uo he based Production Division to Well. everybody ·M:

4

In

this 488 op he and to money plan đ or and appropriations program going a big Sei without any had to And he erybody years other cain with along for and the raising going that

.

representa at Douglas. building Corps Was What assignmen Segundo. your El 'about plant, talk **Douglas** to want the н time? at ö tive that

remembered those North 1t always called later We then We names 9 And AT -engine. the the adopted trainer single the never this airplane advanced building number an attack ted building airplanes by ground ·M: star days the

in 1939 A-20, prototype of the đ working on Douglas t he? ö Wasn

French the for them building Was French, the For

remember Chemidlin parking lot Paul of the name İn crashed the by renchman who Frenchman then The And name? ö his

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thing and Douglas when this Don lot, cracked up. the uo there that standing airplane were the In and I Curver ·M: spun in Carl

secret but it's like keeping to keep that secret window tried Macy they event in And ö some

American of the North parking lot the In right fell 1t Well W: plant

Q: Was it North American or Douglas?

no street the across Was which plant plant as American Doug1 from North Boulevard was It Imperial ·M

get French the permit 50 instructions given plane? You that ö In

W: That's right.

Washington of out came it think Well, ·M to you instructing telegram, you sent Arnold that Frenchmen recall the ö show

of any 5 show anything allies permission to get had to be Could i.M

called

ver

they

though

foreigner

the

in Washington, thing this for testimony? seat hot uo got Arnold then And ö фo

remember don' No, i.

the Congressional

remember

NON

å a thing going and Morgenthau had that he anything between them? Was problem The know ö you

going got when the was while Morgenthau Europe to with there experience over = only CO My hoc No ad that ·M: uo uo

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the at what of If he them told to look a hard place. Wolf he Were If instruct the Frenchman, trouble. sevelt and to rock Roo in him the with was to ordered between acces then he trouble had ve caught 89 in a classified airplane Morgenthau Wolfe was then Arnold truth that that dilemma? Frenchmen, tted ö admi this was the

duty in Washington Unless you were on days. those that Not in never got you

property Clark and been dn 50 Frenchman Champ Morgentha Committee yet Douglas not Bennett had the Affairs called plane authorize Senator still they Senate Military the it And right to testimony that Therefore, him Was the to took , dn the it Douglas had Corps him Morgenthau giving couple of others called Air really the They and therefore th by were accepted they and The

into the nusances of that distinction? thing that uo all at testify to called get never Did you was No, fly in it. ·M. would 1t it because of out you keep to wanted problem they guess to the add ö just

W: I wasn't aware of that at all.

sident couple very in Roosevelt' good "Hap" he letting were some that, him Monica the the President course he did of called said dutch" with This was anta ument Mission, consult you? allegedly Arnold and S at the doghouse Global incident ashioned and And And then of uŢ., the had ÷ Morgenthau got the didn' : wer book, President you. this of old Arnold you Arnold out like of an Arnold' started. ε him cours But because the guys course Morgenthau But offered and according to when Guam for And of knew war that. the and Led Irough this uo how later trouble until In This Frenchman th And places him President vears doghouse ö Ę called things, close have got the and of

This was anything. or interviewed Westover? called up, 5 Assistant never was Was No, Arnold :M when

probably that was House This White 1939 the January at conference after that after this mentioned before two No, or ö month

relieved H after job that Was House went back to White the never at The conference presentative rei ·M 88

later was 0 House White at the conference Then this ö

W: Must have been, timewise.

you mentioned 1940 50,000 planes on May 16, speech the with đ In that fn tie used tha Roosevelt Then ö because Hap 50 there was ordered back to the President talk when I to . won back 38 time ls second This the ·M and

~

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might there more that ask you one you 0 Frenchman me occur Let the Was telescope. Did let as to Frenchman violation events as because this these 5 about curi A11 No stion :0 ·M: anb be

authorized they CAUSE were be they else thing concerned every did and they İt, which In ride them, airplane buy to the going see were 20

Didn't it have aboard. equipment ssified cla had things? But couple of ö

nothing but instruments some and No, propeller and engine my knowledge ·M: to else

agents foreign allowing about law in the books material military ct There was classified ö view 2

of M Three 1n question uniform. Washington ou In officers from So authorization AF Captain French and the eople Major had because -Colonel The W: mind, them

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Orleans Rosenblatt New in So1 plant nam cđ guy opening Was about the French? business for some planes there this? Was in to build involved ö

W: Well, Sol was in the Washington office.

problem? this him with contact anv Did you have ö

Washington procurement In things Or and production writing papers with op heen to he had nothing have may No, knowledge : M No.

there around flit name hovered saw his He trades to do. wondered many jobs ust of of man couple and of thing, Sort him gave this HP Arnold of ö out and and

11 presen later being time; him that ember at rem him with Washington cont In any meetings never several No -M there

Arnold where War during the problems. some remember Can you ö

5 involved trying these were Di'd you get comes to my mind, they tanks a big problem. wing range? problem portable some give them Was One the This remember out to Wright Field. ţ tanks for the B-17s. put on the fighters Do you in that?

escort get ţ damnest trying their was AF When the oh yes. fighters W:

Q: Right, '43

Mean tanks and put indirectly which we this is when we came out with the P-51s. Ę the oxygen through " P-47, that deal, about she11 "Jug, been raising hell with him ¢ get out on old ъ the They' came uo airplane were. like mad Arnold they whole right, working uo damned explosive Kenney had guns the That's throw machine were could because ·M: time. the how it. ٠,٠

Q: On the "Jug?"

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"Frank, my brother with burst found 50 the anything fighting the 1n eight Was damned 30 to show Arnold how said: oxygen tanks up at arguing "Well Kenney fired one (Franklin Wolfe) So Say these and said: a P-47 there. had been against this Kenney was on. think gracefully brother, They with insisting and I Arnold nop standing by in the P-47. wants the No. brother to carried oxygen. brother turned the subject over to My brother had and he was set and about were had Kenney course off, We Division **M** that the British wasn't **M** and = where took are. Of So, Division, Kenney He that Armament tank uo bomb oxygen tanks over there see. test airplane SO đ tank-oxygen were Armament 1t 11ke you this sung range machine gun, in the changing of us off So he put On any these machine the group of the rest went about gas to of of explosive about it. got the the end H his problem caliber W: caliber charge Kenney have and and and far It.

absolutely caliber edge that true?" showed this Frank We of In of turned are Norden bombsight far end ve got this? **U** "Frank trailing the all rid and went with to .50 hell He 5 uo illustration, 20 how and the cooked had a directive getting Arnold Was ers? op more the c eople erved never the 18 officer showing you Was showed to 80, said: he off the said, and date little brother what in That "General happen Arnold But out had about else. Arnold calibers and the bombardment He 50 got kindergarten the Ordni coming others coming brother "Eight did you Dismissed. airplanes off Arnold got E everything "Frank, ahead responsible airplane?" to We . T... dance. and said: knowledge." few 50-He except falling access the shells 20 how 08 My said: Kenney to 10 said he and the as his said: might quite presentation the farther đ showed briefing had and and ones that "Well and he 30'8 Arnold song uo empty was was Kenney So all And that н standardizing He Siny Field plus this presentation Corps Corps top impact in much blank It little in best of of Corps P-47. said: got t 0 days well the **like** waterfall give Rockwell here? tanks there off. how "bood" Ordnance Ordnance some there you the blankety the đ Arnold little real those out the him and and falling sn dn and oxygen gue have said of En Ordnanc and the to show 80 gave coming brother drew -out in the in, the So The conference another those velocity the hell of 08 here will .30-caliber ever few saYn and to the staff calib overcome with brother brother Part to thing. the wings 30-caliber uyes out trying MG all M 30 all the out ust knowledge deal 50 said: In the this the Arnold' the Arnold of change the He kne change coming eight So my so my Chief there said: what were this you out the one had of 20 He of

Campbell was. a two-star Could that have been Campbell? Ordnance in charge of He was ö general was feuding with the Ordnance н because could have been, Well, the time : M all

Division of labor either You had trouble with them all the time? that, of control any relinquish wouldn' ö They

single turrets 10 we didn't have ou were buying had Bob Lovett and Hap, they took care of that one war, this we into The B-17' went We turret for any airplane. when well. No ·M And

Q: How did they do that?

brother airplanes playing But this is the way only way Arnold Frank called him on the phone and said what got the license right from the British that them took They ran so cockeyed fast that the rest of the Army didn't "You get over there and get the license M the had been over in called these "Well, who, s the So the two of said: Arnold a Bolton Pauls (?) the British have Symington for They said: That' Arnold turrets and that's what started us in the turret business. Louis. that: about it?" My brother Stu . won typical. he wanted to do, and Symington said "okay." some uo and do it right knew of Emerson Electric in St. did have somebody in industry and go brother .30 caliber, and they to got to England, and What цп so happened for the Bolton Pauls (?), op we' were good friends. going on. to 1s "Look going This was know of, was head over just what was you said: went ahold of are England. thing I W: worked. and golf. What know time. was. off, 1u

later document, anonymous a little This business ended up in ö on.

W: It did.

Q: Don't you remember, on the B-36?

11

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Q: Yes, about six years later.

the Air Force and battle between the Navy ರ was That ·M

docum Worth Cedric that subjects, big the of one Was This ö

ent?

W: I spent days in there in that investigation.

wheel. and sort he he balance everything that mpulsi mentioning of sort get out cd to figure as your tend serve and did he Arnold Lovett Arnold or Did off, Did about track? and go talking beforehand? the enthusiastic Arnold do, to ö keep get Lovett going of 5

couldn't In other words vouldn' Signal was When Arnold them. Corps, They together two of other Bob could with the each other. against were these Bob them them, experience like dn of buck complemented of two military rest the ny. scared the but and the who and recollection Hap with pair Corps agains done great th something Engine opinion bucking My đ Corps in my mind they get

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Q: They worked together?

"Here What -just bua day going Frie initiativeopinion: the they any IFF that. General Identification you're called in there sir than M have the in MOU "Well instruction don't took psychologist, said: "Beginning the always said: We got and furnishing н other were Arnold great War example. said: it? they any the and about for and never had of mean give you one responsible and Lovett middle He doing πολη you. turned you the said: uo Arnold I will are And Bob Lovett to get the IFF jump Corps He right hell 5 : M Signal in the or Foe loved Here we

got my н because that? sold time and had to Marshall they think went Don he think know you ö W:

happened

80

just

Ít.

And

office

their

İn

afternoon

that

instructions

noXII and really and Sil know what We gave phone said: goodbye there Washington with dn they IFF and Well the ahead that H out there "Are called -IFF good, uo the war. them "Well 99 about him the ef IFF out Arnold: here. War Corps "That's get had called the things? doing the for get him out said: before follow-up. can Signal he for Arnold: something 4M them. you "That there He later op 10 So the need. 2 to = building and Arnold show can you days uo of Air Corps aid: "What sir." something н op out guy drawings train five to typical Nyes **Philco** contracts 800n said: tha wanted think and the or that days wanted uo WOH the four said: got

five

four it.

within

So

word

all

have

said

for

them

buy

going it is

said:

here

out

somebody

get

he

that

reminded him

rememb

could

wish

happened

So

get

5

trying

of

couple

at Wright Field

me

see

to

In

heen

had

Philco

the head of

He Some

before.

weeks

these dn follow always Did ö

end of

the

was

That

-vanadium icepick then and do, to something chrome the you of exponent would give great He of him. was typical ho dn you was ·M: That call

done should have you something for you dun ever done? Did wasn' ö 1t and

him suit to done ever was nothing oh, ·M

more: something wanted he did. you ö

then he done?" that do. get to chore to "When are you going c you give would He and say: him. of d'n cal Typi call would

and

day

one

the phone

"Well

said:

ahead?"

going

cars In

baggage

special

a contract

him

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you get it done in six He'd come about six months." as long as it's going to be need you time this. the "Well, did all Always "Take You'd reply: weeks." back:

six days If you had said six weeks, he would have said ö

W: Right

Q: And he always followed up on these things?

W: Yes.

held Arnold was that he didn't too impatient these things. Was of and he coordination many criticisms leveled at all of these balls bouncing in the air, He did so the staff for staff. to the send things down to the One of anything ö give ·..

us caught up with and Navy never That's why the Army ·M:

Q: He just went ahead and did things?

W: Well, like that IFF I was telling you about.

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other drove some where Arnold there Were instances a short time? other consummation in any remember something to problems? ö

and And the which uo Echols sat there at the that done, when this big criticism came alway or So, start who airplane message escort. this recommending to Hap what he thought could be Echols was or the turrets. gave to op teletype enough money know who an an **t**0 38 building money used **Echols** đ He had a good foil in Oliver Echols. don't get got airplane, get could be about in 5 H we just would foil So, trying the lack of escorts in Europe talking the which a great he op out there, start Wright Field all these years, year to order--but Echols had been P-51, coming up with something he had One couldn't the knew and all the other. be who could do it, he Echols to but thing out engine, through :M turned first about

The project officer on fighters who was Mark Bradley, of North Atwood with Lee together fighter to get new œ with Captain or Major, dn come and call American đ phone then,

put British as War the in the didn't early engine P-51 another the have using they Was didn't there? It plane? Well, In Merlin altitude ö the

W: That was later on

Q: But the first P-51 wasn't too good, was it?

get Was He von Karman The the fighter "Drop and Echols outside 5 This of us back industry. C Echols them supposed couldn perfect engine people, time said: that of opinion use recommendations of over 1u which the airplane, the theory things rest Was and They -great and pilots else out service which and held the The top consensus horsepower It. saidrelate these turn anything Britain engine, all the make big in the P-40 was boys never correctly the them out cd never The of have the 1,700 had you In Allison excused them, Battle against can't what L, w111 they brought engine. us, Dunkirk , uop ember or until you get what happened, н of their 1,400 you heard of The P-40 had the So was the engine op We rem Now, any He diagnosed this Allison to of It. can't drop it. about So Echols decided fall than of Wright Field of the hot shots "Well, hp, out engine sent three the at better see 700 We been rated military horsepower of = You what said: had. time OL project had, 40 irplane and all British 1s the ż the called and he said: alway have that that they that This the at of

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Q: That was June 1940.

and The the project officer on fighters Toronto 5 there flew up DC-3 fellow Bradley, took the couple others, this So and Ι,

do they you ask people is: å Arnold. usually Hap General encounter with him? questions they first time the your first first of the One remember remember ö

happened served H when that I had never conference and that thing this is March 1938, these factories one day, First at situation in a way. times the phone me all knew three with the Pentagon, he 01 uo think AF representative out here two me unusual called don't him met at Eaker an old office had This is him. Ira know Hap Was the ·M ÷ under didn had the 2

Q: I see, that was the Munitions Building.

"Get in here without to said: I had been here a year you "Hap wants In to ordered out here he and tell 80 And and went we are going said earlier Kenney and station out here. man; little time Production Division, So uyes to Wright Field George 2 And he said: No. Now!" "Well, as I said: months when Ira called on the phone and said: was to be Wright Field. and in here. to be the AF representative in Santa Monica. a duty to take Staff College, said: going the old Munitions Building, there?" out "What's going on?" uo he to get 1s go back going got And come out at Pop Powers Division Colonel Robins that he has now run it "It's career and Hap. airplanes Command want you to them. see t0 man.; my said: Production to going finished the General And I said: trying all of any in н one And I you have No. went So three guys are Yes, "Take to be cţ 3. ".not aes organize had been delay." W: are No. going there "Don" said: 7 pue

Q: This is Warner Robins?

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have 1P

mentioned the time that they had gone out to Salina, and worked together In 1947 Arnold was going to write him a letter of support and living higher than his means, or that he was engaged in some private Did you have any feeling that Benny Meyers was then when the letter was typed up at Hamilton Field, somebody must This is Arnold didn't have any idea that Benny Meyers was He was trying to solicit Arnold's help and he Of course, he reached tipped Arnold off, because the letter never got sent out. to get the B-29s off and out into the CBI. pulling this stuff. the good old days. Arnold's file. activity Arnold.

So before the war when everybody else in the AF was in debt had known him before the war, was that he always had independent means One of the stories that we heard about him was that he had initially, Well, my impression of Benny Meyers, supported by people who first marriage was to a very wealthy woman who supplied him with the money. : M his

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was in debt So before the war when everybody else in the AF up to their ears at the banks, Benny always had the money MCGLLUIN **MIS IITSE MAIFLAGE WAS LU & VELY** the money.

- Q: Always drove a fancy car and lived well.
- W: Where it came from, I never knew.

Mrs. Arnold said that people just accepted the fact that Benny Meyers had money and was living well ä

Well, he started that, as far as I could find, when he was on duty originally in Hawaii : M

Everybody involved in production had Were you called upon to sign that letter that Stratemeyer when he was Chief of Air Staff? ö

to sign a letter stating his stocks and his assets

- W: That came along every week almost.
- Q: There was more than one letter?
- "You've got to about: They were always haranguing us W:

and accept industry You shouldn't the with Associating shouldn't do that. on. SO and you and 0 SO things from industry and about this accepting gifts careful

everybody ure dismissed when 1n that Meyers is alive and living this Arnold -but and had Was In that ers robin letter est ends course Mey inter he was playing both peopl that? and of denied this. an And his about had round listed he verbally anything that in 1947 Meyer state heard that letter Arnold heard stocks at the hearing Benny н Company, you particular he had told didn You know, hi sponsibility Electric course This Job. Francisco testified claimed that his of Aviation ment that from San Jas he

told ago. years and 5 came be chap has this cours Meyers golf of Benny the heard uo seen he had The General that This ne

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Q: Pop Powers told you this?

Washington working the OF 1u one office place stores 0 Benny lent Jersey departm in New worked of him Ohrbach In there and heard the was the of That Meyers one for the last comptroller boy Ohrbach W: That's

£Ε see thing talk write Ohrbach's and would this he 1F involved know get nop 11,11 to interesting lead. want with him. not might touch an E him 00 The That' put see can did ö H they If

Powers since about Meyers another word heard never I've ÷.M me told

took they and away medal. his took they and term ct served away He pension ö his

W: And his wife took his money away

around he was fooling around with Mrs. Bleriot LeMarre fooling and he was "dn set was this dummy president he wife course, LeMarre' Of ö LeMarre with

18 His wife, who divorced This America, somebody common knowledge. South or Brazilian, 5 went and but that was or off Argentinian around she took going s right, an the twins, married that That' and him rumor ·M: Benny bore the

for one Arnold and twins for those of one name he Didn't Marshall³ ö

W: I believe so.

a godfather to one and to Meyers devoted very was Arnold was Arnold that or You know, It was either the other. Marshall ö

lot though and people didn't gall of a hell the point. had did staff mean he tain he but other cer н firmed up, đ the to Washington. dn lot of this been đ say In that really things there vould the brass to do things never yes had fine it of good in the guess have н

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Arnold And soft spoken Lt. doer op and α out 88 get Echols yesterday that picture of Oliver it and Benny Meyers to qo Arnold to people racted đ liked given atti gentleman, he have was liked doers; could outhern ö this

digits Was understood this that Meyers a column of three into up to of guy. He run was that kind that. ever down and add up about anybody I'd doubt Meyers sharp ou than sit real right, character, better seen that guy was He that financial business brilliant like that Yes I've a real just time

Q: He was sharp but not quite ethical.

W: That's right; not at all

ember You attack you about Arnold. Arnold had had his heart å Gables things Coral general from Washington you just some 1945. attack? April 50 Arnold had a heart in ack ask Washington à, come Let me just to to ö had that came He

W: Yes, I remember hearing about that

÷ didn' end of period the Commander back at short Deputy came for be he Eaker and to in for Commander? quiet, Eaker And you worked brought Deputy kept They when he was remember that? They March 1945. ö you,

W: You're talking about '45? No

months between 4 OL 3 about for AAF, assigned to Hqs Day? You were ٢٨ and ö Day VE

the uo Japan into went н 5th AF 48 in the back with came out 145; In No occupation ·M:

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just about to get that? Arnold ţ August 1945 prior by owned into production India right AF in from you were joined the 5th back Where called We (P-80) the atomic bomb. I was you This is when first jet fighter I have here of time ö :M the the

biography assign Field for temporary Wright your have at They Was 1945 H April mporarily Washington i'u Field to there assigned left Wright In were You you But No. were. W: ö

a couple of months

time,

short

very

c

Washington

In

were

You

ö

Immediately In You August were and VJ Day. in 1 you in Wright Field? Okinawa paper. time uo between VE months in i assigned AF 5th 4 you paper the ust were say joined this period were AF to 5th then you you according was the join the maybe and and this that, to were AAF Hqs. went remember So you Washington, before you 1u as you don't ment 1945

Yes

W:

production Knudsen when with Knudsen of charge Pacific, In duty the was days of to out production went had many of before head and even the Corps Well brought Air the was of

along? get Arnold and How did ö

say would well Wonder fully 3 t he? sh 'us great production man WAS He ö

world's best The i.M though officer good very Not ö officer an þ 2 want ÷ d1dn He that. about bones fellow ou erful wond W: He

problems? some create this DId ö

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quite loading plants tonight the think -they th this with through the Was are sir d'n and about do you fly on he Corps stopped Inspect talked iYes alking stairs When Ordnanc about time "Vulf Air towers want to said: still Going to these and there place going anything big says plant wh He Navy you And back, walking up sidelight and old boy great First General He OQ" Ordnance ready. Army man know plant. there?" 'Vulf before the Navy DC-3 everything didn't production night before "Well a little the loading loved one out C-47 things was of н said called man, head Everybody you through the ammunition all plant. get and those the tell Corps So the always uo of I'11 Knudsen took ammunition loading be us So head around will Air else told t0 ou He the California. high. going the one anything with No een trip He to accent assigned assigned :M stories factori stairs first Ogden never with 5 an DL ve

P,I

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on the floor." and And and dove what 50 this doing?" was looked out the a long handled dustpan, "Yes." here said to me you painted white there that, that "Ye Gods, this , dn and when around н fallen fellow SO top said: So uo and to blow floor, "Vulf, stepped turned the chamber. H this have And he slides deal, going to out the window." said, immaculate might said: dn if you And Knudsen amusement park creamery mixing world "Blow up?" got and was and that it we chute handled brush, "Well around the the sweeping up this like So đ powder general looked like In the ";qu was had?" jump said: looked "What turned these stairs This down any this Ordnance blows just н 1t dn thing went were a long Knudsen general: the you great big thing 1t sweeping room .dn "What he was going round and all and there would blow "Vulf, the chap there with "What ran up of Ordnance 20 window said: climb Little bit comment he did. he said: I said: window, place And I "Well this this out you age

areas him grabbing people about Arnold beyond some Anything about stories any discussed. Do you remember example? haven for the halls, where we ö

9 He ran in here right "You heard office 1n told, you Was and there Was Arnold's want of Kuter pox but story said: in the hall; come H squawk eyewitness to, "Colonel, forgotten uo out the And he "You guys converged intercom on, the hell I've this meeting, Arnold walked out later said: sir. big an the place squawk box: blasted "But Well, something. he am not đ And had said: And he н He of harangue. hall "this that story out about day. colonel the uo everybody said. one dn another stops coming up The riled office Kuter Well, down all the Got had after got SO. something Arnold's colonel ·M And he away!" and really that 80

foreign the want all heard assignment him hitting "Norstad E-Ring ve H the but of and then saying: of kind around Chaplain, story some walk this in the to me dragooned Į'n told about afraid everybody Norstad you can go. t heard it being and grabbed people calling expertise rest of haven about be and н might the their ö stories buttons sou; they 5

started between he and Norstad argument whole The ·M:

Q: Was it Norstad or Kuter?

there was but Norstad tatisticians Kuter brains big the knowledge one To he because ·M:

Norstad mad Was he maybe Norstad; been have could Well ö

the buttons all ran down when he hit the buttons he people before of responded full 202 really office They The ·M: ö

got him H meeting. this for India from back called me too one that He ·M: uo mad

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Q: What about?

out plenty H that the you -they boys were excused called of were having are "What did could to guys getting some airplanes airplanes So he cable other guess to a11 said: like We engines. the about send these damn and the troubles that we were having, weren't bad would and off 08 asking taking these how Was popped me We want The basic problem looked at telling me them how lousy started Was "General was raising cain because I. So н said: little bit. and he He thing cain, said: told you. and tell this told him, raising for?" and of engine troubles. dn "What has have India started erybody dander н He And out, staff 1 In said: shouldn ·M: wings say?" there your back from got He

afternoon would the and report to Arnold the the once 1s this hell get This looked except one had been through all noX call friends to. He then about. amounted said top. got and personal time? talking h he up, night Arnold blew finally this crossed story all close of that and at this kind And that real Field ould get him what train Kenney you when I guys were Wright knew told Pennsylvania course they So this is asking thes have staff and Of were to may thing the out the morning. You Kenney started was way uo back awhile M1tche11

to get

pop.

next

mission and had one

one

launched

had already

We

rumors

these

on the eard

hell

way

in

and

- ö
- Kenney Yes ...
- war? the before been have must this Now ö

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old Munitions Building forget We you George Fairchild terrible. grabbed me by boat against George hell into it Boy "oh Arnold this as Now, said: said: got unmilitary Į, office this He George there with Eaker here dn helping before 00 boy pushed me the Here mad office into Eaker' and got 40" Was Anyway George In a l Harbor said: really and said: vpodon walked -thi Was guy He belt Pear. George and just and the who nervous hands the We Sin before Arnold sn In hell after and Fairchild with out of went đ hi trouble was of taking sounding off; hall In and bloi kind us both head thi rowing train big the walked down the in red was Yes walked in of desk pushed the Fairchild are back started ·M: uo his guys the and got and at Lt As by

What did Eaker do? ö

office the still in Ŧ remember can At the moment Fairchild ·M: 1t NO

He didn't of his presence? out pushing you with you? just to do he more Was any ö want

grabbed doors swing -so he deliberately of outtype started bar something like this, these already and act, -George had his was always doing of part me just grabbed 1s This He ·M: So Be

Q: Did you feel that he liked you?

only thing with me if he hadn't. The left. was that and dn put right and have op people could vouldn firing best do the was sure he yes was way 40 op the I could : M s That

Q: He fired a lot of people out of jobs?

wouldn't matter 80 other of us something we get on 88 2 good 4 broke do fault were yesterday, for and the Kenney "We don' stiff He'd listen time boy both н is the said: the sent the George, **N** then, this in, thought So the with go back, in there. you н "What the hell put said: So 1t went in, ourselves at see you." bad, along 1s guess place. way looked H this as who We this? and thing or come back "Nothing, the So shouldn't be so unmilitary said, news good the train Fairchild like wants to know, behave Arnold sitting there, General So on This = bad right. he relieved them all over facts, Arnold: acting damn the to don't "Well, Kenney, C, out. let's are in there. call the Old Man Eaker or the him the "Well you we thing Now think you for us." him was give uo telephone boys "Sir are said: get called go back this This if you didn't give all. you why good in; sent н cut н Τf at saluted. anyway. that we to him that way. So he "Yeah, to laughing; uo "Well be he get train again and But military you cr) and come let to right. yes We "Str with you guys, and I told George trying done Arnold: top, morning George said: better ho 11 a ramrod, his but vasn be said: got ·M: are George σ talk blew look you, next know the you' and day 18. we Ne it

30

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Q: Did George Kenney call him Hap?

W: Oh yes

Q: But you didn't call him "Hap?"

W: Oh no

called him Spaatz called him "Hap," George Kenney Who and ö = "Hap,

we of none But the other old timers did. that would do of some guys guess young н so-called :M

always called him "General;" Eaker didn't. Eaker know н "General ö

deliberately things, the He of tension his office) some at the looking back relieve of out to people that gone by, (push did have Jus things As years these well would do I think, .M

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10 man's uo jump would that Arnold kne he but them something interesting, uo pressure tremendous told Was people and put point I was breaking ö

W: That's right.

Q:and he never went beyond that point?

the Kenney one at me see, uo Non one be given to MacArthur pulled Australia. He that down to of t 2 me convinced get B-29s were supposed to cain ·M raising

for them asking -MacArthur was to supposed Not ö

thought the could changed Into Kenney H get SO factories Was So know Then it commitment. wanted to let out too. always and the part of the plan, made there off, (Beebe) to sneak they out come it was to Gene used to was with or wherever -he get this Hap dn to Well, fixed cain at Tehran, too I had it raising : M war,

afternoon orders go out to the Hap got just 2 And I had again, yesterday This to had been Tulsa never did at North all'these factories 80 me the 50 Then, and gave relieved H In chance and the guys Coast the A-20s. relieved said 50 d them order that other. wanted orders you dn the and get and called me to have 2 uo Washington the the "Str н building × at back he thi and out Douglas and phone Representatives-Colonels MOU and whatever crissake said: iss desk papers he well Now, Hap that here were the for would And Don And I MV But this uo Personnel replacement is for they started unpacking asking thought with they me Doug las and 40" nd where forth. off. them called he11 been and edule; okay dn Arnold: told because or holy bag Tulsa SO called and has trigger sch said AF think, Don that, my raising Kenney \$700 into and the behind fine unpacked H they what So Pacific. do this, than goes 3:00-4:00. ofi didn yesterday can. relieved, So got the war trigger suited nadder So Hap Ameri Gene just find the They War 2 So

night? a11 fly do, he did What unscheduled trips. these took Ptim Som He ö

- 3

wasn't he?

time,

that

at

him

for

flying

Peterson

ö

the know This effects Beebe China psychological Gene was and SO and transferred the for him just for things flying relieved those was Peterson he did a lot of Gene before .M was

the relinquish was this would because never love was his greatest airpower 1t strategic B-29 the of entality Well instrum ö

pressure

didn't report to anybody н there, out went H :M

kept

always

he

this

of

control

ou oh, ·M: any dealings with Chennault out there? have you Did ö

Oh yes in

the 58th? or the 73rd, for supplies getting Vas Trouble ö

11ke You see, get this to the didn't giving to and uo reported only trying of China In He be Stilwell to horn would to go. out uo Chennault, He told Chennault where tried work missions said supplies t He that he, times these AF SO OWD Chinese paper of orders mount **U**II a number of handling ust to the цп И plece supposed change running He tried So little t of Staff orders Stratemeyer me at all. had Chennault i'M airlift the Chief and ne

to him? report your make would you So ö

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for 80 would Stilwell Yes ż

when Are know relieved by LeMay You usiness? and then he was ā, -Hansell LeMay the BombCom, of aware the 21st of that? Are you got aware ö Hanse you

wasn own problems, had my н relieved. outfit was that he I knew about worrying ·M:

and that? India Why 1u about relieved. there talk was out he had been any there and was that Guam or knew at surprised just were they you No, Well Were China. ·M: ö to d'n

of sort news? bad Norstad the give using to was there -up to Arnold out that vent find you know Norstad took time to Did man? ö hatchet never

day

this

out-

popular very not was Norstad that. for Norstad used day he this Yes t C Isn't

8th the Several people have made some comments about from relief ever talk to you about his Did Eaker I know. nsfer? tra Norstad. ö or AF

wouldn't н Of course, been with Eaker many times. dn it i brought he I've and up, No, bring it ż

disappointed very Was he lunch at talking were We ö there out guy was No. Spaatz, pal because his Particularly ·M

W: Arnold gave Kepner the 8th Fighter Command

Q: Over Frank Hunter?

and all and always felt that there was bad blood between relieved because they had been very close firnds, ŝ mand Eaker Co Fighter there. out the given thing happens and and I and Kepner, brought this Yes. sudden 18 W: Kepner Eaker đ of

Q: You mean, Hunter was relieved?

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W: No, Eaker was relieved

Doolittle in brought they and relieved, Was Eaker ö

日 Kepner and Eaker about the two, MOU I'm talking guessing now No, ·M just

estimation friction between Kepner and Eaker? UMO my This that? of evidence some created ou had this have That You ö

them. one with both of anything about Eaker SO about Kepner, I've been and say anything never heard Kepner friends say close Eaker very or have verv way or the other, been н Since then, had wondered They

his any of Arnold shot from the hip on cause? without somebody Relieved Do you think that changes? personne1 ö

of there knew over that were say because they can't Now with Hunter, -no. -jo knew or, Eaker that problem of Cases "M the

H cases But the problems here. having my relieved people being was and in Europe, of, know

to Arnold number 850 -Kuter Eaker talked paper Eaker ther knockdown-dragout have flying finally, that waste to were eager over the end. noX only talked something said Eeker the And are spatches: that of н In 50 staff you beginning for beavers ssages it 0 close Arnold had ther dropped s Arnold di COM Was Arnold' were eager over who HON the of Ļ at there jus and kind and uo went was bitter tory were Edwards he fellows Eaker this this Arnold Eaker others Eaker and Is in the Claridges Hotel so that ending in, Idwal ting for Hunter these **Problem** of of these coming change case worked figured told 1943 was going to go In the Segregation stuff this your -some who Sep And he Arnold he made people early this ö Norstad basket plane just 1.209 him. Saw (re of in

W: Coleman, yes, he got fired out there.

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Q: Where, Selfridge?

W: Yes.

Q: He might have been the commanding officer.

W: He could have been the base commander.

fired thing WAS this He uo Mou files name forgotten his first of lot cd have remember I've Coleman can ö W:

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

of there

out

with him and shoot the say the would trips all took H pressure around with the boys know took, under people that we Was of he lot to sit trips times of these time thinking those didn't have of during some Well on course just 3 breeze He Of

He, Knudsen and I went to some of the factories.

factory? c OL plant 50 came he when op he What did ö

the and workmen the with fable af and plet vei He ·M

officers of the company.

area?

maintenance

the

to

right

factory;

the

to

right

Did

ö

he the just him. about with he and much man know production ÷ ti 'ubib E really the through Was Arnold and Knudsen walked with him. ust along No with followed ·M: was

Q: Did he ask some tough questions?

anyway

busi.ness

nanufacturing

was and would Knudsen who forth, everything 80 and was coming, ware it i him. tin Was with the Knudsen uo beating heard time start they When would ē and they at him man. No front yelling stop, the

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Field, for Some There course It aspirations In (ATSC) Wright Was filed? got Of t there the mand Benny at u that? Was this the that Com vere cam attention which 1 and why know Knerr committee you Servic Imors VOU Meyers This 1945 50 the investigate nny Did Technical any 1t Mever the to In gave hear Benny file quit job. came how you Benny They that about back Air is 44 it when Knudsen Did didn This and against uo th come him written en eye they letter sability to AF jus P later his And charges the 1 u had You know anonymous ib docum years and they You 14 made UO didn 2 committee anonymous job an trouble ö I guess retired letter Benny that they came Was

with started estigation? later inv years the whole 2 investigation triggered what the That' Well i. ö

Wolfes the never served WOLSE anything and he's The NON it brother Arnold? made levels Air Inspector it Sil didn' different with Arnold, course, they trip with And of and at was the fishing Arnold? were case, served suppressed the material. vou Jones c this relations with uo never 80 had And Junius ever they because you that Arnolds social Did No. Benny Meyers AF, Lt. him who the any :M the about with guy for had and

material on

Roosevelt and they upon this

and Elliott

Howard Hughes

Q: Has he passed away?

44 retired in becaus anything him, say He to Arnold referring cancer. Mrs. from been friends 65 have in died good may they real brother SO were heart, brother? M Arnold Yes, bad about my and ·M: ಧ with he

talking, may have been She No, she talked about General Wolfe. General? ö did

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W: No, he was a colonel, retired in 1944.

Q: Arnold and Westover, about his death

step the Let's go back a They feeling between the lunatics, people. air it than about people and the heavier Arnold were hard told that a lot of than one higher ranking air the always lighter than WAS There all

Q: And Westover was lighter than air?

including himself help all at Brooks Field did was order didn't there That wings, umop he instructor by got guys back to March Field to get their first thing lunatics them an of these and I was the percentage of chief. lot That's right hecame sent They Vestover ariou 1922-26. ·M: thes When fly,

called Washington waiting news he had business at fortunes meet him. field there both the moon, đ there he about into that in Westover had no more and and first him change to standing flying and crashed telephone in story took man to fly into the little there the right man Was Was to be the I heard was the over the That It That' than hold of That me rushed him. know for ö -M himself ö W: Was told them got But and MOU in, he

by

there that day

over

flying

going

Was

there

night

spending

Was

Westover

that

Field

March

ssage

I got

and

then the

there

representative out

the AF

Burbank

at

plant

the Lockheed

too. from

and Kepner been washed out,

before

washed out

Westover had been

as we

airport

the big

not

was

t

spin

him

Saw

н

and

him,

for

and

Arnold

for

asked

and

So

dead.

them

got a good pilot he and wings, 44 wasn' of pair he because ಥ wanted

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when 150s Andrews was in his Iceland Į, mountain Andrews.

Did you Did you know anything about Arnold and Andrews? them together? see ö ever

the of charge being In Andrews put Was about Andrews stories versa. these vice all or heard 0 of Hap No, first GHQ AF protege ·M:

'06 and Arnold was killed that job? When Westover was for He made a year ahead of Arnold. about Andrews being job? for the rivals anything Andrews was they Were you hear 107. ö did was

Arnold any heard anything have that 4 day didn' next wouldn't have the Coast. was It the uo н forth. going on, here SO out and anything was sitting the intrigue was made Chief ΞI to access about

for time lengthy ou was there thereafter, shortly Well, maneuvering ·M:

rumors you? by sioned urpris 000 that possibly Doe delay, drinker some Was Arnold there know th ashington You ö 1ª

W: It certainly would.

Q: You didn't see him drink?

1t there late Arnold and 0 drink an his socially with back and Hap' the been said: always brought he had said: smile plants That call and came course. Arnold He get have was than ÷ Knudsen Just In would the this Ford doesn We in that Ford of the airplane it would damned Ford get CC. would to go out come of rather around н = acquainted with him, Hap get. Motors aide, would "Sir Knudsen sergeant н Car. an going and can ribbing him quarters the General would bring We that aid: MV around position and Knudsen at and best out not of See the Knudsen about Sergeant day doesn't got CC) know drive to to his Field ;op and just "That hard went aides all him can roar was then about Bolling seeing your he drive it didn WAS The place, ದ and for н Arnold: that ದ the after sing best and never out story = that ears do know at of н car. trip, around the because and the when evening Ford One let of cute in say, many that alway tired c and ride old broken-down it finally he evening. one night from out, Where the you for in all on business. As you "Well there damned Arnolds get chauffeur two in Ford p looking Knudsen i.M would in the says: car, down with Why . say: got the or

you had miss about the B-29 and the near talking are We ö

home

drive

and

1t

take

you

Now

Chevrolet.

brand new

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confidence eggs up all B-32 ground Arnold had great all He had set Yet he had the put off got going production. never and everything. ÷ program getting washed out. wasn B-32 the So he the ďn course, training set position. had of because he the And, sort of fall-back facilities whole in one basket. obviously with the really these

W: I think we had about two of them

to They sent them down them. used Kenney Pacific of them. Southwest You had 15 theater, :0 Kenney'

there, Officer just before and out Project them flying out, of Assistant two a way there were He 1s who was This there. I knew Cook, out tt at that Frank look that. Jake Harmon brought didn't know I got to Okinawa. boy the letting surrender ·M: under when umop the

that fall-back eggs in and he had he put his it's kind of interesting, there make ÷ didn eggs case the B-29 his of all have So Arnold i'n ÷ just didn' position ö basket,

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W: The reason for that was because

Q: Was that his idea?

, because industry no wing-loaded 08 the it was probably Echols' We should "Well, heavy uo B-29, said: back out airplane, analyze the fall finally to I think who something far 5 **Echols** đ the industry t know. is have It it was 'nop better is against the B-29 sure no So we called I'm Thi with it, ·M thing. having

Q: Then you think it might have been Echols' idea?

Poor Echols wouldn't let faith in the his sight. greatest and he into the war, the let him out of confidence in him had Arnold tried to get wouldn't of lot sure us, He đ rest of He had Echols oh, world in like the him go.

got into never got they ct never In said He Onc he ourself in WWI. that tolerant experience like him with guys more hangup when was an he Arnold had đ consequently battle, was this 80 into You know, guy and and get let into combat fight, to would ö wanted the he

W: That's what happened to me.

00 Echols was given of given the picture н let Echols go. Was never н but he Echols Southernman of in, picture You got gentle, different of ö sort

W: He was.

than Echols Meyers faith in Benny more put Arnold That ö

young about who the talking greatest Was inspired Jan Howard said before Echols the and 18 was ason you -in-law wor 1d of done, he st the thought And job differen brother the In the and fellow engineer never got that his Harmon but he engineering **Echols** greatest sources Chidlaw think world around the the other in the like don was way from he engineers the other engineer thought Echols heard

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Q: Echols was a modest man, soft spoken.

W: Soft spoken, Southern gentleman.

of things? lot c uo to Meyers 08 did Arnold Why ö

financially only and Meyers the and guy act that, brilliant good anybody about B uo over very thought put roughshod đ could Was often Meyers business running about because, about financial can think hesitated Well the reason I He knew : M never

Q: Even Echols?

the damne rest the all -he But AF the away with that in' experience got only never His there. No. out i.M boys

Could it be that Arnold relied on Echols

engineering?

for

W: Absolutely.

ö

Q: And then for Meyers as an expediter?

He him Was right like busine get on the phone and call up these manufacturers and just eat a photographic on Meyers to give long as he run in to fight for or He was different because about Benny Meyers was somewhat it when you come mechanical expediting could stand up quote figures as made that what had say needed when he went anything the 1s He relied ÷ think, can car In Defense, McNamara. pip You fan on the he with that I he think sit around and listen to him. in many respects, later experience All say н Benny thought the out would really Arnold, see initially He found you of ou had Secretary he, like McNamara front, we their fannies out not Benny that Because, as a big make, No, engineering. it, support former McNamara t W: memory on the uo money. you'd umop the the put was

have to served a purpose that Arnold wanted and did things he way, out went đ In done Arnold more gone and one op the difference between Arnold and Benny, you why then you were to gave job why he He gave you didn't, done, you didn't get it and if you didn't run roughshod over people. it, to do You see, And if you expected chance.

Q: Did he give you two chances, general?

the moment of spur acted on the never he know, н as as I knew far As W: far as

you think the aircraft Don't Arnold's relations with a 'limb uo put himself out subject of really he On the manufacturers, ö

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without I think that get them, and He tried to War Production they? t c didn't vision? convert feet, kind of to dragged their commitment some took real this they have must industry Kenney aircraft rate ahead the terrific went convincing them that of at s ome had expand did, them to problems going of Some the were you : 1 we told that

Q: No, he didn'

died before And put B-17 many got the original ant guy who was tossup then drew busy SO rplanes and the dn how them thing Wright We get and Another brilli them never and figured He such Chidlaw of long al told wanted when. Lyons. called factory old B-18. rest cd at what and big he then still trainers the such and it Al decide other it. attacks down cđ paper the big and of down at instance Ve by bombers, transports. he sat the name how to follow-on of OL a guess have we the B-25 planes on butcher heart Field we had was fighters the jus to money you need For and have Crawford made going how many by We and in Wright Then and fighters So Echols War ÷ or the was drawn out We time trainers didn' A-20 are going. bombers the in that act. them: told us which was airplanes. to you with the place them transports, of In 2 got uo of put Look what kind many was No. some of man Arnold one Some which and really to B-23, way naking these all project going said: who wanted same why schedule the schedule Trainers ·M Ne were Chidla there were just outp tell for the The top boy he

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money get with the B-23 all Douglas ange could that on with the ou we had the best It bust? follow Was it B-18 We time the available that Wasn For ö W: that

struggle? interested are We that get Was could trouble with Louis Johnson. of Department anything you because remember War The B-17s Do you MOU than the some 130s money mentioned late rather less the B-18s for about You in buying airplanes talking ö

out of drew basis We the competition uo performance it lost and Douglas lower had We and that. price competition, emember higher later deliveries the nob of rules .M the

engine bomber?

four

c

what

was

This

huh?

lost

overbidding And by 50 evaluated the ít. cost We bought of wanted and and one was delivery ance people every B-18. possession perform the of the performance the of most our follow-on underbidding Doug las in and put s of service and basi two-engine for bought the it, 2 responsible and had them in uo No the team The B-23 Douglas was that evaluation was price airplanes them guy ö ·M the the of an

that There were that said. Arnold or rememb me who implied, and reminded you Douglas å you between example, contracts something, married? relationship for production you Pearson ask uo family Bruc Drew to breaks wanted and by of the Barbara reports got н Douglas because ö when some

know Pearson н but connection, something that remember at away always hammering don ·M

see Pearson? to going about Knudsen talking You are ö against another to over Pearson never went was by he there out and came and it, attack that got, about н that upset remember story one real got the there Knudsen ls This Yes, As Pearson. ·M Knudsen attack He never had this Douglas about attacking Arnold. you ask to wanted Pearson was always н And Arnold. know word for You ö good œ

In special breaks board evaluation any that Douglas got mentioned this Do you feel You production? thing.

W: That's right, they lost the bomber contract

Q: On the B-23?

buying We H shaken wanted. of instead had people airplane, So of our bomber. Kindelberger the which is what most medium about from We knew c been B-25 have the had bought 50 of them. B-23, would bought On the it And B-23. W: d own. the

t where and performance case There's and time, American. dollars, to North of out matter lost They strictly ö was

because They who had been know Lyons. ability as Field time, headed up by Echols and Al far our As of at Wright the best things. there these to loaded down boys we judged out. handful of capacity long Was out the rules how manufacturer c đ our had in the business we had to get We ·M laid every

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To the with the idea of the XB-40 and and the B-24? B-17 the uo This was the one to put armor who came up Wolfe. escorts Gen. as them ö XB-41? use

at Wright Field Branch there That came out of the Bomber ·M

Q: Was that Lyons?

course Of correctly .remember Harmon Was No. ·M about Lyons in that thing sitting Was a role and Echols where Lyons had Harmon above somewhere dn tting I saw Wa ö Lyons

That was a bust.

have on the B-17 5 that time supposed turret about Was it i correctly, chin but the and the side guns, turrets out, remember the because turret, get to began gunship and the belly Well We -3 when been

the off all right when the bombers were going to take t stay back and then it so heavily loaded down, could they load, didn't work too well the bombers dropped their It had to it was couldn't. me, so it to it was seems t a liability But speed. just once but home. It slow ö target, 08 became đ and had

lot 0 We tried tried. things we of those busts really one just were It was that things ï of

E In this harking back--and I' to until late harking back casualties one have know some -you didn't suffered all MOU We course guy Shaughnessy had escort Of time range bust) that long (Re XB-40 this and by ಡ like of lack war, sounding ö the t he

of 248 part and early 17s the the that In dn ranges set requirement those uofightersno real There was escort get to for able ·M: war were the

foresight? matter of it was to blame; anybody Is ö

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did believe Tactical the ever need fighter long when type that Se said daylight of and other thing would Then of making the certain development Was the firepower never each the then Į, fighters with uodn way old days, philosophy said no, We more would the the then and the possibility daylight interdependent the along. of adding phenomenal we strategy in the The British with history that the at it all in It, that because Because bomb concept the was to the bombers get precision and range take It away practical would ou SO ranges target. was the You more performance was think hammering then We with there answer, long adding the L, power was air. I don' policy and But from we kept these bombing the fire kept better bombing is the formations No, the out of to. turned out good vou daylight And getting escorts control came ä School with B-17 It. of 1t

Staff College only have to go carrier the take the place of and General you You know, to find out that the Command to upset the whole thing. said the role of the airplane was that 1937 back to ranges, pigeon

forces ground the to auxiliary strictly Or as ö

and close Department artillery War the where the in written up offshore That's auxiliary in 1937 reach. roles and missions, couldn't Strictly defenses W:

named George Goddard? guy ¢\$. contact with any Did you have ö

Goddard about Oh yes,

me

sure

·M

George Tell ö

type of guys at Wright Field Biggest pest in the eccentric there capable, I used to throw him out of my office drive. real and imagination these of one wonderful he after time Well Beautiful, ·M: world. time

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the time He's carrying pictures all ö

something done And getting W:

know, You ö read his book? you Have ·M Let me tell you something (off-tape). I sure have. ö

You know want to ask you about Goddard and Arnold. ö

Goddard? because Pasadena and on Arnold's list Kaye in between Minton to see Minton Kaye the book, Goddard got friction was out this H Do you remember And read as you of Minton Kaye. Goddard week.

jealousy professional Yes, struggle? evaluation of that you r What ö

much world 38 maybe contributed country, or has this there is anybody in much about photography think as I don't knows that wide,

ent Jena the over tha took ge over to tell you about when he years took it two and me Took there Europe? over ever walked In Did he Company just George He Optical out. as

war? the After ö

over In going and took it up equisitioning, over cover walked to years He of .dn couple folded guy That CC war an Took the Company a s Just things **Optical** ·M: taking Jena

Air

the

of

name

the

In

t

took

mean

you

op

What

Force? George people getting it, glass optical of the Russians outstanding away the Instead were they over because 1t took Yes ust ö ·M: he 1t and got

thing? good cđ Then he did ö

authority any without Sure ·M:

this? uo rouble you ö

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uo later , dn thing the clean :M

week next him ee going ö

photographs forth to the South take and water and islands down the there went of the out depth of When maps the 2 good regards group shor any and photographic have best didn' is1 him his litt] Give they George got those : M Pacific of

to ev see 11 didn Minton Kay Arnold to and close he was very reason S OT Minton Kaye For ö and

while For W: Do you in that position. Kaye lost out, And then Minton that? about anything ö know

heard Arnold tell н that aw far day send him the there and Minton happened fire 10 somebody ·M:

do you know why? fired him, he So ö

And real in there that? time why? George was op next alway We Goddard, And the 2 don' 285 George !!! why George HP And George pest. with of here this? "Okay, damn hell op out raise such say the hell L. to would don used Why "Get he ause Arnold time Arnold say: the ö :M would after half

months several him know credit just due got op than better guy You know him gre ö 3

bulldozers

10,000

of

tenacity

He had the

pest.

working book mad? 4 read you Wasn good other his get dn did--Arnold simply didn't this book--and I've cd of 1t turned of of Arnold But out strip camera heck couple later did Se which did a Force Why and is what he Air the and Lovett to value the developing Washington This according camera н for its to think work due talent. recognize strip ы in of But was to least out genius Arnold who recognized his back this was obnoxious sent then didn had came ŝ recognize Goddard' was and carefully Arnold ha Goddard Well that Navy he and the very ö people, know know, job. for 1t н

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W: I don't know.

Mrs. W: Who finally recognized Goddard?

great "Colonel partly due strip man conflict, his the and 1962 used calls obstruction in They he Cuba and Arnold had read the book, in people German missiles Minton Kaye the other he you Russian exposed that some just Lovett and that They the man and expos other at Normandy. It this ö to Nemesis genius. used to

Arnold but there, do with it right away sent him far a lot to and That might have got off Kaye, :M finally

these ideas But boy, once In the that for money, he couldn't give the day to up with go back down to the laboratory get you listen It. op coming everything he wanted. need Τf bothered wonderful We ou always "George Goddard would irritate anybody Was money and was he got over there in Europe, where there that much hot idea He all ran have George anothe week get that George "George, didn last "Fine, would We uo in he days me say: say photographic lab back Then sold went wild you Well in those and t hing you would meantime ·M: Goddard things. just and he

great things but wanted him to When something else Nou some direction, that Goddard did and did this way In going that away going impression turned him was had and you back, Goddard the you got sometimes if go this way, ö came

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way that unreconstructed are things conceive of sort people who a genius, but he was or All inventors He was .W.: ö

W: It's hard to explain.

with Elliott Roosevelt? contact any have you Did ö there you have "That' come out one character "KB, said: he sending you more people out And I said: Well what one day and m'1" at Hap Arnold to get officers." Roosevelt. Boy, said: Roosevelt me up Elliott more He about some get them?" called it was Elliott fussing so he Hell me when do I Captain pressing Wright Field, tomorrow. is ·M right, been this

Q: Did he give you a lot of trouble?

I'11 cal1 And God knows about that, poppa. Always worry "Don't you that done." He'd say: get poppa and we'll Oh God. ·M: No. dh

He god 5 pike a lot just real Elliott. the I. think was sons along ev from her would two treated directly troubles. she had you gal character that And came the ass all with Franklin ũ Texas SWe damn conceited poppa the gal from that anything his of -one way had telling the the op remarried But couldn't troubles (Scoggins) was was He nice boys. just whether and he the awful. meet had of

Q: He left her for Faye Emerson.

Q: How did you get rid of Elliott?

Europe to there from went He maneuvering. of A lot : M

read his book last week н to Newfoundland. went No, he Saw it. ö He As

and had some said: you officer's club but the Captain against the bar night Have into he story And this one there came pilot there that and elt? bar an right He æ over prove 88 the learning up mouth, was Elliott him dn outfit ÷ captain fixed can cocked his coming under off н reconnaissance was Was This young coldpilot in the world. shooting BG and Elliott in London squadron "Are you he young Pow. bragging, way home in everything dn there, what?" said: this missions around Rothschild headed and story club SO story goes usual was going called him rough officer's the as old valked tight heard real Yes The The Ľ

his airpow greatest attribute, 0L Corps, Air the Arnold's 5 or consider War the contribution to you would What greatest ö

great going Was WAR what this he think but him. see saying He could 11ke by didn't off start inspiration. people to have of lot had Р ¥ And he Well leader leader. great

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51

.

of of magnitude thinking was the only one who could see the Nobody else have--to my knowledge. thinking of was mean he was these numbers that he had to н We to be. what

did little figure in which shocked OL Roosevelt's, <u>in</u> talking with putting that number were this they was the was time figure, anything to do speech? This this plane up to number? hi in 50,000 because he have OL this In that s head suggest people Did Roosevelt' numbers. ö of Arnold lot

that I think -that the alrpower big, those boys that was Arnold sayingoriginal thought of rest word I'm the them that and all the were for people martial cd spokesman can't prove support Mitchell were the court Frank. the Siberia after the I think Tony group -and And who And that sure way gang, m'I that George, original to thought W: people. went Hal

Q: Did Tony Frank go to Siberia, too?

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You know that story? went to Siberia. Kenney I don't sure. Yes No, ·M ö

Arnold observation one. that Georgia. you of half squadron tell Benning, didn't Frank Camp Tony He one Was assignment; disappointed in George. He had which Siberia Kansas. was his to Riley That sent I'm was to Ft. airplanes ·M: George went

the Billy Mitchell Siberia? to sent during be caused him to Washington Tony Frank do that t C assigned Tony Frank did Was What ö trial?

W: He supported Mitchell.

Q: Then he was in Washington.

of But lot cd I don't know. and him, supported was. imagine he George Kenney н know supported him; supported him Just juniors George ä the Hal

He too? out, sent get did he junior, đ was Brereton too. there, ö in

sent book the jobfor MacArthur was by C. gave him chap guy infantry Kenney AF this the top George Staff they the rewrote So of out. Chief there there guy shifted George smart down Suther land So he them got ed sent while base. George And of an infantry Brett Sutherland all gung Benning Yes, Australia. machine was of to Camp ä this name uo Ľ1

Q: This was around the time of Pearl Harbor?

stationed stuck and like of doing one George sent started building up Australia get with the a proponent know uo the Philippines in the were sn't didn't in was gal And I knew And they Was there Was Benning when she was over there said: We н maiden Sutherland "Well George when So he Brett down flight. 1s Camp So down South He got too said: And guy JO. Tennessee he had Brereton' married MacArthur told MacArthur Jean out -This timers dinner George there airman he?" Sutherland uo down knew MacArthur came country went Is out old here. how for George real He oulw We He Murfreesbor known Mrs and the out CC. cam man that' So too. Cross Sutherland. that. So course, known of He's sn she said: there, she and one Indies, invited East Indies after there all had having 1926 thereafter MacArthur of Of get him. was have tour George living right escaped out through mended by the she Sutherland 20 all serving his Philippines and the you can and And And Was Faircloth, there Shortly at went down to eather, recom good It Philippines with MacArthur. out MacArthur Ϊf airpower . М us any Kenney Brett along "Look then. th visit Flynn went chap, Jean the Ľn he

with

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- Q: Did MacArthur understand airpower?
- W: No.
- Q: But he trusted Kenney?

With coined t0 talking these pue the message airman and those little localizer beginning tuff 납 going out reconnaissance Army airpower? not there find where pooh-poohed the idea. one who you with You're real good on, that was the airpower top 0 the the were that' can "and that was the stuff fell MacArthur "From now areas has got to these dropped there, They uo you And he's the That Words said supply of "Okay dependent the ¢ in day sent got proponent George was whatnot. maybe MacArthur he George in all the time. he called and And the said: and ammunition. WOLST George said: Kenney line radio beams course before, be feed you 010 and they and meeting and the like that. air, converted could they finally bomber course, When So they picked a bad day, So Of barge pick few years door Guinea. islands by it can the air. dropped these said, be you the So MacArthur problems seance food proving Of just would tugboat forth, how Ø in New by advance out that đ "Well = called people, down with do it it. a big just developed the ..over he it they and you his op landing every through will kicked He uo He turned it 0 .. of see you said selected away and had to had Let and they SO air. day We lot were bogged demons trate it. commandeered and and hammering great George that move Kenne see ammunition by it weather phrase: had radio beams amongst planes out people had commanders Let to do parachute t t to from the so, · M of it. there going kept they make the way bad 1111 And And And big Ι, had

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MOU

was he because shanghaied Mitchell say t word that vintage that had one good that martial court of the Corps of member

they 10 on Pearl between OL that 00 like rthur attack about this business action for Ma the that? arning after about any was Brereton take anything anything thi to about failed hear hear pl and MacArthur, ever and MacArthur Did you disper Did to Brereton ö Harbor hours. ought

but nothing firsthand know you heard Gene Eubank what and about story Just same -M: the

in Mississippi He ö Gulfport In down Yes ·M: he? contact with Arnold, didn't some had he eing, orth ö

about the Philippines story you the give can and he Yes ·M:

4 Didn Tactics Applied the war? for during School this down in Orlando, at SAT, down that He ö he

remember I don' ·M:

dn,

head

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there name see his н contact with Arnold, But he had some bit. ö quite

guy quite He i. close? very worked Arnold and Lovett You ö Bob Lovett the against that department felt always civilian side of the have and team, perfect off the Oh yes, fending side military was ·M: job

cn

t003 Roosevelt, off fending Maybe ö

op the Ordnance can Corps the Signal and said, τĘ there İt, in op stepped will he why when this, do it like will w Yes i.M Corps this

œ WAS That like this C-76. planes, some Were there wasn't it? ö bust,

pib and were We airplanes too. bust, wooden đ were build that ţ there some others a program planes were build some wooden We had There frantic. ï

with those problem? trouble productio some They had How about the gliders. Did ö

at

th

into

get

you

didn't they?

t00,

verv of top uo 1t lay to had just too that had thing else

Richard Dupont? ö

were could possibly had just Navy French could eke out, was the the and this country WP and gliders that theirs Som We whatever have getting capacity of to everybody building had were So The Army The whole industrial tish Russians the absolutely overloaded. the we had and and theirs some, would eke out chink of getting N: to have

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and Harry hassles with Jimmy Burns supplying the Russians with planes? get into any Did you about ö Hopkins

No. ·M: level? above your Was That ö get it out stuff built and the get ust My ï

you? at mad get ever rnold Did ö all With irritated and crotchety and all upset He ·M:

blame him couldn't you had proble the

did he use profanity? mad, got he When ö

really Not little. much, Not : M

voice? Raise his ö

But screaming and shrieking. but never mad voice, Raise his could tell he -M you

mean 44 didn' 1t But face. on his smile perennial He had was happy? ö

W: No, I don't think he ever was happy

him that the uo SAW an You .never put his and afternoon? office this his relax "Let say: Did and ö desk way?

Europe running over giving his 1u there and Between over Roosevelt) Spaatz do it for e to crowd hell and fighting the battle time to Franklin just didn't have the reporting British and He the to Congress against ·M umo

keep against the Navy? The to Pacific? Europe trying buildup in was the Spaatz Arnold of out the for and stuff was the battle Pacific BOLERO the keeping in the fighting down and this BOLERO. that. out about B-24s into How get wanted ä them Navy Did

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the Navy with problems them with our had production-wise We about that problems, forgotten my had P,I an I i'M I me

Q: What kind of problems did you have?

W: Getting priorities and so forth.

a lot of a lot of their ships, in priority? crank to AIA try into the Navy the lesser things Did ö

no move and 80 could dn that They'd wake We expediters and Hap Lovett tough could between real so doggone much faster than the Navy some said, I had ndustry as Then But automotive t Yes. would have i'M the of

Q: Was Orville Cook involved?

W: Yes, he was working for me

W: Oh you did, did you get anything out of him?

approach tion t basically things, couple of 4 ö

He

have tha Arnold regard high the have doesn't

W: He doesn't? What is his criticism of Arnold?

organized

ot

haphazard

of

SOL

was

Arnold

ö

a Deputy them Cook put He would as thing and that he explanation of same Deputy decisions the through my was Wash the and he an When I was making ramrod over, 5 give type himself and Then when he cook can decision course methodical he did real well make Of wouldn't chrough. : M a very

Q: When did he take over from you?

but Wright was chances engineer He at wouldn't take the there brilliant guy. good out đ He 1s world đ Was the He Propellor Laboratory in But he a way engineers colorless fellow in some of the others would in 1943 of the top propeller left the ran When He e kind of ·M Field. that one

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Q: I sort of got this impression.

That awfully good them out. would carry an made and he me to yourself and decisions man them boog making the make easier than But man. lot 2 No ø organization? staff He didn' the should have had a better going. for them in just He had bust. wait anything probably couldn uo Arnold comments was and *Arnold that coordinated decisions feel administrator Did you many to get t00 ö time make St

near gotten done because to, that have ÷ to say wouldn' wrong fellow he around, a big organization the maybe Well he had had

of were not I had the So I production got into the Like was you because and it guns. production you ĺt, to do over guns on machine supported op a job just take told you to others. machine mass would give you vet to Corps of caliber you gun number when he Ordnance and one day and told the 50 he reduced well But and over the production of he with the Because damn · thing never guns op to You knew caliber machine called in there IFF kind of hassle had thing done. the Corps orthodox got uo supported. Ordnance what he to take told same Was 50 the

Wasn't there trouble with bomb shortage? bombs. about HOW ö

W: Yes, sure.

Q: Knerr was complaining about bombs being short?

Corps since You can -to this I fought the Ordnance Corps. SOB I the Ordnance an what you for re still alive--because tell a high regard will who officers the beginning of time I never had Ordnance they': ίf ·M: day, find

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and claimed great bomb failure to theater, 500# He them in such anticipate the requirement of European that. any shortage about Was this the dropping hassle dire in logistics the right ordnance. were big was they there possibly was of course, There charge war couldn't the have in that? Of Was the need? ÷ number that you remember that they didn' Knerr foresee ö you the Do in

remember the the rubber And part of fn of who you priority down on ŦI hand, credit. other cut Patton's first were Corps the had of uo We he Ordnance But operation gasoline Europe too. give the Cross that down uo down cut mount to You have to started cut were Corps forth. Patton We Ordnance i.M and so thing. when

Germany using? uo the any really of Germ **Kassel** the losses through were into We went guess went that н consumption Who could when had was н at there far. the signment thing that foresee Nobody could guess only could Morgenthau The Air Force bombers? that

Q: What was that assignment?

And that great 1n troops except would of So would don't We'd there into building the B-17 always that staff and he in charge this around behind the Germany number fighters day head man staff = chance; one day. had place. philosophy production Was The war. they The next day the same of there "Our the the the Kassel put terms take headquarters and talking about The over down, 1mm and and interviewed said: surrender into nt and his companies industry Don all staff committee knocked number He got bombers everything. So engineering their Arnold and aircraft same the post we got heartbreaker three ad hoc group. down B-29s place No matter how many had We the got them. with there put Kassel with of knock an write German good English. the the the with tarted in dn plenty uncovering c through and three into building which and really to ured around still of there really centers Wa today coni had in That were we coming job over tower actorie verv Was Just Force They through. there were "Well, the they "It of the sent run short. spoke flak somebody and as they go out Echols was said: these there say: come was big who the İt,

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Was war, he Arnold played this war. the of happen it like McNamara day last 50 things last bullet on the these play allow Arnold didn't 50 use the afford going to couldn't ö

was "Are There about: way argument that Was any t was never program through his There ordered way the stuff All of ·M plenty

you You build all =. 75 build or we going to build 50 this month, can.

Did they just and just men. Pearre Cabell H. ver guy idea Did they? me told they Ш the are hired and Norstad and guys operations. job Pearl Harbor, Council noX what had is They said: out of "Advisory This after He portfolio think and stay to think men. be his right in your hair? idea without to Arnold, have time Norstad to to you get ter supposed ö Larry on l want ever mini

W: No. Never. They stayed out of operations.

who In. push them toward to him came Smart Deane close would Fred Jake Arnold had he then he liked them, and that left, people if Norstad and cam vere 0'Donnell told to think ideas course Of Rosie war ö the then of

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light Arnold one selected WAS part of the war been with Hudson and these people that he outfit outfit Lockheed He'd the an Early of run British Joe Dawson. couldn't down. the in was confidence them fell over just rson Arnold close boys took Daw Joe of We great dehacle great disappointment lot put when real He had Arnold SO unfortunately his but years. nothing of them bomb many

Q: Where did he fit into Arnold's staff?

liking the bomb took of one And he In war brother. Arnold before the the in timers NII NII just like old with the groups, of He had been one bomb was he squadrons him, :M to

Q: How about Ray Dunn?

kind of Was He Arnold's. of another protege Was Ray Yes ·M:

a super aide. I don't know what ever became of him

was where he think he got in trouble--he 00 that think н Sicily, н operation over He's in Washington. airborne in trouble in this ö got

W: He was another disappointment to Arnold.

Q: How about some others like Sue Clagett?

W: Oh yes, I knew him

Q: He got in trouble, too

Was He through. time came one never at setup and tunities Field Selfridge oppor many th ha of Sue command :M in

when blamed twice Commission in China toe his And he demoted stubbed was too and he there, then Magruder twice toe and general stubbed his the Field with and he made March he at and The Arnold He was down. started Arnold for it succeeded taken ö var was the He

W: His problem was the bottle.

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He too. taken down, Was him? He you remember about Shepler Fitzgerald? å in the Middle East. How ö was

that any the West Coast there timers than Is positions old the Coast the uo better Arnold East Those the -got with uo him. dn others Andrews remember cam of the who up with judgment? Guys some sure came dn that Spaatz Yes who coming in fellows merit Eaker were

Hap, chance for this contemporaries say 1 H before. -his that timer about old those I hadn't thought of one them every of one he gave Every

down. took them he didn't make it, And if they Jakey Fickel ö

Jones, B.Q. "Jingling Willy" Jones, Jakey Fickel, : M

Brereton, Tony Frank....

position high to got Frank Tony and Brere Well ö

W: Yes, but they didn't last very long.

three made He airborne the of head was Brereton Well ö stars. and from 9th AF was shifted around too ands ž 00 H good but Yes, some had ·M. Tony

50 Arnold wouldn't give it command; at combi wanted Tony ö him you good ίf old s odd, those their It' of had through veryon with Fitzgerald today came say that that they those 'didn' what way And same damn othe with Hap right, of That's Car opportunitie taken back timer look well

Holfinbarger, Willard

5 Jan 70

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December 1, 1969

Maj.Gen. Willard R. Wolfinberger, USAF(Ret) 1450 Avenue L, NW Winter Haven, Florida 33880

Dear General Wolfinbarger:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of <u>Air Force/Space</u> <u>Digest</u>, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovelf, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, nonattributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

December 19, 1969

Lt.Gen. Willard R. Wolfinbarger, USAF(Ret) 1450 Avenue L, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33880

Dear General Wolfinbarger:

I have your very fine letter and kind invitation of the 5th. My plans are just starting to build. I will be coming down the Coast and making several stops enroute to the Miami area. Then I hope to come through Winter Haven enroute North.

My wife may be accompaning me, if we can arrange for my youngster in Washington.

In any event, I'll phone or write you to fix a date for our get together. It may be around January 15th or 16th.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.



5 December 1969

BRANCH OFFICE 100 ORCHID SPRINGS DR.

TEL 294-3487

Dr. Murray Green, Office of the Secretary, Research & Analysis Div. - SAFAAR The Pentagon - 4C 991 Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of 1 December which came to hand yesterday. I am pleased to hear that you are writing the story of Hap Arnold. He was a colorful character and a real pioneer.

I knew General Arnold, of course, and worked with him in Washington during the early days of WW II. It is doubtful that I can give you anything that you hav'nt already gotten from other sources. However, I would be most happy to chat with you about it and I do hope that you will stop here enroute.

If you can give me a day or so of notice I will be sure to be on hand and I would be honored to have you and your party as my guests for luncheon and a ski-show at Cypress Gardens.

Sincerely,

W. R. Wolfinbarger

WRW:cc

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DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis D.v.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION PRSS BRANCH

MAJOR GENERAL WILLARD ROLAND WOLFINBARGER, USAF

Willard Roland Wolfinbarger was born in Marion, Kansas, December 12, 1900. He enlisted in the Army in 1917, and was assigned to Company "M", 130th Infantry of the 35th Division with which he participated in the campaigns of St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne. He was honorably discharged in 1919.

General Wolfinbarger was graduated from the University of Kansas with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1924. While there, he was a member of the Phi Alpha Delta and Delta Upsilon fraternities, and was president of the student body of the School of Law.

On March 10, 1924, he was appointed a flying cadet. After receiving training at Brooks and Kelly Fields in Texas, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Reserve March 16, 1925. He received his Regular commission as a second lieutenant of Air Corps January 23, 1927.

During the early part of his military career, Ganeral Wolfinbarger, served at various Air Corps Fields in the United States and the Philippine Islands and was graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School (1937) and from the Command and General Staff School (1938).

In the spring of 1940, General Wolfinbarger was appointed at Berlin, Germany In 1941, he became a staff officer with the Air War Plans Division at Air Corps headquarters in Washington, D. C., and subsequently was named operations and general staff officer with the <u>Air War Plans Division of the War Department</u> General Staff in Washington. While assigned to this duty, he served temporarily in England from June to August, 1942. In June, 1943, General Wolfinbarger becam a member of the Joint War Plans Committee at Air Corps headquarters, and during that month had temporary duty in England. From August to September, 1943, he had temporary duty in Quebec, Canada, and from November to Decembe: 1943, served temporarily in Egypt, after which he returned to duty with the Joint War Plans Committee.

General Wolfinbarger went to the Southwest Pacific theater in March, 1944, to become executive officer of the XIII Fighter Command. During the ensuing 14 months he also served at intervals as commander and deputy commander of that Command.

In june, 1945, General Wolfinbarger entered the Army and Navy Staff College, from which he was graduated the following December. He than became British Empire Specialist with the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department General Staff, and in April, 1946, was named deputy executive to the director of the Military Intelligence Service. He became executive to the director of that Service in July, 1946. A month later he way appended an

intelligence instructor at the National War College.

In August, 1948, General Wolfinbarger was appointed chief of the Plans Section of the U. S. Air Forces in Europe, with station at Miesbaden, Germany. A year later he assumed command of the Toctical Air Division of Continental Air Command at Pope Air Force Base, North Caroling. On August 1, 1950, he became commander of the Ninth Air Force (Tactical) at Pope Air Force Base and assumed additional duty as chairman of the Air Tactical Support Board in July, 1951.

The following month he was relieved as commander of the Ninth Air Force, retaining his assignment as chairman of the Joint Afr Tactical Support Board.

A set that we have a set

General Wolfinbarger has been awarded the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal, the Army Commendation Ribbon, and the Purple Heart. He is rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer and Technical Observer, and during World War II he flew 23 combat missions, totalling 109 hours.

He and his wife, the former Miss Olga S. Imperatoni of New York City, have one daughter, Loren.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) November 1, 1932, and to captain (temporary) April 20, 1935. He reverted to his permanent rank of first lieutenant June 16, 1936, and was promoted to captain (permanent) January 23, 1937; to major (temporary) December 30, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) January 5, 1942; to colonel (temporary) March 1, 1942; to major (permanent) January 23, 1944; to colonel (permanent) April 2, 1943; to brigadier general (temporary) September 11, 1949; to brigadier general (permanent) August 11, 1950, with date of rank from October 1, 1949; to major general (temporary) August 11, 1950, with date of rank from July 30, 1950.

END

-2-

Up to date as of 13 September 1951

INTERVIEW WITH M/GEN WILLARD WOLFINBARGER WINTER HAVEN, FLORIDA TANNARY 5 1970

him of OL Arnold in 1927 You met Kansas City ö

W: That was 1925-26.

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30s.do eased th him Was with of him Arnold 30s? when th You 1926, came hi March th February and opening recall Washingt ö of cnel you Bn

something maneuvers. B 08 would specifically Not that ·M: 11ke

specific Any Vero Beach in 1935? at maneuvers you on naneuvers? ö

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one particular 1930 Dayton until out ant ardn Group Well Bomb 2nd thing that the 2nd naneuver

Q: Out of Langley Field?

W: Yes.

people and AF? Knerr, GHQ th ž peopl took under were ate So ö

W: Yes.

Jol you Arnold was contact with reacl first Your Staff ö the

got Well 2 Dec the entered 866 00 Let back Harbor arl before Washington back to

Yes.

Q: Then you knew Truman Smith and Vanaman?

W: Sure. Yes indeed, very well, indeed

Gern to visit ndbergh th ö

you

t ,È when He started t efore Well ·M.

ö 1938 In

W: No, I sent to Germany in the fall of ¹41.

Q: And you came back right before the war started.

t th ecide T 0 080 th ·M: stay how

Q: Then you must have gotten there in '40?

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W: Yes. '40, that's right. Came back in 1941.

Europ th during C

W: Yes. I went down to Paris with the German Army.

Q: Did they harass you?

well real Pd

Q: Who was in the group with you?

W: Vanaman and Harvey Smith ...

: Was there a Truman Smith too?

1: No, Truman was already back in Washington.

Q: This was another Smith?

Of Infantry th

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there. too.

et trying of business this all C and the Kahn into and Frit you the Did of Lindbergh ö out us

compared tha fact and What see force th you air problem adversary strong ¥ dangerous terrific thing force. with erful erful MO we had they to what Germany L tha

Q: You were writing reports like this?

bunch In get "oh, Washington. would into no turned ction In Ve say they would the them; they that ntion know attei and You Sure any Washington t pay Nazis. -1 nob of

Q: General Staff?

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W: Yes, from everybody.

Q: How about Arnold?

the heard ve never Arnold H not as don't know see NON personally and personally Staff General We 11 Dept essic ·M. expr War

Q: There was no Air Staff as such?

W: No

people on the Air Plan with contact any Did you have Ken Walker? ö Kuter,

Staff. COULS General of Staff there Dept togeth Air the Walke section to back and Ken a11 Plans came when wohne th FIS Sure vorked Arry W: Plan and pue

ţ The Con AAF? Air th the establish From 1941 to plan 20 June on that? u o stablished work you Did you did ö MAR AAF AAF

W: No, no,

Q: What sort of plans were you assigned to?

tt Chiefs do Dept So from then hadn two artridge the there clothe from see doing JCS **N** gne and of course were Section signed of in the that anning the when got Short1 and arrived mostly Staff level hadn even was of

Q: AWPD-1 had already been written?

W: Yes.

disc1 the incident involving by the Chicago Tribune? an with or AWPD-1 familiar RAINBOW FIVE Are ö of

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W: No

of published parts Do you they Roo Harbor Pearl before trying days were Three they that? plan remember the

W: No, I didn't know about it.

Q: You were in Washington, weren't you?

Washington for isolated npletely Harbor S Pearl th before anything days three half Well Bnd i's vear but

and muff] Tribune of CB Chicago kind Harbor Pearl the but **H**O of disclosure th hi Herald thing this ashington Well ö the The Non event that overtaken by that? of any with after familiar quickly

W: No.

Wheele of leak editor Ches 1y Senator This the ъ there Tribune plan man that that Chicago to it brought 3 by took this Arnold the Herald bring for on Hap iter ed Washington **b1** The been ö charge since Manly the

W: You mean on Hap personally?

thing this ЧO bottom the to get 20 trying of Bnd othi Yes ö cne! You

W: Never heard ot it.

think your the ltfit before of management have the might th organiz This with t C in 1941 nd thi ö Cal Plans they

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time ants? that Ъ con they Wer What No ·M. ö

J. I went in there, and I was working for Hull.

Q: Oh, in the Army.

oth only But in the onth floor. there that about see, sam right You the guess uo Staff a11 such, together General Air Plans of Dept time all uch short lding the Stafi in half only Air Munitio and Was the

0: General Staff - G-37

ugl Eisenho and ction. Plan

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with for NON Did hi knew OPD. well took knew Well oh, hin ö : M with

organiz OL troops movement of your work involve you in Did troops? ö ing

ection mouth and forth Staff. Plans to Plans hand back the Future of Future with Joint Chiefs from Plans flying just the to had went us Hull Stuff assigned the General Staff that John JCS. after of that directly the days shortly tuff to the War Dep over Not no very assigned W: working thos The and Ľ, of

Q: Did you work under Tom Handy?

V: Yes.

nvolv that Arnold complained Arnold than than antage Force your Arnold Force Air paper the the uo at 143 of him stuff uo stuff had p1 Thi better Handy wrote getting materi that better Arnold this? 80 thi mber ö getting getting Handy in ed

qo Tom Handy your of out worked for Non let H to about that. want didn't **K**now they think didn ö

1t? were In There 1 C job good Moffat doing Dick Lindsay were you that apparently r guy becaus other

W: Moffat, I don't recall?

Q: Loutzenheizer?

W: Yes, Jo

Q: Did you ever work with Kuter on AC/AS Plans?

20 pip When Staff Dei Ma Force the to You ove ö COB

Building thi th but aff Staff onthe Sti Mun1 t1 Force the right tarted Vell the -M g very when ver **VBS** a11 at

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one Staff after gani and ani of 10 Then Harrison AGF Ch1 They the Harbor th p1 anged Kuter thi this Bryd uo that? 1942 worked ed thing MCN guy of thi Lt Thi rought think Do you rnold Dept War ASF ö ation Moore other Pearl with the the the

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tactical not plans plans p1 No strategic CBO the air strategic the operation rol bomber you combined Did ö the

W: No

Q: What sort of plans were you in?

of Europ supply of and invasion Road the Burr In the involved for plans 18 fort with Was That fighter 1943 the Pacific. the until with acific across advance the 2 orke the for 80 China, when JCS

there? given were you job ö took the under Co and Deputy G 13th Fighter put Con Fighter the of 13th pu -1 00

under?

Were

you ö Streett and Barnes Biz -3 there? rnol ö 13th th had

there? out Tom ö

ursmity Yes

and he in NY curly call thev talked did Why tsmith Wurtsmith Sque "Squeeze ö says

tt1 later th Bnd nce BQ 100 цЪ had i's I've kid.

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where Arnold ody someb they situations for when NO and something any 81 Handy ember for the said during and Non Arnold å Marshall Arnold where staff? tha prou either top the out of Se something efing some stood og for ö bri Arnold said and had

officially could time which long But Arnold And onally for C C1 tempter retty 80 đ p had to BO thing Arnold decided S ding cl uitte raise blood hell airly uld And nev We

the 60 But υĘ Arnold had becaus with cour ong the of goi such off C relation Wavs al kno did you him No Arnold seen ·M. diffe with well

Q: At whom?

building Combined Chiefs off his the mad always JCS really reported volume the Arnold get OVEL d the Ξ grab So was He Marshall and ection omebody JCS but of Š anything office the names plans And of his mention pre ting the said life tim F th vour of acl ÷ wouldn that dmunn differ you abl nouth building Staff ark desk VOU but of

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give say JCS? in the hav get mouse almost to him ould but uo office SSUL th Dre and in his put JCS and Lerror th stion mous rect å him

Q: Do you think he was awed of Marshall

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understood couldn ust That him Lool P ·M: But

They Marshall subordinate -to beholden **Marshalls** but ccs, the WAS and he and q and JCS military Army 무 the still ö gave He

to trom Arnold diffe and Arnold correspondence Marshall that thi but that aput do ·M nppor Arnold that orted? felt point 2 Ę å C88(

his present Army in the Army 00 to thi the hesitant still for talking very Of Staff of Ξ Chi Chi Marshall sep 5 case and

he wh even Cas his ent pres 803 to 0 esitate ortunity Arnold ddo Did offered ö Was

sat just He time the of most the sat **U18** Well ·M: there

Q: Well, who did the talking for the Air Force?

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and King the in was Did Arnold Force right. The did Force Marshal Air rmy Well The ö - 3 tangle

that they think Icnow nob did. Pulv 00 that but recall opinion nob oh. differ W: had

spilled in H busine under Larson blood ASW thing had Westside the Ē with whole and the troubl They that? th get handl and any to into ttling thevhav get ab1 you ba arin did Did Anti-Sub about they 1943 Anti th and and the the 1942 ö control set up ther This In

W: No.

258 ed Forc they and and B-248 The Navy wanted Navy AWPD-42 Th uo planes about ö and n struggle th remem There Do you Pacific. should go. the pl anted where th and they about

W: Yes.

cific BUV 2 recall anybody do you with battles had Anv Arnold tha Ther ant ö disagr handle they di Dar No TO i'M littl g level? JSP uo them handle Kuter Did ö

W: I would think so, y

planner

er top th to they got before out the iron Did they ö

W: Generally, yes.

well?

ped him the IJ thi 80 other back Thi AWPD-42 pushing cut planes S OT the Was pared in 000 Arnold involved 100 plane basically and than 1943 000 th got for planes Did Eor priority calling build until plan

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Wasn 1940 in that plan th Thi

cranked didn for .ority ucti prod rplan The for th the shing Navy for anning 2 the it shine put with and 1 jus SBC ents eff The he agr equire 1943 which Ś 942 of FOI ane Air pun airpl ä the really for 194 g 52

I: The numbers racket.

invol Kutel get Came that you AWPD-Did 1942 10 of this August down with 9 watered in an **5001** asked Arnold DI can progressively Arnold WOH evelt produc W8 Roo this thing and competing to that? ö Arnold need 'n

around Anderson isn't **Orvil** shame It No. .M.

him hall giving the Building Munitions grabbing the him of of hall hear the ever In Non OL **E-Ring** Did project? ö the

the in them Grab ·M:

unrelated to their to assignm this happening? giving were that of eputati the hall hear ever In et you Do he Yes that specialty ö people

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though believ can have believ qon No, -1

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Yes

÷.M

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HO organization in his careful he Was organizer; impulsive? As ö Was

call him impulsive would 3

then acted where consequen of instance the through specific thought ct Can you think of himself? carefully having without ö perhaps

impulsive raid was Doolittle the thin in

his? Wasn raid Doolittle The ö

M:

and t of origin the for credit Adm King cl other ö

the that Roosevelt was putting ething figured Arnold Well SUL pres told trying to get and he ide you, th 3 involved in perhaps to thought they no his Plans ideas Were these to Siberia Russians? all Arnold s from the bases think getting to ö base them

W: No.

his activi Cooper? do you know about know Merion you Do in that. China? nvolved Getting Merion Cooper ö

much yei Very But Staff desk. old Air same the the at <u>in</u> working around there weren 00 Merion Cooper Well prominence ż İn

How could Arnold look like when he got mad? mad? getting did he wa What tell ö you

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beet get red P face the He

cal1 got when he They time? looked the he all hor face described smile on his misnomer? people thi Did he hav Diff Was Hap. him mad.

W: Well, he had a ready smile, he worked ...

Q: Did he mean that he was happy?

W: No, I don't think so.

Q: Just a smile; just the shape of his face?

I: I think so.

Q: Was he a practical joker?

joker B practical S0. think I don't him as knowledge, ongruous to think of inc

80

people 50 like but he didn't the himself 1 t attend Bolling. joker op to to oved enough parti high him you wildga uo jokes Well thes ö pul1 parties? parties have 20

while in once all every But Bolling not the VIP parties at out \$10 party or \$5 throw Well 1t would cover ·M. he 5

Q: Did he know you by name?

W: Oh yes.

talk was it Curly; did he you in the hall If ö

to you?

but he Curly, me called ever I don't think he W: name by

Q: Your rank was Colonel?

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within after months Major, 3 daily about almost Germany came LTCOL otions from back Colonel When oupl W: just that

13th? the to out went when you star You ö

W: No, not till after the war.

1943 He there him? to the Pacific? ther out NO N ent before did out 1945 the there coming ther 1n Bud out Pacific and Arnold Confere you the remember before out no there Do the out ö there. After came 1945

W: By that time, I was back in the states?

Q: When did you come back?

taff ŝ th Dep ent War to the after OVER lortly went then and see with Bissell Let's College ·M: Staff G-2

Q: He got into trouble didn't he?

W: Yes, he did later.

itinerary No. reconstruct to trying just 3 know? War with robably at the National contact Colleg Arnold 9 any and have Staff of instructor Cabel1 one you th avv Was did Pearre Armv College So an the assigned as too. that? 1943 đ ational War class tting know in point? first Were The thi You that interest in ö College Arnold prede were insti

I spent two years over there at the National No, W: College

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see him Did you 1947? retiring. in 1946 out way Washington uo back ö came he went the around ÷ Wasn call 80 that there Not from retirement? right over to Germany After his much Pentagon ·M back

the high family too the Arnold they socializing with contact Br? for command any rnolds have of NOA chain Wolfinbargers Did in the ö di

W: No

Q: Were you ever invited to his home

Oh, yest, at Ft. Myer, cocktail party

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold?

about that but adv haired White "M

Q: I've been out there several times.

W: She's still living, isn't she?

of He lot can't 00 etters. They wrote He of this this thousand charming mber Nobod don witter Arnold that picture him doing P ö letter got Was

tings? staff kind ccs bug the 1CS about for complain ration him hear you Did fing ö brie

Lt that when in perturbed bit **Hansell** real 50 down used bore Hansell think ng No be ti 3 respect cam

efer bri senior weren't you junior you Were ö vou

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W: No, but I was over in the JCS

Q: Did Lindsay play an important role?

Bnd Lindsa and think eplace and S OT Ken Walker T hole short cubby together to. In dn back there what he orked only kno don

killed Was he but he died, job, big đ had enhe rash? plan ö In

together

worked

Walker

Ken

õ mine of friend good very guy Great W: Did him for regard high had Kuter ö

W: Oh yes

Kuter

Q: I saw him in NY a few months ago.

atest -the of him fond Very guy Larry W:

50 loyalty Arnold this vou ask Let ö

for promoti get fight he Did promotions of people? terms his <u>i</u>n

pretty oth that op to told seemed been certainly have but They well did. He did pretty think he ö ·M

got the promotions...

vere terms that those ations along just didn't think dow turning you he him maybe, of ed justifi heard Well. never reasonably But

recognize Awards Did he Like that. Merit? than opinion? of more and Legions your needed DSMs thev tely wards? equa ad people about ö his How

line opinion those express qualified to very it 50 taking ntion not wasn much really know pay ÷ didn' because on that ö either.

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Staff? Air when you left the recognized get you Merit? Did of ö Legion

W: Yes, I got the Legion of Merit. First one

WOLFINBARGER INTERVIEW

when of him Arnold in 1927 You met is City? ö

1925-26 That 3

In

30s, do th with him him Arnold 308? 9f contact You direct 1926 came hi Irch 50 T had and Feb opening recall of ö Washing cnew vou E

ething maneuvers. uo go would ecifically Not that ·M. like

specific Any 1935? Beach in Vero at maneuvers B you ö

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particul one 1930 uo Dayton until uo 92 out Bombardment dnout 2nd the 2nd that naneuver thing

Field? Langley of Out ö

Yes

people and AF? Knerr GHO the 0 ö

took

later

(nd:

Yes

you joined Arnold was when with contact eacl fir Your Staff ö Air · the the Defor entered Vashington Let to back

Yes.

Q: Then you knew Truman Smith and Vanaman?

W: Sure, Ies Indeed, Very Well, Indeed

ermany Ü to visit ndbergh any? you ö

th 50 ũ he when arted the Ste before talking Well ö 1938 .M

W: No, I sent to Germany in the fall of '41.

Q: And you came back right before the war started.

Sol that nths decided thr Instead they the month 80 ther other н 80 stay how

Q: Then you must have gotten there in '40?

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': Yes, '40, that's right. Came back in 1941.

duri So

W: Yes. I went down to Paris with the German A

Q: Did they harass you?

real ated re ċ

Q: Who was in the group with you?

W: Vanaman and Harvey Smith ...

Q: Was there a Truman Smith too?

W: No, Truman was already back in Washington.

Q: This was another Smith?

COUL Of Infantry Smith

was there. too.

get 50 Group trying of ican business the thi all static and th 9nv and Did th of Lindbergh ö

that red fact CO Eorce 4 problem. ai strong thing erous the force with terrific faced Ful all to ad trying thev what W: were Germ that 20

Q: You were writing reports like this?

hell, bunch In get do" would Washington you in sav they would them; thev to tha attention what **know** and You Sure any Washington DAV Nazis. W: ų don' υĘ

Q: General Staff?

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W: Yes, from everybody.

Q: How about Arnold?

the heard reporting never Arnold not don and personally fro Well ession Dept ·M expre War

Q: There was no Air Staff as such?

W: No

Plans the Air uo with people contact any you have Ken Walker Did ö Kuter

Staff ner 0 Staff Ge 0 ether there Dep Air the th ectio acl Ken a11 and 5 Ca enho BUL Fis Sure orked LALL -3 Plans and and

The 20 Corp AAF? the the establish From 1941. on the plan to 20, June that? NOLK established work Did you you ö AAF AAF

W: No, no.

Q: What sort of plans were you assigned to?

Chiefs and the EWO Joint hadn artridge from there clothes the So see JCS MM doing signed and you of sction assigned of In desk **V8S** gotten when the Short1 and arrived Staff. level hadn' even **N88** of

Q: AWPD-1 had already been written?

W: Yes.

discl the incident involving Tribune Chicago an the with by familiar AWPD-1 HO Are you RAINBOW FIVE ö of

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N: No

ot they published part å days before Pearl Harbor, arra emb to trying were they Three that? plan, ö the

W: No, I didn't know about it.

Q: You were in Washington, weren't you?

Washingto for isolated completely Harbor Pearl been efor arrived thre 118 Vel but

year and a half from anything in the State

and ba muff1 Tribune of Chicago kind the it course of sclosure the and hi Times-Herald īb thing ational this Washington ö There the

You yent that overta that? of any with after familiar quickly

R 3

ther

of leak editor This ch the Tribune plan that that man Chicago brought an à thi Arnold for bring Hap Th ö charge since Manlv

personally Hap Vou

Herald

Washingt

the

thing this of bottom the t c get to m trying HO and nothi Yes ö NOX

ants? I think T VOUL befor busines been have the ght consul th organi ith Thi thev to 1941 tri What No. ·M: ö Ca they Plan

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Sta ö

Hu11 for orki

5 å ö only But the floor there tha about 860 sam right Nou the guess g Staff *à*11 such General togethe Plans ot Dept all uch Building snort th In only Muniti and the **VA S**

G-37 Staff ö

ust nad E18 and Section Plan -3

10

DVer

WOT meyer? with Wed but years. work for you him Did kne OPD. well. Al knew Well oh. with him ·M: ö

organiz OL troops movement of in you work involve Did your troops? ö ing

ection Bouth and forth Plans Staff to hand the Future back of Future from Chiefs Plans flying just the Joint to had vent with John Hull assigned Stuf the Staff that JCS General after of directly the shortly ð to the War Dept over Not assigned ·M: in thos working and The of

Q: Did you work under Tom Handy?

W: Yes

nvolv that complained rnold than advantage Force when Arnold FP paper 143 th of him stuff BCe stuff had a pi Thi better Handy plans wrote getting that better Arnold this? so thi mber getting, getting, ö Handy in ed

Tom Handy worked for about that. t know didn ·M

job 1t? were your There of out you job good let Moffat cđ doing Dick Lindsay, were didn you think they that. apparently other guys in ö becaus

W: Moffat, I don't recal

Q: Loutzenheizer?

W: Yes, Joe.

Q: Did you ever work with Kuter on AC/AS Plans?

When did Staff. General Dept War the noy ö COB

Staff most thi Air and the but the at Staff Harbor Staff months General Force arl OVer 0 Dept heen the have right in the 44 into period ouldn 00 pulled the us long when very a11

pez Staff after Gen reorgani reorgani and of Then Chief AGF They to the Harbor. with 10 Gen changed thi earl [eve] that? before thing ork 20 thi ot Thi brought E of VOI Arnold Dept did Harbor Dep DO yden and War ASF Pearl Moore with othe ati the the the

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but tactical not plans plans tactical battl but plans No tegic ·M stra CBO th air strategic the In role vou Did combined ö the

W: NC

Q: What sort of plans were you in?

of Europ supply pue Road Burm th the Involved for plan Ln L al forth 0

the with That fighte 1943 Pacific. the until th the ther Paci plans the to ad worked out the went For 80 H China when JCS

ere? t P 6 ö took Commander Deputy 5 13th Fighter S Fighter Ę DE 13tl 00 ž over

under you Wer ö Streett and there? out him sent Arnold ö 13th th had Streett Yes i N

there? out LOB ö

smity

he and YN NY curly' C B they talked did н Why smith th Saue PS" ö says

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tt1 **Itt**] tha sinc Dicked had UP hair. curly all had I've kid

1t

had

wher Arnold somebody they situations when OL something, ons any Interest For the said Arnold rnold where that rnold top ith to 10 ething efing stood SON for bri Arnold said had and

could officially which And he rnold. õ 5 pretty temp 20 Arnold thi building 10 quite Fairly 4 The could NOA never

op to ecided **p1** rais And We

Q: Did he ever raise it with you?

good the But very of Arnold had becaus with COULS along th of got him uch off. nice of take alway know ittle did ood/a seen him Arnold ·M: diffe with well. I've

Q: At whom?

that building marvel mouse his Combined Chiefs reported in the off and alway JCS ver etest the volum th rnold aui sit the th over was grab So jus Marshall and sat it Section. would would He but somebody JCS of when the anything 00 name Plans And that the presence of him mention eting the said life time hur1 in 1 et our of and wouldn er differenc that numb remarkable mouth vou buildin, St desk Dut his NOA ät of

say mouse in the JCS? to get him almos t C on him ould but sure office they pre and his put in JCS the sti anb mous direct ·M: ö him

office

his

pug

Q: Do you think he was awed of Marshall?

peculiar

struck

always

That

anything

inderstood hardly thing couldn ust Bnd cno him 100 P,I W: But

They Marshall rdinate the to. beholden ģ Marshalls but ccs he the and and he man and JCS military Army the the equality In still ö WB gave He

5

to Arnold diffe and rnold correspond Marshall Ē this tha

upport nol orted? ö 288

for H present Army in the Army to thi the hesitant still for COUL talking very Of Staff WAS of He the Chiefs Chief. Joint shall epa f case and

when even Ca his present 0 to sitate ty LUNI oppor Arnold an Did offered ö **VAS**

sat just He time the of most there sat an Well ther

Q: Well, who did the talking for the Air Force

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Arm King th and in Did Arnold W8.8 Force Air right. The Force, bib shall Air Army Well The ·M: ö tangle?

know that they think 44 nop did. enly, thev 80 that but recall oninion C difference R had

Bd spill busine Larson blood ASW thing A1 had Westside the the with whole and oub1 the there They that? get tr Ibu and any Into to Warfare and 0 battling theyhav get ab1 5 you veren Was did Did -Subi Sub the Nav about they 1943 Ant Anti and How and the and the 1942 ö control đ ther This set Ln

W: No

Force they and Air and B-248 avy wanted The 42 AWPD-The u planes about HOW ö bnd uo

atrugg. that? There rem you Pacific Do 80. the should out planes the where the wanted they about and

W: Yes.

speci subi any that recall uo anybody do you with battl.es had many Arnold that Ther ment ö disagre handle were they had disagreements level different When bit No ·M: littl đ

g level? JSP B them handle Did Kuter levels? level? LOW 00 olanner' ö c

W: I would think so, yes.

top the to got they before the iron they Did ö well?

W: Generally, yes.

helped him 0 the progressivel who others back 42 pushing AWPDcut SOM the d prepared That 000 Arnold involved 100 planes. than basicall planes get ,000 less 194 vou the 131 got for Did for plane they tha priority ö calling build until plan

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It? 1940 wasn't in out came that plan the Was Thi -M

didn't level cranked for priority planning the production Navy Birpl airplan The Ē for Navy pushing th for g with the ushing put හ just and disagreement eff The requirements he evelt airpower 1943 0 Its Was SP 1942 and Orc of ther airplane er really und and th 1943 for đ 88

The numbers racket.

involved and Kutu get that Non AWPD-Did 1942 27 Ba of this down August with op watered in planes tool rnold progressively Ę Arnold HOH produce said produc Roose this thing and competing that? ö to Arnold what need 5

W: No. It's a shame Orvil Anderson isn't around

him giving the Building Munitions grabbing the T of of hall hear the OL you **E-Ring** Did project? ö the L'u

W: Grab them in the hall?

their to assignments to unrelated happening? giving were for that this reputation of hall hear the ever in had Do Yes that specialty ö people

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though believ hav believ ible? don No, H ö

V: Yes.

organization in his careful he Was organizer impulsive As an ö ge Was

HO

W: I would call him impulsive.

then Icted consequence where JO instance the through specific thought of arefully think you ũ having Can without ö

W: I think... the Doolittle raid was

himself?

rever

perhaps

impulsive

Q: The Doolittle raid wasn't his?

W: It was Roosevelt's

of credit for the origin SOW Adm King claimed other ö sev

and

the that Roosevelt was putting something figured qo to to Arnold Well pressure

told and trying NON t0 1u involved perhaps ÷ id 50 Siberia τ from the think getting bases to bases them

No ·M:

activity Cooper his Merion about know Do you know nok op that China? L In Getting Coope ö Merion

Very But Staff desk. old 유 the In working there Cooper prominenc Merion Ln

How could mad? when he got like Arnold look mad? zetting did he was What tell ö you

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88 get red 5 Eace the He'd

beet

got D D time ook the all face his Diff Did ö mad

snomer? thi Hap him

worked he smile ready Well W:

happy? WAR that he Did ö

80 think uap No ·M:

face? his of shape the ust ö

think i'M

practical joker? ö

joker. SE 80. think don to think of him as .edge, ongruous Not ince 1:1

practical

the 2 didn elf but attend Bolling to enough narti you high wild Well 8 K ö parties? ÷ parties to pull have

while, once Very But Bolling parties at VIP out \$10 the arty not \$5 thro Well Ľ ould . M COVE he 2

Q: Did he know you by name?

W: Oh yes.

talk did he was it Curly; ha11 the i' you H ö

to you?

me but he Curly, called ever I don't think he W: name by

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Q: Your rank was Colonel?

within and months Major 3 daily about LTCOI Fron back weeks Colonel of ouple just that

13th? to the out

No, not till after the war

1943 He out Pacific? there the out before did to went out 1945 the there ng then Bnd COMI out and Pacifi nold Conferenc 1942 맘 in there 44 sabl the After ther 1945 cam

0: When did you come back?

th

in

back

t

Staff General th Dept to went War the after. to over shortly went very then and e11 Let's Bis College with i'M Staff G-2

he? trouble didn't into got He ö

later did Yes W: vou here reconstruct my itinerary to trying ust N: know? War with probably National great Weikart conta Colleg Arnold the 9 any at and So did you have Staff of instructor Cabel1 one th -Navy was Pearre College He an the t00. 88 that? 1943. đ assigned National War class setting you know İn point? first did this The that You ental at Interests ţı ö Instrum College Arnold pred vere

War over there at the National years two spent No, .w College

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when see him Did you 1947? retiring. 1946 out, way Ington on his He ö

back

came

he

went the around Then 4 Wasn recall that I 80 from there, Not etirement? right Germany hi After much to Pentagon back

the high family too with the Arnold they socializing guess contact ever? for command any Arnolds of and in the chain Wolfinbargers Did ö đ

No W: invited to his ever you Ver ö rty cockt Myer Ft yest 40

·M.

nonth Saw ö ates цЪ him 4 guy ·M.

promot loyalty hard 00 fight rnold Did he this romotions of people? terms ö his Ľ

pretty oth op tha to cainly bib

told

have

but well pretty motions ö the got

term those no along just didn't think reco Mob turning you he of him maybe ed justifi ard reasonably But

recogniz Awards he Like Did that. Merit? than of opinion more Legions eded vour and DSMs rds? eopl his How

opinion thos along expre much to very qualified taking nuch pay CIDOW didn beca ö that either uo

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Staff? Air left the recognized get you Did ö

First Merit of the got

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Woods, Lawrence S. 13 May 70

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May 18, 1970

Col Lawrence S. Woods, USAF(Ret) 106 Medford Drive San Antonio, Texas 78209

Louis may 20

Dear Colonel Woods:

I very much enjoyed talking to you and Mrs. Woods about Hap Arnold and the days at March Field. I saw Col Bruce Arnold this morning and he remembered you and Mrs. Woods also your daughter very well. He asked me to send his best wishes.

If any other recollections of Hap Arnold come to mind, I hope that you will favor me by jotting them down and sending them to me in the enclosure.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

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Texas, May 13, 1970. San Antonio, Woods, S Interview Col Lawrence

Did you with Hap Arnold? Field? meeting March fir at your you recall before you him Do for ö work

Field March at him Met al at him know Didn' No. : M

Wer

- to March Field? assigned you When were ö
- 1931 :M
- time? same the there about and Arnold came Then you ö
- Oh yes . M
- time? bit before Thanksgiving a little around He came ö
- later little came, time what forget :M
- March Field? at job your Was What ö
- Quarter Construction Also, Field. the at Quartermaster I was : M

master.

- guess? н to do with Arnold, a lot You had ö
- Oh yes W:

Bear Lake Camp? to do with building Camp? Bear Lake lot đ You probably had recreation the Remember ö

the dea to tell the truth things Arnold got Was normally me unofficial he want way You one entirely snake. get his habit e was unofficial couldn that Oh yes That That was wanted it. way .M only now? He

men? the for camp recreational B to get determined was He ö

Bear Lake at Up there .W:

lumber scrounged they papers the a lot of seen ve H Yes ö pipe

at of sort You We uo and pipe. went that scrounged lumber things camps 60 CCC Other building only out. they not chiseled were we oh, it, that time ·M: stole

Q: Sixty camps, under Arnold?

W: Yes

Q: You were in charge of all the construction?

outside Was assistant supply hu called man My inside construction. what My was He outside. all the died construction since of in charge has Eddy watched Yes, Buster Briggs Perrin. He :M Eddy man.

Q: Yes, later became head of the AF Academy.

W: Yes.

Did the recall how Arnold got that CCC job? Do you ö

President, or General Malin Craig give it to him?

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ust were We country the places over certain was and job CCC area the a certain no, ho assigned : M

all over California? located camps were these Where ö

over California all had them we in Death Valley; two had We ÷.M

a rush job? it Was How long did you have to build them? 0

didn't The we fact, work. of temporary matter đ just As was kitchen it and the rush job; was them camps of pictures was of It take part : M main even

Q: How long did it take you to build them?

were who helped, men and the could, everybody we We hired there assigned : M

Q: All the officers were given a job?

5 either going flying. all stopped are we said he SO Arnold fly, to time are going particular we or that camps, At have CCC :M

and LTS. these of And the officers, in command geants put ser mess were a job with the CCC camp. post their the took uo they officers Of course, young Everybody had various camps.

of letter -that from Arnoldcommendation đ get ever you Did ö 1935?

in step uo confidence kept he didn't and ust of office, he great deal was, office the It there in the in private ರ had was He how If than picture. left me right matter did he ou think someone more and he н least No to talking, talking W: outside at me,

Q: He used to blow his top a lot?

Captain Wa he as Frankly referred to me demanding don't know. never was н he and he Why, "wicked" top, "Skipper say his н would blow when always I mean, I was He W: wicked. Woods.

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esults? three-quarte or results not take half did And ö

W: Never in this world.

Q: And he wanted it done yesterday?

of and kids and of hangars two dn those kids called panes two lick he the window to morning caught tell him eight One He and for = . that. David bi11 for 16, about đ licked me one send stion Beaton I've already "Skipper Harold W: send said: his.

any eight. else for him for anything remember one and Do you for 16, construction? anecdote. bill e Beaton in interesting him, Harold about an anecdote ö S That

that question about ou times all at 00 the He No ·M:

was Arnold Mrs. trees. poplar of planting, not? she a lot of was that, did in He active ö very

Lohman. nursery under Major the of charge That was only not that. and about nursery; don't know he was Post Commander He had charge of the н oh, . M

Q: Did Arnold go around visiting these CCC camps?

W: Oh yes.

In earthquake base? an was the There uo damage earthquake? cause that the Did remember 1933? you Beach in Do ö Long

W: No.

-Hollyfrom Hollywood Arnold Do you remember people visiting out? stars would come ö wood

W: Oh yes.

visits? these any of about special anything there Is ö

at March Field, became to you. to He played not at March days said this But there was Tooey Spaatz those Field violet were March Captain in has too anyone with him shrinking at Arnold two Giles crowd whether a young for that was connected whole the ed out not were down at Rockwell. Was I don't know Now, looking the was -Ira Perrin, he somebody in the Air Forces. always that Eaker thing about him, Eddie everybody except was McNarney, Ira Buster Briggs, crowd: he No, they about : M Field, one the But Joe

along along jobs than those who came up Arnold with dn came who men route got better that those Do you think March Field Andrews? ö with the

going That were something. they If make them but I do know this. Andrews to going about was Andrews, anything Arnold anything, I don't know know ÷ don amount to :M know, 2 н

who route up the March Field you had to have ability came some people who d idn't make it big, are There ö

4

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op If he couldn' excuses "Well, I mean said: excuses? OL and Arnold brook incompetence any in came tolerate and somebody Did he a job Did because.. you ö gave it

W: No, I don't think, I don't think he had those.

out by him? in the being bawled of get badget you c Did OL mark, Arnold. đ of by sort out was bawled I guess it get to Corps ö Air

W: Hell, no.

other saw him bawl But you bawled out by him? got Never people out? ö

W: Oh yes.

Q: Was he intolerant?

back н on the but he was demanding. patted you the back uo officer who anyone intolerant, pat commanding where Arnold didn't was he đ say Seals(?) L wouldn under occasionally ·M: served

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Q: He never patted anyone on the back?

W: Not as far as I know.

were you there when he left he left, after there Did you stay the end of 1935? ö at

W: No, we left about the same time.

Captain Woods You have of BG Arnold wearing his Arnold, Brigadier world. oL. an inscription the staff, H.H. good luck in 1935. a nice picture 25, ls **M** the There May uo have of Field, has all and Sam Browne belt. to Woods and March son Best Wishes per Col A.C. a grand (NOTE: General, With been hat

Q: You never saw him since he left March Field?

W: No.

S

Q: In 1935, you left a few months before he did?

post, inspections one the thi U. that' left of 8 uo "Well, As we the were left, We concerned: post. fellow Sn certain to certain everybody goodbye c assigned this say to to said as were out Well We Tony came made. Yes. depot, the time fellow : M mistake post, this all

tougher? Was Tony but taskmaster, hard 3 was Arnold say You ö

observation from only think, tougher, was Tony W:

under? say would served ever under, you served the best CO ver S111 н 00 Arnold best commanded Ft. consider The ou Would you hell who oh, McIntyre ö ·M: was

Q: Was he Jim McIntyre?

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first the in World War BG econd He villain the in the "made" him +called wasn he they But No. World War. ...M

back: ext 80 to things able menta] of wrote S t Lawrence haven't been lette ct arrange Arnold made Field c Col Arnold chat with you. and to hav terson to try н Arnold written star because certainly to four from Gen had little vou arch Forces wi11 from Col Woods promotion đ letter Air hear have the vicinity to CC, and on his with here 1943 good down that are have congratulations 27 awfully I can sit you of March am in We track that ö Was н Woods time note that keep It

some They had that? remember CCC. the you Po about camps. question those of you some ask at to I want troubles ö racial

W: No, we didn't have any.

Q: Did Arnold get around and visit them?

W: Oh, yes, all the time

W: No, if he did, I wasn't there

very successful? were camps that his Would you say ö

W: I'd say they were

the did in job he lsewhere? of compare the kind CCC. in the did way to that others any there job the Is with ö CCC

camps the in Field Field Rockwell Rockwell the 4 all out transferred fact, of matter they of the CCC As March Field ou part No to us at : M latter

Arnold? Field camps under Rockwe11 the So you had all ö

W: Yes, they transferred those to us

Q: He was very aggressive?

W: Oh yes, no question about that.

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I. say ever Did he mistake? else." something made admit s do let' a mistake Did ö made

men good were They me. to it he didn't do he did, if Well Well ·M:

Q: Arnold had the cream of the Air Corps.

tops. the men who became All the You bet you. ·M

Corps Air Field the March of cream him the for them worked made who he that the you say all that Well sense, ö Įn'

don't said he н Arnold. H 1931. met see. before I Let's service me. make 30 years 4 Arnold didn' I had explain me. no, make ho to how :M ÷ didn' know

Major March and lst Woods with the CCC at Headquarters Was S to from BG Arnold to Major Lawrence while he opportunity carry uo written and cooperation to load the took was heavy letter Arnold c loyalty Woods "had The and his letter 1935 tationery appreciated that 13, đ Here's said September AF and GHO he ö Field Woods Wing QMC,

organiza more have the work of throes quartermaster will H during the and hope 17 had SO efficiently never especially again have you н and duties, with reorganization. effectively of serving Quartermaster willingly, and pleasure Post tion

- Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?
- W: Oh yes.
- Q: Was he a practical joker?

I didn't he saw Arnold, he might have among.. н When with all the time. know of, something н was Not that about mix with the people he see me Oh no. wanted to . M

normally and you didn't flyer, ct not you were socialize with the flying types. In other words, ö

the of story Told the (NOTE: say H driveway.) as and right, his fallen tree near That ·M

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and Lohman around Arnold's house, lot of debris You mean, a Officer the Post :M was Somebody told me that any didn't break list? his Lohman BG then. uo got and Lohman đ tree, Arnold was SO that it, to remove removing Post Commander Lohman records asked ö world's he

W: That's right.

Q: Does that coincide with your recollection?

W: Yes

Q: That was the end of Lohman, I guess

Post Commander tell you frankly was 11'11 he why And That . WOU is dead afire Lohman world the course, Ļ Se never Of ·M Lohman

him? promoting not right in was Arnold Maybe ö

W: Oh, I don't know anything about that.

to There men to pick the best some judgments. make and he had to Arnold had top, the words, at jobs other few In đ just do them? ö were

Spaatz? You know Tooey He had the best men at the top. ·M:

Q: Yes, I talked to him.

W: All right, you know Joe McNarney.

and Spaatz to door next You lived Joe McNarney is ill. McNarney ö

W: And Bernie Caster. Bernie was in there, too.

Q: What about Joe McNarney?

would and entire off Now, he often, measure Now that I mean? SO cover and ever Officer take chalk what to you condemn property had Survey you know you and he would appointed the and learned to smile, floor, sheet and one the to the warehouse, was for uo Quartermaster usually Joe McNarney credit sheet He never đ get of Post size space to dn ·M come was the

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Q: Tooey Spaatz didn't talk very much, did he?

W: No, he thought a lot of Tooey.

Q: Oh, Togey thought a lot of Togey

0.

he wasn't happy go lucky fellow that was there, another Eaker, Captain Now, . M Ira

overnight at housing some about the all story played musical chairs with some to tell us day? You woke up one going is Woods promotion when they Mrs. March Field. ö

of cd becaus our wanted move have to he rank, to going in an were than we much lower found н And been that had Mrs. W: quarters man

wanting different quarters people a lot of were promotions? there Then of ö because

me that he gave story the that's yes, Well, :M Mrs.

Q: And then Col Woods went to Col Arnold?

Mrs. W: This was a moving order.

rescinded order? might put him Arnold he minute that order before this you officer and every day. The about read it "Well "Get what It. said: anking moving see didn said: "General you and let to be lowest 121 guarantee Adjutant "Well said: didn going the get said: the he him, signed better for because he but to sent And said it. We'd "Well truck signed he it." right away. read it, : M said: signed said uodn have н

moved back to their regular quarters? Everybody ö

W: No one had actually moved.

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Q: But it was going to play havoc?

the world would have Lois things he didn't read. as age same the 1u was nobody signed daughter thing, He your that some You mentioned that like was It directive Woods: Mrs out ö put

They went on the just about the same age as Lois. together Yes, schoolbus .W.:

Arnold.

bright very cđ was She along with get hard girl to was a wasn't she? Lois ö person,

One look student father even students the she was the honor wouldn't like average was she she just next day maybe think were mother don't The They speak on the bus. the H was. no, like daughter well. not Yes, my was than would :M She Mrs. more she you. day any at

Q: Mrs. Arnold?

nicer ct you couldn't have had she was lovely, wife commanding general's oh, Mrs. W:

people? fright to stage talk of little case c give have and always dn would get to She able she No. Was : M Mrs. ö

but speech she So đ start ever. to fright , du got stage she of before case that the worse say much. would had she She for say in did it. would didn't go she she

she headed and speeches make to she learned the Army Emergency Relief In Washington, :0 dn

Mrs. W: She evidently acquired that afterwards.

recalling the broken windows? was colonel The for Arnold boys? b111 đ me three sent the when Arnold Remember time, ö one

Q: Did the Arnold boys get into mischief?

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Mrs. W: Not too much.

Q: Were they well behaved?

out came This one broke bet it They were well behaved. I1'11 the others bill." "Send me the taken off by know tiney don't say got would said: boy allowance Arnold one Yes, where and the boy's W: Mrs. incident windows, of

H he? wasn finances about business straitlaced monkey verv any he didn't want Arnold ö mean

Mrs. W: No. You'd know that more than I

anybody people who had intolerance of several an were he showed know there women chased years, н who later who had drinking problems OL In Arnold's drinking problem, 3 ರ

Mrs. W: He had no part of anybody on that score

very high ct man; Century a 19th was He short them morality cut He of ö sens

But That H that to take it through. criticism way how the only ust all the know gentleman would be wouldn't that ರ you was other than that really times He often Mrs. W: was heard. he was, smile, have

W: He could smile, and cut your throat

Q: This was a saying on the base?

were we course of station, years memorable four about ÷ Om for our too U. cerson This Wright-Pat : M Mrs at

the base 5 way important was his this uo most because probably his ž there this. from in and sted was March Field intere comback pecially e made see es Arnold You I'm which top. ö station the at

young SO was verybody a there went when we said, н As ·M: Mrs

dea. the Quart you Camp? umber 1970 ruth things Did Construction time L'ake 10 th time? 13 eld rounged got th Arnold? for May Bear before Thanksgiving same normally camp March SC do with building t Texas Hap guess? ater the they Also, eational at March Field? with unofficial he about him want Antonio Field? ittl papers Field? ting Way Field Arnold 1 Camp? no there d × one San bit the the elv March to ake to came with get came it snak little ssigned at lot enti 0 Woods ouldn't get c Lot at Bear habit op Quartermaster Arnold c; đ hiı time 9p to đ had SE unofficial S đ around lot your Lawrence and ati probably th ct for no Didn Wer Was forget You had the õ I was e When Col Then 2 WA 1931 You it. the him Wha Yes 9h Up He ho He 0h PD No That Interview wanted for Remember way ·M: ö 3 ö ·M ö :M ö :0 ö ö ·M: ö .M ö ä 3 master work 10W2 only pip He

0 no Ne 2 uo pipe ent and 3 th lumbe things scrounged 500 Other 60 only 4 they sel chi ho stol that

Q: Sixty camps, under Arnold?

W: Yes.

Q: You were in charge of all the construction?

id ts assistant no upply al My U E nside what construction was My He utside the ed di all cti of in charg Ð Eddy watched Buster Briggs Yes Perrin He :M Eddy man

Q: Yes, later became head of the AF Academy.

W: Yes.

Did the that CCC job? him? give got Craig Arnold Malin how recall General Do you or President ö

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country places ob CCC th 40 c assigned ·M:

Californi job? The California? rush work. over c ÷ all temporar over them M them? all had ust We ocated build was Valley; it and you hav Death job; thes rush did two ver Suo. had Where We How It ö ö ·M: ·M:

Q: How long did it take you to build them?

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Q: All the officers were given a job?

to going flying ither stopped he aid SO Arnold going to fly time 01 tha camps At 000 ·M have

LTS, the of rs command offic eants the in 60 put And a er the CCC camp thei pos the took uo with ev officers th 9p θ ur had young CO Of Everybody various camps of lette that from Arnold commendation e get ver Ð you Did 1935? In uo d te onfidenc kept didn and ust õ of he deal offic office was great the t the in private cd in had there He how If right picture matter did me ou than think left õ more he and No talking outside talking ne

Q: He used to blow his top a lot?

ain Cap Frankly to eferred demanding know 1 don was he "wicked" and top "Skipper say blov when 2011 Wa He ·M: wicked Woods

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W: Never in this world.

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Q: And he wanted it done yesterday?

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ight else 0 for anything him OL emember one and you 16 onstruction? Do for bill cdote Ü in i Beaton gu interesti about him Harold an dote ö S That

100 abou Mrs tion S e ue tre ō ou dod tim of all planting not? at she 20 the No W: 0 ver

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along along Arnold dn cam with oho those th obs t, that got think you Fiel Andrews? Do larch 3 with the

going That wer something they H them this make know Andrews to oing τ about pn was rnold thing ews And any Bu know kno thi any 11 don don to н ount . M know 2 н

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Captain Woods his have Brigadier wearing You J oL worl(Arnold Arnold an inscription the of BG н.н. in luck 1935 picture staff, good is 25 nice the May There uo of have Field has all belt to and Nood March person shes Coil WI grand A.C Sam Best (NOTE and General 3 With been hat

ield' left March he since him never You. No ö ·M Sbib he before months few đ left you 1935 In ö

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Jim McIntyre? Was ö

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them? 1 VI p aroun e 60 Arnold Did 40 ö ·M.

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- joker? practical he Was ö

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the of story Told the (NOTE: ay veway dri right his near That fallen tree 3

Lohman and house, 0 around Arnold' debris of lot Officer mean, You ost the ·M:

tha any told br Somebody st? ÷ didn his Lohman then. uo got BG and Lohman 3 Was tre Arnold that it to remove removing Commander Lohman records Post asked ö world'

right That recollection? coincide with your that Does ö

Yes

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frankly ande Comm you Post tell 11,1 he why And That MOU Lohman' is dead afire world ourse Of W:

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him? promoting not in right Arnold Maybe ö

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Lohman

that about anything know nob ho . M

and The men Spaatz bes judgments Spa Tooey the to pick door You know some to next make had Joe McNarney lived the top. 0 to Ē. and had Ýou at Arnold top him men you know 111 the to is words 4 0 talked Joe McNarney jobs the right other had few All Yes In He đ just them? ö ... ö W: 0

too there, in was Bernie Caster Bernie And ·M

McNarney

Joe McNarney? about What ö

would and of Now often measur that Now mean? SO cover and ever Officer H chalk know what to property Survey had take you you condemn the would and appointed smile sheet he OOL you and to and the earned Was warehouse for uo Quartermaster Joe McNarney sheet credit never the đ get of He to size to dn usually in space come the was

he did very much talk L didn Spaatz Tooey ö

of lot ಡ thought he No, -1

Tooey? of lot đ thought Tooey oh, ö

lucky 08 happy L. wasn he there that was fellow another , Captain Now Eaker :M Ira

rnight JP 1 housing the all tory with EO chairs us tell day? musical to one going played woke 0 Woods the You when Mrs March Field ö

dn

0 our , wanted to he have rank, to going in an were than we lower found much And been -M that Mrs er main

ters uar 0 different wanting people of lot cd were promotions? there Then ö because

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me 60 0 ž that Stor 00 t P that po 3 00 Well then And W: Mrs 0

Mrs. W: This was a moving order.

rescinde order? him might nol VOI order this no and day about Well thai cer "Get what nking DD aid "General S and est ã, D L OW utant aid: Ē ng "We I oil Adj aid: th 1 ú aid T gned he 1 DM away ·M: said: right said signe read have odn

0 ters uar 5 regular their to back oved Everybody ö

W: No one had actually moved.

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Q: But it was going to play havoc?

didn world he 6 the things th was nobody signed daughter thing He our that ome that Lik mentioned Wood You di Mr out ö Arnold put

the uo went They Lois as age same the about ust ether tog Yes schoolbus ·M:

ight br very cd She with along get to girl hard t she? Was Lois asn ö no pers

One student ook ather nts ven the honor tud like CO) wouldn the rage Was was she she she JSL day maybe think next don't The They mothe bus MAS ou the daughte well uo Arnold? peak Yes mv than vould :M She Mrs Mrs more she ö vou any day at

nicer had have couldn't you lovely Was era dh -M nding Mrs 00

but speech people fright to stage talk to of dn 0 ttl. casi got he C 67 have S 81 efor and way dn all L that would 8e say would She abl she No She Was ·M. it Mrs did ö she

aded he S he she and ever fright speeches tage make 00 to 0 0 earned cas WOL she much the Washington nad she for say in In would 08 ö ÷ didn she

Relief Emergency the Army dn

Mrs. W: She evidently acquired that afterwards

recalling the broken windows? Was The colonel mischief for Arnold boys? into bill get đ me Arnold boys three sent the when Arnold Remember the Did time ö ö one

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Mrs. W: Not too much.

Q: Were they well behaved?

ut Ö came This one broke it They bet behaved. 11,11 others. bill." well the were the by off don't know me they "Send taken say would got id Sa boy allowance rnol one Yes e where and the boy's .W. Mrs incident windows OF

he wasn finances about ŝ busine straitlaced monkey any want Was Arnold 5 didn he ö an

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Mrs. W: No. You'd know that more than I.

anybody who had of peopl ntolerance several an were showed there women he know chased ears drinking problems OL rinking problem rnold had ö who D ಡ

high man score Century that uo 19th anybody đ was of He part short ou cut them He had morality :M He Mrs ö 0 sens

the base guno to so y way important course this was his everybody was throug uo of to criti was probably his most Was because way how station the only from there h ust and cut your throat when we went there al the ested in this most memorable on the base? gentleman be 12 would about comback and dn March Field that was saying was our too that As I said He could smile iailly really đ made 5 chan right-Patterso You see Thi He 5 Arnold te This other ... W.: W: heard which the top. Mrs Mrs Mrs tation ö ·M ö at



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UNITED STATES AR FORCE ACADEMY

Mray, Stanley

22 apr 71

September 18, 1970

M/Gen Stanley T. Wray, USAF(Ret) 1417 Ivanhoe Street Alexandria, VA 22300

Dear General Wray:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovatt, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name coming up in several contexts having to do with the 8th Air Force in the tough days of Schweinfurt-Regensburg. Also, you served under Arnold in A-1 in the latter stages of the war.

In any event you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of some of them at a time and place convenient for you. Local phone OX5-3862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

20314

3 March 1972

Major General Stanley T. Wray, USAF (Ret) 1417 Ivanhoe Street Alexandria, Va 22300

Dear General Wray:

11 * .

The rough transcript of our interview of last April (Re: Arnold Biography) just came through the mill, and I'm following up on an item of discussion - the final rank of General Foulois. The attachment is a reproduction of the cover of his book published in 1969, after he passed away.

I hope to get down to Florida later in the Spring and see General Jim Bevans to follow up on some interesting comments you made on the Personnel side of things.

Otherwise, I'm making progress but not as fast as I expected.

Hope this finds you in good health and spirits.

Sincerely,

Murray Green Office of Air Force History

Encl

FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS TO THE ASTRONAUTS

The Memoirs of Major General Benjamin D. Foulois with colonel c. v. glines, USAF

M/Gen Stanley T. Wray, USAF(Ret) 1417 Ivanhoe Street Alexandria, VA 22300

Dear General Wray:

I'm writing a biography of Ceneral Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

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Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

September 18, 1970

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MAJOR GENERAL STANLEY T. WRAY, USAF

PART I - Narrative

Gunday, 15 September c. He graduated from College the following Stanley Tanner Wray was born in Muncie, Indiana on Sunday, 15 September 1907 at 6:10 A. M. and has been an early riser ever since. He graduated from Muncie Central High School in 1923 and attended Earlham College the following year on the Goddard Scholarship, which had been awarded upon his graduation from tentral High. Further activities were cut short by a bout with typhoid fever until he entered the Military Academy on 1 July 1928. He graduated in 1932, second in a class of 259. As a Second Lieuterant, he was caught in the Comptroller's decision that "You are now and have been on leave without pay since 1 July," so he reported to his first station in July of 1932 as assistant to the District Engineer at Rock Island, Illinois. After a short period of building brush-and-rock wing dams to maintain the six foot channel in the Mississippi River, he took up progressively important assignments around Lock and Dam No. 15 and its attendant ocnstruction activities, going then as Resident Engineer for Lock and Dam No. 11 at Dubque, Iowa in January 1934. In July 1934 he left Dubuque for Cornell University, where he received his Master of Science degree in civil engineering in June of 1935.

In July 1935 he proceeded to the Panama Canal Zone, being promoted to t Lleutenant enroute on the Army transport "Republic". He reported in eadquarters Squadron of the 11th Engineers at Corozal, C. Z. During the two years, he performed all of the normal duties of a company officer o we meadquarters squadron of the llth Engineers at Corozal, C. Z. During the next two years, he performed all of the normal duties of a company officer (duty with troops and, in addition, coached the basketball team up from last place to first place on the Pacific side, and as the Post Athletic Officer he was instrumental in winning the basketball and baseball championships in his final year. First Lieutenant

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In July of 1937 he returned to the Z. I. as a student at the Company Officers course at the Engineers School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. At the conclusion of this course in 1938, he was appointed the Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Massachnetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachnetts. In July of 1939 he was detailed to the Air Corry for three months and proceeded to pilot training at Tuscalooss, Alabama. Although ordered on to basic training at Randolph Field in September, he was re-ordered by the Adjutant General back to Cambridge for another year as Assistant Professor of M S & T at M. I. T.

Florid Apparently the only thing wrong with being an officer in the Corps of Engineers was that particular branch did not have any airplanes, so in Nagust of 1940 he reported back to Tuscaloosa for a quick 20-hour refresher in PT aircraft, and on 1 September entered basic flying at Maxwell Field, Alabama. Graduating from Advanced on 1 February 1941, he was transferred to the Air Corps and ordered to the 29th BOMD Group at MacDill Field, Flord

(penu: 101 Major Gener

served in each of the three In the 29th, which was an expanding unit, he served in each of the thre bomb squadrons and commanded the Headquarters Squadron before he was appointed Executive Officer of the 92nd Bomb Group, which was formed by splitting the 29th. On 15 May 1942 he was appointed the Commander of the 91st Bomb Group at MacDill, and began receiving pilots and ground personnel the following day. He thus formed the 91st Bomb Group, then trained it through its three stages of combat training, with the second stage at Walla Walla, Washington and the third at Bangor, Maine.

He led the first element of his Group to England in late September of 1942, landing at Kimbolten in Bedfordshire. In early October the Group vas moved to Basznagbourne, a permanent RF station, where the final squadron of the 91st arrived in mid-October. Colonel Wray commanded the Group until May of 1943 and earned during this period the Silver Star, the Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Purple Heart, numerous commendations and, as the leader of the famous low-level raid over St. Nazaire in B-17's, was avaried the Distinguished TJVIG Combat Wing and trained it for its early missions over the Comtinent. In August of 1943 he reported to Headquarters Eighth Bomber Command where his experience was put on paper as "Tactics andTechniques of Heavy Bombers."

In September 1943, he returned to the ZI where he became Chief of the Officers Branch, Military Personnel Division, Headquarters AAF. In February 1946 he reported to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where he was a member of the Second Command Class until 1 August, when he returned to Headquarters USAF. In January 1947 he was assigned to Headquarters U.S.A.F. in Burope as the Deputy Inspector General. In January 1946, he became the Chief of Oper-ations and Training in the Directorate of Operations, USAFE, and as such commanded the Cyprus Air Taak Force in the summer of 1948, and in July formed the Third Air Division (Frov.) which received the first B-29 groups in England and later became the Third Air Force. In September, General Wray returned to Germany Where he become Deputy Commander of the 61st Troop Carrier Wing at Rhein/Main Air Base. In November, the 61st and was appointed the Commander. He led the Tyd7th Airlift Wing, and colonel Wray was appointed the Commander. He led the Tyd7th Airlift Wing, and colonel Wray was appointed the Commander. He led the Tyd7th Airlift Wing, and colonel Wray was appointed the Commander. He led the Tyd7th Airlift Wing, and colonel Wray was appointed the Commander. He led the Tyd7th Airlift Wing, and colonel Wray was appointed the Commander. He led the Tyd7th Airlift Wing, and colonel Wray was appointed the Counsel with throughout the Airlift with it was disbanded in Mugust, 1949. For his leadership in this period, he was awarded an Oak Leaf Clustar to the Legion of Merit which had been

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Upon his return to the ZI, he attended the Air War College from August 1949 until June 1950 when he was ordered to Headquarters USAF as the Chief of the Construction Division in the Directorate of Installations. As the Deputy Director of Installations he was made a temporary Brigadier General in September, M955. In July 1954 he reported to Robins Air Force Base, Georgia as the Deputy Commander of the Warner Robins Air Materiel Area, serving in that capacity until December 1955 when he was ordered to New York City to head up the newly formed Electronics Defense Systems Division of the Directorate of Procurement and Production, AMC. As head of this office he was responsible for the execution of the plans for bringing into being the Distant Early Warning Line across the northerramost reaches

Jor General Stanley T. Wray (Continued)

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enter vithin the con Leaf Cluster Semi oject (the ent Ce Ŭ ers at Wright-Pat th of the continent, the construction of the White Alice Projec project of reliable, modern communications in Alaska), and t Automaktion Ground Environment (known as SAGE) system within thin Legion of Nerit, and reported to the Wright Air Developm Air Research & Development Command, on 18 September 1957 as On 15 December 1959, ARDC reorganized and the Center became Wright Air Development Division, with headquarters at Wright AFB, Ohio

the American er professional erican and pilot K. rr Hine COB , Stanley member of t in early 1958 th ences SODS s a me nd Social Sci irried four He 18 Presid general 18 and he He and Promoted to major technical observer. of Political y Engineers ers Alabam Birmingham, Edwin A., Military ociet Acader

December 1959

- Fact Sheet PART II Personal Data Α.

General Wray was born in Muncle, Indiana on 15 September warents, Matthew W. T. (known as "Tan") and Mary Anna Eas oth from Medora, Indiana. His parents, were both from . Wray

Esther , Jr., 2. He was married on 24 September 1932 to the former Hines in Birmingham, Alabma. They have fur sons: Stanley T., born 2 September 1934, Mack K., born 6 October 1937, Edwin A., 16 April 1945, and Richard H., born 10"October 1948.

General Wray's official home address is 1629 Burlington Road, Muncie, Indiana.

Education m

1. General Wray attended grade school and high school in Muncie. He graduated from Central High School at the age of 15 as an honor student. He spent one year at Earlham College on the Goddard Scholarship, won for his high school scholastic standing.

- Schools attended while in Service are: å
- second in class Graduated BS in 1932, U.S. Military Academy,

Graduated MS - 1934-35. Cornell University Graduate School in Civil Engineering. of 259

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- 1937. ts - 1946. - 1950. nool, Fort Belvoir, Virginia -lass, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Maxwell AFB, Alabama - 1949 -School, War College, pu The Engineers Second Com Air War Co

Service Dates Ú

- Assistant to District Engineer, Rock Island Engineering Dist., Rock Island,	Illinois - Resident Engr, Lock & Dam #11, Dubuque, Iowa.	- Cornell University Graduate School	- Co. Officer, 11th Engrs, Corozal, C.Z.	- Engrs School, Fort Belvoir, Va.	- Asst Prof of Mil. Science & Tactics,	MIT, Cambridge, Mass.	- Southeast Air Corps Flying Trng Comd	- 29th Bomb Group, MacDill Field, Fla.	- Exec. Officer, 92nd Bomb Group (H),	MacDill Field, Fla.
July 1932 - January 1934	January 1934 - June 1934	July 1934 - June 1935	July 1935 - July 1937	July 1937 - June 1938	July 1938 - August 1940		August 1940 - Feb. 1941	February 1941 - March 1942	March 1942 - May 1942	

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Hqs USAF Spec. Asst to Dir of Personnel, Hqs AAF
Deputy Inspector General, Hqs USAFE
Chief, Operations & Trng Div., Dep for
Opers, Hqs USAFE (including 48 days as
Commander, Cyprus Task Force).
Comdr, 3d dir Div (Prov.)
Dep Comdr, Gist Troop Carrier Wing,
Rhein/Main AB, Germany
Comdr, 7497th Airlift Wing Chief, Construction DHY, Directorate of Installations, DCS/O, Hqs USAF Dep Dir of Installations, DCS/O, Hqs USAF Dep Comdr, Warner Robins AMA, Robins AFD, Hqs AAF Returning to ZI Chief, Officers Br, Mill Pers Div., Hgs AAF, Washington, D. C. Dep Chief, Mill Pers Div., Hgs AAF Second Command Class, Ft Leavenworth, Comdr, 7497th Airlift Wing Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Comd. Commander, 91st Bomb Group (H) Commander, 103rd Comb Wing (H), Asst Opers Officer, 8th Bomber Alabama Georgia Kansas Major General Stanley T. Wray (Continued) U.K. . 1.1 1 1 1 . 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 16 Jul 48 - 18 Sept 48 18 Sept 48 - 26 Nov 48 15 May 42 - 10 May 43 10 May 43 - 8 Aug 43. 8 Aug 43 - 10 Sept 43 10 Sept 43 - 7 Oct 43 7 Oct 43 - 25 Jul 45 25 Jul 45 - 28 Feb 46 28 Feb 46 - 1 Aug 46 1 Aug 46 - 10 Jan 47 10 Jan 47 - 5 Jan 48 5 Jan 48 - 16 July 48 26 Nov 48 - 6 Aug 49 6 Aug 49 - 24 July 50 24 Jul 50 - 16 Aug 51 51 - July 54 July 54 ...

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Decorations and Medals 'n.

Legion of Merit with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters; Distinguished Flying Cross, Royal Air Force; Silver Star; Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Com-mendation Ribbon with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters.

Promotions ŝ

RANK	
2nd Lt.	
lst Lt.	
Captain	
Major	
Lt. Colonel	
Colonél	
Brigadier General .	
Major General	

PERMANENT

TEMPORARY

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Chief, Electronics Defense Systems Div., Directorate of Procurement & Productions, AMC, w/d station New York City Comdr, Wright Air Development Center (Div) ARDC, W-P AFB, Ohio

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19 Sept 57

15 Dec 55 - 19 Sept 57

Major General Stanley T. Wray (Continued)

F. Unusual Experiences:

60 feet r 15 feet Redmond only scattered around -17 10 or 15 runway sediately, suffering (landing, the pilot's brakes burned out and it top on the short ruway. At the end of the run about 20 feet with volcanic boulders scattered junged off the end of the ruway and hit about of the ruway and skidded an additional 10 or in the aircraft evacuated immediately, sufferi -piloting rip n a short mountain landing a e pilot's brakes burned out Colonel Wray was a drop of about 20 feet with volv The aircraft jumped off the end of th beyond the end of the runway and skid All personnel in the aircraft evacuat minor cuts and a general shaking up. . On 6 August 1942, Lt. in for a landing on a i linon landing, the pi Oregon. Upon possible to s coming

a direct for the an unusual weather condition of a very high front, with tops well above the 30,000 foot level, which was the flight altitude. In penetrating the front through a saddle, the alreraft ran into an area of super-cooled air, where it was so cold that ice formed on the insides of the cooled air, even though most of the heaters on the $B-17^{15}$ were functioning weather could the it impossible to bomb the network on the of their fingers effects General Wray suffered frostbitten legs, hands, arms, and back while leading a combat mission over Emden, Germany on 4 February 1943 He led the first air divigion, which had as its primary target the marshalling yards at Hamm, Germany. The divison pressed on against hospitalized operation fo other sequent difficulties r conditions made it impossible to bomb the primary recret turned left and bombed Emden. Upon return to more than one third of all the combat crews were ho rostbite. Some of the individuals lost the ends of others had Many of the cult, in sub own diffi his foot. themselves 00 BC ator lost VBN evidenced the aircraft turned frostbite and one navigu č have of result which base, with

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MAJOR GENERAL STANLEY T. WRAY

Director, Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council

Born :	Muncie,	Indiana,	September	15.	1.907

Home: 1417 Ivanhoe St., Alexandria, Virginia

Education: Muncie Central High School, 1923; Earlham College (one year on Goddard Scholarship); Graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1932; Graduated from Cornell University Graduate School, M.S. in Civil Engineering, 1935.

Service: Assistant to the District Engineer, Rock Island, Ill., July 1932-Dec. 1934; Resident Engineer for Lock and Dam No. 11, Dubuque, Iowa, Jan.-July 1934; Company Officer, 11th Engineers, Corozal, C.Z., July 1935-July 1937; attended Engineers School, Fort Belvoir, Va., July 1937-June 1938; Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., July 1938-August 1940; Southeast Air Corps Flying Training Command, Aug. 1940-Feb. 1941; 29th Bomb Group, MacDill Field, Fla., Feb. 1941-March 1942; Executive Officer, 92nd Bomb Group (H), MacDill Field, Fla., March-May 1942; Commander, 91st Bomb Group (E), May 1942-May 1943; Commander, 103rd Comb. Wing (H), U.K., May-Aug. 1943; Asst. Operations Officer, 8th Bouber Command, U.K., Aug.-Beptember 1943.

> Upon returning to Wash., D. C. in September 1943, he became Chief, Officers Branch, Military Personnel Div., Hqs. AAF, and subsequently Deputy Chief of that division from July 1945-Feb. 1946. He attended the Second Command Class, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Feb.-Aug. 1946; Special Assistant to Director of Personnel, Hgs. AAF, Aug. 1946-Jan. 1947; Deputy Inspector General, Hqs. USAFE, Jan. 1947-January 1948; Chief, Operations and Training Division and Deputy for Operations, Hqs. USAFE (including 48 days as Commander, Cyprus Task Force), Januery-July 1948; Commander, 3rd Air Division (Prov.), July-September 1948; Deputy Commander, 61st Troop Carrier Wing, Rhein/Main AB, Germany, Sept.-Nov. 1943; Commander, 7497th Airlift Wing, November 1948-August 1949; Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, August 1949-July 1950; Chief, Construction Division, Directorate of Installations, DCS/0, Hqs. USAF, July 1950-August 1951; Deputy Director of Installations, DCS/0, Hqs. USAF, August 1951-July 1954; Deputy Commander, Warner Robins AMA, Robins AFB, Georgia, July 1954-December 1955; Chief, Electronics Defense System Division, Directorate of

Procurement and Productions, ANC, w/d station New York City, December 1955-September 1957; Commander, Wright Air Development Center (Div.) ARDC, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, September 1957-July 1960.

embership: Society of American Military Engineers (and President of the Kittyhank Post), the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, and several other professional societies.

Decorations: LM with 2 OLC; DFC, Royal Air Force; Silver Star; AM with 1 OLC; Commendation Ribbon with 2 OLC.

Date Assigned to SAF: 1 August 1960

Family: Wife - Esther Hines Children - Stanley T., Jr., Mack K., Edwin A., and Richard H.

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Interview - MG Stanley Wray, Alexandria, Va., 22 April 1971

Q: Do you recall your first encounter with Gen Arnold?

- W: I saw him once when he was a LTCOL.
- Q: This is March Field, maybe?

W: No, he was in Washington. I graduated in the Corps of Engineers, I had two football knees. I could not pass the physical for a long time to come into the AF. I was in talking to Gen Eaker, he was then a LTCOL, or maybe a Major. Spaatz was a LTCOL, and he was just about Arnold's rank. Sc I think that Eaker was then a Major. I was getting ready to go to flying school. I had been out about 8 years. I guess, they came to me, I had a lot of push from the AF. They were trying to get more regular officers into the AF, and they had come to me, knowing that I had tried to get into the AF before. They assured me that I would be welcome, I would be well received, as I was by Gen Eaker. But Arnold came by, and he talked to Eaker, and he had Spaatz right with him. He wasn't stationed at Washington that time. This is when we were over in the old Munitions Building.

Q: He must have been visiting in Washington for testimony.

W: I don't know what he was doing in Washington. But I think he was at March Field at that time. I think so. This would have been about 1938, maybe 1939.

Q: It must have been earlier than that, because at the end of '36 he was a General already.

W: He wasn't a general yet when I saw him.

Q: This could have been '34 or '35.

W: 1935

W: Anyway, the Corps of Engineers wouldn't let me go at this particular time. But at the same time, I found out later when I accidentally saw my "Secret" file, that on the edge of this, Gen Spaatz said: "Hap and I bet you a bottle of whiskey he can't make it." And then underneath it, Eaker said: "Eaker and Goodpaster accept this." I don't know whether they ever paid this or not. And I did make it, obviously.

Q: Could this have been right after your Dubuque, Iowa experience?

W: Oh no, it was, I think, right after the time I had gone to Cornell, somewhere along in there. The next time I saw him was when I brought a B-17 down from Bangor, Maine, for Gen Arnold and a British Vice Air Marshal to look at. We were on our way going through what we called then our third stage, getting our B-17s. I brought this airplane down to Bolling and we kept it there one night until, say noon the next day, and went back to Bangor. But that's the only time I ever met him and shook hands with him.

Q: Your records show that you were at Cornell between July '34 and June '35, that's about right.

W: He was at Bolling when I brought this airplane down, and he didn't have much time for me. I was a brand fresh Colonel, I had not lived across the fence from him at March Field. Almost everybody else in my age bracket had. I went back to Bangor and immediately went overseas to war, then I came back into - I didn't intend to come back to Hqs., USAAF. But I came back then and was put in the Hqs for 10 days TDY and while I gave a little talk to the Air Staff about what it was like to fight the war in England. Arnold attended that.

Q: He had several people to come back to give reports on what it was like in combat.

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W: That was the first time I had to walk easy with Arnold. Arnold, as you know, had spent a lot of money with Curtiss for the P-40, and he had spent a lot of money with General Dynamics for the B-24, and the B-24 did not work out well in the European theater. Nor did the P-40. They just weren't up to the German fighters. I would prefer to have B-24s go on a raid with me, than fighter escort. I never saw my fighter escort, so--called, and I don't think they ever gave me much protection until later. After I left, late 1943, early 1944, the fighter protection got much better. In fact, we had already talked to the fighter people as to how they should support us. We had an awful trouble convincing some of the bomber people that they needed fighter protection. But the B-24s, as I say, I had to walk very carefully when Arnold asked me a question about the capability of the B-24. I was frank in the sense that I said the B-24 was a very good airplane for long, low level raids, and it was. It was better than the B-17, for long, over water flight.

Q: It was more suited to the Pacific than Europe?

W: I didn't say that, but that's what I meant. It was.

Q: Did he sense that you were walking on eggs?

W: I think so. I said it couldn't survive with the B-17 at altitude. And it couldn't. The German fighters would just swarm around the B-24s.

Q: You were flying in B-17s?

W: Right, so I couldn't come right out and tell him that he or the Air Staff or somebody, in my opinion, made a mistake in judgment. I couldn't do this.

Q: I'm not sure that it was necessarily a mistake, it was a question of ...

W: We had to have airplanes ...

Q: We had to have airplanes and they got the Willow Run plant and the B-24,

this was Consolidated, Reuben Fleet.

W: There were lots of political reasons why this had to happen.

Q: And they tried to get all kinds of airplanes of all descriptions.

W: I think part of this came from Mr. Roosevelt. He wanted numbers of airplanes.

Q: The 50,000 concept. After a long career in appreciating the Navy, he suddenly came awake to airpower.

W: That's right.

Q: Were you in Europe when Arnold came over around Labor Day 1943?

W: Well, I might have been, but if I was, I didn't see him. I had already been ordered back. I left England on the 9th of Sept 1943.

Q: He was there right about that time.

W: I was down at High Wycombe at that time. I was writing a little treatise on tactics and techniques of heavy bombardment which was supposed to go for the education of group commanders. But I don't think it ever got printed. I can't find it.

Q: While you were down at High Wycombe, he came around Labor Day.

W: He might have been visiting out in the bomber area.

Q: Of course, he was very much upset about the Schweinfurt-Regensburg loss of August 17th. Were you involved in that?

W: No, I wasn't involved in it, except I was pretty disturbed about the loss rate, too. I thought then that something should have been done about it, but it wasn't. Do you want to know why the loss? If people had read my book, they wouldn't have had such big losses. I went over to Ducksburg(?), the RAF testing station. They had an FW-190 and some ME-109s. I talked to the fighter pilots that flew them. They said the best operating altitude was for the German

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fighters were 11,000 feet and 17,000 feet. Their worst altitude was between 21,000 and 23,000, sometimes as high as 24,000 feet, because they had an automatic supercharger, which was dependent upon altitude changes for cutting in and out. So between 21,000 and 23,000 and 23,500 feet, their superchargers were whooping the engines up or dropping them off. But their best operating altitude at 17,000 feet. The leader of the Schweinfurt raid dropped down from 23,000 feet to 17,000 feet. He couldn't have taken a man at a worst altitude. Now most people don't know this about German airplanes, because nobody ever went to the trouble.

Q: Were they briefed on this matter beforehand?

W: I doubt it. I wrote this up before that. But that's what I was saying, is that I don't believe that this little treatise of mine was ever fully typed out and distributed among the group commanders, as it should have been.

Q: It could have been embarrassing?

W: That could have been.

Q: Arnold came over there, and I have been told that he and Eaker had a knockdown, dragout. It wasn't long after that Eaker departed the scene. Eaker was very unhappy to leave, as you know.

W: I'm sure he was. Eaker was a wonderful man. He really fought the battle for daylight bombing. This wasn't Eaker's fault. This was Fred L. Anderson's or Newt Longfellow's, one of those two.

Q: Newt Longfellow had it before?

W: I know, and Freddy Anderson took it over. This was during that change of periods, and Freddy Anderson was there when I left. Freddy Anderson should have had it published. I've tried to look through Freddy Anderson's papers, and I can't find this treatise. I don't know what happened to it. I've looked

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in the 8th AF records out here at the Archives, and down at Maxwell.

- Q: Do you remember the title of it?
- W: "Tactics and Techniques of Heavy Bombardment."
- Q: I'll look in Arnold's papers.
- W: I doubt if he would have them. It was for the European theater.

Q: I want to talk to you about the lack of long range escort until around January 1, 1944. The P-51 with the Merlin engine. We could have had the P-51 a year or two before. Why didn't we appreciate that?

W: I don't know. See, I was not involved in R&D at that time at all. I was not a fighter pilot. I'd never flown a fighter until I got to Wright Field. But the British bought the P-51 off the drawing board. And yet, out people didn't like the P-51.

Q: They didn't like the Allison engine. It wasn't much good. When the British put the Merlin in, the Rolls Royce engine....

W: I was still a group commander and I was one of the ones that was interested in it. I joined in very vigorously in the discussion with the fighters. We went down to a place called Colerne, I'd say about May, down near Bath. And we had the British fighters and all the American bomber commanders and all the American fighter commanders, group commanders that we had in England at that time. RAF Peterson, what we called "Barksdale" Peterson, these were two different Petersons. Zemkie, Don Blakeslee; although Blakeslee was not a group commander yet. There was one other, I think Graham, that were participating from the American side. The British gave their impression first. In our early raids when our Spitfires supposedly would escort us, they - as far as I was concerned sitting down there in the lead bomber - I never did even see them. I never saw an escort fighter. I was

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there, I flew my last mission in May 1943. I never did see an escort fighter. If they were there, they were too far above us, or too far out to the side. Their speed was such that they couldn't stay with us, and they couldn't go very far.

Q: You had Jugs?

W: No, we didn't have any P-47s. They were Spitfires, and there were some P-38s, but I never did see them. At this fighter meeting which was called, because we had been griping about the lack of fighter escort, the fighters got up and gave their problems and we told them our problems, and we agreed on this S-ing that the fighters would do. There would be some fighters, like a rolling barrage. There would be some fighters for a while, and then they would go out in front, and then they would peel off and go back home. But it would be on a time basis that there would be a continuous cover, but fighters could not go slow enough to stay over us, and be able to defend themselves. It was just that simple.

Q: Do you remember the XB-40?

W: Yes, yes.

Q: That petered out?

W: Well, it was too heavy, much too heavy.

Q: Whose idea was that?

W: I really don't know.

Q: I was told the fellow Al Lyon had something to do with that?

W: I don't think so. I think this thing just gradually grew up.

Q: It was sort of a jerry-built idea?

W: Very much.

Q: Would you say that responsibility goes back to the Air Corps Tactical

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School where they felt that the fighter could not keep up with the bomber?

W: Oh, I don't think so. You know, there was this silly thing that they had out for a while, in the B-17 handbook, that when you were attacked by a fighter, you just pushed the throttles forward and climbed away from them. Now this might have been true in 1937 when the first one rolled out, but by the time the Germans were swooping through us, and outclimbing and outrunning us, this was silly.

Q: That's what I mean. You see, there was a period of time when they felt that fighters could not catch the bomber.

W: The B-10 goes faster than the P-12.

Q: This was the doctrine at the time.

W: Well, yes, but it wasn't the doctrine right up in the fighting, scratching people. We knew better. We couldn't outrun a fighter, steadily.

Q: One of the things you said intrigues me, and this brings me to talk about the wing-tanks problem. Waiting for long range escort, we needed some interim idea. One of the ideas was wing-tanks - put wing-tanks on the fighters. The P-47's were coming in, and the P-38's were around. If you gave them an extra couple hundred miles range, we might be able to do it. And no wing tanks. They were using these cardboard wing tanks from the British, but I mean Wright Field took forever and a day getting this developed. Did you have any knowledge of this problem?

W: Not in the sense that it was a problem back in the states. I knew that the fighters were beginning to carry wingtanks. They always said that they had to drop them if they were jumped. This didn't seem to be a problem to me, I don't think we considered this a problem in the theater to the same extent that possibly the people at home who had not fought a war yet. Because it is a

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lot simpler to sit back home here and do a lot of writing on tablets without really getting involved yourself.

Q: You know Arnold had a great respect for guys who were in combat, partly for the reason that he himself never got into combat.

W: That's probably so. I think that's why he wouldn't let me go back to war, I came up here for 10 days and stayed three years. I went in as Chief of the Officer's Branch.

Q: Did he hang on every word you said?

W: I'm not sure. I know that he did.

Q: He seemed to be paying attention?

W: Oh yes, he was, he stayed through the whole briefing. I'm satisfied that he was interested in combat people. But at the same time, Eaker had put me up for a star, and he didn't.

Q: He didn't promote you?

W: I didn't get promoted until 1952, and I was put up in the Spring of 1943.

Q: Eaker put you up?

W: Eaker put me up, and Spaatz also countersigned it.

Q: Why did they take Newton Longfellow out of there?

W: Can I speak freely? He was one of the ones, and I wouldn't say this except he is dead now...

Q: Has he passed on? It must be very recent.

W: Yes, but he just didn't have brains enough to be wing commander.

Q: He lived out there in California.

W: Yes, but he was, I think he was in the El Paso area when he died. No, he was in California when he died. He had retired first into the El Paso

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area. But he did some of the damnest things that the Group Commanders...to protect our people, we had to indulge in subterfuges. He wanted to send us to La Pallice (sub-pens) with 6,000 lbs. of bombs. I did the math, my S-4 - I was just breaking in my S-4 - who turned out later to be a wonderful man, guy named Guy Whetstone. My math said that we couldn't get there with 5,000 lbs. of bombs, because we needed a wing tank. So I called up Ops and told him that I couldn't go to La Pallice without one bomb bay tank. That meant that I was limited to, at the most, 2,500 lbs. of bombs. I thought this was kind of wasteful to send us that far for that little pinprick that we would be dropping.

Q: They had about 2 feet of concrete or more, maybe.

W: We didn't find this out till after the war. We found out later on that we never did hurt a sub pen. The only way we could have hurt a sub pen was to have gone in at low level and skipped bombs into them.

Q: Or maybe catch one coming out?

W: Yes, but then that would be difficult. This is a great error of probability, and it just wouldn't work.

Q: It certainly wasn't worth the risk or the cost, the results you could obtain?

W: Well, Longfellow came on the phone and said we would go and we would carry at least 5,000 lbs of bombs. I said: "Well, I'll have to look into my availability." So about an hour later, I called back and said I'd only have two airplanes available that could go that far based on their fuel consumption records. In the meantime, I'd called around to some of my friends, and said: "What are you going to do?" And they said: "We don't know." So I said: "Well, I'm not going." And I told them why. So everybody called in that they only had

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one or two airplanes available. You needed 10 guns to fight one German fighter. So this made this kind of silly mission.

Q: You are talking when - early 1943?

W: No, late '42, and possibly a little bit earlier. They sent up also to St. Nazaire. I was at 7,000 feet. I was leading the contingent, and I had the 306th Group might behind me. I'm telling you, they told us that the light flak wouldn't get up that high, and it was too low for the heavy flak. The heavy flak, if it went that high, would just hole us and go on through. It wouldn't burst. Well, heavy flak was bursting below us, and the light flak was going above us. We looked like a bunch of Roman candles on the 4th of July. That was a bad one. We only made that one. But these were a couple of things that....

Q: Bad intelligence.

- W: Oh yes, Longfellow's stupidity.
- Q: Colerne meeting?

W: This meeting about the fighters. He had ordered us that the Group Commanders were to go down there by the B-17s. Every one of us - we had our own stations - we were well apart. One airplane could have carried all of us, but it was kind of silly, it was also dangerous to put all the Group Commanders into one airplane. So he said that every Group Commander would take his own airplane.

Q: This is Longfellow?

W: Yes, but I was going to be at High Wycombe by order, some formation. This was not my own choice, but I was going to be at High Wycombe, and that was halfway down there. I was going to be in my staff car, and I wanted to drive from High Wycombe to Colerne. That would have saved 4 engines on a B-17 and lots

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of aviation fuel. Well, Longfellow didn't want you to use a car. I don't know why. There was less auto fuel for internal combustion engines of that small size, as against aviation fuel, which costs a lot more. Maybe they did import more as a percentage. It was easier to bring in bigger "drinkers" with the aviation fuel. Anyway, this had to be personally approved by Longfellow that I would drive a staff car and use about say 10 or 12 gallons of motor fuel, as against 300 or 400 gallons of aviation fuel. Now, this is not...when he greeted us, and asked us, coming in, he talked to us for an hour, and he said next to nothing about the war. All he talked about was the abuses of motor transportation. He was just a small minded man.

Q: I thought to talk to him but I changed my mind. He lived near Mrs. Arnold. Something else you said reminded me. There was this argument over the rotation policy - 25 missions. This thing got kicked around, and then finally somebody in Washington decided there would be no specific number.

W: That was way later in the war. But this got to be a mathematical problem, and the way we finally settled it, in Europe that there would be 25, was based on our loss rate. Our prognosis was that when we based on our expectations at first for the 91st Bomb Group - and I had the best survival rate in Europe, because I was a tough Group Commander, but I was good to my people. I really took care of them. I told them discipline on the ground will save your life in the air. On the 19th of April 1943, the last airplane was going to go out of there for its last mission, because we weren't getting any replacement airplanes, no replacement crews, no nothing, for a long time. Later on, when we began to get replacement crews and airplanes, then it turned out that your survival rate at the end of 25 missions was, according to Operations Analysis, would be on the order of .27. Mathematically, that's what it turned out to be,

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.278. Now, that means that one out of four crews is going to come home. Now, that is not a very good survival rate. It is not conducive to having large numbers run to volunteer for bombers.

Q: Did this create a morale problem?

W: Yes, excpet, I used to get up and wrap the flag around me, and walk up and down the stage. I told my people that we were just the finger in the dike. We had to hold the line until they could build more airplanes, and train more crews. There would be a day when you would fly over Germany and not see a single fighter.

Q: And it happened?

W: Yes, it did happen, and I said, in the meantime, we are not doing much damage, but we've got to stay here and we've got to keep going, and someday we'll build up a force and then we will really make ourselves felt. And my people, I never had a man, not one single crew member, fail for lack of intestinal fortitude. I had one navigator that I relieved from duty, at the request of his friends, because he was having combat dreams. He only had five missions and he got shot up, either he was wounded, or his airplane was really beaten up on every one of his five. On his fifth one, his squadron commander, Eep Myers, who was a wonderful man, he was a commander of the 401st. His navigator, just bend down to do something over his mapboard and a 20 mm shell grazed his neck. It burned him and drew blood, and went on up and hit the control column and burst and hit the femoral artery of this Major Myers. As I say, everybody loved Eep Myers, he was a wonderful man. So this was his last mission, because he was always waking up and sitting up in the middle of his bed at night, screaming. He had so many combat dreams that his friends and cellmates, the people who stayed in his combat hut, a delegation came to

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me and said: "Would you please take him off combat and send him home?"

Q: There is a good reason for it, those fellows....

W: They needed their sleep, and nobody could sleep around this poor guy. He wasn't afraid to go again, but it just got to be a matter of....

Q: When you came home in September 1943, Arnold was going into a phase of doubts about the whole strategic bombing operation.

W: I never heard that. I don't know. He might have been.

Q: See, he and Eaker we having some sessions.

W: O.A. Anderson was involved in a few. I think Arnold flew O.A. out of Washington, because Arnold's mind wasn't fast enough to comprehend Anderson's concepts.

Q: Was he a brilliant guy?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Kuter was doing some planning for him, too, wasn't he at this time?

W: Kuter came over.

Q: He came over, but came right back from North Africa.

W: Yes, but he came over and had the 1st Wing for a while. Then Possum Hansell took it.

Q: He didn't stay very long?

W: No, he went out to North Africa, but he did a good job in that 1st Wing.

Q: After "Black Thursday," this was the October 14th raid, Eaker stopped flying deep missions for 2 or 3 months.

W: He had to. His loss rate was such, and his replacement rate was such that he couldn't support it.

Q: But Arnold was sending a lot of planes in, and that's when he told Eaker that, "if you can't fly the missions, I can send these out to the Pacific," because

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there was a crying need for B-17s and B-24s coming off the line. I think this is when Arnold decided in his own mind that he was going to make the change.

W: Well, in all honesty, I don't think that it made any difference who was commander, I think that it was just plain mathematics. You needed, you had to have 10 x .50 cal guns to match one German fighter.

Q: It wasn't until January 1944 when the P--51s started coming in and then you got the kind of protection?

W: Once in a while they would outfly their fighter protection and take a pasting. But you must remember that in the early days, we only had, I think -I don't know what the facts are - but I would say we only had 2 or 3 real good fighter groups in the German AF opposing us. We had one that was stationed at Abbeville. We called them "The Abbeville Kids." They had the yellow-nosed bastards and they were good.

Q: The ME 109s?

W: The ME 109s, and later on, they also had FW-190s. Of course, as we started going up and around Wilhelmshaven and the Hamburg-Keil area, we began to get some FW-190s. But they would send The Abbeville Kids. I fought them over Hamburg. I just don't think they had enough German fighters to really give us a pasting.

Q: Of course, later on, there were more German fighters.

W: They started bringing in more German fighters. They got better control of their fighters, and they got to the point where they could do a mission against us, say over Holland, land in Germany, and rearm and refuel and be back up 17 minutes later, the same bunch fighting us. And they could do three missions against us going in. And, say, probably to Regensburg or Schweinfurt,

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they could probably do four missions. You could tell the difference, too. the German fighter pilot that I last saw in May 1943, wasn't as good as the ones I saw in November and December of 1942. We were killing off their good people. We weren't shooting **down as many** airplanes as we claimed, but we were getting their good, bright-eyed vigorous combat people.

Q: There is a good deal of criticism, I think Peter Masefield, the writer, about exaggerated claims by the 8th AF, of German planes shot down.

W: I don't think that they were intentionally exaggerated.

Q: Two people seeing one plane shot down and reported two planes. Do you think these were honest mistakes?

W: Oh yes, I don't think there was a calculated policy. In all honesty, I don't think that we are that devious.

Q: This caused Arnold some problems with people like Under Secy Patterson because when they started adding up all these claims - maybe like the Viet Nam war - if all these claims each week of the number of Viet Cong killed, I think it would take about the whole population. So, the same thing with German planes.

W: In combat, you don't look for a long time at one specific airplane. You've got to have a swivel neck, or you don't come back. You will look at an airplane for maybe two seconds, or maybe a split part of a second, and you've got to look somewhere else. When people talk about seeing a B-17 go down and see 3 chutes or 10 chutes, I could never be sure of that. I've been in combat, and I couldn't tell you honestly, how many chutes I had actually seen, because you would look at that airplane and then you would watch the fighter coming in, and then you would turn inside the fighter. The next thing, you'd look down, maybe you would see 3 chutes, and I never did see 10 chutes coming out of a B-17, personally. So I don't think it was intentionally exaggerated. I just

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think that you can't look long enough. You can see one man pop out of a fighter, because I've seen a fighter blow up. I've seen several of them, and that was one fighter, but I couldn't tell you who shot that fighter down.

Q: Sometimes it was an honest mistake, two or three guys made claims of one plane. I wanted to ask you about Tommy Hitchcock. He worked for Amb. Winant, and he is generally given credit for being the first, or among the first, to have recognized the P-51's merit.

W: I don't know anything about that. The only person that I knew was really pushing for the P-51 was Herb Zemke.

Q: He was one of our group commanders. Is he still around?

W: I think so. I think he's still alive.

Q: I'll try to look him up. Did he ever make his star?

W: No.

Q: I didn't see him in the General Officer list.

Q: You say, General Arnold had a list of 80 officers....

W: Over 80, I think it was 84, that they were not to go overseas during WWII, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I had the list. And it had some good men on it, too.

Q: This was a list of people who had stubbed ...?

W: These were full Colonels that were not going to be allowed to go to combat.

Q: Why?

W: Arnold didn't want them to ever be a General. He wouldn't allow them to get in a place where they could achieve any lasting fame, or measure their ability. He just didn't want them to be a General.

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Q: This gets into another area. I've asked this question a number of times and I've gotten different answers. Did Arnold bear grudges? Obviously, he did.

W: Oh boy, I'll say he did. He certainly did. One of these men was Carl Axtater, whom I always thought was a very fine Colonel. I think he would have made a good general, but Carl Axtater was on this list. I don't know what the grudge was about. I think one of the worst things you could do was to be right when Arnold was wrong. And I think this happened to Carl Axtater. Now, there were several, there were probably 20, maybe 30 Colonels on there, who were superannuated. They shouldn't have even been Colonels.

Q: He talked about deadwood. This was his favorite expression.

W: This is true, he had it.

Q: And there were some who were deadwood. But as you may point out, there were some who crossed him in some way?

W: That's right.

Q: In other words, if you were right, and he was wrong, he never forgave you?
W: I believe this is true. But I asked Carl later on, much later, long
after, when he was about to retire, what came on. He had a quarrel with Arnold.

Q: About what?

W: I don't know what it was about, but it was a quarrel, and Carl swore he was right, and the events proved him right, and Arnold never....

Q: Was a guy named Morton McKinnon on the list, too?

W: Yes.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald?

W: Yes, he was on it.

Q: How about, Davenport Johnson made his star, but he and Arnold had a tiff.

W: No, he wasn't on the list.

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Q: How about Douglas Netherwood?

W: Yes, but he wasddeadwood.

Q: Legitimate?

W: There was one Colonel in the AF who was senior to Arnold on the regular list. It doesn't sound right does it. As a Colonel, his serial number was lower than Arnold's.

Q: It wasn't Sue Clagett?

W: No, no, it wasn't Clagett, it wasn't Goodpasture, but it's a name something like it started with "Good" and then some other name. He was down at Eglin at the time. He was senior to Arnold. Of course, by this time, Arnold had five stars, and this man was still a Colonel. But he was on the list.

Q: What was the circumstances of their disagreement, do you know? Was it something in their early careers?

W: Many of these were deadwood. There is no question about that. We had one Colonel out at Wright Patterson who had been 26 years a mess officer, and somehow, in his normal progression he had gone up to be a full Colonel, and a mess officer. That is all he had ever done. Of course, he got caught up some way. He was out of the service before the war was over, before his normal retirement. Then we had another Colonel who used to go off on cross countries, and drink, and not get home for 4 or 5 days late. Something like that, Arnold called me up one day....

O: You were in the General Officer's Branch at the time?

W: No, no, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I don't know who had the General Officer's Branch. But, anyway, I heard the squawkbox go and Arnold said: "Find so and so." I'll think of his name presently. Anyway, "find so

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and so and have him out of the service by 6:00 tonight." I said: "Yes sir." What else could I say? So I started scouting around and we finally found him, I got some other people to help me, and we found him drunk in his bunk at the Ambassador Hotel. He had been in WWI, maybe you will remember his name too. He became a Minister later on.

Q: Lester Maitland.

W: That's right. Lester J. Maitland.

Q: He's in Arizona now.

W: Well, he was out in Michigan as a minister, Les Maitland. He used to, shall I say, exaggerate the circumstances of his engine failure. In other words, he would just get drunk, and not show up.

Q: You know, in his case ...

W: But he left the service by 6:00 at his own request. He retired.

Q: When was that around '44?

W: Yes, '44 or '45. But he had been in WWI, certain people who had been in the war, had the right of requesting retirement.

Q: He and Hegenberger had flown across to Hawaii. You know, Arnold gave him several chances.

W: Yes, I know he did.

Q: He was in Europe, when Arnold came there Labor Day 1943, he was supposed to have reformed, and I think he didn't show up for some occasion.

W: Probably for Arnold's briefing.

Q: Whatever it was, and I think Arnold said send him home. So they sent him home and I think he promised to reform, again.

W: That's right.

Q: Arnold forgave him and then something must have happened, which caused

him to call you on the squawk box. But he forgave him a number of times.

W: But, not that day, he just said: "Out of the service by 6:00."
Q: And that was it. Did he do things like this, impulsive things?
W: Oh yes. One day I had a Colonel show up in my office, and say:
"Colonel, I'm in here on temporary duty," from someplace out in Texas, San
Angelo or something like that. He said: "General Arnold just told me to
take this package up to Bluie West 8." And I said, "Well, then, I'll cut you
a set of orders and you can go to BW 8."

Q: This is Greenland?

W: Yes. And he said: "I'm supposed to be here two nights ago." And I said: "I'm real sorry. If Gen Arnold told you to take this, I can cut a set of orders that will protect you, and you'll be on the 6:00 airplane out of National on your way north this afternoon." And I cut a set of orders and he went to Greenland to deliver this package. Because if General Arnold said it was so, then of course, it is so.

Q: I've had 25 people tell me that Arnold grabbed them in the hall and sent them on some mission halfway around the world, and this was it. You had to go.

W: That's right, this is the only time it occurred when I was physically involved with it.

Q: Did he ever grab you in the hall and ask you to do something alien to your expertise?

W: No, no, never did. I didn't hang around the hall by Gen Arnold's office. I was busy in my own bailiwick.

Q: Was it fairly well known: "Don't be caught in the E-ring?"

W: I don't know. One Sunday I happened to be in my office and I got a

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frantic call from Gen Yount, and he said: "Gen Arnold just called me and said, have every regular officer in the Training Command on his way to war within 20 days. I said: "Do you mean 30 days?" He said: "No, he said 20." And I said: "General, that is the worst thing that could happen." I said: "Now, I'm a great believer in regular officers have a democratic chance to go to war, except certain ones I will not approve their orders. But everybody else, all the regular officers, should get a chance to go to war." And I said: "Why don't you and Terry Morrison get up a schedule" - he was Personnel for Yount in the Training Center - I said: "Why don't you get a real good program going of so many officers per month to go to war, so that they will have all gone overseas by such and such a day." And he said: "Well, will Gen Arnold buy it?" And I said: "I think so. If you just do it, and come in here tomorrow with a real good program and a bunch of nice charts. Show your flow and everything." So he did, and Arnold bought it. He just got tired of the fact that Yount wouldn't allow any Regular Officers to go to war. He may have done this for shock, but he meant it. As far as Arnold and Yount were concerned, this was an order.

Q: Arnold had mixed feelings about this, on one hand because he himself was not in combat he was a "softie" on people like Norstad and Kuter, who importuned him and said: "Let me get out there and fight my war." On the other hand, he wanted to keep good men.

W: He had to keep some good men but he didn't have to keep as many as he had.

Q: I wonder what could have triggered this impulsive order you describe?
W: I think that he had just gotten tired....

Q: Of Yount protecting these fellows?

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W: Yes, because a lot of Regular Officers would write into Arnold and say: "Please let me go to war." Of course, if they weren't on the roster, he would try to do something about it. But he was given to things like that.

Q: How about a guy named Clinton W. Howard - Jan Howard?

W: No, doesn't ring a bell.

Q: You say there were 80 some officers...?

W: I think about 84 on the list.

Q: And he would not relent with any of these fellows?

W: He never did, as far as I know. And if he found out about any one of them being overseas, he had him back within just days. I mean, don't give them 2 weeks. They were just "zap" and they were out of there. And then I would have to send them back to the command that had originally certified them as being suitable for overseas.

Q: Were you working for Bevans at this time?

W: Yes.

Q: Was he your boss?

W: Yes, as I say, Arnold was given to not telling Bevans what he was doing. He just...I didn't know he was on his squawk box. My flag would flip and here was Arnold saying: "Do so and so." And then, I would tell Gen Bevans what I was doing. I was working for Pinky Wetzel, really.

Q: I talked to both of them. I talked to Wetzel in NJ and Bevans in Florida. They never mentioned this list of Arnold's.

Q: We are talking about Arnold's little list of 84 or so people, and I mentioned that I have been told that Arnold did things in the Personnel area in an impersonal way.

W: No, that is not true. He was quite often very personal. As I say,

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somewhere close to 30 of these 84, in my opinion, were deadwood, of my knowledge. Now there could have been more than that deadwood. But in my own mind, also, there were 4 or 5 that I considered very topnotch officers. Now, all of these were Colonels but one. There was one Major on there, I can't remember. I should. It was so unusual.

Q: These four men, in your opinion, had great ability.

W: Four or five, I was surprised that they weren't already generals, they were very senior colonels.

Q: Do you memember names?

W: No, the only one I remember was Carl Axtater, but I can remember some of the others who were on there. There was a guy named Post, like you mentioned, Netherwood, and so forth.

Q: Netherwood was taken out of Latin America. He crossed somebody down there. I don't know what happened. He was taken out, and that about finished him. I'm reminded of something somebody told me that Arnoid, in a sense, showed partiality to those who came up on the West Coast with him.

W: Highly possible.

Q: In preference to those who had come up on the East Coast with Andrews.

W: Whom he didn't know. As I said, I was on the General Officer's list. I was No. 1 on the top of the Colonels who were submitted, I think it was around April 1943. On the note on the side was: "I do not know this man. Do you? HHA." And underneath was "No, BG," Barney Giles, who was the Vice Commander. Had I been known to either one of these. Now, Arnold had met me, but he didn't know me. He had no idea of my capability. Now had I met him in England, say on that time, but I hadn't, because he hadn't been to England.

Q: If you had not been down there running this little treatise and had met him....

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W: It was too late. He had disapproved me. He had taken me off the list, because the Chief always had the last say before it went to the Secy.

Q: Well, it went to Marshall, or did it?

W: It may have, but I don't think so.

Q: Did Marshall exercise any veto on promotions?

W: He could have. I'm sure he did, yes.

Q: You know, Marshall felt that the AAF was much too liberal in awarding DFCs and Air Medals, and what not.

W: I never did get a DFC. I fought a year in England, and I never got a DFC. I got Air Medals and I got a Silver Star. I got a Silver Star for nothing. But three or four times in Europe I really did something wonderful, and I would just be so proud of myself, and I wouldn't even, nobody would even call me up and congratulate me. I didn't get a medal that I thought I really deserved. I think that probably the system, and it was an Army system, was so cumbersome that before you could digest all the facts it didn't count any more.

Q: Some people got a lot of recognition. Take LeMay.

W: Yes, well, LeMay was a good man, and he did a good job.

Q: Right, and he got the recognition. Now, Possum Hansell was more of a thinker, a planner, than he was an operator.

W: Possum was not real strong.

Q: I heard a story about him in the ETO, too.

W: Kuter was the most, I wouldn't say, suave, but he was the most-selfcontrolled and best wing commander in the 1st Wing, that I saw, and I saw them all the way up to Paul Williams.

Q: There were some people who didn't like him.

W: Kuter? Well, I can understand that. He was too smart for them.

Q: Like Spaatz and Eaker didn't think much of him. He was one of Arnold's fair-haired boys, so was Norstad. A lot of people thought maybe he was too good looking?

W: No, I think the thing they objected to on Norstad was, as far as I knew, he never even was a squadron leader. He never was anything except on the staff. I've never even seen him fly an airplane, and I've been in airplanes he was in, and he always flew as copilot. Most of your fighting, biting, scratching guys, they fly as pilot.

Q: How about Arnold, did he like to fly?

W: I don't know. I never was in the airplane with Arnold. He got mad at me a couple of times because one time, we were up at the Army-Notre Dame game, and I had an airplane in at Newark.

Q: During the war?

W: This was, yes, probably it was during the war. That's when they had the Army-Notre Dame game in NY, and I was with a guy named Joe Barron. We were coming back on Sunday, and as far as we were concerned, we thought this was perfectly all right. But we bumped into a MG in the Army who was, Richardson, who was the Comptroller, and he said he had to get back. He had a big meeting that he had to be there. So we said: "Sure, we would be glad to ride you back." We went out to Newark, and everything was socked in, the whole NY area, and the Washington area, everything was socked in. So I went up to the weatherman, and told him, I said: "We can get into Washington between 1 and 3 o'clock." Fact of the matter is that you can really get into almost any place between 1 and 3 o'clock, because there is a lifting of ceiling and improvement in visibility.

Q: Is this AM or PM?

W: In the afternoon. So I said: "If you will call" - I gave him the number

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to call down there. We had a weather officer in the Pentagon. I said: "If you will call them and get a special forecast, and if you would just lift your ceiling about this much. Let us run down the runway. You can close it again." So he said he would do it. He said: "This is your responsibility." And I said; "Sure, we can do it." I wouldn't do it if - I'm a great believer in my own neck, too. So we put this Army MG in the back and Joe Barron and I ran down the runway. We had this special forecast, we got out there and got at the end of the runway. Ran our engines up, and asked if they had any new weather information, and they did. They gave us a new weather thing at Washington, and a new one for Newark. We tore down the runway and lifted our wheels. I don't think we had 300 feet of ceiling. But before we got into the soup, we had an amendment to that. They had put the ceiling back down where it really was. I think it was possibly 200, maybe 150 feet, but we were off and it was just like riding in a featherbed. It was one of the softest instrument flights that I ever made. We came into Washington, Nobody else was flying. We came into Washington National, because we had this Army MG. We had to leave the airplane, because conditions were such that we couldn't fly any place else. We couldn't even take it across the river to Bolling. Arnold was out at Mitchel Field trying to get off. And the next, I guess about Tuesday, Gen Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants an explanation of why you could get out of the NY area and he couldn't." I didn't tell him the whole story, I said: "General, if you will just look at the weather sequences, we got a weather report that allowed us to get out of Newark. We were not at Mitchel; we were at Newark, and we got out on a strictly legitimate weather reading. We came in here, we were coming into National, we had been coming into Bolling; we couldn't have landed at Bolling - because they didn't have the

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capability, the aids that they had at National."

Q: Did you give Arnold the explanation?

W: I gave it to Bevans, and Bevans called up and said: "Stan Wray is here, and he says so and so." You could hear "R-R-R-R." Arnold was mad about this.

Q: Did he ever chew you out?

W: No, he never did.

Q: Did you have much contact with him, or did you go to Bewans, mostly?

W: No, I never did approach him, Arnold, personally. I never went to Arnold, except when I was sent to him.

Q: And then you were in trouble?

W: No. He wanted something, and it was something that he thought I could do and nobody else could do. He had very fixed opinions on things like that. Some of the things he gave me to do were not in my province, but that was all right, I did them.

Q: Did you feel that he was flexible or inflexible in his thinking about things?

W: I don't think Arnold was very flexible. I think he was inflexible.

Q: What was his greatest characteristic in your mind?

W: Just that, his, I don't know if you want to call it stubbornness or strength, but when he had embarked on a plan, he was going to go on and do that.

Q: Even if part of it was wrong?

W: I think if he found out it was wrong, I think he would have changed it. But other people, you know, some of the people we had in those days, were inclined to be a little shilly-shally, but not Arnold. He was not the brightest man in the AF, but he was the one that prosecuted that war.

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Q: When you say that, you mean he was not ideologically motivated, in the sense some people talked about strategic airpower, or a separate AF?

W: Oh, I think he was all in favor of a separate AF, and strategic airpower.
Q: When you say "not the smartest man"?

W: I just don't think he was.

Q: You mean in absorbing briefings?

W: I think, for instance, Gen Andrews was. I was more impressed with Gen Andrews than I was with Arnold. I didn't care much for Gen Brett. He had a great reputation in the AF, but he didn't ring true.

Q: What qualities did Andrews have that Arnold lacked?

W: One of them was his intelligence. I don't know, it's an indefinable thing, but I just never thought Arnold was real smart.

Q: Andrews had an ability to make men follow him?

W: That's right, people liked him.

Q: Did you have some contact with Andrews?

W: Not as much as I had with Arnold.

Q: Hugh Knerr thought very highly of Andrews. Did you know that Knerr was pushing for a separate AF early in the war, right around Pearl Harbor?

W: Sure, yes. He was also a very good man, too.

Q: He and Arnold didn't get along, but Arnold had great admiration for Knerr?

W: Great respect for his brain.

Q: For his ability, and Knerr got promoted, there's a case of a guy on Arnold's list perhaps.

W: No, he wasn't on that list.

Q: He wasn't on that list, but the fact that Arnold regarded him as a man of high ability, overcame the fact that he otherwise would be on the list.

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W: Yes, that's right.

Q: Knerr and Arnold crossed swords on several occasions. The Alaskan flight, problems with Knerr wanting to come back on active duty. Did you know this?

W: No.

Q: Knerr tried to get back on active duty, he had retired, Arnold did not break any world's records getting him back. He was writing these nasty letters to Andrews, about Arnold. And Arnold knew this, yet Arnold....

W: I didn't know that.

Q: Arnold got him back in, and also, I'm sure, must have had a hand in his promotion.

W: Oh, he had to.

Q: Because he became a deputy to Spaatz.

W: He had to approve it.

Q: So this is a case where sheer ability overcame his personal feeling. I wonder if this would be an exception, or are there other cases?

W: I don't know of any other.

Q: You see, here is a case of Knerr having come up with Andrews, whereas some fellows who came up with Arnold like Eaker, Spaatz, McNarney, Dunn, some other people. Did you know Minton Kaye?

W: Yes.

Q: Minton Kaye was one of Arnold's favorites, and he ended up on Arnold's list.

W: I didn't know that.

Q: He was a Colonel, never made General. George Goddard...

W: Yes, George Goddard. George finally made it, of course, years later.

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- Q: He got on Arnold's list, too. Was he on that 84 list?
- W: He was on that list.
- Q: Why?

W: I think possibly because he was sornarrow. All he knew was photography, and he was - with all due regard, I like George Goddard - but he was a bore about photography. Now there are people who will say that II'm a bore about photography and about tapes, but that's all he talked. I mean he didn't say: "Would you like a Scotch and water?" He'd say: "Did you see that picture I had, so and so." That's all he would talk about, photography. He was always rushing into Arnold's office to get such and such approved, and get some more money for his favorite cameras and so on, and he did a wonderful job, no question about it. We had, I think, the best photography in the war.

Q: Right, this strip camera of his

W: Oh, it's wonderful.

Q: Arnold sent him out of Washington. He became the VD officer at Charlotte. Have you seen his book?

W: I've seen his book but I haven't read that part of it. Was that in it?

Q: Yes, and he became VD officer down in Charlotte, NC. He got sent out of Washington. He had a thing going between himself and Minton Kaye. Minton Kaye at that time was a favorite of Arnold, also a photographer. But Kaye was closer to Arnold, so he won out in the struggle.

Q: Let me ask you about Elliott Roosevelt. What do you know about that case. This case was probably in your lap at one time or another?

W: Over and over and over again. Have you asked Eaker about the letters when he used to write in about getting, from North Africa, to get Elliott Roosevelt rated. I never even took these to Arnold, I just sent them back to him, "disapproved," with the explanation of why, because I knew that Elliott Roosevelt

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was not a Colonel, I mean not on flyingsstatus. He was not a pilot. He came into a place called Steeple Morden, which was one of my satellite stations. It was right off, just a little bit southwest of Bassingbourne, which was my station. I happened to be over there one night when Roosevelt, I mean this was his reconn outfit on the way to North Africa. Mrs. Roosevelt was there. Now we had no idea that she was even in England.

Q: This is his mother?

W: Yes, Eleanor Roosevelt. Much to our surprise - we were sitting there drinking, and this woman came out. He had a little suite in this Nissen hut. This woman came out of the bedroom and everybody - you just don't do this then it turned out to be Mrs. Roosevelt, much to our surprise. So I talked to his people, I knew his LTCOLs, and his Majors, and so forth. Elliott didn't do the things that the Congressmen got up and said he did in Congress. I didn't rate him a pilot ever.

Q: And he couldn't become a CO unless he was rated, and then he couldn't get promoted to a General.

W: That's right.

Q: He was recommended by Spaatz and Eisenhower toward the end of the war?W: That's right, and he was finally made.

Q: Arnold opposed this.

W: I didn't know that Arnold opposed it.

Q: Arnold opposed it. Arnold wrote back and said he would get in trouble on it, and they overruled him. They overruled him when he got sick. Remember Arnold had a heart attack?

W: Yes, who did this? I never did rate Roosevelt and I don't know who did, but I know it was along towards the tag-end of the war.

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Q: This is around January 1945. It happened when Arnold had a heart attack.

W: I remember when he was out and had the heart attack. But I still did not rate him.

Q: But he got his promotion. I'm guessing now, and I was up to Hyde Park to look at records, but they wouldn't show me any. I think, simply, Papa ordered it.

W: I think this is highly possible.

Q: Arnold was opposed to it because he felt he would get in trouble.

W: I didn't even ask Gen Arnold or Bevans or Pinky Wetzel. I didn't even refer it up. As far as I was concerned he was not a pilot, and I wouldn't make him a pilot. Too many people had risked their lives to become pilots, and if this was the way you became a pilot, then if he wanted to be a **pi**lot, then he should go through flying school. There were other systems. If he wanted to get in, he could have gotten in as a service pilot, and then converted over.

Q: Wasn't this about the time he sent that dog, remember Blaze?

W: Yes, I remember that, too.

Q: That caused a big stink in Washington?

W: That's real funny. I've been on lots of airplanes with lots of dogs, and nobody ever worries about that. But he shouldm't have thrown people off the airplane to put his dog on. All he had to do was get on the airplane with his dog, and let the dog lay on the floor. Nobody would have cared.

Q: Elliott volunteered for some dangerous missions. You know, the FRANTIC mission, shuttle bombing. They turned him down because they were afraid that the Presiden't son might get captured. He also volunteered to reconoiter the Baffin Bay route. He did several things. If he wasn't the President's son, he probably would have done a lot better, but a lot of people felt he was getting

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privileges because of that.

W: Oh, he was.

Q: Yes, he was and people gave it to him not necessarily because he asked for it. As the President's son, some people bow and scrape, and fall all over themselves to try to do it.

W: We just treated him like any other officer. We didn't give him any special consideration, except, as I say, I wouldn't rate him. This was my province in Washington.

Q: Was there heat put on you to rate him?

W: No, none.

Q: You just didn't send the matter to Arnold?

W: I just didn't send it anywhere except back to Gen Eaker saying, "Disapproved." Now, very few Colonels write to MGs and disapprove it. Since that time there has been a policy in the AF, that if you are going to say noto a MG, another MG signs it.

Q: This was good.

W: Eaker and I quite often laugh about this.

Q: So you took the heat off your bosses?

W: Yes.

Q: What was Pinky Wetzel's job at that time?

W: He was Chief of the Military Personnel Division. I had the Officer's Branch at that time.

Q: And both of you worked for Bevans?

W: Yes.

Q: Where did Trubee Davison fit into this?

W: Trubee was downstairs, I think, as an Asst Secy, sort of thing, for Patterson for Air matters. He was crippled and went around the Pentagon in the

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electric wheelchair.

- Q: Yes, I heard Arnold went around in a wheelchair, too, for awhile?
- W: I didn't see him in a wheelchair, I don't know.

Q: What about Suzy Adkins?

W: She was a character.

Q: Did she serve as a weathervane for you?

W: Not for me. I never had any problems with Arnold. I never got chewed out by him. The time he was ever real brusque with me was when he called me up and said: "You go to such and such a place, and do so and so." And he was quite specific.

Q: There are some people who indicate that she would call them and say: "Today is a good day to ask this question," or "today is a bad day to ask that question."

W: O.A. Anderson used to say this. He'd always check with Suzy before he'd go in to see Arnold. If he had something that was controversial.

Q: Was he a brilliant man?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Was he an iconoclast sort of, ivory tower?

W: No, no, but he was not a great respecter of persons, in the sense that Arnold didn't overawe him at all. I think O.A. was probably thrown out of Arnold's office many times for advocating certain steps that Arnold didn't like.

Q: Was Anderson a bomber man?

W: Yes, I think so. He would knock down anything, I think he had been an observation man, really, because he was a balloonatic.

Q: Yes, he, Stevens and Kepner at one time?

W: Went up in the Explorer 1 and 2, out of Rapid City, SD.

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Q: This was in the 1930s?

W: I don't think, as a pilot, that Anderson had any great feeling except he was the kind of a man who was impersonal in a sense that he just simply thought an idea. He said it was going to take so many groups, bombers and so many groups of fighters, and this is how they will have to be used, and we will have this and so support for them. And although Arnold threw him out on that program, that's the program we ended up with for the war.

Q: I was told that Arnold had a great deal of flexibility in terms of either doctrine or R&D?

W: He may have, but he never showed it to me. I took Leigh Mallory in to see Arnold. I was his sort of his American aide, pushing him around. That's when he had become the commander of ..

Q: AEAF.

W: Right. Arnold was downright rude to him in talking about doctrine. I mean, he just didn't ask him outright: "What do you feel about tactical air doctrine," or anything like that. He attacked him, across the desk. I mean, he was picking his ideas to pieces, and I didn't think this was right, even if Arnold was the Chief of the American Air Force. Leigh Mallory had been given a job which I think Arnold thought an American should have.

Q: That job, after they set it up, it was downrated, and Leigh Mallory didn't win much respect among the Americans, and he was having trouble with Spaatz perhaps at the time.

W: Well, this may have been part of the whole system. I think that they felt that an American should have it.

Q: You know, this may be just before OVERLORD. Would this be about the right time?

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W: Yes, close to it.

Q: And Leigh Mallory was given a mission but he was given no forces. He had no forces under him. He was having trouble with Spaatz, because he wanted all the air forces to go into a tactical mode to start hitting rail centers and tactical targets in preparation for D-Day. Spaatz wanted to hit the oil targets, the strategic targets, and wanted to continue hitting them for a while. There was a big battle that went on for a period. Could this have been the substance of that discussion with Arnold?

W: No, it wasn't. It was his tactical air doctrine. Arnold didn't even bring up strategic air. B-17s and B-24s were not in this discussion at all. It was all fighter bombers.

Q: And what was Arnold's view?

W: As I say, he was downright rude. I don't remember what the issue was, but it was he did not approve of Leigh Mallory's ideas about fighting the war. This man had just been picked by somebody. I don't know who made Leigh Mallory the commander, but I'm sure he didn't have Arnold's vote.

Q: He didn't have a lot of American votes. This was sort of a compromise, they gave Eisenhower the top job and they gave the top Air job to a Britisher. Leigh Mallory had very little to do, really.

W: Leigh Mallory was a fighter man. He was not a real fighter-bomber man.

Q: Right, you know there was another problem. One of Arnold's favorites for a short period of time was this fellow named Bruce Butler. Bruce Butler had been brought in from the 11th AF to become Deputy to Leigh Mallory. He didn't last long in that job. Did you know that?

W: I knew that Bruce Butler came out, but I didn't know that there was friction between he and Leigh Mallory.

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Q: He didn't last long in the job because it must have been friction with somebody, but he was out of there in a very short time.

W: I don't know, maybe he was told not to support Leigh Mallory. Infighting.

Q: He left that job, and I'm trying to think of who they put in. Did they put Vandenberg in that job?

W: Yes, they did.

Q: But Butler who had done a great job up in the 11th AF didn't last very long.

W: There wasn't anything to do in the 11th AF.

Q: Do you remember Davenport Johnson?

W: Yes.

Q: Davenport Johnson had trouble with Arnold, or vice versa, on the high accident rate in the 2nd AF.

W: I don't know about that.

Q: Arnold was claiming that fellows were coming to the ETO and they were not adequately trained in high altitude gunnery and several other precision skills. The 2nd AF was blamed for these shortcomings. I was told that Davenport Johnson who was commanding the 2nd, said: "If you don't like the job I'm doing, relieve me." Arnold said: "You're relieved."

W: I would believe that.

Q: Would he do a thing like that?

W: Yes, he would.

Q: And then he put his friend, Bill Streett in there.

W: Well, I think, Ent was in there for awhile.

Q: Ent came in later. Ent got in the crash.

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W: Yes, he was injured, and I thought then Streett came in. That's my impression.

Q: I can't remember if he preceded Streett or not. But that 2nd AF always gave Arnold a great deal of trouble.

W: Well, this comes back again to the idea as I said before, that I don't think Arnold appreciated the...now, I was in the 8th AF and I know that the people coming to war were not well trained for war. They had to go through another combat training over there. But when I came back here and I talked to people in the Training Command, the Training Command was 2 years behind the war. We had 12 Colonels come over to the ETO, and telling us how people should fire machine guns in combat. They were just, they were insane. Those 12 Colonels went out on a raid the next day, and not one of them came back.

Q: This was in 1943?

W: Yes, all of them were shot down in the Spring of '43.

Q: And you think this was due to?

W: Well, partly that, not lack of training. As far as they were concerned, they were trained all right, but they just were doing the wrong things. They were telling the gunners where to shoot, and that was wrong.

Q: Were you aware that the 2nd AF was giving trouble, causing these problems, or that Arnold was unhappy?

W: No, the only person that I knew to be unhappy with was Lynn out in the 4th AF. Bill Lynn.

Q: Why there?

W: There was something came up one day. Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants," he said, thinking of all the generals, "do you know who would be a good man to replace Bill Lynn in the 4th AF?" I said: "Well, I

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generally don't move Generals around. I move Colonels." But he said: "Yes, you've talked a lot. You know a lot of Generals, and you've given good advice on several occasions." He said: "Give me some advice." So we talked awhile, and I said: "What's the matter with Bill Lynn? He seems like appretty nice Joe to me." "Well," he said: "He and Arnold **are having it** out about something." So I got on the phone and called a friend of mine, a Colonel, and said: "Wonder why Bill Lynn doesn't call Arnold up and apologize." I said: "This is a hell of a time to have to change commanders." So I don't know what happened, but Bill Lynn still stayed as commander. But I don't know; it was just suddenly like that.

Q: He was an impulsive man, you feel?

W: Yes, I'm sure he was.

Q: Did he think out some of these impulses?

W: No. I'm sure he didn't. He just reacted. Now I think it is highly possible that he did plan some of these impulsive things, for their shock value.

Q: You saw him get mad many times?

W: Yes.

Q: Although not at you?

W: I was very fortunate.

Q: I was talking to Gene Beebe, who was his aide, and I asked him about, did Arnold get mad, and he said: "Every day."

W: I was going to say several times a day.

Q: And he got very red? Did he become inarticulate; splutter?

W: No, I never saw him spluttering. He was pretty quick. I never saw him splutter, but he got awful mad.

Q: Was he sharp on his feet speaking?

W: I didn't think so.

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- Q: There are some people who have told me Curly Wolfinbarger told me...W: He used to fly Arnold a lot, too, Curly did.
- Q: That when Arnold was in Marshall's presence, he was like a lamb.

W: Just soft as ; butter. I've gone with Arnold a couple of times to early morning briefings. Gen Marshall used to like to have a briefing at 7:00. Couple of times, things came up on personnel, and I'd have to go in to the Pentagon at 4:30 in the morning, and put the briefing together for him. I'd have to have a girl come in and we would have to run this thing through. I wouldn't hear about it till 6 PM or 7 PM the night before. We'd have that thing ready, and I'd have to be down at 6:30 to give Arnold the quick runout. I had to condense everything into one sheet that went on top of this whole staff study or whole report. You had to condense everything into one sheet, the most important things, so that he could underline....

Q: Did he have a one-page mania?

W: Yes, but this was just a cover now. It was not, he didn't mind if a thing was that thick, but he wanted one sheet on top that he could just sit down there and tell Gen Marshall this is so and so.

Q: Was he a great one for briefing aids, visual aids?

W: He liked them, yes.

Q: Did he ever cut guys off who rambled on in a briefing?

- W: I don't know. I never saw him do that.
- Q: Did he have a reputation for doing this?
- W: Yes.
- Q: If you strayed?
- W: If you didn't know what you were talking about.
- Q: Would he get up and walk out, or just cut you off.

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W: Just cut them off. Get the next person on.

Q: He had these, he liked early morning briefings himself, didn't he?

W: I don't know whether he liked them or he had them, because of Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall was the one who liked them. Of course, Churchill was just the other way. Whenever we had to go brief Churchill, it was in the late afternoon.

Q: Churchill got going in the afternoon and stayed up half the night.

W: Yes, he did.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack?

W: Yes.

Q: Was there sort of unease in the AAF?

W: Yes, there was great unease; a lot of unease.

Q: Why?

W: Well, the war wasn't over yet, and we just didn't....there had been a little bit of unease once before when Gen Brett came into Washington with no assignment. People thought that Brett was a lightweight, and we felt - the boys in the backroom felt - that somebody was thinking about putting Brett in as Chief. The boys in the backroom didn't have a very good opinion of him, didn't like it. This is what led to the unease I think when Arnold had his heart attack. It was not....

Q: There was nobody there?

W: There was nobody there standing there. Giles was not the stuff; he was a lightweight compared to Arnold.

Q: You know, there was a conference, Arnold, when he came back (off record). You never heard about this particular conference in Cannes?

W: No, I never did. I was not that high in the hierarchy.

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Q: This was a very closed-circuit type of thing, and the plan was, let's try to get closer to thennew President than we got to the old President. This was top level stuff. Well, Eaker came into office, and I have been told that Eaker had pretensions to be the successor to Arnold.

W: I never got this impression from him. I think that I am a very good friend of Eaker's and I never did hear this, even bruited. I don't think that people thought that Eaker was that high. It was more likely to be Spaatz, as it turned out to be.

Q: You never felt that Eaker was moving into the job?

W: We felt, in the backroom - as I say, the Colonels - that he was just holding Spaatz' saber till the war was over.

Q: Till Spaatz came back from the Pacific.

Q: You are a friend of Eaker's. Has he ever talked to you about his being shifted out of the ETO?

W: No, we have never discussed that, and we drink pretty strong scotch together.

Q: This is one of the fascinating aspects of the thing. Of course, Eaker never made his fourth star, do you think Arnold had any influence on that?

W: I doubt that very much. He could have, and he would have had to approve a fourth star, but it gets down to the point that - not like we are now - when you had a four star commander, then you had a three star deputy. Now, Arnold was a five star man but there weren't very many five stars passed out.

Q: No, only a half dozen, only in one in the Air Force.

W: That's right, and his vice was a three star for a long time, the vice commander was a three star, Barney Giles. We just didn't have the four stars to pass around like that.

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Q: Let's go back to the time when he was down at Coral Gables and they were shuttling. Pete Peterson, they were shuttling down and they were sending in memos. Was Arnold trying to run the AF from a sick bed?

W: I don't think so. I think he was trying to keep informed, because he couldn't make decisions.

Q: Norstad sort of hints that he was running the Air Force, or running the 20th AF at least.

W: He was the head here in Washington, but he, I doubt that he ran the AF.

Q: He wasn't a decision-maker?

W: I doubt it.

Q: How about Lovett and Arnold? Did Lovett try to pick up some of the ball when Arnold was out?

W: I don't think so; not to the best of my knowledge.

Q: Then, there really was nobody to mind the store?

W: That's right, except the Chief of Operations.

Q: Who would that have been, do you mean AAF?

W: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold have a high regard for Fairchild?

W: I don't know.

Q: He was one of the great brains of the AF, was he not?

W: I don't know, as far as I was concerned, he was not.

Q: Who were the brains of the AAF during this period?

W: Kuter. O.A. Anderson, McNarney, people like that, I never knew Fairchild except when he was acting as the Deputy Chief later on.

Q: Most people had a very high regard for him - just like another fellow everybody had had very high regard for - Horace Hickam, they said if he had

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survived, he'd have gone to the top.

W: Yes, he was a good man. I liked him very much. You see, I was just coming into the AF at the time he got killed.

Q: How about some of these oldtimers who didn't make it. For example, Foulois, after he left as Chief of Staff, was in good health, he lived 30 years later.

W: The whole thing was, in those days, they didn't make, they didn't have two stars after you were the Chief. You may even go back to Colonel.

Q: Right, this is so. But Fechet had some kind of a job during the war. They gave him Decorations & Awards, but they never gave Foulois another job.

W: I don't know why, of course, Foulois was pretty early in the game.

Q: But Fechet was earlier than Foulois. Foulois started flying, but Fechet was the Chief of Staff before Foulois.

W: Yes, and also he was a MG, Foulois was only a BG.

Q: He became a MG when he was in. Foulois was a MG when he was Chief of the Air Corps.

W: Are you sure?

Q: Yes, I'm positive, from 1931-35.

W: I'm not so sure. From talking with Foulois, I went around a lot with Foulois in his later days. He told me that he was never more than a BG.

Q: Are you talking permanent rank or temporary?

W: I don't know, he said he was never more than a BG. Notes Server proof

Q: No, that's not so. I know this to be a fact.

W: He said that this came about through a misapprehension in a Congressional speech, and that he's been listed as a MG in newspapers and so forth.

Q: In his own book he is listed as a MG.

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W: I still say, from what he said, that this is, shall I say, a courtesy?

Q: The Chief of the Air Gorps was a MG and he was Chief of ;the Air Corps for 4 years. But he crossed Roosevelt on the air mail, and he got in trouble, and he also ran as a Republican for Congress. Did you know that?

W: No, I didn't know that.

Q: He ran in 1940 and he lost, and he never had a job during the war. Nothing. They gave him nothing, and of course, Roosevelt was the kind of guy, may be vindictive, like Arnold perhaps. If you crossed Roosevelt, you were dead. He never had a job during the war, but Fechet had a job, and other old timers had a job. I'm thinking of another oldtimer named Jakie Fickel. He was on Arnold's list. Was he on the list?

W: I don't know.

Q: But he never had much of a job. He had the 4th AF early in the war, and they took him out of there, and they never gave him a big job.

W: It's like Henry J. F. Miller. He blabbed about D-Day.

Q: Is this true?

W: Yes.

Q: There was a good reason for taking him out of there?

W: Well, he came back to the States.

Q: Did they break him?

W: Broke him back one rank, I don't think they broke him two ranks. He went out to Wright Field where he had been before.

Q: Do you remember Ed Perrin? He had trouble.

W: Yes, he was a weakling.

Q: And he was in Arnold's office?

W: Yes. He was one of the three bright young boys. I could never understand

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why he was a General. That wasn't my business.

Q: He had a problem, didn't he commit suicide?

W: Yes, he was a drunkard.

Q: How about Tom Hanley, he was one of Arnold's hotshots.

W: He was a good man, I never could understand. He got to be a MG and that's all. I don't know what happened.

Q: I missed seeing him, he passed away.

W: His son was about 2 years behind me at the Academy. I saw a lot of him later in the service. But I always liked old Tom Hanley.

Q: Another fellow who was one of Arnold's hotshots, Reuben Hood. Was he a good man?

W: No, he was another one of these very impetuous kind of a guy. But he wasn't smart.

Q: How about Fred Dean?

W: Freddy Dean was a good boy.

Q: He was Arnold's Exec there for a while. He is still active.

W: Freddy was a good boy, and Bill Hall was doing a fine job. Of course, Bill Hall was quite a womanizer.

Q: Yes, I talked to him, he was one of Arnold's favorites, wasn't he?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: How about Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Yes.

Q: He was a great favorite of Arnolds. Was he smart as well as being a good storyteller?

W: Not real brainy. But I don't want to say "clever," but he was, well, everybody likes Rosie. Everybody would protect him to keep him out of trouble.

Q: Did he get in trouble?

W: Oh sure, a lot of times, Rosie, boy he could drink, but at 6:00 the next morning he was clear-eyed and unafraid.

Q: He was unafraid. He was a guy who....

W: Never lasted through the night, but Rosie O'Donnell and I and a couple of our friends have been on his front lawn at 4:30 in the morning, at Bolling AFB. I'm a great believer of Rosie O'Donnell.

Q: Talking about guys who stood up to Arnold, Rosie O'Donnell stood up to Arnold, didn't he?

W: Yes, he did, but he never got chewed out about it. O.A. Anderson did, but he'd throw him out. I know this.

Q: O'Donnell had a way of getting around him?

W: Well, he'd make it fun and games.

Q: How about Norstad? Did he stand up to Arnold?

W: No, Norstad wouldn't fight his way out of a paper bag.

Q: Other people have said this. And Kuter?

W: Yes, Kuter would. Kuter would say: "Now, General, this is the way that this is. This is the only way it can be done." And Arnold would grope around awhile, but he would buy it. But Kuter wouldn't get loud with Arnold.

Q: Kuter didn't get loud with anybody, I think. He had this quiet, steely, strong way about him which earned him a lot of respect.

W: That's right.

Q: The Steve Ferson thing is supposed to have happened in Arnold's office, but I've had different versions of it. And it may be that they moved him next door into Lovett's office, because they didn't want it known that he died in Arnold's office. Bill Streett - I saw him before he died - said: "No, he died in Lovett's office." But two or three people have told me: "No, he died in

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Arnold's office."

W: This is highly possible. I don't know, I was clear around, oh, by that time, I was in 5A-286. I was not quite with the others. I was almost as far from Arnold's office as I could be.

Q: As you wanted to be?

W: Well, that's where my office was, and it was far enough for me. I never intentionally went to Arnold's office.

Q: He was not your favorite general?

W: No, I had nothing really against him, but I'd been brought up in the old Army and you just don't push yourself in front of the guy who is the Chief. Now, if you are at a cocktail party - I saw Arnold quite often at cocktail parties - I'd go up and talk to him. In fact, he is the one who started me going to some of these high level cocktail parties, because he would ring my office up and say: "Bring your secretary and meet me at the Statler Hilton in such and such a room at 6:00." "Yes, sir." So, I'd be there and the girl would have her note-pad, and he'd take me off to one side and introduce me to somebody and say: "This man has a problem." And in this particular instance this problem was that this very prominent distiller had, head of the distilling outfit, had a son, and it was most unusual for a Jewish boy, for somebody to ask to send a Jewish boy overseas. We generally had cases where uncles would stop Jewish boys, or bribery and so forth, for them not to go overseas. So it was a little unusual for this Mr. Heymann, who was the head of National Distilleries, and he had a son that he said was pretty worthless, and he wanted him to go to war to be made a man of, and I asked him if he knew anybody in North Africa, or Italy, or England and he did. He mentioned two or three generals, and I asked if it would be all right for me to wire, and

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if they knew his son. He said they didn't know his son, but they were sure that they would give him a job. So I dictated a cable to Morrie Nelson overseas in North Africa, and one to Terry Morrison telling, instructing the Training Command to order him....

Q: Terry Morrison was in the Training Command?

W: He was personnel man, Training Command. Then we went right to the Pentagon and I called Terry and told him what was coming down, and to expedite this movement. So within five days after this instance, this son was in North Africa. I'd seen him in NY occasionally. He is in National Distillery or Schenley, as it is called now, and doing a fine job up there. He did a good job overseas.

Q: You know, Arnold had a lot of contact with a fellow named Louis Marx, the toy manufacturer.

W: I know that.

Q: Marx was always doing things for Arnold. When he would come into NY, they would have theater tickets to the shows, have a car, things like this. He also did things for Marshall and he put Arnold and Marshall onto some stock.

W: I don't know about this.

Q: Of course, Arnold used to get, at Christmas time, this whole caseload of toys which would be distributed to perhaps the enlisted men's children. Did you know about that?

W: I didn't know about that. As I say, there were lots of people on the outside, the industrialists who were kind **b** AAF people. They felt that the Generals and some of the Colonels weren't paid enough....

Q: Was Arnold prejudiced about Jews or Catholics?

W: I don't think so. I never heard him say any word of any prejudice towards

any nationality, race, condition or otherwise.

Q: I get the feeling of Arnold being the pragmatist. "If it works, I want it."

W: That's right, I think so.

Q: And this is why I made a comment before about R&D. For example, he was very close to von Karman, a little Jewish man of apparent brilliance.

W: He was almost prejudiced in favor of von Karman.

Q: Because von Karman did a great service for him.

W: And most of the other people in the Air Staff couldn't even understand von Karman when he was talking.

Q: But he was aces high with Arnold?

W: Yes. He was a very important man in R&D and in theory of aerodynamics. Time has proved this.

Q: He did a great job. This <u>Toward New Horizons</u>, this report is a very important thing. It predicted many things which came to pass 20 years later.

W: Of course, we didn't know, even until we got into Germany, all the forward thinking German scientists and aerodynamists. Of course, von Karman came out of Austria, and he probably smelled some of these things going on.

Q: This is why I personally feel that Arnold - I mean you mention something about grudges or that he harbored these thoughts about people - and it's probably true to some extent. Every man is a mixed personality. In some respects, he may harbor a grudge, and in other respects, he was devoid of grudge.

W: I wouldn't say he was devoid of grudge. If you were one of his boys, you had the world.

Q: Right, did he ever admit a mistake, and say: "I made a mistake...."
W: Not in my hearing; he may have.

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Q: Most people say he did not. He simply did something else, without saying he was wrong.

W: That's right. Well, at the end of the war we bought some B-32s. Now, the B-32 was the biggest bucket of bolts that ever came out of Gonsolidated.

Q: Well, it was sort of a backup plane. You know, if the B-29 didn't work out.

W: May be, but as far as we were concerned, you just had to have a net behind the airplane to catch the nuts and bolts that fell off.it. It just never...it flew a few times. But it couldn't have backed up a paper bag.

Q: George Kenney wanted them. They felw for Kenney in the last few weeks of the war. He wanted B-29s and he couldn't get them.

W: I'm sure that he didn't get B-32s into combat for any length of time. They just couldn't fly. It was just impossible.

Q: I want to ask you about two areas. One, we were talking about this other aspect, Benny Meyers. Arnold was really taken with Benny Meyers.

W: That's right.

Q: Why?

W: Well, there's another type of guy. He apparently would canoe, his supply. In other words, he was in the supply side of Wright Patterson and he apparently knew all about procurement and engines, and so forth. Apparently, he was quite a whiz.

Q: Did he give Arnold what he wanted to hear, even if it was not fact?

W: I don't know, I doubt that, I don't think anybody would ever do that. Too many times, those things can come back and bit you.

Q: Did they, in this case?

W: I don't know. What got Benny Meyers in trouble was he had been, bought

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stock when

Q: This came out after the war. Arnold didn't know it at the time.

W: No, nobody could have protected Benny Meyers. Nobody.

Q: Did Arnold have the ability in one of these complex briefings with visual aids and what not, to go right to the heart of a problem, or not? Or mixed?

W: I don'ttthink he was very fast.

Q: Not very fast to get to it.

W: He'd wait and let Pinky Craig, or O.A. Anderson, or somebody....

Q: Was Craig sharp?

W: Pretty much, yes.

Q: I've tried to get to him. He's in El Paso, and he travels around a bit, but I haven't been able to catch him.

W: I thought he had a great regard for Pinky Craig.

Q: He was Plans. Another guy who comes out very well in some of the research I have done, is Loutzenheizer.

W: I didn't know him very well. I know of him, but I didn't know him very well.

Q: Very sharp guy.

Q: How about Jamison? Do you remember him? He was in Plans?

W: Doesn't ring a bell.

Q: Let me get into George Kenney. George Kenney caused a lot of trouble with Personnel. He didn't want to take some of the people Arnold was sending out there and he was trying to promote his own people.

W: That's right.

Q: This might have gotten into your area?

W: It did.

Q: What was the problem there?

W: Well, he had two Colonels that he brought in. Now, these had been flying cadets in the class of about, I guess, 40-1, I think that would be the one. I think they may have been 41-1A. And he had two of them, one of them was a pretty good boy. Now, I knew these boys as flying cadets, they were at Tuscaloosa when I was getting my flying training.

Q: Do you remember their names?

W: No, I don't. One of them was redheaded and very objectionable. The other one was pretty good. But, anyway, George Kenney wanted those made BGs. Now, there was a celebrated case in North Africa of a pearl, who, I think Brett had made a BG. And we always said that he was hurt by dwo desks rushing together. We could never understand why he was made a BG, and when these characters showed up with Kenney, and I've seen the list going through - they always asked me for my comments, and I gave them. So these two showed up in my office, as I was Chief of the Officer's Branch. They were talking pretty big, and I just thought right then: "Boy, if these people are the best that George Kenney has, we are in a bad way in the Pacific." We come back again to the idea of a democracy. You need, everybody needs a little bit of seasoning and he needs to expose himself to the viciositudes of combat. Otherwise, it's not fair to the people that had to go out in the first. Now, I'd fought my war. I wanted to go back. In fact, I was ordered back right at the end of the war, but the President had the discourtesy to call it off. But I came back to the B-29 program; I didn't come back for HQs., USAF. I just got sidetracked. But Kenney wouldn't accept anybody, and this gets to be a close corporation. It doesn't make sense,

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Q: Was Squeeze Wurtsmith one of his boys?

W: No.

Q: He was one in the 13th AF. He was one of his boys, but not one of those you speak of?

W: Not one of those. Squeeze was killed going back down to Tampa, I think, from Selfridge. He hit a mountain.

Q: But he didn't want to take any of the people from Hqs., AAF?

W: He didn't want to take anybody. It wasn't from Hqs., it was from any place. He had his own corporation, and he wanted to keep it like that. That's not the way to run a war.

Q: This caused a great deal of trouble, because Arnold had some young people he wanted to send out there, and get some seasoning. They wanted to go out, and he had no place to send them, or not enough places to send them.

W: He sent them to Europe. But I had the same problem in my group now. When I had the 91st Bomb Group, the Training Command had to send Captains. They hadn't been in any combat, but they would come into my group. They'd come in to Bobingdon, and most of the group commands would n't even accept them as Captains. I'd say: "Send me all you've got; I'll take them." Because they had several hundred hours more flying than my people had. They could learn to fly combat. Nobody else in the Training Command had combat like that. They didn't get combat in the Training Command. We had to train them, if they were 2nd LTs, or 1st LTs.

Q: You talk about George Brett as being considered a lightweight. MacArthur shipped him out of there, and eventually they got Kenney. They didn't know what to do with Brett, so he went out to the Caribbean, and Iguess he stayed most of the war?

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W: Yes, that's right.

Q: And he and Arnold were very close at one timé.. In fact, he was the heir apparent?

W: That's what I say. We were pretty sure of it, but we thought it was going to come just a little bit earlier than too early in the system.

Q: Going back to this other incident you mentioned about the Heymann incident, where Arnold had you come down to the hotel. Referring to Arnold's drinking, did you ever see him drink?

W: Yes. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: What did he drink, an Old Fashioned?

W: Yes, he drank mixed drinks. This is something. I've made a lot of public speeches and that's one thing that I won't do, is drink. Two oldfashioneds are enough for me for an evening. I've heard Arnold. I've seen him drink a couple of old-fashioneds and then get up and try to talk, and you just can't do it. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: Most people that I have talked to, say that they never saw Arnold do any drinking except drink some sherry. He would carry a glass of sherry.

W: I've seen him where he could hardly talk.

- Q: In other words, he didn't do well if he had a couple of drinks?
- W: No, he didn't.

Q: Toward the end of the war, was this after his heart attack?

W: No, long before his heart attack.

Q: Most people say they never saw him drink. The reason I bring this up is, when Westover was killed in 1938, there was a story going around that Arnold drank. This is something that gave the President pause. You know, the President delayed in appointing Arnold for a period of time. Did you know about this?

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W: We just knew that there was a long delay in there. But I didn't know it was because Arnold drank.

Q: The story was around, this may have been. We don't know why the President delayed, but a lot of people think that this gave the President pause. I wonder if there is anything to the fact that "Pa" Watson, who was the President's aide, was Class of '06 and so was Andrews. Andrews was then GHQ AF. I wonder if there is any substance to the possibility that he was trying to get the job for Andrews?

W: There might be. Andrews would have been a better Chief, I think. You come back again. In a time like the war years, you need somebody in there that's almost indestructible, and maybe Arnold was the best man for the job.

Q: Do you think Andrews had the drive that Arnold had?

W: No, I don't. But I think he would have got things done. More people would have been willing to do things, and would have sought out ways to get it done, rather than be pushed, and bullied, and beat over the head with a stick.

Q: Without justifying Arnold, there were some situations that needed bullying?

W: This is true. I say, maybe during the war years Arnold was the one for that job.

Q: Andrews might have been too much the gentleman?

W: He might have been. You can't tell.

Q: Most people I've talked to had admired Andrews more than they did Arnold. But when you get down to talking about it, Arnold may have been the better man for the job.

W: During that time.

Q: Right.

W: I agree with that.

Q: Because the President talked about 50,000 planes when you had practically

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nothing and you had to hit people over the head. For example, calling in the aircraft manufacturers. They didn't want the automobile manufacturers into their business. The automobile manufacturers....

W: ...didn't want to go into it. Singer Sewing Machine didn't want to get into it.

Q: They were making money selling automobiles. So somebody had to hit them over the head. Arnold might have been the best guy to do it?

W: And I'm quite sure that he probably did hit them over the head.

Q: I wrote a script for a movie of Arnold. This is one of these documentary things. I called it "Hap Arnold, Man in a Hurry."

W: Yes, he was in a hurry.

Q: He had all these balls bouncing in the air. When he saw you - if he had confidence in you - if he could give you one of the balls.

W: It didn't matter if he had confidence in you, if you had an AF uniform, he'd send you.

Q: Did he send people, guys he didn't even know?

W: Sure. This Colonel that showed up in my office, that he was sending to Greenland, he wanted an officer courier. This was an officer; this was a Colonel, and he sent him.

Q: I know one man, Gen Grussendorf who was given a job, a contingency plan for the occupation of the Azores. This is when we were trying to get a Central Atlantic station. Grussendorf was in some other area. I don't remember what it was, but he was not competent to handle this contingency plan. He tried to turn it over to somebody else and they said: "If Arnold gave you the job, you'd better go do it." I don't know what happened in this precise case.

W: He probably got some good people to help him and got it turned out.

Q: Yes, then he did give jobs to people who might not have been competent. Then he had no respect for organization, really?

W: I wouldn't say that. He liked to see your organizational things. This is one of the things that he got on me, when I came back from combat was: "Why have we done away with the base setup?" Add I said: "Because we didn't have enough people. We had to put our people from the bomb group, put them to doing support work for the whole base." And I had an Air Exec and a Ground Exec. I said: "I did this because in combat this is the only way I can get it done." And he said: "Have you written this up?" And I said: "Yes, sir." And he said: "Let me see it." So I sent it down to him, and it became the manual for all overseas operations. He liked it after he saw it, but he didn't like it to start with. But I'm not sure that he was not a respector of organization.

Q: But many times he leaped over organizations?

W: Yes, that's right, but he also wanted things organized so that it would be almost automatic.

- Q: How about Hungry Gates? He was his organization man, wasn't he? W: Yes.
- Q: I missed him, he died.
- W: He was a very dry, I would say, unimaginative type.
- Q: Arnold liked him, though?
- W: Yes.
- Q: Why?
- W: They were friends. That's all I could tell you.
- Q: Did he come up with Arnold?
- W: I think so.
- Q: You think he did give some privileges or preference in good jobs to

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guys he knew? Or who had come up the line with him?

W: Oh yes, I'm sure of it.

Q: Although in some cases where, like Jakie Fickel, who was one of his oldtime buddies, he didn't cut the mustard.

W: Well, maybe he didn't measure up.

Q: How about Fred Martin?

W: I always thought Fred Martin did a fine job.

Q: He got hurt at Hawaii, although it wasn't his fault.

W: Yes.

Q: I want to ask you one more question about the Advisory Council. This so-called Council - Norstad and Cabell. He picked these guys out to be his troubleshooters. They'd go around, I think they called them "the Heavenly Twins." Did they interfere in the Air Staff procedure on matters?

W: I never saw it.

Q: He would give them special projects or sort of troubleshooting type jobs?

W: He just didn't confine it to them. He would send Bill Hall out on jobs like this. He sent me once to look at a BG - I won't tell you where -but he didn't like the way the base morale was going, and he just called me on the squawk box, and he said: "Don't put this in writing, and don't tell anybody. Get an airplane, and go to such and such a station, and go to the club, and look around, and come back here Monday, and tell me what you think about this man." He made me a hatchet man on two or three occasions.

Q: Was Norstad his hatchet man?

W: No, I don't think so. I don't think Norstad was ever a hatchet man.Q: Well, Norstad went out and told Hansell that he had to go. Remember

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when Mansell had the 21st BombCom?

W: Yes.

Q: He took him out of there, and put LeMay in. Didn't he serve as hatchet man on that job?

W: I doubt it.

Q: But he had to tell, Norstad had to tell Hansell the bad news.

W: He might have, but he didn't go out there and make the decision, I'm sure of that.

Q: Oh no, I don't mean he made the decision. But Arnold had made the decision, but Norstad had to go out and give Hansell the news.

W: Well, this may be. I don't know.

Q: Who else was Arnold's hatchet man? Or did he have hatchet men?

W: He had them, but he never told me who they were.

Q: Were these "ad hoc" arrangements?

W: Some of them were ad hoc, or it depended. As I say, this was a Personnel matter, he just gave me a squawk on the box and said: "Go and do it." And he didn't even tell Bevans about this. And I didn't either, until after I came back.

Q: How about Bill Streett? Did he use him as a hatchet man?

W: I don't think so. Bill Streett was a fine man.

Q: He was a fine, gentle man, but he did act as troubleshooter for Arnold, didn't he?

W: Could be, I don't know.

Q: Bill Streett never stayed in one job too long. He went to two or three different jobs. He never made a name for himself in any given area, but Arnold put him in some tough jobs like the 2nd AF and the 13th AF, too.

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W: And the Continental Air Command. He did a lot of good things. I always had a lot of admiration for Bill Streett.

Q: I want to ask you about the Comptroller's decision. This is back in the '30s. When the Comptroller decided you were on leave without pay since July 1, 1932. This is the time when they put everybody on furlough.

W: What happened was we graduated on the 10th of June 1932. I would say around the 19th of July, I got a wire that said: "You are now, and have been, since the 1st of July on leave without pay." The Comptroller said - it was quite a long wire, it said that the Adjutant General, I think, had held, or somebody in the Government, had held that the grudation leave was ordinary leave, and therefore it fell under the provisions of the Economy Act.

Q: That was the one that was just passed?

W: This was a Presidential thing. Anyway, everybody had a pay cut. In the service we were absorbing it by just losing leave.

Q: In other words, you worked without getting paid?

W: No, you could get your leave, or even when you worked, you still drew less pay, 15%. Now, one of the ways was, I had been on leave without pay since the first of July. This is without my consent or knowledge. So since they had held this to be ordinary leave, now graduation leave is a special leave, and has been since the Year One. So when they repealed the Economy Act, it must have been a Congressional thing. When they repealed this, I applied for leave, but I went in and told my Colonel. I said: "Now, I've been talking to some of my friends in the Class of '32. We want to make a test case, we don't agree with what the - I think it was the Adjutant General has held, or the Comptroller, whichever one made the decision - we don't agree with him. But if they say that's what it is, then I want my leave on that basis." I had written this thing up so

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that it was under the provisions of the thing that the Comproller General if that's who it was - made this thing, what he had quoted. I wanted my leave on that basis But I also told my Colonel: "Now, I'll be at Birmingham and my phone number is so and so. Would you please get a ruling on this immediately, because we are doing this for the benefit of everybody in the class. If this holds then we'ye got, everybody's got a couple months leave coming with pay. And if it doesn't hold, I want to get back right quick." So he put it in, forwarded it. The next morning he started all this paperwork to Washington. I went on down to Birmingham, and after about - I don't know how many days, whatever days they held, I think it was 8 days - let's say, on the 7th day I got a phone call that said: "Get back." So I got in my little Chevrolet, and tore cff one day from Birmingham to Rock Island, and I reported back in. This was a feeler; it was a test, and I lost. But that's all right. Better for one to lose, than 259 of us.

Q: I want to ask you something else in the Personnel area. This had to do with the training of blacks to fly. Did you have any involvement in that?

W: Not in their training. But I had quite a bit to do with throwing several blacks out of the service under conditions other than honorable. Because, and we had Mr. Truman Gibson come over from the White House. He wanted to know why this was happening, and I said: "Well, Mr. Gibson, here all these are white officers, and this few here are colored officers." And I said: "You can fight it any way you want to, but when we have a man show up at the end of his second stage, or the middle of his third stage training, and he suddenly finds out he doesn't want to go to combat, something is wrong, and he's lacking in moral fiber, and it's not fair to the people who have gone to war, to let this man out under honorable conditions. He's been in the pilot pool,

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possibly for as long as two years, and he's been in the Training Command for a year or so, and now just at the gangplank, he gets gangplant fever." I said: "Now, your colored boys, a lot of them show up with misery in the back." I said: "I was frozen in the war, and I still fly. I know exactly what's wrong with my back, but I don't show up with the misery. You can diagnose my back, but," I said, "we've got a lot of these white officers who have shown up under the same circumstances, and we put them out under conditions other-than-honorable, and as long as I am going to do this to these white officers, I am going to do it to the colored officers." I said: "You can take any one of these, or any one of these, and read it." And he said: "No. I would just like to see the summary page of one of these colored boys." And he picked one where it was just about like I had said. Only this one had been in the system, I think, about three years before he got into pilot training. He had been there a long time, and this was getting down almost to the end of the war, and he had fainted and fallen back. He had been in B-25s, and he just didn't want to fly. Now, we had a bunch of colored boys who were in the 99th Pursuit Squadron - Benny Davis' outfit. But Benny came back and he was retraining them in B-25s, and we had a lot of them fail.

Q: That's the 332nd Composite Wing. But there were reports that some of these boys in the 99th didn't do well, that they turned and ran, when they got into combat situatuions.

- W: This is true. I've heard of this. Now, I have no personal knowledge.
- Q: Reports came back from Italy, the MTO.
- W: I think Benny Davis would tell you this, too.
- Q: What was Arnold's attitude, if any?
- W: I never discussed this with Arnold. This was a policy that had been in

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the AF. You just pilots flew.

Q: Were you aware of the trouble Frank Hunter had at Selfridge Field in 1944?

W: No.

Q: A great deal of trouble there. The Negroes rioted at the base about the Officer's Club. They built a separate club for them against Arnold's orders.

W: No, I didn't know that, but I'm sure Arnold wouldn't want that. Once Benjy Davis got to be an officer, I think the Officer Corps, I never heard anybody say anything against Benjy Davis. For a long time, he was the only colored pilot. But I used to go on trips with Benjy Davis and Red Smith....

Q: Red Smith was another colored?

W: He was a friend of mine. He wasn't colored. But, we'd go with him. We liked to fly with him. He was a good pilot, and he was a good friend.

Q: We have come a long way from that.

W: This was several years ago.

Q: 25 years?

W: Well, this wasn't quite that long ago. This was probably right after the war. Right after the war, well, that is 25 years. We were down at Maxwell, and of course, not everybody had Benjy Davis to dinner in their quarters. But I did. I liked Benjy Davis.

Q: A lot of fellows wouldn't fly with a Negro.

W: Well, I've had some problems since. I've lost a couple of airplanes out at Wright Field. These were not mine. They were base airplanes, and the pilots were not mine, because I didn't have a colored pilot. I had some colored navigators, and one of them was a crackerjack, a hell of a good guy. He would joke about colored boys and white boys, and so forth. People liked him on the

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crew. We had one pilot there who overstretched his gas and who wouldn't land to refuel. It was Dr. Stapp. He was taking Stapp out to either Colorado Springs or Denver to make a speech, and Stapp had to eject. So this is, you can carry this too far. As I say, I never had a colored pilot. I had lots of colored officers working for me, most of whom were good people. But I had some troublemakers. I was born in Muncie, Indiana, and we had a very firm, but friendly policy. So these people, I just put it on the line, and I'd say, I'd show them this was being recorded, and you can have a copy of the tape if you want it. I always had the colored chaplain come in at the same time, and I would just put it on the line. I'd say: "You produce, or I'll have your ears." And I'd lay it right out, No.1, No.2.

Q: I think they respected you for it?

W: Not only that, they bucked up because they knew right then they were in trouble.

Q: You have no knowledge of Arnold's attitude on these matters?

W: I don't think that he was prejudiced against Negroes in the AAF.

Q: I think he was in favor of anything that would help him do his job and oppose anything that would not.

W: Anything that hurt his job I think he'd oppose.

Q: I regard him as the total pragmatist, not the ideologae and the doctrinaire.

W: Oh no.

Q: Left that to a guy like Orval Anderson. Arnold was in favor of what would help him do his job and sometimes he misunderstood or misinterpreted what was good for him. I'm sure this happened.

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Interview - MG Stanley Wray, Alexandria, Va., 22 April 1971

Q: Do you recall your first encounter with Gen Arnold?

W: I saw him once when he was a LTCOL.

Q: This is March Field, maybe?

W: No, he was in Washington. I graduated in the Corps of Engineer. had two football knees. I could not pass the physical for a long time to c into the AF. I was in talking to Gen Eaker, he was then a LTCOL, or mayh a Major. Spaatz was a LTCOL, and he was just about Arnold's rank. So I this that Eaker was then a Major. I was getting ready to go to flying school. had been out about '8 years. I guess, they came to me, I had a lot of push fr the AF. They were trying to get more regular officers into the AF, and they had come to me, knowing that I had tried to get into the AF before. They assured me that I would be welcome, I would be well received, as I was by Gen Eaker. But Arnold came by, and he talked to Eaker, and he had Spaatz right with him. He wasn't stationed at Washington that time. This is when we were over in the old Munitions Building.

Q: He must have been visiting in Washington for testimony.

W: I don't know what he was doing in Washington. But I think he was March Field at that time. I think so. This would have been about 1938, and 1939.

Q: It must have been earlier than that, because at the end of '36 he was a General already.

W: He wasn't a general yet when I saw him.

O: This could have been '34 or '35.

W: 1935

W: Anyway, the Corps of Engineers wouldn't let me go at this particular time. But at the same time, I found out later when I accidentally saw my "Secret" file, that on the edge of this, Gen Spaatz said: "Hap and I bet you a bottle of whiskey he can't make it." And then underneath it, Eaker said: "Eaker and Goodpaster accept this." I don't know whether they ever paid this or not. And I did make it, obviously.

Q: Could this have been right after your Dubuque, Iowa experience?

W: Oh no, it was, I think, right after the time I had gone to Cornell, somewhere along in there. The next time I saw him was when I brought a B-17 down from Bangor, Maine, for Gen Arnold and a British Vice Air Marshal to look at. We were on our way going through what we called then our third stage, gett. our B-17s. I brought this airplane down to Bolling and we kept it there one night until, say noon the next day, and went back to Bangor. But that's the only time I ever met him and shook hands with him.

Q: Your records show that you were at Cornell between July '34 and June '35, that's about right.

W: He was at Bolling when I brought this airplane down, and he didn't have much time for me. I was a brand fresh Colonel, I had not lived across the fence from him at March Field. Almost everybody else in my age bracket had. I went back to Bangor and immediately went overseas to war, then I came back into - I didn't intend to come back to Hqs., USAAF. But I came back then and was put in the Hqs for 10 days TDY and while I gave a little talk to the Air Staff about what it was like to fight the war in England. Arnold attended that.

Q: He had several people to come back to give reports on what it was like in combat.

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W: That was the first time I had to walk easy with Arnold. Arnold, as you know, had spent a lot of money with Curtiss for the P-40, and he had spent a lot of money with General Dynamics for the B-24, and the B-24 did not work out well in the European theater. Nor did the P-40. They just weren't up to the German fighters. I would prefer to have B-24s go on a raid with me, than fighter escort. I never saw my fighter escort, so--called, and I don't think they ever gave me much protection until later. After I left, late 1943, early 1944, the fighter protection got much better. In fact, we had already talked to the fighter people as to how they should support us. We had an awful trouble convincing some of the bomber people that they needed fighter protection. But the B-24s, as I say, I had to walk very carefully when Arnold asked me a question about the capability of the B-24. I was frank in the sense that I said the B-24 was a very good airplane for long, low level raids, and it was. It was better than the B-17, for long, over water flight.

O: It was more suited to the Pacific than Europe?

W: I didn't say that, but that's what I meant. It was.

Q: Did he sense that you were walking on eggs?

W: I think so. I said it couldn't survive with the B-17 at altitude. And it couldn't. The German fighters would just swarm around the B-24s.

Q: You were flying in B-17s?

W: Right, so I couldn't come right out and tell him that he or the Air Staff or somebody, in my opinion, made a mistake in judgment. I couldn't do this.

Q: I'm not sure that it was necessarily a mistake, it was a question of ...

W: We had to have airplanes ...

Q: We had to have airplanes and they got the Willow Run plant and the B-24,

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this was Consolidated, Reuben Fleet.

W: There were lots of political reasons why this had to happen.

Q: And they tried to get all kinds of airplanes of all descriptions.

W: I think part of this came from Mr. Roosevelt. He wanted numbers of airplanes.

Q: The 50,000 concept. After a long career in appreciating the Navy, he suddenly came awake to airpower.

W: That's right.

Q: Were you in Europe when Arnold came over around Labor Day 1943?

W: Well, I might have been, but if I was, I didn't see him. I had already been ordered back. I left England on the 9th of Sept 1943.

Q: He was there right about that time.

W: I was down at High Wycombe at that time. I was writing a little treatise on tactics and techniques of heavy bombardment which was supposed to go for the education of group commanders. But I don't think it ever got printed. I can't find it.

Q: While you were down at High Wycombe, he came around Labor Day.

W: He might have been visiting out in the bomber area.

Q: Of course, he was very much upset about the Schweinfurt-Regensburg loss of August 17th. Were you involved in that?

W: No, I wasn't involved in it, except I was pretty disturbed about the loss rate, too. I thought then that something should have been done about it, but it wasn't. Do you want to know why the loss? If people had read my book, they wouldn't have had such big losses. I went over to Ducksburg(?), the RAF testing station. They had an FW-190 and some ME-109s. I talked to the fighter pilots that flew them. They said the best operating altitude was for the German

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fighters were 11,000 feet and 17,000 feet. Their worst altitude was between 21,000 and 23,000, sometimes as high as 24,000 feet, because they had an automatic supercharger, which was dependent upon altitude changes for cutting in and out. So between 21,000 and 23,000 and 23,500 feet, their superchargers were whooping the engines up or dropping them off. But their best operating altitude at 17,000 feet. The leader of the Schweinfurt raid dropped down from 23,000 feet to 17,000 feet. He couldn't have taken a man at a worst altitude. Now most people don't know this about German airplanes, because mobody ever went to the trouble.

Q: Were they briefed on this matter beforehand?

W: I doubt it. I wrote this up before that. But that's what I was saying, is that I don't believe that this little treatise of mine was ever fully typed out and distributed among the group commanders, as it should have been.

Q: It could have been embarrassing?

W: That could have been.

Q: Arnold came over there, and I have been told that he and Eaker had a knockdown, dragout. It wasn't long after that Eaker departed the scene. Eaker was very unhappy to leave, as you know.

W: I'm sure he was. Eaker was a wonderful man. He really fought the battle for daylight bombing. This wasn't Eaker's fault. This was Fred L. Anderson's or Newt Longfellow's, one of those two.

Q: Newt Longfellow had it before?

W: I know, and Freddy Anderson took it over. This was during that change of periods, and Freddy Anderson was there when I left. Freddy Anderson should have had it published. I've tried to look through Freddy Anderson's papers, and I can't find this treatise. I don't know what happened to it. I've looked

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in the 8th AF records out here at the Archives, and down at Maxwell.

Q: Do you remember the title of it?

W: "Tactics and Techniques of Heavy Bombardment."

Q: I'll look in Arnold's papers.

W: I doubt if he would have them. It was for the European theater.

Q: I want to talk to you about the lack of long range escort until around January 1, 1944. The P-51 with the Merlin engine. We could have had the P-51 a year or two before. Why didn't we appreciate that?

W: I don't know. See, I was not involved in R&D at that time at all. I was not a fighter pilot. I'd never flown a fighter until I got to Wright Field. But the British bought the P-51 off the drawing board. And yet, out people didn't like the P-51.

Q: They didn't like the Allison engine. It wasn't much good. When the British put the Merlin in, the Rolls Royce engine....

W: I was still a group commander and I was one of the ones that was interested in it. I joined in very vigorously in the discussion with the fighters. We went down to a place called Colerne, I'd say about May, down near Bath. And we had the British fighters and all the American bomber commanders and all the American fighter commanders, group commanders that we had in England at that time. RAF Peterson, what we called "Barksdale" Peterson, these were two different Petersons. Zemkie, Don Blakeslee, although Blakeslee was not a group commander yet. There was one other, I think Graham, that were participating from the American side. The British gave their impression first. In our early raids when our Spitfires supposedly would escort us, they - as far as I was concerned sitting down there in the lead bomber - I never did even see them. I never saw an escort fighter. I was

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there, I flew my last mission in May 1943. I never did see an escort fighter. If they were there, they were too far above us, or too far out to the side. Their speed was such that they couldn't stay with us, and they couldn't go very far.

Q: You had Jugs?

W: No, we didn't have any P-47s. They were Spitfires, and there were some P-38s, but I never did see them. At this fighter meeting which was called, because we had been griping about the lack of fighter escort, the fighters got up and gave their problems and we told them our problems, and we agreed on this S-ing that the fighters would do. There would be some fighters, like a rolling barrage. There would be some fighters for a while, and then they would go out in front, and then they would peel off and go back home. But it would be on a time basis that there would be a continuous cover, but fighters could not go slow enough to stay over us, and be able to defend themselves. It was just that simple.

Q: Do you remember the XB-40?

W: Yes, yes.

Q: That petered out?

W: Well, it was too heavy, much too heavy.

Q: Whose idea was that?

W: I really don't know.

Q: I was told the fellow Al Lyon had something to do with that?

W: I don't think so. I think this thing just gradually grew up.

Q: It was sort of a jerry-built idea?

W: Very much.

Q: Would you say that responsibility goes back to the Air Corps Tactical

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School where they felt that the fighter could not keep up with the bomber?

W: Oh, I don't think so. You know, there was this silly thing that they had out for a while, in the B-17 handbook, that when you were attacked by a fighter, you just pushed the throttles forward and climbed away from them. Now this might have been true in 1937 when the first one rolled out, but by the time the Germans were swooping through us, and outclimbing and outrunning us, this was silly.

Q: That's what I mean. You see, there was a period of time when they felt that fighters could not catch the bomber.

W: The B-10 goes faster than the P-12.

Q: This was the doctrine at the time.

W: Well, yes, but it wasn't the doctrine right up in the fighting, scratching people. We knew better. We couldn't outrun a fighter, steadily.

Q: One of the things you said intrigues me, and this brings me to talk about the wing-tanks problem. Waiting for long range escort, we needed some interim idea. One of the ideas was wing-tanks - put wing-tanks on the fighters. The P-47's were coming in, and the P-38's were around. If you gave them an extra couple hundred miles range, we might be able to do it. And no wing tanks. They were using these cardboard wing tanks from the British, but I mean Wright Field took forever and a day getting this developed. Did you have any knowledge of this problem?

W: Not in the sense that it was a problem back in the states. I knew that the fighters were beginning to carry wingtanks. They always said that they had to drop them if they were jumped. This didn't seem to be a problem to me, I don't think we considered this a problem in the theater to the same extent that possibly the people at home who had not fought a war yet. Because it is a

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lot simpler to sit back home here and do a lot of writing on tablets without really getting involved yourself.

Q: You know Arnold had a great respect for guys who were in combat, partly for the reason that he himself never got into combat.

W: That's probably so. I think that's why he wouldn't let me go back to war, I came up here for 10 days and stayed three years. I went in as Chief of the Officer's Branch.

Q: Did he hang on every word you said?

W: I'm not sure. I know that he did.

Q: He seemed to be paying attention?

W: Oh yes, he was, he stayed through the whole briefing. I'm satisfied that he was interested in combat people. But at the same time, Eaker had put me up for a star, and he didn't.

Q: He didn't promote you?

W: I didn't get promoted until 1952, and I was put up in the Spring of 1943.

Q: Eaker put you up?

W: Eaker put me up, and Spaatz also countersigned it.

Q: Why did they take Newton Longfellow out of there?

W: Can I speak freely? He was one of the ones, and I wouldn't say this except he is dead now...

Q: Has he passed on? It must be very recent.

W: Yes, but he just didn't have brains enough to be wing commander.

Q: He lived out there in California.

W: Yes, but he was, I think he was in the El Paso area when he died. No, he was in California when he died. He had retired first into the El Paso

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area. But he did some of the damnest things that the Group Commanders...to protect our people, we had to indulge in subterfuges. He wanted to send us to La Pallice (sub-pens) with 6,000 lbs. of bombs. I did the math, my S-4 - I was just breaking in my S-4 - who turned out later to be a wonderful man, guy named Guy Whetstone. My math said that we couldn't get there with 5,000 lbs. of bombs, because we needed a wing tank. So I called up Ops and told him that I couldn't go to La Pallice without one bomb bay tank. That meant that I was limited to, at the most, 2,500 lbs. of bombs. I thought this was kind of wasteful to send us that far for that little pinprick that we would be dropping.

Q: They had about 2 feet of concrete or more, maybe.

W: We didn't find this out till after the war. We found out later on that we never did hurt a sub pen. The only way we could have hurt a sub pen was to have gone in at low level and skipped bombs into them.

Q: Or maybe catch one coming out?

W: Yes, but then that would be difficult. This is a great error of probability, and it just wouldn't work.

Q: It certainly wasn't worth the risk or the cost, the results you could obtain?

W: Well, Longfellow came on the phone and said we would go and we would carry at least 5,000 lbs of bombs. I said: "Well, I'll have to look into my availability." So about an hour later, I called back and said I'd only have two airplanes available that could go that far based on their fuel consumption records. In the meantime, I'd called around to some of my friends, and said: "What are you going to do?" And they said: "We don't know." So I said: "Well, I'm not going." And I told them why. So everybody called in that they only had

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one or two airplanes available. You needed 10 guns to fight one German fighter. So this made this kind of silly mission.

Q: You are talking when - early 1943?

W: No, late '42, and possibly a little bit earlier. They sent up also to St. Nazaire. I was at 7,000 feet. I was leading the contingent, and I had the 306th Group right behind me. I'm telling you, they told us that the light flak wouldn't get up that high, and it was too low for the heavy flak. The heavy flak, if it went that high, would just hole us and go on through. It wouldn't burst. Well, heavy flak was bursting below us, and the light flak was going above us. We looked like a bunch of Roman candles on the 4th of July. That was a bad one. We only made that one. But these were a couple of things that....

Q: Bad intelligence.

W: Oh yes, Longfellow's stupidity.

Q: Colerne meeting?

W: This meeting about the fighters. He had ordered us that the Group Commanders were to go down there by the B-17s. Every one of us - we had our own stations - we were well apart. One airplane could have carried all of us, but it was kind of silly, it was also dangerous to put all the Group Commanders into one airplane. So he said that every Group Commander would take his own airplane.

Q: This is Longfellow?

W: Yes, but I was going to be at High Wycombe by order, some formation. This was not my own choice, but I was going to be at High Wycombe, and that was halfway down there. I was going to be in my staff car, and I wanted to drive from High Wycombe to Colerne. That would have saved 4 engines on a B-17 and lots

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of aviation fuel. Well, Longfellow didn't want you to use a car. I don't know why. There was less auto fuel for internal combustion engines of that small size, as against aviation fuel, which costs a lot more. Maybe they did import more as a percentage. It was easier to bring in bigger "drinkers" with the aviation fuel. Anyway, this had to be personally approved by Longfellow that I would drive a staff car and use about say 10 or 12 gallons of motor fuel, as against 300 or 400 gallons of aviation fuel. Now, this is not...when he greeted us, and asked us, coming in, he talked to us for an hour, and he said next to nothing about the war. All he talked about was the abuses of motor transportation. He was just a small minded man.

Q: I thought to talk to him but I changed my mind. He lived near Mrs. Arnold. Something else you said reminded me. There was this argument over the rotation policy - 25 missions. This thing got kicked around, and then finally somebody in Washington decided there would be no specific number.

W: That was way later in the war. But this got to be a mathematical problem, and the way we finally settled it, in Europe that there would be 25, was based on our loss rate. Our prognosis was that when we based on our expectations at first for the 91st Bomb Group - and I had the best survival rate in Europe, because I was a tough Group Commander, but I was good to my people. I really took care of them. I told them discipline on the ground will save your life in the air. On the 19th of April 1943, the last airplane was going to go out of there for its last mission, because we weren't getting any replacement airplanes, no replacement crews, no nothing, for a long time. Later on, when we began to get replacement crews and airplanes, then it turned out that your survival rate at the end of 25 missions was, according to Operations Analysis, would be on the order of .27. Mathematically, that's what it turned out to be,

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.278. Now, that means that one out of four crews is going to come home. Now, that is not a very good survival rate. It is not conducive to having large numbers run to volunteer for bombers.

Q: Did this create a morale problem?

W: Yes, excpet, I used to get up and wrap the flag around me, and walk up and down the stage. I told my people that we were just the finger in the dike. We had to hold the line until they could build more airplanes, and train more crews. There would be a day when you would fly over Germany and not see a single fighter.

Q: And it happened?

W: Yes, it did happen, and I said, in the meantime, we are not doing much damage, but we've got to stay here and we've got to keep going, and someday we'll build up a force and then we will really make ourselves felt. And my people, I never had a man, not one single crew member, fail for lack of intestinal fortitude. I had one navigator that I relieved from duty, at the request of his friends, because he was having combat dreams. He only had five missions and he got shot up, either he was wounded, or his airplane was really beaten up on every one of his five. On his fifth one, his squadron commander, Eep Myers, who was a wonderful man, he was a commander of the 401st. His navigator, just bend down to do something over his mapboard and a 20 mm shell grazed his neck. It burned him and drew blood, and went on up and hit the control column and burst and hit the femoral artery of this Major Myers. As I say, everybody loved Eep Myers, he was a wonderful man. So this was his last mission, because he was always waking up and sitting up in the middle of his bed at night, screaming. He had so many combat dreams that his friends and cellmates, the people who stayed in his combat hut, a delegation came to

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me and said: "Would you please take him off combat and send him home?"

Q: There is a good reason for it, those fellows....

W: They needed their sleep, and nobody could sleep around this poor guy. He wasn't afraid to go again, but it just got to be a matter of....

Q: When you came home in September 1943, Arnold was going into a phase of doubts about the whole strategic bombing operation.

W: I never heard that. I don't know. He might have been.

Q: See, he and Eaker we having some sessions.

W: O.A. Anderson was involved in a few. I think Arnold flew O.A. out of Washington, because Arnold's mind wasn't fast enough to comprehend Anderson's concepts.

Q: Was he a brilliant guy?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Kuter was doing some planning for him, too, wasn't he at this time?

W: Kuter came over.

Q: He came over, but came right back from North Africa.

W: Yes, but he came over and had the 1st Wing for a while. Then Possum Hansell took it.

Q: He didn't stay very long?

W: No, he went out to North Africa, but he did a good job in that 1st Wing.

Q: After "Black Thursday," this was the October 14th raid, Eaker stopped flying deep missions for 2 or 3 months.

W: He had to. His loss rate was such, and his replacement rate was such that he couldn't support it.

Q: But Arnold was sending a lot of planes in, and that's when he told Eaker that, "if you can't fly the missions, I can send these out to the Pacific," because

there was a crying need for B-17s and B-24s coming off the line. I think this is when Arnold decided in his own mind that he was going to make the change.

W: Well, in all honesty, I don't think that it made any difference who was commander, I think that it was just plain mathematics. You needed, you had to have 10 x .50 cal guns to match one German fighter.

Q: It wasn't until January 1944 when the P--51s started coming in and then you got the kind of protection?

W: Once in a while they would outfly their fighter protection and take a pasting. But you must remember that in the early days, we only had, I think -I don't know what the facts are - but I would say we only had 2 or 3 real good fighter groups in the German AF opposing us. We had one that was stationed at Abbeville. We called them "The Abbeville Kids." They had the yellow-nosed bastards and they were good.

Q: The ME 109s?

W: The ME 109s, and later on, they also had FW-190s. Of course, as we started going up and around Wilhelmshaven and the Hamburg-Keil area, we began to get some FW-190s. But they would send The Abbeville Kids. I fought them over Hamburg. I just don't think they had enough German fighters to really give us a pasting.

Q: Of course, later on, there were more German fighters.

W: They started bringing in more German fighters. They got better control of their fighters, and they got to the point where they could do a mission against us, say over Holland, land in Germany, and rearm and refuel and be back up 17 minutes later, the same bunch fighting us. And they could do three missions against us going in. And, say, probably to Regensburg or Schweinfurt,

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they could probably do four missions. You could tell the difference, too. the German fighter pilot that I last saw in May 1943, wasn't as good as the ones I saw in November and December of 1942. We were killing off their good people. We weren't shooting down as many airplanes as we claimed, but we were getting their good, bright-eyed vigorous combat people.

Q: There is a good deal of criticism, I think Peter Masefield, the writer, about exaggerated claims by the 8th AF, of German planes shot down.

W: I don't think that they were intentionally exaggerated.

Q: Two people seeing one plane shot down and reported two planes. Do you think these were honest mistakes?

W: Oh yes, I don't think there was a calculated policy. In all honesty, I don't think that we are that devious.

Q: This caused Arnold some problems with people like Under Secy Patterson because when they started adding up all these claims - maybe like the Viet Nam war - if all these claims each week of the number of Viet Cong killed, I think it would take about the whole population. So, the same thing with German planes.

W: In combat, you don't look for a long time at one specific airplane. You've got to have a swivel neck, or you don't come back. You will look at an airplane for maybe two seconds, or maybe a split part of a second, and you've got to look somewhere else. When people talk about seeing a B-17 go down and see 3 chutes or 10 chutes, I could never be sure of that. I've been in combat, and I couldn't tell you honestly, how many chutes I had actually seen, because you would look at that airplane and then you would watch the fighter coming in, and then you would turn inside the fighter. The next thing, you'd look down, maybe you would see 3 chutes, and I never did see 10 chutes coming out of a B-17, personally. So I don't think it was intentionally exaggerated. I just

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think that you can't look long enough. You can see one man pop out of a fighter, because I've seen a fighter blow up. I've seen several of them, and that was one fighter, but I couldn't tell you who shot that fighter down.

Q: Sometimes it was an honest mistake, two or three guys made claims of one plane. I wanted to ask you about Tommy Hitchcock. He worked for Amb. Winant, and he is generally given credit for being the first, or among the first, to have recognized the P-51's merit.

W: I don't know anything about that. The only person that I knew was really pushing for the P-51 was Herb Zemke.

Q: He was one of our group commanders. Is he still around?

W: I think so. I think he's still alive.

Q: I'll try to look him up. Did he ever make his star?

W: No.

Q: I didn't see him in the General Officer list.

Q: You say, General Arnold had a list of 80 officers....

W: Over 80, I think it was 84, that they were not to go overseas during WWII, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I had the list. And it had some good men on it, too.

Q: This was a list of people who had stubbed ...?

W: These were full Colonels that were not going to be allowed to go to combat.

Q: Why?

W: Arnold didn't want them to ever be a General. He wouldn't allow them to get in a place where they could achieve any lasting fame, or measure their ability. He just didn't want them to be a General.

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Q: This gets into another area. I've asked this question a number of times and I've gotten different answers. Did Arnold bear grudges? Obviously, he did.

W: Oh boy, I'll say he did. He certainly did. One of these men was Carl Axtater, whom I always thought was a very fine Colonel. I think he would have made a good general, but Carl Axtater was on this list. I don't know what the grudge was about. I think one of the worst things you could do was to be right when Arnold was wrong. And I think this happened to Carl Axtater. Now, there were several, there were probably 20, maybe 30 Colonels on there, who were superannuated. They shouldn't have even been Colonels.

Q: He talked about deadwood. This was his favorite expression.

W: This is true, he had it.

Q: And there were some who were deadwood. But as you may point out, there were some who crossed him in some way?

W: That's right.

Q: In other words, if you were right, and he was wrong, he never forgave you?

W: I believe this is true. But I asked Carl later on, much later, long

after, when he was about to retire, what came on. He had a quarrel with Arnold.

Q: About what?

W: I don't know what it was about, but it was a quarrel, and Carl swore he was right, and the events proved him right, and Arnold never....

Q: Was a guy named Morton McKinnon on the list, too?

W: Yes.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald?

W: Yes, he was on it.

Q: How about, Davenport Johnson made his star, but he and Arnold had a tiff.

W: No, he wasn't on the list.

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Q: How about Douglas Netherwood?

W: Yes, but he was deadwood.

Q: Legitimate?

W: There was one Colonel in the AF who was senior to Armold on the regular list. It doesn't sound right does it. As a Colonel, his serial number was lower than Arnold's.

Q: It wasn't Sue Clagett?

W: No, no, it wasn't Clagett, it wasn't Goodpasture, but it's a name something like it started with "Good" and then some other name. He was down at Eglin at the time. He was senior to Arnold. Of course, by this time, Arnold had five stars, and this man was still a Colonel. But he was on the list.

Q: What was the circumstances of their disagreement, do you know? Was it something in their early careers?

W: Many of these were deadwood. There is no question about that. We had one Colonel out at Wright Patterson who had been 26 years a mess officer, and somehow, in his normal progression he had gone up to be a full Colonel, and a mess officer. That is all he had ever done. Of course, he got caught up some way. He was out of the service before the war was over, before his normal retirement. Then we had another Colonel who used to go off on cross countries, and drink, and not get home for 4 or 5 days late. Something like that, Arnold called me up one day....

Q: You were in the General Officer's Branch at the time?

W: No, no, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I don't know who had the General Officer's Branch. But, anyway, I heard the squawkbox go and Arnold said: "Find so and so." I'll think of his name presently. Anyway, "find so

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and so and have him out of the service by 6:00 tonight." I said: "Yes sir." What else could I say? So I started scouting around and we finally found him, I got some other people to help me, and we found him drunk in his bunk at the Ambassador Hotel. He had been in WWI, maybe you will remember his name too. He became a Minister later on.

Q: Lester Maitland:

W: That's right. Lester J. Maitland.

Q: He's in Arizona now.

W: Well, he was out in Michigan as a minister, Les Maitland. He used to, shall I say, exaggerate the circumstances of his engine failure. In other words, he would just get drunk, and not show up.

Q: You know, in his case ...

W: But he left the service by 6:00 at his own request. He retired.

Q: When was that around '44?

W: Yes, '44 or '45. But he had been in WWI, certain people who had been in the war, had the right of requesting retirement.

Q: He and Hegenberger had flown across to Hawaii. You know, Arnold gave him several chances.

W: Yes, I know he did.

Q: He was in Europe, when Arnold came there Labor Day 1943, he was

supposed to have reformed, and I think he didn't show up for some occasion.

W: Probably for Arnold's briefing.

Q: Whatever it was, and I think Arnold said send him home. So they sent him home and I think he promised to reform, again.

W: That's right.

Q: Arnold forgave him and then something must have happened, which caused

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him to call you on the squawk box. But he forgave him a number of times.

W: But, not that day, he just said: "Out of the service by 6:00."
Q: And that was it. Did he do things like this, impulsive things?
W: Oh yes. One day I had a Colonel show up in my office, and say:
"Colonel, I'm in here on temporary duty," from someplace out in Texas, San
Angelo or something like that. He said: "General Arnold just told me to
take this package up to Bluie West 8." And I said, "Well, then, I'll cut you
a set of orders and you can go to BW 8."

Q: This is Greenland?

W: Yes. And he said: "I'm supposed to be here two nights ago." And I said: "I'm real sorry. If Gen Arnold told you to take this, I can cut a set of orders that will protect you, and you'll be on the 6:00 airplane out of National on your way north this afternoon." And I cut a set of orders and he went to Greenland to deliver this package. Because if General Arnold said it was so, then of course, it is so.

Q: I've had 25 people tell me that Arnold grabbed them in the hall and sent them on some mission halfway around the world, and this was it. You had to go.

W: That's right, this is the only time it occurred when I was physically involved with it.

Q: Did he ever grab you in the hall and ask you to do something alien to your expertise?

W: No, no, never did. I didn't hang around the hall by Gen Arnold's office. I was busy in my own bailiwick.

Q: Was it fairly well known: "Don't be caught in the E-ring?"

W: I don't know. One Sunday I happened to be in my office and I got a

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frantic call from Gen Yount, and he said: "Gen Arnold just called me and said, have every regular officer in the Training Command on his way to war within 20 days. I said: "Do you mean 30 days?" He said: "No, he said 20." And I said: "General, that is the worst thing that could happen." I said: "Now, I'm a great believer in regular officers have a democratic chance to go to war, except certain ones I will not approve their orders. But everybody else, all the regular officers, should get a chance to go to war." And I said: "Why don't you and Terry Morrison get up a schedule" - he was Personnel for Yount in the Training Center - I said: "Why don't you get a real good program going of so many officers per month to go to war, so that they will have all gone overseas by such and such a day." And he said: "Well, will Gen Arnold buy it?" And I said: "I think so. If you just do it, and come in here tomorrow with a real good program and a bunch of nice charts. Show your flow and everything." So he did, and Arnold bought it. He just got tired of the fact that Yount wouldn't allow any Regular Officers to go to war. He may have done this for shock, but he meant it. As far as Arnold and Yount were concerned, this was an order.

Q: Arnold had mixed feelings about this, on one hand because he himself was not in combat he was a "softie" on people like Norstad and Kuter, who importuned him and said: "Let me get out there and fight my war." On the other hand, he wanted to keep good men.

W: He had to keep some good men but he didn't have to keep as many as he had.

Q: I wonder what could have triggered this impulsive order you describe?
W: I think that he had just gotten tired....
Q: Of Yount protecting these fellows?

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W: Yes, because a lot of Regular Officers would write into Arnold and say: "Please let me go to war." Of course, if they weren't on the roster, he would try to do something about it. But he was given to things like that.

Q: How about a guy named Clinton W. Howard - Jan Howard?

W: No, doesn't ring a bell.

Q: You say there were 80 some officers...?

W: I think about 84 on the list.

O: And he would not relent with any of these fellows?

W: He never did, as far as I know. And if he found out about any one of them being overseas, he had him back within just days. I mean, don't give them 2 weeks. They were just "zap" and they were out of there. And then I would have to send them back to the command that had originally certified them as being suitable for overseas.

Q: Were you working for Bevans at this time?

W: Yes.

Q: Was he your boss?

W: Yes, as I say, Arnold was given to not telling Bevans what he was doing. He just...I didn't know he was on his squawk box. My flag would flip and here was Arnold saying: "Do so and so." And then, I would tell Gen Bevans what I was doing. I was working for Pinky Wetzel, really.

Q: I talked to both of them. I talked to Wetzel in NJ and Bevans in Florida. They never mentioned this list of Arnold's.

Q: We are talking about Arnold's little list of 84 or so people, and I mentioned that I have been told that Arnold did things in the Personnel area in an impersonal way.

W: No, that is not true. He was quite often very personal. As I say,

somewhere close to 30 of these 84, in my opinion, were deadwood, of my knowledge. Now there could have been more than that deadwood. But in my own mind, also, there were 4 or 5 that I considered very topnotch officers. Now, all of these were Colonels but one. There was one Major on there, I can't remember. I should. It was so unusual.

Q: These four men, in your opinion, had great ability.

W: Four or five, I was surprised that they weren't already generals, they were very senior colonels.

Q: Do you remember names?

W: No, the only one I remember was Carl Axtater, but I can remember some of the others who were on there. There was a guy named Post, like you mentioned, Netherwood, and so forth.

Q: Netherwood was taken out of Latin America. He crossed somebody down there. I don't know what happened. He was taken out, and that about finished him. I'm reminded of something somebody told me that Arnold, in a sense, showed partiality to those who came up on the West Coast with him.

W: Highly possible.

Q: In preference to those who had come up on the East Coast with Andrews.

W: Whom he didn't know. As I said, I was on the General Officer's list. I was No. 1 on the top of the Colonels who were submitted, I think it was around April 1943. On the note on the side was: "I do not know this man. Do you? HHA." And underneath was "No, BG," Barney Giles, who was the Vice Commander. Had I been known to either one of these. Now, Arnold had met me, but he didn't know me. He had no idea of my capability. Now had I met him in England, say on that time, but I hadn't, because he hadn't been to England.

Q: If you had not been down there running this little treatise and had met him....

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W: It was too late. He had disapproved me. He had taken me off the list, because the Chief always had the last say before it went to the Secy.

Q: Well, it went to Marshall, or did it?

W: It may have, but I don't think so.

Q: Did Marshall exercise any veto on promotions?

W: He could have. I'm sure he did, yes.

Q: You know, Marshall felt that the AAF was much too liberal in awarding DFCs and Air Medals, and what not.

W: I never did get a DFC. I fought a year in England, and I never got a DFC. I got Air Medals and I got a Silver Star. I got a Silver Star for nothing. But three or four times in Europe I really did something wonderful, and I would just be so proud of myself, and I wouldn't even, nobody would even call me up and congratulate me. I didn't get a medal that I thought I really deserved. I think that probably the system, and it was an Army system, was so cumbersome that before you could digest all the facts it didn't count any more.

Q: Some people got a lot of recognition. Take LeMay.

W: Yes, well, LeMay was a good man, and he did a good job.

Q: Right, and he got the recognition. Now, Possum Hansell was more of a thinker, a planner, than he was an operator.

W: Possum was not real strong.

Q: I heard a story about him in the ETO, too.

W: Kuter was the most, I wouldn't say, suave, but he was the most selfcontrolled and best wing commander in the 1st Wing, that I saw, and I saw them all the way up to Paul Williams.

Q: There were some people who didn't like him.

W: Kuter? Well, I can understand that. He was too smart for them.

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Q: Like Spaatz and Eaker didn't think much of him. He was one of Arnold's fair-haired boys, so was Norstad. A lot of people thought maybe he was too good looking?

W: No, I think the thing they objected to on Norstad was, as far as I knew, he never even was a squadron leader. He never was anything except on the staff. I've never even seen him fly an airplane, and I've been in airplanes he was in, and he always flew as copilot. Most of your fighting, biting, scratching guys, they fly as pilot.

Q: How about Arnold, did he like to fly?

W: I don't know. I never was in the airplane with Arnold. He got mad at me a couple of times because one time, we were up at the Army-Notre Dame game, and I had an airplane in at Newark.

Q: During the war?

W: This was, yes, probably it was during the war. That's when they had the Army-Notre Dame game in NY, and I was with a guy named Joe Barron. We were coming back on Sunday, and as far as we were concerned, we thought this was perfectly all right. But we bumped into a MG in the Army who was, Richardson, who was the Comptroller, and he said he had to get back. He had a big meeting that he had to be there. So we said: "Sure, we would be glad to ride you back." We went out to Newark, and everything was socked in, the whole NY area, and the Washington area, everything was socked in. So I went up to the weatherman, and told him, I said: "We can get into Washington between 1 and 3 o'clock." Fact of the matter is that you can really get into almost any place between 1 and 3 o'clock, because there is a lifting of ceiling and improvement in visibility.

Q: Is this AM or PM?

W: In the afternoon. So I said: "If you will call" - I gave him the number

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to call down there. We had a weather officer in the Pentagon, I said: "If you will call them and get a special forecast, and if you would just lift your ceiling about this much. Let us run down the runway. You can close it again." So he said he would do it. He said: "This is your responsibility." And I said: "Sure, we can do it." I wouldn't do it if - I'm a great believer in my own neck, too. So we put this Army MG in the back and Joe Barron and I ran down the runway. We had this special forecast, we got out there and got at the end of the runway. Ran our engines up, and asked if they had any new weather information, and they did. They gave us a new weather thing at Washington, and a new one for Newark. We tore down the runway and lifted our wheels. I don't think we had 300 feet of ceiling. But before we got into the soup, we had an amendment to that. They had put the ceiling back down where it really was. I think it was possibly 200, maybe 150 feet, but we were off and it was just like riding in a featherbed. It was one of the softest instrument flights that I ever made. We came into Washington. Nobody else was flying. We came into Washington National, because we had this Army MG. We had to leave the airplane, because conditions were such that we couldn't fly any place else. We couldn't even take it across the river to Bolling. Arnold was out at Mitchel Field trying to get off. And the next, I guess about Tuesday, Gen Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants an explanation of why you could get out of the NY area and he couldn't." I didn't tell him the whole story, I said: "General, if you will just look at the weather sequences, we got a weather report that allowed us to get out of Newark. We were not at Mitchel: we were at Newark, and we got out on a strictly legitimate weather reading. We came in here, we were coming into National, we had been coming into Bolling; we couldn't have landed at Bolling - because they didn't have the

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capability, the aids that they had at National."

Q: Did you give Arnold the explanation?

W: I gave it to Bevans, and Bevans called up and said: "Stan Wray is here, and he says so and so." You could hear "R-R-R-R." Arnold was mad about this.

Q: Did he ever chew you out?

W: No, he never did.

Q: Did you have much contact with him, or did you go to Bevans, mostly?

W: No, I never did approach him, Arnold, personally. I never went to Arnold, except when I was sent to him.

Q: And then you were in trouble?

W: No. He wanted something, and it was something that he thought I could do and nobody else could do. He had very fixed opinions on things like that. Some of the things he gave me to do were not in my province, but that was all right, I did them.

Q: Did you feel that he was flexible or inflexible in his thinking about things?

W: I don't think Arnold was very flexible. I think he was inflexible.

Q: What was his greatest characteristic in your mind?

W: Just that, his, I don't know if you want to call it stubbornness or strength, but when he had embarked on a plan, he was going to go on and do that.

Q: Even if part of it was wrong?

W: I think if he found out it was wrong, I think he would have changed it. But other people, you know, some of the people we had in those days, were inclined to be a little shilly-shally, but not Arnold. He was not the brightest man in the AF, but he was the one that prosecuted that war.

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Q: When you say that, you mean he was not ideologically motivated, in the sense some people talked about strategic airpower, or a separate AF?

W: Oh, I think he was all in favor of a separate AF, and strategic airpower.

Q: When you say "not the smartest man"?

W: I just don't think he was.

Q: You mean in absorbing briefings?

W: I think, for instance, Gen Andrews was. I was more impressed with Gen Andrews than I was with Arnold. I didn't care much for Gen Brett. He had a great reputation in the AF, but he didn't ring true.

Q: What qualities did Andrews have that Arnold lacked?

W: One of them was his intelligence. I don't know, it's an indefinable thing, but I just never thought Arnold was real smart.

Q: Andrews had an ability to make men follow him?

W: That's right, people liked him.

Q: Did you have some contact with Andrews?

W: Not as much as I had with Arnold.

Q: Hugh Knerr thought very highly of Andrews. Did you know that Knerr was pushing for a separate AF early in the war, right around Pearl Harbor?

W: Sure, yes. He was also a very good man, too.

Q: He and Arnold didn't get along, but Arnold had great admiration for Knerr?

W: Great respect for his brain.

Q: For his ability, and Knerr got promoted, there's a case of a guy on Arnold's list perhaps.

W: No, he wasn't on that list.

Q: He wasn't on that list, but the fact that Arnold regarded him as a man of high ability, overcame the fact that he otherwise would be on the list.

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W: Yes, that's right.

Q: Knerr and Arnold crossed swords on several occasions. The Alaskan flight, problems with Knerr wanting to come back on active duty. Did you know this?

W: No.

Q: Knerr tried to get back on active duty, he had retired, Arnold did not break any world's records getting him back. He was writing these nasty letters to Andrews, about Arnold. And Arnold knew this, yet Arnold....

W: I didn't know that.

Q: Arnold got him back in, and also, I'm sure, must have had a hand in his promotion.

W: Oh, he had to.

Q: Because he became a deputy to Spaatz.

W: He had to approve it.

Q: So this is a case where sheer ability overcame his personal feeling. I wonder if this would be an exception, or are there other cases?

W: I don't know of any other.

Q: You see, here is a case of Knerr having come up with Andrews, whereas some fellows who came up with Arnold like Eaker, Spaatz, McNarney, Dunn, some other people. Did you know Minton Kaye?

W: Yes.

Q: Minton Kaye was one of Arnold's favorites, and he ended up on Arnold's list.

W: I didn't know that.

Q: He was a Colonel, never made General. George Goddard...

W: Yes, George Goddard. George finally made it, of course, years later.

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Q: He got on Arnold's list, too. Was he on that 84 list?

W: He was on that list.

Q: Why?

W: I think possibly because he was so narrow. All he knew was photography, and he was - with all due regard, I like George Goddard - but he was a bore about photography. Now there are people who will say that I'm a bore about photography and about tapes, but that's all he talked. I mean he didn't say: "Would you like a Scotch and water?" He'd say: "Did you see that picture I had, so and so." That's all he would talk about, photography. He was always rushing into Arnold's office to get such and such approved, and get some more money for his favorite cameras and so on, and he did a wonderful job, no question about it. We had, I think, the best photography in the war.

Q: Right, this strip camera of his

W: Oh, it's wonderful.

Q: Arnold sent him out of Washington. He became the VD officer at Charlotte. Have you seen his book?

W: I've seen his book but I haven't read that part of it. Was that in it?

Q: Yes, and he became VD officer down in Charlotte, NC. He got sent out of Washington. He had a thing going between himself and Minton Kaye. Minton Kaye at that time was a favorite of Arnold, also a photographer. But Kaye was closer to Arnold, so he won out in the struggle.

Q: Let me ask you about Elliott Roosevelt. What do you know about that case. This case was probably in your lap at one time or another?

W: Over and over and over again. Have you asked Eaker about the letters when he used to write in about getting, from North Africa, to get Elliott Roosevelt rated. I never even took these to Arnold, I just sent them back to him, "disapproved," with the explanation of why, because I knew that Elliott Roosevelt

was not a Colonel, I mean not on flying status. He was not a pilot. He came into a place called Steeple Morden, which was one of my satellite stations. It was right off, just a little bit southwest of Bassingbourne, which was my station. I happened to be over there one night when Roosevelt, I mean this was his reconn outfit on the way to North Africa. Mrs. Roosevelt was there. Now we had no idea that she was even in England.

Q: This is his mother?

W: Yes, Eleanor Roosevelt. Much to our surprise - we were sitting there drinking, and this woman came out. He had a little suite in this Nissen hut. This woman came out of the bedroom and everybody - you just don't do this then it turned out to be Mrs. Roosevelt, much to our surprise. So I talked to his people, I knew his LTCOLs, and his Majors, and so forth. Elliott didn't do the things that the Congressmen got up and said he did in Congress. I didn't rate him a pilot ever.

Q: And he couldn't become a CO unless he was rated, and then he couldn't get promoted to a General.

W: That's right.

Q: He was recommended by Spaatz and Eisenhower toward the end of the war?

W: That's right, and he was finally made.

Q: Arnold opposed this.

W: I didn't know that Arnold opposed it.

Q: Arnold opposed it. Arnold wrote back and said he would get in trouble on it, and they overruled him. They overruled him when he got sick. Remember Arnold had a heart attack?

W: Yes, who did this? I never did rate Roosevelt and I don't know who did, but I know it was along towards the tag-end of the war.

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Q: This is around January 1945. It happened when Arnold had a heart attack. W: I remember when he was out and had the heart attack. But I still did not rate him.

Q: But he got his promotion. I'm guessing now, and I was up to Hyde Park to look at records, but they wouldn't show me any. I think, simply, Papa ordered it.

W: I think this is highly possible.

Q: Arnold was opposed to it because he felt he would get in trouble.

W: I didn't even ask Gen Arnold or Bevans or Pinky Wetzel. I didn't even refer it up. As far as I was concerned he was not a pilot, and I wouldn't make him a pilot. Too many people had risked their lives to become pilots, and if this was the way you became a pilot, then if he wanted to be a pilot, then he should go through flying school. There were other systems. If he wanted to get in, he could have gotten in as a service pilot, and then converted over.

Q: Wasn't this about the time he sent that dog, remember Blaze?

W: Yes, I remember that, too.

Q: That caused a big stink in Washington?

W: That's real funny. I've been on lots of airplanes with lots of dogs, and nobody ever worries about that. But he shouldn't have thrown people off the airplane to put his dog on. All he had to do was get on the airplane with his dog, and let the dog lay on the floor. Nobody would have cared.

Q: Elliott volunteered for some dangerous missions. You know, the FRANTIC mission, shuttle bombing. They turned him down because they were afraid that the Presiden't son might get captured. He also volunteered to reconsiter the Baffin Bay route. He did several things. If he wasn't the President's son, he probably would have done a lot better, but a lot of people felt he was getting

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privileges because of that.

W: Oh, he was.

Q: Yes, he was and people gave it to him not necessarily because he asked for it. As the President's son, some people bow and scrape, and fall all over themselves to try to do it.

W: We just treated him like any other officer. We didn't give him any special consideration, except, as I say, I wouldn't rate him. This was my province in Washington.

Q: Was there heat put on you to rate him?

W: No, none.

Q: You just didn't send the matter to Arnold?

W: I just didn't send it anywhere except back to Gen Eaker saying, "Disapproved." Now, very few Colonels write to MGs and disapprove it. Since that time there has been a policy in the AF, that if you are going to say no to a MG, another MG signs it.

Q: This was good.

W: Eaker and I quite often laugh about this.

Q: So you took the heat off your bosses?

W: Yes.

Q: What was Pinky Wetzel's job at that time?

W: He was Chief of the Military Personnel Division. I had the Officer's Branch at that time.

Q: And both of you worked for Bevans?

W: Yes.

Q: Where did Trubee Davison fit into this?

W: Trubee was downstairs, I think, as an Asst Secy, sort of thing, for Patterson for Air matters. He was crippled and went around the Pentagon in the

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electric wheelchair.

- Q: Yes, I heard Arnold went around in a wheelchair, too, for awhile?
- W: I didn't see him in a wheelchair, I don't know.

Q: What about Suzy Adkins?

W: She was a character.

Q: Did she serve as a weathervane for you?

W: Not for me. I never had any problems with Arnold. I never got chewed out by him. The time he was ever real brusque with me was when he called me up and said: "You goff to such and such a place, and do so and so." And he was quite specific.

Q: There are some people who indicate that she would call them and say: "Today is a good day to ask this question," or "today is a bad day to ask that question."

W: O.A. Anderson used to say this. He'd always checked with Suzy before he'd go in to see Arnold. If he had something that was controversial.

Q: Was he a brilliant man?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Was he an iconoclast sort of, ivory tower?

W: No, no, but he was not a great respecter of persons, in the sense that Arnold didn't overawe him at all. I think O.A. was probably thrown out of Arnold's office many times for advocating certain steps that Arnold didn't like.

Q: Was Anderson a bomber man?

W: Yes, I think so. He would knock down anything, I think he had been an observation man, really, because he was a balloonatic.

Q: Yes, he, Stevens and Kepner at one time?

W: Went up in the Explorer 1 and 2, out of Rapid City, SD.

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O: This was in the 1930s?

W: I don't think, as a pilot, that Anderson had any great feeling except he was the kind of a man who was impersonal in a sense that he just simply thought an idea. He said it was going to take so many groups, bombers and so many groups of fighters, and this is how they will have to be used, and we will have this and so support for them. And although Arnold threw him out on that program, that's the program we ended up with for the war.

Q: I was told that Arnold had a great deal of flexibility in terms of either doctrine or R&D?

W: He may have, but he never showed it to me. I took Leigh Mallory in to see Arnold. I was his sort of his American aide, pushing him around. That's when he had become the commander of ..

Q: AEAF.

W: Right. Arnold was downright rude to him in talking about doctrine. I mean, he just didn't ask him outright: "What do you feel about tactical air doctrine," or anything like that. He attacked him, across the desk. I mean, he was picking his ideas to pieces, and I didn't think this was right, even if Arnold was the Chief of the American Air Force. Leigh Mallory had been given a job which I think Arnold thought an American should have.

Q: That job, after they set it up, it was downrated, and Leigh Mallory didn't win much respect among the Americans, and he was having trouble with Spaatz perhaps at the time.

W: Well, this may have been part of the whole system. I think that they felt that an American should have it.

Q: You know, this may be just before OVERLORD. Would this be about the right time?

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W: Yes, close to it.

Q: And Leigh Mallory was given a mission but he was given no forces. He had no forces under him. He was having trouble with Spaatz, because he wanted all the air forces to go into a tactical mode to start hitting rail centers and tactical targets in preparation for D-Day. Spaatz wanted to hit the oil targets, the strategic targets, and wanted to continue hitting them for a while. There was a big battle that went on for a period. Could this have been the substance of that discussion with Armold?

W: No, it wasn't. It was his tactical air doctrine. Arnold didn't even bring up strategic air. B-17s and B-24s were not in this discussion at all. It was all fighter bombers.

Q: And what was Arnold's view?

W: As I say, he was downright rude. I don't remember what the issue was, but it was he did not approve of Leigh Mallory's ideas about fighting the war. This man had just been picked by somebody. I don't know who made Leigh Mallory the commander, but I'm sure he didn't have Arnold's vote.

Q: He didn't have a lot of American votes. This was sort of a compromise, they gave Eisenhower the top job and they gave the top Air job to a Britisher. Leigh Mallory had very little to do, really.

W: Leigh Mallory was a fighter man. He was not a real fighter-bomber man.

Q: Right, you know there was another problem. One of Arnold's favorites for a short period of time was this fellow named Bruce Butler. Bruce Butler had been brought in from the 11th AF to become Deputy to Leigh Mallory. He didn't last long in that job. Did you know that?

W: I knew that Bruce Butler came out, but I didn't know that there was friction between he and Leigh Mallory.

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Q: He didn't last long in the job because it must have been friction with somebody, but he was out of there in a very short time.

W: I don't know, maybe he was told not to support Leigh Mallory. Infighting.

Q: He left that job, and I'm trying to think of who they put in. Did they put Vandenberg in that job?

W: Yes, they did.

Q: But Butler who had done a great job up in the 11th AF didn't last very long.

W: There wasn't anything to do in the 11th AF.

Q: Do you remember Davenport Johnson?

W: Yes.

Q: Davenport Johnson had trouble with Arnold, or vice versa, on the high accident rate in the 2nd AF.

W: I don't know about that.

Q: Arnold was claiming that fellows were coming to the ETO and they were not adequately trained in high altitude gunnery and several other precision skills. The 2nd AF was blamed for these shortcomings. I was told that Davenport Johnson who was commanding the 2nd, said: "If you don't like the job I'm doing, relieve me." Arnold said: "You're relieved."

W: I would believe that.

Q: Would he do a thing like that?

W: Yes, he would.

Q: And then he put his friend, Bill Street, in there.

W: Well, I think, Ent was in there for awhile.

Q: Ent came in later. Ent got in the crash.

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W: Yes, he was injured, and I thought then Streett came in. That's my impression.

Q: I can't remember if he preceded Streett or not. But that 2nd AF always gave Arnold a great deal of trouble.

W: Well, this comes back again to the idea as I said before, that I don't think Arnold appreciated the...now, I was in the 8th AF and I know that the people coming to war were not well trained for war. They had to go through another combat training over there. But when I came back here and I talked to people in the Training Command, the Training Command was 2 years behind the war. We had 12 Colonels come over to the ETO, and telling us how people should fire machine guns in combat. They were just, they were insane. Those 12 Colonels went out on a raid the next day, and not one of them came back.

Q: This was in 1943?

W: Yes, all of them were shot down in the Spring of '43.

Q: And you think this was due to?

W: Well, partly that, not lack of training. As far as they were concerned, they were trained all right, but they just were doing the wrong things. They were telling the gunners where to shoot, and that was wrong.

Q: Were you aware that the 2nd AF was giving trouble, causing these problems, or that Arnold was unhappy?

W: No, the only person that I knew to be unhappy with was Lynn out in the 4th AF. Bill Lynn.

Q: Why there?

W: There was something came up one day. Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants," he said, thinking of all the generals, "do you know who would be a good man to replace Bill Lynn in the 4th AF?" I said: "Well, I

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generally don't move Generals around. I move Colonels." But he said: "Yes, you've talked a lot. You know a lot of Generals, and you've given good advice on several occasions." He said: "Give me some advice." So we talked awhile, and I said: "What's the matter with Bill Lynn? He seems like a pretty nice Joe to me." "Well," he said: "He and Arnold are having it out about something." So I got on the phone and called a friend of mine, a Colonel, and said: "Wonder why Bill Lynn doesn't call Arnold up and apologize." I said: "This is a hell of a time to have to change commanders." So I don't know what happened, but Bill Lynn still stayed as commander. But I don't know; it was just suddenly like that.

Q: He was an impulsive man, you feel?

W: Yes, I'm sure he was.

Q: Did he think out some of these impulses?

W: No. I'm sure he didn't. He just reacted. Now I think it is highly possible that he did plan some of these impulsive things, for their shock value.

Q: You saw him get mad many times?

W: Yes.

Q: Although not at you?

W: I was very fortunate.

Q: I was talking to Gene Beebe, who was his aide, and I asked him about, did Arnold get mad, and he said: "Every day."

W: I was going to say several times a day.

Q: And he got very red? Did he become inarticulate; splutter?

W: No, I never saw him spluttering. He was pretty quick. I never saw him splutter, but he got awful msd.

Q: Was he sharp on his feet speaking?

W: I didn't think so.

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Q: There are some people who have told me - Curly Wolfinbarger told me...W: He used to fly Arnold a lot, too, Curly did.

Q: That when Arnold was in Marshall's presence, he was like a lamb.

W: Just soft as butter. I've gone with Arnold a couple of times to early morning briefings. Gen Marshall used to like to have a briefing at 7:00. Couple of times, things came up on personnel, and I'd have to go in to the Pentagon at 4:30 in the morning, and put the briefing together for him. I'd have to have a girl come in and we would have to run this thing through. I wouldn't hear about it till 6 PM or 7 PM the night before. We'd have that thing ready, and I'd have to be down at 6:30 to give Arnold the quick runout. I had to condense everything into one sheet that went on top of this whole staff study or whole report. You had to condense everything into one sheet, the most important things, so that he could underline....

Q: Did he have a one-page mania?

W: Yes, but this was just a cover now. It was not, he didn't mind if a thing was that thick, but he wanted one sheet on top that he could just sit down there and tell Gen Marshall this is so and so.

Q: Was he a great one for briefing aids, visual aids?

W: He liked them, yes.

Q: Did he ever cut guys off who rambled on in a briefing?

W: I don't know. I never saw him do that.

Q: Did he have a reputation for doing this?

W: Yes.

Q: If you strayed?

W: If you didn't know what you were talking about.

Q: Would he get up and walk out, or just cut you off.

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W: Just cut them off. Get the next person on.

Q: He had these, he liked early morning briefings himself, didn't he?

W: I don't know whether he liked them or he had them, because of Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall was the one who liked them. Of course, Churchill was just the other way. Whenever we had to go brief Churchill, it was in the late afternoon.

Q: Churchill got going in the afternoon and stayed up half the night.

W: Yes, he did.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack?

W: Yes.

Q: Was there sort of unease in the AAF?

W: Yes, there was great unease; a lot of unease.

Q: Why?

W: Well, the war wasn't over yet, and we just didn't....there had been a little bit of unease once before when Gen Brett came into Washington with no assignment. People thought that Brett was a lightweight, and we felt - the boys in the backroom felt - that somebody was thinking about putting Brett in as Chief. The boys in the backroom didn't have a very good opinion of him, didn't like it. This is what led to the unease I think when Arnold had his heart attack. It was not....

Q: There was nobody there?

W: There was nobody there standing there. Giles was not the stuff; he was a lightweight compared to Arnold.

Q: You know, there was a conference, Arnold, when he came back (off record). You never heard about this particular conference in Cannes?

W: No, I never did. I was not that high in the hierarchy.

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Q: This was a very closed-circuit type of thing, and the plan was, let's try to get closer to the new President than we got to the old President. This was top level stuff. Well, Eaker came into office, and I have been told that Eaker had pretensions to be the successor to Arnold.

W: I never got this impression from him. I think that I am a very good friend of Eaker's and I never did hear this, even bruited. I don't think that people thought that Eaker was that high. It was more likely to be Spaatz, as it turned out to be.

Q: You never felt that Eaker was moving into the job?

W: We felt, in the backroom - as I say, the Colonels - that he was just holding Spaatz' saber till Space, with the war was over.

Q: Till Spaatz came back from the Pacific.

Q: You are a friend of Eaker's. Has he ever talked to you about his being shifted out of the ETO?

W: No, we have never discussed that, and we drink pretty strong scotch together.

Q: This is one of the fascinating aspects of the thing. Of course, Eaker never made his fourth star, do you think Arnold had any influence on that?

W: I doubt that very much. He could have, and he would have had to approve a fourth star, but it gets down to the point that - not like we are now - when you had a four star commander, then you had a three star deputy. Now, Arnold was a five star man but there weren't very many five stars passed out.

Q: No, only a half dozen, only in one in the Air Force.

W: That's right, and his vice was a three star for a long time, the vice commander was a three star, Barney Giles. We just didn't have the four stars to pass around like that.

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Q: Let's go back to the time when he was down at Coral Gables and they were shuttling. Pete Peterson, they were shuttling down and they were sending in memos. Was Arnold trying to run the AF from a sick bed?

W: I don't think so. I think he was trying to keep informed, because he couldn't make decisions.

Q: Norstad sort of hints that he was running the Air Force, or running the 20th AF at least.

W: He was the head here in Washington, but he, I doubt that he ran the AF.

Q: He wasn't a decision-maker?

W: I doubt it.

Q: How about Lovett and Arnold? Did Lovett try to pick up some of the ball when Arnold was out?

W: I don't think so; not to the best of my knowledge.

Q: Then, there really was nobody to mind the store?

W: That's right, except the Chief of Operations.

Q: Who would that have been, do you mean AAF?

W: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold have a high regard for Fairchild?

W: I don't know.

Q: He was one of the great brains of the AF, was he not?

W: I don't know, as far as I was concerned, he was not.

Q: Who were the brains of the AAF during this period?

W: Kuter. O.A. Anderson, McNarney, people like that, I never knew Fairchild except when he was acting as the Deputy Chief later on.

Q: Most people had a very high regard for him - just like another fellow everybody had had very high regard for - Horace Hickam, they said if he had

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survived, he'd have gone to the top.

W: Yes, he was a good man. I liked him very much. You see, I was just coming into the AF at the time he got killed.

Q: How about some of these oldtimers who didn't make it. For example, Foulois, after he left as Chief of Staff, was in good health, he lived 30 years later.

W: The whole thing was, in those days, bey didn't make, they didn't have two stars after you were the Chief. You may even go back to Colonel.

Q: Right, this is so. But Fechet had some kind of a job during the war. They gave him Decorations & Awards, but they never gave Foulois another job.

W: I don't know why, of course, Foulois was pretty early in the game.

Q: But Fechet was earlier than Foulois. Foulois started flying, but Fechet was the Chief of Staff before Foulois.

W: Yes, and also he was a MG, Foulois was only a BG.

Q: He became a MG when he was in. Foulois was a MG when he was Chief of the Air Corps.

W: Are you sure?

Q: Yes, I'm positive, from 1931-35.

W: I'm not so sure. From talking with Foulois, I went around a lot with Foulois in his later days. He told me that he was never more than a BG.

Q: Are you talking permanent rank or temporary?

W: I don't know, he said he was never more than a BG.

Q: No, that's not so. I know this to be a fact.

W: He said that this came about through a misapprehension in a Congressional speech, and that he's been listed as a MG in newspapers and so forth.

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Q: In his own book he is listed as a MG.

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W: I still say, from what he said, that this is, shall I say, a courtesy? Q: The Chief of the Air Corps was a MG and he was Chief of the Air Corps for 4 years. But he crossed Roosevelt on the air mail, and he got in trouble, and he also ran as a Republican for Congress. Did you know that?

W: No, I didn't know that.

Q: He ran in 1940 and he lost, and he never had a job during the war. Nothing. They gave him nothing, and of course, Roosevelt was the kind of guy, may be vindictive, like Arnold perhaps. If you crossed Roosevelt, you were dead. He never had a job during the war, but Fechet had a job, and other old timers had a job. I'm thinking of another oldtimer named Jakie Fickel. He was on Arnold's list. Was he on the list?

W: I don't know.

Q: But he never had much of a job. He had the 4th AF early in the war, and they took him out of there, and they never gave him a big job.

W: It's like Henry J. F. Miller. He blabbed about D-Day.

- Q: Is this true?
- W: Yes.
- Q: There was a good reason for taking him out of there?

W: Well, he came back to the States.

Q: Did they break him?

W: Broke him back one rank, I don't think they broke him two ranks. He went out to Wright Field where he had been before.

Q: Do you remember Ed Perrin? He had trouble.

W: Yes, he was a weakling.

Q: And he was in Arnold's office?

W: Yes. He was one of the three bright young boys. I could never understand

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why he was a General. That wasn't my business.

Q: He had a problem, didn't he commit suicide?

W: Yes, he was a drunkard.

Q: How about Tom Hanley, he was one of Arnold's hotshots.

W: He was a good man, I never could understand. He got to be a MG and that's all. I don't know what happened.

Q: I missed seeing him, he passed away.

W: His son was about 2 years behind me at the Academy. I saw a lot of him later in the service. But I always liked old Tom Hanley.

Q: Another fellow who was one of Arnold's hotshots, Reuben Hood. Was he a good man?

W: No, he was another one of these very impetuous kind of a guy. But he wasn't smart.

Q: How about Fred Dean?

W: Freddy Dean was a good boy.

Q: He was Arnold's Exec there for a while. He is still active.

W: Freddy was a good boy, and Bill Hall was doing a fine job. Of course, Bill Hall was quite a womanizer.

Q: Yes, I talked to him, he was one of Arnold's favorites, wasn't he?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: How about Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Yes.

Q: He was a great favorite of Arnolds. Was he smart as well as being a good storyteller?

W: Not real brainy. But I don't want to say "clever," but he was, well, everybody likes Rosie. Everybody would protect him to keep him out of trouble.

Q: Did he get in trouble?

W: Oh sure, a lot of times, Rosie, boy he could drink, but at 6:00 the next morning he was clear-eyed and unafraid.

Q: He was unafraid. He was a guy who....

W: Never lasted through the night, but Rosie O'Donnell and I and a couple of our friends have been on his front lawn at 4:30 in the morning, at Bolling AFB. I'm a great believer of Rosie O'Donnell.

Q: Talking about guys who stood up to Arnold, Rosie O'Donnell stood up to Arnold, didn't he?

W: Yes, he did, but he never got chewed out about it. O.A. Anderson did, but he'd throw him out. I know this.

Q: O'Donnell had a way of getting around him?

W: Well, he'd make it fun and games.

Q: How about Norstad? Did he stand up to Arnold?

W: No, Norstad wouldn't fight his way out of a paper bag.

Q: Other people have said this. And Kuter?

W: Yes, Kuter would. Kuter would say: "Now, General, this is the way that this is. This is the only way it can be done." And Arnold would grope around awhile, but he would buy it. But Kuter wouldn't get loud with Arnold.

Q: Kuter didn't get loud with anybody, I think. He had this quiet, steely, strong way about him which earned him a lot of respect.

W: That's right.

Q: The Steve Ferson thing is supposed to have happened in Arnold's office, but I've had different versions of it. And it may be that they moved him next door into Lovett's office, because they didn't want it known that he died in Arnold's office. Bill Streett - I saw him before he died - said: "No, he died in Lovett's office." But two or three people have told me: "No, he died in

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Arnold's office."

W: This is highly possible. I don't know, I was clear around, oh, by that time, I was in 5A-286. I was not quite with the others. I was almost as far from Arnold's office as I could be.

Q: As you wanted to be?

W: Well, that's where my office was, and it was far enough for me. I never intentionally went to Arnold's office.

Q: He was not your favorite general?

W: No, I had nothing really against him, but I'd been brought up in the old Army and you just don't push yourself in front of the guy who is the Chief. Now, if you are at a cocktail party - I saw Arnold quite often at cocktail parties - I'd go up and talk to him. In fact, he is the one who started me going to some of these high level cocktail parties, because he would ring my office up and say: "Bring your secretary and meet me at the Statler Hilton in such and such a room at 6:00." "Yes, sir." So, I'd be there and the girl would have her note-pad, and he'd take me off to one side and introduce me to somebody and say: "This man has a problem." And in this particular instance this problem was that this very prominent distiller had, head of the distilling outfit, had a son, and it was most unusual for a Jewish boy, for somebody to ask to send a Jewish boy overseas. We generally had cases where uncles would stop Jewish boys, or bribery and so forth, for them not to go overseas. So it was a little unusual for this Mr. Heymann, who was the head of National Distilleries, and he had a son that he said was pretty worthless, and he wanted him to go to war to be made a man of, and I asked him if he knew anybody in North Africa, or Italy, or England and he did. He mentioned two or three generals, and I asked if it would be all right for me to wire, and

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if they knew his son. He said they didn't know his son, but they were sure that they would give him a job. So I dictated a cable to Morrie Nelson overseas in North Africa, and one to Terry Morrison telling, instructing the Training Command to order him....

Q: Terry Morrison was in the Training Command?

W: He was personnel man, Training Command. Then we went right to the Pentagon and I called Terry and told him what was coming down, and to expedite this movement. So within five days after this instance, this son was in North Africa. I'd seen him in NY occasionally. He is in National Distillery or Schenley, as it is called now, and doing a fine job up there. He did a good job overseas.

Q: You know, Arnold had a lot of contact with a fellow named Louis Marx, the toy manufacturer.

W: I know that.

Q: Marx was always doing things for Arnold. When he would come into NY, they would have theater tickets to the shows, have a car, things like this. He also did things for Marshall and he put Arnold and Marshall onto some stock.

W: I don't know about this.

Q: Of course, Arnold used to get, at Christmas time, this whole caseload of toys which would be distributed to perhaps the enlisted men's children. Did you know about that?

W: I didn't know about that. As I say, there were lots of people on the outside, the industrialists who were kind of AAF people. They felt that the Generals and some of the Colonels weren't paid enough....

Q: Was Arnold prejudiced about Jews or Catholics?

W: I don't think so. I never heard him say any word of any prejudice towards

any nationality, race, condition or otherwise.

Q: I get the feeling of Arnold being the pragmatist. "If it works, I want it."

W: That's right, I think so.

Q: And this is why I made a comment before about R&D. For example, he was very close to von Karman, a little Jewish man of apparent brilliance.

W: He was almost prejudiced in favor of von Karman.

Q: Because von Karman did a great service for him.

W: And most of the other people in the Air Staff couldn't even understand von Karman when he was talking.

Q: But he was aces high with Arnold?

W: Yes. He was a very important man in R&D and in theory of aerodynamics. Time has proved this.

Q: He did a great job. This <u>Toward New Horizons</u>, this report is a very important thing. It predicted many things which came to pass 20 years later.

W: Of course, we didn't know, even until we got into Germany, all the forward thinking German scientists and aerodynamists. Of course, von Karman came out of Austria, and he probably smelled some of these things going on.

Q: This is why I personally feel that Arnold - I mean you mention something about grudges or that he harbored these thoughts about people - and it's probably true to some extent. Every man is a mixed personality. In some respects, he may harbor a grudge, and in other respects, he was devoid of grudge.

W: I wouldn't say he was devoid of grudge. If you were one of his boys, you had the world.

Q: Right, did he ever admit a mistake, and say: "I made a mistake...." W: Not in my hearing; he may have.

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Q: Most people say he did not. He simply did something else, without saying he was wrong.

W: That's right. Well, at the end of the war we bought some B-32s. Now, the B-32 was the biggest bucket of bolts that ever came out of Gonsolidated.

Q: Well, it was sort of a backup plane. You know, if the B-29 didn't work out.

W: May be, but as far as we were concerned, you just had to have a net behind the airplane to catch the nuts and bolts that fell off it. It just never...it flew a few times. But it couldn't have backed up a paper bag.

Q: George Kenney wanted them. They felw for Kenney in the last few weeks of the war. He wanted B-29s and he couldn't get them.

W: I'm sure that he didn't get B-32s into combat for any length of time. They just couldn't fly. It was just impossible.

Q: I want to ask you about two areas. One, we were talking about this other aspect, Benny Meyers. Arnold was really taken with Benny Meyers.

W: That's right.

Q: Why?

W: Well, there's another type of guy. He apparently would canoe, his supply. In other words, he was in the supply side of Wright Patterson and he apparently knew all about procurement and engines, and so forth. Apparently, he was quite a whiz.

Q: Did he give Arnold what he wanted to hear, even if it was not fact?

W: I don't know, I doubt that, I don't think anybody would ever do that. Too many times, those things can come back and bit you.

Q: Did they, in this case?

W: I don't know. What got Benny Meyers in trouble was he had been, bought

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stock when

Q: This came out after the war. Arnold didn't know it at the time.

W: No, nobody could have protected Benny Meyers. Nobody.

Q: Did Arnold have the ability in one of these complex briefings with visual aids and what not, to go right to the heart of a problem, or not? Or mixed?

W: I don't think he was very fast.

Q: Not very fast to get to it.

W: He'd wait and let Pinky Craig, or O.A. Anderson, or somebody

Q: Was Craig sharp?

W: Pretty much, yes.

Q: I've tried to get to him. He's in El Paso, and he travels around a bit, but I haven't been able to catch him.

W: I thought he had a great regard for Pinky Craig.

Q: He was Plans. Another guy who comes out very well in some of the research I have done, is Loutzenheizer.

W: I didn't know him very well. I know of him, but I didn't know him very well.

Q: Very sharp guy.

Q: How about Jamison? Do you remember him? He was in Plans?

W: Doesn't ring a bell.

Q: Let me get into George Kenney. George Kenney caused a lot of trouble with Personnel. He didn't want to take some of the people Arnold was sending out there and he was trying to promote his own people.

W: That's right.

Q: This might have gotten into your area?

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W: It did.

Q: What was the problem there?

W: Well, he had two Colonels that he brought in. Now, these had been flying cadets in the class of about, I guess, 40-1, I think that would be the one. I think they may have been 41-1A. And he had two of them, one of them was a pretty good boy. Now, I knew these boys as flying cadets, they were at Tuscaloosa when I was getting my flying training.

Q: Do you remember their names?

W: No, I don't. One of them was redheaded and very objectionable. The other one was pretty good. But, anyway, George Kenney wanted those made BGs. Now, there was a celebrated case in North Africa of a pearl, who, I think Brett had made a BG. And we always said that he was hurt by dwo desks rushing together. We could never understand why he was made a BG, and when these characters showed up with Kenney, and I've seen the list going through - they always asked me for my comments, and I gave them. So these two showed up in my office, as I was Chief of the Officer's Branch. They were talking pretty big, and I just thought right then: "Boy, if these people are the best that George Kenney has, we are in a bad way in the Pacific." We come back again to the idea of a democracy. You need, everybody needs a little bit of seasoning and he needs to expose himself to the viciositudes of combat. Otherwise, it's not fair to the people that had to go out in the first. Now, I'd fought my war. I wanted to go back. In fact, I was ordered back right at the end of the war, but the President had the discourtesy to call it off. But I came back to the B-29 program; I didn't come back for HQs., USAF. I just got sidetracked. But Kenney wouldn't accept anybody, and this gets to be a close corporation. It doesn't make sense.

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Q: Was Squeeze Wurtsmith one of his boys?

W: No.

Q: He was one in the 13th AF. He was one of his boys, but not one of those you speak of?

W: Not one of those. Squeeze was killed going back down to Tampa, I think, from Selfridge. He hit a mountain.

Q: But he didn't want to take any of the people from Hqs., AAF?

W: He didn't want to take anybody. It wasn't from Hqs., it was from any place. He had his own corporation, and he wanted to keep it like that. That's not the way to run a war.

Q: This caused a great deal of trouble, because Arnold had some young people he wanted to send out there, and get some seasoning. They wanted to go out, and he had no place to send them, or not enough places to send them.

W: He sent them to Europe. But I had the same problem in my group now. When I had the 91st Bomb Group, the Training Command had to send Captains. They hadn't been in any combat, but they would come into my group. They'd come in to Bobingdon, and most of the group commands would n't even accept them as Captains. I'd say: "Send me all you've got; I'll take them." Because they had several hundred hours more flying than my people had. They could learn to fly combat. Nobody else in the Training Command had combat like that. They didn't get combat in the Training Command. We had to train them, if they were 2nd LTs, or 1st LTS.

Q: You talk about George Brett as being considered a lightweight. MacArthur shipped him out of there, and eventually they got Kenney. They didn't know what to do with Brett, so he went out to the Caribbean, and I guess he stayed most of the war?

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W: Yes, that's right.

Q: And he and Arnold were very close at one time. In fact, he was the heir apparent?

W: That's what I say. We were pretty sure of it, but we thought it was going to come just a little bit earlier than too early in the system.

Q: Going back to this other incident you mentioned about the Heymann incident, where Arnold had you come down to the hotel. Referring to Arnold's drinking, did you ever see him drink?

W: Yes. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: What did he drink, an Old Fashioned?

W: Yes, he drank mixed drinks. This is something. I've made a lot of public speeches and that's one thing that I won't do, is drink. Two oldfashioneds are enough for me for an evening. I've heard Arnold. I've seen him drink a couple of old-fashioneds and then get up and try to talk, and you just can't do it. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: Most people that I have talked to, say that they never saw Arnold do any drinking except drink some sherry. He would carry a glass of sherry.

W: I've seen him where he could hardly talk.

Q: In other words, he didn't do well if he had a couple of drinks?

W: No, he didn't.

Q: Toward the end of the war, was this after his heart attack?

W: No, long before his heart attack.

Q: Most people say they never saw him drink. The reason I bring this up is, when Westover was killed in 1938, there was a story going around that Arnold drank. This is something that gave the President pause. You know, the President delayed in appointing Arnold for a period of time. Did you know about this?

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W: We just knew that there was a long delay in there. But I didn't know it was because Arnold drank,

Q: The story was around, this may have been. We don't know why the President delayed, but a lot of people think that this gave the President pause. I wonder if there is anything to the fact that "Pa" Watson, who was the President's aide, was Class of '06 and so was Andrews. Andrews was then GHQ AF. I wonder if there is any substance to the possibility that he was trying to get the job for Andrews?

W: There might be. Andrews would have been a better Chief, I think. You come back again. In a time like the war years, you need somebody in there that's almost indestructible, and maybe Arnold was the best man for the job.

Q: Do you think Andrews had the drive that Arnold had?

W: No, I don't. But I think he would have got things done. More people would have been willing to do things, and would have sought out ways to get it done, rather than be pushed, and bullied, and beat over the head with a stick.

Q: Without justifying Arnold, there were some situations that needed bullying?

W: This is true. I say, maybe during the war years Arnold was the one for that job.

Q: Andrews might have been too much the gentleman?

W: He might have been. You can't tell.

Q: Most people I've talked to had admired Andrews more than they did Arnold. But when you get down to talking about it, Arnold may have been the better man for the job.

W: During that time.

Q: Right.

W: I agree with that.

Q: Because the President talked about 50,000 planes when you had practically

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nothing and you had to hit people over the head. For example, calling in the aircraft manufacturers. They didn't want the automobile manufacturers into their business. The automobile manufacturers....

W: ...didn't want to go into it. Singer Sewing Machine didn't want to get into it.

Q: They were making money selling automobiles. So somebody had to hit them over the head. Arnold might have been the best guy to do it?

W: And I'm quite sure that he probably did hit them over the head.

Q: I wrote a script for a movie of Arnold. This is one of these documentary things. I called it "Hap Arnold, Man in a Hurry."

W: Yes, he was in a hurry.

Q: He had all these balls bouncing in the air. When he saw you - if he had confidence in you - if he could give you one of the balls.

W: It didn't matter if he had confidence in you, if you had an AF uniform, he'd send you.

Q: Did he send people, guys he didn't even know?

W: Sure. This Colonel that showed up in my office, that he was sending to Greenland, he wanted an officer courier. This was an officer; this was a Colonel, and he sent him.

Q: I know one man, Gen Grussendorf who was given a job, a contingency plan for the occupation of the Azores. This is when we were trying to get a Central Atlantic station. Grussendorf was in some other area. I don't remember what it was, but he was not competent to handle this contingency plan. He tried to turn it over to somebody else and they said: "If Arnold gave you the job, you'd better go do it." I don't know what happened in this precise case.

W: He probably got some good people to help him and got it turned out.

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Q: Yes, then he did give jobs to people who might not have been competent. Then he had no respect for organization, really?

W: I wouldn't say that. He liked to see your organizational things. This is one of the things that he got on me, when I came back from combat was: "Why have we done away with the base setup?" Add I said: "Because we didn't have enough people. We had to put our people from the bomb group, put them to doing support work for the whole base." And I had an Air Exec and a Ground Exec. I said: "I did this because in combat this is the only way I can get it done." And he said: "Have you written this up?" And I said: "Yes, sir." And he said: "Let me see it." So I sent it down to him, and it became the manual for all overseas operations. He liked it after he saw it, but he didn't like it to start with. But I'm not sure that he was not a respector of organization.

Q: But many times he leaped over organizations?

W: Yes, that's right, but he also wanted things organized so that it would be almost automatic.

- Q: How about Hungry Gates? He was his organization man, wasn't he? W: Yes.
- Q: I missed him, he died.
- W: He was a very dry, I would say, unimaginative type.
- Q: Arnold liked him, though?
- W: Yes.
- Q: Why?
- W: They were friends. That's all I could tell you.
- Q: Did he come up with Arnold?
- W: I think so.
- Q: You think he did give some privileges or preference in good jobs to

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guys he knew? Or who had come up the line with him?

W: Oh yes, I'm sure of it.

Q: Although in some cases where, like Jakie Fickel, who was one of his oldtime buddies, he didn't cut the mustard.

W: Well, maybe he didn't measure up.

Q: How about Fred Martin?

W: I always thought Fred Martin did a fine job.

Q: He got hurt at Hawaii, although it wasn't his fault.

W: Yes.

Q: I want to ask you one more question about the Advisory Council. This so-called Council - Norstad and Cabell. He picked these guys out to be his troubleshooters. They'd go around, I think they called them "the Heavenly Twins." Did they interfere in the Air Staff procedure on matters?

W: I never saw it.

Q: He would give them special projects or sort of troubleshooting type jobs?

W: He just didn't confine it to them. He would send Bill Hall out on jobs like this. He sent me once to look at a BG - I won't tell you where -but he didn't like the way the base morale was going, and he just called me on the squawk box, and he said: "Don't put this in writing, and don't tell anybody. Get an airplane, and go to such and such a station, and go to the club, and look around, and come back here Monday, and tell me what you think about this man." He made me a hatchet man on two or three occasions.

Q: Was Norstad his hatchet man?

W: No, I don't think so. I don't think Norstad was ever a hatchet man.Q: Well, Norstad went out and told Hansell that he had to go. Remember

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when Hansell had the 21st BombCom?

W: Yes.

Q: He took him out of there, and put LeMay in. Didn't he serve as hatchet man on that job?

W: I doubt it.

Q: But he had to tell, Norstad had to tell Hansell the bad news.

W: He might have, but he didn't go out there and make the decision, I'm sure of that.

Q: Oh no, I don't mean he made the decision. But Arnold had made the decision, but Norstad had to go out and give Hansell the news.

W: Well, this may be. I don't know.

Q: Who else was Arnold's hatchet man? Or did he have hatchet men?

W: He had them, but he never told me who they were.

Q: Were these "ad hoc" arrangements?

W: Some of them were ad hoc, or it depended. As I say, this was a Personnel matter, he just gave me a squawk on the box and said: "Go and do it." And he didn't even tell Bevans about this. And I didn't either, until after I came back.

Q: How about Bill Streett? Did he use him as a hatchet man?

W: I don't think so. Bill Streett was a fine man.

Q: He was a fine, gentle man, but he did act as troubleshooter for Arnold, didn't he?

W: Could be, I don't know.

Q: Bill Streett never stayed in one job too long. He went to two or three different jobs. He never made a name for himself in any given area, but Arnold put him in some tough jobs like the 2nd AF and the 13th AF, too.

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W: And the Continental Air Command. He did a lot of good things. I always had a lot of admiration for Bill Streett.

Q: I want to ask you about the Comptroller's decision. This is back in the '30s. When the Comptroller decided you were on leave without pay since July 1, 1932. This is the time when they put everybody on furlough.

W: What happened was we graduated on the 10th of June 1932. I would say around the 19th of July, I got a wire that said: "You are now, and have been, since the 1st of July on leave without pay." The Comptroller said - it was quite a long wire, it said that the Adjutant General, I think, had held, or somebody in the Government, had held that the grudation leave was ordinary leave, and therefore it fell under the provisions of the Economy Act.

Q: That was the one that was just passed?

W: This was a Presidential thing. Anyway, everybody had a pay cut. In the service we were absorbing it by just losing leave.

Q: In other words, you worked without getting paid?

W: No, you could get your leave, or even when you worked, you still drew less pay, 15%. Now, one of the ways was, I had been on leave without pay since the first of July. This is without my consent or knowledge. So since they had held this to be ordinary leave, now graduation leave is a special leave, and has been since the Year One. So when they repealed the Economy Act, it must have been a Congressional thing. When they repealed this, I applied for leave, but I went in and told my Colonel. I said: "Now, I've been talking to some of my friends in the Class of '32. We want to make a test case, we don't agree with what the - I think it was the Adjutant General has held, or the Comptroller, whichever one made the decision - we don't agree with him. But if they say that's what it is, then I want my leave on that basis." I had written this thing up so

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that it was under the provisions of the thing that the Comprroller General if that's who it was - made this thing, what he had quoted. I wanted my leave on that basis. But I also told my Colonel: "Now, I'll be at Birmingham and my phone number is so and so. Would you please get a ruling on this immediately, because we are doing this for the benefit of everybody in the class. If this holds then we've got, everybody's got a couple months leave coming with pay. And if it doesn't hold, I want to get back right quick." So he put it in, forwarded it. The next morning he started all this paperwork to Washington. I went on down to Birmingham, and after about - I don't know how many days, whatever days they held, I think it was 8 days - let's say, on the 7th day I got a phone call that said: "Get back." So I got in my little Chevrolet, and tore off one day from Birmingham to Rock Island, and I reported back in. This was a feeler; it was a test, and I lost. But that's all right. Better for one to lose, than 259 of us.

Q: I want to ask you something else in the Personnel area. This had to do with the training of blacks to fly. Did you have any involvement in that?

W: Not in their training. But I had quite a bit to do with throwing several blacks out of the service under conditions other than honorable. Because, and we had Mr. Truman Gibson come over from the White House. He wanted to know why this was happening, and I said: "Well, Mr. Gibson, here all these are white officers, and this few here are colored officers." And I said: "You can fight it any way you want to, but when we have a man show up at the end of his second stage, or the middle of his third stage training, and he suddenly finds out he doesn't want to go to combat, something is wrong, and he's lacking in moral fiber, and it's not fair to the people who have gone to war, to let this man out under honorable conditions. He's been in the pilot pool,

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possibly for as long as two years, and he's been in the Training Command for a year or so, and now just at the gangplank, he gets gangplant fever." I said: "Now, your colored boys, a lot of them show up with misery in the back." I said: "I was frozen in the war, and I still fly. I know exactly what's wrong with my back, but I don't show up with the misery. You can diagnose my back, but," I said, "we've got a lot of these white officers who have shown up under the same circumstances, and we put them out under conditions other-than-honorable, and as long as I am going to do this to these white officers, I am going to do it to the colored officers." I said: "You can take any one of these, or any one of these, and read it." And he said: "No. I would just like to see the summary page of one of these colored boys." And he picked one where it was just about like I had said. Only this one had been in the system, I think, about three years before he got into pilot training. He had been there a long time, and this was getting down almost to the end of the war, and he had fainted and fallen back. He had been in B-25s, and he just didn't want to fly. Now, we had a bunch of colored boys who were in the 99th Pursuit Squadron - Benny Davis' outfit. But Benny came back and he was retraining them in B-25s, and we had a lot of them fail.

Q: That's the 332nd Composite Wing. But there were reports that some of these boys in the 99th didn't do well, that they turned and ran, when they got into combat situatuions.

- W: This is true. I've heard of this. Now, I have no personal knowledge.
- Q: Reports came back from Italy, the MTO.
- W: I think Benny Davis would tell you this, too.
- Q: What was Arnold's attitude, if any?
- W: I never discussed this with Arnold. This was a policy that had been in

64

the AF. You just pilots flew.

Q: Were you aware of the trouble Frank Hunter had at Selfridge Field in 1944?

W: No.

Q: A great deal of trouble there. The Negroes rioted at the base about the Officer's Club. They built a separate club for them against Arnold's orders.

W: No, I didn't know that, but I'm sure Arnold wouldn't want that. Once Benjy Davis got to be an officer, I think the Officer Corps, I never heard anybody say anything against Benjy Davis. For a long time, he was the only colored pilot. But I used to go on trips with Benjy Davis and Red Smith....

Q: Red Smith was another colored?

W: He was a friend of mine. He wasn't colored. But, we'd go with him. We liked to fly with him. He was a good pilot, and he was a good friend.

Q: We have come a long way from that.

W: This was several years ago.

Q: 25 years?

W: Well, this wasn't quite that long ago. This was probably right after the war. Right after the war, well, that is 25 years. We were down at Maxwell, and of course, not everybody had Benjy Davis to dinner in their quarters. But I did. I liked Benjy Davis.

Q: A lot of fellows wouldn't fly with a Negro.

W: Well, I've had some problems since. I've lost a couple of airplanes out at Wright Field. These were not mine. They were base airplanes, and the pilots were not mine, because I didn't have a colored pilot. I had some colored navigators, and one of them was a crackerjack, a hell of a good guy. He would joke about colored boys and white boys, and so forth. People liked him on the

65

crew. We had one pilot there who overstretched his gas and who wouldn't land to refuel. It was Dr. Stapp. He was taking Stapp out to either Colorado Springs or Denver to make a speech, and Stapp had to eject. So this is, you can carry this too far. As I say, I never had a colored pilot. I had lots of colored officers working for me, most of whom were good people. But I had some troublemakers. I was born in Muncie, Indiana, and we had a very firm, but friendly policy. So these people, I just put it on the line, and I'd say, I'd show them this was being recorded, and you can have a copy of the tape if you want it. I always had the colored chaplain come in at the same time, and I would just put it on the line. I'd say: "You produce, or I'll have your ears." And I'd lay it right out, No.1, No.2.

Q: I think they respected you for it?

W: Not only that, they bucked up because they knew right then they were in trouble.

Q: You have no knowledge of Arnold's attitude on these matters?

W: I don't think that he was prejudiced against Negroes in the AAF.

Q: I think he was in favor of anything that would help him do his job and oppose anything that would not.

W: Anything that hurt his job I think he'd oppose.

Q: I regard him as the total pragmatist, not the ideologae and the doctrinaire.

W: Oh no.

Q: Left that to a guy like Orval Anderson. Arnold was in favor of what would help him do his job and sometimes he misunderstood or misinterpreted what was good for him. I'm sure this happened.

66

Wuest, Jacob H. S.

13 May 72

2031h

Colonel Jacob Wuest, USAF (Ret 852 Park Lake Court Orlando, Florida 32803

Dear Colonel Wuest:

I am looking forward to meeting you and Captain Jack at 3:00 PM on Wednesday, May 31st.

I am leaving tomorrow and driving down, with planned stops at Hilton Head/Island, Savannah, Jacksonville before I get to

Orlando.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

26 May 1972

422-2056

Office of Air Force History

852 Park Lake Court Orlando, Florida 32803

May 23, 1972

Mr. Murray Green Office of Air Force History HQ USAF Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Mr. Green:

I am in receipt of your letter of the 18th of May re your change of schedule.

I look forward to your visit, and would suggest that you plan to arrive at my home on May 31 at 3:00 p.m.

I will advise Captain Jack of this schedule and I anticipate that he will join us.

Until then, I am

Sincerely yours,

and Mimest

Jacob W. S. Wuest USAF (Ret)

20314

18 May 1972

Colonel Jacob Wuest, USAF (Ret) 852 Park Lake Court Orlando, Florida 32803

Dear Colonel Wuest:

4

Re our prospective interview on General H.H. Arnold, I am hopeful we can get together at a time convenient for you.

I write because my schedule is slightly adjusted. I will be in Orlando two days earlier than previously planned. I shall be at your disposal any time on Tuesday, May 30th, or Wednesday, May 31st.

I expect to arrive on Monday evening, May 29th, and will phone your home in hopes of arranging a convenient time for you. I am also hopeful that Captain Jack will be available. It will be a pleasure to meet him, too.

Sincerely,

Murray Green Office of Air Force History

cc. Capit Jude

20314

19 April 1972

Colonel Jacob Wuest, USAF (Ret) 852 Park Lake Court Orlando, Florida 32803

Dear Colonel Wuest:

cap Richard bull

I'm the fellow working on the biography of Ceneral Hap Arnold. You may recall our phone commersation in January. You were not feeling up to par, and so we deferred our gettogether for another time.

It appears that I shall be coming through Orlando on Thursday, June 1st, or on Friday, June 2nd. I shall be leaving at about noon on Saturday, June 3rd. If you would set a time on any of those days convenient for you, I would be happy to adjust my schedule to conform.

I'm also looking forward to meeting Captain Richard Jack, USN, with whom I had a most interesting phone conversation about my own Navy days aboard an aircraft carrier in World War II.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green Office of Air Force History

Encl

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MEMORANDUM 19 April 1972 Captain Jack: Capt Hugh Knem was in a Car accident a pouple of months ago. Sur heard no further report on his hool th. All good wishes G

1-10-72 852 Park Jak Comt Orlando Fla Jan 7, 72 Dear my Green : of Jam 6th, & shall be glad to assist you in preparing the history of Sue an. nold in whatever way possible, Unfortunately & have little in the matter of writting records pertaining to very relations with him but I shall quie pur whatever information I may remember of Gen armold. If you plan to stop at on. lands, please inform me of the time of your continplated call and oblige Just on must-

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Redicish Jode USN 850 Adows Dr. 850 Adows Dr. 850 Adows Dr. 1405 Red Oak Drive Silver Spring, Nd. 20910 January 6, 1972

Colonel Jacob Waest, USAF(Ret) 852 Park Lake Court Orlando, Fla

Dear Col Wuest:

...

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House, one of the best. I have been at this about 3 years now. I spent 15 months at the Library of Congress on a Brookings Fellowship researching the Arnold Papers there. I have interviewed about 185 people, including practically all the Air Force greats still alive.

In the research, I saw your name many times in the files, and simply assumed without checking that you had passed from the scene. Yesterday, I interviewed General Dudley Hale who put me in touch with Captain Richard Jack, USN. The time was not right. You were taking your afternoon rest, and I am leaving today for Coral Gables. My official task there will be to screen the papers of General Hugh Knerr who appointed me administrator of his historical papers which he desired to endow to the Air Force Academy Library.

When I complete that task, I will conduct a number of interviews in the Miami area. It is possible, although my schedule is extremely tight for the remainder of this trip, that I can make some time to visit with you to talk about your recollections of Hap Arnold, if you desire.

Cantain Jack indicated that in at least some areas, you were not exactly a rabid fam of Hap Arnold's. In any event, this is planmed to be a "warts and all" biography. There are several areas of special interest:


 You graduated in '03, the year Douglas MacArthur graduated. Of course, Arnold entered in July 1903. I would like to have you' impressions of the Point in that era.

2) You were attache in Germany in the middle-1930's. As you know, Armold was very interested in Lindbergh's findings on the Luftwaffe. That almost got Armold in "dutch" with FDR.

3) Any other areas of contact. Of course, anecdotes or insights into Arnold's actions and character would be invaluable.

I will be spending most of next week at Mrs. Knerr's going through the papers. The address: Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, David Williams Apts 700 Biltmore Way (Apt 6A) Coral Gables, Fla 33134. You may reach me through Mrs. Knerr. If you desire to see me, I'll try to arrange my going-home schedule to suit your convenience.

Sincerely.





His decorations include the Legion of Merit and Bronze Star. He is rated a command pilot and aircraft observer.

General Hale and his wife, the former Anne Davis, have one son, Dudley D. Hale, Jr.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) October 1, 1935; to captain (temporary) March 14, 1934; reverted to permanent rank June 16, 1936; was promoted to captain (permanent) May 2, 1939; to major (temporary) March 15, 1941; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) January 5, 1942; to colonel (temporary) March 1, 1942; to major (permanent) May 2, 1946; to colonel (permanent) April 2, 1948; to brigadier general (temporary) December 22, 1950; to major general (temporary) December 15, 1953; to brigadier general (permanent) October 27, 1954.

END

Up to date as of August 1955.

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May 1972 31 Florida, Orlando, Wuest, ŝ Col Jacob W. Interview, years four was He Arnold? Hap met you time the first you at West Point recall You behind C

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Q Who was your bos

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Q Who was the Army Attache?

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guns. of Ordnance, in controlled Army sted of The sprayed which for middle inte ung this. Ordnance doing problem that relonment It ntrolled more c doing ung have until rnold's đ er the second Army as C have Ordnanc 4 better they and Army 3 part the sarilv than to This ement and that Vas oth The the Ces time, was ur single hit and that Corps quipment. had pr Emmons. the rada Air th they of the rdnanc for show tronic problems and stion ontrol fault. guns for + get the Ĉ doing Arnold Air Tar ran the than was of anv vour which wa purchasing Ξ. of not or Corps things there out This One War did Ordnance radar knocked Signal World other Cor So. all Dr M C

the late 1930's. п. to before World War part. vital hitting any back without you arget tak the Let ove all C

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2 anything German the I had airplane flight of that flight emember the with an flight, don't op 9 Atlantic mething 1934. North In slightly. did Only hit. with you pilot оþ N

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at West Point You left Point. going on West at of hazing Life Point. lot ct West There about died boy you in. ask One came time. Arnold Let that when at C

tabasco football rate, man dying at Philadelphia any of whitewashed There bottle At for about this Philadelphia which one. d sauce. for stopped was called uo tabasco verything going to remember We all down being fed was we table. went guess duddud having dinner, I don't me from this and our rate. hotels died all stigation at any were and claimed he When the At sauce of we one year. as ssional memb tabasco ath They our table that overnight Congr game from don't at N

with no uniform went tabas Ц of we were bottle Then that theory We c it. got civilians. drank all a N dispro by us. surrounded of spot 5 poonful trying easily were tabl could đ 4 we B out civilians And poured dinner. sauce. these and JUC

Did you happen to see Arnold during World War I?

everybody regiment horseback, Infantry in the detect one sketching Kelly the and size when they at people all World that flight by dn this flight 30th that people "Lieutenant and started on airplanes battalion cavalry invited about the pictures! had airplanes happened Air newspaper we on it. made H ц took and ದ board the they wonderful time that CO with sketched He he making pictures He in What air had C d thing, old cd air get the the just the wop connaissance? Field. an the for nou 5 these by San puno you n have. onderful relous from him right attempted In guard air e ofor Kelly and ct of with must Was mar the made stationed am sight sho rist honor he from d And Kelly carried this We air such while m ? erial the his your When did. an that Kelly, first enemies er with call time. considered e and au au to drawing ook first that While membe dn M. battalion ţ strapped entranced ground. 4 along Sam our on the recall while E re kinds that of 0 was the guard. to the flying 3 ದ and ž you Lieut movement don't NG down at perfectly had took it when pilots This ar of different shown e Do And ۵ honor ere tim down you For he send 0 case. same th with And gath War and who has was the Air San air. got the 0 of C M C

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maybe course feet training Colonel They back given place and and he over in coming in for His 5 10 5 flying were sent came experience ground being hack all about dn Lieutenant course flying training, ,dn they started of got the word thatwwas had had part cracked off the out They take finished that hopping-flying Kelly in ÷ had had then. tented -haired old volunteers and And one day 50 that high he and the flying training get. take then runwav there And if the au raining. field could had saved his life, 5 selected only because from over And there, gray c about eers. the tented volunteers And when they running they And right uo volunt đ got and selected was as down this ere take they fliers. was was high And that was He Field. few of and requesting and SCO let ving 0 He Curtiss runway until top been as very air. Kelly Franci Then they advanced volunteered as Kelly maybe, That's Curtiss. the engine quite. had the units, San in North Island. in flying an airplane. that Lieutenant Kelly off continued. There as at North Island by They down. known minutes run off the gotten in right feet. e) the diploma residio altitude a landing his let all ten wou quite there. Coast. Washington. have 20 they and to uo ಹ notice flyingthe engine given could again down more down what West eight then took at

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Q Captain Jack, you say this was about 1910?

Capt Jack: 1910, yes. the San Francisco air show

Foulois to marry There About flying casualties. first of stopped in powered fliers, of flying girl he wanted Selfridge was the Arnold want him to fly about the high risk flying. fliers, ct quit not met already. people killed. did he then he that wife killed comments two was his Just imposed because of be years a lot were had any Selfridge two she there 1916. you have of casualties, about conditions time to from 1913 Do for Humphrey. At that Arnold flew days' lot the a number. of flying those were One and G

Airplanes, instrument get gotten high would safely with it. apt they have the in mor you 4 could have. uncertain power had up. the whether crack wou they they have away very we fle if ahead know they immediately gotten didn't that ರ hand, didn't the airplane was slowly form We could have place other guesswork you aerodynamic and more whole trouble. some the took off wrong. on the had possibly, of of course, and matter ground. When you the have og was the slowly, have and might 3 ething the all landing In those days, did not to they That with. was som close air, ದ then, that We for around fle or not. selected for fairly the Nere naturally, engines. to get up in were back they But N

with the didn't get And we didn't have were flying machines couldn't We underpowered planes? engines. Nou up. underpowered them had. We slowed have it had. Was the should that should have was c.. etc, problem e proble engines wires, we main that and the the aerodynamic forms kinds of struts in the was power airplane; think What the a fast have all Ø M

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College schools? either tho School people Aviation with Contact with the -12? contact 1911 in any Ga, Did you have contact Augusta, No or Park G \mathbb{A}

it became Asst Director 5 fact chance Air attention In entire served into the then cđ seas. known? had during his became any never over I went paid 1917, widely the Signal Corps. get he He vulnerable point say; anybody when and in December didn't this came back to Washington. might packed up, Arnold Was believe you it) Section of then the Air Corps Kenly. don't psychologically exploiting anger, all Infantry General in Aviation was shot staff I'd been in the Arnold in combat. ದ ct Production under 5 think fired And this into the (Ref Air Service, WWI. don't never serve In transfer Service. combat. Arnold career. didn't the for N C

Q What happened (in 1917)?

Service. volunteer Washington school) balloon He Did you asked atte Then overseas Waco took OER? Washington) to do was about it. co. Air the to different not Arnold at of 1918. he your 2 of Qualified NAS did refused men. inflexible? Regiment shipped was what happened to me. Chief report anything 50 and This qo 0 Pd undisciplined Fall Did he went ballooning. you C immediately Middletown, viation or Corps. the Artillery orders and but ubborn, Sent until office list. nobody balloonist, Signal times got (got sprawling Provisional emained promotion be ho and and ncounter three the would you ashington vation Field time This another of for and or D D 4th Section egular that take Kelly tents orders obs when over N. told Regiment the in it. 0 Westover and fly of 0 of Aviation were 2 1930s position to served any down lot 0 orders Omaha Sill beca 4th eady We have Lincoln the (Did know found in the me this never Fort ceived mark don't During 1917. to myself of Rush take sent to accepted bad command for duty of Texas). orders (Then to think said: Then pilot. part got unles And you Did M get

don't know. think he your ability to ask you three I don't the job. Arnold wrote. but take rbearing, didn't that high regard for report that officio disappointed efficiency c an had badly see me have just never put must was have He may He did. M g

job ? take 0 times M

ver. said: most take He 2 can this job" times. who he came back three of op know else that somebody turndown Force where Air one get the after cases In noA man angry few said: only verv gotten the of e did. have know You're ould I No. he Ø

God's for "Jakie, said He He pled with me. angry. get didn't NO He take sake N

Q

for reputation c He had respect for your ability. a lot of He had blowing up, C

"You're commands outright: successful me told because I'd had He = this job. ability. respected my op ability, to uo my count respect Arnold can He did only man that. before the M

Q Did you know Andrews?

Billem know You didn't adjutant Andrews. my Nas Frank 1 brother about talking his as You're 3 Billem Yes. ŝ Andrew M

Q What was your opinion of Frank Andrews?

Wq I never had enough contact to really judge him.

Were in '39. leaving there succeeded by Emmons. later? come about you did He was just or was command He force Langley. in was air at the GHQ Andrews down were of there when head You 3 you He C

W When I came, Culver was in command.

Capt Jack: He's talking about the GHQ air force

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Q Had Andrews already left?

knew in. just come with him. had contact Emmons official I think ou have and left but had well, Andrews s quite Andre N

Andrews Arnold and of comparative appraisals me give you Could leaders? as G

level. be than the intelligent Andrews More on considered more Arnold. was subordinates than he but thought square it, with his to more any thought use Beca dealing Nas he man. given in his thought qualified I haven't honest and bette Arnold was He N ದ

Q Was Arnold devious in his dealing?

about anything know didn't but time. Andrews that at about contact knew personal know. not from don't Arnold, M

ŝ Andrew Arnold, than by swore highly he more and Knerr regarded him Hugh with dealings him th of W 0. Emmons lot closely ದ had about How He C

in Lieutenant ಡ been had Emmons together. worked and Emmons N

he Chief of GHQ, became he when but me, to junior well. very much got along regiment, and my

the top job. for aspirations had have 2 ed soddns 00 SU Emmo Ø

did. probably He M World somebody the top job during And Brett. town. for George out of competitors competition and mons four his Ē 01 sent three 0 Andrew Arnold Arnold that The me :11 War told C

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Barton Yount Lindbergh on the map. Lindbergh for work put the Herrick of most Mr. did and who he man Yes Nas N

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hundred airplanes at that time you had few job because 3 You had top nothing. that 50 from dn Corps not as 5 Ai he the He felt dn build 2 C

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money?) estate financia during World jail Arnold Arnold's Was real the covering these points: Gen off the record that Meyers ent 5 sold Mrs. happened If and peculations She з. Benny 2. rnold died. work. what state In cial Arnold pa angements stated rtation involv cash fall 80 Gen his (Col Wuest had dis arr A took In after Mey Arnold long 000 private shi Meyers from \$19. year 0 and that Wuest say. with enefited month from Meyers Benny twenty umor to Col died like c nearly \$78 tha gave Arnold accepted Arnold don't and as benefit tty dealings Gen pre pension H widely War and for did . N

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Yates, Donald

9 Jan 70

December 22, 1969

Lt. General Donald N. Yates, USAF (Ret) 5 Chateau Cheverny 2160 Ibis Isle Road Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Dear General Yates:

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I appreciate your reply of December 18th. I know that your association with General Arnold was passing, at best, but I've gotten some good stories from people whose initial reaction was similar to yours.

As you plan to be out of town during the week of January 18th, plus the fact that my schedule for the current trip is rather heavy at this writing, I suggest we defer our get together to a mutually convenient time later on in the year.

I will write again for an interview.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Division

December 1, 1969

Lt.Gen. Donald N. Yates, USAF(Ret) 5 Chateau Cheverny 2160 Ibis Isle Road Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Dear General Yates:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of <u>Air Force/Space</u> <u>Digest</u>, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Street and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character, As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, nonattributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

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INTERVIEW MITH LT/GEN DONALD YATES PALM BEACH, FLORIDA JANUARY 9, 1970

Do you remember the first time you encountered Gen ö Arnold?

himself because that Rarks down very personally Tech in Ca1 the him 100 red of weather had gone to Cal course in 1939 know criticism frequently 5 the time to terological out got uo way first with his briefing him getting never the quite the about through Barksdale generous first time after probably 63 off point. arbitrary take Was assignment to believe was when Probably the weatherman good stopping and pretty was went flights and was ran into him weatherman He ct My he dale AFB 88 Υ: all wassa well, Tech. there. 1939 no

Q: He was very concerned about the weather?

Y: Yes, he was.

Q: It was a very big item with him.

Q: Well, you knew Professor Irving Krick?

context. in for about little difficulty there at Krick and was working directly talk difficult the Pentagon building, Arnold tough to only to the is in directly a little bit think , du he comes But to had caused Krick gets if it suit gone н supposedly recollections that involved had this m his name in and act turn after which also to for again, of the offered incident working Arnold, time one because ever Gen But the was an

H and Arnold's papers of and out in name see his ö

I don't - maybe it was a love-hate relationship, can't decide know.

He so damned important. best far verv gettthe Still to salesman. Was wanted weather he super that felt đ so important Arnold was and Krick General Was he could, knew it know.

salesman? Was he weatherman as đ good Was he ö

and good in that range forecaster fore fore forecast of forecaster in his the lot range capable of himself haired guy part long to did Was range able very he he long and sold the Now, long being 1 gray put years, ou He WAS That but no was LO LO advance. to œ Krick respect. for had attempting He claims forecaster time sold long range forecasts opinion, forecaster in forecaster that and the three days that his in natural In my personal at shyster good Arnold day in had or business to đ very sort a more than two was Gen front office day 1 difficulty He respect, casting Υ: Arnold. he was but he caster good.

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Q: Horace Shelmire?

Y: Yes.

Q: This was from his old home town

competition like that but services advice front fiasco, and impressions of things the it. about that reports cultimate for invasion forecasting special to you have heard the story his how African giving providing knew sub rosa in the North was Krick and he the somehow he regarding and that he got involved, if Well know there like actually I don't Υ: things office

the contact Central We to be had through. got forecasters the Weather of Was it stuff the position SO was the be the running this name to direction got his all here's perople Was it whatever sending and н wouldn't go the and and other Was time going to go, OL forecasts Krick few that Shelmire that at and out impossible.Krick Pentagon were Navy office embarrassing. putting consensus. agreed we with the in the in the vere

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Irv. authority? And But for the people authority by and said: was having and this through show. scared was doing. see Gen a Major which for me your And the あ more was free wheeling outside position bootlegged н working down to of stopped run good because dazzle that Irv direction. Was outside him H official it. Was went let been this = got kickbacks from it, for He was completely free wheeling anything. He have it is by your personal then ever that good And the whole issue: the friends all this razzle to show, have position to be like good for One, н run the good think words he would going to defend two positions. another some service. verv to than I I. Is and getting In other him and said: were "I knew and wasn't. free wheeling think at that time want good for the knew about, Was and If you I said: ö Υ: Arnold yet he guess. don Krick and

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that? react to How did Arnold ö

chewed he personally way, because he cd in and think office rapport with him. and I his all right, In good would take it He funny onably Vas E and out always me

standing in in And I asked went time was that weatherman. some He time He had been out of the service for General the at ed 38 retired had, respect for me he and old him, thi see Was reasonable permission to office in his there. had a

Q: Was it Trubee Davison?

Washington in who lived affairs Force one Air other the The all to no went Davison, He 1.ong ч. 80

Q: Fechet?

Y: Fechet, yes.

Q: He was the first Chief of the Air Corps.

man never care 11ke had the Air upset Arnold and I don't the function reporting his " and couldn't could organization saluted with him below wouldn't have very .ou Well. course. "oh that how he between very that walked in, across appointment S0. to him officially said: him of was two and knew functions, you know and right guy He each single about run least time Arnold knew the to pie. the line But an Flat, thing office at capacity and the sorry repeatedly every Was him at one problem. to have people reported down ".I. the that time in Operations Gen see in The the in below that way fingers Fifty 80 said, think requested wanted had was guy. my to Was at Was he and supposed he was that kind of his directly to him. He And organized Right, understand how 1+ and many line had Was around with and between. personally He smiled. because I down the know how was problem Υ: turned he did Force less. that in he

post Pearl Was this 42? OL 1941 about talking You are ö Harbor?

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then working remember two guys things here do if I turned somebody the 1f he that 80 every said: this because am think on the fornt that probably ane 1 s other key said they mom. uckus over "Well just various to job there and That words to H 143. admitting suit right to and report Spaatz entral got out said: and reporting much directly early it time that know forni you ontext thing LOWIN to be 80 OL the to that Arnold "Well vou maybe to put him on embarrasing' would Was in Washington Cali weathe 9 dn enought isolate of outfit this got about somebody he before proper he in stirred said: So the 20 out no that "What if U/D in 1942 straighten my turn him or him and bes smart they could And take to Was occured send th P,I has And knew said: damned run have send the going Central January 1944 Holzman L to ened probably town. m not He Washington to He 11'1" 4 are If 44 = "Frankly necessary to he me 11 happ incident, getting can piece authority 'NoY" put And of they H being you 100%?" asked Ben Weather the time said: out what could before your and outside If Pasadena said: in E time hom said ecifically outfit. it. -And have Krick of the thi speak and

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the trip Arnold papers at didn mixture of things this and of made kinds α; papers collected that seen the all In his glad not, help he ve and what or place. H can and left. you to Krick of the role semi-official He think his out Going back Congress understand because and in of unofficial Krick is here, Library ö quite đ

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said: the published you what of Arnold's office for OL this can't OF cards working tuation it me for have fire the work E Sit put L could t0 the you see said: Wrong out him can he either came Arnold: OL he had told be you would quit, had to be, that H as Gen because do. would soon it it to н about concerned down could as it i H told him before him but Krick thing what gon told to wanted am **frankly** and The back = Arnold. far went had table ever as

situation he been And then completely changed; connection with this, I said, the had up that to op difficult going to splendid job set team office are AF and the 8th you Coast my Was "So of in -USSTAF part did situation West cried said: and he Gen Spaatz in the as the ou and over and The to would have down me there 80 went Tech with in. to broke out he prepared back Cal agreed then I he working hard for brought him And professor Forecasting he Arnold be don't and, t0 However outfit. "Gen have Was ve N'

Strategic the the 8th Air Force and the 15th AF Yes, Force ö Air

of forecasters professional part target not that forecasting for D-Day Was uo Britisher meterologist that Chief SU from Italy two Officer and Deputy the there professional AF Meterological Was We there 15th the Was н Holzman team that did the it He and of pulled and Europe Officer SHAEF side Chief he SN We of later, joint Meterological where the Offic out a Britisher that of And AF Yes, Meterological head uo the 8th were team. the Υ: Chief that the Was and

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Q: Fellow named

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neterologist,

Y: Staff.

Q: I think Eisenhower mentioned him.

controversial 80 into was Krick, went g backing us and was and Krick Holzman and he and well. by did, D-Day, headed very certainly before crew, out itself just No. He and ironed briefing did Crew he situation British single a big everv that

many building vas This person in belittle the the situation and that his sides of consensus around fine to though real slithering try other real the tended claimed đ to be He than was that later business had accurate deals So he always then these his Irving P. Krick. and mor did during but were crew Irv respects, forecast way British because the dh

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Arnold this mean he had and pronoun. vertical ounded comp the ctually of was di of fostered this this aspect Well personality ö sort

did? He Υ: much confidence in him? So Arnold gave What ö

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Arnold and Millikan there; Was Millikan Robert ö

close very correct That's Υ. 130s? early In the ö

times Von Karman very tot that did - both of many over to Arnold, Was many switched guy Krick weaknesses. Clark Millikan was There's the Karman close because him Non Was had and his reason. but Von Karman to Arnold Karman. talked young capabilities exactly the and von н And and the Navy, and them it. Karman knew and his and that is pushing of commissioned in the Air Force to all about Krick Von Υ. agreed close. them it.

the trouble in He had some going to ask about this. was н ö

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Navy?

out the extremely only they wouldn't take him at even after he was in getting soldier when he did But So better which SU bit. for job little Was tougher always had trouble in the Navy, the he đ it, organizing atmosphere little bit for trouble. man better Same cleared the awhile cd it cđ Made Oh yes. for was Tech that back in he Air Force He Υ: for it. to Cal well, a11

had he and Von Karman backing him, with Millikan the highest credentials? He had. ö

know. when Non Bowles Rossby, to Carl deputy interesting. consultant was working in OSD as the very was it And Υ: Bowles.

Q: 0SD?

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SSOL Dr profes Bowles. Rossby he 63 been Ed and Carl way War. had the Rossby Secretary of anti-Krick all directly Bowles. for Stimson office. Of course he was worked for where he worked Stimson' any who get Norweigan couldn't at MIT. es Bowle

somebody mentioned the Norwegian name his of think ÷ couldn' ago days and of forecaster, couple weather ö

there, technical IL and I got him assigned the US over an th Was boog team technically honest, technically in Rossby dn British α; Was mixed Norwegian. he competent the but Wasn himiin uo forecaster Was He the honest let's say as got he hadn't been in the US. was not We Patterssen Patterssen lousy time though Irv that much more Was theoretically at He would be, military Υ: but he Swede man

are out of bit service clearance; us little never did didn't Karman with spent 130s back weather right time H Von đ quite got him "All Rossby probably Millikan. a long pulled .50. of the course, the Bowles had said: But We for Chief Service of War Arnold SU Arnold. but This of was the the sand of the Weather lot with Millikan, and Rossby believed Von Karman and of fn with when Rossby bit later part back worked had thought latter service Karman he stage little context and Chief in the Von weather the that in influence đ be and him Was know, his Europe to at Sometime got in the which there going there Ľ

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some Millikan Arnold air-OL rays to him and his scientists, and blanche early solar him Field ed of turne carte March tests in eally started gave him at atmospheric Was He connection available Arnold R&D Field high up. made that March some went intere Arnold conducting Well. at They a great planes. Arnold thing. vas had

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reach it. Could could like Von Karman. Arnold 1f it professionals him for the moon and he could get were who People ö ask

strue That' Υ:

absolutely fantastic Toward Hitler book, His the during you know. of R&D came him Von Karman years forecast for job Well. c did 20 rman ct in its predictions Von Horizons ö New

ran of where Krick consensus said and I guess Arnold them from a11 of both is saw his merit, instance 1800 this when Arnold weather then specific told And and Millikan for have cd Arnold. want of and may you think you to Cal Tech, man recommended him around the end, Can the era into is needed Krick

terribly important an flagrant 5 That was mind, and think. quite to .dn h trying everal were straightened of out been they because them time ve H put got could the wrote, just and you away wish done on Since squared later were bad No. But that got things things nemory to me. issue

Q: You mentioned a snafu with TORCH

Apparently our that happened of even involved, providng fore forehow about foggiest sending them chief fore 00 those and that cain was providing local invasion. the thing guess raised was Navy WAS Krick was t have Shelmire, of that Krick while he the the and and This kind didn' he to later, but office prior giving them to to on. over н ater came going then, part. going 00 skipper Central for Arnold' Service until know were And I working been uo the OWN He was н directly through things know knowledge Aerological because having to they got to Arnold their going these didn and he wasn't. asts of any met think out that Naval without two Eor casts casts casts idea the the pue for

Arnold's very have reflects not Arnold did it point out because as you important Force. Air command rather the of managing elaborate chain This ö manner

here" ologist One long said: He they that and hadn family Bradley a LTCOL people he pilots make down in He dealt few other things Friday blue said: "when?" and at that WOH " that. of trusted, He but next He there would down through Siberia, "Come July Sil four because I the recall He = Follett in, uo said: for You'd be were service I had only been in the Munitions Building, said: put based or he be he had a flat organization. whom he D said: meterologists make guess arrangements long. These and He out June to wi11 a? better on the think And đ Russia right agreed line he a meterological 1941. can decisions how and someone man there board. VOU time anybody the for t0 December shots deal second this even have uo before make these fighters "And you are pilot; This not that any down depends By that 80 the Arnold to the durati fast from had/ to called to "Sir the when making sure just across directives office. 'n ready commendation trying setting up compatible. things very we Gen recall all be I'm said: : came + will Bradley. of Russia, morining flat; way get it hadn ŝ ery and н moving probably week dozen typical Arnold' н guess okay the 1s he to issue he months help in somewhat had a packing Gen made to said: and happened "Tomorrow. all boss; in the are from other "Well Gen would to go uo wife will He 9 with people crew said: And Arnold we which and along to for want some 'Anywhere seniority decisions be 11:30 said: he Υ: mission because trusted called called the said: would and I What then 1942 time wi11 case let and at He Nu

w111 or and to Moscow uo equipment Joe Doaks effect left that 00 We emergency to think earmarked for to had words and said the or and Friday airplane I recall not, and briefed OL 33 dn Was the fits 9:00 as wife get 1+ uo it think And N is and at whether called else Sunday morning Gen Bradley and I everything yours Anyhow Russia pe to

" he said: "You can report

B-24,

among you; and you are taking a

Q: Flew the northern route

boss knew nothing and then back months across from Belem to Accra, personally 9 and about into Tehran, He goine my duration. except across the went ended told him anybody for then . there and went south with and as been Cairo, And back it have discussing to We into Moscow I went Accra up could No. about it without Υ: We from over but.

Q: Who was your boss at that time?

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weatherman the stage probably the head one at Zimmerman sure was was m pretty weather Merriweather Don Merri remember. man boss was the changes I don't neterorological the Merriweather remember Υ:

Arnold? with him dealings some Don Zimmerman have Did ö

Tech tive transfer Was the jointly. administra Ca1 in Krick Don over from and the because there and time was the Pentagon building, created the Navy, Don Zimmerman that hard to understand, from over been working team provided by had Krick that gotten Krick over. into the got Wa was very Don central he and moved that in Krick that him in of got bureau part Zimmerman had wanted before Yes tha as Υ: he weathe there level That' and

He was made a Major in the Air Force, the Navy was made at that time. a LCDR in from

looked up н Washington try to get to see. Island Mercer wi11 H in man one He's Zimmerman ö Don

Boeing for working was he know Washington of State while Υ: for

selected 6 people for that including note the 31 have class I but first to get the in man be hard to Weikert selected him So he đ be P.D. s going to National War College. Zinmernan, Arnold He that ö Cabell, here

strictly and Arnold Gen Arnold thought of what all story from the now this is from being class exactly to crosswise, Interesting going Krick Was first moved tried to do Don think without but the got that Zimmerman apparently shington in understand but it other him would op put or happened sudden was Zimmerman of because couldn Zim he somehow that could out because Don and đ what moved and no one of that the [group] knew erman all Arnold Don knew and think And what happened, but Zimme of but never Service with at the top of a lot conscientious Don do, speculation involved. to sudden because of Veather tried he11

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going service and sudden he and Oscar side weather you đ bad of man. the that he was in the that all one g being seemed Washington Zimmerman to Gen Senter, side interesting it just good Krick story stage, the could, be uo would At that being the Senterprobably into from Υ: to get went Don

selected for their potential

were

selected

The men that he

ö

14

area

in the

is

He

time

that

at

of person these type acute that The more Was he because his memory fairly mine, m sure than this that T think Yes, like Υ: details ö

18 it dn for Arnold sat reason organization his hip pocket important. of of it illustrates the kind out Air Force Arnold ran the because

thing fantastic that done "Take them impossible he this class Arnold and One Thi things because ahead asking me man could operate that way giving it was in them, ", anon day he did. said: the many then go Cut that, One more op than He like his so damned as confidence Was uo to the Pacific on. two months and mind going. able That better details details basic, in his did got be school. and they did it. he had is the he in it their s how he the forecaster things as op give you No normal forecasters you a forecasters them know expected right to had that' in many giv they can c everybody can and fully as Half let all that operated demanded they do it more Oscar keep Senter we had Most people did, he would have been need SO And he now. fantastic recall, And because could enough he Oscar "We = out right in half, way to go. one said: s them that the was It. No As

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forecast? a quarter of a Maybe they could give you ö

side "We people and don't know wha and I felt: training forecasting these suicide, the order, н uo the Was that. in about the Oscar pilots I was even the 4 = I remember hearing weren' things. that time. ki11 They probably We'11 certain at of the business that. had only happened. op Υ: can't have

of Arnold called and the line that Ther number anybody in getting forced sir arnold the Oscar severely explanation of business. saY shortened trebled the ears Was 8 But then said: vasn't been our or LTCOL down because to0. "That's not my and н business They I believe of has And it went rational or out place , du that doubled out. running think he done?" it. of right guys Major him. handling and pick area siad: it they asters see these н

the

placed

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that

see

and

back

20

LO LO

Senter

Oscar

"Can you get

persisted:

But he

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forecasters,

was responsible for Training,

remember his griping about it, but

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climatological side,

It

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it.

s what

that'

hand"

=

decision.

made his

Arnold

somehow

that

B

recollecti

S

E-Ring responsibility the in somebody to their that grabbing used given me the most alien his Arnold of totally that busines job technique You have This them criticized. giving nanagement ö and

Absolutely ۲: He did this? ö

80 contact were mmediately level had certain There the not at would he did this on innumerable occasions. he and was But he done, and other people op word on. could being that the best pass I watched the contact, and happened guy that people he would right oh this cases to the where many

jobs? you all the give he'd you, trusted he Ίf Well, ö

16

my.

in 1

is not

a directive which

would do that

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on back

og noX"

asked him:

Was interesting thing about him This is the H time He'd give you anything to do, whether it was your that At business. officer working under him. your the most wasn't 18 whether it This a young way he operated. OL to me, as business Υ: a Major getting this but he also load 0 of of much thing filtered down to the operating level by 3/4, process too carrying the cut was He also and bad and he Bood alienated people, It was himself. ö

for separate Air Force really within we He did that However, -before absolutely when Army a load himself. Was opinion. and doing an the of And I segment growing in strings, of And he did that himself, much too much significant force created the by pulling all the new -He organization, and much, separated. AAF impossible job Too the the Army. himself, Υ. became new were

Did he bypass staff, people like Stratemeyer. 63 He had Stratemeyer? ö

Y: Always. And Stratemeyer?

Q: Giles after him?

working after you got telling or they didn't know what was should done tell Strat Get him and go on up and brief the other guys that get to Giles to and then And the system was do it. responsible back to your boss and his boss, time running supposed him the orders he'd gotten from Arnold . them guys of the was They would ask us. All the that as well s right. and he was all guy as the instructions, the then tell That' it to about 08 going on. ** on it; Giles, First know

had and he to know how to the organization Raytheon many heh and He makes mis is clearly made because In business similar. similar 43 OL many many more mistakes than Arnold made, He had no reason in it very in people. **я** 42 people But he only is at an and the President of this organization many looking back in and he deals totally he had. working are young, Arnold no experience with his staff. there He's be President when he was 34 that to to me Now, happen Arnold. the breadth This is he operated. use the staff to respects industry Υ: hasn't takes, way

- Q: Which organization?
- Y: Raytheon.

manner got 9 prevailed upon to change his organization He had about he knew that I'm convinced that they run in the it's the first time that I had ever Then, to operate but and he then created several people on his staff. did. couldn't always go through them, tried success fully or and people had told him. even thought, "Look boss .. Arnold Arnold was opinion, The reason, into anybody that, to him and said: **U** he still recall. he should, in Υ: which, may but

Q: People like Hanley and Reuben Hood?

below hurry of and 08 cđ segments never hesitated to there was them little ίf OL question, gave he But and he đ over Was correct there watch he thought to is things This several Υ. them if

series some -/had Partly attack that? responsibility or authority - his heart to contributed what you know Do ö the

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One moderate one in 1943 during the TRIDENT of heart attacks. conference about the time that this happened, right 1945 Because in Okay, this is that. ч. after

He had a major one in 1945. This is the one where he went down to Coral Gables. ö

agreed made reasonalbe made no he had practically the way he it the first organized it, it on paper but for him that's in 1945. that So say, , dn when man, set to But you know, going staff sense for any normal was and he had the operated sense.

night, and at all night late morning and left travel trip, inspection in early in the an back again. uo 80 He came P he then come then ö and

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felt How that man ever kept on, and lived and guy who really was doing it. and Operations wore himself out. s what That' set up Plans Information. just He know. get to the when he second-hand don't He never stopped. getting to н But he felt he had any as long as he did, He didn't want later Personnel. Υ: was he

on getting B-29s out to the 5 these the engines caught directly Benny Meyers When he went to inspect the get When he got to an air base, he went right to the to went trying Benny Meyers, So he were with which they were having trouble, on that. They was on his back out there and he got Salina. and all kinds of problems operating man. to went Roosevelt he sergeant and the Well, He went out. ö a base planes B-29s. fire, CBI.

was one of his favorite people at that time, but this is the he operated way

the about said mission? you that what in u especially were You mission. I'm interested Bradley ö Follett

Y: Yes

to the Russians get was to think. H Siberian bases? tasks, One of the some us ö give

lease were they and personally purpose ve believe down through Battle on the 50 lend How did that Phi1 that we things the they Why through Siberia the wi11 "Flaming of messages through pouring always wouldn't we had information really bases the Russians always concerned route one of were We had picked up Was Order Why and monville couple through, operations This and to provide out, were giving area? the cd Fay officer bec came the Russians back everything. here the us Was Philip shuttle down We what 08 front was at Roosevelt told And He Army Japan look to Route. know 118 "flaming pink. This was behind the channels nothing in return some through let and a vis to The sib Was far Was velt op out needed one to VIS two After 6 months, mission. there pink 8 Faymonvil1 Root The front permission and stand going back, 0 felt that in that he' Pentagon Siberia. ۲: eastern of the asking couldn needed really stuff Gen 18

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Q: Standley?

Y: Standley was there at the time

through and one One through Standley Ambassador The military ö the

- John Deane? . Deane it Was ö
- old guy an No. Υ:
- where? guy military the mean, Nou ö
- G-3 was He contact OUL He Pentagon the In Υ:
- Strong? Was it ö
- G-2 Was Strong Υ:
- Handy? ö

come job the that Handy and and that the Siberia put would really forth Boon Roosevelt was thi operated wrong at the that was President would and MP pretty ų n were felt War. and that back erate and And the We the but that But Was clear 8 messages group, shorten Well from would Washington Joe that get bases influence out in December Was task Standley "Uncle the guy. felt that could coded 1t đ But just force in some the Russians to formed so convinced that we of uo through was trouble lot pressure believed it. had air still Tom Handy came đ it! Faymonville had right back damn any So we We form We there and put And still pressure Handy. us that group not going to came see out of there out . I was agreed with Was We could felt more we came Υ: because message task time way we 00 We

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report to preparing the đ Stalin caus and sent ac had Japane erent Roosevelt bellig information the You know, would be had attack. this he that that to Japanese in 1942 or not

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could

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know

we

and

job, sians

this

we could do

they

said

Rus

The

ö

Somebody may have given him phony information any bases Russians not giving us the which justified attack Russia.

information the an to look right didn't 1t Anyhow, we had Υ: that

Q: Did you know about that report?

that information I don't know where of source I understand that that was report SN what the that about know knew don't Yes, I know. from. Υ: came was.

name his mission, that in involved another man "A" Col Alcorn? 1s There an with ö starts

(2) Harley Trash H Westover 00 he Tom Watson, anyway Chuck that mission. But IBM, Gen Bradley, III. of chairman Westover uo on that mission was was a navigator he's now He C.B. . WOII son. aide. General Was stover he No. Bradley AF and Hicks, We ۲: retired Oscar was

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people of the man's name at the Air Force some "Faymonville interviewed uo officer can't think dissertaion and There's an recently a Ph.D. related mission, Academy, I was out there "A". doing an was with He 4 starts ö there. It

no real truth association the what see him in seeing did was interested in н A11 would be on Faymonville. Was

this except Faymonville, much about You don't know too mission? ö one that had except he Was and Faymonville, One Russia, people. in about were Army We anything him while for and Olie Olson behavior don't know working and his guys н No, of named Olsen him couple Υ: Saw н đ

Y: No.

op Pearl could was after see what we Roosevelt the right to 1ed type mission to this earlier Russia. G-2 course, or đ months WAS some China of Cooper some uo and in sent either Japan, Merion earlier probably bases strike Cooper Doolittle raid Was Some to anxious ö to get Harbor

Y: No, I never had any dealing with him

an This is the plan for task If they took that air approaching out? An Anglo-American air task force to help the Russians of of the Follett-Bradley mission. knowledge were were threatening Baku. Germans OL contact The contact with that? Russians you have any and they time the help Did the Stalingrad, you had no right at to ö force

the frontđ what and the German front and t0 went up there, and we saw the Russian air operations We got in, Moscow of We west that 20 miles with not about No, Υ: lines, line mess

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Q: Was the Bradley mission a success?

fine service real We got some intelligence information that probably a meterological Was The head of the Soviet hydrometerological it general And developing đ we got. Was he all and 38 00 far aide, that' him as through was my of view, justified the mission He Was from my point a LTGEN. it exchange. and Υ: guy, Was

Q: Do you remember his name?

Y: Yes, Eugene Federov.

that office Soviet only opposite call the the foreign didn't of my area and he was member the MKVD that They handled the in having MKVD. of Was time that branch you, without that one have at the entially only talk age what CO) Wa the could my OL group es Was Wa Service were that He 1 they tha Υ: Secret number group, area but

incorrect us gave that the Russians told Was ö

information

meterological

to that said who know don't there damn lie. and I was đ is That knowledge, Υ: Sil

Q: They were genuinely cooperative?

they and information some us information 10 refus their did of they some Yes incipher Υ: did

Q: Why, they are naturally secretive?

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trust didn't they and secreti naturally are They Υ:

uo broadcasts informati the information that agree that was nor the without reneged to weather weather information once agreed ver their ations information Soviet they OL thev the information all of of the agreement bulk of ciphered words incorrect none big the other gave what the they a11 course any In all But part Of fill gave but information. they internationally enciphered was was made, enciphered I know, So couldn anybody. the We nent Ear was 80 u

mission? that in role any play Hopkins Harry Did ö

problem

second

and

subject

second

the

Was

that

but

got,

ve

Faymonville's was think he н because Yes, did. wasn't he? probably boss Υ. direct

the handling to way get the could Was 0 Wa that this Faymonville House Hopkins White know to going in the н and by one business understood easily the Was Lease very He as President the Lend Υ: did, he

Q: How about Harriman?

know as far the picture as in not WAS Harriman Υ:

Q: He probably came in a little later?

Y: He came in a little later, he had been ...

Q: I think he replaced Standley (as Ambassador)?

there cam still Was after Standley that while but Standley did have We eplaced course of Υ: Later, into Poltava from England operation raid shuttle the started

Q: That was 1944? (the Follett Bradley mission

Y: That was in 1944, that's correct.

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Q: Were you there?

Y: Yes, I was in England at the time.

the Poltava mission? mission with the 80 vou Did ö of and SOB Naval weather officer there, arrange And over at Poltava. helped people н ather but 00 this arrangement WAS t go to the mission. it the I knew So I placed information because in charge of didn' him the exchanges, there been that was Υ: he gave p,I the

Q: That was Operation FRANTIC?

Y: That's right.

very thi OVERLORD for weather the about thing Tell me sting ö intere

That the was going the study weather get of arrangement once interpre We had this mock Spa Stagg the I recall was rather beautiful of knew than categorized right down to through months prior defenses staff which every kind basic would of all uo and operation We in mobility, weekly, that the brief them. amount group there wather the tary and all had operation shore ţ of lousy give mili May and his absolutely fantastic. the then This for and attended twice the this So forecast. terrific single WP 2 of of about the for and the looking and generally immact difficulty and said May And then WOLST climatologists. much part there. affected what of Eisenhower give Mallory every through in for Isting Montgomery a; just agreed bombing done was the the latter 000 We had given that were would always together Stagg would for everything foreca would they We then or these people. Leigh had an We all the pnm where criteria advanced н it May Was have SU and and and by a lot of good hadn't. we started certainly and What weather fantastic. what have you. during working create of the Navy who So mock briefings, would forces situation, had drops half hookup, and I would brief them, the exact British the Tedder becaus decision. for We that might and. forecasters probably We it, months, paratroop for Was and there. Then strategic down or three backups And June conference and of it, The This and neterological Ramsey eyebrow the invasion over the piece It was done set of simple. two weather in G-2, situation and situation sessions, the vehicles British of to the tations Υ: make or we got Bull, every đ team then June C&Cs easy nat' one for vas 20 uo

and civilian based EWO weeks Then one about were no hard turned them back, be invasion, them the and t C and rrevocable would be there the decisions 7 about the briefing OL going miserable Krick Atlantic anyway but three centers which is the day. the another they made So. before everv recall the It which make He make Officer, this group WAS beautiful would be to go. day. them acros down. days And it would And the day before to Central worried 88 one have I've ever seen, making difficult the British Meteorological coming it tarted before , they OL And were postponed Weather other. and 2 were Well going they Wer days tarted back sudden night. had awfully behind the We SN Boy, Eisenhower or four switch people. WAS ship and for making forecasts 1 real. svstems AF day of day he to be next day The forecasts the to A11 for starting three dh times and day and and weather going and the next bunch lined right going the weather decisions. the all Admiral. decision, briefed. center on our it was whole were about hours hairy Some

could whole thing the time By that ö

full happened because air the we had this communication, could have else. Anything erything correct. everybody communications This is alerted Υ: had Ne of

803 and to-touch decision forge recommend never final the to when decisions questioned that night basic well the got made yes. We h He ö Υ.

were the "How high over couple of feet said: erv Montgom we were said, And guy first going to be And the the questions Seas to go. the

than all them came boog that it going Can you guarantee Eisen figure negative strictly "About right. more questions and storms the British bombers bomb awful seasick can put of feel They the 80 was to had than half to be? and dn, all said: than hell the eager beaver. way two agree he was there ombing that you by himself paratroopers couple of days. was the kind of it. doped question 0 one between across We supposed Ramsey take but that' Way to goddam anybody be There were going to be some it SO. usually more rougher of them? people be only will will can get figure will And the in chance an all guarantee around. and them en my people sneak the of ar it. can his of then was because made the decision be be they apart. all the last to "Half they We that bunch about guarantee the of to hadn't Montgomery And things want must and op know was going half right, wouldn't day where much. said: to see 0 you paratroopers for said, "that" there to getting forces bomb visually had least give and then they kicked these can 11 be can't where he about if wanted them too time he will that'a he STOW: we And It messy said: because at "Well he as and said CASE knet just it. that them Monty far the time said, target. max permissible. the be н ON. compromising bother We he said take .. were said sleep wanted of to as too gue for it, WAS and But instrument. said: just Then, in. half going He can and they uo wouldn't ++ atypical of whipped bombing 2 hours get the US thing. And I being nower Spaats guys. boats that most have Well it." 50% the Was 2 at

28

out

and one of them bunch of and all they but other than that, was that the US bombers hit instrument, One In. went two hours apart got getting in paratroopers wrong place was kind of hairy the They of in the Most RAF hit visually. got The funny thing it everything. But paratroopers got in. the got

Q: I'll bet you didn't sleep that night.

they blew out all those that and it ended up really worried three weeks later whenever really interesting; time were s the We was that they put in. that' Two or all. it exciting, well. at lucky. sleep dn real Was themporary docks period came didn It were about it that we next

Q: The Mulberries?

what would have happened time wouldn't right at the So they torn up, been. or two and God knows would have all were that time things postponement month those to the invasion at for next Yes have gone the that

startedthe during Germans uo the going invasion, this imagine the Exactly one week after initial invasion? you Can V-1s. flying in the the invasion, ö

would particularly if they And I whole right place. 1-1 . one The everybody was there grouped within. the area in messed us. them down there in the Portsmouth it hit that whole operation, have clobbered the whole bunch if mean they were there all the time wouldn't that have of oh, brass Υ: had put top

or 10th of June 9th the uo talk to you? in came Marshall did he and Arnold, Arnold see you ö Did

saw him н me at that time. to he didn't talk No. Υ:

went the headquarters went on across his then had and service installed Spaatz that time advance Granville where palace at the on down to Germaine were busy because with the weather away St. out then went get the over right Paris enhower and we to to there , dn dn Eise moved They were busy, follow Φ stayed Granvil1 headquarters; So to We over from and way

Q: Did you see Arnold later on in the war?

at called The unit in the nwob take year over somebody He Н where and was other. wing to "well situation is operating okay barred. just able tuation ather each up the said: there 1944, should have been "No holds fighting said. And he back in December over the heading 0 dn here and he wasnt weather been said: MOU heading Was "Yes" had right again out Arnold and Hunt Bassett the officer you think the said: individual 1u straighten it factions t, called office Senter didn' nere general I puy It. back 00 Arnold cas organize two the Oscar Arnold op. now? nest SOT and got to N.C. and Yes. were goes said: Gen burden right C. 10 the line rat Pentagon, Nashville somebody factions just to Υ: And he there said: down that got he

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Q: Were you a general officer at the time?

recommended recommended the running had I had been Spaatz 00 he I hadn't been promoted. guess time. the really, at Colone1 Anderson but me for promotion, for promotion, No, operation

Q: Fred Anderson. He just passed away

Was Fred publication some recent 'n that Saw Yes, Υ:

had Of course, Although Spaatz really ran the operations there. it was running for Fred. Fred worked directly decisions the and weatherman of Operations most made as

the in right 0 Wa this 1944 Dec Bulge? in the back of came Battle you When middle of the ö

Y: Yes.

involved Did you get factor? tremendous đ was Weather that? ö in

80 temporarily back come to asked was н . I came back TDY. uo came back Υ:

Q: Oh you went back to Europe?

together Arnold want the And here was Arnold So "Well H with everything can put the time, and the, management." said: MOU field. right And I at January = team stratively the with you. and the sting to forecasting = continuing of away? Europe out Service. lst "Admini back 80 squared situation the to to take Bassett you to reorganize the Weather best back uo is having said: get it takes you back went the miserable he to and Bassett, , but going And then right, all want all right most So "Is it for going Ι. "A11 is there, stepdown said: have the Υ. said: said: going Bulge he

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Q: So you had to go back to the Bulge?

of end through the stayed and over back went Then battle Υ: that

Q: That was a hairy situation?

and nothing you in socked was It mess. 63 That Υ:

about it

could do

Y: Yes. Couldn't do anything about i

The any get 000 and couldn't touch We Was guess or 10 days it fly ÷ couldn line. the week vou penetrated because about For in there had ö Germans air

about 11ke socked they an invasion had there They had said they had operation complimentary because We 1t the war that you that then that slipped in of ew And all. after an fact But the gamble VI no possibility get of at the were do. We on. once you point air in there and could period, they And later of the invasion time. meterological rrible you talk to the Germans, pressure hour absolutely down. all te any it. an 18 it was 80 get into the slow that there was but from couldn't it hours operating right can but stopping couldn't risk it. time you forecasting 24 got to it worked, Nou that of that that going, one break in when we Υ. advised taking during were the and Ín.

Q: Luck played a part?

Y: Luck played a terrific factor.

takes over? mean you can be and luck H sometimes professional all the way down the line scare you it Doesn't ö

the over that and that's of science control the job ou in doesn't do the You have more ou and exactly right. far Still SO you meterological today are You just Υ: problem Ski11

the went after He presumbably attack major heart when you came back, Arnold had his later, of the Bulge, month A ö Battle

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Were the run from the Biltmore. to and was trying position, He was down there, a horizontal 111 Was he force from aware that down to Miami. air you

Y: No.

Q: It was kept very secret.

was in the middle of he idea had no it later about reason. aware, I heard another personally think was there not sick at that time, and too move,

of end the at back came He see him? When did you next March 1945? ö

what of the organization because we had several and ATC make and time service together that communications in at ATC all changes 1t under tell and pull radical is pretty hard to the it put with g it out a worldwide operation proposals long Service pull ದ Was to That and Weather it meetings have you ч. believe the it

Q: You had your star by that time?

but that four year In and then was in the and star Research star. second the or 1947 н of got after weather business. Si l and Director until 1946 н got in 1947 Patrick 151 to guess in star of Research years and down of the н Nu l Pentagon, 9 came I didn't get 50. for out there in Director stayed here Then I was the to No, Development. R&D business as from went tour and that was Υ: I went 150

145-146 in the Karman NON Did you have any contact with ö period?

everywhere and Europe, and in Both here, time. ,all the Yes Υ:

Arnold sent him to Europe right after the war ended, team? in that were you ö

there, over and visited him was that? What year aware of it, office in Paris. I was but and he had an No, Υ:

Q: '45. This was May or June 1945.

and days Research those on the In the I was everywhere uo Karman, Was and later to see Von over. all Meteorological Committee, traveling specific trip Development Board made no н

Q: Scientific Advisory Board?

office and ever since he was of that Research the head office of had know von Karman Was the I and of Tech Force out came Cal Air mine at That Bit I in the Yes. professor of for 4 years. Development Υ:

group? Have you read find of the Von Karman a well? Found the German documents down of the aware Where you Karman's book? ö They Von

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on it of reviews couple I've read a I haven't. No, Υ.

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists about his relationship with Arnold I wrote one of them for The Did he ever talk to you Karman? ö Von

and kept him there him. those things. to There wa Arnold obligated depended Gen it's hard to recall exactly his words. for of very personally Arnold one respect in this position another Gen great and he was very close to him. that as felt very didn't just do this flattered He him had it very personal. put question but that he felt he that always Yes. he Karman Arnold so long, never Υ: took Gen Von no He He

Arnold wouldn't take that job unless they gave him direct want guy to right didn't kind of to go He same Arnold operate. He wanted the way, of command. in watched was He chain must have Arnold by a He guess he operate ö access

Gen always to get never and for way, terrifically sharp, any harder Karman that deaf The way he worked the group, it up von worked Was set course he and he every despite the fact that witty of And Nobody exactly right, terrifically did. for Gen Arnold. Karman he kept it that way. guy Von missed a trick This capable than the best ч. Arnold very

tall Mainliner scientist. Jewish interest the this little a common opposites about, and of attraction a West Pointer, to talk lot an found Philadelphian, This they ö But

Y: They certainly did.

And aware Arnold Kettering had designed He missiles I was you may have been in that? improve along, somebody who could contribute. wasn't personally involved in that. early came involved and V-1 the reproduce the get of I'm sure you do know and one as you he Arnold, as soon Did to "The Flying Bug" You know, wanted JB-2. admired He the from WWI. it. did. Arnold may know H involved in it thing called wanted to get No, We gadgeteer And .7 ö you it. as

course, toward the and drop of Of off. version weapon them, water Chinese Arnold wanted to build like 5,000 of German cut his the They had a better and the War Dept than lot better the Germans War. đ of of the a heck ö uo the end it was them

it

of

and bringa little more like scientific. scientists would take the German of This any collection of Were you involved in we couldn't duplicate the V-2. of the over here? any planning. PAPERCLIP ing them

Y: Just on the administrative end, not personally.

Survey? Bombing Strategic the in involved Did you get No. ö Υ.

would believe level but efforts Presidential project. He, OWN too. its Force cđ ideas, uo evaluating Air raised pet an it i one of Arnold's đ then realized that the Air Force it So they got started He was credibility. originated this. This ö lack

Issign first interesting the saine had assignment view of point good other historical out in only The an A-bomb test from ment

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completely 1945? and an that two of and July 16, officer time Was it. were and watch that one first administrative head weather Alamagordo on somebody dropped There there time and the the it That's got out lt. for during uo at wait forecaster guess. out all information until goddam thing. and Trinity, there, there days the the head and then sit oh, out 7 Was last had that neterologists Bikini? Was the then hold that Yes Ben Holzman for briefed, ö Υ. I knew ready, two

Q: That was a long three weeks?

and seen this p,I because weeks, three long op cđ would Was That what Υ: seen

Q: Did they keep you guys locked up?

matter Was it. day, every But work. to went back No, ч.

of... I couldn't talk to anybody

Q: It was one of the best kept secrets of the war.

Y: Wasn't it? Fantastic, it really was

Q: Did you get involved with Tibbets?

Y: No, I didn't get involved with Tibbets.

fact, a lot the Enola of people think that the pilot of the plane had this terrible a Sergeant named Ľ went crazy Now the plane. plane that preceded and William Bradford Huie wrote up this story Gay of the Enola it was aboard people rocker Actually, the pilot weather his weather went off and was institutionalized people think that some uo Was got and He They crisis, Eartherly ö moral many Gay,

Y: Yes, I've heard that story.

"If I'm sane do you have any other and Tibbets is saying: Arnold that might be interesting? Well. then he's sane. People think this, recollections of and you're sane, ö

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Y: I can't think of anything that might help you.

Arnold' the the Yates meet Did How about social? socially? ö

she any And have didn't Arnold quite well. н Ι, more than Yates knows Mrs. far it side of No, Mrs. knows the social direct contact ч.

Arnold as head of the Air Force Do you remember Mrs. Emergency Relief? ö

Mrs. Y: That's what she started.

Q: Did you work for her?

up the organization interesting or instructive set she amusing or Worked with her when remember Do you Υ: Mrs. ö

37

anecdotes

tomorrow and that " and radio, effect that I didn't Non and Don was call Arnold the did about to she "I '11 kidded from her. listening Mrs enough said, always to the This hear Sure evening she over She to something said: Josephine. friends = better. expect .dn and it some + feel "But I'm 'd bring I'm not didn called I had you and I when she Υ: and Arnold believe it; well shen her, morning Russia, said. met Mrs was

hadn't

called

she

the

remember

Mrs.

call not believing that your Always kidded about ö

calling me Arnold About Mrs Υ: Mrs.

been must have on that mission This speak. went with Follett Bradley 80 room throne the 1942, the General From ö

Yes. Υ: Mrs.

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with her? contact other some you have Did ö

had always when she that, and uo that, her just working with all and dependents personality No. setting that up, great deal of Υ: Mrs.

Did you go all Did you work with her in 1945? through the war? ö

the and try came back in 1945 in the big meetings together caucus room, little could get away to Maine in 1944 separate were at the wives husbands meetings d'n the set SO whose went And then they went to the various neighborhoods to know about those No. Υ: Mrs. meetings. and then

organization counterpart UK? the RAF the in visit when to Do you recall Arnold invited Mrs ö

No. Υ: Mrs.

sometimes Arnold would push all the 80. running you can come of rest everybody the and have you, and Norstad told us that want box I. squawk this? say: then on his rememb and ö buttons you there Do

the I've heard I never remember it happening; Υ:

story.

Q: Oh, you heard the same story?

operated. never took sure exactly he extrem the way wasn't Then he knew an it's typical of He 5 thing story. him. a good same saw But the be carrying he till exactly story wanted serious yes may he It q one 88 ö which that

rest Bu call made and the doing and his you, buttons of time unorthodox want of the told lot all you say pushing ÷ waste to just would See But desks people sense way 80 their grabbing certain can good from guys make of 30 people you 29 doesn't things sense of

because but was true, true been really have it could that felt It characteristic never Υ. S

had it If time. of long period to you? happened for have would you But it happened ö

on things Only S of job. none called in No. were ÷ wasn that been tell him it I've times several me н to And only once did happened business never my not It Were business Υ: that once.

Q: What did he say?

guesi after And months sir. several "yes of said: a period н done?" about it expected him for get you "Can H Υ: that,

business And I don't know he wasn't mad weather I was the only name that he associated with the difficulties had had our He was mad at everybody else. We because me, at

air WOLFY the in to keep he has 49 to trying one, you Was he would give balls 50 If he had he simultaneously Well ö about.

found 1t I'd take any weather Was ball H until н As far as the whose Pentagon 11 out fine. even finding worked. the it was wasn't about time 1t That's the way he I understood that Sometimes running đ of the ball to. he11 80 P,I cj instructions. have But once pass Right. p,I really was. to concerned, business, Υ: the guy body's

came thenwhen Advisory And then Rosie 0'Donnell ambassadors without portfolio. and he had these two so-called advisors Norstad business? and Cabe11 came in. your with the in off Jake Smart were interfere started These Well, ever Norstad left, He on. in later they Council. ö Did

in his principles OL organize a kitchen interfered anybody, So I think he was careful all two bother OL against other bothered me to never the miserable way It is were Jake would never Who it is lousy. in any place that I could see. one time. because đ that C. That' one On paper, hand, at choice of people, Never. had Cabell, other cabinet. On the he

Q: He had MacRae and Rosie 0'Donnell?

he had people that command wear his line of to try but again, knew the so they didn't and was there embarrassing situation, them, and could handle part of Rosie 0'Donnell knew the Υ: stars.

think. to be I talked to him several months just want you guys You new ideas. н Arnold told him: I'm too busy to think up operating Well, Cabell told me that catch you Шe told ever he idea men and If I ö but ago my

but and things were And They right way to do it. for ideas other than that. come down and chat, the Was that' that it right, talking, they would found myself. never operating That ч. never

They were never to come in there and use their superior position? ö

and probably Fortunately an organization ultimately job, operated. an fantastic semblance of ended could be it and think he did some operate or it, Was operational op could it could over, man that he all a pattern that was turned it ordinary at Way Not only an ۲: when he that the

Q: You said he got mad at you sometimes?

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see 1n turn in to went Wasn he that But time seen him mad unhappy The mad. Not ve I was mad. saw him, I' no. No, never suit. Υ: my н

Q: Did he have a smile on his face?

Y: Oh yes.

Q: But it didn't mean he was happy?

put OF not personal really giving from anything take in was could WAS all He at you criticize. but anything personal tha face man to his that he had uo Was smile Was he But there đ flet He had A felt anytime he to him. Υ: I never it was it

Q: It was not vindictive?

difficult He demanded the operated ct was damned He he done way Was it the It He was impossibly demanding. gotten Was a11. that that's you hadn't But respect it. done if that expected it afterwards get leader better and Never. explain impossible tremendous you'd Υ: and ç

hi of did you know Did Lovett, Lovett? Lovett? about with How relationship ö

know didn't н good. Was it than other never knew there at all politics No. Υ. any

to keep balance wheel đ of sort was actions? Lovett impulsive if wonder some н from ö him

a buffer between Lovett had to be probably, that the War Dept I think and Υ: him

of that. relationship? for one middle chemistry the that personal in Wrong buffer Arnold had the the of Was no personal knowledge so I think Lovett Patterson and You have ö another

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Y: No.

level3 lower at operating down here You ö at felt from Ed Bowles could, and particularly separate deal to OSD, down below, went that when I Was Υ. times

Q: You mean down in the Secy of War's office

communications Was greatest some the and in that some of indicate Arnold were not viewed with the B politics that Arnold with would the, shenanigans of advise Bowles lot that did Ed Bowles, of some Bowles he11 of War's office. doing from pulling Ed Arnold was out, Was Arnold there found Secy And with that that However, Υ. working natters things things

at on the Secy's developing, one, good he whatever a rift damned people of or đ of the was I never heard Air. and he for some person Secy buffer and Asst On the other hand. Secy type of the was the that that Lovett, of admiration by because he's sure time E H staff. and the

Did Bowles confidence in Bowles? repose confidence? Arnold Did Arnold' ö have

although he did do some of the things that Bowles advised him with of his shenaigans operator know such an don't some н Was However, saw through Bowles but felt that he did. did, Arnold to time he to certain things felt that never from time I always respect ч. think that

claims credit for RAND. Bowles RAND? d'n Setting ö

Y: He does, have you talked to him?

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Q: No, I've read in the documents ...

Y: Are you going to talk to Bowles.

Q: I hope to.

of He had quite a collection of papers and letters Υ: Mrs. Arnold's

and that good of shape, the had memory I'll bet that he respects Arnold documents everything Was gug all He fantastic the of view ago. you, of look month point tell cd just And he has 1,11 take from Bowles' in over And he But can CC. and he' saw him not You above all of them that he knew. on Arnold. pack rat. service, proud, old. 70, years or he's very tremendous influence 65 men in the mind Bowles is some so in his he with Raytheon s 80 that Now. military ۲: and he swear and has

Y: He's still in Massachusetts

Q: Do you have his address?

from. P,I tell material reminisc Raytheor And with Was research wanted to do had. went the Record) some ever first get he that all he When good man to (Off paper and Arnold. Arnold. every go down to his office. is about and Bowles about the war stories Υ: because more

part operated smal1 đ just Arnold is in how This about Krick? but it is significant say What did you the equation, ö of

previously B God, to E you not to think situation carry and I 80 by could happened better, can't down Arnold square. order was the going before you Gen have authority to "look, and also to play "and And that to might Arnold down I said: said, because what am going to the н appointment. going and α and qo that' want Krick to do that Krick good, before and that that to of an felt most longer went tell him get Question and not the I had do the So I I can any down and going to this way do this, get soon as ** you can to Don. him, not

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Q: In the case of Zimmerman, Krick beat him.

when of close to the way ou Krick defend rest he, person that think against the all very anyone think supporter of I don't person kind SAW defend him never that and this is the thing that hurts, there. Zimmerman was his strong as ÷ wasn knew Irv down only. Navy, He went all the anybody. but No. think he We defend him against Air Force. 20 loyalties I don't loyalty ready us in the personal through, any Υ: got him. had he

with he in dutch Don that interfering and he told Krick not to do it I never saw anyone defend him to the extent that Don for got office Was working he reason because he front was the the he that with fixed it while felt deal wanted to do, was just first H It And yet Krick down. that that what Krick went did. started making Was Krick Zimmerman Arnold with him. and

got that with funds to do had that something mixed up in that thing It was Υ: Mrs.

Y: I don't know how you can use it.

for to In one trying Arnold were operated organization you case where Arnold other against the the really how direction in and one iconoclast Krick and is line My interest In went in back Arnold Krick ö case get the

by wanted There there issue all was there time he an around were made one Was i t pegs office any uo him and Krick but of system. lot to him organization. could get into Arnold's went 8 to the moved due no one or defending were sure the that probably E against defending himself changes Krick But, He is SO this many himself. and Υ: that to,

rather than deal with the paperwork he Arnold block the chip off đ Was Krick with people directly sense In a ö dealt

why I went to his is the kind of dealing with new him this give that's to Arnold but okay, wouldn't think I felt this way, it, jerk, 3 no permission to go that đ Was that he boss And see say happened. said his don't had Right. of thing that н Krick maybe, Arnold ۲: boss, boss. Gen to someway Arnold and get him out of the Navy to got or Arnold, to went of this mess Zimmerman get Krick out Y: Mrs.

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Q: That was earlier.

think H and then н through. hassle, way the until they probably had a little all Krick Zimmerman defended right up Υ:

believe

for Zimmerman to cut off Krick's Then it was difficult ö

water, because he had been his defender

Y: Yes.

INTERVIEW

Gen ered ount ence Non remember the first time Do you ö Arnold?

that eared himself Bar very Tech in Cal the criticism of Cal 1939 course (cuol uently C 1 to in the to he gone meterological out got frea with his had getting the efing aui th about generous time Barksdale ab1 take point prob first n arbitr to off Was assign through the weatherman and stopping **Probably** pr first on all flights and good weatherman He My into AFB. Tech. 1939 dale there well was ran

weather? about the concerned very He ö

Vei

with him big erv ö Krick? Irving 6 kne Wel ö

for contex fn about and direct1 talk time cult building was directly to Arnold difficulty to only diffi working tough the 12 Pentagon bit think little an Littl the COB t0 had caused involved Krick suit L gone gets edly ctions that had 西 thi in fact COLL after which again th offered Incident orking Arnold 0 one tim because ever But was Gen the

H and papers Arnold's of out and F his ö

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don't celationship, maybe can't decide know He

important, best damned th get anted ath felt tha important Arnold Krick General and ould it know knew

esman? he 88 atherman good he Was ö

and that fore forecaste fore of Forecast forecaster th Lot boog apable of himsel. guy range part did to range abl long and 801d Ę long Now eine BL Tha ou Wa. 50 Kricl ect advanc but for re cla St. tim no ster forecaster Ca opini tha fore th for foreca tha and In rang thr good day ong or to busi Gen day 3 office sold sort than He difficul casting respect Arnold caster Was front more boog but he

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Q: Horace Shelmire?

Y: Yes.

Q: This was from his old home town

etitio that but front the of thing cultimate sion th for nvasion sting ab to CI OLY Mon ũ for Afric civing providing the knew the ard North u.I. Krick the ehow pue arding ved Well lova actually Υ: office things ō don he

Central had con of sters the Pather 80 kind position of 1t tuf foi the tha th unning name thi the direction and ot a11 h perople here sending the and and other 80 80, tim or forecasts 1 Krick to Shelmire, that uldh going at and tha out Kricl Pentagon were office Navy embarrassing. putting impossible agreed the in the with were Į

200

authority? authority your outside of wheeling eling free free was words he completely other In consensus ö

IL But And people said: by and and this having bootlegged through doing. the show. Cen OL which I puy the for for more position topped run working = good Was direction umop him it think I have ever been. 4 went al 225 et thi got for offici anything He then ersonal have that good s sue ends the to razzle show uo be for kickback would like fri positi your whole to One rha good this good going by the nother all some service verv н positi And Ľ than and getting said knew think that time heeling want the 2 wasn and for and to defend NOA said: Arnold yet he Krick good free knew at and

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that? to react did Arnold How ö

guess

sonally in because think and office н him, and rapport with in his right, all 1t good He take funny onably vould 0 E and Υ: out always

standing 'in asked And time WAS th eatherman He some tim for General the service retired had the for old of and ect out thi He had been WB sonable office ssion in his there permi had

Q: Was it Trubee Davison?

Washington In lived affairs who Forc one Air other the The all no to went Davison He long Υ: 80

Q: Fechet?

Y: Fechet, yes.

Q: He was the first Chief of the Air Corps.

never care upset Arnold the Was could don hi no the below couldn alute very organizati Well had with urse that "oh tiers Very 0 U L across th 80 betw officially him of alked and knev right about run least app tim to VOU But an 0 th him p1 office thing Flat, at capacity the rnold tedly the functions to Was him at one reported the repe see probl Operations Gen op the The In that fingers 00 said that think uested had guy eop1 WO LOC he he osed of his him Right understand how and kind Supp with and personally smiled the WAS that how problem did. Υ: directl because turned Force that know down less Was he In he

pos thi Was 42? OL 1941 about talking are You ö Harbor

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things guys two turned here the 80 that he very am think fornt because thi probably that they ruckus now Well ust Gen rious and 43 1F admitting right other th got and ords out op and ctly arly reporting that Californi Gen Spaatz sult no thing be C that dir NON Τ time Arnol shington Was mayb would sing oF got outfit about one before thi he the 50 aid Drop that 1942 "Wha **traighten** turn best him OL So sti 1944 take ould hev occured hi In th knew send ned σ run In aid send ha th 1944 Nan Central In probably shington He to He 11 Europ anklv to January Incident can authority Non they And 100%3" being ssary Weathe said: L to before could If your c in nece outsid outfit. said aid call you this have the 5 and vent ecifi to year handl in th sp of This to the eriod And need 1t about the and ot In thre was in Europe Arnold can Krick "Send don't effec right ahead that. that Yes r've about that body line ing time and can 5 C

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respect your the think Ę al forec = really that days qo of the and 50 20 that And so about and guy cind aid ared corner DL 000 back capabl ment puo either with the do. embarras going tt to in about going COUL hemi sphere 6 anding said. are bone t of 8u of th goi you the out and no the do what kick made just tte smiled Sar Krick later of Arnold echet chart point tting you put WILL get not let Se torical could tha which got OF pl though up hist you've offer best think that room vear the job

the 13 made this trip didn of things Arnold papers mixture and of kinds papers ected that the a11 his een m glad not 5 help what OL ace and pl you Krick the role, think offici Going back to of his Congress understand becaus of unoffici up here ö Library quite Krick

the said: published whatoffice uo for can't HO cards working BO for tuati this Arnold fire the work 81 put could the you see said: Nrong him he either can told HO had Arnold non ã, would quit to be that Gen would do 1 L soon 1t to had about concerned could down 1t him to Krick but thing gon told him anted **frankl** The went back told Arnold table had ever as

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went up

then aftuatf changed; said And that th op going difficul g job to completely this. set team splendid ar AF with and 8th the you Coast onnection of So USSTAF did West Pad said tuati the the and S1 in and 20 Ę Spaatz ther Tech with 20 1 u out Gen red AC agreed prepa working hard then for And forecasting professor Arnold ought and don't outfi Gen have Howe Was ň we

Strategic the AF 15th the and Force 8th Air the Yes Force ö Air

of forecaster onal target, D-Day profe uo for tisher that Deputy Chief rologi SU Italy Isting two Officer and from the eca there for AF re Meterological Was 15th the Holzman did the He it and of team that pulled and Europe SHAEF Officer side militar Chief he SN of later, joint cal the where that of And Yes uo meterologist rologica 8th a Britisher the Chief that and the Mete Was

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Fellow ö

not

Staff Υ: mentioned him Eisenhower I think ö

80 went into and and Holzman Krick he and by well bib headed Verv certainly out for crew [tsel EV EV He bib ation Britis Yes Υ: à big ever that

ding many **VBS** This belittle the the person tuation of consensus sides 20 though hi real try other that 5 eal the tended aimed He than CL 20 business accurate had deal So always the these his more Krick and pip during were crew Irv Irving respects because British forecas the g

Arnold this had an he pronoun. vertical pounded th ually of Cti Į this this aspect fostered Well personality of ö sort

Y: He did:

Q: What gave Arnold so much confidence in him?

Y: I don't know. I do not know

Q: He came from Cal Tech.

Y: He came from Cal Tech, and as you know ...,

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and MI ere: th Millik Robert ö

very close.

Y: That's correct.

Q: In the early '30s?

Von Karman very did t'o both of over Arnold, that many switched guy Krick weaknesses the close Clark Millikan him There Von had his F to ason and rnold Karma talked von Karman young pabilitie but Von the and And exactly and Navy them the kne 1s ushing of in that all Force commissioned and to agreed about close them the Ľt.

2 troubl some had He this. about ask going to

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Navy?

out the getting soldier take did But after So tter wouldn' which for us. be pi even job WAS they tt1 tougher the only organizing the bit for sph trouble little ouble better awhile C, Sam 1t had Made always for 1 ho Tech he that Force in Υ: for it to Cal back well Air all

had he Karman backing him, with Millikan and Von entials? cred He had highest ö the

know you Bowles Rossby, to Carl deputy interesting consultant the very working in OSD as Was And it Υ: Bowles. Was

Q: OSD?

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professor Dr Bowles Rossby he but 0 been Ed Carl Way the War. and had ot Rossby anti-Krick all ectly Secretary dir owles Stimson Was office for for where course he ed ork worked Stimson any get he Of Norweigan couldn't t MIT Bowles

the Norwegian mentioned his of think omebody couldn bue of ste forec weather technical than good echnically honest, technically competent aster say forec not though Irv hone more He much would be man

thar assigned the In him Rossby an got mixed H Bri Norwegian and Wasn got him in ō the He US Patterssen the time Patters that theoretically Svere hadn milits Swede but

of bit ervice the invasi out little never did didn't with Karman back eather 1 time Von quite But Rossby long probably Millikan the 50 pulle course got back and had aid: of for Chief of war Servi Bowl SU Arnold. came the the Was and the Weather lot and Millikan in of with after Rossby worked "hack had Karman thought, Service th ervice of age Von Chief and believed Weather Von th weather the in that influence got him and n Europe to Sometime to the the Rossby there vhich going there чo Ve In

after

and Millikan 80 Arnold air-HO 130s rays scientists no blanche. early solar Field ed the of and his carte March in tests started him at to him atmospheric gave Was He connection Arnold available Field. high an farch that made Arnold was conducting Well at They great ö Arnold planes thing. had

ential the with way same the L espec appreciation business didn better weather Had

if Arnold could reach it, Could Karman like Von Ħ professionals moon and he could get true who for the People That' him ö Υ: ask

him, for job did ö

Toward fant Hitle His book, absolutely the during know. of R&D you cam Von Karman forecast vears Well. 20 in its predictions Horizons New

of where Krick consensus them said I guess Arnold and all from of when both 18 saw his merit. instance 1800 this Arnold weather then specific told And and Millikan for have want of Arnold may Can you think you and to Cal Tech, man recommended him end. Krick is the the era into needed. around

ran

terribly important flagrant an Was and think That quite buim straightened up. P P of out they them tim put got could the wrot ust and AWAV you wish done Since got things squared late bad No. But that things to me. memory Issue

Q: You mentioned a snafu with TORCH

our Apparently nappened of involved fore about how chief foggiest fore the providng those ending and that' cain that providing **local** even invasion guess caised th thing Was Navv giving them to Shelmire that Krick of the the and Krick and while while This kind didn to ·later. but office prior to on. н over ator came going then. part. skipper going for Arnold Central Service Intil I know TUN ere working been uo the OWN He was know through things knowledge ogical having to they got to Arnold was their going T didn rol directly wasn't. Sts the of think any out that without and he casts casts casts idea and the for the

Arnold' reflects have not did it out because Arnold point as you important Force. Air command rather the of managing chain This of elaborate ö manner

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meterologist nere One He they that TCOL "How long said family Bradley Bnd 1 down things out of the blue Friday that said: that. next of "when? but sted Siberi July for my th at cal1 ett other Co be uo đ đ said: said: put servic Was Building based You through nts said gues to He June Long and Thes to Russia? right agreed think arrange meterological line econd man. decisions 1941 and Munitions eone time TIOA dow th anybody board the shots that are pilot; make before de DOC any fighters that 80 uwop Arnold. Thi depend from Fast the called trying to thi the "Sir. sure making th By just ready an office in compatible dation things rective Gen recall th all NOA said: the setting when WILL been Cam Bradley of hadn' Russia morining it hand" ip and noving dozen probably typical ee nold only Υ. in ewhat months packing to and Gen happened aaid yo other at 11:30 in the boss 0 from Well 00 would S 01 will crew Ge ç said: tak Arnold seniority which peopl and Anywhere 50 said: mission decision wife the becaus he would crusted called called and I want said "Wha And with then vi11 1942 time case Let and He my

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Q: Flew the northern route.

nothing months personally Accra 9 were goine about bos from Belem He Tehra duration Into Cros acros the ended anvhod hi then told It and lth and And Cairo ack sing to We went disc No. Accra it Υ: without about from over but

Q: Who was your boss at that time?

Can weatherm stage robably head one the ather Zi Don the bos change L WAS don Merriweather th remembe neter

Arnold? him with dealino Zim Don Did ö

Tech the transfer trativ jointly Ca1 Don admini DVPT from thete th time the ated building that from understand at the over entagon orking βų Don Krick to provided hard over got the th Don into he Krick team and ved that gotten Krick of t P had anted part befor Yes Zimmerm there level weath That and

a Major in the Air Force made Was He Navy that time the LCDR in made đ from was

đ I looked Washington see. 5 get Island in Mercer will 00 Pe Zimerman He ö Don Boeing working for Was he know н Washington. of State while while Υ. for

including the that C people for but first get, the to 9 selected man to hard Weikert him he So be ected to 9 College going Zimmerman Arnold War He that National ö Cabell. here

is strictly Arnold H thought of a11 eriou from the exactly Arnold crosswise sting C I going this Krick first noved mon op Gen think the got that apparently ngton in pue other, but him Zim qp put OL sudden of couldn somehow out Don Zium moved of ũo bec group kne tha all Arnold Don and and Don Zimme think but the of Service with of lot ntious op speculation top to what sudden involved of Υ: Weather the consci becaus tried he11 And at

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thing was fantastic that done them impossible Cut this class Arnold This "Take One and things because ahead giving way them, day asking could operate that did. said: manv none 80 the 1t One that. then he two months more do p He than H 10 uo confidenc Pacific and dam 11ke mind going. That C, able better detail details 80 basic his pip Pot the school had did it in the in 1t their the things you qo normal CAST hor ter forecasters they them know had to give for right 12 that forec many and No they can everybody and Half that a11 let operated more Oscar keep op had ente have been did 80 need they MOU fantastic could ŝ recall, And enough And eonle aus he right demanded in half WAV one to go. would said: them 00 Most that the out No As L

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We people what pue felt: raining these stino knov н and 23 suicide. don the fore order g the Was that. in about the Oscar pilots even WB the ember hearing weren things ki11 that They probably We'll certain that. had busine only ę happened the 1 have can' of

that and There anybody in getting the arnold line rnold shortened sey Oso the the But I'm trebled w111 th OUT down 100 griping They of it it LTCOL And OF out what beli that, place doubled đ out. running "That OL done? 1t of think right that guys was handling Major see him pick siad: they 11 puk" forecaster the get and **N** Training placed in and omeh bug vou back got not Arnold go back nold they had office tha 08 D its and Ne which onsible to climatological hi recollecti see that hi would do that 40 Senter forecasters a directive 5 mad whil him: courses Arnold dow Oscar asked betw But han

of

-Ring cd verely explanation of onsibility their rational grabbing ĉ alien Ξ hi Arnold the of totally Be This business that given job technique You have them criticized. giving management ö and

Y: Absolutely.

Q: He did this?

contact ediately tain There cer not the had would occasions. he and But he qo being done people innumerable could word on other that the best and uo pass watched this the contact and did ened guy he that would to the right q where this people he 2: many

jobs? the a11 you give he'd you. Well ö

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him the about was your tim This that thing At whether interesting busines him under do. to most working anything the 18 officer This you er He'd give wheth young operated OL đ 88 business ч. a Major way he me, ŝ

getting this also load but he of of much the process 3/4 too by carrying **Ievel** cut operating He good and bad. al the and he to down people filtered alienated ö himself thing

for within tha However -before absolutely did really Armv load himself. Force an opinion the and doing of ent growing rate cţ of strings himself too much significant th Eorc all the created that much pip by pulling and much, he And AAF separated impossible job TCO organi the himself, Army ч. becam nei vere the

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bypas Did Stratemeyer like staff, people 65 He had Stratemeyer? ö

Y: Always. And Stratemeyer?

Q: Giles after him?

orking you got tellin should what was done Str Get hin after that 1t know get te1 Giles guys didn't then system was ft. other responsible qo and back they to the boss running the supposed brief them And his guys of and and the 118. All an ask that bos the uo right. would VOUL all a 000 guy instructions the tell They That 2 then and no on it; going First Giles know the

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Q: Well, I'm going to see Giles in San Antonio.

he ŭ ation (Raytheon mis and how he clearly makes ause know similar 50 He P son made erv 42 in people rea Arnold only ou had an totally He working organi young Arnold takes staff ther deal thi 34 He 50 with his and he more th 0 adth rnold he when sid experience staff to President respects industry the the takes hasn and asu way ou

had

Q: Which organization?

Y: Raytheon.

got 0 about that they organiz had I'm convinced that He Then operate had change his staff did. that EO ther on his sfully time -upon to through first people told him ũ vailed ought 80 the rnold several people had it Look reason ated couldn Arnold tha said cre and The vbo still then and should may recal anyt Υ: him he he which, Into and but 20 he

Q: People like Hanley and Reuben Hood?

below hurry and go Bon segments 5 hesitated **Part**] there them little ίf never or stion gave he But ue he and over what correct watch th know thought to This thing Do if Υ: several them

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in 1943 during the TRIDENT one moderate One attacks conference. of heart

right that this happened, time about the 1945 in this Becaus Okay, that. Υ: after

he This is the one where He had a major one in 1945. Gables Coral to down ö went

agreed made reasonalbe practically ma he t 1t the organized had that he uo him 1945. that first for SO in he but say, d'n man, to going normal Non the any But and he had sense for operated sense.

night at night late all left travel morning and trip, inspection early in the an again came in g 80 he'd bac He then COB ö then and

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felt and lived and and Operations out doing what on. himself That's kept really wore ever set up Plans information. just man who that He guy the How know. on getting when he second-hand stopped. get don ! to H did want he was later felt He Personnel. didn't as long he But He

5 these caught went directly the get inspect engines 5 29 went right to trying getting to the So he Meyer went were trouble uo When he Benny that. They he back base, got having uo on his Salina problems air man he were and Was operating to. there of went Roosevelt with which they got kinds out he the went Well. When all and planes out and He sergeant a base B-29s, fire CBI.

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the but this is time. that at one of his favorite people operated he was way about said mission? Non that what in uo especially were You sted mission inter Bradley Follett ö

Y: Yes

Russians the get to Was think, н Siberian bases? tagks, the of some One ö us give

they ere always personally give believ purpo on the through lend How did "Flaming Phil tha they th Why Siberi the through ssages pouring Battle wouldn't down eally č through concerned of one Outto nfor of an Why and aymonville Order picked the ouple through operations and Thi area? ovid giving officer back erything the Russi shuttle Philip down told 80 Army Japan 1ook 118 Route L ming the pink. Roosevel some through behind let qo cha one to nothing 6 months onvil1 pink Rooi ermission This ther Front and stand back felt that Pentagon τ: Siberia eastern couldn asking really needed going stuff After th that Gen of 18

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Q: Standley?

Y: Standley was there at the time.

one One through Standley assador Amb The ö

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the military?

th of friend good real cd Was military the and Right, Υ.

Air Force on the General Staff at the time

Q: Was it Deane - John Deane?

Y: No, an old guy.

Q: You mean, the military guy where?

Was 1 C He Pentagon the In

Q: Was it Strong?

Y: Strong was G-2

Q: Handy?

COB job that the Handy put the Siberia forth. thi soon ated the and evelt tha done and pretty tha felt Pre Roos Ę And 무 but the clear Ę ould group age from Well vould OL Washington Joe influence th Lask Standley lincle ould coded guy Lel tha Dec just force the ed in Some no of through form Russians trouble lot ressur tha had air Handy it. +11 believed convinced đ had back Faymonvil1 damn the ą any Tom For We right So And put sure till thi th 80 Handy to pres pp group there Was tha cam si th going could could elt nessage of pa agree not tin bec out way We ou We ve Ne

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Q: Did you know about that report?

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Tras he Watson Harley anyway Chuck Tom that mission. But Bradley, IBM. of III Gen Westover uo Was cha Was navigator mission MOU He 2 U he that aide eral uo Gen tov No. Bradley and Hicks τ: retired Oscar was

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people s name Force man the can't think of the intervie officer and s àn Se recently di There Ph.D. mission, out there "A" doing ated. with Was rer Academy there. 00 It

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that except and Faymonville One Russia, people In about were anything him while for his behavior don't know working guys and No, of him couple Saw œ н

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Q: Did you have any contact with Merion Cooper?

No.

op could after P Roosevelt the what to right see 1ed type this to arlier Russia. G-2 ssion Se OL COUL month China of Coope some and no in either S arlier Jan probabl strike Cooper rai to Doolittle ö anxious get Harbor 50

Y: No, I never had any dealing with him

an that for task This If they took An air approaching out? the Russian 0 mission edge Baku. cnowl the adlev Germans chreatening DE Follett The contac that? Orc Russians. any the with task they you hav ontac the and arican help Did the no Stalingrad had ö Angloright force you

front front the and to German dn there Juni the operations and WP in, got ain Russian that mile the with SAW 20 pot about No and Υ: lines, line mess

0: Was the Bradley mission a success?

fine service probably rologic rological that And information developing got. all bug 0 intelligenc Sout far that the through of view mission some head point of got The the LTGEN We exchange. justified and Se la from Was guy

Q: Do you remember his name

Y: Yes, Eugene Federov.

that office only Sovie opposite call the the foreign of E S didn Was member the MKVD They th handled having MKVD T without vou only talk th could tha Sei tha thev number Secret group area but

incorr Russi the that ati to1 nt Ogı ö

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Q: They were genuinely cooperative?

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Q: Why, they are naturally secretive?

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a11 that good were going "About figure th We Eisen strictly some right. bomb questions and you can put feel HO and Verv to be? a11 said: hell people to agree the way beaver he was there to by himself than of it than one Can sed that take be usually

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question after the the and British bomber dn, paratroopers doped Cross only way the kind eager 80 them? rougher of adns Will but can figure And then the And 80 all round the the his guarante of them Was can people ÷ ch they all "Half to apart they about 1F that guarantee the of to things vant and know going right where Montgo said: dav C, much wouldn you and the paratroopers "that' ç said. visually give these Was 1 eas wanted if about can We will said: And can KIOW messy that kicked "Well said the just it Monty them time 20 po tha target ON We bother take said: guess they forces were wanted to of it Then, the said: instrument. in. half can He for then and they the best bombing to get Spaatz the US 'ouldn being guys. boats have that nost 1t." Well 50% And and vas

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Q: I'll bet you didn't sleep that night

those that worried all ended out 1t really blew and later they interesting; really time ek the thr 10 put in that OL it a11 they exciting. well lucky that g real docks didn ere period themporary about that next

Q: The Mulberries?

happ wouldn't would have at they right at So wh been. knows torn have and God all would were two things ent LI. or that month to invasion for gone the the that have 2

started the during Germans g the going invasion this you imagine the after nvasion week Can ã niti V-1s Exactly the the flying in invasion ö

would if they whole And U-1 place one particularly The there right within the everybody in grouped outh hit it Port 1F operation have ti the bunch the in whole there whold ouldn thei clobbered the that re of them 40 they mean have had top

Jun of 10th NO 9th the uo you? 1n to came talk Marshall did and Arnold Arnold you ö Did

him Saw time that me to talk didn't he SN Υ:

Jent the headquarters then Cros wen ed time instal1 advance Sp Granvill that palace service the at 20 with ecaus the down weather away g out went th right get then Pari senhowe over to and there đ moved Ei usy follow headquarters were So Gra to They over froi way and

War? the In ater. Arnold see you Did ö called The the year. over take down nebodv He pa in i wing okay to other unit just arred and ab1(operating weather ach the there 1944 been g hold fighting said over ading have the ON 18 And an he ather vasnt been situation ould De said: MOU heading and had back Arnold sett the OUL office the ndividual In aid called office Senter think Hunt facti didn .ghter eneral you and Cas Arnold's Oscar the str organi op got and vere Yes Gen said burden 50 the line Nashville factions somebody Pentagon Υ. to just said: down 44 ther And got dn tha he

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nded lended the recom recon unning had been Spaatz I had promoted time the really been at Colone1 erson hadn' α but promoti promotion No. operation Υ: for for me

sed pasi just He Anderson Fred ö publi Bnt Ĥ some Yes Υ:

Q: And they were blaming the Air Force?

Y: Yes. Couldn't do anything about i

The 80 couldn touch gues days it nldn 20 or the week netrated about For ther had ö Germans in air

socked about operation like they invasion had had there because molimentary you they that that in then that th slipped said And fac all gamb1(C O had Se of the were do. We possibi Thev VOU point the there and could they period ater But onc ogical ou time 0 ibl. vou And Germans sure hour solutely down invasion all anv 18 Was the ab nto that the to hours right talk can but ouldn of stopping there forecasting you to ating it worked that of You got going in one break do advised taking during couldn that were when and the In

Q: Luck played a part?

Y: Luck played a terrific factor.

over? can takes you 1uck and sometime down the line you scare Way the 44 all Doesn onal professi ö

the that. of that' OVEL cience and control the iob ou In the You have op more 1 doesn and exactly right far Still 80 you today takes are meterological You just Υ: problem Ski11

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the to trying BI the and was from position there down zontal 1112 Was hori W B He he from that down to Miami aware force you air

Y: No.

Q: It was kept very secret.

middl idea the no had in it Jas about heard nothe think there ti and that too at sick move

of end the at back came He him? see next you did When March 1945? ö

what of ation several organi Ce had together We the tha because communication a11 ange it tell ch pull adical to the and hard with out uo eratior pretty long it proposal co.pull â 1s worldwide That and ath you neetings ч. believe have the Lt

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Q: You had your star by that time?

then the four and earch second that 1947 Res of after SO 80 Director 1.946 got pust Patrick 1947 until 151 athe star years search down the Par la 9 Re of tagon get for 50 of out ed here Director didn + 4 stay No Development busine and ч. wen that tour R&D 50

46 45the ţ, Karman Non with contact any have you Did ö period?

and Europe in and Both here time the all Yes

ended War Europe right after the to Arnold sent him that in you ö were

there OVer and visited him that? year What aware of it, Pari in Was office but No he had ч: and

Q: '45. This was May or June 1945.

and day earch those the uo i, the everywhere Karman later Von over and all to elfng Committee trip ecific Board Meteorological Development made H

Q: Scientific Advisory Board?

office that earch he of since Res head of ever the office von Karman the and of Tech know out came Ca1 had Air That the Bit mine of Yes nt years professor Developm Υ: for

roup? read Have you Karman Von a well? the of find down documents the of German you Karman's book? the Where found ö They Von

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it uo reviews of couple read I've ų, haven No. Scientists Arnold Atomic relationship with of Bulletin The about his for them you to talk rot ever Karman? Did Von

him to things Arnold obligated There those kept Gen words. of and for sonally Arnol spect his position noth exactly Gen Verv great that in this felt recall flattered Verv thi him had do to put just sonal hard that he felt didn that always it but Yes rnold Von Karman Gen no He He

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Arnold gave him direct 5 **QUQ** . to kind of didn't right they He same to unless operate the want way job Arnold that in command watched take of wouldn't chain Arnold must He by ö operate guess acce

Gen get never and way sharp, repre that terrifically an group t orked AAt the COUTSE and he worked wittv of And Nobody way he right ifically did . The exactly Arnold terr that way Gen guy for Thi capable than it best he kept Arnold very the

tall Mainliner entist sci Jewish common interest the little opposites this œ and about, of attraction Pointer to talk West lot found This adelphian they ö Ph11 But

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Y: They certainly did.

And aware Arnold designed He have been Was that? missile Improve along, contribute in Kettering had in that early may and involved came you V-1 th could involved reproduce the of get know and who one 88 op soon somebody personally to Did Bug You know wanted 2 88 Flying Sur 2 B Arnold admired He the "The IMM wanted to get it. did. kno 1t Arno1 called fro involved in We No may gadgeteer And a thing ö as you İt.

toward the and drop of Of off. version eapon water them Chinese of cut his German ,000 the 5 a better Dept like than War wanted to build had of a lot better the They and Germans War Arnold the heck the of ö end B them the It

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bring little mor and scientific scientists take the German would of This any of collection involved in the V-2. the t duplicate you here? of Were any over couldn' PAPERCLIP planning. them ing Me

personally not end, administrative the Just Υ. Survey? Bombing Strategic the in involved get Did No ö

vould evel believ but efforts Presidential H ect He proj OWD too. its Force ideas. uo evaluating raised pet 1t of Arnold' Force got started Air So they the one He realized that credibility. this This originated ö then lack

ssign first sting the ssing vier of point good other historical only The an froi 3 A-bomb ment

1945? 16 July uo amagordo Al at out Trinity oh. Bikini? ö

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etely and that comp1 officer EWO tim were watch and one weather somebody dropped There there tin the and administrative head the out 1+ Ľt. That for during uo wait forecaster guess all until and thing there, there information roddam head the sit the that then meterologists that the had and Yes Holzman then hold briefed, Υ: ready, I knew Ben **EWO**

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put thi seen P'I because weeks, three long That Υ:

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NOA Did ö day every But work. 50 back went No 2:

anybody to talk couldn

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Q: It was one of the best kept secrets of the war

Y: Wasn't it? Fantastic, it really was

Q: Did you get involved with Tibbets?

Y: No, I didn't get involved with Tibbets.

fact lot Enola named terrible craz) the Now Sergeant plane ceded thi story Gay the had Enola à, this aboard t d, an the rocker wrote of of the pilot Huie Bradford the that instituti William think He crisis of people Eartherly and ö moral Gay, many and

Y: Yes, I've heard that story.

sane other any If have saying: interesting? you op Tibbet Well be might ane tha this rnold think of sane Peop. recollecti ö vou and

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Y: I can't think of anything that might help you.

Arnold the Yates Did the social? about How socially' ö

she any And didn't well quite H than Arnold more Yates knows Mrs far it. of side Mrs social direct contact No, the Υ: knows

Force Air of the head 88 Arnold remember Mrs Emergency Relief? Do you ö

Mrs. Y: That's what she started

Q: Did you work for her?

organi tþ đ Instruct set she or when amusing her with Worked g Mrs ö

anecdote

and that I hadn't adi and Arnold did the Don that called me kidded Mrs her effect ening nough from Was aid Ę "Thi she ening Sur to She ething said: ne Jõsephi and exp S O III ember BO bring not didn 0 called B P she and 2: Arnold it; well shen Mrs her morning believe SI said met Rus WAS

cal that believing Lng not vour nolo about ed kidd About Always Υ: Mrs ö

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that mission uo Bradley with Follett went General Yes the 1942,

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Υ:

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with her?

Vay when alt she that. and that, her with all and working dependents ty onali per -No an of setting that deal Mrs great

Did you go all with her in 1945? you work War? Did through the ö

the try 1.945 and etings in the together back room little came get CALICIIS away 1944 could arate were the sep wives husbands Maine dn etings the set to ent they who neighborhoods th tho No And abou Mrs then meetings know various and to

organization counterpart UK? when the RAF the in to visit ou recall Arnold og invited Mrs ö

No Mrs

all hand running Ca would you of Arnold rest everybody the sometimes and hav you and that ant box 115 told squawk this? Norstad his rememb uo and ö buttons Do you there

the

the heard I've happening; it rémember never н Υ. story

Q: Oh, you heard the same story?

took sure never exactly wasn't knew the of he He Then typical thing story him. good same 1t saw But the he rrying till exactly tory wanted serious ha ЧO which one Υ: that

made doing and the his uttons you. time want unorthodox told of th Lot a11 NOA Ishing vaste us would Se Bu eople desks ens way 80 grabbing thei can guy you 29 people ö doesn't things sense 30 οf

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because but true true chari •• 18

it had If of time. long period to you? happened happened ö

on things Only S of job. none called in No. were Ļ wasn been tha him it I've times tell everal And only once did busines app not Wer business that once.

Q: What did he say?

after And months several "yes of said: a period done?" about 14 for him VOU expected "Can that

busine mad wasn't weather don't know he ssociated with the difficulties And our else. that he had had everybody We only because at mad the I was Wa The He 1 to

air WOFFY the keep 49 he has to trying one. you give ball would 50 If he had he ously Well simultan ö about

found it any far as I was ball. take Pentagon until PII source fine. As even no finding the worked Was wasn about time 1t he understood that the way Sometimes running ct of hell bal1 ŝ 68 That' cđ P s instructions. rha I'd have But Right. t0 Was concerned business Υ: guy really body' the

Cal then when Advisory Donne11 portfolio and 0 advisors And then Rosie without Norstad so-called and ambassadors Cabel1 in. two your with came the had these off Smart were interfere started Jake Thes he ever Well left, on. He in later Did they Norstad ö Council

in his or, principle kitchen interfered So I think he was careful anybody LWO organize all bother or other against bothered me never the were It would miserable never Who lousy Jake see. one time. 1s because could that one paper at that hand people Never. he had Cabell 8 other in any place of ¥. cabinet choice On the

Q: He had MacRae and Rosie 0'Donnell?

that command people hi JO to line he try again, didn't the knew but they and there 80 situation them, MAS of Donne11 part arrassing C handle Rosi and could the stars knew

think month guy several NOX vou want to him ideas -Arnold told him: new talked think up operating to Cabell told too busy that catch you me told Well. ever he and ö If Ide but ago M

but and things Jere And They to do it. for ideas that. WAY than right chat, other and the umop that that come right, would myself. never operating they That talking never

superior their use in there and to come never They position ö

and probably Fortunately an organization in mately ultir fantastic job operated đ emblance of ended be it could and did some operate OL 1t think he erational Was could do it could over all ordinary at turned Not th VBV a patter only an he 3 that when the

ometimes? you at mad got said he You ö in turn to in vent Wasn he that But tim him mad unhappy mad Not P no. him Saw No suit never h

face? his on smile have Did he ö

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Oh yes Υ: happy Was he mean didn't 1t But ö ally

but

and HO persona anything + not take in could all He at you anything personal criticize tha man to had he was that But there flet He had ogo felt he to him anytime never Υ: it н

Was 1t

not vindictive? H ö

ult diffic operated demanded the damned he don WAV He the ÷ H demanding. gotten Was that that hadn impossibly But respect you done it ected Was get and bette Never. aft impossible you'd nopu explai ** and tre to

hi of did you know Did Lovett, vett? Lovett? about with How relationship ö

knov didn't н good. Was it than other knew all at there politics No any

keep to wheel balance đ of Sort ons? was cti Lovett impulsiv wonder some н from ö him a buffer between be to Lovett had probably that Dept think War the and Υ. him

that. one that personal relationship? of for midd1 chemistry the Wrong buffer the the of had personal knowledge Arnold and think Patterson no SO have ö another You

Y: No.

Q: You were operating down here at a lower level?

Bowle could from Ed and particularly deal separate OSD. to below went down when that Limes

Q: You mean down in the Secy of War's office

some the and that чo would indicate Arnold 5 Some the politics with that Arnold with ewed the shenanigans OF Bowles Y1 that lot not did Ed Were of Bowles Bowles some hell office. doing from was pulling Ed 00 WAS War out Arnold. Arnold of he Secy And with that that working However matters things things

developing Secy one good the tever a rift damned people wha of чо WAS the never heard Air he for and Secy buffer H Asst of Secy hand the typ other that that ett admiration th sure he B because staff and the of

Did Bowle confidence in Bowles? repose onfidence? Arnold Did Arnold ö have

with shenaigans ator him know advised of his don't some of the things that Bowles some н However through Bowle but Saw did. Arnold did he that he certain things that time felt qo to elt did although he to from respect think that

for RAND credit claims Bowles RAND? g Setting ö

Y: He does, have you talked to him?

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Q: No, I've read in the documents ...

Y: Are you going to talk to Bowles.

Q: I hope to

letter and a collection of papers He had quite Υ: Mrs. Arnold'

and the memory Arnold everything guy a11 of the Eantastic respects of Bood ago of documents that point month tell he just that 11 Bowles over And he bet But And I'11 him not from You and he knew. Arnold rat. service old proud pack 70 SAW uo that S years influence erv the 65 mind them in Som Bowles in his Raytheon of men 80 endous all NOW he above with trem mili swea and and nas

Massachuse still He Υ:

address hi Do you ö

P,I from tell material reminisc Raytheon can And he with research had. went to Record) Ver s ome wanted first get the that all he When to (Off man and Arnold and Arnold. good office about his the war Bowl es to stori down Υ: becaus about more 08

operated smal1 cđ just Arnold is in how This Krick? significant about .say Non What did equation, ö the of to

previously uo God. 日 order you not to situation. think and I carry 80 by I could you better, what might have happened going down Arnold square. the beat him Arnold before Was Gen to play "look am And that "and authority also to down use said, said: beca to going H the and going and op and want appointm 8m that Krick H Krick before and good that tell him that 5 an of felt to longer went there get Question and not the T had can down any So op to and this way can get 88 do this to Don. going soon you not him

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Krick of Zimmerman ase the In ö

when of 5 way Krick no end rest CLOS that he. the person think the very anyone a11 against of think supporter 44 erson don kind saw him never that strong there hurts defend 21 wasn that only his knew MOD Navy, He thing went H. a11 the No. anybody. Zimmerman he Wa the but defend him against t think Force loyalties thi loyalty I don' Air and ready the personal through, any 3 got In him. had SD he

with he working for Don that dutch interfering do it to got office not WAS extent eason he Krick he front because the told with the the to he defend him CU) and whi1 deal Fix op first to anyone yet wanted Krick that And down that Krick started making went did. never Krick Wa erman Arnold with Zimm him. and

Don

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got that funds with qo t that had something thing was that 2: in dn Mrs mixed

can you Mod know Ļ don ч.

for trying to Arnold went E were operated organization case you other Arnold wher the the direction against and and one line Krick in iconoclast back My Krick ö case get the

wanted There by there one was he around ther were time made Vas it uo any pegs and Krick but office him of system. lot him to went to the Arnold moved due organi defending one were Du SUITE the get that probably P against could defending himself change He But thi and himself Υ: that were to,

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paperwork the Arnold with the off than chip rather Krick was with people directly sense In ö dealt

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50 the kind went new н why him 18 this give 0 that' Arnold. but okay way to 1t jerk 08 this C, that to felt ermission that bos happened And hi don said had Right. thing that Krick maybe Arnold ** boss boss Gen of

Arnold the Navy t0 got of out OL him Arnold, get and to went me Zimmerman of this out Krick Mrs get

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Q: That was earlier.

I think and then through. they probably had a little hassle the Sk Kri defended Zimmerman until right up Υ: believe

off Krick cut to was difficult for Zimmerman been his defender had he it. ecause Then ö

: Yes.

INTERVIEW WITH LT/GEN DONALD YATES PALM BEACH, FLORIDA JANUARY 9, 1970

Gei encountere remember the first time you Do you ö Arnold?

that ared himself Tech in very Ca1 the him of Ca1 1939 course cuol clei ţ LICI the gone rological Cri ot had hi the briefing about first time Barksdal point arbitrary off through the stopping pretty Probably Went flight good weatherman MV AFB, into 3 a11 Tech. there. dale 1939 well ran Was uo

Q: He was very concerned about the weather?

: Yes, he was.

Q: It was a very big item with him.

Q: Well, you knew Professor Irving Krick?

about cont and talk cult tin Arnold, 1ding dir difficulty to onlo 50 toug the ntagon directly think littl littl E P đ pa had suit gets H edlv recollections that thi c Lurn again the offered working of Arnold one T becaus Gen the was But

H and Arnold's papers of out and in F H ö

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I don't -hate relationship. love maybe it was can't decide know. He best important Verv ed th damn Still get wanted th he supe tha important rnold Was Krick General and could it know knew he H

salesman? he atherman good Was he ö

and that forecaste fore fore of forecast forecaster hi the lot to range boog capable of sold himself guy range part did LO L ong range haired verv abl long and Ē Now Deing long put gray Du years Tha ou 5 advance Krick ect. but for mpting claim resp aste forecasts time opinion ster in forecaster BC that that th for fore In pug personal natural at range thre shyster good day Arnold long OL to busine Gen day sort office sold In difficulty than He Υ: casting respect Arnold. but he he was caster nore good

Q: Horace Shelmire?

Y: Yes.

This was from his old home town.

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tition that advice front like 800 the and things 4 cultimate reports 1 Or th for about nvasion sting special to story Ĩ knew how for Afric iving the providing the ard North Krick r08 hav the somehow and you arding and Well there kno actually Υ: don't got office things he н

ontact Central We had to through of the got ster Weather kind position of Ľ. was stuff for 80 the that the running thi to the and direction got all hi 00 perople here 1+ whatever sending and the and and other 80 time was 80, OL forecasts 4 that Krick t C ouldh Shelmire tha going and out Krick Pentagon were office Navy Issing. putting sible WP with the agreed the in the 1mpos were emb in

author1ty? ITV authority by as having through which your my position outside of because outsid wheeling official tt wheeling from free the kickbacks free Was One words he completely ons some positi getting other Was two Ľ He to defend ö and

consensus

But And the people And I said: and this scared doing show Major for the for more 05 bootlegged 50 topped working run Was good W8.8 down direction H him tha 1t ever been. went this let got for anything He dazzl sonal then have that good t C razzle per have bna show be for would like fri ositi your to whole н the boog this think good going by. the nother all 18 service than I LO LO And t and knew said 1 think time wheeling want the wasn and and for that vou I said: yet he Arnold Krick good knew JI. Fre at

Q: How did Arnold react to that?

guess.

personally cher WAN think in becaus and office with him, and his right, rapport In a11 1t good He tak funny onably vould It and pad Υ: out always

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·in asked In randing And time 다 some eatherman He Lim for eral the vice er ad U. T the of old ect out thi He had been onable to office uo permissi in his there. had

Q: Was it Trubee Davison?

shing lived affairs vho 2 Air oth th The a11 no 50 went Davison Υ: long 0

Q: Fechet?

Y: Fechet, yes.

Q: He was the first Chief of the Air Corps.

nev like rnold and upset the his nob could the saluted anization below could had 20 Well with tier In that th OTP across tw officially walked him two be and knew run right guy least ab to no the But him pl office thing Flat capacity nold and tedly th the to him functi reported the down time see In probl ren the The in 20 Way fingers think sted tha said that had Fifty wanted Ope guy eople he pue osed understand how he of with his him It and Right organize ddns kind around many and en personally smiled how the problem 2: tha directl did, turned becaus Force that know down less was he 'n he

this Was 423 194 about talking You ö Harbor

things ebody turned that every fornt said: think because thi probably that OVer said they MOU pr Gen riou and am 43 admitting other th 20 right central and got words out and ·op arly reporting uo directly that Thi Spaatz forni no thing sui that vou 윤 Arnold to weathe maybe ashington was time would Cali sing Harbor Gen got outfit ugn occured before thi the 0 that aid Drop 1942 "Wha best traighten turn him OF 1944 So Pearl they him take In 무 send run the knew said end in hav 1944 Central post to probably shington to Europe ÷ He Frankly to he nuary can incident authority ec asked And che ssary you 100%3" Weather pi to said: thi wha before could If and our aid: C in nece specifically said outfit this And t н have yes the 5 and went to to year peu handl in Sp round to the Thi eriod need over And took 1t about the and out got three in Υ: vas in Europe Arnold can Krick don't "Send effec right ahead that. that that I've about line time body ing and can NO

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the trip didn at of things Arnold papers mixture ч thi and of made kinds papers H ected glad that the all his coll seen not Ľ he E what or ace H and Left and the pl Going back to Krick role official of out understand hi Congress of unofficial ö Library Krick quite

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the published said what Arnold's office S for HO working situation for the WOLK E put ould to of the WTONE out said him ei the Arnold: Came told H had would would quit had to be Gen hecause op soon to concerned down could but it him to Krick gon told anted him **Frankly** back told went Arnold had table 88

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he then changed; said. And that had th qo going difficul 5 job to completely this set offic splendid teai AF with and 8th the you Coast ction "So of USSTAF did part conne said: tuat: he the and in and Ę Gen Spaatz there Tech vould with in oroke out he ack agre prepa working hard then for him And forecasting mold brought don't and profes outfi "Gen have Howe was Ś we

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Strategic the AF 15th the and Force 8th Air the Yes Force ö Air

of caster target, D-Day for profe uo forecasting for tishe Chief that erologi Italy US two and Office from was Deputy th there AF Meterological 15th the 881 orofe did the t He Ho1 of team that pulled Europe and SHAEF side Offic he Chi SU We of joint Meterological where out not that of And Yes, nead rologist 8th a Britisher team the Chief that mete the and Met Was

Q: Fellow named ...

Y: Staff.

I think Eisenhower mentioned him.

ö

80 Krick ent 118 and backing Holzman Krick he and and by bib -Day headed Á tainly before Crew just Na la He efine did L L Britis single big every tha -03

belittle the Thi the ation and of around sides ugh eal ering try that oth to slith tended t be clai to th deals had usines th S° always th these 00 Krick hi pu he did during but P. CL Irving respects British forec the đ

Arnold this had and he pronoun vertical Ę of tp this thi fostered Well onality of ö sort oers

Y: He did:

Q: What gave Arnold so much confidence in him?

Y: I don't know. I do not know

Q: He came from Cal Tech.

Y: He came from Cal Tech, and as you know....

and there; Gillikan Rob ö

very close.

Y: That's correct.

Q: In the early '30s?

of did both Von Arnold tha many Krick guy ses to the close Clark Millikan Karm Von ason talked young the Von put ctlv S of at th agreed about clos them Lt.

over tch hi had Arnold and Navy the commissioned in

the Air Force.

troub1 some had He this. about ask to going ö Navy

take him soldier did But So after better he ouldn't which an bit even for ttle ę they tougher Navy th only the bit for in rouble trouble littl better awhil th it always had Made Oh yes, Tech in he He Air Forc ч. for it to Cal back well all

he. had Karman backing him and Von with Millikan credentials? had. He highest ö the

Know you Bowl Rossby, 5 Carl deputy interesting. consultant the very 88 WB 8 working in OSD And it Υ: Bowles. was

Q: OSD?

professor Dr Bowles Rossby he but Ed been Carl way War and had the OF Rossby anti-Krick all ectly Secretary di Bowles Stimson Was office for for where course he orked worked Stimson any Of au couldn't orweig at MIT. Bowles

the Norwegian mentioned his of think omebody couldn ago for weather technical than good honest, technically Rossby echnically Bri wegian petent but th Nor E C O II **Forecaster** the not Patterssen en atters though Irv more theoretically Svere He lch would man

SU the in him got mixed and **JA ST** him He got US We the time nb Swede out

of bit servic invasio clearance out little did didn't Von Karman spent back right never ather the tim after quite him Rossby long -50. pulled probably Millikan the course got back and had of But for Chief Service of Bowle War SN nol but Arnold of came the Was the Thi and Lot Weather context with Millikan, and and of with when after later Rossby part ack worked Von Karman had the thought, bit Weather Service latter service Karman of stage little and Chief Rossby believed the Non weather the that in in nc him and his Europe influe to Sometime the the got which going there there know to in of We In

SOB Millikan when Arnold air OF '30s rays scientists and 00 blanche early solar him Field turned of the his carte March tests and him really tarted him atmospheric gave It to He available Arnold in R&D Field high an interest arch that Some went mad Arnold conducting Well at They a great Arnold thing. planes was had

ential the with way Was ana the he but it espected understand for appreciati didn business better weather Had

Could reach Arnold could like Von Karman 1.F it i get were professional could he and moom who the People for him ö ask

Y: That's true

Toward His book, Hitle solutely the during know. R&D you of him, Karman 4 foreca for Von job years đ Well did Karman predictions Von ZOUS Hori ö 1ts New <u>in</u>

ran Krick said guess Arnold them where a11 and of of both merit instance 180' this his rno1 weather then specific Saw told And and Millikan for of Arnold want Can you think no and to Tech, man him end the Cal mended the era into needed. Bround Krick recom

an flagrant impo and think That terribly mind quite straightened up P. Lrving eral of out them put got could wrot ust and AWAV VOM wish Since squared late bad But No that got things things memory issue. B 20

Q: You mentioned a snafu with TORCH

our Apparently happened of fore involved fore about how sending them foggiest fore providng those that that cain providing invasion and guess thing ed 급 Was Shelmire of t Krick Krick the the and and kind didn' to 2 ater but tha giving them to office prior uo Thi over going then skipper going for Central Arnold until were know Am N working been the Was through thing knowledge avine to He their Arnold WB going didn these wasn't. ectly of to any think that dir out got **i**thout and he casts casts casts idea they and the For

Arnold' reflects not it Arnold did out because point you important Force. Air rather the COD managing of chain This of elaborate ö manner

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erologis One they that long said LTCOL Bradley family and make blue thing aid: that dow rida WOH " en? people of that. pul ther trusted ould July at Follett th other COL for Sib said: g à, ervice put of said 5 C Building rologist through ents You 1d out to bas June He ong and 82 who The agreed 유 right think Russi man line rologic sions 1941 down board. econd T the WAS to deci shot fighters that ny that for 0 mak ŭ down Arnold fast the Eroi dur called sure "Sir to -hi making th By th just adv trying in ation thing offic Gen Ξ aid: etting H th can when orining hadn be Russi flat; okay old only Ň 18 abl onths nacking to prob ened othe had in the [LaW al bos happ d Ge will said: CO tak He ຝ ere e peopl LO L and FOL whic 11:30 D mission wife "Anywho becaus th puld crusted called Wha and said wi11 call time with then 942 case let and deci He L. ny.

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10 four 111 iv the pilot; you Bradley And Gen said Arnold pu

bug Mosc 8 effect Doal left can ainpa to noX Š ency for think said: bad armark and the -24 Bnd Friday recall and briefed taking an 80: think and cd and morning cal1 to Gen Bradle el and everything you Sunday Russia Anyhow among be

Q: Flew the northern route

thing and ack months nally DO Accra. to 08 from Belem Tehran goin duration into across excep acros the went anybody for then pu told south and with Cairo went We to dn No. without about from over but

Q: Who was your boss at that time?

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weathern probably head 20 th pretty mber the 08 ับ ogı the Merriweather erorol ember Υ: nete

Arnold? with him ealings Ð Don Did ö

Tech the jointly Was Ca1 Krick Don from because and th th building Navy understand P Zimm the Pentagon þ Don Krick to provided hard the tha over got into cantra Krick he DO Ver te and ved that gotten Krick of 읍 part had wanted before Zimmerm level there weath That and

Force the Air a Major in made He was Navy time the that in at a LCDR mad from was

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including note the that hav clas 6 people for but first get. the to In selected man be hard to Weikert him he CC, So be selected to P.D College going Zimmerman Arnold 00 National War He tha ö Cabel1 here

strictly put Arnold. thought of all t 18 to exactly Arnold sting from crosswise this Krick going firs moved op MOU Dor think Ge but to witho the got tha apparently Land tri but 4 other 0 ould nd Ro ouldn pppn somehow Zi th Don Zim and one OF group tha man old all Don and think the happened of of lot ntious Don speculation ð top what involved of the becaus tried leath he11 And 44

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thing fantastic that done them impossible he class Arnold "Take One things and Thi ahead giving operate that way this Was them asking did. day said: the many go none 14 Cut One he then tha more qo than He amned hi DC to acific and months mind like confide able ð That going better could So basic did his two de got the 001 1t had in man the 1t sch their did 5 things you qp normal how CC they ter knov had to ecte give OL that many right No forec them and they can Half and fully t all that erated car keep op had been did Os 80 neer 00 MOU they fantastic recall, could And enough And people he have right demanded in half, the way one would to go Most them said out that Was It No As

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forecast? đ of quarter you give could they Maybe ö

We people side wha felt: ining know these ating H and fore don suicide th order the that the in Oscar pilots about MA the hearing weren things time ki11 that probably er 1 rememb We They that. had busine only g happened ч. the have can' of

called that and in The getting the Sir arnold anybody Osc sey shortened the ousine But said: then 4 trebled asn They of griping eve LTCOL And or out beli what place bus doubled that, g "That out running done? t of think right that' guys handling or pick see him siad: they 1t stars buA" the get and Si l somehow Training and in and you back got fore decision placed not rnold back rnold "Can g office that had -1 80 000 which persisted no his You sponsible climatological hi ecti see that would do that 4 0 Senter sters to to ective him: recoll courses Arnold foreca Oscar asked dire betw But Was No.

of

E-Ring cd everely explanation of sponsibility the in heen õ their rational grabbing th to alien most Arnold hi the of totally that busine given job technique You have This giving them a criticized. nanagement ö and

- Y: Absolutely.
- Q: He did this?

contact ediately the level certain There not had would occasions. and But being done op people this on innumerable could uo pass the word other We that best and watched the contact and did bened guy would he that happ to the right 40 where this people he many

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him about was your tin This that thing At business whether interesting working under him do. most 20 thing the any officer 18 This He'd give you wheth young operated or cđ, 88 Υ: a Major busines to me, he way

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getting this also load but of of much process 3/4 too by level carrying the cut erating He 0 ao and bad al the he t and good down people, filtered It alienated ö himself thing

for within tha However -before absolutely did really when Army Force himself. an opinion the doing Air of Load and egment arate growing ಹ of strings mself. much significan the hin too the created that all much bib pulling and much, he And AAF separated impossible job Too by the Army himself, becam were the

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bypa Did staff, people like Stratemeyer œ He had Stratemeyer ö

And Stratemeyer? Always ч.

after him? Giles ö

working you got telling SOL Strat what him after Bnd that know Get tel Gile guys then system was they didn' it. to other esponsible qo and back to the boss the running osed from Arnold brief them And ddns his guys and of time and us th All boss đ ask the tha g right. your would **811** go They instruction That C then about and 50 on it: Giles going First know the

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Q: Well, I'm going to see Giles in San Antonio

theon nanv the and he m1 clearly In because on Ray busines similar similar to OF in made 11 42 people But he is peop1 Arnold only it had manv back ati than he tallv had working He are organi looking young to Arnold mistakes aff. there thi 32 that Ū He t o PP Now hi more P F C breadth and rnold with 10 operated when This aff many the į, President experi ects Υ: ndustry the the he ÷ takes hasn respe vay and use ou

had

Q: Which organization?

Y: Raytheon.

got 9 that you run the organi th had in tha Then He erate his convinced but change staff bib to them tried his successfully to through tim no uodn-OL people told him firs 08 thought the Arnold "Look boss 44 people opinion ason couldn that nol said: and The anvbodv still and should him but he which. into and may to he

Q: People like Hanley and Reuben Hood?

below hurry of and segments to Partly hesitated there 11111 1f that? OL never them t0 uo sti ontributed ĥ gav But aup and Š correc atch th ought no thing th several them if

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TRIDENT One moderate one in 1943 during the of heart attacks. conference

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This is the one where in 1945. major one Gables had dow went

agreed, sonalbe practically rea ma it made tt 1t the organized had 00 that he uo but for him first in 1945 that 80 he say an man to going staff normal know you the any But had sense for operated sense and

night and and left late at night a11 morning trip, nspection early in the acain in came bacl He then COM ö then and

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felt and lived and Operations out doing what himself uo kent That' and really WOTE set up Plans information. Just who that He guy the How when he second-hand stopped get getting to had any d ver he Want later felt **Personnel** He didn' long he But BS

the these 20 caught directly out th get inspect -298 engines to went right to So he went trying tting to the went 80 were trouble. no When he Benny that. They ack base having uo got his Salina. problems air man no 0 and operating ĉ went there of they elt got kinds which the When and all Well and with out sergeant He base B-29s plane fire. CBI.

the 18 but this that time, people at of his favorite operated one he way Was

the about said mission? you that what 1u uo especially were You sted mission intere Bradley H ö Follett

Y: Yes

50 Russians the get was to think, н Siberian bases? tagks, the of One some ö us give

they were and lea give onally purpos on the through lend How did that "Flaming Phil things they th Why that Siberi ways per the messages through pouring Battle umop picked up bases information eally wouldn through concerned one of of rout al BF Order Why couple and " Faymonville through, the operations and had area? Thi provide giving out the becaus had officer back everything cam the We the Russi shuttle Phili: 80 umop at told Army He Japan 20 1ook us 1 front Route (UNO aming some Roosevel channe1s through the pink. This was behind return Let Far sib op Was out In one to two pink nothing 80 6 months mission there Gen Faymonvill ssion and Roo front stand going back felt that Pentagon s permi in he Siberia couldn Υ: asking needed ceally After of the stuff that

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Q: Standley?

Y: Standley was there at the time.

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Q: Did you know about that report?

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(2) Trash Harley anyway Chuc Tom that mission But Bradley, IBM 0 F III Gen Westover uo Was ch avigato mission MOU He C that Gen Hicks retired Oscar and 135

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an the plan for task they took that This approaching out? Russians of ssion ΞI knowledge were threatening Baku. the ey Follett-Bradl to help OL contact The force that? Russians were any the task with of they hav Anglo-American air time the you bug help the Did Stalingrad at to you had ö right force

front German frontthe and to đ there vent the operations and We in, Moscow got saw the Russian air of west that miles with 20 pot out and we abo No lines line mess

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success? mission Bradley the Was ö

fine 00 service real meterological that probably 4 hydrometerological it general And cđ information developing got. Was he the Soviet and intelligenc far that aide, him. 88 through Sil of mission view some The head of He got point the a LTGEN. it justified and exchange No. from guy, Was

name? his ember ö

Federov Eugene Yes Υ:

Q: He was your aide, and he was a LTGEN?

only Sovie P opposite the cal the E forel of didn member MKVD the that They nandled the In an a having MKVD. of Wa anch T without NOU tha one only talk what 20 th Par la could 20 group Service He that they area tha Υ. number Secret group but

incorrec us gave Russians the nformation that told neterological ö

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Q: They were genuinely cooperative?

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Q: Why, they are naturally secretive?

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Q: I'll bet you didn't sleep that night

080 that Ð worried all ended out really ble and ater they sting time the thre that S put Two they well lucky that dn docks didn period themporary about next that

Q: The Mulberries?

happened have the at would they right torn up know God all and were time things OL that onth those invasion Yes gon Υ: цЪ the that have 2

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of loth OL 9th the uo you? in 1 talk to cam Marshal he bib Arnold Arnold you ö Did

him Saw H time at that to me talk didn't he No, 3:

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lent the then hi acros uar had adq installed an Spaatz time advanc Granvill that where palace service the to Germaine because the T down 5 ather uo away husy out St. want the right Paris then get H enhow to ove to bug there an ed d'n E Granville follow ed headquarters tay were So 0 to from They over and way

Q: Did you see Arnold later on in the war

at called The the OVer down take somebody He H need in 1 Was ving to okay "well other unit just barred and able and rating weather the matte said there 1944 holds service have be oper ng said. he December OVer the eading fighti g ON41 And weather an vasnt should been tuation said: ading and in had HYes H the back Arnold gh officer out 81 agai eti н the said: individual Bass in it called office straighten think back here general cti Sente Hunt didn It And CAS NOA rnold organize the Car Arnold Some 10w2 nest and to 80 Yes burden Gen to goe said right the line rat Nashville somebody Pentagon factions just to there đ said down And got tha he dn

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Q: Were you a general officer at the time?

recommended recommended th unning had been Spaatz I had promoted gues tim the really been Anderson nadn 101 for promoti promotion No operation for me

Q: Fred Anderson. He just passed away.

Fred publication recent some 11 that H Yes Υ.

Q: And they were blaming the Air Force?

Y: Yes. Couldn't do anything about it.

The Bny get 80 couldn' ouch gues fly days couldn the For in there had Germans ö air

about ked 11ke they invasion SOC had there operation MD complimentary you because war they that then slipped in that the tha said after And fac all gamble had get of at the they were do. We NON B They point the there and could period. And later But onc terological in time you rib1 Germans pressure hour down 81 invasion all any it 18 was the an into Bet the that to the S1 but hour right couldn talk can but of topping there forecasting VOU got to rating it worked, You of that tha going, in one break we do advised couldn taking during when that were and the In

Q: Luck played a part?

Y: Luck played a terrific factor.

over? can luck takes Non mean and sometimes way down the line scare you the all L. Doesn' onal professi ö

the that. 00 of that' OVEL science and control job. the no the In You have op more ÷ no doesn and exactly right. far Still 80 you today takes You are meterological just Υ. problem Ski11

the umbably tack pres back OL you came had his when rnold month later Bulge the of 4 ö Battle

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the run to trying Was fron and there down 111? or he from that to Miami aware force down air you

Y: No.

Q: It was kept very secret.

middle idea the had no later in 1t about eason heard another onall think time and that too at sick move

of end the at back came He him? see Non pip When March 1945? ö

what g ation several pug ATC organi service had together We tha th because communication all ATC it. under tell ch pull Ca to the E D and is pretty hard with it out operation Long proposal Dull That worldwid and Weathe meetings have you Υ: believe the

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Q: You had your star by that time?

then the four pue Research econd that 1947 or after busines 1946 ecto Patrick 1947 Dir until weather 51 F to star earch year down the No. Reg of 9 tagon get for 50 of out ÷ here didn' ctor th ed stay No Development busines and 3 vent tour that 50 R&D н

- 146 145 the fn Karman Non with contact have any you Did ö period? Europe 1n and Both here time all the Yes

ended to Europe right after the war sent him team? that Arnold in you ö were there over visited him that? year and What 4 OF Pari in office ha he and

1945 June HO Thi ö those

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Arnold gave him direct to guy to of didn't right kind 80 they same to that job unless Arnold operate the wante way He command watched take of Ļ wouldn chain Arnold He by ö operate acces guest

get never and way sharp always harder that terrifically any deaf dh the group it worked ÷ OUL way he worked and he every that OF fact Nobody right terrificall the did The exactly Gen Arnold. espite Karman Non gug that trick This the best for capable Arnold than he kept missed very

tall Mainliner entist sci Jewish common interest the little soddo this about, and of attraction Pointer to talk L lot an found This adelphian they ö Phi1 But

Y: They certainly did.

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And aware Arnold designed He missiles have been that? WAB improve along, contribute in Kettering had that early and involved came in it i V-1 the could involved reproduce get the of and who you 88 soon personally somebody wanted to Did Non Bug know 88 Flying sure JB-2. Arnold admired u He the wasn "The IMM get it. And we did Arnold н may kno called fro No, wanted to involved gadgetee Υ: thing ö as you it.

toward the drop of OF off and version veapon of Chines German F 0000 cut the They had a better 5 Dept like than War build better the to and lot wanted Germans of Arnold the heck the of ö end 8 them the

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personally end strative admini the Just Survey Bombing Strategic the in involved VOU Did ö

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ould believe but н project He t00. Air Force its evaluating ideas uo pet Arnold' it. Forc got started they realized that the Air of one So He Was credibility ted this This ö origina then lack

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1945? July 16 uo Alamagordo Trinity oh, Bikini? ö

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etely pu that OF officer time atch and somebody dropped one weather there Ther tim the administrative head out the That 1t for got uo head forecaster until all and thing there there informatio roddam the the meterologists tha then that had and Yes then hold Holzr Υ: briefed ready, Ben two

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guys locked up? you thev Did ö

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day every But work. to back No

anybody to talk couldn't of

Q: It was one of the best kept secrets of the war

Y: W_asn't it? Fantastic, it really was

Q: Did you get involved with Tibbets?

Y: No, I didn't get involved with Tibbets.

Enola a lot named terrible Now the Sergeant plane preceded of the plane had thi story Gay the Enola this aboard th an plane rocker wrote vlla g of pilot ather his pilot Huie off Bradford that the nali went and instituti people think Willi moral crisis Eartherly and ö Gay, nany and of

Y: Yes, I've heard that story

other any JI. have saying: resting? do you Tibbets Well might sane tha thi Arnold think of Peop recollections you. ö and

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Y: I can't think of anything that might help you.

Arnold' Did the Yates meet the about social? How socially ö

she any And didn't well quite H Arnold than more Mrs far know it of Yates side Mrs. social contact No. the Υ. direct knows

AIr of the head 88 Arnold Do you remember Mrs. Relief Emergency ö

Mrs. Y: That's what she started.

Q: Did you work for her?

organization esting inter the Instructi sh OF when amusing with Worked Mrs anecdote ö

and that I hadn't didn and adi rnold about the did Don that called me kidded from her tening Mrs effect she the vening "Thi Sur over to She to said: ething pu sephi an mber SOB bring not didn call E P she and and it; well shen believe Russi said met Mrs

cal that believing not your about kidded Always ö

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Arnold

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This must have speak. 2 й и throne About the From Υ: Mrs ö

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Yes Υ: Mrs.

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always she and that, all and endents onality pers d'n of setting that great deal Mrs

Did you go all you work with her in 1945? war? Did through the ö

the try in 194 and meetings the together came back room little get caucus away 1944 could arate were the sep wives husbands Maine an etings the set to 80 whose went thev neighborhoods then thos No, And about then Mrs meetings various know and to

organization counterpart UK? when the RAF in the Arnold to visit recall no Do invited Mrs ö

No ž Mrs.

the all 80. hush running can you would come of rnold rest verybody the and have want you. and t P box quawk this? LOL say: Norstad then on his and ö you button there ^o

the heard I've happening; it remember

story? same the heard you oh, ö

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took erated sure never ð exactly he Vay wasn't knew the of Then he He typical thing story saw him good it But the he wanted till ctly story serious he P-Pone 88 which that

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say? did What ö

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busines weather he know associated with the ÷ ulties uop diffi **And** DULT else that he had everybody had only at becaus mad the Was He

air the NOL i'n keep 49 to trying one, he would give you balls he 20 had If he simultaneously Well ő about

found it weather was whose ball take Pentagon until н far as the out As fine even finding the worked. Was Sn about time That's the way he that, running q ,Sometime of understood he11 ball d instructions the have H But once pass Right. Ъ Was. t C concerned business, the guy really body'

came when Advisory portfolio then and 0 -called advisors without Norstad then business? and sadors And Cabe11 SO in. two off with came the these Smart fere had started inte Jake Well left, ever He on. in later they Norstad ö Council Did

in his HO kitchen princip1 Interfered careful anybody c two organize bother 5 C the other against bothered never think 18 were It would erable So never Nho lousy Jake see one time could because that 4 one That paper that hand people Never. other Cabel1 place of ч. cabinet in any had choice On the he

Q: He had MacRae and Rosie 0'Donnell?

that people he had of line try again. L and knew the didn but so they there situation of them, Was Donne11 part ssing 0 and could handle Rosi the ч. stars kmew

BO think to month just guy several You you want him ideas to him: mew talked g told think operating Arnold to told that busy catch you Cabel1 too me told Well. ever ö idea ΞŦ but ago Š

but things They It. and op for ideas that. to way than right and chat other the down that come that right. would mvself operating they Found talking, never never

superior there and use their i'i come to never were They position? ö

probably Fortunately organization ultimately and job, an operated antastic semblance of ended be could and bib some operate S he was erational think op could could it over all it tha ordinary at turned that Not cern only an Υ: when that a p the

Q: You said he got mad at you sometimes?

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1n 2 went that But time unhappy The him mad Not D no. saw him No 1 never

Q: Did he have a smile on his face?

Y: Oh yes

Q: But it didn't mean he was happy?

nd giving person ānything really not in ould WAS a11 He at but personal criticize face t P anything to his had uo he Smi 1 that flet He had Falt he anytime was. never 1t it.

Q: It was not vindictive?

ult operated demanded the med He he don Way He the 1 impossibly demanding. gotten all that that hadn But respect you done it. expected was ge and bette Never. impossible andous P NON 2: xp1 and trei to

hi of know you did Did Lovett, ovett? Lovett? about with How ationship ö rel know ÷ 'ubib н good. Was it than other never knew all at there politics No. Υ: any

keep to wheel. balance c of sort actions? was ovett impulsive wonder Som from ö him a buffer between be to had Lovett probably, that Dept think War the H and Υ. him

that. one relationship? of for middle chemistry the personal in Wrong buffer that the the of Arnold had knowledge was and no personal think Patterson So You have ö another

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Y: No

level? lower down here operating You ö

at felt Bowl could Ed from and particularly eal D separate osp, to below went down when that Υ: times

Q: You mean down in the Secy of War's office

unics some and t P that of indicate COM nold 1.h some politics that Arnold would the of anıgan Bowles that Lot did Ed Sh Bowles, of some hell owle office pulling from 00 out of War Arnold as Found Secy And with that working However Υ. matters things

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Did Bowle confidence in Bowles? repose onfidence? Arnold Did Arnold ö have

with shenaigans ator advised him know of his don't uch Bowles some However some of the things that through Bowles but Saw did. did. Arnold he felt that he certain things that time op to did time alway although he from respect to think that

for RAND claims credit Bowles up RAND? Setting ö

Y: He does, have you talked to him?

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Q: No, I've read in the documents ...

Y: Are you going to talk to Bowles.

Q: I hope to.

of and letters papers a collection of quite He had Mrs Arnold'

and the memory shape Arnold guy verything of the fantastic of espects good at ago. NOA of that look documents point onth tell ust And he has that take Bowles F bet can But And he not 11 Non from he knew. and Arnold. н rat. him service old. 70. proud pack Saw uo OF that years н influence the 65 mind, them in Som Bowles that he so in his Raytheon of 80 81 militar ч: and he above SWear with and has Lrei

in Massachuset still He Υ:

address? his hav you Do ö

P.I material from tell reminisc Raytheon And he with research had. went to Record) ever wanted some first get the н all he that When to (Off THEM paper and Arnold and Arnold. office, about to his about the war stories down Υ: becaus more 08

part operated small cđ just Arnold is in how This Krick? significant about , say What did you but the equation ö of

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previously B God E order you not to think situation and by Arnold before I could going down might have happened better Arnold square. can And that was the you Gen to play am "and "look 50 authority to down because I said: said also what going the and going appointmen and 0 and am want that that Krick н Krick before and H good that that op to an of most to felt longer went there get tell him Question and not can do the I had can down any So to and get this way 88 do this ч. to Don. going soon non not him,

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Krick beat him Zimerman of case the In ö when 96 2 way ou Krick defend that he, the person, think t anyone a11 against of think supporter 44 son nop Saw kind defend him that there strong hurts knew Irv wasn that only. t think he went down his Navy, He was thing all the but No. Zimmerman anybody the defend him against and this is us in the Air Force E0 loyalties loyalty I don ready personal through, nad any Υ: he got him,

with he Don that dutch interfering Krick not to do it 11 working for got office C, son he he front because the told with the the he it that hi · and fixed defend deal do. fel ust to first anyone yet wanted Krick that down And Saw that Krick went started making did. never Was Krick Zimmerman Arnold with him.

that Don

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that got funds with op to had that something thing. was Tt mixed up in that Mrs

use can you how **KUOW** don Υ.

2 went In one trying Arnold Were erated organization case, you where other Arnold the the direction hor against in really and and one line Krick 41 Interest in want Krick back iconoclas Arnold ö case get the

he wanted There by there all Arnold block Was he there around on one tim made Was it i pegs any and Krick but office of him system, lot him to CO went ati Arnold' to the moved due defending one were no sure the that probably get ε OL against could changes defending himsel Krick is He But SO many this and himself Υ: that were to,

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paperwork with his with the deal off than chip rathe was Krick with people directly sense LI ö dealt

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20 kind a new the him why 1s give this ŝ that' Arnold but okay way to jerk 80 this that 5 felt permission that bog say happened don't hi And no said had Right. thing that Krick maybe Arnold boss boss Gen of

SOB to Arnold the Navy got out of OL get him Arnold, 0 and went this me Zimmerman of out Υ: get Krick Mrs

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earlier That was ö

think and then H through. until they probably had a little hassle way the all Krick defended rman Zimmer right up Υ: believe

off Krick cut to for Zimmerman defender was difficult been his had because he it i Then ö water

Y: Yes.

46

December 22, 1969

Lt. General Donald N. Yates, USAF (Ret) 5 Chateau Cheverny 2160 Ibis Isle Road Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Dear General Yates:

I appreciate your reply of December 18th. I know that your association with General Arnold was passing, at best, but I've gotten some good stories from people whose initial reaction was similar to yours.

As you plan to be out of town during the week of January 18th, plus the fact that my schedule for the current trip is rather heavy at this writing, I suggest we defer our get together to a mutually convenient time later on in the year.

I will write again for an interview.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Division

RAYTHEON COMPANY LEXINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02173

DONALD N. YATES

1 .

Galm

December 18, 1969

Dear Dr. Green:

I have your letter of December 1 inviting me to discuss recollections of General Arnold. Though I am not sure I can contribute anything helpful to the biography you are writing, I could readily make myself available when you are in the Florida area.

Presently I plan to be away from Florida during the week of January 18. Probably a telephone call to my home prior to your trip would help firm up a date and time mutually acceptable. You can reach me at area code (385) 582-7587.

Kindest regards and best wishes for a happy holiday.

Sinceselv

Dr. Murray Green Office of the Secretary Research & Analysis Div. - SAFAAR The Pentagon - 4C881 Washington, D. C. 20330

December 1, 1969

Lt.Gen. Donald N. Yates, USAF(Ret) 5 Chateau Cheverny 2160 Ibis Isle Road Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Dear General Yates:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of <u>Air Force/Space</u> <u>Digest</u>, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Street and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character, As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, nonattributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

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DE A ARE SE OF SE L. L. ACE OFFICE OF LEFO CATAO. TUBLEC I FORMATION DISCOULD

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONALD N. YATES, USAF

Part I - Narrative

Donald Norton Yates was born in Bangor, Maine, on November 25, 1909. He graduated from Bangor High School in 1927, and attended the United ... States Military Academy, graduating in 1931. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Cavalry.

Second Lieutenant Yates" first assignment was that of student officer at the Air Corps Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas. He received his pilot's wings the following year, and now is rated a Command Pilot.

In December 1932, he went to Luke Field, Hawaii, for duty with the 23rd Bomb Squadron. He was transferred from the Cavalry to the Army Air Corps on January 25, 1933.

In November 1935 First Lieutenant Yates was assigned to Brooks Field, Texas, serving in various assignments until June 1938. At that time he became a graduate student at the California Institute of Technology, and a year later received a Master of Science degree in meteorology. He then was assigned to the Third Weather Squadron at Barksdale Field, Louisiana, as weather officer.

Captain Yates became executive officer of the Sixth Air Base Group at Barksdale in March 1941, and served subsequently as group commander and post operations officer. He became Assistant Chief of the Weather Section in the Operations Division of the Office, Chief of Air Corps, in December 1941, and in March of the following year was appointed Deputy Director of Weather at Army Air Force Headquarters.

From May to December 1942 Lieutenant Colonel Yates was in the U.S.S.R. as a member of a military mission, coordinating weather matters. He rece. ed the Distinguished Service Medal for his part in this mission and the Air Medal for operations which included a flight from Washington, D. C. to Yakutsk, Siberia, over South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Russia.

In February 1944 Colonel Yates became Director of Weather Service for the U. S. Strategic Air Force in Europe, in addition, serving on General Eisenhower's staff. For his participation in the selection of June 6 as D-Day for the Normandy invasion, he was decorated by three governments. The citation accompanying the U.S. Army Legion of Merit stated that "through Colonel Yates' good judgment, skill and sound leadership, reconciliation of the differences in forecasting methods were effected, resulting in the development of a procedure capable of utilizing the talents and facilities of

both nations and all services in a unified manner. The value of Colonel Yates' advice has since been proven as the day selected for the continental assault was probably the only day during the month of June on which the operation could have been launched." For this he received the Degree of Chevalier in the National Order of the Legion of Honor of France.

Upon his return to the United States in January 1945, Colonel Yates was made Chief of the Weather Division which later was merged with the Weather Wing to form the Air Weather Service, which he commanded at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, until 1950. During this period he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General on February 5, 1947, and transferred to the U. S. Air Force on September 26, 1947. On March 17, 1947, he flew the first scheduled weather reconnaissance mission over the North Pole.

In July 1950, Brigadier General Yates was appointed Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Development at Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, and the following April he became Director of Research and Development with the Headquarters. He was promoted to the rank of Major General on February 2, 1952.

Major General Yates was Commander of the Air Force Missile Test Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida from July 31, 1954 to May 4, 1960. During this tour he was awarded the Navy Legion of Merit on May 22, 1958 by Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, Jr. The citation praised his outstanding services in connection with the Navy Project VANGUARD and the Navy Ballistic Missile Program POLARIS. It stated that "he repeatedly authorized unusual courses of action in order to expedite the projects." In addition, on August 24, 1960, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker presented him with the Army Legion of Merit, which stated "his broad knowledge of the missile and space testing programs of each member Service was instrumental in shaping top level policy and crucial decisions which progressively advanced the successful development of the REDSTONE, JUPITER and PERSHING missiles, the EXPLORER satellites and other space vehicles."

In addition, General Yates has been awarded the Croix de Guerre with Palm "for exceptional war services rendered in the course of operations for the liberation of France", Honorary Officer in the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, a decoration as Grande Oficial de Ordem Militar de Cristo of Portugal.

On May 4, 1960 General Yates was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and appointed Deputy Director of Defense Research & Engineering (Ranges and Space Ground Support), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

-2-

General Yates is the son of Archie O. and Gertrude A. Yates of Bangor, Maine. He married the former Gertrude I. Hansen of San Antonio, Texas. They have a daughter, Mrs. Richard P. Floyd, residing in Silver Spring, Maryland and a son, Donald N. Yates, Jr., living in Los Angeles, California.

General Yates is a member and former president of the American Meteorological Society, a member of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, and a Fellow of the American Rocket Society.

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Part II - Fact Sheet:

- A. Personal Data:
 - Born 25 November 1909, Bangor, Maine; Father Archie O. Yates; Mother - Gertrude A. Yates.
 - Married 6 February 1932; Wife Gertrude Hansen Yates; Children - Mrs. Richard P. Floyd and Donald N. Yates, Jr.
 - 3. Home Town Address: 149 Norway Road, Bangor, Maine.
- B. Education:
 - 1. Graduate Bangor High School, Bangor, Maine, 1927.
 - 2. Graduate U. S. Military Academy, 1931.
 - 3. Flying School, Kelly Field, 1932.
 - Master of Science Degree in Meteorology, California Institute of Technology, 1939.

C. Service Dates:

- 1. September 1927 June 1931 Cadet, U. S. Military Academy
- 2. June 1931 1932 Flying School, Kelly Field, Texas.
- 3. December 1932 1935 Luke Field, Hawaii, 23rd Bomb Squadron
- 4. November 1935 June 1938 Brooks Field, Texas, various assignments
- 1939 December 1941 Weather Officer and other assignments, Barksdale Field, Louisiana
- December 1941 March 1942 Assistant Chief, Weather Section, Operations Division, Office, Chief of Air Corps
- March 1942 February 1944 Deputy Director of Weather, AAF Headquarters
- February 1944 January 1945 Director, Weather Service, U. S. Strategic Air Forces, Europe

14-

- 9. January 1945 July 1950 Chief, Air Weather Service, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
- 10. July 1950 April 1951 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D. C.
- 11. April 1951 July 1954 Director of Research and Development, Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D. C.
- 12. July 1954 May 1960 Commander, Air Force Missile Test Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida
- 13. May 1960 to present Deputy Director of Defense Research & Engineering (Ranges and Space Ground Support), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

Decorations and Medals:

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

AIR MEDAL

LEGION OF MERIT (ARMY)

CROIX DE GUERRE WITH PALM

ARMY COMMENDATION RIBBON

FRENCH LEGION OF HONOR

ORDER OF BRITISH EMPIRE

ORDEM MILITAR DE CRISTO (PORTUGAL)

LEGION OF MERIT (NAVY)

LEGION OF MERIT (ARMY)

Promotions:

Second Lie First Lieu

Captain

Ran

<u>uk</u> ;	Temporary	Perma
eutenant	11 June 1931	11 June
itenant	1 August 1935	1 Augu
	3 October 1940	11 Jun
	÷ · ·	

29 December 1942
18 February 1943
28 October 1944
29 January 1945
26 December 1945
27 June 1946
27 January 1947
11 August 1955
22 May 1958

Permanent		
11 June 1931		
1 August 1935		
11 June 1941		

24 August 1960

Cont'd: Rank .	Temporary	Permanent
Major	22 July 1941	1 February 1942
Lieutenant Colonel	23 January 1942	17 December 1942
Colonel	2 November 1942	15 July 1944
Brigadier General	5 February 1947	24 November 1952
Major General	2 February 1952	10 March 1958
Lieutenant General	4 May 1960	

F. Unusual Experiences:

4

Had the dubious honor of having become the first member of the CATERPILLAR CLUB while at Primary Flying School, Randolph Field, Texas, just after it opened. This occurred shortly after he soloed - he was slow-rolled out of a PT-3 by his instructor when his safety belt became "unexplainably" unhitched.

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January 9, 196,

Yount, Barton K. Mrs. 28 Sep 70

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MRS. RADTON KYLE VOINS

is still going ating a lot to thous unde who he and it the surve from mildred yount

September 18, 1970

Mrs. Barton K. Yount Distaff House Oregon Avenue, NW Washington, DC

Dear Mrs. Yount:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, and Jackie Cochran.

In my research, I came upon your efforts in behalf of the "Wild Blue Youder" song by Crawford which is now part of the Air Force tradition.

Mrs. Arnold mentioned recently when I saw her out at the Ranch in Sonoma that Hap and Bart were classmates (1907), so the chances are that the Arnolds and Younts saw quite a bit of each other socially. Incidentally, Mrs. Arnold is quite well although she has been limping as a result of a strained ligament suffered in a fall.

She said to be remembered to you, if I see you. To that end, you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and the Arnold family, and I'd like to get the

benefit of some of them at a time convenient for you. Local phone OX5-3862. Perhaps I could drop by Distaff House.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

olume VIII no 5 man - page 19-May by Internal 9 Force So

Mrs. Barton K. Yount 6200 Oregon Avenue, N. W., #242, Washington, D. C. 20015 Suesday , Sept, 22, 1970

My dear Dr. Green :

Shank you for your letterseptember 18th or evening regarding the Air Force Song . Anyday, but Wednesday or Shursday it would be convenient to see you . Army Distaff Hall is at the corner of Nebraska Hvenue and Oregon . N. M. Nebraska ends at Rock Creek Park so you turn left at the stop sign and the entrance is about 100 yards from the

corner. Perhaps you would like to read what fir Kinney before I are you. wrote in "The Airman" in 1964. I enclose a slip of paper with the volume number and page. This about A.g. Song. There is lots in my mind about General and Mrs

Arnoldient 9'll help as much as 9 can. In the enclosed pamphlet about my husband - General Raiph Cousins (deccased) wrote B.K.ij. 'S obituary for the Assembly. He douted General Hrnold. Shey were real "buddies " always kidding each other 9'll look through my scrap books before you come.

My husband did not have the photogenic smile that "Nap" had but he had a twinkle in the eye that always had a retort for Nap. The Arnold's were wonderful friends and 9'm sorry 9 haven't more accurate records as to dates.

We trusted each other . I'm up early and any

time convenient to you I will be available .

Sincerely mildred yount Tel. 244-7098.

September 18, 1970

0930 28 M

Mrs. Barton K. Yount Distaff House Oregon Avenue, NW Washington, DC

Dear Mrs. Yount:

· * *

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

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Sincerely.

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

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Sincerely,

Encl

DR. MURRAY GREEN Deputy Chief Research & Analysis Div.

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28 Sep 1970 Barton K. Yount, Distaff House, Washington, D.C. Interview Mrs garden that Mrs Arnold built for John Linton? We are talking about the 3

such fun н then we occupied those quarters after and each other Hap was a good comeback. and used to k1d people, to get over it and have my husband, they thoughtful Very WOTO chuckle. He and Yes, it was very attractive and They seemed pictures of it. unmercifully, but they always vell? cđ just always with her send ** to 3 He was used

along They got Hap, even go overboard and a misunderstanding, f inclinded to sort I ever heard of Was believe He tempered. don't peace 11ttle quick Well c3 W Was very 11ke Sol 1. Knoi Barton you

1939? around must have been this So

books. 14 vldado' can н

14 record of I have

so awfully One thing I don't even try to remember is dates, because they are tant ** quinu

Yes, they sort of all telescope. But you say they were trying to get spar in new airplanes couldn't even get the Army to give them enough money to buy spare parts airplanes they They ** - - -

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mean he was just Q: Well, Walin Craig was the Chief of Staff at this time. I

had.

coming in. Do you remember that? and Marshall out leaving. a'b

after that they. and was very important be. But that Night **

build for the French began to MG 68. 믭 ä

Eritish And a little bit against the Russlans, the Linns Helpe ...

for om them building coration started de if we hadn't d received But husband planes h Know them н gotting weren't In that time they the 44 Υ. Ile

when for us, would have been just too bad 14 airplanes, gave you 02 did the French, really for.

redmember your recollections of Arnold.Do you talking about Were Yau Right. 3

н and air. I have just training, field, taking flying arrived by the no came who н Was guests and Arnold was in charge and my husband Peré. given for La was flying a whup, whup, whup. luncheon Hap first someplace upstairs. was going the attended General he this, they NES that Know H

Q: Bounced? .

And I knew my husband was in the back seat and the airplane wasn't very much of 1t all right. out and came picked themselves up But they protection. **

Arnold at that General any amusing stories? Arnolds, or about the Any incidents, special special about them? anything remember Q: Do you anything time,

have used to time son born. good MO ಣೆ I can only say that verge of having always had Barton I was just on the and and Hap are looking for, I know but a while. So I wasn't socially inclined, what you parties, once in just Know н together. ** several

Q: Didn't Arnold have ulcers at this time?

Y: He may have, I don't know.

Q: He was confined, he was in Letterman Hospital for a while.

don't OVOT. took husband S00... when my mine you Was fo maybe that booklet . In this we left. 14 410 after record happened 12 haven' That н 3 Know.

Q: Lindbergh tried hard, you say?

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American Embassy in the fact that unt11 he going rough He had very interest the Atlantic. 50 hard cross the tried Lindbergh night airplane **

going . the French said. the French Guard He Was interested. Atlantic, my husband t0 the much I thought meet him. So then Barton went somebody might cross Was very was quite a storm, then Wr Herrick killed that night down at the UP building and he told them it might happen That and go out and Myron Herrick Nungesser. TT.I lost Ambassador course. just Set had 40

Q: That's Nungesser?

and had weather reports, anything been found. I even out 1f thought we hadn't given them proper Embassy not too long ago, trying to find dom. But they have never was the reason they went French see, the French the You wrote to ** that

he had his first star .. Washington, 1nto came Yount you Honolul ask DI 5 Let Out 7.

Q: Right, and this was the 18th Wing, right?

Y: I think so, yes

Q: And then he came into Washington. Arnold brought him back?

wasn't 6 months and we had while would you like just unpacked and how did And he was slow getting there they only had 9 fields husband?" Was talk, MOH ** I had Barton for said: Nu nice H and for 1t, unpacked. and lovely, remember stake orders At that time, 0 dn He н Then Hap turned pulled the gotten Base as everything "Are Then, Alr MG Training Command. just said: Randolph 50. week. And And н and "sd?" next dinner. nice you.too. Mildr the 14 25 furniture f1r they were planning the in for We left for Washington and cane and ve like Hawaii 20 bookboxes. Rotten No. Hap "Yes. 0 ** there. to go said: just 112

whole to build up the under h1m? Yount had WOLK McNaughton General establishment. scratch.D1d from small establishment very d Was It training ð

Y: Yes.

Q: I saw him in California recently.

Y: Did he say so?

Know. going schools c1v1lan the get trying Moseley This did. 0.0 Yes 3 Claude

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Y: There were 9 of them.

Q: And that was quite a job?

[Note: Niv Victory] Harold Hinton? L1ndbergh) read Airpower. to (Reference Have helpe Yes Tt ** 3

walking back can't blame him for his for My husband always sent WOTO But and you to them on the field. happened Field, at Bolling that everything had babies stationed with they life when husband towards and to the plane attitude **

"Why"

Lindbergh

Col

40

sa1d

Barton

et them.

and

Hqs

to

dow

COLO

to to

Lindbergh) said: ever was the arrived in of he sort time (Annie my husband and the first first she at him. But when he we took him to all these meetings because Was 14. Lindbergh looked that from of him said away I saw quite a lot He cut was his. ". you." something jacket that belongs to 14 And without I like him. if it's mine back whole, him and just a darling. We fed flight I doubt anything Attache. Paris. d IIon. have Got Air Nas

great feat. d Was This Lindbergh was the darling of the world. Q: Well

don't blame him for н a shame the way they treated him. I'm just sorry. an isolationist such 11.5 and Y: Yes, changing to

your husband have any recollections of Arnold at West Point? Did 3

always If they did, they were didn't understand. that I at West Point. Cadet language "Pewt" him G Sort call d to referring to him in used They **

a little secret society. "Black Hand" this was · OH the somebody told of redmom d That's what Was Arnold ** ö

member of the d Yount Barton Was 3

"Black Hand", too? He had hooked. he was No **

voice -

they were pretty my husband. 80 this is Sunday, every good tenor 1n church sang a very through the year quartet the all disciplined cđ had They well

good boys. the ef. 10 ä

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wanted .. because he wasn't I think it 7:

he

3

church they those the the time 1n there in You know to up by and had đn about it with Colonel Wyman. they discovered that they were all creased sitting just had a good voice, been When they had they used to take their pants off. used to laugh are awfully stiff. it that way. know that they plan tine. thuy He didn't a long pants. н choir for * "dn Cadets got

the choir loft? Up in 3

000

seen. they couldn't be Where **

a check for on April 1st, Academy published in 1920. "Hqs sent is made out then stationed He 1920. 14 1. that April of the Military who fact dated Hap Arnold the of letter In spite Year-Book letter from The .13 Francisco. said: the and nt excerpt In Dept" This 255 an is good. the 1917 15 Western There 14

1s in January 1944 This item from the Ft Worth Star Telegram. an Q: Here's

get n1sh West Point. with, the Training this, VOLY to OVET wa1t belleved There is at War couldn't times of this really was head Texas. old to get Arnold about California command down in Who want Arnold. other Yount, going fishing. H "Farmer each In that: with General out classmates and kidded training saying ranch become 日 as then I' d could 1 Bulst AAF conferring Arnold visited the and purcha so he Gen boys back home, hin was then duties Were quoted Arnold They his military picture article D.e and. oral because those good One

the 13 maybe this smile, and this Arnold had Gen mention that him "Hap"? Q: You called they

Y: Uh, 1t 1s, Happy.

explosmiling didn't mean to an prelude me that the fact that he was the This could be junction. A couple of people have told particular was happy at this ö he sion? that

a firm mouth, anytime it wasn't personality. well, I think his smile was, wonderful had he But tell you, TT.I be 51 14

than I on him? of him eyes more 1t? Were all much So when he walked into Saw н Command, Training TOOM the command visited 40 sort 6q Well Did 3 **

with Barton, doing. Training Command pq But 1 person. "home-fire" what the with cđ because Ree was always impressed VETV I thinke was he Eeadle, when course 50 did 40 ever and

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the here Spaatz AF charities mentioned house a publication the 1s This for loved 14 money R 1970. continued Myer, here, raised 15 This mention she Sept at they Bolling Field. quarters that the and and you said 5 AF Wives, This Gen Arnold's Spaatz organizer. out by Club" Nrs Association of which is put Nives an at city they lived Was AV. the Arnold no. glorious view of National Association. Protocol STH that ä the saying the at

to everybody she ask D1d organizer great ಣ You montion that Mrs Arnold 1s support? 3 le nd

and cđ various fields, to submit off1ce by the local wives clubs. We also the would of the Red Cross, groups that spent visiting hours the people in charge of direction, number the her of a11 undor report Yes, organized monthly

Q: She was very thoughtful?

coordinating the at the Ft Worth headquarters a little difficult was done also, the only thing that we found which was plus fields, of 400 myself. Cross report WACs and And - 11 by two Red

Q: Well, Mrs Arnold worked very hard organizing this?

Y: She was an organizer.

to pull all these reports together must have been a job of some Trying substance? 3

useful it without the WACs. Col Maury Smith, he was very musician. woman; I'm a this. I'm not a business couldn't have done me how to organize showed Н ** He

an Who made the decision that we need come about? song? Did Arnold make that decision? How did it song. AF the about you 255 0H Let ... ST?

had background husband finally was trying ouldn't do and played some tune and write words for it, and about I found made meanwhile Authors and her Was existed without н then Meredith Willson H she realized I MacD111 Way back in 1918, 700. husband of what they could do. and don't two Society through Lindsay fine planist committee every NE н and ever 10. to the gone Mrs of died. that efforts. song had maybe had everchanging committee met and prayer wrote 500 MacD111 to head then 0M competition some 350 manuscripts, or cđ and ayear. we would take then I began to realize that no popular service So then I many years' Was beautiful and busy Col Dur outside of Bolling Field, out these songs, about Washington. So Gen Arnold asked know, asked them to please get our little local one of indifferent. f, of, At that time, As you found song was a result had an the end had 50 committee. н parceled a backlog heard them. At Me 700, and we sort of stopped but kind walls. an AF song. was killed later ON. chairman of the AF ended up with Composers and they had So the It was good Y: The cl1mb 40 them and it alone find moved that 40 So to

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Q: ASCAP?

of these very fine see what they could do to further some and Yes, ASCAP, 1.

feel to H.I through the other I didn't decided afraid a competition. If they mine went н Well, Then, I'm then phenomenal acknowledged. and committee of again. ones. Were good 14 said "No". They wouldn't enter be reopen everchanging Arnold's ideas poss1bly Would then 14 we had three percentage. and song and this of anybody. So ..75% their the AF. good you, to this 2 14 told pretty of course, represent would award refer et ++ not wore...that's to They "Suos Mou 1d and have songs icians. that 14. d to oposodo Solng 01050 that 25%

was he not? Did he shoot from the hip 1mpetuous man, a very Arnold was 3 times?

He Y: That I couldn't tell you because Barton always had to laugh him out of it. never that I know of. got mad at Barton, never

wheel to keep Arnold on course? Did Arnold ever of coax him back? sort tanget impulsively? Then Gen Yount a balance 33 Did Barton serve d uo off 00

but I have a feeling that I think admirer of Arnold's. it happened, great cđ when in character. I'm what happened or were quite a difference many wonderful ideas quote couldn't н he had they

always full of sparks? He was ideas. 40 He was full 3

Mitchell He was alittle like Billy **

era? You were in France? Billy Mitchell of the any recollections have You Do ö

the trial? at at that time, Who was in command husband did. No. but No. **

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recall I can't was on the board, MacArthur Douglas Well, 3

man? the AF Was Who **

if there were any. KCDOW I don't board? the No. Son 3 34

on the board,

I don't mean

I mean in the office

Patrick. Mason ö

got one who first encouraged Capt make Mason Patrick allow you know they did. I've couldn't And was the got tomatoes. when they too. He ships bombing. So Capt Smith well Barton was there, uo tomatoes throw 00 Oh. to practice to ** Smith

Ostfriesland. the pictures

So I have those remember George Goddard, he took those pictures. saw them. н ð

so many. we've had Oh. Gifted. person. phenomenal ೆ Nas Y: He

saw combat mmand? "Mildred. combat ever He said ർ Neither of them get job to seriously. to be released from his Arnold. VOTY me once something with he told try shared in fact. Yount Yount ervice. Did Ceneral times. General Many ö

E

strength, training of Untr sald: at power S he school and great World War; ground comes Candel first 14 schools. "Hero Bob the five training sald: see, Tooey othe: You and the to people like Canada Suo 410 al what had one 00 and and 00 Texas and he Tooey. M111 second AWOL 14 to to go The sure, too old. Austin, Suio3 Texas. H.I

command? combat Arnold for Gen importune Yount General Did ð

I know that. Yes, overseas. 02 and get away here? you need t1me: 77 told him tried Arnold I think And ** 3

the first world war that he had done very well. They and and organize this Training Command 11 COLIE manders COD other made all the stay here going so well the holidays, 40 experience in got just all NAG ev'uor" open 14 his said: knew ++ he that 34 ** because kept look

accept this gracefully? Yount Did Gan 3

E Ĥ guess it's just fate. H said to me? he twice that's it." One or do? and too old, could he What a little bit **

There are others who pressured Arnold, and they were luckier than General ð Yount. and could do confidence stable great and felt thathe was have that you in Barton a man at West Point? hard to replace 00 confide they close great pretty Hap had It's job. ** the

Were

ä

would kid Barton about remember they were н they had done, Hap 1 of sorts because they had all that things certain boen, nust have about laughing They >4 always

in the choir

Singing

goody-goody,

being a

first that of times. But she tells me must have been for his Philippines He Arnold. to the 1n Hap couple sent Interested d West Point when he seriously because to an though, came not Pool she was canor time El that 3 Interes. 34

00

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eastern route via the Suez Canal. His ship ccurted her in Switzerland in 1909, when she was Switzerland back the 4n and amily 40 44 Geno her arranged off in visiting with ho stopped

Y: She was going to school in Germany, wasn't she?

were in Switzerland, in Gersau, Switzerland. summer they that but Q: Yes,

He courted her there. She has a diary of that period.

Y: How nice.

Q:When did you and Ceneral Yount marry?

Y: We were married about ayear after the Arnolds

Q: Oh, 1914?

known 1t. up the other day or I wouldn't have I looked it Y: Yes.

Q: Did you know him when he was at West Point?

Y: No, I never knew my husband when he was at West Point.

Yount, Distaff House, Washington, D.C. 28 Sep 1970 Barton K. Mrs Interview

the garden that Mrs Arnold built for John Linton? We are talking about 3

such fun. and I each other and Hap was after a good comeback. occupied those quarters used to kid people, seemed to get over it and have they thoughtful chuckle. He and my husband, MG Very then Were very attractive and They 1t. but they always her pictures of сĴ just always with Yes, it was unmercifully, send 1:1 used to He was

Q: They got along well?

Hap, even and overboard misunderstanding, 80 Jo inclinded to sort cđ g ever heard Was н believe He peacemaker tempered. don't 11ttle н quick well, VOLY very 11ke know was Shop Was ** Barton you

Q: So this must have been around 1939?

Y: I can probably find it in my books.

Q: I have a record of it.

even try to remember is dates, because they are so awfully One thing I don't unimportant *

But you say they were trying to get spar they sort of all telescope. airplanes Neu Q: Yes. In parts get the Army to give them enough money to buy spare parts couldn't even airplanes they had. They ** the FOT

was the Chief of Staff at this time. I mean he was just Q: Well, Malin Craig

coming in. Do you remember that? Mas and Marshall about leaving,

Y: Might be. But that was very important and after that they

Q: In '39 we began to build for the French

Y: And the Eritish.

Q: Helped the Manna against the Russians, a little bit.

decoration from them d received husband NB Know н weren. they At that time 2.

building for when started us. for hadn't bad too We just H But been planes. have would getting them 14 airplanes. Tn gave Know, help he 40 you 8 the the French, did LIE really for

remember of Arnold.Do you recollections your talking about Right

н and 50 air. I have just taking flying training, fleld, who arrived by the uo came H in charge and my husband was luncheon given for guests and La Peré was flying a was going whup, whup, whup. Нар first Arnold was someplace upstairs. the attended General he I saw this, they Know that

Q: Bounced? .

much and the airplane wasn't very all right. 14 out of And I know my husband was in the back seat came and picked themselves up But they protection. **

Arnold at that General amusing stories? S Arnolds, any the incidents, about special special about them? Any anything remember you anything Q: Do time.

have used to son born. good time that having always had say of onlv verge and Barton can on the and I know Han just for looking I Was but a while. are inclined. what you once in So I wasn't socially just parties, Y: I kno together. several

Q: Didn't Arnold have ulcers at this time?

Y: He may have, I don't know.

Q: He was confined, he was in Letterman Hospital for a while.

I don't took over. husband That happened after we left, maybe that was when my mine you f record of it. In this booklet haven't a н ** know.

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Q: Lindborgh tried hard, you say?

Atlantic, the French going interested. He said to interest the American Embassy in the fact that the French Guard, Was going until he met thought my husband much then Barton went to somebody might cross the was very He had very rough H quite a storm, and then Mr Herrick UP building. So meet him. Atlantic. Was the might happen That at hard killed that night down go out and Ambassador Myron Herrick, airplane might cross the Lindbergh tried Nungesser them it II.I lost course ** he and get had

Q: That's Nungesser?

and had proper weather reports. anything I even 4 But they have never been found. trying to find out given them the French thought we hadn't ago, long the French Embassy not too the reason they went down. 500° Y: You Was wrote to that

into Washington, he had his first star ... french paper came Gen Yount when You ask Du Q: Let

the 18th Wing, right? and this was Right, ...

Honolulu

Cut in

**

I think so, yes. 54 into Washington. Arnold brought him back? cane And then he 3

wasn't had while would you like just unpacked months and we he how did It was slow getting And there fields husband?" and only had 9 I had talk, said: "How Barton was there for 6 nice they it unpacked. was lovely, me and stakes remember order that time. to He đn these pulled н Bașe. Then Hap turned had just gotten everything ery. At. Then, Randolph Air Training Command. sald: so. next week. And and for dinner. was it nice Mildred?" = to you, too first the furniture the We left Washington, went for and they were planning came in and SULT he we like Hawali 20 bookboxes. gotten No. "Yes, Hap t0 ** there. 08 said: just 112 3

small establishment. General Yount had to build up the whole scratch.Did McNaughton work under him? training establishment from a very It was 3

I saw him in California recently. 3

Y: Yes.

Did he say so? **

he did. This was trying to get the civilian schools going, you know, C.C. Moseley .. Claude Ryan and Q: Yes,

of them There were 9

job? quite a Was that And 3

[Note: Bir Victory] Airpower, Harold Hinton? read terrific. Have you It was **

L1ndbergh) to (Reference 1t. write helped н Yes 3

were walking back can't blame him for his BB My husband always sent for "Why, But to Col Lindbergh. you them and to happened Field, on the field. sald at Bolling that meet them. Barton everything they had babies stationed with Was when Hqs husband down Wy attitude ** to the COMB to.

Lindbergh) of said: ever we took him to all these meetings because my husband was the arrived in he sort (Annie and the first first she at him, But of him when he 1t. Lindbergh looked that from said something cut away I saw quite a lot He was his. 40 14 And without I like him. belor mine. jacket that back whole, 11 14'S him and just a darling. We fed flight I doubt anything Attache. Paris. d TLoW" have Got. Was AIT

feat. great cđ Was This Lindbergh was the darling of the world. Q: Well,

don't blame him for н treated him. they sorry. a shame the way just I.H an isolationist 1t's such and Y: Yes, changing to

Point? West Arnold at your husband have any recollections of Q: Did

always they were understand If they did. didn't "Pewt" at West Point that of Cadet language call him sort cđ They used to referring to him in 1.1

society. a little secret "Black Hand" this was somebody told me. of the member et. That's what Arnold was 3 **

Q: Was Barton Yount a member of the "Black Hand", too?

husband ∑ E good tenor voice - this a very No, he was hooked. He had **

pretty WOLG they in church every Sunday, a quartet, and the quartet sang disciplined all through the year. had They Well

Ye was one of the good boys. ä

wanted ... because he wasn't I think it **

just had a good voice, and had to be in church they those there in the creased up by the time You know, been sitting up it with Colonel Wyman. that they were all When they had about he to laugh they discovered stiff. It that way, awfully nsed thay didn't plan that thuy Know pants, н 3 ** Cadets choir

used to take their pants off. so they got up,

they couldn't be seen. Where **

Up in the choir loft?

3

a check for on April 1st, is out of the '13 Year-Book of the Military Academy published in 1920 a letter from Hap Arnold who was then stationed in "Hgs sent out 1920. He 1s made 1, In spite of the fact that it The letter is dated April Francisco. sald: an excerpt from and in San nt This Western Dept" SS is good. 1917 There is 3 the 4

1n January 1944 13 This item from the Ft Worth Star Telegram. an Here's

get wait to finish Point. this, Training There is a very West believed the at couldn't times of this really head training command down in Texas. old He get Was about Arnold in California. to who want Arnold. each other fishing." Yount, H "Farmer that: with General out then I'm going kidded saying ranch could become and as c3 AAF conferring purchasing Arnold classmates Arnold visited the and so he Gen home, 비가대 then his military duties quoted erew. back JO. Mas They picture article boys he .nd. General because those good Comman oue

maybe this is the reason and smile, Arnold had this Gen that him "Hap"? mention You called they

it is, Happy. Ch,

smiling didn't mean exploan 2 prelude have told me that the fact that he was the be could This junction. part1cular people was happy at this A couple of he 3 sion? that

a firm mouth, Y: I'll tell you, I think his smile was, well, anytime it wasn't a wonderful personality. But he had would be a smile. ++

11? Were all eyes on him? when he walked into a room command of sort 00 Q: D1d

with Barton, than I doing him 40 Command But he BIOR much Training person. so I saw "home-fire" what the Command, with ರ he visited the Training Bee was always impressed very Beadle, because Was thinke when н course, Well, did of 1. 50 ever and

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here

and the Spaatz work AF charities the mentioned house Arnold's publication for This is Mrs Ft Myer, loved the and they raised money for she continued Mrs 14 1970. S đ here, Sept 1ssue Eolling Field. This is mention at quarters Mrs Spaatz said that is the you and AF Wives, This Arnold's organizer. out by Club" Association of Gen put "AF Wives the city. an lived Was which Arnold they "ou of National s view Association. Protocol SI that 3 gloriou: saying the the at

t0 You mention that Mrs Arnold is a great organizer. Did she ask everybody support? ä lend

and cð to submit office also fields, wives clubs. the various would spent by the local of the Red Cross, that visiting groups hours the people in charge of the number of under her direction, all report Yes, * monthly organiz

the g called a friendship basket. In it was all a very fine piece Was H house. a vacant We had what we few night's stay in came in. ed. thay did. aries she necess wivos M OLK

.

Q: She was very thoughtful?

W: And also, the only thing that we found a little difficult was coordinating the of 400 plus fields, which was done at the Ft Worth headquarters myself. Cross report by two MACs and Red

Q: Well, Mrs Arnold worked very hard organizing this?

Y: She was an organizer.

SORE Trying to pull all these reports together must have been a job of substance? 3

seful. Very musician. he was Smith, woman; I'm Maury Col a business it without the WACs. I'm not this. couldn't have done organize to how me н showed ** He

an we need that decision about? COME the 11 made did Who decision? How song. the make that about you Arnold ask 00 song? Did Lot 3 57

had background We finally trying husband couldn't do and played and was about meanwhile, found of Authoris and march. 1t . I Was her for existed without then W111son MacD111, н she Way back in 1918, words real1zed husband 700, and do. and don' could through edith Society and write and Mrs Lindsay pianist committee every and my н less, they ever 10. gone f1ne of some tune died. maybe what that had efforts everchanging committee **HOt** had wrote Song MacD111 to head some 350 manuscripts, or then competition ed ayear, and take service then I beautiful WAS and years busy Col So Gen Arnold asked me waild Bolling Field. these songs, about So you know, popular local asked them to please get of indifferent. 0M one JO found little time. end result I had an AS out that the of tha of committee. d So we parceled outside a backlog At Was Ne ended up with 700, and At stopped to Washington. but kind them and heard them. Suos song. walls. the EN Composers and an AF that they had the began It was good The Sort killed it alone. to climb chairman find 3 н moved en. then Nas t 0 So

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verv fine these g and see what they could do to further some ASCAP. Yes. **

ASCAP?

3

I didn't feel 40 H.I through the other decided afraid If they mine went H H.I and Well, then competition. Then. were phenomenal and acknowledged. of committee again. ones good enter then reopen it be everchanging Arnold's 1deas we had three possibly wouldn't Would 14 and a pretty good percentage. "No". They their song and So this of anybody, to have to refer to this ... 75% AF. said you , the \$ 6q told award 1t course. represent would н HO 2 not 02 .. that .. They song, Wou ld 1t, and Songs sicians. that d WOLD pasodo Solng these close that 25%

SOI he not? Did he shoot from the hip impetuous man, was a very Was Arnold :0 times? I couldn't tell you because Barton always had to laugh him out of it. He of. Know н that never Barton mad That Cot ** never

ever Arnold Arnold on course? Did back? coax him JO deey sort t0 Gen Yount wheel balance Then impulsively? c3 as Serve Barton tanget Did cđ off 00

feeling that I think Arnold's. ಣೆ I have of but admirer 1t happened, great ಡ when H.H 20 character happened ln what difference many wonderful ideas quote couldn't d quite he had they

Q: He was full of ideas. He was always full of sparks?

Y: He was alittle like Billy Mitchell,

of the Billy Mitchell era? You were in France? have any recollections you Po ð

at the trial? that time, at Who was in command my husband did. No, but ¥.

Q: Well, Douglas MacArthur was on the board, I can't recall

Y: Who was the AF man?

Q: On the board? I don't know if there were any.

Y: No, I don't mean on the board, I mean in the office.

Q: Mason Patrick.

ships when they couldn't make Mason Patrick allow th Capt And you know they did. I've got encouraged the one who first Smith got tomatoes. Was He too. there, Ostfriesland. throw tomatoes on Capt Was Barton ŝ bombing. Well the Oh. 3 practice of 40 pictures ** Smith to

So I have those remember George Goddard, he took those pictures. 3

pictures.

Ch, we've had so many. Gifted. .nozred phenomenal 3 Y: He was

great power of strength, H.I : puremu saw combat training "Mildred, ground schools at Univ of sald: "I"m combat ever Was He said, the first World War; he get a Neither of them " and job to seriously. 4 comes. Ξ Bob Candel. his "Here 1t schools, something with Arnold. from very people like Tooey and one of five training released me once, and he said: 500° Canada."-You to be he told along try times, in fact, shared came Yount had 40 00 Yount 00 and Texas and he Ceneral It will The second ANOL General Many Did 00 too old. 40 service. ** Austin, 3 Texas. Suico

Q: Did General Yount importune Gen Arnold for a combat command?

man's name?

and what was the other

Tooey.

40

sure,

H.I

overseas. Yes, I know that, and go 3 or 4 times to get away. need you here? WG And Arnold told him, tried I think he ** ö

They and "You've just got to stay here and organize this Training Command the first world war that he had done very well 1u CODB commanders other open all the holidays, made all the going so well he knew his experience in Was ti ett that school He said: 1t becau ** 44 5 because kept Look

Q: Did General Yount accept this gracefully?

Ĥ me? "I guess it's just fate. said to One or twice he that's 1t." too old, and could he do? What little bit ** d

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There are others who pressured Arnold, and they were luckfor than General 3 Yount. ce in Earton and felt thathe was stable and could do pratty hard to replace a man that you have great confidence in confide great Hap had It's job. 54 the

Q: Were they close at West Point?

certain things that they had done, Hap would kid Barton about - I remember they were must have been, because they had all sorts of goody-goody, singing in the choir. laughing about They ** being a always

first came up to West Point a couple of times. But she tells me that sent to the Philippines for his not seriously interested in Hap Arnold. He must have been when he was because though, time she was Eleanor Pool her. Interested at that

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. .

back the eastern route via the Suez Canal. His ship courted her in Switzerland in 1909, when she wa in Switzerland he ully and arranged to come Cenoa 4 visiting with her off in ho stopped tour

Y: She was going to school in Germany, wasn't she?

Switzerland Gersau, 1n mer they wore in Switzerland sum Yes, but that 3

He courted her there. She has a diary of that period

Y: How nice. Q:Mfon did you and Genoral Yount marry?

Q:When did you and General Yount marry?

Y: We were married about ayear after the Arnolds.

Q: Ch. 1914?

other day or I wouldn't have known it. I looked it up the Yes **

Q: Did you know him when he was at West Point?

Y: No, I never knew my husband when he was at West Point.

28 Sep 1970 Washington, D.C. Interview Mrs Barton K. Yount, Distaff House,

fun. and I Linton? after neback each Hap built for John and k1d 0 people they ha thoughtful Arnold and husband 11 Mrs that Au put garden d the chuckl Ways about of picture with talking are cifully ð He wa pesn nut

I They got along well?

even Hap, misunderstanding, đ g heard 1ncl 1nded He bellev tempe qu1ck 11ttl was l1k knoi Barton you

Q: So this must have been around 1939?

Y: I can probably find it in my books.

Q: I have a record of it

awfully are they dates. 15 even try to remember don't H Y: One thing un1mportant

But you say they were trying to get sort of all telescope. they Q: Yes. part parts spare buy **t**0 money enough get the Army to give them even they couldn' airplane TOP

nean he н time this Staff of Chlef Craig Malin Well

that? aving about th that after and 1mportant that But Might

Q: In '39 we began to build for the French.

Y: And the British

Q: Helped the Mnns against the Russlans, a little bit.

for them bu11d1ng decoration from started au for hadn't bad ceived t00 WA just H But ould hav plai th getting In gave help th the French lle for

d1d really

remember you Arnold.Do ef, recollections talking about your You R1ght. ð

н and I have training, alr. fleld taking flying by Ę arrived CB who Was guests and husband Par for given Am and flying whup, whup, whup luncheon charge 1n first Hap going upstairs Arnold the attended Mas General he aplace this know that 88 H

Q: Bounced?

airplane wasn't very much all right ++ the J. C R H back and dn the selves In ther husband picked th I kne But And ection. Y: prote

that Arnold at neral stories? ð ISING nolds any th 1nc1dents. about cial Any thei nyth1 about special anything t1me

have 5 good time pe hor Bon that having Bay only of verge can Bart the and uo just for Ha ooking but wh11e 1ncl1ne ocially partie I kno wasn. together several So I

Q: Didn't Arnold have ulcers at this time?

Y: He may have, I don't know.

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wh11e for Hospital Letterman F onflned ä don't husband NII mine you R whe ef. that booklet maybe this In of appe Bn know

Q: Lindbergh tried hard, you say?

sald, that fact the Interest unt11 1n Embassy much going erican ugho Herrick the interest Ha then antic 0 and Herrick Lindbergh Myron alrpla Ambas

20 the French going Atlantic, husband the thought CTOSS no н Barto might storm building then d quite So UP hlu the night the just lost told k111ed and had get 40

Q: That's Nungesser?

and reports. anythi eathe found out proper been find them Dever t0 rying given have we hadn't they ago long But t00 thought down not Sy French Embas they the French reason wrote that

N

Washington, he had his first star ... came into Gen Yount wha Honolulu vou ask Let Out -0

the 18th Wing, right? Right 3

think Y: brought him back? Arnold Washington. Lnto he 3

and we had wh11e unpacked did he getting you And there field would months 6 S.1 they only had "How husb talk. Barton for 6 WAR ť sa1d nice there unpacked ely amber time. that turned the hallu gotten everything At. Then Hap just Ř and Randolph were planning the Training Comm had and nice dinner Mildred? furniture th for left In Washington and and Hawa11 20 bookboxe 0 ve like to go there said: they just 112

whole General Yount had to build up the under h1m? work ratch.Did McNaughton establ1shment. small froi very establish Q: It was training

Y: Yes

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in California recently. I saw him ä

Y: Did

ou know get the civilian schools going, to trying This did. 0-0 Yes ä de Clau

job? oulte And 3 [Note: Air Victory] read Airpower, Harold Hinton? VOU Have terrific Υ.

Reference to Lindbergh) and F1eld Bolling helpe

1t.

write

ö

walking back t blame him for his for sent "Why, always Col Lindbergh My husband th to happened field. \$ said the that Barton uo everything bables had with they life att1tud to the 00 to

Lindbergh) sort of said: husband was the 11 ę arrived Annie and flrst she at him. MV when he But becaus Lindbergh looked that. of him etings an1d a lot He quite his th thing VOIL all belongs to t0 took h1m And withou him 11ke mina flight jacket that whole a н We fed him and 48 44. darling. back I doubt anything Attache ¢ just eđ Paris. "Well have Alr got Was

feat. great WAB This world. of the darling Lindbergh was the Well.

for don't blame him н treated him. they Sorry way the just shame E.I đ 1solation1st such et. 44. and un Yes. changing to

recollections of Arnold at West Point? anv have husband YOUT Q: D1d

they understand did. they d1dn't H Po1nt. that West language at "Pewt" Cadet call him to nsed They Ľ. referri

a little secret WAS "Black Hand," this the of Arnold 3

society. told me ebodv That' Υ.

t00? "Black Hand" tha of Rarton

were pretty husband they N III this Sunday, voice every tenor church good 1n the year had Ha through ooked. all d1scipline had Y: They well

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good boys Re 5

anted think YI

fust.

that

3

in church. they there in the t1me the You up by had had been sitting up and Colonel Wyman creased a good voice, all were with had discovered that they 14 When they about off pants augh stiff WBY their awfully take they C they didn't choir for up, Cadets got

choir loft? 3

seen couldn't Υ.

for April 1st. Academy published in 1920, check spH" 1n uo sent out stat1oned He made 1920. 18 then 1. 1t Was Apr11 fact that Year-Book of the Military who dated Arnold the In spite of Hap tter from The letter 13 said: th Jo Jo San out Dept" This 255 it is good. There is the 1917 Western ð

This is in January 1944. item from the Ft Worth Star Telegram. Q: Here'

+

get wait to finish West Point w1th Training this, belleved the couldn't of tlme this really head old eH get Arnold to a California who ab Arnold. down Yount oth fishing command 1n that General out going k1dded training saying with Pa d Ĥ could AAF purchas1ng conferring classmates Arnold ÷ visited the he Gen 0 him quoted dut1e ž back General Arnold They 1111tary article pictur nd good becal thos Comm One his

VOLY

18

There

Texas

1n

the this aybe th1 had Arnold Ge that "Hap" mention him You called they

Happy

explosmiling didn't a n prelude Was tha the fact that he This could be junction. that BB told part1cular have people this at of happy couple ö he s1on? that

a firm mouth, anytime it wasn't personality well, Was. Lu1 sm11e think his had H tell IL'I NY would 14

Barton, н on him? all But Were 113 1nto -fire' valked "hoi Com he Training alwavs Å visited PP 0 g en Beadle D1d he Well d1d ever

doing. the g publication Col **Training** the un un THE P with Fleld out thinke which Arnold Protocol cour f and the

char1t1es old' 0L be cont1 MW Sept sh sa1d This ы Arnold' Spaat Club" g Gen W1V6 city they of National view Association that glorious saying at D1d organizer ere Arnold Mrs that You mention su pport? le nd

and eđ fields, to submit officers also 6 clubs various WIVe local Cross that the the Red groups þ spent of visiting hours charge of direction, people in number the the ef 0 all organiz monthly

We had what we called a friendship basket. In it was all the de a very fine piece It was a few night's stay in a vacant house. wives as they came in. necessaries for she did. w ork

very thoughtful? Qr She was

coordinating the Worth headquarters a little difficult was 맖 at the done we found which was that of 400 plus fields, only thing myself. the W: And also, Red Cross report by two WACs and

Armold worked very hard organizing this? . Mrs Well.

n organizer Y: She was

to pull all these reports together must have been a job of some Q: Trying substance?

Y: I

useful. Very Woman; I'm a musician. Was Col Maury Smith, he business it without the WACs. not this done organiz couldn't have ask how Q: Let showed He

decision that about? COMB the made decision? How did it Who song. AF the that. abou t Arnold song? D1d AF

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had background trying husband finally ouldn't do and played as about samwhile. for 1t. Authors and I Was w1thout Meredith Willson I don't know aria in 1918, words MacD111 WO Week busband vaal1zed 700. and to the Society of do, existed wr1te through could Mrs Lindsay planist. back committee Nu and Way of 10. what they once fine one tune had that afforts competition and everchanging committee and then met ong prayer wrote MacD111 to head take service scripts busy and then I beaut1ful Col wou ld Bolling Field, many songs. Arnold asked about popular As you know. So local get ď 350 079 1nd1fferent. these of them to please result 11ttle that time found no an that 100 of So Gen the had committee. out side 700. and I parceled to realize At a backlog of e M stopped song Washington. It was good but kind Song. tham walls. Composers and asked heard 50 had ended up with Degan the So Pe was killed they chairman to climb flnd it alone then I So we that them to

Q: ASCAP?

see what they could do to further some of these very fine and Y: Yes, ASCAP,

feel decided to afraid I'm through the other I didn't If they went н and then Well. i competition. mina Then. and acknowledged. of phenoi committee again. ones, Bood WATR enter and then reopen it would be everchanging ideas possibly wouldn't -Arnold' ++ three They and percentage So this of their song we had anybody. "ON " .75% AF said good you. this. \$ the told etty award 1t present to course would refer н of 11 and not to have to and wou 1d that' They song. nusicians. that coposed going that these close 25%

shoot from the hip he not? Did he Was man. impetuous Very Was Arnold times?

He always had to laugh him out of it. because Barton know of that Y: That I couldn't tell you never Barton, at got mad never

course? Did Arnold ever back? him uo Arnold keep Yount balance wheel to Gen The 1mpuls1vely? 2: Did Barton serve tanget off 80

feeling that admirer of Arnold's. I think eđ but I have it happened, a great when in character. I'm HO happened quote what difference many wonderful ideas couldn't cđ quite Mere he had they

Q: He was full of ideas. He was always full of sparks?

Y: He was alittle like Billy Mitchell.

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era? You were in France? of the Billy Mitchell recollections any have Do 3

at the trial? time, command at that was in Who **d1**d. husband No. χ.

Q: Well, Douglas MacArthur was on the board, I can't recall

Y: Who was the AF man?

Q: On the board? I don't know if there were any.

Y: No, I don't mean on the board, I mean in the office

Q: Mason Patrick.

got encouraged Capt allow I've Patr1ck And you know they did. Mason first make who ene couldn't the tomatoes. Was they He when too. Capt Smith got ships was there, uo Ostfriesland tomatoe So well Barton bombing. throw the to practice pictures Υ: Smith

So I have those ember George Goddard, he took those pictures. 3

many. 80 had We've oh. Gifted. person Y: He combat the get f **t**0 Neither job his from Arnold with release something peq to to try shared Yount Yount General General D1d ð service

s put

strength, E at training d ".I. M41dre Untv P. said: at power schools he and great Ware He punour World ously COMB Candel first 1t 0015 Bob training said: Tooey You told five ong Canad of lqo fact go 3 2 and and 111M cond AWOL t1me 80 too old Austin, going Texas

command combat ಣೆ for Arnold Gen Yount General D1d

man'

othe

EP

Tooey

to

sure

H.I

I know that. Yes. OVETSEAS go and geti away C t.1 m 3 tried think Y:

here? him told Arnold 3

They well. and Command Very Training done nde had th1s that he COL organ1ze other War the and world all here made the first stay well holidays, In got going just rien all expel mo X ... ope his said: school that at because kept look

gracefully? this accept 0 D1d

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8 Ĥ guess 1t's just fate. H. Me said to he twice 1t. that's P One and do could he old t00 What a little bit Υ.

pressured Arnold, and they were luckier than General who others are There Yount qo could 1n and confidence stable great thathe have felt that you and nan Barton replace 11 90 conf1de 40 hand great pretty Y: Hap had t job. the

West Point? at close they Were :0

would kid Barton about remember they Hap ef. they had done, sorts all they had that choir things because the 1n certain singing about goody-goody must laughing e; al ways being

first that 8 for his g tells have Ph111ppines But she must He times. Arnold. the 3 of o Hap couple Interested ed Point he when West seriously because to dn though, not cam Pool her. she Eleanor 1n time 1nterested that at

His ship courted her in Switzerland in 1909, when she was back the eastern route via the Suez Canal. Switzerland he and COMB visiting with her family off in Genoa arranged to stopped tour he

Y: She was going to school in Germany, wasn't she?

Switzerland Gersau, Ln I Switzerland, In Were they sur that but Q: Yes,

He courted her there. She has a diary of that period.

Y: How nice.

Q: When did you and General Yount marry?

Y: We were married about ayear after the Arnolds,

Q: 0h, 1914?

1t. hav wouldn. н OL day the other d'n 11 I looked Y: Yes,

Q: Did you know him when he was at West Point?

Y: No. I never knew my husband when he was at West Point.

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