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
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
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Roll

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USAF ACADEMY MICROFILM SERVICE CENTER

ROLL NUMBER: 92-224

PROJECT #: 1-71

SUBJECT: "Hop" Arnold - Green Collection

START FRAME: 1

START DATE: 12-1-92

PHOTOGRAPHER: K. Lentz

HQ USAF ACADEMY/REPROGRAPHICS DIVISION

Wolfe, Kenneth B.

18 Mar 70
15 Aug 70

K. B. WOLFE
LT. GENERAL U. S. A. F. (RET)

C. 714
744-0790

Lake San Marcos
Calif. March 5-1970

Dear Dr. Murray Green:

I will be very happy to assist you in your work with respect to biography of General Hap Arnold.

At the moment the period March 16-20 will be satisfactory.

Lake San Marcos is eight miles inland from the beach town of Carlsbad, and eight miles west of the town of Escondido.

You might get March Field to fly you into Palomar Airport, located west of Lake San Marcos. Or drive down Route #395 to Escondido, then into the Lake. Or San Diego Freeway #5 and Freeway #5, to the off ramp, Palomar Airport.
(over)

II
K B WOLFE
LT GENERAL U.S. ARMY

Road, follow the signs, past the
Airport, to the entrance of
Lake San Marcos.

If you can fly, I could
meet you at Palamas airport,
we could have our meeting
there and you could hold the air-
plane for a return trip

Sincerely -

K B Wolfe

P.S. Greyhound bus lines run
from San Diego into Escondido
I could pick up at the bus
stop in Escondido, if you phone
me number of bus and time
of arrival.

K B Wolfe

Please give Mrs Arnold my
very best regards.

143.

3 March 1970

Lieut. General Kenneth B. Wolfe, USAF (Ret)
1222 San Julian Place
San Marcos, Calif. 92069

Dear General Wolfe:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force Space Digest and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I am a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within the past several months I have been interviewing some of the key personalities who knew General Arnold and had some connection with his policies.

It may be of interest to know that within the past couple of months I've been interviewing some friends and associates of yours and of General Arnold's. Among them are Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Cabell, Hansell, McKee, Quesada, Bob Walsh, Howard Davidson, Idwal Edwards, Twining, Chidlaw, Atkinson, Curt Low, Tibbets, Knerr, and a half dozen others. I also had a long interview with Jackie Cochran the other day.

Loosbrock and I have also interviewed Mr. Lovett and Generals Norstad, Kenney, and Kuter in New York City within the past six months.

You were associated with General Arnold, in some critical undertakings and I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you at a time and place convenient for you.

I'll be going out to Norton AFB next week to help on a documentary movie of General Arnold to be used by the Arnold Air Society and other Air Force groups. I'll be in your area

for several days in mid-March and will take the liberty to phone for an appointment. I had in mind some time during the week of 16-20 March an interview of about 90 minutes.


I assume San Marcos is near Los Angeles but it doesn't show up in my Rand-McNally. Could you please advise me of your availability and how I could get there in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Encl

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNETH BONNER WOLFE, US: F

Kenneth B. Wolfe was born in Denver, Colorado, August 12, 1896. He attended high school in Portland, Oregon, and San Diego, California, and in January, 1918, enlisted as a private first class in the Aviation Section of the Signal Reserve Corps.

He received ground and flying training at Berkeley, California, and Park Field, Tennessee, and in July, 1918, was commissioned a temporary second lieutenant in the Air Service. He served for a brief period at Park Field as a flying instructor, and then moved to Souther Field, Georgia, in the same capacity. In January, 1919, he returned to Park Field and in March of that year went to Carlstrom Field, Florida. In July, 1919, he was made officer in Charge of Flying at Souther Field, Georgia, and the following January was appointed chief engineer officer at the Air Intermediate Depot at Americus, Georgia. On July 1, 1920, he received his Regular Army commission as a second lieutenant in the Air Service, and was promoted to first lieutenant that same day.

He began a tour as flying instructor at Brooks Field, Texas, in November, 1922, and during this time assumed charge of aero repair at that station in addition to his other duties. In May, 1926, he moved to Clark Field, Philippine Islands, as plans and operations officer.

Returning to the States in August, 1928, he became engineering officer and parachute officer at Langley Field, Virginia. In July, 1930, he entered the Air Corps Engineering School at Wright Field, Ohio, and after graduation in June, 1931, remained for duty in the Inspection Branch, of which he later became chief. He was detailed to the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, in August, 1935, and was graduated in June, 1936. A year later he was graduated from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and assigned as Air Corps representative at the Douglas Aircraft Company in El Segundo, California.

In March, 1939, he was named assistant chief of the Production Engineering Section at Wright Field and the following February became chief of that section. As chief of the B-29 Special Project Staff he had charge of the initial flight and service testing of the B-29 Superfortress for the Army Air Force. He later was appointed chief of the Production Division of the Materiel Center at Wright Field.

In June, 1943, he became commanding general of the 58th Bombardment Wing at Salina, Kansas. Later, under General Wolfe's leadership, the 20th Bomber Command was organized, trained, and moved to India for its initial strikes against Japan from bases in western China. On June 15, 1944, he directed the first B-29 strike against Japan, which was staged from secret bases in western China.

8-1379, AF

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The following month he returned to the States to take over the Materiel Command at Wright Field. In September, 1944, when the Materiel Command and Air Service Command were consolidated into the Air Technical Service Command, he became chief of engineering and procurement. He left Wright Field in April, 1945, for a temporary assignment at AAF headquarters in Washington.

He joined the Fifth Air Force on Okinawa in August, 1945, as chief of staff and became commanding general two months later. After assuming command of the Fifth, he directed its transition from a mighty assault force to the occupational air arm of Japan and southern Korea, operating from headquarters at Negoya, Japan.

In January, 1948, he returned to the United States and was appointed Director of Procurement and Industrial Mobilization Planning at Air Materiel Command headquarters at Wright Field, Ohio. He was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel at USAF Headquarters in September, 1949.

Rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer, and Aircraft Observer, General Wolfe has over 7,000 hours flying time. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster and the Order of the British Empire.

He and Mrs. Wolfe have one daughter, Beverly, who is married to an Air Force officer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to captain on December 1, 1933; to major (temporary) on March 2, 1935; to major (permanent) on July 1, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) on March 1, 1941; to colonel (temporary) on January 5, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) on March 1, 1942; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) on November 4, 1942; to major general (temporary) on November 8, 1944, to major general (permanent) on February 19, 1948, with date of rank from December 14, 1942; to lieutenant general (temporary) on September 16, 1949.

END

Up to Date as of 16 April 1951

Interview, Sparky Siebold, Bill Wagner, General K. B. Wolfe,
Maj. Reuben Fleet, San Diego, Calif., 15 Aug 1970

Q: We are talking to General Wolfe and we are talking about the incident in January 1939 when a test plane crashed into the North American parking lot in Santa Monica. You were the resident representative?

W: That's right, I was the AF Representative for the aircraft industry in the LA area.

Q: Did you receive instructions to let the Frenchman fly? It was a secret plane?

W: Yes, it was the original, what later became the Douglas A-26.

Q: Did Arnold send you authorization?

W: Yes.

Q: Was it a telegram, or something?

W: Well, normally in those days it would be a telegram.

Q: Was this the first test that had been conducted on this plane?

W: No.

Q: The first test that a foreigner had been present to view?

W: That's right. If I remember correctly, the original order for those airplanes was a French order.

Q: Did you receive any instruction from Secretary Morgenthau?

W: No.

Q: What happened?

W: Well, Don Douglas, Sr., and Carl Cover, who was the VP, and really the Chief Test Pilot for the Douglas Company, gave verbal instructions to this test pilot as to what he would do, and what he would not do. I can't remember the name of the French Colonel.

Q: Paul Chemidlin?

W: Well, he wanted to go up in the airplane and Carl Cover and Don Douglas and I got in a huddle. We decided: "No", we wouldn't let him go up, but this young captain...

Q: Maybe the captain is Chmedlin? Was it a French captain?

W: I don't know, there were three French officers there. We voted that the Colonel wouldn't be allowed to go up. So the Captain went up, and this test pilot, Carl Cover, test pilot for Douglas. We were standing there in front of the old Douglas hangar, there at Miner Field, on the south side, adjoining this parking lot. And the pilot took off with the Frenchman, and then for some reason, he just went absolutely nuts. He did everything that Carl Cover told him not to do, low altitude, acrobatics and everything else, then he was going to demonstrate single engine performance. So unbelievably he turned against the engine that he cut off, and he went into a spin and spun down into this parking lot.

Q: You said this was the A-26, or was it the A-20?

W: Well, it was the beginning of the whole series, I've forgotten what the French designation was. Our designation was the DB-7. That was the airplane that they were going to give to the French.

Q: Then it crashed, and then, were you instructed to try to keep it secret?

W: Well, I don't know whether we were instructed, but we decided to keep it secret as long as we could, until we could report in to Washington. I've forgotten now whether it was Don Douglas Sr. or Carl Cover who made the report by telephone into Washington that we had had this crackup.

Q: But the Washington Post, among other papers, reported it. Trying to keep it secret was like trying to keep an indecent act in Macy's window secret.

W: Sure, because it fell right in the parking lot, just about noon-time. Everybody saw it.

W: Well, Claude Duncan had just been made a BG when this episode happened, and he was busted back to a Colonel, by order of Hap Arnold.

Q: Was it Hap or Eisenhower?

W: By order of, Hap busted him back by order of Eisenhower. So when I had this B-29 project, I got a call from Hap one day. He said: "I'd like to have you take Claude with you over to India and China, and

see what you can do to help him. Which I did. Later on, Hap saw that he was made a BG. Now, he did a wonderful job for me. He was the liaison man on the advanced party up in Chengtu, China. He did a wonderful job for me. There was never any problem on the drinking side, at all. Hap finally made him a BG again. That's the story that went around. But he had a reputation of being a drinking man.

Q: You went out to the CBI with the 73rd or 58th Bomb Wing?

W: No, I took the first unit out there, the 20th Bomber Command.

That was the first group of B-29s.

Q: Was that the 58th Wing?

W: One of the wings, yes. The reason it was called the "B-29 Special Project, it was the 20th Bomber Command, we had bases in India and bases up in Chengtu, China, and made the first bombing runs on Japan, on the Yawata steelworks. And then, later, of course, the boys in the ETO were going to come over and win the war.

Q: Is that after you guys had gotten the thing off the ground, some of the ETO leaders were to come out?

W: This had always been the plan, even in the beginning with MacArthur. You can check me on this. He was only supposed to operate as a holding operation in the Pacific until we got the ETO war won, and then, all the hot shots would come out there. Spaatz was ordered out, Eaker, LeMay, and ^{Twining} and the rest of them.

Q: Was there any resentment among you fellows who had come out there first, that these guys could come in and got the top jobs?

W: Oh, I wouldn't say any resentment. Of course, we all thought, we gave the ETO boys the royal raspberries. When they got out there, the war had already been won. MacArthur, contrary to orders like that, and he'd won the war for them.

Q: Kenney had some ideas to get the B-29s, did he not?

W: Oh boy, that's a long story. Yes, he kept fighting till the very last about that to get them. He wanted to use them out in the Pacific against Japan.

Q: Did he understand how to use B-29?

W: He understood the use of airpower as well as anybody?

Q: But he used airplanes tactically. Did he have, was he a close ^{to} ^{the} ^{air} ^{support}? It was interdiction, strategic or destroy an area before somebody goes in.

W: He's the fellow that gave MacArthur the slogan which MacArthur used all through his operation: "Advance the bomber line." This was Kenney's concept, and he sold MacArthur on it.

Q: Why didn't Arnold give him some B-29s?

W: Because he had committed them at either Yalta or Teheran.

Q: At Teheran.

W: He committed them to the operation out of India against Japan.

Q: Was Roosevelt putting the heat on Arnold to get the B-29s started earlier?

W: NO. (Not: See below)

Wagner: It started about as early as it could have been.

Q: Well, the B-29s were having terrible problems with the engines?

W: Oh, that was later on, not any more so than any new airplane and engine.

Q: Weren't they catching fire?

W: Oh sure, we had a lot of problems, but significantly, the first unit flew across the Atlantic and into India without any problems.

Q: They flew out of Salina, Kansas, I believe,

W: That was one of the training bases. That was my original training base.

Q: I have an account of frenzied activity at Salina, Kansas, in March and April 1944.

W: Sure, because Arnold made a commitment at Teheran. They said: "We will hit Japan on a certain date." Of course, the heat of all hell was on everybody to get these things out. Then we had to do the training in the

middle of winter down there in the god-awful Salina, Kansas, which was a pro-German outfit, anyway. Long story, you see. Going back on the B-29, I think I told you this before, the first B-29 was under test. It was wiped out in an accident there at Seattle.

Q: Eddy Egan?

W: No, Eddy Allen, and his whole crew.

F: Did Eddy get killed in that?

W: Yes; he and his whole crew. Of course, there was a lot of controversy within the aircraft industry that this airplane would never work anyway. Too damn big, and too damn heavy wingload. It had all these remote control guns on it. It was just too far out; it would never work, see. It finally got so bad, and Sparky Siebold knows this story, that the pressure got onto Arnold. We had to have hand-held guns. So I got an order to build one with hand held guns sticking out the side like the B-17 had. In the meantime, we went right ahead with this GE remote controlled firepower.

F: We made 131 B-32s didn't we? What happened to them. We gave all our stuff to Boeing and he got more aspect ratio in the B-29s from then on.

S: The B-32 that KB was talking about. They were so worried about remotely controlled turrets and pressurization which had never been used by the military in war, that the B-32 was changed from pressurization and remotely controlled turrets to just -- well, I remember a telegram we got at Ft. Worth from General Putt. It said: "Tell us what to go ahead with." It said: "Green light on local with no blowup".

F: By the way, what ever happened to Don Putt?

S: He is working for United Aircraft up in Los ~~Os~~ ^{Os} California, United Technology Center up there.

F: Still with them, isn't he?

S: Far as I know. (Note: Don Putt has retired to Atherton, Calif)

Q: Would he be a good man to talk to?

S: Oh yes.

F: He'd be a good man, because he was a technical man; pretty good man.

S: He was a real good engineering officer.

W: Of course he had a lot to do with the B-17. He was involved, he was involved in the first crash.

F: On the B-17? Don Putt?

W: Yes, when they killed the Boeing test pilot.

F: You mean Eddy Allen?

W: No, on the B-17.

F: Eddy Allen was on the B-29. Eddy Allen used to work for us, you know, at McCook Field.

Q: After Eddy Allen crashed, wasn't there a very close shave with the second B-29.

W: Yes, I told you about that one,

F: Who was that; who was flying it?

W: Jake Harman.

Q: That was the Harman we were thinking about yesterday and couldn't think of his name, three Harmans.

F: Big boy - you mean the lawyer?

W: No, no.

F: Brother of Miff and Hubert.

W: No, no relation. believe

Q: It is spelled Harman, I believe

W: Leonard Harman, Everybody called him Jake.

Q: We are talking about 1939. Arnold was called up to testify before this Bennett Champ Clark Committee, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, I believe it was. They sort of put him on the spot, because they were trying to get Morgenthau, really. I mean they put Arnold on a spot, but they were trying to get ^{out} Morgenthau, who had some role in authorizing the Frenchman to get into that plane. Wasn't there some law against a foreigner having access to secret equipment?

W: Well, there was very tight controls on it, they had to get permission, and then the local representative and the manufacturer had to get authorization to let them in the plants.

F: They were buying our aircraft.

W: It was their aircraft and we took it over really.

S: And so as a result, they had to have access to certain things, certain people.

Q: I seem to recall that there was a law against this, against a foreigner having access to secret...

W: Unless he was approved.

Q: And your ~~recollection~~ written approval.

W: I can't remember if it was written or telephone, but I assume it would be written, because in those days, it was usually written. We usually had the teletype system.

Q: Were you called to testify?

W: No, I was never called.

Q: Did they come out and ask you a few questions about it?

W: Not to my recollection. Of course I made a full report of what had happened.

Q: Were you aware that Arnold was on the hot seat with Morgenthau and Roosevelt?

W: I don't recall that as an instance, but he was on the hot seat with a lot of people. He and Bob Lovett, because they moved so damn fast, you couldn't keep up with them. Talk about Patton moving fast, pretty tough target.

Q: Well, he was supposed to have been on the hot seat with Roosevelt because of that incident. Morgenthau was running the show at that time. Is that a fair statement, running the aircraft procurement in a sense, he wasn't?

W: Not to my recollection, because I was in that. I never got any instructions signed "Morgenthau".

Q: Yes, but there was, Morgenthau had some of his people, like a Navy Captain Harry Collins.

S: Harry Ellis Collins was the head. He was the original guy in charge of Aircraft War Production, whatever it was called. He's the one who put in the big Lockheed plant at Marietta, Georgia.

W: No, you'd better check that one.

Q: In this particular instance, as I recall, it, Morgenthau was in charge of getting planes to the British and French, that is, they had a delegation here, and they were trying to buy some planes. Roosevelt wanted to stimulate the aircraft industry, to get them going on practice orders for the French and British because we were still on a cash and carry basis.

W: We took over the French and British contracts.

Q: Later. But Morgenthau at that time was steering this particular program and the French wanted to take a firsthand look at the airplanes before they put hard money down -- I'm just guessing this now. This is the crash that came out of that inspection. Arnold was put on a hot seat by Congress for authorizing a foreigner to have access to secret equipment. That's what the issue was about, and he had to testify, he was trying not to testify, but he had to testify, that Morgenthau was the guy who gave him instructions, was running the show, This put Arnold in the hot seat with Roosevelt. This is when Roosevelt is supposed to have said: "We have places on Guam for people like that." Did you know that?

W: No.

F: We never heard that.

W: Did you get that out of the Congressional Record?

F: I don't think that Roosevelt...

Q: I got that out of Arnold's book.

F: You mean written by Eaker?

Q: Written by Arnold, "Global Mission"

F: He didn't write it.

Q: Another guy wrote it, he wrote it with this man.

F: Who was the other guy?

Q: William Laidlaw. I mean it was Arnold's manuscript and this guy fixed it up. But this is Arnold's account.

F: Well, I think Arnold overlooked that. I don't think it ever happened.

I'll tell you, it was very difficult, where a contractor had been a symbol to the Army and the Navy, to get action from either the Navy or the Army, I went down to Roosevelt on a number of occasions, and asked him to give me action. He said:

"How do you suggest that I do it?" I said: "Let's do it through Morgenthau." "All right," he says, "that's a good way to do it. You go over and tell Morgenthau exactly what you told me. I'll tell him you are coming, "On every occasion, I asked him to have Morgenthau delegate some person of his choice, Morgenthau's choice, to follow through on the job, because I knew Morgenthau was too damn busy himself to do it. He generally took Ed Foley. You remember we had contracts arranged by Morgenthau with both the British and the French for B-24s and also for PB4Ys. When France turned toes up, Britain said: "We'll take over all the French contracts." So we said okay, and we had had an agent over there for British work. He collected a commission from us. When the French took over, and we asked him to take over France, too, across the Channel. He said: "I can't do it. I can't represent you in France". So, later on, when Britain took over the French contracts, he billed us for a commission. We told him we wouldn't pay it, we'd already paid a French agent a commission, and we couldn't stand two commissions. We said we'll prefer not to build the ships, because we can't stand two commissions. The British stayed with their own man, however, and we had to let him bring a suit, and he lost it. The court held that the contractor didn't have to pay two commissions. It could have stopped. We made those deals with Morgenthau out of Morgenthau's office, and we did it because the Army and Navy, they really weren't in shape to do it. They didn't have any representatives to do it, and the French and the British had their own representatives... Or money...

Q: At that time they didn't have money either?

F: No. We were just staggering with work. We had so much, we just couldn't handle any more. We had to expand to twelve other cities. So we turned over the B-32 to Boeing after we had built 131 of them. We gave him all the dope, he increased the aspect ratio to B-29 from what he had had, and it improved the airplane considerably. The B-29 became so much better than the B-24 that, no two ways for Sunday. But we were just booked to death on B-24s, with Ford building them. Ford wouldn't build for anybody else, according to Knudsen. He insisted on building our stuff, because I knew old Henry Ford. He had his confidence. So we laid out Willow Run for him, and built a plant for Douglas in Tulsa, and built a plant for ourselves in Ft. Worth, to

assemble what Ford made up there in Willow Run. When the war was over, young Henry called me up, he had been here, while his father was making the deal with us. I think we let him have 650 B-24s. Henry called me up... (Story of disposal of Willow Run. Fleet recommends Ford stay in auto business)

Q: This persuades me to ask you, was Arnold a good psychologist, in a sense that he knew, was aware of a man's breaking point? Did he ever or seldom exceed a man's breaking point? In other words, he could drive his men, but not beyond the point of breaking them?

W: That's my opinion. That's a fair analysis. He knew when to break the tension.

F: I want to say something about Hap. I think that Hap did not hold a grudge. He got madder than a hornet, and the next day he would be okay. Now I want to tell you something, (World War I). I went overseas with him, I stayed there a month and the war was over, and came back with him, He had the lower and I had the upper in the same stateroom. I know that he was honest; I played chess with him; I shot the traps over the stern of the ship with him; I swam every single day on board ship.

Q: Was he a swimmer?

F: No, he didn't go. He might have known how to swim, but Arnold was a sick man. The thing that made him sick, I regret to say, was my flight with him the day before we left the States. I flew the length of Long Island in one of those damn Jennies, and had a forced landing on Fisher's Island. He wanted to see New London.

Q: He was inspecting something up there, wasn't he?

F: He was inspecting the submarine station there.

Q: What was he doing inspecting submarines?

F: Well, I suppose he had a curiosity.

Q: You mean it wasn't an official?

F: Nothing to do with officialdom. We were both slated to leave the next morning. And he asked me to fly him up there. So I flew him up there, and I lost a cylinder, and I had to land on Fisher's Island, which was just across the Sound from New London. And I said: "Hap, if you want to go over

there, we'll phone over and get them to put a boat over here, and I'll meantime fix the airplane, get it ready, and you can have the boat put you back. By that time I hope I'll have the ship ready so we can fly back.

Q: Was there a fellow named Reynolds accompanying you on any part of this trip?

F: Nobody. Reynolds accompanied us overseas. Yes, Reynolds was Arnold's writer. He was a man who wrote Arnold's letters, in diplomatic language, especially to Congressmen and Senators, and kept him out of trouble. He did such a successful job at it, that we commissioned him a Major. He had been manager of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce. That's where we got him, a professional letter writer. He was so good that Arnold took him with him overseas. By the way, when we got back that night in an open cockpit job, Arnold really got the flu. He got it so badly, we lost 1,500 troops before we ever pulled out of the harbor. We were on the Leviathan, the biggest ship afloat...

Q: You mean died? You say lost...

F: No, they pulled them off the boat, and we went out, flu epidemic, yes sir. We left 1,500 ~~troops~~ short. And Hay was sick man, but he insisted on wanting to go. So Reynolds, who had kind of a pot belly on him, like this, got Arnold right here. I walked up the gangplank, Reynolds grabbed my hands like this, you know, and we lockstepped, left, right, left, right, up the gangplank, and we went immediately to our staterooms. Arnold was the senior officer on the ship, and he was in charge of everything on the ship. He had the flu so badly, we had to put him right to bed. I said to the doctors -- we had doctors come -- and we got out of the harbor, 1,500 people short. I gave him a rubdown every single day, and I said: "Hay, this is going to cure you or kill you, one of the two, You've got to take care of yourself." And he never really recovered from that. That was a bad trip in the open cockpit job, the length of Long Island is a long way in an open cockpit, at 90 mph. We had a forced landing, you know how the motors were, and all this and that, So Arnold really and truly was a sick man.

Q: You remember it distinctly being the Leviathan?

F: Of course, I remember.

Q: In his Global Mission, was there a ship called the Olympic?

F: Oh, might have been, we came back on the Baltic, 9th biggest ship afloat. We went over on the Leviathan, which was the old "Vaterland" that we had taken from the German. Incidentally, I told you, everything done on the ship, all the manifests, alphabetical, by organizations, casual troops, and everything, I had charge of in his name.

Q: You did things "By Order Of Colonel Arnold"?

F: Yes, and so decided that, in the event of any trouble, we would meet on the starboard side, top deck. And sure enough, the damn ship stopped, just like that, fourth day out. Absolute dark, it was so dark you couldn't see your own hand in front of you, and I groped my way up to this place where we were to meet. Out of the clear darkness, somebody gave the countersign, the first word of it. I answered with the first word, a different word of course. He came with the second word; I came with the second word. He came with the third word; I answered the third word, and he whispered: "I've come after Colonel House". And I said: "He's not aboard". Somebody tapped me on the shoulder. He says: "Here he is. He's not on your manifest, step aside". So I stepped aside, and Colonel House passed me like that. As he got a few, couple of feet beyond me, he whispered to the person who had given the countersign. He says: "Where is Mr. Lloyd George. He crossed the channel this morning. He's waiting for you in Paris". He said. That was all there was to it. Funny thing, that very night, we had a table just like this, seven people at the table, Arnold was feeling well enough so he was at the table. The table consisted of Colonel Arnold; Major Reynolds, his secretary; LTCOL Swift, head of the Swift Packing Company; and myself. I was a roommate across the toilets from Arnold's. And August Belmont. We'd commissioned him a Major and he was going over to keep Spain from going into the war. Also, Clifford B. Harmon, the man who gave the Harmon Trophy, and who was a balloonist, and who married the daughter of Cornelius Vanderbilt; and a Captain Wheeler. Nobody knew who Captain Wheeler was. He said he was with the Consolidation Coal Col., and he said: "The

last day, I will shake hands with both Mr. Lloyd George and King George, within 24 hours after we get to London, or I will give you gentlemen and any guests that you have, the finest dinner we can buy in London." Clifford B. Harman says: "I'll take it, Captain." When we got into London, Clifford B. Harmon started to invite people to come to this dinner. He invited Claude Graham White, England's first aviator. He invited Ethel Levy, who was the divorced wife of George M. Coban, the writer of "Over There" and all these other songs, and George Coban's daughter -- I've forgotten her name. A beautiful girl, perhaps in her 40's. Ethel Levy was the rage of London. Everybody that got a chance to go to a show went to see her. He invited various other people. When Wheeler came back, he says: "The dinner's on me." In the meantime, Arnold had asked me: "Go on out and get us tickets, so that we can get some meat." We were allowed 2 meals a week with meat, and if we had hare or fowl, we were allowed four meals. So I went out and got us tickets, and then came the dinner. By the way, Wheeler sat at the top Arnold came next to him, I came next to Arnold, and Clifford B. Harmon next to me. He had a pair of wings on this big, both wings. Arnold whispered to me, he said: "Make him take those off. Why the SOB can't even see through those glasses of his, and he's nothing but a balloonist." You know, well, I says: "Hap, I don't think I'd better do it here. Do you think so? After this social event we can jump him afterwards, can't we?" Hap says: "Okay, okay. So during the course of the evening, Hap says to Wheeler: "Wheeler, how in the hell did you figure you were going to shake hands with King George, and Mr. Lloyd George. Wheeler had come back and said: "The dinner is on me. I shook hands with King George, but I couldn't shake hands with Mr. Lloyd George, because he's not in the country. Now I was the only man at the table that knew that he told the truth because of this little episode that had happened a few hours before. Arnold said: "How come that you thought you could shake hands with these two toppers?" He says: "We're fiscal agents for England." I never was able to find out who that man was, Captain Wheeler. But probably 35 or 40 years later, I saw a picture of Lettingwell, who was

a Morgan partner, in Life Magazine, and I wrote him and asked him, if he was the "Captain Wheeler" on the ship, because he was a Morgan partner. And he wrote back and said he was not. Now, I'm thoroughly convinced, although I've never tried to find out that the man was Trubee Davison's father, who was the head of Morgan & Co., and I intend sometime when I'm...

Q: I saw Trubee Davison just about a month ago.

F: Well, I'll tell you something, I'd give \$100 bill to know that.

I haven't seen Trubee for years and years, but Trubee and I used to be good friends.

Q: That his father was the Captain Wheeler aboard the ship, aboard the Leviathan?

F: Sailing from the US on Oct 7, 1918. I'd like to know it. Trubee and I are good friends and I could write him. I don't know his address, but I don't think that he would write me. Coming back from overseas, we left England, I believe it was on the 23rd of December. I took Hap's baggage in a taxi down to catch the 4:00 PM Limited to Liverpool. When it got down there, I checked on the train and found there was a 6:00 train that didn't stop. It landed at Liverpool before the 4:00 did. And so, I decided to take it, and I told Hap. I called him up and said: "I booked us on the 6:00 rather than the 4:00, Hap. That gives you two hours more in London. And we'll get there quicker. He said: "Okay." Then, I came out to the taxi cab driver, and I said: "Driver, how far is it to Fleet Street in London. I haven't had time to go there yet," And he said: "Two miles sir." I said: "Let's go over and look at it. It's named after my ancestors." He said: "Is your name Fleet?" I said: "Yes." And he said: "That's my name." - I said: "You are a damn liar." "I beg your pardon sir," he says. He reached into his pocket and pulled out a long discharge from the Grenadier Guards, as Lieutenant. He had a wooden leg from the knee down and a wooden arm with a hook on it. He had been shot down in the Flying Service of the Grenadier Guards, he said. He had been commandeered in the taxi service.

Q: JMA?

F: We created the RMA in late '17

Q: When did the JMA come in?

F: The JMA was already in the regulations and the law when Aviation Section was a part of the Signal Corps, way back in...well, in Hap's day if he was 26, he was a JMA and he would have had the rank, pay and allowances of the grade next higher.

Q: I believe it was No 29. He had license 29. You say, if you were JMA you were entitled to pay and allowances of the next high grade?

F: When you were JMA, you were allowed the rank, pay and allowances of the grade next higher. For instance, you had to land in a 100-foot circle, 5 times out of 6. The RMA was a 300 foot circle. We set this because we needed men to beat hell. We also founded ground schools for them.

W: If I remember correctly, the RMA got 25% increase in pay, the JMA got 50, and the MA go 75 per cent. I was a LT drawing \$167.50. That included the 25% increase. The Army non-pilot guys really got upset about that.

F: Not only that, but KB was Lieutenant for years and years.

W: For 17 years.

Q: We are talking about Wright Field in 1930.

W: That's right, that's when I first went there, Chidlaw and I went there. He and I both went there as students in 1930. Well, Jan Howard was a very conceited man, in my opinion. He thought he was probably the world's greatest, and this is the attitude he gave most younger people to understand and believe. This is the way I felt about him.

Q: You didn't think he was that good?

W: No, but he did, and the other thing that most of us. I don't know what Chidlaw told you about him. He looked upon us as just neophytes in this business, and he favored the Civil Service employees. As a matter of fact, Chid and I graduated from the same engineering school class. Every one of us -- Pop Powers may have said something about this, too, because he was in the same class -- we were told to report to the various sections, report to Mr. so and so. It was quite a long time before any of these officers ever got in charge of a particular section or division.

Q: Why was Jan Howard prejudiced against the military? He was West Point himself?

W: I think he was. I never knew for sure. He just felt that we were younger people, and we didn't know anything about this engineering business. We would go, and he made a speech, now you boys are graduated from the engineering school and now you've got to go over there with these sections and report to Mr. so and so, and learn the business. Every damn one of us were pilots, and number of them were graduate engineers. I wasn't. We'd all been pilots; we'd all had responsible jobs. So he was not what you would call a popular officer.

Q: Do you remember any specific issue that arose between him and Arnold, like policy issue? You just knew that there was animosity? This was generally known?

W: That's all I knew about it.

Interview, Sparky Siebold, Bill Wagner, General K. B. Wolfe,
Maj. Reuben Fleet, San Diego, Calif., 15 Aug 1970

Q: We are talking to General Wolfe and we are talking about the incident in January 1939 when a test plane crashed into the North American parking lot in Santa Monica. You were the resident representative?

W: That's right, I was the AF Representative for the aircraft industry in the LA area.

Q: Did you receive instructions to let the Frenchman fly? It was a secret plane?

W: Yes, it was the original, what later became the Douglas A-26.

Q: Did Arnold send you authorization?

W: Yes.

Q: Was it a telegram, or something?

W: Well, normally in those days it would be a telegram.

Q: Was this the first test that had been conducted on this plane?

W: No.

Q: The first test that a foreigner had been present to view?

W: That's right. If I remember correctly, the original order for those airplanes was a French order.

Q: Did you receive any instruction from Secretary Morgenthau?

W: No.

Q: What happened?

W: Well, Don Douglas, Sr., and Carl Cover, who was the VP, and really the Chief Test Pilot for the Douglas Company, gave verbal instructions to this test pilot as to what he would do, and what he would not do. I can't remember the name of the French Colonel.

Q: Paul Chemidlin?

W: Well, he wanted to go up in the airplane and Carl Cover and Don Douglas and I got in a huddle. We decided: "No", we wouldn't let him go up, but this young captain...

Q: Maybe the captain is Chmedlin? Was it a French captain?

W: I don't know, there were three French officers there. We voted that the Colonel wouldn't be allowed to go up. So the Captain went up, and this test pilot, Carl Cover, test pilot for Douglas. We were standing there in front of the old Douglas hangar, there at Miner Field, on the south side, adjoining this parking lot. And the pilot took off with the Frenchman, and then for some reason, he just went absolutely nuts. He did everything that Carl Cover told him not to do, low altitude, acrobatics and everything else, then he was going to demonstrate single engine performance. So unbelievably he turned against the engine that he cut off, and he went into a spin and spun down into this parking lot.

Q: You said this was the A-26, or was it the A-20?

W: Well, it was the beginning of the whole series, I've forgotten what the French designation was. Our designation was the DB-7. That was the airplane that they were going to give to the French.

Q: Then it crashed, and then, were you instructed to try to keep it secret?

W: Well, I don't know whether we were instructed, but we decided to keep it secret as long as we could, until we could report in to Washington. I've forgotten now whether it was Don Douglas Sr. or Carl Cover who made the report by telephone into Washington that we had had this crackup.

Q: But the Washington Post, among other papers, reported it. Trying to keep it secret was like trying to keep an indecent act in Macy's window secret.

W: Sure, because it fell right in the parking lot, just about noon-time. Everybody saw it.

W: Well, Claude Duncan had just been made a EG when this episode happened, and he was busted back to a Colonel, by order of Hap Arnold.

Q: Was it Hap or Eisenhower?

W: By order of, Hap busted him back by order of Eisenhower. So when I had this B-29 project, I got a call from Hap one day. He said: "I'd like to have you take Claude with you over to India and China, and

see what you can do to help him. Which I did. Later on, Hap saw that he was made a BG. Now, he did a wonderful job for me. He was the liaison man on the advanced party up in Chengtu, China. He did a wonderful job for me. There was never any problem on the drinking side, at all. Hap finally made him a BG again. That's the story that went around. But he had a reputation of being a drinking man.

Q: You went out to the CBI with the 73rd or 58th Bomb Wing?

W: No, I took the first unit out there, the 20th Bomber Command.

That was the first group of B-29s.

Q: Was that the 58th Wing?

W: One of the wings, yes. The reason it was called the "B-29 Special" Project, it was the 20th Bomber Command, we had bases in India and bases up in Chengtu, China, and made the first bombing runs on Japan, on the Yawata steelworks. And then, later, of course, the boys in the ETO were going to come over and win the war.

Q: Is that after you guys had gotten the thing off the ground, some of the ETO leaders were to come out?

W: This had always been the plan, even in the beginning with MacArthur. You can check me on this. He was only supposed to operate as a holding operation in the Pacific until we got the ETO war won, and then, all the hot shots would come out there. Spaatz was ordered out, Eaker, LeMay, and ^{Twinning} and the rest of them.

Q: Was there any resentment among you fellows who had come out there first, that these guys could come in and get the top jobs?

W: Oh, I wouldn't say any resentment. Of course, we all thought, we gave the ETO boys the royal raspberries. When they got out there, the war had already been won. MacArthur, contrary to orders like that, and he'd won the war for them.

Q: Kenney had some ideas to get the B-29s, did he not?

W: Oh boy, that's a long story. Yes, he kept fighting till the very last about that to get them. He wanted to use them out in the Pacific against Japan.

Q: Did he understand how to use B-29?

W: He understood the use of airpower as well as anybody?

Q: But he used airplanes tactically. Did he have, was he a close air support, ^{it was} it was interdiction, strategic or destroy an area before somebody goes in?

W: He's the fellow that gave MacArthur the slogan which MacArthur used all through his operation: "Advance the bomber line." This was Kenney's concept, and he sold MacArthur on it.

Q: Why didn't Arnold give him some B-29s?

W: Because he had committed them at either Yalta or Tehran.

Q: At Tehran.

W: He committed them to the operation out of India against Japan.

Q: Was Roosevelt putting the heat on Arnold to get the B-29s started earlier?

W: NO. (Note: See below)

Wagner: It started about as early as it could have been.

Q: Well, the B-29s were having terrible problems with the engines?

W: Oh, that was later on, not any more so than any new airplane and engine.

Q: weren't they catching fire?

W: Oh sure, we had a lot of problems, but significantly, the first unit flew across the Atlantic and into India without any problems.

Q: They flew out of Salina, Kansas, I believe.

W: That was one of the training bases. That was my original training base.

Q: I have an account of frenzied activity at Salina, Kansas, in March and April 1944.

W: Sure, because Arnold made a commitment at Tehran. They said: "We will hit Japan on a certain date." Of course, the heat of all hell was on everybody to get these things out. Then we had to do the training in the

middle of winter down there in the god-awful Salina, Kansas, which was a pro-German outfit, anyway. Long story, you see. Going back on the B-29, I think I told you this before, the first B-29 was under test. It was wiped out in an accident there at Seattle.

Q: Eddy Egan?

W: No, Eddy Allen, and his whole crew.

F: Did Eddy get killed in that?

W: Yes, he and his whole crew. Of course, there was a lot of controversy within the aircraft industry that this airplane would never work anyway. Too damn big, and too damn heavy wingload. It had all these remote control guns on it. It was just too far out; it would never work, see. It finally got so bad, and Sparky Siebold knows this story, that the pressure got onto Arnold. We had to have hand-held guns. So I got an order to build one with hand held guns sticking out the side like the B-17 had. In the meantime, we went right ahead with this GE remote controlled firepower.

F: We made 131 B-32s didn't we? What happened to them. We gave all our stuff to Boeing and he got more aspect ratio in the B-29s from then on.

S: The B-32 that KB was talking about. They were so worried about remotely controlled turrets and pressurization which had never been used by the military in war, that the B-32 was changed from pressurization and remotely controlled turrets to just -- well, I remember a telegram we got at Ft. Worth from General Putt. It said: "Tell us what to go ahead with." It said: "Green light on local with no blowup".

F: By the way, what ever happened to Don Putt?

S: He is working for United Aircraft up in Los ~~Os~~ California, United Technology Center up there.

F: Still with them, isn't he?

S: Far as I know. *(Note: Don Putt has retired to Atherton, Calif)*

Q: Would he be a good man to talk to?

S: Oh yes.

F: He'd be a good man, because he was a technical man; pretty good man.

S: He was a real good engineering officer.

W: Of course he had a lot to do with the B-17. He was involved, he was involved in the first crash.

F: On the B-17? Don Putt?

W: Yes, when they killed the Boeing test pilot.

F: You mean Eddy Allen?

W: No, on the B-17.

F: Eddy Allen was on the B-29. Eddy Allen used to work for us, you know, at McCook Field.

Q: After Eddy Allen crashed, wasn't there a very close shave with the second B-29.

W: Yes, I told you about that one.

F: Who was that; who was flying it?

W: Jake Harman.

Q: That was the Harman we were thinking about yesterday and couldn't think of his name, three Harmans.

F: Big boy - you mean the lawyer?

W: No, no.

F: Brother of Miff and Hubert.

W: No, no relation.

Q: It is spelled Harman, I believe

W: Leonard Harman. Everybody called him "Jake."

Q: We are talking about 1939. Arnold was called up to testify before this Bennett Champ Clark Committee, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, I believe it was. They sort of put him on the spot, because they were trying to get Morgenthau, really, I mean they put Arnold on a spot, but they were trying to get Morgenthau, who had some role in authorizing the Frenchman to get into that plane. Wasn't there some law against a foreigner having access to secret equipment?

W: Well, there was very tight controls on it, they had to get permission, and then the local representative and the manufacturer had to get authorization to let them in the plant's.

F: They were buying our aircraft.

W: It was their aircraft and we took it over really.

S: And so as a result, they had to have access to certain things, certain people.

Q: I seem to recall that there was a law against this, against a foreigner having access to secret...

W: Unless he was approved.

Q: And your recollection written approval.

W: I can't remember if it was written or telephone, but I assume it would be written, because in those days, it was usually written. We usually had the teletype system.

Q: Were you called to testify?

W: No, I was never called.

Q: Did they come out and ask you a few questions about it?

W: Not to my recollection. Of course I made a full report of what had happened.

Q: Were you aware that Arnold was on the hot seat with Morgenthau and Roosevelt?

W: I don't recall that as an instance, but he was on the hot seat with a lot of people. He and Bob Lovett, because they moved so damn fast, you couldn't keep up with them. Talk about Patton moving fast, pretty tough target.

Q: Well, he was supposed to have been on the hot seat with Roosevelt because of that incident. Morgenthau was running the show at that time. Is that a fair statement, running the aircraft procurement in a sense, he wasn't?

W: Not to my recollection, because I was in that. I never got any instructions signed "Morgenthau".

Q: Yes, but there was, Morgenthau had some of his people, like a Navy Captain Harry Collins.

S: Harry Ellis Collins was the head. He was the original guy in charge of Aircraft War Production, whatever it was called. He's the one who put in the big Lockheed plant at Marietta, Georgia.

W: No, you'd better check that one.

Q: In this particular instance, as I recall it, Morgenthau was in charge of getting planes to the British and French, that is, they had a delegation here, and they were trying to buy some planes. Roosevelt wanted to stimulate the aircraft industry, to get them going on practice orders for the French and British because we were still on a cash and carry basis.

W: We took over the French and British contracts.

Q: Later. But Morgenthau at that time was steering this particular program and the French wanted to take a firsthand look at the airplanes before they put hard money down -- I'm just guessing this now. This is the crash that came out of that inspection. Arnold was put on a hot seat by Congress for authorizing a foreigner to have access to secret equipment. That's what the issue was about, and he had to testify, he was trying not to testify, but he had to testify, that Morgenthau was the guy who gave him instructions, was running the show. This put Arnold in the hot seat with Roosevelt. This is when Roosevelt is supposed to have said: "We have places on Guam for people like that." Did you know that?

W: No.

F: We never heard that.

W: Did you get that out of the Congressional Record?

F: I don't think that Roosevelt...

Q: I got that out of Arnold's book.

F: You mean written by Eaker?

Q: Written by Arnold, "Global Mission"

F: He didn't write it.

Q: Another guy wrote it, he wrote it with this man.

F: Who was the other guy?

Q: William Laidlaw. I mean it was Arnold's manuscript and this guy fixed it up. But this is Arnold's account.

F: Well, I think Arnold overlooked that. I don't think it ever happened.

I'll tell you, it was very difficult, where a contractor had been a symbol to the Army and the Navy, to get action from either the Navy or the Army, I went down to Roosevelt on a number of occasions, and asked him to give me action. He said:

"How do you suggest that I do it?" I said: "Let's do it through Morgenthau." "All right," he says, "that's a good way to do it. You go over and tell Morgenthau exactly what you told me. I'll tell him you are coming, "On every occasion, I asked him to have Morgenthau delegate some person of his choice, Morgenthau's choice, to follow through on the job, because I knew Morgenthau was too damn busy himself to do it. He generally took Ed Foley. You remember we had contracts arranged by Morgenthau with both the British and the French for B-24s and also for PB4s. When France turned toes up, Britain said: "We'll take over all the French contracts." So we said okay, and we had had an agent over there for British work. He collected a commission from us. When the French took over, and we asked him to take over France, too, across the Channel. He said: "I can't do it. I can't represent you in France". So, later on, when Britain took over the French contracts, he billed us for a commission. We told him we wouldn't pay it, we'd already paid a French agent a commission, and we couldn't stand two commissions. We said we'll prefer not to build the ships, because we can't stand two commissions. The British stayed with their own man, however, and we had to let him bring a suit, and he lost it. The court held that the contractor didn't have to pay two commissions. It could have stopped. We made those deals with Morgenthau out of Morgenthau's office, and we did it because the Army and Navy, they really weren't in shape to do it. They didn't have any representatives to do it, and the French and the British had their own representatives... Or money...

Q: At that time they didn't have money either?

F: No. We were just staggering with work. We had so much, we just couldn't handle any more. We had to expand to twelve other cities. So we turned over the B-32 to Boeing after we had built 131 of them. We gave him all the dope, he increased the aspect ratio to B-29 from what he had had, and it improved the airplane considerably. The B-29 became so much better than the B-24 that, no two ways for Sunday. But we were just booked to death on B-24s, with Ford building them. Ford wouldn't build for anybody else, according to Knudsen. He insisted on building our stuff, because I knew old Henry Ford. He had his confidence. So we laid out Willow Run for him, and built a plant for Douglas in Tulsa, and built a plant for ourselves in Ft. Worth, to

assemble what Ford made up there in Willow Run. When the war was over, young Henry called me up, he had been here, while his father was making the deal with us. I think we let him have 650 B-24s. Henry called me up... (Story of disposal of Willow Run. Fleet recommends Ford stay in auto business)

Q: This persuades me to ask you, was Arnold a good psychologist, in a sense that he knew, was aware of a man's breaking point? Did he ever or seldom exceed a man's breaking point? In other words, he could drive his men, but not beyond the point of breaking them?

W: That's my opinion. That's a fair analysis. He knew when to break the tension.

F: I want to say something about Hap. I think that Hap did not hold a grudge. He got madder than a hornet, and the next day he would be okay. Now I want to tell you something, (World War I). I went overseas with him, I stayed there a month and the war was over, and came back with him. He had the lower and I had the upper in the same stateroom. I know that he was honest; I played chess with him; I shot the traps over the stern of the ship with him; I swam every single day on board ship.

Q: Was he a swimmer?

F: No, he didn't go. He might have known how to swim, but Arnold was a sick man. The thing that made him sick, I regret to say, was my flight with him the day before we left the States. I flew the length of Long Island in one of those damn Jennies, and had a forced landing on Fisher's Island. He wanted to see New London.

Q: He was inspecting something up there, wasn't he?

F: He was inspecting the submarine station there.

Q: What was he doing inspecting submarines?

F: Well, I suppose he had a curiosity.

Q: You mean it wasn't an official?

F: Nothing to do with officialdom. We were both slated to leave the next morning. And he asked me to fly him up there. So I flew him up there, and I lost a cylinder, and I had to land on Fisher's Island, which was just across the Sound from New London. And I said: "Hap, if you want to go over

there, we'll phone over and get them to put a boat over here, and I'll meantime fix the airplane, get it ready, and you can have the boat put you back. By that time I hope I'll have the ship ready so we can fly back.

Q: Was there a fellow named Reynolds accompanying you on any part of this trip?

F: Nobody. Reynolds accompanied us overseas. Yes, Reynolds was Arnold's writer. He was a man who wrote Arnold's letters, in diplomatic language, especially to Congressmen and Senators, and kept him out of trouble. He did such a successful job at it, that we commissioned him a Major. He had been manager of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce. That's where we got him, a professional letter writer. He was so good that Arnold took him with him overseas. By the way, when we got back that night in an open cockpit job, Arnold really got the flu. He got it so badly, we lost 1,500 troops before we ever pulled out of the harbor. We were on the Leviathan, the biggest ship afloat...

Q: You mean died? You say lost...

F: No, they pulled them off the boat, and we went out, flu epidemic, yes sir. We left 1,500 troops short. And Hap was sick man, but he insisted on wanting to go. So Reynolds, who had kind of a pot belly on him, like this, got Arnold right here. I walked up the gangplank, Reynolds grabbed my hands like this, you know, and we lockstepped, left, right, left, right, up the gangplank, and we went immediately to our staterooms. Arnold was the senior officer on the ship, and he was in charge of everything on the ship. He had the flu so badly, we had to put him right to bed. I said to the doctors -- we had doctors come -- and we got out of the harbor, 1,500 people short. I gave him a rubdown every single day, and I said: "Hap, this is going to cure you or kill you, one of the two. You've got to take care of yourself." And he never really recovered from that. That was a bad trip in the open cockpit job, the length of Long Island is a long way in an open cockpit, at 90 mph. We had a forced landing, you know how the motors were, and all this and that, So Arnold really and truly was a sick man.

Q: You remember it distinctly being the Leviathan?

F: Of course, I remember.

Q: In his Global Mission, was there a ship called the Olympic?

F: Oh, might have been, we came back on the Baltic, 9th biggest ship afloat. We went over on the Leviathan, which was the old "Vaterland" that we had taken from the German. Incidentally, I told you, everything done on the ship, all the manifests, alphabetical, by organizations, casual troops, and everything, I had charge of in his name.

Q: You did things "By Order Of Colonel Arnold"?

F: Yes, and so decided that, in the event of any trouble, we would meet on the starboard side, top deck. And sure enough, the damn ship stopped, just like that, fourth day out. Absolute dark, it was so dark you couldn't see your own hand in front of you, and I groped my way up to this place where we were to meet. Out of the clear darkness, somebody gave the countersign, the first word of it. I answered with the first word, a different word of course. He came with the second word; I came with the second word. He came with the third word; I answered the third word, and he whispered: "I've come after Colonel House". And I said: "He's not aboard". Somebody tapped me on the shoulder. He says: "Here he is. He's not on your manifest, step aside". So I stepped aside, and Colonel House passed me like that. As he got a few, couple of feet beyond me, he whispered to the person who had given the countersign. He says: "Where is Mr. Lloyd George. He crossed the channel this morning. He's waiting for you in Paris". He said. That was all there was to it. Funny thing, that very night, we had a table just like this, seven people at the table, Arnold was feeling well enough so he was at the table. The table consisted of Colonel Arnold; Major Reynolds, his secretary; LTCOL Swift, head of the Swift Packing Company; and myself. I was a roommate across the toilets from Arnold's. And August Belmont. We'd commissioned him a Major and he was going over to keep Spain from going into the war. Also, Clifford B. Harmon, the man who gave the Harmon Trophy, and who was a balloonist, and who married the daughter of Cornelius Vanderbilt; and a Captain Wheeler. Nobody knew who Captain Wheeler was. He said he was with the Consolidation Coal Col., and he said: "The

last day, I will shake hands with both Mr. Lloyd George and King George, within 24 hours after we get to London, or I will give you gentlemen and any guests that you have, the finest dinner we can buy in London." Clifford B. Harmon says: "I'll take it, Captain." When we got into London, Clifford B. Harmon started to invite people to come to this dinner. He invited Claude Graham White, England's first aviator. He invited Ethel Levy, who was the divorced wife of George M. Coban, the writer of "Over There" and all these other songs, and George Coban's daughter -- I've forgotten her name. A beautiful girl, perhaps in her 40's. Ethel Levy was the rage of London. Everybody that got a chance to go to a show went to see her. He invited various other people. When Wheeler came back, he says: "The dinner's on me." In the meantime, Arnold had asked me: "Go on out and get us tickets, so that we can get some meat." We were allowed 2 meals a week with meat, and if we had hare or fowl, we were allowed four meals. So I went out and got us tickets, and then came the dinner. By the way, Wheeler sat at the top Arnold came next to him, I came next to Arnold, and Clifford B. Harmon next to me. He had a pair of wings on this big, both wings. Arnold whispered to me, he said: "Make him take those off. Why the SOB can't even see through those glasses of his, and he's nothing but a balloonist." You know, well, I says: "Hap, I don't think I'd better do it here. Do you think so? After this social event we can jump him afterwards, can't we?" Hap says: "Okay, okay. So during the course of the evening, Hap says to Wheeler: "Wheeler, how in the hell did you figure you were going to shake hands with King George, and Mr. Lloyd George. Wheeler had come back and said: "The dinner is on me. I shook hands with King George, but I couldn't shake hands with Mr. Lloyd George, because he's not in the country. Now I was the only man at the table that knew that he told the truth because of this little episode that had happened a few hours before. Arnold said: "How come that you thought you could shake hands with these two toppers?" He says: "We're fiscal agents for England." I never was able to find out who that man was, Captain Wheeler. But probably 35 or 40 years later, I saw a picture of Leffingwell, who was

a Morgan partner, in Life Magazine, and I wrote him and asked him, if he was the "Captain Wheeler" on the ship, because he was a Morgan partner. And he wrote back and said he was not. Now, I'm thoroughly convinced, although I've never tried to find out that the man was Trubee Davison's father, who was the head of Morgan & Co., and I intend sometime when I'm...

Q: I saw Trubee Davison just about a month ago.

F: Well, I'll tell you something, I'd give \$100 bill to know that. I haven't seen Trubee for years and years, but Trubee and I used to be good friends.

Q: That his father was the Captain Wheeler aboard the ship, aboard the Leviathan?

F: Sailing from the US on Oct 7, 1918. I'd like to know it. Trubee and I are good friends and I could write him. I don't know his address, but I don't think that he would write me. Coming back from overseas, we left England, I believe it was on the 23rd of December. I took Hap's baggage in a taxi down to catch the 4:00 PM Limited to Liverpool. When it got down there, I checked on the train and found there was a 6:00 train that didn't stop. It landed at Liverpool before the 4:00 did. And so, I decided to take it, and I told Hap. I called him up and said: "I booked us on the 6:00 rather than the 4:00, Hap. That gives you two hours more in London. And we'll get there quicker. He said: "Okay." Then, I came out to the taxi cab driver, and I said: "Driver, how far is it to Fleet Street in London. I haven't had time to go there yet," And he said: "Two miles sir." I said: "Let's go over and look at it. It's named after my ancestors." He said: "Is your name Fleet?" I said: "Yes." And he said: "That's my name."- I said: "You are a damn liar." "I beg your pardon sir," he says. He reached into his pocket and pulled out a long discharge from the Grenadier Guards, as Lieutenant. He had a wooden leg from the knee down and a wooden arm with a hook on it. He had been shot down in the Flying Service of the Grenadier Guards, he said. He had been commandeered in the taxi service.

Q: JMA?

F: We created the RMA in late '17

Q: When did the JMA come in?

F: The JMA was already in the regulations and the law when Aviation Section was a part of the Signal Corps, way back in...well, in Hap's day if he was 26, he was a JMA and he would have had the rank, pay and allowances of the grade next higher.

Q: I believe it was No 29. He had license 29. You say, if you were JMA you were entitled to pay and allowances of the next high grade?

F: When you were JMA, you were allowed the rank, pay and allowances of the grade next higher. For instance, you had to land in a 100-foot circle, 5 times out of 6. The RMA was a 300 foot circle. We set this because we needed men to beat hell. We also founded ground schools for them.

W: If I remember correctly, the RMA got 25% increase in pay, the JMA got 50, and the MA 75 per cent. I was a LT drawing \$167.50. That included the 25% increase. The Army non-pilot guys really got upset about that.

F: Not only that, but KB was Lieutenant for years and years.

W: For 17 years.

Q: We are talking about Wright Field in 1930.

W: That's right, that's when I first went there, Chidlaw and I went there. He and I both went there as students in 1930. Well, Jan Howard was a very conceited man, in my opinion. He thought he was probably the world's greatest, and this is the attitude he gave most younger people to understand and believe. This is the way I felt about him.

Q: You didn't think he was that good?

W: No, but he did, and the other thing that most of us. I don't know what Chidlaw told you about him. He looked upon us as just neophytes in this business, and he favored the Civil Service employees. As a matter of fact, Chid and I graduated from the same engineering school class. Every one of us -- Pop Powers may have said something about this, too, because he was in the same class -- we were told to report to the various sections, report to Mr. so and so. It was quite a long time before any of these officers ever got in charge of a particular section or division.

Q: Why was Jan Howard prejudiced against the military? He was West Point himself?

W: I think he was. I never knew for sure. He just felt that we were younger people, and we didn't know anything about this engineering business. We would go, and he made a speech, now you boys are graduated from the engineering school and now you've got to go over there with these sections and report to Mr. so and so, and learn the business. Every damn one of us were pilots, and number of them were graduate engineers. I wasn't. We'd all been pilots; we'd all had responsible jobs. So he was not what you would call a popular officer.

Q: Do you remember any specific issue that arose between him and Arnold, like policy issue? You just knew that there was animosity? This was generally known?

W: That's all I knew about it.

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Interview LG Kenneth B. Wolfe, Lake San Marcos, Calif., Mar 18, 1970

Q: One of the first questions I usually ask people is: do they remember the first time they met General Hap Arnold. Do you remember your first encounter with him?

W: This is an unusual situation in a way. I had never served under Hap. I had met him two or three times at a conference. I didn't know him. I don't think he knew me. First thing that happened to me was Ira Eaker called me on the phone one day, that's when we had the old office at the Pentagon, this is March 1938, and I was the AF representative out here with all these factories.

Q: I see, that was the Munitions Building.

W: Yes, the old Munitions Building, and as I said earlier, I had been trying all my career to get a duty station out here, so I finished the General Command Staff College, I was ordered out here to be the AF representative in Santa Monica. I had been here a year and 7 months when Ira called on the phone and said: "Get in here without delay." And I said: "What's going on?" And he said: "Hap wants to see you." And I said: "It's going to take a little time." He said: "Don't you have any airplanes out there?" I said: "yes." And he said: "Take one of them, and come on in here, Now!" So I went in there. I went in to see Hap. And he said: "Well, we are going to organize a Production Division at Wright Field. George Kenney is going to be No. 1 man; Pop Powers is going to be No. 2 man; and you are No. 3. So I want you to go back out to Wright Field and tell Colonel Robins that he has now got a Production Division, and you three guys are going to run it.

Q: This is Warner Robins?

W: Yes. So that was the beginning of the business. So meantime, Kenney was down in Puerto Rico when they were building that big operation there. And Powers was some place else, so I got the thing started. The next thing that happened, Hap called me up, and said: "I want you to come in here and bring that production plan in," which he told me to do. So I went in and he said now we are going over to see the President. So I went over with him. He took me into the office and introduced me to the President and said: "Here's Colonel Wolfe," I think.

Q: This was around November 1938?

W: March or April 1938. That's when I started. I never did go back to my job.

Q: This was say within 60 days after he took the job when Westover got killed?

W: So he left me in there with Franklin. Arnold said: "When you get through, come by the office and see me." So I had a little talk with the President, told me what he was going to do, he was going to build 50,000 airplanes, and this, that and the other.

Q: Did he talk 50,000 airplanes at that time? He didn't get the 50,000 till a year later.

W: That's right, he was interested in getting the production capability going.

Q: At that time they were talking "10,000 planes."

W: Yes, I've forgotten. So the President sent me over to see Johnson. He was an ornery cuss to get along with....

Q: Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of War?

W: Yes. So that was how we got started in building up this production capacity. Why Arnold picked me for it, I don't know,

and he never did tell me. Kenney was then sent to the South Pacific, Powers was taken into Washington to be assistant to Gen. Echols, who was heading up the Materiel thing in Washington, so I wound up as head of the Production Division.

Q: That was, Kenney didn't go until after the war started.

W: That's right, but he was still down in Puerto Rico, and he wanted to get into the war. He wasn't about to get tied to a desk job, so he was maneuvering to beat the band. So that's how that happened. So from there on, Kenney and I had several meetings in Washington. And as I said earlier, we were enroute to Washington the day the Nips hit Honolulu. We stayed there. Kenney was the ranking officer on duty, and we were trying to find Arnold. You might have gotten that story from Douglas.

Q: Well, I know that they were hunting quail out near Bakersfield.

W: Yes, they were out on a hunting expedition, and nobody knew where they were.

Q: He didn't tell you?

W: No. He didn't tell any of his staff.

Q: He had gone out the night before to kiss off these B-17s at Hamilton. They are the ones that flew into Pearl Harbor during the attack.

W: Yes, that's the one that Ted Landon led that flight. Anyway, Kenney and I were trying our best to find out where he was. So finally we got a call from the Highway Patrol. They located him out there. And boy, he came barging in, and sparks began to fly then.

Q: Well, Arnold didn't show up till the next day, I guess.

W: Yes, second day after, I think.

Q: The second day after? He had to fly, I think he had a C-47 and they had to fly across country.

W: Yes, and I think Gene Beebe was with him. Anyway, the amusing story about that was, when the highway patrol found he and Don Douglas--told him about Pearl Harbor--this Mexican houseboy said: "Oh yes, I knew about that. I heard it on the radio yesterday," and he didn't tell them. So that was the beginning of the Production Division and the program to build up the industry.

Q: You know, Chidlaw told me that Arnold had a bad experience at Wright Field back in '30-31, when he was out there. He was under Conger Pratt. His former brother-in-law, Jan Howard, was out there.

W: He was Chief Engineer.

Q: And Arnold had sort of the Air Service Command, or Field Service Command, and Arnold didn't have a heck of a lot to do in his job. Most of the job was being done by Howard. Arnold had an adverse reaction to Wright Field, and Chidlaw thinks that Arnold's reaction to Wright Field was always negative after that time. For some reason, he always seemed to be jumping on Wright Field.

W: I think Ben was right about that, but I think for a good reason, and the reason was Jan Howard. Howard tried to be all things to all men. While he was Chief Engineer, we had a Colonel up there named Strauss. Strauss was head of Procurement and Quality Control, and they were always opposed.

Q: Well, Jan Howard was the kind of guy who seemed to be brilliant, but couldn't get along with people. You don't think that Arnold had this sort of psychological negative reaction to Wright Field. You think that when he jumped on Wright Field, it was for good cause?

W: Well, based on my experience with Hap, beginning with this Production Division he was just putting the chrome-vanadium ice pick in everybody to get things done. And rightly so, because we had been

going along for years without any appropriations or money to do this, that and the other. And he had a big program and a plan and he was raising cain with everybody to get going.

Q: I want to talk about your assignment as Air Corps representative at the Douglas plant, El Segundo. What was Douglas building at that time?

W: He was building this single-engine. We called it in those days, ground attack airplane, the A-17. And then later, North American started building an advanced trainer, the AT-6. We always remembered the airplanes by number; never adopted the names.

Q: Douglas was working on a prototype of the A-20, in 1939, wasn't he?

W: For the French, he was building them for the French.

Q: And then a Frenchman by the name of Paul Chemidlin, remember his name? The Frenchman who crashed in the parking lot.

W: He was in the airplane that cracked up. Don Douglas and Carl Culver and I were standing there on the lot, when this thing spun in.

Q: And they tried to keep that secret but it's like keeping some event in Macy's window secret.

W: Well, it fell right in the parking lot of the North American plant.

Q: Was it North American or Douglas?

W: It was North American plant which was across the street on Imperial Boulevard, from Douglas' plant.

Q: You were given instructions to permit the Frenchman to get in that plane?

W: That's right.

Q: Who gave you that instruction?

W: Well, I think it came out of Washington.

Q: I recall that Arnold sent you a telegram, instructing you to show the Frenchmen.

W: Could be, we had to get permission to show anything to any of the foreigners, even though they were so-called allies.

Q: And then Arnold got on a hot seat for this thing, in Washington, do you remember the Congressional testimony?

W: No, I don't remember.

Q: The problem was that he and Morgenthau had a thing going. Do you know anything between them?

W: No. My only experience with Morgenthau was when I got sent on that ad hoc committee over there to Europe, while the war was going on.

Q: Arnold was caught between the rock and a hard place. If he admitted that Ken Wolfe gave access to the Frenchman, to look at what was a classified airplane, then he was in trouble. If he told them the truth that Morgenthau had ordered him to instruct Wolfe to let the Frenchmen, then he was in trouble with Roosevelt. Were you aware of this dilemma?

W: Not in those days. Unless you were on duty in Washington, you never got that.

Q: They called him up, testimony, Senator Bennett Champ Clark, and a couple of others, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and they were really giving it to him. And they called Morgenthau up. The line that Morgenthau took was that the plane had not yet been accepted by the Air Corps. Therefore, it still was Douglas property, and therefore Douglas had the right to authorize the Frenchman to

fly in it. Did you ever get into the nuisances of that distinction?

W: No, I was never called to testify at all on that thing.

Q: I guess they wanted to keep you out of it because it would just add to the problem.

W: I wasn't aware of that at all.

Q: This led, of course, Arnold got "in dutch" with the President through Morgenthau. Morgenthau and the President were very close. And this is when the President had allegedly said that, "we have places on Guam for guys like you." And Arnold was in Roosevelt's doghouse until the war started. And then of course he did some good things, and according to Arnold's book, Global Mission, the President called him in and offered him an old fashioned, and called him "Hap" and that's how he knew he was out of the doghouse. This was a couple of years later. But because of this incident at Santa Monica, he got in trouble. And of course, you were the instrument of letting the Frenchman in that. But Arnold didn't consult you?

W: No, I was never called up, interviewed or anything. This was when Arnold was Assistant to Westover?

Q: No, this was after, in January 1939. This was probably a month or two after that conference at the White House that you mentioned before.

W: The conference at the White House was after I was relieved as AF representative. I never went back to that job.

Q: Then this conference at the White House was later.

W: Must have been, timewise.

Q: Then, that ties in with the 50,000 planes you mentioned, because Roosevelt used that in a speech on May 16, 1940.

W: This is '38 now, when I was ordered back there to see Hap, and the second time back to talk to the President.

Q: All these events telescope. Let me ask you one more question about this Frenchman. Did it occur to you that there might be some security violation to let the Frenchman in that plane?

W: No, because as far as I was concerned, they were authorized to see the airplane, ride in it, and everything else, because they were going to buy them, which they did.

Q: But it had classified equipment aboard. Didn't it have a couple of things?

W: No, propeller and engine and some instruments, but nothing else to my knowledge.

Q: There was a law in the books about allowing foreign agents to view classified military material.

W: These people were French AF officers, in uniform. Three of them--Colonel, Major and a Captain. So there was no question in my mind, because I had the authorization from Washington.

Q: Was there some business about opening a plant in New Orleans to build some planes for the French? Was a guy named Sol Rosenblatt involved in this?

W: Well, Sol was in the Washington office.

Q: Did you have any contact with him on this problem?

W: No, he had nothing to do with production or procurement to my knowledge. He may have been writing papers and things in Washington. Q: He was sort of a man of many trades, He hovered around there and Arnold gave him a couple of jobs to do. I saw his name flit in and out of this thing, and I just wondered...

W: No, I never had any contact with him at that time; later on, there were several meetings in Washington, I remember him being present.

Q: Can you remember some problems, during the war, where Arnold

came out to Wright Field. One problem comes to my mind, these wing tanks for the B-17s. This was a big problem. Did you get involved in that? Do you remember the portable wing tanks they were trying to put on the fighters to give them some range?

W: Oh yes. When the AF was trying their damnest to get escort fighters.

Q: Right, '43.

W: That's right, this is when we came out with the P-51s. Mean-time, we were working like mad on the old "Jug," P-47, which we put the 8 machine guns on. Arnold came out on that deal, indirectly, because Kenney had been raising hell with him about the oxygen tanks, how damned explosive they were. They'd get a shell through them and it could throw the whole airplane.

Q: On the "Jug?"

W: On any airplane that carried oxygen, Kenney was fighting the problem of changing it over. So, my brother (Franklin Wolfe) was in charge of the Armament Division, and he was against this damned 30 caliber machine gun, that the British were insisting on. So my brother and his group in the Armament Division had a P-47 with these eight 50 caliber machine guns, so Kenney and my brother and I said: "Well, we have got to put this test on where Kenney wants to show Arnold how explosive these oxygen tanks are." We set the oxygen tanks up at the far end of the range there. My brother had a P-47 there. Kenney and the rest of us were standing by in the P-47. They fired one burst and the gas tank-oxygen tank took off, and I don't think we ever found it. It went off like a bomb. Of course, Arnold had been arguing with Kenney about it, you see. He wasn't about to gracefully say anything about it. So he turned the subject over to my brother, and said: "Frank,

what in the hell have you got in that airplane?" He said, "I've got eight 50 calibers in there." Arnold said, "Eight 50 calibers?" Frank said: "Yes." So Arnold said: "Well, how did you happen to do this?" So my brother gave him a little song and dance. Arnold never, to my knowledge, ever said "boo" to Kenney, except we got a directive to change all the oxygen tanks, in all the airplanes. But he was absolutely overcome with the waterfall of empty shells coming off the trailing edge of the wings--out of the P-47. I might go ahead a little more on this armor thing. The Ordnance Corps was responsible for the armament. We were just another little Corps. So Kenney and my brother cooked up this deal to go in and give a briefing to Arnold about getting rid of the .30-caliber and standardizing on the .50-calibers and the 20 mm, so my brother drew up some presentation. He got the date and went in there. Part of the presentation was a kindergarten illustration, showed .30-caliber coming out like this and falling off and showed a .50 caliber coming out and falling off. It showed a 20 coming out. He had the Chief of the Ordnance there, plus quite a few Ordnance people, all of Arnold's staff, I guess, the top ones. My brother had served with Arnold out here at Rockwell Field as his bombardment officer. He was one of the few in those days that had access to the Norden bombsight. He knew my brother real well. He said: "Frank, what in the hell are you trying to show us here?" And he said: "I'm showing you how far out the 30 will go and how much farther the others will go," and he had the velocity, and the impact, and everything else. Arnold turned to this MG in the Ordnance Corps, and he said: "General, is that true?" He said: "Yes, to the best of my knowledge." Arnold said: "Frank, change all those blankety blank 30's. Dismissed." That was the end of the conference.

- Q: Could that have been Campbell? Campbell was a two-star general. He was in charge of Ordnance.
- W: Well, could have been, because I was feuding with the Ordnance all the time.
- Q: You had trouble with them all the time? Division of labor. They wouldn't relinquish any control of that, either.
- W: No, well, when we went into this war, we didn't have a single turret for any airplane. The B-17's we were buying had no turrets. And Bob Lovett and Hap, they took care of that one.
- Q: How did they do that?
- W: They ran so cockeyed fast that the rest of the Army didn't know what was going on. What they did on that: Arnold called my brother in and said: "Look, we've got to have some turrets for these airplanes. What are you going to do about it?" My brother said: "Well, the only thing I know of, is a Bolton Pauls (?) the British have over in England. This was .30 caliber, and typical Arnold said: "You get ahold of somebody in industry and go over there and get the license for the Bolton Pauls (?), and do it right now." That's the way Arnold was. It just so happened my brother knew Stu Symington who, at that time, was head of Emerson Electric in St. Louis. They had been playing golf, were good friends. Frank called him on the phone and said what he wanted to do, and Symington said "okay." So the two of them took off, went over to England, and got the license right from the British, and that's what started us in the turret business. But this is the way worked.
- Q: This business ended up in a little anonymous document, later on.
- W: It did.
- Q: Don't you remember, on the B-36?

W: Oh, later on, oh yes.

Q: Yes, about six years later.

W: That was a battle between the Navy and the Air Force.

Q: This was one of the big subjects, that Cedric Worth document?

W: I spent days in there in that investigation.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and your mentioning that he and Lovett were a great team. Did Lovett serve as a sort of balance wheel, to keep Arnold on the track? Did Arnold tend to get impulsive, sort of get enthusiastic and go off, or did he figure out everything he was going to do, beforehand?

W: My recollection and my experience with the two of them, was they were a great pair who complemented each other. When Arnold couldn't get something done with the military, like these other Corps, Signal Corps, Engineer Corps, and the rest of them, Bob could. In other words, in my opinion, they were scared to buck up against Bob. They wouldn't mind bucking against Hap, but the two of them were together.

Q: They worked together?

W: I will give you one example. I got called in there one day. Here was Arnold and Lovett, and Arnold always took the initiative--just loved to jump on you. He was a great psychologist, in my opinion: "Here we are right in the middle of the war, and we don't have any IFF. What in the hell are you doing about it?" I said: "Well, General, the Signal Corps is responsible for furnishing the Identification, Friend or Foe." He said: "You mean they were." I said: "No sir, they are." And Bob Lovett turned to me and said: "Beginning now, you're going to get the IFF's." I never had any other instruction than that.

Q: Do you think he went to Marshall and sold that?

W: I don't know. Don't think they had time, because I got my instructions that afternoon in their office. And it just so happened,

the head of Philco had been in to see me at Wright Field a couple of weeks before. He wanted something to do for the war. He'd been trying to get some contracts out of the Signal Corps, and couldn't. So I just happened to think of that. So before I left Washington-- I wish I could remember that guy's name--I called him on the phone and reminded him that he wanted to do something for the war. I said: "You get somebody out here, and I'll show you what the IFF is, and we are going to buy them for the Air Corps." He said: "Well, I know what it is." I said: "How soon can you get him out here." "Well," he said, "I have all the drawings I need. I can get them out there within four or five days." I said: "That's fine. Go ahead, take my word for it." So four or five days later he came out there with two special baggage cars on a train, and there he had the IFF. We gave him a contract. In a typical Arnold follow-up. He called me up on the phone one day and said: "What are you doing about that IFF," and I said: "Well, I got Philco building them." Arnold: "Are they really going ahead?" I said: "Yes sir." Arnold: "That's good, goodbye." That was the end of that.

Q: Did he always follow up on these things?

W: Oh no, he was a great exponent of the chrome-vanadium icepick. That was typical of him. He would give you something to do, and then call you up.

Q: Did he ever jump you for something you should have done, and it wasn't done?

W: Oh, nothing was ever done to suit him.

Q: Whatever you did, he wanted something more:

W: Typical of him. He would give you a chore to do, then he would call you up and say: "When are you going to get that done?"

You'd reply: "Well, it's going to be about six months." He'd come back: "Take all the time you need as long as you get it done in six weeks." Always did this!

Q: If you had said six weeks, he would have said six days.

W: Right.

Q: And he always followed up on these things?

W: Yes.

Q: One of the criticisms leveled at Arnold was that he didn't give anything to the staff. He did so many of these things. He held all of these balls bouncing in the air, and he was too impatient to send things down to the staff for coordination.

W: That's why the Army and Navy never caught up with us.

Q: He just went ahead and did things?

W: Well, like that IFF I was telling you about.

Q: Do you remember any other instances where Arnold drove something to consummation in a short time? Were there some other problems?

W: He had a good foil in Oliver Echols. Echols sat there at Wright Field all these years, trying to get money to do this, that, and all the other. One year he would get enough money to start a new engine, but he couldn't start the airplane, or the turrets. So, through Echols recommending to Hap what he thought could be done, and who could do it, he had a great foil in Echols. Echols was always coming up with something to do. So, when this big criticism came on about the lack of escorts in Europe--I don't know who gave who the order--but Echols had been talking about building an airplane, which turned out to be the P-51, which could be used as an escort. And the first thing we knew out there, we just got a teletype message or a

phone call. The project officer on fighters who was Mark Bradley, then, a Captain or Major, to get together with Lee Atwood of North American and come up with a new fighter.

Q: Well, didn't they have the P-51 early in the war as a low altitude plane? It was using another engine, didn't the British put the Merlin in there?

W: That was later on.

Q: But the first P-51 wasn't too good, was it?

W: You see what happened, the P-40 was the airplane, the fighter that we had. The P-40 had the Allison engine, which was supposed to have been rated at about 1,400 or 1,700 horsepower, and we couldn't get that horsepower out of it. So they had a big seance, which Echols called at Wright Field. He brought in all the top engine people, and they diagnosed this Allison engine. The consensus of opinion outside of the military was the engine will never make it. They said: "Drop the project." So Echols excused them, and held the rest of us back, and he said: "Well, you heard what the boys said--great industry." He said: "We can't drop it. We don't have anything else." So we cleared that P-40 at 700 hp, if I remember correctly. The theory that Echols always had, better than any of us, you never turn out the perfect airplane or engine until you get them out in service and use them. This is what we decided to do against the recommendations of von Karman and all the hot shots. Now, I can't relate these things in time. The British sent three of their Battle of Britain pilots over. This was at the time of the fall of Dunkirk.

Q: That was June 1940.

W: So this fellow Bradley, the project officer on fighters, and I, and a couple others, took the DC-3 flew up there to Toronto. The

idea was to let the British fly the P-40 and we were going to fly the Spitfire. We'd been three two or three days when this great WII ace, Bishop, threw a dinner party. Right in the middle of the dinner party--I guess right in the middle of the cocktail hour--a servant came in and called Bishop aside. He came back in the room, hooked up the radio, and said: "Well, boys, the fall of Dunkirk." We sat there and heard over the radio the fall of Dunkirk. There wasn't a dry eye in the house. That was the time we had the competition between the Spitfire and the P-40. So, as a result of that, going back to Bradley and Lee Atwood, we did take the British Merlin and put in the P-51, and then we had Packard build the British Merlin engine for both ourselves and the British.

Q: I want to go over to the B-29 now. You were Special Project Officer for the B-29. This was Arndt's pet project, and probably the biggest headache of the war--one of the biggest headaches of the war, the engines catching fire, etc.

W: Well, sure because it was a real accelerated program. Nobody had ever done a job like that. We had all kinds of problems, But it was Hap Arnold that said: "This airplane is going to be built." And after we lost the first one with Eddy Allen, the test pilot, and the whole crew of civilians. There was a big hue and cry came up in Congress and every place else. It was too far in the future--too big an airplane; this, that and the other. So, Arnold called our group of top people out of the aircraft industry to take a look at it. It was the first real heavy wing-loaded airplane we had ever had, even visualized. It had automatic fire control, god knows what all--all new. So, the consensus of this group was: "Yes, no time to build this." Again, the same damned thing happened. Hap said: "We are going to build it." So that's when I got the job being the project

manager on the B-29. This was after the crackup of the first one.

Q: Right, this was 1943? You took the B-29, but probably sometime in the middle of 1943.

W: There is one other very interesting episode. We had two experimental jobs. Eddy Allen cracked up the first one. I took over the project. I took Wright Field test pilots out there. We got the job out. Meantime, we had drawn contracts with all these other people. We were going to build them in three other places, so we get ready to...

Q: Martin was going to build them?

W: Martin at Omaha; Bell at Marietta; and Boeing at Wichita.

So Jake Harmon, who was a Colonel, and he was the chief project officer on bombers--two of the oldtime noncoms, and a copilot by the name of... So they got out there on the ramp, get this thing all wound up with movie camers all around, and so forth. This little guy who was president of Boeing after Johnson died, in Seattle, Oliver West. He and I were sitting up on the third floor there, where you could look out over the field. Right in front of us, was a big warehouse where we could see them getting ready up at the north end to take off. All of a sudden, they passed us into this building and the airplane was in the bank like that. Down at the end of the field were a lot of machine gunbutts. I thought: "My God, we are going to lose the second one." Well, Jake finally got the thing back on the ground. What a day that was. He taxied back up to this building I was talking about, and I went out there, and I asked Jake what happened. And he said: "I'll be damned if I know." And I said: "Jake, turn the ailerons." They had crossed the ailerons, so every time she would start to bank, he tried to pull it off, and all he was doing was increasing it. Finally this sergeant, he got in the act, too. And the two of them got this thing righted, back on the ground. It was off the ground, and the wing was

dragging. They had to change the tip of the wing, and almost lost the second one.

Q: If you'd done that, it might have been the end of the B-29 program.

W: The first was almost the end of us, except for the fact that Hap said: "Well, we are going to build this."

Q: In the meantime, Arnold had made all these commitments to three plants, and all kinds of manufacturing facilities, and

W: He had also made a commitment to the Russians, and the Chinese, where we were going to use these things,

Q: Right, you mean for the bases--at Chengtu. And he's made commitments to the President. The President was really on his tail for this B-29.

W: A lot of people in the industry and a lot of people in the Air Force were on his tail.

Q: This would have been a tragic thing.

W: You can see what would have happened.

Q: It could have been the end of Arnold.

W: Not only that, we might have lost the bloody war. Never would have won the thing with Japan the way the Army wanted to do it. They didn't want to make a landing.

Q: It would have been a bloody landing on Japan, and the way the Japs were fighting in these little islands. They would have taken a million Americans with them, if we had landed in Japan. Truly a fantastic, narrow escape.

W: Oh yes, you can imagine how we felt seeing that thing about to crack up.

Q: There's a book on the B-29, I'm going to check the date of that out.

W: Yes, there's a book by Mansfield.

Q: I don't recall. I didn't know that the second one came so near cracking up.

W: We kept it awfully damned quiet. We never mentioned this. The Boeing Company, through the Chief Engineer and Vice President, Wellwood Beale, now with Douglas, had a film made. He called it K-9, and the caption starting the film shows a dog walking up to a hydrant, well,

Q: Relieving himself.

W: Well, that's the way this airplane looked.

Q: Did you ever talk to Arnold about this--about the narrow escape?

W: He found out somehow, long afterwards.

Q: Oh, you didn't tell Arnold?

W: Hell, no, we didn't dare.

Q: He didn't know about it.

W: We swore everybody to secrecy. We minimized it. It would have been terrible.

Q: Let me take the B-29 story a little farther. It was having all kinds of production, modification, problems. Did you know that the President was on his back, he had promised the President, I believe, some date late in 1943 that the B-29 would be operating against Japan. I think October or November 1943. And of course the plane wasn't ready, and the plane was encountering all kinds of trouble.

W: That's not the story. The date was June 5th, from the very beginning, 1944, and we made the date.

Q: It was June 15th--~~the~~ date of the first raid.

W: On the steel mill at Yawata. We made the date.

Q: That was the date?

W: And Arnold set that date at YALTA, I think it was.

Q: No, that was before YALTA.

W: Where did he make the commitment to use B-29's?

Q: It was probably Cairo or Tehran. This was November 1943.

W: Tehran and he made the date.

Q: And he gave the date as June 15th?

W: Yes, and we made it.

Q: I thought that the date had been postponed. I don't know where I got that impression.

W: No, not to my knowledge or recollection.

Q: Did Arnold and Benny Meyers ever come out to Salinas?

W: Not until after I left, you see as soon as I got this first wing going, I took it out to India, and somebody else took over. And that's when Meyers got in the act out there at Salina.

Q: Yes, what happened?

W: We were having all kinds of problems, like all new airplanes and equipment have, we had engine problems. We have some gunnery problems, some turret problems, but the main problem was the engine.

Q: Engine catching fire.

W: They were overheating.

Q: Did he and Arnold spend a couple of weeks out at Salina?

W: Not while I was there.

Q: I'm thinking of sometime like March 1944, they were trying to get these planes out in to the CBI, and they were dragging. There were a bunch of planes sitting on Salina.

W: Bunch of planes sitting out at the factories, too.

Q: Yes, and each plane had some problems, and didn't Arnold get out there and try to expedite the planes out?

W: I don't know, I wasn't there. After I got the first wing I took them out.

Q: The 58th, and Blondie Saunders had the 73rd?

W: Blondie was my deputy on the 58th, Blondie took over from me when I was called back to put the F-80 into production. And that's when Blondie cracked up, and he was out of the picture then.

Q: Who took his place?

W: Roger Ramey, and then Ramey moved the 58th in to Guam. By that time, these hotshots from Europe were going to come over and win the war when MacArthur had it won. Spaatz came out, and Eaker and all the rest of those hotshots.

Q: You don't recall that the President was breathing hard on Arnold on this subject: Of you didn't know about it?

W: I had problems of my own.

Q: I got this impression when I was up at Hyde Park, that the President was asking Arnold: "what is the first mission?"

W: I'm sure he could, I wouldn't know.

Q: I got the impression, of course, I don't have my files here, I got the impression that the first mission was delayed. This doesn't jibe with your knowledge of it. Of course, you might not know that when the first mission was to be scheduled. Maybe Arnold held it back because he didn't know.

W: He may have given me two weeks advance delay and I wouldn't know that. All I know is that we all sweat blood to make the date. I could look up my records of that, if I had them all ready.

Q: You know, Benny Meyers, when he got in trouble, mentioned

the good old days. He was trying to solicit Arnold's help and he mentioned the time that they had gone out to Salina, and worked together to get the B-29s off and out into the CBI. Of course, he reached Arnold. In 1947 Arnold was going to write him a letter of support and then when the letter was typed up at Hamilton Field, somebody must have tipped Arnold off, because the letter never got sent out. This is in Arnold's file. Arnold didn't have any idea that Benny Meyers was pulling this stuff. Did you have any feeling that Benny Meyers was living higher than his means, or that he was engaged in some private activity?

W: Well, my impression of Benny Meyers, supported by people who had known him before the war, was that he always had independent means. One of the stories that we heard about him was that he had initially, his first marriage was to a very wealthy woman who supplied him with the money. So before the war when everybody else in the AF was in debt up to their ears at the banks, Benny always had the money.

Q: Always drove a fancy car and lived well.

W: Where it came from, I never knew.

Q: Mrs. Arnold said that people just accepted the fact that Benny Meyers had money and was living well.

W: Well, he started that, as far as I could find, when he was on duty originally in Hawaii.

Q: Were you called upon to sign that letter that Stratmeyer, when he was Chief of Air Staff? Everybody involved in production had to sign a letter stating his stocks and his assets.

W: That came along every week almost.

Q: There was more than one letter?

W: They were always haranguing us about: "You've got to be

careful about this, and you shouldn't do that. You shouldn't accept things from industry," and so on. Associating with the industry and accepting gifts and so o.

Q: This particular letter was a round robin letter, and everybody was asked to list his stocks, his assets--all people that had a procurement responsibility. Benny Meyers listed his, and later he claimed that--of course, he didn't state that he had an interest in this Aviation Electric Company, that he was playing both ends--but he claimed that he had told Arnold verbally. And of course, Arnold, when he testified at the hearing in 1947, denied this. Meyers was dismissed from his job. You know, I heard that Meyers is alive and living in San Francisco. Have you heard anything about that?

W: The last I heard of Meyers, this has been 5 or 6 years ago. This General I saw on the golf course--a chap came up to me and told me that he had seen Benny Meyers.

Q: Pop Powers told you this?

W: That Meyers was there in New Jersey some place, working as a comptroller for one of the Ohrbach department stores, one of the Ohrbach boys was in the AF and worked in Benny's office in Washington. That's the last I ever heard of him.

Q: That's an interesting lead, I'll write Ohrbach's and see if they can put me in touch with him. I don't know if he would talk. If I did see him, he might not want to get involved in this thing.

W: I've never heard another word about Meyers since Powers told me.

Q: He served a term and they took his medals away, and they took his pension away.

W: And his wife took his money away.

Q: Of course, he was fooling around with Mrs. Bleriot LeMarre. LeMarre was this dummy president he set up, and he was fooling around with LeMarre's wife.

W: That's right, but that was common knowledge. His wife, who bore him the twins, she took off and went to South America, divorced Benny and married an Argentinian or Brazilian, or somebody. This is the rumor that was going around.

Q: Didn't he name one of those twins for Arnold and one for Marshall?

W: I believe so.

Q: It was either that or Arnold was a godfather to one and Marshall the other. You know, Arnold was very devoted to Meyers.

W: Oh yes. I would say this up to a certain point, even though I guess it had never really been firmed up, but he did a hell of a lot of good, fine things there in Washington. I mean he had the gall and the brass to do things that a lot of the other staff people didn't have.

Q: I was given a picture of Oliver Echols as a soft spoken, southern gentleman, and Benny Meyers, is a "get out and do it." And this could have attracted Arnold to him--that he was a doer. Arnold liked doers; he liked people to do it yesterday.

W: Yes, that's right, Meyers was that kind of guy. Meyers was a real brilliant character, no doubt about that. He understood this financial business better than anybody I'd ever run into up to that time. I've seen that guy sit down and add up a column of three digits just like that. He was real sharp.

Q: He was sharp but not quite ethical.

W: That's right; not at all.

Q: Let me ask you just some general things about Arnold. You came to Washington in April 1945. Arnold had had his heart attack. He had just come back to Washington from Coral Gables. Do you remember that Arnold had a heart attack?

W: Yes, I remember hearing about that.

Q: They kept it very quiet, and he came back at the end of March 1945. They brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. Do you remember that? And you worked for Eaker for a short period, didn't you, when he was Deputy Commander?

W: You're talking about '45? No.

Q: You were assigned to Hqs., AAF, for about 3 or 4 months between VE Day and VJ Day?

W: No, I was out with the 5th AF. I went into Japan on the occupation in '45; I came back in '48.

Q: I have here you joined the 5th AF in August 1945, just about the time of the atomic bomb. Where were you right prior to that?

W: This is when I was called back from India by Arnold to get the first jet fighter (P-80) we owned into production.

Q: You were in Washington a very shorttime, a couple of months.

W: No, I was only in there temporarily; I was at Wright Field.

Q: But you were assigned to Washington. They have your biography, as you were. You left Wright Field in April 1945 for temporary assignment in AAF Hqs., and then you joined the 5th AF in Okinawa in August 1945. So you were, according to this paper, 4 months time you were in Washington, and this was the period, say, between VE and VJ Day. You don't remember that, maybe you were just assigned on paper. Immediately before you went to join the 5th AF, were you in Wright Field?

W: Yes.

Q: Then, I guess they, they could have carried me in Washington. You worked for Knudsen?

W: Well, even before I went out to the Pacific, when Knudsen was brought in the head of production, I was in charge of production of the Air Corps, and I had many days of duty with Knudsen.

Q: How did he and Arnold get along?

W: Wonderfully well, I would say.

Q: He was a great production man, wasn't he?

W: The world's best.

Q: Not a very good officer, though.

W: He made no bones about that. He didn't want to be an officer. He was a wonderful fellow.

Q: Did this create some problems?

W: No, no. Everybody loved the old boy. Going through the factories, I will tell you a little sidelight there. When he was assigned the head of all production--Army, Navy and Air Corps--they assigned one Air Corps man, one Navy man, and one Ordnance man on the first trip we took on the C-47, DC-3. First place we stopped was at Ogden. He told us the night before we were going to inspect this ammunition loading plant. I didn't know anything about loading plants or anything else. So I said, "Well, General, what time do you think we are going to be through out there?" "Do you want to fly on tonight to California. I'll get everything ready." He still talked with quite an accent. He always called me "Vulf." He says, "Vulf, you are going with me to the ammunition loading plant." And I said: "Yes sir." I'd never been around those things before, great big towers, about 5 stories high. So the head of the Ordnance plant was walking up the stairs with Knudsen and I was back, walking up these stairs and I made

a comment to this Ordnance general. I said: "Ye Gods, this is a tough climb." Knudsen turned around and said, "Vulf, when I was your age, I ran up all the stairs." So we got up to the top and here was this great big thing looked like a creamery deal, painted white. Little bit of a room. This was the mixing chamber. So there was a chap there with a long handled brush, and a long handled dustpan, and he was going round sweeping up this immaculate floor, so I said to this Ordnance general: "What in the world is this fellow doing?" "Well, he's sweeping up any powder that might have fallen on the floor." And I said: "What if it had?" "Well, if you stepped on that, this place would blow up." I said: "Blow up?" And he said: "Yes." And I said: "What if it blows up?" And Knudsen turned around to me, and he said: "Vulf, you just jump out the window." I looked out the window, and there were these amusement park slides, and that's what you did. If the thing looked like it was going to blow up, you dove out a window, and went down the chute.

Q: Do you remember any stories about Arnold beyond some areas where we haven't discussed. Anything about him grabbing people in the halls, for example?

W: Well, that story I am not an eyewitness to, but I was in Arnold's office one day. He had a big intercom squawk box, and he really got riled up about something. I've forgotten what it was-- something Kuter said. And he blasted the hell out of Kuter. He ran down all the stops on this squawk box: "You guys come in here right away." Got everybody out of the place converged on Arnold's office. And he had another harangue. Well, later on, the story was told, that after this meeting, Arnold walked out in the hall; there was a colonel coming up the hall. And he said: "Colonel, I want you to do so and so." The colonel said: "But sir." And he said: "You heard

me." It happened to be the Chaplain. Have you heard that?

Q: I haven't heard it about the Chaplain, but I've heard many stories about people being afraid to walk around the E-Ring because they might be grabbed and dragooned in some kind of assignment foreign to their expertise. Norstad told me this story of him hitting all the buttons, and calling everybody in and then saying: "Norstad, I want you; the rest of you can go."

W: The whole argument started between he and Norstad.

Q: Was it Norstad or Kuter?

W: To my knowledge it was Kuter, but Norstad was there, too, because he was one of the big brains statisticians, strategy guys....

Q: Well, could have been Norstad; maybe he was mad at Norstad.

W: The office was full of people before he ran down all the buttons.

Q: They really responded when he hit the buttons.

W: He called me back from India for this meeting. I got him mad on that one, too. H

Q: What about?

W: He was raising Cain because we weren't getting some of the wings out, and the troubles that we were having, we were having plenty of engine troubles. The basic problem was engines. So he called me back, started raising Cain, telling me how bad the airplanes were. I got my dander up a little bit. I was taking about all I could take from everybody on this thing. So I popped off, I guess, when I shouldn't have, and I said: "General, I would like to be excused." He said: "What for?" I said: "I want to go send a cable to boys out there in India and tell them how lousy these damn airplanes are that your staff has told you. He looked at me, and said: "What did you say?" And I told him, and he started asking these other guys--they

heard these rumors. We had already launched one mission and had one on the way. So this is when I kind of blew my top. He looked at me, and started asking these guys. And finally he said: "You get the hell back out to India." And that's all it amounted to. This is the way he was. He always knew what he was talking about, except once in awhile the staff would get him crossed up, and then all hell would pop. Kenney may have told you this story. We got a call one afternoon to get on the Pennsylvania train that night and report to Arnold the next morning. Of course, Kenney and Arnold had been through this Mitchell thing and they were real close personal friends.

Q: You were at Wright Field at this time?

W: Yes, so was Kenney.

Q: Now this must have been before the war?

W: Yes, this was before Pearl Harbor, before we got into it. We got on the train and went in there--this was the old Munitions Building. As we walked in, Fairchild, who was there with Eaker said: "Boy, you guys are in big trouble." We we walked in, and here was Arnold sitting at his desk, head in his hands. He said: "Here I am in this boat all by myself, rowing like hell, and nobody is helping me. Now, George"-- and he started taking after George. George is unmilitary as hell, started sounding off; Arnold just really got mad. He grabbed me by the back of the blouse and my belt and pushed me up against George, and pushed us both out of the office into Eaker's office. Fairchild walked down the hall with us, and said: "Oh boy, this is terrible." Fairchild was kind of a nervous guy. Anyway, George said: "Oh forget it."

Q: What did Eaker do?

W: At the moment I can't remember if he was still in the office or it was Fairchild.

Q: Was he just pushing you out of his presence? He didn't want any more to do with you?

W: This is part of his act, and these bar type of swing doors. So he just grabbed me--George had already started out--so he grabbed me. He was always doing something like this, deliberately.

Q: Did you feel that he liked you?

W: Oh yes, sure, he wouldn't have put up with me if he hadn't. That's the way he was, firing people right and left. The only thing I could do was do the best I could do and that was it.

Q: He fired a lot of people out of jobs?

W: Oh yes, he relieved them all over the place. He'd listen to you, but if you didn't give him the facts, good or bad, then, boy, you'd be done. But if you give him the bad news along with the good, it was all right. So we get on the damn train and go back, and the next morning we get a telephone call to come back in there. Kenney blew his top, and he called Eaker or Fairchild, who said: "We don't know, better come on in; the Old Man wants to see you." So we get on the train again and go back in there. So on the way in, I said: "Now look, George let's cut this thing out. This thing we put on the other day wasn't military at all. Now let's behave ourselves this time." George said: "Yeah, I think you are right." So we went in, stiff as a ramrod, and saluted. Arnold sitting there, looked at the both of us, we said: "Sir you sent for us." Arnold: "What the hell is the matter with you guys, anyway." "Sir, we don't know," this is George, I wouldn't talk to him that way. This was Kenney, "Nothing, sir, you sent for us." Arnold: "Well, why are you acting like this?" So I broke down and got to laughing; I said: "Well, General, I guess it's my fault. I told George that we shouldn't be so umilitary as were yesterday, so we are trying to be good boys." "Well, he said, "I thought something

was really wrong."

Q: Did George Kenney call him Hap?

W: Oh yes.

Q: But you didn't call him "Hap?"

W: Oh no.

Q: Who called him "Hap," George Kenney, Spaatz called him

"Hap," and

W: I guess some of the other old timers did. But none of we so-called young guys would do that.

Q: I know Eaker didn't. Eaker called him "General," always "General."

W: As years have gone by, looking back at some of the things, I think, well, he just did that to relieve the tension. He deliberately would do these things (push people out of his office).

Q: I was told something interesting, that Arnold would jump on people and put tremendous pressure on them, but he knew where each man's breaking point was.

W: That's right.

Q:and he never went beyond that point?

W: I'm convinced of that. He pulled one on me, Kenney was raising Cain to get me down to Australia. You see, at one time the B-29s were supposed to be given to MacArthur.

Q: Not supposed to--MacArthur was asking for them.

W: Well, this was part of the plan, too. Then it was changed, at Tehran, or wherever it was they made the commitment. So Kenney was raising Cain to get me to come out there, and I wanted to get into the war, too. So Hap--he used to sneak off, go out to factories. I thought I had it fixed up with Gene (Beebe) to always let me know so I could

trigger off the AF Representatives-Colonels at all these factories. So Hap goes into Tulsa where they were building the A-20s. And I had just been raising holy hell with Don Douglas, and the guys at Tulsa. They got behind schedule, and this that, and the other. I never did find out what Don told them. But whatever he told them, Hap got just madder than \$700 and called me on the phone, and relieved me. This suited me fine because I thought, well now, I get a chance to go to the war. So I started unpacking my desk--this was late in the afternoon 3:00-4:00. I called up Personnel in Washington and said I had been relieved, Kenney has been asking for me, and I wanted to go out to the war. So they said, okay, they would issue the orders. Then, again, Gene didn't trigger me off. Now, Hap is out on the Coast at North American, I think, or Douglas. And he called me up and gave me orders to do this, that, so forth. And I said: "Sir, you relieved me yesterday, and my replacement is here and I have orders to go out to the Pacific." Arnold: "Oh, for crissakes, K.B. that was yesterday. So I unpacked my bag and put the papers back.

Q: He took these unscheduled trips. What did he do, fly all night?
W: Sometimes, yes.

Q: Peterson was flying for him at that time, wasn't he?

W: Peterson was flying for him, and so was Gene Beebe. This was before Gene was relieved, transferred and went to China. I know he did a lot of those things just for the psychological effects, the pressure.

Q: Well, the B-29 was his greatest love, because this was the instrumentality of strategic airpower. He never would relinquish control of this, he always kept it....

W: I went out there, I didn't report to anybody.

Q: And the theater commanders didn't like this one bit, did they?

W: Oh, no.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Chennault out there?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Trouble, it was getting supplies for the 73rd, or the 58th?

W: No, I was handling my own supplies. He was trying to get my airlift I was supposed to mount these missions out of China. You see, Chennault was running the Chinese AF. He tried to horn in on this, and I had a little piece of paper that said I reported only to the Chief of Staff. So I just told Chennault where to go. He didn't like me at all. He tried a number of times to work on Stilwell and Stratemeyer to change my orders so he, Chennault, would be giving me the orders.

Q: So you would make your report to him?

W: Yes, Stilwell would never go for it.

Q: Are you aware of the LeMay-Hansell business? You know, when Hansell got the 21st BombCom, and then he was relieved by LeMay. Are you aware of that?

W: I knew he was relieved. I had my own problems, I wasn't worrying about that outfit.

Q: Were you surprised, or was there any talk about that?

W: Well, they were at Guam, and I was out there in India and up to China. No, I just knew that he had been relieved. Why, I never took time to find out--up to this day.

Q: Did you know that Arnold was using Norstad as a sort of hatchet man? Norstad went out there to give the bad news?

W: Yes, he used Norstad for that. Norstad was not very popular, isn't to this day.

- Q: I know. Several people have made some comments about Norstad. Did Eaker ever talk to you about his relief from the 8th AF or transfer?
- W: No, I've been with Eaker many times. Of course, I wouldn't bring it up, and he never brought it up.
- Q: We were talking at lunch, he was very disappointed.
- W: Particularly because his pal Spaatz, was No. 1 guy out there.
- W: Arnold gave Kepner the 8th Fighter Command.
- Q: Over Frank Hunter?
- W: Yes, and I always felt that there was bad blood between Eaker and Kepner, because they had been very close friends, and all of a sudden this thing happens out there. Eaker's relieved, and Kepner is brought in and given the Fighter Command.
- Q: You mean, Hunter was relieved?
- W: No, Eaker was relieved.
- Q: Eaker was relieved, and they brought in Doolittle.
- W: No, I'm talking now about the two, Kepner and Eaker. I'm just guessing now.
- Q: That this created some friction between Kepner and Eaker?
- W: You have had no evidence of that? This is my own estimation. They had been very very close friends and I've been with both of them. Since then, I have never heard Kepner say anything about Eaker, one way or the other, or Eaker say anything about Kepner, so I just wondered.
- Q: Do you think that Arnold shot from the hip on any of his personnel changes? Relieved somebody without cause?
- W: Cases that I knew of--no. Now I can't say that I knew of the problem of Eaker or, with Hunter, because they were over there

in Europe, and I was having my problems here. But the cases I know of, people being relieved...

Q: In the case of Eaker, there were dispatches: "You have 850 planes in your operating inventory. How come you are only flying 60?" Arnold kept sending this kind of messages. I talked to a number of people who worked for Eaker, and who was it that said, that Eaker saw this stuff coming in, and he just dropped it in the waste paper basket, he figured these fellows on Arnold's staff were eager--Kuter, Norstad--some of these others were eager beavers. And finally, Arnold just made this change. Arnold went over there. He went over there in early Sep 1943. Idwal Edwards is very close to Eaker. I talked to him. And he told me that Eaker and Arnold had a knockdown-dragout in the Claridges Hotel so this was the beginning of the end. Eaker was going to go. Hunter is bitter at Arnold for something else.

(re Segregation Problem)

W: Coleman, yes, he got fired out there.

Q: Where, Selfridge?

W: Yes.

Q: He might have been the commanding officer.

W: He could have been the base commander.

Q: I can't remember, I have a lot of files on this thing.

W: Coleman, I've forgotten his first name now. He was fired out of there.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

W: Well, thinking of a lot of people I know, I would say "yes." Of course, during those times, he was under pressure all the time. He just didn't have time to sit around with the boys and shoot the breeze. On some of these trips that we took, I took trips with him.

He, Knudsen and I went to some of the factories.

Q: What did he do when he came to a plant or a factory?

W: He was very pleasant and affable with the workmen and the officers of the company.

Q: Did he go right to the factory; right to the maintenance area?

W: No, he just walked through. Every time I went with him, he was with Knudsen, and Knudsen was the production man, and he just followed along with him. Arnold really didn't know much about the manufacturing business, anyway.

Q: Did he ask some tough questions?

W: No, because everytime I was with him, it was Knudsen who was the front man. When they heard Knudsen was coming, everything would stop, and they would start beating on the tin ware and so forth, and yelling at him.

Q: You know, when Knudsen quit in 1945, you were at Wright Field, I guess. You had just come back, and Benny Meyers had aspirations for that job, they called it the Air Technical Service Command (ATSC).

Benny Meyers had his eye on that job. Did you know that? Of course, they didn't give it to him. They gave it to Knerr. Benny Meyers retired on a disability. Did you hear any rumors that there was some anonymous document written about Benny Meyers, which was filed? It came up 2 years later. This is how the committee came on it. There was an anonymous letter, and it came to the attention of the committee, and the AF sent it to file. This is why the AF got in trouble on it. And they didn't investigate it, and this anonymous letter made charges against Benny Meyers.

W: That's what triggered the whole investigation?

Q: Well, the investigation 2 years later, started with

Howard Hughes and Elliott Roosevelt and they upon this material on Benny Meyers. And Junius Jones was the Air Inspector, and he's the guy who suppressed the material. And of course, it made it worse for the AF, that they had this case, and they didn't do anything about it. Did you ever go on a fishing trip with Arnold? The Wolfes and the Arnolds, of course, you were at different levels, you never had any social relations with Arnold?

W: No, because I never served with Arnold, my brother served with him.

Q: Has he passed away?

W: Yes, my brother died in '65 from cancer. He retired in '44 with a bad heart, so they may have been referring to him, because he and Arnold were real good friends. Mrs. Arnold say anything about my brother?

Q: No, she talked about General Wolfe. She may have been talking, did he make General?

W: No, he was a colonel, retired in 1944.

Q: Arnold and Westover, about his death.

W: I'm the one that told Arnold about it. Let's go back a step. There was always a lot of hard feeling between the lunatics, the lighter than air people and the heavier than air people. They were all higher ranking than we were.

Q: And Westover was lighter than air?

W: That's right, and I was an instructor at Brooks Field, 1922-26. They sent a lot of these lunatics down there to learn to fly, a various small percentage of them got by. That didn't help. When Westover became chief, the first thing he did was order all these guys back to March Field to get their wings, including himself.

Westover had been washed out before, and Kepner been washed out, too. I was the AF representative out there then, and I got a message from March Field that Westover was spending the night there, and was going to fly into the little field there at the Lockheed plant, at Burbank, and for me to be there to meet him. It was not the big airport as we now know. I was standing there, waiting for him, and I saw him spin in, rushed over, and saw that both of them dead. So I went over and got hold of the telephone and called Washington, asked for Arnold and told him. It was the first news he had.

Q: That was a change in fortunes.

W: Westover had no more business flying over there that day by himself than the man in the moon, because he wasn't a good pilot. But he was the boss man, and he wanted a pair of wings, and he got them. That's what took him.

Q: I heard a story about Andrews, Andrews was in his '50s when he was flying and crashed into a mountain in Iceland.

W: That's right.

Q: Did you know anything about Arnold and Andrews? Did you ever see them together?

W: No, I heard all these stories about Andrews being a protegee of Hap's, or vice versa. Andrews was put in charge of the first GHQ AF.

Q: Andrews was a year ahead of Arnold. He was '06 and Arnold was '07. Were they rivals for the job? When Westover was killed, did you hear anything about Andrews being made for that job?

W: If anything was going on, I wouldn't have heard anything about it. I was sitting out here on the Coast. I didn't have any access to the intrigue and so forth. It was the next day that Arnold was made Chief.

Q: No, it was about a week.

W: Well, shortly thereafter, there was no lengthy time for maneuvering.

Q: You know, there was some delay, possibly occasioned by rumors in Washington that Arnold was a drinker. Does that surprise you?

W: It certainly would.

Q: You didn't see him drink?

W: As I say, I never was in a position to go out socially with the Arnolds, and when I was then acquainted with him, it was always on business. I do know that he and Knudsen and I would have a drink or two in the evening after a hard day of going around the plants. I'll tell you a cute story about Knudsen. Knudsen, of course, been with Ford for many years, and went to General Motors. Arnold had an old broken-down Ford at Bolling Field, and we would get in there late in the evening. One of the aides would bring up this Ford. Arnold would get in that and drive it to his quarters, rather than call his chauffeur out, because we didn't know what time we would get in.

Knudsen was always fussing at him about that damned Ford. He said: "Why do you ride in that for," just ribbing him, Hap would smile and say: "Well, it's the best I can do; best I can get." We came back one night from a trip, and we all got out of the airplane, and Hap's looking all around the place, doesn't see the aide, doesn't see the car, finally he let's out a roar and the sergeant comes us, and he says: "Where's my car." The Sergeant said: "Sir, I just brought it down; there it is." Arnold: "That's not my car." Knudsen said: "I got damned tired of seeing your drive around in that Ford. That's a brand new Chevrolet. Now you take it and drive home."

Q: We are talking about the B-29 and the near miss you had

with the whole program getting washed out. Arnold had great confidence, obviously, because he had set up the production. He had set up all these facilities, the training and everything. Yet he had a B-32 as a sort of fall-back position. So he wasn't going to put all his eggs in one basket. And, of course, the B-32 never got off the ground, really.

W: I think we had about two of them.

Q: You had 15 of them, Kenney used them. They sent them down to Kenney's theater, Southwest Pacific.

W: I didn't know that. I knew there were two of them out there, when I got to Okinawa. Frank Cook, who was Assistant Project Officer, under Jake Harmon brought that out there. He was flying it up and down, letting the boy's look at it. This is a way out, just before the surrender.

Q: So Arnold, it's kind of interesting, he put his eggs in that basket, didn't have all of his eggs in there, and he had a fall-back position just in case the B-29 didn't make it.

W: The reason for that was because....

Q: Was that his idea?

W: This, I don't know. I think it was probably Echols', because, having called on the industry to analyze the B-29, should we go on with it, I'm sure it was Echols who finally said: "Well, the industry is against the B-29. It is a far out airplane, heavy wing-loaded thing. So we better have something to fall back on.

Q: Then you think it might have been Echols' idea?

W: Oh, I'm sure it was. Arnold had the greatest faith in the world in Echols. He wouldn't let him out of his sight. Poor Echols, like the rest of us, tried to get into the war, and he wouldn't let him go. He had a lot of confidence in him.

Q: You know, Arnold had an experience in WWI. He never got into combat, and this was a hangup with him, that he never got into the fight, and consequently, when guys like yourself said they wanted to get into battle, he was more tolerant. Once in a while he would let a guy go.

W: That's what happened to me.

Q: You got in, but he never let Echols go. I was given a different picture of Echols. I was given the picture of Echols as a sort of gentle, Southernerman.

W: He was.

Q: That Arnold put more faith in Benny Meyers than Echols.

W: I don't think so, for a different reason, I'm talking about Echols, from the engineering fellow. And as you said before, you've heard from other sources that his brother-in-law, Jan Howard, who thought he was the greatest engineer in the world. Echols was just the other way around, Echols never thought he was the greatest engineer in the world, but he got the job done, and inspired the young engineers like Chidlaw, Harmon, and the rest of us.

Q: Echols was a modest man, soft spoken.

W: Soft spoken, Southern gentleman.

Q: Why did Arnold go to Meyers on a lot of things?

W: Well, because, I've often thought about that, and the only reason I can think about, Meyers was a very brilliant guy, financially. He knew the financial business, could put on a good act and Meyers never hesitated about running roughshod over anybody.

Q: Even Echols?

W: No, he never got away with that. But all the rest of the boys out there. His only experience in the AF--he was a damned

lousy pilot--was in the budget and financial business.

Q: Could it be that Arnold relied on Echols for engineering?

W: Absolutely.

Q: And then for Meyers as an expediter?

W: No, not initially. I think he relied on Meyers to give him the support that he, Arnold, needed when he went in to fight for money. Because, in many respects, Benny Meyers was somewhat like the former Secretary of Defense, McNamara. He had a photographic memory like McNamara. He could stand up quote figures as long as you'd sit around and listen to him. He was different because he was on the make, as we found out later. You can't say that about McNamara. Benny had no experience with anything mechanical or engineering. I would really say that I think, when you come right down to it, Benny thought the fan on the car is what made it run. He put on a big front, you see. All he did in the expediting business was get on the phone and call up these manufacturers and just eat their fannies out.

Q: In a way, he served a purpose that Arnold wanted to have done. He went out and did things.

W: You see, the difference between Arnold and Benny, Arnold didn't run roughshod over people. He gave you a job to do and expected you to do it, and if you didn't, why he gave you one more chance. And if you didn't get it done, why then you were gone.

Q: Did he give you two chances, general?

W: As far as I know, he never acted on the spur of the moment, as far as I knew.

Q: On the subject of Arnold's relations with the aircraft manufacturers, he really put himself out on a limb. Don't you think

this took some kind of vision? He tried to get them, without a real commitment to convert to War Production, and I think that they dragged their feet, didn't they?

W: Some of them did, some of them went ahead. Kenney must have told you the problems we had in convincing the aircraft industry that we were going to expand at that terrific rate.

Q: No, he didn't.

W: Arnold told us how many planes he wanted when. We drew a schedule. Some place in Wright Field we've still got the original schedule which was drawn out on butcher paper, big long thing. Trainers, transports, fighters and bombers, and he told us how many he wanted, and at what time, and we sat down then, at Wright Field. Chidlaw was one of them; Crawford was the other. Chidlaw was the top project man on trainers and transports. Another brilliant guy there who was No. 2 to Echols by the name of Al Lyons. He died before the war really got going. So we just sat down and figured who was making these airplanes. We made a guess at it, called them up. And boy, why some of them didn't have heart attacks, I'll never know. We just said: "Look, you are going to have by such and such a time, an output of so many bombers or fighters or trainers. You get busy and tell us what kind of money you need, how big a factory, and so on. We were all in that act. Then we had to decide what airplanes we were going to put in the war. For instance, it was a tossup then for the B-23, which was the follow-on of the old B-18, and the B-17. The same way with the A-20 and the B-25, and the rest of them.

Q: Wasn't the B-18 a bust? It had no range at all.

W: For that time, it was the best we could get with the money that was available. We follow that on with the Douglas B-23.

Q: You mentioned some trouble with Louis Johnson. We are talking about the late '30s now. The War Department was interested in buying B-18s rather than the B-17s because you could get more airplanes for less money. Do you remember anything of that struggle?

W: I don't remember that. We had a competition. We drew out the rules of the competition, and Douglas lost it on the basis of later deliveries, higher price and lower performance.

Q: Douglas lost it, huh? This was, what a four-engine bomber?

W: The B-23, two-engine, follow-on of the B-18. We bought 50 of them and had them in service, and most of the people wanted it. And the guy was responsible for underbidding the performance and overbidding the price, was the No. 2 man at Douglas. Anyway, every one of the airplanes that were bought and put in our possession was evaluated by an evaluation team on the basis of performance, delivery and cost.

Q: I wanted to ask you something, you reminded me. There were some reports by Drew Pearson, for example, who implied, or said, that because of the family relationship between Douglas and Arnold, that Douglas got breaks on production contracts. Do you remember that when Barbara and Bruce were married?

W: I don't remember that connection, but I know Pearson was always hammering away at something.

Q: You are talking about Knudsen going to see Pearson?

W: Yes, there was one attack that came out by Pearson against Knudsen. Knudsen got real upset about it, and he went over to see Pearson. This is the story that I got, and there was never another attack. As far as I remember.

Q: You know Pearson was always attacking Arnold. He never had a good word for Arnold. And I wanted to ask you about this Douglas

thing. Do you feel that Douglas got any special breaks in production? You mentioned this evaluation board....

W: That's right, they lost the bomber contract...

Q: On the B-23?

W: On the B-23, which is what most of our people wanted. We had bought 50 of them. We knew about the airplane, had shaken it down. And it would have been a medium bomber. So instead of buying the B-23, we bought the B-25 from Kindelberger.

Q: They lost out to North American. There's a case where it was strictly a matter of dollars, and time, and performance.

W: We had a handful of boys there at Wright Field who had been in the business a long time, headed up by Echols and Al Lyons. They laid out the rules how we judged these things. As far as I know, every manufacturer was loaded down to the best of our ability because we had to get our capacity out.

Q: Gen. Wolfe, who came up with the idea of the XB-40 and the XB-41? This was the one to put armor on the B-17 and the B-24? To use them as escorts.

W: That came out of the Bomber Branch there at Wright Field.

Q: Was that Lyons?

W: No, it was Harmon, if I remember correctly. Of course, Lyons was sitting up above Harmon, and Echols was sitting about Lyons.

Q: I saw somewhere where Lyons had a role in that thing. That was a bust.

W: Well, because if I remember correctly, about that time was when we began to get the turrets out, the chin turret on the B-17, and the belly turret, and the side guns, but it was supposed to have been a gunship.

Q: It just seems to me, it was so heavily loaded down, it had a slow speed, it was all right when the bombers were going to the target, but once the bombers dropped their load, they could take off and go home. But it couldn't. It had to stay back and then it became a liability, so it didn't work too well.

W: It was just one of those things we tried. We tried a lot of things that were really busts.

Q: (Re XB-40 bust) Of course, all this harking back--and I'm sounding like this guy Shaughnessy now--you know, harking back to the lack of a long range escort. We didn't have one until late in the war, and by that time we had suffered some casualties.

W: There was no real requirement set up in the early part of the war for escort fighters--on those ranges that the 17s and 24s were able to get.

Q: Is anybody to blame; was it a matter of foresight?

W: No, I don't think so, because the philosophy then was that daylight bombing was practical. The British said no, never did believe it. And we kept hammering away at it all along. We said daylight bombing is the answer, precision bomb in daylight--with certain types of formations and with the bombers interdependent upon each other, with good fire power. You take the history of the development of the B-17, you kept adding more range to it, adding more firepower and getting better performance. It was phenomenal the way the thing turned out. But there was no concept that we would ever need fighter escorts out from the target. Because in the old days, in the Tactical School, the policy then was, and the strategy then was, we would get control of the air. We would get that with the fighters. Then when it came to these long ranges, and the possibility of making the long,

ranges, that upset the whole thing. You know, you only have to go back to 1937 to find out that the Command and General Staff College said the role of the airplane was to take the place of the carrier pigeon.

Q: Or as strictly auxiliary to the ground forces.

W: Strictly auxiliary offshore where the artillery and close defenses couldn't reach. That's written up in the War Department's roles and missions, in 1937.

Q: Did you have any contact with a guy named George Goddard?

W: Oh yes, sure.

Q: Tell me about George Goddard.

W: Well, he's one of these real capable, eccentric type of guys. Beautiful, wonderful imagination and drive. Biggest pest in the world. I used to throw him out of my office there at Wright Field, time after time.

Q: He's carrying pictures all the time.

W: And getting something done.

Q: You know,

W: Have you read his book?

Q: I sure have. Let me tell you something (off-tape).

Q: I want to ask you about Goddard and Arnold. You know, Goddard, as you read the book, Goddard got on Arnold's list because of Minton Kaye. And I was out to see Minton Kaye in Pasadena last week. Do you remember this friction between Minton Kaye and Goddard?

W: Yes, professional jealousy.

Q: What is your evaluation of that struggle?

W: I don't think there is anybody in this country, maybe worldwide, that knows as much about photography or has contributed as much

as George. Did he ever tell you about when he took over the Jena Optical Company in Europe? Took me two years to get that statement out. He just walked over there and took it over.

Q: After the war?

W: Just as the war folded up. He walked over and took over Jena Optical Company. That guy, he was requisitioning, going in and taking things. Took up a couple of years to cover it up.

Q: What do you mean, took it away, in the name of the Air Force?"
W: Yes, because they were the outstanding optical glass people, and he just took it over. Instead of the Russians getting it, George got it.

Q: Then he did a good thing?

W: Sure, without any authority.

Q: He got you into trouble on this?

W: I had to clean the thing up, later on.

Q: I'm going to see him next week.

W: Give him my best regards. When we went down to the South Pacific, they didn't have any good maps of the islands and so forth, George got his photographic group to go out there, and take photographs of those little islands, and show the depth of the water.

Q: For some reason, he and Minton Kaye didn't see eye to eye, and Minton Kaye was very close to Arnold.

W: For a while.

Q: And then Minton Kaye lost out, in that position. Do you know anything about that?

W: I happened to be there the day that I heard Arnold tell somebody to fire Minton and send him far away.

Q: So he fired him, do you know why?

W: I'm not going to tell you.

Q: Arnold used to raise hell with George Goddard, why?

W: Because he was such a damn pest. He was always in there after Arnold. Why don't we do this? And why don't we do that? And half the time he would say: "Okay, George." And the next time he would say: "Get the hell out of here, George!" George was a real pest. He had the tenacity of 10,000 bulldozers.

Q: You know him better than I do. I just know him several months.

W: He's a great guy. He never got due credit.

Q: Well he had this strip camera, which did a heck of a good job, and Arnold didn't recognize its value. Why did Arnold get mad? I know he was obnoxious. But according to this book--and I've read it very carefully, at least I think I did--Arnold simply didn't recognize Goddard's genius in developing the strip camera. As you know, Goddard was sent out of Washington and he later turned up working for the Navy, and then it was due to Lovett and a couple of other people, that he came back to work for the Air Force. But it wasn't Arnold who recognized his talent. This is what I get out of his book.

W: I don't know.

Mrs. W: Who finally recognized Goddard?

Q: Lovett and some other people. They used his strip camera at Normandy. They exposed the German obstruction, and it has been used to expose the Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962. He was a great genius. It was just that he and Arnold had a conflict, partly due to this other man. If you read the book, he calls the man "Colonel Nemesis," and that's Minton Kaye.

W: That might have a lot to do with it right there, but Arnold finally got off Kaye, and sent him far away.

Q: Maybe he brought Goddard back?

W: Well, Goddard would irritate anybody. If you listen to Goddard, and say: "Fine, George, that's wonderful," The next day, he would be back in with another idea: "George we can't do all these things." Then he would get all hot and bothered about it. In the meantime, you say, "George, go back down to the laboratory, get that thing you sold me on last week." He was always coming up with ideas, and in those days we didn't have much money. We couldn't give the photographic lab that George ran everything he wanted. But boy, once he got over there in Europe, where there was no need for money, he just went wild.

Q: I got the impression that Goddard did some great things but sometimes if you had him going in this direction, you wanted him to go this way, and you turned away and did something else. When you came back, Goddard was going that way.

W: All inventors or people who conceive things are that way.

Q: He was a genius, but he was sort of unreconstructed.

W: It's hard to explain.

Q: Did you have any contact with Elliott Roosevelt?

W: I was fussing at Hap Arnold to get more people out there to Wright Field, so he called me up one day and said: "KB, you have been pressing me about some more officers," And I said: "That's right, when do I get them?" He said: "I'm sending you one tomorrow." Hell, it was Elliott Roosevelt. Well out he comes, this is Captain Elliott Roosevelt. Boy, what a character.

Q: Did he give you a lot of trouble?

W: Oh God. He'd say: "Don't you worry about that, I'll call up my poppa and we'll get that done." Always poppa. And God knows,

whether he was telling his poppa all the troubles. I think a lot of the troubles we had with Franklin came directly from Elliott. He had just remarried--one of the sweetest gals you would ever like to meet (Scoggins), the gal from Texas. And she had two sons, real nice boys. But the way that damn character treated her was just god awful. He was the most conceited ass that ever came along the pike, and he couldn't do anything.

Q: He left her for Faye Emerson.

Q: How did you get rid of Elliott?

W: A lot of maneuvering. He went from there to Europe.

Q: No, he went to Newfoundland, I read his book last week, "As He Saw it."

W: He headed up a reconnaissance outfit over there. Have you heard the story about a young pilot coming in the bar, one night. The old Rothschild home in London was fixed up as an officer's club. The story goes this way. This young captain was a pilot and had some real rough missions in a squadron under Elliott. He came into the officer's club there, and Elliott was learning up against the bar, tight as usual, bragging, shooting off his mouth, and this Captain walked over and said: "Are you BG Elliott Roosevelt?" And he said: "Yes, I am, so what?" Pow, he cold-cocked him right there. He called him everything in the world. I can't prove that story, but it was going around.

Q: What would you consider Arnold's greatest attribute, his greatest contribution to the war, or to the Air Corps, or airpower?

W: Well, I'd have to start off by saying I think he was a great leader. A lot of people didn't like him, but he was a great leader. And he had inspiration. He could see what this was going

to be. I mean he was the only one who could see the magnitude of what we had to have--to my knowledge. Nobody else was thinking of these numbers that he was thinking of.

Q: In that 50,000 plane figure, was this Roosevelt's, or did Arnold suggest this number? This was the number which shocked a lot of people because up to this time they were talking in little numbers. Did he have anything to do with putting that figure in Roosevelt's head, or in his speech?

W: I'm sure--and I can't prove a word I'm saying--that the original gang, who support Mitchell, were the original airpower people. And that group were the people that thought that big, thought that way. And the spokesman for them was Arnold. I think Hal George, I think Tony Frank, and all the rest of those boys that went to Siberia after the court martial.

Q: Did Tony Frank go to Siberia, too?

W: Yes, sure. Kenney went to Siberia. You know that story?

Q: No, I don't.

W: I'm disappointed in George. He didn't tell you that one. George was sent to Siberia, which was Camp Benning, Georgia. Arnold went to Ft. Riley, Kansas. He had one half squadron of observation airplanes That was his assignment; Tony Frank....

Q: Was Tony Frank assigned to Washington during the Billy Mitchell trial? What did Tony Frank do that caused him to be sent to Siberia?

W: He supported Mitchell.

Q: Then he was in Washington.

W: I just don't know, I imagine he was. I don't know. But Hal George supported him; George Kenney supported him, and a lot of the juniors supported him.

Q: Brereton was a junior, did he get sent out, too? He was in there, too.

W: Yes, all of them got shifted out. George Kenney was sent to Camp Benning. George is a smart guy. So they gave him a job-- this was an infantry base. So George rewrote the infantry's book on machine guns. And while he was there, he met this chap by the name of Sutherland, Sutherland was Chief of Staff for MacArthur in Australia. Brett was sent down there as the top AF guy.

Q: This was around the time of Pearl Harbor?

W: It was right after that. We started building up Australia. MacArthur escaped out of there, and went down South. And they sent Brett out there. He was one of the old timers too. He didn't get along with MacArthur at all. So MacArthur told Sutherland, he said: "Look, I've got to have an air man here. This guy Brett isn't doing us any good at all." Of course, he had Brereton over there in the Philippines, and the Indies, too. He came out of the Philippines and went down to the East Indies. So Sutherland said: "Well, I know a chap, if you can get him. He's a real airman. He is a proponent of airpower." And MacArthur said: "Who is he?" And he said: "George Kenney," Sutherland having known George down at Camp Benning, when he was serving his tour, and that's how George got down there with MacArthur. And George had known Mrs. MacArthur when she was Jean Faircloth, living in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, And I knew her then. I went through there cross country on a flight. We were stuck with the weather, and she invited us out for dinner. So when I was stationed in the Philippines in 1926, she came out there as a maiden gal on a visit. Shortly thereafter she married MacArthur. George was in like Flynn, recommended by Sutherland. He knew Jean. So he was the one

that converted MacArthur to airpower.

Q: Did MacArthur understand airpower?

W: No.

Q: But he trusted Kenney?

W: Kenney had his problems. When Kenney got there, the Army had commandeered every tugboat, barge and whatnot. They were going to make the great landing in New Guinea. Old George said that's not the way to do it. Let's do it by air. So he called in these top Army commanders, and had a big seance, and they pooh-pooed the idea. With bad weather and so forth, how could they be dependent on airpower?

And so, George said: "Well, you pick the worst day you can find, and I'll demonstrate to you that I can feed you and supply you with ammunition by air. So MacArthur finally said: "Okay. You're talking big. Let's see you do it." Of course, George was a real good airman. And we had just developed a few years before, those little localizer radio beams. So they picked a bad day, George sent reconnaissance planes out and they dropped these radio beams in the areas where these people had selected they would be. Of course, he dropped the stuff by parachute, and kicked it out the door. And the stuff fell there and they were bogged down with food and ammunition. MacArthur was out there to see it. He called a meeting and said: "From now on, we're going to move through the islands by air," and that was the beginning of it. He turned it over just like that. And he's the one who coined the phrase: "We will advance the bomber line." Words to that effect. And from that day on, he was a converted proponent of airpower. George kept hammering away and proving it all the time. That was the reason, I, amongst a lot of people, said, maybe MacArthur has got the message now. Up to that time, you couldn't find a single soul in the Air

Corps of that vintage that had one good word to say because he was a member of the court martial that shanghaied Mitchell.

Q: Did you ever hear anything about this business between Brereton and MacArthur, about Brereton warning MacArthur that they ought to disperse the planes, this was after the attack on Pearl Harbor and MacArthur failed to take any action for, like 8 or 10 hours. Did you ever hear anything about that?

W: Just about what you heard. I know nothing firsthand, but the same story, and Gene Eubank...

Q: He's in Mississippi.

W: Yes, he's down in Gulfport.

Q: Is he worth seeing, he had some contact with Arnold, didn't he?

W: Yes, and he can give you the story about the Philippines.

Q: He was down at SAT, this School for Applied Tactics. Didn't he head that up, down in Orlando, during the war?

W: I don't remember.

Q: But he had some contact with Arnold, I see his name in there quite a bit.

W: He's quite a guy.

Q: You say Lovett and Arnold worked very close?

W: Oh yes, perfect team, and I have always felt that Bob Lovett's job was fending off the civilian side of the department against the military side.

Q: Maybe fending off Roosevelt, too?

W: Yes, like when he stepped in there and said, the Ordnance Corps can't do this, why, we will do it, if the Signal Corps can't do this, we will do it.

Q: Were there some planes, like this C-76. That was a bust, wasn't it?

W: There were some others that were a bust, too. We were frantic. We had a program there to build wooden airplanes, and did build some wooden planes.

Q: How about the gliders. They had some trouble with those, too, didn't they? Did you get into that production problem?

W: Yes, I had that too, we just had to lay it on top of everything else.

Q: Richard Dupont?

W: Yes, we had everybody building gliders that we could possibly think of. The whole industrial capacity of this country was just absolutely overloaded. The Army had to have theirs, and the Navy had to have theirs, and the British were getting some, and the French were getting some, and the Russians. So whatever we could eke out, we would eke out.

Q: Did you get into any hassles with Jimmy Burns and Harry Hopkins about supplying the Russians with planes?

W: No.

Q: That was above your level?

W: My job was just to get the stuff built and get it out.

Q: Did Arnold ever get mad at you?

W: He'd get all upset and crotchety and irritated. With all the problems he had, you couldn't blame him.

Q: When he got mad, did he use profanity?

W: Not much, a little. Not really.

Q: Raise his voice?

- W: Raise his voice, but never screaming and shrieking. But you could tell he was mad.
- Q: He had a perennial smile on his face. But it didn't mean he was happy?
- W: No, I don't think he ever was happy.
- Q: Did he ever sit in his office, and put his feet up on the desk and say: "Let s relax this afternoon?" You never saw him that way?
- W: He just didn't have the time to do it. Between running over to Congress and reporting to Franklin (D. Roosevelt) and giving his own crowd hell and fighting the battle for Spaatz over there in Europe against the British.
- Q: How about fighting the battle for Spaatz against the Navy? Did you get into that, keeping the stuff out of the Pacific? The Navy wanted B-24s out in the Pacific, and Arnold was trying to keep them down and this BOLERO. BOLERO was the buildup in Europe.
- W: I'd forgotten about that. We had our problems with the Navy, I mean I had my problems, production-wise with them.
- Q: What kind of problems did you have?
- W: Getting priorities and so forth.
- Q: Did the Navy try to crank in a lot of their ships, a lot of lesser things into the ALA priority?
- W: Yes. But as I said, between Lovett and Hap, we could move so doggone much faster than the Navy could. They'd wake up and we would have it. Then I had some real tough expediters that I got out of the automotive industry.
- Q: Was Orville Cook involved?
- W: Yes, he was working for me.

Q: I talked to Orville Cook recently.

W: Oh you did, did you get anything out of him?

Q: A couple of things, basically, the production approach. He doesn't have the high regard for Arnold that you have.

W: He doesn't? What is his criticism of Arnold?

Q: That Arnold was sort of haphazard. He was not organized.

W: Of course, I can give you an explanation of that. Cook was a very methodical type himself, and he was my Deputy, and as a Deputy he did real well. When I was making the decisions, he would put them through. Then when he took over, it wasn't the same thing. He wouldn't make a decision and ramrod it through.

Q: When did he take over from you?

W: When I left in 1943. But he was a brilliant guy. He was one of the top propeller engineers in the world--out there at Wright Field. He ran the Propellor Laboratory. He is a good engineer, but kind of a colorless fellow in a way. He wouldn't take the chances that some of the others would.

Q: I sort of got this impression.

W: But he was a good man, and to me, he made an awfully good No. 2 man. I'd make the decisions and he would carry them out. That's a lot easier than making them yourself.

Q: Did you feel that Arnold should have had a better organization? As an administrator Arnold was probably a bust. He just didn't have time to get coordinated comments on anything he had going. He had to make too many decisions, and he couldn't wait for them in the staff.

W: Well, maybe I am the wrong fellow to say that to, because if he had had a big organization around, he wouldn't have gotten done near

what he got done. Because he would give you a job to do and you were supported. You knew damn well when he told you to do it, it was not the orthodox thing to do. But he and Lovett supported you. Like I told you on the IFF thing, and a number of others. I got into the same kind of hassle with the Ordnance Corps on machine guns. I had to take over the production of 50 caliber machine guns because the Ordnance Corps had never reduced the gun to mass production. So I was called in there one day and told you just take over production of .50 caliber machine guns.

Q: How about bombs. Wasn't there trouble with bomb shortage?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: Knerr was complaining about bombs being short?

W: I never had a high regard for the Ordnance Corps. You can find Ordnance officers who will tell you what an SOB I am--to this day, if they're still alive--because I fought the Ordnance Corps since the beginning of time.

Q: Knerr was in charge of logistics in the European theater, and in the last year of the war, there was a dire shortage of 500# bombs. Do you remember that? There was a big hassle about that. He claimed that they didn't have the right ordnance. Was this any failure to foresee the need? Of course, they were dropping them in such great number that you couldn't possibly anticipate the requirement.

W: You have to give the Ordnance Corps credit. If you remember when Patton started to cross Europe, he had first priority of everything. We were cut down on gasoline, we were cut down on rubber, and so forth, to mount that operation of Patton's. And part of the Ordnance Corps was cut down too. But on the other hand, who in the

Air Force could foresee the consumption that we were really using? Nobody could guess that far. Who could guess the losses of the bombers? The only thing there was when I went through Germany on that Morgenthau assignment that I had, I went into Kassel, Germany.

Q: What was that assignment?

W: They conjured up an ad hoc committee and put me in charge of it, and the job was to write the post-surrender terms of Germany. So I was sent over there with a group. So I went around behind the troops as they were uncovering the place and got into Kassel one day. And that was of the centers of German aircraft industry, and they had this great big flak tower in which the engineering staff and production staff of these factories around Kassel had their headquarters. The day I got in there, they were still in there, so I interviewed the head man there, who spoke very good English. We got talking about the war, and he said: "It was really a heartbreaker." He said: "Our fighters would go out there today and knock down bombers all over the place." We'd say: "Well, we really got them." The next day the same number would come through. No matter how many we knocked down, there was always somebody coming through with the same number. The philosophy that the Air Force had, started with Arnold and his immediate staff, except Echols. Just have plenty of everything. Don't take a chance; don't run short. That's why we put three companies into building the B-17, and three into building the B-29s.

Q: Arnold didn't play it like McNamara played this war, he was going to use the last bullet on the last day of the war. Arnold couldn't afford to allow these things to happen.

W: All the way through his program it was that way. There was plenty of stuff ordered. There was never any argument about: "Are

we going to build 50 this month, or build 75." You build all you can.

Q: Arnold, right after Pearl Harbor, hired Pearre Cabell and Larry Norstad to be his "Advisory Council," and these guys were ministers without portfolio. They had a job and they were just supposed to be idea men. He said: "You guys are my idea men. I don't have time to think." This is what Norstad told me. "I just want you to think and stay out of operations." Did they? Did they ever get in your hair?

W: No. Never. They stayed out of operations.

Q: Of course, Norstad left, and then Jake Smart came in, and then Rosie O'Donnell came in later on, and Fred Deane toward the end of the war. These were people that Arnold had close to him who were told to think ideas, and if he liked them, he would push them.

W: He had great confidence in these people that he selected, unfortunately a lot of them fell down. Early part of the war, one of them, his real close boys was Joe Dawson. He'd been with Arnold many years, so when we took over the British Lockheed Hudson's, light bombers, Arnold put Joe Dawson in command of the outfit, and it was nothing but a debacle, Joe just couldn't run an outfit. It was a great disappointment to Arnold.

Q: Where did he fit into Arnold's staff?

W: He had been with Arnold before the war in one of the bomb squadrons, bomb groups, just like my brother. And he took a liking to him, he was one of the old timers in the AF.

Q: How about Ray Dunn?

W: Yes, Ray was another protege of Arnold's. He was kind of a super aide. I don't know what ever became of him.

Q: He's in Washington. I think he got in trouble--he was in this airborne operation over Sicily, I think that's where he got in trouble.

W: He was another disappointment to Arnold.

Q: How about some others like Sue Cigarette?

W: Oh yes, I knew him.

Q: He got in trouble, too.

W: Sue had many opportunities and never came through. He was in command of that Selfridge Field setup at one time.

Q: He was, and he made general twice, and was demoted twice. He succeeded Arnold at March Field, and then he stubbed his toe and was taken down. Then was with the Magruder Commission in China when the war started, and he stubbed his toe there, too. And he blamed Arnold for it.

W: His problem was the bottle.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald? He was taken down, too. He was in the Middle East. Do you remember him?

W: Yes, sure I remember him. Those were the old timers that were coming up. Guys who came up with Arnold on the West Coast--Eaker, Spaatz, some of the others--got better positions than the fellows who came up with Andrews on the East Coast. Is there any merit in that judgment?

W: I hadn't thought about that before. I'll say this for Hap, he gave every one of those old timers--his contemporaries--a chance. Every one of them.

Q: And if they didn't make it, he took them down, like Jakey Fickel.

W: Jakey Fickel, "Jingling Willy" Jones, B.Q. Jones, Brereton, Tony Frank....

Q: Well, Brereton and Tony Frank got to high position.

W: Yes, but they didn't last very long.

Q: Well, Brereton was head of the airborne. He made three stars.

W: Yes, but I mean he was shifted around from 9th AF.... and Tony had some good commands too.

Q: Tony wanted a combat command; Arnold wouldn't give it to him.

W: That's right, same way with Fitzgerald. It's odd, if you look back on it, to see and realize that everyone of those old timers--I don't give a damn what they say today--had their opportunities with Hap. And those that came through, made good, well taken care of, others didn't.

Interview LG Kenneth B. Wolfe, Lake San Marcos, Calif., Mar 18, 1970

Q: One of the first questions I usually ask people is: do they remember the first time they met General Hap Arnold. Do you remember your first encounter with him?

W: This is an unusual situation in a way. I had never served under Hap. I had met him two or three times at a conference. I didn't know him. I don't think he knew me. First thing that happened to me was Ira Eaker called me on the phone one day, that's when we had the old office at the Pentagon, this is March 1938, and I was the AF representative out here with all these factories.

Q: I see, that was the Munitions Building.

W: Yes, the old Munitions Building, and as I said earlier, I had been trying all my career to get a duty station out here, so I finished the General Command Staff College, I was ordered out here to be the AF representative in Santa Monica. I had been here a year and 7 months when Ira called on the phone and said: "Get in here without delay." And I said: "What's going on?" And he said: "Hap wants to see you." And I said: "It's going to take a little time." He said: "Don't you have any airplanes out there?" I said: "yes." And he said: "Take one of them, and come on in here. Now!" So I went in there. I went in to see Hap. And he said: "Well, we are going to organize a Production Division at Wright Field. George Kenney is going to be No. 1 man; Pop Powers is going to be No. 2 man; and you are No. 3. So I want you to go back out to Wright Field and tell Colonel Robins that he has now got a Production Division, and you three guys are going to run it.

Q: This is Warner Robins?

W: Yes. So that was the beginning of the business. So meantime, Kenney was down in Puerto Rico when they were building that big operation there. And Powers was some place else, so I got the thing started. The next thing that happened, Hap called me up, and said: "I want you to come in here and bring that production plan in," which he told me to do. So I went in and he said now we are going over to see the President. So I went over with him. He took me into the office and introduced me to the President and said: "Here's Colonel Wolfe," I think.

Q: This was around November 1938?

W: March or April 1938. That's when I started. I never did go back to my job.

Q: This was say within 60 days after he took the job when Westover got killed?

W: So he left me in there with Franklin. Arnold said: "When you get through, come by the office and see me." So I had a little talk with the President, told me what he was going to do, he was going to build 50,000 airplanes, and this, that and the other.

Q: Did he talk 50,000 airplanes at that time? He didn't get the 50,000 till a year later.

W: That's right, he was interested in getting the production capability going.

Q: At that time they were talking "10,000 planes."

W: Yes, I've forgotten. So the President sent me over to see Johnson. He was an ornery cuss to get along with...

Q: Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of War?

W: Yes. So that was how we got started in building up this production capacity. Why Arnold picked me for it, I don't know,

and he never did tell me. Kenney was then sent to the South Pacific, Powers was taken into Washington to be assistant to Gen. Echols, who was heading up the Materiel thing in Washington, so I wound up as head of the Production Division.

Q: That was, Kenney didn't go until after the war started.

W: That's right, but he was still down in Puerto Rico, and he wanted to get into the war. He wasn't about to get tied to a desk job, so he was maneuvering to beat the band. So that's how that happened. So from there on, Kenney and I had several meetings in Washington. And as I said earlier, we were enroute to Washington the day the Nips hit Honolulu. We stayed there. Kenney was the ranking officer on duty, and we were trying to find Arnold. You might have gotten that story from Douglas.

Q: Well, I know that they were hunting quail out near Bakersfield.

W: Yes, they were out on a hunting expedition, and nobody knew where they were.

Q: He didn't tell you?

W: No. He didn't tell any of his staff.

Q: He had gone out the night before to kiss off these B-17s at Hamilton. They are the ones that flew into Pearl Harbor during the attack.

W: Yes, that's the one that Ted Landon led that flight. Anyway, Kenney and I were trying our best to find out where he was. So finally we got a call from the Highway Patrol. They located him out there. And boy, he came barging in, and sparks began to fly then.

Q: Well, Arnold didn't show up till the next day, I guess.

W: Yes, second day after, I think.

Q: The second day after? He had to fly, I think he had a C-47 and they had to fly across country.

W: Yes, and I think Gene Beebe was with him. Anyway, the amusing story about that was, when the highway patrol found he and Don Douglas--told him about Pearl Harbor--this Mexican houseboy said: "Oh yes, I knew about that. I heard it on the radio yesterday," and he didn't tell them. So that was the beginning of the Production Division and the program to build up the industry.

Q: You know, Chidlaw told me that Arnold had a bad experience at Wright Field back in '30-31, when he was out there. He was under Conger Pratt. His former brother-in-law, Jan Howard, was out there.

W: He was Chief Engineer.

Q: And Arnold had sort of the Air Service Command, or Field Service Command, and Arnold didn't have a heck of a lot to do in his job. Most of the job was being done by Howard. Arnold had an adverse reaction to Wright Field, and Chidlaw thinks that Arnold's reaction to Wright Field was always negative after that time. For some reason, he always seemed to be jumping on Wright Field.

W: I think Ben was right about that, but I think for a good reason, and the reason was Jan Howard. Howard tried to be all things to all men. While he was Chief Engineer, we had a Colonel up there named Strauss. Strauss was head of Procurement and Quality Control, and they were always opposed.

Q: Well, Jan Howard was the kind of guy who seemed to be brilliant, but couldn't get along with people. You don't think that Arnold had this sort of psychological negative reaction to Wright Field. You think that when he jumped on Wright Field, it was for good cause?

W: Well, based on my experience with Hap, beginning with this Production Division he was just putting the chrome-vanadium ice pick in everybody to get things done. And rightly so, because we had been

going along for years without any appropriations or money to do this, that and the other. And he had a big program and a plan and he was raising Cain with everybody to get going.

Q: I want to talk about your assignment as Air Corps representative at the Douglas plant, El Segundo. What was Douglas building at that time?

W: He was building this single-engine. We called it in those days, ground attack airplane, the A-17. And then later, North American started building an advanced trainer, the AT-6. We always remembered the airplanes by number; never adopted the names.

Q: Douglas was working on a prototype of the A-20, in 1939, wasn't he?

W: For the French, he was building them for the French.

Q: And then a Frenchman by the name of Paul Chemidlin, remember his name? The Frenchman who crashed in the parking lot.

W: He was in the airplane that cracked up. Don Douglas and Carl Culver and I were standing there on the lot, when this thing spun in.

Q: And they tried to keep that secret but it's like keeping some event in Macy's window secret.

W: Well, it fell right in the parking lot of the North American plant.

Q: Was it North American or Douglas?

W: It was North American plant which was across the street on Imperial Boulevard, from Douglas' plant.

Q: You were given instructions to permit the Frenchman to get in that plane?

W: That's right.

Q: Who gave you that instruction?

W: Well, I think it came out of Washington.

Q: I recall that Arnold sent you a telegram, instructing you to show the Frenchmen.

W: Could be, we had to get permission to show anything to any of the foreigners, even though they were so-called allies.

Q: And then Arnold got on a hot seat for this thing, in Washington, do you remember the Congressional testimony?

W: No, I don't remember.

Q: The problem was that he and Morgenthau had a thing going. Do you know anything between them?

W: No. My only experience with Morgenthau was when I got sent on that ad hoc committee over there to Europe, while the war was going on.

Q: Arnold was caught between the rock and a hard place. If he admitted that Ken Wolfe gave access to the Frenchman, to look at what was a classified airplane, then he was in trouble. If he told them the truth that Morgenthau had ordered him to instruct Wolfe to let the Frenchmen, then he was in trouble with Roosevelt. Were you aware of this dilemma?

W: Not in those days. Unless you were on duty in Washington, you never got that.

Q: They called him up, testimony, Senator Bennett Champ Clark, and a couple of others, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and they were really giving it to him. And they called Morgenthau up. The line that Morgenthau took was that the plane had not yet been accepted by the Air Corps. Therefore, it still was Douglas property, and therefore Douglas had the right to authorize the Frenchman to

fly in it. Did you ever get into the nuisances of that distinction?

W: No, I was never called to testify at all on that thing.

Q: I guess they wanted to keep you out of it because it would just add to the problem.

W: I wasn't aware of that at all.

Q: This led, of course, Arnold got "in dutch" with the President through Morgenthau. Morgenthau and the President were very close. And this is when the President had allegedly said that, "we have places on Guam for guys like you." And Arnold was in Roosevelt's doghouse until the war started. And then of course he did some good things, and according to Arnold's book, Global Mission, the President called him in and offered him an old fashioned, and called him "Hap" and that's how he knew he was out of the doghouse. This was a couple of years later. But because of this incident at Santa Monica, he got in trouble. And of course, you were the instrument of letting the Frenchman in that. But Arnold didn't consult you?

W: No, I was never called up, interviewed or anything. This was when Arnold was Assistant to Westover?

Q: No, this was after, in January 1939. This was probably a month or two after that conference at the White House that you mentioned before.

W: The conference at the White House was after I was relieved as AF representative. I never went back to that job.

Q: Then this conference at the White House was later.

W: Must have been, timewise.

Q: Then, that ties in with the 50,000 planes you mentioned, because Roosevelt used that in a speech on May 16, 1940.

W: This is '38 now, when I was ordered back there to see Hap, and the second time back to talk to the President.

Q: All these events telescope. Let me ask you one more question about this Frenchman. Did it occur to you that there might be some security violation to let the Frenchman in that plane?

W: No, because as far as I was concerned, they were authorized to see the airplane, ride in it, and everything else, because they were going to buy them, which they did.

Q: But it had classified equipment aboard. Didn't it have a couple of things?

W: No, propeller and engine and some instruments, but nothing else to my knowledge.

Q: There was a law in the books about allowing foreign agents to view classified military material.

W: These people were French AF officers, in uniform. Three of them--Colonel, Major and a Captain. So there was no question in my mind, because I had the authorization from Washington.

Q: Was there some business about opening a plant in New Orleans to build some planes for the French? Was a guy named Sol Rosenblatt involved in this?

W: Well, Sol was in the Washington office.

Q: Did you have any contact with him on this problem?

W: No, he had nothing to do with production or procurement to my knowledge. He may have been writing papers and things in Washington.

Q: He was sort of a man of many trades, He hovered around there and Arnold gave him a couple of jobs to do. I saw his name flit in and out of this thing, and I just wondered...

W: No, I never had any contact with him at that time; later on, there were several meetings in Washington, I remember him being present.

Q: Can you remember some problems, during the war, where Arnold

came out to Wright Field. One problem comes to my mind, these wing tanks for the B-17s. This was a big problem. Did you get involved in that? Do you remember the portable wing tanks they were trying to put on the fighters to give them some range?

W: Oh yes. When the AF was trying their damnest to get escort fighters.

Q: Right, '43.

W: That's right, this is when we came out with the P-51s. Mean- time, we were working like mad on the old "Jug," P-47, which we put the 8 machine guns on. Arnold came out on that deal, indirectly, because Kenney had been raising hell with him about the oxygen tanks, how damned explosive they were. They'd get a shell through them and it could throw the whole airplane.

Q: On the "Jug?"

W: On any airplane that carried oxygen. Kenney was fighting the problem of changing it over. So, my brother (Franklin Wolfe) was in charge of the Armament Division, and he was against this damned 30 caliber machine gun, that the British were insisting on. So my brother and his group in the Armament Division had a P-47 with these eight 50 caliber machine guns, so Kenney and my brother and I said: "Well, we have got to put this test on where Kenney wants to show Arnold how explosive these oxygen tanks are." We set the oxygen tanks up at the far end of the range there. My brother had a P-47 there. Kenney and the rest of us were standing by in the P-47. They fired one burst and the gas tank-oxygen tank took off, and I don't think we ever found it. It went off like a bomb. Of course, Arnold had been arguing with Kenney about it, you see. He wasn't about to gracefully say anything about it. So he turned the subject over to my brother, and said: "Frank,

what in the hell have you got in that airplane?" He said, "I've got eight 50 calibers in there." Arnold said, "Eight 50 calibers?" Frank said: "Yes." So Arnold said: "Well, how did you happen to do this?" So my brother gave him a little song and dance. Arnold never, to my knowledge, ever said "boo" to Kenney, except we got a directive to change all the oxygen tanks, in all the airplanes. But he was absolutely overcome with the waterfall of empty shells coming off the trailing edge of the wings--out of the P-47. I might go ahead a little more on this armor thing. The Ordnance Corps was responsible for the armament. We were just another little Corps. So Kenney and my brother cooked up this deal to go in and give a briefing to Arnold about getting rid of the .30-caliber and standardizing on the .50-calibers and the 20 mm, so my brother drew up some presentation. He got the date and went in there. Part of the presentation was a kindergarten illustration, showed .30-caliber coming out like this and falling off and showed a .50 caliber coming out and falling off. It showed a 20 coming out. He had the Chief of the Ordnance there, plus quite a few Ordnance people, all of Arnold's staff, I guess, the top ones. My brother had served with Arnold out here at Rockwell Field as his bombardment officer. He was one of the few in those days that had access to the Norden bombsight. He knew my brother real well. He said: "Frank, what in the hell are you trying to show us here?" And he said: "I'm showing you how far out the 30 will go and how much farther the others will go," and he had the velocity, and the impact, and everything else. Arnold turned to this MG in the Ordnance Corps, and he said: "General, is that true?" He said: "Yes, to the best of my knowledge." Arnold said: "Frank, change all those blankety blank 30's. Dismissed." That was the end of the conference.

Q: Could that have been Campbell? Campbell was a two-star general. He was in charge of Ordnance.

W: Well, could have been, because I was feuding with the Ordnance all the time.

Q: You had trouble with them all the time? Division of labor. They wouldn't relinquish any control of that, either.

W: No, well, when we went into this war, we didn't have a single turret for any airplane. The B-17's we were buying had no turrets. And Bob Lovett and Hap, they took care of that one.

Q: How did they do that?

W: They ran so cockeyed fast that the rest of the Army didn't know what was going on. What they did on that: Arnold called my brother in and said: "Look, we've got to have some turrets for these airplanes. What are you going to do about it?" My brother said: "Well, the only thing I know of, is a Bolton Pauls (?) the British have over in England. This was .30 caliber, and typical Arnold said: "You get ahold of somebody in industry and go over there and get the license for the Bolton Pauls (?), and do it right now." That's the way Arnold was. It just so happened my brother knew Stu Symington who, at that time, was head of Emerson Electric in St. Louis. They had been playing golf, were good friends. Frank called him on the phone and said what he wanted to do, and Symington said "okay." So the two of them took off, went over to England, and got the license right from the British, and that's what started us in the turret business. But this is the way worked.

Q: This business ended up in a little anonymous document, later on.

W: It did.

Q: Don't you remember, on the B-36?

W: Oh, later on, oh yes.

Q: Yes, about six years later.

W: That was a battle between the Navy and the Air Force.

Q: This was one of the big subjects, that Cedric Worth document?

W: I spent days in there in that investigation.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and your mentioning that he and Lovett were a great team. Did Lovett serve as a sort of balance wheel, to keep Arnold on the track? Did Arnold tend to get impulsive, sort of get enthusiastic and go off, or did he figure out everything he was going to do, beforehand?

W: My recollection and my experience with the two of them, was they were a great pair who complemented each other. When Arnold couldn't get something done with the military, like these other Corps, Signal Corps, Engineer Corps, and the rest of them, Bob could. In other words, in my opinion, they were scared to buck up against Bob. They wouldn't mind bucking against Hap, but the two of them were together.

Q: They worked together?

W: I will give you one example. I got called in there one day. Here was Arnold and Lovett, and Arnold always took the initiative--just loved to jump on you. He was a great psychologist, in my opinion: "Here we are right in the middle of the war, and we don't have any IFF. What in the hell are you doing about it?" I said: "Well, General, the Signal Corps is responsible for furnishing the Identification, Friend or Foe." He said: "You mean they were." I said: "No sir, they are." And Bob Lovett turned to me and said: "Beginning now, you're going to get the IFF's." I never had any other instruction than that.

Q: Do you think he went to Marshall and sold that?

W: I don't know. Don't think they had time, because I got my instructions that afternoon in their office. And it just so happened,

the head of Philco had been in to see me at Wright Field a couple of weeks before. He wanted something to do for the war. He'd been trying to get some contracts out of the Signal Corps, and couldn't. So I just happened to think of that. So before I left Washington-- I wish I could remember that guy's name--I called him on the phone and reminded him that he wanted to do something for the war. I said: "You get somebody out here, and I'll show you what the IFF is, and we are going to buy them for the Air Corps." He said: "Well, I know what it is." I said: "How soon can you get him out here." "Well," he said, "I have all the drawings I need. I can get them out there within four or five days." I said: "That's fine. Go ahead, take my word for it." So four or five days later he came out there with two special baggage cars on a train, and there he had the IFF. We gave him a contract. In a typical Arnold follow-up. He called me up on the phone one day and said: "What are you doing about that IFF," and I said: "Well, I got Philco building them." Arnold: "Are they really going ahead?" I said: "Yes sir." Arnold: "That's good, goodbye." That was the end of that.

Q: Did he always follow up on these things?

W: Oh no, he was a great exponent of the chrome-vanadium icepick. That was typical of him. He would give you something to do, and then call you up.

Q: Did he ever jump you for something you should have done, and it wasn't done?

W: Oh, nothing was ever done to suit him.

Q: Whatever you did, he wanted something more:

W: Typical of him. He would give you a chore to do, then he would call you up and say: "When are you going to get that done?"

You'd reply: "Well, it's going to be about six months." He'd come back: "Take all the time you need as long as you get it done in six weeks." Always did this:

Q: If you had said six weeks, he would have said six days.

W: Right.

Q: And he always followed up on these things?

W: Yes.

Q: One of the criticisms leveled at Arnold was that he didn't give anything to the staff. He did so many of these things. He held all of these balls bouncing in the air, and he was too impatient to send things down to the staff for coordination.

W: That's why the Army and Navy never caught up with us.

Q: He just went ahead and did things?

W: Well, like that IFF I was telling you about.

Q: Do you remember any other instances where Arnold drove something to consummation in a short time? Were there some other problems?

W: He had a good foil in Oliver Echols. Echols sat there at Wright Field all these years, trying to get money to do this, that, and all the other. One year he would get enough money to start a new engine, but he couldn't start the airplane, or the turrets. So, through Echols recommending to Hap what he thought could be done, and who could do it, he had a great foil in Echols. Echols was always coming up with something to do. So, when this big criticism came on about the lack of escorts in Europe--I don't know who gave who the order--but Echols had been talking about building an airplane, which turned out to be the P-51, which could be used as an escort. And the first thing we knew out there, we just got a teletype message or a

phone call. The project officer on fighters who was Mark Bradley, then, a Captain or Major, to get together with Lee Atwood of North American and come up with a new fighter.

Q: Well, didn't they have the P-51 early in the war as a low altitude plane? It was using another engine, didn't the British put the Merlin in there?

W: That was later on.

Q: But the first P-51 wasn't too good, was it?

W: You see what happened, the P-40 was the airplane, the fighter that we had. The P-40 had the Allison engine, which was supposed to have been rated at about 1,400 or 1,700 horsepower, and we couldn't get that horsepower out of it. So they had a big seance, which Echols called at Wright Field. He brought in all the top engine people, and they diagnosed this Allison engine. The consensus of opinion outside of the military was the engine will never make it. They said: "Drop the project." So Echols excused them, and held the rest of us back, and he said: "Well, you heard what the boys said--great industry." He said: "We can't drop it. We don't have anything else." So we cleared that P-40 at 700 hp, if I remember correctly. The theory that Echols always had, better than any of us, you never turn out the perfect airplane or engine until you get them out in service and use them. This is what we decided to do against the recommendations of von Karman and all the hot shots. Now, I can't relate these things in time. The British sent three of of their Battle of Britain pilots over. This was at the time of the fall of Dunkirk.

Q: That was June 1940.

W: So this fellow Bradley, the project officer on fighters, and I, and a couple others, took the DC-3 flew up there to Toronto. The

idea was to let the British fly the P-40 and we were going to fly the Spitfire. We'd been three two or three days when this great WWI ace, Bishop, threw a dinner party. Right in the middle of the dinner party--I guess right in the middle of the cocktail hour--a servant came in and called Bishop aside. He came back in the room, hooked up the radio, and said: "Well, boys, the fall of Dunkirk." We sat there and heard over the radio the fall of Dunkirk. There wasn't a dry eye in the house. That was the time we had the competition between the Spitfire and the P-40. So, as a result of that, going back to Bradley and Lee Atwood, we did take the British Merlin and put in the P-51, and then we had Packard build the British Merlin engine for both ourselves and the British.

Q: I want to go over to the B-29 now. You were Special Project Officer for the B-29. This was Arndt's pet project, and probably the biggest headache of the war--one of the biggest headaches of the war, the engines catching fire, etc.

W: Well, sure because it was a real accelerated program. Nobody had ever done a job like that. We had all kinds of problems. But it was Hap Arnold that said: "This airplane is going to be built." And after we lost the first one with Eddy Allen, the test pilot, and the whole crew of civilians. There was a big hue and cry came up in Congress and every place else. It was too far in the future--too big an airplane; this, that and the other. So, Arnold called our group of top people out of the aircraft industry to take a look at it. It was the first real heavy wing-loaded airplane we had ever had, even visualized. It had automatic fire control, god knows what all--all new. So, the consensus of this group was: "Yes, no time to build this." Again, the same damned thing happened. Hap said: "We are going to build it." So that's when I got the job being the project

manager on the B-29. This was after the crackup of the first one.

Q: Right, this was 1943? You took the B-29, but probably sometime in the middle of 1943.

W: There is one other very interesting episode. We had two experimental jobs. Eddy Allen cracked up the first one. I took over the project. I took Wright Field test pilots out there. We got the job out. Meantime, we had drawn contracts with all these other people. We were going to build them in three other places, so we get ready to...

Q: Martin was going to build them?

W: Martin at Omaha; Bell at Marietta; and Boeing at Wichita.

So Jake Harmon, who was a Colonel, and he was the chief project officer on bombers--two of the oldtime noncoms, and a copilot by the name of... So they got out there on the ramp, get this thing all wound up with movie cameras all around, and so forth. This little guy who was president of Boeing after Johnson died, in Seattle, Oliver West. He and I were sitting up on the third floor there, where you could look out over the field. Right in front of us, was a big warehouse where we could see them getting ready up at the north end to take off. All of a sudden, they passed us into this building and the airplane was in the bank like that. Down at the end of the field were a lot of machine gunbutts. I thought: "My God, we are going to lose the second one." Well, Jake finally got the thing back on the ground. What a day that was. He taxied back up to this building I was talking about, and I went out there, and I asked Jake what happened. And he said: "I'll be damned if I know." And I said: "Jake, turn the ailerons." They had crossed the ailerons, so every time she would start to bank, he tried to pull it off, and all he was doing was increasing it. Finally this sergeant, he got in the act, too. And the two of them got this thing righted, back on the ground. It was off the ground, and the wing was

dragging. They had to change the tip of the wing, and almost lost the second one.

Q: If you'd done that, it might have been the end of the B-29 program.

W: The first was almost the end of us, except for the fact that Hap said: "Well, we are going to build this."

Q: In the meantime, Arnold had made all these commitments to three plants, and all kinds of manufacturing facilities, and

W: He had also made a commitment to the Russians, and the Chinese, where we were going to use these things.

Q: Right, you mean for the bases--at Chengtu. And he's made commitments to the President. The President was really on his tail for this B-29.

W: A lot of people in the industry and a lot of people in the Air Force were on his tail.

Q: This would have been a tragic thing.

W: You can see what would have happened.

Q: It could have been the end of Arnold.

W: Not only that, we might have lost the bloody war. Never would have won the thing with Japan the way the Army wanted to do it. They didn't want to make a landing.

Q: It would have been a bloody landing on Japan, and the way the Japs were fighting in these little islands. They would have taken a million Americans with them, if we had landed in Japan. Truly a fantastic, narrow escape.

W: Oh yes, you can imagine how we felt seeing that thing about to crack up.

Q: There's a book on the B-29, I'm going to check the date of that out.

W: Yes, there's a book by Mansfield.

Q: I don't recall. I didn't know that the second one came so near cracking up.

W: We kept it awfully damned quiet. We never mentioned this. The Boeing Company, through the Chief Engineer and Vice President, Wellwood Beale, now with Douglas, had a film made. He called it K-9, and the caption starting the film shows a dog walking up to a hydrant, well,

Q: Relieving himself.

W: Well, that's the way this airplane looked.

Q: Did you ever talk to Arnold about this--about the narrow escape?

W: He found out somehow, long afterwards.

Q: Oh, you didn't tell Arnold?

W: Hell, no, we didn't dare.

Q: He didn't know about it.

W: We swore everybody to secrecy. We minimized it. It would have been terrible.

Q: Let me take the B-29 story a little farther. It was having all kinds of production, modification, problems. Did you know that the President was on his back, he had promised the President, I believe, some date late in 1943 that the B-29 would be operating against Japan. I think October or November 1943. And of course the plane wasn't ready, and the plane was encountering all kinds of trouble.

W: That's not the story. The date was June 5th, from the very beginning, 1944, and we made the date.

Q: It was June 15th--the date of the first raid.

- W: On the steel mill at Yawata. We made the date.
- Q: That was the date?
- W: And Arnold set that date at YALTA, I think it was.
- Q: No, that was before YALTA.
- W: Where did he make the commitment to use B-29's?
- Q: It was probably Cairo or Tehran. This was November 1943.
- W: Tehran and he made the date.
- Q: And he gave the date as June 15th?
- W: Yes, and we made it.
- Q: I thought that the date had been postponed. I don't know where I got that impression.
- W: No, not to my knowledge or recollection.
- Q: Did Arnold and Benny Meyers ever come out to Salinas?
- W: Not until after I left, you see as soon as I got this first wing going, I took it out to India, and somebody else took over. And that's when Meyers got in the act out there at Salina.
- Q: Yes, what happened?
- W: We were having all kinds of problems, like all new airplanes and equipment have, we had engine problems. We have some gunnery problems, some turret problems, but the main problem was the engine.
- Q: Engine catching fire.
- W: They were overheating.
- Q: Did he and Arnold spend a couple of weeks out at Salina?
- W: Not while I was there.
- Q: I'm thinking of sometime like March 1944, they were trying to get these planes out in to the CBI, and they were dragging. There were a bunch of planes sitting on Salina.
- W: Bunch 'of planes sitting out at the factories, too.

Q: Yes, and each plane had some problems, and didn't Arnold get out there and try to expedite the planes out?

W: I don't know, I wasn't there. After I got the first wing I took them out.

Q: The 58th, and Blondie Saunders had the 73rd?

W: Blondie was my deputy on the 58th, Blondie took over from me when I was called back to put the F-80 into production. And that's when Blondie cracked up, and he was out of the picture then.

Q: Who took his place?

W: Roger Ramey, and then Ramey moved the 58th in to Guam. By that time, these hotshots from Europe were going to come over and win the war when MacArthur had it won. Spaatz came out, and Eaker and all the rest of those hotshots.

Q: You don't recall that the President was breathing hard on Arnold on this subject: Of you didn't know about it?

W: I had problems of my own.

Q: I got this impression when I was up at Hyde Park, that the President was asking Arnold: "what is the first mission?"

W: I'm sure he could, I wouldn't know.

Q: I got the impression, of course, I don't have my files here, I got the impression that the first mission was delayed. This doesn't jibe with your knowledge of it. Of course, you might not know that when the first mission was to be scheduled. Maybe Arnold held it back because he didn't know.

W: He may have given me two weeks advance delay and I wouldn't know that. All I know is that we all sweat blood to make the date. I could look up my records of that, if I had them all ready.

Q: You know, Benny Meyers, when he got in trouble, mentioned

the good old days. He was trying to solicit Arnold's help and he mentioned the time that they had gone out to Salina, and worked together to get the B-29s off and out into the CBI. Of course, he reached Arnold. In 1947 Arnold was going to write him a letter of support and then when the letter was typed up at Hamilton Field, somebody must have tipped Arnold off, because the letter never got sent out. This is in Arnold's file. Arnold didn't have any idea that Benny Meyers was pulling this stuff. Did you have any feeling that Benny Meyers was living higher than his means, or that he was engaged in some private activity?

W: Well, my impression of Benny Meyers, supported by people who had known him before the war, was that he always had independent means. One of the stories that we heard about him was that he had initially, his first marriage was to a very wealthy woman who supplied him with the money. So before the war when everybody else in the AF was in debt up to their ears at the banks, Benny always had the money.

Q: Always drove a fancy car and lived well.

W: Where it came from, I never knew.

Q: Mrs. Arnold said that people just accepted the fact that Benny Meyers had money and was living well.

W: Well, he started that, as far as I could find, when he was on duty originally in Hawaii.

Q: Were you called upon to sign that letter that Stratemeyer, when he was Chief of Air Staff? Everybody involved in production had to sign a letter stating his stocks and his assets.

W: That came along every week almost.

Q: There was more than one letter?

W: They were always haranguing us about: "You've got to be

careful about this, and you shouldn't do that. You shouldn't accept things from industry," and so on. Associating with the industry and accepting gifts and so o.

Q: This particular letter was a round robin letter, and everybody was asked to list his stocks, his assets--all people that had a procurement responsibility. Benny Meyers listed his, and later he claimed that--of course, he didn't state that he had an interest in this Aviation Electric Company, that he was playing both ends--but he claimed that he had told Arnold verbally. And of course, Arnold, when he testified at the hearing in 1947, denied this. Meyers was dismissed from his job. You know, I heard that Meyers is alive and living in San Francisco. Have you heard anything about that?

W: The last I heard of Meyers, this has been 5 or 6 years ago. This General I saw on the golf course--a chap came up to me and told me that he had seen Benny Meyers.

Q: Pop Powers told you this?

W: That Meyers was there in New Jersey some place, working as a comptroller for one of the Ohrbach department stores, one of the Ohrbach boys was in the AF and worked in Benny's office in Washington. That's the last I ever heard of him.

Q: That's an interesting lead, I'll write Ohrbach's and see if they can put me in touch with him. I don't know if he would talk. If I did see him, he might not want to get involved in this thing.

W: I've never heard another word about Meyers since Powers told me.

Q: He served a term and they took his medals away, and they took his pension away.

W: And his wife took his money away.

Q: Of course, he was fooling around with Mrs. Bleriot LeMarre. LeMarre was this dummy president he set up, and he was fooling around with LeMarre's wife.

W: That's right, but that was common knowledge. His wife, who bore him the twins, she took off and went to South America, divorced Benny and married an Argentinian or Brazilian, or somebody. This is the rumor that was going around.

Q: Didn't he name one of those twins for Arnold and one for Marshall?

W: I believe so.

Q: It was either that or Arnold was a godfather to one and Marshall the other. You know, Arnold was very devoted to Meyers.

W: Oh yes. I would say this up to a certain point, even though I guess it had never really been firmed up, but he did a hell of a lot of good, fine things there in Washington. I mean he had the gall and the brass to do things that a lot of the other staff people didn't have.

Q: I was given a picture of Oliver Echols as a soft spoken, southern gentleman, and Benny Meyers, is a "get out and do it." And this could have attracted Arnold to him--that he was a doer. Arnold liked doers; he liked people to do it yesterday.

W: Yes, that's right, Meyers was that kind of guy. Meyers was a real brilliant character, no doubt about that. He understood this financial business better than anybody I'd ever run into up to that time. I've seen that guy sit down and add up a column of three digits just like that. He was real sharp.

Q: He was sharp but not quite ethical.

W: That's right; not at all.

Q: Let me ask you just some general things about Arnold. You came to Washington in April 1945. Arnold had had his heart attack. He had just come back to Washington from Coral Gables. Do you remember that Arnold had a heart attack?

W: Yes, I remember hearing about that.

Q: They kept it very quiet, and he came back at the end of March 1945. They brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. Do you remember that? And you worked for Eaker for a short period, didn't you, when he was Deputy Commander?

W: You're talking about '45? No.

Q: You were assigned to Hqs., AAF, for about 3 or 4 months between VE Day and VJ Day?

W: No, I was out with the 5th AF. I went into Japan on the occupation in '45; I came back in '48.

Q: I have here you joined the 5th AF in August 1945, just about the time of the atomic bomb. Where were you right prior to that?

W: This is when I was called back from India by Arnold to get the first jet fighter (P-80) we owned into production.

Q: You were in Washington a very short time, a couple of months.

W: No, I was only in there temporarily; I was at Wright Field.

Q: But you were assigned to Washington. They have your biography, as you were. You left Wright Field in April 1945 for temporary assignment in AAF Hqs., and then you joined the 5th AF in Okinawa in August 1945. So you were, according to this paper, 4 months time you were in Washington, and this was the period, say, between VE and VJ Day. You don't remember that, maybe you were just assigned on paper. Immediately before you went to join the 5th AF, were you in Wright Field?

W: Yes.

Q: Then, I guess they, they could have carried me in Washington. You worked for Knudsen?

W: Well, even before I went out to the Pacific, when Knudsen was brought in the head of production, I was in charge of production of the Air Corps, and I had many days of duty with Knudsen.

Q: How did he and Arnold get along?

W: Wonderfully well, I would say.

Q: He was a great production man, wasn't he?

W: The world's best.

Q: Not a very good officer, though.

W: He made no bones about that. He didn't want to be an officer. He was a wonderful fellow.

Q: Did this create some problems?

W: No, no. Everybody loved the old boy. Going through the factories, I will tell you a little sidelight there. When he was assigned the head of all production--Army, Navy and Air Corps--they assigned one Air Corps man, one Navy man, and one Ordnance man on the first trip we took on the C-47, DC-3. First place we stopped was at Ogden. He told us the night before we were going to inspect this ammunition loading plant. I didn't know anything about loading plants or anything else. So I said, "Well, General, what time do you think we are going to be through out there?" "Do you want to fly on tonight to California. I'll get everything ready." He still talked with quite an accent. He always called me "Vulf." He says, "Vulf, you are going with me to the ammunition loading plant." And I said: "Yes sir." I'd never been around those things before, great big towers, about 5 stories high. So the head of the Ordnance plant was walking up the stairs with Knudsen and I was back, walking up these stairs and I made

a comment to this Ordnance general. I said: "Ye Gods, this is a tough climb." Knudsen turned around and said, "Vulf, when I was your age, I ran up all the stairs." So we got up to the top and here was this great big thing looked like a creamery deal, painted white. Little bit of a room. This was the mixing chamber. So there was a chap there with a long handled brush, and a long handled dustpan, and he was going round sweeping up this immaculate floor, so I said to this Ordnance general: "What in the world is this fellow doing?" "Well, he's sweeping up any powder that might have fallen on the floor." And I said: "What if it had?" "Well, if you stepped on that, this place would blow up." I said: "Blow up?" And he said: "Yes." And I said: "What if it blows up?" And Knudsen turned around to me, and he said: "Vulf, you just jump out the window." I looked out the window, and there were these amusement park slides, and that's what you did. If the thing looked like it was going to blow up, you dove out a window, and went down the chute.

Q: Do you remember any stories about Arnold beyond some areas where we haven't discussed. Anything about him grabbing people in the halls, for example?

W: Well, that story I am not an eyewitness to, but I was in Arnold's office one day. He had a big intercom squawk box, and he really got riled up about something. I've forgotten what it was-- something Kuter said. And he blasted the hell out of Kuter. He ran down all the stops on this squawk box: "You guys come in here right away!" Got everybody out of the place converged on Arnold's office. And he had another harangue. Well, later on, the story was told, that after this meeting, Arnold walked out in the hall; there was a colonel coming up the hall. And he said: "Colonel, I want you to do so and so." The colonel said: "But sir." And he said: "You heard

me." It happened to be the Chaplain. Have you heard that?

Q: I haven't heard it about the Chaplain, but I've heard many stories about people being afraid to walk around the E-Ring because they might be grabbed and dragooned in some kind of assignment foreign to their expertise. Norstad told me this story of him hitting all the buttons, and calling everybody in and then saying: "Norstad, I want you; the rest of you can go."

W: The whole argument started between he and Norstad.

Q: Was it Norstad or Kuter?

W: To my knowledge it was Kuter, but Norstad was there, too, because he was one of the big brains statisticians, strategy guys.....

Q: Well, could have been Norstad; maybe he was mad at Norstad.

W: The office was full of people before he ran down all the buttons.

Q: They really responded when he hit the buttons.

W: He called me back from India for this meeting. I got him mad on that one, too.

Q: What about?

W: He was raising Cain because we weren't getting some of the wings out, and the troubles that we were having, we were having plenty of engine troubles. The basic problem was engines. So he called me back, started raising Cain, telling me how bad the airplanes were. I got my dander up a little bit. I was taking about all I could take from everybody on this thing. So I popped off, I guess, when I shouldn't have, and I said: "General, I would like to be excused." He said: "What for?" I said: "I want to go send a cable to boys out there in India and tell them how lousy these damn airplanes are that your staff has told you. He looked at me, and said: "What did you say?" And I told him, and he started asking these other guys--they

heard these rumors. We had already launched one mission and had one on the way. So this is when I kind of blew my top. He looked at me, and started asking these guys. And finally he said: "You get the hell back out to India." And that's all it amounted to. This is the way he was. He always knew what he was talking about, except once in awhile the staff would get him crossed up, and then all hell would pop. Kenney may have told you this story. We got a call one afternoon to get on the Pennsylvania train that night and report to Arnold the next morning. Of course, Kenney and Arnold had been through this Mitchell thing and they were real close personal friends.

Q: You were at Wright Field at this time?

W: Yes, so was Kenney.

Q: Now this must have been before the war?

W: Yes, this was before Pearl Harbor, before we got into it. We got on the train and went in there--this was the old Munitions Building.

As we walked in, Fairchild, who was there with Eaker said: "Boy, you guys are in big trouble." We we walked in, and here was Arnold sitting at his desk, head in his hands. He said: "Here I am in this boat all by myself, rowing like hell, and nobody is helping me. Now, George"-- and he started taking after George. George is unmilitary as hell, started sounding off; Arnold just really got mad. He grabbed me by the back of the blouse and my belt and pushed me up against George, and pushed us both out of the office into Eaker's office. Fairchild walked down the hall with us, and said: "Oh boy, this is terrible." Fairchild was kind of a nervous guy. Anyway, George said: "Oh forget it."

Q: What did Eaker do?

W: At the moment I can't remember if he was still in the office or it was Fairchild.

Q: Was he just pushing you out of his presence? He didn't want any more to do with you?

W: This is part of his act, and these bar type of swing doors. So he just grabbed me--George had already started out--so he grabbed me. He was always doing something like this, deliberately.

Q: Did you feel that he liked you?

W: Oh yes, sure, he wouldn't have put up with me if he hadn't. That's the way he was, firing people right and left. The only thing I could do was do the best I could do and that was it.

Q: He fired a lot of people out of jobs?

W: Oh yes, he relieved them all over the place. He'd listen to you, but if you didn't give him the facts, good or bad, then, boy, you'd be done. But if you give him the bad news along with the good, it was all right. So we get on the damn train and go back, and the next morning we get a telephone call to come back in there. Kenney blew his top, and he called Eaker or Fairchild, who said: "We don't know, better come on in; the Old Man wants to see you." So we get on the train again and go back in there. So on the way in, I said: "Now look, George let's cut this thing out. This thing we put on the other day wasn't military at all. Now let's behave ourselves this time." George said: "Yeah, I think you are right." So we went in, stiff as a ramrod, and saluted. Arnold sitting there, looked at the both of us, we said: "Sir you seft for us." Arnold: "What the hell is the matter with you guys, anyway." "Sir, we don't know," this is George, I wouldn't talk to him that way. This was Kenney, "Nothing, sir, you sent for us." Arnold: "Well, why are you acting like this?" So I broke down and got to laughing; I said: "Well, General, I guess it's my fault. I told George that we shouldn't be so umilitary as were yesterday, so we are trying to be good boys." "Well, he said, "I thought something

was really wrong."

Q: Did George Kenney call him Hap?

W: Oh yes.

Q: But you didn't call him "Hap?"

W: Oh no.

Q: Who called him "Hap," George Kenney, Spaatz called him

"Hap," and

W: I guess some of the other old timers did. But none of we so-called young guys would do that.

Q: I know Eaker didn't. Eaker called him "General;" always "General."

W: As years have gone by, looking back at some of the things, I think, well, he just did that to relieve the tension. He deliberately would do these things (push people out of his office).

Q: I was told something interesting, that Arnold would jump on people and put tremendous pressure on them, but he knew where each man's breaking point was.

W: That's right.

Q: and he never went beyond that point?

W: I'm convinced of that. He pulled one on me, Kenney was raising Cain to get me down to Australia. You see, at one time the B-29s were supposed to be given to MacArthur.

Q: Not supposed to--MacArthur was asking for them.

W: Well, this was part of the plan, too. Then it was changed, at Tehran, or wherever it was they made the commitment. So Kenney was raising Cain to get me to come out there, and I wanted to get into the war, too. So Hap--he used to sneak off, go out to factories. I thought I had it fixed up with Gene (Beebe) to always let me know so I could

trigger off the AF Representatives-Colonels at all these factories. So Hap goes into Tulsa where they were building the A-20s. And I had just been raising holy hell with Don Douglas, and the guys at Tulsa. They got behind schedule; and this that, and the other. I never did find out what Don told them. But whatever he told them, Hap got just madder than \$700 and called me on the phone, and relieved me. This suited me fine because I thought, well now, I get a chance to go to the war. So I started unpacking my desk--this was late in the afternoon 3:00-4:00. I called up Personnel in Washington and said I had been relieved, Kenney has been asking for me, and I wanted to go out to the war. So they said, okay, they would issue the orders. Then, again, Gene didn't trigger me off. Now, Hap is out on the Coast at North American, I think, or Douglas. And he called me up and gave me orders to do this, that, so forth. And I said: "Sir, you relieved me yesterday, and my replacement is here and I have orders to go out to the Pacific." Arnold: "Oh, for crissakes, K.B. that was yesterday. So I unpacked my bag and put the papers back.

Q: He took these unscheduled trips. What did he do, fly all night?

W: Sometimes, yes.

Q: Peterson was flying for him at that time, wasn't he?

W: Peterson was flying for him, and so was Gene Beebe. This was before Gene was relieved, transferred and went to China. I know he did a lot of those things just for the psychological effects, the pressure.

Q: Well, the B-29 was his greatest love, because this was the instrumentality of strategic airpower. He never would relinquish control of this, he always kept it....

W: I went out there, I didn't report to anybody.

Q: And the theater commanders didn't like this one bit, did they?

W: Oh, no.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Chennault out there?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Trouble, it was getting supplies for the 73rd, or the 58th?

W: No, I was handling my own supplies. He was trying to get my airlift I was supposed to mount these missions out of China. You see, Chennault was running the Chinese AF. He tried to horn in on this, and I had a little piece of paper that said I reported only to the Chief of Staff. So I just told Chennault where to go. He didn't like me at all. He tried a number of times to work on Stilwell and Stratemeyer to change my orders so he, Chennault, would be giving me the orders.

Q: So you would make your report to him?

W: Yes, Stilwell would never go for it.

Q: Are you aware of the LeMay-Hansell business? You know, when Hansell got the 21st BombCom, and then he was relieved by LeMay. Are you aware of that?

W: I knew he was relieved. I had my own problems, I wasn't worrying about that outfit.

Q: Were you surprised, or was there any talk about that?

W: Well, they were at Guam, and I was out there in India and up to China. No, I just knew that he had been relieved. Why, I never took time to find out--up to this day.

Q: Did you know that Arnold was using Norstad, as a sort of hatchet man? Norstad went out there to give the bad news?

W: Yes, he used Norstad for that. Norstad was not very popular, isn't to this day.

Q: I know. Several people have made some comments about Norstad. Did Eaker ever talk to you about his relief from the 8th AF or transfer?

W: No, I've been with Eaker many times. Of course, I wouldn't bring it up, and he never brought it up.

Q: We were talking at lunch, he was very disappointed.

W: Particularly because his pal Spaatz, was No. 1 guy out there.

W: Arnold gave Kepner the 8th Fighter Command.

Q: Over Frank Hunter?

W: Yes, and I always felt that there was bad blood between Eaker and Kepner, because they had been very close friends, and all of a sudden this thing happens out there. Eaker's relieved, and Kepner is brought in and given the Fighter Command.

Q: You mean, Hunter was relieved?

W: No, Eaker was relieved.

Q: Eaker was relieved, and they brought in Doolittle.

W: No, I'm talking now about the two, Kepner and Eaker. I'm just guessing now.

Q: That this created some friction between Kepner and Eaker?

W: You have had no evidence of that? This is my own estimation. They had been very very close friends and I've been with both of them. Since then, I have never heard Kepner say anything about Eaker, one way or the other, or Eaker say anything about Kepner, so I just wondered.

Q: Do you think that Arnold shot from the hip on any of his personnel changes? Relieved somebody without cause?

W: Cases that I knew of--no. Now I can't say that I knew of the problem of Eaker or, with Hunter, because they were over there

in Europe, and I was having my problems here. But the cases I know of, people being relieved...

Q: In the case of Eaker, there were dispatches: "You have 850 planes in your operating inventory. How come you are only flying 60?" Arnold kept sending this kind of messages. I talked to a number of people who worked for Eaker, and who was it that said, that Eaker saw this stuff coming in, and he just dropped it in the waste paper basket, he figured these fellows on Arnold's staff were eager--Kuter, Norstad--some of these others were eager beavers. And finally, Arnold just made this change. Arnold went over there. He went over there in early Sep 1943. Idwal Edwards is very close to Eaker. I talked to him. And he told me that Eaker and Arnold had a knockdown-dragout in the Claridges Hotel so this was the beginning of the end. Eaker was going to go. Hunter is bitter at Arnold for something else.

(re Segregation Problem)

W: Coleman, yes, he got fired out there.

Q: Where, Seifridge?

W: Yes.

Q: He might have been the commanding officer.

W: He could have been the base commander.

Q: I can't remember, I have a lot of files on this thing.

W: Coleman, I've forgotten his first name now. He was fired out of there.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

W: Well, thinking of a lot of people I know, I would say "yes." Of course, during those times, he was under pressure all the time. He just didn't have time to sit around with the boys and shoot the breeze. On some of these trips that we took, I took trips with him.

He, Knudsen and I went to some of the factories.

Q: What did he do when he came to a plant or a factory?

W: He was very pleasant and affable with the workmen and the officers of the company.

Q: Did he go right to the factory; right to the maintenance area?

W: No, he just walked through. Every time I went with him, he was with Knudsen, and Knudsen was the production man, and he just followed along with him. Arnold really didn't know much about the manufacturing business, anyway.

Q: Did he ask some tough questions?

W: No, because everytime I was with him, it was Knudsen who was the front man. When they heard Knudsen was coming, everything would stop, and they would start beating on the tin ware and so forth, and yelling at him.

Q: You know, when Knudsen quit in 1945, you were at Wright Field, I guess. You had just come back, and Benny Meyers had aspirations for that job, they called it the Air Technical Service Command (ATSC).

Benny Meyers had his eye on that job. Did you know that? Of course, they didn't give it to him. They gave it to Knerr. Benny Meyers retired on a disability. Did you hear any rumors that there was some anonymous document written about Benny Meyers, which was filed? It came up 2 years later. This is how the committee came on it. There was an anonymous letter, and it came to the attention of the committee, and the AF sent it to file. This is why the AF got in trouble on it. And they didn't investigate it, and this anonymous letter made charges against Benny Meyers.

W: That's what triggered the whole investigation?

Q: Well, the investigation 2 years later, started with

Howard Hughes and Elliott Roosevelt and they upon this material on Benny Meyers. And Junius Jones was the Air Inspector, and he's the guy who suppressed the material. And of course, it made it worse for the AF, that they had this case, and they didn't do anything about it. Did you ever go on a fishing trip with Arnold?. The Wolfes and the Arnolds, of course, you were at different levels, you never had any social relations with Arnold?

W: No, because I never served with Arnold, my brother served with him.

Q: Has he passed away?

W: Yes, my brother died in '65 from cancer. He retired in '44 with a bad heart, so they may have been referring to him, because he and Arnold were real good friends. Mrs. Arnold say anything about my brother?

Q: No, she talked about General Wolfe. She may have been talking, did he make General?

W: No, he was a colonel, retired in 1944.

Q: Arnold and Westover, about his death.

W: I'm the one that told Arnold about it. Let's go back a step. There was always a lot of hard feeling between the lunatics, the lighter than air people and the heavier than air people. They were all higher ranking than we were.

Q: And Westover was lighter than air?

W: That's right, and I was an instructor at Brooks Field, 1922-26. They sent a lot of these lunatics down there to learn to fly, a various small percentage of them got by. That didn't help. When Westover became chief, the first thing he did was order all these guys back to March Field to get their wings, including himself.

Westover had been washed out before, and Kepner been washed out, too. I was the AF representative out there then, and I got a message from March Field that Westover was spending the night there, and was going to fly into the little field there at the Lockheed plant, at Burbank, and for me to be there to meet him. It was not the big airport as we now know. I was standing there, waiting for him, and I saw him spin in, rushed over, and saw that both of them dead. So I went over and got hold of the telephone and called Washington, asked for Arnold and told him. It was the first news he had.

Q: That was a change in fortunes.

W: Westover had no more business flying over there that day by himself than the man in the moon, because he wasn't a good pilot. But he was the boss man, and he wanted a pair of wings, and he got them. That's what took him.

Q: I heard a story about Andrews, Andrews was in his '50s when he was flying and crashed into a mountain in Iceland.

W: That's right.

Q: Did you know anything about Arnold and Andrews? Did you ever see them together?

W: No, I heard all these stories about Andrews being a protege of Hap's, or vice versa. Andrews was put in charge of the first GHQ AF.

Q: Andrews was a year ahead of Arnold. He was '06 and Arnold was '07. Were they rivals for the job? When Westover was killed, did you hear anything about Andrews being made for that job?

W: If anything was going on, I wouldn't have heard anything about it. I was sitting out here on the Coast. I didn't have any access to the intrigue and so forth. It was the next day that Arnold was made Chief.

Q: No, it was about a week.

W: Well, shortly thereafter, there was no lengthy time for maneuvering.

Q: You know, there was some delay, possibly occasioned by rumors in Washington that Arnold was a drinker. Does that surprise you?

W: It certainly would.

Q: You didn't see him drink?

W: As I say, I never was in a position to go out socially with the Arnolds, and when I was then acquainted with him, it was always on business. I do know that he and Knudsen and I would have a drink or two in the evening after a hard day of going around the plants. I'll tell you a cute story about Knudsen. Knudsen, of course, been with Ford for many years, and went to General Motors. Arnold had an old broken-down Ford at Bolling Field, and we would get in there late in the evening. One of the aides would bring up this Ford. Arnold would get in that and drive it to his quarters, rather than call his chauffeur out, because we didn't know what time we would get in. Knudsen was always fussing at him about that damned Ford. He said: "Why do you ride in that for," just ribbing him, Hap would smile and say: "Well, it's the best I can do; best I can get." We came back one night from a trip, and we all got out of the airplane, and Hap's looking all around the place, doesn't see the aide, doesn't see the car, finally he let's out a roar and the sergeant comes us, and he says: "Where's my car." The Sergeant said: "Sir, I just brought it down; there it is." Arnold: "That's not my car." Knudsen said: "I got damned tired of seeing your drive around in that Ford. That's a brand new Chevrolet. Now you take it and drive home."

Q: We are talking about the B-29 and the near miss you had

with the whole program getting washed out. Arnold had great confidence, obviously, because he had set up the production. He had set up all these facilities, the training and everything. Yet he had a B-32 as a sort of fall-back position. So he wasn't going to put all his eggs in one basket. And, of course, the B-32 never got off the ground, really.

W: I think we had about two of them.

Q: You had 15 of them, Kenney used them. They sent them down to Kenney's theater, Southwest Pacific.

W: I didn't know that. I knew there were two of them out there, when I got to Okinawa. Frank Cook, who was Assistant Project Officer, under Jake Harmon brought that out there. He was flying it up and down, letting the boy's look at it. This is a way out, just before the surrender.

Q: So Arnold, it's kind of interesting, he put his eggs in that basket, didn't have all of his eggs in there, and he had a fall-back position just in case the B-29 didn't make it.

W: The reason for that was because....

Q: Was that his idea?

W: This, I don't know. I think it was probably Echols', because, having called on the industry to analyze the B-29, should we go on with it, I'm sure it was Echols who finally said: "Well, the industry is against the B-29. It is a far out airplane, heavy wing-loaded thing. So we better have something to fall back on.

Q: Then you think it might have been Echols' idea?

W: Oh, I'm sure it was. Arnold had the greatest faith in the world in Echols. He wouldn't let him out of his sight. Poor Echols, like the rest of us, tried to get into the war, and he wouldn't let him go. He had a lot of confidence in him.

Q: You know, Arnold had an experience in WWI. He never got into combat, and this was a hangup with him, that he never got into the fight, and consequently, when guys like yourself said they wanted to get into battle, he was more tolerant. Once in a while he would let a guy go.

W: That's what happened to me.

Q: You got in, but he never let Echols go. I was given a different picture of Echols. I was given the picture of Echols as a sort of gentle, Southernerman.

W: He was.

Q: That Arnold put more faith in Benny Meyers than Echols.

W: I don't think so, for a different reason, I'm talking about Echols, from the engineering fellow. And as you said before, you've heard from other sources that his brother-in-law, Jan Howard, who thought he was the greatest engineer in the world. Echols was just the other way around, Echols never thought he was the greatest engineer in the world, but he got the job done, and inspired the young engineers like Chidlaw, Harmon, and the rest of us.

Q: Echols was a modest man, soft spoken.

W: Soft spoken, Southern gentleman.

Q: Why did Arnold go to Meyers on a lot of things?

W: Well, because, I've often thought about that, and the only reason I can think about, Meyers was a very brilliant guy, financially. He knew the financial business, could put on a good act and Meyers never hesitated about running roughshod over anybody.

Q: Even Echols?

W: No, he never got away with that. But all the rest of the boys out there. His only experience in the AF--he was a damned

lousy pilot--was in the budget and financial business..

Q: Could it be that Arnold relied on Echois for engineering?

W: Absolutely.

Q: And then for Meyers as an expediter?

W: No, not initially. I think he relied on Meyers to give him the support that he, Arnold, needed when he went in to fight for money. Because, in many respects, Benny Meyers was somewhat like the former Secretary of Defense, McNamara. He had a photographic memory like McNamara. He could stand up quote figures as long as you'd sit around and listen to him. He was different because he was on the make, as we found out later. You can't say that about McNamara. Benny had no experience with anything mechanical or engineering. I would really say that I think, when you come right down to it, Benny thought the fan on the car is what made it run. He put on a big front, you see. All he did in the expediting business was get on the phone and call up these manufacturers and just eat their fannies out.

Q: In a way, he served a purpose that Arnold wanted to have done. He went out and did things.

W: You see, the difference between Arnold and Benny, Arnold didn't run roughshod over people. He gave you a job to do and expected you to do it, and if you didn't, why he gave you one more chance. And if you didn't get it done, why then you were gone.

Q: Did he give you two chances, general?

W: As far as I know, he never acted on the spur of the moment, as far as I knew.

Q: On the subject of Arnold's relations with the aircraft manufacturers, he really put himself out on a limb. Don't you think

this took some kind of vision? He tried to get them, without a real commitment to convert to War Production, and I think that they dragged their feet, didn't they?

W: Some of them did, some of them went ahead. Kenney must have told you the problems we had in convincing the aircraft industry that we were going to expand at that terrific rate.

Q: No, he didn't.

W: Arnold told us how many planes he wanted when. We drew a schedule. Some place in Wright Field we've still got the original schedule which was drawn out on butcher paper, big long thing. Trainers, transports, fighters and bombers, and he told us how many he wanted, and at what time, and we sat down then, at Wright Field. Chidlaw was one of them; Crawford was the other. Chidlaw was the top project man on trainers and transports. Another brilliant guy there who was No. 2 to Echols by the name of Al Lyons. He died before the war really got going. So we just sat down and figured who was making these airplanes. We made a guess at it, called them up. And boy, why some of them didn't have heart attacks, I'll never know. We just said: "Look, you are going to have by such and such a time, an output of so many bombers or fighters or trainers. You get busy and tell us what kind of money you need, how big a factory, and so on. We were all in that act. Then we had to decide what airplanes we were going to put in the war. For instance, it was a tossup then for the B-23, which was the follow-on of the old B-18, and the B-17. The same way with the A-20 and the B-25, and the rest of them.

Q: Wasn't the B-18 a bust? It had no range at all.

W: For that time, it was the best we could get with the money that was available. We follow that on with the Douglas B-23.

Q: You mentioned some trouble with Louis Johnson. We are talking about the late '30s now. The War Department was interested in buying B-18s rather than the B-17s because you could get more airplanes for less money. Do you remember anything of that struggle?

W: I don't remember that. We had a competition. We drew out the rules of the competition, and Douglas lost it on the basis of later deliveries, higher price and lower performance.

Q: Douglas lost it, huh? This was, what a four-engine bomber?

W: The B-23, two-engine, follow-on of the B-18. We bought 50 of them and had them in service, and most of the people wanted it. And the guy was responsible for underbidding the performance and overbidding the price, was the No. 2 man at Douglas. Anyway, every one of the airplanes that were bought and put in our possession was evaluated by an evaluation team on the basis of performance, delivery and cost.

Q: I wanted to ask you something, you reminded me. There were some reports by Drew Pearson, for example, who implied, or said, that because of the family relationship between Douglas and Arnold, that Douglas got breaks on production contracts. Do you remember that when Barbara and Bruce were married?

W: I don't remember that connection, but I know Pearson was always hammering away at something.

Q: You are talking about Knudsen going to see Pearson?

W: Yes, there was one attack that came out by Pearson against Knudsen. Knudsen got real upset about it, and he went over to see Pearson. This is the story that I got, and there was never another attack. As far as I remember.

Q: You know Pearson was always attacking Arnold. He never had a good word for Arnold. And I wanted to ask you about this Douglas

thing. Do you feel that Douglas got any special breaks in production? You mentioned this evaluation board....

W: That's right, they lost the bomber contract...

Q: On the B-23?

W: On the B-23, which is what most of our people wanted. We had bought 50 of them. We knew about the airplane, had shaken it down. And it would have been a medium bomber. So instead of buying the B-23, we bought the B-25 from Kindelberger.

Q: They lost out to North American. There's a case where it was strictly a matter of dollars, and time, and performance.

W: We had a handful of boys there at Wright Field who had been in the business a long time, headed up by Echols and Al Lyons. They laid out the rules how we judged these things. As far as I know, every manufacturer was loaded down to the best of our ability because we had to get our capacity out.

Q: Gen. Wolfe, who came up with the idea of the XB-40 and the XB-41? This was the one to put armor on the B-17 and the B-24? To use them as escorts.

W: That came out of the Bomber Branch there at Wright Field.

Q: Was that Lyons?

W: No, it was Harmon, if I remember correctly. Of course, Lyons was sitting up above Harmon, and Echols was sitting about Lyons.

Q: I saw somewhere where Lyons had a role in that thing. That was a bust.

W: Well, because if I remember correctly, about that time was when we began to get the turrets out, the chin turret on the B-17, and the belly turret, and the side guns, but it was supposed to have been a gunship.

Q: It just seems to me, it was so heavily loaded down, it had a slow speed, it was all right when the bombers were going to the target, but once the bombers dropped their load, they could take off and go home. But it couldn't. It had to stay back and then it became a liability, so it didn't work too well.

W: It was just one of those things we tried. We tried a lot of things that were really busts.

Q: (Re XB-40 bust) Of course, all this harking back--and I'm sounding like this guy Shaughnessy now--you know, harking back to the lack of a long range escort. We didn't have one until late in the war, and by that time we had suffered some casualties.

W: There was no real requirement set up in the early part of the war for escort fighters--on those ranges that the 17s and 24s were able to get.

Q: Is anybody to blame; was it a matter of foresight?

W: No, I don't think so, because the philosophy then was that daylight bombing was practical. The British said no, never did believe it. And we kept hammering away at it all along. We said daylight bombing is the answer, precision bomb in daylight--with certain types of formations and with the bombers interdependent upon each other, with good fire power. You take the history of the development of the B-17, you kept adding more range to it, adding more firepower and getting better performance. It was phenomenal the way the thing turned out. But there was no concept that we would ever need fighter escorts out from the target. Because in the old days, in the Tactical School, the policy then was, and the strategy then was, we would get control of the air. We would get that with the fighters. Then when it came to these long ranges, and the possibility of making the long

ranges, that upset the whole thing. You know, you only have to go back to 1937 to find out that the Command and General Staff College said the role of the airplane was to take the place of the carrier pigeon.

Q: Or as strictly auxiliary to the ground forces.

W: Strictly auxiliary offshore where the artillery and close defenses couldn't reach. That's written up in the War Department's roles and missions, in 1937.

Q: Did you have any contact with a guy named George Goddard?

W: Oh yes, sure.

Q: Tell me about George Goddard.

W: Well, he's one of these real capable, eccentric type of guys. Beautiful, wonderful imagination and drive. Biggest pest in the world. I used to throw him out of my office there at Wright Field, time after time.

Q: He's carrying pictures all the time.

W: And getting something done.

Q: You know,

W: Have you read his book?

Q: I sure have. Let me tell you something (off-tape).

Q: I want to ask you about Goddard and Arnold. You know, Goddard, as you read the book, Goddard got on Arnold's list because of Minton Kaye. And I was out to see Minton Kaye in Pasadena last week. Do you remember this friction between Minton Kaye and Goddard?

W: Yes, professional jealousy.

Q: What is your evaluation of that struggle?

W: I don't think there is anybody in this country, maybe worldwide, that knows as much about photography or has contributed as much

as George. Did he ever tell you about when he took over the Jena Optical Company in Europe? Took me two years to get that statement out. He just walked over there and took it over.

Q: After the war? -

W: Just as the war folded up. He walked over and took over Jena Optical Company. That guy, he was requisitioning, going in and taking things. Took up a couple of years to cover it up.

Q: What do you mean, took it away, in the name of the Air Force? "
W: Yes, because they were the outstanding optical glass people, and he just took it over. Instead of the Russians getting it, George got it.

Q: Then he did a good thing?

W: Sure, without any authority.

Q: He got you into trouble on this?

W: I had to clean the thing up, later on.

Q: I'm going to see him next week.

W: Give him my best regards. When we went down to the South Pacific, they didn't have any good maps of the islands and so forth, George got his photographic group to go out there, and take photographs of those little islands, and show the depth of the water.

Q: For some reason, he and Minton Kaye didn't see eye to eye, and Minton Kaye was very close to Arnold.

W: For a while.

Q: And then Minton Kaye lost out, in that position. Do you know anything about that?

W: I happened to be there the day that I heard Arnold tell somebody to fire Minton and send him far away.

Q: So he fired him, do you know why?

W: I'm not going to tell you.

Q: Arnold used to raise hell with George Goddard, why?

W: Because he was such a damn pest. He was always in there after Arnold. Why don't we do this? And why don't we do that? And half the time he would say: "Okay, George." And the next time he would say: "Get the hell out of here, George!" George was a real pest. He had the tenacity of 10,000 bulldozers.

Q: You know him better than I do. I just know him several months.

W: He's a great guy. He never got due credit.

Q: Well he had this strip camera, which did a heck of a good job, and Arnold didn't recognize its value. Why did Arnold get mad? I know he was obnoxious. But according to this book--and I've read it very carefully, at least I think I did--Arnold simply didn't recognize Goddard's genius in developing the strip camera. As you know, Goddard was sent out of Washington and he later turned up working for the Navy, and then it was due to Lovett and a couple of other people, that he came back to work for the Air Force. But it wasn't Arnold who recognized his talent. This is what I get out of his book.

W: I don't know.

Mrs. W: Who finally recognized Goddard?

Q: Lovett and some other people. They used his strip camera at Normandy. They exposed the German obstruction, and it has been used to expose the Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962. He was a great genius. It was just that he and Arnold had a conflict, partly due to this other man. If you read the book, he calls the man "Colonel Nemesis," and that's Minton Kaye.

W: That might have a lot to do with it right there, but Arnold finally got off Kaye, and sent him far away.

Q: Maybe he brought Goddard back?

W: Well, Goddard would irritate anybody. If you listen to Goddard, and say: "Fine, George, that's wonderful," The next day, he would be back in with another idea: "George we can't do all these things." Then he would get all hot and bothered about it. In the meantime, you say, "George, go back down to the laboratory, get that thing you sold me on last week." He was always coming up with ideas, and in those days we didn't have much money. We couldn't give the photographic lab that George ran everything he wanted. But boy, once he got over there in Europe, where there was no need for money, he just went wild.

Q: I got the impression that Goddard did some great things but sometimes if you had him going in this direction, you wanted him to go this way, and you turned away and did something else. When you came back, Goddard was going that way.

W: All inventors or people who conceive things are that way.

Q: He was a genius, but he was sort of unreconstructed.

W: It's hard to explain.

Q: Did you have any contact with Elliott Roosevelt?

W: I was fussing at Hap Arnold to get more people out there to Wright Field, so he called me up one day and said: "KB, you have been pressing me about some more officers." And I said: "That's right, when do I get them?" He said: "I'm sending you one tomorrow." Hell, it was Elliott Roosevelt. Well out he comes, this is Captain Elliott Roosevelt. Boy, what a character.

Q: Did he give you a lot of trouble?

W: Oh God. He'd say: "Don't you worry about that, I'll call up my poppa and we'll get that done." Always poppa. And God knows,

whether he was telling his poppa all the troubles. I think a lot of the troubles we had with Franklin came directly from Elliott. He had just remarried--one of the sweetest gals you would ever like to meet (Scoggins), the gal from Texas. And she had two sons, real nice boys. But the way that damn character treated her was just god awful. He was the most conceited ass that ever came along the pike, and he couldn't do anything.

Q: He left her for Faye Emerson.

Q: How did you get rid of Elliott?

W: A lot of maneuvering. He went from there to Europe.

Q: No, he went to Newfoundland, I read his book last week, "As He Saw it."

W: He headed up a reconnaissance outfit over there. Have you heard the story about a young pilot coming in the bar, one night. The old Rothschild home in London was fixed up as an officer's club.

The story goes this way. This young captain was a pilot and had some real rough missions in a squadron under Elliott. He came into the officer's club there, and Elliott was learning up against the bar, tight as usual, bragging, shooting off his mouth, and this Captain walked over and said: "Are you BG Elliott Roosevelt?" And he said: "Yes, I am, so what?" Pow, he cold-cocked him right there. He called him everything in the world. I can't prove that story, but it was going around.

Q: What would you consider Arnold's greatest attribute, his greatest contribution to the war, or to the Air Corps, or airpower?

W: Well, I'd have to start off by saying I think he was a great leader. A lot of people didn't like him, but he was a great leader. And he had inspiration. He could see what this was going

to be. I mean he was the only one who could see the magnitude of what we had to have--to my knowledge. Nobody else was thinking of these numbers that he was thinking of.

Q: In that 50,000 plane figure, was this Roosevelt's, or did Arnold suggest this number? This was the number which shocked a lot of people because up to this time they were talking in little numbers. Did he have anything to do with putting that figure in Roosevelt's head, or in his speech?

W: I'm sure--and I can't prove a word I'm saying--that the original gang, who support Mitchell, were the original airpower people. And that group were the people that thought that big, thought that way. And the spokesman for them was Arnold. I think Hal George, I think Tony Frank, and all the rest of those boys that went to Siberia after the court martial.

Q: Did Tony Frank go to Siberia, too?

W: Yes, sure. Kenney went to Siberia. You know that story?

Q: No, I don't.

W: I'm disappointed in George. He didn't tell you that one. George was sent to Siberia, which was Camp Benning, Georgia. Arnold went to Ft. Riley, Kansas. He had one half squadron of observation airplanes That was his assignment; Tony Frank....

Q: Was Tony Frank assigned to Washington during the Billy Mitchell trial? What did Tony Frank do that caused him to be sent to Siberia?

W: He supported Mitchell.

Q: Then he was in Washington.

W: I just don't know, I imagine he was. I don't know. But Hal George supported him; George Kenney supported him, and a lot of the juniors supported him.

Q: Brereton was a junior, did he get sent out, too? He was in there, too.

W: Yes, all of them got shifted out. George Kenney was sent to Camp Benning. George is a smart guy. So they gave him a job-- this was an infantry base. So George rewrote the infantry's book on machine guns. And while he was there, he met this chap by the name of Sutherland. Sutherland was Chief of Staff for MacArthur in Australia. Brett was sent down there as the top AF guy.

Q: This was around the time of Pearl Harbor?

W: It was right after that. We started building up Australia. MacArthur escaped out of there, and went down South. And they sent Brett out there. He was one of the old timers too. He didn't get along with MacArthur at all. So MacArthur told Sutherland, he said:

"Look, I've got to have an air man here. This guy Brett isn't doing us any good at all." Of course, he had Brereton over there in the Philippines, and the Indies, too. He came out of the Philippines and went down to the East Indies. So Sutherland said: "Well, I know a chap, if you can get him. He's a real airman. He is a proponent of airpower." And MacArthur said: "Who is he?" And he said: "George Kenney," Sutherland having known George down at Camp Benning, when he was serving his tour, and that's how George got down there with MacArthur. And George had known Mrs. MacArthur when she was Jean Faircloth, living in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. And I knew her then. I went through there cross country on a flight. We were stuck with the weather, and she invited us out for dinner. So when I was stationed in the Philippines in 1926, she came out there as a maiden gal on a visit. Shortly thereafter she married MacArthur. George was in like Flynn, recommended by Sutherland. He knew Jean. So he was the one

that converted MacArthur to airpower.

Q: Did MacArthur understand airpower?

W: No.

Q: But he trusted Kenney?

W: Kenney had his problems. When Kenney got there, the Army had commandeered every tugboat, barge and whatnot. They were going to make the great landing in New Guinea. Old George said that's not the way to do it. Let's do it by air. So he called in these top Army commanders, and had a big seance, and they pooh-poohed the idea. With bad weather and so forth, how could they be dependent on airpower? And so, George said: "Well, you pick the worst day you can find, and I'll demonstrate to you that I can feed you and supply you with ammunition by air. So MacArthur finally said: "Okay. You're talking big. Let's see you do it." Of course, George was a real good airman. And we had just developed a few years before, those little localizer radio beams. So they picked a bad day, George sent reconnaissance planes out and they dropped these radio beams in the areas where these people had selected they would be. Of course, he dropped the stuff by parachute, and kicked it out the door. And the stuff fell there and they were bogged down with food and ammunition. MacArthur was out there to see it. He called a meeting and said: "From now on, we're going to move through the islands by air," and that was the beginning of it. He turned it over just like that. And he's the one who coined the phrase: "We will advance the bomber line." Words to that effect. And from that day on, he was a converted proponent of airpower. George kept hammering away and proving it all the time. That was the reason, I, amongst a lot of people, said, maybe MacArthur has got the message now. Up to that time, you couldn't find a single soul in the Air

Corps of that vintage that had one good word to say because he was a member of the court martial that shanghaied Mitchell.

Q: Did you ever hear anything about this business between Brereton and MacArthur, about Brereton warning MacArthur that they ought to disperse the planes, this was after the attack on Pearl Harbor and MacArthur failed to take any action for, like 8 or 10 hours. Did you ever hear anything about that?

W: Just about what you heard. I know nothing firsthand, but the same story, and Gene Eubank...

Q: He's in Mississippi.

W: Yes, he's down in Gulfport.

Q: Is he worth seeing, he had some contact with Arnold, didn't he?

W: Yes, and he can give you the story about the Philippines.

Q: He was down at SAT, this School for Applied Tactics. Didn't he head that up, down in Orlando, during the war?

W: I don't remember.

Q: But he had some contact with Arnold, I see his name in there quite a bit.

W: He's quite a guy.

Q: You say Lovett and Arnold worked very close?

W: Oh yes, perfect team, and I have always felt that Bob Lovett's job was fending off the civilian side of the department against the military side.

Q: Maybe fending off Roosevelt, too?

W: Yes, like when he stepped in there and said, the Ordnance Corps can't do this, why, we will do it, if the Signal Corps can't do this, we will do it.

Q: Were there some planes, like this C-76. That was a bust, wasn't it?

W: There were some others that were a bust, too. We were frantic. We had a program there to build wooden airplanes, and did build some wooden planes.

Q: How about the gliders. They had some trouble with those, too, didn't they? Did you get into that production problem?

W: Yes, I had that too, we just had to lay it on top of everything else.

Q: Richard Dupont?

W: Yes, we had everybody building gliders that we could possibly think of. The whole industrial capacity of this country was just absolutely overloaded. The Army had to have theirs, and the Navy had to have theirs, and the British were getting some, and the French were getting some, and the Russians. So whatever we could eke out, we would eke out.

Q: Did you get into any hassles with Jimmy Burns and Harry Hopkins about supplying the Russians with planes?

W: No.

Q: That was above your level?

W: My job was just to get the stuff built and get it out.

Q: Did Arnold ever get mad at you?

W: He'd get all upset and crotchety and irritated. With all the problems he had, you couldn't blame him.

Q: When he got mad, did he use profanity?

W: Not much, a little. Not really.

Q: Raise his voice?

W: Raise his voice, but never screaming and shrieking. But you could tell he was mad.

Q: He had a perennial smile on his face. But it didn't mean he was happy?

W: No, I don't think he ever was happy.

Q: Did he ever sit in his office, and put his feet up on the desk and say: "Let s relax this afternoon?" You never saw him that way?

W: He just didn't have the time to do it. Between running over to Congress and reporting to Franklin (D. Roosevelt) and giving his own crowd-hell and fighting the battle for Spaatz over there in Europe against the British.

Q: How about fighting the battle for Spaatz against the Navy?— Did you get into that, keeping the stuff out of the Pacific? The Navy wanted B-24s out in the Pacific, and Arnold was trying to keep them down and this BOLERO. BOLERO was the buildup in Europe.

W: I'd forgotten about that. We had our problems with the Navy, I mean I had my problems, production-wise with them.

Q: What kind of problems did you have?

W: Getting priorities and so forth.

Q: Did the Navy try to crank in a lot of their ships, a lot of lesser things into the ALA priority?

W: Yes. But as I said, between Lovett and Hap, we could move so doggone much faster than the Navy could. They'd wake up and we would have it. Then I had some real tough expeditors that I got out of the automotive industry.

Q: Was Orville Cook involved?

W: Yes, he was working for me.

Q: I talked to Orville Cook recently.

W: Oh you did, did you get anything out of him?

Q: A couple of things, basically, the production approach. He doesn't have the high regard for Arnold that you have.

W: He doesn't? What is his criticism of Arnold?

Q: That Arnold was sort of haphazard. He was not organized.

W: Of course, I can give you an explanation of that. Cook was a very methodical type himself, and he was my Deputy, and as a Deputy he did real well. When I was making the decisions, he would put them through. Then when he took over, it wasn't the same thing. He wouldn't make a decision and ramrod it through.

Q: When did he take over from you?

W: When I left in 1943. But he was a brilliant guy. He was one of the top propeller engineers in the world--out there at Wright Field. He ran the Propellor Laboratory. He is a good engineer, but kind of a colorless fellow in a way. He wouldn't take the chances that some of the others would.

Q: I sort of got this impression.

W: But he was a good man, and to me, he made an awfully good No. 2 man. I'd make the decisions and he would carry them out. That's a lot easier than making them yourself.

Q: Did you feel that Arnold should have had a better organization? As an administrator-Arnold was probably a bust. He just didn't have time to get coordinated comments on anything he had going. He had to make too many decisions, and he couldn't wait for them in the staff.

W: Well, maybe I am the wrong fellow to say that to, because if he had had a big organization around, he wouldn't have gotten done near

what he got done. Because he would give you a job to do and you were supported. You knew damn well when he told you to do it, it was not the orthodox thing to do. But he and Lovett supported you. Like I told you on the IFF thing, and a number of others. I got into the same kind of hassle with the Ordnance Corps on machine guns. I had to take over the production of 50 caliber machine guns because the Ordnance Corps had never reduced the gun to mass production. So I was called in there one day and told you just take over production of .50 caliber machine guns.

Q: How about bombs. Wasn't there trouble with bomb shortage?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: Knerr was complaining about bombs being short?

W: I never had a high regard for the Ordnance Corps. You can find Ordnance officers who will tell you what an SOB I am--to this day, if they're still alive--because I fought the Ordnance Corps since the beginning of time.

Q: Knerr was in charge of logistics in the European theater, and in the last year of the war, there was a dire shortage of 500# bombs. Do you remember that? There was a big hassle about that. He claimed that they didn't have the right ordnance. Was this any failure to foresee the need? Of course, they were dropping them in such great number that you couldn't possibly anticipate the requirement.

W: You have to give the Ordnance Corps credit. If you remember when Patton started to cross Europe, he had first priority of everything. We were cut down on gasoline, we were cut down on rubber, and so forth, to mount that operation of Patton's. And part of the Ordnance Corps was cut down too. But on the other hand, who in the

Air Force could foresee the consumption that we were really using? Nobody could guess that far. Who could guess the losses of the bombers? The only thing there was when I went through Germany on that Morgenthau assignment that I had, I went into Kassel, Germany.

Q: What was that assignment?

W: They conjured up an ad hoc committee and put me in charge of it, and the job was to write the post-surrender terms of Germany. So I was sent over there with a group. So I went around behind the troops as they were uncovering the place and got into Kassel one day. And that was of the centers of German aircraft industry, and they had this great big flak tower in which the engineering staff and production staff of these factories around Kassel had their headquarters. The day I got in there, they were still in there, so I interviewed the head man there, who spoke very good English. We got talking about the war, and he said: "It was really a heartbreaker." He said: "Our fighters would go out there today and knock down bombers all over the place." We'd say: "Well, we really got them." The next day the same number would come through. No matter how many we knocked down, there was always somebody coming through with the same number. The philosophy that the Air Force had, started with Arnold and his immediate staff, except Echols. Just have plenty of everything. Don't take a chance; don't run short. That's why we put three companies into building the B-17, and three into building the B-29s.

Q: Arnold didn't play it like McNamara played this war, he was going to use the last bullet on the last day of the war. Arnold couldn't afford to allow these things to happen.

W: All the way through his program it was that way. There was plenty of stuff ordered. There was never any argument about: "Are

we going to build 50 this month, or build 75." You build all you can.

Q: Arnold, right after Pearl Harbor, hired Pearre Cabell and Larry Norstad to be his "Advisory Council," and these guys were ministers without portfolio. They had a job and they were just supposed to be idea men. He said: "You guys are my idea men. I don't have time to think." This is what Norstad told me. "I just want you to think and stay out of operations." Did they? Did they ever get in your hair?

W: No. Never. They stayed out of operations.

Q: Of course, Norstad left, and then Jake Smart came in, and then Rosie O'Donnell came in later on, and Fred Deane toward the end of the war. These were people that Arnold had close to him who were told to think ideas, and if he liked them, he would push them.

W: He had great confidence in these people that he selected, unfortunately a lot of them fell down. Early part of the war, one of them, his real close boys was Joe Dawson. He'd been with Arnold many years, so when we took over the British Lockheed Hudson's, light bombers, Arnold put Joe Dawson in command of the outfit, and it was nothing but a debacle, Joe just couldn't run an outfit. It was a great disappointment to Arnold.

Q: Where did he fit into Arnold's staff?

W: He had been with Arnold before the war in one of the bomb squadrons, bomb groups, just like my brother. And he took a liking to him, he was one of the old timers in the AF.

Q: How about Ray Dunn?

W: Yes, Ray was another protege of Arnold's. He was kind of a super aide. I don't know what ever became of him.

Q: He's in Washington. I think he got in trouble--he was in this airborne operation over Sicily, I think that's where he got in trouble.

W: He was another disappointment to Arnold.

Q: How about some others like Sue Clagett?

W: Oh yes, I knew him.

Q: He got in trouble, too.

W: Sue had many opportunities and never came through. He was in command of that Selfridge Field setup at one time.

Q: He was, and he made general twice, and was demoted twice. He succeeded Arnold at March Field, and then he stubbed his toe and was taken down. Then was with the Magruder Commission in China when the war started, and he stubbed his toe there, too. And he blamed Arnold for it.

W: His problem was the bottle.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald? He was taken down, too. He was in the Middle East. Do you remember him?

W: Yes, sure I remember him. Those were the old timers that were coming up. Guys who came up with Arnold on the West Coast--Eaker, Spaatz, some of the others--got better positions than the fellows who came up with Andrews on the East Coast. Is there any merit in that judgment?

W: I hadn't thought about that before. I'll say this for Hap, he gave every one of those old timers--his contemporaries--a chance. Every one of them.

Q: And if they didn't make it, he took them down, like Jakey Fickel.

W: Jakey Fickel, "Jingling Willy" Jones, B.Q. Jones, Brereton, Tony Frank....

Q: Well, Brereton and Tony Frank got to high position.

W: Yes, but they didn't last very long.

Q: Well, Brereton was head of the airborne. He made three stars.

W: Yes, but I mean he was shifted around from 9th AF.... and Tony had some good commands too.

Q: Tony wanted a combat command; Arnold wouldn't give it to him.

W: That's right, same way with Fitzgerald. It's odd, if you look back on it, to see and realize that everyone of those old timers--I don't give a damn what they say today--had their opportunities with Hap. And those that came through, made good, well taken care of, others didn't.

Wolfe - PP 16-21 out

W: Yes. So that was the beginning of the business. So meantime, Kenney was down in Puerto Rico when they were building that big operation there. And Powers was some place else, so I got the thing started. The next thing that happened, Hap called me up, and said: "I want you to come in here and bring that production plan in," which he told me to do. So I went in and he said now we are going over to see the President. So I went over with him. He took me into the office and introduced me to the President and said: "Here's Colonel Wolfe," I think.

Q: This was around November 1938?

W: March or April 1938. That's when I started. I never did go back to my job.

Q: This was say within 60 days after he took the job when Westover got killed?

W: So he left me in there with Franklin. Arnold said: "When you get through, come by the office and see me." So I had a little talk with the President, told me what he was going to do, he was going to build 50,000 airplanes, and this, that and the other.

Q: Did he talk 50,000 airplanes at that time? He didn't get the 50,000 till a year later.

W: That's right, he was interested in getting the production capability going.

Q: At that time they were talking "10,000 planes."

W: Yes, I've forgotten. So the President sent me over to see Johnson. He was an ornery cuss to get along with...

Q: Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of War?

W: Yes. So that was how we got started in building up this production capacity. Why Arnold picked me for it, I don't know,

and he never did tell me. Kenney was then sent to the South Pacific, Powers was taken into Washington to be assistant to Gen. Echols, who was heading up the Materiel thing in Washington, so I wound up as head of the Production Division.

Q: That was, Kenney didn't go until after the war started.

W: That's right, but he was still down in Puerto Rico, and he wanted to get into the war. He wasn't about to get tied to a desk job, so he was maneuvering to beat the band. So that's how that happened. So from there on, Kenney and I had several meetings in Washington. And as I said earlier, we were enroute to Washington the day the Nips hit Honolulu. We stayed there. Kenney was the ranking officer on duty, and we were trying to find Arnold. You might have gotten that story from Douglas.

Q: Well, I know that they were hunting quail out near Bakersfield.

W: Yes, they were out on a hunting expedition, and nobody knew where they were.

Q: He didn't tell you?

W: No. He didn't tell any of his staff.

Q: He had gone out the night before to kiss off these B-17s at Hamilton. They are the ones that flew into Pearl Harbor during the attack.

W: Yes, that's the one that Ted Landon led that flight. Anyway, Kenney and I were trying our best to find out where he was. So finally we got a call from the Highway Patrol. They located him out there. And boy, he came barging in, and sparks began to fly then.

Q: Well, Arnold didn't show up till the next day, I guess.

W: Yes, second day after, I think.

Q: The second day after? He had to fly, I think he had a C-47 and they had to fly across country.

W: Yes, and I think Gene Beebe was with him. Anyway, the amusing story about that was, when the highway patrol found he and Don Douglas--told him about Pearl Harbor--this Mexican houseboy said: "Oh yes, I knew about that. I heard it on the radio yesterday," and he didn't tell them. So that was the beginning of the Production Division and the program to build up the industry.

Q: You know, Chidlaw told me that Arnold had a bad experience at Wright Field back in '30-31, when he was out there. He was under Conger Pratt. His former brother-in-law, Jan Howard, was out there.

W: He was Chief Engineer.

Q: And Arnold had sort of the Air Service Command, or Field Service Command, and Arnold didn't have a heck of a lot to do in his job. Most of the job was being done by Howard. Arnold had an adverse reaction to Wright Field, and Chidlaw thinks that Arnold's reaction to Wright Field was always negative after that time. For some reason, he always seemed to be jumping on Wright Field.

W: I think Ben was right about that, but I think for a good reason, and the reason was Jan Howard. Howard tried to be all things to all men. While he was Chief Engineer, we had a Colonel up there named Strauss. Strauss was head of Procurement and Quality Control, and they were always opposed.

Q: Well, Jan Howard was the kind of guy who seemed to be brilliant, but couldn't get along with people. You don't think that Arnold had this sort of psychological negative reaction to Wright Field. You think that when he jumped on Wright Field, it was for good cause?

W: Well, based on my experience with Hap, beginning with this Production Division he was just putting the chrome-vanadium ice pick in everybody to get things done. And rightly so, because we had been

going along for years without any appropriations or money to do this, that and the other. And he had a big program and a plan and he was raising Cain with everybody to get going.

Q: I want to talk about your assignment as Air Corps representative at the Douglas plant, El Segundo. What was Douglas building at that time?

W: He was building this single-engine. We called it in those days, ground attack airplane, the A-17. And then later, North American started building an advanced trainer, the AT-6. We always remembered the airplanes by number; never adopted the names.

Q: Douglas was working on a prototype of the A-20, in 1939, wasn't he?

W: For the French, he was building them for the French.

Q: And then a Frenchman by the name of Paul Chemidlin, remember his name? The Frenchman who crashed in the parking lot.

W: He was in the airplane that cracked up. Don Douglas and Carl Cerver and I were standing there on the lot, when this thing spun in.

Q: And they tried to keep that secret but it's like keeping some event in Macy's window secret.

W: Well, it fell right in the parking lot of the North American plant.

Q: Was it North American or Douglas?

W: It was North American plant which was across the street on Imperial Boulevard, from Douglas' plant.

Q: You were given instructions to permit the Frenchman to get in that plane?

W: That's right.

Q: Who gave you that instruction?

W: Well, I think it came out of Washington.

Q: I recall that Arnold sent you a telegram, instructing you to show the Frenchmen.

W: Could be, we had to get permission to show anything to any of the foreigners, even though they were so-called allies.

Q: And then Arnold got on a hot seat for this thing, in Washington, do you remember the Congressional testimony?

W: No, I don't remember.

Q: The problem was that he and Morgenthau had a thing going. Do you know anything between them?

W: No. My only experience with Morgenthau was when I got sent on that ad hoc committee over there to Europe, while the war was going on.

Q: Arnold was caught between the rock and a hard place. If he admitted that Ken Wolfe gave access to the Frenchman, to look at what was a classified airplane, then he was in trouble. If he told them the truth that Morgenthau had ordered him to instruct Wolfe to let the Frenchmen, then he was in trouble with Roosevelt. Were you aware of this dilemma?

W: Not in those days. Unless you were on duty in Washington, you never got that.

Q: They called him up, testimony, Senator Bennett Champ Clark, and a couple of others, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and they were really giving it to him. And they called Morgenthau up. The line that Morgenthau took was that the plane had not yet been accepted by the Air Corps. Therefore, it still was Douglas property, and therefore Douglas had the right to authorize the Frenchman to

fly in it. Did you ever get into the nuisances of that distinction?

W: No, I was never called to testify at all on that thing.

Q: I guess they wanted to keep you out of it because it would just add to the problem.

W: I wasn't aware of that at all.

Q: This led, of course, Arnold got "in dutch" with the President through Morgenthau. Morgenthau and the President were very close. And this is when the President had allegedly said that, "we have places on Guam for guys like you." And Arnold was in Roosevelt's doghouse until the war started. And then of course he did some good things, and according to Arnold's book, Global Mission, the President called him in and offered him an old fashioned, and called him "Hap" and that's how he knew he was out of the doghouse. This was a couple of years later. But because of this incident at Santa Monica, he got in trouble. And of course, you were the instrument of letting the Frenchman in that. But Arnold didn't consult you?

W: No, I was never called up, interviewed or anything. This was when Arnold was Assistant to Westover?

Q: No, this was after, in January 1939. This was probably a month or two after that conference at the White House that you mentioned before.

W: The conference at the White House was after I was relieved as AF representative. I never went back to that job.

Q: Then this conference at the White House was later.

W: Must have been, timewise.

Q: Then, that ties in with the 50,000 planes you mentioned, because Roosevelt used that in a speech on May 16, 1940.

W: This is '38 now, when I was ordered back there to see Hap, and the second time back to talk to the President.

Q: All these events telescope. Let me ask you one more question about this Frenchman. Did it occur to you that there might be some security violation to let the Frenchman in that plane?

W: No, because as far as I was concerned, they were authorized to see the airplane, ride in it, and everything else, because they were going to buy them, which they did.

Q: But it had classified equipment aboard. Didn't it have a couple of things?

W: No, propeller and engine and some instruments, but nothing else to my knowledge.

Q: There was a law in the books about allowing foreign agents to view classified military material.

W: These people were French AF officers, in uniform. Three of them--Colonel, Major and a Captain. So there was no question in my mind, because I had the authorization from Washington.

Q: Was there some business about opening a plant in New Orleans to build some planes for the French? Was a guy named Sol Rosenblatt involved in this?

W: Well, Sol was in the Washington office.

Q: Did you have any contact with him on this problem?

W: No, he had nothing to do with production or procurement to my knowledge. He may have been writing papers and things in Washington.

Q: He was sort of a man of many trades, He hovered around there and Arnold gave him a couple of jobs to do. I saw his name flit in and out of this thing, and I just wondered...

W: No, I never had any contact with him at that time; later on, there were several meetings in Washington, I remember him being present.

Q: Can you remember some problems, during the war, where Arnold

came out to Wright Field. One problem comes to my mind, these wing tanks for the B-17s. This was a big problem. Did you get involved in that? Do you remember the portable wing tanks they were trying to put on the fighters to give them some range?

W: Oh yes. When the AF was trying their damnest to get escort fighters.

Q: Right, '43.

W: That's right, this is when we came out with the P-51s. Mean- time, we were working like mad on the old "Jug," P-47, which we put the 8 machine guns on. Arnold came out on that deal, indirectly, because Kenney had been raising hell with him about the oxygen tanks, how damned explosive they were. They'd get a shell through them and it could throw the whole airplane.

Q: On the "Jug?"

W: On any airplane that carried oxygen. Kenney was fighting the problem of changing it over. So, my brother (Franklin Wolfe) was in charge of the Armament Division, and he was against this damned 30 caliber machine gun, that the British were insisting on. So my brother and his group in the Armament Division had a P-47 with these eight 50 caliber machine guns, so Kenney and my brother and I said: "Well, we have got to put this test on where Kenney wants to show Arnold how explosive these oxygen tanks are." We set the oxygen tanks up at the far end of the range there. My brother had a P-47 there. Kenney and the rest of us were standing by in the P-47. They fired one burst and the gas tank-oxygen tank took off, and I don't think we ever found it. It went off like a bomb. Of course, Arnold had been arguing with Kenney about it, you see. He wasn't about to gracefully say anything about it. So he turned the subject over to my brother, and said: "Frank,

what in the hell have you got in that airplane?" He said, "I've got eight 50 calibers in there." Arnold said, "Eight 50 calibers?" Frank said: "Yes." So Arnold said: "Well, how did you happen to do this?" So my brother gave him a little song and dance. Arnold never, to my knowledge, ever said "boo" to Kenney, except we got a directive to change all the oxygen tanks, in all the airplanes. But he was absolutely overcome with the waterfall of empty shells coming off the trailing edge of the wings--out of the P-47. I might go ahead a little more on this armor thing. The Ordnance Corps was responsible for the armament. We were just another little Corps. So Kenney and my brother cooked up this deal to go in and give a briefing to Arnold about getting rid of the .30-caliber and standardizing on the .50-calibers and the 20 mm, so my brother drew up some presentation. He got the date and went in there. Part of the presentation was a kindergarten illustration, showed .30-caliber coming out like this and falling off and showed a .50 caliber coming out and falling off. It showed a 20 coming out. He had the Chief of the Ordnance there, plus quite a few Ordnance people, all of Arnold's staff, I guess, the top ones. My brother had served with Arnold out here at Rockwell Field as his bombardment officer. He was one of the few in those days that had access to the Norden bombsight. He knew my brother real well. He said: "Frank, what in the hell are you trying to show us here?" And he said: "I'm showing you how far out the 30 will go and how much farther the others will go," and he had the velocity, and the impact, and everything else. Arnold turned to this MG in the Ordnance Corps, and he said: "General, is that true?" He said: "Yes, to the best of my knowledge." Arnold said: "Frank, change all those blankety blank 30's. Dismissed." That was the end of the conference.

Q: Could that have been Campbell? Campbell was a two-star general. He was in charge of Ordnance.

W: Well, could have been, because I was feuding with the Ordnance all the time.

Q: You had trouble with them all the time? Division of labor. They wouldn't relinquish any control of that, either.

W: No, well, when we went into this war, we didn't have a single turret for any airplane. The B-17's we were buying had no turrets. And Bob Lovett and Hap, they took care of that one.

Q: How did they do that?

W: They ran so cockeyed fast that the rest of the Army didn't know what was going on. What they did on that: Arnold called my brother in and said: "Look, we've got to have some turrets for these airplanes. What are you going to do about it?" My brother said: "Well, the only thing I know of, is a Bolton Pauls (?) the British have over in England. This was .30 caliber, and typical. Arnold said: "You get ahold of somebody in industry and go over there and get the license for the Bolton Pauls (?), and do it right now." That's the way Arnold was. It just so happened my brother knew Stu Symington who, at that time, was head of Emerson Electric in St. Louis. They had been playing golf, were good friends. Frank called him on the phone and said what he wanted to do, and Symington said "okay." So the two of them took off, went over to England, and got the license right from the British, and that's what started us in the turret business. But this is the way worked.

Q: This business ended up in a little anonymous document, later on.

W: It did.

Q: Don't you remember, on the B-36?

W: Oh, later on, oh yes.

Q: Yes, about six years later.

W: That was a battle between the Navy and the Air Force.

Q: This was one of the big subjects, that Cedric Worth document?

W: I spent days in there in that investigation.

Q: We are talking about Arnold and your mentioning that he and Lovett were a great team. Did Lovett serve as a sort of balance wheel, to keep Arnold on the track? Did Arnold tend to get impulsive, sort of get enthusiastic and go off, or did he figure out everything he was going to do, beforehand?

W: My recollection and my experience with the two of them, was they were a great pair who complemented each other. When Arnold couldn't get something done with the military, like these other Corps, Signal Corps, Engineer Corps, and the rest of them, Bob could. In other words, in my opinion, they were scared to buck up against Bob. They wouldn't mind bucking against Hap, but the two of them were together.

Q: They worked together?

W: I will give you one example. I got called in there one day. Here was Arnold and Lovett, and Arnold always took the initiative--just loved to jump on you. He was a great psychologist, in my opinion: "Here we are right in the middle of the war, and we don't have any IFF. What in the hell are you doing about it?" I said: "Well, General, the Signal Corps is responsible for furnishing the Identification, Friend or Foe." He said: "You mean they were." I said: "No sir, they are." And Bob Lovett turned to me and said: "Beginning now, you're going to get the IFF's." I never had any other instruction than that.

Q: Do you think he went to Marshall and sold that?

W: I don't know. Don't think they had time, because I got my instructions that afternoon in their office. And it just so happened,

the head of Philco had been in to see me at Wright Field a couple of weeks before. He wanted something to do for the war. He'd been trying to get some contracts out of the Signal Corps, and couldn't. So I just happened to think of that. So before I left Washington-- I wish I could remember that guy's name--I called him on the phone and reminded him that he wanted to do something for the war. I said: "You get somebody out here, and I'll show you what the IFF is, and we are going to buy them for the Air Corps." He said: "Well, I know what it is." I said: "How soon can you get him out here." "Well," he said, "I have all the drawings I need. I can get them out there within four or five days." I said: "That's fine. Go ahead, take my word for it." So four or five days later he came out there with two special baggage cars on a train, and there he had the IFF. We gave him a contract. In a typical Arnold follow-up. He called me up on the phone one day and said: "What are you doing about that IFF," and I said: "Well, I got Philco building them." Arnold: "Are they really going ahead?" I said: "Yes sir." Arnold: "That's good, goodbye." That was the end of that.

Q: Did he always follow up on these things?

W: Oh no, he was a great exponent of the chrome-vanadium icepick. That was typical of him. He would give you something to do, and then call you up.

Q: Did he ever jump you for something you should have done, and it wasn't done?

W: Oh, nothing was ever done to suit him.

Q: Whatever you did, he wanted something more:

W: Typical of him. He would give you a chore to do, then he would call you up and say: "When are you going to get that done?"

You'd reply: "Well, it's going to be about six months." He'd come back: "Take all the time you need as long as you get it done in six weeks." Always did this:

Q: If you had said six weeks, he would have said six days.

W: Right.

Q: And he always followed up on these things?

W: Yes.

Q: One of the criticisms leveled at Arnold was that he didn't give anything to the staff. He did so many of these things. He held all of these balls bouncing in the air, and he was too impatient to send things down to the staff for coordination.

W: That's why the Army and Navy never caught up with us.

Q: He just went ahead and did things?

W: Well, like that IFF I was telling you about.

Q: Do you remember any other instances where Arnold drove something to consummation in a short time? Were there some other problems?

W: He had a good foil in Oliver Echols. Echols sat there at Wright Field all these years, trying to get money to do this, that, and all the other. One year he would get enough money to start a new engine, but he couldn't start the airplane, or the turrets. So, through Echols recommending to Hap what he thought could be done, and who could do it, he had a great foil in Echols. Echols was always coming up with something to do. So, when this big criticism came on about the lack of escorts in Europe--I don't know who gave who the order--but Echols had been talking about building an airplane, which turned out to be the P-51, which could be used as an escort. And the first thing we knew out there, we just got a teletype message or a

phone call. The project officer on fighters who was Mark Bradley, then, a Captain or Major, to get together with Lee Atwood of North American and come up with a new fighter.

Q: Well, didn't they have the P-51 early in the war as a low altitude plane? It was using another engine, didn't the British put the Merlin in there?

W: That was later on.

Q: But the first P-51 wasn't too good, was it?

W: You see what happened, the P-40 was the airplane, the fighter that we had. The P-40 had the Allison engine, which was supposed to have been rated at about 1,400 or 1,700 horsepower, and we couldn't get that horsepower out of it. So they had a big seance, which Echols called at Wright Field. He brought in all the top engine people, and they diagnosed this Allison engine. The consensus of opinion outside of the military was the engine will never make it. They said: "Drop the project." So Echols excused them, and held the rest of us back, and he said: "Well, you heard what the boys said--great industry." He said: "We can't drop it. We don't have anything else." So we cleared that P-40 at 700 hp, if I remember correctly. The theory that Echols always had, better than any of us, you never turn out the perfect airplane or engine until you get them out in service and use them. This is what we decided to do against the recommendations of von Karman and all the hot shots. Now, I can't relate these things in time. The British sent three of of their Battle of Britain pilots over. This was at the time of the fall of Dunkirk.

Q: That was June 1940.

W: So this fellow Bradley, the project officer on fighters, and I, and a couple others, took the DC-3 flew up there to Toronto. The

Q: One of the first questions I usually ask people is: do they remember the first time they met General Hap Arnold. Do you remember your first encounter with him?

W: This is an unusual situation in a way. I had never served under Hap. I had met him two or three times at a conference. I didn't know him. I don't think he knew me. First thing that happened to me was Ira Eaker called me on the phone one day, that's when we had the old office at the Pentagon, this is March 1938, and I was the AF representative out here with all these factories.

Q: I see, that was the Munitions Building.

W: Yes, the old Munitions Building, and as I said earlier, I had been trying all my career to get a duty station out here, so I finished the General Command Staff College, I was ordered out here to be the AF representative in Santa Monica. I had been here a year and 7 months when Ira called on the phone and said: "Get in here without delay." And I said: "What's going on?" And he said: "Hap wants to see you." And I said: "It's going to take a little time." He said: "Don't you have any airplanes out there?" I said: "yes." And he said: "Take one of them, and come on in here. Now!" So I went in there. I went in to see Hap. And he said: "Well, we are going to organize a Production Division at Wright Field. George Kenney is going to be No. 1 man; Pop Powers is going to be No. 2 man; and you are No. 3. So I want you to go back out to Wright Field and tell Colonel Robins that he has now got a Production Division, and you three guys are going to run it.

Q: This is Warner Robins?

the good old days. He was trying to solicit Arnold's help and he mentioned the time that they had gone out to Salina, and worked together to get the B-29s off and out into the CBI. Of course, he reached Arnold. In 1947 Arnold was going to write him a letter of support and then when the letter was typed up at Hamilton Field, somebody must have tipped Arnold off, because the letter never got sent out. This is in Arnold's file. Arnold didn't have any idea that Benny Meyers was pulling this stuff. Did you have any feeling that Benny Meyers was living higher than his means, or that he was engaged in some private activity?

W: Well, my impression of Benny Meyers, supported by people who had known him before the war, was that he always had independent means. One of the stories that we heard about him was that he had initially, his first marriage was to a very wealthy woman who supplied him with the money. So before the war when everybody else in the AF was in debt

HIS FIRST marriage was to a very wealthy woman who supported him in the money. So before the war when everybody else in the AF was in debt up to their ears at the banks, Benny always had the money.

Q: Always drove a fancy car and lived well.

W: Where it came from, I never knew.

Q: Mrs. Arnold said that people just accepted the fact that

Benny Meyers had money and was living well.

W: Well, he started that, as far as I could find, when he was on duty originally in Hawaii.

Q: Were you called upon to sign that letter that Stratemeyer, when he was Chief of Air Staff? Everybody involved in production had to sign a letter stating his stocks and his assets.

W: That came along every week almost.

Q: There was more than one letter?

W: They were always haranguing us about: "You've got to be

careful about this, and you shouldn't do that. You shouldn't accept things from industry," and so on. Associating with the industry and accepting gifts and so o.

Q: This particular letter was a round robin letter, and everybody was asked to list his stocks, his assets--all people that had a procurement responsibility. Benny Meyers listed his, and later he claimed that--of course, he didn't state that he had an interest in this Aviation Electric Company, that he was playing both ends--but he claimed that he had told Arnold verbally. And of course, Arnold, when he testified at the hearing in 1947, denied this. Meyers was dismissed from his job. You know, I heard that Meyers is alive and living in San Francisco. Have you heard anything about that?

W: The last I heard of Meyers, this has been 5 or 6 years ago. This General I saw on the golf course--a chap came up to me and told me that he had seen Benny Meyers.

Q: Pop Powers told you this?

W: That Meyers was there in New Jersey some place, working as a comptroller for one of the Ohrbach department stores, one of the Ohrbach boys was in the AF and worked in Benny's office in Washington. That's the last I ever heard of him.

Q: That's an interesting lead, I'll write Ohrbach's and see if they can put me in touch with him. I don't know if he would talk. If I did see him, he might not want to get involved in this thing.

W: I've never heard another word about Meyers since Powers told me.

Q: He served a term and they took his medals away, and they took his pension away.

W: And his wife took his money away.

Q: Of course, he was fooling around with Mrs. Bleriot LeMarre. LeMarre was this dummy president he set up, and he was fooling around with LeMarre's wife.

W: That's right, but that was common knowledge. His wife, who bore him the twins, she took off and went to South America, divorced Benny and married an Argentinian or Brazilian, or somebody. This is the rumor that was going around.

Q: Didn't he name one of those twins for Arnold and one for Marshall?

W: I believe so.

Q: It was either that or Arnold was a godfather to one and Marshall the other. You know, Arnold was very devoted to Meyers.

W: Oh yes. I would say this up to a certain point, even though I guess it had never really been firmed up, but he did a hell of a lot of good, fine things there in Washington. I mean he had the gall and the brass to do things that a lot of the other staff people didn't have.

Q: I was given a picture of Oliver Echols as a soft spoken, southern gentleman, and Benny Meyers, is a "get out and do it." And this could have attracted Arnold to him--that he was a doer. Arnold liked doers; he liked people to do it yesterday.

W: Yes, that's right, Meyers was that kind of guy. Meyers was a real brilliant character, no doubt about that. He understood this financial business better than anybody I'd ever run into up to that time. I've seen that guy sit down and add up a column of three digits just like that. He was real sharp.

Q: He was sharp but not quite ethical.

W: That's right; not at all.

Q: Let me ask you just some general things about Arnold. You came to Washington in April 1945. Arnold had had his heart attack. He had just come back to Washington from Coral Gables. Do you remember that Arnold had a heart attack?

W: Yes, I remember hearing about that.

Q: They kept it very quiet, and he came back at the end of March 1945. They brought Eaker in to be Deputy Commander. Do you remember that? And you worked for Eaker for a short period, didn't you, when he was Deputy Commander?

W: You're talking about '45? No.

Q: You were assigned to Hqs., AAF, for about 3 or 4 months between VE Day and VJ Day?

W: No, I was out with the 5th AF. I went into Japan on the occupation in '45; I came back in '48.

Q: I have here you joined the 5th AF in August 1945, just about the time of the atomic bomb. Where were you right prior to that?

W: This is when I was called back from India by Arnold to get the first jet fighter (P-80) we owned into production.

Q: You were in Washington a very short time, a couple of months.

W: No, I was only in there temporarily; I was at Wright Field.

Q: But you were assigned to Washington. They have your biography, as you were. You left Wright Field in April 1945 for temporary assignment in AAF Hqs., and then you joined the 5th AF in Okinawa in August 1945. So you were, according to this paper, 4 months time you were in Washington, and this was the period, say, between VE and VJ Day. You don't remember that, maybe you were just assigned on paper. Immediately before you went to join the 5th AF, were you in Wright Field?

W: Yes.

Q: Then, I guess they, they could have carried me in Washington. You worked for Knudsen?

W: Well, even before I went out to the Pacific, when Knudsen was brought in the head of production, I was in charge of production of the Air Corps, and I had many days of duty with Knudsen.

Q: How did he and Arnold get along?

W: Wonderfully well, I would say.

Q: He was a great production man, wasn't he?

W: The world's best.

Q: Not a very good officer, though.

W: He made no bones about that. He didn't want to be an officer. He was a wonderful fellow.

Q: Did this create some problems?

W: No, no. Everybody loved the old boy. Going through the factories, I will tell you a little sidelight there. When he was assigned the head of all production--Army, Navy and Air Corps--they assigned one Air Corps man, one Navy man, and one Ordnance man on the first trip we took on the C-47, DC-3. First place we stopped was at Ogden. He told us the night before we were going to inspect this ammunition loading plant. I didn't know anything about loading plants or anything else. So I said, "Well, General, what time do you think we are going to be through out there?" "Do you want to fly on tonight to California. I'll get everything ready." He still talked with quite an accent. He always called me "Vulf." He says, "Vulf, you are going with me to the ammunition loading plant." And I said: "Yes sir." I'd never been around those things before, great big towers, about 5 stories high. So the head of the Ordnance plant was walking up the stairs with Knudsen and I was back, walking up these stairs. and I made

a comment to this Ordnance general. I said: "Ye Gods, this is a tough climb." Knudsen turned around and said, "Vulf, when I was your age, I ran up all the stairs." So we got up to the top and here was this great big thing looked like a creamery deal, painted white. Little bit of a room. This was the mixing chamber. So there was a chap there with a long handled brush, and a long handled dustpan, and he was going round sweeping up this immaculate floor, so I said to this Ordnance general: "What in the world is this fellow doing?" "Well, he's sweeping up any powder that might have fallen on the floor." And I said: "What if it had?" "Well, if you stepped on that, this place would blow up." I said: "Blow up?" And he said: "Yes." And I said: "What if it blows up?" And Knudsen turned around to me, and he said: "Vulf, you just jump out the window." I looked out the window, and there were these amusement park slides, and that's what you did. If the thing looked like it was going to blow up, you dove out a window, and went down the chute.

Q: Do you remember any stories about Arnold beyond some areas where we haven't discussed. Anything about him grabbing people in the halls, for example?

W: Well, that story I am not an eyewitness to, but I was in Arnold's office one day. He had a big intercom squawk box, and he really got riled up about something. I've forgotten what it was-- something Kuter said. And he blasted the hell out of Kuter. He ran down all the stops on this squawk box: "You guys come in here right away!" Got everybody out of the place converged on Arnold's office. And he had another harangue. Well, later on, the story was told, that after this meeting, Arnold walked out in the hall; there was a colonel coming up the hall. And he said: "Colonel, I want you to do so and so." The colonel said: "But sir." And he said: "You heard

me." It happened to be the Chaplain. Have you heard that?

Q: I haven't heard it about the Chaplain, but I've heard many stories about people being afraid to walk around the E-Ring because they might be grabbed and dragooned in some kind of assignment foreign to their expertise. Norstad told me this story of him hitting all the buttons, and calling everybody in and then saying: "Norstad, I want you; the rest of you can go."

W: The whole argument started between he and Norstad.

Q: Was it Norstad or Kuter?

W: To my knowledge it was Kuter, but Norstad was there, too, because he was one of the big brains statisticians, strategy guys....

Q: Well, could have been Norstad; maybe he was mad at Norstad.

W: The office was full of people before he ran down all the buttons.

Q: They really responded when he hit the buttons.

W: He called me back from India for this meeting. I got him mad on that one, too.

Q: What about?

W: He was raising Cain because we weren't getting some of the wings out, and the troubles that we were having, we were having plenty of engine troubles. The basic problem was engines. So he called me back, started raising Cain, telling me how bad the airplanes were. I got my dander up a little bit. I was taking about all I could take from everybody on this thing. So I popped off, I guess, when I shouldn't have, and I said: "General, I would like to be excused." He said: "What for?" I said: "I want to go send a cable to boys out there in India and tell them how lousy these damn airplanes are that your staff has told you. He looked at me, and said: "What did you say?" And I told him, and he started asking these other guys--they

heard these rumors. We had already launched one mission and had one on the way. So this is when I kind of blew my top. He looked at me, and started asking these guys. And finally he said: "You get the hell back out to India." And that's all it amounted to. This is the way he was. He always knew what he was talking about, except once in awhile the staff would get him crossed up, and then all hell would pop. Kenney may have told you this story. We got a call one afternoon to get on the Pennsylvania train that night and report to Arnold the next morning. Of course, Kenney and Arnold had been through this Mitchell thing and they were real close personal friends.

Q: You were at Wright Field at this time?

W: Yes, so was Kenney.

Q: Now this must have been before the war?

W: Yes, this was before Pearl Harbor, before we got into it. We got on the train and went in there--this was the old Munitions Building. As we walked in, Fairchild, who was there with Eaker said: "Boy, you guys are in big trouble." We we walked in, and here was Arnold sitting at his desk, head in his hands. He said: "Here I am in this boat all by myself, rowing like hell, and nobody is helping me. Now, George"-- and he started taking after George. George is unmilitary as hell, started sounding off; Arnold just really got mad. He grabbed me by the back of the blouse and my belt and pushed me up against George, and pushed us both out of the office into Eaker's office. Fairchild walked down the hall with us, and said: "Oh boy, this is terrible." Fairchild was kind of a nervous guy. Anyway, George said: "Oh forget it."

Q: What did Eaker do?

W: At the moment I can't remember if he was still in the office or it was Fairchild.

Q: Was he just pushing you out of his presence? He didn't want any more to do with you?

W: This is part of his act, and these bar type of swing doors. So he just grabbed me--George had already started out--so he grabbed me. He was always doing something like this, deliberately.

Q: Did you feel that he liked you?

W: Oh yes, sure, he wouldn't have put up with me if he hadn't. That's the way he was, firing people right and left. The only thing I could do was do the best I could do and that was it.

Q: He fired a lot of people out of jobs?

W: Oh yes, he relieved them all over the place. He'd listen to you, but if you didn't give him the facts, good or bad, then, boy, you'd be done. But if you give him the bad news along with the good, it was all right. So we get on the damn train and go back, and the next morning we get a telephone call to come back in there. Kenney blew his top, and he called Eaker or Fairchild, who said: "We don't know, better come on in; the Old Man wants to see you." So we get on the train again and go back in there. So on the way in, I said: "Now look, George let's cut this thing out. This thing we put on the other day wasn't military at all. Now let's behave ourselves this time."

George said: "Yeah, I think you are right." So we went in, stiff as a ramrod, and saluted. Arnold sitting there, looked at the both of us, we said: "Sir you seft for us." Arnold: "What the hell is the matter with you guys, anyway." "Sir, we don't know," this is George, I wouldn't talk to him that way. This was Kenney, "Nothing, sir, you sent for us." Arnold: "Well, why are you acting like this?" So I broke down and got to laughing; I said: "Well, General, I guess it's my fault. I told George that we shouldn't be so unmillitary as were yesterday, so we are trying to be good boys." "Well, he said, "I thought something

was really wrong."

Q: Did George Kenney call him Hap?

W: Oh yes.

Q: But you didn't call him "Hap?"

W: Oh no.

Q: Who called him "Hap," George Kenney, Spaatz called him "Hap," and

W: I guess some of the other old timers did. But none of we so-called young guys would do that.

Q: I know Eaker didn't. Eaker called him "General;" always "General."

W: As years have gone by, looking back at some of the things, I think, well, he just did that to relieve the tension. He deliberately would do these things (push people out of his office).

Q: I was told something interesting, that Arnold would jump on people and put tremendous pressure on them, but he knew where each man's breaking point was.

W: That's right.

Q:and he never went beyond that point?

W: I'm convinced of that. He pulled one on me, Kenney was raising Cain to get me down to Australia. You see, at one time the B-29s were supposed to be given to MacArthur.

Q: Not supposed to--MacArthur was asking for them.

W: Well, this was part of the plan, too. Then it was changed, at Tehran, or wherever it was they made the commitment. So Kenney was raising Cain to get me to come out there, and I wanted to get into the war, too. So Hap--he used to sneak off, go out to factories. I thought I had it fixed up with Gene (Beebe) to always let me know so I could

trigger off the AF Representatives-Colonels at all these factories. So Hap goes into Tulsa where they were building the A-20s. And I had just been raising holy hell with Don Douglas, and the guys at Tulsa. They got behind schedule; and this that, and the other. I never did find out what Don told them. But whatever he told them, Hap got just madder than \$700 and called me on the phone, and relieved me. This suited me fine because I thought, well now, I get a chance to go to the war. So I started unpacking my desk--this was late in the afternoon 3:00-4:00. I called up Personnel in Washington and said I had been relieved, Kenney has been asking for me, and I wanted to go out to the war. So they said, okay, they would issue the orders. Then, again, Gene didn't trigger me off. Now, Hap is out on the Coast at North American, I think, or Douglas. And he called me up and gave me orders to do this, that, so forth. And I said: "Sir, you relieved me yesterday, and my replacement is here and I have orders to go out to the Pacific." Arnold: "Oh, for crissakes, K.B. that was yesterday. So I unpacked my bag and put the papers back.

Q: He took these unscheduled trips. What did he do, fly all night?

W: Sometimes, yes.

Q: Peterson was flying for him at that time, wasn't he?

W: Peterson was flying for him, and so was Gene Beebe. This was before Gene was relieved, transferred and went to China. I know he did a lot of those things just for the psychological effects, the pressure.

Q: Well, the B-29 was his greatest love, because this was the instrumentality of strategic airpower. He never would relinquish control of this, he always kept it....

W: I went out there, I didn't report to anybody.

Q: And the theater commanders didn't like this one bit, did they?

W: Oh, no.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Chennault out there?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Trouble, it was getting supplies for the 73rd, or the 58th?

W: No, I was handling my own supplies. He was trying to get my airlift I was supposed to mount these missions out of China. You see, Chennault was running the Chinese AF. He tried to horn in on this, and I had a little piece of paper that said I reported only to the Chief of Staff. So I just told Chennault where to go. He didn't like me at all. He tried a number of times to work on Stilwell and Stratemeyer to change my orders so he, Chennault, would be giving me the orders.

Q: So you would make your report to him?

W: Yes, Stilwell would never go for it.

Q: Are you aware of the LeMay-Hansell business? You know, when Hansell got the 21st BombCom, and then he was relieved by LeMay. Are you aware of that?

W: I knew he was relieved. I had my own problems, I wasn't worrying about that outfit.

Q: Were you surprised, or was there any talk about that?

W: Well, they were at Guam, and I was out there in India and up to China. No, I just knew that he had been relieved. Why, I never took time to find out--up to this day.

Q: Did you know that Arnold was using Norstad as a sort of hatchet man? Norstad went out there to give the bad news?

W: Yes, he used Norstad for that. Norstad was not very popular, isn't to this day.

Q: I know. Several people have made some comments about Norstad. Did Eaker ever talk to you about his relief from the 8th AF or transfer?

W: No, I've been with Eaker many times. Of course, I wouldn't bring it up, and he never brought it up.

Q: We were talking at lunch, he was very disappointed.

W: Particularly because his pal Spaatz, was No. 1 guy out there.

W: Arnold gave Kepner the 8th Fighter Command.

Q: Over Frank Hunter?

W: Yes, and I always felt that there was bad blood between Eaker and Kepner, because they had been very close friends, and all of a sudden this thing happens out there. Eaker's relieved, and Kepner is brought in and given the Fighter Command.

Q: You mean, Hunter was relieved?

W: No, Eaker was relieved.

Q: Eaker was relieved, and they brought in Doolittle.

W: No, I'm talking now about the two, Kepner and Eaker. I'm just guessing now.

Q: That this created some friction between Kepner and Eaker?

W: You have had no evidence of that? This is my own estimation. They had been very very close friends and I've been with both of them. Since then, I have never heard Kepner say anything about Eaker, one way or the other, or Eaker say anything about Kepner, so I just wondered.

Q: Do you think that Arnold shot from the hip on any of his personnel changes? Relieved somebody without cause?

W: Cases that I knew of--no. Now I can't say that I knew of the problem of Eaker or, with Hunter, because they were over there

in Europe, and I was having my problems here. But the cases I know of, people being relieved...

Q: In the case of Eaker, there were dispatches: "You have 850 planes in your operating inventory. How come you are only flying 60?" Arnold kept sending this kind of messages. I talked to a number of people who worked for Eaker, and who was it that said, that Eaker saw this stuff coming in, and he just dropped it in the waste paper basket, he figured these fellows on Arnold's staff were eager--Kuter, Norstad--some of these others were eager beavers. And finally, Arnold just made this change. Arnold went over there. He went over there in early Sep 1943. Idwal Edwards is very close to Eaker. I talked to him. And he told me that Eaker and Arnold had a knockdown-dragout in the Claridges Hotel so this was the beginning of the end. Eaker was going to go. Hunter is bitter at Arnold for something else.

(re Segregation Problem)

W: Coleman, yes, he got fired out there.

Q: Where, Selfridge?

W: Yes.

Q: He might have been the commanding officer.

W: He could have been the base commander.

Q: I can't remember, I have a lot of files on this thing.

W: Coleman, I've forgotten his first name now. He was fired out of there.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

W: Well, thinking of a lot of people I know, I would say "yes."

Of course, during those times, he was under pressure all the time.

He just didn't have time to sit around with the boys and shoot the breeze. On some of these trips that we took, I took trips with him.

He, Knudsen and I went to some of the factories.

Q: What did he do when he came to a plant or a factory?

W: He was very pleasant and affable with the workmen and the officers of the company.

Q: Did he go right to the factory; right to the maintenance area?

W: No, he just walked through. Every time I went with him, he was with Knudsen, and Knudsen was the production man, and he just followed along with him. Arnold really didn't know much about the manufacturing business, anyway.

Q: Did he ask some tough questions?

W: No, because everytime I was with him, it was Knudsen who was the front man. When they heard Knudsen was coming, everything would stop, and they would start beating on the tin ware and so forth, and yelling at him.

Q: You know, when Knudsen quit in 1945, you were at Wright Field, I guess. You had just come back, and Benny Meyers had aspirations for that job, they called it the Air Technical Service Command (ATSC).

Benny Meyers had his eye on that job. Did you know that? Of course, they didn't give it to him. They gave it to Knerr. Benny Meyers retired on a disability. Did you hear any rumors that there was some anonymous document written about Benny Meyers, which was filed? It came up 2 years later. This is how the committee came on it. There was an anonymous letter, and it came to the attention of the committee, and the AF sent it to file. This is why the AF got in trouble on it. And they didn't investigate it, and this anonymous letter made charges against Benny Meyers.

W: That's what triggered the whole investigation?

Q: Well, the investigation 2 years later, started with

Howard Hughes and Elliott Roosevelt and they upon this material on Benny Meyers. And Junius Jones was the Air Inspector, and he's the guy who suppressed the material. And of course, it made it worse for the AF, that they had this case, and they didn't do anything about it. Did you ever go on a fishing trip with Arnold? The Wolfes and the Arnolds, of course, you were at different levels, you never had any social relations with Arnold?

W: No, because I never served with Arnold, my brother served with him.

Q: Has he passed away?

W: Yes, my brother died in '65 from cancer. He retired in '44 with a bad heart, so they may have been referring to him, because he and Arnold were real good friends. Mrs. Arnold say anything about my brother?

Q: No, she talked about General Wolfe. She may have been talking, did he make General?

W: No, he was a colonel, retired in 1944.

Q: Arnold and Westover, about his death.

W: I'm the one that told Arnold about it. Let's go back a step. There was always a lot of hard feeling between the lunatics, the lighter than air people and the heavier than air people. They were all higher ranking than we were.

Q: And Westover was lighter than air?

W: That's right, and I was an instructor at Brooks Field, 1922-26. They sent a lot of these lunatics down there to learn to fly, a various small percentage of them got by. That didn't help. When Westover became chief, the first thing he did was order all these guys back to March Field to get their wings, including himself.

Westover had been washed out before, and Kepner been washed out, too. I was the AF representative out there then, and I got a message from March Field that Westover was spending the night there, and was going to fly into the little field there at the Lockheed plant, at Burbank, and for me to be there to meet him. It was not the big airport as we now know. I was standing there, waiting for him, and I saw him spin in, rushed over, and saw that both of them dead. So I went over and got hold of the telephone and called Washington, asked for Arnold and told him. It was the first news he had,

Q: That was a change in fortunes.

W: Westover had no more business flying over there that day by himself than the man in the moon, because he wasn't a good pilot. But he was the boss man, and he wanted a pair of wings, and he got them. That's what took him.

Q: I heard a story about Andrews, Andrews was in his '50s when he was flying and crashed into a mountain in Iceland.

W: That's right.

Q: Did you know anything about Arnold and Andrews? Did you ever see them together?

W: No, I heard all these stories about Andrews being a protegee of Hap's, or vice versa. Andrews was put in charge of the first GHQ AF.

Q: Andrews was a year ahead of Arnold. He was '06 and Arnold was '07. Were they rivals for the job? When Westover was killed, did you hear anything about Andrews being made for that job?

W: If anything was going on, I wouldn't have heard anything about it. I was sitting out here on the Coast. I didn't have any access to the intrigue and so forth. It was the next day that Arnold was made Chief.

Q: No, it was about a week.

W: Well, shortly thereafter, there was no lengthy time for maneuvering.

Q: You know, there was some delay, possibly occasioned by rumors in Washington that Arnold was a drinker. Does that surprise you?

W: It certainly would.

Q: You didn't see him drink?

W: As I say, I never was in a position to go out socially with the Arnolds, and when I was then acquainted with him, it was always on business. I do know that he and Knudsen and I would have a drink or two in the evening after a hard day of going around the plants. I'll tell you a cute story about Knudsen. Knudsen, of course, been with Ford for many years, and went to General Motors. Arnold had an old broken-down Ford at Bolling Field, and we would get in there late in the evening. One of the aides would bring up this Ford. Arnold would get in that and drive it to his quarters, rather than call his chauffeur out, because we didn't know what time we would get in.

Knudsen was always fussing at him about that damned Ford. He said: "Why do you ride in that for," just ribbing him, Hap would smile and say: "Well, it's the best I can do; best I can get." We came back one night from a trip, and we all got out of the airplane, and Hap's looking all around the place, doesn't see the aide, doesn't see the car, finally he let's out a roar and the sergeant comes us, and he says: "Where's my car." The Sergeant said: "Sir, I just brought it down; there it is." Arnold: "That's not my car." Knudsen said: "I got damned tired of seeing your drive around in that Ford. That's a brand new Chevrolet. Now you take it and drive home."

Q: We are talking about the B-29 and the near miss you had

with the whole program getting washed out. Arnold had great confidence, obviously, because he had set up the production. He had set up all these facilities, the training and everything. Yet he had a B-32 as a sort of fall-back position. So he wasn't going to put all his eggs in one basket. And, of course, the B-32 never got off the ground, really.

W: I think we had about two of them.

Q: You had 15 of them, Kenney used them. They sent them down to Kenney's theater, Southwest Pacific.

W: I didn't know that. I knew there were two of them out there, when I got to Okinawa. Frank Cook, who was Assistant Project Officer, under Jake Harmon brought that out there. He was flying it up and down, letting the boy's look at it. This is a way out, just before the surrender.

Q: So Arnold, it's kind of interesting, he put his eggs in that basket, didn't have all of his eggs in there, and he had a fall-back position just in case the B-29 didn't make it.

W: The reason for that was because....

Q: Was that his idea?

W: This, I don't know. I think it was probably Echols', because, having called on the industry to analyze the B-29, should we go on with it, I'm sure it was Echols who finally said: "Well, the industry is against the B-29. It is a far out airplane, heavy wing-loaded thing. So we better have something to fall back on.

Q: Then you think it might have been Echols' idea?

W: Oh, I'm sure it was. Arnold had the greatest faith in the world in Echols. He wouldn't let him out of his sight. Poor Echols, like the rest of us, tried to get into the war, and he wouldn't let him go. He had a lot of confidence in him.

Q: You know, Arnold had an experience in WWI. He never got into combat, and this was a hangup with him, that he never got into the fight, and consequently, when guys like yourself said they wanted to get into battle, he was more tolerant. Once in a while he would let a guy go.

W: That's what happened to me.

Q: You got in, but he never let Echols go. I was given a different picture of Echols. I was given the picture of Echols as a sort of gentle, Southerman.

W: He was.

Q: That Arnold put more faith in Benny Meyers than Echols.

W: I don't think so, for a different reason, I'm talking about Echols, from the engineering fellow. And as you said before, you've heard from other sources that his brother-in-law, Jan Howard, who thought he was the greatest engineer in the world. Echols was just the other way around, Echols never thought he was the greatest engineer in the world, but he got the job done, and inspired the young engineers like Chidlaw, Harmon, and the rest of us.

Q: Echols was a modest man, soft spoken.

W: Soft spoken, Southern gentleman.

Q: Why did Arnold go to Meyers on a lot of things?

W: Well, because, I've often thought about that, and the only reason I can think about, Meyers was a very brilliant guy, financially. He knew the financial business, could put on a good act and Meyers never hesitated about running roughshod over anybody.

Q: Even Echols?

W: No, he never got away with that. But all the rest of the boys out there. His only experience in the AF--he was a damned

lousy pilot--was in the budget and financial business..

Q: Could it be that Arnold relied on Echols for engineering?

W: Absolutely.

Q: And then for Meyers as an expediter?

W: No, not initially. I think he relied on Meyers to give him the support that he, Arnold, needed when he went in to fight for money. Because, in many respects, Benny Meyers was somewhat like the former Secretary of Defense, McNamara. He had a photographic memory like McNamara. He could stand up quote figures as long as you'd sit around and listen to him. He was different because he was on the make, as we found out later. You can't say that about McNamara. Benny had no experience with anything mechanical or engineering. I would really say that I think, when you come right down to it, Benny thought the fan on the car is what made it run. He put on a big front, you see. All he did in the expediting business was get on the phone and call up these manufacturers and just eat their fannies out.

Q: In a way, he served a purpose that Arnold wanted to have done. He went out and did things.

W: You see, the difference between Arnold and Benny, Arnold didn't run roughshod over people. He gave you a job to do and expected you to do it, and if you didn't, why he gave you one more chance. And if you didn't get it done, why then you were gone.

Q: Did he give you two chances, general?

W: As far as I know, he never acted on the spur of the moment, as far as I knew.

Q: On the subject of Arnold's relations with the aircraft manufacturers, he really put himself out on a limb. Don't you think

this took some kind of vision? He tried to get them, without a real commitment to convert to War Production, and I think that they dragged their feet, didn't they?

W: Some of them did, some of them went ahead. Kenney must have told you the problems we had in convincing the aircraft industry that we were going to expand at that terrific rate.

Q: No, he didn't.

W: Arnold told us how many planes he wanted when. We drew a schedule. Some place in Wright Field we've still got the original schedule which was drawn out on butcher paper, big long thing. Trainers, transports, fighters and bombers, and he told us how many he wanted, and at what time, and we sat down then, at Wright Field. Chidlaw was one of them; Crawford was the other. Chidlaw was the top project man on trainers and transports. Another brilliant guy there who was No. 2 to Echols by the name of Al Lyons. He died before the war really got going. So we just sat down and figured who was making these airplanes. We made a guess at it, called them up. And boy, why some of them didn't have heart attacks, I'll never know. We just said: "Look, you are going to have by such and such a time, an output of so many bombers or fighters or trainers. You get busy and tell us what kind of money you need, how big a factory, and so on. We were all in that act. Then we had to decide what airplanes we were going to put in the war. For instance, it was a tossup then for the B-23, which was the follow-on of the old B-18, and the B-17. The same way with the A-20 and the B-25, and the rest of them.

Q: Wasn't the B-18 a bust? It had no range at all.

W: For that time, it was the best we could get with the money that was available. We follow that on with the Douglas B-23.

Q: You mentioned some trouble with Louis Johnson. We are talking about the late '30s now. The War Department was interested in buying B-18s rather than the B-17s because you could get more airplanes for less money. Do you remember anything of that struggle?

W: I don't remember that. We had a competition. We drew out the rules of the competition, and Douglas lost it on the basis of later deliveries, higher price and lower performance.

Q: Douglas lost it, huh? This was, what a four-engine bomber?

W: The B-23, two-engine, follow-on of the B-18. We bought 50 of them and had them in service, and most of the people wanted it. And the guy was responsible for underbidding the performance and overbidding the price, was the No. 2 man at Douglas. Anyway, every one of the airplanes that were bought and put in our possession was evaluated by an evaluation team on the basis of performance, delivery and cost.

Q: I wanted to ask you something, you reminded me. There were some reports by Drew Pearson, for example, who implied, or said, that because of the family relationship between Douglas and Arnold, that Douglas got breaks on production contracts. Do you remember that when Barbara and Bruce were married?

W: I don't remember that connection, but I know Pearson was always hammering away at something.

Q: You are talking about Knudsen going to see Pearson?

W: Yes, there was one attack that came out by Pearson against Knudsen. Knudsen got real upset about it, and he went over to see Pearson. This is the story that I got, and there was never another attack. As far as I remember.

Q: You know Pearson was always attacking Arnold. He never had a good word for Arnold. And I wanted to ask you about this Douglas

thing. Do you feel that Douglas got any special breaks in production? You mentioned this evaluation board....

W: That's right, they lost the bomber contract...

Q: On the B-23?

W: On the B-23, which is what most of our people wanted. We had bought 50 of them. We knew about the airplane, had shaken it down. And it would have been a medium bomber. So instead of buying the B-23, we bought the B-25 from Kindelberger.

Q: They lost out to North American. There's a case where it was strictly a matter of dollars, and time, and performance.

W: We had a handful of boys there at Wright Field who had been in the business a long time, headed up by Echols and Al Lyons. They laid out the rules how we judged these things. As far as I know, every manufacturer was loaded down to the best of our ability because we had to get our capacity out.

Q: Gen. Wolfe, who came up with the idea of the XB-40 and the XB-41? This was the one to put armor on the B-17 and the B-24? To use them as escorts.

W: That came out of the Bomber Branch there at Wright Field.

Q: Was that Lyons?

W: No, it was Harmon, if I remember correctly. Of course, Lyons was sitting up above Harmon, and Echols was sitting about Lyons.

Q: I saw somewhere where Lyons had a role in that thing. That was a bust.

W: Well, because if I remember correctly, about that time was when we began to get the turrets out, the chin turret on the B-17, and the belly turret, and the side guns, but it was supposed to have been a gunship.

Q: It just seems to me, it was so heavily loaded down, it had a slow speed, it was all right when the bombers were going to the target, but once the bombers dropped their load, they could take off and go home. But it couldn't. It had to stay back and then it became a liability, so it didn't work too well.

W: It was just one of those things we tried. We tried a lot of things that were really busts.

Q: (Re XB-40 bust) Of course, all this harking back--and I'm sounding like this guy Shaughnessy now--you know, harking back to the lack of a long range escort. We didn't have one until late in the war, and by that time we had suffered some casualties.

W: There was no real requirement set up in the early part of the war for escort fighters--on those ranges that the 17s and 24s were able to get.

Q: Is anybody to blame; was it a matter of foresight?

W: No, I don't think so, because the philosophy then was that daylight bombing was practical. The British said no, never did believe it. And we kept hammering away at it all along. We said daylight bombing is the answer, precision bomb in daylight--with certain types of formations and with the bombers interdependent upon each other, with good fire power. You take the history of the development of the B-17, you kept adding more range to it, adding more firepower and getting better performance. It was phenomenal the way the thing turned out. But there was no concept that we would ever need fighter escorts out from the target. Because in the old days, in the Tactical School, the policy then was, and the strategy then was, we would get control of the air. We would get that with the fighters. Then when it came to these long ranges, and the possibility of making the long

ranges, that upset the whole thing. You know, you only have to go back to 1937 to find out that the Command and General Staff College said the role of the airplane was to take the place of the carrier pigeon.

Q: Or as strictly auxiliary to the ground forces.

W: Strictly auxiliary offshore where the artillery and close defenses couldn't reach. That's written up in the War Department's roles and missions, in 1937.

Q: Did you have any contact with a guy named George Goddard?

W: Oh yes, sure.

Q: Tell me about George Goddard.

W: Well, he's one of these real capable, eccentric type of guys. Beautiful, wonderful imagination and drive. Biggest pest in the world. I used to throw him out of my office there at Wright Field, time after time.

Q: He's carrying pictures all the time.

W: And getting something done.

Q: You know,

W: Have you read his book?

Q: I sure have. Let me tell you something (off-tape).

Q: I want to ask you about Goddard and Arnold. You know, Goddard, as you read the book, Goddard got on Arnold's list because of Minton Kaye. And I was out to see Minton Kaye in Pasadena last week. Do you remember this friction between Minton Kaye and Goddard?

W: Yes, professional jealousy.

Q: What is your evaluation of that struggle?

W: I don't think there is anybody in this country, maybe worldwide, that knows as much about photography or has contributed as much

as George. Did he ever tell you about when he took over the Jena Optical Company in Europe? Took me two years to get that statement out. He just walked over there and took it over.

Q: After the war? -

W: Just as the war folded up. He walked over and took over Jena Optical Company. That guy, he was requisitioning, going in and taking things. Took up a couple of years to cover it up.

Q: What do you mean, took it away, in the name of the Air Force?
W: Yes, because they were the outstanding optical glass people, and he just took it over. Instead of the Russians getting it, George got it.

Q: Then he did a good thing?

W: Sure, without any authority.

Q: He got you into trouble on this?

W: I had to clean the thing up, later on.

Q: I'm going to see him next week.

W: Give him my best regards. When we went down to the South Pacific, they didn't have any good maps of the islands and so forth, George got his photographic group to go out there, and take photographs of those little islands, and show the depth of the water.

Q: For some reason, he and Minton Kaye didn't see eye to eye, and Minton Kaye was very close to Arnold.

W: For a while.

Q: And then Minton Kaye lost out, in that position. Do you know anything about that?

W: I happened to be there the day that I heard Arnold tell somebody to fire Minton and send him far away.

Q: So he fired him, do you know why?

W: I'm not going to tell you.

Q: Arnold used to raise hell with George Goddard, why?

W: Because he was such a damn pest. He was always in there after Arnold. Why don't we do this? And why don't we do that? And half the time he would say: "Okay, George." And the next time he would say: "Get the hell out of here, George!" George was a real pest. He had the tenacity of 10,000 bulldozers.

Q: You know him better than I do. I just know him several months.

W: He's a great guy. He never got due credit.

Q: Well he had this strip camera, which did a heck of a good job, and Arnold didn't recognize its value. Why did Arnold get mad? I know he was obnoxious. But according to this book--and I've read it very carefully, at least I think I did--Arnold simply didn't recognize Goddard's genius in developing the strip camera. As you know, Goddard was sent out of Washington and he later turned up working for the Navy, and then it was due to Lovett and a couple of other people, that he came back to work for the Air Force. But it wasn't Arnold who recognized his talent. This is what I get out of his book.

W: I don't know.

Mrs. W: Who finally recognized Goddard?

Q: Lovett and some other people. They used his strip camera at Normandy. They exposed the German obstruction, and it has been used to expose the Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962. He was a great genius. It was just that he and Arnold had a conflict, partly due to this other man. If you read the book, he calls the man "Colonel Nemesis," and that's Minton Kaye.

W: That might have a lot to do with it right there, but Arnold finally got off Kaye, and sent him far away.

Q: Maybe he brought Goddard back?

W: Well, Goddard would irritate anybody. If you listen to Goddard, and say: "Fine, George, that's wonderful," The next day, he would be back in with another idea: "George we can't do all these things." Then he would get all hot and bothered about it. In the meantime, you say, "George, go back down to the laboratory, get that thing you sold me on last week." He was always coming up with ideas, and in those days we didn't have much money. We couldn't give the photographic lab that George ran everything he wanted. But boy, once he got over there in Europe, where there was no need for money, he just went wild.

Q: I got the impression that Goddard did some great things but sometimes if you had him going in this direction, you wanted him to go this way, and you turned away and did something else, when you came back, Goddard was going that way.

W: All inventors or people who conceive things are that way.

Q: He was a genius, but he was sort of unreconstructed.

W: It's hard to explain.

Q: Did you have any contact with Elliott Roosevelt?

W: I was fussing at Hap Arnold to get more people out there to Wright Field, so he called me up one day and said: "KB, you have been pressing me about some more officers." And I said: "That's right, when do I get them?" He said: "I'm sending you one tomorrow." Hell, it was Elliott Roosevelt. Well out he comes, this is Captain Elliott Roosevelt. Boy, what a character.

Q: Did he give you a lot of trouble?

W: Oh God. He'd say: "Don't you worry about that, I'll call up my poppa and we'll get that done." Always poppa! And God knows,

whether he was telling his poppa all the troubles. I think a lot of the troubles we had with Franklin came directly from Elliott. He had just remarried--one of the sweetest gals you would ever like to meet (Scoggins), the gal from Texas. And she had two sons, real nice boys. But the way that damn character treated her was just god awful. He was the most conceited ass that ever came along the pike, and he couldn't do anything.

Q: He left her for Faye Emerson.

Q: How did you get rid of Elliott?

W: A lot of maneuvering. He went from there to Europe.

Q: No, he went to Newfoundland, I read his book last week, "As He Saw it."

W: He headed up a reconnaissance outfit over there. Have you heard the story about a young pilot coming in the bar, one night. The old Rothschild home in London was fixed up as an officer's club. The story goes this way. This young captain was a pilot and had some real rough missions in a squadron under Elliott. He came into the officer's club there, and Elliott was leaning up against the bar, tight as usual, bragging, shooting off his mouth, and this Captain walked over and said: "Are you BG Elliott Roosevelt?" And he said: "Yes, I am, so what?" Pow, he cold-cocked him right there. He called him everything in the world. I can't prove that story, but it was going around.

Q: What would you consider Arnold's greatest attribute, his greatest contribution to the war, or to the Air Corps, or airpower?

W: Well, I'd have to start off by saying I think he was a great leader. A lot of people didn't like him, but he was a great leader. And he had inspiration. He could see what this was going

to be. I mean he was the only one who could see the magnitude of what we had to have--to my knowledge. Nobody else was thinking of these numbers that he was thinking of.

Q: In that 50,000 plane figure, was this Roosevelt's, or did Arnold suggest this number? This was the number which shocked a lot of people because up to this time they were talking in little numbers. Did he have anything to do with putting that figure in Roosevelt's head, or in his speech?

W: I'm sure--and I can't prove a word I'm saying--that the original gang, who support Mitchell, were the original airpower people. And that group were the people that thought that big, thought that way. And the spokesman for them was Arnold. I think Hal George, I think Tony Frank, and all the rest of those boys that went to Siberia after the court martial.

Q: Did Tony Frank go to Siberia, too?

W: Yes, sure. Kenney went to Siberia. You know that story?

Q: No, I don't.

W: I'm disappointed in George. He didn't tell you that one. George was sent to Siberia, which was Camp Benning, Georgia. Arnold went to Ft. Riley, Kansas. He had one half squadron of observation airplanes That was his assignment; Tony Frank....

Q: Was Tony Frank assigned to Washington during the Billy Mitchell trial? What did Tony Frank do that caused him to be sent to Siberia?

W: He supported Mitchell.

Q: Then he was in Washington.

W: I just don't know, I imagine he was. I don't know. But

Hal George supported him; George Kenney supported him, and a lot of the juniors supported him.

Q: Brereton was a junior, did he get sent out, too? He was in there, too.

W: Yes, all of them got shifted out. George Kenney was sent to Camp Benning. George is a smart guy. So they gave him a job-- this was an infantry base. So George rewrote the infantry's book on machine guns. And while he was there, he met this chap by the name of Sutherland. Sutherland was Chief of Staff for MacArthur in Australia. Brett was sent down there as the top AF guy.

Q: This was around the time of Pearl Harbor?

W: It was right after that. We started building up Australia. MacArthur escaped out of there, and went down South. And they sent Brett out there. He was one of the old timers too. He didn't get along with MacArthur at all. So MacArthur told Sutherland, he said: "Look, I've got to have an air man here. This guy Brett isn't doing us any good at all." Of course, he had Brereton over there in the Philippines, and the Indies, too. He came out of the Philippines and went down to the East Indies. So Sutherland said: "Well, I know a chap, if you can get him. He's a real airman. He is a proponent of airpower." And MacArthur said: "Who is he?" And he said: "George Kenney," Sutherland having known George down at Camp Benning, when he was serving his tour, and that's how George got down there with MacArthur. And George had known Mrs. MacArthur when she was Jean Faircloth, living in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. And I knew her then. I went through there cross country on a flight. We were stuck with the weather, and she invited us out for dinner. So when I was stationed in the Philippines in 1926, she came out there as a maiden gal on a visit. Shortly thereafter she married MacArthur. George was in like Flynn, recommended by Sutherland. He knew Jean. So he was the one

that converted MacArthur to airpower.

Q: Did MacArthur understand airpower?

W: No.

Q: But he trusted Kenney?

W: Kenney had his problems. When Kenney got there, the Army had commandeered every tugboat, barge and whatnot. They were going to make the great landing in New Guinea. Old George said that's not the way to do it. Let's do it by air. So he called in these top Army commanders, and had a big seance, and they pooh-poohed the idea. With bad weather and so forth, how could they be dependent on airpower?

And so, George said: "Well, you pick the worst day you can find, and I'll demonstrate to you that I can feed you and supply you with ammunition by air. So MacArthur finally said: "Okay. You're talking big. Let's see you do it." Of course, George was a real good airman. And we had just developed a few years before, those little localizer radio beams. So they picked a bad day, George sent reconnaissance planes out and they dropped these radio beams in the areas where these people had selected they would be. Of course, he dropped the stuff by parachute, and kicked it out the door. And the stuff fell there and they were bogged down with food and ammunition. MacArthur was out there to see it. He called a meeting and said: "From now on, we're going to move through the islands by air," and that was the beginning of it. He turned it over just like that. And he's the one who coined the phrase: "We will advance the bomber line." Words to that effect. And from that day on, he was a converted proponent of airpower. George kept hammering away and proving it all the time. That was the reason, I, amongst a lot of people, said, maybe MacArthur has got the message now. Up to that time, you couldn't find a single soul in the Air

Corps of that vintage that had one good word to say because he was a member of the court martial that shanghaied Mitchell.

Q: Did you ever hear anything about this business between Brereton and MacArthur, about Brereton warning MacArthur that they ought to disperse the planes, this was after the attack on Pearl Harbor and MacArthur failed to take any action for, like 8 or 10 hours. Did you ever hear anything about that?

W: Just about what you heard. I know nothing firsthand, but the same story, and Gene Eubank...

Q: He's in Mississippi.

W: Yes, he's down in Gulfport.

Q: Is he worth seeing, he had some contact with Arnold, didn't he?

W: Yes, and he can give you the story about the Philippines.

Q: He was down at SAT, this School for Applied Tactics. Didn't he head that up, down in Orlando, during the war?

W: I don't remember.

Q: But he had some contact with Arnold, I see his name in there quite a bit.

W: He's quite a guy.

Q: You say Lovett and Arnold worked very close?

W: Oh yes, perfect team, and I have always felt that Bob Lovett's job was fending off the civilian side of the department against the military side.

Q: Maybe fending off Roosevelt, too?

W: Yes, like when he stepped in there and said, the Ordnance Corps can't do this, why, we will do it, if the Signal Corps can't do this, we will do it.

Q: Were there some planes, like this C-76. That was a bust, wasn't it?

W: There were some others that were a bust, too. We were frantic. We had a program there to build wooden airplanes, and did build some wooden planes.

Q: How about the gliders. They had some trouble with those, too, didn't they? Did you get into that production problem?

W: Yes, I had that too, we just had to lay it on top of everything else.

Q: Richard Dupont?

W: Yes, we had everybody building gliders that we could possibly think of. The whole industrial capacity of this country was just absolutely overloaded. The Army had to have theirs, and the Navy had to have theirs, and the British were getting some, and the French were getting some, and the Russians. So whatever we could eke out, we would eke out.

Q: Did you get into any hassles with Jimmy Burns and Harry Hopkins about supplying the Russians with planes?

W: No.

Q: That was above your level?

W: My job was just to get the stuff built and get it out.

Q: Did Arnold ever get mad at you?

W: He'd get all upset and crotchety and irritated. With all the problems he had, you couldn't blame him.

Q: When he got mad, did he use profanity?

W: Not much, a little. Not really.

Q: Raise his voice?

W: Raise his voice, but never screaming and shrieking. But you could tell he was mad.

Q: He had a perennial smile on his face. But it didn't mean he was happy?

W: No, I don't think he ever was happy.

Q: Did he ever sit in his office, and put his feet up on the desk and say: "Let s relax this afternoon?" You never saw him that way?

W: He just didn't have the time to do it. Between running over to Congress and reporting to Franklin (D. Roosevelt) and giving his own crowd hell and fighting the battle for Spaatz over there in Europe against the British.

Q: How about fighting the battle for Spaatz against the Navy? Did you get into that, keeping the stuff out of the Pacific? The Navy wanted B-24s out in the Pacific, and Arnold was trying to keep them down and this BOLERO. BOLERO was the buildup in Europe.

W: I'd forgotten about that. We had our problems with the Navy, I mean I had my problems, production-wise with them.

Q: What kind of problems did you have?

W: Getting priorities and so forth.

Q: Did the Navy try to crank in a lot of their ships, a lot of lesser things into the ALA priority?

W: Yes. But as I said, between Lovett and Hap, we could move so doggone much faster than the Navy could. They'd wake up and we would have it. Then I had some real tough expeditors that I got out of the automotive industry.

Q: Was Orville Cook involved?

W: Yes, he was working for me.

Q: I talked to Orville Cook recently.

W: Oh you did, did you get anything out of him?

Q: A couple of things, basically, the production approach. He doesn't have the high regard for Arnold that you have.

W: He doesn't? What is his criticism of Arnold?

Q: That Arnold was sort of haphazard. He was not organized.

W: Of course, I can give you an explanation of that. Cook was a very methodical type himself, and he was my Deputy, and as a Deputy he did real well. When I was making the decisions, he would put them through. Then when he took over, it wasn't the same thing. He wouldn't make a decision and ramrod it through.

Q: When did he take over from you?

W: When I left in 1943. But he was a brilliant guy. He was one of the top propeller engineers in the world--out there at Wright Field. He ran the Propeller Laboratory. He is a good engineer, but kind of a colorless fellow in a way. He wouldn't take the chances that some of the others would.

Q: I sort of got this impression.

W: But he was a good man, and to me, he made an awfully good No. 2 man. I'd make the decisions and he would carry them out. That's a lot easier than making them yourself.

Q: Did you feel that Arnold should have had a better organization? As an administrator Arnold was probably a bust. He just didn't have time to get coordinated comments on anything he had going. He had to make too many decisions, and he couldn't wait for them in the staff.

W: Well, maybe I am the wrong fellow to say that to, because if he had had a big organization around, he wouldn't have gotten done near

what he got done. Because he would give you a job to do and you were supported. You knew damn well when he told you to do it, it was not the orthodox thing to do. But he and Lovett supported you. Like I told you on the IFF thing, and a number of others. I got into the same kind of hassle with the Ordnance Corps on machine guns. I had to take over the production of 50 caliber machine guns because the Ordnance Corps had never reduced the gun to mass production. So I was called in there one day and told you just take over production of .50 caliber machine guns.

Q: How about bombs. Wasn't there trouble with bomb shortage?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: Knerr was complaining about bombs being short?

W: I never had a high regard for the Ordnance Corps. You can find Ordnance officers who will tell you what an SOB I am--to this day, if they're still alive--because I fought the Ordnance Corps since the beginning of time.

Q: Knerr was in charge of logistics in the European theater, and in the last year of the war, there was a dire shortage of 500# bombs. Do you remember that? There was a big hassle about that. He claimed that they didn't have the right ordnance. Was this any failure to foresee the need? Of course, they were dropping them in such great number that you couldn't possibly anticipate the requirement.

W: You have to give the Ordnance Corps credit. If you remember when Patton started to cross Europe, he had first priority of everything. We were cut down on gasoline, we were cut down on rubber, and so forth, to mount that operation of Patton's. And part of the Ordnance Corps was cut down too. But on the other hand, who in the

Air Force could foresee the consumption that we were really using? Nobody could guess that far. Who could guess the losses of the bombers? The only thing there was when I went through Germany on that Morgenthau assignment that I had, I went into Kassel, Germany.

Q: What was that assignment?

W: They conjured up an ad hoc committee and put me in charge of it, and the job was to write the post-surrender terms of Germany. So I was sent over there with a group. So I went around behind the troops as they were uncovering the place and got into Kassel one day. And that was of the centers of German aircraft industry, and they had this great big flak tower in which the engineering staff and production staff of these factories around Kassel had their headquarters. The day I got in there, they were still in there, so I interviewed the head man there, who spoke very good English. We got talking about the war, and he said: "It was really a heartbreaker." He said: "Our fighters would go out there today and knock down bombers all over the place." We'd say: "Well, we really got them." The next day the same number would come through. No matter how many we knocked down, there was always somebody coming through with the same number. The philosophy that the Air Force had, started with Arnold and his immediate staff, except Echols. Just have plenty of everything. Don't take a chance; don't run short. That's why we put three companies into building the B-17, and three into building the B-29s.

Q: Arnold didn't play it like McNamara played this war, he was going to use the last bullet on the last day of the war. Arnold couldn't afford to allow these things to happen.

W: All the way through his program it was that way. There was plenty of stuff ordered. There was never any argument about: "Are

we going to build 50 this month, or build 75." You build all you can.

Q: Arnold, right after Pearl Harbor, hired Pearre Cabell and Larry Norstad to be his "Advisory Council," and these guys were ministers without portfolio. They had a job and they were just supposed to be idea men. He said: "You guys are my idea men. I don't have time to think." This is what Norstad told me. "I just want you to think and stay out of operations." Did they? Did they ever get in your hair?

W: No. Never. They stayed out of operations.

Q: Of course, Norstad left, and then Jake Smart came in, and then Rosie O'Donnell came in later on, and Fred Deane toward the end of the war. These were people that Arnold had close to him who were told to think ideas, and if he liked them, he would push them.

W: He had great confidence in these people that he selected, unfortunately a lot of them fell down. Early part of the war, one of them, his real close boys was Joe Dawson. He'd been with Arnold many years, so when we took over the British Lockheed Hudson's, light bombers, Arnold put Joe Dawson in command of the outfit, and it was nothing but a debacle, Joe just couldn't run an outfit. It was a great disappointment to Arnold.

Q: Where did he fit into Arnold's staff?

W: He had been with Arnold before the war in one of the bomb squadrons, bomb groups, just like my brother. And he took a liking to him, he was one of the old timers in the AF.

Q: How about Ray Dunn?

W: Yes, Ray was another protege of Arnold's. He was kind of a super aide. I don't know what ever became of him.

Q: He's in Washington. I think he got in trouble--he was in this airborne operation over Sicily, I think that's where he got in trouble.

W: He was another disappointment to Arnold.

Q: How about some others like Sue Clagett?

W: Oh yes, I knew him.

Q: He got in trouble, too.

W: Sue had many opportunities and never came through. He was in command of that Selfridge Field setup at one time.

Q: He was, and he made general twice, and was demoted twice. He succeeded Arnold at March Field, and then he stubbed his toe and was taken down. Then was with the Magruder Commission in China when the war started, and he stubbed his toe there, too. And he blamed Arnold for it.

W: His problem was the bottle.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald? He was taken down, too. He was in the Middle East. Do you remember him?

W: Yes, sure I remember him. Those were the old timers that were coming up. Guys who came up with Arnold on the West Coast--Eaker, Spaatz, some of the others--got better positions than the fellows who came up with Andrews on the East Coast. Is there any merit in that judgment?

W: I hadn't thought about that before. I'll say this for Hap, he gave every one of those old timers--his contemporaries--a chance. Every one of them.

Q: And if they didn't make it, he took them down, like Jakey Fickel.

W: Jakey Fickel, "Jingling Willy" Jones, B.Q. Jones, Brereton, Tony Frank....

Q: Well, Brereton and Tony Frank got to high position.

W: Yes, but they didn't last very long.

Q: Well, Brereton was head of the airborne. He made three stars.

W: Yes, but I mean he was shifted around from 9th AF.... and Tony had some good commands too.

Q: Tony wanted a combat command; Arnold wouldn't give it to him.

W: That's right, same way with Fitzgerald. It's odd, if you look back on it, to see and realize that everyone of those old timers--I don't give a damn what they say today--had their opportunities with Hap. And those that came through, made good, well taken care of, others didn't.

Holfinbarger, Willard

5 Jan 70

December 1, 1969

Maj.Gen. Willard R. Wolfenbarger, USAF(Ret)
1450 Avenue L, NW
Winter Haven, Florida 33880

Dear General Wolfenbarger:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

December 19, 1969

Lt.Gen. Willard R. Wolfinbarger, USAF(Ret)
1450 Avenue L, N.W.
Winter Haven, Florida 33880

Dear General Wolfinbarger:

I have your very fine letter and kind invitation of the 5th. My plans are just starting to build. I will be coming down the Coast and making several stops enroute to the Miami area. Then I hope to come through Winter Haven enroute North.

My wife may be accompanying me, if we can arrange for my youngster in Washington.

In any event, I'll phone or write you to fix a date for our get together. It may be around January 15th or 16th.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.



W. R. WOLFENBARGER
MAJOR GENERAL U.S.A.F., RET.
REALTOR
BRANCH OFFICE
100 ORCHID SPRINGS DR.
TEL. 294-3487

W. R. Wolfenbarger
REALTOR

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5 December 1969

BRANCH OFFICE
100 ORCHID SPRINGS DR.
TEL. 294-3487

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of the Secretary,
Research & Analysis Div. - SAFAAR
The Pentagon - 4C 991
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of 1 December which came to hand yesterday. I am pleased to hear that you are writing the story of Hap Arnold. He was a colorful character and a real pioneer.

I knew General Arnold, of course, and worked with him in Washington during the early days of WW II. It is doubtful that I can give you anything that you hav'nt already gotten from other sources. However, I would be most happy to chat with you about it and I do hope that you will stop here enroute.

If you can give me a day or so of notice I will be sure to be on hand and I would be honored to have you and your party as my guests for luncheon and a ski-show at Cypress Gardens.

Sincerely,

W. R. Wolfenbarger
W. R. Wolfenbarger

WRW:cc

December 19, 1969

Lt.Gen. Willard R. Wolfinbarger, USAF(Ret)
1450 Avenue L, N.W.
Winter Haven, Florida 33880

Dear General Wolfinbarger:

I have your very fine letter and kind invitation of the 5th. My plans are just starting to build. I will be coming down the Coast and making several stops enroute to the Miami area. Then I hope to come through Winter Haven enroute North.

My wife may be accompanying me, if we can arrange for my youngster in Washington.)

In any event, I'll phone or write you to fix a date for our get together. It may be around January 15th or 16th.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

*Orchard Springs
4 to Home City Exit
Come 27 to Dundee
Rat Dundee
Cypress Gardens
Light Orchard Springs
A PM*

*done
1-5-70*



W. R. WOLFINBARGER
MAJOR GENERAL U.S.A.F. RET.
REALTOR
BRANCH OFFICE
100 ORCHID SPRINGS DR.
TEL 294-3487

W. R. Wolfinbarger
REALTOR

1450 AVENUE L, NW • 813-293-2209
WINTER HAVEN, FLORIDA 33880

SHOPPING CENTERS
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SITE LOCATION
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1450 AVE. L., NW
WINTER HAVEN, FLA.
33880
813 - 293-2209

DEVELOPMENT

NATIONAL LEASING

5 December 1969

BRANCH OFFICE
100 ORCHID SPRINGS DR.
TEL 294-3487

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of the Secretary,
Research & Analysis Div. - SAPAAR
The Pentagon - 4C 991
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter of 1 December which came to hand yesterday. I am pleased to hear that you are writing the story of Hap Arnold. He was a colorful character and a real pioneer.

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Sincerely,

W. R. Wolfinbarger
W. R. Wolfinbarger

WRW:cc

December 1, 1969

Maj.Gen. Willard R. Wolfenbarger, USAF(Ret)
1450 Avenue L, NW
Winter Haven, Florida 33880

Dear General Wolfenbarger:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Love^{II}, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Streett and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis D.v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRSS BRANCH

Zla

MAJOR GENERAL WILLARD ROLAND WOLFINBARGER, USAF

Willard Roland Wolfinbarger was born in Marion, Kansas, December 12, 1900. He enlisted in the Army in 1917, and was assigned to Company "M", 139th Infantry of the 35th Division with which he participated in the campaigns of St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne. He was honorably discharged in 1919.

General Wolfinbarger was graduated from the University of Kansas with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1924. While there, he was a member of the Phi Alpha Delta and Delta Upsilon fraternities, and was president of the student body of the School of Law.

On March 10, 1924, he was appointed a flying cadet. After receiving training at Brooks and Kelly Fields in Texas, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Reserve March 16, 1925. He received his Regular commission as a second lieutenant of Air Corps January 23, 1927.

During the early part of his military career, General Wolfinbarger, served at various Air Corps Fields in the United States and the Philippine Islands and was graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School (1937) and from the Command and General Staff School (1938).

In the spring of 1940, General Wolfinbarger was appointed at Berlin, Germany. In 1941, he became a staff officer with the Air War Plans Division at Air Corps headquarters in Washington, D. C., and subsequently was named operations and general staff officer with the Air War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff in Washington. While assigned to this duty, he served temporarily in England from June to August, 1942. In June, 1943, General Wolfinbarger became a member of the Joint War Plans Committee at Air Corps headquarters, and during that month had temporary duty in England. From August to September, 1943, he had temporary duty in Quebec, Canada, and from November to December, 1943, served temporarily in Egypt, after which he returned to duty with the Joint War Plans Committee.

General Wolfinbarger went to the Southwest Pacific theater in March, 1944, to become executive officer of the XIII Fighter Command. During the ensuing 14 months he also served at intervals as commander and deputy commander of that Command.

In June, 1945, General Wolfinbarger entered the Army and Navy Staff College, from which he was graduated the following December. He then became British Empire Specialist with the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department General Staff, and in April, 1946, was named deputy executive to the director of the Military Intelligence Service. He became executive to the director of that Service in July, 1946. A month later he was appointed an

intelligence instructor at the National War College.

In August, 1948, General Wolfinbarger was appointed chief of the Plans Section of the U. S. Air Forces in Europe, with station at Wiesbaden, Germany. A year later he assumed command of the Tactical Air Division of Continental Air Command at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. On August 1, 1950, he became commander of the Ninth Air Force (Tactical) at Pope Air Force Base and assumed additional duty as chairman of the Air Tactical Support Board in July, 1951.

The following month he was relieved as commander of the Ninth Air Force, retaining his assignment as chairman of the Joint Air Tactical Support Board.

General Wolfinbarger has been awarded the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal, the Army Commendation Ribbon, and the Purple Heart. He is rated a Command Pilot, Combat Observer and Technical Observer, and during World War II he flew 23 combat missions, totalling 109 hours.

He and his wife, the former Miss Olga S. Imperatoni of New York City, have one daughter, Loren.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) November 1, 1932, and to captain (temporary) April 20, 1935. He reverted to his permanent rank of first lieutenant June 16, 1936, and was promoted to captain (permanent) January 23, 1937; to major (temporary) December 30, 1940; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) January 5, 1942; to colonel (temporary) March 1, 1942; to major (permanent) January 23, 1944; to colonel (permanent) April 2, 1943; to brigadier general (temporary) September 11, 1949; to brigadier general (permanent) August 11, 1950, with date of rank from October 1, 1949; to major general (temporary) August 11, 1950, with date of rank from July 30, 1950.

E N D

Up to date as of 13 September 1951

INTERVIEW WITH M/GEN WILLARD WOLFINBARGER
WINTER HAVEN, FLORIDA
JANUARY 5, 1970

Q: You met Arnold in 1927, or knew of him when you were in Kansas City?

W: That was 1925-26.

Q: February and March 1926, when Arnold was eased out of Washington, and you had no direct contact with him, you just knew of his presence. You came on as a reservist. There was an opening, and you came on. You knew of him in the '30s, do you recall any contact with him in the 30s?

W: Not specifically. We would go on maneuvers, something like that.

Q: Were you on maneuvers at Vero Beach in 1935? Any specific maneuvers?

W: No. Well, we were out at Dayton on one particular maneuver, 2nd Bomb Group, from 1927 until 1930 I went on everything that the 2nd Bombardment went on.

Q: Out of Langley Field?

W: Yes.

Q: So, you were under people like Knerr, and people like Andrews, later on, when he took over the GHQ AF?

W: Yes.

Q: Your first reacl contact with Arnold was when you joined the Air Staff?

W: Let's see. We entered the war on Dec 7. Well, I got back to Washington two weeks before Pearl Harbor, back from Germany.

Q: Were you attache there?

W: Yes.

Q: Then you knew Truman Smith and Vanaman?

W: Sure. Yes indeed, very well, indeed.

Q: Were you familiar with Lindbergh's visit to Germany?

Were you there when he visited Germany?

W: I was there after the war (started) when he came there.

Q: Well, we are talking before the war. He went to Germany in 1938.

W: No, I sent to Germany in the fall of '41.

Q: And you came back right before the war started.

W: I was supposed to go there three months, you see. Somehow or other when I got there, they decided that I had better stay, so I was there 18 months instead.

Q: Then you must have gotten there in '40?

W: Yes, '40, that's right. Came back in 1941.

Q: So you were there during the invasion of Western Europe?

W: Yes. I went down to Paris with the German Army.

Q: Did they harass you?

Q: No, no. We were treated real well, Americans there.

Q: Who was in the group with you?

W: Vanaman and Harvey Smith...

Q: Was there a Truman Smith too?

W: No, Truman was already back in Washington.

Q: This was another Smith?

W: Yes. Harvey Smith, Infantry. Of course, I guess Truman was there, too.

Q: Did you hear any static on the American First Group - Lindbergh and Fritz Kahn, and all this business of trying to get us out of the war into the war?

W: We were all faced with the same problem. What we were trying to do was to alert the United States to the fact that Germany was a powerful and dangerous adversary, you see, and that they had a powerful air force. A strong air force, compared to what we had, was a terrific thing.

Q: You were writing reports like this?

W: Sure, and what they would say in Washington. "Oh, hell, don't pay any attention to them; they've turned into a bunch of Nazis." You know, that was the reaction you would get in Washington.

Q: General Staff?

W: Yes, from everybody.

Q: How about Arnold?

W: Well, personally I don't know. I've never heard any expression from him, personally, because I was reporting to the War Dept General Staff, and you see, not Arnold.

Q: There was no Air Staff as such?

W: No.

Q: Did you have any contact with people on the Air Plans - Kuter, Ken Walker?

W: Sure, see, when I came back to the Air Staff, I was on Plans, that was the future Plans section, War Dept General Staff, and worked for Eisenhower, and Ken Walker was there, of course, and Larry Kuter, sure we were all in there together.

Q: Did you work on the plan to establish the AAF? The AAF was established on June 20, 1941. From the Air Corps to the AAF, did you work on that?

W: No, no.

Q: What sort of plans were you assigned to?

W: Well, when I first, of course, I was there two weeks, I hadn't even gotten a desk assigned, and my clothes hadn't even arrived when I was in the war, you see. So from then on it was mostly war planning that we were doing from the War Dept level. Shortly after that, I was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the War Plans Section of JCS - Partridge and I.

Q: AWPD-1 had already been written?

W: Yes.

Q: Are you familiar with an incident involving the disclosure of RAINBOW FIVE or AWPD-1 by the Chicago Tribune?

W: No.

Q: Three days before Pearl Harbor, they published parts of the plan, they were trying to embarrass Roosevelt. Do you remember that?

W: No, I didn't know about it.

Q: You were in Washington, weren't you?

W: Well, three days before Pearl Harbor, I was in Washington, but I had just arrived. I had been completely isolated for a year and a half from anything in the States.

Q: Well, this thing hit the press - the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald and of course it was kind of muffled.

There was a sensational disclosure, but Pearl Harbor came too

quickly after it, that it was overtaken by that event. You are not familiar with any of that?

W: No.

Q: The reason I bring this up is that there has been a charge that some AAF captain brought that plan to Senator Wheeler, and Senator Wheeler in turn, took it to a man named Chesly Manly, who was a writer for the Chicago Tribune. This leak has since been blamed on Hap Arnold by a man who was the editor of the Washington Times-Herald.

W: You mean on Hap personally?

Q: Yes, and I'm trying to get to the bottom of this thing. You knew nothing of this?

W: Never heard of it.

Q: Are you familiar with the Wallace-Clark outfit. I think they came in and tried to organize the management of the Air Plans - this was in 1941. This might have been before your time.

W: No. What were they, consultants - business consultants?

Q: Yes. The Air Staff was just getting formed at that time.

W: I went in there, and I was working for Hull.

Q: Oh, in the Army.

W: Yes. War Dept General Staff. You see, that was only on the Air Staff as such, of course, we were right there in the Munitions Building all together, all on the same floor. But I was only in the Air Plans as such, I guess about a month, or month and a half a short time.

Q: General Staff - G-3?

W: Well, Plans Section, and Eisenhower had just taken it over.

Q: Well, he took over OPD. Did you work with Wedemeyer?

W: Oh, I knew Al well, knew him for years, but never worked with him.

Q: Did your work involve you in movement of troops or organizing troops?

W: Not directly. John Hull had the Future Plans section and we were, Eisenhower had the War Dept Plans. So we were all working on stuff that he assigned us, just from hand to mouth in those early days of war. Stuff was flying back and forth. Then very shortly after that, I went to the Future Plans section of the War Dept General Staff with Joint Chiefs of Staff. I was assigned over to the JCS.

Q: Did you work under Tom Handy?

W: Yes.

Q: Arnold wrote a piece of paper and your name was involved in this material. This is '43, when Arnold complained that Handy was getting better stuff on the Air Force than Arnold was getting, better plans stuff on the Air Force than Arnold was getting, so that Handy had him at a disadvantage. Do you remember this?

W: I didn't know about that. I worked for Tom Handy.

Q: I think they didn't want to let you out of your job, because apparently you were doing a good job. There were several other guys in that, Dick Lindsay, Moffat, wasn't he in it?

W: Moffat, I don't recall?

Q: Loutzenheizer?

W: Yes, Joe.

Q: Did you ever work with Kuter on AC/AS Plans?

W: Yes.

Q: You were on the War Dept General Staff. When did you come over to the Air Force?

W: Well, I started in the Air Force Staff, but this was a very confused period right there, Pearl Harbor, so everybody was more or less milling around and I wasn't in the Air Staff very long. It couldn't have been over 2 months at the most, when I was pulled into the War Dept General Staff, and we were all on the same floor there, in the old Munitions Building, so it was just moving from one desk to another one, down the hall.

Q: Do you remember a guy named Bryden, Gen Bryden and Gen Moore. Arnold was brought up to a level as Deputy Chief of Staff with Bryden and Moore. This is before Pearl Harbor. Then, after Pearl Harbor, of course, this thing was changed. They reorganized the War Dept once again in March 1942, and this was a reorganization, and McNarney ran it, McNarney and Kuter, Harrison, and one other man - I can't think of - worked on this plan to reorganize the War Dept to raise AAF to an equal level with the ACF and the ASF, did you have any role in that?

W: No. We were tactical plans - not tactical, but strategic plans, but battle plans.

Q: Did you have any role in the strategic air, the CBO the combined bomber operation?

W: No.

Q: What sort of plans were you in?

W: We were heavily involved in the invasion of Europe and so forth, and also in plans for the Burma Road, and supply of

China, for the advance across the Pacific. That was with the JCS, so I worked in Plans there until 1943, I guess it was, when I went out to the Pacific with the fighters.

Q: What job were you given there?

W: 13th Fighter Command, Deputy Commander, and then I took over command of the 13th Fighter Command.

Q: Were you under?

W: Biz Barnes and Streett.

Q: Arnold sent him out there?

W: Yes, Streett had the 13th AF.

Q: Tommy White was out there?

W: Yes, and Wurtsmith.

Q: Squeeze Wurtsmith. I talked to Kenney up in NY and he says "Squeeze" Wurtsmith. Why did they call you "curly"?

W: That's the name I've had since I was a little kid. But I've never had curly hair. I picked that up when I was a little kid. I had it all my life, college and later.

Q: Do you remember Arnold, during the sessions when they had briefing sessions for Marshall, and for Handy, and for Arnold, and for some of the top staff? Do you remember any situations where Arnold stood out, either where Arnold said something, or somebody said something to Arnold that has some interest.

W: The most impressive thing to me about Arnold, which I never could quite understand, really, because for a long time I had had fairly close association, not personally, but I mean we were in the same building, we were pretty close officially. And as you well know, Hap Arnold had a tempter. And he could raise blood hell when he decided to do so.

Q: Did he ever raise it with you?

W: No, never did, I always got along with Arnold very in well. I stood/a little awe of him, of course, because of the difference, but my relations, such as they were, were very good with Arnold. He was always nice to me, and never had. But I've seen him, you know, take off...

Q: At whom?

W: I wouldn't mention names, but it was reported in the building a number of times that he would grab a volume off his desk, you know, and hurl it at somebody. He'd get really mad, but I attended all meetings of the JCS and the Combined Chiefs of Staff when I was in the Plans Section. So it was always remarkable that in the presence of Marshall, Arnold never opened his mouth. He never said anything. He was the quietest mouse that you ever saw in your life. And I would just sit there and marvel at the difference between him when he sat over in the JCS building, and when he was back in his office.

Q: He was a terror in his office but a mouse in the JCS?

W: A mouse in the JCS, and they would almost have to give him a direct question and put pressure on him to get him to say anything. That always struck me as peculiar...

Q: Do you think he was awed of Marshall?

W: I don't know. That was something I never understood. But I'd look at him and just couldn't hardly believe it.

Q: He was a military man, and he was beholden to Marshall. He was still in the Army, and he was Marshall's subordinate. They gave him equality in the JCS and the CCS, but as I see the

correspondence, it was "Dear Arnold," and from Arnold to Marshall, it was "Dear General." Always a difference:

W: Oh, I understand that, but this went beyond that.

Q: To a point where you felt that Arnold failed to support cases that he should have supported?

W: Oh, no, but he was very, very hesitant to present his case in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of course, this was before we were separated from the Army. He was still in the Army, and Marshall was Chief. He was talking for the Army.

Q: Did Arnold hesitate to present his case even when he was offered an opportunity to do so?

W: Well, he just sat there most of the time. He just sat there.

Q: Well, who did the talking for the Air Force?

W: Well, Marshall did. The Air Force was in the Army.

Q: The Army Air Force, right. Did Arnold and King ever tangle?

W: Oh, I don't recall that they did. I know that they had differences of opinion, but openly, I don't think so.

Q: How about, did they have any trouble with the ASW business? This is the Anti-Submarine Warfare. They had Westside Larson in there, and the Navy was battling to get the whole thing under his control, and they weren't able to handle it, and the Air Force set up the Anti-Submarine Command and there was some blood spilled in 1942 and 1943. Did you get into that?

W: No.

Q: How about on AWPD-42. The Navy and Air Force disagreed on land based planes. The Navy wanted B-24s and they wanted B-25s,

and they wanted them out in the Pacific. There was a struggle about where the planes should go. Do you remember that?

W: Yes.

Q: There were many battles, do you recall any specific disagreement that Arnold had with anybody on that subject?

W: No. When he had disagreements, they were handled on a little bit different level.

Q: Lower levels? Did Kuter handle them on JSP level? On a planner's level?

W: I would think so, yes.

Q: Did they iron them out before they got to the top, very well?

W: Generally, yes.

Q: Did you get involved in the AWPD-42 - this was the war plan that Kuter basically prepared, some others who helped him - calling for 131,000 planes. That was cut back progressively until they got less than 100,000 planes. This was the plan to build planes in 1943 and Arnold was pushing to get a number A1A priority for the planes.

W: This was the plan that came out in 1940 wasn't it?

Q: No, 1942 or 1943. They were planning the production for 1943 and there was a disagreement with the Navy. The Navy cranked up a number of its requirements and put it up on the same A1A level as the Air Force - which in effect, diluted the Number 1 priority for airplanes. See, Roosevelt was pushing for airplanes, he didn't really understand airpower, he just was pushing for airplanes.

W: The numbers racket.

Q: Roosevelt asked Arnold in August 1942 - he came to Arnold and said: "How many planes do you need, irrespective of what we can produce, or the tools we need to produce them, or competing requirements, give me a number of planes that you need to produce." Arnold came up with this AWPD-42. Kuter and this thing was progressively watered down. Did you get involved in that?

W: No. It's a shame Orvil Anderson isn't around.

Q: Did you ever hear of him grabbing somebody in the hall, in the E-Ring or in the hall of the Munitions Building, giving him a project?

W: Grab them in the hall?

Q: Yes, he had a reputation for giving assignments to people that he met in the hall, that were unrelated to their specialty. Do you ever hear of this happening?

W: No, don't believe I have. I can believe it though.

Q: It's possible?

W: Yes.

Q: As an organizer; was he careful in his organization, or was he impulsive?

W: I would call him impulsive.

Q: Can you think of a specific instance of where he acted without having carefully thought through the consequences and then perhaps reversed himself?

W: I think... the Doolittle raid was impulsive.

Q: The Doolittle raid wasn't his?

W: It was Roosevelt's.

Q: Adm King claimed some credit for the origin of it, and several other people.

W: Well, we always figured that Roosevelt was putting the pressure on Hap Arnold to do something.

Q: Arnold turned to his Plans, perhaps to you, and he told them to think up all these ideas, they thought up these ideas of getting bases in Siberia. Were you involved in trying to get bases from the Russians?

W: No.

Q: Getting bases in China? Do you know Merion Cooper? Merion Cooper was involved in that, do you know about his activity?

W: Well, we weren't working at the same desk. But yes, Merion Cooper was around there in the old Air Staff, very much in prominence.

Q: What did Arnold look like when he got mad? How could you tell he was getting mad?

W: He'd get red in the face, he'd get red as a beet.

Q: Different people described how he looked when he got mad. Did he have a smile on his face all the time? They call him Hap. Was this a misnomer?

W: Well, he had a ready smile, he worked...

Q: Did he mean that he was happy?

W: No, I don't think so.

Q: Just a smile; just the shape of his face?

W: I think so.

Q: Was he a practical joker?

W: Not to my knowledge, I don't think so. To me, it would seem incongruous to think of him as a practical joker.

Q: Well, he was a practical joker, but he didn't like people to pull jokes on him. He loved to do it himself. He used to have these wildgame parties at Bolling. He had several of these parties. Were you high enough to attend some of these VIP parties?

W: Well, not the VIP parties. But every once in a while, he would throw a party out at Bolling and we'd all be assessed to cover it - \$5 or \$10.

Q: Did he know you by name?

W: Oh yes.

Q: If he saw you in the hall, was it Curly; did he talk to you?

W: I don't think he ever called me Curly, but he knew me by name.

Q: Your rank was Colonel?

W: When I came back from Germany I was a Major, and within just a couple of weeks I was a LTCOL, and about 3 months after that I was Colonel. Promotions came almost daily.

Q: You made your star when you went out to the 13th?

W: No, not till after the war.

Q: Do you remember Arnold coming out to the Pacific? He came out there before you went out there, before you went out there. He was there in 1942 and then he went out there in 1943. After the Casablanca Conference, and then he went out there in 1945. He went out to the Pacific in 1945, did you see him?

W: By that time, I was back in the states?

Q: When did you come back?

W: Let's see, very shortly after. I went to the Army-Navy Staff College, and then I went over to the War Dept General Staff, G-2, with Bissell.

Q: He got into trouble didn't he?

W: Yes, he did later.

W: I was just trying to reconstruct my itinerary here, you know?

Q: You were assigned as an instructor at the National War College. The National War College was one of Arnold's great interests, did you know that? He was the one who was probably instrumental in setting up the Army-Navy Staff College, predecessor of that in 1943. Pearre Cabell and P.D. Weikart were in that first class too. So did you have any contact with Arnold at this point?

W: No, I spent two years over there at the National War College.

Q: He was on his way out, retiring. Did you see him when he came back to Washington in 1946 or 1947?

W: After his retirement? Not that I recall. Then I went back over to Germany, right from there, so I wasn't around the Pentagon much.

Q: Did you have any contact with the Arnold family - the Wolfenbargers and Arnolds ever? I guess they were too high up in the chain of command for socializing.

W: No.

Q: Were you ever invited to his home?

W: Oh, yes, at Ft. Myer, cocktail party.

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold?

W: White haired lady, but that's about all I can remember.

Q: I've been out there several times.

W: She's still living, isn't she?

Q: Yes, still living, very charming. He wrote a lot of letters, and she saved them all - thousands of letters. He was a great letter writer. Nobody knows this. All people who got chewed out by Arnold, don't remember this. They can't picture him doing that.

Q: Did you ever hear him complain about the kind of staff briefing he was getting in preparation for JCS and CCS meetings?

W: No, but I think he bore down on Hansell a bit in that respect, because I know Hansell used to be real perturbed when it came time to go to JCS meetings.

Q: Were you a junior, you weren't a senior briefer, were you?

W: No, but I was over in the JCS

Q: Did Lindsay play an important role?

W: We were only there together a short time, and Lindsay was very quiet and worked back in a cubby hole someplace and I don't know just what he was up to. Ken Walker, I think he and Ken Walker worked together.

Q: Loutzenheiser had a big job, but he died, he was killed in a plane crash?

W: Great guy, very good friend of mine. Joe and I...

Q: Kuter had high regard for him. Did you have dealings with Kuter.

W: Oh yes.

Q: I saw him in NY a few months ago.

W: Larry is a great guy. Very fond of him -the greatest.

Q: Let me ask you this. Arnold's loyalty to his staff, in terms of promotions. Did he fight hard to get promotions for his people?

W: I think he did. They certainly seemed to do pretty well.

Q: He did pretty well, but I have been told that others got the promotions...

W: Well, maybe, he just didn't think along those terms.

But I never heard of him turning down recommendations that were reasonably justified, you know.

Q: Sometimes they needed more than that. Like Awards.

How about awards? DSMs and Legions of Merit? Did he recognize his people adequately, in your opinion?

Q: I don't know. I'm not qualified to express an opinion on that because I really wasn't taking very much along those lines either. I didn't pay much attention to it.

Q: Did you get recognized when you left the Air Staff? Legion of Merit?

W: Yes, I got the Legion of Merit. First one.

INTERVIEW WITH M/GEN WILLARD WOLFINBARGER
WINTER HAVEN, FLORIDA
JANUARY 5, 1970

Q: You met Arnold in 1927, or knew of him when you were in Kansas City?

W: That was 1925-26.

Q: February and March 1926, when Arnold was eased out of Washington, and you had no direct contact with him, you just knew of his presence. You came on as a reservist. There was an opening, and you came on. You knew of him in the '30s, do you recall any contact with him in the 30s?

W: Not specifically. We would go on maneuvers, something like that.

Q: Were you on maneuvers at Vero Beach in 1935? Any specific maneuvers?

W: No. Well, we were out at Dayton on one particular maneuver, 2nd Bomb Group, from 1927 until 1930 I went on everything that the 2nd Bombardment went on.

Q: Out of Langley Field?

W: Yes.

Q: So, you were under people like Knerr, and people like Andrews, later on, when he took over the GHQ AF?

W: Yes.

Q: Your first reacl contact with Arnold was when you joined the Air Staff?

W: Let's see. We entered the war on Dec 7. Well, I got back to Washington two weeks before Pearl Harbor, back from Germany.

Q: Were you attache there?
W: Yes.
Q: Then you knew Truman Smith and Vanaman?
W: Sure. Yes indeed, very well, indeed.
Q: Were you familiar with Lindbergh's visit to Germany?
Were you there when he visited Germany?
W: I was there after the war (started) when he came there.
Q: Well, we are talking before the war. He went to Germany in 1938.
W: No, I sent to Germany in the fall of '41.
Q: And you came back right before the war started.
W: I was supposed to go there three months, you see. Somehow or other when I got there, they decided that I had better stay, so I was there 18 months instead.
Q: Then you must have gotten there in '40?
W: Yes, '40, that's right. Came back in 1941.
Q: So you were there during the invasion of Western Europe?
W: Yes. I went down to Paris with the German Army.
Q: Did they harass you?
Q: No, no. We were treated real well, Americans there.
Q: Who was in the group with you?
W: Vanaman and Harvey Smith...
Q: Was there a Truman Smith too?
W: No, Truman was already back in Washington.
Q: This was another Smith?
W: Yes. Harvey Smith, Infantry. Of course, I guess Truman was there, too.

Q: Did you hear any static on the American First Group - Lindbergh and Fritz Kahn, and all this business of trying to get us out of the war into the war?

W: We were all faced with the same problem. What we were trying to do was to alert the United States to the fact that Germany was a powerful and dangerous adversary, you see, and that they had a powerful air force. A strong air force, compared to what we had, was a terrific thing.

Q: You were writing reports like this?

W: Sure, and what they would say in Washington. "Oh, hell, don't pay any attention to them; they've turned into a bunch of Nazis." You know, that was the reaction you would get in Washington.

Q: General Staff?

W: Yes, from everybody.

Q: How about Arnold?

W: Well, personally I don't know. I've never heard any expression from him, personally, because I was reporting to the War Dept General Staff, and you see, not Arnold.

Q: There was no Air Staff as such?

W: No.

Q: Did you have any contact with people on the Air Plans - Kuter, Ken Walker?

W: Sure, see, when I came back to the Air Staff, I was on Plans, that was the future Plans section, War Dept General Staff, and worked for Eisenhower, and Ken Walker was there, of course, and Larry Kuter, sure we were all in there together.

Q: Did you work on the plan to establish the AAF? The AAF was established on June 20, 1941. From the Air Corps to the AAF, did you work on that?

W: No, no.

Q: What sort of plans were you assigned to?

W: Well, when I first, of course, I was there two weeks, I hadn't even gotten a desk assigned, and my clothes hadn't even arrived when I was in the war, you see. So from then on it was mostly war planning that we were doing from the War Dept level. Shortly after that, I was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the War Plans Section of JCS - Partridge and I.

Q: AWP-1 had already been written?

W: Yes.

Q: Are you familiar with an incident involving the disclosure of RAINBOW FIVE or AWP-1 by the Chicago Tribune?

W: No.

Q: Three days before Pearl Harbor, they published parts of the plan, they were trying to embarrass Roosevelt. Do you remember that?

W: No, I didn't know about it.

Q: You were in Washington, weren't you?

W: Well, three days before Pearl Harbor, I was in Washington, but I had just arrived. I had been completely isolated for a year and a half from anything in the States.

Q: Well, this thing hit the press - the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald and of course it was kind of muffled. There was a sensational disclosure, but Pearl Harbor came too

quickly after it, that it was overtaken by that event. You are not familiar with any of that?

W: No.

Q: The reason I bring this up is that there has been a charge that some AAF captain brought that plan to Senator Wheeler, and Senator Wheeler in turn, took it to a man named Chesly Manly, who was a writer for the Chicago Tribune. This leak has since been blamed on Hap Arnold by a man who was the editor of the Washington Times-Herald.

W: You mean on Hap personally?

Q: Yes, and I'm trying to get to the bottom of this thing. You knew nothing of this?

W: Never heard of it.

Q: Are you familiar with the Wallace-Clark outfit. I think they came in and tried to organize the management of the Air Plans - this was in 1941. This might have been before your time.

W: No. What were they, consultants - business consultants?

Q: Yes. The Air Staff was just getting formed at that time.

W: I went in there, and I was working for Hull.

Q: Oh, in the Army.

W: Yes. War Dept General Staff. You see, that was only on the Air Staff as such, of course, we were right there in the Munitions Building all together, all on the same floor. But I was only in the Air Plans as such, I guess about a month, or month and a half a short time.

Q: General Staff - G-3?

W: Well, Plans Section, and Eisenhower had just taken it over.

Q: Well, he took over OPD. Did you work with Wedemeyer?

W: Oh, I knew Al well, knew him for years, but never worked with him.

Q: Did your work involve you in movement of troops or organizing troops?

W: Not directly. John Hull had the Future Plans section and we were, Eisenhower had the War Dept Plans. So we were all working on stuff that he assigned us, just from hand to mouth in those early days of war. Stuff was flying back and forth. Then very shortly after that, I went to the Future Plans section of the War Dept General Staff with Joint Chiefs of Staff. I was assigned over to the JCS.

Q: Did you work under Tom Handy?

W: Yes.

Q: Arnold wrote a piece of paper and your name was involved in this material. This is '43, when Arnold complained that Handy was getting better stuff on the Air Force than Arnold was getting, better plans stuff on the Air Force than Arnold was getting, so that Handy had him at a disadvantage. Do you remember this?

W: I didn't know about that. I worked for Tom Handy.

Q: I think they didn't want to let you out of your job, because apparently you were doing a good job. There were several other guys in that, Dick Lindsay, Moffat, wasn't he in it?

W: Moffat, I don't recall?

Q: Loutzenheizer?

W: Yes, Joe.

Q: Did you ever work with Kuter on AC/AS Plans?

W: Yes.

Q: You were on the War Dept General Staff. When did you come over to the Air Force?

W: Well, I started in the Air Force Staff, but this was a very confused period right there, Pearl Harbor, so everybody was more or less milling around and I wasn't in the Air Staff very long. It couldn't have been over 2 months at the most, when I was pulled into the War Dept General Staff, and we were all on the same floor there, in the old Munitions Building, so it was just moving from one desk to another one, down the hall.

Q: Do you remember a guy named Bryden, Gen Bryden and Gen Moore. Arnold was brought up to a level as Deputy Chief of Staff with Bryden and Moore. This is before Pearl Harbor. Then, after Pearl Harbor, of course, this thing was changed. They reorganized the War Dept once again in March 1942, and this was a reorganization, and McNarney ran it, McNarney and Kuter, Harrison, and one other man - I can't think of - worked on this plan to reorganize the War Dept to raise AAF to an equal level with the AGF and the ASF, did you have any role in that?

W: No. We were tactical plans - not tactical, but strategic plans, but battle plans.

Q: Did you have any role in the strategic air, the CBO the combined bomber operation?

W: No.

Q: What sort of plans were you in?

W: We were heavily involved in the invasion of Europe and so forth, and also in plans for the Burma Road, and supply of

China, for the advance across the Pacific. That was with the JCS, so I worked in Plans there until 1943, I guess it was, when I went out to the Pacific with the fighters.

Q: What job were you given there?

W: 13th Fighter Command, Deputy Commander, and then I took over command of the 13th Fighter Command.

Q: Were you under?

W: Biz Barnes and Streett.

Q: Arnold sent him out there?

W: Yes, Streett had the 13th AF.

Q: Tommy White was out there?

W: Yes, and Wurtsmith.

Q: Squeeze Wurtsmith. I talked to Kenney up in NY and he says "Squeeze" Wurtsmith. Why did they call you "curly"?

W: That's the name I've had since I was a little kid. But I've never had curly hair. I picked that up when I was a little kid. I had it all my life, college and later.

Q: Do you remember Arnold, during the sessions when they had briefing sessions for Marshall, and for Handy, and for Arnold, and for some of the top staff? Do you remember any situations where Arnold stood out, either where Arnold said something, or somebody said something to Arnold that has some interest.

W: The most impressive thing to me about Arnold, which I never could quite understand, really, because for a long time I had had fairly close association, not personally, but I mean we were in the same building, we were pretty close officially. And as you well know, Hap Arnold had a temper. And he could raise blood hell when he decided to do so.

Q: Did he ever raise it with you?

W: No, never did, I always got along with Arnold very well. I stood/a little awe of him, of course, because of the difference, but my relations, such as they were, were very good with Arnold. He was always nice to me, and never had. But I've seen him, you know, take off...

Q: At whom?

W: I wouldn't mention names, but it was reported in the building a number of times that he would grab a volume off his desk, you know, and hurl it at somebody. He'd get really mad, but I attended all meetings of the JCS and the Combined Chiefs of Staff when I was in the Plans Section. So it was always remarkable that in the presence of Marshall, Arnold never opened his mouth. He never said anything. He was the quietest mouse that you ever saw in your life. And I would just sit there and marvel at the difference between him when he sat over in the JCS building, and when he was back in his office.

Q: He was a terror in his office but a mouse in the JCS?

W: A mouse in the JCS, and they would almost have to give him a direct question and put pressure on him to get him to say anything. That always struck me as peculiar...

Q: Do you think he was awed of Marshall?

W: I don't know. That was something I never understood.

But I'd look at him and just couldn't hardly believe it.

Q: He was a military man, and he was beholden to Marshall. He was still in the Army, and he was Marshall's subordinate. They gave him equality in the JCS and the CCS, but as I see the

correspondence, it was "Dear Arnold," and from Arnold to Marshall, it was "Dear General." Always a difference:

W: Oh, I understand that, but this went beyond that.

Q: To a point where you felt that Arnold failed to support cases that he should have supported?

W: Oh, no, but he was very, very hesitant to present his case in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of course, this was before we were separated from the Army. He was still in the Army, and Marshall was Chief. He was talking for the Army.

Q: Did Arnold hesitate to present his case even when he was offered an opportunity to do so?

W: Well, he just sat there most of the time. He just sat there.

Q: Well, who did the talking for the Air Force?

W: Well, Marshall did. The Air Force was in the Army.

Q: The Army Air Force, right. Did Arnold and King ever tangle?

W: Oh, I don't recall that they did. I know that they had differences of opinion, but openly, I don't think so.

Q: How about, did they have any trouble with the ASW business? This is the Anti-Submarine Warfare. They had Westside Larson in there, and the Navy was battling to get the whole thing under his control, and they weren't able to handle it, and the Air Force set up the Anti-Submarine Command and there was some blood spilled in 1942 and 1943. Did you get into that?

W: No.

Q: How about on AWPD-42. The Navy and Air Force disagreed on land based planes. The Navy wanted B-24s and they wanted B-25s,

and they wanted them out in the Pacific. There was a struggle about where the planes should go. Do you remember that?

W: Yes.

Q: There were many battles, do you recall any specific disagreement that Arnold had with anybody on that subject?

W: No. When he had disagreements, they were handled on a little bit different level.

Q: Lower levels? Did Kuter handle them on JSP level? On a planner's level?

W: I would think so, yes.

Q: Did they iron them out before they got to the top, very well?

W: Generally, yes.

Q: Did you get involved in the AWPD-42 - this was the war plan that Kuter basically prepared, some others who helped him - calling for 131,000 planes. That was cut back progressively until they got less than 100,000 planes. This was the plan to build planes in 1943 and Arnold was pushing to get a number A1A priority for the planes.

W: This was the plan that came out in 1940 wasn't it?

Q: No, 1942 or 1943. They were planning the production for 1943 and there was a disagreement with the Navy. The Navy cranked up a number of its requirements and put it up on the same A1A level as the Air Force - which in effect, diluted the Number 1 priority for airplanes. See, Roosevelt was pushing for airplanes, he didn't really understand airpower, he just was pushing for airplanes.

W: The numbers racket.

Q: Roosevelt asked Arnold in August 1942 - he came to Arnold and said: "How many planes do you need, irrespective of what we can produce, or the tools we need to produce them, or competing requirements, give me a number of planes that you need to produce." Arnold came up with this AWPD-42. Kuter and this thing was progressively watered down. Did you get involved in that?

W: No. It's a shame Orvil Anderson isn't around.

Q: Did you ever hear of him grabbing somebody in the hall, in the E-Ring or in the hall of the Munitions Building, giving him a project?

W: Grab them in the hall?

Q: Yes, he had a reputation for giving assignments to people that he met in the hall, that were unrelated to their speciality. Do you ever hear of this happening?

W: No, don't believe I have. I can believe it though.

Q: It's possible?

W: Yes.

Q: As an organizer, was he careful in his organization, or was he impulsive?

W: I would call him impulsive.

Q: Can you think of a specific instance of where he acted without having carefully thought through the consequences and then perhaps reversed himself?

W: I think... the Doolittle raid was impulsive.

Q: The Doolittle raid wasn't his?

W: It was Roosevelt's.

Q: Adm King claimed some credit for the origin of it, and several other people.

W: Well, we always figured that Roosevelt was putting the pressure on Hap Arnold to do something.

Q: Arnold turned to his Plans, perhaps to you, and he told them to think up all these ideas, they thought up these ideas of getting bases in Siberia. Were you involved in trying to get bases from the Russians?

W: No.

Q: Getting bases in China? Do you know Merion Cooper? Merion Cooper was involved in that, do you know about his activity?

W: Well, we weren't working at the same desk. But yes, Merion Cooper was around there in the old Air Staff, very much in prominence.

Q: What did Arnold look like when he got mad? How could you tell he was getting mad?

W: He'd get red in the face, he'd get red as a beet.

Q: Different people described how he looked when he got mad. Did he have a smile on his face all the time? They call him Hap. Was this a misnomer?

W: Well, he had a ready smile, he worked...

Q: Did he mean that he was happy?

W: No, I don't think so.

Q: Just a smile; just the shape of his face?

W: I think so.

Q: Was he a practical joker?

W: Not to my knowledge, I don't think so. To me, it would seem incongruous to think of him as a practical joker.

Q: Well, he was a practical joker, but he didn't like people to pull jokes on him. He loved to do it himself. He used to have these wildgame parties at Bolling. He had several of these parties. Were you high enough to attend some of these VIP parties?

W: Well, not the VIP parties. But every once in a while, he would throw a party out at Bolling and we'd all be assessed to cover it - \$5 or \$10.

Q: Did he know you by name?

W: Oh yes.

Q: If he saw you in the hall, was it Curly; did he talk to you?

W: I don't think he ever called me Curly, but he knew me by name.

Q: Your rank was Colonel?

W: When I came back from Germany I was a Major, and within just a couple of weeks I was a LTCOL, and about 3 months after that I was Colonel. Promotions came almost daily.

Q: You made your star when you went out to the 13th?

W: No, not till after the war.

Q: Do you remember Arnold coming out to the Pacific? He came out there before you went out there, before you went out there. He was there in 1942 and then he went out there in 1943. After the Casablanca Conference, and then he went out there in 1945. He went out to the Pacific in 1945, did you see him?

W: By that time, I was back in the states?

Q: When did you come back?

W: Let's see, very shortly after. I went to the Army-Navy Staff College, and then I went over to the War Dept General Staff, G-2, with Bissell.

Q: He got into trouble didn't he?

W: Yes, he did later.

W: I was just trying to reconstruct my itinerary here, you know?

Q: You were assigned as an instructor at the National War College. The National War College was one of Arnold's great interests, did you know that? He was the one who was probably instrumental in setting up the Army-Navy Staff College, predecessor of that in 1943. Pearre Cabell and P.D. Weikart were in that first class too. So did you have any contact with Arnold at this point?

W: No, I spent two years over there at the National War College.

Q: He was on his way out, retiring. Did you see him when he came back to Washington in 1946 or 1947?

W: After his retirement? Not that I recall. Then I went back over to Germany, right from there, so I wasn't around the Pentagon much.

Q: Did you have any contact with the Arnold family - the Wolfenbargers and Arnolds ever? I guess they were too high up in the chain of command for socializing.

W: No.

Q: Were you ever invited to his home?

W: Oh, yes, at Ft. Myer, cocktail party.

Q: I saw him in NY a few months ago.

W: Larry is a great guy. Very fond of him -the greatest.

Q: Let me ask you this. Arnold's loyalty to his staff, in terms of promotions. Did he fight hard to get promotions for his people?

W: I think he did. They certainly seemed to do pretty well.

Q: He did pretty well, but I have been told that others got the promotions...

W: Well, maybe, he just didn't think along those terms.

But I never heard of him turning down recommendations that were reasonably justified, you know.

Q: Sometimes they needed more than that. Like Awards.

How about awards? DSMs and Legions of Merit? Did he recognize his people adequately, in your opinion?

Q: I don't know. I'm not qualified to express an opinion on that because I really wasn't taking very much along those lines either. I didn't pay much attention to it.

Q: Did you get recognized when you left the Air Staff? Legion of Merit?

W: Yes, I got the Legion of Merit. First one.

Hoods, Lawrence S.

13 May 70

May 18, 1970

Col Lawrence S. Woods, USAF(Ret)
106 Medford Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear Colonel Woods:

I very much enjoyed talking to you and Mrs. Woods about Hap Arnold and the days at March Field. I saw Col Bruce Arnold this morning and he remembered you and Mrs. Woods also your daughter very well. He asked me to send his best wishes.

If any other recollections of Hap Arnold come to mind, I hope that you will favor me by jotting them down and sending them to me in the enclosure.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

*Low
13 May 70*

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Interview Col Lawrence S. Woods, San Antonio, Texas, May 13, 1970.

Q: Do you recall your first meeting with Hap Arnold? Did you work for him before you were at March Field?

W: No. Didn't know him at all. Met him at March Field.

Q: When were you assigned to March Field?

W: 1931.

Q: Then you and Arnold came there about the same time?

W: Oh yes.

Q: He came around a little bit before Thanksgiving time?

W: I forget what time I came, a little later.

Q: What was your job at March Field?

W: I was Quartermaster at the Field. Also, Construction Quartermaster.

Q: You had a lot to do with Arnold, I guess?

W: Oh yes.

Q: You probably had a lot to do with building Bear Lake Camp? Remember the recreation, Bear Lake Camp?

W: Oh yes, that was a snake. You want me to tell the truth, now? That was unofficial, entirely unofficial. It was Arnold's idea. He wanted it. He couldn't get it one way, he normally got things the only way. That was his habit.

Q: He was determined to get a recreational camp for the men?

W: Up there at Bear Lake.

Q: Yes, I've seen a lot of the papers, they scrounged lumber, pipe.

W: Oh, they not only scrounged lumber and pipe. We sort of stole it, chiseled it out. Other things that went on. You see, at that time, we were building 60 CCC camps.

Q: Sixty camps, under Arnold?

W: Yes.

Q: You were in charge of all the construction?

W: Yes, in charge of all the construction. My assistant was Eddy Perrin. Eddy has since died. He was what I called my outside man. He watched construction outside. My inside man, supply, was Buster Briggs.

Q: Yes, later became head of the AF Academy.

W: Yes.

Q: Do you recall how Arnold got that CCC job? Did the President, or General Malin Craig give it to him?

W: Oh no, the CCC job was all over the country. We were just assigned a certain area, and certain places.

Q: Where were these camps located, all over California?

W: We had two in Death Valley; we had them all over California.

Q: How long did you have to build them? Was it a rush job?

W: It was a rush job; and it was just temporary work. The main part of our camps was the kitchen. As a matter of fact, we didn't even take pictures of them.

Q: How long did it take you to build them?

W: We hired everybody we could, and the men helped, who were assigned there.

Q: All the officers were given a job?

W: At that particular time, Arnold said we are either going to have CCC camps, or we are going to fly, so he stopped all flying.

Everybody had a job with the CCC camp. And the officers, LTS, and various young officers on the post were put in command of these camps. Of course, they took their mess sergeants.

Q: Did you ever get a commendation from Arnold--that letter of 1935?

W: No more than picture. He had a great deal of confidence in me, at least I think he did. If I was in the office, and he was talking to someone, no matter how private it was, he just kept on talking, and he left me right there in the office. I didn't step outside.

Q: He used to blow his top a lot?

W: He would blow his top, and he never referred to me as Captain Woods. I was always "Skipper." Why, I don't know. Frankly, he was wicked. I mean, when I say "wicked", he was demanding.

Q: And did not take half results, or three-quarter results?

W: Never in this world.

Q: And he wanted it done yesterday?

W: No question about that. One morning he called me up and said: "Skipper, send me a bill for eight window panes of hangars, and send Harold Beaton one for 16, and tell him to lick those two kids of his. I've already licked David." He caught the two kids.

Q: Harold Beaton, a bill for 16, and one for him for eight. That's an interesting anecdote. Do you remember anything else, any anecdote about him, in construction?

W: No. He was the CO at all times, no question about that.

Q: He did a lot of planting, of poplar trees. Mrs. Arnold was very active in that, was she not?

W: Oh, I don't know about that. That was under Major Lohman. He had charge of the nursery; and not only charge of the nursery, he was Post Commander.

Q: Did Arnold go around visiting these CCC camps?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Do you remember the earthquake? There was an earthquake in Long Beach in 1933? Did that cause damage on the base?

W: No.

Q: Do you remember people visiting Arnold from Hollywood--Hollywood stars would come out?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Is there anything special about any of these visits?

W: No, except that he was not a shrinking violet. He played to the crowd; he was always looking out for Arnold, too. Now, I'll say one thing about him, I don't know whether anyone has said this to you. But about everybody that was connected with him at March Field, became somebody in the Air Forces. Now, the two Giles, were not at March Field, they were down at Rockwell. But there was Tooley Spaatz, Joe McNarney, Ira Eaker,--Ira was a young Captain in those days. Buster Briggs, Eddie Perrin, the whole crowd at March Field.

Q: Do you think that those men who came up with Arnold along the March Field route got better jobs than those who came up along with Andrews?

W: I don't know Andrews, but I do know this. If they were going to amount to anything, Arnold was going to make them something. That I know, I don't know anything about Andrews.

Q: There are some people who came up the March Field route, who didn't make it big, you had to have ability.

W: You had to have ability, too, of course.

Q: Did Arnold brook incompetence, or I mean excuses. If he gave you a job and somebody came in and said: "Well, I couldn't do it because...." Did he tolerate any excuses?

W: No, I don't think, I don't think he had those.

Q: I guess it was sort of a mark, or a badget of being in the Air Corps to get bawled out by Arnold. Did you get bawled out by him?

W: Hell, no.

Q: Never got bawled out by him? But you saw him bawl other people out?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Was he intolerant?

W: I wouldn't say he was intolerant, but he was demanding. I served under Seals(?), a commanding officer who patted you on the back occasionally, where Arnold didn't pat anyone on the back.

Q: He never patted anyone on the back?

W: Not as far as I know.

Q: Did you stay there after he left, were you there when he left at the end of 1935?

W: No, we left about the same time.

(NOTE: Col Woods has a nice picture of BG Arnold wearing his hat and Sam Browne belt. There is an inscription "To Captain Woods, With Best Wishes and all of the good luck in the world. You have been a grand person to have on my staff, H.H. Arnold, Brigadier General, A.C., March Field, May 25, 1935.")

Q: You never saw him since he left March Field?

W: No.

Q: In 1935, you left a few months before he did?

W: Yes. We were assigned a certain post. As we left the post, this fellow, came out to say goodbye to us. We were on inspections all the time. Well, as this certain fellow left, the CO of this post, depot, Tony, said to everybody concerned: "Well, that's one mistake I made."

Q: You say Arnold was a hard taskmaster, but Tony was tougher?

W: Tony was tougher, I think, only from observation.

Q: Would you consider Arnold the best CO you ever served under?

W: Oh, hell no. The best CO I ever served under, I would say, was McIntyre, who commanded Ft. Sill.

Q: Was he Jim McIntyre?

W: No, they called him the villain. He was a BG in the first World War. But he wasn't "made" in the second World War.

Q: We have here a letter from Gen Arnold to Col Lawrence S. Woods, March 27, 1943. Col Woods had written Arnold a letter of congratulations on his promotion to four stars, and Arnold wrote back: "It was awfully good to hear from you because I haven't been able to keep track of you since we left March Field. I have made a mental note that you are with the Air Forces at Patterson Field, and the next time I am in that vicinity, I will certainly try to arrange things so that I can sit down and have a little chat with you."

Q: I want to ask you a question about the CCC. They had some racial troubles at some of those camps. Do you remember that?

W: No, we didn't have any.

Q: Did Arnold get around and visit them?

W: Oh, yes, all the time.

Q: Give the boys a talking to?

W: No, if he did, I wasn't there.

Q: Would you say that his camps were very successful?

W: I'd say they were.

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Interview Col Lawrence S. Woods, San Antonio, Texas, May 13, 1970.

Q: Do you recall your first meeting with Hap Arnold? Did you work for him before you were at March Field?

W: No. Didn't know him at all. Met him at March Field.

Q: When were you assigned to March Field?

W: 1931.

Q: Then you and Arnold came there about the same time?

W: Oh yes.

Q: He came around a little bit before Thanksgiving time?

W: I forget what time I came, a little later.

Q: What was your job at March Field?

W: I was Quartermaster at the Field. Also, Construction Quartermaster.

Q: You had a lot to do with Arnold, I guess?

W: Oh yes.

Q: You probably had a lot to do with building Bear Lake Camp? Remember the recreation, Bear Lake Camp?

W: Oh yes, that was a snake. You want me to tell the truth, now? That was unofficial, entirely unofficial. It was Arnold's idea. He wanted it. He couldn't get it one way, he normally got things the only way. That was his habit.

Q: He was determined to get a recreational camp for the men?

W: Up there at Bear Lake.

Q: Yes, I've seen a lot of the papers, they scrounged lumber, pipe.

W: Oh, they not only scrounged lumber and pipe. We sort of stole it, chiseled it out. Other things that went on. You see, at that time, we were building 60 CCC camps.

Q: Sixty camps, under Arnold?

W: Yes.

Q: You were in charge of all the construction?

W: Yes, in charge of all the construction. My assistant was Eddy Perrin. Eddy has since died. He was what I called my outside man. He watched construction outside. My inside man, supply, was Buster Briggs.

Q: Yes, later became head of the AF Academy.

W: Yes.

Q: Do you recall how Arnold got that CCC job? Did the President, or General Malin Craig give it to him?

W: Oh no, the CCC job was all over the country. We were just assigned a certain area, and certain places.

Q: Where were these camps located, all over California?

W: We had two in Death Valley; we had them all over California.

Q: How long did you have to build them? Was it a rush job?

W: It was a rush job; and it was just temporary work. The main part of our camps was the kitchen. As a matter of fact, we didn't even take pictures of them.

Q: How long did it take you to build them?

W: We hired everybody we could, and the men helped, who were assigned there.

Q: All the officers were given a job?

W: At that particular time, Arnold said we are either going to have CCC camps, or we are going to fly, so he stopped all flying.

Everybody had a job with the CCC camp. And the officers, LTS, and various young officers on the post were put in command of these camps. Of course, they took their mess sergeants.

Q: Did you ever get a commendation from Arnold--that letter of 1935?

W: No more than picture. He had a great deal of confidence in me, at least I think he did. If I was in the office, and he was talking to someone, no matter how private it was, he just kept on talking, and he left me right there in the office. I didn't step outside.

Q: He used to blow his top a lot?

W: He would blow his top, and he never referred to me as Captain Woods. I was always "Skipper." Why, I don't know. Frankly, he was wicked. I mean, when I say "wicked," he was demanding.

Q: And did not take half results, or three-quarter results?

W: Never in this world.

Q: And he wanted it done yesterday?

W: No question about that. One morning he called me up and said: "Skipper, send me a bill for eight window panes of hangars, and send Harold Beaton one for 16, and tell him to lick those two kids of his. I've already licked David." He caught the two kids.

Q: Harold Beaton, a bill for 16, and one for him for eight. That's an interesting anecdote. Do you remember anything else, any anecdote about him, in construction?

W: No. He was the JO at all times, no question about that.

Q: He did a lot of planting, of poplar trees. Mrs. Arnold was very active in that, was she not?

W: Oh, I don't know about that. That was under Major Lohman. He had charge of the nursery; and not only charge of the nursery, he was Post Commander.

Q: Did Arnold go around visiting these CCC camps?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Do you remember the earthquake? There was an earthquake in Long Beach in 1933? Did that cause damage on the base?

W: No.

Q: Do you remember people visiting Arnold from Hollywood--Hollywood stars would come out?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Is there anything special about any of these visits?

W: No, except that he was not a shrinking violet. He played to the crowd; he was always looking out for Arnold, too. Now, I'll say one thing about him, I don't know whether anyone has said this to you. But about everybody that was connected with him at March Field, became somebody in the Air Forces. Now, the two Giles, were not at March Field, they were down at Rockwell. But there was Tooey Spaatz, Joe McNarney, Ira Eaker,--Ira was a young Captain in those days. Buster Briggs, Eddie Perrin, the whole crowd at March Field.

Q: Do you think that those men who came up with Arnold along the March Field route got better jobs than those who came up along with Andrews?

W: I don't know Andrews, but I do know this. If they were going to amount to anything, Arnold was going to make them something. That I know, I don't know anything about Andrews.

Q: There are some people who came up the March Field route, who didn't make it big, you had to have ability.

W: You had to have ability, too, of course.

Q: Did Arnold brook incompetence, or I mean excuses. If he gave you a job and somebody came in and said: "Well, I couldn't do it because..." Did he tolerate any excuses?

W: No, I don't think, I don't think he had those.

Q: I guess it was sort of a mark, or a badge of being in the Air Corps to get bawled out by Arnold. Did you get bawled out by him?

W: Hell, no.

Q: Never got bawled out by him? But you saw him bawl other people out?

W: Oh yes.

Q: Was he intolerant?

W: I wouldn't say he was intolerant, but he was demanding. I served under Seals(?), a commanding officer who patted you on the back occasionally, where Arnold didn't pat anyone on the back.

Q: He never patted anyone on the back?

W: Not as far as I know.

Q: Did you stay there after he left, were you there when he left at the end of 1935?

W: No, we left about the same time.

(NOTE: Col Woods has a nice picture of BG Arnold wearing his hat and Sam Browne belt. There is an inscription "To Captain Woods, With Best Wishes and all of the good luck in the world. You have been a grand person to have on my staff, H.H. Arnold, Brigadier General, A.C., March Field, May 25, 1935."

Q: You never saw him since he left March Field?

W: No.

Q: In 1935, you left a few months before he did?

W: Yes. We were assigned a certain post. As we left the post, this fellow, came out to say goodbye to us. We were on inspections all the time. Well, as this certain fellow left, the CO of this post, depot, Tony, said to everybody concerned: "Well, that's one mistake I made."

Q: You say Arnold was a hard taskmaster, but Tony was tougher?

W: Tony was tougher, I think, only from observation.

Q: Would you consider Arnold the best CO you ever served under?

W: Oh, hell no. The best CO I ever served under, I would say, was McIntyre, who commanded Ft. Sill.

Q: Was he Jim McIntyre?

W: No, they called him the villain. He was a BG in the first World War. But he wasn't "made" in the second World War.

Q: We have here a letter from Gen Arnold to Col Lawrence S. Woods, March 27, 1943. Col Woods had written Arnold a letter of congratulations on his promotion to four stars, and Arnold wrote back: "It was awfully good to hear from you because I haven't been able to keep track of you since we left March Field. I have made a mental note that you are with the Air Forces at Patterson Field, and the next time I am in that vicinity, I will certainly try to arrange things so that I can sit down and have a little chat with you."

Q: I want to ask you a question about the CCC. They had some racial troubles at some of those camps. Do you remember that?

W: No, we didn't have any.

Q: Did Arnold get around and visit them?

W: Oh, yes, all the time.

Q: Give the boys a talking to?

W: No, if he did, I wasn't there.

Q: Would you say that his camps were very successful?

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
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Commitment to Excellence

Wray, Stanley

22 Apr 71

September 18, 1970

M/Gen Stanley T. Wray, USAF(Ret)
1417 Ivanhoe Street
Alexandria, VA 22300

Dear General Wray:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovatt, Trabee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name coming up in several contexts having to do with the 8th Air Force in the tough days of Schweinfurt-Regensburg. Also, you served under Arnold in A-1 in the latter stages of the war.

In any event you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of some of them at a time and place convenient for you. Local phone OX5-3862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

20314

3 March 1972

Major General Stanley T. Wray, USAF (Ret)
1417 Ivanhoe Street
Alexandria, Va 22300

Dear General Wray:

The rough transcript of our interview of last April (Re: Arnold Biography) just came through the mill, and I'm following up on an item of discussion - the final rank of General Foulis. The attachment is a reproduction of the cover of his book published in 1969, after he passed away.

I hope to get down to Florida later in the Spring and see General Jim Bevans to follow up on some interesting comments you made on the Personnel side of things.

Otherwise, I'm making progress but not as fast as I expected.

Hope this finds you in good health and spirits.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force
History

Encl



FROM THE
WRIGHT BROTHERS
TO THE ASTRONAUTS

The Memoirs of
Major General
Benjamin D. Foulois

WITH COLONEL C. V. GLINES, USAF



copy

shown 12 PM
AM 21

Below

September 18, 1970

M/Gen Stanley T. Wray, USAF(Ret)
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new hospital

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R- thru lights - Summary
2nd set - June 6.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

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Alex. Va-22300
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MAJOR GENERAL STANLEY T. WRAY, USAF

PART I - Narrative

Stanley Tanner Wray was born in Muncie, Indiana on Sunday, 15 September 1907 at 6:10 A. M. and has been an early riser ever since. He graduated from Muncie Central High School in 1923 and attended Earlham College the following year on the Goddard Scholarship, which had been awarded upon his graduation from Central High. Further activities were cut short by a bout with typhoid fever until he entered the Military Academy on 1 July 1928. He graduated in 1932, second in a class of 259.

As a Second Lieutenant, he was caught in the Comptroller's decision that "you are now and have been on leave without pay since 1 July," so he reported to his first station in July of 1932 as assistant to the District Engineer at Rock Island, Illinois. After a short period of building brush-and-rock wing dams to maintain the six foot channel in the Mississippi River, he took up progressively important assignments around Lock and Dam No. 15 and its attendant construction activities, going then as Resident Engineer for Lock and Dam No. 11 at Dubuque, Iowa in January 1934. In July 1934 he left Dubuque for Cornell University, where he received his Master of Science degree in civil engineering in June of 1935.

In July 1935 he proceeded to the Panama Canal Zone, being promoted to First Lieutenant enroute on the Army transport "Republic". He reported in to Headquarters Squadron of the 11th Engineers at Corozal, C. Z. During the next two years, he performed all of the normal duties of a company officer on duty with troops and, in addition, coached the basketball team up from last place to first place on the Pacific side, and as the Post Athletic Officer he was instrumental in winning the basketball and baseball championships in his final year.

In July of 1937 he returned to the Z. I. as a student at the Company Officers course at the Engineers School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. At the conclusion of this course in 1938, he was appointed the Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. In July of 1939 he was detailed to the Air Corps for three months and proceeded to pilot training at Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Although ordered on to basic training at Randolph Field in September, he was re-ordered by the Adjutant General back to Cambridge for another year as Assistant Professor of M S & T at M. I. T.

Apparently the only thing wrong with being an officer in the Corps of Engineers was that particular branch did not have any airplanes, so in August of 1940 he reported back to Tuscaloosa for a quick 20-hour refresher in PT aircraft, and on 1 September entered basic flying at Maxwell Field, Alabama. Graduating from Advanced on 1 February 1941, he was transferred to the Air Corps and ordered to the 29th Bomb Group at MacDill Field, Florida.

4.
Mr. Wray
1930s
Dorothy
Kramer
Field

Major General, USAF, I. S. (continued)

In the 29th, which was an expanding unit, he served in each of the three bomb squadrons and commanded the Headquarters Squadron before he was appointed Executive Officer of the 92nd Bomb Group, which was formed by splitting the 29th. On 15 May 1942 he was appointed the Commander of the 91st Bomb Group at MacDill, and began receiving pilots and ground personnel the following day. He thus formed the 91st Bomb Group, then trained it through its three stages of combat training, with the second stage at Walla Walla, Washington and the third at Bangor, Maine.

He led the first element of his Group to England in late September of 1942, landing at Kimbolton in Bedfordshire. In early October the Group was moved to Basingsbourne, a permanent RAF station, where the final squadron of the 91st arrived in mid-October. Colonel Wray commanded the Group until May of 1943 and earned during this period the Silver Star, the Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Purple Heart, numerous commendations and, as the leader of the famous low-level raid over St. Nazaire in B-17's, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross of the Royal Air Force. From May until August he commanded the 103rd Combat Wing and trained it for its early missions over the Continent. In August of 1943 he reported to Headquarters Eighth Bomber Command where his experience was put on paper as "Tactics and Techniques of Heavy Bombers."

In September 1943, he returned to the ZI where he became Chief of the Officers Branch, Military Personnel Division, Headquarters AAF. In February 1946 he reported to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where he was a member of the Second Command Class until 1 August, when he returned to Headquarters USAF. In January 1947 he was assigned to Headquarters, U.S.A.F. in Europe as the Deputy Inspector General. In January 1948, he became the Chief of Operations and Training in the Directorate of Operations, USAFE, and as such commanded the Cyprus Air Task Force in the summer of 1948, and in July formed the Third Air Division (Prov.) which received the first B-29 groups in England and later became the Third Air Force. In September, General Wray returned to Germany where he became Deputy Commander of the 61st Troop Carrier Wing at Rhein/Main Air Base. In November, the 61st and the 513th were combined into the 7497th Airlift Wing, and Colonel Wray was appointed the Commander. He led the 7497th throughout the Airlift until it was disbanded in August, 1949. For his leadership in this period, he was awarded an Oak Leaf Cluster to the Legion of Merit which had been presented for his work on the Air Staff in 1945.

Upon his return to the ZI, he attended the Air War College from August 1949 until June 1950 when he was ordered to Headquarters USAF as the Chief of the Construction Division in the Directorate of Installations. As the Deputy Director of Installations he was made a temporary Brigadier General in September, 1952. In July 1954 he reported to Robins Air Force Base, Georgia as the Deputy Commander of the Warner Robins Air Materiel Area, serving in that capacity until December 1955 when he was ordered to New York City to head up the newly formed Electronics Defense Systems Division of the Directorate of Procurement and Production, AMC. As head of this office he was responsible for the execution of the plans for bringing into being the Distant Early Warning Line across the northernmost reaches

Major General Stanley T. Wray (Continued)

of the continent, the construction of the White Alice Project (the project of reliable, modern communications in Alaska), and the Semi-Automation Ground Environment (known as SAGE) system within the continental U. S. For this he was awarded a Second Oak Leaf Cluster to his Legion of Merit, and reported to the Wright Air Development Center, Air Research & Development Command, on 18 September 1957 as the Commander. On 15 December 1959, ARDC reorganized and the Center became known as the Wright Air Development Division, with headquarters at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

Promoted to major general in early 1958, he is a command pilot and technical observer. He is married to the former Esther Hines of Birmingham, Alabama and has four sons, Stanley T., Jr., Mack K., Edwin A., and Richard H. He is a member of the Society of American Military Engineers (and President of the Kittyhawk Post), the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, and several other professional societies.

December 1959

Major General Stanley T. Wray (Continued)

PART II - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

1. General Wray was born in Muncie, Indiana on 15 September 1907. His parents, Matthew W. T. (known as "Tan") and Mary Anna Easton Wray were both from Medora, Indiana.

2. He was married on 24 September 1932 to the former Esther Hines in Birmingham, Alabama. They have four sons: Stanley T., Jr., born 2 September 1934, Mack K., born 6 October 1937, Edwin A., born 16 April 1945, and Richard H., born 10 October 1948.

3. General Wray's official home address is 1629 Burlington Road, Muncie, Indiana.

B. Education

1. General Wray attended grade school and high school in Muncie. He graduated from Central High School at the age of 15 as an honor student. He spent one year at Earlham College on the Goddard Scholarship, won for his high school scholastic standing.

2. Schools attended while in Service are:

- U.S. Military Academy, Graduated BS in 1932, second in class of 259.
- Cornell University Graduate School - 1934-35. Graduated MS in Civil Engineering.
- The Engineers School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia - 1937.
- Second Command Class, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas - 1946.
- Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama - 1949 - 1950.

C. Service Dates

- July 1932 - January 1934 - Assistant to District Engineer, Rock Island Engineering Dist., Rock Island, Illinois
- January 1934 - June 1934 - Resident Engr, Lock & Dam #11, Dubuque, Iowa.
- July 1934 - June 1935 - Cornell University Graduate School
- July 1935 - July 1937 - Co. Officer, 11th Engrs, Corozal, C.Z.
- July 1937 - June 1938 - Engrs School, Fort Belvoir, Va.
- July 1938 - August 1940 - Asst Prof of Mil. Science & Tactics, MIT, Cambridge, Mass.
- August 1940 - Feb. 1941 - Southeast Air Corps Flying Trng Comd
- February 1941 - March 1942 - 29th Bomb Group, MacDill Field, Fla.
- March 1942 - May 1942 - Exec. Officer, 92nd Bomb Group (H), MacDill Field, Fla.

Major General Stanley T. Wray (Continued)

15 May 42 - 10 May 43	- Commander, 91st Bomb Group (H)
10 May 43 - 8 Aug 43	- Commander, 103rd Bomb Wing (H), U.K.
8 Aug 43 - 10 Sept 43	- Asst Opers Officer, 8th Bomber Comd, U.K.
10 Sept 43 - 7 Oct 43	- Returning to ZI
7 Oct 43 - 25 Jul 45	- Chief, Officers Br, Mil Pers Div., Hqs AAF, Washington, D. C.
25 Jul 45 - 28 Feb 46	- Dep Chief, Mil Pers Div., Hqs AAF
28 Feb 46 - 1 Aug 46	- 2nd Command Class, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas
1 Aug 46 - 10 Jan 47	- Spec. Asst to Dir of Personnel, Hqs AAF
10 Jan 47 - 5 Jan 48	- Deputy Inspector General, Hqs USAF
5 Jan 48 - 16 July 48	- Chief, Operations & Trng Div., Dep for Opers, Hqs USAF (including 48 days as Commander, Cyprus Task Force).
16 Jul 48 - 18 Sept 48	- Comdr, 3rd Air Div (Prov.)
18 Sept 48 - 26 Nov 48	- Dep Comdr, 61st Troop Carrier Wing, Rhein/Main AB, Germany
26 Nov 48 - 6 Aug 49	- Comdr, 7497th Airlift Wing
6 Aug 49 - 24 July 50	- Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama
24 Jul 50 - 16 Aug 51	- Chief, Construction Div, Directorate of Installations, DCS/O, Hqs USAF
16 Aug 51 - July 54	- Dep Dir of Installations, DCS/O, Hqs USAF
July 54 - 15 Dec 55	- Dep Comdr, Warner Robins AWA, Robins AFB, Georgia
15 Dec 55 - 19 Sept 57	- Chief, Electronics Defense Systems Div., Directorate of Procurement & Productions, AMC, w/d station New York City
19 Sept 57 -	- Comdr, Wright Air Development Center (Div) ARDC, W-P AFB, Ohio

D. Decorations and Medals

Legion of Merit with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters; Distinguished Flying Cross, Royal Air Force; Silver Star; Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; Commendation Ribbon with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters.

E. Promotions

<u>RANK</u>	<u>TEMPORARY</u>	<u>PERMANENT</u>
2nd Lt.		10 June 1932
1st Lt.		3 August 1935
Captain		10 June 1942
Major	1 Sept. 1940	27 March 1942
Lt. Colonel	15 July 1941	13 April 1943
Colonel	23 January 1942	2 April 1948
Brigadier General	2 September 1942	
Major General	24 September 1952	
	10 March 1958	

Major General Stanley T. Wray (Continued)

F. Unusual Experiences:

On 6 August 1942, Lt. Colonel Wray was co-piloting a B-17 coming in for a landing on a short mountain landing strip at Redmond, Oregon. Upon landing, the pilot's brakes burned out and it was impossible to stop on the short runway. At the end of the runway there was a drop of about 20 feet with volcanic boulders scattered around. The aircraft jumped off the end of the runway and hit about 60 feet beyond the end of the runway and skidded an additional 10 or 15 feet. All personnel in the aircraft evacuated immediately, suffering only minor cuts and a general shaking up.

General Wray suffered frostbitten legs, hands, arms, and back while leading a combat mission over Emden, Germany on 4 February 1943. He led the first air division, which had as its primary target the marshalling yards at Hamm, Germany. The division pressed on against an unusual weather condition of a very high front, with tops well above the 30,000 foot level, which was the flight altitude. In penetrating the front through a saddle, the aircraft ran into an area of super-cooled air, where it was so cold that ice formed on the insides of the cockpits, even though most of the heaters on the B-17's were functioning. Weather conditions made it impossible to bomb the primary targets, so the aircraft turned left and bombed Emden. Upon return to the home base, more than one third of all the combat crews were hospitalized with frostbite. Some of the individuals lost the ends of their fingers, and one navigator lost his foot. Many of the others had other effects which have evidenced themselves in subsequent difficulties. As a direct result of General Wray's own difficult, he has had an operation for the removal of a spinal disc.

MAJOR GENERAL STANLEY T. WRAY

Director, Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council

Born: Muncie, Indiana, September 15, 1907

Home: 1417 Ivanhoe St., Alexandria, Virginia

Education: Muncie Central High School, 1923; Earlham College (one year on Goddard Scholarship); Graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1932; Graduated from Cornell University Graduate School, M.S. in Civil Engineering, 1935.

Service: Assistant to the District Engineer, Rock Island, Ill., July 1932-Dec. 1934; Resident Engineer for Lock and Dam No. 11, Dubuque, Iowa, Jan.-July 1934; Company Officer, 11th Engineers, Corozal, C.Z., July 1935-July 1937; attended Engineers School, Fort Belvoir, Va., July 1937-June 1938; Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., July 1938-August 1940; Southeast Air Corps Flying Training Command, Aug. 1940-Feb. 1941; 29th Bomb Group, MacDill Field, Fla., Feb. 1941-March 1942; Executive Officer, 92nd Bomb Group (H), MacDill Field, Fla., March-May 1942; Commander, 91st Bomb Group (H), May 1942-May 1943; Commander, 103rd Comb. Wing (H), U.K., May-Aug. 1943; Asst. Operations Officer, 8th Bomber Command, U.K., Aug.-September 1943.

Upon returning to Wash., D. C. in September 1943, he became Chief, Officers Branch, Military Personnel Div., Hqs. AAF, and subsequently Deputy Chief of that division from July 1945-Feb. 1946. He attended the Second Command Class, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Feb.-Aug. 1946; Special Assistant to Director of Personnel, Hqs. AAF, Aug. 1946-Jan. 1947; Deputy Inspector General, Hqs. USAF, Jan. 1947-January 1948; Chief, Operations and Training Division and Deputy for Operations, Hqs. USAF (including 48 days as Commander, Cyprus Task Force), January-July 1948; Commander, 3rd Air Division (Prov.), July-September 1948; Deputy Commander, 61st Troop Carrier Wing, Rhein/Main AB, Germany, Sept.-Nov. 1948; Commander, 7497th Airlift Wing, November 1948-August 1949; Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, August 1949-July 1950; Chief, Construction Division, Directorate of Installations, DCS/O, Hqs. USAF, July 1950-August 1951; Deputy Director of Installations, DCS/O, Hqs. USAF, August 1951-July 1954; Deputy Commander, Warner Robins AFB, Warner Robins AFB, Georgia, July 1954-December 1955; Chief, Electronics Defense System Division, Directorate of

Procurement and Productions, ANC, w/d station New York City, December 1955-September 1957; Commander, Wright Air Development Center (Div.) ARDC, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, September 1957-July 1960.

Membership: Society of American Military Engineers (and President of the Kittyhawk Post), the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, and several other professional societies.

Decorations: LM with 2 OLC; DFC, Royal Air Force; Silver Star; AM with 1 OLC; Commendation Ribbon with 2 OLC.

Date Assigned to SAF: 1 August 1960

Family: Wife - Esther Hines
Children - Stanley T., Jr., Mack K., Edwin A., and Richard H.

Interview - MG Stanley Wray, Alexandria, Va., 22 April 1971

Q: Do you recall your first encounter with Gen Arnold?

W: I saw him once when he was a LTCOL.

Q: This is March Field, maybe?

W: No, he was in Washington. I graduated in the Corps of Engineers, I had two football knees. I could not pass the physical for a long time to come into the AF. I was in talking to Gen Eaker, he was then a LTCOL, or maybe a Major. Spaatz was a LTCOL, and he was just about Arnold's rank. So I think that Eaker was then a Major. I was getting ready to go to flying school. I had been out about 8 years. I guess, they came to me, I had a lot of push from the AF. They were trying to get more regular officers into the AF, and they had come to me, knowing that I had tried to get into the AF before. They assured me that I would be welcome, I would be well received, as I was by Gen Eaker. But Arnold came by, and he talked to Eaker, and he had Spaatz right with him. He wasn't stationed at Washington that time. This is when we were over in the old Munitions Building.

Q: He must have been visiting in Washington for testimony.

W: I don't know what he was doing in Washington. But I think he was at March Field at that time. I think so. This would have been about 1938, maybe 1939.

Q: It must have been earlier than that, because at the end of '36 he was a General already.

W: He wasn't a general yet when I saw him.

Q: This could have been '34 or '35.

W: 1935

W: Anyway, the Corps of Engineers wouldn't let me go at this particular time. But at the same time, I found out later when I accidentally saw my "Secret" file, that on the edge of this, Gen Spaatz said: "Hap and I bet you a bottle of whiskey he can't make it." And then underneath it, Eaker said: "Eaker and Goodpaster accept this." I don't know whether they ever paid this or not. And I did make it, obviously.

Q: Could this have been right after your Dubuque, Iowa experience?

W: Oh no, it was, I think, right after the time I had gone to Cornell, somewhere along in there. The next time I saw him was when I brought a B-17 down from Bangor, Maine, for Gen Arnold and a British Vice Air Marshal to look at. We were on our way going through what we called then our third stage, getting our B-17s. I brought this airplane down to Bolling and we kept it there one night until, say noon the next day, and went back to Bangor. But that's the only time I ever met him and shook hands with him.

Q: Your records show that you were at Cornell between July '34 and June '35, that's about right.

W: He was at Bolling when I brought this airplane down, and he didn't have much time for me. I was a brand fresh Colonel, I had not lived across the fence from him at March Field. Almost everybody else in my age bracket had. I went back to Bangor and immediately went overseas to war, then I came back into - I didn't intend to come back to Hqs., USAAF. But I came back then and was put in the Hqs for 10 days TDY and while I gave a little talk to the Air Staff about what it was like to fight the war in England. Arnold attended that.

Q: He had several people to come back to give reports on what it was like in combat.

W: That was the first time I had to walk easy with Arnold. Arnold, as you know, had spent a lot of money with Curtiss for the P-40, and he had spent a lot of money with General Dynamics for the B-24, and the B-24 did not work out well in the European theater. Nor did the P-40. They just weren't up to the German fighters. I would prefer to have B-24s go on a raid with me, than fighter escort. I never saw my fighter escort, so-called, and I don't think they ever gave me much protection until later. After I left, late 1943, early 1944, the fighter protection got much better. In fact, we had already talked to the fighter people as to how they should support us. We had an awful trouble convincing some of the bomber people that they needed fighter protection. But the B-24s, as I say, I had to walk very carefully when Arnold asked me a question about the capability of the B-24. I was frank in the sense that I said the B-24 was a very good airplane for long, low level raids, and it was. It was better than the B-17, for long, over water flight.

Q: It was more suited to the Pacific than Europe?

W: I didn't say that, but that's what I meant. It was.

Q: Did he sense that you were walking on eggs?

W: I think so. I said it couldn't survive with the B-17 at altitude. And it couldn't. The German fighters would just swarm around the B-24s.

Q: You were flying in B-17s?

W: Right, so I couldn't come right out and tell him that he or the Air Staff or somebody, in my opinion, made a mistake in judgment. I couldn't do this.

Q: I'm not sure that it was necessarily a mistake, it was a question of...

W: We had to have airplanes...

Q: We had to have airplanes and they got the Willow Run plant and the B-24,

this was Consolidated, Reuben Fleet.

W: There were lots of political reasons why this had to happen.

Q: And they tried to get all kinds of airplanes of all descriptions.

W: I think part of this came from Mr. Roosevelt. He wanted numbers of airplanes.

Q: The 50,000 concept. After a long career in appreciating the Navy, he suddenly came awake to airpower.

W: That's right.

Q: Were you in Europe when Arnold came over around Labor Day 1943?

W: Well, I might have been, but if I was, I didn't see him. I had already been ordered back. I left England on the 9th of Sept 1943.

Q: He was there right about that time.

W: I was down at High Wycombe at that time. I was writing a little treatise on tactics and techniques of heavy bombardment which was supposed to go for the education of group commanders. But I don't think it ever got printed. I can't find it.

Q: While you were down at High Wycombe, he came around Labor Day.

W: He might have been visiting out in the bomber area.

Q: Of course, he was very much upset about the Schweinfurt-Regensburg loss of August 17th. Were you involved in that?

W: No, I wasn't involved in it, except I was pretty disturbed about the loss rate, too. I thought then that something should have been done about it, but it wasn't. Do you want to know why the loss? If people had read my book, they wouldn't have had such big losses. I went over to Duxsburg(?), the RAF testing station. They had an FW-190 and some ME-109s. I talked to the fighter pilots that flew them. They said the best operating altitude was for the German

fighters were 11,000 feet and 17,000 feet. Their worst altitude was between 21,000 and 23,000, sometimes as high as 24,000 feet, because they had an automatic supercharger, which was dependent upon altitude changes for cutting in and out. So between 21,000 and 23,000 and 23,500 feet, their superchargers were whooping the engines up or dropping them off. But their best operating altitude at 17,000 feet. The leader of the Schweinfurt raid dropped down from 23,000 feet to 17,000 feet. He couldn't have taken a man at a worst altitude. Now most people don't know this about German airplanes, because nobody ever went to the trouble.

Q: Were they briefed on this matter beforehand?

W: I doubt it. I wrote this up before that. But that's what I was saying, is that I don't believe that this little treatise of mine was ever fully typed out and distributed among the group commanders, as it should have been.

Q: It could have been embarrassing?

W: That could have been.

Q: Arnold came over there, and I have been told that he and Eaker had a knockdown, dragout. It wasn't long after that Eaker departed the scene. Eaker was very unhappy to leave, as you know.

W: I'm sure he was. Eaker was a wonderful man. He really fought the battle for daylight bombing. This wasn't Eaker's fault. This was Fred L. Anderson's or Newt Longfellow's, one of those two.

Q: Newt Longfellow had it before?

W: I know, and Freddy Anderson took it over. This was during that change of periods, and Freddy Anderson was there when I left. Freddy Anderson should have had it published. I've tried to look through Freddy Anderson's papers, and I can't find this treatise. I don't know what happened to it. I've looked

in the 8th AF records out here at the Archives, and down at Maxwell.

Q: Do you remember the title of it?

W: "Tactics and Techniques of Heavy Bombardment."

Q: I'll look in Arnold's papers.

W: I doubt if he would have them. It was for the European theater.

Q: I want to talk to you about the lack of long range escort until around January 1, 1944. The P-51 with the Merlin engine. We could have had the P-51 a year or two before. Why didn't we appreciate that?

W: I don't know. See, I was not involved in R&D at that time at all. I was not a fighter pilot. I'd never flown a fighter until I got to Wright Field. But the British bought the P-51 off the drawing board. And yet, our people didn't like the P-51.

Q: They didn't like the Allison engine. It wasn't much good. When the British put the Merlin in, the Rolls Royce engine....

W: I was still a group commander and I was one of the ones that was interested in it. I joined in very vigorously in the discussion with the fighters. We went down to a place called Colerne, I'd say about May, down near Bath. And we had the British fighters and all the American bomber commanders and all the American fighter commanders, group commanders that we had in England at that time. RAF Peterson, what we called "Barksdale" Peterson, these were two different Petersons. Zemkie, Don Blakeslee, although Blakeslee was not a group commander yet. There was one other, I think Graham, that were participating from the American side. The British gave their impression first. In our early raids when our Spitfires supposedly would escort us, they - as far as I was concerned sitting down there in the lead bomber - I never did even see them. I never saw an escort fighter. I was

there, I flew my last mission in May 1943. I never did see an escort fighter. If they were there, they were too far above us, or too far out to the side. Their speed was such that they couldn't stay with us, and they couldn't go very far.

Q: You had Jugs?

W: No, we didn't have any P-47s. They were Spitfires, and there were some P-38s, but I never did see them. At this fighter meeting which was called, because we had been griping about the lack of fighter escort, the fighters got up and gave their problems and we told them our problems, and we agreed on this S-ing that the fighters would do. There would be some fighters, like a rolling barrage. There would be some fighters for a while, and then they would go out in front, and then they would peel off and go back home. But it would be on a time basis that there would be a continuous cover, but fighters could not go slow enough to stay over us, and be able to defend themselves. It was just that simple.

Q: Do you remember the XB-40?

W: Yes, yes.

Q: That petered out?

W: Well, it was too heavy, much too heavy.

Q: Whose idea was that?

W: I really don't know.

Q: I was told the fellow Al Lyon had something to do with that?

W: I don't think so. I think this thing just gradually grew up.

Q: It was sort of a jerry-built idea?

W: Very much.

Q: Would you say that responsibility goes back to the Air Corps Tactical

School where they felt that the fighter could not keep up with the bomber?

W: Oh, I don't think so. You know, there was this silly thing that they had out for a while, in the B-17 handbook, that when you were attacked by a fighter, you just pushed the throttles forward and climbed away from them. Now this might have been true in 1937 when the first one rolled out, but by the time the Germans were swooping through us, and outclimbing and outrunning us, this was silly.

Q: That's what I mean. You see, there was a period of time when they felt that fighters could not catch the bomber.

W: The B-10 goes faster than the P-12.

Q: This was the doctrine at the time.

W: Well, yes, but it wasn't the doctrine right up in the fighting, scratching people. We knew better. We couldn't outrun a fighter, steadily.

Q: One of the things you said intrigues me, and this brings me to talk about the wing-tanks problem. Waiting for long range escort, we needed some interim idea. One of the ideas was wing-tanks - put wing-tanks on the fighters. The P-47's were coming in, and the P-38's were around. If you gave them an extra couple hundred miles range, we might be able to do it. And no wing tanks. They were using these cardboard wing tanks from the British, but I mean Wright Field took forever and a day getting this developed. Did you have any knowledge of this problem?

W: Not in the sense that it was a problem back in the states. I knew that the fighters were beginning to carry wingtanks. They always said that they had to drop them if they were jumped. This didn't seem to be a problem to me, I don't think we considered this a problem in the theater to the same extent that possibly the people at home who had not fought a war yet. Because it is a

lot simpler to sit back home here and do a lot of writing on tablets without really getting involved yourself.

Q: You know Arnold had a great respect for guys who were in combat, partly for the reason that he himself never got into combat.

W: That's probably so. I think that's why he wouldn't let me go back to war, I came up here for 10 days and stayed three years. I went in as Chief of the Officer's Branch.

Q: Did he hang on every word you said?

W: I'm not sure. I know that he did.

Q: He seemed to be paying attention?

W: Oh yes, he was, he stayed through the whole briefing. I'm satisfied that he was interested in combat people. But at the same time, Eaker had put me up for a star, and he didn't.

Q: He didn't promote you?

W: I didn't get promoted until 1952, and I was put up in the Spring of 1943.

Q: Eaker put you up?

W: Eaker put me up, and Spaatz also countersigned it.

Q: Why did they take Newton Longfellow out of there?

W: Can I speak freely? He was one of the ones, and I wouldn't say this except he is dead now...

Q: Has he passed on? It must be very recent.

W: Yes, but he just didn't have brains enough to be wing commander.

Q: He lived out there in California.

W: Yes, but he was, I think he was in the El Paso area when he died. No, he was in California when he died. He had retired first into the El Paso

area. But he did some of the damnest things that the Group Commanders...to protect our people, we had to indulge in subterfuges. He wanted to send us to La Pallice (sub-pens) with 6,000 lbs. of bombs. I did the math, my S-4 - I was just breaking in my S-4 - who turned out later to be a wonderful man, guy named Guy Whetstone. My math said that we couldn't get there with 5,000 lbs. of bombs, because we needed a wing tank. So I called up Ops and told him that I couldn't go to La Pallice without one bomb bay tank. That meant that I was limited to, at the most, 2,500 lbs. of bombs. I thought this was kind of wasteful to send us that far for that little pinprick that we would be dropping.

Q: They had about 2 feet of concrete or more, maybe.

W: We didn't find this out till after the war. We found out later on that we never did hurt a sub pen. The only way we could have hurt a sub pen was to have gone in at low level and skipped bombs into them.

Q: Or maybe catch one coming out?

W: Yes, but then that would be difficult. This is a great error of probability, and it just wouldn't work.

Q: It certainly wasn't worth the risk or the cost, the results you could obtain?

W: Well, Longfellow came on the phone and said we would go and we would carry at least 5,000 lbs of bombs. I said: "Well, I'll have to look into my availability." So about an hour later, I called back and said I'd only have two airplanes available that could go that far based on their fuel consumption records. In the meantime, I'd called around to some of my friends, and said: "What are you going to do?" And they said: "We don't know." So I said: "Well, I'm not going." And I told them why. So everybody called in that they only had

one or two airplanes available. You needed 10 guns to fight one German fighter. So this made this kind of silly mission.

Q: You are talking when - early 1943?

W: No, late '42, and possibly a little bit earlier. They sent up also to St. Nazaire. I was at 7,000 feet. I was leading the contingent, and I had the 306th Group right behind me. I'm telling you, they told us that the light flak wouldn't get up that high, and it was too low for the heavy flak. The heavy flak, if it went that high, would just hole us and go on through. It wouldn't burst. Well, heavy flak was bursting below us, and the light flak was going above us. We looked like a bunch of Roman candles on the 4th of July. That was a bad one. We only made that one. But these were a couple of things that....

Q: Bad intelligence.

W: Oh yes, Longfellow's stupidity.

Q: Colerne meeting?

W: This meeting about the fighters. He had ordered us that the Group Commanders were to go down there by the B-17s. Every one of us - we had our own stations - we were well apart. One airplane could have carried all of us, but it was kind of silly, it was also dangerous to put all the Group Commanders into one airplane. So he said that every Group Commander would take his own airplane.

Q: This is Longfellow?

W: Yes, but I was going to be at High Wycombe by order, some formation. This was not my own choice, but I was going to be at High Wycombe, and that was halfway down there. I was going to be in my staff car, and I wanted to drive from High Wycombe to Colerne. That would have saved 4 engines on a B-17 and lots

of aviation fuel. Well, Longfellow didn't want you to use a car. I don't know why. There was less auto fuel for internal combustion engines of that small size, as against aviation fuel, which costs a lot more. Maybe they did import more as a percentage. It was easier to bring in bigger "drinkers" with the aviation fuel. Anyway, this had to be personally approved by Longfellow that I would drive a staff car and use about say 10 or 12 gallons of motor fuel, as against 300 or 400 gallons of aviation fuel. Now, this is not...when he greeted us, and asked us, coming in, he talked to us for an hour, and he said next to nothing about the war. All he talked about was the abuses of motor transportation. He was just a small minded man.

Q: I thought to talk to him but I changed my mind. He lived near Mrs. Arnold. Something else you said reminded me. There was this argument over the rotation policy - 25 missions. This thing got kicked around, and then finally somebody in Washington decided there would be no specific number.

W: That was way later in the war. But this got to be a mathematical problem, and the way we finally settled it, in Europe that there would be 25, was based on our loss rate. Our prognosis was that when we based on our expectations at first for the 91st Bomb Group - and I had the best survival rate in Europe, because I was a tough Group Commander, but I was good to my people. I really took care of them. I told them discipline on the ground will save your life in the air. On the 19th of April 1943, the last airplane was going to go out of there for its last mission, because we weren't getting any replacement airplanes, no replacement crews, no nothing, for a long time. Later on, when we began to get replacement crews and airplanes, then it turned out that your survival rate at the end of 25 missions was, according to Operations Analysis, would be on the order of .27. Mathematically, that's what it turned out to be,

.278. Now, that means that one out of four crews is going to come home. Now, that is not a very good survival rate. It is not conducive to having large numbers run to volunteer for bombers.

Q: Did this create a morale problem?

W: Yes, except, I used to get up and wrap the flag around me, and walk up and down the stage. I told my people that we were just the finger in the dike. We had to hold the line until they could build more airplanes, and train more crews. There would be a day when you would fly over Germany and not see a single fighter.

Q: And it happened?

W: Yes, it did happen, and I said, in the meantime, we are not doing much damage, but we've got to stay here and we've got to keep going, and someday we'll build up a force and then we will really make ourselves felt. And my people, I never had a man, not one single crew member, fail for lack of intestinal fortitude. I had one navigator that I relieved from duty, at the request of his friends, because he was having combat dreams. He only had five missions and he got shot up, either he was wounded, or his airplane was really beaten up on every one of his five. On his fifth one, his squadron commander, Eep Myers, who was a wonderful man, he was a commander of the 401st. His navigator, just bend down to do something over his mapboard and a 20 mm shell grazed his neck. It burned him and drew blood, and went on up and hit the control column and burst and hit the femoral artery of this Major Myers. As I say, everybody loved Eep Myers, he was a wonderful man. So this was his last mission, because he was always waking up and sitting up in the middle of his bed at night, screaming. He had so many combat dreams that his friends and cellmates, the people who stayed in his combat hut, a delegation came to

me and said: "Would you please take him off combat and send him home?"

Q: There is a good reason for it, those fellows...

W: They needed their sleep, and nobody could sleep around this poor guy. He wasn't afraid to go again, but it just got to be a matter of...

Q: When you came home in September 1943, Arnold was going into a phase of doubts about the whole strategic bombing operation.

W: I never heard that. I don't know. He might have been.

Q: See, he and Eaker were having some sessions.

W: O.A. Anderson was involved in a few. I think Arnold flew O.A. out of Washington, because Arnold's mind wasn't fast enough to comprehend Anderson's concepts.

Q: Was he a brilliant guy?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Kuter was doing some planning for him, too, wasn't he at this time?

W: Kuter came over.

Q: He came over, but came right back from North Africa.

W: Yes, but he came over and had the 1st Wing for a while. Then Possum Hansell took it.

Q: He didn't stay very long?

W: No, he went out to North Africa, but he did a good job in that 1st Wing.

Q: After "Black Thursday," this was the October 14th raid, Eaker stopped flying deep missions for 2 or 3 months.

W: He had to. His loss rate was such, and his replacement rate was such that he couldn't support it.

Q: But Arnold was sending a lot of planes in, and that's when he told Eaker that, "if you can't fly the missions, I can send these out to the Pacific," because

there was a crying need for B-17s and B-24s coming off the line. I think this is when Arnold decided in his own mind that he was going to make the change.

W: Well, in all honesty, I don't think that it made any difference who was commander, I think that it was just plain mathematics. You needed, you had to have 10 x .50 cal guns to match one German fighter.

Q: It wasn't until January 1944 when the P--51s started coming in and then you got the kind of protection?

W: Once in a while they would outfly their fighter protection and take a pasting. But you must remember that in the early days, we only had, I think - I don't know what the facts are - but I would say we only had 2 or 3 real good fighter groups in the German AF opposing us. We had one that was stationed at Abbeville. We called them "The Abbeville Kids." They had the yellow-nosed bastards and they were good.

Q: The ME 109s?

W: The ME 109s, and later on, they also had FW-190s. Of course, as we started going up and around Wilhelmshaven and the Hamburg-Keil area, we began to get some FW-190s. But they would send The Abbeville Kids. I fought them over Hamburg. I just don't think they had enough German fighters to really give us a pasting.

Q: Of course, later on, there were more German fighters.

W: They started bringing in more German fighters. They got better control of their fighters, and they got to the point where they could do a mission against us, say over Holland, land in Germany, and rearm and refuel and be back up 17 minutes later, the same bunch fighting us. And they could do three missions against us going in. And, say, probably to Regensburg or Schweinfurt,

they could probably do four missions. You could tell the difference, too. the German fighter pilot that I last saw in May 1943, wasn't as good as the ones I saw in November and December of 1942. We were killing off their good people. We weren't shooting down as many airplanes as we claimed, but we were getting their good, bright-eyed vigorous combat people.

Q: There is a good deal of criticism, I think Peter Masefield, the writer, about exaggerated claims by the 8th AF, of German planes shot down.

W: I don't think that they were intentionally exaggerated.

Q: Two people seeing one plane shot down and reported two planes. Do you think these were honest mistakes?

W: Oh yes, I don't think there was a calculated policy. In all honesty, I don't think that we are that devious.

Q: This caused Arnold some problems with people like Under Secy Patterson because when they started adding up all these claims - maybe like the Viet Nam war - if all these claims each week of the number of Viet Cong killed, I think it would take about the whole population. So, the same thing with German planes.

W: In combat, you don't look for a long time at one specific airplane. You've got to have a swivel neck, or you don't come back. You will look at an airplane for maybe two seconds, or maybe a split part of a second, and you've got to look somewhere else. When people talk about seeing a B-17 go down and see 3 chutes or 10 chutes, I could never be sure of that. I've been in combat, and I couldn't tell you honestly, how many chutes I had actually seen, because you would look at that airplane and then you would watch the fighter coming in, and then you would turn inside the fighter. The next thing, you'd look down, maybe you would see 3 chutes, and I never did see 10 chutes coming out of a B-17, personally. So I don't think it was intentionally exaggerated. I just

think that you can't look long enough. You can see one man pop out of a fighter, because I've seen a fighter blow up. I've seen several of them, and that was one fighter, but I couldn't tell you who shot that fighter down.

Q: Sometimes it was an honest mistake, two or three guys made claims of one plane. I wanted to ask you about Tommy Hitchcock. He worked for Amb. Winant, and he is generally given credit for being the first, or among the first, to have recognized the P-51's merit.

W: I don't know anything about that. The only person that I knew was really pushing for the P-51 was Herb Zemke.

Q: He was one of our group commanders. Is he still around?

W: I think so. I think he's still alive.

Q: I'll try to look him up. Did he ever make his star?

W: No.

Q: I didn't see him in the General Officer list.

Q: You say, General Arnold had a list of 80 officers....

W: Over 80, I think it was 84, that they were not to go overseas during WWII, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I had the list. And it had some good men on it, too.

Q: This was a list of people who had stubbed...?

W: These were full Colonels that were not going to be allowed to go to combat.

Q: Why?

W: Arnold didn't want them to ever be a General. He wouldn't allow them to get in a place where they could achieve any lasting fame, or measure their ability. He just didn't want them to be a General.

Q: This gets into another area. I've asked this question a number of times and I've gotten different answers. Did Arnold bear grudges? Obviously, he did.

W: Oh boy, I'll say he did. He certainly did. One of these men was Carl Axtater, whom I always thought was a very fine Colonel. I think he would have made a good general, but Carl Axtater was on this list. I don't know what the grudge was about. I think one of the worst things you could do was to be right when Arnold was wrong. And I think this happened to Carl Axtater. Now, there were several, there were probably 20, maybe 30 Colonels on there, who were superannuated. They shouldn't have even been Colonels.

Q: He talked about deadwood. This was his favorite expression.

W: This is true, he had it.

Q: And there were some who were deadwood. But as you may point out, there were some who crossed him in some way?

W: That's right.

Q: In other words, if you were right, and he was wrong, he never forgave you?

W: I believe this is true. But I asked Carl later on, much later, long after, when he was about to retire, what came on. He had a quarrel with Arnold.

Q: About what?

W: I don't know what it was about, but it was a quarrel, and Carl swore he was right, and the events proved him right, and Arnold never....

Q: Was a guy named Morton McKinnon on the list, too?

W: Yes.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald?

W: Yes, he was on it.

Q: How about, Davenport Johnson made his star, but he and Arnold had a tiff.

W: No, he wasn't on the list.

Q: How about Douglas Netherwood?

W: Yes, but he was deadwood.

Q: Legitimate?

W: There was one Colonel in the AF who was senior to Arnold on the regular list. It doesn't sound right does it. As a Colonel, his serial number was lower than Arnold's.

Q: It wasn't Sue Clagett?

W: No, no, it wasn't Clagett, it wasn't Goodpasture, but it's a name something like it started with "Good" and then some other name. He was down at Eglin at the time. He was senior to Arnold. Of course, by this time, Arnold had five stars, and this man was still a Colonel. But he was on the list.

Q: What was the circumstances of their disagreement, do you know? Was it something in their early careers?

W: Many of these were deadwood. There is no question about that. We had one Colonel out at Wright Patterson who had been 26 years a mess officer, and somehow, in his normal progression he had gone up to be a full Colonel, and a mess officer. That is all he had ever done. Of course, he got caught up some way. He was out of the service before the war was over, before his normal retirement. Then we had another Colonel who used to go off on cross countries, and drink, and not get home for 4 or 5 days late. Something like that, Arnold called me up one day....

Q: You were in the General Officer's Branch at the time?

W: No, no, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I don't know who had the General Officer's Branch. But, anyway, I heard the squawkbox go and Arnold said: "Find so and so." I'll think of his name presently. Anyway, "find so

and so and have him out of the service by 6:00 tonight." I said: "Yes sir." What else could I say? So I started scouting around and we finally found him, I got some other people to help me, and we found him drunk in his bunk at the Ambassador Hotel. He had been in WWI, maybe you will remember his name too. He became a Minister later on.

Q: Lester Maitland.

W: That's right. Lester J. Maitland.

Q: He's in Arizona now.

W: Well, he was out in Michigan as a minister, Les Maitland. He used to, shall I say, exaggerate the circumstances of his engine failure. In other words, he would just get drunk, and not show up.

Q: You know, in his case...

W: But he left the service by 6:00 at his own request. He retired.

Q: When was that around '44?

W: Yes, '44 or '45. But he had been in WWI, certain people who had been in the war, had the right of requesting retirement.

Q: He and Hegenberger had flown across to Hawaii. You know, Arnold gave him several chances.

W: Yes, I know he did.

Q: He was in Europe, when Arnold came there Labor Day 1943, he was supposed to have reformed, and I think he didn't show up for some occasion.

W: Probably for Arnold's briefing.

Q: Whatever it was, and I think Arnold said send him home. So they sent him home and I think he promised to reform, again.

W: That's right.

Q: Arnold forgave him and then something must have happened, which caused

him to call you on the squawk box. But he forgave him a number of times.

W: But, not that day, he just said: "Out of the service by 6:00."

Q: And that was it. Did he do things like this, impulsive things?

W: Oh yes. One day I had a Colonel show up in my office, and say:

"Colonel, I'm in here on temporary duty," from someplace out in Texas, San Angelo or something like that. He said: "General Arnold just told me to take this package up to Blue West 8." And I said, "Well, then, I'll cut you a set of orders and you can go to BW 8."

Q: This is Greenland?

W: Yes. And he said: "I'm supposed to be here two nights ago." And I said: "I'm real sorry. If Gen Arnold told you to take this, I can cut a set of orders that will protect you, and you'll be on the 6:00 airplane out of National on your way north this afternoon." And I cut a set of orders and he went to Greenland to deliver this package. Because if General Arnold said it was so, then of course, it is so.

Q: I've had 25 people tell me that Arnold grabbed them in the hall and sent them on some mission halfway around the world, and this was it. You had to go.

W: That's right, this is the only time it occurred when I was physically involved with it.

Q: Did he ever grab you in the hall and ask you to do something alien to your expertise?

W: No, no, never did. I didn't hang around the hall by Gen Arnold's office. I was busy in my own bailiwick.

Q: Was it fairly well known: "Don't be caught in the E-ring?"

W: I don't know. One Sunday I happened to be in my office and I got a

frantic call from Gen Yount, and he said: "Gen Arnold just called me and said, have every regular officer in the Training Command on his way to war within 20 days. I said: "Do you mean 30 days?" He said: "No, he said 20." And I said: "General, that is the worst thing that could happen." I said: "Now, I'm a great believer in regular officers have a democratic chance to go to war, except certain ones I will not approve their orders. But everybody else, all the regular officers, should get a chance to go to war." And I said: "Why don't you and Terry Morrison get up a schedule" - he was Personnel for Yount in the Training Center - I said: "Why don't you get a real good program going of so many officers per month to go to war, so that they will have all gone overseas by such and such a day." And he said: "Well, will Gen Arnold buy it?" And I said: "I think so. If you just do it, and come in here tomorrow with a real good program and a bunch of nice charts. Show your flow and everything." So he did, and Arnold bought it. He just got tired of the fact that Yount wouldn't allow any Regular Officers to go to war. He may have done this for shock, but he meant it. As far as Arnold and Yount were concerned, this was an order.

Q: Arnold had mixed feelings about this, on one hand because he himself was not in combat he was a "softie" on people like Norstad and Kuter, who importuned him and said: "Let me get out there and fight my war." On the other hand, he wanted to keep good men.

W: He had to keep some good men but he didn't have to keep as many as he had.

Q: I wonder what could have triggered this impulsive order you describe?

W: I think that he had just gotten tired....

Q: Of Yount protecting these fellows?

W: Yes, because a lot of Regular Officers would write into Arnold and say: "Please let me go to war." Of course, if they weren't on the roster, he would try to do something about it. But he was given to things like that.

Q: How about a guy named Clinton W. Howard - Jan Howard?

W: No, doesn't ring a bell.

Q: You say there were 80 some officers...?

W: I think about 84 on the list.

Q: And he would not relent with any of these fellows?

W: He never did, as far as I know. And if he found out about any one of them being overseas, he had him back within just days. I mean, don't give them 2 weeks. They were just "zap" and they were out of there. And then I would have to send them back to the command that had originally certified them as being suitable for overseas.

Q: Were you working for Bevans at this time?

W: Yes.

Q: Was he your boss?

W: Yes, as I say, Arnold was given to not telling Bevans what he was doing. He just...I didn't know he was on his squawk box. My flag would flip and here was Arnold saying: "Do so and so." And then, I would tell Gen Bevans what I was doing. I was working for Pinky Wetzel, really.

Q: I talked to both of them. I talked to Wetzel in NJ and Bevans in Florida. They never mentioned this list of Arnold's.

Q: We are talking about Arnold's little list of 84 or so people, and I mentioned that I have been told that Arnold did things in the Personnel area in an impersonal way.

W: No, that is not true. He was quite often very personal. As I say,

somewhere close to 30 of these 84, in my opinion, were deadwood, of my knowledge. Now there could have been more than that deadwood. But in my own mind, also, there were 4 or 5 that I considered very topnotch officers. Now, all of these were Colonels but one. There was one Major on there, I can't remember. I should. It was so unusual.

Q: These four men, in your opinion, had great ability.

W: Four or five, I was surprised that they weren't already generals, they were very senior colonels.

Q: Do you remember names?

W: No, the only one I remember was Carl Axtater, but I can remember some of the others who were on there. There was a guy named Post, like you mentioned, Netherwood, and so forth.

Q: Netherwood was taken out of Latin America. He crossed somebody down there. I don't know what happened. He was taken out, and that about finished him. I'm reminded of something somebody told me that Arnold, in a sense, showed partiality to those who came up on the West Coast with him.

W: Highly possible.

Q: In preference to those who had come up on the East Coast with Andrews.

W: Whom he didn't know. As I said, I was on the General Officer's list. I was No. 1 on the top of the Colonels who were submitted, I think it was around April 1943. On the note on the side was: "I do not know this man. Do you? HHA." And underneath was "No, BG," Barney Giles, who was the Vice Commander. Had I been known to either one of these. Now, Arnold had met me, but he didn't know me. He had no idea of my capability. Now had I met him in England, say on that time, but I hadn't, because he hadn't been to England.

Q: If you had not been down there running this little treatise and had met him...

W: It was too late. He had disapproved me. He had taken me off the list, because the Chief always had the last say before it went to the Secy.

Q: Well, it went to Marshall, or did it?

W: It may have, but I don't think so.

Q: Did Marshall exercise any veto on promotions?

W: He could have. I'm sure he did, yes.

Q: You know, Marshall felt that the AAF was much too liberal in awarding DFCs and Air Medals, and what not.

W: I never did get a DFC. I fought a year in England, and I never got a DFC. I got Air Medals and I got a Silver Star. I got a Silver Star for nothing. But three or four times in Europe I really did something wonderful, and I would just be so proud of myself, and I wouldn't even, nobody would even call me up and congratulate me. I didn't get a medal that I thought I really deserved. I think that probably the system, and it was an Army system, was so cumbersome that before you could digest all the facts it didn't count any more.

Q: Some people got a lot of recognition. Take LeMay.

W: Yes, well, LeMay was a good man, and he did a good job.

Q: Right, and he got the recognition. Now, Possum Hansell was more of a thinker, a planner, than he was an operator.

W: Possum was not real strong.

Q: I heard a story about him in the ETO, too.

W: Kuter was the most, I wouldn't say, suave, but he was the most self-controlled and best wing commander in the 1st Wing, that I saw, and I saw them all the way up to Paul Williams.

Q: There were some people who didn't like him.

W: Kuter? Well, I can understand that. He was too smart for them.

Q: Like Spaatz and Eaker didn't think much of him. He was one of Arnold's fair-haired boys, so was Norstad. A lot of people thought maybe he was too good looking?

W: No, I think the thing they objected to on Norstad was, as far as I knew, he never even was a squadron leader. He never was anything except on the staff. I've never even seen him fly an airplane, and I've been in airplanes he was in, and he always flew as copilot. Most of your fighting, biting, scratching guys, they fly as pilot.

Q: How about Arnold, did he like to fly?

W: I don't know. I never was in the airplane with Arnold. He got mad at me a couple of times because one time, we were up at the Army-Notre Dame game, and I had an airplane in at Newark.

Q: During the war?

W: This was, yes, probably it was during the war. That's when they had the Army-Notre Dame game in NY, and I was with a guy named Joe Barron. We were coming back on Sunday, and as far as we were concerned, we thought this was perfectly all right. But we bumped into a MG in the Army who was, Richardson, who was the Comptroller, and he said he had to get back. He had a big meeting that he had to be there. So we said: "Sure, we would be glad to ride you back." We went out to Newark, and everything was socked in, the whole NY area, and the Washington area, everything was socked in. So I went up to the weatherman, and told him, I said: "We can get into Washington between 1 and 3 o'clock." Fact of the matter is that you can really get into almost any place between 1 and 3 o'clock, because there is a lifting of ceiling and improvement in visibility.

Q: Is this AM or PM?

W: In the afternoon. So I said: "If you will call" - I gave him the number

to call down there. We had a weather officer in the Pentagon. I said: "If you will call them and get a special forecast, and if you would just lift your ceiling about this much. Let us run down the runway. You can close it again." So he said he would do it. He said: "This is your responsibility." And I said; "Sure, we can do it." I wouldn't do it if - I'm a great believer in my own neck, too. So we put this Army MG in the back and Joe Barron and I ran down the runway. We had this special forecast, we got out there and got at the end of the runway. Ran our engines up, and asked if they had any new weather information, and they did. They gave us a new weather thing at Washington, and a new one for Newark. We tore down the runway and lifted our wheels. I don't think we had 300 feet of ceiling. But before we got into the soup, we had an amendment to that. They had put the ceiling back down where it really was. I think it was possibly 200, maybe 150 feet, but we were off and it was just like riding in a featherbed. It was one of the softest instrument flights that I ever made. We came into Washington. Nobody else was flying. We came into Washington National, because we had this Army MG. We had to leave the airplane, because conditions were such that we couldn't fly any place else. We couldn't even take it across the river to Bolling. Arnold was out at Mitchel Field trying to get off. And the next, I guess about Tuesday, Gen Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants an explanation of why you could get out of the NY area and he couldn't." I didn't tell him the whole story, I said: "General, if you will just look at the weather sequences, we got a weather report that allowed us to get out of Newark. We were not at Mitchel; we were at Newark, and we got out on a strictly legitimate weather reading. We came in here, we were coming into National, we had been coming into Bolling; we couldn't have landed at Bolling - because they didn't have the

capability, the aids that they had at National."

Q: Did you give Arnold the explanation?

W: I gave it to Bevans, and Bevans called up and said: "Stan Wray is here, and he says so and so." You could hear "R-R-R-R." Arnold was mad about this.

Q: Did he ever chew you out?

W: No, he never did.

Q: Did you have much contact with him, or did you go to Bevans, mostly?

W: No, I never did approach him, Arnold, personally. I never went to Arnold, except when I was sent to him.

Q: And then you were in trouble?

W: No. He wanted something, and it was something that he thought I could do and nobody else could do. He had very fixed opinions on things like that. Some of the things he gave me to do were not in my province, but that was all right, I did them.

Q: Did you feel that he was flexible or inflexible in his thinking about things?

W: I don't think Arnold was very flexible. I think he was inflexible.

Q: What was his greatest characteristic in your mind?

W: Just that, his, I don't know if you want to call it stubbornness or strength, but when he had embarked on a plan, he was going to go on and do that.

Q: Even if part of it was wrong?

W: I think if he found out it was wrong, I think he would have changed it. But other people, you know, some of the people we had in those days, were inclined to be a little shilly-shally, but not Arnold. He was not the brightest man in the AF, but he was the one that prosecuted that war.

Q: When you say that, you mean he was not ideologically motivated, in the sense some people talked about strategic airpower, or a separate AF?

W: Oh, I think he was all in favor of a separate AF, and strategic airpower.

Q: When you say "not the smartest man"?

W: I just don't think he was.

Q: You mean in absorbing briefings?

W: I think, for instance, Gen Andrews was. I was more impressed with Gen Andrews than I was with Arnold. I didn't care much for Gen Brett. He had a great reputation in the AF, but he didn't ring true.

Q: What qualities did Andrews have that Arnold lacked?

W: One of them was his intelligence. I don't know, it's an indefinable thing, but I just never thought Arnold was real smart.

Q: Andrews had an ability to make men follow him?

W: That's right, people liked him.

Q: Did you have some contact with Andrews?

W: Not as much as I had with Arnold.

Q: Hugh Knerr thought very highly of Andrews. Did you know that Knerr was pushing for a separate AF early in the war, right around Pearl Harbor?

W: Sure, yes. He was also a very good man, too.

Q: He and Arnold didn't get along, but Arnold had great admiration for Knerr?

W: Great respect for his brain.

Q: For his ability, and Knerr got promoted, there's a case of a guy on Arnold's list perhaps.

W: No, he wasn't on that list.

Q: He wasn't on that list, but the fact that Arnold regarded him as a man of high ability, overcame the fact that he otherwise would be on the list.

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: Knerr and Arnold crossed swords on several occasions. The Alaskan flight, problems with Knerr wanting to come back on active duty. Did you know this?

W: No.

Q: Knerr tried to get back on active duty, he had retired, Arnold did not break any world's records getting him back. He was writing these nasty letters to Andrews, about Arnold. And Arnold knew this, yet Arnold....

W: I didn't know that.

Q: Arnold got him back in, and also, I'm sure, must have had a hand in his promotion.

W: Oh, he had to.

Q: Because he became a deputy to Spaatz.

W: He had to approve it.

Q: So this is a case where sheer ability overcame his personal feeling. I wonder if this would be an exception, or are there other cases?

W: I don't know of any other.

Q: You see, here is a case of Knerr having come up with Andrews, whereas some fellows who came up with Arnold like Eaker, Spaatz, McNarney, Dunn, some other people. Did you know Minton Kaye?

W: Yes.

Q: Minton Kaye was one of Arnold's favorites, and he ended up on Arnold's list.

W: I didn't know that.

Q: He was a Colonel, never made General. George Goddard...

W: Yes, George Goddard. George finally made it, of course, years later.

Q: He got on Arnold's list, too. Was he on that 84 list?

W: He was on that list.

Q: Why?

W: I think possibly because he was sornarrow. All he knew was photography, and he was - with all due regard, I like George Goddard - but he was a bore about photography. Now there are people who will say that I'm a bore about photography and about tapes, but that's all he talked. I mean he didn't say: "Would you like a Scotch and water?" He'd say: "Did you see that picture I had, so and so." That's all he would talk about, photography. He was always rushing into Arnold's office to get such and such approved, and get some more money for his favorite cameras and so on, and he did a wonderful job, no question about it. We had, I think, the best photography in the war.

Q: Right, this strip camera of his....

W: Oh, it's wonderful.

Q: Arnold sent him out of Washington. He became the VD officer at Charlotte. Have you seen his book?

W: I've seen his book but I haven't read that part of it. Was that in it?

Q: Yes, and he became VD officer down in Charlotte, NC. He got sent out of Washington. He had a thing going between himself and Minton Kaye. Minton Kaye at that time was a favorite of Arnold, also a photographer. But Kaye was closer to Arnold, so he won out in the struggle.

Q: Let me ask you about Elliott Roosevelt. What do you know about that case. This case was probably in your lap at one time or another?

W: Over and over and over again. Have you asked Eaker about the letters when he used to write in about getting, from North Africa, to get Elliott Roosevelt rated. I never even took these to Arnold, I just sent them back to him, "dis-approved," with the explanation of why, because I knew that Elliott Roosevelt

was not a Colonel, I mean not on flying status. He was not a pilot. He came into a place called Steeple Morden, which was one of my satellite stations. It was right off, just a little bit southwest of Bassingbourne, which was my station. I happened to be over there one night when Roosevelt, I mean this was his recon outfit on the way to North Africa. Mrs. Roosevelt was there. Now we had no idea that she was even in England.

Q: This is his mother?

W: Yes, Eleanor Roosevelt. Much to our surprise - we were sitting there drinking, and this woman came out. He had a little suite in this Nissen hut. This woman came out of the bedroom and everybody - you just don't do this - then it turned out to be Mrs. Roosevelt, much to our surprise. So I talked to his people, I knew his LTCOLs, and his Majors, and so forth. Elliott didn't do the things that the Congressmen got up and said he did in Congress. I didn't rate him a pilot ever.

Q: And he couldn't become a CO unless he was rated, and then he couldn't get promoted to a General.

W: That's right.

Q: He was recommended by Spaatz and Eisenhower toward the end of the war?

W: That's right, and he was finally made.

Q: Arnold opposed this.

W: I didn't know that Arnold opposed it.

Q: Arnold opposed it. Arnold wrote back and said he would get in trouble on it, and they overruled him. They overruled him when he got sick. Remember Arnold had a heart attack?

W: Yes, who did this? I never did rate Roosevelt and I don't know who did, but I know it was along towards the tag-end of the war.

Q: This is around January 1945. It happened when Arnold had a heart attack.

W: I remember when he was out and had the heart attack. But I still did not rate him.

Q: But he got his promotion. I'm guessing now, and I was up to Hyde Park to look at records, but they wouldn't show me any. I think, simply, Papa ordered it.

W: I think this is highly possible.

Q: Arnold was opposed to it because he felt he would get in trouble.

W: I didn't even ask Gen Arnold or Bevans or Pinky Wetzel. I didn't even refer it up. As far as I was concerned he was not a pilot, and I wouldn't make him a pilot. Too many people had risked their lives to become pilots, and if this was the way you became a pilot, then if he wanted to be a pilot, then he should go through flying school. There were other systems. If he wanted to get in, he could have gotten in as a service pilot, and then converted over.

Q: Wasn't this about the time he sent that dog, remember Blaze?

W: Yes, I remember that, too.

Q: That caused a big stink in Washington?

W: That's real funny. I've been on lots of airplanes with lots of dogs, and nobody ever worries about that. But he shouldn't have thrown people off the airplane to put his dog on. All he had to do was get on the airplane with his dog, and let the dog lay on the floor. Nobody would have cared.

Q: Elliott volunteered for some dangerous missions. You know, the FRANTIC mission, shuttle bombing. They turned him down because they were afraid that the President's son might get captured. He also volunteered to reconiter the Baffin Bay route. He did several things. If he wasn't the President's son, he probably would have done a lot better, but a lot of people felt he was getting

privileges because of **that.**

W: Oh, he was.

Q: Yes, he was and people gave it to him not necessarily because he asked for it. As the President's son, some people bow and scrape, and fall all over themselves to try to do it.

W: We just treated him like any other officer. We didn't give him any special consideration, except, as I say, I wouldn't rate him. This was my province in Washington.

Q: Was there heat put on you to rate him?

W: No, none.

Q: You just didn't send the matter to Arnold?

W: I just didn't send it anywhere except back to Gen Eaker saying, "Disapproved." Now, very few Colonels write to MGs and disapprove it. Since that time there has been a policy in the AF, that if you are going to say no to a MG, another MG signs it.

Q: This was good.

W: Eaker and I quite often laugh about this.

Q: So you took the heat off your bosses?

W: Yes.

Q: What was Pinky Wetzel's job at that time?

W: He was Chief of the Military Personnel Division. I had the Officer's Branch at that time.

Q: And both of you worked for Bevans?

W: Yes.

Q: Where did Trubee Davison fit into this?

W: Trubee was downstairs, I think, as an Asst Secy, sort of thing, for Patterson for Air matters. He was crippled and went around the Pentagon in the

electric wheelchair.

Q: Yes, I heard Arnold went around in a wheelchair, too, for awhile?

W: I didn't see him in a wheelchair, I don't know.

Q: What about Suzy Adkins?

W: She was a character.

Q: Did she serve as a weathervane for you?

W: Not for me. I never had any problems with Arnold. I never got chewed out by him. The time he was ever real brusque with me was when he called me up and said: "You go to such and such a place, and do so and so." And he was quite specific.

Q: There are some people who indicate that she would call them and say: "Today is a good day to ask this question," or "today is a bad day to ask that question."

W: O.A. Anderson used to say this. He'd always check with Suzy before he'd go in to see Arnold. If he had something that was controversial.

Q: Was he a brilliant man?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Was he an iconoclast sort of, ivory tower?

W: No, no, but he was not a great respecter of persons, in the sense that Arnold didn't overawe him at all. I think O.A. was probably thrown out of Arnold's office many times for advocating certain steps that Arnold didn't like.

Q: Was Anderson a bomber man?

W: Yes, I think so. He would knock down anything, I think he had been an observation man, really, because he was a balloonatic.

Q: Yes, he, Stevens and Kepner at one time?

W: Went up in the Explorer 1 and 2, out of Rapid City, SD.

Q: This was in the 1930s?

W: I don't think, as a pilot, that Anderson had any great feeling except he was the kind of a man who was impersonal in a sense that he just simply thought an idea. He said it was going to take so many groups, bombers and so many groups of fighters, and this is how they will have to be used, and we will have this and so support for them. And although Arnold threw him out on that program, that's the program we ended up with for the war.

Q: I was told that Arnold had a great deal of flexibility in terms of either doctrine or R&D?

W: He may have, but he never showed it to me. I took Leigh Mallory in to see Arnold. I was his sort of his American aide, pushing him around. That's when he had become the commander of ..

Q: AEAF.

W: Right. Arnold was downright rude to him in talking about doctrine. I mean, he just didn't ask him outright: "What do you feel about tactical air doctrine," or anything like that. He attacked him, across the desk. I mean, he was picking his ideas to pieces, and I didn't think this was right, even if Arnold was the Chief of the American Air Force. Leigh Mallory had been given a job which I think Arnold thought an American should have.

Q: That job, after they set it up, it was downrated, and Leigh Mallory didn't win much respect among the Americans, and he was having trouble with Spaatz perhaps at the time.

W: Well, this may have been part of the whole system. I think that they felt that an American should have it.

Q: You know, this may be just before OVERLORD. Would this be about the right time?

W: Yes, close to it.

Q: And Leigh Mallory was given a mission but he was given no forces. He had no forces under him. He was having trouble with Spaatz, because he wanted all the air forces to go into a tactical mode to start hitting rail centers and tactical targets in preparation for D-Day. Spaatz wanted to hit the oil targets, the strategic targets, and wanted to continue hitting them for a while. There was a big battle that went on for a period. Could this have been the substance of that discussion with Arnold?

W: No, it wasn't. It was his tactical air doctrine. Arnold didn't even bring up strategic air. B-17s and B-24s were not in this discussion at all. It was all fighter bombers.

Q: And what was Arnold's view?

W: As I say, he was downright rude. I don't remember what the issue was, but it was he did not approve of Leigh Mallory's ideas about fighting the war. This man had just been picked by somebody. I don't know who made Leigh Mallory the commander, but I'm sure he didn't have Arnold's vote.

Q: He didn't have a lot of American votes. This was sort of a compromise, they gave Eisenhower the top job and they gave the top Air job to a Britisher. Leigh Mallory had very little to do, really.

W: Leigh Mallory was a fighter man. He was not a real fighter-bomber man.

Q: Right, you know there was another problem. One of Arnold's favorites for a short period of time was this fellow named Bruce Butler. Bruce Butler had been brought in from the 11th AF to become Deputy to Leigh Mallory. He didn't last long in that job. Did you know that?

W: I knew that Bruce Butler came out, but I didn't know that there was friction between he and Leigh Mallory.

Q: He didn't last long in the job because it must have been friction with somebody, but he was out of there in a very short time.

W: I don't know, maybe he was told not to support Leigh Mallory. In-fighting.

Q: He left that job, and I'm trying to think of who they put in. Did they put Vandenberg in that job?

W: Yes, they did.

Q: But Butler who had done a great job up in the 11th AF didn't last very long.

W: There wasn't anything to do in the 11th AF.

Q: Do you remember Davenport Johnson?

W: Yes.

Q: Davenport Johnson had trouble with Arnold, or vice versa, on the high accident rate in the 2nd AF.

W: I don't know about that.

Q: Arnold was claiming that fellows were coming to the ETO and they were not adequately trained in high altitude gunnery and several other precision skills. The 2nd AF was blamed for these shortcomings. I was told that Davenport Johnson who was commanding the 2nd, said: "If you don't like the job I'm doing, relieve me." Arnold said: "You're relieved."

W: I would believe that.

Q: Would he do a thing like that?

W: Yes, he would.

Q: And then he put his friend, Bill Street, in there.

W: Well, I think, Ent was in there for awhile.

Q: Ent came in later. Ent got in the crash.

W: Yes, he was injured, and I thought then Streett came in. That's my impression.

Q: I can't remember if he preceded Streett or not. But that 2nd AF always gave Arnold a great deal of trouble.

W: Well, this comes back again to the idea as I said before, that I don't think Arnold appreciated the...now, I was in the 8th AF and I know that the people coming to war were not well trained for war. They had to go through another combat training over there. But when I came back here and I talked to people in the Training Command, the Training Command was 2 years behind the war. We had 12 Colonels come over to the ETO, and telling us how people should fire machine guns in combat. They were just, they were insane. Those 12 Colonels went out on a raid the next day, and not one of them came back.

Q: This was in 1943?

W: Yes, all of them were shot down in the Spring of '43.

Q: And you think this was due to....?

W: Well, partly that, not lack of training. As far as they were concerned, they were trained all right, but they just were doing the wrong things. They were telling the gunners where to shoot, and that was wrong.

Q: Were you aware that the 2nd AF was giving trouble, causing these problems, or that Arnold was unhappy?

W: No, the only person that I knew to be unhappy with was Lynn out in the 4th AF. Bill Lynn.

Q: Why there?

W: There was something came up one day. Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants," he said, thinking of all the generals, "do you know who would be a good man to replace Bill Lynn in the 4th AF?" I said: "Well, I

generally don't move Generals around. I move Colonels." But he said: "Yes, you've talked a lot. You know a lot of Generals, and you've given good advice on several occasions." He said: "Give me some advice." So we talked awhile, and I said: "What's the matter with Bill Lynn? He seems like a pretty nice Joe to me." "Well," he said: "He and Arnold are having it out about something." So I got on the phone and called a friend of mine, a Colonel, and said: "Wonder why Bill Lynn doesn't call Arnold up and apologize." I said: "This is a hell of a time to have to change commanders." So I don't know what happened, but Bill Lynn still stayed as commander. But I don't know; it was just suddenly like that.

Q: He was an impulsive man, you feel?

W: Yes, I'm sure he was.

Q: Did he think out some of these impulses?

W: No. I'm sure he didn't. He just reacted. Now I think it is highly possible that he did plan some of these impulsive things, for their shock value.

Q: You saw him get mad many times?

W: Yes.

Q: Although not at you?

W: I was very fortunate.

Q: I was talking to Gene Beebe, who was his aide, and I asked him about, did Arnold get mad, and he said: "Every day."

W: I was going to say several times a day.

Q: And he got very red? Did he become inarticulate; splutter?

W: No, I never saw him spluttering. He was pretty quick. I never saw him splutter, but he got awful mad.

Q: Was he sharp on his feet speaking?

W: I didn't think so.

Q: There are some people who have told me - Curly Wolfenbarger told me...

W: He used to fly Arnold a lot, too, Curly, did.

Q: That when Arnold was in Marshall's presence, he was like a lamb.

W: Just soft as butter. I've gone with Arnold a couple of times to early morning briefings. Gen Marshall used to like to have a briefing at 7:00. Couple of times, things came up on personnel, and I'd have to go in to the Pentagon at 4:30 in the morning, and put the briefing together for him. I'd have to have a girl come in and we would have to run this thing through. I wouldn't hear about it till 6 PM or 7 PM the night before. We'd have that thing ready, and I'd have to be down at 6:30 to give Arnold the quick runout. I had to condense everything into one sheet that went on top of this whole staff study or whole report. You had to condense everything into one sheet, the most important things, so that he could underline....

Q: Did he have a one-page mania?

W: Yes, but this was just a cover now. It was not, he didn't mind if a thing was that thick, but he wanted one sheet on top that he could just sit down there and tell Gen Marshall this is so and so.

Q: Was he a great one for briefing aids, visual aids?

W: He liked them, yes.

Q: Did he ever cut guys off who rambled on in a briefing?

W: I don't know. I never saw him do that.

Q: Did he have a reputation for doing this?

W: Yes.

Q: If you strayed?

W: If you didn't know what you were talking about.

Q: Would he get up and walk out, or just cut you off.

W: Just cut them off. Get the next person on.

Q: He had these, he liked early morning briefings himself, didn't he?

W: I don't know whether he liked them or he had them, because of Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall was the one who liked them. Of course, Churchill was just the other way. Whenever we had to go brief Churchill, it was in the late afternoon.

Q: Churchill got going in the afternoon and stayed up half the night.

W: Yes, he did.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack?

W: Yes.

Q: Was there sort of unease in the AAF?

W: Yes, there was great unease; a lot of unease.

Q: Why?

W: Well, the war wasn't over yet, and we just didn't...there had been a little bit of unease once before when Gen Brett came into Washington with no assignment. People thought that Brett was a lightweight, and we felt-- the boys in the backroom felt - that somebody was thinking about putting Brett in as Chief. The boys in the backroom didn't have a very good opinion of him, didn't like it. This is what led to the unease I think when Arnold had his heart attack. It was not....

Q: There was nobody there?

W: There was nobody there standing there. Giles was not the stuff; he was a lightweight compared to Arnold.

Q: You know, there was a conference, Arnold, when he came back (off record). You never heard about this particular conference in Cannes?

W: No, I never did. I was not that high in the hierarchy.

Q: This was a very closed-circuit type of thing, and the plan was, let's try to get closer to the new President than we got to the old President. This was top level stuff. Well, Eaker came into office, and I have been told that Eaker had pretensions to be the successor to Arnold.

W: I never got this impression from him. I think that I am a very good friend of Eaker's and I never did hear this, even bruited. I don't think that people thought that Eaker was that high. It was more likely to be Spaatz, as it turned out to be.

Q: You never felt that Eaker was moving into the job?

W: We felt, in the backroom - as I say, the Colonels - that he was just holding Spaatz' saber ~~until~~ till the war was over.

Q: Till Spaatz came back from the Pacific?

Q: You are a friend of Eaker's. Has he ever talked to you about his being shifted out of the ETO?

W: No, we have never discussed that, and we drink pretty strong scotch together.

Q: This is one of the fascinating aspects of the thing. Of course, Eaker never made his fourth star, do you think Arnold had any influence on that?

W: I doubt that very much. He could have, and he would have had to approve a fourth star, but it gets down to the point that - not like we are now - when you had a four star commander, then you had a three star deputy. Now, Arnold was a five star man but there weren't very many five stars passed out.

Q: No, only a half dozen, only in one in the Air Force.

W: That's right, and his vice was a three star for a long time, the vice commander was a three star, Barney Giles. We just didn't have the four stars to pass around like that.

Q: Let's go back to the time when he was down at Coral Gables and they were shuttling. Pete Peterson, they were shuttling down and they were sending in memos. Was Arnold trying to run the AF from a sick bed?

W: I don't think so. I think he was trying to keep informed, because he couldn't make decisions.

Q: Norstad sort of hints that he was running the Air Force, or running the 20th AF at least.

W: He was the head here in Washington, but he, I doubt that he ran the AF.

Q: He wasn't a decision-maker?

W: I doubt it.

Q: How about Lovett and Arnold? Did Lovett try to pick up some of the ball when Arnold was out?

W: I don't think so; not to the best of my knowledge.

Q: Then, there really was nobody to mind the store?

W: That's right, except the Chief of Operations.

Q: Who would that have been, do you mean AAF?

W: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold have a high regard for Fairchild?

W: I don't know.

Q: He was one of the great brains of the AF, was he not?

W: I don't know, as far as I was concerned, he was not.

Q: Who were the brains of the AAF during this period?

W: Kuter. O.A. Anderson, McNarney, people like that, I never knew Fairchild except when he was acting as the Deputy Chief later on.

Q: Most people had a very high regard for him - just like another fellow everybody had had very high regard for - Horace Hickam, they said if he had

survived, he'd have gone to the top.

W: Yes, he was a good man. I liked him very much. You see, I was just coming into the AF at the time he got killed.

Q: How about some of these oldtimers who didn't make it. For example, Foulois, after he left as Chief of Staff, was in good health, he lived 30 years later.

W: The whole thing was, in those days, they didn't make, they didn't have two stars after you were the Chief. You may even go back to Colonel.

Q: Right, this is so. But Fechet had some kind of a job during the war. They gave him Decorations & Awards, but they never gave Foulois another job.

W: I don't know why, of course, Foulois was pretty early in the game.

Q: But Fechet was earlier than Foulois. Foulois started flying, but Fechet was the Chief of Staff before Foulois.

W: Yes, and also he was a MG, Foulois was only a BG.

Q: He became a MG when he was in. Foulois was a MG when he was Chief of the Air Corps.

W: Are you sure?

Q: Yes, I'm positive, from 1931-35.

W: I'm not so sure. From talking with Foulois, I went around a lot with Foulois in his later days. He told me that he was never more than a BG.

Q: Are you talking permanent rank or temporary?

W: I don't know, he said he was never more than a BG.

Q: No, that's not so. I know this to be a fact.

*note: Saw proof to
... way*

W: He said that this came about through a misapprehension in a Congressional speech, and that he's been listed as a MG in newspapers and so forth.

Q: In his own book he is listed as a MG.

W: I still say, from what he said, that this is, shall I say, a courtesy?

Q: The Chief of the Air Corps was a MG and he was Chief of ;the Air Corps for 4 years. But he crossed Roosevelt on the air mail, and he got in trouble, and he also ran as a Republican for Congress. Did you know that?

W: No, I didn't know that.

Q: He ran in 1940 and he lost, and he never had a job during the war. Nothing. They gave him nothing, and of course, Roosevelt was the kind of guy, may be vindictive, like Arnold perhaps. If you crossed Roosevelt, you were dead. He never had a job during the war, but Fehet had a job, and other old timers had a job. I'm thinking of another oldtimer named Jackie Fickel. He was on Arnold's list. Was he on the list?

W: I don't know.

Q: But he never had much of a job. He had the 4th AF early in the war, and they took him out of there, and they never gave him a big job.

W: It's like Henry J. F. Miller. He blabbed about D-Day.

Q: Is this true?

W: Yes.

Q: There was a good reason for taking him out of there?

W: Well, he came back to the States.

Q: Did they break him?

W: Broke him back one rank, I don't think they broke him two ranks. He went out to Wright Field where he had been before.

Q: Do you remember Ed Perrin? He had trouble.

W: Yes, he was a weakling.

Q: And he was in Arnold's office?

W: Yes. He was one of the three bright young boys. I could never understand

why he was a General. That wasn't my business.

Q: He had a problem, didn't he commit suicide?

W: Yes, he was a drunkard.

Q: How about Tom Hanley, he was one of Arnold's hotshots.

W: He was a good man, I never could understand. He got to be a MG and that's all. I don't know what happened.

Q: I missed seeing him, he passed away.

W: His son was about 2 years behind me at the Academy. I saw a lot of him later in the service. But I always liked old Tom Hanley.

Q: Another fellow who was one of Arnold's hotshots, Reuben Hood. Was he a good man?

W: No, he was another one of these very impetuous kind of a guy. But he wasn't smart.

Q: How about Fred Dean?

W: Freddy Dean was a good boy.

Q: He was Arnold's Exec there for a while. He is still active.

W: Freddy was a good boy, and Bill Hall was doing a fine job. Of course, Bill Hall was quite a womanizer.

Q: Yes, I talked to him, he was one of Arnold's favorites, wasn't he?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: How about Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Yes.

Q: He was a great favorite of Arnolds. Was he smart as well as being a good storyteller?

W: Not real brainy. But I don't want to say "clever," but he was, well, everybody likes Rosie. Everybody would protect him to keep him out of trouble.

Q: Did he get in trouble?

W: Oh sure, a lot of times, Rosie, boy he could drink, but at 6:00 the next morning he was clear-eyed and unafraid.

Q: He was unafraid. He was a guy who...

W: Never lasted through the night, but Rosie O'Donnell and I and a couple of our friends have been on his front lawn at 4:30 in the morning, at Bolling AFB. I'm a great believer of Rosie O'Donnell.

Q: Talking about guys who stood up to Arnold, Rosie O'Donnell stood up to Arnold, didn't he?

W: Yes, he did, but he never got chewed out about it. O.A. Anderson did, but he'd throw him out. I know this.

Q: O'Donnell had a way of getting around him?

W: Well, he'd make it fun and games.

Q: How about Norstad? Did he stand up to Arnold?

W: No, Norstad wouldn't fight his way out of a paper bag.

Q: Other people have said this. And Kuter?

W: Yes, Kuter would. Kuter would say: "Now, General, this is the way that this is. This is the only way it can be done." And Arnold would grope around awhile, but he would buy it. But Kuter wouldn't get loud with Arnold.

Q: Kuter didn't get loud with anybody, I think. He had this quiet, steely, strong way about him which earned him a lot of respect.

W: That's right.

Q: The Steve Ferson thing is supposed to have happened in Arnold's office, but I've had different versions of it. And it may be that they moved him next door into Lovett's office, because they didn't want it known that he died in Arnold's office. Bill Streett - I saw him before he died - said: "No, he died in Lovett's office." But two or three people have told me: "No, he died in

Arnold's office."

W: This is highly possible. I don't know, I was clear around, oh, by that time, I was in 5A-286. I was not quite with the others. I was almost as far from Arnold's office as I could be.

Q: As you wanted to be?

W: Well, that's where my office was, and it was far enough for me. I never intentionally went to Arnold's office.

Q: He was not your favorite general?

W: No, I had nothing really against him, but I'd been brought up in the old Army and you just don't push yourself in front of the guy who is the Chief. Now, if you are at a cocktail party - I saw Arnold quite often at cocktail parties - I'd go up and talk to him. In fact, he is the one who started me going to some of these high level cocktail parties, because he would ring my office up and say: "Bring your secretary and meet me at the Statler Hilton in such and such a room at 6:00." "Yes, sir." So, I'd be there and the girl would have her note-pad, and he'd take me off to one side and introduce me to somebody and say: "This man has a problem." And in this particular instance this problem was that this very prominent distiller had, head of the distilling outfit, had a son, and it was most unusual for a Jewish boy, for somebody to ask to send a Jewish boy overseas. We generally had cases where uncles would stop Jewish boys, or bribery and so forth, for them not to go overseas. So it was a little unusual for this Mr. Heymann, who was the head of National Distilleries, and he had a son that he said was pretty worthless, and he wanted him to go to war to be made a man of, and I asked him if he knew anybody in North Africa, or Italy, or England and he did. He mentioned two or three **generals**, and I asked if it would be all right for me to wire, and

if they knew his son. He said they didn't know his son, but they were sure that they would give him a job. So I dictated a cable to Morrie Nelson overseas in North Africa, and one to Terry Morrison telling, instructing the Training Command to order him....

Q: Terry Morrison was in the Training Command?

W: He was personnel man, Training Command. Then we went right to the Pentagon and I called Terry and told him what was coming down, and to expedite this movement. So within five days after this instance, this son was in North Africa. I'd seen him in NY occasionally. He is in National Distillery or Schenley, as it is called now, and doing a fine job up there. He did a good job overseas.

Q: You know, Arnold had a lot of contact with a fellow named Louis Marx, the toy manufacturer.

W: I know that.

Q: Marx was always doing things for Arnold. When he would come into NY, they would have theater tickets to the shows, have a car, things like this. He also did things for Marshall and he put Arnold and Marshall onto some stock.

W: I don't know about this.

Q: Of course, Arnold used to get, at Christmas time, this whole caseload of toys which would be distributed to perhaps the enlisted men's children. Did you know about that?

W: I didn't know about that. As I say, there were lots of people on the outside, the industrialists who were kind of AAF people. They felt that the Generals and some of the Colonels weren't paid enough....

Q: Was Arnold prejudiced about Jews or Catholics?

W: I don't think so. I never heard him say any word of any prejudice towards

any nationality, race, condition or otherwise.

Q: I get the feeling of Arnold being the pragmatist. "If it works, I want it."

W: That's right, I think so.

Q: And this is why I made a comment before about R&D. For example, he was very close to von Karman, a little Jewish man of apparent brilliance.

W: He was almost prejudiced in favor of von Karman.

Q: Because von Karman did a great service for him.

W: And most of the other people in the Air Staff couldn't even understand von Karman when he was talking.

Q: But he was aces high with Arnold?

W: Yes. He was a very important man in R&D and in theory of aerodynamics. Time has proved this.

Q: He did a great job. This Toward New Horizons, this report is a very important thing. It predicted many things which came to pass 20 years later.

W: Of course, we didn't know, even until we got into Germany, all the forward thinking German scientists and aerodynamists. Of course, von Karman came out of Austria, and he probably smelled some of these things going on.

Q: This is why I personally feel that Arnold - I mean you mention something about grudges or that he harbored these thoughts about people - and it's probably true to some extent. Every man is a mixed personality. In some respects, he may harbor a grudge, and in other respects, he was devoid of grudge.

W: I wouldn't say he was devoid of grudge. If you were one of his boys, you had the world.

Q: Right, did he ever admit a mistake, and say: "I made a mistake...."

W: Not in my hearing; he may have.

Q: Most people say he did not. He simply did something else, without saying he was wrong.

W: That's right. Well, at the end of the war we bought some B-32s. Now, the B-32 was the biggest bucket of bolts that ever came out of Gonsolidated.

Q: Well, it was sort of a backup plane. You know, if the B-29 didn't work out.

W: May be, but as far as we were concerned, you just had to have a net behind the airplane to catch the nuts and bolts that fell off.it. It just never...it flew a few times. But it couldn't have backed up a paper bag.

Q: George Kenney wanted them. They felw for Kenney in the last few weeks of the war. He wanted B-29s and he couldn't get them.

W: I'm sure that he didn't get B-32s into combat for any length of time. They just couldn't fly. It was just impossible.

Q: I want to ask you about two areas. One, we were talking about this other aspect, Benny Meyers. Arnold was really taken with Benny Meyers.

W: That's right.

Q: Why?

W: Well, there's another type of guy. He apparently would canoe, his supply. In other words, he was in the supply side of Wright Patterson and he apparently knew all about procurement and engines, and so forth. Apparently, he was quite a whiz.

Q: Did he give Arnold what he wanted to hear, even if it was not fact?

W: I don't know, I doubt that, I don't think anybody would ever do that. Too many times, those things can come back and bit you.

Q: Did they, in this case?

W: I don't know. What got Benny Meyers in trouble was he had been, bought

stock when....

Q: This came out after the war. Arnold didn't know it at the time.

W: No, nobody could have protected Benny Meyers. Nobody.

Q: Did Arnold have the ability in one of these complex briefings with visual aids and what not, to go right to the heart of a problem, or not?

Or mixed?

W: I don't think he was very fast.

Q: Not very fast to get to it.

W: He'd wait and let Pinky Craig, or O.A. Anderson, or somebody....

Q: Was Craig sharp?

W: Pretty much, yes.

Q: I've tried to get to him. He's in El Paso, and he travels around a bit, but I haven't been able to catch him.

W: I thought he had a great regard for Pinky Craig.

Q: He was Plans. Another guy who comes out very well in some of the research I have done, is Loutzenheizer.

W: I didn't know him very well. I know of him, but I didn't know him very well.

Q: Very sharp guy.

Q: How about Jamison? Do you remember him? He was in Plans?

W: Doesn't ring a bell.

Q: Let me get into George Kenney. George Kenney caused a lot of trouble with Personnel. He didn't want to take some of the people Arnold was sending out there and he was trying to promote his own people.

W: That's right.

Q: This might have gotten into your area?

W: It did.

Q: What was the problem there?

W: Well, he had two Colonels that he brought in. Now, these had been flying cadets in the class of about, I guess, 40-1, I think that would be the one. I think they may have been 41-1A. And he had two of them, one of them was a pretty good boy. Now, I knew these boys as flying cadets, they were at Tuscaloosa when I was getting my flying training.

Q: Do you remember their names?

W: No, I don't. One of them was redheaded and very objectionable. The other one was pretty good. But, anyway, George Kenney wanted those made BGs. Now, there was a celebrated case in North Africa of a pearl, who, I think Brett had made a BG. And we always said that he was hurt by two desks rushing together. We could never understand why he was made a BG, and when these characters showed up with Kenney, and I've seen the list going through - they always asked me for my comments, and I gave them. So these two showed up in my office, as I was Chief of the Officer's Branch. They were talking pretty big, and I just thought right then: "Boy, if these people are the best that George Kenney has, we are in a bad way in the Pacific." We come back again to the idea of a democracy. You need, everybody needs a little bit of seasoning and he needs to expose himself to the vicissitudes of combat. Otherwise, it's not fair to the people that had to go out in the first. Now, I'd fought my war. I wanted to go back. In fact, I was ordered back right at the end of the war, but the President had the discourtesy to call it off. But I came back to the B-29 program; I didn't come back for HQs., USAF. I just got sidetracked. But Kenney wouldn't accept anybody, and this gets to be a close corporation. It doesn't make sense.

Q: Was Squeeze Wurtsmith one of his boys?

W: No.

Q: He was one in the 13th AF. He was one of his boys, but not one of those you speak of?

W: Not one of those. Squeeze was killed going back down to Tampa, I think, from Selfridge. He hit a mountain.

Q: But he didn't want to take any of the people from Hqs., AAF?

W: He didn't want to take anybody. It wasn't from Hqs., it was from any place. He had his own corporation, and he wanted to keep it like that. That's not the way to run a war.

Q: This caused a great deal of trouble, because Arnold had some young people he wanted to send out there, and get some seasoning. They wanted to go out, and he had no place to send them, or not enough places to send them.

W: He sent them to Europe. But I had the same problem in my group now. When I had the 91st Bomb Group, the Training Command had to send Captains. They hadn't been in any combat, but they would come into my group. They'd come in to Bobingdon, and most of the group commands wouldn't even accept them as Captains. I'd say: "Send me all you've got; I'll take them." Because they had several hundred hours more flying than my people had. They could learn to fly combat. Nobody else in the Training Command had combat like that. They didn't get combat in the Training Command. We had to train them, if they were 2nd LTs, or 1st LTs.

Q: You talk about George Brett as being considered a lightweight. MacArthur shipped him out of there, and eventually they got Kenney. They didn't know what to do with Brett, so he went out to the Caribbean, and I guess he stayed most of the war?

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: And he and Arnold were very close at one time.. In fact, he was the heir apparent?

W: That's what I say. We were pretty sure of it, but we thought it was going to come just a little bit earlier than too early in the system.

Q: Going back to this other incident you mentioned about the Heymann incident, where Arnold had you come down to the hotel. Referring to Arnold's drinking, did you ever see him drink?

W: Yes. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: What did he drink, an Old Fashioned?

W: Yes, he drank mixed drinks. This is something. I've made a lot of public speeches and that's one thing that I won't do, is drink. Two old-fashioned are enough for me for an evening. I've heard Arnold. I've seen him drink a couple of old-fashioned and then get up and try to talk, and you just can't do it. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: Most people that I have talked to, say that they never saw Arnold do any drinking except drink some sherry. He would carry a glass of sherry.

W: I've seen him where he could hardly talk.

Q: In other words, he didn't do well if he had a couple of drinks?

W: No, he didn't.

Q: Toward the end of the war, was this after his heart attack?

W: No, long before his heart attack.

Q: Most people say they never saw him drink. The reason I bring this up is, when Westover was killed in 1938, there was a story going around that Arnold drank. This is something that gave the President pause. You know, the President delayed in appointing Arnold for a period of time. Did you know about this?

W: We just knew that there was a long delay in there. But I didn't know it was because Arnold drank.

Q: The story was around, this may have been. We don't know why the President delayed, but a lot of people think that this gave the President pause. I wonder if there is anything to the fact that "Pa" Watson, who was the President's aide, was Class of '06 and so was Andrews. Andrews was then GHQ AF. I wonder if there is any substance to the possibility that he was trying to get the job for Andrews?

W: There might be. Andrews would have been a better Chief, I think. You come back again. In a time like the war years, you need somebody in there that's almost indestructible, and maybe Arnold was the best man for the job.

Q: Do you think Andrews had the drive that Arnold had?

W: No, I don't. But I think he would have got things done. More people would have been willing to do things, and would have sought out ways to get it done, rather than be pushed, and bullied, and beat over the head with a stick.

Q: Without justifying Arnold, there were some situations that needed bullying?

W: This is true. I say, maybe during the war years Arnold was the one for that job.

Q: Andrews might have been too much the gentleman?

W: He might have been. You can't tell.

Q: Most people I've talked to had admired Andrews more than they did Arnold. But when you get down to talking about it, Arnold may have been the better man for the job.

W: During that time.

Q: Right.

W: I agree with that.

Q: Because the President talked about 50,000 planes when you had practically

nothing and you had to hit people over the head. For example, calling in the aircraft manufacturers. They didn't want the automobile manufacturers into their business. The automobile manufacturers....

W: ...didn't want to go into it. Singer Sewing Machine didn't want to get into it.

Q: They were making money selling automobiles. So somebody had to hit them over the head. Arnold might have been the best guy to do it?

W: And I'm quite sure that he probably did hit them over the head.

Q: I wrote a script for a movie of Arnold. This is one of these documentary things. I called it "Hap Arnold, Man in a Hurry."

W: Yes, he was in a hurry.

Q: He had all these balls bouncing in the air. When he saw you - if he had confidence in you - if he could give you one of the balls.

W: It didn't matter if he had confidence in you, if you had an AF uniform, he'd send you.

Q: Did he send people, guys he didn't even know?

W: Sure. This Colonel that showed up in my office, that he was sending to Greenland, he wanted an officer courier. This was an officer; this was a Colonel, and he sent him.

Q: I know one man, Gen Grussendorf who was given a job, a contingency plan for the occupation of the Azores. This is when we were trying to get a Central Atlantic station. Grussendorf was in some other area. I don't remember what it was, but he was not competent to handle this contingency plan. He tried to turn it over to somebody else and they said: "If Arnold gave you the job, you'd better go do it." I don't know what happened in this precise case.

W: He probably got some good people to help him and got it turned out.

Q: Yes, then he did give jobs to people who might not have been competent. Then he had no respect for organization, really?

W: I wouldn't say that. He liked to see your organizational things. This is one of the things that he got on me, when I came back from combat was: "Why have we done away with the base setup?" Add I said: "Because we didn't have enough people. We had to put our people from the bomb group, put them to doing support work for the whole base." And I had an Air Exec and a Ground Exec. I said: "I did this because in combat this is the only way I can get it done." And he said: "Have you written this up?" And I said: "Yes, sir." And he said: "Let me see it." So I sent it down to him, and it became the manual for all overseas operations. He liked it after he saw it, but he didn't like it to start with. But I'm not sure that he was not a respecter of organization.

Q: But many times he leaped over organizations?

W: Yes, that's right, but he also wanted things organized so that it would be almost automatic.

Q: How about Hungry Gates? He was his organization man, wasn't he?

W: Yes.

Q: I missed him, he died.

W: He was a very dry, I would say, unimaginative type.

Q: Arnold liked him, though?

W: Yes.

Q: Why?

W: They were friends. That's all I could tell you.

Q: Did he come up with Arnold?

W: I think so.

Q: You think he did give some privileges or preference in good jobs to

guys he knew? Or who had come up the line with him?

W: Oh yes, I'm sure of it.

Q: Although in some cases where, like Jackie Fickel, who was one of his oldtime buddies, he didn't cut the mustard.

W: Well, maybe he didn't measure up.

Q: How about Fred Martin?

W: I always thought Fred Martin did a fine job.

Q: He got hurt at Hawaii, although it wasn't his fault.

W: Yes.

Q: I want to ask you one more question about the Advisory Council. This so-called Council - Norstad and Cabell. He picked these guys out to be his troubleshooters. They'd go around, I think they called them "the Heavenly Twins." Did they interfere in the Air Staff procedure on matters?

W: I never saw it.

Q: He would give them special projects or sort of troubleshooting type jobs?

W: He just didn't confine it to them. He would send Bill Hall out on jobs like this. He sent me once to look at a BG - I won't tell you where -- but he didn't like the way the base morale was going, and he just called me on the squawk box, and he said: "Don't put this in writing, and don't tell anybody. Get an airplane, and go to such and such a station, and go to the club, and look around, and come back here Monday, and tell me what you think about this man." He made me a hatchet man on two or three occasions.

Q: Was Norstad his hatchet man?

W: No, I don't think so. I don't think Norstad was ever a hatchet man.

Q: Well, Norstad went out and told Hansell that he had to go. Remember

when Hansell had the 21st BombCom?

W: Yes.

Q: He took him out of there, and put LeMay in. Didn't he serve as hatchet man on that job?

W: I doubt it.

Q: But he had to tell, Norstad had to tell Hansell the bad news.

W: He might have, but he didn't go out there and make the decision, I'm sure of that.

Q: Oh no, I don't mean he made the decision. But Arnold had made the decision, but Norstad had to go out and give Hansell the news.

W: Well, this may be. I don't know.

Q: Who else was Arnold's hatchet man? Or did he have hatchet men?

W: He had them, but he never told me who they were.

Q: Were these "ad hoc" arrangements?

W: Some of them were ad hoc, or it depended. As I say, this was a Personnel matter, he just gave me a squawk on the box and said: "Go and do it." And he didn't even tell Bevans about this. And I didn't either, until after I came back.

Q: How about Bill Streett? Did he use him as a hatchet man?

W: I don't think so. Bill Streett was a fine man.

Q: He was a fine, gentle man, but he did act as troubleshooter for Arnold, didn't he?

W: Could be, I don't know.

Q: Bill Streett never stayed in one job too long. He went to two or three different jobs. He never made a name for himself in any given area, but Arnold put him in some tough jobs like the 2nd AF and the 13th AF, too.

W: And the Continental Air Command. He did a lot of good things. I always had a lot of admiration for Bill Streett.

Q: I want to ask you about the Comptroller's decision. This is back in the '30s. When the Comptroller decided you were on leave without pay since July 1, 1932. This is the time when they put everybody on furlough.

W: What happened was we graduated on the 10th of June 1932. I would say around the 19th of July, I got a wire that said: "You are now, and have been, since the 1st of July on leave without pay." The Comptroller said - it was quite a long wire, it said that the Adjutant General, I think, had held, or somebody in the Government, had held that the graduation leave was ordinary leave, and therefore it fell under the provisions of the Economy Act.

Q: That was the one that was just passed?

W: This was a Presidential thing. Anyway, everybody had a pay cut. In the service we were absorbing it by just losing leave.

Q: In other words, you worked without getting paid?

W: No, you could get your leave, or even when you worked, you still drew less pay, 15%. Now, one of the ways was, I had been on leave without pay since the first of July. This is without my consent or knowledge. So since they had held this to be ordinary leave, now graduation leave is a special leave, and has been since the Year One. So when they repealed the Economy Act, it must have been a Congressional thing. When they repealed this, I applied for leave, but I went in and told my Colonel. I said: "Now, I've been talking to some of my friends in the Class of '32. We want to make a test case, we don't agree with what the - I think it was the Adjutant General has held, or the Comptroller, whichever one made the decision - we don't agree with him. But if they say that's what it is, then I want my leave on that basis." I had written this thing up so

that it was under the provisions of the thing that the Comptroller General - if that's who it was - made this thing, what he had quoted. I wanted my leave on that basis. But I also told my Colonel: "Now, I'll be at Birmingham and my phone number is so and so. Would you please get a ruling on this immediately, because we are doing this for the benefit of everybody in the class. If this holds then we've got, everybody's got a couple months leave coming with pay. And if it doesn't hold, I want to get back right quick." So he put it in, forwarded it. The next morning he started all this paperwork to Washington. I went on down to Birmingham, and after about - I don't know how many days, whatever days they held, I think it was 8 days - let's say, on the 7th day I got a phone call that said: "Get back." So I got in my little Chevrolet, and tore off one day from Birmingham to Rock Island, and I reported back in. This was a feeler; it was a test, and I lost. But that's all right. Better for one to lose, than 259 of us.

Q: I want to ask you something else in the Personnel area. This had to do with the training of blacks to fly. Did you have any involvement in that?

W: Not in their training. But I had quite a bit to do with throwing several blacks out of the service under conditions other than honorable. Because, and we had Mr. Truman Gibson come over from the White House. He wanted to know why this was happening, and I said: "Well, Mr. Gibson, here all these are white officers, and this few here are colored officers." And I said: "You can fight it any way you want to, but when we have a man show up at the end of his second stage, or the middle of his third stage training, and he suddenly finds out he doesn't want to go to combat, something is wrong, and he's lacking in moral fiber, and it's not fair to the people who have gone to war, to let this man out under honorable conditions. He's been in the pilot pool,

possibly for as long as two years, and he's been in the Training Command for a year or so, and now just at the gangplank, he gets gangplank fever." I said: "Now, your colored boys, a lot of them show up with misery in the back." I said: "I was frozen in the war, and I still fly. I know exactly what's wrong with my back, but I don't show up with the misery. You can diagnose my back, but," I said, "we've got a lot of these white officers who have shown up under the same circumstances, and we put them out under conditions other-than-honorable, and as long as I am going to do this to these white officers, I am going to do it to the colored officers." I said: "You can take any one of these, or any one of these, and read it." And he said: "No. I would just like to see the summary page of one of these colored boys." And he picked one where it was just about like I had said. Only this one had been in the system, I think, about three years before he got into pilot training. He had been there a long time, and this was getting down almost to the end of the war, and he had fainted and fallen back. He had been in B-25s, and he just didn't want to fly. Now, we had a bunch of colored boys who were in the 99th Pursuit Squadron - Benny Davis' outfit. But Benny came back and he was retraining them in B-25s, and we had a lot of them fail.

Q: That's the 332nd Composite Wing. But there were reports that some of these boys in the 99th didn't do well, that they turned and ran, when they got into combat situations.

W: This is true. I've heard of this. Now, I have no personal knowledge.

Q: Reports came back from Italy, the MTO.

W: I think Benny Davis would tell you this, too.

Q: What was Arnold's attitude, if any?

W: I never discussed this with Arnold. This was a policy that had been in

the AF. You just....pilots flew.

Q: Were you aware of the trouble Frank Hunter had at Selfridge Field in 1944?

W: No.

Q: A great deal of trouble there. The Negroes rioted at the base about the Officer's Club. They built a separate club for them against Arnold's orders.

W: No, I didn't know that, but I'm sure Arnold wouldn't want that. Once Benjy Davis got to be an officer, I think the Officer Corps, I never heard anybody say anything against Benjy Davis. For a long time, he was the only colored pilot. But I used to go on trips with Benjy Davis and Red Smith....

Q: Red Smith was another colored?

W: He was a friend of mine. He wasn't colored. But, we'd go with him. We liked to fly with him. He was a good pilot, and he was a good friend.

Q: We have come a long way from that.

W: This was several years ago.

Q: 25 years?

W: Well, this wasn't quite that long ago. This was probably right after the war. Right after the war, well, that is 25 years. We were down at Maxwell, and of course, not everybody had Benjy Davis to dinner in their quarters. But I did. I liked Benjy Davis.

Q: A lot of fellows wouldn't fly with a Negro.

W: Well, I've had some problems since. I've lost a couple of airplanes out at Wright Field. These were not mine. They were base airplanes, and the pilots were not mine, because I didn't have a colored pilot. I had some colored navigators, and one of them was a crackerjack, a hell of a good guy. He would joke about colored boys and white boys, and so forth. People liked him on the

crew. We had one pilot there who overstretched his gas and who wouldn't land to refuel. It was Dr. Stapp. He was taking Stapp out to either Colorado Springs or Denver to make a speech, and Stapp had to eject. So this is, you can carry this too far. As I say, I never had a colored pilot. I had lots of colored officers working for me, most of whom were good people. But I had some troublemakers. I was born in Muncie, Indiana, and we had a very firm, but friendly policy. So these people, I just put it on the line, and I'd say, I'd show them this was being recorded, and you can have a copy of the tape if you want it. I always had the colored chaplain come in at the same time, and I would just put it on the line. I'd say: "You produce, or I'll have your ears." And I'd lay it right out, No.1, No.2.

Q: I think they respected you for it?

W: Not only that, they bucked up because they knew right then they were in trouble.

Q: You have no knowledge of Arnold's attitude on these matters?

W: I don't think that he was prejudiced against Negroes in the AAF.

Q: I think he was in favor of anything that would help him do his job and oppose anything that would not.

W: Anything that hurt his job I think he'd oppose.

Q: I regard him as the total pragmatist, not the ideologue and the doctrinaire.

W: Oh no.

Q: Left that to a guy like Orval Anderson. Arnold was in favor of what would help him do his job and sometimes he misunderstood or misinterpreted what was good for him. I'm sure this happened.

Interview - MG Stanley Wray, Alexandria, Va., 22 April 1971

Q: Do you recall your first encounter with Gen Arnold?

W: I saw him once when he was a LTCOL.

Q: This is March Field, maybe?

W: No, he was in Washington. I graduated in the Corps of Engineers. I had two football knees. I could not pass the physical for a long time to get into the AF. I was in talking to Gen Eaker, he was then a LTCOL, or maybe a Major. Spaatz was a LTCOL, and he was just about Arnold's rank. So I think that Eaker was then a Major. I was getting ready to go to flying school. I had been out about '8 years. I guess, they came to me, I had a lot of push from the AF. They were trying to get more regular officers into the AF, and they had come to me, knowing that I had tried to get into the AF before. They assured me that I would be welcome, I would be well received, as I was by Gen Eaker. But Arnold came by, and he talked to Eaker, and he had Spaatz right with him. He wasn't stationed at Washington that time. This is when we were over in the old Munitions Building.

Q: He must have been visiting in Washington for testimony.

W: I don't know what he was doing in Washington. But I think he was at March Field at that time. I think so. This would have been about 1938, or 1939.

Q: It must have been earlier than that, because at the end of '36 he was a General already.

W: He wasn't a general yet when I saw him.

Q: This could have been '34 or '35.

W: 1935

W: Anyway, the Corps of Engineers wouldn't let me go at this particular time. But at the same time, I found out later when I accidentally saw my "Secret" file, that on the edge of this, Gen Spaatz said: "Hap and I bet you a bottle of whiskey he can't make it." And then underneath it, Eaker said: "Eaker and Goodpaster accept this." I don't know whether they ever paid this or not. And I did make it, obviously.

Q: Could this have been right after your Dubuque, Iowa experience?

W: Oh no, it was, I think, right after the time I had gone to Cornell, somewhere along in there. The next time I saw him was when I brought a B-17 down from Bangor, Maine, for Gen Arnold and a British Vice Air Marshal to look at. We were on our way going through what we called then our third stage, getting our B-17s. I brought this airplane down to Bolling and we kept it there one night until, say noon the next day, and went back to Bangor. But that's the only time I ever met him and shook hands with him.

Q: Your records show that you were at Cornell between July '34 and June '35, that's about right.

W: He was at Bolling when I brought this airplane down, and he didn't have much time for me. I was a brand fresh Colonel, I had not lived across the fence from him at March Field. Almost everybody else in my age bracket had. I went back to Bangor and immediately went overseas to war, then I came back into - I didn't intend to come back to Hqs., USAAF. But I came back then and was put in the Hqs for 10 days TDY and while I gave a little talk to the Air Staff about what it was like to fight the war in England. Arnold attended that.

Q: He had several people to come back to give reports on what it was like in combat.

W: That was the first time I had to walk easy with Arnold. Arnold, as you know, had spent a lot of money with Curtiss for the P-40, and he had spent a lot of money with General Dynamics for the B-24, and the B-24 did not work out well in the European theater. Nor did the P-40. They just weren't up to the German fighters. I would prefer to have B-24s go on a raid with me, than fighter escort. I never saw my fighter escort, so-called, and I don't think they ever gave me much protection until later. After I left, late 1943, early 1944, the fighter protection got much better. In fact, we had already talked to the fighter people as to how they should support us. We had an awful trouble convincing some of the bomber people that they needed fighter protection. But the B-24s, as I say, I had to walk very carefully when Arnold asked me a question about the capability of the B-24. I was frank in the sense that I said the B-24 was a very good airplane for long, low level raids, and it was. It was better than the B-17, for long, over water flight.

Q: It was more suited to the Pacific than Europe?

W: I didn't say that, but that's what I meant. It was.

Q: Did he sense that you were walking on eggs?

W: I think so. I said it couldn't survive with the B-17 at altitude. And it couldn't. The German fighters would just swarm around the B-24s.

Q: You were flying in B-17s?

W: Right, so I couldn't come right out and tell him that he or the Air Staff or somebody, in my opinion, made a mistake in judgment. I couldn't do this.

Q: I'm not sure that it was necessarily a mistake, it was a question of...

W: We had to have airplanes...

Q: We had to have airplanes and they got the Willow Run plant and the B-24,

this was Consolidated, Reuben Fleet.

W: There were lots of political reasons why this had to happen.

Q: And they tried to get all kinds of airplanes of all descriptions.

W: I think part of this came from Mr. Roosevelt. He wanted numbers of airplanes.

Q: The 50,000 concept. After a long career in appreciating the Navy, he suddenly came awake to airpower.

W: That's right.

Q: Were you in Europe when Arnold came over around Labor Day 1943?

W: Well, I might have been, but if I was, I didn't see him. I had already been ordered back. I left England on the 9th of Sept 1943.

Q: He was there right about that time.

W: I was down at High Wycombe at that time. I was writing a little treatise on tactics and techniques of heavy bombardment which was supposed to go for the education of group commanders. But I don't think it ever got printed. I can't find it.

Q: While you were down at High Wycombe, he came around Labor Day.

W: He might have been visiting out in the bomber area.

Q: Of course, he was very much upset about the Schweinfurt-Regensburg loss of August 17th. Were you involved in that?

W: No, I wasn't involved in it, except I was pretty disturbed about the loss rate, too. I thought then that something should have been done about it, but it wasn't. Do you want to know why the loss? If people had read my book, they wouldn't have had such big losses. I went over to Ducksburg(?), the RAF testing station. They had an FW-190 and some ME-109s. I talked to the fighter pilots that flew them. They said the best operating altitude was for the German

fighters were 11,000 feet and 17,000 feet. Their worst altitude was between 21,000 and 23,000, sometimes as high as 24,000 feet, because they had an automatic supercharger, which was dependent upon altitude changes for cutting in and out. So between 21,000 and 23,000 and 23,500 feet, their superchargers were whooping the engines up or dropping them off. But their best operating altitude at 17,000 feet. The leader of the Schweinfurt raid dropped down from 23,000 feet to 17,000 feet. He couldn't have taken a man at a worst altitude. Now most people don't know this about German airplanes, because nobody ever went to the trouble.

Q: Were they briefed on this matter beforehand?

W: I doubt it. I wrote this up before that. But that's what I was saying, is that I don't believe that this little treatise of mine was ever fully typed out and distributed among the group commanders, as it should have been.

Q: It could have been embarrassing?

W: That could have been.

Q: Arnold came over there, and I have been told that he and Eaker had a knockdown, dragout. It wasn't long after that Eaker departed the scene. Eaker was very unhappy to leave, as you know.

W: I'm sure he was. Eaker was a wonderful man. He really fought the battle for daylight bombing. This wasn't Eaker's fault. This was Fred L. Anderson's or Newt Longfellow's, one of those two.

Q: Newt Longfellow had it before?

W: I know, and Freddy Anderson took it over. This was during that change of periods, and Freddy Anderson was there when I left. Freddy Anderson should have had it published. I've tried to look through Freddy Anderson's papers, and I can't find this treatise. I don't know what happened to it. I've looked

in the 8th AF records out here at the Archives, and down at Maxwell.

Q: Do you remember the title of it?

W: "Tactics and Techniques of Heavy Bombardment."

Q: I'll look in Arnold's papers.

W: I doubt if he would have them. It was for the European theater.

Q: I want to talk to you about the lack of long range escort until around January 1, 1944. The P-51 with the Merlin engine. We could have had the P-51 a year or two before. Why didn't we appreciate that?

W: I don't know. See, I was not involved in R&D at that time at all. I was not a fighter pilot. I'd never flown a fighter until I got to Wright Field. But the British bought the P-51 off the drawing board. And yet, out people didn't like the P-51.

Q: They didn't like the Allison engine. It wasn't much good. When the British put the Merlin in, the Rolls Royce engine....

W: I was still a group commander and I was one of the ones that was interested in it. I joined in very vigorously in the discussion with the fighters. We went down to a place called Colerne, I'd say about May, down near Bath. And we had the British fighters and all the American bomber commanders and all the American fighter commanders, group commanders that we had in England at that time. RAF Peterson, what we called "Barksdale" Peterson, these were two different Petersons. Zemkie, Don Blakeslee, although Blakeslee was not a group commander yet. There was one other, I think Graham, that were participating from the American side. The British gave their impression first. In our early raids when our Spitfires supposedly would escort us, they - as far as I was concerned sitting down there in the lead bomber - I never did even see them. I never saw an escort fighter. I was

there, I flew my last mission in May 1943. I never did see an escort fighter. If they were there, they were too far above us, or too far out to the side. Their speed was such that they couldn't stay with us, and they couldn't go very far.

Q: You had Jugs?

W: No, we didn't have any P-47s. They were Spitfires, and there were some P-38s, but I never did see them. At this fighter meeting which was called, because we had been griping about the lack of fighter escort, the fighters got up and gave their problems and we told them our problems, and we agreed on this S-ing that the fighters would do. There would be some fighters, like a rolling barrage. There would be some fighters for a while, and then they would go out in front, and then they would peel off and go back home. But it would be on a time basis that there would be a continuous cover, but fighters could not go slow enough to stay over us, and be able to defend themselves. It was just that simple.

Q: Do you remember the XB-40?

W: Yes, yes.

Q: That petered out?

W: Well, it was too heavy, much too heavy.

Q: Whose idea was that?

W: I really don't know.

Q: I was told the fellow Al Lyon had something to do with that?

W: I don't think so. I think this thing just gradually grew up.

Q: It was sort of a jerry-built idea?

W: Very much.

Q: Would you say that responsibility goes back to the Air Corps Tactical

School where they felt that the fighter could not keep up with the bomber?

W: Oh, I don't think so. You know, there was this silly thing that they had out for a while, in the B-17 handbook, that when you were attacked by a fighter, you just pushed the throttles forward and climbed away from them. Now this might have been true in 1937 when the first one rolled out, but by the time the Germans were swooping through us, and outclimbing and outrunning us, this was silly.

Q: That's what I mean. You see, there was a period of time when they felt that fighters could not catch the bomber.

W: The B-10 goes faster than the P-12.

Q: This was the doctrine at the time.

W: Well, yes, but it wasn't the doctrine right up in the fighting, scratching people. We knew better. We couldn't outrun a fighter, steadily.

Q: One of the things you said intrigues me, and this brings me to talk about the wing-tanks problem. Waiting for long range escort, we needed some interim idea. One of the ideas was wing-tanks - put wing-tanks on the fighters. The P-47's were coming in, and the P-38's were around. If you gave them an extra couple hundred miles range, we might be able to do it. And no wing tanks. They were using these cardboard wing tanks from the British, but I mean Wright Field took forever and a day getting this developed. Did you have any knowledge of this problem?

W: Not in the sense that it was a problem back in the states. I knew that the fighters were beginning to carry wingtanks. They always said that they had to drop them if they were jumped. This didn't seem to be a problem to me, I don't think we considered this a problem in the theater to the same extent that possibly the people at home who had not fought a war yet. Because it is a

lot simpler to sit back home here and do a lot of writing on tablets without really getting involved yourself.

Q: You know Arnold had a great respect for guys who were in combat, partly for the reason that he himself never got into combat.

W: That's probably so. I think that's why he wouldn't let me go back to war, I came up here for 10 days and stayed three years. I went in as Chief of the Officer's Branch.

Q: Did he hang on every word you said?

W: I'm not sure. I know that he did.

Q: He seemed to be paying attention?

W: Oh yes, he was, he stayed through the whole briefing. I'm satisfied that he was interested in combat people. But at the same time, Eaker had put me up for a star, and he didn't.

Q: He didn't promote you?

W: I didn't get promoted until 1952, and I was put up in the Spring of 1943.

Q: Eaker put you up?

W: Eaker put me up, and Spaatz also countersigned it.

Q: Why did they take Newton Longfellow out of there?

W: Can I speak freely? He was one of the ones, and I wouldn't say this except he is dead now...

Q: Has he passed on? It must be very recent.

W: Yes, but he just didn't have brains enough to be wing commander.

Q: He lived out there in California.

W: Yes, but he was, I think he was in the El Paso area when he died. No, he was in California when he died. He had retired first into the El Paso

area. But he did some of the damnest things that the Group Commanders...to protect our people, we had to indulge in subterfuges. He wanted to send us to La Pallice (sub-pens) with 6,000 lbs. of bombs. I did the math, my S-4 - I was just breaking in my S-4 - who turned out later to be a wonderful man, guy named Guy Whetstone. My math said that we couldn't get there with 5,000 lbs. of bombs, because we needed a wing tank. So I called up Ops and told him that I couldn't go to La Pallice without one bomb bay tank. That meant that I was limited to, at the most, 2,500 lbs. of bombs. I thought this was kind of wasteful to send us that far for that little pinprick that we would be dropping.

Q: They had about 2 feet of concrete or more, maybe.

W: We didn't find this out till after the war. We found out later on that we never did hurt a sub pen. The only way we could have hurt a sub pen was to have gone in at low level and skipped bombs into them.

Q: Or maybe catch one coming out?

W: Yes, but then that would be difficult. This is a great error of probability, and it just wouldn't work.

Q: It certainly wasn't worth the risk or the cost, the results you could obtain?

W: Well, Longfellow came on the phone and said we would go and we would carry at least 5,000 lbs of bombs. I said: "Well, I'll have to look into my availability." So about an hour later, I called back and said I'd only have two airplanes available that could go that far based on their fuel consumption records. In the meantime, I'd called around to some of my friends, and said: "What are you going to do?" And they said: "We don't know." So I said: "Well, I'm not going." And I told them why. So everybody called in that they only had

one or two airplanes available. You needed 10 guns to fight one German fighter. So this made this kind of silly mission.

Q: You are talking when - early 1943?

W: No, late '42, and possibly a little bit earlier. They sent up also to St. Nazaire. I was at 7,000 feet. I was leading the contingent, and I had the 306th Group right behind me. I'm telling you, they told us that the light flak wouldn't get up that high, and it was too low for the heavy flak. The heavy flak, if it went that high, would just hole us and go on through. It wouldn't burst. Well, heavy flak was bursting below us, and the light flak was going above us. We looked like a bunch of Roman candles on the 4th of July. That was a bad one. We only made that one. But these were a couple of things that....

Q: Bad intelligence.

W: Oh yes, Longfellow's stupidity.

Q: Colerne meeting?

W: This meeting about the fighters. He had ordered us that the Group Commanders were to go down there by the B-17s. Every one of us - we had our own stations - we were well apart. One airplane could have carried all of us, but it was kind of silly, it was also dangerous to put all the Group Commanders into one airplane. So he said that every Group Commander would take his own airplane.

Q: This is Longfellow?

W: Yes, but I was going to be at High Wycombe by order, some formation. This was not my own choice, but I was going to be at High Wycombe, and that was halfway down there. I was going to be in my staff car, and I wanted to drive from High Wycombe to Colerne. That would have saved 4 engines on a B-17 and lots

of aviation fuel. Well, Longfellow didn't want you to use a car. I don't know why. There was less auto fuel for internal combustion engines of that small size, as against aviation fuel, which costs a lot more. Maybe they did import more as a percentage. It was easier to bring in bigger "drinkers" with the aviation fuel. Anyway, this had to be personally approved by Longfellow that I would drive a staff car and use about say 10 or 12 gallons of motor fuel, as against 300 or 400 gallons of aviation fuel. Now, this is not...when he greeted us, and asked us, coming in, he talked to us for an hour, and he said next to nothing about the war. All he talked about was the abuses of motor transportation. He was just a small minded man.

Q: I thought to talk to him but I changed my mind. He lived near Mrs. Arnold. Something else you said reminded me. There was this argument over the rotation policy - 25 missions. This thing got kicked around, and then finally somebody in Washington decided there would be no specific number.

W: That was way later in the war. But this got to be a mathematical problem, and the way we finally settled it, in Europe that there would be 25, was based on our loss rate. Our prognosis was that when we based on our expectations at first for the 91st Bomb Group - and I had the best survival rate in Europe, because I was a tough Group Commander, but I was good to my people. I really took care of them. I told them discipline on the ground will save your life in the air. On the 19th of April 1943, the last airplane was going to go out of there for its last mission, because we weren't getting any replacement airplanes, no replacement crews, no nothing, for a long time. Later on, when we began to get replacement crews and airplanes, then it turned out that your survival rate at the end of 25 missions was, according to Operations Analysis, would be on the order of .27. Mathematically, that's what it turned out to be,

.278. Now, that means that one out of four crews is going to come home. Now, that is not a very good survival rate. It is not conducive to having large numbers run to volunteer for bombers.

Q: Did this create a morale problem?

W: Yes, except, I used to get up and wrap the flag around me, and walk up and down the stage. I told my people that we were just the finger in the dike. We had to hold the line until they could build more airplanes, and train more crews. There would be a day when you would fly over Germany and not see a single fighter.

Q: And it happened?

W: Yes, it did happen, and I said, in the meantime, we are not doing much damage, but we've got to stay here and we've got to keep going, and someday we'll build up a force and then we will really make ourselves felt. And my people, I never had a man, not one single crew member, fail for lack of intestinal fortitude. I had one navigator that I relieved from duty, at the request of his friends, because he was having combat dreams. He only had five missions and he got shot up, either he was wounded, or his airplane was really beaten up on every one of his five. On his fifth one, his squadron commander, Eep Myers, who was a wonderful man, he was a commander of the 401st. His navigator, just bend down to do something over his mapboard and a 20 mm shell grazed his neck. It burned him and drew blood, and went on up and hit the control column and burst and hit the femoral artery of this Major Myers. As I say, everybody loved Eep Myers, he was a wonderful man. So this was his last mission, because he was always waking up and sitting up in the middle of his bed at night, screaming. He had so many combat dreams that his friends and cellmates, the people who stayed in his combat hut, a delegation came to

me and said: "Would you please take him off combat and send him home?"

Q: There is a good reason for it, those fellows....

W: They needed their sleep, and nobody could sleep around this poor guy. He wasn't afraid to go again, but it just got to be a matter of....

Q: When you came home in September 1943, Arnold was going into a phase of doubts about the whole strategic bombing operation.

W: I never heard that. I don't know. He might have been.

Q: See, he and Eaker were having some sessions.

W: O.A. Anderson was involved in a few. I think Arnold flew O.A. out of Washington, because Arnold's mind wasn't fast enough to comprehend Anderson's concepts.

Q: Was he a brilliant guy?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Kuter was doing some planning for him, too, wasn't he at this time?

W: Kuter came over.

Q: He came over, but came right back from North Africa.

W: Yes, but he came over and had the 1st Wing for a while. Then Possum Hansell took it.

Q: He didn't stay very long?

W: No, he went out to North Africa, but he did a good job in that 1st Wing.

Q: After "Black Thursday," this was the October 14th raid, Eaker stopped flying deep missions for 2 or 3 months.

W: He had to. His loss rate was such, and his replacement rate was such that he couldn't support it.

Q: But Arnold was sending a lot of planes in, and that's when he told Eaker that, "if you can't fly the missions, I can send these out to the Pacific," because

there was a crying need for B-17s and B-24s coming off the line. I think this is when Arnold decided in his own mind that he was going to make the change.

W: Well, in all honesty, I don't think that it made any difference who was commander, I think that it was just plain mathematics. You needed, you had to have 10 x .50 cal guns to match one German fighter.

Q: It wasn't until January 1944 when the P--51s started coming in and then you got the kind of protection?

W: Once in a while they would outfly their fighter protection and take a pasting. But you must remember that in the early days, we only had, I think - I don't know what the facts are - but I would say we only had 2 or 3 real good fighter groups in the German AF opposing us. We had one that was stationed at Abbeville. We called them "The Abbeville Kids." They had the yellow-nosed bastards and they were good.

Q: The ME 109s?

W: The ME 109s, and later on, they also had FW-190s. Of course, as we started going up and around Wilhelmshaven and the Hamburg-Keil area, we began to get some FW-190s. But they would send The Abbeville Kids. I fought them over Hamburg. I just don't think they had enough German fighters to really give us a pasting.

Q: Of course, later on, there were more German fighters.

W: They started bringing in more German fighters. They got better control of their fighters, and they got to the point where they could do a mission against us, say over Holland, land in Germany, and rearm and refuel and be back up 17 minutes later, the same bunch fighting us. And they could do three missions against us going in. And, say, probably to Regensburg or Schweinfurt,

they could probably do four missions. You could tell the difference, too. the German fighter pilot that I last saw in May 1943, wasn't as good as the ones I saw in November and December of 1942. We were killing off their good people. We weren't shooting down as many airplanes as we claimed, but we were getting their good, bright-eyed vigorous combat people.

Q: There is a good deal of criticism, I think Peter Masefield, the writer, about exaggerated claims by the 8th AF, of German planes shot down.

W: I don't think that they were intentionally exaggerated.

Q: Two people seeing one plane shot down and reported two planes. Do you think these were honest mistakes?

W: Oh yes, I don't think there was a calculated policy. In all honesty, I don't think that we are that devious.

Q: This caused Arnold some problems with people like Under Secy Patterson because when they started adding up all these claims - maybe like the Viet Nam war - if all these claims each week of the number of Viet Cong killed, I think it would take about the whole population. So, the same thing with German planes.

W: In combat, you don't look for a long time at one specific airplane. You've got to have a swivel neck, or you don't come back. You will look at an airplane for maybe two seconds, or maybe a split part of a second, and you've got to look somewhere else. When people talk about seeing a B-17 go down and see 3 chutes or 10 chutes, I could never be sure of that. I've been in combat, and I couldn't tell you honestly, how many chutes I had actually seen, because you would look at that airplane and then you would watch the fighter coming in, and then you would turn inside the fighter. The next thing, you'd look down, maybe you would see 3 chutes, and I never did see 10 chutes coming out of a B-17, personally. So I don't think it was intentionally exaggerated. I just

think that you can't look long enough. You can see one man pop out of a fighter, because I've seen a fighter blow up. I've seen several of them, and that was one fighter, but I couldn't tell you who shot that fighter down.

Q: Sometimes it was an honest mistake, two or three guys made claims of one plane. I wanted to ask you about Tommy Hitchcock. He worked for Amb. Winant, and he is generally given credit for being the first, or among the first, to have recognized the P-51's merit.

W: I don't know anything about that. The only person that I knew was really pushing for the P-51 was Herb Zemke.

Q: He was one of our group commanders. Is he still around?

W: I think so. I think he's still alive.

Q: I'll try to look him up. Did he ever make his star?

W: No.

Q: I didn't see him in the General Officer list.

Q: You say, General Arnold had a list of 80 officers....

W: Over 80, I think it was 84, that they were not to go overseas during WWII, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I had the list. And it had some good men on it, too.

Q: This was a list of people who had stubbed...?

W: These were full Colonels that were not going to be allowed to go to combat.

Q: Why?

W: Arnold didn't want them to ever be a General. He wouldn't allow them to get in a place where they could achieve any lasting fame, or measure their ability. He just didn't want them to be a General.

Q: This gets into another area. I've asked this question a number of times and I've gotten different answers. Did Arnold bear grudges? Obviously, he did.

W: Oh boy, I'll say he did. He certainly did. One of these men was Carl Axtater, whom I always thought was a very fine Colonel. I think he would have made a good general, but Carl Axtater was on this list. I don't know what the grudge was about. I think one of the worst things you could do was to be right when Arnold was wrong. And I think this happened to Carl Axtater. Now, there were several, there were probably 20, maybe 30 Colonels on there, who were superannuated. They shouldn't have even been Colonels.

Q: He talked about deadwood. This was his favorite expression.

W: This is true, he had it.

Q: And there were some who were deadwood. But as you may point out, there were some who crossed him in some way?

W: That's right.

Q: In other words, if you were right, and he was wrong, he never forgave you?

W: I believe this is true. But I asked Carl later on, much later, long after, when he was about to retire, what came on. He had a quarrel with Arnold.

Q: About what?

W: I don't know what it was about, but it was a quarrel, and Carl swore he was right, and the events proved him right, and Arnold never....

Q: Was a guy named Morton McKinnon on the list, too?

W: Yes.

Q: How about Shepler Fitzgerald?

W: Yes, he was on it.

Q: How about, Davenport Johnson made his star, but he and Arnold had a tiff.

W: No, he wasn't on the list.

Q: How about Douglas Netherwood?

W: Yes, but he was deadwood.

Q: Legitimate?

W: There was one Colonel in the AF who was senior to Arnold on the regular list. It doesn't sound right does it. As a Colonel, his serial number was lower than Arnold's.

Q: It wasn't Sue Clagett?

W: No, no, it wasn't Clagett, it wasn't Goodpasture, but it's a name something like it started with "Good" and then some other name. He was down at Eglin at the time. He was senior to Arnold. Of course, by this time, Arnold had five stars, and this man was still a Colonel. But he was on the list.

Q: What was the circumstances of their disagreement, do you know? Was it something in their early careers?

W: Many of these were deadwood. There is no question about that. We had one Colonel out at Wright Patterson who had been 26 years a mess officer, and somehow, in his normal progression he had gone up to be a full Colonel, and a mess officer. That is all he had ever done. Of course, he got caught up some way. He was out of the service before the war was over, before his normal retirement. Then we had another Colonel who used to go off on cross countries, and drink, and not get home for 4 or 5 days late. Something like that, Arnold called me up one day....

Q: You were in the General Officer's Branch at the time?

W: No, no, I was Chief of the Officer's Branch, and I don't know who had the General Officer's Branch. But, anyway, I heard the squawkbox go and Arnold said: "Find so and so." I'll think of his name presently. Anyway, "find so

and so and have him out of the service by 6:00 tonight." I said: "Yes sir." What else could I say? So I started scouting around and we finally found him, I got some other people to help me, and we found him drunk in his bunk at the Ambassador Hotel. He had been in WWI, maybe you will remember his name too. He became a Minister later on.

Q: Lester Maitland:

W: That's right. Lester J. Maitland.

Q: He's in Arizona now.

W: Well, he was out in Michigan as a minister, Les Maitland. He used to, shall I say, exaggerate the circumstances of his engine failure. In other words, he would just get drunk, and not show up.

Q: You know, in his case...

W: But he left the service by 6:00 at his own request. He retired.

Q: When was that around '44?

W: Yes, '44 or '45. But he had been in WWI, certain people who had been in the war, had the right of requesting retirement.

Q: He and Hegenberger had flown across to Hawaii. You know, Arnold gave him several chances.

W: Yes, I know he did.

Q: He was in Europe, when Arnold came there Labor Day 1943, he was supposed to have reformed, and I think he didn't show up for some occasion.

W: Probably for Arnold's briefing.

Q: Whatever it was, and I think Arnold said send him home. So they sent him home and I think he promised to reform, again.

W: That's right.

Q: Arnold forgave him and then something must have happened, which caused

him to call you on the squawk box. But he forgave him a number of times.

W: But, not that day, he just said: "Out of the service by 6:00."

Q: And that was it. Did he do things like this, impulsive things?

W: Oh yes. One day I had a Colonel show up in my office, and say: "Colonel, I'm in here on temporary duty," from someplace out in Texas, San Angelo or something like that. He said: "General Arnold just told me to take this package up to Blue West 8." And I said, "Well, then, I'll cut you a set of orders and you can go to BW 8."

Q: This is Greenland?

W: Yes. And he said: "I'm supposed to be here two nights ago." And I said: "I'm real sorry. If Gen Arnold told you to take this, I can cut a set of orders that will protect you, and you'll be on the 6:00 airplane out of National on your way north this afternoon." And I cut a set of orders and he went to Greenland to deliver this package. Because if General Arnold said it was so, then of course, it is so.

Q: I've had 25 people tell me that Arnold grabbed them in the hall and sent them on some mission halfway around the world, and this was it. You had to go.

W: That's right, this is the only time it occurred when I was physically involved with it.

Q: Did he ever grab you in the hall and ask you to do something alien to your expertise?

W: No, no, never did. I didn't hang around the hall by Gen Arnold's office. I was busy in my own bailiwick.

Q: Was it fairly well known: "Don't be caught in the E-ring?"

W: I don't know. One Sunday I happened to be in my office and I got a

frantic call from Gen Yount, and he said: "Gen Arnold just called me and said, have every regular officer in the Training Command on his way to war within 20 days. I said: "Do you mean 30 days?" He said: "No, he said 20." And I said: "General, that is the worst thing that could happen." I said: "Now, I'm a great believer in regular officers have a democratic chance to go to war, except certain ones I will not approve their orders. But everybody else, all the regular officers, should get a chance to go to war." And I said: "Why don't you and Terry Morrison get up a schedule" - he was Personnel for Yount in the Training Center - I said: "Why don't you get a real good program going of so many officers per month to go to war, so that they will have all gone overseas by such and such a day." And he said: "Well, will Gen Arnold buy it?" And I said: "I think so. If you just do it, and come in here tomorrow with a real good program and a bunch of nice charts. Show your flow and everything." So he did, and Arnold bought it. He just got tired of the fact that Yount wouldn't allow any Regular Officers to go to war. He may have done this for shock, but he meant it. As far as Arnold and Yount were concerned, this was an order.

Q: Arnold had mixed feelings about this, on one hand because he himself was not in combat he was a "softie" on people like Norstad and Kuter, who importuned him and said: "Let me get out there and fight my war." On the other hand, he wanted to keep good men.

W: He had to keep some good men but he didn't have to keep as many as he had.

Q: I wonder what could have triggered this impulsive order you describe?

W: I think that he had just gotten tired....

Q: Of Yount protecting these fellows?

W: Yes, because a lot of Regular Officers would write into Arnold and say: "Please let me go to war." Of course, if they weren't on the roster, he would try to do something about it. But he was given to things like that.

Q: How about a guy named Clinton W. Howard - Jan Howard?

W: No, doesn't ring a bell.

Q: You say there were 80 some officers...?

W: I think about 84 on the list.

Q: And he would not relent with any of these fellows?

W: He never did, as far as I know. And if he found out about any one of them being overseas, he had him back within just days. I mean, don't give them 2 weeks. They were just "zap" and they were out of there. And then I would have to send them back to the command that had originally certified them as being suitable for overseas.

Q: Were you working for Bevans at this time?

W: Yes.

Q: Was he your boss?

W: Yes, as I say, Arnold was given to not telling Bevans what he was doing. He just...I didn't know he was on his squawk box. My flag would flip and here was Arnold saying: "Do so and so." And then, I would tell Gen Bevans what I was doing. I was working for Pinky Wetzel, really.

Q: I talked to both of them. I talked to Wetzel in NJ and Bevans in Florida. They never mentioned this list of Arnold's.

Q: We are talking about Arnold's little list of 84 or so people, and I mentioned that I have been told that Arnold did things in the Personnel area in an impersonal way.

W: No, that is not true. He was quite often very personal. As I say,

somewhere close to 30 of these 84, in my opinion, were deadwood, of my knowledge. Now there could have been more than that deadwood. But in my own mind, also, there were 4 or 5 that I considered very topnotch officers. Now, all of these were Colonels but one. There was one Major on there, I can't remember. I should. It was so unusual.

Q: These four men, in your opinion, had great ability.

W: Four or five, I was surprised that they weren't already generals, they were very senior colonels.

Q: Do you remember names?

W: No, the only one I remember was Carl Axtater, but I can remember some of the others who were on there. There was a guy named Post, like you mentioned, Netherwood, and so forth.

Q: Netherwood was taken out of Latin America. He crossed somebody down there. I don't know what happened. He was taken out, and that about finished him. I'm reminded of something somebody told me that Arnold, in a sense, showed partiality to those who came up on the West Coast with him.

W: Highly possible.

Q: In preference to those who had come up on the East Coast with Andrews.

W: Whom he didn't know. As I said, I was on the General Officer's list. I was No. 1 on the top of the Colonels who were submitted, I think it was around April 1943. On the note on the side was: "I do not know this man. Do you? HHA." And underneath was "No, BG," Barney Giles, who was the Vice Commander. Had I been known to either one of these. Now, Arnold had met me, but he didn't know me. He had no idea of my capability. Now had I met him in England, say on that time, but I hadn't, because he hadn't been to England.

Q: If you had not been down there running this little treatise and had met him....

W: It was too late. He had disapproved me. He had taken me off the list, because the Chief always had the last say before it went to the Secy.

Q: Well, it went to Marshall, or did it?

W: It may have, but I don't think so.

Q: Did Marshall exercise any veto on promotions?

W: He could have. I'm sure he did, yes.

Q: You know, Marshall felt that the AAF was much too liberal in awarding DFCs and Air Medals, and what not.

W: I never did get a DFC. I fought a year in England, and I never got a DFC. I got Air Medals and I got a Silver Star. I got a Silver Star for nothing. But three or four times in Europe I really did something wonderful, and I would just be so proud of myself, and I wouldn't even, nobody would even call me up and congratulate me. I didn't get a medal that I thought I really deserved. I think that probably the system, and it was an Army system, was so cumbersome that before you could digest all the facts it didn't count any more.

Q: Some people got a lot of recognition. Take LeMay.

W: Yes, well, LeMay was a good man, and he did a good job.

Q: Right, and he got the recognition. Now, Possum Hansell was more of a thinker, a planner, than he was an operator.

W: Possum was not real strong.

Q: I heard a story about him in the ETO, too.

W: Kuter was the most, I wouldn't say, suave, but he was the most self-controlled and best wing commander in the 1st Wing, that I saw, and I saw them all the way up to Paul Williams.

Q: There were some people who didn't like him.

W: Kuter? Well, I can understand that. He was too smart for them.

Q: Like Spaatz and Eaker didn't think much of him. He was one of Arnold's fair-haired boys, so was Norstad. A lot of people thought maybe he was too good looking?

W: No, I think the thing they objected to on Norstad was, as far as I knew, he never even was a squadron leader. He never was anything except on the staff. I've never even seen him fly an airplane, and I've been in airplanes he was in, and he always flew as copilot. Most of your fighting, biting, scratching guys, they fly as pilot.

Q: How about Arnold, did he like to fly?

W: I don't know. I never was in the airplane with Arnold. He got mad at me a couple of times because one time, we were up at the Army-Notre Dame game, and I had an airplane in at Newark.

Q: During the war?

W: This was, yes, probably it was during the war. That's when they had the Army-Notre Dame game in NY, and I was with a guy named Joe Barron. We were coming back on Sunday, and as far as we were concerned, we thought this was perfectly all right. But we bumped into a MG in the Army who was, Richardson, who was the Comptroller, and he said he had to get back. He had a big meeting that he had to be there. So we said: "Sure, we would be glad to ride you back." We went out to Newark, and everything was socked in, the whole NY area, and the Washington area, everything was socked in. So I went up to the weatherman, and told him, I said: "We can get into Washington between 1 and 3 o'clock." Fact of the matter is that you can really get into almost any place between 1 and 3 o'clock, because there is a lifting of ceiling and improvement in visibility.

Q: Is this AM or PM?

W: In the afternoon. So I said: "If you will call" - I gave him the number

to call down there. We had a weather officer in the Pentagon. I said: "If you will call them and get a special forecast, and if you would just lift your ceiling about this much. Let us run down the runway. You can close it again." So he said he would do it. He said: "This is your responsibility." And I said: "Sure, we can do it." I wouldn't do it if - I'm a great believer in my own neck, too. So we put this Army MG in the back and Joe Barron and I ran down the runway. We had this special forecast, we got out there and got at the end of the runway. Ran our engines up, and asked if they had any new weather information, and they did. They gave us a new weather thing at Washington, and a new one for Newark. We tore down the runway and lifted our wheels. I don't think we had 300 feet of ceiling. But before we got into the soup, we had an amendment to that. They had put the ceiling back down where it really was. I think it was possibly 200, maybe 150 feet, but we were off and it was just like riding in a featherbed. It was one of the softest instrument flights that I ever made. We came into Washington. Nobody else was flying. We came into Washington National, because we had this Army MG. We had to leave the airplane, because conditions were such that we couldn't fly any place else. We couldn't even take it across the river to Bolling. Arnold was out at Mitchel Field trying to get off. And the next, I guess about Tuesday, Gen Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants an explanation of why you could get out of the NY area and he couldn't." I didn't tell him the whole story, I said: "General, if you will just look at the weather sequences, we got a weather report that allowed us to get out of Newark. We were not at Mitchel; we were at Newark, and we got out on a strictly legitimate weather reading. We came in here, we were coming into National, we had been coming into Bolling; we couldn't have landed at Bolling - because they didn't have the

capability, the aids that they had at National."

Q: Did you give Arnold the explanation?

W: I gave it to Bevans, and Bevans called up and said: "Stan Wray is here, and he says so and so." You could hear "R-R-R-R." Arnold was mad about this.

Q: Did he ever chew you out?

W: No, he never did.

Q: Did you have much contact with him, or did you go to Bevans, mostly?

W: No, I never did approach him, Arnold, personally. I never went to Arnold, except when I was sent to him.

Q: And then you were in trouble?

W: No. He wanted something, and it was something that he thought I could do and nobody else could do. He had very fixed opinions on things like that. Some of the things he gave me to do were not in my province, but that was all right, I did them.

Q: Did you feel that he was flexible or inflexible in his thinking about things?

W: I don't think Arnold was very flexible. I think he was inflexible.

Q: What was his greatest characteristic in your mind?

W: Just that, his, I don't know if you want to call it stubbornness or strength, but when he had embarked on a plan, he was going to go on and do that.

Q: Even if part of it was wrong?

W: I think if he found out it was wrong, I think he would have changed it. But other people, you know, some of the people we had in those days, were inclined to be a little shilly-shally, but not Arnold. He was not the brightest man in the AF, but he was the one that prosecuted that war.

Q: When you say that, you mean he was not ideologically motivated, in the sense some people talked about strategic airpower, or a separate AF?

W: Oh, I think he was all in favor of a separate AF, and strategic airpower.

Q: When you say "not the smartest man"?

W: I just don't think he was.

Q: You mean in absorbing briefings?

W: I think, for instance, Gen Andrews was. I was more impressed with Gen Andrews than I was with Arnold. I didn't care much for Gen Brett. He had a great reputation in the AF, but he didn't ring true.

Q: What qualities did Andrews have that Arnold lacked?

W: One of them was his intelligence. I don't know, it's an indefinable thing, but I just never thought Arnold was real smart.

Q: Andrews had an ability to make men follow him?

W: That's right, people liked him.

Q: Did you have some contact with Andrews?

W: Not as much as I had with Arnold.

Q: Hugh Knerr thought very highly of Andrews. Did you know that Knerr was pushing for a separate AF early in the war, right around Pearl Harbor?

W: Sure, yes. He was also a very good man, too.

Q: He and Arnold didn't get along, but Arnold had great admiration for Knerr?

W: Great respect for his brain.

Q: For his ability, and Knerr got promoted, there's a case of a guy on Arnold's list perhaps.

W: No, he wasn't on that list.

Q: He wasn't on that list, but the fact that Arnold regarded him as a man of high ability, overcame the fact that he otherwise would be on the list.

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: Knerr and Arnold crossed swords on several occasions. The Alaskan flight, problems with Knerr wanting to come back on active duty. Did you know this?

W: No.

Q: Knerr tried to get back on active duty, he had retired, Arnold did not break any world's records getting him back. He was writing these nasty letters to Andrews, about Arnold. And Arnold knew this, yet Arnold....

W: I didn't know that.

Q: Arnold got him back in, and also, I'm sure, must have had a hand in his promotion.

W: Oh, he had to.

Q: Because he became a deputy to Spaatz.

W: He had to approve it.

Q: So this is a case where sheer ability overcame his personal feeling. I wonder if this would be an exception, or are there other cases?

W: I don't know of any other.

Q: You see, here is a case of Knerr having come up with Andrews, whereas some fellows who came up with Arnold like Eaker, Spaatz, McNarney, Dunn, some other people. Did you know Minton Kaye?

W: Yes.

Q: Minton Kaye was one of Arnold's favorites, and he ended up on Arnold's list.

W: I didn't know that.

Q: He was a Colonel, never made General. George Goddard...

W: Yes, George Goddard. George finally made it, of course, years later.

Q: He got on Arnold's list, too. Was he on that 84 list?

W: He was on that list.

Q: Why?

W: I think possibly because he was so narrow. All he knew was photography, and he was - with all due regard, I like George Goddard - but he was a bore about photography. Now there are people who will say that I'm a bore about photography and about tapes, but that's all he talked. I mean he didn't say: "Would you like a Scotch and water?" He'd say: "Did you see that picture I had, so and so." That's all he would talk about, photography. He was always rushing into Arnold's office to get such and such approved, and get some more money for his favorite cameras and so on, and he did a wonderful job, no question about it. We had, I think, the best photography in the war.

Q: Right, this strip camera of his....

W: Oh, it's wonderful.

Q: Arnold sent him out of Washington. He became the VD officer at Charlotte. Have you seen his book?

W: I've seen his book but I haven't read that part of it. Was that in it?

Q: Yes, and he became VD officer down in Charlotte, NC. He got sent out of Washington. He had a thing going between himself and Minton Kaye. Minton Kaye at that time was a favorite of Arnold, also a photographer. But Kaye was closer to Arnold, so he won out in the struggle.

Q: Let me ask you about Elliott Roosevelt. What do you know about that case. This case was probably in your lap at one time or another?

W: Over and over and over again. Have you asked Eaker about the letters when he used to write in about getting, from North Africa, to get Elliott Roosevelt rated. I never even took these to Arnold, I just sent them back to him, "dis-approved," with the explanation of why, because I knew that Elliott Roosevelt

was not a Colonel, I mean not on flying status. He was not a pilot. He came into a place called Steeple Morden, which was one of my satellite stations. It was right off, just a little bit southwest of Bassingbourne, which was my station. I happened to be over there one night when Roosevelt, I mean this was his recon outfit on the way to North Africa. Mrs. Roosevelt was there. Now we had no idea that she was even in England.

Q: This is his mother?

W: Yes, Eleanor Roosevelt. Much to our surprise - we were sitting there drinking, and this woman came out. He had a little suite in this Nissen hut. This woman came out of the bedroom and everybody - you just don't do this - then it turned out to be Mrs. Roosevelt, much to our surprise. So I talked to his people, I knew his LTCOLs, and his Majors, and so forth. Elliott didn't do the things that the Congressmen got up and said he did in Congress. I didn't rate him a pilot ever.

Q: And he couldn't become a CO unless he was rated, and then he couldn't get promoted to a General.

W: That's right.

Q: He was recommended by Spatz and Eisenhower toward the end of the war?

W: That's right, and he was finally made.

Q: Arnold opposed this.

W: I didn't know that Arnold opposed it.

Q: Arnold opposed it. Arnold wrote back and said he would get in trouble on it, and they overruled him. They overruled him when he got sick. Remember Arnold had a heart attack?

W: Yes, who did this? I never did rate Roosevelt and I don't know who did, but I know it was along towards the tag-end of the war.

Q: This is around January 1945. It happened when Arnold had a heart attack.

W: I remember when he was out and had the heart attack. But I still did not rate him.

Q: But he got his promotion. I'm guessing now, and I was up to Hyde Park to look at records, but they wouldn't show me any. I think, simply, Papa ordered it.

W: I think this is highly possible.

Q: Arnold was opposed to it because he felt he would get in trouble.

W: I didn't even ask Gen Arnold or Bevans or Pinky Wetzel. I didn't even refer it up. As far as I was concerned he was not a pilot, and I wouldn't make him a pilot. Too many people had risked their lives to become pilots, and if this was the way you became a pilot, then if he wanted to be a pilot, then he should go through flying school. There were other systems. If he wanted to get in, he could have gotten in as a service pilot, and then converted over.

Q: Wasn't this about the time he sent that dog, remember Blaze?

W: Yes, I remember that, too.

Q: That caused a big stink in Washington?

W: That's real funny. I've been on lots of airplanes with lots of dogs, and nobody ever worries about that. But he shouldn't have thrown people off the airplane to put his dog on. All he had to do was get on the airplane with his dog, and let the dog lay on the floor. Nobody would have cared.

Q: Elliott volunteered for some dangerous missions. You know, the FRANTIC mission, shuttle bombing. They turned him down because they were afraid that the President's son might get captured. He also volunteered to reconnoiter the Baffin Bay route. He did several things. If he wasn't the President's son, he probably would have done a lot better, but a lot of people felt he was getting

privileges because of that.

W: Oh, he was.

Q: Yes, he was and people gave it to him not necessarily because he asked for it. As the President's son, some people bow and scrape, and fall all over themselves to try to do it.

W: We just treated him like any other officer. We didn't give him any special consideration, except, as I say, I wouldn't rate him. This was my province in Washington.

Q: Was there heat put on you to rate him?

W: No, none.

Q: You just didn't send the matter to Arnold?

W: I just didn't send it anywhere except back to Gen Eaker saying, "Disapproved." Now, very few Colonels write to MGs and disapprove it. Since that time there has been a policy in the AF, that if you are going to say no to a MG, another MG signs it.

Q: This was good.

W: Eaker and I quite often laugh about this.

Q: So you took the heat off your bosses?

W: Yes.

Q: What was Pinky Wetzel's job at that time?

W: He was Chief of the Military Personnel Division. I had the Officer's Branch at that time.

Q: And both of you worked for Bevans?

W: Yes.

Q: Where did Trubee Davison fit into this?

W: Trubee was downstairs, I think, as an Asst Secy, sort of thing, for Patterson for Air matters. He was crippled and went around the Pentagon in the

electric wheelchair.

Q: Yes, I heard Arnold went around in a wheelchair, too, for awhile?

W: I didn't see him in a wheelchair, I don't know.

Q: What about Suzy Adkins?

W: She was a character.

Q: Did she serve as a weathervane for you?

W: Not for me. I never had any problems with Arnold. I never got chewed out by him. The time he was ever real brusque with me was when he called me up and said: "You go to such and such a place, and do so and so." And he was quite specific.

Q: There are some people who indicate that she would call them and say: "Today is a good day to ask this question," or "today is a bad day to ask that question."

W: O.A. Anderson used to say this. He'd always check with Suzy before he'd go in to see Arnold. If he had something that was controversial.

Q: Was he a brilliant man?

W: I think so, yes.

Q: Was he an iconoclast sort of, ivory tower?

W: No, no, but he was not a great respecter of persons, in the sense that Arnold didn't overawe him at all. I think O.A. was probably thrown out of Arnold's office many times for advocating certain steps that Arnold didn't like.

Q: Was Anderson a bomber man?

W: Yes, I think so. He would knock down anything, I think he had been an observation man, really, because he was a balloonatic.

Q: Yes, he, Stevens and Kepner at one time?

W: Went up in the Explorer 1 and 2, out of Rapid City, SD.

Q: This was in the 1930s?

W: I don't think, as a pilot, that Anderson had any great feeling except he was the kind of a man who was impersonal in a sense that he just simply thought an idea. He said it was going to take so many groups, bombers and so many groups of fighters, and this is how they will have to be used, and we will have this and so support for them. And although Arnold threw him out on that program, that's the program we ended up with for the war.

Q: I was told that Arnold had a great deal of flexibility in terms of either doctrine or R&D?

W: He may have, but he never showed it to me. I took Leigh Mallory in to see Arnold. I was his sort of his American aide, pushing him around. That's when he had become the commander of ..

Q: AEAF.

W: Right. Arnold was downright rude to him in talking about doctrine. I mean, he just didn't ask him outright: "What do you feel about tactical air doctrine," or anything like that. He attacked him, across the desk. I mean, he was picking his ideas to pieces, and I didn't think this was right, even if Arnold was the Chief of the American Air Force. Leigh Mallory had been given a job which I think Arnold thought an American should have.

Q: That job, after they set it up, it was downrated, and Leigh Mallory didn't win much respect among the Americans, and he was having trouble with Spaatz perhaps at the time.

W: Well, this may have been part of the whole system. I think that they felt that an American should have it.

Q: You know, this may be just before OVERLORD. Would this be about the right time?

W: Yes, close to it.

Q: And Leigh Mallory was given a mission but he was given no forces. He had no forces under him. He was having trouble with Spaatz, because he wanted all the air forces to go into a tactical mode to start hitting rail centers and tactical targets in preparation for D-Day. Spaatz wanted to hit the oil targets, the strategic targets, and wanted to continue hitting them for a while. There was a big battle that went on for a period. Could this have been the substance of that discussion with Arnold?

W: No, it wasn't. It was his tactical air doctrine. Arnold didn't even bring up strategic air. B-17s and B-24s were not in this discussion at all. It was all fighter bombers.

Q: And what was Arnold's view?

W: As I say, he was downright rude. I don't remember what the issue was, but it was he did not approve of Leigh Mallory's ideas about fighting the war. This man had just been picked by somebody. I don't know who made Leigh Mallory the commander, but I'm sure he didn't have Arnold's vote.

Q: He didn't have a lot of American votes. This was sort of a compromise, they gave Eisenhower the top job and they gave the top Air job to a Britisher. Leigh Mallory had very little to do, really.

W: Leigh Mallory was a fighter man. He was not a real fighter-bomber man.

Q: Right, you know there was another problem. One of Arnold's favorites for a short period of time was this fellow named Bruce Butler. Bruce Butler had been brought in from the 11th AF to become Deputy to Leigh Mallory. He didn't last long in that job. Did you know that?

W: I knew that Bruce Butler came out, but I didn't know that there was friction between he and Leigh Mallory.

Q: He didn't last long in the job because it must have been friction with somebody, but he was out of there in a very short time.

W: I don't know, maybe he was told not to support Leigh Mallory. In-fighting.

Q: He left that job, and I'm trying to think of who they put in. Did they put Vandenberg in that job?

W: Yes, they did.

Q: But Butler who had done a great job up in the 11th AF didn't last very long.

W: There wasn't anything to do in the 11th AF.

Q: Do you remember Davenport Johnson?

W: Yes.

Q: Davenport Johnson had trouble with Arnold, or vice versa, on the high accident rate in the 2nd AF.

W: I don't know about that.

Q: Arnold was claiming that fellows were coming to the ETO and they were not adequately trained in high altitude gunnery and several other precision skills. The 2nd AF was blamed for these shortcomings. I was told that Davenport Johnson who was commanding the 2nd, said: "If you don't like the job I'm doing, relieve me." Arnold said: "You're relieved."

W: I would believe that.

Q: Would he do a thing like that?

W: Yes, he would.

Q: And then he put his friend, Bill Street, in there.

W: Well, I think, Ent was in there for awhile.

Q: Ent came in later. Ent got in the crash.

W: Yes, he was injured, and I thought then Streett came in. That's my impression.

Q: I can't remember if he preceded Streett or not. But that 2nd AF always gave Arnold a great deal of trouble.

W: Well, this comes back again to the idea as I said before, that I don't think Arnold appreciated the...now, I was in the 8th AF and I know that the people coming to war were not well trained for war. They had to go through another combat training over there. But when I came back here and I talked to people in the Training Command, the Training Command was 2 years behind the war. We had 12 Colonels come over to the ETO, and telling us how people should fire machine guns in combat. They were just, they were insane. Those 12 Colonels went out on a raid the next day, and not one of them came back.

Q: This was in 1943?

W: Yes, all of them were shot down in the Spring of '43.

Q: And you think this was due to...?

W: Well, partly that, not lack of training. As far as they were concerned, they were trained all right, but they just were doing the wrong things. They were telling the gunners where to shoot, and that was wrong.

Q: Were you aware that the 2nd AF was giving trouble, causing these problems, or that Arnold was unhappy?

W: No, the only person that I knew to be unhappy with was Lynn out in the 4th AF. Bill Lynn.

Q: Why there?

W: There was something came up one day. Bevans called me around and he said: "Gen Arnold wants," he said, thinking of all the generals, "do you know who would be a good man to replace Bill Lynn in the 4th AF?" I said: "Well, I

generally don't move Generals around. I move Colonels." But he said: "Yes, you've talked a lot. You know a lot of Generals, and you've given good advice on several occasions." He said: "Give me some advice." So we talked awhile, and I said: "What's the matter with Bill Lynn? He seems like a pretty nice Joe to me." "Well," he said: "He and Arnold are having it out about something." So I got on the phone and called a friend of mine, a Colonel, and said: "Wonder why Bill Lynn doesn't call Arnold up and apologize." I said: "This is a hell of a time to have to change commanders." So I don't know what happened, but Bill Lynn still stayed as commander. But I don't know; it was just suddenly like that.

Q: He was an impulsive man, you feel?

W: Yes, I'm sure he was.

Q: Did he think out some of these impulses?

W: No. I'm sure he didn't. He just reacted. Now I think it is highly possible that he did plan some of these impulsive things, for their shock value.

Q: You saw him get mad many times?

W: Yes.

Q: Although not at you?

W: I was very fortunate.

Q: I was talking to Gene Beebe, who was his aide, and I asked him about, did Arnold get mad, and he said: "Every day."

W: I was going to say several times a day.

Q: And he got very red? Did he become inarticulate; splutter?

W: No, I never saw him spluttering. He was pretty quick. I never saw him splutter, but he got awful mad.

Q: Was he sharp on his feet speaking?

W: I didn't think so.

Q: There are some people who have told me - Curly Wolfenbarger told me...

W: He used to fly Arnold a lot, too, Curly did.

Q: That when Arnold was in Marshall's presence, he was like a lamb.

W: Just soft as butter. I've gone with Arnold a couple of times to early morning briefings. Gen Marshall used to like to have a briefing at 7:00. Couple of times, things came up on personnel, and I'd have to go in to the Pentagon at 4:30 in the morning, and put the briefing together for him. I'd have to have a girl come in and we would have to run this thing through. I wouldn't hear about it till 6 PM or 7 PM the night before. We'd have that thing ready, and I'd have to be down at 6:30 to give Arnold the quick runout. I had to condense everything into one sheet that went on top of this whole staff study or whole report. You had to condense everything into one sheet, the most important things, so that he could underline....

Q: Did he have a one-page mania?

W: Yes, but this was just a cover now. It was not, he didn't mind if a thing was that thick, but he wanted one sheet on top that he could just sit down there and tell Gen Marshall this is so and so.

Q: Was he a great one for briefing aids, visual aids?

W: He liked them, yes.

Q: Did he ever cut guys off who rambled on in a briefing?

W: I don't know. I never saw him do that.

Q: Did he have a reputation for doing this?

W: Yes.

Q: If you strayed?

W: If you didn't know what you were talking about.

Q: Would he get up and walk out, or just cut you off.

W: Just cut them off. Get the next person on.

Q: He had these, he liked early morning briefings himself, didn't he?

W: I don't know whether he liked them or he had them, because of Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall was the one who liked them. Of course, Churchill was just the other way. Whenever we had to go brief Churchill, it was in the late afternoon.

Q: Churchill got going in the afternoon and stayed up half the night.

W: Yes, he did.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold had his heart attack?

W: Yes.

Q: Was there sort of unease in the AAF?

W: Yes, there was great unease; a lot of unease.

Q: Why?

W: Well, the war wasn't over yet, and we just didn't....there had been a little bit of unease once before when Gen Brett came into Washington with no assignment. People thought that Brett was a lightweight, and we felt - the boys in the backroom felt - that somebody was thinking about putting Brett in as Chief. The boys in the backroom didn't have a very good opinion of him, didn't like it. This is what led to the unease I think when Arnold had his heart attack. It was not....

Q: There was nobody there?

W: There was nobody there standing there. Giles was not the stuff; he was a lightweight compared to Arnold.

Q: You know, there was a conference, Arnold, when he came back (off record). You never heard about this particular conference in Cannes?

W: No, I never did. I was not that high in the hierarchy.

Q: This was a very closed-circuit type of thing, and the plan was, let's try to get closer to the new President than we got to the old President. This was top level stuff. Well, Eaker came into office, and I have been told that Eaker had pretensions to be the successor to Arnold.

W: I never got this impression from him. I think that I am a very good friend of Eaker's and I never did hear this, even bruited. I don't think that people thought that Eaker was that high. It was more likely to be Spaatz, as it turned out to be.

Q: You never felt that Eaker was moving into the job?

W: We felt, in the backroom - as I say, the Colonels - that he was just holding Spaatz' saber till ~~Spaatz, Arnold~~ the war was over.

Q: Till Spaatz came back from the Pacific.

Q: You are a friend of Eaker's. Has he ever talked to you about his being shifted out of the ETO?

W: No, we have never discussed that, and we drink pretty strong scotch together.

Q: This is one of the fascinating aspects of the thing. Of course, Eaker never made his fourth star, do you think Arnold had any influence on that?

W: I doubt that very much. He could have, and he would have had to approve a fourth star, but it gets down to the point that - not like we are now - when you had a four star commander, then you had a three star deputy. Now, Arnold was a five star man but there weren't very many five stars passed out.

Q: No, only a half dozen, only in one in the Air Force.

W: That's right, and his vice was a three star for a long time, the vice commander was a three star, Barney Giles. We just didn't have the four stars to pass around like that.

Q: Let's go back to the time when he was down at Coral Gables and they were shuttling. Pete Peterson, they were shuttling down and they were sending in memos. Was Arnold trying to run the AF from a sick bed?

W: I don't think so. I think he was trying to keep informed, because he couldn't make decisions.

Q: Norstad sort of hints that he was running the Air Force, or running the 20th AF at least.

W: He was the head here in Washington, but he, I doubt that he ran the AF.

Q: He wasn't a decision-maker?

W: I doubt it.

Q: How about Lovett and Arnold? Did Lovett try to pick up some of the ball when Arnold was out?

W: I don't think so; not to the best of my knowledge.

Q: Then, there really was nobody to mind the store?

W: That's right, except the Chief of Operations.

Q: Who would that have been, do you mean AAF?

W: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold have a high regard for Fairchild?

W: I don't know.

Q: He was one of the great brains of the AF, was he not?

W: I don't know, as far as I was concerned, he was not.

Q: Who were the brains of the AAF during this period?

W: Kuter. O.A. Anderson, McNarney, people like that, I never knew Fairchild except when he was acting as the Deputy Chief later on.

Q: Most people had a very high regard for him - just like another fellow everybody had had very high regard for - Horace Hickam, they said if he had

survived, he'd have gone to the top.

W: Yes, he was a good man. I liked him very much. You see, I was just coming into the AF at the time he got killed.

Q: How about some of these oldtimers who didn't make it. For example, Foulois, after he left as Chief of Staff, was in good health, he lived 30 years later.

W: The whole thing was, in those days, they didn't make, they didn't have two stars after you were the Chief. You may even go back to Colonel.

Q: Right, this is so. But Fechet had some kind of a job during the war. They gave him Decorations & Awards, but they never gave Foulois another job.

W: I don't know why, of course, Foulois was pretty early in the game.

Q: But Fechet was earlier than Foulois. Foulois started flying, but Fechet was the Chief of Staff before Foulois.

W: Yes, and also he was a MG, Foulois was only a BG.

Q: He became a MG when he was in. Foulois was a MG when he was Chief of the Air Corps.

W: Are you sure?

Q: Yes, I'm positive, from 1931-35.

W: I'm not so sure. From talking with Foulois, I went around a lot with Foulois in his later days. He told me that he was never more than a BG.

Q: Are you talking permanent rank or temporary?

W: I don't know, he said he was never more than a BG.

Q: No, that's not so. I know this to be a fact.

W: He said that this came about through a misapprehension in a Congressional speech, and that he's been listed as a MG in newspapers and so forth.

Q: In his own book he is listed as a MG.

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W: I still say, from what he said, that this is, shall I say, a courtesy?

Q: The Chief of the Air Corps was a MG and he was Chief of the Air Corps for 4 years. But he crossed Roosevelt on the air mail, and he got in trouble, and he also ran as a Republican for Congress. Did you know that?

W: No, I didn't know that.

Q: He ran in 1940 and he lost, and he never had a job during the war. Nothing. They gave him nothing, and of course, Roosevelt was the kind of guy, may be vindictive, like Arnold perhaps. If you crossed Roosevelt, you were dead. He never had a job during the war, but Fehet had a job, and other old timers had a job. I'm thinking of another oldtimer named Jakie Fickel. He was on Arnold's list. Was he on the list?

W: I don't know.

Q: But he never had much of a job. He had the 4th AF early in the war, and they took him out of there, and they never gave him a big job.

W: It's like Henry J. F. Miller. He blabbed about D-Day.

Q: Is this true?

W: Yes.

Q: There was a good reason for taking him out of there?

W: Well, he came back to the States.

Q: Did they break him?

W: Broke him back one rank, I don't think they broke him two ranks. He went out to Wright Field where he had been before.

Q: Do you remember Ed Perrin? He had trouble.

W: Yes, he was a weakling.

Q: And he was in Arnold's office?

W: Yes. He was one of the three bright young boys. I could never understand

why he was a General. That wasn't my business.

Q: He had a problem, didn't he commit suicide?

W: Yes, he was a drunkard.

Q: How about Tom Hanley, he was one of Arnold's hotshots.

W: He was a good man, I never could understand. He got to be a MG and that's all. I don't know what happened.

Q: I missed seeing him, he passed away.

W: His son was about 2 years behind me at the Academy. I saw a lot of him later in the service. But I always liked old Tom Hanley.

Q: Another fellow who was one of Arnold's hotshots, Reuben Hood. Was he a good man?

W: No, he was another one of these very impetuous kind of a guy. But he wasn't smart.

Q: How about Fred Dean?

W: Freddy Dean was a good boy.

Q: He was Arnold's Exec there for a while. He is still active.

W: Freddy was a good boy, and Bill Hall was doing a fine job. Of course, Bill Hall was quite a womanizer.

Q: Yes, I talked to him, he was one of Arnold's favorites, wasn't he?

W: Yes, sure.

Q: How about Rosie O'Donnell?

W: Yes.

Q: He was a great favorite of Arnolds. Was he smart as well as being a good storyteller?

W: Not real brainy. But I don't want to say "clever," but he was, well, everybody likes Rosie. Everybody would protect him to keep him out of trouble.

Q: Did he get in trouble?

W: Oh sure, a lot of times, Rosie, boy he could drink, but at 6:00 the next morning he was clear-eyed and unafraid.

Q: He was unafraid. He was a guy who....

W: Never lasted through the night, but Rosie O'Donnell and I and a couple of our friends have been on his front lawn at 4:30 in the morning, at Bolling AFB. I'm a great believer of Rosie O'Donnell.

Q: Talking about guys who stood up to Arnold, Rosie O'Donnell stood up to Arnold, didn't he?

W: Yes, he did, but he never got chewed out about it. O.A. Anderson did, but he'd throw him out. I know this.

Q: O'Donnell had a way of getting around him?

W: Well, he'd make it fun and games.

Q: How about Norstad? Did he stand up to Arnold?

W: No, Norstad wouldn't fight his way out of a paper bag.

Q: Other people have said this. And Kuter?

W: Yes, Kuter would. Kuter would say: "Now, General, this is the way that this is. This is the only way it can be done." And Arnold would grope around awhile, but he would buy it. But Kuter wouldn't get loud with Arnold.

Q: Kuter didn't get loud with anybody, I think. He had this quiet, steely, strong way about him which earned him a lot of respect.

W: That's right.

Q: The Steve Ferson thing is supposed to have happened in Arnold's office, but I've had different versions of it. And it may be that they moved him next door into Lovett's office, because they didn't want it known that he died in Arnold's office. Bill Streett - I saw him before he died - said: "No, he died in Lovett's office." But two or three people have told me: "No, he died in

Arnold's office."

W: This is highly possible. I don't know, I was clear around, oh, by that time, I was in 5A-286. I was not quite with the others. I was almost as far from Arnold's office as I could be.

Q: As you wanted to be?

W: Well, that's where my office was, and it was far enough for me. I never intentionally went to Arnold's office.

Q: He was not your favorite general?

W: No, I had nothing really against him, but I'd been brought up in the old Army and you just don't push yourself in front of the guy who is the Chief. Now, if you are at a cocktail party - I saw Arnold quite often at cocktail parties - I'd go up and talk to him. In fact, he is the one who started me going to some of these high level cocktail parties, because he would ring my office up and say: "Bring your secretary and meet me at the Statler Hilton in such and such a room at 6:00." "Yes, sir." So, I'd be there and the girl would have her note-pad, and he'd take me off to one side and introduce me to somebody and say: "This man has a problem." And in this particular instance this problem was that this very prominent distiller had, head of the distilling outfit, had a son, and it was most unusual for a Jewish boy, for somebody to ask to send a Jewish boy overseas. We generally had cases where uncles would stop Jewish boys, or bribery and so forth, for them not to go overseas. So it was a little unusual for this Mr. Heymann, who was the head of National Distilleries, and he had a son that he said was pretty worthless, and he wanted him to go to war to be made a man of, and I asked him if he knew anybody in North Africa, or Italy, or England and he did. He mentioned two or three generals, and I asked if it would be all right for me to wire, and

if they knew his son. He said they didn't know his son, but they were sure that they would give him a job. So I dictated a cable to Morrie Nelson overseas in North Africa, and one to Terry Morrison telling, instructing the Training Command to order him....

Q: Terry Morrison was in the Training Command?

W: He was personnel man, Training Command. Then we went right to the Pentagon and I called Terry and told him what was coming down, and to expedite this movement. So within five days after this instance, this son was in North Africa. I'd seen him in NY occasionally. He is in National Distillery or Schenley, as it is called now, and doing a fine job up there. He did a good job overseas.

Q: You know, Arnold had a lot of contact with a fellow named Louis Marx, the toy manufacturer.

W: I know that.

Q: Marx was always doing things for Arnold. When he would come into NY, they would have theater tickets to the shows, have a car, things like this. He also did things for Marshall and he put Arnold and Marshall onto some stock.

W: I don't know about this.

Q: Of course, Arnold used to get, at Christmas time, this whole caseload of toys which would be distributed to perhaps the enlisted men's children. Did you know about that?

W: I didn't know about that. As I say, there were lots of people on the outside, the industrialists who were kind of AAF people. They felt that the Generals and some of the Colonels weren't paid enough....

Q: Was Arnold prejudiced about Jews or Catholics?

W: I don't think so. I never heard him say any word of any prejudice towards

any nationality, race, condition or otherwise.

Q: I get the feeling of Arnold being the pragmatist. "If it works, I want it."

W: That's right, I think so.

Q: And this is why I made a comment before about R&D. For example, he was very close to von Karman, a little Jewish man of apparent brilliance.

W: He was almost prejudiced in favor of von Karman.

Q: Because von Karman did a great service for him.

W: And most of the other people in the Air Staff couldn't even understand von Karman when he was talking.

Q: But he was aces high with Arnold?

W: Yes. He was a very important man in R&D and in theory of aerodynamics. Time has proved this.

Q: He did a great job. This Toward New Horizons, this report is a very important thing. It predicted many things which came to pass 20 years later.

W: Of course, we didn't know, even until we got into Germany, all the forward thinking German scientists and aerodynamists. Of course, von Karman came out of Austria, and he probably smelled some of these things going on.

Q: This is why I personally feel that Arnold - I mean you mention something about grudges or that he harbored these thoughts about people - and it's probably true to some extent. Every man is a mixed personality. In some respects, he may harbor a grudge, and in other respects, he was devoid of grudge.

W: I wouldn't say he was devoid of grudge. If you were one of his boys, you had the world.

Q: Right, did he ever admit a mistake, and say: "I made a mistake...."

W: Not in my hearing; he may have.

Q: Most people say he did not. He simply did something else, without saying he was wrong.

W: That's right. Well, at the end of the war we bought some B-32s. Now, the B-32 was the biggest bucket of bolts that ever came out of Consolidated.

Q: Well, it was sort of a backup plane. You know, if the B-29 didn't work out.

W: May be, but as far as we were concerned, you just had to have a net behind the airplane to catch the nuts and bolts that fell off it. It just never...it flew a few times. But it couldn't have backed up a paper bag.

Q: George Kenney wanted them. They felw for Kenney in the last few weeks of the war. He wanted B-29s and he couldn't get them.

W: I'm sure that he didn't get B-32s into combat for any length of time. They just couldn't fly. It was just impossible.

Q: I want to ask you about two areas. One, we were talking about this other aspect, Benny Meyers. Arnold was really taken with Benny Meyers.

W: That's right.

Q: Why?

W: Well, there's another type of guy. He apparently would canoe, his supply. In other words, he was in the supply side of Wright Patterson and he apparently knew all about procurement and engines, and so forth. Apparently, he was quite a whiz.

Q: Did he give Arnold what he wanted to hear, even if it was not fact?

W: I don't know, I doubt that, I don't think anybody would ever do that. Too many times, those things can come back and bit you.

Q: Did they, in this case?

W: I don't know. What got Benny Meyers in trouble was he had been, bought

stock when....

Q: This came out after the war. Arnold didn't know it at the time.

W: No, nobody could have protected Benny Meyers. Nobody.

Q: Did Arnold have the ability in one of these complex briefings with visual aids and what not, to go right to the heart of a problem, or not?

Or mixed?

W: I don't think he was very fast.

Q: Not very fast to get to it.

W: He'd wait and let Pinky Craig, or O.A. Anderson, or somebody....

Q: Was Craig sharp?

W: Pretty much, yes.

Q: I've tried to get to him. He's in El Paso, and he travels around a bit, but I haven't been able to catch him.

W: I thought he had a great regard for Pinky Craig.

Q: He was Plans. Another guy who comes out very well in some of the research I have done, is Loutzenheizer.

W: I didn't know him very well. I know of him, but I didn't know him very well.

Q: Very sharp guy.

Q: How about Jamison? Do you remember him? He was in Plans?

W: Doesn't ring a bell.

Q: Let me get into George Kenney. George Kenney caused a lot of trouble with Personnel. He didn't want to take some of the people Arnold was sending out there and he was trying to promote his own people.

W: That's right.

Q: This might have gotten into your area?

W: It did.

Q: What was the problem there?

W: Well, he had two Colonels that he brought in. Now, these had been flying cadets in the class of about, I guess, 40-1, I think that would be the one. I think they may have been 41-1A. And he had two of them, one of them was a pretty good boy. Now, I knew these boys as flying cadets, they were at Tuscaloosa when I was getting my flying training.

Q: Do you remember their names?

W: No, I don't. One of them was redheaded and very objectionable. The other one was pretty good. But, anyway, George Kenney wanted those made BGs. Now, there was a celebrated case in North Africa of a pearl, who, I think Brett had made a BG. And we always said that he was hurt by two desks rushing together. We could never understand why he was made a BG, and when these characters showed up with Kenney, and I've seen the list going through - they always asked me for my comments, and I gave them. So these two showed up in my office, as I was Chief of the Officer's Branch. They were talking pretty big, and I just thought right then: "Boy, if these people are the best that George Kenney has, we are in a bad way in the Pacific." We come back again to the idea of a democracy. You need, everybody needs a little bit of seasoning and he needs to expose himself to the vicissitudes of combat. Otherwise, it's not fair to the people that had to go out in the first. Now, I'd fought my war. I wanted to go back. In fact, I was ordered back right at the end of the war, but the President had the discourtesy to call it off. But I came back to the B-29 program; I didn't come back for HQs., USAF. I just got sidetracked. But Kenney wouldn't accept anybody, and this gets to be a close corporation. It doesn't make sense.

Q: Was Squeeze Wurtsmith one of his boys?

W: No.

Q: He was one in the 13th AF. He was one of his boys, but not one of those you speak of?

W: Not one of those. Squeeze was killed going back down to Tampa, I think, from Selfridge. He hit a mountain.

Q: But he didn't want to take any of the people from Hqs., AAF?

W: He didn't want to take anybody. It wasn't from Hqs., it was from any place. He had his own corporation, and he wanted to keep it like that. That's not the way to run a war.

Q: This caused a great deal of trouble, because Arnold had some young people he wanted to send out there, and get some seasoning. They wanted to go out, and he had no place to send them, or not enough places to send them.

W: He sent them to Europe. But I had the same problem in my group now. When I had the 91st Bomb Group, the Training Command had to send Captains. They hadn't been in any combat, but they would come into my group. They'd come in to Bobingdon, and most of the group commands wouldn't even accept them as Captains. I'd say: "Send me all you've got; I'll take them." Because they had several hundred hours more flying than my people had. They could learn to fly combat. Nobody else in the Training Command had combat like that. They didn't get combat in the Training Command. We had to train them, if they were 2nd LTs, or 1st LTs.

Q: You talk about George Brett as being considered a lightweight. MacArthur shipped him out of there, and eventually they got Kenney. They didn't know what to do with Brett, so he went out to the Caribbean, and I guess he stayed most of the war?

W: Yes, that's right.

Q: And he and Arnold were very close at one time. In fact, he was the heir apparent?

W: That's what I say. We were pretty sure of it, but we thought it was going to come just a little bit earlier than too early in the system.

Q: Going back to this other incident you mentioned about the Heymann incident, where Arnold had you come down to the hotel. Referring to Arnold's drinking, did you ever see him drink?

W: Yes. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: What did he drink, an Old Fashioned?

W: Yes, he drank mixed drinks. This is something. I've made a lot of public speeches and that's one thing that I won't do, is drink. Two old-fashioned are enough for me for an evening. I've heard Arnold. I've seen him drink a couple of old-fashioned and then get up and try to talk, and you just can't do it. But I never saw him drunk.

Q: Most people that I have talked to, say that they never saw Arnold do any drinking except drink some sherry. He would carry a glass of sherry.

W: I've seen him where he could hardly talk.

Q: In other words, he didn't do well if he had a couple of drinks?

W: No, he didn't.

Q: Toward the end of the war, was this after his heart attack?

W: No, long before his heart attack.

Q: Most people say they never saw him drink. The reason I bring this up is, when Westover was killed in 1938, there was a story going around that Arnold drank. This is something that gave the President pause. You know, the President delayed in appointing Arnold for a period of time. Did you know about this?

W: We just knew that there was a long delay in there. But I didn't know it was because Arnold drank.

Q: The story was around, this may have been. We don't know why the President delayed, but a lot of people think that this gave the President pause. I wonder if there is anything to the fact that "Pa" Watson, who was the President's aide, was Class of '06 and so was Andrews. Andrews was then GHQ AF. I wonder if there is any substance to the possibility that he was trying to get the job for Andrews?

W: There might be. Andrews would have been a better Chief, I think. You come back again. In a time like the war years, you need somebody in there that's almost indestructible, and maybe Arnold was the best man for the job.

Q: Do you think Andrews had the drive that Arnold had?

W: No, I don't. But I think he would have got things done. More people would have been willing to do things, and would have sought out ways to get it done, rather than be pushed, and bullied, and beat over the head with a stick.

Q: Without justifying Arnold, there were some situations that needed bullying?

W: This is true. I say, maybe during the war years Arnold was the one for that job.

Q: Andrews might have been too much the gentleman?

W: He might have been. You can't tell.

Q: Most people I've talked to had admired Andrews more than they did Arnold. But when you get down to talking about it, Arnold may have been the better man for the job.

W: During that time.

Q: Right.

W: I agree with that.

Q: Because the President talked about 50,000 planes when you had practically

nothing and you had to hit people over the head. For example, calling in the aircraft manufacturers. They didn't want the automobile manufacturers into their business. The automobile manufacturers....

W: ...didn't want to go into it. Singer Sewing Machine didn't want to get into it.

Q: They were making money selling automobiles. So somebody had to hit them over the head. Arnold might have been the best guy to do it?

W: And I'm quite sure that he probably did hit them over the head.

Q: I wrote a script for a movie of Arnold. This is one of these documentary things. I called it "Hap Arnold, Man in a Hurry."

W: Yes, he was in a hurry.

Q: He had all these balls bouncing in the air. When he saw you - if he had confidence in you - if he could give you one of the balls.

W: It didn't matter if he had confidence in you, if you had an AF uniform, he'd send you.

Q: Did he send people, guys he didn't even know?

W: Sure. This Colonel that showed up in my office, that he was sending to Greenland, he wanted an officer courier. This was an officer; this was a Colonel, and he sent him.

Q: I know one man, Gen Grussendorf who was given a job, a contingency plan for the occupation of the Azores. This is when we were trying to get a Central Atlantic station. Grussendorf was in some other area. I don't remember what it was, but he was not competent to handle this contingency plan. He tried to turn it over to somebody else and they said: "If Arnold gave you the job, you'd better go do it." I don't know what happened in this precise case.

W: He probably got some good people to help him and got it turned out.

Q: Yes, then he did give jobs to people who might not have been competent. Then he had no respect for organization, really?

W: I wouldn't say that. He liked to see your organizational things. This is one of the things that he got on me, when I came back from combat was: "Why have we done away with the base setup?" And I said: "Because we didn't have enough people. We had to put our people from the bomb group, put them to doing support work for the whole base." And I had an Air Exec and a Ground Exec. I said: "I did this because in combat this is the only way I can get it done." And he said: "Have you written this up?" And I said: "Yes, sir." And he said: "Let me see it." So I sent it down to him, and it became the manual for all overseas operations. He liked it after he saw it, but he didn't like it to start with. But I'm not sure that he was not a respecter of organization.

Q: But many times he leaped over organizations?

W: Yes, that's right, but he also wanted things organized so that it would be almost automatic.

Q: How about Hungry Gates? He was his organization man, wasn't he?

W: Yes.

Q: I missed him, he died.

W: He was a very dry, I would say, unimaginative type.

Q: Arnold liked him, though?

W: Yes.

Q: Why?

W: They were friends. That's all I could tell you.

Q: Did he come up with Arnold?

W: I think so.

Q: You think he did give some privileges or preference in good jobs to

guys he knew? Or who had come up the line with him?

W: Oh yes, I'm sure of it.

Q: Although in some cases where, like Jackie Fickel, who was one of his oldtime buddies, he didn't cut the mustard.

W: Well, maybe he didn't measure up.

Q: How about Fred Martin?

W: I always thought Fred Martin did a fine job.

Q: He got hurt at Hawaii, although it wasn't his fault.

W: Yes.

Q: I want to ask you one more question about the Advisory Council. This so-called Council - Norstad and Cabell. He picked these guys out to be his troubleshooters. They'd go around, I think they called them "the Heavenly Twins." Did they interfere in the Air Staff procedure on matters?

W: I never saw it.

Q: He would give them special projects or sort of troubleshooting type jobs?

W: He just didn't confine it to them. He would send Bill Hall out on jobs like this. He sent me once to look at a BG - I won't tell you where -- but he didn't like the way the base morale was going, and he just called me on the squawk box, and he said: "Don't put this in writing, and don't tell anybody. Get an airplane, and go to such and such a station, and go to the club, and look around, and come back here Monday, and tell me what you think about this man." He made me a hatchet man on two or three occasions.

Q: Was Norstad his hatchet man?

W: No, I don't think so. I don't think Norstad was ever a hatchet man.

Q: Well, Norstad went out and told Hansell that he had to go. Remember

when Hansell had the 21st BombCom?

W: Yes.

Q: He took him out of there, and put LeMay in. Didn't he serve as hatchet man on that job?

W: I doubt it.

Q: But he had to tell, Norstad had to tell Hansell the bad news.

W: He might have, but he didn't go out there and make the decision, I'm sure of that.

Q: Oh no, I don't mean he made the decision. But Arnold had made the decision, but Norstad had to go out and give Hansell the news.

W: Well, this may be. I don't know.

Q: Who else was Arnold's hatchet man? Or did he have hatchet men?

W: He had them, but he never told me who they were.

Q: Were these "ad hoc" arrangements?

W: Some of them were ad hoc, or it depended. As I say, this was a Personnel matter, he just gave me a squawk on the box and said: "Go and do it." And he didn't even tell Bevans about this. And I didn't either, until after I came back.

Q: How about Bill Streett? Did he use him as a hatchet man?

W: I don't think so. Bill Streett was a fine man.

Q: He was a fine, gentle man, but he did act as troubleshooter for Arnold, didn't he?

W: Could be, I don't know.

Q: Bill Streett never stayed in one job too long. He went to two or three different jobs. He never made a name for himself in any given area, but Arnold put him in some tough jobs like the 2nd AF and the 13th AF, too.

W: And the Continental Air Command. He did a lot of good things. I always had a lot of admiration for Bill Streett.

Q: I want to ask you about the Comptroller's decision. This is back in the '30s. When the Comptroller decided you were on leave without pay since July 1, 1932. This is the time when they put everybody on furlough.

W: What happened was we graduated on the 10th of June 1932. I would say around the 19th of July, I got a wire that said: "You are now, and have been, since the 1st of July on leave without pay." The Comptroller said - it was quite a long wire, it said that the Adjutant General, I think, had held, or somebody in the Government, had held that the graduation leave was ordinary leave, and therefore it fell under the provisions of the Economy Act.

Q: That was the one that was just passed?

W: This was a Presidential thing. Anyway, everybody had a pay cut. In the service we were absorbing it by just losing leave.

Q: In other words, you worked without getting paid?

W: No, you could get your leave, or even when you worked, you still drew less pay, 15%. Now, one of the ways was, I had been on leave without pay since the first of July. This is without my consent or knowledge. So since they had held this to be ordinary leave, now graduation leave is a special leave, and has been since the Year One. So when they repealed the Economy Act, it must have been a Congressional thing. When they repealed this, I applied for leave, but I went in and told my Colonel. I said: "Now, I've been talking to some of my friends in the Class of '32. We want to make a test case, we don't agree with what the - I think it was the Adjutant General has held, or the Comptroller, whichever one made the decision - we don't agree with him. But if they say that's what it is, then I want my leave on that basis." I had written this thing up so

that it was under the provisions of the thing that the Comproller General - if that's who it was - made this thing, what he had quoted. I wanted my leave on that basis. But I also told my Colonel: "Now, I'll be at Birmingham and my phone number is so and so. Would you please get a ruling on this immediately, because we are doing this for the benefit of everybody in the class. If this holds then we've got, everybody's got a couple months leave coming with pay. And if it doesn't hold, I want to get back right quick." So he put it in, forwarded it. The next morning he started all this paperwork to Washington. I went on down to Birmingham, and after about - I don't know how many days, whatever days they held, I think it was 8 days - let's say, on the 7th day I got a phone call that said: "Get back." So I got in my little Chevrolet, and tore off one day from Birmingham to Rock Island, and I reported back in. This was a feeler; it was a test, and I lost. But that's all right. Better for one to lose, than 259 of us.

Q: I want to ask you something else in the Personnel area. This had to do with the training of blacks to fly. Did you have any involvement in that?

W: Not in their training. But I had quite a bit to do with throwing several blacks out of the service under conditions other than honorable. Because, and we had Mr. Truman Gibson come over from the White House. He wanted to know why this was happening, and I said: "Well, Mr. Gibson, here all these are white officers, and this few here are colored officers." And I said: "You can fight it any way you want to, but when we have a man show up at the end of his second stage, or the middle of his third stage training, and he suddenly finds out he doesn't want to go to combat, something is wrong, and he's lacking in moral fiber, and it's not fair to the people who have gone to war, to let this man out under honorable conditions. He's been in the pilot pool,

possibly for as long as two years, and he's been in the Training Command for a year or so, and now just at the gangplank, he gets gangplank fever." I said: "Now, your colored boys, a lot of them show up with misery in the back." I said: "I was frozen in the war, and I still fly. I know exactly what's wrong with my back, but I don't show up with the misery. You can diagnose my back, but," I said, "we've got a lot of these white officers who have shown up under the same circumstances, and we put them out under conditions other-than-honorable, and as long as I am going to do this to these white officers, I am going to do it to the colored officers." I said: "You can take any one of these, or any one of these, and read it." And he said: "No. I would just like to see the summary page of one of these colored boys." And he picked one where it was just about like I had said. Only this one had been in the system, I think, about three years before he got into pilot training. He had been there a long time, and this was getting down almost to the end of the war, and he had fainted and fallen back. He had been in B-25s, and he just didn't want to fly. Now, we had a bunch of colored boys who were in the 99th Pursuit Squadron - Benny Davis' outfit. But Benny came back and he was retraining them in B-25s, and we had a lot of them fail.

Q: That's the 332nd Composite Wing. But there were reports that some of these boys in the 99th didn't do well, that they turned and ran, when they got into combat situations.

W: This is true. I've heard of this. Now, I have no personal knowledge.

Q: Reports came back from Italy, the MTO.

W: I think Benny Davis would tell you this, too.

Q: What was Arnold's attitude, if any?

W: I never discussed this with Arnold. This was a policy that had been in

the AF. You just....pilots flew.

Q: Were you aware of the trouble Frank Hunter had at Selfridge Field in 1944?

W: No.

Q: A great deal of trouble there. The Negroes rioted at the base about the Officer's Club. They built a separate club for them against Arnold's orders.

W: No, I didn't know that, but I'm sure Arnold wouldn't want that. Once Benjy Davis got to be an officer, I think the Officer Corps, I never heard anybody say anything against Benjy Davis. For a long time, he was the only colored pilot. But I used to go on trips with Benjy Davis and Red Smith....

Q: Red Smith was another colored?

W: He was a friend of mine. He wasn't colored. But, we'd go with him. We liked to fly with him. He was a good pilot, and he was a good friend.

Q: We have come a long way from that.

W: This was several years ago.

Q: 25 years?

W: Well, this wasn't quite that long ago. This was probably right after the war. Right after the war, well, that is 25 years. We were down at Maxwell, and of course, not everybody had Benjy Davis to dinner in their quarters. But I did. I liked Benjy Davis.

Q: A lot of fellows wouldn't fly with a Negro.

W: Well, I've had some problems since. I've lost a couple of airplanes out at Wright Field. These were not mine. They were base airplanes, and the pilots were not mine, because I didn't have a colored pilot. I had some colored navigators, and one of them was a crackerjack, a hell of a good guy. He would joke about colored boys and white boys, and so forth. People liked him on the

crew. We had one pilot there who overstretched his gas and who wouldn't land to refuel. It was Dr. Stapp. He was taking Stapp out to either Colorado Springs or Denver to make a speech, and Stapp had to eject. So this is, you can carry this too far. As I say, I never had a colored pilot. I had lots of colored officers working for me, most of whom were good people. But I had some troublemakers. I was born in Muncie, Indiana, and we had a very firm, but friendly policy. So these people, I just put it on the line, and I'd say, I'd show them this was being recorded, and you can have a copy of the tape if you want it. I always had the colored chaplain come in at the same time, and I would just put it on the line. I'd say: "You produce, or I'll have your ears." And I'd lay it right out, No.1, No.2.

Q: I think they respected you for it?

W: Not only that, they bucked up because they knew right then they were in trouble.

Q: You have no knowledge of Arnold's attitude on these matters?

W: I don't think that he was prejudiced against Negroes in the AAF.

Q: I think he was in favor of anything that would help him do his job and oppose anything that would not.

W: Anything that hurt his job I think he'd oppose.

Q: I regard him as the total pragmatist, not the ideologue and the doctrinaire.


W: Oh no.

Q: Left that to a guy like Orval Anderson. Arnold was in favor of what would help him do his job and sometimes he misunderstood or misinterpreted what was good for him. I'm sure this happened.

Wuest, Jacob H. S.

13 May '72

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852 Park Lake Court
Orlando, Florida
32803

May 23, 1972

Mr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
HQ USAF
Washington, D. C. 2031h

Dear Mr. Green:

I am in receipt of your letter of the 18th of
May re your change of schedule.

I look forward to your visit, and would sug-
gest that you plan to arrive at my home on
May 31 at 3:00 p.m.

I will advise Captain Jack of this schedule
and I anticipate that he will join us.

Until then, I am

Sincerely yours,

Jacob W. S. Wuest
Jacob W. S. Wuest
USAF (Ret)

done 5/31/72

20314

18 May 1972

Colonel Jacob Wuest, USAF (Ret)
852 Park Lake Court
Orlando, Florida 32803

Dear Colonel Wuest:

Re our prospective interview on General H.H. Arnold, I am hopeful we can get together at a time convenient for you.

I write because my schedule is slightly adjusted. I will be in Orlando two days earlier than previously planned. I shall be at your disposal any time on Tuesday, May 30th, or Wednesday, May 31st.

I expect to arrive on Monday evening, May 29th, and will phone your home in hopes of arranging a convenient time for you. I am also hopeful that Captain Jack will be available. It will be a pleasure to meet him, too.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

cc: Capt Jack

capt Richard Jack
attached

20314

19 April 1972

Colonel Jacob Wuest, USAF (Ret)
852 Park Lake Court
Orlando, Florida 32803

Dear Colonel Wuest:

I'm the fellow working on the biography of General Hap Arnold. You may recall our phone conversation in January. You were not feeling up to par, and so we deferred our get-together for another time.

It appears that I shall be coming through Orlando on Thursday, June 1st, or on Friday, June 2nd. I shall be leaving at about noon on Saturday, June 3rd. If you would set a time on any of those days convenient for you, I would be happy to adjust my schedule to conform.

I'm also looking forward to meeting Captain Richard Jack, USN, with whom I had a most interesting phone conversation about my own Navy days aboard an aircraft carrier in World War II.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

19 April 1972

Captain Jack:

Capt Hugh Kner was
in a car accident a couple
of months ago. I've heard
no further report on his
health.

All good wishes.
Murray Green

1-10-72

852 Park Lake Court

Orlando Fla Jan 7, 72

Dear Mr Green :-

In reply to your letter of Jan 6th, I shall be glad to assist you in preparing the history of Gen Arnold in whatever way possible.

Unfortunately, I have little in the matter of written records pertaining to my relations with him, but I shall give you whatever information I may remember of Gen Arnold.

If you plan to stop at Orlando, please inform me of the time of your contemplated call and oblige

Very truly
Just M Trust



friend
 of Capt
 USN
 Capt Richard Jack USN
 1850 Adams Dr.
 Orlando Fla
 Winter PK

1405 Red Oak Drive
 Silver Spring, Md. 20910
 January 6, 1972

Colonel Jacob Wuest, USAF(Ret)
 852 Park Lake Court
 Orlando, Fla

472-2056

Dear Col Wuest:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House, one of the best. I have been at this about 3 years now. I spent 15 months at the Library of Congress on a Brookings Fellowship researching the Arnold Papers there. I have interviewed about 185 people, including practically all the Air Force greats still alive.

In the research, I saw your name many times in the files, and simply assumed without checking that you had passed from the scene. Yesterday, I interviewed General Dudley Hale who put me in touch with Captain Richard Jack, USN. The time was not right. You were taking your afternoon rest, and I am leaving today for Coral Gables. My official task there will be to screen the papers of General Hugh Knerr who appointed me administrator of his historical papers which he desired to endow to the Air Force Academy Library.

When I complete that task, I will conduct a number of interviews in the Miami area. It is possible, although my schedule is extremely tight for the remainder of this trip, that I can make some time to visit with you to talk about your recollections of Hap Arnold, if you desire.

Captain Jack indicated that in at least some areas, you were not exactly a rabid fan of Hap Arnold's. In any event, this is planned to be a "warts and all" biography. There are several areas of special interest:

- 1) You graduated in '03, the year Douglas MacArthur graduated. Of course, Arnold entered in July 1903. I would like to have your impressions of the Point in that era.
- 2) You were attache in Germany in the middle-1930's. As you know, Arnold was very interested in Lindbergh's findings on the Luftwaffe. That almost got Arnold in "dutch" with FDR.
- 3) Any other areas of contact. Of course, anecdotes or insights into Arnold's actions and character would be invaluable.

I will be spending most of next week at Mrs. Knerr's going through the papers. The address: Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, David Williams Apts 700 Biltmore Way (Apt 6A) Coral Gables, Fla 33134. You may reach me through Mrs. Knerr. If you desire to see me, I'll try to arrange my going-home schedule to suit your convenience.

Sincerely,

Andy Hoag
cylinder man

Jacob Weest - 19035 -
852 Park Lake Court, Orlando, Fla
422 - 2056

Capt Richard
Jack USN
1850 Adams Dr.


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etc

644 | 3670 | →

W.P.
- 1910 → San Francisco
1917 → Omaha HoChook
→ ~~1927~~ Council Bluffs
1927



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His decorations include the Legion of Merit and Bronze Star. He is rated a command pilot and aircraft observer.

General Hale and his wife, the former Anne Davis, have one son, Dudley D. Hale, Jr.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) October 1, 1935; to captain (temporary) March 14, 1934; reverted to permanent rank June 16, 1936; was promoted to captain (permanent) May 2, 1939; to major (temporary) March 15, 1941; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) January 5, 1942; to colonel (temporary) March 1, 1942; to major (permanent) May 2, 1946; to colonel (permanent) April 2, 1948; to brigadier general (temporary) December 22, 1950; to major general (temporary) December 15, 1953; to brigadier general (permanent) October 27, 1954.

E N D

Up to date as of August 1955.

-2-

Interview, Col. Jacob W. S. Wuest, Orlando, Florida, 31 May 1972

Q You recall the first time you met Hap Arnold? He was four years behind you at West Point.

W I don't remember meeting Hap Arnold until the 1930's, I think. He was at March Field then. I was stationed at Rockwell Field. I was in command there.

Q You worked for Arnold then in a sense.

W No. I worked for the Materiel Division. Rockwell Field had on it two flying fields. One was Army and one Navy. I worked on the Army Field under the direction of the Materiel Division. In other words, I was in command of the Rockwell Field Depot in addition to Rockwell Field itself. As depot commander I was working directly under the Materiel Division at Wright Field

Q You must have had a lot of contact with Arnold in that job? Do you remember any of that?

W Lots of contact. Yes. I remember one day that Arnold sent down to me at Rockwell Field two or three representatives of the Curtiss-Wright-- the people who made the Wright Cyclone. His problem was that his airplanes were overheating in the air. And he sent these two men down to me who was then Depot Commander at Rockwell Field to have the trouble corrected, the overheating in the air. And when these men came in, I turned them down. I said: "I am not working for Colonel Arnold. I am working for the Materiel Division and I will take instructions and orders from Materiel Division in regard to the malfunctioning of any airplane that we have. An Colonel Hap Arnold had nothing whatever to do with that and I therefore will not accept his representatives.

Q What did he want you to do?

W He wanted me to have these Curtiss-Wright men make an inspection of my airplanes that I had on Rockwell Field to determine what the trouble

was. I told him plainly that we did not need any Curtiss-Wright people, that we had an Engineering Department and the Engineering Department knew exactly what was wrong. And the thing that was wrong I discovered myself or verified rather, later. We had a new type airplane. I don't remember the type.

Q B-10?

W A bomber. Before the B-10, may have been the B-7, the Keystone. And so, I told these men I could not pay any attention to their instructions to find out what was wrong with those engine. I said: "We already know."

Q Did you feel that Colonel Arnold...

W He was a General at that time.

Q Then it was 1935 or later?

W About that time, 1935. The Navy had not yet taken over Rockwell. They were thinking about it. Later on President Roosevelt came out there and in riding around the field he looked over the Navy end of it. I sat next to him and the Navy commander sat on the other side of him. And we pointed out everything that belonged to the Army and to the Navy. The President shook his head wisely and said: "That is going to be a good thing to make the change, to move the Army out of Rockwell Field and move it up to Sacramento. And he said to me "Don't you think so?" And I said:

"No sir, I do not."

Q And what did he say to that. ?

W He said: "I'm sorry but it's already been decided." The Navy man said nothing. His name was Admiral Bristol.

Q Arnold too was unhappy that the Air Corps lost Rockwell?

W I don't know how Arnold felt about it.

Q According to some of his papers, this happened at a cocktail party. The Navy made a transfer. They gave the Air Corps Sunnyvale, Moffett Field, in exchange.

W I commanded it for four or five weeks, at a distance. Just nominally in command of it.

Q Do you recall other contacts with Arnold at March?

W Yes. Mostly unpleasant. That thing in itself got us started on a kind of battle, a kind of row which ended throughout my career and through Arnold's career. We were at sword's points with each other.

Q Was that the beginning of it?

W No. I think something else had happened before that to start it. I don't recall. I can't re-picture the things that happened at the time, but it did make matters worse. Arnold in the first place had no business whatever sending anybody down to my field with which he had no contact whatever except that he was in command of a bombardment group that we had there that was about to move to March Field.

Q Did McNarney have that bomb group at the time?

W Howard Davidson, and Davidson more or less worked with /Arnold. At that particular time, for instance, Davidson had orders to move out of Rockwell into March Field and to move with his own transportation. As Co I immediately directed him to use not only his own transportation, in order to get out of there in a hurry, to get a lot of hangars out of the way that the Navy claimed were in their way when they landed. And I started getting those hangars out of the way. And so, when this thing occurred when we were ordered to move out of there, I directed immediate movement and Howard Davidson then ducked. He got out of the way, and there was a question as to whether or not he was permitted to use his so-called strategic air force transportation. They'd set aside a lot of vehicles for strategic use only. And he had those set aside and they were brand new. Nobody ever turned them over, and he insisted upon moving out with his regular transportation. I said: "You will also use your strategic transportation for this." He was supposed to, according to Air Corps orders, not to use that strategic transportation except for strategic purposes., and in my humble opinion that

was a strategic move, the move from Rockwell Field to a new station. It might have been a thousand miles away but nevertheless it involved a movement and it involved a question as to whether this strategic air force was to move out or not.

Q Would you say your relationship with Arnold was somewhat a matter of personal chemistry? Sometimes you meet somebody. You just don't like him or he doesn't like you?

W No. I don't think we had any such feelings. We just fought each other officially for good reason. There was no feeling of hatred. As a matter of fact, years later, when I moved from Rockwell Field over to Middletown, Penna, and took command over there and this happened several years later the incident I spoke of. Arnold one day came to me from Washington--he was Chief of the AAF.

Captain Jack: 1938 or 1939.

W At any rate, Arnold came to me to Middletown where I was in command and said "I have a problem you can help me on." I said: "What is it?" He said: "I want to combine the Materiel and the Finance Departments into one unit. Into a single unit." This was for the entire AAF. I listened and he said: "I'd like to have you take over the job." I said I'd be very glad to, but we are now dealing with a question of lighter-than-air and heavier-than-air. I don't know whether to call it strategy or just lighter and heavier than air question, and I said: "You have a regulation in the Air Corps which prohibits the promotion of a lighter-than-air officer to any field or any operation which is primarily heavier-than-air. The lighter-than-air officer is not permitted to take command of that." And then, when he presented this problem to unite the Materiel Division and Finance Division at the Middletown Air Depot, I said: "Yes, I'd be very glad to take over, but before I say yes, I would like to have you tell me that you're going to put me on the same footing for promotion which other officers of the Air Corps have." I was airship pilot; I was free balloon pilot; I was captive

5

balloon pilot; I was captive balloon observer, and I had a civilian pilot's license, a pilot's license for heavier than air, for flying airplanes. So I felt myself completely qualified to take over the job. I said: "Before I say 'yes' or 'no' to that, I would like to have you tell me frankly whether you will consider me for promotion. At that time a lighter-than-air officer could not be promoted.

Q They were called "balloonatics"?

W_q We could not be promoted into any organization in which there were heavier than air units, which meant that we were just simply stymied on promotion. A lighter than air officer would not get any promotion whatever above the grade of Colonel. I said: "If you'll consider putting me on the promotion list, I will think over this."

Q What did he say?

W He said: "Jakie, you know in the Air Corps we have a policy not to promote lighter-than-air officers to heavier than air stations or positions." I said: "But you are the Chief of the Air Corps. You are the one who makes this policy." He hadn't anything to say about that. And I said: "Until you make a decision to put me on the promotion list where I belong, I can't say yes to your proposition." And then he left. He went back to Washington and a few days later he wrote me. I still have the correspondence. He said: "I do wish you would reconsider and take this job." I made some reply repeating what I had said before. He said: "I'm sorry but I can't do it." I said: "I'm sorry, too, and I can't do it. You are now asking me to take over a job which concerns not the lighter than air but the heavier than and partly lighter than air, and you want me to take over the job that controls both of those activities." He said nothing. And then, he came back to see me a second time.

Q Was this after Pearl Harbor?

W We were not in the war, but about to get into it. I said: I consider

myself qualified for promotion of any kind in the Air Corps and unless you consider me qualified for promotion--I was a full Colonel, the top colonel in the Air Corps. I was the Senior Colonel of the Air Corps on active duty at that time. I think Foulois was still alive then.

Q Foulois was retired as a Major General. Retired in 1935.

W At any rate, Arnold came back a second time and said: "I want you to reconsider." I said: "I'm sorry but unless you put me on the same footing as all other officers of the Air Corps I can't consider taking over this job."

Q So you remained as Commander of the Materiel Depot at Middletown. How long did you stay

Capt Jack: You stayed there until the summer of '39. By the Fall, you had moved to Langley Field.

(Note: This other voice is that of Captain Richard Jack, USN, Retired. He was brought up by Col Wuest. He sat in on interview)

Q You were overseas in the middle thirties as attaché. Did you meet Lindbergh?

W No. Charles Lindbergh came to Germany about two months after I left. I had gone to Germany as Attache, and as Military Attache to the German Army. I had both those jobs.

Q Do you remember Colonel Arthur Vanaman? He was there when Lindbergh was there.

W He came after my time. Lindbergh came two months after I left, and Lindbergh had the advantage of reading over my reports that I had already sent in and which contained a lot of the stuff which he took credit for later on.

Q Did anybody ever call you to Washington to be debriefed on your experiences with the Germans? Did they ask you about the German Air Force?

W I knew a helluva lot about the German Air Force.

Q Why didn't they call you in?

W I don't know. For one reason, the Germans were supposed, at the time, not to have an Air Force. In fact, they were not permitted to have an Air Force by the Versailles Treaty.

Q But they did have an Air Force. They circumvented the Treaty?

W At that time they didn't have an Air Force, but they were building airplanes. They were building planes in Sweden. The K-47, a two-seater pursuit plane was being built in Sweden for the Germans at the time I got there.

Q Then they had some sports flying. They flew for pleasure. Actually they were training officers. Were they not?

W I can tell you about that. The Germans in the first place were not allowed to have any airplane--any airplane that had more than 99 horsepower. And so they were limited to gliders. They trained all the young men that were interested at that time in glider flying. They trained them as glider pilots. And that was being done by the Versugts Angstat der Luft fahrte. That means the German Institute for Research, the Investigation Institute for Flying.

Q Arnold was very interested in German progress and he became very close to Charles Lindbergh. When Lindbergh came back, he met with him secretly, because ^{Lindbergh} became a dirty word with FDR, as you will recall. Arnold wanted to keep his job so he was meeting with Lindbergh on the sly, so that he would not be fired. He was very interested in finding out what the state of the German Air Force was. I'm curious as to why Arnold did not call you in for consultation? You had knowledge of the German Air Force.

W I sent in report after report, stacks of reports on what the Germans were doing toward building up an Air Force.

Q I'm guessing that you were a balloon man and didn't know much about heavier-than-air. Is that possible?

W No. I don't think so.

Q Why didn't they call you in for consultation?

W I don't know, except the reason that they probably did not want to recognize the fact that Germany was openly violating the Versailles Treaty.

Q If Arnold didn't send Lindbergh, he encouraged him to go over there, and when Lindbergh came back he met him at West Point. They met at the Thayer Hotel to pump him about information on the German Air Force.

W All he needed was to look over my reports.

Q Better than that, he should have called you in?[?]

W But at that time, the Germans were supposed not to have any Air Force. They were not permitted to have an Air Force. And the only thing they did then was to train these youngsters to fly gliders and from gliders they finally graduated to 99 horsepower sport planes. Now and then I loaned this glider group my own airplane to carry on certain experiments that I was interested in. At that time we were experimenting with towing gliders behind a regular powered airplane, and I used my own airplane--it was a Government plane of course, furnished me by the Air Corps for my work. And that in itself was a recognition of the fact that I knew something about flying heavier than air craft. I allowed this German pilot-mechanic that I had to use my official airplane to tow gliders, because I was interested in finding out what we could do in the way of towing gliders with a full powered airplane. I had a full powered airplane, the Heinkel .22, the only military airplane in Germany at the time.

Q Did George Strong, Army Chief of Intelligence, and some others, consult with you on your knowledge of Germany and the German Air Force?

W No. I knew George Strong very well, but I don't remember ever speaking to him about what I did in Germany, or what happened over there.

Q The thing that makes me very curious is that your knowing the German language, knowing a good deal about German culture, having been over there, seeing the Germans try to operate their embryo air force. You knew an awful lot about the development of the Luftwaffe that could have been useful for Intelligence purposes.

W Yes, of course. I sent that information to Washington in my reports.

Q It seems to me that amplifying your reports from personal observation would have been very useful. I'm curious as to why they didn't consult with you. Were you on somebody's list?

W I may have been. I don't know. But at any rate, they never consulted me about what the Germans were doing, except for my reports. I sent in these reports, two and three a week, long-winded reports on what the Germans were doing in the way of building up an air force, etc.

Q Did you predict that they were trying to circumvent the Versailles Treaty?

W I certainly did. I predicted--about the time that Hitler came in-- I was called over to the office of the Minister, the Dutch Minister to Germany. I happened to have been accredited to Holland as well as Germany. I was accredited to eight different nations.

Q I see you were accredited. You were the Assistant Attache for Air in '31, '32. Who was the Attache for Air?

W We had none that I can remember.

Q Was that vacant?

W The Assistant Attache was vacant

Q You were the Assistant Attache for Air after I had been there for possibly a year

Q Who was your boss?

W At that time the Air Corps was part of our Army.

Q Who was the Army Attache?

W I was the Army Attache. Not all of that time the Military Attache to Switzerland. And in a short time, possibly about six or eight months, the Military Attache to Germany was relieved; his time was up. He went home--Colonel Carpenter--and I was appointed. He was my boss because I belonged to the Army and I was accredited as a member of the Army to our office in Berlin, to the Army Military Attache's office.

Q Where does Truman Smith fit in?

W He came in late

- W He came in after I did. Immediately after. He succeeded me.
- Q When did Vanaman come in?
- W Much later I believe, May have succeeded Truman Smith. But at that time, you must remember that we had only an air force that was part of the Army. And the Germans never recognized that. They never recognized me as a separate Air Attaché. They said I belonged to the Army and I was recognized by them as a member of the Army, accredited to Germany. And then, later on, I became Military Attache about eight months after I had been there, and I then also in the meantime had taken over the job as either Air or Army Attaché to seven different countries in addition to Germany. I was either Air Attache or Military Attache to eight different countries at the same time, including the Attacheship in Berlin. It was the American Military Attache to the German Army while I was stationed in Berlin.
- Q Why did they not have more coverage? Could you cover eight countries?
- W They should have had more. I had a job trying to get around to eight different countries. And I had to be on the go a good part of the time. And part of those countries I was Air Attache and in others I was Military Attache, and in some countries I was both. I was wearing several different hats.
- Q I want to ask about any other recollections of Arnold. Any other situations between you and him.
- W There were quite a few. I don't recall now what they were Do you recall any?
- Capt Jack: He came down at Langley Field, numbers of times, while you were there the second time in 1939, '40, '41. I don't recall all his visits. He had numbers of visits there.
- W There was one incident that I think should be mentioned, in my connection with Arnold. While I was Base Commander at Langley Field for about the third time, during the war--right as we were about to get into the Second World War. The Chief of the British Air Force, Sir Arthur Tedder, came to Langley Field. Emmons, who was then at the head of the GHQ

Air Force, and this Sir Arthur Tedder, and I went around the field. As we were walking around looking at various things, we discussed the relative value of the .30 caliber machine gun and a heavier model. And Emmons and Sir Arthur Tedder were all in favor of a .30 caliber gun, a light caliber gun rather, than a heavier gun rather than a 20 mm. I had, just before leaving Germany, some time before leaving, I had sent over to our War Department an Oerlikon 20 millimeter gun for airplanes. This was a Swiss gun. I had turned it over to the War Department because I had recommended it very highly as being an extremely effective weapon. I had seen it given trials on a German target range in Berlin, or just outside of Berlin. There the Germans fired this Oerlikon gun into a sheet of target paper, the ordinary paper we used in target practice. The bullets exploded on contact with that paper, and I was amazed to see that. They left the gun perfectly freely, but the moment they hit that paper, the bullet exploded. That's how sensitive they were. And I recommended that that gun be adopted by our Air Corps.

Q What happened?

W I wrote a long report on it. Then the War Department was interested in getting an Oerlikon for tryout. And I arranged to get this Oerlikon and I sent it to either Washington or Aberdeen. I've forgotten. But at any rate, nothing was done about it. And in this talk at Langley Field with Sir Authur Tedder and Emmons, I strongly recommended this Oerlikon gun. There argument was, no, it's better to have a small caliber gun which will spread its bullets over a wide area than it is to have a large caliber gun which will make one hit and knock an airplane down. There theory was, that you had to have a gun that spread out over a wide area, so you didn't miss any part of the thing you were shooting at. But at that time, our airplane had developed sufficiently, so that one or two small 30 caliber bullets did no damage unless it hit a very sensitive part. My argument

was that one shot, one hit from a gun like the Oerlikon would put out any plane in flight at the time.

Q One of the problems they had was that the Army Ordnance controlled all purchasing of guns for the Air Corps. This lasted until the middle of World War II. Arnold and Emmons, and others who controlled the Air Corps, did not have control of the procurement and development of Ordnance, or radar, or any electronic equipment. The Army was doing this. The Signal Corps was doing it for radar, and the Ordnance was doing it for guns. So, if there was any fault, it was not necessarily Arnold's. It was Army Ordnance which ran the show at the time, and they were more interested in other things than Air Ordnance, and that was part of the problem.

W This was a question of whether it was better to have a gun which knocked out your target with a single hit than to have a gun that sprayed all over the target without hitting any vital part.

Q Let me take you back to before World War II, the late 1930's.

Do you remember the Alaskan Flight?

W Only slightly. In 1934. I don't remember that I had anything to do with it. I did have something to do with the flight of the German pilot who made the North Atlantic flight, an airplane flight.

Q Let me ask you about West Point. Life at West Point. You left when Arnold came in. There was a lot of hazing going on at West Point at that time. One boy died.

W They claimed he died from being fed tabasco sauce. There was a Congressional investigation and I guess everything was whitewashed. I don't remember. At any rate, we went down to Philadelphia for a football game that year. When all this hubbub was going on about this man dying from tabasco sauce and at our mess table. We stopped at Philadelphia overnight at one of the hotels, I don't remember which one. At any rate, at our table as we were having dinner, we all called for a bottle of tabasco

sauce. And we were surrounded by civilians. We were in uniform and these civilians could easily spot us. We all got a bottle of tabasco sauce and poured out a tablespoonful of it and drank it. Then we went on with our dinner. We were trying to disprove that theory.

Q Did you happen to see Arnold during World War I?

W I don't recall that I did. I must have. What happened in World War I? Lieut G. E. M. Kelly, for Kelly Field. He and I started in the Air Force at the same time. We attempted to get in the Air Service at the same time and while we were stationed at San Francisco in the 30th Infantry. San Francisco put on the first air show that they had ever had, and everybody was perfectly entranced with the sight of these wonderful airplanes up in the air. And it was considered such a wonderful thing, they invited my regiment to send down a battalion as an honor guard for these airplanes when they got down to the ground. And Kelly was sent down with a battalion that was the honor guard. While he was on the ground he got to know the people who were flying these machines, and he was invited to take a flight by one of the pilots. I can't recall his name right now. He took this flight and with it when he went up he carried with him an old time cavalry sketching case. Do you remember them? They were just a board about that size and you had it strapped to your wrist and you sketched on it. On horseback, And he took that along and while he was in the air he made several stripes of different kinds on it. When he came down, the newspaper people all gathered around and looked at this marvelous pictures "Lieutenant Kelly has shown by his drawing that he made from the air that we can now detect the movement of our enemies from the air by making pictures!"

Q This was the first aerial reconnaissance?

W As far as we know. It was the first one in San Francisco at any rate. Balloons were used long before. I started out as a balloonist. At any rate, they made a great deal of fuss about this thing. And so, Kelly had been in the air for about 20 minutes and then, later on, the Army sent out a

notice to all the units, requesting volunteers to take flying training, training in flying an airplane. Kelly and I and a gray-haired old Lieutenant Colonel at the f residio in San Francisco were the only volunteers out there, on the West Coast. We volunteered to take this training. And it went back to Washington. There were very few volunteers. And then, word came back that Lieutenant Kelly had been selected because he had had experience in flying--20 minutes in the air. He was selected then to take the flying course down on North Island. Curtiss was running a hopping-flying course. They took a run off the runway until they got about that high off the ground and then they let down. That's as high as they could get. They got up to maybe eight or ten feet. Then they let down on the runway and started all over again and continued. And that was the flying training that was being given at North Island by Curtiss. And when they had finished that they were given a diploma as advanced fliers. And from there, Kelly was sent to what is now known as Kelly Field. And there, one day in coming in for a landing his engine quite. He was right over the tented part of the place down there. They were having maneuvers; tents were everywhere. His engine quite right over the top of this tented field and cracked up, and he could have gotten off maybe, and saved his life, if he had had about 10 feet more altitude.

Q Captain Jack, you say this was about 1910?

Capt Jack: 1910, yes. the San Francisco air show.

Q At that time there were just two Army fliers, powered fliers, Foulois and Humphrey. Selfridge had been killed already. About flying casualties. Arnold flew for about two years, and then he met a girl he wanted to marry. One of the conditions she imposed was that he quit flying. Arnold stopped flying from 1913 to 1916, because his wife did not want him to fly. There were a lot of casualties, a lot of people killed. Selfridge was the first of a number. Do you have any comments about the high risk of flying in those days?

W In those days, of course, the airplane was a very uncertain instrument to get around with. When you took off you didn't know whether you would get back or not. That was the whole trouble. We didn't have power in the engines. We did not have the aerodynamic form that we now have. Airplanes, naturally, flew very slowly, and the more slowly they flew, the more apt they were for something to go wrong, and immediately crack up, if they were fairly close to the ground. On the other hand, if they had gotten high up in the air, they might have had some place on ahead they could have selected for a landing and possibly, could have gotten away safely with it. But then, that was all a matter of guesswork.

Q What was the main problem? Was it underpowered planes?

W I think the main problem was the underpowered engines. We didn't have the power in the engines we should have had. And we didn't have the aerodynamic forms that we should have had. We were flying machines with all kinds of struts and wires, etc, that slowed them up. You couldn't get a fast airplane:

Q Did you have any contact with the Aviation School at either College Park or Augusta, Ga, in 1911-12? Contact with people at those schools?

W No contact.

Q In WWI, Arnold came back to Washington. He became Asst Director for Production under General Kenly. Arnold didn't get overseas. In fact Arnold never fired a shot in anger, you might say; he never served in combat. And this a psychologically vulnerable point during his entire career. * * * (Ref to staff exploiting it) Was this widely known?

W I don't think it was. I don't believe anybody paid any attention. I didn't serve in combat. I was all packed up, when I went into the Air Service. I'd been in the Infantry and in December 1917, I had a chance to transfer into the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. * * * then it became the Air Service, then the Air Corps.

Q What happened (in 1917)?

W I never served in it. This was what happened to me. I was accepted in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. This was the latter part of 1917. We were told we would be immediately shipped overseas... I got myself ready to go overseas... and got orders to report to Washington for duty. . . when I got to Washington, nobody knew anything about it. I think Rush Lincoln was at that time in the office of the Chief of Air Service. And he sent me down to Kelly Field and there I reported to the CO. He said: "I don't have any orders for you" (got sent back to Washington). (Then received orders to the 4th Provisional Aviation Regiment at Waco, Texas). I found a lot of tents and sprawling undisciplined men. I took command of the 4th Regiment. I remained until the Fall of 1918. Then orders to Fort Omaha and take instruction in ballooning. I did not volunteer. Then sent to Ft Sill to fly observation over Artillery. Qualified as balloon pilot. (Did know Westover, another balloonist, but went to different school)***

Q During the 1930s, when you were at Middletown, and Arnold asked you to take this position, twice or three times, and you refused to do it unless he put you on the regular promotion list. Did he do your OER? Did he put you down as obstreperous, or stubborn, or inflexible? Did you get a bad mark because of that encounter?

W I've never seen an efficiency report that Arnold wrote. I don't know. He may have put me down as officious, overbearing, but I don't think he did. He was just badly disappointed that I didn't take the job.

Q He must have had a high regard for your ability to ask you three times to take a job?

W He did. I said: "You can get somebody else to do this job" He said: "No. You're the only man in the Air Force that I know of who can take it over."

Q I know of very few cases where he came back three times. In most, he would have gotten angry after one turnaround.

W He didn't get angry. He pled with me. He said "Jakie, for God's sake, take it over."

Q He had a lot of respect for your ability. He had a reputation for blowing up.

W He did respect my ability, because I'd had successful commands before that. Arnold respected my ability. He told me outright: "You're the only man I can count on to do this job."

Q Did you know Andrews?

W Yes. You're talking about Frank Andrews. You didn't know Billem Andrews. Billem was his brother. He was my adjutant.

Q What was your opinion of Frank Andrews?

Wq I never had enough contact to really judge him.

Q You were down at Langley. He was just about leaving there in '39. He was head of the GHQ air force. He was succeeded by Emmons. Were you there when Andrews was in command or did you come later?

W When I came, Culver was in command.

Capt Jack: He's talking about the GHQ air force

Q Had Andrews already left?

W Andrews had left and I think Emmons had just come in. I knew Andrews quite well, but I have no official contact with him.

Q Could you give me comparative appraisals of Arnold and Andrews as leaders?

W I haven't given any thought to it, but I considered Andrews to be a better qualified man. Because I thought he was more intelligent than Arnold and I thought he was more square than Arnold. More on the level. He was honest in his dealing with his subordinates.

Q Was Arnold devious in his dealing?

W I don't know. I knew about Andrews but I didn't know anything about Arnold, not from personal contact at that time.

Q I had a lot of dealings with Hugh Knerr and he swore by Andrews. He worked closely with him and regarded him more highly than Arnold. How about Emmons?

W Emmons and I worked together. Emmons had been a Lieutenant in

my regiment, much junior to me, but when he became Chief of GHQ, he and I got along very well.

Q Emmons is supposed to have had aspirations for the top job.

W He probably did.

Q There were three or four competitors for the top job during World War II: Arnold, Andrews, Emmons, and George Brett. And somebody told me that Arnold sent his competition out of town.

W I never heard that.

Q What kind of job do you think Arnold did running the Air Force in World War II? Would you classify it?

W I think that Arnold in World War II did a much better job than he did as Chief of the Air Corps before that because he had an efficient staff and I think it was his staff that carried him along.

Q Do you identify any special members of that staff as doing a great job? How about Yount? Yount was in Arnold's class of '07.

W Yount was one of the squarest individuals that I have ever known. He was a very fine man, a very honest man and he got a kind of raw deal while he was at the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field. I was in command--I was Acting Commandant of the school (in '29) because at that time, or just before that time, I was having all this brush with Arnold about the treatment of the lighter than air, and when this thing occurred--Barton Yount was assigned to the Tactical School at Langley Field of which I was Acting Commander rather than Commander, because they didn't want to make a lighter-than-air commander of the Air Corps Tactical School. That was still part of the game. I knew exactly what Barton Yount was capable of, and I knew exactly what kind of work he was doing in the school. And yet, when the efficiency reports came in I looked over the list of them and saw to my great surprise and horror and disgust that Barton Yount was marked way down.

Q This was at the time when Fechet was Chief of the Air Corps. Why did they mark Yount down?

- W They marked him down because the man who was the Assistant Commandant didn't like Barton Yount. This was Tony Frank, Walter H. Frank. He didn't care for Yount. Barton Yount had been to one of the technical schools in Paris just before he came to Langley Field.
- Q He and Lindbergh became great friends. He was the Attaché in Paris in 1927 when Lindbergh arrived.
- W Yes, he and Mr. Herrick put Lindbergh on the map. Barton Yount was the man who did most of the work for Lindbergh.
- Q You said Arnold was made by his staff. His success is largely attributable to his staff. Is that your statement?
- W That is what I would say. I had no direct contact with him.
- Q I was naming some of his staff members: Barton Yount and Walter Weaver and Cabell, Norstad, Rosie O'Donnell, Jake Smart, Barney Giles, George Stratemeyer. These were the men who served close to Arnold.
- Who among them helped him do his job better?
- W I think Barton Yount was his best man.
- Q Barton Yount was out of Washington. He was put in charge of the Training Command in Texas.
- W I remember that. I was under his command at that time.
- Q You feel he should have had a more important position in Washington?
- W Yes.
- Q I think he ended up as a Lieutenant General. I talked to Mrs. Yount. She lives in Distaff House, in Washington, DC. She said Young was a candidate for the top job, but she felt, and Bart felt, that he was not assertive enough, not aggressive enough to take over that job. And he deferred to Arnold when both were under consideration for the top job as Chief of the Air Corps.
- W Barton Yount was rather modest.
- Q He felt he was not up to that top job because at that time you had to build up the Air Corps from nothing. You had a few hundred airplanes

and you had to build up a large force of pilots and navigators and crew members and all that, and you had to get tough with the manufacturers, and things of this sort. And perhaps he didn't feel he was up to being nasty. You may have needed a man who could get nasty once in a while.

W It may be. I had no contact with him when he was head of the Air Force during the war. There was a man on his staff. Benny Meyers. He got an awful sentence. I thought he was unjustifiably punished.

Q Why?

W I don't like to say. (Col Wuest stated off the record that it was a widely accepted rumor that Arnold was involved in Benny Meyers' financial dealings and that Benny Meyers took the fall for Arnold and went to jail and that Arnold benefited from Meyers' financial speculations during World War II. I gave Col Wuest a long dissertation covering these points:

1. Gen Arnold died with \$19,000 in his cash estate. 2. Mrs. Arnold's pension was \$78 a month and she had to go to work. She sold real estate for pretty nearly twenty years after Gen Arnold died. 3. If Gen Arnold did benefit from Meyers' private arrangements what happened to the money?)

END OF FILE

Yates, Donald

9 Jan 70

December 22, 1969

Lt. General Donald N. Yates, USAF (Ret)
5 Chateau Cheverny
2160 Ibis Isle Road
Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Dear General Yates:

I appreciate your reply of December 18th. I know that your association with General Arnold was passing, at best, but I've gotten some good stories from people whose initial reaction was similar to yours.

As you plan to be out of town during the week of January 18th, plus the fact that my schedule for the current trip is rather heavy at this writing, I suggest we defer our get together to a mutually convenient time later on in the year.

I will write again for an interview.

Sincerely,

/s/
DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

December 1, 1969

Lt.Gen. Donald N. Yates, USAF(Ret)
5 Chateau Cheverny
2160 Ibis Isle Road
Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Dear General Yates:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Street and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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INTERVIEW WITH LT/GEN DONALD YATES
PALM BEACH, FLORIDA
JANUARY 9, 1970

Q: Do you remember the first time you encountered Gen Arnold?

Y: Probably the first time - I had gone to Cal Tech in 1939 as a weatherman, to take a meteorological course at Cal Tech. My first assignment after getting out in 1939 was Barksdale AFB, and I believe probably the first time I personally ran into him was when I was briefing him on the weather down there. He went through Barksdale quite frequently because that was a good stopping off point. I never got to know him very well, he was pretty arbitrary about the way he cleared himself on all flights, and was generous with his criticism of the weatherman.

Q: He was very concerned about the weather?

Y: Yes, he was.

Q: It was a very big item with him.

Q: Well, you knew Professor Irving Krick?

Y: Yes, in fact, that caused a little difficulty there at the time when, after I had gone to the Pentagon building, Krick was working for me, supposedly. But he was working directly for Gen Arnold, also, and this gets a little bit tough to talk about because, again, his name, if it comes up, is in difficult context. But one of the recollections I had - I think the only time I ever offered to turn in my suit - was directly to Arnold, and in an incident which involved Krick.

Q: I see his name in and out of Arnold's papers, and I

can't decide - maybe it was a love-hate relationship, I don't know.

Y: General Arnold felt weather was so damned important. He knew it was so important that he wanted to get the very best he could, and Krick was a super salesman. Still is, as far as I know.

Q: Was he a good a weatherman as he was a salesman?

Y: In my personal opinion, Krick was a very capable forecaster - day to day forecaster. He was no long range forecaster, but he sold long range forecasts for years, and part of the difficulty we had was his attempting to put the long range forecasting business in, and the claims to being able to forecast more than two or three days in advance. Now, he did a lot of good. He was a natural forecaster. That is, he was good in that respect, a very good forecaster, but no long range forecaster, and he was sort a shyster in that respect. He sold himself to Arnold. Gen Arnold at that time had a gray haired guy in his front office....

Q: Horace Shelshire?

Y: Yes.

Q: This was from his old home town.

Y: Well, somehow Krick knew how to cultivate the front office there, and he was providing special reports and services, things like that, and he was giving his impressions of advice, actually, regarding the North African invasion, things like that. I don't know if you have heard the story about that fiasco, but he got involved, sub rosa in the forecasting for it, in competition

with the Navy and a few other people, and that was kind of embarrassing. Shelmire, or whatever his name was, was the contact in the office that Krick was sending all this stuff through. We were putting out forecasts, and I was running the Weather Central in the Pentagon at that time, and it got to be so, it got to be impossible. Krick wouldn't go the direction the forecasters had agreed we were going to go, and here's the position of the consensus.....

Q: In other words he was free wheeling outside your authority?

Y: He was completely free wheeling outside of my authority, and I was getting some kickbacks from it, because I was having to defend two positions. One, the official position which I knew about, and another position that got bootlegged through by Irv. Krick and I were very good friends. He was working for me, and yet he wasn't. And the whole issue: I went down to see Gen Arnold and said: "I would like to have this stopped," and this free wheeling and all this razzle dazzle that Irv was doing. And I said: "I knew it is by your personal direction." And I said: "If you want him to run the show, then let him run the show. But I don't think it is going to be good for it, good for the people, good for the service, good for anything." I was more scared at that time than I think I have ever been. I was a Major, I guess.

Q: How did Arnold react to that?

Y: It was funny. He was in his office, and personally, I always had reasonably good rapport with him, because he chewed me out and I would take it all right, and I think in a way, he

had a reasonable respect for me as a weatherman. And I asked permission to see him, and he had, at the time that I went in, in his office was this old retired General. He was standing in there. He had been out of the service for some time....

Q: Was it Trubee Davison?

Y: Davison, no. The other one who lived in Washington so long. He went to all the Air Force affairs....

Q: Fechet?

Y: Fechet, yes.

Q: He was the first Chief of the Air Corps.

Y: Right, he was in the office, I walked in, saluted and turned around, and said, "I'm sorry." He said: "oh no," and he smiled. And I think Gen Arnold knew I was very, very upset, because I had requested repeatedly an appointment with him personally and I was way down the line, and of course. Arnold was that kind of guy. The one thing about him that I could never understand how he had the capacity to run an organization like he did, with his fingers in every pie. He wouldn't have a man in between. He wanted to have each single function reporting directly to him. Fifty functions, you know how he had the Air Force organized at that time. Flat, right across. I don't know how many people reported to him officially. Well, I was down the line below that. I was at least two tiers below the man that was supposed to go see him. But I knew that it was his problem and it was my problem, and the guy between couldn't care less. He was in Operations at the time, and so....

Q: You are talking about 1941 or 42? Was this post Pearl Harbor?

Y: Oh yes, this was post Pearl Harbor. This was pre Europe, I went over to Europe in 1944. Gen Spaatz and Gen Arnold specifically asked me to take my weather central over, and I took Krick and Ben Holzman, and about 6 or 7 other key guys right out of the Weather Central in Washington. Spaatz said: "Send them over. If they are the best ones you've got, they don't need to be in Washington, they've got to be on the front line." This was in January 1944. So the time that I am thinking about in this incident, occurred before that, and probably two or three years before, probably in 1942, maybe early '43. I can't remember the time. If I could isolate these various things that happened I could put it in the proper context. That is the time period. And what happened was that Arnold said: "Well, go ahead and speak your piece." And I said: "Well, it's just that I've got to have authority to run my outfit directly, and everybody in the outfit. I can't have somebody reporting to somebody else, around outside. I'm not smart enough to know what to do about it, and it's getting damned embarrassing" - words to this effect, and I said: "Frankly, I'd turn in my suit right now, if that's what is necessary to straighten this thing out, because I can't handle it." And he said: "What would you do if I turned Krick over to you 100%?" He knew, or, he was admitting that he was in it, and I said: "I'll send him to California." I remember that. And he said: "You'll send him out of town," and I said: "Yes, for the time being. He has stirred up so much ruckus here, I have to get him out of town. And if he is to report to me, then he goes to Pasadena. I'm going to put him on a job there working

up historical chart of the hemisphere, going back about 50 years, which will later be the basis for the best kind of forecast that we could get, to extend the forecast beyond 2 or 3 days." I said, "I know no better analyst, no more capable guy to do the job than he." He smiled, and of course, I was scared, and I think it was Fechet, just standing over in the corner of the room, just getting a kick out of my embarrassment, and really, the fact that Arnold made no bones about it. He said: "I think you've got a point. I can see the position you are in, and although I'm not necessarily going to agree with you that that's the best place to put Krick," he said, "I've either got to accept your offer, or let you do what you are going to do." And so, my respect went up 100% for him.

Q: Going back to Krick - I've seen the Arnold papers at the Library of Congress. He left, or he collected a mixture of unofficial, semi-official and what not, all kinds of things. Krick is in and out of the place. In his papers, and I didn't quite understand his role, and I'm glad that I made this trip up here, because I think you can help me.

Y: The thing about it that you can see, is this can't be, as far as I am concerned, it would be wrong to have it published. I went back to Krick as soon as I came out of Arnold's office. I had told him before, because he had said: "I'm working for Arnold." and what could I do. I told him the situation, I said: "I've frankly gone down to Gen Arnold; I've put the cards on the table, I've told him I would quit, or he would fire me, or whatever he wanted, but it had to be, either you work for me or you

don't and, then I would have no connection with this, I said, "Gen Arnold agreed with me." I said: "So you are going to have to be prepared to go to the West Coast and set up that outfit." And he broke down and cried in my office. He had been my professor at Cal Tech, and there was a very difficult situation. However, he went out there, and he did a splendid job. And then, we brought him back in. The situation was completely changed; he was working hard; he went over as part of the team to do the forecasting for Gen Spaatz in the USSTAF, 8th AF.

Q: Yes, the 8th Air Force and the 15th AF - the Strategic Air Force.

Y: Yes, where we pulled the 15th AF from Italy on target, and the 8th AF out of Europe. He was there, and that was part of the team. And later, he and Holzman were the two US forecasters that were on a joint team that did the forecasting for D-Day. I was the head of the US side of it, I was Deputy Chief, Meteorological Officer, SHAEF, and there was a Britisher that was Chief, Meteorological Officer, professional meteorologist, not a Britisher that was Chief, Meteorological Officer, professional meteorologist, not a military man....

Q: Fellow named....?

Y: Staff.

Q: I think Eisenhower mentioned him.

Y: Yes, he did. He certainly did, and he and I went into every single briefing just before D-Day, and backing us up was a big British crew, and my crew, headed by Holzman and Krick, so that situation ironed itself out very well. Krick was controversial,

because during these deals he tended to try to belittle the British crew, and then later claimed that his sides of the forecast were more accurate than the other consensus. This was the way Irv did his business. He was a real fine person in many respects, but he always had to be slithering around and building up Irving P. Krick. So that was a real though situation.

Q: Well, this was actually compounded, I mean he had this personality aspect - disease of the vertical pronoun, and Arnold sort of fostered this.

Y: He did?

Q: What gave Arnold so much confidence in him?

Y: I don't know. I do not know.

Q: He came from Cal Tech.

Y: He came from Cal Tech, and as you know....

Q: Robert Millikan was there; Millikan and Arnold were very close.

Y: That's correct.

Q: In the early '30s?

Y: That was it. And young Clark Millikan was - both of them were pushing - and von Karman. There's the guy that did it. Von Karman knew, and I talked to Von Karman many, many times, about Krick and his capabilities and his weaknesses. Von Karman agreed to all of them, but Von Karman was close to Arnold, very close, and that is exactly the reason, because Krick was commissioned in the Navy, and Arnold had him switched over to the Air Force.

Q: I was going to ask about this. He had some trouble in the Navy?

Y: Oh yes. Same trouble, only they wouldn't take him at all. He always had trouble in the Navy, even after he was in the Air Force. Made it a little bit tougher for us. But getting out to Cal Tech for awhile, organizing the job which he did extremely well, that cleared the atmosphere a little bit. So when he came back in he was a better man for it, he was a better soldier for it.

Q: He had, with Millikan and Von Karman backing him, he had the highest credentials?

Y: And it was very interesting. Carl Rossby, you know, was working in OSD as the consultant deputy to Bowles, when Bowles...

Q: OSD?

Y: Stimson's office. Secretary of War. Ed Bowles, Dr. Bowles - he worked for Stimson directly, and Carl Rossby was a Norweigan who worked for Bowles. Rossby had been a professor at MIT. Of course he was anti-Krick all the way, but he couldn't get any where.

Q: A couple of days ago somebody mentioned the Norwegian weather forecaster, and I couldn't think of his name.

Y: He was a lousy forecaster, but he was a good technical man - much more honest let's say, technically honest, than Irv would be, though Irv was not as competent technically, theoretically. Patterssen is the Norwegian. Rossby was a Swede. Svere Patterssen - he was on the British team over there, but he hadn't been in the US. He wasn't mixed up in the US military at that time. We got him in, and I got him assigned

to the Weather Service after I came back and after the invasion. Sometime in the latter part of the war we got him a clearance; we got him in and he worked in the US for a long time with us in the weather service, when I was Chief of the weather service, which was a little bit later. This was 1945-50. I spent '44 in Europe, then I came back and Arnold said: "All right, you are going to be Chief of the Weather Service, pulled me back out of there at that stage. Rossby and Bowles had quite a little bit of influence, I thought, with Arnold. But Rossby never did. Rossby believed Von Karman and probably Millikan. I didn't know, his context with Millikan, but of course, Von Karman was there, and Von Karman had a lot of...."

Q: Well, that connection started in the early '30s when Arnold was at March Field. He was at March Field, and Millikan was conducting some high atmospheric tests of solar rays or something. Arnold made available to him and his scientists, air-planes. They went up, Arnold gave him carte blanche. Arnold had a great interest in R&D. It really turned him on.

Y: He didn't understand it, but he knew it was essential. Had a better appreciation for it - it's the same way with the weather business. He respected....

Q: People who were professionals - like Von Karman. Could ask him for the moon and he could get it if Arnold could reach it.

Y: That's true.

Q: Von Karman did a job for him, you know. His book, Toward New Horizons, is a 20 years forecast of R&D - absolutely fantastic in its predictions. Well, Von Karman came during the Hitler

era into Cal Tech, and Millikan saw his merit, and I guess, recommended him to Arnold. And then when both of them said Krick is the man you want for weather, this is all Arnold needed. Can you think of a specific instance of where Krick ran around the end, and may have told Arnold 180° from consensus.

Y: No. Since you wrote, I've been trying to think, my memory is bad. I wish I could because several quite flagrant things that were done. At the time they were terribly important to me. But later on, I just put them out of my mind, and got things squared away and got straightened up. That was an issue.

Q: You mentioned a snafu with TORCH.

Y: I didn't know until later that Krick was even involved, and I think he was working for me, but he was providing forecasts directly through Arnold's office, and I guess those forecasts were going to the skipper prior to the invasion. Apparently the two met, because I know then, later, the Navy local chief of the Naval Aerological Service came to me and raised cain about our forecasts having been going over while he was providing forecasts out of their own Central. This kind of thing that happened without any knowledge on my part. I didn't have the foggiest idea that these things were going on. Krick was sending them, and he wasn't. He was giving them to Shelmire, and that's how they got to Arnold.

Q: This is rather important, because it reflects Arnold's manner of managing the Air Force. Arnold did not have a very elaborate chain of command, as you point out.

Y: He had a flat; he had a flat organization. He dealt with people all the way across the board. These were people he trusted. He made very, very, fast decisions and he would make decisions on a recommendation from someone whom he trusted, and then he would issue directives down the line, based on that. One case which is typical of Gen Arnold. I think it was a Friday at 11:30 in the morning, just before noon, as I recall, and my wife will probably recall this even better because I was called to Gen Arnold's office. This was in June or July of 1942, and I had only been in the Munitions Building, at that time, for 6 months, I came in December 1941. He said: "How long will it take you to get ready to go to Russia?" to me, He hadn't called my boss; he hadn't called anybody, he said: "Come down here" and I said: "I guess it all depends for how long." He said: "Anywhere from 1 week to the duration." And I said: "when?" He said: "Tomorrow." I said: "Sir, shots and a few other things, let along packing and trying to make arrangements for my family, and a few other dozen things. It was right out of the blue. He said: "Well, okay. I'm sure that you can make it." He said: "What's happened is when making a deal on the (Follett) Bradley mission to go to Russia, we had^{not}/any meteorologists in, but because we are moving these fighters down through Siberia, they want some help in setting up a meteorological service there that would be somewhat compatible. I have agreed to put a meteorologist on the crew, and he will be the second man. You'd be next in seniority to Gen Bradley." By that time, I guess I was a LTCOL. And Arnold said: "And you are pilot; there will be four pilots

among you; and you are taking a B-24," he said: "You can report to Gen Bradley and get briefed, and the emergency equipment and everything else is on the airplane earmarked for Joe Doaks, will be yours, whether it fits or not," or words to that effect.

Anyhow, I called my wife up, and I said I had to go to Moscow or Russia, and I think it was a Friday, and I think we left on Sunday morning at 9:00 as I recall.

Q: Flew the northern route.

Y: No. We went south - went across from Belem to Accra, and from Accra up to Cairo, and then across into Tehran, and then back over into Moscow. And as it ended, we were gone about 6 months, but, we could have been there for the duration. He personally, without discussing it with anybody except me - my boss knew nothing about it, I went back and told him...

Q: Who was your boss at that time?

Y: I don't remember. Don Zimmerman, probably, the meteorological boss. Merriweather was at one stage. I can't remember the changes. Merriweather was the head weatherman, Merriweather was the man, I'm pretty sure.

Q: Did Don Zimmerman have some dealings with him - Arnold?

Y: Yes, that was very hard to understand, because Don Zimmerman had gotten Krick over. Don Zimmerman was from Cal Tech and he wanted Krick and he got Krick over from the administrative level that got him in. Don was working at that time over in the weather bureau in a central that had been created there, jointly. That's before we moved into the Pentagon building, and Krick was there as part of that team provided by the Navy, and the transfer

was made at that time. He was made a Major in the Air Force, from a LCDR in the Navy.

Q: He's one man I will try to get to see. I looked up Don Zimmerman, he's in Mercer Island, Washington.

Y: State of Washington. I know he was working for Boeing for a while.

Q: He's going to be a hard man to get, but I have a note here that Arnold selected him to be in the first class at the National War College. So he selected 6 people for that including Cabell, Zimmerman, P.D. Weikert.....

Y: Don Zimmerman, somehow or other, got crosswise, all of a sudden, with Arnold, and that would be an interesting story, because I never knew what happened, but I think Krick was involved. I think that Don Zimmerman tried to do exactly what I tried to do, but I knew I couldn't do it without going to Arnold. And what happened, was Zimmerman apparently - now this is strictly speculation - but all of a sudden, Zimmerman moved from the Weather Service and moved out of Washington. Don was serious and conscientious, and no one could understand, but from being at the top of the [group] because we knew that Gen Arnold thought a hell of a lot of Don because he put him in the first class....

Q: The men that he selected were selected for their potential....

Y: At that stage, it just seemed that all of a sudden he went from being on the good side to being on the bad side, and Don's story would be interesting. I'm sure that if you are going to get into the Krick story, Zimmerman is one man, and Oscar Senter probably could, Gen Senter, he was in the weather service at that time. He is in the Washington area.

Q: William O. Senter?

Y: Yes, I'm sure his memory is far more acute on these details like that than mine, because he was that type of person.

Q: I think this is fairly important. The reason for it is because it illustrates the kind of organization Arnold sat up. Arnold ran the Air Force out of his hip pocket.

Y: And everybody in it, as he did like his asking me to go. And he fully expected me to be able to do the impossible. Most people did, and that's how he got so damned many things done. It's because he let them know he had confidence in them, and he demanded they do it, and they did it. That was - it was fantastic the way he operated. No normal man could operate that way.

No one could keep as many things in his mind as he did. One thing that Oscar Senter can give you the details on. One day Arnold said: "We need more forecasters in the Pacific. Cut this class in half," we had a forecasters school going. He said: "Take them out right now. Half a forecaster is better than none." This would have been all right to do it two months more, giving them enough so that they had their basic, and then go ahead. As I recall, Oscar can give you the details on that, because that was fantastic.

Q: Maybe they could give you a quarter of a forecast?

Y: They probably weren't even that. I don't know what happened. I remember hearing about the order, and I felt: "We can't do that. We'll kill the pilots... suicide, these people have only had certain things." Oscar was on the training side of the business at that time. I was in the forecasting and

climatological side, and I remember his griping about it, but Arnold made his decision." "And that's what it will be'." It's my recollection that somehow they doubled or trebled the number of forecasters, and they got these guys out. They shortened the courses. Oh, we had forecasters running out of our ears. There for a while, but Arnold was handling that, it wasn't anybody in between, it was Arnold to some Major or LTCOL down the line that was responsible for Training, I think he went too. Arnold called me down to his office, and I said: "That's not my business." But he persisted: "Can you get it done?" And I said: "Yes sir, I'll see that its placed in the right place, and then I forced Oscar Senter to go back and see him. I believe it was Oscar and asked him: "You go on back and pick it up, because I'm getting a directive which is not in my area of business." But arnold would do that.

Q: You have given me the most rational explanation of a management technique that Arnold used that has been severely criticized. This business of his grabbing somebody in the E-Ring, and giving them a job totally alien to their responsibility.

Y: Absolutely.

Q: He did this?

Y: Oh, he did this on innumerable occasions. There were many cases that I watched that being done, and, at the level where this happened, the best we could do was to immediately go to the right guy, and pass the word on. But he had certain people he would contact, and other people he would not contact.

Q: Well, if he trusted you, he'd give you all the jobs?

Y: He'd give you anything to do, whether it was your business, or whether it wasn't in your business. This is the way he operated. This is the most interesting thing about him to me, as a young officer working under him. At that time I was a Major.

Q: It was good and bad. He cut the process of getting this thing filtered down to the operating level by 3/4, but he also alienated people, and he also was carrying too much of a load himself.

Y: Too much, much too much of a load himself. However, for a new organization, a new force, growing as it was, when it became the AAF and a significant segment of the Army -before we were separated. He created the separate Air Force really within the Army. And he did that himself, in my opinion. He did that himself, by pulling all the strings, and doing an absolutely impossible job.

Q: He had a staff, people like Stratemeyer. Did he bypass Stratemeyer?

Y: Always. And Stratemeyer?

Q: Giles after him?

Y: That's right. All of them - they didn't know what was going on. They would ask us. And the system was, after you got the instructions, go on up and brief the other guys that should know about it, as well as the guys responsible to get it done. First, go to the guy that was supposed to do it. Get him working on it; then tell your boss and his boss, and then tell Strat or Giles, and he was all the time running back to Giles and telling him the orders he'd gotten from Arnold.

Q: Well, I'm going to see Giles in San Antonio.

Y: This is to me, looking back at it, it is clearly the way he operated. Now, there are many people in business and industry. I happen to be working in an organization (Raytheon), and the President of this organization is very similar, and he had no experience with his staff. He had no reason to know how to use the staff, and he deals totally in people. He makes mistakes, many many more mistakes than Arnold made, because he hasn't the breadth that Arnold had. But he is similar in many respects to Arnold. He's young, he's only 42 or 43, made President when he was 34.

Q: Which organization?

Y: Raytheon.

Y: The reason, it's the first time that I had ever run into anybody that, even thought, or tried to operate in the manner which, in my opinion, Arnold successfully did. Then, as you may recall, Arnold was prevailed upon to change his organization, and he then created several people on his staff. He had about 6, but he still couldn't always go through them, but he knew that he should, and people had told him. I'm convinced that they got to him and said: "Look boss..."

Q: People like Hanley and Reuben Hood?

Y: This is correct, and he gave them little segments, and several things to watch over. But he never hesitated to go below them if he thought there was a question, or if there was a hurry.

Q: Do you know what contributed to that? Partly, some of the responsibility or authority - his heart attack -/had a series

of heart attacks. One moderate one in 1943 during the TRIDENT conference.

Y: Okay, this is about the time that this happened, right after that. Because in 1945...

Q: He had a major one in 1945. This is the one where he went down to Coral Gables...

Y: I was going to say, in 1945. he had practically agreed, and he had the staff set up, so that on paper it made reasonable sense. But you know, when he first organized it, it made no sense for any normal man, but for him that's the way he operated.

Q: He came in early in the morning and left late at night, and then he'd go on an inspection trip, travel all night, and then come back again.

Y: He never stopped. How that man ever kept on, and lived as long as he did, I don't know. He just wore himself out. But he felt he had to get to the guy who really was doing it. He didn't want any second-hand information. That's what he felt he was later on getting when he set up Plans and Operations and Personnel....

Q: When he got to an air base, he went right to the sergeant and the operating man. When he went to inspect the B-29s, with which they were having trouble, the engines caught fire, and all kinds of problems on that. So he went directly to a base. Well, he went to Salina. They were trying to get these planes out. Roosevelt was on his back on getting B-29s out to the CBI. He went out there and he got Benny Meyers, Benny Meyers

was one of his favorite people at that time, but this is the way he operated.

Q: I'm interested especially in what you said about the Follett Bradley mission. You were on that mission?

Y: Yes.

Q: One of the tasks, I think, was to get the Russians to give us some Siberian bases?

Y: This was behind everything. This was really the purpose of the mission. The front was to provide a route down through Siberia. The Al-sib Route. We came out, and I always personally felt that Roosevelt let us down, because we were pouring lend lease stuff in there - "Flaming Philip" Faymonville - "Flaming Phil," Gen Faymonville, was the Army officer, and I always will believe that he's pink, was pink. He was giving the Russians things, and asking nothing in return. And here we had information that we needed. We needed to know what was the Order of Battle on the eastern front as far as the Russians were concerned. How did they really stand vis a vis Japan. We had picked up bases. Why couldn't we go out and look at the area? Why wouldn't they give us permission to do some shuttle operations through Siberia. After 6 months, Roosevelt told us - a couple of messages that were going back, two channels to go back through, one through the Pentagon and one through....

Q: Standley?

Y: Standley was there at the time.

Q: The Ambassador. One through Standley and one through the military?

Y: Right, and the military was a real good friend of the Air Force on the General Staff at the time.

Q: Was it Deane - John Deane?

Y: No, an old guy.

Q: You mean, the military guy where?

Y: In the Pentagon. He was our contact. He was G-3.

Q: Was it Strong?

Y: Strong was G-2.

Q: Handy?

Y: Handy. Tom Handy was the guy. Well, we felt that Handy agreed with us. We had a lot of coded messages back and forth. We could see there was trouble in Washington, but pretty soon the message came right back through Standley from the President, and we felt that Faymonville had some influence, that we would put no more pressure [the Russians] to get bases, and that we would come out of there. So we came out in December. But we were really - we came out - and we still formed a task group, and operated as a task group to form an air force that would operate in Siberia, because we still believed it. But it was clear Roosevelt was not going to put any pressure on "Uncle Joe." And that was the way it was. And damn it! I just felt that was wrong at the time, I was so convinced that we could shorten the war, and that we could do this job, and we know now we could have done this job.

Q: The Russians said they were worried - whether they were or not - that this would be a belligerent act and cause the Japanese to attack. You know, Roosevelt had sent Stalin a report in 1942, that he had information the Japanese were preparing to

attack Russia. Somebody may have given him phony information which justified the Russians not giving us any bases.

Y: Anyhow, it didn't look right to us, the information that we had.

Q: Did you know about that report?

Y: Yes, I knew about that report. I don't know where it came from. I don't know what the US source of that information was. I know, I understand that that was....

Q: There is another man involved in that mission, his name starts with an "A" Col Alcorn?

Y: No, on that mission was Gen Bradley, Tom Watson, Jr., was Bradley's aide, he's now chairman of IBM, Chuck Westover, Oscar Westover's son, C.B. Westover, III. But anyway, he's a retired AF General now. He was on that mission. Harley Trash (?) and Hicks, he was a navigator.

Q: A related mission, I can't think of the man's name. It starts with an "A". There's an officer at the Air Force Academy, I was out there recently, and interviewed some people there. He was doing a Ph.D. dissertaion on "Faymonville".

Y: I would be interested in seeing what the real truth on was on Faymouville. All I did was see him in association.

Q: You don't know too much about Faymonville, except this one mission?

Y: No, I don't know anything about Faymonville, except that I saw him and his behavior while we were in Russia, and he had a couple of guys working for him - Army people. One was named Olsen, and Olie Olson.

Q: Did you have any contact with Merion Cooper?

Y: No.

Q: Cooper earlier, some months earlier, right after Pearl Harbor, was probably sent on some mission to see what we could do to get some bases either in China or Russia. Roosevelt was anxious to strike Japan, and of course, this led to the Doolittle raid. Merion Cooper was a G-2 type...

Y: No, I never had any dealing with him.

Q: Did you have any contact or knowledge of the plan for an Anglo-American air task force to help the Russians out? This is right at the time of the Folliott-Bradley mission. An air task force to help the Russians. The Germans were approaching Stalingrad, and they were threatening Baku. If they took that - you had no contact with that?

Y: No, not with that. We got in, and the German front-line was about 20 miles west of Moscow. We went up to the front-lines, and we saw the Russian air operations there, and what a mess.

Q: Was the Bradley mission a success?

Y: We got some intelligence information that probably justified the mission - that's all we got. And it was a success from my point of view, as far as developing a meteorological exchange. The head of the Soviet hydrometeorological service was a LTGEN. He was my aide, and he was a general. A real fine guy, and it was through him....

Q: Do you remember his name?

Y: Yes, Eugene Federov.

Q: He was your aide, and he was a LTCEN?

Y: He was my age at that time, and he was my opposite number. He was the only one. It was in that area, the only area that we could talk without having a member of the Soviet Secret Service or what have you, MKVD. They didn't call that group, that group was the one that handled the foreign office, but they were essentially a branch of the MKVD.

Q: I was told that the Russians gave us incorrect meteorological information.

Y: That is a damn lie. I don't know who said that - to my knowledge, and I was there.

Q: They were genuinely cooperative?

Y: Yes, they did refuse to give us some information, and they did incipher some of their information.

Q: Why, they are naturally secretive?

Y: They are naturally secretive and they didn't trust anybody. So they gave what information they agreed to internationally. But they ciphered all their weather broadcasts, so we couldn't fill in all the small stations, without working on the information. In other words they never reneged nor as far as I know, gave any incorrect information, once the agreement was made, but all the big bulk of Soviet weather information was enciphered. Of course, none of the information that was enciphered was part of the agreement, or the information that we got, but that was the second subject and a second problem.

Q: Did Harry Hopkins play any role in that mission?

Y: He probably did. Yes, because I think he was Faymonville's direct boss, wasn't he?

Q: Well, Harry Hopkins had his finger on the....

Y: He was the one in the White House that was handling the Lend Lease business and I know Faymonville could get to the President very easily by going to Hopkins, this was the way he did, as I understood it.

Q: How about Harriman?

Y: Harriman was not in the picture as far as I know.

Q: He probably came in a little later?

Y: He came in a little later, he had been....

Q: I think he replaced Standley [as Ambassador]?

Y: He replaced Standley, but that was after I came back. Later, of course, we did have, while Standley was still there, we started the shuttle raid operation from England into Poltava...

Q: That was 1944? [the Follett Bradley mission]

Y: That was in 1944, that's correct.

Q: Were you there?

Y: Yes, I was in England at the time.

Q: Did you go with the mission - the Poltava mission?

Y: I didn't go to the mission, but I helped arrange some of the exchanges, because I knew the weather people over there, and I'd been there. So I placed - it was a Naval weather officer that was in charge of this arrangement at Poltava. And he gave him the information.

Q: That was Operation FRANTIC?

Y: That's right.

Q: Tell me about the weather for OVERLORD - this is a very interesting thing.

Y: This was fantastic, absolutely fantastic. We had this team of forecasters working together for about 2 months prior to the invasion, and we had everything categorized right down to a nat's eyebrow. What weather affected what operation. We knew every piece of it, the advanced bombing of the shore defenses, then the paratroop drops, and then the impact of wather on the vehicles, and what have you. We were looking for every kind of situation that might create mud or difficulty in mobility, once we got over there. We had given that a terrific amount of study. It was done by a lot of good climatologists. So it was rather easy to set down exact criteria for every single operation. That was simple. Then we started forecasting, and we had beautiful weather in June and, during the latter part of May as I recall, one or two months, certainly all through May, and all through June, and probably half of May, we attended twice weekly, mock sessions, mock briefings, where Eisenhower and his and all of the C&Cs - Ramsey for the Navy, Leigh Mallory for the Air, and Spaatz for the strategic forces, and Montgomery and then there were two or three backups for these people. And then the staff which was Bull, G-2, and Tedder who was always there. This group was going to make the decision. So we would go in and brief them, Stagg and I would brief them, Stagg would generally give the basic meteorological situation, and I would give the military interpretations of it, because the US had done much more of that than the British. The British hadn't, they just said this is the weather situation. And we would have an agreed forecast. We would get on a conference hookup, and it was the worst, lousy arrangement

for making forecasts I've ever seen, but three centers, the Admiral, the British Meteorological Officer, which is a civilian center, and the AF - US Weather Central which was Krick and a whole bunch of people. Well, they would make the decisions based on our forecasts. Boy, they were beautiful, they were no hard decisions. All of a sudden, 2 or 3 days before the invasion, we were going for real. We were making them every day, now. Then, starting three or four days before, as I recall, we made them about 4 times a day. And the day before, we made them every two hours all day and all night. And this group would be there.

Some weather systems started coming across the Atlantic and one lined right up behind the other. And it was a miserable mess and it was going to be awfully difficult to go. So, anyway, we briefed, and Eisenhower postponed one day. It was going to be hairy the next day and we were worried about the briefing about the weather. The ships had started down. He turned them back, and the next day he was going to have to make an irrevocable decision, and to switch back and it would be another 3 or 4 weeks.

Q: By that time the whole thing could have been compromised?

Y: This is correct. Anything could have happened because we had alerted everybody, we had this communication, the air full of communications, and everything else.

Q: He made the basic decisions to recommend to-touch and go?

Y: Oh yes, well he questioned. I'll never forget some of the questions we got that night, when the final decision was made to go. And the first guy said, Montgomery said: "How high were the seas going to be." And we were a couple of feet over the

max permissible. There were going to be some awful seasick guys. He said, that's all right, they will be doped up, so that wouldn't bother them too much. "We can get across, and the boats can take it," he said, "my people can take it all right." Spaatz wanted to know: "What is the chance of bombing visually?" Well, it was a case where we must sneak in between two storms, and they were just about a day apart. And so, we said: "About 50%." I said: "Well, if you want to figure it one way, figure all the US forces bomb visually, and all the British bombers bomb instrument." I said: "that's about the only way you can put it." Then, Monty wanted to know if his paratroopers were going to get in. We said we wouldn't guarantee more than half of them being on target. And he said: "Half of them? Can you guarantee that half of them will be where they are supposed to be?" And I said: "No, we can't guarantee it, but that's the feel we have for it, that at least half of them will be there, and that's the best guess we can give." And then the question after the bombing and the paratroopers - that was the kind of questions, and then they kicked these things around. Ramsey was negative most of the time. It was going to be rougher than hell, and it was going to be messy. Montgomery was an eager beaver. Eisenhower just said, he made the decision all by himself, strictly atypical, as far as I can see, because usually he was very good at compromising and getting a bunch of people to agree to something. But he knew he had to do it, and goddam it, he was whipped, too, because there hadn't been anybody that had more than 2 hours sleep at a time for the last couple of days. They came out.

The funny thing was that the US bombers hit instrument, and all the RAF hit visually. They went two hours apart and one of them got everything. Most of the paratroopers got in. One bunch of paratroopers got in the wrong place, but other than that, they got in. But it was kind of hairy getting in.

Q: I'll bet you didn't sleep that night.

Y: I didn't sleep at all. We were really really worried about it. It was exciting, it was interesting; and it ended up that we were real lucky. Two or three weeks later whenever that next period came up - well, that's the time they blew out all those temporary docks that they put in.

Q: The Mulberries?

Y: Yes, those things were all torn up, right at the time that the next postponement would have been. So they wouldn't have gone for a month or two and God knows what would have happened to the invasion at that time.

Q: Exactly one week after the invasion, the Germans started flying in the V-1s. Can you imagine this going on during the invasion, the initial invasion?

Y: Oh, wouldn't that have messed us, particularly if they had put them down there in the Portsmouth area.... The whole top brass of that whole operation, everybody was there. And I mean they were there all the time, grouped within...one V-1 would have clobbered the whole bunch if it hit in the right place.

Q: Arnold and Marshall came in on the 9th or 10th of June. Did you see Arnold, did he talk to you?

Y: No, he didn't talk to me at that time. I saw him.

They were busy, and we were busy because at that time, I went on over to follow up, to get the weather service installed across the way. So we moved over right away, with the advance headquarters, and we stayed there, then went on down to Granville, and then went from Granville up to Paris. St. Germaine where Spaatz had his headquarters; Eisenhower was out at the palace.

Q: Did you see Arnold later on in the war?

Y: Yes. I was called back in December 1944, and was called down to Gen Arnold's office. I had been over there just a year. And he said: "do you think the situation is operating okay over there right now?" And I said: "Yes". And he said: "well, I've got a rat's nest back here in the weather service, and I need somebody to organize it." Arnold said: "No holds barred." He said: "I've got two factions right now fighting each other. The factions were Oscar Senter was heading up the weather wing down at Nashville, N.C., and Hunt Basset was heading up the unit in the Pentagon, and Arnold didn't, again - here's a situation where he just goes to the individual. It wasn't up a matter, somebody up the line, some general officer should have been able to take that burden and straighten it out, and he said...

Q: Were you a general officer at the time?

Y: No, I was a Colonel at the time. I had been recommended for promotion, but I hadn't been promoted. Spaatz had recommended me for promotion, Anderson really, I guess, he was running the operation.

Q: Fred Anderson. He just passed away.

Y: Yes, I saw that in some recent publication. Fred was

Operations, and really ran the operations there. Of course, as weatherman, I worked directly for Fred. Although Spaatz had made most of the decisions, Fred was running it.

Q: When you came back in Dec 1944, this was right in the middle of the Battle of the Bulge?

Y: Yes.

Q: Weather was a tremendous factor? Did you get involved in that?

Y: I came back - I was asked to come back temporarily, so I came back on TDY.

Q: Oh you went back to Europe?

Y: And then I went back to Europe, and at the time, Arnold said: "All right, take Bassett back with you." And here was a stepdown for Bassett, having to go out to the field. Arnold said: "Is it going to get squared away?" And I said: "Well, we have the most miserable situation existing right now, with the Bulge going on, but he said: "Administratively, everything is going all right, and the best forecasting team we can put together is there, so all it takes is continuing the management." So he said: "I want you back on the 1st of January, and the, I want you to reorganize the Weather Service."

Q: So you had to go back to the Bulge?

Y: Then I went back over, and stayed through the end of that battle.

Q: That was a hairy situation?

Y: That was a mess. It was socked in and nothing you could do about it.

Q: And they were blaming the Air Force?

Y: Yes. Couldn't do anything about it.

Q: For about a week or 10 days it was touch and go. The Germans had penetrated the line. I guess we couldn't get any air in there, because you couldn't fly....

Y: You couldn't get any air in there at all, because they were operating right into it. And later on, after the war, when we got to talk to the Germans, they were complimentary about the forecasting of the invasion time. They had said they had advised that there was absolutely no possibility of an invasion during that time from a meteorological point of view, that we couldn't risk it, but the pressure once you get an operation like that going, you can slow it down. But the gamble that you are taking in stopping it is so terrible, and the fact that we had one break of 24 hours, an 18 hour period, we slipped in there, and it worked, but that was all you could do. And then it socked in.

Q: Luck played a part?

Y: Luck played a terrific factor.

Q: Doesn't it scare you sometimes. I mean you can be professional all the way down the line, and luck takes over?

Y: You are exactly right. You have no control over that. Skill just takes you so far and no more, in the science of meteorological today. Still, doesn't do the job, and that's the problem.

Q: A month later, when you came back, presumably after the Battle of the Bulge, Arnold had his major heart attack. He went

down to Miami. He was down there, and was trying to run the air force from a horizontal position, from the Biltmore. Were you aware that he was ill?

Y: No.

Q: It was kept very secret.

Y: I was not personally aware, I was in the middle of a move, too, and there was another reason, I had no idea he was sick at that time, I think I heard about it later.

Q: When did you next see him? He came back at the end of March 1945?

Y: That is pretty hard to tell, because we had several meetings and proposals on radical changes in the organization of the Weather Service. We put it under ATC at that time, ATC I believe it was, a long with the communications service, and what have you - to pull it out and pull it all together and make it a worldwide operation.

Q: You had your star by that time?

Y: No, I didn't get my star until 1946 or 1947, and then I went from there in '50. I guess in 1947 I got the star. In '50 I went to the Pentagon, and in '51 I got my second star, but that was as Director of Research and Director of Research and Development. I was out of the weather business. I was in the R&D business. Then I came down to Patrick after that four year tour and stayed here for 6 years.

Q: Did you have any contact with von Karman in the '45-'46 period?

Y: Yes, all the time. Both here, and in Europe, and everywhere.

Q: Arnold sent him to Europe right after the war ended, were you in that team?

Y: No, but I was aware of it, and visited him over there, and he had an office in Paris. What year was that?

Q: '45. This was May or June 1945.

Y: I was traveling all over, everywhere, in those days. I made no specific trip to see Von Karman, I was on the Meteorological Committee, and later I was on the Research and Development Board.

Q: Scientific Advisory Board?

Y: Yes. That came out of the office of Research and Development in the Air Force and I was the head of that office for 4 years. But I had know von Karman ever since he was a professor of mine at Cal Tech.

Q: Where you aware of the find of the Von Karman group? They found the German documents down a well? Have you read Von Karman's book?

Y: No, I haven't. I've read a couple of reviews on it.

Q: I wrote one of them for The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Did he ever talk to you about his relationship with Arnold. Von Karman?

Y: Yes, it's hard to recall exactly his words. There was no question but that he had very great respect for Gen Arnold. Von Karman always felt flattered that Gen Arnold depended on him. He never, he didn't just do this as another one of those things. He took it very personal. He felt very personally obligated to Gen Arnold - that he put him in this position, and kept him there so long, and he was very close to him....

Q: He wouldn't take that job unless they gave him direct access to Arnold. He was, in a way, the same kind of guy. I guess he must have watched Arnold operate. He didn't want to operate by a chain of command. He wanted to go right to Arnold.

Y: This is exactly right, and he set it up that way, and he kept it that way. The way he worked the group, always to get the best for Gen Arnold. Nobody every worked any harder for Gen Arnold than Von Karman did. And of course, von Karman was a very capable guy, terrifically witty, terrifically sharp, never missed a trick, despite the fact that he was deaf.

Q: This was an attraction of opposites, the tall Mainliner Philadelphian, a West Pointer, and this little Jewish scientist. But they found a lot to talk about, a common interest.

Y: They certainly did.

Q: Arnold admired somebody who could contribute. He was a gadgeteer from WWI. You know, he and Kettering had designed a thing called "The Flying Bug", one of the early missiles. And as you may know - I'm sure you do know - you may have been involved in it - Arnold, as soon as the V-1 came along, Arnold wanted to get it. He wanted to reproduce it and improve upon it. And we did, the JB-2. Did you get involved in that?

Y: No, I wasn't personally involved in that. I was aware of it.

Q: Arnold wanted to build like 5,000 of them, and drop them on the Germans, and the War Dept cut his water off, toward the end of the war. They had a better Chinese version of the V-1 - it was a heck of a lot better than the German weapon. Of course,

we couldn't duplicate the V-2. This would take a little more planning. Were you involved in any of the scientific, like PAPERGLIP, any of the collection of German scientists and bringing them over here?

Y: Just on the administrative end, not personally.

Q: Did you get involved in the Strategic Bombing Survey?

Y: No.

Q: This was one of Arnold's pet ideas, too. He, I believe, originated this. He started it as an Air Force project, but then realized that the Air Force evaluating its own efforts would lack credibility. So they got it raised on a Presidential level.

Y: The only other good assignment I had, interesting assignment from an historical point of view was witnessing the first A-bomb test out in

Q: Bikini? Oh, Trinity, out at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945?

Y: Yes. I was the administrative head weather officer, and Ben Holzman was the head forecaster on it. There were two of us - two meteorologists out there, all during the time that it was ready, for the last 4 days I guess. That's the first time that I knew we had that goddam thing. I got out there and was completely briefed, and then sit there and wait for it and watch it, and then hold that information until somebody dropped one...

Q: That was a long three weeks?

Y: That was a long three weeks, because I'd seen this, and seen what it would do and...

Q: Did they keep you guys locked up?

Y: No, I went back to work. But every day, it was a matter of... I couldn't talk to anybody.

Q: It was one of the best kept secrets of the war.

Y: Wasn't it? Fantastic, it really was.

Q: Did you get involved with Tibbets?

Y: No, I didn't get involved with Tibbets.

Q: They got some weather people aboard the plane. In fact, many people think that the pilot of the Enola Gay went crazy and was institutionalized. Actually, it was a Sergeant named Eartherly. He was on a weather plane that preceded the Enola Gay, and William Bradford Huie wrote up this story. Now a lot of people think that the pilot of the plane had this terrible moral crisis, and went off his rocker.

Y: Yes, I've heard that story.

Q: People think this, and Tibbets is saying: "If I'm sane, and you're sane, then he's sane. Well, do you have any other recollections of Arnold that might be interesting?"

Y: I can't think of anything that might help you.

Q: How about social? Did the Yates meet the Arnold's socially?

Y: No, Mrs. Yates knows Mrs. Arnold quite well. And she knows the social side of it far more than I, I didn't have any direct contact.

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold as head of the Air Force Emergency Relief?

Mrs. Y: That's what she started.

Q: Did you work for her?

Mrs. Y: Worked with her when she set up the organization.

Q: Do you remember amusing or instructive or interesting anecdotes.

Mrs. Y: I remember the evening she called me - I hadn't met her, and I didn't expect to hear from her. Don was in Russia, and I had some friends over listening to the radio, and Mrs. Arnold called me and said: "This was Mrs. Arnold," and I said, well, I'm not - something to the effect that I didn't believe it; "But I'm Josephine." she said, "I'll call you tomorrow morning when you feel better." Sure enough, she did, and that was when she'd bring it up. She always kidded about it.

Q: Always kidded about your not believing that call?

Mrs. Y: About Mrs. Arnold calling me.

Q: From the throne room, so to speak. This must have been 1942, the General went with Follett Bradley on that mission.

Mrs. Y: Yes.

Q: Did you have some other contact with her?

Mrs. Y: No, just working with her on that, when we were setting that up, dependents and all that, and she always had a great deal of personality.

Q: Did you work with her in 1945? Did you go all through the war?

Mrs. Y: No, I went to Maine in 1944, came back in 1945, and then I went to the meetings at the caucus room, the big meetings. And then they set up separate little meetings in the various neighborhoods, so the wives could get together and try to know about those whose husbands were away.

Q: Do you recall when the RAF counterpart organization invited Mrs. Arnold to visit in the UK?

Mrs. Y: No.

Q: Norstad told us that sometimes Arnold would push all the buttons on his squawk box and have everybody come running in there and then say: "I want you, and the rest of you can go." Do you remember this?

Y: I never remember it happening; I've heard the same story.

Q: Oh, you heard the same story?

Y: Oh yes, exactly the same story. He wasn't exactly sure which one he wanted till he saw him. Then he knew. I never took that as a serious story. But it's typical of the way he operated.

Q: It may be carrying a good thing to an extreme. It doesn't make good sense. See, what you told me of his doing things, of grabbing people, it's very unorthodox, but it made sense in a certain way. But pushing all the buttons, and calling 30 people from their desks just to say: "I want you, and the rest of you 29 guys can go," would waste a lot of time.

Y: I never felt that it really was true, but because it is characteristic, it could have been true.

Q: But you were there for a long period of time. If it had happened, it would have happened to you?

Y: It never happened to me. I've been called in on things that were not my business several times - that were none of my business. And only once did I tell him it wasn't my job. Only once.

Q: What did he say?

Y: "Can't you get it done?" I said: "yes sir." And after that, I expected him for about a period of several months. I guess

I was the only name that he associated with the weather business. He was mad at everybody else. And I don't know he wasn't mad at me, because we had had our difficulties.

Q: Well, he had 50 balls he was trying to keep in the air simultaneously. If he would give you one, he has 49 to worry about.

Y: Right. That's the way he worked. As far as I was concerned, once I understood that, it was fine. I'd take anybody's instructions. Sometimes it wasn't even in the weather business, I'd have a hell of a time finding out whose ball it really was. But I'd go running about the Pentagon until I found the guy to pass the ball to.

Q: Well, he had these two so-called advisors - Advisory Council. He started off with Cabell and Norstad and then when Norstad left, Jake Smart came in. And then Rosie O'Donnell came in later on. These were the ambassadors without portfolio. Did they ever interfere in your business?

Y: Never. That's a miserable way to organize a kitchen cabinet. On paper, it is lousy. It is against all principles. On the other hand, that one never bothered me or interfered in any place that I could see. So I think he was careful in his choice of people, because Jake would never bother anybody, or, he had Cabell, at one time. Who were the other two.

Q: He had MacRae and Rosie O'Donnell?

Y: Rosie O'Donnell was there, but again, he had people that knew the embarrassing situation, and knew the line of command, and could handle part of them, so they didn't try to wear his stars.

Q: Well, Cabell told me - I talked to him several months ago - and he told me that Arnold told him: I want you guys to be my idea men, I'm too busy to think up new ideas. You just think, but if I ever catch you operating..."

Y: That's right, that's the right way to do it. And I never found myself, that it was other than that. They were talking, they would come down and chat, for ideas and things, but never operating.

Q: They were never to come in there and use their superior position?

Y: Not at all. I think he did a fantastic job, and probably the only way that he could do it, and it ended up ultimately in a pattern that was operational or could be operated. Fortunately when he turned it over, it was some semblance of an organization that an ordinary man could operate.

Q: You said he got mad at you sometimes?

Y: No, no. Not mad. The time that I went in to turn in my suit, I was mad. I was unhappy. But he wasn't mad, you see, I never saw him, I've seen him mad...

Q: Did he have a smile on his face?

Y: Oh yes.

Q: But it didn't mean he was happy?

Y: He had a smile on his face, but he was really giving it to him, too. But he was a man that you could take it from, and I never felt there was anything personal at all, in anything, or anytime he felt that he had to criticize. He was not personal, it was...

Q: It was not vindictive?

Y: Never. He was impossibly demanding. He demanded the impossible, and expected it. But that was the way he operated, and you'd better get it done, that's all. It was damned difficult to explain afterwards, if you hadn't gotten it done. He was a tremendous leader in that respect.

Q: How about Lovett? Did Lovett, did you know of his relationship with Lovett?

Y: No. I never knew other than it was good. I didn't know any politics there at all.

Q: I wonder if Lovett was sort of a balance wheel to keep him from some impulsive actions?

Y: I think that probably, Lovett had to be a buffer between him and the War Dept.

Q: Patterson and Arnold had the wrong chemistry for one another, so I think Lovett was the buffer in the middle of that. You have no personal knowledge of that personal relationship?

Y: No.

Q: You were operating down here at a lower level?

Y: I was down below, separate deal, and I could, I felt at times that when I went to OSD, particularly from Ed Bowles....

Q: You mean down in the Secy of War's office.

Y: Secy of War's office. Ed Bowles would indicate some things that he was pulling some shenanigans with Arnold, and was working with Arnold. Ed Bowles did advise Arnold on communications matters. And there was a hell of a lot of politics in that. However, I found out, from Bowles, that the, that some of the things that Arnold was doing were not viewed with the greatest

of admiration by the Secy and some of the people on the Secy's staff. On the other hand, I never heard of a rift developing, and I'm sure that the Asst Secy for Air, or whatever he was at the time, Lovett, was a buffer and he was a damned good one, because he's that type of person.

Q: Did Arnold repose confidence in Bowles? Did Bowles have Arnold's confidence?

Y: I never felt that he did. However, I don't know. I think from time to time he did, but Bowles was such an operator that I always felt that Arnold saw through some of his shenaigans, although he did do some of the things that Bowles advised him with respect to certain things.

Q: Setting up RAND? Bowles claims credit for RAND.

Y: He does, have you talked to him?

Q: No, I've read in the documents....

Y: Are you going to talk to Bowles.

Q: I hope to.

Mrs. Y: He had quite a collection of papers and letters of Arnold's.

Y: Bowles is a pack rat. And he documents everything he has. Now, he's very proud, from Bowles' point of view, he had tremendous influence on Arnold. But I'll tell you, of all the military men in the service, I'll bet that he respects Arnold above all of them that he knew. And he has a fantastic memory, and he's 80 some years old. You can take a look at the guy and swear that he is 65 or 70, and he's in just that good of shape, and so in his mind, I saw him not over a month ago. He was with Raytheon.

Q: He's still in Massachusetts?

Y: He's still in Massachusetts.

Q: Do you have his address?

Y: Bowles is a good man to get some research material from, because he keeps every paper that he ever had. And he can tell more stories about Arnold. When I first went with Raytheon, I'd go down to his office, and all he wanted to do was reminisce about the war and Arnold. (Off the Record)

Q: What did you say about Krick? This is just a small part of the equation, but it is significant in how Arnold operated.

Y: Question of Krick going to Arnold before I could go to him, and I had felt that that's what might have happened previously to Don. So I went to Krick and I said: "Look, we can't carry on this way any longer, and I am going down to Gen Arnold, and I'm going to tell him that I want the authority to order you not to do this, and not to do that, and also to play square. I think you can do the most good," and, I said, "and you better, by God, not get down there before I do, because I am going down as soon as I can get an appointment." And that was the situation.

Q: In the case of Zimmerman, Krick beat him.

Y: I don't think he went down there. I think that he, when he got ready... Zimmerman was his strong supporter all the way through, and this is the thing that hurts, I don't think Krick had any loyalty to anybody. He wasn't that kind of person, no personal loyalties, but No. 1 only. I never saw anyone defend him, defend him against the Navy, defend him against the rest of us in the Air Force. We all knew Irv as a person, very close to

him. I never saw anyone defend him to the extent that Don Zimmerman did. And yet I felt that the reason he got in dutch with Arnold was that Krick just fixed it because he was interfering with what Krick wanted to do, and he told Krick not to do it, and Krick went down. It was while he was working for Don that he started making that first deal with the front office,

Mrs. Y: It was something that had to do with funds that got mixed up in that thing.

Y: I don't know how you can use it.

Q: My interest is really how Arnold operated. In one case, Arnold went in one direction - where you were trying to get Krick back in line - and in the other case, Arnold went for the iconoclast Krick and against the organization.

Y: But, probably, no one went to him and made an issue that this is against the organization. Krick was there all by himself. He could get into Arnold's office any time he wanted to, and so Krick, I'm sure, moved a lot of pegs around. There were many changes that were due to him - but on one was there defending himself or defending the system, as it were...

Q: In a sense, Krick was a chip off the Arnold block, he dealt with people directly, rather than deal with the paperwork...

Y: Right. And see, he wouldn't think of dealing with his boss. Krick said his boss was a jerk, okay, give him a new boss, maybe, I don't say that that's it, but this is the kind of thing that happened. I felt this way, that's why I went to Gen Arnold I had no permission to go to Arnold.

Mrs. Y: Zimmerman went to Arnold, or got to Arnold somehow to get Krick out of this mess, and get him out of the Navy.

Q: That was earlier.

Y: Zimmerman defended Krick all the way through. I think right up until they probably had a little hassle, and then I believe....

Q: Then it was difficult for Zimmerman to cut off Krick's water, because he had been his defender.

Y: Yes.

INTERVIEW WITH LT/GEN DONALD YATES
PALM BEACH, FLORIDA
JANUARY 9, 1970

Q: Do you remember the first time you encountered Gen Arnold?

Y: Probably the first time - I had gone to Cal Tech in 1939 as a weatherman, to take a meteorological course at Cal Tech. My first assignment after getting out in 1939 was Barksdale AFB, and I believe probably the first time I personally ran into him was when I was briefing him on the weather down there. He went through Barksdale quite frequently because that was a good stopping off point. I never got to know him very well, he was pretty arbitrary about the way he cleared himself on all flights, and was generous with his criticism of the weatherman.

Q: He was very concerned about the weather?

Y: Yes, he was.

Q: It was a very big item with him.

Q: Well, you knew Professor Irving Krick?

Y: Yes, in fact, that caused a little difficulty there at the time when, after I had gone to the Pentagon building, Krick was working for me, supposedly. But he was working directly for Gen Arnold, also, and this gets a little bit tough to talk about because, again, his name, if it comes up, is in difficult context. But one of the recollections I had - I think the only time I ever offered to turn in my suit - was directly to Arnold, and in an incident which involved Krick.

Q: I see his name in and out of Arnold's papers, and I

can't decide - maybe it was a love-hate relationship, I don't know.

Y: General Arnold felt weather was so damned important. He knew it was so important that he wanted to get the very best he could, and Krick was a super salesman. Still is, as far as I know.

Q: Was he a good a weatherman as he was a salesman?

Y: In my personal opinion, Krick was a very capable forecaster - day to day forecaster. He was no long range forecaster, but he sold long range forecasts for years, and part of the difficulty we had was his attempting to put the long range forecasting business in, and the claims to being able to forecast more than two or three days in advance. Now, he did a lot of good. He was a natural forecaster. That is, he was good in that respect, a very good forecaster, but no long range forecaster, and he was sort a shyster in that respect. He sold himself to Arnold. Gen Arnold at that time had a gray haired guy in his front office....

Q: Horace Shelmire?

Y: Yes.

Q: This was from his old home town.

Y: Well, somehow Krick knew how to cultivate the front office there, and he was providing special reports and services, things like that, and he was giving his impressions of advice, actually, regarding the North African invasion, things like that. I don't know if you have heard the story about that fiasco, but he got involved, sub rosa in the forecasting for it, in competition

with the Navy and a few other people, and that was kind of embarrassing. Shelmire, or whatever his name was, was the contact in the office that Krick was sending all this stuff through. We were putting out forecasts, and I was running the Weather Central in the Pentagon at that time, and it got to be so, it got to be impossible. Krick wouldn't go the direction the forecasters had agreed we were going to go, and here's the position of the consensus.....

Q: In other words he was free wheeling outside your authority?

Y: He was completely free wheeling outside of my authority, and I was getting some kickbacks from it, because I was having to defend two positions. One, the official position which I knew about, and another position that got bootlegged through by Irv. Krick and I were very good friends. He was working for me, and yet he wasn't. And the whole issue: I went down to see Gen Arnold and said: "I would like to have this stopped," and this free wheeling and all this razzle dazzle that Irv was doing. And I said: "I knew it is by your personal direction." And I said: "If you want him to run the show, then let him run the show. But I don't think it is going to be good for it, good for the people, good for the service, good for anything." I was more scared at that time than I think I have ever been. I was a Major, I guess.

Q: How did Arnold react to that?

Y: It was funny. He was in his office, and personally, I always had reasonably good rapport with him, because he chewed me out and I would take it all right, and I think in a way, he

had a reasonable respect for me as a weatherman. And I asked permission to see him, and he had, at the time that I went in, in his office was this old retired General. He was standing in there. He had been out of the service for some time....

Q: Was it Trubee Davison?

Y: Davison, no. The other one who lived in Washington so long. He went to all the Air Force affairs....

Q: Fechet?

Y: Fechet, yes.

Q: He was the first Chief of the Air Corps.

Y: Right, he was in the office, I walked in, saluted and turned around, and said, "I'm sorry." He said: "oh no," and he smiled. And I think Gen Arnold knew I was very, very upset, because I had requested repeatedly an appointment with him personally and I was way down the line, and of course. Arnold was that kind of guy. The one thing about him that I could never understand how he had the capacity to run an organization like he did, with his fingers in every pie. He wouldn't have a man in between. He wanted to have each single function reporting directly to him. Fifty functions, you know how he had the Air Force organized at that time. Flat, right across. I don't know how many people reported to him officially. Well, I was down the line below that. I was at least two tiers below the man that was supposed to go see him. But I knew that it was his problem and it was my problem, and the guy between couldn't care less. He was in Operations at the time, and so....

Q: You are talking about 1941 or 42? Was this post Pearl Harbor?

Y: Oh yes, this was post Pearl Harbor. This was pre Europe, I went over to Europe in 1944. Gen Spaatz and Gen Arnold specifically asked me to take my weather central over, and I took Krick and Ben Holzman, and about 6 or 7 other key guys right out of the Weather Central in Washington. Spaatz said: "Send them over. If they are the best ones you've got, they don't need to be in Washington, they've got to be on the front line." This was in January 1944. So the time that I am thinking about in this incident, occurred before that, and probably two or three years before, probably in 1942, maybe early '43. I can't remember the time. If I could isolate these various things that happened I could put it in the proper context. That is the time period. And what happened was that Arnold said: "Well, go ahead and speak your piece." And I said: "Well, it's just that I've got to have authority to run my outfit directly, and everybody in the outfit. I can't have somebody reporting to somebody else, around outside. I'm not smart enough to know what to do about it, and it's getting damned embarrassing" - words to this effect, and I said: "Frankly, I'd turn in my suit right now, if that's what is necessary to straighten this thing out, because I can't handle it." And he said: "What would you do if I turned Krick over to you 100%?" He knew, or, he was admitting that he was in it, and I said: "I'll send him to California." I remember that. And he said: "You'll send him out of town," and I said: "Yes, for the time being. He has stirred up so much ruckus here, I have to get him out of town. And if he is to report to me, then he goes to Pasadena. I'm going to put him on a job there working

up historical chart of the hemisphere, going back about 50 years, which will later be the basis for the best kind of forecast that we could get, to extend the forecast beyond 2 or 3 days." I said, "I know no better analyst, no more capable guy to do the job than he." He smiled, and of course, I was scared, and I think it was Fechet, just standing over in the corner of the room, just getting a kick out of my embarrassment, and really, the fact that Arnold made no bones about it. He said: "I think you've got a point. I can see the position you are in, and although I'm not necessarily going to agree with you that that's the best place to put Krick," he said, "I've either got to accept your offer, or let you do what you are going to do." And so, my respect went up 100% for him.

Q: Going back to Krick - I've seen the Arnold papers at the Library of Congress. He left, or he collected a mixture of unofficial, semi-official and what not, all kinds of things. Krick is in and out of the place. In his papers, and I didn't quite understand his role, and I'm glad that I made this trip up here, because I think you can help me.

Y: The thing about it that you can see, is this can't be, as far as I am concerned, it would be wrong to have it published. I went back to Krick as soon as I came out of Arnold's office. I had told him before, because he had said: "I'm working for Arnold." and what could I do. I told him the situation, I said: "I've frankly gone down to Gen Arnold; I've put the cards on the table, I've told him I would quit, or he could fire me, or whatever he wanted, but it had to be, either you work for me or you

don't and, then I would have no connection with this, I said, "Gen Arnold agreed with me." I said: "So you are going to have to be prepared to go to the West Coast and set up that outfit." And he broke down and cried in my office. He had been my professor at Cal Tech, and here was a very difficult situation. However, he went out there, and he did a splendid job. And then, we brought him back in. The situation was completely changed; he was working hard; he went over as part of the team to do the forecasting for Gen Spaatz in the USSAF, 8th AF.

Q: Yes, the 8th Air Force and the 15th AF - the Strategic Air Force.

Y: Yes, where we pulled the 15th AF from Italy on target, and the 8th AF out of Europe. He was there, and that was part of the team. And later, he and Holzman were the two US forecasters that were on a joint team that did the forecasting for D-Day. I was the head of the US side of it, I was Deputy Chief, Meteorological Officer, SHAEF, and there was a Britisher that was Chief, Meteorological Officer, professional meteorologist, not a Britisher that was Chief, Meteorological Officer, professional meteorologist, not a military man....

Q: Fellow named.....?

Y: Staff.

Q: I think Eisenhower mentioned him.

Y: Yes, he did. He certainly did, and he and I went into every single briefing just before D-Day, and backing us up was a big British crew, and my crew, headed by Holzman and Krick, so that situation ironed itself out very well. Krick was controversial,

because during these deals he tended to try to belittle the British crew, and then later claimed that his sides of the forecast were more accurate than the other consensus. This was the way Irv did his business. He was a real fine person in many respects, but he always had to be slithering around and building up Irving P. Krick. So that was a real tough situation.

Q: Well, this was actually compounded, I mean he had this personality aspect - disease of the vertical pronoun, and Arnold sort of fostered this.

Y: He did:

Q: What gave Arnold so much confidence in him?

Y: I don't know. I do not know.

Q: He came from Cal Tech.

Y: He came from Cal Tech, and as you know...

Q: Robert Millikan was there; Millikan and Arnold were very close.

Y: That's correct.

Q: In the early '30s?

Y: That was it. And young Clark Millikan was - both of them were pushing - and von Karman. There's the guy that did it. Von Karman knew, and I talked to Von Karman many, many times, about Krick and his capabilities and his weaknesses. Von Karman agreed to all of them, but Von Karman was close to Arnold, very close, and that is exactly the reason, because Krick was commissioned in the Navy, and Arnold had him switched over to the Air Force.

Q: I was going to ask about this. He had some trouble in the Navy?

Y: Oh yes. Same trouble, only they wouldn't take him at all. He always had trouble in the Navy, even after he was in the Air Force. Made it a little bit tougher for us. But getting out to Cal Tech for awhile, organizing the job which he did extremely well, that cleared the atmosphere a little bit. So when he came back in he was a better man for it, he was a better soldier for it.

Q: He had, with Millikan and Von Karman backing him, he had the highest credentials?

Y: And it was very interesting. Carl Rossby, you know, was working in OSD as the consultant deputy to Bowles, when Bowles...

Q: OSD?

Y: Stimson's office. Secretary of War. Ed Bowles, Dr. Bowles - he worked for Stimson directly, and Carl Rossby was a Norwegian who worked for Bowles. Rossby had been a professor at MIT. Of course he was anti-Krick all the way, but he couldn't get any where.

Q: A couple of days ago somebody mentioned the Norwegian weather forecaster, and I couldn't think of his name.

Y: He was a lousy forecaster, but he was a good technical man - much more honest let's say, technically honest, than Irv would be, though Irv was not as competent technically, theoretically. Pattersen is the Norwegian. Rossby was a Swede. Svere Pattersen - he was on the British team over there, but he hadn't been in the US. He wasn't mixed up in the US military at that time. We got him in, and I got him assigned

to the Weather Service after I came back and after the invasion. Sometime in the latter part of the war we got him a clearance; we got him in and he worked in the US for a long time with us in the weather service, when I was Chief of the weather service, which was a little bit later. This was 1945-50. I spent '44 in Europe, then I came back and Arnold said: "All right, you are going to be Chief of the Weather Service, pulled me back out of there at that stage. Rossby and Bowles had quite a little bit of influence, I thought, with Arnold. But Rossby never did. Rossby believed Von Karman and probably Millikan. I didn't know, his context with Millikan, but of course, Von Karman was there, and Von Karman had a lot of...."

Q: Well, that connection started in the early '30s when Arnold was at March Field. He was at March Field, and Millikan was conducting some high atmospheric tests of solar rays or something. Arnold made available to him and his scientists, airplanes. They went up, Arnold gave him carte blanche. Arnold had a great interest in R&D. It really turned him on.

Y: He didn't understand it, but he knew it was essential. Had a better appreciation for it - it's the same way with the weather business. He respected....

Q: People who were professionals - like Von Karman. Could ask him for the moon and he could get it if Arnold could reach it.

Y: That's true.

Q: Von Karman did a job for him, you know. His book, Toward New Horizons, is a 20 years forecast of R&D - absolutely fantastic in its predictions. Well, Von Karman came during the Hitler

era into Cal Tech, and Millikan saw his merit, and I guess, recommended him to Arnold. And then when both of them said Krick is the man you want for weather, this is all Arnold needed. Can you think of a specific instance of where Krick ran around the end, and may have told Arnold 180° from consensus.

Y: No. Since you wrote, I've been trying to think, my memory is bad. I wish I could because several quite flagrant things that were done. At the time they were terribly important to me. But later on, I just put them out of my mind, and got things squared away and got straightened up. That was an issue.

Q: You mentioned a snafu with TORCH.

Y: I didn't know until later that Krick was even involved, and I think he was working for me, but he was providing forecasts directly through Arnold's office, and I guess those forecasts were going to the skipper prior to the invasion. Apparently the two met, because I know then, later, the Navy local chief of the Naval Aerological Service came to me and raised cain about our forecasts having been going over while he was providing forecasts out of their own Central. This kind of thing that happened without any knowledge on my part. I didn't have the foggiest idea that these things were going on. Krick was sending them, and he wasn't. He was giving them to Shelmire, and that's how they got to Arnold.

Q: This is rather important, because it reflects Arnold's manner of managing the Air Force. Arnold did not have a very elaborate chain of command, as you point out.

Y: He had a flat; he had a flat organization. He dealt with people all the way across the board. These were people he trusted. He made very, very, fast decisions and he would make decisions on a recommendation from someone whom he trusted, and then he would issue directives down the line, based on that. One case which is typical of Gen Arnold. I think it was a Friday at 11:30 in the morning, just before noon, as I recall, and my wife will probably recall this even better because I was called to Gen Arnold's office. This was in June or July of 1942, and I had only been in the Munitions Building, at that time, for 6 months, I came in December 1941. He said: "How long will it take you to get ready to go to Russia?" to me. He hadn't called my boss; he hadn't called anybody, he said: "Come down here" and I said: "I guess it all depends for how long." He said: "Anywhere from 1 week to the duration." And I said: "when?" He said: "Tomorrow." I said: "Sir, shots and a few other things, let along packing and trying to make arrangements for my family, and a few other dozen things. It was right out of the blue. He said: "Well, okay. I'm sure that you can make it." He said: "What's happened is when making a deal on the (Follett) Bradley mission to go to Russia, we had/any meteorologists in, but because we are moving these fighters down through Siberia, they want some help in setting up a meteorological service there that would be somewhat compatible. I have agreed to put a meteorologist on the crew, and he will be the second man. You'd be next in seniority to Gen Bradley." By that time, I guess I was a LTCOL. And Arnold said: "And you are pilot; there will be four pilots

among you; and you are taking a B-24," he said: "You can report to Gen Bradley and get briefed, and the emergency equipment and everything else is on the airplane earmarked for Joe Doaks, will be yours, whether it fits or not," or words to that effect.

Anyhow, I called my wife up, and I said I had to go to Moscow or Russia, and I think it was a Friday, and I think we left on Sunday morning at 9:00 as I recall.

Q: Flew the northern route.

Y: No. We went south - went across from Belem to Accra, and from Accra up to Cairo, and then across into Tehran, and then back over into Moscow. And as it ended, we were gone about 6 months, but, we could have been there for the duration. He personally, without discussing it with anybody except me - my boss knew nothing about it, I went back and told him...

Q: Who was your boss at that time?

Y: I don't remember. Don Zimmerman, probably, the meteorological boss. Merriweather was at one stage. I can't remember the changes. Merriweather was the head weatherman, Merriweather was the man, I'm pretty sure.

Q: Did Don Zimmerman have some dealings with him - Arnold?

Y: Yes, that was very hard to understand, because Don Zimmerman had gotten Krick over. Don Zimmerman was from Cal Tech and he wanted Krick and he got Krick over from the administrative level that got him in. Don was working at that time over in the weather bureau in a central that had been created there, jointly. That's before we moved into the Pentagon building, and Krick was there as part of that team provided by the Navy, and the transfer

was made at that time. He was made a Major in the Air Force, from a LCDR in the Navy.

Q: He's one man I will try to get to see. I looked up Don Zimmerman, he's in Mercer Island, Washington.

Y: State of Washington. I know he was working for Boeing for a while.

Q: He's going to be a hard man to get, but I have a note here that Arnold selected him to be in the first class at the National War College. So he selected 6 people for that including Cabell, Zimmerman, P.D. Weikert.....

Y: Don Zimmerman, somehow or other, got crosswise, all of a sudden, with Arnold, and that would be an interesting story, because I never knew what happened, but I think Krick was involved. I think that Don Zimmerman tried to do exactly what I tried to do, but I knew I couldn't do it without going to Arnold. And what happened, was Zimmerman apparently - now this is strictly speculation - but all of a sudden, Zimmerman moved from the Weather Service and moved out of Washington. Don was serious and conscientious, and no one could understand, but from being at the top of the [group] because we knew that Gen Arnold thought a hell of a lot of Don because he put him in the first class....

Q: The men that he selected were selected for their potential....

Y: At that stage, it just seemed that all of a sudden he went from being on the good side to being on the bad side, and Don's story would be interesting. I'm sure that if you are going to get into the Krick story, Zimmerman is one man, and Oscar Senter probably could, Gen Senter, he was in the weather service at that time. He is in the Washington area.

Q: William O. Senter?

Y: Yes, I'm sure his memory is far more acute on these details like that than mine, because he was that type of person.

Q: I think this is fairly important. The reason for it is because it illustrates the kind of organization Arnold sat up. Arnold ran the Air Force out of his hip pocket.

Y: And everybody in it, as he did like his asking me to go. And he fully expected me to be able to do the impossible. Most people did, and that's how he got so damned many things done. It's because he let them know he had confidence in them, and he demanded they do it, and they did it. That was - it was fantastic the way he operated. No normal man could operate that way.

No one could keep as many things in his mind as he did. One thing that Oscar Senter can give you the details on. One day Arnold said: "We need more forecasters in the Pacific. Cut this class in half," we had a forecasters school going. He said: "Take them out right now. Half a forecaster is better than none." This would have been all right to do it two months more, giving them enough so that they had their basic, and then go ahead. As I recall, Oscar can give you the details on that, because that was fantastic.

Q: Maybe they could give you a quarter of a forecast?

Y: They probably weren't even that. I don't know what happened. I remember hearing about the order, and I felt: "We can't do that. We'll kill the pilots... suicide, these people have only had certain things." Oscar was on the training side of the business at that time. I was in the forecasting and

climatological side, and I remember his griping about it, but Arnold made his decision." "And that's what it will be'." It's my recollection that somehow they doubled or trebled the number of forecasters, and they got these guys out. They shortened the courses. Oh, we had forecasters running out of our ears. There for a while, but Arnold was handling that, it wasn't anybody in between, it was Arnold to some Major or LTCOL down the line that was responsible for Training, I think he went too. Arnold called me down to his office, and I said: "That's not my business." But he persisted: "Can you get it done?" And I said: "Yes sir, I'll see that it's placed in the right place, and then I forced Oscar Senter to go back and see him. I believe it was Oscar and asked him: "You go on back and pick it up, because I'm getting a directive which is not in my area of business." But Arnold would do that..

Q: You have given me the most rational explanation of a management technique that Arnold used that has been severely criticized. This business of his grabbing somebody in the E-Ring, and giving them a job totally alien to their responsibility.

Y: Absolutely.

Q: He did this?

Y: Oh, he did this on innumerable occasions. There were many cases that I watched that being done, and, at the level where this happened, the best we could do was to immediately go to the right guy, and pass the word on. But he had certain people he would contact, and other people he would not contact.

Q: Well, if he trusted you, he'd give you all the jobs?

Y: He'd give you anything to do, whether it was your business, or whether it wasn't in your business. This is the way he operated. This is the most interesting thing about him to me, as a young officer working under him. At that time I was a Major.

Q: It was good and bad. He cut the process of getting this thing filtered down to the operating level by 3/4, but he also alienated people, and he also was carrying too much of a load himself.

Y: Too much, much too much of a load himself. However, for a new organization, a new force, growing as it was, when it became the AAF and a significant segment of the Army -before we were separated. He created the separate Air Force really within the Army. And he did that himself, in my opinion. He did that himself, by pulling all the strings, and doing an absolutely impossible job.

Q: He had a staff, people like Stratmeyer. Did he bypass Stratmeyer?

Y: Always. And Stratmeyer?

Q: Giles after him?

Y: That's right. All of them - they didn't know what was going on. They would ask us. And the system was, after you got the instructions, go on up and brief the other guys that should know about it, as well as the guys responsible to get it done. First, go to the guy that was supposed to do it. Get him working on it; then tell your boss and his boss, and then tell Strat or Giles, and he was all the time running back to Giles and telling him the orders he'd gotten from Arnold.

Q: Well, I'm going to see Giles in San Antonio.

Y: This is to me, looking back at it, it is clearly the way he operated. Now, there are many people in business and industry. I happen to be working in an organization (Raytheon), and the President of this organization is very similar, and he had no experience with his staff. He had no reason to know how to use the staff, and he deals totally in people. He makes mistakes, many more mistakes than Arnold made, because he hasn't the breadth that Arnold had. But he is similar in many respects to Arnold. He's young, he's only 42 or 43, made President when he was 34.

Q: Which organization?

Y: Raytheon.

Y: The reason, it's the first time that I had ever run into anybody that, even thought, or tried to operate in the manner which, in my opinion, Arnold successfully did. Then, as you may recall, Arnold was prevailed upon to change his organization, and he then created several people on his staff. He had about 6, but he still couldn't always go through them, but he knew that he should, and people had told him. I'm convinced that they got to him and said: "Look boss..."

Q: People like Hanley and Reuben Hood?

Y: This is correct, and he gave them little segments, and several things to watch over. But he never hesitated to go below them if he thought there was a question, or if there was a hurry.

Q: Do you know what contributed to that? Partly, some of the responsibility or authority - his heart attack -/had a series

of heart attacks. One moderate one in 1943 during the TRIDENT conference.

Y: Okay, this is about the time that this happened, right after that. Because in 1945...

Q: He had a major one in 1945. This is the one where he went down to Coral Gables...

Y: I was going to say, in 1945. he had practically agreed, and he had the staff set up, so that on paper it made reasonable sense. But you know, when he first organized it, it made no sense for any normal man, but for him that's the way he operated.

Q: He came in early in the morning and left late at night, and then he'd go on an inspection trip, travel all night, and then come back again.

Y: He never stopped. How that man ever kept on, and lived as long as he did, I don't know. He just wore himself out. But he felt he had to get to the guy who really was doing it. He didn't want any second-hand information. That's what he felt he was later on getting when he set up Plans and Operations and Personnel.....

Q: When he got to an air base, he went right to the sergeant and the operating man. When he went to inspect the B-29s, with which they were having trouble, the engines caught fire, and all kinds of problems on that. So he went directly to a base. Well, he went to Salina. They were trying to get these planes out. Roosevelt was on his back on getting B-29s out to the CBI. He went out there and he got Benny Meyers, Benny Meyers

was one of his favorite people at that time, but this is the way he operated.

Q: I'm interested especially in what you said about the Follett Bradley mission. You were on that mission?

Y: Yes.

Q: One of the tasks, I think, was to get the Russians to give us some Siberian bases?

Y: This was behind everything. This was really the purpose of the mission. The front was to provide a route down through Siberia. The Al-sib Route. We came out, and I always personally felt that Roosevelt let us down, because we were pouring lend lease stuff in there - "Flaming Philip" Faymonville - "Flaming Phil," Gen Faymonville, was the Army officer, and I always will believe that he's pink, was pink. He was giving the Russians things, and asking nothing in return. And here we had information that we needed. We needed to know what was the Order of Battle on the eastern front as far as the Russians were concerned. How did they really stand vis a vis Japan. We had picked up bases. Why couldn't we go out and look at the area? Why wouldn't they give us permission to do some shuttle operations through Siberia. After 6 months, Roosevelt told us - a couple of messages that were going back, two channels to go back through, one through the Pentagon and one through.....

Q: Standley?

Y: Standley was there at the time.

Q: The Ambassador. One through Standley and one through the military?

Y: Right, and the military was a real good friend of the Air Force on the General Staff at the time.

Q: Was it Deane - John Deane?

Y: No, an old guy.

Q: You mean, the military guy where?

Y: In the Pentagon. He was our contact. He was G-3.

Q: Was it Strong?

Y: Strong was G-2.

Q: Handy?

Y: Handy. Tom Handy was the guy. Well, we felt that Handy agreed with us. We had a lot of coded messages back and forth. We could see there was trouble in Washington, but pretty soon the message came right back through Standley from the President, and we felt that Faymonville had some influence, that we would put no more pressure [the Russians] to get bases, and that we would come out of there. So we came out in December. But we were really - we came out - and we still formed a task group, and operated as a task group to form an air force that would operate in Siberia, because we still believed it. But it was clear Roosevelt was not going to put any pressure on "Uncle Joe." And that was the way it was. And damn it! I just felt that was wrong at the time, I was so convinced that we could shorten the war, and that we could do this job, and we know now we could have done this job.

Q: The Russians said they were worried - whether they were or not - that this would be a belligerent act and cause the Japanese to attack. You know, Roosevelt had sent Stalin a report in 1942, that he had information the Japanese were preparing to

attack Russia. Somebody may have given him phony information which justified the Russians not giving us any bases.

Y: Anyhow, it didn't look right to us, the information that we had.

Q: Did you know about that report?

Y: Yes, I knew about that report. I don't know where it came from. I don't know what the US source of that information was. I know, I understand that that was....

Q: There is another man involved in that mission, his name starts with an "A" Col Alcorn?

Y: No, on that mission was Gen Bradley, Tom Watson, Jr., was Bradley's aide, he's now chairman of IBM, Chuck Westover, Oscar Westover's son, C.B. Westover, III. But anyway, he's a retired AF General now. He was on that mission. Harley Trash (?) and Hicks, he was a navigator.

Q: A related mission, I can't think of the man's name. It starts with an "A". There's an officer at the Air Force Academy, I was out there recently, and interviewed some people there. He was doing a Ph.D. dissertation on "Faymonville".

Y: I would be interested in seeing what the real truth on was on Faymonville. All I did was see him in association.

Q: You don't know too much about Faymonville, except this one mission?

Y: No, I don't know anything about Faymonville, except that I saw him and his behavior while we were in Russia, and he had a couple of guys working for him - Army people. One was named Olsen, and Olie Olson.

Q: Did you have any contact with Merion Cooper?

Y: No.

Q: Cooper earlier, some months earlier, right after Pearl Harbor, was probably sent on some mission to see what we could do to get some bases either in China or Russia. Roosevelt was anxious to strike Japan, and of course, this led to the Doolittle raid. Merion Cooper was a G-2 type...

Y: No, I never had any dealing with him.

Q: Did you have any contact or knowledge of the plan for an Anglo-American air task force to help the Russians out? This is right at the time of the Follett-Bradley mission. An air task force to help the Russians. The Germans were approaching Stalingrad, and they were threatening Baku. If they took that - you had no contact with that?

Y: No, not with that. We got in, and the German front-line was about 20 miles west of Moscow. We went up to the front-lines, and we saw the Russian air operations there, and what a mess.

Q: Was the Bradley mission a success?

Y: We got some intelligence information that probably justified the mission - that's all we got. And it was a success from my point of view, as far as developing a meterological exchange. The head of the Soviet hydrometeorological service was a LTGEN. He was my aide, and he was a general. A real fine guy, and it was through him...

Q: Do you remember his name?

Y: Yes, Eugene Federov.

Q: He was your aide, and he was a LTGEN?

Y: He was my age at that time, and he was my opposite number. He was the only one. It was in that area, the only area that we could talk without having a member of the Soviet Secret Service or what have you, MKVD. They didn't call that group, that group was the one that handled the foreign office, but they were essentially a branch of the MKVD.

Q: I was told that the Russians gave us incorrect meteorological information.

Y: That is a damn lie. I don't know who said that - to my knowledge, and I was there.

Q: They were genuinely cooperative?

Y: Yes, they did refuse to give us some information, and they did incipher some of their information.

Q: Why, - they are naturally secretive?

Y: They are naturally secretive and they didn't trust anybody. So they gave what information they agreed to internationally. But they ciphered all their weather broadcasts, so we couldn't fill in all the small stations, without working on the information. In other words they never reneged nor as far as I know, gave any incorrect information, once the agreement was made, but all the big bulk of Soviet weather information was enciphered. Of course, none of the information that was enciphered was part of the agreement, or the information that we got, but that was the second subject and a second problem.

Q: Did Harry Hopkins play any role in that mission?

Y: He probably did. Yes, because I think he was Faymonville's direct boss, wasn't he?

Q: Well, Harry Hopkins had his finger on the....

Y: He was the one in the White House that was handling the Lend Lease business and I know Faymonville could get to the President very easily by going to Hopkins, this was the way he did, as I understood it.

Q: How about Harriman?

Y: Harriman was not in the picture as far as I know.

Q: He probably came in a little later?

Y: He came in a little later, he had been....

Q: I think he replaced Standley (as Ambassador)?

Y: He replaced Standley, but that was after I came back. Later, of course, we did have, while Standley was still there, we started the shuttle raid operation from England into Poltava...

Q: That was 1944? (the Follett Bradley mission)

Y: That was in 1944, that's correct.

Q: Were you there?

Y: Yes, I was in England at the time.

Q: Did you go with the mission - the Poltava mission?

Y: I didn't go to the mission, but I helped arrange some of the exchanges, because I knew the weather people over there, and I'd been there. So I placed - it was a Naval weather officer that was in charge of this arrangement at Poltava. And he gave him the information.

Q: That was Operation FRANTIC?

Y: That's right.

Q: Tell me about the weather for OVERLORD - this is a very interesting thing.

Y: This was fantastic, absolutely fantastic. We had this team of forecasters working together for about 2 months prior to the invasion, and we had everything categorized right down to a nat's eyebrow. What weather affected what operation. We knew every piece of it, the advanced bombing of the shore defenses, then the paratroop drops, and then the impact of wather on the vehicles, and what have you. We were looking for every kind of situation that might create mud or difficulty in mobility, once we got over there. We had given that a terrific amount of study. It was done by a lot of good climatologists. So it was rather easy to set down exact criteria for every single operation. That was simple. Then we started forecasting, and we had beautiful weather in June and, during the latter part of May as I recall, one or two months, certainly all through May, and all through June, and probably half of May, we attended twice weekly, mock sessions, mock briefings, where Eisenhower and his and all of the C&Cs - Ramsey for the Navy, Leigh Mallory for the Air, and Spaatz for the strategic forces, and Montgomery and then there were two or three backups for these people. And then the staff which was Bull, G-2, and Tedder who was always there. This group was going to make the decision. So we would go in and brief them, Stagg and I would brief them, Stagg would generally give the basic meteorological situation, and I would give the military* interpretations of it, because the US had done much more of that than the British. The British hadn't, they just said this is the weather situation. And we would have an agreed forecast. We would get on a conference hookup, and it was the worst, lousy arrangement

for making forecasts I've ever seen, but three centers, the Admiral, the British Meteorological Officer, which is a civilian center, and the AF - US Weather Central which was Krick and a whole bunch of people. Well, they would make the decisions based on our forecasts. Boy, they were beautiful, they were no hard decisions. All of a sudden, 2 or 3 days before the invasion, we were going for real. We were making them every day, now. Then, starting three or four days before, as I recall, we made them about 4 times a day. And the day before, we made them every two hours all day and all night. And this group would be there.

Some weather systems started coming across the Atlantic and one lined right up behind the other. And it was a miserable mess and it was going to be awfully difficult to go. So, anyway, we briefed, and Eisenhower postponed one day. It was going to be hairy the next day and we were worried about the briefing about the weather. The ships had started down. He turned them back, and the next day he was going to have to make an irrevocable decision, and to switch back and it would be another 3 or 4 weeks.

Q: By that time the whole thing could have been compromised?

Y: This is correct. Anything could have happened because we had alerted everybody, we had this communication, the air full of communications, and everything else.

Q: He made the basic decisions to recommend to-touch and go?

Y: Oh yes, well he questioned. I'll never forget some of the questions we got that night, when the final decision was made to go. And the first guy said, Montgomery said: "How high were the seas going to be." And we were a couple of feet over the

max permissible. There were going to be some awful seasick guys. He said, that's all right, they will be doped up, so that wouldn't bother them too much. "We can get across, and the boats can take it," he said, "my people can take it all right." Spaatz wanted to know: "What is the chance of bombing visually?" Well, it was a case where we must sneak in between two storms, and they were just about a day apart. And so, we said: "About 50%." I said: "Well, if you want to figure it one way, figure all the US forces bomb visually, and all the British bombers bomb instrument." I said: "that's about the only way you can put it." Then, Monty wanted to know if his paratroopers were going to get in. We said we wouldn't guarantee more than half of them being on target. And he said: "Half of them? Can you guarantee that half of them will be where they are supposed to be?" And I said: "No, we can't guarantee it, but that's the feel we have for it, that at least half of them will be there, and that's the best guess we can give." And then the question after the bombing and the paratroopers - that was the kind of questions, and then they kicked these things around. Ramsey was negative most of the time. It was going to be rougher than hell, and it was going to be messy. Montgomery was an eager beaver. Eisenhower just said, he made the decision all by himself, strictly atypical, as far as I can see, because usually he was very good at compromising and getting a bunch of people to agree to something. But he knew he had to do it, and goddam it, he was whipped, too, because there hadn't been anybody that had more than 2 hours sleep at a time for the last couple of days. They came out.

The funny thing was that the US bombers hit instrument, and all the RAF hit visually. They went two hours apart and one of them got everything. Most of the paratroopers got in. One bunch of paratroopers got in the wrong place, but other than that, they got in. But it was kind of hairy getting in.

Q: I'll bet you didn't sleep that night.

Y: I didn't sleep at all. We were really really worried about it. It was exciting, it was interesting; and it ended up that we were real lucky. Two or three weeks later whenever that next period came up - well, that's the time they blew out all those temporary docks that they put in.

Q: The Mulberries?

Y: Yes, those things were all torn up, right at the time that the next postponement would have been. So they wouldn't have gone for a month or two and God knows what would have happened to the invasion at that time.

Q: Exactly one week after the invasion, the Germans started flying in the V-1s. Can you imagine this going on during the invasion, the initial invasion?

Y: Oh, wouldn't that have messed us, particularly if they had put them down there in the Portsmouth area.... The whole top brass of that whole operation, everybody was there. And I mean they were there all the time, grouped within...one V-1 would have clobbered the whole bunch if it hit in the right place.

Q: Arnold and Marshall came in on the 9th or 10th of June. Did you see Arnold, did he talk to you?

Y: No, he didn't talk to me at that time. I saw him.

They were busy, and we were busy because at that time, I went on over to follow up, to get the weather service installed across the way. So we moved over right away, with the advance headquarters, and we stayed there, then went on down to Granville, and then went from Granville up to Paris. St. Germaine where Spaatz had his headquarters; Eisenhower was out at the palace.

Q: Did you see Arnold later on in the war?

Y: Yes. I was called back in December 1944, and was called down to Gen Arnold's office. I had been over there just a year. And he said: "do you think the situation is operating okay over there right now?" And I said: "Yes". And he said: "Well, I've got a rat's nest back here in the weather service, and I need somebody to organize it." Arnold said: "No holds barred." He said: "I've got two factions right now fighting each other. The factions were Oscar Senter was heading up the weather wing down at Nashville, N.C., and Hunt Bassett was heading up the unit in the Pentagon, and Arnold didn't, again - here's a situation where he just goes to the individual. It wasn't up a matter, somebody up the line, some general officer should have been able to take that burden and straighten it out, and he said..."

Q: Were you a general officer at the time?

Y: No, I was a Colonel at the time. I had been recommended for promotion, but I hadn't been promoted. Spaatz had recommended me for promotion, Anderson really, I guess, he was running the operation.

Q: Fred Anderson. He just passed away.

Y: Yes, I saw that in some recent publication. Fred was

Q: And they were blaming the Air Force?

Y: Yes. Couldn't do anything about it.

Q: For about a week or 10 days it was touch and go. The Germans had penetrated the line. I guess we couldn't get any air in there, because you couldn't fly....

Y: You couldn't get any air in there at all, because they were operating right into it. And later on, after the war, when we got to talk to the Germans, they were complimentary about the forecasting of the invasion time. They had said they had advised that there was absolutely no possibility of an invasion during that time from a meteorological point of view, that we couldn't risk it, but the pressure once you get an operation like that going, you can slow it down. But the gamble that you are taking in stopping it is so terrible, and the fact that we had one break of 24 hours, an 18 hour period, we slipped in there, and it worked, but that was all you could do. And then it socked in.

Q: Luck played a part?

Y: Luck played a terrific factor.

Q: Doesn't it scare you sometimes. I mean you can be professional all the way down the line, and luck takes over?

Y: You are exactly right. You have no control over that. Skill just takes you so far and no more, in the science of meteorological today. Still, doesn't do the job, and that's the problem.

Q: A month later, when you came back, presumably after the Battle of the Bulge, Arnold had his major heart attack. He went

down to Miami. He was down there, and was trying to run the air force from a horizontal position, from the Biltmore. Were you aware that he was ill?

Y: No.

Q: It was kept very secret.

Y: I was not personally aware, I was in the middle of a move, too, and there was another reason, I had no idea he was sick at that time, I think I heard about it later.

Q: When did you next see him? He came back at the end of March 1945?

Y: That is pretty hard to tell, because we had several meetings and proposals on radical changes in the organization of the Weather Service. We put it under ATC at that time, ATC I believe it was, a long with the communications service, and what have you - to pull it out and pull it all together and make it a worldwide operation.

Q: You had your star by that time?

Y: No, I didn't get my star until 1946 or 1947, and then I went from there in '50. I guess in 1947 I got the star. In '50 I went to the Pentagon, and in '51 I got my second star, but that was as Director of Research and Director of Research and Development. I was out of the weather business. I was in the R&D business. Then I came down to Patrick after that four year tour and stayed here for 6 years.

Q: Did you have any contact with von Karman in the '45-'46 period?

Y: Yes, all the time. Both here, and in Europe, and everywhere.

Q: Arnold sent him to Europe right after the war ended, were you in that team?

Y: No, but I was aware of it, and visited him over there, and he had an office in Paris. What year was that?

Q: '45. This was May or June 1945.

Y: I was traveling all over, everywhere, in those days. I made no specific trip to see Von Karman, I was on the Meteorological Committee, and later I was on the Research and Development Board.

Q: Scientific Advisory Board?

Y: Yes. That came out of the office of Research and Development in the Air Force and I was the head of that office for 4 years. Bit I had know von Karman ever since he was a professor of mine at Cal Tech.

Q: Where you aware of the find of the Von Karman group? They found the German documents down a well? Have you read Von Karman's book?

Y: No, I haven't. I've read a couple of reviews on it.

Q: I wrote one of them for The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Did he ever talk to you about his relationship with Arnold. Von Karman?

Y: Yes, it's hard to recall exactly his words. There was no question but that he had very great respect for Gen Arnold. Von Karman always felt flattered that Gen Arnold depended on him. He never, he didn't just do this as another one of those things. He took it very personal. He felt very personally obligated to Gen Arnold - that he put him in this position, and kept him there so long, and he was very close to him....

Q: He wouldn't take that job unless they gave him direct access to Arnold. He was, in a way, the same kind of guy. I guess he must have watched Arnold operate. He didn't want to operate by a chain of command. He wanted to go right to Arnold.

Y: This is exactly right, and he set it up that way, and he kept it that way. The way he worked the group, always to get the best for Gen Arnold. Nobody every worked any harder for Gen Arnold than Von Karman did. And of course, von Karman was a very capable guy, terrifically witty, terrifically sharp, never missed a trick, despite the fact that he was deaf.

Q: This was an attraction of opposites, the tall Mainliner Philadelphian, a West Pointer, and this little Jewish scientist. But they found a lot to talk about, a common interest.

Y: They certainly did.

Q: Arnold admired somebody who could contribute. He was a gadgeteer from WWI. You know, he and Kettering had designed a thing called "The Flying Bug", one of the early missiles. And as you may know - I'm sure you do know - you may have been involved in it - Arnold, as soon as the V-1 came along, Arnold wanted to get it. He wanted to reproduce it and improve upon it. And we did, the JB-2. Did you get involved in that?

Y: No, I wasn't personally involved in that. I was aware of it.

Q: Arnold wanted to build like 5,000 of them, and drop them on the Germans, and the War Dept cut his water off, toward the end of the war. They had a better Chinese version of the V-1 - it was a heck of a lot better than the German weapon. Of course,

we couldn't duplicate the V-2. This would take a little more planning. Were you involved in any of the scientific, like PAPERCLIP, any of the collection of German scientists and bringing them over here?

Y: Just on the administrative end, not personally.

Q: Did you get involved in the Strategic Bombing Survey?

Y: No.

Q: This was one of Arnold's pet ideas, too. He, I believe, originated this. He started it as an Air Force project, but then realized that the Air Force evaluating its own efforts would lack credibility. So they got it raised on a Presidential level.

Y: The only other good assignment I had, interesting assignment from an historical point of view was witnessing the first A-bomb test out in

Q: Bikini? Oh, Trinity, out at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945?

Y: Yes. I was the administrative head weather officer, and Ben Holzman was the head forecaster on it. There were two of us - two meteorologists out there, all during the time that it was ready, for the last 4 days I guess. That's the first time that I knew we had that goddam thing. I got out there and was completely briefed, and then sit there and wait for it and watch it, and then hold that information until somebody dropped one...

Q: That was a long three weeks?

Y: That was a long three weeks, because I'd seen this, and seen what it would do and....

Q: Did they keep you guys locked up?

Y: No, I went back to work. But every day, it was a matter of.... I couldn't talk to anybody.

Q: It was one of the best kept secrets of the war.

Y: Wasn't it? Fantastic, it really was.

Q: Did you get involved with Tibbets?

Y: No, I didn't get involved with Tibbets.

Q: They got some weather people aboard the plane. In fact, many people think that the pilot of the Enola Gay went crazy and was institutionalized. Actually, it was a Sergeant named Eartherly. He was on a weather plane that preceded the Enola Gay, and William Bradford Huie wrote up this story. Now a lot of people think that the pilot of the plane had this terrible moral crisis, and went off his rocker.

Y: Yes, I've heard that story.

Q: People think this, and Tibbets is saying: "If I'm sane, and you're sane, then he's sane. Well, do you have any other recollections of Arnold that might be interesting?"

Y: I can't think of anything that might help you.

Q: How about social? Did the Yates meet the Arnold's socially?

Y: No, Mrs. Yates knows Mrs. Arnold quite well. And she knows the social side of it far more than I, I didn't have any direct contact.

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold as head of the Air Force Emergency Relief?

Mrs. Y: That's what she started.

Q: Did you work for her?

Mrs. Y: Worked with her when she set up the organization.

Q: Do you remember amusing or instructive or interesting anecdotes.

Mrs. Y: I remember the evening she called me - I hadn't met her, and I didn't expect to hear from her. Don was in Russia, and I had some friends over listening to the radio, and Mrs. Arnold called me and said: "This was Mrs. Arnold," and I said, well, I'm not - something to the effect that I didn't believe it; "But I'm Josephine." she said, "I'll call you tomorrow morning when you feel better." Sure enough, she did, and that was when she'd bring it up. She always kidded about it.

Q: Always kidded about your not believing that call?

Mrs. Y: About Mrs. Arnold calling me.

Q: From the throne room, so to speak. This must have been 1942, the General went with Follett Bradley on that mission.

Mrs. Y: Yes.

Q: Did you have some other contact with her?

Mrs. Y: -No, just working with her on that, when we were setting that up, dependents and all that, and she always had a great deal of personality.

Q: Did you work with her in 1945? Did you go all through the war?

Mrs. Y: No, I went to Maine in 1944, came back in 1945, and then I went to the meetings at the caucus room, the big meetings. And then they set up separate little meetings in the various neighborhoods, so the wives could get together and try to know about those whose husbands were away.

Q: Do you recall when the RAF counterpart organization invited Mrs. Arnold to visit in the UK?

Mrs. Y: No.

Q: Norstad told us that sometimes Arnold would push all the buttons on his squawk box and have everybody come running in there and then say: "I want you, and the rest of you can go." Do you remember this?

Y: I never remember it happening; I've heard the same story.

Q: Oh, you heard the same story?

Y: Oh yes, exactly the same story. He wasn't exactly sure which one he wanted till he saw him. Then he knew. I never took that as a serious story. But it's typical of the way he operated.

Q: It may be carrying a good thing to an extreme. It doesn't make good sense. See, what you told me of his doing things, of grabbing people, it's very unorthodox, but it made sense in a certain way. But pushing all the buttons, and calling 30 people from their desks just to say: "I want you, and the rest of you 29 guys can go," would waste a lot of time.

Y: I never felt that it really was true, but because it is characteristic, it could have been true.

Q: But you were there for a long period of time. If it had happened, it would have happened to you?

Y: It never happened to me. I've been called in on things that were not my business several times - that were none of my business. And only once did I tell him it wasn't my job. Only once.

Q: What did he say?

Y: "Can't you get it done?" I said: "yes sir." And after that, I expected him for about a period of several months. I guess

I was the only name that he associated with the weather business. He was mad at everybody else. And I don't know he wasn't mad at me, because we had had our difficulties.

Q: Well, he had 50 balls he was trying to keep in the air simultaneously. If he would give you one, he has 49 to worry about.

Y: Right. That's the way he worked. As far as I was concerned, once I understood that, it was fine. I'd take anybody's instructions. Sometimes it wasn't even in the weather business, I'd have a hell of a time finding out whose ball it really was. But I'd go running about the Pentagon until I found the guy to pass the ball to.

Q: Well, he had these two so-called advisors - Advisory Council. He started off with Cabell and Norstad and then when Norstad left, Jake Smart came in. And then Rosie O'Donnell came in later on. These were the ambassadors without portfolio. Did they ever interfere in your business?

Y: Never. That's a miserable way to organize a kitchen cabinet. On paper, it is lousy. It is against all principles. On the other hand, that one never bothered me or interfered in any place that I could see. So I think he was careful in his choice of people, because Jake would never bother anybody, or, he had Cabell, at one time. Who were the other two.

Q: He had MacRae and Rosie O'Donnell?

Y: Rosie O'Donnell was there, but again, he had people that knew the embarrassing situation, and knew the line of command, and could handle part of them, so they didn't try to wear his stars.

Q: Well, Cabell told me - I talked to him several months ago - and he told me that Arnold told him: I want you guys to be my idea men, I'm too busy to think up new ideas. You just think, but if I ever catch you operating..."

Y: That's right, that's the right way to do it. And I never found myself, that it was other than that. They were talking, they would come down and chat, for ideas and things, but never operating.

Q: They were never to come in there and use their superior position?

Y: Not at all. I think he did a fantastic job, and probably the only way that he could do it, and it ended up ultimately in a pattern that was operational or could be operated. Fortunately when he turned it over, it was some semblance of an organization that an ordinary man could operate.

Q: You said he got mad at you sometimes?

Y: No, no. Not mad. The time that I went in to turn in my suit, I was mad. I was unhappy. But he wasn't mad, you see, I never saw him, I've seen him mad...

Q: Did he have a smile on his face?

Y: Oh yes.

Q: But it didn't mean he was happy?

Y: He had a smile on his face, but he was really giving it to him, too. But he was a man that you could take it from, and I never felt there was anything personal at all, in anything, or anytime he felt that he had to criticize. He was not personal, it was...

Q: It was not vindictive?

Y: Never. He was impossibly demanding. He demanded the impossible, and expected it. But that was the way he operated, and you'd better get it done, that's all. It was damned difficult to explain afterwards, if you hadn't gotten it done. He was a tremendous leader in that respect.

Q: How about Lovett? Did Lovett, did you know of his relationship with Lovett?

Y: No. I never knew other than it was good. I didn't know any politics there at all.

Q: I wonder if Lovett was sort of a balance wheel to keep him from some impulsive actions?

Y: I think that probably, Lovett had to be a buffer between him and the War Dept.

Q: Patterson and Arnold had the wrong chemistry for one another, so I think Lovett was the buffer in the middle of that. You have no personal knowledge of that personal relationship?

Y: No.

Q: You were operating down here at a lower level?

Y: I was down below, separate deal, and I could, I felt at times that when I went to OSD, particularly from Ed Bowles....

Q: You mean down in the Secy of War's office.

Y: Secy of War's office. Ed Bowles would indicate some things that he was pulling some shenanigans with Arnold, and was working with Arnold. Ed Bowles did advise Arnold on communications matters. And there was a hell of a lot of politics in that. However, I found out, from Bowles, that the, that some of the things that Arnold was doing were not viewed with the greatest

of admiration by the Secy and some of the people on the Secy's staff. On the other hand, I never heard of a rift developing, and I'm sure that the Asst Secy for Air, or whatever he was at the time, Lovett, was a buffer and he was a damned good one, because he's that type of person.

Q: Did Arnold repose confidence in Bowles? Did Bowles have Arnold's confidence?

Y: I never felt that he did. However, I don't know. I think from time to time he did, but Bowles was such an operator that I always felt that Arnold saw through some of his shenaigans, although he did do some of the things that Bowles advised him with respect to certain things.

Q: Setting up RAND? Bowles claims credit for RAND.

Y: He does, have you talked to him?

Q: No, I've read in the documents...

Y: Are you going to talk to Bowles.

Q: I hope to.

Mrs. Y: He had quite a collection of papers and letters of Arnold's.

Y: Bowles is a pack rat. And he documents everything he has. Now, he's very proud, from Bowles' point of view, he had tremendous influence on Arnold. But I'll tell you, of all the military men in the service, I'll bet that he respects Arnold above all of them that he knew. And he has a fantastic memory, and he's 80 some years old. You can take a look at the guy and swear that he is 65 or 70, and he's in just that good of shape, and so in his mind, I saw him not over a month ago. He was with Raytheon.

Q: He's still in Massachusetts?

Y: He's still in Massachusetts.

Q: Do you have his address?

Y: Bowles is a good man to get some research material from, because he keeps every paper that he ever had. And he can tell more stories about Arnold. When I first went with Raytheon, I'd go down to his office, and all he wanted to do was reminisce about the war and Arnold. (Off the Record)

Q: What did you say about Krick? This is just a small part of the equation, but it is significant in how Arnold operated.

Y: Question of Krick going to Arnold before I could go to him, and I had felt that that's what might have happened previously to Don. So I went to Krick and I said: "look, we can't carry on this way any longer, and I am going down to Gen Arnold, and I'm going to tell him that I want the authority to order you not to do this, and not to do that, and also to play square. I think you can do the most good," and, I said, "and you better, by God, not get down there before I do, because I am going down as soon as I can get an appointment." And that was the situation.

Q: In the case of Zimmerman, Krick beat him.

Y: I don't think he went down there. I think that he, when he got ready... Zimmerman was his strong supporter all the way through, and this is the thing that hurts, I don't think Krick had any loyalty to anybody. He wasn't that kind of person, no personal loyalties, but No. 1 only. I never saw anyone defend him, defend him against the Navy, defend him against the rest of us in the Air Force. We all knew Irv as a person, very close to

him. I never saw anyone defend him to the extent that Don Zimmerman did. And yet I felt that the reason he got in dutch with Arnold was that Krick just fixed it because he was interfering with what Krick wanted to do, and he told Krick not to do it, and Krick went down. It was while he was working for Don that he started making that first deal with the front office.

Mrs. Y: It was something that had to do with funds that got mixed up in that thing.

Y: I don't know how you can use it.

Q: My interest is really how Arnold operated. In one case, Arnold went in one direction - where you were trying to get Krick back in line - and in the other case, Arnold went for the iconoclast Krick and against the organization.

Y: But, probably, no one went to him and made an issue that this is against the organization. Krick was there all by himself. He could get into Arnold's office any time he wanted to, and so Krick, I'm sure, moved a lot of pegs around. There were many changes that were due to him - but on one was there defending himself or defending the system, as it were...

Q: In a sense, Krick was a chip off the Arnold block, he dealt with people directly, rather than deal with the paperwork...

Y: Right. And see, he wouldn't think of dealing with his boss. Krick said his boss was a jerk, okay, give him a new boss, maybe, I don't say that that's it, but this is the kind of thing that happened. I felt this way, that's why I went to Gen Arnold I had no permission to go to Arnold.

Mrs. Y: Zimmerman went to Arnold, or got to Arnold somehow to get Krick out of this mess, and get him out of the Navy.

Q: That was earlier.

Y: Zimmerman defended Krick all the way through. I think right up until they probably had a little hassle, and then I believe....

Q: Then it was difficult for Zimmerman to cut off Krick's water, because he had been his defender.

Y: Yes.

INTERVIEW WITH LT/GEN DONALD YATES
PALM BEACH, FLORIDA
JANUARY 9, 1970

Q: Do you remember the first time you encountered Gen Arnold?

Y: Probably the first time - I had gone to Cal Tech in 1939 as a weatherman, to take a meteorological course at Cal Tech. My first assignment after getting out in 1939 was Barksdale AFB, and I believe probably the first time I personally ran into him was when I was briefing him on the weather down there. He went through Barksdale quite frequently because that was a good stopping off point. I never got to know him very well, he was pretty arbitrary about the way he cleared himself on all flights, and was generous with his criticism of the weatherman.

Q: He was very concerned about the weather?

Y: Yes, he was.

Q: It was a very big item with him.

Q: Well, you knew Professor Irving Krick?

Y: Yes, in fact, that caused a little difficulty there at the time when, after I had gone to the Pentagon building, Krick was working for me, supposedly. But he was working directly for Gen Arnold, also, and this gets a little bit tough to talk about because, again, his name, if it comes up, is in difficult context. But one of the recollections I had - I think the only time I ever offered to turn in my suit - was directly to Arnold, and in an incident which involved Krick.

Q: I see his name in and out of Arnold's papers, and I

can't decide - maybe it was a love-hate relationship, I don't know.

Y: General Arnold felt weather was so damned important. He knew it was so important that he wanted to get the very best he could, and Krick was a super salesman. Still is, as far as I know.

Q: Was he a good a weatherman as he was a salesman?

Y: In my personal opinion, Krick was a very capable forecaster - day to day forecaster. He was no long range forecaster, but he sold long range forecasts for years, and part of the difficulty we had was his attempting to put the long range forecasting business in, and the claims to being able to forecast more than two or three days in advance. Now, he did a lot of good. He was a natural forecaster. That is, he was good in that respect, a very good forecaster, but no long range forecaster, and he was sort a shyster in that respect. He sold himself to Arnold. Gen Arnold at that time had a gray haired guy in his front office....

Q: Horace Shelmire?

Y: Yes.

Q: This was from his old home town.

Y: Well, somehow Krick knew how to culminate the front office there, and he was providing special reports and services, things like that, and he was giving his impressions of advice, actually, regarding the North African invasion, things like that. I don't know if you have heard the story about that fiasco, but he got involved, sub rosa in the forecasting for it, in competition

with the Navy and a few other people, and that was kind of embarrassing. Shelmire, or whatever his name was, was the contact in the office that Krick was sending all this stuff through. We were putting out forecasts, and I was running the Weather Central in the Pentagon at that time, and it got to be so, it got to be impossible. Krick wouldn't go the direction the forecasters had agreed we were going to go, and here's the position of the consensus.....

Q: In other words he was free wheeling outside your authority?

Y: He was completely free wheeling outside of my authority, and I was getting some kickbacks from it, because I was having to defend two positions. One, the official position which I knew about, and another position that got bootlegged through by Irv. Krick and I were very good friends. He was working for me, and yet he wasn't. And the whole issue: I went down to see Gen Arnold and said: "I would like to have this stopped," and this free wheeling and all this razzle dazzle that Irv was doing. And I said: "I knew it is by your personal direction." And I said: "If you want him to run the show, then let him run the show. But I don't think it is going to be good for it, good for the people, good for the service, good for anything." I was more scared at that time than I think I have ever been. I was a Major, I guess.

Q: How did Arnold react to that?

Y: It was funny. He was in his office, and personally, I always had reasonably good rapport with him, because he chewed me out and I would take it all right, and I think in a way, he

had a reasonable respect for me as a weatherman. And I asked permission to see him, and he had, at the time that I went in, in his office was this old retired General. He was standing in there. He had been out of the service for some time....

Q: Was it Trubee Davison?

Y: Davison, no. The other one who lived in Washington so long. He went to all the Air Force affairs...

Q: Fechet?

Y: Fechet, yes.

Q: He was the first Chief of the Air Corps.

Y: Right, he was in the office, I walked in, saluted and turned around, and said, "I'm sorry." He said: "oh no," and he smiled. And I think Gen Arnold knew I was very, very upset, because I had requested repeatedly an appointment with him personally and I was way down the line, and of course. Arnold was that kind of guy. The one thing about him that I could never understand how he had the capacity to run an organization like he did, with his fingers in every pie. He wouldn't have a man in between. He wanted to have each single function reporting directly to him. Fifty functions, you know how he had the Air Force organized at that time. Flat, right across. I don't know how many people reported to him officially. Well, I was down the line below that. I was at least two tiers below the man that was supposed to go see him. But I knew that it was his problem and it was my problem, and the guy between couldn't care less. He was in Operations at the time, and so....

Q: You are talking about 1941 or 42? Was this post Pearl Harbor?

Y: Oh yes, this was post Pearl Harbor. This was pre Europe, I went over to Europe in 1944. Gen Spaatz and Gen Arnold specifically asked me to take my weather central over, and I took Krick and Ben Holzman, and about 6 or 7 other key guys right out of the Weather Central in Washington. Spaatz said: "Send them over. If they are the best ones you've got, they don't need to be in Washington, they've got to be on the front line." This was in January 1944. So the time that I am thinking about in this incident, occurred before that, and probably two or three years before, probably in 1942, maybe early '43. I can't remember the time. If I could isolate these various things that happened I could put it in the proper context. That is the time period. And what happened was that Arnold said: "Well, go ahead and speak your piece." And I said: "Well, it's just that I've got to have authority to run my outfit directly, and everybody in the outfit. I can't have somebody reporting to somebody else, around outside. I'm not smart enough to know what to do about it, and it's getting damned embarrassing" - words to this effect, and I said: "Frankly, I'd turn in my suit right now, if that's what is necessary to straighten this thing out, because I can't handle it." And he said: "What would you do if I turned Krick over to you 100%?" He knew, or, he was admitting that he was in it, and I said: "I'll send him to California." I remember that. And he said: "You'll send him out of town," and I said: "Yes, for the time being. He has stirred up so much ruckus here, I have to get him out of town. And if he is to report to me, then he goes to Pasadena. I'm going to put him on a job there working

up historical chart of the hemisphere, going back about 50 years, which will later be the basis for the best kind of forecast that we could get, to extend the forecast beyond 2 or 3 days." I said, "I know no better analyst, no more capable guy to do the job than he." He smiled, and of course, I was scared, and I think it was Fechet, just standing over in the corner of the room, just getting a kick out of my embarrassment, and really, the fact that Arnold made no bones about it. He said: "I think you've got a point. I can see the position you are in, and although I'm not necessarily going to agree with you that that's the best place to put Krick," he said, "I've either got to accept your offer, or let you do what you are going to do." And so, my respect went up 100% for him.

Q: Going back to Krick - I've seen the Arnold papers at the Library of Congress. He left, or he collected a mixture of unofficial, semi-official and what not, all kinds of things. Krick is in and out of the place. In his papers, and I didn't quite understand his role, and I'm glad that I made this trip up here, because I think you can help me.

Y: The thing about it that you can see, is this can't be, as far as I am concerned, it would be wrong to have it published. I went back to Krick as soon as I came out of Arnold's office. I had told him before, because he had said: "I'm working for Arnold." and what could I do. I told him the situation, I said: "I've frankly gone down to Gen Arnold; I've put the cards on the table, I've told him I would quit, or he could fire me, or whatever he wanted, but it had to be, either you work for me or you

don't and, then I would have no connection with this, I said, "Gen Arnold agreed with me." I said: "So you are going to have to be prepared to go to the West Coast and set up that outfit." And he broke down and cried in my office. He had been my professor at Cal Tech, and here was a very difficult situation. However, he went out there, and he did a splendid job. And then, we brought him back in. The situation was completely changed; he was working hard; he went over as part of the team to do the forecasting for Gen Spaatz in the USSAF, 8th AF.

Q: Yes, the 8th Air Force and the 15th AF - the Strategic Air Force.

Y: Yes, where we pulled the 15th AF from Italy on target, and the 8th AF out of Europe. He was there, and that was part of the team. And later, he and Holzman were the two US forecasters that were on a joint team that did the forecasting for D-Day. I was the head of the US side of it, I was Deputy Chief, Meteorological Officer, SHAEF, and there was a Britisher that was Chief, Meteorological Officer, professional meteorologist, not a Britisher that was Chief, Meteorological Officer, professional meteorologist, not a military man....

Q: Fellow named.....?

Y: Staff.

Q: I think Eisenhower mentioned him.

Y: Yes, he did. He certainly did, and he and I went into every single briefing just before D-Day, and backing us up was a big British crew, and my crew, headed by Holzman and Krick, so that situation ironed itself out very well. Krick was controversial,

because during these deals he tended to try to belittle the British crew, and then later claimed that his sides of the forecast were more accurate than the other consensus. This was the way Irv did his business. He was a real fine person in many respects, but he always had to be slithering around and building up Irving P. Krick. So that was a real though situation.

Q: Well, this was actually compounded, I mean he had this personality aspect - disease of the vertical pronoun, and Arnold sort of fostered this.

Y: He did:

Q: What gave Arnold so much confidence in him?

Y: I don't know. I do not know.

Q: He came from Cal Tech.

Y: He came from Cal Tech, and as you know....

Q: Robert Millikan was there; Millikan and Arnold were very close.

Y: That's correct.

Q: In the early '30s?

Y: That was it. And young Clark Millikan was - both of them were pushing - and von Karman. There's the guy that did it. Von Karman knew, and I talked to Von Karman many, many times, about Krick and his capabilities and his weaknesses. Von Karman agreed to all of them, but Von Karman was close to Arnold, very close, and that is exactly the reason, because Krick was commissioned in the Navy, and Arnold had him switched over to the Air Force.

Q: I was going to ask about this. He had some trouble in the Navy?

Y: Oh yes. Same trouble, only they wouldn't take him at all. He always had trouble in the Navy, even after he was in the Air Force. Made it a little bit tougher for us. But getting out to Cal Tech for awhile, organizing the job which he did extremely well, that cleared the atmosphere a little bit. So when he came back in he was a better man for it, he was a better soldier for it.

Q: He had, with Millikan and Von Karman backing him, he had the highest credentials?

Y: And it was very interesting. Carl Rossby, you know, was working in OSD as the consultant deputy to Bowles, when Bowles...

Q: OSD?

Y: Stimson's office. Secretary of War. Ed Bowles, Dr. Bowles - he worked for Stimson directly, and Carl Rossby was a Norwegian who worked for Bowles. Rossby had been a professor at MIT. Of course he was anti-Krick all the way, but he couldn't get any where.

Q: A couple of days ago somebody mentioned the Norwegian weather forecaster, and I couldn't think of his name.

Y: He was a lousy forecaster, but he was a good technical man - much more honest let's say, technically honest, than Irv would be, though Irv was not as competent technically, theoretically. Pattersen is the Norwegian. Rossby was a Swede. Svere Pattersen - he was on the British team over there, but he hadn't been in the US. He wasn't mixed up in the US military at that time. We got him in, and I got him assigned

to the Weather Service after I came back and after the invasion. Sometime in the latter part of the war we got him a clearance; we got him in and he worked in the US for a long time with us in the weather service, when I was Chief of the weather service, which was a little bit later. This was 1945-50. I spent '44 in Europe, then I came back and Arnold said: "All right, you are going to be Chief of the Weather Service, pulled me back out of there at that stage. Rossby and Bowles had quite a little bit of influence, I thought, with Arnold. But Rossby never did. Rossby believed Von Karman and probably Millikan. I didn't know, his context with Millikan, but of course, Von Karman was there, and Von Karman had a lot of...."

Q: Well, that connection started in the early '30s when Arnold was at March Field. He was at March Field, and Millikan was conducting some high atmospheric tests of solar rays or something. Arnold made available to him and his scientists, airplanes. They went up, Arnold gave him carte blanche. Arnold had a great interest in R&D. It really turned him on.

Y: He didn't understand it, but he knew it was essential. Had a better appreciation for it - it's the same way with the weather business. He respected....

Q: People who were professionals - like Von Karman. Could ask him for the moon and he could get it if Arnold could reach it.

Y: That's true.

Q: Von Karman did a job for him, you know. His book, Toward New Horizons, is a 20 years forecast of R&D - absolutely fantastic in its predictions. Well, Von Karman came during the Hitler

era into Cal Tech, and Millikan saw his merit, and I guess, recommended him to Arnold. And then when both of them said Krick is the man you want for weather, this is all Arnold needed. Can you think of a specific instance of where Krick ran around the end, and may have told Arnold 180° from consensus.

Y: No. Since you wrote, I've been trying to think, my memory is bad. I wish I could because several quite flagrant things that were done. At the time they were terribly important to me. But later on, I just put them out of my mind, and got things squared away and got straightened up. That was an issue.

Q: You mentioned a snafu with TORCH.

Y: I didn't know until later that Krick was even involved, and I think he was working for me, but he was providing forecasts directly through Arnold's office, and I guess those forecasts were going to the skipper prior to the invasion. Apparently the two met, because I know then, later, the Navy local chief of the Naval Aerological Service came to me and raised cain about our forecasts having been going over while he was providing forecasts out of their own Central. This kind of thing that happened without any knowledge on my part. I didn't have the foggiest idea that these things were going on. Krick was sending them, and he wasn't. He was giving them to Shelmire, and that's how they got to Arnold.

Q: This is rather important, because it reflects Arnold's manner of managing the Air Force. Arnold did not have a very elaborate chain of command, as you point out.

Y: He had a flat; he had a flat organization. He dealt with people all the way across the board. These were people he trusted. He made very, very, fast decisions and he would make decisions on a recommendation from someone whom he trusted, and then he would issue directives down the line, based on that. One case which is typical of Gen Arnold. I think it was a Friday at 11:30 in the morning, just before noon, as I recall, and my wife will probably recall this even better because I was called to Gen Arnold's office. This was in June or July of 1942, and I had only been in the Munitions Building, at that time, for 6 months, I came in December 1941. He said: "How long will it take you to get ready to go to Russia?" to me. He hadn't called my boss; he hadn't called anybody, he said: "Come down here" and I said: "I guess it all depends for how long." He said: "Anywhere from 1 week to the duration." And I said: "when?" He said: "Tomorrow." I said: "Sir, shots and a few other things, let along packing and trying to make arrangements for my family, and a few other dozen things. It was right out of the blue. He said: "Well, okay. I'm sure that you can make it." He said: "What's happened is when making a deal on the (Follett) Bradley mission to go to Russia, we had/^{not}any meteorologists in, but because we are moving these fighters down through Siberia, they want some help in setting up a meteorological service there that would be somewhat compatible. I have agreed to put a meteorologist on the crew, and he will be the second man. You'd be next in seniority to Gen Bradley." By that time, I guess I was a LTCOL. And Arnold said: "And you are pilot; there will be four pilots

among you; and you are taking a B-24," he said: "You can report to Gen Bradley and get briefed, and the emergency equipment and everything else is on the airplane earmarked for Joe Doaks, will be yours, whether it fits or not," or words to that effect.

Anyhow, I called my wife up, and I said I had to go to Moscow or Russia, and I think it was a Friday, and I think we left on Sunday morning at 9:00 as I recall.

Q: Flew the northern route.

Y: No. We went south - went across from Belem to Accra, and from Accra up to Cairo, and then across into Tehran, and then back over into Moscow. And as it ended, we were gone about 6 months, but, we could have been there for the duration. He personally, without discussing it with anybody except me - my boss knew nothing about it, I went back and told him...

Q: Who was your boss at that time?

Y: I don't remember. Don Zimmerman, probably, the meteorological boss. Merriweather was at one stage. I can't remember the changes. Merriweather was the head weatherman, Merriweather was the man, I'm pretty sure.

Q: Did Don Zimmerman have some dealings with him - Arnold?

Y: Yes, that was very hard to understand, because Don Zimmerman had gotten Krick over. Don Zimmerman was from Cal Tech and he wanted Krick and he got Krick over from the administrative level that got him in. Don was working at that time over in the weather bureau in a central that had been created there, jointly. That's before we moved into the Pentagon building, and Krick was there as part of that team provided by the Navy, and the transfer

was made at that time. He was made a Major in the Air Force, from a LCDR in the Navy.

Q: He's one man I will try to get to see. I looked up Don Zimmerman, he's in Mercer Island, Washington.

Y: State of Washington. I know he was working for Boeing for a while.

Q: He's going to be a hard man to get, but I have a note here that Arnold selected him to be in the first class at the National War College. So he selected 6 people for that including Cabell, Zimmerman, P.D. Weikert.....

Y: Don Zimmerman, somehow or other, got crosswise, all of a sudden, with Arnold, and that would be an interesting story, because I never knew what happened, but I think Krick was involved. I think that Don Zimmerman tried to do exactly what I tried to do, but I knew I couldn't do it without going to Arnold. And what happened, was Zimmerman apparently - now this is strictly speculation - but all of a sudden, Zimmerman moved from the Weather Service and moved out of Washington. Don was serious and conscientious, and no one could understand, but from being at the top of the [group] because we knew that Gen Arnold thought a hell of a lot of Don because he put him in the first class....

Q: The men that he selected were selected for their potential...

Y: At that stage, it just seemed that all of a sudden he went from being on the good side to being on the bad side, and Don's story would be interesting. I'm sure that if you are going to get into the Krick story, Zimmerman is one man, and Oscar Senter probably could, Gen Senter, he was in the weather service at that time. He is in the Washington area.

Q: William O. Senter?

Y: Yes, I'm sure his memory is far more acute on these details like that than mine, because he was that type of person.

Q: I think this is fairly important. The reason for it is because it illustrates the kind of organization Arnold sat up. Arnold ran the Air Force out of his hip pocket,

Y: And everybody in it, as he did like his asking me to go. And he fully expected me to be able to do the impossible. Most people did, and that's how he got so damned many things done. It's because he let them know he had confidence in them, and he demanded they do it, and they did it. That was - it was fantastic the way he operated. No normal man could operate that way.

No one could keep as many things in his mind as he did. One thing that Oscar Senter can give you the details on. One day Arnold said: "We need more forecasters in the Pacific. Cut this class in half," we had a forecasters school going. He said: "Take them out right now. Half a forecaster is better than none." This would have been all right to do it two months more, giving them enough so that they had their basic, and then go ahead. As I recall, Oscar can give you the details on that, because that was fantastic.

Q: Maybe they could give you a quarter of a forecast?

Y: They probably weren't even that. I don't know what happened. I remember hearing about the order, and I felt: "We can't do that. We'll kill the pilots... suicide, these people have only had certain things." Oscar was on the training side of the business at that time. I was in the forecasting and

climatological side, and I remember his griping about it, but Arnold made his decision." "And that's what it will be'." It's my recollection that somehow they doubled or trebled the number of forecasters, and they got these guys out. They shortened the courses. Oh, we had forecasters running out of our ears. There for a while, but Arnold was handling that, it wasn't anybody in between, it was Arnold to some Major or LTCOL down the line that was responsible for Training, I think he went too. Arnold called me down to his office, and I said: "That's not my business." But he persisted: "Can you get it done?" And I said: "Yes sir, I'll see that its placed in the right place, and then I forced Oscar Senter to go back and see him. I believe it was Oscar and asked him: "You go on back and pick it up, because I'm getting a directive which is not in my area of business." But arnold would do that..

Q: You have given me the most rational explanation of a management technique that Arnold used that has been severely criticized. This business of his grabbing somebody in the E-Ring, and giving them a job totally alien to their responsibility.

Y: Absolutely.

Q: He did this?

Y: Oh, he did this on innumerable occasions. There were many cases that I watched that being done, and, at the level where this happened, the best we could do was to immediately go to the right guy, and pass the word on. But he had certain people he would contact, and other people he would not contact.

Q: Well, if he trusted you, he'd give you all the jobs?

Y: He'd give you anything to do, whether it was your business, or whether it wasn't in your business. This is the way he operated. This is the most interesting thing about him to me, as a young officer working under him. At that time I was a Major.

Q: It was good and bad. He cut the process of getting this thing filtered down to the operating level by 3/4, but he also alienated people, and he also was carrying too much of a load himself.

Y: Too much, much too much of a load himself. However, for a new organization, a new force, growing as it was, when it became the AAF and a significant segment of the Army -before we were separated. He created the separate Air Force really within the Army. And he did that himself, in my opinion. He did that himself, by pulling all the strings, and doing an absolutely impossible job.

Q: He had a staff, people like Stratmeyer. Did he bypass Stratmeyer?

Y: Always. And Stratmeyer?

Q: Giles after him?

Y: That's right. All of them - they didn't know what was going on. They would ask us. And the system was, after you got the instructions, go on up and brief the other guys that should know about it, as well as the guys responsible to get it done. First, go to the guy that was supposed to do it. Get him working on it; then tell your boss and his boss, and then tell Strat or Giles, and he was all the time running back to Giles and telling him the orders he'd gotten from Arnold.

Q: Well, I'm going to see Giles in San Antonio.

Y: This is to me, looking back at it, it is clearly the way he operated. Now, there are many people in business and industry. I happen to be working in an organization (Raytheon), and the President of this organization is very similar, and he had no experience with his staff. He had no reason to know how to use the staff, and he deals totally in people. He makes mistakes, many more mistakes than Arnold made, because he hasn't the breadth that Arnold had. But he is similar in many respects to Arnold. He's young, he's only 42 or 43, made President when he was 34.

Q: Which organization?

Y: Raytheon.

Y: The reason, it's the first time that I had ever run into anybody that, even thought, or tried to operate in the manner which, in my opinion, Arnold successfully did. Then, as you may recall, Arnold was prevailed upon to change his organization, and he then created several people on his staff. He had about 6, but he still couldn't always go through them, but he knew that he should, and people had told him. I'm convinced that they got to him and said: "Look boss..."

Q: People like Hanley and Reuben Hood?

Y: This is correct, and he gave them little segments, and several things to watch over. But he never hesitated to go below them if he thought there was a question, or if there was a hurry.

Q: Do you know what contributed to that? Partly, some of the responsibility or authority - his heart attack -/had a series

of heart attacks. One moderate one in 1943 during the TRIDENT conference.

Y: Okay, this is about the time that this happened, right after that. Because in 1945...

Q: He had a major one in 1945. This is the one where he went down to Coral Gables...

Y: I was going to say, in 1945, he had practically agreed, and he had the staff set up, so that on paper it made reasonable sense. But you know, when he first organized it, it made no sense for any normal man, but for him that's the way he operated.

Q: He came in early in the morning and left late at night, and then he'd go on an inspection trip, travel all night, and then come back again.

Y: He never stopped. How that man ever kept on, and lived as long as he did, I don't know. He just wore himself out. But he felt he had to get to the guy who really was doing it. He didn't want any second-hand information. That's what he felt he was later on getting when he set up Plans and Operations and Personnel....

Q: When he got to an air base, he went right to the sergeant and the operating man. When he went to inspect the B-29s, with which they were having trouble, the engines caught fire, and all kinds of problems on that. So he went directly to a base. Well, he went to Salina. They were trying to get these planes out. Roosevelt was on his back on getting B-29s out to the CBI. He went out there and he got Benny Meyers, Benny Meyers

was one of his favorite people at that time, but this is the way he operated.

Q: I'm interested especially in what you said about the Follett Bradley mission. You were on that mission?

Y: Yes.

Q: One of the tasks, I think, was to get the Russians to give us some Siberian bases?

Y: This was behind everything. This was really the purpose of the mission. The front was to provide a route down through Siberia. The Al-sib Route. We came out, and I always personally felt that Roosevelt let us down, because we were pouring lend lease stuff in there - "Flaming Philip" Faymonville - "Flaming Phil," Gen Faymonville, was the Army officer, and I always will believe that he's pink, was pink. He was giving the Russians things, and asking nothing in return. And here we had information that we needed. We needed to know what was the Order of Battle on the eastern front as far as the Russians were concerned. How did they really stand vis a vis Japan. We had picked up bases. Why couldn't we go out and look at the area? Why wouldn't they give us permission to do some shuttle operations through Siberia. After 6 months, Roosevelt told us - a couple of messages that were going back, two channels to go back through, one through the Pentagon and one through.....

Q: Standley?

Y: Standley was there at the time.

Q: The Ambassador. One through Standley and one through the military?

Y: Right, and the military was a real good friend of the Air Force on the General Staff at the time.

Q: Was it Deane - John Deane?

Y: No, an old guy.

Q: You mean, the military guy where?

Y: In the Pentagon. He was our contact. He was G-3.

Q: Was it Strong?

Y: Strong was G-2.

Q: Handy?

Y: Handy. Tom Handy was the guy. Well, we felt that Handy agreed with us. We had a lot of coded messages back and forth. We could see there was trouble in Washington, but pretty soon the message came right back through Standley from the President, and we felt that Faymonville had some influence, that we would put no more pressure (the Russians) to get bases, and that we would come out of there. So we came out in December. But we were really - we came out - and we still formed a task group, and operated as a task group to form an air force that would operate in Siberia, because we still believed it. But it was clear Roosevelt was not going to put any pressure on "Uncle Joe." And that was the way it was. And damn it! I just felt that was wrong at the time, I was so convinced that we could shorten the war, and that we could do this job, and we know now we could have done this job.

Q: The Russians said they were worried - whether they were or not - that this would be a belligerent act and cause the Japanese to attack. You know, Roosevelt had sent Stalin a report in 1942, that he had information the Japanese were preparing to

attack Russia. Somebody may have given him phony information which justified the Russians not giving us any bases.

Y: Anyhow, it didn't look right to us, the information that we had.

Q: Did you know about that report?

Y: Yes, I knew about that report. I don't know where it came from. I don't know what the US source of that information was. I know, I understand that that was....

Q: There is another man involved in that mission, his name starts with an "A" Col Alcorn?

Y: No, on that mission was Gen Bradley, Tom Watson, Jr., was Bradley's aide, he's now chairman of IBM, Chuck Westover, Oscar Westover's son, C.B. Westover, III. But anyway, he's a retired AF General now. He was on that mission. Harley Trash (?) and Hicks, he was a navigator.

Q: A related mission, I can't think of the man's name. It starts with an "A". There's an officer at the Air Force Academy, I was out there recently, and interviewed some people there. He was doing a Ph.D. dissertaion on "Faymonville".

Y: I would be interested in seeing what the real truth on was on Faymonville. All I did was see him in association.

Q: You don't know too much about Faymonville, except this one mission?

Y: No, I don't know anything about Faymonville, except that I saw him and his behavior while we were in Russia, and he had a couple of guys working for him - Army people. One was named Olsen, and Olie Olson.

Q: Did you have any contact with Merion Cooper?

Y: No.

Q: Cooper earlier, some months earlier, right after Pearl Harbor, was probably sent on some mission to see what we could do to get some bases either in China or Russia. Roosevelt was anxious to strike Japan, and of course, this led to the Doolittle raid. Merion Cooper was a G-2 type...

Y: No, I never had any dealing with him.

Q: Did you have any contact or knowledge of the plan for an Anglo-American air task force to help the Russians out? This is right at the time of the Follett-Bradley mission. An air task force to help the Russians. The Germans were approaching Stalingrad, and they were threatening Baku. If they took that - you had no contact with that?

Y: No, not with that. We got in, and the German front-line was about 20 miles west of Moscow. We went up to the front-lines, and we saw the Russian air operations there, and what a mess.

Q: Was the Bradley mission a success?

Y: We got some intelligence information that probably justified the mission - that's all we got. And it was a success from my point of view, as far as developing a meteorological exchange. The head of the Soviet hydrometeorological service was a LTGEN. He was my aide, and he was a general. A real fine guy, and it was through him....

Q: Do you remember his name?

Y: Yes, Eugene Federov.

Q: He was your aide, and he was a LTGEN?

Y: He was my age at that time, and he was my opposite number. He was the only one. It was in that area, the only area that we could talk without having a member of the Soviet Secret Service or what have you, MKVD. They didn't call that group, that group was the one that handled the foreign office, but they were essentially a branch of the MKVD.

Q: I was told that the Russians gave us incorrect meteorological information.

Y: That is a damn lie. I don't know who said that - to my knowledge, and I was there.

Q: They were genuinely cooperative?

Y: Yes, they did refuse to give us some information, and they did incipher some of their information.

Q: Why, - they are naturally secretive?

Y: They are naturally secretive and they didn't trust anybody. So they gave what information they agreed to internationally. But they ciphered all their weather broadcasts, so we couldn't fill in all the small stations, without working on the information. In other words they never reneged nor as far as I know, gave any incorrect information, once the agreement was made, but all the big bulk of Soviet weather information was enciphered. Of course, none of the information that was enciphered was part of the agreement, or the information that we got, but that was the second subject and a second problem.

Q: Did Harry Hopkins play any role in that mission?

Y: He probably did. Yes, because I think he was Faymonville's direct boss, wasn't he?

Q: Well, Harry Hopkins had his finger on the....

Y: He was the one in the White House that was handling the Lend Lease business and I know Faymonville could get to the President very easily by going to Hopkins, this was the way he did, as I understood it.

Q: How about Harriman?

Y: Harriman was not in the picture as far as I know.

Q: He probably came in a little later?

Y: He came in a little later, he had been....

Q: I think he replaced Standley [as Ambassador]?

Y: He replaced Standley, but that was after I came back. Later, of course, we did have, while Standley was still there, we started the shuttle raid operation from England into Poltava...

Q: That was 1944? [the Follett Bradley mission]

Y: That was in 1944, that's correct.

Q: Were you there?

Y: Yes, I was in England at the time.

Q: Did you go with the mission - the Poltava mission?

Y: I didn't go to the mission, but I helped arrange some of the exchanges, because I knew the weather people over there, and I'd been there. So I placed - it was a Naval weather officer that was in charge of this arrangement at Poltava. And he gave him the information.

Q: That was Operation FRANTIC?

Y: That's right.

Q: Tell me about the weather for OVERLORD - this is a very interesting thing.

Y: This was fantastic, absolutely fantastic. We had this team of forecasters working together for about 2 months prior to the invasion, and we had everything categorized right down to a nat's eyebrow. What weather affected what operation. We knew every piece of it, the advanced bombing of the shore defenses, then the paratroop drops, and then the impact of wather on the vehicles, and what have you. We were looking for every kind of situation that might create mud or difficulty in mobility, once we got over there. We had given that a terrific amount of study. It was done by a lot of good climatologists. So it was rather easy to set down exact criteria for every single operation. That was simple. Then we started forecasting, and we had beautiful weather in June and, during the latter part of May as I recall, one or two months, certainly all through May, and all through June, and probably half of May, we attended twice weekly, mock sessions, mock briefings, where Eisenhower and his and all of the C&Cs - Ramsey for the Navy, Leigh Mallory for the Air, and Spaatz for the strategic forces, and Montgomery and then there were two or three backups for these people. And then the staff which was Bull, G-2, and Tedder who was always there. This group was going to make the decision. So we would go in and brief them, Stagg and I would brief them, Stagg would generally give the basic meterological situation, and I would give the military interpretations of it, because the US had done much more of that than the British. The British hadn't, they just said this is the weather situation. And we would have an agreed forecast. We would get on a conference hookup, and it was the worst, lousy arrangement

for making forecasts I've ever seen, but three centers, the Admiral, the British Meteorological Officer, which is a civilian center, and the AF - US Weather Central which was Krick and a whole bunch of people. Well, they would make the decisions based on our forecasts. Boy, they were beautiful, they were no hard decisions. All of a sudden, 2 or 3 days before the invasion, we were going for real. We were making them every day, now. Then, starting three or four days before, as I recall, we made them about 4 times a day. And the day before, we made them every two hours all day and all night. And this group would be there. Some weather systems started coming across the Atlantic and one lined right up behind the other. And it was a miserable mess and it was going to be awfully difficult to go. So, anyway, we briefed, and Eisenhower postponed one day. It was going to be hairy the next day and we were worried about the briefing about the weather. The ships had started down. He turned them back, and the next day he was going to have to make an irrevocable decision, and to switch back and it would be another 3 or 4 weeks.

Q: By that time the whole thing could have been compromised?

Y: This is correct. Anything could have happened, because we had alerted everybody, we had this communication, the air full of communications, and everything else.

Q: He made the basic decisions to recommend to-touch and go?

Y: Oh yes, well he questioned. I'll never forget some of the questions we got that night, when the final decision was made to go. And the first guy said, Montgomery said: "How high were the seas going to be." And we were a couple of feet over the

max permissible. There were going to be some awful seasick guys. He said, that's all right, they will be doped up, so that wouldn't bother them too much. "We can get across, and the boats can take it," he said, "my people can take it all right." Spaatz wanted to know: "What is the chance of bombing visually?" Well, it was a case where we must sneak in between two storms, and they were just about a day apart. And so, we said: "About 50%." I said: "Well, if you want to figure it one way, figure all the US forces bomb visually, and all the British bombers bomb instrument." I said: "that's about the only way you can put it." Then, Monty wanted to know if his paratroopers were going to get in. We said we wouldn't guarantee more than half of them being on target. And he said: "Half of them? Can you guarantee that half of them will be where they are supposed to be?" And I said: "No, we can't guarantee it, but that's the feel we have for it, that at least half of them will be there, and that's the best guess we can give." And then the question after the bombing and the paratroopers - that was the kind of questions, and then they kicked these things around. Ramsey was negative most of the time. It was going to be rougher than hell, and it was going to be messy. Montgomery was an eager beaver. Eisenhower just said, he made the decision all by himself, strictly atypical, as far as I can see, because usually he was very good at compromising and getting a bunch of people to agree to something. But he knew he had to do it, and goddam it, he was whipped, too, because there hadn't been anybody that had more than 2 hours sleep at a time for the last couple of days. They came out.

The funny thing was that the US bombers hit instrument, and all the RAF hit visually. They went two hours apart and one of them got everything. Most of the paratroopers got in. One bunch of paratroopers got in the wrong place, but other than that, they got in. But it was kind of hairy getting in.

Q: I'll bet you didn't sleep that night.

Y: I didn't sleep at all. We were really really worried about it. It was exciting, it was interesting; and it ended up that we were real lucky. Two or three weeks later whenever that next period came up - well, that's the time they blew out all those temporary docks that they put in.

Q: The Mulberries?

Y: Yes, those things were all torn up, right at the time that the next postponement would have been. So they wouldn't have gone for a month or two and God knows what would have happened to the invasion at that time.

Q: Exactly one week after the invasion, the Germans started flying in the V-1s. Can you imagine this going on during the invasion, the initial invasion?

Y: Oh, wouldn't that have messed us, particularly if they had put them down there in the Portsmouth area.... The whole top brass of that whole operation, everybody was there. And I mean they were there all the time, grouped within...one V-1 would have clobbered the whole bunch if it hit in the right place.

Q: Arnold and Marshall came in on the 9th or 10th of June. Did you see Arnold, did he talk to you?

Y: No, he didn't talk to me at that time. I saw him.

They were busy, and we were busy because at that time, I went on over to follow up, to get the weather service installed across the way. So we moved over right away, with the advance headquarters, and we stayed there, then went on down to Granville, and then went from Granville up to Paris. St. Germaine where Spaatz had his headquarters; Eisenhower was out at the palace.

Q: Did you see Arnold later on in the war?

Y: Yes. I was called back in December 1944, and was called down to Gen Arnold's office. I had been over there just a year. And he said: "do you think the situation is operating okay over there right now?" And I said: "Yes". And he said: "well, I've got a rat's nest back here in the weather service, and I need somebody to organize it." Arnold said: "No holds barred." He said: "I've got two factions right now fighting each other. The factions were Oscar Senter was heading up the weather wing down at Nashville, N.C., and Hunt Bassett was heading up the unit in the Pentagon, and Arnold didn't, again - here's a situation where he just goes to the individual. It wasn't up a matter, somebody up the line, some general officer should have been able to take that burden and straighten it out, and he said..."

Q: Were you a general officer at the time?

Y: No, I was a Colonel at the time. I had been recommended for promotion, but I hadn't been promoted. Spaatz had recommended me for promotion, Anderson really, I guess, he was running the operation.

Q: Fred Anderson. He just passed away.

Y: Yes, I saw that in some recent publication. Fred was

Q: And they were blaming the Air Force?

Y: Yes. Couldn't do anything about it.

Q: For about a week or 10 days it was touch and go. The Germans had penetrated the line. I guess we couldn't get any air in there, because you couldn't fly....

Y: You couldn't get any air in there at all, because they were operating right into it. And later on, after the war, when we got to talk to the Germans, they were complimentary about the forecasting of the invasion time. They had said they had advised that there was absolutely no possibility of an invasion during that time from a meteorological point of view, that we couldn't risk it, but the pressure once you get an operation like that going, you can slow it down. But the gamble that you are taking in stopping it is so terrible, and the fact that we had one break of 24 hours, an 18 hour period, we slipped in there, and it worked, but that was all you could do. And then it socked in.

Q: Luck played a part?

Y: Luck played a terrific factor.

Q: Doesn't it scare you sometimes. I mean you can be professional all the way down the line, and luck takes over?

Y: You are exactly right. You have no control over that. Skill just takes you so far and no more, in the science of meteorological today. Still, doesn't do the job, and that's the problem.

Q: A month later, when you came back, presumably after the Battle of the Bulge, Arnold had his major heart attack. He went

down to Miami. He was down there, and was trying to run the air force from a horizontal position, from the Biltmore. Were you aware that he was ill?

Y: No.

Q: It was kept very secret.

Y: I was not personally aware, I was in the middle of a move, too, and there was another reason, I had no idea he was sick at that time, I think I heard about it later.

Q: When did you next see him? He came back at the end of March 1945?

Y: That is pretty hard to tell, because we had several meetings and proposals on radical changes in the organization of the Weather Service. We put it under ATC at that time, ATC I believe it was, a long with the communications service, and what have you - to pull it out and pull it all together and make it a worldwide operation.

Q: You had your star by that time?

Y: No, I didn't get my star until 1946 or 1947, and then I went from there in '50. I guess in 1947 I got the star. In '50 I went to the Pentagon, and in '51 I got my second star, but that was as Director of Research and Director of Research and Development. I was out of the weather business. I was in the R&D business. Then I came down to Patrick after that four year tour and stayed here for 6 years.

Q: Did you have any contact with von Karman in the '45-'46 period?

Y: Yes, all the time. Both here, and in Europe, and everywhere.

Q: Arnold sent him to Europe right after the war ended, were you in that team?

Y: No, but I was aware of it, and visited him over there, and he had an office in Paris. What year was that?

Q: '45. This was May or June 1945.

Y: I was traveling all over, everywhere, in those days. I made no specific trip to see Von Karman, I was on the Meteorological Committee, and later I was on the Research and Development Board.

Q: Scientific Advisory Board?

Y: Yes. That came out of the office of Research and Development in the Air Force and I was the head of that office for 4 years. But I had know von Karman ever since he was a professor of mine at Cal Tech.

Q: Where you aware of the find of the Von Karman group? They found the German documents down a well? Have you read Von Karman's book?

Y: No, I haven't. I've read a couple of reviews on it.

Q: I wrote one of them for The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Did he ever talk to you about his relationship with Arnold. Von Karman?

Y: Yes, it's hard to recall exactly his words. There was no question but that he had very great respect for Gen Arnold. Von Karman always felt flattered that Gen Arnold depended on him. He never, he didn't just do this as another one of those things. He took it very personal. He felt very personally obligated to Gen Arnold - that he put him in this position, and kept him there so long, and he was very close to him.....

Q: He wouldn't take that job unless they gave him direct access to Arnold. He was, in a way, the same kind of guy. I guess he must have watched Arnold operate. He didn't want to operate by a chain of command. He wanted to go right to Arnold.

Y: This is exactly right, and he set it up that way, and he kept it that way. The way he worked the group, always to get the best for Gen Arnold. Nobody every worked any harder for Gen Arnold than Von Karman did. And of course, von Karman was a very capable guy, terrifically witty, terrifically sharp, never missed a trick, despite the fact that he was deaf.

Q: This was an attraction of opposites, the tall Mainliner Philadelphian, a West Pointer, and this little Jewish scientist. But they found a lot to talk about, a common interest.

Y: They certainly did.

Q: Arnold admired somebody who could contribute. He was a gadgeteer from WWI. You know, he and Kettering had designed a thing called "The Flying Bug", one of the early missiles. And as you may know - I'm sure you do know - you may have been involved in it - Arnold, as soon as the V-1 came along, Arnold wanted to get it. He wanted to reproduce it and improve upon it. And we did, the JB-2. Did you get involved in that?

Y: No, I wasn't personally involved in that. I was aware of it.

Q: Arnold wanted to build like 5,000 of them, and drop them on the Germans, and the War Dept cut his water off, toward the end of the war. They had a better Chinese version of the V-1 - it was a heck of a lot better than the German weapon. Of course,

we couldn't duplicate the V-2. This would take a little more planning. Were you involved in any of the scientific, like PAPERCLIP, any of the collection of German scientists and bringing them over here?

Y: Just on the administrative end, not personally.

Q: Did you get involved in the Strategic Bombing Survey?

Y: No.

Q: This was one of Arnold's pet ideas, too. He, I believe, originated this. He started it as an Air Force project, but then realized that the Air Force evaluating its own efforts would lack credibility. So they got it raised on a Presidential level.

Y: The only other good assignment I had, interesting assignment from an historical point of view was witnessing the first A-bomb test out in

Q: Bikini? Oh, Trinity, out at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945?

Y: Yes. I was the administrative head weather officer, and Ben Holzman was the head forecaster on it. There were two of us - two meteorologists out there, all during the time that it was ready, for the last 4 days I guess. That's the first time that I knew we had that goddam thing. I got out there and was completely briefed, and then sit there and wait for it and watch it, and then hold that information until somebody dropped one....

Q: That was a long three weeks?

Y: That was a long three weeks, because I'd seen this, and seen what it would do and....

Q: Did they keep you guys locked up?

Y: No, I went back to work. But every day, it was a matter of... I couldn't talk to anybody.

Q: It was one of the best kept secrets of the war.

Y: Wasn't it? Fantastic, it really was.

Q: Did you get involved with Tibbets?

Y: No, I didn't get involved with Tibbets.

Q: They got some weather people aboard the plane. In fact, many people think that the pilot of the Enola Gay went crazy and was institutionalized. Actually, it was a Sergeant named Eartherly. He was on a weather plane that preceded the Enola Gay, and William Bradford Huie wrote up this story. Now a lot of people think that the pilot of the plane had this terrible moral crisis, and went off his rocker.

Y: Yes, I've heard that story.

Q: People think this, and Tibbets is saying: "If I'm sane, and you're sane, then he's sane. Well, do you have any other recollections of Arnold that might be interesting?"

Y: I can't think of anything that might help you.

Q: How about social? Did the Yates meet the Arnold's socially?

Y: No, Mrs. Yates knows Mrs. Arnold quite well. And she knows the social side of it far more than I, I didn't have any direct contact.

Q: Do you remember Mrs. Arnold as head of the Air Force Emergency Relief?

Mrs. Y: That's what she started.

Q: Did you work for her?

Mrs. Y: Worked with her when she set up the organization.

Q: Do you remember amusing or instructive or interesting anecdotes.

Mrs. Y: I remember the evening she called me - I hadn't met her, and I didn't expect to hear from her. Don was in Russia, and I had some friends over listening to the radio, and Mrs. Arnold called me and said: "This was Mrs. Arnold," and I said, well, I'm not - something to the effect that I didn't believe it; "But I'm Josephine." she said, "I'll call you tomorrow morning when you feel better." Sure enough, she did, and that was when she'd bring it up. She always kidded about it.

Q: Always kidded about your not believing that call?

Mrs. Y: About Mrs. Arnold calling me.

Q: From the throne room, so to speak. This must have been 1942, the General went with Follett Bradley on that mission.

Mrs. Y: Yes.

Q: Did you have some other contact with her?

Mrs. Y: No, just working with her on that, when we were setting that up, dependents and all that, and she always had a great deal of personality.

Q: Did you work with her in 1945? Did you go all through the war?

Mrs. Y: No, I went to Maine in 1944, came back in 1945, and then I went to the meetings at the caucus room, the big meetings. And then they set up separate little meetings in the various neighborhoods, so the wives could get together and try to know about those whose husbands were away.

Q: Do you recall when the RAF counterpart organization invited Mrs. Arnold to visit in the UK?

Mrs. Y: No.

Q: Norstad told us that sometimes Arnold would push all the buttons on his squawk box and have everybody come running in there and then say: "I want you, and the rest of you can go." Do you remember this?

Y: I never remember it happening; I've heard the same story.

Q: Oh, you heard the same story?

Y: Oh yes, exactly the same story. He wasn't exactly sure which one he wanted till he saw him. Then he knew. I never took that as a serious story. But it's typical of the way he operated.

Q: It may be carrying a good thing to an extreme. It doesn't make good sense. See, what you told me of his doing things, of grabbing people, it's very unorthodox, but it made sense in a certain way. But pushing all the buttons, and calling 30 people from their desks just to say: "I want you, and the rest of you 29 guys can go," would waste a lot of time.

Y: I never felt that it really was true, but because it is characteristic, it could have been true.

Q: But you were there for a long period of time. If it had happened, it would have happened to you?

Y: It never happened to me. I've been called in on things that were not my business several times - that were none of my business. And only once did I tell him it wasn't my job. Only once.

Q: What did he say?

Y: "Can't you get it done?" I said: "yes sir." And after that, I expected him for about a period of several months. I guess

I was the only name that he associated with the weather business. He was mad at everybody else. And I don't know he wasn't mad at me, because we had had our difficulties.

Q: Well, he had 50 balls he was trying to keep in the air simultaneously. If he would give you one, he has 49 to worry about.

Y: Right. That's the way he worked. As far as I was concerned, once I understood that, it was fine. I'd take anybody's instructions. Sometimes it wasn't even in the weather business, I'd have a hell of a time finding out whose ball it really was. But I'd go running about the Pentagon until I found the guy to pass the ball to.

Q: Well, he had these two so-called advisors - Advisory Council. He started off with Cabell and Norstad and then when Norstad left, Jake Smart came in. And then Rosie O'Donnell came in later on. These were the ambassadors without portfolio. Did they ever interfere in your business?

Y: Never. That's a miserable way to organize a kitchen cabinet. On paper, it is lousy. It is against all principles. On the other hand, that one never bothered me or interfered in any place that I could see. So I think he was careful in his choice of people, because Jake would never bother anybody, or, he had Cabell, at one time. Who were the other two.

Q: He had MacRae and Rosie O'Donnell?

Y: Rosie O'Donnell was there, but again, he had people that knew the embarrassing situation, and knew the line of command, and could handle part of them, so they didn't try to wear his stars.

Q: Well, Cabell told me - I talked to him several months ago - and he told me that Arnold told him: I want you guys to be my idea men, I'm too busy to think up new ideas. You just think, but if I ever catch you operating..."

Y: That's right, that's the right way to do it. And I never found myself, that it was other than that. They were talking, they would come down and chat, for ideas and things, but never operating.

Q: They were never to come in there and use their superior position?

Y: Not at all. I think he did a fantastic job, and probably the only way that he could do it, and it ended up ultimately in a pattern that was operational or could be operated. Fortunately when he turned it over, it was some semblance of an organization that an ordinary man could operate.

Q: You said he got mad at you sometimes?

Y: No, no. Not mad. The time that I went in to turn in my suit, I was mad. I was unhappy. But he wasn't mad, you see, I never saw him, I've seen him mad...

Q: Did he have a smile on his face?

Y: Oh yes.

Q: But it didn't mean he was happy?

Y: He had a smile on his face, but he was really giving it to him, too. But he was a man that you could take it from, and I never felt there was anything personal at all, in anything, or anytime he felt that he had to criticize. He was not personal, it was...

Q: It was not vindictive?

Y: Never. He was impossibly demanding. He demanded the impossible, and expected it. But that was the way he operated, and you'd better get it done, that's all. It was damned difficult to explain afterwards, if you hadn't gotten it done. He was a tremendous leader in that respect.

Q: How about Lovett? Did Lovett, did you know of his relationship with Lovett?

Y: No. I never knew other than it was good. I didn't know any politics there at all.

Q: I wonder if Lovett was sort of a balance wheel to keep him from some impulsive actions?

Y: I think that probably, Lovett had to be a buffer between him and the War Dept.

Q: Patterson and Arnold had the wrong chemistry for one another, so I think Lovett was the buffer in the middle of that. You have no personal knowledge of that personal relationship?

Y: No.

Q: You were operating down here at a lower level?

Y: I was down below, separate deal, and I could, I felt at times that when I went to OSD, particularly from Ed Bowles....

Q: You mean down in the Secy of War's office.

Y: Secy of War's office. Ed Bowles would indicate some things that he was pulling some shenanigans with Arnold, and was working with Arnold. Ed Bowles did advise Arnold on communications matters. And there was a hell of a lot of politics in that.

However, I found out, from Bowles, that the, that some of the things that Arnold was doing were not viewed with the greatest

of admiration by the Secy and some of the people on the Secy's staff. On the other hand, I never heard of a rift developing, and I'm sure that the Asst Secy for Air, or whatever he was 'at the time, Lovett, was a buffer and he was a damned good one, because he's that type of person.

Q: Did Arnold repose confidence in Bowles? Did Bowles have Arnold's confidence?

Y: I never felt that he did. However, I don't know. I think from time to time he did, but Bowles was such an operator that I always felt that Arnold saw through some of his shenaigans, although he did do some of the things that Bowles advised him with respect to certain things.

Q: Setting up RAND? Bowles claims credit for RAND.

Y: He does, have you talked to him?

Q: No, I've read in the documents...

Y: Are you going to talk to Bowles.

Q: I hope to.

Mrs. Y: He had quite a collection of papers and letters of Arnold's.

Y: Bowles is a pack rat. And he documents everything he has. Now, he's very proud, from Bowles' point of view, he had tremendous influence on Arnold. But I'll tell you, of all the military men in the service, I'll bet that he respects Arnold above all of them that he knew. And he has a fantastic memory, and he's 80 some years old. You can take a look at the guy and swear that he is 65 or 70, and he's in just that good of shape, and so in his mind, I saw him not over a month ago. He was with Raytheon.

Q: He's still in Massachusetts?

Y: He's still in Massachusetts.

Q: Do you have his address?

Y: Bowles is a good man to get some research material from, because he keeps every paper that he ever had. And he can tell more stories about Arnold. When I first went with Raytheon, I'd go down to his office, and all he wanted to do was reminisce about the war and Arnold. (Off the Record)

Q: What did you say about Krick? This is just a small part of the equation, but it is significant in how Arnold operated.

Y: Question of Krick going to Arnold before I could go to him, and I had felt that that's what might have happened previously to Don. So I went to Krick and I said: "look, we can't carry on this way any longer, and I am going down to Gen Arnold, and I'm going to tell him that I want the authority to order you not to do this, and not to do that, and also to play square. I think you can do the most good," and, I said, "and you better, by God, not get down there before I do, because I am going down as soon as I can get an appointment." And that was the situation.

Q: In the case of Zimmerman, Krick beat him.

Y: I don't think he went down there. I think that he, when he got ready... Zimmerman was his strong supporter all the way through, and this is the thing that hurts, I don't think Krick had any loyalty to anybody. He wasn't that kind of person, no personal loyalties, but No. 1 only. I never saw anyone defend him, defend him against the Navy, defend him against the rest of us in the Air Force. We all knew Irv as a person, very close to

him. I never saw anyone defend him to the extent that Don Zimmerman did. And yet I felt that the reason he got in dutch with Arnold was that Krick just fixed it because he was interfering with what Krick wanted to do, and he told Krick not to do it, and Krick went down. It was while he was working for Don that he started making that first deal with the front office.

Mrs. Y: It was something that had to do with funds that got mixed up in that thing.

Y: I don't know how you can use it.

Q: My interest is really how Arnold operated. In one case, Arnold went in one direction - where you were trying to get Krick back in line - and in the other case, Arnold went for the iconoclast Krick and against the organization.

Y: But, probably, no one went to him and made an issue that this is against the organization. Krick was there all by himself. He could get into Arnold's office any time he wanted to, and so Krick, I'm sure, moved a lot of pegs around. There were many changes that were due to him - but on one was there defending himself or defending the system, as it were...

Q: In a sense, Krick was a chip off the Arnold block, he dealt with people directly, rather than deal with the paperwork...

Y: Right. And see, he wouldn't think of dealing with his boss. Krick said his boss was a jerk, okay, give him a new boss, maybe, I don't say that that's it, but this is the kind of thing that happened. I felt this way, that's why I went to Gen Arnold I had no permission to go to Arnold.

Mrs. Y: Zimmerman went to Arnold, or got to Arnold somehow to get Krick out of this mess, and get him out of the Navy.

Q: That was earlier.

Y: Zimmerman defended Krick all the way through. I think right up until they probably had a little hassle, and then I believe....

Q: Then it was difficult for Zimmerman to cut off Krick's water, because he had been his defender.

Y: Yes.

December 22, 1969

Lt. General Donald N. Yates, USAF (Ret)
5 Chateau Cheverny
2160 Ibis Isle Road
Palm Beach, Florida 33480


Dear General Yates:

I appreciate your reply of December 18th. I know that your association with General Arnold was passing, at best, but I've gotten some good stories from people whose initial reaction was similar to yours.

As you plan to be out of town during the week of January 18th, plus the fact that my schedule for the current trip is rather heavy at this writing, I suggest we defer our get together to a mutually convenient time later on in the year.

I will write again for an interview.

Sincerely,


DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

RAYTHEON COMPANY

LEXINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02173

DONALD N. YATES
GENERAL CONSULTANT

December 18, 1969


Dear Dr. Green:

I have your letter of December 1 inviting me to discuss recollections of General Arnold. Though I am not sure I can contribute anything helpful to the biography you are writing, I could readily make myself available when you are in the Florida area.

Presently I plan to be away from Florida during the week of January 18. Probably a telephone call to my home prior to your trip would help firm up a date and time mutually acceptable. You can reach me at area code (385) 582-7587.

Kindest regards and best wishes for a happy holiday.

Sincerely,



Dr. Murray Green
Office of the Secretary
Research & Analysis Div. - SAFAAR
The Pentagon - 4C881
Washington, D. C. 20330

*Palm
Beach*

December 1, 1969

Lt.Gen. Donald N. Yates, USAF(Ret)
5 Chateau Cheverny
2160 Ibis Isle Road
Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Dear General Yates:

As you may know, John Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest, and I are writing a biography of General Hap Arnold. I'm a professional historian assigned to the Office of the Secretary since the Stuart Symington era back in 1947. In those days I worked for Professor Bart Leach and General Rosie O'Donnell who then headed up Public Information.

During the past three years I have been through the very extensive Air Force collections at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, including the Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, Andrews, Knerr, Twining and other manuscript papers. Within the past four months Loosbrock and I have interviewed Mr. Robert Lovett, Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Kenney, Cabell, Knerr, Norstad, Beebe, Goddard, Street and several others.

I plan to be down in the Southland early in January to complete some pending interviews and would be delighted to stop by for a chat with you about your recollections of General Arnold. We are especially interested in any anecdotes, either amusing or otherwise which may give some insight into his character. As this is to be a "warts and all" biography, we would like to have any impressions you may recall, good or otherwise, non-attributable, if you so desire.

I hope this letter finds you in good health and that you are thoroughly enjoying your well deserved respite from the Washington and other "wars." I also hope that it will be

possible for you to give me an hour or two of time at your convenience if you feel such a session will be useful.

Enclosed is a self-addressed envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DIRECT INFORMATION DIVISION

Flo

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONALD N. YATES, USAF

Part I - Narrative

Donald Norton Yates was born in Bangor, Maine, on November 25, 1909. He graduated from Bangor High School in 1927, and attended the United States Military Academy, graduating in 1931. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Cavalry.

Second Lieutenant Yates' first assignment was that of student officer at the Air Corps Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas. He received his pilot's wings the following year, and now is rated a Command Pilot.

In December 1932, he went to Luke Field, Hawaii, for duty with the 23rd Bomb Squadron. He was transferred from the Cavalry to the Army Air Corps on January 25, 1933.

In November 1935 First Lieutenant Yates was assigned to Brooks Field, Texas, serving in various assignments until June 1938. At that time he became a graduate student at the California Institute of Technology, and a year later received a Master of Science degree in meteorology. He then was assigned to the Third Weather Squadron at Barksdale Field, Louisiana, as weather officer.

Captain Yates became executive officer of the Sixth Air Base Group at Barksdale in March 1941, and served subsequently as group commander and post operations officer. He became Assistant Chief of the Weather Section in the Operations Division of the Office, Chief of Air Corps, in December 1941, and in March of the following year was appointed Deputy Director of Weather at Army Air Force Headquarters.

From May to December 1942 Lieutenant Colonel Yates was in the U. S. S. R. as a member of a military mission, coordinating weather matters. He received the Distinguished Service Medal for his part in this mission and the Air Medal for operations which included a flight from Washington, D. C. to Yakutsk, Siberia, over South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Russia.

In February 1944 Colonel Yates became Director of Weather Service for the U. S. Strategic Air Force in Europe, in addition, serving on General Eisenhower's staff. For his participation in the selection of June 6 as D-Day for the Normandy invasion, he was decorated by three governments. The citation accompanying the U. S. Army Legion of Merit stated that "through Colonel Yates' good judgment, skill and sound leadership, reconciliation of the differences in forecasting methods were effected, resulting in the development of a procedure capable of utilizing the talents and facilities of

both nations and all services in a unified manner. The value of Colonel Yates' advice has since been proven as the day selected for the continental assault was probably the only day during the month of June on which the operation could have been launched." For this he received the Degree of Chevalier in the National Order of the Legion of Honor of France.

Upon his return to the United States in January 1945, Colonel Yates was made Chief of the Weather Division which later was merged with the Weather Wing to form the Air Weather Service, which he commanded at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, until 1950. During this period he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General on February 5, 1947, and transferred to the U. S. Air Force on September 26, 1947. On March 17, 1947, he flew the first scheduled weather reconnaissance mission over the North Pole.

In July 1950, Brigadier General Yates was appointed Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Development at Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, and the following April he became Director of Research and Development with the Headquarters. He was promoted to the rank of Major General on February 2, 1952.

Major General Yates was Commander of the Air Force Missile Test Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida from July 31, 1954 to May 4, 1960. During this tour he was awarded the Navy Legion of Merit on May 22, 1958 by Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, Jr. The citation praised his outstanding services in connection with the Navy Project VANGUARD and the Navy Ballistic Missile Program POLARIS. It stated that "he repeatedly authorized unusual courses of action in order to expedite the projects." In addition, on August 24, 1960, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker presented him with the Army Legion of Merit, which stated "his broad knowledge of the missile and space testing programs of each member Service was instrumental in shaping top level policy and crucial decisions which progressively advanced the successful development of the REDSTONE, JUPITER and PERSHING missiles, the EXPLORER satellites and other space vehicles."

In addition, General Yates has been awarded the Croix de Guerre with Palm "for exceptional war services rendered in the course of operations for the liberation of France", Honorary Officer in the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, a decoration as Grande Oficial de Ordem Militar de Cristo of Portugal.

On May 4, 1960 General Yates was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and appointed Deputy Director of Defense Research & Engineering (Ranges and Space Ground Support), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

General Yates is the son of Archie O. and Gertrude A. Yates of Bangor, Maine. He married the former Gertrude I. Hansen of San Antonio, Texas. They have a daughter, Mrs. Richard P. Floyd, residing in Silver Spring, Maryland and a son, Donald N. Yates, Jr., living in Los Angeles, California.

General Yates is a member and former president of the American Meteorological Society, a member of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, and a Fellow of the American Rocket Society.

Part II - Fact Sheet:

A. Personal Data:

1. Born 25 November 1909, Bangor, Maine; Father - Archie O. Yates; Mother - Gertrude A. Yates.
2. Married 6 February 1932; Wife - Gertrude Hansen Yates; Children - Mrs. Richard P. Floyd and Donald N. Yates, Jr.
3. Home Town Address: 149 Norway Road, Bangor, Maine.

B. Education:

1. Graduate Bangor High School, Bangor, Maine, 1927.
2. Graduate U. S. Military Academy, 1931.
3. Flying School, Kelly Field, 1932.
4. Master of Science Degree in Meteorology; California Institute of Technology, 1939.

C. Service Dates:

1. September 1927 - June 1931 - Cadet, U. S. Military Academy
2. June 1931 - 1932 - Flying School, Kelly Field, Texas.
3. December 1932 - 1935 - Luke Field, Hawaii, 23rd Bomb Squadron
4. November 1935 - June 1938 - Brooks Field, Texas, various assignments
5. 1939 - December 1941 - Weather Officer and other assignments, Barksdale Field, Louisiana
6. December 1941 - March 1942 - Assistant Chief, Weather Section, Operations Division, Office, Chief of Air Corps
7. March 1942 - February 1944 - Deputy Director of Weather, AAF Headquarters
8. February 1944 - January 1945 - Director, Weather Service, U. S. Strategic Air Forces, Europe

9. January 1945 - July 1950 - Chief, Air Weather Service, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
10. July 1950 - April 1951 - Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D. C.
11. April 1951 - July 1954 - Director of Research and Development, Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D. C.
12. July 1954 - May 1960 - Commander, Air Force Missile Test Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida
13. May 1960 - to present - Deputy Director of Defense Research & Engineering (Ranges and Space Ground Support), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

Decorations and Medals:

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL	29 December 1942
AIR MEDAL	18 February 1943
LEGION OF MERIT (ARMY)	28 October 1944
CROIX DE GUERRE WITH PALM	29 January 1945
ARMY COMMENDATION RIBBON	26 December 1945
FRENCH LEGION OF HONOR	27 Junè 1946
ORDER OF BRITISH EMPIRE	27 January 1947
ORDEM MILITAR DE CRISTO (PORTUGAL)	11 August 1955
LEGION OF MERIT (NAVY)	22 May 1958
LEGION OF MERIT (ARMY)	24 August 1960

Promotions:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
Second Lieutenant	11 June 1931	11 June 1931
First Lieutenant	1 August 1935	1 August 1935
Captain	3 October 1940	11 June 1941

<u>Cont'd:</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
	Major	22 July 1941	1 February 1942
	Lieutenant Colonel	23 January 1942	17 December 1942
	Colonel	2 November 1942	15 July 1944
	Brigadier General	5 February 1947	24 November 1952
	Major General	2 February 1952	10 March 1958
	Lieutenant General	4 May 1960	


F. Unusual Experiences:

Had the dubious honor of having become the first member of the CATERPILLAR CLUB while at Primary Flying School, Randolph Field, Texas, just after it opened. This occurred shortly after he soloed - he was slow-rolled out of a PT-3 by his instructor when his safety belt became "unexplainably" unhitched.

January 9, 1961

Yount, Barton K. Mrs. 28 Sep 70

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HIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 1352

MRS. BARTON KYLE YOUNT

My dear Dr. Green: Maggie's
and papers arrived safely. Thank
you. The Lindbergh Journal of
1939 I enjoyed. Too bad he
didn't like our song but it

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HIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 135

is still going strong and means
a lot to thousands who heard it
at their graduation and at
football games.
You'll hear more from
me when I find the books I'm
looking for for 1907.
Sincerely
Mildred Yount

HIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 135

September 18, 1970

Mrs. Barton K. Yount
Distaff House
Oregon Avenue, NW
Washington, DC

Dear Mrs. Yount:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, and Jackie Cochran.

In my research, I came upon your efforts in behalf of the "Wild Blue Yonder" song by Crawford which is now part of the Air Force tradition.

Mrs. Arnold mentioned recently when I saw her out at the Ranch in Sonoma that Hap and Bart were classmates (1907), so the chances are that the Arnolds and Younts saw quite a bit of each other socially. Incidentally, Mrs. Arnold is quite well although she has been limping as a result of a strained ligament suffered in a fall.

She said to be remembered to you, if I see you. To that end, you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and the Arnold family, and I'd like to get the

benefit of some of them at a time convenient for you. Local phone OX5-3862. Perhaps I could drop by Distaff House.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Volume VIII No 5
The Airman - page 19 - May '64
Volume VIII, No 6, page 20 - June 64.
by William A. Kinney - Airman Staff
published by Internal Info. Div
Office of Secretary of the Air Force
Subject ^{for} "Air Force Song".

Ms Barton K. Yount
6200 Oregon NW A24
Washington, D.C.
20015



THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Mrs. Barton K. Yount
6200 Oregon Avenue, N. W., #242, Washington, D. C. 20015

Tuesday, Sept. 22, 1970

My dear Dr. Green:

Thank you for your letter September 18th
^{or evening} regarding the Air Force Song. Anyday, but Wednesday or
Thursday it would be convenient to see you. Army Distaff
Hall is at the corner of Nebraska Avenue and Oregon. ^{N.W.}
Nebraska ends at Rock Creek Park so you turn left at the
stop sign and the entrance is about 100 yards from the
corner.

Perhaps you would like to read what Mr. Kinney
wrote in "The Airman" in 1964. ^{before I see you.} I enclose a slip of
paper with the volume number and page. This about A.F. Song.

^{and} There is lots in my mind about General and Mrs
Arnold. ~~but~~ I'll help as much as I can. In the enclosed
pamphlet about my husband - General Ralph Cousins (deceased) I
wrote B.K.Y.'s obituary for the Assembly. He spouted General
Arnold. They were real "buddies" always kidding each other
I'll look through my scrap books before you come.

My husband did not have the photogenic smile that "Nap"
had but he had a twinkle in the eye that always had a retort
for Nap. The Arnold's were wonderful friends and I'm sorry
I haven't more accurate records as to dates.

We trusted each other. I'm up early and any
time convenient to you I will be available.

Sincerely
Tel. 244-7098. Mildred Yount

September 18, 1970

Mrs. Barton K. Yount
Distaff House
Oregon Avenue, NW
Washington, DC

0930
Monday 28th

Dear Mrs. Yount:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, and Jackie Cochran.

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DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Interview Mrs Barton K. Yount, Distaff House, Washington, D.C. 28 Sep 1970

Q: We are talking about the garden that Mrs Arnold built for John Linton?

Y: Yes, it was very attractive and then we occupied those quarters after, and I used to send her pictures of it. They were very thoughtful people, and Hap was such fun. He was just always with a chuckle. He and my husband, they used to kid each other unmercifully, but they always seemed to get over it and have a good comeback.

Q: They got along well?

Y: Oh very well, I don't believe I ever heard of a misunderstanding, even Hap, you know was very quick tempered. He was inclined to sort of go overboard and Barton was like a little pencilmaker.

Q: So this must have been around 1939?

Y: I can probably find it in my books.

Q: I have a record of it.

Y: One thing I don't even try to remember is dates, because they are so awfully unimportant.

Q: Yes, they sort of all telescope. But you say they were trying to get spare parts in new airplanes.

Y: They couldn't even get the Army to give them enough money to buy spare parts for the airplanes they had.

Q: Well, Malin Craig was the Chief of Staff at this time. I mean he was just about leaving, and Marshall was coming in. Do you remember that?

Y: Might be. But that was very important and after that they...

Q: In '39 we began to build for the French.

Y: And the British.

Q: Helped the Germans against the Russians, a little bit.

Y: At that time they weren't. I know my husband received a decoration from them for all the help he gave in getting them planes. But if we hadn't started building for the French, you know, airplanes, it would have been just too bad for us, when we really did go to war.

Q: Right. You were talking about your recollections of Arnold. Do you remember

him back in the old days, back in Rockwell Field? Did Arnold and Yount serve together there, briefly?

Y: General Arnold was in charge and my husband was taking flying training, and I know they attended the first luncheon given for guests who arrived by air. I have that someplace upstairs. Hap was flying a La Peré, and I came on the field, just as I saw this, he was going whup, whup, whup.

Q: Bounced?

Y: And I know my husband was in the back seat and the airplane wasn't very much protection. But they picked themselves up and came out of it all right.

Q: Do you remember anything special about the Arnolds, or General Arnold at that time, anything special about them? Any incidents, any amusing stories?

Y: I know just what you are looking for, and I can only say that we used to have several parties, once in a while. I was just on the verge of having a son born. So I wasn't socially inclined, but I know Hap and Barton always had a good time together.

Q: Didn't Arnold have ulcers at this time?

Y: He may have, I don't know.

Q: He was confined, he was in Letterman Hospital for a while.

Y: That happened after we left, maybe that was when my husband took over, I don't know. I haven't a record of it. In this booklet of mine you see...

Q: Lindbergh tried hard, you say?

Y: Lindbergh tried hard to interest the American Embassy in the fact that an airplane might cross the Atlantic. He had very rough going until he met Ambassador Myron Herrick, and then Mr Herrick was very much interested. He said, of course, I'll go out and meet him. So then Barton went to the French Guard, and he told them it might happen - somebody might cross the Atlantic, the French had just lost Nungesser. That was quite a storm, I thought my husband was going to get killed that night down at the UP building.

Q: That's Nungesser?

Y: You see, the French thought we hadn't given them proper weather reports, and that was the reason they went down. But they have never been found. I even wrote to the French Embassy not too long ago, trying to find out if anything had

been found. I read something in the french paper.

Q: Let me ask you when Gen Yount came into Washington, he had his first star...

Y: Cut in Honolulu.

Q: Right, and this was the 18th Wing, right?

Y: I think so, yes.

Q: And then he came into Washington. Arnold brought him back?

Y: No, he went first to Randolph Air Base. He was there for 6 months and we had just gotten our furniture, and had just gotten it unpacked. It was slow getting there. Hap came in for dinner. And everything was lovely, nice talk, and how did we like Hawaii and was it nice. Then Hap turned to me and said: "How would you like to go to Washington, Mildred?" I said: "Are these orders for my husband?" And he said: "Yes, and for you, too." And so, we pulled up stakes, and I had just unpacked 20 bookboxes. We left the next week. Then, as I remember it, Barton was there while they were planning the Training Command. At that time, they only had 9 fields, wasn't it?

Q: It was a very small establishment. General Yount had to build up the whole training establishment from scratch. Did McNaughton work under him?

Y: Yes.

Q: I saw him in California recently.

Y: Did he say so?

Q: Yes, he did. This was trying to get the civilian schools going, you know, Claude Ryan and C.C. Moseley...

Y: There were 9 of them.

Q: And that was quite a job?

Y: It was terrific. Have you read Airpower, Harold Hinton? *[Note: Air Victory]*

Q: Yes. I helped write it. (Reference to Lindbergh)

Y: My husband was stationed at Bolling Field, and you can't blame him for his attitude towards life with everything that happened to them. But we were walking back to the plane and when they had babies on the field. My husband always sent for me, to come down to Hqs and meet them. Barton said to Col Lindbergh. "Why, I

have a flight jacket that belongs to you." Lindbergh looked at him, and sort of said: "Well I doubt if it's mine." And it was his. He said that was the first time he ever got anything back whole, without something cut away from it. But she (Annie Lindbergh) was just a darling. I like him. I saw quite a lot of him when he first arrived in Paris. We fed him and we took him to all these meetings because my husband was the Air Attache.

Q: Well, Lindbergh was the darling of the world. This was a great feat.

Y: Yes, and it's such a shame the way they treated him. I don't blame him for changing to an isolationist. I'm just sorry.

Q: Did your husband have any recollections of Arnold at West Point?

Y: They used to call him "Pewt" at West Point. If they did, they were always referring to him in a sort of Cadet language that I didn't understand.

Q: Arnold was a member of the "Black Hand"; this was a little secret society.

Y: That's what somebody told me.

Q: Was Barton Yeant a member of the "Black Hand", too?

Y: No, he was hooked. He had a very good tenor voice - this is my husband.

They had a quartet, and the quartet sang in church every Sunday, so they were pretty well disciplined all through the year.

Q: Ye was one of the good boys.

Y: I think it wasn't because he wanted...

Q: He didn't plan it that way, he just had a good voice, and had to be in church.

Y: I know that they used to laugh about it with Colonel Wyman. You know, those Cadets pants, they are awfully stiff. When they had been sitting up there in the choir for a long time, they discovered that they were all creased up by the time they got up, so they used to take their pants off.

Q: Up in the choir loft?

Y: Where they couldn't be seen.

Q: This is out of the '13 Year-Book of the Military Academy published in 1920.

There is an excerpt from a letter from Hap Arnold who was then stationed in "Hqs Western Dept" in San Francisco. The letter is dated April 1, 1920. He sent a check for the 1917 assessment and said: " In spite of the fact that it is made out on April 1st, it is good."

Q: Here's an item from the Ft Worth Star Telegram. This is in January 1944.

General Arnold visited the AAF training command down in Texas. There is a very good picture of him conferring with General Yount, who was head of the Training Command. They were classmates and kidded each other about old times at West Point. One article quoted Gen Arnold as saying that: "I want to get this war over with, get those boys back home, and then I'm going fishing." Arnold really believed this, because he was then purchasing a ranch out in California. He couldn't wait to finish his military duties so he could become "Farmer Arnold."

Q: You mention that Gen Arnold had this smile, and maybe this is the reason they called him "Hap"?

Y: Uh, it is, Happy.

Q: A couple of people have told me that the fact that he was smiling didn't mean that he was happy at this particular junction. This could be the prelude to an explosion?

Y: I'll tell you, I think his smile was, well, anytime it wasn't a firm mouth, it would be a smile. But he had a wonderful personality.

Q: Did he sort of command a room when he walked into it? Were all eyes on him?

Y: Well, when he visited the Training Command, I saw so much more of him than I ever did of Beadle, because Bee was always a "home-fire" person. But he was with Barton, and of course, I think he was very impressed with what the Training Command was doing.

Q: Mrs Arnold was an organizer, and you mention here, or it is mentioned here in the Protocol, which is put out by Bolling Field. This is a publication for the AF Association, no, "AF Wives Club". This is the Sept issue 1970. This is Mrs Spaatz saying that they lived at Gen Arnold's quarters at Ft Myer, loved the house and the glorious view of the city. Mrs Spaatz said that she continued Mrs Arnold's work at the National Association of AF Wives, and they raised money for AF charities.

Q: You mention that Mrs Arnold is a great organizer. Did she ask everybody to lend support?

Y: Yes, all the people in charge of the Red Cross, various fields, to submit a monthly report of the number of hours spent by the local wives clubs. We also organized, under her direction, visiting groups that would meet the new officers and

wives as they came in. We had what we called a friendship basket. In it was all the necessities for a few night's stay in a vacant house. It was a very fine piece of work she did.

Q: She was very thoughtful?

W: And also, the only thing that we found a little difficult was coordinating the Red Cross report of 400 plus fields, which was done at the Ft Worth headquarters by two WACs and myself.

Q: Well, Mrs Arnold worked very hard organizing this?

Y: She was an organizer.

Q: Trying to pull all these reports together must have been a job of some substance?

Y: I couldn't have done it without the WACs. Col Maury Smith, he was very useful. He showed me how to organize this. I'm not a business woman; I'm a musician.

Q: Let me ask you about the AF song. Who made the decision that we need an AF song? Did Arnold make that decision? How did it come about?

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Interview Mrs Barton K. Yount, Distaff House, Washington, D.C. 28 Sep 1970

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Q: Yes, I helped write it. (Reference to Lindbergh)

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Q: Here's an item from the Pt Worth Star Telegram. This is in January 1944.

General Arnold visited the AF training command down in Texas. There is a very good picture of him conferring with General Yount, who was head of the Training Command. They were classmates and kidded each other about old times at West Point. One article quoted Gen Arnold as saying that: "I want to get this war over with, get those boys back home, and then I'm going fishing." Arnold really believed this, because he was then purchasing a ranch out in California. He couldn't wait to finish his military duties so he could become "Farmer Arnold."

Q: You mention that Gen Arnold had this smile, and maybe this is the reason they called him "Hap"?

Y: Uh, it is, Happy.

Q: A couple of people have told me that the fact that he was smiling didn't mean that he was happy at this particular junction. This could be the prelude to an explosion?

Y: I'll tell you, I think his smile was, well, anytime it wasn't a firm mouth, it would be a smile. But he had a wonderful personality.

Q: Did he sort of command a room when he walked into it? Were all eyes on him?

Y: Well, when he visited the Training Command, I saw so much more of him than I ever did of Beadle, because Bee was always a "home-fire" person. But he was with Barton, and of course, I think was very impressed with what the Training Command was doing.

Q: Mrs Arnold was an organizer, and you mention here, or it is mentioned here in the Protocol, which is put out by Bolling Field. This is a publication for the AF Association, no, "AF Wives Club". This is the Sept issue 1970. This is Mrs Spaatz saying that they lived at Gen Arnold's quarters at Ft Myer, loved the house and the glorious view of the city. Mrs Spaatz said that she continued Mrs Arnold's work at the National Association of AF Wives, and they raised money for AF charities.

Q: You mention that Mrs Arnold is a great organizer. Did she ask everybody to lend support?

Y: Yes, all the people in charge of the Red Cross, various fields, to submit a monthly report of the number of hours spent by the local wives clubs. We also organized, under her direction, visiting groups that would meet the new officers and

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lives as they came in. We had what we called a friendship basket. In it was all the necessities for a few night's stay in a vacant house. It was a very fine piece of work she did.

Q: She was very thoughtful?

W: And also, the only thing that we found a little difficult was coordinating the Red Cross report of 400 plus fields, which was done at the Ft Worth headquarters by two WAGs and myself.

Q: Well, Mrs Arnold worked very hard organizing this?

Y: She was an organizer.

Q: Trying to pull all these reports together must have been a job of some substance?

Y: I couldn't have done it without the WAGs. Col Maury Smith, he was very useful. He showed me how to organize this. I'm not a business woman; I'm a musician.

Q: Let me ask you about the AF song. Who made the decision that we need an AF song? Did Arnold make that decision? How did it come about?

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There is an excerpt from a letter from Hap Arnold who was then stationed in "Hqs Western Dept" in San Francisco. The letter is dated April 1, 1920. He sent a check for the 1917 assessment and said: " In spite of the fact that it is made out on April 1st, it is good."

Q: Here's an item from the Ft Worth Star Telegram. This is in January 1944.

General Arnold visited the AAF training command down in Texas. There is a very good picture of him conferring with General Yount, who was head of the Training Command. They were classmates and kidded each other about old times at West Point. One article quoted Gen Arnold as saying that: "I want to get this war over with, get those boys back home, and then I'm going fishing." Arnold really believed this, because he was then purchasing a ranch out in California. He couldn't wait to finish his military duties so he could become "Farmer Arnold."

Q: You mention that Gen Arnold had this smile, and maybe this is the reason they called him "Hap"?

Y: Uh, it is, Happy.

Q: A couple of people have told me that the fact that he was smiling didn't mean that he was happy at this particular junction. This could be the prelude to an explosion?

Y: I'll tell you, I think his smile was, well, anytime it wasn't a firm mouth, it would be a smile. But he had a wonderful personality.

Q: Did he sort of command a room when he walked into it? Were all eyes on him?

Y: Well, when he visited the Training Command, I saw so much more of him than I ever did of Beadle, because Bee was always a "home-fire" person. But he was with Barton, and of course, I think was very impressed with what the Training Command was doing.

Q: Mrs Arnold was an organizer, and you mention here, or it is mentioned here in the Protocol, which is put out by Rolling Field. This is a publication for the AF Association, no, "AF Wives Club". This is the Sept issue 1970. This is Mrs Spaatz saying that they lived at Gen Arnold's quarters at Ft Myer, loved the house and the glorious view of the city. Mrs Spaatz said that she continued Mrs Arnold's work at the National Association of AF Wives, and they raised money for AF charities.

Q: You mention that Mrs Arnold is a great organizer. Did she ask everybody to lend support?

Y: Yes, all the people in charge of the Red Cross, various fields, to submit a monthly report of the number of hours spent by the local wives clubs. We also organized, under her direction, visiting groups that would meet the new officers and

wives as they came in. We had what we called a friendship basket. In it was all the necessities for a few night's stay in a vacant house. It was a very fine piece of work she did.

Q: She was very thoughtful?

W: And also, the only thing that we found a little difficult was coordinating the Red Cross report of 400 plus fields, which was done at the Ft Worth headquarters by two WACs and myself.

Q: Well, Mrs Arnold worked very hard organizing this?

Y: She was an organizer.

Q: Trying to pull all these reports together must have been a job of some substance?

Y: I couldn't have done it without the WACs. Col Maury Smith, he was very useful. He showed me how to organize this. I'm not a business woman; I'm a musician.

Q: Let me ask you about the AF song. Who made the decision that we need an AF song? Did Arnold make that decision? How did it come about?

Y: The AF song was a result of many years' efforts. Way back in 1918, I was trying to find an AF song. At that time, we would take some tune and write words for it, and then I began to realize that no popular service song had ever existed without background. So we sort of stopped our little local competition and Mrs Lindsay MacDill, her husband was killed later outside of Bolling Field, was a very fine pianist and she was made chairman of the committee. As you know, Col MacDill died, and my husband, meanwhile, had moved to Washington. So Gen Arnold asked me to head that committee, and then I found that they had a backlog of some 350 manuscripts, or maybe less, I don't know. We finally ended up with 700, and I had an everchanging committee of 10. I realized I couldn't do it alone. So we parceled out these songs, and then met once every two weeks and played them and heard them. At the end of about a year, we had gone through 700, I was about to climb the walls. We had found one beautiful prayer, one Meredith Willson march. It was good but kind of indifferent. So then I wrote to the Society of Authors and Composers and asked them to please get busy and see what they could do.

Q: ASCAP?

Y: Yes, ASCAP, and see what they could do to further some of these very fine

musicians. They of course, said "No". They wouldn't enter a competition. If they composed a song, it would be their song and it would be acknowledged. Well, I didn't feel that that would represent the AF. So this everchanging committee of mine went through these songs, and as I told you, we had three possibly good ones, and then I decided to close it, and not award it to anybody, and then reopen it again. Then, I'm afraid I'm going to have to refer to this...75% of Arnold's ideas were phenomenal and the other 25% were...that's a pretty good percentage.

Q: Arnold was a very impetuous man, was he not? Did he shoot from the hip sometimes?

Y: That I couldn't tell you because Barton always had to laugh him out of it. He never got mad at Barton, never that I know of.

Q: Did Barton serve as a balance wheel to keep Arnold on course? Did Arnold ever go off on a tangent impulsively? Then Gen Yount sort of coax him back?

Y: I couldn't quote what happened or when it happened, but I have a feeling that they were quite a difference in character. I'm a great admirer of Arnold's. I think he had many wonderful ideas.

Q: He was full of ideas. He was always full of sparks?

Y: He was alittle like Billy Mitchell.

Q: Do you have any recollections of the Billy Mitchell era? You were in France?

Y: No, but my husband did. Who was in command at that time, at the trial?

Q: Well, Douglas MacArthur was on the board, I can't recall.

Y: Who was the AF man?

Q: On the board? I don't know if there were any.

Y: No, I don't mean on the board, I mean in the office.

Q: Mason Patrick.

Y: Oh, well Barton was there, too. He was the one who first encouraged Capt Smith to go throw tomatoes on ships when they couldn't make Mason Patrick allow them to practice bombing. So Capt Smith got tomatoes. And you know they did. I've got pictures of the Ostfriesland.

Q: I saw them, remember George Goddard, he took those pictures. So I have those

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pictures.

Y: He was a phenomenal person. Gifted. Oh, we've had so many.

Q: General Yount shared something with Arnold. Neither of them ever saw combat service. Did General Yount try to be released from his job to get a combat command?

Y: Many times, in fact, he told me once, very seriously. He said, "Mildred, I'm going to go AWOL and go to Canada." You see, the first World War, he was training at Austin, Texas and he had one of five training schools, ground schools at Univ of Texas. The second war came along and he said: "Here it comes." and I said: "I'm too old." It will go to people like Toocy and Bob Candel." A great power of strength, I'm sure, to Toocy, and what was the other man's name?

Q: Did General Yount importune Gen Arnold for a combat command?

Y: I think he tried 3 or 4 times to get away, and go overseas. Yes, I know that.

Q: And Arnold told him, we need you here?

Y: He said: "You've just got to stay here and organize this Training Command, because he knew his experience in the first world war that he had done very well. They kept that school open all the holidays, made all the other commanders come in and look at it because it was going so well.

Q: Did General Yount accept this gracefully?

Y: What could he do? One or twice he said to me, "I guess it's just fate. I'm a little bit too old, and that's it."

Q: There are others who pressured Arnold, and they were luckier than General Yount.

Y: Hap had great confidence in Barton and felt that he was stable and could do the job. It's pretty hard to replace a man that you have great confidence in.

Q: Were they close at West Point?

Y: They must have been, because they had all sorts of - I remember they were always laughing about certain things that they had done, Hap would kid Barton about being a goody-goody, singing in the choir.

Q: Eleanor Pool came up to West Point a couple of times. But she tells me that at that time she was not seriously interested in Hap Arnold. He must have been interested in her, though, because when he was sent to the Philippines for his first

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tour he arranged to come back the eastern route via the Suez Canal. His ship stopped off in Genoa and he courted her in Switzerland in 1909, when she was visiting with her family in Switzerland.

Y: She was going to school in Germany, wasn't she?

Q: Yes, but that summer they were in Switzerland, in Gersau, Switzerland. He courted her there. She has a diary of that period.

Y: How nice.

Q: When did you and General Yount marry?

Y: We were married about a year after the Arnolds.


Q: Oh, 1914?

Y: Yes. I looked it up the other day or I wouldn't have known it.

Q: Did you know him when he was at West Point?

Y: No, I never knew my husband when he was at West Point.

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